ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The workshop was funded by the Research Center for the Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons, Nagasaki University (RECNA); the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation; the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN); the Open Society Foundation;
and Nautilus Institute.
This report was prepared by Doug Randall, Chuck Kapelke, and other staff of Nautilus
Institute, RECNA, and APLN. It is published simultaneously by RECNA, APLN, andNautilus Institute. This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons
License, the terms of which are found here. The authors may be contacted via email at:nautilus@nautilus.org
Copyediting by Maureen Jerrett, with input from workshop participants.
Banner image: Sophia Mauro for Nautilus Institute. This graphic shows the pandemic
distribution from the COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science andEngineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) as of September 25, 2020; andthe two-directional nuclear threat relationships between nuclear-armed states in the formof missile trajectories with re-entry vehicle at the apogees.
Citation:
RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia Pacific Leadership Network, Nautilus Institute,"PANDEMIC FUTURES and NUCLEAR WEAPON RISKS," December 2020, at:
RECNA: https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/75th_scenario_project-e
APLN: http://www.apln.network/project/project_view/PandemicNuclear_Nexus_Scenarios_Project
Nautilus Institute: https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/pandemicfutures-and-nuclear-weapon-risks/

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inefficacy of nation-states and international
institutions in managing global risks and introduced new dynamics—including economic
recession, border closures, vaccine competition, and shifts in military behavior—that
could heighten the risk of nuclear disaster in the years to come. The threat of nuclear
war is particularly urgent in the Northeast Asia region, the locus of multiple simmeringconflicts. Leaders today must take urgent action to mitigate the rising threat of nuclear
war in the era of pandemics reflecting the voice of Nagasaki, “Let Nagasaki be the Last!”
Specific recommendations include the following:
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

Slowing and reversing nuclear force developments and operations in the
Northeast Asia region, including through nuclear-weapon-free zones andnonproliferation treaties
Developing a secure, reliable nuclear hotline network for communicating in a
nuclear crisis
Launching public health security initiatives in the Northeast Asia region to
respond to pandemics
Engaging younger generations in the nuclear disarmament movement andmobilizing a broader base of potential stakeholders in nuclear issues
Enlarging existing city networks such as Mayors for Peace and establishing newcity/regional cooperation networks to play a more direct role in reducing nuclear
risk and pushing for nuclear disarmament
Solving the DPRK puzzle and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula
Increasing monitoring and controls for the storage and transportation of nuclear
materials
Reforming existing global institutions and establishing new programs andinitiatives to improve collaboration among nation-states
Taking advantage of the proliferation of apps and sensors for “on-the-ground”
information in a nuclear crisis, while ensuring that authorities do not abuse theseapps for social and political control
Developing new platforms for sharing emergency response information and ways
to ensure the integrity of this information

These recommendations were developed through the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary
Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project, an international initiative aimed at
exploring how the far-reaching effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (and future
pandemics) could alter the landscape for nuclear risk and disarmament. This event
aimed to identify opportunities for governments, civil society, and market actors to2

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia, with special
attention to new strategies emerging from this unprecedented time in history.
Convened as a series of online workshops in October-November 2020, the project
brought together nearly 50 participants from diverse backgrounds, ages, andnationalities.1 The Project was co-sponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network
for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and the Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainability, in cooperation with the Nagasaki University Planetary
Health Project and the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA).
The goals of the workshop were to (1) develop an analytical understanding of theinterrelated nature of the co-occurring existential threats of nuclear weapons and global
pandemics; (2) explore potential levers and pathways to influence the future undervarious conditions; and (3) identify concrete strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear war
and resume nuclear disarmament by state and non-state actors, particularly in the
Northeast Asia region.
The workshops were structured through a process of scenario planning, a widely usedmethodology for imagining future conditions that are highly uncertain and generating
robust strategies for shaping the future. Participants developed four plausible futures forthe year 2030 that aim to help explore the focal question:
What are the opportunities driven by global pandemics for Northeast Asian
governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear
disarmament?
The scenarios were developed
based on the intersection of two
critical uncertainties: (1) Will the
locus of influence and power innuclear disarmament reside withnation-states, or will it shift toward
non-state actors, such as local
governments and civil society
organizations? And (2) will the
relationships and mutual actions
among actors be characterized byfragmentation and isolation or
1

The opening session, featuring Nagasaki Mayor Tomihisa Taue, former Australian Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans, and four expert presentations, was livestreamed and may be viewed here:
https://youtu.be/qFrnkgrex0Q?t=1353

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

collaboration and cooperation? The scenario narratives are described in the Scenarios
section, beginning on page 14. In summary, the following four scenarios were developed:● Middle Powers Rising: National governments are the primary locus of influence,and the approach to global risks is collaborative. The pandemic brings about a
new recognition of the critical role of global, multilateral collaboration for dealing
with existential risks like pandemics and climate change. “Middle power”
countries fill the leadership void left by traditional superpowers.
● Local Powers Step Up: The locus of power and influence shifts toward nonnation-state actors, and the approach to challenges is collaborative. The scenario
envisions a new role for local governments and civil society to lead a bottom-up
effort to address increasingly dire existential challenges that national
governments prove incapable of tackling by themselves.
● Island Mentality: In this scenario, national governments are the primary driversof influence, but the approach to global risks like pandemics and nuclear
deterrence is fragmented. Resurgent nationalism around the world has led toheightened tension and a sense of instability and fear of war.
● Fragile Optimism: The role of nation-states has diminished and non-state
actors—including cities and civil society organizations—have stepped up to fill
the gap. But there is a lack of coordination among these groups, and they often
find themselves working at cross-purposes.
Through exploring these scenarios, participants identified steps that could be taken
today to help advance the challenge of nuclear disarmament in a world re-shaped bypandemics, as detailed in the Recommendations on page 29. The next step in thisproject will be to develop more concrete recommendations for policymakers, who must
now adopt and implement practical measures to manage existential risks posed by thenexus of pandemics with nuclear weapons.

4Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. 1
Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 2
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 6
The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats ...................................................................... 7
Developing Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios............................................................ 10
Shaping the Focal Question ......................................................................................... 10
Identifying Critical Uncertainties ................................................................................... 11
The Scenarios Matrix .................................................................................................... 13
Shaping the Scenario Narratives ..................................................................................... 14
Middle Powers Rising ................................................................................................... 15
Local Powers Step Up .................................................................................................. 19
Island Mentality ............................................................................................................. 22
Fragile Optimism ........................................................................................................... 26
Recommendations............................................................................................................ 29
Constituent Engagement .............................................................................................. 29
Geo-Strategic Actions ................................................................................................... 30
Technological Solutions ................................................................................................ 31
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 33
Appendix 1: Papers .......................................................................................................... 34
Appendix 2: Critical Uncertainties .................................................................................... 36
Social............................................................................................................................. 36
Technological ................................................................................................................ 37
Economic ...................................................................................................................... 38
Environmental ............................................................................................................... 38
Political .......................................................................................................................... 39
Military ........................................................................................................................... 40
Epidemiological ............................................................................................................. 42
Appendix 3: Roster of Participants................................................................................... 435

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

INTRODUCTION
The year 2020 marks a symbolic milestone for nuclear disarmament, as it is both the75th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 50th
anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). But the distressing reality is that the risk of a nuclear war—intentionalor accidental—is greater than any time since the end of World War II. As of January
2020, the “doomsday clock” published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists shows only“100 seconds to midnight,” indicating we are the closest we have been to nuclear
apocalypse since the clock was introduced in 1947.2
Over the past year, coronavirus (COVID-19) has transformed the world. It is estimatedto have already killed more than 1.5 million people as of the start of December 20203
and has led to global economic shutdowns and societal shifts on an unprecedented
scale. The pandemic has slowed efforts to support nuclear disarmament: the 10th NPT
Review Conference, scheduled to take place in 2020, was postponed to the middle of2021. How the COVID pandemic will affect the international order remains unclear:
could it usher in a new era of international cooperation as nations join together in acoordinated fight against the disease? Or will economic recession, border closures, andbeggar-thy-neighbor “vaccine competition” exacerbate global conflict and antagonism?
Given these uncertainties, it is critically important to analyze the relationship between
the post-pandemic international order and nuclear weapon risks.
The pandemic has also brought to light another key uncertainty: the changing role oflocal and state governments and civil society in the pandemic era. These institutions
could play a role in reducing nuclear risks. Will civic diplomacy increase or decrease inrelative power compared to interstate and corporate diplomacy, and will it prove
sufficient to curb tendencies on the part of nuclear weapons states to use or threaten touse nuclear weapons during the pandemic? Asked broadly, how might the COVID-19
pandemic (and future pandemics) create new opportunities or challenges forgovernments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear
disarmament? And how might those challenges and opportunities emerge in Northeast
Asia, a region that has in recent years seen increased potential for conflict aroundissues such as the status of Hong Kong and Taiwan, territorial rights in the South andEast China Seas, and the nuclear weapons program in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)?
These questions were at the heart of the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear
Nexus Scenarios Project, an international collaboration aimed at exploring how the far2 https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/
3 Data from the Johns Hopkins University & Medicine Coronavirus Research Center,

https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html, accessed December 3, 2020.
6

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

reaching effects of pandemics could alter the landscape for nuclear risk anddisarmament. The project was co-sponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia Pacific Leadership Network
for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Nautilus Institute, in
cooperation with Nagasaki University Planetary Health and the Panel on Peace andSecurity of Northeast Asia (PSNA).
Convened over the course of two weekends in October-November 2020, a series of four
three-hour workshops brought together roughly 40 participants from around the world.
Through the Zoom video conference platform, attendees were able to join from acrosstime zones, including from Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Mongolia,
Philippines, Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and the United States. The workshops
took place under the “Chatham House Rule,” and so ideas and insights are presented inthis report without attribution.4
The workshops were centered on scenario planning, a non-predictive means of
examining a variety of possible futures to identify critical uncertainties and strategic
opportunities. As described in this report, the workshops led to the development of four
distinct scenarios for the year 2030. These narratives are intended to highlight key
questions about dynamics that could shape the “pandemic-nuclear nexus” over the nextten years.
The goals of the Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project are to:● Develop an analytical understanding of the interrelated nature of the co-occurring
existential threats of nuclear weapons and global pandemics● Explore potential levers and pathways to influence the future under various
conditions● Identify concrete strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resume nuclear
disarmament to be considered by state and non-state actors, particularly in the
Northeast Asia region

THE CHALLENGE: MULTIPLE EXISTENTIAL THREATS
The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past
pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience,and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted
during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting
from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era,
pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by
globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs

4 See https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chatham-house-rule7

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likelythat deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.
The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted ata juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climatechange and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is
how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks
associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear
weapons in war.5
Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities,
but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not theentire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more
frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecologicalchange, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched toa breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience tothe point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.
In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of
weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions—most importantly, nuclear
weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis andvulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may
destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventionaland nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological
technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.
The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes
that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD—just as theworld wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs
and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, inpart based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped bypandemics, nuclear weapons—as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear
alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended
deterrence, organizational practices, and the existential risks posed by retaining thesecapabilities —are all up for redefinition.

5 The COVID-19 pandemic has erupted with such ferocity and speed that there is little public analyses of

the geopolitical implications, but this will change soon. Here is one such early effort. T. Wright, “Stretching
the International Order to Its Breaking Point, The greatest error that geopolitical analysts can make may
be believing that the crisis will be over in three to four months,” The Atlantic, April 4, 2020, at:https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/pandemic-lasts-18-months-will-change-geopoliticsgood/609445/?utm_source=nextdraft&utm_medium=email
8Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating thesupreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders,creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as
errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations
gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVIDinfected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently—or at all—due to leadershipconfusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover forpolitical or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly
disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At thesame time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation andsanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of thedisease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear
armed state or its allies.
In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states toreduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may
cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in acooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication,
engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For
example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by
working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people orby joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.
To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of somenuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate
to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets
blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities.
Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear
weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all
6 Geographers refer to how the pandemic has led to the “re-spatialization” of human affairs in all sectors and at every level,from the individual to nation-states. Some suggest that rather than merely increasing the velocity of existing change andbringing underlying conflicts to the surface, the pandemic heralds an epochal, global, and systemic transformation that willlead to a new distribution of power capacities in geo-political, geo-economic, and geo-ecological dimensions. This shift, they
aver, is on a scale with the change wrought by the rise of European imperialism and the displacement of disconnectedsocieties all over the world by colonialism, and the global bifurcation of the entire world into two competing blocs by theUnited States and the former Soviet Union after World War II. Such changes include spatial distancing at every unit level ofhuman societies; border controls, mobility controls within and across borders, contracting supply chains and areconfiguration of production and consumption location, changes in architectural and settlement density and design toreduce infection risk, slowing and reversal of human settlement intrusion into zoonotic-reservoir habitats, shifts in theforecast distribution of climatic effects over coming decades due to changes in greenhouse gas emissions and carbon
uptake in sinks such as forests, etc. We sense this change and see indicators of this change, but we do not yet comprehend
its scale and magnitude, let alone its emergent properties as a new global system that redefines the local.

9Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of
nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely—or even impossible—to achieve thekind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective
vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international
relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons,
further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading
effects on the risk of nuclear war.

DEVELOPING PANDEMIC-NUCLEAR NEXUS SCENARIOSHow might the COVID-19 pandemic (and future pandemics) create new opportunities orchallenges for governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk andresume nuclear disarmament? And how might those challenges and opportunities
emerge in Northeast Asia, in particular?
In the face of so much uncertainty, a powerful way to obtain navigational guidance andto develop robust strategies is to conduct scenario-based dialogues. Scenarios may beunderpinned by analysis, but they rest primarily on eliciting diverse insights through a
dialogic process (typically a workshop) that explores the multiple, powerful drivers ofcomplex problems and possible strategies to resolve such problems. Rather than
predict any specific future, the goal of developing scenarios is to prepare individuals andorganizations for radically divergent, possible futures.
A scenario is a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments
in which today’s decisions might play out. In practice, scenarios resemble a set ofstories built around carefully constructed plots. These stories can express multiple
perspectives on complex events and give multiple meaning to these events.
The development of such scenarios was the primary goal of the Nagasaki 75th
Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios workshop. Through this project, we
wanted to develop an analytic understanding of the interrelated nature of nuclear
weapons and global pandemics. We wanted to explore the potential levers andpathways to influence the future. And we wanted to find concrete strategies to reduce
the risk of nuclear war and resume disarmament, particularly novel approaches that
could engage both state and non-state actors.

Shaping the Focal Question
At the outset of the Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project, the organizers frameda focal question that would guide the development of the scenarios:
What are the opportunities driven by global pandemics for Northeast Asian
governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume
nuclear disarmament?
10Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

This focal question has twin normative values in it: (a) how to reduce the risk of nuclear
war arising from the pandemic and (b) how to resume nuclear disarmament underpandemic conditions. Measures to realize (a) might be in opposition to measures torealize (b). They might be independent, or they might be complementary. Discovering
opportunities where the measures are synergistic has the highest value; avoiding
contradictory measures might be critically important. But forced to choose, we likely
must go first and foremost with measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war, as
disarmament becomes moot and improbable if nuclear war occurs.
As in any scenarios event, we sought to identify robust strategies that could work acrossthe divergent, uncertainty-based scenarios and move each story line toward a higher
probability of realizing these two strategic goals. We were particularly interested inprompting discussion on the role of cities as potential new players with regard to nuclear
war risk reduction. The challenges of “global nuclear governance” and nuclear
disarmament have traditionally been dominated by great powers (that is, nation-states).
But given their evident and emerging leading role as “first responders” to the existential
threats of the coronavirus pandemic and climate change effects, we wanted to see how
cities’ capacity and experience may be useful in relation to nuclear risk anddisarmament.
The focal question also centers on Northeast Asia, a region that was the site of the firstuse of nuclear weapons (in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and that today has thousands ofcities, as well as potential for conflict on multiple fronts, including between China andTaiwan, China and the United States, and the ROK and DPRK. Northeast Asia sits atthe nexus of relations between the world’s three largest nuclear armed states (China,
Russia, and the United States), and it is home to the DPRK, a rapidly developing new
nuclear-armed state.

Identifying Critical Uncertainties
In the first phase of the scenario development process, participants were divided into
four groups where they brainstormed a broad range of “critical uncertainties,” variables
whose outcomes are both undetermined and important for shaping the near- and longterm future. Participants were asked to consider uncertainties based on different
categories (social, technological, environmental, economic, political, military, andepidemiological).
Through their initial brainstorm, groups developed a list of dozens of criticaluncertainties (see Appendix 2). They were asked to narrow down their lists ofuncertainties to those most likely to play a major role in shaping the pandemic-nuclear
nexus. They then considered how these uncertainties could unfold along an axis withtwo diverging outcomes. Following are a few of the drivers participants identified:11

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

How might a distanced society affect nuclear strategies? On one end of the spectrum,for example, re-spatialization could lead to greater cooperation as people work acrossborders, physical and virtual. On the other end, the need to maintain distance could leadto shifts in militaries’ offshore strategies for deterrence/military projection of might andcould potentially lead to the increased use of non-conventional (including nuclear)
weapons.
How will changes in budgets affect dis/armament? The economic recession caused by
the pandemic could lead to drastic cuts in funding for the military, including for nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, countries’ economic struggles could lead them toincreasingly favor investing in nuclear, as opposed to higher-cost conventional
weapons.
How might pandemics affect global cooperation? The COVID-19 pandemic could serveas an impetus for increased international cooperation and the sharing of global
information, which could extend to other areas, including nuclear. On the other hand,questions over the origin of the virus, border closures, and “vaccine competition” could
lead to a rise in tensions.
How will information sharing evolve? The proliferation of misinformation through diverse
media channels (including social media) could erode progress in tackling shared global
challenges. Or new systems could emerge that help ensure that information is sharedwith a high level of transparency and be verified as accurate.
Will inequality increase or decrease? Following the economic recession caused by
shutdowns aimed at limiting the pandemic, the gap could continue to grow between(and within) societies regarding economic well-being and human health. Or the
pandemic may usher in a more redistributive economic system that leads to a decrease
in inequality.
How will governments manage simultaneous or prolonged threats? Governments may
struggle to contend with concurrent challenges of pandemics, climate change, foodinsecurity, and terrorism, leaving them to ignore the nuclear issue. Or they may findways to collaborate, reallocating budgets toward effective solutions and developing
international agreements that could later pave the way for disarmament.
What is the effect of technology on nuclear risk and disarmament? Changes intechnology could have a major influence on nuclear risk. New risks could emerge fromthe proliferation of artificial intelligence systems (including in nuclear command, control,and communication systems), deep fakes, drones, and hackers intercepting and altering
messages. On the other hand, technology could enhance capacity for early warning
systems, increase monitoring of military movement, and improve communication
systems.
12

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

The Scenarios Matrix
Based on the initial brainstorm, the workshop organizers zeroed in on two uncertainties
highly relevant to shaping the near- and long-term future of the pandemic-nuclear nexus
and for exploring the focal question: what are the opportunities driven by global
pandemics for Northeast Asian governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce
nuclear risk and resume nuclear disarmament? These uncertainties were chosen andplotted on two axes to create four separate quadrants (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Matrix

The vertical axis relates to where the locus of power and influence resides. On the top,
decision-making and change is primarily driven by nation-state governments. On thebottom, non-state actors—including local communities, non-governmentalorganizations, companies, and illicit organizations—are the primary influencers ofchange.
The horizontal axis relates to whether the relationships and actions among actors are
fragmented and isolated, or collaborative and cooperative. On the left side of the figure,the approach to shared challenges is fragmented and not highly coordinated. On the13Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

right side, the actors work collaboratively and coordinate their actions through sharedprograms, platforms, and agreements.
These two driving uncertainties provided the “scaffolding” around which the participants
worked in small groups to create four scenario stories. Each story was framed by one of
the four possible paired combinations of the two critical uncertainties.
Each group was asked to develop one scenario that occurs during the ten-year period
from 2020-2030. Groups then prepared a succinct presentation showing how theirscenario came about and sought to convince others that their imagined world isplausible, important, and internally consistent. Each group named their scenario andbrainstormed headlines that encapsulated key events and decision points in eachscenario narrative.
Through additional sessions, the groups explored what challenges and opportunities
their scenarios could pose for those wanting to reduce the risk of nuclear war in theregion. They were also asked to identify significant risks, levers, actions, andstakeholders to help flesh out their stories.
Participants were also challenged to ask the question: If we were certain this future iscoming, what steps would we take today? The purpose was to identify the mostpromising measures that could be taken today to prepare for their scenario and to
identify the most important findings that could help policymakers and other decisionmakers.

SHAPING THE SCENARIO NARRATIVES
Below are descriptions of the four scenarios developed, along with more fleshed-out
narratives (written as if in the year 2030) that provide a vivid, detailed picture of how thisfuture could evolve. These narratives are not meant to be predictive or exclusive. The
future likely will contain elements of each scenario as well as driving forces and events
not imagined in this process. The narratives are described with imagined details to help
paint a realistic picture of the scenario, but the details are arbitrary and should not be
overinterpreted for meaning or potential accuracy. The scenarios provide a logicalstructure that challenges the reader to imagine new ways of addressing nuclear risk
reduction.

14

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Middle Powers Rising

Axis Combination:
Locus of influence: Nation-states
Approach to challenges:
Collaborative

In this scenario, national governments function as the primary locus of power, and theapproach to global risks is collaborative in nature. The COVID-19 pandemic leads to a
new recognition of the critical role of global, multilateral collaboration for dealing withexistential risks like pandemics and climate change. Traditional superpowers, however,
have not been effective in managing these challenges, so “middle-power” countries
have stepped in to fill the leadership void.
This story builds on how the pandemic has exposed the weakness of existing
international institutions and posits that this condition could pave the way for new
international structures to emerge, similar to how the League of Nations evolved into theUnited Nations. Another driver is that a group of states that have not traditionally been
considered major actors on the global stage, such as New Zealand, Taiwan, and theROK, have proved to be unusually effective in dealing with COVID, opening the door forthese small state-actors to assume a more prominent role in responding to existential
threats such as the pandemic.

The Story
Who knew it would take a virus to shake the world’s nations out of their decades-longcomplacency on nuclear weapons? To the surprise of many, the COVID-19 pandemic of
2020-2021 had an enduring effect on the decades-long efforts for nuclear disarmament.
It exposed the failings of so-called “superpowers” and laid the groundwork for new
collaboration among “middle-power” nations who found new ways to work together toaddress increasingly dire challenges.
In early 2021, US pharmaceutical firms began to roll out a vaccine for COVID-19, but
shortly after, Chinese scientists developed a cheaper version of the drug, which was
swiftly distributed across Asia, Africa, and Europe and sold in the United States on the15Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

black market. Angry that American firms had been “ripped off,” outgoing US President
Donald Trump publicly questioned the quality of the Chinese vaccine (leading millions torefuse to take it), and he claimed that China should pay reparations for spreading a“global bio-weapon” that weakened other nations’ economies. The world watched warily
as Trump’s parting shot hardened the stalemate between the United States and China.
Meanwhile, the New START Treaty, a nuclear arms reduction treaty between Russia
and the United States, was extended safely as newly elected US President Biden
started dialogue with Russia.
Thanks to swift distribution of vaccines through international collaboration, by the startof 2022, COVID-19 had been contained in most developed nations, and the scientificcommunity lauded the international effort that had led to the vaccine’s rapid
development, noting it could serve as a model for other shared challenges, including
climate change.
But the pandemic also made it clear that global health bodies like the World HealthOrganization (WHO) were in desperate need of restructuring. States like New Zealandand Taiwan, which had been effective in containing the spread of the disease, played
leadership roles, and Japan, Korea, and Mongolia joined in committing to rebuild theWHO’s Northeast Asia operations. Even as their economies struggled, these states
demonstrated they were willing to invest in a shared public health infrastructure, aneffort that attracted support from civil society, including large foundations, corporations,and individual donors. When a second strain of the coronavirus emerged in Mumbai in
2023, the newly reformed WHO proved to be highly responsive, and the outbreak wasquickly contained. This success reinforced that countries no longer needed to rely on
the traditional great powers to lead the way.
In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party lost power following its failure to deal with the
pandemic effectively, and a new coalition government formed in 2022, strongly backed
by civil society. When a batch of plutonium temporarily went missing during transport
from France to Japan, citizen protests led the coalition’s leaders to agree to sign andratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Attention continued to shift toward nuclear disarmament in 2025 following the“Taiwanese Missile Crisis,” a frightening stand-off that unfolded over the course of twotense months. China’s increasingly strong-handed posture toward Hong Kong andTaiwan—and its testing of a new Dongfeng missile capable of reaching Guam—led to abuild-up of US forces in the region. When a new, artificial intelligence-based warning
system aboard a nuclear submarine in the South China Sea sent a false alarm about animpending missile attack, a retaliatory strike was narrowly avoided. Adding fuel to thefire, a “deep fake” video suspected to be produced by Russian intelligence agencies
purported to show the Taiwanese prime minister on a phone call with US President

16Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Biden, granting his approval for “whatever it takes to keep China out of Taiwan,
including a nuclear strike.”
Following a flurry of diplomacy, the Taiwanese crisis was resolved peacefully, but othergovernments were angry at the leaders of China, the United States, and Russia for theirrecklessness in bringing the world to the brink of apocalypse. Demonstrators marchedin protest in cities across Asia, and in a fiery speech at the United Nations on the 80 th
anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Edano
seized the moment to break with the past mold of the US-Japan security treaty, callingfor “a new global network of nations” that would work together to reduce the possibilities
of nuclear war. “For too long, the world order has been out of balance, and the
supposedly global institutions we created in the last century placed power in the handsof too few nations,” Edano said, in a thinly veiled attack on the imbalance of power
within the United Nations itself.
No longer as economically dependent as they had been during the Cold War, Germany
and some other European nations joined together with Japan, Korea, and other Asian
nations to establish a new organization, the Global Solutions Bloc (GSB), an entity
similar to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), butwith a narrower focus to develop solutions to shared global challenges. GSB member
nations leveraged technology to build a nimble, decentralized bureaucracy, which wasclosely connected to “on-the-ground” civil society organizations already working onchallenges like sea-level rise, deforestation, and air pollution.
In the wake of the Taiwanese Missile Crisis, GSB member-nations voted to impose
economic sanctions on Russia, China, and the United States for “endangering theworld” through their failure to act on nuclear weapons. Around the world, activist
organizations rallied to the cause, activating their networks of supporters to boycott thethree superpowers’ goods and services. “It was a form of rebellion by non-nuclear andsmaller nuclear states to exert pressure on nuclear states,” explained Desmond Yam,
who led Singapore’s involvement in the initiative.
Surprising experts around the world, Kim Jong-Un supported the GSB, announcing thatthe DPRK (North Korea) would be willing to join the bloc if invited. (Kim was facing
growing pressure following his government’s failure to swiftly rebuild after a destructive
earthquake that ensued from a nuclear test.) On January 1, 2028, representatives fromthe DPRK and ROK (South Korea) signed an official peace agreement that called forthe removal of all nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. The DPRK waspromised an initial investment of $5 billion per year over a decade by the GSB—to beinvested with strict oversight—as an incentive to halt its nuclear weapons program andbegin the process of liberalization.

17

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

The United States and Russia initially balked at the efforts of the GSB and pointed out
the hypocrisy that nuclear states like France were calling for the reduction in nuclear
arms. But these nations committed to reduce their own nuclear arsenals, and thesuperpowers eventually buckled to the economic and political pressure. Government
leaders from all three superpowers returned to the negotiating table. There was concern
about backsliding, of course, as well as concerns that the nations were not focusing
enough on other threats, including bioweapons and chemical weapons. But the
momentum favors disarmament, and it became obvious that the GSB’s message wasreceived loud and clear.
“The pandemic drove recognition of the critical role of global multilateral collaboration,”
said German Chancellor Wolfgang Andecher, who helped broker the deal with the
DPRK. “The past ten years have rebalanced global power dynamics. If you bringenough middle powers together —especially with city governments and civil society—they become a superpower unto themselves. The United States had ceded influence,
Russia lacked credibility, and China was not a model we wanted to follow. They were
not providing leadership, and so we had no choice but to lead ourselves.”

Strategic Implications
This scenario suggests a variety of future-oriented strategies, including:● Taking strong action to ensure the integrity of vaccines and improve publicawareness about the safety and effectiveness of vaccines.
● Expanding the permanent UN Security Council to include more “middle-power”
nations, including from Northeast Asia.
● Building on the model of international scientific collaboration that led to the rapid
development of a COVID vaccine to encourage improved collaboration on otherchallenges, such as climate change and areas that could lead to nuclear war.
● Drawing on the experience during the height of the COVID pandemic, curtailing
military, especially nuclear, exercises.
● Ensuring that artificial intelligence is employed safely in military contexts, with
sufficient oversight to prevent accidents.
● Improving methods for detecting “deep fakes” (artificial media) and ensuring
governments have effective ways to communicate directly and verify information
during a crisis.
● Building stronger bridges between global nation-state organizations (like theOECD and UN) and other sectors of civil society that are working to tackle
challenges “on the ground.”● Assessing how economic levers could provide incentives to support
denuclearization.

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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Local Powers Step Up

Axis Combination:
Locus of influence: Non-state
actorsApproach to challenges:
Collaborative

In this scenario, the locus of power and influence shifts toward non-nation-state actors,
and the approach to challenges is collaborative. The scenario envisions a new role for
local governments and civil society, who lead a bottom-up effort to address increasingly
dire existential challenges that national governments prove incapable of tackling by
themselves.
Key drivers of this scenario include the stagnation of nation-states and the improved
capacity of local governments (city, state, and regional) to manage problems on theirown. Northeast Asia in particular has thousands of cities that could benefit from ashared collaboration platform. Key challenges include establishing a structure thatallows so many stakeholders (that is, thousands of cities) to meaningfully collaborate;tying cities together with other non-state actors, such as corporations and civil society;and translating cities’ ability to collaborate on issues they can immediately manage,
such as pandemics or natural disasters, to areas where they do not currently have a
direct role, such as policy related to management of nuclear weapons.

The Story
The COVID-19 pandemic was supposed to end in 2021. But initial vaccines proved tobe less effective than expected, and a new, vaccine-resistant strain of the virus (COVID20) emerged. Many nations proved unable (or unwilling) to manage the worsening
health crisis, as their economies were badly battered. With a lack of coordinatedresponse at national levels, local governments stepped in to fill the void.
Today, in 2030, the Mayors’ Response Network (MRN)—the organization of cities thatfirst joined together to fight COVID-20—has become a global force in tackling sharedchallenges, including managing climate migrants, managing sea-level rise, providing

19Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

public health resources, and even pressuring national governments toward nuclear
disarmament.
The Mayors’ Response Network first emerged during 2022—an economically difficult
period for most cities. The repeated shutdown of businesses due to the COVID-19 and
COVID-20 pandemics had led to sharp reductions in taxes, and cities and states wereforced to drastically slash their budgets. Cities also saw their commercial real estate
plummet in value as a growing number of firms decided their employees could work athome permanently. Still, cities proved more effective in containing the spread of thecoronaviruses as citizens were more likely to trust their local leaders than their national
governments.
Building on existing “sister city” networks, as well as organizations like Mayors for
Peace, the MRN started out as an online forum for city leaders to share solutions tocommon problems. The organization helped ensure that cities played an outsized role indistributing vaccines, an effort that many national governments failed to coordinate. The
MRN also created opportunities for friendly competition: In Busan, Korea, city officials
won the “Vaccine Cup,” setting a record by coordinating two million vaccinations over a
two-day period. “Top-down leadership has not been as effective as it should havebeen,” said Seongim Song, Mayor of Busan, in a celebratory speech delivered at a
MRN celebration. “It is up to us cities to solve these problems by ourselves. There aremany cities in the world, and great disparity in our size and power. But we must findways to coordinate, communicate, and come to agreement on these issues.”
The MRN made it easy for cities to learn from each other’s innovative ideas. At the 2022
Olympics (delayed for two consecutive years), the city of Tokyo gained recognition forrolling out a mobile phone-based app that “gamified” behaviors that prevented the
spread of COVID, including social distancing, mask-wearing, and handwashing.
Boosted by Olympic athletes and influencers, the game became a sensation among
Japanese citizens. Following international exposure during the Olympics, other cities
followed the model and adopted similar versions of the game for their own citizens toshift behaviors around air pollution, crime, and other issues.
Seeking to capitalize on the network’s growing influence, the Russia-based oil industry
used a coordinated social media effort to elevate mayoral candidates to power who
were outspoken about the advantages of fossil fuels. Such campaigns were thwarted,
however, when a team of students in Korea developed a blockchain-based “fake news
detector” that enabled the validation of news information and dissemination of
authoritative reporting that slowed the corrosive effects of misinformation.
The threat of nuclear war was further brought to public consciousness in 2025 when a
Russian vessel misfired a missile that inadvertently sank a Japanese fishing ship in the
Sea of Okhotsk's "donut" of international waters. (This was also partly a result of climate
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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

change: the warming oceans, melting sea ice, and shrinking fishing stock meant thatfishing vessels were restricted to increasingly limited space in the Sea of Okhotsk.)
There was also growing concern about the rise of AI in the military. China’s deploymentof an unmanned submarine with sophisticated AI capabilities raised alarm bells aroundthe world and prompted other nations to increase their military spending to upgrade
their weapons systems.
MRN members shared their growing concern about the dangers of the use of AI
technologies in the military, particularly in systems designed to detect a nuclear attack.
Local government leaders were outraged at the increases in military spending at a time
when so many of their own citizens were going without housing and food.
Partnering with software makers and a network of non-governmental organizations(NGO), the MRN in 2026 launched a highly effective social media campaign and virtual
reality experience designed to bring awareness to “the number one threat to humanity:
nuclear apocalypse, whether intentional or accidental.” This campaign was buoyed bycelebrity and grassroots influencers in countries around the world, and in Northeast
Asia, younger generations became energized about the nuclear issue as never before.
By 2027, municipal trade pacts became a major driver of economic growth, and theincreased inter-city cooperation led cities to make greater demands for “human security”
based on a framework of common regional security, instead of national security. Whilesome countries cracked down on the “insurgent” cities, most countries welcomed the
new governance model. In 2029, the MRN received the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts
to lead the charge in global challenges like climate change and disarmament.
“Collectively, the cities in our network have more citizens than the entire population of
the United States,” said Jai Patel, the New Delhi Mayor and 2029 President of the MRN.
“There are many levers we can use to get the layers of government above us to better
serve our citizens. A shared voice is stronger than speaking alone.”

Strategic Implications
This scenario suggests a variety of future-oriented strategies, including:● Developing improved organizational structures and communications platforms forcity and regional government leaders to share best practices for common
problems.
● Securing the economic future of cities in an era when companies may
increasingly have employees work online from home to save money oncommercial real estate.
● Using communications to build trust and awareness of city- and state-level
initiatives among citizens.

21

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● Exploring how friendly competition and creative incentives could lead to behavior
change and stimulate action on global challenges.
● Ensuring that new and existing institutions aimed at tackling global threats cannot
be compromised or corrupted by outside forces (for example, the oil industry
infiltrating the green movement).
● Improving management of seafaring vessels to reduce accidents in an era when
warming oceans may be shifting the locations of fishing stock.
● Using city-level voices to call attention to the need for increased spending onsocial issues by national governments.
● Explore mechanisms by which cities could work with other non-state actors, suchas corporations or non-profits and grassroots campaigners, to exert pressure on
the disarmament question.

Island Mentality

Axis Combination:
Locus of influence: Nation-states
Approach to challenges:
Fragmented

In this scenario, national governments are the primary drivers of influence, but theirapproaches to global risks like pandemics and nuclear deterrence are fragmented.
Resurgent nationalism around the world has led to heightened tension and a sense of
instability and fear of war. Climate change leads to the spread of migrants toneighboring nations, exacerbating tensions. Increased inequality within nations leads tocivil unrest and marginalization along socioeconomic lines, resulting in reduced focus on
the nuclear issue.
In the coming years, the need to contend with challenges on multiple fronts could leadcountries to reduce their support for each other and adopt a “go our own way” mentality,
which may produce the benefit of increased self-reliance and reduce international
conflict. There may also be more rapid innovation if countries tackle challenges in theirown way, and the fragmentation could also lead to new, otherwise unlikely bi-lateralagreements between nations.
22Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

The Story
The 2020s will not be missed. The decade that began with the COVID-19 pandemic has
seen one challenge after another: economic crises, terrorist attacks, wildfires, drought,
famine, floods, mass migration, and most recently, nuclear disaster.
The start of 2021 was supposed to bring about the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, but
pharmaceutical firms over-promised how much they could produce, and the limited
vaccine available was distributed to the wealthiest citizens in the wealthiest nations.
International tensions rose when vaccine-manufacturing states could not agree on a
global logistical plan to deliver vaccines to developing countries. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and United Nations (UN) attempted
to manage the vaccine distribution globally, but countries balked.
Meanwhile, the economic effects of the pandemic continued to worsen. The period
between 2021-2023 saw the deepest economic depression in history. Governments ran
out of resources, and social welfare programs were near collapse. Facing sharply
reduced budgets, wealthier nations grew reluctant to provide international aid. At thesame time, they faced an influx of COVID refugees from nations that had failed to
manage the pandemic crisis. Nationalism surged in countries like Japan and China,
which had to contend with a growing flow of climate and COVID refugees and migrants
from Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia where whole cities were sinking beneath risingseas. Some nations faced perpetual drought and food shortages. Others were poundedby hurricanes and flooding. The end result was a “feed yourself first” mentality as
nations closed borders and ramped up efforts to localize production and bring backjobs.
The economic meltdown following the pandemic grew into near universal bitterness
toward China’s initial handling of COVID-19. While Donald Trump lost his bid for reelection in 2020, the populist movement that brought him to power remained strong.
Vladimir Putin continued to run the show in Russia. The intensity of misinformation grewworse than ever, and the “Splinternet” only became more fractured as nations continued
to impose new regulations that isolated which parts of the “world wide web” theircitizens could access.
In 2025, a major terrorist attack in the western Chinese city of Chongqing emboldened
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to expand its already extensive facialrecognition and surveillance net. China avoided the spikes in crime that other countries
experienced and the “China model” of governance—with a strong-handed national
government using forceful central control—became increasingly attractive to othernations. Countries like Belgium and Italy, still reeling from the pandemic, electedauthoritarian-style leaders who imposed new regulations on firms while introducing a
new data surveillance platform. In Japan, mobile phone-based apps originally used for23

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks“contact tracing” were converted into behavioral adjustment tools to promote “social
trust.” This program backfired, however, after it was learned that hackers could
manipulate the data.
In 2026, a new, vaccine-resistant strain of COVID emerged, adding to tensions. Thistime, there was little pretense of cooperation. COVID-20 was deadlier than COVID-19,
and the new outbreak led the United Nations to reduce “peacekeeper” troops aroundthe world in favor of remotely controlled drones and autonomous systems. The new
COVID-restricted military movement led to a decrease in military exercises, but wary of
appearing weakened, military leaders found other (potentially more dangerous) ways toshow strength. China announced it was using “deep learning” to train drones to attack,but these systems were vulnerable to cyberattack.
In a world defined by national self-interest the threat of nuclear war loomed large,
particularly as the United States and China expanded their naval nuclear armament
deployed in the West Pacific. The 2028 meltdown of the Fangjiashan Nuclear Power
Plant, near Shanghai, exposed that China’s rush to grow its infrastructure over the pastfew decades was built on a shaky foundation. China initially denied the meltdown had
occurred, but after a northeasterly wind blew a radioactive plume toward Korea andJapan, governments in the region demanded that China offer greater transparency,
establish international early warning systems, and establish a strict regional regulatory
framework for managing its nuclear power plants.
Civil society organizations tried hard to exert pressure on governments to strengthenties and reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. But many NGOs and political parties
found that amassing on-line armies of "slacktivists" who only posted on social media did
not translate into effective organizing and political power.
In December 2029, representatives from Mongolia, Korea, and Japan attempted tonegotiate a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. If adopted, thisframework would eliminate the presence of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula
and Japan. Critics argue that the pact, which would ban all nuclear weapon states in theregion from attacking or threatening to use their arsenals against non-nuclear weapon
states, would not eliminate nuclear risks among nuclear weapon states, and they noted
it would take time for the DPRK to eliminate its own nuclear arsenal. The agreement’s
supporters, on the other hand, argue that increasing tensions make the pact necessary
as the continued rise of nationalism in the United States, China, and Russia—and thepotential danger of autonomous weapons systems—have made the risk of nuclear war
far too dangerous.
Given how tense and tumultuous the past ten years have been, such a pact would havebeen welcomed throughout the region. But especially with the DPRK now firmly

24Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

established as a nuclear state, the proposed treaty is unlikely to be taken seriously by
any of the superpowers.
“The pandemic and economic recession have forced countries to look after their own
interests first, and not necessarily think as much about what the whole world needs,”
says Tak Yamamoto, an analyst for the Tokyo-based World Analysis Institute. “Moreand more countries are adopting dangerous weapons for their own deterrence. Nations
today are islands unto themselves, increasingly disconnected from each other.”

Strategic Implications
This scenario suggests a variety of future-oriented strategies, including:● Providing stimulus to help nations build back their economies while also
managing multiple simultaneous crises.
● Curbing surges in migration related to climate change, war, pandemics, or othercauses, as this external pressure could lead nations to turn inward.
● Developing more unified approaches to technologies like the internet and finding
ways to prevent the spread of “fake news.”● Improving cybersecurity and privacy controls to ensure that technologies
intended to support positive outcomes (for example, contact tracing) are not used
for surveillance or other nefarious ends.
● Establishing confidence-building measures in military and security domains, suchas a regional nuclear weapons-free zone.
● Concentrating national resources to promote technological innovation to
overcome crises and threats like pandemics, systemic risks, or nuclear failures.
● Learning lessons from COVID-19 and helping nations prepare for potential future
pandemics.
● Understanding the role that “respatialization” could play in shifting the behaviors
of existing institutions, including the military.

25

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Fragile Optimism

Axis Combination:
Locus of influence: Non-state actors
Approach to challenges:
Fragmented

In this scenario, the role of nation-states has diminished and non-state actors—
including cities and civil society organizations—have stepped in to fill the gap. But there
is a lack of coordination among these groups, and they often find themselves working at
cross-purposes.
In this future, the erosion of national (and international) governance leads to aresurgence of community-oriented solutions. In a world characterized by weakleadership and relentless crises, a patchwork of smaller institutions emerges to develop
solutions on a more local level. Although their efforts are sometimes at odds with eachother—and far less effective than they would be through greater coordination—they are
better than nothing.

The Story
Starting in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the incompetence and institutional
failings of most nations’ governments. From China’s initial lack of transparency about
the virus, to the United States’ disorganized response, the world’s largest, mostpowerful countries were brought to their knees by wave upon wave of COVID. The rollout of the vaccine in 2021 was slowed when production failed to keep up with demand,and the US government accused China of hoarding a critical ingredient.
Beyond COVID, other challenges exposed how ill-equipped most nations’ governments
were to handle major crises—including those caused by climate change. Although
COVID temporarily led to a decline in CO2 emissions, the damage to the climate hadalready been done, and countries struggled to contend with regular flooding, hurricanes,
and smoke pollution. These events led to a surge of “climate migrants,” many of whom
are moving from rural areas to cities.

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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

In 2025, a new coronavirus emerged in Eastern Europe, but this time, rather than wait
for another weak response from national governments, other institutions took charge.
The World Health Organization received an influx of funding from the Jeff Bezos
Foundation, which secured major donations from billionaires in India, Europe, andbeyond. Thanks to the HealthyPlanet Foundation, medicine and vaccines for COVID-21
were distributed with unprecedented speed.
National governments further ceded influence as the world became increasingly
borderless, thanks to the continued development of cyberspace. Advances in virtual
reality have transformed everything from education to entertainment, and today’s youth
largely inhabit a space not clearly defined by geography. Younger generations in
nations like Japan and Korea have adopted a shared virtual cryptocurrency, YenWon,
that is increasingly being used in both countries—a trend that has raised eyebrows atinstitutions like the International Monetary Fund.
With little oversight due to weakened governments, corporations do what they want, andthere is concern about rising income inequality. The slow degradation of national
governments has also had dangerous consequences, including the spread of corruption
and reckless handling of materials. In 2024, key components of a nuclear warhead werediscovered during a routine inspection of a cargo port in western Russia. A few months
later, a Chinese Snakehead trafficking syndicate was discovered auctioning fissile
nuclear material on the “deep web.”At the same time, the role of official diplomacy has in some cases been taken over by
non-state actors. After President Biden’s nuclear disarmament talks with the DPRK
collapsed in 2022, an international team of scientists reached out to engage Kim JongUn on a new front: environmentalism. Wildfires had become increasingly common inboth the ROK and DPRK due to climate change, leading to cross-border ignition offorest fires and unbearable air pollution in Pyeongchang, as well as in Seoul and other
cities in the ROK. Concerned that the toxic air crisis could weaken his government, Kim
Jong-Un allowed firefighters from other Northeast Asian countries—as well as a groupof provincial governors from the northern part of the ROK—to provide support.
The benefits of this new relationship were promising: 2027 saw the launch of a new“exchange program” through which students and researchers from the ROK and DPRK
were allowed to cross-enroll in university online programs across their respective
borders. And in 2028, with coordination from China and Japan, the ROK and DPRK
officially ended their decades-long war. Looking back, it may seem strange to say the
COVID-19 pandemic had a silver lining, but the deadly disease that kicked off thistumultuous decade had unintended benefits.
The world’s cities became increasingly self-sufficient. Recent years have seen a rapid
increase in community efforts to restore degraded landscapes, bringing back27

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

ecosystems destroyed by statewide mismanagement of water that had resulted inwidespread forest fires. Community and city-based efforts are emerging to create
resilient cityscapes and landscapes to prevent and manage the effects of climatechange. After the COVID-19 pandemic, urgent social needs are addressed with
community gardens and farming cooperatives producing organic food, while leading toresilient landscapes and improved health. Communities are linked to each other incyberspace where they share knowledge, experience, and ideas, but they are also
increasingly going “off-grid” as energy production from local renewable sources has
nearly surpassed traditional energy production.
Cities, communities, and international organizations have more responsibility than ever,and they are more trusted by citizens than governments when it comes to tackling big
global challenges. But while “Build Back Better” became a global rallying cry following
the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been too little effort to coordinate or standardizethese efforts, and the increasingly “borderless” world is more fragmented than ever.

Strategic Implications
This scenario suggests a variety of future-oriented strategies, including:● Ensuring the safety and further reduction of nuclear materials in an era of
declining government resources and competence.
● Using the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic to further explore why somenations succeeded and others failed, and building new models based on findings.
● Creating opportunities for civil society to tackle emerging challenges and play arole in diplomacy and other roles traditionally held by governments.
● Adapting to an increasingly online world and ensuring that “cyberspace” canserve effectively as an area where individuals and organizations can connect andcollaborate.
● Examining the potential for cryptocurrency and cyberspace to diminish the power
and influence of national governments.
● Exploring new opportunities (outside of direct government) to soften ties with the
DPRK.

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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of developing the scenarios is to imagine a range of possibilities—not toidentify one right path forward, but to think broadly and understand what actions we can(and should) take today to be better prepared for whatever the future holds. Thus, thefinal part of the scenario planning process is to identify a variety of “robust actions” that
could be taken today that would likely have benefits in more than one of the scenarios.
Following are descriptions of some of the “robust actions” that emerged from thescenarios:

Constituent Engagement
Engaging a broader base of non-state actors: An overarching message from theprocess of developing the scenarios is that we need to engage a broader base of
potential stakeholders in nuclear issues. The conversation around nuclear disarmament
has become calcified, and the debates are stale. There are opportunities for nontraditional actors to work around the edges and to reform existing institutions (andpotentially forge new kinds of institutions) that can bring a fresh approach to thechallenge. It is important that governments feel pressure from the public—including fromcivil society activists, business sectors, and wider publics. Civil society and state actors
alike can focus on helping more people recognize that nuclear disarmament matters asmuch as other challenges. There may be opportunities to connect our understanding of
the nuclear issue with challenges like climate change and the pandemic, for example,
by using an “umbrella” concept like “planetary health.” It may also be possible to engage
companies to take up the cause of nuclear disarmament as part of their corporate andsocial responsibility efforts.
Using digital media to build awareness among young people An awarenesscampaign that uses digital media (including “gamification,” that is, transforming activity
into an engaging game) could particularly help engage younger generations whocurrently are not as concerned about the issue of nuclear disarmament as were priorgenerations. The moral case against nuclear weapons, such as the slogans "No more
Hiroshima" and "Let Nagasaki be the Last"—must be relentlessly sustained. Young
activists can help persuade policymakers that any perceived “rational” benefits ofnuclear weapons—for example, for superpower stand-offs or the benefits of small
nuclear weapons—are far outweighed by the risks.
Engaging a broader base of nations: Driving change on the nuclear issue could comefrom a wider international community of states than it has traditionally. Just as the
pandemic revealed differences in nations’ approaches to managing the pandemic,
expanding the number of states involved in the dialogue around disarmament could bevaluable, particularly through mechanisms like the NPT review process, support for29

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

nuclear-free zones, or standard-setting initiatives. There could also be efforts to expand
the role of middle-power nations (including those from Northeast Asia) in the United
Nations Security Council and other bodies.

Geo-Strategic Actions
Solving the DPRK Puzzle: The scenarios revealed diverse approaches for addressing
the challenge of bringing together the DPRK and the United States to meaningfully
negotiate disarmament, a puzzle that, left unsolved, will be a major obstacle to nuclear
security in the region. Civil society actors, along with cities and regional governments in
ROK and other Northeast Asian nations, could play a greater role in the effort to bring
DPRK and the United States to the negotiating table. It will also be important to thinkcreatively about what incentives or cross-cultural programs could help soften the stanceof both DPRK and the United States.
Advocating for budgets: The global economy has been upended by the pandemic andsubsequent shutdown of businesses, and this experience will have an effect on budgets
for years to come. Civil society actors should remain involved in budget-making in the
coming years to ensure that national governments allocate sufficient resources toshared global and regional challenges—including issues related to nuclear security,
safety, non-proliferation, and alternative energy.
Supporting international organizations: The pandemic exposed that, while not
perfect, organizations like the World Health Organization play an important role inhelping to coordinate international efforts in the midst of global challenges.
Governments should invest resources to ensure these international organizations are
well-supported as venues for international collaboration, but also work with them tomake them more effective and nimbler.
Establishing city networks and regional cooperation networks: The potential for
cities (and other local and regional) governments to work more closely with each otheris a strategic opportunity for managing nuclear risk and other global threats.
Organizations like Mayors for Peace may play a more direct role, and new networks ofcities and regions could be established. Cities could also increase their leverage withnational governments and move them in a direction to establish a Northeast Asianuclear-weapon-free zone.
NEA Public Health Security Initiative: Cities in the region, perhaps led by Seoul
Metro, could promote a Northeast Asian public health security initiative to respond to
pandemics, similar to the Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease
Control and Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks 31 Public Health proposed30

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

by President Moon Jae-In.7 This initiative could provide an opportunity to engage the
DPRK on public health, and indirectly on the current pandemic, on a large scale as aco-equal partner in a regional context. This approach may also fit into a Biden
Administration’s attempt to reset the US-China relationship and promote a multilateral
COVID-19 response at a regional level. A lesson can be learned from the experiencesof regional and local efforts using digital technologies such as in the ROK, Singapore,
and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). A strong public health system in each country is also thebest defense against deliberate weaponization of pathogenic agents, whether by a nonstate actor or a state.
Nuclear Hotlines: Given the potential risks that nuclear commanders could be infectedduring the pandemic, it is incomprehensible that there is no standardized and routinizedcommunication channel between nuclear commanders today. Such hotlines could be acommon project in a regional security framework; or they could be championed most
likely by a middle power in the region. To get the best hotline, it should be developed
using open-source development. Market players may be able to contribute faster andbetter to such a project than large-scale government projects run by military or security
agencies built on the principles of secrecy, control, and distrust. Successful
development of shared hotline technology could also be a gift from this region to othernuclear-afflicted regions at the brink of nuclear war.
Slow and Reverse (Strategic) Nuclear Forces Deployments and Operations inNortheast Asia: Regional non-nuclear states, whether they are nuclear umbrella states
allied with the United States (Japan, ROK, Australia) or nuclear prohibition states(Mongolia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia), should find common cause to bring pressure
on the nuclear-armed states to undertake serious disarmament dialogue on the nuclearprone conflicts in this region and to identify urgent risk reduction measures, such as
agreements to avoid collisions at sea or in the air, to increase transparency of nuclear
forces, to commit to not targeting nuclear commanders under any circumstances, etc.
This approach could start with a summit at which leaders could declare that nuclear
weapons should never be used again in this region, adopting the message from
Nagasaki (“Let Nagasaki be the last”)

Technological Solutions
Developing new approaches for AI safety and security: A recurring theme in the
scenarios is the potential threat for AI-based systems to feed into the build-up toward
7 In his address at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly on Sep. 23, 2020, ROK President Moon-Jae-in introduced a proposal for aregional public health initiative that would include all nations in the region, including DPRK. “Hoping that the international community views
the issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula through the lens of more inclusive international cooperation, I propose today launching a
Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease Control and Public Health, whereby the DPRK participates as a member alongwith China, Japan, Mongolia and the Republic of Korea.” See https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/881

31

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

nuclear conflict. AI systems that are based on machine-learning are likely to be used ina growing number of contexts, but such systems can have built-in biases. They areoften “black boxes” that lack transparency, and they can be manipulated throughvarious forms of cyberattack. Civil society and governments should collaborate toensure that AI systems are designed for safety and security.
Supporting international scientific cooperation: The sharing of scientific information
has been crucial in rapidly advancing treatments and vaccines for the pandemic. Theinternational partnerships and institutions that led to this success—including datasharing—could serve as a model for other areas, including oversight and reduction of
nuclear weapons. There are also opportunities to improve the trustworthiness ofscientific communication and to improve how communication is presented topolicymakers and the public.
Taking advantage of the proliferation of sensors: The use of contact-tracing apps tomanage the COVID crisis is a reminder of how modern digital devices could serve as
sensors for “on-the-ground” actions that might come into play in the event of a nuclear
crisis, while ensuring that authorities do not abuse these apps.
Developing ways to ensure the integrity of information: The spread of false
information related to the pandemic has made it clear how disinformation could easily
lead to a nuclear disaster. New methods will be needed to verify information, particularly
as social media is used more widely and “deep fakes” become more sophisticated.
Improving cybersecurity will also be important for ensuring the integrity of data in an
increasingly digital world.
Developing new platforms for sharing emergency response information: A key
challenge that emerged across the scenarios relates to the sharing of misinformationand its effect in degrading trust in institutions. This lack of trust could have catastrophic
consequences in the event of a nuclear crisis. New platforms or approaches are neededthat can help verify the source and accuracy of information necessary for the public torespond to an emergency.
Increasing monitoring and controls for nuclear materials: In a world in which
nation-states lose their power and influence and face budget cuts, they may takeshortcuts in the handling of nuclear materials. There may be a need for improved
monitoring and oversight to ensure these materials are carefully tracked and do not fall
into the hands of illicit actors.

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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

CONCLUSION
The risk of catastrophic use of nuclear weapons—whether triggered by human error,
machine error, or with intention—is as grave and immediate as it has ever been. We
desperately need to shake up what has become a calcified approach to nuclear
disarmament and find creative ways to overcome this challenge.
The purpose of this Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios
Project was to explore new ways to think about the issue of nuclear weapons in a worldthat has been re-shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic. In less than a year, the pandemic
has exposed how, in an increasingly interconnected world, we are all vulnerable todeadly viruses, and how even the wealthiest nations may lack the capacity and will tomanage a public disaster.
We have also witnessed the worsening effects of climate change, including increasingly
frequent hurricanes, wildfires, drought, and flooding. Alongside these natural threatsremains the perpetual and ominous specter of nuclear apocalypse. There are still morethan 13,000 nuclear warheads around the world, while most treaties aimed at nuclear
arms reduction have been stalled or abandoned. At the same time, the global stockpileof nuclear materials poses an unacceptable risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism.
Pandemics, climate change, and nuclear war are all existential threats that could end
our civilization as we know it. In the face of these shared global challenges, there is agreater need than ever for collaboration and cooperation. Instead, we see mounting
tensions among major nations and a rise in nationalism and authoritarian governments.
The lack of effective coordination and continued weakening of global and regionalorganizations could lead to disaster.
The objective of the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios
Project workshop was not only to broaden our analytic understanding of the connections
between the pandemic and nuclear threats—and the global and regional responses tothem—but also to identify strategies that will be most productive in overcoming thenuclear threat. The workshop revealed a number of pathways to re-imagine ourapproach to shared global challenges. What needs to be considered in greater depth is
how the nexus between pandemic and nuclear risk, plus the nexus between existential
threats, can be leveraged to prevent nuclear war. At the same time, efforts to prevent
nuclear war should be designed to have parallel policy effects in preventing other publicdisasters.
The next step in this project will be to develop more concrete recommendations forpolicymakers who must now adopt and implement practical measures to manage
existential risks posed by the nexus of pandemics with nuclear weapons.
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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

APPENDIX 1: PAPERS
Links to download the papers can be found on the following websites:
APLN
Nautilus Institute
RECNA

List of Commissioned Papers
1. “The US Election and Nuclear Order in the Post-Pandemic World,” Leon V. Sigal,
September 30, 2020.
2. “The Effect of a Regional Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan: Two
Views,” G. D. Hess, September 30, 2020.
3. “Nagasaki’s Voice: 75 Years’ Experience,” Masao Tomonaga, October 9, 2020.
4. “Pandemics,” C G Nicholas Mascie-Taylor and Kasuhiko Moji, October 12, 2020.
5. “Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World,”
Allan Behm, October 16, 2020.
6. “An Alternative to Nuclear Deadlock and Stalled Diplomacy—Proposals,
Pathways, and Prospects for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,”
Michael Hamel-Green, October 20, 2020.
7. “Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the
Pandemic Era,” Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper, October 27, 2020.
8. “COVID-19 and Labor Demand, Migration, and Military Force Structure
Implications in East Asia,” Brian Nichiporuk, October 28, 2020.
9. “Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications,” Steven E. Miller, October 29,
2020.
10. “The Role of Cities as First Responders to Pandemics: Focusing on the Case of
the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s Response to COVID-19,” Changwoo Shon,
October 29, 2020.
11. “Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures,” Petr Topychkanov, October30, 2020.
12. “Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines: Cooperation Around Research andProduction Capacity is Critical,” David Legge and Sun Kim, October 30, 2020.
34

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

13. “US Planning for Pandemics and Large-Scale Nuclear War,” Lynn Eden,
November 24, 2020.
14. “Post corona world order and geopolitical future of Northeast Asia,” Chung-in
Moon, Sam Gardner, and Sue Jeong (Forthcoming).
15. “Nuclear War in Northeast Asia: Nuclear Forces and Nuclear War Planning,”
Hans Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie (Forthcoming).

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Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

APPENDIX 2: CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
During the workshop, participants were divided into four teams to brainstorm a variety of“critical uncertainties” that could have an effect in shaping the future of pandemics andnuclear weapons over the next ten years. Note that these questions were developed
spontaneously by the different groups and then combined based upon category, so
there may be overlap.

Social
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How can people be more informed and trust media and governments more?
How might community mitigation measures change the structure of societies?
To what extent will millennials take on nuclear as a critical cause?
How might the younger generation respond to implications of resolving
geopolitical tensions they did not live through?
What might be the broader social consequences of an aging population?
How might the shift from a unipolar to multipolar world reshape regional
cooperation?
To what extent might the rise of disinformation campaigns shape nuclear
deterrence/use strategies?
How might spatial distancing influence social movements and the way they
operate?
How might a re-spatialization of society affect nuclear strategies?
Might the pandemic strengthen a sense of global community and sharedhumanity?
What happens if the media loses total trust of the public, and people no longer
have accurate understandings of what is happening with COVID-19 (or otherissues)?
Could the media play a negative role in perceptions of nuclear weapons, andcould the lack of trust in media lead populations to the opposite idea and have apositive view of nuclear?
How can we improve the ability to choose information about the pandemic,
nuclear weapons, and other global issues?
How can we use media influencers to affect general or widespread beliefs on
nuclear issues?
What if we face five to ten years of endless pandemics? How will this affect lifeand security, given the lack of connectivity?
How do gender issues play a role in this pandemic?
Is there any relevance between women's positions in society (gender gap index)
and the spread of COVID-19?
How can civil society be mobilized in the era of pandemics?

36

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● How could global problems like the pandemic influence ethnic tensions or
exacerbate regional disagreements/secession movements?
● How does a long-term pandemic affect people's everyday lives and mindsets,
particularly given the challenges of making friends and other connections?
● How can we increase media literacy to reduce the effect of mis/disinformation?
● To what extent will populations in cities decline due to unemployment or changes
in economic downturn as a result of pandemics?
● How can we make use of information coming from enhanced surveillancesystems, and how does this influence protections of human rights?
● What will be the effect on disinformation and fake news on encouraging
antagonism between states?
● What will be the internal effect of prolonged COVID-19 pandemic on theeconomy, politics, and social security in each country?
● If pandemics continue, will that alter states’ willingness to accept
refugees/immigration?
● How might religious differences effect societies following the pandemic?
● What are the long-term consequences (for example, mental health) of social
isolation measures implemented to reduce pandemic spread?
● How will the decreased social interactions implemented because of the pandemic
affect the decision-making process in business or policymaking?
● After the pandemic, will businesses downsize, move out of cities, and let people
continue to work from home?
● How might the rapid rise of conspiracy theory-fueled civil society groups
influence or offer lessons for nuclear dis/armament?
● Will the aging population lead to intergenerational differences in salience tonuclear dis/armament?

Technological● What are the implications of the increasing role of technology tools, for example,
surveillance and artificial intelligence, that are driven by our digitized age?
● To what extent might social media algorithms drive hostility between nationstates?
● What effect might AI have on strategies for nuclear deterrence/use?
● How will technology development (such as AI and big data) change how people(particularly leaders) make decisions, mainly on the issue of nuclear weapons?
● How do we leverage the increased use of technologies such as Zoom to engage
different communities in different countries on nuclear issues?
● How might the software and hardware you use effect your nuclear strategy?
● How will COVID-19 mitigation technology make people more comfortable withsurveillance?

37

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● How might intellectual property rights effect the way we cooperate on global
issues such as public safety?
● How will people deal with the dilemma of security vs. privacy when it comes tosurveillance, particularly with COVID-19 technology?

Economic● To what extent might reduced budgets and other financial considerations affectdisarmament or proliferation?
● How might rising economic inequality drive nuclear risk up or down?
● To what extent might living with pandemics be a "new normal”?
● Might the pandemic enable conditions that enable workers to fight for greaterlabor rights/protections?
● Might the pandemic pave the way for new laws/institutions to come into
existence?
● What will be the varying economic effect on various populations and how may
that affect the challenge of encouraging groups to agree on nuclear issues?
● What will the effect of the pandemic and nationalism on the supply chain meanfor nuclear-related trade and controls?
● How will a global recession, and potentially a more divided society, effect action
on nuclear disarmament?
● How does global and national wealth inequality and the wealth gap effectinternational issues such as nuclear risk?
● How does increasing government debt and slowing economic growth poseopportunities or challenges for international cooperation?
● How much of an economic recovery will we see by 2030?
● How will the unequal economic effect increase global tensions and risks between
nations?
● How can we reduce inequality in the context of a global pandemic and climatechange?
● Will the reduction in global trade as a result of pandemics lead to moreisolationism and increased risk of warfare?
● How will a global recession (and potentially a more divided society) effect action
on nuclear disarmament?
● How does the current global finance system affect international cooperation on
global problems like pandemics and nuclear risk?

Environmental● How will climate change affect nuclear risk?
● How might environmental advocacy and values support nuclear disarmament?
● Will we still be a single planet species in ten years?
38

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● Might we move away from nuclear in light of nuclear accident risk?
● How might food shortages caused by climate change effect nuclear risk?
● To what extent will climate change lead to the adoption of nuclear power andwhat will that mean for perceptions of nuclear weapons?
● What kinds of climate effects will have direct effects on NE Asia by 2030?
● How will climate refugees effect global stability?
● To what extent will mass migration need to occur as a result of climate change?
● Will the new global leadership stand up to environmental change?
● Will renewable energy supply become readily available and affordable?
● Will there be any nuclear accidents related to nuclear power?
● Will food insecurity as a result of climate change drive increase risk of war?
● What will be the effect of natural resource exhaustion?
● How will climate change affect nuclear risk?
● How does climate change act as a threat multiplier for warfare due tosimultaneous disasters occurring?
● How could the increased digital literacy sparked by the pandemic change civilsociety advocacy?
● How might our success/failure in dealing with climate change effect nuclear risk?

Political● To what extent might the continuation of pandemics increase (or decrease)global cooperation?
● To what extent might the rise of authoritarianism in (historically) democratic
states drive nuclear risk?
● How viable are liberal democracies as a model in ten years?
● Could the fragility of our mortality nudge leaders towards caution in use of force?
● To what extent has the withdrawal of the US from key international institutions
created a vacuum driving nuclear proliferation?
● How might more intense global competition effect nuclear risk?
● What if there is greater nuclear proliferation in ten years? What effect might thathave on the geopolitical status quo?
● Might there come a point when we use pathogen containment as justification for
nuclear use?
● Might an awakened sense of global community drive leadership across sectors toconsolidate international cooperation?
● What would happen if China makes a vaccine before any other country?
● How will relations between Japan and the ROK develop and how can they
improve?
● How will global collaboration be effected if the US falls from global superpower
status?

39

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● If the pandemic continues for several years, how can we ensure that we also talkabout other issues, such as non-proliferation?
● Are authoritarian regimes better suited to dealing with COVID-19?
● Are female leaders more adept at dealing with COVID-19?
● If COVID-19 continues, what would be the effect on democracy and humanrights?
● Will democracy still be appreciated? Will there be a willingness to give control
over to the government?
● How will COVID-19 change the way countries define individual rights vs publichealth?
● What opportunities do the pandemic and climate disasters provide forcommunicating and collaborating with the DPRK?
● What will be the effect of COVID-19 on the UN and other international agencies?
● In what ways will gender influence how the virus is fought?
● How does distrust (whether justified or not) in enforcement of nuclear treaties
affect their veracity?
● How might rising domestic issues (for example, religious tensions in China) leadnations to seek enemies abroad?
● Does the weakening of international institutions reduce their legitimacy and ability
to pressure and constrain powerful states?
● How will society respond if states do not take action to comply with Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons now that it is going to come into force Jan 2021?
● What will be the effects of the ideological divide between authoritarian anddemocratic regimes?
● How can we eliminate the grey zones where there are not currently international
agreements, such as around cybersecurity and private military companies?
● How would the rate at which countries recover from pandemics affect theirpolitical power?
● How can we remove impediments to establish effective regional dialogue forsecurity in East Asia?

Military● To what extent does COVID drive nuclear deterrence when conventional forces
may be compromised?
● To what extent might our pandemic- driven fear drive us to actual military war?
● How might bioterrorism risk increase in this decade amid the backdrop of
pandemics?
● How might COVID lead to a shift of military budgets toward social/healthcare
programs?
● Should we prepare for potential escalation/conflict between Taiwan and China or
China and the US?
40

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks● What would be the best way to increase security in the Asia-Pacific and decrease
the need for deterrence?
● Will countries adapt their nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3)systems, given prominent leaders succumbing to COVID-19?
● How might the continued development of drone and autonomous weaponschange the nature of militaries and other domains?
● How might COVID influence the effect of deterrence and extended deterrence?
● If pandemics were to continue or this pandemic continue and evolve, would
militaries be expected to adopt other operations besides defense and war?
● How can China/America’s competition remain political and economic, and not
military/ideological? Why does there have to be a competition at all?
● Could nuclear war start due to poor communication between adversaries andrapidly diminishing reaction times for checking on data before responding?
● What is the effect of increasing tensions in the South China Sea?
● To what extent do the blurring of boundaries between conventional and nuclear
weapons increase the possibility of nuclear warfare?
● Will the fragility of the extended deterrence doctrine based on the US stepping into protect allies lead to countries acquiring their own nuclear capabilities?
● Will states trust the US to comply with the nuclear umbrella policy and step in toprotect allies?
● What is the risk associated with nuclear power generation technologies being
converted to military use?
● To what extent might we be in a psychological position of fear that is createdfrom the pandemic, that it actually drives us to actual military conflict?
● What is the possibility of escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare,especially in regions with historical tensions?
● What role will the media play in either stoking or de-escalating tensions?
● What would be the best method to increase security in the Asia Pacific anddecrease reliance on deterrence?
● To what extent does lack of transparency between government institutions likethe military about the planning for nuclear warfare preclude the possibility of the
public being involved in political activism?
● Will the financial pressures of COVID-19 reduce government budgets for the
military?
● How will COVID-19 affect the strategic personnel readiness of Northeast Asian
militaries, and will this advantage those militaries with a greater emphasis oncomputer simulation and virtual reality?
● Will a nuclear incident (or a close call) galvanize a new peace movement?
● Is there a risk that a nuclear state in the region could mistake a natural pandemicor accidental biological release for an intentional biological weapon attack andrespond with a nuclear strike?

41

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Epidemiological● Will a vaccine be created in time, and will COVID mutate and require multiple
vaccines to be developed?
● What if COVID cannot be countered by vaccines, like HIV/AIDS?
● How will escalation of climate risk to human settlements effect nuclear risk?
● If the pandemic leads to more economic depression in the region, how will it
affect the military budgets, especially as countries seek to develop new (nuclear)
weapons?
● How does the current international finance system affect global cooperation on
issues such as nuclear risk and pandemics?
● What would happen if the pandemic were widespread in North Korea, beyond
anything that the government could control?
● How will the way the international community responds to the pandemic make it
more or less likely that they will cooperate on other issues, such as nuclear
disarmament?
● How will the response to COVID effect global collaboration?
● How will city leaders come together to build a stronger network for a nuclear free
future?
● What would happen if a country makes a vaccine before any other country?
● What will the distribution of the vaccine look like and how would it affect global
relations?
● What would happen with a dual pandemic?
● How will disagreements over distribution of a vaccine affect global relations?
● How much will the SARS- COV2 virus evolve?
● What happens if recovery takes longer than expected?
● Will states share resources or stockpile for their own use (for example, vaccines,
medical supplies, food, technologies)?
● Will vaccines be effective in creating immunity to COVID-19?
● Will the public accept the need for novel vaccines, and will they allow themselves
to be vaccinated? What happens if they say no?
● How might the implications of cordon de sanitaire lead us from traditional nuclear
armament to new projects/ambitions?

42Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

APPENDIX 3: ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS
OPENING SESSION WELCOMING PRESENTERS

Professor Susumu SHIRABE
Vice President, Nagasaki University

Hon. Tomihisa TAUE
Mayor, City of Nagasaki

WORKSHOP / WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANTS

Jimyong BRENTON UM
Researcher, University of Sydney

Young-mi CHO
Executive Director, Korean Women’s Movement for Peace

Paul CHOIManaging Director & Principal Advisor, StratWays Group43

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Radomir COMPELAssociate Professor, School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki
University

Paul DAVIS
Senior Principal Researcher, RAND

Sunil DUBEY
Institutional Advisor (Government Assets and Innovation), the University of Sydney

Minoru ETOH
Professor of Innovation Management between Industry and Academia, Osaka University

Gareth EVANS
Chair, APLN and Distinguished Honorary Professor at the Australian National University

44

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Fusako GO
Editorial Board Member for International Affairs, Asahi Shimbun (newspaper)

Audrey GUBINAssociate Professor, Department of International Relations, Far Eastern Federal
University

Dan GUDGEON
Korean Sharing Movement, & PhD Candidate, University of North Korean Studies

Morton HALPERIN
Senior Advisor, Open Society FoundationsPeter HAYES
Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies;
Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability45

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Satoshi HIROSE
Vice Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University(RECNA);
Professor of International Organizations and Nuclear Disarmament, Nagasaki University

Anna HOOD
Public International Lawyer, University of Auckland

Soo Yeon (Sue) Jeong
Junior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN)

Dawoom JUNG
Intern, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN)

Kimiaki KAWAI
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Global Humanities and Social Science, Nagasaki
University46

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Heather KEARNEY
Indo-Pacific Strategist

Kanon KOIZUMIHiroshima Nagasaki Peace Messenger, Oin High School Grade 2

Yasuyoshi KOMIZOChairperson Emeritus, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation;
Former Japanese Ambassador to Kuwait

Gregory KULACKI
China Project Manager, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Eun-ha KWON
Deputy Executive Director,
Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)

47

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Vivian LIN
Executive Associate Dean, LKS Faculty of Medicine, University of Hong Kong

Hanako MITSUOKA
Graduate School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University;
co-founder, Peace Caravan TAI

Kazuhiko MOJI
Professor, Nagasaki University

Katsuhiko MORI
Professor, Division of Arts and Sciences, College of Liberal Arts,
International Christian University

Keiko NAKAMURA
Associate Professor,
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)

48

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Elaine NATALIE
Junior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN)

Barbara NORMAN
Director, Canberra Urban and Regional Futures (CURF), University of Canberra

Tuya NYAMOSOR
Former Foreign Minister, Mongolia

Vivian PHAM
Writer, Poet, and Folklorist

Philip REINER
CEO, Institute for Security and Technology (IST)49

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Masaya SAITO
Associate Professor Department of Information Security, Faculty of Information Science,
University of Nagasaki, Siebold

Tamaki SAKAI
Staff Writer, Nagasaki Shimbun (newspaper)

Sayo SARUTA
Director, New Diplomacy Initiative

Heigo SATO
Professor of International Studies and Faculty at the Institute for World Studies (IWS),
Takushoku University

SHEN Dingli
Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University50Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Shatabhisha (Shata) SHETTY
Communications Director, Asia Pacific Leadership Network

Tatsujiro SUZUKI
Vice Director and Professor,
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)

Yukari TAKAMURA
Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, the University of Tokyo

Kae TAKASEVice President, Governance Design Laboratory

Shohei TAKEUCHI
Professor, Department of Nutrition Science, Faculty of Nursing and Nutrition,
University of Nagasaki

51

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Masao TOMONAGA
Visiting Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University(RECNA)

Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI
Visiting Professor,
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA);
Special Advisor, Peace Depot, Inc.

Kosima WEBER LIU
Executive Director, Environmental Education Media Project

Fumihiko YOSHIDA
Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)

Tong ZHAO
Senior Fellow, Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

52

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

STAFF

Doug RANDALL
Chief Scenarist, Randall Consulting

Chuck KAPELKE
Communications Support, Randall Consulting

Working Group Facilitators

Bernise ANG
Principal and Chief Alchemist, Zeroth Labs

Jamais CASCIODistinguished Fellow, Institute for the Future

Jodi-Anne SMITH
Educator and Counselor at www.jodiannemsmith.com

53

Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Yi KIHO
Director, Center for Peace & Public Integrity; Professor, Peace College of Liberal Arts,
College of Global Cooperation, Graduate School of Social Innovation BusinessWorking Group Assistants

Shaun KOH
Principal Facilitator and Co-founder, Zeroth Labs

Jeannette MWAKI
Master Electrician and Lighting Designer

Leah WALKER
Defense Technology Associate, Institute for Security and Technology

Alexa WEHSENER
Research and Operations Manager, Institute for Security and Technology

54Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks

Administrative and Technical Support

Steve FREEDKIN
Senior Associate, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability;
Principal, Your Attention, Please! communications

Hannah SMITH
Technology Assistant, Your Attention, Please! communications

55