Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies
All-Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Civil Defense of population and territories
from technogenic and natural emergences.

«Twenty-five Years after Chornobyl
Accident: Safety for the Future»

National Report of Ukraine

Ʉyiv
2011

ɍȾɄ 621.311.25:621.039.586](477.41-21)
ȻȻɄ 31.47(4ɍɤɪ-4Ʉɢʀ)-08
Ⱦ22
To compile the National Report materials of the following organizations were used:
Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies,
Ministry of Energy and coal-mining industry of Ukraine,
Ministry of Public health of Ukraine,State Nuclear regulatory inspection of Ukraine,
Committee on Environmental Policy, Use of Natural Resources and Elimination of Consequencesof Chornobyl Disaster at Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,
National Academy of medical sciences of Ukraine,
National Academy of Agrarian Sciences of Ukraine,
National Commission on Radiological Protection of Ukraine.
The materials included in the report were compiled by:Abramenko I.V. (3.3.3); Bazyka D.A. (3.3; 7.5.1); Baklan V.A. (8.2); Balashov L.S. (2.1.3); Bakhanova Ye.V. (3.1.1); Bebeshko V.G.
(3); Belousova L.P. (7.3.2); Bilyj Ⱦ.O. (3.3.1); Bogdanova T.I. (3.2.4); Bondarenko G.M. (2.1.3); Borysyuk M.M. (7; 8); Boyuk L.T.
(7.2.4); Buzunov V.O. (3.2); Vasylenko V.V. (3.1.3); Vdovenko V.Yu. (3.2.3); Vynograds’ka V.D. (2.2.3); Voznyuk V.M. (7.2.1.);
Voytsekhovytch Ɉ.V. (2.1.1; 2.2.2); Voytchulene Yu.S. (3.2.1); Galkina S.G.Ƚ. (3.3.1); Garger E.K. (2.1.1); Giryj V.A. (2.1.1);
Glygalo V.M. (7.4); Gramotkin I.I. (5); Grygorash Ɉ.V. (7.3.4); Grodzinsky D.M. (2.2.1); Gudzenko N.A. (3.2.1); Gudkov I. M.
(7.2.4); Davydov M.M. (2.2.4); Davydchyuk S.V. (2.1.1); Dolin V.V. (2.1.3, 2.2.1); Dutov O.I. (2.1.2; 7.2.1); Dyagil I.S. (3.3.1);
Evdin O.M. (8.3); Zhdanova N.M. (2.1.3); Zajvenko V.V. (7.2.5); Ivanova V.E. (8.2; 8.3); Ivanov Yu.O. (2.1.3); Ilyk A.A. (5);Ishchenko A.V. (4.2; 7.2.2; 7.5.1); Yoshchenko V.I. (2.2.1); Kalynenko L.V. (7.2.3); Kanivets V.V. (2.1.1); Kashparov V.O. (2.1.3;
2.2; 2.3); Kilotchits’ka T.P. (7.3.4); Kireev S.I. (2.1.1; 2.1.2); Kymakovs’ka N.O. (2.2.1); Klyuchnikov O.O. (1; 5; 5.1);
Kovalenko O.M. (3.2.4; 3.3.1); Kovalyukh M.M. (2.1.3); Kovgan L.M. (3.1.3); Kolimasov I. M. (2.1.1); Koltunov B.G. (6.1);
Kondratyuk S.Ya. (2.1.3); Konoplyts’ka Ɍ.Ɉ. (4.4.1); Korhagin P.O. (6); Kosovets O.O. (2.1.1); Kochkin K.A. (7.3.1); Kravets V.A.
(7.3.2); Kravchenko O.S. (4.3); Krasnikova L.I. (3.2.1); Krasnov V.O. (1; 5.1); Krasnov V.P.. (2.2.4); Kutlakhmedov Yu.O. (2.1.4);
Kuchma M.D. (7.2.1); Kushka V.M. (7.3.3); Lazarev M.M. (2.2.3); Landin V.P. (2.1.2; 2.2.4; 7.2.1); Laptev G.V. (2.1.1);
Likhtaryov I.A. (3.1); Loganovsky K.M. (3.4.1); Los’ I.P. (6.2); Masyuk S.V. (3.1.3); Matvienko A.P. (4.2); Medun V.D. (7.3.2);
Myshkovs’ka A.A. (7.2.2); Mozhar A.O. (7.2.1); Molchanov M.V. (8.3.3); Nasvit O,I, (7.1); Nechaev S.Yu. (5.1.5); Nikolaeva G.M.
(6.2); Ol’khovik Yu.A. (7.3.2); Omeliyanets M.I. (4.4); Omeliyanets S.M. (1.4; 4.4; 7); Omelyashko R.A. (7.5.3.); Orlov O.O.
(2.2.4); Perepelyatnikov G.P. (2.2.3; 2.3; 8.3); Perepelyatnikova L.V. (7.5); Polyakova I.O. (6.3); Popova E.I. (7.3.1);
Poyarkov V.O. (8; 8.1); Prister B.S. (2); Prykashchikova K.E. (3.2.2); Prysyazhnyuk A.E. (3.2.5); Pushkaryov O.V. (2.1.3);
Rybakova E.O. (7.5); Rybchyuk A.N. (7.3.2); Romanenko A.Yu. (3.2.5); Rud’ko V.M. (1; 5.1); Savushchik M.P. (2.2.4);
Sayenko Yu.I. (4); Sarkisova E.O. (3.4.4); Seida V.O. (1; 5.2); Skakun V.O. (7.5); Skvortsov V.V. (6.1); Skripkin V.V. (2.1.3);
Sobotovytch E.V. (2.1.3; 6); Sova S.I. (7.2.3); Stepanova E.I. (3.2.3); Sushko V.O. (3.4.3; 5.1.5); Sushko T.V. (7.3.4); Tal’ko V.V.
(3.3.3); Tabachny L.Ya. (2.1; 7.2.1); Tkachenko N.V. (7.2.1); Tokarevsky V.V. (6.2; 6.3); Tron’ko M.D. (3.2.4); Uyazdovs’ka O.V.
(7.2.5); Fedirko P.A. (3.3.2); Khodorivs’ka N.V. (4.2; 4.3.1); Kholosha V.I. (1; 4.1; 5; 7); Tsuprikov V.A. (3.2.1); Chabanyuk V.S.
(2.1.1); Chepurny M.I. (3.1.3); Chumak A.A. (3; 7.5.1); Chumak V.V. (3.1.1, 3.1.2); Chupryna S.V. (8.3.2); Shvaiko L.I.(3.4.3);
Shvalya S.M. (3; 7.2.2); Shevchenko O.L. (2.1.3); Shestopalov V.M. (2.1.1; 2.1.3; 2.2.2; 6); Shybetsky Yu.O. (6.2); Shmidt L.B.
(7.3.1; 7.3.3); Shteynberg M.O. (1.1); Shcherbin V.M. (1; 5; 5.1); Yanovych L.A. (3.4.1).
Final version was made by the editorial board:
Baloga V.I. (Editor-in-chief), Kholosha V.I. (assistant editor-in chief), Evdin O.M. ((assistant editor-in chief), Perepelyatnikov G.P.
(executive secretary), Borysyuk M.M., Ishchenko A.V., Makarovs’ka O.A., Omeliyanets S.M., Serdyuk A.M., Sova S.I., Tabachny
L.Ya., Tokarevsky V.V., Khalimon G.V., Shestopalov V.M.
Editorial-technical group: Perepelyatnykova L.V., Blazhchuk K.V., Bukovs’ka V.S., Ivanova T.M., Il’ina N.E, Kalynenko L.V.,
Kashtan G.M., Kymakovs’ka N.O., Rudens’ka G.A..
Co-ordinating organisation: All-Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Civil Defense of population and territories fromtechnogenic and natural emergencies (ME of Ukraine).

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Twenty-five Years after Chornobyl Accident: Safety for the
Future. – K.: KIM. – 328 p.
ISBN 978-966-1547-64-2
Scientific report sums up the work on overcoming the consequences of
the Chernobyl disaster during 25 years and contains recommendations andconclusions regarding the safety of nuclear power engineering for the future.
The authors of chapters are responsible for presentation and reliability of materials

ɍȾɄ 621.311.25:621.039.586](477.41-21)
ȻȻɄ 31.47(4ɍɤɪ-4Ʉɢʀ)-08

ISBN 978-966-1547-64-2

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE. IMPLEMENTATION
OF FIRST-PRIORITY MEASURES ON MITIGATING ITS CONSEQUENCES .............. 121.1. Reasons and scale of the accident at ChNPP ........................................................................... 121.2. Measures on limiting radioactive substance releases into the environment............................. 19
1.3. Activities on population protection.......................................................................................... 21
1.4. Establishment of state management system on overcoming the consequencesof the Chernobyl catastrophe.................................................................................................... 25
1.5. Shelter Object construction ...................................................................................................... 32

2.

RADIOECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATIONDYNAMICS OF TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURESEFFICIENCY ............................................................................................................................... 36
2.1. General characteristics of radioactive contamination in atmosphere, soil,
surface water and groundwater ................................................................................................ 36
2.1.1. Scales and characteristics of the area contamination
by Chernobyl fallout radionuclides................................................................................ 36
2.1.2. Radiation monitoring system for the environment......................................................... 50
2.1.3. Recovery of ecosystems affected by radioactive contamination.................................... 52
2.1.4. Environmental regulation issue ..................................................................................... 56
2.2. Formation of radiation conditions and economic activities
in the areas contaminated as a result of the ɋhNPP accident .................................................. 59
2.2.1. Radiobiological effects of ionizing radiation impact on biota ....................................... 59
2.2.2. Addressing water supply problems in population centres.............................................. 63
2.2.3. Farming in radioactively contaminated areas ................................................................ 64
2.2.4. Solving of radioecological problems of forestry............................................................ 78
2.3. Main tasks and expected future development of agriculture
on radioactively contaminated territories ................................................................................ 83

3.

RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF CHERNOBYL DISASTER .................................................................................................. 85
3.1. Irradiation doses....................................................................................................................... 85
3.1.1. Radiation doses of clean-up workers of the accident.
Retrospective dose reconstruction of clean-up workers of the accident......................... 85
3.1.2. Dosimetry of evacuees ................................................................................................... 94
3.1.3. Population irradiation doses ........................................................................................ 102
3.2. The population health and strategy for its conservationin remote post-accident period ............................................................................................... 110
3.2.1. The health state of the Chernobyl NPP accident clean-up workers.............................. 111
3.2.2. Health state of evacuated in infancy at the time of the accident .................................. 120
3.2.3. Health Effects of the Chernobyl disaster in various contingentsof the affected child population .................................................................................... 121
3.2.4. Diseases of thyroid gland ............................................................................................. 130

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3.2.5. Epidemiological studies of health of the population living
in contaminated territories............................................................................................ 136
3.3. Early and long-term effects associated with irradiation ........................................................ 149
3.3.1. Acute radiation syndrome............................................................................................. 149
3.3.2. Radiation cataracts and other eye pathology ................................................................ 154
3.3.3. Immunological effects ................................................................................................. 155
3.4. Effect of the complex factors of the Chernobyl disaster on public health ............................. 158
3.4.1. Neuropsychiatric effects ............................................................................................... 158
3.4.2. Cardiovascular disease ................................................................................................ 164
3.4.3. Bronchopulmonary pathology ..................................................................................... 165
3.4.4. Pathology of the digestive tract .................................................................................... 166
3.4.5. Hematological effects................................................................................................... 168
4.

SOCIOECONOMIC AND SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER: MAJOR PROBLEMSAND PRESENT ASSESSMENTS OF POSSIBLE OPTIONSFOR THE AFFECTED AREAS DEVELOPMENT .............................................................. 170
4.1. Evaluation of economic expenses and losses related to the Chernobyl disaster .................... 170
4.1.1. Evaluation of loss to the USSR economy related to the Chernobyl disaster................ 170
4.1.2. Evaluation of total economic loss to Ukraine............................................................... 171
4.2. Current major socioeconomic, social, and psychological problems
within the radioactively contaminated areas ......................................................................... 174
4.2.1. Fears and level of health............................................................................................... 174
4.2.2. State of the affected people, as per 1992 polls ............................................................. 175
4.2.3. Eight and a half years after the accident....................................................................... 176
4.2.4. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident ........................................................................ 178
4.2.5. Twenty years after the Chernobyl disaster ................................................................... 178
4.2.6. Results of 1997 social survey ....................................................................................... 180
4.2.7. Activities of the Socio-psychological rehabilitation centres
and distribution of information to the affected individuals ......................................... 181
4.2.8. Social lessons learned from Chernobyl ........................................................................ 182
4.2.9. Nuclear power in Ukraine: attitude of Ukrainian people.............................................. 183
4.3. Dynamics analysis of the demographic, social, and psychological changes
in society caused by the Chernobyl disaster aftermath and ways
to overcome their negative development................................................................................ 184
4.3.1. Demographic changes in Ukraine and within the radioactively contaminated areas .. 185
4.3.2. Ways to overcome negative developmentsof demographic, social and psychological changes
in the society caused by the Chernobyl disaster aftermath ........................................... 188
4.4. Nuclear and radiation risks as percepted by Ukrainian people and implementationof the risk reduction methods into everyday life of Ukrainians ............................................. 188
4.5. Implementing recommendations of UN Chernobyl Forum in Ukraine: accomplishmentof the projects for recovery and development of the affected areas and communities........... 191

5.

SHELTER OBJECT CONVERSION INTO AN ECOLOGICALLY SAFE SYSTEMAND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE CHERNOBYL NPP ................................................ 194
5.1. Shelter Object conversion strategy ........................................................................................ 194
5.1.1. Current status of Shelter Object nuclear and radiation safety ...................................... 194

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5.1.2. Stabilisation of engineering structures ........................................................................ 204
5.1.3. Construction of the New Safe Confinement................................................................. 208
5.1.4. Strategy of further Shelter Object conversion into an ecologically safe system ......... 213
5.1.5. Biomedical and biophysical monitoring of Shelter Object conversion safety.............. 215
5.2. Chernobyl NPP: focal points of decommissioning ............................................................... 219
5.2.1. Current status of Chernobyl NPP power units.............................................................. 219
5.2.2. ChNPP decommissioning strategy ............................................................................... 221
5.2.3. Development of RAW management infrastructure ...................................................... 224
5.2.4. Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Facility (ISF-2) ............................................ 228
5.3. International collaboration for Shelter Object conversion
and ChNPP decommissioning ............................................................................................... 229
6.

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERATED AS A RESULTOF THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE ............................................................................. 232
6.1. Chernobyl accident RAW: management history, types and amounts of RAW,
current status, issues and paths forward ................................................................................ 232
6.2. Establishing system for containment, storage and disposalof RAW generated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe ................................................. 233
6.3. Arrangement of the infrastructure for long-term storage and disposalof RAW generated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe ................................................. 238

7.

THE STATE POLICY OF UKRAINE CONCERNING OVERCOMINGTHE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE ................................. 242
7.1. Analysis of the Regulatory and Legal Framework Created to Overcome
the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe .................................................................. 242
7.1.1. The Regulatory and Legal Framework and the State Policy Efficiency Associatedwith Overcoming the Chernobyl Catastrophe Consequences....................................... 247
7.1.2. Improvement of the Legislation that Regulated the Relationships in the Sphereof Overcoming the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe ............................... 255
7.2. Analysis of the State Programs Implementation Related to Overcoming
the consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe ................................................................... 256
7.2.1. Radiological Protection of Population ......................................................................... 256
7.2.2. Medical Protection of Population ................................................................................ 262
7.2.3. Social Protection of Population ................................................................................... 266
7.2.4. Rise of Level of Radioecology Knowledge and Awarenessof Population on the Issues Associated with Overcoming the consequencesof the Chernobyl Catastrophe ...................................................................................... 274
7.3. The State Policy of Ukraine Considering the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Provision ....... 278
7.3.1. Improving the Safety Culture in order to Maintain the Present Level of Nuclear
and Radiation Safety at the Operating Nuclear Power Plants of Ukraine ................... 278
7.3.2. Strategy for the Safe Spent Nuclear Fuel Management ............................................... 280
7.3.3. Improvement of the Physical Protection Systemof the Radioactive Waste Disposal Storage within the Exclusion Zone ...................... 282
7.3.4. General Government Measures for the State Policy Implementation Concerning
the Issues of Chernobyl NPP Safe Decommissioning and its Conversion into
the Environmentally Safe System and the RAW Handing ........................................... 283
7.4. International Scientific and Technical Cooperation Related to Overcoming
the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe .................................................................. 287

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7.5. Scientific Support Measures to Overcome the Consequencesof the Chernobyl Catastrophe ................................................................................................ 291
7.5.1. Minimization of the Health Consequences of the Catastrophe ................................... 292
7.5.2. Radiological Investigation, Radiological Protectionof Population and Improvement of Environmental Healthof the Radioactively Contaminated Territories ............................................................ 295
7.5.3. Preservation of Cultural Heritage ................................................................................ 297
7.5.4. Radioactive Waste Handling ........................................................................................ 298
8.

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHERNOBYL. SAFETY OF THE FUTURE .................... 300
8.1. Lessons learned from Chernobyl with a view to nuclear power safety ................................ 300
8.2. Lessons learned from ɋhornobyl and response efficiency .................................................... 300
8.2.1. Assessment of planning and countermeasures ............................................................ 301
8.2.2. Assessment of the public protection measures ............................................................. 301
8.2.3. Preparedness to implementation of iodine prophylaxis ............................................... 302
8.2.4. Assessment of the accident consequences modelling................................................... 303
8.2.5. Assessment of monitoring ............................................................................................ 304
8.2.6. Population warning ...................................................................................................... 304
8.2.7. Provision of information to public ............................................................................... 306
8.3. National emergency response system .................................................................................... 306
8.3.1. Unified state civil defence system ................................................................................ 306
8.3.2. Functional subsystem ‘Safety of Nuclear Facilities’ .................................................... 308
8.3.3. Crisis centres of SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ ................................................................ 309
8.3.4. System of emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents ...................... 310
8.3.5. Emergency planning..................................................................................................... 311

LIST OF CONVENTIONAL SIGNSAND ABBREVIATIONS
AC_605ACB
ACS DB DEMOSMONITOR Ɋ
ADR
AELT
ALARA
AMSU
AOR
ARDIETARS
ARS NC
ASRCC
AɌR
AZF
BD
BSS
BSR – 72/87
BSSR
BSRRSU_ 2005
Bq (kBq, MBq, GBq, TBq, PBq)
CCC
CDC IA «Combinat»
CDP
CEC
CER
CEZ «Slavutych»
CFR
CHD
CHNPP
CHC
CIL
CI
CIRS
CL
CMU
CMV

Administration of Construction ʋ 605 MCM of USSR –specialized building organization set up to make sarcophagus
Administration control building
Automated control system of data bases of monitoring of medical
and demographic consequences of Chernobyl catastrophe
Analytical rated dose reconstruction
Average expected lifetime
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
AMS – Academy of Medical Science of Ukraine
Adjusted Odds Ratio
All_union Research and Design Institute of Energetic Technologyof Minseredmash of USSR
Acute radiation syndrom
Acute radiation sickness no-confirmed by experts in 1989
Automatic System of Radiation Condition Control
Attributive risk
Active Zone Fragments (Core Fragment)
Birth Defects
International safety standards
Edition of basic sanitary regulations accepted in USSR in 1987
Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
Basic Sanitary Regulations of Radiation Safety of Ukraine
Becquerel (Bq*103, Bq*106, Bq*109, Bq*1012, Bq*1015),
radioactivity unit
Chronical lymphoid leucaemia
Council of Dosimetric control of Industrial Association«Combinat»«Chernobyl Decommission Plan»
Commission of European Communities
Clinical and epidemiological register
Special economic zone «Slavutych»
Chain fission reaction
Coronary heart disease,
Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant
Chernobyl catastrophe
Current interventional levels
Confidence interval
Complete engineering-radiation survey
Control Level
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
Cytomegalovirus

7

CMZ
CNSDU
COLD
CPMCCRWSCP NSCCPRD
CRMEZ
CSNFSFDA
DCCPDCS
DECOMMISSIONING
DS
EAR
EDC
EDLC
EBRD
ECHNPPAC
EH
EPR
EPC
ESS
ESCUN
EZ and ZAR
EZ
FC
FCM
FE
FGI
FIP
FPC
FSISC
Grey (Gy)
HLRW
IACS
ȱȺȿ
IAEA
IBDSO
ICC
ICD
ICMRW
IDD
IEG NASU AND MEINSAGIPHECA
IQ

8

Critical mass zone
Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine
Chronical Obstructive Lung Disease
Complex for production of metal and ferroconcrete containers forof radioactive wastes saving
Conceptual project NSC
Chernobyl Program of Remediation and Developing
Center of Radiologycal Monitoring of Exclusion Zon
SNF Storage Facility
Deficiency anemia
Definitive closure and conservation project
Diseases of the circulatory system
Removal of ChNPP from usage
Drum separator
Excess of absolute risk
Exposure Dose Capacity
Extremely dangerous labour conditions
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
Elimination of ChNPP Accident Consequences
Essential hypertension
Electron paramagnetic resonance
Extreme permissible content
Ecologically Safe System
Economical and Social Council of UN
Exclusion Zone and Zone of Absolute resettlement
Exclusion Zone
Fuel channel
Fuel Containing Materials
Fuel element
French-German Initiative for Chernobyl
Facilities for personal protection
Fuel and Power Complex
Feasibility study of investments into storage construction
Grey, unit of absorbed doseHigh level radioactive waste
Integrated automated control system
Kurchatov Institute for Atomic Energy
International Atomic Energy Agency
Integrated database for «Shelter Object»
Information crisis Center
International Classification of Diseases
Industrial complex for management of solid RW
Iodine Deficiency Diseases
Institute for environmental geochemistry of NASU and ME
International Consultative Group on Nuclear Safety
International Program on Health Effects of the Chernobyl
Accident
Intelligence Quotient

IRL
IRSA
IS NASUISP NPPKIEP
LC-1 NSC
LFCM
LGW
LMAW
LRWTP
LRW
LRWSF
MAPU
MPI
ɆD
MDSS
ME of UkraineMHU OF UKRAINE
mR, (R)/hour
MIAU
Minseredmash (MPEI)
NASU
NAASU
NCRPU
NEC
NSC
NULESU
ODR
OG
OR
ORR
PCa
PL – 97
PL – 2006
PLEA
PSTTE
PTSD
RADRUERALE
RBEInternational Radiological Laboratory
Interim report on safety analysis
Institute for sociology of NASU
Institute for safety problems of nuclear power plants NAS of
UkraineKyiv Institute «Energy project»
The first launching complex of NSC
Lava_like fuel containing materials
Level of ground waters
Low and medium active wastes
Liquid radioactive wastes treatment plant
Liquid radioactive wastes
Liquid radioactive waste storage facility
Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine
Medical and prophylactic institutions
Ministry of defence of Ukraine
Modernised Dust Suppression System
Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies and Affairs of Population
Protection from the Consequences of Chernobyl catastrophe
Ministry for Health of Ukraine(Roentgen) per hour, exposure radiation dose capacity
Ministry of Internal affairs of Ukraine
Ministry of Power Engineering Industry of USSR
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
National Academy of Agrarian Sciences of Ukraine
National Commission on Radiation Protection of population of
UkraineNuclear energy complex
New Safe Confinement
National University of life and environmental sciences of Ukraine(UIAR of former UAA, NAU)
Official Dose records of military liquidators of ChNPPAC in Stateregistry of Ukraine
Operations Group
Odds Ratio
Operate reactivity reserve
Permissible concentration of substance in air
Permissible Levels of 137Cs and 90Sr radionuclides concentration
in food and drinking water, valid at the moment
Permissible Levels of 137Cs and 90Sr radionuclides concentration
in food and drinking water, valid at the moment
Plans for localization and elimination of an accident
Points for special treatment of technical equipment
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Realistic Analytical Dose Reconstruction and Uncertainty
Analysis
Reduction in anticipated life expectancy
Relative biological efficiency

9

RBMK -1000
RCSS
RCM
RCT
RDIPE (NIKIET)REAREMRIA „Prypiat’»
RIAR (RIARAE)

ROW
RR
RS
RSA
RSSU_97
RTL
RW
SA
SAC
SAD
SBRW
SCS
SDF
SE
SEC HGS NASU
SE NNEGC «Energoatom»
SE SCRMSFA
SFSNF
SFSNF -1
SFSNF -2
SIP SO
SLSW
SLW
SNF
SNRIU
SO
SR
SRISBCSRU
SRW
SRWSF -1
SRWSF -2
SSCDCH ME of Ukraine

10

Model of Reactor (high power capacity, channel) -1000 ɆWt
Report on conformity to sanitary standards
Radio_contaminated materials
Radio_contaminated territories
Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering
Report on Environmental action
Rad equivalent man – outdatednon-system unit for effective
expose dose (1 rem=0,01 Sv)
Research-Industrial Association „Prypiat’»
All-Union research Institute of Agricultural Radiology, Obninsk(since 1991 Russian research Institute of Agricultural Radiology
and Agroecology)
Recovery operation workers (clean-up workers, liquidators)
Relative risk
Radiation sources
Report on safety analysis
Radiation Safety Standard of Ukraine_97
Relative telomere length
Radioactive wastes
Supplementary absorbers
Soil absorbing complex
Small anomalies of development
Sites for burial of radioactive wastes
State committee of statistics
Spent Deffective FuelState Enterprise
Scientific-engineering centre for radio-hydro-geo-ecologicalpolygon studies NASU
SE National Nuclear Energy Generating Company «Energoatom»
State Enterprise «Scientific Centre for Radiation Medicine»
AMSU
Spent Fuel assembly
Storage facility for spent nuclear fuelStorage facility for spent nuclear fuel of wet typeIntermediate storage for spent nuclear fuel of dry type
Shelter Implementation Plan SO
storage for liquid and solid wastes
Short-living wastes
Spent Nuclear FuelState Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine
Shelter Object
Safety rods (System of control and safety of reactor)
State Research Institute for structure, building units
State Registry of Ukraine
Solid radioactive waste
Solid radioactive waste storage facility first type
Solid radioactive waste storage facility second type
State scientific Center for defence of cultural heritage from

SSDW
SSE ChNPP
SSE «Complex»
SSE «Technocentre»
SSRI «Chernobyl Center»
SSRW
SSSIE «Ecocentre»
SSTC NRSSTC CMRWSTLRWSv (mSv)
TB
TC
TD
TF
TF-92
The USSRTG
TISNO
TPL-91
TSF HAW LMA LLW
TSF SRW
TUE
UACOS
UIAR
Ukr SA «Radon»
UkrSSRUNDP
URHMI
UNICEFUN SCNRAURTCUSRICD

UTC
WBC
WHO
WHO-CIDI
WMR

technogenic emergencies of Ministry of Emergencies of Ukraine
Sites for storage of deactivation wastes
State specialized enterprise Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
State Specialized Enterprise «Complex»
State Specialized Enterprise «Technocentre»
State Scientific and Research Institution « Chernobyl Center for
Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology»
storage for solid RW
State Specialized Scientific – Industrial enterprise «Ecocentre»
State scientific and technical Center for nuclear and radiation
safetyScientific-and-technical center for complete management ofradioactive wastes, Zhovti Vody
Sites for temporal localization of RW
Sivert (milisivert), effective dose unit
Technological building
Thyroid cancer
Thermoluminescent dosimeter
Factor of radionuclides in natural chains
Aggregated transfer factor «soil-milk»
The Union of Soviet Social Republics
Thyroid glandTechnogenic intensified sources of natural origin
Temporal Permissible Levels, acted up to 1997
Temporary storage facility for high-active and low-medium active
long living wastes
Temporary storage facility for solid radioactive wastes
Transuranium elements
Ukrainian/American Chernobyl Ocular Study
Ukrainian Institute for Agricultural Radiology
Ukrainian state association «Radon»
Ukrainian Soviet Sicialisr Republic
United Nation Development Program in Ukraine
Ukrainian Research Hydrometeorological Institute under the
Ministry for Emergencies and NAS
United Nations International Children’s Emergency FundUN Scientific Committee on Nuclear Radiation Activities
Ukrainian Radiological Training Centrell-Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Civil Defense of
population and territories from technogenic and natural
emergences, ME of Ukraine
Educational and training Center
Whole body counter
World Health Organization
Composite International Diagnostic Interview
Water_moderated reactor

11

1. CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE. IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST-PRIORITY
MEASURES ON MITIGATING ITS CONSEQUENCES
1.1. Reasons and scale of the accident at ChNPP
During testing of design conditions of power supplying Power Plant’s own needs in the event of
external SOURCES loss, on April 26, 1986, a nuclear accident with catastrophic consequences
happened at Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4. The similar tests were performed earlier too at Chernobyl NPP
Power Unit No. 3 in 1982, and then at Power Unit No. 4 in 1984 and 1985. But all of them turned out tobe failed due to unsatisfactory characteristics of generators’ actuation systems.
The reasons of the accident were analyzed by organizations and individual experts both in theformer USSR and abroad. One can formulate three main reasons set conditions for pre-accident reactor
status and its catastrophic power runaway: Before the accident the reactor facility was in such physical and thermo-hydraulic state ofstability which could be disturbed even by minor excitations. Such state of the reactor wascaused by personnel actions and occurred prior to the tests of generator running-out
operation. All reactor parameters before start of the tests, except for operating reactivity
margin, were within the limits authorized by the process regulations; A direct impulse for the accident occurrence was emergency reactor shutdown system
activation that due to defective design of control and protection rods led to positive reactivity
insertion and start of reactor power excursion;
 This runaway reached disaster proportions because of a large steam coefficient of reactivity
peculiar to high power channel-type reactors (RBMK-1000), and impact of which is notably
strong at a low level of power (small void fraction).
Thus, the direct causes of the accident became neutron and physical, and design peculiarities of
RBMK-1000 reactor implementation of which was promoted by personnel actions. To the main
shortcomings of RBMK-1000 reactor in its operation as of 1986 one should relate: Low speed efficiency of reactor control and protection system (control and protection rods
were inserted into the reactor for 18 seconds, while at reactors of other types it took 2-4
seconds) that did not allow the control and protection system to deal with transient processes;
 Design of control and protection rods which led to the fact that under certain circumstances
the emergency protection did not shut down a reactor, but inserted a positive reactivity into
the reactor and became an initiator of reactor power excursion;
 Unacceptably high coolant density (steam) reactivity coefficient as a result of which, firstly,
at some operations the reactor total coolant density coefficient of reactivity became positive
and, secondly, the decrease of coolant density in the reactor, regardless of the reason, led tocatastrophic power rise; Double-peak throughout the height power density field which together with shortcomings ofreactor control and protection system predetermined formation at reactor’s bottom half ofquasi-individual reactor core with unacceptably high speed of power rise in case of actuating
reactor emergency protection under the condition of low operating reactivity margin.
These particular shortcomings of RBMK-1000 reactor caused the accident at Chernobyl NPP
Power Unit No. 4 on April 26, 1986. They were the consequence of the made deviations by reactor’screators from safety requirements formulated in ɉȻə 04–74 («Nuclear Safety Rules for Nuclear Power

12

Plants») and ɁɉȻ–73 («General Provisions on Safety Assurance of Nuclear Power Plants during
Design, Construction and Operation»). Both documents were in force during designing the Chernobyl
NPP’s Second Generation.
To all of this one should add that RBMK-1000 reactor and a Design of the Chernobyl NPP on thewhole also contained other considerable departures from requirements of normative documents. In
particular, the NPP’s Design envisaged the limited accident containment system the sealed circuit ofwhich included only a part of the reactor and systems of its cooling. Also, that is more important, theDesign did not envisage control and information devices for an operator regarding the operating
reactivity margin, to say nothing about automatic reactor protection under the conditions of deviationsof this parameter from the fixed limits. This particular parameter in the event of its decreasing lower
than a certain value transformed the emergency protection, which in any circumstances must have shut
down the reactor, into the instrument of its power runaway.
Analysis of personnel actions disputes concerning which are still underway revealed that thepersonnel in fact made some mistakes, but a level of their guilt was consciously overestimated in
information provided by the USSR to IAEA in 1986. The accident which in virtue of its scales
concerned many countries demolished a myth about impeccability of the soviet nuclear science andengineering. One failed in concealment of the accident scales and consequences. It was necessary tofind reasons which would to the least give the low-down on state of affairs and not challenge a qualityof the soviet engineering. Thus the slogan «personnel is guilty» appeared. This approach was authorized
by the state political leaders.
A critical part in initiating and developing the accident was played by creators of RBMK-1000
reactor, who, having known about its shortcomings, had not informed about this the operating personnel
and not instructed them about how they must have acted to prevent their appearances. As a result, theprocess regulations and instruction on reactor operation specified directions the actions pursuant towhich at certain operations could have led to disaster consequences. For example, following thecompletion of generator running-out tests at night on April 26, 1986, it was strongly forbidden to shut
down the reactor by pushing AZ-5 button as it was envisaged by the process regulations on RBMK1000 reactor operation, but the personnel did not know about this. Unfair practices of RBMK-1000
reactor creators to conceal information on its shortcomings known to them caused inadequate
preparation of the personnel for actions during unscheduled situations.
The results of investigation of the organization – Chief Designer of RBMK-1000 reactor,
published in 1993, make it possible to stop disputes on technical reasons of the accident. The reactor’s
designers showed that nuclear-physical and thermo-hydraulic characteristics, as well as design defects
led to destruction of RBMK-1000 reactor even in the event of design-basis accident at low power. Alsoit was confirmed that solely «implementation of measures, carried out after the accident at the
Chernobyl NPP, leads to the fact that at all range of initial power, being under study, a maximum
design-basis accident with de-energization does not give rise to a dangerous change of power, and a fast
emergency protection shuts down the reactor». Thus, the Chief Designer confirmed that the reactor wasdoomed by virtue of its design characteristics and only waited for implementing the respective initialconditions. On April 26, 1986, such conditions were created by personnel actions.
Specific details of the accident can be defined more exactly, but the main conclusions will remain
the same. The accident was caused by underestimation and disregard to the possible negative effects of
the known physical phenomenon. It’s overwhelmingly important with the objective to learn lessons for
future to understand what led to the possibility of multi-years operation of the nuclear facility with theshortcomings that caused the disaster, and to realize what one must do in order to prevent an accident in
future.
The shortcomings of RBMK-1000 reactors were known long before the accident. And this fact
has been confirmed by many documents. There were plans for upgrading such reactor facilities.

13However, they either had not been implemented, or were implemented very slowly. For instance, apositive overshoot of reactivity during insertion of control and protection rods into reactor core, been a
trigger for the disaster, was experimentally specified and documented in December 1983 duringcommissioning tests of Ignalina NPP Unit No. 1 and Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4. This effect and its
possible consequences for safety had been considered by the I.V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute(Scientific Manager of RBMK-1000 Design) and Scientific and Research Institute of Energy
Technologies (RBMK-1000 Chief Designer) and the results of this discussion had been known tomanagers of all NPPs with RBMK-1000 reactors and higher organizations.
However, neither the Scientific Manager, nor the General Designer bore responsibility for the
NPP safety. In the USSR at that time there was not operating organization, defined by civilized world,
absolutely responsible for the safety. In the state including the high national level was absent thatnowadays recognized worldwide as «safety culture». The importance of occurring concerns regarding
the safety was underestimated. The measures that could have prevented the disaster were not
implemented.
The USSR undoubtedly achieved considerable success in developing nuclear science andengineering, especially in military industry. However, this success was too much politicized. At thesame time, shortcomings and errors that led to large disasters both at civil (Leningrad NPP, 1975,
Chernobyl NPP, 1982, etc.) and military nuclear facilities (Cheliabinsk, 1957, Chazhma Bay, 1985,
etc.) were concealed. There was not a proper state control over the activity of nuclear institutions(actually, such control was absent until 1984). All this resulted in the fact that infallibility moods
become firmly established in the nuclear engineering. Their best closest main point is presented by theformula «The Soviet nuclear reactors are the best in the world». This was also eloquently seen in
response to the accident happened at the American «Three Mile Island NPP» in 1979, when the leadersof the USSR nuclear industry announced that «such accident was impossible under socialism». The
state political prestige dominated and strangled the basic condition for a peaceful use of nuclear energythat is the assurance of its safety.
At the beginning of 1980’s, after the accident at the American «Three Mile Island NPP»,
tendencies for a critical overestimation of NPPs’ safety emerged in the USSR. But, objective safetyassessments of national reactors were blocked by authorities and leaders of the soviet nuclear scienceand engineering. The role of peer review first of all from the state nuclear safety regulation bodies wasalmost null. Prior to the accident of 1986 a strong and independent nuclear regulation authority that isthe basis for the state nuclear safety system was almost absent.
Politicization of the USSR nuclear science and engineering, image of its exclusiveness andinfallibility, created by years, absence of independent nuclear regulation and efficient state control overthe nuclear power engineering are the fundamental reasons of the Chernobyl tragedy.
The myth, that the nuclear science and techniques of USSR had unlimited financial and material
resources continues to exist till now. It is fair if to speak about what has been intended for the military
purposes. Really the nuclear power felt chronic shortage of funds, first of all for exploratory
developments for a safety and reliability substantiation, experimental try-out of the equipment etc. It isenough to say, that expenses for the Nuclear Power Plants Safety substantiation in USSR were morethan in 10 times lower, than in USA – but it became known only after «Iron Curtain» falling. Absenceof funds for creation of experimental testbed base, procurement of modern computing techniques, toperform researches and try-out of technology for Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear FuelManagement, creation of qualitative dosimetric equipment, creation of training simulators – all that tosome extent appeared during the accident and in process of its consequences liquidation. It can beabsolutely soundly stated that economic bases for Nuclear Safety assurance in USSR haven’t beenarranged and the reason of such position was misunderstanding of a problem or absence of funds it
doesn’t matter. It is important, that Nuclear Energy Safety hasn’t been provided economically.

14

True causes of the accident have been formulated for the first time by the Governmental
commission on investigation of the accident causes at Chernobyl NPP and liquidation of its
consequences. Really, Governmental commission named Chernobyl NPP managers as responsible for
accident, who «have made serious errors in the plant operation and haven’t ensured its safety».
However, only these conclusions became known to the USSR’s population and to wide worldcommunity – the commission’s deed has been hush-hushed. In fact, the Governmental commission also
named as responsible for the accident:
 Ministry of Energy and Electrification, which has tolerated malpractice to perform various
tests and not regulated works in night time, and absence of control for these works; tolerantly
reacted to physical and technical lacks of RBMK-1000 reactors; hasn’t insisted the Chief
Structural Engineer and the Research Adviser for realization of actions to improve thesereactors reliability; hasn’t provided appropriate training for operational staff;
 Ministry of Medium Machinery Manufacturing, which hasn’t taken timely measures for
RBMK type reactors reliability improvement in full conformity with the requirements of«General provisions of Nuclear Plants safety assurance during designing, construction andoperation»; hasn’t provided sufficient technical solutions for the reactor safety assurance; State Nuclear Supervisor, which hasn’t provided appropriate control of nuclear and technicalsafety rules and norms execution; not in full exercised the provided to it rights; acted
irresolutely, hasn’t stopped violation of safety norms and rules by the employers of ministries
and departments, nuclear plants, enterprises supplying the equipment and devices.
Governmental commission has considered engineering and technical aspects of the accident. In
particular, the Commission has noted that the reactor protection emergency system hasn’t executed its
functions and the accident has occurred because of reactor lacks, in particular: presence of positive steam reactivity factor;
 occurrence of the positive general power reactivity factor, which should be negative at normal
and emergency operation;
 unsatisfactory design of a reactor control and protection system roads, which entered positive
reactivity during their initial movement to core; absence in the reactor installation design of the device showing value of an operative
reactivity allowance and preventing about approach to dangerous border.
In essence, Governmental commission even in May 1986 recognized that the RBMK-1000
reactor had the serious constructive lacks, which became the reason of its explosion with catastrophic
consequences.
Bitter and hopelessly tardive confession of the accident causes, political assessment of occurred
were given by last CPSU congress (the newspaper «Pravda» dated 7/14/1990): «In the conditions ofadministrative and command system the former country leaders made the great miscalculations inscientific and technical policy development in the field of nuclear power and population protection in
extreme conditions. Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Medium Machinery Manufacturing, State
Committee of Hydrometeorology, State Nuclear Energy Supervisor, Academy of Sciences, Civil
Defence have shown inability to secure population’s life and health, were unprepared to apply
necessary urgent actions... Overconfidence and irresponsibility of some leading scientists, heads of theministries and the departments involved in Nuclear Power Plants designing, construction and operation,
their statement about absolute safety of Nuclear Power Plants, have led to real absence of the statesystem of works in emergency situations».
Decision of the commission of Ministry of Medium Machinery Manufacturing (May 1976),
created after the accident at Leningrad NPP in 1975 is acknowledgement of the fairness ofGovernmental commission deed and the resolution of last CPSU congress. At that time the commission
has come to a conclusion that the problem of positive steam effect of reactivity isn’t resolved, there are15

no means for immediate moderation chain reaction of fission which could compensate the positive
reactivity released under condition of fast growth of steam content in reactor core. The position ofKurchatov institute about necessity to introduce additional faster emergency protection is stated at thesame document. Thus, the main reasons which have caused accident have been named ten years before
the accident.
But elimination actions have not been realized and designers haven’t prevented operational
personnel about consequences of the miscalculations realization made during designing of the reactor
and haven’t provided recommendations to the personnel how to act in critical situations, till the actions
excluding design defects of the reactor will not be realized.
It is difficult to explain sluggishness in elimination of the revealed deficiencies in RBMK-1000
safety, but set of negligence and self-confidence with a lack of knowledge became one of key causes of
the accident. An incontestable fact is also that important details for safety consciously weren’t
communicated to the personnel. The personnel practically knew nothing about the accident at
Leningrad NPP in 1975 and about other operational incidents at this main NPP from a series with
RBMK-1000 type reactors. One of the most important safety principles – taking into account operating
experience of the same Units was ignored.
IAEA General Director has created the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG)
for the analysis of Chernobyl accident reasons. Its first Report pursued this purpose. The emphasis in it
has been made on personnel errors. Obviously INSAG didn’t carry out independent collection ofmaterials about the accident and was guided by the mispresented information given by the Soviet sidein 1986. Later, on the basis of the researches carried out by the Soviet and foreign experts, Report
INSAG-1 has been revised and the new report, INSAG-7, which is recognized today around the world
as the most true-to-life document about Chernobyl accident reasons and circumstances was issued in
1993.
Coming back to the accident, it needs to provide in brief the information about course of eventson April 25-26th 1986 at Chernobyl Unit 4 led to the accident. Decrease in Unit’s capacity for planned
repair performance has been started at about 1 o’clock in the morning on April, 25th and up to 4 o’clockin the morning power unit’s capacity has been stabilized at the level of 50 % from the nominal. It has
been started preparation of the unit for testing and repair. However, the command of the power supply
system dispatcher at 14.00 has arrived to continue operation at the level of 50 % from nominal tillovercoming of maximum loadings. The permission of the dispatcher shutdown unit has been obtained
only at 23.10. It should be noted that throughout several hours, approximately from 7 am till 14 pm
designed operative reactivity margin was a little below admissible, but the NPP’s Chief Engineer on thebasis of the available at the moment information about the equipment status and being guided byoperating procedure, permitted to continue unit operation under capacity.
At 00.28 during regular operation of transition from one control system to another the SeniorEngineer of the reactor control (SERC) was not capable to make it and capacity of the reactor has
decreased up to 30 Mwatt thermal. Near one SERC renewed automatic control of the reactor andstabilized its capacity at the level 200 Mwatt thermal established by the head of tests. That was a
deviation from the tests program which should be carried out at the capacity 700 Mwatt thermal.
However, operation at the capacity 200 Mwatt thermal wasn’t forbidden by operating procedure for
RBMK – 1000 reactor.
Till now heated discussion proceed, attempts to find the one who has given a command about
renewal of the reactor capacity, considering, what namely this command has led to the accident. Suchcommand wasn’t necessary. The operator has made a mistake and tried to correct it. From a today’s
position it should be noted that it was the fatal decision – it would be correctly to stop the reactor.
Tests were started at 1.23 under the stable parameters of the reactor confirmed by last records ofparameters registration by computer complex «Skala». At 1.23,40 ‘ in the absence of any deviations in16

an operating mode of the reactor and warning or alarm system signals, tests were completed andaccording to the Unit Shift Supervisor command SERC performed regular action – presses AZ-5 button
to reactor shutdown. Last record in operative log of the reactor operator: «01.24. Hard knocks. CPS
roads have stopped without reaching bottom trailing edges. The key of a muffs feeding is removed».
Pushing of ȺZ-5 button became a direct impulse to start emergency process. The imperfectdesign of control and protection roads has caused introduction of positive reactivity in a reactor core.
Speeding up of its capacity has started. It became catastrophic because of big (approximately 5E eff.)
steam factor of the reactivity, which influence was especially high under condition of close to zerosteam content in reactor core.
Low value of ORM not only worsened condition of the reactor control, which was known to thepersonnel, but also has left the reactor without emergency protection, that wasn’t known to thepersonnel. The device for ORM control hasn’t been provided by the design. The regular system of
ORM calculation according to «Prisma» program didn’t provided the operator with information as
worked unstably at low capacity level – ORM value at the moment of AZ-5 button pressing has been
identified by calculation already after the accident. The operator could make ORM assessment on
poisoning curves which has been provided in the reactor operation instruction. Such assessment would
provide him with ORM value at one o’clock in the morning on April 26th – MC 15–16 roads (unitunloading was starved in April 25 at 23.10 under condition of ORM in 26 MC roads).
Low reactor power and high coolant flow, which is close to zero-point core inlet subcooling of
coolant, conditioned high sensitivity of reactor to external impacts. Thus, the proximate reasons of theaccident were neutron-physical, thermal-hydraulic and structural peculiarities of RBMK-1000 reactor,
and personnel actions make their realization possible. It is obvious that reactor was doomed due to its
design characteristics and just waited for implementing corresponding post-conditions. On April 26,
1986, these conditions were created. The details of accident process can be specified, but main
conclusions remain the same.
Personnel really took some actions, which worsened the situation. Stability of connection system
for accessory main circulation pumps was highly affected. But this operation was not prohibited by theprocess regulations, and it was provided by the testing program. Prohibition for such operation appeared
already after the accident. The USSR information provided to IAEA contained personnel accusation indeactivating some shielding. As it is, whole reactor shielding was activated by physical parameters,
including power overshoot and expanding capacities rates. The linings of process shielding were in
positions prescribed by 1986 operational documentation. The only deviation is that shielding setting
regarding water level in drum-separators was changed, but this did not influence on neither initiation
nor development of the accident.
Personnel really made the emergency core cooling system out of operation. However, first of all, thiswas provided by the testing program and, secondly, this was not prohibited by the process regulations. But
emergency core cooling system had to be put into normal operation mode upon condition to postpone time
for shutdown and Unit testing upon the command of energy system supervisor.
It should be mentioned that even if all actions incriminated to personnel by USSR information
provided to IAEA in 1986 were actually taken, they by no means would not influence on initiation anddevelopment of the accident process.
According to Item 10.12 of Reactor Operation Regulations and Item 12.4 of Process Regulations,the reactor is stopped by pressing AZ-5 button. Lead engineer for reactor control did just the same thing
having received the command to stop reactor after testing completion. And just this regulation action
was fatal one. Reactor protection system in case of low operative reactivity margin played the part oflaunching trigger for accident, and high positive density effect of reactivity led to accident developmentof catastrophic magnitudes. Incontrovertible fact is that high-level emergency protection not only did
not save the reactor, but also caused the accident.

17

Neither Management of nuclear power plant, nor operational personnel particularly chose theequipment they should use. The NPP’s staff had to master the provided equipment and learn to control thisequipment. But the time has come when operator was not able to cope with the reactor. The reactor
developers did not provide him with required information. Those limitations, ignorance of which wasreferred to personnel fault later, were not indicated in the process regulations and instructions. Operators fell
into a mode, which was not described and was not prohibited by any acting document until the accident.
Some primary reasons of accident were already mentioned above. There should be added somemore. There was no nuclear legislation in USSR. Only at the end of 80’s of the last century,
understanding became forming that the law is required, which regulates activity in nuclear field,
including authorization system, rights and commitments of its participants. But this law was neveraccepted in USSR.
Fewer claims could be laid to the regulatory framework available at that time. But also it
contained many concessions for RBMK reactor. Moreover, its developers could not meet a lot of
regulatory requirements mentioned above. Attempts to denote them and also any criticism to RBMK1000 were blocked by Management of the Ministry of Middle Engineering. The deserts of this Ministry,
especially in military field and in creating nuclear shield of the country are indisputable. The Ministry
included intellectual elite of the country, outstanding scientists and specialists. But to convert it into
state in the state, actually leave without control, and make its managers infallible oracles is a great
mistake of the country’s leaders, which resulted in tragic consequences.
The security system, in which Soviet nuclear science and machinery existed, should also bereferred to root causes of the accident. Undoubtedly, first of all, the Soviet party suffered from thissystem. Creating peculiar «iron curtain» around national nuclear power industry, USSR was losing
ability to compare its developments with those in other countries of the world, being behind more andmore from the most important trends.
It is sufficient to make one example. In the world’s practice in the 60’s of the last century, prior todecision-taking about NPP construction, to analyze its safety comprehensively became a practical activity.
The American standard RG 1:70, regulating requirements to the structure and content of a reportsummarizing results of such analysis, became an example for the world nuclear community. No such matter
was in USSR, and practice in licensing nuclear power plants in USSR was lacking. The State greatly fellbehind in creating methods of safety analysis and their mathematical support. The world advanced inanalysis methodology for not only design accidents, but also beyond design basis ones. Chernobyl tragedy
opened eyes to this unpleasant fact, and only in the middle of 80’s the practice in NPP licensing, developing
and providing substantiation of safety for new and active nuclear units began developing.
Not only international self-isolation played the negative part in creating conditions resulted incatastrophe. Nuclear energy for all intents and purposes was closed from public control in its own
country. And this is also one of the root causes of the accident.
The accident magnitudes were very large. Vast resources are spent and being spending for theirelimination. A lot of territories are lost for a long time for common economic activity. Tens of villages
have lost their inhabitants and transformed into silent monuments of the catastrophe. It affected fates of
million people. Tens of thousands people lost their health, and many of them lost lives. This is terrible
price for mistakes made when creating RBMK-1000 reactors.
The accident inflicted the great loss to nuclear energy industry in the whole world and deferred
its development for many years. The accident showed that consequences from error of an operator or
NPP creators go beyond the international boundaries. Responsibility for national nuclear energy safety
is transforming into responsibility to world community. And this regards not only to nuclear facility
creators and its operating personnel, but also to national regulators and high level state authorities.
Chernobyl accident gave one more lesson learned, i.e. need in supporting efficient internationalsafety measures for nuclear energy. The world community promptly learned this lesson that is18

confirmed by IAEA activity, conclusion of certain international conventions, first of all, the convention
on nuclear facility safety.
The important lesson learned is a necessity for independent state and public control for nuclear
energy safety. Only society has a right to take decision on nuclear energy development to be precisely
documented in legislation. But for such responsible decision, population should be preparedappropriately. It has to know what NPP is, what its potential hazard is, and what is done to have thishazard so minor to neglect it. It is required to have routine and methodical public relations.
Availability of independent and competent regulatory authority is an indicator of nuclear safety
culture in the country. Lack of such authority or financial and human resources sufficient for performing its
functions, lack of actual independence in taking important safety-related decisions mean the lack of nuclear
energy safety culture in the country and violation of its international safety measures.
Equally important lesson learned from Chernobyl accident is compulsory availability of qualified
operating organization, which is able to solve nuclear energy problems and has the potential for safetyassessment and control of nuclear facilities being under operation.
Finally, one more lesson learned is continuous NPP safety analysis, revelation of safety
deficiencies and their elimination. This should include intensive scientific research of factors
influencing on NPP safety; continuous improvement of regulatory framework; creation of specificsafety-oriented psychological climate in the operators’ teams; continuous advanced training of
personnel and sense of responsibility for accident-free operation of nuclear power units.
The analysis of the thing happened on April 26, 1986 at Chernobyl NPP is not a goal in itself andshould not be retrospective. The primary goal is to learn lessons for nuclear safety today and in future,and to prevent the potential for accident repetition having significant radiological consequences. All
who in some or other way are involved in nuclear safety assurance, whose decisions could directly or
meanly have an effect on nuclear safety, should understand why one was able to operate the facility,
which did not meet the safety requirements, why deficiencies were not eliminated for years, which were
known and resulted in accident with catastrophic consequences. This should be recognized, andappropriate conclusions should be made.

1.2. Measures on limiting radioactive substance releases into the environment
After the first major release of radioactivity due to reactor explosion, radioactivity release did not stop.
The rate of this release was determined by the following processes:
1. Residual heat release by means of radioactive decay of fission products generated in reactor.
Considering release of volatile fission products, this value amounted to ~230 kWt/tU [7] after the
explosion, and decreased hereafter.
2. Heat release due to chemical reactions (mainly in oxidation-caused graphite) [8].
The release intensity from April 26 to May 2 was gradually decreasing, and from May 2 to May 6
it was increasing, probably due to generating a combination of isolated cells into single flux [9], andafter May 6 it decreased suddenly (Figure 1.1.) [3].
Hereafter, estimates were made based on reconstruction of release dynamics on density ofterritory contamination with 137Cs and considering meteorological conditions during accident [10],according to which the release rate was steadily increasing from 26 to 28 April as a result of nuclear
fuel heating.
In order to reduce impact of releases from the destroyed reactor into environment, theGovernment Commission created on April 26 decided to start dropping the materials from helicopters
into the reactor vault to contain release sources. Starting from April 26, about 5,000 t of different
materials [11] were dropped onto Unit 4 for two weeks. To provide fuel cooling – 2,400 t of lead, toprevent potential self-sustained chain reaction – 40 t of boron carbide, to cease graphite burning – 800 t
of dolomite, to filtrate release of fission products – 1,800 t of sand and clay. Total for April and May

19

2-6 PBq/day

Release rate, PBq/day

1986, about 15,000 t of following materials were dropped: lead pellets – 1,500 t, lead bars – 5,220 t,
marble aggregates – 3,532 t, dolomite – 1,167 t, baron carbide – 42 t, rubber resin – 489 t, zeolite –1,890 t, polymerizing liquid – 140 t and tri-sodium phosphate – 1,536 t [12]. Unfortunately, as shown in[12], the significant amount of materials dropped onto destroyed unit did not reach reactor vault. In theCentral Hall, the top height of hill consisting of dropped materials is about 15 m over floor near the wallof destroyed southern drum separator. Average height of the hill in the center of the hall is about 7 m. It
can be explained that smoke source was located, approximately, 25 m eastwards from reactor vault.
Moreover, the upper plate of biological shielding located almost vertically covered reactor vault fromabove together with water pipeline fragments. Dropping of backfill materials from top height led to a
destruction of Turbine Hall roof plates and deaerator stack, and intensive dust-generation led toradiation contamination northwards [9]. The backfill materials coming into Central Hall extinguishedinflammation source being outside reactor vault, and covered there high-level fragments of the corewith thick layer mitigating radiation hazard for builders and personnel.

April

May

Fig. 1.1. Daily release of radioactive substances into environment during Chernobyl accident(not considering inert gases). The values are estimated as of May 6, 1986, including radioactive decay.
Activity released on April 26, 1986, amounted to 740–890 PBq. The uncertainty limit for all releases ± 50%

Generally, further release reduction was conditioned by natural processes inside the reactor:
finishing of graphite burning and temperature decrease of generated lava-like fuel-containing materials
due to decrease of residual heat release and heat removal by means of atmospheric wind convection.
There was one more hypothetic hazard – significantly large amount of nuclear fuel could penetrate
floor structure under reactor compartment, foundation plate and contaminate ground waters with highlevel activity. To eliminate this potential hazard, the Government Commission decided to construct
reinforced concrete under-foundation plate of 30x30 m size and 2.5 m thickness, which is cooled by water
owning to valiant job of miners in extremely complicated conditions. Works on construction of this plate
were completed on June 28. However, when calculating the interaction of melted fuel with structural
materials of reactor compartment, it was not considered that during this interaction fuel would be mixed or
dissolved in their flux, as a result of which a volume would be significantly increased and heat removal

20

conditions would be improved. Thus, the real hazard of melting was only for floor structure between
premise 305/2 and steam distribution corridor [13] (see Section 5.1.1.).
When it was not clear actually what processes take place in the destroyed unit, limited time for
their modeling, incapability to obtain reliable information due to the highest radiation backgrounds nearand inside the unit, as well as psychological impact of catastrophe scale made impossible to take
optimal decisions in some cases.

1.3. Activities on population protection
During some hours after the 4th Power Unit destruction the ChNPP firemen and personnel
managed to liquidate numerous inflammations at the Unit that prevented the threat of fire spreading toother Power Units. Just after the accident at first the 3rd Power Unit, which along with the 4th Power
Unit makes the second ChNPP generation, and then the 1st and 2nd Power Units were shutdown. The
Government Commission on Investigation of Causes of the Accident at the Chernobyl NPP wasestablished under the order of the USSR Council of Ministers. The main tasks of the Government
Commission were determination of the accident scales, development and implementation of measureson its localization and overcoming its consequences, health protection and population aiding, as well as
the detailed study of the accident causes and the development based on the carried out analysis of
immediate and long-term measures on preventing such accidents in future. The activity of theGovernment Commission was carried out in extreme conditions caused both by complexity of the
problem occurred and lack of experience of actions in such situations. [2]One of the first issues faced by the Government Commission was determination of destiny of thetown of Pripyat located 4 km from the ChNPP. Since morning of April 26 a permanent monitoring ofradiation situation was established in the town. By evening of April 26 the radiation levels increased
and in some areas reached hundreds of milliRoentgens per hour. In this connection the Government
Commission took the decision on preparation for evacuation of Pripyat residents. On the night of
26th/27th April 1390 buses and 3 railway trains arrived from Kyiv and other neighbor’s towns. Regions
and settlements were specified to accommodate the evacuated people. The order of their registrationand settling was determined. The special groups to solve the urgent problems were organized. The
evacuation began at 14.00 on April 27, 1986, and was conducted for about 3 hours. That day around 45
thousand people were transported out of the town. Within first hours after the accident the population of
the ChNPP adjacent (10-kilometer) zone was evacuated. On May 2 the decision on the evacuation of
population from the Chernobyl NPP 30-km zone and some settlements beyond the bounds of it wasapproved. Later on by the end of 1986 about 116 thousand of people were resettled from 188
settlements (including the town of Pripyat). [2, 3] In total, since the moment of government decision
making on the evacuation and resettlement of the victims from the radioactively contaminatedterritories, more than 52 thousand of families (164,7 thousand people, 90784 people out of them during
1986-1990) were evacuated and resettled.
It was forbidden to take belongings along. Many people were evacuated in playclothes. In order
not to spread panic it was communicated that the evacuated persons would come back home in threedays. It was forbidden to take domestic animals along (later the majority of them were killed). The safe
roadways for movement of the evacuated population in columns were specified considering theradiation survey data having been already obtained. In spite of this, neither on April 26, nor on April 27
the people was warned about the existent danger. No recommendations were given about a way of
behaving in order to decrease radioactive contamination effects.
On May 7, 1986, the Decree of the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR for theissues of job placement and domestic arrangements of the population evacuated from the dangerous
areas was approved. It specified specific measures on the placement of families of the Chernobyl NPP
workers in Kyiv and other settlements, construction of domestic buildings and facilities used for21

economic activities for relocatees from a rural area, job placement and wage conditions of theevacuated people. In particular, it was envisaged to allocate for these purposes 7500 apartments in Kyiv
and 500 apartments in Chernigiv.
The first official announcement about the accident at the ChNPP was made on TV on April 28. In
a rather scholastic report it was communicated about a fact of the accident and two died. Later theactual scales of the accident started to be communicated. At the beginning of May the radiation
background at the streets of Kyiv exceeded by tens or even by hundreds times the natural one. Though
the medical and other administrations persuaded people using mass media that in the city the radiation
background was not changed and did not exceed 0.15 mR/h, and if was exceeded somewhere to 0.34
mR/h than it was due to radiation of granite by which basements of some buildings were trimmed up.
Somebody from the Ministry of Health management notified that because of more frequent cleaning of
the streets the radiation conditions in Kyiv became even better than it was before the accident. While all
foreign mass media informed about the danger to people life and the map of air streams in the Central
and Eastern Europe was presented by TV screens, in Kyiv and in other cities of Ukraine and Belarus
demonstrations and open air celebrations devoted to the First of May were carried out. Hiding of
information on the accident from the public was initiated by the State leaders. Concerns for preventionof panic among population were adduced as an argument for the accident secure classification. Such
concerns indeed were not unfounded. However, the accident scales were such that it appeared to be
impossible to classify it. The fact of resettlement of the residents of the towns of Pripyat and Chernobyl(April 27, 1986 and May 06, 1986 respectively) promptly became known to the population of Ukraine,
Belarus and Russia. At the same time by the middle of May 1986 doctors of the Ministry of Health andmass media were forbidden to inform the USSR people about the activities performed regarding theliquidation of the accident consequences, about protection methods and scales of the accident. It
resulted in the fact that a great part of population, especially it concerned countrymen, used gardens andfarms products, particularly, milk. Due to this the people were additionally exposed, in particular it
affected thyroid gland. Maps of radiation contamination and radiation levels were classified until 1990.
The hiding of the Chernobyl accident information led to formation and spread of unbelievable rumours
about the possible consequences of the accident. This, in its turn, caused a very large social andpsychological tension among the population and distrust to official information. The hiding of theChernobyl accident information, undoubtedly, was a mistake. [4]As a result of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP a large radioactively contaminated territory wascreated that only in Ukraine makes 54.6 thousand km2, including more than 2.5 thousand km2 of thecreated Exclusion Zone. As was stipulated by the Law of Ukraine «On Legal Regime of a Territory
Affected by Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe» the zone combined
two special territories, namely – the Exclusion Zone and Zone of Absolute (Obligatory) Resettlement.
This very Law declared the Exclusion Zone as the territory which the residents were evacuated from in
1986, while the Zone of Absolute Resettlement – as the territory contaminated by long-lived
radionuclides. Soils of these zones were removed from economic use, isolated from the adjacentterritories and attributed to radiation-dangerous categories. As of today there are 76 settlements within
the Exclusion Zone and 92 settlements within the Zone of Absolute (Obligatory) Resettlement. The
Exclusion Zone is a specific security territory enclosed with barbed wire that is always under guard.
One of the tasks of the guarding is to prevent distribution of radioactive substances outside.
The first-priority tasks faced by scientists and specialists during the first postaccident months
were first of all the issues on stabilization of radiation situation at the territory from which the
population had been evacuated, elimination of secondary contamination sources, carrying out of largescale decontamination activities, creation of conditions for the future NPP safe operation [5, 6, 7]. To
solve these and many others tasks in October 1986 an Association «Kombinat» was established. It
comprises the ChNPP and all enterprises and organizations engaged in the first-priority activities on the22liquidation of the Chernobyl accident consequences within the territory of the actual Exclusion Zone. In
December 1989 the decontamination of the industrial site was mainly completed and the required life
support utilities of the Plant and Exclusion Zone were renewed. The Association «Kombinat» was
reformed into a Scientific and Production Association «Pripyat». The new association within the
Exclusion Zone was assigned the tasks on radiation and dosimetric control, radioactive waste
management, research and development, maintenance of infrastructure of the Exclusion Zone.
Since March 1992 the Exclusion Zone began to be managed by a special subdivision of the
Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine – the Zone Administration. In January 1996 this body was renamed
into the Administration of Exclusion Zone and Zone of Absolute (Obligatory) Resettlement. Later in
December 1997 the transfer of the first line of the Zone of Absolute (Obligatory) Resettlement territory
under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Exclusion Zone and Zone of Absolute (Obligatory)
Resettlement of the Ministry of Emergencies of Ukraine was completed. In 2000 pursuant to the active
Law «On Legal Status of a Territory» and the Edict of the President of Ukraine «On Administrative
Reform in Ukraine», and other standard acts this structure was reorganized into the State Department –the Administration of Exclusion Zone and Zone of Absolute (Obligatory) Resettlement with theobjective of state regulation and management of all measures on elimination of the Chernobyl accident
consequences within the Exclusion Zone. Work activity within the zone is performed under two
directions – the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning (until 2000 – operation of the Plant) and carrying outof activities on the liquidation of the Chernobyl accident consequences. The Zone Department manages
and coordinates carrying out of all actions within its territory. Today within the Exclusion Zone there
are more than 800 facilities for a temporary radioactive waste containment with a total volume of about
1 million m3 and total activity of 380 thousand Ci. The State Enterprises «Complex» and«Technocentre» are dealing with the activities on radioactive waste management. They consist of aComplex for Radioactive Waste Processing and Disposal «Vektor», RAW Disposal Facilities«Buriakivka», «Pidlisnyi», «Kompleksnyi». Within the zone there are also two sites of radioactive
machinery used during the elimination of the accident consequences in 1986–1987.
With the objective to develop safe and efficient technologies for management of RAW, generated
as a result of the ChNPP accident, the complex of facilities for RAW decontamination, transportation,
processing and disposal named «Vektor» was established. Thus, in Ukraine the possibility of RAW
disposal following all requirements of reliable protection of population and natural environment fromradioactive effects was created. Analysis of the situation proves that all radioactive waste disposal
facilities, including Shelter Object containing nuclear fuel residuals, give rise to serious concerns ofspecialists concerning the negative processes associated with conversion of radionuclides into soluble
and mobile forms, in particular, the conversion of Plutonium-241 into Americium-241, and their
possible penetration into groundwater. One of the most important areas of activity on the elimination of
the ChNPP accident consequences are the measures on radiological monitoring at the Exclusion Zone
territory. Periodically, the summarized materials and study results in the form of maps, prediction
calculations, references etc. were systematically submitted to the Government Commission, republican
headquarters of Ukraine and Belarus. Based on these data the decisions on people evacuation andcarrying out of decontamination activities were made, the limits of radioactive contamination(permanent resettlement, temporary resettlement, strict radiation control) and levels of social protectionof the citizens, inhabited or worked within the contaminated territories, were specified.
After the establishment of the Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine and the following establishmentof the Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies and Affairs of Population Protection from the Consequencesof the Chernobyl Accident the planning, coordination and analysis of activities on creation of radiation
monitoring system and refinement of radiation situation of the territories became the priority directionsof their activity. [8] Currently, the radiological control within the Exclusion Zone is performed by theState Enterprise «Chernobyl Radioecological Centre». The radioecological monitoring within the23

Exclusion Zone is an integral component of the State Monitoring System. Health physic research iscarried out under six main directions, namely, radiogeochemical monitoring of soils; surface water
monitoring; groundwater monitoring; air monitoring; monitoring of biological entities; monitoring ofunauthorized habitation areas.
As a result of Chernobyl accident, 4.4 million ha of forests are contaminated in Ukraine withradioactive decay products. The government authorities had to recall 157,000 ha of forests fromcirculation (including 110,000 ha within Exclusion Zone). [9, 10] The conceptual provisions for safe
forest management, envisaging clean product receipt, were finally approved in Autumn 1991.
Dosimetric control network is established to perform measures on safe forest management andprevention of realizing the products with prescribed standards exceeded. Owing to forest areas, which
during the accident played a part of shielding of radionuclide accumulator, wide spreading ofradioactive contamination was certainly limited. It means that forest became a major natural factor forstabilizing radioecological situation within Exclusion Zone. State Specialized Production and Complex
Forestry Enterprise «Chernobyllis» (later on «Chernobyl Puscha») started its activity in 1992 within
Exclusion Zone. The task of this enterprise is to protect forest areas of the Exclusion Zone from fires,poachers, to protect trees from insects, deceases, and the important thing is to plant young forests tobind radionuclides in biological chain.
A hazardous factor leading to repeated radioactive contamination of territories is forest fires.
Mineralized zones are arranged, availability of specialized fire-chemical stations for forest fire fighting
is maintained and other measures for forest protection are performed within Exclusion Zone in order toimprove sanitary-protective functions of forests, prevent repeated radioactive contamination of area due
to fires, prevent radionuclide release to the clean areas.
As statistics showed, 90% of radionuclides are released from the Exclusion Zone by waters.
Water is contaminated, mainly, due to radionuclide wash-off from contaminated areas. [11] A major
hazard of radionuclide wash-off to Prypiat River, and then to Dnipro River, occurs during flooding in
the rivers of the Exclusion Zone. The Government of Ukraine decided to establish Chernobyl
Administration for Operation of Water-protective Structures in Prypiat River Basin in October 1987 for
operation of security facilities. Later on, State Specialized Production and Complex Water-protective
Enterprise «Chernobylvodekspluatatsiia» (Chernobyl Water Operation) was established in 1993. The
whole activity of the enterprise is aimed at reduction of radionuclide release from contaminated areas of
Exclusion Zone by waters. Particularly, this is reached by establishing scientifically based complex ofhydro-technical facilities, which isolated radionuclides of the most contaminated areas of Exclusion
Zone and created barriers on the way of radionuclide migration, e.g. after construction of protective
dam on the left bank of Prypiat River, the carry-over to the river was reduced for 100–150 Cu.
In order to minimize spreading of radioactive substances within the territory of population
habitation, the following activities are carried out in Exclusion Zone:
 Shelter Object transformation into ecologically safe system; Sanitary and fire-protection measures in forests and fields;
 Radiological control of workers in Exclusion Zone;
 Processing and disposal of radioactive waste; Water-protective measures; Support of the Exclusion Zone infrastructure; Physical protection of the Exclusion Zone perimeter;
 Scientific support of works and scientific-research activity.
Immediately after Chernobyl NPP accident occurred in 1986, a compensation policy relating to
all categories of people suffered from Chernobyl accident was introduced in Ukraine. Compensations
were implemented as payments, free and extraordinary access to different services causing significant
increase of costs in the state budget. When country’s independence gained, the political institutes being24

at initial stage, on behalf of their electorate, actively addressed the problems caused by Chernobyl
accident. As a result, the Parliament repeatedly agreed for recovery of damages without appropriate
assessment of resource abilities. A lot of liabilities were not fulfilled, and «Chernobyl payments» fell
onto state budget. [12]The national policy of Ukraine is based on following principles in comprehensive protection ofpeople suffered from Chernobyl NPP accident consequences: The priority of life and health of people suffered from Chernobyl accident, full responsibilityof the State for establishing safe conditions for living and working; Integrated solution of tasks on health protection, social policy and use of contaminatedterritories based on national programs;
 Social protection and full recovery of damages caused to suffered people;
 Use of economical methods for improving life through policy of preferential taxation for
citizens suffered from Chernobyl accident and their unions; Implementation of measures on occupational reorientation and advanced training for suffered
population;
 Cooperation and consultancy between state authorities and suffered people (theirrepresentatives, social teams) when taking decisions on social protection at local and statelevels; International cooperation on health protection, social and radiation protection, occupationalsafety, use of the world’s experience for arranging activities on these matters. [27]There was no reasonably perfect legal framework before 1990 on protection and status of citizens
suffered from Chernobyl accident. The decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the orders of branch ministries and authorities had theeffect. Most of mentioned documents had a security classification limiting their application range. The
Law of Ukraine «About Legal Status of the Territories being Radioactively Contaminated due toChernobyl Accident» implements the legislative determination of legal status for territories having
different radioactive contaminations and measures on its provision. The principles for legislative
provision of protecting suffered people are laid in the Law of Ukraine No.796-ɏɉ dated February 28,
1991, «About Status and Social Protection of Citizens Suffered from Chernobyl Accident», which
determines basic provisions for implementing constitutional right of the citizens suffered from
Chernobyl accident, for protecting their lives and health. A single procedure for determining status ofsuffered people is developed. Corresponding subordinate acts are developed and put in force based on
the Laws.

1.4. Establishment of state management system on overcoming
the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe
The accident at the Chernobyl NPP on its scales did not confine itself to the parameters of theaccidents considered as possible in regulatory documents of the Soviet Union. The global distribution ofa great spectrum of radioactive isotopes of Chernobyl origin happened. It set to the USSR governmental
and administration authorities the completely new tasks associated with localization and mitigation of
the catastrophe consequences. The problems occurred as a result of the accident at the ChNPP andmanagerial decisions pertaining to their liquidation were made based on decrees and directions of theCentral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and Council of Ministersof the USSR, orders of ministries and government agencies, decisions of the state committees. They
were taken classified as «Top secret», «Secret» or «Official use only» that restricted field of theirapplication. In the Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) on their basis the decrees of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Council of Ministers of Ukraine were made. These25

documents were published in 1990 within the composite book prepared for the deputies of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. [1]With the objective to ensure the radiation protection of population the USSR Ministry of Health(USSR MH) right from the first days of the accident started to enact the regulations on temporary
emergency levels of contamination for environmental compartments, body, constructions, roads, public
irradiation doses, permissible levels of radioactive substances content in foodstuffs, agricultural raw
materials, etc. Application of these regulations made it possible to carry out organizational andmanagerial arrangements which helped to ensure people protection from the ChNPP radioactive
releases. In 1987 revised versions of Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-76/87) and Basic Sanitary Rules(OSP-72/87) were enacted in the USSR taking into consideration the refined data regarding ionizing
radiation impact on human body, experience of radiation control assurance and carrying out of
preventive measures, including the measures on liquidation of the accident consequences at the ChNPP[2]. The issues of population medical assistance within the areas of NPPs location and during radiation
accidents were regulated by special regulatory documents. [3, 6]
A principally new in NRB-76/87 was the division of normative standards for each category ofradiation-exposed citizens into three classes: principal dose limits, permissible levels and reference levels.
The maximum permissible dose per year (MPD) was referred to the principal dose limits for Category A(personnel), while for Category B (restricted part of population) – maximum dose per year (MD).
Exposure of the restricted part of population according to NRB-76/87 should have been controlled bymeasurements of releases, field dose rate, and environment radioactive-contamination levels (air, water,soil, foodstuff, etc.) with the following dose calculation. Individual effective exposure dose for Category
B citizens should not have exceeded 0.005 Sv per year. In 1996 almost all documents and materials
related to the accident at the ChNPP become available for public and were published in a special
composite book [7]. The documents, been a part of this composite book (508 documents dated from 1967
until 1996), are the confirmation that the problems, associated with the accident at the ChNPP, from thefirst day were in the spot of the governmental and administration authorities of the former USSR, as well
as Ukraine, Belarus Republic and the Russian Federation. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR in its Decree
dated April 25, 1990, acknowledged the accident at the ChNPP as the greatest catastrophe of modern age,nationwide disaster dealt with the destiny of millions of people populated the large territories.
A political assessment was given to the catastrophe at the ChNPP and to the activities on
liquidation of its consequences at the XXVIII CPSU Congress. The Congress acknowledged themeasures on the liquidation of the ChNPP catastrophe consequences as unsatisfactory and insufficient.
In Ukraine the overall assessment of the activities on the liquidation of the Chernobyl catastrophe wasgiven in the Statement of the XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine «On liquidation of
the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe and protection of population from its effect» dated July
1990, and in the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR dated August 1, 1990. These
documents become a starting point for transition to the breakthrough way of overcoming thecatastrophe consequences.
The Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR during 1990 [8] discussed twice at its sessions theecological situation and urgent measures on population protection from the Chernobyl catastrophe
consequences. The Committee of the Ukrainian SSR Verkhovna Rada on the Issues of the Chernobyl
Catastrophe was established. A year of 1990 was announced the rehabilitation year of the children who
lived within the territories affected by the ChNPP accident. With the objective to ensure thescientifically grounded approach in solving the problems of population radiation protection and to
expand the international cooperation on these issues the decision to establish the National Commission
for Radiation Protection of the Population of Ukraine and the State Committee of the Ukrainian SSR on
the Issues of the Chernobyl Catastrophe was taken. The territory of the Republic was declared a zone of
ecological catastrophe. The authority of the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the26

Ukrainian SSR was delegated to the Head of Government Commission on Emergencies. It was accepted
as necessary to establish the special subdivisions for the assurance of organizational work on
overcoming and liquidating the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences in the staff of the Government andsome Ministries, in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Rivne, Chernigiv, Volyn, Cherkasy, Vinitsa Regions and, if
necessary, in other regions. [9]On March 29, 1990, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Verkhovna Rada, taking into
consideration the proposals of People’s Deputies of Ukraine and general public regarding perpetuatingin people memories the tragic events associated with the ChNPP accident, as well as with the objective
to prevent nuclear catastrophes, declared the 26th April the «Day of Chernobyl Tragedy» by its Decree(No.8985-ɏɉ).
Since 1990 the decisions, taken at the state level, on the assessment of the performed measures on
the liquidation of the catastrophe consequences and proposals pertaining to their elimination in future
started their implementation. «The State Soviet and Republican Program of Urgent Measures on the
Liquidation of the ChNPP Accident Consequences for 1990–1992» was approved [8]. It also specified
those measures which were planned to be performed in Ukraine.
Thus, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne and Chernigiv Regional Executive Committees were authorized toensure the people resettlement from the territories faced radioactive contamination as a result of theaccident at the Chernobyl NPP by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the
Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions No.115 dated May 21, 1990.
Until 1991 the Program’s tasks were implemented by all-union efforts. From the date of the
USSR collapse the accident consequences were liquidated by each state separately that created manydifficulties.
In general the State Union and Republican Program and the adopted decrees envisaged a numberof large-scale state measures targeted at ecological safety assurance, protection and promotion of health,social and legal protection of victims suffered from the Chernobyl disaster and population inhabited thecontaminated territories.
The Government of Ukraine, local governmental and administration authorities performed themeasures targeted at the mitigation of radioactive contamination impact on public health. During theperiod of 1987–1990 the Government of Ukraine enacted 116 decrees and orders on the issues of theliquidation of the ChNPP accident consequences. The State Program of Urgent Measures on the
Liquidation of the ChNPP Accident Consequences in the Ukrainian SSR for 1990–1992 was developedand implemented. In spite of this, the situation within the contaminated areas remained highly
complicated. The problems associated with the lack of detailed territory survey, radiation situationassessment, wide and impartial provision of information to the public concerning the radiation situation
were escalated. The development of the Republican Concept for safe habitation of people within theradioactively contaminated territories was delayed unjustifiably. Up to that time the status of 30 km
zone and other contaminated territories was not specified. The responsible social protection of thevictims was not secured. The decision regarding the provision of the population from the«contaminated» areas with «clean» foodstuff and dosimetric equipment, people rehabilitation andmedical treatment, construction of housing, social facilities and other urgent tasks was not
implemented.
During decision-making the executive authorities followed the basic criterion of temporary
specified levels of contamination by radionuclides approved by the USSR MH in May 1986, that isdensity of contamination.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR by its Decree No.1452-1 of April 25, 1990, emphasized thatthe measures, performed to liquidate the accident consequences, appeared to be insufficient. A highly
stressed social and political situation occurred within the areas that were faced the radioactive
contamination. It was predetermined by contradictions in recommendations of scientists and specialists27

on radiation safety problems, the delay in taking the required measures, and, as a result, loss of trust to
local and central authorities by a part of population.
At the end of 1990 the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Issues of theChernobyl Catastrophe, the Government of Ukraine, the Academy of Sciences, public association«Union of Chernobyl» prepared the drafts of the Concept for habitation of population within the
territories of higher levels of radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, as wellas the Law drafts «On legal regime of a territory affected by radiation contamination as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe» and «On status and social protection of citizens who suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe».
The Concept was developed based on the materials of the Scientific Report of the Council for the
Study of Productive Forces of the Ukrainian SSR under the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.
This Report was prepared for the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR [10]. In the Report theRadiation Safety Concept was proposed. It specified and justified the criteria and normative standardsof people habitation and life support. The international radiation safety practice, which is mainly basedon the non-exceedance of safety normative standards and implementation of all necessary measures onminimizing human exposure, laid the foundation for the Concept.
The basic principle of the Concept is that for the critical group of population (1986 year of birthchildren) the value of effective dose of additional exposure, connected with the Chernobyl catastrophe,should not exceed 1.0 mSv per year and 70.0 mSv per all life besides the doses received by the population
during a pre-accident period in specific natural conditions [11]. The division of all the territory,
contaminated by the accident releases, into zones is envisaged in the Concept and subsequent Laws «Onlegal regime of a territory affected by contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «Onstatus and social protection of citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe». [12]Taking into account a social importance of the draft laws, the Committee on the Issues of theChernobyl Catastrophe took the decision on their nation-wide discussion. The drafts were published in
the central newspapers. Thousands of citizens of Ukraine, ministries, government agencies andorganizations submitted their proposals. The scientists of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian
SSR, staff of the Ministries of Health, Agro-industrial Complex, Labor, and Justice, publicorganizations, local Soviets of the suffered regions were engaged in the development of the law drafts
for a long time. On February 5, 1991, the draft laws were introduced for consideration by the
Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR in the first reading. And on February 27 and 28, 1991, they were
finally adopted by the great majority of people’s deputies.
During consideration of the draft laws at the session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian
SSR the attention was paid to the fact that according to the calculations of the Ministry of Finance theannual expenditures for the implementation of the prescribed benefits made up more than 4 billion
Soviet roubles. If proceed from all decrees and decisions have been adopted and acted as of the time of
the consideration of the draft laws, regarding a differential system of labour remuneration, additional
payments, rehabilitation, free nutrition of children and others than this sum amounted to 580 million
Soviet roubles. Thus, scarcity of funds for the implementation of the laws exceeded 3 billion Soviet
roubles. These funds were envisaged to be received from the Soviet budget.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the possibility to receive the funds from the Soviet budget
was lost, and the financing of all measures, envisaged by the Chernobyl legislation, laid completely on
the Ukrainian budget. Notwithstanding the fact that in the course of the years of independence Ukraine
spent more than 10 billion US dollars on the liquidation of the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences, inprice equivalent the laws were not financed by more than 57%.
Adoption of the Concept and the Laws of Ukraine «On legal regime of territories affected byradioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On status and social
protection of citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe» made it possible to fix by28

law the radioactive contamination zones depending on the rate of a possible negative impact on publichealth, establish the criteria of top-priority resettlement, create the system of monitoring over the safe
habitation and the regime of habitation within the contaminated territories. Provision of benefits andcompensations depending on the prescribed category is guaranteed by the state to each person suffered
as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. [13]To raise the status of the state administration body, which was dealing with the Chernobyl
problems solving, the Ministry for the Issues of Population Protection from the Consequences of theChernobyl Catastrophe was established on the base of the State Committee on the Issues of theChernobyl Catastrophe by Law «On a list of ministries and other central state administration bodies of
the Ukrainian SSR» dated May 13, 1991, No.1030ɛ-XII at the suggestion of the Committee of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Issues of the Chernobyl Catastrophe.
The abovementioned allows referring the function of the state in overcoming the Chernobyl
catastrophe consequences to the one of the major.
The most important factor to refer one function or another to the number of the main is its
constitutional entrenchment. Unlike in the constitutions of other states of the former USSR, the functionof the state with respect to the Chernobyl catastrophe is represented in the Constitution of Ukraine:«… overcoming of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe – a catastrophe of global scale, andpreservation of the gene pool of the Ukrainian people, is the duty of the State» (Article 16).
After acceptance of Chernobyl laws and collapse of the Soviet Union, an issue emerged on
financing of the whole Chernobyl program. According to the Order No.206 of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine «About Republic Draft Budget of Ukraine for Q1 1992» dated December 20, 1991, a Fund for
Measures on Mitigating Chernobyl Accident Consequences and Social Protection of Population was
created as part of Republic Budget for 1992. This Fund received fees from enterprises and economic
organizations irrespective of subordination and proprietary forms in amount of 19% of payroll
allocating transferred sums to the product (works, services) costs. According to the Order No.2147-XIIof the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «About Order of Putting into Force the Law of Ukraine «About
Income Taxation of Enterprises and Organizations» dated February 21, 1992, the allocations to thementioned fund were assessed at amount of 12%, starting from March 1, 1992.
According to Law of Ukraine «About Fund Formation to Implement Measures on Mitigating
Chernobyl Accident Consequences and Social Protection of Population» (1997), a fee amounted to 10%
from tax entity allocating paid sums to gross expenditures of production. [14] By Decree No.857/98 of
the President of Ukraine «About Some Changes in Taxation» dated August 7, 1998, starting fromJanuary 1, 1999, fee allocation to the Fund for Measures on Mitigating Chernobyl Accident
Consequences and Social Protection of Population was stopped. The Decree established that financingof the expenditures from the Fund for Measures on Mitigating Chernobyl Accident Consequences andSocial Protection of Population is carried out at the expense of State Budget of Ukraine, particularly atthe expense of increased budget receipts coming from extended taxation base. Formation, procedure offilling and using assets of the Fund for Measures on Mitigating Chernobyl Accident Consequences andSocial Protection of Population were determined by appropriate Law of Ukraine No.1445-ɒ dated
February 10, 2000. It was defined that financing of expenditures related to mitigation of Chernobyl
accident consequences and social protection of population is carried out at the expense of the Fund for
Measures on Mitigating Chernobyl Accident Consequences and Social Protection of Population, whichis established as a part of State Budget of Ukraine. The Fund’s assets are counted to a separate accountof State Budget of Ukraine. The Ministry of Ukraine for Emergencies and Affairs on Population
Protection from the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe (ME) was determined as Fund
Administrator. [15]Therefore, a legal base for implementing national policy on protection from Chernobyl accident
consequences was gradually formed.

29

The experience in applying the requirements of Law of Ukraine «About Status and Social
Protection of Citizens Suffered from Chernobyl Accident» showed that strategic tasks relating to social
protection of affected citizens were determined correctly. This protection covers the liquidators ofaccident consequences who are liable to hazards, i.e. children and invalids, inhabitants of settlements
located within radioactive contamination areas.
This very Law determines the main provisions regarding implementation of constitutional rightof citizens suffered from Chernobyl accident for protecting their lives and health, and a single
procedure for determining status of suffered people is developed. When this Law is accepted, theGovernment started to work on preparing and putting into force subordinate legislation to implement
provisions determined by the legislation and, first of all, regarding determining status of suffered people
and organizing their social protection. It also should be mentioned that a significant part of measuresprescribed by the Law were never performed and did not meet expectations for expected outcome.
During 1996–2004, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine made some changes to the effective Law of
Ukraine «About Status and Social Protection of Citizens Suffered from Chernobyl Accident», many ofwhich concerning specifying norms of the law and expanding social protection for suffered people. Bychanging revision of the Law dated June 4, 1996, a new procedure for determining categories ofsuffered people is implemented and list of privileges and compensations for suffered children, whose
invalidity relates to Chernobyl accident, is extended. [16]Totally for 1990, regulatory and legal framework on Chernobyl accident amounts to more than
800 documents enabling to regulate different aspects of Ukrainian citizens’ vital activities as a result ofChernobyl accident.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine paid specific attention to the study of theoretical and practical issuesof legal regulation of social protection for citizens who had radiation exposure from Chernobyl accident. The
analysis of legislation regarding social protection of citizens and practice of its application, annuallyconducted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under Parliament proceedings or «The Ukrainian
Government’s Days», gives an opportunity to define new problems and propose methods for improvement.
During the Parliament proceedings devoted to 23rd anniversary of the accident, it was stated thatproblems occurred from Chernobyl accident don’t disappear over the years, but transforming. Some ofthem, first of all social and economic ones, are focused and require integrated solutions and systemapproach in the activity of executive authorities for their solutions. It was emphasized that financing of
Chernobyl programs is characterized by nonconformance of calculated volumes in the budget request to
the volumes approved in the State Budget for corresponding year. It was also decided to create at top
level Interdepartmental Commission on integrated solutions of Chernobyl problems, activity of which isplanned to aim at solving issues associated with social protection of Chernobyl people. The positivechange, first of all in assuring safety of Chernobyl NPP, was made by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
accepting two laws regarding radioactive waste management in Ukraine and above all – Law of Ukraine«On National Program for Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning and Shelter Object Transformation into
an Ecologically Safe System». [17]On January 15, 2009, the President of Ukraine has approved «National Program for Chernobyl
NPP Decommissioning and Shelter Object Transformation into Ecologically Safe System» (No.886-VI),
which gained the status of Law of Ukraine since January 1, 2010. This Program defines common
activities on Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and Shelter transformation into ecologically safe system,
approximate scopes for their financing, organizational and technical tasks.
The objective of the National Program is to ensure implementation of the state policy regarding: Preparation to decommissioning and Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and the Sheltertransformation into ecologically safe system; Ensuring protection of personnel, population and environment from ionizing radiation
exposure.

30

The completion of Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and Shelter Object transformation into
ecologically safe system requires about 100 years, therefore the Program contains primary measures tobe implemented during 2009–2012 at the stage of Chernobyl NPP shutdown and Shelter transformation
into ecologically safe system.
The Program envisages the following main activities:
1. Shutdown, preparation to decommissioning and decommissioning of Chernobyl NPP;
2. Shelter Object transformation into ecologically safe system;
3. Management of Chernobyl NPP radioactive waste accumulated during operation and to begenerated during Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and Shelter Object transformation into an
ecologically safe system;
4. Scientific-technical and informational support of activities on preparation to Chernobyl NPP
decommissioning and Shelter Object transformation into ecologically safe system, ensuringtransparency of decisions for community regarding safety assurance of activity envisaged by
the Program;
5. Social protection of Chernobyl NPP personnel and Slavutych citizens due to pre-schedule
decommissioning of Chernobyl NPP.
State legal mechanism for mitigating Chernobyl accident consequences is the main constituent ofstate legal mechanism of Ukraine. As mentioned in normative legal acts of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine, the structure of state legal mechanism for mitigating Chernobyl accident consequences is notbalanced in Ukraine to date. On one hand, regulatory support system is developed enough, but not
implemented. On the other hand, there is no system activity of the central and local executive
authorities in this area.
Initially, the Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine addressed the issues on mitigating Chernobyl
accident consequences, and since 1997, according to the Decree of the President of Ukraine No.1005/96
dated October 28, 1996, it is the Ministry of Ukraine for Emergencies and Affairs on Population
Protection from Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe. It was the major institution in the system ofother central executive authorities on ensuring implementation of state policy on mitigating Chernobyl
accident consequences. Later on, upon implementing a reform of central executive authorities, in 2004
the functions of population social protection were transferred to a Ministry of Labor and Social Policy.
This complicated the coordination on ensuring the state policy implementation in the area of solving thecomplex of Chernobyl problems. The analysis of ME activities shows that comparing with the Ministryof Chernobyl it was not able to solve full-scale problems of interaction with other state administration
bodies, control their activities on implementing the programs for mitigating accident consequences. It
should be mentioned that when Chernobyl NPP generated the electric energy, a lot of issues relating to
mitigation of Chernobyl accident consequences were succeeded. After shutdown of Chernobyl NPP
Units, the situation of issue solving on mitigating accident consequences became worse.
Mitigation of Chernobyl accident consequences is not a temporary, but purpose-driven activity of
the State intended for long-term period. Scientific feasibility and stability should become the specificfeatures of state management in mitigating Chernobyl accident consequences. Nowadays, it is required
to create such management system for mitigating Chernobyl accident consequences, which could
combine all directions of social protection, rehabilitation and development of population suffered fromthe accident consequences, ecological remediation of radioactively contaminated territories, as well as
to generalize and create efficient regulatory framework, which could regulate and ensure solving of all
problems associated with mitigation of Chernobyl accident consequences enabling to come to newphase, i.e. renewal and development phase. The main assessment of efficiency should be defined asability to achieve desired goal within scheduled terms using provided resources. In its turn, an increased
attention should be paid to the rehabilitation of suffered people. The State policy should be aimed at
reducing «victim» feeling. One should diverge from the stereotypes that only the State could solve all31issues associated with mitigation of the accident consequences. Suffered people should try to overcome
occurring obstructions by their own. Also, it is necessary to transit from risk compensation policy to thecompensations for damage done in fact.

1.5. Shelter Object construction
As a result of the accident the reactor core, considerable part of the technological equipment andconstructions of ChNPP’s Unit 4 (fig. 1.2 look the coloured inset) have been destroyed. Safety barriers
and systems protecting environment from the radionuclides, containing in irradiated nuclear fuel, havebeen destroyed.
Therefore an issue about long-term preservation of Unit 4 by construction of a structure which
would restrict release of radioactive substances and ionizing radiation outside the destroyed power Unit
was arisen directly after the accident.
«Works on disposal of ChNPP Unit 4 and constructions referred to it» had been charged to the
Ministry of medium mechanical engineering of USSR by Resolution of the Central Committee of
CPSU and Council of Ministers of USSR No 634–188 dated 29.05.86. The facility has received thename «Shelter of ChNPP Unit 4».
Another Resolution of the Central Committee of CPSU and Council of Ministers of USSR
No 663–194 dated 05.06.86 assigned functions of the General Designer of works on disposal of ChNPP
Unit 4, radioactive waste and decontamination of ChNPP industrial site equipment on VNIKIET (St.Petersburg). Kurchatov INE performed a scientific management of works on ChNPP Unit 4 disposal.
Peculiarities and complexity of works on the emergency power unit preservation consisted inabsence of experience in national and in world practice in overcoming of such large-scale accident
consequences and in absence of the special normative documents at that period of time for design
decisions development.
In view of critical importance of the Shelter object it was developed at conceptual level eighteen
options of the design, stipulated, in particular, formation of a hill from crushed stone and concrete,construction of a huge structure in the form of a curved arch or a spherical vault and other options. But
the majority of the proposed solutions required considerable construction materials consumption, andthe main thing – enormous efforts and exposure doses for the personnel and long time for theirconstruction, that didn’t correspond to the main requirement – as soon as possible to liquidate accident
consequences. Separate decisions couldn’t be realized at existed at that time level of the equipment.
Taking into account material expenses and dose loadings on the personnel and tight schedule forthe construction it has been accepted the final option of a protective construction which provided the
maximum use of the remained supporting constructions of Unit 4 as part of the Shelter object
constructional system.
Thus, building constructions of the Shelter object is a combination of «old» constructions of thedestroyed Unit 4 and «new» constructions erected after the accident.
Owning to such combination it has been erected the unique structure which constructions carryout extremely important function of a physical barrier on ways of radioactive substances and ionizing
radiation release into environment.
The basis of physical barriers is composed of the external protective constructions built after theaccident: Cascade Wall, Buttress Walls, covering of the reactor block, deaerator stack and Turbine hall(Fig. 1.3 look the coloured inset).
Relatively undamaged constructions of the Unit 4 create a basic contour supporting load bearing
elements of the covering of the reactor block and deaerator stack. First of all these are Northern andSouthern exhaust shafts, a monolithic wall on an axis 50 with an abutting frame (fig. 1.4 look thecoloured inset). The main units of beams B1 and B2 lean on these constructions. These beams together

32with a pipe covering create roof of the central part of the reactor block (in particular, above the CentralHall). Beam «Mammoth» and «Octopus» are supported by the deaerator stack constructions.
Realization of such option of a protective encasement required to resolve two the most difficult tasks: Survey of a technical condition of the remained constructions of Unit 4 in extremely difficult
radiation conditions and assessment of possibility of their use as constructional elements ofShelter object;
 Choice of such constructional and technological decisions which would allow to reduce asmuch as possible terms of Shelter object construction and to minimize radiation impact on the
personnel and environment.
Besides VNIPIET, design works in various directions were carried out by a number of design
institutes, in particular, LenPSK (St.-Petersburg), TSNIIPSK (Moscow), UKRNIIPSK (Kiev),
DneproPSK (Dnepropetrovsk) and other institutes.
To perform building and installation works on the emergency Unit preservation and Shelter
object construction in the system of the Ministry of medium mechanical engineering of USSR it has
been specially created Construction Management No 605.
Supporting facilities were constructed within the shortest terms: bases of supply, base on
maintenance of motor transport and construction machinery, concrete plants, points of building
materials acceptance and unloading and other facilities.
Children pioneer camp, recreation facilities, schools have been adapted for accommodation of theworking personnel, tent towns and promptly mounted construction were created. Canteens and sanitaryand-hygienic facility have been organized.
These facilities were located taking into account radiation condition of territories and availabilityof transport communications. The personnel were daily delivered by «clean» transport to change point
to special transport maintaining restricted area. All motor transport left a restricted area, was subject toa radiation control and, if necessary, decontamination at specialized entry-exit points.
To ensure efficiency and safety of works on preservation of the emergency Unit prior to themajor constructional and installation works it has been performed the complex of measures fordecontamination of surrounding territory. Fragments of the reactor core (fragments of fuel assemblies,
graphite and constructional materials of the reactor), fire fighting vehicles and other equipment,elements of the destroyed constructions and the technological equipment, the top contaminated layer ofearth have been removed. These works were carried out using the special engineer vehicles created on
the basis of tanks and equipped with protective shielding, clamshell, technical television and devices for
detection of local ionizing radiation sources and the bulldozers equipped with protective shielding.
After completion of works on removal of a radioactive waste the territory around the emergency power
unit was covered with a concrete layer in the thickness up to 0.5 m.
The construction along the perimeter of the emergency power unit so-called pioneer walls whichwith shielding function was other essential factor of radiation conditions improvement. Besides, thespace behind pioneer walls was used for disposal of a radioactive waste, collected from surrounding
territory.
Works on decontamination of surrounding territory and creation of protective pioneer walls
allowed to start performance of the main complex of constructional and erection works for the Shelter
object construction.
Construction of the Shelter object in extremely difficult radiation conditions required to develop
and introduce such organizational and technological decisions which as maximum as possible would
provide radiation protection of the personnel.
The main actions for radiation protection of the personnel consisted in realization of radiation
survey of working areas, use of various types of shielding and application of remote controlled
technologies for performance of works in the most hazardous radiation conditions.

33

The technology of installation with use of the large-sized constructions, which were assembled in«clean» zone was extremely effective and permitted remote installation. Constructions were designedwith connection units for which it wasn’t need to perform the operations connected with presence ofpeople directly in an installation zone.
To manage installation process the central operative station was established. The informationfrom the television cameras mounted directly at levers of cranes and special at towers installed in places
with the maximum overlook come to this station.
Special technologies of timbering installation and concreting with remote use of pumps forconcrete mix submission have been also introduced.
To ensure radiation protection of the personnel the complex of organizational, radiological andhygienic and technical measures was carried out, in particular:
 permanent monitoring of radiation conditions at ChNPP area and at adjacent territories; the organization of a sanitary access control;
 personnel provision with necessary individual protection equipment (working clothes,
respirators and another); individual radiation control; shielding of a vehicle cabs and devices; dust suppression in works performance zones and at surrounding area; decontamination of vehicles and mechanisms;
 arrangements for nutrition in «clean» zone.
Construction and erection works were carried out with use of unique for that time vehicles
and mechanisms, in particular: caterpillar cranes «Demag» with weight-lifting capacity on the mainlever up to 650 tons and on auxiliary lever – 112 tons with out-in 78 m; automobile cranes«Liebherr«, pumps for concrete mix submission of firms «Schwing», «Putzmester», «Worthington»
and other cars and the mechanisms which have been equipped additionally with remote control andprotection frames [1].
The general view of the Shelter object construction is provided at Fig. 1.5 (look the coloured inset).
In process of Shelter object construction it has been laid down about 345 thousand m3 of concrete
mix and mounted 7 thousand tons of metal constructions [1].
Beside the construction and erection works the considerable scope of works has been executedfor creation of necessary systems for Shelter object safe operation (ventilation, power supply,
firefighting system, monitoring system and others).
Designing and construction of the Shelter object have been carried out for record short term –only for half-year. The Certificate of the State Commission about Shelter object acceptance formaintenance has been signed on November 30th, 1986.
Construction of the Shelter object became the essential result of urgent measures implementation
for minimization of the consequences of beyond designed accident at ChNPP Unit 4.
At the same time the Shelter object isn’t the facility created according to designing, construction,commissioning and operation rules and norms referring not only to nuclear installations or Radioactive
Waste Management facilities, but also to usual industrial facilities. Its building constructions don’t meetthe safety requirements specified in normative and technical documents in terms of structural integrity
and reliability and have uncertain term of operation.
Following basic demerits are characteristic to Shelter object building constructions:
 supporting constructions of support contour (remained constructions of Unit 4) andconnection joints are significantly damaged, overloaded by the weight of the dropped
constructions and the equipment, and by materials used during the accident liquidation. The
bared armature of reinforced concrete constructions and metal constructions are exposed tocorrosion;34

 reliability and durability of supporting constructions of a support contour can’t be credibly
identified in the absence of access to many elements and units and hazardous radiation
conditions doesn’t allowing to perform their detailed survey;
 the structures constructed after the accident are separated – not connected among themselves,
freely lean on the supporting constructions without physical connection and are kept indesigned position (welding or bolted connections of supporting parts of constructions areabsent); difficult access to metal constructions elements and units for periodic survey and corrosionresistant coating refreshment.
These lacks lead to the Shelter object safety level decreasing in time. Process of building
constructions degradation continues. There is a high probability of constructions collapse, which canlead to considerable radioactive contamination of surrounding environment, and personnel andpopulation exposure.
All that demands permanent supervision for the status of Shelter object constructions, importantfor safety, and intrusion in case of threat occurrence of their condition dangerous deviation from stable.
Therefore surveys of building constructions condition and implementation of urgent measures for theirstrengthening have been started immediately after completion of Shelter object construction.

35

2. RADIOECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES.
RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION DYNAMICS OF TERRESTRIALECOSYSTEMS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES EFFICIENCY
2.1. General characteristics of radioactive contamination in atmosphere,soil, surface water and groundwater
2.1.1. Scales and characteristics of the area contamination
by Chernobyl fallout radionuclides
As a result of the Chernobyl disaster, a considerable territory of the Soviet Union, particularly of
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, as well of Western Europe, primarily the Scandinavian countries and the
Alpine region, was the most severely contaminated. High levels of radioactive contamination in theareas outside the Chernobyl NPP Exclusion Zone are preconditioned by the following: release ofcontaminated masses into the atmosphere to a height of 2000 m and their intense movement at these
altitudes; rainfalls; presence of complex landscapes that dictated changes in directions and altitudes of
the contaminated air masses travelling.
The height of radioactivity release stipulated a global character of contamination, rains andlandscapes conditioned heterogeneity (spottiness) in contamination of the lands [1].
The precipitation falling during movement of contaminated clouds over the territory of Ukraine,
particularly in Narodytskyi and Lugynskyi districts (rayons) of Zhytomyr Oblast (province), southern
districts of Kyiv Oblast, in Cherkasy Oblast, in Podillia and Prykarpattia preconditioned formation ofareas with elevated levels of 134,137Cs. The same weather event caused washout of radioactive substances
and aerosols from the troposphere and formation of areas with high levels of radioactive contaminationon the territory of Belarus, Russia, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Slovenia, Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia [2].
Formation of 131ȱ and 137Cs local contamination maximum in the foothills of the Alps, theBalkans, i.e. at a distance of 800 – 1 400 km from the Chernobyl NPP, was also caused by verticalmovement of air flows that are typical for mountain groups.
The overall area of Western Europe countries, where levels of 137Cs contamination exceeded 20
kBq·m-2 (almost 10-fold higher that the global background) due to the Chernobyl disaster, amounted toapproximately 280 000 km2 [2].
Almost 75% of Ukraine’s territory suffered from radioactive contamination by 137Cs, which
exceeded the pre-accident levels more than twofold. The total activity of 137Cs that was located outside
the Shelter Object (excluding the activity that was located in the form of radioactive waste in theappropriate storage facilities and on temporary storage sites) exceeded 13 PBq [1, 2]. Analysis of 131ȱand 137Cs correlation in the damaged reactor releases and study of its spread during the early stage ofaccident allowed to state that over a half of Ukraine’s child population were subject to adverse effectsof iodine radioactive isotopes [3].
The natural processes of radionuclides decay, which were taking place in the course of 25 years
after the Chernobyl accident, substantially corrected a pattern of radionuclide distribution overUkraine’s territory (Fig. 2.1–2.10). Over this period, the area of localities, where 137Cs contaminationlevels exceeded 10 kBq·m-2, reduced almost twofold (Table 2.1). The area of sites, where 90Sr

36

contamination exceeded 4 kBq·m-2, is now more than 3 times less, i.e. practically 90% of Ukraine’s
territory is characterized by the pre-accident levels of 90Sr contamination [3].
Table 2.1.
The area of Ukraine’s territory contamination by 137Cs in 1986 and in 2011, thousand km2
Republic, Oblast

Oblastarea

Autonomous Republicof Crimea

27.0

Vinnytsia

26.5

Volyn

20.2

Dnipropetrovsk

31.9

Donetsk

26.5

Zhytomyr

29.9

Zakarpattia

12.8

Zaporizhzhia

27.2

Ivano-Frankivsk

13.9

Kirovohrad

24.6

Kyiv

28.9

Lugansk

26.7

Lviv

21.8

Mykolaiv

24.6

Odesa

33.3

Poltava

28.8

Rivne

20.1

Sumy

23.8

Ternopil

13.8

Kharkiv

31.4

Kherson

28.5

Khmelnytskyi

20.6

Cherkasy

20.9

Chernivtsi

8.1

Year

1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011

Area of the territory with the following 137Cs contamination
density, kBq·m-2<2
2 – 10
10 – 40
40 – 185
185 – 555
> 555

0.3
14.8
0.3
2.7
0.3
2.0
8.2
15.5

0.5
2.3
0.5
3.9
0.9
11.1
0.1
1.6
0.1
1.3

2.2
17.5
7.7
0.1
4.7

0.1
1.5
3.6
7.9

0.9
1.7
8.6
0.5

26.1
12.2
16.9
19.0
12.7
14.9
18.9
15.5
11.6
20.7
9.5
13.6
11.0
8.8
24.6
16.0
5.1
8.4
17.8
21.4
3.4
8.3
1.6
19.2
19.6
4.3
23.4
16.7
29.7
28.0
26.5
28.8
6.4
8.6
16.4
18.0
7.2
4.1
14.0
29.1
27.4
7.3
14.2
10.3
7.6
11.3
3.8
5.8

0.6
7.6
4.6
7.0
3.3
4.8
0.9
14
5.8
8.9
6.2
1.3
0.1
1.7
0.1
8.3
3.8
6.5
1.9
14.1
14.4
25.1
7.5

1.7
0.2
0.2

0.9
8.7
6.3

1.7
1.1

0.64
0.33

8.8
4.6

1.6
0.9

1.0
0.70

5.8
7.9
6.5
4.0
2.7
1.8
17.4
2.3
0.2

7.8
3.6
0.8
0.3
0.3

0.1

4.4
1.6
8.2
7.2
3.9
2.2

0.3
0.1
4.9
1.9
0.4
0.1

0.4
0.1
0.2

1.2
0.2
3.5
0.6
2.3

0.2

37

Oblastarea

Republic, Oblast

Chernihiv

31.9

Exclusion Zone

2.6*

Total, in Ukraine

603.7

Area of the territory with the following 137Cs contamination
density, kBq·m-2<2
2 – 10
10 – 40
40 – 185
185 – 555
> 555

Year

1986
2011
1986
2011
1986
2011

0.6
5.3

20.4
130.1

16.5
17.1

12.6
8.3

371.9
367.4

0.5
168.6
84.7

2.1
1.2
0.8
0.8
37.5
18.4

0.1
0.9
0.8
3.7
2.0

0.86
0.5
1.6
1.1

* – area of the Exclusion Zone and the zone of mandatory resettlement located in Kyiv Oblast.

Actually, the level and scale of Ukraine’s territory contamination by Pu isotopes have notchanged. 241Am activity is gradually increasing due to 241Pu decay; and the area of its distribution,
where levels exceed 0.2 kBq·m-2, shall be 30% wider than the area of plutonium isotopes fallout having
the same density [3]. The Ukraine’s area contaminated by 90Sr, 241Am, Pu isotopes [1, 3] is substantiallysmaller than the one contaminated by 137Cs. Since an overwhelming majority of these radionuclides has
penetrated into the atmosphere during the first (explosive) and the third (high-temperature) phases of
the accident and were associated with hot particles [4], they are the most widespread within the
Exclusion Zone boundaries [3].
Polissia (northern districts of Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, and Chernihiv Oblasts) is referredto the worst affected areas in Ukraine in terms of negative effects produced by radioactive
contamination. The effective legislation states that in 1991–1993 2052 settlements or almost 90% of a
total number of habitats on the abovementioned territory were classified as radioactive contamination
zones (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2.
Quantity of settlements that may be referred to radioactive contamination zones
as per zones demarcation criteria stipulated by the effective legislation
Per dosimetric rating
No.

Oblast1
2
3

Vinnytsia
Volyn
ZhytomyrIvanoFrankivsk
Kyiv
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Khmelnytskyi
Cherkasy
Chernivtsi
Chernihiv
Total

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

I

II

1

III

IV

76
80

90
126

4
75
1

20
167
1

1

1

1
237

42
437

Per radionuclides contamination density

V

total

89
490

89
166
696

5

5

446
96
9
10
9
102
14
210
1480

470
339
11
10
9
103
14
253
2165

I

II

11

Classified
as the
zones

III

IV

V

total

45

31
9
371

58
157
307

89
166
734

89
166
734

4

1

5

5

189
133
6
5
6
57
10
80
901

286
206
5
5
3
46
4
172
1250

560
339
11
10
9
103
14
253
2293

560
339
11
10
9
103
14
253
2293

20

11

54

20

22

1
96

Whereas an average predicted effective equivalent dose of human exposure was the main
criterion for classification of the settlements as referring to zone III (of guaranteed voluntary
resettlement), the most part of habitats belonging to zone II (of absolute (mandatory) resettlement) wererespectively classified by the Resolutions of Ukraine’s Governments adopted in 1989–1990 basing on
contamination density assessments and estimated exposure dose and with due regard to geographicaland administrative links. The key criterion for compiling a list of the population centres referred to zone
IV (of enhanced radioecology monitoring) was the density of 137Cs contamination in the area. The
Exclusion Zone, or zone I, was established on the territory, from where people were evacuated in late38April and in the first week of May in 1986 (mainly out of the 30-km zone surrounding the ChNPP). The
evacuation was grounded on the estimated exposure dose rates and on the uncertainty about an absolute
stoppage of releases from the destroyed ChNPP Unit 4.
A high level of radioactive contamination is not always a reason of radioecological problems.
Such a conclusion may be justified by a comparison of the dosimetric rating results and contamination
density data. Since, in the case there are soils with greater bioavailability of 137Cs, the areas withrelatively moderate (even less than 37 kBq·m-2) levels of 137Cs contamination may become critical for
living activities. For instance, a large part of woods is referred to the areas, where low-level 137Cs
contamination caused excess content of 137Cs in forest grass and food stuff (mushrooms, berries) that
surpasses the levels stipulated by PL-2006 [5].
With a glance to the fact that radioactive contamination density has significantly decreased over
the years, as a result of radionuclide natural decay, the positioning of population centres has alsochanged as far as zoning criteria are concerned (Table 2.2).
In 25 years after the accident, the radioecological conditions improved significantly, as compared
to 1986 and 1991. In the meantime, within the boundaries of zone III (today encompassing the area ofalmost 200 population centres) still necessary are the measures aimed at reduction of the exposure doses
potentially absorbed by public due to consumption of locally produced food.
Severely contaminated (over 1.5 MBq·m-2 of 137Cs) localities (almost 300 km2) within theboundaries of Exclusion Zone shall remain uninhabitable for hundreds of years. These water-producing
areas shall remain a long-term source of surface water and groundwater contamination due to surface
washout and vertical migration, respectively.
Radioactive contamination of the atmospheric boundary layer
After a rapid increase in air contamination in April 1986 resulting from radionuclide release fromthe damaged reactor and starting from 1989, a total E-activity of atmospheric aerosols is being primarily
caused by naturally-occurring radioactive elements, which activity in the atmospheric boundary layer is
now almost an order of magnitude higher than the man-caused component (Fig. 2.11–2.12). Recently, a
total E-activity in terms of absolute values is even slightly lower than the one during the pre-accident
years due to a reduced lift of soil particles by wind caused by the area overgrowing [6].
Kyiv
RakhivChornobyl
average for Ukraine

Concentration, 105 Bq/m3

Baryshivka
Odesa
Sevastopol
Shepetivka
ShchorsmonthFig. 2.11. Fluctuation of levels for a monthly average value of specific total E-activity (10-5 Bq·m-3)
in the atmospheric boundary layer on Ukraine’s territory

39

Therewith, seasonal variability limits of volumetric radioactivity levels are single-order in someyears. These differences (Fig. 2.12) in the levels of aerosols’ natural radioactivity depend on manyfactors, and not least is the Earth’s tectonic activity, as well as weather conditions and a state of soil
surface layer, its susceptibility to wind erosion, and other factors [7].
In the areas subject to radioactive contamination resulting from the Chernobyl disaster, wherelands were removed from agricultural use and farming operations (ploughing, harrowing, etc.) are
actually not performed, thereby increasing susceptibility of the soil surface layer to erosion(Chernobyl), the total E-activity is 2–3 times less than the one observed in the areas that are notclassified as the radioactive contamination zones (Shchors, Shepetivka), even under adverse weather
conditions.
Beta-activity (2009)average for Ukraine in 2009
Beta-activity (2008)

Concentration, 105 Bq/m3

average for Ukraine in 2008

month

Fig. 2.12. Seasonal variations of a value for a total volumetric beta-activity of aerosolsin the air on average in Ukraine in 2009 compared to 2008.

At the same time, resuspension in the near-surface air layer has produced high levels of mancaused radionuclide concentrations in the structure of aerosols in the contaminated areas, if compared to
the rest of Ukraine (Fig. 2.13).
In case of intense works involving destruction of a soil surface layer, where 137Cs contaminationlevel is 370–555 kBq·m-2, the radionuclide volumetric activity in aerosols at a height of 3–5 m may
exceed the permissible limits established by NRSU-97 [8].
Starting with 1998, average annual concentrations of 137Cs and 90Sr in aerosols are varying within
the range similar to the pre-accidental one, i.e. 0.08·10-5 Bq·m-3 [9]. At the same time, absolute levels of
air contamination by 137Cs and 90Sr are 4–5 orders of magnitude lower than the permissible
concentrations (NRSU-97).
In due course, concentrations of accidental radionuclides in the air will be slowly decreasing due
to both their natural decay and further penetration into soil.

40

Concentration, 105 Bq/m3

Area with density of soil
contamination > 5 Ci/sq.km (Chornobyl)
Area with density of soil contamination< 0,5 Ci/sq.km
average for Ukraine

month
137

Fig. 2.13. Annual course of Cs concentrations in aerosols, averaged
for the areas with different soil contamination levels

In most of the country, the exposure dose rate of J-radiation (J-background) is within the levels
driven by natural radioactive isotopes and cosmic radiation, and in various areas it amounts to 5–
21 PR·year-1 (depending on natural differences). At the check pints located in the area contaminated as aresult of the ChNPP accident (outside the Exclusion Zone and the zone of absolute (mandatory)
resettlement), the average monthly level of J-background varied within a range of 7–33 PR·year-1, themaximum levels were observed in Korosten (33 PR·year-1).
During a year, J-background in Kyiv was recorded within a range of 8–18 PR·year-1, amounting
to 12 PR·year-1 on average. i.e. it was within the limits of natural background.
Radioactive contamination of surface and underground waters
Since initial period followed the accident, implementation of water protection activities havebeen considering as a priority for the Governmental action plan. In a history of post-Chernobyl
protective took place an effective as well as the incorrect actions, which have not achieved the purpose –to decrease the radioactive contamination of the surface water bodies and consequently radiation risks
due to water consumption and water use by the people leaving at the affected areas. A number ofreviews and scientific studies were devoted to the detailed analysis of these actions.
In the first years after the accident the number of water protective dams having adsorption
filtering body, have been constructed at the many small rivers, the sediment traps at the Pripyat river
have been constructed downstream of the contaminated floodplain near outlet of the Pripyat river to theKiev reservoir.
However, since several years after the accident, the most of small dams installed at the small rivers
were demolished because, dose reduction effects of these facilities have been estimated as very low and havebeen evaluated as inefficient in terms of radiological risk reduction and economical factors.
During the initial post-accidental period, a relatively significant contribution to the human
exposure associated with aquatic pathways was primarily caused by high 131I content in the water, andin particular in the Kyiv water intake [10–12]. Eventually, such radionuclides as 137Cs and 90Sr, whichhave been washed out from the contaminated catchments and river flood plains and transported over41

considerable distances (up to 1000 km), become predominated in the surface water contamination.
Direct fallouts of aerosols to the surface of Kiev and other reservoirs and deposition of thecontaminated suspended particles from the river’s flows onto the bottom, have been formed the initial
picture of the bottom sediment contamination in the Dnieper’s reservoirs. The most of 137Cs activity that
has inlet to the Dnipro cascade has been accumulated in the bottom sediment of Kyiv Reservoir, while
dissolved 90Sr was relatively easily transported by water flows into the Black Sea [10, 13].
The radiation monitoring studies at the surface water and groundwater in the affected areas due toChernobyl accident has been carried out during all whole period passed after the accident [10, 14, 15].
The mathematical models to predict possible long-term consequences and calculate potential exposure
doses for the variety of potentially affected population groups that use water from the Dnipro reservoirs
were developed [12, 14, 16]. Analysis of estimated long-term radiological risks caused bycontamination of the water indicated that critical groups, in terms of potentially increased exposure
through the waterways, included only fishermen’s subject to their consumption of fish from the closed
lakes located in the contaminated areas close to the damaged reactor. The estimated radiological risks
for Ukrainian population due to water consumption were assessed to be relatively low [10, 14].
At the same time, due to Dniper river contaminated occurred to be psychotically sensitive for the
million of peoples leaving along the Dnieper’s cascade and created inadequate perception of theradiation risks forming, the limited number of priority water protective actions, which have been
executed in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, appeared quite justified taking into consideration social andeconomical expediency.
For justification of the water protection strategies in the Chernobyl exclusion zone the methodology
based on collective dose assessment over 70 years of potential exposures due to all actual aquatic pathway,
probabilistic models for long-term water system trend estimation have been applied [12, 14, 16]. The
strategy such as most contaminated flood plain damming at the Chernobyl exclusion zone has been chosentaking into account radiological, social and economic criteria of its expected efficiency.
A perfect example of comprehensive justification and social appropriateness of the actions wereconstruction at the Chernobyl close-in zone the flood protection dams. In 1992–1994 and then during
1999–2000, the dams were built around the most contaminated floodplain sites within the Chernobyl
exclusion zone. The dams made possible to control the most contaminated lands flooding and theradionuclide washout from the left and right banks of the riverside.
No large-scale water protection activities were performed within the Exclusion Zone after 2000.
With-in the objective to mitigate further contamination of water bodies after 2000 the only hydrologicalremediation actions were carrying out: such as runoff regulation by means of hydraulic engineering
facilities in the most severely contaminated areas, support of anti-erosion measures through forestationof the rivers’ catchments and flood plains, installing the barriers to prevent radionuclide migration into
the groundwater from the radioactive temporary waste disposal sites, development of observation
networks for the groundwater contamination, and maintenance of the existing dams and water
protective activities.
The long-term radioecological studies within the Chernobyl exclusion Zone demonstrate thatnatural attenuation processes at the contaminated areas are the major factors contributing to reduction in
the aquatic system radioactive contamination [18, 19].
Radioactive contamination of surface water
Results of observations confirm that radiation condition of the water bodies located in the area
affected by the ChNPP accident has become steady and is predictable now. With regard to all water
bodies, a strong tendency towards a decrease in radionuclide ambient activity and its fluctuations are ofseasonal nature. Relatively high levels of radionuclide activity are still observed in the Pripyat Riverand in other waterways within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (50–300 Bq·m-3 for 90Sr, 20–80 Bq·m-3

42Activity, kBq m-3

for 137Cs). At the same time, 90Sr content in the Pripyat River is about 1.0–1.5 orders of magnitude
lower than allowable levels of radionuclides for the drinking water (2000 Bq·m-3) established in
Ukraine. The data on Fig. 2.14 presents the temporal variation dynamics of 137Cs and 90Sr activity in the
Pripyat River (at the Chernobyl exclusion zone).
The data provided by Central geophysical observatory, which belongs to Hydro-meteorologicalservice of Ukraine, reports that during 2008–2009 the radionuclide concentrations in the Kyiv Reservoir for90
Sr varied in range 40 and 100 Bq·m-3 and for 137Cs the values were observing as 10–20 Bq·m-3, while in the
Kakhovka Reservoir (lowest in the cascade of Dnieper reservoirs) the activities of 137Cs varied in range 0.5–
1.0 Bq·m-3. For the period followed the Chernobyl accident (1986) up to 2000-2004, the content of 137Cs inmost of Ukrainian rivers (lower reservoirs on the Dnipro River, the Desna River, the Pivdennyi Bug and the
Danube River) have reduced to a pre-accident level such as 0.5–1.5 Bq·m-3 [20]. This fact demonstrates theeffects of natural attenuation process such as radionuclide vertical migration and its irreversible fixation bysoil particles, which annually reducing the content of radionuclides in the upper superficial layer of soil.
Accordingly, radionuclides washout in the rivers is constantly decreasing.

Year

Outlet, x1012 Bq

a

Year

b
Fig. 2.14. Annually averaged activities of 137Cs and 90Sr in the Pripyat River (ɚ) and annual valuesof radionuclides inlet to the Kyiv reservoir (b) Data of the Chernobyl ‘Ecocentre’ and UHMI)

43

Activity, kBq m-3

On a background of reduction of carrying out radionuclides by surface runoff, the annual
infiltration outlet of contaminated water from the Chernobyl cooling pond remains more or less stable,
making its relative contribution to the Pripyat River contamination in comparison to surface runoff
higher. However, the infiltration flux of radionuclides from the cooling pond to the Pripyat River and
the Kiev reservoir remains insignificant [20, 21].
A Significant increase the radionuclide inlet to the Pripyat river with groundwater at the mostcontaminated part of the Chernobyl exclusion zone is not expecting in the coming years. Relatively
high contamination is still remains in the lakes situated in surrounding area around ChNPP [21, 22].
Particularly, there are no significant reductions of 90Sr in the Gluboke Lake and in the cooling pondover the last decade (Fig. 2.15).

Date

Activity, kBq m-3

a

Date

b
Fig. 2.15. Dynamics of 137Cs and 90Sr activity (kBq·m-3 ) concentrations in the Glyboke Lake (ɚ)
and in the Chernobyl cooling pond (b).

44

Nevertheless in the future some increase of 90Sr can take place at the closed water bodies (mainly
lakes situated flood plain and area adjacent to Chernobyl NPP industrial site), in which bottom
sediments a significant amount of nuclear fuel particles still well preserved till to now) [23].
Therefore at present time the only regulation of the runoff and water drainages at thecontaminated areas in order to prevent its significant inundation such as the forestation at the mostcontaminated catchments and floodplains, and also controlled natural attenuation process at the mostcontaminated wetlands and lakes can be considering as reasonable achievable remediation actions [19].
Enhancing and optimization of the monitoring network at the most contaminated areas around
ChNPP industrial site such as extension of the automatic hydrological stations and developing
specialized groundwater observational wells have been carried out and to be continued as part ofremediation strategy in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. The analytical laboratory of Chernobyl Ecocentre
is also under its developing. These actions as it expected will allow improving the quality andconsistency of the monitoring data needed for efficient safe management at the Chernobyl exclusionzone. Supporting the environment monitoring network and reliable data collections in the future will beneeded if consider the Chernobyl exclusion zone at this late post-accident period also as unique test site
for validation and development of radionuclide transport and radioecological models.
Drawing up and Evaluating Remediation Strategies for Chernobyl cooling pond. Subsequent to
the last reactor Unit of ChNPP shutdown in 2000, the need in the cooling pond water decreased to aminimum. The cut-off of two canals used to join the pond and ChNPP, and using the canals as fireprotective ones ensures satisfaction of the NPP’s current demand for cooling water. At the same time,
the annual expenses needed to maintain safe condition of the pond is rather high (estimating about
2 millions of UA hryvna per year). The expenses on maintaining stable state of the dam, repairs ofpumping equipment and drainage systems, cost of electric power, etc. are expected to be increased in
the future. Therefore, the ChNPP top managers in agreement with the Regulatory bodies decided to
begin preparation to decommissioning the cooling pond. At the moment the preparedness actions
include developing FS (feasibility studies) EIA (environment impact assessment) and modernization of
the observational network on in the cooling pond and surrounding areas, which will become invalid
within few several years after declining of water level.
Due to significant radioactive contamination of the bottom sediment its safe decommissioning
should be well justified and also regulatory and socially approved. The accident-caused fallout of agreat amount of dispersed nuclear fuel particles, which were fallen down in aerosols to the surface ofthe cooling pond from the damaged reactor and discharge of heavily contaminated process water fromthe ChNPP industrial site through the sewage system have been a reason of a significant radioactive
contamination of the cooling pond [24–29]. The assessments carried out by the UHMI during recent
decade indicate that silt at the cooling pond bottom contains approximately 280 TBq of 137Cs, 42 TBq
of 90Sr and 0.75 TBq of Pu isotopes.
It is expected that as result of stop of the water pumping to the cooling pond from the Pripyat
River, the water level in the pond will be reduced on 6–7 m due to natural filtration of water through the
dam’s body to the river and its evaporation from the surface. The process may last for about 5–6 years.
Afterwards, the water level in the submerged floodplains and lakes that will occur in natural lowlandsof the river’s former floodplain instead of the presently existing cooling pond will depend on the waterlevel in the Pripyat River bed, because they will be hydraulically connected.
As a result, in place of the currently existing cooling pond there should emerge three specificzones, including: a completely drained one (the bottom surface, with absolute altitude ranging between
103–104 and 110.5 m); a transition zone that will be like wetland in high water periods and almost
dewatered during dry summer and low-water seasons; and also lakes, which will be created in place ofthe former floodplain lakes submerged by the elevated water level in the existing cooing pond water45

body. (Fig. 2.16 look the coloured inset). The totally drained area will occupy about 10-12 km2 (50–
60 % of the current area of the cooling pond’s bottom) presently containing almost 15–17 % of 137Cs,
20 % of 90Sr and 12 % of Ɋu isotopes.
Simulation results of the new expected landscape to be created after declining of the cooling
pond, indicate that as result of decommissioning of the pond, most of the radionuclides (75–85 %activities) will remained in the bottom sediment of the new created lakes and wetlands and only about
20–25% of the existing amount of radionuclides in the bottom sediment at present condition will bepotentially exposed for potential wind re-suspension and external expose on the dried bottom surface.
The carried out assessment show that the relatively high contaminated water of the cooling pond,
which will inlet to the Pripyat River as result of its natural infiltration will not create additional
contamination of the rivers and also will not produce any significant negative ecological effects for the
Kiev reservoir aquatic ecosystem.
The total amount of water which is as expected will outlet from the cooling pond due to natural
filtration is estimated to be approximately 60–70 million m3 having activities of 137Cs and 90Sr about 2–
2.5 kBq·m-3. These waters will be dissolved in the huge amount of the Pripyat and Dnieper water andwill not be detectable as increasing of existing low and safe level of the radionuclides in Kiev reservoir.
A loss in the cooling pond’s water volume may result in some activity increase (mainly 90Sr) in residual
water masses, and subsequently in the small water bodies that will form subject to the bottom
topography and water levels. Anyway, once the cooling pond’s water level starts lowering, the annual
seepage discharge of activity into the river will be continuously decreasing.
A possible wind re-suspension and dispersion of the potentially high contaminated dust particles
from the dried bottom sediment and potential fire of the dried vegetation, which as expected will benaturally covered the dewatered bottom sediment relief of the cooling pond are considering as a majorrisk factor to be assessed at the stage of justifying possible needs in application of mitigate measures toprevent negative effect the cooling pond decommissioning, when water level will be declined.
A feature of the case, which was taken into account, are phenomena of fine fuel particles presents
in the bottom sediments that are associated with a silt particulate phase of bottom sediments, whichhave fairly well preserved their structure and integrity over the post-accident period [26–28] incomparison to the «hot particles», which already almost dissolved in the soils at the lands adjacent tothe cooling ponds. It is expected that once the cooling pond’s bottom is partially drained the preserved
till now «hot particles» will be exposing by weathering condition and will rapidly fail [26].
Consequently it will increase their availability for re-suspension and dispersion by wind to adjacentareas. Preliminary assessment of radiological risks for the people, working within the exclusion zone
during possible wind storms condition, which was carried out as a part of preliminary EIA (Kashparovat all, 2001) show that contribution of radionuclide dispersion to the additional contamination of theadjacent area due to aerosol fallout having specific origin at the cooling pond dried area will beinsignificant as well as its expose effects [27]. Gradually, the cooling pond’s surface will overgrow withherbaceous vegetation and with wild willow species that are typical for the area [28], thus mitigatingtransport of radioactive dust particles from the water surface by wind.
Bottom sediment of the Dnipro river Reservoirs. Throughout the whole post-accident period,
ɋs and 90Sr transport delivering into the Kyiv Reservoir by the Pripyat and Dnipro Rivers water havebeen monitored [13, 23, 30]. The spatial distributions of 137Cs and amounts of 137Cs accumulated at thebottom sediment have been studied and estimated for each particular reservoir, based on
implementation of the number of sampling surveys performed by the UHMI during first decadefollowed the accident (1989–1996) [13, 30].
The carried out assessment published [30] show that total inventory of 137Cs and 90Sr in thebottom sediment of reservoirs is gradually reducing since 1990, due to radioactive decay which become
dominated natural attenuation process in surpasses the annul income of radionuclides with river’s runoff

137

46

inlet and continues partly removal of radionuclides from water column to the bottom due to adsorption
sedimentation process.
During the first decade followed the accident, approximately 70 % of 137Cs and 90 % of 90Sr total
income to the Dnipro reservoirs system, were accumulated by the bottom sediment of the Kyiv
Reservoir and in particular in its upper section which accept major part of inlet from the Pripyat Riversediment load. The suspended particles being delivered by the river’s to the upper part of the Kiev
Reservoir have been deposited at the local bottom depressions or old river channels and as result thearea, where contaminated silt particles have been accumulating, become a local hot spots having local
formation of the relatively high radioactive contamination. The years with low-water runoff, thatobserved during period since 1986 till 1993 have contributed to steady local processes of radionuclides
accumulation in the upper part of the reservoir. Instead, during later period having relatively high floods
in 1994 (summer rain flood), and specially as a result of high spring flood, which took place in 1999,
and in 2005, a number of sites, which characterized by relatively steady accumulation rates in the low
water seasons, were flushed by water high floods. Impacted by flash river’s floods, the mostcontaminated fine silt particles have been suspended and transported to the middle and lower parts of
the Kyiv Reservoir, where these particles deposited again in the deepened sites become unavailable forsignificant hydrodynamic stressing.
The recent carried out studies of the radionuclide vertical distribution in the accumulated bottom
sediment columns t the sites with typical condition for sedimentation have indicated a significant
change in spatial distribution of radioactive contamination at the Kiev reservoir, which took place
during passed 15–20. The UHMI survey carried out during 2008–2009 show, that the deposited silt
sediments layers in the central and lower sectors of the Kyiv Reservoir were increased on deep watersites significantly up to 25 sm. Accordingly the radionuclide accumulation density per a unit of thebottom area has also augmented (Fig. 2.17). Consequently, caesium-137 contamination densities atsome particular areas have been increased from 185 kBq·m-2 in 1994 to 610 kBq·m-2 in 2009.
Simultaneously, the sites in the upper sector of the reservoir, where the highest contamination levels
were observed during the first years of the contamination formation, were subject to a significant
cleanup due to hydrodynamic factors impact.

Layers of silt sediments for 1994, cm

Layers of silt sediments for 2009, cm

Activity, kBq kg-1

Fig. 2.17. Vertical distribution of 137Cs in the silt sediment located at the lower sectionof the Kyiv Reservoir in 1994 and 200947

Generally, a radioactive contamination pattern of the reservoir bottom became more contrast.
Shallow water sites of the bottom (0–5 m) became cleaner; on medium depth sites (5–9 m) the
contamination density is approximately the same as it was in early 90th; and on deep water sites the total
amount of Chernobyl-originated radionuclides has increased.
The total radionuclide activity is still reducing due to radioactive decay. Actually, the nuclides
that are strongly occluded in bottom silt particles no longer impact contamination of the water masses.
Beneficial is the fact that current status of the bottom silt radioactive contamination has verged
towards a steady equilibrium condition, as most of the sludge contaminated during the initial postaccident period has moved to the zones of steady (stable) accumulation.
Presumably, a process of contaminated sediment covering with a layer of more clean materials, which
will be delivering to the most contaminated bottom sediment area, will play a role of natural attenuation
processes as well. The sources of relatively clean particulate materials suspended materials contributing due
to coastal and catchments erosion. In the next decade sedimentation factor will play a predominant role tocreate relatively clean sediment layer forming above the buried radioactive contaminated particles at the
deepest areas of the Kiev reservoir. It is very important now to fix the current situation by a repeated surveyof the bottom sediment contamination picture as an intermediate phase on the way of achieving the end-sateof the natural attenuation in self remediation of the Kiev reservoir bottom. Results of such the survey will
also assist in making more accurate calibration of the mathematical models for radionuclide migration insuch system as «catchment-water – suspended particles – bottom sediment» as a basis for developing tools
for safety assessment and radionuclide transport modelling in such complex catchment – river reservoir
environmental system. The new spatial distribution mapping of radionuclides in the bottom sediment ofKiev Reservoir is also needed to justification of dredging strategies and techniques at the reservoir, whichshould be considered as a natural trap for radionuclides delivering to the reservoir from huge Dnipro river
basin. Therefore in respect of sedimentation as a key natural attenuation process in the Kiev reservoir, it
should be monitored – means controlled.
Therefore, monitoring of the bottom sediment radioactive contamination in the Kyiv Reservoir
and other reservoirs should be continued.
Radionuclides in the groundwater
A specific groundwater observational well network to monitor condition of the groundwater after
the ChNPP accident was significantly developed only within the Exclusion Zone and in the localities
for temporary residential areas for personnel working within the Exclusion Zone.
Observation results indicate that radioactive contamination levels of the groundwater are remain
relatively low, excluding sites around temporary waste disposal site and some radioactive storage
facilities situated at the ChNPP industrial site. Groundwater also significantly contaminated in close
adjacent areas to the contaminated water bodies (cooling pond, lakes and wetlands at the mostcontaminated area of the Exclusion Zone). In the worst contaminated areas of the Exclusion Zone, thelevel values vary in range from 0.1 and less to 1.0 Bq·L-3 for 137Cs and between 1 and 10 Bq·L-3 for 90Sr.
A spread rate of the contaminated groundwater aureole in the direction of its discharge into rivers isvery slow, even for strontium-90 [31], mostly up to 20 m per year.
Generally, contamination of the groundwater in the Exclusion Zone and adjacent areas has notproduced catastrophic effects that were expected by the most conservative predictions during the first years
after the accident. The cumulative flow of radionuclides caused by the groundwater discharge into the riversof the Exclusion Zone is relatively low and will remain the same in the future, if compared to surface watertransport of radionuclides in the contaminated areas. It can not produce any significant radiation risks tothe people of Ukraine living beyond the boundaries of the ChNPP Exclusion Zone [32, 33].
At present, relatively high levels of water contamination (in some cases, the levels, which in 10 –100 time exceed critically allowable concentrations (CAC) for drinking water supply) are only48

registered exactly within the bounds of radioactive waste storage facilities that have been constructedwith no special filtration-proof geochemical or other engineering barriers, as well as on some specificsites in the area having the clearly marked depression morphological landforms.
Predictive estimates [34] indicate that the groundwater will start discharging into the Pripyat
River no earlier than in 40-50 years from now. During the forthcoming years, a maximum discharge
may be estimated as to 100–120 GBq (3.0–3.5 Ci). If compare the estimated transport of 90Sr by thesurface water to the Kiev Reservoir, the contribution of radionuclides delivering by the total groundwater flux to the Pripyat river will not exceed 10–15 %.
The model calculation results indicate that the groundwater flow from the Shelter Object site will
hardly reach the Pripyat River, as even in 100 years 90Sr front shall spread no further than 600 meters.
Therefore, during the period of the water arrival to the riverbed, the water contamination levels shallbecome practically insignificant [21, 31]. Both 137Cs and 90Sr contamination of the groundwater in the firstaquifer under the surface registered beyond the Exclusion Zone boundaries does not exceed 0.3 Bq·dm-3.
Within the 25 years have passed after the Chernobyl release, we can make a general statementthat the processes of radionuclide migration in the aeration zone and in saturated soil, unlike their
behaviour in the air and in surface water, are characterized by significant retardation and inertia. The
radiation monitoring system covers the groundwater of Quaternary, Eocene, Cenomanian, and Lower
Cretaceous aquifer systems. The groundwater monitoring is ensured at RAWDS (radioactive waste
disposal sites), major RAWTSS (radioactive waste temporary storage near surface sites), waterretaining structures, and regionally within the entire Exclusion Zone. The radiation condition ofgroundwater in aquifer system of Eocene sediments (sources of centralized water supply to the ChNPP)
is monitored at the operating ChNPP’s water intake facility (the city of Pripyat); the one of Cenomanianand Lower Cretaceous aquifer systems is monitored at the operating water intake facility in the city ofChernobyl. Results of research conducted in 1986–2010 indicate minimal contamination of thegroundwater by the ChNPP release radionuclides (significantly lower than the required limits). 137Cs
and 90Sr specific activities in the drinking water used at the ChNPP and at the Chernobyl City water
intake facilities do not exceed 0.001 Bq·L-3.
The groundwater monitoring results reveal 90Sr contamination in aquifer system of the
Quaternary sediments, which is progressing over time and distance due to the radionuclide migrationfrom accidental RAW temporary storage near-surface sites, i.e. trenches (clamps), and the Shelter
Object industrial site. Migration of the radionuclide to the hydro-geological medium is caused by
infiltration of atmospheric precipitation as well as by direct continual or seasonal groundwater underflooding of RAW. 90Sr specific activity in poral solutions of the trenches’ bodies, under and around thewaste dumps, is 100–1000 times exceeding the permissible limits for drinking water (PL-97). The
aquifer system contamination is several dozen of meters deep, as the groundwater flow runs.
The maximum intensive radionuclide migration was fixed at observation wells in the ‘Red
Forest’, in the former Stroybaza and Yanivsky Lake locations. As of summer 2010, the following
values are true for the water in the wells equipped for the Quaternary aquifer system: 90Sr volumetricactivity in the vicinity of the former Stroybaza varied between 32 kBq·m-3 and 130 kBq·m-3, and near
Yanivsky Lake it was in the range between 0.77 kBq·m-3 and 36 kBq·m-3.
In the vicinity of the cooling pond PK-14, the following 90Sr volumetric activities were registeredin the observation wells’ water: about 1.3–18 kBq·m-3 in the upper section and 1.2–4.3 kBq·m-3 in themedium and lower sections. 137ɋs volumetric activity amounts to 0.007–0.14 kBq·m-3. In K-3
observation well water (Sandy Plateau, RAWTSS, Semykhody Lake location), 90Sr volumetric activity
was registered to be at a level of 22 kBq·m-3, while the water level occurrence depth was 3.2 m.
The values of 90Sr and 137ɋs volumetric activities in the water of the observation wells included
into ‘Pidlisnyi’ RAWDS monitoring network were as follows: 90Sr – 0.18–0.49 kBq·m-3, 137ɋs – 0.009–
0.091 kBq·m-3, while the water level occurrence depth varied between 1 and 6.5 m. In the water of the49regulatory observation wells located within the bounds of ‘Buriakivka’ RAWDS, 90Sr volumetricactivity was 0.26–1.8 kBq·m-3 and 137ɋs volumetric activity was 0.009–0.12 kBq·m-3. At the Pripyat
water intake facility, 90Sr volumetric activity was registered as varying between 0.31 and 2.3 kBq·m-3
and for 137ɋs it was 0.006–0.05 kBq·m-3.
In the water of Cenomanian and Lower Cretaceous aquifer system, 90Sr and 137ɋs volumetricactivities have not exceeded 0.01 kBq·m-3.
The results of research conducted within the near-ChNPP zone enveloping major RAWTSS(«Red Forest», «Budbaza», Yaniv Station, etc.), the ChNPP industrial site, the Shelter Object, as well as«Pidlisnyi», «Kompleksnyi» and other radioactive waste disposal sites indicate that the long-term, i.e.
during 100–300 forthcoming years, lateral distribution of 90Sr dangerous concentrations from thetrenches will be limited to several hundred of meters from the dumps down along the groundwater
stream. Local hydro-geological conditions and geological barriers ensure a rather safe occlusion anddecelerate migration of radioactive strontium and caesium, therefore limiting a spread of radionuclides
by the groundwater.
However, for a long time will the contaminated groundwater surrounding RAWTSS be a steadysource of radiation risks within the near-ChNPP zone. As far as radionuclide potential transport andmigration pattern are concerned, the dumps located in the Yanivsky Lake area (due to its location in the
Pripyat River floodplain) pose a real danger of surface water contamination.
The dominant factors of radionuclide migration intensity variations throughout a year include
specific features of hydro-geological and climate conditions, structural features of disposal sites, as wellas the conditions and intensity of interactions between surface flows, water bodies and groundwater.
Beyond RAW disposal sites, the conditions of groundwater radioactive contamination formation
depend on ‘diffused’ sources of radionuclide migration.
The data provided by the Institute of Geological Sciences under the NASU indicate that up to 40
TBq (1000 Ci) of 137Cs annually penetrate into the geological environment including local sites, i.e.
RAWTSS, RAWDS, and the Shelter Object. An amount of 90Sr annually penetrating into the geologic
environment is well above 137Cs. Consequently, total activity of 137Cs and 90Sr absorbed by thegeological environment is 4–20 times as high as annual export of the activity by the Pripyat Riverbeyond the boundaries of the Exclusion Zone. As per the data provided by the ISTC «Shelter», about
120 MBq of U and Pu and nearly 1.5 TBq (40.5 Ci) of 137Cs and 90Sr can be annually transported into
the geological environment by the Shelter Object waters.
2.1.2. Radiation monitoring system for the environment
The existing legislation for environmental protection, health and disease control, Chernobyl andnuclear issues envisages functioning of a rather extensive radiation monitoring system in Ukraine. The
system is to reliably ensure accomplishment of central tasks for radiation protection of public and theenvironment, including radioactively contaminated areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. Today,
monitoring of radionuclide content in various objects of the natural environment, food, and in people ismainly ensured by radiology departments in the organizations and enterprises subordinate to the ME, theMH, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy, the Ministry of Energy, the State Water Management Committee,
the State Forestry Management Committee, according to areas of their responsibility and authority.
The SSSPE «Ecocentre» is ensuring monitoring within the Exclusion Zone and zone of absolute(mandatory) resettlement at the expense of the State Budget of Ukraine.
The monitoring schedule covers 146 observation centres for various environmental objects(surface waters including sewage, atmospheric boundary layer, landscape), 138 wells for groundwaterobservation, personnel operation sites, 11 centres of population. Annually, over 5,000 samples are taken
and more than 10,000 analytical studies of the samples are carried out. The radiation conditions arecontinuously monitored by means of the computer radiation monitoring system in 39 observation50

stations, including the ChNPP industrial site and the city of Slavutych. With the objective to prevent
man-caused transport of radionuclides beyond the boundaries of the Exclusion Zone, radiation
monitoring of vehicles and cargoes is ensured at monitoring and dosimetry check points.
The radiological service under the Ministry of Agricultural Policy ensures radiation monitoring ofagricultural products obtained in the centres of population referred to radiation contamination zones, as
per the Chernobyl program. However, the service suffered a substantial loss in recent years. Also, aconsiderable scope of work under the agricultural lands passportization programs is being carried out by
the oblast (province) state design & process centres for soil productivity protection. The centres haveconducted radiation surveys of over 5 million hectares of lands. A level of food contamination causedby the Chernobyl disaster consequences is reducing year after year.
The radiation monitoring service subordinate to the State Forestry Management Committee
ensures: latest updates on radiation conditions in forests, at production facilities and private premises;
dosimetry monitoring in forestry work locations, sampling and measurements of standard radionuclides inforest products; support to maintaining the radiation databank; information of top managers at enterprises,
local authorities, and local communities on radiation situation in the forests located in corresponding areas
and on the content of standard radionuclides in the branch products. The annual output of radiologicalmonitoring under the State Forestry Management Committee’s system amounts to 30000 samples per
year. However, the scope is gradually reducing because of a gap in budget financing.
It is noteworthy that along with normalization of radiation situation in forest ecosystems andgradual reduction of a share of products contaminated beyond the permissible limits, radionuclide
content in forest foods, especially in Ukrainian Polissia, is still rather high. Permissible limits for 137Cs
content are exceeded in up to 80 % of the monitored forest foods.
The surveillance over the levels of radioactive contamination executed by the radiation monitoring
system under the State Hydro-Meteorological Service covers the entire territory of Ukraine, inclusive of
the area classified as radioactive contamination zones formed as a result of the Chernobyl disaster.
The monitoring results indicate that during the previous 5 years radiation background practicallyin all oblasts (provinces), including the radioactive contamination zones, was stable, within the limits
equal to the pre-accident levels, i.e. 6–33 PR·hour-1, and driven primarily by natural radionuclides andcosmic radiation. At the Chernobyl check point, where a current density of soil contamination by 137Cs
is about 330 kBq·m-2, J-background was driven by the Chernobyl NPP accident consequences andvaried within a range of 15–27 PR·hour -1. Higher J-background levels (18–33 PR·hour -1) at the
Korosten check point are caused by both soil radioactive contamination of Chernobyl-origin (presently,
about 165 kBq·m-2) and peculiarities of the local geologic framework, particularly by a cropout ofgranitoids that is close to the earth’s surface and is characterised by high concentrations of naturalradionuclides of kalium, uranium, thorium. Monitoring of the contaminated areas is ensured by way ofdaily measurements of J-radiation exposure dose rates at 70 check points, collection and analysis of thefollowing: atmospheric fallout samples at 26 points, airborne particulate samples at 5 points, surface
water samples at 3 points in the Kyiv and Kaniv Reservoirs.
The following are the common problems of all radiological services subordinate to a variety ofagencies: non-availability of implementation programs for the state-of-the-art quality assurance
systems; inadequate financing of radiation monitoring programs, and first of all under the budget
program entitled ‘Radiological Protection of Public and Ecological Recovery of Radioactively
Contaminated Areas’, which in 2009–2010 was reduced more than 20-fold, if compared to 1998. A
failure to carry out dosimetry and radiation monitoring programs as well as programs for radiation
monitoring of the products produced in the contaminated areas has actually made impossible ensuring
constitutional rights of nearly 2 million of Ukrainian citizens, i.e. residents of the localities classified asradioactive contamination zones, with regard to accurate information on contamination levels of theenvironment and locally produced food, and their adverse health effects.

51

2.1.3. Recovery of ecosystems affected by radioactive contamination
The Chernobyl accident was characterised by a relatively short-time pulse release. As a result
there was created an artificial time marker which can be used for estimation of the rate of the following
processes. The fixed date of the fallout, exclusively artificial origin of contamination, high sensitivity ofradiometric measurements, a wide variety of landscape and geochemical conditions within Ukrainian
Polissia determined the reliability of the obtained data and possibility of their generalization for a wide
range of artificial pollutants.
The concept of natural recovery of radioactively contaminated ecosystems. Spatial expansionof radioactivity as well as lack of techniques designed for soil decontamination provided therequirement in researches on natural decontamination of the environment within the area affected by the
Chernobyl Catastrophe. Considering that the locally produced food (potato, milk) prevail in the diet ofthe rural population residing in radioactively contaminated lands, the oral intake of radionuclides
predominates in formation of the irradiation dose. Consequently, along with a significant reduction in
annual doses, as early as in 1988, a portion of exposure caused by peroral intake increased up to 80%[35]. This predetermined a crucial role of the ‘soil – plant’ trophic chain in the process of radiation
exposure and determined the urgently need for a conceptual review of an idea of the ecosystem’snatural recovery.
In the context of ecological safety, natural recovery of an ecosystem includes natural processes
facilitating excretion of a contaminant out of a trophic chain. In contrast to the concepts developed ingeochemistry [36–38], the processes of a contaminating agent’s prolonged fixation by the soil
absorbing complex play a key role in ecosystem natural recovery. These processes are not necessarily
accompanied by destruction of the contaminant or its removal outside a landscape. Therefore, studying
the processes of radionuclide biogenic migration within ecosystems of contaminated areas has become amatter of special concern.
137
Cs and 90Sr are the most dangerous dose-forming radionuclides in medical and biologicalsense. The long-term dynamics of Ukraine’s rural population radiation exposure demonstrates that theradiation exposure decrease rates are significantly higher than the rates of the radionuclides physicaldecay (Fig. 2.18).

Fig. 2.18. Dynamics for the dose-forming radionuclides decay (1) and rates
of total (caused by various sources) normalized annual exposure dose reduction, PSvǜyear-1
per 1 kBqǜm-2 (2), (dots indicate experimental and estimated data).

52

Having fallen on the surface, the radionuclides join the abiogenic transformation processes
resulting in formation of mobile (water-soluble and exchangeable) forms that are the most accessible tovegetation (Fig. 2.19).

Fig. 2.19. Biogenic and abiogenic processes of radionuclide forming and migration.

The concept of the natural recovery of the environment based on speciation has been formulated
in the following way [39, 40]:
 the non-equilibrium thermodynamics of an initial artificial form of being of element in theouter shell of the Earth is a driving force behind the abiogenic transformation of agents;
 speciation of the man-caused elements is accompanied by the intermediate productgeneration, i.e. a mobile form, which content synchronically stipulates an intensity ofbiogenic and abiogenic water migration;
 the kinetic model of transformation determines content of the mobile form as a function oftime elapsed since the moment of an element’s artificial form fallout to the Earth’s surface.
Natural decontamination of trophic chains. The synchronism of dynamics between
radionuclide abiotic speciation and biogenic migration has been render the possibility to regard
parameters of radionuclide speciation in soil as a «geochemical chronometer».
A radionuclide removal out of the biological cycle owing to immobilization at the geochemicalbarrier does not exclude its contribution to the external exposure dose.
Rating parameters of radionuclide removal out of the root nutrition, i.e. an initial link in a trophic
chain, may be regarded as efficiency of impact of a number of geochemical processes’ on thedecontamination. (Table. 2.3).
Comparing constants of the rates for geochemical processes contributing to annual natural
decontamination of plant products in terrestrial ecosystems demonstrates that during the post-accident

53period a key role is played by 137Cs immobilization process, as on the average its rate is one order ofmagnitude greater than the one of radioactive decay.
Table 2.3.
Periods and constants of semi-decontamination rates for terrestrial ecosystems
and their components caused by various geochemical processes
137

90

Cs

Process

Physical decay
Lateral migration
Immobilization
Downward migration
Biogeochemical
migration
intomeadow grass
Biogeochemical
migration into cow’s
milk

-1

Sr

k/Ȝ

Ɍ1/2,
years

k, year- 1

k/ȜɌ1/2, years

k, year30> 10000.10–1.5
70 –>300

0.023
0.00050.45–7.0
0.001–0.01

1.0
0.02
20–3000.043–0.43

29
> 300
1.2–6925–45

0.024
0.00150.01–0.60
0.015–0.028

1.0
0.06
0.42–25
0.65–1.0

2.0–100.07–0.32

3.0–14§ 2.0

0.29–0.38

13–17

2.0–100.07–0.32

3.0–14

N/D

N/D

N/D

N o t e : Ɍ1/2 is a semi-decontamination period (removal from the root nutrition), k is a process rate constant, Ȝ is a radioactive
decay constant, N/D – not determined.

As for 90Sr, the immobilization processes in mineral soils does not play a significant role indecontamination of trophic chains. During the first years after the accident, an increase in 90Sr activity
in annual biomass product of terrestrial ecosystems, which was caused by the mobilization processes,
took place in the areas, where dispersed fuel fallouts have predominated. Later, annual decontaminationof products in the terrestrial ecosystems was determined by a high migration ability of radiostrontium in
Polissia soils.
The data obtained allow estimation of the periods for radionuclide semi-removal of an ecosystem
and a trophic chain due to the processes of abiotic transformation and abiogenic and biogenic migration.
The data presented in Table 2.1.3 demonstrate the difference between the natural recovery capacity of alandscape, i.e. radionuclide transport out of a trophic chain, and the natural attenuation, i.e.
decontamination of a landscape’s abiogenic component. The latter takes place due to the three mainprocesses, including radioactive decay, lateral and vertical migration of radionuclides, and depends on
the physical decay for 137Cs, and for 90Sr the decontamination occurs twice as fast as the decay. The
natural decontamination of meadow ecosystems occurs 3–10 times faster than the decay; due to the
abiogenic transformation, particularly 137Cs fixation in the soil absorbing complex and ion exchange
under 90Sr biologic uptake.
Natural decontamination of forest ecosystems. The biogeochemical flux of radionuclides inforest biogeocenoses are characterized by significantly more complicated patterns. This caused by themultilevel structure of the ecosystem, different time periods, biological peculiarities of plant lifecycles,
etc. With identical density of soil contamination, intensity of 137Cs biogeochemical flow in a pine tree’s
ecosystem increases with biomass gain determined by landscape and geochemical conditions. The
natural decontamination capacity of forest ecosystems increases contrariwise, and for the most of
ecotopes it is governed by a radioactive decay rate. A pine tree biological natural recovery period is 15–
250 years [41, 42].
Natural decontamination of surface water systems. Radionuclide water transfer through the
Dnipro River system is at the top, alongside with the risks of radioactivity spreading from RAW dumpsites or beyond the excluded area boundaries due to a partial damage of the Shelter Object [43].

54However, a steady trend towards a decrease in the annual radionuclide transfer to water reservoirs of theDnipro Cascade is observed (Fig. 2.20).
The analysis of average annual dynamics of 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations in the water of the
Pripyat River demonstrates the availability of two periods in the surface water natural decontamination(Fig. 2.21):in the accident phase the natural decontamination depended on radionuclide fallout forms,
therefore the rate of this process was almost an order of magnitude higher than in the subsequent years;
since 1989, the processes of radionuclide transfer through the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone
drainage system have depended on the rate of radionuclide mobilization in soils within water
catchment. Currently, the water masses natural decontamination rate is almost 5 times as high as thecorresponding rates of isotopes decay. 137Cs transfer is primarily determined by the hydrological regimeof the rivers. And 90Sr transfer depends to a great degree on a water regime of soils, and to a lesser
degree on dryness of a year.

Fig. 2.20. Post-accidental Pripyat River water flow and radionuclide transfer.

Fig. 2.21. Temporal dynamics of 137Cs (a) and 90Sr (b) concentrations in the water of the Pripyat River.

55

Simultaneously with a decrease in water contamination, evident is a change in the radionuclide
speciation towards increasing of conditionally dissolved species and decreasing of suspended ones. The
transformation rate in terms of size corresponds to the rate of radionuclide mobilization in soils, whichindicates a uniform geochemical mechanism for water migration of radionuclides in the environment.
In the past decade the annual transfer of 137Cs to the Kyiv Reservoir amounted to 6·1011 Bq andthat of 90Sr to 7·1012 Bq. Studying the dynamics of radionuclide speciation in the surface water systems
makes possible to assess the total transfer into the Black Sea amounting to 20 TBq of 137Cs and 200
TBq of 90Sr. The reason is that 137Cs is firmly trapped by solid phase of bottom deposits, and 90Sr isalmost completely washed out from the bed silt by the Dnipro River system [44].
2.1.4. Environmental regulation issue
The system of hygienic regulation existing in the country and in the world does not settle theproblem of ecosystems biota safety found within the zone of radioactive accidents and fallouts effect.
The experience of assessment of radionuclides impact on biota as in the case of the Kyshtym andespecially Chernobyl accident has shown that such telling impacts are observed. Accordingly, publishedpaper 103 of the International Commission for Radiological Protection has finally posed the problem of
establishing the special environmental regulation system. The International Commission forRadiological Protection proposes the option of selecting especially sensitive ecosystem species, andtheir response could serve as a basis for a judgment as to exceeding or non-exceeding of the permissible
ecosystems biota contamination levels.
From our point of view, development of the environmental norms system for permissible
discharges and releases of pollutants to ecosystems biota requires special approach and creation of
special models. Relatively simple approaches and models of permissible air, water and foodstuffs
contamination levels assessment are used under the existing hygienic regulation system. Their control
arrangement would be enough to ensure compliance with hygienic norms. The task of establishingenvironmental norms for permissible biota contamination levels is far more complex.
Limitation of the dose of effect on biota within an ecosystem structure requires dynamics andmechanisms of pollutants distribution and redistribution between components of a particular ecosystems
be determined for a critical biota link be found, where depositing of the most considerable amount ofpollutants, as well as the highest does of it, should be expected, and where the most negative impacts on
biota may occur. But it will not necessarily be the selected in advance most sensitive organism species.
At initial stages of an accident, some individual very sensitive species may certainly respond to
relatively high radiation doses, but these specific species will not necessarily be responsible for fate of
the whole ecosystem biota. Eventually any ecosystem biota survival is driven by its capability of saving
biomass, sufficient for the ecosystem procreation and maintenance of the property of conditioning
inhabitation viable for the biota. Consequently, our opinion is that for biota of the ecosystems
characterised by real processes of distribution and redistribution of captured radionuclides the third
option for critical biota components determination must be applied under the environmental regulation
system, and those shall be used for radiation factor regulation.
By using site data and results of calculations based on the developed by us models of radio
capacitance of virtually any ecosystem, specific values of (in particular) 137Cs radioactivity could bedetermined in each component of ecosystem biota under study. Using data on 137Cs Fa (accumulation
factor), radio capacitance model of any components of the subject ecosystem, and results of studied
ecosystem compartment model running may allow of obtaining data on 137Cs radionuclide distribution
and redistribution dynamics according to the system of differential equations representing thecompartment model.
For practical application of the proposed approach the calculation was done for a slope
ecosystem. It is tolerable that the initial level of 137Cs radionuclides ingress into the upper level of the56forest ecosystem (prototype of the slope on Uzh river bank) makes up 1 MBq. Using site data andcompartment model of the ecosystem under study, and radio capacitance models, it is suggested to
calculate the part of radionuclides and biota irradiation dose, and 137Cs radionuclides concentration thatwill form in different inhabitation locations (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4.
Dose rate (Gy) calculation for the lake ecosystem and permissible annual radionuclide
discharge depending upon Fa values for benthos biota (at rising value of 137Cs supply to forest)
Doses from lake ecosystemcomponents impacting biota

Benthos biota Fa
1

10

100

1000

10000

100000From water

5.4-9

5.4-9

5.4-9

5.4-9

5.4-9

5.4-9

From benthal deposits

3.2-8

3.2-8

3.2-8

3.2-8

3.2-8

3.2-8

From lake biomass

1.4-8

1.4-7

1.4-6

1.4-5

1.4-4

1.4-3

Internal dose

3.3-8

3.3-7

3.3-6

3.3-5

3.3-4

3.3-3

Overall biota dose

5.2-8

4.8-7

4.7-6

4.7-5

4.7-4

4.7-3

7.7+13 Bq

8.4+12 Bq

8.4+11 Bq

8.5+10 Bq

8.5+9 Bq

8.5+8 Bq

2100 Ci

220 Ci

22 Ci

2.3 Ci0.23 Ci

0.023 Ci

Permissible 137Cs discharge toforest given that benthos biotadose does not exceed 4 Gy/h

By setting differing biota contamination levels in different compartments according to the B.Amiro
model, one may assess biota dose loads based on the general level of 137Cs radionuclides supply equal 1
MBq. It is clear that these doses will be low as against the proposed here critical bounding dose of 4 Gy/hfor biota. Then in determination of the ratio, limits of 137Cs radionuclides supply to the compartment –forest were set, given that dose rate does not exceed the value of 4 Gy/h. It is therewith demonstrated thatthe greatest dose loads are expected in the lake benthos biota. As follows from Table 1, depending on Fa –benthos biota, permissible radionuclide contamination levels (environmental norms for 137Cs radionuclides
discharge) in forest change appreciably in the range of hundred of Ci to very few. It means that: 1) criticalbenthos biota may limit abruptly the environmental norm value; 2) not only the upper area of the slope
ecosystem may be subject to radionuclide contamination, but also other slope ecosystem compartments
located below. While strictness of the environmental norm as to permissible levels of radionuclides
discharge grows appreciably in case, when 137Cs radionuclide contamination affects lower levels of theslope ecosystem – grassland, terrace. The lower contamination gets down the slope, the lower is apermissible level of radionuclides supply to the slope ecosystem under study.
In review of calculation results presented in Table 1, it should be emphasized that the two bottomlines contain listing of permissible levels of 137Cs radionuclides discharge to the lake using the above
presented ratios. Accordingly, the environmental norm for a permissible level of 137Cs ingress during
the first year after an accident at an actual high Fa value of benthos biota equal 1000 must not exceed an
overall value of 2.3 Ci in the event of a single discharge.
In case of additional discharges of radionuclides into the forest during the years following theaccident, this requirement criterion shall be evaluated as a still smaller value. The point is that, high Ac
values for the bottom biota, which is critical for the slope ecosystem, indicate very limited levels ofenvironmental standards for permissible levels of radionuclides discharges and releases, even in the top
slope. In case of radionuclide fallouts to the lower slope sections, a permissible level of environmental
standard for their contamination by 137Cs radionuclides shall be still noticeably lower. Furthermore, it iseasy to calculate that hygienic standards for the lake water, as drinkable one, (2 Bq/L) have never been
exceeded subject to these ecological standards.

57

The same may be demonstrated by the fact that in case of 137Cs radionuclides penetration into theforest at a level of 2.3 Ci or 0.23 Ci, contamination levels of the terrace meadow grass and forage
grasses shall never result in an excess of the hygienic standard (DU-2006) for milk contamination
amounting to 100 Bq/L, in case of contamination resulting from obtainment of milk from cows grazingon the meadow and from cows feeding on the terrace forage grasses. The same refers to contaminationlevels of vegetables, in case lake water is used for their irrigation, this will also not result in an excessof the hygienic standard for vegetables contamination by 137Cs radionuclides amounting to 100 Bq/kg.
Consequently, in this actual situation involving contamination of the slope ecosystem by 137Cs
radionuclide, the proposed environmental standards for permissible levels of radionuclides discharge
and release are noticeably lower than the hygienic standards in effect in the given slope ecosystem.
It is known that modern active ecological paradigm is that if ecological situation in a specificecosystem is favourable for people, then the ecological situation for wild biota shall be even more sofavourable. This specific analysis that was performed for a near-real slope ecosystem based on
calculation of an environmental standard for permissible 137Cs radionuclide contamination levels
indicates that the above paradigm is not always true. It is possible to presume that environmental
standards for permissible levels of actual ecosystems’ contamination by pollutants may be stricter thanhygienic standards for people. The hygienic standards are relatively easy to develop, because they referto the only biota species, i.e. people. Furthermore, individual components of a habitat are subject tostandardization, i.e. contamination levels for air in breathing zone, drinkable water, and food. Thereby,these standards are developed and calculated only once, and then are very rarely adjusted.
Development of the environmental standards for critical permissible levels of pollutants
discharge and release into various types of ecosystems, and hence assurance of environmental safety,
require special knowledge and models. Complexity of the problem is that even for one and the same
ecosystem (for example, a slope ecosystem), an environmental standard shall vary depending on Fa
values, i.e. biota, bottom sediments depending on pollutants distribution in ecosystem’s components,
etc. The task complexity shall increase in case of analyzing and calculating environmental standards forvarious types of ecosystems, especially those aggregated into complex landscape ecosystems. This may
implicate that environmental standardization, in case it is subject to development, shall requiresignificant theoretical and experimental effort.
Analysis of pollutants’ behaviour in ecosystems of slopes, which form the basis of practically all
terrestrial landscapes, indicated a possibility to describe distribution and redistribution of radionuclides
by the methods of radio receptivity theory, using compartment models. Researches demonstrate that arate of radionuclides migration in a landscape is generally determined by several characteristics: degreeof slope on a slope (Ɋ1), type of coverage (Ɋ2), landscape fissure (Ɋ3), vertical (Ɋ4) and horizontal
migration (Ɋ5). Each of the factors shall be evaluated from 0>1. Due to independence of landscapevalues, the overall evaluation of radionuclides migration probability in landscape elements shall be
evaluated as the convolute probability and calculated by formula Ɋ = Ɋ1 × Ɋ2 × Ɋ3 × Ɋ4 × Ɋ5. Reallandscapes are extremely problematic, when estimations of radio receptivity parameters are applied tovast territories, where factor systems of radionuclides impacting redistribution in biotic and abiotic
components of the ecosystems apply. It is known from field research of the processes for radionuclide
migration in slope systems and for soil erosion under an impact of surface flow, that flow intensity rises
sharply as a slope degree increases.
Using technical potential of ESRI ARCGIS software, we have developed a simulation andanalytical GIS (geographical information system) enabling analysis and predictive modelling ofcontaminating agents’ migration in ecosystems. The mathematical model of contaminating agents’migration in ecosystems, which we have developed, forms the GIS mathematical framework. Physicaland chemical, biochemical characteristics of contaminating agents as well as conditions of natural andanthropogenic environment are the model’s basic informational components. The input data analysis

58enables to end up with key blocks of the model, i.e. factors of pollutants import and export inecosystems. The method enables reconstruction of an area contamination process, as well as
extrapolation of contamination factors to an entire research region based on point-by-point fieldmeasurements, as well as environmental standards for landscapes.

2.2. Formation of radiation conditions and economic activities
in the areas contaminated as a result of the ChNPP accident
2.2.1. Radiobiological effects of ionizing radiation impact on biota
The biota objects within the 30-km ChNPP Exclusion Zone, including plants, mushrooms, allgroups of animals, microorganisms, and viruses, are subject to chronic ionizing radiation effects. This isprecisely why a special attention is given recently to the radiation risks assessment with regard not only
to mankind, but also to other organisms. An issue of radioecology basic paradigm is based on thestatement ‘Once mankind is protected, another biological objects are protected too’ (ICRP 91, 103) isbeing raised. This is indicated by ample discussion about establishing the levels for radiation standards,
search for the ways to develop dosimetry models for biota, as well as establishment of a corresponding
working group by the IAEA in 2004 (EMRAS BWG) and launching of the 5th ICRP committee devoted
to environmental protection in 2005. The goal of activities carried out during an early period of the
ChNPP accident was first of all to protect the public and personnel from exposure. At the same time,
biota in the Chernobyl zone was subjected to acute exposure producing radiobiological effects at
various structural levels of the biological system, starting with a cell or an organism and ending with anecosystem. Particularly, such effects, inclusive of lethal outcomes, were registered for coniferous
forests in vast areas within the Exclusion Zone [45].
The rates of exposure doses and doses absorbed by organisms vary in a wide range between
lethal ones for more radiosensitive organisms and the levels that are close to a natural background ofradioactivity. The biota was subjected to the most acute exposure during early months after theaccident, during the fallout of radioactive agents onto surfaces of leaves, soil, and water. In due course,
the exposure dose rates declined due to radioactive decay of radionuclides and deepening of the latter
into the soil. Nevertheless, there are some natural plant-filled sites within the 10-km zone, where even
now the exposure dose rates amount to dozens of mR per hour.
The biota objects are exposed to both external sources of J-radiation and inner sources related tobiological uptake and tissue accumulation of radionuclides emitting E-, J-, and for some even Dradiation. In early months after the accident, the high radiation dose absorbed by the biota objects wasdue to the hot particles adsorbed by organisms’ surfaces. Uptake of radionuclides through plant rootsystems was gaining significance in the following years. Currently, cycles of 137Cs and 90Sr, andsometimes of Pu and Am isotopes, became established; and as a result definite differential regimes ofirradiation of all living components in biocenoses are being maintained. Various radiobiological effects
in all biota components have developed under these irradiation regimes, i.e. when external exposure
joins the internal one [46, 47]. An extreme manifestation of the radiobiological response presented itself
as a collapse of pine trees and spruces in the area afterwards called the ‘Red Forest’. The two sites,
significant in their area, were distinguished in the ‘Red Forest’; the first one is situated along theWestern Trace about 5 km away from the ruined reactor, and the second one is located along theNorthern Trace on the left bank of the Pripyat River. Dead trees, and not only needle ones but also somebroad-leaved species, including for instance birches and black alders, indicate extremely high initialradiation doses in the area. The average values of doses absorbed by the trees exceeded 170 Gy.
Various species of both plants and animals have died there.
The Scotch Pine (Pinus sylvestris L.) is among the most radiosensitive plants. At the same time,
it is a basic forest-forming species in the Exclusion Zone. Thus, studying biota exposure has a direct59practical meaning. In 2007, the fifth committee recommended a pine tree to be a reference plant forassessing the radioactive effects on biota [48]. On several sites within the Exclusion Zone (first of all,the RAWTSS ‘Red Forest’ site and other plantations of pine trees within the ChNPP 10-km zone), thespecies plant populations indicate suppressed development and mass morphological variations in sometrees (Fig. 2.22).

abFig. 2.22. Gigantism of locust (Robinia) leaves (a) (the city of Pripyat) and abnormal limbs
and very big needles of common spruce (b) (Novo-Shepelychi forest nursery).

effectA precise dependency between the frequency of morphological changes (removal of apicaldominance) and exposure dose rate was estimated (Fig. 2.23) making it possible to unambiguously
identify that exactly the radiation factor is the reason of the above changes [49, 50].

Dose rate Gy year-1
Fig. 2.23. ‘Dose rate – effect (frequency of morphological changes)’ dependency for the Scotch Pine.

Also, the dependencies between a cellular-level radiobiological effect (chromosome aberration,
DNA damage) and an exposure dose rate were estimated for the Scotch Pine. And high sensitivity ofthis species to radiation was thus confirmed. The «dose-effect» dependencies obtained for the Scotch
Pine are of still broader significance. In case a reference level of terrestrial ecosystems dose rate
amounts to 10 PGy hour-1 [51], a rather high frequency of effects was observed in the Scotch Pine,
which can cause suppression of the population or even dropout of the species out of the ecosystem.

60

Further effort should be focused on studying radiobiological effects of irradiation on otherreference species of the Exclusion Zone’s biota. First and foremost, this applies to plant species that are
currently not defined within the framework of the above mentioned approaches [48, 51]. The Chernobylzone provides the corresponding favourable conditions, due to its marked irregularity of radioactive
contamination, proximity of soil and climate conditions, and absence of other significant sources for
man-caused impacts onto the biota.
Changes in the cenoses within the Chernobyl-affected area demonstrate not only radiation
effects, but also a wide range of secondary processes directly related to radioactive contamination of theenvironment. The extremely significant effects onto biota were caused by stopped economic activity,
particularly agricultural one, and resettlement of people from the settlements located within thecontaminated area. A sharp withdrawal of anthropogenic pressure on the excluded areas facilitatednatural mechanisms of demutation self-recovery and revival of the forest and marsh biogeocenoses
typical for Kyiv Polissya.
A recovery of natural vegetation by way of changes in corresponding types of biocenoses, which is
gradually resulting in recovery of the forest systems typical of this area, has started on former agriculturallands. In line with the above changes in vegetation types, a food reserve for herbivores and for the firstorder consumers is being recovered, thus forming a new composition of wildlife species. Certainly, theanimal species, which accompany people, have disappeared. However, the biological diversity is
expanding due to an increase in a number of the species, which normal development has been suppressedby human activities, particularly hunting. The Exclusion Zone with its actual reservation conditions is aunique area as far as fauna is concerned. There one can run across bird and mammal species registered in
the Red Book of Ukraine [52]. Worth noting is successful introduction of such red-listed species as
European bison and Przewalski’s horse into the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in 1998.
A gradual recovery of vegetation is going on at the locations, where biocenoses were subjected to
drastic changes caused by the initial intensive exposure effects, particularly in the Red Forest. Needleleaved trees found now their favourable conditions under the crown cover of broad-leaved ones.
All dead pine trees have fallen within the zone of lethal damage, where no decontamination
activities were carried out in 1986. The broaleafed trees species have fully recovered their state. Typicaldeafforestation groups involving agrestals meadow species, moss, lichens, have formed on dead standsites. Dense patterns of self-seeding birch, aspen, and buckthorn have appeared.
20–85 % of pine trees planted within the sublethal damage zone are well preserved. Populationsof self-seeding broad-leaved species started to form there. The survived rare pine specimens have abroad head, which is not typical for the plantations of trees. The gramineous and ruderal cenoses prevailin the ground cover. However, the typical components of pine forests were preserved; and a moss layer
is now at the same old place. In recent years, non-uniform self-sown pine trees have appeared among
the nurse-wood at the Red Forest border.
Studies of the Exclusion Zone vegetation followed the Chernobyl accident revealed a sufficientnumber of species in phytocenoses. Along with successful development of populations of vascular plants,
registered in the Red Book of Ukraine (2009), their approximate 10% extension is observed. The Instituteof Botany of M.G. Kholodnyi of the NAS of Ukraine registered over 40 species, mostly adventive andruderal, that are new in the area [53]. Over 40 red-listed plant species were found in the zone of absoluteresettlement in Zhytomyr Oblast (province). These included the region-largest populations of perennial
plants, new lichen species, lichenphyllic fungi [54], macromycetes, bryoflora taxons [55].
The increase in ecotopic diversity has logically resulted in the extended diversity of species withregard to both flora and fauna of the Exclusion Zone. In 25 year after the Chernobyl NPP accident, nostrong hazards at the present state in flora and fauna were detected even in highly contaminated areas,
exclusive of some sites within the Exclusion Zone, i.e. under the former Red Forest and some othersignificantly smaller sites [56].

61Mycobiota. Generally, mycobiota, particularly the soil one, was subject to melanization, i.e.
mass outbreak of melan-comprising radioresistant species. In radioactively contaminated area, themelanin enriched fungal strains have formed in the fungal complexes in some myxomycete populations.
Exposure effects and earlier stages of the accident are reflected in melanization of microflora. The
ability to actively destroy ‘hot particles’ is inherent to the mycobiota.
Biota of water bodies. Biota in the worst contaminated water basins is characterized by a highlevel of radioactive contamination. Fish tissues accumulate not only 137Cs but also 90Sr, as well as Pu
and Am isotopes, thus causing a damage of reproductive tissues accompanied by a decreased quantityof some species, particularly spike and bream. The highest values of specific activity in fish wereregistered for predatory fish. A nearly ten fold increase of cells with chromosome aberrations, if
compared to ‘clean’ ones, is observed in the above water basins. Quantity of aberrant cells wasincreasing in mantle medium of the molluscan shellfish [57].
Suppressed development of the club rush (Scirpus) is observed; it is due to a severe deterioration
caused by parasitic fungi and haloforming ticks. However, seed production is subjected to drastic
decrease missing out the plant species out of the flood plain cenoses. The high exposure doses certainly
reduce plant resistance to the above affections and parasites.
The biota auto-rehabilitation processes occurring in the landlocked waterbasins of the Exclusion
Zone are extremely slow.
Amphibian and rodents. Increase in cytogenetic abnormalities, i.e. metaphases with Robertson
interchromosomal fusion, as well as aneuploids are discovered in bone marrow cells of myomorphic
rodents subject to reproduction in biocenoses characterised by elevated radioactivity levels. The
myomorphic rodents demonstrated that a share of radioresistant animals is gradually increasing in
natural population of the Red Forest. Therewith, the higher radioactive contamination level is the higher
is the radioresitance survival.
Radionuclides are depositing in bone tissue of amphibian and rodents living within the Exclusion
Zone thus involving defective processes of differentiation and specific functioning of their osteogenetic
cells. This causes development of dystrophic aberrations of epiphyses and metaphyses in spongy bones
as well as separation of bone plates. The adaptive, compensatory, and pathological changes of this kindprogress as an animal age increases.
Cattle. The following are observed in the HL generations that have absorbed doses of about 0.8
Gy·year-1 (from 137Cs) during the first year after the accident: a) decline in the birth rate and excessive
mortality of new-born calves; b) disorders in equiprobable inheritance of specific alleles, i.e.
elimination of some alleles and predominant inheritance of the others; c) a genetic pattern of parental
generation, which is typical for the dairy stock, declines towards less specific forms in subsequent
generations; d) under the conditions of low-dose exposure, changes in a generation’s genetic patterncoincide with reactions of the population to extreme impacts produced by factors of another, nonradiation, nature. Therefore, the major response of an animal body to chronic effects of ionizing
radiation corresponds to a selection of new gene combinations in subsequent generations [51].
Viruses. As per observations, the frequency of PVX, TMV, PVY viruses detection is higher in theradionuclide contaminated area of the Chernobyl zone. A significantly higher detection rate for plant viruses
was registered for vegetation in the 30-km zone. Apparently, vegetation of this zone can act as reservoirs (orhosts) for viral pathogens. It is noteworthy that this study supports the hypothesis that radionuclide
contaminated ecosystems can act as ‘hotbeds’ of viral infections and sources of epidemics of plant viraldiseases. The main reason for such hypothesis may be a ‘narrowing’ in the diversity of the plant species able
to grow in contaminated soil. Another reason may be the less efficient mechanisms of plant naturalresistance to viral infections, as demonstrated for maize and cereal crops that have been experimentallygrown within the 30-km Exclusion zone. Whatever the reasons are, they may produce a more efficientspread of viral infections, since plants of a contaminated environment are potential ‘hotbeds’ of infection.

62

Soil bacteria. Currently, composition of microflora in biocenoses started to recover gradually.
During the first post-accident decade, significant changes in microorganism species structure wereobserved in various habitats. Particularly, pseudomonades, actinobacter, cellulose-fermenting,
nitrifying, and sulfate-reducing bacteria suffered losses [58]. The decrease in biomass of these bacteria
in soil caused reduced transformation intensity in organic substances. Also, the bacteria distribution
along soil profile has changed, i.e. a particularly sharp decrease in both, number of species and total
biomass of the bacteria was observed in the uppermost layer of soil. Only at a depth of 20 cm, thebacterial composition closely approximated the reference values. It was demonstrated that under theconditions ensuring high levels of a substrate radioactive contamination, a rate of bacteria mutant
formations increased thus indicating a possibility of more radioresistant configurations emergence.
Consequently, the Exclusion zone’s high-level radioactive contamination has resulted in someextent on biological diversity of species and biocenosis but with time processes of recovery of flora andfauna have begun and self-purification of ecosystems in the excluded area for radioactive
contamination are continued being accompanied by biodiversity alterations.
Radiation effects, being traditionally regarded as a negative ecological factor, have produced asignificantly less impact than an almost complete elimination of anthropogenic pressure.
However, obvious are manifestations of the reactions indicating the signs of radiation injury tosome plant and animal species. The cytogenetic and genetic effects resulting from genomic stability
disturbances are of particular significance; they are the reason of mutations, stratification of
populations, reducing in reproductive capacity, and loss of some species.
This fact is not inconsistent, as cumulative radiobiological processes are going on over many
generations thus allowing to assume that the present realization of long-term effects may be incomplete.
Moreover, negative effects of irradiation are opposed by a strong system of recovery processes, security
system of some organisms and biocenoses on the whole potentially ensuring security of the biocenoses
autochthonous composition.
In particular, the radionuclide contamination of ecosystems produced intensification of
microevolution changes in populations of some species, probably due to a change in the norm ofreaction to environmental conditions. Thereby, the two directions of this process take place in biota of
the Exclusion zone: adaptation of species to new conditions and stabilizing selection. The first one
consist of an augmentation of the rate of variability by means of epigenetic (and consequently, genetic)
processes that manifests itself as advanced capabilities of adaptation to unfavourable living conditions
with further shift of the reaction norm subject to the conditions, confirm a selection of specimens, andfinally populations of species, the most adapted for radiation pressure (i.e. radiation adaptation). The
second direction is related to the phenomenon of somatic radioadaptation. This effect is verified by areaction of small rodent populations that declares itself as a relatively low level of variability with apreservation of corresponding sustained quantity allowing a population to retain its features.
2.2.2. Addressing water supply problems in population centres
Radionuclide-free water supply to the residents of Kyiv and other cities located on the banks of
the Dnipro River is among the most important tasks that have emerged after the ChNPP accident.
Intense radionuclide fallout at the Dnipro River water intake caused a sharp increase in radioactive
contamination level of the river. In May 1986, the average decade values for 90Sr concentrations in thewater to the north of Kyiv (the village of Nedanchychi) amounted to § 100·10–10 Ci·l-1, and for 137Cs
they were still higher [59]. Erection of coastal systems to protect rivers from storm and springradionuclide wash-offs as well as construction of entrapment dams, bottom separators, and barriers inthe beds of the Pripyat River and Dnipro River turned out to be ineffective. Under those conditions,provision of drinking water supply using the contamination proof groundwater was the most reliablemeans to protect people [60, 61].

63

Just then, according to the proposals set forward by the Ukraine’s NAS commission, thegovernment made a decision to urgently drill wells with the objective to ensure emergency water supply
to the people of Kyiv and other population centres. Later on this initiative has developed into
construction of well-rooms proved to be the most important source of high-quality drinking water forthe people of Kyiv. While addressing the problem of the cities water supply, the role of groundwater
well-rooms became particularly evident in 1991, when ice gorges tuned up near Yaniv Bridge over the
Pripyat River in Chernobyl during ice motion. Notwithstanding a significance of the problem, themunicipality of the city of Kyiv closed the most of well-rooms in 2008.
While analyzing the Chernobyl accident aftermath in terms of water supply to cities, as early in
1987 scientists insisted on acceptance of some conceptual principles to ensure a reliable water supply tocities with due regard for various potential emergencies:
drinking water supply consisting of mostly groundwater, and particularly establishment of anechelon water supply system having various sources in the cities, where groundwater resources arescare in terms of the cities’ existing and prospective needs. Supply of groundwater in such systems
should take the maximum possible priority in overall water supply;
exploration and development of emergency groundwater supply sources used in case of surface
water intakes cut-off are essential for the cities, where water supply is completely or partially based on
surface water;
during construction of new residential districts, a preference should be given to self-contained
groundwater supply sources.
Over the last 15–17 years, absolute and fractional (if compared to surface water) decrease in
groundwater uses for the public water supply is observed. However, a large untapped reserve of thegroundwater discharge is available. Undoubtedly, such actions will not be to the benefit of reducing apublic hazard and are unacceptable.
Certainly, specific assessments of groundwater intakes performance potential under various
running conditions, under emergency conditions of various types and durability, under complete orpartial cut-off of the groundwater supply, should have been accomplished in the cities having mixed
water supply a long time ago. Special hydrogeological studies of useful groundwater storage should be
carried out, and emergency groundwater intakes for public water supply should be constructed in thecities having only surface water supply. A special nominal operation mode for such water intakes
should be developed and implemented [61].
Thereby, there is an urgent necessity to carry out a specific assessment of groundwater supply
under various emergency conditions. The outcomes of such assessment should underlie development of
the activities targeted at establishment of a reliable emergency water supply system. Only then will the
Chernobyl lesson concerning water supply to the cities be learned.
2.2.3. Farming in radioactively contaminated areas
The International Conference entitled «15 Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Lessons Learned»
recognized the ChNPP accident to be a «communal rural accident» that has stricken out customary way
and mode of life of the affected rural population and changed people’s links with the environment. In
Ukraine only, over 8 million hectares of land in 74 rayons (districts) of 12 region (provinces), where
lived over 3.2 million people including 600 thousand children, were contaminated with radionuclides asa result of the Chernobyl disaster.
Consequences of the accident turned out to be extremely severe for Polissia population, i.e.
northern areas of Volyn, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Rivne, and Chernihiv oblasts. This area was subject to theworst radioactive contamination resulting from the ChNPP accident. In these areas, agriculture was the
major sector of regional economy. Natural landscapes with meadows, pastures, and forests yielded asignificant portion in the product. And the public exposure dose was mainly formed due to the64consumption of locally produced food. In recent years, these statements are still true and even more
complicated against the background of the nation-wide economic collapse that followed the accident. In
25 years after the accident, a percentage of private farms in a total volume of gross agricultural productare exceeding 75 % for the above areas. However, approximately 60 % of meat and 75 % of milk areproduced on private farms. Eating these products stipulates formation of up to 90 % of the public
internal exposure dose.
The products are used by the producers and enter Ukraine’s consumer market. There is no doubtthat a need in countermeasures for the individual farms in critical population centres must becompletely satisfied. In fact, in recent years, only about 0,3 % of the annual funding envisaged for the
Chernobyl disaster elimination in Ukraine was actually spent every year on the agriculturalcountermeasures that allow to get «clean» products and prevention of public exposure above theestablished limits. Furthermore, financing priorities are not followed. The disequilibrium in financing ofagricultural countermeasures existing in Ukraine inhibits the elimination of the purely accidental origin
consequences (production and intake of products that do not meet state normative requirements,
increase of public exposure dose), and contributes to maintenance of social and psychological tension inregions affected by the ChNPP.
According to Ukrainian Constitution Clause16 «...elimination of Chernobyl catastrophe
consequences, the global catastrophe, genetic conservation of Ukrainian nation is the duty of theState…» the state must provide compensation of people for production being not in line withrequirements of PL-2006. Cost of the protective measures that will allow today of this problem, but alsosignificantly reduce of exposure dose at present is almost 20 times less than the cost of contaminatedproducts.
Internal passport average annual effective dose (AAED) in Ukraine used in decision making andoptimization of protective measures process is calculated by «Methodology–96» [62] based on
measurements of 137Cs average specific activity in milk and potatoes. Over 15 years from the date ofthis methodology approval, structure and volume of agricultural production and consumption of major
foods have changed significantly. Moreover, as a result the lack of work in the region, milk became
practically the major marketable product for the population, which resulted in reduced consumption of
it by the producer. The above caused considerable differences, up to 45 times in some settlements, ininternal AAED estimates made by the «Methodology–96» and measurements based on WBC data [63].
The distribution of land areas by radioactive contamination. In June 1986 the Method of
cultivated land radioecological monitoring was developed with assistance of Agronomical andAgrochemical Departments of the USSR State Agricultural and sanitary – epidemiological service. The
monitoring was performed by taking an average representative sample for each of 445 administrative
regions of Ukraine. The essence of it was in taking individual soil samples following the method of anenvelope: 5 samples in each corner and at the intersection of envelope diagonals that covered five fields
in each of the 25–28 farms of a region. Samples were accumulated and averaged in a damp lorry body,then an aliquot was taken for measurements. Specific 137Cs and 90Sr activity was measured in soil by 11
scientific – research institutes and 29 regional zonal agrochemical laboratories under centralised
metrological support. By this means rather accurate map of cultivated lands average contaminationlevels by long-lived radionuclides was obtained in 10 days reflected almost all the spots with increased
density of fallout. This provided an opportunity to initiate protective measures.
As a result of such monitoring, it was found that the area of agricultural land contaminated by the
Chernobyl accident with contamination level of 37 to 185 kBq·m-2 (1–5 Ki·km-2) was 865 hectares,
about30 % of which are hayfields and pastures. Area of lands with contamination density from 185 to
555 kBqm-2 (5–15 Ki·km-2) equals 90 thousand hectares, 50 % of which are meadow – pasture lands.
Approximately 15 % of the total area of contaminated agricultural lands and almost half of hayfields
and pasture in the Rivne and Volyn oblasts are on acid organic peat soils that are characterised by65intense 137Cs migration within the «soil – plant» system. Moreover, mineral soddy – podzolic soils thatare even the most common for the Polissia are insufficiently provided with nutrients and soils with ɪɇ< 5 make up about 10 % of contaminated lands and about 20 % with potassium content lower than 8 mg
per 100 g of soil. On such soils radiocaesium transfer factors in the chain «soil – plant» in 10–100 times
exceed corresponding values of clean mineral soils.
The system of products radiation monitoring. Since 1991 the UIAR developed and provided
for production application the complex of normative documents on sampling and methods ofradionuclides content measurement in raw materials, food and environment. First of all among theabove the interagency methodical instructive regulations «System of food and agricultural products
quality control in the event of a large radiation accident» which became the basic procedure methodical
paper for this issue [64]. Over the last 5 years the amount of agricultural product samples with 137ɋs and90
Sr radionuclides content above allowable levels of less than 2 % and annually decreases. As of today,
53 % of products exceeding PL-2006 present the share of forest products, 40 % – milk, 3–4 % –vegetables and meat.
Dynamics of radionuclides inclusion in food chains and prediction of radiation situation in thecontaminated territories
Levels of agricultural products contamination by radionuclides were determined not only by soil
contamination density, but also their type and agrochemical properties. A significant influence ofenvironmental conditions (landscape and soil type) on rates of caesium intake by population is reflected
the data of the nationwide passportisation of Ukrainian settlements [65]. In the the first year after
fallouts, when aerial contamination of vegetation was prevailing, shares of external and internal
exposure in the total dose of population exposure were equal in two Ukrainian region with equal
contamination level of soil, but differing soil properties. For the second year, when the major way ofradionuclides intake in plants was soil, the contribution of internal exposure dose on organic peat soil
was 10 times higher than on mineral chernozem. Moreover, the value of total annual effective dose of
population exposure in the year of fallouts was almost the same on the both types of soil, but for 25
post-accident years is almost 10 times higher on peat soil, than on chernozem. These data are evidenceof the significant role of ecological factors in formation of population exposure dose after the accident
at the ChNPP.
A large-scale production radioecological monitoring of agricultural lands was started from 1987
in 33 farms of 4 of the most contaminated regions of Ukraine with aim at clarify radiation situation andprediction of agricultural products contamination and countermeasures planning. The monitoring
scheme covered wide spectrum of soil and climatic conditions of agricultural production typical for thezone contaminated by Chernobyl emissions varying in soil contamination density up to 100 times for137
Cs and 10 times for 90Sr. 16 crops forming the basis of food ration of animals and people, which
contribute to intake of the major part of radionuclides by an organism, were studied during themonitoring. The monitoring takes place up to date, though the volume of it has been reduced.
One of the basic mistakes made in the course of Chernobyl accident consequences elimination was
acceptance of limit contamination density (LCD) of soil as the radiation hazard criterion, but the exposure
dose of man. The value of 555 kBq·m-2 was chosen as the 137Cs LCD. The above and insufficient number of
in-process dose measurements resulted in wronge estimates. This was most display on the territory ofPolissya. Population exposure dose was higher in settlements at the distance of 300 km from the ChNPP
with contamination levels up to185 kBq·m-2, than near of accident epicentre with contamination density
exceeding 555 kBq·m-2 [66–68]. Such actions of the government led to that milk and meat contamination
standards were exceeded even on officially «prosperous» territories by soil contamination levels.
Only in 1988 according to the data from the Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Science regarding
rather high of radionuclides transfer factors from soil to milk the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine included

66

Rivne and Volyn regions in the number of affected regions and in these territories began to carry
agricultural countermeasures. Unfortunately, the countermeasures were not carried out over the first two
most critical years though recommendations on their implementation had already existed [69, 70].
Therefore the major parameter for hazard assessment and taking decision on countermeasures
implementation must be total population exposure dose, and information about soil contamination density
is only one of its component along with ecological, demographic, and other characteristics of the territory.
Absence of the «Chernobyl» phenomenon concerning high radiation hazard of «cleaner» areas asagainst contaminated areas, and increase of radiation dose with time while soil contamination density
decreases, was supported by the based on monitoring data linear dependence between radionuclide
specific activity of vegetation SA and particular soil type contamination density D. The linear
dependence between SA and D was determined back in 1967 based on data from the East – Ural
Radioactive Trace [71]. Unfortunately, many of radioecologists diverged from this postulate after theaccident at the Chernobyl NPP. The main reason for mistakes made by many of researches was first of
all noncompliance with the condition of soil identity with different values of D. Differences in soil
properties within the territory contaminated as a result of accident at the ChNPP were so large thatdifferent types of soil were placed into the same group (sample) of soils with differing D values basedon the criterion of «name on large – scale maps». The proved linear dependence between SA and D
confirmed that values of radionuclide transfer factors do not depend up on soil contamination density
for all species of crops on all types of soil, and products contamination level, as well as population
exposure dose is not only the function of soil contamination density, but also ecological specifics of theterritory. Results of such work enabled determination of new values of soil radionuclide LCD forparticular species of crops and even sorts based on particular soil types.
Data array of many thousands with equal distribution of data among crop and soil types enabledtracing of radiation situation dynamics in contaminated agricultural lands and developing models forpredicting radionuclides accumulation by agricultural products. It was determined that values of RN transfer
factor TF from soil to agricultural products decrease with time. Moreover, value of 137Cs TF from soil tocrops changed very quickly during first 3–5 years, and slowly during the following years, 90Sr – steadily
during the whole period after fallout. Determination of radionuclide TF value in the year of fallouts was notpossible, since vegetation was contaminated not only through soil, but also airely. Radionuclide TF in theyear of the accident were obtained by means of dynamic curves extrapolation (Table 2.5).
Table 2.5.
Values of radionuclide transfer factors TF(t=0) extrapolated at the fallouts, kg-1·m2 (G d 25 %)Crop group

Hay of natural grasses
Hay of sown grasses
Green forage
maize, lucerne, clover
Vegetables
cabbage, tomatoes, cucumbers
Tubers, roots
onion, beet, potatoes
Cereal grain
winter wheat, barley, rye

Peat bog
137
Cs

137

Soddy-podzolic
90
Cs
Sr

137

Grey forest
90
Cs
Sr

137

Chernozem
90
Cs
Sr

223
95

29
5.8

10
4.9

–
3.3

39

3.8

1.9

1.6

–

2.9

0.52

2.0

0.14

1.2

0.033

10

1.6

0.79

0.63

0.23

0.60

0.10

7.3

0.89

3.5

0.66

0.72

0.36

0.32

Over the whole post-accidental period 137Cs was for the most part accumulated by natural
grasses, less by sown and forage grasses, vegetables, tubers and roots, and the least 137Cs was
accumulated by cereal grain. Differences in caesium TF values between grasses and grains are as
follows: for organic soils 50–100 times, for mineral 5–30 times. 90Sr was accumulated the most by grain
crops, 3–4 times less by tubers and roots and up to 10 times less by vegetable crops. Knowledge of67

differences in values of radionuclide TF from various types of soil (several soil types can occur within
one agricultural farm) to agricultural crops enables control of crop contamination levels via
organizational countermeasures, i.e. crops selection and determination of their place in crop rotation,
especially forage crops.
Cereals, tubers, roots and vegetables have very low values of TF RN from soil. Besides, these crops
are traditionally grown on the most fertile soil types and most often with the use of fertilizers. Therefore,
in the remote period after the accident the content of radiocaesium in all crop productions did not exceed
allowable levels within almost the entire territory. However, using the population to grow crops, mainly
potatoes, organic or soddy – podzol sandy and sandy soils, the specific activity of 137Cs in products may
reach the level of PL-2006 and sometimes exceed it. The above can be typified by cases, registered over
the recent years, of exceeded allowable content of 137Cs in vegetables and potatoes grown on peat soils of
Gnoine area in villages of Rokytnivskyi and Dubrovytskyi rayon of Rivne oblast. With soil contamination
density about 100 kBq·m-2 specific activity of radiocaesium in vegetables and potatoes exceeds PL-06.
Therefore, for countermeasures be carried out necessary information on soil properties and density ofradionuclide contamination of soil for optimal placement of particular crops and and use of predict dateof contamination agricultural products in order to apply countermeasures.
The values of 137Cs and 90Sr transfer factor to all agricultural crops differed much for various
types of soils both during the year of fallouts and following years. For all crop species on peat – bog
soil 137Cs TF are 7–15 times higher than on soddy – podzolic, 10–20 times – on grey forest, 15–30
times – on chernozem. The highest 90Sr TF values are on soddy – podzolic soil and almost 5 times
lower on grey forest soil and 10 times – on chernozem.
Such significant differences demonstrate sensitivity of 137Cs and 90Sr TF value to plant grow typeof soil that, in its turn, has certain agrochemical properties. Usage of monitoring data on radionuclide
TF and agrochemical properties of soil enabled development of the method complete estimation of soil
properties Sef. The CESP is based on assuming soil as a three-phase system with the following main
characteristics: ɪɇ of soil solution reaction (liquid phase), organic matter content (OM) and sum ofabsorbed bases (SUB) or content of exchange potassium (K2O). The CESP is graphically defined as asectional area of three-dimensional space Sef – a triangle, corners of which lie on ɪɇ, OM, SUB axes
[73, 74]. This assessment allowed of defining the TF relation with soil agrochemical properties that
directly affect radionuclide accumulation by agricultural crops (Figure 2.24).

abFig. 2.24. Dependence of 137Cs TF in crops from the complete estimation of soil properties Sef basedon the OM – ɪɇ – SAB triad (1991): a – cabbage; b – potatoes.

68The defined dependence between radionuclide TF in crops from Sef is of exceptional importance,since it enables accurate calculation of soil fertilising doses aimed at obtaining product with predicted
lower RN content than for the reclamation activities.
Over the post-accident period values of radionuclide TF to crops has decreased up to 100 times
on organic soils, by 10–30 times on mineral soils for 137Cs, and up to 3 times on mineral soils for 90Sr.
An important factor that significantly changes the radiation conditions in contaminated areas isimmobilisation of radionuclides via a soil absorption complex. Furthermore, due to this process, periodsof half-reduction of plant radionuclides transfer factors are considerably shorter for 137Cs and 90Sr, thanperiods of radionuclides half-decay.
Analysis of the numerous monitoring data array on levels of agricultural crops radionuclide
contamination and main agrochemical properties of soil allowed to build a kinetic model in order topredict radionuclides accumulation by agricultural crops and further plan implementation ofscientifically substantiated countermeasures [74–76]:
137

90

Cs:

TFSef , j

TF0, j (0)  e

Sr:

TFSef , j

TF0, j (0)  e

 O j SefO j Sef­°(1  0.031  ln(Sef ))  e 0.31(1 Sef ) t  ½°®
¾
°̄ (0.031  ln(Sef ))  e  0.055(1 Sef ) t °¿

 e0.096(1Sef )t

(2.1)
(2.2)

Parameter values of the kinetic model of radionuclide transfer from different types of soil toagricultural crops, obtained by means of using Sef, are presented in papers [74, 76].
The model was verified based on data from the French – German Initiative Database FGI 3ɚ,
containing over 6 thousand «soil – plant» pairs obtained as a result of agricultural sector monitoring in
the territories of Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
An accuracy of radionuclide TF model calculations for FGI data was about 30 % even in cases ofcountermeasures implementation and changed agrochemical properties of soil. Therefore, in the case ofradioactive fallouts, for accurate predict of agricultural products contamination, it is recommended touse model of radionuclide behaviour in the «soil – plant» system considering the complete estimation ofsoil properties.
Since early 90-s products contaminated above the state hygienic standards has not been produced in
the public sector of Ukraine [77]. This was enabled by thorough radioecological monitoring, radiation
control of agricultural products and implementation of the countermeasures system on collective farms; themeasures were conducted under the section «Agricultural Radioecology» of the «Program of Minimizationof ChNPP Accident Consequences» over the first 10 years after the Chernobyl catastrophe.
In last years, due to economical difficulties in the country and especially in radioactively
contaminated regions there were cases of PL-06 exceeded on radionuclide content in agricultural
products produced in the public sector. For instance, in 2009 double permissible content of 90Sr was
registered in food grain produced on poor soddy – podzolic sandy soil of Ivankiv rayon of the Kyiv
oblast in the area of voluntary guaranteed resettlement (zone III) adjacent to the ChNPP Exclusion
Zone. There are the two following reasons for this fact. Firstly, in the initial 90Sr radioactive fallout on
this territory was in the matrix of particles of irradiated nuclear fuel and was not available for plants.
Fuel particles (FP) dissolved with time and 90Sr transferred into soil solution and its inclusion in the
migration processes. Secondly, last liming of acid soils in the Ivankiv rayon financed by the Chernobyl
foundation took place in 2006 on the area of 300 hectares and, as required, more than 7 thousand
hectares. Since 2008 soil on farms of the rayon was not contribute to soil the organic fertilisers, andmineral fertilizers was conducted at only for 63% of areas. Furthermore, dosage of mineral fertilisers
was not met, namely: given that 150 kg·ha-1 is the required dose, actual dose was only 25 kg·ha-1.
It should be pointed out that 90Sr specific activity in milk, vegetables, and fruits is currently with
PL-2006 requirements and does not cause concern practically on the entire territory of Ukraine outside
the Exclusion Zone.

69

In late 90-s years the worst agricultural scenario was implemented on radioactively contaminatedareas: collective and state farms were liquidated, agricultural lands were shared. In the process of land
sharing in late 90-s population received lands for grazing and haying located in the areas being the mostcritical in terms of radionuclides accumulation. While Item 3.22 of the «Concept of agricultural
production on contaminated territories and their comprehensive rehabilitation for the period of 2000–2010» states that «...safe use of such areas may be guaranteed only if they are owned by a collective
farm or are in government reserve» [78]. Consequently, bulk of hayfields and pastures are located onhydromorphic organogenic and soddy-podzolic sandy and sandy-loam soils, most often located in wet
depression and floodplain rivers with high groundwater level. Since of 137Cs transfer factors from suchtypes of soil to vegetation are rather high, forage of the population is characterised by significant levelof radioactive contamination. Consequently, large number of private households (PHH) still produce
milk and meat products with radionuclide content far exceeding the established state standards.
In 25 years after the accident there are less than 20 settlements in Ukraine, where 137Cs specificactivity in milk and meat is constantly 3–10 times higher than PL-2006, and less than 100 settlements, where
the level of radioactive contamination of milk may exceed PL-2006 in approximately one third of PHH.
According to prediction of agricultural products contamination, as a result of significant
slowdown of autorehabilitation processes, levels of their radioactive contamination and, consequently,internal population exposure doses of «critical» settlements will reduce very slowly with the period of
half-reduction about 20–30 years without countermeasures (Fig. 2.25).

ɚbFigure 2.25. TF 137Cs dynamics: ɚ – on soddy – podzolic soil for: 1 –hay of natural grasses,
2 – cabbage, 3 – barley; b – hay sown grasses on: 1 – peat – bog soil, 2 – soddy -podzolic,3 – chernozem (TF predict values are in dotted lines).

Accordingly, countermeasures are the basic methods for further rehabilitation of territories
affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe.

70

Agricultural countermeasures
Countermeasures implemented during the initial period after an accident are of higher dose
efficiency, since allow to prevent formation of a greater collective dose comparing to a later period. It isdue to that radionuclide concentration in products significantly reduces over time due to processes ofradionuclides immobilisation in soil. Radiological efficiency of countermeasures does not change overtime and enables reduces the radionuclide concentration in products in the same number of times inany period after the accident. Countermeasures cost is also equal during various periods after an
accident. Therefore, economic efficiency of one and the same countermeasure, as well as dose
efficiency, reduces with time after radioactive fallouts. Accordingly, adherence to priorities is of criticalimportance, first of all, direction of financial resources for agricultural production, consumption ofwhich to contribute the intake of major part radionuclide by human organism.
Failure to meet priorities of countermeasures is the major drawback of the elimination ofconsequences of accident at the ChNPP. Works were often carried out simultaneously in many
directions in spite of the lack of funds. This resulted in an incomplete implementation of required
measures and considerable decrease of investments efficiency. The project «Setting Priorities within the
Accident Consequences Minimization Program» was implemented under EU support aimed at resolving
the task of foreground performance. Project results were praised, but were scarcely implemented during
the first year and completely forgotten later. Absence of a prioritization and progress control systembecame the reason for many deficiencies in the implementation of the Accident Consequences
Minimization Program (CMP). A perfect example of failure to adhere to priorities in the course ofprotective measures is presence of almost 50 critical settlements with milk contamination levels
exceeding PL-2006 even in 25 years after the accident.
Plant cultivation
Plough-land. Together with scientists from research institutions and other UAAS industry
institutions, including UIAR was developed recommendations and regulations – guidelines for
agriculture in conditions of radioactive contamination for different levels of government: national,
regional (5 regions), regional and level of private sector [67]. These recommendations were reprinted invarious periods after the accident as radiation environment was changing on contaminated agriculturallands.
Since soil represents the basic source of radionuclides inclusion in the food chain, protective
measures were aimed at decreasing their availability for plants via changing soil properties. The
countermeasures known before the Chernobyl accident [70] were verified during the post-accidental
period and adapted to the ecological conditions of contaminated areas (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6.
Decrease of radioactive contamination of plant cultivation products with countermeasures, times [66, 67]
Countermeasure

Liming, 4 – 6 t·ha-1
Treatment with NPK
Manure, 50 t·ha-1
Liming + NPKZeolitesPloughing, 35 – 40 cm

Mineral137

Cs

1.5–3.0
1.5–2.0
1.5–3.0
1.8–2.7
1.5–2.5
8.0–12

Sr

Organic
137
Cs

1.5–2.6
0.8–1.2
1.2–1.5–
1.5–1.8
2.0–3.0

1.5–2.0
1.5–3.0–
2.5–4.0
–
10–16

90

Liming of acid soils and additional mineral fertilising were among immediate measures within
the zone affected by accident at the ChNPP. It was determined that mineral fertilising per therecommended optimal ratio of N:P:K 1:1.5:2 is an effective method of increasing yield and decreasing
137
Cs contamination of agricultural crops by 1.5–3 times. Fertilising dosage depends on crop species

71and soil properties. For instance, mineral fertilising rate for potatoes is twice lower as against othervegetable crops.
Countermeasures implemented during 1986–1993 resulted in above 1.5 million ha ofcontaminated soil reclaimed in Ukraine. Liming on contaminated territory along with fertilisers allowedof 2.5–5 times decrease of radionuclides content in products. Due to economical difficulties in 1994–
1996 volumes of these works were greatly reduced, which resulted in negative balance of nitrogen,phosphorus and potassium in soils, which lead to increased radioactive contamination of crop
production.
During 1996–1999 there was an attempt to use locally produced mineral sorbents in order to savemoney on meliorants transportation. 723 thousand tons of sapropel and peat compost were used in unitsof the Rivne oblast. These measures were not effective enough, as radionuclides immobilisation
processes slowed down considerably at that stage as against the first years after the accident.
Despite of numerous reductions of the value of permissible levels of radionuclides content infood and raw materials for them, the completed protective measures allowed of many times decrease ofvolume production exceeding PL compared to the first post-accidental period and on the average twotimes lower of population dose. The IAEA and Global Community was officially acknowledged that all
the countermeasures completed till 1994 had been intensive, effective, and had not been to
disadvantage of the country [79–81].
It is of importance that amounts of Chernobyl Program financing could be considerably less, if
should prevailed the modern technologies, balanced ahrofony and rations in the agricultural industryof Ukraine that provide high yield crops and livestock productivity.
Today, countermeasures on arable lands funded from the State Budget are practically not carried out.
Meadows and pastures. Measures – surface and amelioration improvements – were carried out
on natural pastures and meadows during the post-accidental period that, on the one hand, grass
improvement, and, on the other hand, decreased radionuclide penetration to it. These measures
included: treatment of soil, acid soil liming and mineral fertilising (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7.
Countermeasures efficiency on meadow – pasture lands
Countermeasures

Drainage
Disking or rotary cultivation
Common ploughing
Deep ploughing with clod overturn and deepening
to 35 – 40 cm
LimingApplication of nitrogen fertilisers and increaseof phosphoric and potassium fertilisers dosage
Surface improvement
Amelioration

Factor of 137ɋs accumulation decrease in grass, times
Mineral soils (sandy, loam)
Organic soils (peat)–
1.2–1.5
1.8–2.5

2–4
1.8–3.5
2.0–3.2

8–12

10–16

1.3–1.8

1.5–2.0

1.2–3.0

1.5–3.0

1.6–2.9
3.0–12

1.8–14
4.0–16

Scientists recommended optimal liming and mineral fertiliser doses while improving hayland
and pastures, mixed grass crops for cultivating cultural hayland, optimal terms of grass mow in orderto produce various types of forage, the ten years pasture changing scheme. According to therecommendations [70] a differential system of forage conservation for cattle was proposed: hay madeon meadows differing in contamination density shall be stored separately and used for different
animal groups. Forage for milk cattle and meat cattle final fattening must be conserved on cultivatedor ameliorated meadows. This measure was neither taken in the first years after the accident nor isused today.

72

Countermeasures on private pastures in fact not conducted throughout the post-accident period.
On the base of the UIAR were developed 46 technology projects concerning development ofdifferential countermeasures on forage lands of settlements, where 137Cs PL is exceeded. Unfortunately,
almost none of them were used in implementation of the «Rehabilitation Program....». In 2004–2008
radiation environment in critical settlements within the RN contaminated areas of Ukraine was surveyed
with identification of practically all the smallholdings cattle pastures [82]. But the data obtained byscientists are actually not used in financing of protective measures.
Liming and repeated liming of meadows and pastures is currently practically suspended on the
territory of Ukraine contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
Irrigation agriculture. In 1993 water from the Dnipro river was used to irrigate about 1.6
million ha of 2.6 million ha, which is the total area of irrigated lands in Ukraine, and about 4700 million
m3 of Dnipro water was spent annually for this purpose. Approximately 80 % of irrigated lands werelocated in five south oblasts of Ukraine. Irrigated areas reduced in the following years and in 2007 only
about 520 thousand ha were watered. Positive dynamics regarding irrigated lands was registered over
the two recent years. Owing to radionuclide migration in aquatic ecosystems 90Sr and 137Cs weredelivered to soil of flooding checks with irrigation water. Over the 10 years post-accident evolution,
content of these radionuclides in soil of rice checks increased by factor 1.7 and 2.7 respectively.
Waterway of radionuclides delivery to agricultural crops in irrigated agrocenosis depends on
many factors, the basic of those are as follows: physical and chemical properties of radionuclides andspecific water radioactivity; forms of radionuclides presence in water; quality of irrigation water(hydrochemical grade and saltiness); irrigation procedure (irrigation rate and number); irrigation
methods; biological plant properties and their development phases. Direct proportion was determined
between radionuclide water concentration and value of their transfer to plants. This allowed ofconclusion that given radioactive contamination of irrigated crops is forecasted, it would be proper touse factors linking specific radionuclide water and standing crop concentration, considering proceduresof particular crop irrigation with water of particular hydrochemical grade.
137
Cs content in irrigated crops was from 2 to hundreds of times higher, depending on their
species, than 90Sr content. Delivery of 137Cs to agricultural crops did not change in a substantial way
over the 10 post-accident years, and in 1996 was practically on the level of 1988, and delivery of 90Sr
increased almost by factor 20 due to radionuclide particle that penetrated through root. But absolutecontamination of irrigated crops with overhead irrigation of sown areas with water containing 137Cs and90
Sr made up from tenths of becquerel to several becquerels.
Basic factors affecting crop contamination with lands irrigation were identified over the postaccident years: number of irrigations with radionuclide contaminated water, watering rate, irrigation
method.
It was determined that in 20 years after commencement of irrigation with water contaminated by90
Sr its delivery to vegetable and some other crops will result from soil way, while delivery of 137Cs
over a very long period of time (up to 200 years) will result from water contamination.
Rehabilitation of set-aside lands. Issues of ChNPP Exclusion Zone territory practical use
recovery are not considered so far. The territory of the 2-nd Zone of Absolute (Mandatory)
Resettlement in the Zhytomyr oblast is already partially used in economic operations, for instance, forindustrial crops production, cattle pasturing, as hayland and vegetable gardens, fish breeding lakes andso on. Above 6 thousand ha of the previously set-aside lands were recovered in Ukraine in 2008.
The following circumstances hamper recovery of set-aside lands for economic operations in
Ukraine:upon resettlement of people from these territories infrastructure (buildings, electricity, roads,
reclamation systems, etc.) was completely eliminated or deteriorated;
set-aside agricultural lands get reforested, become waterlogged again, their fertility degrades, etc;73

upon rearrangement of agricultural production over the recent 20 years owing to transition tomarket economy large scale utilisation of set-aside lands is not required from either economical orsocial standpoint (except attractive areas, such as bottom of the Prypiat river);as a result of prejudice and lack of professionalism reflected in the information on Chernobyl
issues presented in mass media, public is currently concerned about the attempts to utilise areas of the
2-nd zone for producing any consumption products;
there is no simple legal mechanism in Ukraine for legislative rezoning of radioactively
contaminated territories.
Animal production arrangement and maintenance, fodder production
From the first hours of the accident and to date cow milk has been the critical food link,consumption of which results in formation of the greater part of population exposure dose. Milk is themost essential foodstuff one cannot do without, especially at that time (1986) when it was irreplaceable,
and its removal from child’s diet would mean putting his health at hazard. Therefore, child’s healthprevailed more often, because «radiation is invisible, and a hungry child is apparent to the naked eye».
From the first hours of accident at the ChNPP milk generated iodine hazard for population, as it was themilk that became the route for transfer of this hazardous and at the same time biologically active
radioactive isotope. It is an essential foodstuff and is currently performing the same function, but for adifferent radioactive isotope, i.e. caesium.
Hazard and scale of the accident suppressed by governing bodies deprived completely thepossibility of affecting iodine hazard. The intensive operations commenced after 9 May were vain,
consequently, it is the radioactive iodine that generated the iodine pathology. Mass injury of population,
especially children, by radioactive iodine, though not completely, but could be avoided. Even at failure
to provide considerable costs, population must have been warned, and recommendations that wereavailable at that time developed by civil defence researchers (1973) must have been fulfilled [70]. Firstand foremost, the following must have been prohibited immediately: pasturing of milk cattle on open
territory, consumption of milk of grazer cows, and usage of fodder conserved after radioactive cloud
passed, before further details. Constraint and prohibitive measures are the most effective during firstdays upon any radiation. But they were not carried in full. As a result of that milk cattle products
became the major source of thyroid gland irradiation and human organism as a whole, firstly, owing toradioactive iodine, and later radioactive caesium isotopes.
Livestock evacuation. First days after accident at the ChNPP became the most dramatic foranimal industry of Ukraine. Active elimination of radiation accident consequences started only on 2
May. Decision of the Government Committee on resettlement of 30-km zone population over 3 days
from 2 to 5 May enabled arrangement and implementation of livestock evacuation from the 30-km
zone: 50 thousand head of cattle, 13 thousand pigs, 3.5 thousand sheep, 1 thousand horses [83].
Along with transportation, areas of temporary relocation in fly camps of Borodianka and
Makarov rayons were arranged. When accepted livestock was subject to partial veterinary examination,
treatment with washing agents, radiological control, feeding, and was sent to place of further allocation
to Kyiv oblast units that existed at that time. The above efforts related to animals that actually presented
ionizing radiation sources were managed by the Veterinary Medicine Department. All of them weretreated by animal industry specialists.
In order to preclude any violations in the epizootologic situation, despite of absence of any hard
information on actual radiation situation, and also well-defined policy of further actions the Veterinary
Department carried out veterinary and sanitary cleaning and two-phase disinfection of all the free ofanimals facilities, farm territories and divisions within the 30-kn zone, shooting and disposal of morethan 23 thousand stray animals. Even today it is hard to imagine the scope of work done, and mostimportant is that bulk of the efforts was useless.

74

Radiological monitoring of livestock products. On 9 May 1986 the Veterinary Department was
the first agency of the State Committee for Agricultural Sector that approved recommendations on
procedure for radiological monitoring and animal production on the contaminated territory, developedby specialists of the Main Administration for Veterinary Science of Ukraine and experts of the AllUnion Research Institute for Agricultural Radiology. The Department was short of equipment andhuman resources to support full-scale radiological monitoring in the animal industry and of animal
products from 74 rayons of 12 contaminated oblasts, and almost immediately after the accident
contaminated livestock was supplied to meat-processing factories. For instance, during May-July 1986
118 thousand livestock heads, including 95 thousand head of cattle and 23 thousand pigs wereslaughtered at Zhytomyrskyi, Novograd-Volynskyi and Korostenskyi meat-processing factories without
any prior radiological monitoring. Exceeding of permissible radionuclide content in the meat stored incooling rooms was registered during laboratory analysis. Meat was stored in cooling rooms of meatprocessing factories over a long period of time. Since meet was contaminated by isotopes of 134,137ɋswith half-decay periods of 2.4 and 30 years contamination level did not decrease with time. Coolingrooms at meat-processing factories were packed to capacity and the decision was taken to sendradioactively contaminated meat to Russia, countries of Central Asia and Caucasus, but radiation
control posts had been already arranged there. All that meet, that is about 10 thousand tons, wasreturned to Ukraine and in almost 10 years after accident at the ChNPP was disposed in the Exclusion
Zone. That was not just a loss of essential foodstuff, but disposal of hundreds of millions of hrivnas.
Though the «Recommendations...» [70] existed at that time and stated: «Meat cattle shall not beslaughtered without prior radiological monitoring and, as necessary, fed by clean fodder till bulk ofradionuclides is removed from an organism».
Management and prohibitive countermeasures. Thanks to the initial recommendations milk
from the most contaminated rayons of the Kyiv and Zhytomyr oblasts was sent for churning. In early
May it was prohibited to send milk to Kyiv from production units of northern rayons, procedure ofdifferentiated collection of milk for milk processing factories based on its contamination levels wasestablished in the city. The most contaminated milk was sent for churning and making cheese, i.e.
products that allow of their long-term storage till decay of short-lived radionuclides, and having up to
10 times lower content of long-lived radionuclides 137Cs and 90Sr as compared to milk. ‘Clean’ milk
was sent for baby food production. This allowed of 10 times reduction of dose loading on 4 million
Kyiv citizens.
Lack of both management specialists, as well as radiometric survey equipment and specialists,and suppression at the critical phase of the accident, and further lack of understanding of the accident
scale by country executives; failure to use and comply with the Recommendations and so on developed
before and after the accident led to mass delivery of radionuclide contaminated products to processing
factories.
In April 1987 the Methodology of intravital assessment of animal organisms contamination withradioactive caesium, developed by the Institute of Agricultural Radiology, was agreed and introduced,
as well as later the one for agricultural production within the radionuclide contaminated territory. With
the assistance of veterinary medicine specialists radiological monitoring points were arranged at meatprocessing factories and later at production units when sending cattle to meat-processing factories. In
early 90-s, cattle (meat) contaminated above the state health standards practically was not delivered tomeat-processing factories.
Scientists of the UIAR studied mechanisms of radionuclide metabolism in farm animal organismthat enabled short term development and introduction of a set of recommendations, instructions on
disposal of feedingstuffs, productive animal rations and in fact enabled scientific control of processes ofradionuclides delivery form soil to vegetation and through animal ration to their organism, and withanimal products to human organism. Thanks to the mentioned developments and their introduction in75

maximum short terms the reliable barrier on the way of radionuclides delivery to human body wasarranged in early 90-s. All of the stated above was made possible thanks to joint efforts of thegovernment, ministers, departments, laboratories, local authorities, and, undoubtedly, agriculturalradiological science, recommendations of which were implicitly fulfilled with its prevailing opinion.
Zootechnical countermeasures. Till 1990, scientists, in particular of the UIAR, directed theirmajor efforts on minimisation of agricultural products radioactive contamination to creating conditions
for obtaining clean crop products as the basis for animal forage resources, based on fundamental
knowledge of mechanisms of radionuclide behaviour in the ‘soil-plant-animal products’ link. Analysisof radiation conditions on cultivated lands has shown that with inhomogeneous radioactive
contamination and differing ecological specifics of the territory even within one production unit forage
resources could be arranged for animals of various productivity: the most contaminated forage shall go
to meat cattle, the cleanest – to milk cattle. During first years after the accident the three stage process
of meat cattle feeding was proposed [84, 85]. According to the process forage of any level ofradionuclide contamination can be used at stage I (from 6 months to 12–16 months). During stage IIthat lasts 1–2 months depending on the level of sales of animal contaminated muscular tissues, forage
with contamination level up to 40 kBqkg-1 can be used. Feeding stage III, depending up on the level ofanimal contamination, may last 30–60 days, when forage by an order of magnitude ‘cleaner’ than atstage II is used, it allows of practically 5–8 times reduction of 137Cs level in an animal organism as aresult of its export. As for ruminant animals, depending on their age and productivity, the period of137
Cs half-removal lasts 20–40 days. Furthermore, intravital 137Cs content in muscular tissue can beeasily determined by the Methodology of intravital assessment of animal organisms’ contamination
with radioactive caesium.
Veterinary countermeasures. In early 90-s it became born in that land treatment and reclamation
measures are not enough to finally cease production of animal products, in particular, milk, exceeding
permissible levels, especially in private sector. Private sector utilises natural forage lands that may notalways and fully be subject to land treatment. Major scientific centres of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus
turner their research works to development of preparations that selectively absorb radionuclides.
Dozens of natural and synthetic substances precluding radionuclides delivery from ration to milk andmeat has been tested. Special attention from economical standpoint should be paid to the approaches ofusing ration admixtures that, once forage gets to gastrointestinal tract (GIT), block radionuclide
absorption into blood via competitive interaction with them, adsorption and chemical binding.
Ferrocene, otherwise known as ferric ferrocyanide, is a high-performance compound for limiting
caesium isotopes absorption into GIT of animals, as well as its derivatives, namely: iron, ammonium,
cobalt, nickel, copper ferrocyanide and some metals. Ferrocine forms insoluble compounds withcaesium that do not penetrate through GIT walls into blood and further in tissues, and are extracted
from organism with metabolic products. When a cow is fed 3–6 g of ferrocine daily, 8–10-folddecrease of 137Cs is registered in milk [86–88]. Preparations containing ferrocine have passed
comprehensive experimental and production tests after the Chernobyl catastrophe at contaminatedproduction units of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.
Efficiency of ferrocines utilisation in decreasing levels of animal products contamination with137
Cs was studied on all farm animal species for thousand heads of cattle. Ferrocines have been provento be safe for health status, productive and reproductive abilities of farm animals and consumption of
products from animals that received ration with ferrocene containing preparations, as well as different
amounts, over a lengthy period of time [86].
It was Ukraine where forrocene preparations testing started and that hosted all-union andinternational commission tests of forrocene preparations in various used forms: powder, salt brickets,boluses, ferrocene on cellulose carriers. Unfortunately, tests were the last activity related to the mentioned
developments. This technology did not develop into an industrial scale one in Ukraine. Along with pure76

ferrocine a ferrocine containing preparation was developed in Ukraine based on wine industry waste,
which is almost as effective as ferrocine, but is cheaper. Natural zeolites have been used as sorbents overmany years in Ukraine, but their efficiency in reducing 137Cs content in milk is 1.5–2 times less.
Private sector. Up to 1989 in became born in [65] that success in practical resolution ofradioecological issues in public sector of animal industry cannot be automatically shifted to the private
sector of animal production. Unavailability of proper forage base for private sector livestock,deregulation of this production market, and above all, absence of mechanisms for this sector
management by state led to animal production private sector criticality in terms of radiation hazard for
population. It is the sector that to date provides animal products (basically cattle meat and milk) withexceeding of the existing state standards. In spite of destructive processes in the economy of the country
in 90-s, it was possible to reduce the number of critical populated localities from 600 in early 90-s to
100 in late 90-s, though even several dozens of such settlements still remain (Fig. 2.26). Radiation
environment in the mentioned populated localities will remain as is over a rather long period of time,since natural processes of lowering of radionuclide transfer from soil into vegetation have significantly
retarded, and physical decay will ensure double decrease of the content in products every 30 years.
The amount involved in the issue of exceeding radionuclide content in milk as of today is about
UAH 20 million a year. For instance, current annual collective dose on the territory of the Exclusion
Zone is about 200 man·Sv. The same dose may be formed due to probability of an emergency event(1 time in 100 years) for instance, Shelter collapse. Millions of hrivnas are spent annually on this.
Approximately 600 man·Sv is the annual collective dose currently formed outside the Exclusion Zone,
and only UAH 2- 5 million are allocated for elimination of the issue.

Fig. 2.26. Distribution of settlements Populated localities dose rating basedon overall dosimetric certification.

Child food problem
One of the priority tasks for the state on contaminated areas is providing radiologically safe foodfor infants and schoolchildren. Milk is the major source of 137Cs delivery to organism of all age groupsof children. Contribution of dairy products to internal exposure dose reduces from 90 % for babies of 0–
3 years up to 75 % for infants and 65 % for schoolchildren. Families having cows use their own dairy
products. Infant food production on radioactively contaminated territories requires a set ofcountermeasures be carried out. «ɫlean» pastures shall be allocated for cows producing milk for infant77

food. Should it be impossible, then reclamation of grasslands and pastures is mandatory, or new
grasslands shall be arranged on ploughed fields. Ration of these cows shall contain sorbents or
Cs-binding preparations.
The child food issue is especially pressing in critical populated localities in contaminated
Polissya, as this is the area where families having many children are common, i.e. up to 10 and morechildren in a family (Rokytnivskyi, Dubrivytskyi, Sarnenskyi rayons of the Rivne oblast). From theirbirth children consume with milk «Chernobyl becquerels» prohibited by Ukrainian Laws. Today, thisissue is not dealt with at all and is not singled out in planning and in the course of protective measures.
Though the state should first of all care about health of the younger generation and not keep away fromthe issue of radioactive contamination of child ration.
2.2.4. Solving of radioecological problems of forestry
The Chernobyl catastrophe resulted in radioactive contamination of forests in 17 oblasts on the
country. Density of 137Cs ground deposition within 1.23 million ha of forests exceeded 37 kBq·m-2 as of
the time of survey (1991–1992) [89]. Part of forests, where the mentioned contamination density value
was exceeded, in Zhytomyr, Rivne, Kyiv oblasts made up respectively 60 %, 56 %, 52 % of the total
area of their forest reserves, and approximately 20 % in Volyn, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia andSumy oblasts. Common feature of forests radioactive contamination is its mosaic, spot, high-gradient
form [90].
As is well known, as a result of radioisotopes physical decay radiation conditions incontaminated forests gradually change. As per estimated data, the area of forests with density of 137Cs
ground deposition exceeding 37 kBq·m-2 reduced by 400 thousand ha in 2010 as against 1992 and it canbe used for any forest management activities without restrictions. But there are no legal grounds forthat, since radiation survey was not iterated. Therefore, the State Committee of Forestry of Ukraine
developed the Concept and Program of Contaminated Forests Rehabilitation. Survey of forest lands
with density exceeding 370 kBq·m-2 is planned during 2010–2020, it will enable recommencement of
economic activities at about 600 thousand ha.
Dynamics of radionuclide concentration in wood, wild-growing mushrooms and berries andtheir role in population exposure dose formation
Forest ecosystems have a complex vertical structure and considerable area of aboveground
phytomass. Consequently, forests, especially coniferous, have considerable radiological capacity.
Immediately after radionuclide fallout on forests their vertical migration started from the upper level of thephytocenoses to soil cover, one of the elements of which, forest litter, became a peculiar kind of depot forradionuclides [91]. Research work in forest ranges within the ChNPP 30-km zone (Lelev forestry) allowedof observation that over the period from 20.05.1986 through 15.06.1986 radioactivity of forest litter of
35–year pine stands increased by factor 2.5 [92]. 90–95 % of the total content of radioactive substances
migrated on ground surface in two or three months after their fallout on forests [93].
Velocity of radionuclide migration in forest ecosystems is governed by composition, age, anddegree of density, and depends on intensity of forest litter mineralisation. Forest litter mineralisation
process is slower in coniferous forest ranges as against deciduous, while forest litter mass is large per an
area unit. Consequently, organic substance is conserved in coniferous forest stands, and release ofmineral substances, including radionuclides is slowed down. Accordingly, it can be stated that forest
litter plays the role of geochemical barrier in forest ecosystems and precludes radionuclide carry-overbeyond the ecosystem.
In order to facilitate systematic research aimed at obtaining reliable data on 137Cs and 90Sr
migration in components of Ukrainian forest ecosystems in 1991–1993 stationare network (above 100
experimental plots) was established in Polissya and Forest-Steppe zones on forest typological base.

78

Research of contemporary distribution of 90Sr and 137Cs radionuclide content within forest
biocenosis of pine stands in fresh subor, demonstrates that bulk of overall 137Cs and 90Sr content (76–83%) is contained in soil, 6–13 % are accumulated by forest litter, 6–10 % are held over by tree canopy,
the rest (1–5 %) is contained in moss cover.
Soil presents a starting point for many trophic chains in forest ecosystems that directly or
indirectly lead to humans. Many years research demonstrated that in 1986 maximal specific activity of137
Cs was registered in the upper forest litter; in 1991 – in the layer of half-decomposed forest litter, andin 2009 – in the most of forest ecosystems – layer of decomposed forest litter. Difference in distributionof total radionuclide activity in forest soil is obvious in the same period. In particular, in 1991 60–70 %of total 137Cs activity of forest soil were kept by thick full-profile coniferous forest litters, the rest
migrated to mineral soil; in 2006–2009 distribution of total radionuclide activity in subors andsudubravas turned out to be contrary, but in the pine forests it didn’t change essentially. Soil enrichment
and moisture play significant role in vertical migration of radionuclides [91].
Analysis of 137Cs vertical distribution in Ukrainian Polissia trophotopic catena soils: bors –subors – sudubravas, under wet growing conditions, 60-year pine stands (Fig. 2.27) allows of statingthat with increasing of soil richness the part of 137Cs activity kept by forest litter reduces considerably,
and the part of the above mentioned radionuclide that had migrated to mineral layer of soil increases
accordingly.

Fig. 2.27. Ratio between total 137Cs activity in the forest litter and mineral soil partof Ukrainian Polissya trophotopic soils catena

The above summarised data evidence that under bor conditions the main 137Cs total stock in thesoil is contained in the forest litter (72 % of the total stock 137Cs in the soil), abrupt reduction of thisindex occurs with transfer to subors (39%) and sudubravas (34 %). Such considerable differences intotal 137Cs activity distribution between forest litter and mineral soil layer in soils of studied trophotops
are associated with a complex of factors, including different contents of forest litter per an area unit anddiffering velocity of its mineralisation, which in its turn is closely related to fraction composition andmineralisation intensity, and mostly biological one, where major role is played by soil micromycets.
Radioactive elements transfer from the forest litter to the mineral part of soil, on the one hand,increases their migration ability due to presence of a considerable number of fine roots of many plants
in the top layer of soil, and, on the other hand, their fixation in clay minerals.
The ratio between migration ability and radionuclides fixation in soil needs to be studied further.
Wood. Researches carried out during the five recent years demonstrated that tree trunks present
the major depot of the total radionuclides stock in aboveground part of forest stands. While specific79activity of both 137Cs and 90Sr in wood is the minimum due to its mass which exceeds mass of the rest ofcomponents radionuclide stock of it is the maximum (Fig. 2.28).

ɚbFig. 2.28. Distribution of

137

90

Cs (ɚ) and Sr (b) sum activity in phytomass of pine stands in Polissya

It was found that regardless of tree species in response to a type of forest vegetation conditions
Cs specific activity according long-term studies increases in the majority of tree components: annual
shoots, needles (leaves), bark internal, wood tissue, and just in respect of bark external post-accidental
trend of the mentioned above index was contrary. 137Cs content increased in Scotch pine wood during
1991–2002 (Fig. 2.29ɚ) in 60-year pine stands of moist subor.
Mushrooms and berries. 20–30 % decreasing of 137Cs content was observed during the last five
years (2005–2010) in the majority of edible mushrooms, mycelium of which is located in forest litter(Xerocomus badius, Cantharellus cibarius, Clitocybe nebularis).
As to species with mycelium in deeper soil layers (Boletus edulis, Russula virescens) specificactivity of 137Cs in fruitbodies grew at the same period because of radionuclide migration into deeper
soil layers. The mentioned above trend will be observed during the following 5–7 years.

137

ɚ

b
137

Fig. 2.29. Long-term dynamics of Cs specific activity and its predict: ɚ – in Scotch pine wood in moist subor(ȼ3) with differing density of soil radioactive contamination (1 – 370 kBq/m2; 2 – 185 kBq/m2), air-dry shoots (1)and fresh berries (2) of bilberry (density of 137Cs ground deposition in 1991– 250 kBq·m-2)

From 1991 through 2010 considerable reduction of 137Cs specific activity was typical for main
forest berry species (Fig. 2.2.8b). For instance, fresh cranberry berries 137Cs content lowered by factor
3–4, bilberry – by factor 5. Duration of the ecological effictive period of 137Cs half-decreasing makes
up: for bilberry and cowberry in wet subor conditions (ȼ3) – 7.5 years; for cranberry in damp subor (ȼ4)
– 7.7 years, in moist pine bor (Ⱥ5) – 5.5 years. Predictive duration of the following half-removal period
for the listed species is approximately twice longer.
Surveys at radiological stations resulted in the observation of linear dependency between
radionuclide content and density of radioactive contamination of soil in particular edatope in respect of
all economically valuable species. This allowed to calculate ground deposition density for obtaining
forest products with radionuclide content below permissible lewels. It also allowed to make a groupingof forest managements according with possibility of particular forest raw materials usage.

80

Fig. 1.2. Destroyed ChNPP Unit 4.

Fig. 1.3. SO external protective constructions: 1 – covering of the Central Hall;
2 – Covering of the Turbine Hall; 3 – Cascade Wall; 4 – Western («big») Buttress Wall; 5 – Southern shields;
6 – Southern Shields «stick»; 7 – Northern shields – «sticks»; 8 – Northern («small») Buttress Wall.

Fig. 1.4. Constructions of supports and bearing elements of the Shelter object covering:
1 – B1 Beam (B2 Beam is behind it); 2 – pipe covering; 3 – the top part of a wall on an axis 50,
strengthened by «corset»; 4 – exhaust shaft; 5 – «Mammoth» beam; 6 – Western support of «Mammoth» Beam;
7 – Eastern support of «Mammoth» Beam; 8 – «Octopus» Beam.

Fig. 1.5. Shelter Object construction.

Fig. 2.16. Layout view of the estimated landscape that will be formed in place of the current ChNPP cooling pondbottom after its drainage (light colour is a completely drained zone, dark colour shows a new lake system andgrey colour indicates transitional wetland).

Fig. 5.1. Fragments of destroyed reactor core in premise 305/2.

Fig. 5.2. LFCM varieties.

Fig. 5.3. LFCM in the destroyed ChNPP Unit 4.

Fig. 5.4. Zones of high-uranium LFCM in premise 305/2.

Fig. 5.5. Formation of ‘furnace’ and concrete melt burning through the sub-reactor plate.

Fig. 5.10. The Modernised Dust Suppression System for Shelter Object airborne particulates matter.

Fig. 5.11. Spraying of dust suppression solution (Ⱥ) and protective polymer coating (B)of fragments in the SO inner space.

Corresponding recommendations for forest management in contaminated environment were developedon this methodological basis [94–96].
Hygienists’ researches proved that internal exposure dose of rural population of highly forested
areas of the Ukrainian Polissya as a result of forest mushrooms and berries consumption currently
makes up on average 20% of the total dose. Internal exposure dose of men from the same village may
differ widely. It may be caused by differing ration of population. Whole elimination of forest products
from a diet decreases population exposure dose more than 10 times.
Radiation environment in forests has stabilised and improved over the post-accidental period due
to radionuclide decay and their involvement in biological cycle. This trend will continue in thefollowing years. Changes in radiation environment in forests will be associated with radionuclide
fixation in soils and physical decay.
Forest management on radioactively contaminated territories
Before accident at the ChNPP there was no experience of forest management under large-scale
radioactive contamination in the international practice that put Ukrainian forestry in predicament. In
order to ensure radiation safety and uninterrupted operation of industrial facilities, investigation ofradiation environment in forests, development of normative documents that would govern forest
management, forest harvesting operations, and non-wood forest resources utilization were required in a
relatively short time. Therefore, priority task of foresters was urgent forests inspection for radioactive
contamination, as well as development of scientifically grounded recommendations on forest
management for radioactively contaminated areas. With this object in view the former Ministry ofForestry of Ukraine conducted a number of management and physical measures.
Firstly, organization structure of the Ministry of Forestry of Ukraine was subject to changing, themost radioactively contaminated forests (Chernobyl and Novoshepelivka forestlands of the Kyiv oblast,i.e. about 110 thousand ha) were transferred to the Exclusion Zone. Any forest management activities
were prohibited within the area of about 50 thousand ha, due to high levels of radioactive
contamination. Forest management restrictions were applied on wide areas of the state forest fund. For
instance, forest harvesting of non-wood production was prohibited within the area of above 1.1 million
ha, wood cuttings within approximately 1.1 thousand ha were subject to regulation [96].
Today in conditions of radioactive contamination, 55 forestry enterprises with 36 thousand of
employers (third part of employees in the forestry) are operating. Annual medical examination andindividual dose measurement are carried out in order to maintain medical condition of employees
operating in the contaminated zone.
Radiation control of forestry production. After accident at the ChNPP Radiation Monitoring
Department was established within the structure of the State Committee of Forestry to ensure: obtainingof in-process information about radiation conditions in forest stands, production and dwelling premises
status, dose measurement within areas of forest management activities, sampling and measurement ofradionuclides content in forest products, radiation databank maintenance, reporting to enterprisemanagement and local executive bodies, as well as local public communities on forests radiation status
within territory under their authority and radionuclides content in forest products [97].
The Radiological Department is provided with the precise dosimetry and radiometry
equipment, as well as professional staff. During 1986–1992 the Radiological Department ensured
radiation survey of a forest area of 4.5 million ha and facilitated radiation monitoring of various
species of forest products.
Moreover, scope of radiation monitoring of forest products within the sector gradually decreased.
Budget financing of the Radiological Department of the State Committee of Forestry was stopped (fromthe side of MNS) in the current year. This will undoubtedly reflect on radiation monitoring efficiency,
especially of forest food production.

81

Countermeasures in forest sector of economy. Restrictive measures were the priority
countermeasures at forest sector enterprises during the critical post-accidental period, including:
reduction of daily working hours number, stopping of economic operations on particular areas with highradioactive contamination levels, evacuation of enterprises and their employees to safe area, prohibitionof particular types of forest enterprises production operations (preparation and selling of wild-grown
berries, mushrooms, medical herb raw materials, wood etc.).
In order to ensure operation of contaminated area forestry enterprises, scientifically groundedrecommendations on forest management in radioactive contamination environment were developed andserved as a basis for the below provided grouping of all the enterprises depending on soil radioactive
contamination density under the growing stock and products radioactive contamination level: ȱ – V (Cs137) <37 kBq·m-2; ȱȱ –enterprises of Ukrainian forest-steppe having on their territory forest areas with V (Cs137) >37 kBq·m-2 with spots (100–300 ha in area) with V (Cs137) < 370 kBq·m-2 on fertile clay and loam soil; ȱȱȱ –enterprises of Ukrainian Polissia with V (Cs137) < 185 kBq·m-2; ȱV – enterprises of Ukrainian Polissia with V(Cs137) > 185 kBq·m-2 with plantations on poor soil with intensive radionuclide migration to vegetation.
Economic activities of enterprises belonging to group ȱ were based on standard methods.
Preparation of wild-grown berries and mushrooms is regulated at enterprises of group ȱȱ and ȱȱȱ, theirradiation monitoring is arranged, and the following is prohibited at group ȱV enterprises: preparationof foodstuff forest resources, medical herb raw materials, game animals shooting, and firewood
stocking is regulated.
Countermeasures taken during the critical and further post-accidental periods at different levelsof state regulation in the forestry allowed to precluse staff overexposure, maintaining their medical
condition, and facilitated stability in enterprises operation and production growth.
Starting from 1989 all the measures on Chernobyl ChNPP accident consequences elimination related
to the forestry were implemented and funded under the state Programs of accident consequences mitigationthat enabled huge effort be implemented, preclude overexposure of forest sector employees and reduce
collective exposure doses of population in general. Since 1992 financing of the Programs of minimization of
ChNPP accident consequences in the forestry was reduced by 50 %, and completely stopped from 2009.
Status of radioactively contaminated forests rehabilitation. According to estimates, above 100
thousand ha of forest ranges could be currently rehabilitated and economic activities is recommended.
Rehabilitation of forests shall be based on detailed cartograms of their radioactive contamination. Thisrequires additional survey of forests by areas since substantial mosaic is typical for radioactive
contamination levels of areas.
The State Committee of Forestry of Ukraine developed and approved «Program of radiation
survey and rehabilitation of radioactively contaminated forests for 2010–2015» that envisages gradualforest survey and, if possible, economic activities recommencement or utilisation of particular forest
resources. Rehabilitation of forest products utilisation can be illustrated by recommenced preparation of
wild-grown berries, medical herbs, and mushrooms by state enterprises of the Volyn, Rivne, andChernihiv oblasts. All the prepared products were subject to radiation monitoring and are in line withradiation safety norms. The listed enterprises will increase preparation of forest foodstuff resources in
the following years. Similar measures should be planned on a part of forestlands in the Vinnitsa,
Cherkasy, Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.
Iterated survey of a part of forests is carried out for rehabilitation of forest ranges of theZhytomyr oblast, since forest management and logging operations are prohibited there. Area survey offorest ranges for their radioactive contamination allows of the following: determine current radiation
conditions, plan (if possible) forest management activities on stands improvement within areas surveyed
20 years ago, stock timber with radionuclide content below the set standards. Since 2005 8.7 thousand
ha of forest ranges previously regarded to the mandatory resettlement zone were surveyed andrehabilitated at enterprises SE «Narodytske SLG», SE «Ovrutske SLG», SE «Ovrutske LG». In 201082

1.7 thousand ha of forests were surveyed at the SE «Narodytske SLG» with soil radioactive
contamination levels exceeding 555 kBq·m-2, among which forest management activities wererecommenced on 1.6 thousand ha. First of all, the forest enterprise started sanitation felling of forest
stands, requiring this effort be taken, which, on the one hand, allowed brining them in satisfactory
conditions, on the other hand, certain revenue was derived.
Efficient forest management in the radioactive contamination environment is substantially
impeded by some issues unsettled on the legislative level. In particular, completely prohibited forest
management in forests with ȱ37ɋs soil contamination density exceeding 555 kBq·m-2, set forth in the
Law on status of territories that suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe, interferes with
implementation of vital (for instance, young growth felling; sanitation felling) and economicalarrangement of the contaminated area (reconstruction of roads and bridges, firewater ponds, ride
between compartments, carrying out cutting under high voltage lines etc). Consequently, amending of
the mentioned Law accordingly is critical now.

2.3. Main tasks and expected future development of agriculture
on radioactively contaminated territories
In an effort to solve issues of suffered territories rehabilitation and recovery the State Long-Term
Program of Agribusiness Development on the Territories Contaminated as a Result of Accident at the
ChNPP and their Comprehensive Rehabilitation should be implemented in the following years.
According to the «Concept of Agricultural Production on Contaminated Territories and theirComprehensive Rehabilitation for 1998–2010» [78] the program should ensure resolution of priority
radiological issues, notably comprehensive improvement of radiation environment in critical populated
localities, stopping of agricultural output with radionuclide content exceeding state standards, resolutionof the priority task of child food, obtaining guaranteed clean, competitive agricultural products. It also
should ensure economical development of the regions and social benefits for population.
In an effort to solve issues of suffered territories rehabilitation and recovery the State Long-Term
Program of Agribusiness Development on the Territories Contaminated as a Result of Accident at the
ChNPP and their Comprehensive Rehabilitation should be implemented in the following years.
According to the «Concept of Agricultural Production on Contaminated Territories and theirComprehensive Rehabilitation for 1998–2010» [78] the program should ensure resolution of priority
radiological issues, notably comprehensive improvement of radiation environment in critical populated
localities, stopping of agricultural output with radionuclide content exceeding state standards, resolutionof the priority task of child food, obtaining guaranteed clean, competitive agricultural products. It also
should ensure economical development of the regions and social benefits for population.
Pursuant to decision 62 of the UN General Assembly as of 12.11.2007 the third decade after the
Chernobyl catastrophe (2006–2016) proclaimed as: «...The decade of rehabilitation and stabledevelopment of the suffered regions that must be focused on achievement of the objective of restoring
normal living of the suffered population, if possible, in the same period». Current value of the productsthat do not meet health physics standards of PL-2006 makes up about UAH 200 mn, which is dozensfold above the cost of the protective measures directed at this issue resolution.
Ceasing of milk output with radionuclide content below the PL-2006, first of all, requires
ferrocene be used with the cost of approximately UAH 10 million in year. Moreover, countermeasures
shall be directed to the most critical villages, rather than dispersed all over the territory that sufferedfrom the accident. It is important to remember that ferrocine must be used regularly and upon its
discontinuation the effect of lowering milk contamination level decreases dramatically. In view of thecomplexities associated with the procurement under the State Budget (duration of tendering exercises,
irregular funding, difficulties of foreign supplies and so on) actual efficiency of ferrocene consumption83

in Ukraine may turn out to be lower than expected. Therefore, forage lands amelioration should also
take place being a very effective and lengthy countermeasure on peaty soils of the Rivne oblast.
For the purpose of agriculture development on radioactively contaminated territories a set ofmajor tasks must be fulfilled.
Prioritise measures in populated localities of continuing consumption of milk and some otherproducts with exceed of 137Cs content standard. The state is obliged to eliminate the issue of noncontaminated milk supply to children over 25 years. The issue requires funding in the amount of several
dozens of million UAH, while overall cost of the Chernobyl Program is UAH 3.5 milliard!
Animal and human rations must be balanced via additives and application of complex fertiliserscontaining micronutrients, as lengthy ferrocene consumption aggravates micronutrient malnutrition
typical for the Polissia zone.
Perform scientifically grounded demand calculations and ensure implementation of acountermeasures set in regions, where 137Cs content in cattle milk, meat or crop products is above 80 %of the standard or exceeds it. As this takes place, after-effect of countermeasures in crop cultivation
should be taken into consideration, since it exhibits over several years and enables soils ameliorationand crop production increase.
Establish minor target programs and thoroughly supervise their progress. In order to accomplish
this, a listing of urgent and mandatory points should be developed and validated.
Urgently develop a procedure of programs scientific and technical expert review in order tostreamline and minimise the scope to a possible extent under the acute shortage of investments.
Develop a works scientific support program for the next period and ensure its financing.
Revise involving scientists the radiation monitoring program for products quality with the major
focus on the most critical regions. Take necessary steps in order to keep professional radiologists andmaintain working efficiency of veterinary and agronomical radiological departments over the entire
area of the zone of radioactive contamination.
Facilitate centralised maintenance of databases on radiation conditions in various production
sectors, obtained by various departments over the entire post-accidental period.
Establish and implement a State Social and Economic Development Program for contaminatedterritories. All the development and construction restrictions applicable to the regions that suffered shallbe eliminated for attracting investments, except set-aside territories.
Increase management responsibility for programs implementation and set results
accomplishment.
Reconvene review of the «Social and Economic Development Program for ContaminatedTerritories» developed by the group of people’s deputies of Ukraine conjointly with the Ministry ofAgricultural Policy, and NAAS of Ukraine passed in a first reading by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,but vetoed by the President of Ukraine, V.A.Yushchenko.
Intensive crops cultivation and animal production with adherence to methods may ensure
products contamination lowering at the current stage of contaminated territories rehabilitation.
Accordingly, the major way to rehabilitation of the territories contaminated as a result of accident at the
ChNPP is social and economic development of the region, and basic line of agricultural management is
its intensive development and rise in profitability.

84

3. RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF CHERNOBYL DISASTER
3.1. Irradiation doses
Chernobyl radioactive release started April 26th, 1986 and according to some estimates, lasted 1015 days. Short-lived radionuclides (radioisotopes such as niobium, zirconium, iodine, etc..) played arole of dose factors in the early phase of the accident. With the distance from the start of the accident,
the increasing role in shaping the dose was played by radioisotopes of cesium (137Cs, 134Cs) and muchless – strontium (90Sr). Radioisotopes of transuranic elements (238,239,240,241 Pu, 241Am), though were
present in radioactive emissions, but the physical and chemical properties of the inactive carriers inwhich they were fixed, stipulated that the role of the transuranic dose was small.
During the emergency radioactive release the weather conditions constantly changed, causing
significant heterogeneity of radioactive fallout in Ukraine: 137Cs fallout density varied from units toseveral hundred kBq · m-2. 90Sr contamination levels were approximately 10 times lower. In the area of
population residence levels of fallout 239Pu varied from 0.004 to 0.9 kBq m-2 (at the average level ofglobal fallout 239,240 Pu for Ukraine – 0.037 kBq · m-2).
While in the area of radiation influence of the Chernobyl accident virtually all the residents of
Ukraine were somehow involved, but four critical forces that are most experienced accidental exposure
are highlighted:1) clean-up workers of ChernobylNPP accident known as «liquidators» those who were directly
involved in work on the industrial site or in the Chernobyl 30-km zone;2) evacuated residents of Pripyat and Chernobyl, as well as settlements of 30-km zone;3) children and adolescents (age – at the time of the accident), whose thyroid gland has
undergone irradiation by radioactive isotopes of iodine, which came into the body with food or inhaledin May-June 1986;
4) rural residents living on contaminated territories.
The population of the contaminated areas is the largest in number among the four contingents
outlined above and makes millions of people in Ukraine.
Dose load were formed by two basic ways of irradiation for population of contaminated areas:1) external whole body gamma irradiation from the complex of gamma-emitting radionuclides in
the fall-out on the soil;
2) internal irradiation of thyroid gland from radiocesium (in 1986) and whole body irradiationfrom radiocesium (and much less from other radionuclides) due to consumption of contaminatedfoodstuffs produced (grown) at the radioactively contaminated territories.
3.1.1. Radiation doses of clean-up workers of the accident.
Retrospective dose reconstruction of clean-up workers of the accident
Clean-up workers of the Chernobyl NPP accident (also known as «liquidators») compose one of
the largest and probably the most exposed cohort affected by the Chernobyl accident. Despite theimportance of this population – both in terms of medical and social aspects and position of studying theconsequences of accidental exposure – exposure picture of the situation with the liquidators for a longtime remained uncertain. Thus, among the clean-up workers years of 1986–1990 included in the State85

Register of Ukraine (SRU) of persons affected by the Chernobyl accident only about a half have records
of individual doses. Remained unclear both the quality of available dosimetric data, and the overall
success or failure of radiation protection during clean-up works.
Traditional were ideas of almost total falsification of data on radiation doses and the mass excess
of fixed dose limits. It was also uncertain situation with radiation dose of crystalline lens, one of themost radiosensitive organs, especially beta radiation from the Chernobyl radionuclide mixture.
Therefore a large range of activities was planned and largely implemented for the past ten years aimed
at bringing clarity to the real exposure of clean-up workers and retrospective evaluation of dosimetricmonitoring results during clean-up works.
A special place in the complex problems of exposure assessment dosimetry of clean-up workers took theneed of dosimetric support of post-Chernobyl epidemiological studies. These studies require information on
subjects’individual doses, and solving the problem of dosimetric support needs the implementation of
integrated approaches. The main practices of individual retrospective dosimetry, which was developed in recent
years and successfully used to reconstruct individual doses of clean-up workers is RADRUE (Realistic
Analytical Dose Reconstruction and Uncertainty Analysis) – analytical calculation method jointly developedby Russia (Institute of Biophysics), Ukraine (Research Centre for Rradiation Medicine, Chernobyl NPP), USA(National Cancer Institute) and France (International Agency for Research on Cancer).
An important feature of this method based on an inquiry of clean-up workers, the reliability
analysis of responses by expert monitoring team and the use of expansive databases of radiation
situation in the places of clean-up works, is that it can be universally applied to any clean-up worker,
including the deceased (through the inquiry of colleagues and relatives).
RADRUE method was widely used to reconstruct individual doses for whole body and bonemarrow of subjects (cases and controls) of Ukraine-US research of leukemia among liquidators.
Altogether 1,010 doses were reconstructed for clean-up workers using RADRUE method, in particular
79 subjects who died (through questioning colleagues and relatives of the deceased clean-up workers).
Taking into account that the cohort studied included clean-up workers of 1986–1990, which haveofficial status and registered liquidators in the SRU, the dose range was from zero to about 3.2 Gy,arithmetic mean dose (expectation) – 90 mGy, geometric mean – 12 mGy. Such a huge range of doses
suggests extreme heterogeneity of cohort of clean-up workers composed at the same time with thepeople who received large doses in the first days after the accident, and household sector employees or
persons who visited the 30-km zone during a short business trip.
Doses of certain occupational categories among the clean-up workers differ (Table 3.1.13). Thus,
the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for which there were fewer opportunities toeffectively influence on the levels of exposure, and nuclear power professionals (NPP employees,
workers of Construction Administration-605) received relatively higher doses. It should be noted thatthe last group (nuclear power professionals) also includes so-called early liquidators, i.e. people from
Chernobyl NPP personnel exposed to radiation at the initial crash, when there were no establishedeffective system of radiation protection and radiation control.
Obviously, the highest doses received participants of clean-up works for which no effective
system of radiation protection and exposure management was used, first of all, early liquidators (those
who participated in the clean-up works during April-May, 1986) and certain categories of workers whocarried out works on individual tasks, mostly outside the scope of attention of radiation monitoring
services. Dynamics of military liquidators exposure by years (Tabl.3.1) adequately reflects theevolution of the radiation situation in the 30 km zone and a gradual reduction of the dose limits within
1987–1988. It should be noted that the average dose of military liquidators were significantly lower
than officially registered and established in the public consciousness value. This finding agrees wellwith the independent analysis of official dose records and qualitative considerations concerning
radiation monitoring features of the troops during the clean-up works. l

86

Table 3.1.
Results of reconstruction of individual doses by RADRUE for some categories
of occupational accident (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)
Average dose (mGy) Median dose (mGy)

Geometric standard
deviation

Category

NumberMilitary (total)
Separately by year of participationin the clean-up works
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Professional atomist
Staff of MIA
Sent in official journey
Drivers

218

76

54

2,1

99
52
44
20
3
35
27
340
213

105
78
29
31
60
381
203
70
64

82
46
17
17
24
277
173
48
41

1,89
2,32
2,41
2,22
2,89
1,78
1,86
1,95
1,99

It should be noted that the cohort of subjects of Ukraine-US study of leukemia among liquidators
is quite representative, because data on levels of doses, type of work and distribution of professionalgroups (categories) of clean-up works (Table 3.2) are very informative and can characterize the total setof Ukrainian clean-up workers.
A separate scientific and practical problem is to determine the lens exposure in clean-up workers,
including assessment of individual doses of beta-radiation. The essence of the problem is that during theclean-up works beta-irradiation doses were not controlled (becausse of shortage of existing logisticaland methodological basis) while in the Chernobyl mixture of radionuclides were amply represented
hard beta emitters (144Ce/Pr, 106Ru / Rh, 90Sr / Y), which could form a substantial remote dose betairradiation. Under certain conditions, beta doses on lens of clean-up workers may exceed an order of theappropriate dose of gamma-radiation.
A large study on reconstruction of individual doses of lens beta-irradiation of 8,607 participantsof Ukraine-US ocular Chernobyl research (UACOS) RCRM specialists conducted jointly with theInstitute of Occupational Health, AMS of Ukraine (the main contractor of the project UACOS).
Developed dosimetric model took into account the time elapsed after the accident (and, accordingly,
changes in the composition of the Chernobyl nuclide mixture), peculiarities of exposure (which were
determined through questioning of liquidators) – character of work, workplace characteristics, using ofprotective eyewear. To assess an adequate exposure model was used (phantom, taking into account theanatomical location of the lens, exposure from horizontal and vertical surfaces with different textures)and the method of calculating the distance doses of beta radiation by the Monte Carlo method.
Although the ultimate goal was to assess the total doses to the lens, a correlation between dosesof gamma and beta radiation is also of interest (Fig. 3.1). It was found that approximately 32 % ofsubjects for study beta-irradiation doses were higher than the corresponding gamma doses (i.e., the total
radiation dose in the lens was more than two times higher than the assessment only gamma dose), while
for about 53 % of subjects of beta irradiation did not exceed a half of the corresponding dose of gamma
radiation.
Parameters of total doses (beta + gamma) of lens irradiation in certain groups of clean-up
workers – the study subjects are listed in the table. 3.3. The table shows that the largest radiation dose
received so-called early liquidators, i.e. staff persons from the Chernobyl NPP and other units that wereinvolved in the clean-up worksin at the first days and weeks after the accident. It should be noted that inview of the nature of exposure (dose gamma irradiation + beta; see. Fig. 3.1) and characteristics of thecohort (clean-up workers of 1986–1987) doses of the largest group of studied subjects – militaryliquidators – are in a good agreement with the dose reconstruction by RADRUE (Table 3.1).

87

88

Another original feature of ocular dosimetry project was the sharing of various methods of
dosimetry that were relatively uniform across a single calibration standard («gold standard»). Thus, toassess individual doses of gamma irradiation the high-quality data of personal dosimetry monitoring(staff of Construction Administration ʋ 605 – CA-605), the results of calculation and analytical dosereconstruction (ADR), the official dose records (ODR) of military liquidators were used.
Dose estimates from independent sources were calibrated against EPR dosimetry on tooth enamel
as the most accurate and valid method for retrospective dosimetry. This caused the introduction ofcalibration correction in the primary dose assessment. Thus, it appears that ODR of military liquidators
approximately twice overstate the actual levels of exposure in this category of clean-up workers.
To correct the primary ODR and take into account of doses uncertainty it was to multiply the initialODR by an adjustment of logarithmically normal distribution type with the following parameters: geometricmean – 0.5, geometric standard deviation – 2.2. These options of the corrective distribution reflect large
systematic shift of registered doses, as well as a considerable uncertainty of radiation monitoring data of
military liquidators. Unique data on individual doses of liquidators’ lens irradiation enabled to succeed
ocular research and to analyze the risks of cataract under the influence of ionizing radiation.

Fig. 3.1. The distribution ratio of beta-irradiation to doses of gamma radiation
for the 8,607 subjects of Ukraine-American Chernobyl ocular research (UACOS).

89

Table 3.3.
Characteristics of lens exposure of certain groups of clean-up workers-participantsof Ukraine-American ocular Chernobyl research (UACOS)
Group of clean-up workers / dosimetry method

Employees of CA-605 / individual monitoring by TLD
dosimeters
Representatives of various groups / EPR dosimetry in
tooth enamel
Early liquidators / analytical dose reconstruction(ADR)
Sent to the 30-km zone / ADR
Military liquidators / Official dose records (ODR),
received by the group and group-calculating method
Total

Number in thetested cohort

Dose distribution parameters of lens(beta + gamma) mGy:Median (5 % and 95 % percentile)410

16 (2, 235)104

94 (19, 426)712

502 (142, 1143)

126

16 (1, 242)

7,255

121 (30, 287)

8,607

123 (15, 480)

Serious attention was paid to assessing the quality and reliability of existing dose records ofradiation levels of clean-up workers. These attempts were made on several areas:
Collection and unification of all existing databases on individual doses and the corresponding
paper archives.
Studying the practice of radiation protection and radiation control of various contingents ofclean-up workers, including institutional and regulatory aspects.
Study of dosimetric registration accuracy by statistical methods.
Retrospective evaluation of dosimetric uncertainty of SRU data by comparing the official resultswith the results of dose reference EPR dosimetry.
In the direction of the collection of available dosimetric information with funding from the
National Cancer Institute (USA) all the electronic databases of radiation control during the clean-up
work were acquired. Unfortunately, this information gathered by the efforts of Russian colleagues fromthe Institute of Biophysics (Moscow) was not useful for practical use due to lack of reliable identifiers
for linking records in dosimetric databases with the data in SRU.
Noteworthy achievement was the transfer of dosimetric data archives of the Ministry of Defenceof Ukraine in an electronic database. Results of this work, carried out jointly by specialists of MilitaryArchive, Military Medical Academy and the RCRM was the database containing more than 45 thousand
entries of Ukrainian troops (reguular and reserve), those that include the terms of participation in theclean-up works, the number of units and individual dose during the clean-up works. Comparison of datafrom the archive of Ministry of Defence (MOD) with ODR of the State Register of Ukraine proved tobe very instructive. It appeared that the dose of military liquidators who are registered on the SRU
practically coincide with the data contained in the military archive. Moreover, the degree of overlapping
data sets and SRU and Military Archive was quite high – almost all of the records contained in the
Military Archive is reflected in the SRU. This conclusion confirms the high importance of SRU data asa source of dosimetric information for military liquidators, who are about 90 % of people withregistered dose in the SRU.
Study of regulations and practices of radiation protection and radiation monitoring during theclean-up works that has been done in the framework of Franco-German Initiative «Chernobyl», allowed
to better assess the quality, reliability and completeness of dosimetric data on clean-up workers. It was
found that in terms of quality and level of contingent coverage by dose control, five periods cann besingled out (Table 3.4).
If at the preaccidental period the dosimetry and radiation safety service satisfactorily fulfilled its
tasks, sudden accident revealed a complete failure of the existing dosimetry to effectively determine
individual dose of workers and provide the necessary level of personnel radiation safety in emergency

90

conditions. It should be noted that the period of confusion was quickly overcome and since the second
decade of May, 1986 dosimetry system in support of emergency workers began to be made graduallyand in early June (about a month after the accident) the foundations of effective radiation protection andradiation control of the main forces involved to overcome the disaster were laid.
Table 3.4.
Periods of dosimetric maintenance of clean-up works
PeriodTime Interval

Preaccidental

1978-26.04.1986

Initial26.04.1986 – about
10.05.1986

Interimabout 10.05.1986 –01.06.1986

Main

June-October, 1986

Rutineafter November,
1986

Description

Normal functioning of Chernobyl NPP dosimetry service
in accordance with Radiation Standards-76
Inability of Chernobyl NPP dosimetry service, the useof the war-time approaches to dose control of forces
Parallel operation of dosimetry services Chernobyl NPP and thearmy, introducing a single exposure limit (250 mGy), CA-605
organization with its own dosimetric service
Operation of dosimetry services of Chernobyl NPP, CA-605 andMOD units based on different approaches
Parallel operation of dosimetry services of Chernobyl NPP,
CA-605, IA «Combinat» and MOD departments. Gradual return tonormal operation, reduction of dose limits (1987-1988)

It was found that the quality of dosimetry data (a radiation monitoring) essentially depends on which
service or agency conducted radiation protection of liquidators and dosimetry control. During the clean-up
works (1986–1990) in the 30-km zone four large independent dosimetry services (Table 3.5) and several
smaller independent service providers (USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences,
Integrated Expedition of Institute of Atomic Energy, etc.) were in function. These dosimetric services beganat different times after the accident, covering various contingents and, most importantly, practiced radicallydifferent approaches to the assessment of individual doses of clean-up workers. Therefore the completeness,quality and reliability of their dosimetric data differ significantly (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5.
Basic dosimetric services that performed dosimetric control of clean-up workers
Service

1. Chernobyl NPP
Radiation
Monitoring Service

2. Departments ofMinistry of Defence
3. Division of Radiation
Control CA-605
4. Office of Radiation
Control of IA«Combinat» and its
successorsȼɿɞɨɦɱɚ ɧɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ

Period offunction

Coverage of clean-up
workers

Ministry of Energy andElectrification of the
USSR, from July 1986 –USSR Ministry ofAtomic Energy
USSR Ministry of
DefenceMedium Machine
Building Ministry of the
USSR
USSR Ministry ofAtomic Energy

May, 1986 –to present

NPP personnel andtemporarily attached to
the Chernobyl NPP
personnel

May, 1986 –end of 1990
June 1986 –1987

military liquidators
civil and military
constructors of CA-605

igh

November,
1986 – topresent

civilian personnel who
worked in the 30-km
zone outside the buildingsite of Chernobyl NPP

satisfactory

Data quality

satisfactoryhigh(depending on
the period after
the accident)
low

Dosimetry control of CA-605 staff of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (MMMB) of the
USSR, a specialized construction organization created to build a sarcophagus («Shelter» Confinement)
was the best organized. The result of this exemplary work was 100 % coverage of quality TLD
individual control more than 20 thousand employees of CA-605, mostly business travelers from
MMMB enterprises, based in Russia.

91

Dose control, performed by Chernobyl NPP Radiation Safety Service is characterized by failurein the first weeks after the accident (when the regular dosimetric means have proved inadequate formeasuring high levels of doses) and the gradual restoration of high-quality dose monitoring, which
ended only in June–July, 1986. Negative consequence of such failure of the regular radiation control ofChernobyl NPP was that doseS of early liquidators – probably the highest among clean-up workers –remained unknown. Consequently, the completeness of dosimetry data of Chernobyl NPP personnel
was insufficient (including – in the sense of covering by dosimetric data for each liquidator during theentire period of clean-up works) that determined the need for reconstruction of individual doses.
Throughout the years 1986–1996 in total 1,600 individual doses of Chernobyl NPP workers and those
temporarily assigned to the station were evaluated ADR calculation method. Since July, 1986 dosimetry
monitoring and recording of individual doses were carried out at the Chernobyl NPP properly and that
dosimetric information is characterized by high quality and completeness.
Dose control of civilian personnel (permanent and temporarily assigned), working in 30-km
zone, due to organizational problems practically was not carried out during 1986 and part of 1987,
while this function gradually took over the Office of Dose Control of IA «Combinat» / RIA ‘Pripyat’.
Thus, doses of this contingent, especially in 1986–1987, are characterized by a lack of completenessand not always high quality.
The largest contingent of clean-up works were military liquidators – professional soldiers,
soldiers (initially) and, the most, persons temporarily called to the army from reserve. The importanceof this category is greater, as about 95 % of ODR in SRU belong just to military liquidators (Fig. 3.2).
Such a situation with ODR of military liquidators is the result of a 100 % coverage of thiscontingent by dose control and peculiarities of input dosimetric information to SRU – through the dose
certificate (in case of military personnel – a supplementary sheet to military ticket) which were on handin all military but in very few civilian clean-up workers. However, concurrently with the exemplary
coverage the dosimetry of military liquidators differed by the lowest precision of individual doses
because of rude and inaccurate methods of dose assessment. For military liquidators generally usedgroup (one dosimeter per group) and group-calculated (when the dose of all group members wascalculated in advance on the basis of dosimetric situation and the planned work) dosimetry methods.
It was found during the retrospective assessment of accuracy and bias of the dose estimates of
military liquidators that the average doses estimated by these methods exceeded twice the actual levelof exposure, and geometric standard deviation (uncertainty) was very high and comprised about 2.2.
It is significant also that widespread interpretation of abnormal distribution of individual doses of themilitary liquidators (Fig. 3.3) as the evidence of fraud dosimetry information to bring the reporting of
exposure levels of military personnel in accordance with the applicable dose limits (250, 100 or
50 mSv) not was confirmed.
Statistical methods showed that the possible contribution of false (falsified) results of the dose does
not exceed 10 % of the total, and the atypical form of distribution (left depleted and a sharp precipice atdoses above the limit) corresponds to fairly unusual practice of doses management when the person who
received allowance dose exempted from the armed forces and their replaced by a new reservist.
In general, dosimetry control, which was carried out for different groups of liquidators and thesystem of radiation protection of contingents involved in clean-up works overcoming the Chernobyl
accident consequences, allowed to comply with current norms and exposure limits. Massoverirradiation of cllean-up workers was characteristic only for the initial phase of the accident andconcerned rather limited group of so-called early liquidators.
In the future (from late May, 1986) contingents of many thousands was provided with adequate
radiation protection forces, and cases of exceeding the established dose limits (250 mSv in 1986 andgraduated limits of 100 and 50 mSv in subsequent years) were rare and usually occured in cases
prescribed by current at that time Radiation Standard-76.

92

Fig. 3.2. Distribution of clean-up workerst included in SRU according
to departmental affiliation (per survey).

Fig. 3.3. The distribution of individual doses of military reservists (so called «partisans») of 1986-1987.

Conclusions:
1. The largest individual doses received so-called early liquidators – people who participated in
the clean-up works in April–May, 1986, under conditions of poorly explored radiation situation andlack of adequate facilities for radiation control.
2. Doses of clean-up workers of later periods (since June, 1986) are largely in accordance withestablished at the time dose limits. Radiation protection system, introduced during the clean-up works,
mostly fulfilled its function and provided non-exceeding of permissible exposure.
3. The quality and completeness of dosimetry information significantly differ for different groupsof clean-up workers, causing the need for a critical approach to the use of existing dose records,
retrospective assessment of individual doses and revision and correction of available dosimetric data.
4. Doses of military liquidators are not characterized by strong falsification, but are displaced (inthe direction of overstating actual exposure) and not accurate (with large uncertainty).
5. Studying health consequences of Chernobyl NPP accident among clean-up workers cohort
requires broad application of retrospective dosimetry to determine individual doses of subjects research.

93

6. Developed in recent years retrospective dosimetry methods, in particular instrumental EPR
dosimetry on tooth enamel and analytical calculation method RADRUE allow to effectively support the
post-Chernobyl epidemiological studies.
7. Beta-radiation gave a significant contribution to the lens doses of clean-up workers.
Consideration of this factor is needed in assessing risk of cataract in clean-up workers.

3.1.2. Dosimetry of evacuees
Individual effective dose of irradiation for 12,632 inhabitants of Pripyat (group A, about 25 % of thecity evacuated population) and 14,084 residents of other villages of 30 km area (group B) were recovered
and analyzed by the method of imitation and stochastic simulation based on direct measurements of dose
rate and inquiry of evacuees. Overall evacuees represent 104 village of 30-km zone, including the cities of
Pripyat and Chernobyl; 223 residents who lived in 40 settlements of the Belarusian part of the 30-km zone
were also interviewed and included in the total number of investigated.

Fig. 3.4. The distribution of individual doses of irradiation for 12,632 persons evacuated from Pripyat
Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Table 3.6.
Parameters of external exposure individual doses distribution for individuals evacuated from Pripyat.
Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Number of persons in the group
12,632
The average portion of time outdoors
0.21
Distribution of effective doses of external gamma radiation exposure (mSv)
The arithmetic mean
10.1
Median8.93
Geometric mean
6.79
Geometric standard deviation
3.1
75 percentile
14
95 percentile24
The coefficient of variation (%)
74

94

Table 3.7.
The dependence of the distribution of individual external exposure from the age of persons who were evacuatedfrom Pripyat. Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
19831986
0-3

Birth years
Age group (years)

1979 –
1982
3-7

1974 –
1978
7-12

1970 –
1973
12-16

1961 1969
16-25

1931 1968
25-55

ɞɨ 1931>55

Number of persons in the
1597
2104
2133
601
1159
4456
group
The average portion of time
0.14
0.17
0.18
0.21
0.25
0.25
outdoors
Distribution of effective doses of external gamma radiation exposure (mSv)
The arithmetic mean
8.32
9.09
9.0
10.5
10.8
11.5
Error in mean
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.31
0.24
0.12
Median
7.35
7.89
7.63
9.35
9.63
10.5
Geometric mean
5.50
6.15
6.32
7.16
6.77
7.85
Geometric standard deviation
3.18
3.04
2.79
3.02
3.6
3.13
75 percentile
11.2
12.2
12.2
15.1
15.3
15.6
95 percentile
20.0
21.2
21.3
24.8
25.9
25.8
The coefficient of variation
74
75
73
72
75
70
(%)

582
0.21
10.2
0.32
8.56
7.07
2.74
14.2
23.9
75

Pensioners

Number of persons in
3494 2945 376
202
799 2629 670
210
452
the group
The average portion of
0.16 0.19 0.22
0.23
0.23 0.26 0.24
0.27
0.28
time outdoors
Distribution of effective doses of external gamma radiation exposure (mSv)
The arithmetic mean
8.81 9.4 10.2
11.5
10.9 11.5 10.8
12.6
13.0
Error in mean
0.11 0.13 0.36
0.59
0.28 0.16 0.30
0.73
0.40
Median7.72 7.99 9.66
10.8
9.6 10.5 9.66
10.8
12.4
Geometric mean
5.92 6.51 7.35
7.57
7.66 7.7 7.11
8.27
8.39
Geometric standard
3.11 2.88 2.72
3.16
2.86 3.21 3.46
3.09
3.84
deviation
75 percentile
11.89 12.8 13.7
16.5
14.5 15.9 14.9
16.7
18.0
95 percentile
20.64 22.6 22.4
27.4
25.1 26.2 24.7
29.7
28.2
The coefficient of
74
74
68
73
72
71
72
84
66
variation (%)

Housewives

Chernobyl NPP staff
memberrs

Municipal economy
workers

Engeneers

Workers

Consumers services

Medical workers

Teachers

Schoolboys

Professional group

Preschoolers

Table 3.8.
The dependence of the distributions of individual doses of irradiation from a professional affiliation of persons
who were evacuated from Pripyat. Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

156

375

0.20

0.20

8.94
0.54
8.54
5.74

9.51
0.35
8.11
6.92

3.25

2.53

12.8
20.1

13.4
20.4

75

70

The average effective dose of group A contingent that was accumulated prior to evacuation, was10.1 mSv. Doses of 534 persons from this group exceeded the level of 25 mSv and only 18 people
received doses of 50 mSv. Maximum value of effective doses among this group of inhabitants of
Pripyat was 75 mSv.
Frequency distribution of individual effective doses is shown in Fig. 3.4. Parameters of this dose
distribution are shown in Table. 3.6.

95

The calculation of external exposure of people evacuated from villages of 30 km zone
Dosimetric models for the rural population were used to calculate individual doses of 14,084
persons evacuated from the settlements of the 30-km zone. The calculation covered the period from the
beginning of the accident and till the moment of evacuation beyond the 30-km zone. The average
effective dose among this group (about 25 % of the evacuated population) was 15.9 mSv. Among thisgroup the dose of 1,260 persons exceeded 50 mSv for 120 effective doses were higher than 100 mSv
and only one person with a dose of 214 mSv dose exceeded 200 mSv. Calculated in the course ofrevision the average dose of 15.9 mSv was slightly (14 %) lower than the one that was identified inpreceding study – 18.2 mSv. This difference has several reasons.
Firstly, from this review 3,119 persons were excluded, who lived in remote from Chernobyl NPP
villages and whose doses were, respectively, quite small. On the other hand, a critical review of dose
rate measurement forced to reject some, perhaps, false values. In addition, a more sophisticated methodof spatial interpolation has prevented the development of artificial unreasonably high values of theinterpolated dose rates. For these two reasons, number of persons with high doses slightly decreased.
So, if according to the preliminary consideration 644 persons had dose more than 100 mSv, the resultsof the audit assessed the number of 120 with doses of such magnitude. Moreover, just as in the problemof dose assessment of the urban population, use of age-dependent factors of transition to an effective
dose also contributed to a certain reduction of effective doses received as a result of the audit.
Table 3.9.
Parameters of individual doses distribution of external exposure of individuals who were evacuated from villagesof 30 km zone. Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Group strenghs

14,084

The average share of time outdoors
0.41
Distribution of effective doses of external gamma radiation exposure (mSv)
average15.9
median7.77
geometric mean
7.13
geometric standard deviation
4.08
75 percentile
16.1
95 percentile
67.7
coefficient of variation (%)
142

Noteworthy is a very large coefficient of variation of individual doses – 142 %. Such a large
variation can be explained by significant differences in dose in different villages of the 30-km zone,
varying duration of the population in the zone of radioactive contamination (different time ofevacuation), and individual differences in proportion of time spent outdoors. The distribution ofindividual doses (Fig. 3.5) presented evidence of heterogeneity of presentet in the calculation
population, comprising the residents of faintly contaminated villages (such were majority) and dwellers
of localities with high dose rate.
Quite a wide was distribution of shares of time outdoors. Fig. 3.6 shows that half of the
population spent more than 42 % of time on the street and level of 65 % of time outdoors exceeded 5 %evacuees among the rural population. If the urban population was characterized by average share of
21 % time outdoors, (Table 3.7), the rural residents more time spent in the court, that certainly
contributed to higher levels of exposure. Another factor that has considerable influence on the resulting
dose was the duration of stay of residents in the area of increased radiation.
The parameters of individual doses distributions for the settlements included in the reconstructionof doses are presented in Table. 3.10. For villages with a number of surveyed less than 20, the medianand 95 % quantile were not determined. The table shows that for all sectors except Sector B (Fig. 3.7),
maximum (95 % quantile) dose for the individual settlement exceeded the level of 50 mSv. On average,96the highest doses were received in the villages Usiv – 154 mSv, Mashevo – 79 mSv (both – Sector C)
and Chistogalivka – 70 mSv (Sector A). The parameters of the distributions are shown in the Table.
3.11. For comparison, the table contains parameters for the distribution of Chernobyl – much lessaffected settlement of the most populated settlements among the 30-km zone population.

Fig. 3.5. The distribution of individual doses of irradiation 14,084 persons evacuated from settlementsin the 30-km zone. Results of deterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Fig. 3.6. Cumulative distribution of shares of time outdoors for people who were evacuated fromvillages of 30 km zone (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

97

Fig. 3.7. Location of 30-km zone settlements and distribution per sectors. Line numbers of settlements
and their names see in Tables 3.10, 3.11 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).
Table 3.10.
Results of deterministic calculation of individual doses for particular settlements of 30-km zone. Location of
settlements see Fig. 3.7 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Code

14
20
15
16
18
17
19
10
22
23
24
1
2
3
4
5
12
54
41
43
55

98

Name of settlements

Sector A
Yaniv
Chystogalivka
Buriakivka
Nova Krasnytsia
Rechytsia
Tovsty Lis
Krasne (of Tovstolis
rural district)
Rud’kyStara Krasnytsia
Vilshanka
Lub’ianka
Sector ȼ
Novoshepelychi
Staroshepelychi
Beniovka
Bila Sovoka
Dovliady
KhatkySector ɋ
Mashevo
Usiv
Molochky
Zalissia

Quanntity of
persons

Day ofevakuation

Part-time inthe open air as,%

Average

Median95 % percentile

63
331
56
89
382
408

3
7
8
8
7
8

34
44
45
48
50
51

22
61
29
23
24
52

9.5
70
24
23
26
60

84
98
81
29
33
81

297

8

49

34

15

97

43
20
24
304

7
7
10
10

32
36
34
46

10
9.2
10
12

12
8.4
11
12

19
17
13
16

815
209
101
7
10
19

6
7
8
6
5
9

37
50
48
41
36
44

15
21
18
16
12
10

13
22
18
10
9

31
31
26
23
12

162
89
2
2

8
8
7
6

54
48
34
36

75
150
31
12

79
154
-

96
165
-

Code

Name of settlements

56
57

KriukyKulazhyn
Sector D
Zymovyshche
Kryva Gora
Starosillia
Koshovka
Paryshiv
Chapaivka
Chykalovychy
Sector ȿ
Copachi
Leliov
Chernobyl
Zalisssia
Zapillia
Cherevach
Novosilky
Korogod
Stechanka
Roz’yizzhe
Ilintsy
Rudnia Illinetska
Glinka

51
52
74
73
76
65
75
66
67
68
69
70
71
37
33
29
30
31
32
34

Quanntity of
persons

Day ofevakuation

Part-time inthe open air as,%

Average

Median95 % percentile

14
2

7
8

44
12

66
28

-

-

431
146
100
126
286
211
3

7
8
8
8
8
8
8

37
40
40
45
46
39
50

37
47
3
9
4
6
8

42
51
3
8
4
7
-

56
67
4
12
5
8
-

432
604
4558
1611
69
263
202
601
333
49
366
15
227

8
8
7
8
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
11
7

40
42
32
52
48
47
48
52
43
37
45
36
34

45
22
6
7
6
5
6
4
4
3
3
4
2

53
23
6
8
7
5
6
5
4
3
3
4
2

66
30
14
10
8
8
8
6
5
4
4
5
2

Table 3.11.
Parameters of distributions of individual external exposure doses to certain localities of 30 km zone. Results ofdeterministic calculation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Settlement
Quantity of group

Usiv
89

Mashevo
165

Chystogalivka
331

Distribution of effective doses of external gamma radiation exposure (mSv)
average
150
74.8
60.8
median
154
78.7
69.7
geometric mean
146
69.2
44.7
geometric standard deviation
1,28
1.66
2.77
95 percentile
165
95.7
98.1
coefficient of variation (%)
15
27
52

Chernobyl
4558

6.38
5.84
3.4
4.14
14.4
85

It is seen that within the same locality variation of individual doses is rather small. Geometricstandard deviation size for small settlements equal to 1.4–2.8 proves for a great homogeneity of the
population in terms of exposure, in particular mode of behavior. The exception to this rule are suchlarge settlements like Chernobyl, many population groups of which are characterized by a variety of
behavior modes. In addition, the migration of Chernobyl residents out of the city, as well as selfevacuation of some of them resulted in significant expansion of doses absorbed by residents of thissettlement. Therefore, geometric standard deviation of the doses distribution of Chernobyl evacuees isvery large and complrises 4.14, which is very close to the value of this index calculated for general
distribution of doses of 30-km zone evacuees (Table 3.9).
In general, as it is seen from above quite typical examples, the uncertainty of individual dose
estimates of the rural population is slightly higher than for the reconstruction of the urban population
doses, but even with uncertainty at the level of 60–80 % (coefficient of variation) can be stated thatsuch precision is adequate for the purposes of retrospective assessment of individual doses of
population evacuated from the accident.

99

Doses of evacuation route
The doses received by Pripyat residents during evacuation were estimated as a result of the study.
Analysis of routing messages (formal form), completed in 1988–1989 during a large-scale survey of
evacuees allowed to identify four main routes by which the people of Pripyat moved in the direction ofevacuation points (Table 3.12).
The most significant itinerary was the road to Polisske which passed in the west direction.
Prevalent quantity of evacuees took this route. Another, somewhat less important, was the route to Kyiv
direction, the path of which went through the «Red Forest», Kopachi, Chernobyl, Cherevach and further
to Kyiv. Two less important itineraries were revealed: the railway in the direction of Chernigiv, andself-evacuation on their own transport towards Belarus (the road to the Bila Soroka).
Table 3.12.
Features of evacuation itineraries from Pripyat (per survey)
Current ʋ

1
2
3
4
5
6

Direction of evacuation

Polisske
Kyiv
Chernigiv
Belorussian
The route is not specifically listed
In the villages of 30-km zone

Code of route

Number of
persons

Percentage of
total

1
2
3
4
5
6
Total:

6831
4478
938
612
2271
1063
16193

42
27
6
4
14
7
100

These data, in general, are not contradictory to information about the organization and realizationof evacuation of Pripyat population.
Analysis of the radiation situation at the evacuation routes showed that the entire itinerary can bedivided into two essentially different parts (phases): phase 1, which passed through the 5-km zone ofChernobyl NPP, and the rest of the route (phase 2) from 5-km border zone to the place of destination.
Crucial difference of phase 1 is that the evacuation route crossed several extremely powerfultraces of radioactive emissions, the scale (characteristic size) of which sometimes reached only tens or
hundreds of meters. The rest of the evacuation (phase 2) went through the less contaminated areas withmuch lower dose rate overfalls.
As a result, assessment of doses received on these or other routes of evacuation was carried out
separately for phases 1 and 2. In the case of phase 1 doses reconstruction was conducted manually using
cartograms of radiation environment provided by Chernobyl NPP. In phase 2 dose was estimated byintegrating the dose rate profiles along the route.
It appears from the estimation of doses received during each of the routes of movement, that staff
evacuation route, anticipated by the plan of civil defense in the Poliske direction was not really less safe
than Belarussian direction. On the other hand, a small change of route – leaving the Pripyat through therailway crossing near the plant «Jupiter» instead of travel through the contaminated area near the
overpass over the railroad, crossing Pripyat-Chernobyl NPP and cottages south of the station Yaniv –could significantly reduce the dose load of evacuees.
Route to Kyiv was also associated with significant dose load due to travel through a very active
spot in the cross NPP-Chernobyl-Pripyat. While the rest of the route to the south laid in lesscontaminated areas, doses formed at the first site were high enough.
Dose was most intense on the route in the direction of Chernihiv. This route flew about 6 %questioned evacuees. Evacuation in this direction was carried by rail, and electric trains leaved from
relatively polluted station Yaniv, than went on the north by the fence of the building site where the dose
rates reached a fairly large values. Finally, electric trains made stops provided by schedules at platform
Semihody (north-eastern outskirts of Chernobyl NPP), which only led to greater accumulation of doses.

100

As a result, the doses received by evacuations of rail in the direction of Chernigiv were the largest of all
possible routes of evacuation.
Thus, the doses of the majority of Pripyat dwellers, received during the evacuation, were within
11-19 mSv, which can be compared with preevacuation irradiation.
For comparison at the individual level components of the dose before and during the evacuationof each evacuees of those who had the ordinary mode of conduct during the general evacuation andindicated clearly the point of evacuation (in total 6,908 people met these criteria) the dose received at
the route of evacuation by individualized estimation was attributed. Then the partial contribution ofdose received at the route of evacuation in the total dose of radiation was determined. The distributionof dose partial contributions during evacuation presented in Fig. 3.8, shows that this value varies quite
widely, but most likely value is 0.5. The average (52±19) % of dose evacuees received just during
evacuation.
Thus, it is obvious that the correct estimation of doses during evacuation significantly change thepattern of irraddiation of evacuated Pripyat population. For comparison, it should be emphasized that incase of evacuation of Pripyat in the direction of the Bila Soroka (Belarus route), the dose due to theevacuation would give the only contribution of 6 % of the total dose.

Fig. 3.8. Fractional contribution of dose received during the evacuation to the total dose of evacuees(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

As a result of these efforts, integral dose was estimated separately for each of the four tracks. It
appeared that in terms of dose burden during evacuation, manning evacuation route in the Poliske
direction, which was the plan of civil defense, was not optimal. Evacuation in the Belarussian direction
resulted in the accumulation of an order of magnitude smaller doses than any of the other tracks. On theother hand, driving in the direction of Chernobyl-Kyiv and evacuation by train to Chernigiv gave evenhigher doses.
Comparison of individualized dose estimates on the evacuation route with individual doses
received while staying within the Pripyat during the evacuation, showed that a large number of doses ofthe evacuation route were comparable or even larger than those that were received prior to evacuation.

101

In general, the dose of the evacuation route had given the contribution to the total dose of evacuees ataround 50 %. Thus, consideration of dose on the evacuation route severely alters the overall picture ofevacuees’ irradiation.
3.1.3. Population irradiation doses
Radiological monitoring in 1986
In Ukraine in 1986 radiological emergency monitoring was organized so that literally the firsthours and days the mass measurement of gamma-field ratio in the air from radioactive fallout on the
ground, and later – soil sampling for gamma-spectrometric studies of radionuclide fallout on the basisof the most radioactively-contaminated areas were carried out.
As for the control of radiation exposure of the population-contaminated areas, the dosimetry
monitoring was conducted in bulk and enough good quality, as in the earliest (acute) phase of theaccident (May-June) when the main source of internal radiation were radioisotopes of iodine, whichaccumulate in thyroid gland, and at the beginning of the middle phase (August-December, 1986), when
the basic role was played by radioisotopes of cesium, which are relatively evenly distributed in the soft
tissues.
Total in Ukraine in May–June, 1986 more than 150 thousand direct measurements of radioiodine
activity in the thyroid gland of residents of northern districts of Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Chernigiv regions(among them 130 thousand children and teenagers) were made. In addition, since July, 1986 in
residents of Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions about 23 thousand measurements of the current content of
cesium isotopes in the body (137,134 Cs) using whole body counters (WBC) were made.
Doses of irradiation in 1986
Whole body irradiation
Table 3.13 shows values of average doses of internal radiation from cesium residents of districtsof Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions, assessed by results of measurements on whole body counters (WBC),
conducted in summer and autumn of 1986.
Table 3.13.
Average by districts of Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions individual doses of internal exposure of children
and adults from radiocaesium in 1986 (Results of WBC measurements for areas with density of fallout 137Cs
in soil >37 kBq·m-2 ; data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
District

Zhytomyr region
Korostens’kyi
Lugyns’kyi
Narodytskyi
Ovruchskyi
Kyiv region
Bilotserkivskyi
Boguslavskyi
Ivankivskyi
Kagarlitskyi
Poliskyi
Stavyshchenskyi
Chernobylskyi

Children under 10 years
dose, mSv
number of
WBCGM GSD
measurements

1995
134

1.8
1.1

3.9
2.8

30
28
208
12
1323

0.44
0.28
0.61
0.71
1.2

2.3
2.4
3.3
3.2
3.5

1195

1.3

5.6

Children over 10 years
dose, mSv
number of
WBCGM GSD
measurements

1120
28

1.8
0.43

3.9
2.5

34
12
2753
18

26
17
261
78
1061
31
518

0.89
0.30
0.42
0.39
0.86
0.11
0.58

1.8
3.0
3.0
2.6
3.3
3.6
3.3

652
1872
527
304

Note. GM – geometric mean, GSD – geometric standard deviation

102

Adultsdose, mSv
number of
WBCGM GSD
measurements

0.13
0.32
1.56
0.19

2.9
4.8
4.3
3.5

0.29

3.6

0.81
0.09
0.61

3.5
2.8
5.5

Since WBC monitoring covered the population far from all settlements of radioactivelycontaminated areas a simulation of the transfer of dose forming radionuclides from Chernobyl release
was conducted via the links of trophic chains in the climatic conditions of Ukraine using non-stationarymodels that are traditionally used for retrospection and prognosis kinetics and levels of radioactive
contamination of environmental objects (food in particular) as well as exposure doses of the population
consumed these products.
As it was expected, the main source of internal radiation doses in 1986 was the contamination of
two components of the diet: leafy green, and milk (and milk products).
Evaluations of effective doses of internal radiation from basic radionuclides of emergency release(per 1 kBq m-2·137Cs in soil) obtained according to this model are presented in Table 3.14.
In terms of Western European countries the calculated ratio between doses of first emergency
year and doses accumulated over subsequent years, may reach 10 or more in favor of the first year. At
the same time a variety of soil characteristics, both in Ukraine and Russia, which makes high(uncharacteristically for European countries) coefficients of radionuclides transfer from soil tovegetation and further into the milk, as well as a retro enough technology of dairy production in theprivate sector of Ukraine, identified a wide range of internal radiation dose ratios in the first andsubsequent years.
Table 3.14.
Effective doses of internal exposure in 1986 from the main radionuclides of Chernobyl release (normalized to 1
kBq·m-2 of 137Cs at the soil) in adult rural dwellers of Ukraine, caused by consumption of milk and leafy green(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Radionuclide

89

Sr
Sr
95
Nb
95
Zr
103
Ru
106
Ru
125
Sb
134
Cs
137
Cs
136
Cs
131
I
141
Ce
144
Ce
140
Ba
All radionuclides
90

Relative contributions to total dose of internal radiation dose components«milk»«leafy green»totalȝSv per 1 kBq
relativeȝSv per 1 kBq
relativeȝSv per 1 kBq
relativem-2 of 137Cs at contribution m-2 of 137Cs at contribution m-2 of 137Cs at contribution
the soilto dose (%)
the soilto dose (%)
the soilto dose (%)

0.1
0.39
9.8E-07
4.8E-06
0.002
0.015
0.39
6.8
10
0.08
41
1.0E-07
2.5E-06
0.001
59

0.16
0.7
1.7E-06
8.2E-06
0.003
0.026
0.7
12
17
0.1
70
1.7E-07
4.3E-06
0.002
100

0.064
0.094
0.021
0.042
0.11
0.37
0.015
0.26
0.36
0.014
2.3
0.038
0.21
0.099
4,0

1.6
2.4
0.5
1.1
2.8
9.5
0.38
6.6
9.2
0.35
57
1.0
5.3
2.5
100

0.16
0.48
0.021
0.042
0.11
0.39
0.41
7.1
10
0.10
43.3
0.038
0.21
0.10
63

0.26
0.8
0.03
0.07
0.18
0.6
0.7
11
17
0.16
69
0.06
0.34
0.16
100

In Ukraine (Table 3.15) the ratio of effective dose of internal radiation of the first year (256 days)
to the appropriate dose for the next nearly 20 years (1987–2005) essentially depends on the aggregate
value of transfer factor «soil-milk» (TF-92) in a given settlement. In areas where the value TF-92 does
not exceed 0.5 Bq·l-1 per kBq·m-2, the ratio of doses of the first and another 19 years is 8-50 in favor of
the first year. For areas with TF-92 in the range 0.5-2 Bq·l-1 per kBq·m-2, this ratio is 1-2, but still infavor of the first year. At the same time for the settlements, where the value of TF-92 is 2-20 Bq·l-1 per
kBq·m-2 doses in the middle and late phases of the accident exceed the first year, so the first year doseis 13-50 % of the dose for further years. In areas with very high values of TF-92 that exceed 20 Bq·l-1
per kBq·m-2 doses of the first year do not exceed 9 % of the accumulated dose for subsequent years.

103

Table 3.15.
The ratio of internal radiation doses in 1986 to the appropriate doses for the 1987-2005 depending
on interval values of the aggregated transfer factor «soil-milk» (TF-92). Doses were estimatedby the Method-97 (total 4270 settlements of Ukraine)*

TF-92 *
Bq · l-1per kBq·m-2

D-86/D87-05 doses ratio

Number of
settlements<0,05
0,05-0,1
0,1-0,20,2-0,5
0,5-1
1-2
2-5
5-10
10-20
20-100

49
48
15
8,0
2,6
1,1
0,51
0,25
0,13
0,09

269
261
1106
1097
478
354
404
146
115
40

TF-92 value was determined for a fixed time interval 1991-1993 based exclusively on results of monitoring radioactive
contamination of soil and milk in every settlement

Thus, in some agro-ecological conditions (peat-swampy acidic soil of pastures) the population
can receive significantly larger doses of internal irradiation in postaccidental period compared withdoses of emergency first year (for example, a number of settlements Rokytne district, Rivne region, andKamin-Kashirskyi district, Volyn region ). On the other hand, where the black earth were prevailing,internal radiation doses accrued subsequent years may be a small fraction of the first year dose (forexample, a number of settlements, Cherkassy region).
Irradiation of the thyroid
The most significant in terms of radiation exposure and expected radioinduced consequences
after Chernobyl accident was thyroid irradiation of children by radioiodine that came mainly fromcontaminated milk, dairy products and leafy green in May-June, 1986. A three-level system ofreconstruction of thyroid doses developed and verified on the results of direct measurements allowed to
execute the average gender-age settlement-specific doses of the thyroid gland for all settlements of
Ukraine (Table 3.16).
Table 3.16.
Average regional thyroid doses (mGy) in different age groups of inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine
RegionVinnitsa
Volyn
Lugansk
Dnipropetrovsk
DonetskZhytomyrTranscarpathianZaporizhzhia
Ivano-Frankivsk
Kyiv
Kirovograd
ȺR Crimea
Lviv
Mykolaiv
Odessa

104

<7

37
87
12
13
24
231
7.6
26
19
202
89
34
14
20
15

The average thyroid dose (mGy) by age groups (years)
7-14
15-18
>18

13
33
4.0
4.4
8.0
87
2.8
8.8
7.1
75
31
12
4.9
7.1
5.2

9.8
25
3.1
3.4
6.0
67
2.1
6.2
5.3
58
23
8.8
3.8
5.4
3.8

9.2
21
3.1
3.4
6.1
60
1.8
6.5
4.6
53
23
8.4
3.5
5.0
3.7

all

12
31
4.1
4.5
8.1
81
2.7
8.8
6.7
71
30
12
4.8
7.0
5.1

Region<7

Poltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Kharkiv
KhersonKhmelnytsky
Chercassy
Chernivtsi
Chernigiv
Kyiv city
Sevastopol city
All Ukraine

The average thyroid dose (mGy) by age groups (years)
7-14
15-18
>18

54
177
71
18
26
30
39
142
40
151
94
56
55

19
64
25
6.4
8.7
11
15
52
14
55
30
18
20

15
49
19
4.8
6.5
7.8
11
39
10
43
23
14
15

13
42
19
4.5
6.6
7.3
10
37
9.3
37
24
14
14

all

18
62
24
6.2
8.6
10
14
49
13
50
32
19
19

Table 3.17
The relative distribution of child, adolescent and adult population with a mean absorbed doses of thyroid
Dose interval, Gy< 7 years< 0.050.05–0.1
0.1–0.2
0.2–0.5
0.5–1.0
1.0–2.0
2.0–5.0
>5.0

72
15
8.2
3.7
0.77
0.15
0.04
0.01

Relative (%) distribution of population
7-14 years
15-18 years>18 years

93
4.4
2.2
0.76
0.08
0.03
0.007
0.0005

95
3.5
1.3
0.40
0.05
0.02
0.005
–

95
3.7
1.1
0.21
0.04
0.01
0.004
–

entire population

92
5.0
2.0
0.65
0.12
0.03
0.008
0.001

Dosimetric certification and radiological monitoring at the middle and late phases of disaster«The Concept of the Annual Total Effective Dose», adopted in 1991, was important for planningand carrying out measures to reduce the impact of radioactive emissions on the population. Regulationsof this concept were legalized in the Law of Ukraine ʋ 791a-XII «On legal regime of territories whichhave undergone radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl disaster» (1991) and in the Law
of Ukraine ʋ 796-XII «On the status and social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl
disaster» (1991).
The basic principle of Concept lay in that for the critical population group (children born in1986), the value of calculated effective dose of additional radiation associated with the Chernobyl
disaster, should not exceed 1.0 mSv (0,1 rem) per year and 70.0 mSv (7.0 rem) for life (over the dose
received by the population in pre-accident period in certain natural conditions).
The density of soil contamination with radionuclides was taken as a provisional criterion. Theselaws set a four territorial zone of radioactive contamination (Table 3.18).
In Appendix 1 of the Decree of Cabinet of Ukraine ʋ 106 from July 23, 1991 a list of 2172
settlements was given, which were formally assigned to one of four zones of radioactive contaminationaccording to the Law of Ukraine ʋ 791a-XII.
Annual dosimetric certification was held in Ukraine since 1991 until 2008. All dose calculations
were based on results of annual measurements of radiocaesium contamination of milk and potatoes
produced in those settlements, which were determined by the Decree of Cabinet of Ukraine ʋ 106. In
addition, for radiation monitoring of affected areas residents a united WBC network of Ukraine was set
up during the 1995-1997, providing operational control of the levels of radiocaesium in the body of the
inhabitants of affected areas (Fig. 3.9).

105

Table 3.18.
Areas of contamination according to criteria of the annual dose and densityof radionuclides fallout determined by The Law of Ukraine ʋ 791a-XII (1991)
Territorial zone

1

Exclusion zone
Zone of implicit (mandatory)
resettlement
Zone of guarantee voluntary
resettlement
Zone of enhanced radiation
monitoring

2
3
4
(a)

Zoning criteria
fallout density on soil, kBq m-2 (a)radiostrontium
radiocaesium
plutoniumɪɚɞɿɨɫɬɪɨɧɰɿɣ

the annual
dose mSv
year-1

-

-

-

-

>555

>111

>3.7

>5

185-555

5.5-111

0.37-3.7>137-1850.74-5.5

0.18-0.37>0.5– in the text of the Law fallout density is given in units of «Ci·km-2

Medical organization of 12 most affected regions of Ukraine were provided with 57 units ofWBC «Skrynner-3M» both stationary (40 units) and mobile (17 units) samples produced at the Instituteof Human Ecology (Kyiv) with the use of program-methodical and metrology software, developed by
the Department of Dosimetry Control of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine». From 1995 to 2008 about
800 thousand WBC measurements was held within the network of WBC. The table 3.19 contains therelative distribution of all certified settlements according to established territorial areas as a result of
dose certification within 2001-2008.

SE CRMU
WBC number in aregionNetwork
Total WBC number
in 12 regions
Fig. 3.9. WBC Unified Network of Ukraine, established under the dosimetric certification.

The dynamics of change in numbers of settlements in different zones in 2001, 2005 and 2008 forselected regions of Ukraine where the largest number of settlements were dose certified is shown in
Table 3.19. As it is seen from the table data, since 2001 ~ 15–19 % of all certified settlements were in
the 4th zone of «Enhanced radiation monitoring», and 70–80 % in general were outside the establishedterritorial zones of radioactive contamination.
It should be noted that in the Kiev and Zhytomyr regions in 2001–2008, the number of settlements
in 2nd – 4th zones continuously decreased in comparison with the official distribution by the Decree of106

Cabinet of Ukraine ʋ 106 (Table 3.20). Most of the settlements in these areas were «shifted» to «safe»zone, where passport annual dose did not exceed 0.5 mSv. In the Rivne region, according to Decree of
Cabinet of Ukraine ʋ 106 the majority (~ 76 %) of settlements was attributed to the third zone of«voluntary resettlement» (passport dose should be between 5.1 mSv). But in 2001 already, in this zone
remained ~ 30 % of settlements and in 2008 ~ 7 % of the settlements. Most of the settlements «shifted» inthe 4th zone (passport dose – 0.5–1 mSv), or «safe» zone (passport dose <0.5 mSv).
Table 3.19.
Change in time (2001-2008) distribution of settlements according to value of passport doseYear

Quantity of certified
settlements

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

2163
2163
2163
2163
1831
1967
1596
1925

Relative number (%) of certified settlements with the passport dose(mSv per year)
< 0.5
0.5-1
1-5
>5
«safely»
4 zone3 zone2 zone

67
68
71
72
66
82
81
86

15
15
16
19
14
14
15
12

18
17
13
9
5
3,5
3,6
0,02

0,23
0,14
0,09
< 0,01< 0,01
0,05< 0,01
Table 3.20.

A comparative analysis of certification of settlements of Ukraine in 2001, 2005, and 2008
RegionVinnitsa
Volyn
Zhytomyr
Kyiv
Rivne
Cherkassy
Chernigiv

total

89
166
698
469
339
103
248

 0,5

89
472
441
99
101
205

Quantity of inhabited localities with annual doses (mSv year-1)
2001
2005
2008
0,50,50,5-1
1-5
>5
 0,5
1-5
>5
 0,5
1-5
1
1

3
135
23
109
2
41

163
93
5
126
2

5
-

88*
107
524
428
151
100*
216

55
96
13
122
2*
11

3
43
3
59
-

-

87
121
569
383
150
100
205

40
74
9
99
2
11

3
14
25
-

>5

-

Note: *- data for 2006 (in 2005 dose certification was not performed)

In 2008, almost 82 % of the settlements of Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions referred by the Decree of
Cabinet of Ukraine ʋ 106 to 2nd – 4th zones actually have a «passport» dose of less than
0.5 mSv/year. That is, the dose criterion of the territory of these settlements have already lost the statusof «victims». At Rivnenshchina passport doses below 0.5 mSv per year had 44 % of settlements.
There is an annual reduction of settlements, which according to the dose criteria can be attributed
to 3rd zone (1–5 mSv • year-1). For the 2nd zone (dose >5 mSv), since 2000 in Kyiv and Zhytomyr
regions there were actually no settlements belonging to that area, and in Rivne region in 2001 in thiszone were to be only 5 settlements.

107

Doses accumulated by the residents of Ukraine for 25 years after the Chernobyl accident
Table 3.21.
Effective dose (mSv) external, internal and total irradiation of different regions of Ukraine dependingon the density of fallout 137Cs in soil in 1986
RegionVinnitsa
Volyn
Lugansk
Dnipropetrovsk
DonetskZhytomyrTranscarpathianZaporizhzhia
Ivano-Frankivsk

Kyiv

Kirovograd
ȺR Crimea
Lviv
Mykolaiv
OdessaPoltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Kharkiv
KhersonKhmelnytsky

108

Density of
Cs fallout.
kBq /ɦ2% ofpopulation

EFFECTIVE DOSE (MSV) according to years of exposure
external
internsl
total
1986
1987-20111986
1987-2011
1986-2011<37
37-185<3737-185<3737-185<3737-185<3737-185<3737-185185-555555-1440
>1440
<37
<37
<37
37-185<3737-185185-555555-1440>1440<37
37-185<37<3737-185<3737-185<3737-185<37<3737-185185-555<37
37-185<3737-185<3737-185<37<3737-185185-555

94
6.3
97
2.6
99
0.69
100
0.02
94
5.6
75
17
7.2
0.69
0.06
100
100
95
4.6
76
22
1.1
0.66
0.08
99
0.68
100
100
0.008
100
0.06
100
0.19
100
78
21
0.39
99
0.98
97
3.0
100
0.01
100
98
1.7
0.003

0.24
1.7
0.19
1.4
0.34
1.0
0.1
1.29
0.2
1.1
0.2
2.5
6.8
20
52
0.12
0.07
0.26
1.7
0.45
1.9
8.2
26
92
0.20
1.6
0.12
0.09
1.2
0.12
2.4
0.19
1.3
0.17
0.28
2.2
7.2
0.21
1.91
0.15
1.6
0.18
1.12
0.07
0.16
1.6
6.7

137

0.47
3.4
0.38
2.9
0.68
2.1
0.19
2.6
0.39
2.2
0.4
5.1
14
39
103
0.25
0.15
0.52
3.4
0.89
3.8
16
52
184
0.40
3.2
0.23
0.17
2.4
0.24
4.8
0.38
2.7
0.33
0.56
4.3
14
0.42
3.8
0.30
3.1
0.36
2.2
0.14
0.33
3.3
13

0.51
3.40
0.43
3.0
0.48
1.7
0.18
2.8
0.29
1.4
0.37
1.4
1.9
8.2
22
0.24
0.15
0.55
3.5
0.5
1.5
6.5
8.2
41
0.37
3.5
0.20
0.17
2.6
0.22
5.3
0.34
2.9
0.31
0.45
1.9
5.9
0.41
4.1
0.35
3.3
0.32
2.4
0.14
0.35
3.6
15

0.25
0.31
2.4
13
0.22
0.33
0.19
0.40
0.21
0.27
0.58
5.9
3.4
12
32
0.19
0.16
0.36
0.5
0.42
1.0
2.7
1.5
57
0.15
0.29
0.17
0.16
1.5
0.15
0.50
0.15
1.5
0.22
1.1
14
14
0.32
1.2
0.37
0.77
0.17
0.54
0.13
0.26
0.29
0.15

1.5
8.8
3.4
20.3
1.7
5.2
0.65
7.1
1.1
5.0
1.5
14.9
25.8
79
208
0.80
0.52
1.7
9.0
2.3
8.2
34
88
375
1.1
8.7
0.72
0.58
7.7
0.73
13
1.1
8.5
1.0
2.4
22
42
1.4
11
1.2
8.7
1.0
6.3
0.49
1.1
8.7
35

Density of
Cs fallout.
kBq /ɦ2% ofpopulation

EFFECTIVE DOSE (MSV) according to years of exposure
external
internsl
total
1986
1987-20111986
1987-2011
1986-2011<37
37-185185-555<37
37-185185-555<37
37-185185-555555-1440
<37
<37

84
15
0.37
92
7.6
0.31
97
3.2
0.08
0.01
100
100

0.30
1.9
7.3
0.36
1.7
5.9
0.23
1.8
7.4
18
0.48
0.2

137

RegionChercassy

Chernivtsi

Chernigiv
Kyiv city
Sevastopol city

0.59
3.7
15
0.72
3.4
12
0.45
3.6
15
35
0.96
0.40

0.59
3.3
15.8
0.74
3.2
13
0.41
2.3
8.1
35
0.28
0.34

0.27
0.54
0.12
0.35
0.34
0.25
0.50
2.2
4.0
12
0.13
0.14

1.7
9.5
38
2.2
8.6
31
1.6
9.8
34
100
1.9
1.1
Table 3.22.

Distribution of population-weighted effective doses of total exposure of the inhabitantsof Ukraine in general, depending on the density of fallout 137Cs in soil
Fallout density of137
Cs in soil kBq/m2% of population<37
37-185185-555555-1440
>1440

96
3.7
0.29
0.04
0.005

external
19871986
2011

0.20
1.8
7.0
23
77

0.41
3.7
14
46
154

Irradiation, mSv
internal

total

1986

1987-2011

1986-2011

0.33
2.1
3.5
8.4
34

0.29
3.3
3.4
6.4
47

1,2
11
28
84
313
Table 3.23.

Population-weighted effective doses (mSv) of total whole body irradiationof the inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine
RegionVinnitsa
Volyn
Lugansk
Dnipropetrovsk
DonetskZhytomyrTranscarpathianZaporizhzhia
Ivano-Frankivsk
Kyiv
Kirovograd
ȺR Crimea
Lviv
Mykolaiv
OdessaPoltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Kharkiv
KhersonPopulation-weighted effective doses (mSv) of total whole body irradiation according
to time intervals (years)
1986
1987-1996
1997-2011
1986-2011

1.02
0.72
0.84
0.27
0.60
1.96
0.37
0.22
1.01
1.96
0.61
0.32
0.25
0.35
0.54
0.48
1.48
0.67
0.63
0.50
0.22

0.61
2.34
0.60
0.25
0.47
2.91
0.30
0.20
0.70
1.86
0.38
0.27
0.22
0.26
0.35
0.38
3.77
0.53
0.54
0.36
0.19

0.30
0.81
0.31
0.13
0.25
1.32
0.13
0.10
0.31
0.94
0.19
0.13
0.11
0.13
0.18
0.17
1.47
0.25
0.23
0.17
0.09

1.93
3.86
1.75
0.65
1.32
6.19
0.80
0.52
2.03
4.76
1.18
0.72
0.58
0.74
1.07
1.04
6.72
1.45
1.40
1.03
0.49

109

RegionKhmelnytsky
Chercassy
Chernivtsi
Chernigiv
Kyiv city
Sevastopol city
All Ukraine

Population-weighted effective doses (mSv) of total whole body irradiation according
to time intervals (years)
1986
1987-1996
1997-2011
1986-2011

0.59
1.63
1.45
0.77
0.76
0.54
0.71

0.43
0.95
0.88
0.79
0.71
0.35
0.69

0.20
0.49
0.43
0.34
0.39
0.19
0.32

1.22
3.07
2.75
1.90
1.86
1.08
1.72

Table 3.24.
Relative (%) distribution of citizens of Ukraine living in rural areas with levelsof fallout 137Cs> 37 kBq•m-2 (in 1986), according to intervals of effective whole body dose accumulated
at various times after the Chernobyl accident
Doseintervals
(mSv)

1986

<1
1-2
2-5
5-10
10-20
20-50
50-100
>100

6.2
60
26
6.9
0.78
0.01
-

Time intervals (years)
1987-1996
1997-2011% of the whole population

22
40
19
15
4.2
0.14
-

21
34
31
11
2.7
0.21
-

1986-2011

9.4
40
31
18
1.5
0.08

3.2. The population health and strategy for its conservationin remote post-accident period
Ukraine belongs to countries with priority development of nuclear energy. Since the beginning of1930 deployed nuclear research, and the late 40’s – industrial production and uranium enrichment.
Application of nuclear technology was accompanied by an uncontrolled increase in personnel andpublic exposure with the backlog of medical protection. The most dramatic example of this attitude was
the Chernobyl accident.
Those exposed to radiation from artificial radioactive sources in Ukraine belongs to the following
groups: Personnel and firemen of Chernobyl NPP diagnosed with acute radiation syndrome,
militaries-participants of nuclear tests in the former USSR; Other groups affected by the Chernobyl accident (clean-up workers, population of radiation
contaminated areas, children irradiated before birth, or born to exposed parents);
 Operational staff of operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine; The staff of the 30 km zone and those engaged in transforming the «Shelter» in radiation safe
site;
 Personnel of mines and factories of nuclear cycle and the population living in areas of plant
and tailings.
As of 01.01.2010 in the organs of Labour and Social Welfare of Ukraine were registered
2,254,471 citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster, including 260,807 the Chernobyl clean-up
workers (including 65,666 people of 1st category, 154,238 people of 2nd category and 40,903 persons of
3rd category). There are 1,993,664 sufferers of Chernobyl disaster, including: 45,161 persons of
category 1, 64,660 people of category 2, 460,465 people of category 3, 922,762 people of category 4.
Children-victims of the Chernobyl disaster are registered as 498 409 persons.

110The current situation leaves no other way to Ukraine than the continued deployment of the fullnuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of nuclear energy. The development of this industry is only
possible when using the internationally recognized technology and experience of medical radiation
protection.
Such experience was earned as a result of work to overcome the health consequences of theChernobyl disaster, it is unique in the world as the preferred international heritage of Ukraine andconsists of the following results:
 study of the basic patterns of migration of radionuclides in the environment in post-accident
period; long-term study of the impact of dose-forming radionuclides on human health after theaccident;
 monitoring of people affected by the Chernobyl disaster, with the primary survey of children
and persons of child-bearing age; study of patterns of development and course of diseases, mortality from diseases determining
the health state of the population affected by the Chernobyl disaster, and develop medicines
to alleviate the negative effects of the disaster in the remote period after exposure; identification of risk factors for most common diseases leading to disability among persons
affected by the Chernobyl disaster; improvement of existing and development of new economical and minimally invasive
methods of diagnosis and treatment, rehabilitation and prevention, aimed to preserv andrestor the health of persons affected by the Chernobyl disaster; design of principles of complex evaluation of the effectiveness of measures to mitigate theeffects of technological accidents;
 study of acute effects (acute radiation syndrome, ARS), clean-up workers without ARS andassociated fatal effects in general populations exposed to much lower doses;
 evaluation of radiation-induced cataracts in clean-up workers exposed to relatively high doses
and possibly increased risk of cataracts in those exposed to radiation doses that do not exceed
0.25 Gy; detection of thyroid cancer in persons exposed to 131I in childhood and adolescence; evidence of increased risk of leukemia among clean-up workers of early and more distantperiods.
The study of radiation effects have gained international recognition at 56th (2008) and 57th (2010)
sessions of the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). It should be
noted that scientists of the most affected countries – Ukraine and Belarus put up a united front.
3.2.1. The health state of the Chernobyl NPP accident clean-up workers
According to the annual clinical examination of affected troops 314,192 clean-up workers of theChernobyl accident are registered in SRU, among them 207,486 – liquidators of 1986–1987.
Epidemiological studies after the accident revealed in clean-up workers growing rate andradiation risks of stochastic and non-stochastic effects of irradiation – leukemia, some forms of solidcancers, non-tumor diseases. Descriptive analysis of long-term monitoring of tumors in affected
populations shows the excess of national rates of this pathology only in the clean-up workers of 1986–
1987 participation. Among all the forms the largest increase was in cases of thyroid cancer – 5.6 times.
Incidence of breast cancer in female liquidators of 1986–1987 exceeded the expected level 1.5 times(Table 3.25).
Analysis of the radiation risks of leukemia in liquidators, jointly held by RCRM and U.S.
National Cancer Institute under an agreement between the Governments of Ukraine and the United

111

States 1999, based on an assessment of 162 cases of leukemia among liquidators diagnosed during theperiod 1986–2006 found by case-control study in the cohort of over 110 thousand clean-up workers andconfirmed by international hematological examination.
Table 3.25.
Incidence of certain forms of cancer in Chernobyl accident clean-up workers(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Group of clean-up workers(observation period) and nosology
according to ICD-10

Clean-up workers of 19861987 (2004-2007): malignant
neoplasms (ɋ.00-ɋ.96)
Clean-up workers of 19861987 (2004-2007): thyroid cancer(ɋ.73)
Female clean-up workers of 19861987 (2004-2007): breast cancer(ɋ.50)

Number of cases
expected

actualStandardized incidence
rate (SIR %)95% confidence
interval

6,649

7,190

108.1

105.6-110.6

53

299

564.2

500.2-628.1

149

226

151.7

131.9-171.5

A reliable excess risk of leukemia was determined in the first fifteen years after exposure (Table
3.26). The results were confirmed in Russian liquidators by research of a group of International Agency
for Research on Cancer of United Nations Organization. In the next 5 years a trend towards reduction ofradiation risks of leukemia among the liquidators was noted, coinciding with the survey data of victimsof the atomic bombing.
Table 3.26.
Risks of leukemia in liquidators of the accident (according to Ukrainian-American project, October, 2010)
Observation period

Excess relative risk, ERR

95% confidence interval

Degree of probability, ɪ1986 – 2000
1986 – 2006

3,44
1,37

0,47 – 9,78
0,08 – 3,78

< 0,01
0,03

Analyzed number of leukemias registered in the cohort of liquidators for the period 1986–2006
demonstrated an increase in the incidence of lymphoid type leukemia – chronic lymphoid leukemia(CLL) compared to non-lymphoid type.
According to statistics, the incidence of CLL in the Ukrainian population holds a dominantposition.
Preliminary analysis of the incidence among the male clean-up workers (20 years and over)showed the change of structure with increasing number of individuals with CLL compared to similar
indices in Ukraine as a whole: the incidence of CLL among the male population of Ukraine was 42%, and among the liquidators, about 60 %; acute myeloid leukemia and chronic myeloid leukemia in
the population of Ukraine were 12 % and 13 %, and among liquidators – 6 % and 17 % respectively.
Other oncohematological diseases play negligible role in the structure of morbidity among liquidators(Fig. 3.10, 3.11).
Results of hematopoietic system monitoring among clean-up workers have shown that in early
postemergency period in peripheral blood of 25 % examined were recorded reduction in the number ofleukocytes (leukopenia) and in 12 % – leukocytosis. In 9.5 % of persons increased content of red blood cells
and hemoglobin level were recorded, in 9 % – thrombocytosis in 14.5 % – lymphocytosis and in 10.5% –monocytosis. In the remote observation periods after the accident were determined: leukocytosis in 24 %,leukopenia in 19,7 %, thrombocytopenia in 7,6 %, thrombocytosis in 2.4%. In 15 % of cases bi- andpancytopenia were found. For 2010 remains stable percentage of patients with leucopenia, thrombocytopenia
and anemia and slightly increased the number of people with lymphocytosis.

112

Fig. 3.10. Structure of the leukemia cases among men aged 20 and older in Ukraine in 2005.

Fig. 3.11. Structure of the leukemia cases identified in the cohort of liquidatorsof the accident (1987-2006) (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

For the whole period of observation at a relative normalization of the quantitative indicesqualitative abnormalities were characteristic in the nucleus and cytoplasm of the cell elements.
Megakaryocytes were recorded with increasing number of «old» cells, the presence of giant platelets,
cells with polymorphic grain, and in part of examined – aggregates of platelets, and accumulation of
micro- makroforms.
Non-tumor morbidity of clean-up workers
From 1988 to 2008 among clean-up workers proportion of healthy people decreased from 67.6 %to 5.4 %, chronic non-cancer pathology respectively increased from 12.8 % to 83.3 % (Fig. 3.12).
Worsening of clean-up workers health was associated with complex radiation and non-radiation
factors such as age at the time of exposure, time at risk and others.

113

1988

2008

Fig. 3.12. Dynamics of integral health indices of the Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986-1987
during 1988-2008 (the data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

Fig. 3.13. Dynamics of the non-cancer morbidity level of the Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987
in the cohort as a whole depending on the whole body absorbed (data of «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

Based on the cohort epidemiological studies carried out during the 1988-2008, it appears that
post-accident period was characterized in this contingent by growing level of non-tumor diseases(Fig. 3.13), especially among those who received external radiation dose 0.25–0.7 Gy.
The main contribution to the health state worsening of 1986–1987 clean-up workers cohort madediseases of the digestive, circulatory, nervous system and sensory organs, musculoskeletal andendocrine systems (Fig. 3.14).
1 – cardiovascular diseases,
2 – diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs,
3 – diseases of the digestive system,
4 – diseases of the musculoskeletal system,
5 – diseases of endocrine system,
6 – other diseases
Fig. 3.14. Structure of non-cancer morbidity of 1986–1987 clean-up workers in in 2008
(data of «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

114Effect of radiation on development of clean-up workers non-cancer morbidity is illustrated by the
dynamics of individual classes and groups of diseases – diseases circulatory system (Fig. 3.15), digestive(Fig. 3.16), endocrine system, primarily due to non-cancer diseases of the thyroid gland (Fig. 3.17).

Fig. 3.15. Dynamics of the level of cardiovascular diseases in Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987,
depending on the dose of whole body irradiation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

Fig. 3.16. Dynamics of the level of digestive system diseases in Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987,
depending on the dose of whole body irradiation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

When analyzing the effect of age factor on the development of endocrine system diseases significant
effects at lower doses of radiation (0.1–0.249 Gy) was found in persons whose age at the time of irradiation
was 18–39 years, which may indicate a higher sensitivity of this age group population .
On the basis of risk-analysis a highly significant dose-related effects of non-tumor diseases in the
Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987 were revealed in the range of absorbed doses of 0.25–0.7
Gy: endocrine system diseases – 1.24 times, mental disorders – 3.57 times, cardiovascular diseases –1,25 times, respiratory system diseases – 1.29 times, the digestive system disesases 1.54 times, urinary
system diseases – 1.43 times higher, than in non-irradiated control.
Calculations of additional cases of individual non-tumor diseases in clean-up workers of 19861987 caused by the radiation factor, based on the values of excess absolute risk (EAR • 103 person,
Gy.), attributive risk (ATR in %) for 25-year period after exposure give the total number of 81 631 suchcases, including diseases such as cardiomyopathy (28 280), coronary heart disease (3587), acquired115

hypothyroidism, thyroiditis (8067), cerebrovascular disease (5943), vertigo syndromes and otherdiseases of vestibular apparatus (18 010), neurotic disorders, psychopathy (4967), obstructive chronic
bronchitis (1112), acquired renal cyst (2695), chronic prostatitis (8970).

Fig. 3.17. Dynamics of the level of endocrine system and metabolism diseases in Chernobyl clean-up workers
of 1986-1987, depending on the dose of whole body irradiation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

Development of non-tumor diseases in clean-up workers was conditioned not only due to the
influence of radiation, but also complex non-radiation factors such as age, poor working conditions, badhabits, stress, poor nutrition, concomitant disease, etc. (Fig. 3.18–3.19).

Fig. 3.18. Extra number of cases (per 1000 person-years) of cerebrovascular disease at various risk factors(according to Clinical-Epidemiological Register of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)
1 – dose of external irradiation 0.25–0.49 Gy; 2 – dose of external irradiation 0.5–0.99 Gy; 3 – age 40–49;
4 – age 50-59; 5 – age 60-69; 6 – essential hypertension, 7 – diabetes, 8 – smoking, 9 – emotional overstrain

116

Fig. 3.19. Structure of risk factors for chronic obstructive bronchitis in clean-up workersof the Chernobyl accident

The disability of clean-up workers significantly increased during the period from 1988 to 2008
with a maximum growth in 2002 (Fig. 3.20). A decrease of disability rate from 2003 to 2008 can bemainly due to the influence of various «realization factors» and «extinction».

Fig. 3.20. Dynamics of disability of Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986-1987 for the periodof 1988-2008 depending on age at the time of participation in clean-up works(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

In the structure of the causes of disability leading role play diseases cardiovascular, nervous
system and sensory organs, digestive, endocrine system (Fig. 3.21).
Mortality of clean-up workers from non-tumor diseases for the period 1988–2008 increased
from 2.2 ‰ to 12.0 ‰ (Fig. 3.22).
The highest mortality rate from non-tumor diseases, its dynamic growth after exposure identified
among those whose age at the time of irradiation was 40–60 years, that obviously associated with the
influence of factor «aging».

117

Fig. 3.21. Structure of disability from non-tumor diseases in Chernobyl clean-up workers
of 1986–1987 in 2008 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)
1 – cardiovascular diseases, 2 – diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs,
3 – diseases of the digestive system, 4 – respiratory diseases, 5 – other diseases

Fig. 3.22. The dynamics of Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987 mortality during
the 1988-2008 from non-tumor diseases, depending on age at the time of participation in clean-up works(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

In the structure of causes of death of the Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987
cardiovascular diseases played a key role (their contribution to the structure of mortality is about 80 %)as well as respiratory, digestive, nervous system and sensory organs, endocrine system (Figure 3.23).

Fig. 3.23. The structure of mortality of Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987 from non-tumor diseasein 2008 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)1 – cardiovascular diseases, 2 – diseases of the digestive system, 3 – respiratory diseases, 4 – other diseases

The highest mortality of clean-up workers from non-tumor diseases registered among those who
received doses of external whole body irradiation in the range from 0.05 to 0.7 Gy, primarily concerned
subcohort of dose 0.25–0.7 Gy (Fig. 3.24).

118

‰ < 40 years‰  40 years

Fig. 3.24. The dynamics of Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987 mortality from non-tumor diseases
in the period 1988–2008, depending on age at the time of participation in the clean-up works
and the whole body external exposure (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

A risk-analysis revealed a highly significant dose-related effect of the Chernobyl clean-up
workers of 1986–1987 mortality from non-tumor diseases and cardiovascular diseases (Table 3.27).
At this stage of monitoring reliable dose-dependent effects of mortality risk in people aged under
40 years at the time of the Chernobyl accident were not established. This can be explained by possible
implementation of the risk at more distant stage. Possible dose-dependent effects of mortality fromcardiovascular diseases were found in the subcohort of clean-up workers aged 40–60 years at the timeof exposure.

119

Table 3.27.
Credible relative risks (RR) of mortality from non-tumor diseases in the Chernobyl clean-up workers
of 1986-1987 cohort in general (regardless of age) at doses of the whole body irradiation 0.25-0.7 Gy(average D = 0.3 Gy ) for 5, 10, 15, 20 years after exposure (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Classes and nosologic formsof diseases

Diseases of the
cardiovascular system:- essential hypertension- coronary heart disease- cerebrovascular disease

ICD-9 code

Relative risk (RR)

Confidence interval

390-459

2.4(1.21;3.8)

401-405410-414430-438

1.34
2.81
2.41

(1.19;3.1)(1.9;3.72)(1.3; 3.7)

Described values of the excess relative risk of mortality from cardiovascular diseases, coincidewith the other data obtained in the Life Span Study of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing
survivors [1] and radiation-exposed troops, according to Russian Health And Demographic Register [2].
3.2.2. Health state of evacuated in infancy at the time of the accident
It is known that the body of children and adolescents is more sensitive to the effects of negative
external factors compared to the functionally and morphologically identifiable adult.
Assessment of absolute risk of developing (primary disease) men and women evacuated from the
30-km Chernobyl zone being children and adolescents, for the period of 1993–2007 shows that thehighest absolute risk of disease observed for the nervous, digestive, circulatory system.
Among the diseases of sensory organs and nervous system the most common is retinal
angiopathy. For a number of common diseases angiopathy, including retinal angiopathy is not acomplication, but an integrated part of the pathological process and can be identified before theappearance of other symptoms.
Prevalence and relative risk of retinal angiopathy were analyzed in groups from cohort of 3,773
evacuees from Pripyat city living in Kyiv who were comprehensively surveyed in 1992–1998.
Groups were formed according to age at the time of disaster: first childhood (4–7 years), second
childhood (girls 8–11 years, boys 8–12 years), adolescence (girls 12–15 years, boys 13–16 years)
teenagers (16–20 years old girls, and boys 17–21 years). «Adolescent» and «teenagers» groups wereinternal controls for the groups of exposed in childhood, which were also compared with each other. In
addition, the relative risk of angiopathy for all 4 groups of evacuees were estimated in comparison with
control, data of survey of 105 persons who had no exposure to ionizing radiation.
The research in all 4 groups revealed the prevalence of retinal vascular pathology. In the group ofirradiated at the age of 4-7 years it was 258.62, 320.79 at the age of 8-12 years, 262.22 at the age of 11–
16 years and at the age of 17–21 years 267.39 per 1000 investigated persons. The prevalence ofangiopathy, contrary to the habitual norms, was the largest in the group of exposed at the age of 8–
12 years, but not in groups of older persons.
The relative risk (RR) for each group of exposed persons in comparison with the control was
higher just in exposed at the age of 8-12 years and amounted to 2.60 (1.54, 4.37) with Ȥ ² = 16.89 and p =0.00 004, while for irradiated at the age of 4–7 years – 2.09 (1.06, 4.13) with Ȥ ² = 4,64 and p = 0.0312.
When comparing the relative risks in exposed children in other two groups of evacuees, it appeared thatfor irradiated in 8–12 years RR is 1.22 with confidence interval 1,03; 1,45, Ȥ ² = 5,25 and p =0.0219 compared to exposed adolescents, the difference is significant. For all exposed in childhoodin comparison with «teenagers» group relative risk also was significantly higher (RR = 1.2 withconfidence interval 1.01; 1.42, Ȥ ² = 4.47 and p = 0.03439).
Thus, irradiated in childhood, especially at the age of 8–12 years, have a high risk of vasculardiseases of the retina.

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According to the survey in remote period relative risks of non-cancer diseases were analyzed
separately for men and women evacuated from the 30-km zone of Chernobyl NPP under 18 years
depending on the age at the time of evacuation (Table 3.28).
The women evacuated in childhood, compared with women evacuated in adolescence, hadsignificantly higher risk of morbidity in the class of diseases of skin and subcutaneous tissue.
Conversely, for women evacuees in their teens when compared to evacuated in childhood higher risk ofmental disorders, diseases of the nervous system and sense organs, respiratory, digestive systemdiseases, diseases of the genitourinary system.
Similarly, for men, evacuated in childhood (when compared to evacuated in adolescence) a
significantly higher risk was found for cardiovascular diseases and skin and subcutaneous tissue. In themen evacuated in their teens, compared with evacuated children, significantly higher risk of diseases of
the nervous system and sensory organs, digestive and urinary systems.
Table 3.28.
Relative risks of non-cancer morbidity for evacuees from the 30-km zone of Chernobyl NPP
in adolescence (data examination during 1993-2007 years) compared with evacuated in childhood(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Classes, groups and nosological forms of diseases

Diseases of the endocrine system
Mental disorders
Diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs
Diseases of the circulatory system:
Respiratory diseases
Digestive diseases
Diseases of the genitourinary system
Diseases of skin and subcutaneous tissue
Diseases of the musculoskeletal systemand connective tissue

ICD-9
code

RR

Cȱ

RR

240-279290-319320-389390-459460-519520-579580-629680-709

1.08
0.95
1.56
0.78
1.09
1.38
2.06
0.62

0.80;1.47
0.64; 1.41
1.39; 1.75
0.67; 0.92
0.85; 1.40
1.23; 1.55
1.45; 2.93
0.49; 0.80

1.20
1.49
1.46
1.04
1.42
1.70
2.42
0.71

0.99; 1.45
1.10; 2.03
1.31; 1.61
0.92; 1.17
1.12; 1.81
1.52; 1.91
1.97; 2.96
0.57; 0.88710-739

1.32

0.87; 2.00

1.20

0.90; 1.59

Men

Women
ɋȱ

Thus, it is proved that the effect of ionizing radiation in the groups exposed to the Chernobyl
accident is significantly modified by such factor as the age of exposed, with the most dangerous age
period, based on data analysis of incidence and prevalence of pathological conditions in long term is notearly infancy, but the age from 8 to 12 years and adolescence (from 12 to 15–16 years).
3.2.3. Health Effects of the Chernobyl disaster in various contingentsof the affected child population
Medical consequences of the Chernobyl disaster have been studied in various cohorts of children
evacuated from the 30-km zone of Chernobyl NPP, children-residents of contaminated areas, children
who experienced prenatal exposure and children born to exposed parents. Total in the post-accident
period more than 50 thousand suffered children were supervised by RCRM.
Changes in the health state of children exposed to radioactive iodine and other unfavorable
factors of the Chernobyl accident
In the early phase of the Chernobyl accident (04/26/1986 – 01/09/1986) Children evacuated fromthe area of «alienation» Chernobyl NPP in the early days complained of irritation in the throat sensationof metallic taste in the mouth (55.7 %), tussiculation; (31.1 %), fatigue (50.1 %), headache (39.3 %),dizziness (27.8 %), sleep disturbance (18.0 %), syncope (9.8 %), nausea and vomiting (8.0 %),defecation disorders (6,9%). In 31.0 % of children respiratory syndrome was detected in 32.2 % –hyperplasia of lymphoid tissue in 18.0 % – functional disorders of the cardiovascular system, in 9.4 % –121the gastrointestinal tract, in 9.8 % – liver enlargement, in 3.2 % – the spleen, in 34.2 % – quantitativeand in 92.2% – qualitive modified haemograms were found.
In the early years (1986–1991) functional disorders of other organs and systems were the mosttypical. In children evacuated from the 30-km zone, and the dwellers of contaminated areas they were
unidirectional in nature. In 70.3 % of them the signs of vegetative-vascular dysfunction were found, in
40.0 % – functional changes of the heart, in 53.5 % – a violation of non-respiratory ventilation and lungfunction and in 82.4 % – functional disorder of the digestive system. They have evolved against thebackground of the free radical processes intensification in the body, moderate suppression of T-cell
immunity and dysimunohlobulinemias.Chronic pathology was rarely registered. The high number ofchildren were found to be at risk of developing diseases of thyroid, immune, respiratory, digestivesystems, which were implemented since 1989–1990 (Fig. 3.25).

Fig. 3.25. Percentage of children at risk of developing pathology of the most exposed organs
and systems (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

Next five years (1992–1996) were characterized by transformation of functional disorders inchronic somatic pathology. Quantity of healthy children decreased and the number of children withchronic somatic pathology increased, both among evacuees from the 30-km zone, and among children
residents of contaminated areas. The lowest level of health had children with thyroid radiation dose
exceeding 2.0 Gy (Fig. 3.26).

Fig. 3.26. Number of healthy children with different doses of irradiation of the thyroid gland(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

In 1997–2001 a steady trend to decrease of children’s health was observed, both evacuees from the
30-km zone of Chernobyl, and the inhabitants of contaminated areas. Distribution by groups of health in2001 was as follows: among the evacuees from the 30-km zone was not a single child of I group of health, IIgroup was set to 23.4 %, III – to 63.9 % IV – to 12.7 %. Among children – residents of contaminated areas I
group of health was determined in 6.3 %, II – in 26.1 %, III – in 57.5 % and IV – in 10.1 % .

122In a contingent of children, residents of Narodychi area, distributed into 2 subgroups (by 600
people in each) according to collective dose of 2.6 person-Sv (I subgroup), and 9,4 person-Sv (IIsubgroup), significantly higher incidence of respiratory diseases (2.0 times), vegetative-vascular
dysfunction (1.52 times), fibrosis of liver tissue (2,3 times) and disorders of the blood system (2,5
times) in the subgroup of children with the collective dose of 9.4 person-Sv were found. Chromosome
instability in somatic cells, depending on the dose of radiation was revealed (Fig. 3.27).

Fig. 3.27. Dependence of the frequency of chromosomal aberrations in peripheral blood lymphocytes
from the dose of radiation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

The peculiarrities of somatic pathology were found : the occurrence of diseases in younger age;polysystemic, multiorgan nature of lesions and the prolonged, relapsing course with relative resistanceto therapy. Low level of health in these contingents remained throughout the whole period of childhood.
At the age of 17–18 chronic somatic pathology was revealed in 76.6 % of evacuees from the 30-km
zone of Chernobyl NPP and 66.7 % of the inhabitants of contaminated areas, and the level ofpathological lesions reached 5.7.
Thus, children exposed radioiodine and other unfavorable factors of the Chernobyl disaster camein reproductive age, burdened with numerous chronic diseases, which can not but affect the health oftheir offspring.
Assessment of the health of children born to parents as children evacuated from Pripyat
city and 30-km zone of Chernobyl NPP (I group) and children-dwellers of 3rd and 2nd zones ofradioactive contamination, whose parents at the time of the accident were children, have lived
and still live in these areas (II group), really showed that number of healthy among them did notexceed 10 % and the index of pathological lesions reached 5.39.
Physical development, which is one of the main criteria of health status in 62.40–62.58 % ofchildren differed by dysharmony. The frequency of violations of harmonic physical development at theI group grew by children who had body mass deficit relative to growth, and in the second group, in
addition, due to the increased number of children with growth deficiency. Almost a quarter (24.6 %) ofchildren – residents of contaminated areas, dysharmony in physical development coupled with a lag of
biological age comparing to the passport age.
Phenotypic features of children of both groups were characterized by increased frequency ofvariants with multiple morphogenetic dysmorphias, among them an important place occupied small
anomalies of development (SAD) of musculoskeletal system, connective tissue and organ dysplasia.

123

The immune status of these children was determined by the presence of immune imbalance:
reducing the relative number of CD3+56+ lymphocytes, deregulation of immunoregulatory
subpopulations, decreased levels of IgA and reduced the phagocyt number.
The formation of chronic somatic diseases in children born from people exposed in childhood,
was conditioned by a complex of unfavorable factors. Prominent of them are burdened heredity,
unfavorable micro-social environment, numerous medical and biological risk factors in the mother,some pathological conditions of the child in the infant period, certain features of early childhood.
Probable correlations between the dose of thyroid gland of mother, the dose of whole body radiation of
mother and/or father and the development of immunodeficiency states in their children.
No increase in the number of people with quantitative changes in blood count (lymphocytosis,
monocytosis, eosinophilia) was found during the study of erythrocyte, leukocyte and platelet links ofhematopoiesis in children who were evacuated from the city of Pripyat and 30-km zone in the early
period after the accident and those living in the most contaminated areas of Kyiv, Zhytomyr andChernigiv regions in dynamic monitoring of 1986, 1996, 2009. However, over the last 10 postaccidental
years proportion of children with qualitative changes in the elements of hematopoiesis grew from 40 %to 69 % in the form of increased number of aberrant cells and degenerative forms.
The part of children with deficiency anemia increased: in 1996 the number of such children hasreached 25 % in 2003 – 31 % in 2009 – 46.5 %. In addition, in children of elder age with deficiency
anemia reduced number of red blood cells depended on the degree of total contamination areas – air,water and soil (Fig. 3.28).

Fig. 3.28. The number of red blood cells in children of all ages with deficiency anemia,
taking into account total environmental contamination (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Increased number of monocytes in the blood count of children who live in the ecologicallyunfavorable regions was also established.
Over the past 5 years the number of children with high iron content in blood serum increased
from 2.0 % to 6.4 %, indicating the need for dynamic monitoring of these children as the risk group of
myelodysplastic syndrome.
Defined changes may be caused by an imbalance of trace elements, heavy metal toxicity,
prolonged exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation, poor nutrition of pediatric population, leading tometabolism disorder (lipid, carbohydrate, protein, mineral) and contribute to change the hemopoetic
system functioning.

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According to the data of Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine, there are 494.2 thousand children
who were born from parents of survey groups 1–3. Every year, diseases of blood and blood-forming
organs in this cohort are diagnosed approximately in 27–29 %, 18–22 % of them are iron-deficientanemias. In the dynamics of post-accident period 20–30 cases of leukemias and lymphomas are registeredyearly, which corresponds to population data in Ukraine in general (5.2–5.4 per 100 000 children).

Fig. 3.29. Relative deviation of bone collagen amino acids content in patientswith acute leukemia from the standard (the data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

Analysis of leukemia incidence rates of children living in contaminated areas of Kyiv, Zhytomyr,
Chernigiv regions of Ukraine for post-accident period found no difference in the frequency of acute
myeloid and lymphoblastic leukemia and versions of chronic myeloid leukemia before and after theaccident, and compared to the levels in Ukraine in general. But it should be noted that since 2003 has
increased the number of children who become ill at the age of one year, and older than 12 years.
For children with leukemia of that age groups established disorders of formation of bone
structures, in particular mineral and organic components starting from the early stages of fibroblast
formation, changes in regulation of collagen synthesis (decrease of osteocalcine) and its structure.
Content of oxyproline, proline and aspartic acid in the urine of patients increased, while the glycine andlysine decreased (Figure 3.29), indicating the disintegration of collagen and the lack of plastic material
for the processes of its formation as an integral part in the mechanism of carcinogenesis.
In 32 % of children with acute leukemia changes in the endocrine system, coupled with theunfavorable course of disease were observed. Criteria of the risk group formation of oncohematologic
diseases are being improved among the surveyed exposed to ionizing radiation, and preventive
measures to reduce the frequency of diseases of the blood are developed and implemented.
The data on new treatment and prevention measures in children with anemia and various types ofleykemoid reactions have shown a positive effect in 72.5 % of cases, partial – in 17.1 % and no effect oftreatment in 10.4 % of the examined, indicating the need for further improvement and individualizationof preventive and therapeutic measures in children with changes in the blood.
Children exposed during fetal development
In the dynamics of post-accident period 1,144 children who have suffered acute and prolonged
exposure during fetal development were observed.
Doses on fetal thyroid gland in group I (evacuated from Pripyat) and group II (the inhabitants ofradioactively contaminated territories) did not differ significantly and ranged from 0.0 to 335.0 cGy.
Depending on the gestational age the average dose to thyroid gland of the fetus were: up to 8 weeks –125

0.0 cGy, from 8 to 15 weeks – 31.14 cGy, from 16 to 25 weeks – 84.49 cGy, more than 25 weeks –62.30 cGy.

Fig. 3.30. Percentage of children with chronic somatic pathology in fetal exposure of the thyroid gland indifferent doses range (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
I group – evacuated from Pripyat; II group – residents of radioactively contaminated areas

The exposure of thyroid during fetal development significantly influenced on the health status ofchildren. Chronic somatic pathology was likely to occur more frequently after irradiation of fetal
thyroid in doses of over 0.36 Gy, and at doses above 1.0 Gy it had been registered in almost all children(Fig. 3.30).
Frequency of physical development disturbances of children depended on the dose of thyroid
gland of the fetus (Fig. 3.31).

Fig. 3.31. Percentage of children with disturbances in physical development after fetal thyroid irradiation indifferent doses range (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
I group – evacuated from Pripyat; IIgroup -residents of radioactively contaminated areas

Echostructure of thyroid of children exposed in utero showed the higher frequency of detection of
linear fibrosis elements in all terms of supervision than control data. If the dose of the thyroid gland of
the fetus exceeded 0.76 Gy, children had more often infringement of its ehostructure by elements oflinear fibrosis than at the dose of 0.36 Gy, (Fig. 3.32).

Fig. 3.32. The frequency of thyroid ehostructure disorders in children with its irradiation
at different doses (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
I group – evacuated from Pripyat; II group – residents of radioactively contaminated areas

126

The dependence of the number of small anomalies of development of fetal gestational age at thetime of exposure was defined (Fig. 3.33).

Fig. 3.33. Dependence of the number of small anomalies of development on fetal gestational age
at the time of exposure (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Fig. 3.34. Dependence of chromosome aberration frequency on doses of red bone marrowof the fetus (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Marked increase in the frequency of chromosomal aberrations, which depended on the dose ofirradiation of red bone marrow of the fetus was found (Fig. 3.34).
Thus, the development of chronic somatic pathology, physical impairment, formation ofphenotypes with multiple small abnormalities, increasing the number of chromosomal aberrations insomatic cells and changes of thyroid ehostructure were associated with radiation dose of children during
fetal development.
Health status of children born to exposed parents
Statistics of the Ministry of Health and SRU indicate adverse changes in the health status ofchildren 0-14 years old, born from exposed individuals (1st, 2nd and 3rd of the first groups of primary
registration).
A significant increase in incidence rates and prevalence of diseases was in children born toexposed parents (4th group of primary registration) (Fig. 3.35).

127

Fig. 3.35. Trends of incidence rates (1) and prevalence (2) of diseases in children born to exposed parents
and children of Ukraine (the data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Table 3.29.
The growth of the incidence and prevalence of diseases in children born from irradiated parents
and children of Ukraine (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
IndicesMorbidity
Prevalence ofdiseases

The average absolute increase
Ukraineaffected children

Average growth rate, %Ukraineaffected children

6.7±10.752.3±20.6 *0.84±1.73

7.03±3.23*

21.7±20.2

85.8±20.0 *1.55±1.42

6.30±1.57*

Note. *- The difference likelihood ratios (p<0,05)

However, the growth of these parameters in children of 4th group of primary registration was
more rapid than in children of Ukraine’s population (Table 3.29). As estimated negative trends will be
stored in the near future.

Fig. 3.36. Weight of healthy children and children with chronic somatic pathology among the born to exposedparents in the dynamics of post-accident period (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»)

Attracts attention a sharp rise in registration of certain classes of disease in 2009 compared to 1992 insuffered children with respect to child population as a whole, namely: endocrine diseases – 11.61 times,

128

diseases of the musculoskeletal system – 5.34 times, the digestive system – 5,00 times, mental andbehavioral disorders – 3.83 times, cardiovascular diseases – 3.75 times, urogenital system – 3.60 times.
In this contingent of children the course of adaptation to the environment, since the neonatal
period was more strained. Already at the first year of life among them formed numerous group of often
ill, which the age of 6-7 reached from 49.2 to 58.7 %, and the immune status was characterized by highfrequency of many immunological parameters variations beyond the physiological oscillations (75.0–
45.7 %), which is the basis for the formation of chronic somatic pathology (Fig. 3.36).
In the dynamics of post-accident period, the weight of healthy children decreased from 24.1 % in1992 to 5.8 % in 2008, and the number of children with chronic diseases increased from 21.1 % in 1992
to 78.2 % in 2008.
In SRU are 13,136 children born to the Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986–1987, among themin 1,190 (90.6 per 1000) recorded inborn birth defects (IBD). The highest frequency of IBD was
observed in the first post-accident years (Fig. 3.37). In the course of time that has elapsed since thecessation of father’s contact with radiation, the number of children with birth defects reduced.

Fig. 3.37. The frequency of inborn birth defects in children born to parents who participated in the liquidation of
the Chernobyl accident in 1986 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)

By abscisse axis – the birth year of clean-up workers’ offsprings
Phenotype of children born to clean-up workers exposed to doses of 100–1000 mSv wascharacterized by the presence of multiple stigmata of dysembriogenesis. Growth of frequency ofchromosomal aberrations appeared mainly by increasing the number of chromosomal type damage.
Between the number of aberrations detected in the child and the father had been positive correlation(d = 0.620). Using the strategy of multylocus DNA fingerprint a 5.6 times increase of microsatelliteassociated sequences variability in the genome of children born in post-accident period in clean-up
workers families was found. The incidence of new bands depended on the time elapsed since thecessation of father’s contact with the effect of radiation before proband conception and father’sabsorbed dose. This dependence was of nonlinear nature.
Radiation violation induced in parental germinal cells may emerge at different stages of
ontogenesis of descendants. In postnatal ontogenesis «small» mutations are probably implemented thatare in a heterozygous condition, which causes destabilization of the totality of hereditary structures.
Maybe this phenomenon underlies the so-called «physiological inferiority» and reduced viabilityof offspring of irradiated parents. The consequence of inherited genome instability in offspring of
exposed individuals may be the presence of multiple dysmorphies, organ dysplasia, increased frequencyof chromosomal aberrations and mutations of microsatellite DNA fraction. All this contributes to theviolation of adaptation to living conditions, increasing the risk of development and implementation ofmultifactorial disease and reduce health level of children born to exposed parents.

129

Thus, the dynamic in the state of health of the affected pediatric population is characterized bypersistent negative trends:
 A steady trend of morbidity growth and reduction of quuantity in practicallly healthy
children, the lowest level of health established in children with high-dose irradiation of the
thyroid gland; Peculiarities of formation and course of chronic somatic diseases, namely: the emergence in amore younger age, polysystem, multiorgan nature of lesions, relapsing course with relative
resistance to therapy;
 The existence of reliable correlations between health state, physical development, formationof phenotypes with multiple minor anomalies, increased number of chromosomal aberrations
in somatic cells of children and their dose exposure during fetal development; In children born from exposed persons formed phenomenon of genomic instability,
characterized by predisposition to multifactorial diseases, formation of morphogenetic
variants with multiple small anomalies of development, increased frequency of chromosomal
aberrations in somatic cells and the frequency of mutations in microsatellite-associated DNA
fraction.
3.2.4. Diseases of thyroid gland
Among the adult population of Ukraine affected by Chernobyl, the most common (40-52 %) is
the thyroid gland (TG) pathology, whereas in normal population, according to official statistics from the
Ministry of Health of Ukraine, it occurs much less often. To increased prevalence of thyroid diseases
contributed the complex influence of negative factors of the accident, first of all, ionizing radiation anddeficiency of several micronutrients, especially iodine and selenium.
A sumation (combination) of external Ȗ-irradiation and internal exposure to radionuclides
influence on tropic structure hormone-producing cells, which led to the destruction of various stages ofhormonal regulation, both central and peripheral tissues of the endocrine system. Radiation damage tothese tissues realized via activation of a genetic predisposition through interaction with negativeenvironmental factors.
Part of the absorbed dose was formed in the early days-months of the accident, and anotherprolonged – over the years, which complicates assessment of its impact. Extremely high concentrationsof iodine isotopes in the air in the first days-weeks of the accident and existing iodine deficiency
contributed significantly to the accumulation of radioactive iodine in the thyroid and destruction ofthyreocytes, that caused in clean-up workers with high doses of radiation (more than 1 Sv) developmentof acute radiation thyroiditis, and early implementation of ionizing radiation in the form of thyroid
cancers. In persons with radiation dose (0.25–1) Sv a long transient euthyroid hyperthyroxinemia wasobserved during the first 3–5 post-accidental years (1986–1991). This was a prerequisite for the gradualdevelopment of delayed chronic pathological processes in the thyroid and other endocrine organs,especially thyroiditis, nodular goiter.
Due to nutritional deficiency of iodine, selenium in the pre-accident period a large number ofpeople had functional tension of the thyroid gland in the form of hyperplasia of endocrine (hormoneproducing) cells, contributing to a greater capacity for accumulation of isotopes.
After the Chernobyl accident non-stochastic pathology developed by stages – according to thepathophysiological changes occurring in the tissues of the central and peripheral parts of the endocrine
system.
During the primary response to a complex of negative factors of the accident, which lasted until
August 1986, there was an increase of peripheral concentrations of hormones in the blood because ofpartial endocrine cells destruction.

130

Increased synthesis of peripheral hormones on the background of lack of response of the central
parts of regulation – a violation of feedbacks because of the lack of synthesis of releasing factors andpituitary tropic hormone – was typical for the next period of compensative peripheral hormones
hyperproduction, which lasted from September 1986 to 1989.

Clean-up workersof the ChNPP +evacuated
Vol. of thyroid(cm3)

Frequency of
nodular goiter(%)

Total population
Surgicaltreatment (%)

Chronic(autoimmune)
thyroiditis (%)

Fig. 3.38. The frequency of thyroid cancer among clean-up workers of the Chernobyl accident (1986–1987)
and evacuated from the 30-km exclusion zone (data for 2006) compared to the general population of Ukraine,
which was not involved in influence of ionizing radiation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Fig. 3.39. Prevalence of chronic thyroiditis in Ukraine are among the sufferers of the Chernobyl accidentof different categories (adults and children per 10,000), according to the Ministry of Health of Ukraine.

131

In the next period (1990–1995 years) of subclinical disorders of endocrine tissues functions
restoration of the central regulation of hormone production, decrease of functional capacity of
peripheral endocrine tissues, the development of subclinical conditions of thyroid and other organs wereobserved.
Since 1996 to this time a clinical manifestation of radiation induced endocrine disorders as aburst of endocrine diseases detection against the background of a strong decline of functional capacityof peripheral endocrine tissue, disorders in the central links of hormonal regulation.
In 1992–1996 he a risk of thyroid disease in patients who suffered from the Chernobyl
accident, increased 9 times, type 2 diabetes – in 2,4 times. The annual growth rate of endocrine
diseases in clean-up workers was 3–5 times higher than in the adult population as a whole.
According to SRU (68, 145 persons, the observation period of 1988–2009), an increased rate ofnon-tumor thyroid disease mostly due to chronic (autoimmune) thyroiditis, nodular goiter, acquired
hypothyroidism were also found (Fig. 3.38, 3.39).

Fig. 3.40. Prevalence of chronic (autoimmune) thyroiditis among clean-up workers of the Chernobyl accident
and the residents of Kyiv (adults and children per 10,000; data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

During the period from 1997 to the present chronic thyroiditis incidence among clean-up workers
continues to grow, while among residents of Kyiv its level kept stable (Fig. 3.40). The most rapid
increase in the prevalence of thyroid disease recorded in the clean-up workers, who in 1986 was under
20. The important risk factor for chronic thyroiditis and acquired hypothyroidism in clean-up workers
of 1986-1987 and evacuees from the 30-km exclusion zone are the whole body external exposures in
the range 0.25–1 Gy.
Status of the thyroid system in children
During the first year after the accident in the affected children was observed early reaction to
thyroid irradiation as hyperthyroxinemia without clinical manifestations, short-term «stress»
hiperthyreotropinemia with following resumption of interconnections in the system thyreotropinthyroxine. In 12–18 months after the accident thyroxine content was normalized and in the following
years oscillated within the physiological norm. Further levels of thyreotropinemia averages did not
differ from that of the norm against the backdrop of ongoing hyperthyroxinemia. At doses of radiation132

of thyroid over 2 Gy average thyroxine level in blood significantly grew with increasing dose, reachinga maximum at doses over 15 Gy.
Hormonal changes at the stage of 1986–1991 had no clinical display in the change of thyroid
diseases among children and adolescents. Between 1992–1996 only in 0.8 % cases was noted reduced
free thyroxine and in 0.2% – increase of pituitary thyroid stimulating hormone without any clinicalmanifestations. Cases of chronic thyroiditis, hypothyroidism recorded rarely, but without reliable
increase in the frequency of these diseases that can be explained by the positive sanogenetic role ofprocesses of rehabilitation and compensation in the growing organism.
In the absence of significant changes in the rate of diseases such as hypothyroidism, chronic
thyroiditis and thyrotoxicosis in children affected by the Chernobyl accident in 1999–2003 researches
were conducted on detection of hidden thyroid failure, the principles of treatment and rehabilitation ofchildren with thyroid diseases affected by the Chernobyl accident and permanently living incontaminated areas with a shortage of iodine in the environment.
In the period 2004–2006, it was found that the feature of thyroid system functioning in children
born to liquidators who had been exposed to factors of the Chernobyl accident of iodine period, were
tension is the central regulation of hypothalamic-pituitary axis, which were found in 35.5 % of
examined, as certified by the presenceof hypersecretory reaction of thyreotropin on trial withthyreotropin-releasing hormone and may be indirect evidence of neuroendocrine structuresphysiological inferiority prone to manifestations of thyroid disease. Delayed in time cytogenetic effectdetected with long-term cultivation of cells, shows the transmission of chromosomal instability todescendants of irradiated parents that could promote the thyroid diseases in children with a hidden
functional failure of hypothalamic-pituitary-thyroid system.
Cancer of the thyroid gland in children and adolescents of Ukraine
Today a significant increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer (TC) after the Chernobyl
catastrophe among high risk groups (0–18 years old at the time of the accident) is finally proved; it isrecognized as the main health consequences of the Chernobyl accident by leading medical and scientificinstitutions in the world.
In 25 years after the Chernobyl accident children and adolescents who have experienced the mostsignificant effect of radioactive iodine, moved to the category of adults, so now special attention shouldbe payed to information on the TC among young adults, finding out the dynamics of changes in macromicroscopic characteristics and invasive properties of tumors.
The development of malignant tumors is clearly stochastic effects of radiation, but people who
were exposed to the Chernobyl accident in childhood, especially up to 4 years of age, there was a clear
dependence of the additional degree of TC incidence on thyroid irradiation. More higher prevalence of
thyroid cancer in higher doses in people aged under 18 at the time of the Chernobyl disaster wasobserved during the screening and research for the Ukrainian-American thyroid project. Moreover,morbidity in children born before the accident, is 15 or more times higher than the rates in children bornafter the accident, which further confirms the nature of radiation «children postchernobyl» thyroid
cancer.
Analysis of clinical and morphological data register of Institute of Endocrinology andMetabolism named by V.P. Komissarenko, Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine found that in
Ukraine during post-chernobyl period (1986–2008) 6049 persons were operated born in 1968–1986 (0–18 years old at the time of the accident) with morphologically confirmed diagnosis of «thyroid cancer»
among them 4480 (74.1 %) were in childhood (0–14 years; Fig. 3.41) and 1569 (25,9%) – inadolescence (15–18 years old at the time of the accident; Fig. 3.42).
Ratio of women: men for these age groups increased by age at the time of accident: 3560:920(3,9:1) for children and 1312:257 (5,1:1) for adolescents. The incidence gradually increased from 1990
to 2008. The number of new cases of thyroid cancer in children at the time of the Chernobyl accident in133

2009 was 463 (as in the previous 2008). The number of cases in adolescents at the time of the accident
was 129 and also did not differ from the previous year.

Fig. 3.41. Incidence of thyroid cancer (per 100 thousand of child population aged 0-14 at the time of theChernobyl disaster; data of SI «Institute of Endocrinology and Metabolism named by V.P. Komissarenko,
Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine»)

Fig. 3.42. Incidence of thyroid cancer (per 100 thousand of child population aged 15–18 at the time of theChernobyl disaster; data of SI «Institute of Endocrinology and Metabolism named by V.P. Komissarenko,
Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine»)

More likely relative index, i.e. incidence per 100 thousand children and teenagers at the time of
the accident also rose steadily from 1990 to 2008. In 2009, the incidence was 4.13 in children and 4.87
in adolescents, not exceeding the figures for 2008 (Fig. 3.41, 3.42). Thus, it is possible that in 2008–2009 the peak incidence of thyroid cancer in radiation-risk group was determined, and in 2010 a gradualreduction of such diseases will be expected.
Increase in the incidence of TC to some extent could be explained by a gradual increase in theage of designated cohort during 1986–2008. But the difference between the incidence of TC in the six
most affected northern regions compared with the rest of the country not only conserved, but increased
in 2006–2008 compared with the previous period of research in children and adolescents at the time of
the accident (Fig. 3.41, 3.42), indicating an association between increased TC incidence and radiation
factor, not with increasing age over time that has elapsed since the accident.
By the age at the time of surgery (Fig. 3.43) in recent years TC in children and adolescents wasfound only among born after the Chernobyl disaster. In adults born after the accident first cases of TC
were reported in 2006. During 2006–2009 their number amounted to 91 compared with 2223 cases
identified among people who were children and adolescents at the time of the accident (Fig. 3.43).
Total number of cases of TC, registered over the years 1986–2009, was 6448, among them 6049
were born before the accident and 399 – after the accident. In young adults born before the accident theincidence of TC and morbidity in Ukraine in general and in the most contaminated regions in 2009
remained at the 2008 level (Fig 3.43).

134

Incidence among children, adolescents and young adults of 19–22 years old, born after the
Chernobyl accident (in 1987 and subsequent years) in all years of observation was significantly lower
than in the corresponding age groups born before 1987 (Fig. 3.43).

Figure 3.43. Incidence of thyroid cancer (per 100 thousand population, 19–40 years old at the time of surgery:born before 1987 and in 1987 and later; data of SI «Institute of Endocrinology and Metabolism named
by V.P.Komissarenko, Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine)
1 – Ukraine, born before 1987; 2 – Ukraine, born in 1987 and later; 3 – 6 most polluted regions, born before
1987; 4 – 6 most polluted regions, born in 1987 and later; 5–21 region of comparison, born before 1987,
6–21 region of comparison, born in 1987 and later.

According to morphological characteristics of TC operated in 1990–2008 in patients whose age
at the time of the accident did not exceed 18 years, 92.2 % of cases were papillary carcinoma,With time that has elapsed since the accident, raised the age of exposed, but also significantly
changed the morphological characteristics of papillary carcinoma towards a gradual reduction of thepercentage of carcinomas of a solid structure from 24.4 % in 1990-1995 to 5.7 % in 2006–2009 (p<0.01
per test Ȥ2) and increase the percentage of papillary carcinomas and mixed typical structure: from 12.0 %in 1990–1995 to 34.0 % in 2006–2009 and 25.5 % in 1990–1995 to 43.8 % in 2006–2009 respectively(p<0,05). With the increase in latent period varied the combination of structural components of the mixed
variant of papillary carcinoma as well: the percentage of tumor of solid-follicular structure significantly
decreased (from 72.7 % in 1990–1995 to 25.4 % in 2006–2009, p<0 01), while the percentage of tumor of
papillary-follicular structure increased (from 10.9 % in 1990–1995 to 43.8 % in 2006–2009, p<0,01).
Analysis of the invasive properties of papillary carcinomas has established two major
dependencies: age and time.
Under the age dependency extrathyroid signs of invasion, presence of regional and distantmetastases consistently significantly declined from children of 4–14 years old to adults of 19–40 years
old at the time of surgery.
Over time dependence by combining all cases of patients of 4–40 years a reduction of thementioned above parameters was determined with the increase of latent period (time elapsed from the
Chernobyl accident to the surgery). Of special interest are the data on reduction the percentage ofpatients with the occurence of distant metastases from 23.0 % in 1990–1995 to 1.8 % in 2006–2009(p<0,001).
Moreover, the percentage of encapsulated tumors increased from 7.4 % in 1990–1995 to 29.4 %in 2006–2008 (p<0,001) as well as «small» carcinomas up to 10 mm: from 4.1 % in 1990–1995 to 29.4
% in 2006–2009 (p <0,001).
Thus it can be summarized that the morbidity of thyroid cancer per 100 thousand children andadolescents (age at the time of the accident) were highest in 2006–2008 and stabilized in 2009.
Meanwhile, saving significant difference in morbidity levels between the most and least affected
regions of the country (2.5 times in children and 1,9 times in adolescents), evidence for the fact that in135

Ukraine 24 years after the Chernobyl disaster was kept effect of the radiation factor on the incidence of
thyroid cancer among persons at high risk.
The data also show that with time elapsing after the Chernobyl disaster and age of patients at thetime of surgery, prevailing among thyroid cancers papillary carcinomas experienced significant
morphological changes, which reflecttd the reduction of aggressive disease, as evidenced by asignificant decrease in the percentage of cases with signs of extrathyroid spread, appearence of regionaland distant metastases.
The gradual accumulation of cases among persons born after the Chernobyl accident, comparedwith adequate relevant age group each year adds evidence to support the radiation nature of TC inchildren and adolescents exposed to radiation from the Chernobyl disaster.
3.2.5. Epidemiological studies of health of the population living
in contaminated territories
Stohastic effects
Taking into account the radiation nature of increase the incidence of TC in the remote period
after the Chernobyl accident should a more detailed description of this phenomenon is needed. In
Ukraine as a whole growing of TC incidence in the male population has doubled, and women – threetimes greater than the expected spontaneous rate (Fig. 3.44).

Fig. 3.44. Standardized by age the average annual incidence of thyroid cancer in Ukraine per 100 000 population
for separate time periods (men and women, data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»).

Next Fig. 3.45 reflects the dynamics of the incidence of TC in the most contaminated area.
In the inhabitants of those territories in the pre-accident period (1980–1986) morbidity of TC
were 1.2 per 100 000 inhabitants. In the post-accident years a rapid growth rate of this disease was seen:in the 1987–1991 – 2 times, in 1992–1996 – 4.5 times, in 1997–2001 – 8.3 times. Some decrease in thisindex of 2002–2007 compared with the previous period (at 34.1 %), probably due to a complexity offactors such, for example, migration from these areas populations with the highest risk of developing
this pathology (young families with children). It is necessary also to specify a possible termination of
period of time under the radiation risk of the youngest irradiated age group.

136

Age-standardized incidence rates
per 100 000

Years
Note. * only 1989-1991

Fig. 3.45. Incidence of thyroid cancer in the population of Ukraine, Zhytomyr, Kyiv region, Kyiv city and mostcontaminated with radionuclides territories during 1980–2007 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Among affected by the Chernobyl disaster a significant increase in the incidence of TC wasmarked compared to the country as a whole: in the evacuees – 4.4 times, in residents of mostcontaminated areas – 1.35 times that is conneected to the exposure of the thyroid by radioactive iodine(Table 3.30).
Table 3.30.
Incidence of thyroid cancer (ICD-10 C.73) of the main population groups of Ukraine affected by Chernobyl
accident (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Group of affected and the period of
observation

Evacuated from the exclusion zone
(2000–2007)
Dwellers of the most contaminatedareas (2002–2007)

Number of cases
expected
actualStandardized incidence
rate (SIR %)95% confidence
interval

52,3

231

441.7

384.7–498.6

71

96

135.2

108.2–162.3

According to analysis of long-term monitoring other forms of malignant neoplasms in affected
populations have not exceeded national levels. In most evacuees and residents of contaminated areas(RZT), these values were significantly lower than in Ukraine in general (Table 3.31). However, there isa risk of negative trends in the incidence of cancer in more remote period of observation.
Table 3.31.
The incidence of malignant neoplasms (ICD-10 S.00-S.96) in the main population groupsof Ukraine affected by Chernobyl accident (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Group of affected and the periodof observation

Evacuated from the exclusionzone (2000-2007)
Dwellers of the mostcontaminated areas (2002-2007)

Number of cases
expected
actualStandardized incidence
rate (SIR %)95% confidence
interval

3318

2718

81.9

78.9-85.0

4753

3678

77.4

74.9-79.9

137

Table 3.32.
Incidence of breast cancer (ICD-10 C.50) in groups of female population of Ukraine
affected by Chernobyl accident (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)Group of affected and the period of
observation

Evacuated from the exclusion zone
(2000-2007)
Dwellers of the most contaminatedareas (2002-2007)

Number of cases
expected
actualStandardized incidence
rate (SIR %)95% confidence
interval

344

238

69,2

60,4-78,0

460,5

295

64,1

56,8-71,4

Incidence rate of breast cancer in evacuated and residents of radiation contaminated areas werelower than the national level, despite the continuing trend to increase of the absolute number of cases(Table 3.32). It should be noted that these categories of sufferers in pre-accident period lived in areas
with relatively low incidence of breast cancer.
Non-tumor morbidity
According to researches carried out within 25 years after the Chernobyl accident, health state ofevacuated population considerably deteriorated at the post-evacuation period. The key factor of
disability and mortality are the non-tumor diseases. According to SRU at the expense of non-tumor
diseases from 1988 to 2008 the number of healthy among evacuees has decreased from 67.7 % to 21.5%, with chronic diseases increased from 31.5 % to 78.5 % (Fig. 3.46) .

Fig. 3.46. Integral health indices (%) of the evacuated adult population in 1988 and 2008
(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Epidemiological analysis of changes in non-cancer incidence by five-year period of observation(Fig. 3.47) showed that the highest level of disease was registered in 1998–2002. The gradual reductionof most rates from 1988 to 2007 in evacuees could be due to the implementation of disease newly
diagnosed at the previous stages and partial mortality of cohort.
However, growth of individual diseases in the dynamics shows that the development of nontumor diseases in this troops of suffered is still prolonged, especially it concerns people, who at the timeof the accident were children and teenagers. The of influence»small» doses of irradiation on thedevelopment of non-tumor diseases (distant in time the effects of low doses of ionizing radiation) and aset of non-radiation factors cannot be excluded.
Between 1988–2007 a significant change of evacuees’ non-cancer morbidity was registered forindividual classes and nosological forms.
In 2003–2007 compared with all previous stages incidence of toxic nodular goiter weresignificantly higher. Statistically higher against the first and second stages was morbidity in acquired138

hypothyroidism, diseases of digestive organs, including liver, biliary tract and pancreas. The incidenceof thyroiditis, nervous system and sensory organs, including vegetative-vascular dystonia,
cerebrovascular disease, respiratory diseases, ulcers of stomach and duodenum, urinary andmusculoskeletal system significantly exceeds the level of the first stage only. For other diseases
recorded statistically lower levels.

Fig. 3.47. Dynamics of non-cancer morbidity of adult evacuees by five-year periodsof observation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Similar changes were observed in the structure of non-cancer diseases (Fig. 3.48).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1988 ɪɿɤ
cardiovascular diseases;
respiratory diseases;
digestive system diseases
diseases of nervous system and sensory organs;diseases of the musculoskeletal system;
endocrine diseases;
genitourinary system diseases;
other diseases.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2007 ɪɿɤ
digestive system diseases
cardiovascular diseases;
respiratory diseases;
diseases of the musculoskeletal system;
diseases of nervous system and sensory organs;endocrine diseases;
genitourinary system diseases;
other diseases.

Fig. 3.48. Structure of non-cancer diseases (%) of the evacuated adult populationin 1988 and 2007 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

In 1988 the largest share in the structure consistently accounted for the diseases of circulatory,
respiratory, digestive, nervous system and sensory organs, musculoskeletal, endocrine and urogenital
systems. Their contribution to the overall structure was 91.4 %.
In 2007, mentioned pathology also had the largest share, but changed its position in the structure.
The contribution of cardiovascular diseases decreased and they relocated in the structure of the second

139

rank place. The first place belonged to diseases of the digestive system. Decreased proportion of
respiratory disease, but increased – diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs, and to somedegre – the endocrine and urogenital systems.

Fig. 3.49. Incidence and prevalence of non-tumor diseases among the adult evacuated population,
depending on the gender in 1988 and 2007 (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Gender differences in the dynamics of prevalence and incidence of non-tumor disease consisted
in the fact that the prevalence of disease among women exceeded the corresponding rates for men by
20.0 %, incidence – by 30.9 % (Fig. 3.49).
The greatest differences of prevalence were found in levels of endocrine system diseases,
including thyroid (1.6 times). Women recorded higher more than 2 times values of nontoxic nodular
goiter, thyrotoxicosis and goiter with or without acquired hypothyroidism, thyroiditis. Women have also
higher levels of diabetes mellitus (1.8 times), genitourinary system (2.1 times). The level of cataract inwomen was higher 1.7 times, cerebrovascular disease – 1.5 times. However, the incidence of gastriculcer and duodenum was higher in men.
According to figures of newly diagnosed diseases again most excess were observed in women in
the level of thyroid disease (2 times), including acquired hypothyroidism – 3.3 times, thyrotoxicosis –3.6 times, non-toxic nodal goiter – 2.8 times. More than 2 times higher were cataract, cerebrovasculardiseases, diseases of liver, biliary tract, pancreas, urinary system. At all stages a higher level of nontumor diseases was in persons 40 years and older compared with younger contingent (Fig. 3.50).

Fig. 3.50. Dynamics of non-cancer morbidity of evacuated adult population by age in five-year period of
observation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

140

Fig. 3.51. Dynamics of cardiovascular disease in adult evacuees by five years observation period dependingon age (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

Especially significant difference observed in the level of diseases of cardiovascular system,
including coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular disease (Fig. 3.51).
Significant differences registered in the dynamics of some forms of thyroid diseases. Since 1993–1997 the rates of nontoxic nodular goiter, acquired hypothyroidism, thyroiditis were higher in persons
over 40 years (Fig. 3.52).
Significant dose-related effects of certain non-tumor diseases were found in the adult evacuatedpopulation with irradiation of thyroid and external whole body irradiation. Thyroid irradiation doses 0.3– <2.0 Gy demonstrated reliable connection the dose to cardiovascular diseases, including coronary
heart disease and cerebrovascular pathology, diseases of the musculoskeletal system. With increasing
doses to the thyroid gland to 2.0 Gy the risks of named diseases increased, a credible risk of mental
disorders and diseases of the digestive system was registered as well (Table 3.33).
Doses of whole body external irradiation significantly influenced on the development of noncancer morbidity of evacuees. According to the results of risk analysis a growth of relative risks (RR) of
certain non-tumor diseases were found and increase of their number with reliably verified risk while
increasing exposure doses. The maximum risk for most diseases found in the dose range 0.25–0.32 Gy(Table 3.34).
Compared with the control lowest quantity of disease with a statistically confirmed risk was
registered in dose subcohort 0.05–0.099 Gy. With increasing doses up to 0.1–0.249 Gy the number of141

diseases with ssignificant RR increased due to such nosological forms as cataracts, essential
hypertension, cerebrovascular pathology, diseases of urinary system.

Fig. 3.52. Dynamics of certain forms of thyroid diseases in adult evacuated population by observation periodof five years depending on age (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).
Table 3.33.
Relative risks of certain non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuees in the period of 1989-2005 depending on the
thyroid gland exposure (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Classes and nosological forms of diseases

ICD-9

Diseases of circulatory system

390-459- Coronary heart disease410-414- Cerebrovascular disease430-438

Diseases of digestive system

520-579- Diseases of liver, biliary tract and pancreas

571-577

Diseases of the musculoskeletal system

710-739

Mental disorders

290-319

Note. * – ɪ 0,05

142

Relative risk indices for exposure doses
0.3 – < 2.0 Ƚɪ
t 2.0 Ƚɪ1,89*
(1,64-2,18)
3,22*(2,50-4,15)
2,00*(1,41-2,86)
1,02(0,86-1,22)
1,06(0,82-1,35)
1,22*(1,01-1,49)
1,10(0,65-1,88)

2,91*(2,51-3,37)
4,38*(3,37-5,68)
4,83*(3,46-6,73)
1,40*(1,15-1,71)
1,34*(1,01-1,79)
2,69*(2,21-3,26)
1,82*(1,02-3,26)

Table 3.34.
Relative risks (RR) of some non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuees within
the period 2003 – 2007 depending on the dose of whole body irradiation(dose subcohort of comparison <0.05 Gy; data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
ICD-9

Indices of relative risk (RR) and confidence interval (CI) for exposure doses(Gy)0.05 – 0.099
0.1 – 0.199
0.2 – 0.249
0.25 – 0.32
RR (CI)RR (CI)RR (CI)RR (CI)240-246

1.07 (0.78; 1.48)

244

1.05 (0.38; 2.89)- Thyroiditis245

0.46 (0.16; 1.29)- Diabetes mellitus

250

0.57 (0.26; 1.25)- Vegetative-vascular
dystonia337

2.04 x(1.12; 3.71)- ɤɚɬɚɪɚɤɬɚ

366

1.73 (0.74; 4.04)- Essential hypertension

401-405

0.89 (0.64; 1.24)- Ischemic heart disease412-4141.30 (0.97; 1.74)- Cerebrovascular disease437-438

1.45 (0.97; 2.16)535

1.52 x(1.01; 2.28)

571-576

1.12 (0.91; 1.39)

577

0.88 (0.62; 1.27)

580-599

1.37 (0.87; 2.17)

600-6021.30 (0.73; 2.32)

733.0.
733.1

1.10 (0.82; 1.78)

Nosological groups. formsof diseases

Diseases of the thyroid
gland- Acquired
hypothyroidism- Gastritis. duodenitis- Liver. biliary tract
diseases- Diseases of the pancreas- Diseases of urinary
system- Diseases of the prostate
gland
Osteopathies.
hondropathies

1.10(0.86; 1.41)
0.69(0.30; 1.59)
0.81(0.43; 1.53)
0.65(0.38; 1.25)
4.44 x(2.72; 7.25)
2.74 x(1.38; 5.45)
1.35 x(1.07; 1.72)
1.24(0.98; 1.57)
1.75 x(1.27; 2.42)
1.15(0.82; 1.62)
0.92(0.77; 1.09)
0.84(0.64; 1.11)
1.44 x(1.00; 2.08)
1.12(0.70; 1.79)
1.17(0.93; 1.47)

0.92(0.71; 1.18)
0.94(0.43; 2.07)
0.92(0.50; 1.72)
0.41(0.23; 0.74)
1.45(0.86; 2.43)
1.58(0.78; 3.21)
1.01(0.79; 1.29)
1.19(0.94; 1.51)
1.56 x(1.13; 2.16)
1.52 x(1.09; 2.12)
1.01(0.85; 1.19)
0.83(0.63; 1.08)
1.69 x(1.18; 2.43)
1.52(0.97; 2.40)
1.09(0.86; 1.37)

1.37 x(1.06; 1.77)
1.14(0.50; 2.63)
1.49 x(1.09; 2.79)
1.28 x(1.05; 2.19)
1.17(0.66; 2.06)
2.94 x(1.45; 5.96)
1.20(0.93; 1.55)
1.27 x(1.01; 1.63)
1.94 x(1.39; 2.71)
1.66 x(1.17; 2.35)
1.27 x(1.06; 1.51)
1.14 x(1.06; 1.50)
1.90 x(1.30; 2.77)
2.03 x(1.28; 3.24)
1.39 x(1.09; 1.77)

Note. ɯ – ɪ < 0,05

The largest number of non-tumor diseases with reliably confirmed connection with the dose
determined in the dose subcohort 0.25–0.32 Gy. Statistically significant RR was identified for thyroid
disease, cataracts, coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, gastritis, duodenitis, diseases ofliverand biliary tract, pancreas, urinary and prostate diseases, osteopathy, chondropatiy. With increasing
dose grows the value of RR or apocryphal risk becomes significant.
Calculation results of excesses relative and absolute risks per unit dose also evidence reliable
dose dependence of certain non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuees.
The highest reliably confirmed excess of absolute risks for evacuees at the maximum dose (0.25–
0.32 Gy) was found for coronary heart disease, essential hypertension, liver and biliary tract diseases,
the musculoskeletal system diseases. At the same time too high was also an excess of absolute risk for
diseases of the endocrine system, including thyroid gland, urogenital system, osteopathies andchondropathies2.
Calculation results of excess relative risk per unit dose also prove for reliable evidence of dose
dependence of certain non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuated population. Excess of relative risk of143

cataracts appeared to be the highest. Also rather high were excess of relative risks for diabetes,
thyroiditis, cerebrovascular, urinary tract and prostate gland diseases.
Research SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine» proved that the irradiation caused accelerated
development of age-dependent eye diseases – involutory cataracts, macular degeneration and retinal
angiopathy. Irradiation dose acts as a synergistic factor to age.
The relative risk of involutory cataract is 1.139 (1.057, 1.228) per 1 year of stay at risk, 2.895(2.529, 3.313) for 1 year of calendar year of age, 1.681 (1.033, 2.735) per 1 (d * t), where d – dose in
Gy, t – time spent at risk, years.
The relative risk of macular degeneration – 1.727 (1.498, 1.727) per 1 calendar year of age, 6.453(3.115, 13.37) per 1 (d * t), where d – dose in Gy, t – time spent at risk, years.
Dose-dependency of the retinal angiopathy incidence was shown for the first time, relative risk of
disease in the group of irradiated at a dose of 30–70 cGy in comparison with irradiated at a dose of 0.3
Gy was 1.65 (1.02, 2.67) at F2 = 4.15, p = 0.041.
Non-tumor mortality
Results of epidemiological studies of mortality from non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuees in
the period of 1988–2007 have shown a gradual increase. The highest levels were found at the stage of2003–2007 (Fig. 3.53). At the same time mortality rate of male and female almost equaled.

Fig. 3.53. The dynamics of mortality from non-tumor diseases of the adult evacuated population
by five-year period of observation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

During all periods of research cardiovascular morbidity was leading in the structure of mortality.
Its contribution in different years ranged from 45 % to 83 %. In 2007, the percentage of cardiovasculardisease increased to 89 % (Fig. 3.54).
Certain position in the mortality structure of evacuees is occupied also by diseases of the nervous
system and sensory organs, respiratory and digestive systems. Contribution of respiratory diseases indifferent years varies from 1.3 % to 12.5 %, digestive system – from 0.7 % to 8.1 %, nervous systemand sensory organs from 0.2 to 4.0 %.

144

Fig. 3.54. Structure of mortality (%) from non-tumor diseases of adult evacuees in 2007
(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)1 – cardiovascular diseases, 2 – ddiseases of the digestive system, 3 – diseases of the nervous systemand sensory organs, 4 – respiratory diseases, 5 – other diseases.

Among cardiovascular diseases first place occupied coronary heart disease (39.5 %). Thus, in2007 the death rate from coronary heart disease in men was observed in 66 % of cases, in women – in
60.3 %. Essential hypertension owned 11 %, cerebrovascular diseases – 3.4 %. Cardiovascular disease,especially coronary heart disease pllays the dominant role in shaping the causes of death, at thatmortality of evacuees (11.8±0.22 per 103 person-years) at the stage of 2003–2007 from cardiovasculardiseases in general exceeds the initial rate of 1988–1992 (6.9±0.2 per 103 person-years) almost 2 times.
The mortality rate of essential hypertension during the first three periods stayed almost equal andsignificantly increased at the stage of 2003–2007 (Fig. 3.55).

Fig. 3.55. The dynamics of mortality from essential hypertension of adult evacuees by five-year period of
observation (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

A significant increase of mortality was also noted from diseases of the nervous system andsensory organs, respiratory diseases, mainly due to chronic bronchitis with emphysema and diseases ofthe digestive system mostly due to liver disease, biliary tract and pancreas. Mortality from diseases ofthe endocrine system was mainly stipulated by diabetes.
Indices of mortality from urogenital diseases, musculoskeletal system, skin and subcutaneous
tissue diseases, mental disorders were minimal throughout the study period.

145

Analysis of mortality by gender showed a higher level of indices in men. However, at the stage of2003–2007 the total mortality of men and women became equal (see Fig. 3.53).
The mortality significantly depended on age. In persons under 40 years at all stages it wassignificantly lower compared with older age. However, its gradual increase recorded in both cohorts.
The highest level was recorded in 2003–2007.
The greatest difference in mortality were found for cardiovascular diseases. In persons of 40 andolder the mortality from this class of diseases, as well as from essential hypertension and coronary heartdisease in 2003–2007 was significantly higher against all the previous stages. Mortality from
cerebrovascular disease was almost identical in all periods of study (Fig. 3.56).

Fig. 3.56. The dynamics of mortality from cardiovascular diseases in adult evacuated population
by five years observation period depending on age (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

146

In persons of younger age a reliable increase in mortality has been observed only from theessential hypertension. The death rate from coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular pathology were
almost equal at all stages of research.
In both age cohorts a significant increase of mortality was also established from disease of
nervous system and sensory organs, respiratory and digestive systems (Fig. 3.57), however, at thehigher level of indices in persons of 40 years and older.

Fig. 3.57. The dynamics of mortality from diseases of the digestive system of adult evacuees by five-year
observation periods, depending on age (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine).

In addition, the olders marked significant increase of mortality from stomach and duodenum
ulcers, the youngers – from bronchial asthma.
In 1993–1997 and 2003–2007 in both age cohorts mortality from thyroid disease was registered,but in the 1993–1997 rates were higher in older persons (0.11 ± 0,03 against 0.04 ± 0,02), and in 2003–
2007 – at the age of up to 40 years (0.02 ± 0.01 against 0.007 ± 0.005). Mortality was determined bythyrotoxicosis with or without goiter.

147

A study of mortality risks from non-tumor diseases depending on the external whole body
exposure established reliable dependency on certain nosologies. According to estimates of absolute,
relative risks and their excesses the closest connection was found to cardiovascular diseases, including
coronary heart disease, digestive and urinary tract diseases (especially prostate diseases). The maximum
value of absolute and relative risks of mortality from coronary heart disease registered in the dose rangeof 0.2–0.249 Gy.
When determining the absolute excess risk per dose unit (EAR for 103 person-years, Gy)
statistically significant excessn were recorded for cardiovascular diseases, including coronary heartdisease and diseases of the digestive system (Table 3.35).
In the dose range 0.25–0.32 Gy the excess absolute risk of mortality from cardiovascular diseases
was maximal. Almost the same level EAR mortality reaches separately from coronary heart disease.
Excess absolute risk of mortality from diseases of the digestive system was 2 times smaller.
Table 3.35.
Excess absolute risk of mortality for individual classes and forms in the adult evacuees in 2003-2007 at wholebody irradiation doses of 0.25-0.32 Gy (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Name of diseases

ICD-9

Excess absolute risk,
EAR for 103 person-years, Gy

Diseases of the circulatory system- Coronary heart disease
Diseases of the digestive system

390–459
412–414520–579

6.0 (3.5; 10.5)
5.8 (2.8; 12.0)
2.9 (1.9; 9.0)

The authentic excess of mortality for diseases of the endocrine system, ischemic heart disease,gastritis and duodenitis, urinary diseases, prostate cancer were established by calculations of relative
excess risk per unit dose (ERR-Gy-1) (Table 3.36).
Table 3.36.
Excess relative risk of mortality for individual classes and forms in the adult evacuees in 2003-2007 with thedoses of whole body irradiation 0.25-0.32 Gy (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine)
Name of diseases

ICD-9

excess relative risk,
ERR Gy-1

Diseases of the endocrine system
Coronary heart disease
Gastritis, duodenitis
Diseases of urinary system
Diseases of the prostate gland

240–279
412–414535
581–599
600–608

1.50 (1.21; 1.85)
3.12 (2.23; 4.38)
2.19 (1.54; 3.12)
2.99 (2.04; 4.37)
3.42 (2.14; 5.47)

Apparently, the highest excess relative risk per unit dose was set for coronary heart disease,prostate and urinary tract diseases. Excess of deaths from diseases of the endocrine system was almost 2
times lower.
Presented results of evaluation of dose-dependent effects of non-cancer morbidity and mortality
from non-tumor diseases in the adult evacuees are not conclusive, inasmuch as require additional
studies aimed to determine the impact of so-called complex mix of factors – age, bad habits, unhealthy
working conditions, insufficient nutrition and motor activity, psychosocial stress and more. However, it
can be argued that irradiation of thyroid doses exceeding 0.3 Gy (especially 2.0 Gy and above), as
wellas external whole body radiation doses higher than 0.05 Gy (particularly 0.25 Gy and above) arepromoting the development of dose-dependent effects on certain non-tumor diseases. These data areconsistent with the studies carried out in other countries (Russia, Belorussia, Japan) on radiationexposed contingents [3–5].

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3.3. Early and long-term effects associated with irradiation
3.3.1 Acute radiation syndrome
In 1986 a diagnosis acute radiation syndrome (ARS) was established on 237 individuals. After athorough retrospective analysis (in 1989) the real number of victims with such diagnosis decreased to
134 persons. Of these 28 patients died during the first three months after the accident. Within 25 years
monitoring after the accident 39 people died, who had lived in Ukraine (Fig. 3.58).

Fig. 3.58. Dynamics of the number of people who have suffered acute radiation syndrome as a result of theChernobyl accident (ARS – acute radiation syndrome; ARS NC – non-confirmed acute radiation syndrome)according to the data of SI «SCRM of AMS of Ukraine».

Total (without ARS distribution of confirmed and unconfirmed) the most frequent causes ofdeath were cancer (15 cases) and death from cardiovascular complications (12 cases). Among otherreasons of fatality were marked liver cirrhosis, pulmonary tuberculosis (quickly progressing form),
encephalitis, fat embolism after a broken leg, accidents, traumas (Table 3.37).
Within the 25 years of studies the functional status of major organs and body systems,
metabolism and homeostasis in this category of people were investrigated, a comprehensive assessmentof their health, mental and physical performance was given, risk factors development and peculiaritiesof stochastic and non-stochastic pathology were identified, and the system of rehabilitation of patients
after ARS was developed.
Those who underwent ARS and remain alive, are suffering from chronic diseases of internalorgans and systems (from 5–7 to 10–12 diagnoses at a time). In the first five years after the accident a
sharp increase was seen in diseases of cardiovascular, digestive, nervous and hepatobiliary systems. In
the next 20 years, growth was much lower, but in 25 years after the accident percentage of patients withsomatic pathology reaches 85–100%. (Fig. 3.59).

149

Table 3.37.
Causes of death of patients diagnosed with ARS, who were under the supervision of RCRM
Causes of death

Cardiovascular disease
Oncological and oncohematologicaldiseases
Somatic and neurological disease, infections
Injuries and accidents
Total

0

Number of deaths with the ARS grade
1
2
3

Total

5
8

3
2

2
3

2
2

12
15

2
2
17

1
2
8

3

1
1
6

7
5
39

8

Fig. 3.59. The frequency of non-cancer diseases in people who have suffered acute radiation syndrome(data of «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»).
Table 3.38.
Cases of cancer and hematologic malignancies in patients who had undergone ARS
Disease
Myelodysplastic syndrome
Acute myelomonoblast leukemia
Hypoplasy of hemopoiesis
Colon cancer
Stomach cancer
Cancer of the thyroid gland
Kidney cancer
Cancer of the larynx
Lung cancer
Prostate cancer
Nevrynoma of mandible
Soft tissue sarcoma of the hip
Basalioma of head
Bladder cancer
Maxillary sinus cancer

Number of
cases
3
1
1
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

cases

total quantity
deaths

5

5

16

10

Cancers were mainly solid tumors of different localization (Table 3.38). Five cases of malignant
blood diseases realized in the first 10 years after the accident, and in the next 15 years development of150

solid tumors took pllace. At that the age of 53 % of patients died from malignant tumors andcardiovascular diseases was lower than the average life expectancy in Ukraine.
Typical radiation cataract developed in 24 patients in post-accident years: in 10 persons with
ARS of 3rd grade of gravity, in 8 people with 2nd grade of ARS, in 3 people with ARS of 1st grade and in
3 people with non-confirmed ARS (ARS NC). Virtually all cases of radiation cataracts (96 %) realized
during the first 15 years after exposure (Fig. 3.60). The study of lens pathology showed that beamcataracts are more likely to be stochastic effects of irradiation than deterministic.

Fig. 3.60. Number of new cases of radiation cataract at the stages of observation.

The prevalence of radiation cataract in the remote period after irradiation increased depending on
the logarithm of dose and time of stay at risk.
Dynamic surveillance of hematopoietic system of ARS convalescents in the dose range from 1 to
3 Gy in early and remote post-accident period showed that in the bone marrow and peripheral blood
gradual normalization of quantitative indices took place, while maintaining numerous qualitative
irregularities in cellular elements at the level of nucleus and cytoplasm (Fig. 3.61–3.64).
The degree of irregularities in the nucleus of cells is a prognostic criterion of injury caused byionizing radiation. These materials correlated with the basic laws of radiobiology and showed that thehigher dose absorbed, the greater was the cell cycle delay connected with the loss of not only stem cells
from bone marrow, but also a part of commited cells and, partially, interphase cell death.

Fig. 3.61. Photomicrograph of bone marrow
cytological preparation of the patient St-ARS.
Hypogranulyar myelocyte, hypogranulyar stabneutrophils, vacuolized promonocyte, degranulationof eosinophilic granulocytes.
Colouring by Romanovsky-Gimza. u 1000.

Fig. 3.62. Photomicrograph of bone marrow
cytological preparation of the patient St-ARS.
Vacuolized eosinophilic myelocyte. Colouring
by Romanovsky-Gimza. u 1000.

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Fig. 3.63. Photomicrograph of bone marrow cytologicalpreparation of the patient M-ARS.
Toxogenic granularity of myelocytes, and metamyelocyte
and stab neutrophil. Partial degranulation of thecytoplasm area of stab neutrophil. Colouring by
Romanovsky-Gimza. u1000.

Fig. 3.64. Photomicrograph of bone marrow
cytological preparation of the patient Syd.-ARS.
Vacuolization of cytoplasm of polichromatophilenormoblast. Colouring by Romanovsky-Gimza. u1000.

In young cells capable to mitotic division changes in chromatin structure were marked as a flaky
like mass, and in the cells that lost the ability to divide a hypercondensation of chromatin was
registered, often with the formation of 1–3 local electron-transparent areas. These characteristics were
inherent to cells in apoptosis. In the cytoplasm of part of granulocytes primary and secondary granules
were found, but more often met degranulated cell with vacuolated cytoplasm. Sometimes vacuoles even
deformed nucleus of granulocytes (Fig. 3.65–3.67).
In bone marrow there were islands of erythropoiesis, which differ from the norm by a shortage oferythroid elements around macrophages. There were changes in megacariocyte branch of hematopoiesis
that were expressed by platelet maturation disorders, vacuolization and loss of mucopolysaccharides.

Fig. 3.65. Electron photomicrograph of patient M-v.
Groups of neutrophils. Vacuolization of cytoplasm.
Partial deformation of nuclei. x 15000.

Fig. 3.66. Electron photomicrographof patient M-v.
A plot of neutrophil. Degenerative changes in
the nucleus and cytoplasm. Large nucleolus in
the nucleus of neutrophil. x 7500.

Fig. 3.67. Electron photomicrograph of patient M-v.
Erythropoiesis islet, macrophage in contact with only one
erythropoetic cell. x 15000.

Terms of bone marrow restoration is 1–3 years and to trace them in the dynamics continues to be ofintense interest of scientists. Transition to recovery demonstrates the appearance of increased numbers ofyoung generations of cell in the bone marrow and alternation in trepanobiopsy samples of bone marrow
hypo- and hyperplastic areas. Such processes of bone marrow regeneration, including a comprehensive
analysis of the morphofunctional indices may evolve in several ways, namely: a) towards a full recovery

152with normalization of peripheral blood, b) by hypoplastic way with residual cytopenia and c) bone marrow
suppression with pancytopenia and development of onco-hematological diseases in the future.
In the post-accident period in ARS convalescents and persons with unconfirmed ARS various
hematological syndromes were observed, usually associated with a lower content of mature peripheral
blood cells. The frequency of cytopenia in convalescents of 1st – 3rd grades ARS was higher than in thegroup with non-confirmed ARS (Fig. 3.68).

Fig. 3.68. The frequency of hematological syndromes in ARS convalescents and patients with ARS NC
in the remote period after exposure (data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»).
** – Reliable difference, p<0,01

Fig. 3.69. The frequency of granulocytopenia (A), lymphocytopenia (B), thrombocytopenia (C)and erythrocytopenia (D) at the stages of observation of ARS convalescents and patients with ARS NC(data of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»).

153

High frequencies cytopenia in the first 5 years after exposure changed by the tendency todecrease in subsequent years. Within 25 years the frequency of all hematologic syndromes in ARS
convalescents was significantly higher than in the ARS NC (Fig. 3.69).
In collaboration with scientists from Germany an international computer database was created forsurvey of persons exposed to radiation from the Chernobyl accident, and from other radiological incidents.
The database contains 2,390 histories of ARS convalescents and persons with non-confirmed ARS.
3.3.2. Radiation cataracts and other eye pathology
Before the Chernobyl accident radiation cataract was assumed to occur when a dose load was notless than 2 Gy. But in 1990 already there were reports about the appearance of cataracts at lower doses.
Forecast of 1992, which predicted specific peak of radiation cataract in 1997, was fully justified in two
independent studies of radiation cataract in the sufferers of the Chernobyl disaster – the study based on
Clinical-Epidemiological Registry (CER) of RCRM and international research UACOS.
There are currently 223 known cases of radiation cataract with a typical clinical picture. The first
results of UACOS study showed the possible existence of threshold, but at much lower levels than
2 Gy, for some age groups of approximately 0.1 Gy. The threshold depends on the form of cataracts andcan not be higher than 0.7 Gy.
Analysis of survey results based on the CER showed that the typical radiation cataracts occur atdoses less than 0.1 Gy, the absolute risk of radiation cataract dependent on dose after being at risk for 5
years is shown in Fig. 3.70.

Fig. 3.70. The absolute risk of radiation cataract depending on dose after being at risk for 5 years.

Simulation of radiation cataract revealed that radiation caused by additive-relative risk ofradiation cataract is 3.451 (1.347, 5.555) per 1 Gy, p<0.05. The development of cataract is also
influenced by the duration of radiation. The threshold dose for radiation cataract in this study was not
fixed; the latent period can exceed 22 years. These studies and mathematical modelling evidence for theview on the radiation cataract as the stochastic effects of radiation exposure.
Results of the international «Pittsburgh Project» and conducted in parallel with it, Ivankiv
prolonged study showed that the initial lens changes occur in pediatric population at very low doselevels caused by radiation contamination of soils.
In sufferers of the Chernobyl disaster two new forms of radiation retinopathy were described –«chestnut syndrome» (early and late) and «the syndrome of the radiation grating».

154

There are also new radiogenic effects, with signs of deterministic: The functioning of the eye as a complex of receptors is accompanied by generation of
permanent potential of the retina. Radiation exposure violates the generation of this potential;
threshold dose is 200 mSv [5].
 Radiation exposure causes dose-related decrease in ability to accommodation. Threshold forthis effect is a dose of 150 mSv [6].
3.3.3. Immunological effects
Investigation of the immune system, which began in RCRM in 1987, relied on the existing
experience of the world radiobiology. Study of the impact of small doses of ionizing radiation on thehuman immune system, faces a number of difficulties associated with the need for distinguish radiation
effects from the complex of several negative environmental factors, dependence of pathologicalchanges from the ratio of isotopic spectrum, duration of exposure and routes of radionuclides,
peculiarities of tissue, organ and individual radiosensitivity.

Fig. 3.71. The frequency of secondary immunologic deficiency in affected by the Chernobyl accident.

Investigation of frequency of violations of immune function (Fig. 3.71) in more than 165,000
affected of different categories in the remote period after the accident show the significant growth,which was the most pronounced in clean-up workers. Changes in the immune system of ARS
convalescents, which were observed 5 years after irradiation, were characterized as a radiation-induced
combined immunodeficiency with suppression of functions of T-and B-chains and failure of nonspecific resistance mechanisms.
In 10 years in 32 % of patients compensatory changes appeared in the immune system, 37 %ARS patients showed deregulatory changes. Manifestations of deficiency of cellular immunity were
found in 31 % of patients. In 15–25 years after exposure a violation of differentiation of primitive
progenitor cells was revealed with increased their output in peripheral blood and reduced level ofCD123w-antigen (IL-3 receptor) expression (Fig. 3.72).
In patients suffering from acute radiation syndrome in the remote term a recovery of some
populations of immune cells was recorded – T lymphocytes, including cytotoxic T cells, B lymphocytes
and most phylogenetically older populations – natural killer cells. Dose dependent disturbances of
subpopulations and their functional activity retained, indicating the existence of certain exhaustion of
the compensatory reserve of cell subpopulations. For the total population of CD34+ cells correlation155

coefficient reaches significant – 0.48. This conclusion is confirmed by the analysis of early progenitor
cells, shown in Fig. 3.73.

Fig. 3.72. Changes in the immune system of patients who sufferedfrom acute radiation syndrome during post-accident period.

Fig. 3.73. Histograms of the number of early CD34+117+ progenitor cells dependency
on radiation dose 20 years after the acute radiation syndrome.

Study the effects of remote period in the range of low and medium doses faces a number ofdifficulties associated with the presence of somatic and psychosomatic diseases. Formation of theimmunological effects in the range of low doses is affected by the following main factors:
 Non-lethal radiation-induced damage to cells (proliferation of functionally defective
offspring; Spreading effect due to humoral factors);
 Modification of the immune response (neuro-immune factors, lipid metabolism andconcomitant pathology); Adaptive system responses (a shift of cell cycle phases to radio-resistant; graded dosedependent engaging of immature cells production and non-specific activation).
The results show the changes in responses of leukocytes and particularly lymphocytes to nonspecific mitogens, tissue and microbial antigens in the Chernobyl clean-up workers with chronic
somatic pathology of remote period – chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic hepatitis and156

discirculatory encephalopathy. In the formation of certain definite effects changes in expression of
surface activation antigens of lymphocytes – CD25, CD71, and, to a lesser extent, – HLA-DR were
established. Depending on the existing pathology both the decline and increase of responsiveness werebeing detected. The most probable mechanisms of such changes should include the preservation of nonrepaired radiation-caused damages as well as the chain of secondary effects such as activation-induced
apoptosis of antigen-reactive cells and non-specific immunosuppression.
Significantly shorter telomeres in groups of clean-up workers and staff of 30-km zone was foundas well as the inverse relationship between telomere length, the entry of cells in the early stages of
apoptosis, on one hand, and a history of radiation group, on the other hand (Fig. 3.74).

Fig. 3.74. Scattering diagram with regression direct index of relative telomere lengthand percentage of CD95+ cells On the abscissa axis: RTL – relative telomere length (%), on the axisof ordinate – number of CD95+ cells (%).

At that, a sufficiently high fraction of cells expressing anti-apoptotic protein bcl-2 is conserved,
and in vitro action of apoptosis inducer verapamil does not significantly change the average indices ofthis fraction, indicating a possible heterogeneity of cell populations by telomere length and the entrance
to apoptosis.
The influence of radiation and oxygen radicals can increase gene expression of cytomegalovirus(CMV), which may be the main cause of increased CMV-seropositivity, CMV reactivation among theChernobyl clean-up workers and ARS convalescents. Growth of CMV infectivity has also been linked
to increased rates of somatic diseases, especially chronic gastritis, bronchitis, and various types ofarthritis among CMV-positive patients.
The existence of significant homology between IgHV genes in lymphoid cells of patients with
CLL with antimicrobial and antiviral antibodies was found. Viral and bacterial infections in synergy
with autoantigens or apoptotic cells can trigger CLL. Findings that in Chernobyl-affected patients with
CLL antibodies are homological to antibodies that react with viral and bacterial components, isevidence of possible contribution of infections in CLL pathogenesis even after almost a quarter ofcentury after the nuclear accident.
Research whithin 24 years indicate to the existence of system-defined cellular responses in lowdose irradiation that are defined both in the early period of recovery of the immune system and inremote span of time. The study results of people affected by the Chernobyl disaster enlarge
experimental radiobiological data and come to an agreement with them, which proves the leading valueof radiation factor in the formation of immunological effects.

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3.4. Effect of the complex factors of the Chernobyl disaster on public health3.4.1. Neuropsychiatric effects
Long-term neuropsychiatric consequences of the Chernobyl disaster are recognized in the world[8], although the causes of their origin continue to be discussed. Recently received numerous new dataon the pathogenesis of cerebral effects of even small doses, are schematically shown in Fig. 3.75:
violation of neurogenesis in the hippocampus of adults, changes in gene expression profiles,
neuroinflammation reactions, alteration of neurosignalling, apoptotic cell death, cell death and injuries
due to secondary lesions and others. These disorders, along with long and well-known «vascular-glial
union» are likely to explain the mechanisms of radiosensitivity of the brain.

Fig. 3.75. Pathogenesis of radiation brain damage after irradiation at doses up to 5 Sv.
Table 3.39.
Dose dependency of radiocerebral effects
Dose

50í100 Gy>2í4 Sv>1 Sv>0,3 Sv>0,15í0,5 Sv>1,3í1,5 Gy>1,3í1,5 Gy>1,3í1,5 Gy>0,1 Gy

158

EffectAdults (whole body irradiation)
Radiation brain damage (orthodox)
Radiation neurological manifestations (A.K. Guskova, I. N. Shakirova, 1989; A.K. Guskova, 2007)
Neurophysiological and neuroimaging biomarkers of radiation and postradiation
encephalopathy [SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»]x Neuropsychiatric, neurophysiology, neyroimmune, neuropsychological and neuroimaging
dose-related effects [SI «RCRM AMS of Ukraine»]x Postradiation cognitive deficits [SI «RCRM AMS of Ukraine»]x Excessive dose-dependent increase in mortality from diseases of the circulatory system(McGeoghegan et al., 2008)
Epidemiological data on radiation risks of cerebrovascular disease (Ivanov et al., 2006;
SI «SCRM NAMN Ukraine»; Shimizu et al., 1999, 2010; Preston et al., 2003)
CHILDREN (head exposure)
Remote cerebral effects (Ron et al., 1982; Yaar et al., 1982)
Brain tumors (Sadetzki et al., 2005)
Schizophrenia (Gross, 2004)
Cognitive deficits (Hall et al., 2004)

0,06–0,31 Gy
fetal external exposure
0,28–0,87 Gy
fetal external exposure
The dose to the fetus > 20 mSv and thyroid
gland in utero > 300 mSv (accident at anuclear reactor)
The dose to the fetus > 10 mSv and thyroid
gland in utero > 200 mSv (accident at anuclear reactor)

IN UTEROAt the 8th-15th week of gestation – mental retardation(Otake et al., 1996)
At the 16th-25th week of gestation – mental retardation(Otake et al., 1996)
At the 8th week of gestation or later – neurophysiological andcognitive dose-related effects [SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine»]
At the 16th-25th week of gestation – neurophysiological andcognitive dose-related effects [SI «RCRM AMS of Ukraine»]

Modern data on the dose dependency of radiocerebral effects are summarized in Table 3.39.
Dose-related cognitive and neurophysiological disorders were revealed after prenatal exposure
from the Chernobyl disaster in terms of more than 8 weeks of gestation at doses above 20 mSv to thefetus and greater than 300 mSv to the thyroid gland in utero, and at 16th–25th week – more than 10 mSv
and more than 200 mSv, respectively. Radiation exposure in childhood is associated with dosedependent cognitive decline in adulthood and psychological disorders, including schizophrenia, later inlife. Remote cerebral radiation injury was observed after the impact of 0.1–1.3 Gy to the brain inchildhood. Exposed in utero and in 0-1st year of life require active surveillance in connection with anincreased risk of various neuropsychiatric diseases.
Radiation-associated effects in adults were demonstrated at doses greater than 0.15–0.25 Sv.
Dose-related neuropsychiatric, neurophysiological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging deviation
were found after irradiation at doses greater than 0.3 Sv, and neurophysiological and neuroimaging
markers – at doses above 1.0 Sv. Post radiation brain damage was mainly localized in the frontaltemporal regions of the dominant hemisphere and involved both white and gray matter of the brain.
After irradiation at doses more than 0.3–1.0 Sv such structural and functional brain damages werecharacteristic: the atrophy of frontal cortex and temporal lobe, changes in subcortical structures andconductor paths, especially in the dominant hemisphere. Exposure in adulthood is a risk factor forchronic fatigue syndrome as predisposition to neurodegeneration, cognitive deficits and otherneuropsychiatric disorders, accelerated aging of CNS, and a new model of schizophrenia.
Official (registry) information on mental disorders underestimate the real picture about one orderthrough passive surveillance and reluctance of mentally ill to address medical help. In the most recently
released evidence-based psychiatric epidemiological study of clean-up workers using a structured
international psychiatric interview (Composite International Diagnostic Interview, WHO-CIDI) wasestablished that pursuant to «effect a healthy liquidator» (selection of mentally healthy people to cleanup works), clean-up workers before the accident had significantly lower prevalence of anxiety disorders
and alcohol abuse (Table 3.40).
Table 3.40.
Mental health before the Chernobyl accident: «effect of healthy liquidator»(adapted from Loganovsky, Havenaar, Tintle, Guey, Kotov, Bromet, 2008)
Disorders

Mood disorders
Anxiety disorders other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
PTSD
Alcohol abuse
Periodic explosive disorder
Suicide ideation

Clean-up workers
n=295

Control n=397

11 (3,7%)
5 (1,7%)4 (1,4%)25 (8,6%)
11 (3,8%)
5 (1,7%)27 (6,8%)23 (5,8%)
1 (0,8%)62 (15,6%)
14 (3,5%)
8 (2,0%)After the accident among clean-up workers a significantly increased prevalence of depression(18.0% and 13.1% of control) and suicide ideation (9.2% and 4.1 %) was revealed. However, this did

159not apply to alcohol abuse and periodic explosive disorder. Within the last year before the interview inclean-up workers prevalence of depression (14.9 % and 7.1 %), PTSD (4.1 % and 1.0 %) and headache(69.2 %, and 12.4 %) was increased (Fig. 3.76, 3.77).
Note. After correcting for age in 1986, liquidators and controls differed only anxiety disorder –adjusted odds ratio (AOR) AOR = 0.3; 95 % CI 0.1, 0.9; p = 0,03) and alcohol abuse (AOR = 0.6; 95 %CI 0.3, 0.9; p = 0,02).

Fig. 3.76. The prevalence of mental disorders in clean-up workers of the Chernobyl NPP accident(total since 1986)(Adapted from Loganovsky, Havenaar, Tintle, Guey, Kotov, Bromet, 2008) [9]The probability of differences determined based on the adjusted odds ratio according to age in 1986 and the debutof disorder before the Chernobyl disaster.

Fig. 3.77. The prevalence of mental disorders in in clean-up workers of the Chernobyl NPP accident(last 12 months)(Adapted from Loganovsky, Havenaar, Tintle, Guey, Kotov, Bromet, 2008) [9].
The probability of differences determined based on the adjusted odds ratio according to age in 1986 and thedebut of disorder before the Chernobyl disaster.

160

Clean-up workers with depression and PTSD lost more days of capacity for work than patientswith the same disorder in control group. The degree of the disaster impact was associated with theseverity of somatic symptoms and PTSD. Thus, in the liquidators long-term adverse effects of theChernobyl disaster in relation to mental health were revealed.
Based on analysis of data of CER RCRM clinical and epidemiological evidences were received
about the increasing frequency of mental disorders (organic, depression, etc.) and cerebrovascularpathology in clean-up workers with existing radiation risks at doses >0.25–0.5 Sv.
In contrast to widespread erroneous ideas about the excessive use of the diagnosis «vegetativevascular dystonia» as a «token» of being under the influence of radiation, this diagnosis in the firstyears after the Chernobyl accident was found only about in a quarter of clean-up workers registered in
the system of CER. As it is seen from Fig. 3.78, diagnostics of vegetative-vascular dystonia during
post-accident years significantly reduced and at present amounts to only about 5 % of a representative
sample of clean-up workers.
Gradually after the crash in clean-up workers the prevalence of cerebrovascular disease –especially chronic cerebral ischemia (I67.8), cerebral atherosclerosis (I67.2) and to a lesser extent,
hypertensive encephalopathy (I67.4). significantly increased.

Fig. 3.78. The dynamics of cerebrovascular disorders in the cohort of clean-up workers registeredin the system of Clinical-Epidemiological Registry of SI «RCRM of AMS of Ukraine».

Current rating (2008–2010) of mental health of randomized sampling from representative cohorts
of clean-up workers and evacuees from the exclusion zone, who are registered in the CER, confirmed along-term psychiatric consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. In the clean-up workers and evacuees
there are much more mental and behavioural disorders in general, vascular dementia, mental andbehavioural disorders due to alcohol consumption, dysthymia and PTSD. The frequency of organic
depressive disorder, organic anxiety disorder, organic emotionally labile (asthenic) disorder and organic
personality disorder is increased among clean-up workers.
Neuropsychiatric consequences of the Chernobyl disaster are etiologically heterogeneous as aresult of the combined radiation and non-radiation accident factors, especially stress, as well as social161change and traditional risk factors. Meanwhile, a dose-related increase in cerebrovascular pathology inclean-up workers of 1986–1987, in particular, cerebral atherosclerosis, especially hypertension
encephalopathy was established (Fig. 3.79.).

Fig. 3.79. Relative risk of cerebrovascular disorders in males clean-up workers of 1986–1987 with different
doses of irradiation. Control – clean-up workers with doses <0.05 Gy (CER data,1992–2004).
(Adapted from L.I. Krasnykova, V.A. Buzunov, 2008) [10]. Indicated the values of the significant relative risks.

The growth other neuropsychiatric diseases in clean-up workers of 1986–1987 was established,including dose-dependent increase of vertigo and vestibular disorders frequency.
According to SRU, a dose-related increase in diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs,vegetative-vascular dystonia, essential hypertension and cerebrovascular pathology in clean-up workers
of 1986–1987 was also found (Fig. 3.80).
Excesses relative risks (ERR) per 1 Gy for neuropsychiatric diseases were established in clean-up
workers of 1986–1987 according to SRU and CER data (Fig. 3.81).
Alcohol addiction syndrome is prevalent among 26.8 % of clean-up workers of 1986–1987 (inpopulation 15.6 %, p <0.001), and another 17.2 % of clean-up workers abuse alcohol. In other words, mental
and behavioral disorders due to alcohol use were found in 44 % of liquidators. The link was revealed
between exposure to the complex factors of the Chernobyl disaster and the development of alcohol
dependency syndrome, which occurs secondary, due to existing mental disorders in clean-up workers.
In the prenatally exposed children more nervous system diseases and mental disorders were
found. They had a lower overall rate of intellectuality (IQ) due to lower verbal IQ and increased
frequency of disharmonious intelligence compared with the unexposed group of peers. When thisdisharmony exceeded 25 points, it correlated with radiation dose of fetus. No differences in verbal
intelligence were in both groups of mothers, but evacuated experienced significantly more stress eventsand had more depressive disorders, PTSD, somatoform disorders, anxiety and insomnia, social
dysfunction than mothers from Kyiv.
Despite the relatively low fetal doses of irradiation during the radiation accident at a nuclear
reactor with the release of iodine radionuclides into the environment brain damage is possible not onlyat the most critical period of cerebrogenesis (8th and 15th weeks of gestation) but in later pregnancy,
when thyroid doses in utero are the highest (Fig. 3.82).

162

Fig. 3.80. Relative risk of neuropsychiatric diseases in males clean-up workers of 1986–1987 with different dosesof irradiation. Control – clean-up workers with doses <0.05 Gy (data of SRU, 1986–2001).(Adapted from
V.A.Buzunov, L.I. Krasnykova, E.A. Pirogova, etc.) [11]. Indicated the values of the significant relative risks.

Fig. 3.81. Excess relative risk of neuropsychiatric pathology per 1 Gy in males clean-up workers
of 1986–1987 with different doses of irradiation (data of SRU, 1986–2001 and CER, 1992–2004).
(Adapted from V.A.Buzunov, L.I. Krasnykova, E.A. Pirogova, etc.) [11].

163Fig. 3.82. Conditional image of relationship between critical periods of cerebrogenesis and growthin thyroid doses in utero by a model of ICRP-88 in in utero exposed children from the Chernobyl disasterarea (gray shapes correspond to the degree of vulnerability of brain irradiation by radioiodine)(adapted from Loganovsky et al., 2008 [12]).

Based on extensive neuropsychiatric research with reliable personal dosimetry guidance, thefindings regarding damages of the dominant (left) hemisphere of the brain after intrauterine exposure
from the Chernobyl disaster were revealed.
Though, no excess of severe mental retardation, persons exposed in utero had moreneuropsychiatric disorders, neurological signs of destruction of the brain left hemisphere, lower rates ofgeneral and verbal IQ, disharmonic development of intellect through lower verbal IQ, disorganized
EEG patterns, excess lateralized to the left frontal-temporal area of delta- and beta-spectral powerbioelectric activity of brain with depression of theta- and alpha-power, and interhemispheric inversion
of processing visual information. Mothers’ mental health disorders, stress, and prenatal exposure led tocontribute to these effects, along with traditional risk factors.
The main neuropsychiatric lessons of the Chernobyl disaster defined in the framework of theNATO Science for Peace and Security: negative psychological effects (radiation anxiety and panic
reaction) and psychosomatic disorders, «victimization» with «panic escape to the disease», disability andsocial inactivity, inadequate social protection; socio-psychological and radiological problematic ofresettlement; peculiarities of the «postradiation PTSD» with hypochondriac fixation of the future (anxiety
about possible oncopathology, congenital abnormalities in children and others); effects on the developing
brain, long-term mental health disturbances in adults; potential radiocerebral effects; suicides.
3.4.2. Cardiovascular disease
At the global level is recognized that in most large-scale nuclear accident at Chernobyl NPP
priority impact on the health of all categories sufferers belongs to cardiovascular diseases. The
relationship between radiation dose and pathogenic, clinical features, morbidity and mortality fromcardiovascular diseases remain one of the main research areas. According to the Scientific Registry of
Cardiology among cardiovascular diseases of 18,669 clean-up workers prevail hypertensive andcoronary heart disease. Their share in the structure of hospitalization increased 4 times (Fig. 3.83). The
most critical category consists of clean-up workers 1986.

164

Fig. 3.83. Shares of coronary heart disease (CHD) and essential hypertension (EH)in the structure of causes of clean-up workers hospitalization at 2009.

Fig. 3.84. Structure of clean-up workers mortality.

According to the analysis of pathologoanatomic investigations of 988 deceased clean-up workers,
essential hypertension (EH) with coronary heart disease (CHD) cause more deaths than all cancer
diseases in total (Fig.3.84).
3.4.3. Bronchopulmonary pathology
Results of long-term (1996–2009) pulmonological investigations of 16,133 clean-up workers of
1986–1987 in the Outpatient Clinic of Radiation Register of RCRM of AMS of Ukraine testify tosignificant steady increase in cases of respiratory diseases.

165

Among 7,665 male clean-up workers of 1986–1987 with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease(COPD) and radiation dose above 250 mSv relationship between probable relative risk of COPD,
chronic bronchitis and exposure was dose-dependent (Fig. 3.85).

Fig. 3.85. Relative risks (RR) and 95 % confidence interval of COPD morbidityof Chernobyl clean-up workers of 1986-1987.

The course of COPD in clean-up workers is characterized by fast development fibroplasticchanges in the lungs and bronchial mucosa with progressive deformation of the latter, hyporeaktivity of
exacerbations and disorders of bronchial secretion, accompanied by a lack of inflammatory response inbronchial mucosa with redistribution of cells in T-lymphocyte system. COPD in clean-up workers is acomponent of multiple organ pathology, which is essentially caused by disturbances in the integrative
systems of homeostasis.
Character of disregenerative changes in bronchial epithelium of clean-up workers, particularly
expressive pathology of cambial cells and the presence of cells with changed phenotype, suggests toconsider outlined contingents a high risk group to develop endobronchial neoplasms. In cases of COPD
the patterns of normal expression of EGFR, HER2 and the tendency to higher expression of Ki-67 andthe low level of Ctk+, Vim+, and BER-EP4+ cells. Lung cancer is characterized by high expression of
Ki-67+ and HER2+ epithelial cells in combination with the low number of EGFR+, Ctk+Vim+BER-EP4+,
CD25+ and HLA-DR+ cells.
3.4.4. Pathology of the digestive tract
Diseases of the digestive system takes 2–3 rank place among non-tumorous diseases inindividuals affected by the Chernobyl disaster. Cohort study of morbidity, disability and mortality ofChernobyl clean-up workers show persistent negative changes in health – after 24 years diseases ofdigestive system took top spot (31.1 %) in the structure of non-cancer disease, and the third place in theperformance of disability indices (10.3%).
Gastrointestinal system in the conditions of Chernobyl accident is the main target-tissue fordamaging factors of radiation and non-radiation nature. Monitoring of the digestive system in clean-up
workers showed that erosive-ulcerative pathology of the stomach and duodenum and liver disease are
the most common.
According to CER data, erosive-ulcerative pathology of the stomach and duodenum in clean-up
workers in the post-accident years increased from 119.1 ‰ in 1993–1994 to 133.1 ‰ in 2007–2009 andwas higher than the official statistics (68.3 ‰ – 96.6 ‰) (Fig. 3.86).
Epidemiological «case-control» study showed higher risk of erosive-ulcerative pathology in the
Chernobyl clean-up workers with absorbed dose >25 cGy (OR = 4.67 with CI 2.84–7.71) in a broad age
range (20–59 years).

166

Fig. 3.86. The incidence of erosive-ulcerative pathologies of stomach and duodenum in the Chernobyl clean-up
workers (CUW) and residents of 4th contaminated zone (CZ) during the observation periods.

Ionizing radiation and other negative factors of the Chernobyl accident influence on theorganization of all structural components of the gastric mucosa in clean-up workers of all ages. Thesechanges can be characterized as induced pathomorphosis characterized by atypical clinical course withdominated astheno-vegetative syndrome, association with Helicobacter pylori, altered secretion andautonomic regulation, combinaton with concurrent disease. Indices of basal concentrations of cortisol,
adrenocorticotropic hormone and gastrin were in direct relationship with the level of absorbed doses
above 25 cGy, which indicates a damage of local self-regulation of gastroduodenal area withdomination of gastrin mechanism acid-formation.
In the remote period after the accident (2004–2009) in clean-up workers with erosive-ulcerous
pathology of the stomach and duodenum marked atrophic changes of the stomach were revealed thatcauses a high percentage of hypo- and anacide states. Reduction of gastrin and gastric acidity was
growing since the dose increased starting with 25 cGy, the lowest value of these parameters wererecorded in irradiated in the range of 50.0–99.9 cGy. Changes of personality revealed, characterized byhigh levels of anxiety, presence of mental and emotional stress and lack of neuro-psychologicalmechanisms that relieve anxiety.
From the second decade after the accident a marked increase in the number of detected cases ofchronic hepatitis and cirrhosis was noticed. Between 1992–2009 among the 2,881 CER patients sufferingfrom chronic hepatitis, 70 cases of liver cirrhosis were found. The most numerous group in the nosologicalstructure of chronic diffuse liver diseases were non-alcoholic steatohepatosis (50.0 %) and steatohepatitis(36.6 %). Changes in functional state of the liver were more prominent in clean-up workers with large dosesof radiation. A direct correlation was found between the level of absorbed radiation dose and the activity of
gamma-glutamiltranspeptidase (r = 0.6, p<0,02), alaninaminotransferase (r = 0.39, p<0,02), glucose
concentration (r = 0.5, p<0,03) in serum (Fig. 3.87).
Analysis of liver functional state biochemical parameters of clean-up workers in accordance withthe dose of irradiation showed significantly increased activity of aspartataminotransferase (p<0.001)
alaninaminotransferase (p<0.05), decrease of bilirubin (p<0.05) and beta-lipoprotein (p<0.001) in cleanup workers with absorbed doses >50 cGy in comparison with the liquidators who received doses<5 cGy.

167

Fig. 3.87. Regression-correlation analysis between the level of absorbed radiation dose and the activity of serum
gamma-glutamiltranspeptidase in clean-up workers with non-alcoholic steatohepatitis and steatohepatosis.

Contrary to the notion of sustainable benign course of non-alcoholic steatohepatitis thedevelopment of this pathology in clean-up workers is progressive. Long persistent course increases thelikelihood of liver fibrosis and its final stage – cirrhosis in the remote period after the accident.
Taking into account the pathogenic features of digestive system diseases approaches to thetreatment of this pathology in Chernobyl clean-up workers were developed.
3.4.5. Hematological effects
Results of hematopoietic system monitoring of clean-up workers have shown that at the earlypost-accidental period (1986–1990) in 25 % examined in peripheral blood reduction in the number ofleukocytes (leukopenia) and in 12 % – leukocytosis were recorded, the 9.5 % had higher content oferythrocytes and hemoglobin level, 9 % – thrombocytosis, 14.5 % – lymphocytosis and 10.5 % –monocytosis. At the more remote observation periods after the accident (1991–2000) were determined:leukocytosis and leukopenia in 24 % and 19.7 % of examined, in 7.6 % – thrombocytopenia, in 2.4 % –thrombocytosis. In 15 % of cases bi- and pancytopenia were found. In 2009 remains stable percentageof patients with leucopenia, thrombocytopenia and anemia and slightly increased number of people withlymphocytosis (Fig. 3.88).

Fig. 3.88. Structure of hematological disorders in clean-up workers in dynamic observation.

For the whole period of observation at a relative normalization of quantitative indices qualitative
damages were characterized by irregularities in the nucleus and cytoplasm of the cell elements of168

hematopoiesis as hyposegmented neutrophils, vacuolization of the cytoplasm of granulocytes andlymphocytes, cytoplasmic outgrowths, toxogenic granularity.

Fig. 3.89. Ratio of qualitative disorders in hematopoietic cells among clean-up workers by observation periods.

Fig. 3.90. Accumulation of platelets.

Fig. 3.91. Abnormal megakaryocytes with partial
platelet constriction.

Among megakaryocytes the number of «old» cells increased, the presence of giant platelets, cellswith polymorphic granularity, and in part of examined – aggregates of platelet, and accumulation of
micro-makroform were found (Fig. 3.89–3.91).
Thus, not only exposure, but the whole complex of factors associated with the Chernobyl disaster
affected the health of the population, needing additional health measures to counteract that impact.

169

4. SOCIOECONOMIC AND SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER: MAJOR PROBLEMSAND PRESENT ASSESSMENTS OF POSSIBLE OPTIONSFOR THE AFFECTED AREAS DEVELOPMENT
4.1. Evaluation of economic expenses and losses related to the Chernobyl disaster
The Chernobyl disaster brought about considerable losses to the economy and social sphere not
only in the former USSR but also beyond its boundaries. The accident has caused extremely large-scale
destructions to the everyday life, environment, and industry in the numerous regions of the former
Ukrainian SSR, Belarus SSR, and Russian SFSR. The accident consequences are still producing
destructive impact onto all aspects of life in Ukraine, Belarus, and in Russian Federation:
 decreased production of the electricity consumed by economy and public;
 heavy losses suffered by agricultural and industrial facilities;
 damaged forest areas and water industry (a limited use of 5120 km2 of farmlands and4920 km2 of forests);
 significant expenses for evacuation of 116 thousand people and construction of residential
space for the people evacuated in 1986; also in 1986–1987 the following were madeavailable: almost 15 thousand apartments, hostels for over a thousand affected people, 23
thousand buildings, 800 sociocultural institutions; right after the accident, substantial funds were targeted to ensure protection of populationfrom radiation impact and minimize the threat to human life and health; huge amounts of financial aid and technical resources in the former USSR were directed tothe affected areas in order to renew life activities and industry, decontaminate theenvironment, ensure social support to the people who still have lived within the contaminatedareas, provide them with clean food and medical services; the affected people have got partial compensation for the evacuation-caused material losses,
including losses of personal property, grain crops, residential space, etc.; and all types of industrial facilities and collective farms have got compensations for the lostfinancial, material, and technical resources with the objective to renew their activity andensure employment of the evacuated people.
Overcoming the Chernobyl disaster consequences is on-going, still diverting great resources fromthe state budget, generally decelerating economic development of Ukraine, and worsening standard andquality of the entire country population’s life.
4.1.1. Evaluation of loss to the USSR economy related to the Chernobyl disasterAs per the data provided by the Ministry of Finance of the USSR the total amount of direct losses
and expenses from all sources of financial support was 9 200 million roubles (approximately USD
12.6 billion) over the period of 1986–1989.
In 1990, the expenses from the USSR state budget spent for the activities dealing with elimination of
the Chernobyl disaster consequences amounted to 3324 million roubles. Moreover, one billion roubles wereconsumed from republican budgets of the Russian SFSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belarus SSR.

170

As is well known, the following year of 1991 was a peculiar one. This was the year of the USSR
collapse. Though the USSR allocated 10300 million roubles for the liquidation activities, only a part ofthem was used; and at the end of the year it was exclusively from the state budgets of Ukraine, Belarus,
and Russian Federation.
The costs out of the ‘Assistance Fund for the Chernobyl Accident Consequences Elimination’(account No. 904920) in the amount of 544 million roubles were spent on elimination of the Chernobyl
disaster aftermath. The costs of the fund were accumulated from budget sources of the USSR,
Ukrainian SSR, and Belarus SSR, State Insurance funds, as well as voluntary contributions from natural
persons and legal entities. In 1988–1989, receipts in foreign currencies amounted to 2970 thousand
roubles, including 2200 thousand roubles in freely convertible currencies.
4.1.2. Evaluation of total economic loss to Ukraine
Total economic loss includes of several components.
The direct loss includes a loss caused by a damaged to the infrastructure located within the
Chernobyl NPP-adjacent area and within the 30-km Exclusion Zone, including the cities of Pripyat andChernobyl. Hence, valuation of the direct loss caused by outage of the national economy’s tangible
objects (objects of economy) located within the Exclusion Zone that has resulted out of the Chernobyl
accident amounts to 1010.6 million roubles (Table 4.1.).
Table 4.1.
The loss caused by outage of the national economy’s tangible objects (objects of economy) located within the
Exclusion Zone in Ukraine and taken out of use as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl NPP accident
Description of tangible object lost as a result of theChernobyl disaster

Objects and expenses for principal construction of
the Chernobyl NPP (Level ȱȱȱ)Chernobyl NPP Unit 4‘Chernobyl-2’ facility
Enterprises of various industries (11)Hard surface motorways (353 km)
Collective and state farms (16)Inter-farm enterprises (3)Facilities and networks of water supply systems,
sewerage systems, heat and power supply systems
Housing facilities State (402)
Private (2 278)
Rural houses (9 050)
Facilities of social infrastructure (150)
Total

Fixed production assets and tangible floating assets
Value, thousand
Year of evaluation
Roubles
USD

1986*

99.0

136.1

1964**
1984***
1986
1986
1986
1986

201.0
97.7
149.0
60.6
98.4
18.7

223.3
137.0
205.1
83.3
135.2
25.7

1986

12.0

16.5

1986
1986
1986
1986
-

209.8
7.1
28.2
29.1
1010.6

288.3
9.8
38.8
40.0
1339.0* In April 1986 one USD had been costing 72.75 kopecks.
** In 1964 one USD had been costing 90 kopecks.
*** In October 1984 one USD had been costing 71.3 kopecks.

In addition to the substantial loss caused by outage of the tangible objects within the Exclusion
Zone, the following types of losses were inflicted:
 losses and damages of the technical and mechanical vehicles that were used and contaminatedduring the accident consequences elimination and then disposed at ‘Rossokha’ retention site
and at ‘Buriakivka’ radwaste disposal site – 33.5 thousand roubles or USD 46.0 thousand; losses caused by resettlement of the affected people and outage of capital assets during theperiod that followed 1986;171 value of wasted housing facilities and private property located out of the Exclusion Zone –0.2 billion roubles (as per 1984 prices) or USD 2.8 billion;
 value of wasted fixed production assets located out of the Exclusion Zone – approximately
0.4 billion roubles (as per 1984 prices) or USD 5.6 billion.
So, the total direct loss amounts to USD 1 billion and 385 thousand (Table 4.2):
Table 4. 2.
The total loss within the Exclusion Zone
Type of loss
Loss of tangible objects
Disposed vehicles and equipment, activities
Total

Roubles, thousand
1010.633.5
1044.1

USD, thousand
1339.046.01385.0

The total direct loss of tangible objects and objects of economy located out of the Exclusion Zone
amounted to 0.6 billion roubles or USD 0.84 billion.
Totally, 0.601 billion roubles or USD 0.841 billion.
The total direct loss amounts (1,385+0,84)= USD 2.225 billion.
Evaluation of direct expenses. The cost of accidental and post-accidental measures wascalculated based on the total amount of finance allocated for the following types of activities: social
protection of affected people, specific medical aid, research and development, radiation monitoring,
ecological remediation of the environment; rehabilitation and RAW disposal, capital investments,
works within the Exclusion Zone, and other expenses.
According to the calculation of expenses basing on the abovementioned pattern, the total sum of
direct expenses in 1986–2010 amounts to USD 30500 million.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive State Program for the Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning and
the Shelter Object Transformation into An Ecologically Safe System for 2006–2010 determined theimplementation period to be approximately one hundred years. Financial support to all the required
activities shall be provided from the State Budget of Ukraine. The cost of activities amounts toapproximately UAH 3.5 billion or USD 470 million (USD 1 = UAH 7.5 at average during these years).
Analysis of the indirect loss.
Economic activity has been completely stopped within the areas with contamination density
exceeding 555 kBq/m2 (15 Ci/km2) and partially stopped in the sectors with contamination density
amounting to 185–555 kBq/m2 (5–15 Ci/km2). Recovery of these lands will take no less than dozens ofyears. Moreover, use of about 5000 km2 forest areas is limited. Over 1986–1991, the total loss in forest
management and wood processing industry amounted to 1.8–2.0 billion roubles (as per 1984 prices).
The reduction in coniferous powder harvesting inflicted the damage amounting to 15 million roubles.
Economic loss of the waterworks system and fishing industry in Ukraine was 2.3–3.1 billion roubles.
Hence, the annual losses caused by a disuse of the contaminated agricultural lands, forest areas,
and water resources in 1986–1991 amounted to 1.625 billion roubles (total loss is 9.75 divided by 6
years = 1.625).
Thus, in 30 yeas after the accident (till 2015) the indirect loss to the mentioned field shall amountto 1.625 ɯ 30 = 48.75 billion roubles.
Over this period, reduction in electric energy generation shall inflict damage in the amount of
20.0 billion roubles, and the loss caused by the moratorium on operating NPPs power development shallmake up 48.0 billion roubles.
Till 2015, the total amount of indirect losses shall amount to 116.75 billion roubles In 1984, at
the time of calculating the indirect loss, one USD had been costing 0.713 roubles. Therefore, total
amount of the indirect loss is USD 163.74 billion. (Table 4.3).

172

Table 4.3
Breakdown of the indirect loss inflicted by Ukraine as a result of the Chernobyl accident till 2015
Description of loss

Billion roubles

Caused by disused agricultural lands, forest areas, and water resources
Cost of non-generated electric energy
The loss caused by the moratorium on operating NPPs power development
Total(USD 1 = 0.713 roubles)

68,37
28.05
67,32
163,74In late 2001, the Chernobyl NPP operation was stopped. The nuclear power plant was finally
shutdown subject to the Memorandum between the Government of Ukraine, the Governments of the G7
Countries, and the Commission of the European Communities (Canada, Ottawa, 20 December 1995)
and as specified in the appropriate decisions taken by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The
following is the shutdown order for the Chernobyl NPP Units: Unit 1 on 30 November 1996; Unit 2 on
11 October 1991; Unit 3 on 15 December 2000.
As a result of Chernobyl NPP presheduled shutdown, it’s service life hasn’t been reached, andhence 197181600,0 MWt/hr of electric energy was non-generated. Whereas 1 KWt|hr be costing 0,03 €total costs of electric energy realization had to be amounted 5,92 billion €.
According to the world-wide experience (Leningrad, Kursk, Smolensk NPP in RussianFederation) service life of 1, 2, 3, ChNPP units (RBMK-1000) can be prolonged for 15 years overdesigned term. In addition it would permit to generate about 275940000,0 MWt/hr of electric energy
and earn about 8,28 billion € whereas 1 KWt|hr be costing 0,03 €.
Therefore total costs of electric energy realization had to be amounted 5,92+8,28=14,2 billion €.
Costs for electric energy generation (prime cost of production), costs for recovery works on unit
N2 after the fire in machinery hall, costs for change of TC have to be accounted. These costs would
amount 1,3 billion € at the designed term of service life, and 1,59 billion € at the extended one, that isamounted in total 1,3+2,09=3,39 billion €.
Thereby, losses because of non-generated electric energy due to presheduled shutdown of ChNPP
amounted to 14,2-3,39=10,81 billion €, or USD 14,51 billion (rate 1 € § USD 1,34 ɞɨɥ.ɋɒȺ).
Evaluation of Ukraine’s total economic loss. In accordance with the presented calculation
pattern (Table 4.4.), the total economic loss of Ukraine caused by the Chernobyl NPP accident amounts
to USD million. 198 ɦɥɪɞ. 402.
Table 4.4
Breakdown of the final amount of the total loss inflicted by Ukraine as a resultof the Chernobyl accident, as of 2010
No.

Expense items

1
1.1
1.2
2

Direct losses of tangible objects and objects of economy– within the Exclusion Zone
– out of the Exclusion Zone
Direct expenses to financing the activities and works aimed at elimination of
the accident consequences:– share of Ukraine in the USSR State Budget of expenditure (1986 – 1991)– expenses of independent Ukraine (1992 – 2010) including expenses todecommissioning the Chernobyl NPP and transformation of the Shelter Object
into ecologically safe system
Indirect loss (with an allowance for a 30-year period after the accident – till2015) and losses due to presheduled shutdown of ChNPP

2.1
2.2

2.3
Total

USD, million

1 385
840

5 732,512194,94
178250198402,44

The abovementioned losses are not comprehensive, as it is extremely difficult to take into
account all the indirect losses inflicted by the economy of Ukraine, for example: (a) health breakdown,

173incapacity for work, loss of income by the present and future generations of affected people; (b) future
expenses for the contaminated lands and water bodies remediation; (c) future expenses incurred due todecommissioning the Chernobyl NPP, transformation of the Shelter object into an ecologically safe
system, and radioactive waste disposal from the Shelter Object.
Conclusions and proposals
1. The Chernobyl accident demonstrated that the expenses for assuring safety at nuclear
facilities are significantly lower than those for elimination of potential accidents’consequences.
2. The Chernobyl disaster caused enormous losses, first of all, to the three affected countries,
i.e. Ukraine, Belarus Republic, and Russian Federation. For instance, the total economic lossof Ukraine amounts to approximately USD 232 billion. Among them, heavy indirect losses
were inflicted (non-production in power engineering, manufacturing, agricultural, forest,
water, and fishing industries, etc.).
3. The scope of Ukraine’s social and economic losses to be eliminated during the forthcoming
decades is incomparable with an actual economic potential of the country, and thus
preconditions a pressing necessity for international assistance.
4. The burden imposed on the Ukrainian economy by the Chernobyl accident and large scalesof the elimination activities is still among the most severe and major consequences of thedisaster. For many decades, the expenses for the Chernobyl disaster aftermath minimization
shall complicate economic development of the country and deteriorate the population’s life
quality and standard.

4.2. Current major socioeconomic, social, and psychological problems within
the radioactively contaminated areas
Chernobyl is a social tragedy. The social and psychological impact upon the public was animmense suddenness of Chernobyl. The ecological, economic, and medical consequences werepotentially predictable. Hiroshima, Cheliabinsk, nuclear polygons in Kazakhstan have provided an evermore convincing doubtful experience. Chernobyl has demonstrated an enormous devastating effect onto
the social and psychological sphere of a great number of people (up to six million people, if to include
Kyiv residents, who were actually affected, though were not officially declared as victims).
The Institute of Sociology was involved into research too late; as late as in 1992, when Ukraine
was already overwhelmed by a wave of political and socioeconomic crisis that has ‘mixed’ with theChernobyl factor.
In 1992, the first-phase opinion polls covered ten thousand victims of all categories, including
liquidators. Over next several years, the sampling included 100 individuals residing within the‘exclusion zone’, 300 individuals out of zone II and 300 ones out zone III, 300 liquidators, and 300
individuals from the ‘clean’ zone for comparison. Unfortunately, the social monitoring indicates thatsocial consequences of the Chernobyl disaster are still large-scaled and their comprehensive addressing
leaves much to be desired.
4.2.1. Fears and level of health
Fear is gradually vanishing. 47% of the whole host of the Ukrainian population were afraid of theChernobyl consequences in 1992. However, a level of fear reduced annually, and became a third,
having dropped down to 16% (Table 4.5). Also, a share of citizens, who believe ‘the Chernobyl factor’
to be the major driver in their health deterioration, reduced from 41% to 15%. A level of fear related to
the Chernobyl accident aftermath is too closely related to a level of health effects produced by the174Chernobyl consequences, the correlation coefficient is R = 0.90. It appeared that affected individuals
from zones II and III evaluated a status of their psychological health twice as good (60 and 62 scores,
respectively) as their physical health status (33 and 36 scores, respectively). The scale was from 0
scores (critical) up to 100 scores (very good). The resettled victims assessed both their health statuses as
being on equally low levels (37 and 32 scores). The same refers to ‘clean’ area residents. Levels of boththeir health types are equal – 45 scores (the data are as of 1997).
Table 4.5.
Comparison of population shares in Ukraine that have evaluated a level of their own health status and an extent
of the Chernobyl disaster impact onto their health. Ukraine. N = 1880. Years 1992 and 2010, %Health status

Very poor or poor
Satisfactory
Good or very good
Total
Health impact of theIs the major factor contributing
Chernobyl disasterto health deterioration
Is deteriorating health equally toother factors
Other factors have greater
impact than the ‘Chernobyl’ one
It’s difficult to say
Total
Scared of the Chernobyl disaster aftermath

1992

2010

Changes

17
53
30
100

22
58
20
100

+5
+5
-10
-

41

15

-26

27

36

+9

10

22

+12

22
100
47

27
100
16

+5
–
-31

Source: Sociological survey of IS NASU: Ukrainian society. – Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, 2010. – pp. 45, 55.

The main criteria, and hence the main goal, of overcoming the Chernobyl disaster aftermath
should become such a rehabilitation of the affected people that is able to maximize their social life
standard, i.e. to recover an individual’s pro-active attitude towards addressing vital problems, most ofwhich look to the future.
4.2.2. State of the affected people, as per 1992 polls
60% of the respondents had fear related to food quality; also their general helplessness level,
insomnia, and irritation have increased. About a third (30%) had lost interest in life and 20% had lost
appetite (Table 4.6). One in two suffered from bad mood, loss of activity; the accident left its stamp on
entire life of 40% of people. The affected community is deeper and deeper immersing in a state ofsocial infantilism. A ‘community of the doomed’ is being formed. They rely mainly upon God,themselves, immediate relatives, and life-long support from the state. Ninety percent of the affected
people are concentrated on their own health, health of their children and family. Sociocultural andlandscape space of the resettled people is in disorder, they badly adapt themselves to new conditions.
Most of them wish to come back to native though dangerous land.
The highest ratings go to the most critical life factors: ‘future of children’ – 73%; ‘price rises’ –69%; and ‘health status’ – 56%. These are related to a family and an individual. ‘Fate of Ukraine’ as the
fourth factor has got a rating of 51% having confirmed that even in the post-catastrophic situation the
Ukrainians have not lost their progressive citizenship. Generally, pessimists dominate among theaffected people (60% in zones II and III; 41% among the migrants). Instead, there are 45% of optimists
and only 27% of pessimists within ‘clean’ areas.
Actually, the affected people and the entire population of Ukraine have suffered from a double
stress. There were ‘two Chernobyls’. The first one was objectively evident, as some people witnessed
the accident and others got to know about it due to rumours and the ‘hostile’ media. The ‘second175

Chernobyl’ was informational, when domestic media was permitted to openly put the disaster’s history
into the public domain. The affected people started to independently seek for adequate post-accidental
survival patterns.
Table 4.6.
Consequences of the Chernobyl disaster as percepted by the affected people during
the first years after the accident, 1992, %The following deteriorated
after the accident:

Future forecast with referenceof the accident:

Completely satisfied with:

Whom do you rely upon?

Where costs are to be allocatedfirst of all?

HealthFinancial condition
Attitude towards authorities
Situation at work
Family relations (climate)
Attitude towards religion
Things will come right, I’m
not scared
It is necessary to seek for away out
It’s no need to cry overspilt milk
The worst is in the future
We are doomed
Medial check-up
Medial treatment andrecreation
Supply of medicines
Supply of clean foodMyselfGod
Authorities
Science
Foreign assistanceResettlement
Medical care
All costs are to be
distributed among theaffected people

Residents ofthecontaminatedareas

Resettled
peopleResidents of‘clean’ areas

81
45
43
38
42
4

85
65
45
40
30
3

20
35
32
6
6
1

5

9

17

11

20

28

18

28

18

38
22
1

26
15
5

21
6
5

8

2

12

5
2
38
56
10
6
2
43
11

3
9
45
22
13
4
1
27
31

6
16
57
34
5
10
4
12
41

19

25

19

4.2.3. Eight and a half years after the accident
The second sociological survey took place in 1994 and generally demonstrated stabilization ofpeople’s passive socio-psychological orientations within the affected zones.
Migration. A share of potential migrants amounts to 52% within the affected zones in contrast to
27% in ‘clean’ areas.
Expectations. Surprisingly, the affected people have become a little more active (Table 4.7). A
number of those wishing to run a business, take land on lease or buy it, re-educate is almost twice as large as
the same quantity among ‘clean’ individuals. It’s noteworthy that both within ‘clean’ areas and among theaffected people, there was a quarter of passive individuals ‘living to survive’, 28% and 24% respectively.
Mitigation of the Chernobyl disaster consequences. All self-evaluations of the situation made by
the affected individuals are directly related to the issue of overcoming the Chernobyl consequences.
Only 1% of the affected are sure that ‘everything that is required is being done’. However, 40% believe176

that ‘something is being done’. 39% gave a peremptory answer: ‘nothing is being done’. Surprisingwere 20% of undecided. After all, the full picture of overcoming the aftermath is affecting their fate andis taking place in front of their very eyes. It is notably that a third of the affected people, whatever area
they live in, point out that they ‘overcome all hardships’.
Table 4.7.
Expectations of the affected individuals and population of ‘clean’ areas, 1994, %Expectations

Seek for additional income
Do not have any plans, just want to survive
Run a business
Take a land on lease or buy it
Re-educate

Affected areas‘Clean’ areas

42
28
21
14
11

55
24
11
8
6

Note: the percentage total in the columns exceed 100, as respondents have selected up to three answers.

Urgent types of social aid. The lead is assumed by the types of aid that are absolutely predictable
in a state of social exclusion: monetary aid – 66%; medicines – 64%; food – 51%; clothes – 47%;
medical treatment – 40–47% (Table 4.8). Among 10 most urgent types of assistance, the 9th position istaken by a purely psychological aid: 16% of the affected need ‘improvement of family relations’, andfor some reason this indicator was significantly higher for the ‘clean’ amounting to 23%. Wellbeing of afamily is often narrowed down to its material prosperity. However, it proves to be far from it.
Table 4.8.
Criticality of social aid types, 1994, %
Rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Types of social aid

Monetary aid
Medicines
Food
Clothes
Medical treatment of children
Medical treatment of relatives
Personal treatment
Organization of leisure, rest
Improvement of family relations
Changing a place of residence

Affected areas‘Clean’ areas

66
64
51
47
47
46
40
26
16
14

63
62
39
56
32
38
38
24
23
5

Attitude towards food. Few, if any, affected people eat only ‘clean’ food. There are 10–18 % offoolhardy: a quality of food does not matter for them. Besides, the affected people and ‘clean’
individuals have almost identical structure of food positioning.
Conclusions
1. Notwithstanding their place of residence and extent of its radiation contamination, theaffected people are almost completely concentrated on the problems of just survival.
2. When solving the problems of survival, the affected people first and foremost rely uponthemselves, their family and relatives, i.e. isolate in a small family circle. They have trust
neither to community-based organizations, nor to authorities. The Ministry of Chernobyl(presently the Ministry for Emergencies of Ukraine) is an exception.
3. More than a third of the affected individuals know nothing about or hit the high spots in the
Law ‘On Status and Social Protection of the Citizens Affected by the Chernobyl Disaster’.
Only 1% of the affected people believe its provisions are fair.

177

4.2.4. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident
During 1992–1997, a share of the affected individuals (approximately 20%), who were still in astate of social and psychological maladjustment, remained almost constant – ‘Chernobyl has broken myentire life’. This proportion was less among the youth, only 10%. Women and residents of rural areas
were particularly vulnerable to the ‘syndrome of an accident victim’. As of March 1997, acuteness ofresettlement from zones II and III, as percepted by the affected individuals, reduced down to the level ofnationwide migration trends.
With regard to the renewed industry, the affected individuals consider the following directions tobe the most prospective: processing of agricultural products – 70%; production of consumer goods –68%; traditional national business – 52%, etc. Therewith, the young are notable for higher optimism,
economic confidence, and initiative.
Chernobyl raised an issue of comparing man-caused, biogeneous, and sociogenic risks. From theone hand, there are objective risks governed by technical and technological characteristics and natural
factors. From the other one, there are subjective risks that are formed in people’s consciousness andsubconsciousness[8-10].. In case there is a lack of well-functioning system of information, training, andeducation that covers standards of daily living activities and there are discrepancies between theobjective and subjective (sociological) assessments, then a situation may turn into a catastrophic one.
Governmental decisions become inadequate.
4.2.5. Twenty years after the Chernobyl disaster
A range of the Chernobyl disaster social consequences is too wide and deep (Figure 4.1). With
the objective to avoid sociocultural degradation, each component of the problem requires muchattention, great amounts of expenses, and relevant reaction of government and community. A
technological disaster happens in a clap. However, the induced sociocultural disaster is expanding
slowly, since a community of affected people degrade into radiation-isolated reservations gradually,
almost imperceptibly in the first instance. More than that, the environment becomes clearer and safer,
though a community of victims, who are left to themselves, is further degrading.
So far, treatment of the following variety of social syndromes that have been imposed on theaffected community by the disaster and its aftermath was a failure[12–13], whether it was done by
medical means, or at the expense of material compensations, or by environmental rehabilitation: (ɚ)‘syndrome of a victim’ – a large part of the affected individuals refer themselves to a community ofvictims during their entire life; (b) ‘syndrome of social exclusion’ – absence of initiative, paternalism,
demands for ‘eternal rent from the government’ dominate in the collective consciousness of affectedindividuals; (c) ‘syndrome of evacuation and resettlement’ is driven by a disturbed picture of the world
and weak adaptation to new conditions that are typical for the affected people; (d) ‘syndrome of lost
health’ is a combination of adults’ and children’s health deterioration and a fact of the disaster and its
overpowering consequences; (e) ‘syndrome of uncertainty and confusion’ is a paradox reliance of theaffected individuals upon the government in terms of solving their problems combined withsimultaneous almost complete distrust to authorities and recognition of a real support from a family; (f)‘syndrome of ignorance’ is the affected individuals’ unfamiliarity with laws and rules of activities fordaily living in the post-accident environment, thus guidance by subjective risks and not by actual
situation in a daily life. Instead, affected people choose the following vital targets for their future:promote health of children – 80%; establish own business – 55%; indulge in spiritual development –54%; strengthen a family – 52%; promote personal health – 50%.

178

Social consequences of the Chornobyl disaster

Socioeconomic Consequences:– Redistribution of money– Types of activity– Types of work
– Disuse (recovery) of lands– Limitation of daily living activities– New forms of economic activities,
innovation techniques– Reconstruction of social
infrastructure

Political and Legal Consequences:– Population policy– Ecology– Migration– Gene bank protection– Social protection– Law– Changes in regulatory and legal
framework– Management– Reconstruction of social spheres

Sociopsychological Consequences:– Mental status of people– Microsociety– Stereotypes– Aims– Expectations– Behavior– System of values– Communities of victims– Adaptation– Migration (initial, secondary)– Social health– Methods of rehabilitation– Social orientations– Social safety

Ethnic and Cultural Consequences:– Ethnic and cultural values andcustoms– Morality– Regional culture– Communication processes– Upbringing in the post-accidental
environment– Organization of culture-saving
activities

Fig. 4.1. Structure of the Chernobyl disaster social consequences.

As early as in 1998, a research group from the Centre of Social Expertise under the NASU’s
Institute of Sociology submitted the following proposals:
1. Review the concept for the affected people resettlement, since a share of volunteers has
sharply decreased and the state funds were severely scarce.
2. Develop a specific program for a ‘recovery of life’ within the gradually decontaminatedareas.
3. Conceptually and functionally redirect social policies towards the affected individuals andcomprehend it from the following aspects: (ɚ) self-sustainability, i.e. establish a system ofsocioeconomic conditions providing an active individual with an opportunity to earn money
for a completely independent support of his/her family and pay taxes; (b) rehabilitation, i.e.
renew an adequate status of the affected people’s social health and turn some of them into
active citizens; (c) it is certainly necessary to consider social criteria while evaluating
effectiveness and efficiency of any activity for eliminating consequences of the accident ordisasters; (d) it is necessary to transfer social policy from a social aid concept to a concept of179social recovery of active individuals and communities, the following structure of the victims
is to be a benchmark: (a) the self-sufficient individuals able to secure all personal needs andneeds of their family after the recovery; (b) the demi self-sufficient individuals, who require
some social aid to become self-sufficient; (c) the dependants, who can exist only at theexpense of social assistance.
4.2.6. Results of 1997 social survey
The respondents included 1200 affected individuals and liquidators. Also, 121 experts haveprovided their assessments of the situation and the proposals regarding its improvement.
Among other factors, results of the survey demonstrated that almost no conditions have been
established for: (ɚ) providing jobs to the affected people; (b) rehabilitation of safe environment; (c)robust social infrastructure (education, medicine, post, transport, etc.); (d) efficient management
instruments; (e) family business, as only 8% of the affected people thought the above conditions wereavailable. Social capital (potential for mutual aid and interaction) is quite scanty and has certain
particularities regarding each category of the affected individuals. The level of community control over
the authorities’ decisions is low. Very few affected individuals the same as before refer to social bodies(mostly local authorities) for assistance.
Conservatively negative remains the self-esteem of the Chernobyl disaster’s health effects madeby the affected individuals: liquidators – 86%; zone II – 77%; zone III – 74%. Satisfaction by the leveland quality of medical services in all groups of the affected individuals is still quite low. Compared toprevious years (2001 in particular), the awareness about rules of living activities among the populationof the radioactively contaminated areas has increased to some extent. Specifically, 7–10% of residents
from the involuntary resettlement areas assert that they have thoroughly studied such rules, another 12–
14% note they use the rules (follow them) in their daily life. Large majority of the affected people(almost 90%) need special-target educational programs covering the safety of living withinradioactively contaminated areas. Environmental activity of the public has risen considerably. In 2007
almost 70% of the affected individuals participated in the environmental activities, compared to 45% in
2001. The most pressing problems of the victims are as follows: 71% need extra jobs; 64% – recovery
of safe environment; 62% – a full-fledged servicing system; 61% – efficient management instruments;
33% – conditions for small and family business.
Experts state that there are no structures of civil society able to ensure control over the authorities andaddress pressing problems jointly with the power within the contaminated areas. Interface of various bodies
within RCA is coordinated mainly by the command and administrative methods, i.e. top-down.
Assessment of the activities for the Chernobyl accident consequences elimination as made by theaffected people point out the following:
1. It is necessary to thoroughly revise the social policy with the objective to revive life within
RCA and involve national, non-governmental, business, and public effort into the process ofrecovery, i.e. it is necessary to join administrative and self-government controls in an integral
system;
2. It is necessary to re-orient the program of life recovery within RCA from contamination
hazards, i.e. radiation risks, towards activation of people and communities, search forinnovative chances of life-sustaining activity and behaviour within RCA.
3. It is necessary to develop an evolutionary way for transformation of people from the‘affected’ status to a status of a full-fledged citizen of Ukraine.
Proposals: 1. Adopt new legislative instruments. 2. Develop all forms of social partnership andpromulgate positive experience through involvement of mass media and efficient dissemination of
information.

1804.2.7. Activities of the Socio-psychological rehabilitation centres and distributionof information to the affected individuals
The negative impact of the Chernobyl disaster long-term effects produced on population is firstof all manifested in social and psychological domain, since traditional ways of people’s daily living
activities have undergone deformations and socioeconomic activities within the areas contaminatedwith radionuclides has been falling into a decay. Against the background of the above problems, morethan 20 years these people are living in a situation of an aggravated though uncertain health risk.
Therefore, a steady anxiety about adults’ and children’s health status has formed in the affected people.
Generally, the situation may be characterized as a poly-modal life crisis of the affected individuals that
intensifies a number of social risks, generates a confrontation in interpersonal relations and intergroupattitudes, and evokes prolongation of the crisis.
It is necessary to consider sociological and psychological impact of the Chernobyl aftermath asseriously as the effects of dose absorbed by people, since a psychological stress contributes not only to
an increased incidence rate among population, especially with regard to psychosomatic diseases, butalso to an increased level of morbidity. Moreover, psychological effects are the most widespread andlong-term.
The Centres for socio-psychological rehabilitation and distribution of information among theaffected people that were established in 1994–2000 by the Ministry of Ukraine for Emergencies andAffairs in Protection of Population from the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster under the supportof UNDP programs (Borodianka, Boyarka, Ivankiv, Korosten, Slavutych) were involved into taskoriented elimination of the social and psychological consequences of Chernobyl.
The following were the field of concerns covered by the Centres for socio-psychologicalrehabilitation and distribution of information among people: social and psychological support to people;
development of personal responsibility for one’s own life; orientation towards affirmative addressing ofexisting problems; development of communities and interpersonal relations; formation of efficient
behavioural models in line with new living conditions. While ensuring continuous interface with thecommunities in terms of developing their self-government and local upgrowth potential, the Centres
warrant projects’ outcomes stability and ensure dissemination and acquisition of positive experience.
Social and psychological problems of the affected people to date are still urgent, as well as
overcoming the ‘syndrome of a victim’ and negative perception of radioactively contaminated areas as
far as a living possibility is concerned. Hence, experts of the Centres for people’s socio-psychologicalrehabilitation endeavour to find new approaches to addressing the problems above.
Also, the Centres’ important work area is developing civic engagement among youth. The
objective is to involve the oncoming generation into social and political life of a native habitat, foster
leadership skills in youth as well as interest in decisions taken to make effect onto life of thecommunities, form environmental outlook and healthy lifestyle.
Dissemination of information on the Chernobyl disaster consequences to public is still the mostefficient method for overcoming social and psychological problems. Informational, analytical, andeducational activities of the Centres are aimed at identifying the key issues regarding generalenvironmental situation in the region, socioeconomic processes, as well as public needs for the
information about safe living within the radioactively contaminated areas. A top-priority of the Centres’
research activity are the following issues of ‘Chernobyl’: public attitudes towards various problems;
level of awareness; psychological, social, and ecological aspects of life in the regions.
In order for the Centres to efficiently implement initiatives and programs, introduce advanced
international techniques into the recovery processes and sustainable development of a strong psychologicaland social immunity among the affected population, the institutions collaborate with internationalorganizations and programs, promote attraction of charitable funds to implementation of the projects targetedat socioeconomic recovery of the affected regions and improvement of the local life standard.

181

The Centres for rehabilitation demonstrated their highly efficient activity while helping all age
brackets of people; disseminating information about opportunities for social risks mitigation among allinterested groups; extending their activity to entire districts (rayons); facilitating formation of active
communities in population centres that are targeted at overcoming their most pressing problems.
4.2.8. Social lessons learned from Chernobyl
Lesson 1. It is necessary to lay an anthropological concept for both prevention and overcoming of
the disaster’s consequences at the centre, i.e. an individual and a social community, being the absolutevalues of society and mankind in general, apply to the centre. Everything produced by mankind, startingwith ideas, techniques, engineering, wars, services, etc., produces social impact, improvement anddeterioration of people’s life.
Lesson 2. It is necessary to give consideration to substantial differences, gaps, and discrepancies
between subjective and objective assessments of risks. A provision for the following levels is to be
made: academic (expert assessments), legal (regulations, standards), managerial (resources, capacities,
staff), informational (completeness and topicality of information); everyday consciousness (the affected
people’s understanding and assessing their own status and the world around). Nothing but minimizationof gaps between the levels produces the most efficient outcomes in terms of adequate actions aimed atsurmounting the consequences.
Lesson 3. An almost complete oblivion of the destiny of hundreds of thousands of ‘liquidators’ isunacceptable, as they localized the accident and its consequences at the expense of their health, if not
life. A recourse to the methods of overcoming a disaster using a tremendous number of people isunacceptable. It is necessary to train professional cohorts of liquidators in advance and move to an‘unmanned’ surmount of accidents’ consequences and reduce involvement of volunteers to a reasonable
minimum.
Lesson 4. The society of ‘Chernobyl’ victims (2.6 million people) is in a state of social
depression and social exclusion. Paternalistic orientations towards a governmental rent for the lost
health and broken lives are increasing. It is a mistake to limit the social policy for eliminating theconsequences exclusively to social assistance. Large-scale recovery activities are needed in order toreturn the affected individuals to active life.
Lesson 5. Long-term keeping of the affected communities in a state of information vacuum is
unacceptable. It is necessary to continuously disseminate information about environmental conditions
and ways of adequate behaviour and living; the information is to be recipient-oriented and specific.
Lesson 6. In contrast to the risk concept that causes fear, stress, and various ‘social syndromes’ inthe affected people, it is necessary to increase productivity of a chance concept, i.e. focus on search forand implementation of efficient behavioural models and life activities in post-accidental situations.
Lesson 7. A leading role in the chance concept is to be given to the idea of social health and turnof consciousness towards the future.
Lesson 8. Regard is to be had to the fact that during a disaster and after it especially significant
role is gained by subjective risks of a situation assessment, they are caused by a number of reasons, andlack of information especially. Exactly the subjective risks followed by affected individuals usuallydiffer greatly from objective assessments. Distribution of complete, timely, and targeted information
about the risks and chances usually helps affected people to return to an actual situation spacing andreal behaviour.
Lesson 9. Keeping the Chernobyl-affected people in a ‘stopped life’ atmosphere for such a longtime is unacceptable. It is necessary for a large-scale recovery and development program for theaffected individuals and communities to become (although with a great delay) a ‘roadmap’ inovercoming social, sociocultural, and socioeconomic impact of the disaster.

182

Lesson 10. For all the activities aimed at recovery and development of the affected communities
and areas an allowance is to be made for the nationwide trends of retargeting onto active models of
behaviour and living activity.
Lesson 11. To overcome social consequences, it is necessary to consolidate all types ofgnoseological potential (skills of innovative thinking and appropriate chance models finding): (a) local,
i.e. leaders and volunteers in local communities; (b) national, i.e. multidisciplinary expert groups; (c)international, i.e. academic, governmental, and public.
Lesson 12. The international community has no right to forget the not yet surmounted social
consequences of Chernobyl, fate of 2.6 million victims. The same as we remember fascism and theHolocaust. Ukraine is not able to solve social problems of Chernobyl independently.
Lesson 13. The monitoring that has been accomplished by the Institute of Sociology under
NASU is unique, since unlike traditional techno-economic and ecological approach towards analysis ofman-made accidents or disasters, the focus was put onto an individual and social community that are themain values of nation and mankind in general.
Lesson 14. Both for Ukraine and for the whole humanity, the Chernobyl has laid the foundationof a search for new post-accidental models of survival, i.e. a revolutionary change of axiological andnormative system became archi-urgent.
Lesson 15. An exceptional priority of the anthropological concept is underpinned by recent
events in the world. The U.S. officials were sure that the ‘Iraqi problem’ would be instantly solved bytechnics and tactics of the military industrial sector. Actually, the U.S. and their allies are subject tounpredictable social and sociocultural consequences and have no clear and constructive idea about theirovercoming. The military doctrine has steeped in a multidimensional social space.
Therefore, the post-Chernobyl situation should be evaluated basing first of all on an extent ofaddressing social problems, on condition they are not merely narrowed down to social assistance(benefits, special payments, retired pays, etc.).
4.2.9. Nuclear power in Ukraine: attitude of Ukrainian people
The Chernobyl NPP has been shut down. Instead, the topicality of nuclear power development inUkraine (NPU) is continuously present on the government task list. In spring 2009, a package of NPU
issues was included into the Social Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology under NASU. Despite aresidual fear of the Chernobyl accident consequences, the Ukrainian community votes affirmatively andin the main says ‘yes’ to NPU (the rating is 41%), including even radical approvals, i.e. 13% vote for
NPU development and believe the Chernobyl NPP closure was a mistake. NPU is disapproved by theminority (33%). About half of the citizens (46%) think it is safe to live at a distance not less than 50 km
from an operating NPP. Almost a third failed to give a definite answer. This was due to the lack ofpublic awareness, which is confirmed by the fact that only 7% have enough or profound knowledge
about safety of operating NPPs; 29% believe their knowledge is satisfactory, a quarter has only heard
something in gossips and talks, and a third are unaware. Hence, knowing a level of people’s trust to
sources of information is important (Table 4.9). The most confidence regarding safety of operating
NPPs people instil in radiology experts (43%), ecological organizations (39%), mass media (36%) andinternational monitoring agencies (31%); the less authority belongs to the management of NPPs andRAW storage facilities (14%).
While doubting safe living within an NPP area, people wish the following compensations for a riskof potential accidents: regular medical and preventive examinations – 64%; free health improvement andtreatment at health resorts – 59%; monthly monetary payments – 48%; access to the information on aradiation situation – 22%; establishment of civilian control over the safety rules adherence – 18%. The
majority of citizens (65%) would like none of their relatives to work at NPP; 12% of the respondents
personally agree to work there; 21% of the population failed to give a definite answer.

183

Table 4.9.
Level of trust to the sources of information about operating NPPs’ and RAW storage facilities’safety levels. Ukraine. 2009. 1800 questionnaires, %Sources soughtRadiology experts
Ecological organizations
Mass media
International monitoring agencies
National monitoring agencies
Management of operating NPPs and RAW storage facilities
It’s difficult to say

%
43
39
36
31
21
14
10

Note: the respondents have chosen up to three sources.

The conclusions. A somewhat unsure attitude of Ukrainian people towards nuclear power isdriven by the stereotypical state of mind that has formed after the Chernobyl disaster, as well as
untimely and occasional provision of information.
Consequently, further development of nuclear power in Ukraine may encounter a significant
resistance in the society. The branch is still informationally closed, seems dangerous, and Ukrainians are still
not prepared to active civilian control over its activities. Large-scale PR-campaigns are required to change a
subjective perception of Ukrainian nuclear power facilities network’s safety into the realistic one.

4.3. Dynamics analysis of the demographic, social, and psychological changes
in society caused by the Chernobyl disaster aftermath and ways
to overcome their negative development
Unfortunately, after 2007 the system for governmental accounting of the individuals affected by
the Chernobyl disaster and provision of information on implementation of relevant programs wasdestroyed. The State Statistics Service has suspended publication of statistical data books on
implementing the programs for elimination of the Chernobyl accident consequences. The authors had tomake a considerable effort in order to gather the information required to develop this Section of the
National Report.
The data summarized by us in Table 4.10 bear evidence of the fact that over the course of the past
25 years the Chernobyl disaster and its consequences have become a tragedy for Ukraine and many
millions of its residents. Not all from among the affected people have got a medical servicing at medical
and preventive treatment facilities under the MH of Ukraine.
Table 4.10.
Dynamics of a number of people exposed (affected) as a result of the Chernobyl disasterin Ukraine in 1987–2009, at the close of a reported year, individuals

1

Quantity of the affected people (were under medical
supervision*)2

Quantity of citizens, who have obtained
the status of ‘affected’ **
3

1987
1988
1989
1990
1995
2000
2005
2009

2645872568493204593472522744226
26083542342207
2238334

Recording was started in 1994

Year

* – as per the data from the state statistical reports, forms 2-TsDN, 15, 16,** – as per the data from the state statistical reports, form 7 (Chernobyl).

184

3092958
327852125262162254471

As of 01 January 2010, a quantity of the affected people in Ukraine amounts to 2254471
individuals. Over 2.15 million of the victims, i.e. 95.4% of the total amount, still have to live within aradioactively contaminated area (Table 4.11). More than 164 thousand people left RCA over a wholepost-disaster period.
Table 4.11.
Quantity of affected people living within RCA, individuals, as of 01 January 2009
Category of the affected people

All victims
Of which in the zones: exclusion zone
absolute (mandatory) resettlement
guaranteed voluntary resettlement
Enhanced radioecology monitoring21518111174548
6120801535066

Of which children
aged 0-14

Includingchildren under
1 year3738461026
131358241462

27541
78
9611
17852

Source: data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

Table 4.12.
Distribution of population residing within the radioactively contaminated areas and subject to an extra
irradiation dose exceeding 0.5 mSv/year, as of 2009
Average annual dose, mSv

Total number, individualsChildren under 18, individuals

5986
135621
179874317467

319
32758
54909
87986

1–<5
0.5 – < 1Total

In consequence of socioeconomic changes and crises, all conditions of life, labour, nutrition, andmedical services in the population centres within RCA do not fully correspond to the modern standards.
As of 2009 (as demonstrated by the data in Table 4.12), 317 467 individuals, including 87 986 children
under 18, are still exposed to the doses exceeding 0.5 mSv/year.
4.3.1. Demographic changes in Ukraine and within the radioactively contaminated areas
During the period of 1991–2009, Ukraine lost almost 6.5 million people as a result of thenationwide demographic crisis. Over the last years, the demographic situation in the worst affected
regions (the Zhytomyr Oblast and the Kyiv Oblast) has not differed markedly from the national
markers. For instance, in 2000–2009 the birth rate was even slightly higher there (Figure 4.2 4.1).
However, the mortality rate was also higher: whereas its average level in Ukraine in 2000–2009
amounted to 15.9 ‰, in the Zhytomyr Oblast it was 17.7 ‰ and in the Kyiv Oblast it amounted to17.4 ‰. The differences between the markers of 2004–2009 is statistically valid (Ukraine – 16.13r0.19,
the Zhytomyr Oblast – 18.17r0.24, t=6.72, the Kyiv Oblast – 17.73r0.23, t=5.47).
An increased birth rate was registered in zones II and III in 1992–1999. It was at the time when
the affected people have been most actively resettling to clean areas. We believe, the increase wasrelated to their wish of having benefits when getting residential space and jobs at the places ofimmigration. Analysis of the population death rate outside the radioactive contamination zones revealed(Figure 4.4.) that mortality levels depend on a category of radioactive contamination zone and a level oflegally regulated average individual exposure dose.
During the post-disaster years, the demographic crisis within RCA has worsened significantly. In
early 90th, reproductivity of population within RCA was negative low (zone II – 5.6 ‰, zone III –6.0 ‰, zone IV – 9.1 ‰); and since 2006 it became catastrophic negative (zone II – 20.6 ‰, zone III –14.0 ‰, zone IV – 21.5 ‰). Over 18 years (1986-2003), the total demographic loss within the185radioactively contaminated areas amounted to 48.8 thousand people. The net population loss wasformed due to 25.2 thousand of unborn and excess (6.9 thousand) of died people. Level of loss inunborn children per 1000 women of childbearing age increased from 8 people in 1986 up to 76 in 2001,
i.e. 9.5 fold, and in a whole post-accident period this level amounts to 41,1 ‰. The rate of loss inchildren unborn by women aged 15-49 in the monitored region was equal to the national level, and in
1986-2003 its value was 14.2 ‰, which is three-fold lower than within RCT.

Fig. 4.2. Birth rate in Ukraine, in the Zhytomyr and Kyiv Oblasts in 2000-2009, per 1 000 people.

In 1991–2005, the loss of population within the contaminated areas was greater than in theirlocation regions. In accordance with our calculations, in 1991–2000 52–98 % of the civilian loss withinzones II and III was caused by migration outflow of people (a regulated and voluntary resettlement).
And in subsequent years, the main factor was the predominance of deaths over births (Figure 4.3).

Fig. 4.3. Loss of population in 1991-2005 in relation to a radioactive contamination zone category, %The demographic loss in population within the worst radioactively contaminated regions is also
formed because childbearing is usually put off by fertile women. The most significant contribution to
the total loss of unborn children was made by the children not born by women aged 20–29.
In 1986–2003 as compared to 1979, the population loss linked to supermortality increased
everywhere through all main types of death causes. The biggest waste of population was formed out of
the losses caused by non-neoplastic somatic pathology that preconditioned about 40.0% of female andalmost 24.0% of male deaths. The next (in order of relevance) death type belongs to neoformations; it
has caused 35.1 % of the losses as compared to only 15.9 % of such losses nationwide. A considerable
part of the human loss caused by neoformations is formed out of 45–75 year old age groups, which186

contributes to ageing of population. External death causes form 20% of the affected individuals.
Especially in the employable age and in 60–64 year old age group.

Fig. 4.4. Population death rate depending on a category of a radioactive contamination zone
and a level of legally regulated average individual exposure dose in 1991-2006, per 1000 people.

In accordance with the component analysis data, the contribution of non-neoplastic pathology to
RALE (reduction in anticipated life expectancy) changes formation was ranging between 45 and 65 %,the input of neoformations was 10–25 %, external causes – 10–45 %, depending on sex, area, andperiod of survey. During 1996–2000, the contribution of neoformations to RALE change reduced
almost twice as compared to 1991–1995. However, the contribution of somatic pathology increased
1.2–1.3 times. The sharpest (over 85 %) reduction in life expectancy was due to deaths of people aged
15–59. The disorders in organs and systems, which have formed in the previous years, later, since 1991,
started to demonstrate themselves by an increased general mortality of population and child morbidity
within the worst affected areas (Figure 4.5).

Fig. 4.5. Morbidity of children aged 0-14 and residing within zone II
and radioactively contaminated areas, per 1000 children.

An increased infant morbidity rate is still present within the contaminated areas, and first of all it
is stipulated by respiratory system diseases, conditions emerging during prenatal life, and congenitalabnormalities. Thus, the data obtained afford grounds to believe that the exposure preconditions not
only an increased rate of infant morbidity, but also a change in the structure of its causes.

187

4.3.2. Ways to overcome negative developments of demographic, socialand psychological changes in the society caused by the Chernobyl disaster aftermath
The areas of radiation hazard (zones I and II) has formed within a radius of 100 km around
ChNPP and still exist in Ukraine, in 25 years after the Chernobyl accident. Inhabitation of people aswell as getting of agricultural and other products and foodstuffs, which meet nationally accepted
standards, are impossible there. Due to the disaster and its consequences, the so-called ecologicalmigration has emerged. Complete abandonment of the two cities and over a hundred villages;
irreversible degradation of at least 67 villages, one city, and three towns; accelerated degradation of
about a thousand villages located in the northern part of the Zhytomyr and Kyiv Oblasts and in thewestern part of the Chernihiv Oblast form a significant negative impact of the catastrophe. Moreover, as
far as radiation factor is concerned, in 25 years the pre-accident conditions of life were renewed in noneof 2 293 centres of population that were approved as ‘radioactively contaminated’ in 1991. During thepost-accident years, a typical feature of the worst affected areas has become the increased morbidity
rate resulting from chronic radiation effects and basically caused by somatic pathology depending on
the levels of contamination and exposure. This regularity is distinctive both at the oblast (province)
level and at the rayon (district) one. Taken together, these factors have resulted in heavier demographic
loss, reduced vitality and life expectancy of RCA inhabitants, if compared to the entire country.
In order to improve demographic situation within RCA as far as radioactive contamination andpublic exposure doses are concerned, it is necessary to create the radiation conditions that would meetnational safety criteria. Recovery of radioactively contaminated population centres has been envisagedby the activities for the catastrophe consequences elimination in Ukraine for many years already.
However, this activity was implemented in none of them.
The main effort is to be targeted at preventing morbidity of people of employable age and older,
inclusive of males. While developing the migration policy, it is also necessary to take account of theexisting radiation conditions and levels of anticipated exposure doses.
Under the existing socioeconomic conditions and as a result of ionizing radiation effects, healthof ACE (accident consequences elimination) participants is being deteriorated. As far as death rate isconcerned, they rank next to RCA residents. Common for both groups of the affected individuals are
the excess mortality and increased death rate caused by the diseases of blood circulatory system anddigestive apparatus. Therefore, an improved medical support to the affected people, that is treatment
and diagnostic work to prevent chronic illnesses and reduce morbidity, is to become the next crucial
trend in time-distant activities for eliminating the disaster consequences.

4.4. Nuclear and radiation risks as percepted by Ukrainian people
and implementation of the risk reduction methods into everyday life of Ukrainians
The reality situation of the affected individuals was characterized by an increased radioecology
risk, which overall effect on people is still to be determined. Going through situations of an elevatedrisk evokes anxiety, uncertainty of the future, fear for one’s own health and health of children. Most
everyone among the affected individuals has a low level of tolerance for enduring uncertainty, the latter
causes their disadaptation, i.e. reduced ability to independently renew normal daily living activities.
Therefore, the affected people have fewer chances to withstand risks, no matter what risks lie at the rootof assessing a situation, whether objective or subjective ones. A risk level depends on the awarenessabout actual everyday conditions and ways of their improvement, which is connected with anopportunity to find contextual and future-oriented chances for constructing current and future life.
Improving a standard of knowledge about actual nuclear and radioecology risks is still an urgent
problem for the affected individuals, since they need to be guided by objective versus subjective
assessments of the post-Chernobyl conditions. Nowadays, the instruments to define objective nuclear

188and radiation risks have been developed and clearly formulated in science and practice; i.e. a hazard
level for both the environment at large and public health in particular is estimated depending on actual
data on environmental conditions. However, apart from objective assessments, people are also prone tohave a purely subjective perception of a situation, which forms the subjective risk.
Usually, an individual feels socially and psychologically uncomfortable in a radiation hazard
environment. The malaise is due to the post-accidental emotional shock, as any negative impact of external
factors ‘spoils’ the well-being of subjects. However, effects of radiation exposure particularly differ fromother negative impacts. Until a certain edge, an individual does not physically and mentally feel radiation
effects in such a way as he feels, for instance, cold or heat, light or noise. Then why the fact that the
Chernobyl disaster has produced extremely severe negative consequences in terms of deteriorating socialand psychological well-being of the affected people and doing general harm to social health is given such agreat importance? Firstly, an accident-caused trauma; secondly, a long-term stay of a large number of people
in the post-accident reservation; thirdly, the long-term effects of low-dose radiation.
Most people’s assessments of the world around are based not on scientific knowledge, but on
instinctive and subjective judgments about what is safe and acceptable and what is dangerous and should bebetter avoided. These very subjective judgments form social and psychological feeling of people. And if alife goes wrong, then depression and dejection are formed even though a physical health is good.
The social subjective risks are caused primarily by an extent of affected individuals’ capability tocope with the problems of everyday life (Table 4.13). Significant is the fact that 97% of the affected
people in 30-km zone have coped with their everyday problems in the best way, while 78% was thevalue for zone II and 85% were among the ‘clean’ ones. A tenth (11%) of self-settlers within 30-km
zone live a full life and overcome all their problems. Instead, the relative values are: 7% for zone II and
5% for ‘clean’ areas. However, there are a lot more people, who are ‘just surviving’ or are ‘driven todespair’; 62% within 30-km zone, 43% in zone II, and 50% among the ‘clean’ ones. Thus, the country
is totally impoverished and hapless. The share of those completely or partially coping with theirproblems is equal in all the three groups, i.e. 35% in each.
Table 4.13.
Breakdown of answers to the question: ‘Characterize your present life’.
Victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe. 2001. 1200 questionnaires, %Characteristics of life

Live a full life, cope with all problems
Not always cope with hardships and difficulties
Not live, but survive
Driven to despair
It is difficult to say
Total

Affected zone
Zone I

Zone II

11
24
57
5
3
100

7
28
40
3
22
100

‘Clean’ areas

5
30
46
4
15
100

Fear-risks (Table 4.14). The fear of a recurrent accident at the ChNPP has been discarded byhistory, since the NPP is not in operation for a long time already. Surprising is the fact that ‘Chernobyl’
people are less afraid of an incurable severe disease (48%) than the ‘clean’ ones (54%), andsignificantly less is the fear of people living in Zakarpattia, the value is only 31%. Naturally, the fear ofa natural disaster worries residents of Zakarpattia 1.5-fold more than others; 34 versus 2–22%. Within‘clean’ areas the level of anxiety to impoverish down to a beggar is significantly higher (26%), if
compared to the affected zones (12–18%). Just the same refers to a loss of job, 28% versus 6–12%.
Anxiety causes risks, which have the following probability (according to self-evaluations of people
affected by the Chernobyl disaster): (ɚ) related to a threatening environment – 0.81; (b) related to healthof children – 0.70; (c) related to social life – 0.68; (d) related to industrial activity – 0.57; (e) related tofamily environment – 0.44.

189

Table 4.14.
Breakdown of answers to the question: ‘What are you most afraid to suffer from?’ Victims of the Chernobyl
catastrophe and victims of disasters in Zakarpattia (Transcarpathian region). 2001. 1200 questionnaires, %

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Repeated accident at the Chernobyl NPP
Incurable severe disease
Accident at a Ukrainian NPPNatural disaster
Accident at the Shelter of Chernobyl NPP Unit 4
Impoverishment down to a beggar
Loss of job
Crime and hooliganism
Transport accident
Employment injury
Mushroom, etc. poisoning

Zones I and II
Victims of theaccident

Victims of
ecologicaldisasters inZakarpattia

Residents of‘clean’ areas

59
48
24
22
18
12
12
10
7
5
2

14
31
18
34
6
18
6
5
9
8
1

19
54
19
20
5
26
28
15
11
7
1

The so-called ‘syndrome of a victim’ is among the most considerable factors that form subjective
risks of the affected individuals. Its significance was intensified by speculations of politicians, as well
as by mass media that could sometimes have presented information that was not verified or notconfirmed by expert conclusions against the background of the state’s poor economic development,
unstable political environment, and deterioration of public health caused by the Chernobyl accident
consequences, crises, changes of power, and other factors.
In 2007, the affected individuals identified the negative factors that, in their eyes, produced themost considerable health effects: consequences of the Chernobyl accident gained 58%; impoverishmentof a family – 38%; ecological situation – 30%. Therewith, it is remarkable that the affected people
attribute very low rates to the factors that really produce a significant negative impact on human health:quality of food – 22%; unhealthy lifestyle – 16%, smoking – 14%, harmful work environment – 13%,and drinking alcohol – 8%. Thus, while analyzing a social impact produced by the Chernobyl disaster
aftermath, it is necessary to juxtapose objective and subjective risks and clear out which ones takepriority in addressing specific problems of the post-Chernobyl situation.
Exposure of the affected people’s consciousness, as well as the consciousness of the entire
Ukrainian nation, to risks depends on formation and further enhancement of radiological safety culture
in administrative, industrial, technical or nationwide context, i.e. generally, in a broad social sense.
Everyday, routine ability to resist negatives stipulates efficiency of the safety culture. It is facilitation ofaccess to professional services and resources (medical, educational, informational, industrial, economic,
administrative) as well as individual learning of safety rules that considerably reduce a level ofsubjective risks.
As per medical expert assessments, a reduction in illness risk is possible due to the following: (ɚ)
early diagnostics and timely treatment; health improvement and psychological adjustment; (b) full value
nutrition; (c) mastering of methods for health self-improvement, disease prevention, adherence to ahealthy lifestyle.
Economic, material, and professional risk factors are to be reduced by way of consolidating
power, local self-government, and business structures; implementation of efficient radiology-safe
practices and management techniques; improvement of dosimetry and radioecology monitoring;development of radiology-safe production methods; training in safe conduct and operations withinradioactively contaminated areas, etc.
As far as education is concerned, it is proposed to introduce training in radiological risk
prevention, methods for health improvement and disease prevention, safe conduct within contaminated190

areas, psychological adjustment, self-maintenance, etc. into pre-school and school educational
programs, as well as into the trainings for future mothers, families with infants.
Crucially important are the methods of day-to-day, particularly symbolic, ‘transformation’ of thedisaster’s negatives into human potential positives based on scope of knowledge, skills, feelings, andexperience. Extremely efficient is increasing a capacity for recovering competence in and culture ofeveryday radiological safety and transmitting them to others.
Current tasks of the policy for shaping and improvement of radiological safety culture are within
the following directions: Review of legal basis towards activation of social position in the affected individuals,
rendering professional and vocational assistance, while increasing the chances forrehabilitation and recovery.
 Enhancement of educational and informational activity with all with all strata of the affected
people, while providing personnel and resources.
For a successful implementation of these tasks, the great experience and colossal scope ofknowledge accumulated by the experts in ‘Chernobyl’ issues are to be applied.

4.5. Implementing recommendations of UN Chernobyl Forumin Ukraine: accomplishment of the projects for recovery and developmentof the affected areas and communities
Promotion of sociocultural and socioeconomic activity was determined as a priority inovercoming the Chernobyl disaster consequences both on the international level in the United Nations
Resolution on sustainable development in the report ‘The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl
Nuclear Accident. A Strategy for Recovery’ and in the national policy of Ukraine, particularly in the
National Program for Minimization of the Chernobyl Disaster Consequences during 2006–2010 and in
the Chernobyl Forum’s profound scientific report, titled ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental,
and Socioeconomic Impacts’.
The Chernobyl accident caused a number of factors that had a negative impact onto
socioeconomic activity, including family and medium business development. The following are among
them: (ɚ) Radioactive contamination, rural areas were mostly affected, as small and medium business isbased on agriculture there, and most part of farm units ceased to exist as a result of the Chernobyl
disaster; (b) Demographic structure of population, large-scale migration of people, low birth and highdeath rates, ageing in the affected areas, and consequent reduction in potential staffing for small andmedium business; (ɫ) Inactivity related to the so-called ‘syndrome of a victim’; (d) Limited access to
information, rights, and opportunities with regard to running a private business, etc.
According to recommendations of the UN Chernobyl Forum, the following is to be done toaddress the above problems:
1. Facilitate recovery of social units that have been ruined or lost as a result of the evacuation,
resettlement, and collapse of the Soviet Union by way of social interaction improvement anddevelopment of community initiatives and economic projects in cities and villages;
2. Promote establishment and advanced development of small and medium enterprises,
particularly agricultural and food ones, notwithstanding their ownership pattern, with theobjective to recover an estimable management and surmount poverty;
3. In every possible way contribute to the development of specific eco-tourism and conservationof biodiversity in the Polissia region.
In late 2002, a joint project of UNDP and the Ministry for Emergencies of Ukraine, titled ‘Chernobyl
Recovery and Development Program (CRDP)’, was launched to provide assistance to the government of
Ukraine in implementing innovative and efficient approaches to comprehensive overcoming of the socio-

191

psychological and economic problems. The CRDP objective is to involve people into independent solving of
problems of their habitats by recovering social units in the affected centres of population, forming people’s
skills in independent identification and addressing of a problem, gaining self-government experience; all theabovementioned activities would promote advanced life standard of the affected people.
During 2002–2009, 279 community organizations were setup and are operating in 192 villages of
the affected areas through implementation of the principle ‘Community and Power: Recovery andDevelopment Partners’. The community includes over 20 thousand individuals, who have implemented
190 socioeconomic initiatives under the CRDP support (reconstruction of water piping, schools,
washhouses, first-aid and ambulance stations; ensuring gas supply; establishment of youth, civil,
household, and service centres), etc.
To implement a project, the community had to establish partnership relations with local
governance, representatives of rayon and oblast (province and district) administrations, and local
businessmen. It is noteworthy that exactly private entrepreneurs and businessmen play an important rolein community projects implementation. The CRDP experience demonstrated high activity ofbusinessmen in accomplishing community initiatives. In particular, with total cost of the community
projects exceeding UAH 18 million, over UAH 2 million, or approximately 9%, were contributed by
local sponsors. On average, financial support of the projects consists of the following: up to 17% were
contributed by a community independently, ~ 40% by local authorities, ~ 30% by CRDP. The
community projects had a great effect in getting access to improved servicing and life standard;
consequently, about 200 thousand people have got benefits from the accomplished community projects.
Some initiatives of the community were targeted at small servicing businesses establishment. For
instance, in 2006 the Prometheus Community setup a service and household centre offering a wide
range of services in the village of Cherepyn in Ovruch Rayon. Six people found their jobs in the centre,
some of them were previously unemployed. After the success, in 2008the Prometheus Community
decided to implement another economic project, i.e. start of the Cattle Insemination Centre.
Within the framework of the SRDP project, during 2002–2009 the communities established 3
service centres and 40 youth and public centres, which are operating as social enterprises. The community
development initiatives not only produce economic effects but also surmount poverty. Built on trust,
critical thinking, and joint activities, the community development process ensures exerting control overpersonal life, ability to overcome personal fears and surmount everyday problems. Moreover, it is thecontrol over your own life that is an essential precondition for a private business establishment.
With the objective to address the problem, CRDP facilitated setup of a network that includes 7
economic development agencies in the four worst affected oblasts (provinces): three in the Zhytomyr
Oblast (Brusyliv, Korosten, Ovruch); two in the Kyiv Oblast (Borodyanka and Ivankiv); one in the Rivne
Oblast (Dubrovytsia) and one in the Chernihiv Oblast (Ripky). The agency is an institution forcompetitive advantages build-up, investment attraction, and rendering other informational and methodical
assistance to regional businessmen. To undertake their mission, the agencies have qualified personnel andup-to-date technical facilities; on a daily basis they provide consultations to private entrepreneurs andindividuals, who plan to establish their own business. Unfortunately, as of 2010, a large part of theaffected areas did not have access to the Internet, which is constraining their search initiatives.
The Chernobyl Forum also recommends another prospective direction of small and medium
business, i.e. green tourism development. Traditionally, Polissia was a recreation and relaxation area. In
2009 and 2010, a review of green tourism initiatives was accomplished within the affected localities of
the Rivne and Chernihiv Oblasts, it revealed that many owners of green tourism homesteads have
purposely created them to improve an economic climate in the family, with no view of businessdevelopment prospective. In addition, there is a need in initial capital.
Establishment and running of a family business are also complicated by a lack of the legal basisthat deprives entrepreneurs of economic and social protection and notwithstanding a high192

unemployment level greatly limits a scope of volunteers. In particular, a poll in the three worst affecteddistricts (rayons) of the Rivne Oblast demonstrated that 36% of respondents consider it necessary tocreate jobs in the nearest future; at the same time, only 4–5% wish to establish their own business underthe existing complicated and uncertain conditions. This factor is twice as low as the national one
amounting to 8%.
Small and medium business development shall facilitate improvement of the economic situation
within the affected areas and will be able to partially address the problem of employment. Presently
business initiatives however are rather pilot projects than a systematic approach to addressing the
problem. To fully use a business development potential, it is necessary to update a legislative basis forsmall and family business, improve dissemination of information about business development
opportunities among people, and enhance the procedure for a private business establishment, renderconsultation services to the individuals, who have already started or plan to start their own business.
By its resolution of 20 November 2007, the United Nations General Assembly has again
confirmed that the Chernobyl disaster has caused significant social, psychological, and economic
consequences.

193

5. SHELTER OBJECT CONVERSION INTO AN ECOLOGICALLYSAFE SYSTEM AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE CHERNOBYL NPP
5.1. Shelter Object conversion strategy
Major principles, purpose and strategic areas of activities related to the Shelter Object (SO)conversion into an ecologically safe system for the first time were established in the ‘Strategy of theShelter Object Conversion’ developed in 1997.
In view of the main results of the first stage of the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) the‘Strategy of the Shelter Object Conversion’ was refined and approved by decision of the Inter-Agency
Committee for Comprehensive Resolution of Chernobyl NPP Problems dated 12 March 2001.
Universally recognized basic principles and objective concepts of safety reflected in the requirementsof the effective safety norms, regulations and standards were taken as a basis for the subject Strategy.
The Strategy established the following three basic stages of the Shelter Object conversion into an
ecologically safe system: Stage 1 – stabilization of the state of the existing facility, enhancement of operation
reliability and durability of the structures and systems ensuring stabilization and monitoringof the Shelter’s safety performance.
 Stage 2 – construction of additional protective barriers, primarily the confinement, thatprovide conditions required for technical efforts of Stage 3 and ensure safety of personnel,
public and environment, preparatory engineering and technical activities aimed at developing
process of fuel containing materials removal from the SO during stage 3, arrangement of theinfrastructure for Shelter Object radwaste management.
 Stage 3 – removal of fuel containing materials and long-lived RAW from the SO, theirconditioning and further storage and disposal in radwaste storage facilities in accordance withthe effective standards, decommissioning of the Shelter Object.
Major part of the works planned for Stage 1 and 2 is being performed under the SIP.
Furthermore, part of the efforts planned for Stage 1 has been already completed. In particular, the above
is related to modernization of the dust suppression system and engineering structures stabilization. The
work on creation of the Integrated Automated Monitoring System is nearing completion. The New Safe
Confinement (NSC) is being designed, and when constructed it will create preconditions for
implementation of further plans related to SO conversion into an ecologically safe system.
5.1.1. Current status of Shelter Object nuclear and radiation safety
Radiation and nuclear hazardous materials inside the Shelter Object
Varieties of nuclear fuel formed during the active stage of the accident are currently in the Shelter
Object.
There are three varieties of fuel containing materials (FCM), containing the bulk of irradiatednuclear fuel (INF): fragments of the reactor core (FRC), fuel particles (fuel dust) and lava-like fuelcontaining materials (LFCM).
Most of them are found in the central hall and premise 305/2 under the reactor (fig. 5.1 look thecoloured inset).

194

Significant part of SNF got into the reactor vessel and premise 305/2 under the reactor, whereconditions for fuel heating up to high temperatures were created. Fuel fragments entered into reaction
with structural materials: zirconium, metalwork, serpentinite filling of biological protection, sand,concrete and formed high-level lava-like fuel containing materials (LFCM).
LFCM spread over the premises, corridors, cable passages and other free channels and, when
hardened, formed accumulations of their varieties (fig. 5.2 look the coloured inset) at different
elevations of the destroyed ChNPP Unit 4.
LFCM may contain up to 130t of uranium INF [1], and significant part of radionuclides
generated in the reactor. Therefore, LFCM still present the main source of nuclear, radiation and radioecological hazard.
Assessment of the overall nuclear fuel amount that remained in destroyed Unit 4 was based onstudies on radiation fall-out [2], and now it gives grounds to consider the matter that about 95% of
nuclear fuel of the initial reactor loading are in the Shelter Object.
Table 5.1.
Specific activity ratings for generated radionuclides located in Shelter Object premises
as of the end of 2010, Bq/g of uranium
Alpha-emitters
238

Pu – 6.41 • 106
239
Pu – 5.0 • 106
240
Pu – 8.18 • 106
241
Pu – 2.30 • 104
242
Pu – 1.30 • 104
241
Am – 2.24 • 107
243
Am – 5.15 • 103
244
Cm – 8.65 • 105

Beta-emitters90

Sr – 6.63 • 108
90
Y – 6.63 • 108
106
Ru – 2.86 • 102
147
Pm – 6.00 • 106
241
Pu – 2.97 • 108

Beta-gamma-emitters
106

Rh – 2.86 • 104
Sb – 1.75 • 105
134
Cs – 2.43 • 105
137
Cs – 7.98 • 108
144
Ce – 8.15
154
Eu – 1.05 • 107
155
Eu – 2.04 • 106

125

Total ~ 2.5 • 1012 Bq/g of uranium

Consequently, total activity of the radionuclides in the Shelter Object currently makes up
approximately 4.8 • 1017 Bq.
Recent investigations on refinement of LFCM accumulations geometry and spatial arrangement[3] have shown that there are two areas at top elevations of ChNPP Unit 4 in the vicinity of biologicalprotection system ‘E’, where LFCM accumulation can be found (fig. 5.3 look the coloured inset).
Calculation results analysis have shown that minimal amount of LFCM (1 t of UO2) at the top
elevations of the destroyed Unit 4 is no less than 15t. This fact must be considered while developing
strategies of INF removal from the Central Hall, and in construction of the New Safe Confinement andin the course of further activities on the Shelter Object conversion into an ecologically safe system.
The experimental data analysis [4] suggests that high-uranium FCM accumulations are located in
the south-east part of premise 305/2 (near the gap opening into premise 304/3), as well as in the vicinityof the burn-through towards premise 307/2 (fig. 5.4 look the coloured inset) [5].
Detailed investigations allowed considering LFCM generation scenario from a new angle.
Fuel channels failure, fuel meltdown and dispersion in the south-east quarter of the reactor coreresulted in depressurization of the reactor space. Pressure pulse lowered the reactor support(Scheme ‘ɈɊ’) by 3.85 m, blew off and raised the biological protection system (Scheme ‘E’)
weighting more that 3000 tons.
The process had the nature of a powerful dynamic pulse. The reactor support sank. The fuel melt
thereafter flew in the open space towards the south-east part of the wall of premise 305/2 and the gap
between the reactor support and biological protection tank (Scheme ‘Ʌ’).
Detonation of steam-hydrogen mixture resulted in the south-east quadrant of premise 305/2 filledwith fragments of the destroyed reactor core. Consequently, reactor core fragments formed the ‘furnace’

195configuration. Its burden was presented by the following constituents: ‘sinter’ (zirconium, zirconium
dioxide, uranium dioxide, metal); ‘coke’ (graphite blocks, rings, plugs); ‘cindery fluxes’ (serpentinite,
filling of expansion joints and installed clearances) [6]. First, all the ‘burden’ components were heatedto a high temperature, and from below were heated by its melt, which gradually melted through the subreactor plate’s concrete.
The ‘burden’ subsided gradually with materials consumption, and the ‘sinter’ ran out through the
opening in the wall between premises 305/2 and 304/3, and formed horizontal stream of the black
LFCM. Furthermore, fuel concentration grew gradually due to the settlement of fuel inclusions of the‘burden’ and formed the three-layer composition: ‘sinter’ (LFCM), fuel and metal (fig. 5.5).
The top layer down to elevation 9.7 m is presented by uranium-poor black LFCM (congealed
solution of light oxides). The bottom layer is formed by high-ruthenium metal. The intermediate layer(congealed solution of heavy oxides) with uranium concentration exceeding 50 % forms accumulations offuel containing materials, composition and structure of it is unknown due to absence of access to them.
Table 5.2.
Expert assessments of LFCM distribution in build-up of premise 305/2
Premise305/2

FCM accumulation, elevations

Properties of FCM inaccumulation

No.1 – elevation +8.400 – +11.000 Black LFCM, FRC
No.2 – elevation +9.000 – +11.000 Brown and black LFCM,
FRC are possible
No.3 – elevation +11.000 –LFCM, burden, FRC+13.500
305/2 and 504/2
No.4 – elevation +11.000 –Loose FCM
+16.500
No.5 – eevation +11.000 –LFCM, burden, FRC, loose+24.000
FCM
No. 6 – elevation +16.000 –Stalactite- LFCM
+24.000
305/2
No.7 – elevation +9.700
LFCM

FCM amountm3

Uranium fuelamount, t

150 – 180
80 – 100

36 r 1225 r 65 – 10

3r2

40 – 60

3.5 r 270 – 100

12 r 7

0.7 – 1.4

0.2 r 0.1

Up to 20

Up to 1.5

The meltdown zone is currently filled with water, the level of which is at elevation 9.1 m. The
location of meltdown resultant from interaction of fuel with concrete was proven by results ofexperiments carried out under the international project CORPHAD.2 [7]. Such scenario may help to
explain growth of intensity of fission products release into the atmosphere in 1986 on the sixth day of
the accident. This could be related to thinning and subsequent disappearance of the so called ‘burden’layer. Fission products release reduced drastically on the tenth day, when meltdown surface congealed
and precluded further release of fission products from the melting zone into the atmosphere.
In 2010 based on new design data and analyses of the processes that took place in premise 305/2
at the stage of Chernobyl lavas formation and spreading, expert assessment of nuclear fuel distribution
in this premise was done.
The assessment was done for 7 separate representative zones [5]. Overall amount of the irradiatednuclear fuel located in premise 305/2, according to the completed assessment, is 80 r 30t (uranium).
The expert assessments of LFCM distribution in build-up of premise 305/2 are presented in Table 5.2.
The information on condition, behaviour forecast and location of radiation and nuclear hazardous
materials within the Shelter Object enables to assess nuclear, radiation and radioecological hazard of theShelter Object and develop optimal solutions while converting the Shelter Object into an ecologicallysafe system.

196

Shelter Object nuclear safety
On 19 June 1990 neutron activity growth was registered in SO premise 304/3 [8]. Drastic growthbegan on 29 June and reached 60-times increase as against the background.
Detailed investigation of incident triggers and development factors showed that the neutron
anomaly concurred with the period, when precipitations water was intensively penetrating into the hot(over 100ɨɋ) porous structure of this accumulation (fig. 5.6.) [9].

Fig. 5.6. Critical incident in 1990.
Diagram of neutron activity in SO premise 304/3.

At the power acceleration stages, during each power leap the accumulation reachedsupercriticality at positive reactivity the value of which depended on current fuel temperature. The
power excursion stopped when amount of water in the accumulation exceeded the amount of optimal
damping. Rise of the water front resulted in negative reactivity, and further water ingress lead toaccumulation return to the subcriticality.
Long-term monitoring of temperature and neutron activity dynamics has demonstrated highprobability of presence of FCM accumulation with high (over 40%) concentration of nuclear fuel inpremise 305/2.
Systematisation of temperature measurements data enabled building of isothermal cartogram forfoundation slab of this premise and obvious demonstration of presence of 2 zones of intensive heatrelease in premise 305/2 (fig.5.7.) [5].
Water of temperature exceeding the one of surrounding concrete is permanently observed inwells in the vicinity of zone 1. High temperature gradient between zone 1 and sub-reactor plate remains
to date (1988-1989 – > 100 °ɋ, 2010 ~ 20 °ɋ).
Neutron and physical characteristics of the FCM accumulation located in the south-east quadrantof premise 305/2 were assessed based on design modelling of critical assemblies fitting actual footprintof the meltdown area.
Figure 5.8 presents design of such assembly reactivity change due to humidity at a temperature of
27 and 80°ɋ.

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Fig. 5.7. LFCM massif in premise 305/2. Location of high uranium concentration zones.

Fig. 5.8. Reactivity graph for critical FCM accumulation in premise 305/2 south-east quadrant
at different temperature and humidity.

In 1988 temperature of the FCM accumulation was 200oC. The FCM accumulation was dry andsubcritical. In June 1990 temperature of FCM accumulation surface was lower, i.e. 100oC. It wasdamped and critical incident occurred. Then, due to ingress of excessive moisture the accumulation
became subcritical. In 2010 and later temperature of the FCM accumulation was 40–50oC. The
accumulation is flooded and subcritical. Should the moisture level decrease, the accumulation will pass
to supercritical state.

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Contemporary notion of neutron and physical, physical and chemical characteristics of FCM
accumulations hidden in meltdown zones inside the slab under the destroyed ChNPP Unit 4 reactor has
been stated until now, but the issue of nuclear hazard of these accumulations needs to be subject tofurther studies.
Today, when the New Safe Confinement facility may dramatically impact temperature andhumidity conditions of the fuel containing materials, nuclear protection requirements will require
permanent attention both during routine operation and at each stage of the Shelter Object conversion
into a durable ecologically safe system.
In order to timely preclude potential critical incident the nuclear safety control system needs to be
improved by facilitating reliable monitoring of neutron flux density for this critical mass zone anddevelop preventive measures and means.
In future, the Shelter Object nuclear safety concept, which is based on ‘detection and immediate
elimination of supercriticality in FCM accumulations’ must be revised based on the principal of‘elimination of possibility of a self-sustained chain reaction.’
Shelter Object radiation safety
Shelter Object radioactive airborne particulatesRadiological hazard of airborne particulates of Chernobyl genesis lies in highly toxic
transuranium and long-lived isotopes they contain, in particular plutonium and americium isotopes.
Air masses contamination inside and outside the Shelter Object may occur due to the following
set of processes:
 dust raised from facility premises surface; dust generation in the course of construction and installation works;
 dust generation and dust raise caused by collapse of facility structural members;
 fuel containing materials degradation due to radioactive process and aging of materials;
 leaching of radioactive substances, solutions drying, salt deposits formation and their dust
raise.
There are the following two paths of airborne particulate matters transport from the Shelter
Object: ‘controlled’ airborne particulates release occurs through the Bypass system and VS-2
ventilation stack, and uncontrolled’ release – through leakages (cracks, openings, maintenancemanholes) in the external engineering structures.
Regular monitoring of radionuclides amount (top assessment) and composition in uncontrolled
airborne particulates matter release has been done since 1992 by means of accumulative plates installed
above light roofing maintenance manholes [10]. Figure 5.9 presents the dynamics of the uncontrolled
airborne particulates matter release from the Shelter Object.
An increase in activity releases was registered in 1998 caused by the ventilation stackreinforcement works.
A certain activity increase in 2001 was caused by unfavourable weather conditions, light roofing
maintenance works.
In 2002 the monitoring of airborne particulates matter concentrations and particle size in the‘controlled’ release through the Bypass system and ventilation stack VS-2 began. Chernobyl accident
beta-emitting nuclide products concentration (Ȉȕ) ranged from 0.07 to 23 Bq/m3 in 2009. The mostfrequently occurring Ȉȕ value range was 1–10 Bq/m3. Furthermore, 137Cs contributed to about 30 % ofactivity. Particles size as a rule is 1–10 micron.
Radon and thoron progeny have a special place among the Shelter Object radioactive airborne
particulates matter. They primarily affect radiation environment in the Shelter Object premises anddetection of airborne particles of the Chernobyl genesis.

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Fig. 5.9. The dynamics of uncontrolled airborne particulates matter release from the Shelter Object.

At inhalation of air containing radon and thoron, their progeny are of the greatest hazard, sincealmost half of them are alpha-emitting. Moreover, they are on submicron airborne particles of 0.05–
0.3 micron and can reach lower lung fields.
A concentration of radon and thoron progeny in the Shelter Object is, as a rule, higher, than of
airborne particulate products resultant from the Chernobyl accident, which presents a negative factor for
the Shelter Object personnel, and has not been counted in internal exposure doses to date. Additional
inhalation doses may reach dozens of percents from the dose constrain.
Reduction of uncontrolled releases from the SO has been observed over the recent years.
Commissioning of the Modernized Dust Suppression System (MDSS) in 2004–2006 played asignificant role in this process, since it expanded the zone of radioactive dust control to the entire area
under the SO roof (fig. 5.10 look the coloured inset and 5.11 look the coloured inset).
220 tones of dust suppression solution (48.8 t of dry residue) were supplied to the SO inner spaceover the period 2006–2009.
MDSS commissioning has more than twice reduced radioactive airborne particles release fromthe SO, and removable surface contamination in the SO inner space reduced by more than four ordersof magnitude. The protective polymer coat covers almost the entire area inside the SO and functions as
a containment – precludes transport of radioactive substances into the environment [11].
Today, level of Shelter Object Local Zone near surface air layer contamination with radioactive
particles is also measured on a regular basis. It is carried out by means of aspiration units installed along
its perimeter.
Figure 5.12 presents the dynamics of average annual concentrations (Ȉȕ: 90Sr + 90Y, 137Cs and241Pu) of radioactive postulates matter during 1993–2010. Orderly reduction of average annual
concentrations (Ȉȕ: 90Sr + 90Y, 137Cs and 241Pu) of radioactive postulates matter began from 1996. It
resulted from accident products settling down into the ground, decontamination of the Industrial Site, itsverdurization, dust suppression during construction works, and so on. Reduction of 137Cs concentrationin the near surface air layer demonstrates insignificant contribution of the Shelter Object releases.

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Fig. 5.12. Average annual concentrations of radioactive airborne particulates (Ȉȕ: 90Sr + 90Y, 137Cs and 241Pu) in
the north, north-west and south areas of the SO Industrial Site in 1993 – 2010.

Increased concentration of airborne particulates in 2009 in the south of the Local Zone resulted
from dust generation and dust raise during excavation on the Turbine Hall side.
During 2009–2010 as a result of the intensive excavation on construction of the NSC north andsouth foundation strips, the concentration of airborne particulates carrying products of the Chernobyl
accident increased considerably practically within the entire territory of the Shelter Object Local Zone.
Evaluation of the Shelter Object impact on the environment presents a complex and multi-factor
issue. Radioactive airborne particles that are being currently transported from the facility have been
generated during the accident and located in the form of dust inside the Shelter Object, and the newones generated in the course of physical and chemical degradation of fuel containing masses undernatural and technogenic factors. Air contamination monitoring may serve as a peculiar kind of indicatorof FCM destruction, including the accumulations that are beyond the direct control. Such information
would be useful during the NSC construction and commissioning. Furthermore, it is important to know
radionuclide composition of airborne particulates matter, their concentration, particles size, locations
and reasons for airborne particulates generation, paths of radioactivity transport and settlement, as wellas type of dissolution in human respiratory system for determination of individual and collective
protection means efficiency. Consequently, monitoring of radioactive airborne particles both in theenvironment and inside the destroyed unit remains valid in terms of radiation protection andunderstanding of the processes ongoing in the Shelter Object, in particular assessment of the status of
nuclear fuel remains and lava-like fuel containing materials.
Liquid radioactive waste in the Shelter Object
The process of moisture ingress into the facility and accumulation at the bottom levels of the unit
in the form of liquid radioactive waste (LRAW) present another factor capable of destabilisation of thecurrent state of nuclear, radiation and ecological safety of the Shelter Object. Moisture penetrates into
the SO as a result of precipitations, condensate and man-made solutions. Precipitations get to the SO
through cracks and leakages in the light roofing and facility walls. The operating dust suppression
system presents the source of man-made solutions.

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Having got into SO premises and along its way from top elevations to bottom ones moistureinteracts with structural and fuel containing materials, which leads to fission products and produced
isotopes transition to water solutions.
Such uncontrolled leakages result in medium-level liquid radwaste accumulated at the bottom
levels, which uninterruptedly escape from the SO in the following two directions – to the north andnorth-east [12–13]. The north stream is accumulated in SO premise 001/3. Up to 300 m3 of LRAW,
which is from 60 % to 70 % of the total amount of water in the Shelter Object is permanently found in
this premise. Leakages from the north zone of the pressure-suppression pool, central and south-east
premises of the Shelter Object, as well as from the Cascade Wall flow together here. The stream of
700–900 m3 annually leaks further through the dividing wall to Unit 3 premises and is pumped to the
ChNPP Chemical Shop for temporary storage and treatment.
Radionuclide concentration in LRAW from premise 001/3, including transuraniun elements(TUE) tends to increase (fig. 5.13.). Major contributor (up to 80 %) to total alpha-activity of LRAW isamericium-241. Contribution of plutonium is less than 30 %.

Fig. 5.13. The dynamics of average annual concentration of 238+239+240Pu
in LRAW accumulation in premise 001/3.

The south-east LRAW stream of 300 m3 gets into premises 017/2 and 018/2 and leaks to ChNPP
Unit 3 premises. The dynamics of average annual radionuclide concentration, including TUE, in LRAWof this stream in similar to the one observed in the north stream (fig. 5.14.) [14].
Part of the activity transported with water leakages is concentrated in the form of bottom
settlings. Their amount, for instance, in premise 001/3 is estimated as 100 m3 at total weight of about
150 t [15]. Radionuclide concentration in bottom settlings is by two–three orders of magnitude higher
than concentration in the ‘unit water’. Bottom settlings drying in the event of cease of leakages and
LRAW pumping from premise 001/3 may result in significant exceed of permissible radioactive
airborne particles concentration in these and other SO premises.

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Fig. 5.14. The dynamics of 238+239+240Pu concentration in LRAW accumulation in premise 017/2.

Shelter Object LRAW are characterised by high concentration of organic compounds, including
oil products, surfactants and film-forming compounds, as well as TUE activity that does not allow of
their reprocessing using the existing Chemical Shop facilities avoiding additional purification [16].
Absence of the latter leads to growth of organic compounds and TUE concentration in the ChNPPLRAW storage facilities. At particular TUE and organic compounds concentration reached, it will not
be possible to process such waste at the Liquid Radwaste Treatment Plant which is undercommissioning.
Radiation conditions in the Shelter Object premises
Radiation conditions in the Shelter Object premises are caused by their surfaces contamination
and radioactive materials they accommodate.
An average exposure dose rate (EDR) value does not exceed 1 R/h (table 5.3) in the most of thereactor unit premises to date. Reactor vessel, premises at elevation +9.00m, steam corridor, premises ofthe pressure-suppression pool and other, where most of FCM are located present the exception. EDR
close to FCM accumulation surface reaches several thousands of roentgens per hour in some places andgradually decreases due to fission of the major dose generating nuclides, first of all, caesium-137 [17].
Table 5.3.
Ranging of surveyed SO premises based on EDR levels

Number ofpremises< 0.050.05 – 0.1

0.1 – 1

EDR, R/h
1 – 10

10 – 100

100 – 1000

! 1000

27

11

35

54

19

8

2

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Deaerator Stack premises are significantly less contaminated than ones of the reactor unit. There
are only several premises, where EDR exceeds 1 R/h. These premises are located at top elevations
where engineering structures were almost completely destroyed.
EDR is in the range between 0.1 – 2000 mR/h in the Turbine Hall. EDR does not exceed
0.8 mR/h in the normally occupied premises of the SO.
EDR at the SO roof is characterised by the following values: over the pipe roof (above the Central Hall) – from 0.5 to 8 R/h, the highest values wereobserved above the east part of the Central Hall;
 the highest values reach 5 R/h over the ruined premises of separating drums;
 on the Turbine Hall roof – from 0.2 to 4 R/h;
 on the Deaerator Stack roof – from 0.2 to 1 R/h.
Shelter Object premises contamination. SO premise surfaces were contaminated as a result ofradioactive particles settlement and their water flooding during the accident of 1986 and during its
elimination. Consequently, rather deep penetration of radionuclides into structural materials occurred.
Radionuclide composition of the contamination corresponds to the composition of power unit 4
fuel and includes 137Cs, 90Sr, 239-241Pu, 241Am.
Surface contamination levels inside the SO vary within a rather wide range, in particular: from 0 to 3000 particles/(cm2min.) – for Į- particles; from 30 to 1000000 particles/(cm2min.) – for E- particles.
The removable part of surface contamination is estimated to be 6% of the total amount, as for theindividual radionuclides: 137Cs – 4%, 241Am – 10%, 239,240Pu – 2%, 90Sr – 8% ɿ U – 5%.
It should be noted that the radiation conditions at the SO uninterruptedly change both due tonatural processes (radioactive fission, FCM degradation, leaching of radionuclides, so on), and humanactivities (SO operation and conversion).
In assessment of the SO nuclear and radiation safety status in 25 years after the accident it ispossible to state that the considerable amount of investigations that took place over this period allowed
to obtain results, which enabled arrangement of safe works on SO structural stabilisation andpreparatory works for the New Safe Confinement construction.
5.1.2. Stabilisation of engineering structures
In respect that engineering structures function as physical barriers on paths of radioactive substances
and ionizing radiation release into the environment, the problem of their reliability and durability is of utmost
importance in terms of ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of the Shelter Object.
The completed surveys demonstrated insufficiency of the existing structural system stability
when under extreme loads (earthquake, tornado, etc.), and in some critical areas even under limitedloads mostly due to local damages, overloading, considerable displacements and corrosion. The
overriding negative factor lies in impossibility to ensure compliance with normative requirements to
supporting fixing of structures and installation quality control in the course of SO construction in
extremely severe radiation environment.
Over 1988-1989 structures of the following three critical zones were subject to strengthening: upper tier of Deaerator Stack framework; ceiling over the south premise of main circulating pumps;
 ceiling over the south premise of exhaust ventilation air ducts.
Certain defects were later found within the area where southern B1 and B2 beams are supportedby the west wall. Reinforcement of the above support area was performed in 1994 by installing steel
stanchions under the bottom chords of B1 and B2 beam block. However this measure solved the
problem of increase of the support reliability only partly.

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Elimination of the hazard related to VS-2 ventilation stack state of failure was the next important
step in solving the problem of increasing reliability of the structures affecting the Shelter Object safety.
Repair of the ventilation stack load-bearing framework was made in 1998 under the international
project with the assistance of experts from Ukraine, USA and Canada.
Since 1998, further surveys of engineering structures state and their stabilization are performed inline with the Shelter Implementation Plan.
The completed analysis of the engineering structures status over their entire life time andassessment of efficiency of the previous measures on failed units and elements strengthening allowed
determination of critical zones of the SO structure requiring additional stabilization.
Aa already noted, reinforcement of the supporting joints of southern B1 and B2 beam block
completed in 1994 did not provide for acceptable level of this structural component reliability. Besides,
defects were found in the area of northern B1 and B2 beam support. Therefore, considering importanceof these units reliability for overall SO safety southern and northern B1 and B2 beam supports wereadditionally reinforced in 1999 (fig. 5.15).

Fig. 5.15. B-1 and B-2 reinforcement (in colour additional reinforcement as of 1999).

Design documentation for the mentioned stabilization measure was developed by theInternational consortium ICC (MK) consisting of the Washington Group International Inc. (USA),
BNFL Engineering Ltd. (Great Britain) and Ukrainian organizations: Kiev Institute ‘Energoprojekt’(KIEP), Scientific Research Institute of Civil Structures (NIISK) and Institute for Safety Problems of
NPPs (ISP NPP).
In 2002-2003 the KSK Consortium consisting of KIEP, NIISK and ISP NPP prepared and got
concurred by the Regulatory Authorities of Ukraine the working design stipulating urgent stabilisation of themost important structures that ensure overall integrity of the SO facility and its separate zones, namely: western zone;
 upper tier of Deaerator Stack framework and damaged ceiling slabs;205 Mammoth beam western and eastern supports;
 connection joints of southern panels and southern ‘hockey-stick’ panels;
 northern Buttress wall and its connection joints with the northern ‘hockey-stick’ panels; ventilation shafts;
 light roofing.
The Working Design for Stabilisation was implemented in accordance with requirements of theeffective normative documents on ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, construction engineering
norms, and with consideration for specifics of construction and installation works implementation inradiation hazardous environment of the SO.
Prior to stabilisation measures commencement the set of preparatory works aimed at arrangementof the infrastructure required for stabilisation and construction site preparation for construction andinstallation works was carried out. In particular, the following facilities were constructed: Change
Facility for 1430 people (fig. 5.16 look the coloured inset), Small Stroybaza, Training Center (TC),
Equipment and Tools Decontamination Site, and Modernized Dust Suppression System.
Shelter western zone stabilisation is the major among the set of stabilization measures withconsideration for the extent of construction and installation works, number of personnel engaged andcollective exposure dose.
The idea of the SO western zone stabilisation was construction of two spatial steel towers west of
the Buttress wall, installed on heavy reinforced concrete foundations and joined by spatial trusses atthree levels (fig. 5.17 look the coloured inset).
The towers were arranged with cantilevers to support B1 and B2 beam blocks functioning as
main load-bearing elements of the existing roof system over the destroyed reactor unit.
Such solution enabled load removal from the damaged framework and wall of the western zone
and its transfer to newly erected tower structures.
The Deaerator Stack framework stabilization plan envisaged installation of additional steel angle
braces joining upper part of columns inclined considerably towards the Turbine Hall with ceiling
structures located below and having no significant defects.
Stabilisation of the ceiling panels that had inadmissible bends and cracks involved metal supports
installation under them. These supports precluded collapse of these panels during works on Deaerator
Stack framework upper tier strengthening take place, and also facilitate stability of these panels tilldeconstruction works upon New Safe Confinement construction.
Stabilisation of the Mammoth beam western support anticipated strengthening of cross couplings
by increasing their thickness via welding of additional elements. The Mammoth beam eastern support
strengthening was resolved by filling openings in its base with concrete.
The southern zone of the roof was stabilised by joining flat panels and ‘hockey-stick’ panels in
the area of their leaning on the Mammoth beam. The above was achieved by bracing truss installed on
the outside of the roofing (fig. 5.18 look the coloured inset).
Stabilisation within the northern zone of the Shelter Object involved simultaneous resolution of
the following two problems: joining of the following northern elements into a single structure: ‘hockey-stick’ panels andButtress wall; strengthening of the Buttress wall.
The joining of the ‘hockey-stick’ panels and Buttress wall was performed by anchors installationand fixation to bearing parts of the ‘hockey-stick’ panels and Buttress wall, they were installed in thefree from concrete wall inside with its further concreting.
In view of the challenging radiation environment in ventilation shafts, a constructive decision
was taken regarding western zone stabilisation that allowed rejection of local strengthening ofventilation shaft walls in the areas of B-1 beams support.

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The light roofing was repaired by new corrugated decking installation within 40 % of the roofarea.
The set of organisational, health physics and technical measures was taken in order to ensureradiation protection of personnel who were engaged in stabilisation works.
The organisational measures involved training of contracting organisations personnel at theTraining Centre, development of particular procedures on arrangement of safe construction andinstallation works implementation, permanent control of compliance with radiation and industrial safety
requirements. Prior to training receipt at the Training Centre personnel was subject to medical
examination in Kyiv under the BIOMED program. The personnel that did not pass the medical
examination were not admitted to the following preparation stages.
The training polygon was specially arranged with structural mock-ups and mock-up trainers fordrilling of particular process operations.
Among the basic health physics and technical radiation protection measures, which enabledconsiderable personnel exposure doses reduction, as well as minimization of environmental
contamination, the following should be mentioned:
 sanitary and access control arrangement; zoning of working areas; radiation monitoring; supply of personnel with basic and additional personal protection equipment, as well as
control of their adequate use; shielding; dust suppression and decontamination.
Arrangement of the sanitary and access control created conditions for precluding radioactive
contamination spread beyond the SO area limits, thanks to control of building machinery and personal
protection equipment contamination, their sending for decontamination, as required, changing ofoveralls by personnel and their sanitary treatment. Personnel access the SO site and return only throughthe change facility.
The following working places zoning was established to limit spread of radioactive substances
within the SO site: construction and installation works areas were divided into zones with differing
radioactive contamination levels, temporary mobile sanitary locks were located on borders of thesezones.
The radiation monitoring was performed in consistency with requirements of the effective SSE
ChNPP documents and involved dosimetric monitoring, radioactive contamination spread control andenvironmental monitoring.
Personnel were provided with personal protection equipment (PPE). While selecting PPE
preference was given to the models, which in addition to the required protection had a least effect on afunctional state of worker’s organism and his efficiency.
A certain amount of works was carried out at a distance from the major ionizing radiation
sources, located in the SO. In particular, most of the preparatory works for west zone stabilisation took
place at the Small Stroybaza, and Steelwork Pre-Assembly Area distant from the SO. It helped
reduction of personnel exposure doses.
Since external gamma radiation presented the major factor of hazardous impact on personnel
during stabilisation works implementation, therefore, permanent or temporary shielding was one of themost effective means for builders’ radiation protection.
The permanent shielding involved protective walls or shields installed on the existing or new
structures in the course of preparatory works related to access routes and working locations
arrangement. Such shielding arrangements were not subject to (when not required) to dismantling andwere used under the stabilised structures monitoring and maintenance effort.

207

The temporary shielding was installed to ensure protection of personnel only over the period ofworks and involved utilization of portable protective structures (box type), factory-made shieldedsuspended and portable platforms and boxes.
0.4 m thick and 9.6 m concrete wall (fig. 5.19 look the coloured inset) installed to protect thepersonnel operating at the Steelwork Pre-Assembly Area is an example of successful use of shielding.
In the course of stabilisation works, building machinery and vehicles, tools and equipment,
structural members of removed contaminated facilities, inner surfaces of the process premises occupied
by personnel (protective box, temporary sanitary lock) were subject to decontamination. Special trays
were envisaged for footwear decontamination.
Both the Modernised Dust Suppression System and mobile units were utilised for dust
suppression within working areas and along personnel access routes. Efficiency of the compounds used
for dust suppression was supported by long-term practice of this operation during normal operation of
the SO.
Collective effective exposure dose of the personnel who were engaged in stabilisation measures
was around 14 man·Sv, which is lower than stipulated by the design. It was achieved mostly due to
implementation of organizational and technical radiation protection measures, as well as additional
measures aimed at increasing an efficiency and productivity of the construction and installation works.
The stabilisation was completed within 2004–2008, and stabilised structures were accepted for
operation based on the Deed of the State Commission dated 29.10.2008. The successfully completed
SO engineering structures stabilisation still remains the most ambitious task completed under the SIP.
The completed stabilisation measures provide acceptable level of SO safety in view of the fifteen
years period of stabilised structures operation, considering completion of the New Safe Confinement
construction within the claimed period. In future, the unstable SO structures issue of must be resolved
through their deconstruction or reinforcement inside the NSC. Should the NSC construction be delayed,
the stabilisation measures scope must be expanded with consideration for the present SO engineering
structures degradation rates.
5.1.3. Construction of the New Safe Confinement
The Law of Ukraine ‘On General Principles of Further Operation and Decommissioning of
Chernobyl NPP and Conversion of the Destroyed Power Unit Four of This NPP into an Ecologically
Safe System’ stipulates that «the confinement is a protection facility that includes a complex of processequipment for removal of fuel containing materials from the destroyed ChNPP Unit 4, for RAW
management and other systems designed to support its conversion into an ecologically safe system andprotect workers, public, and the environment».
Construction of the NSC must facilitate pursuing of the following goals:
 protection of workers, public, and the environment from impact of nuclear and radiation
hazard sources inherent in the existing Shelter Object; Create the required conditions to support physical activities on the Shelter Object conversion into
an ecologically safe system, including removal of nuclear fuel remains and FCM, RAW
management activities, and deconstruction/stabilization of the unstable Shelter Object structures.
One of the major NSC functions is prevention of radioactive substances and ionizing radiationtransport outside the NSC under normal operation conditions, in the event of normal operation
disturbance, emergencies and accidents, and shall be fulfilled due to: Integrity of NSC protecting structures over a long period of its operation (at least 100 years); precluding collapse of the Shelter Object unstable structures by means of their deconstruction
or strengthening for the period governed by the NSC safety operation conditions;
 limitation of precipitations penetration into the facility;208 protection of hydro-geological environment from contamination with radioactive substances
located in the NSC;
 limitation of radioactive substances spread inside the NSC.
In view of the current radiation conditions outside the Shelter Object, as well as expediency ofradioactive effect decrease only within the areas attended by personnel, no additional requirements for
the NSC engineering structures to function as a shielding are set. Shielding must be designed only
within the areas of structures and systems maintenance, as well as implementation of other radiation
hazardous works.
Process support and physical protection is among other NSC functions.
The process support function is fulfilled by means of systems and components accommodationand functioning, as well as creation of conditions required for normal NSC operation,
deconstruction/strengthening of the Shelter Object unstable structures, radioactive waste (RAW)management and future removal if fuel containing materials (FCM).
The physical protection system lies in physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials
that are in the SO.
The above listed functions evidence that the NSC represents a multifunctional facility that must
be designed with consideration for numerous interrelations between the newly constructed systems andelements, and existing Shelter Object components.
It should be mentioned that shortly after the Shelter Object construction in view of low reliability
and durability rates of engineering structures, specialists proposed various options of additional
protecting engineering barriers, in particular in the form of so called ‘Shelter- 2’.
However this idea was subject to a far more systematic and thorough elaboration starting from1998 in the course of the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP).
The International Consortium ‘Chernobyl’ formed by the Washington Group International, Inc(USA), BNFL Engineering Ltd (UK) and Ukrainian organizations: Kyiv Institute ‘EnergoProekt’(KIEP), Research Institute of Engineering Structures (RIES) and Institute for Safety Problems of NPPs
(ISP NPP) performed comprehensive analysis of all the earlier technical decisions, stated NSC
conceptual design criteria and requirements, and proposed the strategy of its construction. The
following three confinement options: FRAME, DOCK-CAISSON and ARCH of a very similar
performance were proposed for further refinement at the stage of feasibility study.
Further evaluation of the above mentioned options with independent Ukrainian experts
representing the International Advisory Group involved resulted in the ‘ARCH’ option selected.
The Governmental Interagency Committee for Comprehensive Resolution of Chernobyl NPP
Problems lead by Prime Minister of Ukraine took the decision reflected in Minutes No.2 dated 12
March 2001: ‘With the objective to accelerate activities on Shelter Object conversion into an
ecologically safe system and with consideration for insistent recommendation of EBRD andindependent experts ARCH type design of the confinement shall be recognized as a basic that willreflect prospective technical decisions of other projects.’
In 2003, the International Consortium comprised of the Bechtel International Systems (USA),Electricite’ de France (France) and Battelle Memorial Institute (USA) with the participation of KIEP,RIES and ISP NPP developed the NSC Conceptual Design (NSC CD). Following the result of the State
Comprehensive Expert Review the NSC CD was approved by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine DecreeNo.443-ɪ dated 05 July 2004.
During 2004–2007 the Tender exercise for the NSC construction took place, the Consortium
NOVARKA was selected as a preferred bidder that provided its Technical Tender based on the NSC
CD adaptation. In September 2007 the contract was signed between the SSE ChNPP (Employer) andNOVARKA (Contractor) for design, construction and commissioning of the NSC Commissioning
Stage (NSC CS-1).

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According to the NSC project implementation strategy elaborated in document [18] and endorsedby the regulatory authorities of Ukraine, NSC shall be constructed in three stages.
The first stage is dedicated to preparatory works that must enable safe and effective NSC
construction, in particular:
 Pioneer Wall Berm removal;
 area clearance, levelling and excavation for NSC foundations and assembly area construction;
 arrangement of NSC construction infrastructure; New Ventilation Stack construction.
The Pioneer Wall Berm removal was required due to NSC foundation designed within this area.
In view of Berm structure various methods and technical means for deconstruction of concrete andreinforced concrete monolithic structures, precast structures, and removal of complex backfillingmaterials (crashed stone, sand, soil, concrete and metal pieces). The activities were carried out in theradiation hazardous environment in the vicinity of the Shelter Object (fig. 5.20 look the coloured inset).
Moreover, removed materials were contaminated to a different extent, which required a set of radiation
protection measures be developed and implemented with regard to the personnel engaged in works andenvironment. The Pioneer Wall Berm removal was successfully completed in April 2008.
Prior to major NSC construction works, a tremendous amount of works was performed involving
area clearance and levelling, excavation of trenches for construction the NSC Erection, Transfer andService Zone foundations, as well as Arch structures Pre-Assembly Area (fig. 5.21 look the coloured
inset).
Complexity of the mentioned works implementation was caused by a considerable contamination
rate of the facilities subject to deconstruction, as well as technogenic soils within the excavation sitesthat were placed in the category of radioactive waste (RAW), including high-level waste. In the courseof excavation the process system for RAW management was introduced that provided radiation
monitoring during each operation, sorting of RAW into categories, their hauling to the Temporary
Laydown Area or Disposal Site.
In the effort to enable timely and effective NSC construction activities early works on required
infrastructure arrangement began, in particular including construction/reconstruction of the following
activities:
 temporary buildings and facilities for personnel;
 motor roads, railway and port facilities for equipment and materials delivery; Arch structures Pre-Assembly Area arrangement; materials and equipment pilling/storage areas arrangement.
Since the existing ventilation stack VS-2 interferes with NSC east end arrangement, it must be
dismantled prior to sliding of the confinement to its design position. Accordingly, the New Ventilation
Stack (NVS) must be constructed and commissioned prior to VS-2 dismantling. The design
documentation has been concurred, the Contractor has been selected and preparatory works for NVS
construction are currently underway.
Design and construction of the NSC, the whole set of the required tests and its commissioning isunderstood to be the second stage. The NSC is anticipated to be split into the two commissioning
stages: Commissioning Stage 1 (CS-1) – protective structure with process life-support systems andrequired infrastructure; Commissioning Stage 2 (CS-2) – infrastructure for SO unstable structures dismantling.
CS-1 engineering structures and process systems are being designed based on the design criteria
and requirements set forth in the ‘CS-1 NSC Concept Design Safety Document’ (CDSD) [19],concurred by the Regulatory Authorities of Ukraine. Ukrainian partners of NOVARKA also participate
in the design: KIEP and Ukrainian Research Institute of Steel Structures Design.

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As per [18], design of the deconstruction facilities (CS-2) must have started in parallel with theCS-1 design. Unfortunately, this design plan has not been implemented and considerable delay is CS-2
design has surfaced.
Early SO unstable structures dismantling within the scope determined during the deconstruction
working design will commence at the NSC project stage three, upon CS-2 commissioning.
CS-1 is designed of the following constituents represented by the NSC main structures andfacilities:
 steel Arch is the main structure; Operation and Control Facility (OCF) and Technological Building (TB); Technical Area.
The Arch is about 270 m wide, 164m long and 110 m high, including both end walls the eastern
and western (fig. 5.22 look the coloured inset).
The main bearing structure of the Arch consists of 16 arch trusses, installed with a pace of
12.5 m. The arch trusses in their design position (in the Service Zone) shall lean on the foundations bymeans of special supports. Span of the arch trusses is 257.44 m.
An arch truss is formed by two chord (upper and lower) and orthogonal lattice bracing of
triangular type. Chords are at 12.00 m from each other. Truss chords form a single node at the point ofrest on foundations. Arch truss chords are manufactured of tubes 813 mm in diameter and from 12.5 to40 mm thick.
The upper chord of arch trusses supports external cladding purlins, internal cladding members are
fixed to the lower chord. Leak tight Annular Space is formed between the external and internal cladding, it
protects Arch structures from external climatic effects and potential condensate inside the NSC.
Frame girders to support crane equipment are attached to arch trusses at the top elevations.
Design of the Arch west wall is represented by the system of vertical lattice columns andhorizontal trusses, and bracing. The entire West wall will be suspended from the Arch prior to its
sliding to the Service zone, and at the stage of operation will rest on foundation being supported by one
additional column installed in the central zone of the wall.
There is a lift, escape staircases and passages inside the west wall between its external andinternal cladding. A ventilation stack of 4.00 m diameter is attached to the west wall from the outside,
as well as gallery for ventilation equipment to be installed.
The Arch east wall is similarly to the west wall formed by the system of vertical lattice columns
and horizontal trusses, and bracing. The east wall is suspended from the wall and transfers no forces tothe existing structures. The east wall has a certain number of tilting panels to enable its travel over the
protrusion of the existing structures during the Arch sliding to its design position. These panels will be
reclined during sliding and set in their design position only upon definitive placement of the Arch in theService Zone.
It is designed to connect Arch load bearing members, including west and east walls using highstrength friction bolts.
Total weight of the Arch steel structures is about 20 thousand tons.
The following three types of foundations have been designed:
 foundations within the Arch assembly area (Erection Zone foundations);
 foundations within the zone of Arch sliding to its design position (Transfer Zone
foundations);
 foundations within the zone of Arch setting into its place (Service Zone foundations).
The Erection Zone foundations are designed as pile monolithic reinforced concrete groundbeams. 26.00m long steel driven piles are accepted in the form of pipes 1.02 m in diameter, and 30mm
thick wall in the top part, and 16mm along pile remainder.
Strip shallow reinforced concrete foundations are designed for the Arch Transfer Zone.

211

The Service Zone foundations are designed as pile monolithic reinforced concrete ground beams.
CFA piles are assumed 1.00 m in diameter and 19.00 m long.
General approach to selection of the Arch construction technology is based on the concept ofminimal operation under the Shelter Object radiation hazardous conditions, and envisages thefollowing:
 manufacturing of Arch members of the largest possible size and weight in shops; preassembly of erection blocs (Arch segments) in the Preassembly Area;
 final assembly of the Arch from Arch segments in the Erection Zone;
 sliding of the Arch in its design position.
Arch segments will be assembled from the shop manufactured members in the Preassembly Area
located at a considerable distance from the SO (about 1 km). 12 special benches will be provided on thearea for this purpose, equipped with demountable templates and patterns. Assembled segments of theArch shall be transported by means of four trailers to the Erection Zone located at the distance of about
300 m from the SO (fig. 5.23 look the coloured inset).
The Arch will be assembled in the Erection Zone in several stages (fig. 5.24 look the coloured
inset). Firstly, Arch east part, including the east end wall will be erected, and then it will be transferred
to waiting position. Subsequently, west part of the Arch will be assembled including the west end wall.
Certain process systems and equipment will also be installed in the process of the Arch assembly (inparticular, crane girders, a lift, ventilation, power supply, control and others). At the next stage the eastpart of the Arch will be transferred for further connection with the west part of the Arch. East and west
parts of the Arch will be connected and Main Cranes System will be also installed. The final stage isdedicated to the pre-commissioning works and acceptance of process systems and equipment of theArch prior to sliding into the design position.
Hoisting equipment, as well as special auxiliary erection equipment, in particular lifting towers
and beams, support beams, supports, locking devices, temporary braces, jacks, carriages, winches, andso on will be used for Arch erection.
Arch will be slid to its design position by means of a horizontal jack system. Upon completion of
the Arch sliding to its design position, temporary support nodes will be successively replaced bypermanent supports. That done, junction of the Arch to the Technological Building and existing
structures of the ChNPP Stage II Main Building, as well as process systems hook-up to the stationary
power supply sources will be done.
The Operation and Control Building and Technological Building are located next to the Archwest end wall. Moreover, part of the Technological Building is situated inside the Arch. Vehicles,
mechanisms and personnel will access the Arch through airlocks of the Technological Building, andsanitary lock located from the south of the ex-power unit 4 Turbine Hall.
Construction of the Operation and Control Building and Technological Building must becompleted before sliding of the Arch to the design position.
The Technological Building includes the Technological Block, Additional Unit, Southern andNorthern Airlocks, Annex to accommodate Liquid Radwaste Treatment System.
The Operation and Control Building is divided into separate functional blocks connected between
themselves and Technological Building by the technological gallery and personnel access gallery.
The Technical Area is located some way from the NSC (~ 500 m). Technical Area facilities will
provide for permanent NSC engineering support as to electrical power, hot and cold water, fire waterand portable water supply. Specialised pipe racking will connect the Technical Area and NSC facilities.
It is expected that the entire NSC Design will be completed by the middle of 2011. It is worthy ofnote that NSC design and construction works in general are considerably delayed as against the initial
SIP schedule. In view of the current situation it can be projected that NSC construction andcommissioning will be completed not earlier than in 2014.

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Another issue is that the current NSC construction value is estimated at 1 milliard Euro, which ismore than twice higher than the initial price reflected in the Contract with NOVARKA.
Only NSC CS-1 design documentation is currently developed. NSC CS-2 design will at the moststart in early 2011; it may result in imperfect consideration of the demands associated with SO unstablestructured deconstruction in NSC CS-1 development.
The equally serious issue poses the fact that no design work is currently carried out on
construction of a new and reinforcement of the existing ChNPP Stage II structures that will be
integrated in the NSC enclosure.
The abovementioned failures are to a wide extent caused by imperfection of the SIP, which liesin the fact that the single problem of the Shelter Object conversion was split into numerous tasks andpackages with a lack of interface ensured between a variety of Contractors. This approach creates
certain risks related to making optimal technical decisions.
5.1.4. Strategy of further Shelter Object conversion into an ecologically safe system
Development of safe methods and infrastructure for removing fuel containing materials from theShelter Object and their further management is a prerequisite to resolution of the problem of converting
this facility into an ecologically safe system. Resolution of this problem is of utmost importance toensuring future environmental safety of Ukraine and neighbouring countries, and raising world public
opinion of nuclear engineering development issues.
According to the ‘Shelter Object Conversion Strategy’ FCM removal efforts must be
implemented at the final third stage of the SO conversion into an ecologically safe system.
Judging by the condition and composition of the FCM accumulated in the Shelter Object they
represent long-lived radioactive waste (RAW). Additional surveys of some inaccessible FCM
accumulations are required in view of their potential nuclear hazard. That is should uncontrolled FCM
remain inside the SO it will never be released from nuclear regulation and control.
It should be mentioned that potential hazard of FCM may grow with time due to spontaneous
failure of lava-like FCM surface accompanied by high-level dust generation. Generation of such dust
inside the Shelter Object is of radioecological hazard of equally local and global nature. Therefore,
FCM removal and conditioning prior to their widespread failure is really pressing.
A part of the previously completed works dedicated to the problem of FCM removal from the SO
was based on the approaches that did not envisage construction the new confining structure (Shelter-2).
Such approach cannot be considered acceptable in view of the challenge of personnel andenvironmental protection.
Other designs, in particular of ISP NPP and Design Bureau ‘Pivdenne,’ contained processdecisions anticipating operations on FCM removal utilizing various NSC options (‘Start,’ ‘DockCaisson’ and other projects). However, given that definitive decision on NSC arch option has been
already taken, and design and preparatory works for its construction are underway, therefore processdecisions regarding FCM removal should be developed based on the actual situation.
SIP Task 19 ‘Study and Development of FCM Removal and RAW Management Strategy’ andTask 20 ‘Development of RAW Removal Process’ concerned the issue of FCM removal and further
management. Results of the above mentioned tasks served as a basis for program decision P7 taken in
December 2000, which stipulated preliminary strategy of FCM removal and RAW management. Basic
provisions of the strategy are as follows: FCM must be removed within the NSC life time; removal duration is 40÷50 years;
 removal of FCM and other long-lived RAW directly to the final disposal storage facility instable geological formations is of higher priority;213 selective FCM removal should start upon deconstruction of SO unstable structures andcompletion of FCM removal method testing; mass FCM removal must start upon resolution of their storage and disposal issue.
Moreover, decision P7 was reviewed similarly to the previous one that must be validated by the
key decision P8 based on the results of demonstration experiment on FCM removal at the SO Industrial
Site. The need for a demonstration experiment on FCM removal was reflected in program decision P9
taken in June 2001.
However, the document accepted in 2005 ‘Shelter Object FCM and Waste Management Strategy.
Action Plan’ [20] got concurred by the State Nuclear Regulation Committee states that: At present, there are no additional data regarding applicability of various technologies at the
OS for FCM removal, which could be used at the conceptual level as a basis to revise thepreliminary FCM removal strategy stated in P7, and adopt key decision P8. Therefore, any
further works on conceptual study of FCM removal strategy and technologies are notbeneficial at this stage;
 At this stage of SIP implementation no additional information about FCM was received topermit the decision on their early removal to be made. The existing information regarding
long-term behaviour of FCM needs to be supplemented by the elaboration of a FCM
monitoring and control program before and during their removal;
 The detailed design and demonstration of FCM removal technology prototype has been
acknowledged to be not effective in terms of cost and schedule.
At the same time, document [20] specifies the following Action Program to achieve P8 key decision: Pending approval of the key programmatic decision P8, during construction activities related
to stabilization of the Shelter structures, construction of the NSC and early dismantlement of
the unstable Shelter structures, the RAW, including FCM, will be managed in the frameworkof the ‘Integrated RAW Management Program at the Stage of ChNPP Shutdown and Shelter
Object Conversion into an Ecologically Safe System’; Task 14 will provide input data for development and installation of the FCM behaviour
monitoring system, and for the creation of systems maintaining optimal temperature andhumidity environment for storing FCM inside OS. This will allow obtaining information on
negative tendencies in FCM behaviour in timely manner;
 The forecast FCM behaviour model and the data obtained by means of the FCM behaviour
monitoring system, as well as nuclear safety monitoring system will enable implementing
timely preventive activities related to reduction of risk of any hazardous effects associatedwith deterioration of the FCM condition, as well as taking a decision on the need for FCM
early removal. Based on the forecast model and the results of FCM monitoring, the ‘FCM
Removal and Waste Management Strategy’ will be finalized and approved through the P8
Decision.
Given that FCM behaviour monitoring system development and introduction is not exercised,taking of P8 key decision does appear to be feasible in the nearest future.
Consequently, the NSC is being designed in circumstances where clear strategy of future FCM
removal and RAW management is missing. The only requirement for the NSC in the context of NSC
CS-1 design is provision of process room for future allocation and implementation of FCM and otherRAW removal methods. This poses certain risks of that FCM removal utilizing the NSC systems may
be considerably complicated or event impossible as regards particular FCM accumulations. Moreover,development of FCM management processes and infrastructure will take much time, but all the FCM
removal-related activities must be completed before the NSC process systems become worn out andoutdated. NSC radiation conditions may change significantly in the process of FCM removal, whichmust be considered in development and justification of a set of additional radiation protection measures.

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It should be mentioned that arrangement of several leak tight barriers precluding from any effecton the environment is a prerequisite to safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. The NSC is not a leak tightfacility, consequently, the risks of effect that power unit 4 nuclear fuel remains may have on theenvironment will be valid until it is removed from the SO.
Therefore, development of critical process decisions regarding FCM removal utilizing NSC
systems, as well as substantiation of their safe implementation that must be concurrent with the NSC
design and construction to allow consideration of future FCM removal needs to the maximum possible
extent in the course of NSC construction, is of immediate interest. This effort is being currently
implemented by the ISP NPP.
In order to successfully implement final stage of the ‘Shelter Object Conversion Strategy’ ageologic repository for FCM and other long-lived RAW disposal should be arranged under the national
program. Today a set of prospecting, estimate, scientific and methodological, research and design works
is envisaged under the ‘National Ecological Program for Radioactive Waste Management’ in order toselect sites that are potentially available for geological repository arrangement. Completion of thementioned efforts is scheduled in 2017.
In the circumstances concerned, the most optimistic date for the mass removal of FCM from the
SO to commence is 2030. Completion of these works within the NSC life time is of importance.
The Shelter Object does not have a single analogue in the international practise, i.e. the issue of
its conversion into an ecologically safe system presents a unique challenge, handling of which involves
efforts of Ukraine and world community.
5.1.5. Biomedical and biophysical monitoring of Shelter Object conversion safety
The Shelter Object conversion into an ecologically safe system is one of the high priority national
programs of Ukraine, medical and dosimetric measures aimed at maintenance of personnel healthengaged in these works is among central problems of contemporary clinical radiobiology, healthphysics and radiation protection [21, 22].
SIP works uniqueness lies in that personnel in fact performs set technical tasks being exposed
to high-level open radionuclide ionising radiation sources in destroyed ChNPP Unit 4 premises or in
the close vicinity of it within the contaminated area. Activities in the SO are carried out undermultifactor hazard with the radiation factor prevailing, intensified by hazardous industrial andcontamination factors in conditions of hard-to-get-to temporary working places located in premise of
the destroyed nuclear facility.
These activities make possible incorporation of transuranium element radionuclides in a humanbody (plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-240, plutonium-241, americium-241), and alsostronsium-90, cesium-137. The listed radionuclides are of extremely high radiobiological toxicity.
Nevertheless, it is practically impossible to detect most of them (except for cesium-137) directly in ahuman body. Moreover, high psychoemotional tension during works should mentioned. Accordingly,
specific requirements are imposed to somatic health and psycho-physiological characteristics of
personnel.
There are the following risk factors:
 aggressive chemical aerosols, including welding ones;
 high humidity rate and uncomfortable temperature conditions in any season;
 absence of forced exchange ventilation inside the SO; insufficient and more often artificial lighting; ‘confined space’ factor in the bulk of SO premises; height factor;
 difficulties of accessing working places under ionizing radiation exposure;215

 personnel protective equipment effect;
 synergic effect possible as a result of combined action of risk factors.
Consequently, personnel perform operations on SO conversion into an ecologically safe system
under synergy of radiological and industrial risks, as well as high psychoemotional tension.
Following recommendations of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, the State Establishment‘National Centre of Radiation Medicine’ (NCRM) of the National Academy of Medical Science of
Ukraine as the major scientific and medical institution of Ukraine in the area of health physics,
dosimetry and clinical radiation medicine, and the WHO Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness
and Assistance Network (WHO-REMPAN) were assigned to develop and lead the program of medical
and biophysical support of the SO conversion into ESS.
The system of medical and biophysical monitoring of engaged personnel health status andperformance capability was established based on the gained unique experience in medical, biologicaland dosimetric support of works in terms of extreme radiation and non-radiation hazard factors
affecting medical condition and performance efficiency of personnel with consideration forrequirements of basic normative documents, as well as national and international consensuses regarding
diagnostics of conditions representing contra-indications to operation under specific dangerous andhazardous working conditions (SDHWC). Major elements comprising the system is initial, regular, final
and special (including emergency) medical and psycho-physiological examination; among additional
elements is individual inspection and routine (preshift) medical examination (fig. 5.25).

Medical examination of SIP contractors' personnel
Initial examination

NCRM clinic,
Kyiv

Medical report on
permission/contraindications towork under SIP/SDHWC

Individual inspection
examination

NCRM clinic,
Kyiv

Validation of medical opinion
on fitness to work under
SIP/SDHWC

Special examination

NCRM clinic,
Kyiv

Validation of medical opinion
on fitness to work under
SIP/SDHWC

Routine (preshift)monitoring

Change Facility 1430
(ChNPP Industrial
Site)

Validation of medical opinion
on fitness to work under
SIP/SDHWC

Regular examination

NCRM clinic,
Kyiv

Validation of medical opinion
on fitness to work under
SIP/SDHWC

Final
examination

NCRM clinic,
Kyiv

Medical report on medical
condition upon engagement in
SIP/SDHWC works

Fig. 5.25. Chart of SIP contractors’ personnel medical examination

Major tasks of the Program for medical and biophysical monitoring of SIP personnel stipulate thefollowing:
1. Prevention of admission of personnel who are unable to perform works due to somatic or
psycho-physiological unfitness to work under specially dangerous and hazardous conditions.

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2. Prevention of any process accidents and incidents that may be caused by dramatic deteriorationof worker’s health. Especially in the event when deterioration of health state results in considerable
exposure dose or any other hazardous consequences.
3. Monitoring of potential internal exposure dose. Ascertain that workers do not get internal
exposure in the course of SIP works.
4. Radionuclide intake is precluded by means of training and workers’ discipline, as well as
adequately selected personnel protection means. An advantage of the program is an independent
assessment of personnel exposure risk enabled by available means.
5. Should radionuclide intake exceeding the permissible rate be observed, additional medical andbiophysical examination is carried out aimed at checking potential overexposure as a result of internaland external exposure, and possibility of further worker engagement in works at the ChNPP.
Biophysical monitoring (fig. 5.26) being a set of physical and biodosimetric measures aimed at
identification of cases of radioactive substances incorporation in workers’ organisms, calculation of
actual individual internal exposure doses resultant from these events and validation of compliance ofradiation and hygienic conditions at working places with Ukrainian sanitary legislation is a constituentof the Program of access and ensuring monitoring of SO works radiation safety [23].

Biophysical monitoring of SIP contractors' personnel

Initialexamination

Sampling – NCRM clinic, measurements –Research Institute of Radiation Protectionof Technical Science Academy, Dosimetry
Department

Routineexamination

Sampling – NCRM clinic, measurements –Research Institute of Radiation Protectionof Technical Science Academy, Dosimetry
Department

Specialexamination

Sampling – NCRM clinic, measurements –Research Institute of Radiation Protectionof Technical Science Academy, Dosimetry
Department

In-process
examination

Sampling – NCRM clinic, measurements –Research Institute of Radiation Protectionof Technical Science Academy, Dosimetry
Department

Final
examination

Sampling – NCRM clinic, measurements –Research Institute of Radiation Protectionof Technical Science Academy, Dosimetry
Department

Identification ofradioactive substances
incorporation cases,
calculation of actual
individual internal
exposure doses resultant
from these events basedon results of working
conditions analysis,
whole body counting
and bioassay

Fig. 5..26. Procedure of SIP contractors’ personnel biophysical monitoring

In the context of SIP works, biophysical monitoring includes collection on initial dosimetric
information about a worker and working place, and also routine health physics and biophysicalmonitoring. Initial and final, special, urgent (emergency) biophysical monitoring is performed
simultaneously with medical examination.

217

6510 employees of contracting organizations engaged in SIP works were subject to medical andbiophysical examination during 2004 – December 2009 in terms of obtaining permission to work at the
SO. Besides, 783 employees were subject to special medical examination (Table 5.4 and 5.5).
Table 5.4.
Results of SIP contractors’ personnel medical examination over the period from 12.10.2004 through 31.12.2009
Examination type

Fit

InitialRegularInspection
SpecialFinal

3125 (48.00%)
654 (62.82%)
605 (68.13%)

Unfit

Total

3385 (52.00%)
387 (37.18%)
283 (31.87%)
783 – individuals, 909 – cases
465

6510
1041
888

Table 5.5.
Scope of biophysical monitoring of SIP contractors’ personnel completed overthe period from 12.10.2004 through 28.02.2010
InitialBioassay year andmonth

12.10.2004 through28.02.2010

Faeces samples
activity measurement,
expert WBC

7268

Biophysical monitoring typeRoutineSpecialFaecesRadiometricsamplesmeasurement
Number ofactivitys of nostrilcases
measurem
smears
ent

8133

60491

1009

Final
Faeces samples
activity
measurement,
expert WBC

425

Final biophysical monitoring has not practically resulted in radionuclides observed in organismsof candidates for participation in SIP works, as well as radionuclides in bioassays (faeces, urine).
The data obtained during routine biophysical monitoring of personnel engaged in SIP works
evidence of measured 239+240Pu doses in examined personnel faeces samples. The number of cases of239+240
Pu content exceeding 1.5 mBq/sample measured in faeces samples, which required special
medical and biophysical examination of workers, equals 1009 (while some workers were subject tospecial examination three and more times).
Individual internal exposure doses assessed based on special biophysical monitoring results do
not exceed 3 mSv, which is the reference level for individual internal exposure dose adopted at the
ChNPP.
In October – November 2005 after the first year of medical and biophysical support of the SIP
works the Employer – SSE ChNPP evaluated the Program by means of the international audit. The
audit team was formed by specialists who represented the RTI International (Research Triangle Park,
North Carolina, the USA), Battelle Memorial Institute (Richland, Washington, the USA) ɿ Duke
University (Durham, North Carolina, the USA). According to the international audit conclusion thisproject merits high opinion and full support both for the methodology used and works organization withsome recommendations regarding streamlining of its management. The SIP works audit conducted by
the Mouchel Parkman Corporation in February 2007 resulted in the report stating that the Medical andbiophysical monitoring program turned out to be extremely successful in achieving its main goal:
ensuring medical fitness of SIP workers and precluding trials due to damaged health of the present andformer SIP workers.
The above presented medical and biophysical monitoring results evidence of the criticalimportance of further medical and biophysical support of SIP works, since exactly the issue of
personnel exposure is the key one in the course of operations under similar radiation and hygienic
conditions.

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5.2. Chernobyl NPP: focal points of decommissioning
5.2.1. Current status of Chernobyl NPP power units
The SSE ‘Chernobyl NPP’ (Fig. 5.27 look the coloured inset) is currently at the shutdown stage
that envisages implementation of the following activities: maintaining safe condition of the power units;
 removal of nuclear fuel from the power units;
 removal of working media and potentially hazardous substances from systems and equipment;
 final shutdown of systems and elements;
 removal of accumulated radioactive waste (RAW) from the power units; performance of the comprehensive engineering and radiation survey (CERS); dismantling of external (with regard to reactor facilities) equipment;
 reconstruction of decommissioning (DM) life support systems;
 DM documentation development; DM infrastructure development.
Safety on the Chernobyl NPP site is a high-priority. Notwithstanding the fact that the ChNPP
Units are shutdown and do not generate power now, they still pose a nuclear and radiation hazard. With
the objective to promote the already achieved level of safety at the Chernobyl NPP, the following set of
activities to maintain safe condition of the power units is being performed:
 maintaining operating condition of safety-important and process control systems, testing thesystems in accordance with the requirements stated in regulations and specifications; operation of systems and equipment in strict adherence to the requirements of technicalspecifications and manufacturer’s instructions;
 maintenance of the required temperature and humidity conditions in buildings and structures; maintenance and routine repairs of equipment as frequently as established by regulations andspecifications;
 maintenance of the already created fire prevention conditions on the pant’s site;
 ensuring an appropriate sanitary and access control, including a system of barriers on theways of radionuclides’ possible carry-over beyond the SSE ChNPP and Exclusion Zone
boundaries;
 ensuring radiation monitoring of the facilities and technology, including but not limited to: in-process radiation monitoring; radiation dosimetric monitoring; radiation monitoring of the protective barriers’ condition;
 control over non-proliferation of radioactive substances; radiation monitoring of the environment.
 strict adherence to the already established reference levels for a radiation well-being; continuous effort towards maintaining proficiency and qualification upgrades of thepersonnel.
Both the SSE ChNPP management and independent supervisory bodies strictly control fulfilmentof safety assurance activities. Over the past few years, no accidents or emergencies, cases of anunauthorised elevated exposure to personnel and carry-over of radioactive substances beyond thedesign-basis boundaries were registered at the Chernobyl NPP site.
Removal of nuclear fuel out of the power units is the major factor that determines a term of
decommissioning. In early March 2010, fresh nuclear fuel was exported to Russia (in the amount of 68
fresh fuel assemblies and 3 fuel elements).

219

Since 2006, SNF is being removed from the power units to ISF-1, an already available storage
facility, due to a delay in construction and commissioning of the new Interim Spent Fuel Dry Storage
Facility (ISF-2). The objective is to mitigate risks during decommissioning and transformation of theShelter Object into an ecologically safe system, as well as to reduce expenses for the power units’ safe
condition maintenance. Prior to start localization of additional SNF in ISF-1, the SSE ChNPP has
accomplished a large volume of work to reassess safety of the existing storage facility. Based on thesafety reassessment results, the ‘Plan for ISF-1 Safety Improvement’ was developed and is being
successfully implemented now. Accomplishment of the Plan’s first-priority tasks (first of all,reconstruction of transport and handling equipment) has provided the SSE ChNPP with an opportunity
to obtain the License for ISF-1 operation and to start SNF removal from the power units.
Removal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is performed in three phases:
 the first phase envisages transportation of spent nuclear fuel from Unit 3 to ISF-1;
 the second phase shall include transportation of fuel (exclusive of damaged one) from Units
1&2 to ISF-1;
 at the third phase the damaged nuclear fuel shall be removed from Units 1&2.
The first phase was successfully implemented in September 2010; the nuclear fuel wascompletely removed from Unit 3. Now, nuclear fuel in Units 1&2 is only present in the cooling pools
adjacent to the reactors. The damaged NF in the cooling pools of Units 1&2 is stored in special
canisters of various configurations constructed through an independent effort of the SSE ChNPP.
Currently in progress are ate preparations to start the second phase of activities that envisages removalof nuclear fuel from the power units.
Development of the ChNPP decommissioning documentation
Over the past five years, development of the conceptual documents concerning the Chernobyl
NPP power units decommissioning was completely finished. Before 2009, ‘The Comprehensive
Program of the Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning’ approved by Resolution No. 1747 issued by the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 29 November 2000 was the principal national-level document thatguided activities for the Chernobyl NPP power units decommissioning and transformation of the Shelter
Object into an ecologically safe system. In 2009, following adoption of the Law of Ukraine titled ‘On
the National Program for the Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning and Transformation of the Shelter
Object into an Ecologically Safe System’, the Comprehensive Program became out-of-date and ceased
to be effective. The National Program describes strategies for decommissioning the Chernobyl NPP
units and transformation of the Shelter Object into an ecologically safe system. Also, the document
includes estimation of funding needs and a list of top-priority activities (till 2013) required to
implement the strategies.
During 2008-2009, the following were developed, approved, and carried into effect: ‘Program for ChNPP Units Decommissioning’; ‘Health Physics Criteria of the Final Condition Resulting from the ChNPP Decommissioning’.
The above documents include a detailed description of the decommissioning activities scheduledtill completion of the process (till 2064) and establish numerical values for radioactive contaminationlevels at the ChNPP site after the decommissioning completion.
Development of the ‘Project for ChNPP Units Final Shutdown and Mothballing (FSM)’ is inprogress. The Project shall become a basic document for obtaining a permission to start the first stage of
ChNPP decommissioning activities.
The Project includes a great number of documents. These are 9 separate projects related tomothballing of Units 1,2&3, a set of safety justifications (SAR, EIA, SCR), the Phase
Implementation Program to guide the FSM phase activities. The Program is a detailed action planfor the period of 2013-2022.

220

Development of the ‘Program for Research and Development Support to the Activities for the
Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning and Transformation of the Shelter Object into an Ecologically Safe
System’ is in progress. ‘The Integrated Program for the SSE ChNPP Radioactive Waste Management’has been revised.
Information technologies
As per ‘General Provisions on Nuclear Plants Safety’ NP 306.2.141-2008, an operator shalladjust to new conditions an informational support system for decommissioning process prior to start
works and operations for a nuclear power plant (unit) decommissioning.
The following were developed and put into operation at the SSE ChNPP: CERS database (INFODEC); RAW inventory database; Integrated Shelter Database (ISDB).
The activities for development and commissioning of the following are in progress:
 integrated system for informational support to decommissioning; visualization centre for the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning.
In spite of a lack of experience in large nuclear industrial facilities decommissioning, a large
number of works has been accomplished at the ChNPP site. Presently, at the Chernobyl NPP Units
shutdown stage, during 2000–2010:
1. working media and potentially hazardous substances were removed out of over 200 processsystems;
2. over 370 systems and 700 pieces of equipment and elements were finally shutdown, that is
63% of all existing systems and elements and 98% of a number of the systems and elements
subject to final shutdown prior to the fuel complete removal;
3. with the objective to pilot dismantling techniques and gain a relevant experience, over 1000
tons of equipment were dismantled, 12% of the dismantled equipment were decontaminateddown to the levels permitting a release from regulatory control;
4. nuclear fuel was removed from Units 1,2&3 reactors that were finally shutdown;
5. comprehensive engineering and radiation surveys of Units 1,2&3 were accomplished;
6. Unit 1 CERS data were updated, update of Unit 2 CERS data was started;
7. a 10-year extension of operating life was ensured for the systems and elements of Units 1&2
that are involved into RAW and SNF management processes (Unit 1 – till 2017, Unit 2 – till2018). In 2010-2011, the effort to extend operating life of Unit 3 systems and elements is inprogress.
5.2.2. ChNPP decommissioning strategy
In accordance with ‘The Chernobyl NPP Decommissioning Concept’ approved in 2004 that wasdeveloped to meet specific conditions of the decommissioning license and with due regard for theinternational and national experience, regulatory system of Ukraine, and actual condition of the ChNPP
site, decommissioning includes the following three phases (Fig. 5.28):
 final shutdown and mothballing of reactor facilities (mothballing of the reactors and the worst
radioactively contaminated equipment shall be accomplished at this stage (tentatively till 2022);
 cooling of reactor facilities over the period ensuring natural reduction of radioactivity down
to acceptable levels (tentatively till 2045);
 dismantling of reactor facilities (at this phase the equipment shall be dismantled and the site
shall be cleaned with the objective to maximally remove restrictions and release regulatory
control (tentatively till 2065).

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Fig. 5.28. The Chernobyl NPP decommissioning strategy.

The Concept outlines the following strategy for the ChNPP decommissioning: deferred dismantling (SAFSTOR method, as per the internationally accepted classification)
 early removal of FC; dismantling of lifting equipment in CH;
 reconstruction of CH marquees;
 dismantling of external structures;
 cooling of primary circuit (PC) and reactors, up to 50 years;
 engineering structures dismantling and ChNPP site cleanup are not decommissioning
activities, they shall be considered within the framework of activities for mitigation of theaccident consequences and recovery of the Exclusion Zone.
Currently, the Chernobyl NPP is at the shutdown stage. This is a preparatory stage preceding
decommissioning. During this phase, nuclear fuel shall be removed from the power units anddispatched to a long-term storage facility. This is the main task inducing duration of the phase. It shallbe completed no earlier than 2013.
The following are the major tasks of the Chernobyl NPP at the shutdown stage: maintain safe condition of power units 1,2,3 and existing spent nuclear fuel storage facility; develop the infrastructure needed to manage spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste at the
Chernobyl NPP industrial site; remove nuclear fuel from the power units;
 complete construction and commissioning of the following: the second storage facility for spent nuclear fuel; liquid radioactive waste treatment plant; industrial complex for solid radioactive waste management;
 develop and approve the following projects:
 for the phase of Units 1,2,3 final shutdown and mothballing; for reconstruction of transport and process sectors at the existing spent nuclear fuelstorage facility; for the damaged nuclear fuel management; for the cooling pond decommissioning; upgrade the infrastructure facilities (power supply network, heat and water supply, fire
suppression system, telecommunications, etc.);
 remove working media and potentially hazardous substances from systems and equipment;
 finally shutdown, decommission, and partially dismantle some systems and elements at thepower units; accomplish the comprehensive engineering and radiation survey (CERS); implement administrative and technical measures for management, operation, maintenance,and repairs of the systems that shall be in further operation, ensure safety monitoring.

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At the stage for the Chernobyl NPP power units’ final shutdown and mothballing the following
major activities shall be implemented:
 dismantle external (with regard to a nuclear reactor) systems and elements of the facilities
that do not impact safety and shall not be required at further stages;
 improve the barriers that prevent from release of radioactivity into the environment;
 safely mothball those parts of the facilities that are not subject to dismantling; ensure conditions to allow temporary monitored storage of radioactive substances at thefacilities;
 collect and condition the radioactive waste accumulated during the abovementioned
activities, transfer the radioactive waste to specific enterprises.
During the reactor facilities cooling phase the following major activities shall be implemented:
 operation of the systems and elements ensuring safe storage of the radioactive substances
contained in the mothballed facilities;
 periodical survey of a mothballed facility condition;
 dismantling of equipment that was not subject to mothballing; collection and conditioning of the radioactive waste accumulated during the abovementioned
activities, transfer of the radioactive waste to special enterprises.
The following are planned for a phase of the reactor facilities dismantling: dismantle and remove systems and elements, which contamination level exceeds the removal
levels, with the objective to dispatch them for interim storage in radioactive waste storage
facilities;
 collect and condition the radioactive waste accumulated during the abovementioned
activities, transfer the radioactive waste to special enterprises; execute final radiation survey of a site with the objective to confirm that the decommissioning
activities are complete.
Since the ChNPP is located within the area that was radioactively contaminated as a result of the1986 accident and some engineering structures of Unit 3 are common with the Shelter Object, the end
goal of decommissioning ChNPP is such a condition that conventionally may be called a ‘brown spot’.
The ‘brown spot’ is a condition of a site, where dismantling of equipment, structures, and buildings iscomplete and radioactivity of engineering structures, being the sources of ionizing radiation, is within
the levels established for a restricted release from regulatory control. Actually, this is a cleanup of thesite and engineering structures down to the contamination level similar to the one present within the
Exclusion Zone around the ChNPP and resulting from the 1986 accident. However, in the current
context such a final status of the ChNPP site is economically inadvisable.
Currently, the ChNPP is endeavouring to prepare a new Decommissioning Concept that will
identify the site’s new final status, i.e. an ‘industrially developed site’. Development of the ChNPP site
shall not only remove the burden from the state budget that is imposed by the upkeep of the Exclusion
Zone, elimination of the Chernobyl accident consequences and ChNPP decommissioning, but also
recover economic activity on the restricted lands, take the maximum benefit, turn the lands into an
economically developed area. For this purpose, it is necessary to efficiently use the following specificfeatures of the Exclusion Zone and ChNPP industrial site: simultaneous decommissioning of three metal-intensive units;
 availability of the undeveloped operational structure, i.e. the systems of communications,power supply, physical security, water supply, radiation monitoring and railroad and motor
access ways;
 isolation from centres of population;
 availability of the personnel competent in radioactive material management;
 location within the Exclusion Zone, being the a restricted use area.

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We propose to more actively use the above specific features and potentialities of the ChNPP
industrial site and Exclusion Zone for the needs of Ukraine’s nuclear industry, with regard to the final
link in a nuclear energy uses technique (nuclear power plant units decommissioning and radioactive
material management), for example:
 develop a centralized system for the Ukrainian NPPs SNF management within the Exclusion
Zone and provide the ChNPP with an operator status;
 launch production of RAW long-term storage/disposal containers for Ukraine’s nuclear
industry and establish an integrated unified SNF and RAW transportation and processing
pattern to enable the following: recycle the Exclusion Zone’s radioactively contaminated materials for the purpose of
RAW storage containers production, which will also allow a significant reduction in the
total volume of radioactively contaminated waste;
 save government funds spent on disposal of the branch-produced RAW; establish a complex facility for the NPPs’ RAW management within the Exclusion Zone, thefacility shall include: a plant for large-sized equipment processing and interim storage;
 a complex facility for processing and remelt of the radioactively contaminated metal from
nuclear facilities (including the ChNPP and Exclusion Zone) and industrial complex of
Ukraine.
 on the basis of the Chernobyl NPP training centre, establish a head training centre in Ukraine
for training, retraining, and advanced vocational training of personnel in decommissioning
and RAW management techniques.
5.2.3. Development of RAW management infrastructure
According to the National Program of Decommissioning, the most crucial now are RAW
management activities, in terms of the Chernobyl NPP safe decommissioning and the Shelter Object(SO) transformation.
The total volume of RAW subject to processing during the ChNPP Units DM and the SO
transformation into an ecologically safe system in the course of 35 years (prior to a start of thedecommissioning phase) amounts to 140 000 m3 (exclusive of the SO structures as such). Therefore,
development of an integrated RAW management system applicable to the ChNPP conditions is among
the urgent tasks faced by the SSE ChNPP today.
Currently, the following facilities are available at the ChNPP:
for RAW management:
 ChNPP and SO floor drain processing system; solid RAW storage facility;
 liquid RAW storage facility; solid & liquid RAW storage facility; solid RAW interim storage facility
for radioactively contaminated material management: decontamination sites; interim storage sites for contaminated large-sized equipment; interim storage site for process materials.
The existing system for RAW management was designed for an operating NPP. The task was tochange the RAW management system into a system for RAW management at an NPP subject todecommissioning. For the first time, the strategy of an integrated RAW management systemdevelopment at the ChNPP site was outlined in the ChNPP Decommissioning Plan (CDP) elaborated in224

Fig. 5.16. Change Facility for 1430 people.

Fig. 5.17. SO western zone stabilisation.

Fig. 5.18. Stabilisation of the south roofing zone.

Fig. 5.19. The protective concrete wall.

Fig. 5.20. Pioneer Wall Berm removal.

Fig. 5.21. NSC Construction Site Preparation.

Fig. 5.22. NSC overall view.

Fig. 5.23. Delivery of an Arch segment to the Erection Zone.

Fig. 5.24. Assembly of the Arch in the Erection Zone.

Fig. 5.27. The Chornobyl NPP industrial site.

Fig. 5.29. Liquid Radwaste Treatment Plant.

Fig. 5.30. Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management.

Fig. 5.31. Complex for producing metal drums and reinforced concrete containers to store radioactive waste.

Fig. 5.32. Allocation of special productsin the Central Hall.

Fig. 5.33. Long waste fragmentation plant.

Fig. 5.34. ISF-2 storage modules.

Fig.6.1. General view of the ‘Vektor’ Complex Commissioning Stage One.

1996 under TACIS Program. The document specifies a list and key features of the facilities to beconstructed on the plant’s site in order to ensure the process for power units decommissioning andradioactive waste (RAW) management: a plant for liquid radioactive waste collection, transportation,and cementation; a plant for solid radioactive waste collection and processing, the RAW disposal site.
Currently, the above listed facilities are being developed at the Chernobyl NPP site under theinternational community’s support through a number of projects:
 liquid radioactive waste treatment plant; industrial complex for solid radioactive waste management;
 complex for producing metal drums and reinforced concrete containers to store radioactive
waste;
 improvement of the Chernobyl NPP facilities for long-length scrap fragmentation.
Liquid Radwaste Treatment Plant (LRTP)
The LRTP (fig.5.29 look the coloured inset) is designed for treatment of liquid radioactive waste
accumulated over the operation time, those generated in the course of ChNPP decommissioning, andalso operation SO LRAW. The LRTP is designed to process LRAW over the 10 year operation life. It
minimal design capacity is 2500 cubic meters of unprocessed LRAW per a year. The plant is within the
ChNPP protected perimeter in the vicinity of the Liquid Radwaste Storage Facility and is interfacingwith the latter through process pipelines installed on the enclosed pipe rack.
The LRTP is built up from: the unit for liquid radioactive waste (LRAW) removal from theexisting storages; the unit for LRAW hauling to the treatment unit; the treatment unit – LRAW concrete
fixation aimed at sealing and immobilisation.
Hardened liquid radwaste in the form of concrete compound, i.e. final product is packed in 200liter drums and is hauled in reinforced concrete containers to the location of conditioned RAW longterm controlled storage. This location is LOT-3 of the Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste
Management.
LRTP Design was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree No.105ɪ dated 22
March 2001.
The plant is constructed under the Chernobyl NPP Nuclear Safety Project funded by EBRD
financed under the Nuclear Safety Account as per Grant Agreement with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development dated 12.11.96. The works were commenced in 1999 under Contract
No.ChNPP C-1/2/036 dated 16.09.1999. Consortium formed by BELGATOM\SGN\FINMECANNICA SpA D’AZIE Ⱥ ANSALDO NUCLEARE was the Contractor. Initial schedule had
31.12.2001 as the construction completion date.
In view of repeated works cost increase and project duration period extension, and also due toinadequate performance of the Contractor it was decided at consent of the Nuclear Safety AccountDonor Countries Assembly to transfer LRTP completion from the Consortium lead by Belgatom, theMain Contractor, for direct management by the Employer (SSE ChNPP). On 18.09.2006 all the works
at LRTP were stopped, one month was spent for proper transfer of the facility from the Contractor to
the Employer as a result of LRTP contract termination. The LRTP has been in the ‘incomplete
construction’ status since the date of contract termination. The SSE ChNPP maintains life support
systems of the facility.
The Contractor handed over the facility to the Employer in the state actual at the moment ofexecution of the agreement (construction and installation works were complete for 90%, installation ofequipment for 16 %, the design was 50 % inconsistent with normative and technical documentation).
Contract Value increased by approximately 50% over that period.
From the moment of contract termination till positive decision on further funding of LRTP
completion works (at the Donor Countries Assembly conducted 17–18 July 2007) the SSE ChNPP

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conjointly with the Chernobyl Safety Project Management Unit carried out the following activities
aimed at further implementation of the LRTP project: technical assessment of systems and facility state upon termination of the contract withconsortium; determined the scope of works on LRTP project completion;
 estimated LRTP project completion cost; determined LRTP project completion duration;
 project implementation risks were determined and analysed; ‘LRTP completion strategy’ was developed and concurred by EBRD; ‘LRTP completion plan’ was developed and concurred by EBRD.
As per the developed ‘LRTP completion strategy’ all the activities required for projectcompletion were divided into 4 packages:
Ⱥ – design and safety justification;
ȼ – procurement, installation, setup, testing of equipment and entire plant;
ɋ – ensuring functioning of automated process control systems;
D – expert and advisory services.
Tender exercises take place and contracts are signed for each package as per the EBRD
Procurement Policies and Rules. LRTP construction activities are currently nearing completion.
Commissioning is scheduled to start in the latter half of 2011.
Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management (ICSRM)
The Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management (ICSRM) (fig.5.30 look thecoloured inset) is designed for solid RAW removal from the ChNPP Solid RAW Storage Facility(SRSF), processing, packing and temporary storage. The ICSRM is formed by four interfacing units(lots):
Lot 0: Temporary Storage Facility for Solid Waste of Category III, Low- and Intermediate Level
Long-Lived Waste (HLW & LIL LLW);
Lot 1: Unit for RAW removal from the SRSF;
Lot 2: Solid RAW sorting, conditioning and processing plant (SRPP);
Lot 3: Specially Equipped Shallow Ground Repository for Solid Low- and Medium-Level RAW,
located at the ‘Vektor’ Complex site.
The Employer and Beneficiary in respect of Lot 1 and 2 is SSE ChNPP, as regards Lot 3 – SSE‘Tekhnotsentr.’ ICSRM construction works were carried out in accordance with the design approved by
CMU Decrees No.816-ɪ dated 26.12.2003, No.659-ɪ dated 27.12.2006. As per Contract 1L10/99
signed on 05.03.2001 the NUKEM Technologies GmbH (Germany) was the Contractor. All the works
under the Contract have been completed to date. On 24.04.2009 the Contractor was provided with theCompleted Facility Acceptance Certificate, authorization for Lot 1, 2 commissioning was obtained.
Works on Lot 3 were completed in February 2010. Commissioning is expected to be complete in theformer half of 2011. However, it should be mentioned that the below listed issues having direct impact
on facilities operation efficiency are still pending: criteria of solid RAW acceptance to the SRPP are too conservative, which will require
additional operations be performed on characterisation and sorting of solid radioactive waste
generated in the curse of ChNPP decommissioning and SO conversion prior to theiracceptance for conditioning; too conservative criteria of conditioned RAW acceptance for disposal that will result in theiramount increase; high operating costs.

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Complex for Producing Metal Drums and Reinforced Concrete Containers to Store SSE
ChNPP Radioactive Waste (CPMD&CR)
The Complex for Producing Metal Drums and Reinforced Concrete Containers to Store SSE
ChNPP Radioactive Waste (fig. 5.31 look the coloured inset) shall facilitate safe processing,transportation, and storage of the processes RAW. Casks of 3 m3 in capacity and round metal drums(primary package) with lids of four types differing in size, design, materials and operation life will be
produced. The Complex is constructed under Contract No.99691 dated 28.12.2007 by the Ukrainian
Corporation ‘UkrTransBud.’ The project is funded by the European Union. Construction andinstallation works at the construction site in the Slavutich Industrial Zone are currently nearing
completion. Works completion as scheduled under the Contract is second quarter of 2011.
Improvement of the Chernobyl NPP facilities for long-length scrap fragmentation
Equipment and special products utilised in reactor cores during operation (fig. 5.32 look thecoloured inset) are currently stored in cooling pools, process pits, as well as ChNPP Unit 1, 2, 3
reactors. Their processing will result in approximately 2000 m3. Moreover, ISF-1 cooling pools
contain about 18000 stainless steel canisters over 10 m long, currently containing Spend Fuel
Assemblies (SFA) and will be empty once SNF is sent to ISF-2. Practically all the special products
are from 6 to 22 meters long, which requires using special equipment and process for their treatment(fig. 5.33 look the coloured inset). Furthermore, special products activity varies along their length
depending on location relative to the core centre. Therefore, differentiated approach shall be applied
while radiation condition is determined and in selection of preliminary treatment methods for the
special products. Improvement of the Chernobyl NPP facilities for long-length scrap fragmentation isexactly aimed at handling these problems.
The improvement of the Chernobyl NPP facilities for long-length scrap fragmentation project is
implemented being supported by the EU under Contract TACIS/2007/132-889 dated 03.08.2009, theContractor is AMEC Nuclear International Ltd, (UK). Project completion date is 02.02.2013 (365 days
warranty period included).
With progress of works on decommissioning and Shelter Object conversion into an ecologicallysafe system amount of RAW differing in type and activity considerably increases requiring quite a few
facilities for RAW management in accordance with effective norms and standards. This applies toremoved reinforced concrete structures and metalwork, cable products, building refuse. According tocomprehensive engineering and radiation survey 90 thousand tons is the amount of contaminated metalfrom 3 power units, 80% of the amount are radioactively contaminated. Therefore arrangement of an
integrated RAW management system at the ChNPP Site is one of priority tasks.
The listing of additional facilities required has been generated under the ‘National Ecological
Program for Radioactive Waste Management’ (Table 5.2):
Required facilities

Plant for LRAW Preliminary Treatment including TUE and Organic Substances
RemovalBuffer Storage for LML-SLW, Buffer Storage for Removed Contaminated Equipment
Solid LML-LLW Management Area
Cable Products Processing Plant
LLW and HLW Storage Facility
Complex for Radioactively Contaminated Metal Processing
Fragmentation and Large-Size Equipment Disassembling Area

Commissioning date

2012
2013
2012
2012
2013
2013
2012

Activities have started on some of the items. For instance, a pilot plant for organic substances and
TUE removal from SO water is currently under trial operation, since it will be used for proposed
treatment method testing. These activities are supported by the IAEA. Upon its approbation the next
phase will start, i.e. full-scale plant construction.

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Construction and commissioning of the new ChNPP facilities will substantially expand
processing capabilities for radioactive waste generated in the course of units decommissioning andconversion of the Shelter Object into an ecologically safe system.
5.2.4. Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Facility (ISF-2)
Spent fuel assemblies (SFA) of the Chernobyl NPP are stored in the spent fuel pool (ISF-1),
commissioned in 1986, and at-reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cooling pools.
More than 21 thousand nuclear fuel elements (spent fuel assemblies) have accumulated at the
Chernobyl NPP site over the period of its operation. Design capacity and design period of safe ISF-1
operation do not allow placement of all the ChNPP SFA for long-term storage, which raised the needfor another spent fuel storage facility be constructed (ISF-2) (fig. 5.34 look the coloured inset).
The ‘Memorandum of Understanding between governments of the G7 countries, European
Commission and Ukrainian government regarding decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP’ wasconcluded on 20 December 1995. Power units defueling is the prerequisite to transfer from the
shutdown stage to decommissioning. Following the domestic and world experience of spent fuelmanagement the open international tender resulted in a dry fuel storage facility with fuel stored in leaktight canisters located in ventilated concrete modules selected for construction at the Chernobyl NPP.
ISF-2 construction will facilitate long-term storage of the gross volume of SNF accumulated at
the Chernobyl NPP, as well as ISF-1 decommissioning. On 12.11.1996 Grant Agreement No.006 wassigned between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter – EBRD),
Ukrainian Government and Chernobyl NPP, and ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on
18.03.1997. According to this Agreement with EBRD the ISF-2 construction is funded by the Nuclear
Safety Account.
The FRAMATOME Company was the first Main Contractor. ISF-2 construction was stopped in
April 2003 due to considerable deviations from the Terms of Reference, and the Contract with
FRAMATOME was terminated. Contract ChNPP/ɋ2/10/062 for ISF-2 project completion was signed
between the SSE ChNPP and Holtec International on 17.09.2007.
Pursuant to the Contract terms the project is implemented in two the stages (Authorisations):
 Authorisation 1 – design documentation development, support of the State Comprehensive
Expert Review and design approval, support of the process for obtaining authorisation forresumption of the construction;
 Authorisation 2 – supply of materials and equipment, construction and installation works,
pre-commissioning test, support of obtaining authorisation for ISF-2 commissioning.
As per the Contract Work Schedule the design ‘SSE ChNPP. Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage
Facility (ISF-2). Construction Completion Design’ and ISF-2 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report(PSAR) have been developed. ISF-2 will facilitate acceptance for storage, preparation for storage, andstorage over 100 years of more than 21000 SFA of LWGR-1000 (light-water-cooled graphitemoderated reactor) at the capacity of 2500 SFA per a year. ISF-2 is composed of the two parts:
 Spent Fuel Storage Preparation Unit (SFSPU).
SFSPU function lies in preparing for storage and packaging of more than 21 000 SFA, about
2 000 SFC (spent fuel canisters) and over 23 000 shim rods received form ChNPP power units 1, 2 andISF-1. The Unit is designed for ensuring minimal annual productive efficiency of processing 2500 SFA
or SFC.
 Spent Fuel Storage Zone (SFSZ)
The following operations are performed in the SFSZ:
 hauling of canisters filled with spent fuel from the SFSPU to SFSZ by means of the Canisters
Handling and Transportation System;228 placement of canisters into horizontal concrete storage modules (CSM) of 100 years design life; storage of nuclear fuel canisters over 100 years.
The forecast date of ISF-2 construction completion and start of its commissioning is middle of 2013.

5.3. International collaboration for Shelter Object conversion
and ChNPP decommissioning
The accident of 1986 at the ChNPP affected drastically life of millions of people and resulted in a
deep concern of the world community. Overcoming of its consequences required efforts of the global
community be integrated, therefore international collaboration became essential for the accident
consequences elimination. Since 1990 international collaboration was focused on improving safety andthe following priority directions were determined: final shutdown of the ChNPP and conversion of thedestroyed unit four into an ecologically safe system.
Conversion of the Shelter Object into an ecologically safe system was and remains one of the
major challenges associated with elimination of the Chernobyl accident consequences andenvironmental safety.
The first step within the international collaboration in the mentioned direction was theinternational contest of designs and technical solutions for SO conversion into an ecologically safe
system announced in 1992. The contest resulted in the Concept of gradual conversion of the SO an
ecologically safe system selected, which included stages of stabilisation of the existing Shelter Object,
construction of a new structure confining the SO (‘Shelter-2’), construction of shallow groundrepositories, removal, conditioning and placement of SO radioactive materials in storage facilities.
In 1993 the European Commission called for tenders for feasibility study (FS) of the first concept
stages, i.e. stabilisation of the existing Shelter Object and ‘Shelter-2’. The ‘Alliance’ Consortium leadby the French Company ‘Campenon Bernard SGE’ became the selected tenderer.
On 11 September 1995 Brussels hosted the European Commission session attended by Ukrainiandelegation and dedicated to determination and coordination of further joint measures based on‘Alliance’ Consortium studies. The meeting resulted in the agreement concluded in the frame of the
TACIS project between the European Commission and ‘Alliance’ Consortium and ‘Trischler undPartner GmbH’ Company for development of short and long-term measures. The Recommended Policy
establishing potential short- and long-term measures and proposing set of first-priority measures wasdeveloped under this project.
Further efforts under the project ‘Chernobyl Unit 4. Short- and Long-Term Measures’ atcooperation of the European Commission, Ukraine, the USA and international experts group resulted inthe ‘Shelter Implementation Plan’ (SIP) developed, which was accepted at the meeting of the Group of
Seven in June 1997. The Plan established the main concept, including the set of steps aimed at SO
conversion into an ecologically safe status.
On 20 November 1997 the conference of the Donor Countries took place in New York; attendees
pledged liabilities for the specially established Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) for the Plan
implementation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was entrusted with
the Fund management task. The Agreement (‘Framework Agreement’) between Ukraine and EBRD
was also signed at the conference. Today, the number of Donor Countries equals 28.
On 20 April 1998 the Contract for SIP Project Management Unit Consultant was signed with theselected tenderer. The Consortium formed by Bechtel (USA), Battelle (USA) and EDF (France) became
the winner.
The SIP was recently progressing. In 2008 the first phase of the Plan was completed. Shelter
Object structures were accepted for operation upon their stabilisation measured under the Deed of theState Acceptance Committee dated 29 October 2008. Design for Stabilisation was developed by the229Ukrainian consortium formed by the Kyiv Institute ‘EnergoProekt,’ Research Institute of Engineering
Structures and NPP Safety Problems Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
Construction was performed by the Main Contractor composed of the ‘AtomBudEksport’ Close
Corporation Close, ‘Rivno NPP Construction Department’ Corporation, ‘UTEM’ Public Corporation,
Ukrainian Design and Technological Institute ‘AtomEnergoBudProekt,’ and State Enterprise ‘UTEMEngineering’. This is the major project implemented under the SIP. The tender for the New Safe
Confinement (NSC) construction was held in the same year and the contract was awarded to the winner,
the NOVARKA Consortium. NSC construction works are in progress. While not every safety importantmeasure envisaged by the SIP is implemented. For instance, development of a method for fuelcontaining materials (FCM) removal from the destroyed unit four (Task 20) and removal oftransuranium elements and organic substances from Shelter Object water (Task ɚ 13) were postponedfor indefinite term and their funding under SIP was stopped. Collaboration with the Donor Countries
must be renewed at the national level regarding resumption of these measures critical in terms of safety
within the SIP and potential fundraising thanks to new donor countries.
The ChNPP also actively collaborates with the global community as for the decommissioning.
Initial attempts of estimating ChNPP decommissioning cost were made under the TACIS
program. In 1996 the AEA Technology Company developed the ‘Chernobyl Decommissioning Plan’(CDP). According to the CDP equipment mothballing within the existing structures for at least 30 yeas
including minimal work on reactor installations dismantling was acknowledged to be the mostappropriate option.
Moreover, the CDP provides approximate man-hours calculations, financial needs of the whole
ChNPP decommissioning project before the mothballing phase, lists and provides basic characteristics
of major facilities to be constructed at the plant site to enable power units decommissioning andradioactive waste (RAW) management.
In 1996 the ChNPP Nuclear Safety Project was launched. The project is funded under the Grant
Agreement between Ukraine and EBRD, and also Nuclear Safety Account. ChNPP Unit 3 safetyenhancement measures were implemented under this project, and process of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment
Plant and Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISF-2) design are currently subject to improvement.
In 1997 works on Heat Plant (HP) construction completion commenced funded through theinternational aid (the US Department of Energy), as well as Ukrainian contribution. The Heat Plant
designed for heat supply to the site facilities upon final power units shutdown, was commissioned inJune 2001.
Today, Ukraine is one of the major countries receiving technical aid from the European Union. 5
projects initiated in the frame of the ɌȺCIS Technical Aid Program for the CIS countries are atdifferent implementation stages at the ChNPP Site: the put into operation Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management(ICSRM); additional works associated with ICSRM are underway, including installation of ventilation
system in building 84;
 Complex for Producing Metal Drums and Reinforced Concrete Containers to Store SSE
ChNPP Radioactive Waste; improvement of the Chernobyl NPP facilities for long-length scrap fragmentation;
 arrangement of the ChNPP decommissioning information support system.
The project ‘Arrangement of the ChNPP decommissioning information support system’ waslaunched on 26 May 2009 as a result of the need for storing and update of information gained in thecourse of ChNPP units decommissioning. Implementation of the project will allow selection of the most
optimal organizational and technical solutions for decommissioning; ensuring support for planning of
the decommissioning; storing and update of information gained at each stage of the decommissioning.

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Since 2001 the IAEA provides purposeful support to Ukraine as regards decommissioning of the
ChNPP. Starting from 2001 the ChNPP receives technical aid under four national projects that are
mostly aimed at supporting implementation of the tasks set forth in the National ChNPP
Decommissioning Program, and also radioactive waste management at the Chernobyl site. The IAEA
support is exercised in the format of seminars, trainings, expert missions, visits aimed at experienceexchange. Major directions within the collaboration is transfer of experience and knowledge regarding
development of documentation on decommissioning, decommissioning safety assessment, dismantlingand contemporary equipment decontamination methods; support in arrangement and improvement of
the ChNPP RAW management system, including SO radioactive materials; establishment of thepersonnel management system for the decommissioning purposes.
IAEA experts participate in development and update of a number of important documents, suchas ‘Integrated RAW Management System’, ‘Decommissioning Design’ and other documents governing
the RAW management process and decommissioning issue.
Furthermore, the following projects implemented during 2004–2006 supported by the UK
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) should be also mentioned as they are aimed at elaboration of
documentation on decommissioning and other new facilities required for licensing. Norway is currently
expressing its readiness to render support for activities concerning ChNPP units decommissioning and
Shelter Object conversion, which was reflected in the Protocol of Intent signed on 28.11.2006.
We hope that attention of the international community to the Chornoyl NPP and Shelter Object
will not cease on the day, when Arch will be slid, and Ukraine will not be left alone with its problems.

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6. MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERATEDAS A RESULT OF THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE
6.1. Chernobyl accident RAW: management history, types
and amounts of RAW, current status, issues and paths forward
Since 26 April 1986 over the course of time the constituent of problems related to radioactive
waste of Chernobyl (accident) origin within the state system of radioactive waste (RAW) management
has been reducing. It is not only due to considerable waste activity lowering as a result of naturalradionuclides decay, especially short-lived, but to the course to further nuclear energy utilisation forelectrical power generation, proclaimed by Ukraine, which requires development of the industry.
Nevertheless, basic strategic tasks on reliable RAW confinement, including high-level and longlived waste, are still vital. Reliable protection from adverse radioactive waste effect may be ensured tothe present and future generation only in case of geological repository construction.
Analysis of the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences elimination leads to understanding of theneed in having the own national system of nuclear legislation. Based on the experience of the mostadvanced countries, public relations must be managed legally at any activities in the nuclear energy
field, establishment and functioning of the legal bases for the system of nuclear and radiation safetycontrol and management, ensure obviousness of the priority of public and environmental protection
against ionizing radiation effect.
Rather complete and balanced national legal system was established, when Ukraine gained its
independence. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified a number of international conventions, namely:
Convention on Nuclear Safety;
Convention on the Early Notification of an Accident;
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management and so on.
The Law of Ukraine ‘On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety’ enacted in 1995 presents thebasic law in the area of nuclear energy utilization. The following laws of Ukraine could be also
regarded to the nuclear legislation system:‘On Radioactive Waste Management’;‘On Population Protection against Ionizing Radiation Impact’;‘On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste and Other
Ionizing Radiation Sources’;‘On General Provisions of Further Operation and Decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP andConversion of Destroyed Unit Four of the NPP into and Ecologically Safe System’;‘On Licensing Activities in the Nuclear Energy Field’;‘On Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Provisions,’ etc.
The Law of Ukraine ‘On Radioactive Waste Management’ [1], development of which was initiatedby specialists of the State Committee of Population Protection against Consequences of Accident at the
Chernobyl NPP, introduced rather progressive for that time legislative regulations, specifically, legally
established isolation of the radioactive waste management field from nuclear energy application in order topreclude departmental approach to ensuring safety in case of their long-term storage or disposal. Entities
generating radioactive waste were prohibited from radioactive waste disposal. Disposal of liquid waste, as

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well as waste in explosive, inflammable and nuclear-hazardous form was also prohibited. In view ofconsiderable period of radioactive waste hazard the law sets forth that RAW become property of the state,once they are transferred by waste generators to specialized entities.
The law [1] states that the state RAW management policy-making process includes development
and implementation of the State RAW Management Program, which is subject to revision and approvalby the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine every three years.
The next step in establishing of the state radioactive waste management system was approvalof the State RAW Management Program by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree No.480 dated
29 April 1996 [2]. This program was further revised and approved by Decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine (CMU Decree No.542 dated 05.04.1999 [3], No.2015 dated 25.12.2002 [4]).
Though the status of the State RAW Management Program was lowered to a comprehensive
program in its following revisions.
Major tasks set forth in the State RAW Management Program are as follows: development of normative and legal environment on RAW management;
 ensuring activities compliance with legal requirements;
 commissioning of the ‘Vektor’ Complex Stage One for decontamination, transportation,
processing and disposal of RAW from the territory that was subject to radioactive
contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe; design and construction of the ‘Vektor’ Complex Facilities Stage Two for processing andstorage of high-level and long-lived RAW; technical re-equipment and change of function of state regional specialised complexes of theState Corporation ‘Ukrainian State Association ‘Radon’ for collecting and containerised
storage of any RAW from all Ukrainian radioactive waste generators;
 establishment and maintenance of the state register of RAW and state cadastre of RAW
storage and disposal sites; construction of a geological repository for radioactive waste and so on.
The experience gained in implementation of actions under the State RAW Management Program
evidences of required conformity to plan and coordination of works unachieved, as well as
incompliance with results of previous studies on geological repository construction. One of the reasonsis lack of permanent funding. The National Report of Ukraine ‘Twenty Years After Chernobyl
Accident. Future Outlook’ states that owing to lack of aggressive and efficient management and,
consequently, permanent financing none of the state of programs on radioactive waste management was
fully implemented [5].

6.2. Establishing system for containment, storage and disposalof RAW generated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe
The accident at the ChNPP led to generation of enormous amounts of RAW being considerablylarger than amounts of RAW collected as a resultant of other types of activities associated withutilisation of nuclear power, ionising radiation sources and radiation technologies.
Major locations of RAW generated as a result of accident at the ChNPP are as follows: Shelter Object; RAW disposal sites (Radioactive Waste Disposal Site (RWDS) ‘Buriakivka’, ‘Pidlisnyi’,‘ChNPP Stage III’); temporary RAW localisation sites (TRWLS);
 natural and technogenic environment within the ChNPP Industrial Site and adjacent territory;
 decontamination waste storage sites (DWSS) and machinery special treatment sites (STS)located outside the Exclusion Zone.

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As of 2010 [6] total amount of RAW in the Exclusion Zone (excluding the Shelter Object) is
about 2800 thousand m3, 1940 thousand m3 of which are located at RWDS and TRWLS of total activity
about 7.25ȿ+15 Bq (according to the 4-th state inventory reconciliation, 2010 [7]). Overall activity ofradioactive substances on natural sites of the Exclusion Zone (in upper layer of soil, benthal deposits,
vegetation, etc.) is above 8.50ȿ+15 Bq.
RAW of Chernobyl origin are extremely varied in radionuclide composition, specific activity
levels and material constitution. Presence of a wide range of radionuclides, including long-lived ones, ischaracteristic for these wastes. As accident ones, they are stored under conditions that do not fullycomply with the contemporary normative requirements for radiation safety. Radionuclide release
followed by ground water contamination is observed at most of the Exclusion Zone RAW storage
facilities. It is the resultant of absence of an adequate system of engineering barriers and recurrent
underflooding of some TRWLS.
Shelter Object operation, including the period of its conversion into an ecologically safe system(stabilisation stage), leads to generation of great amounts of solid RAW disposed at the RWDS
‘Buriakivka’.
Overall amount of up to 500 thousand m3 of low and medium-level RAW is represented by soil,
metal, concrete, equipment, various materials and so on are located at the ChNPP Industrial Site. As of
01.01.10 [6] solid and liquid waste storage facilities contain:
SRAW – 2500 m3 of activity 1.40E+14 Bq,
LRAW – 19800 m3 of activity 3.85E+14 Bq.
According to the approved ‘Strategy of Shelter Object Conversion into an Ecologically Safe
System’ fuel containing materials, high-level and other long-lived waste must be removed from theShelter Object and hauled to geological repositories. The first stage of the Strategy – Shelter Object
structures stabilisation and the second – NSC construction and preparation for FCM removal are
implemented under the project ‘Shelter Implementation Plan’.
The issues involved in Shelter Object conversion in to an ecologically safe system associatedwith substantiation of unique NSC structure reliability should be supplemented with the need fordeveloping technical means for FCM removal, their sorting, conditioning and packing, as well as means
for their transportation to storage facilities. Problems of management of radioactive waste generated in
the course of preparatory works for NSC foundations construction also require resolution.
From 1987 to 2010 the Sate Specialised Enterprise ‘Complex’ collected, processed andtransported RAW within the Exclusion Zone, maintained the functioning radioactive waste disposal site
(RWDS) ‘Buriakivka’, was monitoring the mothballed RWDS ‘Pidlisnyi’ and RWDS ‘ChNPP Stage
III’, as well as temporary radioactive waste localisation sites (TRWLS). RWDS and RWTLS within the
Exclusion Zone were created under extreme post-accidental conditions in 1986 and do not comply withthe effective normative requirements to facilities designed for RAW management.
The RWDS ‘Buriakivka’ has been in operation since 1987. The RWDS ‘Buriakivka’ was aimed atstorage of RAW with exposure dose rate (EDR) up to 1 R/h at waste surface. Decree of the Government
Committee authorized receipt of waste of EDR up to 5 R/h. The RWDS is still operating. As of 01.01.2010
overall capacity is 690 thousand m3, 606 thousand m3 occupied, activity is 2.51ȿ+15 Bq [6].
RWDS ‘Buriakivka’ storage facilities are surface, trench type. Total number of trenches is 30.
Design capacity of a filled trench is 22 thousand m3. The space available at the RWDS is about 35
thousand m3, which resulted in its reconstruction planned.
Due to occupied design capacity of the RWDS ‘Buriakivka’ the operator SSE ‘Complex’ plansreconstruction of the RWDS ‘Buriakivka’ in order to create extra facilities for disposal of low-level
RAW that will be generated as a result of works at the Chernobyl NPP and Exclusion Zone. Safety
reassessment in terms of ensuring operational and long term disposal safety with consideration for all
RAW amounts planed for disposal and protective barrier status has been also designed.

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The RWDS ‘Pidlisnyi’ has been in operation since December 1986 through 1988. RAW of EDR
up to 50 R/h were accepted by the RWDS ‘Pidlisnyi’, then based on Governmental Committee Decree
RAW of EDR up to 250 R/h were received. Overall amount of RAW is 11000 m3, total activity isassessed as 2.59ȿ+15 Bq [6].
To date, preliminary assessment of the RWDS ‘Pidlisnyi’ safety has been made. Considering theabove mentioned assessment, mothballing design was developed, implementation of which will allowof strengthening of the existing engineering barriers of the storage facility and monitoring system
improvement. Expert review of nuclear and radiation safety of the design is nearing completion. In its
implementation, major attention should be paid to ensuring radiation safety of personnel engaged inworks under complex radiation conditions on the territory of the storage facility.
Practically all RAW of the RWDS ‘Pidlisnyi’ are long-lived ones and should be disposed in ageological repository. Numerous cracks in concrete foundation and walls of the facility necessitate fullscale examination of its structures and implementation of required safety enhancement measures.
The RWDS ‘ChNPP Stage III’ (was in operation till the end of 1986) was constructed for RAW
with EDR up to 1 R/h, but waste with higher EDR were accepted there. The RWDS contains 26.0
thousand m3 of low and medium-level waste, including long-lived ones, of total activity 3.43ȿ+14 Bq [6].
Design of this RWDS mothballing has been developed; its implementation will allow ofadditional barriers installation to preclude ingress of atmospheric precipitations to the storage facility,
as well as monitoring system improvement. Positive conclusion was provided as a result of the statecomprehensive expert review for NRS of the storage facility mothballing design.
There are nine TRWLS within the Exclusion Zone: ‘Yaniv Station’, ‘Petroleum Storage Depot’,‘Sandy Plateau’, ‘Red Forest’, ‘Former Construction Laydown Area’, ‘New Construction Laydown
Area’, ‘Prypiat’, ‘Kopachi’, ‘Chystogalivka’.
Temporary RAW Localisation Sites (TRWLS) present facilities constructed in 1986–1988 as aresult of decontamination of sites and Exclusion Zone territory with wastes localisation in situ, incommon trenches or piles having no engineering barriers. TRWLS trenches were excavated, filled andbackfilled by Civil Defence paramilitary units under high levels of ionising radiation, consequently,
design documentation is absent, as well as topographical coordinates of the sites.
There are about 1000 trenches and piles within the overall area of the nine TRWLS ofapproximately 10 km2. For convenience of record keeping trench groups are divided into sectors named
after the territory.
Over a half of TRWLS has not been investigated to date even after twenty five years after theaccident. Neither location nor characteristics of accumulated RAW are known for part of TRWLS todate. TRWLS ‘Petroleum Storage Depot’ and ‘Sandy Plateau’ were completely examined, ‘Red Forest’and ‘Yaniv Station’ were partially examined over the previous years. Wastes in TRWLS are presented
by contaminated soil, equipment, metal, concrete, building materials, wood, remains of destroyed
domestic houses, debris and so on. According to estimates TRWLS contain up to 1300.0 thousand m3 ofwaste of total activity 1.80ȿ+15 Bq [6]. Bulk of them is low-level RAW. Practically all wastes containlong-lived radionuclides. All the TRWLS are situated within the territory of high water table; about 100
waste trenches are permanently or periodically flooded.
They should be characterised (amount and activity of RAW, nuclide composition, storage conditions)in order to assess their safety, determine radionuclide migration dynamics and develop measures forminimisation of their negative effect. Advisability and sequence of RAW removal from current locations
and re-disposal may be determined only on the ground of the above mentioned assessments.
Safety analysis and environmental impact assessment are necessary for a decision be taken on
further brining of RAW storage facilities in compliance with radiation safety requirements andoptimisation of RAW conservation or re-disposal costs. Particular administrative measures, risks andcountermeasures assessment shall be developed to prevent incidents during construction and operation235

of new RAW management facilities. Consequently, assessment methodologies for risks, emergency
response plans and countermeasure designs should be updated and approved. Introduction of an
integrated monitoring system for RAW storage facilities, environment within RAW storage facility
areas, especially general hydrological and hydrogeological situation within the Exclusion Zone, is vitalfor taking informed decisions.
Since 2002 TRWLS examination and inventorying have not been done. 235 disposal locations
were identified, 15 % of those are flooded. Flooding depth (from trench bottom to ground water table)
is from 0.3 to 2.2 m in during flood season.
Re-disposal is a possible way of fundamental changing the situation for precluding release ofradionuclides from TRWLS. However not all the trenches are filled with radioactive waste. Some ofthem may be released from regulatory supervision due to corresponding levels reached.
In the course of accident consequences mitigation activities outside the Exclusion Zone a certain
number of special sites was created that are still under monitoring and being maintained, namely: machinery special treatment sites (STS) designed for vehicles and machinery decontamination;
 decontamination waste storage sites (DWSS).
As of 01.01.11, total number of such sites that are registered and controlled is 54, including:Zhytomyr oblast – 29 DWSS 18.7 thousand m3 in capacity; Kyiv oblast – 16 DWSS 143.7 thousand m3
in capacity; Chernihiv oblast – 3 DWSS 9.3 thousand m3 in capacity; and 6 STS in Kyiv oblast [6].
Decontamination waste storage sites were created in 1986-89 as a result of decontamination of
populated localities that remained populated by Civil Defence units. Similarly to the Exclusion Zone
design documentation for these sites is not available, particular coordinates of their location, as well as
waste amounts and activity are not known.
In early 90-s the Ministry of Ukraine for Population Protection against Consequences of Accident
at the Chernobyl NPP launched broad program of decontamination of radioactively contaminatedpopulated localities [14]. However decontamination of buildings, facilities and territory was not themain target of these activities. At that time it was clear that decrease of population exposure doses (in 34 years after the accident) via decontamination of settlements would be very low at extremely highcosts. The major task for that period was improvement of social and living conditions of people as set
forth in Ukrainian SSR CM Decree No.106 dated 23 June 1991.
Such buildings contain decontamination waste disposed that, according to their specific activity, do
not present radioactive waste, but posed certain threat to people and environment at that period of time.
Decontamination waste storage sites and machinery special treatment sites are being monitored
and maintained by the Kyiv State Regional Specialised Complex of the State Corporation ‘Ukrainian
State Association ‘Radon’.
Decontamination activities after the accident at the ChNPP as a counter radiation measure(interference) require a separate explanation.
Efficiency of the populated localities decontamination, considering analysis of practise andcontemporary approaches to planning and streamlining of countermeasures (interference) in the eventof radiation accidents, was assessed based on the ‘Instructive and methodological recommendations for
streamlining of direct countermeasures at a late phase of radiation accident’ developed by the Scientific
Centre of Radiation Medicine of the Academy of Medical Science of Ukraine [8].
As any other countermeasures, decontamination has planning stage and is carried out inaccordance with radiation protection principals. So, according to the propriety principal benefit forsociety and individual from a dose precluded by decontamination and, consequently, precluded
potential unwanted health effects associated with irradiation shall exceed total harm (medical,
economical, social and psychological and so on) associated with the interference. According to the
optimisation principal format and scale of decontamination shall be selected in the way for difference236between total benefit and harm to be not only positive, but maximal. In other words, any planned
countermeasures must be justified and optimal.
Since 1991, when the Concept of population residence on territories of higher radioactive
contamination levels as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe was approved (Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of
Ministers Decree No. 91–12 dated 27 February 1991) and corresponding laws were adopted >9, 10@,large-scale decontamination activities were planned and implemented. The decision was taken to carryout decontamination within the voluntary resettlement zone (zone III) in populated localities with total
value of annual effective dose of additional (accident) irradiation exceeding 1 mSv. According to thementioned decision only the Scientific and Technical Centre for Comprehensive RAW Management
developed over 40 designs for decontamination and recovery measures within settlements of Kyiv,
Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Rovno and Sumy oblasts during 1992–1993 under an order of the
Ministry of Ukraine for Population Protection against Consequences of Accident at the Chernobyl NPP.
However, propriety and optimality of decontamination works was not always substantiated at the stageof their planning. Consequently, most of decontamination works performed in 4–10years after theaccident turned to be inefficient in terms of reducing accident population exposure.
The Korosten town of Zhytomyr oblast was one of the populated localities subject to large-scaledecontamination. In 1995-96 specialists of the Scientific Centre of Radiation Medicine of the Academyof Medical Science of Ukraine carried out the research on comprehensive radiological monitoring ofKorosten including analysis of decontamination efficiency [11].
The Korosten town that covers an area of above 46.2 km2, 20 km2 of which are occupied bydomestic and public buildings, having a population of up to 70 thousand citizens is placed into zone 3,
i.e. the Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement >12@. Average density of radioactive contamination of thetown territory by caesium-137 according to estimates as of 1991 was 6.9 Cikm-2, but some areas of thetown were characterised by higher contamination levels. For instance, caesium-137 contamination
density of above 50 % of the territory of microdistrict Pashyny was over 10 Cikm-2, and 20% – above
15 Cikm-2. During 1988–1996, the Korosten town, as against any other town of Ukraine, was subject tothe most complete and detailed radiation monitoring of the environment, and a set of decontamination
activities aimed at decrease of population exposure doses caused by radionuclides of Chernobyl origin
was performed there.
Decontamination was carried out on the territory of the town from 1988 to 1996 and included thefollowing activities:
 removal and hauling of the ‘dirty’ layer of soil from private possessions and pre-schools;
 delivery of ‘clean’ soil; re-roofing of houses and public buildings;
 yard concreting and arrangement of blind area around public buildings;
 asphalting of areas in public places and roads;
 liming of gardens on plots of land attached to houses.
In the course of activities, thousands cubic meters of decontamination wastes were generated;according to Civil Defence town headquarters those wastes were hauled to the DWSS and Exclusion
Zone.
Upon the decontamination, collective annual town population exposure doses caused by caesium
radionuclides precluded by the decontamination were assessed.
While evaluating the competed protective measures based on the criterion of cost of a precluded
exposure dose unit, they proceeded from that any radiation protection activity may be efficient and,
consequently, justified, should its costs not exceed a particular amount that society (state) may afford to
spend for precluding a collective exposure dose unit (1 man-Sievert). In the international practice, thisparameter is determined by two constituents of harm to the health of exposed people. The objective
constituent (D-component) is a money equivalent of negative (stochastic) exposure effect for human237

health. Another constituent – E-component is determined by moral, political, social and otherconstituents of a harm, and presents a money equivalent of compensation for exposed people healthrisk. Details for application of optimisation procedure and decision-making can be found in themethodology of the International Committee for Radiation Protection (Published Paper No.55).
According to estimates made by researchers of the Scientific Centre of Radiation Medicine of the
Academy of Medical Science of Ukraine cost of D-component 1 man-Sievert accepted at that time wasup to the amount equivalent to 400 US dollars.
Cost estimate based on prices as of 1990 evidences that 4.4 mn roubles or 6.87 mn US dollars (1US dollar = 0.64 roubles in 1990) were spent for precluding the collective effective dose of 2.91 manSievert in the Korosten town over the period of 1988-96. Minor value of the precluded collective
effective dose and considerable share of E-component in the expenses give grounds to consider that
protective measures implemented in the Korosten town over different years lacked economic
justification. They can be regarded as beneficial only indirectly due to ‘social’ effect, which is also
ambiguous. Accordingly, estimated demonstrated that considerable costs spend for decontamination
activities on the territory of Korosten in 4-10 years after the accident had minor effect on exposure
doses (1.2%), and did not change radiation risk for health of town citizens.
Results of studies and other similar researches confirm the fact that decontamination, as counter
radiation measures within radioactively contaminated populated territories, at a late stage (over 23 years) of a radiation accident, such as the Chernobyl catastrophe, lack efficiency [13].

6.3. Arrangement of the infrastructure for long-term storage and disposalof RAW generated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe
The radioactive waste that are currently contained on a temporary basis in trench-type storages
both within and outside the Exclusion Zone pose radioecological threat for the living and future
generations. The plan is to remove RAW from temporary storages and relocated to contemporarystorage facilities fitted out with multi-barrier engineering protective systems that will safety isolate
hazardous radioactive materials to preclude their negative effect on the environment.
Removal of waste of the Chernobyl origin from TRWLS, STS and DWSS is held not only by
unavailability of costs, methods and process equipment to facilitate safety of personnel and prevent
contamination spread in the course of works, but mostly by absence of storage facilities, where removed
waste could be hauled for storage or disposal.
In 1996 the SSE ‘Tekhnotsentr’ was established and entrusted with functions of the customer fordesign and construction of the ‘Vektor’ Complex aimed at processing and disposal of radioactive wastefrom the territories contaminated as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP.
The site of the ‘Vektor’ Complex located within the Exclusion Zone at a distance of 1 km fromRWDS ‘Buriakivka’ and 20 km from the Chernobyl NPP within the so called Chernobyl contamination
trace, occupies an area of 160 ha, ground water table is 18-21 m. In 1996, radioactive contamination
density within the site area reached 290 Ci/km2 for caesium-137, 140 Ci/km2 for strontium-90,
3.2 Ci/km2 for plutonium isotopes, 1.7 Ci/km2 for americium-241. Consequently, the territory lacks any
prospects in terms of being populated, unless a large-scale decontamination takes place.
The SSE ‘Tekhnotsentr’ was entrusted with the function of the operator for RAW disposal
storage facilities and according to requirements set forth in legal and normative documents theenterprise obtained RAW disposal shallow repositories design, construction and operation licenses. The‘Vektor’ Complex is designed for solid radioactive waste (RAW) collection, transportation, processing,storage and disposal. It presents a complex of facilities aimed at RAW management, located at the samesite within the Exclusion Zone together with the infrastructure required for operation support. In
accordance with the executive documents construction of the ‘Vektor’ Complex is split into the two238

stages: 1) disposal of radioactive waste from the territories contaminated as a result of accident at the
Chernobyl NPP; 2) processing and storage of radioactive waste from the territories contaminated as aresult of accident at the Chernobyl NPP. In order to optimise expenses and accelerate commissioning ofthe ‘Vektor’ Complex the Commissioning Stage was isolated within the Stage I design that includes one
storage for disposal of each type of RAW (SRAW-1 and SRAW-2) and infrastructure facilities.
Construction of the first stage of ‘Vektor’ facilities was scheduled in 1996 (Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine Decree No.480 dated 29 April 1996, including amendments), the design was approved in
1997 with construction duration of 5 years, the construction commenced in March1998. Stage one
construction estimated cost made up 412.61 mn UAH. The Feasibility Study for investments in the‘Vektor’ Complex stage two construction was agreed by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree
No.1605-ɪ dated 23 December 2009 with construction duration of 4 years and total estimated cost of
518.955 mn UAH.
As of 01.10.2010, 189193.7K UAH were spent, including 146629.4K UAH for construction andinstallation works. Costs were provided irregularly over the entire construction phase and in amounts
that were not sufficient for normative construction duration be followed, and it became the long term
construction project.
In 2008 the Specially Equipped Shallow Ground Repository for Solid Radioactive Waste(SESGRSRW, or ICSRWM Lot-3) constructed on the ‘Vektor’ Complex site under a separate project in
the frame of International Technical Aid for Chernobyl NP decommissioning was accepted for operation.
Bulk of facilities within the engineering infrastructure of the ‘Vektor’ Complex that present the minimum
required for SESGRSRW operation commencement were accepted in operation in the same year. 43
facilities and systems of the commissioning stage are currently in operation. While SRAW-1 and SRAW2 disposal storages within the ‘Vektor’ Complex Commissioning Stage One, containers preparationbuilding (building 20) and 14 facilities and systems of the ‘Vektor’ Complex infrastructure remain noncommissioned. Construction of the Commissioning Stage One is actually 70-95% complete. Current
status of the Commissioning Stage is shown on Fig.6.1 (look the coloured inset).
In view of the long-term construction, as well as changes in the normative and legislative base,some provisions of the ‘Vektor’ Complex Commissioning Stage One are outdated. However, revision isthe ‘Vektor’ Complex Commissioning Stage One construction design is unreasonable due to thefollowing reasons. Firstly, the ‘Vektor’ Complex shall accept for storage and disposal radioactive waste
not only from the territories contaminated as a result of accident at the Chernobyl NPP, but the rest ofradioactive waste of Ukraine. Secondly, Stage One and Two facilities will be constructed over many
dozens of years concurrently with operation of the commissioned facilities, i.e. Stage One and Twoshould be merged into a single complex design and annually working designs for commissioning
facilities should be got approved. Thirdly, it is suggested to change the approval concept for long-term
projects with implementation periods exceeding 5 years, namely: omit designs re-approval and be
confined to approval of working design for commissioning facilities.
One of the key tasks of the State Program [6] is further development of the ‘Vektor’ Complex –further construction and operation of Stage One facilities, commencement of construction and operationof its Stage Two, which envisages not only disposal, but also a long-term storage and processing ofRAW. Facilities of the ‘Vektor’ Complex Commissioning Stage Two will be located on the Stage One
site with its infrastructure utilisation. Interfaces between these facilities are demonstrated on Fig.6.2 andare implemented via material (wide arrows) and information (normal arrows) flows. Information flows
connect each facility of the ‘Vektor’ Complex with the information and analytical centre, which isfacilitated via corresponding digital communication lines anticipated in the design. Fig. 6.2 shows only
the part of information flows, which is associated with RAW registration and monitoring systems
within the ‘nominally dirty’ zone.

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Fig. 6.2. Process chart of RAW management at the ‘Vektor’ Complex

As per the concurred Feasibility Study for investments in the ‘Vektor’ Complex stage twoconstruction, endorsed by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree No.1605-ɪ dated 23.12.2009,
construction of the centralised storage facility for long-term storage of spent high-level ionisingradiation sources (CSFHLIS) is envisaged, including adoption of their processing and packing method
for long-term storage considering further disposal. This project is being currently implemented in theframe of the international technical cooperation, initiated by the G-8 due to financial support of theGreat Britain.
Some other facilities are being constructed within the Exclusion Zone designed for managementof RAW accumulated at the ChNPP and expected to be generated during plant decommissioning,
namely: Liquid Radwaste Treatment Plant; Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management (ICSRWM) comprised of: Unit for RAW removal from the ChNPP storage facilities (Lot 1);
 Solid RAW Processing Plant (Lot 2);
 Shallow Ground Repository for Solid Low- and Medium-Level RAW, located at the siteof ‘Vektor’ complex facilities (Lot 3).
In pursuance of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Radioactive Waste Management, ‘Provision for the StateRadioactive Waste Register’ and ‘Provision for the State Cadastre of Radioactive Waste Storage
Facilities and Temporary Storage Locations’, approved by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree
No.480 dated 29 April 1996; the Register and Cadastre are maintained by the Main Information andAnalytical Centre (MIAC) of the State System of Radioactive Waste Registration of the Corporation
UkrSA’Radon’. The MIAC receives information from Regional Radwaste Registration Centres. The
Regional Radwaste Registration Centres function of the base of the state regional Special Complexes
SC ‘UkrSA’Radon’ and SSE ‘Complex’.

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The Regional Radwaste Registration Centres under the state regional Special Complexes SC‘UkrSA’Radon’ register solid and liquid wastes, and wastes presented by closed spent ionising radiation
sources stored at special complexes storage facilities, and register radioactive waste located atenterprises served by the special complexes. The Regional Radwaste Registration Centre of the SSE‘Complex’ registers radioactive wastes of the Exclusion Zone.
For the purpose of radioactive waste observation, ensuring their controlled accumulation andtransportation, delivery for storage and/or disposal to special enterprises, effective use of available
storage capacities, in order to ensure continuous maintenance and timely update of the Register andCadastre, regular state radioactive waste and radwaste storage facilities inventory reconciliations takeplace, including facilities storage facilities for RAW within the territory of waste generators. State
radwaste inventorying takes place once in three years. The fourth state radioactive waste inventorying
was carried out in 2010 [9].
In 2009, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine accepted the Strategy of Radioactive Waste
Management [15], developed by the international expert team [16]. It encompasses basic provisions to
be implemented that will facilitate stable development of the field, among which there is establishmentof the special RAW management fund, National RAW Management Organisation, development of aconcept and programs of short-lived low- and medium-level waste disposal, as well as high-level andlong-lived wastes in geological repositories and so on. Unfortunately, the RAW Management Fundestablished in pursuance of the above strategy has not functioned to the full extent. Since selection of asite for arranging a geological repository for high-level and long-lived RAW is a time-consuming effort,
the Strategy recommends acceleration of reconnaissance commencement. Only occasional selfmotivated research works took place heretofore [17].

2417. THE STATE POLICY OF UKRAINE CONCERNING OVERCOMINGTHE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE
7.1. Analysis of the Regulatory and Legal Framework Created to Overcome
the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
The history of the formation of the regulatory and legal framework set up to deal with theChernobyl catastrophe during the Soviet period is described in detail in Section 4.1.
At present, the total number of regulations and laws, covering all aspects of the Chernobyl
catastrophe reaches over a thousand. They include not only the most often cited areas of state activity inthis field (radiology, medicine and the social welfare of those who suffered as a result of thecatastrophe), but also new acts concerning the implementation of radiological monitoring, maintenanceof the Exclusion Zone barrier functions, the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning, conversion of the Object
Shelter into an environmentally safe system, as well as the creation and development of the radioactive
waste handling system..
At the same time, there are general regulatory legal acts which define the legal framework used
to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The main ones being:
1. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR Decree «On the Concept of People residing in the
Ukrainian SSR territories with the heightened levels of radioactive contamination as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe», dated 27 February 1991, N 791-XII.
2. The Law of Ukraine «On the legal status of territories contaminated as a result of theChernobyl Catastrophe», dated 27 February 1991, N 791-XII.
3. The Law of Ukraine «On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered from the
Chernobyl catastrophe», dated 28 February 1991, N 796-XII.
4. The Law of Ukraine «On the National program of overcoming the Chernobyl catastrophe
consequences for 2006-2010», dated 14 March 2006, N 3522-IV.
5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of
the Group of Seven and the Commission of European Communities concerning the Chernobyl NPP
decommissioning, dated 20 December 1995, No. 998_008 (Ottawa Memorandum).
6. Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment concerning the work of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund in Ukraine, dated 20 November 1997.
7. The Law of Ukraine «On the National principles of the further operation of the Chernobyl NPP
and the decommissioning and conversion of the ruined Power Unit 4 into an environmentally safe
system», dated 15 January 2009, N 886-VI.
8. The Law of Ukraine «On the National program of Chernobyl NPP decommissioning andconversion of the Shelter object into an environmentally safe system», dated 15 January 2009, N 886-VI.
9. The Law of Ukraine «On the National target environmental program of radioactive waste
handling», dated 17 September 2009, N 516-VI.
The basic government resolutions:
10. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree «On implementation of the Ukrainian SSR
Verkhovna Rada Decrees on the procedure of the Law of Ukrainian SSR implementation: «On legal
regime of the territories contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status andsocial protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe», dated 23 July 1991, No. 106.

242

11. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree «On the approval of Procedure for performanceof the Shelter Implementation Plan», dated 31 March 2003, N 421.
The Government acceptance of the urgency to solve the problems caused by the Chernobyl
catastrophe is reflected in the Basic Law of Ukraine – the Constitution of Ukraine [2]. Constitutionalrights and responsibilities apply to all citizens of the state and, naturally, to victims of the Chernobyl
catastrophe.
The following are the most important resolutions in the Constitution of Ukraine to protect the
population from the Chernobyl catastrophe [3]:1. Provision of environmental safety and maintenance of the ecological balance within the
Ukrainian territory; overcoming consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe– the global catastrophe andthe preservation of the Ukrainian gene pool are the government obligations (Article 16).
2. A person, his life and health … are the main social values (Article 3).
3. The Constitution has superior legal status. Other laws and legal acts are accepted on the basis
they comply with the Constitution (Article 8).
4. Each person has a right to a safe life and environment, and on the compensation for violationof this law… (Article 50).
5. Each person is obliged not to inflict harm to nature, cultural inheritance and to compensate forany damages caused (Article 66).
These provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine are reflected in the various legal acts set up to
overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
Amongst such documents, still in effect at the end of 2010, historically the first document focused on
the concept of public health for the population residing within the Ukrainian SSR territory, with its
heightened levels of radioactive contamination [4]. The document, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Concept’,has as its declared objective, reducing the impact of the Chernobyl catastrophe on public health.
The Concept’s basic principle lies in the fact that for the critical population group (children bornin 1986), the value of additional effective exposure dose associated with the Chernobyl catastrophe,should not exceed 1 mSv (0.1 rem) per year and 70.0 mSv (7 rem) per life, compared with the dose thatthe population received before the accident, within the certain natural conditions. The Concept’s basic
mechanism for radiological population protection (within the given circumstances) is the staged
population evacuation to radiologically clean areas in accordance with the temporary criterion of soil
contamination density (with radionuclides – cesium, strontium, plutonium).
The Concept and the following laws «On the status and social protection of citizens who sufferedfrom the Chernobyl catastrophe» [5] and «On the legal regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl
accident» [6] provide the division of all the territory contaminated by the accidental releases on the zones.
The Law of Ukraine «On the legal regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident»[6] regulates the issue of a radioactively contaminated zone’s usage and protection regime, conditionsof the population’s residence, work, economic, research and other activities within these areas. The law
establishes and guarantees the usage and protection regime of the areas for the purpose of minimizing
the impact of ionizing radiation on human health and ecological systems.
The Law of Ukraine «On the legal regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident» [6]assigns responsibility to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for the coordination of activities within thezones to minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe (at the time of a law adoption, it was State
Chernobyl Committee, then Ministry of Chernobyl, now Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine) and for theprovision of necessary information to the population about the radiation situation within the territory.
The Law of Ukraine «On the legal regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident»[6] defines the types of activities prohibited within radioactively contaminated zones, and the
mandatory measures to be implemented within these territories. The Law gives a detailed description of
the types of radiation monitoring performed by the certain state agencies, within the subject territories.

243

The Law of Ukraine «On the legal regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident»[6] establishes the State’s responsibility for governance and monitoring of the legal regime within zones
that were radioactively contaminated following the Chernobyl catastrophe, as well as the liabilities forviolations of this regime.
The provisions concerning the constitutional rights of citizens who suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe the protection of their lives and health are defined in the Law of Ukraine «On thestatus and social protection of the citizen, who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» [5].
This law defines the State’s policy principles for the social protection of persons who suffered asa result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, indeed defining «persons who suffered from the Chernobyl
catastrophe», «liquidators of the Chernobyl catastrophe», «victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe»,«children who belong to the victims category of the Chernobyl catastrophe», and establishes the State’s
liability to the citizens for damages caused in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.
The above Law establishes criteria that categorize people according to their misfortune andsuffering as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe in order to establish benefits and compensation, andalso gives the reasons for the categories. In addition to the categories, the corresponding benefits,compensation, additional payments and/or other remedial measures are presented.
The Law of Ukraine «On the status and social protection of the citizen, who suffered from the
Chernobyl catastrophe» [5] defines the reasons for resettlement and establishes the citizens’ right toindependent resettlement from the radioactively contaminated zones. It also covers the production offood and agricultural products with the specification of acceptable levels of radionuclides therein, andthe obligations of government agencies and manufacturers to comply with these regulations law.
Over the years, when adopting the Government budget laws, changes in its provisions were
made, which terminated or suspended the validity of some articles or specific articles provisions of the
Law «On the status and social protection of the citizen, who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe»[5]. The reasons for this shall be examined in detail in Section 7.2. It should be noted that in order topreserve the Law against revisions that would cut the size or scope of benefits, in 2006 the Law wasamended with Article 71 «Peculiarities of Law revision» which specifies the following: «The operationof this Law may not be suspended by other laws, the exception being laws on revisions».
Thus, adoption of the Concept and the following Laws of Ukraine «On legal regime of theterritories contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social protection of
citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» allowed legislation of the criteria for that
determined radioactively contaminated zones in accordance with the degree of potential negative
impact on population health, to define the grounds and priority of resettlement, to create the monitoring
system for safe accommodation, and to organize life within the contaminated territories. The
Government guaranteed benefits and compensation to every person who suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe in accordance with established categories [7].
After adoption of the Laws of Ukraine «On the status and social protection of citizens who
suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the
Chernobyl catastrophe» work was started relating to the development and execution of subordinate actsallowing determination of the list of settlements in radioactively contaminated zones, and the status ofaffected individuals and arrangement of their appropriate social welfare.
One of the most important normative acts concerning the implementation of Laws «On the status
and social protection of the citizen, who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the legal
regime of territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident» [5, 6] is the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine Decree «On implementation of the Ukrainian SSR Verkhovna Rada Decrees on the procedureof the Laws of Ukrainian SSR implementation «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the
Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered from the
Chernobyl catastrophe» [8] dated 23 July 1991, No. 106.

244

This Decree approved the list of settlements recognized as being within the radioactively
contaminated zones and whose residents of get monthly benefits and salary allowances (at premium
rates) to compensate for limitations on the consumption of locally produced food.
The Law of Ukraine «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl
catastrophe» had been revised 11 times since adoption, the last revision was incorporated on 26 June
2009, there is also an official interpretation of the Law in the Constitutional Court Resolution dated 6
October 2009, No. 24-ɪɩ/2009.
The Law of Ukraine «On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered from the
Chernobyl catastrophe» had been revised 38 times since adoption, the last revision was incorporated on
2 December 2010, and there are also three official interpretations and explanation of the Law in theConstitutional Court Resolution.
The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine «On implementation of the Ukrainian SSR
Verkhovna Rada Decrees on the procedure of the Laws of Ukrainian SSR implementation «On legal
regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social
protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» dated 23 July 1991, No. 106, hadbeen revised and amended several times in order to complement the approved lists of the settlements.
Only one time, in 2004, six towns of Volyn and Rivne regions were transferred from the zone of
unconditional (mandatory) resettlement area to voluntary guaranteed resettlement (Section 7.2 contains
the detailed information on this subject).
Revisions have not been incorporated into the Concept of population residence at the territoriesof the Ukrainian SSR with a heightened level of radioactive contamination since the Chernobyl
catastrophe; its provisions remain effective at present, despite the significant changes in the radiologicalsituation within these territories.
The practical implementation of the following laws «On the status and social protection of
citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On legal regime of the territory
contaminated by the Chernobyl accident» [5, 6] were carried out within the framework of a number ofurgent programs and other measures concerning overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe, which were approved for a certain period starting from 1991. Within recent years, thesemeasures have been implemented within the framework of the National Program for overcoming
consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe for 2006-2010, approved by the Law of Ukraine dated 14
March 2006, No. 3522-IV [9].
The above laws and government resolutions are the basis of legal relationships to overcome
consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe and are associated with the implementation of social,
medical and psychological measures for rehabilitation of the population and their protection fromradiation, radiation monitoring and maintenance of the Exclusion Zone barrier functions as well as the
economic regeneration of the territories outside the Exclusion Zone boundaries. But there is anotheraspect of the activities related to overcoming the Chernobyl catastrophe– activities focused on the
Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and conversion of the Object Shelter into an environmentally safe
system. Also the creation and development of a radioactive waste handling system.
The agreement concerning the Chernobyl NPP shut-down by the end of 2000 and the activities related
to its decommissioning and conversion of the Object Shelter into an environmentally safe system wasreached during the continuous negotiations with the Group of Seven and the Commission of European
Communities. The agreement was fixed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of
Ukraine and Governments of the Group of Seven and the Commission of European Communities dated 20
December 1995, No. 998_008 [11] (named the Ottawa Memorandum after the place of its signing).
The Ottawa Memorandum states that the parties came to an understanding on a Comprehensive
Program of cooperation to support the Chernobyl NPP shut-down by 2000. It comprises six parts andnine points and provides the following:245

Restructuring of the energy sector of Ukraine, the introduction of market reforms, developmentof a financially efficient electrical power market with pricing fixed according to market principles,
which will stimulate the economical production and usage of the energy and energy conservation.
Investment in the energy sector of Ukraine, in profitable projects that are planned on the principleof least cost and, in particular, these projects will develop replacement power capacity for that lost by
the Chernobyl NPP to meet the future electricity needs of the Ukraine, in an open market conditions.
Safety enhancement of Chernobyl NPP Power Unit 3 and the plant decommissioning, as well as
further cooperation to develop a profitable and environmentally acceptable approach to solve theproblem of the Shelter of Power Unit 4.
Assist the Government of Ukraine to develop an action plan to ‘mitigate’ the social consequencesof the Chernobyl NPP shut-down; cooperation in determination of the international and Ukrainian
sources of funding and in mobilizing international financial support for the Program’s activities.
Introduction of the following principle as the primary one: commercial projects are being financed byinternational loans and Ukrainian ‘own’ resources. Non-profit projects that directly support the shut
down of the Chernobyl NPP are being financed through subsidies and Ukrainian ‘own’ resources taking
into consideration the financial and economic situation in Ukraine.
The Addenda to the Ottawa Memorandum presents summary data of current funding amounts
that have already been allocated or reviewed by the Group of Seven and international financial
institutions. The Addenda also presents the list of priority projects of the Comprehensive Program.
The following are some of the principles of this Program: Dependency between reforms in theenergy sector and achievement of the economic and social reform objectives of Ukraine; Thecomplementarity of measures taken to shut-down the Chernobyl NPP and development of a long-term
energy strategy for Ukraine, taking into account rational economic, financial and environmental criteria,
which will lead to an efficient, steady, market-oriented energy sector meeting the needs of Ukraine.
Execution of the Ottawa Memorandum was a great step forward towards the Chernobyl NPP
decommissioning and conversion of the Shelter object into an environmentally safe system, whichallowed searching for specific mechanisms of the agreements implementation, but the uncoordinatedobligations of the parties has resulted several times in misunderstandings and hence a delay in the shutdown of the Chernobyl NPP Power Unit 3.
It should be noted that Ukraine has not yet completed the market reforms in the energy sector
specified in the Ottawa Memorandum, and hasn’t developed a financially rational electricity market
with price fixation in accordance with market principles, nor proceeded to planning the energy projects
on the principle of least cost.
The following documents, together with the Ottawa Memorandum [10] define a system of legal
relationships that address the decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP and conversion of the Object
Shelter into an environmentally safe system: Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development concerning the work of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund in
Ukraine dated 20 November 1997 [11], ratified by the Law dated 04 February 1998, No. 80/98-BP; theCabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree «On the approval of Procedure for execution of the Shelter
Implementation Plan [12] dated 31 March 2003, No. 421 and the «Shelter Implementation Plan» itself;
the Law of Ukraine «On the General Principles of the Chernobyl NPP further operation anddecommissioning and conversion of the ruined Power Unit 4 into the environmental safe system» dated
11 December 1998, N 309-XIV [13]; the Law of Ukraine «On the National Program of Chernobyl NPP
decommissioning and conversion of the Shelter Object into the environmentally safe system» dated 15
January 2009, No. 886-VI [14].
The established systems relating to the projects’ management is quite complex. In accordancewith the agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (which isfixed in Ukraine at the level of legislation), Project Management Units (PMU) were created at the246Chernobyl NPP. The western Consultant heads and is a member of them. The Consultant is to represent
the interests of the Employer (SSE Chernobyl NPP) and to assist him in cooperation with the EBRD
and the Contractors. One of his main functions is to provide transparency of the sponsor’s funds
application. However, the raising of project management efficiency requires the strengthening of
Employer’s role and authorities – SSE Chernobyl NPP.
Legal issues which have arisen during the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and conversion of
the Object Shelter are being resolved systematically by the intercommunication of Western andUkrainian parties, but perhaps not as quickly as the parties expect.
Lately, it has been decided to exempt from taxation the profit of the Chernobyl NPP, if suchprofits are used to finance the preparations on the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and the Object
Shelter conversion into environmentally safe system, and to exempt from taxation the enterprises’
income received from the international technical assistance or from the funds that are provided by theGovernment budget as a contribution of Ukraine to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund to implement theinternational program – Shelter Implementation Plan [15, Articles 154.3, 154.4]. Although there is anundecided question concerning the profit taxation if the work may be classified by the International
Advisory Group of EBRD as the work under the Shelter Implementation Plan.
In December 2010, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree «On financial provision of thecivil liability for nuclear damage by the State Specialized Enterprise «Chernobyl NPP» dated 22
December 2010, No. 1164 regulated the issue concerning the financial civil liability for nuclear damage
by the State Specialized Enterprise «Chernobyl NPP» [16].
The Law of Ukraine «On the National target environmental program of radioactive waste
handling» dated 17 September 2008, N 516-VI [17] defines the following Program objectives among
the others:
The further development of radioactive waste handling formed as a result of Chernobyl NPP
catastrophe;
Creation and operation of radioactive waste handling infrastructure at the Chernobyl NPP and the
Object Shelter.
7.1.1. The Regulatory and Legal Framework and the State Policy Efficiency Associatedwith Overcoming the Chernobyl Catastrophe Consequences
The regulatory and legal framework setup to deal with the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning andconversion of the Object Shelter into environmentally safe system, and the creation and development ofradioactive waste handling system formed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe is quitebalanced and undergoes systematic improvement.
However, the framework has some significant defects when it comes to addressing issues related
to the social, medical, and psychological rehabilitation of the population, their radiation protection, theimplementation of radiation monitoring, and the economic recovery of areas outside the Exclusion Zone
and the zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement. The following analysis focuses on this part of
the regulatory and legal framework, hereafter referred to as the Chernobyl legislation.
The effectiveness of any means or measures is determined by their ability to meet the assigned
objective within the defined terms and resources.
It should be noted that the significant part of the measures initiated to meet the requirements of
the Chernobyl legislation were unfinished, and they failed to achieve the expected results. There areseveral reasons for this failure.
The first reason which is often identified as the main one is a lack of funds for the measures
implementation. The second is «insufficiency of central and local authorities’ systematic activities inthis sphere». But there is another important reason, which significantly contributes to both of these.
That is the lack of scientific grounding of the objective (to overcome a particular consequence of the247

Chernobyl catastrophe), the tasks that need to be performed in order to achieve that objective, the way it
will be implemented, and the terms and resources established for its implementation.
When the Chernobyl legislation at the Ukrainian SSR Verkhovna Rada session in February 1991
was reviewed, attention was paid to the Ministry of Finance calculations of the annual costs toimplement the measures. The calculated cost of benefits and compensation was over 4 billion rubles.
The cost of implementation of all resolutions and decisions concerning differential wage payments,
improvement of health, children’s free meals etc., which were accepted and were valid during thelegislations consideration, was 580 million rubles [1]. Additional costs for the implementation oflegislations were provided on the account of the Union budget and immediately the following procedure
was proposed.
The Verkhovna Rada among other things instructed the Council of Ministers of the USSR within
the framework of the Resolution «On the Implementation of the Law of the Ukrainian SSR «On thestatus and social protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» dated 28 February
1991, No. 797, about the following: «Submit the proposal to the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR on
the full funding of the activities and measures related to minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe on the account of the Union budget. In case of refusal to perform this proposal, to provide
reduced payments to the Union budget funds required for financing the activities and measures related
to dealing with the Chernobyl catastrophe starting from 1 April 1991».
After Ukraine gained its independence, the entire weight of funding the activities related toovercoming the Chernobyl catastrophe laid on the budget of the young State, but above all – the level ofbenefits and compensation was not corrected.
Table 7.1.
Comparison of Budgeted and Actual Expenditure Required to Overcome Consequencesof the Chernobyl accident from 1996-2005 (including social protection of the population) [18, 20, 21]Year

Requirement in
Budgeted
Budgeted
ActualActualaccordance with Contribution from Contributi Contribution
Contribution as
the effective
the State for theon as a %from thea % of thelegislation,
respective year, of Require- State (UAH
Requirement(UAH million)(UAH million)
mentmillion)

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

3363,32
5681,724548,56015,95
7479,258744,46

1794,562513,00
2606,00
1746,80
1812,89
1843,99

53,4
44,2
57,3
29,0
24,2
21,08

1527,881746,59
1432,26
1535,51
1809,63
1925,02

85,1
69,5
55,0
87,9
99,8
104,4

2002

9957,82144,521,52002,893,42003

12656,74

1381,1611,01381,16

100,0

2004
2005

14872,5

1667,19
2041,77

11,2

1640,4
1877,1698,491,9

Debts at the beginningof year160,59310,04
457,75763,21
931,48786,4729,3
including 634,6 ofsocial protection
760,3
including 596,4 ofsocial protection
685,4

In the literature, data on the Ukrainian cost to overcome consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe is available (see Section 4.1). One can also find data on the ratio of the planned and actual
budget expenditures used to finance activities under the Chernobyl legislation since 1992 [18]. But dataon the funding of all the measures taken under the Chernobyl legislation and comparison of planned andactual expenditures is only available from 1996 [19, 20, 21], Table 7.1. Lately, the assessment offunding requirements is not carried out every year. Apart from the assessed requirements presented inTable 7.1, the funding requirements of all the measures provided by the Chernobyl legislation in248

2007 was UAH 40 billion [22] and in 2010 – UAH 70 billion [21]. The consolidated budget
expenditures for overcoming consequences for the Chernobyl accident and the related social protection
during 2004-2010 are presented in Table 7.2.
Despite some discrepancies in the figures presented, the data allows certain conclusions to be
drawn.
Firstly, according to the effective legislation the funding requirements have a steady increase –from 1996 to 2004 they increased in 4.4 times, and from 2004 through 2010 –3,8 times. The reasons forthis increase lies in inflation processes and an increase in the standard of living.
Table 7.2.
The consolidated budget expenditures in 2004-2009 (actual), 2010* and 2011 (plan) provided to liquidate
consequences of the Chernobyl accident, showing the contribution toward social protection and pensions
provision for those citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, UAH million [21]YearState budget –expenditure required
to liquidate theaccident’s
consequences

Expenditure allocated for social protection andpensions provision to the citizens who suffered as aresult of the Chernobyl catastrophe – total:

Expenditure allocated forthe social protection(without pensions andhousing and utility
services):

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2970,53623,93859,85085,76326,47015,57727,08541,02621,53188,33406,24545,45762,86500,36966,07777,1

1640,4
1877,2
1939,92388,1
2164,72171,52559,2
2561,4* – There was no National report data concerning the actual expenditures of the consolidated budget for 2010 for the time ofSection 7.1. Analysis of regulatory and legal framework which regulates the legal relationship in the sphere of overcoming
the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe was written.

Secondly, there is a steady reduction in the ratio of budgeted Government expenditure andfunding needed to implement the Chernobyl legislation. In 1996-1998, the planned expenditure covered
about 44-57% of the need, in 1999-2002 only 21-29% and in 2003-2010 – only 11-14% of expenses
created by the effective legislation.
Thirdly, plans to finance the Chernobyl programs till 1999 inclusive were not fully performed,
the actual financing was 55-87% of the plan, and only since 2000 has the actual financing been close to
the planned one (provided by the Government budget), although significantly lower than that needed by
the legislation.
One of the key moments in the area of population protection was the approval by the USSR
Verkhovna Rada in 1991 of the Concept of population protection (hereafter referred to as the Concept),
for those residing in the Ukrainian SSR territories with their heightened levels of radioactive
contamination in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe [4]. Within this Concept, the basic
principle of radiological protection for the population was the staged population resettlement toradiologically clean areas as determined by temporary criterion of soil contamination density (withradionuclides – cesium, strontium, plutonium). The main motive for this principle was the absence ofcomprehensive information about the additional exposure doses the population would receive bycontinuing to live within contaminated areas, in addition to the exposure they had already received dueto the during Chernobyl accident..
The Concept evolved from the conclusions of the Rada research report and a study of USSR
productive forces by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR [23], which was prepared for the Council of
Ministers of the USSR. Whilst acknowledging the report justified the measures as being a means ofreorganizing productive forces and the rational use of productive capacity, one should not overestimate249

its importance in promoting the principle of resettlement and the radiological criteria concerning its
implementation.
In the Laws of Ukraine «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl
catastrophe» and «On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl
catastrophe» the above principle and criteria of contamination density were the basis for zoning
territories contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree «On implementation of the Ukrainian SSR
Verkhovna Rada Decrees on the procedure of the Law of Ukrainian SSR implementation «On legal
regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social
protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» dated 23 July 1991, No. 106
defined the set of legislative measures focused on protection of the population from the negative impactof the Chernobyl catastrophe and the elimination of its consequences. The Decrees also list thosesettlements classified as radioactively contaminated zones (total 2293 items) [8].
It should be noted that there is a significant contradiction in the Chernobyl legislation. According
to Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl
catastrophe», the territories within which the population can receive an exposure dose exceeding 1.0
mSv (0,1 rem) per year are referred to as contaminated territories in the aftermath of the Chernobyl
accident [6]. A similar provision encloses Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine «On the status and social
protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe», which establishes the conditions
by which the population can residee and work without limitation (due to radioactive contamination).
The Article quotes a maximum annual exposure dose of 1,0 mSv (0,1 rem) per year [5]. However, in
Article 2 of the above laws among the categories of contaminated territories there is a zone of enhanced
radiation monitoring, which is defined as a territory with the soil contamination density over the preaccident level with cesium isotopes from 1,0 to 5,0 Ci/km2 or with strontium isotopes from 0.02 to 0.15
Ci/km2 or with plutonium isotopes from 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/km2 on the basis that the calculated effective
exposure dose to the individual, taking into account the coefficient of radionuclide migration in plants
and other factors, exceeds 0,5 mSv (0,05 rem) per year more than the dose an individual obtained
during the pre-accident period.
So, according to some articles, a zone of enhanced radiation monitoring does not require
restrictions on where people can live or work, but according to other articles within the same laws,
radiation protection measures are implemented within this territory, and the population receives benefits
and compensation for residing there and there may be limitations on their activities. According to
official data [24] the number of people who reside within the radioactively contaminated zones is about
2.15 million, and more than 1.5 million people are residents of areas of enhanced radiation monitoring.
It should also be noted that according to the Concept, the density of soil contamination withradionuclides is used as a temporary criterion for making the decisions until an individual effective
exposure dose shall be established. Contamination density, especially at this stage, doesn’t accuratelyreflect the radiation risk to those residing within the territories classified as contaminated. Using theterritories contamination density as a criterion for the territory’s inclusion as a radioactively
contaminated zone is not recommended according to current radiological knowledge, since the exposure
doses the population receives can differ in many ways as a result of differences in environmental
conditions within the same contamination density. But this criterion is still the basic one used in
Chernobyl legislation.
In Ukraine starting from 1991, the dosimetric certification of settlements that suffered as a resultof radioactive contamination in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe is being implemented
systematically. The individual effective exposure doses of these settlements (so-called certificate doses)
and their dynamics are well known and are regularly published [25-33]. Today, because of self
protection and countermeasures taken, the content of radionuclides in the environment’s objects has

250decreased almost two times, and in agricultural products two or more times, which in turn has led to a
reduction of external and internal exposure doses of 2-4 times. This reduction is reflected in thesettlements distribution changing in accordance with the certificate dose levels, see Table 7.3. For
comparison, the same table shows the classification of settlements referred to as radioactively
contaminated zones in accordance with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 23 July 1991,
No. 106, which is still effective, including six towns of Volyn and Rivne regions, which weretransferred from the zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement to the zone of guaranteed voluntary
resettlement according to the Law «On transfer of some towns of Volyn and Rivne regions to the zoneof guaranteed voluntary resettlement» [34].
Table 7.3 presents the striking differences between ‘officially declared’ radioactively
contaminated zones, and the dosimetry realities of the present days. As was already noted, according to
official data [4], the population size residing in radioactively contaminated zones is about 2.15 million
people. However, the numbers who actually reside in settlements where the certificate dose exceeds 0.5
mSv per year, is around 320 thousand persons, and in those settlements where the certificate dose
exceeds 1 mSv per year its around 136 thousand people [33]. However, at present there is no procedure
for changing the settlements status of the radioactively contaminated zones.
Table 7.3.
Distribution of settlements and the levels of additional exposure doses, defined on the basisof dosimetric certification materials
Year of certification

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1991, CMU Decree
No. 106< 0,5 mSv

1307
1350
1332
1375
1417
1455
1471
1538
1551
1426
1613
1296
1647
-

Number of settlements with average annual exposure doses
0,5-0,99 mSv
1,0-4,99 mSv> 5,0 mSv

333
359
375
380
298
314
317
338
410
297
285
242
236
1290
(Zone 4)

507
443
440
397
440
389
372
285
202
108
68
58
42
841
(Zone 3)

6
9
7
9
6
5
3
2
0
0
1
0
0
86
(Zone 2)The mechanism to revise the zone boundaries, as defined in Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine «Onlegal regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social
protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» is extremely difficult.
In accordance with the provisions of the above articles, such revision is performed after the regional
councils submit the respective proposal. However, despite full awareness of the improvement of theradiological situation within the territories of their jurisdiction, none of the regional councils, except forVolyn and Rivne, have submitted any proposals for the transfer of settlements to a category of reduced
contamination. This is despite almost 20 years having passed since the adoption of the Cabinet of Ministers
of USSR Decree dated 23 July 1991, ʋ 106, that categorized settlements into zones of radioactive
contamination. Only Rivne and Volyn regional councils, at the request of village councils, submitted
proposals to transfer settlements to the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement when the latter refused tomove out of six towns that are within the zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement.
Also, the provisions of these articles provide that the Cabinet of Ministers review the zones
boundaries based on experts’ reports from a number of organizations and central authorities. However,251

it is not clear from the provisions of these articles or any other document; what should be the focus of
the experts’ conclusions, provided by the Bodies or Organizations with the exception of Ministry of
Emergency and the National Commission for Radiation Protection of Ukraine. Still the transfer of thesettlements between radioactively contaminated zones should be carried out in accordance with theradiological criteria, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the above laws.
For a long time the Government of Ukraine tried to remove the contradiction between thelegislation and economic capabilities of Ukraine, to optimize the level of social protection of persons
affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe, and to overcome an increasing social and psychological tension
within different social groups of citizens. However no remarkable shifts in this area have happened.
Twice, in 1994 and in 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine carried out attempts torevise the Cabinet of Ministers Decree of the Ukrainian SSR dated 23 July 1991, No. 106, which
would take into account the actual improvement of the radiological situation within the territories
that are within the radioactively contaminated zone, but in both cases, the Cabinet of was forced tosuspend or cancel its decision, primarily due to the failure to meet the mechanism of the zones
boundaries review established by the Law.
At the same time, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Presidium Resolution dated 12 September
1994, No. 127/94-ɉȼ «The suitability of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree suspension dated
29 August 1994, No. 600», the Government guidelines were formulated in such a way that the adoptionof a new redaction of the Concept (of population residence within contaminated areas) by the
Verkhovna Rada actually stipulated its following policy in this area. This prompted the development of
a new document providing a basis to review the laws of Ukraine (related to the Chernobyl catastrophe).
Such document was prepared and approved by the Government of Ukraine in 1997-98 and was
submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. But at the end of 1999, the document was recalled by the
new Government to assess its relevance and to revise it, and it has not been resubmitted to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
Taking into consideration the Concept’s importance, the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine «On parliamentary hearings concerning the fourteenth anniversary of the Chernobyl
catastrophe» assigned the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Academy of Medical Sciencesof Ukraine, and Ukrainian Academy of Agrarian Sciences to review the draft Concept. During
presidium meetings of the above academies, the scientists supported the project as a basis for further
improvement of the legislation, but the Government has not submitted this document to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
This process was completed by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 25 July 2002, No.
408-p «On approval of the Concept of the Law of Ukraine «On revision incorporation to the Law of
Ukraine «On legal regime of the territories contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On thestatus and social protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe». Today, 13 years
after its development and nearly 10 years after its approval, some of the document’s provisions are still
effective, but in general it can no longer serve as a basis for the improvement of Chernobyl legislation.
In recent years another serious problem has surfaced, caused by flaws in the Chernobyl
legislation. As mentioned above, the total amount of all payments, additional payments and subsidies tocitizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe provided by the Law of Ukraine «On thestatus and social protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe», when added
together exceeded the Government budget.
Inconsistency between the provisions of the Law of Ukraine «On the status and social protectionof citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» relating to the size of compensation
payments, additional payments and subsidies and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Acts that havebeen issued to ensure their implementation has led to mass appeals in the courts with lawsuits against
the State. Their number is growing rapidly.

252

The drastic coordinated actions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine and the highest judicial bodies of Ukraine are needed to improve the situation.
Another the Chernobyl legislation’s problem is the shift of the Government support priorities:
instead of providing unconditional implementation of measures aimed at ensuring the production of
products with the acceptable level of radionuclides content, the Government spends much more funds
for financial assistance in connection with the limitation of the consumption of locally produced foodand for additional payments for work within contaminated territories, which actually has long ceased to
be radioactively contaminated according to the criteria defined in the effective regulations.
Thus, the Government budget for 2010 provided only UAH 1.9 million for the radiologicalprotection of population and environmental improvement of territories, contaminated by the Chernobyl
catastrophe and in accordance with the Program «Monthly subsidies related to limitation of the local
food products consumption and compensations for special provision with products to the citizens who
suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «Additional payments for work within contaminatedareas, the preservation of wages while transfer to lower-paid work and payments in relation toresettlement of increased grants and additional vocation to the citizens who suffered from the
Chernobyl catastrophe» – UAH 814.5 and 596 million respectively.
At this, the dosimetric certification of settlements that are within the radioactively contaminatedzone, the cost of which today did not exceed UAH 10 million, was not carried out due to lack of funds
during 2009-2010.
Meanwhile, at present – almost in 25 years after the accident – there are still about a hundred
places in Ukraine, where the certificate exposure doses or the radionuclides content in local foodproducts is above the acceptable levels. In particular, in some settlements of Rivne region, the internalradiation exposure dose of children at the account of contaminated milk consumption, reaches the levels
that were observed here in 1987.
Next problem is a lack of motivation of the population and local authorities to improve the situation:on the contrary, there is a reverse motivation when the effective system of compensation encourages the
population and local authorities to maintain the high levels of radionuclides content in the local foodproducts. No measures for the introduction of positive motivation are arranged by the State.
The National Program on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe for 20062010 [9] provided the following objectives as the most important ones: «improvement of the system ofmeasures aimed at stimulating the production of clean products, economic development of areas thatwere radioactively contaminated» and «provision of scientific grounded application of funds for
implementing measures on social protection of individuals who suffered from the Chernobyl
catastrophe, and overcoming its consequences». The expected results are the following: reduction of theamount of funds provided to pay for unemployment benefits, encouragement of innovation activities,
creation of competitive industries, including agricultural development, assistance in the increase of the
population labor activity and creation of conditions for their productive employment, acceleration of
economic development of areas that suffered as a result of radioactive contamination, creation of
conditions for their steady development.
However, among the Budget programs provided by the Attachment to the National Program ofovercoming the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for 2006-2010 «Amount of expenditures from theGovernment budget of Ukraine for implementation of priority tasks of the National Program of overcoming
the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for 2006-2010», there was not any Program, within theframework of which these tasks could be implemented, and the expected results could be achieved.
It should be noted once again that a system of the budget priorities determines which of the
instruments provided by the Programs to implement its policy, the Government considers the mostimportant and which is less important, which instruments provide the opportunity to work and which,being deprived of appropriate funding, remain declarative.

253

Table 7.4.
Objectives and tasks of the State Programs related to overcoming the consequencesof the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, Russian Federation, and Ukraine
Belarus

Russian Federation

UkraineState Programon overcoming the consequences of
the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe for2006 – 2010
Objectives:• socio-economic and radiationecological rehabilitation of thecontaminated areas;• creation of conditions for
economic management without
restrictions by the radiation factor
and the further risks reduction on
health of affected populations.

Federal Target Program
Overcoming consequences of theradiation accidents for the period till
2010
The program’s objective is thecompletion in 2010 of the activities
associated with provision ofprotection to the citizens in RussianFederation affected by the radiation
impact as a result of the accident at
the ... Chernobyl NPP ... and thesocial and economic rehabilitation of
territories contaminated as a result of
the Chernobyl accidents..., including
the return of these territories into
economic circulation, reducing therisk of radioactive contamination of
the environment from potentially
dangerous sources of pollution.

The main tasks:• staged rehabilitation of thecontaminated areas and affected
populations;• optimization of medical care ofvictims on the basis of scientificrecommendations;• implementation of the preventive
measures related to reduction of theradiation exposure doses;• cost-effective production of
products that meet the radiologicalquality of republican andinternational requirements.

The Program’s objectives are thefollowing:• creation of the infrastructureneeded to provide the safe living
conditions for the population incontaminated areas;• development and implementationof set of measures in the sphere ofhealth protection of citizens affectedby the radiation, including thespecialized address medical
assistance;• creation of conditions for the safe
forest management within theaffected areas (taking into accountthe established norms of radiation
safety);• improvement of the target
monitoring systems and theircomponents, as well as forecasting
the situation within contaminatedareas;• information support and sociopsychological rehabilitation of thecitizens living within contaminatedareas

National State Programon overcoming the consequencesof the Chernobyl catastrophe for2006 – 2010
The objectives of the Program are
the following:• health provision of individuals
affected by the Chernobyl
catastrophe and their descendants;• strengthen and support of thesafety barriers, radiation protectionof population living in areas that
suffered as a result of radioactive
contamination, the maximum
possible limitation of theradionuclides spread from the
Exclusion Zone;• improvement of social protectionof the individuals who suffered asa result of the Chernobyl accident,
rehabilitation of territories andsettlements.
The main tasks of the Program are
the following:• health provision of individuals
injured as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe;• strengthen and support of theradiation barriers;• radiation protection of population
living in the radioactive
contaminated areas;• limitation of radionuclides spreadout the Exclusion zone;• social protection of theindividuals suffered as a result ofChernobyl accident;• economic rehabilitation of theareas subjected to radioactive
contamination and their removing
into “clean” category.
Main points are expoundedin 11 text pages

No better situation was established with determination of the above Program’s objectives. The
following objectives are declared: preservation of the health of individuals who suffered as a result of
the Chernobyl catastrophe and their descendants, strengthen and support of the safety barriers, radiation
protection of population residing within areas that were radioactively contaminated, the maximum254possible limitation of the radionuclides spread from the Exclusion Zone, improvement of the social
protection of the Chernobyl catastrophe victims, rehabilitation of territories and settlements [9]. The
above objectives are actually the areas of activity, each of which requires the constant hard work, but allof them, except for rehabilitation of territories and settlements, are not to be the objectives of theProgram because it is impossible to achieve them.
Table 7.4 presents the objectives and tasks of the Programs on overcoming the consequences of
the Chernobyl catastrophe effective in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine during 2006-2010. The Belarus andRussian programs are significantly different from the Ukrainian one where a greater emphasis was laidon the territories rehabilitation and their return into economic circulation. The Belarus Program
considers the social protection only as one of method of these tasks solution and the rehabilitation
objectives implementation.
The Information State policy concerning the Chernobyl problems and radiation risks lacks someconsistency, and do not fully presents an effective instrument on overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe.
Within recent years, the requirements of the Law of Ukraine «On legal regime of the territories
contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe» and «On the status and social protection of citizens who
suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» has not been fully implemented regarding bringing to thepeople’s attention and publication at the national and regional mass media of the maps of contamination
areas, lists of settlements referred to these areas, and annual dosimetry certification data.
In general, a complex «Chernobyl victim» has been developed among the part of affected
population appeared in a social apathy and disbelief in their own strength, mood of doom, depend only
on outside help, and getting used to a benefits and compensation.
The effective measures to fight against these negative processes are the measures that are being
developed and implemented in Ukraine, including by the UN agencies. In particular these are themeasures of the Chernobyl Economic Forum, aimed at stimulating business activity within thecontaminated areas, supported by the UNDP in Ukraine, activities of centers of the social andpsychological rehabilitation of the population, created under support of UNESCO, as well as measuresof the ICRIN information center (International Chernobyl Research and Information Network) of the
UN’s organization, in particular the spread of understandable and clear scientific knowledge concerning
the Chernobyl catastrophe and its consequences, including recommendation related to healthy life-style
based on the reports, results and recommendations of the Chernobyl Economic Forum and the UN
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
The executive and local authorities should facilitate such activities of the UN system in Ukraine
and seek out and create its own forms of support and provision of steady development and growth of
the undertaken initiatives.
To sum up, it should be acknowledged that the Chernobyl legislation despite the high humanisticorientation needs the certain improvement in order to become an effective tool to overcome theconsequences of the Chernobyl disaster.
7.1.2. Improvement of the Legislation that Regulated the Relationships in the Sphereof Overcoming the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
The issue of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe is very topical for the
Ukrainian society. Therefore, changes in legislation have to be offered considering the open analysis
results of the affairs’ condition and involving a wide range of experts to this analysis and to design
recommendations.
In the State, there is a number of political (parliamentary hearings, governmental decisions, thePresident of Ukraine message) and expert (conferences, roundtables, etc.) procedures for analysis of thesituation condition in the specific field. Preparation of national report for the anniversary of the255Chernobyl catastrophe is also an open procedure to analyze the situation condition on overcoming its
consequences. In addition, there are international organizations and international expert groups whichanalyze the situation and accumulate its recommendations focused on its improvement. The Chernobyl
Forum is the international group of experts who presented their reports on the impact of the Chernobyl
accident on environment [35] and health [36], and recommendations to the Governments of Belarus,
Russia, and Ukraine related to the further activities [37] on overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe before 2006.
Proposals related to improvements of the Chernobyl regulatory framework should solve problems
identified in Section 7.1.1. The following changes are needed to be incorporated:
1. Improvement of the review procedure of the radioactively contaminated zones boundaries,
introduction into the Law of the periodicity regulation on such review.
2. Transition to the dose criterion of the radioactively contaminated zones boundaries
determination, formed as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe at the national legislation.
3. Introduction into the Law of regulation associated with the compulsory periodic (annual)
dosimetry certification implementation.
4. Introduction into the regulatory legal act of the regulation associated with the mandatory
implementation of Whole Body Counter – monitoring of individuals who live within radioactively
contaminated zones.
5. Fortification of mechanisms of the positive motivation among the local authorities andresidents of settlements to improve the radiological situation in these settlements.
6. Introduction of the business support system within areas classified as contaminated, and thoseremove from the radioactively contaminated zones.
7. Improvement of the existing system of benefits and compensation.
It is necessary to coordinate the provisions of legislation in the sphere of overcoming theconsequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe with the legal norms in the other spheres. In particular,
modern system of radiation safety and radiation protection [38] fully takes into account the Chernobyl
experience; that is why it’s time to make an attempt to coordinate the provisions of regulatory legal actsin the sphere of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe with the legislation on theradiation protection.
Improvement of the system of benefits provision shall be performed in accordance with theStrategy on regulation of the benefits system to certain categories of citizens until 2012, approved by
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 3 June 2009, No. 594-p [39] and taking into accountthe peculiarities and practice of benefits allocation to the Chernobyl categories.
Implementation of changes to the Chernobyl legislation requires consolidation of efforts of theexpertise, the executive and legislative power, and mobilization of information resources. Today theabove can be achieved only if all participants shall consider this issue as something that is of utmost
importance.

7.2. Analysis of the State Programs Implementation Related to Overcoming
the consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
7.2.1. Radiological Protection of Population
Today, looking back at 25 years and evaluating the measures of radiological (radiation) protection,
one must admit that almost all specified countermeasures in the international and national regulations aimed
at protection of population from ionizing radiation were realized at the early stage of liquidation of theChernobyl catastrophe despite an initial underestimation of the scale of event and secret regime.
Immediate measures in cases of radiation accidents were performed – evacuation andresettlement, iodine preventive treatment, sanitation measures, an access restriction to radioactively

256

contaminated areas, limitation of contaminated food consumption, measures in agrarian sector,
decontamination of contaminated areas, informing the public and others.
One of the key tasks of State policy at the present stage concerning minimization of theconsequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe is the implementation of measures aimed at comprehensive
protection of the population, creation of safe living conditions within contaminated territories. The
implementation of State policy was performed until 2006 in accordance with the Annual Programs, inwhich a significant place was occupied by the measures oriented to meet the radiation safety
requirements of the population residing and working within the contaminated areas.
In 2006, the Law of Ukraine «On the National Program of overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe for 2006-2010» dated 14 March 2006, No. 3522-IV, defined the objectives andpriorities of radiological protection of population at a later stage of overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe [40].
In accordance with the provisions of the National Program, the set of measures aimed at reducing
the negative impact of radioactive contamination on public health includes the following: dosimetry
monitoring, monitoring the levels of radioactive contamination of food and raw materials, provision of
the radiation monitoring network with devices of new generation; radiological rehabilitation of theterritories; conversion of farms, retraining and certification of specialists in radiological protection,
informing of the population about the radiation state of territory.
The efforts were focused first of all on reducing the collective additional exposure dose on population
through the respective reducing of the total intake of radionuclides with the products of consumption, andfixation of qualitative indicators achieved in the production of clean products within areas that suffered as aresult of radioactive contamination. The efforts were also directed to those «critical» settlements andfacilities where there is a danger of exceeding the average annual total dose over 1 mSv.
An objective assessment of radio ecological conditions of living within the affected areas was
and remains at present the basis for the measures planning related to radiological protection. A leadingrole of this task implementation belongs to the dosimetry monitoring, consisting of the following:
dosimetry and thyrodosimetric certification of settlements and determination of internal exposure doses,
according to data of the direct measurement of radiocaesium content in the human bodies.
The system of general dosimetry certification of settlements was established in 74 districts, 12regions, and 2139 settlements after 1991. The system provides the estimation of the certificate dose of
the settlements referred to the radioactively contaminated zones. The data of radiation contamination
density with 137Cs and 90Sr and its concentration in milk and potatoes is used to estimate such dose.
A set of activities includes the following: sampling of food products (milk and potatoes) and their spectrometric and radiochemical
analysis («milk» monitoring); measurement of radionuclides content in the human body; calculation of exposure doses of the population;
 final measurements for quality assessment of the dosimetry certification;
 compilation and issuance of the dosimetry certificates to the settlements.
As a result of calculations, the following data are obtained: the average density of ɋs137, Sr90 fallouts in soil for the settlements (and its environs);
 value of the average concentration of ɋs137, Sr90 in milk; values of the calculated certificate exposure dose of the passport.
In accordance with the procedure for work implementation related to specification of theradiation condition and radioecological monitoring performance within the contaminated areas of
Ukraine, the following is established:
Double sampling and analysis of milk in 503 settlements of the guaranteed voluntary
resettlements zone.

257

A sampling in other 1627 settlements referred to the radioactively contaminated zone.
Sampling of potatoes is performed one time per year (in August – September) in the settlements,
where according to the observation of previous years, the certificate exposure dose exceeds 0.5
mSv/year, in average about 16670 samples of potatoes and milk were taken.
That is, the monitoring of the soil and the basic foods radioactive contamination is being carriedout during the implementation of general dosimetry certification of settlements.
The certificate dose is the weighted average dose per professional and age structure of residentsof the settlement and is intended only for support decisions made by the Government authorities inaccordance with the effective legislation. It was noted that the use of this dose in epidemiologicalstudies is unacceptable.
Results of the general dosimetry certification of settlements are summarized in special issues, thecollection of which contains over 13 collections. The latest collection includes a generalized data for 2008.
The materials of radiation and dosimetry monitoring (see Section 2.1.2) are the basis ones todevelop the Program of rehabilitation of territories and, under the condition of insufficient funding,gives the possibility to estimate and optimize the measures implementation associated with theterritories rehabilitation. The scope of measures related to radiological protection of population andecological improvement of the territories that was radioactively contaminated, greatly depends on theamount of funding of the respective section of Chernobyl Program (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5.
The Program financing according to the Section «Radiological protection of population and environment
enhancement of the territories affected by the radiation contamination»
Items of financing

Provided by the State
Approved by the Government budget
Practically financed, including:Rehabilitation of the territories:
1. meadow and pasture formation andreformation
2. liming of acid soils
3. applying the heightened doses ofmineral fertilizers
4. introduction of mixed fodders, mineraland saline briquettes basis of ferrocene
and zeolite
5. set of countermeasures within the zoneof unconditional (mandatory)
resettlement
6. Radiological examination of land
7. Assessment of the countermeasuresand their support effectiveness8. Targeted programs at the animal
breeding sphere
9. Fire-prevention measures in the woods
Radiation monitoring system:
10.
Procurement of the radiation
monitoring devices, their maintenance,
calibration
11. Dose-monitoring (certification of
the settlements)
12. Radiation monitoring of the
products (radiation monitoring network)
Training

258

2006

Financing per years, UAH thousand
2007
2008
2009

2010

19500,012743,011517,1

15000,012743,011518,2

20000,013609,510367,1

20000,01361,01361,020000,0
1861,01861,02013,01660,1

1275,0001000,0

642,0

0

0

0

1547,22815,01830,0001287,01145,2

1595,0

0

500,0

350,0

450,0

450,0

150,0

200,0

400,0

250,0

220,0

0

0

165,0

120,0

128,6

0

0

616,0

615,0

702,8

0

0

5585,0385,03310,0

0

0

310,3

324,0

123,0

0

0

862,6

797,0

1007,0002221,02185,02485,71111,01035,0

160,0

130,0

240,0

100,0

126,1

Upon the justified need (for 2006-2007) in UAH 43.7 million per year, in recent years funding
has been significantly reduced, first in 3-4 times, and later starting from 2009, financing of the measures
implementation oriented to the territory rehabilitation and dosimetry certification was ceased at all. This
disparity in funding of countermeasures against the background of general funds which are allocated by
the Government to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, holds in clean products
production, makes it impossible to influence effectively the reduction of population exposure dose anddo not assists in reducing of the social and psychological tensions within the regions affected by
Chernobyl catastrophe.
The Laws of Ukraine provide the possibility to review zone boundaries in case of change ofradiological situation and gradually return them into the commercial use without restrictions, however,the drawbacks in the legal procedure are practically blocked its action, and despite the fact that atpresent within a great part of the radioactively contaminated area, the population exposure doses isbelow the criteria established by the effective legislation, the boundaries of areas had not been reviewed
for 20 years (apart from 6 settlements in Rivne and Volyn regions).
Countermeasures in Agricultural and Forestry Economy Sectors
One of the main courses of the radiological protection of the population living withincontaminated territories is the implementation of optimized countermeasures based on radiation
monitoring, in particular associated with the provision of food production in compliance with theGovernment hygienic standards on the radionuclides content.
According to the recommendations on agricultural production in areas contaminated as a result of
the Chernobyl accident, the main measures which considered to be the most effective, are as follows:
meadow and pastures formation; liming of the acid soils; putting the heightened doses of fertilizers;
introduction of mixed fodders on the basis of ferrocene and zeolite admixtures; introduction of mineraland saline briquettes on the basis of ferrocene; conversion of farms to «beef cattle» and «reproductive
swine breeding»; additional radiological examination of certain critical territories and complex of antiradiation measures in forestry.
The program of rehabilitation of contaminated territories provides the implementation of themain task – significantly reduce the expected collective exposure dose on individual residing within thecontaminated area at the account of implementation of comprehensive countermeasures aimed at the
production of clean agricultural products. Only on account of the countermeasures performed at theagricultural areas, the dose loading at the population has decreased in two times which was officiallyrecognized by the International community and was fixed at the IAEA documentation.
The maximum effect of the basic countermeasures introduction was achieved in 1991-1992. The
actual volumes of liming and of radical improvement of meadows and pastures in 2008 compared with
1991 decreased from 69.99 to 0.76 (Figure 7.1) thousand hectares and from 112.15 to 0.964 thousand
hectares, respectively. The volumes of application of mixed fodder, premixes and zeolites are also
reduced (Figure 7.2). Financial cuts, which began in the mid-90, resulted in this situation with theintroduction of countermeasures (Table 7.5).
For 25 years passed since the Chernobyl accident, a series of decisions had been taken in thesphere of forestry, which, in general, were aimed at provision of safe working and living conditions forthe forest workers and their families, and also aimed at production, the radioactive contamination ofwhich has not exceeded the established norms.
Time requirement is a need to obtain adequate timely information about the forest radiation
conditions in case of any nuclear incident, which in turn requires the availability of a team of experts inthe forest Radiology within the State Forestry Committee on a regular basis, since forests are the criticallandscapes in terms of formation of internal radiation doses of the population, particularly in the
Ukrainian Polesie. At a time when most people in one way or another use the forest products,259

characterized by the high content of 137Cs, the contribution of the latest to formation of internalradiation dose is significant. An important component in minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl
accident is prevention of the production and distribution of products containing the excess radioactive
substances out of contaminated area border.

Fig. 7.1. Volumes of liming of the acid soils contaminated as a results of Chernobyl disaster, thousand ha

Fig. 7.2. Volumes of the root improvement of the meadows and pastures contaminated as a resultof the Chernobyl disaster, thousand ha

During the acute period after accident, the top priority countermeasures at the Forestry
Management Enterprises were the activities of the restrictive character. The following are found among
them: reduce of working hours, termination of economic activity in some areas with high levels ofradioactive contamination, evacuation of enterprises and employees to the safe zone, the prohibition ofcertain types of industrial activities of the Forest enterprises (procurement and selling of the wild
berries, mushrooms, medicinal raw materials, wood, etc).
The new recommendations for the forest management in conditions of radioactive contamination
have been developed on the basis of scientific research to ensure the production activity of Forestry
enterprises located within contaminated areas (2008).
The countermeasures during the acute and remote period after the accident at different levels of
the State regulation in the Forestry sector prevented the irradiation of workers, preserved of their healthand led to the stability of enterprises and growth of the production scopes.

260

Fig. 7.3. The volumes of mixed fodder, zeolites and premixes application within the territories contaminatedas a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, thousand tons

During the remote period after the accident, the most effective implemented countermeasures are
the following: restriction of public access to woodlands with the contamination density more than 555
kBq m-2; provision of radiation monitoring of the forests, radiation control of places for storing theforest resources, and the medicinal raw materials; the provision of individual dosimetry monitoring ofworkers, working places, equipment and machinery; timber sorting according to specific activity ofradionuclides, use of special technological methods of wood processing from cutting areas; provision of
the radiation monitoring of forest products.
Since 1989, all measures to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Forestry
management have been performed and funded within the framework of the State program on
minimization the consequences, which allowed performing significant scope of work, avoiding
irradiation of forest workers and reduce the collective dose on the population in general. Since 1992,
funding to minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Forestry management has been
reduced by 50%, and from 2009 terminated at all. At present these activities are carried out by own
funds. The situation with the financial support of radiation monitoring of forest products can lead to acomplete stop. The population usage of wild berries, mushrooms, medicinal raw materials without
radiation control will eventually lead to an increase of the collective exposure dose of the population.
Summarizing the analysis of the State program tasks implementation on the radiologicalprotection of population, it should be noted that in Ukraine there is still more than 300 settlements inwhich the average annual exposure doses of the population, or the locally produced agricultural
products do not meet the hygienic standards despite the fact that the total area contaminated by the
Chernobyl catastrophe (more than 37 kBq m- 2 by 137Cs) was shortened almost in two times, and theannual radiation dose decreased in 7-30 times (depending on the place of living). According to theexperts’ assessment, without the countermeasures implementation, the number of such settlements will
decrease very slowly.
When planning and introducing the long-term measures on radiological protection, it should betaken into account that the choice of rehabilitation measures should be optimized per the radiological,
economic, social, psychological, and environmental feasibility criteria.
The following is still the basis of the radiological protection: dosimetry monitoring; reliable,scientifically grounded awareness of the population on radiological situation within the territories

261

contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe; and the optimized countermeasures in agriculture andforestry, as such countermeasures during the remote period of overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe preserves a high radiological and economic efficiency.
7.2.2. Medical Protection of Population
Medical protection of victims was carried out permanently after the accident. Within recent
years, the protection was performed in accordance with the tasks defined by the National Program on
overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster for 2006-2010 (hereinafter referred to as theProgram).
To realize this direction of the Program, the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine together with the
Ministry of Health Protection and the Government Administration developed a set of measures that
included the following: the provision of hospital medical aid; annual medical examinations (clinical);development and operation of the State registry of affected persons; arrangement of theInterdepartmental Experts Commissions work related to establishment of a causal connection of
disease, disability and death with the action of ionizing radiation and other harmful factors as a result of
the Chernobyl accident; equipping of medical facilities with modern diagnostic and therapeutic medical
equipment; provision of medicines and expendable medical supplies; treatment of seriously ill patients;social and psychological rehabilitation; introduction of scientific developments in medical practice.
A network of specialized centers, clinics and medical facilities in an amount of more than 300
healthcare facilities, including 36 scientific and clinical institutions of higher accreditation and 77
central district hospitals were established in order to provide continuous medical care to victims and tocountrymen who live within contaminated territories.
Necessity to implement the above measures was stipulated by the high levels of morbidity andmortality among victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe (see Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.5). Affected people every
year need the scheduled and unscheduled treatment, preventive measures of chronic diseases
exacerbations in order to prevent disability and aggravations.
The country has a system of medical care for victims, which consists of annual clinicalexamination, ambulatory, according to indications, in-patient treatment, and rehabilitation measures inhealth resorts and rehabilitation centers.
In accordance with the established manner, the annual medical examinations of disabled persons
and the accident liquidators are performed before the Chernobyl disaster anniversary, and the children
examinations – before the beginning of summer health-improving season.
The coverage rates for annual medical examinations have been stable within recent years andamong the liquidators of the accident are equal to 97.3–97.8%, among the adult population – 95.2% andamong the affected children – 99.2%.
The following also affects the morbidity level of the affected population: the transition period of
economy, changes in the demographic situation and the social and psychological condition worsening,lack of effective measures associated with overcoming the early and remote effects of negative factorsof the Chernobyl catastrophe, the low level of provision with the highly qualified personnel andinsufficient equipping with laboratory and diagnostic equipment of the regional medical institutions,lack of awareness in the field of radiobiology and radiation medicine by the local governments, medical
and teaching staff who work within contaminated areas.
The following reasons substantially affected the reduction of the medical protection efficiency:
failure to take into consideration the combined effect of ionizing radiation and the otherenvironmental risks, including chemical, environmental factors on the human body;unbalanced diet, and the low level of the population provision with the of animal and vegetable
protein, vitamins, essential macro-and micronutrients;262

unsufficient equipping of the field laboratory with the portable equipment in order to implement
the current population survey in the remote areas;
insufficient social security of victims of different categories;
insufficient funding for implementation of the timely special-purpose clinical examination of
persons affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe;
insufficient enlightening of the scientists and specialists’ experience on medical and sanitaryconsequences of the Chernobyl disaster by the mass media;
failure to implement in full the restoration treatment as at the out-patient level and in sanatoria
and health resorts of Ukraine.
The external exposure impact and the radionuclides penetration through inhalation have lost theirrelevance gradually. At the present stage after the accident at the ChNPP, the main contribution to the
exposure of the population of Ukraine belongs to internal exposure due to radionuclides content in food.
Hygienic aspects of this issue are as follows: rationing of the minimum acceptable level offoodstuffs and raw materials contamination, the prohibition of production and consumption of local
products, monitoring of the contamination levels of food products and the removal of the mostcontaminated food from the food ration (mushrooms, berries, milk, meat), under the condition of theirreplacement with the imported ones; development of technological and cooking methods of foodtreatment in order to reduce their contamination with radionuclides, increase the protective andpreventive properties of food rations.
The State Sanitary Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine is constantly
performing the radiation control of foodstuffs and food raw material within the framework of the«Comprehensive Program of the State sanitary supervision implementation in the field of radiation
safety of Ukraine, radiation monitoring of environmental by the agencies and institutions of the State
Sanitary and Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, involving the ResearchInstitutes of the Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine for 2006-2010 «(the Order of the Ministry of
Health of Ukraine dated 20 March 2006, No. 137), the surface water monitoring is implemented inaccordance with the «Program of the radiological characteristics observations of transboundary water
facilities with Russia and Belarus» and the «Temporary program of water quality monitoring ofPivdennyi Bug, Dnieper, Dniester and the Severskyi Donets river basins within the bounds of Ukraine.
Every year, the agencies of the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Healthof Ukraine make almost 200 thousand gamma and beta-spectrometric surveys of food on the content ofradionuclides cesium-137 and strontium-90. Analysis of the obtained results shows that the radiation
situation in Ukraine is stable, but there is still fixed the exceedance of the permissible levels of radionuclides
in milk, meat, vegetables, and wild mushrooms and berries of the local production in Volyn, Zhytomyr,
Rivne, Kyiv and Chernihiv, the regions that were affected by the ChNPP accident the most.
Analysis of the annual monitoring results of about 5 thousand water surveys of economic anddrinking water supply and about 2 thousand surface water surveys on the content of radionuclides
indicates the non-exceedance of the control levels within the recent years.
The Social and Psychological Centers of the population rehabilitation and their awareness on theissues of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl consequences (hereinafter referred to as theCenters) are dealing with the purposeful overcoming of the psychological problems of the affected
population. These Centers are located in towns Borodyanka, Boyarka, Ivankov, Korosten, andSlavutich.
The Centers’ specialists have developed and implemented the social projects and rehabilitation
programs aimed at psychological and physical health improvement of different age categories of theaffected population.
The Centers not only provide the social and psychological assistance to the population but theyplay an important role in life of the communities located within radioactively contaminated territories.

263

Activity of the population, its initiative, and independence in solving the social and economic, andcultural problems has increased.
A significant area of the Centers’ activity is to promote the youth civic activity in order to attract
the younger generation to the social and political life of their city and to cultivate in young people theleadership skills, interest in decisions making that would influence the destiny of the community, and toform an ecological world outlook and healthy lifestyles.
A new area in the public informing is the introduction of modern information technologies. Theirown sites in four centers had been created (there were 257.5 thousand visitors on the sites in 2010).
Implementation of these technologies allows expanding its activities in the sphere of public information
on overcoming social and psychological consequences of the Chernobyl accident, promoting thehealthy lifestyles, and examining the requests of the community.
The Centers involve international organizations and their programs in order to implement
effectively their projects and programs, and to introduce the advanced international technologies in theprocesses of recovery and sustainable development of psychological and social immunity of theaffected population.
Only during 2010, 85 469 persons applied to the Centers. The Centers’ specialists provided an
individual work and consultations to 9310 individuals, conducted 8045 group sessions, read 187
lectures and performed 375 publications in the media and issued 132 information publication.

Fig. 7.4. The dynamics of the population attendance of the Social and Psychological Centers

Having insuring the continuous work with communities regarding their potential development ingovernance and participation in local development, these institutions are a guarantee of stable projects
results and provide the spread of the positive experience.
The Centers have become integral parts of social infrastructure of cities and regions, aimed at
establishment of the partnership connections between the Government institutions, social institutions,and community organizations in order to activate the population through self-development anddetermination of priorities in the social, economic and ecological spheres of life.
It should be noted that the measures for health protection and social and psychologicalrehabilitation were implemented under the conditions of permanent deficit of the State and local
budgets and underfunding of the approved by the Program amounts of expenditures (see Table).
These problems adversely affect the moral situation of victims, delay the receipt of medical carein a timely manner, and increase the number of appeals to the central executive agencies.
Structural changes in all the central executive agencies, involved in decision making associatedwith overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, are actually led to the destruction of theGovernment management system in this sphere.
The conclusion about the insufficient funding of the main health protection measures of
population residing within contaminated areas during 2005–2008, was unanimously developed by theexperts from the State Institution «SCRM of Academy of Medical Science of Ukraine», the Health264

Security Head Department of Kyiv Regional State Administration and the National Shupyk Medical
Academy of Postgraduate Education, which evaluated the implementation state of the main healthprotection measures of population residing within contaminated areas during 2006–2008 in order to
identify possible ways of their correction.
Table. 7.6.
Financing of the Programs focused on «Comprehensive health care provision and cancer treatment of the citizens
affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe using the high-cost medical technologies»
2006

Provided by the
Program at theaccount of theGovernment
budgetPlanned amountof financing at theaccount of theGovernment
budgetActually financed
Percent of theactual financing
provided by the
ProgramYears of the Program implementation, thousand UAH
2007
2008
2009

Total
2010

45000,045000,045000,045000,045000,0225000,044570,044970,027000,06300,06300,0129140,025469,1

44970,021381,55534,2

6300,0103654,7

56,6

99,9

47,5

12,3

14,0

46,1

Limited amount of funding (the «partial» funding level) were allocated for psychologicalassistance to the residents of contaminated areas and to the affected individuals by the Chernobyl
catastrophe, for informing about the behavior peculiarities when residing within contaminated areas, forpreventive measures in order to avoid certain types of diseases and for the rehabilitation treatment. The
procurement scope of medicines and supplies was insufficient for provision of the full high-quality
medical care. Financing of procurement of the reagents for clinical laboratories and medical diagnostic
equipment was also partial. Material and technical base of specialized medical institutions has not been
updated during recent years.
Experts have the unanimous opinion concerning that there is a need for additional or specializedcare for all categories of victims when the structure of morbidity is available. The system of medicalcare for residents of contaminated areas remains effective through the principle of consistency between
all institutions that provide this assistance.
Factors of the worse medical support than expected ones are as follows:lack of experts on security of maternal and child health and prevention of certain types of
diseases, provision of primary health and extended care, examination and treatment in specialized
hospitals, treatment in health and rehabilitation centers, public awareness about the behavior
peculiarities when residing within the contaminated areas;lack of teaching materials and guidance associated with the primary health care, examination andtreatment in specialized hospitals, rehabilitation treatment, preventive measures regarding prevention of
the certain types of diseases, psychological assistance to certain categories of victims;
discrepancy between the material and technical base and the tasks of complete implementation ofannual physical check-ups, examination and treatment in specialized hospitals, rehabilitation treatment,
psychological assistance, measures associated with the maternal and child health security andprevention of certain types of diseases, public awareness about the behavior peculiarities when residing
within the contaminated areas.

265Analysis of the causes of poor or incomplete implementation of measures aimed at preservationof the victims’ health, gives grounds to identify three main directions of improvement of medical careof the contaminated areas residents.
The first – includes a set of measures that need improvement in the financing level, namely:
primary health care, urgent hospital care, treatment in health and rehabilitation centers, measuresassociated with the maternal and child health security, procurement of medicines, supplies and reagentsfor clinical laboratories, procurement of medical diagnostic equipment, maintenance of medical
facilities and etc.
The second – work with residents of the contaminated areas associated with formation of theirunderstanding on necessity of systematic observation of their health and the health of their close ones.
The third – comprehensive orientation of activities, namely: informing of the population about
the behavior peculiarities and the possibility of residing within the contaminated area under thecondition of complete and regular financing, understanding the need for systematic population healthobservation, the availability of teaching materials and guidance.
The following issues are required to be solved: staffing with the doctors and nurses at thecontaminated territories, searching for new ways of aid provision, which will provide modern methodsof in-patient treatment of disease (day hospital, home care, the traditional inpatient treatment), detectedduring preventive examinations, and which will increase the victims’ personal responsibility for theirown health preservation.
The priority group of population of third after-disaster decade is still the people who havesuffered as a result of the acute radiation sickness, namely: liquidators with radiation exposure doses
above 250 mSv, evacuated people from the 30-kilometer zone, individuals with high doses of the
thyroid gland exposure, pregnant women and children residing within contaminated areas and born ofparents who received the high radiation exposure doses.
The following problems should be considered as the most significant ones for the future:need for government support for work implementation on the study of deterministic andstochastic effects;
development of measures associated with the improvement of the evidence-based treatment ofradiation-associated and/or radiation-induced diseases;
development of preventive measures aimed at reducing cancer and oncohematological morbidity;
clinical examination and monitoring of organs and systems disorder that are the most sensitive toradiation exposure in remote period;
medical rehabilitation of the affected population;
support of the programs on studying the medical consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe
during the remote period, especially within contaminated areas where abnormally high levels ofincorporated radionuclides are observed;
improvement of health and sanitary base of specialized hospitals, which are constantly provide
the medical care to the victims.
7.2.3. Social Protection of Population
Population dynamics of citizens who suffered in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
At present, 2 million 210 thousand 605 persons, almost half a million among whom are thechildren, have the status of victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Ukraine.
The population dynamics of liquidators of the Chernobyl accident is presented in accordancewith data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (till 2006 inclusive) and Regional Labor andSocial Security (since 2007). (Table 7.7)

266

Table 7.7.
Population dynamics of liquidators of the Chernobyl accident
Years

Liquidators

Among them disabled persons of the Ist category

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

363780358633343084346316340654335785329607324332318 016308 694297 850276 327
266 801
260 807
255 862

41221
44265
49011
56462
58580
60889
62239
63986
64 80865 18165 78065 36166 27065 66666 489Over the last 15 years, the total number of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine
has decreased by 1 002 721 persons, including the number of liquidators of the Chernobyl accident
consequences has decreased by 107 918 persons, the number of victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe
has decreased by 294 053 persons, number of children who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl
accident has decreased by 600 750 people (due to loss of status after reaching 18 years). Number ofdisabled persons had increased by 50 617 persons.
As of January 2011, the following number of population had been registered in the Social Policy
and Labor authority:
 255 862 liquidators of the Chernobyl accident (its share in the total number – 11%);
 195 4743 victims of the Chernobyl accident (over 88%), among them 482 357 children(25%);
 28 548 persons who have the status of a spouse of the deceased citizen whose death isconnected with the Chernobyl catastrophe; 5 865 persons who participated in the liquidation of other nuclear accidents and were
attributed to the relevant categories of victims.
Considering the trends in the future, one can expect that due to natural movement of population(subject to the maintenance of modern criteria of the national legislation) the total number of victims
and the share of children victims will be decreasing.
Among disabled people, disability of whom is connected with the Chernobyl catastrophe (total
number of them is 112 729 persons), 60% – are the direct participants of the Chernobyl accident
consequences liquidation (66 489) Table 7.8.
In 1991, the process on the disability determination has begun only after the Law adoption. Moreor less stable process has been observed since 1996.
Condition of the Programs funding related to social protection of citizens who suffered as aresult of the Chernobyl catastrophe and performance of compensatory payments and allowances.
Amount of expenses on social protection of citizens, who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl
catastrophe, is provided annually taking into account the real possibilities of the Government budget of
Ukraine expenditures.
In accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On Government Budget of Ukraine for 2010»,
allocations for the implementation of the Chernobyl budget programs, according to which the Ministryof Labor is the primarily administrator, have increased by 18% – from UAH 2.1 billion to UAH 2.46
billion (Table 7.9).

267

268
Table 7.8.

Table 7.9.
Amount of the Budget Programs’ expenditures associated with the social protection of the citizens who suffered asa result of the Chernobyl accident
Code of theAmount of expenditures, UAH millions
Program
The Budget Program description Approved In % till Approved In % till Maximum (+,-)In %Expenditure
amounttill 2010
for 2009
2008
for 2010
2009
Classificationfor 2011
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9

2501200

250121025012302501240

2501250

2501270

2501300

2501360

Additional payments for workwithin contaminated territories,
the preservation of wage whentransfer to the low-paid job andin connection with resettlement,
increased grants payments andgranting of additional holiday tothe citizens who suffered as aresult of Chernobyl catastrophe
Compensation for families withchildren and free meals forchildren who suffered as a resultof the Chernobyl catastrophe
Monthly financial allowance tothe citizens who suffered as aresult of the Chernobyl
catastrophe in connection withthe limitation of consumption of
locally produced food andcompensations for reduced foodprovisionCompensation to citizens who
suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe for thelost property and payment inconnection with expenses
associated with the movement
to a new residence
Compensation for damage
caused to health and the aid forrecovery in case of the citizens
dismissal who suffered as aresult of the Chernobyl
catastrophe
Allowance by temporary
disability to the citizens who
suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe
Maintenance of bank loans on
preferential terms granted
before 1999, to the citizens who
suffered as a result ofChernobyl catastrophe
Improvement of citizens’ health
who suffered as a result of theChernobyl catastrophe
Total

371,1

100,0

596,0

160,6

596,0

100,0

575,4

100,0

579,9

100,8

574,1

99,0

742,5

100,0

814,5

109,7

814,5

100,0

10,0

100,0

10,0

100,0

9,264

92,6

46,6

100,0

46,6

100,0

46,6

100,0

15,2

100,0

37,2

244,7

37,2

100,0

0,4

50,0

0,383

95,8

0,341

89,0

330,0

100,0

383,0

116,1

385,0

100,5

2091,299,98

2 467,5117,8

2 463,099,8But, according to the experts estimations, the complete implementation of the Law of Ukraine«On Status and Social Protection of People who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» (hereinafter269

referred to as the Law) requires more than UAH 70 billion. This makes the implementation of payments
for social protection programs Chernobyl unrealistic.
Except for the above mentioned 8 Budget Programs, the Ministry of Labor finances the Program,
entitled «Social protection of the employers released due to the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning», theexpenditures of which are defined by the Law of Ukraine «On general principles of the Chernobyl NPP
further operation and decommissioning, and conversion of the ruined Power Unit 4 into the environmentallysafe system». The implementation procedure of this Program is approved by the Cabinet of Ministers
Decree, entitled «On provision of additional State guarantees for the employers released due to the early
Nuclear Power Plant decommissioning», dated 21 June 2001, reference number 1090 (Table 7.9).
Table 7.10.
Social protection of employers released due to the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning
Expenditures description

Welfare payment for the period of
employment for employees that are
released due to the Nuclear Power
Plant decommissioning, and pensions
till reaching the retirement age and thepension premiums

Approved
for 2009

0,87

Amount of expenditures, UAH millions
Maximu% tillApproved% tillm amount2008
for 2010
2009
for 2011

68,8

1,96

226,4

1,30

(+,-)% till
2010

54,2

Within the frames of the Budget Program implementation «Additional payments for work withincontaminated territories, the preservation of wage when transfer to the low-paid job and in connection
with resettlement, increased grants payments and granting of additional holiday to the citizens who
suffered from Chernobyl catastrophe», the additional payments are granted to individuals who workwithin the Exclusion Zone (in accordance with the Cabinet of Ministers Decree, entitled «On additional
payments to individuals who work within the Exclusion Zone» dated 10 September 2008, reference
number 831), which were financed one hundred percent for the scheduled appointments.
Due to the above Decree, an additional payment is set in the amount of 150 percent of the minimum
wage for almost 7.5 thousand employers who work on a permanent basis within the Exclusion Zone andperform activities associated with the reinforcement of the Exclusion Zone’s barrier functions, the Chernobyl
NPP Power Units decommissioning and conversion of the Object Shelter into the environmentally safe system.
The size of payments for the work within the Exclusion Zone is set in the amount of 150 percentof the minimum wage for the period from 1 January 2009 through 1 January 2012. Such payment isdetermined in proportion to the worked hours but not more than the established amount. As for 1
January 2010, the amount of such payment equals to UAH 1412 (for comparison, before the CMU
Decree adoption it was equal to UAH 264).
The compensatory and additional payments financing, including those provided by the above theCabinet of Ministers Decree, was fully implemented in accordance with the approved Government
Budget for the amount of allocations in 2010.
The Cabinet of Ministers Decree, entitled «On changes incorporation to the List No. 1 ofproduction, activities, professions, positions and indicators at underground works, especially during theactivities with particular harmful and particularly difficult working conditions, full-time employment inwhich gives the right on pension under the concessional terms» dated 24 February 2010, reference
number 173, was adopted in order to remove the social tension among the employers of the Exclusion
Zone and the Chernobyl NPP and to allocate the pension to the mentioned category of persons throughincluding the worked hours or services to the record and period of work under the concessional terms.
Since 2009, the following was introduced: modern procedure for property evaluation, property rights
for the compensation payments for the lost immovable property upon evacuation or voluntary resettlement270

from contaminated areas (in accordance with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 18
November 2009, reference number 1243 «On approval of procedure for compensation payments for the lostimmovable property in case of evacuation or voluntary resettlement from contaminated areas»).
Provision of Pension Benefits to the Citizens who Suffered from the Chernobyl Catastrophe
One of the urgent issues remains the provision of pension benefits to the affected citizens, theexpenditures to which exceed the budget allocations for all other benefits and compensation in three times.
As of 1 November 2011, the average size of pensions for the disabled individuals (participants of
the ChNPP accident consequences liquidation), was assigned in accordance with the Law of Ukraine«On Status and Social Protection of citizens who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe» (hereinafterreferred to as the Law), and was established at the following level: I group – UAH 2262.98;
 II group – UAH 2374.16;
 II group – UAH 1835.25.
Respectively to increase in 2011 of living wage for people who have lost the working capacity,
the size of additional pension for damage to health, and the size of monthly compensation in case of thewage-earner loss, which are allocated under the mentioned Law, is growing.
Government pensions, assigned in accordance with this Law (pension by disability, which
occurred as a result of illness or injury due to the Chernobyl accident and the pension by the wageearner loss as a result of the Chernobyl accident), are allocated from the earnings received from workwithin the Exclusive Zone in 1986–1990 in the amount of actual damages compensation, which isdetermined in accordance with the Law (Article 54, first part of the Law).
The minimum size of such pension is set in the Law in multiple size to index of the minimum old
age pension (for the disabled of 1st group – 10 minimum old age pensions, for the disabled of 2nd group– 8, for the disabled of 3rd group – 6, part four of Article 54 of the Law).
At the same time it should be noted that the pension insurance of persons whose disability isconnected with the Chernobyl disaster, is performed at the account of the Government budget.
According to the second part of Article 95 of the Constitution of Ukraine, any Government
expenditures for social needs, size and purpose of such expenditures are determined exclusively by theGovernment Budget of Ukraine.
Thus, based on the above, the size of minimum pension by disability (with an additional payment)
and additional pension for damage to health to persons affected by the Chernobyl disaster, that are paid
under the mentioned Law, is established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decrees «Some aspects ofsocial protection of certain categories of citizens» dated 28 May 2008, reference number 530 and «On
improving the retirement security of citizens» dated 16 July 2008, reference number 654.
Arrangement of Health Improvement of Citizens who Suffered as a result of the Chernobyl
Catastrophe
A special place among the issues of preservation and restoration of the population’s healthaffected by the Chernobyl disaster belongs to the issue of arrangement of health improvement that is a
key area of social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster.
The Law of Ukraine «On status and social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl
disaster» (hereinafter referred to as the Law) provides the health improvement of affected citizens(2.454.471 persons), including the affected children (498 409 persons).
In 2010, 364 417 applications were submitted, among which: 147 121 applications for healthresort vouchers of citizens aged 18 and older (adults), among whom 35 003 citizens assigned to the 1st
category; 193 222 applications of children in groups; 24 074 children under 10 years accompanied by aparent (vouchers for mother and a child).
Despite the increased expenditures on these purposes in the Government Budget of Ukraine for 2010(by UAH 53 million, or by 16%), the amount of necessary funds for Program «Health improvement of271

citizens affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe» (UAH 383 million) remains insufficient, at this the total
funds required for the vouchers procurement is more than UAH 1.15 billion in 2010.
In accordance with the result of tenders, 111 383 vouchers were purchased including 70 194
vouchers for children within the frames of allocated funds.
Such vouchers are distributed between the administrative and territorial units in proportion,according to the submitted applications, taking into account the nosology of diseases.
A positive achievement of health campaign for 2010 is the increase by 48% over the previous
year of the number of purchased vouchers for health-resort treatments of disabled persons with spinal
problems, from among of victims of the Chernobyl disaster, but unfortunately, it satisfies the need topurchase vouchers for these category of citizens only at 28%.
According to information of the Labor and Social Welfare Central Departments, the health of
89 108 people affected by the Chernobyl disaster, including 56 157 children was improved as of
1 December 2010.
Privileged Provision with the Special Vehicles
Privileged provision with the special vehicles for citizens affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe
is defined in Item 13 of Article 20 of the Law of Ukraine «On status and social protection of citizens
affected by the Chernobyl disaster.»
In accordance with Item 12 of the Procedure on the Government budget funds applications to
implement programs related to social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster,
approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 20 September 2005, reference number
936, the vehicles provision for disabled people is implemented by the Regional Government
Administrations’ Department of Labor and Social Protection of Population in accordance with theProcedure for the special vehicles provision for the disabled people, approved by the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated 19 July 2006, reference number 999.
As of 01 January 2010, 87 177 disabled persons are registered to get a special vehicle.
Specifically, among them 16 239 disabled people are the victims or liquidators of the Chernobyl
accident, including the following: I and II groups, who have medical indications for out-of-sequence provision with special
vehicles, 4320 of disabled persons; II group, who have no medical indications and III group with the medical indications, 11 919
disabled persons.
It should be noted that under the global financial crisis, the Law of Ukraine «On Government
Budget of Ukraine for 2009» did not include the costs for provision with special vehicles to the disable
people, but relevant proposals have been incorporated during its formation.
The Law of Ukraine «On amending the Law of Ukraine «On Government Budget of Ukraine for2009», the program was renewed and provided UAH 1.218 million for provision with the vehicles fordisabled people..
In 2009, 214 vehicles were purchased only for families in which two or more disabled persons
are living, at the account of the special fund amounting to UAH 7.8 million.
The Law of Ukraine «On the Government Budget of Ukraine for 2010» in order to implement theBudget program «Provision with the special vehicles for the disabled people affected by the Chernobyl
accident» has approved UAH 89.1 million, among which UAH 88.1 million were allocated to thepurchase 2253 vehicles that were provided to the disabled people registered at the Agencies of Laborand Social Protection of Population.
In accordance with the Government budget for 2011, the allocations have increased according to
the relevant budget program and are UAH 89.7 million.

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Improvement of Legislation
Pursuant to Item 1 of the Plan on the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Decree implementation «On
the state, activities and prospects of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe» dated
18 April 2008, No. 276-VI, the draft Law of Ukraine «On amending the Law of Ukraine «On the status
and social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster» was developed and worked up
together with the central authorities, scientists and public «Chernobyl» organizations , which proposes
to amend the majority of its articles.
However, it should be noted that acceptance of all proposals submitted to the draft law will
expand the circle of beneficiaries and, consequently, will lead to a significant additional load on the
Government expenditure budget.
At the same time, this there is a high probability of rejection of the draft law by the public«Chernobyl» organizations and, as a consequence the social tensions among the respective category of
citizens’ will increase.
Since at present, under the unstable social and economic situation in the country, the Government
arranges some activities associated with the strict conditions of the budgetary costs savings during theregular Working Group meeting held on 25 December 2009. It was decided to gradually modify theeffective Law of Ukraine «On status and social protection of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster«(hereinafter referred to as the Law).
Taking into account the long, almost a quarter of century, period of time after the Chernobyl NPP
accident, and limited financial capacity of the State, development of a strategic document that provides
a set of measures to optimize the effective system of social protection «Chernobyl people» is urgent andcrucial task.
Problems and Solutions
The effective Law of Ukraine «On status and social protection of people affected by the
Chernobyl catastrophe» (hereinafter referred to as the Law), adopted during the Soviet period, provides
almost 100 different types of benefits, compensation and additional payments. Today the cost of the
Law in full is more than UAH 70 billion every year, while the expenses of the Government Budget of
Ukraine for 2011 were approved in the amount of UAH 321.9 billion.
The certain articles of the Law provide the implementation of payments, additional payments andaid to the victims of the Chernobyl disaster in the amounts established according to the minimum wage
(Articles 30, 36, 37, 39, 48) and the minimum retirement pension (articles 50, 51, 52, 54). It is required
UAH 36.8 billion every year to implement these articles of the Law in full.
According to Article 95 of Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine «On Government Budgetof Ukraine» determines any Government expenditures for social needs, size, and purpose of such
expenditures based on actual financial resources of the Government budget.
Therefore, the certain articles of the Law of Ukraine «On the Government Budget of Ukraine»(Article 101 in 2007, Article 73 in 2008, Article 71 in 2009 and Article 70 in 2010) gave the right to the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to set the sizes of social benefits which, according to the legislation, aredetermined depending on the minimum wage size, in absolute amounts within allocations provided by
the respective budget programs.
As a result, a discrepancy has occurred between the size of payments established by the Law to
the size of payments established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decrees (the sizes of certain
payments provided by the Law, exceed the actual amounts of the benefits paid in accordance with the
Cabinet’s resolution in 8-10 times).
This led to mass references of the affected citizens to the courts of different instances with theclaims. Most of these claims were satisfied in courts in the part of the pension, compensation andallowances payment in full in accordance with the Law.

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Therefore, the beneficiaries of the above compensations, additional payments, and allowances areunder the unequal conditions: some of them receive social support from the Government on the basis of
the court decisions, the majority receive the support the size of which is much lower in accordance withthe government’s decision.
According to latest information of Regional Department of Labor and Social Protection of Population,
there are over 134 thousand of citizens’ claims under the trial of different instances totaling more than UAH
1318 million as of 01 February 2011. These claims are associated with the recalculation of compensatory
payments in the amount provided by the Law, including 75 thousand judgments worth UAH 832 million thatare not subject to appeal. Therefore, the executive body at the end of 2010 had attached 215 arrests to theaccounts of the Regional Department of Labor and Social Protection of Population, the total worth of which
is UAH 72 million and which are not provided by the Government budget.
Considering that since 1996, the social payments, the size of which depends on the minimum
wage and minimum old age pension in accordance with the Law, were determined by the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, and bearing in mind that at present these sizes (Articles 30, 36, 37, 39 , 48, 50, 51,
52, 54) are established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decrees («On establishing payment sizes
for some categories of citizens affected by the Chernobyl disaster», dated 20 April 2007, No. 649; «On
the compensation payments to individuals affected by the Chernobyl disaster», dated 26.07.1996, No.
836; «On an annual assistance for the rehabilitation of people affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe»
dated 12.07.2005, No. 562; «Some aspects of social protection of certain categories of citizens» dated
28.05.2008, No. 530; «On improving the retirement insurance of citizens» dated 16.07.2008, No. 654),
the Ministry of Labor together with the relevant central authorities and with the presence of social
dialogue participants are designing the Law of Ukraine «On amending the Law of Ukraine «On status
and social protection of people affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe» (regarding the size of pension,compensation payments, additional payments and benefits) (hereinafter referred to as the draft law),which would bring into compliance the size of pension, compensations, additional payments andallowance with the size set by the Cabinet of Ukraine guarantees within the expenditure provided by theGovernment budget for the respective year.
7.2.4. Rise of Level of Radioecology Knowledge and Awareness of Populationon the Issues Associated with Overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
For 25 years that had passed after the accident, Radiobiology and its special field Radioecology
were enriched with the very important actual material. Ecology-biological, medical and sociodemographic consequences of the accident were carefully examined; new aspects of action of small
doses of the ionizing radiation and the chronic exposure on the human body were investigated;scientific basis of radiation protection at all levels is developed – from certain individuals to groups oforganisms. Radiology, besides the problems of radiation monitoring of the environment, develops themodern methods of economic activities performing, especially in agriculture, within the areas
contaminated with radionuclides.
However, despite these achievements, there are some notable contradictions in the treatment of
the results obtained by scientists from different fields and by the officials. These contradictions areoften lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the contemporary radiation situation. Undoubtedly, this is
the result of insufficient radiological literacy not only of population but also of officials working in thefield of atomic energy and ecology. This is the result of incomplete ecological education in general at
all levels, from primary school till the higher education.
As for the first levels (schools, lyceums, gymnasiums, training colleges), there are no
Radiobiology and Radioecology as an independent subject or the section of other subject according to
the standards of education. The certain information about Radiology students receive or can receive
through the study of Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Basic Life Safety.

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Within the secondary special education (technical secondary schools, colleges) the issue ofRadiology may be treated while learning the basics of Ecology. However, the scope of information inthis sphere and its level largely depends on the individual characteristics of the teacher, his awareness ofthe problem, his attitude towards it. Nevertheless, it should be noted that during the first 10-15 years
after the accident, teaching of the Radiology basics was included in the curricula of some schools of thislevel, including agrarian area, under the approved special program. A special textbook was published.
Government educational standards of higher professional education provide radiological training
courses for a number of specialties and specializations (Radiobiology, Radioecology, Radiology andsome other more narrow specialties) in the following scope: 32–48 hours as a rule, for engineer andtechnical specialties and 48–64 hours for biological, medical and agricultural specialties. However,when preparing the curriculum, these disciplines are often referred to the elective ones (subject to the
choice of educational institution) or optional (facultative).
Analysis of radiological education in Ukraine shows that the most satisfactory situation in thiscontext is in the sphere of agricultural and environmental education. In higher agricultural education
schools, Radiobiology course with the Radiology essentials as an obligatory subject was introduced in
the curricula of veterinary schools and faculties of Soil Science and Agricultural Chemistry for the firsttime in the late 50’s of the last century, when the mass testing of nuclear weapons in the atmospheretook place. Even then it was clear that agricultural lands and vegetation and animal products are themain battery and therefore a source of a human exposure. Exactly these specialists of these directions,who possess the basic knowledge of Radiobiology and Radiology, played a significant role inminimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in the agricultural sector of the country.
Future doctors had received some of the basics radioecological knowledge during the Medical
Radiology and Roentgenology courses at that time. Students of the Physics Departments, especiallywith bias in nuclear physics received some pieces of knowledge in Radiology.
After the accident, the situation as to radiological education has changed for the better. Fromthe school year 1987–1988, the Radiobiology course with a particular bias (Agricultural
Radiobiology, Veterinary Radiobiology, Forest Radiobiology, Radiobiology, Radioecology) was
introduced not only in all higher specialized agricultural education but also in secondary ones foralmost all agro-and bio- natural sciences (with the exception of mentioned Veterinary Medicine,
Soil Science and Agricultural Chemistry – for all agronomic specialties, Zoo-Engineering, Forestry
and Landscape Architecture, and some others) sometimes in very large scopes (up to 120 hours).
But those were also the elective ones. That is why this course is still, though in shortened form,
preserved in universities located in officially declared zones of radioactive contamination, and isdismissed from the curriculum, or combined with other disciplines in schools located within therelatively «clean» areas. The most prosperous situation as to learning such discipline should beconsidered is in the National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine (NUBiP of
Ukraine) and Zhytomyr Agroecological National University.
For the first time, course of Radiobiology, which constitutes more than half of Radiologicalsections, as an independent mandatory subject is taught at 11 departments of natural and agriculturalareas, namely: Ecological, Biotechnical, Agrobiological, Agrohimservice and Soil Science, Plant
Protection, Fruit and Vegetable Growing, Veterinarians, Zoo-Engineering, Fish Farm, Forestry,
Landscape Management on the «Bachelor» degree of educational qualification in the scope from 32 to
64 hours. Half of the curriculum is lectures course and half – laboratory studies.
In others agricultural universities for most specialties the Radiobiology course is elective with the
exception of mentioned Veterinary Medicine, Agricultural Chemistry and Soil Science and Ecology andEnvironment.
Specialists as to «Ecology, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Use of Natural Resources»
are being trained in more than hundred of public universities of different directions, including275

agriculture. This direction provides the mandatory teaching of Radiobiology and Radioecology
disciplines, which include both lectures and laboratory classes. Depending on the capabilities of theuniversity and its location, the scope of course hours ranges from 144 hours (NUBiP of Ukraine), andup to 64 hours in the most institutions.
The longest course regarding this direction which is being taught at the Ecology Department at
the NUBiP Ukraine, apart from extended lectures course and laboratory work, involves the performanceof course work, which presents a situational problem solving regarding specific sectors of agriculture in
the contaminated territories, and conducting educational and practical training on farms located within
the territories affected by the radionuclides.
The two-week practical training includes a performance of gamma-ray survey of an area,sampling of soil, plants and livestock products, preparation of samples for analysis on radionuclides
content, the analysis of 137Cs content in the samples, the calculation of coefficients of accumulation andtransfer of radionuclides, mapping areas regarding its content in the soil.
The practical training, which is conducted within the framework of the diploma preparation,
provides the performance of these common tasks, as well as the others, beyond all, of Radiobiology andRadiation directions depending on the specific topics of certain work.
For students of this specialty, and of the Agricultural Chemistry and Soil Science specialty, aspecial course in Agricultural Radiology is given on the «Master» degree.
Zhytomyr State Agroecological University trains specialists on the «Radioecology» specialization
within the framework of this direction from 1997. Training includes teaching of specialized courses onRadiometry and Dosimetry, Radiation Monitoring, Radiation Protection, Radiation Hygiene and, of course,
peculiarities of various agricultural sectors located within the contaminated areas.
The students of this university undertake the training practice on the basis of Laboratory ofRadiation Zone Soil Revival of Polesie Agriculture Institute of the National Academy of Agricultural
Sciences of Ukraine. As part of the degree work performance of the both qualification degrees, thestudents are engaged in research work at the stations within the zones of radioactive contamination by
the Government subject «To conduct a comprehensive radiological monitoring of contaminated areas
and to develop scientific principles of environmentally safe technologies for agricultural production on
contaminated territories.»
Within the same area, there is a specialization «Radioecology» in the Odessa State Ecological
University and in the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry. In the Odessa
University, ten special courses are held, including the following: «Modeling of physical processes inRadiology», «Methods of nonlinear analysis and dynamic processes in Radiology», «Creation andusage of databases for Radiological Researches», «Physical kinetics of radionuclides» at the Ecology
and Economic Department during 3–5 courses in addition to the general basic courses of Radiobiology,
Radioecology, Radiation Safety. On the Ecology and Technological Faculty of the Sevastopol
University, such courses as «Radioactive Waste Handling», «Radiation Sources», «Radiation
Toxicology» are held during 3–4-courses in addition to the basic courses.
Radiobiology Department and discipline «Radiobiology» were started within the first years after theaccident at the biological faculty of the Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. The curriculum
includes a large cycle of such special subjects as Radiation Biophysics, Radiation Biochemistry, MolecularRadiobiology, Cell Radiobiology, Radiobiology of Microorganisms, Radiobiology of Plants, Radiobiologyof Animals and Human, Radioecology, Radiological Monitoring, Biogeochemistry of Radionuclides,
Radiobiological Consequences of Nuclear Accidents, Radiation and Evolution, Microdosimetry theory,
Quantitative Radiobiology, and Mathematical Modeling of Radiobiological Processes. The specialists fromthe National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine are involved for teaching.
The training courses «Human Health and Safety» and «Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation»,
which include the general and specialized sections of Radiobiology and Radiology, are taught at the276

department of Medical Radiophysics of Radiophysics Faculty of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko
University.
In most of the specialties of Medical specialization, the students get some basic Radiology
knowledge during the following courses: Radiology, Radiation Hygiene, Ecology, General Health,
Health and Safety. At the National Medical Bogomoletc University, the Radiology course at therespective department was completed with the Radiation Medicine course. The Radiation Hygiene
Department was established and some general issues of Radiology and Radiological Monitoring were
taught within the framework of the respective course. However, in 2004, the Department was abolishedand the course of Radiation Hygiene was shortened and combined with the general Hygiene.
A course on «Selected Issues of Radiation Medicine» was arranged at the Radiology Departmentof the National Medical Shupika Academy of Postgraduate Education with a total scope of 18 hours.
The course foreseens visits to almost every region of Ukraine.
At the Institute of Postgraduate Education of NUBiP of Ukraine, the certain lectures on theradiological situation in Ukraine and the farming peculiarities within the contaminated territories areread almost for all areas of the advanced training courses. Sometimes they are accompanied bylaboratory classes, which include familiarization with the operation and practical use of radiometers anddosimeters of different systems.
Teaching Radiology as a separate discipline, and disciplines that include Radiological sections
are curtailed in whole despite the fact that Radiology and Radiobiology textbooks and manuals wereprepared for all areas in the Ukrainian language, and there are appropriate guides in Russian; and that ingeneral, the country has enough specialists in specialty 03.00.01 – Radiobiology (several doctoral andup to dozen master’s theses are defended in this specialty of biological and medical areas at two
specialized dissertation councils annually). Radiobiology and Radioecology are actually remained in thelist of the main disciplines only for areas for which they had been taught until 1986. For otherspecialties, except Ecology and Environmental Protection, they are the disciplines to be introduced into
curriculum by the Educational Institution’s decision, and, respectively, withdrawn in the same way.
That is why over the years after the accident, and after the general improvement of the radiation
situation in the country, Radiological disciplines began to feel some pressure – reduction of the teaching
scope up to the full exclusion from the curriculum, integration with other subjects (Ecology, Civil
Protection, Life Safety and others). Thus, courses were excluded practically from all specialized schoolsof I-II-levels and in some schools of III-IV-levels located at the southern regions. The scopes of theses
subjects teaching were reduced sharply, sometimes in two times, even in the education institutions ofagricultural area. Specialized departments were liquidated or combined with others which were createdin the late 80’s and early 90’s. At present time, there is only one special Department of Radiobiology
and Radioecology at NUBiP in Ukraine.
There are no reasons and excuses for such reduction. Around the world, after the relative declineof the NPP construction rates caused by the Chernobyl accident, there is a sharp rise of the above rates.
The new nuclear units are put and are planned to be put into operation in Ukraine. The number ofradiation technologies is increasing using in their processes objects exposure with ionizing radiation orradioactive isotopes. Along with them, an amount of radiation sources is growing, which increases
probability of their runaway. There are signs of the nuclear terrorism threat. All this requires the quality
improving of radiation environmentality among the population in general and among specialists,training of enough Radioecologists for various economy areas.
Undoubtedly, Ukraine is a nuclear nation. She ranks eleventh place in the world and first in
Europe by the uranium resource and eighth place in the world by the number of nuclear units at Nuclear
Power Plants, 15 blocks at four Nuclear Power Plants produce half of the electricity volume that thecountry consume. And if the past 20th century was called atomic, then started 21st century will be evenmore atomic. And a resident of Ukraine must know all advantages and disadvantages of atomic energy277industry, have an idea of how the ionizing radiation effects living organisms, by which ways radioactive
substances penetrate into the body and finally how to reduce the possible effects of radiation.
The basic knowledge of Radiology is required not only for the specialists of certain areas, but foreveryone involved in the production of material and spiritual values. Radioecology must not be just an
area of a general Ecology interest, but she has to become a compulsory part of the continuous
environmental educational system.
As it has already been noted, untimely and insufficient awareness of population about the
Chernobyl accident consequences by the government has created the psychological and social tension insociety. So today, one of the key elements of public policy in overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe is a guaranteed public access to information about the radiological situation
within the territories contaminated in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
The effective legislation of Ukraine defines the kind and periodicity of information preparationand distribution among the population by the executive power. This information concerns the exposure
doses of the population, contamination density of areas that are within the zone of radioactive
contamination and the radionuclide content in food.
In recent years, this information is being prepared in the form of booklets, which, together withinformation on exposure doses, also provide useful scientific-based information on the patterns of theradiological situation within contaminated areas, and in the form of atlases of the contaminated areas.
Atlases contain interactive maps, through which one can obtain additional radiological information foreach settlement referred to radioactively contaminated zones.
Scientific National Reports of Ukraine are being prepared annually where lead researchers of
Ukraine present a comprehensive assessment of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe, in particular, assessing the effectiveness of the performed work on overcoming theconsequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Letters of information about dynamics of the radiologicalsituation in the territories considered to be radioactive contamination zone (in areas sections), were
issued for the local authorities.
In order to conduct an educational work in schools and institutions on issues related to theprinciples of Radioecology knowledge» and «informing the public on issues of safe farming withincontaminated lands», the following was carried out: thematic studies on the preparation andperformance of training seminars for specialists of management, education, health protection; correction
and introduction of information materials related to the living safety within the areas affected in theaftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe for teachers; replication and introduction of educational film forschools regarding the radio-ecological knowledge basis and so forth.
The centers of social and psychological rehabilitation and public information on overcoming theChernobyl catastrophe which were established by the Ministry of Ukraine carry out the great work on
informing the population on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

7.3. The State Policy of Ukraine Considering the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Provision
7.3.1. Improving the Safety Culture in order to Maintain the Present Level of Nuclear
and Radiation Safety at the Operating Nuclear Power Plants of Ukraine
The term «safety culture» had been applied in the document «Final report of the meeting
considering the review of the causes and consequences in the «Chernobyl» No. 75-INSAG-1 for the
first time, and had been further in use thought the following documents No. 75 INSAG 3, ʋ 75 INSAG 4,
INSAG 12, INSAG 13 INSAG 15 and the other IAEA documents.
In Ukraine, the requirements on the «safety culture» provision were specified in the regulations
ɇɉ 306.2.141-2008 «General safety provisions of Nuclear Power Plants», which takes into account the278

IAEA recommendations and the gained national and international experience in the Nuclear Power
Plants operation.
The above normative document ɇɉ 306.2.141–2008, as well as the IAEA report No. 75INSAG- 4, define the safety culture as a safety fundamental principle.
The Company activities related to provisions of the safety fundamental principle – safety culture –are focused on creation of an atmosphere of personnel loyalty to the safety objectives, and his personal
responsibility and formation of the basic safety culture principles such as following: comprehension by the very employee of his activities influence on the safety andconsequences, which can be caused as a result as non-compliance or poor compliance withregulations, manufacturing and job descriptions, technical regulations for safe operation;
 strict abidance to discipline within a clear division of powers and personal responsibility ofmanagers and the direct performers; meeting the manufacturing instructions and technical regulations related to safe operation, theirsteady improvement based on gained experience and results of scientific and technical research; self-control of the employee’s activities related to safety;
 selection, training and professional development of managers and personnel with an emphasison the priority of safety and understanding the errors consequences for safety;
 work performance with exclusive liability in accordance with the established procedures;
 systematic evaluation of activities related to safety.
According to the requirements of legislation of Ukraine, taking into account the IAEA
recommendations and the Safety statement, issued in SE «Energoatom», the operating organization SE
NAEK «Energoatom» (hereinafter referred to as the operating organization) assumes full responsibility
for the Nuclear Power Plants’ safety at all life cycle stages and sets an absolute priority of safety
purposes over any other objectives.
The main tasks of the operating organization are the following: maintenance of the design level of
nuclear and radiation safety, steady improvement of the NPP safety in accordance with rules and standards
on nuclear and radiation safety, international best practices and operating experience. The Council of safety
culture established within SE «Energoatom» regularly holds meetings. This Council is a body of strategicplanning, control and coordination of actions aimed at improvement of safety culture of SE «Energoatom».
In separate divisions of a NPP the Councils/Committees of safety culture has been also established.
The SE «Energoatom» Management review an application in the field of safety from time totime, regularly provides implementation of an International Conference of Safety Culture, initiates areview of the organizational structure in order to improve the management system. Responsibilities andduties of management are carefully being analyzed and documented in job descriptions.
On 18–19 November 2010 in Kyiv, the 5th regular International Scientific Conference on safety
culture was held. Such Conferences are held every two years. This forum gathers leaders and experts in thefield of nuclear energy and there they discuss various aspects related to safe operation and development ofsafety culture at the Nuclear Power Plants. Specialists of organizations of Ukraine, Russia, European
countries that operate Nuclear Facilities and the IAEA are invited to participate in the Conference. The main
objectives of the Conference is to exchange experiences and to evaluate the safety provision results related to
Nuclear Power Plants, improving the safety culture in the sphere of nuclear power.
The SE «Energoatom» carried out several significant steps related to the safety culture conditionassessment at Nuclear Power Plants – methodologies were developed, self-assessment and independentcalibrations were performed.
In 2008–2010, Programs of specific actions were developed at the each NPP aimed at establishment
and development of safety culture at the separate divisions of NPP for 2008–2010, Program of the safety
culture level self-assessment at the separate divisions of NPP. During 2009–2010, at the each separate
divisions of NPP and other divisions of the Company, the safety culture level self-assessment had been279

performed in accordance with the SCART standards. The independent assessment of the current safety
culture level at the NPP was carried out in April-August 2010. According to the results of suchcalibrations (independent assessment) the reports were developed related to the current level assessmentof the fundamental principle of safety – the safety culture at the separate divisions of NPP, which
identified areas that require improvement of safety culture, and corrective action were developed.
At NPP Power Units a significant number of measures were implemented within the frameworkof the Concept of safety increase. The Concept’s measures implementation is now at the final stage andwill be completed by the end of 2012.
The measures associated with the safety increase provided for the Rivne NPP Power Unit 1 arecompleted, and by the end of the year they will be completed for Power Unit 2, which will ensure theUnits’ safe operation after the extension of their operation terms.
The implementation of measures to improve safety of the Khmelnitskiy NPP Power Unit 2 andthe Rivne NPP Power Unit 4, which were carried out within the framework of a special program, iscompleted (147 for the KhNPP and 146 for the RNPP). Financing of the measures was performed at theoperating organization’s expense and at the expense of the MFO credit (EBRD/Euratom). According to
EBRD/Euratom creditors – implementation of Modernization Program of Kh2/R4 is the mostsuccessful project among those credited by EBRD/Euratom.
At this, the Company does not stop its activities: a Comprehensive (consolidated) Safety Program
for NPP Power Units of Ukraine was prepared for the implementation.
An Expert Group of the European Commission and the IAEA had conducted a comprehensive
assessment of the Ukrainian NPPs safety for their compliance with effective international standards (92experts from 20 countries and international organizations, and 32 full-time IAEA employees
participated in these Commissions). Similar assessments so far have no analogues in the world. The
assessment was conducted to confirm the compliance with the IAEA fundamental standards subject tothe following areas: design safety, operational safety, radioactive waste handling and decommissioning,
and regulatory issues. The compliance with the IAEA safety requirements was confirmed by all areas.
SE NAEK «Energoatom», making and developing the safety culture, assigns an objective toimplement safety culture as a process of continuous improvement, in which everyone can and should
contribute – employees and management of the operating body, equipment suppliers, organizations ofscientific and engineering support, State management and regulation – to obtain general results –maintenance and increase of the nuclear power safety as a significant component of State energy safety.
7.3.2. Strategy for the Safe Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
For Ukraine, nuclear power is a basic component of the National energy system, stable andreliable operation of which is a condition of the guaranteed provision for national economy withelectrical energy, and of the stable economic growth and improvement of the citizens’ welfare today
and in the future. A the Nuclear Power Plants of Ukraine operate 15 reactors of VVER type, which
produce about half the country’s electricity at a price half less compared with traditional heatgeneration. This allows maintaining electricity tariffs at a level suitable for the present economic
condition of society.
One of the essential components of the technological cycle of electricity production at Nuclear
Power Plants is the formation of spent nuclear fuel (SF), which in accordance with the provisions of the
National nuclear legislation belongs to the category of nuclear materials (not radioactive waste, thefurther usage of which is not expected).
Currently the most countries with nuclear power made the decisions which provide a long-termed
storage of spent nuclear fuel at the appropriate facilities on their own territories. Analysis of global
experience of the above storages operation that have been already built, indicates a high level of safety
and reliability, as evidenced by their low environmental impact.

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For Ukraine the problem of SF handling at the Nuclear Power Plants is extremely important. There
are no spent nuclear fuel storage facilities in Ukraine, in consequence of which the organization which
operates NPP – SE NAEK «Energoatom» is to transport SF outside the Government every year for storing
and reprocessing in Russian Federation, under the condition to take back to Ukraine radioactive waste ofsuch processing. The cost of services of foreign specialized enterprises for spent nuclear fuel storage andprocessing of NPP of Ukraine has increased more than in 2 times within last 15 years.
Besides saving money, which will have a positive effect on restrain of the electricity tariffs
growth, the construction of own storage facility in Ukraine will significantly increase the energy safetyof Ukraine. In fact, if the SF removal will be suspended for any reason, three existing Nuclear Power
Plants of Ukraine, for which storage is assigned, and which currently provide about 25% of electricity
production in the country, also will have to stop their operation soon due to nuclear safety requirements.
Therefore, construction in Ukraine of safe SF temporary storage of VVER reactors for its own
need completely meet the international practice primarily aimed at provision of energy and nuclear
safety of our country and completely meet the National energy program of Ukraine, approved by the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 15 May 1996, the Presidential Decree of Ukraine dated 27 December
2005 «On NSDC of Ukraine decision dated 9 December 2005 «On the Government of energy safety in
Ukraine and the principles of State policy in the sphere of its provision», Energy Strategy of Ukraine till
2030, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
The draft law, entitled «On location, design and construction of centralized storage of spent
nuclear fuel of VVER type reactors of National Nuclear Power Plants» was developed to implement theabove decisions of higher authorities of Ukraine and in accordance with current legislation provisions.
The site of the storage location, chosen on the results of multifactor analysis during development of theconstruction feasibility study, is proposed to allocate within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, 10-12 km
south-west from Chernobyl.
In accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine, entitled «On the order ofdecisions making about location, design and construction of nuclear installations and facilities which were
designated for radioactive waste handling and which have the national significance», a set of supported
materials was developed to the draft law, including the following: feasibility study for investments
approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, a positive conclusion of the State ecological expertise,report to inform the contiguous states on the possible effect of SNFTS (Spent Nuclear Fuel Treatment
Shop) within a transboundary context and agreement of the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine to allocate
SNFTS within the Exclusive Zone territories contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl accident.
Feasibility study for investments (FSi) for a storage construction had passed a comprehensive
State examination, including the following: environmental, sanitary-epidemiological and investment
expertise, nuclear and radiation safety expertise, performed by authorized State agencies. In particular,
the conclusion of the State ecological expertise indicates that the SNFTS allocation and operation at thesite chosen for this purpose is environmentally acceptable. The general conclusion of a comprehensive
State expertise of FSi is positive.
According to the design decisions proposed in the FSi, the centralized Spent Nuclear Fuel
Storage is proposed to be constructed within the Exclusion Zone territories contaminated by the
Chernobyl catastrophe. The sanitary protective zone of the facility as estimated in FSi will not exceed
100 m, and the monitoring zone where the facility’s impact is possible – 1000 m. The above special
zones completely belong to the Exclusion Zone, which excludes the impact of SNFTS on population.
The procedure of decision making on location of nuclear installations and facilities within the
territory of Exclusion Zone and the zone of unconditional (obligatory) resettlement, designed forradioactive waste handling that are of national significance, was regulated by the amendments to the
Law of Ukraine «On making decisions about the design, construction of nuclear installations andfacilities designated for radioactive waste that have a national significance» (the Law of Ukraine ʋ281

1566-VI, Article 3–1). According to these amendments, the decision on approval of nuclear
installations and facilities location within the territory of Exclusion Zone and the zone of unconditional(obligatory) resettlement, designed for radioactive waste handling and have a national significance, ismade by the central executive body authorized to solve the issues on legal regime of the territories
contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe. According to this legislative regulation, location of the
SNFTS within the Exclusion Zone was approved by the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine.
SE «Energoatom» performed a considerable information and explanatory work in order to inform thepublic of Ukraine on safety issues when the SNFTS construction and operation, including the following: publication in the newspaper «Uriadovyi Kyrier» («Governmental Courier») of statements related
to intent and environmental consequences of the SNFTS construction, coverage in the media ofmaterials concerning the SNFTS, post on the SE «Energoatom» website of information about thechosen storage technology of the SF storage, the storage construction and operation, information
and analytical review of feasibility study for investments of the SNFTS construction, etc.;
 public meetings (briefings, round tables with the public and media representatives), publicdebate in the settlement of urban type Ivankov (with participation of Polesie district public)
and in Slavutich, Kyiv region, informational support of public hearings in Slavutich, held by
public participation of the Slavutich, Ivankov and Polesie districts, arrangement of tours forthe public members of the above areas to the Zaporozhye NPP where the similar Spent
Nuclear Fuel Storage is in operation, coverage of the safety issues of the SNFTS Project; process of the measures results, the public issues, and preparation of their responses, coverageof the work results with the public.
The implemented work with the public of Ukraine concerning the SNFTS safety was reflected inthe «Report on Public Consultation on the construction of a Centralized Storage for Spent Nuclear Fuelof a VVER type of NPP of Ukraine». The above «Report ...» was included into the SNFTS EIA(Environment Impact Assessment), which held the State ecological expertise.
However, in order to implement the provisions of Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine, entitled «On
Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety» and to ensure the incorporation of the recommendations of theabove public hearings concerning the SNFTS issues held in Slavutich, the draft law provides funds inthe amount of 10 percent of the total estimated cost related to the storage construction and constructionof social facilities in Slavutich, Ivankov and Polesie districts of Kyiv region, which will facilitate theissues solution regarding the social and economic development of these areas and will provide an
opportunity to create new working positions. In accordance with Part 8 of Article 12 of the Law of
Ukraine, entitled «On Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety» transferring of these funds will be carriedout in proportion to the SNFTS capital investment.
7.3.3. Improvement of the Physical Protection Systemof the Radioactive Waste Disposal Storage within the Exclusion Zone
Radioactive Waste Disposal Storages and Radwaste Temporary Localization Sites of the
Exclusion Zone are included in the management sphere of Ministry of Emergency, which in accordancewith the legislation requirements is responsible for programs’ development related to improvement of
the physical protection system of its subordinate facilities.
However, it should be noted that implementation of the Governmental policy in the area ofphysical protection of radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, aiming at protection of
the national safety interests, prevention and suspension of the acts of nuclear terrorism andstrengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, is not the priority of the Ministry of Emergency,
and the Exclusion Zone Administration at present.
Thus, in accordance with the results of comprehensive inspections performed by the SNRCU
during 2008–2009–2010, a very poor state of physical protection system of Radioactive Waste Disposal

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Storage and Radwaste Temporary Localization Site (RWDS, RWTLS) located within the Chernobyl
NPP Exclusion Zone was revealed. .For instance, absence of the technical means of detection and video
monitoring systems does not allow effectively performing the functions of security at RWDS
«Pidlisnyy», «Buriakivka», «3rd commissioning stage of ChNPP» and RWTLS «Rozsokha. Due to theabsence of technical means of illumination of the restricted access zones, the complete security
functions are not performed during the night time. Within the certain sections of the restricted accesszone of RWTLS «Rozsokha, adjacent to the forest, there is no perimeter fencing and warning signs.
As an example of the negative consequences of non-compliance of physical protection systemwith the legislation and legal acts requirements – there was a theft of radioactively-contaminatedcopper-nickel-iron pipes, with the total weight of 6 t. 920 kg from the RWDS «Buriakivka» restricted
area in the IV quarter 2009. And in 2010 while attempting to penetrate to the RWDS «Pidlisnyy»
territory, an employee of one of the Exclusion Zone enterprises was detained; in the third quarter of thesame year a theft of radioactive materials was recorded (products manufactured from depleted uranium)
with a total weight of 74.4 kg at facility «3rd commissioning stage of ChNPP».
Based on the results of the implemented inspections, it has been concluded that the system ofphysical protection of radioactive waste disposal sites of the Exclusion Zone does not completely
comply with the legislation requirements on the nuclear physical protection, and is unable to performthe function of a counterwork to potential threats. Arrangement of activities at these facilities does notprovide comprehensive solutions of problems associated with provision of the radioactive waste
physical protection, which in turn may be defined as the failure of Ukraine to perform the international
obligations – namely, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Lack of effective
internal control creates an atmosphere of impunity and irresponsibility of the industrial personnel.
Also, one of the negative situation factors is the failure to meet Article 27 of the Law of Ukraine,
entitled «On the physical protection of nuclear installations, nuclear materials, radioactive waste and othersources of ionizing radiation» related to the funding procedure of the physical protection system of radiation
hazard objects. So far the calculations have not been performed considering the need to create an effective
system of the RWDS physical protection as it is foreseen by the effective legislation requirements.
7.3.4. General Government Measures for the State Policy Implementation Concerning
the Issues of Chernobyl NPP Safe Decommissioning and its Conversion
into the Environmentally Safe System and the RAW Handing
The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee within the frames of its powers, implements the State
policy on the nuclear energy use, provides for meeting the nuclear and radiation safety requirements,
and within its activities related to the Object «Shelter» follows the Laws of Ukraine, decrees and ordersof the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, legal acts in the sphere of nuclear energy use.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine approved the«Statement about the policy of nuclear and radiation safety regulation of the Chernobyl NPP Object«Shelter» dated 08 April 1998, No. 49 in order to clarify the State policy of nuclear and radiation safety
regulation of the Object «Shelter». It defined the basic principles of nuclear and radiation safety
provision when implementing the activities related to the Object «Shelter» in the course of its
conversion into environmentally safe system, namely: management principles, prevention of nuclear
accidents, radiation protection, radioactive waste handling, and the general technical principles.
In 2001 the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee developed and registered in the Ministry ofJustice of Ukraine the «Requirements to the structure and content of the Shelter Implementation Plan
safety analysis report». In accordance with requirements of this document, the SSE ChNPP develops
the safety analysis report of the designs to be submitted to the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee aspart of the documents set in order to obtain a permit to conduct certain activities or operations at the
Object «Shelter».

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During the 2005–2006, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee developed the «Basic safety
principles of activities within the framework of the Shelter Implementation Plan» and «Guidelines on
the application of safety principles when performing regulatory activities within the framework of theShelter Implementation Plan» with participation of foreign experts.
In October 2010, the Legal Act «Conditions and procedure for issuing written permits for certain typesof activities or operations related to conversion of the Object «Shelter» into the environmentally safe system»
developed by the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee came into force. This document defines the types ofactivities or operations to be carried out under the individual permits at the Object «Shelter», sets the conditions
and procedure for issuing, amending, refusal to issue, suspension and revocation of permits for certain activities
or operations related to conversion of the Object «Shelter» into the environmentally safe system.
For the arrangement of mutually agreed activities of regulatory authorities involved in the Shelter
Implementation Plan (SIP) performance, State Nuclear Regulatory Committee, Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, State Committee of
Ukraine on Industrial Safety, Labor Protection and Mining Supervision, State Fire Safety Department of
MES of Ukraine executed a «Protocol between the regulatory authorities of Ukraine related to cooperationand division of competence in respect of Shelter Implementation Plan» in order to avoid duplication ofactivities, to shorten the designs review terms, and to adopt the coordinated regulatory decisions in 2003.
Coordination of regulatory authorities’ activities oriented on the most important issues is conducted
through the «Interdepartmental Working Group on Coordination of the regulatory authorities’ activity whenissuing licenses for activities on the Object «Shelter» and Chernobyl NPP decommission».
«SIP Projects Licensing Plan. Phase 2» was developed in 2003 in order to ensure a clear processof the SIP projects licensing, the determination of interaction between parties involved in the review ofthese designs. This document defines the scheme of documents concurrence, obtaining the permits fromthe regulatory and supervisory authorities. The individual licensing processes for the most important
projects were developed in the course of this document evolution, namely: implementation ofstabilization measures, realization of the New Safe Confinement, realization of the Object «Shelter»
Integrated Automated Monitoring System.
In accordance with the National Program of the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning andconversion of the Object «Shelter» into the environmentally safe system, approved by the Law of
Ukraine dated 15 January 2009, N 886-VI, measures taken at the Object «Shelter», shall be classified as
the measures aimed at the Object «Shelter» conversion into the environmentally safe system.
The Object «Shelter» conversion into the environmentally safe system requires mobilization ofsignificant financial and material resources and international support to solve this wide scale problem.
The International program of the Object «Shelter» conversion into the environmentally safe
system – Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP), in Ukrainian: ɉɥɚɧ Ɂɞɿɣɫɧɟɧɧɹ Ɂɚɯɨɞɿɜ (ɉɁɁ) was
developed jointly with the Governments and experts from different countries during 1997.
The SIP includes 22 tasks aimed at ensuring of the basic safety objectives, namely: reducing theprobability of the Object «Shelter» collapse (stabilization of structures), mitigation of the collapse
consequences, increasing the nuclear safety, raising the personnel and environment safety, long-term
strategy of measures related to the Object «Shelter» conversion into the environmentally safe system.
The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee performs the examination of nuclear and radiation
safety (technical evaluation) of designs, technical decisions, design and technical documentation
developed in order to carry out certain SIP tasks. Since the beginning of the SIP projects more than 200
such examinations were implemented.
For their performance a number of methodical and regulatory documents was developed, which
identify the requirements’ system of the Object «Shelter» nuclear and radiation safety and activities
within its framework: from the fundamental principles and safety foundation applied to the Object«Shelter», to specific criteria and requirements concerning this facility.

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One of the main SIP projects is the construction of the Object «Shelter» New Safe Confinement (NSC).
Confinement is a protective structure that includes a complex of technological equipment for theremoval of materials that contain nuclear fuel from destroyed Power Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP,
radioactive waste handling and other systems designed to implement the measures aimed at conversionof this Unit into the environmentally safe system and the personnel and environment safety provision.
Providing for the licensing process of the Object «Shelter» New Safe Confinement construction
is a task of top priority of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee.
In the course of the NSC construction, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee closelycooperates with the SSE ChNPP and with the Contractor of the NSC First Commissioning Stage,
provides the consultative support and clarifications on the regulations requirements and on approaches
to safety justification of the designs, etc. In particular, such support was provided while developing the
NSC additional design criteria and requirements, related to the effects caused by the avalanche ofsnow/ice from the roof of the NSC protective structure, impact of tornado Class 3 on the NSC
structures, impacts of wind loads, requirements for material of steel sheets and welded pipes of the NSC
protective bearing structures, and the NSC main crane system.
Infrastructure for the ChNPP radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel handling within theframework of the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning foresees the construction of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Storage (ISF-2), the Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant (LRTP), the Industrial Complex For
Solid Waste Management (ICSRM), Complex of production on decontamination, transportation,
processing and disposal of radioactive waste from the areas contaminated after the Chernobyl
catastrophe (code-named «Vector»).
ISF-2 (Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage).
Terms of license, entitled «Nuclear Installation Construction» Series EO # 000124 dated 13 May
2003, issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee, foresee the activities for the construction of ISF-2
only after approval of the revised Design for the ISF-2 construction in the established order and agreement of
the ISF-2 preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) with the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee.
During 2010, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee involving the experts from State Scientificand Technical Center of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS) (Ukraine) and RISKAUDIT(Germany – France) performed the State Expert Review of nuclear and radiation safety of ISF-2 PSAR
and other documentation related to completion of the ChNPP ISF-2 construction.
On 19 October 2010, the Decree of Collegium of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee No. 12
approved the conclusion of the State expert review of PSAR and other documentation associated withthe completion of ChNPP ISF-2 construction, as the ones that demonstrate the compliance of the ISF-2
design decisions with nuclear and radiation safety requirements in general.
As of present-day, the Chernobyl NPP takes measures related to approval of ISF-2 design and reissuance of the license Series EO # 000124 «Nuclear Installation Construction», issued by the State
Nuclear Regulatory Committee on 13 May 2003.
LRTP (Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant).
As of today, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee plans their activities within the frameworkof the LRTP licensing on the basis of the «Schedule of the documents development and submission inorder to obtain permits for the LRTP commissioning and operation» updated by the ChNPP.
Expert support within licensing activities related to the LRTP project implementation, is being
provided under the Contracts awarded in accordance with «Grant Agreement (Chernobyl NPP Nuclear
Safety Project) between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as Administrator of
grant funds from the Nuclear Safety Account), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the State
Nuclear Regulation Committee of Ukraine (as the Recipient)» (Grant Agreement dated 07 August 2009,
Reference Number 007).
The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee has approved the SEE ChNPP Technical Decision «Onrevisions of the design of «Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant». This Technical Decision is an285

important document of the Operator in the context of the LRTP project completion and commissioningof this facility, as the SSE ChNPP formulates a list of major modifications (revisions) in this documentthat are to be incorporated to the LRTP design and are significant from the point of view of safety ofthis facility. To evolve this Technical Decision, the SSE ChNPP shall prepare the working
documentation packages on modifications and submit them to a Comprehensive State Expert Review.
Submission of application and the documentation package to obtain the certain written permit of
the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee for the LRTP commissioning is scheduled for 4 quarter 2011,
and for the operation – 1 quarter of 2012.
ICSRM (Industrial Complex for Solid Waste Management).
Project Composition: Lot 0 – Temporary Storage for interim storing of low and medium active
long-lived and highly radioactive waste that is being constructed inside the Liquid and Solid
Radioactive Waste Storage Facility (LSWSF); Lot 1 – Installation of Solid Radwaste Removal; Lot 2 –Solid Radwaste Treatment Plant; Lot 3 – Specially Equipped Surface Storage of Solid Radwastes(SESSSR), constructed at the Vector site.
Lot 0.
On 10 December 2010, the State Nuclear Regulation Committee of Ukraine signed a Particular
Permit No. 000040/4 on operation of the Temporary storage of solid radwaste of the third group andlow and medium active long-lived wastes (hereinafter referred to as TS SRW and LM LLW) which ispart of Industrial complex on solid radioactive waste management at the site (hereinafter – ICSRM) of
the SSE «Chernobyl NPP».
The grounds for granting such permission are as follows:
1) positive conclusions of the State nuclear and radiation safety expert review;2) results of inspection survey held by the Commission of State Nuclear Regulatory Committee
in September 2010 (Deed dated 17 September 2010, No. 46-24-34ɉ).
Also, the following was taken into consideration: the Plan of measures on eliminating thecomments, presented in the Act of inspection survey dated 17 September 2010, No. 46-24-34ɉ, and thecomments revealed within the framework of the State nuclear and radiation safety expert examination
documentation which justify the safe operation of TS SRW and LM LLW, approved by Mr. A. Bilyk,
Technical Director (Chief Engineer) of SSE ChNPP on 26 November 1910, and put into force by the
SSE ChNPP Order dated 26 November 2010, No. 757.
In accordance with the terms of this Permit: practical works on acceptance of RAW packages and their load into the compartments of TS
SRW and LM LLW may be initiated only under the circumstances that the mentioned above«Plan of measures on eliminating the comments ...» is implemented (including the provisionof supporting documents);
 Receiving waste packages may be made from processing plant solid waste ICSRM only.
It should be noted that this Permit gives the right to perform the activities related to TS SRW andLM LLW operation and associated with acceptance, and storing of the SRW and LM LLW packages until
the storage’s compartments are full. In the future, taking into account the speed of the compartments
filling of the TS SRW and LM LLW, but not later than in 10 years, the SSE «Chernobyl NPP» is to planand perform the reevaluation of the storage safety. As part of the storage safety reevaluation, the SSE«Chernobyl NPP» should provide to the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee a revised Safety Analysis
Report of the storage and other documents that substantiate the safe storage of radioactive waste packages.
Among other things, according to the revaluation results of the TS SRW and LM LLW safety, the periodof radioactive waste packages storage should be defined and justified.
Lots 1, 2. On 13 May 2010, the State Nuclear Regulation Committee of Ukraine executed a
Particular Permit, ref number 000040/3 for the commissioning of Solid Radwaste Removal Plant(hereinafter – SRRP, Lot 1) and Solid Radwaste Treatment Shop (hereinafter – SRTS, Lot 2) of theIndustrial complex for radioactive waste at the SSE «Chernobyl NPP».

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According to the granted permission, SSE «Chernobyl NPP» has the right to conduct activities
within the framework of the first stage («hot tests») of the SRRP and SRTS commissioning, as provided
by documents «ICSRM Commissioning Program» and «Work Program of the ICSRM «hot tests»
first stage».
ICSRM Commissioning Program provides for three stages of the SRRP and SRTS
commissioning, namely:
Phase 1 – testing with radioactive waste (hereinafter – RAW) that are inside hermetic containers,
with the known characteristics beforehand;Phase 2 – testing with RAW without hermetic containers («open» RAW) with the known
characteristics;
Phase 3 – testing with RAW removed from the ChNPP SWSF sections.
In order to obtain a permit to perform work during the second phase («hot tests») of the SRRP
and SRTS commissioning, the SSE «Chernobyl NPP» has to provide the State Nuclear Regulatory
Committee with the following documents: reports related to achievement of the criteria for the firststage completion, in accordance with the ICSRM Commissioning Program; copies of Deeds ofcommission for acceptance of the SRRP and SRTS technological equipment and systems after the «hottest»; the Working Program for the second stage of the «hot tests».
Lot 3 – SESSSR. The License Series EO # 000894 dated 07 February 2009 was issued to SSE«Technocenter», with 5 years of validity period. In accordance with the special conditions of thisLicense, SSE «Technocenter» must undertake all necessary measures to ensure and to demonstrate thestorage safe operation through the following: revealing and eliminating the causes of water inflow
under the storage, providing for the analysis of the storage structures and systems functions foreseen by
the design, implementation of modern procedures for safety assessment, implementation of actual
analysis of long-term safety of disposal system, and optimization of acceptance criteria. In order tosolve the issues on safety assessment of the storage, including seismic analysis, the European
Commission provided SSE «Technocenter» with technical support.

7.4. International Scientific and Technical Cooperation Related
to Overcoming the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
The Chernobyl catastrophe is one of the most tragic events in human history, but is also a vivid
example of the unification of the world in the face of a global threat. Now, a quarter of century after theaccident, the final resolution of the Chernobyl problem is possible, perhaps now more than ever, thanks tothe efforts of the international community, its persistence and consistency. Recent political decisions by the«Group of Eight» leaders and their declaration at the regular summit on nuclear safety issues, held on 11–14
April 2010 in Washington, demonstrate an intent to meet obligations related to the Shelter Implementation
Plan (SIP) i.e. conversion of the Object «Shelter» into an environmentally safe system [41]. As is wellknown, the main task of the Plan (construction of a new protective shell over the destroyed reactor), is still
not complete, despite all the efforts of the international community. The construction of the technicalinfrastructure, needed for safe decommissioning, has been significantly delayed.
Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl catastrophe, its consequences are still a global problem.
An important step in arranging further international cooperation is the international scientific andstrategic conference «Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl catastrophe. Safety for the Future», whichis scheduled in Kyiv on 20–22 April 2011.
From the first day of the accident, the world’s attention was riveted to the Chernobyl NPP, as asource of planetary peril. The main risk was the destroyed reactor and potentially the other reactors of
the Chernobyl Plant, which continued their operation.
Taking into account the threat of global environmental radioactive contamination that arose, theeconomically developed countries – above all the countries of forming the «Group of 7» immediately

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offered assistance to the USSR to help control the situation as soon as possible. The main condition of the«Group of 7» governments was a requirement related to the prompt final shut-down of all the reactors ofChernobyl NPP as soon as possible. This was not included in the plans of the USSR government, so in 1986
the «Group of 7» agreed to assist only in the field of radiation medicine and not in any technical sphere.
Now, twenty-five years after the accident, looking back at the Chernobyl events andacknowledging the current situation regarding construction of a new safe shell over the «Shelter», it isfair to say no country in the world would be able to solve a problem of this scale alone.
After the collapse of the USSR, international assistance and cooperation with Ukraine has
gradually grown, focusing on the following main objectives (since 1992):
 Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP); technical assistance to develop the infrastructure needed for the safe decommissioning of
Chernobyl NPP and conversion of the Object «Shelter» into an environmentally safe system; research projects in the Chernobyl NPP Exclusion Zone and projects to survey the health ofindividuals affected by radiation;
 projects of humanitarian aid:a) supplying Ukraine with medical equipment, medicine, clothes and food;b) the rehabilitation of victims (mostly children) overseasc) assistance in building local government and promotion of the civil self-help movement (UNProgram) [42].
Although it was the technological and radiological aspects that attracted the attention of theinternational community within the first years after the Chernobyl accident, the scale of the humanitarian
aspect of the Chernobyl catastrophe has become clearer since the incident and cannot be overlooked.
According to some assessments, about 2.6 million people living in 2293 settlements were affected
as a result of the accident [43]. These communities were affected by direct exposure to radiation and also
by the restrictions on economic activity within contaminated areas. In addition, government subsidies
gradually depreciated due to inflationary processes and this has intensified people’s apathy and scepticism
of the measures. Decreasing subsidies have had a significant negative impact on people’s lives: shortagesof available medicine and medical equipment, low education levels of children and teenagers, and a lackof maintenance for engineering and technical infrastructure in the settlements.
Since the early 90’s, contact and communication between Ukrainian non-governmentalorganizations and individuals of various foreign institutions has become much simpler. This has helped
create favorable conditions for the development of a civil movement of support and solidarity with theaffected population of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. After 1992, in Germany for example, there wereover a thousand organizations that provided charitable assistance to residents of the affected areas andevacuees [44]. The Government of Cuba is providing invaluable assistance in the treatment andrehabilitation of children from the resettled villages and towns [45].
Over the past 20 years many non-governmental organizations have provided a wide range ofassistance to help overcome the effects of the Chernobyl incident – from the rehousing and rehabilitation ofchildren, the provision of medication and technical support to medical and health institutions, to large-scalesocial and environmental projects [46]. The establishment of the Unified Chernobyl European Network of
non-governmental organizations is a significant step forward in the European charity movement on the eveof 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. In January 2011, Germany planned to publish a book, entitled«25 years after the Chernobyl – a European culture of memory and solidarity». Its main objective is topresent a comprehensive history of the involvement of the European charity movement [47].
Bilateral and multilateral, governmental and non-governmental support, which was initiallyprovided to Ukraine in the ‘90s, had a tendency to be focused on short term objectives, dealing with theimmediate consequences of the accident. Later on, the international community understood theemphasis needed be move towards longer term development programs.

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The need to change the approach to the provision of humanitarian support to victims of theaccident was first highlighted in the report «Humanitarian Consequences of the Chernobyl
Catastrophe – a Recovery Strategy» [48], which was published in 2002 by the UN Development
Program (UNDP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) under the support of the United Nations Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization (WHO). In late 2002,
UNDP and the Government of Ukraine have started a program of restoration and development ofareas affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe (RDPCH) [49].
The program paid special attention to three objectives related to assisting the local population.
The objectives were: restoring a sense of dignity and independence;
 development of initiatives to search for resources and economic opportunities;
 protect the health and wellbeing of inhabitants residing within the contaminated areas.
During 2003–2007 years, UNDP/RDPCH provided funding for approximately 190 social
improvement projects. The total budget for these projects is about USD 3.4 million, 30% of which wasprovided by UNDP/RDPCH [50].
Additional funding for implementation of the RDPCH Program was provided by the CanadianInternational Development Agency, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Within the
UNDP/RDPCH framework, the development projects were completed in the seventeen most contaminatedregions of Chernigov, Rivne, Kyiv and Zhytomyr. Through these activities, 279 community organizations in
192 settlements were established involving a total of more than 20000 inhabitants.
Part of the Program was funded by the Government of Japan through the UN Trust Fund forhuman safety. Financial assistance was provided (grants from USD 20 thousand to 75 thousand) to nongovernmental organizations and medical institutions [51].
16 projects were performed with the total cost of USD 717.5 thousand within the framework ofthis Program between 2002 and 2008.
The official position of the international community regarding future plans and activities within the
Chernobyl projects is specified in the 62nd UN Assembly recommendations (October 2007), and consists ofrehabilitation and development phases as the next stage in minimizing the effects of the Chernobyl
catastrophe. The UN Secretary-General in the report «Optimizing the international efforts on studying andminimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe» noted that a return to normal life is a realistic
prospect for most people living in areas that have been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe [52].
According to the experts’ conclusions, at present the main problem of the affected areas lies in
the non-compliance of social and economic infrastructures, unsatisfactory funding of local authorities
and the limited capacity of the local governments. The Chernobyl programs didn’t focus on reducing
the poverty of the population within the affected areas due to the outdated approaches of the social
support system. New ‘realities’ require the development of new concepts and approaches to social
welfare, the main task being to move from humanitarian assistance with its outdated social safetysystem to the real stimulation of social and economic development in the regions.
The old programs, which developed Chernobyl ‘victims’, should be decisively replaced withpersonal and community development initiatives that would encourage the local residents to build theirown future, and instilling self-confidence in them.
To this end, the UN experts suggest the main efforts of the international community should focus
on stimulation of a steady social and economic development, the creation of new jobs, and attracting
investments in order to ‘rehabilitate’ those territories affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe.
Taking this approach into account, the European Union experts have developed a social andeconomic strategy for the Chernobyl region and the Exclusion Zone development. For the first time, the
EU International Expert Committee has introduced an assessment of business potential for the
Chernobyl region, because these areas were being considered only from the point of view of social289

safety provision. The experts have chosen the following three business-ideas as the top priority ones:brick factory, rape cultivation in Ivankiv region, and dry wood processing in the Exclusion Zone [53].
According to the European Union experts’ conclusions, there will be a real danger of fires in the
Chernobyl area until radical measures for the utilization of contaminated dry forest are introduced. The
European Union experts suggested for Ukraine a project involving ‘environmentally clean’ woodburning in the Exclusion Zone, implementation of which will cost EUR 2.5 million. Experts haveestimated the risks and profitability of the projects. Attracting investors falls is the responsibility of thelocal administrations. But to start a business on land that’s classified as contaminated, one needs a
special permission from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and numerous regulatory authorities andthis process discourages potential investors.
Part of implementing the new UN strategy, a practical contribution to the international
community, was a series of seminars held in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus during 2009 [54]. For the firsttime the seminars were co-organized by all four specialized UN organizations: IAEA, UNDP, UNICEF
and WHO. The purpose of the seminars was the advanced training of professionals in the distribution of
information related to the Chernobyl catastrophe, and training of the local authorities’ representatives
responsible for decision making and the provision of information to the public.
In Ukraine, this seminar was held during 2–4 June 2009 in Kyiv, at the Radiation Medicine ResearchCenter of Medical Sciences Academy of Ukraine under the support of Ministry of Emergencies and Affairsof Population Protection from Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe of Ukraine.
The seminar was within the framework of the Regional project of IAEA technical cooperation
RER/3/004 «Radiological rehabilitation support for territories affected by the Chernobyl accident», aswell as within the ICRIN project (International draft of the UN organizations), which was devoted to
the Chernobyl problems.
Currently the position of the international community remains unchanged concerning the assessmentof the current state of the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe – this was presented before the 20th anniversary of theaccident in a number of Chernobyl Forum documents: Joint report of the UN, IAEA, WHO «Chernobyl
heritage: medical, ecological and social and economic consequences», «Chernobyl: the true scale of theaccident», the UNDP and UNICEF reports «Humanitarian Consequences of the Chernobyl accident: astrategy for rehabilitation», Documents from the International Conference «Chernobyl: 20 years later» andthe adopted Chernobyl action plan for the period until 2016 by the UN [54].
The main conclusions of the above documents may be summarized as follows: degree of the radiation risk to the health of local people (outside the Chernobyl NPP
Exclusion Zone) is currently rated as zero.
 restrictions in the economic and commercial sphere caused by radiation stigmatization (i.e.
hanging labels, generally isn’t justified, for example: in Ukraine, all lands and all agricultural
products are radioactively contaminated), hence investment and infrastructure is missing; the practice of granting a wide range of benefits in the social sphere formed «dependence
syndrome» among the population of the affected regions, and extensive radio phobia whichcaused passivity and helplessness. These factors are combined within the «Chernobyl victim
syndrome» concept;
 the need to change the current policy of humanitarian aid by the international community,
implementation of which contributes to strengthening of the consumer frame of mind among
the affected population;
 radiological rehabilitation of the population has been completed, the size of contaminatedareas is reducing, and its recommended existing international standards are applied for theirclassification;
 the international scientific community needs greater access and use of the unique scientific‘laboratory’, which the Exclusion Zone around the Chernobyl NPP represents.

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Analysis of experience gained and the results of years of work demonstrates that international
cooperation in Chernobyl does not represent a so-called movement «one-side side». If Ukraine received
a large-scale humanitarian and technical aid, the countries that have granted such assistance got anaccess to a unique «Chernobyl polygon».
To facilitate international research, the U.S. Government and the International Radioecology
Laboratory (IRL) sponsored activities within the Exclusion Zone in Ukraine. The IRL has the necessary
research base directly at the Exclusion Zone.
Despite the short period of the laboratory’s existence, significant scientific findings have beenobtained from international projects: the IRL scientists, along with leading scientists from the U.S., UK,
Germany, France and several other countries published more than 100 works. Since 2007, the IRL
together with the research centers in the U.S. such as the Washington Savannah River Company LLC,
Savannah River National Laboratory (later – Savannah River Nuclear Solutions), have moved from thelong-term gathering of scientific and theoretical measurements to summarizing the gained knowledge
and skills derived in minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, including the treatment ofcontaminated areas and the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning. As part of these projects, information has
been collated and organized, including: that pertaining to the decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP
and the cooling pond, the construction of the new safe confinement over the Object «Shelter», theradioecological processes that occur in different ecosystems of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone,
approaches to radioecological risks, procedures for environmental researches, and others.
One of the most ‘challenging’ objects within the Exclusion zone is the Chernobyl NPP Cooling
Pond. Its safe handling requires cooperation at an international level. As a result of the accident, thePond has been contaminated by dispersed nuclear fuel and high-active water discharges from thereactor’s primary loop. The handling issues of this object have been periodically reviewed by experts
from different countries within the framework of the IAEA Programme at the Chernobyl NPP. One of
the last tasks, which took place in October 2009, was devoted to the following: discussing the current
state of contamination of Cooling Pond and the surrounding area, the impact of the Pond on theenvironment, contamination peculiarities of sediments; a forecast of changes to the ecosystem during
Pond removal; previous experiences in rehabilitation of radioactively contaminated water bodies.
Establishment of the International Radioecology Laboratory has enriched the treasury of humanknowledge in the field of Radiology and Radiation Protection, expanded and strengthened contacts
between the scientists of many countries and helped to preserve and increase the scientific potential of
Ukraine. The IRL opens a great opportunity for researchers from all around the world to develop andresearch tools for the estimation of the technogenic environmental contamination consequences andoptimal and efficient solutions to overcome these effects.
According to rankings of the most exotic tourist destinations that attract people from many
countries, the Chernobyl NPP Exclusion Zone occupies one of the highest positions (according toForbes magazine). Of course, Chernobyl is not a tourist center. Most people who visit the Exclusion
Zone are scientists, journalists, writers, environmentalists and politicians. These are people who have aprofessional interest in the Chernobyl NPP accident. Ukraine has to attract attention to the accident andits consequences constantly, but foreign tourism to Chernobyl is one way of educating foreigners about
this catastrophe. These visits should not be considered as entertainment or vacations, but as a form of
public awareness about the scale of the Chernobyl catastrophe and the overcoming of its consequences.

7.5. Scientific Support Measures to Overcome the Consequencesof the Chernobyl Catastrophe
Scientific support in all areas of work associated with the Chernobyl accident has been identified
as one of the main mechanisms for overcoming the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences.

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At the time of the world’s largest technogenic catastrophe (at Chernobyl NPP), Ukraine had no
specialized scientific institutions in the field of Radiation Medicine, Radiobiology, Radiology, andAgricultural Radiology. Taking into account the scale of the accident, it was decided to establish in
Kyiv a number of specialized research institutions to solve the problems caused by the catastrophe.
Immediate formation of the scientific support infrastructure enabled the investigation and solution of awide range of scientific problems resulting from the Chernobyl accident.
7.5.1. Minimization of the Health Consequences of the Catastrophe
Analysis and summarizing of the basic research results for the first 10 years after the accident
showed that the health effects of Chernobyl catastrophe were significantly different from the predicted
ones. The stochastic effects brought significant contribution to the health decline of all categories ofvictims in the shape of a wide range of non-tumorous forms of somatic and psychosomatic diseases. In
most cases they caused the disability and mortality.
As a result of 15 years observation of different groups of victims in 2001, Ukrainian scientists
together with the experts from the WHO, UN SCEAR (Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation), IAEA and other organizations have developed predictions and recommendations concerning
minimization of the health consequences for the coming years. It was indicated that within the next 10
years (till 2010), the trends to the number of disease could increase on many forms of disease andpossibly cancer, including natural ageing of the affected populations.
The purpose of the «National Program on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe for 2006–2010» was the health preservation of persons affected by the Chernobyl disasterand their descendants, strengthening and support of radiation safety barriers, radiation protection of
population living within radioactively contaminated areas, the maximum possible limitation of theradionuclides spread from the Exclusion Zone, the improvement of social protection of victims of theChernobyl disaster, and rehabilitation of territories and settlements.
The analysis shows the effectiveness of applied medical countermeasures on minimization of thehealth consequences of the Chernobyl accident, including measures to reduce exposure of children
population in 1986, and the planned rehabilitation of affected children. The system of measures associatedwith the early diagnosis and treatment of thyroid cancer, which included clinical examination withultrasound diagnosis, surgery and radioiodine therapy of metastases has become effective. The UN
Chernobyl Forum (2006) stated that mortality from thyroid cancer in affected countries did not exceed 1%.
The Chernobyl Forum formulated recommendations related to priority tasks of the health system.
They included the following: continuation of the monitoring of individuals exposed in childhood; when planning the system of measures on the health protection, predictive assessment must
be used taking into account the cancer and exposure risks;
 implementation of analytical researches are recommended as those that provide thequantitative assessment of the disease risk within exposed persons and modifying factors. It is
important to continue environmental studies for the efficient distribution of scarce financial
resources in health care area, to document the geographical and temporal changes in risks
under the large number of diseases;
 the cancer registry is an important element of activities, which are characterized by highquality data.
The Chernobyl Forum specified that it is impossible to exclude the possibility of increasing theradiation risks of thyroid cancer after exposure in adulthood. Implementation of the properly planned
and analyzed studies has been recommended. The same recommendations were given for research
implementation of children exposed during the prenatal development.

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The continuation of extensive analytical studies of leukemia and temporal differences in thevalues of radiation risks was recommended. As for the other forms of cancers, it was concluded that
although there were no evidences of the cancer frequency increased apart from the thyroid cancer at thetime of the analysis performance; the possibility of the risks increase could not be ignored, especiallywith the liquidators. If a surplus exists, it will be recorded in one or several decades after the disaster.
It is also recommended to implement the research to verify the role of ionizing radiation in the
induction of cardiovascular diseases at liquidators.
The UN SCEAR completed drafting of document «Effects of the Chernobyl accident on humanhealth associated with the action of ionizing radiation» in 2008. In the document, published in 2011,
publications before 2006 inclusive were analyzed. The prevailing limitation of the SCEAR document
was the analysis implementation only of those effects for which the relation with the radiation wasestablished earlier. Compared to the previous document (Annex J, 2000) leukemia, cataracts at
liquidators besides the thyroid cancer were added to the established effects. The necessity of research ofcancers, including breast cancer, and cardiovascular disease at liquidators was scientifically justified.
Almost 25 years have passed since the Chernobyl accident. Problems caused by the Chernobyl
catastrophe have not disappeared, and their acuity hasn’t decreased. However, the scientific analysis
shows the changes in trends of morbidity, which requires the adjustments in planning measures related
to minimization of health consequences.
The main problem of recent years is the probable increase of mortality level of liquidators
compared with the population of Ukraine. The main causes of death were cancer and death fromcardiovascular complications. In accordance with the environmental research, previous assumptions
about the increased of thyroid cancer at adults – liquidators and evacuees are being confirmed. Disease
incidences of breast cancer exceeded the expected level at female liquidators of 1986-1987 in 1.5 times.
The radiation risks of leukemia increase are confirmed, which are similar to those established at thevictims of nuclear bombings. The results are confirmed following the research of Russian liquidatorsgroup by the UN International Agency for Cancer Research.
At the same time, a tendency of decreasing the number of radiogenic leukemia cases amongliquidators has appeared. It was expected and can be explained by temporal trends of changes inradiation risks and high mortality from cardiovascular system and other forms of cancer.
Studies of the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe showed that one of its mostadverse effects is an increase of the children’s disease indices of almost all classes of diseases, among
which the significant disorders in the immune system and pathology of the gastrointestinal tract are
noted. Researches of the last period also show the availability of problems in children – descendants ofthe exposed parents (children of liquidators and evacuees).
The less urgent problems in terms of medical radiation protection in recent years are the general
health condition of the population residing within contaminated territories. This is connected with thedecrease of annual doses loads due to natural processes of decay and the migration of radionuclides,
migration processes on settling the contaminated territories within younger population who was not
exposed with ionizing radiation in primary dose formation period. These processes are positively
reflected in the demographic values. At the same time, the problems of radiation protection of
population residing within the contaminated territories with abnormally high levels of incorporation ofradionuclides are still crucial.
Dynamics and forecast of the medical consequences of the Chernobyl disaster showed that
increase of the medical assistance efficiency to persons who have undergone radiation impact does not
only preserves its actuality, but also it becomes the most priority in the coming years. According to theexisting structure of morbidity there is a need for additional or specialized care for all categories ofvictims. The system of medical care to residents of contaminated territories remains effective owing to
the principle of consistency between all institutions that provide such assistance.

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The requirement and the basis for the development of Government programs and system of measures
aimed at preserving the health of victims, scientific and social research implementation is the support andproper functioning of the State Register of Ukraine (SRU) and the National Cancer Registry of Ukraine. The
SRU level does not meet modern requirements in connection with the obsolescence of equipment andsoftware, insufficient quality of data entered at the SRU local levels, the availability of exposure doses onlyat 38% and the technical impossibility to include the retrospective data of individual dosimetry, and others.
Coordination and exchange of data between the three existing systems of accounting – the SRU of persons
affected by the Chernobyl disaster, the official statistics of the annual clinical examination and specialized
departmental sub registers are required. All affected persons are to be included into the SRU.
Analysis of health consequences for 25 years after the Chernobyl accident shows that in general,they correspond to the consequences among those who suffered from atomic bombing. Considering thedetermined patterns of radiation effects at victims, the following is expected in the coming years:
 Increase of the cancer frequency at liquidators, including: maintaining the high incidence of thyroid cancer, urinary tract, increased incidence ofbreast and lung cancers;
 reduction of radiation-induced leukemia incidence with increasing incidence of multiple
myeloma and myelodysplastic syndrome.
 Increased morbidity and mortality of liquidators from non-tumorous diseases, in the firstplace – cardiovascular pathology.
 Maintenance of the increased incidence of radiation cataracts.
 Increased incidence of non-tumoral and some forms of cancer in the population affected withradioactive iodine during pre-natal development, in childhood and adulthood (evacuated); Increased frequency of congenital and hereditary pathology, and possibly other classes of
diseases at children born of parents-liquidators and those evacuated in childhood from Pripyat
and the 30-km zone.
Contingents of priority observation during the third after disaster decade are still the people whohave suffered acute radiation sickness, liquidators with radiation dose above 250 mSv, evacuees fromthe 30-kilometer zone, persons with high-dose exposure of the thyroid, pregnant women and children
living within contaminated areas and born of parents who received high radiation doses.
Development of measures aimed at preservation of the health and working abilities of the SSE
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (SSE ChNPP) and the Object «Shelter» (OS) personnel during the shut
down and conversion of the OS into radiation safe system is one of the most topical problems ofmodern radiation safety and Radiation Medicine, a testing for medical radiation protection system,
including on the ability to assimilate the past lessons and conclusions from the mistakes. Analysis ofresults shows that effective health protection is only possible when using rigid standards of medical
professional selection, constant current control of dose loads and the introduction of behavior culture ofworkers within the exposure area. Proper application of these known criteria reduces the radiationinduced effects risks to acceptable ones.
The following should be considered as the most significant problems on minimization of theconsequences of the Chernobyl disaster in the future: need of government support for the work implementation related to minimization of thedisaster effects and approval of the Government program for 2012–2016;
 introduction of effective diagnosis of remote cancer and non-tumor effects of irradiation andtheir treatment; clinical examination of victims with timely transfer of personalized data to the SRU;
 continuation of scientific analytical, environmental, epidemiological and basic research
related to study of the medical consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in the remote period in
the priority observation groups;294 medical rehabilitation of the affected population, development of preventive measures aimed
at early diagnosis of cancer incidence;
 continuation of national and international programs associated with the population awareness,
continuation of participation in the WHO «ICRIN» Program; continuation of dosimetry certification of the contaminated areas where the abnormally highlevels of incorporated radionuclides are observed within the population; provision of local
health institutions with the modern dosimetric equipment instead of equipment that havedepleted their resources; improvement of medical and sanitary base of specialized hospitals, which are constantly
providing medical care to the victims.
At the national and international levels, there is a necessity in development and expansion of scientificresearch programs taking into consideration the long-term objectives. It is reasonable to continue improving
the system of health provision and social protection of population affected by the Chernobyl accident,
focusing on medical monitoring of the priority contingent. Introduction of balanced and scientifically based
approach to measures aimed at eliminating the consequences of disasters and works to convert the Object«Shelter» into the radiological safe system can ensure their relevance and high efficiency.
7.5.2. Radiological Investigation, Radiological Protection of Population and Improvementof Environmental Health of the Radioactively Contaminated Territories
The Ukrainian Scientific and Research Institute of Agricultural Radiology (UIAR) established in1986 is the main and coordinating institution in the field of agricultural radiology, radiologicalinvestigations, and rehabilitation of contaminated territories in Ukraine, which elaborates the issue ofagriculture within the affected territories.
During the first post-accident years, a large amount of practical work was performed to assess theradiological situation within contaminated territories and within the different areas of agriculture,
namely: the sampling and analysis of tens of thousands of samples of soil, vegetation, animal products,
summarizing of the obtained results. In the course of investigation, the critical farms were found within
the contaminated regions of Ukraine where the content of 90Sr in cereals exceeded acceptable levels;
countermeasures in all areas of agriculture were elaborated and implemented. Also, the special
technologies and the Program of contaminated land recultivation were developed.
In that period the following had been developed: express method to assess the contamination level of agricultural land, which allowed to examine
them at the entire territory of Ukraine in no time, to map the agricultural contamination territories
and to remove the most contaminated areas from the agricultural usage;
 conversion program of the farms which are located in the contaminated territories;
 radiological certificate of an agricultural enterprise; methods of farmlands decontamination and technological projects of the differential
countermeasures application in the collective and individual farms.
Implementation of all these scientific developments has allowed stabilizing the radiological situationin the agricultural industry of Ukraine and practically providing the Public Sector with production ofagricultural products, in which the concentration of radionuclides did not exceed the acceptable levels.
The Law of Ukraine «On the Government program for overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe for 2006–2010» dated 14 March 2006, # 3522-IV was adopted in 2006 in orderto determine the priorities during the long stage of minimization of the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe.
One of the key objectives of Governmental policy on minimization of the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe is the implementation of a set of measures oriented on the comprehensive

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protection of population, creation of safe living conditions within the contaminated territories. A basis
for these activities planning is an objective assessment of radiological living conditions anddevelopment of the respective Programs related to the radiological revival of the territories
The subjects of investigations related to radiological protection of population and environmental
health improvement of the territories that suffered radioactive contamination, were the following: theterritories contaminated due to the Chernobyl catastrophe; social and economic development of thoseterritories and places of the citizens compact resettlement; critical settlements that belong to the second
contamination zone in accordance with Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine «On legal regime of theterritories contaminated in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe» and in accordance with theradiation situation can be removed outside the second zone boundaries.
Based on the comprehensive radiation and hygienic analysis of the radiation situation in thesettlements within the contaminated territories referred to the second zone of radioactive contamination,
the radiation situation as of 01 January 2008 was described, the settlements were defined, which inaccordance with radiological parameters can be removed outside the second zone boundaries, critical
agricultural lands were identified, the effectiveness of existing countermeasures and procedures for
optimization of these settlements application were assessed.
In this regard, the analysis was performed concerning the modern radiation and environment
condition of the Exclusion Zone, the prospects of the Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and conversion
the Object Shelter into environmentally safe system, and development of proposals related to theterritories within the short, medium and long period of application.
When developing the issues concerning the further strategy of liquidation of the consequences of
the Chernobyl catastrophe, the following was performed: generalization of available information;
review of approaches to planning; establishment of priorities in the countermeasures’ implementation
and assessment of their effectiveness in order to assess the radiation protection strategies, and theeffectiveness of protective measures undertaken in the post-accident years within the affected
territories. The most critical settlements were defined and the amount of necessary funding was
calculated, the activities were continued related to the assessment of course and intensiveness ofradionuclides penetration into the human body on the basis of the developed criteria for assessing theeffectiveness of radiological countermeasures. The obtained materials became the basis for the National
Program’s objectives and measures draft developed for overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe for 2010–2014.
For post-accident period the Institute’s scientists published more than thousand research papers,
including more than 100 methods, recommendations, proposals focused on the organization ofagricultural production within the territories contaminated by radioactive substances. These research
papers guide the Departments of Ministry of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine, the workers of radiologicalservices in the regions, districts, and farms. The concept of agricultural production within contaminatedareas of Ukraine till 2010, and the Rehabilitation programs of the contaminated territories weredeveloped. Technical projects were developed ensuring obtaining the production that meets the sanitary
standards in Ukraine for the most critical of settlements. The UIAR specialists as the highly qualified
experts are invited by a number of national (NCCR, SNRC, National Security Council, Ministry of
Emergency, Ministry of Agrarian Policy, etc.) and international organizations (IAEA, OSCE, NATO,etc) for the significant scientific and industrial tasks solution.
In 2007–2008, new edition of «Recommendations for the agricultural production on radioactively
contaminated territories as a result of the Chernobyl accident for 2007–2010» and «Recommendations
for the forest management within radioactively contaminated territories» were developed and published.
The informational materials were updated to meet the most urgent problems related to ensuring
the victims’ safe residing within the territories affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe. The materials
were analyzed with a view of their perception by youth and school audience and with the following

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publication of a poster with the respective content. As the results of this work, a new model poster was
created associated with the radionuclides penetration into the body and methods to reduce thepossibility of their penetration.
7.5.3. Preservation of Cultural Heritage
Ukrainian Polesie, which preserves many unique archaic features of traditional folk culture, is thepart of Slavs ancestors’ fatherland in accordance with one of the scientific hypothesis.
The territory of the Exclusion Zone and the zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlementceased to exist as a whole ethno cultural area for ever due to the Chernobyl catastrophe. There is a real
danger to lose irreversibly the monuments of material and spiritual culture of the Polesie inhabitants.
The destructive processes in the sphere of social and cultural traditions are observed in the area ofguaranteed voluntary resettlement (835 towns and villages with population about 650 thousand people),
which still retain the status of increased risk area.
Thus, the Ukrainian science and society faces the problem of urgent issue to save and preservefor posterity all the ethnic heritage complex of the contaminated region.
Therefore, the comprehensive integral systematic fixation of endangered ethno cultural complex
is an optimal way to preserve the cultural heritage from the destructive consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe. The purpose of such fixation lies in creating a multi-regional research fund as acomprehensive information source for the further development of historical science, social and cultural
rehabilitation of affected population.
Historical and Cultural Expedition of Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine was established inaccordance with the Verkhovna Rada Decree «On urgent measures to protect the citizens of Ukraine
from the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences» (1990), which in 1992 arranged for development a
perspective comprehensive program (which was included into a separate section to the National
Program on minimization of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe). The Expedition also
attracted a number of temporary creative groups, formed on the basis of relevant academic institutes,
universities, museums and public organizations in Ukraine to implement the Program.
On 16 October 2007, the State Scientific Center for protection of the cultural heritage fromtechnogenic catastrophes was established on the basis of Historical and Cultural Expedition following
the policy of Ministry of Emergency. This Center was financed by the Government.
The scientific activities of the State Scientific Center for protection of the cultural heritage fromtechnogenic catastrophes (hereinafter referred to as the State Scientific Center) are focused on
implementation of the tasks defined by the National Program on overcoming the consequences of theChernobyl catastrophe for 2006–2010.
Within this time, 7 historical and ethnographic and 3 archaeological expeditions took place,during which the following was implemented:
investigation of the affected settlements oriented to the following identification and observation of themonuments of material and spiritual culture located within the affected territory of Ukrainian Polesie;archaeological excavations within the territory of medieval Chernobyl town (total area of 80
square meters.), where the cultural layers of XI, XII, XVII and XVIII centuries had been discovered;continuation of archaeological investigation of the monument’s complex near Velykyi Dyvlyn
village (Luhyny district). As a result of excavation, 623 objects had been found and a new archeologicalmonument was discovered – an old village dated IX-X centuries, that was called «Velykiy Dyvlyn – 2».
The following was arranged within the implementation plan of the cultural circulation of thecollected museum and archival funds:
on the occasion of 22nd anniversary of Chernobyl catastrophe, the historical and ethnographic
exhibition «Memories about the Paternal land», which was held from 21 April through 10 May 2008 in
the National Museum of Literature of Ukraine, the following expositions of the permanent exhibition297

were renewed: «Memories about the Paternal land» in Chernobyl, archeological exposition «Medieval
Chernobyl Settlement» (from 25 April through 25 May 2008) at the National University of KyivMohyla Academy;
participation in arrangement and performance of the exhibition «Child in the customs of the
Ukrainian people» (since 6 September though 1 November 2008);
historical and ethnographic, and archaeological exhibitions: «Weaving at the Polesie region» (inKyiv), «Memories about the Paternal land» (in Chernobyl), «Archaeological investigations of theaffected regions of Ukrainian Polesie» (in Kyiv).
The following is an important part of the research works results introduction by the State
Scientific Center: issuance of the scientific publications «National clothing of the right-bank Polesie
inhabitants in the middle of XIX–XX centuries. (Historic and Ethnographic atlas. Dictionary)» andpreparation of research manuscripts «Calendar of customs and traditions of the Rivne Polisie
inhabitants: Local peculiarities. Transformation (XX – beginning XIX century.)», «Illustrated
Dictionary of the Middle Polesie building vocabulary», «Musical folklore Kyiv Polesie. Volume 1».
Also, the monitoring of scientific and research activities of institutions is being implemented in thesphere of cultural heritage preservation against the emergencies.
Today the State Research Center for protection of the cultural heritage from technogenic
catastrophes is the leading and practically the only institution of such kind. It is still the basic founder ofmuseum and archive complex funds of the affected Polesie areas. The main objective of the Centre
related to the further implementation of the National Target Program on overcoming the consequencesof the Chernobyl catastrophe is foundation of a Museum-archive of ethnic and cultural heritage of theaffected areas of Ukrainian Polesie. The further implementation of these important public objectives
requires appropriate maintenance and preservation of museum and archives funds, as well as systematic
rescue activities.
It should be taken into account that the future Museum-archive, as the place to be visited by theinternational tourists, shall be located in an accessible place with the convenient system of transport
communication.
7.5.4. Radioactive Waste Handling
The Ministry of Emergency, as a body of government administration in the sphere of radioactive
waste handling, arranges for realization the government policy on radioactive waste handling, including
those formed as a result of Chernobyl catastrophe. In accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On
Radioactive Waste Handling», the Ministry has developed the Law of Ukraine «On the National Target
Environmental Program of Radioactive Waste Handling», which was approved by the Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine dated 17 September 2008, # 516-IV. Implementation of the program will allow achieving ahigh level of nuclear and radiation safety through the following measurers:
creation of unified system of radioactive waste handing;introduction of unified technical policy for radioactive waste handing and physical protection;
reduction of the risks related to radioactive waste penetration into the unauthorized circulation.
To implement the strategic directions and objectives defined in the Energy Strategy of Ukraine
till 2030, the Ministry of Emergency develops National strategy for radioactive waste handling in
Ukraine. The above Strategy takes into account the experience gained in the field of radioactive waste
handling in Ukraine, Soviet Union, the European Union, and fully corresponds to the principles andrequirements of European legislation and recommendations of international organizations such as the
IAEA, European Atomic Energy Community, etc.
One of the main objectives of governmental policy on radioactive waste management issummarized and highlighted in the published book «Radioactive waste Storages». This objective
reduces the duration of temporary waste storage at the areas of their formation (production), and298

intensification of their processing with their following storage in the central storage facilities for longand / or permanent storage (disposal).
Minimization the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe – is not a temporary activity, but
designed for long period of time purposeful Government activity to be carried out during the long
historical period, which requires the full and effective support from the central and local executive
authorities, local governments, enterprises, institutions and organizations regardless of ownership in theissues of life facilitation of the affected population. It is clear that the implemented activities andmeasures were insufficient to meet the needs of victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe and to minimize
the consequences of it. Therefore everything possible must be done to maximize the implementation of
the Laws of Ukraine on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe so that eachChernobyl inhabitant feels that the central and local governments’ activities, the efforts of scientists,
physicians, and community organizations are focused on the final positive result for his/her welfare.
Within this context the adoption of terms of the National Program of overcoming theconsequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe for 2012–2016 years seems reasonable. This Program shallprovide for implementation of the measures focused on the further social, medical and psychologicalrehabilitation and radiation protection of the population; completion of economic regeneration of
settlements; development of the radioactively contaminated territories, preservation of their cultural andhistorical heritage, scientific support of all aspects of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe.
The main scientific support objectives for the following period are:continuation of examination of the impact of the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences on healthand environment;
improvement of the radioecological and dosimetrical system of monitoring within the territories
that were contaminated due to the Chernobyl catastrophe;
improvement of measures aimed at stimulation of the manufacture of clean production, economic
development of the radioactively contaminated territories;
provision of scientifically reasonable usage of funds for implementation of measures on social
protection of persons affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe, and overcoming its consequences;wide application of work results on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe
into practice to prevent other emergencies and liquidation of its consequences, emergency response toradiation accidents;
coordination of international research related to the Chernobyl catastrophe consequences, focusedon the Program’s objective implementation.
A sharp decrease in financing of the research studies related to overcoming the consequences of
the Chernobyl catastrophe (scientific support of all the Program’s activities and objectives) in 2009–2010 (UAH 2739.2 thousand against UAH 10000.0 thousand provided by the National Program),significantly reduces possibilities of rational use of scientific potential for solving the issues onminimization the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and therefore leads to administrativedecision making and execution of their work without sufficient scientific evidences.

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8. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHERNOBYL.
SAFETY OF THE FUTURE
8.1. Lessons learned from Chernobyl with a view to nuclear power safety
The accident has stricken huge impact to nuclear power throughout the world and slowed down
its development for many years. Responsibility for the national nuclear power safety grows into the
responsibility to the world community. And it refers not only to designers of a nuclear facility and its
operators , but also to national regulatory authorities and the highest state authorities.
The Chernobyl accident has given another lesson: a necessity to maintain efficient international
nuclear safety system. This lesson has been learned by the world community rather quickly, as
confirmed by the IAEA activities, adoption of a series of important international conventions, and theconvention on nuclear safety first of all.
The most important lesson is a necessity of independent state and public control over nuclear safety.
Only society has the right to decide about nuclear power development, and it must be clearly formalized inlegislation. However, public should be accordingly prepared to make such a responsible decision. The publicshould know what is an NPP, what are its potential hazards, what has been done for the hazards to become
as small as possible . A routine, systematic interface with public shall be ensured.
Availability of an independent and competent state regulatory body is an indicator of a country’s
nuclear safety culture. Absence of such a body or financial resources and manpower required for
implementation of its functions, lack of actual independence during safety-important decision-making
indicates lack of nuclear safety culture in a state and infringement of the international safety system.
Equally important lesson of the Chernobyl accident is an obligatory existence of a professionallystrong operator able to address problems dealing with nuclear engineering and possessing the potential
to assess and manage safety of operating nuclear facilities.
Finally, one more lesson is a continuous NPP safety analysis, identification and elimination ofsafety deficiencies. The following components shall be referred to this end: investigation of the factors
impacting an NPP safety; continuous improvement of regulatory framework; creation of special, safetyoriented, psychological climate in operators’ community; continuous upgrades of personnel
qualifications and a sense of responsibility for a safe operation of nuclear power units.
Analysis of the events that took place on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl NPP is not a goal in itself
and it should not be focused on the past. The main thing is to digest the nuclear safety lesson today and in the
future, prevent the very possibility for reoccurrence of an accident involving serious radioecologicalconsequences. All those, who in one way or another are involved with nuclear safety assurance, whose
decisions may directly or indirectly affect nuclear safety, should understand why it was possible to operate
the facility that has not met safety requirements, why the known shortfalls that have resulted into theaccident producing catastrophic aftermath have not been eliminated for years. It should be realized.

8.2. Lessons learned from ɋhornobyl and response efficiency
State-of-the-art technologies provide an opportunity to establish comfortable living conditions forpeople, i.e. extensive use of electric power, development and introduction of new materials in various
branches of economy. However, they also impose additional risks attributed to using hazardous materials
and technologies. Nowadays, some states produce over 80% of electricity at NPPs, radioactive materials are300

widely used in medicine, industry, transport, war and other areas of human activities. Under the conditionsof normal operation of nuclear and isotope installations , their contribution to human exposure is less than
one tenth of a percent. However, the accident that happened at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP in 1986 shookup the entire world. About 3 million people were subject to additional exposure. The accident demonstrated
that if we wish to further use nuclear energy, we should make every possible effort to prevent nuclear
accidents and minimize their consequences. Our principal task is to protect people from high doses ofradiation in case of radiation and nuclear accidents by means of appropriate and efficient response system.
Studying the experience of emergency response during the Chernobyl accident provides a unique
opportunity to enhance efficiency of emergency management at all nuclear and other hazardous facilities.
The response efficiency 100% depends on establishment and efficient functioning of a national
emergency management system, high-grade planning of the activities to be performed by government
agencies and response staff, their ability to make every effort to protect people and eliminate accidents
and their consequences based on the beforehand developed plans. If a response system with clearly
defined decision-making levels is available, all potential accident scenarios are foreseen, qualified
experts are ready to respond, public is accordingly prepared and informed, then an impact of an
accident itself and its consequences on people shall be considerably minimized. The Chernobyl accident
is a unique example of the case when notwithstanding a heroic effort of accident liquidators, planning
shortages have resulted in such large-scale and long-term effects.
8.2.1. Assessment of planning and countermeasures
At the time of the Soviet Union, the Chernobyl NPP on-site and off-site emergency plans havebeen developed. However, implementation of the plans during the accident response revealed theirimperfection and formed a basis for emergency planning development throughout the world.
One of the main drawbacks in the plans was lack of provisions regarding accidents of such scale.
Nobody admitted that an accident involving complete damage of a reactor core may occur at RBMK
reactors. Since such a severe accident has not been provided for, corresponding consequences have notbeen planned also.
Consequently, the plant suffered from a lack of necessary dosimetry and radiometry equipment ensuring
real time assessment of radiation conditions. Thus, there was a delay in evaluating the accident scales and,correspondingly, in initiation of appropriate protective actions. In addition, due to underestimation of potential
accident scales, no protective equipment was available for fire fighters, who were suppressing the fire at Unit 4,
and for the plant personnel as well; and as a result 28 people perished from exposure. Absence of vehicles toensure appropriate radiation protection on the site led to additional exposure of personnel and emergency staff.
Due to an absence of protective confinement in this type of reactor, it was impossible to promptly establish
control over the wrecked reactor and ensure effective implementation of protective actions. Only erection of theShelter Object enabled restore the control over the accident source.
8.2.2. Assessment of the public protection measures
The major task of response is to protect people and the environment from hazardous impacts. In
ICRP Publication 63, the International Commission on Radiological Protection has established that
exposure dose in particular is an index of the hazard imposed by deterministic and stochastic effects ofradiation. The International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) >18@ were developed with due regard for the
ICRP Publication 63 recommendations on estimation of the threshold doses, which form a decisionmaking basis with regard to radiation protection of public. The intervention levels in Ukraine are
stipulated by the national legislation and differ from BSS >10, 13@.
According to Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Human Protection Against Ionizing Radiation
Impact’ – ‘The intervention conditioned by a necessity to protect human life and health shall be301performed in such a way as for the minimization of harm, which was caused by ionizing radiation
effects by way of exposure dose reduction, to be sufficient for justification of both intervention
relevance and intervention-caused losses.
Sheltering of people shall be applied in case during the first two post-accident weeks ananticipated cumulative effective exposure dose may possibly exceed 5 millisieverts. A short-term
evacuation of people shall be carried out in case during the first two post-accident weeks an effective
exposure dose may possibly achieve a level of 50 millisieverts.
In accordance with the regulations established by the Ministry of Health of Ukraine’, the iodine
prophylaxis shall be implemented in the case an anticipated absorbed thyroid gland exposure dose
caused by radioactive iodine accumulated in the thyroid gland may possibly exceed 50 milliGreys forchildren or 200 milliGreys for adults.
Intervention levels are established by the Law in the units that cannot be measured during an accident
by field instruments, but are to be estimated or determined in laboratory conditions. Hence, the intervention
levels stipulated by the Law cannot be used as a basis for making decisions on implementation of protective
actions during an early phase of accident. According to the international recommendations (TECDOC-955>19@), the operational intervention levels (OIL), which quantities are directly measured by field instruments(for instance, dose rate), shall be calculated prior to an accident. In case of an accident, the OILs shall be
used to make prompt decisions on the protective actions necessity. For instance, a dose rate value exceeding
1 mSv/hour indicates a necessity to evacuate public. OILs are an effective instrument of response, especiallyduring early phases of a release, when little is known about a nature of hazards, however a need to takedecisions is urgent. The OILs to be put into actual practice basing on BSS recommendations were calculated
in TECDOC-955 >19 restore the control@. They are based on various assumptions concerning characteristics
of an accident. These default OILs were developed to be applied during the first several hours or days after anuclear reactor accident. The OILs shall be revised once composition of a release and actual contaminationof the environment are known. In most cases, a need in the default OILs recalculation is related to changes inisotopic composition and distribution of radionuclides. TECDOC 955 includes OIL values for all types ofprotective actions and methods to adjust the values with due regard for subsequently obtained information
about actual contamination. Since intrusion levels in Ukraine differ from the ones stated in BSS, the levels
calculated in TECDOC-955 shall not be directly applied in Ukraine under the effective legislation. As aresult, currently Ukraine has no OILs required for urgent implementation of protective actions in case of a
nuclear accident.
8.2.3. Preparedness to implementation of iodine prophylaxis
An important feature of NPP or other nuclear radiation accidents is presence, alongside withother alpha-, beta-, and gamma-emitters, of radioactive iodine isotopes (iodine-131, iodine-132, iodine133, iodine-135) in a radionuclide release to the environment. These isotopes impose the most severeradiation danger during the first month after an accident. Iodine-131, the most long-lived among them,has a half-life of about 8 days. Radioactive iodine isotopes may penetrate into a body through digestivesystem, respiratory apparatus, injured or burnt surfaces.
During an initial period of an accident, the most dangerous is inhalation intake of radioactive
iodine isotopes by an organism, since they penetrate into blood quicker than in case of peroral intake; as
early as in the first days large quantities of the isotopes are accumulated by the thyroid gland. Selective
and rapid concentration of iodine radioisotopes in the thyroid gland stipulates its high exposure doses.
The radioactive iodine accumulation depends on age. For instance, in children, due to a small size andfunctional hyperactivity of the thyroid gland, absorbed doses are formed several times as high as inadults. In newborns and infants the absorbed doses per a unit of absorbed activity are 25 times as highas in adults. Inhalation of radioactive iodine is particularly dangerous for newborns due to the higher
respiratory rate and smaller mass of the thyroid gland.

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Radioactive iodine has the same chemical and biological properties as naturally occurring stableiodine contained in food and used in medicine. Therefore, there exists a simple easy-to-implement method of
public protection against the thyroid gland exposure to radioactive iodine. During taking a necessary dose of
stable iodine, for instance in a form of potassium iodide (KI) pills, the thyroid gland shall be saturated withiodine, and radioactive iodine absorption by the thyroid gland shall be blocked, thus preventing its irradiation(the so-called iodine blocking or iodine prophylaxis). Table 8.1 presents the stable iodine intake doses fordifferent age groups pursuant to 1999 recommendations of the World Health Organization >15@.
Table 8.1.
Stable iodine intake doses for different age groups
Age group

Iodine mass (mg)KI mass (mg)A part of 100 mg pill

Adults and teens (over 12 years)
Children (3-12 years)
Infants (between 1 month and 3 years)
Newborns (under 1 month)

100
50
25
12.5

130
65
32
16

1
½
¼
ǩ

The highest protective effect is achieved when stable iodine in form of a medicine is taken 36 hours prior to radioactive iodine intake.
The method preserves a great extent of its efficiency even in case of a delayed start: in 2 hours
the protection rate is 80%, in 8 hours it amounts to 40%; an in 24 hours it is approximately 7% >16@.
However, a delay in implementation of iodine prophylaxis exceeding 6 hours after radioactive fallout
shall significantly reduce its efficiency, and in a day its appropriateness seems doubtful at all.
Iodine prophylaxis shall be implemented to mitigate consequences of not only inhalation intakeof radioactive iodine, but also its penetration together with food, water, especially with milk and dairy
products, contaminated by radionuclides. Furthermore, a risk of such products and water intake may
hold true for several days (up to 2–3 weeks).
For the benefit of iodine prophylaxis efficiency, it is necessary that people potentially affected by anuclear accident shall be early informed about the method, provided with iodine medicines andrecommendations on their use >17@. The iodine medicines shall be renewed on a timely basis and be readily
available to a facility’s personnel and to the public, particularly children, wherever they are at the moment ofan announcement about a necessity to implement iodine prophylaxis. The essence of iodine prophylaxis andmechanism of its effects shall be explained to public in understandable and any-time-accessible manner: on
relevant Internet websites, in a form of brochures, posters, and in other forms obtainable by public.
Secrecy of emergency plans and non-availability of a decision-making system in the time ofChernobyl, particularly at local and regional levels, have resulted in a delay in implementation of iodine
prophylaxis and other protective actions. The actual iodine prophylaxis in Pripyat was started muchlater, in 8–10 hours after the first release (and in some population centres still later), and only directionof the wind during the first release has rescued the citizens from a significant exposure of the thyroid
gland. Iodine prophylaxis is the easiest, cheapest, though efficient measure of public protection; its
timely implementation has a tremendous psychological effect, an individual shall feel protected at thevery beginning of an emergency.
8.2.4. Assessment of the accident consequences modelling
In case of accidents involving a significant air release of radionuclides to the environment, thefirst phase of assessing potential consequences shall include modelling ensured by means of the
programs for radionuclide transport, dissemination, and fallout.
As a result of the Chernobyl accident, availability of a heavily contaminated area including about3000 km2 caused a necessity to evacuate people. However, it was clear only on 6 May 1986, when the303

first maps with dose rates isopleths were made available (average doses of gamma-radiation on open
ground were used for the zoning basing on external exposure; the doses were adjusted by 10 May 1986,
when a relatively full and reliable information on dose rates in the centres of population was obtained>20@). Tremendous resources of the Soviet Union were involved to develop the maps; aircrafts equippedwith high-sensitivity gamma spectrometers. Those large-scale activities would have been considerably
more efficient, if it were for the computer modelling with involvement of the radionuclide transport,
dissemination, and fallout modelling . However, effective modelling requires a considerable preparatory
effort ensuring timely information support with regard to characteristics of a release, detailed
meteorological data adjusted for local conditions, regional landscape characteristics >21@.
Unfortunately, no such modelling system is currently available in Ukraine.
8.2.5. Assessment of monitoring
The main goal of emergency monitoring is to ensure timely provision of the information, basingon which the first decision on the types of protective actions (based on accidents classification) shall be
confirmed or revised.
To this end, presence of radioactive fallouts, their localization and composition shall be determined.
Ensuring prompt monitoring shall be the most important for an efficient emergency response.
In case of a radiation accident, a decision on evacuation or resettlement of people shall be madebased on the exposure dose rate and environmental contamination monitoring data.
A monitoring system for the environment radiation contamination (sampling and measurement ofradioactivity in soil, water, vegetation, food samples) was actually not available; no required equipment,
certified sampling and measurement procedures, trained personnel were in place.
An aerial survey by means of aircrafts and helicopters shall be applied in case of a large-scale
accident; mobile laboratories shall be used to get more details on dose rates and radionuclide composition of
fallouts. Crucially important is that measurement procedures are tested in advance, have a metrological basis,
and are unified for the different laboratories planned to be involved in case of a severe accident. The controls
shall be calibrated and personnel shall have already received an appropriate training.
8.2.6. Population warning
Timely notification of public of a threat, situation resulting from accident , as well as informingof procedure and rules of conduct in case of an emergency are one of the major population protection
measures.
The warning process includes timely, in the shortest possible time, notification of control agencies,
administrative officials and response forces, as well as workers (personnel) of an operating shift andinhabitants of corresponding territory of set in advance signals, orders and information of executive bodies
and local public authorities regarding threats and rules of conduct under the circumstances.
It should be stressed that delayed use of a warning system considerably reduces efficiency ofprotective measures and may lead to unjustified victims and population losses similarly to the first dayof the Chernobyl tragedy of 1986.
The process of population warning is necessarily supported by arrangement of warning ofmanagement bodies and responsible designated persons who will take decisions on particular population
protection, emergency and rescue, and other urgent actions be taken within regions of emergency.
Heads of executive power of the corresponding level bear responsibility for warning arrangement
and exercise.
The unified state civil defence system of Ukraine first envisages warning of population at any natureof a threat, activation of an electrical siren, buzzer of which means only the signal of hazard ‘Attention all!’Having heard this sound (signal) people have to switch on any available verbal information receivers –304

wired-radio outlets, radio receivers and TV sets in order to get information massage on the nature and scopeof the threat, and recommendations on the most reasonable conduct in the existing situation.
Verbal information must be brief, clear, and instructive enough to make clear what happened andwhat should be done.
For warning targets to be met at each level of the unified state civil defence system, special
centralised warning systems (CWS) of the state, regional, local and facility level are established.
Regional, local and facility levels are the major ones.
Warning system of any level presents an administrative and technical formation of on-line andemergency departments of civil defence control agencies, special control and warning equipment,
communication channels (lines) ensuring transmittal of control commands and verbal information incase of en emergency. Decision of warning system activation shall be taken by head of a stateadministration, local public authority.
Regional centralised warning system is the major link within the entire warning system. This is
the level that serves as a basis for planning of centralised warning arrangement.
The task of a regional CWS is warning of administrative officials and population residing on the
territory covered by CWS of this level. Information communicated to control agencies andadministrative officials is an on-line one, and population gets information on the nature and scale of thethreat and actions considering the existing situation.
Local centralised warning system (town, rural region) ensures warning of administrative
officials of this level, as well as control agencies of the facility level, and also residing on the territory
covered by warning system of this level.
Local CWS is controlled directly by on-line and emergency department of the Ministry for
Emergencies in a town or via a communication centre shift employee on duty.
Arrangement of a rural region warning system is much more complicated as against a town
warning system. It is associated with a number of reasons: rural telephone networks are less advanced as compared to urban ones;
 rural region covers a vaster area than a town; a region has quite a number of populated localities;
 though insignificant, but a part of rural settlements do not telephone communication;
 telephone connections of rural settlements are arranged via one or two long distancecommunication channels;
 bulk of rural settlements do not have a three-phase power supply network that limits power
supply networks utilisation.
All the above referenced restricts utilisation of the existing control and warning equipment,
requires involvement of considerable financial and material resources. Accordingly, local CWS cover
only regional centres, and population of other rural settlements is mainly warned via radio andtelevision, rural telephone network, portable sound amplifiers of civil defence forces, internal affairs
departments and household rounds.
Facility warning systems are divided into local, arranged at high-hazard facilities (nuclear
power plants, chemical-dangerous facilities, hydraulic works, etc.), and warning systems arranged at
different facilities of economic activities that are not regarded as potentially hazardous.
Area of local warning system coverage (LWS) at a nuclear power plant is set within a radius of 5km
around it; a nearest settlements must be necessarily covered by it. Direct control of a LWS is arranged
starting from a shift supervisor, as a rule, power unit one shift supervisor. In the event of an accident,
consequences of which can go beyond its area, shift supervisor by himself or with an assistance of NPP
communication centre shift personnel on duty remotely activates warning means for administrative officials
and plant personnel, population of plant settlement and populated localities within the 5-km zone. Shiftsupervisor uses direct dial to warn corresponding MEU control agency via its duty officer.

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In view of importance of the issue of timely warning and notification of population of a danger
actualisation or threat of danger actualisation, executive bodies or local public authorities, MEU control
agencies at all levels shall take measures on warning system arrangement (upgrade) using modern
technical means ensuring the most complete warning of population, maintenance of the systems in theconstant-ready status. While the attention should be paid to the fact that equipment of the most of local
CWS has been in operation twenty-four-hours during 20–25 years, and some of it even more, and it isworn out and outdated, and requires urgent replacement by the state-of-the-art one.
8.2.7. Provision of information to public
Delayed and lacking objectivity informing of public of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP by state
control bodies created precondition for development of a social and psychological stress in the society.
In the course and after the Chernobyl accident, as well as any other emergency in the world, theprevailing human responses were fear, despair, depression, hopelessness, etc., their intensity increases
at absence of reliable information. This suggests the conclusion to be followed in future: informationmust be timely, clear, its completeness should not leave a room for ambiguous interpretations.
Consequently, civil defence information shall consist of data on emergencies that are forecasted
or have occurred, with their classification, propagation limits, means and methods of protection.
The unified state civil defence system control agencies shall via mass media provide public withon-line and reliable information regarding civil defence, in particular: of threat and occurrence of any
emergencies, and their activities in the mentioned area.
Heads of entities operating potentially hazardous facilities have an obligation to provide
information on such facilities.
Information should be provided as follows: publication in official printed sources or dissemination by information departments ofcorresponding state authorities and institutions; publication in printed mass media or public announcement via audio and audiovisual mass media;
Information must contain:
 data on the party providing the information, field of its activities;
 hazardous substances available at the facility, their hazardous properties; potential risk nature in case of accidents, including effect on public and environment;
 way of public notification in case of a threat of actualisation or occurrence of an accident, andrules of conduct to be followed;
 evidences of reporting to control agencies on compliance with safety requirements, proper
agreements concluded with response and rescue departments.
Heads of entities operating potentially hazardous facilities, in particular, radiation-hazardous
ones, shall list data that shall be provided to population of the surveillance area around such facility inthe event of a threat of occurrence or occurrence of an accident at it associated with hazardous
substances release, in particular, radioactive. A list of such data shall be approved by the speciallyauthorised central executive body for civil defence.

8.3. National emergency response system
8.3.1. Unified state civil defence system
At the present development stage of our country, a problem of ensuring and improving the levelof its public and area safety in case of emergency appears to be among the most important social,economic, and ecological issues.

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Civil defence is a state function aimed at protection of public, territories, natural environment,
and property from emergencies by way of emergency prevention and elimination as well as provision ofassistance to affected individuals.
Civil defence shall be ensured within the entire Ukraine’s territory in times of peace and during
special periods and shall be applied to its entire population, government authorities, other government
bodies, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, local government authorities
and enterprises, as well as other legal entities.
Civil defence of people and territories from emergencies acquires a priority in the activities of alladministrative agencies.
With the objective to ensure and improve safety in the society, maintain successful control overnatural hazards and man-caused, natural, and ecological disasters, a targeted national policy is requiredalong with establishment of its major implementation instrument, i.e. an emergency response system.
The national policy in the area of civil defence in Ukraine is governed by the corresponding
legislation.
The basic Laws of Ukraine that govern its national policy in the area of civil defence, ensure its
implementation in times of peace and war, stipulate legal relations and organizational principles for the
subjects of activities in the domain are as follows:‘On Civil Defence of Ukraine’ adopted in 1993;‘On Protection of Public and Territories against Man-Caused and Natural Emergencies’ adopted
in 2000;‘On Legal Principles of Civil Defence’ adopted in 2004;‘On Emergency and Rescue Services’ adopted in 1999;‘On Fire Safety’ adopted in 1993.
All these laws have been developed in the course of 15 years and at different times; due to theabsence of law subjects, to which the documents might be applied, some of them have lost theirapplicability, scopes of some documents envisage a common legal regulation subject, some containnumerous duplications and inconsistencies, and in some instances they do not correspond to theinternational humanitarian law standards.
To confirm incompleteness of the civil defence laws, the national legal system currently, de jure,envisages the following three national emergency response systems, namely:
civil defence system (established in 1993 pursuant to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Civil Defence in
Ukraine’);unified state system for prevention of and response to man-caused and natural emergencies(established in 2000 pursuant to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Protection of Public and Territories Against
Man-Caused and Natural Emergencies’);unified state system for civil defence of public and territories (established in 2004 pursuant to the
Law of Ukraine ‘On Legal Principles of Civil Defence’).
However, in practice, de facto, Ukraine has only one state system that is functioning to addresscivil defence issues, because the system has the same components, including government agencies, civil
defence staff, supporting means i.e. material and financial reserves for a case of emergency, monitoring
systems, training of experts, training of public to act in case of emergency.
Therefore, pursuant to the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine ‘On
Functioning Status of the Unified State System for Prevention of and Response to Man-Caused andNatural Emergencies’ dated 16 May 2008 and enacted by Decree of the President of Ukraine No.
590/2008 of 26 June 2008, the Civil Defence Code of Ukraine was determined to be developed as a
uniform systematized legislative instrument for the issues of civil defence.
As of 1 April 2011, the draft Civil Defence Code of Ukraine has been developed and is currently subject
to the procedure of agreement and further submission to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for a review.

307Currently, functioning of the unified state system for civil defence is formalized in the Law of
Ukraine ‘On Legal Principles of Civil Defence’. The Civil Defence Code of Ukraine envisages
improvement and development of the system, specifies its components, establishes objectives andfunctions of the components.
The unified state civil defence system has been developed and is functioning with the objective to
integrate the activities of central and local executive authorities, local government authorities,
enterprises, institutions and bodies, their subordinate staff in order to ensure civil defence in Ukraine.
The unified state civil defence system constitutes a complex of its administrative bodies, theirsubordinate civil defence staff, as well as enterprises, institutions, and organizations ensuring
implementation of functions related to civil defence, including but not limited to the following:enterprises maintaining the funds of financial, material, technical, and medical resources,
including reserves envisaged for emergencies;
subjects supporting the public urgent assistance system via a uniform phone number 112;
enterprises under the system of communication (including the special one), notification, andinformation support;
institutions and organizations that constitute the network of emergency monitoring andforecasting system;
educational and scientific institutions that conduct trainings on and ensure scientific support tocivil defence issues.
Organizational structure of the unified state civil defence system includes functional andterritorial subsystems of national, regional, local, and object levels operating on permanent basis.
The functional subsystems of the unified state civil defence system shall be established by thecentral executive authorities in corresponding public sectors.
The functional subsystem elements shall be established at local and object levels, particularly atenterprises, in institutions and organizations of corresponding public sectors.
An official of a government body or at an enterprise, who has established a subsystem, element,
shall be directly responsible for the management of the functional subsystem, element under the unifiedstate civil defence system.
The territorial subsystems of the unified state civil defence system shall be established by the Councilof Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and by local executive authorities in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, in oblasts (provinces), in the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, correspondingly
Elements of the unified state civil defence system’s territorial subsystem shall be established by alocal executive authority in the rayons (districts) of the Crimea Autonomous Republic, oblasts(provinces), the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; and executive authorities of city councils shall establish
them in oblast centres, in the cities of oblast and rayon levels.
An official directing the body, which has established a subsystem or element, shall be directly
responsible for the management of the territorial subsystem or element under the unified state civil
defence system.
The Council of Ministers of Crimea Autonomous Republic shall be directly responsible for the
management of the Crimea Autonomous Republic territorial subsystem under the unified state civil
defence system.
Depending on scale and characteristics of a forecasted or existing emergency, the unified state
civil defence system shall operate in the following modes: routine operation, high alert, emergency
situation, emergency status, special period.
8.3.2. Functional subsystem ‘Safety of Nuclear Facilities’
Pursuant to the civil defence legislation and basing on Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine ‘On the Unified State System for Prevention of and Response to Nuclear and Natural308

Emergencies’ No. 1198 dated 3 August 1998, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee (according to
Decree No. 1085 issued by the President of Ukraine on 09 December 2010, the State Nuclear
Regulatory Committee of Ukraine was renamed into the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate ofUkraine) has established the functional subsystem ‘Safety of Nuclear Facilities’ and is currently
maintaining its activities under the unified state civil defence system.
The functional subsystem ‘Safety of Nuclear Facilities’ is operating at national, regional, andobject levels.
Object-level activities of the subsystem are ensured by the State Nuclear Safety Inspections at
nuclear power plants, and its operations of regional level are maintained by the Regional State Nuclear
and Radiation Safety Inspections.
The Information and Crisis Centre (hereinafter referred to as ICC) under the State Nuclear
Regulatory Inspectorate is a key element of the subsystem at the national level. The most highly
experienced experts of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate and its subordinate organizations are
involved into ICC operations.
During 2010, the ICC was functioning exclusively in routine operation mode, thus ensuring a 24hour duty, operational communications with the nuclear power plants of Ukraine, analysis andrecording of information on the events at the nuclear power plants of Ukraine into a computercontrolled database. Summary information on Ukraine’s power units status, messages about failures in
Ukraine’s nuclear power plants operation are placed on the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate’s
web-site at www.snrcu.gov.ua.
The following are the ICC basic systems:
reliable power supply system;
telephone conversations recording system;
system of personnel automatic notification;system for on-line transmission and display of nuclear power plants’ data via the main crisis
centre of the State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company ‘Energoatom’ (hereinafterreferred to as SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’).
8.3.3. Crisis centres of SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’
The emergency preparedness and response system of SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ is an integral
part of the functional subsystem under the USS for emergencies entitled ‘Nuclear Engineering and Fueland Energy Complex’ and subordinate to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine (according to
Decree No. 1085 issued by the President of Ukraine on 09 December 2010, the Ministry of Fuel andEnergy of Ukraine was reorganized into the Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining Industry of Ukraine).
The abovementioned system has been established and is currently operating basing on the principles
stipulated by the legislation of Ukraine that covers the issues of nuclear energy uses and radiation
safety, as well as civil defence issues.
The functional subsystem includes the following technical constituents: main and backup crisis
centres of the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’; the nuclear power plant assistance centre under theEmergency and Technical Centre, being a SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ separated subdivision and locatedin the village of Bilohorodka in Kyiv Oblast.
The SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ main crisis centre is located in the building of SE NNEGC‘Energoatom’ Directorate in Kyiv; the backup crisis centre was established and is currently operating as apart of the separated subdivision ‘Atomremontservice’ in the village of Dniprovske in Chernihiv Oblast.
Apart from the abovementioned backup and main crisis centres of the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’,the effective regulations envisage establishment of on-site (on an NPP site) and off-site (within asurveillance area) crisis centres at each nuclear power plant.

309

A nuclear power plant on-site crisis centre shall ensure the functions of a control centre for
localization of an accident and elimination of its consequences on an NPP site and within a sanitarycontrol area. A nuclear power plant off-site crisis centre is envisaged to be used in case of accidents,
when operation of a corresponding on-site crisis centre is impossible.
In case of a nuclear power plant accident, whenever necessary, the entire network of the SE
NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ crisis centres shall be involved into the activities, including crisis centres atother nuclear power plants that shall operate in a routine mode, at the level of engineering and technicalsupport groups.
With the objective to ensure a reliable video communication in case of emergency, a satellite
communication system is installed at the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’. The system covers the main andbackup crisis centres of SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’, the nuclear power plant assistance centre under thesubdivision ‘Emergency and Technical Centre’, on-site and off-site crisis centres of the following
separated subdivisions: ‘Rivne NPP’, ‘Zaporizhzhia NPP’, ‘Khmelnytskyi NPP’, and ‘South Ukrainian
NPP’. The data transmission system ensures display of required information to describe an emergency
situation on the crisis centres’ monitors.
In case of emergency at a nuclear power plant, staff and facilities of the separated subdivisions‘Emergency and Technical Centre’ and ‘Atomremontservice’ shall be detached and directed to an
emergency object, where they shall be under operational control of an on-site emergency manager, who
controls activities for elimination of a nuclear power plant accident and its consequences. Using, whenevernecessary, robots and other unique equipment, the emergency personnel of the separated subdivisions‘Emergency and Technical Centre’ and ‘Atomremontservice’ shall assist personnel of an emergency facility
to perform radiation and engineering survey; collection and localization of radioactive waste;decontamination; repairs of equipment in reactor, turbine, and electrical shops at a nuclear power plant, etc.
8.3.4. System of emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents
The central task of the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ emergency preparedness and response system(hereinafter referred to as ERS) is further full-scale development, improvement, and implementation thesystem itself; its emergency, technical, and repairs subdivisions; emergency and technical subdivisions
at the operating NPPs with the objective to form a complementary complex of technical means andresources; organizational, technical, radiation, and sanitary measures oriented towards attainment of theemergency response aim, i.e. prevention or mitigation of radiation effects for personnel, public, andnatural environment in case of an NPP accident or an accident-caused emergency.
The top-priority and long-range objectives of ERS functioning and development include
improvement of actual preparedness in terms of emergency response to any nuclear or radiation
emergency in accordance with the IAEA requirements (ʋGS-R-2).
The following are the basic top-priority tasks of the above direction:
standardization and unification of organizational and technical decisions during operation of onsite and off-site crisis centres at NPPs, main and backup crisis centres of the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’
directorate;
maintaining operational condition and improvement of the systems for collection, processing,
documenting, storage, display, and transmission of data from NPP power units monitoring and control
systems, notification and communication systems;
development and improvement of the legal and regulatory environment covering emergency
preparedness and response; establishment and maintaining relevancy of the library stock including
regulatory, organizational, and administrative documentation concerning emergency preparedness andresponse, as well as of the reserve stock including design, engineering, process, production, andtechnical documentation of NPPs, to the extent required to ensure comprehensive support to counteremergency activities and liquidation works;

310

adjustment of some discrepancies between the legislation in the area of civil defence and the one
in the area of nuclear energy uses and radiation safety;
technical upgrades and modernisation of emergency response facilities, equipment, and means;renewal and augmentation of stocks of backup materials and emergency kits for prevention andelimination of man-caused and natural emergencies;
establishment of a focus group rendering expert support to decision-making in case of
emergencies and ensuring its instant functioning, including software development and optimization ofmanagerial decisions and solutions concerning the activities for personnel and public protection in caseof an NPP radiation accident;
methodological, material, and technical improvement of the system and process for emergency
personnel training and counter-emergency drills at various levels.
The midrange and long-range tasks are:establishment of a unified information and analytical system for emergency preparedness andresponse of a nuclear facilities operator, its emergency and technical subdivisions and operating NPPs,
integration of the system into a single information and analytical space of the governmental regulatory
authorities for nuclear and radiation safety, state administration agencies for nuclear energy uses andcivil defence, as well as nuclear design organizations and institutions ensuing their scientific andtechnical support, other nuclear operators, etc.;
addressing issues of social protection of and extra motivation for emergency personnel;
further capacity building of staff and facilities ensuring emergency response, supply of
emergency response means with state-of-the-art materials and equipment and provision of cutting edge
hardware and software;
adaptation of the emergency preparedness plans and tasks to the conditions of nuclear and industrial
branch corporatisation and energy-saving efforts within the fuel and energy complex of Ukraine;
involvement and implementation of investment programs into the initiatives for further
development of emergency preparedness and response system at different levels.
With the objective to implement the abovementioned and other tasks on a step-by-step basis, theSE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’ has adopted ‘Development Program for the SE NNEGC ‘Energoatom’
Emergency Preparedness and Response System for the Period till 2015’, PM-D.0.03.396-10.
Implementation of the Program under an appropriate financing pattern shall ensure support and further
development of the currently existing high (as per assessments made by international experts of various
levels) level of preparedness to emergency activities in case of a radiation emergency.
8.3.5. Emergency planning
Appropriate emergency response plans shall be developed to ensure an organized performance ofactions ensuring response to a radiation accident.
The Radiation Accidents Response Plan has been developed at the national level. It was approvedby the joint decree of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Ministry for
Emergencies and Affairs in Protection of Population from the Consequences of the Chernobyl DisasterNo. 87/211, dated 17 May 2004 and registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 10 June 2004
under reference No. 720/9319.
The Radiation Accident Response Plan was reviewed in March 2010. The Plan review wasaccomplished by a working group that included experts of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee,
Ministry for Emergencies, Ministry of Fuel and Energy, Ministry of Health, and Ministry for Ecology
and Natural Resources. The working group was established to implement resolution No. 11 issued by
the Board of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee on 20 March 2008 and entitled ‘On
Implementation of IAEA Recommendations Regarding Emergency Preparedness and Response with
Due Consideration of the Experience in Conduction of Emergency Trainings’.

311

Amendments to the Plan were approved by administrative order ‘On Approval of Amendments to
the Radiation Accident Response Plan’ No.24/126 issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee
and Ministry for Emergencies on 02 March 2010 and registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
25 March 2010 under reference No. 250/17545.
The Radiation Accident Response Plan (hereinafter referred to as Plan) was developed to ensure
a coordinated immediate response of administrative agencies, staff and resources of functional andterritorial subsystems of the unified state civil defence system in case of a radiation accident(hereinafter referred to as RA) or a threat of it.
The Plan was developed with due regard to the requirements stated in the Laws of Ukraine ‘On
Nuclear Energy Uses and Radiation Safety’, ‘On Protection of Public and Territories During Mancaused and Natural Emergencies’, ‘On Legal Principles of Civil Defence’, ‘On Protection of People
from ionizing Radiation Effects’, the National Emergency Response Plan approved by resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1567 dated 16 November 2001, as it refers to RA, as well as
pursuant to recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The following were the Plan development objectives:
legal regulation of the actions implemented by functional and territorial subsystems of the unified
civil defence system with due regard to a specific character of emergency planning and RA response;
harmonisation of legal and regulatory environment in the area of emergency response that is in effectin Ukraine and the effective legal and regulatory environment in the countries of the European Union.
The RA response Plan establishes the following:
categories of radiation hazard for the facilities and activities that may produce a RA;
breakdown for the classes of radiation accidents and other hazardous events, including but notlimited to: municipal accident, site-level accident, industrial accident, emergency preparedness, loss ofcontrol over a source;
allocation of RA response responsibilities among an enterprise, central and local executive
authorities;
procedure of emergency response including but not limited to: implementation of plans,organization of crisis centres’ activities, etc.
financial provision of the activities envisaged in the Plan;
organization and conduction of emergency training.
With the objective to ensure timely response to RA and undertake effective measures forprotection of public and territories, the following RA response plans shall be developed in addition to
the Plan:emergency plans of the facilities, where practical activities related to radiation or radiationnuclear technologies are performed;
response plans of the territorial subsystems’ links under the unified civil defence system, locallevel ones;
response plans of the territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence system, regional-level ones;
response plans of the functional subsystems under the unified civil defence system.
Emergency response plans for the facilities, which may occur within radioactive contamination
zones, shall envisage, as a separate section, relevant RA response activities.
Top managers of the enterprises acting as operators of the facilities performing practical activities
related to radiation or radiation-nuclear technologies shall be responsible for the development, approval,
and implementation of measures envisaged in the response plans.
Top managers of the enterprises ensuring transport of radioactive materials shall be responsible
for the development, approval, and implementation of action plans for eliminating consequences of theaccidents that may occur during transportation of radioactive materials, pursuant to Provisions forPlanning Measures and Actions in Case of Accidents during Radioactive Materials Transportation,

312approved by Order of State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine on 07 April 2005 No.38, andregistered in the Ministry of Justice on 22 April 2005 under reference No. 431/10711.
Emergency plans that are developed at the facilities, where practical activities related to radiation
or radiation-nuclear technologies are performed, shall identify a facility’s radiation hazard category.
The radiation hazard category shall be identified based on a facility’s radiation safety analysis with due
regard to an estimated classification of objects and types of activity by radiation hazard categories.
Emergency plans for the facilities of radiation hazard category I shall be developed based on the
Typical Emergency Plan for Ukrainian NPPs; the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine shall be
responsible for its development and agreement with other involved Ministries.
Requirements to RA response plans for the territorial subsystems of local and regional levels
under the unified civil defence system shall be developed by the ME with the participation of the MH
and Ministry for Ecology and Natural Resources, in accordance with a radiation hazard category of the
facilities and types of activities that may possibly affect a subsystems’ territory in case of RA.
Response plans for the territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence system, which area
entirely or partially refers to an observation zone of the facilities pertaining to radiation hazard category
I-II (but not less than a thirty-kilometre zone for an NPP with a capacity up to 4 GW, a fifty-kilometrezone for an NPP with a capacity exceeding 4 GW) shall be developed as separate documents.
Response plans for the territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence system, within whichareas the facilities of radiation hazard category III are located or the activities of radiation hazard
categories IV-V are performed, may be included as separate sections into the response plans developed
for the emergencies most probable to occur within a territory and are developed to fulfil resolution of
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 16 November 2001 No. 1567 ‘On Approval of the National
Emergency Response Plan’.
Response plans for the territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence system, which area
entirely or partially refers to an observation zone of the facilities pertaining to radiation hazard category
I-II, shall be developed based on source information provided by the enterprises, which operate thefacilities pertaining to radiation hazard category I-II, and shall be agreed by top managers of theenterprises.
Response plans for the territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence system, which area
entirely or partially refers to an observation zone of the facilities pertaining to radiation hazard category
I, shall be developed based on the Model RA Response Plan for territorial subsystems under the unified
civil defence system, approved by the ME order, and agreed with the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, MH,
and Ministry for Ecology and Natural Resources.
All response plans for the territorial subsystems shall be mutually consistent.
Response plans of the functional and territorial subsystems under the unified civil defence systemshall establish the following:procedure for information exchange with other RA responders;
recommendations on form and content of press releases to be prepared to inform public andmedia, depending on an existing or forecasted situation at various stages of an RA development.
Conclusion
Modern society cannot abandon using nuclear energy. However, people should always remember
the Chernobyl disaster, keeping in mind the necessity to take due responsibility when using hazardous
technologies. It is the sum and substance of safety culture. Nuclear energy should not be used without
scientific and engineering support, competent experts training system, multilevel decision-making andresponsibility system.

313

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Chapter 1
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21.

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ɡɚɦɿɧɢ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɢ ɩɿɥɶɝ ɧɚ ɚɞɪɟɫɧɭ ɝɪɨɲɨɜɭ ɞɨɩɨɦɨɝɭ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɸ».
ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɩɪɨ ɫɬɚɧ ɬɟɯɧɨɝɟɧɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɭ 2004 ɪɨɰɿ.
ɉɟɪɟɥɿɤ ɧɚɣɜɚɠɥɢɜɿɲɢɯ ɪɿɲɟɧɶ ɍɪɹɞɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɊɋɊ ɩɨ ɭɫɭɧɟɧɧɸ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɧɚɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɿɣ Ⱥȿɋ ɡɚ 1986–1990 ɪɪ. Ʉ.: Ȼ. ɿ., 1990.
ɇɨɪɦɵ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ ɇɊȻ-76/87 ɢ Ɉɫɧɨɜɧɵɟ ɫɚɧɢɬɚɪɧɵɟ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɚ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ Ɉɋɉ72/87. Ɇ.: ɗɧɟɪɝɨɚɬɨɦɢɡɞɚɬ, 1988.
Ƚɭɫɶɤɨɜɚ Ⱥ. Ʉ., Ʉɢɪɸɲɤɢɧ ȼ. ɂ., Ʉɨɫɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. Ɇ. ɢ ɞɪ. Ɋɭɤɨɜɨɞɫɬɜɨ ɩɨ ɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢ
ɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɫɥɭɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɥɢɰ, ɩɨɞɜɟɪɝɲɢɯɫɹ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɸ ɢɨɧɢɡɢɪɭɸɳɟɝɨ ɢɡɥɭɱɟɧɢɹ / ɉɨɞɪɟɞ. Ʌ. Ⱥ. ɂɥɶɢɧɚ.– Ɇ.: ɗɧɟɪɝɨɚɬɨɦɢɡɞɚɬ,1985.
ɋɛɨɪɧɢɤ ɧɨɪɦɚɬɢɜɧɵɯ ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɨɜ ɩɨ ɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɫɤɨɣ ɩɨɦɨɳɢ ɩɪɢ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɵɯ
ɚɜɚɪɢɹɯ. Ɇ.: Ɇɢɧɡɞɪɚɜ ɋɋɋɊ, ɭɱ. ɦɟɬɨɞ. ɤɚɛ.– 1986.
Ɇɚɤɨɜɫɶɤɚ ɇ. ȼ., ɉɚɪɮɟɧɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. Ⱦ., ɒɚɬɚɥɿɧɚ ȯ. ɉ. ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɚ ɬɪɚɝɟɞɿɹ. Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɢ ɿɦɚɬɟɪɿɚɥɢ /ɍɩɨɪɹɞɧɢɤɢ.: ɇ. ɉ. Ȼɚɪɚɧɨɜɫɶɤɚ (ɝɨɥɨɜ. ɭɩɨɪɹɞ.).– Ʉ.: ɇɚɭɤ. ɞɭɦɤɚ, 1996.
Ɉ ɟɞɢɧɨɣ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɟ ɩɨ ɥɢɤɜɢɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ ɢ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɢɢ,ɫɜɹɡɚɧɧɨɣ ɫ ɷɬɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɟɣ / ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨɝɨ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ ɋɋɋɊ ɨɬ 25.04.90 ɝ.– ɂɡɜɟɫɬɢɹ.– 1990.
Ɉ ɧɟɨɬɥɨɠɧɵɯ ɦɟɪɚɯ ɩɨ ɡɚɳɢɬɟ ɝɪɚɠɞɚɧ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɨɬ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ /ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨɝɨ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ ɍɋɋɊ ɨɬ 01.08.90 ɝ.– ɉɪɚɜɞɚ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ.– 1990.– 7 ɚɜɝɭɫɬɚ.
Ɋɚɫɫɟɥɟɧɢɟ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ, ɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɟ ɪɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɡɚɧɹɬɨɫɬɢ ɬɪɭɞɨɜɵɯ ɪɟɫɭɪɫɨɜ ɢ ɷɮɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɟ
ɩɨɬɟɧɰɢɚɥɚ
Ɂɨɧɵɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ
ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ
ɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ
ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɫɤɨɣ ɋɋɊ: ɇɚɭɱɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ / Ɉɬɜ. ɪɟɞ. ɋ. ɂ. Ⱦɨɪɨɝɭɧɰɨɜ. – Ʉ.:ɋɈɉɋ ɍɋɋɊ Ⱥɇ ɍɋɋɊ, 1991.
ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɊɋɊ. 1991.– ʋ 9.
ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɊɋɊ. 1991.– ʋ 16.
əɰɟɧɤɨ ȼ. Ɇ., Ȼɨɪɢɫɸɤ Ɇ. Ɇ., Ɉɦɟɥɶɹɧɟɰɶ ɋ. Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨɜɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɿɩɪɨɬɢɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɯɢɫɬɭ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ʀɯ ɡɚɤɨɧɨɞɚɜɱɟ ɡɚɛɟɡɩɟɱɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ / ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ–96.
«ɂɬɨɝɢ: 10 ɥɟɬ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɩɨ ɥɢɤɜɢɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑȺɗɋ // ɋɛ. ɬɟɡ. ɩɹɬɨɣ Ɇɟɠɞ.
ɧɚɭɱɧ.-ɬɟɯɧ. ɤɨɧɮ. 1996. Ɂɟɥɟɧɵɣ Ɇɵɫ.
ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.– 1997.– ʋ 36.
ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.– 2000.– ʋ 13.
ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.– 1996.– ʋ 35.
ɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɫɶɤɿ ɫɥɭɯɚɧɧɹ 08.04.2009, ɫɚɣɬ ȼɊɍ http://www.rada.gov.ua/zakon/new/par_sl/
sl0804109.htm
Ɉɫɧɨɜɧɵɟ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɧɵɟ ɪɟɲɟɧɢɹ, ɩɪɢɧɹɬɵɟ ɩɪɢ ɥɢɤɜɢɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ. Ɉɬɱɟɬ ȼɫɟɫɨɸɡɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɧɨɝɨ ɢ ɧɚɭɱɧɨ-ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɬɟɥɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɢɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɚ
ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɢ «ȼɇɂɉɂɗɌ». – ɂɧɜ. ʋ 34713. – Ʌɟɧɢɧɝɪɚɞ, 1986. –106 ɫ.

Chapter 2
1.
2.
3.
4.

20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. ɉɨɝɥɹɞ ɭ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ // ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. –Ʉ.: Ⱥɬɚɤɚ, 2006. – 224 ɫ.
Ⱥɬɥɚɫ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ ȿɜɪɨɩɵ ɰɟɡɢɟɦ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ // ɇɚɭɱɧ. ɪɭɤ. ɘ.Ⱥ.ɂɡɪɚɷɥɶ. –Ʌɸɤɫɟɦɛɭɪɝ: Ȼɸɪɨ ɩɨ ɨɮɢɰɢɚɥɶɧɵɦ ɢɡɞɚɧɢɹɦ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɣ Ʉɨɦɢɫɫɢɢ, 1996. – 108 ɫ.
Ⱥɬɥɚɫ «ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. Ɋɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɟ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ». – Ʉ.: Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2008. – 52 ɫ.
Kashparov V.A., Oughton D.H., Protsak V.P. etc. Kinetics of fuel particle weathering and 90Sr
mobility in the Chernobyl 30 km exclusion zone // Health Physics. – 1999. – v. 76. – Ɋ. 251 – 259.

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5.
6.
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11.
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Ⱦɟɪɠɚɜɧɿ ɝɿɝɿɽɧɿɱɧɿ ɧɨɪɦɚɬɢɜɢ "Ⱦɨɩɭɫɬɢɦɿ ɪɿɜɧɿ ɜɦɿɫɬɭ ɪɚɞɿɨɧɭɤɥɿɞɿɜ137Cs ɬɚ90Sr ɭ ɩɪɨɞɭɤɬɚɯ
ɯɚɪɱɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɩɢɬɧɿɣ ɜɨɞɿ", ɇɚɤɚɡ ɆɈɁ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 03.05.2006,ʋ256.
Ɏɨɧɨɜɨɟ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɟ ɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɨɣ ɫɪɟɞɵ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢ ɋɋɋɊ ɬɟɯɧɨɝɟɧɧɢɦɢ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɦɢ
ɩɪɨɞɭɤɬɚɦɢ. Ɉɬɱɟɬɵ ɂɗɆ. Ɉɛɧɢɧɫɤ, 1981-1985.
Ɋɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɟ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿʀ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ 2009 ɪɨɰɿ. ɓɨɪɿɱɧɢɤ. Ɂɜɿɬ. ɐɟɧɬɪɚɥɶɧɚ
ɝɟɨɮɿɡɢɱɧɚ ɨɛɫɟɪɜɚɬɨɪɿɹ.- Ʉɢʀɜ:2010, 102 ɫ.
Ƚɚɪɝɟɪ ȿ.Ʉ. ȼɬɨɪɢɱɧɵɣ ɩɨɞɴɟɦ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɚɷɪɨɡɨɥɹ ɜ ɩɪɢɡɟɦɧɨɦ ɫɥɨɟ ɚɬɦɨɫɮɟɪɵ. ɂɧ-ɬɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ Ⱥɗɋ.-ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶ:2008, 192ɫ.
Ɏɨɧɞɨɜɵɟ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵ Ƚɨɫɤɨɦɝɢɞɪɨɦɟɬɚ ɋɋɋɊ. Ɉɛɧɢɧɫɤ, 1986ȼɨɣɰɟɯɨɜɢɱ Ɉ.ȼ. / Ɋɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɟ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɜɨɞɧɢɯ ɫɢɫɬɟɦ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɧɚ ɑȺȿɋ. Ɉɝɥɹɞ
ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɿɜ ɜɢɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɡɚ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ 1986-2005 ɪɪ. // ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ 20 ɪɿɱɱɹ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ȿɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɢ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɧɚ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɿɣ Ⱥȿɋ. ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɿɧɬɟɪɿɧɮɨɪɦ. 2006 ɪ.
ȼɨɣɰɟɯɨɜɢɱ Ɉ.ȼ. ɍɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟ ɤɚɱɟɫɬɜɨɦ ɩɨɜɟɪɯɧɨɫɬɧɵɯ ɜɨɞ ɜ ɡɨɧɟ ɜɥɢɹɧɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ. Ʉ.: ȼɿɩɨɥ, 2001. – 136 ɫ.
Y. Onishi, O.Voitsekhovich, M. Zheleznyak. Chernobyl: What Have We Learned? The Successes andFailures to Mitigate Water Contamination over 20 Years. Springer , 2007. 360 p.
Ʉɚɧɢɜɟɰ ȼ.ȼ. Ⱥɧɚɥɢɡ ɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɯ ɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɢɣ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɣ ɨɛɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɢ ɜ Ⱦɧɟɩɪɨɜɫɤɨɣ
ɜɨɞɧɨɣ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɟ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ // ȼɿɫɧɢɤ ɚɝɪɚɪɧɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɢ. – 1996. – ʋ4. – ɋ.40-56.
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ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ ɩɨɜɟɪɯɧɨɫɬɧɵɯ ɢ ɩɨɞɡɟɦɧɵɯ ɜɨɞ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑȺɗɋ.//ȼɿɩɨɥ. 2001 – 147 ɫ.
Berkovsky V, Ratia G, Nasvit O. Internal doses to Ukrainian populations using Dnieper River water,
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ȼɨɣɰɟɯɨɜɢɱ Ɉ.ȼ., ɉɚɧɚɫɟɜɢɱ ɗ.Ʌ. ɉɪɨ ɞɨɡɨɜɭ ɢ ɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɨ-ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɭɸ ɰɟɥɟɫɨɨɛɪɚɡɧɨɫɬɶ
ɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɣ ɜɨɞɨɨɯɪɚɧɧɨɣ ɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢ ɜ ɡɨɧɟ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɑȺɗɋ // Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ
ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɹ ɡɨɧɵ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ. – ʋ12. – 1998. – ɋ.3-8.
ɋ.ȱ. Ʉɿɪɽɽɜ, Ⱦ.Ɉ. ȼɢɲɧɟɜɫɶɤɢɣ, Ȼɚɪ'ɽɪɧɿ ɮɭɧɤɰɿʀ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ / Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ
ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ'ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ) ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ʋ2 (32), 2008. ɋ. 5-16.
ɋ.ȱ. Ʉɿɪɽɽɜ, ɋ.Ɇ. Ɉɛɪɿɡɚɧ. ɒɟɜɱɟɧɤɨ Ɉ.Ʌ., Ȼɭɝɚɣ Ⱦ.Ɉ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ ɜɨɞɨɨɯɨɪɨɧɧɨʀ
ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɡɨɧɿ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ / Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ'ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ) ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ʋ1 (27), 2006. ɋ. 66-77.
Ʉɚɧɢɜɟɰ ȼ.ȼ., Ⱦɟɪɤɚɱ Ƚ.Ⱥ., Ʌɭɰɟɧɤɨ ɋ.ɂ. ɋɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ ɪɟɱɧɵɯ ɢɦɨɪɫɤɢɯ ɜɨɞ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɱɟɪɟɡ ɞɜɚ ɞɟɫɹɬɢɥɟɬɢɹ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ. ɋɛɨɪɧɢɤ ɧɚɭɱɧɵɯ
ɞɨɤɥɚɞɨɜ Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɣ ɤɨɧɮɟɪɟɧɰɢɢ RANEXA05 «Ɋɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɫɬɶ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɜɡɪɵɜɨɜɢ ɚɜɚɪɢɣ», Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, ɞɟɤɚɛɪɶ 2005.
ɒɟɫɬɨɩɚɥɨɜ ȼ.Ɇ., ɋ.ȱ. Ʉɿɪɽɽɜ, Ȼ.Ɉ. Ƚɨɞɭɧ, ɬɚ ɿɧɲ. Ɋɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɫɬɚɧ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɭ 2007 ɪɨɰɿ /Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ'ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ) ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ
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ɋ.ȱ. Ʉɿɪɽɽɜ, Ȼ.Ɉ. Ƚɨɞɭɧ, Ɍ.ȱ. ɇɿɤɿɬɿɧɚ. Ɍɚ ɿɧɲɿ. Ɋɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɫɬɚɧ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɜ 2009 ɪɨɰɿ /Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ'ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ) ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ
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ɜɵɜɨɞɚ ɜɨɞɨɺɦɚ-ɨɯɥɚɞɢɬɟɥɹ ɢɡ ɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɩɨɞɝɨɬɨɜɤɚ ɢɫɯɨɞɧɵɯ ɞɚɧɧɵɯ ɞɥɹ ɜɵɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɹ

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ɜɟɬɪɨɜɨɝɨ ɩɟɪɟɧɨɫɚ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɯ ɚɷɪɨɡɨɥɟɣ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɱɚɫɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ ɨɫɭɲɟɧɢɹ ɜɨɞɨɟɦɚ-ɨɯɥɚɞɢɬɟɥɹ
ɑȺɗɋ. Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɹ ɡɨɧɵ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɡɨɧɵ ɛɟɡɭɫɥɨɜɧɨɝɨ
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ɉɟɬɪɨɜ Ɇ.Ɏ., Ʉɿɪɽɽɜ ɋ.ȱ. ɉɪɢɪɨɞɧɟ ɡɚɪɨɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɥɨɠɚ ɜɨɞɨɣɦɢ-ɨɯɨɥɨɞɠɭɜɚɱɚ ɑȺȯɋ ɩɿɫɥɹ
ɩɨɧɢɠɟɧɧɹ ɣɨɝɨ ɪɿɜɧɹ / Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ
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ɪɚɫɱɟɬɵ ɜɨɞɨɟɦɚ-ɨɯɥɚɞɢɬɟɥɹ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ. Ȼɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɹ ɡɨɧɵɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɡɨɧɵ ɛɟɡɭɫɥɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ) ɨɬɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ ʋ1 (25), ɚɩɪɟɥɶ 2005. ɋ.42-58.
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Ƀɨɳɟɧɤɨ ȼ.ɂ., Ȼɨɧɞɚɪɶ ɘ.Ɉ. Ⱦɨɡɨɜɚɹ ɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɫɬɶ ɱɚɫɬɨɬɵ ɦɨɪɮɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɢɡɦɟɧɟɧɢɣ ɭɫɨɫɧɵ ɨɛɵɤɧɨɜɟɧɧɨɣ (Pinus sylvestris L) ɜ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɡɨɧɟ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ // Ɋɚɞɢɚɰ. ɛɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ.
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Ƀɨɳɟɧɤɨ ȼ.ɂ., Ʉɚɲɩɚɪɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ., Ʌɟɜɱɭɤ ɋ.ȿ., Ȼɨɧɞɚɪɶ ɘ.Ɉ., Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ ɇ.Ɇ., Ƀɨɳɟɧɤɨ Ɇ.ɂ.
ɗɮɮɟɤɬɵ ɯɪɨɧɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɥɭɱɟɧɢɹ ɫɨɫɧɵ ɨɛɵɤɧɨɜɟɧɧɨɣ (Pinus sylvestris L.) ɜ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ
ɡɨɧɟ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ // Ɋɚɞɢɚɰ. ɛɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ. Ɋɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ. 2010. Ɍ. 50. ʋ 6.
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Ƚɚɳɚɤ ɋ.ɉ., ȼɢɲɧɟɜɫɶɤɢɣ Ⱦ.Ɉ., Ɂɚɥɿɫɶɤɢɣ Ɉ.Ɉ. Ɏɚɭɧɚ ɯɪɟɛɟɬɧɢɯ ɬɜɚɪɢɧ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɡɨɧɢɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ (ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ) / Ɂɚ ɡɚɝ. ɪɟɞ. ɋ.ɉ. Ƚɚɳɚɤɚ. – ɋɥɚɜɭɬɢɱ: ȼɢɞ-ɜɨ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɰɟɧɬɪɭ ɡɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɹɞɟɪɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ, ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɿɜ ɬɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɟɤɨɥɨɝɿʀ, 2006. – 100 ɫ.
Ȼɚɥɚɲɨɜ Ʌ.ɋ. Ɋɨɥɶ ɪɨɫɥɢɧɧɨɝɨ ɩɨɤɪɢɜɭ ɜ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɚɯ ɚɜɬɨɪɟɚɛɿɥɿɬɚɰɿʀ // Ⱥɜɬɨɪɟɚɛɿɥɿɬɚɰɿɣɧɿ
ɩɪɨɰɟɫɢ ɜ ɟɤɨɫɢɫɬɟɦɚɯ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ / ɒɟɫɬɨɩɚɥɨɜ ȼ.Ɇ., Ɏɪɚɧɰɟɜɢɱ Ʌ.ȱ.,Ȼɚɥɚɲɨɜ Ʌ.ɋ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. / ɉɿɞ ɪɟɞ. ɘ.Ɉ. ȱɜɚɧɨɜɚ, ȼ.ȼ. Ⱦɨɥɿɧɚ. – Ʉɢʀɜ, 2001. – ɋ. 133-144.
Ɏɟɞɨɪɟɧɤɨ ɇ.Ɇ., Ʉɨɧɞɪɚɬɸɤ ɋ.ə., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ɉ.Ɉ. Ʌɢɲɚɣɧɢɤɢ ɬɚ ɥɿɯɟɧɨɮɿɥɶɧɿ ɝɪɢɛɢ ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪɫɶɤɨʀ
ɨɛɥɚɫɬɿ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ: ɉɉ «Ɋɭɬɚ», ȼɢɞ-ɜɨ «ȼɨɥɢɧɶ», 2006. – 148 ɫ.
ȼɿɪɱɟɧɤɨ ȼ.Ɇ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ɉ.Ɉ. Ɇɨɯɨɩɨɞɿɛɧɿ ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪɫɶɤɨʀ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɿ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ: ɉɉ «Ɋɭɬɚ», ȼɢɞ-ɜɨ«ȼɨɥɢɧɶ», 2009. – 216 ɫ.
Ȼɿɞɧɚ ɋ.Ɇ. Ⱦɟɦɭɬɚɰɿɣɧɿ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɢ ɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɿɣ ɡɨɧɿ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ʀɯ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɞɥɹɡɚɥɿɫɧɟɧɧɹ ɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɢɯ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɣ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ɤɚɧɞ. ɫɿɥɶɝɨɫɩ. ɧɚɭɤ: 06.03.03. –Ʉ., 2000. – 21 ɫ.
Ƚɭɞɤɨɜ Ⱦ.ȱ. Ɋɚɞɿɨɧɭɤɥɿɞɢ ɜ ɤɨɦɩɨɧɟɧɬɚɯ ɜɨɞɧɢɯ ɟɤɨɫɢɫɬɟɦ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
Ⱥȿɋ: ɪɨɡɩɨɞɿɥ, ɦɿɝɪɚɰɿɹ, ɞɨɡɨɜɿ ɧɚɜɚɧɬɚɠɟɧɧɹ, ɛɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɟɮɟɤɬɢ: Ⱦɢɫ… ɞɨɤɬɨɪɚ ɛɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɯ
ɧɚɭɤ: 03.00.01, ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬ ɝɿɞɪɨɛɿɨɥɨɝɿʀ. – Ʉ., 2006. – 34 ɫ.
Ɋɨɤɢɬɤɨ ɉ.ȼ. ɋɤɥɚɞ ɛɚɤɬɟɪɿɣ ɜ 10-ɤɦ ɡɨɧɿ ɑȺȿɋ ɿ ʀɯ ɫɬɿɣɤɿɫɬɶ ɞɨ ɝɚɦɚ-ɜɢɩɪɨɦɿɧɸɜɚɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɿɧɲɢɯ
ɫɬɪɟɫɨɜɢɯ ɮɚɤɬɨɪɿɜ: Ⱦɢɫ. ..ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬɚ ɛɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ: 03.00.07/ ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬ
ɦɿɤɭɪɨɛɿɨɥɨɝɿʀɿ ɜɿɪɭɫɨɥɨɝɿʀ ɿɦ.. Ⱦ.Ʉ. Ɂɚɛɨɥɨɬɧɨɝɨ. – Ʉ. -139 ɫ.
Ɋɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ ɜɨɞɧɵɯ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɨɜ ɡɨɧɵ ɜɥɢɹɧɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɹ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ // Ɇɨɧɢɬɨɪɢɧɝ
ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ ɩɪɢɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɜɨɞ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ. – Ʉ.: «ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɢɧɬɟɪɢɧɮɨɪɦ», 1997. –Ɍ. 1. – 308 ɫ.
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Ⱦɨɜɿɞɧɢɤ ɞɥɹ ɪɚɞɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɯ ɫɥɭɠɛ Ɇɿɧɫɿɥɶɝɨɫɩɩɪɨɞɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.: ɍɤɪɇȾȱɋȽɊ, 1997. – 176 ɫ.

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ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ ɡɚ 2001 – 2004 ɪ. ɉɿɞ ɪɟɞ.
Ʌɿɯɬɚɪɶɨɜɚ ȱ.Ⱥ. Ɂɛɿɪɧɢɤ 10. – Ʉ.: ɆɈɁ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2001. – 62 ɫ.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., Ⱥɥɟɤɫɚɯɢɧ Ɋ.Ɇ., Ȼɟɛɟɲɤɨ ȼ.Ƚ. ɢ ɞɪ. ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɚɹ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɚ: ɗɮɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɫɬɶɦɟɪ ɡɚɳɢɬɵ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ, ɨɩɵɬ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ // ɉɨɞ ɪɟɞ. ɚɤɚɞɟɦ. ɍȺȺɇɉɪɢɫɬɟɪɚ Ȼ.ɋ. – Ʉ.: ɐɌɂ «ɗɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɚ ɢ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɢɮɢɤɚɰɢɹ», 2007. – 100 ɫ.
ȼɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɫɿɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɜɢɪɨɛɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɹɯ, ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɢɯ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ, ɭ ɜɿɞɞɚɥɟɧɢɣ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ (Ɋɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ) // Ɂɚ ɡɚɝ. ɪɟɞ. ɚɤɚɞɟɦ. ɍȺȺɇɉɪɿɫɬɟɪɚ Ȼ.ɋ. – Ʉ.: Ⱥɬɿɤɚ, 2007. – 196 ɫ.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɩɨɜɟɞɟɧɢɹ ɪɚɞɢɨɧɭɤɥɢɞɨɜ ɜ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɟ ɩɨɱɜɚ –ɪɚɫɬɟɧɢɟ // ȼ ɤɧ. «Ⱥɞɚɩɬɚɰɢɹ ɚɝɪɨɷɤɨɫɮɟɪɵ ɤ ɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɦ ɬɟɯɧɨɝɟɧɟɡɚ». ɉɨ ɪɟɞ. ɱɥ. – ɤɨɪ. Ⱥɇ ɊɌɂɥɶɹɡɨɜɚ Ɋ.Ƚ. – Ʉɚɡɚɧɶ: Ⱥɇ ɊɌ, 2006. – ɋ. 78 – 125.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ. ɉɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ ɞɥɹ ɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɚ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ //ɂɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɐɉɗɊ. – Ʉ. – 1999. – ʋ 20. – 103 ɫ.
Ɏɟɞɨɪɨɜ ȿ.Ⱥ., ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., Ɋɨɦɚɧɨɜ Ƚ.ɇ. ɢ ɞɪ. Ɋɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɜɟɞɟɧɢɸ ɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɢ ɥɟɫɧɨɝɨ
ɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɚ ɩɪɢ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɦ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɢ ɜɧɟɲɧɟɣ ɫɪɟɞɵ // ɉɨɞ ɪɟɞ. ɞɟɣɫɬɜ. ɱɥ. ȼȺɋɏɇɂɅ
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ɂɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɟ ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɚ ɪɚɫɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɢɹ ɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɫɬɢ ɩɨɱɜɵ ɢ ɪɚɫɬɟɧɢɣ ɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɫɥɟɞɚ: Ɉɬɱɟɬ // Ɉɇɂɋ; ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., Ʉɨɪɱɟɦɤɢɧ ɘ.ɂ., Ɏɟɞɨɪɨɜ
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Ʉɚɲɩɚɪɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ., Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ ɇ.Ɇ., ɉɟɪɟɜɨɡɧɢɤɨɜ Ɉ.ɇ. ɗɮɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɫɬɶ ɤɨɧɬɪɦɟɪ ɜ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɵɯ
ɩɭɧɤɬɚɯ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑȺɗɋ //Ⱥɝɪɨɯɢɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɜɟɫɬɧɢɤ. – 2008. – ʋ2. – ɋ. 25 – 27.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., Ȼɢɡɨɥɶɞ Ƚ., Ⱦɟɜɢɥɶ – Ʉɚɜɟɥɢɧ ɀ.. ɋɩɨɫɨɛ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɨɣ ɨɰɟɧɤɢ ɫɜɨɣɫɬɜ ɩɨɱɜɵ ɞɥɹɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɧɚɤɨɩɥɟɧɢɹ ɪɚɞɢɨɧɭɤɥɢɞɨɜ ɪɚɫɬɟɧɢɹɦɢ // Ɋɚɞ. ɛɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ. Ɋɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ. –2003. – Ɍ. 43. – ʋ 6. – ɋ. 39 – 42.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., ȼɢɧɨɝɪɚɞɫɤɚɹ ȼ.Ⱦ. Ɇɨɞɟɥɶ ɞɥɹ ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɞɨɡɵ ɜɧɭɬɪɟɧɧɟɝɨ ɨɛɥɭɱɟɧɢɹ
ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ ɩɪɢ ɩɨɱɜɟɧɧɨɦ ɩɭɬɢ ɜɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɹ ɞɨɥɝɨɠɢɜɭɳɢɯ ɪɚɞɢɨɧɭɤɥɢɞɨɜ ɜ ɩɢɳɟɜɵɟ ɰɟɩɢ //ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɿɣ ɿ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ. – 2009. – ȼɢɩ. 11. – ɫ. 128 – 135.
ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., Ⱥɥɟɤɫɚɯɢɧ Ɋ.Ɇ. Ɋɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɚɹ ɡɚɳɢɬɚ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ – ɭɪɨɤɢ Ʉɵɲɬɵɦɫɤɨɣ ɢɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ // ȼ ɤɧ. «XXXVI ɪɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɱɬɟɧɢɹ ȼ.Ɇ. Ʉɥɟɱɤɨɜɫɤɨɝɨ». – Ɇ.,
2008. – ɋ. 47 – 75.
Prister B.S., Baryakhtar V.G., Perepelyatnikova L.V,. Vynogradskaja V.D., Rudenko V.A., Grytsyuk
N.R., Ivanova T.N. Experimental Substantiation and Parameterization of the Model Describing 137Cs
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Fesenko S.V., Alexakhin R.M., Balonov M.I. etc. An extended critical review of twenty years ofcountermeasures used in agriculture after the Chernobyl accident // Science of The Total Environment. –2007. – V. 383 (1). – P. 1 – 24.
Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɰɿɹ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɫɿɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɜɢɪɨɛɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɧɚ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɢɯ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɹɯ ɿ ʀɯɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɨʀ ɪɟɚɛɿɥɿɬɚɰɿʀ ɧɚ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ 2000 – 2010 ɪ. // ɉɿɞ ɪɟɞ. ɉɪɿɫɬɟɪɚ Ȼ.ɋ.– Ʉ.: ɋɜɿɬ, 2000. – 48 ɫ.
ɂɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɨɧɧɵɣ ɰɢɪɤɭɥɹɪ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ. Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɤɨɧɮɟɪɟɧɰɿɹ «Ⱦɟɫɹɬɢɥɟɬɢɟ ɩɨɫɥɟ
ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɹ: ɨɰɟɧɤɚ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ». – INFCIRC, 1996. – 26 ɫ.
Prister B.S., Aleksakhin R., Firsakova S. etc. Short and Long Term Environmental Assesment // Proc.
of the workshop on restorstion strategies for contaminated territories resulting from the Chernobyl
accident. – Brussels. – November, 2000. – EUR 18193 en. – P. 103 – 114.
Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɣ ɮɨɪɭɦ «ɇɚɳɚɞɤɢ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ: Ɇɟɞɢɱɧɿ, ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɬɚ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ – ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɿ
ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɢ». – ȼɿɞɟɧɶ, 5 6 ɜɟɪɟɫɧɹ 2005.
Ȼɸɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɤɪɢɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɧɚ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɢɯ ɪɚɞɿɨɧɭɤɥɿɞɚɦɢ
ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɹɯ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.: ɍɤɪɇȾȱɋȽɊ ɇɍȻɿɉ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2009. – 106 ɫ.
Ⱦɨɫɬɨɽɜɫɶɤɢɣ ɉ, Ƚɥɭɲɤɨ Ⱥ., Ȼɿɥɨɧɨɦ Ɇ. Ɋɨɥɶ ɜɟɬɟɪɢɧɚɪɧɨʀ ɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɢ ɍɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɥɿɤɜɿɞɚɰɿʀ
ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɧɚ ɑȺȿɋ // ȼɟɬɟɪɢɧɚɪɧɚ ɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɚ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. – 2001. – ʋ4. – ɋ. 8 – 10.

319

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ɉɪɢɫɬɟɪ Ȼ.ɋ., ɂɜɚɧɨɜ ɘ.Ⱥ., ɉɟɪɟɩɟɥɹɬɧɢɤɨɜɚ Ʌ.ȼ. ɢ ɞɪ. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɢɹ ɤɨɧɬɪɦɟɪ ɜɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɦ ɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɟ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥȿɋ // ȼɿɫɧɢɤ ɚɝɪɚɪɧɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɢ. –ɋɿɱɟɧɶ 1996. – ɋ. 74 – 81.
Prister B.S., Lazarev N.M., Romanov L.M. Radiobiological problems concerning grazing animals
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Ⱥɥɟɤɫɚɯɢɧ Ɋ.Ɇ. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɪɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɢ: ɗɜɨɥɸɰɢɹ ɢɞɟɣ. ɂɬɨɝɢ. – Ɇ., 2006.
Ɇɚɹɤɨɜ ȿ.Ⱥ., Ȼɭɞɚɪɤɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ., əɫɬɪɟɛɤɨɜ ɘ.Ⱥ. ɋɪɟɞɫɬɜɚ ɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɹ ɦɢɝɪɚɰɢɢ ɢɡɨɬɨɩɨɜ ɰɟɡɢɹ ɢɫɬɪɨɧɰɢɹ ɩɨɨ ɩɢɳɟɜɵɦ ɰɟɩɨɱɤɚɦ //Ɇɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɣ ɧɚɭɱɧɨ-ɩɪɚɤɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɰ
ɤɨɧɮɟɪɟɧɰɢɢ, ɩɨɫɜɹɳɟɧɧɨɣ 40-ɥɟɬɢɸ ȼɇɂɂȼȼɢɆ. – ɝ. ɉɨɤɪɨɜ, 1998.
Ɋɚɞɢɨɛɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ. Ɋɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɚɹ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶ ɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɯ ɠɢɜɨɬɧɵɯ. ɉɨɞ ɪɟɞɚɤɰɢɟɣ
ȼ.Ⱥ.Ȼɭɞɚɪɤɨɜɚ. – Ɇ.:Ʉɨɥɨɫ, 2008.
Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.ɉ. Ɋɚɞɿɨɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɹ ɥɿɫɿɜ ɉɨɥɿɫɫɹ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ: ȼɨɥɢɧɶ, 1998. – 128 ɫ.
Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.ɉ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ. Ɋɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ ɹɝɨɞɧɵɯ ɪɚɫɬɟɧɢɣ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ: ȼɨɥɵɧɶ, 2004. – 264 ɫ.
Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.ɉ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ., Ȼɭɡɭɧ ȼ.Ⱥ., Ʌɚɧɞɢɧ ȼ.ɉ., ɒɟɥɟɫɬ Ɂ.Ɇ. ɉɪɢɤɥɚɞɧɚɹ ɪɚɞɢɨɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ ɥɟɫɚ/ ɉɨɞ ɪɟɞ. ɞ. ɫ.-ɯ. ɧ., ɩɪɨɮ. ȼ.ɉ. Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜɚ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ: ɉɨɥɿɫɫɹ, 2007. – 680 ɫ.
Ʌɚɧɞɿɧ ȼ.ɉ. Ɉɫɨɛɥɢɜɨɫɬɿ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɥɿɫɿɜ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɉɨɥɿɫɫɹ. //Ʌɿɫɿɜɧɢɰɬɜɨ ɿɚɝɪɨɥɿɫɨɦɟɥɿɨɪɚɰɿɹ. – ȼɢɩ. 86. – Ʉɢʀɜ: «ɍɪɨɠɚɣ», 1993. – ɋ. 10-19.
Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.ɉ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ɉ.Ɉ., Ƚɟɬɶɦɚɧɱɭɤ Ⱥ.ȱ. Ɋɚɞɿɨɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɹ ɥɿɤɚɪɫɶɤɢɯ ɪɨɫɥɢɧ. – ɀɢɬɨɦɢɪ:ɉɨɥɿɫɫɹ, 2005. – 216 ɫ.
Ɋɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɜɟɞɟɧɢɸ ɥɟɫɧɨɝɨ ɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ / Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ
ȼ.ɉ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ., ɂɪɤɥɢɟɧɤɨ ɋ.ɉ. ɢ ɞɪ. / ɉɨɞ ɪɟɞ. ȼ.ɉ. Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜɚ. – Ʉɢɟɜ: Ⱥɝɪɚɪɧɚ ɧɚɭɤɚ, 1995. –62 ɫ.
Ɋɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ ɡ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɥɿɫɨɜɨɝɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ / Ʉɚɥɟɬɧɢɤ
Ɇ.Ɇ., Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.ɉ., ɋɚɜɭɳɢɤ Ɇ.ɉ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. – Ʉɢʀɜ, 1998. – 66 ɫ.
Ɋɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ ɡ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɥɿɫɨɜɨɝɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ / Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ
ȼ.ɉ., Ɉɪɥɨɜ Ɉ.Ɉ., Ʌɚɧɞɿɧ ȼ.ɉ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. / ɉɿɞ ɪɟɞ. ȼ.ɉ. Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜɚ. – Ʉɢʀɜ, 2008. – 82 ɫ.
Ʌɚɧɞɿɧ ȼ.ɉ. Ɋɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ ɧɚ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜɚɯ ɥɿɫɨɜɨɝɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ // Ⱦɨɫɜɿɞ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ
ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ (ɫɿɥɶɫɶɤɟ ɬɚ ɥɿɫɨɜɟ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɨ) / ɇɚɞɬɨɱɿɣ ɉ.ɉ.,Ɇɚɥɢɧɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ Ⱥ.ɋ., Ɇɨɠɚɪ Ⱥ.Ɉ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. / Ɂɚ ɪɟɞ. ɉ.ɉ. ɇɚɞɬɨɱɿɹ. – Ʉ.: ɋɜɿɬ, 2003. – ɋ. 197-204.
Ʉɚɲɩɚɪɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ., Ƀɨɳɟɧɤɨ ȼ.ɂ., Ȼɨɧɞɚɪɶ ɘ.Ɉ., Ɍɚɧɤɚɱ ɗ.ɋ. Ɋɚɞɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɨɛɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɚ ɜɍɤɪɚɢɧɟ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɢ ɨɩɬɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɹ ɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɢɹ ɤɨɧɬɪɦɟɪ ɧɚ ɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɦ
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ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɩɨ ɞɚɧɧɵɦ ɭɝɥɭɛɥɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɤɥɢɧɢɤɨ-ɷɩɢɞɟɦɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ
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11.
12.
13.

ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɩɟɪɲɢɣ). ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ ɫɢɧɞɪɨɦ: ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ
ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɢ. – Ʉ.: «ɋɨɰɿɭɦ», 1995. – 109 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɞɪɭɝɢɣ). ɋɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɚ ɞɢɧɚɦɿɤɚ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. –Ʉ.: ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 1995. – 161 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɬɪɟɬɿɣ). Ⱦɢɧɚɦɿɤɚ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ: ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ
ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. – Ʉ.: ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, ɐɋȿɉ, 1997. – 267 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɱɟɬɜɟɪɬɢɣ). Ⱦɢɧɚɦɿɤɚ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ: ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. – Ʉ.: ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, ɐɋȿɉ, 1998. –247 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɩ’ɹɬɢɣ). ɋɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɭɦɨɜ ɠɢɬɬɹ ɬɚɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɝɪɭɩ ɩɨɬɟɪɩɿɥɢɯ ɜɿɞ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ: ɩɨɪɿɜɧɹɥɶɧɢɣ ɚɧɚɥɿɡ ɬɚɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ. – Ʉ.: ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, ɐɋȿɉ, 1999. – 310 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɲɨɫɬɢɣ). ɋɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɭɦɨɜ ɠɢɬɬɹ ɬɚɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɝɪɭɩ ɩɨɬɟɪɩɿɥɢɯ ɜɿɞ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ: ɩɨɪɿɜɧɹɥɶɧɢɣ ɚɧɚɥɿɡ ɬɚɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ. – Ʉ.: ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, ɐɋȿɉ, 2000. – 338 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɫɶɨɦɢɣ). ɋɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-ɩɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɭɦɨɜ ɠɢɬɬɹ ɬɚɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɝɪɭɩ ɩɨɬɟɪɩɿɥɢɯ ɜɿɞ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ: ɩɨɪɿɜɧɹɥɶɧɢɣ ɚɧɚɥɿɡ ɬɚɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ. – Ʉ.: «ɋɬɢɥɨɫ», 2001. – 408 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɜɨɫɶɦɢɣ). Ɋɨɡɪɨɛɤɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɟɣ ɠɢɬɬɽɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɩɿɞɜɢɳɟɧɨɝɨ
ɪɢɡɢɤɭ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɧɚɞɡɜɢɱɚɣɧɢɯ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɣ ɬɚ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮ: ɡ ɭɪɚɯɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ ɞɨɫɜɿɞɭ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. – Ʉ.: ɐɋȿɉ ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 2002. – 152 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɞɟɜ’ɹɬɢɣ). Ɋɨɡɪɨɛɤɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɟɣ ɠɢɬɬɽɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ
ɩɿɞɜɢɳɟɧɨɝɨ ɪɢɡɢɤɭ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɧɚɞɡɜɢɱɚɣɧɢɯ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɣ ɬɚ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮ: ɡ ɭɪɚɯɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ ɞɨɫɜɿɞɭ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. – Ʉ.: ɐɋȿɉ ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 2003. – 255 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɞɟɫɹɬɢɣ). ɋɭɱɚɫɧɿ ɪɢɡɢɤɢ: ɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿʀ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ, ɲɥɹɯɢ
ɦɿɧɿɦɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ. – Ʉ.: ɐɋȿɉ ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 2004. – 312 ɫ.
ɉɨɫɬɱɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ: 20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɩɨ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɨɞɢɧɚɞɰɹɬɢɣ). – Ʉ.:ɐɋȿɉ ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 2005. – 232 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɞɜɚɧɚɞɰɹɬɢɣ). ɋɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɪɢɡɢɤɭ: ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɚ ɞɟɬɟɪɦɿɧɚɧɬɚ. –Ʉ.: ɐɋȿɉ ȱɋ ɇȺɇɍ, 2006. – 220 ɫ.
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɭɦ (ȼɢɩɭɫɤ ɬɪɢɧɚɞɰɹɬɢɣ). ɋɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɝɪɨɦɚɞ ɿ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɣ,ɩɨɫɬɪɚɠɞɚɥɢɯ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. – Ʉ.: ɉɐ «Ɏɨɥɿɚɧɬ», 2007. – 316 ɫ.

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ɉɚɡɭɯɢɧ ɗ.Ɇ. «Ʌɚɜɨɨɛɪɚɡɧɵɟ ɬɨɩɥɢɜɨɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɳɢɟ ɦɚɫɫɵ 4-ɝɨ ɛɥɨɤɚ ɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋɬɨɩɨɝɪɚɮɢɹ, ɮɢɡɢɤɨ-ɯɢɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɫɜɨɣɫɬɜɚ, ɫɰɟɧɚɪɢɣ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ» // Ɋɚɞɢɨɯɢɦɢɹ, ɬ. 36, ʋ 2,
1994, ɋ. 97 – 142.
Ʉɚɲɩɚɪɨɜ ȼ.Ɉ., Ʌɭɧɞɿɧ ɋ.Ɇ., Ɂɜɚɪɢɱ ɋ.ȱ. ɬɚ ɿɧ. ȼɢɤɢɞ ɬɚ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿʀ ɪɚɞɿɨɧɭɤɥɿɞɚɦɢɭ ɫɤɥɚɞɿ ɩɚɥɢɜɧɢɯ ɱɚɫɬɢɧɨɤ // Ȼɸɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ’ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ) ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ. – 2002. – N20. – ɫ. 22-32.
ɉɚɡɭɯɢɧ ɗ.Ɇ., Ʌɚɝɭɧɟɧɤɨ Ⱥ.ɋ., Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ., Ȼɢɥɶɤɨ ȼ.ȼ. Ɍɨɩɥɢɜɨ ɧɚ ɜɟɪɯɧɢɯ ɨɬɦɟɬɤɚɯ
ɪɚɡɪɭɲɟɧɧɨɝɨ 4-ɝɨ ɛɥɨɤɚ ɑȺɗɋ. ɍɬɨɱɧɟɧɢɟ ɫɰɟɧɚɪɢɹ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɩɨɥɢɯɪɨɦɧɨɣ ɤɟɪɚɦɢɤɢ //Ɋɚɞɢɨɯɢɦɢɹ. – Ɍ. 48, ʋ 6, 2006. – ɋ. 470 – 480.
ȼɵɫɨɬɫɤɢɣ ȿ.Ⱦ., Ʉɥɸɱɧɢɤɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ., Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ.Ⱥ. Ʌɨɤɚɥɢɡɚɰɢɹ ɹɞɟɪɧɨ-ɨɩɚɫɧɵɯ ɫɤɨɩɥɟɧɢɣ
ɬɨɩɥɢɜɨɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɳɢɯ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ // Ɍɚɦ ɠɟ. – 2007. – ȼɢɩ.7. – ɋ. 66—75.
ɉɚɡɭɯɢɧ ɗ.Ɇ., Ʌɚɝɭɧɟɧɤɨ Ⱥ.ɋ., Ⱦɨɜɵɞɶɤɨɜ ɋ.Ⱥ. ɇɨɜɵɟ ɤɨɥɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɟ ɨɰɟɧɤɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɬɨɩɥɢɜɚɜ ɩɨɦɟɳɟɧɢɢ 305/2 ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» // ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɿɣ ɿɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ. – 2010. – ȼɢɩ. 14. – ɋ. 85 – 94.
ȿ.Ⱦ. ȼɵɫɨɬɫɤɢɣ, Ⱥ.Ⱥ. Ʉɥɸɱɧɢɤɨɜ, ȼ.ɇ. ɓɟɪɛɢɧ, ȼ.Ȼ. ɒɨɫɬɚɤ ȼ.Ȼ. ɇɟɣɬɪɨɧɧɨ-ɮɢɡɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ
ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɢɫɬɢɤɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨ-ɨɩɚɫɧɵɯ ɫɤɨɩɥɟɧɢɣ ɬɨɩɥɢɜɨɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɳɢɯ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ // «ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ
ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɿɣ ɿ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ». – 2009. – ȼɢɩ. 12. – ɋ. 93 – 102.
Bechta S.V., Granovsky, Khabensky V.B., Gusarov V.V. et al. Corium Phase Equilibria based on
MASCA V.S., METCOR and CORPHAD Results // Nuclear Engineering and Design. – 2008. – 238. –P. 2761-2771.
Ɂɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɟ ɷɤɫɩɟɪɬɧɨɣ ɤɨɦɢɫɫɢɢ ɨ ɩɪɢɱɢɧɚɯ ɚɧɨɦɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɫɨɛɵɬɢɹ ɜ ɩɨɦɟɳɟɧɢɢ 304/3 ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ
"ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ" ɜ ɢɸɧɟ 1991 ɝ. / ɂȻɊȺɗ ɊȺɇ, Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, 1992. – 67 ɫ.
ȼɵɫɨɬɫɤɢɣ ȿ.Ⱦ., Ʉɥɸɱɧɢɤɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ., ɓɟɪɛɢɧ ȼ.ɇ., ɒɨɫɬɚɤ ȼ.Ȼ. ɇɟɣɬɪɨɧɧɨ-ɮɢɡɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ
ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɢɫɬɢɤɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨ-ɨɩɚɫɧɵɯ ɫɤɨɩɥɟɧɢɣ ɬɨɩɥɢɜɨɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɳɢɯ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ // «ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ
ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɿɣ ɿ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ». – 2009. – ȼɢɩ. 12. – ɋ. 93 – 102.
Ɉɝɨɪɨɞɧɢɤɨɜ Ȼ.ɂ., ɉɚɡɭɯɢɧ ɗ.Ɇ., Ʉɥɸɱɧɢɤɨɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ. Ɋɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɟ ɚɷɪɨɡɨɥɢ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ»:1986 – 2006 ɝɝ.: ɦɨɧɨɝɪɚɮɢɹ. – ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶ: ɂɧ-ɬ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ Ⱥɗɋ ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ. –2008. – 456 ɫ.
Ɉɬɱɟɬ ɨ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɧɵɯ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹɯ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɹ ɡɚɳɢɬɧɨɝɨ ɩɨɥɢɦɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɩɨɤɪɵɬɢɹ
ɩɨɞɤɪɨɜɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɫɬɜɚ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ». ɉɥɚɧ ɨɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɦɟɪɨɩɪɢɹɬɢɣ ɧɚɨɛɴɟɤɬɟ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ». Ʉɨɧɬɪɚɤɬ ʋ SIP05-4-011. ʋSIP AOS2 07 4 SMT 00 03.
Ʉɪɢɧɢɰɵɧ Ⱥ.ɉ., Ʉɨɪɧɟɟɟɜ Ⱥ.Ⱥ., ɋɬɪɢɯɚɪɶ Ɉ.Ʌ., ɓɟɪɛɢɧ ȼ.ɇ. Ɉ ɦɟɯɚɧɢɡɦɟ ɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ
ɠɢɞɤɢɯ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɯ ɨɬɯɨɞɨɜ ɜ ɩɨɦɟɳɟɧɢɹɯ ɛɥɨɤɚ Ȼ ɢ ȼɋɊɈ // ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ. -2002. –ȼɢɩ. 9 – ɋ. 98 – 104.
Ʉɨɪɧɟɟɜ Ⱥ. Ⱥ., Ʉɪɢɧɢɰɢɧ Ⱥ. ɉ., ɋɬɪɢɯɚɪɶ Ɉ. Ʌ., ɓɟɪɛɢɧ ȼ. ɇ. ɀɢɞɤɢɟ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɟ ɨɬɯɨɞɵ
ɜɧɭɬɪɢ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» // Ɋɚɞɢɨɯɢɦɢɹ. – 2002. – Ɍ. 44, ʋ 6. – ɋ. 545 – 552.
Ɉɞɢɧɰɨɜ Ⱥ. Ⱥ., ɏɚɧ ȼ. ȿ., Ʉɪɚɫɧɨɜ ȼ. Ⱥ., ɓɟɪɛɢɧ ȼ. ɇ. Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ ɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɧɢɹ ɪɚɞɨɧɭɤɥɢɞɨɜ ɜɜɨɞɧɵɯ ɫɤɨɩɥɟɧɢɹɯ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» ɜ 2007 – 2008 ɝ.ɝ. // ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ
ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰiɣ i ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ. – 2009. – ȼɵɩ. 12. – ɋ. 143 – 153.
ɉɚɧɚɫɸɤ ɇ.ɂ., ɋɤɨɪɛɭɧ Ⱥ.Ⱦ., ɉɨɞɛɟɪɟɡɧɵɣ ɋ.ɋ. ɢ ɞɪ. ɉɨɞɫɱɟɬ ɤɨɥɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ ɪɚɞɢɨɧɭɤɥɢɞɨɜ ɜɞɨɧɧɵɯ ɨɫɚɞɤɚɯ ɩɨɦɟɳɟɧɢɹ 001/3 ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» // ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɢɯ
ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɿɣ ɿ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɹ. – 2005. ȼɢɩ. 2. – ɋ 46 – 48.
Ʉɪɢɧɢɰɵɧ Ⱥ. ɉ., ɋɬɪɢɯɚɪɶ Ɉ. Ʌ., ɓɟɪɛɢɧ ȼ. ɇ. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɚ ɨɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɹ ɫ ɠɢɞɤɢɦɢ
ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɦɢ ɨɬɯɨɞɚɦɢ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» // Ɋɚɞɢɨɯɢɦɢɹ. – 2003. – Ɍ. 45, ʋ 5. – ɋ. 461 – 465.
Ɉɬɱɟɬ ɨ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɢ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ ɨɛɴɟɤɬɚ «ɍɤɪɵɬɢɟ» ʋSIP-P-PM-22-460-SAR-124-05. –2008. – 343 ɫ.
ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɿɹ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɨʀ ɪɟɚɥɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɭ ɇȻɄ. SIP-P-PM-21-330-EXN-004-01. Ɋɟɞ.2 ɜɿɞ 23.04.2004 ɪ.
Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɢ ɿɡ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɭ ɪɚɦɤɚɯ ɤɨɧɰɟɩɰɿʀ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɭ ɉɄ-1 ɇȻɄ. SIP-N-LI-22-A500-CDS-001-01.
Ɋɟɞ. 1 ɜɿɞ 04.12.2010 ɪ.
SIP-P-D1-19-120-STG-083-02. ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɿɹ ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɉȼɆ ɿ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ ɨɛ’ɽɤɬɚ«ɍɤɪɢɬɬɹ». ɉɥɚɧ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɢɯ ɞɿɣ. 2005 ɪ.

21.

22.
23.

Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ „ɉɪɨ ɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɿ ɡɚɫɚɞɢ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɨʀ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ ɿ ɡɧɹɬɬɹ ɡ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɬɚ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɡɪɭɣɧɨɜɚɧɨɝɨ ɱɟɬɜɟɪɬɨɝɨ ɟɧɟɪɝɨɛɥɨɤɭ ɰɿɽʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɧɚɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨ ɛɟɡɩɟɱɧɭ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɭ” ɜɿɞ 11.12.1998 ɪ. ʋ 309-XIV.
20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. ɉɨɝɥɹɞ ɭ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ: ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.:Ⱥɬɢɤɚ, 2006. – 244 ɫ.
ɇɨɪɦɢ ɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ (ɇɊȻɍ-97). – ɆɈɁ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, Ʉɢʀɜ, 1997, ɫ. 121.

Chapter 6
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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15.
16.
17.

ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ: ɩɨɝɥɹɞ ɜ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ»Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ «ɉɪɨ ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ».
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟ Ʉɚɛɢɧɟɬɚ ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɨɜ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɨɬ 29.04.96 ʋ480 «ɉɪɨ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ
ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ».
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟ Ʉɚɛɢɧɟɬɚ ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɨɜ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɨɬ 05.04.99 ʋ542 «ɉɪɨ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ
ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ».
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟ Ʉɚɛɢɧɟɬɚ ɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɨɜ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ ɨɬ 25.12.2002 ʋ2015 «ɉɪɨ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ
ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ».
20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. ɉɨɝɥɹɞ ɭ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ». ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.:Ⱥɬɿɤɚ. 2006 – 224 ɫ.
Ɋɿɱɧɢɣ ɡɜɿɬ ɡɚ 2010 ɪ. ɡ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ Ⱦɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɝɨ ɪɟɽɫɬɪɭ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɿɜ ɬɚ Ⱦɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɝɨ
ɤɚɞɚɫɬɪɭ ɦɿɫɰɶ ɡɛɟɪɿɝɚɧɧɹ ɚɛɨ ɡɚɯɨɪɨɧɟɧɧɹ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɿɜ. Ʉ.: ȾɄ «ɍɤɪȾɈ «Ɋɚɞɨɧ». 2011.
Ɂɜɿɬ ɩɪɨ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ 4-ʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨʀ ɿɧɜɟɧɬɚɪɢɡɚɰɿʀ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɿɜ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ, 2010 ɪ. ȾɄ«ɍɤɪȾɈ «Ɋɚɞɨɧ». .Ʉ.: ȾɄ «ɍɤɪȾɈ «Ɋɚɞɨɧ». 2011ȱɧɫɬɪɭɤɬɢɜɧɨ-ɦɟɬɨɞɢɱɧɿ ɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ ɡ ɨɩɬɢɦɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɩɪɹɦɢɯ ɤɨɧɬɪɡɚɯɨɞɿɜ ɧɚ ɩɿɡɧɿɣ ɮɚɡɿɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ». Ʉɢʀɜ, ɍɇɐɊɆ ȺɆɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ “ɉɪɨ ɩɪɚɜɨɜɢɣ ɪɟɠɢɦ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿʀ, ɳɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ
ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ”.
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ “ɉɪɨ ɫɬɚɬɭɫ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɡɚɯɢɫɬ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ, ɹɤɿ ɩɨɫɬɪɚɠɞɚɥɢ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ”.
Ʉɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɢɣ ɪɚɞɿɨɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝ ɦ. Ʉɨɪɨɫɬɟɧɶ: ɡɜɿɬ ɩɪɨ ɇȾɊ / ɇɐɊɆ ȺɆɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ;Ʉɟɪɿɜɧɢɤ ȱ.ɉ. Ʌɨɫɶ. – ʋ ȾɊ 0196U010001;. – Ʉ., 1996. – 131 ɫ.
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɚ ɄɆ ɍɊɋɊ ɜɿɞ 23 ɱɟɪɜɧɹ 1991 ɪ. ʋ106.
Ɉɰɿɧɤɚ ɪɟɚɥɿɡɨɜɚɧɢɯ ɬɚ ɧɚɭɤɨɜɟ ɨɛɝɪɭɧɬɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɬɭɩɧɢɯ ɤɨɧɬɪɡɚɯɨɞɿɜ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɛɟɡɩɟɱɭɸɬɶ
ɛɟɡɩɟɱɧɟ ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɧɚ ɑȺȿɋ: ɡɜɿɬ ɩɪɨ ɇȾɊ / ɇɐɊɆ ȺɆɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ;Ʉɟɪɿɜɧɢɤ ȱ.ɉ. Ʌɨɫɶ. – 1996. – 90 ɫ.
Ɉɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɟ ɫ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɦɢ ɨɬɯɨɞɚɦɢ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ, ɨɩɵɬ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ. /Ʉɨɪɱɚɝɢɧ ɉ.Ⱥ.,Ɂɚɦɨɫɬɶɹɧ ɉ.ȼ., ɒɟɫɬɨɩɚɥɨɜ ȼ.Ɇ.. – Ʉ., 2000. – 178 ɫ.
ɉɪɨ ɫɯɜɚɥɟɧɧɹ ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɿʀ ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. – Ɋɨɡɩɨɪɹɞɠɟɧɧɹ
Ʉɚɛɿɧɟɬɭ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɪɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 19.08.2009 ɪ. ʋ 990.
Ɋɚɡɪɚɛɨɬɤɚ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɢ ɢ ɤɨɧɰɟɩɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɨɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɸ ɫ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɦɢ ɨɬɯɨɞɚɦɢ ɜɍɤɪɚɢɧɟ, ɜɤɥɸɱɚɹ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɸ ɩɨ ɨɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɸ ɫ ɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɦɢ ɨɬɯɨɞɚɦɢ ɇȺɗɄ «ɗɧɟɪɝɨɚɬɨɦ»:ɩɪɨɟɤɬ TACIS U4.03/04 / ɩɨɞ ɨɛɳɟɣ ɪɟɞɚɤɰɢɟɣ ȼ.Ɇ.ɒɟɫɬɨɩɚɥɨɜɚ.– Ʉ.: ɂɡɞɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ
“ɉɊɈɆȱɇɖ”, 2008.– Ɍ.1. – 500 ɫ.– Ɍ.2. – 320 ɫ.

Chapter 71.
2.
3.

20 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. ɉɨɝɥɹɞ ɭ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ: ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.– Ʉ.:Ⱥɬɿɤɚ, 2006.– 224 ɫ.
Ʉɨɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɹ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 28 ɱɟɪɜɧɹ 1996 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ. 254ɤ/96-ɜɪ, ɨɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɪɟɞɚɤɰiɹ ɜiɞ 30.09.2010.
http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96-%E2%F0Ɋɨɡɞɿɥ 5 ȿɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɚ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɚ ɿ ɩɪɚɜɨɜɿ ɬɚ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɿ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɱɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ / Ȼɚɛ'ɹɤ
Ɉ.ɋ., Ȼɿɥɟɧɱɭɤ ɉ.Ⱦ., ɑɢɪɜɚ ɘ.Ɉ. ȿɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɟ ɩɪɚɜɨ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɇɚɜɱ. ɩɨɫɿɛ. ɞɥɹ ɜɢɳ. ɧɚɜɱ. ɡɚɤɥ. /ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɭɧ-ɬ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɿɧɧɹ, ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɬɚ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣɧɨ-ɩɪɚɜɨɜɢɯ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɿɣ. Ɏɚɤɭɥɶɬɟɬ

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.
19.

324

ɨɯɨɪɨɧɢ ɧɚɜɤɨɥɢɲɧɶɨɝɨ ɫɟɪɟɞɨɜɢɳɚ; ɘɪɛɥɚɝɨɞɿɣɤɨɧɫɚɥɬɢɧɝ. – Ʉ. : Ⱥɬɿɤɚ, 2001. – 216ɫ.
http://adhdportal.com/book_630_chapter_21_Rozdɿl_5_EKOLOGȱCHNA_BEZPEKA_ȱ_PRAVOVȱ_TA_SOɋȱALNȱ_PROBLEMI_CHORNOBILSKOȲKATASTROFI_*.html
Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɰɿɹ ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɹɯ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɊɋɊ ɡ ɩɿɞɜɢɳɟɧɢɦɢ ɪɿɜɧɹɦɢ
ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. Ɂɚɬɜɟɪɞɠɟɧɚ ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɨɸ
ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɊɋɊ ɜɿɞ 27.02.91 ʋ 791.– ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɊɋɊ ɜiɞ
16.04.1991.– 1991.– ʋ 16.– ɫ. 197.
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɫɬɚɬɭɫ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɡɚɯɢɫɬ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ, ɹɤɿ ɩɨɫɬɪɚɠɞɚɥɢ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ» ɜɿɞ 28 ɥɸɬɨɝɨ 1991 ɪɨɤɭ N 796-XII http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=796-12
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɩɪɚɜɨɜɢɣ ɪɟɠɢɦ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿʀ, ɳɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ
ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ» ɜɿɞ 27 ɥɸɬɨɝɨ 1991 ɪɨɤɭ N 791ɚ-XII.
http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=791%E0-12əɰɟɧɤɨ ȼ. Ɇ., Ȼɨɪɢɫɸɤ Ɇ. Ɇ., Ɉɦɟɥɶɹɧɟɰɶ ɋ. Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨɜɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɿɩɪɨɬɢɪɚɞɿɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɯɢɫɬɭ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ʀɯ ɡɚɤɨɧɨɞɚɜɱɟ ɡɚɛɟɡɩɟɱɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ / ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶ-96.
«ɂɬɨɝɢ: 10 ɥɟɬ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɩɨ ɥɢɤɜɢɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑȺɗɋ // ɋɛ. ɬɟɡ. ɩɹɬɨɣ Ɇɟɠɞ.
ɧɚɭɱɧ.-ɬɟɯɧ. ɤɨɧɮ.– 1996. Ɂɟɥɟɧɵɣ Ɇɵɫ.– ɋ. 6–7.
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɚ Ʉɚɛɿɧɟɬɭ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɪɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 23 ɥɢɩɧɹ 1991 ɪ. ʋ 106 «ɉɪɨ ɨɪɝɚɧɿɡɚɰɿɸ ɜɢɤɨɧɚɧɧɹ
ɩɨɫɬɚɧɨɜ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɊɋɊ ɉɪɨ ɩɨɪɹɞɨɤ ɜɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɞɿɸ Ɂɚɤɨɧɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɊɋɊ«ɉɪɨ ɩɪɚɜɨɜɢɣ ɪɟɠɢɦ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿʀ, ɳɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ» ɬɚ «ɉɪɨ ɫɬɚɬɭɫ ɿ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɡɚɯɢɫɬ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ, ɹɤɿ ɩɨɫɬɪɚɠɞɚɥɢ
ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ»Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ ɧɚ 2006-2010 ɪɨɤɢ» ɜɿɞ 14 ɛɟɪɟɡɧɹ 2006 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ 3522-IV http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=3522-15
Ɇɟɦɨɪɚɧɞɭɦ ɩɪɨ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɪɨɡɭɦɿɧɧɹ ɦɿɠ ɍɪɹɞɨɦ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɿ ɍɪɹɞɚɦɢ ɤɪɚʀɧ "ȼɟɥɢɤɨʀ ɫɿɦɤɢ" ɬɚɄɨɦɿɫɿɽɸ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɩɿɜɬɨɜɚɪɢɫɬɜɚ ɳɨɞɨ ɡɚɤɪɢɬɬɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɜɿɞ 20 ɝɪɭɞɧɹ
1995 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ 998_008 http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=998_008
Ɋɚɦɤɨɜɚ ɭɝɨɞɚ ɦɿɠ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɸ ɬɚ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɦ ɛɚɧɤɨɦ ɪɟɤɨɧɫɬɪɭɤɰɿʀ ɬɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɫɬɨɫɨɜɧɨ
ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨ Ɏɨɧɞɭ "ɍɤɪɢɬɬɹ" ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ( ɍɝɨɞɭ ɪɚɬɢɮɿɤɨɜɚɧɨ Ɂɚɤɨɧɨɦ ʋ
80/98-ȼɊ ɜɿɞ 04.02.98
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɚ Ʉɚɛɿɧɟɬɭ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɪɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɡɚɬɜɟɪɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɉɨɪɹɞɤɭ ɜɢɤɨɧɚɧɧɹ ɉɥɚɧɭ
ɡɞɿɣɫɧɟɧɧɹ ɡɚɯɨɞɿɜ ɧɚ ɨɛ'ɽɤɬɿ "ɍɤɪɢɬɬɹ" ɜɿɞ 31 ɛɟɪɟɡɧɹ 2003 ɪ. ʋ 421 http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=421-2003-%EFɁɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɿ ɡɚɫɚɞɢ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɨʀ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ ɿ ɡɧɹɬɬɹ ɡ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɬɚ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɡɪɭɣɧɨɜɚɧɨɝɨ ɱɟɬɜɟɪɬɨɝɨ ɟɧɟɪɝɨɛɥɨɤɚ ɰɿɽʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɧɚɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨ ɛɟɡɩɟɱɧɭ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɭ» ɜɿɞ 11 ɝɪɭɞɧɹ 1998 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ 309-XIV (ɪɟɞɚɤɰiɹ ɜiɞ 01.01.2011).
http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=309-14
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ ɡɧɹɬɬɹ ɡ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ Ⱥȿɋ ɬɚɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɨɛ'ɽɤɬɚ "ɍɤɪɢɬɬɹ" ɧɚ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨ ɛɟɡɩɟɱɧɭ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɭ» ɜɿɞ 15 ɫɿɱɧɹ 2009 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ 886Vȱ http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=886-17
ɉɨɞɚɬɤɨɜɢɣ ɤɨɞɟɤɫ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜiɞ 02.12.2010 ʋ 2755-VI http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=2755-17
ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɚ Ʉɚɛɿɧɟɬɭ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɪɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɨɜɟ ɡɚɛɟɡɩɟɱɟɧɧɹ ɰɢɜɿɥɶɧɨʀ ɜɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɿɡɚ ɹɞɟɪɧɭ ɲɤɨɞɭ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɢɦ ɫɩɟɰɿɚɥɿɡɨɜɚɧɢɦ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜɨɦ "ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɚ Ⱥȿɋ"» ɜiɞ
22.12.2010 ɪ. ʋ 1164Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɰɿɥɶɨɜɭ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ ɩɨɜɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɦɢ ɜɿɞɯɨɞɚɦɢ» ɜɿɞ 17 ɜɟɪɟɫɧɹ 2008 ɪɨɤɭ ʋ 516-VI http://www.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=516-17Ⱦɟɫɹɬɶ ɥɟɬ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ. ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ. 1996 ɝ.
Ɇɢɧɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ.– Ʉ., 1996.– 213 ɫ.
15 ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. Ⱦɨɫɜɿɞ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ. ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.,
2001.– 144 ɫ.

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ȱɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣɧɨ-ɞɨɜɿɞɤɨɜɿ ɦɚɬɟɪɿɚɥɢ ɩɪɨ ɫɬɚɧ ɜɢɤɨɧɚɧɧɹ ɡɚɤɨɧɨɞɚɜɫɬɜɚ ɳɨɞɨ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɨɝɨ
ɜɢɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ, ɩɿɞɝɨɬɨɜɥɟɧɿ Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢɞɨ ɉɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɫɶɤɢɯ ɫɥɭɯɚɧɶ… 2005 ɪ., Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2005.
Ⱦɨɜɿɞɤɚ ɞɨ ɪɨɡɝɥɹɞɭ ɧɚ ɡɚɫɿɞɚɧɧɿ Ɋɚɞɢ ɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɿ ɨɛɨɪɨɧɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɩɢɬɚɧɧɹ „ɉɪɨɜɞɨɫɤɨɧɚɥɟɧɧɹ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ɳɨɞɨ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ”.
Ⱥɩɚɪɚɬ ɊɇȻɈ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2010.– 18 ɫ.
ɉɪɨ ɫɬɚɧ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɡɚ 2006-2007 ɪɨɤɢ.
ɓɨɪɿɱɧɚ ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. – Ʉ.: 2008 – 185 ɫ. http://www.mns.gov.ua/content/
Chernobyl_report_2007.html
Ɋɚɫɫɟɥɟɧɢɟ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ, ɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɟ ɪɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɡɚɧɹɬɨɫɬɢ ɬɪɭɞɨɜɵɯ ɪɟɫɭɪɫɨɜ ɢ ɷɮɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɟ
ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ
ɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ
ɩɨɬɟɧɰɢɚɥɚ
Ɂɨɧɵɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɹ
ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɫɤɨɣ ɋɋɊ: ɇɚɭɱɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ / Ɉɬɜ. ɪɟɞ. ɋ. ɂ. Ⱦɨɪɨɝɭɧɰɨɜ.– Ʉ.:ɋɈɉɋ ɍɋɋɊ Ⱥɇ ɍɋɋɊ, 1991.– 118 ɫ..
ɉɪɨɟɤɬ Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɰɿʀ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨʀ ɰɿɥɶɨɜɨʀ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɢ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ ɧɚ 2012-2016 ɪɨɤɢ http://www.mns.gov.ua/files/2010/11/24/Koncepc2010.doc
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 6).– Ʉ.: Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ ɨɯɨɪɨɧɢ ɡɞɨɪɨɜ’ɹɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɡ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɧɚɞɡɜɢɱɚɣɧɢɯ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɣ ɬɚ ɭ ɫɩɪɚɜɚɯ ɡɚɯɢɫɬɭ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹɜɿɞ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ, ɇɐɊɆ ȺɆɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 1997.– 103 ɫ.
Ɋɟɬɪɨɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɧɨ-ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɧɿ ɞɨɡɢ ɨɩɪɨɦɿɧɟɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ
1997 ɪ. ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɳɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 7), – Ʉ.: ɆɈɁ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ 1998. – 155 c.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ ɡɚ 1998 ɬɚ 1999 ɪɪ. (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 8). – Ʉ.:Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɇɐɊɆ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ȱɊɁ ȺɌɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2000.– 58 c.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ ɡɚ 1998, 1999 ɬɚ 2000 ɪɨɤɢ (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 9). –Ʉ.: Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɇɐɊɆ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ȱɊɁ ȺɌɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2001.– 59 c.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰiɹ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤi ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞiɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ
ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩiɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪiʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ ɡɚ 2001-2004 ɪɪ. (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 10). – Ʉ.,
2005. – 57 ɫ.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ ɬɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɅȼɅ-ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝɭ ɜ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɚɯ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿɡɚ 2005-2006 ɪɪ. (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 11). – Ʉ., 2007. – 63ɫ.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰɿɹ ɬɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɅȼɅ-ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝɭ ɜ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɚɯ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤɿ ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪɿʀ. ɍɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɟɧɿ ɞɚɧɿɡɚ 2007 ɪ. (Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 12). – Ʉ., 2008. – 62 ɫ.
Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɨɡɢɦɟɬɪɢɱɧɚ ɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɢɡɚɰiɹ ɬɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɥɜɥ-ɦɨɧɿɬɨɪɢɧɝɭ ɜ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɚɯ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɹɤi ɡɚɡɧɚɥɢ ɪɚɞiɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ ɩiɫɥɹ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɚɜɚɪiʀ. Ⱦɚɧɿ ɡɚ 2008 ɪ.
Ɂɛɿɪɤɚ 13. Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2009.
Ɋɚɞɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɫɬɚɧ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɣ, ɜɿɞɧɟɫɟɧɢɯ ɞɨ ɡɨɧ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ (ɭ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ
ɪɚɣɨɧɿɜ). – Ʉ.: Ɇɇɋ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2008.- 49 ɫ.
Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɜɿɞɧɟɫɟɧɧɹ ɞɟɹɤɢɯ ɧɚɫɟɥɟɧɢɯ ɩɭɧɤɬɿɜ ȼɨɥɢɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɬɚ Ɋɿɜɧɟɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɟɣɞɨ ɡɨɧɢ ɝɚɪɚɧɬɨɜɚɧɨɝɨ ɞɨɛɪɨɜɿɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ».– ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜiɞ
19.03.2004.– 2004.– ʋ 12.– ɋɬ. 161.
ɗɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ ɢ ɢɯ ɩɪɟɨɞɨɥɟɧɢɟ:ɞɜɚɞɰɚɬɢɥɟɬɧɢɣ ɨɩɵɬ. Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɷɤɫɩɟɪɬɧɨɣ ɝɪɭɩɩɵ "ɗɤɨɥɨɝɢɹ" ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɮɨɪɭɦɚ. –ȼɟɧɚ : ɆȺȽȺɌɗ, 2006. – 193ɫ.
Ɇɟɞɢɰɢɧɫɤɢɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɢ ɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɵ ɡɞɪɚɜɨɨɯɪɚɧɟɧɢɹ.
Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɷɤɫɩɟɪɬɧɨɣ ɝɪɭɩɩɵ «Ɂɞɨɪɨɜɶɟ» ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɮɨɪɭɦɚ ɈɈɇ. – ɀɟɧɟɜɚ : ȼɈɁ, 2006. – 190ɫ.
ɇɚɫɥɟɞɢɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɹ: ɦɟɞɢɰɢɧɫɤɢɟ, ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɢ ɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɨ-ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɢɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚɦ Ȼɟɥɚɪɭɫɢ, Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ. ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɢɣ
Ɏɨɪɭɦ: 2003–2005. ȼɬɨɪɨɟ, ɢɫɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɧɨɟ ɢɡɞɚɧɢɟ. – ȼɟɧɚ : ɆȺȽȺɌɗ, 2006. – 58ɫ.

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ɉɭɛɥɢɤɚɰɢɹ 103 Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɣ Ʉɨɦɢɫɫɢɢ ɩɨ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɣ ɡɚɳɢɬɟ (ɆɄɊɁ). ɉɟɪ ɫ ɚɧɝɥ. /ɉɨɞɨɛɳɟɣ ɪɟɞ. Ɇ.Ɏ. Ʉɢɫɟɥɺɜɚ ɢ ɇ.Ʉ.ɒɚɧɞɚɥɵ. – Ɇ. : ɂɡɞ. ɈɈɈ ɉɄɎ «Ⱥɥɚɧɚ», 2009. – 344ɫ.
Ɋɨɡɩɨɪɹɞɠɟɧɧɹ Ʉɚɛɿɧɟɬɭ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɪɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 3 ɱɟɪɜɧɹ 2009 ɪ. ʋ 594-ɪ «ɉɪɨ ɫɯɜɚɥɟɧɧɹ
ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɿʀ ɭɩɨɪɹɞɤɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɢ ɧɚɞɚɧɧɹ ɩɿɥɶɝ ɨɤɪɟɦɢɦ ɤɚɬɟɝɨɪɿɹɦ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ ɞɨ 2012 ɪɨɤɭ»ɉɪɨ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ ɧɚ 2006-2010ɪɨɤɢ / Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 14 ɛɟɪɟɡɧɹ 2006 ɪ. ʋ 3522-ȱV // ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. –2006. – ʋ 34. – ɫɬ. 290.
Ʉɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚ ɧɚɭɱɧɨɣ ɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɤɢ ɪɚɛɨɬ ɜ ɡɨɧɟ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɡɨɧɟ ɛɟɡɭɫɥɨɜɧɨɝɨ
(ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ) ɨɬɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ ɧɚ ɩɟɪɢɨɞ ɞɨ 2010 ɝɨɞɚ, / http://www.tesec-int.org/chernobyl/
Complex_r.htm/
ɋɟɫɫɢɹ Ƚɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɣ Ⱥɫɫɚɦɛɥɟɢ ɈɈɇ, ɪɟɡɨɥɸɰɢɹ «ɍɤɪɟɩɥɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ
ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ ɢ ɤɨɨɪɞɢɧɚɰɢɹ ɭɫɢɥɢɣ ɜ ɞɟɥɟ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ, ɫɦɹɝɱɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɦɢɧɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ
ɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ» 10 ɮɟɜɪɚɥɹ 2004 ɝɨɞɚ/ http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/docs/
a_res_58_119_r.pdf«Ɋɚɞɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɫɬɚɧ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɣ, ɜɿɞɧɟɫɟɧɢɯ ɞɨ ɡɨɧ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ (ɭ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ
ɪɚɣɨɧɿɜ)», pɟɞ. ɏɨɥɨɲɚ ȼ.ȱ. /http://www.mns.gov.ua/UserFiles/File/2009/table_1.pdf
http://chernobyl.info/index.php?userhash=&navID=182&lID=3«20-ɹ ɝɨɞɨɜɳɢɧɚ ɭɤɪɚɢɧɫɤɨ-ɤɭɛɢɧɫɤɨɣ ɉɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɵ ɩɨ ɪɟɚɛɢɥɢɬɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɥɟɱɟɧɢɸ ɞɟɬɟɣ,ɩɨɫɬɪɚɞɚɜɲɢɯ ɜɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɬɪɚɝɟɞɢɢ», http://www.cons-ukr.ru/ru/page/20-yagodovshchina-ukrainsko-kubinskoi-programmy-po-reabilitatsii-i-lecheɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ « 20 ɥɟɬ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ: ɜɡɝɥɹɞ ɜ ɛɭɞɭɳɟɟ»,http://www.mns.gov.ua/Chernobyl/20_year/03/n_report_ru.pdf/http://www.seu.ru/
programs/atomsafe/ books/gumposl/gumposl.htm.
“25 ɥɟɬ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɹ – ɩɭɬɶ ɤ ɬɪɚɧɫɝɪɚɧɢɱɧɨɣ ɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɟ»/ ɩɚɦɹɬɢ“/http://www.
charityfound.org/stat_i/after_chernobyl.
«Ƚɭɦɚɧɢɬɚɪɧɵɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ, ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹ ɪɟɚɛɟɥɢɬɚɰɢɢ» – ɨɬɱɟɬɩɨ ɡɚɤɚɡɭ ɉɊɈɈɇ ɢ ɘɇɂɋȿɎ ɩɪɢ ɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɤɟ ɍɄȽȾ ɈɈɇ ɢ ȼɈɁ, ɇɶɸ-Ƀɨɪɤ-Ɇɢɧɫɤ-ɄɢɟɜɆɨɫɤɜɚ, 6 ɮɟɜɪɚɥɹ 2002 ɝɨɞɚ, http://www.un.org/russian/ha/chernobyl /report/chernrep.pdf.
«ɉɥɚɧ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ ɈɈɇ ɩɨ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɸ ɞɨ 2016 ɝɨɞɚ» / ɉɪɨɟɤɬ ɩɪɟɡɟɧɬɚɰɢɢ ɞɥɹɆɟɠɜɟɜɟɞɟɦɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɪɚɛɨɱɟɣ ɝɪɭɩɩɵ ɈɈɇ ɩɨ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɸ/ http://www.un.org/russian/ha/chernobyl/plan.html.
Ɉɫɤɨɥɤɨɜ Ȼ.ə. ɇɨɫɨɜɫɤɢɣ Ⱥ.ȼ. "ȿɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɚɫɩɟɤɬɢ ɜɢɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
Ⱥȿɋ ". Ȼɸɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ’ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ)ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ. ʋ 16, ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɿɧɬɟɪɿɧɮɨɪɦ, 2000, /http://www.Chernobyl.net/ru/index.php?newsid=
1181549515.
«Ɉɛɳɢɧɵ ɩɨɦɨɝɚɸɬ ɫɟɛɟ ɫɚɦɢ» – Ƀɨɫɢɨ Ɇɚɰɭɤɢ, ɛɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ 50-2, ɦɚɣ 2009ɝ.,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull502/Russian/50202794952_ ru.pdf.
Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ Ƚɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɫɟɤɪɟɬɚɪɹ «Ɉɩɬɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɹ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɭɫɢɥɢɣ ɜ ɞɟɥɟ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ,ɫɦɹɝɱɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɦɢɧɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ», A/60/443 24 ɨɤɬɹɛɪɹ 2005
ɝɨɞɚ/ http://chernobyl.undp.org/russian/ch3.html.
ɉɥɚɧ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɚ-ȿɋ.//ȯȼɊɈɉȿɃɋɖɄȺ ɉɈɅȱɌɂɄȺ ɋɍɋȱȾɋɌȼȺ (Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬ Microsoft
Word, 245 ɄȻ)/ http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/ virtual_library/19_action_plan_uk.pdf.
Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɿ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɢ ɡ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ/http://www.mns.gov.ua/content/Chernobyl_international.html?PrintVersion.

Chapter 8
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ɉɪɨ Ɂɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɭ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ ɧɚ 2006-2010ɪɨɤɢ / Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜɿɞ 14 ɛɟɪɟɡɧɹ 2006 ɪ. ʋ 3522-ȱV // ȼɿɞɨɦɨɫɬɿ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨʀ Ɋɚɞɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. –2006. – ʋ 34. – ɫɬ. 290.
Ʉɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚ ɧɚɭɱɧɨɣ ɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɤɢ ɪɚɛɨɬ ɜ ɡɨɧɟ ɨɬɱɭɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɡɨɧɟ ɛɟɡɭɫɥɨɜɧɨɝɨ
(ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ) ɨɬɫɟɥɟɧɢɹ ɧɚ ɩɟɪɢɨɞ ɞɨ 2010 ɝɨɞɚ, / http://www.tesec-int.org/chernobyl/
Complex_r.htm/

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58 ɋɟɫɫɢɹ Ƚɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɣ Ⱥɫɫɚɦɛɥɟɢ ɈɈɇ, ɪɟɡɨɥɸɰɢɹ «ɍɤɪɟɩɥɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ
ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ ɢ ɤɨɨɪɞɢɧɚɰɢɹ ɭɫɢɥɢɣ ɜ ɞɟɥɟ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ, ɫɦɹɝɱɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɦɢɧɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ
ɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ» 10 ɮɟɜɪɚɥɹ 2004 ɝɨɞɚ/ http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/docs/
a_res_58_119_r.pdf«Ɋɚɞɿɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɫɬɚɧ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɿɣ, ɜɿɞɧɟɫɟɧɢɯ ɞɨ ɡɨɧ ɪɚɞɿɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɡɚɛɪɭɞɧɟɧɧɹ (ɭ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ
ɪɚɣɨɧɿɜ)», pɟɞ. ɏɨɥɨɲɚ ȼ.ȱ. /http://www.mns.gov.ua/UserFiles/File/2009/table_1.pdf
http://chernobyl.info/index.php?userhash=&navID=182&lID=3«20-ɹ ɝɨɞɨɜɳɢɧɚ ɭɤɪɚɢɧɫɤɨ-ɤɭɛɢɧɫɤɨɣ ɉɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɵ ɩɨ ɪɟɚɛɢɥɢɬɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɥɟɱɟɧɢɸ ɞɟɬɟɣ,ɩɨɫɬɪɚɞɚɜɲɢɯ ɜɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɬɪɚɝɟɞɢɢ», http://www.cons-ukr.ru/ru/page/20-yagodovshchina-ukrainsko-kubinskoi-programmy-po-reabilitatsii-i-lecheɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ « 20 ɥɟɬ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ: ɜɡɝɥɹɞ ɜ ɛɭɞɭɳɟɟ»,http://www.mns.gov.ua/Chernobyl/20_year/03/n_report_ru.pdf /http://www.seu.ru/programs/atomsafe/
books/gumposl/gumposl.htm.
“25 ɥɟɬ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɹ – ɩɭɬɶ ɤ ɬɪɚɧɫɝɪɚɧɢɱɧɨɣ ɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɟ»/ ɩɚɦɹɬɢ“/http://www.
charityfound.org/stat_i/after_chernobyl.
«Ƚɭɦɚɧɢɬɚɪɧɵɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ ɚɜɚɪɢɢ ɧɚ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ Ⱥɗɋ, ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹ ɪɟɚɛɟɥɢɬɚɰɢɢ» – ɨɬɱɟɬɩɨ ɡɚɤɚɡɭ ɉɊɈɈɇ ɢ ɘɇɂɋȿɎ ɩɪɢ ɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɤɟ ɍɄȽȾ ɈɈɇ ɢ ȼɈɁ, ɇɶɸ-Ƀɨɪɤ-Ɇɢɧɫɤ-ɄɢɟɜɆɨɫɤɜɚ, 6 ɮɟɜɪɚɥɹ 2002 ɝɨɞɚ, http://www.un.org/russian/ha/chernobyl /report/chernrep.pdf.
«ɉɥɚɧ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ ɈɈɇ ɩɨ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɸ ɞɨ 2016 ɝɨɞɚ» / ɉɪɨɟɤɬ ɩɪɟɡɟɧɬɚɰɢɢ ɞɥɹɆɟɠɜɟɜɟɞɟɦɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɪɚɛɨɱɟɣ ɝɪɭɩɩɵ ɈɈɇ ɩɨ ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɸ/ http://www.un.org/russian/ha/chernobyl/plan.html.
Ɉɫɤɨɥɤɨɜ Ȼ.ə. ɇɨɫɨɜɫɤɢɣ Ⱥ.ȼ. "ȿɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɚɫɩɟɤɬɢ ɜɢɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɟɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɿʀ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
Ⱥȿɋ ". Ȼɸɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɟɤɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɧɭ ɡɨɧɢ ɜɿɞɱɭɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɚ ɡɨɧɢ ɛɟɡɭɦɨɜɧɨɝɨ (ɨɛɨɜ’ɹɡɤɨɜɨɝɨ)ɜɿɞɫɟɥɟɧɧɹ. ʋ 16, ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɿɧɬɟɪɿɧɮɨɪɦ, 2000, /http://www.Chernobyl.net/ru/index.php?newsid=
1181549515.
«Ɉɛɳɢɧɵ ɩɨɦɨɝɚɸɬ ɫɟɛɟ ɫɚɦɢ» – Ƀɨɫɢɨ Ɇɚɰɭɤɢ, ɛɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ 50-2, ɦɚɣ 2009ɝ.,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull502/Russian/50202794952_ ru.pdf.
Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ Ƚɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɫɟɤɪɟɬɚɪɹ «Ɉɩɬɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɹ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɭɫɢɥɢɣ ɜ ɞɟɥɟ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ,ɫɦɹɝɱɟɧɢɹ ɢ ɦɢɧɢɦɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɣ ɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɵ», A/60/443 24 ɨɤɬɹɛɪɹ 2005
ɝɨɞɚ/ http://chernobyl.undp.org/russian/ch3.html.
ɉɥɚɧ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɚ-ȿɋ.//ȯȼɊɈɉȿɃɋɖɄȺ ɉɈɅȱɌɂɄȺ ɋɍɋȱȾɋɌȼȺ (Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬ Microsoft
Word, 245 ɄȻ)/ http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/19_action_plan_uk.pdf.
Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɿ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɢ ɡ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ/http://www.mns.gov.ua/content/Chernobyl_international.html?PrintVersion

327ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɩɿɞɛɢɜɚɽ ɩɿɞɫɭɦɤɢ ɪɨɛɨɬɢ ɡ ɩɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ
ɡɚ 25 ɪɨɤɿɜ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɦɿɫɬɢɬɶ ɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿʀ ɬɚ ɜɢɫɧɨɜɤɢ ɳɨɞɨ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨʀ ɟɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ ɧɚ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɽ.

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«Ⱦɜɚɞɰɹɬɶ ɩ’ɹɬɶ ɪɨɤɿɜ ɑɨɪɧɨɛɢɥɶɫɶɤɨʀ
ɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢ. Ȼɟɡɩɟɤɚ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɶɨɝɨ»ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɚ ɞɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ
(ɚɧɝɥ. ɦɨɜɨɸ)ȼɢɞɚɜɟɰɶ ɬɚ ɜɢɝɨɬɿɜɧɢɤ “ȼɢɞɚɜɧɢɰɬɜɨ ɄȱɆ”ɋɜɿɞɨɰɬɜɨ ɩɪɨ ɜɧɟɫɟɧɧɹ ɞɨ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɝɨ ɪɟɽɫɬɪɭ ɫɭɛ’ɽɤɬɿɜ
ɜɢɞɚɜɧɢɱɨʀ ɫɩɪɚɜɢ ɫɟɪɿʀ ȾɄ ʋ 2888 ɜɿɞ 3.07.2007 ɪ.
03680, ɦ. Ʉɢʀɜ, ɜɭɥ. Ʉɪɠɢɠɚɧɿɜɫɶɤɨɝɨ, 3ɈɄɌȻ – ɤɨɪɩ. 5, ɨɮ. 140. Ɍɟɥ.: (044) 502-41-23.
Ɏɨɪɦɚɬ 60ɯ84/16. ɍɦ.-ɞɪɭɤ. ɚɪɤ. 26,35. Ɍɢɪɚɠ 100 ɩɪ. Ɂɚɦ. ʋ 095-11.

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