TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WHY DID BERSATULEAVE PAKATANHARAPAN?
Wan Saiful Wan Jan

ISSN 0219-3213
TRS10/20s
ISBN 978-9-814881-89-0

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

9789814 881890

ISSUE

10
2020

TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It
is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security,and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its
wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research
programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES),
Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social
and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN
Studies Centre (ASC), the Temasek History Research Centre (THRC)
and the Singapore APEC Study Centre.
ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued morethan 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of
research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishingworks with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors todisseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast
Asia to the rest of the world.

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WHY DID BERSATULEAVE PAKATANHARAPAN?
Wan Saiful Wan Jan

ISSUE

10
2020

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Published by:

ISEAS Publishing
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
publish@iseas.edu.sg
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg© 2020 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.
The author is wholly responsible for the views expressed in this book which
do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher.
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Name(s): Wan Saiful Wan Jan.
Title: Why did Bersatu leave Pakatan Harapan? / by Wan Saiful Wan Jan.
Description: Singapore : ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, June 2020. |Series: Trends in Southeast Asia, ISSN 0219-3213 ; TRS10/20 | Includes
bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN 9789814881890 (paperback) | ISBN 9789814881906(PDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia. | Pakatan Harapan(Malaysia) | Electoral coalitions—Malaysia. | Malaysia—Politics andgovernment. | Malaysia—Ethnic relations—Political aspects.
Classification: LCC DS501 I59T no. 10(2020)
Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

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FOREWORD
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast
Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacularrise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn
greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays ininternational relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967
towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has
had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, mostof these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes
domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet newinternational challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out
in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious
analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at
encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity anddynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Choi Shing Kwok
Series Editor:
Ooi Kee Beng
Editorial Committee:
Daljit SinghFrancis E. Hutchinson
Benjamin Loh

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Why Did BERSATU Leave
Pakatan Harapan?
By Wan Saiful Wan Jan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia’s 14th generalelection on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took placein the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020,
when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition.
The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especiallywhen it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking
various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental
differences were never reconciled during the coalition’s time inpower.
PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from theethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by themainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP
were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while ingovernment.
Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan
Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed
Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar tochampion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister.
BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH toform a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as anecessary step for a better chance at winning GE15.
This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within
BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party’s decision to leave
PH.
Following Mahathir’s sudden resignation on 24 February 2020,
BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This

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led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH andthe formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the threebiggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS.
The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties thatwish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the
Malays, especially those in rural areas.

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Why Did BERSATU Leave
Pakatan Harapan?
By Wan Saiful Wan Jan1INTRODUCTION
Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan (PH) government lasted less than two
years. After winning the 14th general election (GE-14) on 9 May 2018
to great fanfare, it crashed on 24 February 2020 following the sudden
resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the departureof Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) from the PH coalition.
Many were surprised by Mahathir’s move, but a closer look at the natureof PH and how their agenda was received by Malaysians—especially by
the Malay bumiputra group—shows that trouble started brewing rightfrom the beginning of its formation. The problems were never resolved
and continued to simmer in the background throughout its short tenure.
Some have argued that PH was never truly stable as a governmentor as a coalition. Leaders from its component parties continuously andpublicly bickered, creating a perception that they lacked cohesion. Oncein government, PH also lost five of the ten by-elections that took place
after GE-14, indicating that their grip on the country’s imagination had
eroded over time. PH was also unable to maintain popularity while inoffice, with their poll ratings plummeting as they entered their second
year of administration.
Opinions differ as to why PH collapsed. This essay examines the topic
from BERSATU’s point of view, documenting why the party decided toleave the very coalition that brought them to power. Indeed, many have

Wan Saiful Wan Jan is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak
Institute, Singapore.
1

1

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argued that it was wrong for BERSATU to leave PH, but so far none havesought to answer the question why the party chose such a controversial
path. This essay is an attempt in that direction.
In conducting this research, this author interviewed several key
leaders from all four PH component parties, some of whom are citedhere. Relevant literature was reviewed to supplement the primary data
gathered from the interviews as well as the author’s personal observations.
The author sits in the BERSATU Supreme Council and was involved inseveral high-level discussions related to the topic. As such, this essay
also benefits from an insider perspective. At the same time, great effort
has been made to avoid making a moral judgement on the decision takenby the party especially since, at the time of writing, sentiments are stillrunning high.2
Those familiar with Malaysian politics will notice that some oftdebated issues are not discussed deeply in this essay. These include therole of former Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) deputy president
Azmin Ali and his followers, the competence of PH ministers, and PH’squestionable commitment to their own manifesto. These issues may havecontributed to PH’s downfall but were not major factors for BERSATU.
Since this is a study of what led BERSATU to leave PH, only issues
that played a significant role in the party’s decision-making process are
discussed here.
The next section discusses the dynamics within PH before GE-14
and the coalition’s strategy going into the 2018 general election. Then,the main challenges faced by PH while in government will be described,
after which the key factors that contributed to BERSATU’s decision aredelved into. The week of 23 February 2020 is particularly importantas that was the week during which the PH government collapsed. The
events during that week are discussed. The conclusion comments on thelessons that can be learnt from PH’s experience in government.

The author is conscious that his direct involvement in the saga may also create
bias in the analysis. All reasonable measures have been taken to remove personalpartiality, including by cross-referencing to third-party opinions and report.
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that some researcher bias may persist.
22

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PRE-GE-14 DYNAMICS
The formation of PH was officially announced on 22 September 2015.
The coalition brought together three opposition parties—KEADILAN,
Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH),
and replaced the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition which had KEADILAN,
DAP, and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) as members. After
Malaysia’s 13th general election, the PR coalition collapsed when
its constituent parties failed to resolve their differences. One major
contributing factor was the failure of PAS and DAP to reconcile on how
much Islam should influence the nature of the state. PAS itself then split
into two, with the conservative ideologues staying in the party and theirmore progressive leaders venturing out to form a new party, AMANAH.3
This new party then joined hands with KEADILAN and DAP to formPH, to continue the struggle from where PR left off. Despite still being
in prison at the time, long-time opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim4 wasnamed as the de facto leader of PH.
The absence of PAS from PH meant that the opposition coalition
did not have a strong party to compete for Malay votes against United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling
Barisan Nasional (BN).5 This lack of Malay representation was somewhat
resolved when another new party was formed following the departureof several key figures from UMNO. The new party—BERSATU—wasregistered on 9 September 2016 and officially launched on 14 January
2017. On 14 March 2017 BERSATU announced that it would seek tojoin PH to attain a united opposition front. And on 20 March 2017,

Wan Saiful Wan Jan, “Islamism in Malaysian Politics: The Splintering of theIslamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the Spread of Progressive Ideas”, Islam andCivilisational Renewal Journal 9, no. (2018): 128–53.
3

In 2015, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was sentenced to five years
imprisonment for sodomy. Many observers believed that the case against Anwar
was politically motivated.
45

UMNO is the leading party in the BN coalition.
3

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18/6/20 11:30 AMBERSATU was formally accepted into the coalition by PH’s Presidential
Council.6

Fundamentally Dissimilar Coalition Partners
Some knowledge of the background of the parties that formed PH isnecessary if we are to understand the coalition’s internal dynamics.
i. KEADILAN’s membership is rather mixed. It is not possible todefine the party’s political ideology on the traditional left-to-rightspectrum because it brings together political activists with a variety ofbackgrounds. That said, some have argued that certain KEADILAN
leaders subscribe to social democracy. However, the glue that bonds
the party is their historic loyalty to Anwar Ibrahim. KEADILAN wasformed after Anwar was sacked as deputy prime minister in 1998.
During Anwar’s time in prison, KEADILAN led the campaign to get
him freed. Since its formation in 1999, KEADILAN has only had
two people as its top leaders, Anwar himself and his wife Wan Azizah
Wan Ismail.
		 As a multiracial party, KEADILAN’s leadership line-up reflects
its membership. Their strength is in mixed constituencies, especiallyin semi-urban and urban areas, as well as in Anwar’s traditional seatof Permatang Pauh in the state of Penang. The first general election
they contested was in 1999, in which KEADILAN was part of theBarisan Alternatif opposition coalition. KEADILAN won just 5 of
the 193 parliamentary seats then. The party gradually grew to contest
for 71 of the 222 parliamentary seats in GE-14, winning 48 seats—
mainly in urban and multi-ethnic areas. This made KEADILAN thebiggest party in the PH coalition (see Table 1).
ii. DAP was formed in 1965, which makes it the oldest and mostexperienced party in PH. It has historical links to Singapore’s

Wan Saiful Wan Jan, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia in Johor: New Party, Big
Responsibility, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 2/2018 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof
Ishak Institute, 2018).
6

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Table 1: Electoral Performance of National Opposition Parties,
1995–2018
1995

1999

2004

2008

2013

2018

DAP

9

10

12

28

38

42

KEADILAN

N/A

15

11

31

30

50

PAS

7

27

17

23

21

18

*

AMANAHBERSATU

**

11

**

13

Note: * Not part of PH in GE-14; ** Formed after GE-13.

People’s Action Party (PAP). When Singapore left Malaysia in
1965, the process to form DAP was started by PAP leaders who
remained in Malaysia.7 On its website, DAP describes itself thus:“Our original ideology was democratic socialism that promotes theidea of Malaysian Malaysia—unity in diversity in a multiracial andmulticultural nation. In 2006, the party amended its constitution to
adopt social democracy as its ideology, reflecting a more embracing(sic) of diverse democratic and progressive viewpoints.”8
		 DAP has always realized that no party can win power in Malaysia
by standing alone due to the country’s demography. For that reason,even back in 2003, DAP secretary general Kerk Kim Hock stressedthat “DAP was willing to take all political risks to help form a coalition
which would be a political vehicle to bring about political change in

Chew Huat Hock, “The Democratic Action Party in Post-1969 Malaysian
Politics: The Strategy of a Determined Opposition” (MA thesis, Australian
National University, Canberra, 1980), pp. 1–3.
7

8

https://dapmalaysia.org/en/about-us/the-party/ (accessed 23 March 2020).
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Malaysia.”9 The party regularly adapted their election strategies tosuit the coalition that they were in. Electorally, their share of seatsin the Malaysian parliament has steadily increased year by year,
especially from the time when they joined forces with KEADILAN
and PAS for the 1999 general election. In GE-14, they won 42 of the
47 parliamentary seats that they contested for, also mainly in urban
and multi-ethnic areas, and this made them the second biggest party
in government.
		 Despite being essentially a non-ethnic-based party, DAP is mostfrequently tasked to contest in mixed and non-Malay constituencies.
They are predominantly seen, and often portrayed, as a party cateringto the interests of ethnic Chinese. They have been unable to shed
the reputation as a Chinese party, partly because their leadership line
up has almost always been overwhelmingly Chinese; and in all thecoalitions they were in, they were persistently tasked with winning
the Chinese vote.
iii. AMANAH was launched in 2015 to house Islamists who left PAS
after their fallout with conservatives. The party’s ideology is best
described as progressive Islamism, indicating their commitment
to Islamic political ideals, but in a more progressive and liberal
democratic fashion. Although the party is not exclusive to Muslims,
their leadership line up and current membership are overwhelmingly
Muslim and Malay. There is only one Chinese and one Indian in
the national executive committee. Nevertheless, the party does not
subscribe to ethnic-based politics, believing instead that Malaysia
would be better if her politics were inclusive.10
		 AMANAH’s main target are constituencies that have traditionallybeen dominated by PAS. Their main audience therefore are those who

9Policy Speech at DAP’s 2003 National Congress.

For further details, see Wan Saiful Wan Jan, “Parti Amanah Negara inJohor: Birth, Challenges and Prospects, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 9/2017(Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017).

10

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18/6/20 11:30 AMsubscribe to political Islam but who have lost faith in PAS due to thelatter’s leap towards conservatism. AMANAH did not do very wellin GE-14, however. They contested in thirty-four seats and won only
eleven, mainly rural Malay areas, making them the smallest party in
the PH coalition.
iv. BERSATU was launched in 2017 following the expulsion of several
prominent leaders from UMNO. In particular, BERSATU’s formation
was the result of the coming together of three big names in Malay
politics: former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad; former Deputy
Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin; and Mahathir’s son, the former
Chief Minister of the northern state of Kedah Mukhriz Mahathir. The
party was intentionally organized to be a Malay party to challenge
UMNO’s dominance in Malay-majority areas. Many of the party’s
leaders at national, state and division levels soon crossed over from
UMNO. Mahathir Mohamad, in his capacity as chairman of the party,
repeatedly proclaimed that BERSATU intention was to take over
UMNO’s role as the main political party for ethnic Malays.
		 BERSATU’s ideology is Malay and bumiputra nationalism.
Non-Malays can become associate members but with no voting
rights. It is therefore not a surprise that within PH, BERSATU was
tasked with winning Malay constituencies, especially in rural areas.11
The bad news for BERSATU, however, was that most of theseareas were UMNO strongholds. The party did not do very well in
GE-14, capturing only 13 parliamentary seats of the 52 that they
contested.
As can be seen from the brief descriptions, the four parties are alldifferent from one another. In terms of composition, KEADILAN is amultiracial party, DAP and AMANAH are theoretically multiracial but

For further discussion on this, see Wan Saiful Wan Jan, Parti Pribumi Bersatu
Malaysia in Johor.
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in practice are not, while BERSATU is a party set up to champion the
Malay-bumiputra agenda. In terms of ideology, DAP is a secular party
that subscribes to social democracy, AMANAH is an Islamist party,
BERSATU holds to Malay nationalism, while KEADILAN has no clear
political philosophy although it can be argued that they hold to someelements of social democracy similar to the DAP.
During PH’s formative months, the main uniting factor was not
ideology or philosophy. Rather, the four parties were brought together
pragmatically. All were realistic enough to know that that they could
not win if opposition votes were divided. In the quest to defeat the BN
government, they divided among themselves the 222 parliamentaryseats, ensuring only straight fights between PH against BN. Although
PAS somewhat disrupted this strategy when they created multicornered
fights by contesting in 158 of the 222 seats, at least for PH this divisionenabled each of their component parties to focus in constituencies where
they had higher chances of winning, thereby optimizing the use of theircampaign resources.

Differences Were Never Truly Resolved
Although the parties were united in wanting to defeat BN, the ideologicaldifferences among PH component parties were never truly resolved.
This created hurdles. Unlike the BN coalition, where the sheer size of
the Malay party UMNO makes them the dominant party, PH had very
different intra-coalition dynamics because no one party could claim theleadership position by default. The component parties were seen more as
equals,12 leadership roles had to be negotiated, and parties had to provetheir influence and strength to claim authority. This made the relationshipcomplex and less predictable, even making PH seem divided at times. Ina country where citizens were used to seeing BN as a united coalition

Mohd Dzaki Mohd, “Kelestarian Kerjasama Parti Pembangkang di Malaysia
Sebelum Pilihanraya Umum ke-14”, 2018, bit.ly/kelestarianPH (accessed
22 March 2020).
128

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led by a dominant UMNO, the equality among PH’s component parties
created a perception that they were incoherent and weak, even with astrong figure like Mahathir leading them.13
The lack of a clear coalition leader created both strengths andweaknesses for PH. It was a strength from the perspective that all theparties had to make their case if they wanted the whole coalition toaccept their policy position and no one party had the right to impose
their position on the others. This ensured rational debates on policy
and held potential for it to incubate more mature ideas-based politics
in contradistinction from the narrow ethnoreligious politics that haveplagued Malaysia for decades. But it was also a weakness because much
effort was needed to create and maintain coherence within the coalition,
especially when there was no “stick” available to punish any coalition
partner that stepped out of line.
History has shown that when opposition coalitions fail to manage
their differences, they collapse. Malaysian academic Faisal Hazis puts
it nicely when, in analysing the collapse of the previous Pakatan Rakyat
opposition coalition, he stated that although opposition coalitions were
well known for championing issues like combating corruption, reducing
the cost of living, fighting crime and other matters that affect the people’s
livelihoods, this was never enough to bridge the visible differences
between the component parties. Pakatan Rakyat crumbled after GE13
because they failed to find the ideological glue to bind the component
parties.14 Similarly, it was evident that PH had inherited the same
weakness right from the first day it was formed.
As explained earlier, PH was initially formed by three parties—
DAP, KEADILAN and AMANAH. And it was only after months ofnegotiation that a coalition agreement between PH and BERSATU washttps://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2017/01/17/pakatandisunity-preferred-to-bns-unequal-coalition/ (accessed 22 March 2020).
13

Opinion article by Faisal Hazis available from https://aliran.com/thinkingallowed-online/2014-ta-online/runtuhnya-pakatan-dan-harapan-rakyatbahagian/ (accessed 21 March 2020).
14

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signed, on 13 December 2016 (see Appendix 1). Three months later, on
20 March 2017, BERSATU formally joined as the fourth member of PH.
BERSATU’s entry immediately raised a big question mark about PH’s
leadership. It should be noted that since 1998, Anwar Ibrahim was always
seen as the de facto leader of the opposition movement in Malaysia.
Despite being in prison, he remained as the leadership figure for PH and
his decisions were still sought from behind prison walls. BERSATU’s
entry into PH meant that two other giant names in Malaysian politics
were now within PH as well—former Prime Minister and BERSATU
chairman Mahathir Mohamad, and former Deputy Prime Minister andparty president Muhyiddin Yassin. They brought with them the antiNajib Razak faction from UMNO, creating even more diversity in PH.
With Anwar in prison, PH had to go through difficult negotiations
to name a new line-up that included BERSATU for its presidential
council, the decision-making body that consists of the top representatives
from each member party. This negotiation took another four months,
concluding only in a meeting that ended late after midnight on 13 July
2017.15 Mahathir was named chairman of PH and KEADILAN president
Wan Azizah as president of PH. Three deputy presidents were alsoannounced—DAP secretary general Lim Guan Eng, AMANAH president
Muhammad Sabu, and BERSATU president Muhyiddin Yassin.
Anwar Ibrahim was named “Ketua Umum” or “General Leader”,
a position that put him below Mahathir. This was a very bold decision
by PH because, when Mahathir was Prime Minister in 1998, it was he
who accused Anwar of sodomy and who sacked him as Deputy Prime
Minister. Anwar’s political history since then, including the formationof KEADILAN and the coming together of opposition parties in various
coalitions since 1998, has been largely predicated on cleaning up
Malaysia of the excesses and damage wrought during the Mahathir era.
Even Mahathir himself expressed his surprise and gratitude to Anwar
for his willingness to prioritize the country over personal grudges. In

https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/07/257162/pakatan-harapanannounces-leadership-line-anwar-de-facto-leader-dr-m
15

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a speech at a PH event in January 2018, Mahathir said “When I was
running the government previously, Anwar was sent to the Sungai Buloh
prison. It is not easy for him to accept me. Not just for Anwar but also
for his family who must have suffered when he was imprisoned. They
suffered for twenty years and it must be very difficult for the family duringthat time.”16 Nevertheless the decision was not universally accepted byAnwar’s supporters. This created a tension that continued to simmer inthe background, an issue that will be discussed later in this essay.
At the same event where Mahathir made the above speech, PH
announced another milestone in forging the coalition. Negotiations onseat distribution for Peninsular Malaysia had been concluded, and all thefour parties agreed on where they would contest. This was a major feat for
PH. Reaching an agreement well before GE-14 was called allowed them
ample time to select candidates and to start their campaign. BERSATU
received the lion’s share of seats, with fifty-two being allocated to them.
KEADILAN followed closely behind with fifty-one seats, DAP withthirty-five seats and AMANAH with twenty-seven seats (for a detailed
list, see Appendix 2). The numbers changed later as the seats for Sabah
and Sarawak were added. Being able to agree on the distribution for
Peninsular Malaysia so early in the day was an achievement in itself.
The seat distribution highlights how racial identity was a major
influence on PH’s strategy. PH may have been using the slogan “NewMalaysia” in their campaign, envisioning a Malaysia free from race-based
politics.17 But the seat allocations showed that the racial composition

This author attended the Pakatan Harapan Convention on 7 January 2018, inShah Alam, Selangor. Mahathir’s speech was in Malay and the quote is as follows“Di masa saya memerintah, dia dihantar ke Sungai Buloh. Bukan mudah baginya
untuk menerima saya. Bukan sahaja Anwar, malah keluarganya tentu merasaitekanan apabila Anwar dimasuk dalam tahanan. Mereka menderita selama
20 tahun dan untuk melupakan peristiwa ini bukan mudah buat keluarga Anwar.”
16

The heavy influence of race and religion in Malaysian politics has been widely
studied and commented upon. For example, see Lian Kwen Fee and Jayanath
Appadurai, “Race, Class and Politics in Peninsular Malaysia: The General
Election of 2008”, Asian Studies Review 35, no. 1 (2011): 63–82.
17

11

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of a constituency remained a major factor. Almost all Malay-Muslim
constituencies were entrusted to BERSATU and the Islamist AMANAH,
while the secular DAP stayed away from all such seats, and multiracial
KEADILAN only went for seats that were mostly mixed. PH was clearly
aware of voters’ racial sentiment and how it could affect their electoral
performance. This race-based strategy is understandable because
whatever the rhetoric used by PH, racial sentiment was still pervasive
among the electorates. Had PH devised a strategy that ignored this reality,
their chances of winning GE-14 would have been slight.
At the same time, PH was clearly aware that Malay voters did nottrust the DAP. In the run-up to GE-14, study after study found that Malay
voters, both in urban and rural areas, had very low trust in the DAP and
saw the party as a threat to the special privileges that they enjoy as per the
Malaysian Federal Constitution.18 This contributed to how the seats wereallocated. In fact, the distrust of the DAP was nothing new. Soon after theformation of PH was announced on 22 September 2015, almost half of
KEADILAN’s central committee members signed a petition demanding
an emergency meeting. Their main concern was that DAP’s influence anddominance in PH could deter Malay voters.19 Thus, the challenges posedby the DAP’s presence were not just recognized by outside analysts, butalso by leaders in multiracial KEADILAN.
Two months after announcing the seat distribution, PH achieved
another major milestone. On 8 March 2018, to great fanfare and in
front of more than 1,000 people, PH launched their manifesto themed“Rebuilding Our Nation, Fulfilling Our Hopes”. The manifesto wasarranged into five “pillars”, namely (i) Reducing the people’s burden;

See, for example, Serina Rahman, Malaysia’s General Election 2018:
Understanding the Rural Vote, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 9/2018 (Singapore:
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018); and Wan Saiful Wan Jan, GE-14: Will
Urban Malays Support Pakatan Harapan?, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 10/2018(Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018).
18

https://www.mstar.com.my/lokal/semasa/2015/10/05/wan-azizah-dijangkakena-jawab-lancar-pakatan-harapan (accessed 2 March 2020).
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(ii) Institutional and political reform; (iii) Spurring sustainable andequitable economic growth; (iv) Returning Sabah and Sarawak to thestatus accorded by the Malaysia Agreement 1963; and (v) Creating a
Malaysia that is inclusive, moderate and respected globally.
The manifesto was an ambitious one. Presented as a book of almost
200 pages, it outlines a whole raft of promises from welfare provision toeconomic and institutional reforms. The welfare and economic promises
were very much populist in nature while the institutional reforms werepraised by many as exactly what Malaysia needed.20 Notably absent in
the book was how much these reforms would cost and how PH planned tofund them. Nevertheless, the populist welfare and economic promises—
such as abolishing the Goods and Services Tax (GST), increasing theminimum wage, and controlling the price of basic goods—were wellreceived by the electorate.
The signing of the coalition agreement, the appointment of coalition
leadership, the agreement on seat distribution, and the launch of the
manifesto, were attempts to create a stronger framework for the different
parties to work together as one government, should they win GE-14.
While these steps successfully united the four parties to enter into
battle with the ruling coalition, they were essentially superficial moves.
Fundamental differences in ideology, and in attitudes towards racial andreligious issues, were swept under the carpet as they went into campaign
mode after the manifesto launch. But, as will be seen in the next section,
the more fundamental differences very quickly came back to haunt PH
soon after they won GE-14.

POST-ELECTION DYNAMICS
GE-14 was fiercely contested and, in the beginning, many analysts andpollsters predicted that BN would win.21 But as it turned out, PH won

Talk by Laurence Todd, Director of Research at the Institute for Democracy andEconomic Affairs (IDEAS), 28 June 2019.
20https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2018/05/367411/merdeka-center-pollshows-bn-expected-retain-power (accessed 10 March 2020).
21

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113 of the 222 available seats, allowing them to form a government witha simple majority. The numbers were further strengthened when anotherparty, Sabah-based Warisan, decided to support the PH coalition, bringing
in a further eight seats. But once the euphoria surrounding the historic
victory subsided, the unresolved fundamental differences between PH
coalition members started to appear.

Failure to Address Malay Anxiety
Of the 113 seats won by PH, KEADILAN had the biggest share with48 seats. Second was DAP with 42, followed by BERSATU with 12
and AMANAH with 11. This outcome created a situation never seen
before in Malaysian politics. Since the country’s Independence in 1957,
UMNO had always had the biggest share of seats in government, and byextension the largest number of Ministers.
Following GE-14, for the first time in Malaysian history, the twobiggest parties in government were not Malay parties, but the multiracial
KEADILAN and the Chinese-dominated DAP instead. Between the two,they had 90 seats, which made up almost 80 per cent of PH government
seats in parliament. The party within PH seen as representing ethnic
Malays, BERSATU, came third with a measly 12 seats. Even if combinedwith the 11 seats won by Islamist AMANAH, the total number was still
very small compared to DAP and KEADILAN.
Even though UMNO did not win GE-14, they maintained their
popularity in Malay majority areas, especially in rural parts of Malaysia,
as seen in Figures 1 and 2. The two maps show how these two parties
actually won a large number of rural and Malay majority areas, while PH
won mainly in urban areas and in mixed constituencies. UMNO won 54
seats in total, making them the biggest single party in parliament at thattime.22 Malay voters also voted for the Islamist PAS, giving them 18 seatsin parliament.

Up to the time this essay was written, seventeen UMNO MPs have defected into
PH. See https://pages.malaysiakini.com/defectors/en/ (accessed 5 March 2020).
22

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Figure 1: Parliamentary Seats in Peninsular Malaysia by
Ethnicity and Winning Party (GE-14)

Source: Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun, “9 May 2018: The
Unexpected”, in The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge?
edited by Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof
Ishak Institute, 2019), p. 13.

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Figure 2: Parliamentary Seats in Sabah and Sarawak by
Ethnicity and Winning Party (GE-14)

Source: Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun, “9 May 2018: The
Unexpected”, in The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge?
edited by Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof
Ishak Institute, 2019), p. 14.

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Thus, the two Malay parties UMNO and PAS won 72 seats intotal, which is three times that of BERSATU and AMANAH. Thisoutcome is important because it is related to the Malay sentimentdiscussed in the preceding section. As described earlier, before
GE-14, Malay voters had consistently expressed scepticism towards PH,
especially due the presence of the DAP. The results of GE-14 showedthat not only did the scepticism persist, it was translated into votes. The
numbers behind GE-14 showed that PH failed to convince the Malays
and rural voters, and consequently their victory was driven mainly by
votes from ethnic Chinese and Indians as well as urbanites.
There were exceptions such as in the state of Selangor and someparts of Johor where Malay support for UMNO did decline. But when
examined from the national perspective, it was found that only 25 to
30 per cent of Malay voters voted for PH, compared to 95 per cent ofChinese voters and 70 to 75 per cent of Indian voters.23 Additionally,it has also been argued that some of the Malay support obtained by PH
was merely because of the wave of temporary rejection of UMNO. A
group of researchers from Monash University studied the phenomenon
and summarized their findings thus:
despite an overall swing of Malay voters against BN in GE-14, thelack of a statistically significant change in Malay voting behavior
between GE-13 and GE-14 does not warrant calling it a “Malay
tsunami”. It is speculated that some Malays voted against BN witha “this time only” mindset, hoping to rid themselves of the GST
and former PM Najib Razak. Quoting a CNN opinion piece by
ISEAS fellow Serina Rahman, “… a common statement reflectedamongst the rural Malays was that ‘there is nothing wrong with
UMNO. The problem was Najib. If he had stepped down, none ofthis would have happened. BN wouldn’t have lost.’ ”24

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2018/06/14/report-95chinese-but-less-than-30-malays-voted-for-ph/ (accessed 5 March 2020).
23

https://www.monash.edu.my/research/researchers-say/ge14-did-a-malaysiantsunami-occur (accessed 19 May 2020).
24

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Even though the election result should have raised alarm bells within
PH about how they failed to win the support of the majority population,
PH acted as if there was no urgency in the situation. When Mahathir, as
the new Prime Minister, announced the members of his cabinet, UMNO
immediately attacked the appointment of DAP Secretary General Lim
Guan Eng as Finance Minister. His background as an accountant did not
deter criticism. UMNO used his pending corruption trial as the reason
for their protest. However, a Malay NGO, PERKASA, immediately
supported UMNO’s call by saying the post of Minister of Financemust be given to a Malay and not a Chinese from DAP. According to
PERKASA acting president Ruhanie Ahmad, “If a non-Malay wasappointed, we are worried … that the socio-economic future of the
Malays will be threatened.”25 Even within Mahathir’s party, BERSATU,
the protest against Lim’s appointment was raised, and continued to beraised throughout the life of the PH administration.
Yet it is understandable why Mahathir persisted with his decision.
With the DAP being the second biggest party in PH, by convention
their leader needed to be appointed to a commensurate post. In addition
to the Minister of Finance, two more major appointments also raised
eyebrows, namely that of the Chief Justice and Attorney General.26
Both were filled by non-Malays. Even though the two appointments
were non-partisan and non-political in nature—and the nominees areboth of towering stature—it opened the door for the PH government
to be accused of weakening Malay political power within just weeks ofgetting into office.
As time passed, the situation did not improve for PH. DAP continued
to be seen as too dominant and too vocal in the PH administration. The
party insisted that they be treated as a truly equal partner in government,

https://malaysiagazette.com/2018/05/16/perkasa-menentang-lim-guan-engjadi-menteri-kewangan/ (accessed 5 March 2020).
25

In June 2018, Richard Malanjum was appointed as Chief Justice and TommyThomas as Attorney General.
26

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refusing to accept the previous model practised by BN where thegovernment was designed as a Malay-led government.27
DAP top leaders were aware that the public was wary of this attitude,
but they failed to manage their own leaders. Two of their Central
Executive Committee members, P. Ramasamy and Ronnie Liu, regularly
issued statements that roused Malay sensitivities, provoking BERSATU
into reacting. Even though BERSATU’s responses were meant to showthat the Malay party was strong enough to challenge DAP, the continuous
spat created a picture of a coalition in disarray, with a Malay party now
having to fend off an onslaught from a much bigger non-Malay party.28
It is therefore not surprising that an opinion poll conducted a year after
PH won power found that the government’s popularity had plummeted
and Malay insecurity had increased. In the poll, only a paltry “24 percent of Malay voters felt the country was headed in the right direction—astrong sign that the government needs to reassure the Malays their needs
are being addressed.” Mahathir’s popularity as Prime Minister plunged
from 71 per cent in August 2018 to just 46 per cent, while only 39 per centof Malaysians gave the PH administration positive ratings, a figure thatwas “almost as low as the 34 per cent vote share former prime ministerNajib Razak’s Barisan Nasional coalition obtained” in GE-14. In otherwords, one year after winning GE-14, PH’s approval ratings were almost
as low as that of BN just prior to them being booted out from government,
and they were particularly unpopular among Malay voters. The survey
also found that one of the key reasons for the unpopularity was concerns
over Malay rights and the protection of the Malay agenda under PH.29
Six months later, in October 2019, when the results of another poll wereInterview with Kamaruddin Jaffar, who was a KEADILAN MP and Deputy
Minister during the PH administration, 15 April 2020.
27

See, for example, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/10/23/ronnieliu-has-one-week-to-apologise-says-syed-saddiq
28

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/mahathir-and-pakatan-harapan-govtsee-popularity-ratings-drop (accessed 5 March 2020).
29

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published, PH’s popularity still had not changed, indicating that the
Malay voters remained unconvinced.30
The distrust was not just found in polls. When rural Malay voterswere interviewed after GE-14 and asked how they felt about BN’s
downfall, they expressed a sense of regret. They voted for PH in
GE-14 but they did not expect the coalition to win. Thus, after
GE-14, these rural folks became “worried that the new government
would not help them the way UMNO did in the past,” and that “there is
no longer a party in power that can genuinely champion the Malays andIslam”. Some even went so far as to say that the PH administration was a“Chinese government ... working to disempower the Malays”.31 Clearly,
even though they may have voted for PH, the Malays were still doubtful
about PH’s commitment to protect their interests.
Despite the widespread anxiety among the majority population, PH
did not make any real attempt to rectify the situation. Top PH leaders
were dismissive of the need to tackle Malay fears and insecurity. Whenquestioned about their tumbling popularity, DAP Secretary General Lim
Guan Eng merely focused on the economy by saying “We still have four
more years to go and we should use this opportunity to turn the economy
around” and “The crucial factor is always about economic prosperity
so that people feel confident that they will live better than before.”32
Similarly, Mahathir too did not take his plunging popularity, especiallyamong the Malays, very seriously. Commenting on the poll findings,
he stated “I don’t know how they did this survey, but what I know ismany people still want to shake hands, take photos, meaning there is still

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2019/10/06/dr-mdismissed-report-of-plummeting-ph-support/ (accessed 5 March 2020).
30

Serina Rahman, “The Rural Malay voters in GE-14: Expectations, Surprise, andMisgivings”, in The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge?,edited by Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof
Ishak Institute, 2020), p. 179.
31

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2019/08/29/yes-phpopularity-is-in-decline-but-weve-4-more-years-to-go-says-guan-eng/ (accessed
5 March 2020).
32

20

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18/6/20 11:30 AMsupport … The other (government leaders) also get the same requests.
This is proof that there is still support.”33 In short, the PH administration
ignored Malay anxiety, which created a gap between the administrationand the biggest voter block in the country.

Reform Missteps
PH’s manifesto promised some very bold institutional reforms, someeasier to fulfil than others. For example, the promise to abolish the GST
was delivered within just days of PH coming into government. But
there were also more difficult promises such as separating the Officeof Attorney General from the Public Prosecutor, which would require a
two-thirds majority in parliament which PH did not have.
Granted, there is no question about how much Malaysia needed—and still needs—institutional reform. PH immediately took steps to
implement this agenda and in just twenty months they declared that they
had implemented 60 per cent of their reform promises.34 They claimed
that many of the promised institutional reforms were either implemented
or were on track to be introduced. Among the important institutional
reforms that PH announced were the revamping of government
procurement processes, improving the transparency of Malaysia’s
financial administration, limiting the Prime Minister’s tenure to just
two terms, giving greater freedom to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission, and preparing for the establishment of an independent
police complaints commission.35

33

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/494688 (accessed 5 March 2020).

http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/baki-40-peratus-janji-manifestoph-akan-ditunai-pada-2020-guan-eng-225316 (accessed 6 March 2020).
34

For a more detailed assessment of how PH fared in implementing their
manifesto promises, see Project Pantau Report Cards no. 1, 2 and 3 publishedby the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), accessible fromtheir website http://www.ideas.org.my/publications/reports/
35

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Several times, Prime Minister Mahathir reiterated his government’s
commitment to pursue even more institutional reforms. It was clearly
one of his top priorities, as he stated in a parliamentary speech: “Themandate given to us by the people is to change. This is why institutional
reform is our priority.”36 Under normal circumstances the commitment
to institutional reform would certainly be praised. Unfortunately, in thiscase it added to the problems faced by the PH government because
institutional reform was an agenda that originated from the urban elites,
whereas the majority of the population was more concerned about
their livelihoods and the rising cost of living. This disconnect was
highlighted by Anwar Ibrahim himself, when he commented that “Theurban elite sets a list of priorities which are a disconnect from the real
problems of the poor, and at times, the elite seems to ignore these real
problems. I have not heard them talking about poverty, inequality.”37
Anwar even warned the PH administration that “There is still a feelingamong the majority of Malays that the government policies do notbenefit them. It is unsustainable for the government to ignore the voicesof the majority.”38
The influence of the urban elites on the PH administration was tobe expected because most seats won by PH were urban. This has been
illustrated earlier in Figures 1 and 2, and it created a disconnect between
PH and the rural and Malay population. The danger of being overly
focused on urbanite demands for institutional reform was highlighted
soon after PH won power. Barely three weeks after GE-14, a respected
analyst of Malaysian politics, Professor William Case, warned that
PH’s “fast and furious” approach in pushing for reforms could triggera backlash if not managed carefully.39 This author too raised the same

https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/10/487727/jawatan-pmmb-km-hanya-dua-penggal (accessed 6 March 2020).
36

37

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/474060 (accessed 6 March 2020).

38

https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/171266 (accessed 6 March 2020).

39

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/428005 (accessed 6 March 2020).

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concern, calling out those living in the “Bangsar bubble”40 as being too
demanding and insensitive towards the needs of the wider population,
especially the rural population and the Malays who form the majority ofthe electorates.41
As implied by the quote from Anwar Ibrahim above, the “realproblems” faced by the country have been economic in nature, especiallyamong the poorer segment of society. This is not to say that institutional
reforms are not important, but his statement was an acknowledgementthat many Malaysians were struggling to cope with the rising cost ofliving since before GE-14 and this issue was their number one concern
going into the election. While no one would deny that institutional reform
was needed, most analysts put economic hardship, stagnant wages, anddeclining purchasing power as the most urgent issues—certainly moreurgent than institutional reform—in the eyes of voters.42
Thus, when the PH administration was seen as putting more energy
into institutional reforms, the outcome was a disenchanted public,
because the economic benefits they desired from voting for change in
GE-14 had not materialized. Additionally, the situation became worse
for PH if the economic situation was analysed based on ethnicity. The
Malays have the lowest mean real household income compared to ethnic
Chinese and Indians,43 yet they felt that PH was not addressing theirgrievances. Whether PH actually helped the Malays or not is beside

Bangsar is an upper middle-class enclave in Kuala Lumpur. The term “Bangsar
bubble” implies that the views of some civil society activists and politicians are
too restricted to the elite environment they are familiar with.
40

https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/07/21/dont-just-promotereform-in-bangsar-bubble-wan-saiful-tells-ngos/1654558 (accessed 6 March
2020).
41

https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/runup-ge14-analysts-rising-costliving-and-stagnant-wages-voters-main-concerns (accessed 6 March 2020).
42

Martin Ravallion, “Ethnic Inequality and Poverty in Malaysia”, Paper presented
at the Eighth Meeting of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, Paris
School of Economics, 3–5 July 2019.
43

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the point. PH’s problem in this regard was perception. UMNO and PAS
also stoked this sentiment to aggravate the situation, a factor that will be
described later in this essay. The unpopularity of the PH administrationas captured by poll after poll is easier to understand if this economic issue
is taken into consideration. Not only did the Malays feel they had lost
political power in GE-14, PH’s mistaken prioritization of institutional
reforms meant they also felt that the government was no longer looking
after their economic well-being.
Having said the above, there is one important qualification thatmust be made. This essay is not arguing that PH was successful in
implementing the reforms that they promised. It should be noted thatthe 60-percent achievement quoted above was a self-proclamation
with not much details on how they reached that figure. In fact, someobservers felt that PH’s drive for institutional reform stagnated after
their first year in office, and that PH had only announced the beginningof reform initiatives rather than their completion. Even long-time DAP
leader Lim Kit Siang wrote that “the pace of institutional reform is still
too slow and unsatisfactory and more should be attempted.”44 Instead,the argument here is that, as a result of being overly-influenced by the“Bangsar bubble”, PH’s announcements and actions were perceived to
be too focused on institutional reforms while welfare was neglected. It
can be argued that this perception was factually incorrect because PH
did introduce various welfare programmes, such as the “Bantuan Sara
Hidup” cash transfer scheme, and they also increased the minimum
wage. But, as explained above, PH lost in the public perception battle
due to their missteps.

The Mahathir-Anwar Tussle
Another issue that continuously lingered was the never-ending tussle forpower and influence between Mahathir and Anwar. The rivalry between
the two has dogged Malaysian politics since the 1990s. But, as describedearlier, when PH was in the process of being formed, the two opted to44

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/484755 (accessed 2 June 2020).

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put aside their differences. Anwar—at that time still in prison—agreed
to relinquish his leadership position to Mahathir when BERSATU joined
PH. In return, Mahathir agreed that Anwar should be pardoned if PH
were to win power. Indeed, Mahathir delivered on this promise just one
week after PH took over.45
PH also promised that Anwar would succeed Mahathir as Prime
Minister. The time frame for transition was never put to paper but manyin PH—especially Anwar’s supporters—insisted that they expectedtransition to happen by May 2020, two years after GE-14. The two-yeartime limit was set by Mahathir himself. In an interview with Japanesenewspaper Mainichi Shimbun published on 3 February 2018, Mahathir
was quoted as saying “I can’t stay for very long. At the most, I can lastfor two years.”46 The same report also stated “Mahathir revealed that hewants to hand over the role of prime minister to Anwar after his releasefrom prison,” But once in office, Mahathir changed his view and statedthat he would instead only resign after the APEC Economic Leaders’Meeting scheduled for November 2020. He also changed his tone froman outright promise to hand over the responsibility to Anwar to sayingthat the next Prime Minister is whoever can garner the majority supportof MPs in parliament.47
Having said the above, it should be noted that BERSATU’s entry into
PH was a matter of political strategy. It was generally accepted that todefeat BN, opposition parties must be united under one banner. However,
BERSATU, and especially Mahathir, was never enthusiastic about thepossibility of handing over the prime ministership to Anwar.48 It was, in

https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/05/426377/anwar-bebas(accessed 3 March 2020).
45

https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180203/p2a/00m/0na/006000c (accessed
20 May 2020).
46

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/mahathir-says-promise-onleadership-transition-remains-but-pm-must-hold-majority-in (accessed 4 March
2020).
47

Interview with Hasnizam Adham, Selangor State Secretary for BERSATU and
one of the early activists of the party, 20 April 2020.
48

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fact, a marriage of convenience, which was made clear by many leadersof BERSATU, including Mahathir himself. In various closed-door
discussions and meetings after GE-14 attended by this author,49 Mahathir
was both adamant and consistent that he did not want to see Anwar
succeed him as Prime Minister despite his public statements. To Mahathir,Anwar is someone who would neither champion the Malays nor defend
the privileges accorded to ethnic Malays by the Federal Constitution.
Mahathir also believed that Anwar’s plans could be thwarted if the threemajor Malay parties—BERSATU, UMNO and PAS—were brought
together so that a new Malay-led government could be formed—doing
away with the Chinese-dominated DAP and the multiracial KEADILAN
in PH in the process.
Therefore, around March or April 2019, in a BERSATU Supreme
Council meeting chaired by Mahathir, it was agreed that Hamzah
Zainuddin—a former minister from UMNO who defected into BERSATU
after GE-14—should initiate conversations between BERSATU, UMNO
and PAS on the possibility of working together. In another meetingin July 2019, Mahathir asked for a national congress to be organized
so that he could showcase his ability to unite the Malays. Once again,
Hamzah Zainuddin was asked to coordinate the effort. The Malay
Dignity Congress was subsequently held on 6 October 2019. Mahathirdelivered the keynote speech, after which he stood on stage flanked by
PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang and UMNO Secretary General Annuar
Musa, symbolizing the coming together of the three main Malay parties
under his leadership. Anwar, however, was not invited until the very lastminute, and did not attend.50
Anwar’s supporters continued to pressure Mahathir to set a firm
date for the transfer of power. Week after week, the issue was raised

As a member of BERSATU Supreme Council since 1 March 2018, this author
was privy to various meetings and discussions on this topic, including with
Mahathir.
49

http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/kongres-maruah-melayu-anwardiundang-saat-akhir-219431 (accessed 3 March 2020).
50

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and debated, including by civil society groups close to Anwar such as
the Malaysian Islamic Youths Movement (ABIM).51 Even other PH
component parties joined the chorus, with AMANAH deputy president
Salahuddin Ayub saying “We accepted Mahathir as the Pakatan Harapan
chairperson after arriving at a consensus with a written agreement—that Mahathir will be the seventh prime minister while the eighth will
be Anwar … AMANAH will ensure we uphold the agreement.”52 Other
Anwar loyalists went as far as to threaten holding street rallies to maketheir demands more visible, alleging that Mahathir was untrustworthy
and that he wanted to cling to power forever.53 Throughout, Anwar hardly
made any effort to stop his supporters.
The tension between the two became a major distraction for the
PH administration. It was disruptive to Mahathir because he would bebombarded with questions about transition whenever he met the press.
It also diverted public attention from the various reforms and good workthat the administration had undertaken. This “passive aggressive” attitude
shown by Anwar, by portraying to the public that he was not demanding
for a quick transition but at the same time refusing to stop his supportersfrom making very vocal demands, weakened the PH administration andadded to the perception that PH was divided.54

THE OUTCOME
As can be seen from the above, during its time in office, PH was riddledwith some serious problems. The coalition won GE-14 mainly on theback of support from the non-Malays. Yet despite knowing this fact,
PH did not make any real attempt to woo Malay voters. Instead they

https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/malaysia-s-bersih-calls-formahathir-to-set-date-for-succession (accessed 3 March 2020).
5152

https://m.malaysiakini.com/news/488453 (accessed 2 March 2020).

Speech by KEADILAN national treasurer William Leong MP, 16 February
2020.
53

54

Interview with KEADILAN vice president Tian Chua, 14 April 2020.
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continued to prioritize institutional reforms, which, although important
for the country, were not the priority for a considerable proportion of
the population, who was more worried about their livelihoods and thesoaring cost of living. Worse, PH allowed the rivalry between Mahathirand Anwar to fester, thereby adding to the perception that the government
was unstable.

The Response from UMNO and PAS
PH’s problems became more acute when UMNO and PAS sensed thatthey had an opportunity to solidify the already negative public perception
on the government, especially among the Malays. Some key moves by
the two parties were as follows:i. Capitalizing on Malay sentiment—UMNO and PAS quickly capitalizedon the perception among Malay voters that PH was not looking after
their interests. After months of discussion, on 14 September 2019,
UMNO and PAS signed a joint charter to establish Muafakat Nasional(National Consensus), marking a formal partnership between the twoparties. The partnership was unprecedented because the last time PAS
and UMNO worked together in a formal pact was in 1974 as partof national reconciliation following the bloody 13 May 1969 ethnic
riots. But the formation of Muafakat Nasional was not unexpected.
The two parties had started courting each other almost immediately
after GE-14, upon realizing that they had a chance to capture the large
Malay vote base that did not opt for PH.
		 The first time that UMNO and PAS had a chance to work together
was in August 2018, three months after GE-14. In the run-up to the
Sungai Kandis by-election that month, PAS decided to not contest,
giving way to UMNO so that there would be a one-on-one fight against
PH. A month later, in the Balakong by-election, PAS once again did
not name a candidate and openly called for voters to choose BN. In
the same month, there was another by-election in Seri Setia. Thistime, BN did not name a candidate, allowing PAS to challenge PH ina straight fight. Even though PH won all three polls, the relationshipbetween UMNO and PAS grew closer and they continued to work28

20-J06951 01 Trends_2020-10.indd 28

18/6/20 11:30 AMtogether in all the ensuing by-elections, in which the relationshipstarted to bear fruit. Together UMNO and PAS defeated PH in threeout of the five by-elections that took place between October 2018 andAugust 2019. Following the official formation of Muafakat Nasionalin September 2019, two more by-elections took place and PH lostin both. The most significant one was in Tanjung Piai, Johor, inNovember 2019. BN named a Chinese candidate while PH put their
bet on a Malay imam. BN won a landslide with more than 15,000
majority, indicating that the partnership between the two Malay
parties worked even if their candidate was not a Malay who was, inturn, challenging a Malay candidate with religious credentials. The
Tanjung Piai by-election showed that Muafakat Nasional was alreadyable to command the Malay voters, including in getting them to votefor a non-Malay candidate.
		 The formation of Muafakat Nasional marked a rightward shift by
UMNO and PAS. Soon after losing GE-14, UMNO toyed with thepossibility of opening membership to non-Malays55 but only briefly.
The party quickly discovered that it would be a lot easier for them toregain support if they returned to their core voters, the Malays. Hence
their courting of PAS and the subsequent formation of Muafakat
Nasional. For UMNO, working with PAS in Muafakat Nasional
would enable them to become the dominant party once again because
they have a much bigger representation in parliament than PAS.
The new partnership would enable them to go back to their Malay
constituents with the argument that they were more able than PH toprotect Malay interests.56
ii. Discrediting the PH administration—UMNO and PAS, together
with other opposition parties, also invested time and effort in awell-orchestrated media campaign to highlight the division and thehttps://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/06/07/pahang-umno-chiefurges-party-to-open-membership-to-all-races/1639232 (accessed 20 May 2020).
55

Interview with an UMNO Supreme Council member who requested anonymity(19 May 2020).
56

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weaknesses within PH. This was perhaps the easiest step, because PH
kept making one blunder after another, and at the same time, PH’scommunication strategy was very weak and ineffective.57 The rivalry
between Mahathir and Anwar, as well as the perceived dominanceof the DAP in the PH administration, became daily ammunition for
attacking the government. Social media was widely used to increase
public dissatisfaction with the PH administration, enhancing theperception that PH was incompetent.
		 Questions were raised constantly about PH’s commitment toprotecting Malay interests. This too was repeatedly exploited by
UMNO and PAS to strengthen public assumption that PH was notcommitted to helping the Malays and that the Malays would be betteroff under a different administration. The concerted media effort
helped to forge public perception that the newly formed Muafakat
Nasional could be the saviour of the Malays in Malaysia, especiallyin the fight against DAP-controlled PH. Whether this view was inreality correct or not is beside the point; that was in any case certainly
the perception that was created.58
iii. Opening the door for a bigger Malay unity—Perhaps most importantly,
having successfully forged Muafakat Nasional and having successfully
discredited PH, especially among the Malays, both UMNO and PAS
leaders accepted the invitation from BERSATU—through Hamzah
Zainuddin as described earlier—to discuss uniting the Malay parties.
This was a significant move because even though in public UMNO
and PAS portrayed BERSATU as an enemy, behind the scene,
negotiations were taking place at the highest level. UMNO and PAS
leaders did not just converse with BERSATU through Hamzah, theyalso maintained a cordial relationship with Mahathir himself, bypersonally visiting him several times for private discussions.

Interview with AMANAH vice president and MP for Pokok Sena, Mahfuz
Omar, 11 April 2020.
57

Interview with KEADILAN director of communications and MP for Lembah
Pantai, Fahmi Fadzil, 17 April 2020.
5830

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These actions bore their first fruit with the organization of the Malay
Dignity Congress on 6 October 2019. Mahathir ventured out from thegovernment and even from the PH structure to embrace both UMNO
and PAS at that Congress. This move was approved by the BERSATUSupreme Council on the basis that they were the two biggest parties for
the Malays. In his keynote speech, Mahathir publicly called for the three
Malay parties to unite. He said “We are now divided into six small groups
and no one of us is able to garner more than 50 per cent of public support.
We did this to ourselves … When we are divided, we end up fighting
each other.”59 He even derided the need to work with non-Malays to win
public support and the subsequent need to share power with them bysaying “When we fight each other, we are forced to rely on support fromothers in order to win. We then feel that we owe them a favour … And
that forces us to pawn our powers to them because we are divided … I
want to admit here that this government, even though led by Malays, our
Malayness is not as strong as before … This is because whether we wantto or not, we must consider the feelings of others … If we do not consider
them, we will lose in the elections.”60
The organization of the Congress, and Mahathir’s presence in it, may
have been a decision made by the BERSATU Supreme Council. But it

Translated from Mahathir’s speech: “Terpecah kepada enam buah badan yangkecil-kecil belaka dan mana-mana satu dari mereka tidak mampu menguasai
50 peratus daripada sokongan rakyat. Inilah yang kita lakukan kepada diri kita
… Apabila kita pecah dan kita jadi kumpulan-kumpulan yang kecil maka kita
berlawan sesama kita.”
59

Translated from Mahathir’s speech: “Apabila kita berlawan sesama kita maka
terpaksalah kita bergantung kepada orang lain untuk mendapat kemenangan.
Apabila kita bergantung kepada orang lain sedikit sebanyak kita terhutang budi
kepada mereka … Dengan sendirinya kita sudah gadaikan kuasa yang diberi
kepada kita kerana kita berpecah belah … Saya nak mengaku di sini bahawa
kerajaan walaupun dipimpin oleh orang Melayu tidak sekuat keMelayuannya
sekarang. … Tidak kuat kerana nak tak nak pun kita kena ambil kira perasaan
orang lain. Kalua kita tidak ambil kira, datang pilihanraya, kita akan kalah.”60

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was also the clearest indication yet that the strategy taken by UMNO
and PAS to woo BERSATU out of the PH coalition had started to work.
The move towards Malay unity was also approved by Mahathir who
spearheaded the effort from within BERSATU.

The February 2020 Saga
With all that happening in the background over the course of many
months, the stage was set for the historic saga in February 2020. PH
held its Presidential Council meeting on Friday, 21 February 2020, with
the issue of transition being the biggest agenda. Reports stated that themeeting became tense when the topic came up for discussion.61 But it
concluded with a decision that Mahathir be given full freedom to decide
when he wanted to resign and hand over to Anwar.62
Both UMNO and BERSATU then had their respective Supreme
Council meetings on Sunday, 23 February 2020.63 Both debated thepossibility of forming a new government led by a coalition of the three
Malay parties. While UMNO agreed in principle with the move,64 the
BERSATU meeting chaired by Mahathir deserves further elaboration
because it created a raft of consequences for the party and for the country.
At the meeting, Mahathir objected to the proposed partnership for two
reasons. First, he disliked the idea of partnering with UMNO en bloc,
preferring instead to encourage individual UMNO members and MPs tojump ship into BERSATU. According to Mahathir, UMNO was corrupt
and did not deserve to be brought into government as one party. Second,

https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2020/02/568242/meeting-turns-tense(accessed 7 March 2020).
61

https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2020/02/567842/its-all-me-dr-m-sayspower-transition-plan (accessed 7 March 2020).
62

https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/02/23/leaders-holed-up-inpolitical-meetings (accessed 7 March 2020).
63

Interview with an UMNO Supreme Council member who requested anonymity(19 May 2020).
64

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Mahathir pleaded that he should be allowed to fulfil his promise to handover the prime ministership to Anwar. Both these arguments came asa major surprise to others in the meeting. Prior to this meeting, behindclosed doors Mahathir had always been clear about not wanting to pass
the baton to Anwar, and he was also open to partnering with UMNO
as evidenced by his own instruction to organize the Malay Dignity
Congress. But at that meeting, Mahathir suddenly changed his mind.
Up until the present, Mahathir has not explained the reason behind thissignificant change of heart.
Mahathir’s objection was supported by his son, BERSATU deputy
president Mukhriz Mahathir, as well as a small group of party members.
But a large majority of Supreme Council members felt it was time to makea firm decision on the matter and for BERSATU to lead the formation ofa new, Malay-led government. They argued that this issue should not be
guided by Mahathir’s personal desires alone. Instead the priority shouldbe the long-term survival of the party, especially among the Malays,
whom they feel would not vote for BERSATU in GE-15 if the party
remained in a coalition with DAP. Mahathir eventually relented, sayingthat he would abide by the majority decision. The meeting thus decided(i) with majority support that BERSATU would leave PH and form a
new Malay-led government, and (ii) with unanimous support that thechairman of the party could decide when to implement the decision. The
latter was proposed by Muhyiddin when he saw how reluctant Mahathir
was with the decision.
It should be noted that the decision for BERSATU to leave PH wasmade on the understanding that Mahathir would remain as Prime Ministerin the new government. At the 23 February meeting, it was explained to
BERSATU leadership that 133 MPs—mainly from BERSATU, UMNO
and PAS—had signed statutory declarations confirming their confidence
in Mahathir. The new government would not just be a Malay-led
government, but it would also be a more stable government holding abigger majority, with Mahathir at the helm and free from the pressure to
resign within a stipulated time.
But Mahathir caught everyone off-guard when he protested bysubmitting his resignation both as Prime Minister and as BERSATU
Chairman around noon on Monday 24 February 2020. The sudden
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resignation drove BERSATU into crisis mode. With Mahathir no longer
Chairman of the party, Muhyiddin had to take over as Acting Chairman.65
The most pressing issue he had to handle on that day was the fact that,with Mahathir’s resignation as Prime Minister and PH still holding the
majority in parliament, the door suddenly became wide open for Anwar
to claim that he held sufficient support to succeed Mahathir. Muhyiddin
immediately exercised his power as acting chairman to implement
the decision taken by BERSATU Supreme Council the day before, inline with the second decision of the meeting as described earlier. He
announced that BERSATU was leaving PH effective immediately, whichmeant that PH—and therefore Anwar—no longer had the majority inparliament. According to Muhyiddin, this move saved the party fromhaving to accept Anwar as Prime Minister, which was a situation thatneither Mahathir nor BERSATU wanted.66 In the same announcement,
Muhyiddin reiterated the party’s support for Mahathir to be reappointed
as Prime Minister.
Mahathir however remained adamant that he did not want to form a
new government that included UMNO. Instead he proposed that parties
from all sides join him to form a unity government.67 This sudden changeof heart created a major problem for BERSATU because it meant they
could not proceed to establish a new, Malay-led government that had
been in the works for more than a year. On Tuesday, 25 February 2020,
UMNO and PAS retaliated by announcing that since Mahathir was
unyielding in wanting to continue working with the DAP, then they

Paragraph 16.9 of BERSATU Constitution states that if the chairman resigns
or is removed, the president automatically becomes the acting chairman until anelection is held to choose a new chairman.
65

Explanation by Muhyiddin Yassin in a closed-door meeting with BERSATU
leaders at the official residence of the Prime Minister (Seri Perdana), 3 March
2020.
66

https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/02/25/sources-dr-m-eyeingunity-government/1840794 (accessed 8 March 2020).
67

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would withdraw support for him.68 To add salt to Mahathir’s wound, on
Wednesday, 26 February 2020, PH announced that since BERSATU had
left the coalition and Mahathir was no longer chairman of BERSATU,
they too had decided to withdraw their support for Mahathir, preferring
to nominate Anwar as Prime Minister instead.69 Mahathir was therefore
left with insufficient support to return as Prime Minister.
On the morning of Thursday, 27 February 2020, Muhyiddin had
a meeting with Mahathir, accompanied by then secretary general of
BERSATU Marzuki Yahya and Youth Chief Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul
Rahman. They discussed the national crisis and concluded that if
Muhyiddin was able to garner enough support, Mahathir would agree tosupport him as the next Prime Minister.70 Mahathir himself announced
that decision on the same day in a press conference, saying “There arevarious possibilities that we discussed including of course the possibility
that Muhyiddin might become the candidate. If everybody chooses him,
I am OK. As the PM, yes … if he goes to parliament and he is given fullmajority then he has the right to become the prospective Prime Ministerand the Agong (King) can appoint him. He can be sworn in and then ofcourse he can form his cabinet.”71
That announcement by Mahathir started the ball rolling forMuhyiddin’s nomination as Prime Minister. The original plan to createa Malay-led government was also back in the picture, albeit this timewith Muhyiddin at the helm. On Friday, 28 February 2020, UMNO, PAS
and all BN component parties declared their support for Muhyiddin tohttps://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2020/02/569044/bn-pas-pbrs-urgedissolution-parliament (accessed 8 March 2020).
68

https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/71607/KHAS/Peralihan-Kerajaan/
PH-sepakat-calon-Anwar-sebagai-Perdana-Menteri (accessed 8 March 2020).
69

Explanation by Muhyiddin Yassin in a closed-door meeting with BERSATU
leaders at the official residence of the Prime Minister (Seri Perdana), 3 March
2020.
70

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/02/27/im-okayif-more-lenient-muhyiddin-gets-support-for-pms-post-says-dr-m/ (accessed
7 March 2020).
71

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take the helm of the country. A group of eleven MPs led by KEADILAN
deputy president Azmin Ali also defected from their party to support
Muhyiddin.72 By the evening, the number of MPs supporting Muhyiddin
grew, with MPs from Sabah and Sarawak joining the new Perikatan
Nasional (PN) coalition under Muhyiddin.
The growing numbers led the King to summon Muhyiddin and otherleaders from parties in his new coalition for an audience on Saturday toassess if Muhyiddin commanded the confidence of the majority of MPs
in parliament.73 Subsequently, on Sunday, 30 February 2020, the National
Palace announced that “After getting representation from all leaders
representing their respective parties and independent Dewan Rakyat74
members, in the opinion of his Royal Highness, the member that is likely
to enjoy majority confidence among the Dewan Rakyat members is Tan
Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, the Pagoh MP.”75 This announcement marked theending of a tumultuous week in Malaysian politics, culminating with theappointment of Muhyiddin as the new Prime Minister. It also sealed thefate of PH, ending their twenty-two-month rule, and returning them tothe opposition benches.

CONCLUDING REMARKSThis essay has explained that the downfall of PH was not just due to
BERSATU’s quest to ensure Malay interests were better protected andAzmin Ali was sacked from KEADILAN on 24 February 2020. In the bigger
scheme of things, Azmin and his group of MPs played a significant role that
led to the formation of PN government. However, their actions had no major
influence on BERSATU’s decision to leave PH. BERSATU’s movement took
place independent of the split in KEADILAN. Hence the limited discussion on
Azmin’s role in this essay.
72

https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/71938/KHAS/Peralihan-Kerajaan/
Muhyiddin-menghadap-Agong-bawa-suara-Perikatan-Nasional (accessed
7 March 2020).
73

74

Dewan Rakyat is Malaysia’s lower house of Parliament.

75

https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/512686 (accessed 7 March 2020).

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that their party would survive and succeed in the long term, but it wasalso caused by the failure of PH to adjust their attitude and strategy tosuit the political reality. At this point, it is worth recalling that this study
set out to examine the episode from BERSATU’s point of view. Thus, as
stated in the introductory section, although there were many other factors
and actors which contributed to the demise of PH, they were disregarded
because the interviews conducted in this study found that they did nothave a significant influence in BERSATU’s decision-making process.
Looking back to when PH was formed, fracture points clearly existedfrom the beginning, especially resulting from their decision to sweep theirideological differences under the carpet. PH component parties ignored
the most significant difference they had—namely their attitude to theissue of racial and religious diversity—pretending that they could maskover it simply by proclaiming that they were committed to defending
the relevant clauses in the Federal Constitution. They also downplayed
the anxiety shown by the Malays, despite being told repeatedly by many
analysts and observers that they were suffering a major trust deficit
from that group. And although there were calls for the government togive more attention to the rural and poor Malays who needed economic
assistance, PH was too influenced by those in the “Bangsar bubble” whoinsisted that the government focused on institutional reforms instead.
The presence of DAP in PH was always the Achilles heel when
it came to obtaining more Malay support. It is important to note that
DAP’s commitment to the much-needed institutional reform wasunquestionable and, in fact, praiseworthy. But Malaysian politics isheavily coloured by ethnoreligious debates and those who ignore this do
so at their peril. PH won GE-14 with a very low level of support from
the Malays because the Malays feared what the DAP would do to Malay
privileges once in power. UMNO and PAS very quickly noticed thisweakness and they targeted the DAP whenever they could, accentuating
the perceived threat.
Most BERSATU leaders also realized that DAP was fast becoming aliability because of how they were perceived by the Malays. Ultimately,
the majority of BERSATU leaders decided that it was time to place
the long-term interest and mission of the party over and above any
personal considerations, believing that if they stayed in PH, the party
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would perform even worse in GE15. Thus, a decision was made as
early as March 2019 to explore forming a new, Malay-led government
in partnership with UMNO and PAS, which would be a government
more in line with BERSATU’s own purpose. The culmination was thechange of government in February 2020. For BERSATU, while they
acknowledged that GE-14 was won in partnership with PH, a significant
change of direction was needed in preparing for GE-15. Their assessment
was that staying in PH would result in desertion by Malay voters. Beinga Malay party, leaving PH and forming a government that could better
serve Malay interests was the most logical course of action.
From the whole episode, it is clear that any political party or coalition
that wants to govern Malaysia cannot afford to ignore sentiments among
the majority population. Outside of the “Bangsar-bubble”, the Malays
were not ready for the equality agenda perceived to be championedby the DAP and to some extent by KEADILAN. They saw in PH the
Chinese-dominated DAP insisting on being treated as an equal partner,
which is something many Malays today still find unacceptable. It did
not help that some DAP leaders continued to touch on sensitive issues
that served only to heighten Malay fears. This created a heavy burden
on other coalition partners, especially on BERSATU, who then had toshoulder the responsibility of defending the DAP against attacks by the
sceptical Malay audience.
The public, especially the Malay voters, expressed their disapprovalby punishing PH not just in opinion polls but also in by-elections. Yet
PH remained either too arrogant or too ignorant about the situation andcontinued to overlook their grouses, perhaps assuming that the issue betackled later in their supposed five-year term. Perchance, PH had thecorrect ideals for the country, envisioning a society where there was true
equality for all. Nonetheless this saga proves that in politics, idealism
must be tempered with a large dose of reality to avoid being detachedfrom realities on the ground, and, while the ideals must remain theultimate aim, the push for change must be done gradually.

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APPENDIX 1: Coalition Agreement Between Pakatan
Harapan And Bersatu
The agreement was signed on 13 December 2016. At the time, BERSATU
had not yet joined PH. Thus, this agreement was considered a “PHBERSATU” agreement.76
1. To ensure that the fight is in line with the spirit of the 1957/1963
Federal Constitution, especially on matters related to:a. Defending the Federal Constitution, Islam as the religion of
the Federation while other religions can be practised freely andpeacefully in accordance to Article 3; defending the special
position of the Malays and the Sabah and Sarawak bumiputra as
well as the legitimate interest of other communities in accordance
to Article 153;
b. Defending the role and responsibilities of the institution of
constitutional monarchy;c. Uplifting the status and usage of the Malay language inaccordance to Article 152 and to make the Malay language thelanguage of knowledge and regional lingua franca; defending
and championing the usage and learning of the mother tongues ofother ethnic groups; and improving the command of the English
language so as to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness globally.
2. To champion the reform agenda in developing the country for the
benefit of the people, based on shared values, including truth, justice,
freedom, integrity, welfare, and good governance.
3. To name only one candidate to represent Pakatan Harapan and
BERSATU in the election once seat distribution is negotiated anddecided based on winnability.

Translated from Malay. For a more accurate understanding, refer to the
Malay version at https://www.roketkini.com/2016/12/13/kandungan-perjanjianpersefahaman-pakatan-harapan-dan-parti-pribumi-bersatu-malaysia/
76

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4. To negotiate with other opposition parties so that as far as possible
there will be only one opposition candidate opposing Barisan
Nasional.
5. To create a united opposition coalition prior to GE-14 with a view toform a government after GE-14.
6. To set up a Joint Technical Committee to negotiate seat distribution,
manifesto and a common logo, as well as to plan the work towards
GE-14.
7. Based on friendship and cooperation, parties in this agreement will
maintain a healthy and cordial relationship with each other and any
dispute will be resolved through negotiation.

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41

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Arau
Padang Besar

Langkawi
JerlunKubang Pasu
Jerai
Pendang
Baling

Tasek Gelugor

Kedah (15)Penang (13)BERSATU(52)

Perlis (3)State(Total Seats)

Permatang Pauh
Bayan Baru
Nibong Tebal
Balik Pulau

Alor Setar
Kuala Kedah
Kulim Bandar Baru
MerbokPadang Serai
Sungai Petani

KangarKEADILAN
(51)

Bagan
Bukit Mertajam
Batu Kawan
Bukit Bendera
Tanjong
Jelutong
Bukit Gelugor

DAP
(35)

APPENDIX 2: Peninsular Malaysia Parliamentary Seat Allocation Within PH

continued on next page

Kepala Batas

Pokok Sena
Sik
Padang Terap

AMANAH(27)

42

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Larut
Lenggong
TambunBagan Serai
Gerik
Tapah
Kuala Kangsar
Pasir Salak

Tanjong Karang
Sabak Bernam
Sungai Besar

Selangor (22)BERSATU(52)

Perak (24)State
(Total Seats)

APPENDIX 2 — cont’dHulu Selangor
Selayang
GombakAmpangPandanPetaling Jaya
SubangSungai Buloh
Kapar
Kuala Langat

Padang Rengas
GopengSungai Siput
Bagan Datoh
Tanjung Malim

KEADILAN
(51)

Bangi
Puchong
Damansara
Klang

Taiping
Ipoh Timur
Ipoh Barat
Batu Gajah
BeruasKampar
Teluk Intan

DAP
(35)

Kota Raja
SepangHulu Langat
Shah Alam
Kuala Selangor

Lumut
Parit
Parit Buntar
Bukit Gantang

AMANAH(27)

43

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Kuala Pilah
JempolAlor Gajah
Masjid Tanah

Pagoh
Mersing
Tenggara
Sri Gading
Pengerang
Pontian
Muar
Simpang Renggam
Kota Tinggi
Tanjung Piai

Jerantut
Kuala Krau
Lipis
Paya Besar
Maran
Pekan

Negeri Sembilan(8)

Melaka (6)Johor (26)Pahang (14)Indera Mahkota
KuantanBera
RompinSegamatSekijang
LedangBatu Pahat
Sembrong
Pasir Gudang
Johor Bahru
TebrauHang Tuah Jaya
Tangga Batu

Port Dickson
RembauRaub
Bentong
Cameron Highland

Bakri
KluangIskandar Puteri
Kulai
Labis
Ayer Hitam

Kota Melaka

SerembanRasahcontinued on next page

Temerloh

Pulai
Parit Sulong

Jasin

JelebuTampin44

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BERSATU(52)

Hulu Terengganu
Setiu
Besut

Pasir Putih
BachokJeli
Gua Musang
KeterehMachang
TumpatPutrajaya
Titiwangsa

State(Total Seats)

Terengganu (8)Kelantan (14)Wilayah
Persekutuan (12)APPENDIX 2 — cont’dLembah Pantai
Setiawangsa
Wangsa Maju
Batu
Bandar Tun Razak

Tanah Merah
Pasir Mas

KemamanDungunKEADILAN(51)

KepongSegambut
Bukit Bintang
SeputehCheras

DAP(35)

Kubang Kerian
Kota Bharu
Pengkalan Chepa
Kuala Krai
Rantau Panjang

MarangKuala Terengganu
Kuala Nerus

AMANAH(27)

TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WHY DID BERSATULEAVE PAKATANHARAPAN?
Wan Saiful Wan Jan

ISSN 0219-3213
TRS10/20s
ISBN 978-9-814881-89-0

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

9789814 881890

ISSUE

10
2020