ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ, making a speech at the Welcome Dinner

Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary General, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
giving the keynote speech in the Session III

Participants lively exchanging views in the Session III

Preface
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world,
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus.

For

this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 24 years in organizing policy‐oriented bilateral
and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.
It is for this reason that GFJ held the Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue “Peace andProsperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role of Japan” in Tokyo on 27‐28 November 2005.

This

report intends to summarize the achievements of these discussions between Japanese and their BlackSea Area counterparts.

Though the printed version of the report will be made available to only a

restricted number of people such as members and friends of GFJ and their counterparts from Black Sea
Area, the full text of the report will be available at http://www.gfj.jp/.
The Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue “Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area
and the Role of Japan” was supported by the Japan Foundation, co‐sponsored by GFJ, University of
Shizuoka, the Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF) and the International Center for Black Sea
Studies (ICBSS), under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Yomiuri
Shimbun and was attended by 25 participants including 12 panelists representing Wider Black Sea Area.
Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significant importance related to the future ofJapan‐Wider Black Sea Area relations.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude

to the Japan Foundation, which generously supported this Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue.

February 1, 2006
ITO Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan

Table of Contents
1. Program……………………………….………………………...………………………………1
2. Participants List..……………………………………………...………………………………...3
3. Biographies of Panelists….……………………..………...…………………………………..5
4. Outlines of Discussions……………………………...…………………………………………95. Policy Recommendations………………………………...…………………………………11
6. Papers of Speeches…………………...……………………………………………………….12
Speech at the Welcome Dinner by ITO Kenichi…………………………………………..12
Opening Speeches………………...……………...……………...………………………….13
by ITO Kenichi ………………………..….....…..……..…......……….…13
by HARADA Chikahito ……………...……..….....…..…….….....……….…14

Keynote Speeches…………………...…………………………………………………….17
Session I: ʺReview and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area″by Mustafa AKŞİN ………………………..….....…..……..…......……….…17
by UEGAKI Akira…………………...……..….....…..…….…......…….…22

Session II: ʺStrategic Implications of Big Power Interests in the Area″………..……………...………………….….…33
by MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo ……………………..……………..……...……37

by Ioan Mircea PASCU

Session III: ʺThe Importance of the Area for Japan and Japanʹs Role in the Area″.………………………...………………………….47
by Tedo JAPARIDZE ….…………………...………………………….….….51

by HAKAMADA Shigeki

7. Minutes of Discussions…………………………...…………………...……………………59
8. Appendix 1………………………………………………...…………………………………76(1) Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area by Sergei GONCHARENKO….76(2) The ways of further security strengthening as the basis for the functional co‐operation in.………………………...…………………78(3) The Importance of the Area for Japan and Japanʹs Role in the Area by Tatyana KUZNETSOVA….82
the Black Sea region by Yuriy KOSTENKO

9. Appendix 2 : The Article of the Yomiuri Shimbun Article on the Dialogue……..……84
10. An Introduction to GFJ…………………………………………………...…………………85
11. An Introduction to University of Shizuoka…………………………………………..........88
12. An Introduction to BSUF………………………………………….................……………...90
13. An Introduction to ICBSS…………………………………………….……...……………..91

1. Program「日本・黒海地域対話」
THE JAPAN-WIDER BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE「黒海地域の平和・繁栄と日本の役割」
Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role of Japan2005年11月27-28日 / November 27-28, 2005
東京、日本 / Tokyo, Japan
助成 / Supported by
国際交流基金 / The Japan Foundation
主催 / Sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
共催 / Co-sponsored by
静岡県立大学 / University of Shizuoka
黒海大学基金 / The Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF)
国際黒海研究所 / The International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)
後援 / Under the Auspices of
日本国外務省 / The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
読売新聞社 / The Yomiuri Shimbun

2005 年 11 月 27 日（日） / Sunday, November 27, 2005
全日空ホテル「シリウス」 / ANA Hotel "Sirius"
開幕夕食会 / Welcome Dinner
18:00-20:00

伊藤憲一グローバル･フォーラム執行世話人主催開幕夕食会
Welcome Dinner hosted by ITO Kenichi, President of GFJ

2005 年 11 月 28 日（月） /Monday, November 28, 2005
日本国際フォーラム「会議室」 / The Japan Forum on International Relations "Conference Room"
オープニングセッション / Opening Session
10:00-10:30
開会挨拶 （10分間）
Opening Remarks (10min.)伊藤 憲一 GFJ執行世話人
ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

開会挨拶 （10分間）
Opening Remarks (10min.)イォアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 前ルーマニア国防大臣
Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of Romania

開会挨拶 （10分間）
Introductory Remarks (10min.)原田 親仁 外務省欧州局長
HARADA Chikahito, Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

本会議Ⅰ / Session I
10:30-12:30「黒海地域における機能的協力の現状と展望」"Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area″

議長 （５分間）Chairperson (5min.)

甲斐 紀武 GFJ世話人（前駐チュニジア大使）
KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ (former Ambassador to Tunisia)

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)ムスタファ・アクシン 国際黒海研究所会長
Mustafa AKŞİN, Chairman of the Board, the International Centre for Black Sea Studies

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)

上垣 彰 西南学院大学経済学部教授
UEGAKI Akira, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University

コメントA（7分間）
Lead Discussant A (7min.)
コメントB（7分間）
Lead Discussant B (7min.)セルゲイ・ゴンチャレンコ ロシア連邦外務省経済協力局次長
Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation
竹中 繁雄 アジア生産機構事務総長(前駐トルコ大使)
TAKENAKA Shigeo, Secretary General of Asian Productivity Organization (former Ambassador toTurkey)

コメントC（7分間）
Lead Discussant C (7min.)

ユーリー・コステンコ 駐日ウクライナ大使
Yuriy KOSTENKO, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan

コメントD（7分間）
Lead Discussant D (7min.)今村 朗 外務省欧州局中東欧課長
IMAMURA Akira, Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan

コメントE（7分間）
Lead Discussant E (7min.)

ポリクセニ・ペトロプル 駐日ギリシャ大使館一等参事官（政治担当参事官）
Polyxeni PETROPOULOU, First Counselor (Political Counselor), Embassy of Greece in Japan

自由討議 （50分間）
Free Discussions (50min.)

出席者全員
All Participants1昼食 / Lunch

樓外樓飯店
Rogairo (Seventh Heaven)12:30-13:30

本会議Ⅱ /Session Ⅱ
13:30-15:30「黒海地域における大国の利益及びその戦略」"Strategic Implications of Big Power Interests in the Area″

議長 （５分間）Chairperson (5min.)伊藤 憲一 GFJ執行世話人
ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)イォアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 前ルーマニア国防大臣
Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of Romania

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)六鹿 茂夫 静岡県立大学大学院国際関係学研究科教授
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor of the Graduate School of International Relations,
University of Shizuoka

コメントA（7分間）
Lead Discussant A (7min.)オグズ・オジ トルコ外務省経済局長
Oğuz ÖDGE, Director General for Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

コメントB（7分間）
Lead Discussant B (7min.)

石原 忠勝 外務省総合外交政策局政策企画室企画官
ISHIHARA Tadakatsu Senior Coordinator, Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan

コメントC（7分間）
Lead Discussant C (7min.)ブラゴヴェスト・センドフ 駐日ブルガリア大使
Blagovest SENDOV, Ambassador of Bulgaria to Japan

コメントD（7分間）
Lead Discussant D (7min.)

末澤 恵美 平成国際大学助教授
SUEZAWA Megumi, Associate Professor of Heisei International University

コメントE（7分間）
Lead Discussant E (7min.)アウレリアン・ネアグ 駐日ルーマニア大使
Aurelin NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan

コメントF（7分間）
Lead Discussant F (7min.)コンスタンチン・サルキソフ 山梨学院大学法学部政治行政学科教授
Konstantin SARKISOV, Professor of Department of Politics and Public Administration,
Faculty of Law, Yamanashi Gakuin University

自由討議 （45分間）
Free Discussions (45min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

コーヒー・ブレイク /Coffee Break

ロビーにて
in the Lobby

15：30-15：45

本会議Ⅲ /Session Ⅲ
15：45-17：45「日本にとっての黒海地域の重要性と日本の役割」"The Importance of the Area for Japan and Japan's Role in the Area″

議長 （５分間）Chairperson (5min.)イォアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 前ルーマニア国防大臣
Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of Romania

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)

袴田 茂樹 青山学院大学教授
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

基調報告（15分間）
Paper Presenter (15min.)

テド・ジャーパリッゼ 黒海経済協力事務総長
Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary General, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

コメントA（7分間）
Lead Discussant A (7min.)ソルマズ・ユナイドゥン 駐日トルコ大使
Solmaz ÜNAYDIN, Ambassador of Turkey to Japan

コメントB（7分間）
Lead Discussant B (7min.)

長崎 泰裕 ＮＨＫ報道局記者
NAGASAKI Yasuhiro, NHK Senior Correspondent, NHK-BS News Anchor

コメントC（7分間）
Lead Discussant C (7min.)
コメントD（7分間）
Lead Discussant D (7min.)
自由討議 （55分間）
Free Discussions (55min.)タティアナ・クズネツォーバ ロシア外務省経済局総務参事官
Tatyana KOZNETSOVA, Head of Chancery of the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation
廣瀬 陽子 東京外国語大学大学院地域文化研究科講師
HIROSE Yoko, Senior Lecturer of the Graduate School of Area and Culture Studies, Tokyo University ofForeign Studies
出席者全員
All Participants

ローリーズ・ザ・プライムリブ東京／ Lawry's The Prime Rib
総括報告会 / Wrap-up Meeting
1８:00-20:00

議長 甲斐紀武グローバル･フォーラム世話人
Chaired by KAI Noritake, Governor of GFJ

2

2. Participants List
【Black Sea Area Panelists】
H.E. Mr. Mustafa AKŞİN, Chairman of the Board, the International Centre for BlackSea Studies
Dr. Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of Economic
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation
H.E. Mr. Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary General, Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation
H.E. Mr. Yuriy KOSTENKO, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan
Mrs. Tatyana KOZNETSOVA, Head of Chancery of the Director General of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
H.E. Mr. Aurelian NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan
H.E. Mr. Oğuz ÖZGE, Ambassador, Director General for Economic Affairs at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
H.E. Mr. Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of Romania
Mrs. Polyxeni PETROPOULOU, First Counselor (Political Counselor), Embassy of
Greece in Japan
Dr. Konstantin SARKISOV, Professor, Department of Politics and Public
Administration, Faculty of Law, Yamanashi Gakuin University
H.E. Acad. Blagovest SENDOV, Ambassador of Bulgaria to Japan
H.E. Ms. Solmaz ÜNAYDIN, Ambassador of Turkey to Japan【Japanese Panelists】
Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
Mr. HARADA Chikahito, Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs
Ms. HIROSE Yoko, Senior Lecturer of the Graduate School of Area and Culture
Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
Mr. IMAMURA Akira, Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan
Mr. ISHIHARA Tadakatsu, Senior Coordinator, Policy Planning Division, Foreign
Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ
Mr. KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ (former Ambassador to Tunisia)
Mr. KANEKO Toru, Staff Writer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
Prof. MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor of the Graduate School of International
Relations, University of Shizuoka
Mr. NAGASAKI Yasuhiro, NHK Senior Correspondent, NHK‐BS News Anchor

3

Prof. SUEZAWA Megumi, Associate Professor, Heisei International University
Mr. TAKENAKA Shigeo, Secretary General, Asian Productivity Organization(former Ambassador to Turkey)
Prof. UEGAKI Akira, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University【Observers】
Mr. Serdar CENGIZ, First Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan
Ms. Vera STEFANOVA, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Japan（In Alphabetical Order）【The Global Forum Secretariat】
Ms. WATANABE Mayu, Executive Director
Ms. HAYASHI Yuka, Officer in Charge
Mr. FUKUDA Toshio, Secretarial Staff
Ms. NORO Naoko, Secretarial Staff
Ms. FUJII Miyuki, Secretarial Staff
Mr. NAGAYAMA Daigo, Secretarial Staff
Mr. KEVORK Christopher, Secretarial Assistant
Ms. KIM Jemma, Secretarial Assistant
Mr. KOHO Takaya, Secretarial Assistant
Mr. SANO Takeshi, Secretarial Assistant（In Seniority Order）

4

3. Biographies of the Panelists【Black Sea Panelists】
Ioan Mircea PASCU

former Minister of National Defense of Romania

Received his M.A. from the Academy of Economics, Bucharest in 1971, and his Ph.D. from the Institute of
Political Sciences, Bucharest in 1980. Served Presidential Counselor at the Political Analysis Department of the
Romanian Presidency, Minister of National Defense, and Professor at the International Relations Section of the
National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest.
Mustafa AKŞİN

Chairman of the Board, the International Centre for Black Sea Studies(Turkey)

Received an M.A. from the University of Ankara in 1954, and an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy in 1955. Served various positions including Ambassador to Kenya, Syria, and Yugoslavia,
Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and Dean of Students and Senior Lecturer at Bilkent
University, Ankara.
Sergei GONCHARENKO

Deputy Director of the Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served various positions. Also, served as Chairman of theCommittee of Senior Officials of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Chairman of theWorking Group on Economic Cooperation at the Barents/Euro‐Arctic Council from 2000‐01, Chairman of theWorking Group on Economic Cooperation at the Council of the Baltic Sea States from 2001‐2002. Concurrently,
Senior official of the Russian Federation at the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.
Yuriy KOSTENKO

Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan

Graduated from the Taras Shevchenko University, Kiev, in 1968. Entered Foreign Service in 1968. Served
various positions in Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs including Ambassador to Austria, Ambassador to
the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador‐at‐large. Since March 2001, Ambassador of Ukraine toJapan.
Polyxeni PETROPOULOUFirst Counselor (Political Counselor), Embassy of Greece in Japan

Received her M.A. from York University, and studied at the National School of Public Administration,
Athens. Served various positions including First Secretary and Consul of Greece in Melbourne, First
Counselor of the Embassy of Greece in Brussels, Deputy Director of North American Department at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and since 2003 Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Greece in Tokyo.
Oğuz ÖZGE

Ambassador, Director General for Economic Affairs at the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Turkey

Graduate of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs andserved various positions including Chief of Section in Multilateral Economic Affairs Department, Headof Department in the Directorate General of European Council, Deputy Director General in the
Directorate General of European Union from 1996‐1998, Deputy Director General in the Directorate
General of Central Europe and Baltics from 1998‐1999, Ambassador to Moldova from 1999‐2004.

5

Blagovest SENDOV

Ambassador of Bulgaria to Japan

Received his Ph.D. from Sofia University in 1964 and was conferred the Scientific Degree “Academician” in
1981. Served various positions including Dean of the faculty of Mathematics at Sofia University, President at
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the 37th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. Since
December, 2003, Ambassador to Japan.
Aurelian NEAGU

Ambassador of Romania to Japan

Graduated from Academy for Economic Studies in Bucharest in 1983. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and served various positions including Counsellor at the embassy of Romania in Seoul and at Asia, Africa andMiddle East Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Konstantin SARKISOVProfessor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Facultyof Law, Yamanashi Gakuin University (Russia)

Graduated from the St. Petersburg (Leningrad) State University in 1966. Received his Ph.D in 1975, “Japan andthe United Nations.” Served various positions including President of the Russian Japanologists Association,
Visiting Professor of Hosei University, Visiting Professor at Hitotsubashi University, Special visiting Professor
at Keio University.
Tedo JAPALIDZESecretary General, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

Graduated from Tbilisi State University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989. Served Assistant of
the Head of the Council of National Security and Defense of Georgia, Ambassador of Georgia to the UnitedStates of America, Canada and Mexico, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia from 2003‐2004. Before
assuming his responsibilities in the BSEC PERMIS, he was the Honorary Chairman of the Transcaucasus
Foundation and Special Advisor to Washington Strategic Advisors, LLC.
Solmaz ÜNAYDIN

Ambassador of Turkey to Japan

Received M.A. from Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, USA. Entered the Minisstry of Foreign Affairs in 1967.
Served various positions including Second Secretary and Counsellor in the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the
U.N., First Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Egypt, Ambassador of Turkey to Sweden and Poland, Director
General of the Department for Overseas Promotion of Turkey, Director General for Policy Planning
Department.
Tatyana KOZNETSOVAHead of Chancery of the Director General, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation

Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of Department at the Administraation of the President of theRussian Federation from 1994‐2003.

(In order of appearance)

6

【Japanese Panelists】
ITO Kenichi

President, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at Harvard
University from 1961‐63. Served in the Japanese Foreign Service until 1977. Concurrently, President & CEO of
the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President of CEAC, President & CEO of GFJ, and Professor
at Aoyama Gakuin University.
HARADA Chikahito

Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Graduated from Tokyo University in 1974. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1974. Served various
positions including Director of Russian Division of European Affairs Bureau, Deputy Director‐General ofNorth American Affairs Bureau, DDG of European Affairs Bureau, and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Japan to China.
KAI Noritake

Governor, GFJ

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964. Served various
positions including Director of the First Africa Division, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ambassador to Panama,
Ambassador to Lebanon, Ambassador to Tunisia, Professor at Kagoshima Prefectural College in 2003.
Concurrently, Councilor of the Japan Forum on International Relations.
UEGAKI Akira

Professor, Faculty of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1974. Received his M.A. from the University of Tokyo in 1977 and
his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Tokyo in 1994. His research interests include comparative economic
systems, Russian economy, and Romanian economy.
TAKENAKA Shigeo

Secretary General of Asian Productivity Organization (former
Ambassador to Turkey)

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University, graduated from Swarthmore College, USA. Entered the Ministry ofForeign Affairs in 1965. Served various positions including, Ambassador in charge of inspection, Ambassador
to Turkey, Ambassador to Bangladesh, Executive Director of the Metal Mining Agency of Japan and Director
General at the Department of Immigration of the Ministry of Justice.
IMAMUA Akira

Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan

Graduated from University of Tokyo in 1984. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1984. Served various
positions including First Secretary at the Embassy in Russian Federation, Counselor at the Embassy in the USA,
Director of the Russia Assistance Division of the European Affairs Bureau.
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo

Professor, Graduate School of International Relations, University of
Shizuoka

Graduated from Sophia University (Tokyo) in 1976. Received his M.A. in International Relations from Sophia
University in 1978, and his Ph.D. in Law from Bucharest University in 1985. Visiting Fellow at the European
Institute of London School of Economics and Political Science (July 2000‐March 2001), Dean of the Faculty ofInternational Relations (January 2002‐December 2003) and a Presidential aid of University of Shizuoka (June2005~present).

7

ISHIHARA Tadakatsu

Senior Coordinator, Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan

Graduated from Tohoku University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1971. Served various
positions including First Secretary at the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic, and Switzerland,
Consul at the Consulate-General in Berlin.
SUEZAWA Megumi

Associate Professor, Heisei International University

Received her M.A. from the Graduate School of Political Science, Tokai University in 1990, Studied at Moscow
State University, Graduate School of International law from 1990‐1991, became a Ph.D. candidate at Tokai
University in 1993. Served as Research Fellow, Center for Russian Studies and Center for Global Issues(European Section), The Japan Institute of International Affairs from 1995‐2002. Concurrently, Lecturer at Tokai
University from 1993‐present.
HAKAMADA Shigeki

Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

Graduated from Tokyo University in 1967 and engaged in postgraduate studies at Moscow State University
from 1967−72. Served as visiting fellow at Princeton University, visiting Professor at Tokyo University,
visiting Professor at Moscow State University. Concurrently, professor (former dean) of School of International
Politics, Economic and Business at Aoyama Gakuin University. President of the Japanese Society for Russianand East European Studies, an opinion leader member of GFJ.
NAGASAKI Yasuhiro

NHK Senior Correspondent, NHK‐BS News Anchor

Joined NHK in 1981. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has reported on the ongoing reforms towards
market economy in East European former socialist states and has continued to cover and analyze their EU
accession process for NHKʹs International News/News Department. Also covered and produced stories on
ethnic issues in post‐cold war Europe, such as the Bosnian conflict in former Yugoslavia. Stints ascorrespondent in Tehran, Berlin, Prague, Geneva and Moscow. NHK‐BS news anchor since April 2003.
HIROSE Yoko

Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Area and Culture Studies, Programof Peace and Conflict Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Received her M.A. in Law (1997) from the University of Tokyo and became a Ph.D. candidate in 1997.
Researched in Azerbaijan as the Akino Fellow of UN University from 2000‐2001. Served as Research Fellow of
the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science from 2001‐2002, Assistant Professor at Keio University, Facultyof Policy Management from 2002‐2005. Concurrently, Special Researcher at National Museum of Ethnology
and at Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Part‐time lecturer at Keio University.
KANEKO Toru

Staff writer, The Yomiuri Shimbun ( Japanese daily newspaper )Entered The Yomiuri Shimbun in 1994. Since 2000, staff writer of the International news department.

(In order of appearance)84. Outlines of Discussions
The Global Forum of Japan co‐hosted, together with the International
Center for Black Sea Studies etc., “The Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue”
on 27th and 28th of November 2005 in Tokyo. The theme was “Peace andProsperity of the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role of Japan.” The event was
supported by the Japan Foundation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
Yomiuri Shimbun and others.
There were fourteen participants from such countries as Ukraine,
Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Russia, among whom were a former Defense
Minister from Rumania and a former Foreign Minister from Georgia, while
there were also fourteen participants from Japan including Mr. HARADA
Chikahito, Director General of the European Affairs Bureau of MOFA and Prof.
ITO Kenichi, President of the Global Forum of Japan.
This “Dialogue” was first proposed by the Black Sea Area side andfollowed up by the Japan side through a year of preparation, resulting in the
successful “First Dialogue” between Japan and the Black Sea Area countries.
The “Dialogue” was composed of the three Sessions of “Functional
Cooperation,” “Big Power Strategy,” and “Japan’s Role.”
First, Mr. Mustafa AKŞİN, Chairman of the International Center forBlack Sea Studies, stated, “After the end of the Cold War Turkey has taken
initiative to promote economic cooperation in the Black Sea Area, and in 1992
the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was establishedwith the membership of six littoral and six non‐littoral states.”
Then, Mr. Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary General of the Organization of
BSEC, reported the achievements of regional cooperation in the fields of energy,transport, environment, trade, economic development, tourism, agriculture,science and technology, democratization, human rights, anti‐drug trafficking,control of arms smuggling, counter‐terrorism, etc.
Further, Mr. Ioan Mircea PASCU, former National Defense Minister of
Rumania, reminded the participants of the strategic importance of the Black Sea
9Area from the ancient times as a cross roads intersected by the East‐West
corridor connecting Europe with Central Asia and the North‐South corridor
connecting Russia with Middle East. Then he referred to the strategic
importance of the Area today as a corridor for passage of oil and natural gas
produced in the Caspian Sea. Finally he added that Japanese enterprises had
already invested in the Area for the development of energy projects.
Amb. Solmaz ÜNAYDIN of Turkey stressed that the economic growthrate of this Area in the year of 2004 was as high as 7 percent. Mr. Sergei
GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs Department of
Russian Foreign Ministry, asked Japanese investors to pay attention to the plan
to build networks of electric power supply and automobile high ways covering
the entire region.
Finally, Secretary General JAPARIDZE requested Japan to apply for an
observer status in BSEC. In response, Director General HARADA assured that
he would positively study the matter.

10

5. Policy Recommendations
1. As a global player and a leading economic power, Japan should consider
becoming in the near future an observer to the organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as the US, Russia etc., which has been at thecenter of dynamic and strategic changes occurred recently in the Black Sea
region.
2. Japanʹs pacifism is needed as a positive model for the region. Considering theexisting regional conflicts, Japanʹs involvement in helping the consolidation ofpeace and democratization of the region would be a welcome contribution.
3. Japanese business and entrepreneurs should study closely investment
opportunities in areas such as hotels and infrastructure in tourism in the region.
Japanese airlines should consider extending their operations to the BSEC
countries, where their absence is conspicuous.
4. Japan should take part in working groups of the BSEC on energy, tradeand development. Japan Foundation is requested to consider running one ofthese meetings in Istanbul.
5. Japan is invited to arrange seminars on topics such as small and medium
scale enterprises, taxation and services industry. Japan should also show
active interest in large scale projects in such areas as electric power, highways,
and the widening of internal waterways .The construction of a new watertransport system connecting the Caspian Sea region to the Black Sea region
should also be given considerations.
6. It would be recommendable for Japan to send several Japanese entrepreneurs
to the region for six months or a year to identify options for regional
development and present them to the Japanese business community.
7. This Dialogue should be followed by meetings in Istanbul, Tokyo or Moscow
and The GFJ is invited to these meetings.

11

Papers of Speeches
Welcome Dinner Speech
ITO Kenichi
President, Global Forum of Japan

His Excellency Minister Ioan Mircea PASCU, Mr. Tedo JAPARIDZE, Distinguished
Participants of the “Japan Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue,” Ladies and Gentlemen,
In my capacity as President of the Global Forum of Japan(GFJ), which is the host of the“Japan Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue,” I would like to extend my heartfelt welcome toall of you who have gathered here to attend the “Japan Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue”
to be held tomorrow. Particularly to those of you who have traveled thousands of miles
to come to Tokyo from the Wider Black Sea Area.
Frankly speaking, until today there have existed no contact, much less relationship,
between Japan and a regional grouping called the Wider Black Sea Area. We, Japanese,were not even aware of the presence of such a regional entity as called the Wider BlackSea Area. But starting today, we will be in close touch with each other.
Though we were not very familiar with the circumstances in which the countries of theWider Black Sea Area were situated, we were quick to understand the implications of thestate of the Wider Black Sea Area because they seemed to resemble those of the state of
the Japan Sea Area. Both the Black Sea and the Japan Sea were a frozen sea during theCold War years. They were the forefront of the confrontation between East and Westduring the Cold War. However, after the end of the Cold War a new relationship ofmutual communication and cooperation is growing in the Japan Sea Area. Therefore,
we, Japanese, could instantly grasp the meaning of the Wider Black Sea Area when we
first heard about it. Tomorrow we would like to hear more about the implications of
the formation of the Wider Black Sea Area and to think about the perspective of peace
and prosperity in the Area.
The world is quickly changing. For instance, in this part of the world the concept ofwhat is called an “East Asian Community” is being discussed not only on the private
level of Track 2 but on the official level of Track 1. Next month in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, there will be held what is called the “East Asian Summit,” where heads of stateof 10 ASEAN nations plus Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand will29

assemble. In your part of the globe, the former Soviet Union dissolved into the three
independent nations of Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, while Romania followed the suit ofTurkey and Greece in joining NATO. In this context of global change, which isaccelerated by the rapidly growing interdependence between nations and regions, it
becomes timely and appropriate for us to hold the “Japan Wider Black Sea Area
Dialogue” tomorrow.
Let me conclude my Welcome Remarks by saying that I sincerely hope that tomorrow’s“Dialogue” between us will pave the way for strengthening of contacts and cooperation
between Japan and the Wider Black Sea Area. Thank you very much.

30

Opening Remarks Speeches
ITO Kenichi
President, Global Forum of JapanAs I announce the opening of the “Japan and Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue,” it may benecessary and appropriate to say a few words on how the idea of this Dialogue was bornand has been evolved. True, as everybody in this room will concur, the Black Sea Area
and Japan are separated from each other by a huge distance, but, thanks to the end of theCold War and the ensuing process of globalization, we are becoming first neighbors andthen friends very quickly. The proposal to hold this Dialogue between the Black Sea
Area and Japan came first from our friends in Romania. Let me disclose that twelve
years ago in 1993 H.E.Prof. Ioan Mircea PASCU was staying with us at the Japan Forumon International Relations, sister organization of the Global Forum of Japan, as a senior
visiting research fellow. Later upon his return to Romania, he became a politician andserved as the Defense Minister of Romania until very recently. It was he and his friends
in the Black Sea University Foundation who suggested this Dialogue.
However, frankly speaking, we were not sure at the outset that this idea will be
understood and accepted in either Japan or in the Black Sea Area countries. However,there was a way where was a will. Many people with whom we consulted, including
Mr. OGURA Kazuo, President of the Japan Foundation, on the Japanese side andAmbassador Solmaz UNAYDIN of Turkey on the Black Sea side, were quick tounderstand the importance of such a “Dialogue” and instantly offered us their helping
hand. Without their support this “Dialogue” would have never materialized. Let me
also mention that the personal decisions taken by Mr. HARADA Chikahito,
Director-General of the European Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan, and Mr. Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, to participate in this “Dialogue” in person elevated the relevancyof the “Dialogue.” Finally, it is my pleasure to introduce to you that the Yomiuri
Newspaper, the biggest commercial newspaper in the world with the daily circulation ofover ten million copies, have kindly agreed to print and report the contents of our“Dialogue” to its readers.
Now let me also say a few words on the Global Forum of Japan which is the organizer ofthis “Dialogue.” The Global Forum of Japan is known for its long history ofpolicy-oriented international exchanges dating back to 1982, when Japanese, Americans,Europeans and Canadians met in Washington and established the then so-called
Quadrangular Forum. After the end of the Cold War, the Quadrangular Forum itself

31was dissolved in 1991. However, the Japanese component of the Quadrangular Forumsurvived as a national body for policy-oriented international exchanges with Japan as a
hub for all countries in the world and has been active as such since then in the name of
the Global Forum of Japan. Every year we organize three to four what we call
“Dialogues.” This year we have already had such “Dialogues” with Korea and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN. Next year we will have such
“Dialogues” with China, the United States and ASEAN.
Welcoming all of you who have participated in this “Dialogue” and hoping a fruitfulexchange of views and opinions among you, let me conclude my opening remarks.
Thank you again.

HARADA Chikahito
Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to make a few introductory remarks to you on thisintellectually intriguing theme: peace and prosperity in the wider Black Sea area and therole of Japan.
The wider Black Sea area is distinctive in its dynamism and diversity where various
cultures co‐exist after centuries of the rise and fall of different civilizations. The area,
however, has never been recognized as a region with common characteristics until
recently. This is partially because the geographical scope of the area extends all the way
from Europe, the Caucasus to the Middle East. Many countries, therefore, have yet todesign a foreign policy which encompasses the entire area. Japan regrettably is no
exception.
However, if looked at from a different angle, the area has been gradually acquiring
common features of geopolitical and economic importance. This gives us some hints
for a possible role that Japan can play in this area.
I would like to mention some of the significant features which enable Japan to involve
itself in the area. First, in recent years, the area has become an important transportationroute of energy resources connecting the Caspian Sea with Europe. As Caspian oil
development projects in which Japanese companies also participate increase theirproduction, not only the Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project but also the BlackSea itself are being increasingly used for the transportation of oil by tankers. With the
Bosporus Straits already heavily burdened, the ports on the western coast of the BlackSea are gaining significance. Japan has provided yen credits in order to upgrade the32capacity of terminal ports through the Bourgas Port Expansion project in Bulgaria andthe Rehabilitation of Port of Constanza Project in Romania. Furthermore, while further
improvement needs to be made for a more favorable investment environment, Japanfinds the area attractive as a potential partner for trade and investment, with a market of
400 million people and competitive labor costs.
Second, there is an increasing trend in the area toward democratization and market
reforms, accompanied by an aspiration to accession to the EU and NATO. This trend
has become more evident especially after the so called “Rose Revolution” of Georgia in
2003 and “the Orange Revolution” of Ukraine in 2004. Organizations such as GUAM(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and the Community of Democratic Choicecreated by Ukraine and Georgia aim at achieving many of these goals. Considering
democratization as an important factor for regional stability, Japan actively assists theirefforts toward democratization, through the dispatch of the election observation
missions to Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, and the undertaking of a high‐level dialogue
with these countries. One example of the latter is the meeting between Mr. Junichiro
Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine in
July this year on the occasion of Mr. Yushchenko’s visit to Japan. The two leaders
signed a Joint Statement in which Japan reaffirmed its intention to further support theconsolidation of democracy in Ukraine. Japan has also provided the countries in thearea with technical assistance not only in support of democratization, but also for the
purpose of human resource development to promote further transition to a market
economy.
Third, as history has demonstrated, the area is not immune from conflicts. Even today
conflicts remain in such region as Transdniestr, Abkhazia, South Ossetia andNagorno‐Karabakh, and these are the primary factor of instability in the area. Althoughethnic, religious and other issues continue to complicate these conflicts, Japan calls fortheir peaceful settlement. Placing “peace consolidation and nation building” as one ofthe pillars of Japan’s international cooperation, Japan is ready to consider assisting thearea in its efforts in peace building during the post‐conflict stage. In fact, Japan took
such an initiative in the Western Balkans by co‐chairing with the EU, the Ministerial
Conference on Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the Western Balkans
in Tokyo last year, with a view to encouraging the countries in the region to fully
cooperate in accomplishing peace consolidation and sustainable economic development,with participation from Western Balkan countries as well as many countries of the wider
Black Sea area.
Fourth, the area is facing problems which have cross‐border implications and require
regional cooperation, such as infectious diseases as well as transnational organized crime
including the trafficking of drugs and human beings. The illegal trade of arms andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also the issues of our concern. Taking
into consideration their global implications, Japan is cooperating in addressing those
problems by participating in the Regional Center of SECI (Southeast European

33

Cooperative Initiative) for Combating Transborder Crime in Bucharest and the Scienceand Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev.
Japan highly values initiatives of regional cooperation in the area as an effective tool forbuilding confidence, coping with transborder issues and promoting trade andinvestment. We consider that such cooperation must be open to all the countries of theregion. In that sense, we welcome the constructive role played by the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as a unique body encompassing all thecountries of the region. Against the background of the new tendencies mentioned
above, we expect that it can even further strengthen its activities. Many countries of theregion are also taking their own initiative for regional cooperation. Georgia attaches
importance to the east‐west transportation corridor as a pillar of its economic policy.
Romania also promotes “the Black Sea policy” and intends to become a mediator which
would prevent potential conflicts over energy from occurring in the area.
Japan, as an honest partner of the area, intends to continue assisting the efforts made by
the countries of the region toward democratization and a market economy. We would
also like to encourage the further improvement of the environment for trade andinvestment and to continue cooperation particularly in dealing with transborder issues
in such fields as environmental protection, climate change and transnational organizedcrime. I am convinced that the strengthening dialogue between countries of the region
and Japan at various levels will contribute to the promotion of such cooperation.
Today’s meeting organized by the Global Forum of Japan is a valuable attempt at a
non‐governmental level and I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the Forum.
I would like to close my remarks by wishing for success in the wider Black Sea
cooperation, and wishing our sumo wrestlers Koto‐oshu from Bulgaria and Kokkai from
Georgia, bridge‐builders of a friendly relationship between Japan and the area, good luckin their pursuit of higher titles in the tournaments.
Thank you very much for your attention.

Session I
Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area

Mustafa AKŞİN
Chairman of the Board, the International Centre for Black Sea Studies

34

Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area
Mr. Chairman,
Over the last 15 years, we have witnessed the ending of the Cold War and thechanges that occurred throughout the globe in the aftermath of this historic event. At theepicenter of these momentous changes were Eastern Europe and the region referred to as
Eurasia, stretching from Eastern Europe all the way into Central Asia and the frontiers ofChina. At the center of this vast region lies the Black Sea basin where the land routes andsea lanes connecting east and west and north and south intersect. This is the region thatoverlaps the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East and constitutes the link between
the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Located at this strategic spot, it was naturalfor Turkey to take the initiative at the beginning of the 1990s and propose the formationof a regional cooperation arrangement that would ensure that the Black Sea becomes asea of peace, stability and prosperity through closer economic cooperation. This was the
background against which the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) came into being
in 1992 with the participation of 11 states. These were Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In 2004,
Serbia and Montenegro joined BSEC as its 12th member.
The founding members of BSEC had little in common when they embarked on theircooperative venture. Six of them were component republics of the former Soviet Union,
which had dissolved the previous year. Three members were former single‐party stateswith centrally planned economies. Only Greece and Turkey had market economies. At
the time, Greece was already a member of the European Union. Although both were
NATO allies, Greece and Turkey were at odds over a number of unresolved disputes.
Some of the 11 countries were struggling with separatist movements and others were inopen conflict with one another. All but two of the member states were going through thepainful transition from communism to a market economy, a process usually involving
drastic economic contraction, hyperinflation, unemployment, penury and very often,
political instability.
And yet, the leaders of these countries had the wisdom and foresight to engage inregional economic cooperation at a time when their attentions were focused on pressing
domestic issues and their only common denominator appeared to be geographic locationin the Black Sea region.
At first, BSEC was merely a commitment to engage in economic cooperation and to
be bound by the Helsinki Final Act and the principles of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. However, in 1998, the Heads of State of the member
countries signed the BSEC Charter, subsequently ratified by the national parliaments.
This transformed the BSEC from being a process of cooperation into a fully‐fledged

35international organization and paved the way for closer cooperation with similarorganizations. Today, BSEC has observer status at the General Assembly of the UN andcooperation with other organizations like the World Bank, the OECD and the EU. BSEC
is in the process of tightening its links with the EU as Bulgaria and Romania make readyto join Greece as full members by 2007. In addition, Turkey is now engaged in accession
talks with the EU.
After this introductory background information, we can turn to the structure of
BSEC and how it functions.
The decision‐making organ of BSEC is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
The Council acts upon the recommendations of the Committee of Senior Officials whose
members represent the Ministers and oversee the implementation of the decisions andrecommendations of the Council. BSEC has a Secretariat headed by the Secretary General.
The location of the Secretariat is Istanbul. The work of BSEC is carried out throughWorking Groups consisting of government representatives and experts with each
Working Group dealing with a particular sector. The Working Groups meet periodicallyand report to the Senior Officials. There are 15 Working Groups in sectors like energy,transport, environment, trade and economic development, tourism, agriculture, scienceand technology and others.
BSEC has 4 related bodies consisting of the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC
(PABSEC), the BSC Business Council (BSEC BC), the Black Sea Trade and Development
Bank (BSTDB) and the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), which is one of
the co‐sponsors of this meeting. I will now briefly describe these related bodies.
PABSEC is the parliamentary dimension of BSEC cooperation. It is active in areas
like harmonizing legislation to facilitate trade, combating organized crime andenhancing democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It was established in 1993 andits Secretariat is located in Istanbul. PABSEC conducts its business through 3 committees:
1) Economic, Commercial, Technological and Environmental Committee; 2) Legal andPolitical Affairs Committee and 3) Cultural, Educational and Social Affairs Committee.
The BSEC Business Council, with its Secretariat also located in Istanbul, is a
non‐governmental organization that brings together the business communities of themember states. Among its activities are promotion of investments into the region,
elimination of impediments to trade, helping develop cooperation among small andmedium sized enterprises and so forth.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, located in Thessaloniki, Greece, is thefinancial arm of BSEC. Since it became operational in 1999, the Bank has developed into
an effective instrument providing credit for cross‐border projects, financing exports andso forth. The Bank has an active portfolio of $ 675 million and an investment‐grade ratingfrom Moody’s.
Another related body is the International Center for Black Sea Studies with
headquarters in Athens. Established in 1998 at the initiative of Greece, the ICBSS
represents the scientific and academic dimensions of Black Sea cooperation. The Center

36

also carries out the function of a think tank, supporting the BSEC Secretariat withintellectual inputs. To cite one example, the ICBSS made a major contribution to thedrafting of The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future that was adopted in 2001. The
ICBSS has also contributed to publicizing the work of BSEC, particularly within the EU
and helped in fostering institutional cooperation between BSEC and the EU.
After 13 years of existence, BSEC and its related bodies can claim to have achieved
maturity and scored some noteworthy successes. >From being engaged in purely
economic cooperation, BSEC has broadened its activities to encompass new fields. These
include environmental protection, water management, science and technology,
institutional renewal and governance, seismic protection and soft security measures in
the framework of multilateral cooperation. Soft security includes combating organizedcrime, illegal trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, corruption and money laundering.
The member states have recently concluded the Agreement on Combating Organized
Crime, which is considered to be a serious impediment to investments and an obstacle toeconomic development.
Gradually, rhetoric in the BSEC has turned into concrete action in a broad range offields. One such field is the creation of the Project Development Fund designed toprovide financial support to projects of regional interest. Another is the Agreement on
Cooperation in Emergency Assistance in Natural and Manmade Disasters signed on 15
April 1998. An important accomplishment is the Research Potential of the Black Sea
Countries Project undertaken by ICBSS and designed to compile an inventory of theresearch potential of member countries and identify opportunities for cooperation in thisfield. This list should give an idea of some of the tangible achievements attained within
the framework of BSEC and its related bodies.
After 13 years, BSEC members have made much progress in getting into the habit ofworking with their Black Sea neighbors for the common good. During this period, many
outstanding problems among members have been resolved. Coming from Turkey, I cansay that relations with Greece, both political and economic, have seen a dramatictransformation since 1992. Although we still see unresolved bilateral disputes between
BSEC members that need to be addressed, the atmosphere today is much more
conducive to their eventual resolution than the prevailing atmosphere in 1992. There ismore political stability and democracy in the region today. But most striking is the
progress achieved in the economic sphere. Hyperinflation has been mastered and thenational economies have been stabilized through good macroeconomic management.
Much privatization has taken place and all of the member countries are enjoying healthy
growth. In fact, the robust growth in some of the members could well place them in the
category of “tiger economies” if this pace is kept up. In some cases, there has been
healthy expansion of intra‐regional trade, though the overall record in this area is mixed.
For instance, there is the case of bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey, the twolargest economies in BSEC. In 1992, this trade amounted to $ 1.5 billion, but by the year
2004, it had reached a figure in excess of $ 10 billion, though it must be pointed out thatsales of Russian oil and gas accounted for a substantial share of this sum. However, as
the trade of the former component republics of the USSR diversifies, the share of37

intra‐BSEC trade has tended to fall and BSEC needs to do more to improve transport
links, speed up border‐crossing procedures and eliminate the many obstacles still
standing in the way of expanding trade. Cross‐border investments are growing nicely,with considerable sums from Greece, Russia and Turkey being invested in other BSEC
countries.
Mr. Chairman,
Let me come back to the location of the Black Sea region. BSEC is a neighbor of theEU, a market of 454 million people with an economy that is larger than the US economy.
BSEC is also next door to the greater Middle East, the region that is forecast to receive oil
income in the magnitude of 600 billion to 1.2 trillion dollars over the coming years. The
population of BSEC countries is in the region of 330 million people and the land area ofmembers extends over 20 million square kilometers. BSEC countries have the world’s
largest oil and gas reserves after the Middle East. Russia by itself is the largest oil
producer after Saudi Arabia. BSEC neighbors like Kazakhistan and Turkmenistan, large
producers of oil and natural gas, depend on BSEC members to export their production toworld markets. In fact, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria are alreadyserving as energy corridors and Greece will join their ranks as an energy corridor toWestern Europe when the Turkish and Greek natural gas pipeline networks are linked in
the coming months. Further projects for alternative oil pipelines are in the advancedplanning stage to relieve the Turkish straits from excessive tanker traffic, which poses a
grave threat to the environment.
Against this background, is it surprising that the US has applied for observer status
with BSEC? The present observers in BSEC are Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Poland, Slovakia and Tunisia and last month Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic andthe US joined this list as observers.
As a major global economic actor, it seems to me that Japan cannot afford to neglect
this region so strategically placed and with so much promise. That is why we should
welcome the holding of this dialogue and congratulate the Global Forum of Japan for its
timely initiative. Since I come from Turkey, let me give you some examples from mycountry about the possibilities for Japanese traders in Turkey. The share of Japan in
Turkey’s imports is a mere 2 % of Turkey’s total annual imports of over $ 100 billion.
Although we are happy to see major Japanese investors like Toyota, Honda andBridgestone producing in Turkey, the number of Japanese firms with such investments
is only 67 out of 15,000 Japanese firms with overseas operations. These random figuresdemonstrate that there is much room for growth in Japan’s presence in our region,
especially in the energy and manufacturing sectors. BSEC countries are well endowedwith natural resources, skilled manpower and scientific talent to make such investments
profitable.

38

The same is true for Japanese construction companies as the BSEC countries get
ready to undertake large infrastructure projects to capitalize on their strategic location.
We in Turkey have already seen in the 1980s Japanese firms constructing the suspension
bridge over the Bosphorus, linking Europe with Asia. Now we are witnessing theperformance of Japanese firms as they build the rail tunnel under the Bosphorus to link
Europe with Asia one more time. All of us in BSEC expect Japanese firms to repeat thesefeats in our region.
Predictions are that one of the fastest growing industries in the 21st century will be
the travel industry. Greece and Turkey are already major destinations for tourists andthe potential for further tourism growth in the region is very promising, given the
sunny beaches, skiing resorts, archaeological treasures, rich cuisine and cultural
diversity of our member countries. Japanese investors should be looking closely at thepossibilities for investments in hotels and other tourist infrastructure. Also Japanese
airlines should seriously consider extending their operations to more BSEC airports
where the Japanese absence is conspicuous.
Let me end by saying that for up to date information on the new opportunities in these
exciting emerging markets, Japanese businessmen should not fail to address themselvesto the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki and the BSEC BusinessCouncil in Istanbul.
Thank you.

39

UEGAKI Akira
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University
International Trade and Economic Cooperation of BSEC Countries
The End of Cold War and BSEC
The end of the Cold War opened new possibilities of international relations in the world.
Who could imagine the economic relation between South Korea and Uzbekistan 20 years
ago? The economic relation between the USA and Azerbaijan is also a typical new
phenomenon after the Cold War. The Black Sea area would be one of the mostpromising areas among others that could take advantage of this new world situation.
This area includes countries of the former and today’s members of COMECON, Warsaw
Pact, Soviet Union, NATO, OECD and EU. If they can overcome the past political andeconomic constraints of these frameworks, they might well expect a prosperous economy
on this area.
In fact the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (hereafter BSEC) 1 was set up in June 1992 inorder to promote “mutually advantageous cooperation arising from their geographic
proximity and from the reform process and structural adjustments”. On June 5, 1998,
the member states adopted a Charter in Yalta, which transformed the BSEC into a
regional economic organization with an international legal identity. The Charter was
ratified by the respective parliaments by May 1, 1999 (Aral, 2002).
After thirteen years, however, we cannot observe any apparent economic achievement of
the organization. The percentage of the intra‐BSEC export in their total export to theworld was only 14.4% in 2003 and that of import was 16.8%. 2 On average, about 85% ofeach BSEC country’s export and import goes to and comes from the countries other thanthe BSEC members. These figures show that the BSEC are playing a very limited role in
the economy of the region. This paper presents how the international trade of the BSEC
countries has developed recently and then shows some hints for further cooperation
Trade among BSEC Countries and Its Share
Figures 1 to 3 show the BSEC countries’ share in the total export of each member country.
Here we can find five categories of the BSEC countries. Moldova and Georgia show astable but modestly declining trend at high level. Secondly, we see a steep decline in the
1

BSEC includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia,

Turkey and Ukraine.
2

Calculated by the author using the data of DTS.

40

trend of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thirdly a gradual decline from middle level isobserved in the trend of Bulgaria, Ukraine and Albania. Fourthly, Greece’s trend was
kept stable at middle level. Lastly, three countries, Russia, Romania and Turkey, traced
a stable trend at low level (see Table 1).
These trends are closely related with the export to Russia in each country. Table 2
shows the share of Russia in each country’s total export. Here we can understand that
the Moldova and Georgia’s stable but modestly declining trend in figure 1 corresponds
to the trend of both countries’ export to Russia, which has been declining from 58.1% to39.0% and from 29.8% to 17.7% respectively. Armenia and Azerbaijan’s steep decline in
Figure 1 corresponds to considerable decline of Russia’s share in their export. Ukraine’s
gradual decline in Figure 2 corresponds to gradual decline of Russia’s share in Ukraine’s
export from 26.2% to 17.8%. These facts suggest that Russia is an indispensable factor
in the trade relations among BSEC countries. This is a natural result of largeness of theRussian economy. This means that without the trade with Russia, the intra‐BSEC tradefor each member country is a negligible part of the member’s trade (See Aral, 2002, Note
9).
Table 3 tells us this problem clearly. If we exclude the trade with Russia from theintra‐BSEC trade, the share will decline to 11.9% (export) and 10.0% (import) in 2003.
Especially the 2003’s data on the import side are important. The difference between the
figure including Russia and that excluding Russia is 6.8% and this figure represents theimport of the BSEC countries from Russia, a large part of which must be oil, gas andother natural resources.
Table 2, however, also shows another interesting feature of the trade among BSEC
countries. It tells us that the former COMECON countries like Bulgaria and Romania
do not have close trade relation with Russia any more. Their situation is different fromthat of the former republics of the Soviet Union. The share of Russia in the export of
Bulgaria and Romania is even smaller than that of Greece or Turkey. Table 4 tells that
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey (I call them “BGRT Four”) has been making a
steady, though very modest, progress in promoting trade in the region. Especially
Bulgaria’s active role in this sub‐region is impressive. We see a ray of hope for new
structure among BSEC countries though the trade with Russia will remain the mostimportant factor in the trade among the BSEC countries.
Current Account Deficit
The most important problem which would hinder the economic growth of the region iscurrent account deficit of the BSEC countries. According to Table 5, all the BSEC
countries except Russia and Ukraine has recorded current account deficit in theirinternational transaction. The amount of the deficits is large enough to be considered asserious burden for the economic development of the region. For example, Romania’s

41

deficit of USD 5,589 million in 2004 was 7.64% of its GDP. 3 Considering the fact thatJapan’s current account “surplus” in 2002 was only 2.83% of its GDP, the figure of
Romania (not “surplus” but “deficit”) is dangerously large.
The current account deficits of Turkey and Greece are so large that we must pay special
attention to. If another financial and currency crisis occurs from Turkey or Greece, theregion’s economy will suffer great damage. Here the most important thing that theinternational financial cooperation among the member countries cannot be done under
the circumstance of current account deficit of most of the countries (except Russia).
Besides, one problem is concealed under the data of Table 5. That is, in some countriesof the BSEC (underlined countries in Table 5), the deficit in goods and services trade ismuch larger than current account deficit. A part of the goods and services trade deficit
is covered by “current transfer” in the case of BSEC countries. According to the Balanceof Payments Manual of the IMF (5th edition) the current transfer includes the followings.
(1) Gifts of food, clothing, other consumer goods, medical supplies, etc. associated withrelief efforts in the wake of natural disasters, war, or other actions, (2) gifts of certain
military equipment, (3) annual or other regular contribution paid by governments tointernational organizations, (4) workers’ remittances by migrants who are employed inforeign countries and considered residents there, and (5) others (BPM, Paragraphs
298‐302). For several reasons, we can assume that a large part of the current transfer
recorded in the balance of payments statistics of the BSEC countries is “workers’
remittances”. 4 Therefore if it had not been for workers’ remittances from abroad, thecurrent account deficits of some of the BSEC countries would have increased remarkably.
Any national economy whose international payments are covered by money from
emigrants must be called unhealthy one. We cannot expect fruitful economic
cooperation among them.
The first thing to overcome such problems is to reorganize the internal economic
structure to alter the import – export components of each country. To do suchreorganization the FDI from industrialized countries will serve as a key factor. It is wellknown that the recent economic growth in Central Europe, such as Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary, has been driven by FDI. Can the BSEC follow the way of Central
Europe?
Fig. 4 shows the gross inflows of FDI into the BSEC countries. It tells that the amount of
FDI inflow is negligible in BSEC countries except Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Table 6 also presents small figures of FDI inflows (here the figure is “net 5 ” amount instead of “gross” amount) of the BSEC countries in comparison with Central Europe.
3

Calculated by the author using various data in IFS.

4

Turkey is not underlined in Table 5 because of lack of proper data but very famous for its large “export”

of workers.
5

Net FDI inflow means gross FDI inflow minus gross FDI outflow.

42

It is true that each government must take promoting measures to attract FDI. However,
we come across here a very delicate problem to solve. Under the situation of today’s
international financing, where international financial transfer can be carried out very
easily, investors would consider their investment from a global point of view. That is, aJapanese investor would compare the north eastern region of China with Ireland inselection of his/her investment destination. Therefore any FDI attracting measure
would lead to a zero‐sum game in the world. The Black Sea region would be involvedin such zero‐sum games and any economic cooperation among them would not play aneffective role.
Globalization and Regional Cooperation
I would like to present a theoretical problem of international economic relations. That is,whether regional economic cooperation efforts will lead to the free system of the global
economy. We can suppose the following four ideas as for the problem.
(1) Economic globalization is desirable. Regional economic cooperation is also
desirable, because every effort for regional cooperation in the world will result in the
globalization in the end [Optimist].
(2) Economic globalization is desirable or inevitable. But regional economic
cooperation is not desirable because the latter would disturb the free global economictransactions [Genuine Globalist].
(3) Economic globalization must be avoided. Regional economic cooperation must be
also avoided because both would destroy the national identity of each small country
and everyday life of the ordinal people [Nationalist].
(4) Economic globalization is not desirable. But regional economic cooperation isdesirable because the latter can mitigate the vices of the economic globalization[Ecologist].
How can we evaluate the BSEC under the above framework? The political leaders of
the BSEC countries would officially regard their standpoint as the idea (1). However it
is important that the idea (1) cannot be justified from a pure theoretical point of view. It
is true that there are many thoughts, which try to justify the regional cooperation as
introductory steps to the global free economy. For example, B. Balassa has been
insisting the virtues of regional economic cooperation or integration since 1960s.
However a strong opposite view is expressed by leading economists recently. For
example, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University criticizes the supporting theories forregional economic integration. He even stands against FTAs saying that the FTAs will
disturb the global free economy. Apparently Bhagwati supports the idea of (2). We
must not underestimate this theoretical trend. Especially, how to interpret Article 24 of

43the GATT 1994 will be a polemic matter in the near future. 6
The report of the Working Group on Trade and Economic Development held in
Thessaloniki on 7‐8 December 2000 “noted the importance of the efforts towards gradualestablishment of the BSEC Free Trade Area, though as a long‐term objective. It stressedthat further measures towards liberalization of trade in BSEC region must be taken”(quoted from the Webpage of the BSEC). Liberalization is OK, but liberalization under
the framework of FTA will provoke a dispute.
The FTA between Japan and Thailand, which reached an agreement recently, would
harm the Indonesian economy because Indonesia must take unfavorable conditions in
the competition with Thailand to attract FDI from Japan. In such a case, even an FTA
will be incompatible with free market discipline.
Then what is left for us to do in the framework of BSEC? The least we can do is tocooperate to arrange minimum requirements for further economic development among
the member countries.
First of all, cooperative efforts for protection of the environment, especially for protectionof the water of Black Sea, are such minimum requirements, which would never be
incompatible with any article of the GATT.
In the sphere of environmental protection, some efforts have been conducted in theframework of the BSEC. For example, the Ministerial Meeting on Environment held in
Thessaloniki on 23‐24 September 1999 and the ministers “shared the view that as theenvironment was deteriorating rapidly, the efforts for efficient protection should be
strengthened with specific policies, programs and actions, and stressed the need tointegrate further the concept of sustainable development in the economies of the BSEC
Member States” (quoted from the Webpage of the BSEC).
They underlined the importance of “the cooperation in the following directions: a)monitoring of air, water and soil pollution, b) dealing with environmental hazards
caused by industrial accidents and natural disasters; c) nature conservation andmanagement, in which the significance of coastal areas was recognized; d) developmentof tourism, which is gaining a high potential when developed as an environmental‐friendly activity” (quoted from the Webpage of the BSEC).
These efforts are good starting point for economic development of the region because
environment protective measures will generate employment and attract some kind of FDI.
6

Article 24 of the GATT 1994 stipulates the conditions under which customs unions, free-trade areas,

and interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or tree-trade area are established.
The Japanese government is asserting that the rigorous examination of each regional trade agreement
must be taken on the basis of this Article. It is very reasonable attitude to the problem.

44

The second minimum requirement is the Confidence and Security Building Measures,
because peace is the essential basis of economic prosperity. Besides, anti‐terror andanti‐organized crime measures are also the basis for economic development.
At the Instanbul decennial summit on 25 June 2002 the participants of the summit
declared that they “firmly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as aprofound challenge to peace and security and a highly dangerous threat to political,
economic and social stability of States and the international community as a whole,adversely affecting the market economies and the development of multilateral andbilateral cooperation. They reaffirmed their resolution to take all the necessary steps,
while firmly respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined inapplicable instruments, countering terrorism and other linked illegal activities. They
deemed it imperative that the relevant BSEC organs and national competent authorities
enhance the implementation of the BSEC Agreement on Cooperation in Combating
Crime, in particular in its organized forms and, furthermore, consider new means ofcooperation within the mandate of the BSEC” (quoted from the Webpage of the BSEC).
The most dangerous risk for economic activity in the world is terror and organized crime.
If the BSEC ensure the “terror‐free and crime‐free zone” around Black Sea, the region can
attract much capital from the world.
Conclusion
There are no magic measures to increase trade among the BSEC countries to asatisfactory level and to accelerate economic growth at high rate. To compel
unreasonable measures to activate trades only in the region would bring a severe
discussion under the WTO framework. On the contrary, the protection of environment
and anti‐terror, anti‐crime measures provide a good starting point for further
cooperation. Anyone cannot oppose them.

Fig. 1) Share of Export to BSEC in Total Export (1)
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00

Moldova
Azerbaijan

40.00

Armenia
Georgia

30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
1997

1999

2001

2003

Year
Source: Calculated from the data of DTS (2004)

45

Fig. 2) Share of Export to BSEC in Total Export (2)
40
35
30
25
%

Ukraine20

Bulgaria
Greece

15
10
5

2003

2001

1999

1997

0

Year
Source: Calculated from the data of DTS (2004)

Fig. 3) Share of Export to BSEC in Total Export (3)
25

20

15

Albania
RussiaRomania
Turkey10

5Year
Source: Calculated form the data of DTS (2004)

Table 1) Trend of Each County's Export
to the other BSEC countries
Moldova,
Georgia
Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Albania,
Bulgaria,
GreeceRomania,
Russia, Turkey

Stable but modest decline at highlevel
Steeple decline
Gradual decline from middle level
Stable at middle level
Stable trend at low level

46

2003

2001

1999

1997

0

T able 2) Share of R ussia in E xport (% )
1997
58.1
26.2
7.9
3.8
23.1
27.0
0.0
29.8
3.0
7.8

M oldova
U kraine
B ulgaria
G reece
A zerbaijan
A rm enia
A lbania
G eorgia
R om ania
T urkey

1999
41.3
20.7
4.6
2.3
8.9
14.6
0.2
12.5
0.6
2.2

2001
43.7
22.6
2.4
2.8
3.4
17.7
0.0
23.5
0.7
3.0

2003
39.0
17.8
1.4
2.6
4.5
12.1
0.5
17.7
0.3
2.9

D TS (2004).

Table 3) Intra-BSEC Trade (% of Total BSEC Trade)
ExportImportIcluding Russia Excluding Russia Icluding Russia Excluding Russia
1993
10.1
8.7
9.4
6.5
2003
14.4
11.9
16.8
10.0
Source: DTS (2000), DTS (2004).

Table 4) Trade among the BGRT Four
(Share of partner country in total export [%])
1997

Importing Coutry
GreeceRomania Turkey
Total
8.8
1.4
9.9
20.1
2.9
1.6
3.9
8.4
0.7
2.1
4.2
7.0
0.7
1.1
1.4
3.2

Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Exporting
GreeceCountry
Romania
Turkey2003

Importing Coutry
GreeceRomania Turkey
Total 3
10.5
3.1
9.2
22.8
6.2
2.6
4.0
12.9
1.6
2.4
5.1
9.2
1.3
1.9
1.8
5.1

Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Exporting
GreeceCountry
Romania
TurkeyTable 5) Current Account of BSEC Countries (Millions of US Doll
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Georgia
GreeceMoldova
Romania
RussiaTurkeyUkraine

1998
65
-418
-1365
-62
-276
-335
-2917
216
1984
-1296

1999
-155
-307
-600
-652
-198
-7295
-79
-1297
24611
-1344
1658

2000
-156
-278
-168
-704
-269
-9820
-108
-1355
46840
-9819
1481

2001
-217
-200
-52
-984
-212
-9400
-34
-2229
33795
1
3390
1402

2002
-408
-148
-768
-827
-221
-10405
-72
-1525
29116
-1521
3174

2003
-407
-189
-2021
-1676
-375
-11225
-131
-3311
35410
-7905
2891

2004
-162
-2589
-1806
-426
-114
-5589
60109
-155436804

1

Note: = At the end of 2000, the financial crisis occurred in Turkey
and the import of Turkey declined on a massive scale in 2001.
Source: IFS (2005).

47

Fig. 4 FDI per capita (2004)
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50

ne

A
ve
ra
ge

To
ta
l

U
kr
ai

Tu
rk
ey

Ru
ss
ia

Ro
m
an
ia

e

ol
do
va
M

G
re
ec

G
eo
rg
ia

ga
ria
Bu
l

n:
20
00
)

en
ia

tio

A
rm

A
ze
rb
ai

jan

(p
op
ul
a

A
lb
an
ia
(

20
03
)

0

Table 6) Net Inflows of FDI per Capita (2001)
Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Georgia
Moldova
Romania
RussiaUkraine

US $
66
22
37
10
22
37
52
0
16

CoutryCzech RepublicHungary
PolandSlovak Republic
Slovenia

US$
531
222
179
271
187

Source: TR , 2003, p.65.

References
Aral, Berdal (2002), “The Black Sea Economic Co‐Operation after Ten Years:
What Went Wrong”, Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4.
BPM (1993), IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition, New York.
DTS (2000), IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2000, New York.
DTS (2004), IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2004, New York.
IFS (2005), IMF, International Financial Statistics, September 2005, New York.
Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel (2005), Euro‐Turks, A Bridge between Turkey
and the European Union?: A Comparative Study of German‐Turks andFrench‐Turks, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Sayan, Serdar (1998), “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A
Substitute for or A Complement to Globalization Efforts in the Middle
East and the Balkans?”, Economic Research Forum (Cairo, Egypt),
Working Paper, No. 9806.
TR (2003), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition
report 2003, Integration and Regional Cooperation, London.
Webpage of the BSEC: http://bsec‐organization.org/

48

Session II
Strategic Implications of Big Power Interests in the Area

Ioan Mircea PASCU
Former Minister of National Defense of Romania
Strategic Implications of Great Power Interests in the Wider Black Sea Area

1. The Black Sea area has become again, after almost 150 years of relative neglect (seethe Crimean War 0f 1854‐1856), a focal point of Great Power interaction. The reasons
are multiple. Of them, I shall mention only a few: the end of the Cold War and thesubsequent dismantling of the former Soviet Union, the incrementally increased
importance of oil and gas reserves of the Caspian sea and Central Asia and the
newly acquired status of this latter region as the pinnacle of world politics. Therefore,
the formula “Wider Black Sea Area” is meant to both indicate that the Black Sea ispart of a larger strategic context, anchored in Central Asia, and that it is in self
sufficiently important at least to initiate Japan’s dialogue with it.
2. The Black Sea Area is strategically important because it opens towards 3 main
directions: towards the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, including the Gulf,
and Central Asia (through Caucasus and the Caspian Sea). Moreover, it is locatedexactly on the route between the Caspian producers of oil and gas the consumers
in the West. Depending on where you look at it for Europe it is both a springboard
towards those 3 areas and a buffer for the asymmetrical threats generated in thoseareas.
3. It should be noted, however, that, in order to get access to and from Europe to theBlack Sea Area, one needs the river Danube, the true European main waterway
leading to the North Sea, on condition of resolving the current blockage related to thestatus of Serbia and Montenegro. (It should be noted that one of the major

49

consequences of the victory over Russia in the Crimean War was cutting its access to
the river and the creation of the Danube Commission, which exists even today).
4. Given this state of affairs, it was inevitable that the area was “attracted” into theGreat Power game (not to say rivalry) triggered by the redistribution of power into
the international system following the end of the Cold War. In one word, the area –until then “locked” almost completely into and by the former Soviet Union
becomes accessible to the outside powers. Inevitably, clashes with Russia – thesuccessor to the USSR – and even within the ʺWestern Campʺ ensued, which
complicated the scene even further, along its political‐military and economic
dimensions.
5. Indeed, these are the two most important “targets” for all the “actors”: the US, Russia,
Britain, the EU, Turkey and Ukraine. Acquiring/maintaining strategic locations in
the area and control over the oil and gas transport routes through it motivate
almost totally the action of the above mentioned actors in the region.
6. Russia, aware that its succession to the former Soviet Union does not confer
automatic exclusivity over the latter’s possessions (although, militarily, Russia
succeeded in keeping a relative number of former Soviet bases and military
installations in its immediate vicinity) and realistic about its lesser potential
compared to that of the former USSR, wants, naturally, to retain a position ofcontrol in what has been for so long its “backyard”. Consequently, it applied arelatively successful model of leaving conflicts behind, waiting to be called upon only
to contribute to their resolution. The Caucasus and, to a certain extent, Central Asia
are riddled with such conflicts. That way, Russia hit two targets at once: first, it took
advantage of the deterring role insecurity plaid in the area with respect to foreign
involvement and, as said, made herself part of any solution one could possibly
envisage trying to “cure” it.
7. In the Black Sea, Russia – which controls Sevastopol, following an agreement with
Ukraine, until 2017 – is already investing in a number of other militarily relevant
important projects (the port of Novorossiysk and the channel linking Black Sea to the
Azov Sea). Moreover, indicators that she is willing to comply with the Istanbul
OSCE decisions to withdraw from Transnistria or Georgia, where it keeps importantmilitary installations and/or large quantities of military equipment and ammunition,
are still absent. (For instance, all plans advanced or favored by Russia to settle the50conflict in Transnistria have as common denominator the conservation of the Russianpresence; indeed, the removal of it would push Russia back almost 700 km).
8. In terms of energy, Russia is actively using this as an instrument to keep thecountries in the area (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia) totally dependent on
her. And, as for the transport routes, it controls the old lines (through Ukraine)
towards the west and it has engaged herself in new projects (Novorossiysk – Burgas– Alexandropoulos).
9.

The US started to pay attention to the region only recently, after the area has been
“opened” and became the transit route for the Caspian oil and gas towards the west.
Baku – Ceyhan pipeline – to be built with important American financial contribution– or Varna – Duress (Albania) pipelines are but a demonstration of the US
determination to be key actor in this game.

10. Consequently, in the political and military field, the US have become actively
involved – through support in NATO, but also through bilateral programs – in
Caucasus (particularly Georgia), Ukraine (see the echo of the Orange Revolution of
2004) and Moldova (an observer to the resolution process of the Transnistrian
conflict). The US ship visits and military exercises with the riparian countries haveconstantly multiplied and increased in dimension, as well as the support forextending the operation Active Endeavor (to control illegal activities at sea) from theMediterranean to the Black Sea.
11. War in Iraq, as part of the global struggle against international terrorism, coupledwith Romania’s and Bulgaria’s newly acquired membership in NATO have opened
up new venues for US military involvement in these countries (Talks of establishing alight US military presence at the Black Sea in those two countries are almost
finalized). (Defense Minister Ivanov of Russia had declared last year, at the Munich
annual security conference, that his country understands such a rationale for bases inRomania and Bulgaria, but it does not for bases in, , for example, Poland ?!)12. The EU is also making moves towards the area, through its neighborhood policy
towards the Caucasus countries, Moldova and Ukraine. Discussions for accession
with Turkey, which have opened recently surrounded by controversy, are also part ofthis drive. However, the EU as such cannot be counted as an actor into the game,especially if compared with some important member countries like Britain and, to a51

certain extent France, Germany and Italy. (For instance, after inaugurating with anaviation show in 2001, UK has proceeded to annual air exercises with the Romanian
Air Force at Kogalniceanu – near the port of Constanta, while the port visits of ships
from those countries have multiplied).
13. Regional actors – like Turkey and Ukraine – are important players in this new
game, too, especially the former (for Ukraine it seems to be more a matter of energy
supply and prestige). Indeed, Turkey seems really concerned about the potential
modification of the 1936 Montreux Convention regulating the Black Sea Straits status
and wants, naturally, to continue to control the flow of oil through them, along withparticipation in the building and exploitation of the new pipelines (Baku – Ceyhan
and gas from Iran towards Western Europe).
14. It is interesting to note the coordination of Turkey with Russia on many importantmatters related to the Black Sea. (For instance, Turkey, a key NATO ally ‐ actually, themost powerful in the area ‐ does not favor the position of extending ʺActive
Endeavorʺ Operation from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea; instead, it prefers totask the Blackseafor, an instrument of the Black Sea countries, with it, thus sharing
the same position with Russia). Such coordination is motivated by the common
desire of those two countries to retain their positions in the area, in the face ofincreasing interest and involvement of “outside” powers, like the US and EU. In thislatter respect, it should be noted that the recent rapprochement between Turkey andRussia, in the face of strong opposition to the opening of EU – Turkey admission
negotiations could be interpreted as a powerful instrument in the hands of Turkey.
Because, if those negotiations fail, then Europe would have to contemplate aTurkish‐Russian “barrier” in an area rapidly becoming vital to her in terms ofenergy supply.
15.

In sum, it is evident that the increasing importance of the Black Sea area isaccompanied with increased great power involvement which, inevitably, carries
with it the risk of increased rivalry. However, even if materialized, such rivalry:a. Does not obscure the initial relevance of the area as an eastern gate to Europe
using the Danube – Rhine waterway.

52

b. Cannot develop itself in open conflict; the only way to share in thepromised bonanza brought about by the passage of Caspian oil and gas
towards the west is through obligatory cooperation.
c. Cannot be contained to the area, but it will rather melt down into the generalbilateral and multilateral web of relations between the Great Powers andbecome part and parcel of the current efforts to redefine the new power
balance after the end of the Cold War.

53

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo
Professor of the Graduate School of International Relations,
University of Shizuoka

The Interests and Strategy of the Major Powers in the Black Sea Region,and the Responses of the Regional States
In this paper, we would like to discuss three points concerning the title of thissection ‐ the Strategic Implications of Big Power Interests in the Black Sea Area: firstly, theinternational context in which the Big Powers are competing in the Black Sea region;
secondly, the transformation of the Black Sea region in terms of international, regionaland sub‐national dimensions (here we will mention the big powers interests and the
responses of the regional states to these); and finally, issues to be emphasized regarding
the stability of the Black Sea region.
Ⅰ．International Context
１．Continuity and discontinuity of international politics among the big powers in
the Black Sea region
With regard to the first issue – the international context – we would like toemphasize two points: firstly, the continuity and discontinuity of international politics
among the big powers in the Black Sea region; and secondly, the conditionality effects of
EU/NATO enlargement.
International politics in the Black Sea region have been a history of the struggle fordominance among the big powers. The stronger powers have divided this region among
their spheres of influence, and the strongest have dominated it monopolistically. Afterancient Greek colonization and annexation by the Roman Empire, the region became aterritory of the Byzantine Empire during the 9th and 10th centuries, and of the Ottoman
Empire after the 15th century. Then it became the focal point of competition among GreatBritain, France, the Ottomans, and Russia, and during the Cold War the Soviet block andNATO confronted each other in the Black Sea area.
This historical pattern of the big powers in the region has continued even since theend of the Cold War. NATO, a stronger actor from a military point of view, has embarked
on an eastern enlargement, and has filled the vacuum of power created between the Westand Russia, reaching the eastern shore of the Black Sea ‐ Rumania and Bulgaria ‐ inaddition to its southern coastal state ‐ Turkey. The EU, a stronger actor from an economic
point of view, increased its members from fifteen to twenty five in May 2004, and now it
too is approaching the eastern coast of the Black Sea.
However, we should also pay attention to the discontinuity of international politics

54

in the Black Sea region. The enlargements of the EU and NATO have been promoted
neither through the enforcement by the Big Powers against the will of the regional states,
nor have all the aspirant states been welcomed by the EU. On the contrary, only the statesthat have accomplished the conditionalities for EU/NATO accession could become
members. It is these conditionality effects of the EU/NATO enlargements that havebrought relative stability to Central and Eastern Europe.
２ ． The placement of the current situation of the Black Sea region in thetransformation process of the Wider Europe international system
From here, we can place the current situation in the Black Sea region in thetransformation process of the Wider Europe international system. This is the second
point about the international background for the competitive relations of the big powers.
In a word, the first stage of the region’s transformation was completed when the Central
and Eastern European states became EU and NATO members. We are now in the second
stage. In this second stage, firstly, the EU is obliged to tackle its problem of internal
integration. Secondly, the conditionality effects of enlargement are expected to bebrought to the West Balkan states by the SAP (Stabilization and Association Process) andMAP (Membership Action Plan). And thirdly, as for the EU/NATO`s new neighbours,
the EU and NATO intend to stabilize them through the ENP (European Neighbourhood
Policy) for the WNIS and the Southern Caucasus, through the Intensified Dialogue with
Ukraine, and through the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) with Georgia andthe others.
Therefore, the future options for the Black Sea region are either, one, the WNIS andthe Southern Caucasus will catch up with the West Balkans, and may even outstrip themin accomplishing conditionalities like the Baltic states did, or, two, the WNIS and theSouthern Caucasus will continue to lag behind the Western Balkans, and will finallymove away from the EU and NATO, remaining within the Russian zone of influence.
Ⅱ．Big powers interests and the responses of the regional states
It is this fluid situation that has caused the transformation of the Black Sea region inthree dimensions ‐ international, regional and sub‐national. In the international
dimension, it aggravated the tug of war over the Black Sea region between the big
powers, in particular, between the West and Russia. And this divided the region, if I may
dare to simplify, into two groups. One is GUAM, and the other is the group of states led
by pro‐Russian, authoritative leaders. And this dichotomy of international and regional
levels is also reflected in the sub‐national dimension. Pro‐Western reformist forces andpro‐Russian status‐quo forces have fought each other in several countries. Consequently,
the result of these confrontations in the international, regional and sub‐national
dimensions has caused the domino of democratization, and as a result, the anti‐Westernand anti‐democratic forces in the three dimensions have begun to consolidate theirsolidarity. There are interesting parallels here to the world of the Protestant‐Reformation
versus Catholic Counter Reformation conflicts of the 17th century, the Holy Alliance55

versus revolutionary forces conflicts in the 19th century Vienna international system, andthe capitalist versus communist conflicts of the Cold War period. In order to understandthe mechanism of these confrontations in the three dimensions, it is worthwhile paying
attention to the interests and strategies of the major powers – the U.S., the EU, NATOand Russia – in the Black Sea region, and to the responses of the states within the region
to these.
1. The interests and strategy of the U.S., the EU, NATO and Russia
First of all, let us indicate the interests and strategy of major powers towards theBlack Sea region, as listed below.
a. The interests of the United States of America in the Black Sea region
The U.S. observes the geo‐strategic significance of the Black Sea region in relation toIraq, an Enlarged Middle East, Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Foreign Policy Objectives of the U.S. towards the Black Sea region① Anti‐terrorism cooperation② Democratization and good governance③ Military bases and/or military cooperation④ Stable transportation route for energy from the Caspian Sea region⑤ Independence of the regional states in order to obstruct Russian imperialism⑥ Stability, and in particular, resolution of frozen conflictsb. The interests of the EU in the region
The vital interests of the EU are the stability of the region for its own security.
Main Foreign Policy Objectives of the EU towards the Black Sea region① Stabilisation of the Black Sea region by ENP and Action Plan
② Stability of the West Balkans through SAP③ Anti‐terrorism cooperation④ Stable transportation route for energy from the Caspian Sea region ‒ Traceca,
Inogate⑤ Stability, and in particular, resolution of frozen conflicts⑥ Cooperation with Russia through Four Spacesc. The interests of NATO in this region
NATO’s interest lies in the geo‐political significance of the area from the Balkans to
Afghanistan through an Enlarged Middle East and Central Asia.
Main Foreign Policy Objectives of the NATO towards the Black Sea region① Support for accession of the West Balkan states to NATO through MAP② Support for accession of Ukraine to NATO through Action Plan and Intensified
Dialogue, and that of Georgia through IPAP
③ Strengthening of democratization and military cooperation with Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan through IPAP
④ Stabilization of the Black Sea region through PARP and the special
representative⑤ Cooperation with Russia through NRC

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d. The interests of Russia in the region
Russia’s most significant interest is to maintain her sphere of interest in the “NearAbroad”.
Main Foreign Policy Objectives of Russia towards the Black Sea region① Anti‐terrorism cooperation ‒ resolution of Chechen conflict and integration of
Russian state② Maintenance of pro‐Russian leaders in power in the CIS③ Privatization in the CIS states with Russian capital④ Transportation routes of gas and petrol through Russian territory⑤ Dependence of Moldova and Georgia on Russia through perpetuation of frozen
conflict⑥ Obstruction or delay of further enlargement of the EU and NATO in order toprevent Russia from being isolated in the Eurasian international system
2. Rivalry and cooperation between the U.S. and the EU in the Black Sea region
There is no conflict or grave difference of interests in or concepts of the Black Sea
region between the U.S. and the EU, as there was in the serious confrontation over the
Iraq war. They have virtually common principles and interests in this region:
democratization, market economy, stability, anti‐terrorism, and stable energy
transportation routes. They have also pursued almost the same concrete policy towards
the region, such as the withdrawal of the Russian army from Moldova and Georgia,
participation of the U.S. and the EU in the pentagonal negotiation process on theTransnistrian issue only if all the five participants agree to it, and the same evaluation of
the Ukrainian presidential election and the Moldovan parliamentary election.
Only two things differ between them. One is that the U.S. places much more
importance on military forces than the EU, and the other is their attitudes toward Russia.
The U.S. pays attention to the democratization of Russia as well as its stability, whilesome members of the EU, such as France and Germany, consider the stability of Russia
much more important than its democratization and the independence of the CIS.
3. Rivalry and cooperation between the EU and Russia in the Black Sea region
The objectives of the EU since its enlargement in May 2004 have been to promote theinternal integration of the EU, to support the accession of two Eastern Balkan states,
Rumania and Bulgaria, to encourage regime transformation of the Western Balkans, andto stabilize its new neighbours, the WNIS and the Southern Caucasus. In order toaccomplish these objectives, the EU adopted SAP towards the Western Balkan states in1999 on the premise of their future accession to the EU, and has promoted SAP and
Cards (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) withthe expectation that Western Balkan states will also experience the conditionality effects
of EU enlargement. Concerning its new neighbours, however, the EU has neverrecognized their accession to the EU, and has adopted the ENP towards them. The ENP
is a policy to assure the security of the EU by stabilizing its new neighbours through its

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Action Plan, which includes political and economic benchmarks, and to offer economic
benefits differentially to these new neighbours according to their implementation of thebenchmarks. This carrot‐and‐stick method brings to mind EU conditionality policy,
although there is a sharp contrast between the case of the Western Balkan states and thatof the new neighbour states. The EU has paid more attention to the Balkans rather thanto WNIS and the Southern Caucasus.
Nevertheless, the EU has recently turned its attention to the latter two areas since“the domino of democratization” began in Georgia and Ukraine. The so‐called Solana
ten point letter in January 2005 showed the EU’s support for the accession of Ukraine to
the WTO, agreement on FTA after becoming a member of WTO, “Market Economy
Status” of Ukraine and the earmarking of 250 million Euros for loans to Ukraine. In
addition, Ukraine and Moldova have been invited to sign important documents
concerning EU foreign policy. Moreover, the EU made a decision on the appointment of
an EU special representative for Moldova on 16 March 2005, opening the EU office in
Chisinau and dispatching a EU observer mission to the border between Ukraine andMoldova (Transnistria). Furthermore, the EU and the U.S. were determined to participate
with observer status in the pentagonal negotiation framework for the settlement ofTransnistrian issue at the end of September 2005. The EU has had a special representativein the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia since 2003, and decided to include Southern
Caucasus to the ENP in June 2004, taking the Rose Revolution into consideration.
However, all of these EU policies towards the Black Sea region are fundamentally acountry to country approach, and the EU has not developed a regional approach to thisarea. The EU has not engaged an expert in charge of the Black Sea region as a whole, incontrast to NATO, which has an expert who is engaged with the Black Sea region as awhole. This individual approach of the EU towards the region, however, does not meanthat it has never promoted a collective approach to the region. The EU organized a firstsemi‐official meeting with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in Brussels in 11
April 2005 at the initiative of Greece, then chair‐state of the EU. The issues of humantrafficking, smuggling of narcotics, energy transport, environment, etc. were discussed atthat meeting. The first meeting on the transport of energy between the EU and BSCE washeld in November 2004, and the second meeting is scheduled to be held in 2006.
In sum, the EU has developed its relations in the Black Sea region mainly throughthe ENP and its concrete method, the Action Plan. The interest of the EU towards theBlack Sea region will increase much more once Rumania and Bulgaria become members.
However, there is no driving force to promote regional cooperation in the Black Sea likethe role of Germany in the development of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Germany
itself mentioned cooperation between the EU and the Black Sea region in an unpublishedpaper this February (2005), suggesting that it should be developed within the existing
framework.
As we observed, the main objective of the EU towards the Black Sea region is tostabilize the region for the sake of the EU’s own security. This necessitates Russiancooperation, partly because this region has been traditionally influenced by Russia, and58

partly because the conditionality effects of the EU might not function in this region, as
the EU faces its own integration issues after the fifth enlargement and it will not use theEU accession card for WNIS and the Southern Caucasus.
However, confrontational points are much more accentuated between the EU andRussia, while there are common interests between them in the Black Sea region such as
stable transportation route of energy and anti‐terrorist. Firstly, independent of the EU’s
real aims in this region, the increased interests of the EU in this region – lying within the
traditional Russian sphere of influence – has made Russia nervous. Secondly, themeaning of stability of the new neighbours indeed differs between the EU and Russia,
just as the meaning of democratic regimes in the East European states differed between
Stalin and Roosevelt/Churchill. For Russia, stability can be or should be attained throughpro‐Russian authoritative regimes in the new neighbours, while for the EU, it can bebrought about only through democratization and the institution of a market economy. In
addition, democratization generally leads to an increase of power amongpro‐democratic, that is, pro‐Western political forces, which are not generally sympathetic
to Russia. This can be clearly seen in the fierce confrontations between the EU/U.S. andRussia over democratization in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Thirdly, there is also
divergence between them in the military dimension. The EU has asked Russia towithdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia, but Russia has stationed its troops there
accompanied by various arguments, and furthermore it has promoted common defensewith Belarus and Ukraine. In addition, Russia has opposed the proposal of several EU
members to transform the current Transnistrian PKF under Russian leadership into a
multilateral PKF under the mandate of the OSCE, although Russia has sent its police
units to Bosnia and Macedonia under the framework of ESDP cooperation. Fourthly, theEU and Russia have had confrontations over two pillars among four spaces for bilateral
cooperation – democracy and human rights, and external security, in particular frozen
conflicts.
Nevertheless, the possibility of cooperation between the EU and Russia has comeabout because of the Road Map that they drew up in May this year (2005). Although thisRoad Map does not include concrete stipulations on the above‐mentioned two realms, it
presents the opportunity to bring Russia to the negotiating table on the issue of these twodomains, which Russia had previously categorically refused to negotiate over. EU
experts emphasize the fact that it has opened a significant step for cooperation on
democratization and frozen conflicts, and they even do not conceal their expectation that
direct negotiations with Russian technical civil servants will bring more fruitful results
than those carried out through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. Rivalry and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the Black Sea region
The U.S. and Russia have common interests, such as an anti‐terrorism coalition andnon‐proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the individual ‘special’
relationship between President Bush and President Putin ended when President Putin
rejected the request of President Bush to join the U.S. in the case of the Iraq war, and it

59

seems that their divergence has been accentuated more and more by issues such as
democratization, military bases and military influence in the CIS states, oil and gas
pipeline routes from the Caspian Sea region, Russian policy towards its Near Abroad,and NATO enlargement. Firstly, the Bush administration is obliged to succeed in the
democratization of Iraq in order to counteract the critics of the Iraq war, and, therefore, it
has been promoting democratization of the Enlarged Middle East. In this context, theneighbour of the Enlarged Middle East, the Black Sea region, has become significant
from a strategic point of view. Thus, President Bush visited Georgia as well as Latvia in
February this year (2005), and he declared the success of the “domino of
democratization” from the Velvet Revolution through the Purple Revolution in Iraq, theRose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan, on to the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. Secondly, while the Russianindustrial‐military complex and petrol industry, which are the financial base formaintaining Putin’s authoritative regime, need to expand exports of their products, theU.S. has tried to obstruct exports of military goods to ‘rogue nations’, and to assure
stable energy transportation routes, bypassing Russian territory, such as the BTC
pipeline. Thirdly, while Russia has tried to increase its influence in the region of theformer Soviet Union, the U.S. has supported the independence of the CIS states from
Russia. For instance, the U.S. together with the EU pressured Moldovan President
Voronin not to sign the Kozak memorandum, which would increase the dependence ofMoldova on Russia, as well as the Ukrainian government in order to correct the unjust
presidential election. Fourthly, Russia has opposed NATO enlargement, as it has feared
its isolation in the Eurasian international system, while the U.S. standpoint on NATOenlargement is to admit the accession of aspirant states to NATO if they accomplish all
the necessary conditionality of the MAP.
5. Rivalry and cooperation between NATO and Russia in the Black Sea region
Since the end of the cold war, NATO has embarked on the stabilization of theBalkans, promoted military operations in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia,
welcomed Rumania and Bulgaria to NATO membership in April 2004, and has
supported the accession of West Balkan states to NATO. Croatia, Macedonia and Albania
have been implementing the MAP, which constitutes a gateway to NATO accession.
After September 11th, NATO expanded its military activity from the Balkans to
Afghanistan. As a result, the significance of the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea
region has increased, and NATO has recently strengthened its relations with its newneighbour states since the last enlargement. NATO concluded the Action Plan with
Ukraine at the Prague Summit in November 2002. Ukrainian President Yushcenko
visited Brussels and Washington in February and March in 2005, and reconfirmed his
country’s intentions for accession to NATO, while American President Bush expressed
his support for Ukrainian accession to NATO. In addition, the Intensified Dialogue
between NATO and Ukraine began in June 2005. It is said that all the Eastern and Central
states passed through Intensified Dialogue so that they could become NATO members.

60

As for the other regional states of the Black Sea, NATO promoted the IPAP after its lastenlargement as well as PfP (Partnership for Peace). Georgia concluded an IPAP with
NATO in October 2004, Azerbaijan did so in May 2005, and Armenia, Kazakhstan andMoldova are currently negotiating with NATO for IPAPs. NATO has also appointed a
special representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Furthermore, NATO has also tried to promote regional cooperation in the Black Sea
region, just as it did in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. In the case of the Balkans,
NATO took its decision on the SEEI (South East Europe Initiative）at the Washington
Summit in April 1999 and organized the SEEGROUP (South East Europe Group)composed of the Balkan states, which published the SEECAP (South East Europe
Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities) in May
2001. NATO also elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue to the NATO Partnership in June
2004. In addition, NATO mentioned the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in June 2004,
which provided bilateral security to the Enlarged Middle East, and issued acommunique at the NATO Istanbul Summit which referred to the strategic importance of
the Black Sea region. Moreover, NATO discussed the extension of its operation “Active
Endeavour” from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, although it failed to implement
its official regional strategy towards the Black Sea region.
Russia has observed these movements cautiously and has sometimes expressed its
opposition to further enlargement of NATO. At this moment, however, NATO andRussia are not in confrontation over NATO enlargement, partly because Ukraine andGeorgia are still at a stage some distance from fulfilling the MAP, and partly because
cooperation between NATO and Russia has been enhanced through NRC (NATO‐Russia
Council).
6. The relations between the major powers and the regional states
As was mentioned above, the U.S., the EU, NATO and Russia have competed over 1)
democratization, human rights and democratic elections, 2) military bases and military
influence, 3) frozen conflicts and 4) energy. In addition, they have tried to increase theirinfluence in the Black Sea region. Therefore, the regional states have looked at the U.S.,
the EU, and NATO on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand. Ukraine under
President Kuchma followed a policy of ‘Go to the EU together with Russia’, andMoldova tried to resolve the Transnistrian issue with close cooperation with Russia
under the auspices of the OSCE. But it seems that the influence of the West into the BlackSea region has increased little by little recently, and, as a result, some regional states areapproaching the West more and more, as the domino of democratization demonstrates.
After Rumania and Bulgaria became NATO members, Ukraine and Georgia began
approaching NATO. Their strategic plans are to transform the Intensified Dialogue with
NATO into the MAP (Ukraine) and the IPAP into the MAP (Georgia) at the NATO
Summit in 2006, and to attain NATO membership at the NATO Summit in 2008.
Moldova also made clear its intention to conclude an IPAP when President Voronin
visited Brussels in June this year (2005), although it declared its neutrality and prohibited61

foreign troops from stationing in its territory by its constitution, and it did not actively
attempt to conclude the IPAP at the time. It might consider NATO membership if theRussian army were withdrawn from its territory. Or it might reevaluate its security
strategy, even if the Russian army were not withdrawn, but if Ukraine and Georgia were
to become NATO members. This is one reason why the GUAM states have increased
their cooperation regarding democratization, and why Uzbekistan has left theorganization.
In this context, Rumania and Bulgaria are very important players. They have been
active in strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. New Rumanian President
Basescu declared the significance of the Washington‐London‐Bucharest axis and thestability of the Black Sea region in his inaugural address in January this year (2005).
President Bush told President Basescu that he trusted the new president, who knows thesituation in Moldova very well, when he visited Washington in March this year (2005).
After this, I remember a Polish diplomat’s comment: “Poland behaved to realize theAmerican interests in Ukraine with close contact with Bush administration at the
Ukrainian presidential election. As the U.S. does not have any know‐how on WNIS, it
needs close ally, which can pursue the U.S. interests there instead of the U.S. It is
Poland.” Thus, Rumania can play an important role in the security and stability of theBlack Sea region, just as Poland and Lithuania have been playing the role of pulling
Ukraine and Belarus towards the West. But the problem is whether Rumania will be able
to overcome several unresolved issues with Moldova and Ukraine, as Poland did
regarding historically sensitive relations with Ukraine, by enthusiastically supporting the
democratic movement in Ukraine during the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004.
However, this is not to say that all of the NATO member states and the aspirant
states of the Black Sea region are in monolithic solidarity. At present, Turkey’s current
foreign policy is a point of great interest, as there was once a fixed image of Turkey as aloyal American alley, and as it has confronted Russia over the Turkish states in the BlackSea and Caspian Sea region. In contrast to such an image, Turkey has developed not only
economic cooperation with Russia, such as the Blue Stream pipeline, but has also
opposed the extension of NATO military operations from the Mediterranean into theBlack Sea. Turkey and Russia – the military powers in the Black Sea region – havecommon interests in dominating the Black Sea, preventing outside states fromintervening in it, while Rumania, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Georgia, which are weaker froma military point of view, have requested the inclusion of NATO naval troops in the BlackSea in order to counter its monopolization by Russia and Turkey.
Ⅲ．Issues to be emphasized regarding the stability of the Black Sea region
Firstly, as is clear from what has been discussed above, the key issue regarding
the stability of the Black Sea region is Russia’s traditional way of thinking about the CIS,
and its authoritative regime, which has promoted its “Near Abroad” foreign policy.
Needless to say, a democratic, prosperous and stable Russia would be ideal. However, if
we should have to choose between an authoritative but stable Russia and a62

democratizing but unstable Russia, which would be preferred? A high‐ranking American
official indicated the latter without any hesitation, stating that democratization is closely
related to the stability of the Middle East, and Iraq in particular. Such an Americanemphasis on democratization may continue, and even increase, the confrontation
between the U.S. and Russia.
Visiting Bratislava, Riga and Tbilisi this spring, President George Bush praised thedomino of democratization, and expressed his expectation that democratization would
be further extended. The West, with the OSCE, has facilitated an international election
monitor. Moreover, American NGOs such as IRI, NDI and the Soros Foundation havecontributed to the development of civil society in the CIS. On the other hand, Russia has
supported pro‐Russian authoritative political leaders in their election campaigns, andrecently passed a law requiring the obligatory registration of external NGOs.
How can we encourage Russia to democratize and cooperate in promoting
democratization and stability of the Black Sea region, while at the same time lessening
Russia’s apprehension that it may be isolated from the Eurasian international system? In
relation to this, we have already seen favorable tendencies such as the NRC(NATO‐Russia Council) and the Road Maps for the four Common Spaces between the
EU and Russia. I suppose it is not coincidental that Russia is said to have started
discussions openly with the EU and the U.S. on democratization and policy towards CIS.
Such discussions were said to be categorically rejected by Russian officials previously.
In addition, the democratization policies of the Bush government also have contradictory
aspects in relation to strategic and energy interests, as the cases of Uzbekistan andAzerbaijan aptly demonstrate. Furthermore, it will be noteworthy to observe whether
Turkey, which is promoting tri‐lateral diplomacy with the US‐NATO, Russia and theregional states, can succeed in encouraging a cooperative Russian foreign policy.
Secondly, the settlement of frozen conflicts is indispensable for the stability of theregion. On this point, the Russian attitude to the frozen conflicts is a key element, and thetouchstone is whether Russia has transformed its fundamental foreign policy or not.
Without the complete resolution of the frozen conflicts, the independence and stability of
Moldova and Georgia will not be accomplished, nor regional stability. We appreciate
Ukrainian efforts towards the settlement of the Transnistrian issue, although theproposed early implementation of elections in Transnistria was unrealistic andirresponsible. We can also evaluate as a step forward both the decision of the Russianarmy to withdraw from two bases in Georgia, and the participation of the EU and the
U.S. as observers in the pentagonal consultative framework for the resolution of theTransnistrian issue. Once the frozen conflicts have been resolved, Japan might contributeto the stabilization of the region, just as it cooperated with the EU in the reconstruction of
the Balkans after the war.
Thirdly, we cannot neglect the role which the EU and NATO have been playing andwill continue to play in the democratization of the region. We should follow closely how
the ENP will contribute to the promotion of democratization in the region, even without
giving the WNIS and Southern Caucasus states tickets to EU membership. If this does63

not produce the conditionality effects seen in the Eastern and Central states, theRumanian model might be applied to these nations. Romania, which failed to take theticket of EU membership, was stimulated by the conditionality of the NATOmembership ticket. With regard to this, IPAP and MAP might play the same role in the
Ukrainian and Georgian cases that they did in the Rumanian case.
Fourthly, taking into consideration that regional cooperation has not produced
fruitful results up to now, it seems essential that outside actors, and in particular the EU,
increase cooperation with the BSEC in order to promote economic development,
improvement of the environment, etc. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the EU started
semi‐official meetings with the BSEC this year (2005). Once Rumania and Bulgaria
become EU members, the strengthening of relations between the EU and the Black Sea
region will be inevitable.

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Session III
The Importance of the Area for Japan and Japanʹs Role in the Area

HAKAMADA Shigeki
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
The Possibility of Cooperation in the Black Sea Area and Problems –Centered on the former USSR Region
Whether or not the Black Sea Area can become economically and geopolitically an
independent region depends on the ability of the countries of the region to deepen theircooperation both politically and economically. I would like to begin by studying theBlack Sea Area by individually considering the problems faced by Ukraine, Georgia andMoldova. I will then proceed to analyze the possibility of cooperation among thecountries of the region.
Shaky Ukraine and Russia Relations
The new Ukrainian regime headed by Victor Yushchenko took at first a very severe
position regarding Russia, as was demonstrated in the slogan of entering the “EU, NATOand WTO.” In so doing, Ukraine sought to become the nucleus of a new regional
cooperation organization seeking to replace the CIS. As a consequence, Ukraine took arather negative stance towards participation in the “Unified Economic Space,” which is
being proposed by Russia with the aim of including Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan andBelarus. With the establishment of the new regime in Ukraine, however, a power
struggle within the Yushchenko regime surfaced. The Ukrainian economy has also been
deteriorating, which has led to instability of the Yuschenko government.
According to sociological research, about half of the Ukrainian population feels that they
have been deceived by the new regime (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October, 10, 2005). In
order for the governing party to win in the March 2006 National Assembly elections,
Yushchenko compromised with the old guard and dismissed reformist Prime Minister
Yulia Timosehnko in October 2005 and replaced her with the moderate Yuri Ekhanurov.

65

Yuri Ekhanurov, the new Prime Minister, visited Moscow after his inauguration in aneffort to improve Ukrainian‐Russian relations which deteriorated at the time of the“Orange Revolution.” The background of his visit to Russia was the Ukrainian economiccrisis and problems related to energy.
Energy is an Achilles Heel for Ukraine as she depends on Russia for 85% of her oil, and asignificant component of natural gas totaling around 70 billion cubic meters. It isreported that Russia will raise the price of gas from $50 per 1000 cubic meters to $160‐80
per 1000 cubic meters. Ukraine is trying to negotiate with Russia for a gradual price rise
spread over a 5‐7 year period.
At the same time, in order to become less dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas
Ukraine is attempting to diversify these energy imports. At the end of May this year,
Yushchenko visited Kazakhstan where he managed to obtain a promise from President
Nazarbayev for the import of crude oil of between 2 million‐4 million tons to be effectivefrom June this year.
Another objective of Ukraine is to secure a stable supply of natural gas from
Turkmenistan. Until now Ukraine has imported natural gas at the order of 36 billion
cubic meters annually from Turkmenistan. However, in June this year when a Ukrainian
energy negotiation team visited Turkmenistan, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan
criticized Ukraine in a very severe tone. The Ukraine’s government gas payment was inarrears to the tune of $900 million and on top of this a large amount of gas was stolen
from the pipeline. The latter problem, that is the theft of the natural gas, has become asource of friction between Ukraine and Russia. If an energy crises becomes severe, theinvestment risk in Ukraine will become greater.
The new regime in Ukraine expected economic assistance and aid from Westerncountries, but until now these expectations have not been realized. In this context,
Ukraine is attempting to strengthen relations with Russia and taking a positive stance onparticipation in the “Unified Economic Space.”
Whether Ukraine can play as an independent state an important role in the Black Sea
Area Cooperation, depends on how she solves her economic and in particular her energy
problems. In order for Ukraine to strengthen its ability as an independent state, reduce
its dependence on Russia and achieve a secure and stable energy supply, she must seek
to fortify regional cooperation with countries in the Black Sea Area.

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Georgia, GUAM and the “Community of Democratic Choice”
The Saakashvili regime has been strongly asking the withdrawal of Russian troops
stationed in Georgia, as Georgia believes Russian troops are supporting the separatist
movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While disputes with Russia deepen, theGeorgian economy continues to be in slump. Georgia is also facing serious energy
problems. President Saakashvili, in an effort to ameliorate Georgia’s energy problems,
visited Kazakhstan after Yushchenko in an attempt to negotiate with President
Nazarbayev on energy problems.
At the end of May this year the Baku‐Tiblisi‐Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was constructed. As
a result of the construction of this pipeline it is expected that Georgia will obtain around
US$2.5 billion in 40 years time (Izvestiya, October, 13, 2005.). The BTC pipeline also has asymbolic meaning from the standpoint of maintaining energy security in the Black Sea
Area.
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova adopted a policy of keeping
distance from Russia in the 1990s, and established the GUUAM Group in 1999. After the
revolution in Georgia and Ukraine, the character of GUUAM

evolved into apro‐American, European and democratic organization ― Uzbekistan left the GUUAM in
April 2005. In April 2005 at the time of the GUAM summit in Kishinyov, Moldova
adopted a positive stance and invited leaders of Eastern Europe and the EU. The
government of Azerbaijan, however, feared the spread of revolutionary fervor andtherefore distanced itself from GUAM. As a result of Azerbaijan’s moves, GUAM lost its
meaning as an organization. In August 2005, the governments of Georgia, Ukraine,
Moldova, Poland and other Baltic countries, announced the establishment of the“Community of Democratic Choice,” in opposition to the CIS. The idea of establishing
this community was an attempt to create a new East European community which will
positively promote and expand democracy and the market economy.
Confrontation between Moldavia and Russia
The country most at odds with Russia is currently Moldova. As a member of GUUAM,
Moldova once had a policy of keeping distance from Russia. President Vladimir Voroninof Moldova later switched this policy to a more positive Russian line, but the change of
regimes in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004 made a strong impact on Moldova and Voroninchanged his Russian policy 180 degrees once again to one of a pro‐Western European
stance. Moldova is opposing Russia by demanding Russia withdraw its troops from67

Transnistria. Russia has insisted in keeping its troops in place until 2020, but Moldova’s
National Assembly, responding to a proposal of Ukraine, insisted to replace Russian
troops with multilateral forces of OSCE, in particular Ukrainian troops.
In October 2005 the President of Moldova criticized Russia in a strong tone saying, “evenif we lose Russian natural gas and wine markets we will not surrender to Russia on theTransnistria issue.” To this, members of Russia’s Lower House proposed in October thisyear the suspension of wine imports from Moldova. Moscow city has already stopped
the import of vegetables and meat from Moldova in these six months (Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, October, 12, 2005).
Such measures as these will deal a damaging blow to the Moldovan economy. Moldova
shows a positive stance towards the creation of the “Community of Democratic Choice,”
as well as an equally positive stance for the creation of economic cooperation in the BlackSea Area. Moldova’s enthusiastic approach to both of the above initiatives can be
ascribed to its desire of aiding the realization of the political and economic independenceof the region. However, as Ukraine is now attempting to reconstruct its relations with
Russia, the future of the “Community of Democratic Choice” is unclear.
Conclusion
Whether the Black Sea Area countries can establish a stable regional environment forcooperation, and demonstrate their substantial presence both politically andeconomically depends to a large extent on whether these countries can realize theirstability as independent of Russian influence. The economic independence and stability,
especially in the security and energy fields, is critical, if political stability as independent
states is to be achieved. Consequently the most urgent problem needing attention in theBlack Sea Area is how to establish cooperative relationships in the field of energy. The
two main energy producing countries in this region are Azerbaijan and Russia, but many
countries in this region do not wish to be dependent on Russia, even if they are so for
their energy needs.
In this context, the promotion of Black Sea Area cooperation depends on how to makeeffective use of energy resources produced in Azerbaijan, neighboring Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan in view of economic activation of this region: Outside the energy field thisregion should be revitalized. Japan and other East European countries must seriously
study what types of energy and economic cooperation they can provide.
Until now, Japan has not had any comprehensive view or approach to recognize the68Black Sea Area region as a united entity. Even if it is at an elementary level, Japan shouldat first recognize the geopolitical importance of this region. For that purpose we must
actively disseminate information on the Black Sea Area to the political, bureaucratic,
business and mass media worlds of Japan. Japanese embassies in the countries
concerned should make more strenuous efforts in conducting activities and events forenhancing mutual understanding with the authorities of the government concerned of
the region. I hope that this Dialogue will be a first step of achieving such a goal.

Tedo JAPARIDZESecretary General, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

THE ISLAND NATION & THE INLAND SEA:A STRATEGIC VISION OF JAPAN AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

When I was first asked to speak on the subject of the Black Sea and Japan, I quickly
found that few analysts or commentators had delved into the subject in much detail.
Perhaps, I said to myself, there may be a reason for that. And perhaps the reason there
were so few, if any, grand strategic visions put forward were devastatingly simple.
Maybe the region really had so little relevance to Japan that no one had even bothered to
examine what role Japan might play in the area.
As an analyst, I always try to understand the perspectives of the other side, to put myself
in their shoes, so to speak. I know that diplomats are not always known for their
sympathetic understanding of the concerns and sensitivities of their negotiating partners,
and as I look around the conference room today, I can see several of my colleagues from
BSEC Member States who still bear the scars of many a fierce internal battle within our
own Organization.
But understanding the other side provides the essential foundation and framework for a
fuller analysis. First, even though I represent a regional economic cooperation
organization, I can appreciate that many people find it hard to comprehend the greaterBlack Sea area as a coherent region, in the same way that, say, Southeast Asia or
Scandinavia are so easily comprehensible as distinct geographical and economic regions.
I can also understand that Japanese business has focused on our larger Member States,
such as the Russian Federation and Turkey, or on those States, such as Romania andBulgaria, which are on the path to full accession to the European Union and its vastinternal market. And I fully appreciate that many states in the greater Black Sea region69

are poor, and are characterized all too often by corruption, weak institutions and theinconsistent application of rule of law, all factors that have effectively ruled them out – atleast for now‐ as suitable candidates for significant inward investment.
And our region unfortunately suffers from several unresolved conflicts, a situation that is
one of the biggest barriers not only to inward investment from outside, but which acts asa curb on greater intra‐regional trade and investment.
In the past, the Black Sea region was seen as a strategic crossroads and space throughwhich values, art, culture and technological achievements of some of the world’s greatest
civilizations were transmitted. Today, we are still seen as a strategic space, but one
through which all too often is a transit point for the illegal trafficking in people, narcotics,
weapons, terrorism and organized crime.
Our sheer distance from Japan may also be seen as a barrier, although in one sense, ourlargest Member State, Russia, is of course an important neighbor of Japan. So perhaps wearen’t such strangers after all – I heard many times from my curious Japanese friends thatthey’d like to learn more about their biggest neighbor’s neighborhood.
We certainly weren’t in the distant past. The Silk Road, stretching from Asia to the BlackSea, offers eloquent testimony to that. And perhaps it is from history that we shoulddraw some lessons that may offer us insights into how our future might evolve.
One of the first common markets in Europe was not a product of post‐World War Two
reconciliation. Many centuries before that ancient Black Sea civilizations enjoyed acommon market in metals, with each sub‐region providing the others with essential raw
materials for their economic development.
So perhaps the fractious and fragmented face that much of our region presents to Japanand the rest of the world today is not our natural condition, but merely a modern
historical aberration. I for one would like to think this is so.
But the Black Sea region is not still a nascent political union. The long‐term strategic
goals and aims of Member States are simply too complex and contradictory for that andthe economic and political gravitational pull of the European Union too great for such a
conclusion.
At this point, perhaps I need to elaborate on the influence of the EU in our region inorder to better explain the region’s relevance to Japan. Recently, many commentators
have emphasized that enlargement has been perhaps the most successful European
policy since the 1950s, when the first moves to create a European entity cemented thereconciliation of France and Germany.
Perhaps that is only a perspective of Europe’s political and media elites. But it hascertainly worked in the 10 most recent accession states, where the prospect of EU
membership has clearly underpinned the peaceful transformation of former communist

70

economies, and helped to introduce and entrench democratic values.
That enlargement did not directly affect the Black Sea region. But the next one – if there
is a next one – will. Of the 12 Member States of BSEC, only Greece is a current EU
member. Two others ‐ Romania and Bulgaria – are in the final stages to accede to the EU
in 2007. Accession talks with Turkey began last month; a process which I personallybelieve will have a profound transformational effect not only on its immediate neighbors
but on the Black Sea region as a whole. Serbia and Montenegro is covered by a broader
EU commitment to the western Balkans. Ukraine has made no secret that it sees its futurein Europe. So too has my own country, Georgia. All BSEC States that are not on a directaccession path are subject to the still‐evolving European Neighbourhood Policy thatseeks to reward, in some still ill‐defined way, countries that embrace “European norms
and values.” The only exception is Russia, which already has a complex “special”
strategic relationship with Europe as well as Japan.
It is perhaps ironic that, at a time when many people in what I will call “established
Europe” are so disenchanted with the European project, that its allure and attraction
exerts such power and influence over its “near abroad.”Some Black Sea countries have never appeared on any list for accession. Yet theEuropean flag flies alongside their national flags in front of parliaments and other publicbuildings. Some can do so because it is also the official flag of the Council of Europe, of
which all BSEC countries are a member. But that flag does not fly there to impress
visiting European officials and politicians and to persuade them to support ourlong‐term hopes and aspirations. It is no publicity or public relations stunt. It flies there
because it serves as a psychological anchor in countries which have been wracked either
by civil wars or economic collapse.
This flag symbolizes hope. Not hope for a future economic gravy train, or for bottomlesssubsidies or handouts from Brussels; nobody in the Black Sea region is so naive as tobelieve that. But that flag‐ the EU flag‐ symbolizes a hope for stability, for the possibilityof future prosperity.
Whatever direction the present debate in established Europe takes, Europe will continue
to exert a fundamental influence on our development in the Black Sea region. Many of
our economies and companies are already aligning themselves with European andinternational standards and regulations, a development that over time will make ourregion more attractive to potential investors, including those from Japan.
We are also emerging rapidly as a major energy hub, not only for Europe but for
countries such as Japan. Japanese companies are partners in three of the most importantenergy projects in the BSEC area, the development of some of Azerbaijan’s biggest
offshore oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea, the Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan oil
pipeline ‐ linking Caspian oil reserves to the Turkish Mediterranean Sea coast and thenon to wider world markets, and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline from Azerbaijan
to Turkey via Georgia. Japanese suppliers, such as Sumitomo, played a crucial role inproviding the vast amount of pipes required by the three projects, whose total value is71estimated at around $20bn.
Other critical energy infrastructure projects are on the drawing board, and it is hard to
imagine that Japanese interest in the strategic potential of the region’s energy reserves
and energy supply corridors will diminish. In fact in today’s volatile global energy
markets, it seems to me that Japanese interest and involvement can only increase incoming years as competition for scarce resources intensifies.
But even as Japanese commercial involvement increases, an obvious question comes tomind. Where are the other Japanese institutions and agencies, both from the public andprivate sectors, to help ensure that such investments are sustainable in the long term andto ensure that those investments bring benefits both to Japan and to the region as awhole?
Given the deeply uncertain direction of the EU, that is more than of purely academic
interest. Imagine, if you will, if that magnetic, psychological attraction of Europe isremoved altogether. Unfortunately, it is now not an unimaginable thought. Imagine aswell if, as a result of recent events within the EU, that it closes its door on much of theBlack Sea region. I cannot tell you what will happen or predict what new political
upheavals or re‐alignments may take place, or whether an all‐encompassing economic
malaise will settle over the region. All I can say is that in much of the region democratic
institutions are still fragile. Economies are still struggling. In some cases, extreme anddivisive nationalisms have been in held in check only because the prospect of Europe has
proved a far more powerful attraction.
Europe is where we naturally gravitate towards simply through geographical proximity,
and Europe has demonstrated how powerful “soft power” can be, even in a region that
historically has proved to be fertile ground for recurrent Great Power rivalries andconflicts. And this is perhaps where Japan can find a role beyond its economic
self‐interest, as important as that is.
Let me be blunt for a moment. Our region is one where suspicion is deeply entrenched,
where the motivations and ultimate designs of external parties are subjected to endlessconspiracy theories. The collective memories of the past persist into the present and areroutinely projected into the future. We are still all too often prisoners not only of ourgeography but of our past and of the ancient rivalries that lie just below the surface.
That is our problem and burden. But it could also be an opportunity for a country such
as Japan. Japan is not ensnared in our past. It does not carry the burden of our tortured
history. But Japan could help shape our future, both economically and socially. At many
points in its history, Japan has had to make many difficult transitions andtransformations. Its experiences could help us to do the same.
But I know that a Japanese mind likes alongside these academic reflections to hear moresome concrete facts on the ground for further Japanese involvement with BSEC. Herethey are:72

A strong argument in favor of participation of Japan in the activities of BSEC could bethat the twelve BSEC countries grew by an estimated 7, 3% in real GDP during 2004. This
followed growth of more than 5% in 2002 and 6% in 2003. The region is second only to
East Asia & the Pacific in average growth during the last 3 years. Involvement in the only
full fledged regional Organisation of the Black Sea area with well institutionalized andlegally structured framework composed of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
(BSTDB), BSEC Business Council, BSEC Parliamentary Assembly, and ICBSS, (our BSEC
“think tank”), will increase the potential of the strong Japanese export sector in
maximising sales in the region and provide useful commercial insights to be utilised by
the strong Japanese manufacturing and services sectors.
The BSTDB is providing large scale financing to banking institutions in the Black Sea
region. Up to now the BSEC Bank has provided 283 million USD to the expansion ofbanking operations. Taking into account the relatively low level of penetration ofadvanced financial services in most of the BSEC countries, Japanese Banks could beinterested in the privatisation of the regional national banks. It should be noted that quite
recently the prices for privatised banks in Central and Eastern Europe have skyrocketed(the largest Romanian bank was sold in November for a price almost 30% more than theprevious highest estimate).
Participation of Japan in the different BSEC Working Groups, and specifically on the
Banking and Finance matters and other respective bodies of BSEC, could provide more
information and leverage on this regard taking into account that the Japanese financial
institutions are among the largest in the world.
The protection of the environment is one of the main priorities of the BSEC and it has
undertaken extensive work, especially in the cleaning of the Black Sea itself. To thisregard the BSEC is extensively cooperating with the Black Sea Environment Programme(BSEP). Japan is a world leader in environmental technology and at the same time isproviding financing to BSEP. Participation of the Japanese experts at the relevant forumsof BSEC will increase its leverage in this sector.
And these are just couple of facts.
Japan has been at the forefront of globalization. That globalization will grow in coming
years and decades is a given, in spite of its potential to trigger economic, cultural andpolitical dislocations. The challenge is how to exploit it at the same time as preserving
and promoting the unique characteristics of individual economies and societies in theface of seemingly overwhelming forces.
For economic powerhouses such as Japan, globalization is not just about penetrating anddeveloping new markets and building critical commercial mass. It also increasingly
carries with it specific responsibilities for helping to ensure that those markets develop inan orderly and stable way. That is simply good business practice in the 21st century.
And this is where I believe that our Organization – BSEC – could offer significant

73

opportunities for Japan, both in the economic and political spheres. There are several
distinctive areas for potential cooperation. The first is that we could jointly help BSEC
Member States to identify and understand the underlying technological, economic andcommercial strands and trends that intertwine to produce “globalization,” and how suchdevelopments may impact on their economies and cultures. The key here is not to haveairy, academic debates on the rights and wrongs of globalization, but to bring the debate
down to a level in which its consequences, and thus any consequent opportunities, areidentified in Black Sea context.
BSEC is also a natural vehicle through which together we could help to break down thepolitical, fiscal and physical barriers that undermine the Black Sea region’s inward
investment environment. Japan’s image in our region as being a “neutral” agent ofchange makes it a potentially potent and effective partner, and one without a secret or
hidden political or economic agenda.
Black Sea societies and Japan also share a deep regard for the cultural achievements of
our ancestors. The Black Sea region is perhaps the world’s oldest continuously‐inhabitedregion. It is said that in some of the Middle East’s greatest oil producing states that all
you have to do to find oil is to push a stick into the ground. That, of course, is certainly
an exaggeration and an obvious slight to the skills of geologists worldwide. But dig a
deep‐enough hole almost anywhere in the Black Sea region and you will more thanlikely come face‐to‐face with the achievements of our ancient ancestors.
Cultural heritage is not just about the past, however. It can have a practical andpragmatic economic impact on the present, offering unique opportunities for tourism
and jobs in areas which have traditionally suffered from chronic under‐investment. In
remote northeast Anatolia in Turkey, one can routinely see busloads of Japanese tourists
who have made the long and arduous journey to visit unique monuments andarchaeological sites. We need to develop the vast potential in our region for the creationof cross‐border cultural heritage trails and trans‐national tourist routes. What better
partner could we have than Japan?
BSEC, in turn, can offer Japan a unique perspective and position in the region. Perhaps inthe past BSEC has not itself seen the relevance or importance of that perspective or
position. But global political, economic and security related developments, good and bad,have made that view a necessary element of the broader strategic picture. But only BSEC,
working closely with partners such as Japan, can bring that about. Together we can build
upon BSEC’s existing structures and resources to put forward views, forums, projects
and relationships that will be beneficial to both sides. It is a unique time in modern
history. And the Black Sea region is in a unique strategic space, one in which Japan isuniquely placed to play a positive role across a broad array of areas.
Having in mind the fascinating dynamic trends and processes in the Black Sea area, andtaking advantage of the presence of several esteemed representative of Japan’s foreign
ministry, I would like to invite Japan to consider joining countries such as the US,
Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Israel and many others as an Observer of BSEC.

74

Last year, the Tsunami that tragically swept across much of the Indian Ocean
dramatically demonstrated that the power of a single tectonic geological event in one
remote area of the world can have a devastating effect on people and societies thousandsof kilometers away. Over the past decade or so much of the Black Sea region has
experienced tectonic political events. These too have had an impact well beyond our
region, and in some senses, are still being felt.
Our region, as one of the world’s great cross‐roads, will continue to be subject to change,and sometimes suddenly. We sincerely hope whatever changes occur overall will be forthe better. It is what our citizens not only desire but demand. But we need sincere
partners to ensure those changes are positive and to help bring stability and economic
growth. Japan, an island nation, at one point in its history chose isolation from much of
the world. In more recent times, much of our inland sea region was isolated from muchof the world through political and ideological divisions. But in today’s world, neither anisland nation nor an area dominated by an inland sea can afford to be isolated from eachother or the wider world. It is simply not an option.
Concluding, I would like to thank the Organizers of this wonderful Conference,
personally Mr.

Noritake KAI, Governor of the Global Forum of Japan, and His

Excellency Taro ASO, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Japanese Embassy inTurkey and His Excellency Tomoyuki ABE, Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of
Turkey. My special gratitude, by all means, goes to the Turkish Embassy in Japan andpersonally Her Excellency Solmaz ÜNAYDIN, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey
who urged us to participate in this very important Conference for the Black Sea region
and BSEC. Thank you Madam Ambassador very, very much!
And thank you all for your more than kind attention.

76

7. Minutes of Discussions
Opening Session
Opening Remarks

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

This dialogue came about because of the good offices of Romania andparticularly Professor Pascu and the Black Sea University Foundation. It was
first suggested last year. Well there were doubts about whether it would beunderstood, many people immediately recognized its importance and offered
their help.
The participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation Organization has elevated the relevancy of the dialogue.
The Yomiuri newspaper will be printing a story on the dialogue and I hopethat the dialogue would pave the way for stronger relations between Japanand the wider Black Sea Area in the future.
Opening Remarks

Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of
Romania

I am representing the Black Sea University Foundation.
Many changes have taken place in the region since the end of the Cold War.
The Black Sea is being transformed into the gateway to Europe and is gaining
new importance and relevance, particularly for Japan. Like Asia, the area iscomplex and events there reverberate throughout the world.
The GFJ has the power to create public awareness of this area and today
represents an opportunity to issue a ʺbirth certificateʺ for an area that still lacks
identity.
Introductory Remarks

HARADA Chikahito, Director‐General, European Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

There is much dynamism and diversity in the wider Black Sea Area, withvarious cultures coexisting after centuries of different civilizations rising andfalling. The area has never been recognized as having common regional
characteristics until recently, partly because of its geographical scope. Few
countries have designed a foreign‐policy which encompasses the entire area,
and Japan is no exception.

59

However, it is gradually acquiring common features of geopolitical andeconomic importance, and there is a possible role for Japan to play there. Witha market of 400 million people and competitive labor costs, Japan regards thearea as a potentially attractive trade and investment partner. Japanesecompanies are participating in more oil production projects and Japan has
provided yen credits for upgrading the capacity of terminal ports in somecountries.
Japan considers democratization to be an important factor in regional stability
and actively assists the area by, for example, sending election
observers and holding dialogues. Japan also provides technical assistance andwants to play a role in peace consolidation and nation‐building. It welcomesthe role played by BSEC as a unique entity encompassing all countries in theregion.
The region faces many problems with cross‐border implications, among them:
infectious diseases, transnational organized crime, illegal arms trade andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan encourages regional
cooperation initiatives as an effective tool for coping with trans‐border issues
and promoting trade and investment. It also notes that many countries in theregion are taking their own initiatives and Japan will continue to serve as ananonymous partner in achieving further improvement on many of these issues.
Todayʹs meeting is a valuable attempt at a non‐government level.
Free discussion

All participants

Would Japan consider observer status in BSEC?
Mr. Harada responded that Japan did not yet have a position on this question
but would need to consider it in due course. There is potential for establishinga dialogue between Japan and the region similar to the dialogue between Japanand Central Asia.
Professor Pascu noted the potential for collaboration with the European Union,
which is stressing the non‐military aspects of security, and Japan, which isalready prepared to participate in non‐military areas.
Professor Sarkisov expressed concern over the implications for territorial
disputes with Russia and the potential for Russia to perceive Japanese
involvement in BSEC as an attempt to exploit the situation. Mr. Harada
expressed confidence that Russia understands Japan does not have any claims
or ambitions in the Black Sea Area.

60

Session I: Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Area
Chairperson

KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ (former Ambassador toTunisia)

The Black Sea Area had begun to emerge with its own identity since the end of
the Cold War. NATO has shown great interest in the region and Europeʹspresence already reaches to the coast of the Black Sea. Japan has implemented
a policy of ʺSilk Road Diplomacyʺ with countries in Central Asia and there has
been remarkable progress in the fields of trade, investment and industry. We
may perhaps be able to use a similar approach with the Black Sea region.
Paper Presenter

Mustafa AKŞİN, Chairman of the Board, the International
Centre for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)

BSEC was at first a commitment to engage in economic cooperation, but in1998 heads of state signed the BSEC Charter, which transformed it into a fully‐
fledged international organization. BSEC now has 12 members plus 12
observers and has recently gained observer status at the General Assembly of
the UN.
Its decision‐making organ is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Thereis a secretariat located in Istanbul and working groups meet regularly to
discuss specific issues.
BSEC works in cooperation with other international organizations and has
recently broadened its scope to include areas such as environmental protection,water management, science and technology, institutional renewal and goodgovenance, seismic protection, and soft security issues such as organized crime,
illegal traffic of drugs and arms, terrorism, corruption and money‐laundering.
The Business Council is a non‐Government Organization of the business
communities of member states that helps promote investments, works toeliminate impediments to trade and assists in developing cooperation amongsmall and medium‐sized enterprises.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank located in Greece is the financial
arm, with an active portfolio of $675 million. The International Center for BlackSea Studies is responsible for the academic and scientific dimension of BlackSea cooperation and serves as a think tank for BSEC.

61

There have been unresolved issues between BSEC members, but thanks to
BSEC, the atmosphere is now more conducive to their eventual resolution.
BSEC members are recording robust growth that will put them in the categoryof ʺtiger economiesʺ if it can be sustained. The region needs to do more topromote intra‐BSEC trade, however.
BSEC is a neighbor of both the EU and the greater Middle East. Some membersof BSEC are major producers of energy and many serve as energy corridors toWestern Europe. As such, BSEC members offer many opportunities toinvestors that want to tap the region’s huge natural and human resources.
There is room for growth in Japanese involvement with the region, especiallyin energy, manufacturing, infrastructure and particularly tourism, where
Japanese firms are notably absent from the hotel and airline markets.

Paper Presenter

UEGAKI Akira, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Seinan
Gakuin University

Different countries will have different views on the GATT agreement andglobalization.
ʺOptimistsʺ view economic globalization is desirable and regional economic
arrangements as a means to it. ʺGenuine globalistsʺ say yes to economic
globalization but no to regional cooperation because the latter disturbs freeglobal economic transactions. ʺNationalistsʺ say no to both economic
globalization and regional economic cooperation because of their potential todestroy the national identity of small countries. ʺEcologistsʺ say no toglobalization and yes to regional cooperation because of the potential for thelatter to mitigate the vices of economic globalization.
Most BSEC members probably view globalization and regional economic
cooperation as something desirable. This optimism, however, cannot be realized
shortly because there are economic problems among BSEC members, particularly
current account deficits and dependence on labor remittances.
To begin with, the region needs to create a terror‐free, crime‐free zone around theBlack Sea in order to attract capital. Cooperative efforts for the protection of
the environment, especially the water of the Black Sea, are minimum
requirements for further development.

62

Lead Discussant A

Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of
Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federationʺ

Russia considers the Black Sea Area an important region. It has historically
been a Black Sea country itself and its policy towards the region is tostrengthen peaceful and friendly relations. Russia considers BSEC to be a very
effective mechanism for cooperation. Romania is the current chair and Russia
will be the next. The organization works in line with the philosophy of modern
international relations and makes an interesting partner for non‐regionalcountries. Russia welcomes the initiative of the United States as well as Belarus,
Croatia and Czech Republic to obtain observer status with BSEC
Among the proposals introduced by Russia are electric power links, passenger
interaction between ports on the Black Sea and ports on the Mediterranean,and modern highways.
In 1997, Russian Government empowered the foreign ministry to coordinate all
Russian Federation activities in the direction of BSEC, which it finds a very
convenient arrangement.
Lead Discussant B

TAKENAKA Shigeo, Secretary General of Asian
Productivity Organization (former Ambassador to Turkey)

Asia has a longer history in regional cooperation, and there are two primary
regional organizations for this: ASEAN and SARC. When ASEAN started,
there were many conflicts between its members, but they gradually realizedthat cooperation should take precedence and their conflicts subsided. Large
regional players like Indonesia restrain themselves within the organization so
as not to dominate it, and this gives it credibility. By contrast, SARC isdominated by India and lacks the same credibility as ASEAN.
The implications for the Black Sea Area are that conflict should be resolved andcountries should exercise restraint.
I think Japan should become an observer of BSEC and that the Foreign
Ministry should handle all Black Sea countries under the same department,
which would enable a moral coherent policy to be produced for the region.

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Lead Discussant C

Yuriy KOSTENKO, Ambassador of Ukraine to JapanThe United Nations, NATO, European Union, Council of Europe and otherorganizations help to maintain stability and democracy in the Black Sea Area.
Ukraine considers GUAM to be one of the main instruments for guaranteeing
stability in the region, which it believes should be based on democracy,
economic development and security components. ʺFrozen conflictsʺ are among
GUAMʹs highest priorities.
Ukraine has also launched the Community of Democratic Choice as a publicforum for resolving conflict and maintaining human rights. Its first meeting
will take place in Kiev in December with high‐level participation from
European countries.
Lead Discussant D

IMAMURA Akira, Director, Central and South Eastern
Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of JapanThe Black Sea region can be compared and contrasted with East Asia. Bothhave a wide diversity of values, religions, cultures and history, and there arealso wide diversity in the degree of democratization and marketization inboth regions. Like East Asia, it is premature to seek integration like EU in theBlack Sea region, but it is more suited to promote functional cooperation
among the countries of the region with its current level of diversity.
In East Asia, some of countries have security arrangements with the UnitedStates but no multilateral organization akin to NATO or the EU. In the BlackSea region the US also has a great interest in the stabilization of the Middle
East and Black Sea regions and in connection with this it will be establishingmilitary bases in Romania on the Black Sea coast. But like in East Asia, there isno multilateral security organization that covers all the region, due todiversified views on security threat in the Black Sea countries. There are also
differences between the two regions. Unlike East Asia the degree of economic
interdependence is still low in the Black Sea region. Asymmetry exists in termsof energy supply structure in the region, with Russia being single biggest
supplier.
Stability in this region is important for Japan and cooperation should be open
to all participants. Japan does not have a multilateral Black Sea policy at thistime, but it does enjoy strong bilateral relations with each country of the region,
which it would like to further strengthen. Furthermore, Japan can play a role
once frozen conflicts are resolved and can assist in economic development andinfrastructure creation. It is particularly concerned with cross‐border crime,64

not only terrorism and weapons, but also human trafficking, because many ofthe victims end up in Japan, working and staying here illegally. Finally, in thearea of environment, Japan is interested in joint projects under the Kyoto
protocol.
Lead Discussant E

Polyxeni PETROPOULOU, First Counselor (PoliticalCounselor), Embassy of Greece in Japan

BSEC is a relatively mature organization with a broad base. It is the mostadvanced expression of regional cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Area andmany associate organizations have been developed.
Greece is the only member of both the EU and BSEC and as such wishes to be a
driving force for cooperation between the two regions. In October 2005 Greece
was mandated by the BSEC Council of Ministers to hold exploratory
consultations with EU Institutions on the enhancement of BSEC‐EU interaction.
BSEC has a significant role to play in the creation of a common Eurasian
economic space. A strong and effective partnership between the EU and BSEC,
based on common economic, political and cultural values, is needed for thepromotion of peace, stability and regional cooperation.
Free Discussions

All ParticipantsParticipants discussed the status of GUAM, with some questioning whether it
had lost its relevance because the positions of member states, particularly
Azerbaijan, had changed. Others affirmed that GUAM was still a vibrant andactive initiative. For instance, it has a common position on the need for thewithdrawal of Russian troops in the region. It is also moving to create asecretariat.
One of the difficulties with regional cooperation and identity is that there aremagnets more powerful outside the area than inside, particularly Europe,
which is attractive to countries in the region. There is still some question about
what the Black Sea Area constitutes, specifically whether the Baltics areincluded. Some participants said that ʺWider Black Sea Areaʺ was synonymouswith BSEC, which itself represented the institutionalization of trends taking
place in the region.
GUAM was considered by some to be an ʺinitiativeʺ rather than anʺorganization.ʺ It is not necessarily in opposition to CIS.
While identity is an issue for the region, many participants felt that it should
not be addressed at the beginning; rather identity is something that emerges

65after substantive cooperation and interaction build up. East Asia still does nothave a clear identity itself. Other participants noted that different countries in
the region have fundamentally different perceptions of history which cannot
be reconciled and which will be an impediment to developing a coherent
identity. Others pointed to the Byzantine, Turkish and Russian influences on
the region, which give countries there a common flavor.
There were questions about the current account deficits presented in some ofthe papers and participants noted that overvalued currencies play a large rolein the Turkish deficit in particular.
It was suggested that representatives of Japan be invited to BSEC working
groups and workshops and perhaps the Japan Foundation would consider
running one of the meetings in Istanbul.

Session II: Strategic Implications of Big Power Interests in the Area
Chairperson

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJPaper Presenter

Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of
Romania

After 150 years of relative neglect, the Black Sea Area is again a focal point for
the great powers. It has three main strategic directions: towards the Soviet
Union, towards the Middle East and towards Central Asia. Through the
Danube, it is now a gateway to Europe as well. There are two main strategic
aims for big power interests: to acquire or maintain strategic positions and tocontrol energy resources. ʺOil for democracyʺ is another new trend in theregion.
Russia has tried to step into the shoes of the former Soviet Union, but is notable to fill them completely. The withdrawal of its troops from the area isessential to the solution of conflicts. Russia is also trying to keep countries in
the region dependent on her. Some 60% of Turkish gas supplies come from
Russia.
The United States is interested in oil and gas, and also wants a political andmilitary presence in the area, which it sees as a part of the larger Middle East.
US troops have been stationed in Romania.
The EUʹs Neighborhood Policy has resulted in agreements with Ukraine,
Moldova and the Caucasus. Turkey regulates naval activity in the Black Sea

66and coordinates with Russia, which is its second‐largest economic partner.
Should Turkey failed to join the EU, she would be bottled up at the entrance ofthe Middle East, which is something that it does not desire. It might then workwith Russia to present a barrier for the European Union.
Whatever happens, it will not diminish the relevance of the region as agateway. There is too much to gain through cooperation, so conflict is not a
possibility.
Paper Presenter

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor of the Graduate School ofInternational Relations, University of Shizuoka

The international context for the transformation of the Black Sea region is thatthe big powers have always dominated this region and continue to do so.
NATO is moving in to fill the power vacuum created by the end of the Cold
War, and the EU, which is a stronger actor from an economic point of view,has extended its borders to the vicinity of the eastern coast of the Black Sea.
There is also discontinuity, primarily because of the conditionality of the
EU/NATO membership. Should the region fail to be integrated with the West,it will move closer to the Russian sphere of influence. While ʺdomino
democratizationʺ has occurred, there is also conflict between pro‐Western andpro‐status quo forces.
Turkey and Russia cooperate because of common economic interests and also
common political interests in that they wish to exclude outside influence fromthe region and maintain their own positions.
The key issue regarding the stability of the Black Sea region is the traditional
Russian thinking on the CIS and its Near Abroad policy. A democratic,
prosperous and stable Russia would be ideal, but the Americans preferstability above all, if we should choose one between an authoritative but stable
Russia and a democratizing but unstable Russia. The key question is whether
Russia has really transformed its fundamental foreign‐policy. Without this, theindependence and stability of Georgia and Moldova will not come about.
The regional cooperation has not produced fruitful results to this point, so it
seems essential that outside actors cooperate, particularly the EU, whichstarted semiofficial meetings with BSEC this year.
Once conflicts have been resolved, there will be room for Japan to cooperatewith the region, just as it has in the Balkans.

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Lead Discussant AOğuz ÖZGE, Ambassador, Director General for Economic
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

The Black Sea Area is strategically important because it lies at the heart of theEurasian land mass. As the key point controlling the east/west and north/southtransportation routes, the area has been a center of attention for centuries andcontinues to be so. Following World War II, the Wider Black Sea Area, with the
exception of the Middle East, remained under the influence of the Soviet Union,
and a power vacuum emerged after the Soviet Unionʹs collapse because the
newly independent states were too weak to contribute to the stability of thearea.
Its rich oil and gas resources make the area attractive to India and China for
their energy security, and indeed China, India, the EU and Japan are all poised
to become influential players in this region because of their increasing energy
demand. Turkey is located strategically between energy producers andconsumers and is becoming a major energy power thanks to its pipelines.
The area has historically been unstable, and strengthening security is becoming
a high priority for nations that have stakes there. Stability and security will
require political form, democratization and economic reform, not just physicalmeasures.
Organized crime and terrorism are risks. The Black Sea itself has become moresecure than the Wider Black Sea Area thanks to cooperative naval
arrangements among the six coastal states. BSEC develops security measures
to cope with challenges.
Lead Discussant B

ISHIHARA Tadakatsu, Senior Coordinator, Policy Planning
Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan

While there have been some positive developments like democratization, there
are many complex problems and conflicts that remain in the Wider Black Sea
Area. Russia, for instance, considers it to be a ʺbackyardʺ of vital importance.
The United States is making inroads in the region through the expansion of the
EU/NATO. At the current point, the region is more favorable to the West than
it is to Russia, and this is particularly the case for Ukraine and Georgia.
Turkey is a major power in the region and its interest sometimes differ fromthose of the US. If Turkey is not accepted into the EU, it will reorient itself
more towards Russia and the Middle East.

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Iran, China and India are all becoming players in the region. Settlement of theTransnistria problem might facilitate closer ties between Romania andMoldova.
Lead Discussant C

Blagovest SENDOV, Ambassador of Bulgaria to JapanThe security of the Black Sea requires more attention.
Conferences and seminars have recently been held on security arrangements.
For instance, Bulgaria recently held a seminar on strengthening security in theBlack Sea which was attended by delegations from Great Britain, Georgia,
Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Bulgaria. Other importantdevelopments include the NATO Istanbul communiqué and the Atlantic
Disaster Response Organization.
The Black Sea will be on the border with the EU and will need to increase
security in cooperation with other states. The main focus should be on the
management of volatile ʺfrozen conflicts.ʺ For example, Armenia andAzerbaijan are now in high‐level political dialogue and Bulgaria highlights the
positive developments that have been made in the peaceful settlement ofterritorial conflicts. However, the most important decisions are still to be taken.
The key question for the region is how the interests of the big powers will playout for stability and security.
Lead Discussant D

SUEZAWA Megumi, Associate Professor of HeiseiInternational University

The Black Sea has not been at the top of the European security agenda andmost states in the region have been involved in their own problems. Territorial
issues have also hampered progress. Many states see NATO membership as
the first step in joining the EU. NATOʹs borderline already extends to the BlackSea coast, which raises concern about collisions of interests among the great
powers in this region.
BSEC has the opportunity to set a model for international cooperation. It canplay a much wider and more significant role than expected, for instance, in
promoting Ukrainian integration.
Todayʹs conference will help to raise awareness of the Black Sea region in
Japanese society, but Japan should not employ double standards as it provides
cooperation. Japan is trusted in the region because of its lack of politicalambition and could play the same role there that it played in Ukraine.

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Lead Discussant E

Aurelian NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan

BSEC is the only instrument that brings together the countries of the region
and it is gaining importance in the eyes of the world. The interest in this region
can be seen from the new observers that have been added to BSEC. We would
like to consider official status for Japan in the organization and are particularlyinterested in further economic cooperation. Japan is welcome to participate in
the energy or military forums scheduled for next spring.
Many countries have vested interests in gas and oil in this area and there is a
proposal for a multinational company to be established in order to ensure
maximum transparency.
Romania would like to leave a legacy to BSEC while it is in the chair. We wantto provide a reality check so that we can explore common interests andcommon areas of concern.
Lead Discussant F

Konstantin SARKISOV, Professor of Department of Politics
and Public Administration, Faculty of Law, Yamanashi
Gakuin University (Russia)

BSEC is a good example of regionalism as a mechanism to lessen thedestructive features of globalization, and this is where the idea of an East
Asian economic community derives from. In this transitional period ininternational relations, regional solidarity is becoming increasingly important.
The region used to have old confrontations, for example between Turkey and
Greece or Russia and Turkey, but the collapse of the USSR has helped it toovercome traditional animosities. On the other hand, it has also added new
conflicts. All of the frozen conflicts are due to its collapse.
Today, the region is stable, but not 100%. Stability is maintained by the major
powers: the United States, Russia, EU and Turkey. The key to solving conflicts
will be economy, as increasing interdependence will make it easier toovercome political controversies. However, political will is also required.
While Japan can contribute with money and technology, its pacifism is alsoneeded. Japan is a good example of how a peaceful country can be successful.
Free Discussions

All ParticipantsʺFrozen conflictsʺ are not ʺfrozen;ʺ they are ongoing. It is the resolution that isfrozen. BSEC needs to explore ways to unfreeze resolutions, and economic
models may be useful in this.

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Turkey enjoys close ties with Russia, but not at the expense of other states in
the region. Its goals are to foster economic growth and prosperity and toenhance stability and peace. It is open to cooperation with all Black Sea
member states.
Turkey holds an annual conference in Istanbul for people in the oil and energy
industries. When Russia is the chair of BSEC, it would be interesting to hold asimilar conference in Moscow or even in Japan.

Session III:The Importance of the Area for Japan and Japanʹs Role in the Area

Chairperson

Ioan Mircea PASCU, former Minister of National Defense of
Romania

The participants in the dialogue realize the importance of Japan for the area
and also the importance of the area for Japan. Japan has always been serious inits undertakings; once it decides to move, it really moves. Japanese decision‐
makers have come to the conclusion that the Black Sea Area is worth looking
into and our job is to help them formulate a policy towards it. This policy willcomprise political, economic and commercial dimensions.
This is also in line with Japanʹs desire to have a more dynamic role ininternational politics by, for example, obtaining a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council. Japan is a permanent participant in various internationalorganizations in both military and non‐military respects.
We understand that Japan requires more time and analysis in order to present
its decision‐makers with enough information to motivate them to take adecision on involvement in the Black Sea Area.
Paper Presenter

HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin
University

It has been noted that Japan does not have ambitions in this area, but we mustalso acknowledge that Japan lacks strategy as well.
The most important question is whether the region will become stable. If that isachieved, relations will easily normalize. Japan needs to cooperate for thebuilding of stability in this region.
Many countries in the region have unresolved conflicts and issues with Russia.
Ukraine, which was at one point very negative towards Russia and seeking
membership in the EU, NATO and WTO, is now moving to improve relations71

in part because of its energy dependency and in part because of dissatisfaction
at home. Ukraine expects economic assistance from the West, but those
expectations have not been met.
Georgia demands the withdrawal of Russian troops but faces its own energy
problems. After the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the character of
GUAM changed, which caused Uzbekistan to leave it and Azerbaijan to
distance itself.
The Community of Democratic Choice seems to be in opposition to the CIS
and we would like more explanation about its concepts and aims. Moldova isvery anti‐Russian and seeks immediate withdrawal of troops. Whether theBlack Sea Area countries can establish a stable regional environment depends
on whether they can achieve their own stability as states independent of
Russian influence.
Paper Presenter

Tedo JAPARIDZE, Secretary General, Organization of theBlack Sea Economic Cooperation

The Wider Black Sea Area suffers from intra‐regional conflict, corruption,
weak institutions and unresolved disputes. In the past, it was a strategic
crossroads through which values, culture and technology were transmitted;
today it is seen as a transit point for illegal traffic in people, narcotics, weapons,terrorism and organized crime.
Japan and the Black Sea were not so distant in the past, when the Silk Road
connected them, nor has the Black Sea always been as fragmented as it is today.
Black Sea countries look to the EU for their future and the European
Neighborhood Policy seeks to reward countries that embrace European norms
and values. Many of them see it as a symbol of hope for stability andprosperity in the aftermath of civil war and economic collapse, and arealigning themselves with European and international standards. Even Russia
has a complex ʺspecialʺ strategic relationship with Europe.
In todayʹs volatile global energy markets, Japanese interest and involvement in
the region can only increase as competition for scarce resources intensifies, butwhere are the other Japanese institutions and agencies?
Japan has an opportunity in the Black Sea region because this is an area wheresuspicion is deeply entrenched and Japan does not carry the burden of history.
It could help to shape the areaʹs economic and social future as a neutral agent
for change. In this context, BSEC offers significant opportunities for Japan.

72For economic powerhouses like Japan, globalization carries a civic
responsibility to help ensure that market development proceeds in an orderly
and stable manner.
I would encourage Japan to consider obtaining observer status in BSEC.
Lead Discussant A

Solmaz ÜNAYDIN, Ambassador of Turkey to Japan

There has been significant economic progress in the region in spite of thepolitical conflicts, and it is a point of interest for the big powers (USA, Russia,
Europe) both for its geographical location and its energy resources.
It is only natural for a country like Japan to seek an international position in
keeping with its economic achievements. I would like to associate myself withall of the proposals regarding the role of Japan in BSEC, including observer
status. I understand that Japan requires more time to study the issues, but I am
confident that once Japan decides to tackle the problem it should not take long.
Indeed, Japan already has bilateral relations with many countries in the region
regarding the issues on the agenda of BSEC.
Japanʹs involvement in peace consolidation is a welcome move, but weshould not wait till that point. In the meantime, Japan should take part inworking groups on energy, trade and development. We welcome any input
from Japan, whether money, technology or human resources.
I agree with the comments that Japan could join several forthcoming BSEC
committee and related organ meetings in Turkey, Greece, Romania or Moscow.
Lead Discussant B

NAGASAKI Yasuhiro, NHK Reporter

The adjustments of the interests of Russia and Turkey and Turkish
membership in the EU will be vital for the stability of the region.
Japan will be very effective in this region because it can work from a neutral
position, free from the great power games of the past. Everyone agrees thatJapan should take part in enhancing the stability and prosperity of the region;
the question is how to do so. In the past, we have not had a coordinatedviewpoint or approach to the Black Sea Area.
We need to give general information about the area to the Japanese public. It is
still difficult to convince mainstream news agencies to run articles on theregion because it is far removed and people do not see its relevance. However,once people have a good image of the region, that image will continue and will
make it possible to enhance cooperation.

73

Lead Discussant C

Tatyana KUZNETSOVA, Head of Chancery of the Director
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation

The Russian Foreign Ministry values Japanese interest in the BSEC region. We
would like to create stable, pragmatic and long‐term economic relations
supported by political relations, and we encourage Japan, as a leading
economic power, to achieve observer status in BSEC. This status may make iteasier for Japanese companies to participate in BSEC‐related projects.
Japanese expertise will be useful to BSEC states in many areas, including small
and medium enterprises, services, SME policy and taxation. We understandJapanese representatives could arrange seminars on these topics. Japan may
also be interested in the big projects going on in the area: electric power,
highways, widening of internal waterways, and construction of a new watertransport system connecting the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea.
Lead Discussant D

HIROSE Yoko, Senior Lecturer of the Graduate School of
Area and Culture Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign
Studies

My focus is on the Caucasus area where the biggest hurdle is conflict, whichmust be resolved before further progress can be made. There is no sign of
democratization in Azerbaijan, but the US and Europe employ a double
standard because they focus on stability. Other countries likewise care about
good relations with Azerbaijan and do not think about exporting revolution.
Japan has a role to play in this region as a fair mediator helping to bring abouta resolution of conflicts. Azerbaijan is an important source of energy and it
should be possible for Japan to deepen its relationship with the country.
Free Discussions

All Participants

There have been many concrete, practical ideas put forward. We would
appreciate thinking from Japan about how it could contribute to thedevelopment of non‐oil sectors. It would be worthwhile to send several young
Japanese investment bankers to the region for six months or a year to identify
options for regional development and present them to the Japanese business
community.
This dialogue is just a first step. We would like to follow up with meetings in
Istanbul, Tokyo or Moscow and would be glad to invite GFJ to put together an
event in Istanbul or jointly publish articles and books.

74

The core of Ukraineʹs problem is that it wants to be a member of the EU but
also have special relations with Russia. It is sitting on the fence, as are many
Eastern European countries. Russians see them as trying to milk two cows.
Russia is not a new neighbor of the EU; it is a traditional, old neighbor. Indeed,
Russia is more European than many others.
Our conclusion is that Japan should play a role in the Black Sea Area. It could
contribute to stability and partnerships with it could help economic
development to pick up. Once living standards improve, democracy will beestablished and entrenched.
The Japanese role could go beyond observer status and evolve into that of amediator, which would give it a political role in the area.
Japanese support for the Black Sea region will hinge on whether the Ministryof Foreign Affairs is able to place its approach within the framework of
Eurasian diplomacy. We need to clarify what the Black Sea means, define how
Japan can achieve its objectives and articulate how aid will enhance Japaneseinterests. Japan does not have the will or experience to become involved in the
mediation of frozen conflicts.
The lesson for Japan is that the EU also was not interested in the region in thepast, but now it is.

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8. Appendix 1(1) Review and Perspective of the Functional Cooperation in the Areaby Sergei GONCHARENKO

This report was prepared by Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Departmentof Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
**************************************************************************
Russia considers the Black Sea area to be a region that is historically closely
connected to its political, economic, social and cultural development. Being the BlackSea country, Russian Federation makes every possible effort to strengthen peaceful andfriendly relations with all neighboring countries, and of course, with all BSEC Member
States, and to promote development of trade and economic cooperation in the BlackSea Region. We consider BSEC to be an independent, full‐pledged and well‐establishedregional economic organization. Of special importance is that BSEC is the only
organization in this part of the world. We think there is a good potential for promoting
economic links inside this region. Russia is an active participant of BSEC.
BSEC provides a very effective mechanism of cooperation with a regular, twicea year, meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of BSEC Member States.
Besides, there is a positive experience of regular meetings of Ministers in charge of
special areas of cooperation – such as energy, transport, emergencies, internal affairsetc.
Of special importance is that BSEC enjoys cooperation with the United Nations.
In 1999‐2004 UN General Assembly adopted four resolutions on its relations with
BSEC. We feel that BSEC Member States should concentrate their efforts on practicalissues of cooperation, including areas that are of importance to all of them: transport
and telecommunications, energy, emergencies, environment, tourism, combating
terrorism and organized crime. These and other issues are widely discussed atmeetings of the BSEC working groups (there are 16 of them now). Such meetings andother activities carried out within the framework of the BSEC are coordinated by the
Chairman‐in‐Office (the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Member State). Currently
Romania is the BSEC Chairman‐in‐Office; Russia will be the next one (in May‐October2006).
There are several proposals that have been introduced by the RussianFederation within the BSEC area that are of interest to all BSEC countries. Among themproposals to accelerate efforts to integrate electric power systems of Eastern andWestern Europe, to create a Black Sea electric power ring, to run regular passenger and76ferry services between the Black Sea ports, as well as to develop water transport routes
that include inland waterways of the region.
Russian Federation has supported the concept of coordinated development of
highways along the Black Sea coast. In our view, another promising field of action
would be further joint improvement of the region’s transport infrastructure and linking
it with European and Asian transport arteries.
In the light of the declarations adopted at the BSEC Ministerial Meetings it isessential now to make a special emphasis on how to implement these initiatives. We
understand how important it is to agree on monitoring implementation of thedecisions made at such special meetings: after all, this mechanism would be crucial forenhancing efficiency of the Organization itself.
We came forward with this proposal at the meeting of the BSEC Committee ofSenior Officials in Istanbul in September 2005. For citing an example of such activity
we provided information prepared by the Russian Ministry of Transport todemonstrate how our country is implementing the Joint Statement of the Ministers ofTransport of the BSEC Member States, adopted in January 2005.
BSEC has good prospects, as it works in line with the philosophy of modern
international relations. That is one of the reasons why BSEC seems to be an interesting
partner for regional and non‐regional countries, who apply for Membership andObserver status in our Organization. We in BSEC welcome such interest: in 2004 Serbia
and Montenegro entered BSEC as a new Member State. In 2005 four countries received
Observer status in BSEC: Belarus, Czech Republic, Croatia and United States ofAmerica. We look forward to their fruitful participation in BSEC activities and in BSEC
projects.
In early November 2005 issues of possible American participation in BSEC
projects were discussed in Moscow with our colleagues from the US Department ofState, who visited us in our Foreign Ministry. American side seemed to be interested inenergy cooperation and in some other projects and, we hope, in the nearest future
American businessmen may be able to introduce some specific proposals. We are readyto discuss with Japanese side possibilities of Japanese businessmen’s cooperation in
BSEC area as well.
As soon as Russian Federation is the biggest BSEC Member State and the only
BSEC country, neighboring Japan, few words on recent changes in economic life of mycountry. These are the positive changes. In 2005 the GDP growth in expected to be 5,9per cent. Services sector, which accounts for 54 per cent of the economy, will increaseby 7,5 per cent. Fixed investments will grow by 9,4 per cent. Increase in population real
incomes will exceed 8,5 per cent. Over the last five years the per capita GDP more thandoubled in dollar terms.
Financial stability is provided both by budgetary surplus and positive balanceof payments. Russia has smoothly passed the peak payments on foreign debt; in timeor on some occasions even in advance goes along with its foreign debt.
And, finally, last but not least. In accordance with the Russian Government
Decree, Russian MFA is appointed coordinator of activities of all Russian Ministries,
State Agencies and Regional Administrations on issues related to their interaction with
BSEC.

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(2) The ways of further security strengthening as the basis for thefunctional co‐operation in the Black Sea region
by Yuriy KOSTENKOThis report was prepared by H.E. Mr. Yuriy KOSTENKO, Ambassador of Ukraine toJapan, for distribution to the participants of the Dialogue.
**************************************************************************
Maintaining peace, stability and strengthening of security is the basic, founding
function of any cooperation among countries. Its absence or insufficiency prevents
fruitful development of the other components of functional cooperation: economic,
financial, information, cultural etc. It also prevents resolution of the other pressing
transnational issues (terrorism, non‐proliferation, etc.).
The Black Sea Region has been an arena of conflicting strategic interests ofmany countries for thousands of years. Periodically these interests were falling in such
intricate contradictions that they lead to military conflicts, wars. 150 years ago
Southern Ukraine was a stage for the hostilities of the war, known in history as
Crimean War. 60 years ago the firestorm of the Second World War rushed through that
land. During the Cold war the Black Sea was a huge natural buffer zone in the Warsaw
Pact – NATO confrontation.
In our interrelated and interdependent world of today, peace, stability anddemocracy in the Black Sea region is maintained by a number of global and regional
intergovernmental organizations, multilateral structures and mechanisms.
This is, first of all, the UNO, which through the Security Council is responsible
for the global and regional legal order. Today NATO is one of the core pillars of
security system in Europe. All the nations of the Black Sea region take part in theactivities of this body of collective security through membership or associatedmembership programmes. NATO cooperates closely with my country within theframework of the NATO‐Ukraine Commission. The classical model of cooperative
security is OSCE – the structure that has been quite sufficient in Europe for almost 30
years. The Black Sea area deserves a special place in the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), provided by the European Union. We are keeping in mind that one of the
major aims of ENP is the stabilization of the neighboring regions. The Council ofEurope is a very effective instrument in the strengthening of democracy in Black Sea
region.
Confidence and security building measures (CSBM), established by, forexample, OSCE (Vienna Document 1999), Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional78

Forces in Europe (CRF), “Open skies” treaty made a significant contribution into
reinforcing the level of understanding among the countries of the region.
Soviet Union’s disappearance from the political map has significantly changed
strategic situation both in the world in general, and in the Black Sea region in particular.
As is known, it is neighboring unstable regions, for example, the Middle East. The
vacuum of stability emerged there. That is why the young independent countries,
including Ukraine, more than ten years ago started thorough search for additional
multilateral ways and means of strengthening security, stability and democracy in thisregion.
And we managed to achieve something, going along this way for the last
decade. The Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, theRepublic of Turkey and Ukraine signed on April 2, 2001 in Istanbul the Agreement on
the establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group(BLACKSEAFOR). This Group was established in order to contribute to the further
strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the above
mentioned Black Sea states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region,
through the enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among naval forces. The
tasks of the BLACKSEAFOR are: Search and Rescue Operations; Humanitarian
Assistance Operations; Mine Counter Measures; Environmental Protection Operations;
Goodwill Visits. The BLACKSEAFOR is conducting exercises in order to increase its
efficiency and interoperability in execution of the above mentioned tasks.
Countries‐participants, due to the known regions, are paying particularattention now to the employment of the BLACKSEAFOR for the purposes of
preventing the threat of terrorism and illicit trafficking in Weapons of Mass
Destruction, their means of delivery and related materials.
According to this Agreement, the Group is composed of minimum 4‐6 ships
from the Parties, including one command‐and‐control ship.
The experience of BLACKSEAFOR has shown that it has been functioning
intensely. This August another so‐called activation was conducted, during which thecrews of the ships of the group were performing a number of specific tasks ofcontrolling the “violators”, conducted rescue operations.
Political consultations of the special representatives of the ministers of foreign
affairs of the countries, participating in the BLACKSEAFOR, have been held in recent
years. The next such meeting is planned for December 15, 2005. It will be held in Tbilisi.
The countries mentioned above signed very important Document on
Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea on
April 25, 2002. This document provides for the extensive information exchanges,
exchanges of visits of their ships, joint maneuvers and exercises, etc. According to theAnnual Implementation Review for the year 2004, the Parties are doing a lot useful
work, aimed at strengthening understanding among the participating countries, andthus, at upgrading the level of security and stability in the region.
The regional association of four countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan andMoldova, also known as GUAM has existed for some years now. The top body of thisassociation is the annual summit of the countries‐participants. Its executive body is theCouncil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries‐participants. National

79

Coordinators’ Committee is its working organ. Coordination of their cooperation isvested into the seven working groups on energy issues, on transport issues, on
economy and trade, on information technology issues, on culture, science andeducation, on tourism, on fighting terrorism, organized crime and drugs trafficking.
Business Council and Parliamentary Assembly of GUAM were established inthis association.
The last summit of this entity, which took place in Kishinyv on April 22, 2005,
displayed the process of its consolidation, transformation into an influential factor in
the region, in particular, as far as the process of its transformation into a full‐scaleregional organization with clearly set goals, programme and efficient structures.
Ukraine considers GUAM as one of the main instruments of guaranteeing
stability in the region through the efforts of the countries that take part in it. We believe,that the principle of this regional entity’s functioning should be based on the threecomponents: democracy, economic development and security. Our intention is totransform GUAM into a community of nations that will become a guarantor of
democratic changes and stability in the Black Sea‐Caspian region.
One of the key items in this context is that the course of the European andeuroatlantic integration is that of priority for the members of this entity. Thus, ourcooperation, the goal of which is to guarantee peace, security and stability in this area,
will be implemented in close cooperation with European Union and NATO, theorganizations, the membership in which Ukraine and its regional partners are seeking
to acquire. This explains the trend to harmonize the national and social life of thecountries of the region with EU within the context of establishing the single European
space without any lines, dividing it, the subjects of which will be acting in complete
adherence to the universally recognized democratic principles.
Implementation of the security policy of GUAM, along with counteraction
against international terrorism and organized crime, provides for prevention of threatsof extremism, which are to a great extent related with the so‐called “frozen conflicts” inthe region. Their settlement is one of the priorities for GUAM. The application of thepeace‐building potential of GUAM member‐countries, in particular, throughestablishing a joint military unit for participation in the peacekeeping operations in theregion (and potentially – beyond its boundaries) under the auspices of UNO and OSCE
and in cooperation with euroatlantic partners is to become one of the effective
mechanisms in this sphere.
Two out of three so‐called “frozen conflicts” in the post‐Soviet area are locateddirectly in the Black Sea region. These are Transdnistria and Abkhazia. Ukraine
participates in settling of, first of all, the Transdnistrian conflict.
Among the main provisions of the Plan for resolving the Transdnistrian
problem “Through the Settlement to Democracy”, presented by the President of
Ukraine V.Yushchenko, are creation of conditions for the development of democracy
and civil society, holding of free and democratic elections to the Supreme Council ofTransdnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova. Besides, we deem it necessary totransform the current format of the peacekeeping activity in the Transdnistrian Region
into an international mechanism of the military and civilian observers under the
auspices of OSCE.

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Our position, concerning democratization, as well as demilitarization of thezones of “frozen conflicts” is endorsed by the countries‐participants to GUAM.
According to the Joint Communiqué of the GUAM countries, made public at
November 4 meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, “democratization anddemilitarization of separatist regions is the most important way of restoring theterritorial integrity of the countries where there are such conflicts. This is the way tothe consolidation of their independence and sovereignty”. “The settlement of theconflicts will increase the capacity of the members of the organization to fightinternational terrorism, trafficking of drugs, arms and people, as well as the otherchallenges to regional and international security”, says the Communiqué. “GUAM
member‐countries believe that withdrawal of Russian troops in accordance with thecommitments of the Istanbul Summit of OSCE will speed up settlement of political,
economic and security problems”.
Ukraine thinks that there is not only the need, but favourable conditions for the
implementation of further efforts, aimed at strengthening stability and development of
democracy in the Black Sea region in particular.
Ukraine considers spreading European democracy values and standards as
guarantee of stability and sustainable development. Grateful to all nations for assistingin the victory of democracy during the Orange revolution, Ukraine is making its
contribution to democratic transformation in the region. The new example was
declared, along with Georgia, the launching of Community of Democratic Choice. The
idea, announced by presidents of Ukraine and Georgia in Borzhomi declaration in
August 2005 is expected to materialize in a row of high‐level CDC Fora. First to happen
in Ukraine on December 2nd, 2005, the next – here in Bucharest tentatively in March,and others will follow.
We are glad to point out, that more than 15 representatives of other countries
and international organizations at high level announced that they were ready to takepart in a CDC Fora of December 2 in Kyiv.
In the view of organizers, the Community is neither a structure, nor an
organization. It is a two‐fold official‐public Forum called for clearing the region fromthe remnants of dividing lines; from violations of human rights; from any spirit ofconfrontation; from “frozen conflicts” and, thus, spreading realms of democracy,
security, stability and lasting peace throughout the whole Europe, from the Atlantic to
the Caspian Sea. This Forum will be open to all countries, willing to strengthen theEuropean identity of the region.
The CDC future activity will be determined within the two global movements –the Community of Democracies and the UN Fund for Democracy. Its efforts will be
aimed at implementing the Seoul Action plan of the Community of Democracies, but inthe Baltic‐Black‐Caspian Seas’ region.
The Community for Democratic Choice is an answer to the natural desire ofstates and peoples, of every coming generation and every human being of reaching
higher standards in democracy. The high objective of the Community of Democratic
Choice is extended to ensemble all the countries’ human rights and spreading
European values throughout all Europe.

81I do not dwell on the economic aspect of cooperation in the Black Sea region,
understanding only too well that my colleagues have already done it or are going to do
it in their presentations. Therefore, from the political point of view specifically, I would
like to express my view of Japan’s role in that region. Japan today is a global player ininternational stage. It absolutely fairly is claiming to get recognition of its real place inthe world, in particular through acquisition of permanent membership in the UN
Security Council. Ukraine fully supports its efforts. Japan, as a global player, should be
responsible for peace and stability all over the world, do its best to facilitate settlementof existing and prevention of any new conflicts, strengthening of security in all regionsof the world, including that of the Black Sea.
What are the ways of reaching such influence? I think that Japan should more
actively be engaged into the fruitful activities of already existing multilateralorganizations, structures and projects, to share its rich experience in strengthening
democracy at both bilateral, and multilateral basis. It is well known that Japan has for along time now had the status of observer in OSCE, Council of Europe. This positive
practice should be developed further on. We hope that Japan will be engaged, forexample, in the CDC activity in the observer capacity.

(3) The Importance of the Area for Japan and Japanʹs Role in the Areaby Tatyana KUZNETSOVAThis report was prepared by Mrs. Tatyana KUZNETSOVA, Head of Chancery of the
Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
**************************************************************************
We in Russia appreciate Japan’s interest to activities within the Black Sea area,
which is one of the dynamically developed region on the border of Europe and Asia.
This region, where Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation wasformed, has a vast economic potential. Total GDP of BSEC Member States is about 1,3
trillion USD, its population is about 340 million, while territory of these countries is,approximately, 20 million square km. Two BSEC Member States – Russia andAzerbaijan – produce energy resources and supply them to the world market; BlackSea is an important area for transporting oil and gas to Southern and Western Europe.
And, besides, BSEC area is the vast market for high‐tech products. All these and some82

other factors make BSEC area attractive for all world powers and, as we feel it, forJapan as well.
We mean here not only direct commercial benefits. Stable, pragmatic and long‐term economic relations supported by efforts of politicians to form a creative
partnership is needed.
To our view Japan being one of leading economic powers, could have become
one of the partners of BSEC Member States, acquiring the Observer Status with BSEC.
This will enable Japan to participate in all BSEC meetings at ministerial and otherlevels, including those of BSEC Working Groups, where economically viable projects
are discussed.
There are several areas where Japanese experience may be of interest for BSEC
Member States. They are, particularly, small and medium size enterprises and state
support for these enterprises, services, taxation, healthcare, social and medical
insurance etc. Japanese representatives may assist in organizing conferences orseminars in these and, probably, some other spheres.
Japan may be also interested in big projects; some of them were proposed by
the Russian Federation for implementation in the Region. Among them – proposals tocreate the Black Sea Electric Power Ring, to run regular passenger and ferry services
between the Black Sea ports, to develop water transport routes etc.

83

9. Appendix 2This Dialogue appeared in the morning edition of “The Yomiuri Shimbun” on
December 1, 2005.

84

10. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)(1) Introduction【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization
and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in
the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On
the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interestsand issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business, opinion andpolitical leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional
arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there wereexpressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk.
Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector
views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo,
U.S. Trade Representative William Brock, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne Davignon, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward
Lumley, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in
Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had
made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanesecomponents of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as statedabove, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international
community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants fromother parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component(housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International
Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on
February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all
countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was
reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, andindependent of any other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organizationin Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications.
While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations,
including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at
the initiative of Hattori Ichiro, Okita Saburo, Takeyama Yasuo, Toyoda Shoichiro in 1983, GFJ is currently headed by Okawara Yoshio
as Chairman and Ito Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 13 Business Leader Members including the two Governors,
Mogi Yuzaburo and Toyoda Shoichiro; 80 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, Ito Kenichi, Kai Noritake, Okawara
Yoshio, and Shimada Haruo; and 30 Political Leader Members including the two Governors, Hatoyama Yukio, and Tanigaki Sadakazu.
Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 13 leading Japanese business corporations(with 2 corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each and the other 11 corporations
contributing 1 share each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, The Tokyo Club, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation,
Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Daiwa Bank Foundation for Asia and Oceania, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, Toshiba
International Foundation, etc. Watanabe Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1996, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacificregion including US, China, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, Australia and India, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding
and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizationsin those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number ofJapanese participants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its
overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given below.
Year Month2001 May

Topic
Co-sponsor
U.S.-Japan Security Relations under the New U.S. The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)Administration
September The Role of Japan and Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific Chinese Eurasian Education Foundation (Taiwan)
Region in the 21st Century
2002 February The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and ASEAN ISIS
Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region
May
Japan-China Relationship in the world
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
September Japan and Australia: Perspectives on Cooperation Australian Consortium (Australia)
in Asia and PacificNovember Japan and Korea: Working Together for The
The Seoul Forum on International Affairs (Korea)
Future of East Asia
2003 January The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and ASEAN ISIS
Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region
April
Entrepreneurship in Asia
The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)OctoberJapan-Taiwan Dialogue: New Situation in AsiaFoundation on International & Cross-Strait Studies (Taiwan)
Pacific region and Japan-Taiwan Cooperation
2004 JulyA Roadmap towards East Asian Community
ASEAN ISIS
September Future Prospect of East Asian Community andChina Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
Japan-China RelationshipNovember The Japan-U.S. Korea Dialogue: Future of
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Korean Peninsula and Japan-U.S.-Korea(US)･Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies (Korea)
Security Cooperation2005 April
The Prospect of East Asian Community andPresidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative
Japan-Korea Cooperation(PCNEACI)June
The Prospect for East Asian Community and
ASEAN ISIS
Regional Cooperation
November Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area University of Shizuoka
and the Role of JapanThe Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF)
The International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)85

(2) Membership List of GFJ
In alphabetical order

As of February 1, 2006
【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies

NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, University of Tokyo
OSANAI Takayuki, Foreign Policy Critic
OWADA Hisashi, Judge, International Court of Justice
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Keio University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro,Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
SHIRAISHI Takashi, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUMIDA Nagayoshi, President, The Sankei Shimbun
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAJIMA Takashi, Former Ambassador to Canada
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, University of Tokyo
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, Press Secretary/Director-General for Pressand Publications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANI Masahito, Commissioner, National Personnel Authority
TANINO Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to China
UEDA Takako, Professor, International Christian University
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
WAKABAYASHI Masatake, Professor, University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, President, International University
YONEKURA Seiichiro, Professor, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leaders】(13 Members)[Governors]
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation[Members]
HIRAIWA Gaishi, Advisor, The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
ISHIKAWA Rokuro, Chairman, Kajima Corporation
KOBAYASHI Yotaro, Chairman and CEO, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
MATSUNO Haruki, Chief Executive Counselor, Member of the Board, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SAWADA Hideo, Chairman, H.I.S Co., Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
【Opinion Leaders】(81 Members)[Governors]
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
KAI Noritake, Councilor, The Japan Forum of International Relations Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, Professor, Keio University[Members]
AKASHI Yasukazu, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press【Political Leaders】(30Members)
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention[Governors]
AOKI Tamotsu, Professor, Hosei University
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)ASOMURA Kuniaki, Visiting Professor, Reitaku University
CHUMA Kiyofuku, Journalist[Members]
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
ABE Shinzo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)
FUKAGAWA Yukiko, Professor, University of TokyoAICHI Kazuo, M.H.R. (LDP)
GOMI Norio, Professor, Rikkyo Graduate School of Business
AIZAWA Ichiro, M.H.R. (LDP)
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HAMADA Takujiro, Former Member of the House of Councillors
KISHIDA Fumio, M.H.R. (LDP)
HANAI Hitoshi, Professor, Reitaku University
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HARUNA Mikio, Special Correspondent, Kyodo News
KOMIYAMA Yoko, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, President, Japan-Australia-New Zealand Society
MAEHARA Seiji, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin
MASUHARA Yoshitake, M.H.R. (LDP)HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
SONODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, Chuo University
TAKEMASA Koichi, M.H.R. (DPJ)IOKIBE Makoto, Professor, Kobe University
TANAHASHI Yasufumi, M.H.R. (LDP)ITO Eisei, Executive Adviser, ARACO Co., Ltd.
TSUCHIYA Shinako, M.H.R. (LDP)
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Stuies
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)
JIMBO Ken, Director of Research, The Japan Forum of International Relations Inc.
ARAKI Kiyohiro, M.H.C. (NK)
KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
HATA Yuichiro, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)
KANEKO Kumao, President, Japan Council for Economic Research
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KOHNO Masaru, Professor, Waseda University
KATOH Shuichi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOJIMA Atsushi, Corporate Officer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)
KOJIMA Tomoyuki, Professor, Keio University
SUZUKI Kan, M.H.C.(DPJ)
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
TAKANO Hiroshi, M.H.C. (NK)
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)
TAKEMI Keizo, M.H.C. (LDP)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
YANASE Susumu, M.H.C. (DPJ)KUMON Shumpei, Senior Executive Director, GLOCOM, International Universityof Japan【Executive Secretary】
KUSANO Atsushi, Professor, Keio University
WATANABE Mayu
MANO Teruhiko, Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan
MATSUMOTO Kenichi, Professor, Reitaku University
Ind.: The Independents
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
LL: Liberal League
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman, J-Wave, Inc.
NCP: New Conservative Party
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
NK: New Komeito
MURATA Koji, Associate Professor, Doshisha University
RNP: Reformer's Network Party
NAGANO Shigeto, President, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
SDP: Social Democratic Party
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, Senior Advisor, Financial Services Agency

86

(3) Acknowledgement

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its“Business Leader” members listed below for theirgenerous contributions. Their support is making theactivities of the Forum financially sustainable.

[GFJ Governors] [5 share]
Toyota Motor Corporation
Kikkoman Corporation[GFJ Members] [1 share]
Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
H.I.S. Co., Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha(In the order of enlistment)8711. An Introduction to University of Shizuoka
History of the University of Shizuoka
June

1982

April

1987

March

1988

July

1988

Shizuoka Prefectural Assembly decides to reorganize the prefectural university andcolleges.
The University of Shizuoka opened with Dr. Koji UCHIZONO as its first president byunifying the Shizuoka College of Pharmacy（est.1953）, Shizuoka Women's
University（est. 1967）, and Shizuoka Women's Junior College（est.1951）.
Establishment of Graduate School of Pharmaceutical Sciences （Doctoral and
Master's programs）approved.
Friendship agreement made with Hanzhou University in Zhejiang Province, China.

March

1989

Construction of the new campus completed.
Shizuoka Women's Junior College closed.

April

1989

March

1990

March

1991

March

1991

April

1991

April

1993

March

1995

April

1996

April

1997

May

1997

May
December

1997
1997

March

1999

April
December

1999
2000

April

2002

School of Pharmaceutical Sciences moved to new Yada Campus.
Shizuoka College of Pharmacy and Shizuoka Women's University closed.
Establishment of Graduate School of Nutritional and Environmental Sciences（Master's program）, and Graduate School of International Relations （Master's
program）approved.
Friendship agreement made with California State University, Northridge, California,
USA.
Friendship agreement was made with Moscow State Institute of International
Relations, Moscow, Russia.
Dr. Takeshi HOSHI appointed as second president.
Establishment of Graduate School of Nutritional and Environmental Sciences（Doctoral program）approved.
Friendship agreement made with the University of the Philippines.
School of Nursing, Institute for Environmental Sciences, and Junior College at
Shizuoka established.
Friendship agreement made with Zhejiang Academy of Medical
Sciences, Zhejiang Province, China.
The university celebrates the 10th Anniversary of its foundation.
Establishment of Graduate School of Administration and Informatics（Master's
program）approved.
Friendship agreement made with the University of Newcastle upon
Tyne, Newcastle, UK.
Dr. Masaaki HIROBE appointed as the third president.
Establishment of Graduate School of Nursing（Master's program）approved.
Division of Clinical Pharmaceutical Sciences added to the Graduate School of
Pharmaceutical Sciences.

88Organizational Chart8912. An Introduction to the Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF)

NGO with special Consultative Status with the Economic andSocial Council of the United Nations
and with Participatory Status with the Council of Europe

FOUNDING
AND
SHORT HISTORY

The Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF) was founded in 1992 as a
non-governmental and non-profit organization. This occasion aroused
together with the founding of the governmental and parliamentaryorganizations of the Black Sea .At the high level reunion in Istanbul the
initiative of a ‘Romanian group of professors was announced, giving
priority to Romania and forcing the other countries to choose initiatives inother areas. That is why BSUF remained the only organization of the civilsociety that has in view the promoting of the ideas of cooperation
persuaded by the official institutions of the member states (Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, as coast countries joined
by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova and Albania). Because the
BSEC and PABSEC headquarters are in Istanbul, Greece wished toestablish in Athens a Centre for Black Sea Studies with the BSEC, which
has almost the same interests as those of the BSUF. (This Centre issustained financially by the Greek government, which offered not only
wages for international office-worker, one of them being an initial partnerwith the BSUF, but also generous offices for international reunions inAthens and in the Greek islands.)
The experience gained in 1991 and 1992 by its founders, following theorganization of five European summer schools with the support andcollaboration of Bruges European College, helped consolidate theFoundation's training and life-long education dimension. This
collaboration with the European College focused on the European
challenges, but the Black Sea area proved to be more attractive, because
the European themes were included in larger objectives of modernizationand development of the region including Romania. The educational
vocation followed the research carried out in its centers: the National
Centre for Sustainable Development - NCSD (presently an autonomous
institution), the Conflict Prevention Studies Centre – CPSC and theLaboratory for Information Technologies in Education - LITE.
The BSUF subtitle resumes the essence of its vocation:
International Centre for Research and Training.

9013. An Introduction to International Centre for Black Sea Studies
STATUS

4 Xenofontos str., Syntagma 105 57, Athens, Greece

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR BLACK SEA STUDIES (ICBSS)The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) is an independent non-profit
making institution, serving as the acknowledged think-tank of the Organisation of theBlack Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). It was established in 1998 as a legal entity
under the Law of the Hellenic Republic and in conformity with the decision of theCouncil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States.
In accordance with the amended BSEC Charter, the ICBSS has the status of a Related
Body of the Organisation, alongside the Parliamentary Assembly, the Business Council
and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank.

MISSION STATEMENT
The main goals of the ICBSS are to study practical ways of widening and deepening
regional cooperation among the Member States of the BSEC as well as the BSEC-EU
relationship and to promote the application of the achievements of science andtechnology to concrete fields of multilateral cooperation, based on the principles of the
BSEC Charter and the priorities set by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

ACTIVITIESAs a member of the BSEC institutional family, the ICBSS:
participates, on a consultative basis, in the deliberations of the BSEC decisionmaking, related and subsidiary bodies;
prepares, on assignment, preliminary draft policy documents (ministerial
declarations, action plans, background papers) for consideration by BSEC
decision-making bodies;coordinates the work of ad hoc groups of experts established to that effectand compiles relevant document files;
reports, according to the established procedure, to the BSEC Committee ofSenior Officials on all its activities that are relevant to the BSEC aims andpurposes.
As an independent research organization, the ICBSS, through individual members of
its staff and other contributors, including invited research fellows:
produces research papers and studies that do not commit the ICBSS as an
institution or BSEC established policies;
publishes the results of that research (books, collections of essays, dedicatedissues of periodicals, occasional papers) and maintains a periodically updated
website;organizes conferences, seminars, round-table discussions and brain-storming
sessions on subjects related to the Black Sea regional affairs and participates insuch events organized by other national or international research organizations;
undertakes research projects on contract basis under EU or other funding
programmes using also the expertise available in the academic communities of
the BSEC Member States;
develops and maintains a network of cooperative relations with similar national
and international research organizations within and outside the BSEC region;
keeps a specialized library of books and periodicals related to regional
cooperation and a regularly updated fund of country-specific and thematic files;
reports to the ICBSS Board of Directors on all above-mentioned activities.

91

STRUCTURE
Board of Directors. The ICBSS is governed by an international Board of Directors, consisting ofrepresentatives (National Directors) of all the BSEC Member States appointed for a three-years term.
The Secretary General of the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat (BSEC PERMIS) is also amember of the Board. In addition, three personalities of international renown are invited to participate.
Management. The ICBSS is headed by the Director General who is assisted in the exercise of his/herduties by the Alternate Director General.
Personnel. The ICBSS staff includes a Director of Studies and Research, senior and junior researchers,
and support staff.
Advisory Panel. The Advisory Panel is composed of personalities of international repute from theinternational academic, political and business spheres.

RESOURCESThe Greek Government provides material support for the functioning and development of the Centre.
The resources of the Centre include additional funding from research contracts and voluntary
contributions from the BSEC member states and other donors.

CONTACT US
4 Xenofontos str., Syntagma 10557, Athens – Greece
Tel: (+30) 210 3242321 Fax: (+30) 210 3242244
website:www.icbss.gr
email:icbss@icbss.gr

92

GF-Ⅲ-E-B-0029

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2190 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/