CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL.9 (2018)2, 25-48. DOI: 10.14267/CJSSP.2018.2.02

VOTING RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONALJUSTICE: FRAMING EFFECTS AND VOTER
ATTITUDES
Béla Janky - Attila Gulyás1
ABSTRACT We investigate attitudes toward voting reforms that attribute greater
weight to younger generations in a survey experiment. The main assumption ofthis research is that due to the distortions caused by elite discourse, voters are notaware of the intergenerational inequality of redistribution, thus attempts to change
the voting system – that currently provides an equal vote to each voter, thereby
maintaining inequality – would not get sufficient public support.
After providing a review of potential voting reforms for improving intergenerational
justice, we present results from an online survey sample of one thousand
respondents. The data show that presenting the arguments for intergenerational
justice increases the sensitivity of younger voters towards the political rights ofyoung generations, but does not improve the acceptance of such reforms among the
middle-aged and the elderly.
KEYWORDS: intergenerational justice, voting right, survey-experiment,
Hungary

INTRODUCTION
Our study examines support for voting-rights reforms that could better
represent the interests of young and future generations compared to current
voting systems based on equal votes. These reforms include giving additional
votes to families with children; increasing the weight attributed to younger
1 Béla Janky is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Social Research of the Hungarian Academyof Sciences (HAS), and associate professor at the Dept. of Sociology and Communication of the
Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME), Attila Gulyás is a senior research
fellow at the HAS; e-mails: janky@eik.bme.hu, gulyas.attila@tk.mta.hu
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voters; and decreasing the voting age. We do not focus on the sociodemographic
background to the current attitudes. Rather, we investigate the relationshipbetween public discourse and support for the such voting-rights reforms.
The research question employed in the study concerned how the framing ofstate redistribution mechanisms affects the sensitivity of young generations
to the voting rights of future generations. The main methodology for thisresearch was a framing survey experiment involving respondents reacting to
the survey after having been presented with specific forms of information about
redistribution-related dilemmas.
First, we assume that in the public discourse about the role of the state theintergenerational aspects of state redistribution are usually neglected. Therefore,
voters do not perceive the intergenerational injustice of current welfare regimes,
resulting in their being insensitive to the intergenerational justice coded into
the current voting system. Survey-based experiments can simulate the longterm effects of complex discourses to a certain extent, as well as the short-term
effects of presenting several aspects of the problem to respondents. Using sucha survey experiment with pre-survey framing we were able to investigate theseeffects. We assume that such an analysis could help with understanding the roleof public discourses on attitudes.
In our experiment the online sample of one thousand adults were split into fourgroups of equal size. The first group of respondents answered three questions
related to voting-rights reforms without any manipulations, and thus served as
the control group. The questions focused on support for voting-rights reforms
that award greater voting weight to younger generations. Another randomly
generated group watched a short framing video that discussed state redistribution
dilemmas in line with the current public discourse before completing the survey,
which also contained a few attitude-related questions before the questions
on voting-rights reforms. The framing video for this group highlighted theintragenerational aspects of redistribution, including the dilemmas involved insupporting the poor via taxation of the working population.
The third random group was presented with information similarly framed,
but in their case the framing video highlighted intergenerational redistribution
issues through presenting the dilemma of making elderly or large families thebeneficiaries of redistribution.
The fourth group did not watch a framing video but were exposed to somepriming questions in their survey that intentionally conflated Roma people withlarge families and those on welfare before the questions about voting rights.
Our results partially confirm our expectations, and suggest that presenting
information about aspects of intergenerational redistribution does increase thesensitivity of younger respondents to the political rights of younger generations,
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but does not decrease the overall level of rejection of voting-rights reforms
among the middle-aged and the elderly. An interesting result is that better
educated respondents are more likely to reject such reforms than less educatedrespondents.
In the following section we review issues surrounding intergenerational
justice and the reforms of voting rights that have been proposed in this domain.
These suggestions served as a basis for the survey. We then describe the theories
and results used to formulate our hypotheses that explain voter preferences
relating to the dilemmas of intergenerational redistribution. The following two
sections present the methodology and the results. We conclude by summarizing
our results and giving an overview of the lessons learned during this work.

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE:
THE CLASHING INTERESTS OF GENERATIONS
Our research focuses on the potential for voting-rights reforms that ensure
the representation of future generations’ interests to a much greater degree thancurrent systems. Here, we do not aim to give a detailed analysis, but rather
constrain ourselves to a discussion of the political possibilities of these reforms.
The decisions of current generations influence future generations’ possibilities
negatively in many aspects. The most frequently mentioned domains areenvironmental problems (Arnell 1999; Hackl and Pruckner 2003; Lumer 2009)
and the fiscal policies that lead to the accumulation of public debt (Alesina andTabellini 1990; Kopits 2007; Penner and Steuerle 2007). In the current decade
not only has the concept of intergenerational justice became more prominent
in these domains, but several indicators have been developed to allow relatedcomparisons across countries (McQuilkin 2018; Vanhuysse 2013b).
The importance of environmental factors is widely accepted today among the
majority, yet the policies that are designed to save natural resources and react
to climate change are often rejected due to the conflicting interests of private
consumption. Put another way, this involves a collective action dilemma:
individuals create a “public bad” – although they know what should be done,
they are not willing to do it (Hauert, Wakano, and Doebeli 2008). This is despite
the fact that over the last two decades (due to the rise in awareness about theseissues) governmental actors have put considerable effort into conserving the
Earth’s natural state and dealing with the challenge of the overuse of natural
resources, with the support of most of the public of developed countries.
Although the environment is a key topic in intergenerational justice andideas about sustainable development, our research focuses on another similarly
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important issue that receives much less attention in public discourse: the effectof state overspending on future generations; or, in other words, accumulating
government debt and other related fiscal balance issues (Buchanan and Wagner
1977; Kopits 2007). Usually, decisions about public or governmental debt levels
are considered under this topic, yet many consider the individual-level dilemmaof childbearing to involve similar challenges. The former dilemma involves theaccumulation of state debt and the sustainability of pension systems (Noord
1993). State debt presents a threat to intergenerational justice, as for sustaining
present generations in the future, the taxes and social contributions of future
generations will be spent. This situation can be thought of as a sustainability
issue for pension systems: active generations will need to provide such levels of
support to elderly generations that they will not be able to support themselves
as pensioners given current demographic trends (or only through increased tax
burdens on future generations).
Our research question concerns how voters relate to the inequalities in theintergenerational redistribution of state expenditure. This dilemma has alreadybeen discussed by numerous economists in the domain of political behavior
and state redistribution in the last decades by using the “selfish voter” model
to explain redistribution outcomes. The basis of the rational voter model,
meanwhile, is the clear and concise theoretical analysis of Browning (Browning1975). The rational voter in this model participates in a one-time vote about theparameters of the social security system (for the sake of simplicity, we focus on
pension systems only), and each voter is driven by self-interest corresponding
to their age. Elderly voters – pensioners – thus vote for large pensions and are
not interested in the level of taxes and social contributions. Voters active on thelabor market prefer to decrease current taxes and are indifferent about the levelof their pensions. However, voters are not only selfish but they are prescient as
well, hence those near retirement age would prefer high taxes and pensions as
they consider that they would in the long term be better off under this scenario,
even considering the present higher level of taxes. Thus, these voters may votesimilarly to pensioners out of pure self-interest.
In Browning’s model, overspending on social security is caused by current
pensioners, and those close to retirement age will vote for a pension system thatis unsustainable in the long term to sustain their current pension and well-beingat the expense of future generations.2 Based on this model, active middle-age
voters would also favor a generous pension system, while younger voters would
be against it.

2 For a more detailed analysis of this model, see Galasso and Profeta (Galasso and Profeta 2002).
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Browning’s model was later refined,3 but its main approach to political
economics did not change: the claim remains that the elderly will support anunsustainable pension system, while youngsters may form a voting coalition
against free-riding on future generations.
The explanations of such phenomena in classical sociology sharply contrast
with self-interest based interpretations of economics. Yet, in our models thisself-interest is replaced by a preference for collective interest representation
based on class-consciousness.4 The conclusions of theories based on classconsciousness make similar predictions to those of self-interest-based economic
models regarding preferences for intragenerational redistribution. However,conclusions diverge in terms of intergenerational redistribution: class-solidarity
may suppress the issues involved in intergenerational redistribution (Street
and Cossman 2006). However, many sociologists have previously questioned
the political behavioral models that rely on classical class theories and instead
projected a struggle between different generations in postmodern welfare states(Foner 1974; Turner 1989, 1998). This model of political sociology is hardly
distinguishable from the model of purely self-interest driven voters, yet thethesis of an age-class struggle has largely been rejected in mainstream politicalsociology (Hamil-Luker 2001; Irwin 1996, 1998; Street and Cossman 2006).

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE:
ADVOCACY OF FUTURE GENERATIONSRegarding the differences between generations, future generations are mostly at
a disadvantage in terms of advocacy. In our study we refer to advocacy in politicalinstitutions and decision making as future generations cannot participate indecisions that influence their future lives directly. Future generations do not only
include children of below voting age, but also those unborn children whose lives
will be affected by any long-term decisions. Although these children currently do
not have rights per se, they will have rights in the future that should be respected.5
Hence when mentioning ‘long-term’ effects we refer to those effects that span
generations –which the affected generations cannot influence at all.
Hence, the advocacy of future generations is hindered by the partial
impossibility of interacting with the current (voting) generations. For the former
3 For example, on the inclusion of the combined effect of in-family altruism and material inequalities,
see Tabellini (Tabellini 2000).
4 See Manza and Brooks (Manza and Brooks 1999) for an overview.
5 For a thorough discussion of the future rights of children yet unborn, see Tremmel (Tremmel 2006).
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it is physically impossible to sanction any decision by current generations whichmight hurt them in the future – such decisions include economic decisions(superfluous state overspending), as well as environment-related decisions(deforestation, or the overuse of polluting technologies). Either decision
could damage the well-being of future generations compared that of current
generations. The self-advocacy of children would theoretically be possible,
but of course children are usually not mentally mature enough to perceive themagnitude and consequences of such decisions. For the unborn, the option is noteven theoretically possible.
In the following section we mention a few of the institutions dedicated to
advocating for the rights of younger generations with the goal of dealing with theabove-mentioned challenges. We describe two approaches: the representation of
future generations via voting rights or institutions; and legislative constitutional
and institutional barriers. Although our study focuses on voting-rights-related
issues, we consider it important to have a brief look at other methods ofrepresentation.6

REPRESENTING FUTURE GENERATIONS –POLITICALLY, LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
Future generations can be represented directly by legal personnel or
institutional bodies. In practice, such representation includes parliamentaryadvocates, or different committees (including environmental or economic
committees). In the case of such forms of representation, although future
generations are represented by the living and the issues under debate may beanalyzed from the perspective of future generations specifically, the former do
not participate in nominating the actual decision-making bodies. However, they
may have veto-rights and some limited authority in decision-making. Thus,
the most important prerequisite of such a representational body is politicalindependence.
A typical solution for the institutional representation of future generations
in decision making is representation through fiscal councils and authorities(Debrun and Kumar 2008; Hagemann 2010). The activities of such bodies may
include producing forecasts, reviewing budgetary planning, and even actual
participation in decision-making. The most significant advantage of independent
fiscal councils is that fiscal policy can thus be made independent from political
cycles, hence better fiscal discipline can be created – provided that councils are
6 These methods are discussed in detail by Jakab (Jakab 2016)
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indeed independent and possess sufficient authority with fiscal policy. There
are many examples of such fiscal councils in EU countries, most of which play
an advisory role in budgetary planning (Hagemann 2010). In Hungary, theBudgetary Council (Költségvetési Tanács) was founded as such an institution in
2008, and makes proposals about annual budgets.
Future generations can also be represented by other committees and advocates(ombudsman) that are not necessarily related to fiscal policies. Examples include
New-Zealand, Canada (commissioners) and Israel, Brazil, Germany, and Chile(committees). Unfortunately, Hungary is not among these countries, as while one
such institute did exist (the institute of the Ombudsman for Future Generations(Jávor 2006; Jövő Nemzedékek Országgyűlési Biztosa 2008) it was abolished in2012 and was integrated into another institution that works with fundamental
rights and has no specific focus on future generations, the Ombudsman For
Fundamental Rights (Fülöp Sándor 2012).
It is easier to find examples of legal representation. In several legal cases amultitude of bodies have represented the interests of future generations (in thesecases, the future generations were interpreted as the plaintiffs): federal states in
the USA (Göpel 2009), a special court body in Australia (Department of Justiceand Attorney General 1979), and simply a group of children in the Philippines(The Supreme Court of the Philippines 1993). In other cases, a single person(amicus curiae) whose knowledge may contribute to understanding the detailsof the case from the perspective of future generations may assist the work of
the court. Strictly speaking, the animus curiae is not a direct representation of
future generations, but rather a professional form of court support with a focus
on upholding the interests of future generations (for a few recent examples, seeCenter for International Environmental Law 2017; Our Children’s Trust 2016).
The constitutional representation of future generations is also considered a formof legal representation. This usually covers the recognition of general responsibility
towards future generations (as in the constitution of the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Switzerland) or environmental responsibility (Italy, Netherlands, and Latvia).
Debt brakes and upper limits on state deficits in constitutions (Finland, Germany,and Poland) should also be considered a form of representation of future
generations, as respecting these limitations is in their interest.
Hungary’s constitution also includes several paragraphs similar to thesementioned above – involving the need for the protection of environmental andcultural goods, the call for restrictions on the size of the state debt, and principles
for the use of public property. The role of the Parliamentary Commissioner of
Future Generations was taken over by the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights
and its institutional background, although enforcement of the constitutionalclauses faces several obstacles not discussed here.
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REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS –VOTING RIGHTS
Providing the right to vote to children and delegating that right to their legal
parents was proposed by Paul Demény (Demény 1986) and became publicly
known as “Demeny-voting” (or “proxy-voting”). Among the three voting rightreforms investigated in this paper, this approach has sparked the most debate
and come closest to actually being introduced.
In the original concept, children are provided with a vote that is split between
parents until the child reaches voting age. The proposal can easily be applied
to to non-conventional families. The true novelty of this proposal is not that achild’s right is transferred to the parent, but that children are included amongvoters. This does not involve the direct representation of children, and does notaddress those not yet born, but we can assume that parents would cast votes so
as to represent the interests of their children and other descendants.
The introduction of Demeny-voting was considered in several countries
as a means of representing future generations, including Japan (Aoki and
Vaithianathan 2009, 2010; Vaithianathan, Aoki, and Sbai 2013), Germany(Deutscher Bundestag 2003), and Austria (Vanhuysse 2013a). For various
reasons, this proposal was not finally introduced.
A common counter-argument is that parents may not be competent to casttheir children’s vote; furthermore, they could abuse this extra vote in their own
self-interest. The first counter-argument may easily be refuted with the argumentthat if parents were unable to assess the effects of any political or economic
decisions on their children’s well-being, they would similarly be incapable ofdoing this for themselves. Following this counter-argument, parents’ own rights
to vote are made questionable.
In terms of parents misusing their children’s votes, there is some evidence
that parents would cast the votes of their children for a different party thanthe one they would personally vote for (Aoki and Vaithianathan 2012). In therelated study, more than one-tenth of respondents engaged in such behavior.
However, these results do not document if the other respondents considered
their own preferred party as a good alternative for their children, or if they wereindifferent in this regard. Regardless, this experiment shows that voters would
be willing to consider the interest of their children.
Besides this issue, there are other challenges to Demeny-voting. Governments
may make decisions that affect not only the living, but also those not born yet.
Extending and delegating voting rights would not be a solution to this. Anothertechnical issue would be applying Demeny-voting to non-conventional families
such as households with one parent, step-parents, and orphanages.
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Another option for empowering younger generations in a voting system isage-weighted voting. In this system the weight of an individual vote depends
on the voter’s age. The basis of this idea is that younger voters have to live withthe consequences of their votes for longer than elderly voters. Such reforms
have not made their way into scientific discussions, but are the subject ofmedia interest (Martin Hiesboeck 2016; Moraro 2016) and are presented as aninteresting alternative. A recent analysis of the Brexit vote raises the issue ofthe potential consequences of using weighted votes to decide about issues of asimilar historical weight (Nouvellet 2017).
Alongside these possibilities, lowering the voting age in general often also
arises as an alternative. There are a few examples of places where voters of lessthan 18 years old are allowed to vote (16 yrs: Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Somalia,
Nicaragua; 17 yrs: East-Timor, Indonesia, Sudan, North-Korea), while inGermany the same was suggested regarding local elections (reducing the voting
age to 16 years). Evidence for the positive effects of lowering the voting age ismixed. (Bergh 2013; McAllister 2014; Wagner, Johann, and Kritzinger 2012;
Zeglovits and Zandonella 2013). Some studies find that that lowering the voting
age increases the maturity of the youngest voters (at the age of 16), while others
do not find evidence for this. Nonetheless, the common goal of these approaches
is to foster the engagement of youth in democratic processes.

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
OPINION: EARLIER FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESESIn terms of intergenerational justice, young generations (especially those notyet born) are prone to be affected by the kindliness and responsibility of thecurrently active and the elderly. However, future generations have no influenceon the decisions of the former, neither can they sanction decisions that will
negatively affect them.
Preferences for intergenerational redistribution have been analyzed throughattitudes towards the pension system, and studies have not confirmed predictions
based on models premised on self-interest. This does not mean that age is not amain driver of attitudes towards pensions, but the effects of ideological concernsand status properties prove to be much stronger (Boeri, Boersch-Supan, andTabellini 2002; Boeri and Pestieau 2004; Els, End, and Rooij 2003; Evans etal. 2004; Gelissen 2001; Hamil-Luker 2001; Silverstein et al. 2000; Street andCossman 2006).
Current trends in economics and sociology highlight the possible impact ofsome universal moral sentiments driven by concerns of fairness independent of
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self- or class-interest (in Hungarian see [Gulyás 2007]). These desires include
a wish to respect “deservingness” and to respond to neediness in terms of the
distribution of benefits. Polls indicate that the support of younger generations
for the level of benefits for the elderly can be explained by a belief that theelderly have earned their benefits through their lives’ work. On the other hand,public opinion is much more divided in the case of benefits for children (theworking force of future generations); one selection criterion is often the ethnic
background of the family which would potentially benefit.
Both traditional models based on class solidarity and novel models driven byfairness concerns predict that excessive support for the elderly versus future
generations is the result of a public discourse that is focused on intragenerational
redistribution. People simply do not consider intergenerational justice andsimply are not aware of the imbalance caused by redistribution. However, theimpact of public discourse on redistribution is recognized in refined models
involving voters who are driven by pure self-interest, and individuals who lackinformation. In the literature such distortions are often assumed, and the dual
nature of the welfare state is also emphasized: firstly as a state that redistributes
goods from the rich to the poor within generations (a ‘Robin Hood’ state) but at
the same time one which accumulates savings to support a life-course model (a‘piggy bank’ state).
Our main thesis which grounds the empirical study can be deducted from thisposition: the reason for voter negligence of the interests of future generations
is that the state’s redistribution discourse excludes intergenerational justiceconcerns, and focuses on the state’s ‘Robin Hood’ function. If intergenerational
aspects were present in public discourse, voters would consider the associatedmoral sentiments as well, hence they would support reforms leading to the better
representation of the interests of future generations. These include voting-rights
reforms resulting in the greater incorporation of future generations’ interests
in decision-making, besides direct decisions about redistribution. Basically, wehypothesize that if voters considered these factors, they would vote accordingly.
We analyzed support for such voting-right reforms through an empirical study
in which we investigated whether framing of state redistribution dilemmas
influences attitudes towards voting-right reforms. More explicitly, the mainquestion was whether raising awareness about intergenerational dilemmas
improves sensitivity to future generations’ rights and interests.
Such survey-based experiments face two challenges. First, critics of attituderesearch and framing research often claim that attitude changes due to framing
do not model opinion formulation processes in real discourses. They represent
ad hoc, short-term effects and respondents adapt to perceived expectations with
their responses. Second, the claim is that those respondents who do have their
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opinions influenced by real discourses would not respond to the hypothesizedstimuli in the predicted way, although the topics of the frames used in theexperiments do affect them.
Both claims represent grave critiques of research that uses framing effects
in experiments, but a method has been recently developed to respond tothem. The former critiques build on two opposing models of ideal voters andpsychological research has identified methods for determining with whichmodel the personalities of respondents can be associated (Matthes 2007). One
type of respondent has difficulty formulating opinions and uses easily accessible
response patterns when facing non-trivial questions. In other contexts, however,they respond in a different way, without “carrying over” previous responses.
Hence, the validity of their survey responses is quite low. These types of
respondents are referred to as “memory-based information processors.” Thesecond type of respondent easily formulates opinions which are consistent
with earlier responses, but which are modified and reevaluated based on new
information. The opinions of the latter are changed by simple manipulations
only with dificulty, yet their response validity is higher as they are likely tocarry over their attitudes to real situations without framing effects. Results fromframing experiments are stronger if they involve respondents of the second type.
Considering the above, we formulated our hypotheses. The first assumption
was that the discourse about state redistribution focuses mainly on
intragenerational dilemmas (the “Robin Hood” state). Thus, our first hypothesis
was that, compared to the control group, an intragenerational frame should
not have considerable effects (H1). Our second hypothesis was the motivating
assumption of our research: we hypothesized that discussion of intergenerational
redistribution dilemmas before surveying attitudes towards the aforementioned
voting-right reforms would improve support for those reforms (H2). However,considering the multiple approaches to voter behavior we assumed that thiseffect would be different among generations: weak for the elderly, stronger forthe middle-aged, and strongest among the youngest (H3).
An important component of the literature about redistribution preferences is therelationship between ethnic prejudice and welfare preferences. In the literature on
intergenerational redistribution, however, this is a marginal topic despite the factthat the theoretical connection is quite strong. However, in the Hungarian policy
discourse about voting rights reforms this topic was emphasized. Namely, it has
been expressed that providing additional rights to large families would simply
increase the political weight of the roma, hence such reform proposals would faceserious resistance from prejudiced voter groups. For this reason, we also included
the issue of roma and benefits in our experiment as well, wording it in a way thatwould not present the dilemma as redistribution between roma and non-roma.
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Instead, our ethnic frame only very shallowly suggested a connection between
large families in need and the roma. We assumed that the ethnic frame would also
decrease support for voting-right reforms (H4).

DATA AND METHODSThe empirical study involved a survey using an online quota sample of 1000
respondents between the end of June and beginning of July 2016. The structure of
the sample in terms of age, cohort, and regional distribution resembles the overall
Hungarian population. However, given that the sample was conducted online, theproportion of uneducated respondents is lower than in the population overall, thus
the raw responses are probably not representative of the population. However,
our study does not focus on simple frequencies of responses (it was not designed
to be similar to polls which precede referenda, or pre-surveys related to politicaldecisions). Our sole purpose was to investigate the effects of the framing stimuli
on responses to our questions (Schuman 2008). Recent results, especially fromonline surveys, show that the demographic differences between the sample andthe population have negligible (or easily manageable) effects on such framing
experiments (Mullinix et al. 2015; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014).
Our study focuses on possible reforms of the voting-system. We posed three
attitude-related questions in relation to topic, asking respondents their opinions
about the following reform-related options:
1. F or each child below the age of 18, a family should get an extra vote
2. I n referenda that influence the future of the state, the votes of young votersshould should be awarded more weight than those of the elderly
3. S imilarly to in Austria, the voting age should be decreased to 16 years old
Respondents reported their level of their agreement using a four-item Likertscale. The three responses were processed into a composite variable thatlocated respondents on an opinion-dimension defined by the factor analysisof responses to individual questions. We assumed that this latent dimension
would measure the strength of opinions about the principle of improving future
generations’ representation, separating this from specific aspects related to thesurvey questions. This factor score variable was our dependent variable and waspresent on the left side of our regression model.
Our experiment focuses on examining framing effects on political opinion.
We created four random subgroups for the sample (250 respondents each;quotas were used regarding demographic properties on the total sample but not
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on these sub-samples). Besides the control group one group was exposed tointergenerational and another one intragenerational frames during the survey,
while the third group was exposed to a frame that was aimed at artificiallycreating associations between large families in poverty and the roma (werefer to this as ‘ethnic treatment’). The respective frames were employed at
the beginning of the survey for the inter- and intragenerational redistributiongroups, while the ‘ethnic treatment’ involved priming questions throughout
the survey as a treatment. Following exposure to the frames, respondents wereasked to respond to various questions about public policy and politics.
The framing consisted of two steps. First, an information video was shown
to respondents with related infographics and an explanation of the respective
dilemmas.7 The videos did not contain potential solutions, but only factual
statements (numerical information), and exposed the dilemma of redistribution
between old vs. young followed by rich vs. poor. The video was followed bya series of questions about attitudes towards redistribution, as outlined in theframing. Another set of questions then followed about redistribution in general,and only after these questions were the actual voting-right reform questions
presented. In the ethnic treatment there was no informational video, and nor were
respondents asked questions about redistribution from an inter/intragenerational
perspective. Instead, this group answered a series of attitude questions about thepoor and recipients of benefits, wherein stereotypical statements about roma andbenefit recipients followed each other.
The information videos attempted to encourage respondents to think about theredistribution dilemmas presented therein, while the ethnic treatment was not
specifically designed to provoke conscious association between the two factors.

RESULTSAs previously described, the respondents in our sample were asked three questions
related to voting rights. The first one was about providing voting rights to parents,
the second proposed increasing the weight of young generations in votes, while
the third involved decreasing the voting age to 16 years following the example ofAustria. Responses ranged from fully support to completely reject on a 4-level scale.
7 The video-vignette of the intragenerational redistribution frame is available here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVjMlSmcooI
The video-vignette of the intergenerational redistribution frame is available here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLIiqdDNycs
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Respondents in general rejected each proposal. Giving additional voting
rights to parents with underage children in the family was rejected by 62% of
the control group (without framing), and only 17% of respondents agreed withthis proposal to a smaller degree. Similarly, the proposal to increase the weightof younger generations’ votes was rejected by 56% of the control group and only
one in six respondents agreed with it to a lesser degree. For both questions, 6%
supported the proposals completely. Decreasing the voting age was also rejectedby the majority of respondents (38% completely against, 32% supported, andonly 12% expressed full support). In the control group, 30% were strictly against
each proposal. However, in our sample 43% of the respondents agreed at least toa small degree to at least one of the proposals.
These proportions may indicate current trends, yet the results should be handledwith care, and not only because of the small sample size (the control group consistingof 250 respondents). Our online sample that was optimized for this survey experiment
did not properly represent the adult population in some important respects. Most
importantly, educated respondents were over-represented in our sample. Note thatthose with low level of education (who did not graduate from high school) are more
supportive of these proposals than educated respondents.
As mentioned before, we used regression models to investigate the effectof framing on attitudes to maintaining the status-quo of intergenerational
relations. The dependent variable in these regression models was a composite
variable constructed by factor analysis of the three responses. The variable wasstandardized with higher values denoting “gerontocratic” preferences aimed atconserving the status quo, while low values express a preference for providing
future generations and younger voters with more weight.
The first table contains three linear regression models which approximate theeffect of experimental manipulations on preferences about voting rights basedon the data from the sample. The first model compares the responses of thecontrol group with the responses of the treatment groups (the simplest test of oursecond hypothesis, H2). The second model examines our hypotheses about theage-group dependent effects of age and framing (H1 and H3).
In our experiment, many respondents were excluded from the sample due tothe limitations of their devices (cell phones, typically) and were substituted byothers. The most interesting effect of this is the under-representation of young
respondents in the groups with treatments involving information videos. But there
were other less obvious differences due to the selection effects of the device on
which the online survey was responded to. In order to control for such problems,
we also estimated a model enriched with sociodemographic controls. We consider
that this model best estimates the experimental effects, thus we focus on the
results of it below – note that there are no differences between the second and the
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VOTING RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

39

third model with respect to the conclusions about experimental effects. The fit of
the models shows that the explanatory power of the experimental treatments arequite low. The same holds for our model that includes an extended set of control
variables (sex, education, income, residence, labor market status, household size,
underage children, siblings, partisan and ideological position, faith).8
Table 1. Support for voting-rights reforms (composite dependent variable). OLS
regression estimations, full sample.

Experimental manipulation
Intergenerational frame
Intragenerational frame‘Roma= poor large families’ frame– middle-aged
Age group
Young: 18-29 years(1)
Model 1(2)
Model 2(3)
Model 30.129
(0.149)0.0379(0.672)0.0673(0.452)0.136§(0.271)0.108§(0.374)0.0852(0.480)0.118§(0.326)0.0886§(0.457)0.0820(0.490)-0.123(0.413)0.202(0.212)0.0105(0.952)0.0700(0.706)-0.464*(0.0700)-0.0218(0.918)-0.254(0.303)-0.237(0.266)-0.126(0.564)-4.19e-05(1.000)-0.0687(0.424)-0.442*(0.0796)-0.0542(0.793)-0.209(0.387)-0.238(0.255)-0.113(0.597)0.0221(0.921)-0.683*(0.0839)

Old: 60-x years
Interaction: experimental manipulation X age
Intergenerational#Young
Intergenerational #Old
Intragenerational # Young
Intragenerational # Old
Poor Roma # Young
Poor Roma # Old
Constants-0.0586(0.355)

N
1,000
1,000
R2
0.002
0.028
ControlsNONO
p values in parentheses * p<0.1, § Effect size for middle-aged respondents

1,000
0.111
YES

8 Based on our approximations, the statistical power of a sample size of 1000 is considerable. The
model that includes the control variables in the table below would be able to reveal the effects of
the intergenerational frame at 80% probability even if the model’s explanatory power improved
by 0,7% (R2). This is the explanatory power of this frame among younger respondents. An effectcausing a 2% increase in R2 could be shown in such a sample with 99.5% probability – using
the estimation methods in STATA; results can be found here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BqpUqAOfZ1pb1FEc19NUHczeDA/view?usp=sharing
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BÉLA JANKY – ATTILA GULYÁS

We analyzed the effect of the experimental manipulation separately foryounger (18-29 years old), middle-aged (30-59 years old) and elderly (60+ years
old) respondents. Estimations using these age groups indicate that mentioning
stereotypes against roma and large families did not significantly influence
attitudes towards the reforms. Those who were exposed to such stimuli did notsupport the status quo more than those in the control group. The effect size iscomparable to that for political orientation (and not significant statistically).
The voting-rights preferences of respondents who participated in theintragenerational treatment did not differ significantly from the preferences of
those in the control group. The opinions of younger and elderly respondentschanged positively due to the treatment, but there were no changes in the case of
middle-aged respondents. The influence of the intragenerational experimental
manipulation was not significant in either group.
Our study focuses mainly on the effects of the treatment with the intergenerationalframe. The middle-aged respondents in this group swung slightly towards rejecting
the reforms, yet for the elderly the effect was barely noticeable (the effects and thedifference between these two generations are not significant). Younger voters weresignificantly affected by the intergenerational frame, suggesting more support for
their own interests and those of future generations, resulting in support for the
voting rights reforms that were proposed. However, the effect is small as well, as
shown in the third column of Table I (the parameter estimation of the interaction
variable shows the effect of the frame in comparison with that for the middleaged generation). The framing practically shifted the opinions of the younger
respondents with a third of the standard deviation.
To sum up, we conclude that the treatments did not have considerable effects
on the opinions of respondents, except for the younger ones whose opinions
were affected by the intergenerational frame. Note though that we cannot
accept responses to questions about such complex and abstract matters without
skepticism. The paradigm of standard survey-based attitude-related research isoften criticized by questioning the external validity of research into abstract
issues that do not exist in everyday life. We rely on another type of critiquethat emphasizes that there are numerous differences between people when it
comes to revealing their opinions and thinking about such complex questions(Bizer et al. 2006). Critics claim that a considerable fraction of respondents
have difficulties formulating opinions about such matters. Their responses
concerning such topics are rather ad-hoc and less consciously arrived at.
Another fraction of people more consciously form their opinions and it is moredifficult to artificially divert them using latent stimuli. Due to this conscious
process of opinion formation they may react better to explicit information that
requires rational reflection.
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VOTING RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

41

In our study we measured the ease of opinion formulation using a set ofquestions typically used for such purposes in the literature (“need to evaluate”
scale [Bizer et al. 2004]) and then split our sample into two (as equally sized as
possible). The first part consisted of less conscious respondents, while the second
part contained those that had less difficulty with opinion-formulation. We thenapproximated the same regression models as above for these two subsamples
individually, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Support for voting-rights reforms (composite dependent variable). OLS
regression estimations in subsamples based on respondent types
VARIABLES
Experimental manipulation
Intergenerational frame – middle-aged
Intragenerational frame– middle-aged‘Roma= poor large families’ frame– middle-aged
Age group
Young: 18-29 years
Old: 60-x years
Interaction: experimental manipulationXage
Intergenerational#Young
Intergenerational #Old
Intragenerational # Young
Intragenerational # Old
Poor Roma # Young
Poor Roma # Old
Constants
N
R2
Controls
p values in parentheses ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
M2 memo M3 memo M2 online M3 online
based
based
proc.
proc.
0.304*(0.0641)
0.0922(0.588)0.281*(0.0919)0.304*(0.0599)
0.0753(0.653)0.280*(0.0933)-0.0596(0.751)0.115(0.491)-0.150(0.383)-0.0978(0.599)0.107(0.528)-0.126(0.458)-0.271(0.213)0.0730(0.773)-0.0583(0.821)-0.0117(0.967)-0.0160(0.937)0.203(0.326)-0.0225(0.924)0.165(0.504)-0.202(0.541)-0.121(0.710)0.0170(0.962)0.127(0.701)-0.367(0.240)0.0260(0.939)-0.242**(0.0451)-0.228(0.486)-0.185(0.567)-0.0108(0.975)0.0668(0.838)-0.449(0.146)-0.00229(0.995)-1.150**(0.0402)-0.909**(0.0360)
0.103(0.713)-0.507(0.126)-0.483*(0.0777)
0.178(0.551)
0.0957(0.743)0.135(0.259)-0.747*(0.0844)0.0728(0.792)-0.444(0.175)-0.441(0.108)0.202(0.493)0.0696(0.807)0.181(0.756)

520
0.043
NO

520
0.149
YES

480
0.044
NO

480
0.148
YES

Data show that more conscious respondents were – according to our
expectations – more positively affected by the intergenerational frame. Similarly
to previous results, the elderly did not react to the frame, and the middle-aged
only reacted to a very small degree (not significant statistically) in terms of
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BÉLA JANKY – ATTILA GULYÁS

support for voting-rights reforms. Among younger respondents this change
is not only statistically significant, but its extent is also approximately one
standard deviation for the composite variable that describes support for votingrights reforms. Also, these results are robust for changes in the age groups: thepositive effect is observed even when the upper age boundary of the younger age
group is increased from 29 years to 34 years.
Investigation of the effects of experimental manipulations in the cases ofthe different voting-rights reform proposals is also interesting (note that acomposite dependent variable was analyzed above). For the reasons outlined
above, we only demonstrate regression results for more conscious respondents.
The first question concerned voting reform in the shape of giving extra voting
rights to parents for their children. Results are very similar to those obtainedin the case of the composite variable. Elderly respondents are unaffected by
the intergenerational redistribution frame, while it slightly increases support forreforms in the case of the middle-aged and has a significant positive effect foryoung respondents. Similarly, the intragenerational frame has a positive effecton support of this reform, yet to a much lesser extent.
The second reform addressed the weight of the votes of younger voters.
This proposal directly separates the interests of future generations and current
generations and creates the biggest contrast between them. Perhaps this was thereason that numerous respondents refrained from responding to support the selfinterest of their own generation. Nevertheless, the effect of age on opinions was
not stronger than in the case of the previous question, and the intergenerationalframe had smaller effects on younger and middle-aged respondents. The effectof the intragenerational frame was smaller compared to the previous question
as well (however, this question apparently had a different effect on the middleaged compared to the elderly and young respondents; this contrast resulted insignificant regression parameters).
The third, much less radical form of reform (only marginally related tointergenerational justice) concerned lowering the age of voting. It is not
surprising that we did not experience any effect of either frame among the mostconscious respondents.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSIn our study we investigated the effect of extending voting rights to future
generations. From a moral point of view, we may be correct to doubt the wisdomof directly providing voting rights to children (due to their lack of decisionCORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 9 (2018) 2

VOTING RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

43

making capabilities given their age and maturity), or giving their parents
extra voting rights (as parents may abuse this right to pursue their own selfinterests). Despite this, it is clear that while some pillars of the representationof future generations are already defined, these have no influence whatsoeveron the course of democratic elections. These pillars include representation in
the case of environmental questions (institutions or constitutional barriers),
legal representation, and the revisions of some governmental decisions byprofessional bodies and committees representing future generations (such asmonetary councils). Even in these cases the focus is not on giving the choice tofuture generations, but on influencing issues that could have long-term effects
on future generations.
In our empirical study we investigated support for reform proposals thatwould improve the intergenerational justice of the voting system using an
online survey, where we framed this topic in different ways. Our main question
concerned the voting rights of children, and we inquired about support for threereform proposals: giving extra voting rights to children (and delegating that voteto parents); changing the weight of the votes of younger voters; and decreasing
the voting age.
The first proposal does not involve the explicit participation of future
generations in voting, but rather delegates voting rights to parents or otherrepresentative institutions. This raises numerous practical questions, but theseare outside the scope of our current work. The second proposal would not include
children among voters, but would increase the weight of the vote of younger
voters to counter the asymmetry due to current negative demographic trends. The
third proposal was to include a small proportion of future generations in voting
by decreasing the voting age. Attitudes towards these reforms were surveyedusing differently framed surveys: one frame emphasized the intergenerational
aspects of the welfare system, another frame introduced the intragenerational
redistribution dilemma (poor vs. rich), while the third promoted an ethnic focus
as well (roma and large families in relief) – here we used a priming techniqueinstead of framing for the survey. Naturally, there was one unframed version of
the survey to provide us with a control group.
Results indicate that these proposals are unpopular, irrespective of framing.
We found that the interests of future generations were less important to theelderly – however, it is vital to emphasize that these issues are not generally
present in public discourse. The purpose of our framing was not to provide
information about the topic, but to present various redistribution dilemmas.
Despite our expectations, framing did not significantly change responses, andnor could we identify significant relationships between support for the proposed
reforms and some sociodemographic variables. This situation was not improved
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extensively, even by controlling for strong-opinion-formulating voters (the only
exception to this were more conscious young respondents). Another surprising
result was that ethnic priming did not influence responses either. One may
conclude that the problem of representing future generations in the democratic
voting system – either directly, or by delegating votes – is so removed fromeveryday issues that a typical survey respondent may not be able respond in ameaningful way.

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