Cross-Ministerial
Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP)
Research and Development Plan for
Cyber Physical Security for IoT Society

July 19, 2018
(Revised July 11, 2019)

Director-General for Science,
Technology, and Innovation,
Cabinet OfficeOverview of the Research and Development Plan
1. Significance and goals
IoT is the fundamental technology of Society 5.01, where IoT devices embedded in a physicalspace, such as social infrastructures, industrial systems, living environments, and naturalenvironments, are expected to create various added values and services, and to bringsignificant benefits to the economy and society, which are also physical space, throughconnection with cyberspace, such as clouds via various networks, collaboration with advanced
knowledge processing (represented by AI), and analysis processing as big data.
On the other hand, the scope of the targets of cyberattacks is rapidly expanding, and attack
techniques are becoming more advanced. In particular, as a result of the spread and expansionof IoT which create new value within industrial society and family life, the threat ofcyberattacks can be found in all industrial activities, not only in cyberspace, but also in
physical space.
In addition, the risks of illegal programs being embedded, and programs being altered in an
unauthorized manner during the processes of production and distribution of products andservices, are becoming more prevalent within supply chains. Enhancement of cybersecurity
measures is required within the global supply chains. As it is strongly feared that business
operators, products, or services that fail to meet a certain level of security requirements may be
excluded from global procurement projects in the future, it will be an important task to secure
opportunities for the participation of the manufacturing sector, which accounts for the majorityof exports from Japan.
That is why the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" (hereinafter referred to as"Infrastructure"), which can be utilized to protect IoT systems, services and large-scale supply
chains including SMEs, should be developed and verified for the purpose of protecting various
IoT devices, and ensuring safety and security in society as a whole, towards the secure Society
5.0. After the effectiveness of the Infrastructure is confirmed through verification, theInfrastructure will be incorporated into supply chains that are actually operated, and put topractical use. Through promotion of implementation of this Infrastructure in society, IoT
society will be made stronger against cyber threats, and a value of approximately 90 trillion
yen, which Society 5.0 will bring2, will be endorced.

Society 5.0 is a concept proposed in the 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan (Cabinet decision
on January 22, 2016), which refers to a human-centered society where systems integrating
cyberspace (virtual) and physical space (real) to a high degree will promote economic development,
and solve social challenges.
2
From the "New Industrial Structure Vision" by New Industrial Structure Committee, Industrial
Structure Council, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
http://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shinsangyo_kozo /pdf/017_05_00.pdf
11

2. Content of the research
The research and development of the Infrastructure, which can handle the scale where alarge-scale supply chain including SMEs becomes a multilayered structure (having 10,000 or
more component organizations) and achieves the assurance of security for IoT systems/services(with thousands [or more] various IoT devices) and components (humans, organizations,products, systems, services, and data, etc.) of the supply chains, will be promoted. The

Infrastructure is designed to achieve the security of the IoT systems/services and supply chainsas a whole, by repeatedly performing the assurance of security (creation of trustworthiness)and confirmation thereof (confirmation of trustworthiness) on IoT devices and components ofthe supply chains, and by constructing a trustworthy chain. The three major items of researchand development for the Infrastructure are as follows:(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology
Multidimensional research and development of the trustworthiness creation andconfirmation technology necessary to enhance security of each IoT device and services, and toachieve assurance of security for various IoT systems/services and supply chains as a whole,will be conducted.
(B) "Construction & Distribution of a Trustworthy Chain" technology
Research and development of technologies for constructing a "trustworthy chain" in IoT
systems/services and supply chains engaged in procurement and construction, and of ensuring
the secure distribution of necessary information, will be conducted so that the security ofvarious social infrastructures and services, as well as of a wide variety of supply chains, may be
assured.
(C) "Verification & Maintenance of a Trustworthy Chain" technology
Research and development of technologies for verifying and maintaining the safe operationsof a "trustworthy chain" will be conducted within the IoT systems/services, and supply chains
where the "trustworthy chain" has been constructed.

3. Implementation structure
Program Director Atsuhiro GOTO3 (hereinafter referred to as "PD") will be in charge of theestablishment and promotion of the research and development plan. The Promotion Committee,
which is chaired by the PD, and is composed of related ministries and agencies, specialists andexperts, and for which the Cabinet Office serves as secretariat, will perform generalcoordination. Research and development will be promoted by research managers, who will beselected through open recruitment, through utilization of the National Research andDevelopment Agency New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization(hereinafter referred to as "NEDO"). The progress of each research theme will be controlled
3

President/Dean/Professor of the Institute of Information Security2

under the management of NEDO. The PD may, if necessary, appoint sub-PDs to support the PD
in managing the content and progress of the research and development. In addition,committees and working groups (WG) for planning and implementing efforts to widely publicize
the activities and outcomes of activities for the project, and promote recognition anddissemination within industry, will be established as necessary.

4. Management of intellectual properties
The Intellectual Property Committee will be established in NEDO or an institution to which
the selected research manager belongs (trustee), for the purpose of adjustment, so that thetrend of intellectual properties applied by the trustee may be understood and managed, andsuch properties may be more conveniently used for industrial purposes.

5. Evaluation
Prior to the evaluation made by the Governing Board4 at the end of each fiscal year, theresearch managers will conduct self-inspection, and the PD and management agency will also
conduct self-inspections, referring as necessary to the opinions of outside experts.

6. Exit strategies
The research and development team will collaborate with user companies that are aware ofchallenges will be established from the start of the project, so that user requirements may bereflected in the technology development and verification experiments, and participatingcompanies' proactive efforts for commercialization and establishment of business will bepromoted. Introduction of the Infrastructure into supply chains (including SMEs) as a whole,and into the IoT systems/services of their constituent companies, will be promoted so that theoutcomes of the projects may be adopted by 50% of the SMEs prior to 2030.
This project will be promoted through the SIP fund, and the participating companies'
proactive contributions. The participating companies will play a central role in commercializing
the outcomes of the research and development, and in promoting adoption thereof in various
industrial areas. Some outcomes will be registered as IP (intellectual property rights), andlicensed to related vendors for the purpose of dissemination. In order to disseminate theoutcomes of this project more widely, the PD and the research and development team will have
symposiums, seminars, and international conferences that may increase people's recognition
and understanding of this project.
Projects related to this project are expected to include SIP automated driving (enhancementof systems and services), and SIP smart logistics services.

The Governing Board is held to examine and consider important matters concerning SIP, thereby
ensuring the smooth promotion of SIP.
3

4

Contents
1. Significance and goals ......................................................................................................6(1) Background, and situations inside and outside of Japan .............................................6(2) Significance and strategic importance ...........................................................................7(3) Objective/Aim ..................................................................................................................8(i)

Toward realization of Society 5.0 ................................................................................8(ii)

Social objectives .........................................................................................................10(iii) Industrial objectives ..................................................................................................10(iv) Technical objectives ................................................................................................... 11(v)

Objectives pertaining to institutional systems.........................................................12(vi) Global benchmarks ....................................................................................................13(vii) Collaboration with local government bodies ............................................................13
2. Description of R&D activities ........................................................................................14(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology........................................16(B)"Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology ...........................19(C) "Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology ...............................21(D) Surveys of trends related to the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" ..............24
3. Implementation structure..............................................................................................25(1) Utilization of National Research and Development Agency New Energy andIndustrial Technology Development Organization ..................................................25(2) Selection of research managers ....................................................................................25(3) Measures to optimize the research system ..................................................................25(4) Enhancement of the activities for dissemination and promotion of outcomes ..........25(5) Coordination with government ministries and agencies ............................................26(6) Contribution from the industries .................................................................................27
4. Matters related to intellectual properties .....................................................................28(1) Intellectual property committees .................................................................................28(2) Arrangement concerning IP rights...............................................................................28(3) Licensing of background IP rights ...............................................................................28(4) Handling of foreground IP rights .................................................................................28(5) Licensing of foreground IP rights.................................................................................29(6) Approval for transfer of, and establishment and transfer of an exclusive license for,4

foreground IP rights ..................................................................................................29(7) Handling of intellectual property rights at the time of termination ..........................30(8) Participation by overseas organizations, etc. (such as foreign companies, universities,
and researchers) ........................................................................................................30
5. Matters related to assessment.......................................................................................31(1) Assessing entities ..........................................................................................................31(2) Timing of assessments ..................................................................................................31(3) Assessment items, and assessment standards ............................................................31(4) Methods for reflecting assessment outcomes ..............................................................31(5) Disclosure of outcomes..................................................................................................32(6) Self-inspection ...............................................................................................................32(i) Self-inspection by research managers ..........................................................................32(ii) Self-inspection by PD ...................................................................................................32(iii) Self-inspection by the management agency ...............................................................32
6. Exit strategy ...................................................................................................................33(1) Exit-oriented research promotion ................................................................................33(2) Measures for dissemination .........................................................................................35
7. Other important matters ...............................................................................................37(1) Legal basis ....................................................................................................................37(2) Flexible changes of the project .....................................................................................37(3) History of PD and personnel responsible ....................................................................37
Appendix

Financial planning and accumulation ...........................................................395

1. Significance and goals(1) Background, and situations inside and outside of Japan
Society 5.0 refers to a human-centered society where systems integrate cyberspace (virtual)and physical space (real) to a high degree (hereinafter referred to as "Cyber Physical Highly
Integrated Systems"), to promote economic development and solve social challenges, and asociety where all humans and things are connected through the use of advanced technologies
such as IoT and AI, so that various knowledge and information may be shared, and new values
may be created.
In addition, the development of networks, such as Connected Industries5, enables
construction of more flexible and dynamic supply chains that are different from those of thepast, and increases opportunities to create new added values. On the other hand, in terms ofcybersecurity, the number of target points of attack are increasing, and the range of necessary
defenses must expand. One of the characteristics of cyberattacks is that attackers can break in
if they can find even a single vulnerable point. From the attacker point of view, systems are
becoming easier than ever to intrude into.
Moreover, the threat of cyberattacks is increasing day by day, and may significantly impact
not only cyberspace, but also physical space, in Society 5.0, which is expected to develop alongwith the upcoming explosive dissemination and expansion of IoT devices6. There have actually
been some cases of serious damage, such as a serious network fault caused by a large-scale
DDoS attack via vulnerable IoT devices.
A certain security vendor's survey stated that cybercrimes in the entire world cause an
economic loss of USD 600 billion (equivalent to 0.8% of the global GDP)7.
Furthermore, the risks of illegal programs being embedded, or programs being altered in an
unauthorized manner, during the processes of production and distribution of products andservices, are becoming more prevalent within supply chains, such as in cases where thefunction of transmitting users' personal information overseas is embedded in the firmware of asmartphone.
To combat such supply chain risks, compliance with NIST SP800-171 is required for
procurement by the Department of Defense, and other cybersecurity measures are beingenhanced in the U.S. Similar cybersecurity measures are beginning to be required amongsupply chains in Japan, and fulfillment of certain standards may become a prerequisite for"Connected Industries" is a concept advocated in March 2017 by the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry as a model for future Japanese industries, referring to an industrial society in which
various connections will create new added values.
6
According to estimates by IHS Technology, the number of devices connected to the Internet was
17.3 billion as of 2016, and has been increasing at an average annual rate of 15.0% since then, so is
expected to reach approximately 30 billion by 2020.
7
From the report jointly published by McAfee LLC and CSIS, in February 2018.
65

business relationships in the future. It is feared that business operators, products, or services
that don’t satisfy security requirements may be gradually excluded in global supply chains.
In Society 5.0, the entire Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System composed of supply
chains (including SMEs) and various IoT systems/services should be made highly resistant tocyberattacks from the formation phase of such societies. For that purpose, it is essential forassurance of security in the entire Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System to embedadvanced security measures against unknown cyberattacks, on the assumption that such
unknown cyberattacks may exist within the design, manufacturing, and operations phases,
even after the elements (humans, organizations, products, systems, services, and data, etc.)
constituting Society 5.0 are intricately interconnected to establish a diversified society.

(2) Significance and strategic importanceIn order to promote Society 5.0 and Connected Industries, it is important to take adequate
security measures to assure safety and security, but the security measures taken by a single
company are far from sufficient in a society composed of various elements (humans,organizations, products, systems, services, and data, etc.) collaborating and merging with one
another. In other words, even if each company separately considers cybersecurity measures for
its products and services from the standpoint of "security by design" from the planning anddesign stages, it will not be sufficient. In addition to said measures, the entire IoT
systems/services composed of a wide variety of IoT devices, and the entire supply chains
including manufacturing and distribution (including related companies and business partners,etc.), should take security measures, taking into consideration the resilience of businessactivities, and cybersecurity should be established, including the security of data circulation,
which would be difficult for a single player to strictly control (Figure 1-1).
If cybercrimes cause loss to the Japanese market at the same rate as that of the global
economic loss found in the above-mentioned survey, the loss to the Japanese market may beapproximately 3 trillion yen, which is 0.8% of Japan's current GDP. Thus, from the standpointof Japan's economic development, cybersecurity measures for preventing cyberattacks areimportant.
On the other hand, in "Chapter 3 Cybersecurity Measures" of the "New Economic Policy
Package", formulated by the Cabinet on December 8, 2017, the necessity of enhancement of IoT
security and cybersecurity measures for SMEs is explained. This is an important project for
promoting enhancement of the cybersecurity of IoT systems/services and the entire supply
chain including SMEs in this IoT age.
In Society 5.0, which will be realized through a system that highly integrates cyberspace andphysical space, it is essential for the advancement of the ICT industry, and the development of
the society associated therewith, to establish a "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure"(hereinafter referred to as "Infrastructure"), which can assure security for various IoT devices,7systems, and services from consumer equipment (such as smart home appliances) to industrial
systems, as the most secure social infrastructure in the world.

Figure 1-1.

Challenges of the Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System toward
Realization of Society 5.0

For that purpose, the most advanced core technologies in the world that will be necessary forrealizing the Infrastructure will be developed, security will be assured for entire supply chains(including SMEs) engaged in the procurement and construction of IoT systems/services, andmaintenance of security for various services will be realized. Verification of the effect of suchdevelopments within each industrial area8 will contribute to an increase in the international
competitiveness of industry, through reduction of the costs required for assurance of security ofthe entire life cycle of products and services, and improvement in the quality of security.
A value of approximately 90 trillion yen that Society 5.0 will bring, will be supported byestablishment of the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure".

(3) Objective/Aim(i) Toward realization of Society 5.0▪ In Society 5.0, which will be realized by a system highly integrating cyberspace andphysical space, this Project will assure the cybersecurity of the entire life cycle of theSociety 5.0 services and systems, through the most secure social infrastructure in theworld, "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" (Figure 1-2).
The purpose is to ensure complete security, without gaps even in situations where

8
Areas where further economic development can be expected in Society 5.0 include automatic
driving of vehicles, smart homes and buildings, new 5G-based communication services, the defense
industry that supports Japan's defense capability, and medical devices.
8the elements (humans, organizations, products, systems, services, and data, etc.)
constituting Society 5.0 are diversified, and a large number of companies are
involved in the supply chain in a multilayered manner.


The evolution of cyberattacks will never cease, and the threat of such attacks may
seriously affect not only cyberspace, but also physical space, in Society 5.0. With thissituation in mind, we aim to make the entire Cyber Physical Highly Integrated
System highly resistant to cyberattacks, by assuming that unprecedented
cyberattacks may occur in the stages of operations, and in provision of products,
systems, and services.

▪ As Growth Strategy 20179 aims to improve labor productivity in the entire
manufacturing industry by 2% or more every year through realization of Society 5.0, thisProject will promote development and social implementation of technologies useful for theenhancement of the cybersecurity measures of entire supply chains including SMEs,
which is essential for achievement of said aim.
▪ It is assumed that the information necessary for the "Cyber Physical Security
Infrastructure" will be in the merged and expanded databases of the "Trustworthiness
Lists", which is the trustworthiness information of supply chains, and the original
information to be used to determine the authenticity of components, in addition to
traditional databases related to information security (vulnerability information, incident
information, and threat information, etc.).
▪ Effectiveness of the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" will be confirmed throughverification of the Infrastructure, and social implementation (that is, incorporation into
live supply chains for practical use) of the Infrastructure will be promoted earlier than in
any other countries, so that the IoT society may be made more resistant to cyberattacks,
and realization of secure Society 5.0 in Japan may be promoted.

9

Cabinet decision on June 9, 2017.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/miraitousi2017_t.pdf
9Figure 1-2.

Roles of this Project in Society 5.0(ii) Social objectives
In a situation where the sources of cyberattacks are rapidly expanding, and attack▪

techniques are becoming more sophisticated, this project will assure security of the entire
supply chains (including SMEs) engaged in procurement and construction of IoT
systems/services, and provide maintenance of security of the various IoT systems/services
that are operated, thereby protecting IoT devices, systems, and services in the
manufacturing/distribution areas, and smart buildings, etc., establishing the safety andsecurity of all of society, and supporting a value of approximately 90 trillion yen that willbe created by Society 5.0.

(iii)
▪

Industrial objectives
The project will receive a good rating in the marketplace for the effectiveness of its

technologies, by working on verification of the technologies in specific industrial areas
constituting services that serve as social infrastructures or foundations, and large-scale
supply chains, and by horizontally deploying the technologies in Japan and achieving
satisfactory results after the technologies are established. As a result, international
competitiveness will be enhanced in the areas of automated driving and smart life
industries, new 5G-based communication services, the defense industry that supports
Japan's defense capability, and medical devices, where further economic development canbe anticipated due to the realization of Society 5.0.
10

In order to avoid factors that may inhibit the international development of Japan's▪

industries, consistency with cybersecurity measures taken in Europe and the U.S. will beensured. Such measures will be introduced prior to 2030 in 50% of the SMEs that havehigh monozukuri quality in Japan, and responses to global supply chains will bepromoted.
Although Japan relies heavily on overseas business operators for security products for▪

traditional IT devices, the leading technology development of security foundation products
for IoT will be promoted through this research and development project, and efforts tostandardize the technologies or to make them "de facto" will be made, so that acompetitive advantage will be secured in overseas markets.

(iv)▪

Technical objectives
Multidimensional research and development will be conducted of (A) the "Creation &Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology necessary to enhance the security of each
IoT device and service, and to achieve assurance of security for various IoT
systems/services, and entire supply chains, that is, the trustworthiness basic
implementation (trustworthiness creation) technology applicable to a wide variety andlarge number of small-sized IoT devices in terms of both cost and performance, the IoT
devices authenticity assessment (trustworthiness confirmation) technology, and thetechnology for eligibility assurance (trustworthiness confirmation) of the manufacturing
process.
▪

Research and development will be conducted of (B) the "Construction & Distribution ofTrustworthy Chain" technology for constructing a "trustworthy chain" in IoT
systems/services, and of supply chains engaged in procurement and construction, andensuring the secure distribution of necessary information so as to assure security invarious social infrastructures and services, and a wide variety of supply chains, that is,
the protocol technology and information distribution technology capable of constructing
and utilizing the trustworthy chain.

▪

Research and development will be conducted of (C) the "Verification & Maintenance ofTrustworthy Chain" technology to enable verification of safe operation, and maintenanceof a "trustworthy chain" in IoT systems/services and supply chains where the"trustworthy chain" has been constructed.

▪

The (A) Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness, (B) Construction & Distribution ofTrustworthy Chain, and (C) Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain above
should not be developed simply as an elemental technology, but as a suite of technologies
that can be consistently secured.

▪

As a concrete goal, "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology,"Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology, and "Verification &11

Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology will be established that can handle thescale where a large-scale supply chain including SMEs becomes a multilayered structure(having 10,000 or more component organizations), and achieve assurance of security for
the IoT systems/services (with thousands [or more] of various IoT devices), and eachcomponent (humans, organizations, products, systems, services, and data, etc.) of the
supply chains.
▪

As for the technology readiness level (hereinafter referred to as "TRL"), 10the goal is
TRL6 for the entire project, and TRL7 partially.

(v) Objectives pertaining to institutional systems▪

Cyberattacks are performed across borders, so purely domestic efforts are notsufficient. Efforts that are always designed to secure international harmonization, suchas enhanced collaboration with European countries and the U.S., and active promotion
should be made of our efforts as international standards in anindustry/academia/government collaboration. Specifically, with international trends in
mind, collaboration should be pursued with ongoing activities for establishing security
policies in the industrial areas of power, defense, automotive, smart homes/buildings,
public transport, and telecommunications and broadcasting (Industry by Industry).

▪

In close collaboration with government measures by the Cyber Security Task Force(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), the Study Group for Industrial
Cybersecurity (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), and the IoT Security Working
Group (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and IoTPromotion Consortium)[hereinafter referred to as the "Three Major Government
Measures11"]), contribution to establishment of systems for specific measures should beHere, TRL as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will be used. TRL1: Level ofproposal of basic principles/research and development papers TRL2: Level of confirmation andevaluation of basic principles/research and development papers TRL3: Analysis of basic principles
and evaluation thereof in the laboratory TRL4: Level of evaluation of technical elements that are
researched and developed, or of prototypes in the laboratory TRL5: Level at which technicalelements that are researched and developed can be evaluated in the relevant environment TRL6:
Level at which technical elements that are researched and developed can be demonstrated in therelevant environment TRL7: Level at which system prototypes can be demonstrated in theoperational environment TRL8: Operation verification in linkage with the actual system TRL9:
Level at which application to the actual/commercial system is possible.
11
In Japan, the Study Group for Industrial Cybersecurity was established in the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry in December 2017, and has just started considering cybersecurity
measures in whole supply chains, with international trends in mind. Since December 12, 2017, theIoT Security Working Group under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the IoT Promotion Consortium
has considered measures for assuring the security of IoT devices, including authentication of IoT
devices satisfying certain security requirements, while checking trends in the other countries
mentioned above. In addition, the Cyber Security Task Force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
1012made, depending on individual needs in the industrial sector12.

(vi)

Global benchmarks
In the United States, NIST SP800-171 is established as a standard for cybersecurity▪

measures for controlling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)13, and in connection
with procurement for defense purposes, compliance with NIST SP800-171 by supply
chains (including even subcontractors) is required (DFARS Clause 252.204-7012). In
addition, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, in which the government established theframework for risk evaluation of cybersecurity, states the policy of clearly positioning theevaluation of cyber supply chain risks.
In Europe, the policy package published in September 2017 states that the EU▪

Cybersecurity Certification Framework will be improved in the future. Cybersecurity
measures that include supply chains are most likely to be sought in the future, with thecharacteristics of devices and certification methods both taken into consideration.
This project will examine whether or not supply chains and IoT systems/services for▪

which security is assured through the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" can satisfy
the overseas requirements mentioned above, as well as those in the Three Major
Government Measures, thereby confirming their advantage in the world.

(vii)
▪

Collaboration with local government bodies
IoT-related systems currently possessed by local government bodies, systems that are

expected to be possessed in future, and their supply chains will be understood throughinformation exchange with local government bodies, ministries, and industry associations,and the security requirements that are required for safe construction and operation will
be clarified.

Communications announced "General Measures for IoT Security", including improvement of thesystems for taking measures against vulnerability of IoT devices, in October 2017, promoting theirmeasures.
12
Japanese companies are significantly behind in responses to business partners, including
contractors, compared with companies in European countries and the U.S.
http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/kenkyukai/shoujo/sangyo_cyber/pdf/001_05_00.pdf
For this reason, guidelines concerning comprehensive security measures have been established incollaboration with the "Cyber Physical Security Measures Framework", which the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry is trying to establish, in the hope that establishment of common
guidelines concerning efforts through the detailed definition of security requirements in each area,
and the social implementation of outcomes of the SIP, will double the understanding of security
measures in IoT systems/services and supply chains, to a level comparable to European countries
and the U.S.
13
Although it is not highly confidential, it is regarded as "Controlled Unclassified Information",that is, information which should be controlled between only stakeholders having a need to share it.
13

2. Description of R&D activities
This Project will develop technologies for the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure" thatwill meet requirements such as (i) improved security of individual IoT devices, (ii) assurance of
security in the entire supply chain (including SMEs) engaged in procurement and constructionof IoT systems, and (iii) maintenance of security for various services, as well as for social
infrastructures operated as IoT systems, thereby protecting IoT devices in such fields as
production, logistics, and smart buildings, and establishing safety and security within all ofsociety, with an aim to achieve secure Society 5.0.
oAssurance of security through the trustworthy chain
The basic idea of this research and development is to enhance security resistance byconstructing and maintaining a trustworthy chain among components, both in the supply
chain, and in IoT systems/services.
In the supply chain, the base of trustworthiness will be established on any of the components(humans, organizations, products, systems, services, and data, etc.) (that is, trustworthinesswill be created), and a trustworthy chain starting from the base will create trustworthiness ofeach component, and enable confirmation thereof. By repeating this process, the "trustworthy
chain" will be constructed throughout the supply chain, and the security of the supply chain
will be assured through validation and maintenance of the trustworthy chain.
Similarly, in IoT systems and services, the base of trustworthiness will be established on IoTterminal equipment, etc., and the trustworthiness of each component (IoT equipment, IoT
networks, clouds, etc.) will be created from the base and confirmed, thereby preventing
tampering, etc., of the components. Construction, validation, and maintenance of such a"trustworthy chain" covering the components will achieve assurance of security over the entire
IoT systems/services.
In addition, the supply chain and IoT systems/services are in a complementary relationship.
For example, manufacturing plants and logistics systems, which are a part of the supply chain,
are IoT systems, and products provided by the supply chain in the manufacturing and ICT
industries are IoT systems (or equipment) or services. For this reason, in order to assure
security for IoT systems/services, security for the supply chain engaged in procurement andmanufacturing of said systems/services should be assured (e.g. a trustworthy chain should beconstructed). Assurance of security for the supply chain will necessitate assurance of security
for IoT systems/services that are components of the supply chain (e.g. production lines).
o

Major R&D items
In this research and development of the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure", creation oftrustworthiness, confirmation of trustworthiness, and construction and maintenance of the14

trustworthy chain are important14. The three major R&D items are as follows:(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology(B) "Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology(C) "Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology
In addition,(D) Surveys of trends related to the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure",
which are required for research and development, will be conducted.
Figure 2-1 shows the complete picture of R&D items which are required for social
implementation of security for the entire supply chain over the life cycle of products/services,
through repeated assurance of security (creation of trustworthiness), and confirmation thereof(confirmation of trustworthiness) for each component of the supply chain, to construct atrustworthy chain.

Figure 2-1.

Image of the Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure Constructed with theTrustworthy Chain

In connection with (A), the "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology,
multidimensional research and development will be conducted of the technology for creation
Also in the "Cyber Physical Security Framework", which the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry is trying to establish, assurance of security (creation of trustworthiness), and confirmation
thereof (confirmation of trustworthiness), will be repeated for each component, and a trustworthy
chain will be constructed and maintained, so that security for the entire value creation process will
be achieved.
15
14and confirmation of trustworthiness, which is necessary to enhance the security of each IoT
device and service, and to achieve assurance of security for various IoT systems and services,and entire supply chains. In connection with (B), the "Construction & Distribution ofTrustworthy Chain" technology, research and development will be conducted of the technology
for constructing a "trustworthy chain" in IoT systems/services, and in supply chains engaged in
procurement and construction, and for ensuring the secure distribution of necessary
information so as to assure security in various social infrastructures and services, and a wide
variety of supply chains. Further, in connection with (C), the "Verification & Maintenance ofTrustworthy Chain" technology, research and development will be conducted of the technology
to enable verification of safe operation, and maintenance of a "trustworthy chain" in IoT
systems/services and supply chains where the "trustworthy chain" has been constructed. In
addition, efforts will also be made to prepare the deployment and operation instructions
necessary for social implementation of technical achievements, and to develop organizations
and human resources.
During the research and development of the Infrastructure, experimental demonstrations on
the development technology will be widely made, surveys for measuring the validity and effects
of challenges will be conducted, and the results will be fed back to research and development.
Dissemination activities, such as participation in international conferences where mutual
evaluation with overseas initiatives is possible, will also be conducted.
In addition, (D) overseas trend surveys will be concurrently conducted, including surveys on
R&D trends of related technologies and policy trends, and reflected in the research anddevelopment as appropriate, along with trend surveys on individual technologies to be
conducted in (A), (B), and (C), respectively.
The three R&D items, and trend survey items, are described below.

(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology
Assurance of security for various IoT systems/services, and entire supply chains, will startfrom a base on which the security for individual IoT devices and services can be enhanced, andon which their trustworthiness can be created. To that end,
(A1) research and development of the technologies for creating trustworthiness of IoT supply
chains will be promoted.
In addition, in order to confirm the trustworthiness of the target devices, the manufacturing
process thereof, and the provision process of the target services,(A2) research and development of technologies for confirming trustworthiness throughmonitoring of authenticity and integrity of IoT devices, and(A3) research and development of technologies for confirming trustworthiness throughcertification of the eligibility of procedures
16will be conducted to realize frameworks for confirming that the target devices or services, havebeen generated while meeting requirements, both in terms of products and processes, or for
confirming trustworthiness of the organizations or responsible individuals engaged in theprocess for generating the target devices or services.
Concurrent with this research and development, trend surveys related to technologies forcreating and confirming trustworthiness will be conducted.
Based on the technologies mentioned above, the mechanism for certification concerning"things", hardware, software, services, and procedures will be prepared, and deployed in asystem that is actually providing services, to verify the effects of the mechanism. In addition, it
will be verified that (B) construction and distribution of the trustworthy chain, and (C)verification and maintenance of the trustworthy chain, which are the outcome of this researchand development, constitute a consistent technology group. Experimental demonstrations will
be conducted, including measurements of effectiveness, and dissemination activities will be
conducted, based on their results.

(A1) Research and development of the technologies for creating trustworthiness of IoT
supply chains
As the foundation of trustworthiness of large-scale IoT systems/services and IoT supply
chains required in the age of Society 5.0, a set of functions for establishing the base oftrustworthiness15 (security assurance) on a IoT terminal device (terminal node), and enabling
construction of a trustworthy chain through determination of authenticity of IoT devices andcertification of the eligibility of procedures starting from the base is critical. To form such a setof functions, the following technologies will be researched and developed.
(i) Technologies for utilizing a cryptographic module which can be embedded in IoT devices,
as the basis of trustworthiness.
(ii) Technologies for improving resistance to tampering, and for resisting malicious functions
that may be embedded in hardware in any phase of the supply chain contrary to the
supplier's intention, in order to respond to both cyberattacks and to physical attacks, on
the base of trustworthiness.
(iii) Improvement/construction of the security assurance scheme for the base oftrustworthiness. Specifically, patterns of attacks on the base of trustworthiness will be
investigated, the technology for determining vulnerability of systems related to the baseof trustworthiness will be established, standards for determining vulnerability will beestablished, and a framework will be constructed as an assurance scheme.
The technical challenge aspects of this theme are realization of the cutting-edge technology

15
In the real world, based on a passport or driver's license (the base of trustworthiness), theidentity of the holder of a bank account or mobile phone is assured (an example of construction of atrustworthy chain, starting from the base of trustworthiness).
17

for a base of trustworthiness which can be deployed in small-sized IoT devices, which is basedon world-class cipher implementation techniques, and realization of resistance to tampering at
low cost, which can be installed in various small-sized IoT device products.
Participating corporations and organizations：Electronic Commerce Security Technology Research Association(Member: Yokohama National
University, Kobe University, The University of Tokyo, Tohoku University, Nara Institute of
Science and Technology,and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation), National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology(A2) Research and development of technologies for confirming trustworthiness throughmonitoring of authenticity and integrity of IoT devices
As IoT devices cannot be properly monitored due to their characteristics, such as the large
number, having no operator, and automatic operations, they tend to go unnoticed even if they
are modified (tampered, or secretly switched), so damage may continue to occur for an extended
period of time. In order to avoid damage, monitoring of the authenticity and integrity of each
IoT device constituting the Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System, and immediate detectionof contamination by malicious IoT devices, are required. To this end, the following technologies
will be researched and developed.
(i) Technology for monitoring of authenticity and integrity that is so lightweight as torespond to IoT devices which otherwise would not accept security functions, and can
respond to the very wide variety of architectures of IoT devices, and characteristics of thetarget devices.
(ii) Technology that can respond to the diversity of IoT devices, IoT systems, and supply
chains, and enable reliable, efficient monitoring of the authenticity and integrity of theentire system, even if it is composed of an enormous number of IoT devices.
In spite of the diversification of IoT devices according to their usage and purposes,
technologies that can monitor the authenticity and integrity of IoT systems while ensuring highresistance to cyberattacks and resilience will be realized, even if the IoT systems include anenormous number of IoT devices. In addition, lightness capable of responding to small-sized IoT
devices, and flexibility capable of responding to IoT systems with various structures, are also
technical challenges of this theme.
Participating corporations and organizations：
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation(Re-consignee:FFRI, Inc), NEC Corporation)(A3) Research and development of technologies for confirming trustworthiness through18

certification of the eligibility of procedures
In order to achieve secure Society 5.0, it is necessary to assure trustworthiness over entire
supply chains. A procedure is a process in itself for creating values in a supply chain, so thetechnology for assuring eligibility that can certify trustworthiness of the procedure is necessary
in order to construct a trustworthy chain. Thus, the following technologies will be researchedand developed to assure the implementation of the procedures in the right order, without any
addition or omission, as well as the trustworthiness of humans, organizations, products,
systems, services, and data, etc., related to the procedure.
(i) Technology for making it possible to confirm that the procedure is implemented
according to the predefined order, from events that can be observed from outside (suchas human operation, the system log, network packets, etc.).
(ii) Technology for certifying the trustworthiness of an individual acting in a situation where
several organizations act in linkage with one another, without using authority.
(iii) Technology for handling data according to a policy established by the creator (owner) of
the data, and assuring that the data is not leaked or destroyed at the time of itsdelivery/receipt between organizations.
(iv) Technology for storing digital evidence so that the trustworthiness of humans,organizations, products, systems, services, data, and procedures, etc., can be confirmed
at a later date.
The technical challenge aspects of this theme are realization of assurance of eligibility
capable of integrating various kinds of element information existing in both physical space andcyberspace, to be presented to third parties, and assurance of traceability with digital evidence
in an environment where many large-scale supply chains overlap with one another.
Participating corporations and organizations：
Hitachi, Ltd., NEC Corporation, KDDI Research, Inc.( Re-consignee: Advanced
Telecommunications Research Institute International, Waseda University)(B)"Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology

In large-scale plant and automotive industries, the number of OEM companies in supply
chains is in the range of tens of thousands, and most of them are SMEs. IoT systems/services
are provided by such supply chains, while part of these supply chains is composed of IoT
systems. In this way, IoT systems/services and supply chains form a multilayer structure in
Japanese industry as a whole.
In such IoT systems/services and large-scale supply chains, an environment will be necessary
where a "trustworthy chain" is constructed through repetition of creation and confirmation of19

trustworthiness and necessary information for operations is made to flow, and in such anenvironment, creation and management of a trustworthiness list that makes it possible toefficiently confirm that the target devices or services have been correctly generated, anddevelopment and realization of a secure distribution environment of work-related data,
including information on trustworthiness, will be important. To that end,
(B1) research and development of the technology for constructing a trustworthy chain on thebasis of characteristics of each area, and(B2) research and development of the technology for safe distribution of information related
to the trustworthy chain will be promoted.
Concurrent with this research and development, trend surveys will be conducted that are
related to technologies for construction and distribution of trustworthy chains.
Based on the technologies mentioned above, a mechanism for construction and distribution of
the trustworthy chain will be prepared, and deployed in a system that is actually providing
services, to verify the effects of the mechanism.
In addition, the technology for construction and distribution of trustworthy chains will beestablished through repetition of verification in a demonstration field in several application
areas, and it will be verified that (A) creation and confirmation of trustworthiness, and (C)verification and maintenance of trustworthy chains, which are the outcome of this research anddevelopment, constitute consistent group technologies. Experimental demonstrations will be
conducted, including effectiveness measurement, and dissemination activities will be conductedbased on their results.

(B1) Research and development of the technology for constructing a trustworthy chain
on the basis of the characteristics of each area
The following technologies will be researched and developed, because in various businessfields to which the outcomes of this research and development will be applied, different
elements (such as humans, organizations, products, systems, services, data, procedures, etc.)
are important for assurance of trustworthiness in the relevant supply chain.
(i) Development of requirements for achieving security for supply chains, depending on thecharacteristics of the application area ("area-specific profile") as security measures foreach business area(ii) Techniques for constructing a trustworthiness list according to the area-specific profile(techniques for configuring and managing the trustworthiness list)(iii) A trustworthiness list technique for certifying that humans, organizations, products,
systems, services, data, procedures, etc., involved in creating values can be trusted, andthe techniques for utilizing the trustworthiness list by business operators that constitutea supply chain (techniques for registration, update and reference of the trustworthiness20

list, the protocol technology, collaboration with the procurement system, and others.)
The technical challenge aspects of this theme are realization of techniques for construction
and utilization of a trustworthiness list of which the compatibility with business operation of
the actual operator can be confirmed through experimental demonstrations in an actual supply
chain, and realization of both reduction of the operational costs, and robustness of thetrustworthiness list corresponding to that actual business.
Participating corporations and organizations：
Hitachi, Ltd.( Re-consignee: National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science andTechnology, Secom Co., Ltd.), NEC Corporation, KDDI Research, Inc.( Re-consignee:
Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International)(B2) Research and development of technology for safe distribution of information
related to the trustworthy chain
Data circulation technology, which provides safe distribution of work-related data (such as
information related to trustworthiness) in order to form a trustworthy chain in theprovision/operation of IoT systems/services and supply chains, will be realized. Specifically,
technology (which satisfies the following) will be realized by monitoring and managing security
in data circulation, and if any anomaly is detected, impacts on the system will be reduced inminimum, and then secure and scalable data circulation will be enabled.
(i) Technology for securing certification and traceability required for construction of atrustworthy relationship during data circulation.
(ii) Technology for visualizing the impact of cyberattacks related to data circulation.
(iii) Technology for minimizing any impact on the system by cyberattacks.
(iv) Technology for assuring resiliency related to safe data circulation through integrated
implementation of (ii) and (iii) above.
The technical challenge aspects of this theme are realization of technologies having both
scalability and traceability in an information distribution environment where a large number ofwide-area, large-scale supply chains overlap with one another, and realization of an
information distribution environment which is easy to deploy due to lightweight
implementation, and reduction of operational costs.
Participating corporations and organizations：
Fujitsu Limited(Re-consignee: National Institute of Informatics, Nagoya University)(C) "Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology

21

It is important to verify and maintain safe operations of the "trustworthy chain" even after
construction of a "trustworthy chain" is realized on a Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System.
To that end,
(C1) research and development of the technology for verifying trustworthy chains, and(C2) research and development of the technology for maintaining trustworthy chains
will be promoted. In addition, technology for ensuring and improving system recovery andresilience during operations, and technology for controlling data circulation, will be also
considered as subjects of the research and development.
Concurrent with this research and development, trend surveys will be conducted that are
related to technologies for verification and maintenance of trustworthy chains.
Based on the technologies mentioned above, the mechanism for verification and maintenanceof trustworthy chains will be prepared, and deployed in a system that is actually providing
services, to verify the effects of the mechanism. In addition, it will be verified that (A) creationand confirmation of trustworthiness, and (B) construction and distribution of the trustworthy
chain, which are the outcome of this research and development, constitute a consistenttechnology group. Experimental demonstrations will be conducted, including effectivenessmeasurement, and dissemination activities will be conducted based on their results.

(C1) Research and development of the technology for verifying trustworthy chains
In order to secure the trustworthiness of an entire supply chain, it is necessary that business
operators constituting the supply chain develop the technology for verifying a trustworthy
chain that is constructed on the Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System. In particular, thefollowing technologies will be developed, taking into consideration the difference between thebusiness operators, difference of business areas, difference of configuration and operation, etc.,
of area-specific profiles and trustworthiness lists, and the need to conceal parts of the supply
chain in some business areas.
(i) Technology for verifying trustworthy chains between different business operators, ordifferent business areas, and the technology that enables coordinated verification among
several different trustworthiness lists (such as protocol technologies, coordination withprocurement systems, and others.)(ii) Technology that enables verification of a trustworthy chain only by confirming that the
chain is composed of trustworthy individuals, organizations, products, systems, services,
data, and procedures, even if the specific names of the organizations, or specificstructures of things, are not disclosed.
The technical challenge aspects of this theme are performance of evaluation of consistency
and operational costs of activities related to the supply chain, through establishment of averification protocol in an operational environment among several business operators, and22

realization of technology that enables verification of trustworthiness, while keeping
information hidden.
Participating corporations and organizations：
Hitachi, Ltd.( Re-consignee: National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology),
NEC Corporation, KDDI Research, Inc. ( Re-consignee: Advanced Telecommunications
Research Institute,Inc.)(C2) Research and development of technology for maintaining trustworthy chains
As coordinated operations by various devices that constitute cyberspace and physical spaceare promoted, the targets of cyberattacks are anticipated to expand from current relatively
simple IoT devices performing IP communications to more diverse and specialized IoT devices.
In addition, devices for which security countermeasures are insufficient, or devices on which it
is difficult to implement security countermeasures, will continue to be used, due to the limited
capabilities of the IoT devices themselves, or lack of operator skills.
In these surroundings, we will establish the three following technologies in order to maintainsafe operation of trustworthy chains in a Cyber Physical Highly Integrated System. These
technologies will support the entire security process, including detection, analysis, andmitigation of anomalies occurring on the system, and enable prompt responses to security
incidents.
(i) Detection technology that enables accurate detection of anomalous events occurring
across cyberspace and physical space, by efficiently and correctly collecting events inboth cyberspace and physical space, and analyzing them in an integrated manner.
(ii) Technology for detecting and eliminating illegal data (physical data, control data, etc.)that flows between cyber/physical space.
(iii) Technology that enables, by using simulation, assessment of impacts and determinationof countermeasures when cyberattacks take place on a Cyber Physical Highly Integrated
System, and supports taking said countermeasures in the actual environment.
One technical challenge aspect of this theme is to remarkably shorten response time from theoccurrence of an anomalous event until detection and response. In addition, this theme also
aims to make it possible to decide swift and optimal countermeasures against the cyberattack
while suppressing any impact on the actual system, by simulating and assessing in advance thedirect impact of the attack, and the side effects of countermeasures.
Participating corporations and organizations：23

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation（Re-consignee: Osaka University）, Mitsubishi

Electric Corporation（Re-consignee: Kanazawa Institute of Technology）, Hitachi, Ltd., NEC
Corporation(D) Surveys of trends related to the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure"
To constantly update the exit strategies of this research and development, trend surveys will
be conducted, mainly overseas, on the following four items, including trends of R&D, andpolicies related to the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure". For such surveys, all of thesurveys, including ones that are individually conducted in connection with the research themesof (A), (B) and (C), will be coordinated. This surbeys was conducted only in 2018.
(i) Similar legal systems and civil activities in Asia, Europe, and the U.S.
(ii) Trends of evaluation technologies, taking into consideration the development oftechnologies related to IoT systems/services.
(iii) Trends of vendor evaluation as seen from the entire supplier chains, and related
technologies.
(iv) Proposal on the direction of this research and development, based on results of thesurveys.
Participating corporations and organizations：NEC Corporation24

3. Implementation structure(1) Utilization of National Research and Development Agency New Energy andIndustrial Technology Development Organization
This Project will be implemented in the structure shown in Figure 3-1, using subsidies
granted to NEDO. NEDO will support PD and the Promotion Committee and provide necessary
cooperation in, for example, budget management and management of the progress of theresearch and development (including management of intellectual properties).

(2) Selection of research managers
This Project will construct a project implementation structure based on industry/academia
cooperation, including universities and ventures that have advanced technologies, and among
others, corporations that can independently make practical use of and commercialize theoutcomes of the research and development. On the basis of this concept and this R&D Plan,
NEDO will select research themes, as well as research entities and research managers that will
pursue the research themes, through open recruitment. NEDO will, in consultation with PD
and the Cabinet Office, determine the method of screening for the selection, such as standards
for screening, and judges. In principle, PD and outside experts will participate in the screening.
Stakeholders of researchers that have applied for a theme will not participate in the screening
for the theme. The scope of "stakeholders" will be defined by NEDO. After research themes are
determined through the selection, the research themes, as well as research entities andresearch participants thereof, will be specified in this Plan.

(3) Measures to optimize the research system
PD will consider changing or adding to research themes, or replacing or adding research
entities, depending on the progress of the research themes, research results of technicalsurveys, conducted by related organizations, and changes of social circumstances. PD may, if
necessary, appoint sub-PDs to support PD in managing the content and progress of the researchand development.
For some research themes, adoption of the "stage gate method" may be considered, in which
research entities will be narrowed after various proposals are selected and promoted for a fixed
period, so that this Project may be promoted with an optimal structure.
A Leader Committee will be established, so that coordination amongst the research entities
working on their own research themes can be promoted, and the objectives of this Project canbe shared through regular information exchanges.

(4) Enhancement of the activities for dissemination and promotion of outcomes
Besides demonstration of the activities and outcomes of this Project by the participating25

corporations and organizations, PD will take the initiative in appropriately establishingcommittees and working groups (WG) designed to more widely disseminate such activities andoutcomes, to make them understood by the industrial world, and by announcing the content ofefforts in symposiums, seminars, and business events, and by planning and providing
international conferences.
WG planned are as follows. In fiscal 2019, in parallel with research and development ,we will
start WG activities to resolve cross-theme issues.
(i) Demonstration and evaluation WG:
In the demonstration test, investigate and consider methods to measure the▪

practicality and effectiveness,and jointly with potential pilot partners and share among
the themes for conducting pilot experiments.
Consider demonstration experiments among the issues in this project, in cooperation▪

with other national projects. (Role of external liaison)(ii) Dissemination of R&D outcomes WG:▪

Promote commercialization (productization) by participating companies and promote
introduction to each industry field (collaboration with IP Committee)▪

Launching an environment where small and medium-sized enterprises, such as
shared verification centers (for voluntary evaluations), can easily utilize the R&D
products and outcomes▪

Plan and hold an international symposium to disseminate this initiative overseas(iii) Internationl trend survey WG:▪

Consolidate the status of relevant trends surveyed in Japan and abroad for eachtheme and share them across projects▪

Organize advocacy activities actively to the United States NIST, European ENISA,
and others. as international collaboration activities(5) Coordination with government ministries and agencies
The "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure", which is the goal of this Project, aims to assure
security for supply chains of various social services and the manufacturing sector, and for theiroperational collaborations, and is a cross-sectional effort that requires coordination amongst awide variety of government ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, NISC, the IT
Comprehensive Strategy Office, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Defense, and theMinistry of Health, Labor and Welfare. For this reason, this Project will be promoted incollaboration with the Promotion Committee and the three major ministries mentioned above
to, among other things, establish the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure", which will benecessary to assure security for systems and services corresponding to IoT society and entire
supply chains.
26

(6) Contribution from the industries
In this Project, practical use and commercialization is contemplated of the products andoutcomes of the research and development, based on voluntary contribution by theparticipating corporations. In order to ensure that business operators and vendors who haveactual fields and are aware of challenges may independently work on experimental
demonstrations toward social implementation of technology outcomes, a structure in which
they can closely collaborate with the research and development team from the start of thisProject, and requirements from the standpoint of sharing social implementation, will beestablished. Each of the corporations engaged in the research and development, and thebusiness operators participating in demonstration experiments, will be urged to invest humanand business resources on their own initiative. Future contribution from the industrial world(including human and material contribution) is expected to account for 15% to 35% of the total
research and development expenses (the total includes contributions from the national
government, and the industrial world).

Figure 3-1. R&D Team by Leading Organizations27

4. Matters related to intellectual properties(1) Intellectual property committeesoFor each research theme or research item constituting a research theme, an intellectual
property committee will be established in the management agency, or an organization towhich the selected Research Manager belongs (trustee).

oIntellectual property committees will determine policies for the publication of papers, andthe application and maintenance of patents (hereinafter referred to as "IP rights"),
concerning outcomes of the research and development, conducted by an organization which
has established a relevant intellectual property committee, and perform adjustment,
concerning licensing of IP rights, if necessary.

oIntellectual property committees will in principle be composed of PD or PD's agent, major
stakeholders and experts.

oDetails of operating methods of an intellectual property committee will be determined byan organization which has established an intellectual property committee.

(2) Arrangement concerning IP rightso

The management agency will determine in an agreement with the trustee in advance thehandling of confidentiality, background IP rights (IP rights that research managers and theorganizations to which they belong had possessed prior to participating in the program, orthat they obtain without the use of the operating expenses of SIP after participating in the
program), and foreground IP rights (IP rights generated through the use of the operating
expenses of SIP during the program).

(3) Licensing of background IP rightso

The rights holder can grant a license for a background IP right to another program
participant under terms and conditions determined by the rights holder (or "in accordancewith the agreement with the program participant").

o

In cases where IP rights holder responses, including said terms and conditions, mayinterfere with the promotion of SIP (including not only the research and development, but
practical use and commercialization of the outcomes), the relevant intellectual property
committee will make efforts for coordination and reasonable solutions.

(4) Handling of foreground IP rightso

In principle, the provision of Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the Industrial Technology
Enhancement Act will apply to foreground IP rights, which will be vested in theorganization to which the research manager who is the inventor belongs (trustee).

oIn the event of an invention made by a re-trustee and others, IP rights may be vested in the28

re-trustee and others, only with the approval of the relevant intellectual property
committee. In such cases, the intellectual property committee may attach conditions tosuch an approval.
oIf the rights holder of an IP right has little intention of commercializing it, the relevant
intellectual property committee may promote possession of the IP rights by, or grant license
for the IP rights to, an individual who is more committed to commercialization.

o

For any individual withdrawing from the project during the participation period, themanagement agency and others, will have that individual assign free of charge, or grant alicense for, all or part of the outcomes obtained with the use of the operational expenses of
SIP during that individual’s participation period (or all of the outcomes since that
individual initially participated in the project, in the event of participation for several fiscal
years) at the time of withdrawal.

oIn principle, the rights holder will be responsible for the costs of application andmaintenance of the IP rights. In the case of joint application, the percentages of ownershipand cost burden will be determined through consultation between the joint applicants.

(5) Licensing of foreground IP rightso

The rights holder can grant a license for a foreground IP right to another program
participant under terms and conditions determined by the rights holder (or "in accordancewith the agreement with the program participant").

o

The rights holder can grant a license for a foreground IP right to a third party under terms
and conditions determined by the rights holder; provided, however, that such terms andconditions shall not be more advantageous than those for other program participants.

o

In cases where IP rights holder responses, including said terms and conditions, mayinterfere with the promotion of SIP (including not only the research and development, but
practical use and commercialization of outcomes), the relevant intellectual property
committee will make efforts for coordination and reasonable solutions.

(6) Approval for transfer of, and establishment and transfer of an exclusive license for,foreground IP rightsoUnder the provision of Article 19, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Industrial Technology
Enhancement Act, any transfer of, or any establishment or transfer of an exclusive license
for, foreground IP rights will require the approval of the management agency, except incases of transfer due to a corporate merger or division, or transfer of IP rights to a
subsidiary or parent company, or establishment or transfer of an exclusive license to a
subsidiary or parent company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "cases of IP rights
transfer due to mergers, etc.").

oCases of IP rights transfer, etc., due to mergers, etc., will require the approval of the29management agency, etc., under contract with the management agency, etc.
oEven after IP rights transfer, etc., due to mergers, etc., the management agency, etc., may
be able to possess a license for the IP rights, including the right for sub-licensing. Unless
this condition is accepted, the transfer will not be permitted.

(7) Handling of intellectual property rights at the time of terminationo

As for IP rights, etc., that no one wishes to possess when the research and development isterminated, the relevant intellectual property committee will discuss responses(abandonment or succession by the management agency, etc.).

(8) Participation by overseas organizations, etc. (such as foreign companies,
universities, and researchers)o

If participation by an overseas organization, etc., is necessary for promotion of tasks, suchparticipation will be permitted.

o

In principle, from the perspective of appropriate executive management, only an overseasorganization, etc., with a point of contact or an agent in Japan that can process paperwork
related to acceptance of the research and development will be permitted to participate in
the Project.

o

In the case of an overseas organization, etc., IP rights will be shared by the management
agency, etc., and the overseas organization, etc.

30

5. Matters related to assessment(1) Assessing entities
Based on the self-inspection reports by PD and NEDO, the Governing Board will perform
assessments by inviting external experts. The Governing Board may perform assessments
separately for each area or issue.

(2) Timing of assessmentsoPre-assessments, assessments at the end of every fiscal year, and final assessments will be
performed.

oAfter a lapse of a certain period after the termination (three years in principle), tracking
assessments may be performed, if necessary.

oIn addition to the above, assessments may be performed in the middle of a fiscal year, if
necessary.

(3) Assessment items, and assessment standards
With the "General Guideline for the Evaluation of Government Research and Development(R&D) Activities" (established by the Prime Minister on December 21, 2016) taken into
consideration, from the perspective of assessment of necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness, theassessment items and the assessment standards will be as follows. Assessments will not only
determine whether or not the goals are attained, but also analyze the cause and factors of such(non-)attainment, and improvement measures will be proposed.
(1) The importance, and consistency with the purpose of the SIP system.
(2) The appropriateness of the goals (especially the technology outcomes), and the degree ofachievement of the process table towards attainment of the goals.
(3) Whether or not proper management is being made. Particularly, how effective thecoordination is with government ministries and agencies.
(4) The strategic relevance to, and degree of achievement of, practical use andcommercialization.
(5) Expected outcomes, output, or ripple effects in the final assessment. Whether or not
follow-up methods after the termination are appropriately and clearly specified.

(4) Methods for reflecting assessment outcomesoPre-assessments will be performed in connection with the Plan for the following fiscal year
and thereafter, and will be reflected in the Plan, for the following fiscal year and thereafter.

oAssessments at the end of a fiscal year will be performed in connection with actual
achievements up to the fiscal year and the Plan for the following fiscal year and thereafter,
and will be reflected in the Plan, for the following fiscal year and thereafter.
31

oFinal assessments will be performed in connection with actual outcomes up to the final
fiscal year, and will be reflected in the follow-up, after termination.

oTracking assessments will be performed in connection with the progress of practical use
and commercialization of the outcomes of each task, and improvement measures will be
proposed.

(5) Disclosure of outcomeso

In principle, assessment outcomes will be made available to the public.

o

The Governing Board that performs assessments will be privately held, because it may
include undisclosed research and development information.

(6) Self-inspection(i) Self-inspection by research managers
Research managers will, in connection with the research theme that they are in charge of,inspect both the actual outcomes after the previous assessment, and the future plan
according to the assessment items and assessment standards listed in 5(3), and willsummarize not only determination of whether or not the goal was attained, but also analysisof the cause and factors of such (non-)attainment, and improvement measures will be
proposed.

(ii) Self-inspection by PD
While seeing results of the self-inspection by research managers, and referring to theopinions of third parties and experts as necessary, PD will personally inspect the actual
results of the PD, NEDO, and each research manager and the future plan, according to theassessment items and assessment standards listed in 5(3), and will summarize not only
determination of whether or not the goal was attained, but also analysis of the cause andfactors of such (non-)attainment, and improvement measures will be proposed. Based on the
results of such an inspection, PD will determine whether or not each research entity should
continue their research, and provide necessary advice to research managers. In this way, astructure will be established which can autonomously improve itself.
On the basis of these results, PD will prepare materials for the Governing Board, with thesupport of NEDO.

(iii) Self-inspection by the management agency
Self-inspection by NEDO will be performed only in connection with the proper processingof paperwork procedures related to budget execution.

32

6. Exit strategy(1) Exit-oriented research promotion
To achieve social implementation of the research themes, it will be necessary not only todisseminate technologies demonstrated in each theme to private corporations, but also to build
a structure designed to construct, verify, and maintain trustworthy chains in entire supply
chains.
As for confirmation of whether each component of a supply chain truly satisfies security
requirements or not (confirmation of trustworthiness), the content and standard of security
requirements that are required differ according to industrial areas, and confirmation should bebased on knowledge within each industry. Therefore, for example, industry groups andincorporated administrative agencies are expected to take the initiative in establishing theconfirmation structure.
In addition, in order to build and manage a list or database for storing originals of certified
trustworthiness information and making them available to inquiries by third parties, not only
industry groups and incorporated administrative agencies, but also existing credit information
databases that handle cross-industry information of companies may be utilized.
As for information on vulnerability, incidents and threats, to be utilized for maintenance oftrustworthy chains, the examination will be continued on the assumption that coordination
between the existing information sharing frameworks and public organizations is in place.
By around 2020, experimental demonstrations will be sequentially started, each one being
on getting prepared for implementation, with the goal of social implementation of the "Cyber
Physical Security Infrastructure" in IoT systems/services or supply chains, in experimental
demonstration partner environments such as manufacturing/distribution sectors and building
sectors, and other efforts will be made to apply or expand the Infrastructure to social
infrastructure industries that possess large-scale supply chains.

33

Figure 6-1.

Project time Line for Social Implementation

By 2022, when this Project will terminate, for the industrial sectors where thedemonstration experiments have been conducted, consideration of the structures of anorganization for making confirmation, an organization for constructing and managing
trustworthiness lists, and an organization for managing information on vulnerability, incidents
and threats, etc., all based on outcomes of the experimental demonstrations, will be completed,and a structure capable of achieving assurance of security for entire supply chains will beestablished.
While this Project will work on experimental demonstrations in addition to technology
developments, the participating companies will play a central role in commercializing outcomesof the research and development, and in promoting adoption thereof in various industrial areas.
Some outcomes will be registered as IP (intellectual property rights), and licensed to related
vendors for the purpose of dissemination.
Introduction of the Infrastructure into entire supply chains (including SMEs) and IoT
systems/services of their constituent companies will be promoted, so that the outcomes of theInfrastructure may be adopted by 50% of the SMEs for which measures for supply chains are
required prior to 2030.
34

(2) Measures for dissemination
Efforts will be made to disseminate the Infrastructure, which is the outcome of the researchand development of security policies and trustworthy chains required in each area, that havebeen established with international trends taken into consideration, in areas such as
automotive, smart buildings, communication and broadcasting, power supplies, public
transportation, and defense, while demonstrating application of the Infrastructure in each of
said areas. As a measure for promoting adoption of the Infrastructure, the national or local
governments or IoT service providers will be encouraged to utilize the Infrastructure to confirm
trustworthiness, and both suppliers and purchasers of IoT devices and services will be madeaware of the benefits of the Infrastructure. As a means for raising such awareness, situations ofefforts on their way to final achievement will be published at various events (such aspresentations at symposiums, seminars and business events, and international conferences) tomake them better understood by people engaged in IoT services in industry sectors both within
and outside of Japan. Such events will also be utilized as opportunities for coordination todevelop into efforts for international solutions, and as a result, the outcomes of the R&D efforts
in Japan may lead to international contribution.
In addition, the Infrastructure will coordinate certification of IoT devices and assurance of
security for IoT devices, which are being considered in the IoT Security WG established by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
and the IoT Promotion Consortium. This will contribute to establishing a system as effective as
the status of the cybersecurity frameworks in the U.S. and Europe.
o

Scenario of regulatory and institutional reforms
Efforts for early social implementation will be made through repetition of the demonstrationof technologies that have been researched and developed, and the feedback thereof, andutilization of the Infrastructure by entire supply chains including SMEs will be promoted, sothat products, services, and systems made in Japan that have high security quality may be
disseminated.
For this reason, efforts will be made to contribute to establishment of security policies,
certification of IoT devices, and measures for assuring security for IoT devices, which arerequired in various sectors such as automotive, smart homes and buildings, communication andbroadcasting, power supplies, public transportation, and defense (Industry by Industry), in
collaboration with the Three Major Government Measures mentioned above, with international
trends taken into consideration.
o

Scenario of international cooperation
As cyberattacks cross borders, taking only in-country measures may not be effective enough.

In addition, in regards to overseas deployment of the IoT devices and services of Japan, it is35

important to share policies with the U.S. and European countries, and efforts should be made,including enhanced collaboration with other countries, with international harmonization
always taken into consideration.
Specifically, international symposiums will be utilized, in cooperation with various ministries
and agencies, where opinions will be proactively exchanged with experts from various regionsof the world, in an effort to make the activities of Japan/this Project understood, to understandactivities in other regions, and compare them with those of Japan, so that international
exchange may be promoted. In particular, it will be verified that the activities and outcomes ofthis Project are compatible with the trend of the cybersecurity framework accelerated in the
U.S. and European countries (see below), and the research and development will be promoted,
while ensuring that international competitiveness may be assured.


U.S. NIST SP800-171: Standards for cybersecurity measures to control "Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI)". Compliance with NIST SP800-171 had already beenrequired by supply chains for defense procurement (DFARS Clause 252.204-7012).

European cybersecurity authentication framework: Development of the framework wasannounced in the policy package published in September 2017.

oCoordination amongst issues of SIP, or with other national projects
Mutual collaboration on core technologies will be formed with the fundamental technicalissues in the 2nd term of SIP (cyberspace and physical space). In addition, mutual collaboration
on joint implementation of experimental demonstrations will be formed with the applied issuesof the Society 5.0 system (autonomous driving, logistics, etc.).
Through these efforts, the security quality in autonomous driving, smart buildings, 5G
communication services, and defense industries, which are expected to lead to further economic
development by Society 5.0, will be assured, thereby enhancing international competitiveness.

36

7. Other important matters(1) Legal basis
This Project will be implemented in accordance with "3. Basic policy concerning the expense
for creation and maintenance of science, technology and innovation" (May 23, 2014, Council for
Science, Technology and Innovation) of Article 4, Paragraph 3, Item 7 of the Act for
Establishment of the Cabinet Office (Act No.89 of 1999), the implementation policy for the 2nd
term (funded by the supplementary budget for FY2017) of the Cross-Ministerial Strategic
Innovation Promotion Program (SIP) (March 29, 2018, Council for Science, Technology andInnovation), the operational guideline for the Cross-Ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion
Program (May 23, 2014, Governing Board of Council for Science, Technology and Innovation)
and Article 15, Item 2 of the Act on the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization.

(2) Flexible changes of the projectThis Project may be revised according to circumstances, from the perspective of the mostearly and maximal outcomes.

(3) History of PD and personnel responsible(i) PD

Atsuhiro GOTO (since April 2018)(ii) Sub PD
Makoto IMASE(since April 2019)
Kazuhisa URYU(since April 2019)(iii) Responsible councilor (or director)
Takao NITTA, Councilor (since April 2018)
Reiko KONDO, Councilor (since July 2018)
37

Chie FUKUSHIMA, Director (April-July, 2018)(iv) Personnel responsible
Akihiro OKAZAKI (since April 2018)38

Appendix

Financial planning and accumulation

Fiscal year 2018

Total 2,500 million yen(Accounting breakdown)
2,350 million yen

1. R & D budget16(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology

850 million yen(B) "Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology

750 million yen(C) "Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology

670 million yen(D) Surveys of trends related to the "Cyber Physical Security Infrastructure"
2. Project promotion expenses17
Fiscal year 201980 million yen
150 million yen

Total 2,200 million yen(Accounting breakdown)
1. R & D budget(A) "Creation & Confirmation of Trustworthiness" technology

750 million yen(B) "Construction & Distribution of Trustworthy Chain" technology

600 million yen(C) "Verification & Maintenance of Trustworthy Chain" technology

700 million yen

2. Project promotion expenses

16
17

2,050 million yen

Include general and administrative expenses and overhead expenses
Include personnel expenses, evaluation expenses, conference expenses, etc.
39

150 million yen