Insurance Law Alert

April 2015

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Manifestation Trigger for Property Damage
ClaimsApplying Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a district court did not err in applying
an injury-in-fact trigger to determine general liability coverage for property damage claims.
Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2015 WL 1529038 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Third Circuit Rules That “Insured Property” Does Not Encompass Land
The Third Circuit ruled that a standard flood policy does not cover the expenses of removal ofdebris from the land surrounding an insured house. Torre v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 781
F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2015). (click here for full article)“You got it deadright on Simpson
Thacher being Tier 1 ininsurance. They absolutely
rule the roost there. I square
off against them often, and they
never fail to impress me with theirsubject matter expertise andlitigation talent.”–Benchmark
Litigation 2015

Florida Appellate Court Rules That Post-Loss Assignee of Insurance
Rights Not Required to Have an Insurable Interest in the Property at theTime of Loss
A Florida appellate court ruled that state statutory law requiring an insurable interest inproperty at the time of loss does not apply when the original insured assigns insurance policy
rights to another party after a loss has occurred. Accident Cleaners, Inc. v. Universal Ins. Co.,2015 WL 1609973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2015). (click here for full article)

Wisconsin Court Rules That Insurers Are Equitably Estopped From
Choosing Policyholder Counsel
A Wisconsin federal district court ruled that insurers were estopped from requiring a
policyholder to accept the insurers’ choice of counsel because of the insurers’ delay in selecting
counsel. Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., Inc., 2015 WL 1505686 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Strictly Enforcing Notice Requirements, Kentucky Court Rejects“Seamless Coverage” Argument for Consecutive Claims-Made Policies
A Kentucky federal district court ruled that a policyholder forfeits coverage by violating
an unambiguous notice provision in a claims-made policy regardless of whether notice issubsequently provided under a consecutive policy. C.A. Jones Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Scottsdale
Indem. Co., 2015 WL 1393261 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2015). (click here for full article)

Fifth Circuit Finds That Arbitrator Exceeded His Authority and Vacates
Arbitration Award
The Fifth Circuit ruled that when an arbitrator is appointed in a manner inconsistent with theprocedures set forth in the agreement to arbitrate, the award must be vacated. PoolRe Ins.
Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., 2015 WL 1566633 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015).

(click here for full article)
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

New York Appellate Court Finds Questions of Fact as to Existence andScope of “Follow the Settlements” Clause
A New York appellate court ruled that questions of fact exist as to whether a reinsurance
certificate provision constituted a “follow the settlements” clause, and if it did, whether it
precluded a reinsurer from challenging the allocation of underlying settlement proceeds. New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1292579 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Reinsurer Need Not Establish Prejudice for Late Notice Defense Under
Illinois Law, Says Second Circuit
Applying Illinois law, the Second Circuit ruled that a reinsurer was entitled to deny coveragebased on late notice, regardless of prejudice. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co.,2015 WL 1474605 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2015). (click here for full article)

Vermont Supreme Court Rules That Pollution Exclusion Is Not Limited to
Traditional Environmental Contamination
The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that an absolute pollution exclusion bars coverage for
injuries caused by spray foam insulation fumes, rejecting the trial court’s holding that theexclusion is limited to traditional environmental hazards. Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc., 2015 WL 1524206 (Vt. Apr. 3, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Georgia Supreme Court Rules That Bad Faith Claim Is Precluded Where
Policyholder Settled Without Insurer Consent
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a policyholder that violates a “consent to settle” clause isprecluded from asserting bad faith refusal to settle against its insurer. Piedmont Office Realty
Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1773620 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Sixth Circuit Rules That Federal Taxing Statute Allows Prevailing Party to
Shift the Costs of Imaging a Computer’s Hard Drive
The Sixth Circuit clarified that federal statutory law permitting a prevailing party to recoverreasonable and necessary litigation expenses allows recovery of the costs of imaging acomputer hard drive or other physical storage device. Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas,
Inc., 781 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2015). (click here for full article)

2

Eleventh Circuit ruled that MidProperty Insurance The
Continent had a duty to defend the underlying
suit in light of the uncertainty as to Florida
trigger law in this context. Noting that
Alerts:Florida law is unclear as to which trigger

Eleventh Circuit Rejects
Manifestation Trigger for Property
Damage Claims

Applying Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that a district court did not err inapplying an injury-in-fact trigger to determine
general liability coverage for property damage
claims. Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.,2015 WL 1529038 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015).
The coverage dispute arose out ofconstruction defect claims. The homeowners(as assignees of the builder’s rights toinsurance proceeds) sued Mid-Continent,
seeking coverage under four consecutive
liability policies issued between 2005 and2008. Mid-Continent argued that it had
no duty to defend because the underlying
complaint alleged that the defects could nothave been discovered until 2010, after the
expiration of the last policy period. A Florida
federal district court disagreed, ruling that thedetermination of whether property damage
occurred during any Mid-Continent policy
period was based on “the date of the actual
damage” rather than the date of manifestation
or discovery of damage. The district court
found that actual damage caused by wood rot
occurred in 2005 and thus that the 20052006 policy was triggered. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.

applies to insurance claims for property
damage, the Eleventh Circuit found that
“Mid-Continent did not know whether there
would be coverage for the damages soughtin the underlying action because Florida
courts had not decided which trigger applies.
Mid-Continent was required to resolve thisuncertainty in favor of the insured and offer adefense to [the builder].” Turning to the issue
of indemnity, the court held that based on thefactual record presented, the district court
properly applied an injury-in-fact trigger.
The court reasoned that property damage
occurs “when the damage happens, not when
the damage is discovered or discoverable.”Significantly, the court declined to establisha bright line rule and expressly limited its
holding to the facts presented—namely, asituation in which the date of actual damage
was discernable. The court cautioned that it
had “no opinion on what the trigger should
be where it is difficult (or impossible) to
determine when the property was damaged.”

Third Circuit Rules That “Insured
Property” Does Not Encompass
Land
In the wake of Storm Sandy and otherrecent storms, disputes over the scope offirst-party coverage have proliferated. In a
recent decision, the Third Circuit addressed
the unsettled question of whether the term
“insured property” in a flood insurance policy
encompasses the parcel of land on which ahome is built. The court held that a standard
flood policy does not cover the expenses ofremoving debris from the land surrounding
an insured house. Torre v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 781 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2015).
The standard flood policy at issue provided
coverage for the expense of removing debris“that is on or in insured property.” Thehomeowners argued that the undefinedterm “insured property” should be read toencompass the entire parcel of land. The
insurer contended that it should be readto apply only to the specific structuresand items of property listed in the policy.
Agreeing with the insurer, the court heldthat “insured property” unambiguously
referred only to the structure or other items
3specified in the policy. In so ruling, the court
deemed it insignificant that the address of
the land parcel was listed on the policy’s
declarations page, emphasizing that thepolicy distinguished between the “describedlocation” (i.e., the address) and the “insured
property” (i.e., the structure).

Florida Appellate Court Rules That
Post-Loss Assignee of Insurance
Rights Not Required to Have an
Insurable Interest in the Property
at the Time of Loss
A Florida appellate court ruled that statestatutory law requiring an insurable interestin property at the time of the loss does not
apply when the original insured assigns
insurance policy rights to another party aftera loss has occurred. Accident Cleaners, Inc.
v. Universal Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1609973 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2015).
A homeowner assigned the rights to his
property policy to a cleaning service company
after a loss. When the insurance company
refused to pay the full amount of cleaning
services associated with the loss, the cleaning
company filed suit. The trial court dismissed
the complaint on the basis that the cleaning
company did not have an insurable interestin the property at the time of loss, as requiredby Florida statutory law. See Florida Statutes
section 627.405 (“No contract of insuranceof property … shall be enforceable … except
for the benefit of persons having an insurable
interest in the things insured as at the time of
the loss”). The appellate court reversed.
The appellate court ruled that section 627.405
does not require a post-loss assignee to havean insurable interest at the time of loss. The
court reasoned that under Florida common
law, the right to recover under an insurance
contract is freely assignable after loss. The
court explained that because section 627.405
did not express an intent to displace orotherwise alter this common law, an owner’s
insurable interest may be imputed to a
post-loss assignee so long as the property
owner who holds the insurance policy had aninsurable interest at the time of the loss. As
the court noted, “[t]his interpretation allows
both the insurable-interest requirement
and free assignability of post-loss claims
to coexist.”

Defense Alert:

Wisconsin Court Rules That
Insurers Are Equitably Estopped
From Choosing PolicyholderCounselA Wisconsin federal district court ruled that
insurers were estopped from requiring a
policyholder to accept the insurers’ choiceof counsel because of the insurers’ delay inselecting counsel. Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe
Millwork Co., Inc., 2015 WL 1505686 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 1, 2015).
Policyholder Kolbe Millwork tendered
defense of a product liability suit to its
insurers in February 2014. That same month,
Kolbe notified its insurers of its choice ofcounsel. The insurers acknowledged theirdefense obligation and did not object toKolbe’s counsel selection, but noted theirconsideration of other potential defense
firms. In June 2014, the insurers provided
Kolbe with a choice of two law firms to serve
as defense counsel. By that time, Kolbe’s
original counsel had answered the underlying
complaint, prepared initial disclosures, filed
preliminary motions, issued and preparedresponses to discovery requests and retained
experts. As a result, Kolbe refused to consider
the insurers’ counsel choices. Thereafter, theinsurers filed a motion to intervene in theunderlying action and sought a declarationthat they had the right to choose defense
counsel. The court disagreed.
In deciding whether the insurers had the rightto select counsel, the court assumed, without
deciding, that the insurers did not forfeit theirright to control the defense (including theselection of counsel) by issuing a reservationof rights. However, the court concluded thatthe insurers were equitably estopped fromenforcing the insurers’ choice of counsel by
their inaction over the course of four months.
The court explained that estoppel applied
because Kolbe reasonably relied on theinsurers’ inaction as to choice of counsel andwould be prejudiced by a change of counsel
after its own attorneys had “already invested
significant time and resources into the case.”
The court also pointed to the insurers’ delay
in seeking relief from the court as a basis for
its estoppel ruling.

4

Notice Alert:

Strictly Enforcing Notice
Requirements, Kentucky Court
Rejects “Seamless Coverage”
Argument for Consecutive ClaimsMade Policies
Our November 2010 Alert reported on acontroversial Kentucky appellate court
decision holding that a policyholder’s failure
to report a claim during the period of aclaims-made policy did not bar coveragefor the claim. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. v.
Tussey, 2010 WL 3603844 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept.
17, 2010). There, although the policyholder
failed to report a claim within the policy
period in which it arose (and instead reported
it in a subsequent policy period), the court
allowed coverage, reasoning that the twopolicies created “seamless coverage over
the two-year period.” As the Tussey dissent

Co., 2015 WL 1393261 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25,
2015).
In Jones Management, the court discounted
Tussey’s persuasive value, stating that it isundermined by basic principles of contract
interpretation which require courts to afford
an insurance policy its plain meaning.
The unambiguous policy language at issue“requires that even if an insured purchases
consecutive claims-made policies with thesame insurer, he must nonetheless satisfy
the reporting requirements provided in thepolicy.” The court also criticized Tussey as
improperly creating a “long and unbargainedfor tail of liability exposure” underclaims-made policies. In recent months,
several other courts have also rejected the“seamless coverage” approach set forth in
Tussey and held that claims-made reporting
requirements must be strictly applied as
written. See February 2015 Alert.

Arbitration Alert:

Fifth Circuit Finds That Arbitrator
Exceeded His Authority and Vacates
Arbitration Award
Because courts use a highly deferential
standard in reviewing arbitration awards,
petitioners face an uphill battle when they
file motions to vacate arbitration awards.
However, in a recent decision, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that when an arbitrator isappointed in a manner inconsistent withthe procedures set forth in the agreement toarbitrate, the award must be vacated. PoolRe
Ins. Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc.,
2015 WL 1566633 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015).

observed, the majority’s decision “break[s]rank with the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions all over this country who haverepeatedly held that failure to notify aninsurer within the policy period in a claimsbased policy defeats coverage under thepolicy.” In a decision issued last month, aKentucky federal district court expressly
rejected Tussey and ruled that a policyholder
forfeits coverage by violating an unambiguous
notice provision in a claims-made policy
regardless of whether notice is subsequently
provided under a consecutive policy. C.A.
Jones Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Scottsdale Indem.

The dispute at issue involved two separate
but related sets of arbitration agreements: (1)service agreements between Capstone andOrganizational Strategies, Inc. (“OSI”), which
required AAA arbitration; and (2) reinsurance
agreements between PoolRe and certain
captive insurance companies, which required
ICC arbitration. When billing disputes
arose between Capstone and OSI, PoolRecancelled its reinsurance agreements withthe captives. Thereafter, Capstone initiatedarbitration against OSI. The arbitration
demand was forwarded to Dion Ramos ofConflict Resolution Systems in Texas, who
appointed himself arbitrator in the CapstoneOSI arbitration (governed by the AAA).
PoolRe intervened in the arbitration for the5limited purpose of having Ramos appoint
an Anguilla-based arbitrator, as required by
the PoolRe arbitration agreements. Ramos,
applying AAA guidelines, ruled that PoolRe
waived its right to arbitration in Anguilla byintervening and that he had jurisdiction todecide PoolRe’s claims. After Ramos issued anarbitration award, the parties filed competing
motions in Texas federal district court toconfirm and vacate the award and to compel
a second phase arbitration. The court foundthat Ramos was not selected in the mannerrequired by the PoolRe agreement and thathe exceeded his authority by exercisingjurisdiction over and applying AAA rules tothe dispute between PoolRe and the captives.
The court vacated the award and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that vacatur of theaward was justified because the selection ofRamos as arbitrator did not conform withthe selection process of the PoolRe-captivereinsurance agreements. The court explainedthat arbitrator selection is a material contract
term and that a non-trivial departure from
authorized procedures warrants vacatur. The
court further reasoned that Ramos exceeded
his authority by applying AAA rather than
ICC rules to the dispute in contraventionof the PoolRe arbitration clause. The court
held that by violating this provision, Ramos
exceeded his authority. Finally, the Fifth
Circuit held that vacatur of the entire award
was appropriate and that the district court
was not obligated to “carve out only theobjectionable part of the award [relating
to PoolRe] and confirm the rest.” Although
district courts have the discretion to partiallyvacate an award, they are not required to
do so, particularly where, as here, the entire
arbitration process was tainted and the award
is not easily divisible.

Reinsurance
Alerts:New York Appellate Court Finds
Questions of Fact as to Existenceand Scope of “Follow the
Settlements” Clause
A New York appellate court ruled thatquestions of fact exist as to whether areinsurance certificate provision constituted
a “follow the settlements” clause, and if it

did, whether it precluded a reinsurer fromchallenging the allocation of underlying
settlement proceeds. New Hampshire Ins.
Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1292579(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2015).
New Hampshire Insurance Company andseveral other AIG-affiliated insurers settled
hundreds of millions of dollars of asbestos
claims with Kaiser Aluminum. The settlement
gave AIG the right to allocate the settlement
amount at their sole discretion. AIG allocated
100% of the settlement to claims within
the coverage of a New Hampshire excess
policy reinsured by Clearwater. When
Clearwater challenged the reasonablenessof the allocation, New Hampshire argued
that language in the reinsurance certificatesstating that Clearwater’s “liability … shallfollow [New Hampshire’s] liability inaccordance with the terms and conditions of
the policy reinsured hereunder” establisheda “follow the fortunes” requirement and that
Clearwater was bound by AIG’s settlement
allocation. A New York trial court ruled that
(1) Clearwater was collaterally estopped
from denying that the certificates imposed
a duty to “follow the settlements” in lightof a Massachusetts trial court decisioninterpreting similar language; and (2)notwithstanding the deference afforded
to a ceding insurer’s coverage decisions
pursuant to a “follow the settlements”
clause, there were questions of fact as to thereasonableness of the allocation and whether
Clearwater should be bound by it. The
appellate court affirmed in part and reversedin part.
6

Reversing the collateral estoppel ruling, theappellate court held that Clearwater was notbound by a different state court’s constructionof the relevant language because the dispute
before the court concerned “a different
certificate issued to a different cedent withrespect to an underlying policy covering a
different insured.” The court further foundthat the language at issue constituted a“following form” requirement (for the
purpose of achieving concurrency between
the reinsured contract and the reinsurance
policy), not a “follow the settlements”
provision. The court then considered whethera “follow the settlements” duty is implied inreinsurance contracts even in the absence ofa contractual provision. Noting conflicting
decisions in this context, the court declined
to resolve the question and instead heldthat even assuming that Clearwater was
obligated to follow the settlements, there werequestions of fact as to the reasonableness of
AIG’s settlement allocation. In particular, thecourt noted that the allocation decision wasmade unilaterally by AIG and that none of thesettlement payments were allocated to certain
categories of claims, such as premises claims
or defense costs. Because the record did notestablish “whether or not it was reasonable
to allocate no portion of the settlement toclaims that were not asserted against New
Hampshire or were not even covered by its
policy,” summary judgment was unwarranted.
The appellate court also reversed the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling on late
notice, finding that Clearwater had raised
triable issues of fact as to whether New
Hampshire complied with the contractual
notice provisions and as to whether any delay
resulted in prejudice.

Reinsurer Need Not Establish
Prejudice for Late Notice Defense
Under Illinois Law, Says Second
CircuitOur September 2014 Alert reported on a
Second Circuit decision holding that under
Illinois law, late notice defeats a ceding
insurer’s coverage claim regardless of
prejudice to the reinsurer. AIU Ins. Co. v.
TIG Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4211080 (2d Cir.
Aug. 27, 2014). There, the Second Circuit
explicitly ruled that Illinois law does not
require a showing of prejudice. The decision
is noteworthy because neither the Illinois
Supreme Court nor any Illinois appellate

courts have directly addressed this issue.
In a decision issued this month, the Second
Circuit again ruled that Illinois law permits
a reinsurer to deny coverage based on late
notice, regardless of prejudice. Granite State
Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 2015 WL
1474605 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2015). Citing to AIU,
the court noted that the consensus drawn
from various state and federal decisions
interpreting Illinois reinsurance law was that
Illinois has endorsed a no prejudice rule.

Pollution
Exclusion Alert:

Vermont Supreme Court Rules That
Pollution Exclusion Is Not Limited
to Traditional Environmental
Contamination
Reversing a trial court decision, the Vermont
Supreme Court ruled that an absolute
pollution exclusion bars coverage for
injuries caused by spray foam insulation
fumes, rejecting the trial court’s holdingthat the exclusion is limited to traditional
environmental hazards. Cincinnati Specialty
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes,
Inc., 2015 WL 1524206 (Vt. Apr. 3, 2015).
The underlying suit alleged bodily injury
resulting from exposure to airborne chemicals
from spray foam insulation. The foamcompany’s insurer denied coverage on thebasis of a pollution exclusion. A Vermont
trial court ruled in favor of the policyholder,holding that the exclusion was intended toprotect only against liability for traditional
environmental contamination and that theterm “pollutants” was ambiguous because“it was capable of such broad interpretation
as to frustrate any reasonable purposeof the policy.” The Vermont Supreme
Court reversed.
The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that where
the policy language is “clear and susceptibleof only one possible interpretation,” it must
be enforced as written. Because the injuries atissue were allegedly caused by the dispersalof a toxic substance, the court concluded thatthe exclusion squarely applied. In enforcing
the pollution exclusion, the court rejected
several arguments frequently asserted
by policyholders in this context: that theexclusion renders coverage illusory; that thepolicyholder’s “reasonable expectations”
7should dictate coverage; and that thehistorical background of the exclusion
establishes limitations on its scope. The court
noted, however, that its ruling was limited tosurplus lines insurance in light of Vermont
regulations requiring in-state general liability
insurers to provide pollution coverage inmost cases.

Bad Faith Alert:
Georgia Supreme Court Rules
That Bad Faith Claim Is Precluded
Where Policyholder Settled
Without Insurer Consent
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that apolicyholder that violates a “consent to settle”
clause is precluded from asserting bad faithrefusal to settle against its insurer. Piedmont
Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins.
Co., 2015 WL 1773620 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2015).
Policyholder Piedmont was sued in a federal
securities class action. Piedmont’s defense
costs in that case exceeded the limits of a
primary policy and exhausted $4 millionof a $10 million excess policy issued by XLSpecialty Insurance Company. Piedmontsought XL’s consent to settle the claims
for the remaining $6 million in policy
proceeds. XL agreed to contribute $1 million
towards settlement. Without further noticeto XL, Piedmont reached a court-approved
settlement of the securities suit for $4.9
million. Thereafter, Piedmont sued XL for
breach of contract and bad faith failure
to settle. A Georgia federal district court
dismissed Piedmont’s complaint, citing toPiedmont’s violation of the policy’s consent tosettle provision. The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that “Piedmont is precluded
from pursuing this action against XL because
XL did not consent to the settlement andPiedmont failed to fulfill the contractuallyagreed upon condition precedent.”

Discovery Alert:
Sixth Circuit Rules That Federal
Taxing Statute Allows Prevailing
Party to Shift the Costs of Imaging a
Computer’s Hard Drive
United States litigants are entitled to limited
reimbursement of costs, including duplicating
costs, after prevailing in a federal court
dispute. In a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit
clarified that a federal statute permitting aprevailing party to recover reasonable andnecessary litigation expenses allows recoveryof the costs of imaging a computer hard driveor other physical storage device. Colosi v.
Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., 781 F.3d
293 (6th Cir. 2015).
After an employer prevailed in litigation
initiated by a former employee, the employer
filed a bill of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920, which the court clerk approved.
The employee moved to reduce the bill,arguing that certain expenses were nottaxable under the statute. In particular, theemployee challenged the decision to tax thecost of imaging a computer’s hard drive (i.e.,creating an identical copy of the hard drive),arguing that electronic discovery costs are
not recoverable under the statute. The court
disagreed. Section 1920 allows courts to tax“the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained foruse in the case.” The court concluded that“making copies” encompasses the imaging ofa hard drive or other physical storage device.
The court reasoned that “courts have longunderstood that the phrase ‘making copies’
fairly includes the production of imitations
in a medium or format different than theoriginal.” Although the Third Circuit hasreached a contrary conclusion, and hasconstrued the phrase “making copies” toexclude the costs of imaging hard drives
based on a “functional equivalent” analysis,
the Sixth Circuit found such a construction“overly restrictive” and contrary to thestatutory text.
8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.
Mary Kay Vyskocil+1-212-455-3093
mvyskocil@stblaw.com

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ckronenberg@stblaw.com

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gwang@stblaw.com

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dwoll@stblaw.com

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mgarvey@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw(mforshaw@stblaw.com/+1-212455-2846) and Bryce L. Friedman(bfriedman@stblaw.com/+1-212-4552235) with contributions
by Karen Cestari(kcestari@stblaw.com).

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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