Report of
THE JAPAN-US DIALOGUEon“US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century”

June 1, 2007
The Japan Forum on International Relations “Conference Room”
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)Preface

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world,
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus. For
this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 25 years in organizing policy‐oriented
bilateral and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.
It is for this reason that GFJ held the Japan‐US Dialogue “US‐Japan Alliance in the 21stCentury” in Tokyo on June 1, 2007. This report intends to summarize the achievements of these
discussions between Japanese and U.S. counterparts. Though the printed version of the report will bemade available to only a restricted number of people such as members and friends of GFJ and theircounterparts from United States, the full text of the report will be available at http://www.gfj.jp/.
The Japan‐US Dialogue “US‐Japan Alliance in the 21st Century” was co‐sponsored by GFJ
and National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), and was attended by 19 participants
including 10 panelists. Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significant importance related to
the future of Japan‐US relations.

August 1, 2007
ITO Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan

Table of Contents

Ⅰ

Programs of THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE
1.

Program............................................................................................................................................1

2.

Participants List...............................................................................................................................2

3. Biographies of the Panelists...........................................................................................................3Ⅱ

Outlines of Discussions of THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE…………….…......5

Ⅲ

Minutes of Discussions of THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE
1.

The Morning Session: …………………………………………………………………………..7“Major Challenges in the US‐Japan Alliance: North Korea and Other Factors”

2.

The Afternoon Session: …………………………………………………………………...…….15“Prospects for the US‐Japan‐China Triangular Relationship and/orNortheast Asian Security”

Ⅳ

Appendix

1.

An Introduction to GFJ...............................................................................................................25

2. An Introduction to NCAFP.........................................................................................................28

Ⅰ The Programs of THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE

１．Program
The JAPAN-US DIALOGUE" US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century "June 1, 2007 / Tokyo, Japan
Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)Friday, June 1, 2007
The Japan Forum on International Relations "Conference Room"Morning Session
10:00-12:00"Major Challenges in the US-Japan Alliance: North Korea and Other Factors″

Chairperson

Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

Lead Discussant A (10min.)Prof. Robert A. SCALAPINO, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

Lead Discussant B (10min.)Prof. INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, Chuo University

Lead Discussant C (10min.)Amb. Nicholas PLATT, President Emeritus, Asia Society

Lead Discussant D (10min.)Prof. TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Free Discussions (80min.)All Participants

Lunch

Rogairo (Seventh Heaven)

12：00-13：00
Afternoon Session
13：00-15：00"Prospects for the US-Japan-China Triangular Relationshipand/or Northeast Asian Security″

Chairperson

Dr. George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFP

Lead Discussant A (10min.)Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University

Lead Discussant B (10min.)Mr. Joseph R. DONOVAN Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy in Japan

Lead Discussant C (10min.)Mr. TAKEUCHI Yukio, Adivisor and former Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Lead Discussant D (10min.)Prof. Donald S. ZAGORIA, Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects and Trustee, NCAFP

Free Discussions (80min.)All Participants

12. Participants List
THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE“US‐Japan Alliance in the 21st Century”

Participants List
June 1, 2007
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Conference Room, Tokyo, Japan【US Panelists】
Robert A. SCALAPINO
Nicholas PLATT
George D. SCHWAB
Joseph R. DONOVAN Jr.
Donald S. ZAGORIA

Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley
President Emeritus, Asia Society
President, NCAFP
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy in Tokyo
Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects and Trustee, NCAFP【Japanese Panelists】
ITO Kenichi
INOGUCHI Takashi
TAKUBO Tadae
MORIMOTO Satoshi
TAKEUCHI Yukio

President, GFJ
Professor, Chuo University
Guest Professor, Kyorin University
Professor, Takushoku University
Adivisor and former Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan(In order of appearance)【Participants】
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
IWAMA Yoko
KAWATO Akio
KITAGAMI Keiro
MURAKAMI Masayasu
MURATA Koji
OKAWARA Yoshio
SOEYA Yoshihide
SUZUKI Keisuke

Councilor, JFIR
Associate Professor, The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
General Manager, Japan‐World Trends
Member of the House of Representatives (Democratic Party of Japan)
Acting Executive Governor, GFJ
Professor, Doshisha University
Chairman, GFJ
Professor, Keio University
Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)（Ｉn alphabetical order）【The Secretariat of Global Forum of Japan 】
WATANABE Mayu
Executive Secretary
NORO Naoko
Deputy Chief of Planning and Development
YANAGITA Mariko
Officer in Charge of Exchange Programs
YANO Takuya
Officer in Charge of Regional Programs
WADA Daiju
Secretarial Staff
NAKAMURA Yumi
Secretarial Staff
Bennett RICHARDSONSecretarial AssistantAlex BRISTOW
Secretarial Assistant
ISHIHARA Yusuke
Secretarial Assistant
KANZAKI Tomotaka
Secretarial Assistant
SHIOJIRI Kotaro
Secretarial Assistant2

3. Biographies of the Panelists[US Panelists]
Robert A. SCALAPINO

Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

Received B.A. from Santa Barbara College and M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. Taught at the
Political Science Department at the University of California, Berkeley (1949 ‐1990). Founded the Institute of
East Asian Studies in 1978. Published some 550 articles and 39 books or monographs on Asian politics and USAsian policy. Recipient of Order of the Sacred Treasure from the Government of Japan, Order of Diplomatic
Service Merit.

Nicholas PLATT

President Emeritus, Asia Society

Graduated from Harvard College in 1957 and received M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies in 1959. Served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (responsible forpolitico‐military relations with Japan, Korea, China and Southeast Asia), Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (1985‐1987), US Ambassador to the Philippines (1987‐1991) and Pakistan (1991‐1992).
President of the Asia Society (1992‐2004).

George D. SCHWAB

President, NCAFP

Received Ph.D. from Columbia University and taught there until joined the Department of History at City
College of City University of New York in 1960. Co‐founded the NCAFP in 1974 and served as its president
since 1993. For the past thirty years he has been editor of American Foreign Policy Interests, its bimonthly
journal. Concurrently, Professor Emeritus of history at the City College. Received the Ellis Island Medal of
Honor in 1998 and the Order of the Three Stars, Latviaʹs highest honor, in 2002.

Joseph R. DONOVAN Jr.,

Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Japan

Received a Bachelorʹs Degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and Masterʹs Degree in
National Security Affairs from U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Served as Deputy Political Counselor andChief of Political‐Military Affairs Unit at U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Deputy Head of the Political Section at the
U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and Director for Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asia andPacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State before becoming Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy inTokyo in 2005.

Donald S. ZAGORIA

Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects and Trustee, NCAFP

Received B.A. from Rutgers University, M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia University. Served as consultant toboth National Security Council and East Asian Bureau at State Department during Carter Administration. He
has frequently been called as an expert witness on Asia by the United States Congress. Written and edited
numerous articles and books on U.S.‐China, U.S.‐Soviet, and Sino‐Soviet relations. Concurrently, Professor of3

Government at Hunter College.

[Japanese Panelists]
ITO Kenichi

President, GFJ

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and Studied at Harvard University. Entered Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1960. Served various positions, including Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977.
Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (1980‐2006). Concurrently, President of Council on East
Asian Community (CEAC), and Professor Emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University.

INOGUCHI Takashi

Professor, Chuo University

Received M.A. from University of Tokyo and Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Served as
Associate Professor at Sophia University（1974‐77）, Professor of University of Tokyo (1988‐2005), Senior Vice
Rector (Assistant Secretary General of UN) of United Nations University Headquarter (1995‐1997), Presidentof Japan Association of International Relations (2000‐2002).
TAKUBO Tadae

Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Graduated from Waseda University and received Ph.D. from Keio University. Served as Hamburg, Nahaand Washington correspondent and foreign news editor of Jiji Press before becoming deputy managing
editor in 1983. Visiting Fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1979‐1980). Joined thefaculty of social sciences at Kyorin University in 1984 and served as Dean (1992‐2002).
MORIMOTO Satoshi

Professor, Takushoku University

Graduated from National Defense Academy of Japan and entered Defense Agency in 1965. From 1979 served
various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including First Secretary at Japanese Embassy inWashington D.C. and Director of Security Policy Division in Bureau of Information Analysis, Research
Planning（1987‐1989）. Senior Researcher at Nomura Research Institute, Ltd（1992‐2000）. Concurrently, amember of advisory committee to strengthen the function of Prime Minister’s Office for national security.

TAKEUCHI Yukio

Advisor and former Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Graduated from Kyoto University in 1966 and Worcester College, Oxford University in 1969. Served various
positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Deputy Director‐General of Asian Affairs Bureau (1993‐95), Director‐General of North American Affairs Bureau (1997‐99), Deputy Vice‐Minister for Foreign Policy(1999‐2000), Ambassador to Indonesia (2001‐2002), Vice‐Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002‐2005).

(In order of appearance)4

Ⅱ Outline of Discussions of
THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUEThe Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy(NCAFP) co‐sponsored “the Japan‐U.S Dialogue: US‐Japan Alliance in the 21st Century” in Tokyo on
June 1, 2007. In the Dialogue, heated discussion was held among experts over the potential
divergence of opinions between the US and Japan as to how to deal with North Korean problems
such as the abduction issue and nuclear testing, as well as over the viability of the status of the
US‐Japan Alliance in the 21st century.

Morning Session: Major Challenges in the US‐Japan AllianceIn the Morning Session on the theme “Major Challenges in the US‐Japan Alliance,” four lead
discussants stated respectively that “Japan should pay attention not only to the abduction issue but
also to bigger issues like the dismantlement of nuclear facilities. We expect Japan to reinforce its
contributions to global affairs through PKO and such, and at the same time, improve bilateralrelations with its neighbors. This leads to the consolidation of a multilateral framework within theregion” (Prof. Robert SCALAPINO); “Japan is now seeking the status of ‘a global, ordinary power.’
Already ‘a global power’ as it is, for Japan to be ‘ordinary’ is yet to be defined. What the US will belike in 10‐20 years is our grave concern” (Prof. INOGUCHI Takashi); “Due to the emerging
importance of soft power, like economic power, the US‐Japan‐China triangular relationship has
shifted from the Cold‐War balance‐of‐power type to the post‐Cold‐War balance‐of‐influence type.
Therefore, powers should act in concert. Future US‐Japan relations should aim at close partnershipwith China” (Amb. Nicolas PLATT); “North Korean nuclear and abduction issues, Chinese militarybuildup and the ambiguity of US foreign policy all put Japan in complex of dilemmas. While the US
seems to oppose Japan going nuclear, the chances are that it will be surrounded by nuclear powers
sooner or later. Should that be the case, how reliable is the US‐Japan Alliance? We should all knowthat the US‐Japan Alliance is now at a crossroads” (Prof. TAKUBO Tadae).
In the following Free‐Discussions, both US and Japanese panelists exchanged frank views. Hereare two examples: “Japan should consider how to improve its relations with neighboring countries
rather than consider whether or not to go nuclear. The US wants Japan strong both politically andeconomically, but not militarily” (US panelist); “The US kept on compromising with North Korea
with no gains. This is the same with Iraq. When will it stop? Is the nuclearization of North Korea theonly product of Bush’s eight years of diplomacy?” (Japanese panelist)

Afternoon Session: Prospects for the US‐Japan‐China Triangular Relationship and/orNortheast Asian Security
In the Afternoon Session on the theme “Prospects for the US‐Japan‐China Triangular
Relationship and/or Northeast Asian Security,” four lead discussions were made, which included thefollowing points: “As Chinese strategic importance is being shifted from the north (Sino‐Soviet
border) to the sea area (Taiwan), US military transformation accordingly takes shape in the5reinforcement of the Guam base. Although Six‐party Talks aims at the denuclearization of North
Korea, it is likely that she will remain nuclearized. The US has to comprehensively review its nuclear
strategy to match the post Cold‐War era” (Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi); “There is in East Asia no clear
image of a regional security architecture to supersede the US‐centered hub‐and‐spokes model. It
remains to be seen whether it would be Asia‐oriented or the Pacific‐oriented. From the US
standpoint, an APEC‐centered architecture is preferable because it includes Taiwan. As for North
Korean problems, while normalizing the US‐Japan‐China triangular relationship is our first task, theultimate goal of the US is to denuclearize North Korea” (Min. Joseph DONOVAN); “Japan wonders
with concern whether the rise of China serves to stabilize the region. It is not sensible to overstressthe ‘value gaps’ between Japan and China. While we should endeavor to foster a cooperative
relationship with China, the US‐Japan Alliance will remain an indispensable public asset for thestability and prosperity of Asia” (Mr. TAKEUCHI Yukio, former Foreign Vice Minister); “Taiwan is
now ‘Taiwanizing’ itself and to consolidate the status quo is the best option for the region. The UScontinues with its dual policies of deterrence and reassurance” (Prof. Donald ZAGORIA).
Afterwards, in the Free‐Discussions, frank opinions were raised, such as “The US is trying to geta clear understanding of nascent regional organizations in East Asia and where they are going. It is
possible that the US should engage in the question of regional architecture without participating in
those organizations” (US Panelist); “The US should understand that it is in view of human rights
and democracy that we invite Australia and New Zealand to discussions on an East Asian
Community” (Japanese panelist).

6

Ⅲ Minutes of Discussions of
THE JAPAN‐US DIALOGUE

1. Morning Session:“Major Challenges in the US‐Japan Alliance: North
Korea and Other Factors”

Chairperson:

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

We have had a solid alliance for many years and generally speaking haven’t had any serious
difficulty in understanding each other in the past. I don’t say we have such difficulties today, butthere are apprehensions about changing circumstances particularly after September 11, 2001 forAmericans and after October 9, 2006 for the Japanese. We need to communicate and let each otherknow what we are thinking.

Lead Discussant A:

Robert A. SCALAPINO, Professor Emeritus, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley

The situation with respect to North Korea and the February 13 Agreement remains murky at thispoint, with the Macao money issue not yet resolved and the North therefore declining to move
forward with the dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. If one is optimistic, one can say that there
are certain elements in the situation that offer more hope than in the past. America is showing greater
flexibility in dealing with this issue including a willingness to have bilateral talks with the North andto make certain concessions with respect to the monetary question. Moreover, North Korea has strong
reasons for trying to work with, rather than against, the parties concerned. After its nuclear test, it
faced unprecedented isolation in the world. Even its presumed ally, China, spoke negatively about
this event and applied modest economic sanctions. South Korea also, despite its “Sunshine policy,”
was very disturbed by the events of 2006.
In my view, Japan has remained relatively tough regarding North Korea, insisting that the abduction
issue be handled satisfactorily prior to advances on other matters. Some Americans as well as other
Asians hope that Japan will be willing to show greater flexibility on the big issues such as
dismantlement of nuclear weapons while still keeping abduction on the table as an importantconcern.
There are two key issues which will continue to be paramount to any final agreement. One isverification. The U.S., Japan, and others will insist upon absolute verification of the dismantlement of7

the nuclear program not only at Yongbyon but also regarding other nuclear facilities in North Korea,
acknowledged and unacknowledged. The second issue will be with respect to timing. North Korea
has demanded simultaneous actions. The U.S. has called for sequential actions: you take action anddemonstrate that you have taken action, and we will respond appropriately in the economic, politicalor security realm. In my opinion, this matter will remain important in future negotiations. At thesame time, North Korea will insist upon some type of treaty or agreement outlawing the use of force.
The Korean War has not officially ended. Moreover, North Korea has a genuine fear of the UnitedStates. I hope that we can move forward on each of these matters, insisting upon reciprocity, but
remaining flexible.
I am optimistic with regard to the U.S. – Japan relationship. It is stronger today than at any time sinceWorld War II. In the security realm, we have certain problems and questions about the future U.S.
commitment, but in very general terms, we are on the same path. The U.S., at present, has redefinedits security policy to place a strong emphasis on ultra‐modern weaponry, long range deployment, andsome reduction in foreign bases and troops overseas, supported by the principle that allies should
accept greater responsibility in the security realm. Therefore, the U.S. is basically supportive ofJapan’s moves to expand its perimeter of security deployment, to request the same security rights
afforded to any normal nation, and to participate in peacekeeping and related activities on an
expanded scale.
Nevertheless, there is going to be continuing discussion and debate on certain matters. We are notgoing to resolve the Korean issue in the near term. On the Taiwan issue, China is upset over Japan’s
stated interest in Taiwan affairs. The Chinese want Taiwan to be an issue to be handled solely by
China, with minimal outside “interference.” Despite on‐going issues such as Korea and Taiwan, andthe rapid rise of China as a major power, the prospects for a relatively low level of tension in theregion are promising. The major powers each have serious domestic challenges that must be given
priority, and conflict at those levels would exact unacceptable costs.
Every nation in the world, including those in the Asia‐Pacific region must deal with threesemi‐conflictual forces today: internationalism, nationalism, and communalism. The latter refers to
the quest of individuals and groups for a more meaningful identity via closer adherence to religion,
greater emphasis on ethnicity, or closer identification with one’s local community – thus promoting
separatism. How a nation handles these three forces will go far in determining its political stability
and capacity for economic growth.
Most of us are hopeful that the relations of both the U.S. and Japan with China, the two Koreas andRussia can be improved in the period ahead. The initial efforts of Prime Minister Abe in this respectsignal a new course for Japan, although multiple problems remain to be handled. Meanwhile, in its
final months, the Bush administration is also showing greater flexibility as recent events with regard
to both North Korea and Russia illustrate. Thus, there is hope.
8

Lead Discussant B:

INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, Chuo University

I try to place the nature of the US‐Japan alliance and its gradual modification over years in context. I
have identified five phases of US‐Japan relations. Basically, it is a very simple scheme, which follows
Henry KISSINGER’s non‐expert history of Japan. He says that the Japanese are exceedingly slow atmaking decisions and that it takes almost 15 years for the Japanese to make even a small decision.
After Commodore PERRY’s visit to Japan in 1853, it took 15 years for the Japanese to have the Meiji
Restoration which modernized Japan. For 15 years after 1945, the Japanese debated what should bedone about the US‐Japan alliance and the post‐war constitution. Prime Minister KISHI Nobusuke put
an end to this in 1960. Regarding the collapse of the bubble economy, in 15 years time, the economy
recovered.
Once you start to look at the alliance from this angle, 1945‐60 is when the Japanese were extremely
divided about the utility of the US‐Japan alliance. This wasn’t the era of the Yoshida Doctrine. That
period was merely agonizing about the alliance. The Yoshida Doctrine only started in 1960. Belief inthe power of the alliance is how people simplify the Yoshida Doctrine. Following this came US
recognition of the free‐riding status of Japan, which would be gradually amended during 1975‐90.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Japan reviewed its responsibilities,
aspiring to become a civilian power, during 1990‐2005. We have just entered into the fifth phasewhich will be completed sometime around 2020. I term this the period when Japan is wandering
about what kind of global ordinary power it should become.
Because Japan is a huge entity, Japan cannot escape from being a global power. But what does it mean
to be an “ordinary” power? Ordinary means that it is not exceptional, just like most other countries.
We are not sure how things might evolve even within this year. We understand Prime Minister ABE
Shinzo’s preference for constitutional revision, but the exact nature of global ordinary power remains
difficult to define. Although we say it’s the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, if you look at it closely,
what kind of action is Japan envisaging taking in areas as diverse as Estonia, Romania, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Myanmar and East Timor? Ordinary power is not necessarily exciting, but relates toroutine matters: trying to help elevate the degree of freedom and prosperity in ways that the Japaneseare reasonably good at. It’s not like neo‐con at all. It is also crucial to correctly judge which kind of
global hegemonic power the US will be in 10‐20 years’ time.

Lead Discussant C:

Nicholas PLATT, President Emeritus, Asia Society

I always found that if you map the decision curve from inspiration to implementation in both the US
and Japan it came to be about the same period of time. Japan would usually develop a decisionslowly and then await consensus. So the curve looks a little bit different. However, the US would
9

make a decision right away, but once this conclusion has been reached, it would take a long time tohammer out the details. So the actual time to implement the decision was about the same in bothcountries. 15 years is not a very long time. I think it’s a perfectly reasonable amount of time.
One of the decisions Kissinger made which proved to be right was to open to China. Before 1972, theUS had to choose between Japan and China. After 1972, we were able to have constructive relations
which made a huge difference to the outcome of the Cold War. I think this helped bring about thecollapse of the Soviet Union. When the Cold War was over, everything changed. Old balance ofpower calculating didn’t work any longer because the US was more powerful than the other powers.
In globalization, all kinds of things cross the state borders ‐ it’s a much more complicated situationthat it used to be. So, the 21st Century is going to see a combination of concert of power and balanceof power approaches. Balance of power will be managed in a different way – its not only guns andtanks, but also oil production and a combination of soft and hard powers that are important. I would
call it not balance of power but balance of influence.
States are starting to think in balance of power and concert of power terms. The ability of the US andJapan to work together has been one of the important factors in the past 50 years. I think you could
say the same thing too for the ability of Japan and the US to deal with China: to adjust to different
ways of measuring power, and exerting power is going to be a key. 50 years is a long time, but it’s notvery long for a grand scheme to take place.
There is skepticism from Japan about American behavior in the Six Party Talks. But as a grandscheme, I think the US‐Japan alliance is more important than ever. It has to be constantly reinvented.

Lead Discussant D:

TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Japan is now in a very complicated dilemma, with uncertainties involving nuclear threats andabduction issues with North Korea, an increasing Chinese political presence backed by military
power, and ambiguity in US policy.
Last October, after North Korea conducted a nuclear test, NAKAGAWA Shoichi, chairman of the
LDP’s Policy Research Council and ASO Taro, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made remarks one after
another that we were free to discuss the nuclear problem, though it has long been taboo in Japan. In
an unprecedented development, NAKAGAWA and ASO didn’t resign from their posts, and since thattime all monthly magazines and weeklies have taken up discussions of the nuclear issue freely.
The reaction of the US government to Japan’s nuclear debate was quick. Secretary of State
Condoleezza RICE flew over to Japan to assure ASO that the US‐Japan alliance was strong enough tocope with any challenges by missiles carrying nuclear weapons. The joint statement by the 2+210meeting in May stated: “US extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security.
The US reaffirmed that the full range of US military capabilities – both nuclear and non‐nuclear strike
forces and defensive capabilities – form the core of extended deterrence and support UScommitments to the defense of Japan.” These repeated US assurances have another implication in myview: to put down any thought Japan might have of going nuclear. It is almost impossible to go
nuclear at present due to nuclear‐allergy among people, technological difficulties and strong
opposition by surrounding countries and the US.
The abduction of the Japanese people under the order of a cult‐like dictatorship galvanized theattention of the people. If priorities attached to abduction issue show gap between Japan and US, it
could be a fatal blow not only to ABE or other leaders but also to Japan in her relation to North Korea.
Japan‐US relation will surely be affected.
With regard to China, Japan‐China relations are not bilateral but correlated with the US in a delicate
triangular relation. Geopolitically, the international order in the Far East during the last war
proceeded with the confrontation, US‐China vs. Japan, but after the war, it was replaced by US‐Japanvs. China relation. A slightest trouble in this triangle would cause a great shock to Japan. The best
example was the Nixon Shock.
Our anxieties over China include its continuous increases in defense expenditure, its militarypresence around our territory and its political pressure on Japan over the Yasukuni Shrine, school
textbooks, and comfort women and so on. Second, China does not hide her intention to invade
Taiwan. The Bush administration previously regarded China as “strategic competitor.” But now
US‐China policy is best expressed in a word “responsible stakeholder” and President Bushrepeatedly said that U.S. opposes to the independence of Taiwan.
On the one hand, the US is urging us to become stronger militarily. The first Armitage Reportpublished 7 years ago was as frank as to say “The Japanese Constitution is an obstacle to the
U.S.‐Japan alliance.” On the other hand, the US is clearly opposing Japan going nuclear. For the time
being, this American attitude is also good for us. But I am not sure if international circumstances can
wait for us to change. Sooner or later there could be a united Korea that would lead to anti‐Japan andnuclear armed. One fine morning, Japan suddenly might realize we are put in the greatest crisis
surrounded by nuclear countries: united Korea, Russia, China, Pakistan, India and the US. Now is thetime for Japan and US to readjust the alliance that has long been believed to be absolute.

11Free Discussion

All Participants

North Korea
A Japanese participant asked how long the US will continue on this path of making concessions toNorth Korea without obtaining anything in return. He also noted that there had been reports
concerning the ill health of KIM Jong Il and asked what kind of implications this would have for the
Six Party Talks.
Another Japanese participant also asked why the Bush administration has changed its policy on
North Korea so drastically. He suggested two explanations. One is that the Bush team was coming to
the end of its term in power and they didn’t have any other option because the last thing they want to
see was a nuclear Korea. The other explanation is that the US has some grand vision involving thisseries of concessions which viewed the unification of the Korean Peninsula as inevitable and thedenuclearization of North Korea within a framework of unification.
The US side responded that the Bush administration had not made unnecessary concessions onquestions that are truly critical, such as the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. A participant said that
one must keep in mind that past American stiffness enabled North Korea to move ahead tonuclearization while outside powers were divided. He stated that the US would not make unilateralconcessions on critical issues, and was rather establishing a framework for dialogue which can unify
the outside powers. Another US participant said that the main reason the Bush administration was
facing problems with North Korea was because they didn’t move towards a more flexible position
earlier and that there has been a gradual evolution of Bush policy toward sanity.
On the question of KIM Jong Il’s health, the US participant said a hereditary monarchy is notpresently preserved because Kim has not developed one of his sons as a successor. Thus, North Korea
would become a military dominated regime under such a scenario. He added that the policy goals of
the military are unknown, as is the degree of political unity within the military.

Regional Threats and the Alliance
A US participant asked if the Japanese side did not take seriously the emergent reality of a united
Korea and what threat this will constitute to Japan, not to mention a highly militarized China. He
said US leeway to protect Japan could be overstretched with a reemerging Russia and the US busy in
the Middle East.
Another US participant said that Japanese security is going to cost more in the future and that thiswas an issue which has to be determined in Japan. He added that the crucial issue for Japan today is
whether it can meld a strong US‐Japan bilateral relationship into a broader reach into North East Asia,
in which Japan’s relations with its neighbors are improved. He also said that Japan has no need to12worry about US‐Japan relations. The trend will be away from American unilateralism towardscommitment to, and collective responsibility with US allies, and thereby reduction of costs.
A Japanese participant said that if a potentially united Korea showed the possibility of becoming
anti‐Japanese, then Japanese strategy should be to prevent as much as possible such a scenario frombecoming a reality. Likewise, there was a need for a strategy to render China less threatening to Japan.
He said it was Japan’s strategic responsibility to continue to redefine the importance of the alliance inlight of any uncertainty on the part of the US.
Another Japanese participant said that most Japanese don’t believe that the US would come to therescue in Japan’s time of need. He said that in order to have a solid alliance, it should be based on theexchange of views and flexible change of policies. He added there was a need to be careful about
imperfections in the alliance, but that mutual interests and dialogue explained its longevity.
It is also pointed out by a Japanese participant that Japan was surrounded by two super powers forthe first time in its history. Japan is now getting into a phase in which it needs to redefine and thinkover the US‐Japan security alliance. He added that security is not absolute anymore and is becoming
relative, and that there was a need for not only a redefinition of Japan’s alliance but some form ofmultilateralism in Asia coexisting with Japan’s security alliance, perhaps based around the Six Party
Talks.
A Japanese participant asked if the US would be willing to use force even if it risked attack by
Chinese missiles. He pointed out that the US government recently expressed the concern over China’s
military expansion and its ability to attack the US mainland with long‐range missiles. He was worried
that if the US administration lacks sufficient political assets, they will not commit so much to East
Asia and asked what the US president would risk to protect Japan.
A US participant responded that it’s the job of government to worry about something, and that theirconcern about China and its military expansion was perfectly normal. Asia is either concerned that
the US is behaving too strongly and throw its weight around Asia, or worried that it may leave theregion. The latter has always been the most worrisome for Asians, but it would take many years for
China to reach parity with the US. He added that US involvement in Asia is inevitable given its
growing importance and that he hoped American commitment in Asia would continue to be strong
and growing.
Another US participant also responded that it was possible to count on the alliance despite the factthat the US was overstretched. He added that the US Navy and US Air Force were not overstretched,
and that it was important not to take certain scenarios as given. He said there was some good news in
the region with the Taiwan situation much closer to some peaceful resolution over the next 2‐4 years,
and that positive resolutions to the North Korea situation were also possible over time. He
13emphasized the importance of the US‐Japan alliance as the bedrock of East Asian stability. He also
said that there is no contradiction between bilateralism and stronger multilateralism, which isnecessary for security in East Asia and particularly to get US‐China‐Japan triangular relations right.

Japanese Security Policy and Nuclear Debate
An American participant said there was no great fear in the US of a nuclear Japan. The issues were forJapan to assume greater responsibility for its own security and for regional security in a broad sense.
He hoped to see a stronger Japan in Asia in the near future, not militarily, but politically andeconomically.
Another US participant said it was important for Japan to ask how it could assume a greater
responsibility for regional security, and to improve its relations with its neighbors. He said he
couldn’t think of a worse decision than going nuclear as it would jeopardize a greater role for Japanin regional security and impede improving its relations with its neighbors.
A Japanese participant said that the nuclear debate in Japan was not as new as many thought, but hequestioned assumptions by ASO and NAKAGAWA on the need to go nuclear. He also said that hesupported revising the collective self defense policy and that Japan needed to make clear to what
extent and under what conditions Japan can exercise forces. He emphasized the necessity for Japan tohave such a legal framework as National Security Act.

14

2. Afternoon Session:“Prospects for the US‐Japan‐China Triangular
Relationship and/or Northeast Asian Security”

Chairperson:

George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFPThe discussions in the morning session were extremely valuable to us, and we are looking forward tocontinuing on an issue that we have already touched upon this morning.

Lead Discussant A:

MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University

The Pentagon has a very comprehensive analysis on which direction China is going by 2020, and theconclusion is that there is no conclusion. In other words, the conclusion is that no one knows which
direction China is going in the future. But that has implications for US policy toward China. I wastold by some US policymakers that the US approach to China has a double track. One track is as a
stakeholder approach to encourage China to share common national values and make policy with the
US as a stabilizing factor in the Asia‐Pacific region, mainly employed by the State Department andother economists. Another approach is by the Pentagon, which is called the hedging strategy tomanage Chinese force projection on the sea area. The Chinese strategic importance shifted in thepost‐Cold War period from the Sino‐Soviet border to the littoral sea area mainly to manage
unification with Taiwan but also to protect Chinese national interests including national resources
and sea lanes of communications in The South China Sea and The East China Sea.
In this sense, I think if you look at the force‐structure, the purpose of the US military transformation
and realignment is to manage the rise of China and Chinese military forces at sea. The US has tried touse the Guam base as a strategic base for this purpose. I would like to raise two issues relating to this.
One is that I fully agree on the transferal of the US Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, but weshould negotiate with the US to allocate areas as joint use training and reserve facilities in Guam for
our Self Defense Forces. Maybe in the future we can use these facilities with other nations such as
Australia, India and ASEAN.
The second point is that in expanding our bilateralism to multilateralism, the first step should be to
expand the US‐Japan alliance to multilateral relations, especially security relations. Initially, thiswould take the form of US‐Japan‐Australia relations. Then we should try to encourage other15

Asia‐Pacific nations including New Zealand, India, ASEAN and South Korea to participate in thismultilateral security cooperation in order to rehabilitate our alliance in the next century.
On the issue of North Korea, my frustration is that the US so far hasn’t prioritized addressing nuclear
production, storage, testing and deployment facilities over reprocessing facilities and the transfer ofnuclear systems. If that is so, we have no meaningful or substantial objective for the Six Party Talks to
be reached in the future. I think our true objective is to eliminate all nuclear weapons from North
Korea. But North Korea will never give up nuclear weapons so you have to take for granted that a
nuclear North Korea will survive in the future. The US should have a very comprehensive nuclear
strategy review rather than nuclear posture review in the post‐Cold War period regarding how
nuclear deterrence capabilities can prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons. That is
not necessarily clear and this frustration affects our discussion of the nuclear option.
I fully agree on the development of US‐Japan missile defense in this area, but we need some sort ofoperational coordination between the US and Japan. The US deployed missile defense systems in
Poland and the Czech Republic, which Russia is strongly against. The US deployment of missile
defense used Iranian ballistic missiles as an excuse; I think its actual objective is to manage a possible
Russian military threat. In East Asia, I think North Korea may be the excuse and the true objective is
how to manage the Chinese ballistic missile threat. Russia and China are intensifying themodernization of strategic offensive systems. Recently, I have been thinking about whether we canapply the lessons of the deployment of SS‐20 missiles to this issue. I have no answer, but even if the
US is successful in negotiating with Iran and North Korea, I don’t think either will give up on nuclear
development. I wonder how we can encourage both countries to eliminate nuclear development in
the future. We have to think about a more strategic framework to deal with this issue; otherwise we
can’t deal with it exclusively by bilateral means.
On the issue of Iraq, I wonder to what extent the US military operation in Iraq and the war on terror
have implications for the future prospect of balance in the Middle East and the Gulf. I don’t think the
US will turn inward or become isolationist even if it is seriously damaged in the Iraq military
operation, but my concerns are on the military strategy of the US. The US navy and air‐force havesustained no damage and remain very healthy, but if we look at the ground forces such as the US
army and marine core, this is one of the most serious crises in the history of the US army. But weshould not conclude that the implications of military operations in Iraq mean that the US will end all
military operations. My concern is whether the mismanagement of Iraq has any implications for the
US forward deployment in the Asia‐Pacific region. I am seriously concerned about the resource andmanpower reduction and depletion of morale and readiness of the US army and marine core over thelast one and a half years, which may have negative implications for any possible operation in the Far
East under the contingency scenario between our two countries.
Finally, the Constitution is not directly related to the US‐Japan alliance but is a serious policy question.
16

What constitutes a comprehensive national strategy and the national interest is yet to be defined. I
hope that the possible establishment of the NSC will raise this issue to explain to the people and othercountries such as the US about what kind of Japan we should be aiming towards and what kind of
thinking on policy principles or doctrine would be adopted by the government in the future. I think
this has implications for the modification of the Constitution, especially after May 2010.

Lead Discussant B:

Joseph R. DONOVAN Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy inJapan

East Asian regional architecture is a very hot topic now for a good reason – countries in the region are
seeking to manage a wide range of security, economic and transnational issues in the post‐Cold War
and post‐September 11 era. For the past 60 years in East Asia, the lion’s share of the credit for
maintaining a peaceful environment in which the nations of the region could develop and prosper
should be given to a series of bilateral US security alliances – the so‐called hub‐and‐spokes theory.
These arrangements have served the US and the region very well. The major question is what is next?
My answer is that I don’t know. But I would like to offer a few observations. First, for the foreseeable
future, I do not see any effective substitute for the web of bilateral US alliances in the region. As aresult, the US will continue to play a pivotal role in regional security. The security of the region will
therefore be reinforced to the extent that each of these bilateral relationships is positive and stable.
This is especially true of the US‐Japan security alliance, with its very important regional component.
I believe that security specialists will look back to this time as a very formative time for regionalarchitecture in Asia including North East Asia. We can already look to a number of regional fora –APEC, ASEAN, ARF, EAS and the Six Party Talks. All of these have something to offer and none ofthem is perfect. To date, East Asian regionalism is centered around South East Asia, while the centerof gravity of the region’s economy, its military capacities, its technical prowess and overall politicalclout lies in North East Asia. The exception to this is the Six Party Talks, a multilateral approach
focused on a specific task, which is to de‐nuclearize the Korean peninsula. We don’t know whether
the Six Party Talks will accomplish this objective. If it does, it is worth considering that it may provide
a model for the future of North East Asia. But even should it succeed, we should expect its
development to be very slow and incremental. We should not expect the Six Party Talks to replace thesystem of bilateral alliances any time soon.
For those who would look to the European Union as a model, remember that it took two horrific wars
to convince the nations of Western Europe to begin a process to overcome their history. One of thechallenges for this region is to avoid a similar painful process. The intentions of some of the major
actors in the region are not clear to the other actors. I would cite China and its rapid and ambitious
military modernization as an example of intentions and directions that are unclear to us, but there areothers as well and these must be overcome. There are issues – most prominently Taiwan – that will17

limit the possibilities for cooperative security in North East Asia. It’s very difficult for me to see any
mechanism in North East Asia or East Asia that can be effective without the participation of Taiwan
in some form. Another issue that needs to be resolved in terms of East Asian regional architecture is
the question of whether or not mechanisms will be Asian focused, East Asian focused or Pacificfocused. From a US point of view, we are a Pacific country with vast interests in this region that aretrans‐Pacific and it is in our interests to include ourselves in anything that comes along on this. The
key issue is to get relations between the major powers in the region right; that is, between the US,
Japan and China.
I agree very strongly with Prof. MORIMOTO that Guam might offer real opportunities for training
the Self Defense Forces; I think it an excellent idea and something that we want to consider. On theissue of North Korea, every official pronunciation that I have seen from the US government is thatour policy is not based on the idea of non‐proliferation or living with a nuclear North Korea, but on
the premise of a de‐nuclearized North Korea. That is the correct direction to be going in. I don’t wantto underestimate the difficulties, but the process that we are going through needs to be aimed at that
ultimate objective.

Lead Discussant C:

TAKEUCHI Yukio, Advisor and former Vice‐Minister, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, JapanAny kind of triangular relationship will inevitably contain jealously, suspicion and quarrels. China’s
constant frustration and possible anxiety, with good reason, is that Japan and the US would conspireagainst China. While China’s rise is an impetus to regional growth as well as world dynamism, it
poses a long list of difficult problems. The future of its political system with the question of social
instability is uncertain. China has to become a bearer of international norms. It needs to work more
for the public good of the world community.
In the export market, China, with its mercantilist trade practices, is a formidable rival to many
developing countries. China is not providing the “flying geese” pattern of growth as Japan did. Someof its neighbors in ASEAN are beaten in the export markets by Chinese products. When ASEAN
economies need more foreign investment, China is drawing capitals that could be directed to ASEAN
countries. Even the future of China’s booming economy is also a source of our wariness. Is it
sustainable? Will the bubble burst?
China itself will have to find solutions to these problems. But if we, Japan and the US, want to shape abetter Asia, we need to effectively influence China. How can we do this? Can we do this by simply
exaggerating the value gap with China? No.
Many people are tempted to exaggerate the value gaps with China to the extent of China bashing or18

even Sino‐phobia. But it is not only counterproductive but harmful. It will not constitute soundincentive for China to be a true stake holder of the international public order. It may unnecessarily
arose Chinese unhealthy nationalism. It will drive many countries into the Chinese side in the end.
We need to be always reminded of the value gaps with China, but China bashing is not diplomacy.
We all have now mutual interest with China. So much is at the stake with China. On many issues weneed China’s participation and cooperation. We have to deal with China and by working together
with her we need to make win‐win relations.
For the purpose of positively influencing China to set her in the right direction, both Japan and the
US have a lot to do in order to create win‐win relations.
In the triangular relationship, it is said that Japan’s concern is so‐called ʹJapan passing,ʹ while the US
concern is possible exclusion from regional institutional frameworks or fora that are evolving in East
Asia. The Japan‐US alliance is the most important asset for Japan, and I believe that it provides a solid
basis for Japan to conduct effective diplomacy and to play an active role in Asia. I also believe that
our alliance provides a solid basis for the US in its sustained engagement in Asia. Synergies of ouralliance are uniquely effective. The US military presence and the US free market have been critically
helpful in making Asia stable, prosperous and free.
Japan, though it has still history issues with a couple of its neighbors in Northeast Asia, has arespected record in Asia as a primary contributor towards the development of many Asian countries.
In a world‐wide poll in 2006, Japan was voted as the most respected contributor of public goods. Thisillustrates Japan’s unique soft power. Thus, the Japan‐US alliance will continue to be a vital factor in
shaping future prosperity and security in Asia.
However, we should not be too complacent. The alliance needs attentive management constantly. We
need to have real strategic dialogues in its true sense. During the three years from 2002 through 2004,
Richard ARMITAGE, Deputy Secretary of State and I, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, had real
strategic dialogues. We met eight times in three years. Excellent coordination concerning the Iraq War
was one of the fruits of these dialogues. Both sides were determined to avoid a repetition of the fiasco
at the time of the Gulf War. While the political leaders of the two countries, Prime Minister KOIZUMI
Junichiro and President George W. BUSH, enjoyed a strong personal relationship, bureaucrats had
solid and constructive consultations.
Apart from the good “chemistry” existing between the leaders of Japan and the US, issufficient

strategic consultation is actually taking place now, for example, on the North Korean nuclear issue?
Setting aside the BDA issue, more fundamentally, are we really in agreement that the prevention of
the export of nuclear weapons from North Korea is not enough, but that the ultimate goal is completede‐nuclearization of the Peninsula? And on the abduction issue, do we understand honestly eachother’s priorities? These are extremely sensitive questions and they need delicate dealing in our
19alliance management. The question is whether we are really addressing fundamental points in our
dialogue as a matter of our alliance management.
Back in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, with the trauma of the Gulf War and in the
midst of bilateral economic friction, our alliance was said to be drifting. We successfully mended it.
The Six Party Talks may evolve in the future to become a certain security mechanism for the region,
but the Japan‐US alliance should still remain as indispensable public asset for the benefit ofAsia‐Pacific regional stability. We must not forget that.

Lead Discussant D:

Donald S. ZAGORIA, Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects
and Trustee, NCAFPI share with everybody here the view that the US‐Japan alliance is the core of Asian security: the corefor Japan and the core for the US. We have gotten Japan right over the past half century. And we also
have gotten China right since Henry KISSINGER opened it up in 1972. I’m hopeful that we will get
things right for the next half century as well. We are not about to leave Asia as we have enduringcommitments, economic, strategic and otherwise. The question is how to get things right.
On the Taiwan‐China issue, I see a window of opportunity that’s going to open up after the electionsin Taiwan in March 2008. The first reason for the window of opportunity is that CHEN Shui‐bian will
be gone and there will be a new president. But quite apart from that there are several factors
involved; I think there is a possibility to arrange some kind of informal, de facto, status quo agreement
between China and Taiwan that will be blessed by the US. I think that all three sides – the US, China
and Taiwan – have come to the conclusion that the status quo is quite satisfactory and we just need toconsolidate and stabilize it. First, public opinion in Taiwan shows that 70% of the public want neither
reunification nor independence. They want the status quo.
Secondly, the two main candidates in the election – MA Ying‐jeou from the KMT and Frank HSIEH
from the DPP are both middle of the road candidates. They both stressed to us in our May meetingsin Taipei the importance of stabilizing relations with the Mainland and of improving relations with
the US. Both the KMT and the DPP are moving toward the center. The KMT is now Taiwanizing itself.
It is going to revise the KMT Charter and remove references to reunification and insert more things
about Taiwan. The DPP is also moving to the center. They selected Frank HSIEH as the candidate
because he is the most moderate, and they avoided all the fundamentalist candidates. China has, inthe past few years, changed its policy in a rather important way. It has moved away from a stress onreunification to a stress on simply deterring independence. The US continues with its policy of dual
deterrence and dual reassurance. We are deterring China from using force and deterring Taiwan fromdeclaring independence. At the same time we are reassuring China that we have a one China policy
and reassuring Taiwan that we maintain the Taiwan Relations Act and are committed to Taiwan’s
20

security. This is an area in which the US and Japan share a fundamental interest. We have an identicalpolicy – no independence, no reunification; the status quo, peaceful resolution. That is now withinsight and I think that is good news for the alliance.
Let me turn to the North Korea issue, which is a little more problematic. I remain cautiously
optimistic on the North Korean issue because there is a change in the Bush Administrationʹs policy
towards greater flexibility. Now we are talking to North Korea bilaterally. We are not making any
concessions on the critical issue ‐ complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear
weapons – and we are keeping the five other powers together, which is important in pure policy
terms.
The second reason is that China is playing quite a constructive role on the North Korean nuclear issue.
China is one of the UNSC permanent members which signed on to the sanctions resolution against
North Korea’s nuclear program. I believe that they have been exercising quiet pressure to bring North
Korea back to the talks. China also insists on complete de‐nuclearization on the Korean peninsula.
For the time being, China will accept a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program rather than pushingtowards complete denuclearization. This is a policy in accord with current realities, and the US is
moving in this direction also.
Third, I am convinced that North Korea wants to establish normal relations with the US. North
Koreans and South Koreans have great suspicion toward both China and Japan. Koreans balance
relations among the neighboring great powers and reach out to the distant powers. That has beenSouth Korea’s strategy and is also becoming North Korea’s. I also think that North Korea has agenuine fear of the US since it saw us moving into Iraq.
Their conclusion is that the US moves into countries which don’t have nuclear weapons. So getting
nuclear weapons is the ultimate deterrence. But I think they understand that, in the long run, the only
way to assure their security is to establish a more normal relationship with the US. That is what they
are going to do. I think we need a stronger IAEA. I think the US and Japan are perfectly capable ofworking more closely together on North Korean and related strategy.
Finally let me close with the rise of China. I am not as anxious about the rise of China as some inJapan and the U.S. are. I think that there will be a long time during which China will concentrate on
its huge internal problems. China is a fragile superpower. It needs a peaceful international
environment. Moreover, the whole international situation is different from a decade ago. There is
new balance of power shaping in Asia. All three of the great powers in the Asia/Pacific region – theUnited States, China and Japan – have an interest in peace and stability and will need to work out asuitable equilibrium.

21

Free Discussion

All Participants

Regional Architecture and Community Building
A Japanese participant said it was strange that nobody mentioned the East Asia Community concept,
as promoted by the ASEAN+3 or the East Asia Summit, which is ASEAN+6.
A US participant responded that the idea of East Asian architecture has been getting a lot of attentionin Washington and will continue to do so within the current administration. But there has been somewariness and uncertainty about what the East Asia Summit means, where it is going, and how it
differentiates itself from other organizations like APEC. As a result, the US has not really been willingto participate until now. He said that it is important to get a clear notion with all these nascentorganizations on what role they are going to play and where they are going, and that the US would
likely become increasingly willing to engage on the question of regional architecture and havemeaningful discussions with close allies like Japan.
A Japanese participant said he felt irritated about a lack of appreciation on the part of the US about
Japan’s conceptions and approach to an East Asian Community. He said that there was competition
between Japan and China over the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 formulas in an East Asian Community.
Japan promotes the ASEAN+6, while China prefers the ASEAN+3 process, which Japan sees as notentirely beneficial for the future of East Asian regionalism. This ought to be much better appreciatedby the US side, and there should be more consultation and dialogue about that on the part of theJapanese government. He said that China is sabotaging Japan’s initiatives on ASEAN+6 and that there
was a serious worry that the ASEAN+6 formula might lose momentum in coming years.
Related to the above argument, another Japanese participant pointed out that there are some people
in Japan who are strongly opposed to the concept of an East Asian Community because it means
Chinese hegemony. We cannot deny the fact of rapidly developing regional cooperation andintegration. If Japan takes a negative stance toward an East Asian Community, Japan would be
isolated in East Asia, which could allow China to take the initiative in the region. He mentioned thatthe mere denial of an East Asian Community is not the option Japan should take.
A Japanese participant said that if the US became more assertive and vocal on the issue, there would
be a corresponding reaction from China and other members, which could be counterproductive. He
said that it is sometimes wiser for the US to keep a low profile in the process of an East Asian
Community, and he agreed with the US approach to date.

TaiwanA Japanese participant agreed that the status quo for Taiwan was the best idea being considered at the
moment, but asked what would happen if people in Taiwan wanted to be independent by peacefulmeans.
22

A US participant responded that Taiwan was already independent as a matter of fact and the peopleof Taiwan accepted the situation. There is a need to face geographical realities as Taiwan is 90 miles
away from China; China has historical claims to Taiwan, a very strong sense of nationalism and is a
big military power. De facto independence appeared good enough for almost everybody on theisland. He added that the Chinese he had spoken to would be able to accept Taiwanese de facto
independence for the next 50 years or so, but the Chinese government would not say that. He said
that the key to the Taiwan issue in the long run is how China evolves.
Another Japanese participant asked what should be the Japanese and the US attitude toward theChine navy if the status quo around Taiwan is agreed on. Also asked was what the US option would
be if there were a voluntary merger between Taiwan and China.
Another US participant responded that he could not answer the question on any voluntary merger
between Taiwan and the mainland. He said that currently Taiwan was seeing an increase in
Taiwanese identity and Taiwanization, and that a voluntarily merger would not likely be consideredin the foreseeable future. He added that getting the Taiwan issue right was key to controlling futurenationalism in China.

China
A Japanese participant wondered how the alliance should deal with China if that nation faced serious
domestic problems. If the situation became chaotic, an authoritarian regime may take control andChinese nationalism might shift in a dangerous direction. He suggested that Japan could quietly
hedge, but that it would be wise not to talk loudly when hedging against the possibility of a collapseof order in China. He also mentioned that another approach is for Japan and the US to talk explicitly
about a comprehensive strategy on how to control the future direction of Chinese nationalism, and tofoster a growing civil society within China.
Another Japanese participant said that while China was playing a constructive role in peace andsecurity over the Korean Peninsula via the Six Party Talks, China was helping perpetrate a massacreof 200,000 people in the Sudan.
A US participant agreed that China’s role in Sudan was negative, and that it has a poor human rights
record. The US could never ally with China because such facts showed that there is a major values
gap.

North Korea
A Japanese participant asked why a US member was cautiously optimistic on North Korea. He asked
if such an opinion was based on the assumption that humans are good‐natured, and that the North
Korean regime is responsible or thinks and acts reasonably. He pointed out that the Japanese people23

in general, and Japanese policymakers in particular have been frustrated with the recent approach of
the US State Department. He said that the US ought to exercise a little bit more pressure on North
Korea.
Another Japanese participant said that the abduction issue was very important, but that the Japaneseapproach lacked a broader strategic view in which to locate or assess how the abdication issue relates
to other components. He said US‐Japan cooperation was very important in terms of such a strategic
perspective, and that the US and Japan should talk more on this matter.
A US participant responded that consultations were very important when dealing with a situationthat was changing as fast as the situation in North Korea. He said that the first issue should be thede‐nulearization of North Korea, but that the US has recognized the importance of the abduction
issue not only to the Japanese government but also to the Japanese people. He also mentioned that
the Japanese had suggested that the US needed to talk directly to North Korea and that the US is now
beginning to do that. He added that it would be very difficult to convince North Korea to give up its
nuclear weapons. The UNSC sanctions had little effect on North Korea from the US perspective
because a kind of blockade was already in place and there was little trade and contact with North
Korea. He said that the parties had to keep going forward with the multilateral approach andencourage China to take a difficult stance against North Korea and prevent a resurgent Russia frombecoming a complicating factor. He added that South Korea had to see the advantages of holding astrong line against North Korea on the nuclear issue.
Another US participant said that one of the biggest mistakes of the Bush administration was the linethat “we don’t talk to evil regimes,” and that in reality there was no alternative to engaging North
Korea and talking to them.

Future of US‐Japan Alliance in Asia
A US participant said that strategic dialogue between Japan and the US had been strong at the
beginning of the Bush Administration and that it ought to be revived. He stated that the
US‐Japan‐China triangle is not an equilateral triangle, but a triangle where the US and Japan act
closely together. He said that the ability of the US to influence China is limited by the fact that China
is guided primarily by developments within itself, but that the ability to influence China ismaximized when the US and Japan are working closely together and when the alliance is very strong.
Another US participant said that there is a need to be aware of issues that would affect the alliance inthe 21st century and to broaden the discussion. He said one such issue would be the rise of India,
which was sure to become a major common concern. Another was the impact of climate change onenergy supplies and the safety of cities, which in many respects could be considered an issue similarin nature to weapons of mass destructions due to the damage that climate change could cause.

24

Ⅳ

Appendix1. An Introduction to GFJ【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization andregionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the
Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basisof such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion
leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed
concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it
was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly
to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William
BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward
LUMLEY, as representatives ofthe private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since
then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum tometamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World
Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global
consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participantsfrom the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's
activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanesecomponent (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board ofTrustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateraldialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's
Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing,self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan toengage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat ishoused in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on
International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro,
OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO
Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 12 Business Leader Members including the two Governors,
MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 88 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, ITO Kenichi, MURAKAMI
Masayasu, OKAWARA Yoshio, and SHIMADA Haruo; and 20 Diet Members including the three Governors, KOIKE Yuriko,
HATOYAMA Yukio, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the
Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by
12 leading Japanese business corporations (with 2 corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shareseach and the other 10 corporations contributing 1 share each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN
Exchange Projects, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. WATANABE Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangularcountries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US,
China, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Blacksea area , for the purposes of deepening mutual
understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchangeorganizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial numberof Japanese participants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its
overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given below.
Year Month

Topic

Co-sponsor

2003

Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in the Asia‐Pacific Region
Entrepreneurship in Asia
New Situation in Asia‐Pacific region and Japan‐Taiwan
Cooperation

ASEAN‐ISISA Roadmap towards East Asian Community
Future Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan‐China
Relationship
Future of Korean Peninsula and Japan‐U.S.‐Korea Security
Cooperation

ASEAN‐ISIS
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)

January
April
October

2004

July
September
November

2005

April
June
November

2006

2007

February
June
September
January

The Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan‐Korea
Cooperation
The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional
Cooperation
Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Roleof Japan
Review and Perspective of the Japan‐Taiwan Relationship
An East Asian Community and the United States
Prospect for Japan‐ASEAN Strategic Partnership after theFirst East Asia Summit
The China‐Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental
IssuesJune

The US‐Japan Alliance in the 21st Century

July

The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era

25

The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)Foundation on International & Cross‐Strait Studies (Taiwan)

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher School(US)Yonsei University (Korea)
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Korea)
ASEAN‐ISIS
University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University Foundation (Rumania)
The International Center for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)
Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community
The Japan Forum on International Relations, ASEAN‐ISIS
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission(China), The Japan Forum on International Relations
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)The Japan Forum on International Relations
The Japan Forum on International Relations, ASEAN‐ISISMembership List of The Global Forum of Japan
As of June 1, 2007

In alphabetical order【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies

ITO Eisei, Corporate Auditor, Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd.
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
ITO Tsuyoshi, Professor, Meiji University
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
JIMBO Ken, Assistant Professor, Keio University
KAI Noritake, Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
KANEKO Kumao, President, Japan Council for Economic Research
KAWAI Masao, Guest Professor, Hakuo University
KIMURA Takayuki, Guest Professor, International Christian University
KINOSHITA Hiroo, Director, Japan-U.S. Center for Peace and Cultural Exchange
KOGURE Masayoshi, former Professor, Toyo University
KOJIMA Tomoyuki, Professor, Keio University
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
MANO Teruhiko, Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University
MATSUMOTO Kenichi, Professor, Reitaku University
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman and CEO, Miyoshi Networks Co., Ltd.
MORI Toshimitsu, Advisor, The Michinoku Bank, Ltd.
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, The University of Shizuoka
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, Senior Advisor, Financial Services Agency
NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University
NAKOSHI Kenro, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, The University of TokyoOWADA Hisashi, Judge, International Court of Justice
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University, & Visiting Scholar, Columbia University
SAITO Akira, Corporate Officer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro,Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
SAJIMA Naoko, Professor, Senshu University
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
SHIMIZU Yoshikazu, Director, U.N. Association of JapanSHIRAISHI Takashi, Vice President, The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUDO Shigeru, Director of Energy and Environment Program, International Development Center of JapanSUMIDA Nagayoshi, President, The Sankei Shimbun
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAIDA Hideya, Special Assistant to the President, The Japan Foundation
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, Rikkyo University
TAKAHASHI Kazuo,Guest Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, Councilor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKEUCHI Yukio, Honorary Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, The University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANI Masahito, President, National Personnel Authority
TANINO Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to China
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
YAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru,President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry
YUSHITA Hiroyuki, Guest Professor, Kyorin University【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Acting Executive Governor】
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leader Governors】
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation【Diet Member Governors】
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)【Opinion Leader Governors】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------【Business Leader Members】(12 Members)
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, Director, Kajima Corporation
KOBAYASHI Yotaro, Chief Corporate Advisor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
MATSUNO Haruki, Chief Executive Counselor, Member of the Board, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation
TBD (To be determined), The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
【Diet Member Members】(20 Members)
AICHI Kazuo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)HATOYAMA Yukio, M.H.R. (DPJ)HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)
KITAGAMI Keiro, M.H.R. (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)
NAGASHIMA Akihisa, M.H.R. (DPJ)
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)
OGUSHI Hiroshi, M.H.R. (DPJ)
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)SUZUKI Keisuke, M.H.R. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)YAMAGUCHI Tsuyosi, M.H.R. (DPJ)YAMANAKA Akiko, M.H.R. (LDP)ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)NAITO Masamitsu, M.H.C. (DPJ)SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)【Opinion Leader Members】(88 Members)
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
AOKI Tamotsu, Commissioner, Agency for Cultural Affairs
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
ASOMURA Kuniaki, Dean, International Cooperation Course, Graduate School, Kibi International University
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
FUJITA Yukihisa, former Member of the House of Representatives【Supporters’ Club Members】(18 Members)
FUKUSHIMA Teruhiko, J.F. Oberlin University
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs【Executive Secretary】
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
WATANABE Mayu
HARUNA Mikio, Professor, Graduate School of Nagoya University
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, President, Japan-Australia-New Zealand Society
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin[Note]
DPJ: Democratic Party of JapanHIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
NK: New Komeito
ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University
IKEO Aiko, Professor, Waseda University
IMAGAWA Yukio, Former Ambassador to Cambodia
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, The University of TokyoIOKIBE Makoto, President, The National Defense Academy of Japan

26

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its “Business
Leader” members listed below for their generous
contributions. Their support is making the activities of
the Forum financially sustainable.

[GFJ Governors] [5 share]

Toyota Motor Corporation
Kikkoman Corporation[GFJ Members] [1 share]
Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha(In the order of enlistment)27

2. An Introduction to NCAFPThe National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor
Hans J. Morgenthau and Dr. George Schwab, its current president. It is a nonprofit, activist
organization dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the
NCAFP identifies, articulates, and helps advance American foreign policy interests from a
nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism.
American foreign policy interests include: preserving and strengthening national security; supporting
countries committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism;
improving U.S. relations with the developed and developing worlds; advancing human rights;
encouraging realistic arms‐control agreements; curbing the proliferation of nuclear and otherunconventional weapons; and promoting an open and global economy.
Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the NCAFP offers educational
programs that address security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of
publications, including its bimonthly journal, American Foreign Policy Interests, which present keen
analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy.
The NCAFP has been running Track II projects for over 15 years and specifically on Northeast Asian
security issues for a decade. It has organized three ongoing Track II projects on Northeast Asian
security – one on U.S.‐China relations with a particular emphasis on the Taiwan issue, a second on the
North Korea nuclear challenge, and a third on the future of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South
Korea. NCAFP pursues each of its Track II projects by holding closed‐door, off‐the‐record meetings
between officials, former officials and leaders in academia and business. The meetings fill a niche
between official dialogues by providing a forum where direct discussions can take place. The NCAFP
believes the alignment of many transnational security concerns calls for multilateral dialogue.
The Northeast Asian region is of paramount importance in the minds of those in power in the UnitedStates; it is in this region that the interests of three of the world’s principal nuclear powers (the UnitedStates, China and Russia) intersect; it is home to approximately 100,000 U.S. troops; and it contains
three of the world’s five largest economies (the United States, China and Japan). It is against thisbackdrop that the NCAFP strives to defuse potential areas of tension while seeking to maximize areasof common interest.
<The location of the office>National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.
320 Park Avenue, Eighth Floor, New York, NY 10022‐6839
Tel:+1 (212) 224‐1120 Fax: (212) 224‐2524
E‐mail: contact@ncafp.org

URL: http://www.ncafp.org

28

GF-Ⅲ-E-B-0035

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/