China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background andIssues for Congress
Updated August 16, 2024

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33153China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Summary
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of
U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway forabout 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more
modern and capable force. China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seasregion, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in the broader waters of the Western
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships, meaning the types of ships thatcount toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. DOD states that China’s navy “is the largest navyin the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants,
submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet
auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol
combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The… overall battle force [of China’snavy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030.” The U.S. Navy, bycomparison, included 296 battle force ships as of August 12, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025
budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of
FY2030. U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding thepace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China’s shipbuilding industry comparedwith the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes andcapabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of ship, aircraft, weapon, andC4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance) acquisition programs, as well as improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel
quality, education and training, and exercises. China’s navy currently has certain limitations andweaknesses, which it is working to overcome. China’s military modernization effort, including its
naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among otherthings, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree ofcontrol or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; defending
China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the
Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as theleading regional power and a major world power. Observers believe China wants its navy to becapable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S.
intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failingthat, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort.
Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;
assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific; maintained or increased general
presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation withallied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy;
initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies
and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; and developed new
operational concepts for countering PRC maritime A2/AD forces. The issue for Congress iswhether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans,budgets, and programs for responding to China’s naval modernization effort.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1
Sources and Terminology .......................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ........................................................... 2
Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ......................................................................... 6
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6
Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known ............................. 7
Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be
of Value Analytically ....................................................................................................... 7
Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships ........................................... 8
Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships ....................................... 12
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................... 18
Anti-Ship Missiles ............................................................................................................ 18
Submarines........................................................................................................................ 24
Aircraft Carriers ................................................................................................................ 28
Surface Combatants .......................................................................................................... 37
Amphibious Ships ............................................................................................................. 43
Operations Away from Home Waters................................................................................ 48
U.S. Navy Response................................................................................................................ 50
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 50
Planned Size of Navy ........................................................................................................ 51
Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems ........................................ 51
New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept ................................. 52
Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries ........................................ 53
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 54
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 54
U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power................................................................................. 55
Davidson Window/Decade of Concern ............................................................................. 56
Shipbuilding Capacity....................................................................................................... 59
Other Specific Issues......................................................................................................... 60
Legislative Activity for FY2025 .................................................................................................... 64
Coverage in Related CRS Reports .......................................................................................... 64
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638) ........................................ 65
House ................................................................................................................................ 65

FiguresFigure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ......................... 13
Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ................................. 14
Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships ....................................................... 15
Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships........................................................ 16
Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements ................................................... 17
Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy .......................... 18

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Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) ................................................................ 19
Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) ................................. 19
Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) .................................................. 21
Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 22
Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 23
Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher.............................. 23
Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS) ..................................................................... 26
Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN) ................................................................ 26
Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) ................................................... 27
Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier ........................................................................... 31
Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier ......................................................................... 32
Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 32
Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 33
Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 34
Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier ...................................................................... 35
Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter .................................................................. 36
Figure 23. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter .................................................................. 37
Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 38
Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 39
Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer .............................................................................. 40
Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate .................................................................................. 41
Figure 28. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette ....................................................................................... 42
Figure 29. Reported New Corvette Design ................................................................................... 42
Figure 30. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship ........................................................................... 43
Figure 31. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 44
Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 45
Figure 33. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship................................................................. 46

TablesTable 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004 ............................... 9
Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030 ........................... 11
Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040 ............................................... 12

Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and PRC Numbers of Ships and Naval Capabilities ..................... 68
Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter PLA ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons ................ 70

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 75

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Introduction
Issue for CongressThis report provides background information and issues for Congress on the naval modernization
effort of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and its implications for U.S. Navycapabilities. China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the
top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.1 The issue for Congress is whether to approve,
reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programsfor responding to China’s naval modernization effort. Congress’s decisions on this issue could
affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base.

Sources and Terminology
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,2 a
2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China’s military power,3 a 2015 Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI) report on China’s navy,4 published reference sources such as IHS Jane’sFighting Ships,5 and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization effort to refer to themodernization not only of China’s navy, but also of PLA forces outside China’s navy that can beused to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-shipballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air Forceaircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for
detecting and tracking ships at sea.
China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).
This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, andSouth China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between thePhilippines and Guam.6

1 For an overview of China’s military, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army

(PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For more on China’s military modernization effort being the top focus of U.S. defense
planning and budgeting, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, Annual
Report to Congress, released on October 19, 2023, 192 pp. Hereinafter 2023 DOD CMSD.
3 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp.
Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP.
4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21 st Century, undated but releasedin April 2015, 47 pp.
5 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2022-2023, and previous editions.
6 For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 69.

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Background
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following:
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China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader PRC militarymodernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,7 has been
underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed
China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force.
China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and
it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including
the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around
Europe.
China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in
Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy surpassed the U.S.
Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that counttoward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China’s navy the numericallylargest in the world. DOD states, “The PLAN is the largest navy in the world
with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants,
submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers,and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60
HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).
The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.”8
The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of August 12,
2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will
include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.9
U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm
regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China’s
shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s
navy and the U.S. Navy.10 China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to7 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic

warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging militaryapplicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy
technologies, and quantum technologies. For more on China’s military modernization effort in general, see CRS Report
R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For a discussion of advanced
military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler. U.S.China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic competition
that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions.
8 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 55. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background andIssues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 See, for example, Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval
Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024; James Stavridis, “China Has 350
Warships. The US Has 290. That’s a Problem,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2024; Lauren C. Williams, “China Is Winning the
Shipbuilding Numbers Game—and That’s a Problem, INDOPACOM Nom [Nominee] Says,” Defense One, February
2, 2024; Svetlana Shkolnikova, “China’s Buildup of Warships on a ‘Concerning Trajectory,’ Says Nominee to(continued...)Congressional Research Service2China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities•

the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water
ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has
faced since the end of the Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a PRC
challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military
power in the Western Pacific.
China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are much more modern and capablethan they were at the start of the 1990s, and are comparable in many respects to
those of Western navies. DOD states, “Today, the PLAN is largely composed ofmodern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors.”11 ONI states that “Chinese naval ship design
and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy]
ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”12

Command US Forces in Indo-Pacific,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2024; Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Navy Is
Falling Behind China, And The Pentagon Knows It,” 19FortyFive, October 31, 2023; Michael Lee, “Chinese
Shipbuilding Capacity Over 200 Times Greater Than US, Navy Intelligence Says,” Fox News, September 14, 2023;
Joseph Trevithick, “Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China’s 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity,” The
Drive, July 11, 2023; Chris Bradford, “Point of No Return, US Navy Faces Being Totally Outgunned by China in Just
Seven Years—We Need a Fleet Ready to Fight War Now, Says Expert,” U.S. Sun, March 1, 2023; Keith Griffith,“China's Naval Fleet Is Growing and the US ‘Can't Keep Up’ with the Warship Buildup as Beijing Uses Its Sea Powerto Project an ‘Increasingly Aggressive Military Posture Globally,’ Navy Secretary Warns,” Daily Mail (UK), February
23, 2023; Brad Lendon and Haley Britzky, “US Can’t Keep Up with China’s Warship Building, Navy Secretary Says,”
CNN, February 22, 2023; Meredith Roaten, “Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military
Leaders,” National Defense, January 26, 2023; Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning
About China From US Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China
Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022; Aidan Quigley, “Chinese Navy
Narrowing Capability Gap with U.S., Analysts Say,” Inside Defense, November 16, 2021; Alex Hollings, “Just How
Big Is China’s Navy? Bigger Than You Think,” Sandboxx, July 28, 2021; Kyle Mizokami, “China Just Commissioned
Three Warships in a Single Day, That’s Almost Half as Many as the U.S. Will Induct in One Year,” Popular
Mechanics, April 27, 2021; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “China’s Navy Has More Ships than the US. Does That Matter?” Navy
Times, April 9, 2021; Dan De Luce and Ken Dilanian, “China’s Growing Firepower Casts Doubt on Whether U.S.
Could Defend Taiwan, In War Games, China Often Wins, and U.S. Warships and Aircraft Are Kept at Bay,” NBC
News, March 27, 2021; Brad Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing Going to Do
with It?” CNN, March 5, 2021; Andrew S. Erickson, “A Guide to China’s Unprecedented Naval Shipbuilding Drive,”
Maritime Executive, February 11, 2021; Stephen Kuper, “Beijing Steps Up Naval Shipbuilding Program with Eyes on
Global Navy,” Defence Connect, January 11, 2021; James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for
the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, 32 pp.; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is theWorld’s Biggest Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge Advantage’ in aLong Fight with the US, Experts Say,” Business Insider, September 8, 2020; Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s‘World-Class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020; Dave Makichuk, “China’s Navy
Shipbuilders Are ‘Outbuilding Everybody,’” Asia Times, March 11, 2020; Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S.
and Chinese Navies Stack Up,” National Defense, March 9, 2020; H. I. Sutton, “The Chinese Navy Is Building An
Incredible Number Of Warships,” Forbes, December 15, 2019; Nick Childs and Tom Waldwyn, “China’s Naval
Shipbuilding: Delivering on Its Ambition in a Big Way,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 1,
2018; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life of Surface
Fleets,” Orbis, Spring 2017: 269-285.
For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever—
The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power,
Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp.
11 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
12 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission.

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China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform andweapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned
vehicles (UVs),13 and supporting C4ISR (command and control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements inlogistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.14
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, isassessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things,
addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater
degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly theSouth China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign
military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15
defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly
those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western
Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major
world power.16 Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting
maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating PRC nationals
from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarianassistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a
conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failingthat, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly
known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-levelgoal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total
ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected
force levels.
Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s
naval capabilities, China’s navy currently is assessed as having limitations or
weaknesses in certain areas,17 including joint operations with other parts of

13 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Reveals New Heavily Armed Extra-Large Uncrewed Submarine,” Naval

News, February 23, 2023; Ryan Martinson, “Gliders With Ears: A New Tool in China’s Subsea Surveillance Toolbox,”
Maritime Executive, March 21, 2022; Gabriel Honrada, “Underwater Drones Herald Sea Change in Pacific Warfare,”
Asia Times, January 12, 2022.
Ryan Fedasiuk, “Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea Vehicles,” Center forInternational Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 17, 2021.
14 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on theHigh Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020.
15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 For additional discussion, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020.
17 For a discussion focusing on these limitations or weaknesses, see Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime
Power, Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp. See also Tai Ming Cheung, “Russia’s Ukraine Disaster Exposes
China’s Military Weakness,” Foreign Policy, October 24, 2022.

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China’s military,18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited
capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far fromhome waters,19 a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,20 a needto train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,21 non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) that are not empowered by unit commanders through missioncommand to achieve a commander’s intent,22 and a lack of recent combat
experience.23 China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations and

18 See, for example, Ben Noon and Chris Bassler, “Schrodinger’s Military? Challenges for China’s MilitaryModernization Ambitions,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021.
19 See, for example, Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National
Defense, June 10, 2020.
20 See, for example, Kristin Huang, “Size of China’s Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet But What Can the PLA
Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2021.
21 See, for example, Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy Goes Back to Work on Big Ambitions but Long-Term Gaps
Remain,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could
Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,” USNI News, September 20, 2023.
22 See, for example, Rich Abott, “INDOPACOM Official Names Chinese Military Structure Limitations And Russian
Debts To China,” Defense Daily, October 12, 2023.
23 Alastair Gale, “China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?” Wall Street Journal, October 20,
2022; Benjamin Brimelow, “China’s Military Is Growing Rapidly, But It Hasn't Been ‘Tested’ Like US Troops Have,
Former Top US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, March 29, 2022. See also Andrew Scobell, “Xi Jinping’s Worst
Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2023.
In November 2023, The Economist published a collection of articles regarding weaknesses and limitations in China’s
military as a whole, including its navy. The online landing page for the collection is “Unknown Soldiers,
Overestimating China’s Armed Forces Would Be Dangerous, Argues Jeremy Page,” Economist, November 11, 2023.
Individual articles in the collection include the following: “How Scary is China? America Must Understand China’s
Weaknesses as Well as Its Strengths,” Economist, November 9, 2023; “The People’s Liberation Army Is Not Yet as
Formidable as the West Fears,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “From Hypersonic Missiles to Undersea Drones, The
PLA Is Making Leaps, But China’s Military Tech Still Lags Behind the West’s,” Economist, November 6, 2023;“China Is Struggling to Recruit Enough Highly Skilled Troops,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Worries
That China’s Troops Are Not Ready to Fight,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Is Obsessed with Political
Loyalty in the PLA, Ideology Is Undermining China’s Drive to Prepare Forces for Combat,” Economist, November 6,2023; “Invading Taiwan Would Be a Logistical Minefield for China,” Economist, November 6, 2023. See also Paul
Dibb, “Be Alert to China’s Military Weaknesses,” Strategist, December 1, 2023.
The use of a dual command structure in the crews of larger PLA Navy ships, involving both a commanding officer anda political officer, has been raised as a source of potential reduced command effectiveness in certain tactical situations.
See Mallory Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,”
USNI News, September 20, 2023; Roderick Lee, PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational
Performance, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, June 2023, 21 pp.; “Leadership:
China Cripples Naval Officers,” Strategy Page, July 18, 2020.
Some observers argue that corruption in China’s shipbuilding companies may be a source of weaknesses in China’s
naval modernization effort. See, for example, Zi Yang, “The Invisible Threat to China’s Navy: Corruption,” Diplomat,
May 19, 2020. See also Bloomberg News, “China’s Military Probes Slew of Graft Issues Going Back to 2017,”
Bloomberg, July 26, 2023; Gordan G. Chang, “China's Military Is Nowhere Near as Strong as the CCP Wants You toThink,” Newsweek, June 16, 2023; Frank Chen, “Ex-PLA Navy Chief in Deep Water Amid War on Graft,” Asia Times,
June 26, 2020.
Regarding corruption in China’s military in general, see, for example, “Xi Jinping Is Struggling to Stamp Out Graft in
the PLA, How Will It Affect China’s Fighting Ability?” Economist, January 11, 2024; Chun Han Wong, “China’s
Military Shake-Up Raises Questions About Combat Readiness,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2024; Peter Martin andJennifer Jacobs, “US Intelligence Shows Flawed China Missiles Led Xi to Purge Army,” Wall Street Journal,
December 6, 2023. For an alternative perspective, see Alex Velez-Green, “Corruption in China’s Military Is No Excuse
for American Complacency,” Defense News, January 22, 2024; John Grady, “Chinese Military Corruption Won’t Slow
PLA Expansion, Panel Says,” USNI News, October 31, 2023.

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5China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities•

weaknesses.24 Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may
nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to China’s leaders.
As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficientto perform a wider array of potential missions.
In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the sizeand capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China’s coast guard is “thelargest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world.”25 China also operates a
sizeable maritime militia that includes a large number of fishing vessels. China
relies primarily on its maritime militia and coast guard to assert and defend its
maritime claims in its near-seas region, with the navy operating over the horizon
as a potential backup force.26

Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy
Overview
DOD states

24 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some shipcomponents. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced incountry, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source:
Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China:
Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by
Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission.) Regarding the ASW capabilities of China’s Navy, DOD states
The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare capabilities through the development of its
surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability.
(2023 DOD CMSD, p. 56.)
See also Gabriel Honrada, “China Simulates ‘Z-day’ Total Sea War with the US,” Asia Times, July 5, 2023; Stephen
Chen, “Chinese Military Conjures World War Z Scenario of All-Out Conflict to Test and Evaluate New Navy
Weapons,” South China Morning Post, June 28, 2023; Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at
Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Bryan Clark, “Submarines Will Not
Solve America’s Eroding Undersea Advantage,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2022; Ryan D. Martinson andConor Kennedy, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Beijing’s New Approach to Prepare its Navy for War,” China
Brief, March 25, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Network: Bold Moves for Ocean
Dominance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, February 17, 2022.
25 DOD states that
The CCG’s [China Coast Guard’s] continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest
maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable thanolder vessels, allowing them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. While exact
numbers are unavailable, open-source reporting and commercial imagery counts indicate the CCG
has over 150 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels
include over 20 corvettes transferred from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. ,The newer, larger CCG vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity watercannons, multiple interceptor boats and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters., Revised estimatesindicate the CCG operates more than 50 regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which
can be used for limited offshore operations, and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499
tons).
(2023 DOD CMSD, pp. 79-80. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 78.)
26 For additional discussion, see 2023 DOD CMSD, pp. 79-82, and CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic
Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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6China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms,
including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine
warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include
approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles(ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.27

DIA states that “the PLAN is rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger,
multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons andsensors and C2 [command and control] facilities.”28
Another set of observers states:
China’s rapid military buildup has left the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) poised
to overtake the U.S. Navy in several measures of maritime might more quickly thansometimes assumed. If China continues to expand its fleet at the current pace and theUnited States does not revitalize its shipbuilding industry, China will grow increasingly
likely to emerge victorious from interstate war, especially a prolonged great power war….
China now possesses the world’s largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships[excluding auxiliary and support ships] to the U.S. Navy’s 219 [warships excluding
auxiliary and support ships].29

Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navymakes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows
planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected
force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.30 In contrast, China does not release a navy force-levelgoal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total shipprocurement quantities, planned ship retirements, or resulting projected force levels. The ultimate
size and composition of China’s navy might be an unsettled and evolving issue among China’s
military and political leaders. One observer states that “it seems the majority of past foreign
projections of Chinese military and Chinese navy procurement scale and speed have been
underestimates…. All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired ‘criticalmass’ to aspire toward. Whether the Chinese navy is close to its desired force or not, is of nosmall consequence.”31

Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can
Be of Value AnalyticallyRelative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative
numbers of U.S. and PLA ships (or comparative aggregate fleet displacements [i.e, tonnages]).
Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate displacement) is relatively
27 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 55. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
28 2019 DIA CMP, p. 69.
29 Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
30 For more information on the U.S. Navy’s force-level goal, 30-year shipbuilding plan, and five-year shipbuilding
plan, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,by Ronald O'Rourke.
31 Rick Joe, “Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s,” Diplomat, December 25, 2020.

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bearon a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. As a result,as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total numbers of ships inChina’s navy and the U.S. Navy (or aggregate displacements) are highly problematic as a meansof assessing relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to themissions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends overtime in these relative numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) can shed some light on how
the relative balance of U.S. and PLA naval capabilities might be changing over time.

Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports
Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships—those that might be thought of as
the principal combat ships (PCSs)32 of China’s navy—from 2004 to the present, along with thenumber of China Coast Guard ships from 2016 to the present, as presented in DOD’s annual
reports on military and security developments involving China. (The DOD report for a given year
presents data for PLA forces for the previous year.)33 As can be seen in Table 1, most types of
PLA Navy ships shown in the table have increased numerically since 2004.
As can be seen in Table 1, about 53% of the increase since 2004 in the total number of PLA Navy
ships shown in the table (a net increase of 59 ships out of a total net increase of 112 ships)
resulted from increases in missile-armed fast patrol craft starting in 2008 (a net increase of 9
ships) and corvettes starting in 2014 (50 ships). These are the smallest surface combatants shownin the table. The 50-ship increase in corvettes is due to the Jingdao (Type 056) corvette program
discussed later in this report. ONI states that “a significant portion of China’s Battle Forceconsists of the large number of new corvettes and guided-missile frigates recently built for the
PLAN.”34 As can also be seen in the table, most of the remaining increase since 2004 in thenumber of PLA Navy ships shown in the table is accounted for by increases in cruisers anddestroyers (29 ships) and amphibious ships (17 ships).
Table 1 lumps together less capable older PLA ships with more capable modern PLA ships. In
examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of the types of
PLA ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more capable modern
designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types was changing
little.
For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs),
meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy, and compares it to
the total number of the types of PLA ships that are shown in the table. The result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison, because the PLA figures exclude auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S.
Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S.
Navy has very few patrol craft). Changes over time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison,

32 The term principal combat ships (PCSs) is a term used in this CRS report.
33 Thus, the 2023 edition of the DOD report covers presents data for 2022, and so on for prior-year editions of thereport.
34 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission.

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8China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

however, can be of value in understanding trends in the comparative sizes of the U.S. and PLA
navies.
Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004
Figures for PLA ships taken from annual editions DOD reports on military and security developments
involving China dated 2005 and subsequent years, showing data for 2004 and subsequent years
Principal PLA combat ships—excludes auxiliary and support ships. (The figure fortotal U.S. battle force ships shown toward the right includes auxiliary and support
ships, but excludes patrol craft, of which the Navy has very few.)

Data forthat year(as shownin DOD
reportdated thefollowing
year)

SSB

SSN

SS

CV

CG

DD

FF

FFL

PC

2004

1

6

51

0

0

21

43

0

2005

1

5

50

0

0

25

45

2006

1

5

53

0

0

25

2007

1

5

54

0

0

2008

2

6

54

0

2009

2

6

54

2010

2

5

2011

2

2012

Submarines

Surface combatants

Amphibious ships

Total
U.S.
battle
force
ships

U.S.
vs.
China

LHA

LST/
LPD

LSM

Total

China
Coast
Guard

51

0

20

23

216

n/a

292

+76

0

45

0

25

25

221

n/a

281

+60

47

0

41

0

25

25

222

n/a

281

+59

29

45

0

45

0

26

28

233

n/a

279

+46

0

27

48

0

70

0

27

28

262

n/a

282

+20

0

0

25

49

0

85

0

27

28

276

n/a

285

+9

49

0

0

26

53

0

86

0

27

28

276

n/a

288

+12

5

48

0

0

26

53

0

86

0

28

23

271

n/a

284

+13

3

5

49

1

0

23

52

0

85

0

29

26

273

n/a

287

+14

2013

3

5

51

1

0

24

49

8

85

0

29

28

283

n/a

285

+2

2014

4

5

53

1

0

21

52

15

86

0

29

28

294

n/a

289

-5

2015

4

5

57

1

0

23

52

23

86

0

30

22

303

n/a

271

-32

2016

4

5

54

1

0

21

56

23

88

0

34

21

317

185

275

-42

2017

4

5

57

1

0

28

51

28

86

0

33

23

306

240

279

-27

2018

4

6

50

1

0

33

54

42

86

0

37

22

335

248

286

-49

2019

4

6

46

2

1

32

49

49

86

0

37

21

333

255

290

-43

2020

6

9

56

2

1

32

48

51

86

57

348

223

296

-52

2021

6

9

56

2

6

36

45

50

84

57

351

224

294

-57

2022

6

6

47

2

8

42

47

50

60

328

142

289

-39

-4

+2

+8

+21

+4

+50

+9

+112

n/a

-3

-115

3

57

Change from 2004 to 2022
+5

0

+17

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2023 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on militaryand security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military
power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure andShipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The DOD report shows data for
China for the year prior to the report’s cover date. For example, the 2005 edition of the DOD report shows
data for 2004.
Key to abbreviations: n/a = data not available in annual DOD report. SSB = ballistic missile submarines. SSN= nuclear-powered attack submarines. SS = diesel attack submarines. CV = aircraft carriers. CG = cruisers. DD= destroyers. FF = frigates. FFL = corvettes (i.e., light frigates). PC = missile-armed patrol craft. LST =amphibious tank landing ship. LPD = amphibious transport dock ship. LSM = amphibious medium landing ship.

Congressional Research Service

9China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities(Starting with the 2021 edition, the annual DOD report shows a combined figure for LST/LPD and LSM.)
Column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right, which shows what might be thought of as the principal
combat ships of China’s navy, does not include other PLAN ship types not shown to right, such as auxiliary andsupport ships. CCG = China Coast Guard ships. U.S. total = Total U.S. Navy battle force ships, which includes
auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). U.S. vs.
PLAN ship types shown = total U.S. Navy battle force ships compared to the column for Total PLAN shiptypes shown to right.
Notes: The DOD report generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2021 edition covers
events during 2020, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the 2021 column shows thefigure for the end of FY2020, and so on for earlier years.

On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2014, the total number of principal
combat ships in China’s navy (a figure that excludes PLAN auxiliary and support ships) surpassed
the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure that includes U.S. Navy auxiliary andsupport ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in composition between
the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many more diesel attack
submarines, frigates, and corvettes.35

Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020
Table 2 shows comparative total numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs),
as well as specific figures for certain types of ships that contribute toward China’s total number ofbattle force ships from 2000 to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The
figures for China’s ships are taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. (As noted
earlier, battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy.
The ONI information paper applied the same counting rules to the PLA Navy.) For China, thetotal number of battle force ships shown excludes the missile-armed patrol craft (PCs) shown in
Table 1, but includes auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared toTable 1, the figures in Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of thetwo navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft
can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain.36
As shown in Table 2, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle
force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1,
however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies.
The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy currently has many more diesel
attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.37

35 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking

China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
36 See, for example, Richard Sterk, “Chinese Missile Boats Operate on an Attack Swarm Principle,” Defense andSecurity Monitor, March 19, 2024.
37 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking
China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.

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Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030
Figures for PLA Navy ships taken from ONI information paper of February 2020
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Ballistic missile submarines

1

1

3

4

4

6

8

Nuclear-powered attack submarines

5

4

5

6

7

10

13

Diesel attack submarines

56

56

48

53

55

55

55

Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers

19

25

25

26

43

55

65

Frigates, corvettes

38

43

50

74

102

120

135

Total number of China Navy battle force
ships, including types not shown above

210

220

220

255

360

400

425

Total U.S. Navy battle force ships

318

282

288

271

296

287

294

U.S. total above compared to China total above

+108

+62

+68

+16

-64

-113

-131

Selected ship types

Sources: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for
Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy
Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS andCBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of
calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: In the column for the year 2000, the ONI information paper showed a figure for the total number ofChina navy battle force ships of 110, but the Navy later stated that this was a typo, and that the correct figure is210.

Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020
Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships in 2020, and projections of thosenumbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in
2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040. The figures for China’s ships
were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with Table 1, the result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison between the PLA Navy and U.S. Navy totals, because the PLA total excludes
auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total includes auxiliary and support ships, but
excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft).
As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Navy projects that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of
PLA ships of the types shown in the table will increase by 94, or about 39%, with most of that
increase (77 ships out of 94) coming from roughly equal increases in numbers of large surface
combatants (cruisers and destroyers—39 ships) and small surface combatants (frigates andcorvettes—38 ships). The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2040
assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships
in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year
editions of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.38

38 Congressional Budget Office, Perspectives on the Navy’s 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, Presentation by Eric J. Labs, ananalyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium, January 12,2023, available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58864, slide 8 of 24, entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet
Under the Past 11 Shipbuilding Plans, Compared With Actual Inventories.”

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Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040
Figures for PLA ships are from U.S. Navy, reflecting data as of October 2020
2020

2025

2030

2040

2040 change
from 2020

Ballistic missile submarines

4

6

8

10

+6

Nuclear-powered attack submarines

6

10

14

16

+10

Diesel attack submarines

47

47

46

46

-1

Aircraft carriers

2

3

5

6

+4

Cruisers and destroyers

41

52

60

80

+39

Frigates and corvettes

102

120

135

140

+38

LHA-type amphibious assault ships

0

4

4

6

+6

LPD-type amphibious ships

7

10

14

14

+7

LST-type amphibious tank landing ships

30

24

24

15

-15

TOTAL for China of types shown above

239

276

310

333

+94

TOTAL number of U.S. Navy battle force ships

296

287

294

378

+82

U.S. total above compared to China total above

+57

+9

-16

+45

-12

Ship type

Source: For PLA Navy ships: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, reflecting
data as of October 26, 2020. For U.S. Navy ships: U.S. Navy data—actual for 2020, and projections for
subsequent years shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan.

Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
Graph Showing PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force
Ships
Figure 1, which uses numbers from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy
principal combat ships (PCSs)—a figure that excludes auxiliary and support ships—and the total
number of U.S. Navy battle force ships—a figure that includes auxiliary and support ships. In
other words, Figure 1 depicts the apples-vs.-oranges comparison discussed earlier in connection
with Table 1 and Table 3. The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025
through 2040 assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented.
As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year
has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the
Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.39

39 Congressional Budget Office, Perspectives on the Navy’s 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, Presentation by Eric J. Labs, ananalyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium, January 12,2023, available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58864, slide 8 of 24, entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet
Under the Past 11 Shipbuilding Plans, Compared With Actual Inventories.”

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Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
PLAN principal combat ships (PCSs) excludes auxiliary and support ships; U.S. Navy battle force ships(BFSs) includes auxiliary and support ships

Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 3 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data,
including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. PCSs are
principal combat ships (which exclude auxiliary and support ships); BFSs are battle force ships (which include
auxiliary and support ships).

Graph Showing PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
Figure 2, which uses figures from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy
battle force ships (BFSs), the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships plus missile-armed
patrol craft (PCs), and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships. (As mentioned earlier, theU.S. Navy has very few patrol craft.) As discussed in connection with Table 2, comparing total
numbers of battle force ships comes closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of thetwo navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft
can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain. As discussed in connection
with Figure 1, the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040
assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by
CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been

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less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan.40
Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
Figures for both PLAN and U.S. Navy are total number of battle force ships (BFSs), which include auxiliaryand support ships.

Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 2 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data,
including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. BFSs arebattle force ships; PCs are missile-armed patrol craft.

Graph Showing PLAN and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding Patrol
Craft
Figure 3, which was prepared by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) using datafrom the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), shows numbers of PLA Navy andU.S. Navy principal combatant ships, excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs). The dashed line
at the top is the line for the U.S. Navy.
40 Congressional Budget Office, Perspectives on the Navy’s 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, Presentation by Eric J. Labs, ananalyst in CBO’s National Security Division, at the Surface Navy Association’s 35th National Symposium, January 12,2023, available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58864, slide 8 of 24, entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet
Under the Past 11 Shipbuilding Plans, Compared With Actual Inventories.”

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Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships
Excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs)

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.

Figure 4, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the launch dates of PLA
Navy and U.S. Navy warships. (Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final
stages of its construction.)

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Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Notes: Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction.

Figure 5, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the aggregate displacement(i.e., tonnage) of PLA Navy submarines and U.S. Navy submarines. A ship’s displacement issometimes used as a rough proxy for its capability, as a larger ship can carry more combat systemequipment and more weapons. As mentioned earlier and discussed in further detail in Appendix
A, displacement is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out other factors bearing on a ship’s
capability.

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Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Notes: “Chinese conventio…” is Chinese conventionally powered submarines. “Chinese nuclear-p…” isChinese nuclear-powered submarines.

Figure 6, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the ratio between theaggregate number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells on U.S. navy ships and the aggregate
number of VLS cells on PLA Navy ships. VLS cells are cells on a ship for storing and firing
missiles. A ship’s number of VLS cells is one measure of the ship’s weapon capacity, though not acomplete one, as ships can be armed with additional missiles that are fired from deck-mounted
box launchers rather than VLS cells, and ships can be armed with weapons other than missiles,
including guns. Even so, aggregate numbers of VLS cells are sometimes used as a shorthand formeasuring a navy’s total missile capacity.41

41 See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels

for Fiscal Year 2025, March 2024, p. 11 (Figure 1), and Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, p. 22 (Figure 8).

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Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Notes: VLS is vertical launch system.

Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Below are brief overviews of selected elements of China’s naval modernization effort.

Anti-Ship Missiles
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China has fielded two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at
sea at extended ranges—the DF-21D (Figure 7), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile(ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 810 nautical miles), and theDF-26 (Figure 8), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a

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maximum range of 3,000 kilometers to 4,000 kilometers42 (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles to
2,160 nautical miles) that DOD says “is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear
warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS [South China Sea] from mainland China.”43
Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,”
AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.

Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng-26 (DF-26),”
Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019,
accessed August 28, 2019.

42 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 66. A map on page 69 of the report shows the DF-26 with a range of 4,000 kilometers.
43 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 67. The report similarly states on page 89: “The DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile is acapable of ranging Guam and is capable of conducting nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.”

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Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China toattack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in theWestern Pacific.44 The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to
ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon.
China reportedly is developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into PLA ASBMs,
could make PLA ASBMs more difficult to intercept. A February 2, 2023, press report states
For the first time, the PLA has officially revealed the performance of its advanced antiship hypersonic missile, sending a warning to the US amid high tensions in the Taiwan
Strait, Chinese analysts said.
China’s YJ-21, or Eagle Strike-21, has a terminal speed of Mach 10, cannot be interceptedby any anti-missile weapons system in the world and can launch lethal strikes towards
enemy ships, according to an article posted by the official Weibo account of the People’s
Liberation Army Strategic Support Force on Monday [January 30]....
The article declares that the missile travels six times the speed of sound all the way, andhas a terminal speed of 10 times the speed of sound, meaning a speed of 3,400 metres per
second (11,155 feet per second) when it hits the target.
“Such a terminal speed cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapon system at thisstage. Even if it is dropped directly at this terrifying speed [hitting the target] without an
explosion it will cause a fatal strike to the enemy ship,” the article stated.
The debut of its export variant, the YJ-21E, at last year’s Airshow China “shows that thedomestic version of the Eagle Strike-21 ship-borne hypersonic missile is no longer thenavy’s most advanced ship-borne hypersonic missile, and more advanced ship-borne
hypersonic missiles are likely to have appeared,” it said.
The article was first published on the website of China Science Communication,
Guangming Online last year, but it was reposted by an official PLA account for the firsttime, a development experts described as a clear message for the US. 45

An August 9, 2024, press report states:
Through a series of images and videos that went viral via Open Source Intelligence(OSINT) sources, the latest test launches of the new YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile
from a Type 055 destroyer of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have come tolight….
The YJ-21 is one of the most advanced hypersonic anti-ship missiles in service at thePeople’s Liberation Army Navy, with an operational range of approximately 1,500
kilometers [about 810 nm] and cruising speeds of Mach 6, reaching terminal speeds ofMach 10.
Although many details about the missile remain classified, various sources speculate thatthe missile is an adapted version for launch from surface ships, based on the CM-401
missile, but with substantial improvements in speed and range. Furthermore, as various

44 See, for example, Chris Panella, “China Has a Lot More Missiles — with US Warships and Bases in Its Sights,”

Business Insider, May 4, 2024.
45 Amber Wang, “Chinese Military Announces YJ-21 Missile Abilities in Social Media Post Read as Warning to US
Amid Tension in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023. Material in brackets as in original. See
also Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Hypersonic Triad Pressing Down on US,” Asia Times, April 4, 2023.

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reports suggest, there are versions designed to be launched from H-6N bombers in service
with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.46

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
China’s extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 9, Figure 10, andFigure 11 for examples of reported images) includes both Russian- and PRC-made designs,
including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the PRC-made YJ-18.47
Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, “China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic
ASCM,” Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states “This is an article published in our December 2016
Issue.”) The article states “According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and Industry
Corporation (CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as ‘the world’s best anti-ship missile.’ The
missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in earlyNovember [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be usedin the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-302
is the export version of CASIC’s YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC’s armed forces.”

Although China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs,
observers are nevertheless concerned about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively
long ranges of certain PLA ASCMs have led to concerns among some observers that the U.S.
Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged
ASCMs.

46 “A Type 055 Destroyer of the Chinese Navy Successfully Conducted the Launch of the New YJ-21 Hypersonic Anti-

Ship Missile,” Zona Militar, August 9, 2024. See also Mark Nicol, “China Has Made ‘Dramatic Advances’ in Its
Hypersonic Missiles that Can Reach up to 6,500mph and Are Almost Impossible to Stop, Intelligence Officials Warn,”
Daily Mail (UK), February 7, 2024.
47 2023 DOD CMSD, pp. 56-57. See also Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, PT. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower And
Mass Firing Schemes,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 1, 2023 (the acronym DMO refers
to distributed maritime operations); Sam Goldsmith, Vampire Vampire Vampire, The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 2022, 43 pp.;
Michael Peck, “Chinese Scientists Say They’re Working on an Anti-Ship Missile that Can Fly as High as an Airlinerand Dive as Deep as a Submarine,” Business Insider, October 20, 2022; “China Is Developing a New Supersonic AntiShip Missile,” Naval News, September 19, 2022.

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Press reports in April 2019 and December 2021 stated that China might be developing a YJ-18
launcher that can be packaged inside a standard commercial shipping container, for the potential
purpose of surreptitiously deploying YJ-18s on merchant ships (Figure 12),48 a capability that, if
implemented, could violate the law of naval warfare.49
Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Photograph accompanying “YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1,
2019. The article states, “A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People’s
Republic of China’s 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship missiles
called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in central
Beijing.”

48 See, for example, Bill Gertz, “China Building Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Ship Container,”

Washington Free Beacon, March 27, 2019; Alex Hollings, “China’s New Long-Range Cruise Missiles Are Built to be
Fired from Containers on Merchant Ships,” SOFREP (Special Operations Forces Report), April 4, 2019; “China Is
Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers,” Navy Recognition, April 8, 2019; Rajesh
Uppal, “Threat of Concealed Weapon and Missiles Systems on Standard International Shipping Container,”
International Defense, Security & Technology, October 20, 2021; Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in
Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.
See also Fan Wei and Cao Siqi, “China Debuts Container-Type Missile Launch System; Weapon Can ‘Effectively
Improve Defense Capabilities of Coastal Countries,’” Global Times, November 12, 2022.
49 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare,”
International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College), vol. 97, 2021: 1160-1170.

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Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing
China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study ofChinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an
unnumbered page following page 14. The caption to the photograph states, “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos.

Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher

Source: Illustration accompanying Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for
Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.

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Submarines
Overview
China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now
built to relatively modern PRC and Russian designs.50 Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines
might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,51 but compared to China’s earlier
submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much morecapable.52 An August 2023 Naval War College Report on China’s submarines states
After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on
the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues thatthe propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could
approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped witha pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18
vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.
China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its
predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN
in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in
terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096
would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security. 53

A September 2023 Naval War College report on China’s submarine industrial base states
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting themodernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, boththrough robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading ofproduction infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards…. Nevertheless,
China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses inpropulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with
Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technologicallimitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining
undersea technology secrets.54
50 For a discussion of Russian military transfers to China, including transfers of submarine technology, see Paul

Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS), June 2021, 8 pp. See also Gabriel Honrada, “China-Russia in a Nuclear Sub Counter to
AUKUS,” Asia Times, October 23, 2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Top Russian Submarine Design Bureau Hit By Cyber
Attack With Chinese Characteristics,” The Drive, May 10, 2021.
51 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines as being the most capable faced by the U.S. Navy. See,for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese and Russian Subs,”
Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia’s Submarines,” National Interest,
October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface Challenge,” Waron the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the Pentagon,” Foreign
Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News,
October 28, 2014.
52 For an additional overview of China’s submarine force, see U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies
Institute, Quick Look Report “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” undated, 2 pp., whichsummarizes an academic conference on China’s undersea warfare capabilities that was held by the China Maritime
Studies Institute on April 11-13, 2023. See also Alastair Gale, “The Era of Total U.S. Submarine Dominance Over
China Is Ending, New Chinese Submarines and Sensors to Catch U.S. Subs Will Alter the Balance of Power,” WallStreet Journal, November 20, 2023.
53 Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang, A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines Nuclear
Submarines, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, August 2023, p. 1.
54 Sarah Kirchberger, China’s Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics State-Led(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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Types and Numbers
Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also
operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number ofnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may
grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue for some time to consist mostly of SSs.
DOD states that “the PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its
force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate newtechnologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-poweredballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48
diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). The PLAN’s submarine force is
expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement ofolder hulls due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.”55
ONI states that “China’s submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with
substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine
production yards could allow higher future production numbers.” ONI projects that China’s
submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76
boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030.56 A November 27, 2022, press report states “Thedry-docks at China’s nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased
activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International
analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a newgeneration of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.”57
China’s newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 13), its newest
SSN class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 14), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin(Type 094) class SSBN (Figure 15).
DOD states
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, thePLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO-class SS units, eight of which are capable oflaunching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039)
and 21 YUAN-class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP)(Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN-classsubmarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO-class submarines(both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.58

Innovation with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College,
September 2023, p. 1.
552023 DOD CMSD, p. 55.
56 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 1. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission. See also H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Production Of AIP Submarines With Massive New
Shipyard,” Naval News, February 16, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Nuclear Submarine Under
Construction,” Naval News, February 1, 2021.
57 Jamie Seidel, “Satellite Photos Reveal China’s Hypocrisy After Dig to Australia,” News.com.au, November 27,
2022. See also H. I. Sutton, “Further Expansion Of China's Nuclear Submarine Shipyard,” HISutton.com, January 5,
2023.
58 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 55.

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Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS)

Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 039A Yuan class,” SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August28, 2019.

Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)

Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, “Type 093 Shang Class,” July 1, 2018, accessed August 27,
2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/.

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Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China Puts a Damper on Navy’s 70th
Anniversary Celebrations As It Tries to Allay Fears Over Rising Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 23,
2019. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua.

DOD states further that
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear submarines—two SHANG
I-class SSNs (TYPE 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (TYPE 093A), and six JIN-class
SSBNs (TYPE 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) (3,900NM) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400NM), the PLAN’s six
operational JIN-class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.
Each JIN-class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles
at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation TYPE 096
SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The TYPE 096 will
likely begin construction in the near future. Based on the projected 30-plus-year service
life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and TYPE 096 SSBN fleets concurrently
in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve“stronger growth.”
The PRC launched two SHANG III (TYPE 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack
submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of
this class operational hulls by 2025. This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the
PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option
if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its antisubmarine warfare capabilities through the development of its surface combatants andspecial mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare(ASW) capability.59

A June 21, 2024, press report states:

59 2023 DOD CMSD, pp. 55-56. See also Ryan Chan, “Satellite Photos Show China Building New Submarine,”

Newsweek, July 29, 2024; Thomas Newdick, “China’s Latest Submarine Features X-Shaped Stern,” The War Zone,
July 29, 2024.

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China’s increased focus on nuclear-powered submarines is aimed at boosting long-distancenaval combat and deterrence power amid growing risks of high-seas confrontation with theUS, according to military analysts.
The People’s Liberation Army has for the first time publicly acknowledged a strategic shift
away from conventional submarines, as Beijing pushes to build a modernised military by
2027.
“The current development of China’s submarine fleet is dual-capable, both nuclearpowered and conventional, with a focus on nuclear capabilities,” Wen Xuexing, a memberof a PLA Navy submarine unit, told state broadcaster CCTV. 60

Submarine Weapons
China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided andwake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface
ships to decoy. DOD states that each Jin-class SSBN is equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3
nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).61 The JL-3 is a new SLBM with arange longer than that of the JL-2. A May 2, 2021, press report stated that China’s latest Jin-class
SSBN is armed with JL-3s.62

Aircraft Carriers
Overview
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001), entered service in 2012. China’s second aircraft
carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 002), entered service in
2019. China’s third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), reportedly conducted sea trials in early May 2024.
China’s fourth carrier reportedly has begun construction.
Liaoning and Shandong are conventionally powered and launch fixed-wing aircraft using a “skiramp” at the ship’s bow. Compared with Liaoning and Shandong, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are
60 Zhao Ziwen and Coy Li, “Chinese Military Focusing on Nuclear-Powered Subs with Eye on US Navy: Analysts,”

South China Morning Post, June 21, 2024.
61 2023 DOD CMSD, pp. 55, 108. DOD estimates the range of the JL-2 at 3,900 nautical miles (2023 DOD CMSD, p.
55). Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) fromprotected bastions close to China, targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) fromlocations south of Japan, targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from
mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii, or targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii. DOD states
thatWith a range of approximately 3,900NM, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in
the mid-Pacific Ocean in order to threaten targets in the western half of the Continental UnitedStates (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii in order to threaten targets on the East
Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400NM which would
allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS [continental United States] from
Chinese littoral waters.
(2023 DOD CMSD, p. 59. See also pp. viii, 104, 108.)
See also Kyle Mizokami, “China’s New Submarine-Launched Missile Can Reach the Western U.S., The JL-3 NuclearTipped Missile Can Only Hit About a Third of the United States, But It’s Enough,” Popular Mechanics, November 28,
2022.
62 Minnie Chan, “China’s New Nuclear Submarine Missiles Expand Range in US: Analysts,” South China Morning
Post, May 2, 2021. The article states that the JL-3 has a “range [of] over 10,000km (6,200 miles), a source close to the[PLA] navy said.” Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack larger portions of the United States from thelocations described in the previous footnote.

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larger, nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising endurance than a conventionally poweredship), able to embark and operate a larger number of aircraft, and launch fixed-wing aircraft using
catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of aircraft
launched with a ski ramp. Fujian is conventionally powered, closer in size and flight deck
configuration to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers,63 and equipped with catapults rather than a ski ramp
for launching aircraft.
Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly morethan six) aircraft carriers. Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters carrierbased aircraft operations on a substantial scale.64
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for PLA operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based PLA aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is acquiring
carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate China’s status asa leading regional power and major world power. PLA aircraft carriers could be used for powerprojection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces, and toimpress or intimidate foreign observers.65 In a combat situation involving opposing U.S. naval
and air forces, PLA aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships andaircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing othermissions. PLA aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), andnoncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

Liaoning (Type 001)
Liaoning (Figure 16) is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from
Ukraine in 1998 as an unfinished ship.66 It has an estimated full load displacement of about
60,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing airplanes andhelicopters, including 24 fighters. Some observers have referred to the Liaoning as China’s“starter” carrier. China has used Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018, China reportedly
announced that the aircraft carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached initial operational
capability (IOC),67 although that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD inconnection with U.S. weapon systems.
63 For a graphic providing an overhead comparison of the Type 003 design to the U.S. Navy’s Gerald R. Ford (CVN-

78) class aircraft carrier design, see Kathrin Hille, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Prepares to Take to the Seas,”
Financial Times, September 12, 2023.
64 For additional discussion, see Bradley Perrett, “Chinese Carrier Aircraft Fleet Is Poised For Rapid Growth,” Aviation
Week, June 20, 2023; Michael Dahm, “Lessons from the Changing Geometry of PLA Navy Carrier Ops,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, January 2023; Michael Peck, “China Is Scrambling to Find Pilots to Fly From Its Growing
Aircraft Carrier Fleet,” Business Insider, March 8, 2023.
65 For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft
Carriers, China’s Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
April 10, 2014; Sebastien Roblin, “All of the Reasons Why the World Should Fear China’s Aircraft Carriers,” National
Interest, October 24, 2017. See also Ben Ho Wan Beng, “(Re)assessing the Near-Term Chinese Carrier Threat in a
Taiwan Scenario,” Breaking Defense, July 21, 2023.
66 Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union and the place
where the Soviet Union built its aircraft carriers.
67 Andrew Tate, “Liaoning Carrier Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4,
2018. See also Travis Fedschun, “China Says Carrier Group Reaches ‘Initial’ Combat Capability,” Fox News, May 31,
2018; “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Formation Capable of Systemic Combat Operation,” CGTV.com, May 31, 2018;(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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Shandong (Type 002)
Shandong (Figure 17) is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design
improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air
wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.68 Its displacement is estimated at about 66,000 tons.

Fujian (Type 003)
Fujian (and Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20) was launched (i.e., put into the water for the
final stages of its construction) on June 17, 2022,69 and reportedly conducted sea trials in earlyMay 2024.70 ONI expects the ship to enter service by 2024,71 though some observers believe it
could be years before the ship begins making regular deployments.72 The ship has an estimatedfull load displacement of about 80,000 tons and is equipped, as observers had expected, withelectromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which will improve the range/payload capabilityof the fixed-wing aircraft that it operates.73

China’s Fourth Carrier
A March 7, 2024, press report states that construction of China’s fourth aircraft carrier reportedly
has begun.74 The ship’s design, including its estimated displacement and whether it will be
nuclear-powered or conventionally powered, had not been announced as of March 2024.75

Global Times, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Forming All-Weather Combat Capability with Successful Night Takeoff andLanding,” People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2018.
68 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,”
Global Times, August 13, 2019; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,”
South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019.
69 See, for example, Alexandra Stevenson, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier in Major Milestone for Xi Jinping,”
New York Times, June 17, 2022; Chun Han Wong, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier, Advancing Naval
Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2022; Jack Lau, “China Launches Fujian, PLA Navy’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier,”
South China Morning Post, June 17, 2022.
70 See, for example, Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,” China Daily, May 8,2024; Jesse Johnson, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Begins First Sea Trials,” Japan Times, May 1, 2024; Brad
Lendon, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Heads to Sea for First Time,” CNN, May 1, 2024; Dzirhan Mahadzir,“Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Leaves for First Set of Sea Trials,” USNI News, May 1, 2024; Jun Mai, Yuanyue
Dang, and Hayley Wong, “China’s Third Aircraft Carrier Fujian Tests Power, Navigation in Maiden Sea Trial,” South
China Morning Post, May 1, 2024; Yuichi Shiga and Tamayo Muto, “China Flexes Muscle at Sea as New Aircraft
Carrier Starts Trials,” Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024; Albee Zhang, Ryan Woo and Kevin Krolicki, “China Launches Sea
Trials for Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier,” Reuters, May 1, 2024.
71 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission.
72 See, for example, Alex Wilson, “China’s Newest Carrier Likely Several Years Away from Regular Deployments,
Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, May 2, 2024.
73 China Power Team. “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), May 17, 2023 (updated May 3, 2024); Naval News, “3rd China Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Fujian Holds
Propulsion Tests,” Navy Recognition, May 4, 2023.
74 Fabrice Wolf, “The Construction of the 4th Chinese Aircraft Carrier Has Reportedly Started,” Meta-Defense.FR,
March 7, 2024.
75 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China to Unveil Fourth Aircraft Carrier Soon: PLA Navy Political Commissar,”
Global Times, march 6, 2024.

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Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Chris Osieck, “Analysis of Chinese Aircraft Carriers
Their History, Modifications, Spotted Places, and What the Future Has in Store for Us,” Medium, June 14, 2022.

Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier
China reportedly is building a new dedicated drone carrier (i.e., a carrier whose embarked air
wing would consist entirely of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) (Figure 21).76

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship
See also the discussion of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship that might be equipped with anelectromagnetic aircraft catapult, in the section on China’s amphibious ships.

Commercial Heavy-Lift Ship Reportedly Used in Exercise as Helicopter Carrier
In August 2020, it was reported that China had used a commercial heavy-lift ship in a military
exercise as a platform for operating at least two PLA Army helicopters.77
76 H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First Dedicated Drone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024.
77 David Axe, “Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship Into An Instant Helicopter Carrier,”(continued...)Congressional Research Service

31China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “China’s Shandong Aircraft Carrier Strike GroupOperated under Strict Surveillance by Japanese Naval Air Assets,” Zona Militar, July 17, 2024.

Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Orange Wang, “China Says Its Fujian Carrier Is World’s
Largest Conventionally Powered Warship,” South China Morning Post, June 23, 2024. The caption to thephotograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.

Forbes, August 22, 2020; Dave Makichuk, “PLA Army Tests Commercial Ships as Wartime Flight Decks,” Asia
Times, August 25, 2020; John Dotson, “Semi-Submersible Heavy Lift Vessels: A New “Maritime Relay Platform” for
PLA Cross-Strait Operations?” Jamestown Foundation, August 31, 2020.

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Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes
Maiden Sea Trials,” China Daily, May 8, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.

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Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,”
China Daily, May 8, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.

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Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First DedicatedDrone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024. The uncropped version carries a mark showing that it is from
Airbus DS. The line extending away from the left end of the ship is an annotation that was added to theuncropped version to indicate that this is the dedicated drone carrier.

Carrier-Based Aircraft78
China’s primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15 or Flying Shark (Figure 22 and Figure23), an aircraft derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate fromcarriers equipped with a ski ramp rather than catapults, but which some observers have critiqued
for its range/payload limitations in operations from carriers equipped with ski ramps rather thancatapults.79 December 2021 press reports stated that China had developed an upgraded, catapultcapable version of the J-15 that could have improved range/payload when operated from acatapult-equipped carrier.80
China may be developing a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31/J-31 fifth-generation stealthfighter to complement or succeed the J-15 on catapult-equipped PLA carriers.81 China reportedly
78 For an overview of PLA naval aviation forces, see “PLA Navy Aerospace Forces” in PLA Aerospace Power: A

Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 3rd Edition, Air University, China Aerospace
Studies Institute (CASI), undated, posted August 15, 2022, pp. 38-52. See also Akhil Kadidal, “Armed to the Teeth:
China’s New Aircraft Carrier Provides Unprecedented Strike Power,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 5, 2023.
79 For a discussion of the J-15, see, for example, Rick Joe, “China’s J-15 Carrierborne Fighter: Sizing up theCompetition,” Diplomat, May 20, 2021.
80 Andreas Rupprecht Mainz and Jon Grevatt, “Shenyang Produces First Catapult-Capable J-15,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, December 16, 2021; David Axe, “China’s Next Carrier Fighter Is A Lighter, Meaner J-15,” Forbes, December
20, 2021.
81 See 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 62; Yukio Tajima, “China Develops New Stealth Aircraft Likely to Be Deployed on
Carriers,” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2024; Amber Wang, “China’s Latest Stealth Fighter Jet ‘J-31B’ Ready for MilitaryService, CCTV Video Post Suggests,” South China Morning Post, July 6, 2024; Daniel Salisbury, PRC Navy Likely
Testing Carrier-Based Stealth Fighters, China Aerospace Studies Institute, January 2022, 3 pp.; Mike Yeo, “New
Variants of Chinese Stealth Fighters Break Cover,” Defense News, October 29, 2021; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is Working
on a Next-Generation Fighter Jet for Its Growing Fleet of Aircraft Carriers and Could Unveil It This Year,” Business
Insider, September 30, 2021; Zhao Lei, “New AVIC Fighter Jet to Appear ‘Before Year’s End,’” China Daily,
September 30, 2021; Reuben Johnson, “China’s J-35 Carrier Fighter Appears; Step To ‘Most Powerful Navy’?”(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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is also developing a carrier-based airborne early warning (NAEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600,
that is similar to the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft,82 and stealth drone
aircraft.83
Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying “China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy
from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea,” Military Watch Magazine,
August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.

Breaking Defense, July 1, 2021; Reuben Johnson, “COVID, Hacking, and Spying Helped China Develop a New StealthFighter in Record Time,” Bulwark, June 23, 2021; Mike Yeo, “Stealth Fighter Mock-up Appears at China’s Aircraft
Carrier Testing Facility,” Defense News, June 9, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Sighting Of New Stealth Fighter For Chinese
Navy’s Aircraft Carriers,” Naval News, June 8, 2021; Rick Joe, “The FC-31, China’s ‘Other’ Stealth Fighter, A Look at
the Jet with Many Names—and Its Carrier-Based Future,” Diplomat, February 18, 2021; Kris Osborn, “Is China
Building Its Own F-35 Fighter Jets for its Aircraft Carriers?” National Interest, July 3, 2020; Caleb Larson, “FC-31:
China’s Next Carrier Jet is Stolen and Stealthy,” National Interest, April 18, 2020; Sebastien Roblin, “China’s New
Aircraft Carriers Are Getting Stealth Fighters,” National Interest, October 26, 2019; Rick Joe, “Beyond China’s J-20
Stealth Fighter,” Diplomat, September 20, 2019; Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy ‘Set to Pick J-20 Stealth Jets for Its Next
Generation Carriers,’” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2019. See also Thomas Newdick, “New Images Of
China’s Elusive Catapult-Capable J-15T Carrier Fighter Emerge,” The Drive, November 18, 2020.
82 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 58. See also, for example, Liu Zhen, “China’s Military Steps Up Development of Ship-Based
Warplanes to Keep Up with Aircraft Carrier Advances,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2022; Liu Xuanzun,“China’s First Carrier-Based Early Warning Plane Continues Flight Tests: Report,” Global Times, February 22, 2021;
H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Carrier-Based AEW Plane,” Forbes, August 29, 2020; Liu Xuanzun,“China’s First Carrier-Based, Fixed-Wing Early Warning Aircraft Makes Maiden Flight: Reports,” Global Times,
September 1, 2020; Peter Suciu, “The Xian KJ-600 Could Make China’s Aircraft Carriers Far More Powerful,”National Interest, September 5, 2020; Kris Osborn, “KJ-600: China’s New Surveillance Plane Will Make Their
Aircraft Carriers Even More Deadly,” National Interest, September 8, 2020.
83 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China
Morning Post, September 17, 2019. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Seen With A Fleet Of
Drones On Its Deck,” The Drive, June 2, 2022.

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Figure 23. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying Mike Yeo, “Footage Shows Domestic Engine on China’s J-15 Fighter Jet,”
Defense News, November 28, 2022. The article credits the photograph to China’s Defense Ministry.

Surface Combatants
Overview
China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built
surface combatants, including a new cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), several classesof destroyers and frigates, a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missilearmed patrol craft.
These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navysurface combatant technology. DOD states that China’s navy “remains engaged in a robust
shipbuilding program for surface combatants. As of late 2022, the PLAN was building an aircraft
carrier, a new batch of guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and a new batch ofguided missile frigates, including a new 054 variant designated JIANGKAI III. These assets will
significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and willbe critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air
defense systems.”84 DIA states that “the era of past designs has given way to production ofmodern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China’s technologicaladvancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some84 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 56.

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cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.”85 China is also upgrading its older surface
combatants with new weapons and other equipment.86

Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer
China is building a new class of cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), called the Renhaiclass or Type 055 (Figure 24 and Figure 25) that reportedly displaces between 12,000 and
13,000 tons.87 A March 7, 2021, press report by a PRC media outlet states that the ship displaces
more than 12,000 tons.88 By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) classcruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers anddestroyers) displace about 10,100 tons and 9,700 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy’s threeZumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers displace about 15,700 tons. ONI states that Type 055 ships
are being built by two shipyards.89 The first Type 055 ship was reportedly commissioned into
service in January 2020,90 and the 10th was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water for the
final stages of its construction) in May 2024.91
Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Type-055 Destroyer Sails at Sea,” People’s Daily Online,
December 18, 2023. The photograph is credited to eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou.

85 2019 DIA CMP, p. 70.
86 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Potency Of Anti-Carrier Capabilities,” Forbes, May 1, 2020; Peter

Suciu, “Chinese Warships Are Now Armed with Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles,” National Interest, May 10, 2020.
87 One article from a Chinse media outlet, for example, states, “This ship class has a displacement of more than 12,000
tons.” (Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese PLA’s Two Newly Commissioned Large Destroyers ‘Ready for Combat’ with Latest
Drills,” Global Times, August 22, 2022.) See also China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s
Daily Online, March 10, 2021.) For a discussion of the Type 055 design, see Sidharth Kaushal, “The Type 055: A
Glimpse into the PLAN’s Developmental Trajectory,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 19, 2020.
88 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021.
89 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission.
90 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021. See also
China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s Daily Online, March 10, 2021; Xavier Vavasseur,“China’s 2nd Type 055 Destroyer ‘Lhasa’ 拉萨 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, March 7, 2021; Xavier
Vavasseur, “China Commissions A Type 055 DDG, A Type 075 LHD And A Type 094 SSBN In A Single Day,”
Naval News, April 24, 2021.
91 Alex Luck, “China Launches 10th Type 055 Vessel, Increases Production At Dagushan,” Naval News, May 28,
2024.

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Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Photograph accompanying Seong Hyeon Choi, “China Could Match US in Military Conflict Thanks to
Shipbuilding Strength, Analysts Say,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2024. A caption to the photograph credits
the photograph to Weibo.

Type 052 Destroyer
China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 26), whichdisplaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile
systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Press
reports in March 2021 stated that China had begun to put into service an upgraded version of theType 052D, informally called the Type 052DL, that incorporates an extended-length helicopter
flight deck and a new radar.92
Type 052D ships have been in serial production for some time; a March 12, 2023, press reportstates that the 27th and the 28th Type 052D ships had been launched (i.e., put into the water for the
final stages of their construction), and that three additional Type 052D ships were underconstruction at the same shipyard.93

92 “Chinese Navy Commissions Upgraded Variation of the Type 052D Destroyer,” Navy Recognition, March 3, 2021;

Liu Xuanzun, “PLA’s 4th Improved Type 052D Destroyer Makes Maiden Appearance in Maritime Exercise,” Global
Times, March 30, 2021; Liu Zhen, “Chinese Navy Sails New Destroyers in South China Sea Amid Military
Shipbuilding Spree,” South China Morning Post, June 15, 2021.
93 Tayfun Ozberk, “China Launches Two More Type 052DL Destroyers In Dalian,” Naval News, March 12, 2023. See
also Liu Xuanzun, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers: Media,” Global Times, March 12, 2023; John
Hill, “China’s Navy Launches New Destroyers at Dalian Shipyard,” Naval Technology, March 14, 2023. An August(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Type 052D Luyang-III Class,” SinoDefence.com,
September 3, 2017, accessed August 28, 2019.

Type 054 Frigate
China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 27), whichdisplaces about 4,000 tons. ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service
between 2008 and 2019.94 Construction of Type 054 frigates reportedly has shifted to improved
versions called the Type 054AG and 054B.95

21, 2022, press report (Xavier Vavasseur, “Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China,” Naval News,
August 21, 2022) referred to a photograph of five Type 05D ships under construction at a shipyard at Dalian, China.
The article stated, “Contacted by Naval News, two Chinese military observers confirmed that there are currently 25
destroyers of the class (13 Type 052D and 12 Type 052DL) currently in service with the PLAN. They will soon bejoined by the five under construction at Dalian and (at least) one more being built at the Jiangnan Changxing
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Corporation (the other Chinese shipyard building large surface combatants, locatedNorth East of Shanghai).”
94 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with thecommittee’s permission. For a press article discussing the potential features of China’s next frigate design beyond theType 054A, see Rick Joe, “What Will the Chinese Navy’s Next Frigate Look Like?” Diplomat, May 15, 2020.
95 Alex Luck, “China Launches Improved Type 054AG Frigate, More Hulls Coming,” Naval News, August 14, 2024;
Liu Zhen, “China’s Navy Starts Open Water Trials for New Type 054B Frigate,” South China Morning Post, January
19, 2024; Minnie Chan, “China Has Launched Bigger, Faster Version of 054A Guided Missile Frigate, Online Photos
Suggest,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2023; Alex Luck, “China’s Type 054B Next-Gen Frigate Under
Construction?” Naval News, January 30, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Makes Progress on Advanced Warship Bigger
than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2023; “China
Makes Progress on Advanced Warship Bigger than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,” Pakistan
Defence, January 27, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Naval Steel Order Sparks Speculation over Bigger, Faster Frigate,”
South China Morning Post, May 7, 2022.

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Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate

Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, “Type 054A (Jiangkai II class) FFG-546
Yancheng Guided Missile Frigate in Mediterranean,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in
February of 2014), accessed August 29, 2018.

Type 056 Corvette
China has also built a new class of corvettes (i.e., a light frigates, or FFLs) called Jiangdao classor Type 056 ships (Figure 28) that reportedly displace 1,300 tons to 1,500 tons.96 Type 056 ships
were built at a high annual rate in four shipyards—the first was commissioned in 2013, and the72nd and final ship of the type was reportedly commissioned in early 2021, implying an averagecommisisoning rate of about eight ships per year. DOD states that China’s navy “commissioned
the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently
transferred the early flight TYPE 056 variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in
2021, probably due to the early models’ lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs(056A) are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are, thus, capable of contributing to ASW
operations.”97 As shown in Table 1, the rapid growth in the number of Type 056 corvettes since2013 accounts for a substantial share of the net increase in the total number of ships in China’s
navy since 2013.

96 For an overview of the Type 056 corvette, see Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of theFirst Island Chain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2022.
97 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 56.

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Figure 28. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette

Source: Cropped version of image included at Chinese Military Review, “Random Images of Chinese Type 056
Jiangdao Class Light Corvette,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in October 2013),
accessed August 29, 2018.

Reported New Corvette Design
China reportedly has built at least one example of a new corvette (i.e., light frigate or FFL) designthat observers estimate to be somewhat larger than the Type 056 design. It is not clear whether
this ship is a test platform or the lead ship of a new class of corvettes.98
Figure 29. Reported New Corvette Design

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Joseph Trevithick and Oliver Parken, “China’s
Mysterious Stealthy Warship Has Headed Out To Sea (Updated),” The War Zone, May 14, 2024.

98 Joseph Trevithick and Oliver Parken, “China’s Mysterious Stealthy Warship Has Headed Out To Sea (Updated),”The War Zone, May 14, 2024.

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Amphibious Ships
Type 071 Amphibious Ship
China’s new Yuzhao or Type 071 amphibious ships (Figure 30) have an estimated displacementof more than 19,855 tons,99 compared to about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio(LPD-17) class amphibious ships. A May 6, 2021, press report states that the eighth Type 071 ship“recently made its first publicly known maritime exercise appearance.”100
Figure 30. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship

Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, “Jinggang Shan (999) Type 071 YUZHAOClass Amphibious Transport Dock,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in February 2012),
accessed August 29, 2018.

Type 075 Amphibious Assault ShipIn April 2021, China commissioned into service the first of a new type of amphibious assault
ship,101 called the Yushen or Type 075 (Figure 31 and Figure 32), that has an estimateddisplacement of about 36,000 tons, compared to 41,000 to 45,000 tons for U.S. Navy LHA/LHDtype amphibious assault ships.102 In March 2022, it was reported that the first Type 075 ship had
99 Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. IHS Jane’s Fighting

Ships 2017-2018, p. 156, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 19,855 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 19,855 tons.
100 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Newly Commissioned Amphibious Landing Ship Joins Exercises, ‘to Form PowerfulPartnership with Amphibious Assault Ship,’” Global Times, May 6, 2021.
101 Amphibious assault ships, also referred to as helicopter carriers or (in British parlance) commando carriers, look likemedium-sized aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships are designated LHA or LHD.
102 See, for example, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “China’s
Massive Next-Generation Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), August 1, 2024; Mike Yeo, “China simultaneously commissions three warships on Navy anniversary,” Defense
News, April 26, 2021. For an in-depth discussion of the Type 075 design, see Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell,
The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval
War College, China Maritime Report No. 23, October 2022, 45 pp.

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achieved initial operational capability (IOC),103 although that term might not mean the same as it
does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems.
The second Type 075 ship reportedly was commissioned into service in late December 2021.104
The third was reportedly commissioned on or perhaps a few days prior to October 1, 2022.105 The
fourth was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) in
December 2023.106
Figure 31. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, “China Is Finishing Its First Large Helicopter Assault Ship,”National Interest, October 29, 2019.

103 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 1st Amphibious Assault Ship Reaches Initial Operating Capability, To Make World Tour,”Global Times, March 2, 2022; Ridzwan Rahmat, “China’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Achieves Initial
Operating Capability,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2022.
104 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 2nd Type 075 LHD Guangxi 广西 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, December

30, 2021.
105 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 3rd Type 075 LHD Anhui 安徽 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, October 1,

2022.
106 Xavier Vavasseur, “China Launches 4th Type 075 LHD For The PLAN,” Naval News, December 14, 2023. See also
“Construction of China Navy Fourth Type 075 LHD Progressing Well,” Navy Recognition, November 10, 2023.

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Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, “Chinese Military’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Begins
Sea Trial,” South China Morning Post, August 7, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Weibo. Possible Type
076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship.

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship
China reportedly is building a new type of amphibious assault ship called the Yulan or Type 076
that has an estimated displacement of 50,000 tons and might be equipped with an electromagnetic
aircraft catapult (Figure 33). An August 1, 2024, blog entry states:
New satellite imagery of China’s sprawling Changxing Island Shipbuilding Base shows
rapid progress on the construction of the first Yulan-class landing helicopter assault (LHA)
ship. Dubbed the Type 076, the vessel represents a substantial step forward in the abilityof the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to project power farther from China’s shores.
Once completed, the Type 076 will be the world’s largest amphibious assault ship. Satellite
imagery from July 4, 2024, shows that its flight deck spans approximately 260 meters by
52 meters, which is over 13,500 square meters (m2)—nearly the area of three U.S. football

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fields. That is considerably larger than the U.S. America-class LHA and Japanese Izumoclass helicopter carriers (CVHM/DDH). The Type 076 will also be much larger than its
Chinese predecessor, the Type 075….
… The vessel will feature significant technological upgrades that place it in a class above
its peers. Most notably, it will boast a catapult for launching fixed-wing aircraft, making it
unique among all other amphibious assault ships. Historically, only “flat top” aircraft
carriers have been outfitted with catapults, while amphibious assault ships have only beenable to launch helicopters and vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft such as
the F-35B. China has not yet fielded manned aircraft with V/STOL capabilities.
The Type 076’s catapult will likely be similar to the electromagnetic aircraft launch system(EMALS) pioneered by the U.S. Ford-class aircraft carriers….
The exact timeline of the Type 076’s construction is unknown, but even for China’s prolificshipyards, the pace of the ship’s progress has been extraordinary. Extrapolating from theconstruction timeline of China’s Fujian carrier and its Type 075s, the Type 076 could belaunched into the water in the first half of 2025. It will then take another several months oreven years before the ship is commissioned into China’s navy.107

Figure 33. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S.
Bermudez Jr., “China’s Massive Next-Generation Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), August 1, 2024.

Amphibious Ship Roles and Missions
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071, Type 075, and Type 076 would be ofvalue for conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers
107 Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “China’s Massive Next-

Generation Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 1,
2024. See also Maritime Executive, “China is Building the World's Largest Amphib and Adding a Catapult,” Maritime
Executive, August 1, 2024; Chen Chuanren, “China Equipping Amphibious Assault Ship With UCAS Launch System,”
Aviation Week, June 10, 2024.

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believe that China is building such ships in part for their value in conducting other operations,such as operations for asserting and defending China’s claims in the South and East China Seas,humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as
antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, amphibious
ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities) and for
impressing or intimidating foreign observers.108

Potential Use of Commercial Ships
Whether and when China will become capable of conducting a large-scale amphibious invasionof Taiwan is an ongoing matter of debate and discussion.109 In assessing China’s capacity for
conducting a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, some observers have focused on China’s
potential for using civilian ferries and other commercial ships to augment the transport andlanding capacity of China’s amphibious ships. Reported PLA exercises indicate that China is
exploring and testing this concept.110

108 See, for example, Grant Newsham, “China’s Amphibious Force Emerges,” Asia Times, November 5, 2019.
109 See, for example, Jeff Seldin, “Doubts Cast China Will Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027,” VOA, April 17, 2024;

Jesse Johnson, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, U.S. Commander Says,” Japan Times, March
21, 2027; Laura Zhou, “PLA May Not Be Ready for Major Amphibious Attack on Taiwan Before 2030: Ex-US NavyIntelligence Officer,” South China Morning Post, February 11, 2024.
110 See, for example, Gregor Stuart Hunter, “China Preparing Armada of Ferries to Invade Taiwan,” Telegraph (UK),May 26, 2024; Conor M. Kennedy, Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option for a Cross-Strait Invasion, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, CMSI Note No. 4, February 8, 2024, 6 pp.; J. Michael Dahm,
Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales, The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China's Military Activities, 2023, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 35, February 2024, 68 pp.; Matthew P.
Funaiole, Brian Hart, Jaehyun Han, and Jennifer Jun, “China Accelerates Construction of ‘Ro-Ro’ Vessels, withPotential Military Implications,” China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), October 11,2023; Jack Lau, “China’s Navy Includes Civilian Ferry in Military Transport Drill,” South China Morning Post, July26, 2023; John Konrad, “Is COSCO China’s Secret Invasion Fleet?” gCaptain, April 1, 2023; Conor Kennedy, “RORO Ferries and the Expansion of the PLA’S Landing Ship Fleet,” Center for International Maritime Security(CIMSEC), March 27, 2023; J. Michael Dahm, More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in
Military Activities, 2021-2022 Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022, China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 25, January 2023, 71 pp.; Parth Satam,“Civilian Ship Armed With Tanks—Scary Images Reveal China’s ‘Notorious Plan’ To Invade & Annex Taiwan,”
Eurasian Times, November 8, 2022; Thomas Shugart, “Mind the Gap, Part 2: The Cross-Strait Potential of China’s
Civilian Shipping Has Grown,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2022; H I Sutton and Sam LaGrone, “Chinese Launch
Assault Craft from Civilian Car Ferries in Mass Amphibious Invasion Drill, Satellite Photos Show,” USNI News,
September 28, 2022; Bethany Dawson, “China Is Using a Stealth Fleet of Fishing Boats and Ferries to Boost Its Naval
Power, Say Military Experts,” Business Insider, September 24, 2022; David Rising, “China Using Civilian Ships toEnhance Navy Capability, Reach,” Associated Press, September 24, 2022; Thomas Shugart, “Mind The Gap: How
China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2022; J. Michael Dahm,
Chinese Ferry Tales, The PLA’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Support of Over-the-Shore Logistics, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 16, November 2021, 56 pp.; Brian
Waidelich, Patrick deGategno, Timothy Ditter, and Thomas Bickford, Chinese Views of Civilian Ship Mobilization,
DSI-2021-U-030614-Final, CNA, November 10, 2021, 2 pp. (with a note indicating that it is a summary based on the
full-length CNA report, Chinese Views of Civilian Ships’ Support to PLA Maritime Operations, DRM2021-C-029795Final); Kris Osborn, “Could China’s Civilian Ferries Play a Role in a Taiwan Invasion?” National Interest, October 21,
2021; Keoni Everington, “Video Shows Ship Packed with Chinese Tanks for ‘Future Battlefield’ in Taiwan,” Taiwan
News, October 18, 2021; Michael Dahm and Conor M. Kennedy, “Civilian Shipping: Ferrying the People’s Liberation
Army Ashore,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), September 9, 2021; Chris Horton, “China
Mobilizes Civilian Ferries for Taiwan Invasion Drills,” Nikkei Asia, August 25, 2021; Andrew Tate, “Chinese Military
Using Commercial Ro-Ro Shipping to Enhance Its Amphibious Capabilities,” Jane’s, August 23, 2021; Thomas
Shugart, “Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August
16, 2021; Mike Yeo, “China Reportedly Converted Civilian Ferries for Amphibious Assault Operations,” Defense(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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Operations Away from Home Waters
Ship Operations
Although China’s navy operates primarily in China’s home waters, PLA Navy ships are
conducting increasing numbers of operations away from China’s home waters, including thebroader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters surrounding Europe,
including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. A November 23, 2019, DOD news report
quoted Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as statingthat China’s navy had conducted more global naval deployments in the past 30 months than it hadin the previous 30 years.111
DOD states that “the PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC [first island chain] ismodest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger
and more advanced platforms. The PRC’s experience in extended range operations primarily
comes from extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulfof Aden.”112 China has been conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since December
2008 via a succession of more than 45 rotationally deployed naval escort task forces.113 China’s
long-distance naval deployments have also been for making diplomatic port calls and conducting
training exercises.

Current or Potential Bases Outside China
China’s distant naval operations are supported in part by China’s military base in Djibouti,
which is located where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea. China officially opened the base inAugust 2017 as its first overseas military base.114
Some observers expect that China in coming years will seek to establish a global network oflocations in various parts of the world for refueling and resupplying PLA Navy ships conducting
distant naval operations.115
News, August 4, 2021; David Hambling, “China Converts Car Ferries For Amphibious Assault,” Forbes, July 27, 2021;
Courtney Mabeus, “Chinese Navy Using Commercial Car Ferries to Launch Amphibious Landing Craft,” USNI News,
July 26, 2021; Conor Kennedy, “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift,” China
Brief, July 16, 2021.
111 David Vergun, “Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander,”DOD News, November 23, 2019.
112 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 54. See also p. 91.
113 See Dennis J. Blasko, Recent Changes in the PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Deployment Pattern, China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI), Naval War College, CMSI Note No. 8, August 13, 2024, 8 pp. See also, for example, “45th, 46th
Chinese naval escort taskforces rotate in Gulf of Aden,” China Military Online, March 6, 2024; Aadil Brar, “China
Sends Warships to the Middle East,” Newsweek, February 22, 2024.
114 For discussions of Djibouti and other potential PLA military bases outside China, see 2023 DOD CMSD, pp. xi,
154-156; Kathrin Hille, Demetri Sevastopulo, and John Paul Rathbone, “China Denies Building Naval Bases But Fearof Its Military Reach Grows,” Financial Times, June 19, 2022. Regarding China’s military base in Djibouti, see H. I.
Sutton, “Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base,” Forbes, May 10, 2020; Peter Suciu,“China’s Naval Base in Africa Is Getting Bigger. Is a Network of Bases Next?” National Interest, May 11, 2020; staff
writer, “Chinese Navy Expanding Base in Africa, Satellite Images Confirm,” War Is Boring, May 11, 2020; Jean-Pierre
Cabestan, “China’s Djibouti Naval Base Increasing Its Power,” East Asia Forum, May 16, 2020; Dave Makichuk,“China Builds a Mega-Fortress on the Horn of Africa,” Asia Times, May 18, 2020; Michael Evans, “Beijing’s African
Port Ready for Aircraft Carriers,” Times (UK), May 19, 2020.
115 See, for example, Maxwell Simon and Jayaram Ravi, Navigating China’s Opportunistic Approach to Overseas
Naval Base Acquisition, Belfer Center (Harvard Kennedy School), November 2023, 69 pp.; Cristina L. Garafola,(continued...)Congressional Research Service

48China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Observers are now following developments at Cambodia’s Ream naval base, which fronts onto
the Gulf of Thailand.116 DOD states, “In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would
have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base.”117 The first PLA Navy ships reportedly
docked at the base in December 2023.118
A security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands that was announced by the
Solomon Islands in April 2022 has led some observers to express concern that the agreement
could eventually lead to, among other things, the establishment of a PRC naval base in that

Stephen Watts, and Kristin J. Leuschner, China’s Global Basing Ambitions, Defense Implications for the United States,
RAND, report RRA1496-1, 2022, 31 pp.; Brad Lendon and Simone McCarthy, “Blue-Water Ambitions: Is China
Looking Beyond Its Neighborhood Now It Has the World’s Largest Navy?” CNN, September 2, 2023; John Grady,“Beijing Investing in Network of Global Chinese Naval Bases, Researchers Find,” USNI News, August 16, 2023;
Rathindra Kuruwita, “AidData Report Warns of a Chinese Naval Base in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port,” Diplomat,
August 15, 2023; Guy Taylor, “Port Call: China’s Navy Scouting Range of Sites for Future Overseas Bases,”
Washington Times, August 15, 2023; Philip Heijmans, “China’s Top Option for Next Naval Base Is Sri Lanka, Report
Says,” Bloomberg, July 28, 2023; Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang, “Beijing Is Going Places—and Building Naval
Bases,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2023; Alex Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson, Harboring
Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases, AidData (William &Mary), July 2023 (posted online July 25, 2023), 44 pp.
116 RFA Staff, “Cambodian Naval Base Could Accommodate Chinese Submarines: Analyst,” Radio Free Asia (RFA),
July 26, 2024; Agnes Chang and Hannah Beech, “The Chinese Base That Isn’t There,” New York Times, July 14, 2024;
Christopher Woody, “China’s Newest Military Base Abroad Is Up and Running, and There Are More on the Horizon,”
Breaking Defense, July 12, 2024; Austin Ramzy, “Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but Two Ships Raise
Suspicions,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2024; RFA Staff, “Record Number of Chinese Warships Operating in
Cambodia,” Radio Free Asia (RFA), May 21, 2024; Sopheng Cheang and David Rising, “Chinese Warships Have Been
Docked in Cambodia for 5 Months, But Government Says It’s Not Permanent,” Associated Press, May 8, 2024; Seong
Hyeon Choi, “Chinese War Ships Have ‘Exclusive’ Access at Cambodia Port: US Report,” South China Morning Post,
April 19, 2024; Shaun Turton and Bopha Phorn,” Nikkei Asia, April 18, 2024; “First Among Piers: Chinese Ships Settle
in at Cambodia’s Ream,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), April 18, 2024; Yuji Nitta, “Chinese Warships Spotted Again at Cambodia Naval Base,” Nikkei Asia, April 1,
2024; Aadil Brar, “US Worried About China-Funded Naval Base,” Newsweek, March 8, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “USHas ‘Serious Concerns’ about Chinese-Funded Upgrade to Cambodian Naval Base, Senior Diplomat Daniel
Kritenbrink Says,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 2024; Aadil Brar, “Satellite Photos Show China's Dramatic
Progress at Foreign Naval Base,” Newsweek, February 23, 2024.
117 2023 DOD CMSD, p. 154.
118 David Brunnstrom, “US Monitoring Reports of Chinese Warships at Cambodian Base,” Reuters, December 6, 2023;
Nectar Gan, “The First Chinese Warships Have Docked at a Newly Expanded Cambodian Naval Base. Should the US
Be Worried?” CNN, December 6, 2023; Philip Heijmans, “US Raises Concern Over China Warships’ Rare Stop in
Cambodia,” Bloomberg, December 6 (updated December 7), 2023; Jack Lau, “Chinese Warships Visit Controversial
Cambodian Naval Base for Joint Exercise,” South China Morning Post, December 6, 2023; RFA Staff, “Chinese
Warships Dock at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base for ‘Training,’” Radio Free Asia (RFA), December 6, 2023. See also
H.I. Sutton, “Chinese Navy’s Suspected New Overseas Base In Cambodia Now Even Larger,” Naval News, November
13, 2023.
For press reports in July 2022 about construction of the base nearing completion, see James Brooke, “China
Completing Major Naval Base in Cambodia, Capable of Docking Its New Generation of Carriers,” New York Sun, July28, 2023; Ashish Dangwal, “China’s 1st Naval Facility In Indo-Pacific Almost Ready; Capable Of Hosting Aircraft
Carrier–Reports,” Eurasian Times, July 26, 2023; Sun Narin and Han Noy, “Cambodian Ream Naval Base Modernizedby China Nears Completion: Defense Ministry,” VOA, July 26, 2023; Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chinese Base in
Cambodia Nears Completion in Challenge to US Naval Power,” Financial Times, July 24, 2023; Blacksky, “Blacksky
Releases Imagery of Near-Complete Chinese Military Naval Station in Cambodia,” press release dated July 24, 2023.

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country.119 The Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands reportedly ruled out that possibility, statingthat it would “put our country and our people as targets for potential military strikes.”120
In December 2021, it was reported that China may be seeking to establish a military (including
naval) base at a port in Equatorial Guinea, a country located on the Atlantic coast of Africa—alocation that could enhance China’s ability to conduct naval operations in the Atlantic.121
A January 3, 2023, press report states “China is once again pressuring Argentina to build a naval
base in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego province, which would mean opening the door to Antarctica
for Beijing.”122
A November 7, 2023, press report states, “President Joe Biden has been briefed on what his
advisers see as a PRC plan to build a military facility in Oman, people familiar with the matter
said, amid a broader effort by Beijing to deepen defense and diplomatic ties with the Middle
East.”123

U.S. Navy Response
Overview
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort.
Among other things, the U.S. Navy has•

shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;124

119 See, for example, Camilla Pohle-Anderson, “China’s Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the PacificIslands,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 21, 2022; Damien Cave, “Why a Chinese Security Deal in the Pacific Could
Ripple Through the World, In Potentially Opening the Door to a Chinese Military Base, the Solomon Islands Threatens
the Balance of Power in a Vital Shipping Region,” New York Times, April 20, 2022; Ralph Jennings, “Analysts:
Chinese Navy to Grow Through 2050, With Emphasis on Hardware,” Voice of America, April 5, 2022.
120 See, for example, “Solomons Leader: Chinese Base Would Make His People Targets,” Associated Press, July 14,2022; John Feng, “China Military Base in Solomon Islands Ruled Out in Blow to Naval Ambitions,” Newsweek, July
14, 2022; Lice Movono and Kate Lyons, “Solomon Islands PM Rules Out China Military Base and Says Australia is‘Security Partner of Choice,’” Guardian, July 13, 2022.
121 See, for example, Nadia Helmy, “The Impact of the Potential Chinese Naval Bases on the Atlantic Ocean,” Modern
Diplomacy, February 15, 2024; Michael M. Phillips, “U.S.-China Tensions Have a New Front: A Naval Base in
Africa,” Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2024; Alex Vines, Henry Tugendhat, and Armida van Rij, “Is China Eyeinga Second Military Base in Africa?” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 30, 2024; Paul Nantulya, “Considerations for a
Prospective New Chinese Naval Base in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 12, 2022; Cobus van Staden,“Fears of a Chinese Naval Base in West Africa Are Overblown,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2022; Michael M. Phillips,“U.S. Aims to Thwart China’s Plan for Atlantic Base in Africa,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2022; Bonny Lin,
Jude Blanchette, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, “Is China Building a New String of Pearls in
the Atlantic Ocean?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 20, 2021; Michael M. Phillips,“China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds, Alarmed Officials at the WhiteHouse and Pentagon Urge Equatorial Guinea to Rebuff Beijing’s Overtures,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021.
122 Guillermo Saavedra, “China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base,” Diálogo Americas, January 3, 2023.
123 Michelle Jamrisko and Jennifer Jacobs, “Biden Briefed on Chinese Effort to Put Military Base in Oman,”
Bloomberg, November 7, 2023.
124 Efforts in this regard began at least as far back as 2006: The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available andsustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.” (U.S.
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. February 6, 2006, p. 47.) Subsequent
to this directive, the Navy announced an intention to increase to 60% (from a starting point of about 55%) thepercentage of the fleet as a whole that is assigned to the Pacific. An October 13, 2021, press report stated, “US Naval
Chief of Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, on Tuesday kicked off his 5-day visit to India by meeting his Indian(continued...)Congressional Research Service

50China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

•
•

•
•

•
•

assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific;
maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental
exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the
Indo-Pacific;
increased the planned future size of the Navy;
initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new
military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, andweapons;
developed new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy and Marine
Corps forces) for countering PLA maritime A2/AD forces; andsignaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet
architecture that will feature a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles.

Some of the above items are discussed in more detail below.

Planned Size of Navy
As discussed in greater detail in another CRS report,125 the Navy’s preferred force-level goal calls
for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 381 battle force ships, compared to the Navy’s 296 battle
force ships as of August 12, 2024. Under the Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054)
shipbuilding plan, the U.S. Navy would grow to more than 300 ships in FY2032 and reach a totalof more than 381 ships in FY2042.

Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems
Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons, and othersystems can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability tocounter PLA maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples include the following:••••

Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs);126
the Navy’s envisaged next-generation SSN, called the SSN(X);127
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs);128
Navy and Marine Corps versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);129

counterpart Admiral Karambir Singh, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and other senior government
officials.... Asked about what the US intends to do to counter China’s aggressive modernisation of its Navy, Gilday
said they will not try to outspend it, but partners like India in the region will be the key to ensure that the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) is stable. Given the importance of the region, 60 per cent of US Navy’s forces are now in the IndoPacific, he said.” (Krishn Kaushik, “60% Navy Forces in Indo-Pacific Region Now: US Navy Chief,” Indian Express,
October 13, 2021.)
125 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
126 For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
127 For more on the SSN(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
128 For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
129 For more on the JSF program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by John R.
Hoehn.

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•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class guided missile destroyers (DDGs);130
the Navy’s envisaged next-generation DDG, called the DDG(X);131
Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates;132
new anti-ship weapons, such as the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM);133
hypersonic weapons, including the ship-launched Conventional Prompt Strike(CPS) weapon and the Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO) weapon, also
known as OASuW Increment 2;134
shipboard high-energy lasers;135
new electronic warfare systems;136 andundersea surveillance systems for detecting and tracking adversary
submarines.137

New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept
As discussed in other CRS reports,138 the Department of the Navy (which includes the Navy andMarine Corps) is implementing a new operating concept called Distributed Maritime Operations(DMO) for using U.S. naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) forces in combat operations against an
adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S.
Navy surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other weapons. Key features of DMO appear toinclude the following:••

Dispersing Navy units over a larger area within the theater of operations, so as tomake it harder for an adversary to detect and target Navy units, while still
permitting Navy units to support one another and concentrate their fires onadversary targets.
Spreading the Navy’s sensors and weapons across a wider array of ships andaircraft, so as to reduce the fraction of the Navy’s sensors and weapons that

130 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
131 For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
132 For more on the FFG-62 program, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
133 For more on the LRASM program, see CRS In Focus IF11353, Defense Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions,by Daniel M. Gettinger.
134 For more on the CPS program, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues forCongress, by Kelley M. Sayler
135
For more on Navy laser programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
136 See, for example, Thomas Newdick, “Destroyer Looks Radically Different After Electronic Warfare Upgrade,” The
War Zone, November 8, 2023; Brett Tingley and Tyler Rogoway, “Navy’s New Shipboard Electronic Warfare System
Is Being Shrunk Down For Smaller Ships,” The War Zone, January 15, 2022.
137 See, for example, Joe Brock, “U.S. Revives Cold War Submarine Spy Program to Counter China,” Reuters,
September 21, 2023; Anders Hagstrom, “US Pours Billions into Cold War Submarine Program as China Bolsters
Navy,” Fox News, September 21, 2023.
138 See CRS In Focus IF12599, Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept, by Ronald
O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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52China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities••

would be lost due to the destruction of any one Navy ship or aircraft (i.e., avoid“putting too many eggs into one basket”).
Making greater use of longer-ranged weapons, unmanned vessels, and unmanned
aircraft in support of the previous two points.
Using resilient communication links and networking technologies to knit theresulting widely dispersed force of manned and unmanned ships and aircraft into
a coordinated battle force that can withstand and adapt to enemy attacks on Navycommunications and networks.

Some examples of Navy acquisition programs that appear associated with DMO include thefollowing:
•

•

•

•

•

Programs for acquiring longer-ranged weapons, such as the Maritime Strike
Tomahawk (a new anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile) and thepreviously mentioned Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).
The Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV), which is to be equipped with a
Vertical Launch System (VLS) for storing and firing anti-ship missiles and otherweapons. LUSVs are intended to act as adjunct missile magazines for manned
Navy surface combatants.139
The Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV), which is to be equipped withradars or other sensors. MUSVs are intended to help form a distributed sensor
network for supporting Navy operations.140
The light replenishment oiler (TAOL) shipbuilding program for building a newclass of smaller oilers. TAOLs are intended to enhance the Navy’s ability toprovide fuel and supplies to Navy ships that are operating in a more distributedmanner across a wider sea area.141
The Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program for building a class of smaller
amphibious ships. The LSM program is central to implementing a Marine Corps
operating concept associated with DMO that is called Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO).142

Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries
In General
U.S. Navy efforts to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies such as Japan andAustralia and other countries such India, including exercises and other forms of engagement,
appear aimed not only at improving interoperability between U.S. and allied naval forces, but also
at expanding existing bilateral forms of naval cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.India) into trilateral (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Australia-India) or quadrilateral (U.S.Japan-Australia-India) forms that could enhance the ability of the United States and its allies in
139 For more on the LUSV program, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
140 For more on the MUSV program, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
141 For more on the TAOL program, see CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
142 For more on the LSM program and EABO, see CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously
Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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the Indo-Pacific region to balance against China’s growing military capabilities and deter
potential assertive actions by China.143

AUKUS Security Agreement
The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership announced
in September 2021 includes a major initiative (called Pillar 1) to homeport U.S. and UK nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs) in Australia and establish an eight-boat Australian SSN force,and another major initiative (called Pillar 2) for the three countries to cooperatively pursue
advanced military capabilities, including undersea capabilities other than SSNs (such as
unmanned underwater vehicles and undersea weapons); quantum technologies; artificial
intelligence and autonomy; advanced cyber capabilities; hypersonic and counter-hypersoniccapabilities; and electronic warfare.144

Issues for Congress
Overview
The overall issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden
Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China’s
naval modernization effort. Within this overall issue, specific issues include but are not limited to
the following:
•

•

•

•

the current and potential future U.S.-China balance of naval power in general,and in specific geographic areas, particularly the Taiwan Strait and the South
China Sea;
whether the planned size and capabilities of the Navy will be appropriate forcountering China’s naval modernization effort in coming years while also
permitting the Navy to perform other missions, including countering Russian
military forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and defending U.S.
interests in the Middle East;
whether the Navy is doing enough to• improve its ability to counter China’s ASBMs, hypersonic weapons, or othermaritime A2/AD weapons, such as wake-homing torpedoes;• develop and procure new ASCMs with ranges that match or exceed those of
China’s longer-ranged ASCMs;• increase the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, so as to improve theability of carriers and their air wings to achieve effects while operating at
longer distances from PLA ASBMs and other A2/AD weapons; andwhether constraints on U.S. shipbuilding capacity are hampering the U.S. Navy’s
ability to counter China’s naval modernization effort, and could hamper the

143 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,

Japan, India, and Australia, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
144 For more on AUKUS Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report
R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress, by Luke A. Nicastro; andCRS Report R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress, by Luke A.
Nicastro.

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ability of the United States to compete with China for post-conflict naval
superiority in the aftermath of a U.S.-China conflict in which large numbers of
U.S. and PRC navy ships are destroyed and both countries work to reconstitutetheir fleets.

U.S.-China Balance of Naval PowerRegarding the U.S.-China balance of naval power in general, U.S. and other observers generally
assess that while the United States today has more naval capability overall, China’s naval
modernization effort since the 1990s has substantially reduced the U.S. advantage, and that if
current U.S. and PLA naval capability trends (such as those for numbers of ships shown in Table
1, Table 2, Table 3, Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4) do not change, China might
eventually draw even with or surpass the United States in overall naval capability. In remarks to aconference on November 3, 2022, for example, Admiral Charles A. Richard, commander of U.S.
Strategic Command, stated
As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking. It is sinking
slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than
we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan]is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are—we're not going to haveenough of them. And that is a very near-term problem....
Undersea capabilities is still the one ... maybe the only true asymmetric advantage we still
have against our opponents. But unless we pick up the pace, in terms of getting ourmaintenance problems fixed, getting new construction going ... if we can't figure that out... we are not going to put ourselves in a good position to maintain strategic deterrence andnational defense.145

Regarding the U.S.-China naval balance of power specifically in the South China Sea, someobservers are concerned that China has already drawn even with or even surpassed the UnitedStates. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from the
Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee toconsider nominations, including Davidson’s nomination to become Commander, U.S. PacificCommand (PACOM),146 stated that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea inall scenarios short of war with the United States.”147
Skeptics of assessments like those above might argue that they do not give adequate weight torelative U.S. strengths (and corresponding PLA relative weaknesses and limitations) in areas suchas undersea warfare; personnel quality, training, and initiative; operational experience(particularly in combat situations); joint operations with other U.S. military services; andpotential support from allies and partners, particularly Japan and Australia. A December 7, 2022,
blog post, for example, states
One of the data points used to bolster the China threat argument is the relative size of thetwo naval fleets, but not all fleets are created equal. In terms of the number of ships, the145 C. Todd Lopez, “Stratcom Commander Says U.S. Should Look to 1950s to Regain Competitive Edge,” DOD News,

November 3, 2022. (Material in brackets and ellipses as in original.) Admiral Richard’s remarks are quoted similarly in
Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning About China From US Strategic Command Chief,
Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the “Ship Is Slowly Sinking” in Terms of U.S.
Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; and Max Hauptman, “US Strategic Command Chief: Ukraine ‘Just the
Warmup’ for ‘the Big One’ with China,” Task & Purpose, November 8, 2022.
146 The name of the command has since been changed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
147 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. PacificCommand, p. 18. See also pp. 8, 16, 17, 19, and 43.

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is significantly larger than the U.S. Navy.... The
discrepancy between the Chinese fleet and the U.S. fleet is already striking, but it will likely
only grow in the coming years, and that simple fact will undoubtedly continue to be
exploited by defense hawks....
While the raw data may seem alarming, they hardly tell a complete story. What the U.S.
fleet lacks in total numbers it more than makes up in tonnage. The relative weight of a fleet
is significant because it indicates the sailing range and purpose of the fleet. Larger ships
are needed for longer voyages, since they can carry more fuel and munitions. For instance,
the U.S. Navy’s global mission necessitates larger ships capable of spanning oceans andoperating away from friendly shores and land-based defenses.
The Chinese fleet combined displaces approximately 1,854,000 tons, less than half of thetotal tonnage of the U.S. Navy. The difference is easy to see when comparing similar vessel
types....
The larger American ships give the fleet a significant advantage in a number of areas,
including the capacity to launch cruise missiles. U.S. surface ships have more than 9,000
vertical missile launch cells, compared to the 1,000 in the Chinese fleet.
When it comes to submarines, the Chinese force is about the same size as the U.S. Navy’s,
but the two differ significantly in capability....
China’s Navy would have a difficult time operating outside the waters adjacent to themainland because it lacks the structure necessary to do so. Much has been made about
Chinese aircraft carriers in recent years, but the carrier fleet remains in its infancy....
The Chinese military overall lacks experience conducting major modern combat
operations. The Chinese last fought a war in 1979, when the People’s Liberation Armybriefly invaded northern Vietnam in support of China’s allies in Cambodia and to disrupt
the alliance between the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union.... Chinese military leaders are
now two generations removed from actual combat experience, which calls into question
their potential prowess.148

Davidson Window/Decade of Concern
Some Members of Congress and other U.S. observers are concerned about the possibility that
China might attack Taiwan sometime between 2021 and 2027 (a timeframe sometimes referred toas the Davidson window)149 or between 2020 and 2030 (a timeframe sometimes referred to as the
148 Dan Grazier, “China Threat Inflation and America’s Nonsensical Plans,” Project on Government Oversight(POGO), December 7, 2022. See also Brad Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing
Going to Do with It?” CNN, March 5, 2021.
149 At a March 9, 2021, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Philip S. Davidson,
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), when asked about a timeline for a potential conflict in
the Taiwan Strait, replied
I think our concerns are manifest here during this decade not only on the development, the numberof ships, aircraft, rockets, etc. that they have—that they have put in the field but the way they areadvancing those capabilities as well in combination with everything that you just cited Hong Kong
and Tibet and line of actual control in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea.
I worry that they are accelerating their ambitions to be—to supplant the United States and ourleadership role in a rules-based international order which they have long said that they want to dothat by 2050. I'm worried about the moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of theirambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six
years.
(CQ transcript of hearing. See also, for example, William Cole, “China Could Soon Outgun US in
Western Pacific, Indo-Pacific Chief Says,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, March 6, 2021; Mallory(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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decade of concern),150 and about the readiness the U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy, for a
conflict in that timeframe.
In addition to the Davidson window and the decade of concern, some observers have offeredalternative near-term time windows.151 Still other observers, including some DOD officials,
believe a PRC attack on Taiwan does not appear to be imminent or is not particularly likely tooccur in the near term,152 or have questioned the notion of identifying a particular time window.153
For observers who are concerned about the Davidson window or decade of concern, given thetime needed to build major U.S. Navy warships (typically several years), decisions made now on
Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years,’” USNI
News, March 9, 2021; Adela Suliman, “China Could Invade Taiwan in the Next 6 Years, Assume
Global Leadership Role, U.S. Admiral Warns,” NBC News, March 10, 2021.)
The period between 2021 and 2027 subsequently came to be referred to by some observers as the Davidson window.
Possibly the earliest user of the term was Jerry Hendrix; see, for example, Jerry Hendrix, “Closing the Davidson
Window,” Real Clear Defense, July 3, 2021. See also Noah Robertson, “How DC Became Obsessed with a Potential
2027 Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” Defense News, May 7, 2024; Hiroyuki Akita, “China Wants Ability to Invade
Taiwan by 2027, U.S. Admiral Says,” Nikkei Asia, April 24, 2024 (reporting remarks by Admiral John Aquilino); Miya
Tanaka, “Ex-U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Sticks to 2027 Window on Taiwan Attack,” Kyodo News, January 23,
2023.
150 Possibly the earliest user of the term decade of concern was James (Jim) Fanell. See, for example, China’s National
Sovereignty and the Tightening Noose Around the Senkaku Islands, James E. Fanell, Captain U.S. Navy (Retired),
Testimony before Hearing on the Hotspots Along China’s Periphery, Panel II: How China Prepares to Fight in
Hotspots: East China Sea / Senkaku Islands Contingency Operation, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, April 13, 2017, p. 3, 25-27, 32; Jim Fanell, “Now Hear This—The Clock is Ticking in China: The
Decade of Concern Has Begun,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2017; China’s Global Naval Strategy andExpanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony, Testimony by Captain James Fanell (USN, Ret.) [preparedstatement for hearing on China’s worldwide military expansion before the House Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence, May 17, 2018], pp. 55-59; Bonnie Girard, “Time to Counter China and Rebuild the US Navy? A Former
U.S. Pacific Fleet Naval Intelligence Chief Testifies to Congress on China’s Maritime Ambitions,” Diplomat, May 23,
2018; James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure,” Naval War
College Review, Winter 2019.
151 See, for example, Keoni Everington, “China Could Invade Taiwan in ‘A Year or Two’: Former US National
Security Adviser,” Taiwan News, May 5, 2023; Takashi Imai (Yomiuri Shimbun), “China May Invade Taiwan Within
2 Years, Former U.S. National Security Adviser Says,” Japan News, May 4, 2023; Bill Gertz, “China Held Taiwan
War Council in October, General’s Memo Reveals, Memo Predicting Conflict by 2025 Clashes with Biden Detente
Push,” Washington Times, February 2, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “China’s Accelerated Timeline to Take Taiwan
Pushing Navy in the Pacific, Says CNO Gilday,” USNI News, October 19, 2022. See also Robert Delaney, “US Navy
Should Prepare for an Invasion of Taiwan as Soon as This Year, Fleet Chief Says,” South China Morning Post, October
20, 2022; Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Navy chief warns China could invade Taiwan before 2024,” Financial Times,
October 20, 2022; Agence France-Presse, “ China Could Invade Taiwan This Year, US Admiral Warns,” News.com.au,
October 21, 2022.
152 See, for example, J. Tedford Tyler, “China Isn’t Ready to Invade Taiwan,” National Interest, December 11, 2022;
Meghann Myers and Joe Gould, “Pentagon Sees No Imminent Threat to Taiwan from Chinese Buildup,” MilitaryTimes, November 29, 2022; Jerusalem Post Staff, “US General Mark Milley Says Invading Taiwan Would Be ‘Very
Difficult’ for China,” Jerusalem Post, November 18, 2022; Derek Grossman, “Xi Jinping Is Not Looking to Go to War
over Taiwan Anytime Soon, Little Sign Chinese Leader Is Accelerating Invasion Preparations,” Nikkei Asia, November
16, 2022; Nick Wadhams, “China Won’t Be Able to Attack Taiwan in Near Future, US General Milley Says,”
Bloomberg, November 16, 2022; John Grady, “China Will Increase Pressure on Taiwan in Next Two Years Rather
Than Invade, Says Pentagon Official,” USNI News, November 7, 2022; Briana Reilly, “DOD Policy Chief Doesn’t
Anticipate Taiwan Invasion in ‘Near Term,’” Inside Defense, November 4, 2022; Iain Marlow, “‘Sloppy’ US Talk on
China’s Threat Worries Some Skeptical Experts,” Bloomberg, November 3 (updated November 4), 2022; Timothy R.
Heath, “Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No,” War on theRocks, October 14, 2022.
153 See, for example, Bryan Clark, “Adm. Franchetti, Biden’s Pick For CNO, Should Focus on the Short Game,”
Defense News, August 21, 2023; Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Commander Pushes Back against Colleagues ‘Guessing’Taiwan Invasion Date,” Financial Times, April 18, 2023.

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procuring new ships for the Navy will have only a small impact on the number of ships the Navy
will have in service during the Davidson window or the decade of concern. (Decisions made now
on procuring new ships for the Navy will primarily impact the number of ships the Navy will
have in service in years after the Davidson window or the decade of concern, a time period whichis also of potential concern to policymakers.) Options for bolstering Navy capabilities during theDavidson window or the decade of concern focus mostly on matters other than procuring new
ships, including but not limited to the following, which are not presented in any particular order:
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

keeping existing ships and aircraft in service during the Davidson window ordecade of concern rather than retiring them during the Davidson window ordecade of concern (while preserving the option of retiring them after the end of
the Davidson window or decade of concern);increasing the material readiness of existing ships and aircraft, so as to maximize
the percentage of them that are available for operations, by working down ship
and aircraft maintenance backlogs;
shifting additional ships, aircraft, weapons, and supplies from the Atlantic theater
to the Pacific theater (although the risks of doing that in connection withdeterring and responding to Russian actions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
would be a factor to consider);upgrading existing ships, aircraft, and weapons, particularly through the
installation of improved or additional systems, or components that can be quickly
switched out or bolted on;
procuring new aircraft, weapons, and unmanned systems, if they can enter
service before the end of the Davidson window or the decade of concern;154
procuring spare parts and supplies and positioning them in the Pacific;
acting to alleviate bottlenecks or otherwise increase the capacity of the industrial
base to produce aircraft, weapons, and supplies and/or repair ships, aircraft,
weapons, and supplies;
hardening air bases and other land-based facilities in the Pacific that support U.S.
Navy operations so as to improve their ability to withstand attack by PLA
missiles or other weapons;
increasing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities forunderstanding and monitoring China’s naval forces;
increasing activities for measuring and understanding the physical operating
environment in the Pacific;
increasing the operational proficiency of Navy personnel through training andexercises; andincreasing operations for demonstrating U.S. Navy capabilities to China and/or
perhaps creating uncertainty or confusion in China about U.S. Navy capabilities,
concepts of operations, or tactics.155

154 Regarding the adequacy of Navy weapon inventories for a potential conflict in the Pacific, see Nick Wilson, “Del

Toro: Navy Needs Larger Missile Stockpiles in the Pacific,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2023.
155 See also Mark F. Cancian, Security in the Western Pacific, Building Future Capabilities in the Time of AUKUS,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 2024, 36 pp. The report states
Although strategists seek to expand the number of submarines, the U.S. submarine fleet will not(continued...)Congressional Research Service

58China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Shipbuilding Capacity
As discussed at length in another CRS report,156 industrial base capacity constraints for building
U.S. Navy ships have become more prominent as an oversight matter for the congressional
defense committees since about 2022. Industrial base capacity constraints for building U.S. Navy
ships are present at both shipyards and supplier firms, and arise from limits on production
facilities (i.e., numbers and ages of production spaces and equipment) and workforce challenges,
including limits on available numbers of naval architects and marine engineers to design newclasses of ships, and challenges in recruiting and retaining desired numbers of production workers
at shipyards and supplier firms to build new ships.
Some Members of Congress and other observers, viewing China’s much-larger shipbuilding
capacity, are concerned that constraints on U.S. shipbuilding capacity are hampering the U.S.
Navy’s ability to counter China’s naval modernization effort, and could hamper the ability of theUnited States to compete with China for post-conflict naval superiority in the aftermath of a U.S.China conflict in which large numbers of U.S. and PRC navy ships are destroyed and bothcountries work to reconstitute their fleets.
Contributing to this concern is an unclassified U.S. Navy briefing slide with a graphic showingthat China has about 230 times as much shipbuilding capacity as the United States whenmeasured in terms of gross tons of ships that can be produced per unit of time.157 This measureappears to relate primarily to capacity for building relatively less complex commercial cargoships (China is a world leader in the production of commercial cargo ships) as opposed tocapacity for building relatively more complex warships that are equipped with complex combat
system equipment. China’s capacity for building complex combat system equipment for warships
may be far less than 200 times the U.S. capacity for building such equipment, meaning that theeffective PRC-U.S. ratio for capacity for building warships with complex combat systemequipment may be far less than 230:1. Even so, the ratio may be higher, and perhaps considerably
higher, than 1:1. Some observers have characterized limits on U.S. shipbuilding capacity,
particularly in relation to China’s shipbuilding capacity, as a strategic liability or major cause forconcern for the United States in competing militarily with China.158
grow beyond its current size until the 2040s. Thus, the project studies wargames and the war in
Ukraine to identify ways for the United States and its partners to manage this submarine gap.
(Page 1)
See also The Department of the Navy and Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China, Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA), September 2023, 44 pp. The report’s abstract states, “The Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Navy
asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) for near-term recommendations for how DON [the Department of theNavy] can better position itself for such competition in peacetime—that is, below the threshold of armed conflict.”(Page i)
156 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke
157 For images of this briefing slide, see, for example, Matthew Hipple, “China's Navy is Using Quantity to Build
Quality,” Maritime Executive, February 18, 2024; Joseph Trevithick, “Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China’s
200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity,” The Drive, July 11, 2023. See also Michael Lee, “Chinese Shipbuilding
Capacity Over 200 Times Greater Than US, Navy Intelligence Says,” Fox News, September 14, 2023.
158 See, for example, Peter Apps, “China Looks to Its Shipyards to Beat US in Any Future War,” Reuters, August 14,2024; Justin Katz, “State Dept’s Campbell: Gap between US, China Shipbuilding Is ‘Deeply Concerning,’” Breaking
Defense, July 30, 2024; James E. Fanell, “The Changing Nature of Naval Power in the Pacific,” GeopoliticalIntelligence Services (GIS), July 9, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “China Could Match US in Military Conflict Thanks to
Shipbuilding Strength, Analysts Say, Observers Said China’s Ability to Rapidly Reconstitute Its Combat Losses May
Give It an Advantage, Including against ‘Hellscape’ Strategy,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2024; David Axe,
“It’s Just a New, Small Chinese Stealth Ship. But Its Arrival Is Terrifying,” Telegraph (UK), May 26, 2024; Gil(continued...)Congressional Research Service

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The most prominent U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base capacity constraints are those forbuilding submarines. Virginia-class attack submarines have been procured at a rate of two boats
per year since FY2011, but the submarine construction industrial base since about 2019 has notbeen able to complete two Virginia-class boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of
Virginia-class boats that have been procured but not completed. Since 2022, the completion rate
has been about 1.2 to 1.4 Virginia-class boats per year. The Navy aims to increase the completion
rate two 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year by 2028. Shipbuilding capacity constraints are also
affecting the construction rates for surface ships such as DDG-51 class destroyers.
As discussed in the above-cited CRS report that discusses at length the issue of industrial basecapacity constraints for building Navy ships, the Navy and the U.S. shipbuilding industry aretaking certain steps to increase U.S. industrial capacity for building Navy ships. The above-cited
CRS report also outlines options for expanding current efforts to increase U.S. industrial capacity
for building Navy ships and for making better use of available shipbuilding capacity.

Other Specific Issues
Longer-Range Weapons
The Navy has initiated efforts to develop and procure longer-ranged ASCMs and other new
weapons. The Navy testified in May 2024 as follows:
Tomahawk [cruise missile]
The Navy is continuing investment into Tomahawk Block V new production, Maritime
Strike Tomahawk, and recertification/modernization of Tomahawk Block IV. Ally andpartner interest in Tomahawk capability emphasized missile production throughput
challenges. The FY 2025 budget request continues to fund factory improvements toincrease industrial capacity, increasing throughput to 600 missiles per year by FY27. In the
FY 2025 budget request, the Department sustains the Tomahawk as the nation's premier
all-weather, long-range, survivable deep strike offensive weapon to include new
production of and recertification of current inventory into modernized BLK V Tomahawk
missiles. BLK V(a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) provides a long-range moving
maritime strike capability to meet current and future threats, supporting the Surface
Warfare Mission area through the inclusion of a seeker suite in the Tomahawk BLK V
missile. The FY 2025 budget request for MST provides continuation of Operational andIntegration Testing and ultimately fields hardware, software, and munitions for the MST
capability in 2025. The FY 2025 budget request continues engineering, manufacturing, anddevelopment of the Joint Multiple-Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which will delivera hardened target penetration capability with the Tomahawk BLK V(b) missile in FY 2027.
The FY 2025 budget request continues engineering, manufacturing, and development of
the Military Code Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, which will deliver significant
increased resiliency in spoofing and jamming threat environments capability to the
Tomahawk BLK V missile in 2026.

Barndollar and Matthew C. Mai, “The U.S. Navy Can’t Build Ships,” Foreign Policy, May 17, 2024; Steve Cohen,“Almost All Navy Shipbuilding Is Hopelessly Behind Schedule,” The Hill, May 2, 2024; Thomas Black, “US Navy
Shipbuilding Has Fallen Dangerously Behind,” Bloomberg, April 17, 2024.
Jeffrey M. Voth, “Charting a New Course: Why the US Navy Must Confront Unrealistic Optimism,” Diplomat, April
15, 2024, which states that “Admiral Phil Davidson’s warning of potential Chinese aggression toward Taiwan by
2027—now termed the “Davidson Window”—underscores the strategic vulnerabilities these [shipbuilding] delays
could exacerbate…. This is no longer an issue of delayed timelines; it has become a strategic liability.”

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Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1/ Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM), LRASM C-1/C-3, and OASuW Increment 2 / HALO
The LRASM C-1 and C-3 variants add near-term, cost-effective capacity to the DON’slong range strike capability while enhancing the OASuW mission. The FY 2025
President’s Budget requests $102.5 million in procurement funding to buy 30 DON
LRASM C-1 weapon systems with associated support to provide economic order quantity[EOQ] funding in support of the MYP [multiyear procurement]159 initiated in FY24, andto provide the assets for operational test of the C-1 configuration. The FY 2025 President’s
Budget request also includes $163.3 million in RDT&E funding for the continuing
development of the LRASM C-3 capability improvement. Navy AGM-158 development
efforts involve integration of a Beyond Line-of-Sight radio subsystem to enable enhanced
operational flexibility.
The FY 2025 President's Budget continues developing the AGM-158 C-3 variant throughsoftware development and test, platform integration, and entry into integrated test. The FY
2025 President’s Budget request also includes $223.9 million for procurement of 60
LRASM in the C-3 configuration migrating the primary production line to the morecapable C-3 configuration as the program reaches sufficient maturity.
The FY 2025 President’s Budget includes $178.6 million for development of OASuW
Increment 2, which is now referred as Hypersonic Air Launched OASuW (HALO). HALO
supports the national imperative to mature hypersonic capabilities and transition them into
warfighting systems, increasing the lethality and deterrent effect of our Carrier Wings. The
program represents a longer-term capability that encompasses increased performance andwill provide the Navy with the necessary air-launched, carrier-based weapon to address
evolving long-range, -threats from near peer competitors. HALO will complete Milestone
B and enter formal Engineering and Manufacturing Development, to include a competitive
contract award during FY 2025.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) & AARGM Extended-Range(AARGM-ER)
AARGM domestic procurement completed in FY 2021 with the award of the last Navy
Full Rate Production (FRP) contract. There have been 1450 AARGMs (All Up Rounds,
Training Missiles, and Spares) delivered to the Fleet as of March 2024. Program of recorddelivery is 1803 missiles. Deliveries continue through FY 2025 in support of the transition
to AARGM-ER. AARGM-ER provides the DON with a 5th generation compatible
extended range asset to project power and provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses,
both at-sea and on land. The first AARGM-ER delivery is scheduled for 3QFY24 [third
quarter of FY2024]. The FY 2025 President’s Budget requests $22.3 million in RDT&E tosupport operational and integration testing of production representative hardware. The
budget requests $248.6 million in [the] Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN)[appropriation account] to procure 151 AARGM-ER all-up-rounds and six Captive Air
Training Missiles and advance procurement.
Hypersonic Program
The DON is developing a hypersonic weapon system that will enable precise and timely
strike capability against deep inland targets in contested environments. In collaboration
with the Army, the Department is leveraging a common missile design and joint test
opportunities to field a conventional hypersonic weapon system. Zumwalt [DDG-1000]
Class DDGs will be the first Navy platform to field this hypersonic capability in the mid2020’s, followed by Block V Virginia Class SSNs. In March 2020, the Services executed
159 For more on multiyear procurement, including economic order quantity procurement, see CRS Report R41909,

Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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a successful flight test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, and in 2022, the Services
followed up that testing with several static-fire tests and a flight test of the newly-developed
two stage Solid Rocket Motor. The DON has validated the design of the Navy’s cold-gas
launch approach and is continuing subscale and component testing in support of futurecapability development, manufacturability, and affordability improvements. This rapid
development and demonstration of hypersonic strike weapon systems supports the U.S.
ability to deter, and if necessary, defeat potential adversaries.
The Department’s FY 2025 budget request will support critical milestones on the path tofielding CPS to the first Zumwalt Class DDG. The request totals $903.9 million in CPS
R&D funding.
The Marine Corps is working towards the capability to employ smaller, highly mobile
hypersonic weapons through science and technology initiatives. The Marine Corps ispursuing an acquisition strategy that leverages the developmental work of other Services
and agencies, investing when the capability has reached a higher technology readiness levelthat allows for expedited prototype experimentation at reduced costs.
Torpedoes
As the primary weapon in maintaining an advantage in the undersea domain, Heavyweightand Lightweight Torpedoes remain a critical component of the Department’s munitions
inventory. Continued investments in torpedo capacity and capability are vital to outpace
our strategic competitors. The MK 48 Heavyweight Torpedo remains the Navy’s primarysubmarine-launched ASW [antisubmarine warfare] and ASuW [anti-surface warfare]weapon, while the MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo provides additional undersea dominancefrom the surface and air domains. The Navy continues to modernize and upgrade existing
inventory to incorporate the latest capability advancements, the Navy has also restarted
production of the MK 48, ramping up production through FY23 after accepting delivery of
the first new production heavyweight torpedoes in over twenty years during the summer of2022. Furthermore, the MK 48 MOD 8 and MK 48 MOD 9 will bring new capabilities andtechnologies to ensure our advantage is maintained will into in the future. The Department
also continues to deliver and upgrade MK 54 Lightweight Torpedoes to surface ships andair platforms to maintain our edge over the ASW threat. Producing the upgraded MK 54
MOD 1 for the U.S. Navy as well as MK 54 MOD 0 torpedoes for our allied partners
ensures the torpedo industrial base remains healthy.
The Department continues its partnership with industry and university affiliated research
centers to develop next-generation torpedoes. These include the MK 54 MOD 2 Advanced
Lightweight Torpedo designed to fight the high-end threat, and the Compact Rapid Attack
Weapon, a Very Light Weight Torpedo with multi-mission capability providing both ahard-kill torpedo countermeasure and a short range ASW weapon. The Navy continues toprocure the High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC) wing kit to employ MK 54
from high altitude via the P-8A, and we’ve made great progress in developing theHammerhead encapsulated effector, continuously demonstrating the flexibility andeffectiveness of MK 54 payloads for the US and our Allies.160

A February 27, 2024, press report states:
The US Navy is seeking industry’s assistance to rapidly prototype and field a new airlaunched, stand-off weapon inexpensive enough to manufacture en masse and perform on
par with the service’s current anti-ship cruise missile.
160 Statement of Nickolas H. Guertin, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) andVice Admiral James Pitts, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities (OPNAV
N9) and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration,
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on FY25 Seapower Investment Hearing, May 1, 2024, pp. 33-36.

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Dubbed the “Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE),” the service posted apublic notice earlier this month that it should have “increased range at lower costs” and“integrated a high-maturity propulsion system with proven payloads.”“The objective of this notice is to help the government determine if there are existingsources with the capability and experience to rapidly prototype, integrate, test and field along-range, network-enabled weapon system capable of launch from a F/A-18E/F and F35A/C,” according to the notice.
The exact ranges of most Pentagon weaponry are classified, but the notice states MACE
should be “complimentary” to the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the Lockheed Martinmade missile fielded on the Navy’s F/A-18 and Air Force’s B-1B.161

An April 19, 2021, press report stated, “Exposing a new layer of long-range striking power for the
U.S. Navy carrier battle group, a photo obtained by Aerospace Daily shows what appears to be aRaytheon RIM-174 SM-6 [Standard Missile 6] missile integrated on a left wing pylon of a
Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet in flight.”162 An August 14, 2024, press report states:
The U.S. Navy's deployment of new extremely long-range air-to-air missiles in the IndoPacific could erase China's advantage in aerial reach, experts say, part of an intensifying
focus on projecting power amid high tensions in the region.
The AIM-174B, developed from the readily available Raytheon (RTX.N) SM-6 air defence
missile, is the longest-range such missile the United States has ever fielded and wasofficially acknowledged in July.
It has three key advantages: it can fly several times farther than the next-best U.S. option,
the AIM-120 AMRAAM; it does not require new production lines; and it is compatible
with the aircraft of at least one ally, Australia.
Crucially, a weapon such as the AIM-174B, which can attack aerial targets as far away as
400 km (250 miles), outranges China's PL-15 missile, allowing U.S. jets to keep threats
farther from aircraft carriers, and safely strike "high-value" Chinese targets, such ascommand-and-control planes….
The AIM-120, the standard long-range missile for U.S. aircraft, has a maximum range ofabout 150 km (93 miles), which requires the launching aircraft to fly deeper into contested
territory, exposing aircraft carriers to greater danger of anti-ship attacks….
The advent of Chinese stealth aircraft such as the J-20, and more important, the PL-15
missile it can carry internally—with a range of 250 km (155 miles) or more—eroded the
U.S. edge, said Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center….
The AIM-174B was developed to quickly address that need.
The secretive Lockheed Martin (LMT.N) AIM-260, a separate U.S. Air Force program todevelop an extremely long-range air-to-air missile small enough for stealth aircraft to carryinternally, has been in development for at least seven years….
Using Raytheon's (RTX.N) SM-6, originally designed for a ship-launched air defence role,means production lines are already available. Funding has already been earmarked for morethan 100 SM-6 missiles a year….

161 Justin Katz, “Navy Seeking to Rapidly Prototype New Air-Launched, Stand-Off Missile,” Breaking Defense,

February 27, 2024. See also Abby Shepherd, “Navy Asks Industry If It Can Quickly Build New Low-Cost, Standoff
Air-Launched Weapon,” Inside Defense, February 8, 2024.
162 “The Weekly Debrief: Air-Launched, SM-6-Like Missile Exposed In New Test Photo,” Aviation Week, April 19,
2021.

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The Navy said the missile was "operationally deployed" but declined to comment onwhether it would be supplied to allies, whether it would be integrated onto other aircraft,and how many AIM-174Bs it wanted each year.
The versatility of the SM-6, which has also been used to hit ships, land targets and missiles,
opens up possibilities beyond the AIM-174B, said Peter Layton, a defence and aviation
expert at the Griffith Asia Institute.
For instance, if fitted with an anti-radar seeker, it could attack and disrupt surface-to-air
missile batteries from extremely long range.163

Countering ASBMs
For background information on the Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs and hypersonic
weapons, see Appendix B.

Carrier Air Wing Operating Range
The issue of the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is a key component of an ongoingdebate over the future survivability, utility, and cost-effectiveness of aircraft carriers and their air
wings, with critics arguing that the current operating range of Navy carrier air wings will force
Navy aircraft carriers to operate well within the ranges of PLA ASBMs or other A2/AD systems,
which could put the carriers’ survivability at substantial risk, or alternatively require carriers tooperate beyond the range of those PLA A2/AD systems, in locations that are safer but so far awaythat the carriers and their air wings will contribute little combat capability.
A key U.S. Navy program for increasing the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is the MQ25 Stingray program, which is a program to acquire a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) for use as a tanker for in-flight refueling of manned carrier-based aircraft (with asecondary mission of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Some observers, while notnecessarily objecting to the MQ-25 program, have argued that the Navy should do more toincrease the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, such as developing a stealthy, carrierbased UAV capable of penetrating enemy air defenses and striking land targets at very longranges.

Legislative Activity for FY2025
Coverage in Related CRS Reports
A variety of CRS reports cover U.S. Navy programs that in varying degrees can be viewed as
responses to, at least in part, China’s naval modernization effort. These reports, which include
legislative activity on the programs they cover, include but are not limited to the following:

163 Gerry Doyle with additional reporting by Yi-Mou Lee, “US Navy’s Newest Air-to-Air Missile Could Tilt Balance inSouth China Sea,” Reuters, August 14, 2024. See also Douglas Barrie, “Phoenix Successor Redux: the USN’s Range
Riposte to China’s PL-17?” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), July 29, 2024; Ryan Chan, “How US
Navy’s New Air-to-Air Missile Can Thwart China Threat,” Newsweek, July 19, 2024; Mackenzie Eaglen and Cole
Spiller, “The Navy’s New Air-to-Air Capability Could Set Roadmap for Repurposing Old Systems,” Breaking Defense,
July 16, 2024; Tyler Rogoway, “AIM-174 Missile Brings Navy’s Future Counter-China Air Combat Strategy Into
Focus,” The War Zone, July 8, 2024; Jake Epstein, “US Navy Super Hornets Armed with SM-6s, a Warship Missile
Newly Tested in Combat, Have Been Spotted in the Pacific,” Business Insider India, July 5, 2024.

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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS
Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah
Gertler (the JSF program is a joint DOD program with Navy participation)
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light
Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke
CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) (Previously
Next-Generation Logistics Ship [NGLS]) Program: Background and Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues forCongress, by Ronald O'Rourke

FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638)
House
In H.R. 8070 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 118-529 of May 31,2024) and passed by the House on June 14, 2024,••

Section 1017 would direct DOD to submit a report containing the findings of astudy on the feasibility of implementing one or more naval blockades ofshipments of fossil fuels to China in the event of an armed conflict between the
United States and China;
Section 1306 would delete a national security waiver for a requirement for the
Secretary of Defense to certify certain things before DOD can enable or facilitate
PRC participation in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise;164

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Section 1308 would expand a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to certify
certain things before DOD can enable or facilitate PRC participation in any
RIMPAC naval exercise by adding a requirement for the Secretary to certify that
the PRC has held an internationally recognized free and fair presidential
election;165
Section 1315 would direct the Secretary of Defense to designate an official to be
responsible, in coordination with appropriate DOD officials, for coordinating
DOD efforts to monitor the PLA’s network of overseas military bases and the
PLA’s global pursuit of military access agreements, and require DOD to submit
an annual report each year from 2025 to 2030 detailing matters relating to the
PLA’s network of overseas military bases and the PLA’s global pursuit of military
access agreements;
Section 1318 would direct DOD to invite the naval forces of Taiwan to any
RIMPAC exercise that is to take place following the date of enactment of the
FY2025 NDAA; andSection 1319 would direct DOD, in consultation with the heads of other relevantfederal departments and agencies, to submit a report on• the feasibility of developing and deploying asymmetric naval assets for apotential defense of Taiwan,• whether Taiwan’s ability to deter or confront a PRC maritime invasion would
be enhanced by the deployment of certain new armed boats,• the capabilities of certain existing and planned Taiwan corvettes, and• the vulnerability of certain existing Taiwan destroyers and frigates.

H.Rept. 118-529 states:
Long-range fires
The committee notes that American adversaries are rapidly developing strike capabilities
designed to push U.S. forces to engage at longer ranges. The committee is concerned about
the Navy’s ability to execute the necessary volume of long-range surface and undersea fires
in a contested environment. The committee understands there are various efforts underway
to address this concern but is concerned about the planning, progress, and coordination ofthese efforts.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct
a review of the Navy’s systems and technologies needed for its long-range fires. The review
should examine:(1) the requirements and digital infrastructure associated with long-range fires in acontested environment including any external information and systems the Navy is reliant
on to execute long-range fires;(2) the Navy’s development and acquisition plans for the systems and technologies it seeks
in the near- and long-term to improve its long-range fires;the FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). Section 1306 of H.R. 8070 would amend Section
1259 of P.L. 115-232 by striking subsection (b).
165 The requirement for the certification was established by subsection (a) of Section 1259 of the FY2019 NDAA (H.R.
5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). Section 1306 of H.R. 8070 would amend Section 1259 of P.L. 115-232 byadding the holding of an internationally recognized free and fair presidential election to the list of things to be certified.

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66China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities(3) challenges the Navy faces in developing, acquiring, and fielding systems andtechnologies needed to implement its plans for long-range fires and the Navy’s plans toaddress those challenges;(4) the extent to which the Navy is developing and assessing architectures to improveinformation flow and the ability to integrate new capability quickly; and(5) any other areas the Comptroller General deems important.
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a briefing
to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2025, with one ormore reports to follow. (Pages 22-23)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states:
Maritime De-Risking
The committee is aware that our strategic competitor, the People’s Republic of China, isexpanding its influence over the high seas. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views its
control over the oceans as a vital national security interest and has used the authority andresources of their government to direct, resource, and gain the world’s most dominantposition over shipbuilding, shipping, and international maritime infrastructure. Theiractions have often disregarded legal norms, principles, and values shared by the UnitedStates and its allies.
The United States faces significant risks to both national security and economic vitality
from the Government of China’s potential to cripple the critical supplies and lifeline of theAmerican people during peacetime, crisis, or war by shutting off access to the world’s
oceans, as well as by controlling critical shipping interests and infrastructure. To address
this threat, the United States must pursue a strategy of “de-risking,” aimed at mitigating
reliance and vulnerability to Chinese shipbuilding, shipping, and maritime infrastructure.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with theSecretaries of Transportation, Commerce, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, as well as
the U.S. Trade Representative and Office of Management and Budget to provide a reportto the House Armed Services and Senate Armed Services committees by November 1,
2024:(1) An analysis of the current risks posed to US interests by the CCP’s dominance of themaritime industry and its civilian and military impacts to security and economic prosperity.
(2) A comprehensive strategy for de-risking America’s maritime domain from the People’s
Republic of China and other asymmetric or emerging maritime threats, recognizing that
our security and economic way of life relies on assured access to free, open, safe, andsustainable oceans without coercion from our global competitors.
(3) An assessment of the possible establishment of a National Maritime Council to oversee
implementation of the nation’s maritime strategies, and requirements for annual reporting
to Congress on status of implementing such strategies.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(Pages 251-252)

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Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and PRC Numbers of
Ships and Naval Capabilities
This appendix presents some additional discussion of factors involved in comparing U.S. and
PRC numbers of ships and naval capabilities.
U.S. and PRC naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and PRC ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate
displacement [i.e., tonnage]) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure thatleaves out numerous other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities
compare to its assigned missions. One-dimensional comparisons of the total numbers of ships inChina’s navy and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and
PRC naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to thosenavies, for the following reasons:•••A fleet’s total number of ships (or its aggregate displacement) is only apartial metric of its capability. Many factors other than ship numbers (oraggregate displacement) contribute to naval capability, including types of ships,
types and numbers of aircraft, the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR
systems, and networking capabilities, supporting maintenance and logistics
capabilities, doctrine and tactics, the quality, education, and training of personnel,
and the realism and complexity of exercises.166 In light of this, navies withsimilar numbers of ships or similar aggregate displacements can havesignificantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of numbers ofships or aggregate displacements can provide a highly inaccurate sense of theirrelative capabilities. The warfighting capabilities of navies have derived
increasingly from the sophistication of their internal electronics and software.
This factor can vary greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily
assessed by outside observation. As the importance of internal electronics andsoftware has grown, the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navies
principally on the basis of easily observed factors such as ship numbers anddisplacements has become increasingly less reliable, and today is highly
problematic.
Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines or surface
combatants) can obscure potentially significant differences in thecapabilities of those ships, both between navies and within one country’s
navy. Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a numberof other factors, including sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking
capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time
the ship is available for operation).
A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that changes in total
numbers necessarily translate into corresponding or proportional changes inaggregate capability. For a Navy like China’s, which is modernizing by
replacing older, obsolescent ships with more modern and more capable ships, thisis not necessarily the case.

166 For further discussion, see, for example, Robert McKeown, “Assessing Military Capability: More than Just

Counting Guns,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2022.

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Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) do nottake into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting
locations of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide
responsibilities, and a substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the
Atlantic. As a consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might beavailable for a crisis or conflict scenario in China’s near-seas region, or could
reach that area within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China’s navy has
more-limited responsibilities outside China’s near-seas region, and its ships are
all homeported along China’s coast at locations that face directly onto China’s
near-seas region. In a U.S.-China conflict inside the first island chain, U.S. naval
and other forces would be operating at the end of generally long supply lines,
while PLA naval and other forces would be operating at the end of generally
short supply lines.
Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate displacement) do not take
into account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might
have outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles(ASBMs), land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based Air
Force aircraft armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant
maritime-relevant non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and PRC militaries,
this is a particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and PRC militarycapabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China
incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China
military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving
multiple branches of each country’s military.
The missions to be performed by one country’s navy can differ greatly fromthe missions to be performed by another country’s navy. Consequently, navies
are better measured against their respective missions than against one another.
Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might
nevertheless be better able to perform Navy A’s intended missions than Navy B isto perform Navy B’s intended missions. This is another significant considerationin assessing U.S. and PRC naval capabilities, because the missions of the twonavies are quite different.

As mentioned earlier, while comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s Navy and the
U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and PRC naval
capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, anexamination of the trends over time in the relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how
the relative balance of U.S. and PRC naval capabilities might be changing over time.

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Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter
PLA ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons
This appendix provides background information on the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
China’s ASBMs and hypersonic weapons.

Ability to Counter ASBMs
Although China’s ASBMs have in past years sometimes been characterized as “game changers,”
that does not mean they cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches forcountering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination.
ASBMs are not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past hasdeveloped counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring
various approaches for countering ASBMs.
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e.,“hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e.,“soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing
ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack
various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed tocarry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, andlocalization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM,
and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an
opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes
Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] killchains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”167
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as
controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for
China to detect, identify, and track those ships.168 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems
for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, forattacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying
and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in
167 David A. Fulghum, “USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions, Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily &Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
168 See, for example, also Nick Danby, “Carrier Strike Groups Should Be Ready to Go Dark in Conflict,” War on theRocks, August 29, 2023. For a journal article discussing actions by the Navy during the period 1956-1972 to conceal
the exact locations of Navy ships, see Robert G. Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight, The U.S. Navy and Dispersed
Operations Under EMCON, 1956-1972,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F.
Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile
Defense, A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University inpartial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed
October 5, 2023, at https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553587; Jon Solomon, “Deception and the
Backfire Bomber: Reexamining the Late Cold War Struggle Between Soviet Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. NavyCountertargeting,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 27, 2014; John Solomon,“Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part II,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net),
October 28, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information Dissemination(www.informationdissemination.net), October 29, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV,”
Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 30, 2014.

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flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA
version) and the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile.169 Options for decoying andconfusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems,
such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radaropaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.170
An October 4, 2016, press report states the following:
Several times in the past, [Chief of Naval Operations John] Richardson has stressed thatlong range weapons developments from adversarial nations like Russia and China aren't
the end-all, be-all of naval conflicts.
Just because China’s “carrier-killer” missile has a greater range than the planes aboard a
US aircraft carrier doesn't mean the US would shy away from deploying a carrier withinthat range, Richardson has stated on different occasions.
Again, Richardson challenged the notion that a so-called A2/AD zone was “animpenetrable keep out zone that forces can only enter at extreme peril to their existence,
let alone their mission.”
Richardson took particular issue with the “denial” aspect of A2/AD, repeating his assertion
that this denial is an “aspiration” not a “fait accompli.” The maps so common in
representing these threats often mark off the limits of different system’s ranges with “redarcs that extend off coastlines,” with the implication that military forces crossing theselines face “certain destruction.”
But this is all speculation according to Richardson: “The reality is far more complex, it’s
actually really hard to achieve a hit. It requires the completion of a really complex chain of
events.... these arcs represent danger for sure... but the threats they are based on are notinsurmountable, and can be managed, will be managed.”“We can fight from within these defended areas, and we will... this is nothing new and has
been done before,” said Richardson.
So while Russia and China can develop missiles and radars and declare their ranges on
paper, things get a lot trickier in the real world, where the US has the most and bestexperience in operating.
“Potential adversaries actually have different geographic features like choke points,
islands, ocean currents, mountains,” said Richardson, who urged against oversimplifying
complicated, and always unique circumstances in so-called A2/AD zones.
“Have no doubt, the US navy is prepared to go wherever it needs to go, at any time, andstay there for as long as necessary in response to our leadership’s call to project our
strategic influence,” Richardson concluded.

Similarly, an August 29, 2016, press report states the following:

169 For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SM-6, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
170 Regarding electronic warfare, see, for example, Brett Tingley, “The Navy’s Secretive And Revolutionary Program
To Project False Fleets From Drone Swarms,” The Drive, November 7, 2019. Regarding the option of systems forgenerating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War
College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84; Scott Tait, “Make Smoke!” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 58-63.
Regarding radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, see “7th Fleet Tests Innovative Missile Defense System,” Navy News
Services, June 26, 2014; Kevin McCaney, “Navy’s Carbon-Fiber Clouds Could Make Incoming Missiles Miss Their
Targets,” Defense Systems (http://defensesystems.com), June 27, 2014. See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Cyber, EW
Are Secret Missile Defense Weapons Too Secret To Use,” Breaking Defense, December 4, 2015.

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The United States Navy is absolutely confident in the ability of its aircraft carriers andcarrier air wings to fly and fight within zones defended by so-called anti-access/area denial(A2/AD) weapons....
In the view of the U.S. Navy leadership, A2/AD—as it is now called—has existed since
the dawn of warfare when primitive man was fighting with rocks and spears. Overtime,
A2/AD techniques have evolved as technology has improved with ever-greater range andlethality. Rocks and spears eventually gave way to bows and arrows, muskets and cannons.
Thus, the advent of long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles is simply anothertechnological evolution of A2/AD.
“This is the next play in that,” Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, told The
National Interest on Aug. 25 during an interview in his office in the Pentagon. “ThisA2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitors, but achieving that goal ismuch different and much more complicated.”
Indeed, as many U.S. Navy commanders including Richardson and Rear Adm. (Upper
Half) DeWolfe Miller, the service’s director of air warfare, have pointed out, anti-accessbubbles defended by Chinese DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile systems or
Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missile systems are not impenetrable ‘Iron Domes.’
Nor do formidable Russian and Chinese air defense systems such as the S-400 or HQ-9
necessarily render the airspace they protect into no-go zones for the carrier air wing.
Asked directly if he was confident in the ability of the aircraft carrier and its air wing tofight inside an A2/AD zone protected by anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles as well as
advanced air defenses, Richardson was unequivocal in his answer. “Yes,” Richardson
said—but he would not say how exactly how due to the need for operational security. “It’sreally a suite of capabilities, but I actually think we’re talking too much in the open aboutsome of the things we’re doing, so I want to be thoughtful about how we talk about things
so we don’t give any of our competitors an advantage.”...
Miller said that there have been threats to the carrier since the dawn of naval aviation. In
many ways, the threat to the carrier was arguably much greater during the Cold War when
the Soviet Union massed entire regiments of Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfires and deployedmassive cruise missile-armed Oscar-class SSGN submarines to hunt down and destroy the
Navy’s flattops. The service developed ways to defeat the Soviet threat—and the carrier
will adapt to fight in the current environment.
“We could have had this interview twenty-years-ago and there would have been a threat,”
Miller said. “The nature of war and A2/AD is not new—that’s my point. I don’t want to
downplay it, but our improvements in information warfare, electronic warfare, payloads,
the weapons systems that we’ve previously talked about—plus our ability to train to thosecapabilities that we have—we will create sanctuaries, we’ll fight in those sanctuaries andwe’re a maneuver force.”171

An October 18, 2017, blog post states the following:
Assuming the DF-21D is ready for battle, can America defend against China’s mighty
missile?
While opinions are clearly mixed—in speaking to many sources over the last several years
on this topic—it seems clear there is great nervousness in U.S. defense circles. However,as time has passed, initial fears have turned towards a more optimistic assessment....

171 Dave Majumdar, “Chief of Naval Operations Richardson: US Aircraft Carriers Can Fight Inside A2/AD Zones,”

National Interest, August 29, 2016. See also Ryan Pickrell, “Navy Admirals Brush Aside Biggest Worry Of Modern
Naval Combat,” Daily Caller, August 31, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “Here Is Why the US Military Is Not In Panic Mode
Over China’s Carrier-Killer Missiles,” National Interest, June 20, 2016.

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In the end, the weapon might not be the great “game-changer” that many point it out to be,
but a great complicator.172

A January 28, 2021, press report states
The U.S. Navy’s top intelligence officer has said the service is watching closely as China
expands its anti-ship missile capabilities, particularly in and around the disputed South
China Sea, to include the ongoing development of long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles.
At the same time, he said he “hopes” that China’s People’s Liberation Army will continue
to invest significant resources into these efforts, hinting that the U.S. Navy already has
extensive measures to counter these threats already in use now or in development.
Navy Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information
Warfare, made his remarks about China’s anti-ship missile arsenal during an online event
put on by the non-profit Intelligence and National Security Alliance on Jan. 27, 2021….
… not only did Vice Admiral Trussler seem less concerned about PLA anti-ship missile
capabilities than one would expect, he made clear he was happy with them continuing topour time and resources into those efforts.
“I hope they just keep pouring money into that type of thing,” he said. “That may not be
how we win the next war.”
The clear indication here is that Trussler is aware of countermeasures, whether they becertain systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures, that are either available now or indevelopment. The Vice Admiral did not offer any specific details about what the Navy isdoing to go along with these remarks….
We also know that, by 2019, warships assigned to the Navy’s 7th Fleet, which is based inJapan, were fitted with the AN/SLQ-59 Transportable Electronic Warfare Modules(TEWM). TEWM is described as a “counter-terminal threat defensive system,” indicatingthat it is designed to help defeat incoming anti-ship missiles, or other threats, such as
swarms of small drones, in the final phase of their attack on a ship. Based on theinformation available, The War Zone previously assessed that the AN/SLQ-59 was most
likely acquired in response to growing cruise missile threats, and Chinese developments,
in particular, given its fielding first on ships forward-deployed in Japan.
The Navy has also been hard at work developing an entire networked electronic warfare“ecosystem,” as part of its shadowy Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against
Integrated Sensors program, or NEMESIS. The goal here has been to craft a ‘system ofsystems’ comprising of various manned and unmanned ships, as well as submarines andaircraft, equipped with electronic warfare systems that can work together cooperatively.
One of the key uses of these capabilities would be to generate signals that mimic real fleetsof ships and aircraft to distract and confuse opponents, making it difficult for them toeffectively spot and target real Navy assets. These networked electronic warfare platforms
could also employ other kinds of electronic warfare tactics across a broad area to protect
against various kinds of threats. You can read more about NEMSIS in detail in this past
War Zone feature.173
A highly adaptive and deeply networked electronic warfare ecosystem could be particularly
useful against long-range anti-ship missile strikes, especially using ballistic missiles, which

172 Harry J. Kazianis, “Could China’s Aircraft Carrier Killer Missiles ‘Sink’ the U.S. Navy?” National Interest, October18, 2017. See also Dick Mosier, “Breaking the Anti-Ship Missile Kill Chain,” Center for International Maritime
Security, February 26, 2018; Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Myth of the ‘Game-Changer’ Weapon,” Asia Times, April 26,
2018.
173 The article linked at this point is Brett Tingley, “The Navy’s Secretive And Revolutionary Program To Project False
Fleets From Drone Swarms,” The Drive, November 7, 2019.

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would require targeting information from offboard platforms and the ability to send
updated information to the weapon during the mid-course stage of flight….
The Navy does have Arleigh Burke class destroyers outfitted specifically for ballistic
missile defense, including the ability to launch the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which isdesigned to knock down ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of their flight.
Those ships are also slated to get interceptors designed to bring down hypersonic weapons
in the future as part of the Regional Glide Phase Weapon System (RGPWS) program….
The Navy, which has been looking to stop deploying Arleigh Burkes on dedicated missile
defense missions, could seek to make more widespread use of the SM-3 Block IIA in the
future. Those destroyers and other ships could gain additional missile defense capabilities
as the improved Block IB variant of the SM-6 missile begins to enter service. Existing
Block I and IA versions of the SM-6 already have the ability to intercept ballistic missiles
during the terminal phase of their flight, as well as engage various other aerial and surface
threats. The SM-6, in particular, potentially provides a potent defense against anti-shipballistic missiles, especially those that break through mid-course traditional ballistic
missile defenses, if mid-course ballistic missile defense assets are available at all.
There’s the possibility that Vice Admiral Trussler is aware of other developments in theclassified realm that could further mitigate some or all of these threats, as well. Beyond
that, there’s no discounting that his public comments, which are certain to be scrutinizedby the PLA itself, are a form of misinformation designed to prompt concerns within the
Chinese military that its priorities may be, in some way, seriously off base.
Whatever the case, the threat posed by China’s anti-ship missile arsenal, which continues
to grow in capability, including with the development of new anti-ship ballistic missiles, isreal. At the same time, while the Navy obviously knows this, the service seems to bestrongly hinting that it feels it making very good progress on getting around thesechallenges, or at least wants to make the Chinese think so.174

Regarding the above-reported remarks by Vice Admiral Trussler, a January 29, 2021, press reportstatedThat confident [U.S. Navy] posture caught the attention of the Chinese military
establishment. “What Trussler is saying is that the U.S. has sufficient power to handle theanti-ship missile threat from China,” former People’s Liberation Army instructor Song
Zhongping told the South China Morning Post on Friday [January 29]. “The U.S. isemphasizing that threat and it will further boost its defenses against Chinese missiles.” 175

A February 5, 2024, press report stated:
A U.S. aircraft carrier would be capable of executing its mission in a conflict with China,
a senior Navy official says, responding to the argument that Beijing's "carrier killer"
missiles would make the vessel less relevant to a battle in the western Pacific.
"Our highly trained sailors can operate these complex, contested domains and be lethal andsurvivable, and execute the mission regardless of what the threat is," Rear Adm. Carlos

174 Joseph Trevithick, “Top Navy Intel Officer Hopes China Will Keep Dumping Money Into Anti-Ship Ballistic

Missiles, The Navy Is Strongly Hinting that It Feels It Is Well on Its Way to Mitigating the Very Real Threats Posed by
Anti-Ship Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,” The Drive, January 28, 2021. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “U.S. Admiral:
China Can ‘Keep Pouring Money’ Into Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” USNI News, January 27, 2021.
175 Joel Gehrke, “China’s ‘Carrier Killer’ and Military Won’t ‘Win the Next War,’ US Admiral Says,” Washington
Examiner, January 29, 2021. The South China Morning Post article being cited is Teddy Ng and Minnie Chan, “USAdmiral Calls China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles a ‘Destabilising Effort’ that May Not Win a War,” South China
Morning Post, January 29, 2021. See also Kris Osborn, “Could the US Navy Destroy Attacking Chinese ‘CarrierKiller’ DF-26 Anti-Ship Missiles?” Warrior Maven, October 11, 2022.

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Sardiello, commander of the USS Carl Vinson strike group, told a few reporters aboard thecarrier on Wednesday [January 31].176

Ability to Counter Hypersonic Weapons
Another CRS report provides a brief survey of DOD (including Navy) efforts for developing
defenses against hypersonic weapons.177 Regarding the Navy efforts to develop capabilities forcountering hypersonic weapons, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) testified in
April 2024:
Initially just focused on ballistic missile defense, MDA today is developing weaponssystems and sensors to defeat the serious threat posed by hypersonic glide vehicles andmaneuvering threats. MDA continues to develop a layered defense capability to defeat
regional hypersonic threats with the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) development program. By
the end of FY 2024, MDA will select a single GPI interceptor design with which tocomplete development. In FY 2025, MDA will continue to develop and mature the GPI
capability with a focus on critical technology maturation and risk reduction activities. We
will also continue to update the [U.S. navy] Aegis Weapon System to integrate the GPIinterceptor. Our FY 2025 budget request supports the planned cooperative development of
the glide phase interceptor with Japan. We expect to complete the formal agreement onthat project this spring. Japan will fund and develop key missile components, primarily
propulsion elements.
The GPI weapon system design will provide a layered defense with currently deployed[U.S. Navy] Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) capabilities. SBT provides terminal defense of
assets at sea and forces ashore. We anticipate delivering SBT Increment 3 capabilities in
FY 2025 to provide expanded capability. SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement
against an operationally realistic hypersonic glide vehicle target in FY 2025, and an
engagement using a [U.S. Navy] Standard Missile (SM)-6 against a hypersonic glide target
in FY 2026.178

Author Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

176 Ryo Nakamura, “U.S. ‘Confident’ Carrier Can Operate under China Missile Threat: Admiral,” Nikkei Asia,

February 5, 2024.
177 CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
178 [Statement of] Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins, USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House
Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 12, 2024, pp. 2-3.
For more on the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of andunder the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes otherthan public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress inconnection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are notsubject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed inits entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images ormaterial from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
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