Mahayana Buddhism and Human Rights:
Focusing on Methods of Interpretation
Toru Shiotsu

D

INTRODUCTIONOUBTS have often been expressed about the relationship between
Buddhism and human rights. It is true that Buddhist scriptures do
not allude directly in either content or form to the modern idea of protecting human rights. The same could be said however for the Christian
Bible and other texts. Why then are Christianity and Buddhism judged
differently in terms of their contribution to human rights theory? The
answer lies in their respective development of a sense of purpose interms of grappling with the various problems of modern society whileremaining grounded in sacred texts written in ancient times, and how
much effort has been made to interpret those texts. In this essay I shall
examine these issues, focussing primarily on interpretative method, anissue of which there has to date been insufficient awareness.1
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY VIEWPOINT
Relatively little research has actually been undertaken neither in Japannor in the rest of the world on the topic of Buddhism and human rights.
In English the writings of Sally King and Damien Keown feature mostprominently, with both authors approaching human rights theory fromthe discipline of Buddhology. The approach I shall take however differs,
being from the perspective of law. Human rights theory is primarily
concerned with law, and by starting here in my search for the possibilities in Buddhist ideology, while my topic may be identical to that ofwriters like King and Keown, my approach to the research is from completely the opposite direction.
I should explain perhaps that by law I do not mean law in the narrow
sense of legal interpretation, but approaching Buddhism from the wider
viewpoint of legal philosophy. The legal philosophy viewpoint in thisinstance means not the guarantee of specific human rights, but identifying a theoretical basis for human rights as such. In this essay I identify
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human dignity as this theoretical basis, and examine how Buddhist
thought can contribute to human dignity. Therefore in both aspects:
human rights theory and Buddhist ideology, the focus will be on themethod of interpretation.
First I shall examine the issue of interpretative method in humanrights theory. The focus here is on a return to the idea of natural rights
in legal philosophy, and human dignity as the foundation of humanrights. By natural rights I refer to the idea that “All men are created freeand equal” seen in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776,
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, based on aview of humanity that maintains that in their natural state, humanbeings live in equality and freedom. This concept of natural rights was
the driving force behind the English, French and American Revolutions.
Once these revolutions were over however and each nation drew up
a constitution guaranteeing human rights, these rights became “systemized.” What then emerged was the concept of legal positivism, of systemized legal thought, the idea that only the individual human rights
specified in the constitution ought to be guaranteed. In this mode oflegal thought, any exploration of the view of humanity found in theconcept of natural rights is lost, leaving the legal system as the soleconcern. In contrast to this tendency however, a return to the idea of
natural rights has been identified in many countries, particularly after
WWII, coupled with enthusiastic debate about what exactly defines ahuman being, and what is required to protect the dignity of that humanbeing.
For example, the constitution of the United States has been in placefor over 200 years, and makes no clear pronouncement on the right toprivacy, which has become a mandatory human right in modern society.
However since the case of Roe v. Wade,2 the US Supreme Court has
identified the right to privacy in its interpretation of the due process of
Law in the 14th Amendment. In this interpretative method, the judges
considered not whether the right to privacy was written in the Constitution as a specific human right, but read it into the due process of law as
a human right that should naturally be guaranteed for the sake of human
freedom.
The idea of natural rights may not be alluded to directly in this opinion of the Supreme Court, but at the very least it does show the existence of the freedom and a view of human beings as free to make decisions for themselves on matters that concern themselves. Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin raises the issue of this type of interpretative
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rights by whether or not they are stated specifically in the Constitution
is pointless. He also maintains that the Constitution is a system of principles, those principles being equal treatment and basic freedoms, andthat the right to privacy may be derived from these principles.3 Certainof Dworkin’s views are close to the concept of natural rights.
Next, as an example in which the concept of natural right isexpressed in the actual provisions of a constitution, let us look at theGerman constitution (Bonn Basic Law). Article 1 of the German constitution states that human dignity is inviolable, and that the authority of
the judiciary, legislature and executive are bound by this fact. Furthermore the prescription for human dignity in the constitution forms thebasis for interpreting it to guarantee specific human rights, and humandignity is a general human right encompassing those human rights nototherwise clearly specified. In other words, interpreting what exactly ishuman dignity is indispensable to the guarantee of human rights.
As these examples demonstrate, there is a growing tendency inhuman rights theory today to view human beings as free and equal, abelief inherent in the concept of natural rights, and to base the propagation of this view on the idea of human dignity. What in Japanese are
known as jinken (human rights) and kenri (rights) are in English “right”
and German “recht,” both of which also mean “correct.” This may beseen as rooted in the idea that rather than having to guarantee humanrights because there is a system in place to do so, human rights ought tobe constructed and protected by the system because they are “correct,”because they represent the way human life ought to be, and for the sakeof human dignity.
In short, only when we look at the issue of human rights from thislegal philosophy viewpoint can we see the possibility of ideas shared by
Buddhist ideology. If we assume our method for interpreting humanrights theory to be one of basing our ideas on that of human dignity, we
should then think about the connection between our method and theanswer to the question of what human dignity means in Buddhist ideology, rather than in individual phrases of Buddhist scripture. Next therefore I shall examine this interpretative method as applied to Buddhist
scriptures.
INTERPRETING BUDDHIST SCRIPTURESAs stated at the beginning, previous failure to identify ideas shared by
Buddhism and human rights theory may be attributed to a lack ofawareness of how to interpret Buddhist scriptures. Let us therefore con-

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template a method of interpreting these scriptures, from three different
perspectives.
First, we need to recognize the breadth of Buddhist concepts. Christianity has altered over the centuries from its inception to the presentday, and now takes many forms, for example the Catholic, Protestantand the Eastern Orthodox churches. Buddhism has undergone changes
in the same way, and is now broadly speaking divided into two streams:
Theravada Buddhism in the south, and Mahayana Buddhism in thenorth of Asia.
Among Western scholars however there is a tendency to concentrateon the historical origins of Buddhism and solely on Theravada, in what
therefore becomes a limited understanding of Buddhist ideology. In
extreme cases this has even meant actively downplaying the significance of Mahayana Buddhism, based on a theory that Mahayana Buddhism were not even the teaching of Shakyamuni, the historical Buddha. However like Christianity, we need to view Buddhism more broadly not simply in terms of its origins, but including its historical development and current position.
It is important to consider the words of professor emeritus Masato
Nagao on this issue. According to Professor Nagao, the writings of
Buddhism have three meanings. One, the teachings preached by the
Buddha (Shakyamuni); two, teachings related to Buddha (laws andtruths), and three, teachings designed to enable people living now toachieve Buddha status.4 Here I would like to pay particular attention to
the third variety of teaching.
In Buddhology, the scriptures written in Balinese are believed toexpress most directly the words of Shakyamuni, and Theravada Buddhism to be based on these scriptures. However, if we take a broader
view of the concepts of Buddhism and include teachings for the purposeof attaining Buddhahood, the scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism arealso of obvious importance. Buddhism has developed historically as ateaching to enable people to achieve Buddhahood. A “living Buddhism” perspective is therefore also essential.
Christianity has theology, which is more than Biblical interpretationand commentary. Christian theology has always endeavored to address
the various issues faced by Christians and Christian societies. Particularly in the West Christianity has historically been “living Christianity”
developing with the times. Buddhism too should not be restricted by thepreference for tranquility observed in its past history—it is only naturalthat Buddhist ideology continue to develop amid the turbulence of modern society.

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Secondly there is the problem of how to interpret the Buddhist scriptures. Attempting to describe Buddhism by extracting single phrases
holds little meaning. Obviously scriptures written in ancient times will
not have direct links to modern ideas of human rights. Even if one wereto find a phrase of the scriptures linked to a specific human right foundin modern constitutions, e.g. freedom of speech, such a link would besuperficial, and logically not really supportable.
More important is to find out what these scriptures are attempting toconvey through their words and expressions, in other words, identifying
in them principles and ideas. Finding principles and ideas in texts in thisway is the act of interpretation. And this interpreting of Buddhist
scriptures must be concerned with more than syntax and logic: it mustalso take into account the historical background of the time. Even more
important however is to realize that interpreting scriptures is not a oneway process in which we receive messages from the past. For the very
reason that Buddhism is alive here and now, anyone endeavoring tointerpret its writings needs to be aware of issues facing the world today
as they look for answers in the past. In other words this interpretingneeds to be a two-way process. Previous discourse on the relationshipbetween Buddhism and human rights has been defective because
researchers focused on individual phrases in their interpretation of Buddhist scriptures, to the detriment of seeking out principles and ideas,
and because their awareness of social issues was insufficient. This was
not a problem with the scriptures themselves, but meant a need to question the method used to interpret them.
Moreover an awareness of social issues means more than being
deeply conscious of problems in society. It is a matter of whether one
can feel “pain” when approaching such problems. This pain felt for others could be described as sensitivity to human rights. This sensitivity tohuman rights demands that pain be alleviated, in other words the construction of a theory of human rights for the purpose of salvation.
Awareness of social issues requires this sensitivity to human rights plus
a legal logical structure for the practical protection of human rights.
Thirdly, we must search for Buddhist ideas that fit with discourse on
human dignity in law. Of course Buddhism does not discuss human dignity as such, but there are individual concepts within it that equate tothat of human dignity, because Buddhism presents us with an image of
the way human beings should live, and this image can be linked to legal
discourse on human dignity.
By Buddhist ideas, my focus here is particularly on Mahayana Buddhism, the reason being that as the name Mahayana (i.e. “Greater Vehi-

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MAHAYANA BUDDHISM AND HUMAN RIGHTScle”) implies, it has developed as a Buddhist movement with an emphasis on bosatsu-gy ō (bodhisattva practice) among ordinary people. As amovement of the people Mahayana Buddhism offers a guide for lifethat is intimately linked to everyday life. It is difficult to derive any
concrete discussion of what defines a human being, of human dignity,from a Buddhism in which the primary emphasis is on holy places andrituals removed from everyday living.
Discourse on human existence in Mahayana Buddhism has both epistemological and prescriptive aspects, which are not clearly distinguished. Plus it encompasses many ideas, not arranged in any particularorder or formed into any kind of system. My discussion here is purely
one of the significance of these ideas in terms of legal discourse on theissue of human dignity. Of course, this assumes one is interpreting
scriptures by reading them from a fixed perspective. From here I shallcontinue my examination of Buddhist ideology by focusing on the concepts of Buddha-nature, dependent origination and karma.
HUMAN DIGNITY IN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM
The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature
The doctrine of Buddha-nature or inherent Buddhahood is unique to
Mahayana Buddhism. The Nirvana Sutra states that “all sentient creatures possess Buddha-nature.” From the doctrine of Buddha-nature wecan derive much related to the concept of human dignity. First it isimportant to make people aware that they themselves possess Buddhanature (the dignity of human beings). As society demands greater economic efficiency, as we are controlled in so many ways, transformed
into “things” and relegated to a state of passivity, the doctrine of Buddha-nature can give us pride as human beings.
This does not mean simply recognizing the Buddha-nature in ourselves. The “all” of “all sentient creatures” also means having consideration for the Buddha-nature of all people. In Japanese we use the word
jinken (human rights) and occasionally kenri (right) for human rights,
however the character(ri—benefit or gain) used here is not reallysuitable for use in a translation of “right.” In the early Meiji years thecharacters
are said to have been used for kenri. This is the of(dori—reason, justice). Human rights should therefore not be a tool
for personal gain, but based on a sense of reason and justice that
respects human dignity, both that of the self and of others.

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Furthermore, because the doctrine of Buddha-nature maintains thatall people possess an inherent Buddhahood, it may be described as adoctrine of true equality. It is well known that the historical Buddha or
Shakyamuni criticized the social discrimination and caste system of hisage. The scriptures state that “People are not born base. Nor are theyborn Brahmins. By their actions they become base, and by their actions
they become Brahmins.” (Suttanipata) In this sense the doctrine of Buddha-nature has much in common with the natural rights concept of people being born free and equal.
However it pays to remember that while Buddha-nature is a doctrineof equality, it is not a mechanical (formal) doctrine of equality. Buddhanature is said to consist of wisdom and mercy, however this wisdom is
wisdom used to enable us to live better lives, in other words, that whichworks to enable us to maximize our innate potential. That is, the doctrine of Buddha-nature shows that (all) individuals have equal potential
for self-realization, however the way in which this self-realization is
manifested will not necessarily be identical.
A mechanical doctrine of equality furthermore would in fact lack theperspective of salvation for people actually living in disadvantaged circumstances.5 The question of a precise definition of equality is one of
the main topics in human rights today, however while everyone may
approve of outlawing irrational discrimination, there are no clear ideological guidelines for more active ways of making equality reality. If
however we interpret equality as the potential for self-realization as
found in the doctrine of Buddha-nature, we may deduce from this aconsideration for others from a sympathetic point of view, for example
for a socially disadvantaged person who has used their wisdom to overcome their circumstances.
Up to now I have said that Buddha-nature is wisdom, however whatever its precise meaning may be it is certainly not a particularly idealized version of a specific state of being or reality. The Buddha-nature
doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism does not equal a fixed ideal state. The
doctrine of Buddha-nature is composed of “Buddha” and “nature,” anddoes not mean departing from human form to become a Buddha, butdemonstrating the nature and abilities of a Buddha while remaining ahuman being. It was T’ien-t’ai the “Great Teacher” of China who formulated a very clear theory on this point in his doctrine of Ten Worlds.
T’ien-t’ai constructed a doctrine of 10 worlds or realms of human life
ranging from hell to Buddhahood, and using the Lotus Sutra to prove
his theory of “mutual possession of the Ten Worlds,” described the rela-

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tionship between Buddhahood and the other nine worlds as “the nineworlds are Buddhahood” and “earthly desires are enlightenment,” bywhich he meant that a person can attain Buddhahood while still ahuman being. “Earthly desires are enlightenment” refers to working
toward self-realization while carrying on an everyday existence. In
other words, the fundamental position of Mahayana Buddhism is not
one of fleeing from pain and conflict to arrive at some pure destination,
nor of ignoring the physical and spiritual desires we possess as humanbeings.
Compared to Christian ideology therefore there are some obvious differences. The God of Christianity transcends human beings. Human dignity is said to have its basis in the fact that human beings “are created in
the image of God.” In addition Kant, also a major influence on humanrights doctrine in the West, maintained that people capable of rational
self-determination have dignity. In any case, both share an emphasis on
rationality and spirituality in their definition of human dignity, andassume transcendence from the practical state of everyday living.
In contrast, in the doctrine of Ten Worlds, Buddhahood does not transcend the other nine worlds, but is manifested alongside the physicaldesires and social attachments of the worlds of hell, hungry spirits, Animals and asuras. In other words, the doctrine of Buddha-nature as seenin that of the Ten Worlds is not slanted exclusively toward lofty spirituality, but amid the conflicts of body and mind and of society, seeks not
to destroy these things, but to use our wisdom to make the most ofthem. I have on a previous occasion dubbed this feature of the doctrineof Buddha-nature “concrete corporeality,” however I believe it deserves
closer examination here.
The reason is that in “concrete corporeality” we may deduce a way of
thinking intimately connected with the roots of democracy, not only theconcerns of individuals. In Christianity it could be said that a vertical
relationship exists between God and human beings, in that an absolute
entity transcending humanity, known as God, saves people from conflict
and woe. If we replace this God with temporal law, then law becomesthe absolute entity. For example, it is frequently said that “equality inthe eyes of God” has developed into “equality in the eyes of the law.”
However the doctrine of Buddha-nature maintains that each of us has aninherent Buddhahood, leading easily to the logical conclusion that wemay seek counsel with others to attain a result. Mahayana Buddhism
attaches importance to the horizontal relationships between people, andin this we may find an affinity with democracy, i.e. “control by the people.”

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Dependent Origination
Buddhism preaches a doctrine of dependent origination as represented
by the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination or causation. The
doctrine of the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination shows alogical progression from the ignorance of the individual to their enlightenment, however the doctrine of dependent origination preached in
Mahayana Buddhism today has a broader logic structure than this. For
example, the Miscellaneous Agama Sutra states most directly, “Whenthere is this, that is. With the arising of this, that arises. When this is
not, neither is that. With the cessation of this, that ceases.”
The problem however is how to interpret this.
Here we may find a mode of thought that does not perceive various
beings including human beings as separate or fixed, but which understands things always in terms of their relation to others. To look at thisunderstanding of relationships another way, it means that relationships
with others are always open. We can imagine two different viewpoints
arising from this doctrine of dependent origination. In one, we see thisconnection as meaning not viewing things as fixed, but constantly
changing. The other viewpoint emphasizes this connection as coexistence with others, a symbiotic relationship.
The first viewpoint echoes that of Nagarjuna of India, who described
dependent origination as “nonsubstantiality.” If we believe things toalways be changing, we may draw conclusions such as the following:
human beings sometimes believe the situations in which they find themselves to be absolute, become attached to them, and are vulnerable todisappointment. However the doctrine of dependent origination teaches
us that by viewing situations as temporary, as a phase in a continual
process of change, we may perceive the first step in escape from thesesituations.
Potential for change is by no means confined to the realm of the individual. According to the doctrine of dependent origination, social systems are not rigid either. Changes to social systems tend to be viewed as
undesirable by those in possession of political power at the time (i.e.
those with a vested interest in the status quo). For examples we need
only think of the caste system of India, or the Edo Period Japan structure of warrior, farmer, artisan and merchant classes. Advocate the doctrine of dependent origination in such situations, and naturally it
becomes a criticism of the status quo.
However whether it be an individual or an entire social system, thisconcept of change is not a passive one in which people simply accept

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change as it occurs. The doctrine of dependent origination in Mahayana
Buddhism includes not only the knowledge of change, but maintains
that change should occur to achieve an ideal. On an individual level thismeans enlightenment and the manifestation of Buddhahood, and insocial systems too demands reforms to make these developments possible.
To recap what I have discussed so far: understanding our lives as one
phase in a process of continual change means at the individual level
always having hope and not falling into the trap of disappointment andattachment to the status quo, and behaving in a benevolent manner
toward others regardless of our present relationship with them (social
status, gender etc.). If this is what constitutes an open person, then on
the social level this person will demand an open society always accepting of all kinds of people, and with the potential for change.
Next let us turn to the second viewpoint we may derive from the doctrine of dependent origination—that of symbiosis. From this viewpoint,
the connection described earlier may be seen as the relationship ofmutual dependency between human beings. This means overcoming
egotism or self-interest. In the modern world, urbanization has weakened ties among family members and within local communities, andrather than caring for others, there is a growing tendency to use themfor our own ends. This type of behavior could be described as a closed
relationship with other people. So how does the doctrine of dependent
origination address this situation?
The catch-cry of the French Revolution, which was grounded in theconcept of natural rights, was “Liberty, fraternity, equality.” This fraternity referred to solidarity with others, however as we have already seen,
today this spirit of fraternity is disappearing. In reaction to this we may
identify two streams of modern legal thought: that of the “libertarians”
who value greater freedom for the individual, and of the “communitarians” who desire greater communality.
Buddhism is generally believed to place more emphasis on communality, and this has been described a feature of Buddhism contrastingwith the individualism of the West. What we need to be careful of here
however is over-simplifying this dichotomy of the individual—community: because if more emphasis is placed on the community or communality this categorization could serve to equate Buddhism with completeannihilation of the individual, and quite frankly to stress the opposing
natures of Buddhist communality and Western individualism so muchthat Buddhist communality becomes annihilation of the individual
would be a serious mistake.

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In the doctrine of dependent origination found in Mahayana Buddhism, by understanding people in terms of their interdependence, wefirst of all open up human relationships that had been closed by selfinterest, and begin to have consideration for others. This does not mean
however a fusion of the self and others in a relationship in which theself is annihilated. If we add the Buddha-nature to this equation, what isdoes mean is being aware of the Buddha-nature within ourselves, andrespecting the Buddha-nature in others, and that this is part of the relationship of interdependence between us all. In a communality thatinvolves annihilation of the self, a doctrine of dependent origination
showing the connection between the self and others could not exist.
Let us explain this in terms of the bosatsu-gyō (bodhisattva practice)of Mahayana Buddhism. Bosatsu-gyō has been described as putting
mercy into practice, feeling the pain of others, and extending to them
the hand of salvation. This must be an action taken toward another person in accordance with our autonomous will and practice, and our wishes as individuals. Furthermore it is not a one-way action performed onanother person: by taking that action toward the person it simultaneously becomes a “two-way street” in which we reveal our own Buddhanature. In conclusion, the symbiotic viewpoint that may be derived fromthe doctrine of dependent origination is the overcoming of ourclosed-off egotism, and does not mean annihilation of the individual. It
is an attempt to create communality from the autonomy of individuals.
So far incidentally I have discussed the doctrine of dependent origination, as it relates both to individuals and to society, in terms of theconnections between people. However, the doctrine of dependent origination may also be thought to include the relationship between humanbeings and the natural world. In Buddhist tradition this may be seen in
Japan in the idea of “trees, plants, the land, all can attain Buddhahood”—the perception that Buddha-nature may be found not only inhuman beings but also in the vegetation around us. In view of this, weneed to consider the Buddhahood not only of humans but also of nature.
Moreover Mio-lo of China preached the oneness of life and its environment, demonstrating a mutually dependent relationship between
human beings and the environment with human beings as the focus.
Our own experience tells us that people create environments and alter
them, and are also influenced by their environment. The richness ofnature enriches human beings spiritually, however destruction of theenvironment does more than inflict damage on that spirituality: in theworst scenario it may place us in real physical jeopardy. To understandthe danger of this, we can do no better than to recall the book Silent

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Spring by Rachel Carson.
It is too late to realize the importance of nature when its destructionis already a physical threat to human beings. Such destruction is theultimate manifestation of many years of abuse, and treating only its
symptoms is by this stage no longer adequate. It is instead an issue weneed to think about every day, at the very basic level of what form therelationship between human beings and the natural world should take.
The view that “trees, plants, the land, all can attain Buddhahood” lies atthe very heart of this idea, and is the departure point from which it
develops. The need to establish rights for the environment so frequently
stressed these days is also an issue that ought to be considered not interms of policy responses to problems such as environmental destruction and pollution, but in terms of one origin of the concept of humandignity.
Karma
So far I have discussed the doctrine of dependent origination mainly as
it relates to the connections between people and between people andnature, i.e. spatial relationships and the horizontal aspect of dependent
origination. The doctrine of dependent origination however also has avertical dimension of temporal connection, known as the doctrine ofkarma. Karma or gō in Japanese literally means “action.” In Buddhism
there are three types of action—physical, verbal and mental, that is tosay a temporal connection between actions in a broad sense. Physicalaction is that which involves the body, verbal our use of words asmeans of expression, and mental what lies in our hearts, and collectively these may be thought to represent action in the wider sense of theword.
What then is the temporal relationship between these three types ofaction? Most simply, it may be expressed in the oft-heard saying, “Asye sow, so shall ye reap.” In other words, perform good deeds and you
will reap good results, while the reverse also applies. Just as the connectivity and possibility of change of the horizontal doctrine of dependent origination are not confined to a simple awareness but are prescriptive in nature, so the doctrine of karma, having as it does the “As yesow, so shall ye reap” causative relationship, is prescriptive in terms oftelling us we should have the correct causes, take the correct action.
If this is the meaning of the doctrine of karma, then in it we may
identify a number of different viewpoints. One is that because results
are influenced by the actions of individuals, the self-determination of
the individual is important. And, if we respect the right to self-determi-

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nation of the individual, we may also say that they have responsibility
for themselves. Determination and responsibility are two sides of thesame coin. Earlier I stated that Buddhism did not mean the annihilationof individuality, and the doctrine of karma, while preaching the causality of our actions, indeed precisely because it does so, also asks penetrating questions about the self-determination and responsibility of individuals.
A second viewpoint is that this prescriptiveness possesses a broader
morality than the legal prescriptions of the state. In an ordinary society,unless one violates a law of the nation, malicious or discriminatory
statements, or actions taken purely out of self-interest may well be permitted. However, the doctrine of karma is stricter than this, as may beobserved in the concept of “mental action,” i.e. if a person is bad withinthemselves, they will be called to account for the results. It must be said
however that this strict morality is not morality in the sense of a penalty
imposed objectively by the state, but always a morality in which theindividual themselves makes a subjective judgement.
The third viewpoint, in connection with this, lies in the separation of
the doctrine of karma from that of environmental determinism. In thedoctrine of karma, respect for self-determination viewed from anotherangle means that the environment can be altered by the actions of theself. This does not mean that we are totally free of the influence of theenvironment, but that we can take autonomous action in various environmental conditions to change our environment. I would like to contemplate this point further, while touching on the past misuse of thedoctrine of karma in Japanese Buddhism.
Japanese Buddhism frequently preaches a doctrine of karma known
as shukugō in which the pain of this world is deemed to be the result of
misdeeds in the past. In this doctrine the past determines the present,
and it is a doctrine of environmental determinism for the individual living now. This is not an issue of fundamental Buddhist ideology, but was
merely an attempt by those in political power at the time to shift the
responsibility for social problems onto the victims of discrimination, in
which the priesthood colluded with the authorities to justify this discrimination in the name of Buddhism.
The substance of the Buddhist doctrine of karma lies in the positive
idea that a person living now can overcome their past and not be boundby it, to look to the future and lead a creative life. In the earlier discussion on dependent origination the focus was on overcoming a rigid setof circumstances and being closed to others. This being the case, naturally the doctrine of karma should also refute the idea of being bound154

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by the past found in the doctrine of shukugō.
Fourthly, the doctrine of karma is said to include the karma of individuals (fugūgō) and of society (gūgō or “common karma”), which transcends the individual. In this case the theory of common or collective
karma means that if a large number of people behave badly, this bad
behavior will combine to form a bad social consciousness. This social
consciousness will eventually be transformed into a social system. Thisway of thinking also contends that social consciousness and social systems will be passed down through the generations and in turn provide
norms for the consciousness and behavior of individuals.
According to the Buddhist scriptures preaching the doctrine of common karma, the caste system of India was formed when the avarice,
envy and pride of the people created discrimination within society,which then became a social system. The doctrine of common karma
contends that there are social problems that cannot be attributed to thekarma of individuals. In saying this however, what the doctrine of common karma really means is that even though we may refer to something
known as “the social system,” ultimately this system is created by thekarma of people, and precisely because of this, in accordance with theright to self-determination and responsibility of each individual weshould face the future and take the proper actions to bring about a revolution in social consciousness and social systems.
SUMMARY
The Buddhist scriptures do not refer directly to specific modern humanrights, however in them we may identify a concept that forms the foundation of human rights. To borrow the terminology of modern humanrights we may call this the concept of human dignity. In order however
to discover this type of concept and see it begin to take form in thescriptures, we must engage in the act of interpretation. To do so it isimportant to understand Buddhism as “living Buddhism,” and to reinterpret the Buddhist sutras in light of our awareness of problems inmodern society. This ideological task requires the practical study of various Buddhist doctrines carried out to date by religious groups, and in
addition to Buddhology, which involves philological and corroborative
research on Buddhism, a new Buddhist theology.
In one of its rulings,6 the US Supreme Court, quoting a section fromthe report of the Second Vatican Council, commented that “People arelooking to religion for answers to the riddles posed by human existence.
In other words, religion is what we look to answer the questions of what

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is a human being, and what is the meaning and purpose of our lives.” It
would be correct to view the purpose of the Supreme Court in quoting
this extract as an expectation of answers from various religions to thequestion of the meaning of human existence, which lies at the root of
human rights. This essay is one answer from Mahayana Buddhism.
NOTES
1
The author has already discussed the issue of Buddhism and human rights in
Bukkyo shiso to jinkenron no setten (“Crossover between Buddhist ideology and humanrights theory”) in Vol. 37 No. 2 of Toyo Gakujutsu Kenkyu (1998), however for thisessay has rearranged the points in this article and reworked it to focus on interpretative
method. Only the notes and reference material deemed particularly necessary has been
included.
2
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) The US Supreme Court had recognized the rightto privacy in cases previous to this, however this was the first ruling to be based fully on
the 14th Amendment.
3
See Ronald Dworkin (translated by Fumihiko Ishiyama), Jiyū no hō (original English title Freedom’s Law), Bokutakusha, 1999.
4
See Omine Akira, Bukkyō Hihan Kenkyū (“Research on Critiques of Buddhism”),
Kikan Bukkyō, No. 49, Hōzōkan, 1999, pp. 142–3.
5
For example, Amartya Sen, who reexamined the doctrine of equality to worldwide
acclaim, focuses on the reality of the diversity of human existence and its latent possibilities, an interesting connection to the author’s point here.
Amartya Sen (translated by Yukio Ikemoto et al.), Fubyōdō no saikentō (English
title “Inequality Reexamined”), Iwanami Shoten, 1999.
6
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) See work by Dworkin mentioned earlier for translation of report.

Bibliography
1 Sallie King, “Human Rights in Engaged Buddhism,” Buddhist Theology, Richmond: Cruzon Press, 2000
2 Vesna A. Wallace, “Biblical Scholarship and Buddhism,” Buddhist Theology,
Richmond: Cruzon Press, 2000
3 Damien V. Keown, “Are There Human Rights in Buddhism?” Buddhism andHuman Rights, Richmond: Cruzon Press, 1998