Getting
Gerasimov
Right
Charles K. BartlesOn 26 February 2013, chief of the Russian
General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov
published “The Value of Science Is in theForesight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking
the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat
Operations” in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (VPK)(Military-Industrial Courier). In this article, Gerasimovlays out his perspective—and the prevalent view in
Russian security circles—of the recent past, present,
and expected future of warfare. This article was published about a year before the Maidan protests that set
in motion the events leading to the eventual annexation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored insurrectionin eastern Ukraine.1 The chain of events that followed
the Maidan protests could in no way be foreseen by
Gerasimov, but his article is often cited in the West
as “Gerasimov’s Doctrine” for the way Russian forces
conducted its operations.
In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov’s article is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian
way of warfare that blends conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power,
often referred to as “hybrid warfare.” This article
will attempt to put Gerasimov’s article, which was
written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S.
readers to explain some allusions that are sometimes
missed or misunderstood.

The Russian Chief of General Staff
For background, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff isoften equated with the Russian General Staff, but
this is a great understatement of the Russian General
Staff ’s importance. The Russian chief of the General
30(Photo courtesy of the Press Service of the Russian Defense Ministry)

Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov

Staff has far more authority than any flag grade officer
in the U.S. military. He is responsible for long-termplanning duties equivalent to both the U.S. Officeof the Secretary of Defense and the unified combatant commanders. In addition, he has oversightof strategic transportation equivalent to that of U.S.
Transportation Command, force doctrinal and capabilities development, and equipment procurement for
all branches of the Ministry of Defense. He even has
an inspector-general-like function for ensuring that
General Staff standards and regulations are adhered to.
Also, although the chief of the General Staff does
not have operational control of the force, he does have
day-to-day control (in peacetime) of the Glavnoye
Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence
Directorate, commonly known as GRU), which is adirectorate of the General Staff, and several strategic
assets including the Russian airborne, which functions
as a strategic reserve.
In the hierarchy of the Russian government,
there are uniformed officers serving in positions
technically above the chief of the General Staff, but
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MILITARY REVIEWRUSSIAN VIEW

arguably none of these assignments areas prestigious.

Elaboration on Strategic
Foresight
In general, it is a duty of the Russian
general staff to use foresight to develop
the theory and practice of future war. Thisis the context in which Gerasimov’s article
is written. The use of the term “foresight”
in the article’s title is not coincidental, andthe term has a specific military definitionin the Russian lexicon:(Photo by Efrem Lukatsky, Associated Press)
Foresight (military) is the process ofHundreds of thousands of protesters poured into the streets of Ukraine’s capital, Kiev,
cognition regarding possible changes
8 December 2013, toppling a statue of Soviet-era leader Vladimir Lenin and blockadingin military affairs, the determinakey government buildings during escalating protests against the government. Gen. Valery
Gerasimov has stated that the greatest dangers to Russia are so-called “color revolutions.”tion of the perspectives of its future
development. The basis of the scienceof foresight is knowledge of the objective laws
but instead in Russia’s senior political leadership. Russia
of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis of
has powerful militarized intelligence and security
events transpiring in a given concrete-historservices that compete with the Ministry of Defense forical context.2
resources. Gerasimov’s article may have been intended
In Russian military thought, foresight is directly
to send a message that the Ministry of Defense canlinked to military science, with military science being
meet Russia’s current and future threats, an importthe science of future war.3
ant message in a resource-constrained environment.4
The General Staff takes a rather academic apNo matter what reason the article was published, it isproach to the endeavor of military science, including
important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply
the use of a peer-review-like process that functions
explaining his view of the operational environmentby opening debates on ideas through the publicationand the nature of future war, and not proposing a newof articles in various outlets, including professionRussian way of warfare or military doctrine, as thisal journals. There are several often-used outlets forarticle was likely drafted well before the start of thethe military’s academic discussion and debate, most
Maidan protests.
notably the journal Voyennaya Mysl (VM) (Military
The Russian Narrative of the UnitedThought), which is published by the General Staff.
States and Forced Regime Change inGerasimov chose to publish this article in VPK, a
the Post-Soviet Era
different, but also commonly used journal for such
For U.S. readers, Gerasimov’s linking of the Arabideas. The VPK is a private newspaper, owned by thequasi-government-controlled Almaz-Antey company, Spring and “color revolutions” (and in later comments,
the Maidan Movement) with military capability develwhich focuses on the military and military-industrial
complex matters. VPK also serves as a frequent venue opment may seem odd. In order to put his comments
in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view offor top military leaders to inform the force, tout sucwarfare and forced regime change as it has developed
cesses, and propose reforms.
since the end of the Cold War.
This particular article, like other such articles by
In the Russian view, transgressions against thesenior military leadership, was likely published in the
VPK in order to reach a much larger audience than the post-Cold War international order began with therather dry VM. The intended audience for Gerasimov’s partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Russia
was at her weakest. While the Western narrative ofarticle may not even be in the Russian armed forces,
MILITARY REVIEWJanuary-February 201631

is that most Russians
still resent this U.S./
NATO action.
Thus, it is no surprise Russia justified
Search for a pretext to
Iraq
many aspects of its
launch a military operation
1991, 1998, 2003
Crimea annexation on
the lessons learned andYugoslavia
precedents set by the
1999West in Yugoslavia,
Military Operation
which led to the evenHaiti
tual independence of1994, 2004
Kosovo.5 Additionally,
Afghanistan
post-Kosovo, the2001
most obvious U.S.
regime change operations occurred in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Russia views those
Opposing State
operations as having
been very similar to
the Kosovo operation.
In the Russian view,
the pattern of U.S.
Figure 1. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery
forced regime change
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Third
has been as follows:
Moscow Conference on International Security13
deciding to executea military operation;
finding an appropriate
NATO’s Yugoslavia intervention is one of militarypretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons
action to prevent mass genocide, Russia has a much dif- of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military
ferent view. Most Russians generally view the NATO
operation to cause regime change (figure 1).
bombing campaign as having been illegal because it was
However, Russia believes that the pattern of forced
conducted without the approval of the UN Security
U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely supCouncil and believe that Serbia was simply being
planted by a new method. Instead of an overt military
punished for engaging in counterterrorism operations,invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. attack come fromalbeit with some excesses. The most egregious sin, fromthe installment of a political opposition through state
the Russian view, was the partitioning of Yugoslavia.
propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social
This action set a precedent for external actors to makemedia, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
decisions about the internal affairs and territorial integ- After successfully instilling political dissent, separatrity of sovereign nations alleged to have committed
ism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has
some wrong. It is important to note that Russia wasincreasing difficulty maintaining order. As the security
dealing with its own Islamic insurgency at the same
situation deteriorates, separatist movements can betime in the North Caucasus. This may have caused
stoked and strengthened, and undeclared special operaRussian concern about a similar NATO action taktions, conventional, and private military forces (defense
ing place inside Russia. One consequence of Westerncontractors) can be introduced to battle the governintervention resulting in the destruction of Yugoslavia
ment and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate“Traditional” Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals

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MILITARY REVIEWRUSSIAN VIEW

government is forced to use increasingly aggressive
the threat is coming increasingly from more indirect
methods to maintain order, the United States gains a
and asymmetric methods. This change in the nature
pretext for the imposition of economic and politicalof the threat to Russia’s sovereignty is causing Russian
sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such
military development to increasingly focus on obtainas no-fly zones, to tie the hands of the besieged governing improved capabilities to counter those asymmetricments and promote further dissent (figure 2).
and indirect threats.
Eventually, as the government collapses and anarchy
The means required to implement these capabilities
results, military forces under the guise of peacekeepers
will be as diverse and asymmetric as the threats they
can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, andare intended to counter and could come in the form of
a new government that is friendly to the United States
undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, special
and the West can be installed (figure 3).
operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign
This theory may sound far-fetched to U.S. ears but
legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs,
is a very common view throughout the former Soviet
and cyber/propaganda warriors.8
Union. This narrative also sheds some light on the
Russian government’s hostility toward NGOs.6 Though Hybrid War, the Nature of War, andModelsthere are usually no allegations of NGOs being directly
Probably the most misunderstood aspect ofor indirectly controlled by foreign governments, mostGerasimov’s article is the idea of “indirect and asymRussian reporting on NGOs purports that they are
metric methods” that has been interpreted by the Westsimply being funded because they have an objective toas hybrid war. Of note, there is a general consensus in
influence a particular government in a given way, or tojust cause general instability. An interesting aspectof these allegations is that
Adaptive Approach for Use of Military Forcethe Central Intelligence
Agency (a favored
scapegoat for any RussianConcealed Use of Military Forcemisfortune) is no longer
Military trainSupply of weapons
Application of special Reinforcement
typically mentioned;ing of rebels
and resources to the operations forces and of opposition
the usual culprits (in theby foreignanti-government
private military comunits with
instructors
forcespaniesforeign fighters
new narrative) are theU.S. State Department
Search for (creation of) aand United States
No
Agency for International
Pretext for Military Operation
Has the resistance ofDevelopment (USAID).7
the opposing side
Accusing a conProtection
From a Russian milibeen
suppressed?
flicting party ofof civilians
tary perspective, this newusing weapons ofand foreign
Western way of war has
mass destruction
citizens
many implications thatYes
can be easily identified
in Gerasimov’s article
Change ofMilitary Operation
and Russia’s current
Political Regime
military doctrine. In thepast, the primary threatof foreign-forced regime
Figure 2. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valerychange has come from an
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Third
army storming across the
Moscow Conference on International Security13
border. In contrast, today,
MILITARY REVIEWJanuary-February 201633

understanding of the previously discussed color revolutions and the Arab Spring.
The view that NGOs are
the means of an indirect
Open military
Adaptive use of force
and asymmetric method ofinterference
war makes it very clear that
Search for a pretext
to launch a military
Gerasimov is talking about
Concealed
operationuse of force
something very different
Application ofthan the Western notion ofprivate militarySpecialSupport to companies
operations
hybrid war.9
armed
forcesopposition
One of the most interestapplication
ing aspects of Gerasimov’s
article is his view of therelationship on the use ofNonmilitary means
nonmilitary and military“Color Revolutions”
measures in war. The leveraging of all means of national
power to achieve the state’s
Opposing stateends is nothing new for
Russia, but now the Russian
military is seeing war as
being something much morethan military conflict. As thegraphic from Gerasimov’s
Figure 3. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery
article illustrates (figure 4),
Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense’s
war is now conducted byThird Moscow Conference on International Security13
a roughly 4:1 ratio of nonRussian military circles that hybrid war is a completemilitary and military measures. These nonmilitaryly Western concept as no Russian military officer ormeasures include economic sanctions, disruption ofstrategist has discussed it, except to mention the West’s
diplomatic ties, and political and diplomatic pressure.
use of the term, or to mention the West’s use of hybrid
The important point is that while the West considers
warfare against Russia.
these nonmilitary measures as ways of avoiding war,
The Russian military has been adamant that they
Russia considers these measures as war (figure 4).
do not practice a hybrid-war strategy. Moreover, there
Some analysts in the West, having read Gerasimov’s
have been many Russian commentaries that state thisarticle and viewed current Russian operations inconcept is nothing new, that the aspects of hybrid war
Crimea and eastern Ukraine, have created models formentioned by Western analysts have been practiced
a new Russian way of warfare. Although these models
since warfare began.
may be useful analyzing past actions, not much stock
However, it is difficult to compare the terms
should be put in them for predicting the nature of
because there is no recognized definition for the
future Russian operations. In Gerasimov’s own words,
terms, either in Russia or the West. Undoubtedly,“Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an unthere is some overlap about what these terms likely
derstanding of its own particular logic, its own uniquemean, but it is clear that hybrid war refers to a muchcharacter.”10 He is saying that there is no model or fornarrower scope of activities than the term “indirectmula for understanding the operational environment
and asymmetric methods.” One example that clearlyor the exercise of national power in every war scenario.
illustrates the difference in the terms is the Russian
Each instance of a problem will be looked upon as a“New” Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals

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MILITARY REVIEWRUSSIAN VIEW

Military conflict

Neutralization of military conflict
Localization of military conflict
Crisis reaction

Directmilitary threat
Deepening contradictions
Targeted
military threat

The transformation of differences into contradictions
and their recognition by the
military-political leadership

Potential
military threat
1. Covert origin

3. Initialconflicting
actions

2. Strains

4. Crisis

The formation of coalitions and alliances

5. Resolution

6. Reestablishment of peace(postconflict regulation)

The search for methods of regulating a conflict

Political and diplomatic pressure

Nonmilitary
measures

Economic sanctions

Economic
blockade

Disruption of diplomatic relations

Formation of the political opposition

Actions of opposition forces

Correlation of nonmilitaryand military measures (4:1)

Conduct

Carrying out complex measures toreduce tensions inrelations

Transition of
economy tomilitary lines
Change of thepolitical-militaryleadership
Information conflict

Military measures of strategic deterrence

Militarymeasures

Strategic deployment

Conduct of military operations

Peacekeeping operations

Figure 4. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26
February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles
unique situation that will require the marshalling of
the state’s resources in whatever way is necessary.
Although Russia may respond similarly to two
different situations, this is not an indicator of a specificformula for action, rather it just means the similarityof the situations required similar responses. At the tactical level, models and formulas are essential for determining the correlation of forces needed for victory, but
MILITARY REVIEWJanuary-February 2016at the operational and strategic levels, a much different
approach is required (figure 5).

The U.S. Threat to Russian Strategic
Deterrence Capabilities
A cornerstone of Russia’s national security policy
is the concept of strategic deterrence. Russia’s theoryof strategic deterrence is based upon the premise that35

The use of military forces

The use of political, diplomatic, economic
and other nonmilitary measures in combination with the use of military forces

Traditional forms and methods

New forms and methods-initiation of military operations after strategic deployment-frontal clash of large groupings of line-units, the basis ofwhich consists of ground troops-the destruction of personnel and weaponry, and the consequent possession of lines and areas with the goal of the seizureof territories-destruction of the enemy, destruction of the economic potential and possession of his territories-the conduct of combat operations on the ground, in the air andat sea-the command-and-control of groupings of line units (forces)
within a framework of a strictly organized hierarchical structure of command-and-control agencies-initiations of military operations by groupings of line-units(forces) in peacetime-highly maneuverable, noncontact combat operations of interbranch groupings of line-units-reduction of the military-economic potential of the state by thedestruction of critically important facilities of his military andcivilian infrastructure in a short time-the mass use of high-precision weaponry, the large-scale useof special operations forces, as well as robotic systems andweapons based on new physical principles and the participation of a civil-military component in combat operations-simultaneous effects on line-units and enemy facilities throughout the entire depth of his territories-warfare simultaneously in all physical environments and theinformation space-the use of asymmetric and indirect operations-command-and-control of forces and assets in a unified
information space

Figure 5. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy
Kurier, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles
the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic
nuclear forces will cause such an amount of damage toan aggressor’s military and economic potential under
any circumstances that the cost of such an endeavor
will be unacceptable to the aggressor. Even in the worstof economic times, Russia has been able to rely on her
strategic nuclear forces for such strategic deterrence.
However, after NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia,
Russia saw NATO’s interference with what it perceived as an internal matter in Yugoslavia as somethingthat might be replicated in its own breakaway region,
Chechnya. In response, Russia incorporated the concept
into its 2000 Military Doctrine of “de-escalation” thatsays if faced with a large-scale conventional attack it
could respond with a limited nuclear strike.11 In the past,
the relatively weak condition of Russia’s conventional
forces required Russia to change the conditions for theuse of strategic nuclear forces as a strategy for deterrence, but the parity and deterrence value of nuclear
forces was never questioned. The combination of theUnited States’ development of the anti-ballistic missile
defense and Prompt Global Strike (capability to conduct
a precision strike on any target in the world in less thanhour) programs in the 2000s changed this status quo of
36

parity for the first time. Russia believes that a combination of these two programs would severely degrade
Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent, especially with theaddition of hypersonic weapons.12

Other Salient Observations of Note
Gerasimov’s view of the future operational environment is in many ways very similar to our own. Likeus, he envisions less large-scale warfare; increased useof networked command-and-control systems, robotics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importanceplaced on interagency cooperation; more operations inurban terrain; a melding of offense and defense; and ageneral decrease in the differences between military activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Interestingly, despite some very similar views, he andhis staff are approaching these problems in some very
different ways. Russia is experimenting with some rather
unconventional means to counter hostile indirect andasymmetric methods, but Russia also sees conventional
military forces as being of the utmost importance.
At a time when the U.S. military is cutting back onheavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at asimilar future operational environment, and doubling
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MILITARY REVIEWRUSSIAN VIEW

down on hers. While the United States increases its
special operations forces (SOF), Russia is keeping her
SOF numbers relatively static and is entrusting her
conventional forces to perform many SOF functions,
not by necessity, but by design.
The biggest difference in how Gerasimov perceives the operational environment is where hesees threat and risk. His article and Russia’s 2014
Military Doctrine make apparent that he perceives
the primary threats to Russian sovereignty as stemming from U.S.-funded social and political movements such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring,and the Maidan movement. He also sees threats in
the U.S. development of hypersonic weapons andthe anti-ballistic missile and Prompt Global Strike
programs, which he believes could degrade Russianstrategic deterrence capabilities and disturb the current strategic balance.

Conclusion
Gerasimov’s position as chief of the General Staff
makes him Russia’s senior operation-strategic plannerand architect for future Russian force structure andcapability development. In order to execute these duties,
the individual in that position must have the foresight tounderstand the current and future operating environments along with the circumstances that have createdthose environments and will alter them. Gerasimov’s
article is not proposing a new Russian way of warfare ora hybrid war, as has been stated in the West. Moreover,in Gerasimov’s view of the operational environment, theUnited States is the primary threat to Russia.

Charles K. Bartles is a Russian linguist and analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. He has deployed in various assignments as an officer of the Army Reserve to Afghanistan and Iraq. He also
has served as a security assistance officer at U.S. embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. He has a
BA in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies fromthe University of Kansas.

Notes
1. Gabriel Gatehouse, “The Untold Story of the Maidan Massacre,” BBC, 12 February 2015, accessed 5 November 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31359021.
2. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow: Voyenizdat,1983), 585, s.v. “foresight.”
3. Jacob Kipp, “The Methodology of Foresight and Forecastingin Soviet Military Affairs,” Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988, accessed 30 October 2015, http://www.dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf.
4. Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian
Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows (blog), 6 July 2014, accessed 5 November 2015, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.
com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linearwar/. Any assessment of Gen. Gerasimov’s article should include athorough read of Galeotti’s blog on the topic. Galeotti’s blog also
provides a translation of the article with inline commentary that isinvaluable.
5. Nathan Hausman, “Competing Narratives: Comparing
Perspectives on NATO Intervention in Kosovo,” December 2014,
accessed 30 October 2014, http://www.cla.temple.edu/cenfad/
SAandJROTC/documents/Hausman%20US-Russia%20Kosovo.pdf.
6. Roger N. McDermott, “Protecting the Motherland: Russia’s Counter–Color Revolution Military Doctrine,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 11, 18 November 2014, 206, accessed 30 October
MILITARY REVIEWJanuary-February 20162015, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=43094&no_cache=1#.VJzJe14AA; Tony Papert,“Moscow Conference Identifies ‘Color Revolutions’ as War,”
Executive Intelligence Review, 13 June 2014, accessed 30 October 2015, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eirv41n24-20140613/07-25_4124.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman,“Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of aWorld Destabilized by the US and the West,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 28 May 2014, accessed 30 October
2015, http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution;“Aliyev: ‘Maidan’ Was Being Prepared in Azerbaijan, Money forwhich Was Brought by ‘Fifth Column’ NGOs,” Interfax, 8 September 2015.
7. Velimir Razuvayev, “Senators Approve First List of Russia’sFoes,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 9 July 2015, accessed 14
July 2015, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2015-07-09/3_senatory.
html; “Putin agrees that USAID is trying to influence politics in
Russia,” Interfax, 20 September 2012; Veronika Krasheninnikova,“Who Is Serving in USAID? Watching over the Health of Russians
Are American Career Military Persons and Security Specialists,”
Komsomolskaya Pravda online, 25 September 2012, accessed 30
October 2015, http://www.kp.ru/daily/25955/2896580/.
8. Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to the New Western Way of War,” publication
37

forthcoming; 2014 Russian Military Doctrine, accessed 30 October
2015, http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
9. Ruslan Puhkov, “The Myth of Hybrid Warfare,” Nezavisimaya
Gazeta online, 29 May 2015, accessed 30 October 2015, http://
nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html; Jacob W. Kipp and Roger
N. McDermott, “The Bear Went Under the Mountain: Is Russia’s
Style of Warfare Really New?” European Leadership Network
online, 15 December 2014, accessed 17 January 2015, http://www.
europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-bear-went-under-the-mountain-is-russias-style-of-warfare-really-new_2263.html.
10. General Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in theForesight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms andMethods of Carrying out Combat Operations,“ Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier online, 26 February 2013, accessed 30 October
2015, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
11. Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike ‘de-escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13
March 2014, accessed 30 October 2015, http://thebulletin.org/
why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation.

12. O. Yu. Aksyonov, Yu N. Tretyakov, and Ye N. Filin, “Basic
Principles of a System to Assess Current and Anticipated Damage
to Key Strategic Deterrence System Elements,” Military Thought
24(3), 2015, 44–51; Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Way of Maintaining Strategic Deterrence,” publication forthcoming;“Russia Taking‘Prompt Global Strike’ Countermeasures,” Interfax, 30 October2015.
13. Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman attended the Russian Ministryof Defense’s third Moscow Conference on International Security
on 23 May 2014. While in attendance, Cordesman was able totake pictures of Gen. Valery Gerasimov’s slide presentation. A
few of the presentation’s key slides (figures 1, 2, and 3) have been
substantially recreated to accompany this article. Cordesman later
produced a report on the conference that includes a broader
selection of not only the slides presented by Gerasimov, but aselection of materials presented by other participants. The reportis titled “A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the
US and the West.” It may be viewed in its entirety at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies website, accessed 20 November
2015, http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution.

Report can be accessed at http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution
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