JAPAN-INDIA MARITIME COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMSREPORT SUBMITTED BY

Dr Rupakjyoti Borah
Assistant Professor(International Relations)
School of Liberal Studies
Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, India
Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India

1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
At the outset, I would like to thank the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)
for awarding me this Visiting Research Fellowship to undertake research on this topic. I
would also like to thank my supervisor Vice-Admiral Hideaki Kaneda (Retd.), who
painstakingly guided my research while I was in Japan. A big note of thanks is also due
to all the staff at JIIA who made my stay very comfortable and fulfilling. I am also
grateful to my University, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, India, for giving meleave during this period to undertake this research and to many people in both India
and Japan whom I cannot name here due to constraints of space. Last, but not the least,a big thanks to my wife Maushumi and my son Hurjyudoy for bearing with my absence
during the time I undertook my research. At the end, all mistakes in this work are mine
only. The views expressed in this report are entirely personal.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Japan and India have historical ties dating back to the period when Buddhism madeinroads into Japan from India. However, the positive perceptions of each other were notsufficient to prevent India and Japan joining the post- Second World War community ofnations with diametrically opposite standpoints. In the post-Cold War era, however,India and Japan moved closer to each other because of factors like India’s “Look-East
Policy” and its economic liberalization, demise of the erstwhile Soviet Union,
complementary strategic interests in the wider Asia-Pacific region, India’s improving
ties with the United States and partly due to common concerns about China.
India’s “Look-East Policy” was designed to reinvigorate its ties with the Southeast
Asian and East Asian countries as throughout the annals of its history, India has had
deep cultural, economic, and political ties with these countries.

Though the relations

between India and Japan deteriorated in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests in 1998,
they bounced back soon after, particularly after the visit of the then Prime Minister ofJapan, Yoshiro Mori to India in August 2000. In May 2007, India and Japan became partof a new grouping-the Quadrilateral Initiative (QI) which also included Australia and theUnited States, though it fizzled out soon thereafter.
The maritime relations between India and Japan are one area which has not been
given its due importance by both the governments and hence it is very pertinent that a
study is undertaken of the prospects of maritime cooperation between India and Japanin the Asia-Pacific region. This study will analyse the areas of convergence anddivergence in Indo-Japanese maritime ties in this region while suggesting ways to workaround the problem areas. Besides, it will elucidate how the two countries can copewith common threats like maritime terrorism, natural disasters and piracy.

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BACKGROUND
The relations between Japan and India go back to the 6th century A.D. when
Buddhism made inroads into Japan from its country of origin, India. The famous Indian
poet Rabindranath Tagore visited Japan in 1916 and he was friends with the renowned
Japanese scholar Okakura Tenshin. Many Japanese still remember that Indian JusticeRadha Binod Pal was the only dissenting voice on the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (IMTFE), commonly known as the Tokyo Trials, set up after the end of
the Second World War. India did not claim any reparations from Japan following WorldWar II, unlike many other countries, and refused to attend the San Francisco Peace
Conference in 1951, instead preferring to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan in
1952. However, in India’s post-independence period, all this camaraderie began to fadeas Japan became an ally of the United States and on the other hand, India became closer
to the erstwhile Soviet Union.
Following the end of the Cold War, India embarked on a path of economic
liberalisation and enunciated its “Look East Policy”, which aimed at reviving India’s
age-old ties with the countries of East and Southeast Asia. India’s nuclear tests of
1998, however, jolted the relationship and they were revived only with the visit of thethen Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to India in 2000. Thereafter military-tomilitary cooperation strengthened. In February 2001, Japan participated in theInternational Fleet Review in Mumbai, which was followed by the visit of a Japan
Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) squadron to the southern Indian city of Chennai
later in the year in May 2001. 1 It was during Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s
landmark visit to India in August 2000 that the foundation was laid for a "Global
Partnership in the 21st Century". Since then, relations have moved at a fast pace. A
Strategic and Global Partnership was established between the two countries in
December 2006 and a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was issued in October
2008. India and Japan now have an annual summit at the Prime Ministerial level.
Economic ties between the two countries have been on an upswing. A
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and Japan
1

Rajaram Panda(2011), Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Future Trends available at
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/rp/publications/no06/contents.html accessed on June 20, 20124

took effect in August 2011 and is slated to eliminate about 94 per cent of the tariffs
between the two countries within 10 years. 2
JAPAN-INDIA TRADE (Values in Indian Rupees in Lacs)
S.No.

\Year

2006-2007

2007-2008

2008-20092009-20102010-2011

1,295,361.13

1,551,559.21

1,380,771.30

1,714,278.60

2,363,046.60

19.78-11.01

24.15

37.84

65,586,352.18

84,075,505.87

14.71

28.19

0.57

35.14

1.

EXPORT

2.

%Growth

3.

India's Total
Export4.

%Growth

5.

%Share

2.27

2.37

1.64

2.03

2.07

6.

IMPORT2,079,487.72

2,545,779.99

3,583,282.46

3,189,384.21

3,930,930.77

7.

%Growth

22.42

40.75

-10.9923.25

8.

India's Total
Import9.

%Growth

10.

%Share

11.

TOTAL
TRADE

12.

%Growth13.

India's Total
Trade

14.

%Growth

15.

%Share16.

TRADE
BALANCE17.

India's Trade
Balance57,177,928.52

84,553,364.38 114,264,897.18

84,050,631.33 101,231,169.93 137,443,555.45 136,373,554.76 168,346,695.57
20.44

35.77

-0.78

23.45

2.47

2.51

2.61

2.34

2.34

3,374,848.85

4,097,339.20

4,964,053.76

4,903,662.81

6,293,977.37

21.41

21.15

-1.22

28.35

141,228,559.85 166,817,522.10 221,519,061.32 220,926,919.14 282,611,592.75
18.12

32.79

-0.27

27.92

2.46

2.24

2.22

2.23

2.39

-26,872,702.81 -35,644,817.75 -53,368,049.58 -51,820,190.38 -54,081,798.39

Note: Since 2006-07, Petroleum figures are being computed from Import Daily trade Returns (DTRs) togenerate country-wise/port-wise tables. Up to 2005-06 consolidated petroleum import figures werebeing received
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp

Besides these areas, Japan and India share many common interests. Japan helped
India to become a part of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and both countries share concerns
about China and its rising aggressiveness.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs(2012), Government of Japan, Japan-India Relations,available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html accessed on 12
June 2012
2

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WHY IS INDIA PAYING INCREASING ATTENTION TO THE MARITIME DOMAIN?
It was in his classic 1890 work, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" thatthe renowned naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan described the world's oceans as "agreat highway... a wide common" 3 India used these seas and oceans to build close ties
with countries and regions across the world. On land, India’s options are restricted
since it shares land borders with many countries, including with countries like China.
However, unlike on land, where India’s force projection capabilities are restricted, theIndian Ocean region affords India a great opportunity for strategic leverage, like in thehistorical past when Indian influence spread to Southeast Asia and beyond. Regions likeSouth China Sea have now become critically important for many nations, including
Japan and India. As noted scholar, Robert Kaplan notes ‘East Asia, or more precisely
western Pacific, is quickly becoming the world’s new centre of naval activity’ 4
WHY INDIA AND JAPAN NEED TO COOPERATE IN THE MARITIME ARENA?
Maritime cooperation is one of the most important areas of cooperation between
Japan and India. Japan is heavily dependent on energy supplies from the Middle Eastand the Indian Navy has a formidable presence in the region between the Straits of
Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. The navies of the two countries have been
cooperating for quite some time now. Japan and India are also part of the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP).
In November 1999, the Indian Coast Guard and Navy successfully rescued aJapanese-owned tanker MV Alondra Rainbow, hijacked by pirates- in the process,showcasing India’s naval capabilities.

India has already been conducting a host of

exercises with other navies. It conducts the SIMBEX with Singapore, INDINDOCORPAT
with Indonesia besides the multilateral MILAN series of exercises. The MILAN exercises,
Assured Access to the Global Commons available at http://www.act.nato.int/mainpages/globalcommons
accessed on 12 March 2012
3

Robert D. Kaplan(2011),
The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict?page=full accessed on 12 February 201246

held since 1991, are designed to foster closer cooperation and address maritime
security issues among the navies of India and the Southeast Asian countries besides
countries like Australia and New Zealand.
Both India and Japan are poor in indigenous energy resources and are dependent
on oil imports from the Middle East. More than 90% of India’s trade by volume and77% by value are transported through the seas. In addition, over 97% of its energy
needs of oil are either imported or produced from offshore fields and hence India’s
economic growth is intrinsically linked to the seas. 5
In the case of Japan, it is entirely dependent on oil imports and the major
concentration of the sources of these imports is in the Middle East. 6 In addition,
following the Fukushima disaster, Japan has reduced the production of nuclear powerand hence Japan’s oil and gas imports have increased. Hence, unrestricted freedom ofnavigation is crucial for the security and economic well-being of both India and Japan.
JAPAN-INDIA COOPERATION IN THE MARITIME ARENA
Combined anti-piracy, search and rescue exercises have been conducted between
the coast guards of India and Japan since 2000, while the two coast guards exchanged aMemorandum on Cooperation during commandant Ishikawa's visit to India in
November, 2006. 7 Japan had participated in the Malabar naval exercises in 2007 and2009, but could not do so in 2011 because of the disastrous tsunami which struck Japan.
Meanwhile, the 11th edition of the Indo-Japan Coast Guard Joint Exercises, whichalternates between India and Japan every year, was organized in late-January this year
in the Bay of Bengal.
In a landmark development in the field of Japan-India maritime ties, the inauguralbilateral maritime exercise between India and Japan named 'JIMEX 12' (Japan -India
5

Ministry of Defence(2012), Government of India, Annual Report, 2011-12, available at
http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html accessed on 13 June 2012
6 International Energy Agency(2011), Impact of Earthquakes and Tsunamis on energy sectors

in Japan, available at http://www.iea.org/files/japanfactsheet.pdf accessed on 22 June 2012
7 n.2

7

Maritime Exercise) commenced on June 9 off the coast of Tokyo. From the Japaneseside, two destroyers; one maritime patrol aircraft and a helicopter participated in theexercises while from the Indian side, four ships, the INS Rana, INS Shivalik, INS Karmukh
and INS Shakti participated in the exercises. These ships entered Japan after paying
visits to Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines and Republic of Korea en route. The bilateral
exercise was timed to coincide with the commemoration of 60 years of theestablishment of diplomatic relations between India and Japan.
Of late, piracy in the Indian Ocean region has emerged as a major threat for all
countries. The Indian Navy has been at the forefront of efforts to fight against piracy. It
has deployed one warship continuously in the Gulf of Aden since October 23, 2008. Over
600 merchant ships from different countries have been escorted safely by Indian
warships.
Japan and India are also part of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Japan has also been facing a
lot of problems due to piracy. In 2008, pirates attacked the Takayama, a 150,000-tonne
oil tanker, which was rescued later by the German navy. Earlier in 2007, a chemical
tanker Golden Nori was captured by the ransom-hunting pirates who freed it six weeks
later.
In order to fight the menace of piracy, since 2009, the JMSDF (Japan Maritime SelfDefence Force) has deployed two destroyers and two P-3C aircraft off the coast of
Djibouti. In July 2011, Japan opened a military base in Djibouti which will be very
helpful in combating piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa.
Maritime terrorism is another major threat and both India and Japan need tocollaborate to combat the same. The attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 in the
Yemeni port of Aden stands out in the field of maritime terrorism. In the case of thehorrendous Mumbai attacks of November 2008 in India, the attackers came by sea.
Meanwhile, India and Japan together with Australia and the United States formed
the original "core group" for providing assistance to the countries hit by the disastrous
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tsunami of December 26, 2004. The two countries are also collaborating in anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. Besides, there is scope for greater maritime cooperation,
intelligence-sharing, joint initiatives on maritime security, counter-terrorism, disasterprevention and management, combating of maritime pollution and environmental
disasters like oil spills for India and Japan.
CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA
Another point of worry for India and Japan is that China will soon be deploying anaircraft carrier and is rapidly modernizing its navy. China has, of late, become very
aggressive in the South China Sea region. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler
rammed into Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku islands and this created amajor diplomatic issue. During this crisis, China unofficially declared a ban on theexport of rare earth materials to Japan. Interestingly, the Joint Statement issued at theend of Japanese Prime Minister Noda’s 2011 visit to India notes that “Indian andJapanese enterprises would jointly undertake industrial activities to produce and export
rare earths at the earliest” which in effect aims at challenging the present Chinesemonopoly in the production of rare-earth materials.
In May 2007, a flutter was created in diplomatic and strategic circles when the
Quadrilateral Initiative (QI) was set up-involving Japan, India, Australia and the UnitedStates - though it fizzled out later, largely due to the desire among these countries not tobe seen as “ganging up against China”. Indian strategic circles have also expressed
concerns about the so-called Chinese “string of pearls” strategy which reportedly seeks
to enclose India by funding ports and refuelling stations in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka(Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong), and Myanmar (Sittwe and Kyaukpyu). China
has in the past warned India against undertaking oil exploration activities in the South
China Sea, though India has brushed aside these warnings. India’s state-owned
ONGC(Oil and Natural Gas Corporation)’s foreign arm, ONGC Videsh Limited has
significant investments off the coast of Vietnam, though it has recently pulled out of oneof the blocks because it was financially “ unviable”.

9India and Japan have also reaffirmed their commitment to the universally-agreed
principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international maritime law.8 This assumes
significance in the wake of China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and its
maritime disputes with many countries, including Japan.
THE US FACTOR
One of the factors which has led to improved maritime ties between India and Japanis the growing synergy between India and the United States. Now many American firms
have entered the lucrative Indian defence market. India has bought American militaryequipment including the C-130J aircraft, Harpoon missiles and maritime surveillance
aircraft from the US. This could allow for interoperability between the navies of thethree countries. In the light of the US’ “return to Asia”, there will be even more
opportunities for India, Japan and the United States to collaborate. In an unmistakable
sign of the growing collaboration between the three countries, the first trilateraldialogue between the US, Japan and India was held in Washington D.C. in December
2011
PROBLEM AREAS
However, the maritime ties between Japan and India have been beset by a series ofroadblocks as well. Due to the lack of a proper codified maritime cooperation
mechanism, maritime cooperation between the two countries is happening on a caseby-case basis. Japan’s arms exports laws also have prevented the two countries fromcooperating closely in the maritime arena. Earlier in April this year, Japan went ahead
with joint production of weaponry with the United Kingdom 9 and something similar
can be worked out for India too. Meanwhile, India has now emerged as the world’s

MinistryofExternal
Affairs(2011),
Government
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530518843 accessed on

8

9

of

India,Japan
Times(2012),
Japan,
U.K.
agree
on
arms
development,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120411a2.html accessed on 12 May 201210

availableatavailableatbiggest arms importer 10 and has gone in for some big-ticket defence purchases lately
and Japan can benefit from the same.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING JAPAN-INDIA MARITIME TIESThe two countries could have joint patrolling activities in the Bay of BengalThere should be more joint exercises with countries like Malaysia, Singapore andIndonesia with which India has close ties and conducts regular naval exercises.

They could undertake joint production of maritime equipment as India is trying
to move from being a ‘Buyers’ Navy to a Builders’ Navy’.



There are prospects for cooperation in ship-building, dry-dock expansion,hydrographic surveys etc.



Building of ports is another area of cooperationIt will help if Japan could loosen its arms exports laws



Signing of a maritime cooperation treaty which will encompass anti-piracy,
refuelling, disaster-relief, anti-terrorism efforts etc. will help to fast-track JapanIndia maritime ties

Japan can help India upgrade its coastal security- learning from the Mumbai
experienceIn a recent development, two Indian fishermen were killed by Italian marines
deployed on an Italian oil tanker in Indian territorial waters, who mistook themfor pirates. Japan and India need to have a mechanism to avoid such incidents.

10

India world’s largest arms importer(2012), The Hindu,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3012810.ece, March 19, 2012 accessed on May 12,
2012

11



Jointly go for seabed exploration and provide security to off-shore assets like oil
platforms

CONCLUSION
Japan-India maritime cooperation in still in its infancy and has a long to go. Although
the bilateral naval exercises are a good start, there is still a lot to be desired withregards to the cooperation between the two countries in the maritime arena. During
the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to India in April this year, the two sides“decided to establish a working-level dialogue on maritime issues which would cover awide range of maritime issues”11.
India has recently decided to sign a major defence deal with South Korea for
procuring eight advanced minesweeping and hunting warships from that country.
Under the terms of the contract, which is worth over 6,000 crore Indian Rupees, two ofthese mine counter-measures vessels (MCMVs) will be sent directly from the South
Korean firm, Kangnam Corporation, while the rest will be manufactured by Goa
Shipyard in India after technology transfer.

12This is where Japan is losing out.

Although the Indian Navy has been reported to be evaluating the Japan-madeShinmaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft; a short take-off and landing (STOL) amphibious
aircraft which can take off from either land or from water, much more cooperation ispossible between Japan and India in this field. With a range of 4,700 kilometres, theShinmaywa US-2 can take part in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue
operations. 13

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan(2012), Visit to India by Minister for Foreign Affairs Koichiro Gemba(Overview), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/meeting1204_fm.html accessedon 20 June 2012

The Times of India(2012), India to buy 8 warships from South Korea for Rs 6,000 crore, available at
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-10/india/32155479_1_mines-mcmvs-warships
accessed on 19 June 2012
12

Business Standard(2012), India, Japan to talk on cooperation in Asia-Pacific, http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/india-japan-to-talkcooperation-in-asia-pacific/472333/ accessed on 20 June
2012
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Japan and India are two countries which do not have any clash of strategic interests
nor any historical baggage and the time is ripe for the two countries to seize theinitiative as far as their maritime ties are concerned. The maritime arena provides agreat opportunity for building a strong kizuna(bond) between the two countries and anenhanced cooperation in the maritime sphere between Japan and India is a sine qua nonfor ensuring peace and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

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INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
1. Ms Marie Izuyama, NIDS
2. Mr Handa, Trustee, Japan Ship Owners’ Association
3. Japanese Coast Guard
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Southwestern Asia Division, Government of Japan
5. US Embassy, Tokyo, Japan

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