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UN/US Sanctions on Eritrea:
Latest Chapter in a Long History of
Injustice

Eritrean-SMART Campaign Working Paper No. 2

By the E-SMART Research Team
December 23, 2010
http://www.eritrean-smart.org

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Eritrean Sanctions Must be Annulled and Repealed Today!

Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 3
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Part I: A HISTORY OF BETRAYALS ............................................................................................................. 6
Denial of Right to Self‐Determination and Independence ........................................................................... 6
A Sham Federal Arrangement ...................................................................................................................... 7
OAU’s Refusal to Address the Plight of the Eritrean People ........................................................................ 8
U.S. Support of Ethiopia during Eritrea’s War of Independence .................................................................. 8
Efforts to Make Eritreans Settle for Something Short of Independence ..................................................... 9
The Costs of Betrayals to Eritreans ............................................................................................................. 11
Border Dispute and the Algiers Agreement for Peaceful Settlement ........................................................ 12
Conclusion on A History of Betrayal ........................................................................................................... 14
Part II: SANCTIONS: DIFFERENT CENTURY, SAME UN BETRAYAL............................................................. 16
The Path to Resolution 1907 (2009) ........................................................................................................... 17
Eritrea’s Response to a ‘Smear’ Campaign ................................................................................................. 19“Punishment” where there is no crime ...................................................................................................... 21
The Process Leading to the Sanctions ........................................................................................................ 22
Conclusion on the Unjust Sanctions ........................................................................................................... 24
References ............................................................................................................................................ 25

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Executive Summary
The paper takes a close look at Eritrea’s relations with both the US and the UN over the last six
decades in an attempt to make sense of the December 23, 2009 UN Security Council decision to
impose sanctions on this young African nation based on groundless charges. A careful analysis of
the historical records shows an unmistakable pattern of betrayals of and injustice against the peopleof Eritrea by the West in general and the US in particular, as well as the United Nations and theAfrican Union (formerly Organization of African Union (OAU). The analysis reveals in a stark way
that U.S. foreign policy for the Horn of Africa has been generally devoid of fairness and justice—always skewed to favor Ethiopia, and always at the expense of the region in general, and especiallyEritrea and the Eritrean people in particular.
The last 60 years, except for a brief period between 1991 and 1998, has been a long war the Eritrean
people have been fighting to determine their own destiny—a right most other peoples and nations
take for granted. During this period, on almost all of the questions relating to Eritrea’s freedom andsovereignty, the West has been on the wrong side.
When examined against this historical backdrop, the US-led UN sanctions measure--Resolution
1907 (2009)--was not meant to bring about peace and security in Somalia or the rest of the Horn ofAfrica subregion. It was to “punish” the young and independent-minded nation of Eritrea forrefusing to accept the West’s misguided policy in Somalia. So, the unjust decision on sanctions
happened because the United States wanted it to happen and that is unfortunate because Eritreansand Eritrean Americans look up to Washington to exercise fairness and justice in dealing with thenations in this fragile and war-ravaged part of Africa. History, and particularly that of Eritrea andEthiopia, has repeatedly shown that any big power policy devoid of balance, fairness and justice
only leads to war and destruction which this sub-region of Africa has had too much of the last 60
years. 1
In the end, any fair-minded observer must ask why Eritrea and its people are repeatedly singled out
for such an unfair treatment, denied a chance to live in peace, develop their nation and focus on
their real enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance and other characteristics of underdevelopment.
____________________

1

Recently leaked cables originating from US Embassy in Asmara show that Eritrea has been willing to work with the United States
despite repeated attempt to destabilize the new nation in support of Ethiopia.

3

INTRODUCTION
Eritrea, the size of the U.S. State of Pennsylvania with a population of 4.5 million people, is definedby a series of harmoniously co-existing dualisms – geography (highland and lowland), religion(Christianity and Islam), and socio-economic groups (sedentary cultivators and agro pastoralists). It
is comprised of nine ethno-linguistic communities coming together as a national identity. Eritrea’s
geographic location in the Horn of Africa renders great strategic and economic importance. Lying
along the Red Sea, Eritrea shares with Yemen and Djibouti the Bab el Mandeb chokepoint between
the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, through which important maritime routes pass to Europe,
Asia and North America.
Situated at a crossroads of economic activity and migration, the Horn of Africa is wedged between
growing centers of instability. Increased traffic from different camps through the region creates not
only a security concern for the countries in the Horn, but also business interests in the region.
Eritrea’s strategic location along the Red Sea had long made it a target of every imaginable powerthat wanted to dominate the Red Sea shipping lanes. The country had to wage a 30-year war of
independence to shake off Ethiopia’s occupation that was supported by the capitalist west and thecommunist east. In its first years of independence, Eritrea was forced to face international terrorist
forces that wanted the country to be governed by religious laws in place of secular rule. Though anation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and despite attempts by external forces tosow seeds of civil strife, Eritrea has remained an oasis of stability in the volatile Horn of Africa
region.
Security in the Horn of Africa is at a teetering point of stasis or slowly unraveling. The USbrokered Algiers agreement ending the 1998-2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
concluded in virtual demarcation instead of physical due to Ethiopia’s refusal, with US backing, tohonor its treaty obligations. In the Sudan, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
which ended decades of civil war between the north and south, remains incomplete; conflicts also
persist unresolved in other parts of the country, most notably in Darfur. Somalia’s struggle
continues as a failed state. Complicating the region further, a purported border conflict between
Eritrea and Djibouti has now come to life without any sound basis.2 The resulting US-engineered
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Eritrea on its alleged involvement in theSomali conflict and border dispute with Djibouti expose shortsighted and damaging approaches tothe region’s conflicts. The underlying reason for sanctioning Eritrea appears to be punishment for
its refusal to endorse failed US policies in Somalia.
At present, US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa center on preventing Somalia frombecoming a safe haven for Al-Qaeda or other transnational extremist groups. In pursuing its
counter-terrorism strategy, the US has heavily relied on Ethiopia to do its bidding. The Ethiopian
government’s behavior, however, both domestically and regionally, poses mounting difficulties for
the US and in reality undermines its regional standing and long-term interests in the area. America’s
myopic view of the region and blind support of Ethiopia is directly linked to the region’s chronic

2

A June 8, 2010 accord mediated by the Qatari government in which Djibouti and Eritrea signed an agreement shows that there
was nothing to the uproar orchestrated by external actors—external to the two nations. For more, see page 19.)4

destabilization and has hindered US ability to identify real potential partnerships that would in fact
help to bring about a more conflict-free and secure region. These factors necessitate acomprehensive “policy shift”3 in the Horn if the US wishes to influence events in the region and toeffectively fight terrorism in the region. Now, more than ever, the need for constructive andforward-looking engagement, and not a policy of isolation and sanctions, is crucial. The US and
Eritrea, in fact, have many common interests, and despite many mischaracterizations, Eritrea has on
many occasions agreed to work jointly with the US on matters of mutual interest. It should be notedthat Eritrea has played an influential role in peace building and conflict resolution in the Sudan, andits position in Somalia has consistently called for an inclusive Somali-driven reconciliation process
in place of the externally crafted and financed patch-work approach seen over the last two decades.
The Horn of Africa in general and Eritrea in particular have suffered from flawed US policies for
decades. Having orchestrated Ethiopia’s initial annexation of Eritrea and then backing its continued
occupation politically and militarily, the US and the international community have unfortunately
played a damaging role in Eritrea’s history. Particularly during the 30-year war for independence,the destruction experienced in Eritrea was tremendous, including human atrocities, mass
displacements and economic ruin. The effects of these experiences along with their psychological,
cultural and social ramifications are still being felt today and will be for some time to come.
A peaceful and stable region is not only in the best interest of the US and the international
community, but also the nations of the region. It is, therefore, imperative for the UN and the US toreevaluate their policies towards the Horn of Africa and redirect their efforts to bring about
equitable and lasting peace and development to the region. Perhaps it is high time that the US
policy makers understand the immorality in crippling a man and then accusing him of limping.
The focus of this paper is to discuss two major issues: (1) the history of UN, US, EU and AU
betrayals and interventions in Eritrea for context, and (2) the unjust nature of the recently imposed
UN sanctions on Eritrea.

3

Burton, B.E. (2009) “US policy shift needed in the Horn of Africa,” August 6, 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19982/us_policy_shift_needed_in_the_horn_of_africa.html#, retrieved 4/7/2010

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Part IA HISTORY OF BETRAYALS
The past 60-year period is marked with a history of betrayals and injustice against the people ofEritrea by the United States and the West in general, the United Nations and the African Union(formerly Organization of African Union (OAU)).

Denial of Right to Self­Determination and IndependenceWith the advent of decolonization beginning in the 1940s, when colonized African and Asianpeoples began intensifying their struggle against colonial powers demanding their independence,
the rights of many colonized peoples to self-determination and independence were recognized. The
people of Eritrea, under Italian colonial rule at the time, were entitled to the same rights.4 And
Eritreans aspired for independence, but it turned out to be achievable only in the face of
insurmountable difficulties. Attempts at derailing that aspiration began with: (a) the British Militaryoccupation under the guise of trusteeship, and (b) the hatching of a sinister scheme, known as theBevin-Sforza plan.
The British plan to dismember Eritrea began as soon as its Military Administration, in the name oftrusteeship, occupied Eritrea. Brigadier General Stephen H. Longrigg, the Chief Administrator of
Eritrea, 1942‐44, had floated the idea as early as August 3, 1944, in an article he wrote in the
Eritrean Weekly Gazette using the penname “concerned Eritrean.” A year later he brought the idea
to the open with these words:
It seems, then that the single Eritrea of to‐day is doomed. Dismemberment, in someform and to some extent, must be the alternative. If this is so—and the evident racialand cultural and historical diversities suggest it—it must be in favour of the two
greater neighbours of the territory, the Sudan and Ethiopia. 5
Besides attempting to dismember Eritrea, the British Military Administration was also determined
to render Eritrea economically unviable. To “prove” that Eritrea’s economy was too weak tosurvive independently, it systematically set out to destroy Eritrea’s economy through a wantonplunder. According to Araia Tseggai, “Entire factories, transportation facilities, radio stations, port
facilities and other heavy equipments” were sold to the highest bidder. A cement factory producing
1000 tons per day was sold to the Sudan; scrap metal from over a thousand homes in Massawa wassold to Yemen, in the process dynamiting the port city of Massawa. Equipment from about 20 radio
stations was sold to different countries; a floating dry dock with two huge cranes used for ship
repair was sold to Pakistan; Malta and Egypt bought two big cranes; 16 large boats were sold toItaly and Saudi Arabia. A salt factory from the port of Assab, potash mining factory from Mersa
Fatma; oil drilling machinery from the island of Nocra, more than 300 railway wagons together

4

For details on Eritrea’s right to self‐determination, see Tesfagiorgis, Gebre H., “Self‐Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by
the United Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea,” Commentary in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1,
Fall 1987, at 75‐127.
5
Longrigg, Stephen H. (Chief Administrator of Eritrea, 1942‐44), Short History of Eritrea, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1945, at 172.

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with railway construction supplies that were designed to connect the Eritrean town of Akordat with
the Ethiopian town of Gondar, and the motors of the cable transport system that linked Massawa
with Asmara were all auctioned to countries like Israel, Yemen (Aden), Kenya, Egypt and theSudan. Overall, the British government earned over 19.5 million dollars from the illegal sale ofpieces of Eritrean equipments. 6
The Bevin-Sforza Plan was proposed by the then British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and then
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlo Conte Sforza. Thus, the name “Bevin-Sforza Plan.”
According to the plan, Eritrea was to be partitioned into two: the western lowland, inhabited by
predominantly Muslim Eritreans, was to be merged with the Sudan (then British colony) and theremaining, highland Eritrea, inhabited by predominantly Christian Eritreans, was to be merged with
Ethiopia. This plan was initiated by Ethiopia and fully supported by its main ally, the U.S. Only astrong, united opposition by the people of Eritrea prevented the implementation of this sinister plan.

A Sham Federal Arrangement
Following Italy’s defeat in World War II by the Allied Forces, the issue of determining the future of
the then Italian colonies (Libya, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea) was formally taken up by theUnited Nations. The UN sent a delegation to Eritrea and the delegation gave a divided report. While
Libya and Italian Somaliland were slated to gain their independence, following a preparation
through a period of trusteeship under the UN or some Western powers, Eritrea’s case, however, wasmired in a controversy and geopolitical quagmire. Though the British administration had estimated“that independence bloc commands 75 percent of Eritrea”7 as late as August 1949, following several
pretenses of attempts to gauge the political will of the people of Eritrea, and political maneuvers
especially by the U.S., the United Nations resolved to federate Eritrea with neighboring Ethiopia(UN Resolution 390A (v)) on December 2, 1950. The U.S. was instrumental in federating Eritrea
with Ethiopia justifying, in the words of then US Secretary of State, John F. Dulles,
From the point of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean People must receive
consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea
basin and considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that thecountry has to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.8
This policy pronouncement was implemented in the form of the above-stated federal resolution inspite of the clear Eritrean aspiration and demand for independence. 9
In addition to its being contrary to Eritreans’ expressed desire for independence, the federalarrangement was defective in that it was a federation in name only. The arrangement was designed
to place Eritrea “under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown” and not as a partner in thefederation of two autonomous entities. The “federal” arrangement provided Ethiopia with the

6

Tseggai, Araia, The Economic Viability of an Independent Eritrea. Ph. D. Dissertation, the University of Nebraska, July 1981, at 150‐152.
7US Embassy, Addis Ababa declassified letter to the DOS, No. 171, 8/19/49.
8
Quoted in Heiden, Lynda, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence. Monthly Review, 30 (2) (June 1978), page 15.
9For details on Eritreans’ demand for independence, see, Fessehatzion, Tekie, Eritrea: From Federation to Annexation, 1952‐1962,
Eritreans for Peace and Democracy (EDP), Working Paper No.2, March 1990.

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mechanism and incentive to undermine Eritrean rights. The federation period was marked by asystematic erosion of Eritrean rights including the weakening and/or outright banning of tradeunions, political parties, the press and other democratic institutions, the suppression of Eritrean
languages, and the dismantling of businesses and factories from Eritrea and move them to Ethiopia.
And when in 1962, the government of Ethiopia unilaterally abrogated the federal arrangement andannexed Eritrea, reducing it to a mere province of Ethiopia, in an obvious violation of the Federal
Act, not a single voice of dissent was heard from the U.S., the United Nations, the OAU or otherinternational organizations.

OAU’s Refusal to Address the Plight of the Eritrean People
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was formed in May 1963 (six months after
Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea) with its headquarters in Addis Ababa), never raised the questionof Eritrea. Ethiopia, under Emperor Haile Selassie, as a key player in the formation of the OAU outof the Casablanca and Monrovia groupings, has historically managed to maneuver the pan-Africanorganization to its advantage. As a consequence, the OAU chose to conveniently regard the Eritrean
question as an internal Ethiopian matter, and not for what it really is – an issue of decolonizationand the right of a people to self-determination. That same Ethiopian role also explains why the
OAU chose not to intervene in the Ethio-Somali disputes over the Ogaden region and related
issues.10 It should be pointed out that this is the very same OAU that recognized the Polisario Front,
supporting the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in theface of Morocco’s claim of the territory on historical and cultural grounds, the same way Ethiopia
laid claim on Eritrea. It is also the same organization that helped through its Liberation Committee
every independence movement in Africa, including in Zimbabwe, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique,Angola, Namibia and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.

U.S. Support of Ethiopia during Eritrea’s War of Independence
When all peaceful avenues to preserve their democratic rights and to assert their rights to selfdetermination and independence were exhausted, the people of Eritrea resorted to a protracted
armed struggle. During Eritrea’s long armed struggle for independence (1961 to 1991), for whichtens of thousands of Eritrean lives were sacrificed, it was primarily U.S. military and politicalsupport that sustained successive Ethiopian governments, first the government of Emperor Haile
Sellasie in the 1960s and early 1970s, and then the military regime (the Derg) that deposed him in
the late 1970s. According to Jeffrey A. Lefebvre,
Between 1953 and 1977 Addis Ababa received, over 80 percent of the Military
Assistance Program (MAP), more than 55 percent of the International Military
Education and Training Program (IMETP), and about one-fifth of Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) financing funds allocated to sub-Sahara Africa. Ethiopia also accounted
for approximately one-third of FMS cash arms transfers approved by Washington for
Africa. Even with the proliferation of American security assistance programs

10

Amate, C.O.C. Inside the OAU: Pan‐Africanism in Practice. London, UK: Macmillan, 1986.

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throughout the African continent during the 1970s, more than 45 percent of total
U.S. arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa were designated for Ethiopia.11
The U.S. desire to secure a communication facility at Kagnew station in Asmara, which was a vital
U.S. intelligence link, was the driving force for the U.S. betrayal of the Eritrean people in favor of
Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s alliance with and support of the U.S. in the Korean war and the Congo civil
war were additional factors. All these led to, by the mid 1960s, Washington “making Ethiopia thefirst black-ruled state in sub-Saharan Africa to possess supersonic jet fighters.”12 Even when
Ethiopia went “communist” under the military regime (Derg) in the late 1970s, US political support
to Ethiopia continued under the “the Israeli security agreement,” that is, Ethiopia was perceived tobe fighting against Arab radicals that threatened Israel’s security. Eritrea’s legitimate struggle forindependence was also cast in this light of the U.S.-Israeli policy, as the following statement clearly
indicates:
An independent Eritrean state would adopt a pro-Arab, anti-Israel foreign policy
orientation. … Tel Aviv viewed the Eritrean civil war [sic] as a southerly extensionof the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel’s strategic objective in Ethiopia, therefore, wasquite simple and dovetailed with U.S. and Ethiopian interests – to prevent the
emergence of an independent Eritrean state. … The Israeli security argument, aspresented in Washington, was based upon a worst-case analysis constructed byIsraeli defense officials. It envisioned the Red Sea being converted into an Arab lakein the event of an Eritrean victory in the civil war [sic].13
In spite of all the military and political support Ethiopia was receiving, and against all odds, thepeople of Eritrea single-handedly and heroically won the war of independence and presented theinternational community with a fait accompli independence in 1991.
Efforts to Make Eritreans Settle for Something Short of Independence
In the late 1980s, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian government were
engaged in a round of talks in Atlanta and Nairobi under the mediation of US former President
Jimmy Carter. It turned out that the former president was far from a neutral mediator. He tried his
best, including making prior deals with the Ethiopians, to make the Eritreans settle for something
short of independence. Former President Carter also tried his best to block Eritrea’s request to invite
the UN as an observer in the peace talks. According to the initial agreement, Eritrea and Ethiopia
each were entitled to choose any two observers without the objection of the other. Carter had
secretly promised the Ethiopians to agree to this condition and that he would do everything in his
capacity to block Eritrea’s request to involve the UN.14 Herman Cohen, George H. W. Bush’s
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (1989-1992) described Carter’s position as follows:11

Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. Arms For the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953‐1991. Pittsburgh, PA: University ofPittsburgh Press, 1991, at 13‐14.
12Ibid, at 113.
13
Ibid. at 163.
14
Mohamed Said, Alamin. Hidget zeyfqid mesel (in Tigrigna). Asmara, Eritrea: Hidri Publishers, 2002.

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A Carter Center press release had predicted that substantive talks would take place
early in 1990.The same document disingenuously disposed of the UN observer issue
by saying ‘a seventh invitation was issued to the United Nations, which declined toserve’; but the UN had declined to serve because they had not been invited by theGovernment of Ethiopia according to established procedures.15
Carter’s own admission in 2005 is even more revealing about his lack of neutrality when he stated,“After [Prime Minister] Meles prevailed in 1991 and despite my concerns about Eritrean leadership,
he granted Eritrea complete independence in 1993, cutting Ethiopia off from the Red Sea andmaking it the most populous landlocked nation in the world.”16
U.S. favoritism towards Ethiopia remained consistent throughout the early 1990s. According to a
U.S. “non-paper” presented to the EPLF and Ethiopia in October 1990, the U.S. desire for Eritrea
was a federal or con-federal arrangement within the sovereignty of Ethiopia, not independence. Infact the US policy of “respecting Ethiopia’s territorial integrity” remained intact even after the
EPLF’s Army marched into Asmara. Again, Herman Cohen puts this U.S. policy in the following
terms:
Territorial integrity was also the only point of agreement between the American andEthiopian governments. Although we sympathized with Eritrea’s historicalgrievances, we were keen supporters of the cardinal principle of the Organization of
African Unity – that colonial boundaries inherited by African states should be left
intact to preclude demand for hundreds of ethnically based mini-states.17
U.S. policy changed only after the London Peace Conference was convened between the EPLF, andthe Ethiopian forces of the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) and theOLF (Oromo Liberation Front).
During the days leading to the London conference, there were several U.S. attempts to shortchange
Eritreans. As Herman Cohen admitted, the U.S. was adamantly opposed to Eritrea’s declaration of
independence by threatening to withhold recognition should the victorious Eritreans declare
independence. He stated,
We argued that decisions made concerning Eritrea could not fail to have an impact
on the future of Ethiopia and that the EPLF should act reasonably. The EPLF should
not declare independence immediately despite the fact that the Ethiopian Army inEritrea has surrendered. If that happened, the major industrial powers would notgrant recognition.18

15

Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a troubled Continent. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
at 29.
16
Carter, Jimmy. Ethiopia Trip Report, May 11‐17, 2005. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2102.html, accessedon 4/7/2010.
17
Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000,
at 22. Mr. Cohen is obviously wrong here. The OAU’s principle of inviolability of colonial boundaries actually supports Eritrea’s casefor independence within its colonially established boundaries.
18
Ibid, at 50.

10Following the London Peace Conference, and the holding of an internationally monitoredreferendum in 1993, the outcome of which was, an overwhelming majority of Eritreans (98.8%)
voting for independence, the international community, including the major industrial powers, had
no choice but to recognize newly independent Eritrea.

The Costs of Betrayals to Eritreans
The costs of the history of betrayals to the Eritrean people were immense. The war of independence
lasted for 30 years, costing Eritrea dearly -- more than 250,000 Eritreans lost their lives, about
65,000 of them were young Eritreans who sacrificed their lives for their peoples’ cause. Over
10,000 young men and women became severely disabled war veterans. Practically every Eritrean
family has lost a member during the war. More than 753,000 Eritreans took refuge in the Sudan andother nearby countries, and many continued their journey to the West.19 Another 600,000 Eritreans
were internally displaced as the country was laid to waste.
Sustained US and Soviet support of the Ethiopian military made it one of the largest and mostruthless forces in sub-Saharan Africa, committing mass atrocities against innocent civilians.
Eritrea’s basic economic assets and infrastructure were destroyed; its educational system wasgrossly neglected. Before the war, Eritrea had flourishing small-scale industries and a welldeveloped system of roads and railroads, which was built during the Italian colonial occupation.
The British Military Administration’s acts, as previously described, followed by Ethiopia’s ruthless
war, basically destroyed Eritrea‘s entire economy and infrastructure. Virtually all of the cities andthe countryside that were liberated by the EPLF were carpet bombed by the Ethiopian Air Force.
The port city of Massawa remains a standing testimonial to Ethiopia’s war of brutality. At
independence, Eritrea’s country side was the second worst case (after Angola) of unexploded
landmines.20 As a consequence, farming or herding in much of the countryside had become a veryrisky business for a long time. Not only did farmers lose their arable land, they also faced thedanger of stepping on land mines and getting killed.
To the human and material loses and economic devastation should be added the psychologicaldamage, and the systematic destruction of the cultural, institutional and intellectual resources of theEritrean population. There were generations of Eritreans that experienced nothing but war situation
during the over thirty-year duration of the armed struggle for independence.
Such a huge price Eritrea was forced to pay to assert its right to independence and nationhood is not
attributable to Ethiopia's appetite for domination alone, but also to the continued betrayals by the
U.S. and the West in general.

19

EPLF Foreign Relation. Eritrea: General Facts. Eritrea, 1989. Two years before independence, there were about 600, 000 refugees
in the Sudan, 100, 000 in the Middle East, 30, 000 in Europe, 17, 000 in the USA, hundreds in Australia, and 6,000 in othercountries.
20
OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Remembering the innocent victims of landmines. http://ocha‐
gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/LSGZ‐7DDHKU, April 4, 2008. Accessed 4/13/2010.

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Border Dispute and the Algiers Agreement for Peaceful Settlement
When war erupted in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia primarily over a border dispute, initialattempts by the U.S. and the state of Rwanda, to play the role of a mediator failed. Instead ofplaying the role of an impartial mediator, the US was primarily interested in preserving the nascent
Tigray-dominated EPRDF, reasoning that the situation in Ethiopia was so fragile that Eritrea
needed to make unreasonable concessions in the attempts to peacefully resolve the dispute. The
war, nevertheless, expanded and intensified resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of lives onboth sides before the parties could agree to a peaceful settlement.
On December 12, 2000, the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia signed The Algiers Agreement tosettle their border dispute peacefully and legally. The agreement was signed under the auspices of
the OAU and the UN, with the USA, EU and the Government of Algeria as witnesses andguarantors of the Agreement. Article 4(2) of the agreement states, “A neutral Boundary
Commission composed of five members shall be established with a mandate to delimit anddemarcate the border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicableinternational law. The Commission shall not have the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono.”
The Agreement further stipulated, “The parties agree that the delimitation and demarcation
determinations of the Commission shall be final and binding. “ (Terms italicized here for
emphasis.)
The key phrases in the agreement are: (1) pertinent colonial treaties, (2) applicable internationallaw, (3) no power to make decisions ex aequo et bono, and (4) final and binding. First, the mandate
is quite specific -- to delimit and demarcate on the basis of pertinent colonial treaties. This takes
into account Africa’s uti possidetis, “the principle of respect of the borders existing at independence
as stated in resolution AHR/Res 16(1) adopted by the OAU in Cairo in 1964,” which has acquired
the force of international law in the African context. The Agreement itself specifies the relevant
treaties to be the 1900, 1902 and 1908 treaties between the Empire of Ethiopia, then under Emperor
Menelik, and the Colony of Eritrea under the Italian colonial administration.
Second, for applicable international law, the Commission sought support in “rules of customaryinternational law,” especially in border disputes adjudicated by the International Court of Justice(ICJ). Example of such rules are: (a) A treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance withthe ordinary meaning in the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose;(b) Apply the doctrine of “contemporaneity,” that is, interpret treaty by reference to thecircumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded; (c) The role of subsequent practice orconduct, e.g., acquiescence is tantamount to amending the treaty; (d) If one party admits or accepts
the right of the other party; (e) The delimitation process was an adversarial proceeding – each party
presents its claim and supporting evidence, and the Commission acts as an independent magistrate;(f) All decisions of the Commission shall be made by a majority of the commissioners.
Third, the Commission was not permitted to make decisions on what it considers “to be fair andequitable” to the parties, like what Ethiopia and the United States wanted after the delimitation

12

decision was announced,21 but rather on strict reading of the treaties and applicable internationallaw.
Fourth, and perhaps most significant, is that the two parties agreed that the Commission’s decision
was going to be final and binding.
A commission, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), was duly established inaccordance with the Algiers’ Agreement. It was comprised of five neutral, prominent jurists (legal
experts) with impeccable credentials. The Commission rendered its decision on April 13, 2002. The
Commission’s decision was fair and sound, based on legal proceeding: (a) The Commission stayed
within its mandate, delimiting the border based on colonial treaties as required by the Algiers’
Agreement; (b) It provided the two parties the opportunity to present their cases in an adversarial
proceeding; (c) It weighed all the evidence presented to it by the parties, that is, Eritrea andEthiopia; and (d) It followed pertinent rules of international law in its adjudication proceedings.
Eritrea immediately accepted the Commission’s decision and expressed its readiness to implement
it. Ethiopia, on the other hand, after initially making misleading statements of acceptance, refused
to abide by the decision in violation of international law and defiance of global opinion, andcontinues to occupy Eritrea’s territory. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Ethiopia’s Prime
Minister, Meles Zenawi stated:
The Commission’s decision … are illegal, unjust and irresponsible. ...It is
unimaginable for the Ethiopian people to accept such a blatant miscarriage of justice.
The decision is thus a recipe for continued instability, and even recurring wars. ...
Nothing worthwhile can therefore be expected from the Commission to salvage thepeace process. Indeed, the Commission seems to be determined to continue its
disastrous stance whatever the consequence to the peace of the region....As theCommission’s decisions could inevitably lead the two countries into another roundof fratricidal war, the Security Council has an obligation, arising out of the UN
Charter, to avert such a threat to regional peace and stability.22
Thus, not only expressing his country’s refusal to abide by the decision, but essentially trashing thegood work of a reputable commission, the EEBC.
Unfortunately, the EEBC did not conclude its mandate the way it wanted to. Its several attempts topersuade the parties to agree on physically demarcating on the ground failed. Despite the diplomatic
niceties, the Commission did not hide the fact that it was Ethiopia that failed to cooperate. The
Commission was frustrated and concluded its mandate in end of November 2007 by declaring theborder virtually demarcated by the coordinates it had issued a year earlier. Earlier this was how the
EEBC had put its frustration with Ethiopia in its 16th report to the United Nations:
Ethiopia is not prepared to allow demarcation to continue in the manner laid down in
the Demarcation Directions and in accordance with the timeline set by theCommission. It now insists on prior “dialogue” but has rejected the opportunity for

21
22

Bolton, John, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations. New York, NY: Threshold Editions, 2007.
Zenawi, Meles. Letter to the Security Council, September 19, 2003.

13

such “dialogue” within the framework of the demarcation process provided by theCommission’s proposal to meet with the Parties on 22 February. This is the latest ina series of obstructive actions taken since the summer of 2002 and belies thefrequently professed acceptance by Ethiopia of the Delimitation Decision.23
The Commission’s response to one of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister’s several letters that attempted tocircumvent its decision was pointed.
Ethiopia proposes that “an alternative mechanism to demarcate the contested parts ofthe boundary” be set up. Such an alternative mechanism would involve a departure
from, and thus an amendment to, the terms of Article 4.2 of the Algiers Agreement,
which gives the Commission the mandate to demarcate the boundary. Moreover,
Ethiopia’s reference to “the contested boundary” can only be understood as areference to those parts of the boundary to which it alone and unilaterally takes
exception: no part of the boundary is “contested” by both Parties.24
The U.S. government reaction to Ethiopia’s refusal to honor the EEBC decision was at best
deceptive. While paying lip service to the EEBC decision in general terms, the U.S. government
started to work against the letter and spirit of the Algiers Agreement, and to outright sabotage thedecision’s implementation. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nation, John Bolton, recounts
how a "U.S. initiative" to render the Algiers Agreement useless was being forwarded by the
Department of State and pushed in the UN Security Council:
For reasons I never understood, however, [Jendayi] Frazer [then Assistant Secretaryfor Africa] reversed course, and asked in early February [2005] to reopen the 2002
EEBC decision, which she had concluded was wrong, and award a major piece ofdisputed territory to Ethiopia. I was at a loss how to explain that to the Security
Council, so I didn't, simply asking in February for another thirty-day extension of the
UNMEE status quo while the "U.S. initiative" continued.25 (Italics added foremphasis)
The U.S., the African Union and the United Nations, as guarantors and witnesses of the Algiers
Agreement, have given a deaf ear to calls for implementing the EEBC decision, and refrained fromputting any pressure on Ethiopia to abide by the final and binding decision. Instead the international
community, especially the U.S. government, treats Ethiopia with a kid’s glove, reluctant to offend a
country it perceives as an ally in the war against terrorism. It is a perfect example of a situation
where once again geo-political interests of the US overwhelm all other considerations.

Conclusion on a History of Betrayals
We have seen that the past 60 years have been marked with a history of betrayals and injusticeagainst the people of Eritrea starting in the 1940s and 1950s with schemes to deny them their rightto self-determination and independence, coupled with the British Military Administration’s actions

23

Eritrea‐Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Sixteenth Report on the Work of the Commission. 24 February 2005.
Eritrea‐Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Response to the Ethiopian Prime Minister's letter. October 7, 2003.
25
Bolton, John. Surrender Is Not an Option. P. 347‐348
24

14

to weaken Eritrea’s economy in order to “prove” that Eritrea could not be viable. This was followedby the imposition on the people of Eritrea of a sham federal arrangement with Ethiopia, and theinternational community’s complete silence when Ethiopia illegally abrogated the federation andannexed Eritrea in 1962. U.S. military and political support to Ethiopia during the war of
independence enabled the latter to cause untold atrocities and destruction in a futile attempt tocheck the tide of Eritrea’s war of independence. Even after the Eritreans won the war, U.S. attempts
to make them settle for something short of independence was intensive. In the post-independence
border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the U.S. support for Ethiopia, at the cost of Eritrea,
continues unabated guided by a single-minded policy aligning with a perceived ally in the war
against terrorism.
It is with such a history of betrayals as the backdrop that the recent sanctions against Eritrea, thatwere spearheaded by the U.S and imposed by the UN Security Council, should be examined.

15

Part IISANCTIONS: DIFFERENT CENTURY, SAME UN BETRAYALOn December 23, 2009, the UN adopted Resolution 1907 (2009), imposing sanctions on Eritrea
based on groundless charges orchestrated by Eritrea’s traditional enemies, especially Ethiopia. It isclear that these sanctions are a continuation of the history of betrayals explained in the previous
section of this paper. All evidence shows the sanctions were designed to weaken and punish
independent-minded Eritrea and bolster and reward Ethiopia, hoping the latter will continue toserve U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa. They were imposed with the possibility of inflaming theborder conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and of assisting Ethiopia gain the upper hand in thebalance of forces.
Conventionally speaking, sanctions fall into two categories: targeted and comprehensive. A targeted
sanction is meant to focus its “impact on leaders, political elites and segments of society believed
responsible for objectionable behavior, while reducing collateral damage to the general population.”
Moreover, targeted sanctions involving arms embargo is meant to “bend the military and politicalleaders by denying them access to weapons and military equipment.”26 Chingono says, “Theconcept of “smart sanctions” or “targeted sanctions” emerged as a way to improve the traditional
comprehensive sanctions and their devastating catastrophes following the Iraq sanctions.” 27 At aminimum, sanctions are intended to shame, stigmatize, demonize and isolate the sanctioned country
and its leadership. An American president, Woodrow Wilson, came with the idea [1919] of
imposing sanctions as a means of pressuring a nation into submission or surrender without the useof force: “A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful,silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost alife outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure upon the nation that, in my judgment, nomodern nation could resist.”28
However, the idea has been challenged from various sides. Sanctions rarely bring about surrenderof the sanctioned nation. Nor do sanctions preclude the use of force. A misguided, frustrated orimperious foreign policy can use sanctions as a prelude to destructive brute force. Be that as it may,
sanctions are hostile and detrimental nonetheless. Furthermore, sanctioning a nation and trying to
ostracize it from the world community without justifiable cause is a miscarriage of justice of thehighest order. And, that is what Resolution 1907 (2009) represents—a miscarriage of justice, adiplomatic lynching, carried by the most powerful against a young and vulnerable African nation
based on groundless charges..

26

Halfbaue, Gary Clyde; & Oegg, Barbara. (2000). Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative? Peterson Institute for International
Economics. http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/geojintl32&div=9&id=&page=,
retrieved April 7, 2010.
27
Chingono, Heather. (2009). Zimbabwe sanctions: An analysis of the “Lingo”guiding the perceptions of the sanctioners and thesanctionees. http://academicjournals.org/AJPSIR/PDF/pdf2010/February/Chingono.pdf, retrieved 7/20/2010
28
Quoted in Saul K. Padover, ed., Wilson's Ideals (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, p. 108).

16

The Path to Resolution 1907 (2009)
A cursory look at the path that led to Resolution 1907 (2009) shows that the sanctions package wasindeed the crescendo of a series of decisions or resolutions by the UN targeting Eritrea.
Notwithstanding the redundancy and repetitiveness of the content found in the cluster ofresolutions, the key objective was to portray Eritrea as a rogue and recalcitrant state, deserving theire of the world community. Among the previous such resolutions invoked in Res.1907 (2009) are
Resolutions 733(1992), 1844 (2008), 1425(2002) and 1862(2009). Furthermore, the Djibouti
Agreement of June 9, 2008, and the 2008 Somalia Monitoring Group report are referenced as acompendium of complaints against Eritrea. Let us take a quick look at some of these resolutions.
Resolution 733(1992) invokes Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and imposes anarms embargo against Somalia: “All States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability
in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weaponsand military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise.” The resolution
was invoked because of allegations that Eritrea was supplying military hardware to Somali
insurgents, though this portion of the charges was dropped at the end by the Council for lack ofevidence.
Resolution 1425(2002) was a reiteration of Resolution 733 with minor modifications and its focus
was on allegations against Eritrea pertaining to financial assistance, technical advice and militarytraining given to Somali insurgents. It alleges that “Eritrea has provided political, financial andlogistical support to armed groups engaged in undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia andregional stability.” When the principal allegation of supplying arms failed for lack of evidence, it
seems the charges that were initially leveled in Res. 1425 (2002) were used as a catch-all fallback
option hoping that some of that would stick. However, there is virtually nothing to support thiscompendium of charges either.
Resolution 1844 (2008), was a resolution which pertains to targeted sanctions on individuals andentities. To this effect it decided “that all Member States shall take the necessary measures toprevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the[Sanctions’] Committee,” and “that all Member States shall freeze without delay the funds, otherfinancial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned orcontrolled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee.”
Resolution 1862 (2009), the Djibouti-Eritrea Border Conflict: This too was invoked in Res.
1907 because it accuses Eritrea of entering into a military conflict with Djibouti, of refusing topullback its forces to the “status quo ante” and of refusing to settle the dispute through mediation.
Portraying Eritrea as a belligerent country is a hackneyed ploy designed to isolate Eritrea.. As wewill see below, this looks like an undisguised attempt to steer regional and global attention awayfrom the real issues threatening peace and security in the region, including U.S. ally Ethiopia’srefusal to accept the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission ruling and vacate sovereign
Eritrean territory, and Ethiopia’s invasion and continued destructive involvement in Somalia.
The Djibouti Agreement of June 9, 2008 on Somalia was purported by the UN as a milestone in
the history of the Somali people and as a harbinger of a lasting peace. This accord of two major
protagonists, the Temporary Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia

17

(ARS), was hoped to lead to the cessation of armed conflict and fill the prevailing political vacuum.
According to the terms of the agreement, the UN would “authorize and deploy an international
stabilization force from countries that are friends of Somalia excluding neighboring states.” At
some point in the future, “the Ethiopian Government [would] withdraw its troops from Somalia
after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN Forces.” The UN insists that the politicalmarriage between the TGF and the ARS is the best thing that happened to the Somali people and noone should jeopardize or put it asunder.
One part of the ARS refused to be part of or signatory to the Djibouti Agreement and insisted on thewithdrawal of Ethiopian Government troops as a precondition to any dialogue. Following theaccord, it promulgated that “the Djibouti exercise has no validity and shall not be binding on the
ARS and the Somali people." It invited the Somali people “to redouble their heroic struggle against
the occupation.” The al-Shabaab, another fighting group, denounced the Djibouti Agreement as“futile” and inconsequential. 29
As demonstrated above, the Djibouti Agreement was not inclusive of all the Somali factions thathave a stake in the peace process. Neither was the TFG a coalition government of all the Somali
forces. Eritrea is criminalized or sanctioned for not endorsing the Djibouti Agreement and notrecognizing the TFG as the sole representative of the Somali people. Recognizing or notrecognizing the legitimacy of an emergent government is the prerogative of a sovereign country andEritrea was simply exercising its right. Making Eritrea the scapegoat for the UN-botched peace
process is yet another miscarriage of justice.
The UN Somalia Monitoring Group and Its “Findings”: In addition to these cluster ofresolutions from the UN Security Council, the UN Somalia Monitoring Group, established pursuant
to UNSC Resolution 1630 (2005), issued reports in which it compiled similar charges that are easily
traced to Eritrea’s principal traditional enemy, Ethiopia. The group’s report accuses many countriesof violating the arms embargo on Somalia, yet Eritrea was the only one that was made a target.
While the monitoring group’s report had alleged that the source of "80% of ammunition available atthe Somali arms markets” were supplied by TFG [Transitional Federal Government of Somalia],
the Government of Ethiopia and the Ugandan-led African Peacekeeping Forces, and “themonitoring committee received details of some 25 military flights by Ethiopia into Somalia andknew that Ethiopian troops had brought military equipment into the country to arm friendly clans,"
only the group’s unsubstantiated charges against Eritrea were disseminated in a series of reports andother forms of communication, thereby giving the misinformation an air of legitimacy –full ofminute details to make them sound credible. However, in the end even the UNSC was forced todrop the key charge---alleging that Eritrea had been supplying weapons to Somali insurgents-- theMonitoring Group has been pushing against Eritrea since its inception five years ago in an attempt
to build a case against this young nation. The key allegations are: that Eritrea offers Somali
insurgents sanctuary within its territory; that Eritrea participates in “sanction-busting behavior” byallowing planes transporting insurgents use its airport; that Eritrea provides travel documents toSomali insurgents; that Eritrea funnels money to Somali insurgents through its diplomats andintelligence officials in foreign countries or via hawalas; that Eritrea maintains training camps for

29

IRIN. (2008) SOMALIA: "Alliance" divided over Djibouti peace accord.” http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=78667,
retrieved 7/20/2010.

18

members of Somali and Ethiopian opposition groups. However, as we will see in the following
section, these charges were groundless and amount to a ‘smear’ campaign.

Eritrea’s Response to a ‘Smear’ Campaign
Eritrea tried to nib what it described as a “smear’ campaign in the bud. In response to the firstvolley of charges by the UN Somalia Monitoring Group in 2006, when a sustained campaign topaint Eritrea as the rogue state in the Horn became evident, the Government of Eritrea called theeffort “outrageous” and “baseless.” In a response to a letter from the then coordinator of themonitoring group, Bruno Schiemsky, the Eritrean Permanent Representative to the UN, said that the
charges of supplying weapons to “militant fundamentalists in Somalia” were “outrageous andregrettable.” Further, the Eritrean envoy said, “This baseless and unfounded accusation against mygovernment that has a good track record on combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa is
unacceptable.”30
In another letter four days later, to Nassir Abdulazziz Al-Nasser, then chairman of the Security
Council, pursuant to Res. 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, Eritrea requested that the UN Sanctions
Committee on Somalia “undertake immediate investigation” of the campaign of disinformation
against Eritrea. “The Government of the State of Eritrea believes there is an ongoing campaign ofdisinformation from some quarters designed to discredit Eritrea with allegations of complicity withwhat the Monitoring Group calls ‘militant fundamentalists in Somalia.” Adding, Eritrea said, thejob and responsibilities of UN-established bodies such as the Somalia Monitoring Group “shouldbe, among others, not only to ensure that the information they receive are credible and verifiable but
also to exercise utmost caution in discharging their mandated task.”31
However, instead of exercising caution in the gathering, processing, and disseminating theinformation, the UN Somalia Monitoring Group became the source of all sorts of misinformation
about this Horn of Africa nation. For example, in its first report in 2006, the group said that Eritrea
deployed 2000 troops to Somalia on August 26, 2006, and gave a great deal of details about how
the troops got to Somalia and how they were re-deployed in the areas of Somalia occupied by theIslamic Court Union (ICU). “They were re-deployed as follows: 500 of the Eritrean troops went toBaledogle, 500 to Hilweyne training camp, 500 to Lower Shabelle, and 500 remained in Mogadishu
and were stationed at Villa Baidoa and the former Police Academy, Bolisiya.” A lot of neat details,
but all evidence shows that these phantom troops were conjured up by some dirty trick agents toprovide cover for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia, which took place six months later; it was aclumsy attempt to frame the invasion as a proxy war between Asmara and Addis Ababa. But when
Ethiopian troops entered and temporarily controlled Somalia, they didn’t find a single Eritrean
soldier. However, the group is yet to acknowledge or rectify the misinformation; instead, every time
it puts out anything on the Horn of Africa, it seems to beat its own record on the amount andincredulity of the misinformation it circulates on Eritrea.
In a press statement released at the end of that year, Eritrea said, it “categorically rejects thisrepeated defamation and disinformation campaign” and it said, it was an attempt to portray the30
31

Letter from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the UN, March 27, 2006.
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the UN, March 31, 2006).

19

invasion as a “proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia’ [and it] is nothing but a cover up by major
powers for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia under the pretext of combating the spread ofterrorism.”32
Eritrea sees the UNSC sanctions as “a political act that has nothing to do with international law andjustice” and says it is “a culmination of the unprovoked, concerted and multi-faceted efforts
directed against Eritrea, principally by the United States,” due to differences in “regional policies
and practices” with regards to Somalia and Sudan provoking sustained U.S. “hostility andretribution” against Eritrea. The Eritrean government adds, “The truth is Eritrea has been andremains the aggrieved party.”33
Records show that Eritrea’s position on the Somali case has been consistent and very public and it
consisted of the following three dimensions: First, Eritrea, right from the start, expressed strong
opposition to any attempt to solve the crisis militarily. Second, Eritrea has been opposed to any
sectarian approach to the crisis; it doesn’t favor one party over another in the Somali conflict. In a
letter to the president of the UN Security Council, one month before the Council passed Resolution
1907 (2009), the Eritrean ambassador to the UN, reiterating a point Eritrea had been making since2006, said, “Eritrea firmly holds that a durable and sustainable solution requires the participation of
all Somali actors in an inclusive political process,” and added this: “Eritrea affirmed this position inregional and international forums, specifically the most recent African Union Summit in Tripoli,
Libya, which endorsed the need for a political settlement as well as in numerous bilateral meetings,
including the Joint EU Mission on Somalia’s meeting” with the Eritrean president in November
2009.” Third, “Eritrea has been engaging with key countries and regional and internationalorganizations in an effort to create an environment conducive to an inclusive process.”34
Eritrea’s position on the Djibouti-Eritrea border portion of the charges is even clearer. Eritrea sees
the charges based on Resolution 1862 (2009) as a distraction—pure and simple—that was devised
to steer global and regional attention away from the real issues boiling in the cauldron that is theHorn of Africa, including the occupation of Eritrean sovereign territory by the minority regime in
Ethiopia in total disregard of a ‘final and binding’ decision by an independent international
commission (discussed in detail in Part I). Ethiopia continues to occupy sovereign Eritrean territory
with the blessing of the United States and the rest of the international community. The fact that
Eritrea was condemned before the UN fact-finding mission was dispatched to the area is anotherclear indication that the whole Eritrea-Djibouti issue was a political move by the powers thatwanted to punish Eritrea.
The outcome of the recent mediation by the Qatari government in which Djibouti and Eritrea signed
an agreement on June 8, 2010, also shows that there was nothing to the uproar orchestrated byforces external to the two nations. Media reports, quoting an official Qatari news agency said thatthe two nations signed a deal that will see “the Qatari government as mediators. Qatar is also to

32

Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement, December 6, 2006.
A series of documents issued by the Government of Eritrea to counter the campaign by its traditional enemies through the UN
Somalia Monitoring Group.
34
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the UN, Nov. 23, 2009.
33

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deploy its troops on the Eritrea-Djibouti border in a move that helps out a pressured Djiboutian
government.”35“Punishment” where there is no crime
The political nature of the sanctions measure becomes a little clearer when one looks at how the
goalposts kept moving throughout the process to justify the final outcome and punish Eritrea
irrespective of whether any of the charges were true or not---showing that the actions had nothing to
do with Somalia or Djibouti. For example, the primary charge that triggered the sanctions stemmed
from allegations that Eritrea supplied weapons to Somali insurgents; however, after using it to hypethe charges during the months leading up to Resolution 1907 (2009), this critical part of the charges
was eventually dropped because the facts on the ground didn’t support it. Under normal
circumstances, this should have killed the entire drive and clamor for sanctions against Eritrea;
however, not only did it not kill the drive, it didn’t change “the punishment” that Washingtonsought to impose on Eritrea right from the start. As a result, the UNSC went ahead to impose thefollowing: an arms embargo and travel ban and asset freeze of some individuals upon designationby the Sanctions Committee. The imposition of an arms embargo on Eritrea is telling; imposing anarms embargo so that Eritrea would not import arms is not designed to stop the flow of arms into
Somalia from Eritrea but to strength Ethiopia’s hand by tying Eritrea’s hands behind its back so thatthe former would come stronger in its conflict with the latter.
Now, let us take a close look at the components of the punishment package and their implications
for peace and security in the region—the purported goals of Resolution 1907:
First, the arms embargo imposed on Eritrea equates Eritrea’s need and right to self-defense withalleged military adventurism of the Eritrean leadership, that of supplying arms to Somali insurgents.
Eritrea’s role as a Somali conduit of arms is without a shred of evidence but the charge was pushed
to deprive Eritrea from acquiring military equipment for its own defense. It is questionable whether
the UN is acting legally and in conformity with its own charter in the event it impedes or precludes
a sovereign country from procuring arms to defend its very existence. ”Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nation…” [Article 51] This is a deliberate maneuver
designed to tip the balance of power in favor of Ethiopia and to encourage Ethiopia’s belligerent
posture.
Second, the sanctions mandate that assets or properties belonging to some members of the Eritrean
political and military leadership be frozen or blocked. The Eritrean leadership is not known for
amassing wealth or indulging in vanities, that does not make the act justifiable however.
Third, the aviation or visa restriction is targeted against the Eritrean leadership. However,regardless of its scope and severity, this targeted sanction is an attempt at depriving the Eritrean
people from being represented by its leadership in international forums and the arena of diplomacy.
It is an attempt at depriving the Eritrean Diaspora from staging seminars and festivals where

35“Djibouti‐Eritrea border dispute towards solution.” (2010) http://www.afrol.com/articles/36288, retrieved June 8, 2010.

21

members of the Eritrean leadership would be featured speakers. Thus imposing travel restriction isdone to hamper work-related trips. Where the interest of the Eritrean people and the mandate of theEritrean leadership are intertwined, the targeted ban exerts more than minimal impact. Whether the
Security Council will compile a comprehensive list of Eritrean individuals to be placed in the“blacklist” and whether the ban will be ingeniously circumvented remain to be seen. Informationfrom the Sanctions Committee shows that the Ethiopian minority regime has been busy fabricating
bogus data to incriminate Eritrean military commanders, heads of security institutions, presidential
office staff, party officials, and business entities, and urging the UNSC to exact punitive measuresagainst the “Eritrean culprits.” To-date there is no indication that the UNSC will stoop so low or
succumb to heinous pressures like these. In its list of 12th of April, 2010, on the basis of resolution
1844, the UNSC did not include any one from the Eritrean political and military leadership. To
make up for this setback, the US unilaterally imposed asset freeze on Mr. Yemane Gebreab, head ofpolitical affairs and presidential adviser, by presidential decree: Executive Order 13536 of April 12,
2010. This is a pure example that the sanctions were a political move without merit. However,anyone who knows how fragile the Horn of Africa is knows targeting the Eritrean leadership islikely to have profound negative consequences on peace and stability.
One of the implied purposes of the measure may have been to create a wedge between theleadership and the people. If that was the case, the UN action may have produced the exact opposite
result. Last February, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans in the Diaspora staged rallies across theglobe and conducted letter-writing campaigns strongly denouncing the UN sanctions. So, it looks
Resolution 1907 (2009) has created “greater political cohesion around the targeted leadership”
defeating one of its implied purposes.

The Process Leading to the Sanctions
One of the most unprecedented aspects of this unjust sanctions measure is the process that led to it andthe role individuals and organizations external to the UNSC played to make it happen. At the rootof the contorted path it took is the question on whether the UN Security Council can delegate theauthority entrusted to it by Article 39 of the UN Charter to determine what or who constitutes athreat to peace and stability, or, to be more specific, whether Eritrea’s principal enemy in theregion, Ethiopia, can determine for the UN Security Council, whether this young nation poses risk
to regional stability in the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular. Ethiopia is also theprimary source of the misinformation Resolution 1907 (2009) invokes. Former U.S. assistantsecretary for Africa Herman Cohen said, “There are friends in the region, like the Ethiopians, whoprobably are feeding false intelligence about terrorists being hidden and that sort of thing, because
the Ethiopians are deadly afraid of Moslem control and also they have their own Moslem problem
among the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia. So they want to keep the Islamists out of power, andthey will bring the U.S. into it, if they can.”36

Soon after the imposition of the sanction resolution on December 23, 2009, the US ambassador to
the UN, Susan Rice, took pains to point out that "This was an ‘African initiative.’ It was theconsequence of a decision taken by the African Union.” This was also repeated in a statement put
out by the US Department of State and the US embassy in Eritrea. To make sure that this point was

36

Interview with PBS June 6, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan‐june06/somalia_06‐06.html

22fully understood and to dispel suspicions that this was in fact hatched by Washington, the USambassador to the UN added this in her statement: “From the United States´ point of view, let me
say that we have for many, many months sought a constructive dialogue with the government ofEritrea.”
Given the role the US ambassador played in spearheading the process, and her relentless effort toconvince hesitating members of the council to support sanctions, it is very difficult not to see theissue as a Washington initiative barely tinted with a thin, very thin, African veil. But, it is important
to make note of the elaborate African veil that was used to cover up the real ownership of the case.
It took three prongs to make it look like an African initiative. It began in the Ethiopian capital, atthe 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers “on the security and politicalsituation in Somalia” held in Addis Ababa on 20 May 2009, followed two days later by the Peaceand Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 190th meeting held to deliberate on “ thesituation in Somalia in light of the outcome of the 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Councilof Ministers on the security and political situation in Somalia. Both were chaired by high Ethiopian
officials—the foreign minister and the prime minister--and naturally both urged the UN Security
Council to impose sanctions on a member nation and their principal enemy. The AU’s Peace andSecurity Council asked the UNSC to “impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within
and outside the region, specially Eritrea, providing support to the armed groups engaged indestabilization activities in Somalia, attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM,
as well as against all the Somali individuals and entities working towards undermining the peaceand reconciliation efforts and regional stability.37
Then a month later, the Ethiopian leaders, along with their satellite regimes in Djibouti andSomalia, sent a high level delegation to New York to urge the Security Council to impose thesanctions not on “all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region,” but only on Eritrea.
There are at least seven nations that were implicated by the Monitoring Group in the Somali crisis.
So, it is easy to see that the purpose was not to find solutions to the Somali crisis but to use it as acover to impose sanctions on the young nation of Eritrea. However, the effort was soon aborted infavor of making it even more “African” by taking it to the 2009 African Union Summit held in
Sirte, Libya, the next month. What happened in Sirte also exposes that this was more of a charade
to cover up the true ownership of the initiative. It was presented at the wee hours of the night whenmost of the members of the Union were not present. To add to the “Africaness” of the measure,
Uganda, which was on the Security Council during this time, was made to front the effort.

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Retrieved May 3, 2010, from http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200905230001.html.

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Conclusion on the Unjust Sanctions
There are two inescapable conclusions one can discern through this “African” smoke screen:First, the unjust sanctions happened because the United States wanted it to happen and that is
unfortunate because Eritreans look up to Washington to exercise fairness and justice in dealing with
the nations in this fragile and war-ravaged part of Africa. History, and particularly that of Eritrea
and Ethiopia, has repeatedly shown that any big power policy devoid of balance, fairness andjustice only leads to war and destruction which this sub-region of Africa has had too much of thelast 60 years.
Second, Resolution 1907 (2009) is not meant to bring about peace and security in the Horn ofAfrica in general and Somalia in particular. It is to “punish” the young nation of Eritrea for“reasons” that were not mentioned in the UN sanctions package—for not accepting the West’s
misguided policy in Somalia. The countries which shoulder primary responsibility for the cause andexacerbation of the crisis in Somalia do not indeed have moral, political or legal authority to indictor punish Eritrea. The sanctions measure is purported to guarantee peace and stability.; however,"justice will hardly reign when the US, instead of being an unsullied peace broker, favors Ethiopia
over Eritrea, demands subservience from Eritrea or seeks to extend its sphere of influence in theHorn region regardless of whose rights are violated or trampled. If truth be told, siding with orpropping up Ethiopia is part of US grand scheme of transforming Ethiopia into a ‘satellite state’ andits armed forces into ‘military surrogates.’”38
If peace and stability were the earnest desire and objective of the powers that be, the border
between Ethiopia and Eritrea would have been demarcated once and for all and Ethiopia would
have willy-nilly relinquished its hold on Eritrean territory.
In the end, any fair-minded observer must ask why Eritrea and its people are repeatedly singled out
for such an unfair treatment. In this paper, we saw a pattern of behavior by the West and its ally
Ethiopia that has denied the Eritrean people a chance to live in peace, develop their nation andfocus on their real enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance and other characteristics ofunderdevelopment. A careful look at the last six decades reveals that, except for a brief period
between 1991 and 1998, this has been a long war the Eritrean people have been fighting todetermine their own destiny—a right most other peoples and nations take for granted. During thisperiod, on almost all of the questions relating to Eritrea’s freedom and sovereignty, the West has
been on the wrong side. The recent US-led UN sanctions imposed on this young nation, whenviewed against this historic record, can be seen only as a continuation of this long history of
betrayals of the Eritrean people.

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Rozoff, Richard. (2005). New Colonialism: Pentagon Carves Africa Into Military Zones, May 5, 2010, retrieved May 10, 2010, fromhttp://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/05/05/new‐colonialism‐pentagon‐carves‐africa‐into‐military‐zones/24

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