Takeshi Nishimura
Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
FY2012 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Research Fellow
Email: yoshihirotake“at”hotmail.co.jp
Fields: Game Theory, Auction Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization
Research Interests: Economic Analysis of Procurement Mechanisms
Dissertation Title: “Economic Analysis of Procurement” (tentative)
Education
Ph.D. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2014 (expected)
M.A. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2009
B.A. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2003
Experience
2011 – present

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Research Fellow,
Hitotsubashi University Global Centers of Excellence (COE) Program“Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in SocialSciences”

2010 – 2011

COE Young Researcher, Hitotsubashi University Global COE Program“Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in SocialSciences”

2003 – 2005

Associate Consultant, IBM Business Consulting Services K.K., Tokyo,

JapanPublications“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction with Multidimensional Quality”, Hitotsubashi
University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 238, 2012.
“Bundling Decision in Procurement Auctions with Risk-Averse Suppliers”, Hitotsubashi
University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 237, 2012.
“Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal”, Hitotsubashi University Global COE Hi-StatDiscussion Paper Series, no. 224, 2011.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent”, Hitotsubashi

University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 165, 2010.
“Analysis of Contracts in the Software Industry” (in Japanese, with Fumitoshi Moriya,Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Shigeru Takahashi, and Hiromi Nakamura), SEC Journal, vol. 5,no. 6, December 2009: 362-367.

Conference Presentations“Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal,” GAMES 2012, Bilgi University, July 23,
2012.
“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” ISER Seminar Series, Osaka University, May 9,
2012.
“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Nagoya University Workshop, Nagoya University,April 20, 2012.
“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Game Theory Workshop 2012, Shizuoka
University, March 7, 2012.
“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Kansai Game Theory Seminar, Konan University,
February 25, 2012.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” 2011 Asian Meeting ofEconometric Society, Korea University, August 11, 2011.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” Hitotsubashi G-COELectures and Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare, Hitotsubashi University,October 24, 2010.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” The 16th
Decentralization Conference, Kwansei Gakuin University, September 17, 2010.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Contract Theory
Workshop, Niigata University, August 5, 2010.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Contract Theory
Workshop East (CTWE), Hitotsubashi University, June 11, 2010.
“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Kansai Game Theory
Seminar, Toyama International Conference Center, May 22, 2010.
“Risk Sharing and Incentives in Multi-Stage Procurement: Theory and Case-Studies of
the Japanese Software Industry,” Kansai Game Theory Seminar, Hiroshima Universityof Economics, October 24, 2009.
“Short-Term Versus Long-Term Contracts in Procurement: Theory and Case-Studies ofJapanese Customized Software Industry,” Contract Theory Workshop: Summer
Conference in Hokkaido 2009, Hokkaido University, August 7, 2009.
References
Professor Akira Okada
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Professor Reiko Aoki
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University