Disclaimer
This report was compiled by an ADRC visiting researcher (VR) from ADRC
member countries.
The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of
the ADRC. The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon the maps in the report also do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the ADRC.

Final repo
ort of vissiting res
search FY
F 20122B

Tra
ackingg system and
a
ma
anage
ementt of do
onate
ed gooods
inn Japaan

Rujira Chariy
yaphannSoccial workerDeepartmeent of DisasteD
er Prev
ventionn and M
Mitigatiion
(
(DDPM
M)
Minis
stry off Interioor, Thailand

2

Rujira Chariyaphan
Social worker
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation(DDPM)
Ministry of Interior, Thailand

Table of contents

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...............................................................................................

3

ABBREVIATION.........................................................................................................

4

1.

BACKGROUND...........................................................................................................

5

2.

THE

6

3.

(GEJE) ....................................................

GREATDISASTER

EAST

JAPAN

MANAGEMENT

EARTHQUAKE8SYSTEM

OF

8JAPAN.......................................................

9

3.1 LEGAL BASIS........................................................................................................

15

3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT

15

SYSTEM.................................

16

5.

DISASTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT……………………….……...

19

6.

4.1 OUTLINE OF DISASTER RESPONSE..................................................................

24

4.2 CABINET OFFICE DISASTER RESPONSE MECHANISM...................................

24

NATIONAL RESPONSE IN THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE (GEJE) ..

38

4.

COORDINATION DISASTER RELIEF DURING THE GEJE.......................................
7.

6.1 GOVERNMENT…………………………………......................................................

43

8.

6.2 NON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

48

9.

(NGOs), INTERNATIONAL…………….

53

10.
11.

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION COORDINATION (INGO),

57

VOLUNTEE.

62

RECEIVING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASISTANCE IN DOMESTIC………

62

DISASTER RELIEF MATERIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE GEGE………………………

63

PROLBLEM AND CAUSES OF RELIEF MATERIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE GEJE82

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................
APPENDIX…………………………………………………………………………………...
-

THAILAND FLOODS 2011...............................................................................

-COMPARISON BETWEEN IN THE GEJE AND THAILAND FLOOD 2011….

BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................

4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my thanks to ADRC for providing me with the opportunity toparticipate in Visiting Researcher Program and for the invaluable assistance during thecourse. For me, Visiting Researcher Program was quite a memorable experience because
I have learned more about disaster management and disaster reduction in Japan. Besides,
I have had a great opportunity to learn Japanese language and to get to know aboutsocial ,tradition and Japanese culture.
I am sincerely grateful to DDPM for giving me the opportunity and support toparticipate in the visiting research program. In particular, I have the opportunity to develop
myself and gain knowledge on disaster management at the international level.
I am thankful Ms.Yoshida Maki Senior Researcher for guidance and supervision
I also special thanks to Ms. Shiomi Yumi, Researcher ADRC for providing necessary
information regarding the research and many assistance and introduced about Japan
during the entire period of the program. Moreover, many thanks for Ms. Fujinaka for her
willing assistance when I need help in making my living in Japan smooth and enjoyable.
I must thank Japanese Teacher Mr. Shoji Kawahara, for teaching basic Japanese
language and information about travelling in Kobe and Kansai area which makes use of theJapanese life filled with enjoyable weekend.
I also would like to thank my visiting researcher colleagues Mr. Duni Chand Rana,
Mr. Agustian Rizal and Ms. Ma Aletha Ahumada Nogra for a great friendship, participationand their support like same family in Japan.
Lastly, my special thanks also go to Saratari family, for the warm welcome andmake me feel as part of their family,including my family members and friends for theirsupport and encouragement to do research in Japan.

5

ABBREVIATIONS
DDPM

Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Ministry of Interior,
Thailand

FROC

Flood Relief Operations Command

GEJE

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake

DCBA

Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act

JRCS

The Japanese Red Cross Society

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Japan

MOJ

Ministry of Justice ,Japan

FDMA

Fire and Disaster Management Agency

CAO

Cabinet Office

MLIT

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism ,Japan

MHLW

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,Japan

MoF

Ministry of Finance,Japan

MEXT

Ministry of Education,Culture,Sports,Science and Technology,Japan

JTFC

Japan Trade Fair Commission

NGOs

Non Government Organizations

WFP

World Food Program

NPA

Non-Profit Organization

IHA

International Humanitarian Assistance6

Tracking system and management of
donated goods in Japan
1. Background
From the great floods of Thailand in 2011.One lesson we learned was that the
involvement of many agencies in tracking and distributing donated goods creates
potential confusion. During the last floods, quite a few organizations did not go throughestablished channels when donating goods. Some went directly to provinces. Others
worked with government agencies that established relationships with. It should also be
noted here that since the Thai Government did not officially ask for assistance, many
triggers normally used by international organization to provide assistance were not invoked.
This likely also had a significant contribution to what channels were used for providing
assistance. There are, in fact, a large number of stakeholders that are potentially involved inreceiving, transporting and receiving good which creates a potentially confusing receiving
good .
The National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan BE 2553-2557 (2010-2014)
mentions that the responsibilities for receiving and tracking international assistance areshared by different agencies, including DDPM which is the central government agency incharge of disaster prevention and mitigation. The problem, however is that Thailand does
not have a database or system in place for receiving and tracking international donations.
There appears to be no common national database system for receiving and tracking
donations of goods. Even at the department level, the processes used to track goods
depend on the individual official. As a staff member of DDPM, I foresee a growing interest in
studying this issue. This challenge should be addressed so that donations can be effectively
used to meet the needs of disaster victims in Thailand in the future.
The propose of research is to study tracking system donated goods and the
management of donated goods in Japan.

7

2.

The Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE)
2.1 Overview situation
The 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku often referred to in Japan

as Higashi nihon daishinsai and also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the Great
East Japan Earthquake, and the 3.11 Earthquake, was a magnitude 9.0 (Mw) undersea
mega thrust earthquake off the coast of Japan that occurred at 14:46 on 11 March 2011, withthe epicenter approximately 70 kilometres (43 mi) east of the Ojika Peninsula of Tōhoku andthe hypocenter at an underwater depth of approximately 30 km (19 mi). It was the mostpowerful known earthquake ever to have hit Japan, and the fifth most powerful earthquake inthe world since modern record-keeping began in 1900. The earthquake triggered powerful
tsunami waves that reached heights of up to 40.5 metres (133 ft) in Miyako in Tōhoku's Iwate
Prefecture, and which, in the Sendai area, travelled up to 10 km (6 mi) inland. The earthquake
moved Honshu (the main island of Japan) 2.4 m (8 ft) east and shifted the Earth on its axis by
estimates of between 10 cm (4 in) and 25 cm (10 in).
On 12 September 2012, a Japanese National Police Agency report confirmed
15,882 deaths, 6,142 injured, and 2,668 people missing across twenty prefectures, as well
as 129,225 buildings totally collapsed, with a further 254,204 buildings 'half collapsed', andanother 691,766 buildings partially damaged. The earthquake and tsunami also caused
extensive and severe structural damage in north-eastern Japan, including heavy damage toroads and railways as well as fires in many areas, and a dam collapse. Japanese Prime
Minister Naoto Kan said, "In the 65 years after the end of World War II, this is the toughest
and the most difficult crisis for Japan." Around 4.4 million households in northeastern Japan
were left without electricity and 1.5 million without water.
The tsunami caused nuclear accidents, primarily the level 7 meltdowns at threereactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex, and the associatedevacuation zones affecting hundreds of thousands of residents. Many electrical generators
were taken down, and at least three nuclear reactors suffered explosions due to hydrogengas that had built up within their outer containment buildings after cooling system failure.
Residents within a 20 km (12 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a
10 km (6.2 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant were evacuated.
In addition, the U.S. recommended that its citizens evacuate up to 80 km (50 mi) of the plant.

8
Early estimates placed insured losses from the earthquake alone at US$14.5 to$34.6 billion.The Bank of Japan offered ¥15 trillion (US$183 billion) to the banking system
on 14 March in an effort to normalize market conditions. The World Bank's estimatedeconomic cost was US$235 billion, making it the costliest natural disaster in world history.
2.2 International Assistance
The Government of Japan has received 138 offers of assistance fromcountries as well as 39 offers from international organizations. It has accepted relief items
from 29 countries and international organizations. The Government says the need forfurther international assistance is limited and any support should clearly be in accordancewith the Government of Japan’s criteria:
2.2.1 With regard to relief items, the Government of Japan has received
offers for relief goods/material from many countries, and international organizations.
The Government is identifying the needs and trying to match the offers with the identified
needs for efficient and effective delivery. As the transportation and storage capacity is still
limited, it is strongly recommended not to send any relief goods without coordination with
the Government or the local authorities.
2.2.2 Concerning offers of assistance by NGOs, the Government of Japan
states that due to the shortage of petrol and damages to infrastructure in the affectedareas, International NGOs are recommended to wait until the situation improves before
commencing activities that are completely self-sustainable and with a local partner. WFP isplanning to provide 20 mobile warehouses. The warehouses will be used by Peace Boatand JEN. WFP is also planning to hold a training workshop for Japanese NGOs so thatthey can set up the warehouses by themselves. WFP is also ready to provide prefabricatedhousing to NGOs. OCHA has officially ended its support role in-country to the Governmentof Japan for the emergency. NGO consortia Japan Platform and Japan NGO Center forInternational Cooperation will take the lead in information exchange and coordination ofinternational NGOs with their local partners.

9Picture 1. The Great East JAPAN Earthquake (GEJE)
3. Disaster Management System of Japan
3.1 LEGAL BASIS
Various disaster management related laws adopted since late 40s has laid
down the legal framework for the disaster management system of Japan. These laws cover
all phases of disaster management – preparedness, prevention/mitigation, response andrecovery/rehabilitation phases. According to the latest brochure of Disaster Management
System in Japan, only 3 laws has been enacted to regulate disaster response activities atnational level: 1) Disaster Relief Act - 1947 year 2) Fire Services Act -1948 year
3) Flood Control Act – 1949 year - whereas the numbers of the laws regulating other phasesof disaster management are considerably more: 7 Basic Acts; 18 with regard to Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness; 23 Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction and Financial
Measures [5; 6-7 p.] Given the interconnectedness of these laws, major aspects of someother laws will also be highlighted, while the main focus will be put on disaster response
laws.
Disaster Relief Act – The purpose of the law is to provide essential emergency relief in theevent of a disaster through the cooperation of local governments, non-governmentalorganizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so as toprotect the disaster victims and maintain social order. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the DRA

10
set the framework for the government policy with regard to costs management andreimbursement and penal provisions related with disaster relief activities. In the case of
emergency relief, the Disaster Relief Act is referred to for matters such as rescue operations
and the state contribution to relief expenses, for which the law has specific provisions.
Under the Act, relief is provided only in the event of, for example, the destruction of a certain
number of houses relative to the population of the municipality or municipalities concerned
due to a disaster. (Example: At least 30 households have their dwellings destroyed throughtotal structural collapse in a municipality with a population of less than 5,000). The extent,
methods and duration of relief are to be specified by the Minister of Health, Labour andWelfare (MHLW).The MHLW plays key role in implementation of DRA during disaster times
as a central supervisory and coordinating body. As stipulated by the law, relief is provided bya prefectural governor with the assistance of his municipal mayors. Where necessary, theprefectural governor may delegate part of his authority to municipal mayors. The Act defines
the responsibility of the prefectural governor as follows;
The prefectural governor shall constantly endeavor to formulate required plans, establish
powerful relief organizations, and provide for labor, facilities, equipment, supplies andfunding to ensure fully effective.
The following types of relief activities are defined by the Disaster Relief Act: setting up ofplaces of refuge and emergency temporary housing; supply of food and water; supply ofclothing, bedding, etc; rescue of disaster victims; emergency repair of houses. Provision ofschool supplies Burial arrangements; search for deceased victims and body treatment;
removal of debris and other obstacles in and around dwellings

3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Likewise, its national government system, disaster management in Japan is
also vested on 3-layered system – national, prefectural and municipal layers. Disastermanagement system of Japan has undergone tremendous advancement throughout thepast 5-6 decades. Disaster Management Councils established at each level and eachcouncil is responsible for the implementation of all disaster management related issues
under its authority.The comprehensive coordination and communication system has been
put in place to foster holistic and effective management at each level. The outline
of Disaster Management System of Japan, the structure of Central Disaster Management
Council established under the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (DCBA) as well as
Disaster Management Planning System based on the same law is shown below:
The enactment of the DCBA is considered to be the turning point in thehistory of modern disaster management system of Japan. Adopted in 1961, two years after
the Ise-wan Typhoon which caused tremendous destructions and loss of more 5000
people,11

the DCBA defined protection of national land as well as citizens’ lives, livelihoods, andproperty from natural disasters as a national priority.
The DCBA lays down the national level framework for the disastermanagement. The act has provisions governing the following matters: Definition of
responsibilities of disaster management, Disaster Management Organizations, Disaster
Management Planning System, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, Disaster
Emergency Response, Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation, Financial Measures, State ofDisaster Emergency.

[5; 8p] The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and related laws

complement each other as general legislation and detailed legislation, the latter consistingof specific laws establishedin response to various specific needs. In the event of adisaster, specific laws are first applied depending on the nature of the disaster, and theDisaster Countermeasures Basic Law is only invoked where there are no provisions in theselaws mentioned as stated earlier,

The DCBA which covers all phases of disastermanagement and stipulates establishment of disaster management councils at three levels:
national – Central Disaster Management Council; Prefectural – Local Disaster Management
Council and Municipal Disaster Management Councils as well as defines organization andduties ofthese councils and defines conditions for establishment of headquarters fordisaster control in case of emergency.

Figure 1. Basic Scheme of the DCBA

12(Source: www.adrc.asia)

Figure 2. Outline of the disaster management system in Japan(Source: www.bousai.go.jp)

13

Central Disaster Management Council consists of the prime minister, who isthe chairperson, Minister of State for Disaster Management, all ministers, heads of major
public institutions and experts. The council promotes comprehensive disastercountermeasures including deliberating important issues on disaster reduction according torequests from the Prime Minister or Minister of State for Disaster Management. Duties of thecouncil include formulating and promoting implementation of the Basic Disaster
Management Plan and Earthquake Countermeasures Plans, formulating and promoting
implementation of the urgent measures plan for major disasters, deliberating important
issues on disaster reduction according to requests from the Prime Minister or Minister ofState for Disaster Management (basic disaster management policies, overall coordination ofdisaster countermeasures and declaration of state of disaster emergency) and offering
opinions regarding important issues on disaster reduction to the Prime Minister
and Minister of State for Disaster Management.

Figure 3. Composition of Central Disaster Management Council(Source: www.bousai.go.jp)

14

Disaster management planning in Japan is implemented at three levels:
1. Basic Disaster Management Plan is prepared by the Central Disaster
Management Council and basis plan for disaster management activities. The plan must be
based on Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act. The structure of it is as shown in the figure
below:

Figure 4. Structure of Basic Disaster Management Plan
(Source: www.bousai.go.jp)
2. Disaster Management Operation Plan is made by each designated governmentorganization and designated public corporation based on the Basic Disaster Management
Plan
3. Local Disaster Management Plan is made by prefectural and municipal disastermanagement councils, subject to local circumstances and based on Basic Disaster
Management Plan.

15

Mission of the Cabinet
C
Offfice
Along with a seriies of reform
ms of the centralcgove
ernment system in 2001
1, thepost of Minister of State forr Disaster ManagementM
was newly established
d to integratee anddinate disasster reductio
on policies and measu
ures of ministries and agencies. In the
coord
Cabin
net Office, which is reesponsible forf securing
g cooperatio
on and collaaboration among
relateed government organiza
ations in wid
de-ranging issues, the Director-Gen
D
neral for Dis
sasterMana
agement is mandatedmtoo undertake the planning of basic disaster man
nagement pooliciesand responser
to large-scale disasters, asa well as co
onduct overa
all coordinattion.
Additio
onally, takiing into accountathee lessons learned ffrom the Great
Hansshin-Awaji Earthquake,E, the Cabinet Secretariat system
m was alsso strengthened,
includding the app
pointment off the Deputy Chief Cabinnet Secretarry for Crisis M
Managemennt andthe establishme
ent of the Cabinet In
nformation Collection Center, to strengthenn riskagement fun
nctions to ad
ddress eme
ergencies su
uch as large
e-scale disassters and seeriousmana
accid
dents. Thereeby, the Caabinet Officee has a rolee in supporrting the Caabinet Secreetariatregarrding disaste
er managem
ment matterss.

O
Organiza
ation of NationalN
Governnment annd Cabinet Officce

Figure 5. Organizzation of Na
ational Gov
vernment andaCabineet Office（Disasster Manage
ement）(Sourcce: www.adrrc.asia)

16

4. Disaster Emergency Response Management.
(1) Outline of Disaster Response
The national and local governments need to quickly collect and sharedisaster and damage information, and secure communications so that they can carry out
eﬀective emergency activities such as search and rescue and medical operations. Based onsuch information, local governments set up a disaster management headquarters andrelated organizations establish their own operations mechanism.
The national government collects disaster information at the Cabinet
Information Collection Center 24 hours a day. When a large-scale disaster strikes, anemergency team composed of the director generals of the respective ministries andagencies gathers immediately at the Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's
Office to grasp and analyze the disaster situation, and report the results to the Prime
Minister. Inter- ministerial meetings at the ministerial or high-ranking senior-official level areheld to decide basic response policies if necessary. According to the level of damage, thegovernment may establish a Headquarters for Major Disaster Management (headed by the
Minister of State for Disaster Management) or a Headquarters for Extreme Disaster
Management (headed by the Prime Minister).
Additionally, a government investigation team headed by the Minister ofState for Disaster Management may be dispatched, or an onsite response headquarters
maybe established.
（2）Wide-area Support System
In the case of large-scale disasters that exceed the response capabilities of
the affected local government, various wide-area support mechanisms are mobilized by the
National Police Agency (Interprefectural Emergency Rescue Unit), Fire and Disaster
Management Agency (Emergency Fire Rescue Team), and Japan Coast
Guard.Furthermore, the Self-Defense Forces can be dispatched for emergency response
activities upon request from the governor of the aﬀected prefectural government.
Also, the disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) will be dispatched toprovide wide-area medical-transport services. These teams transport severely injured
persons via Self-Defense Forces vehicles to hospitals outside the stricken zone.

17

Figure 6. Cabinet Office Disaster Response Mechanism(Source: http://www.bousai.go.jp)

18

Figure 7. Disaster Response Mechanism(Source: http://www.bousai.go.jp)

19

Figure 8. Outline of Government Headquarters in response to
the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE)(Source: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/incident/outline_110509.pdf)

20
5. National Response in the Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE)(Source: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Situation Report No.16,UNOCHA,
http://www.unocha.org.)
5.1 Coordination
The Government of Japan’s Emergency Management agencies areleading the response through the Emergency Response Team, headed by Prime Minister
Naoto Kan. Information from the Government of Japan. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s
Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers
Coordination Unit.
A network of NGO/ volunteer organizations “Japan Civil Network for
Disaster Relief in East Japan” has been established in order to facilitate the communicationand exchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support
the survivors. The aim of the network is to coordinate the assistance provided in Tohoku
area by the NGOs/volunteer organizations. Coordination of international NGOs and theirlocal partners will be provided by Japan Platform and JANIC The next inter-agency meetingis scheduled for the 2 April in Tokyo.
5.2 Infrastructure
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport reports that most of the
Tohoku region’s main land, sea and air routes are open. 99 percent of highways and mainroutes have been repaired, except for those near the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant.
More than 37,200 vehicles are now passing through the Tohoku Expressway per day,
1.3 times more than the regular traffic before the earthquake due to the large number of
emergency vehicles. Express buses are carrying 4,660 passengers per day into and out of
the region, 2.4 times more than that before the disaster. However, many local roads andresidential roads in the affected area are still impassable, blocked with debris and this ishampering the delivery of aid to those staying in their own homes and in smaller evacuation
centers.
All ports and airports are now open, except for Sendai Airport which isreserved for humanitarian aid. In other airports 71 per cent of domestic flights haveresumed. Railway tracks are open for 62 percent of bullet trains and 60 per cent of local
trains. The interim assessment of the East Japan Railway Company has assessed half ofthe total railway tracks and found that 23 train stations and 22 km worth of railway tracks
have been completely washed away in the region.
Electricity has been restored by 96.3 percent in Tohoku, leaving only
180,000 households without power. Gas supplies have been restored to roughly 32 percent of households and 340,000 households remain without. Because 4 out of 7 supply
bases of liquefied petroleum (LP) gas are not operational, the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry will release 40,000 tons from the national reserve for the first time from 4 April.

21
To date, 87.9 per cent of water has been restored to buildings and only
260,000 households in eight prefectures are still without running water. Currently 320 water
trucks are deployed and 200 more will shortly deliver water to those without access to
tap water.
Regardless of the on-going recovery, the fuel shortage remains a serious
issue in the affected areas, exacerbated by a limited number of operational fuel stations
and increasing needs. The Government plans to spend US$210 million (1.7 billion JPY) to
procure of tankers and install makeshift fuel stations.
5.3 Shelter
The construction of temporary shelters is continuing in the affected
prefectures. Some prefectures have revised their plans upwards in order to respond to theneeds. Iwate Prefecture announced that they are increasing the number of temporary
shelters from 8,800 to 18,000, which will cover 40,000 to 50,000 people. Miyagi Prefecture
which is requesting 10,000 houses be built has announced that construction of 1,195
shelters will start on the 5 April in 11 towns and cities. Currently, construction is underway
for 1,207 shelters.
The challenge is to find suitable land to construct the houses, as the coastal
area of Tohoku is mountainous and it is difficult to find flat land. The Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and transportation says that only 8 percent of the land needed for theconstruction has been secured so far. The plan is to have 30,000 temporary shelters built
by mid May. According to the National Policy Agency 70,409 families are living inevacuation centres.
In order to allow evacuees to have better access to basic services while
waiting for the temporary shelters, the Government is trying to find available public/
government housing which can accommodate evacuee families. 42,145 public/government
housings units across 47 prefectures are available for displaced families. In Tokyo
prefecture, 600 families have been allocated vacant public housing units yesterday, free ofcharge, for a period of 6 months.
Starting in May 2011, the Government will provide $10,000 (1 million JPY)
to each family who lost their homes. Movements from evacuation centres to temporary
shelters will soon intensify, and financial support to families will be indispensable.
5.4 WASH
Access to water has been restored to more than 1.9 million households
over the past three weeks and the priority is to regain access for the remaining 260,000
households (or 10 per cent who have been affected), according to the Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare. More than 400 water supply companies across the country have now
established emergency water supply systems to provide water trucking service to theaffected prefectures. 189 water supply vehicles are operating in Miyagi, 84 in Iwate and 35

22
in Fukushima. The Ministry has secured 520 vehicles in total and has maintained thedeployment of about 320 vehicles.
Assessments have revealed that additional sewage systems in Miyagi,
Iwate and Fukushima are not functioning or have been damaged, according to the Ministryof Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. In Miyagi, there are 66 facilities that are notfunctioning or damaged, 18 in Iwate and 14 in Fukushima. More than 2,405 professionals
from the Ministry, prefectural governments and various sewage associations have been
deployed to the affected areas and 210 professionals are currently on the ground to help
repair the sewage systems.
More than 5.5 million bottles of water have been delivered to evacuation
centres and hospitals, according to the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters
reports. This is more than twice of what was delivered within one week after the disaster.
Another 1 million bottles are in transit or being distributed. Meanwhile, a lack of clean waterfor evacuees’ personal hygiene is posing public health risks in some evacuation centres.
Media reports that the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital found that sanitation and hygiene
environment is deteriorating in 30 per cent of the 314 evacuation centres that they haveassessed in Ishinomaki, Higashi-Matsushima and Onagawa in Migyai. Excreta disposal is aparticular challenge. The local social welfare office is conducting a training on drainage workand maintenance of toilets.
Ministries such as the Ministry of Defense have provided bathing services to
1.2 million people so far. For evacuees not being able to wash regularly or change theirclothes is a particular hardship.
5.5 HealthTohoku University reports that cases of pneumonia among the elderly
living in evacuation centres in Miyagi are increasing. During 20 to 26 March, the University
received 40 referrals from two local hospitals, a level 10 times above the average. Amidst
such fears of rising prevalence of infectious diseases and flu among the evacuees, theMinistry of Health, Labour and Welfare announced that 142 medical teams of 640
professionals from across the country are currently responding mainly in Miyagi, Iwate andFukushima. In addition, more than 630 pharmacists, 250 nurses, 110 public health officers,
nutritionists, dentists and other medical professionals have been deployed to evacuation
centres and hospitals. 20 teams of 95 professionals are also catering to psychosocial needs
and 280 care-givers are attending to people with disabilities and people who require nursing.
About 8,000 additional care-givers are on standby. About 400 child welfare specialists arealso on standby and 17 have been deployed to Iwate so far.

23
Hospitals providing emergency response services in the three most affected
prefectures are gradually building back capacity. Of the 33 major hospitals in these
prefectures, 26 are now accepting both inpatients and outpatients. Media reports thatsufficient medical supplies are now reaching key hospitals. The challenge is the onward
distribution to a network of local hospitals and clinics, which is being hampered by lack ofpharmacists.
In the meantime, the nationwide mobilization of medical assistancecontinues. In the non-affected prefectures, there are more than 390 public hospitals with
about 3,400 available beds. Social welfare facilities have identified accommodation facilities
for at least 35,000 elderly, 8,700 people with disabilities, 7,100 children and 900 people
with other protection needs. So far, 690 people have moved into these facilities. One of the
major health concerns is the continuity of treatment for patients with serious illnesses andchronic diseases, such as cancer and diabetes. Medical institutions in non-affected
prefectures are now publicizing services available for these patients on their websites.
346 domestic Emergency Response Units and medical teams of the Japanese Red Cross
Society (JRCS) have completed their mission, 27 remain in the three most affected
prefectures and 117 are on standby. JRCS has also handed out more than 125,500
blankets, 26,100 emergency kits (including radios, flashlights and other supplies), 11,000
sleeping kits (including pillows, camping mats, ear plugs, etc.) and clothing to families in
evacuation centres.
5.6 Food
The Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters reports that an estimated
14 million meals have been delivered to evacuation centres and hospitals in the affectedareas to date. Approximately 1.5 million meals were delivered on 30 and 31 March.
In addition, approximately 3 million meals are in transit. The figure does not include
distribution of food items by municipalities, NGOs, private sector, and Japan’s Self Defence
Force.
5.7 Education
While the academic year is due to start in April, many schools in thethree prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima are not able to resume their classes, as alarge number of schools have either been damaged by the earthquake and tsunami or are
being used as evacuation centres. In the three worst affected areas, approximately 1,700(70 per cent) of public schools have been damaged, and among them, 291 primary andjunior high schools have so far no prospect of resuming their classes. Each prefecture isconsidering using unused public facilities in other locations to minimize the delay to school
opening. Many teachers are also missing or dead. The mayor of Ishinomaki in Miyagi says
he is finding it difficult to propose that people sheltering in schools should vacate to anotherdestination before classes resume on the 21 April.

24
The prefectures of Hiroshima, Tokushima and Yamaguchi are considering
sending 145 teachers to the three most affected northern prefectures. However, they are
not able to receive them at this stage as accommodation and food are still lacking on the
ground. The teachers have been requested to wait until such time that the three prefectures
are ready.
The Prefecture of Iwate, together with the Ministry of Education, is
considering establishing boarding schools for children orphaned from the disaster.
However, the number of orphans is yet to be established, and concrete plans will have to
be made after a proper needs assessment. The Ministry is ready to discuss similar planwith the municipalities in Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures, if requested.
5.8 Agriculture
Although the total damage is yet to be determined, the Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries estimates that nearly 24,000 hectares, 2.6 per cent ofagricultural land have been damaged by the tsunami in six prefectures, Aomori, Iwate,
Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba. The worst-hit was Shichigahamamachi, Iwate, where
93.4 per cent of land was washed away or inundated. As Tohoku is the biggest riceproducing zone in Japan, rice fields account for 85 per cent of the total damage. As forfisheries, over 18,500 fishing vessels are reportedly damaged or lost. In the 3 worst affected
prefectures, Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima, the damage is 87.9 percent.
Only 4 percent of 14,200 registered fishing vessels were not damaged in
Iwate. Similarly, the damage to fishing ports has also been severe. Nearly all fishing ports
in the three prefectures have sustained significant damage. Considering that agriculture
and fisheries are one of the biggest industries in Tohoku Region, reconstruction of these
sectors will be critical for the reconstruction of livelihoods.
5.9 Funding
Individuals and private sector companies, along with countries and aidorganizations have contributed and pledged a total of $ 951 million bilaterally to theGovernment of Japan, Red Cross Societies, NGOs and other partners to support relief
efforts, according to the Financial Tracking Service. The amount reported in the FTS has
nearly doubled over the past week and more than 91 per cent of the contributions continue
to be funds raised from the private sector. The Japanese Red Cross Society received arecord $725 million from more than 1.1 million local donations. The Japanese diplomaticestablishments abroad have received $12 million, according to the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs.

25

6. Coordination Disaster Relief during the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE).
6.1 Government
6.1.1 Cabinet office1) Coodination of international Disaster Relief¾ Institutional Arrangement
Basic Disaster Management Plan (excepts)
The plan was revised in July 1995 after the Great Hanshine – Awaji
Earthquake to define procedures to accept and facilitate international disaster relief.

Basic Disaster Management Plan
Chapter 1 Disaster Prevention - The government should prepare
procedure necessary to accept and facilitate international relief.
Chapter 2 Emergency Response When an offer for relief is reached from aboard, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster Management Headquarters of its type,
expected, arrival date and destination.
 The government Headquarters should determine whether to accept
the offer.
 When the government accepts the offer, a plan for facilitating therelief should be prepared according to the pre-defined policy and be notified to the offeringcountry as well as related ministries and local governments.
¾ Inter- Ministerial Agreement
An Inter- Ministerial Agreement was drafted in 1998 to assess concreatarea of relief and determine responsible ministries.
Potential Areas of International Relief and Responsible Ministries (Partial list).
Potential Areas

Responsible Ministries

Search and rescue

National Police Agency, Fire and disaster(including handling of rescue dogs)

Management Agency, Ministry of Agriculture(for quarantine), Ministry of Justice (for immigration)

Medical staff

Ministry of Health, labour and welfare, Ministry ofJustice (for immigration)

food

Ministry of Agriculture

water

Ministry of Health, labour and welfare

Daily essentials

Ministry of Economy,Trad and Industry

Monetary aid

Cabinet Office

Table 1. Potential Areas of International Relief and Responsible Ministries.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)

262) Government Disaster Management Headquarters(1) Structure of the Headquarters and; (2) International Coordination
Team

Figure 9. Government Disaster Management Headquarters(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)

27(3) Key Activities and Dates
Dates
March 11, 2011

Key Activities
1) Evening, notification from MoFA of first international
offers (8 offers as at 6 pm)
2) Night, establishment of the team in Emergency
Operations Centre (ca.10pm)

March 12, 2011

1) Korea (1st) and Singapore SAR teams arrived,
requested NPA tocooperate

March 13, 2011

2) Germany, Switzerland, USA, China, UK and New
Zealand teams arrived, requested
3) FDMA to cooperate (SAR teams continued to arrive
during March)

March 14, 2011

4) Relief goods from China (900 tents, 2,000 blankets
and 200 flashlights) arrived (goods continued to arrive
during March and April)

March 17, 2011

5) Issued an advisory to relevant ministries on facilitationof International relief goods

March 20, 2011

6) Launch of the Headquarters for Supporting the Livesof Disaster Victims

March 23, 2011

7) MoFA issued an advisory to its diplomatic missions onneeded goods

March 27, 20118) Medial team from Israel arrived(the only full‐fledged medical team)March 30, 20119) An offer list of relief goods provided to affectedmunicipalities

April 20, 2011

10) Free domestic transport services provided by DHL

May 9,201111) The team downsized and merged with other teams

Table 2. Key Activities and Dates.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)

28(4) Key Results
Humanitarian Aid
The Government Headquarters provided the following services in order to facilitate
SAR teams:
1) review of team capacities before arrival2) designation of cooperating agencies
3) facilitation of immigration procedures
4) transport to the designated site (as appropriate) in cooperation with relevant
ministries.
The following SAR teams were facilitated by the headquarters:
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Germany, Switzerland, United States, China,
United Kingdom, New Zealand,Mexico, Australia, France, Taiwan, Russia, Mongolia, South
Africa, Turkey, India.

Goods Aid
The Government Headquarters facilitated distribution of relief goods offered byforeign governments by studying and developing local needs from affected municipalities
and matching them with the offers. The headquarters also supported domestic transport andinterim storage as necessary.
The following list shows examples of relief goods that the Government
Headquarters matched with needs. Offered country names are indicated in parenthesis.
Coats (Israel), socks (ROK), underwear and socks (Viet Nam), water (ROK,Thailand), retort food packages (Singapore), corn flakes (Thailand), canned foods(Kazakhstan and Indonesia), tea bags (SriLanka), coffee beans (Tanzania), masks(Thailand), towels (Viet Nam), blankets (Mongolia, France,Turkey, ROK and Thailand)

29(5) Role of Government Headquaters in Facitating SAR teams.
The Government Headquarters requested Fire and Disaster Management
Agency (FDMA) and National Policy Agency (NPA) to cooperate with SAR teams. It also
supported immigration and domestic transport. At the local level, liaison officers from MoFA
coordinated with SAR teams.

Figure 10. Role of Government Headquaters in Facitating SAR teams.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)

30(6) Role of Government Headquaters in Facitating Relife Goods
Since it was difficult to utilize the mass procurement and mass-shipping chanel
within the headquarters, the directly contact municipalities and match their needs withoffered goods. The majority of goods were transport by offering countries.

Figure 11. Role of Government Headquarters in Facilitating Relife Goods.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)

31

Lesson learned in the GEGE (By Cabinet Office,Government of Japan)
About Humanitarian aid(1) Facilitation of SAR Teams From Early Stage¾ Because of the magnitude of the disaster and the disruption ofcommunication tools, it was practically impossible at earlier stage to match the offeredsupports with actual needs of the disaster‐affected area – which was against the proceduresprescribed in the operations manual.
¾ In anticipation of future disasters where the grasp of local needs might bedifficult during the initial 2‐3 days, rules and procedures for rapidly determining theacceptance of foreign SAR teams at the national level and sending them to the affectedarea should be developed.
¾ On the other hand, the entry of the SAR teams to the country was
facilitated with the full support from the ministries responsible for customs, immigration andquarantine (CIQ).
(2)

Domestic Transport of SAR Teams¾ Self Defense Forces (SDF) provided transport services to a number of SAR

teams that did not have their own means of transport. However, as the amount of SDF’s
own operations grew, it became difficult to rely only on SDF in providing transport services.
¾ On the other hand, many SAR teams moved by their own, by hiring trucks
and buses, bringing them from their own countries or requesting support from US Forces
Japan.
¾ At times of large disasters, as the operating agencies will be occupied with
their own operations and may lack the capacity to provide transport services, it might berealistic to¾ On the other hand, the Government Headquarters should facilitate theactivities of international SAR teams by designating their vehicles as emergency vehicles
and/or rationing gasoline along with domestic rescue agencies.
(3) Coordination with Local Forces¾ Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched its staff as liaison officers that
accompanied to SAR teams and supported their activities in the affected area. This had
facilitated local coordination.
¾ However, there was confusion about the equipment and the roles of theliaison officers.It is necessary to formalise the work of
in a manual.

liaison officers by prescribing them32(4) Support from US Forces Japan¾ Initially there were some cases where the Government Headquarters
coordinated offers of support from USFJ. Majority of cases were handled directly by SDF
or relevant ministries.
¾ Ministry of Defenselater declared to serve as the focal point for any kind of
request to USFJ.Similar arrangement should be established in advance in preparation for
future disasters.
(5) Medical Teams¾ Along with SAR teams, offers of support to dispatch medical teams weremade from various countries. Their acceptance was quite limited, however, because of thelack of local needs.
¾ It is understandable that the affected communities feel reluctant to accept
medical teams because of linguistic and cultural barriers.
¾ Moreover, measures to deal with potential claims against injuries anddamages by SAR or medical teams should be prepared.

About Good aid(6) Matching the offers with needs¾ Initially, efforts were made in the Government Headquarters to use Team
C4 (goods coordination team) as the focal point and find out the needs from affected areasthat can be met or complimented by foreign relief goods. It turned out difficult, however,to combine the foreign relief goods whose specifications, amounts and arrival dates were
unclear as part of the supply stock, while it was the urgent requirement for Team C4 totransport domestically procured goods in a large volume and at once.
¾ On the other hand, local needs at municipal level became gradually clear
and Team C7 in the Government Headquarters decided to conduct matching based on
local information it collected with the support from prefectural international offices or
through direct phone calls to municipal offices.
¾ Specifications of goods, such as quality, taste and shape, often differ fromthose of goods found in Japan. Matching was therefore made with due care, with such
efforts as checking the taste beforehand by Japanese mission and then sharing the details
withmunicipal officials.
¾ In this way, matching of foreign goods takes time. Moreover, it takes longer
time to ship good to Japan. It sometimes happened that the needs vanished before thegoods arrived.
¾ For future, it might be considered to accept foreign relief goods withoutcompleting matching. In order to do this, the issue of domestic transport, should be cleared.

33(7) Domestic transport and interim storage of goods¾ The issue of who will bear the burden of expenses was raised.
¾ Disaster Relief Act and related national subsidy were not utilised fortransporting foreign relief goods because the law considered prefectures as primary relief
bodies while the matching of foreign goods was made primarily with municipalities. Anotherreason was that the application of Disaster Relief Act seemed inappropriate for goods thatwere offered by foreign countries.
¾ The use of Cabinet Office’s reserved fund for fiscal year 2010 was also
considered but only applied to one case. It was difficult to complete matching and confirm
origins and destinations of transport by end of the fiscal year (March). Another obstacle
was the fact that the fund was applicable only to the three most severely damaged
prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima).
¾ Consequently, majority of foreign relief goods were transported domesticallyby the offering countries. Nonetheless, considering the fact that when Japan provides relief
goods to disaster affected countries it only transports goods to national hub airports, theassisting countries might have been overburdened.
¾ Even if Disaster Relief Act or the reserve fund was used, it might have beendifficult to use them to such activities as storing and sorting goods at the arriving airport andpacking several goods for the same destination. Therefore, it is necessary to consider inadvance the ways in which expenses for domestic transport of relief goods from abroad,especially from foreign countries.
(8) Partnership between international organizations and private companies.
¾ In addition to the above cases, some international organizations and privatecompanies offered domestic transport for some of the foreign relief goods for free of charge.
Other companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and the management of thewarehouse for free. Moreover, although with limited results, partnership with NGOs was alsosought. In order to facilitate goods transport and matching for future disasters, utilisation of
those external resources should be studied.
(9) Strengthening of the government Headquarter.
¾ As clearly shown this time, coordination of human aid will be needed andshould start immediately after a disaster strikes. It is therefore necessary to conduct certain
preparatory works such as securing staff and conducting drills. The utilisation of staff inJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that has expertise in emergency relief
should also be considered.
¾ Matching of relief goods requires certain amount of staff. Because thecoordination with municipalities may not finish in one day, it is advisable to assign staff forthe same task for a certain duration of time instead of rotating them day by day.

34

¾ As the nature of human and goods aid from abroad changes as the
emergency response phase progresses, it is necessary to flexibly secure needed staff foreach phase.
¾ Even though international assistance has already been included in thegovernment’s table top drills, the scenario should be improved reflecting the experience forthis time.
(10) Clarifying condition for accepting international relief.
¾ In order to avoid rejection, inconsistency or confusion when acceptinginternational relief, it is necessary to clarify in advance the conditions as much as possible
and show them to offering countries when a disaster strikes. It should also be promoted toshare information about Japan’s system for accepting international relief with othercountries.
6.1.2 The Roles of Municipality, Prefectural and Central government
The Disaster Relief Act of the Roles of Municipality, Prefectural andCentral government.
 Application of the Disaster Relief Act (decisions taken by prefectural
governors) The Act is applied in all municipalities in Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture, andFukushima Prefecture. The Act is applied in 113 municipalities in other 7 prefectures.
 Flexible enforcement of the Disaster Relief Act
All prefectural governments, including those prefectures not affected by
the disaster, were notified of the implementation of the flexible enforcement of the Disaster
Relief Act, so that even prefectural governments not affected by the disaster could actively
rescue evacuees. Specifically, it was clarified that when prefectures not affected by theearthquake set up evacuation shelters and temporary housings or rent ryokans(Japanese-style inns) and hotels, a considerable amount of the cost was funded by theGovernment (depending on the financial capability of the affected Local Governments)
The following are main roles of central government, prefecture andmunicipality in public help (FDMA (2007), Fukushima Prefecture (2008).
1 ) Roles of municipality
1) Damage assessment, counting of affected people, report to prefecture2) Assessment of affected people’s needs
3) Distribution of materials procured as stockpiles and distributioin stock
materials to affected people
4) Request to prefecture about materials beyond municipality’s
procurement capacigy

355) Acception of procured material from central government andprefecture and donated materials and their distribution6) Food distribution2 ) Roles of prefecture1) Damage assessment and counting of affected people
2) Compiling affected people’s needs assessments
3) Distribution of materials procured as distributioin stock materials4) Coordination of relief materials across prefectures
5) Request to central government about material beyond prefecture’s
procurement capacigy6) Receipt of materials procured by central government as well as
donated materials and distbitution to municipalities
3 ) Roles of central government
1) Damage assessment and counting of affected people
2) Compiling affected people’s needs assessments
3) Material procurement by distributioin stock materials and under support
agreement4) Coordination of relief materials across prefectures
5) Request to central government about material beyond prefecture’s
procurement capacity
6) Coordination of donated materials
Municipal government has primary responsibility in disaster emergency
response. When a disaster is large scale and is under Disaster Relief Act, prefecture
conducts disaster relief activities. Materials are purchased from private companies within theprefecture and procured from other prefectures under regional support system. Disaster
Relief Act stipulates prefecture has primary responsibility to conduct disaster relief while it isapproved to partially charge municipalities with authorities of disaster relief. Thus prefecture
and municipality share responsibilities of their roles in fact.
As stipulated in Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale
and beyond prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of material
procurement to relevant ministries (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare: water andmedical supplies, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: rice owned by government,
request of food shipping, Ministry of Economy and Industry: daily commodities, Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Communications: communication equipments, Fire and Disaster
Management Agency: coordination of materials provided by unaffected prefectures, Ministryof Defense: food and water distribution to affected people, Japan Coast Guard: water
distribution). According to Central Disaster Management Council (2007), the country should

36
prepare the following materials as regional procurement: food including rice, bread, rice ball,lunch box, instant noodle, powdered milk for baby, canned food, retort pouch food and waterin PET bottle; daily necessities including underwear, blanket, working clothes, towel, engine,
portable cooking stove and gas cylinder. On the other hand, about donated materials
provided by many individuals and groups for free, the country should announce the publicshould avoid sending the donated materials to affected municipalities because they arechaotic in the beginning of disaster occurrence. Also, the country should coordinate donatedmaterials when affected municipalities hope to accept donated materials.
4) Role of central government in relief material management
In the Great East Japan Earthquake, while roles of central government,
prefecture and municipality were quite different in accordance with degree of impacts, they
are consistent with those described in the section 1.2 mentioned above. Roles ofprefectures and municipalities are mentioned in Chapter 3. The following are two majorroles that central government played.

One is material procurement/transport coordinationin Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) set up for about forty days
from 11 March to 20 April. The other is a consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense
Force about relief materials from local government and private sector which wasannounced on 16 March.
Immediately after the earthquake on 11 March, transport coordinationteam and material coordination team were set up in administrative operation group (GroupC) in Emergency Disaster Headquarters with a total of 15 and 22 officials respectively.
As special headquarters on life support of affected people were set up on 20 March, they
were reorganized as transport and communications team and material coordination teamwith a total of 17 and 27 officials respectively. Utilizing materials provided by companies forfree and 30.2 billion yen for FY2012 reserve, food equivalent to 26.21 million meals, 7.94
million bottles of beverage, daily commodities like toilet paper, blanket, diaper, proprietary
drug and mask were procured and transported to affected areas, basically prefectural
stockyard.For transportation, about 1,900 trucks arranged by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transportation and Tourism and Japan Trucking Association, 150 aircrafts of Air Self
Defense Force, 5 helicopters from police and private sector, 8 vessels. Maximum delivery
amount per day is 1.13 million meals. Regarding material procurement and transportation
coordination, please refer to Cabinet Office (2011) in charge of disaster.
The other role by central government is consolidated transport scheme by
Self Defense Force (See Figure5).

Self Defense Force, in collaboration with group of

governors, established reception counter at prefectural government offices, transporting
donated materials brought at Ground Self Defense Force camps at each prefecture toaffected areas.

37

Aircrafts transported about 1,000 tons of materials to Fukushima, Matsushima andHanamaki airports by May. Most of materials transported by the aircrafts were sent toprefectural stockyard. On the other hand, trucks transported about 1,150 materials bySeptember. It is said that consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force helped
reduce burden of Emergency Disaster Headquarters in material procurement and transport
coordination. However, this might have worsened material pileup in prefectural andmunicipal stockyard though transport bases of Self Defense Force did not have material
pileup. In the beginning of the scheme, reception counter at prefecture meant to transportmaterials provided by prefecture, municipality, and private sector excluding individual. But
as prefectures and municipalities had accepted relief materials from individuals and groups,
a large amount of materials were delivered to affected areas with no specification on boxes
or boxes containing multiple types of items. As a result, material beyond capacity ofprefectures and municipalities accumulated, accelerating suspension of accepting at
prefectural and municipal stockyards. Also, since prefecture stopped accepting materials,
some donated materials lost destination and delivered in nearly six months after the quake.
By the way, Self Defense Force transported about 1,800 tons by air and about 700 tons
under material procurement and transport coordination operation by the above-mentioned
Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) in addition to the consolidated
transport scheme.

38

Figure 12. Outline of Disaster Relief Act(Source: Ministry of Land and Infrastructure,
the relief material issues at the Great East Japan Earthquake)

39
6.2 Non Government Organizations (NGOs), International

Non-Governmental Organization Coordination (INGO) and Volunteer
6.2.1 Japanese Red Cross (JRC)The JRC is specified as a “Designated Public Corporation” under theDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act. According to the Disaster Relief Act, the JRC isobligated to cooperate with the national and prefectural governments in the provision ofrelief assistance, the details of which are laid out in the agreement signed by the Minister of
Health, Labour and Welfare and the President of the JRC. Based on this, the JRC isdeveloping disaster relief responses according to relief regulations and disastermanagement plans. Additionally, as a member of the Central Disaster Management Council
headed by the Prime Minister, and in collaboration with other organizations, the JRC is
responsible for a part of the country’s overall disaster management. JRC’s activities:
Medical Relief
In order to be prepared for disasters, the JRC has formed 500 medical
relief teams (approximately 7,000 people) comprised primarily of doctors and nurses fromthe 92 Red Cross Hospitals across the nation. At the time of disaster, response teams(6 members per team) and DERU (domestic Emergency Response Units) are dispatchedto the affected area and undertake activities such as setting up aid stations, administering
medical diagnosis, and providing psychosocial care.
Stockpiling and Distribution of Relief Supplies
On a regular basis the JRC keeps emergency stores of blankets(approximately 200,000 nationwide), sleeping kits (mats, eye masks, etc., which can beused in evacuation centres to help victims get a better sleep, approximately 30,000 sets),and emergency relief kits (approximately 80,000 sets that contain daily necessities which
can be useful in times of emergency).
Provision of Blood Products
In order to smoothly secure and provide blood products required by
medical institutions nationwide in times of emergency, the JRC maintains a stock of
products at each blood centre while also operating a system to regulate blood supplies
throughout the country.
Collection of Donations
The JRC accepts donations for disaster victims and distributes themthrough donation distribution committees organized by charity organizations andgovernment agencies in the affected areas.

40

Disaster Volunteer Activities
Disaster volunteers of the JRC receive training on a regular basis andperform a variety of services during an emergency. The operations include gathering
information, administering first-aid, preparing hot meals, tracing, transporting anddistributing relief supplies, and supporting victims at evacuation centres.
6.2.2 Japan Platform (JPF)
Japan Platform (JPF) is an international emergency humanitarian aid
organization which offers more effective and prompter emergency aid, in response to theworld situation, focusing the issues of refugees and natural disaster. JPF conducts such aid
with a tripartite cooperation system where NGOs, business community, and government ofJapan work in close cooperation, based on equal partnership, making the most of therespective sectors’ characteristics and resources.
The revenue source of this “PLATFORM-foundation” is composed of public
and private funding: government fund-raising as well as donations from business communityand citizens. Therefore, NGOs are able to get expenditures for initial response to implement
emergency aid, immediately and directly, from the foundation, and go to the site promptly tostart the aid activities timely.
As for business community, “Nippon Keidanren-Japan Business Federation”
has initiated to support JPF. This support will be expected to actualize the respective
member companies’ participatory contribution through offering their technology, equipment,
staff, and information. Also, in order to enhance the transparency and accountability of JPF,
we invite media, private foundations, and academic society for their participation andcooperation. We aim to build a system to cope with international emergency aid together withall the parties concerned. That, we believe, is our challenge to facilitate the development ofJapanese civil society in the 21st century.
6.2.3 Japan NGO Center For International Cooperation (JANIC)JANIC is a non-profit, non-partisan networking NGO founded in 1987 by agroup of NGO leaders who saw the need to better coordinate activities in Japanese society
and facilitate communication with groups overseas. JANIC ‘s mission are• To promote networking and collaborative activities among

citizens’organizations (NGOs) engaged in international cooperation.
• To facilitate collective action by its members and wider Japanese civilsociety to influence the policies and practice of governments and institutions at domestic
and international levels.
• To strengthen the institutional capability of NGOs in carrying out their

missions.

41• To disseminate information and knowledge concerning people's living conditions

in developing regions of the world and the impact of the public’s way of life on these people.
• To enlighten the general public on the role of NGOs and encourage themtoparticipate in NGO activities in any form.
At present, JANIC has 96 NGO members and is governed by a Board of Trustees,
with a secretary general and 33 staff members.
6.2.4 JICA
JICA's Disaster Relief Program dispatches Japan Disaster Relief (JDR)
teams and provides emergency relief supplies when major disasters occur, mainly indeveloping areas, in response to requests received from the governments of affected
countries or international agencies. A partial revision of the Japan International Cooperation
Agency Law, which involves the addition of emergency relief supplies, led to theestablishment of Japan''s comprehensive emergency disaster relief system. The JDR Law
was partially amended in June 1992, making it possible for the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
after consultations with the director-general of the Defense Agency, to send teams from theJapanese Self-Defense Forces when large-scale aid is required in the wake of a large-scaledisaster and self-sufficient activities are required in the disaster area.
JDR Activities, as personnel assistance, JICA's Disaster Relief Program
dispatches rescue teams, medical teams, and expert teams and provides emergency
supplies as material assistance.
The provision of materials includes emergency relief supplies, such asblankets, tents, water purifiers, generators, and pharmaceutical products to assist in therecovery process.
JICA also cooperates with Japanese NGOs operating in affected areas inorder to implement more effective operations.

6.2.5 The Councils of Social Welfare¾ Role and Function of the Councils of Social Welfare
The Councils of Social Welfare is private organizations that promote
community welfare, giving high priority to public interests.
Not only welfare and health services but also connections with neighbors
and friends are essential for elderly persons, disabled persons, and other people in need ofsupport to continue to live in the communities where they have lived so long. It is hard forthem to continue to live in the communities without community people’s intention to support
them as members of their communities and their actual support. It can be said that
community welfare is a system whereby specialists and community people can jointly

42
support people in need of support.
In addition, the Social Welfare Act provides that a municipality may have
only one Council of Social Welfare and that a Council of Social Welfare shall consists of (1)persons engaged in social welfare and (2) residents and volunteers. As an organization
whereby persons engaged in social welfare and residents jointly carry out activities, eachCouncil of Social Welfare represents the community and gives high priority to public
interests.
¾ Network of the Councils of Social Welfare
Japan National Council of Social Welfare
1
Prefectural Councils of Social Welfare

47

Municipal Councils of Social Welfare

1,782

Cabinet-Order Designated City Councils of Social Welfare

18

Ward Councils of Social Welfare

130¾ Standard services provided by the Municipal Councils of Social
WelfareThe Social Welfare Act only shows an outline of the Councils of Social
Welfare. There are only a limited number of “services to be performed.” Therefore, eachCouncil of Social Welfare has been providing various services according to the local
characteristics and circumstances.
However, there is a basic framework, in which services have been roughlyclassified into the following four sections:(1) Community welfare activities promotion section: This section
researches and analyzes various welfare issues arising in the community, promotes
systematic and planned efforts to solve the issues in cooperation with the residents,
volunteers, and various organizations and agencies and, if necessary, create community
welfare services.
(2) Welfare service use support section: To support elderly and disabled
persons, this section promotes the support for the use of welfare services and the support
for life through general counseling, lending of funds, procedural agency, provision of
information, etc.
(3) Home welfare service section: This section carries out services under
the long-term care insurance system and the assistance benefit supply system andmanages home welfare services commissioned by the municipality under laws andcontracts.

43

In addition to them, the corporate management section was newly
established to administer the corporation properly, to manage the services efficiently and toplan and coordinate affairsn concerning the overall organization, such as financial andpersonnel affairs. Below, the services of each Council of Social Welfare in line with theabove-described classification into the three sections.
¾ Services provided by the community welfare activities promotion
sectionThe section elicits interest in welfare (activities) from the community people,
encourages them to participate in welfare activities, coordinates needs with activities,
adjusts and coordinates activities, and supports the creation of activities. The section ischaracterized by provision of support to both territorially-bonded organizations (autonomous
neighborhood associations and residents’ associations for promotion of community welfare)and volunteer and civil activities carried out in a little wider area, such as at the municipal
level.
The following are examples of services provided by the section Watchingand support network: Three to four volunteers (mainly neighbors) watch, visit, and support
an elderly or disabled person. If there are problems that cannot be solved only by thevolunteers, they are sent to specialized organizations. The network also connects elderly
and disabled persons tending to be isolated with the community without fail. The operationof the network requires acquisition of approval from each elderly or disabled person. In
many cases, those who do not give approval have serious problems. In such cases, it isimportant to watch them gently. This network system has been adopted by 46.4% of theCouncils of Social Welfare in Japan.
Friendly and lively salons: These are places where users and volunteers
can spend happy time together. Unlike day service centers, salons have a more relaxedatmosphere and users can freely visit them at any time. Many Councils of Social Welfare
hold a salon once a month or once a week. Some Councils of Social Welfare hold it everyday. There are various salons: those for the elderly, the intellectual disabled, the mentallydisabled, and childrearing families. Salons for childrearing families are sometimes called“childrearing salons.” This salon system has been adopted by 71.8% of the Councils ofSocial Welfare in Japan. There are about 40,000 salons in Japan.
Meal service: Volunteers provide meals through delivery or gathering.
Meals are prepared by volunteers or professionals. Provision of high-quality meals enables
elderly and disabled persons to have sufficient nutrition. In addition, volunteers can talk withthem and check their health conditions. It is important for volunteers to make them eat as
pleasantly as possible (many elderly persons do not eat properly). This service has been

44
provided by 68.7% of the Councils of Social Welfare in Japan. The total number of meals is
1.4 million.

Counseling office (by residents): In areas where activities are briskly carriedout based on the above-described services, residents themselves manage counselingoffices. Volunteers flexibly satisfy the needs that cannot be satisfied by government
programs (whenever necessary, counseling offices seek advice from the Councils of Social
Welfare or specialists).
7. Receiving International Humanitarian Assistance in Domestic DisasterOne lesson that had been learned from the 1995 Kobe earthquake is the needto accept the help of other countries. One of the outstanding characteristics of the 1995
earthquake was the extreme reluctance of the Japanese government to accept aid fromabroad.
Within a month of the earthquake and tsunami, Japan had received offers ofassistance from at least 138 countries and 39 international organizations and 670 NGO’s,and on the 11th April the Prime Minister’s office published a letter thanking the global
community for their support and friendship, which was published in every major newspaperin the world.
The Government says the need for further international assistance is limited
and any support should clearly be in accordance with the Government of Japan’s criteria:With regard to relief items, the Government of Japan has received offers forrelief goods/material from many countries, and international organizations.The Government
is identifying the needs and trying to match the offers with the identified needs for efficientand effective delivery. As the transportation and storage capacity is still limited, it is strongly
recommended not to send any relief goods without coordination with the Government or the
local authorities.
1) International Humanitarian Assistance in Domestic Disaster (IHA)
offered in the GEJE (GEJE)“Establishment of IHA Coordinating Group in March 11th ,2011 22:00”
Assistance offered: 197 countries/institutions
Assistance received: 138 countries/institutions- USAR: 26 countries- Medical Team: 4 countries

45- Non-food items: 108 countries/institutions- NGO/NPO : N/A

2) Characteristic on International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for
Disaster
1.1 Immediate & massive inflow of resource.
-

Different type of resources: goods,funds,people.

Different organizations: UN,GO,INGO/NGO,Private sector.

1.2 Lack of Governance of local government3) IHA Reception System in JapanThe Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake (1995)
Assistances offered from 76 institution/countries
Received assistances from 44 institutions/countries

Disaster Management Plan (1996)• MOFA

GO. Crisis Management Center decides whether toreceive.
• Disaster Management Plan of National Government and Local
Government should include article related to receiving international
assistance4) Areas of assistance and Ministries in Charge
Areas of AssistanceSearch & Rescue

Assigned Ministry
Police Agency,Fire Dept.,Min. of Agriculture (Quarantine),
Min.of Justice (Custum)

MedicalMin. of Health and Labor, Min. of Justice (Custum)

Food

Min. of Agriculture

Portable Water

Min. of Health and Labor

Non-food Items

Min. of Economy and Industry

DonationsCabinet office
Table 3. Areas of assistance and Ministries in Charge

46(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)5) Reception System of IHA in Japan
National Disaster
Management HQ

Ministries
Cabinet

MOFA
Japan

IHA

Fire Dept.

Coordinating
Group

AssistingGovernment

PoliceMin. HealthJapanese
Embassy

Min. Agriculture

Disaster Affected
Local Government
Figure 13. Reception System of IHA in Japan(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)6) Emergency Response by National Government.

Disaster Management Head Quarter
March 11th 15:14 based on Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
Director General: Prime Minister
Vice Director: Minister On Disaster Prevention
Member: Ministers
On-site Disaster Management Head Quarter (Miyagi Prefecture)
March 12th 6:00
Director: Vice Minister of Cabinet Office
Deputy Direct.
Secretariat General:
Deputy Secretariat

47

Iwate Head Quarter

Fukushima Head Quarter

Figure 14. Emergency Response by National Government(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)7) Coordination for International SAR Team-coordinated by Fire DepartmentPrefecture
Iwate

City

Country

OfunatoMiyagiMinami-Sanriku

Noarrivaldeparture

USA

132

13/3/2011

19/3/2011

UK69

13/3/2011

19/3/2011

China

15

13/3/2011

20/3/2011

Taiwan35

16/3/2011

18/3/2011

Germany

41

13/3/2011

19/3/2011

Switzerland27

13/3/2011

19/3/2011

Australia

75

14/3/2011

21/3/2011

New-Zealand42

13/3/2011

19/3/2011

Remark: Started SAR 13/3/2011

Table 4. Coordination for International SAR Team
(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)8) Coordination for Receiving ISAR[

Iwate Pref. DM HQ
Emergency Fire Dept.
Coordination HQ

Ofunato Mun. DM HQ
Ofunato Fire Dept
On-siteEmergency Fire Dept. TeamMOF

• Sakai Mun. Fire. Team

• USA

• Kochi Pref. Fire Team• UK
• China48

C7Fire.Dept
Support Team (Liaison)

National Fire Dept. asked
Collaboration of Osaka Mun.
Fire Dept. to coordinate

MOFA

Embassyinternational Asistance

Figure 15. Coordination for Receiving ISAR
(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)9) On-site coordination• Area coordination• Information collection & sharing•

On-site joint coordination center•

Coordination meeting• conditions•

self complete•

respect Japanese traditions

10) Conditions to Receive Assistance•

To be self complete- All domestic transportations, fuels, hotels, foods, interpreters should be coveredby assisting countries.
•

To be under on-site command•

To respect Japanese tradition
Liaison officers by MOFA & embassy11) Success of receiving ISAR Team
(receiving assistance)• Integrated into Japanese Emergency Fire Assistance Team• Asked collaboration of Command Team of Fire Department.
• International Command Team was familiar with ISAR (IRT registered teams, JICA
Training exper.)(Providing assistance)• International Standard for SAR-

Capacity Development though INSARAG-

Evaluation of SAR by IEC (heavy/middle/light)

Translation

4912) Assistance Coordination
Areas of AssistancePlan

The GEJE

Assigned Ministry
Search & Rescue

National

On-sitePolice Agency, Fire Dept,
Min. of Agriculture(Quarantine).

MedicalMin. of Health and Labor,
Min. of Justice (Custum)

Food

Min. of Agriculture

Portable Water

Min. of Health and Labor,

Non-food Items

Min. of Economy andCabinet Office

Local Gov.

Industry
DonationsCabinet Office

NGO/NPO/Volunteer

Volunteer
Center/NGO

Table 5. Assistance Coordination(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)8. Disaster Relief Material Management in the Great East Japan
Earthquake (GEJE)
8.1 Classifications of relief materials is divided into emergency material anddonated material. Term: Definition.
1. Relief material: Food and daily commodities provided to affected
people at disaster time.
2. Emergency material: stockpile or procured material provided by local

50
government to affected people who cannot procure necessary materials for daily life bythemselves at disaster time.
3. Stockpiles: daily commodities such as food, drinking water and blankets
stockpiled by resident and local government in preparation for disaster4. Procured material: Material that affected local government requests
and procures from central government, other local governments and private companies.
This includes material with or without agreement on material procurement before disaster.
Also this includes material procured with or without payment.
5. Donated material: material voluntarily donated by resident inside or outsideaffected area, private companies and organizations without request from affected local
government at disaster time.
6. Public stockpile: stockpile of material that local government prepares byitself in preparation for disaster7. Distribution stockpile: material procurement system where local
government makes agreement with private companies on necessary items for disaster time.
8.2 Self help, mutual help and public help
Material procurement at disaster time is classified as self help, mutual help
and public help FDMA (2007) says “Self help by resident is fundamental”. When material
procurement by self help is limited, local government procures materials and provides
residents with them as emergency materials. As prescribed in Article 4 and 5 of Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act, local government has responsibility to protect life and healthagainst disasters. No doubt that in GEJE where sufficient material procurement by self help
and mutual help was impossible, public help by central, prefectural and municipal
governments played a critical role.
8.3 Overview of relief material management
This survey generally defines a series of process of material procurement,
transportation to affected area, receiving, distributing, and storing at stockyard, sending fromstockyard, delivering to evacuation center as “relief material management”.
Once needs of evacuation center are identified by municipalities, order orrequest of materials are made directly by the municipalities or providers such as
non-affected local government, private sector or individual via prefecture or central
government. Order or request to provider is finally made by municipality, prefecture orcentral government. Sometimes donated materials are provided without any request frommunicipality, prefecture or central government. Thus material procurement can be classified
as 4 patterns; 1) procurement by municipality, 2) procurement by prefecture, 3) procurement
by central government and 4) donated material.
On the other hand, there are three patterns of transportation of reliefmaterials; 1) delivery to evacuation center via both prefectural stockyard and municipal

51
stockyard, 2) delivery to evacuation center via municipal stockyard only, and 3) direct
delivery to evacuation center without passing through prefectural or municipal stockyard.
Combination of four procurement types and three patterns of transportation makes twelve
patterns in total. Excluding non-existing patterns such as central government procurement
directly delivered to evacuation center, there are nine patters of material procurement andtransportation. As food has freshness date and expiration date, when food is procured bymunicipality, food can be transported to evacuation center without passing throughmunicipal stockyard (pattern 2). In case of procurement by prefecture, material can bedelivered to municipal stockyard or evacuation center without passing through prefectural
stockyard (pattern 4 and 5). Also this applies when time passes after the earthquake and thenumber of evacuation center declines.
Means of transportation is prepared by material provider in principle. When
prefecture and municipality procures material, material provider arranges transportationmeans to prefectural or municipal stockyard and evacuation center. On the other hand,regarding to material provided by central government or donated material coordinated bycentral government, trucks procured by central government and aircrafts and vessels of Self
Defense Force transported a large amount of materials at the Great East Japan Earthquake.
In case of transportation from prefectural stockyard to municipal stockyard, truck associationin each prefecture delivered almost all transportation. Transportation from municipal
stockyard to evacuation center varies depending on municipalities and timing; case1) transportation by official vehicle or their own vehicles, case 2) by vehicles of Self Defense
Force and case 3) by private distributors commissioned by municipality.
Source : Revised from Fire and Disaster Management Agency (2007)
8.4 Role of central government in relief material management
In the Great East Japan Earthquake, while roles of central government,
prefecture and municipality were quite different in accordance with degree of impacts.
Roles of prefectures and municipalities are mentioned. The following are two major roles
that central government played. One is material procurement/transport coordination in
Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) set up for about forty days
from 11 March to 20 April. The other is a consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense
Force about relief materials from local government and private sector which wasannounced on 16 March.
Immediately after the earthquake on 11 March, transport coordination teamand material coordination team were set up in administrative operation group (Group C) in
Emergency Disaster Headquarters with a total of 15 and 22 officials respectively. As special
headquarters on life support of affected people were set up on 20 March, they werereorganized as transport and communications team and material coordination team with a
total of 17 and 27 officials respectively. Utilizing materials provided by companies for free52
and 30.2 billion yen for FY2012 reserve, food equivalent to 26.21 million meals, 7.94 bottles
of beverage, daily commodities like toilet paper, blanket, diaper, proprietary drug and mask
were procured and transported to affected areas, basically prefectural stockyard.
For transportation, about 1,900 trucks arranged by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transportation and Tourism and Japan Trucking Association, 150 aircrafts of Air Self
Defense Force, 5 helicopters from police and private sector, 8 vessels. Maximum delivery
amount per day is 1.13 million meals. Regarding material procurement and transportation
coordination, please refer to Cabinet Office (2011) in charge of Disaster.

The other role by central government is consolidated transport scheme by
Self Defense Force. Self Defense Force, in collaboration with group of governors,
established reception counter at prefectural government offices, transporting donatedmaterials brought at Ground Self Defense Force camps at each prefecture to affected areas.
Aircrafts transported about 1,000 tons of materials to Fukushima,
Matsushima and Hanamaki airports by May. Most of materials transported by the aircrafts
were sent to prefectural stockyard. On the other hand, trucks transported about 1,150
materials by September. It is said that consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense
Force helped reduce burden of Emergency Disaster Headquarters in material procurement
and transport coordination. However, this might have worsened material pileup in
prefectural and municipal stockyard though transport bases of Self Defense Force did nothave material pileup. In the beginning of the scheme, reception counter at prefecture meant
to transport materials provided by prefecture, municipality, and private sector excluding
individual. But as prefectures and municipalities had accepted relief materials fromindividuals and groups, a large amount of materials were delivered to affected areas withno specification on boxes or boxes containing multiple types of items. As a result, material
beyond capacity of prefectures and municipalities accumulated, accelerating suspension of
accepting at prefectural and municipal stockyards. Also, since prefecture stopped accepting
materials, some donated materials lost destination and delivered in nearly six months after
the quake. By the way, Self Defense Force transported about 1,800 tons by air and about
700 tons by se under material procurement and transport coordination operation by theabove-mentioned Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) in addition to
the consolidated transport scheme.
8.5 Logistics Chain Management for Emergency Supplies
In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) disaster, relief
goods were distributed and delivered through prefectural- and municipal-level depots. Thisdelivery system faced several problems including fuel shortages, interruption of

53
telecommunication services, and supply and demand mismatches, resulting in stockpiling of
the goods in depots and delayed delivery to the people in need. Several measures can betaken to address these issues, including prior surveys of depot facilities, estimating in
advance the quantities of emergency goods that will be required, enlisting the support ofprofessional logistics specialists, and promoting logistics information management in
unaffected areas, among others.
The damage from the earthquake and tsunami was enormous; over 120,000
houses were totally damaged, and more than 470,000 people had to leave their home andevacuate to over 2,400 shelters. Delivery of relief goods was planned to be executed
through depots at two levels—prefectural and municipal. Especially in the first two weeks,
fuel shortages made downstream deliveries from prefectural depots very difficult. Also,
manpower shortages and the inconvenient building specifications of depots were the maincauses of unnecessary stockpiling in depots. Telecommunications disruptions furtheredmismatches between real needs and supplies. But the professional support of logistics
specialists was effective in relieving the bottlenecks in depots.
The relief goods delivery system in Japan
In Japan delivery of relief goods is the responsibility of the prefectural
governor, who responds to requests from the municipalities. According to the post disaster
plan, delivery of relief goods was to be executed using depots at two levels: prefectural andmunicipal,as shown in figure 1. As illustrated in green in the figure, the national government

54

Figure 16. Information and transportation flows
in the official relief goods delivery system(Source: Makato Okumura)(cabinet office) was also included in the plan to facilitate nationwide distribution.
By April 20, the national goods distribution component had mobilized 26 million meals,
8 million bottles of beverages, and 410,000 blankets using 1,900 trucks, 150 aircraft,
5 helicopters, and 8 ships.
Delivering several kinds of goods, such as food, drinking water, clothing, andbedding, either to people’s homes or to more than 2,000 shelters, was a challenge,
especially in the first several weeks when fuel was in short supply. This was especially true
for the smaller local transport companies that did not have their own storage facilities.
By the end of June, 1,800, 1,400, and 2,400 trucks were dedicated to transporting goods
from prefectural depots to municipal depots in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, respectively.
Fuel shortages combined with power outages and telecommunications failures hampered
local government efforts to meet emergency needs.
Although many believe that transportation problems were the critical factor,
several other forces were at play. The workload spiked at the same time that many staff
were being lost to the disaster. Moreover, while the disaster countermeasure manuals state55that the economic or industrial support branch of the local government is responsible for thedelivery system, workers in that section did not have enough knowledge or experience withlogistics and supply chain management. They simply stored the goods in public buildings,
with no logistics management plan, so the space was quickly
The building specifications and design of the depots was also a contributing factor.
The depots require large storage and handling capacity as well as easy access to
expressways, especially prefectural depots. Privately owned warehouses would have been
ideal if they had not been damaged. The space under viewing stands in athletic fields, race
courses, and indoor gymnasia also served well as depots. In Miyagi Prefecture, large
warehouses located near Sendai Port were severely damaged by the tsunami.
Neither Yume Messe Miyagi, the convention complex at Sendai Port, nor the
Miyagi Prefectural Sports Park could be used as depots since they had already been
designated as mortuaries.
9. Problems and Causes of Relief Material Management in the Great East

Japan Earthquake (GEJE)
Table summarize problems and causes of relief material management in the
Great East Japan Earthquake
Stage

Problem

Cause

1.Distribution

1.1 Length of time to- Lack of absolute amount of stockpile

to affecteddistribute minimum food

- Malfunction of distribution stockpile systempeopleand drinking water- Difficulties of assessment of evacuation
center by municipality due to damaged
government building, information shutdown
and fuel shortage

Stage

ProblemCause- Difficulties of situation assessment in
affected areas due to information shutdown- Inequality of amount of material among
affected municipalities.
- Difference of community’s support among
affected municipalities- Declining of transportation capacity inaffected areas

1.2 Lack of- Loss of vehicles by tsunami

56transportation- Shortage of manpower

capacity in affected- Shortage of fuelareas

- Disconnection of roads by debris- Ineffective utilization of distribution
companies

1.3 Material distribution- Long-term paralysis of commercial

to evacuees at home

distribution- Difficulties in situation assessment ofevacuees at home
- Lack of recognition by municipalities

1.4 Material distribution- Defect in distribution rule to cross - boundary

to cross-boundary

evacuees

evacuees- Difficulties in situation assessment ofcross-boundary evacuees

1.5 Time lag in material- Inconsistent standards and amount of

distribution

materials- Consideration in equality among evacuees

1.6 Difficulties in coping- Lack of information like past disasters

with change in needs

necessary to foresee changes in needs- Difficulties in surveying changes in needs ofaffected people- Busy officials

2. Storage of

2.1 Difficulties in finding- Lack of expectation in advancematerials

stockyards- Loss by tsunami and impacts from blackout- Use of facility in different purpose from planStage

ProblemCause

2.2 Lack of capacity and- Use of facility in different purpose from planfunction of stockyard- Large amount of relief material- Extreme excessive material

57

2.3 Heavy burden on- Confusion by large scale disaster beyond

officials

expectation- Decline in local governance by affected
government office and officials- Large amount of relief material beyond
capacity- Unfamiliar relief material operation- Lack of information in transportation andarrival status- Donated material with insufficient
information- Distributing chores of materials containing
mixed items- Ineffective utilization of distribution
companies

2.4 Ineffective utilization- Lack of understanding of Disaster Relief Lawof distribution companies

by municipalities- Affected distribution companies

2.5 Difficulties in- A large number of various donated materials

inventory management- Donated material with insufficient
information- Donated material containing mixed items- Changes in needs according to the lapse oftime

2.6 A large number of- Donated materials without prior coordination

excessive materials

with municipality- Donated materials that do not match withneeds of affected people-

Donatedmaterial

with

insufficient

information- Donated materials containing mixed items- Impact of media reports
2.7 Distribution of- Lack of recognition of supporters

donated materials- Lack of public relations

containing mixed items
Stage

Problem

Cause

58

3.Material

3.1 Malfunction of- Paralysis of commercial distribution

procurement

distribution stock system- Damage by tsunami

3.2 Shortage of stockpile- Large scale of impact beyond expectation- Loss by tsunami

3.3 Malfunction of mutual- Damages incurred to municipalities that

support system athave mutual agreement

disaster time

- Information shutdown

3.4 Difficulties in making- Decline in municipality’s function

procurement request to- Confusion in situation assessment ofprefecture from

evacuation centermunicipality- Information shutdown

3.5 Difficulties in needs- Information shutdown

assessment of affected- Ineffective material procurement system

areas by central
government andprefecture
4. Material

4.1 Confusion in truck- Lack of fueltransportationtransportation- Insufficient road information

to affected- Insufficient information sharing between

areas

cargo and recipient- Information shutdown- Issuance of emergency vehicle pass
4.2 Confusion in truck- Impact by Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Powertransportation in

ReactorFukushima
4.3 Decline in vessel- Damage to port

transportation

Table 6. Problems and Causes of Relief Material Management in The GEJE.

10. CONCLUSION

59

One lesson that had been learnt from the 1995 Kobe earthquake is the need toaccept the help of other countries. One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1995
earthquake was the extreme reluctance of the Japanese government to accept aid
from abroad. Experience in receiving goods during the Great Hanshin Earthquake,
Hyogo prefecture by Kobe city receive donations directly from the people and donation
by mailing at post office without charge made a lot of donation goods at the hub ofreceive donation goods (The social welfare council). In the management of donation
goods, Kobe city select the evacuation centers are managed and distributed. At thattime, management by city and municipality many people from nationwide interested in
donating a lot making difficult to management. Especially, made a burden on the staff
to select, storage and distribution. Furthermore, local government did not explore theneeds of victim people at first.
For this reason, made Japan government decide to receive donations in the formof money than goods because there is more flexibility and easy to manage the funds.
In addition, Japan government get donated specifically such as selected donated waterfrom a large company including transportation to disaster area in Tohoku. Besides,
Japan government prepare stockpiling in the prefectures at bases around Japan tohelp people immediately when has disaster and when disaster in large scale occurredin aboard can use this stockpiling to help people by government of Japan as well.
I. Plan for Relief
1.

Japan has Disaster Relief Act to provide emergency relief in the event of adisaster through the local governments, non-governmental organizations,such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so as toprotect the disaster victims and maintain social order.

2.

The Basic Disaster Management Plan of the country defines procedures for
accepting and facilitating international disaster relief goods and it states thatthe government should prepare procedure necessary to accept and facilitate
international relief when an offer for relief is reached from aboard. The Ministryof Foreign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster Management
Headquarters of its type, expected, arrival date and destination.The
government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer and aplan for facilitating the relief according to the pre- defined policy and notify theoffering country as well as related ministries and local governments.

60

3.

When a large-scale disaster strikes, an emergency team composed of the
Director Generals of therespective

ministries and agencies gathers

immediately at the Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's Officeto grasp and analyze the disaster situation, and report the results to thePrime Minister. Inter-ministerial meetings at the ministerial or high-ranking
senior-official level are held to decide basic response policies if necessary.
According to the level of damage, the government may establish a
Headquarter for Major Disaster Management (headed by the Minister ofState for Disaster Management)

or a Headquarters for Extreme Disaster

Management (headed by the Prime Minister). Additionally, a government
investigation team headedby the Minister of State for Disaster Management
maybe dispatched, or an onsite response headquarters may be established.
4.

The roles of Municipal, Prefectural and Central Government - Municipal
governments have the primary responsibility in disaster emergency
response. When a disaster is of large scale and is under Disaster Relief Act,
prefecture conducts disaster relief activities. Materials are purchased fromprivate companies within the prefecture and procured from other prefectures
under regional support system. Disaster Relief Act stipulates prefecture has
primary responsibility to conduct disaster relief while it is approved to partiallycharge municipalities with authorities of disaster relief. Thus prefecture andmunicipality share responsibilities of their roles in fact. As stipulated in Basic
Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale and beyond
prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of material
procurement to relevant ministries.

II. Disaster Emergency Response Management.
5.

Government Disaster Management Headquarter sets up international
coordination team to review offer of international relief and coordination withrelated ministries for facilitating the relief work, once an offer is accepted. The
Team comprises of supervisory staff and 16 members.

61

6.

The Government Headquarter facilitates distribution of relief goods offered byforeign governments by studying and developing local needs from affectedmunicipalities and matching them with the offers. The headquarters also
supports domestic transport and interim storage.

7.

The Government of Japan received 138 offers of assistance from countries aswell as 39 offers from international organizations. It accepted relief items from29 countries and international organizations.

8.

Japan Red Cross Society (JRC) - Disaster relief activities are conducted asa mission of the Red Cross under the Japanese Red Cross Law and its
statutes. In addition, the JRC is designated as a “Designated Public
Corporation” by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Disaster
Relief Act, and is required to co-operate with the Government to offer relief
assistance in times of disaster. The contents of such assistance are provided
for under an agreement with the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare.

9.

The domestic disaster relief activities of the JRC – Involvement of JRC inrelief goods includes storage and distribution of relief goods and collection
and distribution of voluntary donations. Activities by Red Cross volunteers
include collection of information, first aid, provision of hot meals, tracing
services, transportation and distribution of relief goods, and caring for those
who evacuate to shelters.

10.

JICA - JICA’s Response to Great East Japan Earthquake are relief activities
by JICA staff and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs) in
disaster affected areas, shelter for the people evacuated, accommodation forthe patients from disaster affected areas, liaison services for international
agencies and overseas medical teams,UNDAC/UNOCHA teams and JICA
provided various support to the teams, collaboration with NGO/NPO, Japan
Platform (JPF) and Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)
and local NGO/NPO networks for the coordination of relief and recovery
activities.

62

III. Volunteer Coordination.
11.

The Government of Japan’s Emergency Management agencies lead the
response through the Emergency Response Team. The Chief Cabinet
Secretary’s Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs
through its Volunteers Coordination Unit to facilitate the communication andexchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area tosupport the survivors. Coordination of international NGOs and their local
partners was done by Japan Platform and JANIC.

IV. International Non-Governmental Organization Coordination (INGO) andPrivate companies.
12.

In coordination with the government, Japan Platform (an international
emergency humanitarian aid organization) and the Japan Non-Governmental
Organization Center for International Cooperation (acting as part of the Japan
Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Asia) served as the key organizations
coordinating with international non-governmental organizations.

13.

Some international organisations and private companies offered domestic transport tosome of the foreign relief goods for free of charge.Other companies
also provideda warehouse at Narita Airport and the management of the warehouse for free.

V. Self Help, Mutual Help and Public Help.
14.

Japan has material procurement at disaster time is classified as self help,
mutual help and public help.FDMA (2007) says “Self help by resident isfundamental. When material procurement by self help is limited, local
government procures materials and provides residents with them as
emergency materials. As prescribed in Article 4 and 5 of Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act, local government has responsibility to protect
life and health against disasters. In the GEJE where sufficient material
procurement by self help and mutual help was impossible, public help bycentral, prefectural and municipal governments played a critical role.

63

15.

Japanese government promote Japanese people for helping themselves by“Self help” before others help such as preparing goods at least three days
during initial disaster before help from government or private sector comes.
The

important

of

“Self

help”,

orprotecting

one’s

own

life,

and

“mutual-assistance,” in which neighbors help each other to protect theircommunities, invaluable in the event of disaster, was one again strongly
reconfirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, it need not
be mentioned that “public-assistance” – the role of the government authorities
in preparing for disaster in normal times and their activities at the time ofdisaster, such as the search and rescue of resident - is also essential. It will benecessary to strengthen the disaster response capabilities or the various
parties concerned with Self-help, mutual-assistance, and public-assistance.
16.

Japan is now paying more attention to self-help a lot. Including, mutual
assistance”. The community is educated and motivated to prepared for safe
evacuation, prepare emergency bags containing necessary food and water
for the initial period of emergency, etc. In particular, the focus is on
self-reliance.

VI. Civil Society.
17.

The Councils of Social Welfare- The Councils of Social Welfare is
promoting community welfare, giving high priority to public interests andhealth services and also connecting with neighbors and friends for elderly
persons, disabled persons, and other people in need of support to continue
to live in the communities. Community welfare is a system whereby
specialists and community people can jointly support people in need ofsupport.

64

11. Appendix
Thailand Floods 2011
Overview situation

For the flooding which involved southern Thailand in March–April 2011, see2011 Southern Thailand floods. Severe flooding occurred during the 2011 monsoon
season in Thailand. Beginning at the end of July triggered by the landfall of Tropical
Storm Nock-ten, flooding soon spread through the provinces of Northern, Northeastern
and Central Thailand along the Mekong and Chao Phraya river basins. In Octoberfloodwaters reached the mouth of the Chao Phraya and inundated parts of the capital
city of Bangkok. Flooding persisted in some areas until mid-January 2012, and resulted
in a total of 815 deaths (with 3 missing) and 13.6 million people affected. Sixty-five ofThailand's 77 provinces were declared flood disaster zones, and over 20,000 square
kilometres (7,700 sq mi) of farmland was damaged. The disaster has been described
as "the worst flooding yet in terms of the amount of water and people affected."
The World Bank has estimated 1,425 billion baht (US$45.7 Bn) in economic
damages and losses due to flooding, as of 1 December 2011 Most of this was to the
manufacturing industry, as seven major industrial estates were inundated by as much
3 meters (10 feet) during the floods.[4] Disruptions to manufacturing supply chainsaffected regional automobile production and caused a global shortage of hard disk
drives which lasted throughout 2012.
The World Bank's estimate for this disaster means it ranks as the world's fourthcostliest disaster as of 2011 surpassed only by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami inJapan, 1995 Kobe earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Thailand's southern provinces also saw seasonal flash-flooding towards theend of the year, although these did not occur in the same extreme nature as in the more
northern provinces.

Picture 2. Thailand Floods 2011

65

Comparison between tracking system and management of donated goods in the
Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE) 2011, Japan and Thailand Flood 2011.

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake

Thailand Flood 2011

(GEJE) 2011

1) Administration
A. In Basic Disaster Management Plan

1) Administration
A.Thailand provides a very general(1995) of Japan, there is a mention ofguideline on roles for accepting

coordination of international Disasterinternational assistance in the National

Relief. The Plan defines procedures toDisaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan

accept and facilitate international disasterand plan also has article related torelief but there is no system of receiving

receiving assistance and donation inassistance and donation at prefecture andprovincial and local government. But whenlocal government level. The good point

Thailand was flooded in 2011 the plan toduring Japanese response during disastermanage the flood disaster was not put into

was that the Government Disasteraction and instead Thai Government at thatManagement Headquarters wastime established FROC (Flood Relief

established by the Cabinet office.

Operation Centre). This created confusionin the minds of all stakeholders via theirrole.

B. Procedure
Japan established International

B. Procedure
The Thai government does not

Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for Disaster officially request aid from international
Coordinating during the GEJE to receive

community, but aid is accepted by Foreigninternational assistance coordinated byAssistance Coordination Centre, Ministry

MOFA.

of Foreign Affairs through the coordinating
center.It facilitates import of relief material
through customs

C. Institutional arrangement (Structure)

C. Institutional arrangement (Structure)

and Management of donated goods

and Management of donated goods.

The Cabinet office is the Government

Thailand does not have such a strong

Headquarters when large disaster like theinstitutional mechanism in place as in2011 GEJE occur. The Headquarters.

Japan. Moreover, the mechanism

66

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake

Thailand Flood 2011

(GEJE) 2011Thailand Flood 2011

responds and manages disaster through prescribed in the Disaster Prevention andworking group and assign duties to the Mitigation Plan is not put in place when theagency which is responsible

disaster strikes as is the case in 2011
floods. The Thai Govt. established the
Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC), to
respondent to flood and receive anddistribute relief material.

2) Needs Assessment

2) Needs Assessment- Both Japan and Thailand used the- Thailand explored needs assessment

same mechanism in needs assessment

primarily by assisting the local government

whether counting of affected people,

agencies and Bangkok Metropolitan

assessment of affected people’s needs,

Administration (BMA) and rendered help in

distribution of materials to affected people

the initial distribution. This includes

by local governance.

assisting with the donation by the donor.

- The Government Headquarters
facilitated distribution of relief goods
offered by foreign governments bystudying and developing local needs from
affected municipalities and matching themwith the offers.
3) Tracking system

3) Tracking system

Japanese people are taught to cope up

In Thailand, the FROC was the hub towith disasters by preparing themselves toget donations as well as to store, sort out

sustain life for at least 3 days andand transport the relief goods. The delivery

according to Central Disaster Management of relief goods to the disaster area wasCouncil (2007), the country should prepare provided through vehicles almost arranged
materials as regional procurement. In
addition, about tracking system, thedelivery of relief goods is the responsibility

by government and the military.

67

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake

Thailand Flood 2011

(GEJE) 2011Thailand Flood 2011of the prefectural governor which theGovernment Headquarters facilitated andsupported domestic transport and interim
storage as necessary. Also some reliefmaterial used was a purchased productfrom companies with auto transport by thetransportation into the area which thismechanism can adaptation in anothercountry.
4) Collaboration with partners

4) Collaboration with partners

A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer

A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer

Japan has central agency toThailand has no central agency tocoordinate assistance to the NGO such as

coordinate the NGO assisting victims with

JANIC and Japanese Red Cross. The

the government like in Japan.However, In

Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office isthe event of disaster, including Thailand

responsible for coordinating volunteer

flood 2011 found a lot of volunteers to thegroups and NGOs through its Volunteers

affected areas without effective

Coordination Unit in order to facilitate themanagement support systems, lack ofcommunication and exchange offunding and communication. Volunteers

information among the organizations

had no direction to do anything or extend

working in Tohoku area to support

any help. Many a times the volunteer

The survivors and coordination of

may not be prepared for practice and lackinternational NGOs and their local

of skills needed to help.

partners.
B. Civil Society
In case of disaster, civil society in

B. Civil Society
Thailand doesn’t have a formal

Japan is quite strong. There are Socialorganization about civil society like Japan.

Welfare Councils in a nationwide set up

But has temporary Civil Society

with volunteer centers in the affectedorganizations responded to Thailand

municipalities. It’s making the volunteer

flood 2011 situation.

68

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake

Thailand Flood 2011

(GEJE) 2011Thailand Flood 2011activities in community are effective andalso continue has activity when in normal
situation.
C. Private Sector
Japan government has pre-existing

C. Private Sector
Private sector in Thailand had a little

emergency agreement with private sectorrole in Thailand flood because they don’t

so that it can help people and government

have emergency agreement between

a lot when in large disaster occurs andgovernment and private sector like incooperation between private sector inJapan.

Japan can be a model in another country.
5) Problems- There was a common problem in The

5) Problems- Thailand has no formally stated

GEJE and Thailand flood of large number

national or set of principles established butof excessive materials but there was nohas preparation plan all level from national

system to manage the information on relief

level to provincial level but do not use thesupplies.

plan when Thailand flood 2011occured.

- In the GEJE, There was no

Thai Government used FROC as the hub

preparation or plan for the management of

to manage everything, receiving the

donated goods in prefecture level and local

donation, storage, sorting and transport.

government level. However at the national

There was a major problem in thelevel the government headquarters (Themanagement of non-union. There werecabinet office) tried to solve the problem.

many players involved with accepting and

But in large scale disaster like this there

distributing goods which causes potential

were many problems that cabinet officeconfusion.Politicians had a lot of role in the

could handle. There was one directional

whole process.

communication i.e. only from the top down
was not enough. Difficulties were faced inneeds assessment of affected areas bycentral government and prefecture. There
was lack of Information, and non-viability of

69

The Great East JAPAN Earthquake(GEJE) 2011Thailand Flood 2011

fuel to transport the material to the affectedareas.

- There was a lack of transportation
capacity in affected areas. Cases ofoversupplies of food and medicine in somearea while there were cases severe foodshortages in others.
1) Administration
A. PlanJapan
1. The Basic Disaster Management Plan (1995), mentions coordination ofinternational Disaster Relief to define procedures to accept and facilitate
international disaster relief. In Chapter 1 Disaster Prevention - The government
should prepare procedure necessary to accept and facilitate international relief.
In Chapter 2 Emergency Response -When an offer for relief is reached fromaboard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster
Management Headquarters of its type, expected, arrival date and destination.
The government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer.
When the government accepts the offer, a plan for facilitating the relief should be
prepared according to the pre- defined policy and be notified to the offeringcountry as well as related ministries and local governments.
2. An Inter- Ministerial Agreement was drafted in 1998 to assess concrete area ofrelief and determine responsible ministries such as for food responsible
ministries is Ministry of Agriculture, monetary aid is Cabinet Office, daily
essentials are ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

70

3. Disaster Management Plan (1996), Disaster Management Plans of National
Government and Local Government don’t mention article related to receiving
international assistance.
4. However the GEJE was large scale and the management was only top downfrom government and no plan as how to do and to respond in prefecture andlocal government level. In the prefecture and local government plan, there is noplan mention how to manage donation goods when disaster occurs.
5. In Basic Disaster Management Plan (1995) of Japan, there is mention of
coordination of international Disaster Relief to define procedures and to accept
and facilitate international disaster relief but doesn’t

have plan to mention

article related to receiving assistance and donation in prefecture and local
government. The good point when Japan response during disaster occurred isthat the Government Disaster Management Headquarters was established by
the Cabinet office.
Thailand6. Thailand has no formally stated rational or set of principles established forallowing and tracking donated goods. Section 4.2.6 of the National Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation Plan provides very general guidelines on roles for
accepting international assistance. Section 6.3.2 mentions that when disasteroccurs in any area they should establish the headquarters of the Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation particular in that area. The headquarters in the area isdivided as structure 8 parts and 1 advisory group. One of the structures which is
responsible for receiving donations include the donor center, the allocation offunds and relief materials, the accountants get paid and material donation.
Likewise, the provincial and local plans have provision as how to manage
donation goods when disaster occurs.
7. One can see that Thailand has Disaster Prevention and Mitigation planstoreceive assistance and donation at all level from national level plan, provincial
level plan and local government plan. The plan mentions who is responsible formanagement of donation and where to store, how to manage etc. Despite thecountry having plans but the same were not implemented as is seen during
Thailand Flood in 2011.

71

8. Thailand provides very general guidelines on roles for accepting international
assistance in the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and plan also
has article related to receiving assistance and donation in provincial and local
government.

But when Thailand was flooded in 2011 the plan to manage theflood disaster was not put into action and instead Thai Government at that time
established FROC (Flood Relief Operation Centre). This created confusion in theminds of all stakeholders via their role.
B. ProcedureJapan
9. Establishment of International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for Disaster
Coordinating – The IHA center established during the GEJE to receive
international assistance was coordinated by MOFA. IHA Reception System in
Crisis Management Center decided whether to receive assistance or not. There
was immediate & massive inflow of resource. However, there was lack of
capacity at local government level .There were conditions to receive assistancesuch as all domestic transportations, fuels, hotels, foods; interpreters should becovered by assisting countries, and to respect Japanese tradition etc.
Thailand10. The Thai government does not officially request aid from international community,
but aid is accepted by Foreign Assistance Coordination Centre, Ministry ofForeign Affairs through the coordinating center. It facilitates import of reliefmaterial through customs.
11. Foreign aid received is divided into three parts:(i)Many countries support financially either through the Red Cross or throughthe government itself.

(ii) Relief supplies such as sandbags, water pumps Medicine punts, etc. were
given as relief supplies when sent to Thailand. It was distributed to theagencies involved.
(iii) Providing technical assistance or technical cooperation. Some countries
sent Staff to support FROC (The Flood Relief Operation Center) such as
Netherlands which is experienced in the management of water. Two

72experts from Netherlands were sent to help the Govt. Moreover, meetings
with FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States
were held through teleconference to learn from their experience in handling
Katrina. Besides, the United States has had send an officer to assess thedamage and make recommendations. In the same manner, ASEAN also
assessed damages to evaluate situations and make recommendations.
Thailand did not request assistance from abroad while Japan has been
helped by the lessons learnt from the Kobe earthquake.
C. Institutional arrangement (Structure) and Management of donated goodsJapan
12. The Cabinet office is the Government Headquarters when large disaster like the2011 GEJE occur. The Government Disaster Management Headquarters(The Cabinet office) responds and manages disaster through working group andassign duties to the agency which is responsible for a particular job such as daily
essentials is the responsibility of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry andMonetary aid is the responsibility of Cabinet Office. During the 2011 GEJE, Japan
had set up the Government Disaster Management Headquarters at Cabinet
Office and had 2 teams to facilitate and coordinate SAR Teams.
13. The national government formed a special team to take charge of the logistics
for relief supplies.
14. According to the Disaster Relief Act, the JRCS is obligated to cooperate with thenational and prefectural governments in the provision of relief assistance. The
responsibility during the GEJE such as stockpiling, distribution of relief supplies,
collection of donations and disaster volunteer activities was also entrusted to
JRCS.
15. Japan Red Cross is the center, which received donation money during the
GEJE. The government of Japan chose to receive donation money rather than
goods because of the flexibility in management.
16. Disaster Relief Agreements. During the past couple of decades, more and more
local governments in Japan have signed disaster relief agreements with one
another. A typical agreement involves two localities, located far enough apart so

73

that both are not affected by the same disaster; and if either party is affected by adisaster, the other is supposed to help. As of April 2010, 1,571, or 89.8 percent of
all municipalities, had signed such an agreement, of which 820 signed with amunicipality outside their own prefectures. Various kinds of support were
provided to the municipalities affected by the GEJE based on these agreements.
Thailand17. Thailand does not have such a strong institutional mechanism in place as inJapan. Moreover, the mechanism prescribed in the Disaster Prevention and
Mitigation Plans is not put in place when the disaster strikes as is the case in2011 floods.
18. In 2011 Thailand Flood, donated goods were managed by the Flood Relief
Operation Center (FROC), which provides support services including a place to
get reliefs material donated to the flood victims and shelters.
19. Regulation of the Prime Minister on donations to help the victims of disaster
B.E. 2542 (1999),Thailand. Specify a fund established to help the victims ofdisaster, Office of the Prime Minister to obtain money or property donated tohelp the victims of disaster for their survival occupational and restoration ofliving conditions for the better. As well as to any other actions necessary toprovide for the public good.
20. During Thailand Flood 2011, the Thai government opening account "fund tohelp the victims of disaster responsible by The Prime Minister’s office to collectfunds through public donations fund to help the flood victims who are stronger
in the provinces such as funds have costs awarded to the heirs of victims who
died, help people who has homes damaged by the disaster, purchase skiffs ,and the purchase of consumer goods to DDPM to help victim people .Besides,
also support many foundations and Thai Red Cross.
21. The "National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act B.E. 2550(2007) provides
for "The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee which is chairedby the Prime Minister. But the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
Committee is unable to perform their duties effectively. With the establishment ofvarious committee to act as a redundant. Course of make trouble shooting andcommissioning confusing and cannot be done on time urgency.

74

22. After Thailand Flood, Thai government established a new organization
responsible for national water resources and flood management named as
Project Management Office (PMO) ’s Regulation on National Water
Resources and Flood Management B.E. 2555 (2012) and addition addendumof The national Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan, a new chapter about
Water and Flood Management.
23. Thailand does not have such a strong institutional mechanism in place as inJapan. Moreover, the mechanism prescribed in the Disaster Prevention and
Mitigation Plan is not put in place when the disaster strikes as is the case in2011 floods. In addition to, established the Flood Relief Operation Center(FROC), which Headquarters responds and manages disaster including aplace to get reliefs material donated to the flood victims and shelters.
2) Needs Assessment
Japan
24. The Government Headquarters facilitated distribution of relief goods offeredby foreign governments by studying and developing local needs from affectedmunicipalities and matching them with the offers.
25. The municipality has a role to damage assessment, counting of affected
people, assessment of affected people’s needs, distribution of materials
procured as stockpiles and distribution of stocked materials to affected
people, the reception of procured material from central government andprefecture and donated materials and their distribution throughout food
distribution.
26. As stipulated in Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale
and beyond prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of
material procurement to relevant ministries.
Thailand27. Thailand explored primarily by assisting local government agencies and
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and rendered help in the initial
distribution. This includes assisting with the donation by the donor.

75

28. Both Japan and Thailand use the same mechanism in need assessment
whether counting of affected people, assessment of affected people’s needs,
distribution of materials to affected people by local governance.
3) Tracking system(Storage/Sorting/Distribution of Goods/Vehicle/Trucking/Shipping)Japan
29. Japanese people are taught to cope up with disasters by preparing
themselves to sustain life for at least 3 days without expecting any help fromthe Government.
30. According to Central Disaster Management Council (2007), the country
should prepare the following materials as regional procurement: foodincluding rice, bread, rice ball, lunch box, instant noodle, powdered milk forbaby, canned food, retort pouch food and water in PET bottle; daily
necessities including underwear, blanket, working clothes, towel, engine,
portable cooking stove and gas cylinder.
31. In the case of Hyogo Prefecture, the materials have stocked in the Hyogo
Prefectural Emergency Management and Training Center which can be used
to help victims of the disaster in a timely manner. Japan can bring thesematerials to assist victims in another country to assist in humanitarian settings
as well.
32. The Government Headquarters facilitated and supported domestic transport
and interim storage as necessary. Since it was difficult to utilize themass‐procurement and mass shipping channels within the Headquarters, theHeadquarters’s team directly contacted municipalities and matched theirneeds with offered goods.
33. The delivery of relief goods is the responsibility of the prefectural governor,
who responds to request from the municipalities.

76

34. There are three patterns of transportation of relief materials; 1) delivery toevacuation center via both prefectural stockyard and municipal stockyard, 2)delivery to evacuation center via municipal stockyard only, and 3) direct
delivery to evacuation center without passing through prefectural or municipal
stockyard.
35. When prefecture and municipality procures material, material provider
arranges transportation means to prefectural or municipal stockyard andevacuation center. On the other hand, regarding material provided by central
government or donated material coordinated by central government, trucks
procured by central government and aircrafts and vessels of Self Defense
Force transported a large amount of materials at the Great East Japan
Earthquake. In case of transportation from prefectural stockyard to municipal
stockyard, truck association in each prefecture delivered almost alltransportation. Transportation from municipal stockyard to evacuation center
varies depending on municipalities and timing; case 1) transportation by
official vehicle or their own vehicles, case 2) by vehicles of Self Defense
Force and case 3) by private distributors commissioned by municipality.
36. Some relief material used was a purchased product from companies with autotransport by the transportation into the area.
Thailand37. In Thailand the FROC used Don Muang International Airport as the hub to get
donations as well as to store sorting and transport the relief goods. The
delivery of relief goods to the disaster area was provided through vehicles
arranged by government and the military.
38. When donated goods come at FROC it considers as to whom and whereshould the relief go first.
39. In sorting process, there are many volunteers and military help is also taken insorting and packing items to facilitate the distribution but the system was noteffective because of lack of main coordinator.

77

40. Since the affected area was huge there was lack of adequate transportsystem in place it was difficult to deliver the goods to the affected people as aresult of which relief got piled up and could not be delivered in time.
4) Collaboration with partners
A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer
Japan
41. Japan has central agency to coordinate assistance to the NGO such as JANIC
and Japanese Red Cross. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office is responsible
for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers
Coordination Unit in order to facilitate the communication and exchange of
information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support thesurvivors and coordination of international NGOs and their local partners.
42. Stakeholder involvement - The national and local government, communities,
NGOs, and the private sector all know their role.
Thailand43. Thailand has no central agency to coordinate the NGO assisting victims withthe government like in Japan.
44. However, In the event of disaster, including Thailand flood 2011 found a lot ofvolunteers to the affected areas without effective management support
systems, lack of funding and communication. Volunteers had no direction to do
anything or extend any help. Many a times the volunteer may not be preparedfor practice and lack of skills needed to help.
45. The Thai Red Cross in tsunami disaster in Thailand 2004 report concluded thatcooperation of the volunteer is important to make donations delivered todisaster victims in a timely manner. It should be in the policy process to develop
a network of volunteers that are available and build their capacity to work as
volunteers to work. It is important to prepare volunteers in order to reduce
losses and to assist the community and effectively in a time bound manner.

78

46. The DDPM recognizes the importance of the role of volunteers in disastermanagement and CBDRM projects to provide community-based disastermanagement. It is important to develop the capacity of the community.
Preparedness training to the community has the potential to alleviate sufferingand to cope with a disaster on their own.
47. Civil Defence Volunteer is a community-based organization whose function
holistically is to assist the government official’s operation in all types of disaster.
Currently, there are approximately 1.2 million Civil Defence Volunteers (2014)
that had been trained and registered nation wind. These Civil Defence
Volunteer are based in their community and are on stand-by to be summonedat all time. An important role in surveillance, reconnaissance and rescue victims
in the area which can more effectively be performed by the volunteers.
B. Civil SocietyJapan
48. During the GEJE the Social Welfare Council is also worked effectively. The
Japan National Council of Social Welfare set up volunteer centers in theaffected municipalities. The social welfare councils in municipalities nationwide
sent more than 30,000 person-days of staff to operate the volunteer centers.
The civil society organizations played an indispensible role in disastermanagement. These organizations have the advantage of flexibility and speed
in reaching and caring for affected communities.
49. In case of disaster, civil society in Japan is quite strong. There are Social
Welfare Councils in a nationwide set up with volunteer centers in the affectedmunicipalities. It’s making the volunteer activities in community are effective
and also continue has activity when in normal situation.
Thailand50. Thailand doesn’t have a formal organization of civil society like Japan to deal
with disasters but has temporary organizations which are set up temporarily to
do activity at that the time of disaster. For example, Thai Flood Group. Thai
Flood Group is a group of public organizations with the team as a volunteer tohelp FROC since its first opening. This group has no less important role in79

providing information to the public. Flood situation in real-time and useful
information on various aspects to cope with the floods through cyberspace,complaint issues the flood victims across the country and was made available
through a platform www.thaiflood.com.
C. Private Sector
Japan
51. Partnership between international organizations and private companies:
Some international organizations and private companies offered domestictransport for some of the foreign relief goods for free of charge. Other
companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and the managementof the warehouse for free. Moreover, although with limited results, partnershipwith NGOs was also sought.
52. Relief supplies, which were then sent first to prefectural primary distribution
centres, then on to secondary distribution centres at the municipal level,
before being delivered to evacuation centres. Delivery as far as the secondary
distribution centres was undertaken by the Japan Trucking Association,according to the terms of a pre-existing emergency agreement.
53. Yamato Transport, Japan’s largest delivery firm, was able to keep its businessrunning and to rapidly restart delivery to the tsunami-affected area. In this timeof need, some Yamato drivers, who themselves were affected by the disaster,
restarted delivery in disaster-affected areas on their own initiative. Other
Yamato workers soon followed, using their expertise to manage, sort, anddistribute supplies at the distribution centres. Yamato HQ, in support of suchground-up efforts, set up a Relief Supplies Logistics Support Team. As thehuman element at the end of a chain of emergency supplies, Yamato provided
logistics support to 350 evacuation centres in the three worst affected
prefectures, in a manner that met the specific needs of evacuees.
54. Japan government has pre-existing emergency agreement with private sector
so that it can help people and government a lot when in large disasteroccurred and cooperation between private sector in Japan can be a model inanother country.

80

Thailand55. Private sector in Thailand had a little role in Thailand flood because theywasn’t any pre-existing emergency agreement between government andprivate sector like in Japan.
56. Private sector in Thailand also had a minor role in getting involved in disastermanagement a little. However, in this flood private agencies such as Thai
SCG organized buses to shuttle people affected by flooding. CP Groups
provided relief to the public. While the Seven Eleven provided food for public
service as well.
5) Problems (Sorting/Distribution/Stockpile/Vehicle/Trucking/Shipping)JAPAN – 2011 GEJE
57. A large number of excessive materials was received but there was no system
to manage the information on relief supplies.
58. There was no preparation or plan for the management of donated goods inprefecture level and local government level.
59. There is no training to local and international staff for assessment in affectedareas. As a result, the government response to disaster was poorly managed
and coordinated, and many people suffered needlessly and difficulties inneeds assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture.
60. In the aftermath of the disaster, this kind of information about the emergency
goods ordered by the national government was not available to prefecturesand municipalities in time. In addition, relief goods often arrived unexpectedly
from various private companies, nonprofit organizations, and individuals withno prior information.
61. There were issues like, difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas bycentral government and prefecture, ineffective material procurement system,
shortage of stockpile and difficulties in making procurement request to
prefecture from municipality.

81

62. The communication between the government and field responders was one
direction only from the top down.
63. A large number of various donated materials with insufficient information,
containing mixed items were received. Also changes in needs according to
the lapse of time was there but it was not taken care of.
64. It took long time to distribute minimum food and drinking water and there wasinequality of amount of material among affected municipalities and difficulties
of assessment of evacuation center by municipality due to damaged
government building, information shutdown and fuel shortage.
65. The Japanese government also administers the needs of those affected were
not thorough.

Mostly, victims often received aid who were in evacuation

centers. For those living outside the camps did not get relief materials
because they were not surveyed.
66. Donations of critical items such as food were turned away by the government atthe very time when many survivors were desperately in need. On the other
hand, unneeded donations poured into some areas, resulting in oversupplies offood and medicine in some locales while others faced severe shortages.
67. There was lack of transportation capacity in the affected areas. The delivery
system of relief goods faced several problems including fuel shortages,
interruption of telecommunication services, and supply and demand
mismatches, resulting in stockpiling of the goods in depots and delayeddelivery to the people in need.
68. Shelter management in the disaster-stricken areas was weak and inconsistent,
and in some cases appeared to be nearly nonexistent. Many shelters were
described as either being “self-managed” or having “no management.” Local
residents did their best to manage local shelters in the absence of any
government presence or any guidance on shelter management. The result wasa very uneven level of management where some shelters very well run andothers were not.

82

Thailand – 2010 Thailand Flood
69. There was no formally stated rational or set of principles established forimporting and tracking donated goods.
70. There were many players involved with accepting and distributing goods whichcaused potential confusion. During the last floods, quite a few organizations did
not go through established channels when donating goods. Some went directly
to provinces. Others worked with government agencies that they already had
established relationships with. There were, in fact, large numbers of
stakeholders that were potentially involved in receiving, transporting andreceiving goods.
71. There was no database or system in place for receiving and tracking goods.
There appears to be no common national database system for receiving andtracking goods donated. Even at the departmental level the way goods weretracked depends on the individual officer. There were many examples thatcan potentially be applied to this including just-in-time delivery systems andsupply chain tracking systems used in the private sector. The military also had
developed open source systems that could be used.
72. FROC had a major problem in the management of the heterogeneity. There
was no system for public information. It was also found that most people
donated charity. When being transported to distribute to public it was found that
there were complaints from the public that there is no transparency in
distribution. And bringing things out of the FROC had to go through security
checks before.
73. Arrangements lacked experience with respect to shelters and evacuation
centers. These centers were flooded at some locations and at many locations
there was issue of congestion and these centers were far away from theresidences too. Therefore, there were problems in the evacuation of somecommunities. Many people in the disaster area refused to abandon their homes
for fear of being robbed.
74. Owing to no system of receiving the donation, the donations contained labelsof acting and former politicians of the ruling party. Besides, donations were
hoarded for specific groups of victims.

83

75. There are many problems in the storage, sorting and transport. There as amajor problem in the management of non-union. There were complaints about
discrimination of goods. Political interference was also there and before thegoods could cross FROC, it needed political approval.
There were common problems of large number of excessive materials and lack ofsystem to manage the information on relief supplies. During the 2011 GEJE it wasnoticed that there was no preparation or plan for the management of donated goods inprefecture level and local government level but such system existed at the Central
Govt. (Cabinet Office) level. But in large disaster like the GEJE, the Cabinet Officecannot manage and handle such a huge volume of relief material at its own withoutarrangements at the Prefecture or Local level. The one directional communication only
from the top down is not enough. Difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas bycentral government and prefecture were seen. Lack of information, shortage oftransportation facilities and fuel hampered relief operations.

There were oversupplies

of food and medicine in some area while others faced severe shortages.
Thailand has no formally stated set of principles established but has Preparedness
Plan at all level from national level to provincial level. But the plan was not put to
operation when 2011flood occurred. Thai Government used FROC as the hub tomanage everything, receiving the donation, storage, sorting and transport. There was amajor problem in the management of non-union. There were many players involved withaccepting and distributing goods which caused a lot of confusion. Besides, there was a
lot of political interference in the relief distribution.

84

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami,WIKIPEDIA,from http://www.wikipedia.com.
2. Disaster Emergency Response Management, from http://www.bousai.go.jp.
3. Disaster Management in Japan brochure. Published by Director General for Disaster
Management, Cabinet Office.(2011).
4. Takeo Murakami, Coordination of international disaster relief during the great japan
Earthquake, Cabinet office of Japan, December 16, 2011.
5. Emin NAZAROV, Disaster management response in Japan, Final research report,(2011),
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