Purity and Heterogeneity: Warfare, Ethnic Identity, and Resistanceagainst the State among the Hor of Southwestern Ethiopia

YUKIO MIYAWAIG
Osaka Prefecture University

The war discourse of the Hor, comprised of idioms that provide them with meanings related
to waging war, diverges considerably from the Hor's present interethnic relationships with theirneighbors. Since the end of the 19'h century, the Hor have lived under Ethiopian state rule but
have tried to maintain their cultural and political autonomy by constructing and upholding
a patriarchal "tradition" (aada). 1l1is "tradition" includes sets of discourses and rituals, among
which the war discourse is one of the most important. 1ltis paper analyzes the war discourseand demonstrates how it functions to consolidate the Hor's patriarcl1al tradition. As interethnic
relationships have changed, new idioms have been added, even though the discourse appears
authentic and unchanging. While deterioration of the Hor's relationship with the neighboring
Borana animated the war discomse in the 1990s, changes to the discourse also reflect challenges
to Hor tradition from within.

Keywords: discourse, Ethiopia, Hor, tradition, warfare

1. INTRODUCTION
Ethnlc warfare in southwestern Ethiopia has interested many antlu·opologists studying in this region.
Wben the first generation of"modero" anthropologists arrived i.n southwestern Ethi op ia in the mid-

1960s and early 1970s, the y found the area rife with ethnic conflict. They attributed the conflicts tovarious motivations, including the desire for cattle and vengeance, the clainllng of victims in associa­
tion with the deaili of favorite oxen and of trophies proving a man's status in the age hierarchy and,competition for environmental resources (Legesse 1973, Strecker 1976, Fukui and Turton 1977).
These motivations, however, presume that the causes of ethnic warfare should be interpreted witllln
the context of the dyadi.c relationships of the warring ethnic groups.
In contrast, studies of the history and political economy of Ethiopia have looked at warfare fromdifferent p oint s of view (Donham and James 1986). According to these studies, state influence has
touched even tl1e most peripheral areas since ilie creation of the modern Ethiopian empire at the endof the 19'h century. Thus, such studies have proposed that interethnic warfare be reinterpreted froma wider range of perspectives.
For example, Turton (1994) has suggested that Mursi warfare should be analyzed in relation to state

encroachment. According to Turton, the Mursi organize attacks on the neighboring Nyangatom inorder to maintain their group identity in the face of encroaching E thiopian state influence (Turton1994). Turton's analysis is stimulating, but some questions remain. First, ilie rela tionship between
warfare and ethnic identity was not described. That is, how does organizing wars against neighbor-Ni/o-Ethiopian Studies 12:61-74 (2008)
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ing groups contribute to the maintenance of ethnic identity in relation to the state? Second, Turton
restricted his analysis to recent warfare, since the end of the Derg regime in 1991. However, consider­ing the overwhelming influence of the state during the entire 2Q•h century, the warfare of the previous
period must also be analyzed.
During my fieldwork in Hor communities in the 1990s, war with the Borana was a chronic sourceof tension. Informants often spoke of what war should be for Hor warriors, and many linked the
motivation to go to war with the desire to acquire fertility. W hile it was considered bad to kill someneighboring groups, others were seen as good to kill (Tadesse 1997). The Maale, Omotic agricultural­ists who live in the northern mountainous area, and the K.ore (Samburu), Nilotic pastoralists who livein Kenya, were said to be mortal enemies of the Hor. In killing an enemy, a Hor man could expect toacquire fertility from the enemy's blood. The killer's cattle would proliferate, his crops would thrive,and his wife would bear many children. The Borana were also considered to have "sweet" blood. In
contrast, neighboring groups such as the Hamar, Waata, and Tsamako were believed to have "bitter"blood, and killing them would make the Hor warrior's crops wither and his cattle and wife sterile.
Cattle of enemies were also considered to be good to loot, since they were believed to proliferate
rapidly once they were brought to Hor lands.
However, "sweet" blooded enemies were also considered good for marriage. Once married to a Hor
man, the women of"sweet" blood groups were thought to bear many children. The enemies were also
said to consider Hor blood "sweet" for them, so that the Hor and their enemies mutually "wanted
each otl1er".
Notably, such talk of war, motivations for war, management of deatl1, its consequences, and theroles attributed to each Hor according to his or her age, gender, and social positions were all pre­scribed and quite formalistic. I call such beliefs and ideals "wru· discourse". 1l1e idiom set of the war
discourse provided people with meanings for wru· and enabled them to understru1d it in their culturalcontext.
Strikingly, during my research, I found tl1at what informants presented as their war ideal appar­
ently contradicted their current state of fighting. For exru11ple, I soon found that one "mortal enemy,"the Samburu, had retreated into Kenya, 200 km south of the Ethiopian border, more than 100 years
ago, and the Hor had seldom encountered them during the 20th century. Meanwhile, the Maale livein the highlands some 70 km north, but the Hor had raided them only a few times during the 20'"
century. The relationship with the Borana bad been good, at least until me 1930s, having deteriorated
only relatively recently. The worst enemy that the Hor had confronted were the Hamar, whom they
had fought for almost 30 years, even though the Hamar had "bitter" blood.
Considering this state of fighting, their war ideal seemed not only contradictory but also anachro­nistic. In tl:tis paper, I interpret this discrepancy by exploring the political situation of the Hor during
the 20'h century and demonstrate how the war ideal has been upheld as an ideology that maintains
the Hor's ethnic identity under encroaching state rule.
First, I outline the structure of the Hor's war discourse and show how, as part of their "authentic
tradition", the war discourse functions as an ideology to uphold patriarchal rule. Second, I describe
the historical background of Hor warfare in the coo text of Ethiopia's political economy. Finally, I
discuss how some Hor have adopted strategies that allow for acceptance of heterogeneous outside
cultural elements. I suggest that tl1e present war discourse of the Hor can be interpreted as a strategy
for consolidating ethnic identity under patriarchal rule and for coping with various influences tl1at arethought to be eroding their authentic tradition.

2. WAR DISCOURSE OF THE HOR

2-1. The Hor
The Hor are agro-pastora.lists numbering 3,000 who reside along the Weito River in the Southern
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) of southwestern Ethiopia. They cultivate sor-

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63

ghum along the Weito River and keep catde and small livestock in the savanna grassland. Membersof the northern territorial group call d1emselves the Arbore, and their territory is divided into two
sections: Gandarab and Kulam.. The southern territorial group call themselves the Made and are
divided into the sections ofMurale and Egude. Their neighbors include the Hamar in the west, theWaata and Borana in the east, and the Tsamako in the north (see map in Fig. 1).

Each territorial section has its own chiefs and age organization. The k'awot is the paramount chief,with the power to bless and curse. The kernet is a subsidiary chief who intermediates between the

k'awot and the elders. ]aldaabs aJe the elders appointed from the dominant generation set of the age
organization. They support the k'awot and kernet and preside over their territorial sections.

2-2. Structure ofthe war discozme
1J1e Hor's war discouJse not only differentiates "true enemies", with "sweet blood" and the power of
fertility, from others, but also justifies patriarchal rule through the pe1formance of complex rituals
concerning the killing of enemies. Such rituals are indispensable parts of a system that consolidates
patriarchy by integJating practice, rituals, and historical memories.
The way of killing enemies is prescribed as if it were a ritual. Once a warrior has killed an enemy,
his close friend must seveJ the penis from the dead body. 1he killer d1en gives a calf to "buy" thetrophy back, puts on a costwne that displays his status as a killer, and hangs the trophy from an aca­
cia tree outside his setdement. Then the killer, the friend, and the acacia tree enter into a tabooed
relationship called agas; those who become agas must not hun one another, nor should their lineage
marry wid1 each other.
The fertility of the enemy's blood can then be "bought" by a third person d1rough a ritual called"meeJak'in". The third person wanting to become "a killer" proposes to buy the trophy from the killer.
He then prepares gourds of honey wine and invites his relatives and friends. At night, the killer andhis agas come with speais to the purchaser's house, where the purchaser and his friends await. Bothgroups engage in a mock fight, after which the killer falls down, and a friend of the purchaser takes

Fig. 1. Map. The Hor and their neighbors

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64

from him a piece of wood symbolizing the severed trophy. The purchaser then gives a calf to the killer,
and the purchaser, his friend, and rhe killer become part of the agas relationship.
The Hor believe that the fertility that makes crops, cattle, and children proliferate is obtained
through the two routes. One, as discussed above, is from the blood of enemies. 'The other is to obtain
fertility from God (waak') by the mediation of a k'awot (paramount chief). The power of the k'a7.uot,
which is believed to be crucial to the prosperity of Hor lands, is related to the killing of enemies on
at least two levels.

Fir st, a k'a'1uot's power is directly increased by the blood of enemies. Upon obtaining the title of
k'awot, that person must become a killer of enemies in order to be a "perfect" k'awot. However, sincethe Hor consider a k'awot to be like a woman (i.e., a symbol of peace and fertility), a k'awot cannot
participate in warfare. To become a killer, the k'awot must carry out the meeJak'in ritual. Thus, "com­moner" warriors need to kill to provide the necessary trophies and increase tl1e power of the k'awot.
Second, there is an ambiguous association of the "chief" with the enemy. 1J1e Hor believe thatthe power of k'awots is not only benevolent but also dangerous. A k'awofs curse is thought to be afatal weapon against enemies, but if it is directed against other Hor, the result is disastrous. 'Thus the

k'awois power is held within the framework of rituals, where it can be properly guided through thesupport of the elders of the age organization. A well-known story of the first k'awot, told in Gandarab,
illustrates the ambiguity of his power and the process of its domestication. The story relates that thefirst k'awotwas a stranger who had magical power and usurped ilie position of tlle indigenous chief
The k'awot and his relatives then started to monopolize valuables such as ivories, women, and flood
plain lands, which were essential to tlle life of the Hor. The indigenous chief and his relatives stoodup against this tyranny, killed tl1e k'awois kinsmen, and remade the position of k'awot to become tl1at
of a ritual expert. Thereafter, the k'awot and his clansmen were excluded from tlle office of the elders
who distribute flood plain lands.
Thus, the war discourse forms an important part of the total ideology on which the patriarchal ruleof the Hor is founded. Men are considered to be essential for tlle prosperity of tlle Hor. Men are
the waniors who bring the fertility of tlle enemy's blood and also the trophies that are needed by the

k'awot to become "perfect". Finally, men are the elders who domesticate ilie power of the k'awot andlead it properly.
The war discourse also plays an important part in the drawing of ethnic boundaries, through therituals of mee fak'in and marriage, and in distinguishing "us" from "them". Marriage is contracted
among the exogamous clans within the Hor, as well as with some other neigh boring etlmic groups
such as the Borana and Dassanetch. The elders often mention the similarity of marriage and kill­ing enemies, since both involve tlle transfer of calves, the (ritual) death of the object of exchange(killed enemy and circumcised girl), and the formation of tabooed relationships after the rituals. The
lineages that contract a marriage enter into a relationship called sod. Thereafter, they are prohibitedfrom hurting each other or marrying each other for three generations. Their blood becomes "sweetwith each other" and they "want each other". These rituals seem to prescribe men as the subjects of
exchange. More importantly, by describing enemies as a mirror image of their immediate neighbors,these rituals appear to distinguish the in-groups who share and exchange the essential resources fromtl1e out-groups who should be excluded from sharing in this area where interethnic, cross-cutting ties
abound.
Although the Hor's well-organized social structure and ritual complex associated witll the war
discourse seem to have retained their "traditional'' forms for hundreds of years, the Hor ethnic group
was actually formed about 120 years ago. Since that time, colonial and state powers have encroachedon the Hor. 1J1e fluidity of 19'" century society and marginalization by colonial and state powers in
the 20th century are tlle common characteristics in this area of Ethiopia.

MIYAWAJG: Purity and Heterogeneity65

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3-1. Wars and state rule
3-1-1. The 19'h century
In the 19th century, various ethnic groups rose and fell in the Turkana Basin. These groups had in­terethnic cross-cutting ties and resorted to those ties in cases of environmental and social crisis sucl1
as drought, famine, and warfare. Immigration was frequent, with immigrants becoming assimilatedby their hosts, although sometimes immigrants also influenced the cultural and social institutions of
their hosts (Schlee 1989, Sobania 1980, 1988, 1991). One such group was the Hor, whose members
formed as an ethnic entity sharing a common culture and social institutions through immigration
and assimilation.
1he Arbore, the northern territorial group, were agriculturalists with small livestock who had
settled along the Weito River. Prior to this, they were probably pastoralists living to the north of
Turkana Lake and moving to the Weito area at the beginning of the 19'" centw-y. The chieftainshipof the Arbore seems to have been established by Borana immigrants in the mid-19'h century. The
Arbore accepted many Borana immigrants up until the end of the 19'11 century, and the Borana chiefs(k'allu) and Arbore k'awot had strong ties until the mid-20'11 century. TI1e Arbore and Harnar were on
good terms dming the second half of the 19'h cenrury, and some Hamars shared the Weito flood plain
with the Arbore. (t) The Marle, the southern territorial group of the Hor, settled in their present ter­ritory in the mid 1880s, when severe famine ravaged this area (von Hohnel 1968: 187, Sobania 1980:
145-152). Before that time, they were itinerant pastoralists who migrated seasonally from south ofLake Chew Bahir toKw-az on the western side of the Omo river. Before they settled, the Arbore andMarle are said to have fought with each other when they met.(llInterethnic relationships changed with political and environmental changes in this area. The
Arbore tell of fighting with tbe Muz, who attacked them from the south, before settlement of theMarle.C3> The Marle remember that they fought with the Waldai from the south. But both of thosegroups later left the area.<4> At the mid-19•h century, the Sarnburu moved northward seeking pasturesand settled in me area between Lake Chew Ba.hir and Turkana, where they fought wiili the Arbore.
Although they were initially on good terms wiili the Marle, those groups also occasionally fought. In
the 1880s a severe rinderpest outbreak and invasion by the Turukana drove the Samburu back to thesouth (Sobania 1980: 97-100). The Arbore remember that a k'awot ofKularn, who had been injuredby the Samburu, cursed iliem, creating a big lake between ilie 1\rbore and the Sa.mburu. Then the
Samburu disappearedY>
Somali caravans reached the area in the 19th century. The Arbore acted as mediators in the ivory
trade between Somali merchants and indigenous inhabitants around Lake Turukana (Vanutelli andCiterni, 1899: 355). The accumulation of property brought by the ivory trade is said to have led to
the Arbore's chieftainship becoming heredita.ry.<6l

3-1-2. Arnhara invasion and Neftennya rule
The expansion of ilie Ethiopian Empire at the end of ilie 19'" century altered the political situation oftllls area. In 1897, the army ofFitewrari Habte-Giorgis invaded the Weito valley from theKonsoland
and attacked the Hor. The Hor dispersed and lived in exile among the Dassanetch, Tsamako, andWaata.m The "settler-northerners" ( neftennya) constructed fortified settlements in the conquered
highlands and ruled ilie sw-rounding area. 1his conquered area was annexed to ilie Etlllopian empire,
and a border was drawn between Etlllopia and British colonialKenya. Southwestern Ethiopia wasdivided into tlu·ee districts, wiili administrative offices located in Maji, Bako, and Gardulla.
The overall pattern of interethnic war changed as national and district boundaries divided the area.
In the southwestern periphery, ilie Dassa.netch, supported by neftennyas from Maji, spearheaded raids
onKenyan pastoralists. In the south, northern settlers called Tigre transgressed the border to hunt el­ephants and loot local inhabitants (Hickey 1984: 164- 170). W iiliin Ethiopia, pastoralists crossed ilie
district boundaries and raided neighboring pastoralists under ilie influence of other neftennyas. The

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Hamar, who had once dispersed and lived among the Dassanetch, returned to their territory, which
was part ofBako, and started to raid theBorana, who had settled in Gardulla (Strecker 1997).
In the Weito valley, the neftennyas of Gardulla hunted elephants, depleting their population(Harrison 1901). The Hor returned to the area in the mid-1920s and started to pay tributes (k'alat)to the administration in Gardulla.<8l During tl1is period, the Hor did not wage war on other groups.
3-1-3. Italian rule
Italian rule, which began in 1937, changed the situation once again. The Hor recall that the Ital­ian invasion was preceded by a raid by the Borana, who had already been under Italian rule. The
Italians and Ethiopians tl1en fought in Gandarab. Settlements were bmned to tl1e ground, and tl1e
Hor dispersed again. After driving Eiliiopians from the area, the Italians constructed a base campin Gandarab and started to organize an infantry corps called the banda. Local inhabitants, mainly
from the Borana but also some Hor, were recruited as banda soldiers. "The banda marched to thewest, which was still w1der Ethiopian rule. Both the Hor and Hamar recall atrocities committed by
the banda against the Hamar inhabitants, including stealing cattle, raping women, and killing andcastrating men.<9l
In the early 1940s, when the Ethiopian insurrections started to gain force, the pattern of war andraids changed according to the political divide between Ethiopia and Italy. Ethiopian guerrillas at­tacked pastoralists allied with the Italians. The J-Ior waged a raid against the Borana, who were atthat time under the rule of Ethiopian guerrillas. This was me first time that the Hor had waged war
against theBorana, and it was done under the aegis of the Italians. However, as the political situation
swayed toward favoring Etl1iopia, ilie Hor switched to the Etl1iopian side.<10l
3-1-4. Hail.e Selassie regime
The retreat of the Italians created a political vacuum in southwestern Ethiopia, allowing an opportu­
nity for retaliation by a number of settlers against local inhabitants who had sided with the Italians.
Some pastoralists also participated in tl1e retaliation, which involved looting cattle (Strecker 1979).
The Hor tried to take advantage of this situation and sent a raiding party against the Maale.Oll
However, in the highlands, turmoil rapidly subsided after the assignment of local governors to thearea. The southwestern highlands became a center of cash crop production, including coffee and spiceproduction, and became integrated into the burgeoning Etl1iopian capitalist economy. In contrast,
the lowland pastoral areas lacked such economic incentives for northern settlers. l\llany pastoralists
had guns obtained from the Italians, government control was slack, and old grudges had accumulated.
These factors led to war among pastoralists in Ethiopia, as well as cross-border raids, mostly by theHama.r, against Kenyan pastoralists.
The warfare between the Hor and Hamar began with a Hamar attack in the early 1940s. A cycleof vengeance then continued for more man thirty years, interrupted by only short truces (Strecker
1976; Ayalew 1997). The Hamar sometimes forced the Hor out of mei.r settlements, forcing theminto Waata territmy on the eastern side of the Weito River. The war also claimed the lives of threesuccessive k'awots. Finally, in 1974, the Hor and Hamar concluded a cease-fire agreement adminis­
tered by the local governor of Gemu-Gofa province.02l
3-1-5.1he Derg regime and after
During the Derg regime, local government attempts to halt ethnic warfare were successful among theHor. Although the Hor and Hamar committed several murders against each otl1er, these incidents
did not develop into war.<13l However, by tl1e end of tl1e Derg regime, the relationship between the
Hor andBorana had deteriorated due to livestock theft and injuries committed by young people on
both sides. Mter the fall of the Derg regime, theBorana organized a raiding party of more than 500
men. However, the Hor had heard of tl1e raid and successfully drove back the Borana, claiming as
many as 100 Borana casualties on ilie battlefield. Many of the dead were said to have been ex-Derg
soldiers who had returned from the Eritrean northern f ront. A peace ceremony took place in 1993 in

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Gandarab, but inhabitants of the Borana territorial sections, which had provided most of the men for
the raiding party, refused to enter into the peace agreement. Some retaliatory assaults continued, andthe Hor twice raided cattle camps in these sections. In 2003 the Hor and Borana finally concluded
the peace treaty, with arbitration by Farm Mrica.
The pattern and frequency of interethnic wars in southwestern Ethiopia have changed with changes
in the political situation of the Ethiopian state. The severing of longstanding ties among pastoralists
along the national borders, caused by the Ethiopian conquest and British colonial rule, led to innu­
merable cross-border raids by Ethiopian pastoralists against Kenyan pastoralists. W ithin Ethiopia,
the land became divided into districts and ruled by settlers, who attained independent political power;
under these divisions, transgressing raids occurred between neighboring groups of pastoralists. The
Italian invasion and subsequent Ethiopian resistance brought conflict among the groups allied on
different sides. Pastoralists accumulated gw1s by fighting as agents of the state and colonial powers.
As the economjc situation changed under the rule ofHaile Selassie, tl1e importance of pastoralists asagents of the settlers diminished. State rule weakened in the lowlands, and warfare erupted among
the pastoralists.
While state and colonial rule had clear influences, pastoralists did not react to those situations
w1iformly. Rather, as the broader political situation influenced local politics, interests in war became
diversified witl1in groups, creating even more intricate conflicts of interest among generations, ter­ritorial sections, clans, and political leaders and leading to more complex patterns of war.

J-2. Mediators and war
3-2-1. Wakene: the first Hor mediator
Mter the Ethiopian conquest, tl1eHor political situation underwent a drastic change. The power of

k'awots diminished as mediators became the most powerful figures. Mter the Hor retmned to the
Weito valley in the mid-1920s, the Ethiopian empire assigned a Hor man named Wakene to serve
under the local administrator (shoomi I ch'ik'a shum), who ruled the area on behalf of the government.
Wakene had been taken from the area during rhe conquest and brought up among Ethiopians. As
the onlyHor man who could speak Arnharic, Wakene wielded enormous power over all theHor. He
resided in Gandarab, whicl1 became the political center of the Hor. His closest associates were theOlmok, the chieftain clan ofGandarab, who gave 11in1 their daughters and became his affinesY�l3-2-2. Arkulo Baje: the first mediator from the Chieftain clan
The next powerful mediator was Arkulo Baje, a brotl1er in law of Walcene who belonged to tl1e
Olmok. Arkulo B3:je worked w1der Wakene and developed administrative skills. When the Italians
invaded tl1e south, he is said to have sent a message asking them to come to the Hor and eliminate
the Ethiopians . Under Italian rule, he accU01ulated guns and dominated the Hor. He organ.ized amilitia called the logorato, recruiting members from his clan and his affines in Gandarab. W hen the
Ethiopian guerrillas regained strength, he immediately changed sides and smvived the subsequentera. Arkulo's power was founded on symbolic as well as physical violence. He was always guarded
by his men, who would execute his orders by tlu·eatening people with guns. Arkulo eagerly imitatedthe colonial powers. He wore Western clothes and lived in a large house during the Italian rule
(Ricci 1950: 8). He then imitated the behavior of the Etl1iopians dming the Haile Selassie regime.
Since Arkulo had shifted the burden of colonial exploitation to tl1e three other territorial sections,the residents of those sections resented him. Although Arkulo managed to suppress those revolts,
the disparity between Gandarab and the other sections seems to have influenced the initial stage offighting with theHamar, as will be shown below.<15l
3-2-3. SmaGino 1: a fierce war leader

Arkulo's rule continued through the 1940s, but by tl1e mid-1950s, a new mediator had begun todistinguish himself from Arkulo's circle. His name was SuraGino, and he was known as a fierce war
leader.

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Sura Gino was born into the R.iis clan, one of the early clans to settle Gandarab, but was rumoredto be a son ofWakene. He worked under Arkulo, and his abilities were soon recognized by the Ital­ians. During the Italian rule, he plundered the Borana several times and looted many cattle. These
raids were unusual for the Hor at that time. Fmt, the Hor had never before raided the Borana, withwhom they had close relationships through kinship ties and connections between the Hor k'awots
and Borana k'allu. Second, the raids were conducted mainly by uninitiated young men belonging to
the Sura's generation set. According to Hor tradition, the uninitiated are prohibited from participat­
ing in warfare. Third, these raids took place under the aegis of the Italians, but without the approvalof the elders and k'awot. These anomalies, together with the declining power of the k'awots, caused
concern among the Hor about the deterioration of their tradition. Mter the Italians retreated, Sura
led a raiding party against the Maale. Although the elders of Gandarab, fearing persecution by theneftennyas who ruled the M aale, prohibited such activity, Sura plundered the Maale twice.
3-2-4. Berinas: the Hamar mediator waging war against the Hor
Meanwhile, war broke out between the Hamar and Hor. 1he Hamar made the initial raid, led by an
outstanding Hamar mediator called Berinas. Berinas had grown up north of Lake Turkana, where
the Hamar had fl.ed at the end of the 1890s after the Ethiopian conquest. Mter the Hamar returnedto their territory, ruled by the Bako nefttenyas, Berinas started to distinguish himself as a politicalleader who could negotiate with the Ethiopians. Both the Ethiopians and the Hamar recognized
him as a capable mediator. Berinas could see through the rivaL-ies between the Ethiopians who ruled
the neighboring districts, and he often led looting raids against the Borana in Gardulla to retrieve
cattle the Hamar had lost during their exile.
D uring the Italian rule, the Hamar suffered atrocities committed by the banda infantry, and Beri.nas
is said to have developed grudges against those who participated in those atrocities. Despite oppo­
sition from the Hamar in Asile, the territory neighboring the Hor that had been cooperating withthem in livestock herding and cultivation, Berinas instigated war and attacked Gandarab.<16l
1his attack failed because Gandarab residents had sufficient guns to repel Berinas' troops, but war
continued. Arkulo attempted a cease fire, but the Mar le, led by another mediator, Gino Baje, resisted
his efforts. The Marle had a close relationship with the Dassanetch, who were at the time mortal
enemies of the Hamar. Together, the Marle and Dassanetch continued to loot Hamar cattle camps.
Arkulo captured Gino and put him in prison in Chencha, the administrative center of the province,
but Gi.no did not surrender. As war continued, Gandarab also gradually became involved.

3-2-5. Sura Gino 2: from a war leader to rhe peace makerIn the 1950s, Sura rose to power as a new mediator, replacing the aged Arkulo. As Sura began inter­mediations, he quickly realized the needs of administrators and transformed himself from a fierce war
leader to a capable peacemaker. He energetically traveled to the administrative towns and mobilizeda police force to interfere in the Hor and Hamar warfare. Sura's peacemaking was well received in the
Hor territorial sections, with the exception of Gandarab, where Sura was not accepted. The Olmok
hated him because he appeared to usurp the position of the ch'ik'a shum (local administrator), which
they had monopolized. The elders feared him since he seemed to surpass the power of k'awot. Youngmen disliked him because he constantly interfered in their plans to retaliate against enemies. 1hus,
men of Gandarab continued to raid the Hamar, despite Sura's efforts. By the mid-1970s, however, theHor and Hamar entered into a truce agreement; as recalled by the Hor, the truce was finally reachedbecause both sides had become exhausted by the long period of war. Sura and Aike, who was the sonof Berinas and a mediator for the Hamar, arranged an agreement under the administration of theprovincial officer. 'TI1e cease-fire ceremony was performed according to tradition, recognizing bothsides as having concluded the treaty by their own wiJl.<17)
3-2-6. Hora Sura: the mediator during the Derg regime
In the mid-1970s, the infl.uence of the Ethiopian revolution spread to southwestern Ethiopia. Among

MIYAWAKI: Purity and Heterogeneity69

the Hor, Hora Sura, the son of Sura Gino, succeeded to the position of mediator. He had worked
as a translator for the cadres dispatched to the Hor from the local government and later became acadre member. He began to organize a farmers' association to which he appointed his age mates andfriends as officers. He also established a school and mandated attendance by local children. As partof the farmers' association, Hora organized a militia, sending some of his age mates to the militarytraining camp in Gamo. Hora was eager to modernize the Hor and did not hesitate to eliminate
whoever opposed him. For example, after his women's education program fell through due to theresistance of k'awots and elders, who considered the school a threat to the Hor tradition, he arrested
the k'awots, put them in prison, and gathered up and burned their regalia. Hora attempted to keep
the peace by directly interfering with interethnic conflicts, arresting "criminals," and sending them toprison. 'TI1e elders disapproved of these measures. The Hamar, Hor, and Waata secretly concluded atreaty prescribing that murderers be handed over to the relatives of their victims for execution. (IS)In 199] the Derg regime collapsed, and the new government recruited young men as officials.
While most of these men had been educated by Hora, they soon became opposed to him. In thepolitical vacuum of the transition, a large armed force ofBorana raided the Made, who repelled them.
A peace ceremony was held in 1993 under the leadership of Hora, who arranged it in cooperation
with anthropologists, a non-governmental organization, and local inhabitants. However, the truce
was not effective because some Borana sections refused to agree to the cease-fire treaty. Around thesame time, a large private cotton plantation was developed in the upstream part of the Weito River;
the irrigation water diverted for the cotton, affected the flood regime downstream. 111e Tsamako,
whose pastures had suffered due to the altered river flow, rose up but were brutally subdued by thegovernment. Most Hor say that their lives worsened during these ten years. Livestock herds devel­
oped disease, harvests decreased, and rain and flooding became irregular. Above all, those in power
pursued personal profit by this "eating" of their own people.

4. AUTHENTICITY AND HETEROGENEITY

4-1. Historical changes in the war discourse
As the political situation changed, the war discourse changed accordingly It is difficult to reconstructhistorical changes in the war discourse due to the lack of written historical documents on Hor culture.
Thus, I present only a tentative sketch of changes based on oral histories and written documents deal­
ing with interethnic relationships in this area.
At the end of ilie 19th century, the Hor appeared to ah·eady believe that an enemy's blood would
bring fertility. The Samburu, one of the Hor's mortal enemies according to the war discourse, lived
south of the Chew Balm, and the Hor fought with them. In the latter half of the19'h century, waves
of immigrants impacted Hor communities. Many Borana came into ilie northern territorial group,
the Arbore, and lived with iliem (Smiili 1969: 262). The Marle, having lost most of their livestock torinderpest virus and drought, also settled to the south of the Arbore (von Hohnel1968: 187). Sucha situation probably created the need to demarcate in-group from out-group members. However,ilie idioms concerning k'awots may not have been included in the discourse, since the power andsupremacy of the k'awot was still under construction in tllis period. The k'awot lineage seems to havebeen brought in with Borana immigrants in the mid-19'h century, and most people must have still re­membered clearly when and how the k'awot came to the Hor. The story of the first Gandarab k'awot
must not have been established yet (Miyawaki, 2006a, 2006b).
After tl1e Ethiopian conquest, the Hor lived in exile for almost 30 years. Considering this longdispersion and exile, the present complex of patriarchal ideoJogy, which is called the "tradition" (aada),
seems to have been reconstructed after they returned to their territory in the 1920s.(19) The full­
fledged idioms of ilie war discourse had probably been developed at least by the start of the Italianrule in 1936, as confirmed by some informants who had grown up at that time.<20l In that period, theyoung generation started to raid the Borana, even though most Hor did not approve of those raids.

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Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

The war discourse seems to have functioned as a device to convert the Borana from people who weregood to marry i nto those who were good to ki.ll.

An apparent contradiction in the war discourse and actual warfare emerged as the Hor began tofight the Hamar after the Italian retreat. The Hamar bad been regarded as bad to kill, and the Hor
did not have formal measures to praise warriors who killed Hamar. But as warfare continued, theelders declared that the "killer's song" (meet-at) could be sung for ki.llers of Hamar; previously, thissong had been permitted only for the ki.llers of "true" enemies. Following this, d1e custom of eam­ing a "ki.ller name" was introduced from the Dassanetch, after originating among the Nyangatom
and spreading among the neighboring groups as warfare in the area intensified.<21l Although Hamar
blood had never been considered "sweet", young Hor men considered Hamar killers to be praisewor­
iliy and craved ilieir own fame as ki.llers. czz) Hamar cattle were also desired and taken through looting.

One of the elders who emphasized ilie fertility power of"true" enemies insisted iliat ilie same power
could be obtained by Hamar cattle; he backed up his statement by claiming that cattle looted fromthe Hamar proliferated in his kraal. However, iliis new ritual was not integrated into ilie former war
discow·se.
'The "traditional" war discourse was again activated when the relationship between tl1e Hor andBorana deteriorated in the 1990s. 'Those who ki.lled a Borana smeared d1e enemy's blood on ilieir
body and cut genital from the enemy's body. Although some killers were eager to perform meefak'in

wid1 d1ese trophies, many elders were skeptical iliat meefak'in could be performed wiili Borana blood.
The elders noted that meefok'in had never been performed with the blood of the Borana, and that if
it were performed the Hor and Borana would become mortal enemies. They often cited historicalmemories to remind tl1eir group members iliat the Hor and Borana were once the same people. The
elders thus tried to restore the relationship with the Borana by resorting to the war discourse, and its
function of demarcating in-group from out-group,.in an effort to keep ilie in-group from splitting.
4-2. Authenticity and heterogeneity at the tum ofthe century

If the function of the war discourse is to elaborate meanings when waging war with otl1er people, it
is difficult to understand why it is constituted from idioms that "expired" long ago. For example, theSamburu moved south nearly 100 years ago, and the Hor have not fought with tl1e Maale for nearly
60 years. Ald1ough it was d1e hostile relationship witl1 the Borana that animated the war discourse in
the 1990s, it is necessary to investigate the social background through which this anachronistic war
discourse was constructed as authentic among tl1e Hor.
'The Hor believe in the authenticity and antiquity of the war discourse. Authenticity is confirmed
for them by ilie incorporation of cultural elements in the tradition, such as ilie story of the first k'awot.
Such elements are believed to have existed "before" the Ethiopian conquest. The same authenticity
may also function for the enemies who had left the area before the Ethiopian conquest. This mecha­
nism appears to fit their intent, effectively connecting their tradition to the period of their indepen­
dence, and offering a contrast with the present state of subordination. Observing the traditional ways,
ilierefore, means maintaining their independence under the state rule.
During the 20'h century, the Ethiopian state exploited the Hor, ruling iliem through mediators.
The elders attempted to put the mediators under tl1eir controL Upon assignment, each new mediator
had to be first blessed by the elders and then approved by the administrators of the district. However,strong mediators often surpassed these powers and took over control of the Hor. In such situations,the elders could only attempt to restrict the power of the mediators by separating the domain of state
rule (hig) from the domain of tradition (aada). The mediators dealt wiili the administrative functionsof the state, such as tax collection, while the elders dealt with the administration of local affairs suchas distributing flood plain lands, regulating marriage, and approving interethnic warfare.
However, as time passed, state rule began to encroach even on the realm of tradition. O utside
influences included the direct intervention in interethnic conflicts and the education program for
women planned during the Derg regime, which the elders fiercely resisted, fearing it would destroy
the Hor's marriage system.

MIYAWAJG: Purity and Heterogeneity71

In addition, some of the Hor adopted the lifestyles that were eroding their tradition. For example,
in the 1960s, a possession cult called ayana was introduced from the Borana to the Hor. 1his cult im­
mediately spread, with the number of followers multiplying despite oppression by the Derg govern­
ment. An interesting feature of this cult is that it enthusiastically adopted cultural traits of both the
Ethiopians and the foreigners, traits that had been regarded as immoral from the traditionalist pointof view. Most of the possessing spirits came from the world of the Ethiopians and foreigners. The
seance ritual mimicked the Ethiopian coffee ceremony, and divination was paid for by merchandise
such as spirits ( alak'e), soap, clothes, and cash, only recently introduced from the outside. Religious
communions organized by followers, most of whom were women, often involved seances, during
which followers could act freely under the pretext of religious activity. These activities seem to haveresisted, at least obliquely, the patriarchal rule under which women's fl·eedom was restricted.
Some of the Hor also attempted to utilize recent interethnic ties to increase their political power.
A k'awot of Kuile, named Dale Armar, entered into a Konso organization called the fonno (Tadesse
2002). In the early 1970s, some Konso started to settle around the police station near Gandarab.
Because the k'awot of Kuile is considered the chief of the Tsamako as well as a strong k'awot of theHor, the Konso approached him. Dale and his followers promised to provide them with flood plain
land and attempted to profit from this relationship. However, since Dale was not one of the elders
responsible for distributing flood plain land, a quarrel broke out between Dale and the k'awot of
Gandarab who was responsible for the flood plain. Each cursed the other. The k'awot of Gandarab
died, and a rum or rapidly spread tl1at Dale's curse caused his death. In the 1990s, Dale was approachedby the cotton plantation manager and agreed to alienate part of the Tsamako territory. The agreement
brought strong criticism by some Tsamako and Hor.
To most Hor, these activities, together with those of the mediators and the educated young men as­
signed to the administrative office in the 1990s, presented clear evidence of the degeneration of theirtradition. The Hor regarded this situation as the realization of a prophesy foreseen by a diviner before
the Ethiopian conquest. According to the prophecy, children of the Hor will lose their tradition andwill start to kill each other. Only a final war that will ravage the entire world can redeem this moral
degeneration and enable the Hor to restart their life (Miyawaki 2006a; 2006b). Those who were ex­
cluded from the power struggle and still followed the system of domination by the elders thus needed
to show themselves what their tradition was, how it operated, and their roles within it.

5. CONCLUSION

The full-fledged war discourse of the Hor that exists today was constructed after the Ethiopian
conquest. Although people often refer to this discourse as a motive for wagi ng war, it is misleading
to regard the war discow·se as tl1e direct cause of interethnic warfare. As discussed above, wars have
erupted in this area from complex interactions between multiple factors, of which state and colonial
rule have been among the most influential. In fact, the important function of war discourse, in iliis
instance, is to consolidate patriarchal rule among the Hor, together with other rituals and discoursesthat constitute the "tradition". The authenticity of ilie tradition has been maintained by incorporat­
ing cultural elements, and the tradition has been used to resist state rule. However, challenges tothe authenticity of the tradition have continually come from within, as indigenous Hor leaders havewielded power through the support o f the Ethiopian state. Furthermore, as state and colonial rule
have altered interethnic relationships among pastoralists, by exerting influence on their local politics,
this war discourse has failed to make the situation intelligible. War with the Hamar, for instance,compelled the Hor to introduce new rituals that would give meaning to waging war with a new en­emy, one that had been categorized as "the bad to kill". These rituals were not a part of the former
war discourse. 1he revival of the "traditional" war discourse in the 1990s was ignited by antagonism
against the Boraoa, wbo had been converted to being "good to kill", due to their structural position
within the discourse.

Nilo-Ethiopiau Studies

72

It is, however, important to note that even war with an enemy such as the Hamar may have con­tributed to the survival of the discourse. That is, warfare with the Hamar spurred the idea that Hor
tradition was deteriorating, because fighting the Hamar apparently contradicted the discourse. 1l1is,
in turn, caused the Hor to consider their present state of subordination to the state. The sense of de­teriorating "tradition", together with strategies employed by the various Hor groups to utilize outside
power, has made Hor elders, in particular, aware of the need to protect the "tracli tion" from infiltration
by foreign cultures. As part of the "tradition", the war discourse has thus been maintained as a tool
for resisting state rule and the encroachment of foreign influences.

NOTES(1) Interviews with Buro Orro, Egude, 2000. See also des Avancher (1859) and Cavendish (1898).
(2) Interviews with Buro Orro; M urale Kemet, Murale, 2000; Argore Arshal, Muralc, 2000; Hukka Arkulo,
Kulam, 2000.
(3) Interviews with Sura Gino, Gandarab, 2000; Biiyo Shun mole, Kuram, 2000.
(4) Interview with Buro Orro.
(5) Interview with Wati Karayu, Gandarab, 1998.
(6) Interview with Galcha Arsirba, Gandarab, 2000.
(7) Interviews with Wati Karayu; Sura Gino; Buro Orro; Argore Arshal; Elema Dadi, Gandarab, 2000; Jarsa
Gioo, Egude, 2000.
(8) Interviews with Buro Orro, Sura Gino.
(9) Interviews with Sura Gino; Buro Orro; Elema Dadi; Jarsa Gino; Argore Arshal.
(10) Interviews with Wati Karayu, Sura Gino; Biiyo Shunmolc; Hando Adama, Egude, 2000.
( 1 1) Interviews with Wati Karayu; Elema Dadi; Hando Adama.
(12) Interviews with Sura Gino, Biiyo Shunmolc; Argore A.rshal; Buro Orro; Elema Dadi; Argore A.rattu;
Hando A.dama; Hukka Arkulo; Baje Arkulo, Gandarab, 2000.
(13) Interviews with Elema Dadi; Biiyo Shunmole; Argore Alattu; Argore A.rshal; Buro Orro; Hando A.dama;
Hora Sura, Gandarab, 2002; A.rgore Argido, Kulam, 2000.
(14) Interviews with Wati Karayu; Sura Gino; Elema Dadi; Hando A.dama; Hukka A.rkulo, Kulam, 2000;
Koranke Gino, Gandarab, 2000.
(15) Interviews with Sura Gino; Baje Arkulo; Biiyo Shun mole; Argore Argido; Hukka Arkulo; Jarsa Gino;
Buro Orro; Argore Arattu; Hando A.dama; Elema Dadi.
(16) Interviews with Weino Kerle and others, Asile, Hamar, 2002. see also Strecker 1997.
(17) Interviews with Sura Gino; Biiyo Shunmole; Argore Argido; Jarsa Gino; Buro Orro; Hando Adama;
Elema Dadi; Sura Gino & A.safa Gino, Ganda.rab, 2002.
(18) Interviews with Hora Sura; EJema Dadi, 2002; Bala Arnilo, 2002, Murale.
(19) f'or a reconstruction of the Hor tradition, see Miyawaki, 2006a.
(20) lnterview with Sura Gino.
(21) Interviews with Elema Dadi, 2000; Biiyo Shunmole. See also Strecker (1976).
(22) Young men who have killed big game or an enemy are praised by young women; those who have not yet
killed are insulted as undeserving of marriage. This insult is called koora, and young men are said to wage
war to remove the disgrace attached to them by such insults (Gabbert, with Gino, 2007).

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YUI<JO MIYAWAKJ: School ofHumanities and Social Sciences, Osaka Prefecture University, Gakuen-cho 1-1,
Naka-ku, Sakai, Osaka, 599-85Jl,]apan. rniyawaki@fine.ocn.ne.jp