FOURTEENTH REGIONAL SEMINAR ON GOOD GOVERNANCEFOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

Hosted by UNAFEI
23-24 March 2021, Tokyo, Japan (Online)

July 2021
TOKYO, JAPANi-1-

The views expressed in this publication are those of the respective presenters and authors
only, and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNAFEI, the Government ofJapan, or other organizations to which those persons belong.

SETO Takeshi
Director
United Nations
Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Offenders(UNAFEI)
2-1-28 Mokuseinomori, Akishima-shi, Tokyo 196-8570, Japan
https://www.unafei.or.jp/english/
unafei@i.moj.go.jp

ii-2-

FOREWORD
It is my great pleasure and privilege to present this report of the Fourteenth Regional
Seminar on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries, which was held in Tokyo,
Japan, from 23–24 March 2021. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Good GovernanceSeminar was held online for the first time.
The main theme of the Seminar was Integrity and Independence of Judges, Prosecutors
and Law Enforcement Officials. The Seminar was attended by a visiting expert from the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, China, and 14 criminal
justice practitioners from the countries of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste.
Corruption is a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all
countries. Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development
and contributes to governmental instability. As with other regions in the world, the fightagainst corruption in Southeast Asian countries has taken on an international dimension.
The main theme of the Fourteenth Seminar focused on providing updates on the latest anticorruption measures and corruption-related trends across Southeast Asia.
The Seminar addressed the importance of integrity and independence of criminal
justice officials in preserving the rule of law and considered the role of codes of conduct,financial disclosures, appointment procedures and so on in establishing and maintaining
integrity and independence. The participants exchanged knowledge, experiences, effective
strategies and best practices, and the Chair’s Summary, published in this report, details the
key conclusions and recommendations of the Seminar. In addition, the Seminar enabled theparticipants to develop personal and professional contacts between anti-corruption
authorities and investigators in Southeast Asia.
It is a pleasure to publish this Report of the Seminar as part of UNAFEI’s mission,
entrusted to it by the United Nations, to widely disseminate meaningful information on
criminal justice policy.

SETO Takeshi
Director, UNAFEI
July 2021

iii
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iv
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INDEXINTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORSAND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7
Opening Remarks by Mr. SETO Takeshi, Director, UNAFEI ................................................... 9
Chair’s Summary .......................................................................................................................... 11
Visiting Expert’s Contribution ................................................................................................... 17
Visiting Expert, Mr. Lawrence Chung, Principal International Liaison and Training
Officer, Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, Special
Administrative Region, China ................................................................................................ 19Country Presentation Papers ...................................................................................................... 35
Brunei Darussalam .................................................................................................................... 37
Cambodia .................................................................................................................................. 47
Indonesia ................................................................................................................................... 53
Lao PDR .................................................................................................................................... 61
Japan.......................................................................................................................................... 67
Malaysia .................................................................................................................................... 73
Philippines ................................................................................................................................. 91
Singapore ................................................................................................................................ 125
Thailand .................................................................................................................................. 149
Timor-Leste .......................................................................................................................... 159
List of Participants, Visiting Experts and Organizers .............................................................. 167
Seminar Schedule ..................................................................................................................... 169
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 171
Photographs .......................................................................................................................... 173-5-5-

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INTRODUCTION

Opening Remarks by
Mr. SETO Takeshi
Director of UNAFEI-7-7-

-8-8-

OPENING REMARKSSETO Takeshi *Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure and privilege for me to announce the opening of the Fourteenth
Regional Seminar on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries.
We sincerely welcome all of you to this significant forum which is taking place in an
online format for the first time in the history of this seminar. Due to the disruptions causedby the current pandemic, we have, very unfortunately, made the difficult decision to
postpone all international training courses in Fiscal Year 2020. However, thanks to theadvancement of technology, it is our great pleasure to be able to continue to host thisseminar despite the pandemic. Some of the target countries have not been able to join theseminar under current situation this year, yet we are delighted that 10 countries, including
Japan, are participating in this seminar.
Since 2007, this seminar has been an exceptional opportunity for criminal justicepractitioners in Southeast Asian countries to share our experiences in pursuit of theeradication of corruption in this region. The seminar has been co-hosted by UNAFEI andparticipating countries: it was first held in Thailand, and then the Philippines, Japan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and last year Japan again.
Over these thirteen years, we have discussed many important issues in anti-corruption
legislation and criminal justice practices in this region. This time, in our two-day discussion,
we will focus on “Integrity and Independence of Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement
Officials”. One of the most important responsibilities of the criminal justice system is todetect corruption and impose appropriate punishment on corrupt politicians and public
officials. However, if the criminal justice system, itself, is corrupt, there is no one left tostop the serious risks to democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the integrity of judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement officials is essential. At the same time, if decisions are
influenced by undue external pressures such as political interference, the rule of law will
also be undermined. Thus, the independence of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement
officials, which facilitates their impartiality, is also indispensable. For this reason, we findit extremely useful to visit this fundamental topic to share each participating country’s legal
frameworks, current situation and best practices on this issue.
In order to deepen our discussion, as a visiting expert, we welcome in this seminar Mr.
Lawrence Chung, the Principal International Liaison and Training Officer at the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. I would like toexpress my sincere appreciation to Mr. Chung for joining us to share his expertise andexperiences.
Director, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (UNAFEI).

*

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To all of the distinguished participants, I would also like to thank you for taking
valuable time away from your work to make precious contributions to this seminar. I canassure you that all of us will learn from each other and that will put us further on the path
toward eliminating corruption.
In this seminar, UNAFEI has continued its practice of inviting participants from one or
two criminal justice organizations from each country. And as I said before, some of theseorganizations co-hosted previous seminars. I believe this system establishes not only apersonal network among participants but also an organizational network.
I look forward to seeing this seminar provide a useful forum to exchange expertise andexperience in our common endeavour against corruption, contributing further to thepromotion of good governance in Southeast Asia.
Thank you very much for your attention.

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CHAIR’S SUMMARY
FOURTEENTH REGIONAL SEMINAR ON GOOD GOVERNANCEFOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIESTokyo, Japan (Online)
23 – 24 March 2021

OPENING CEREMONY
1. Mr. SETO Takeshi, Director of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for thePrevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), served as the Chair of the
Fourteenth Regional Seminar on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries, cohosted by the Ministry of Justice of Japan (MOJ) and UNAFEI. Officials and experts fromthe following jurisdictions attended the seminar: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste.

VISITING EXPERT’S LECTURE
2. MR. LAWRENCE CHUNG, Principal International Liaison and Training Officer, Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, China, delivered his lecture on thetheme of Independence and Integrity of Judges, Prosecutors and Anti-Corruption Officials:
Their Roles in Hong Kong’s Fight against Corruption from the ICAC’s perspective. The
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) reflects the global consensus thatindependence and integrity are key elements for the eradication of corruption. These
international standards have long been adopted in Hong Kong where investigation,prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases are handled by distinct institutions,
namely the ICAC, the Department of Justice and the Judiciary. There are multiple levels of
safeguards to protect independence and integrity of these institutions. The Basic Law of theHong Kong Special Administrative Region, the territory’s constitutional document,
provides the most fundamental constitutional guarantee. Under the Basic Law, the three
institutions shall exercise their power free from interference, and ensure people working inthese institutions are of high quality. On the legal front, both the statutory laws and the caselaw support the institutions to act with independence and integrity. For example, theIndependent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance provides robust powers to the
ICAC in anti-corruption investigation, systemic prevention and public education. The
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and the common law offence of “Misconduct in Public
Office” also set the minimum integrity standards for public officers including judges,
prosecutors and ICAC officers. In addition, at the institutional level, the three institutions
have their own rules and regulations on staff integrity, with internal mechanisms inrecruitment, staff discipline and checks and balances to ensure their members’ integrity.
The institutions are also mindful of maintaining their independence and integrity under thehigh expectation of the society and the international obligations as shown in UNCAC.
Apart from enforcing the anti-corruption laws, the ICAC assists the public sector, including
the Judiciary and the Department of Justice, in promoting integrity through comprehensive
prevention and education initiatives.

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COUNTRY PRESENTATIONS
3. BRUNEI DARUSSALAM: Established in 1982, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) is Brunei’s
lead agency for investigating corruption by civil servants, including judges, prosecutors
and law enforcement officials. ACB officials are subject to numerous legal standards,
including the Public Service Commission Act, and conflicts of interest are avoided throughrules on case assignment and disclosure. ACB officials also give talks to promoteawareness of corruption among the civil service. An egregious case of embezzlement andmoney-laundering by a married couple – a bankruptcy receiver and a judge – wasintroduced, detailing the investigation and tracing of assets. Due to the depth of the
defendants’ connections in the judiciary and prosecution, the case was tried before avisiting judge from the United Kingdom, while the Government of Brunei retained Queen’s
Counsel to prosecute the case impartially.
4. CAMBODIA: To ensure integrity within the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Disciplinary Council
and Internal Control (DCIC) issues ethics rules, conducts investigations and imposes
disciplinary sanctions. These sanctions include reprimand, suspension without pay,
demotion, forced early retirement, dismissal and prosecution. Conduct subject to sanction
includes abuse of power, use of public assets for personal interest and so on. ACU officials
are mandated to declare their assets and liabilities every two years, and failure to do so may
result in fine or imprisonment. Newly recruited officers undergo integrity training and otherprogrammes on professionalism. To manage conflicts of interest, the ACU has detailed
rules on the reporting and acceptance of gifts and hospitality (dining out etc.), and – upon
the assignment of a case – any actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest must bereported to superiors. While challenges such as implementing UNCAC, interagency
coordination and professional skills remain, the public has increasingly developed amindset that rejects corruption since the creation of the ACU in 2010.
5. INDONESIA: As integrity is an important component of law enforcement, the Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) promulgated a code of conduct that applies to allcommission employees. The code of conduct defines terms such as “integrity”, “synergy”(cooperation and cohesiveness), “justice”, “professionalism” and “leadership” in order toalign expectations and personal values among all commission employees. The code of
conduct is enforced by the KPK’s Supervisory Board. These hearings have resulted insevere sanctions such as dishonourable discharge for the receipt of gratification.
Gratification paid to KPK officials in amounts as small as USD 20 have been actively
enforced. Other enforcement actions have involved giving a telephone contact number to adetainee, receiving a food parcel, and an action against the Chairman of the KPK for the
personal use of a helicopter.
6. JAPAN: The distinct roles of judges and public prosecutors in Japan were introduced, as
well as the separation of judicial and executive powers under Japan’s constitution and thestructure of Japanese courts and prosecutors’ offices. Judicial independence is guaranteedby the Constitution and by law, and the removal of judges from office is limited, as is theirsuspension from work and reduction of salary. Measures to secure the integrity of judges
include sufficient salary, integrity screening by a nominations committee, random
assignment of cases to judges, trial by three-judge panels and the practice of regularnationwide transfers to prevent the establishment of collusive relationships. As prosecutors
exert influence on the criminal justice system, prosecutorial power must be exercised
independently. Like judges, prosecutors are paid sufficient salary and are subject to- 12 - 12 -

nationwide transfer. A 1954 case was introduced to demonstrate how the then Minister ofJustice’s interference in a bribery investigation resulted in public backlash, entrenching
public opinion against political intervention in criminal investigations, which may play apart in the culture of integrity among Japanese public officials.
7. LAO PDR: The State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA) is a ministerial levelgovernment agency mandated to, among others, conduct inspections, prevent and combat
corruption, and investigate complaints. As a part of a broad anti-corruption legal framework,
the Law on Civil Servants defines principles, regulations and measures for recruitment ofcivil servants throughout the country, and the Decree on the Ethics of Civil Servants sets
standards for integrity. The LCS and the Decree on Ethics both establish administrative,
disciplinary and criminal sanctions for violations of these rules. As a part of the framework
to avoid conflicts of interest, the Criminal Procedure Law requires recusal fromparticipation in cases in which an official may have an interest. In 2019, the SIAA received
1,038 complaints, of which 226 have been resolved, 407 transferred to other authorities,
104 are being monitored and 249 are subject to ongoing investigation.
8. UNAFEI: While anti-corruption enforcement and the punishment of corrupt officials isnecessary, even the suspicion of corruption undermines public trust in government. Thus,
public officials should never be suspected of being improperly influenced, and codes ofconduct can be an effective approach to the prevention of corruption. The presentation
detailed Japan’s ethics rules for national government officials, addressing the receipt ofgifts, food or drink, borrowing money, personal property or real estate, accepting services
free of charge, and so on from interested parties. The code of conduct requires supervisors
to take action, which may involve instructing the subordinate or reporting the misconduct,
if they believe that a subordinate has violated ethics rules; other officers are prohibited fromreceiving benefits that result from ethics violations and must not make false reports. Certain
public officials are required to report the receipt of gifts, the purchase or sale of stock, andannual income. When ethics rules are violated, common disciplinary actions include
dismissal, suspension from duty, salary reduction and warning.
9. MALAYSIA: The Malaysian government was plagued by corruption, nepotism, kleptocracy
and abuse of power, but political change in 2018 displaced the ruling party and ushered inan era of change and the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) 2019-2023.
The NACP aims to enhance the accountability and credibility of the judiciary, prosecution
and law enforcement officials. To promote integrity, Malaysia has adopted professional
codes of conduct and assigned oversight and advisory roles to independent bodies. A“Check and Balance Mechanism” was established to provide oversight to the MalaysianAnti-Corruption Commission (MACC), through which five entities scrutinize MACC’s
activities, examine complaints against officers and perform other functions to ensure
integrity, transparency and professionalism. Since 2009, the judiciary has been subject to
the Judges’ Code of Ethics, which was drafted in line with the Bangalore Principles. Under
the code, judicial appointments are scrutinized by the commission, and violations of thecode are heard by ad hoc Judges’ Ethics Committees. Prosecutors are also subject to codesof conduct and ethics, as well as statutory prohibitions against gratification and abuse of
their special position and powers.
10. PHILIPPINES: To address the problem of corruption in its country, the Philippines hasenhanced its efforts to ensure independence and integrity in the criminal justice system.
Established in 2020, the Judicial Integrity Board acts on all administrative complaints or- 13 - 13 -disciplinary actions against judges, and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office
investigates corruption in the judiciary and conducts lifestyle checks of judges and otherjudicial officials. The Office of the Ombudsman acts on complaints filed against officers
or employees of the government and prioritizes complaints against high-level officials; italso implements programmes to enhance integrity. The independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is established under the 1987 Constitution, and legislative provisions, such asappointment, remuneration and dismissal, further strengthen the independence of personnel.
The Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation are executive
agencies that have authority to investigate graft and corruption, but the PNP has been
particularly vulnerable to corruption. The PNP “Ethical Doctrine” establishes ethicalstandards, such as commitment to democracy and public interest, non-partisanship,
confidentiality, respect for human rights – violations of which can be punished criminallyor administratively. Among other measures, the Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement
Group supports the PNP’s internal cleansing mechanism by gathering intelligence on rogue
PNP officers and assisting the public in filing criminal complaints against police officers.
11. SINGAPORE: Known as a clean country, factors that led to Singapore’s success in fighting
corruption include strong political will, the independence of the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau, a strong code of conduct for public service, and outreach andprevention efforts directed to law enforcement agencies on a regular and continual basis.
The code of conduct addresses general conduct and discipline, conflicts of interest,
financial embarrassment, gambling and casino visits, gifts and entertainment, andmandatory job rotation and block leave. Strong outreach and prevention efforts include
public education talks and training, working with the media to encourage reporting,convenient channels for reporting, and so on. Prosecutorial independence is established byvesting prosecutorial discretion wholly in the Attorney General, although charging
decisions in each case require multiple layers of assessment. To avoid conflicts of interestin the judiciary, judges are prohibited from hearing cases in which they have a personal
interest and should recuse themselves in any case in which they have an apparent bias.
12. THAILAND: Although the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) was established in 1893,
its independent status had not been recognized until 1991 when the office underwent a
major structural and organizational change and was separated from the Ministry of Interior
and assumed independent status as an autonomous agency under the supervision of thePrime Minister. Later, the independent status was reaffirmed by the 2007 Constitution,
giving the OAG autonomy with respect to budget, personnel and prosecutorial discretion,of which the superintendent is the Attorney General. To fight corruption, the OAG works
alongside the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to combat corruption bypoliticians and other state officials. After finishing the investigation, if there are grounds
for disciplinary or administrative action, the NACC submits a report and evidence to thesuperior or authorized person for disciplinary procedure; if there are grounds for criminal
penalty, the NACC submits the case to the OAG for prosecution. If the OAG finds that theinquiry file is incomplete for justification of initiation of a prosecution, a joint OAG–NACC
committee is created to complete the case file. If the OAG and NACC still fail to agree, the
NACC is empowered to prosecute the case on its own; if the Attorney General is thesuspected of corruption, the President of the NACC may prosecute the case.
13. TIMOR-LESTE: Law enforcement corruption is devastating to society as it denies people
accessibility to legal protection and protects the illegal activities of criminals, and TimorLeste has been significantly impacted by it. Asset declaration is an important tool to counter- 14 - 14 -corruption, and Timor-Leste has benefited from the experiences of countries that havealready implemented such systems. UNCAC and national anti-corruption laws serve as thelegal basis for the practice of asset declaration by officials including law enforcement
officials in Timor-Leste, and the content of the declarations covers all types of income,financial securities, movable and immovable assets, debts and other financial obligations,among others. The key elements identified for an effective asset declaration system include
broad and detailed coverage of income and assets; proper identification of officials required
to report; verification mechanisms (formal and risk based); transparency and accessibilityof disclosures to the public; sanctions; and reporting.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14. Conclusions
A. The integrity of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials is essential topreserve democracy, the rule of law and a fair and effective criminal justice system,taking into account their critical roles in detecting corruption and imposing appropriate
punishment on corrupt politicians and public officials;
B. It is also indispensable to ensure the due level of independence of judges, prosecutors
and law enforcement officials because it enables them to make their decisions free fromundue external pressures and serves to enhance their impartiality;
C. Some countries have established independent anti-corruption agencies to fight endemic
corruption and restore or build public trust in the criminal justice system. This has been
an effective means to strengthen the integrity and independence of judges, prosecutors
and law enforcement officials, especially where integrity and independence have been
compromised.
15. Recommendations
A. To ensure integrity, relevant authorities should develop or revise codes or standards ofconduct for judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, and should conduct
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of such codes or standards with theallocation of necessary financial and human resources;
B. The processes of recruitment and promotion for judges, prosecutors and law
enforcement officials should be accountable and transparent, and education and training
programmes on integrity and the risks of corruption should be provided upon
appointment and continuously throughout each career path;
C. Periodic asset declaration or financial disclosure should be required for positions at
substantial risk of corruption in order to identify potential or existing conflicts ofinterest and as a means to identify illicit enrichment;
D. Judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement authorities should provide the public withinformation for the sake of the transparency of, and accountability for, their actions,with due regard for the confidentiality of investigation, prosecution and judicial
deliberation;- 15 - 15 -

E. With a view to promoting active participation of society in the prevention of and thefight against corruption, public awareness of, and education on, the procedures andprinciples of the criminal justice system should be encouraged to improve theunderstanding of the role of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials and thestandards to which they are held.

24 MARCH 2021
TOKYO, JAPAN (ONLINE)- 16 - 16 -

VISITING EXPERT’S CONTRIBUTION

Mr. Lawrence Chung
Principal International Liaison and Training Officer
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, China- 17 - 17 -

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INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORSAND ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICIALS: THEIR ROLES IN
HONG KONG’S FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Lawrence Chung *I. INTRODUCTION
A robust criminal justice system is vital to the success of a territory’s anti-corruption
work, and such success in turn guarantees a strong, fair and sustainable criminal justicesystem. To keep the criminal justice system fair, clean and effective in fighting corruption,
it is important to safeguard the independence and integrity of the key component
institutions, including the judiciary, the prosecution authority and the anti-corruption
agency, as well as the individuals working in these institutions. The reason is that the
principles of independence and integrity are the major pillars supporting the effective,
unbiased and transparent operation of these institutions, which is a prerequisite forsustaining a fair and clean environment in the public and private sectors of the society. In
the fight against corruption, investigation, prosecution and adjudication play the crucialrole in bringing the culprits to justice and ridding the society of this harmful scourge. These
institutions and their members, including judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption officials,
must have enough authority and independence to perform their duties. If undue pressure isput on these institutions and their members, they will be unable to maintain impartiality
and objectivity when discharging their mandates.
As judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption officials are vested with wide power, theirintegrity becomes particularly important. If they have any misconduct such as conflict ofinterest and abuse of authority, or even engage in bribery, there will be no other means tocombat corruption effectively. This is definitely detrimental not only to the anti-corruption
work, but also to the criminal justice system, the rule of law and ultimately the entire society.
Therefore, it is equally important for judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption officials to
uphold the highest standard of integrity in their conduct, behaviours and performance of
duties.
It is the global consensus that the judiciary, the prosecution authority, the anticorruption agency and their members must be free from interference and observe highstandards of integrity when performing their duties. This consensus is enshrined in the
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the only legally binding
universal anti-corruption instrument. The Convention stipulates that the States Parties shallensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption
through law enforcement and prevention, and that they shall be granted with the necessary
independence (Articles 6 and 36). The State Parties shall also criminalize the use ofphysical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with the exercise of official anticorruption duties by justice or law enforcement officials (Article 25(b)). In addition, the
UNCAC contains provisions aiming to enhance the integrity of public officials. The State*
Principal International Liaison and Training Officer, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Hong
Kong, Special Administrative Region, China.

- 19 - 19 -Parties shall set up codes or standards of conduct and anti-corruption measures for public
officials (Article 8). In particular, there shall be measures to strengthen integrity andprevent opportunities for corruption in the judiciary and prosecutorial authorities (Article
11).
Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republicof China, has long adopted these universally accepted standards of non-interference withthe work of the judiciary, the prosecution authority and the anti-corruption agency. Hong
Kong also places great emphasis on maintaining the integrity of these institutions and theirmembers. The city maintains its own legal system under the “One Country, Two Systems”
framework. In relation to the fight against corruption, the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC) is the territory’s dedicated law enforcement agency with the statutory
mandate to fight and prevent corruption. Apart from investigation, the ICAC achieves its
mission through systemic prevention and community education. In addition, theDepartment of Justice (DoJ), which is the prosecutorial authority in Hong Kong, and the
Judiciary play an essential role in eradicating corruption to ensure that Hong Kong has aclean and efficient public sector, a private sector with a level playing field and a society
which values integrity and rejects corruption. The probity environment in Hong Kong is,
to a large extent, attributed to the independence and integrity of these institutions, thefeatures which have long been renowned worldwide.
This paper aims to explain, from the ICAC’s perspective, how Hong Kong upholds andsafeguards the independence and integrity of judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption
officials, who are the key players in the fight against corruption. It contains three parts,
each addressing an issue under this broad theme but with different focuses. The first part
introduces Hong Kong’s anti-corruption system, in particular the relationships among the
judiciary, the prosecution and the anti-corruption agency in dealing with corruption cases.
The second part discusses the multiple safeguards of the independence and integrity ofthese three institutions in performing their functions. The third part explains the roles of
the ICAC in promoting integrity in the public sector, covering all government departments
and public authorities on the law enforcement, prevention and education fronts.
II. DIVISION OF WORK AMONG THE JUDICIARY, PROSECUTIONAUTHORITY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY
Hong Kong’s legal system is set out in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, theconstitutional document of the territory that came into effect on 1 July 1997 with Hong
Kong’s return to the People’s Republic of China. 1 The Basic Law, among other things,
essentially preserves Hong Kong’s legal system which has been in place before 1997,
including the laws previously in force such as the common law and the statutory laws. 2
Under this legal system, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases aretaken care by distinct institutions, namely the ICAC, the DoJ and the Judiciary. Each ofthese institutions has its own mandate and functions independently to keep corruption undereffective control.
The Government of the Hong Kong SAR, “Some Facts about the Basic Law”,<https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/facts/index.html>.
2
Article 8 of Basic Law stipulates that “[the] laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except forany that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the HKSAR”.
1- 20 - 20 -

A. Independent Commission Against Corruption
The ICAC is the dedicated agency in Hong Kong with statutory power to combat andprevent corruption through law enforcement, systemic prevention and community
education. On the law enforcement front, the Commission’s duties include receiving andconsidering allegations of corrupt practices, as well as investigating alleged or suspected
offences. While most of the investigations start from corruption complaints made bymembers of the public, the ICAC has a proactive strategy to uncover cases of corruption
which might otherwise have remained unreported.
The ICAC has full-fledged investigative powers under the law to conduct anticorruption investigations. When it comes to prosecution of the offences under Part II of thePrevention of Bribery Ordinance, it requires the consent of the Secretary for Justice, whoheads the DoJ. In practice, the ICAC seeks the advice of the DoJ before commencing any
prosecution. 3 The ICAC uses its investigative powers responsibly and in strict accordancewith the law. As a measure of checks and balances, the investigative work of the ICAC isoverseen by the Operations Review Committee, an advisory committee of the ICAC which
comprises mostly independent citizens appointed by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
SAR. 4 All ICAC cases must be submitted to this Committee for scrutiny. In particular, theCommittee scrutinizes reports on completed investigations before endorsing therecommendations of taking no further action by the ICAC. The ICAC also, on theCommittee’s recommendations, forwards reports on alleged misconduct of government
officers to the government departments concerned for consideration of disciplinary and/or
administrative action.
Law enforcement is only part of the legal mandate of the ICAC. To tackle corruption
from a holistic angle, the problem should be addressed through deterrence, improvement
in systems and procedures, as well as change in people’s attitude and development of ananti-corruption culture in the society. Hence, apart from the Operations Department whichinvestigates corruption, the ICAC has two functional departments specializing in systemic
prevention and community education, respectively. They are the Corruption Prevention
Department and the Community Relations Department. With these three departments, theICAC tackle both the root causes and the symptoms of corruption.
B. Department of Justice
The DoJ is headed by the Secretary for Justice who has the ultimate responsibility forthe prosecution of all offences, including corruption, in Hong Kong. The Department’s
prosecutorial function is carried out by the Prosecutions Division. The Division makes
prosecutorial decisions, including whether to prosecute and, if so, what charges to lay andbefore which courts. Counsels of DoJ do not investigate cases or collect evidence as law
enforcement officials do. Instead, they provide legal advice to the ICAC, as well as otherlaw enforcement agencies and government departments, on matters related to prosecution,
criminal law and procedure. They also conduct trials and most appeals in courts. 5

ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, ICAC Annual Report 2019, p. 38,<https://www.icac.org.hk/icac/annual-report/2019/>.
4
ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “Operations Review Committee”,<https://www.icac.org.hk/en/check/advisory/orc/index.html>.
5
Department of Justice, Hong Kong SAR, “Our Legal System: Department of Justice”,<https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/our_legal_system/doj.html>.
3- 21 - 21 -

C. Judiciary
The Judiciary is responsible for the administration of justice in Hong Kong, and it
operates criminal courts in which cases are decided and sentenced. All criminal proceedings,
including those about corruption, commence in the Magistrates’ Courts. More serious
offences are transferred from the Magistrates’ Courts to either the District Court or the
Court of First Instance. 6 A trial is to be heard by a magistrate, a district court judge or, inthe case of the Court of First Instance, a judge and a jury. The prosecution and defendants
may appeal to higher courts against court rulings. Depending on its nature, an appeal is tobe heard in (i) the Court of First Instance by a judge, (ii) the Court of Appeal usually by abench of three judges, or (iii) the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Final Appeal is thehighest appellate court in Hong Kong. It is sat by a bench of five judges, usually including
the Chief Justice as the Chair, three permanent judges, and either one non-permanent Hong
Kong judge or one judge from another common law jurisdiction. 7
The fact that the ICAC, the DoJ and the Judiciary function independently ininvestigation, prosecution and adjudication gives sufficient checks and balances among
these three key institutions. As a result, the fight against corruption is carried out in a fair
and accountable manner. Such division of work also facilitates specialization andprofessionalism. As elaborated in the next part, the independence and integrity of thesethree institutions are protected by different levels of safeguards. These safeguards ensure
the effective implementation of the anti-corruption work and the rule of law in Hong Kong.
III.

MULTIPLE LEVELS OF SAFEGUARDS OF INDEPENDENCE AND
INTEGRITY

Hong Kong has a clean and efficient public sector. Under this corruption-freeenvironment, the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, the DoJ and the ICAC areprotected at constitutional, legal, institutional, societal and international levels. The
different levels of safeguards serve to empower these institutions to perform their duties
effectively without fear, favour or bias.
A. Constitutional Framework
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, which sets out the constitutional framework
for the territory’s legal system, provides the most fundamental guarantee of the
independence of the Judiciary, the DoJ and the ICAC. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong
is authorized by the National People’s Congress, the top legislature of the People’s
Republic of China, to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislativeand independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication (Article 2). 8 Under thisfundamental principle, there are a number of articles in the Basic Law articulating
unambiguously that Hong Kong’s judicial, prosecutorial and anti-corruption authorities
shall exercise their power free from interference.

Judiciary, Hong Kong SAR, “Court Services & Facilities: Magistrates’ Courts”,<https://www.judiciary.hk/en/court_services_facilities/mag.html>.
7
Judiciary, Hong Kong SAR, “Court Services & Facilities: Court of Final Appeal”,<https://www.judiciary.hk/en/court_services_facilities/cfa.html>.
8
Article 2 of the Basic Law stipulates “[the] National People’s Congress authorizes the HKSAR to exercise
a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that offinal adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”6- 22 - 22 -

By virtue of Article 19, the courts of Hong Kong are vested with independent
jurisdiction over all cases in the territory, except with restrictions imposed by the legal
system and for those involving acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. 9 Article 85
stipulates that the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any
interference, and that members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in theperformance of their judicial functions. 10
The independence of the DoJ and the ICAC is enshrined in Articles 63 and 57. Under
Article 63, the DoJ is empowered to “control criminal prosecutions, free from any
interference”. Article 57 specifies that the ICAC “shall function independently and be
accountable to the Chief Executive”. 11
In addition to this constitutional guarantee of the independence of these institutions, theBasic Law establishes mechanisms to govern the qualities, including the ethical standards,
of judges and other public officers. Judges and other members of the judiciary shall bechosen on the basis of their judicial and professional qualities (Article 92). 12 Judges shallbe appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission
composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent persons fromother sectors (Article 88). 13 It is worth mentioning that the Basic Law allows a judge to be
removed for misbehaviour, provided that the prescribed stringent procedures have been
followed, such as the requirement of forming a tribunal consisting of local judges (Articles
89 and 90). 14 With this detailed arrangement, the Basic Law strikes a balance between thenecessities to ensure judges’ integrity on one hand, and, on the other, the protection ofjudges from arbitrary removal, which is essential to maintaining the independence of the
Judiciary.
Article 19 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[the] HKSAR shall be vested with independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. The courts of the HKSAR shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the
Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously
in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.”10
Article 85 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[the] courts of the HKSAR shall exercise judicial power
independently, free from any interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in theperformance of their judicial functions.”
11
Article 63 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[the] Department of Justice of the HKSAR shall control criminal
prosecutions, free from any interference. Article 57 stipulates that “[a] Commission Against Corruption shallbe established in the HKSAR. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive.”
12
Article 92 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[judges] and other members of the judiciary of the HKSAR
shall be chosen on the basis of their judicial and professional qualities and may be recruited from othercommon law jurisdictions.”
13
Article 88 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[judges] of the courts of the HKSAR shall be appointed by the
Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons
from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sectors.”
14
Article 89 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[a] judge of a court of the HKSAR may only be removed forinability to discharge his or her duties, or for misbehavior, by the Chief Executive on the recommendation ofa tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal and consisting of not fewer than three
local judges. The Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR may be investigated only forinability to discharge his or her duties, or for misbehavior, by a tribunal appointed by the Chief Executive
and consisting of not fewer than five local judges and may be removed by the Chief Executive on therecommendation of the tribunal and in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Law.” Article 90 of
the Basic Law stipulates that “…[in] the case of the appointment or removal of judges of the Court of Final
Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court of the HKSAR, the Chief Executive shall, in addition tofollowing the procedures prescribed in Articles 88 and 89 of this Law, obtain the endorsement of theLegislative Council and report such appointment or removal to the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress for the record.”
9- 23 - 23 -The Basic Law also specifies the appointment and promotion of public officers
including prosecutors and ICAC officers. Article 103 of the Basic Law requires that their
appointment and promotion shall be on the basis of their qualifications, experience andability. Moreover, Hong Kong’s system of recruitment, employment, assessment,
discipline, training and management for the public service which has been in place before
1997 shall be maintained. 15 As further elaborated below, a robust system is in place within
the DoJ and the ICAC to ensure a high level of integrity of their officers.
B. Legal Provisions
While the Basic Law prescribes the constitutional framework to uphold the
independence and integrity of the Judiciary, the DoJ and the ICAC, there are a number ofstatutory and case laws on which a more detailed structure is developed for sustaining these
two essential principles. For example, the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong emphasizes theprosecutorial independence of the Secretary for Justice and the DoJ in one of its judgments:
The prosecutorial independence of the Secretary for Justice is a linchpin of therule of law… ‘the decision whether any citizen should be prosecuted orwhether any prosecution should be discontinued, should be a matter for theprosecuting authorities to decide on the merits of the case without political orother pressure’ [Sir Robert Finlay, 1903]… these statements… reflect accepted
and applied fundamental principle in this jurisdiction [i.e. Hong Kong] thecontinuation of which is preserved by the entire theme of the Basic Law as
well, specifically, as by article 63. 16
The anti-corruption laws discussed below serve to illustrate the legal safeguards of theintegrity of judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption officials by outlawing specificmisbehaviour in the public sector. 17 The laws also reflect that the ICAC is empowered todischarge its duties independently.
1. Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (ICACO) gives the ICACa statutory anti-corruption mandate and prescribes the Commission’s powers and duties.
The independence of the ICAC is stipulated in the ICACO that “[the] Commissioner shallnot be subject to the direction or control of any person other than the Chief Executive”(section 5). The Ordinance also ensures the ICAC’s financial stability through a provisionthat the expenses of the Commission shall be charged to the government’s general revenue(section 4).

Article 103 of the Basic Law stipulates that “[the] appointment and promotion of public servants shall beon the basis of their qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong’s previous system of recruitment,
employment, assessment, discipline, training and management for the public service, including special bodies
for their appointment, pay and conditions of service, shall be maintained, except for any provisions forprivileged treatment of foreign nationals.”
16
Re C (A Bankrupt) [2006] 4 HKC 582 at 590; Department of Justice, Hong Kong SAR, Prosecution Code,paragraph 1.4, <https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/publications/prosecution_code.html>.
17
The anti-corruption laws of Hong Kong outlaw corruption in both the public and private sectors. For a more
focused discussion, only the legal provisions concerning public sector corruption are included in this paper.
Further information about the anti-corruption legislation can be found in ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “Legal
Empowerment”, <https://www.icac.org.hk/en/about/power/index.html>; ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “Anticorruption Laws”, <https://www.icac.org.hk/en/law/law/index.html>.
15- 24 - 24 -The Ordinance empowers the ICAC to investigate, among other things, bribery-related
offences. Apart from that, the Commission has the purview to receive, consider andinvestigate complaints alleging corrupt practices, as well as to investigate government
officers’ conduct which is connected with or conducive to corrupt practices (section 12).
More importantly, the ICAC performs these duties on its own. The Commission is not
required to seek prior permission from any person or body before starting an investigation.
The ICACO also sets out the parameters of the ICAC investigations, procedures forhandling suspects and the disposal of property connected with offences. The ICAC, forexample, possesses powers to arrest and search suspects of corruption-related offences and,with court warrants, to search and seize their premises and detain their properties. The
ICAC’s powers of investigation are further strengthened by the POBO, under which the
ICAC has the authority to access bank accounts and records, and with court orders, searchand examine business and private documents. With judicial controls, the ICAC may requirea suspect to furnish information of his property, expenditure, liabilities, and money orproperty sent out of Hong Kong. The ICAC may also require a suspect to surrender his
travel documents and restrain him from disposing of his property. This legal empowerment
allows the ICAC to perform its duties independently with adequate resources and powers.
Apart from the mandate in law enforcement, the ICACO stipulates that the ICAC has
the duty to examine the practices and procedures of government departments and publicbodies to identify corrupt practices, and to secure the changes of these practices orprocedures to reduce corruption. The ICAC is also tasked under the Ordinance to educate
the public of the evils of corruption, and to foster public support in combating corruption.
2. Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) is the main anti-corruption law in HongKong. Administered by the ICAC, it outlaws corruption in both the public and private
sectors. By imposing specific legal sanctions on public officers’ corrupt behaviours,
including outright bribery, acceptance of restricted advantages in their private lives andpossession of unexplained wealth and property, the Ordinance serves as a useful instrument
governing the integrity of public officers.
Judges, prosecutors and ICAC officers are categorized as “public servants” and“prescribed officers” under the POBO. The Ordinance outlaws public servants’ solicitation
and acceptance of any advantage as an inducement to or reward for performing any act intheir official capacity (section 4). Prescribed officers are further prohibited from solicitingor accepting any advantage without the general or special permission of the Chief Executive(section 3), even if such advantage is unconnected with the prescribed officers’ official
duties. The objective of this strict provision, which is an anti-corruption measure, is toprevent prescribed officers from falling into the trap of being sweetened up andcompromising their integrity, even though the advantage concerned may be of very smallvalue and may not be directly related to his/her official capacity.
To curb illicit enrichment by corrupt officials who receive bribes over a long period oftime but whose assets cannot be linked to a specific corrupt dealing, the POBO provides
that a prescribed officer shall be guilty of an offence if he/she maintains a standard of living
or has assets not commensurate with his/her official emoluments and he/she fails to give asatisfactory explanation to the court (section 10).

- 25 - 25 -

3. Common Law Offence – Misconduct in Public Office
In addition to statutory laws, case law, or precedents, play an important role in the legal
system of Hong Kong. Public officers’ integrity deficit may take place in different forms,
such as outright bribery, acceptance of advantages from work-related contacts, conflict ofinterest, as well as abuse of power, discretion and duties. As illustrated above, the POBO
is capable of tackling outright bribery, acceptance of restricted advantages in prescribed
officers’ private lives and possession of unexplained wealth and property. However, some
corrupt practices may be less definite but exhibit a tendency to undermine integrity
seriously enough to attract criminal liability on part of public officers, and the POBO may
not be wide enough in scope to redress these situations. In these cases, the common law
offence of misconduct in public office comes into play.
This common law offence is necessarily cast in general terms because it needs to coverdifferent forms of misconduct, no matter whether it takes place by act or omission. The
offence is committed where:(i) a public official;(ii) in the course of or in relation to his public office;(iii) wilfully misconducts himself; by act or omission, for example, by wilfully
neglecting or failing to perform his duty;(iv) without reasonable excuse or justification; and(v) where such misconduct is serious, not trivial, having regard to the responsibilitiesof the office and the officeholder, the importance of the public objects which they
serve and the nature and extent of the departure from those responsibilities. 18
While the aforementioned statutory and case laws target specific offences, they can also
be seen as the minimum integrity standard which government officers, judges, prosecutors,
and ICAC officers must observe.
C. Institutional Arrangements
Legal provisions seek to protect the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, theDoJ, the ICAC and their members by outlawing specific illegal behaviours. However, there
are some other misbehaviours or ethical issues which are not illegal per se, but may
seriously affect the independence and integrity of the key players working in the anticorruption system if not dealt with properly. To address these problems, government-wide
rules and regulations and the institutions’ internal guidelines and procedures are often as
important as the legal provisions in ensuring the members’ independence and integrity.
Over the years, the concepts of independence and integrity have already been embeddedin these rules and guidelines. This can be illustrated in four areas, namely (i) recruitment
and appointment, (ii) codes and regulations, (iii) discipline and sanction, as well as (iv)checks and balances mechanism.
1. Recruitment and Appointment
The Basic Law’s requirements for establishing an independent system to appoint judges
and judicial officers, as mentioned in the earlier part of this paper, is effected through the
Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission (JORC) and the Judiciary’s recruitment
exercises. The JORC is a nine-member statutory body responsible for making
18

Sin Kam Wah Lam Chuen Yip and Another v HKSAR [2005] HKCU 672.

- 26 - 26 -

recommendations to the Chief Executive on appointment of most of the judicial offices in
the Judiciary, from magistrates up to the Chief Justice. 19 It is assisted by the Judiciary,
which regularly conducts open recruitment exercises of judges and judicial officers except
those in the appellate courts. Advertisements are placed on the Judiciary's website andnewspapers. The Chief Justice appoints judges and/or judicial officers to a selection board,which considers the applications and submits its views to the JORC for consideration. The
selection is based on the applicants’ professional qualifications and experience, having
regard to the relevant constitutional and legal requirements.
The JORC and the related mechanism ensure that judges and judicial officers are
selected and appointed without the executive authorities’ interference. In fact, one of thePermanent Judges of the Court of Final Appeal, who was long involved in the work of theJORC, remarked on the occasion of his retirement in 2013 that “I can bear witness to thefact that there has never been any interference from any quarter or any person in theappointment of judges. All my colleagues were appointed on their own merits.” 20
The recruitment of prosecutors and ICAC officers is subject to stringent administrative
procedures which ensure the appointees’ high quality and the prevention of cronyism. The
DoJ and the ICAC conduct their own recruitment exercises openly. The entry requirements,
qualities expected and job duties are set out in the job advertisements posted in newspapers
and on the institutions’ websites. There is a clear, predetermined set of criteria for selecting
the candidates. Before the formal appointment, the potential appointees have to undergo
integrity checking, the complexity of which depends on the nature and rank of the post. 21
Such processes may include checking the background of the candidate and his/her family,interviewing past employers and/or paying visits to the candidate’s residence. These
measures ensure that the appointees are of good character and high integrity.
2. Codes and Regulations
There are regulations, codes and guidelines in the Judiciary, the DoJ and the ICAC toprescribe the conduct of their members and provide guidance for the members to discharge
duties. Independence and integrity are emphasized in these regulations. Some of theexamples are quoted below:(i)

The Judiciary has developed a Guide to Judicial Conduct for judges and judicial
officers. “Independence”, “Impartiality” as well as “Integrity and Propriety” areset as the three guiding principles for considering whether a judicial conduct isappropriate. 22(ii)

Prosecutors and ICAC officers are bound by the government’s Civil Service Code,in which six principles, namely “commitment to the rule of law”, “honesty andintegrity”, “objectivity and impartiality”, “political neutrality”, “accountability
for decisions and actions” and “dedication, professionalism and diligence” are set

The list of judicial offices under the purview of the JORC can be found in Schedule 1 of the Judicial
Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance.
20
Farewell Sitting for the Honourable Mr Justice Chan PJ (18 October 2013) (2013) 16 HKCFAR 1012 at
1019.
21
Civil Service Bureau, Hong Kong SAR, “Integrity checking”,<https://www.csb.gov.hk/english/admin/conduct/136.html>.
22
Judiciary, Hong Kong SAR, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2004),<https://www.judiciary.hk/doc/en/publications/gjc_e.pdf>.
19- 27 - 27 -

as the core values of the civil service. In addition, the government has acomprehensive set of Civil Service Regulations, supplemented by circulars issued
by the Civil Service Bureau, to govern and guide behaviours and conduct of civil
servants and ICAC officers. Topics include conflict of interest, acceptance ofadvantages and entertainment, declaration of private investments, as well as thereporting of crime and corruption.
(iii) The DoJ’s Prosecution Code is a set of statements and instructions to guideprosecutors in conducting prosecutions. “Independence of the Prosecutor”
constitutes the first chapter of the Code, which stresses that a prosecutor must not
be influenced by, among a number of factors, the political and individual interestof the prosecutor. 23(iv) The ICAC has its own Commission Standing Orders (CSOs) regulating the
conduct and discipline of its officers. The Code of Ethics in the CSOs specifies
that ICAC officers are “to adhere to the principles of integrity and fair play” and“to carry out their duties without fear or favour, prejudice or ill will”.
The requirements for handling properly conflict of interest can be used to demonstrate
how these regulations and codes operate. Conflict of interest generally refers to the situation
where an individual’s private interest competes or conflicts with the interest of theinstitution which he/she serves or with the individual’s official duties. Conflict of interest,
no matter whether it is an actual, perceived or potential one, poses a threat to both
independence and integrity of the public officer and the institution, and therefore must be
handled properly. This issue is covered in the internal regulations for judges, prosecutors
and ICAC officers in various ways.
For instance, prosecutors and ICAC officers must follow the government’s guidelines
on conflict of interest. The general principle is to avoid conflict of interest from happening
in their performance of duties. In case such conflict is unavoidable, the officer in question
must declare the conflict to his/her supervisors as soon as possible, and the officer should
refrain from taking part in that task. Depending on the office and seniority which a person
holds, there are additional requirements for preventing conflict of interest. Examples
include declaration of private investments and restriction on outside employment after
his/her service in the institution.
While there are common ethical issues which exist across the public sector, individual
institutions may have their own concerns of members’ integrity in particular areas. These
concerns are often reflected in their internal regulations and daily work practices.
For example, the ICAC, as a law enforcement agency, places much emphasis on
confidentiality of its investigative work. Confidentiality is a fundamental principle of the
ICAC because any premature disclosure of information related to corruption cases will
jeopardize the investigation and affects the reputation of a person who is the subject ofcomplaint. The strict adherence to confidentiality also gives confidence to members of the
public that they can make reports to the ICAC without any fear that their identities will beknown by third parties. In fact, confidentiality is a legal requirement for the ICAC’s
Department of Justice, Hong Kong SAR, Prosecution Code,<https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/publications/prosecution_code.html>.

23- 28 - 28 -investigation. Section 30 of the POBO prohibits unauthorized disclosure of details about
an investigation of POBO offences and the identity of the person being investigated. The
confidentiality requirement is therefore built into the ICAC’s internal regulations and daily
practices. The ICAC Code of Ethics requires officers to “maintain necessaryconfidentiality”. ICAC officers carry out duties, especially those related to investigation,according to the “need-to-know” principle. When handling corruption complaints, theidentity of the complainant is treated in strict confidence. Only case officers or thedesignated officers are allowed to gain access to the information. 24
3. Discipline and Sanction
The integrity of judges, prosecutors and ICAC officers is also upheld through effective
mechanisms to handle allegations of malpractices. The Judiciary has set up a system toreceive and handle complaints against a judge’s conduct (as opposed to a judge’s judicial
decision, which should be solved only through an appeal to the higher court). A member ofthe public may lodge his/her complaint in writing. The court leader whom the judge being
complained works under will investigate the matter and take further action as appropriate,including bringing the matter to the attention of the Chief Justice and/or the JORC. 25 As
mentioned above, the Basic Law allows a judge to be removed for misbehaviour, provided
that the prescribed stringent procedures have been followed.
Prosecutors are subject to the same mechanism for handling disciplinary matters as thatfor other civil servants. If a civil servant, such as a prosecutor, contravenes the government
regulations, the department concerned will follow up in accordance with the establishedprocedures, such as departmental investigation, summary disciplinary action, and/or formal
disciplinary hearings. If there is evidence that the civil servant has misconducted
himself/herself or has been convicted of criminal offence, the department will takeappropriate action, such as imposing suitable disciplinary punishments from verbal/written
warning to dismissal. 26
The ICAC also has a comprehensive mechanism to monitor its officers’ conduct andhandle complaints against their malpractices. In particular, there is an internal investigationand monitoring group within the ICAC to investigate breaches of staff discipline andallegations against ICAC officers. Investigations into alleged corruption and related
offences are referred to the Secretary for Justice for advice. When an investigation iscompleted, it will be reported to the Operations Review Committee for consideration. Other
criminal complaints not relating to corruption are referred to the appropriate law
enforcement authority for investigation. For non-criminal complaints against the ICAC or
its staff, the progress of the investigation by the internal investigation and monitoring groupis monitored by an independent ICAC Complaints Committee, which is formed by external
members appointed by the Chief Executive. 27 The ICAC has procedures to administer
ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “Reporting Corruption – Frequently Asked Questions”,<https://www.icac.org.hk/en/rc/faq/index.html>.
25
Judiciary, Hong Kong SAR, Complaints against a Judge’s conduct,<https://www.judiciary.hk/doc/en/publications/complaintsjjoleaflet.pdf>.
26
Possible disciplinary actions include verbal warning, written warning, reprimand, severe reprimand,
reduction in rank, compulsory retirement and dismissal. Department of Justice, Hong Kong SAR, “Press
Release: LCQ9: Ensuring the Impartiality of Prosecutors”, 4 December 2019,<https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201912/04/P2019120400439.htm>.
27
ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, ICAC Annual Report 2019, p. 54,<https://www.icac.org.hk/icac/annual-report/2019/>; ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “ICAC Complaints
Committee”, <https://www.icac.org.hk/en/check/complaint/index.html>.
24- 29 - 29 -summary and formal disciplinary actions, depending on the gravity of the misconduct. In
extreme cases, the Commissioner may terminate the appointment of an officer under
section 8(2) of the ICACO if the Commissioner considers that the breach is of such a serious
nature that it is in the interests of the Commission to do so.
4. Checks and Balances Mechanism
It is of utmost importance that judges, prosecutors and ICAC officers should be
independent from interference when carrying out their duties. On the other hand, it is also
legitimate for the society to have high expectation for them to act with integrity and proper
conduct. The reason is that insufficient transparency and lack of checks and balances maylead to allegations of abuse of authority and trigger public mistrust. Moreover, the anticorruption system will earn more public confidence if it is suitably monitored by thecommunity and is capable of responding to legitimate expectations, including those on the
integrity standard of its members. Such healthy interaction between the institutions andexternal parties may, in turn, further consolidate the independence and integrity of the anticorruption system.
For example, while the ICAC is directly accountable to the Chief Executive, its
Commissioner is required to answer to the legislature on policy and funding matters. In
addition, there are four advisory committees to oversee different aspects of work of the
ICAC. The Advisory Committee on Corruption oversees the general work direction of the
ICAC and advises the Commission on policy matters in relation to the fight against
corruption. The Operations Review Committee, the one mentioned above, oversees theinvestigation work of the Operations Department. The Corruption Prevention Advisory
Committee advises the ICAC on the priority of corruption prevention studies and examines
all the study reports prepared by the Corruption Prevention Department. The Citizens
Advisory Committee on Community Relations advises the Commission on community
education and engagement strategies and the work of the Community Relations Department.
Most members of these committees are prominent citizens appointed by the Chief
Executive, so that citizens’ voice is channelled to the ICAC. In addition to the four advisorycommittees, the independent ICAC Complaints Committee, which monitors the handlingof non-criminal complaints against the ICAC and its officers, is another part of the checks
and balances mechanism to ensure the good conduct of ICAC officers.
D. Societal Expectation
The performance of the ICAC, as well as the entire criminal justice system, is subject
to close public scrutiny. The vibrant mass media in Hong Kong constantly keeps a close
eye on the work of public authorities, including the ICAC. The public also has a highexpectation for the ICAC in properly discharging duties without bias and fear. In the
Annual Survey 2020 conducted locally by an independent polling agency commissionedby the ICAC, 93.2% of the respondents consider that the ICAC deserves their support.
81.7% of the respondents are willing to report corruption to the ICAC, and 72.4% are of
the view that the ICAC’s anti-corruption work is effective. 28 While the favourable findings
indicate the local community’s great confidence in the ICAC, the survey itself serves as animportant tool to measure the level of public support for the ICAC. It spurs the Commission
to improve its performance and uphold its members’ conduct, so as to meet the increasing
expectation of the society.
ICAC, Hong Kong SAR, “Findings of Survey 2020”,<https://www.icac.org.hk/en/survey/finding/index.html>.

28- 30 - 30 -

E. International Obligations
Hong Kong has to fulfil its international obligations to ensure the independence andintegrity of its anti-corruption work. The UNCAC, as mentioned at the beginning of thispaper, includes provisions for the independence and integrity of public officials, thejudiciary, prosecution services and anti-corruption agencies. The Convention entered into
force for China in 2006, and has since then been applied to Hong Kong. Hong Kong, beinga special administrative region of China, is subject to the Convention’s implementation
review mechanism. The first review on the implementation of Chapter III “Criminalizationand Law Enforcement” and Chapter IV “International Co-operation” has been completed.
The second implementation review cycle, focusing on Chapter II “Preventive Measures”
and Chapter V “Asset Recovery”, is now underway.
International surveys also confirm the strong confidence of the global community in
Hong Kong’s criminal justice and anti-corruption systems. Hong Kong is ranked the second
highest in Asia in respect of the rule of law and control of corruption in the 2020 update of
the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank Group. 29 It has the second
highest score among Asian countries/territories under the indicator “judicial independence”
of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019. 30 In the World
Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2020, Hong Kong is ranked the third in Asia for its
overall rule of law performance. 31 Its ranking in the relevant sub-factors of the Rule of Law
Index is listed below:
Sub-factors
2.2 Government officials in the judicial
branch do not use public office for private
gain
8.1 Criminal investigation system is
effective
8.2 Criminal adjudication system istimely and effective

Hong Kong’s
score(from 0 to 1)
0.94

Hong Kong’s
ranking in
Asia
World
2nd
13th

0.70

3rd

3rd

0.70

3rd

12th

The Worldwide Governance Indicators report aggregate and individual governance indicators for over
200 economies for six dimensions of governance, namely (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political
Stability and Absence of Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv) Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule ofLaw, and (vi) Control of Corruption. In the 2020 update, Hong Kong is ranked 18th and 17th globally (outof 209 countries/territories) in the dimensions of “Rule of Law” and “Control of Corruption”, respectively.
Details can be found on the Worldwide Governance Indicators project website<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.
30 The Global Competitiveness Report reflects the economic competitiveness of an economy by assessing
the strength of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of that economy.
Hong Kong is ranked the 3rd most competitive place among 141 economies in the 2019 Report. Among the
103 indicators, Hong Kong is ranked the 8th globally in “Judicial Independence”. Details can be found in
the Global Competitiveness Report 2019 website <https://www.weforum.org/reports/how-to-end-a-decadeof-lost-productivity-growth>.
31
The Rule of Law Index assesses the extent which countries / territories adhere to the rule of law inpractice by examining eight factors, namely (i) constraints on government powers, (ii) absence ofcorruption, (iii) open government, (iv) fundamental rights, (v) order and security, (vi) regulatory
enforcement, (vii) civil justice and (viii) criminal justice. In 2020, Hong Kong’s overall ranking out the 128
countries and jurisdictions surveyed is 16th. Details can be found in the Rule of Law Index 2020 website<https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020>.
29- 31 - 31 -

Sub-factors

Hong Kong’s
score(from 0 to 1)
0.68
0.87
0.58

8.4 Criminal system is impartial
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption
8.6 Criminal system is free of improper
government influence
Source: World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2020

Hong Kong’s
ranking in
Asia
World
th
4
15th
rd
3
11th
3rd
41st

These positive findings not only reflect the capability of Hong Kong’s criminal justice
and anti-corruption systems of upholding integrity and effectiveness, but also serve as aconstant reminder for Hong Kong to ensure that the Judiciary, the DoJ and the ICAC
continue to remain impartial at the highest global standard when discharging their mandates.
IV. ICAC’S ROLES IN PROMOTING INTEGRITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTORThe ICAC adopts a holistic approach to bring culprits to justice by law enforcement, tominimize possibilities of corruption by systemic prevention, and to entrench a probity
culture in the society by community education. This three-pronged strategy is deployed tosupport all institutions in the public sector, including those in the criminal justice system,
to uphold their members’ integrity.
In addition to enforcing the anti-corruption law stringently to create a deterrence effect,
the ICAC has implemented comprehensive prevention and education initiatives to assist
the public sector, including the Judiciary and the DoJ, in preventing corruption andpromoting an integrity culture. The ICAC conducts in-depth corruption prevention studies
into various work areas of government departments and public organizations, covering
different policy initiatives, legislative proposals, operational and administrative proceduresand practices, licensing, regulatory and enforcement regimes. Since its establishment in
1974, the ICAC has completed more than 4,000 studies to help these institutions, including
the Judiciary and the DoJ, minimize corruption risks, enhance governance and strengthen
staff integrity mechanisms.
The ICAC also promotes the culture of integrity in government departments throughtrainings, educational materials and awareness raising projects. For example, the ICAC
organized the “Ethical Leadership Programme” in collaboration with the Civil Service
Bureau. Under this Programme, each government department, including the Judiciary andthe DoJ, has designated a senior official as “Ethics Officer”. These Ethics Officers map out
ethics management strategies based on the departments’ needs and priorities, and takecharge of implementing integrity-related activities within the department. As a co-initiatorof the Programme, the ICAC supports the government departments and their Ethics
Officers to raise anti-corruption awareness within the departments. For example, thematic
seminars are organized to update the Ethics Officers on topical issues related to staff
integrity and corruption risks. The Ethics Officers may adopt materials developed by the
ICAC, such as corruption prevention guides, educational cartoons and feature articles, inthe staff integrity training of their departments. An intranet portal has also been set up for
the ICAC and the Ethics Officers to share the information, reference materials, experienceand best practices on promoting integrity.
- 32 - 32 -

In addition to working through Ethics Officers, the ICAC arranges anti-corruption
training talks and workshops for around 30,000 civil servants every year. These training
activities feature topics like anti-corruption laws and common corruption risks. Ethicalchallenges such as conflict of interest, misuse of authority, undesirable association withpeople of dubious background, and supervisors’ accountability in managing the integrityof their staff, are also discussed. Government departments are encouraged to arrange anticorruption training for their staff members regularly, so that the entire workforce can be
kept reminded of the importance of upholding high ethical standards. The ICAC also
developed an “Integrity Management e-learning Platform for Civil Servants”,
encompassing learning modules on the anti-corruption laws and ethical scenarios. Civil
servants can access it any time through the government-wide online learning portal.
All the above initiatives aim to help build up a robust anti-corruption system in the
public sector, in which possibilities of corruption are minimized, and members’ awarenessagainst corruption is maximized.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKSThis paper tries to illustrate, from the ICAC’s perspective, how Hong Kong safeguards,
at multiple levels, the independence and integrity of judges, prosecutors and anti-corruption
officials, which are crucial to the territory’s fight against corruption. In addition to theconstitutional framework and legal provisions which set out the high-level guarantees of
independence and integrity, each institution within the anti-corruption system has its
significant role to ensure that it functions in a fair, just and unbiased way. The interplay ofother safeguards, including the checks and balances mechanism, ICAC’s anti-corruption
measures, and most importantly the consensus and aspirations of the society, also helps
sustain the independence and integrity of the judicial, prosecutorial and anti-corruption
authorities in Hong Kong.

- 33 - 33 -- 34 - 34 -

COUNTRY PRESENTATION PAPERS

Ms. Norfarisah Mohd Harris& Ms. Rashidah binti Haji Rashid, Brunei Darussalam***
Mr. Tong Heng, Cambodia***
Mr. Lie Putra Setiawan, Indonesia***
Mr. Thongkham Soumaloun, Lao PDR***
Mr. OTANI Junichiro, Japan***
Mr. Asrul Ridzuan Bin Ahmad Rustami& Mr. Mohamad Faizal Bin Sadri, Malaysia***
Ms. Hazel Canet Decena-Valdez, Ms. Lyn Gaa Dimayuga& Mr. Renato Aviles Peralta Jr., Philippines***
Mr. Khoo Wei Quan, Wilson& Mr. Hon Yi, Singapore***
Mr. Sutthi Sookying, Thailand***
Mr. Augusto Da Costa Castro, Timor-Leste- 35 - 35 -- 36 - 36 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OFJUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Norfarisah Mohd Harris *I. CASE STUDY
PP vs Ramzidah binti Pehin Datu Kesuma Diraja Kol (R) Hj Abd Rahman (1st Defendant)
and Haji Nabil Daraina bin Pehin Udana Khatib Dato Paduka Seri Setia Ustaz Hj
Awang Badaruddin (2nd Defendant)o The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) of Brunei Darussalam received informationthat the Honourable Senior Registrar, High Court Ramzidah binti PDKD Hj Abdul
Rahman, who is also the Official Receiver, committed an act contrary to Section 12(maintains a standard of living or in control of assets which are not commensuratewith official emoluments), Section 12 A (misconduct of public office) and Chapter
6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131) and was also suspected ofcommitting other offences under the Penal Code (Chapter 22) and other related laws.
o Ramzidah, a former magistrate, was one of the few Court-appointed Official
Receivers for bankruptcy, and in such capacity she oversaw payments into the
Court’s trust accounts for creditors (also referred to as “Official Receiver accounts”).
During the course of her employment in this role, she removed funds from 255
Judgment Debtors’ accounts for personal use in the amount of BND15,750,292.24.
o Haji Nabil, Ramzidah’s husband and a former prosecutor before becoming a judge,
was not involved in the predicate offending; however, he was involved inlaundering of the proceeds of Ramzidah’s offending. They were both charged withpossession of unexplained wealth under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter131), but those charges were stayed until the completion of the trial. The stay has
since been lifted and the prosecutors are currently still deliberating on whether toproceed with these charges.
A. Initial Detectiono The ACB received information on 28 December 2017 which indicated thatRamzidah and Nabil were living lavishly in a manner that exceeded their expected
income. The Complaints Evaluation Committee (CEC) assessed this information on
30 December 2017 and investigation commenced on the same day.
o Information from the intelligence-gathering phase that included an analysis of thefinancial statements was sufficient for ACB to determine that there was reason tocommence a full-blown investigation, starting with the issuance of freeze orders on
the two suspects’ bank accounts in January 2018, which amounted to
BND681,496.45 and GBP5,050.13.
*

Senior Special Investigator, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Brunei Darussalam.

- 37 - 37 -o A separate money-laundering investigation into this case was opened on 5 March2018.
o The ACB utilized a multi-disciplinary investigation team to investigate thiscomplex case. The team consisted of investigation officers from different fields or
specialization such as intelligence, financial investigation, forensic investigation
and a designated investigator who would carry out investigation under thePrevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131) or other prescribed offences. This teamworked together to identify proceeds of crime to plan for seizure, asset management
and confiscation.
B. Funds Tracing: Internationalo From the initial analysis of their financial details, it was determined that not all
funds that were embezzled made their way into the two magistrates’ accounts. Any
cash withdrawn from the Official Receiver accounts was mostly deposited toRamzidah’s and Nabil’s account. The remainder that was not deposited was later
found to have been used to purchase luxury items within the country or overseas.
Moreover, those funds that were deposited to the Ramzidah’s and Nabil’s personalaccounts eventually also made their way overseas through bank telegraphictransfers.
o Open-source information indicated that Ramzidah, Nabil and their children had asignificant presence in the United Kingdom. Their social media platforms,
including Instagram, indicated that they were living at a residence in the UK, anddrove their own vehicles. The authorities obtained further information to assess any
flow of funds to the UK as well.
a. Wire transfers were identified amounting to GBP875,581.02 and BND1.3
million from their accounts in Brunei to their accounts in the UK that could
support their purported lavish expenses in the UK, and this information wasshared with the ACB.
b. Obtained confirmation from the UK that all the purported residences andvehicles were rentals and not owned outright by either Ramzidah or Nabil.
c. Further to this, the ACB also sought informal assistance from the Bribery
and Corruption Intelligence Unit (BCIU) of the National Crime Agency(NCA) of the UK. The NCA conducted intelligence gathering on bankaccounts and assets owned by Ramzidah and Nabil in the UK and thefindings were then used to substantiate the request subsequently madethrough formal Mutual Legal Assistance channels.
C. Operation
The ACB conducted operations in three phases:
a. Phase I (to locate and identify their properties)Conducted search at the Judiciary office- 38 - 38 -

Search was conducted to collect evidence relating to the judgment
debtors such as bank passbook, files on the dividend pay-out, cash
and other supporting evidence to support the criminal breach of trust
offences.
Conducted search at their residence
Search at their residence was conducted to collect evidence relating
to the judgment debtors and also to collect evidence on the lavish
lifestyle and any other supporting evidence on the proceed of crimes.
The assets found during the search were secured and sealed. This
will ensure that the assets are not removed or destroyed.

Conducted search at their registered address
Further search was conducted at their registered address.
Preliminary investigation revealed that Ramzidah and her children
had a registered address at her parents’ house. In order for thoroughinvestigation the parents’ house was searched for any evidence
pertaining to proceeds of crimes or assets. Assets found were seized
and some were sealed to prevent removal or being destroyed.

Secured all assets
All assets found during the preliminary investigation and searchwere seized or sealed to ensure that the assets are not disposed. For
example, regarding the cars. ACB notified the relevant authority toprevent any sales or transfer of ownership.

Froze all local banks accounts
All bank accounts established during the preliminary investigationand search were frozen. Relevant banks issued Notice Orders signedby the Public Prosecutor.

b. Phase II (to seize their properties)Re-searched their residence and registered address
Searches were conducted at their residence for the purpose of seizing
all the cars, luxury items such as handbags and watches as theinvestigation revealed that items were acquired using proceeds ofcrime. Thorough search was conducted to ensure no secret area tohide the cash withdrawn from the official receiver bank accounts.



Seized all assets e.g., cars, luxury items- 39 - 39 -All assets were seized from both their residence. The assets werethen kept at a secure location for safekeeping. Assets are maintainedfor confiscation.
c. Phase III (to locate and seize the remaining properties)


Seized cars from parents’ house, car agents and parking lot
All assets were seized from their parents’ house, car agents and also
hotel parking lot. The assets were then kept at a secure location for
safekeeping. Assets are maintained for confiscation.

Investigation continues, calling for witness and gathering evidence to be tendered incourt. ACB has called witnesses for statement to support the evidence of Criminal Breachof Trust, Prevention of Corruption Act and Money Laundering offences. During theinvestigation ACB has called the following:









Judiciary officers and personnel- to support the roles and responsibility ofRamzidah and the procedures in handling official receiver bank accounts.
256 judgment debtors – to support that there was no instruction to Ramzidah
for withdrawing money from their official receiver accounts.
Creditors – to support that they have not received payments to settle thedebts.
Bank personnel – to support the withdrawal made from Official Receiveraccounts by Ramzidah and the cash denomination she received.
Bank personnel – to support the cash deposits and telegraphic transfers toUnited Kingdom.
Expert Witness – ACB has documentation to support evidence thatRamzidah withdrew the cash withdrawal from the banks.
CCTV – to support the CCTV footage at the banks – during withdrawal and
Cash deposits using the cash deposit machine.
Car sales agents – to support the cash payments for the cars purchased.

D. Prosecution and Trial
 In order to avoid any conflict of interest or lack of impartiality as both defendants
are judiciary officers and also previously a Deputy Public Prosecutor from the
Attorney General Chambers, the Government of Brunei engaged Queen’s Counsel(QC) from the United Kingdom to lead the prosecution team.
 Meanwhile the Judiciary Department assigned the case to the visiting High Court
Judge from the United Kingdom to Brunei to hear the case.
 In July 2018, both defendants faced 157 charges which were reduced to 40 charges
for offences of criminal breach of trust (CBT) by a public servant under Section 409
of the Penal Code, Cap 22; money laundering (ML) under Section 3, CARO; andpossession of unexplained property under Section 12, Prevention of Corruption Act,Cap 131.

- 40 - 40 - In January 2020, the case was concluded with a conviction of the charges for bothdefendants. Haji Nabil was sentenced to 5 years for the offence under money
laundering while Ramzidah was sentenced 10 years concurrently for CBT andmoney laundering.
II. CONCLUSION
The High Court sentenced Ramzidah, who was the deputy official receiver at the
Bankruptcy Office to the maximum penalty of ten (10) years for each of the charges ofcriminal breach of trust by a public servant and five (5) years for each of the charges ofmoney laundering. This maximum custodial sentence is allowed under the relevant
legislation. The judge highlighted during sentencing that “it would be impossible to find amore egregious example of criminal breach of trust and it was wrong you assume that yourposition in judiciary and society could protect you from your crime”.
For Hj Nabil who was a senior magistrate, the court sentenced him to five years
concurrently for each of his offences of money laundering. The judge highlighted that there
is no doubt that he was fully aware of his wife’s activity. If he had integrity, he could havereported it to the authorities, but he was more than happy to share in the lavish lifestyle hiswife has provided. He had abused his position in the judiciary.
Though both defendants have been sentenced to jail, the prosecution still applied for abenefit recovery order to assess the value of the benefit derived from the defendant's crimes.
The prosecution has also filed notice for a restraining order on all the property seized by
the Anti-Corruption Bureau to prohibit the property from being taken or dealt with in any
manner, as they are subject to the confiscation order.
This case proves that judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials are not above
the law, and they are independent in combating corruption and other wrongdoing.

References
i.
ii.
iii.

Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131)
Criminal Asset Recovery Order (CARO), 2012
PP vs Ramzidah binti Pehin Datu Kesuma Diraja Kol (R) Hj Abdul Rahman (1stDefendant) Haji Nabil Daraina bin Pehin Udana Khatib Dato Paduka Seri Setia
Ustaz Hj Awang Badaruddin (2nd Defendant) Criminal Trial No.11 of 2018)- 41 - 41 -- 42 - 42 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OFJUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Rashidah binti Haji Rashid *I. INTRODUCTIONThe United Nations and other international organizations have made efforts to promote
the integrity and independence of the judiciary, prosecutorial authorities and law
enforcement authorities and have adopted several relevant legal instruments. Most
importantly, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Article 5 statesthat a State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system,
develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that
promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of rule of law, proper
management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency andaccountability. In addition to Article 5, Article 11 states the importance of securing theindependence of the judiciary and integrity in order to prevent and suppress corruption. In
addition to UNCAC, there are other essential laws and regulations to ensure integrity andindependence of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies.
In Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister’s Office is the central coordinating body for
all Government ministries and agencies, including the Judiciary Department, the Attorney
General Office and the Law Enforcement Agency. All public servants are governed byseveral laws and regulations and government circulars namely the Public Service
Commission Act (Chapter 83) – Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations.
The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Brunei Darussalam was established on 1st February
1982. Following the formation of the Bureau, the Emergency (Prevention of Corruption)
Order, 1981 was replaced with the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131) (PCA). The
ACB is the lead agency with designated powers of investigation into corruption offences.
The PCA was reviewed and amended to include preventive powers and duties of theofficers of the Bureau and additional powers of investigation including misconduct inPublic Office. As for the Brunei Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), each investigator isgoverned under several laws and regulations. The laws and regulations are as follows:o The Public Service Commission Act (Chapter 83 of the Brunei Laws
This Act makes provision for the punishment of offences in connection with the
Public Service Commission, for the protection and remuneration of the members of
the Commission and for other matters connected therewith. ACB officers are
considered as members of the Commission. Under this Act, no member of theCommission shall publish or disclose any contents/documents/communications orinformation without consent. Any person contravening the provision shall be guiltyof an offence, with a penalty $5,000.00 and imprisonment of one year.

*

Assistant Special Investigator, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Brunei Darussalam.

- 43 - 43 -o Regulations made in General Orders:
All government officers have to follow the regulations stated in General Orders. If
any officers is against this order, they could be removed from the government office
if convicted, or they will not be promoted as disciplinary action.
o Instruction from the Prime Minister’s Office known as Surat Keliling:
This is a memorandum by the Prime Minister’s office which stated that if any
officers suspected/found to commit any offence under the Penal Code, the Ministry
has power to withhold their salary and to suspend them from working while the caseis under investigation.
o Treasury Circulars issued on financial matters; and Financial Regulation 1983
governing procurement and related issues.
It is the duty of all officers to be conversant with Financial Regulation and withsuch Treasury Circulars and special accounting instruction as are applicable to themor to their department. This is to establish a proper system of accounting and tosupervise the expenditure and disbursement of the Government account so as toensure the integrity of the officers.
Several other government agencies also act as a check and balance on the conduct ofcivil servants. This includes the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Besides the general laws andregulations, the ACB also has several standard operating procedures (SOP) in place toensure that investigations are conducted with integrity and independence. For example:o Any information received will be reviewed by the Complaint Evaluation
Committee;
o The committee consists of ACB senior officers and is chaired by the director;o Once investigation is completed the investigation papers will be forwarded to the
Deputy Public Prosecutor (DPP) for advice;o The DPP will decide to proceed with prosecution to ensure checks and balances
between investigation and prosecution.
As for prosecutors, the Criminal Justice Division under the Attorney General Chambers(AGC) is responsible for prosecuting the ACB’s and other law enforcement agencies’ cases.
The DPP will then evaluate the investigation papers forwarded by the ACB to ensure thatthe investigation is conducted in accordance with law and that there is sufficient evidence
to proceed with prosecution.
Magistrates and judges are governed under laws and regulations similar to other civil
services. Hence, magistrates and judges can be investigated and prosecuted.
II. CORRUPTION CONTROLIn 2015, Brunei enacted a new corruption law to address abuse of power andmisconduct in public office. The latest laws will give powers to the ACB to investigate
civil servants who fail to carry out their duties, for example, criminalizing the use of publicfunds for private purposes; giving undue preferential treatment; misuse of informationacquired during the course of duty; and allowing private interests to come into conflict withpublic duties. Hence, with these latest laws it will allow legal action to be taken against- 44 - 44 -

judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officers who fail to carry out their duties to a highethical standard.
III. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Since the new corruption laws were enacted, the ACB and the AGC have been giving
awareness talks to the civil service. The AGC also conducts training for ACB investigators
on what is required to conduct the investigation, such as handling exhibits and digital
evidence.
IV. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
In order to avoid any conflict of interest in case assignments (e.g., disqualification andrecusal of judges and prosecutors) some procedural safeguards have been put in place. For
example, in the Anti-Corruption Bureau, an investigator must declare to the director if there
is any conflict of interest in connection with a person of interest. For example, if the subject
is family or friend to the investigator, the case will then be reassigned to anotherinvestigating officer and as far as possible, the conflicted investigation will not be involvedin the case at all. As for prosecutors and judges, they must recuse themselves from any caseif they are disqualified from performing their legal duties because of a conflict of interestor lack of impartiality. The conflict of interest should be avoided to ensure integrity of thecase officer and also to avoid bias.
V. CONCLUSION
With high integrity of the Judges, Prosecutors, and Law Enforcement of Officials, mostof the cases in Brunei have been investigated and prosecuted well. Independence shows
equality and fairness of the duties of judges and prosecutor, and it is considered right for
all citizens.

References
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Constitutional Matters I, Constitution of Brunei Darussalam
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131)
Criminal Asset Recovery Order (CARO)- 45 - 45 -

- 46 - 46 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTIONOFFICIALS IN CAMBODIA
Tong Heng *I. THE INTEGRITY OF ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICIALS
Integrity can be considered as a strong moral principle that individuals and institutions
need to comply with. Integrity is obtaining a sense of trust, professionalism and confidence
from the public. In the early stages of the establishment of the Anti-corruption Unit (ACU),
integrity of officials was on the top of the agenda to make sure that all officials maintainthe highest standard of integrity and dignity. It was a good start for good officials.
A. Inspection and Supervision of Anti-Corruption Officials
In December 2014, the Disciplinary Council and Internal Control (DCIC) wasestablished. The legal mandate of the DCIC is to issue internal rules and inspect andsupervise anti-corruption officials. 1 Where there is any violation of work discipline and/or
conflict of interest, or any complaint against anti-corruption officials, the DCIC will open
an investigation.
The DCIC pronounces the following disciplinary sanctions 2:
First degree:- Oral censure;- A written record of censure entered into the official’s personnel file;- Involuntary transfer of the official from the existing post/position following thedisciplinary action and measures;- Removal of the official’s name from the list requesting promotion of rank andposition.
Second degree:- Severe reprimand which results in the permanent removal of the official’s namefrom the existing list of rank/position promotion once that individual’s name isalready on the list or suspended or delayed promotion of rank or position of that
official for a limited period of time, but this promotion sanction shall not beapplied for longer than the period of two years in the promotion turn;- Impose unpaid suspension on that officer for the period not longer than one
year;- Downgrade the official’s rank/position one scale lower or more than one scale;- Force the officer into early retirement or dismissal from office;- Dismissal of the officer from the civil service;- File the case in court.
Assistant to the President, Anti-corruption Unit, Cambodia.
Decision on the establishment of the Disciplinary Council and Internal Control (DCIC), art. 2,5.
2Internal Rules and Regulations for Anti-Corruption Officials, art. 12.
*1- 47 - 47 -

B. Asset Declaration and Liability Disclosure
The declaration of assets and liabilities is a historic work of Cambodia that wasdeveloped as a tool to prevent corruption. All ACU officials including contracted officials
declare their assets and liabilities every two years. Failure to declare or wrongly declare theassets and liabilities is subject to a sentence from one month to one year in prison and afine from one hundred thousand Riel (1,00,000) to two million Riel (2,000,000), and theofficial is forced to declare the assets and liabilities to the ACU. In case of refusal, double
punishment shall be applied.
Where there is an increase in the official’s assets and the official cannot provide
reasonable explanation in comparison to his or her lawful income, such unexplained wealthis subject to confiscation. All of the confiscated assets will become state property. In
addition, if the unexplained wealth is connected to any corruption offence, the property’s
owner shall be punished in accordance with the anti-corruption law.
C. Education and Training
Capacity-building and integrity are among the most important agenda items, and they
are included in the national anti-corruption strategy phase 3 (2020-2025). There are 12
courses on integrity per year. The course aims to raise awareness about the importance ofintegrity and the risks of corruption. Each course has 40 to 60 participants randomly
selected from all departments in the ACU. All anti-corruption officials have attended thiscourse. Furthermore, there are nine specialized training courses, such as case management,
firearms training and gun safety, mobile phone forensics etc., conducted each year toenhance capacity-building and professionalism.
D. Conflicts of Interest
1. Hospitality Management
Apart from official hospitality, which includes participation in workshops, conferences,and so forth representing the ACU or as a guest of honour nominated by the President of
the ACU, “Hospitality” refers to an invitation for entertaining activity, the offering ofaccommodation, travel arrangements and other services provided related to health,education, dining out and so forth.
ACU officials cannot accept the payment of any health service fees on their behalf or
any health insurance offered by any party, except offers from the government, family
members and relatives. For close friends who wish to provide such support, the officer mustseek permission and get approval from the President of the ACU and the Head of the DCIC.
“Dining Out” refers to having meals at any places such as at homes, restaurants etc.
when offered by other parties. Dining out may be arranged among ACU officials without
the presence of other parties or being arranged or paid for by other parties. Payment of thebill must be in one of two ways: shared bill (Russian style), or the higher-ranking official
must pay the bill for the subordinate officials (ACU Style).
2. The Management of Gifts
According to the ACU, “Gift” refers to any assets or services given to ACU officials
by a natural person or a legal entity which are not considered as an agreement, and it is nota traditional or customary gift such as gifts given at weddings or religious ceremonies.

- 48 - 48 -

All gifts which are worth 100,000 Khmer Riel or more should be rejected, except in thefollowing cases:
1.

Formal gift;

2.

Gift from lottery programme or any form of competition;

3.

In situations that the recipient finds it hard to reject or cannot reject the gift;

4.

Permission was obtained from the President of the ACU.

When receiving or declining gift, ACU officials are required to immediately report to
the President of the ACU and the Head of the DCIC. The Head of the DCIC shall make adecision as follows:
1. The recipient can keep the gift for the recipient’s personal use;
2. Order the sale of the accepted gift to the recipient according to the market price incase there is a request made to buy the gift;
3. To keep the gift as the property of the ACU.
Where there is an offering of hospitality or gift, an anti-corruption official must seek
permission from the President of the ACU and the Head of the DCIC via a means oftelegram 3 where the name of participants, the inviting party, the venue, time, the content
and the purpose of the meeting shall be informed. The President of the ACU and the Headof the DCIC have to reply within 60 minutes upon receiving the request. After receivingsuch request, the Head of the DCIC shall copy that request into the telegram of the DCIC,
and summarize the request and post it in the ACU’s official telegram. In case of there is no
reply, the request is considered to be approved.
3. On Case Assignment
Complaint officers and case officers must declare actual conflicts of interest, perceived
conflicts of interest, and potential conflicts of interest once having been assigned to fulfil
any missions or any working objectives. 4
II. INDEPENDENCE OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION UNIT
With a strong political will to combat corruption, the anti-corruption institution is
independent in budgeting, 5 structure 6 and operations. 7 On budgeting, an amendment of theanti-corruption law provided the anti-corruption institution with a special budget from thenational budget. The operational budget is from 0.2 to 0.3 per cent of the national budget

A mobile application used for communication.
Internal Rules and Regulations, 14th point and 2012 ACU Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of
Investigation.
5
Law on the Amendment of the Anti-corruption Law, art.16 new.
6
Law on the Amendment of the Anti-corruption Law, art.10 new.
7
Anti-corruption Law, art. 11.
34- 49 - 49 -per annum. 8 The budget is subject to review every three years. Where there is a need, theACU can request supplementary allocations as necessary.
On operations, the ACU is mandated to investigate all kinds of corruption offences andto refer these cases to the court without any consultation with any ministry. The ACU isaccountable to the National Council Against Corruption and the National Assembly. To
fulfil its mandate effectively, the Law on the Amendment of the Anti-corruption Law(2011) also provided the president of the National Council Against Corruption the right tostructure and nominate officials from the deputy director level to bottom line.
Anti-corruption Unit:
The mission statement of the ACU is to promote integrity and the fight against
corruption by all means, in all sectors, and at all levels in Cambodia through education,
prevention and deterrence, and law enforcement with participation from the public andinternational cooperation. Since the establishment of ACU, there has been a great change
in the public mindset – that is, participation in the fight against corruption has increased
year by year from every corner of society. As a result, there has been a significant increasein state revenue every year, which improved the efficiency of the delivery of public services.
Furthermore, at the time of this report, 100 Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) havebeen signed between the ACU and the private sector to demonstrate the commitment of
those private companies to remain corruption free.
There are many challenges along the way. These challenges include:
1. Changing the mindset, concept and habits of a society takes time andparticipation.
2. Legal framework, procedure and mechanism: the implementation of therecommendations obtained from the UNCAC review process have not yet met
the requirements for both witness and whistle-blower protection, asset recovery
and mutual legal assistance.
3. Anti-corruption efforts require participation from all stakeholders to work
together: that is, the participation from all stakeholders both from the public andprivate sectors.
4. Inter-agency coordination: despite positive and smooth progress, there is a needfor greater participation and understanding in both the public and judicial
institutions, especially on new priorities such as anti-money-laundering efforts,
asset recovery and so on. The mobilization of the participation of otherstakeholders will increase the speed and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.
5. Professional resources: skills such as financial document analysis, computer
forensics and accounting are still limited, especially when dealing with complex
and cross-border cases.
6. International Cooperation: although the ACU has had good experiences incollaborating with foreign counterparts, this work is still a challenge that8

Sub-decree on the management and division of budget of the ACU.

- 50 - 50 -requires building more knowledge, skills and expanding bilateral andmultilateral relations as much as possible.

- 51 - 51 -- 52 - 52 -

CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE CORRUPTION ERADICATIONCOMMISSION
Lie Putra Setiawan *Integrity is an important component for any institution in any country that is engaged
in public service, including judicial bodies. The integrity of judicial bodies is one of the
crucial issues, because the judiciary controls social values and norms. In this case, integrity
has become a necessity, because integrity is a tool that harmonizes values and norms thatare considered ideal and guided by the community.
As we know, laws and other regulations are only inanimate objects, where the strengthand usefulness of a law will become reality if it is enforced by law enforcement officials
who have good integrity.
The community can follow laws and regulations to regulate the relationship between
them; however, people sometimes disagree about the meaning of the formulation of the law
or how to apply it. This is why integrity is needed in the role of law enforcement officials,
including judges, who are obliged to try cases properly, produce fair decisions and havepositive impacts on society and the State.
Efforts to improve and maintain integrity have also been carried out by the Corruption
Eradication Commission, Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency, by adopting a code of
conduct that applies to every commission employee, including commissioners,
investigators and prosecutors. Like codes of conduct in general, this code of conduct must
be obeyed, and there are sanctions for violators.
I. BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT AT THE
CORRUPTION ERADICATION COMMISSION
A code of conduct is needed to direct the spirituality, motivation, attitudes andbehaviour of all Commission employees, so that it becomes a shared commitment andresponsibility in making it happen.
The Corruption Eradication Commission has formulated its basic values and code of
conduct twice. The first time, it was enacted in 2006 with the Corruption Eradication
Commission Regulation Number 05.P.KPK of 2006, concerning the Code of Conduct for
Corruption Eradication Commission Employees, which includes seven personal basic
values, namely: (1) integrity; (2) professionalism; (3) innovation; (4) transparency; (5)productivity; (6) religiosity; and (7) leadership.
Furthermore, with the background of changes in vision, mission, strategy andenvironmental dynamics, in 2013 the Corruption Eradication Commission changed the*Prosecutor, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Indonesia.

- 53 - 53 -

personal core values to five, namely: (1) religiosity; (2) integrity; (3) justice; (4)professionalism; and (5) leadership.
Articles 37 A and B of Law Number 19 of 2019 concerning the Second Amendment to
Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, theSupervisory Board was formed to improve the performance of the Corruption Eradication
Commission so that it is more effective and accountable in carrying out its duties andauthorities.
Article 37 B paragraph (1) letter c Law Number 19 of 2019 stipulates that theSupervisory Board is tasked with compiling and establishing a code of conduct forCommissioners and Employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission, and that thecode would take effect on 4 May 2020.
The Supervisory Board has issued three supervisory board regulations, namely:• KPK Supervisory Board Regulation Number 01 of 2020 concerning the Code of
Conduct of the Corruption Eradication Commission.
• KPK Supervisory Board Regulation Number 02 of 2020 concerning Enforcement of
the Code of Conduct of the Corruption Eradication Commission.
• KPK Supervisory Board Regulation Number 03 of 2020 concerning Procedures for
Examination and Trial of Code of Conduct for the Corruption Eradication
Commission.
Furthermore, the Supervisory Board held a session to examine any suspected violationsof the code of conduct by the commissioners and employees of the Corruption Eradication
Commission as stipulated in Article 37 B paragraph (1) letter e of Law Number 19 of 2019.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE CORRUPTIONERADICATION COMMISSIONThe Supervisory Board of the Corruption Eradication Commission has held several
hearings involving Commission employees, in which one of the hearings has handed downa verdict with severe sanctions in the form of dishonourable discharge of one of theemployees. The employee was proven to have received gratification which is consideredas bribery that violates the code of conduct stipulated in Article 4, paragraph (1), letters g
and h, as well as Article 4, paragraph (2), letter a, Regulation of the Supervisory Board
Number 02 of 2020 concerning Enforcement of the Code of Conduct of the Corruption
Eradication Commission. The employee's actions include giving a telephone contact
number to a detainee, receiving a food parcel, borrowing IDR800.000 and receiving anamount of money from one of the Corruption Eradication Commission detainees in theamount of IDR300.000.
In addition, there was also a hearing conducted by the Corruption Eradication
Commission's Supervisory Board against the Chairman, Firli Bahuri, regarding thepersonal use of a helicopter, which is considered as living a luxurious lifestyle and contrary
to ethics.

- 54 - 54 -The allegation against the Chairman for using the helicopter provoked negative
responses from society, which lowered public confidence in his leadership and theleadership of the Corruption Eradication Commission as a whole. In the decision imposing
punishment, the Chairman is said to have not shown exemplary values. Because of his
actions, the Chairman was declared to have violated the code of conduct stipulated in
Article 4, paragraph 1, letter n, and Article 8, paragraph 1, letter f, Regulation of theSupervisory Board Number 02 of 2020.
III. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE CORRUPTION ERADICATIONCOMMISSION
The five basic personal values of the Corruption Eradication Commission have beendetailed in various forms of actions, namely:
A. Integrity
The elements of integrity include obedience to laws and regulations, consistency withthe values of truth, anti-corruption, honesty, virtue, kindness, trustworthiness and good
reputation, which is detailed in the form of actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

Behave and act honestly in carrying out duties in accordance with the facts andtruth;
Obey and carry out commission regulations and/or take an oath or promise as aCommission Person;
Maintaining the image and dignity of the Commission in various forums, bothformal and informal, at home and abroad;
Having commitment and loyalty to the Commission and putting aside personal,
group or group interests in carrying out their duties;
Report if they know of an alleged violation of the code of conduct by theCommission's personnel;
To report assets in accordance with statutory regulations and Commission
regulations;Reject any gratuities deemed bribery, namely those related to position and contrary
to duties and obligations, which have been given directly;
Must report any gratuities deemed as bribery, namely those related to position andcontrary to duties and obligations, received directly or indirectly in accordance withapplicable regulations;
Obliged to notify fellow Supervisory Board, fellow Commissioners, or superiors if
there is a close relationship or family relationship or if intensively communicatingwith a party designated as a suspect or defendant by the Commission in accordancewith the Commission's regulations;Must resign from assignment if the performance of the task is reasonably suspectedof causing a conflict of interest in accordance with the Commission's regulations;
It is prohibited to have direct or indirect contact with a suspect, defendant, convictedperson, or other party connected with a corruption case where the Commission is
known to have handled the case except in the context of carrying out their duties
and with the knowledge of the leadership or direct superiors;
Notifying fellow Supervisory Board members, fellow Commissioners, or superiors
about meetings or communications that have been carried out or will be held with- 55 - 55 -

•

•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

other parties that are suspected of causing a conflict of interest with theimplementation of the Commission's duties and functions;Must provide access to the Supervisory Board to all facilities and personal property
used in the work and positions of Commission personnel (such as communication
devices, computers and transportation) for the purpose of examining and enforcing
serious violations of the code of conduct;
Not abusing their position and/or authority, including abusing their influence as
Commission personnel both in carrying out their duties and in their personal
interests;
Do not misuse Commission personnel identification, letter of assignment, or otherproof of employment;
Not receiving other income that creates a conflict of interest with the duties andfunctions of the Commission and is detrimental to the interests of the Commission;
Not doing work or owning a business that provides services or trading businesses
related to the duties and functions of the Commission and creates a conflict ofinterest;
Do not receive payments, compensation in any form from other parties related tothe performance of tasks except for transportation, daily allowances (pocket money,
local transport, meal allowances), accommodation, food and drinks served in thecontext of meetings, training, seminars/workshops, partnerships and socializationthat apply in general and in accordance with Commission regulations and as longas it is not funded by the Commission;
It is prohibited to notify, lend, send or transfer, sell or trade, make use of all or partof the Commission's documents, data or information in electronic or non-electronic
form for personal gain, to unauthorized parties, or allow this to happen unless withthe approval of the direct superior or the Chairman of the Commission;
Maintain the secrets entrusted to him or her, including the results of meetings which
are declared confidential, up to a predetermined time limit or until the matter has
been declared open to the public as long as it does not conflict with statutory
regulations;
It is prohibited to hide, modify, transfer, destroy records or documents belonging to
the Commission except for the purpose of carrying out duties;
It is prohibited to use documents, items, and facilities belonging to the Commission
for matters outside the performance of their duties unless with the approval of theirsuperiors;
It is prohibited to use points or benefits from frequent flyer programmes, point
rewards, or the like obtained from official travel in exchange for airplane tickets,goods and/or vouchers for personal gain;
Do not include family or other parties who are not related to the implementation ofduties when traveling on business unless there are humanitarian reasons and basedon the permission of the direct superior and do not obstruct or override theimplementation of duties and do not harm the Commission's finances;
It is prohibited to enter places that are considered ethically and morally
inappropriate in society, such as places of prostitution, gambling, and nightclubs,
except for assignments.
Be fully aware that all of his or her attitudes and actions are always inherent in his
or her capacity as Commission personnel;
Not showing a hedonistic lifestyle as a form of empathy for the community,
especially for fellow Commission personnel;- 56 - 56 -

•Use social media wisely and responsibly.

B. Synergy
The elements of synergy include common thinking, cooperation, harmonization,
partnership, collaboration, mutual productivity and synchronization, which is detailed in
the form of actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Willing to work together and build harmonious partnerships with all stakeholders
to find and implement the best, useful and quality solutions;Sharing information, knowledge, and data to increase the effectiveness ofcorruption eradication, except for those that are confidential or must be kept
confidential;
It is prohibited to do actions that create a work atmosphere that is not conducive
and harmonious;
Do not spread false news and/or information that cannot be justified, which cancause hatred and/or enmity;
Do not take any action that shows sectoral ego without reducing independence incarrying out tasks, both in the external and internal environment of the Commission;
Willing to share solutions, information, and/or data according to the authority tosolve problems in the implementation of tasks, except for those that are confidential
or must be kept secret;Be cooperative with parties from other work units involved in carrying out tasks;
Not denying commitment to joint decisions and their implementation.

C. Justice
The elements of justice include respect for the principles of legal certainty, thepresumption of innocence and equality before the law, as well as human rights, which isdetailed in the form of actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recognizing equality and respecting the rights and obligations of every
Commissioner;
Fulfilling obligations and claiming rights in a balanced manner;
Applying the principle of equality before the law;Not being discriminatory or showing partiality or harassment against differences inrace, sex, religion, national origin, physical or mental ability, age, marital status, or
socioeconomic status in carrying out duties;
Do not act arbitrarily or bully and/or harass Commission personnel or other parties
both inside and outside the work environment;
Providing equal opportunities without discriminating against religion, ethnicity,
physical ability or gender for career development and competence of Commission
personnel;
Superiors are assertive, rational and transparent in making decisions with objective,
fair and impartial considerations;
Provide access to information that is open to the public in accordance with statutory
regulations.

D. Professionalism
The elements of professionalism include skills/competencies in certain fields related towork, encouragement to improve competence, obedience to work according to rules and- 57 - 57 -

standards, objectivity, independence, sincerity and measurement in work, responsibility,
hard work, productivity and innovation, which is detailed in the form of actions:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Work according to standard operating procedures;
Refusing orders from superiors that are contrary to standard operating procedures
and applicable legal norms;
Respect differences of opinion and be open to constructive criticism andsuggestions;
Not influenced by personal or group interests as well as public and media pressure
in carrying out the Commission's duties and functions;
Prohibited from serving as supervisors, managers, directors, commissioners of acorporation, business entity, company, foundation, or cooperative, committee ormember of a political party, or any other professional position while serving in theCommission;
Prioritizing the implementation of tasks over personal or group interests;
Completing tasks or jobs accountably and thoroughly;
Dare to admit and take responsibility for mistakes;
Responsible for the security of goods, documents, data and information belonging
to the Commission under its control;
Optimizing the competencies they have to complete a task or job;
Does not prevent Commission personnel from carrying out innovations that support
increased effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of the Commission's
duties;Able to adapt to changes for the better;Not responding to criticism and suggestions negatively and excessively;
It is prohibited to issue statements to the public that can influence, impede orinterfere with the Commission's case handling process;Not playing golf or other sports with parties that directly or indirectly have thepotential to create a conflict of interest with the Commission;
Carry out activities related to duties or positions with the permission or knowledgeof superiors.

E. Leadership
The elements of leadership include service orientation, equality, exemplary conduct,
pioneering, driving change, persuasion, initiative and the ability to guide the behaviour ofa person or group of people, which is detailed in the form of actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Show appreciation and cooperation with all state institutions and apparatus for the
benefit of the nation and the State of the Republic of Indonesia;
Superiors must provide opportunities for subordinates to perform worship whenwork meetings or official duties are in progress;
Providing the best possible service in carrying out the duties and functions of theCommission;
Mutual respect and respect for fellow Commission personnel in carrying out theirduties and daily interactions;Objectively assessing the performance of Commission personnel based on clear andmeasurable criteria in accordance with Commission regulations;Show exemplary conduct in daily actions and behaviour;
Guiding Commission personnel in carrying out their duties;- 58 - 58 -

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Giving appreciation for the work and achievement of each individual andencouraging the Commission's personnel to improve their work performance;
Do not act arbitrarily or unfairly or discriminatively against subordinates or fellow
Commission personnel;
Superiors must reprimand subordinates who are proven to have committed
violations;Superiors must have the courage to make decisions in difficult situations and havethe courage to face and accept the consequences;
Be assertive in applying the principles, values and decisions that have been agreed
upon;
Be open to proposed improvements;
Avoiding attitudes, behaviour or words made to seek popularity, praise orappreciation from anyone in the performance of the Commission's duties.
IV. CONCLUSION

Integrity is an important component for every institution that is engaged in public
service, including for the Corruption Eradication Commission. To maintain its integrity,
the Corruption Eradication Commission has adopted a code of conduct that applies to every
commission employee, including its commissioners, investigators and prosecutors. The
Board of Supervisors of the Corruption Eradication Commission has properly enforced thecode of conduct as a realization of efforts to maintain the integrity of the Corruption
Eradication Commission.

- 59 - 59 -

- 60 - 60 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORSAND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Thongkham Soumaloun *I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Since the anti-corruption agency was established in 1982, Laos has constantly
endeavoured to control corruption by improving itself in all aspects such as in terms ofenhancing organizational structures, management mechanisms, legislation, mandates andpower, and human and financial resources. The State Inspection and Anti-Corruption
Authority of the Lao PDR (SIAA) is a ministerial level government agency primarily
mandated to conduct inspections, prevent and combat corruption, investigate corruption
cases and complaints within its scope of rights, duties and supervise such work throughout
the country.
Institutionally, there are three levels of state inspection and anti-corruption authorities,
that is, the SIAA at the central, provincial and district levels. Sectorally, there are state
inspection and anti-corruption authorities at line ministries, organizations and in sectoral
bodies of provincial departments, all of which are equipped with appropriate manpower
and necessary resources. In order to prevent and curb corruption, the Government of the
Lao PDR has endeavoured to improve institutional structures at all levels and sectors,
including state enterprises, to make them stronger and more transparent, reducebureaucracy in public service, eliminate conditions conducive to the abuse of power andcorruption. Moreover, the Government has applied modern technology in revenue
collection and in public administration and intensified the oversight duties of the National
Assembly, the Provincial People’s Council on the performance of executive branch,people’s prosecutors, the people’s court and government authorities.
At the same time, the Government of the Lao PDR has gradually developed legal
instruments in all areas of work to ensure effective and efficient state administration.
Among others, the government adopted its first National Anti-Corruption Strategy, dated 4
December 2012, which provides for measures to reduce corruption and ensure that propertyof the state, collectives and individuals are not embezzled directly or indirectly. It stresses
the need to provide anti-corruption education, to revise and enforce all related legislation,and promote the development of other measures as necessary. It encourages stateorganizations to enhance transparency in public administration; strengthen and streamline
work procedures and remove outdated bureaucratic red tape; encourage and support full
public participation. Further, the Government enacted: (1) the amended Law on AntiCorruption (AC Law) which lays out principles, regulations and measures, prohibitions forpreventing and combating corruption in order that the properties of the state, collectives,
society or the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens are not damaged,
misappropriated or embezzled; to subject offenders to legal proceedings and protect those
who are innocent aiming to make state organizations transparent, strong and capable of*Senior International Relations Officer, State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA), Lao PDR.

- 61 - 61 -

conducting inspections at all times; (2) the Law on State Inspection (LSI, 2017) (The SIAA
also exercises its powers and functions based on the LSI, which was enacted to detect thestrengths and weaknesses, investigate violations of the laws and any other wrongdoing in
the performance of duties by public officials, persons, legal persons or organizations; andto come up with preventive, countering and corrective measures, aiming to strengthen theeffectiveness in public administration); (3) the Law on the Handling of Petitions (LHP) andso forth. In particular, the AC Law and Anti-Corruption Strategy have been elaborated
further into many other measures which have contributed tremendously and effectively tocurbing corrupt practices in the country in recent years. Such regulations include the Decreeon the Early Monitoring and Inspecting of Government Investment Projects, the Decree on
Thriftiness and Anti-Extravagance and the Decree on the Declaration of Assets and Income.
The most recent measures are related to monitoring of job performance of public officials
by the people, media and parliamentarians to strengthen full public participation in the fightagainst corruption.
II. CODES OF CONDUCT AND OTHER MEASURES FOR CORRUPTIONCONTROLOne of the most relevant laws formulated to control corruption and applied alongside
the aforementioned measures, more precisely to ensure integrity, transparency andaccountability of the government officials in the provision of fair and impartial public
service, is the Law on Civil Servants (LCS). Promulgated in 2015, the LCS defines
principles, regulations, and measures relating to civil service. The LCS, articles 5 (4, 5, 6)
and Chapter III, articles 16-20, spells out in detail the principles and requirements forrecruitment, assignment, development and performance assessment of civil servants basedon the principle of competency, equality, transparency, accountability and qualifications.
The law also defines the rights (art 54) and obligations (art 57) of civil servants.
The Government has issued the Decree on the Ethics of Civil Servants, dated 26 June
2019, to implement the LCS. The Decree, which is binding on all civil servants, defines
principles, regulations and measures relating to the ethics of civil servants to be used as abasis for the organizations of the Party, the Government, the Lao Front for National
Development, the National Veterans Federation, mass organizations at the central and local
levels to govern and educate civil servants for them to have political commitment, firm
morality, integrity, a high sense of responsibility, proactiveness, respect and strictly follow
the laws and regulations to contribute to the national protection and development.
Both measures stipulate administrative, disciplinary and criminal sanctions for noncompliance based on the gravity of an offence. Another important aspect of the LCS andthe Decree on Ethics of Civil Servants is that they all provide remuneration for good
performance, such as raises, promotions, health care and additional leave for all civil
servants.
A. Monitoring and Inspection
The monitoring and inspection of law enforcement officials in their performance ofofficial duties are carried out based mainly on the Law on State Inspection. The LSI, Article
12, stipulates that inspections are carried out based on regular plans, projects, decisions,orders, notices, citizens’ requests, audit findings, National Assembly Resolutions andviolations. There are three forms of inspection: regular inspection; inspection based on- 62 - 62 -orders, decisions and notices; and immediate inspections. The inspection or supervision is
to monitor the implementation of policies, laws, regulations, powers, duties andresponsibilities in public administration. The subjects of inspection include natural persons,legal persons and organizations.
Inspection was carried out on 153 targets; 70 targets were related to corruption with
196 people found guilty. Similarly, investigations were conducted on 18 targets with 464
offenders involved; among those 380 have faced administrative sanction and 84 wereprosecuted criminally. Cases involving 62 alleged offenders have been submitted toprosecutors’ offices, and cases involving 37 accused persons have been presented to thecourt, 34 of which have been adjudicated. The offenders were both public and private
employees, while a considerable amount of losses have been recovered. Some of the mostprominent forms of corruption include abuse of power; giving and taking bribes;
embezzlement, cheating, forging and using forged documents in order to cheat or embezzle
and so on. In 2019, the State Inspection Authority received 1,038 complaints, of which 226
have been resolved, 407 transferred to other competent authorities, 52 complaints havebeen responded to, 104 have been kept for further monitoring, while 249 of them areundergoing fact-checking and collection of information. Most of the complaints are related
to dissatisfaction over decisions made by state administration authorities, the job
performance of government officials and civil servants and others.
B. Asset Declaration
In line with the AC Law, ever since the first Decree on the Asset and Income
Declaration was enacted in 2013, Laos has completed two rounds of asset declarations. All
public officials are required to submit asset declarations, whereas the property to be
declared includes, among others, land, houses, inheritance, vehicles, industrial machines,
precious metals, bonds, gold, shares, payable debts and receivable debts whose value isworth 20 million LAK or more. Salary and other income must also be disclosed.
III. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Education and training are conducted for law enforcement officials regarding
professional responsibility and integrity. Based on the above-mentioned legislation, theNational Assembly, the Government, ministries and local administration authorities haveactively and regularly conducted awareness-raising programmes for public officials,
soldiers, police officers and all citizens to deepen respect for the law and proactively
participate in preventing and combating corruption in different ways. For instance, from2019-2020, Party committees, administration authorities, inspection committees at eachlevel rolled out up to 153 public education campaigns for Party members, civil servants,
soldiers, police officers, students and people of all strata to enhance awareness andunderstanding of the consequences and dangers of corruption. More than 349,869 people
participated in the campaigns.
The SIAA, in partnership with Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES), hascompleted developing integrity education for all levels of schools. Similarly, the SIAA has
completed its anti-corruption curriculum to be used to train students and public officials inhigher education institutions. The curriculum, which has been taught since 2018, can be
adjusted based on the actual needs of each institution and target group. Apart from that,
more than 330 dissemination programmes have been broadcast via television and radio,- 63 - 63 -

252 newspaper articles have been published and 5 issues of Inspection Magazine with
26,025 copies have been distributed.
IV. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Procedures and internal regulations to avoid conflicts of interest in case assignment(disqualification and recusal of law enforcement officials) have been adopted. Although
Lao PDR has no specific regulation that particularly aims at addressing conflicts of interestin case assignment, there are clear provisions prescribed in many different laws in practice.
For example, the Law on State Inspection and Anti-corruption defines 8 prohibitions forlaw enforcement authorities, especially inspectors. For example, inspectors are strictly
prohibited from: (1) the abuse of power, duties and rights in all forms for personal gain, forfamily or relatives; (2) soliciting, demanding or taking bribes; (3) offering a promise or
associating with the subjects of inspections/investigations for personal gain; (4) working as
an adviser or middleman to businesses, recruiting or assigning one’s close associates topositions vulnerable to corruption and so on. All of these prohibitions and practices areintended to deter and avoid any possible conflicts of interest in the performance of official
duties by all public officials. Another effective prohibition is clearly described by law.
Under Article 15 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which addresses recusal and challenges,“If a judge, public prosecutor, court clerk, interrogator, investigator, expert, or translator isa relative of, or has any interest in or conflict with, any of the parties of the case, [suchperson] shall recuse himself from the proceedings. If such person does not voluntarily
recuse himself, either party has the right to challenge such person [and require that he be]recused from the proceedings.”
V. INDEPENDENCE
Article 5, paragraph 4, indicates that the officials of the anti-corruption agency shallperform their duties under five principles. One such principle stipulates that said officials
shall ensure that there is no undue interference, obstruction or threat from any person orlegal entity. It is further stipulated in article 6 that the officials of the anti-corruption
authorities at each level shall perform their duties objectively, transparently and rightfully,
based on its the scope of rights and duties, accountable to the law and under the oversightof the people and National Assembly, while article 45 further indicates that officials must
exercise their mandate independently.
VI. INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION OF CORRUPTLAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Corruption poses negative effects on the national development, as it corrodes the
scarcely limited government funds badly needed for development. Corruption is found in
the public and private sectors. In Laos, corruption usually occurs in development projects(infrastructure), revenue collection, etc. The most common forms of corruption include theabuse of power, bribery, embezzlement, cheating and falsification of standards inconstruction, design and calculations. Corruption poses enormous negative effects on, andimpedes the socio-economic development of, each country, big or small, poor or rich, andit threatens the stability of public and private institutions like never before, especially as- 64 - 64 -the world is struggling to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic that has already lasted over a
year – eventually giving rise to social unrest and injustice. Corruption is eroding national
income, draining funds for state development projects, resulting in low quality projects; itis also plundering revenues of the collectives and people in a most sophisticated way,causing huge losses to the state and citizens every year. Corruption reflects the reality of
the lack of integrity, ethical values of civil servants, soldiers, police in public institutions
and employees in private entities.
A. Investigation and Prosecution
As an investigative body, the SIAA is empowered to investigate corruption cases. Upon
inspection and/or investigation, if sufficient evidence of a corruption offence is found, withthe value of damages amounting to 5 million LAK, the SIAA shall finalize the investigation
findings and submit the case to the Prosecutors’ Office for prosecution.
The SIAA investigators perform their functions based on Article 41 of the Law on AntiCorruption (ACL 2012) and the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which include, among
others, the right to receive and record complaints and reports of acts of corruption; propose
decision-making authority to issue summonses, arrest and detention warrants, order seizureor freezing of assets, etc. Other rights include the right to seize and maintain seized items
relating to corruption, including together with other authorities the right to conduct
household and vehicle searches, make arrests based on the order issued by the Head of theProsecutors’ Office or the Head of the People’s Court.
The procedures for investigation consist of (1) issuing an order to open an investigation,(2) carrying out investigation and (3) developing case files to submit to the Prosecutors’
Office who shall then prosecute the accused in open court. The president of the SIAA is
mandated to issue an order to open or not to open an investigation.

- 65 - 65 -

- 66 - 66 -

ETHICS RULES FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INJAPANOTANI Junichiro *I. INTRODUCTION
If the politicians and public officials who bear the responsibility of sustaining thefoundation of their country lack integrity, and bribery is pervasive, the basis of democracy
will be endangered. Thus, one of the most important duties of a criminal justice system isto detect corruption and impose appropriate punishment on corrupt politicians and public
officials.
The prevention of corruption is no less important than detection and punishment.
Confidence in politicians and public officials can be damaged quite easily, but rebuilding
it takes considerable time and effort. The punishment of corrupt politicians and public
officials does not necessarily help prompt restoration of public confidence.
Taking into account the importance of confidence, public officials should never besuspected of allowing themselves to be influenced in their work by inappropriate requests
or considerations. Public officials should refrain from doing anything that may incur
suspicion. In this regard, there is an old saying: “Do not touch your hat under a plum tree.”(By doing so, you will be suspected of stealing a plum.)
What harm is caused when the public loses confidence in its public officials? One of
the harms is a negative effect on the administration of government, and the other is anegative effect on the morale of government officers. It should be noted that not only thecorrupted officer, but also the whole ministry, or even the whole government, will beaffected.
II. ETHICS RULES FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JAPANA. Background
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, Japanranks 20th out of 198 countries. It is fair to say that Japan is a relatively clean country.
Nonetheless, Japan is not free from corruption, and some corruption cases have been
detected over the years.
In 1996, the Vice-Minister of Health was arrested for receiving money from a social
welfare service corporation in exchange for providing subsidies. In 1998, high-ranking
officials of the Ministry of Finance in charge of inspection of banks were entertained bybanks and securities companies.

*

Professor, UNAFEI.

- 67 - 67 -

These cases provoked criticism from the public and led to the enactment of the National
Public Service Ethics Act of 1999 and the National Public Service Ethics Code of 2000.
The ethics rules in Japan consist of two major components: the code of conduct and thereporting system.
B. Applicable Public Officials
The National Public Service Ethics Act is applicable to national government officials.
Although it is not applicable to local government officials, local governments have similar
rules.
C. Prohibited Conduct
The following conduct is prohibited by the Act and the Code:(1) Receiving gifts (money, goods or real estate) from interested parties
However, as an exception, it is allowed to accept promotional goods or commemorative
items that are widely distributed to the public, or to accept congratulatory money for awedding or condolence money for a funeral (based on the general social courtesy andspecial relationship between the interested parties).
(2) Accepting food and drinks from interested parties
However, as an exception, it is allowed to attend a buffet-style party that has many
participants (around 20 persons or more), or to accept modest food and drinks (e.g.
lunchbox or tea) at a business meeting. Government officials are allowed to eat anddrink with interested parties if they pay their own expenses. However, advance
notification to the Ethics Supervisory Officer is required if the expense for food anddrinks exceeds 10,000 yen.
(3) Borrowing money from interested parties
However, as an exception, it is allowed to borrow money from a financial institution asa customer.
(4) Borrowing or renting goods or real estate for free from interested parties
However, as an exception, it is allowed to borrow goods (e.g. stationery) when an
officer visits an interested party in the regular course of the officer’s business.
(5) Accepting a service free of charge from interested parties
However, as an exception, it is allowed to ride in a company’s vehicle when an officer
visits an interested party in the regular course of the officer’s business and there is no
public transportation available.
(6) Receiving unlisted stocks from interested parties
It is prohibited even if a government officer pays for unlisted stocks.
(7) Traveling or playing golf with interested parties.
However, as an exception, it is allowed to travel for official duty or to travel together
when an officer participates in a tour arranged by a travel agent and an interested party
happens to be on the same tour. With regard to playing golf, it is allowed to play golfwith an interested party when an officer joins a golf competition (the number ofparticipants is more than 30 and the participation of an interested party is unpredictable)
and the officer happens to have a chance to play golf with an interested party.
- 68 - 68 -

(8) Requesting interested parties to engage in “prohibited conduct” for a third party.
(9) General exception
In addition to the exceptions stated above in items (1) through (8), if there is a private
relationship between a government officer and an interested party, the “prohibited
conduct” may be exceptionally permissible on the condition that the conduct does notinvite any suspicion or distrust of the general public. In deciding whether there is a
private relationship, factors such as (i) degree of “conflict of interest,” (ii) relationshipbetween the two parties, and (iii) type of conduct are considered.
(10) Receiving remuneration for editing services of the following books:
Books that are produced through subsidies or government expenses; books when the
majority of them will be purchased by the government.
D. Interested Party
An interested party with respect to a government official means an entity or anindividual who is the counterpart of the government official with respect to permission,
subsidy, inspection or audit, disposition, administrative guidance, contract or intergovernmental regulation.
E. Conduct Prohibited with Non-interested Parties
The following conduct with non-interested parties is prohibited:(1) Accepting gifts beyond the level of general social norms, e.g. repeatedly accepting
gifts from the same company.
(2) Having someone (who is not present) pay for food, drinks or other charges.
(Accepting payment for food, drinks or other charges from someone who is notpresent.)
F. Responsibility of Supervisors
Supervisors should take action if they suspect one of their subordinates has violated thecode of conduct. The examples of such actions are:- Giving instructions to the subordinate.
- Reporting misconduct to the Ethics Supervisory Officer (e.g. the Vice-Minister of
each ministry).
G. Responsibility of Other Officers
It is also a responsibility of a government official not to receive benefits that are theresult of violations of Ethics Rules, and not to hide or to make false reports with regard to
violations of the Code of Ethics.
III. REPORTING RULES
A. Types of Reports
There are three types of reports that a government official should submit: (i) reports on
the receipt of gifts, (ii) reports on the exchange of stocks, and (iii) reports on income.
B. Reports on the Receipt of Gifts
A government official who is at the rank of assistant director or above at the- 69 - 69 -

headquarters should submit a quarterly report on the receipt of gifts if they receive gifts,
food and drink, remuneration for lectures, or any other benefits from business operatorsthat exceeds 5,000 yen.
C. Reports on the Exchange of Stocks
A government official who is at the rank of deputy director general or above at theheadquarters should submit a report on the exchange of stocks once a year in March.
D. Reports on Income
A government official at the rank of deputy director general or above at the headquarters
throughout the previous year should submit a report on income once a year in March.
E. Reporting Procedure
Government officials should submit the above reports to the heads of the ministry oragency to which they belong. Copies of those reports are sent to the National Public Service
Ethics Board. The general public may request the disclosure of reports on gifts exceeding
20,000 yen.
IV. NATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE ETHICS BOARD
The National Public Service Ethics Board is composed of five members. As of January
2021, the President of the Ethics Board is a former judge, and other members are a journalist,a professor, etc. Although the Ethics Board is established under the National Personnel
Authority, the Ethics Board works independently. One of the major functions of the Ethics
Board is to examine copies of the reports sent from each ministry or agency. Whenreviewing these reports, the key considerations are whether an inappropriate acceptance ofgifts or an inappropriate exchange of stocks which could distort the fair execution of thenational public service has taken place, and whether the reports have been properly
submitted. The Ethics Board has also established the Public Service Ethics Hotline, throughwhich it accepts information from the public on suspicious acts that might be a violation of
the Ethics Act or the Ethics Code. In handling such information, due consideration is given
to the protection of whistle-blowers (e.g. maintaining confidentiality of the whistle-blowers’
identity etc.).
V. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
In case of violation of the ethics rules, a disciplinary action, such as dismissal,
suspension from duty, salary reduction or warning, will be imposed. The National
Personnel Authority has established criteria for disciplinary actions. When an officer
receives money or gifts from an interested party, dismissal, suspension from duty, salary
reduction, or warning may be imposed. As a past example, in case of receiving “beervouchers” of 66,000 yen, a 10 per cent salary reduction was imposed for one month. When
an officer is entertained, salary reduction may be imposed or a warning may be issued. Asa past example, in case of being entertained at a restaurant costing 10,672 yen, a warning
was imposed. The effects of disciplinary actions are both direct and indirect. For example,
in case of the sanction of salary reduction, not only the salary is reduced, but also there arenegative impacts on future promotion, wage increase or the amount of bonus.

- 70 - 70 -

VI. CONCLUSION
Learning the ethics rules is not limited to obtaining knowledge on prohibited acts, but
it is an opportunity to reflect on ethics in one’s role as a government official. In this regard,
it is not enough to simply learn the ethics rules once, but it is necessary to review them
periodically. In Japan, government officials are requested to take a self-learning training
course on the ethics rules every year.
Reflection on ethics leads not only to the prevention of violations of ethics regulations
and corruption. It is an opportunity to think about how we, as government officials, should
act and how we can improve our motivation to carry out our duties and serve the public.

References
Rules for Maintaining National Public Employees’ Ethical Conduct (National PublicService Ethics Board) (October 2020), available in Japanese at<https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/siryou/rule2020.pdf>.
Rules for Maintaining National Public Employees’ Ethical Conduct (National PublicService
EthicsBoard)(April2015),
available
in
Englishat<https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/eng/engrule1504.pdf>.
Activities of the National Public Service Ethics Board (National Public Service Ethics
Board), available at <https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/eng/engactivities1504.pdf>.
Ethics for National Public Employees (National Public Service Ethics Board), available inJapanese at <https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/kensyu/03_H29ippansyoku.pdf>.
Ethics for National Public Employees Case Studies (National Public Service Ethics Board),
available in Japanese at <https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/kensyu/jireikenkyu22.pdf>.
National Public Employees’ Ethics Manual (National Public Service Ethics Board),
available in Japanese at <https://www.jinji.go.jp/rinri/siryou/2020_kyohonmanga.pdf>.

- 71 - 71 -

- 72 - 72 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORS,
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Asrul Ridzuan Bin Ahmad Rustami *I. BACKGROUNDIn Malaysia, integrity and independence of law enforcement officials are upheld
through various established organizations with the sole aim of contributing towards
creating a positive perception towards law enforcement agencies and the Government, in
addition to facilitating the efforts in gaining public support and cooperation in combating
corruption, abuse of power and malpractice.
The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), an independent anti-corruption
commission, is monitored by its own “Check and Balance Mechanism” with an aim
towards convincing the public of the MACC’s independence, transparency andprofessionalism.
The Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC) was formed in 2011 where theother 21 Federal Enforcement Agencies come under the supervision of the Commission.
The establishment of the Commission is in line with the Government's aim to inculcate andenhance integrity among enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies, thus
strengthening public confidence in them.
II. THE MALAYSIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION (MACC)
In early 1959, Malaysia's (then Malaya) efforts to combat corruption were carried out
by two entities, focusing on investigations and prevention. Investigations on corruption
cases were tasked to the Special Crimes Unit of the Criminal Investigation Department of
the Royal Malaysian Police, while an Anti-Corruption Agency was set-up in the Prime
Minister’s Department to manage the aspect of prevention. Matters related to prosecution
were under the purview of the Attorney General's Chambers.
In view of the fact that anti-corruption activities were then carried out by three different
agencies, the Government decided to consolidate the task of investigation, prevention andprosecution under one umbrella by setting-up the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) in 1967
in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Act 1967.
In 2008, the Parliament and the Government unanimously approved the formation of
an independent anti-corruption commission to be known as the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC) and replaced the Anti-Corruption Act with the Malaysian AntiCorruption Commission Act 2009. The MACC Act 2009 came into effect on 1 January
2009, which led to the official establishment of the MACC as an independent, transparent*

Senior Assistant Commissioner, Head of AMLA Unit, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, Malaysia.

- 73 - 73 -and professional body to manage the nation’s anti-corruption efforts effectively andefficiently.
The MACC aims to be a professional anti-corruption commission in enforcing the law
and educating the public against corruption in moving towards greater prevention andultimately to eradicate corruption in Malaysia through the following principles which are
Independent, Transparent and Professional.
The Code of Ethics and Conduct of the MACC combines moral values with theuniformed deeds and actions to guide MACC officers to perform their duties andresponsibilities with the objectives of strengthening the level of integrity of MACC officers
in the execution of their duties and responsibilities and clarifying permissible and nonpermissible actions by MACC officers in accordance with the enforced policies, guidelines
and the law.
Integrity is a core element in the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the MACC. The corevalues of integrity that are held by the MACC in shaping the “MACC Values” are:
Trustworthy, Firm, Fair, Independent, Transparent and Professional. In addition, positive
values such as Discipline, Cooperation, Loyalty and Commitment also form the “MACC
Values” which are to be consistently upheld by all MACC officers in executing their duties
and responsibilities.
III. CHECK & BALANCE MECHANISM
In moving towards convincing the public of the MACC’s independence, transparency
and professionalism, a Check and Balance Mechanism was created through the formationof five external and independent oversight bodies to monitor the functions of theCommission closely and constantly.
The Check and Balance Mechanism comprises the Anti-Corruption Advisory Board(ACAB), the Special Committee on Corruption (SCC) and the Complaints Committee (CC),which are made through the provision of the law, while the Operations Review Panel (ORP)
and the Consultation and Corruption Prevention Panel (CCPP) are established throughadministrative order.
These five entities are responsible for ensuring that MACC performs its duties in an
independent, transparent and professional manner. The mechanism assists in fulfilling the
public’s expectations towards the Commission’s independence, efficiency, effectiveness,transparency and accountability in executing its designated legal obligations. The checkand balance mechanism will contribute towards creating a positive perception of the
MACC and the Government, in addition to facilitating the efforts in gaining public support
and cooperation in combating corruption, abuse of power and malpractice.
Members of these bodies represent the general public and are composed of senior exgovernment officials, politicians (government and opposition), professionals from thebusiness and corporate sector, academicians, lawyers and well-respected individuals.

- 74 - 74 -

A. Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (ACAB)
The Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (ACAB) is set up by the provision of law under
section 13 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (Act 694). The
members of the ACAB are appointed by the King of Malaysia among individuals who haverendered distinguished public service or have achieved distinction in their professions. The
Chief Commissioner of MACC shall be appointed as an ex officio member of the ACAB
as provisioned under section 13(2) (b) of the said Act.
The functions of the ACAB are provided as follows:i. To advise the Commission on any aspect of the corruption problem in Malaysia;
ii. To advise the Commission on policies and strategies of the Commission in its
efforts to eradicate corruption;iii. To receive, scrutinize and endorse proposals from the Commission towards theefficient and effective running of the Commission;
iv. To scrutinize and endorse resource needs of the Commission to ensure its
effectiveness;
v. To scrutinize the annual report of the Commission before its submission to theSpecial Committee on Corruption; andvi. To submit its comments to the Special Committee on Corruption as to the exercise
by the Commission of its functions under this Act.
B. Special Committee on Corruption (SCC)
The Committee is set up by the provision of law under section 14 of the MalaysianAnti-Corruption Act 2009 (Act 694). The members of the SCC are appointed by the Kingof Malaysia, who shall be drawn from both the members of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives. The said section had also stated that none of them shall be a member of
the administration.
The functions of the SCC are provided as follows:i. To advise the Prime Minister on any aspect of the problem of corruption in
Malaysia;
ii. To examine the annual report of the Commission;iii. To examine the comments of the Anti-Corruption Advisory Board as to the exercise
by the Commission of its functions under this Act; andiv. To seek clarifications and explanations on the annual report of the Commission andthe comments of the Anti-Corruption Advisory Board.
C. Complaints Committee (CC)This committee was formed by law through section 15 of the Malaysian AntiCorruption Commission Act 2009 (Act 694) and appointments are made by a Minister.
The functions of the CC are provided as follows:i. To examine complaints and action or outcome of investigation on complaints aswell as give opinions on the results of investigation;
ii. To examine the types of offences committed by MACC Officers and to suggest
measures to enhance the efficiency and capability of officers in carrying out theirduties (through trainings and other methods);- 75 - 75 -iii. To receive and acknowledge disciplinary results and suggest preventive measures;
andiv. To review work procedures and recommend improvements on work procedures andlogistic needs.
D. Operations Review Panel (ORP)The ORP is appointed administratively by the Prime Minister among experts who
represent relevant professions and who can represent the quality of integrity andindependence of the Commission. The ORP shall act as the check and balance mechanism
for ongoing cases and on reasons regarding actions upon cases to be prosecuted or no
charges are preferred. The ORP may also present its views to the MACC on cases if further
clarifications are needed.
The functions of the ORP are provided as follows:i. To receive and seek clarification regarding statistics of Investigation Papers openedby the Commission;
ii. To receive and scrutinize reports from the Commission regarding Investigation
Papers exceeding 12 months of investigation;iii. To receive reports from the Commission regarding all cases where suspects arrested
are released on bail bond by the Commission exceeding six months;
iv. To receive reports on closure of Investigation Papers and to advise on improving
investigations due to weaknesses plus reviewing whether further investigation isrequired; andv. To scrutinize, examine and endorse proposals to enhance the Commission’s
investigation operations to the Anti-Corruption Advisory Board.
E. Consultation and Corruption Prevention Panel (CCPP)The CCPP is appointed administratively by the Prime Minister among individuals who
represent various civil society organizations and other organizations such as academician,the business community, religious figures, media experts and social activists that can assist
the MACC towards its objective of inculcating hatred against corruption among the society
at large.
The functions of CCPP are provided as follows:i. To advise the Commission on enhancing the effectiveness of inspection andconsulting activities upon the practices, systems and work procedures of both the
public and private sectors which may be conducive to the occurrence of corruption;
ii. To advise the Commission on enhancing the effectiveness of public education
activities towards increasing the awareness on corruption and support on anticorruption efforts;
iii. To advise the Commission on enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption
activities through the mechanism of strengthening integrity in both the public andprivate sector;
iv. To advise the Commission on some of the best practices in the fields related to theimplementation of consultation and anti-corruption activities;
v. To assist the Commission as the key communicator in garnering support from thepublic, the media and the sectors identified towards the prevention efforts by theCommission; and- 76 - 76 -

vi. To submit its comments on the Commission’s undertaking of its function on
consultation and anti-corruption under the MACC Act 2009 to the Anti-Corruption
Advisory Board.
IV. INTERNAL CONTROLInternally, the Excellence and Professionalism Division is responsible for the regularmonitoring of the officers of the Commission by ensuring appropriate actions are taken
against those being involved in activities which could bring about a negative perception
towards the Commission. This Division also serves in guiding the officers of theCommission to perform their duties and responsibilities with the highest level of integrity.
The functions of the Excellence and Professionalism Division are provided as follows:i)

Integrity Enhancementa. Ensure the acculturation, institutionalization, and implementation of
integrity in MACC officers through the development of human capitalwith integrity and strengthening a culture of integrity and moral values.
b. Provide counselling services to identified MACC officers and forreferred cases.

ii)

Complaint Management
a. Receive and act on all complaints or information on misconduct ordisciplinary violations not of a criminal nature.
b. Serve as secretariat to the MACC Complaints Committee (CC) andprepare the CC Annual Report.

iii)

Detection and Verification
a. Detecting and verifying complaints or information on misconduct anddisciplinary violations not criminal in nature involving MACC staff. In
cases where there is a basis behind the disciplinary violation or
misconduct, the matter shall be referred to the Disciplinary Secretariat
for appropriate action under the Regulations Public Officers (Conduct
and Discipline) 1993 or other administrative actions.
b. In cases where there is a basis for a criminal offence, information will
be referred to the Information Evaluation Committee (IEC), Records
Management and Information Division for further action.

iv)

Disciplinary Secretariat
a. Manage disciplinary proceeding papers for the consideration of therelevant Disciplinary Authority.
b. Act as Secretariat to the relevant Disciplinary Board Meeting andprepare minutes of meetings as well as inform and act on meeting
decisions.

v)

Compliancea. Conduct compliance inspectorate through inspection and enforcementon compliance with the law, policies, regulations, chief commissioner’s- 77 - 77 -

b.

c.
d.
e.
vi)

standing orders (PTKP), code of ethics and standard operatingprocedures in force on all MACC staff.
Report and provide feedback on any weaknesses, violations of the codeof conduct and non-compliance with policies, regulations and SOP to
the relevant MACC Divisions or State for corrective action,
improvement or appropriate action.
Provide reports to the Disciplinary Secretariat in cases of disciplinary
violation or misconduct by officers for appropriate action.
Conduct studies, assessments and update the effectiveness of andcompliance with existing policies, regulations, PTKP and SOP.
Conduct assessment on the understanding and compliance with policies,
regulations and SOP stipulated.

Governancea. Ensure the effective implementation of organizational governanceinvolving integrity issues to curb corruption and disciplinary violations.
b. Receive reports and act as secretariat for the Anti-Corruption
Committee meeting and the reporting for MACC Organizational AntiCorruption Plan (OACP).
c. Examine weaknesses and improvements to regulations, systems andprocedures to shut any opportunities for corruption and disciplinary
violations for MACC staff.

V. ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INTEGRITY COMMISSION (EAIC)
The EAIC is a Federal Statutory Body established by an Act of Parliament under
Section 3 of the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission Act 2009, which was enforcedon 1 April 2011. Under subsection 1 (4) of the Act, there are 21 Federal Enforcement
Agencies listed under the supervision of the Commission. Some notable agencies among
those listed are the Royal Malaysia Police, Royal Customs Department of Malaysia,
Immigration Department of Malaysia and the Road Transport Department.
This Act replaces the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission Bill2005. The establishment of the Commission is in line with the Government's aim toinculcate and enhance integrity among enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies,
thus strengthening public confidence in them.
Since the Act came into force, the Commission has begun to carry out functions asprovided in section 4 of the Act. The main function of this Commission is to receive
complaints of misconduct from the public against enforcement officers or law enforcement
agencies in general and investigate and hold a hearing on the complaints received. Thisway the enforcement activities are constantly monitored and in the event of misconduct,
appropriate actions will be recommended.
Generally, there are nine statutory functions carried out by the Operations Division of
the Commission, which are:
1. To receive, investigate and hold hearings on complaints of misconduct of law
enforcement agencies;- 78 - 78 -

2. Establish mechanisms for detecting, investigating and preventing misconduct inenforcement agencies;
3. Protecting the public from the misconduct of enforcement agencies;
4. Monitoring the operation and procedures of enforcement agencies;
5. Promoting awareness and education integrity;
6. Formulating legislative and administrative measures recommended to theGovernment;
7. Reviewing the procedures and propose recommendations for improvements ofenforcement agency;
8. Holding tours of enforcement agencies’ premises to ensure law and SOP arecomplied with and making recommendations for improvements; and9. Doing all things expedient or necessary for the implementation of the Commission'sfunctions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MACC is committed to achieving its vision of creating a corrupt-free Malaysiansociety based on high spiritual and moral values, as well as shaping the Commission into aworld class anti-corruption agency. The efforts of the Commission are further supported by
the Government of Malaysia, which is also committed to addressing issues of governance,
integrity and anti-corruption.
The government's fight against corruption is evident through the formation of theSpecial Cabinet Committee on Anti-Corruption and the National Centre for Governance,
Integrity and Anti-Corruption (GIACC). GIACC had developed the National AntiCorruption Plan (NACP) 2019-2023 with the aim of making Malaysia a corrupt-free nation
by 2023.

- 79 - 79 -

- 80 - 80 -

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORSAND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Mohamad Faizal Bin Sadri *I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of integrity and independence of the judiciary, prosecutors and law
enforcement officials has always been a matter heavily discussed by the ruling government,with every change of administration promising greater improvement and development of
key policies to strengthen the governance and integrity of these institutions.
More recently, the administration announced the Shared Prosperity Vision 2030
(SPV2030), 1 whereby focus is placed on the integrity and governance relating to the “legal,
judicial and law enforcement” sectors under Guiding Principle 13: Integrity and Good
Governance and Enabler 4: Governance and Integrity.
It is no surprise that irrespective of the political leanings of the administration, theintegrity and independence of the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement officials arealways viewed as core elements of good governance. Malaysia has always strived tocombat corruption and bad governance by introducing various measures in the past andmore so in recent years.
It was recently announced in January 2021 that Malaysia had dropped six spots to the57th position among 180 countries in the Transparency International (TI) Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2020. 2 Nonetheless, the current government's commitment tocontinue with the agenda to improve governance and fight corruption with the National
Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) is seen in a positive note globally.
The commitment reinforces Malaysia’s seriousness in pursuing legitimate, accountableand effective ways of obtaining and using public power and resources in the pursuit ofwidely accepted social goals. Good governance is also associated with impartiality. In 1996,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that promoting good governance in all
aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountabilityof the public sector and tackling corruption, are essential elements of a framework within
which economies can prosper.
Under the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) 2019–2023, 3 the Government of
Malaysia is focusing on the creation of a corruption-free nation where one of the main goals
is in respect of the accountability and credibility of the judiciary and prosecution and law
Deputy Director, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission.
Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 <https://www.pmo.gov.my/shared-prosperity/>.
2
Transparency International – Malaysia – Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/mys>.
3
National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) 2019–2023,<http://giacc.jpm.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/National-Anti-Corruption-Plan-2019-2023.pdf>.
*
1- 81 - 81 -

enforcement agencies. Based on the risk assessment done in formulating the NACP, thesethree bodies are susceptible to significant risk when it comes to matters such as abuse of
power and corruption. Efforts like the NACP have been widely seen as a positive step inthe right direction, especially in laying down the foundation for improvement in the area ofgovernance and integrity for the years to come.
When viewed in the international context, it is also good to highlight that the NACP
also makes reference to Malaysia’s commitment toward achieving the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) introduced in the United Nations (UN): 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. 4 One of the goals, Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong
Institutions, emphasises the importance of addressing corruption in order to achieve theSDGs. There exists a clear consensus among the UN member countries on the fact thatshould there be no action to reduce corruption, there will be serious impediment toachieving the other SDGs.
Any failure of Malaysia to address issues of governance and integrity will not be looked
upon favourably; and may have a lasting impact in terms of Malaysia’s standing politicallyand economically.
This paper seeks to highlight some of the most recent measures taken and plans by theGovernment of Malaysia to improve the governance and integrity of the judiciary,prosecutors and law enforcement officials.
II. THE JUDICIARY
The Malaysian judiciary is an important facet of the administration which needs to beable to exercise its power with fairness and effectiveness, without fear or favour. One of
the most notable efforts by the Government of Malaysia is the introduction of the Judge’s
Code of Ethics 2009. 5
As previously remarked by a former colleague at the First Regional Seminar on Good
Governance for Southeast Asian Countries hosted by the United Nations Asia and Far East
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) in 2007, 6
members of the public must be informed about the existence of such code, its contents andcomplaint-mechanism, in the event there is a violation of the code. Civil society
participation is integral when devising this code, and judges should, on taking their oath of
office, agree to the Code of Conduct and agree, in the case of a breach of the Code, thatthey will resign or be removed from judicial office.
a. Judges’ Code of Ethics 2009o The Code took effect on 24 June 2009.
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>.
Malaysia’s Judge’s Code of Ethics 2009,<http://www.jac.gov.my/spk/images/stories/10_akta/akta703/judges_code_ethics_2009.pdf>.
6
First Regional Seminar on Good Governance for South East Asian Countries Judges, United Nations Asia
and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) (2008),<https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/1st_Regional_Seminar.pdf>.
45- 82 - 82 -o Part III of the Code specially provides for a code of conduct to be compliedwith and practised by all judges up to the highest court of the land, namely,
the Federal Court. In performing their duties, judges are expected to uphold
the integrity and independence of the judiciary, while avoiding any
impropriety or any appearance of judicial impropriety during theperformance of judicial functions and activities.
o Part IV of the Code provides that a complaint may be made against a judge
for any breach of the Code. If the complaint has merit, a Judges’ Ethics
Committee may be set up to hear the complaint. The judge complained
against may explain his or her conduct. If the complaint is proved, the judge
may be admonished or even suspended for not more than one year.
o In a more serious case of breach of ethics, a judge may be removed fromoffice. However, this process is not provided under this Code, but under
Article 125 of the Federal Constitution, the supreme law of the land, wherea special tribunal may be constituted for this purpose.
o In addition, the UN Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002 7 havealways been a cornerstone in the implementation of code of ethics.
o Appointments of judges are also made via a specially constituted Judges
Appointment Commission (JAC) to ensure transparency and that only
persons of the highest calibre are selected.
o A Sessions Judge was charged in 2019 for receiving bribes, while a Courtof Appeal Judge has been summoned before a Judges’ Ethics Committee toanswer allegations of misconduct against him.
III. THE PROSECUTORSThe position of prosecutor is important for any community or government, as
prosecutors are essential to the community’s safety. They are also a crucial institution
which helps keep private individuals, companies and government officials accountable.
Prosecutorial decisions must be independent and must be based on the facts of the case andnot on the status and/or importance of the individuals involved or the interest of any otherparty.
But the lack of prosecutorial integrity and corruption are still serious problems in many
parts of the world. Thus, in any country it is important to understand the level of, or
potential for, corruption within a particular agency. It is also crucial to recognize where
corruption is most likely to occur within an agency in the course of a prosecutorial process;the potential motivating factors for those within the prosecution service to submit to thelure of corruption; and the cultural and political pressures that are likely to compromise aprosecutor’s decision.

UN Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002,<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf>.

7- 83 - 83 -

In Malaysia, considering the essential role of prosecutors in upholding the rule of law
and pursuing government accountability, the integrity of the prosecutorial operations is of
special importance. Various measures have been taken to train and equip the prosecutors
with the necessary knowledge and awareness to reduce the likelihood of being
compromised, with formal rules in place as an additional barrier to keep the prosecutors incheck. We wish to recap a few of the formal rules as follows:a. Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 [P.U. (A)395/1993]
o Commonly nicknamed the “General Orders” (GO), all prosecutors in
Malaysia are public officers, and as such they are bound by the GO, which
is binding on every public officer in Malaysia. Misconduct or breach of therelevant provisions may result in a disciplinary proceeding taken against an
officer. If found guilty, punishments range from admonition, fines andreduction in rank to dismissal from service.
o An officer is also required to declare his assets and properties at least once
every five years.
b. Code of Ethics for the Attorney General’s Chambers (2010)o This Code was specially made as the guidelines for conduct on all Attorney
General’s Chambers (AGC) officers. Six Core Values have been outlined,
namely, “truthfulness”, “trustworthiness”, “transparency”, “gratefulness”
and “fairness”. All prosecutors in Malaysia are AGC officers and, therefore,
subject to this Code.
c. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 [Act 694]
o Under this law, prosecutors, being public officers, are also prohibited fromsoliciting or receiving gratification or bribes of any kind, or making false
claims in respect of their official duties.
o As they are endowed with special position and powers, it is also an offence
to abuse their position or powers to gain an advantage or favour of any kind,for themselves, as well as for their family members or associates.
d. Code of Conduct for Prosecutors (2012)o The Code was drafted and prepared collectively by the AGC. It is meant toprovide guidelines on the minimum ethical standards for prosecutors. The
contents of the Code are more detailed than the 2010 Code of Ethics
abovementioned.
o The minimum ethical standards expected from all AGC prosecutors are,among others, “independence”, “honesty, fairness and impartiality”,“loyalty”, “integrity” and “professional growth and competence”.

- 84 - 84 -

e. Proposed separation of functions between the Attorney General and the Public
Prosecutor (2018 – present)o The proposal was one of the initiatives contained in the NACP (see Strategic
Objective 4.1, paragraph 4.1.5). The rationale behind this initiative is due tothe Attorney General and Public Prosecutor being one and the same person.
o It is, therefore, believed that such amalgamation of roles may lead toconflicts of interest, as the Attorney General is the principal advisor for theGovernment, which may potentially affect his judgment when dealing withcriminal cases involving senior officials of the Government or members of
the Cabinet. The work on this proposal has been entrusted to AGC and is
still ongoing.
o There are several countries where the office of the Attorney General isdistinct from that of the Public Prosecutor. This will also avoid an unhealthy
concentration of power in the hands of one individual.
IV. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Law enforcement is the task of ensuring the provision of security for citizens going
about their daily lives, in accordance with a nation’s legal framework, mainly throughdeterrence and prevention, but also by appropriate interventions to stop violations of thelaw.
In the context of combating corruption, effective law enforcement by the various
enforcement agencies has the effect and capacity in providing Malaysia with a soundhuman security framework of civilian control, respect for the rule of law and also humanrights.
Some overarching measures that have been taken by the Government of Malaysia tocombat corruption and improve the governance and integrity of enforcement agencies are
as follows:a. Governance, Integrity and Anti-Corruption Centre (GIACC)(http://giacc.jpm.gov.my/).
o GIACC was established on 1 June 2018. Its aim is primarily to curb
corruption. Its functions include advising the Government of Malaysia andcoordinating all governance, integrity and anti-corruption initiatives among
implementing and enforcement agencies in Malaysia. It also monitors theabove-mentioned agencies on their governance, integrity and anticorruption performance and, where necessary, reports its findings to the
public via relevant mediums.

- 85 - 85 -

b. National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) 2019–2023 8
o On 8 June 2018, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the then Prime Minister, was ofthe view that a comprehensive anti-corruption plan needed to be framed
quickly to address corruption issues in Malaysia. As a result, under theleadership of the GIACC, the NACP was created, and it is the primary
document that outlines the necessary actions to combat corruption.
o The NACP has three main visions:
i.
ii.
iii.

accountability and credibility of the judiciary and prosecution and law
enforcement agencies;
efficient and responsive delivery by the public service; andintegrity in business.

o The NACP is a five-year plan (2019 – 2023) contained in a 65-page
document which is divided into 5 Chaptersc. Special Cabinet Committee on Anti-Corruptiono The Committee was established under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s
Department, pursuant to the establishment of the NACP. The Prime Ministerchairs the Committee, of which its members include the Ministers of
relevant ministries, the Chief Secretary to the Government, the Attorney
General, the Auditor General and the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission.
o Its main aim is to determine policies relating to the strengthening ofgovernance, integrity and anti-corruption initiatives.
d. Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC)(http://www.eaic.gov.my/en)o The Commission was set up in 2009. Its main aim is to receive
complaints of misconduct from the public against an officer of an
enforcement agency or the enforcement agency itself.
o The commission is empowered to investigate such a complaint andrefer its findings to an appropriate disciplinary authority, or where
the complaint relates to a criminal matter, it may refer the matter toa Public Prosecutor for a decision.
e. Proposed Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission(IPCMC)o In spite of the formation of the EAIC, many civil society
organizations, non-governmental organizations and human rights
National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) 2019–2023,<http://giacc.jpm.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/National-Anti-Corruption-Plan-2019-2023.pdf>.

8- 86 - 86 -

activists in Malaysia are of the view that the EAIC has not beeneffective in addressing misconduct in the police force. The EAIC
also does not have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against the police, despite findings of misconduct.
o At the time this paper is written, a draft IPCMC Bill has been
prepared and is currently being fine-tuned before it is tabled before
the Parliament.
o Among the features of the proposed IPCMC law is that it would be
able to investigate wide arrays of misconduct. Further, reports of any
deaths in custody are to be reported directly to the IPCMC, which
reduces the likelihood of the police themselves interfering in suchcases.
o The IPCMC may also compel any person, including police officers,
to provide information or surrender documents to facilitate an
investigation, the failure of which could result in a fine or
imprisonment, or both, for an offender.
V. PROSECUTION OF HIGH-PROFILE CASES
In recent years, the AGC and MACC, together with the judiciary, have exemplified theideals of independence and integrity through the prosecution of several high-profile cases.
This was done without fear or favour; in line with the continuous improvements made to
the integrity and independence of the said bodies.
We have compiled a number of these cases in this paper to illustrate the progress madeby the relevant bodies, taking into account the various issues in prosecuting the case,including political pressure and allegations of the offenders having “deep state” operators
working behind the scenes to frustrate the efforts.
a. Prosecution and Conviction of the Top Govt. Officer (Mr. X)
o On 4 July 2018, the Top Govt. Officer (Mr. X) was charged with seven charges(relating to criminal breach of trust, abuse of position and money laundering) at theHigh Court for his role in the multibillion-dollar Company X scandal. In July 2020,
after a full trial, Mr. X was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to 12 years’
imprisonment plus an additional fine of RM210 million. Mr. X has appealed against
his convictions and sentences to the Court of Appeal.
o Meanwhile, Mr. X is also facing several other corruption charges at another High
Court, namely, four counts of abuse of power for using his positions as the Top
Govt. Officer and Company X board of advisers Chairman to receive gratification
worth RM2.28 billion in another episode of Company X-Tanore trial. He is also
facing 21 counts of money laundering involving over RM4.3 billion.

- 87 - 87 -o His wife (Madam YZ) was also charged in 2018 with three counts of dishonestly
soliciting RM194 million in bribes connected to government project contracts andfaces up to 20 years in jail if found guilty.
b. Prosecution of several former Ministerso Apart from Mr. X, the other former Top Govt. Official (Mr. A) was charged in 2018with a total of 47 charges, 12 of which are for criminal breach of trust, eight forbribery and 27 for money laundering involving tens of millions of ringgit belonging
to a charitable foundation established by him.
o On 26 June 2019, Mr. A was further charged in another case at the Sessions Court
with seven counts of having accepted bribes totalling SGD$4.24mil (RM12.94
million) from a company, and on 27 June 2019, he was charged at the Sessions
Court with 33 counts of having accepted RM42.76 million from a company relating
to the overseas visa system. These 40 additional charges, plus the earlier 47 charges
in the first case, now totals 87 charges.
o Other notable politicians that have been charged include former Top Govt. Servant(Mr. T) and (Mr. B). Mr. T, the former Top Govt. Servant, was recently found guilty
in December 2020 for receiving a bribe of RM2 million from a company during his
ministerial tenure, and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and a fine of
RM2 million.
o Mr. B, the Top Govt. Servant, a State in Malaysia, was charged in May 2019 withtwo counts of receiving bribes of RM2.6 million and RM262,500, respectively, tofacilitate approval for an investment scheme in a government statutory body, of
which he was the non-executive chairman.
VI. THE RULE OF LAW MUST BE STRICTLY FOLLOWEDThe “rule of law” literally is an exercise of governmental powers using and guided bypublished standards, widely supported by social values. In the context of Malaysia, it meansthat a legal framework in the country exists, there is law and order, the judiciary system isindependent and effective, property rights and contracts are enforced and human rights
norms are implemented.
Not only must the three major institutions highlighted in this paper be effective incombating corruption, but laws also need to be responsive to the needs of society, fair andimpartially enforced. However, the genuine rule of law requires the cooperation of theGovernment and society, and is an outcome of a complex and deeply rooted social process.
It is a process that takes time, and it is heart-warming to see Malaysia making good progress
towards achieving a society guided by the rule of law.
VII. CONCLUSIONThe United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
suggests that the core elements of good governance include transparency, integrity,- 88 - 88 -

lawfulness, sound policy, participation, accountability, responsiveness, and the absence ofcorruption and wrongdoing.
The examples above demonstrate the recent multi-faceted efforts that have been taken
by Malaysia to combat corruption and uplift governance. Ultimately, the journey to a better
Malaysia will require all hands on deck and is not just incumbent on the authorities. It is
our goal to foster a good partnership between the society and law enforcement agencies, topromote substantive outcomes and improve on public legitimacy.
While we see a lot of positive notes in recent years in terms of the improvements carriedout in Malaysia, these are still considered baby-steps towards a greater goal of achieving asociety which thrives on good governance and integrity. It remains to be seen, especiallyin the next 10 years, whether there is sufficient political and social will in implementing
the great ideas embodied in various great policies such as the SPV2030 and NACP.

- 89 - 89 -

- 90 - 90 -

FIGHTING CORRUPTION FROM THE BACKYARD:
ENSURING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Hazel Canet Decena-Valdez *I. INTRODUCTION
Every country has its own approach to control graft and corruption in government. The
Philippines has its own. In fact, it would even seem that all sorts of anti-corruption
strategies and measures have been done over the years, from one administration to another.
Studies about this phenomenon in Philippine governance also abound – conducted not only
by scholars, journalists, think-tanks, advocates, but by the government itself – all with theend in view of finding the most effective way to “cure” this so-called “social cancer”.
One area of focus in the fight against graft and corruption is the government’s
machinery that enforces the country’s anti-corruption laws and ensures that violators arebrought to justice and eventually punished – the criminal justice system, more specificallylaw enforcement, the prosecution and the judiciary. These government institutions per se(and the people that run and compose them of course) need to practice what they preachbecause the effectiveness of this machinery that they are part of depends largely on theirindividual and collective integrity and independence. Thus, at the core of every anticorruption worker, whether a public officer or employee or an entire government office oragency, is their adherence to sound moral and ethical values and principles.
This paper seeks to examine the structures of the law enforcement, prosecution andjudicial institutions in the Philippines, as well as the mechanisms, processes and measurespeculiar to these institutions that impact and reflect on their integrity and independence inthe context of their role in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of graft andcorruption cases, both within their respective institutions as well as in the entirety of thegovernment. A presentation of existing anti-corruption mechanisms among these agenciesof the government will also be made, along with some past efforts that may be considered
as best practices in addressing the corruption menace in the Philippines.
II. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. National and Local Governments; Government Corporate Sector
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. The three principal powers of thegovernment, namely the legislative, executive and judicial powers, are clearly delineatedand exercised among its three co-equal branches. The legislative or law-making power isSenior Assistant State Prosecutor, Department of Justice - National Prosecution Service, Manila,
Philippines.

*- 91 - 91 -

vested in a bicameral Congress that consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 1
The executive branch is headed by the President who has control over all the departments,
bureaus, and offices, and ensures that the laws are faithfully executed. 2 Finally, the judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court and other lower courts established by law. 3 The
independence of the three branches of government through a system of strict separation of
powers is one of the most significant corruption prevention mechanisms in place in thePhilippines.
The exercise of government powers is decentralized through a local government
structure composed of (from the biggest to the smallest unit) provinces, cities,municipalities or towns, and barangays. Each of these local government units has its own
local chief executive and a local legislative body. For purposes of administrative
governance of the various departments under the executive branch, and to some extent, of
the judiciary, contiguous groups of local government units are clustered into administrative
regions. The seventeen administrative regions of the country, however, do not have local
chief executives or local legislative bodies similar to those of the local government units.
The government corporate sector, considered as the third level of the executive branchof the government, is composed of government owned or controlled corporations (GOCC),
including government instrumentalities with corporate powers or government corporate
entities and government financial institutions, that are vested with functions relating to
public needs, whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Philippine
government either wholly or to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capitalstock in the case of stock corporations. 4 A government office, the Governance Commission
for GOCCs (GCG), acts as the central advisory, monitoring, and oversight body over this
sector. It also plays an important role in protecting valuable government resources in these
GOCCs against graft and corruption.
B. Independent Constitutional Bodies
The Philippine Constitution established independent bodies which are called“Constitutional Commissions” that exercise specific powers and functions. They are as
follows: the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which administers the civil service covering
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and thus acts as thecentral personnel agency of the government 5; the Commission on Elections, which as its
name connotes, takes exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest, peacefuland credible elections 6; and the Commission on Audit (COA), which holds the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue andreceipts and expenditures or uses of the funds and properties of the Philippine government. 7
Aside from the three Constitutional Commissions, there are two other Constitutional
bodies whose mandates, powers and functions, as well as composition, are specifically
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Ibid., Sects. 1 and 17, Art. VII.
3
Ibid., Sect. 1, Art. VIII.
4
Sect. 3(o), Republic Act No. 10149.
5
Ibid., Sects. 2.1 and 3, Art. IX-B.
6
Ibid., Sect. 2, Art. IX-C.
7
Ibid., Sect. 2.1, Art. IX-D.
1
2- 92 - 92 -

provided for in the Constitution itself: the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) as the principal
agency of the government responsible for ensuring propriety and accountability of public
officers, and is thus primarily responsible for investigating and prosecuting graft andcorruption cases; and the Commission on Human Rights, which is mandated to promote
and protect human rights.
The three Constitutional Commissions, the OMB and theCommission on Human Rights do not fall under any branch of the government and enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations are automatically and regularly
released. Furthermore, the tenure of the members of the Constitutional Commissions, theOmbudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen is fixed by the Constitution. The establishment andpresence of these Constitutional bodies, more particularly those involved in monitoring theaccountability of public officers and employees – the CSC, COA and OMB – are significant
corruption prevention mechanisms that are manifest in the structure of the Philippine
government.
III. CLEANING THEIR OWN BACKYARDS
Like most democratic countries, the Philippines adheres to the age-old principle that“public office is a public trust”. Thus, no less than the Constitution exhorts that “public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them withutmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, andlead modest lives.” 8 Moreover, there is an abundance of legislation that seeks to advancethe policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. As a matter offact, there are at least seventy-seven corruption-specific laws and executive issuances 9 thathave been enacted to date in order to combat corruption, starting with the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines that was enacted in 1932, which criminalized certain acts andomissions of public officers. Excluded from this number are other special penal laws which
provide for sanctions on public officers who participate one way or the other in thecommission of crimes. Among the most significant of these laws are Republic Act (RA)No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials andEmployees”, and RA 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
On top of these laws that apply to all public officers and employees across all branches
and levels of the government, each law enforcement, prosecution and judicial institution
involved in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of graft and corruption in thegovernment has its own internal mechanism and processes, as well as programmes andcampaigns, that seek to ensure and promote the integrity of the institution per se and of its
own anti-corruption-related work. Cleaning their own backyards, so to speak, is a norm
among these institutions.
A. Law Enforcement
The Philippines has two major law enforcement agencies, both of which are under the
executive branch of the government. These are the Philippine National Police, which isunder the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the National Bureau of
Investigation, which is an agency under the Department of Justice.

Ibid., Sect. 1, Art. XI.
Sixty-one were identified and listed by Prof. Danilo R. Reyes in “Chronicling Corruption in the Philippines:
A Brief Historical Background Up to 2004”.

8
9- 93 - 93 -

1. Philippine National Police and National Police Commission
The Philippine National Police (PNP) was first established in 1990 through Republic
Act (RA) No. 6975, the law which organized the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and its component offices, including the National Police Commission(NAPOLCOM), a constitutionally mandated body tasked to administer and control anational police force. The PNP was initially composed of members of the old police
organization and of the military who sought absorption into the newly organized civilian
police force.
The PNP’s principal power and function is to “investigate and prevent crimes, effectthe arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution”. 10
It has a national presence through its police stations in every city and municipality/town of
the country, as well as provincial and regional offices in all provinces and regions of thecountry. Bigger cities even have additional satellite stations or police community precincts
in barangays. While its jurisdiction in the investigation of crimes is more general comparedto that of the National Bureau of Investigation, the PNP’s role in the investigation of graft
and corruption incidents nonetheless becomes more relevant in places where no other law
enforcement agency of the government is present.
The NAPOLCOM is a six-member collegial body composed of the Secretary of the
DILG as the ex officio chairperson, four civilian (non-military or law enforcement agencyconnected) commissioners, and the PNP Chief as an ex officio member. It is attached to
the DILG only for policy and programme coordination purposes. Its power to haveadministrative control and operational supervision over the PNP include the development
and promulgation of policies and standards involving police procedures, performance,
facilities and activities including recruitment, selection, promotion, and training. It also
exercises disciplinary authority over PNP officers and personnel through its appellate
jurisdiction over personnel disciplinary actions.
(a) PNP Ethical Doctrine (PNP Code of Professional Conduct and Ethical Standards)
The “PNP Code of Professional Conduct and Ethical Standards” serves as the national
police force’s basic moral and ethical guidance to its members. In 2014, the PNP“rebranded” this Code into what is now called “The PNP Ethical Doctrine” in order toremind the police force of its provisions and to continue its propagation to, andinternalization by, all its members. The PNP Ethical Doctrine is anchored on the divine andmoral precepts, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and relevant provisionsof the Revised Penal Code, RA 6713, RA 3019, RA 6975 and other related special laws.
All new entrants to the PNP are provided with copies of the PNP Ethical Doctrine andthe doctrines and principles embodied in the code are part of academic courses given to
PNP personnel. All PNP members are enjoined to fully adhere to its provisions in theperformance of their duties and to commit to uphold its intent and spirit at all times.
Violations of such provisions are made punishable under the applicable penal laws andadministrative regulations issued by NAPOLCOM, the PNP, Civil Service Commission or
the DILG.

10

Sect. 24(c), RA 6975.

- 94 - 94 -(b) People’s Law Enforcement Board
The People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) is an innovation under RA 6975; a checkand balance mechanism where ordinary citizens can have redress of their grievances against
law enforcers who abuse their authority and lodge their complaints against them. It is also
a strategy to empower the community in general to instil discipline in the PNP ranks.
The PLEB is a five-member collegial body that is created in every city and municipality
through their local legislative bodies. It is composed of the following: a member of thelocal legislative body, a barangay captain of the city or municipality, and three respected
members of the community known for their probity and integrity chosen by the local peaceand order council, one of whom must be a woman and another a member of the Bar, or, in
the absence of the latter, a college graduate, or the school principal of the central elementary
school in the locality.
As the central receiving entity for complaints from the public against PNP members, ittakes cognizance of complaints involving offences punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension of forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof,
for a period exceeding thirty days, or by dismissal, 11 and refers the rest to the appropriate
disciplinary or adjudicatory authority depending on the imposable penalty for the offence
complained of.
(c) Internal Affairs Service (IAS)
Pursuant to its objective to reform the PNP, RA 8551 introduced the Internal Affairs
Service (IAS) and gave it the following mandates:(i) pro-actively conduct inspections and audits on PNP personnel and units;(ii) investigate complaints and gather evidence in support of open investigations;(iii) conduct summary hearings on administrative charges against PNP members;(iv) submit periodic reports on the assessment, analysis, and evaluation of thecharacter and behaviour of PNP personnel and units to the PNP chief and the
NAPOLCOM;(v) file appropriate criminal cases against PNP members before the courts and assist
in the prosecution of the case;(vi) provide assistance to the OMB in cases involving PNP personnel;(vii) conduct, motu proprio, automatic investigation of the following cases:• incidents where a PNP personnel discharges a firearm;• incidents where death, serious physical injury, or any violation of humanrights occurred in the conduct of police operations;• incidents where evidence was compromised, tampered with, obliterated, orlost while in the custody of PNP personnel;• incidents where a suspect in the custody of the police was seriously injured;and• incidents where the established rules of engagement have been violated; and(viii) provide documents or recommendations concerning promotions ordesignations of PNP members to any key position.

11

Sect. 41(a)(3), RA 6975.

- 95 - 95 -

The IAS is present in every regional and provincial PNP office throughout the country,
as well as in the head office or PNP headquarters. It is headed by an Inspector General who
is a civilian appointed by the President.
(d) Administrative Disciplinary Machinery
Aside from the PLEB, local police chiefs, the local chief executives of provinces, cities
and municipalities/towns also exercise administrative disciplinary authority over PNP
officers and members.
Minor offences of police officers are dealt with through an internal mechanism where
local police chiefs may summarily impose administrative punishment depending on theinfraction involved. Offences considered as minor are acts or omissions that affect theinternal discipline of the organization and do not involve moral turpitude, like simple
misconduct or negligence, insubordination, frequent absences or tardiness, habitual
drunkenness, and engaging in unlawful gambling. Depending on the disciplinary authority,summary penalties that may be imposed range from admonition or reprimand, withholdingof privileges, forfeiture of salary or suspension, or a combination of any of these penalties,
up to demotion or even dismissal from the service. The PNP Chief and regional police
chiefs both have summary dismissal powers when the charge is serious and the evidenceof guilt is strong, or when the erring police officer is a recidivist, or has been repeatedly
charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the officer is guilty of the charges,
or is guilty of a serious offence involving conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
(e) Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement GroupIn 2019, the PNP created the Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement Group (IMEG) asa strategy to strengthen its campaign against corrupt policemen, especially those involved
in illegal drugs. IMEG “upgraded” the Counter-Intelligence Task Force, a comparatively
smaller office that was originally formed as part of the internal cleansing mechanism in theorganization. As a bigger office than its predecessor, IMEG has been given more resources,
including personnel, and a wider latitude of authority and more functions. Among others,
it assists the public in filing criminal complaints before the prosecution offices against
erring police officers, more particularly those that arise from drug operations of the PNP.
To further reinforce its internal cleansing programme and to curb graft and corruption in
the organization, the PNP leadership recently gave IMEG an additional task – to conduct
lifestyle checks among its personnel. 12
2. National Bureau of Investigation
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is the second major law enforcement
agency of the government. It is the Philippine’s version of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the United States of America. From its original creation in 1936 as a mere
“Division of Investigation” under the DOJ, the NBI has undergone a number ofreorganizations and expansions over the years.
Among its original principal mandates was to undertake investigation of crimes andother offences upon its own initiative and as public interest may require, and to renderassistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes andother offences. 13 It was reorganized in 1960 in order to promote maximum efficiency in the
1213<https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1354327/pnp-to-undertake-lifestyle-checks-to-fight-corruption>.
RA 157.

- 96 - 96 -

discharge of its duties and to secure full implementation of its functions, especially thosepertaining to investigation of graft and corruption cases. 14
The NBI was recently reorganized and modernized under a recent law 15 wherein thepositions and compensation of its officers and personnel were upgraded, while the scopeof its investigatory authority was limited to specialized crimes like human trafficking,cybercrimes, extrajudicial or extralegal killings and transnational crimes. As regards graft
and corruption cases, the NBI shall only take cognizance of those that are referred to it by
the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council. 16 Similar to the PNP, the NBI also has
nationwide presence through its regional as well as district offices. Unlike the PNP though,the NBI has no local offices in cities and municipalities or towns.
(a) Internal Affairs Division
The NBI also has an Internal Affairs Division under the Office of the Director. Unlike
the PNP, however, its regional offices do not have an administrative disciplinary
mechanism or machinery. Hence, complaints against its officers and personnel are filed
with, and investigated and adjudicated by, the Office of Director at the head office.
B. Prosecution
There are also two government offices that conduct preliminary investigation 17 andprosecution of graft and corruption cases – the National Prosecution Service under the
Department of Justice and the OMB.
1. National Prosecution Service
The National Prosecution Service (NPS) is the office primarily responsible for the
conduct of preliminary investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations ofpenal laws in the Philippines. Established by virtue of RA 10071, the NPS is composed ofa Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice headed by a Prosecutor General,
regional prosecution offices, as well as field prosecution offices in every province and cityof the country. It is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice.
The investigative authority of the NPS over complaints involving alleged commissionof crimes is akin to the PNP’s “general jurisdiction” to investigate crimes. This is so
because the OMB holds the primary jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases, especiallythose falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 18 The NPS exercises concurrent
jurisdiction over complaints falling outside Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction which it canresolve without the need for OMB’s approval. Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement
between the DOJ and the OMB, 19 the latter may likewise refer cases to the NPS for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the first and second level courts.

RA 2678.
RA 10867.
16
Discussed further under IV.B.1.
17
Defined under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”
18
Also discussed in part III.C.2 of this paper.
19
Signed 29 March 2012.
14
15- 97 - 97 -(a) Selection and Promotion Board
RA 10071 expressly requires that prosecutors of the NPS shall be selected from among
the qualified and professionally trained members of the legal profession who are of provenintegrity and competence. 20 To this end, the NPS Selection and Promotion Board,
composed of the highest-ranking officials of the NPS and chaired by no less than theProsecutor General, require applicants for position in the NPS to submit clearances fromthe NBI, OMB, Sandiganbayan, and Civil Service Commission in order to apprise themwhether candidate prosecutors have been charged or are facing any criminal oradministrative cases, and the nature and details of those cases if any. Results of neuropsychiatric examination are likewise required from applicants. As an added measure toensure compliance with the statutory qualification standards for prosecutors, the Board
invites as resource persons during the deliberation of applications, the chiefs of prosecution
offices of the place where an applicant is seeking appointment. A shortlist of applicants is
submitted to the Secretary of Justice, who in turn endorses it to the President, who appoints
prosecutors of the NPS.
(b) Code of Conduct of Prosecutors
The Code of Conduct of Prosecutors of the NPS sets down the core values as well as
the mandatory standards for professional and individual conduct that prosecutors shouldobserve in the performance of their duties as public servants and pillars of the criminal
justice system. More specifically, the Code emphasizes the following:(i) Commitment to the Rule of Law and Public Interest;(ii) Prompt, Effective and Efficient Service;(iii) Dedication, Diligence and Competence;(iv) Impartiality, Independence, and Fidelity to Duty; and(v) Honesty, Integrity and Professionalism.
(c) Internal Affairs Unit
The Secretary of Justice exercises disciplinary authority over prosecutors of the NPS
through an Internal Affairs Unit (IAU), which assists the Secretary in acting on
administrative complaints, or motu proprio, initiating proceedings, against prosecutors andpersonnel of the NPS. The offences that may be subject of administrative charges include
violations of the provisions of the following:(i) Revised Penal Code as amended, on crimes committed by public officers;(ii) RA 3019 as amended;(iii) RA 6713;(iv) Administrative Code of 1987;(v) Civil Service Law and its Omnibus Rules and Regulations;(vi) Code of Conduct for Prosecutors; and(vii) Pertinent DOJ policies, other special laws, rules and regulations. 21
2. Office of the Ombudsman
As previously mentioned, the OMB is a constitutional body designed to be the principal
agency of the government responsible for ensuring propriety and accountability of public
officers and has the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute graft and corruption
20
21

Section 16, RA 10071.
Department Circular No. 010 dated 25 March 2015.

- 98 - 98 -

cases. It is composed of the Ombudsman, an Overall Deputy Ombudsman, four deputies[one deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (the Philippines’ major island groups),
a deputy for the military and other law enforcement offices (MOLEO)], and several
assistant ombudsmen. Also under the OMB is an Office of the Special Prosecutor which
serves as its prosecution arm. The Ombudsman, his deputies and the Special Prosecutor are
all presidential appointees and serve specific fixed terms. 22
As “protectors of the people”, 23 the OMB has the following powers, functions andduties:(i)

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omissionof any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act oromission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(ii) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
(iii) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(iv) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and reportany irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(v) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary
in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents.
(vi) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances sowarrant and with due prudence.
(vii) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for theirelimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(viii) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. 24(a) Internal Affairs Board
The Internal Affairs Board (IAB) of the OMB does not only act on all complaints
against its incumbent officials and employees. It also plays a big role in recommending to
the Ombudsman policies, programmes and procedures that ensure compliance by OMB
officials and employees with RA 6713 and all laws, rules and regulations concerning civil
service and public accountability. The IAB also has the authority to offer
recommendations regarding the promulgation of a code of conduct and ethical standards
for all officials and employees of the OMB, as well as of a manual of operations for its
various offices to ensure faithful performance of its mandated functions in accordance
Please see related discussion about the Judicial and Bar Council in part III.C.3.
Ibid., Sect. 12, Art. XI.
24
Ibid., Sect. 11, Art. XI.
22
23- 99 - 99 -with the norms of conduct of public officials and employees under RA 6713. Finally, theIAB may request any intelligence or investigating agency to direct any official, employee
or unit of the OMB to conduct an intelligence operation or fact-finding investigation on
any of its officials or employees.
The IAB is mandated to act on all complaints cognizable by it, whether filed by the
public or by any official or employee of the OMB, and in whatever form it may be filed –orally or in writing, signed or unsigned, or verified or not. Depending on the merits, orlack thereof, complaints go through a series of processes – evaluation, preliminary
investigation and/or administrative adjudication, fact-finding investigation, evenintelligence operation – are finally decided by the Ombudsman. 25
C. Courts
1. Regular Courts
The hierarchy of the judicial branch of the Philippine government starts with first level
courts stationed in cities and municipalities/towns, namely the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and Metropolitan Trial
Courts. In criminal cases, these courts take cognizance of minor infractions of the law.
Second level courts, on the other hand, are composed of Regional Trial Courts that are
scattered throughout the country’s administrative regions, provinces and cities. They havejurisdiction to try offences that carry more severe penalties. All proceedings in both firstand second level courts are presided by only one judge.
Decisions of first and second level courts as well as of other quasi-judicial bodies canbe elevated to the Court of Appeals, a collegiate court which exercises appellate jurisdiction
on all cases not falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Considered as the second highest tribunal of the land, it sits by divisions of three justicemembers. Currently, it is composed of twenty-three divisions.
At the top of the judicial hierarchy is the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of legal issues
and controversies of the land. It is composed of a Chief Justice and fifteen Associate
Justices. Besides adjudicating cases that fall within its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
likewise exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel.
2. Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan is a special court under the judicial branch which has original andappellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices andother offences committed by public officers and employees (including those ingovernment-owned or controlled corporations) in relation to their office. It was originallycreated under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1486 issued in 1978 with the same rank as asecond level court but was shortly later elevated to the same level as the Court of Appeals
via PD 1606.
Over the years, the Sandiganbayan underwent several reorganizations and expansions.
From an original eight-member court, it now has twenty-one justices who sit in sevendivisions of three members. Its jurisdiction has likewise undergone revisions.

25

Administrative Order No. 23, Series of 2016, of the OMB.

- 100 - 100 -The jurisdiction to try corruption cases is shared among the first and second level courts
and the Sandiganbayan depending on the offence committed or the salary grade of the
public officer at the time of commission of the offence. Generally, public officers
occupying positions classified as Salary Grade (SG) 27 and above pursuant to thegovernment’s system of compensation and position classification, are tried before the
Sandiganbayan, while those below SG 27 are tried before the first and second level courts,
unless they are charged together with officers whose positions are classified as SG 27 andabove. Cases decided by first and second level courts are appealable to the Sandiganbayan.
Its decisions may be elevated on appeal before the Supreme Court.
3. Judicial and Bar Council
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is another independent Constitutional office whose
primary task is to recommend appointees to the judiciary and the OMB to the President. It
is composed of representatives of the three branches of government as ex officio members(the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and a member from the legislature), a
representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 26 a professor of law, a retired
member of the Supreme Court, and a representative from the private sector. 27
The JBC is a mechanism that ensures the independence of the judicial branch of
government, for while the President ultimately appoints the members of the judiciary andthe OMB, appointments could not be done arbitrarily since the choice is limited to the listof nominees submitted by the JBC. It, therefore, ensures as well that the selection process
for the judiciary and the OMB is not politicized. Furthermore, the highly stringent
application, screening, selection and nomination process of the JBC ensures that only
persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence as required by no lessthan the Constitution, are appointed to the judiciary.
In screening applications for the judiciary and the OMB, the JBC ensures the existenceof the minimum qualifications pertaining to length of practice of law, age and experience
as required by the Constitution. In addition, competency requirements are determined bylooking at the individual applicant’s educational preparation as reflected in scholastic
records, performance on the bar examination and prejudicature programme, academic
awards, scholarships. Work performance ratings as well as the results of psychological andpsychiatric evaluations are likewise scrutinized. Finally, exemplary accomplishments ofapplicants are likewise considered, such as awards for judicial excellence, authorship ofbooks, treatises, articles and other legal writings, as well as leadership in professional orcivic organizations.
As a measure to ensure that members of the judiciary and the OMB are of provenhonesty, integrity, probity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to soundmoral and ethical standards, the JBC requires the submission of testimonials from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations, as well as certifications orclearances from relevant government offices – courts, law enforcement agencies, the IBP,
Office of the Bar Confidant, including the OMB. Moreover, the JBC may likewise orderthe conduct of discreet background checks on the integrity, reputation and character ofapplicants and validate the results of such efforts. Feedback from the public in the form of

26
27

The national organization of lawyers in the Philippines.
Ibid., Sect. 8, Art. VIII.

- 101 - 101 -complaint or opposition is encouraged through the publication of the list of applicants for
positions in the judiciary and the OMB in two newspapers of general circulation.
In determining the independence of applicants for positions in the judiciary and the
OMB, the JBC scrutinizes their decisions (for incumbent judges) if they are reflective of
the wisdom and soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, impartiality, cold
neutrality, fortitude and strength of character. Validated testimonials from reputableofficials and impartial organizations or outstanding citizens are likewise considered.
Finally, to determine potential conflicts of interest that may impede these applicants’
impartiality or ability to remain independent once appointed, the JBC looks into theirpersonal, social and professional relationships, business interests and financial
connections. 28
4. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
As a reaction to the adoption in 2002 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore
Draft”) by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, 29 the Philippine Supreme
Court updated the then existing Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics,
and eventually adopted, in 2004, a New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. The New Code’s first two canons emphasize independence and integrity, thus:
Canon 1
Independence
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial
independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1
Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of theirassessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understandingof the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat orinterference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 2
In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to makeindependently.
Section 3
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Section 4
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to28
29

The 2020 Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC No. 2020-01).
A group of Chief Justices and Superior Court Judges from around the world.

- 102 - 102 -advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Section 5
Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influenceby, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear
to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Section 6
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to
the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 7
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial
duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
independence of the judiciary.
Section 8
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order toreinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to themaintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1
Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2
The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice musty not merely be done but must also beseen to be done.
Section 3
Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers
or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may havebecome aware.
5. Judicial Integrity Board and Corruption Prevention Investigation Office
To prevent corruption in the judiciary and further strengthen its integrity, the Supreme
Court created in 2018 the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention
Investigation Office (CPIO). 30 The JIB is composed of retired justices of the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan or Court of Tax Appeals. It has the mandate to act
on complaints (whether verified or anonymous) for disciplinary action against justices of30

A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC.

- 103 - 103 -the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, judges and personnel offirst and second level courts, including the Shari’a courts, and officials and employees of
the Offices of the Jurisconsult and the Court Administrator. The Supreme Court may also
motu proprio initiate proceedings before the JIB against the justices, judges, officers andpersonnel of the foregoing courts and offices. The JIB is also tasked to motu proprio initiate
disciplinary actions in the Supreme Court against the foregoing officials and personnel ofthe judiciary on account of either a conviction or even a mere charge for any crime. As forcomplaints that involve graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards against
members of the Supreme Court, they are referred to its Committee on Ethics and EthicalStandards which is tasked to conduct a preliminary investigation before the submission of
its findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court en banc.
The CPIO on the other hand, has the authority to conduct intelligence, surveillance orentrapment (undercover) operations, as well as lifestyle checks and discreet investigations
on the foregoing justices, judges, officers and personnel of the judiciary, for purposes ofdetection or identification of those who commit, appear to be involved in, or are liable forviolations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary or of any of
the charges enumerated under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 31 The disciplinary powersof the judiciary among its ranks, however, does not deprive the law enforcement agenciesof the government to take cognizance of complaints for alleged commission of crimes(including graft and corruption) filed against justices, judges and court personnel.
Otherwise said, investigation on criminal complaints against them may be conductedindependent of, and may proceed separately from, any disciplinary or administrative
proceedings before the Supreme Court or the JIB.
6. Compensation Package and Other Benefits
Positions in the judiciary are among those highly paid in the government. In the 33level salary grade (SG) hierarchy, salaries of the members of the Supreme Court are at SG
31-32 (SG 33 is assigned solely to the President), while salaries of justices of the othercollegiate courts are at SG 30-31, and those of judges of first and second level courts, at
SG 28-29. On top of their basic salary, members of the judiciary regularly receive various
allowances as well as hazard pay.
IV. BEST PRACTICES IN ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
A. Utilizing the Cabinet System, the “Cory Way”
The administration of former President Corazon “Cory” Aquino (1986-1992)
succeeded what has been known to be the most corrupt regime in Philippine history – themore than two decades of the Marcos regime. Among the efforts done by the Aquino
administration to get the country back on its feet was to recover ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their cronies, to restore democratic institutions and to “cleanse” thegovernment of graft and corruption.
President Aquino’s anti-corruption strategy consisted of integrating the initiatives into
the regular structure of the executive branch, or the cabinet. Each department head/cabinet
member was directed to study their organization and to formulate and implement an anti“Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts, Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals, Court Administrator, Deputy Court Administrator, and Assistant Court Administrator”.

31- 104 - 104 -corruption plan based on such study. Cabinet members reported to the President on thestatus of their department’s anti-corruption campaign or programme during cabinet
meetings. As each department dealt with its own problems, various offices within thecabinet likewise came up with joint or multilateral solutions for interrelated orinterconnected concerns.
According to an assessment of President Aquino’s anti-corruption strategy, theapproach which allowed cabinet members to tackle their own office’s problem of graft andcorruption proved successful. The strategy which they called “The Cory Way” amplified
the government’s cleansing process as each and every office in the executive department
simultaneously undertook varied strategies that were appropriate and unique to theiroffice’s situation at the time. The accomplishments of the campaign also differed from one
department to another – from improvement of existing policies and procedures toformulation of new ones, creation of new programmes, monitoring of personnel, todischarge or dismissal of officials. Other departments implemented organizational changes
and improvements in efficiency which limited opportunities for corruption. On the whole,
it is believed that it is possible to make substantial progress against corruption within theexisting framework of government institutions without creating a new anti-corruption
agency. 32
B. Inter-Agency Cooperation Mechanisms
While the “Cory Way” of dealing with corruption in the government (at least in theexecutive) was an effective strategy, the need for inter-agency cooperation was also
recognized. Hence, inter-office resources were pooled together to address problems thatnecessitated multi-agency response.
1. The Inter-Agency Anti-Graft and Corruption Council
The Inter-Agency Anti-Graft and Corruption Council (IAAGCC) is a voluntary allianceof government agencies aimed at preventing or eliminating graft and corruption ingovernment services through strategic cooperation in the prevention, detection,
investigation and prosecution of these cases. It was originally established in 1997 througha memorandum of agreement among the heads of the agencies that have been mandated to
uphold integrity and accountability in the public service, namely the OMB, COA, CSC,NBI and the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The
alliance mutually agreed to share information and closely coordinate with one another, toundertake inter-agency-skills-training programms and to promote inter-agency conferences.
In 1998, the DOJ joined the IAAGCC, and in 1999, the President of the Republic
officially recognized its establishment through Administrative Order No. 79. The Order
likewise enjoined all government agencies to extend full support and assistance to
IAAGCC in the implementation of its programmes and projects for which the President
made available the amount of Five Million Pesos from the Social Fund of the Office of the
President.

32

Prof. Leonor Magtolis Briones, “Framework for a National Anti-Corruption Program”.

- 105 - 105 -(a) Guidelines of Cooperation
Since several of the mandates and functions of IAAGCC member agencies overlap with
one another, and may therefore result to potential areas of conflict and confusion, IAAGCC
operations are governed by a Guidelines of Cooperation.
The IAAGCC’s governance body is well-structured, viz. the IAAGCC itself, composedof the head of the member agencies; the Consultative Committee (CONSULCOM) whichis composed of representatives of the member agencies and acts as an advisory body to theCouncil; the Secretariat which provides administrative support to both the IAAGCC andthe CONSULCOM; an auditor from COA; a coordinator; an Operations Group, which iscomposed of a research team, task forces and the investigation and prosecution teams; andan Administrative Group. The “hosting” of IAAGCC rotates among the member agencies
every two years, during which time period the host agency serves as chairman of both the
IAAGCC and the CONSULCOM.
The Guidelines of Cooperation establishes a mechanism of cooperation through theestablishment of an Inter-Agency Coordinating Center (IACC), coordinating andmonitoring centres in each member agency (at the head office and in regional or local
offices nationwide), and inter-agency task forces. Besides creating a clear organizational
structure and prescribing a cooperation mechanism, the Guidelines categorically prescribe
the scope of authority of each member agency in criminal cases, civil as well as
administrative cases.
The IACC has the following functions:(i)serve as the central repository of all records/information of concerning interagency activities;(ii) coordinate with monitoring units of member-agencies;(iii) maintain files on the modus operandi in the commission of fraud related cases;(iv) maintain a computer database of case profiles and statistics;(v) disseminate information/instructions among member agencies;(vi) monitor the activities of the inter-agency task forces;(vii) maintain and compile all reference materials for use of member agencies;(viii) serve as a hotline centre;(ix) promote public awareness and involvement in inter-agency programmes
against the incidence of graft and corruption by:• establishing hotlines in member agencies;• immediately responding to complaints;• assuring confidentiality of information;• disseminating information on causes and effects of graft and modus operandi
in the commission of graft;• emphasizing the primary responsibility of agency head in the prevention anddetection of graft and corruption; and• coordinating with the Philippine Information Agency and other public
offices in disseminating information on the evils of graft and corruption.
The IACC, being equipped with the latest communication facilities in order to expedite
actions on complaints and requests for information/statistics on graft cases, also facilitates
the information exchange among the member agencies by keeping track of requests for- 106 - 106 -information and inquiries from one another, and monitoring response/reaction time of
member agencies and reminding them to promptly address requests/inquiries.
This network between the IACC on one hand, and the coordinating and monitoring
centres within each IAAGCC member agency on the other, facilitates the communicationand information exchange among the member agencies and ensures that graft andcorruption-related matters are acted upon efficiently.
IAAGCC, however, does not take on all graft and corruption cases. The CONSULCOM
only certifies and refers to the task forces for investigation cases that meet the following
criteria:(i) complex fraud-related government transactions with national impact;(ii) involving the amount of P50 million pesos or higher; and(iii)involving high-ranking public officials with the position of bureau director or
higher.
(b) IAAGCC’s Gains
Since its establishment in 1997, investigators, prosecutors, and other personnel frommember-agencies have been jointly trained on fraud investigation, prevention, detection
and prosecution of graft and corruption cases, and asset forfeiture. Furthermore, when thePhilippine government was shaken by the Priority Development Assistance Fund 33 (PDAF)
scam in 2013, the IAAGCC’s cooperation mechanism was quickly activated with thecreation of an inter-agency task force composed of investigators, technical experts andprosecutors from the OMB, DOJ and COA that was tasked to conduct a joint investigation
into the misuse of the PDAF. The task force’s collaborative work resulted in the filing ofcases against several senators and members of the House of Representatives before the
Sandiganbayan.
V. CONCLUSION
The Philippine institutions involved in the investigation, prosecution and adjudicationof graft and corruption cases may be lauded for their separate and individual drives not only
to promote and strengthen integrity and independence within their ranks, but also to cleanse
their organizations of misfits. For instance, it was seen above that most of these agencies
have their respective codes of ethical standards. Most of them, too, have their own internalaffairs unit/division/board and mechanism that serve as the first avenue for taking action
against errant members of their organization. It will be noted as well that most of these
disciplinary or internal affairs structures are collegial, which is an added measure to ensure
the integrity of their decisions. Moreover, these institutions periodically intensify their anticorruption programmes which trumpet earnest desires for a corrupt-free office.
With these measures in place, however, along with other corruption-prevention
standards not mentioned but which are certainly present in these institutions, like theincreased level of remuneration and additional benefits for government workers (lawenforcement officials, investigators and prosecutors included), reward and promotion
These are discretionary funds available to members of Congress which aim to support small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects which are not included in the national infrastructure
programme involving massive and costly projects.

33- 107 - 107 -procedures, and continuing education and training, it cannot be denied that graft andcorruption still disturb the country’s criminal justice system. Perhaps a more focused,
intense, sincere and sustained cleaning of the backyard is needed.

- 108 - 108 -ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF
PHILIPPINE JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AS A COUNTERMEASURE
AGAINST CORRUPTIONLyn Gaa Dimayuga *I. INTRODUCTION
Robert F. Kennedy once said, “Every time we turn our heads the other way when we
see the law flouted, when we tolerate what we know to be wrong, when we close our eyes
and ears to the corrupt because we are too busy or frightened, when we fail to speak up andspeak out, we strike a blow against freedom, decency and justice.” Corruption is an issue
that has plagued the Philippines since time immemorial. While not exclusive to our country,
it cannot be denied that corruption in the Philippines is at an all-time high. In the study
conducted by Transparency International, the Philippines dropped to the 113th rank out of
180 countries in their 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, a 14-notch fall from its standingof 99th place in 2018. In the said study, the Philippines scored 34 points on a scale wherezero is “highly corrupt” and the perfect score of 100 is “very clean.” 1 Also, in the National
Household Survey on Experience with Corruption in the Philippines, a study released by
the Office of the Ombudsman in 2018, it was discovered that 1 out of every 20 households
had bribed a government official or employee. 2
The negative effects of corruption cannot be overemphasized. As billions of publicfunds are siphoned off by corrupt officials, delivery of basic services, such as food, housing
and medical benefits, and even water supply, are hampered. Investors are discouraged from
opening their businesses in this country, bearing in mind the millions of pesos they have toshell out to obtain the necessary permits and licenses for their business operations. People
dread law enforcement officers because of these officials’ rampant involvement in
kidnapping, sale of illegal drugs and other heinous crimes. The concept of justice becomes
distorted as cases are won based on who has the money to bribe the judge or the prosecutor,
and not on the evidence on record.

Assistant Special Prosecutor, II Office of the Ombudsman, Philippines.
Philippines Drops to 113th Rank in 2019 Corruption Index, by Julia Mari Ornedo, 23 January 2020, GMA
News Online.
2
Ombudsman insists on prioritizing corruption prevention | Inquirer News By: Gabriel Pabico Lalu;
INQUIRER.net, 9 December 2019.
*1- 109 - 109 -II.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINEJUDICIARY, PROSECUTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENTAGENCIES

A. “Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan” 3
Sometime in 2001, two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan. The first
was for Falsification of Public Documents and the second was for Violation of Section 3(e)of the Anti-Graft Law. Charged were several members of the Philippine Marine Corps andcivilian employees, including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her relatives and three ofher employees. The cases were raffled to the Fourth Division where Associate JusticeGregory S. Ong sat as Chairperson.
These cases were referred to as the Kevlar case because it involved the questionablepurchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles. The purchase of the
Kevlar helmets was deemed anomalous because payment was made even prior to thedelivery of the goods; the suppliers appeared to be mere dummies of Napoles and thehelmets were made in Taiwan and not in the USA, as represented by the suppliers. After
trial, Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted for Falsification of PublicDocuments but Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted inboth cases.
Sometime in the middle of 2013, another controversy involving Napoles was unveiledby the Philippine media. The scandal, referred to as the Priority Development AssistanceFund (PDAF) scam, or pork barrel scam, involved the fraudulent use by certain membersof the Senate and House of Representatives of their PDAF, which have been allocated tothem to support their priority development projects either at the local or national level.
During the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), whistle-blowers Benhur Luy,
Marina Sula and Merlina Suñas, who were former employees of Napoles, named certain
government officials and personalities who allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs.
Napoles' parties and events. Among those identified by the whistle-blowers was thenincumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, who, as earlier mentioned,presided over the Kevlar case and eventually acquitted Napoles.
Following the whistle-blowers’ disclosure, an investigation into Justice Ong’s conduct
was ordered by the Supreme Court. After investigation, the Investigating Justice confirmed,
based on records, that Justice Ong performed the following acts: 1) he acted as the contact
of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division where he was the Chairperson; 2) being Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan, he fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal; 3) he received anundetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case; thus, Napoles was assured of her acquittal; 4) he visited Napoles in her
office where she handed to him eleven (11) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a
total of ₱3,102,000.00, purportedly as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million Banco de
3

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB), 23 September 2014.

- 110 - 110 -Oro check which she deposited in her personal account; and 5) he attended Napoles' parties
and was even photographed with Senator. Estrada and Napoles.
Based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice,
Justice Ong was dismissed from service, with a corresponding forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits. In arriving at said decision, the Supreme Court
explained:
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public ingeneral to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the
Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court,
even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation,
respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where
he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted
by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at
her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondentdeliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only
when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the“contact” of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentionedof only one instance he visited Napoles (“This is the single occasion
that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x. ”).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matterseven before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu
proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity
in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.” Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed,dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary. 4
B. People of the Philippines vs. Joselito C. Barrozo 5
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was the respondent in several cases for Estafa andViolation of Batas Pambasa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law. Her cases wereassigned for the conduct of preliminary investigation to Atty. Joselito C. Barroza, AssistantPublic Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. On one occasion, Atty. Barroza told herthat he would resolve the cases in her favour in exchange for ₱20,000.00. Valeriano thenwent to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the incident. Thereafter, theRegional State Prosecutor and Valeriano went to the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI), which immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the operation
conducted on February 15, 2005, Atty. Barrozo was caught red-handed by the NBI agentsreceiving the amount of ₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.
4
5

Ibid.
Administrative Case No. 10207, 21 July 2015.

- 111 - 111 -Following his arrest, Atty. Barrozo was charged with Direct Bribery under paragraph
2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.
The case, however, was later indorsed to the Sandiganbayan since the accused wasconsidered a high-ranking public officer, occupying a position with a salary grade 27 orhigher.
In a Decision, dated 17 March 2011, the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Barrozo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Bribery and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional maximum,
as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor medium,as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. He was likewise imposed the penalty of
special temporary disqualification. On 16 August 2012, Atty. Barrozo’s conviction became
final and executory.
In 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a report that Atty. Barrozo
was still engaged in the practice of law. Considering that his conviction is a ground for
disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, theSupreme Court issued a Resolution dated 11 December 2013, requiring him to comment
on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
In his Comment, Atty. Barrozo denied that he was engaged in the practice of law as henever received any renumeration for his services. Subsequently, upon Order of the Court,
the OBC evaluated the case and came up with its 20 February 2015 Report andRecommendation recommending the disbarment of the respondent.
The Supreme Court adopted the above recommendation. Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo was
disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. As held by the Court
in its Resolution:
It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime
respondent was an assistant public prosecutor of the City of Dagupan.
His act therefore of extorting money from a party to a case handled byhim does not only violate the requirement that cases must be decided
based on the merits of the parties’ respective evidence but also lessens
the people’s confidence in the rule of law.
Indeed, Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity andgood moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying apublic office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrainfrom any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidenceof the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fairdealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdenedwith a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice.
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregardof his oath as a government official but is likewise of such a nature as- 112 - 112 -to negatively affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be
disbarred from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect theadministration of justice by requiring that those who exercise thisimportant function be competent, honorable and reliable – lawyers inwhom courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence. Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital
yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the]profession of odious members. 6
C. The Kian de los Santos Story 7
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Field Investigation Bureau (FIB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman filed separate complaints before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging several police officers with criminal and administrative offences forthe death of 17-year-old Kian delos Santos during a purported drug buy-bust operation in
Caloocan City. Charged were Police Chief Superintendent Roberto Fajardo, Police Senior
Superintendent Chito G. Bersaluna, Police Chief Inspector Amor Cerillo, Police Officer 3
Arnel Oares, Police Officer 1 Jeremias Pereda, Police Officer 1 Jerwin Cruz and private
citizen Nono Lubiran.
The complaints are based on the affidavits executed by three witnesses Ma. Luisa
Walican, Princess Ann Alano and Sheen B. Concepcion, who all narrated that on theevening of 16 August 2017, Oares, Pereda, Cruz and Lubiran were standing outside a store.
When Kian passed by said store, Lubiran pointed to him as his drug runner. Oares, Pereda
and Cruz then accosted Kian and dragged him to a dimly lit cul-de-sac where Oares shot
him in the head. Two plastic sachets of shabu and a .45 calibre handgun were recoveredfrom the body of Kian. The cases are still pending review and evaluation.
III. RELEVANT LAWS ON CORRUPTION
To address the proliferation of corruption in our country, various laws have been enacted.
They include the following:
A. Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
This specific Article of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the Accountabilityof Public Officers. Section 1 of the same declares, “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them withutmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, andlead modest lives.” Sections 2 and 3 thereof further describe the process by which the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of theConstitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. The other sections
6
7

Ibid.
Records. Fajardo vs. Fajardo, et al., OMB-P-C-17-0344; OMB-P-A-17-0410.

- 113 - 113 -provide for the creation of the Ombudsman and the anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan.
B. Republic Act No. 6770, Otherwise Known as “An Act Providing for the Functionaland Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and For Other
Purposes”
Under this law, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority and responsibility for the
exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers
and functions. It is the Ombudsman who has supervision and control of the office. It has
the authority to organize directorates for administration and allied services as may benecessary for the effective discharge of its functions.
C. Republic Act No. 3019, Otherwise Known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act”
This law was created pursuant to the constitutional principle that a public office is publictrust. It defines and penalizes the specific acts of public officers, and private individuals
acting in conspiracy with such public officers, which the law considers as graft or corrupt
practices. In addition, this Act also discusses prohibitions on private individuals,
government officials’ relatives and members of Congress as well as the procedure for filingof the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN).
D. Republic Act No. 6713, Otherwise Known as “An Act Establishing a Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, To Uphold
the Time-Honoured Principle of Public Office Being a Public Trust, Granting
Incentives and Rewards For Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts
and Transactions and Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof and for Other
Purposes”
This law enumerates the standards of personal conduct in the execution of public duties,
the duties of public officials and employees, prohibited acts and transactions and penalties
for transgression thereof.
E. Republic Act No. 7080, Otherwise Known as “An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder”
This law defines the crime of plunder and how it is committed. Under the law, plunder isthe criminal act of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least P50 million, through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts.
F. Act 3815, or the Revised Penal Code
Title Seven of this Code specifically enumerates, defines and penalizes crimes committed
by public officers. Some of the more common crimes included in this Title are Direct Bribery,
Indirect Bribery, Malversation of Public Funds or Property, Illegal Use of Public Funds orProperty and Failure of Public Officer to Render Accounts.
G. Republic Act No. 1379, Otherwise Known as “An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favorof the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor”
This law governs the process by which the State may institute forfeiture proceedings
against a public officer who, during his incumbency, amasses property that is manifestlyout of proportion to his legitimate income.
- 114 - 114 -H. Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known as “An Act Defining the Crime of Money
Laundering, Providing Penalties Therefor and For Other Purposes”
The law aims to protect our banks and other financial institutions from being used as
money laundering sites for the proceeds of any unlawful activity.
I. Republic Act No. 10660, Otherwise Known as “An Act Strengthening Further the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Further
Amending Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor.”This is the law creating the Sandiganbayan, or the Anti-Graft Court of the Philippines.
It has the sole jurisdiction to hear criminal cases filed against high-ranking officials of thegovernment, specifically, those occupying positions with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
J. Republic Act No. 9485 or the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007
This is the policy applicable to government agencies and offices which provide
frontline services to the public. A notable feature of this act is the creation of the Citizen’sCharter or the set of service standards of the particular office which should be posted in themain entrances of government buildings or other conspicuous places.
IV. MEASURES TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
Aside from the passage of the above-mentioned laws, our government also continuallyadopts measures to develop and enhance integrity of those serving its people.
A. In the JudiciaryOn 7 July 2020, the Supreme Court en banc, passed and approved Resolution A. M.
No. 18—01-05-SC, entitled “Establishment of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the
Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO).” Under said Resolution, the JIB
was vested with the power and authority to receive and act on all administrative complaints
or disciplinary actions against either the Presiding Justices and Associate Justices of theappellate courts and Judges of the lower courts, as well as act on complaints or referrals asprovided for in Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the “Internal Rules” of the JIB as approvedby the Supreme Court en banc, as well as the Supreme Court Circulars, Administrative
Orders or other issuances. 8
Likewise, JIB was given exclusive jurisdiction over administrative complaints against(1) Court officials with Salary Grades 30 and 31, excluding those that are not within thejurisdiction of the JIB, regardless of the gravity of the offence; (2) First and Second Level
Court Judges, including Shari’a District and Circuit Court Judges, charged with serious
charges under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (3) Court officials and or employees,with Salary Grades 27 to 29, regardless of the gravity of the violation of the “Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel” and of the Civil Service Law and Rules. 9
The CPIO, on the other hand, has the primary duty to conduct investigation and/or
intelligence, surveillance or entrapment operations, as well as lifestyle checks to detect and89Section 4, A. M. No. 18—01-05-SC.
Ibid.

- 115 - 115 -identify justices, judges and officials of the judiciary who commit, appear to be involvedin or are liable for any of the offences enumerated under Section 9 of said Resolution. 10
B. Internal Cleansing of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
In the PNP, an Enhanced Revitalized Internal Cleansing Strategy (ERICS) was
implemented to instil values formation, spiritual development and strengthening of familiesof its personnel. The programme aims to build a God-centred, service-oriented and familybased organization. Under the punitive aspect of the PNP ERICS, a total of 3,537 personnel
were penalized, of which 1,121 were meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, while
9,513 personnel were neither exonerated nor their cases dismissed. 11
The PNP has likewise created the Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement Group(IMEG) tasked to conduct intelligence build-up and law enforcement operations against
PNP personnel involved in illegal activities, institutionalizes efforts against rogue cops andcleansing police ranks to ensure that the PNP will be able to fulfil its duty with honesty,
honour and integrity. 12
C. Integrity Measures in the Office of the Ombudsman
Not to be outdone, the Office of the Ombudsman, in partnership with international
agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and theInternational Development Law Organization (IDLO), regularly organize and conduct
trainings for its prosecutors. These trainings are geared towards developing and enhancing
the capacity of its prosecutors to ensure the successful prosecution of graft cases filed incourt against erring public officials. It has likewise introduced measures focused on
developing and improving integrity in public service. Some of these measures are:
1. The Campus Integrity Crusaders ProgramThis programme is the platform through which the Office of Ombudsman realizes the
pro-active and preventive approach of its anti-corruption drive. In 2019, a total of 3,842
elementary, secondary and tertiary student-leaders were capacitated on anti-corruption andintegrity development by the Office of the Ombudsman resulting in the involvement of
1,287 high school and college organizations in 1,250 activities cascading the values ofintegrity, honesty, transparency and accountability in schools and communities. 13
2. Integrity Management Program (IMP)This programme aims to establish a systematic approach in building, improving,
reinforcing and sustaining a culture of integrity in public sector institutions that is rooted
in acceptable values, principles and standards of good governance. In 2018, the IMP wasrolled out to five (5) agencies in the Executive Branch, namely, the Department of Health(DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau ofInternal Revenue (BIR). 14 The IMP proved to be effective in identifying vulnerable areasin agency processes and helping them draw up corrective measures that will build anddevelop a culture of integrity in the agency. 15
Section 9, A. M. No. 18—01-05-SC.
PNP 2019 Annual Accomplishment Report, p. 23.
12
Ibid., p. 28.
132018 Ombudsman Annual Report, p. 17.
14
Ibid., p. 19.
15
Ibid.
10
11

- 116 - 116 -3. Integrity, Transparency, Accountability in Public Service (ITAPS) Program
One of the notable initiatives of the Office is the Integrity, Transparency,
Accountability in Public Service Program or the ITAPS Program. It is a programme offeredby the National Integrity Center, the training arm of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Designed using interactive adult learning methods, it is offered to government officials andemployees, whereby modules have been designed to provide a good understanding ofcorruption (Module 1), accountability of public officers (Module 2), penalizing corruption(Module 3) and integrity in public service (Module 4). Explanations on specific violations
such as Bribery, Malversation, Failure to Render Accounts, Illegal Use of Fund or Property
and specific laws such as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers andEmployees, Plunder, Anti-Graft Law and the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act are also being
offered by the programme. 16
4. Red Tape Assessment
Another anti-corruption initiative is the conduct of the Red Tape Assessments (RTA)
in government institutions, including law enforcement agencies. Patterned after theOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Red Tape Assessment
tool, the Ombudsman initiated RTA aims to simplify administrative procedures with theend in view of reducing administrative burdens on businesses. As a methodology, the RTA
evaluates the adequacy and functionality of the internal controls in place and determines
whether they are proportionate to the risk of fraud, corruption, abuse, and mismanagement
through listing down in two separate matrices all the documentary and other requirements
for availing a service, the various steps required for such, and the rationale behind them inorder to assess whether there is a relative impact in an agency’s mandate in case arequirement or procedure is dispensed with. 17
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the progress our government has achieved in pursuing its anti-corruption drive,the following are suggested as further steps for improvement:
A. Intensifying the internal cleansing within the PNP ranks;
B. Implementing a more rigorous selection process for applicants or appointees topublic positions to ensure that these positions are given or offered only to personsof unquestionable integrity and competence;
C. Improving the fact-finding/intelligence-gathering capacity of the Department ofJustice, Ombudsman and the PNP by conducting continuous trainings;
D. Procuring technologically advanced equipment that will facilitate fact-finding andscientific investigation for case build up;

Integrity, Transparency, Accountability in Public Service (ITAPS) Program Primer.
Red Tape Assessment Report for Supervisory Office for Security and Investigation Agencies of thePhilippine National Police. Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Bureau, Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, Office of the Ombudsman.

16
17- 117 - 117 -E. Review and amend the Bank Secrecy Law 18 to enable the Anti-Money Laundering
Council to conduct speedier bank inquiry and investigation on the accounts ofpublic officers involved in corruption and other illegal activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of corruption is an issue that is felt by all Filipinos in their daily lives. To
this end, adopting measures to develop and enhance the integrity of our public officials is
imperative to ensure that public funds are spent not for their own benefit but for the needsof the people they have sworn to serve. When public funds are used and devoted to meetthe people’s needs, we take a step closer towards achieving economic stability, security anddevelopment for our country.
The war against corruption is far from over but our government’s resolve to win thiswar remains steadfast and unbending. However, this responsibility does not rest on ourgovernment alone. All citizens must likewise do their part by remaining vigilant andadopting the attitude of non-tolerance against corruption. For it is only through the joint
effort of the government and its citizens that we can make any headway in staving off thefurther spread of this malaise.

18

Republic Act No. 1405.

- 118 - 118 -INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORSAND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Renato Aviles Peralta Jr.*The prosecution of offences committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Integrity connotes being consistent in doing the right thing in accordancewith the law and ethical standards every time. 1 To insulate the Office from outside pressure
and improper influence, the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 6770, 2 has endowed
it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free fromlegislative, executive or judicial intervention. 3 The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing
its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. 4
I. COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
In the case of the Office of the Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines,
safeguards to its independence have either been built-in or added during its four decades ofoperation in order to address the institutional vulnerabilities and sometimes, human frailties,
in the performance of functions. The Office of the Ombudsman Philippines relies on two
approaches – legislative measures and programmatic interventions. 5
A. Legislative Measures 6
The basic legal framework of the Philippines, the 1987 Constitution, is by far the mostpotent weapon and shield of the Ombudsman Philippines in ensuring its independence. The
creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
in response to the people’s clamour to restore familiar structures of democracy 7 that would

Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018.
2
The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
3
Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 397 Phil. 829, 831 (2000), cited in Angeles v. Desierto, 532 Phil. 647,
656 (2006).
4
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196231, 4 September 2012
and Wendell Barreras-Sulit v. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. et al., G.R. No. 196232, 4 September 2012.
5
Panel Discussion on Maintaining Independence and Surviving Threats by Samuel R. Martires, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court (Ret.) and Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines during theInternational Seminar Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Thai Ombudsman
and Signing Ceremony for the Memorandum of Intent of the South East Asian Ombudsman Forum (SEAOF),
12 February 2020.
6
Panel Discussion on Maintaining Independence and Surviving Threats by Samuel R. Martires, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court (Ret.) and Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines during theInternational Seminar Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Thai Ombudsman
and Signing Ceremony for the Memorandum of Intent of the South East Asian Ombudsman Forum (SEAOF),
12 February 2020.
7
Based on the speech of former Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, one of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, delivered during the 25th Anniversary Forum of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group(CFAG).
*
1- 119 - 119 -guarantee the preservation of rights and dignity. As such, the Office of the Ombudsman
acquires its legitimacy from the blessing of the people and that of the Constitution.
It was the vision of the framers of the Constitution for the Office of the Ombudsman to
go beyond politics; thus, it was removed from the bureaucratic structure and was made into
a constitutional office. 8 Being an independent constitutional office, its abolition cannot be
simply subjected to the power of the legislative branch and would require a much moretaxing amendment of the Constitution.
Pursuant to the Constitution, Executive Order No. 243 was issued decreeing the formalorganization of the Office of the Ombudsman, followed by the passage of “The
Ombudsman Act of 1989”, or Republic Act No. 6770, which further strengthened its
independence in the discharge of its mandate.
To outline the elements of independence as contained in the Ombudsman Act, we will
be following some of the defining elements of independence that have been summarized in
the International Framework of the Ombudsman Institution, a research effort by the Catalan
Ombudsman (Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya) describing some of the internationalframeworks on the ombudsman’s core characteristics. 9
The first element is on personal and professional qualities and eligibilities. Similar to
the international models which commonly define an Ombudsman to be of exemplary recordof independence and impartiality and not engaged in political activities, the Ombudsman
Act requires top Ombudsman officials to be of recognized probity and independence, andmust not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding
election. 10
The second is on the term of office. The top officials serve for a fixed term of seven (7)years without reappointment, and are not qualified to run for any public office in theelections immediately succeeding their cessation from office. A fixed term avoids theprobability of the ombudsmen compromising themselves by the interest of gaining futureappointment, 11 as what is also being advocated by the Venice Commission. 12
The third is on appointment and remuneration. The Ombudsman and the Deputies areappointed by the President from a shortlist of at least three nominees for every vacancy tobe submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the same body that screens nominees
to the judiciary. Per the Constitution, such appointments require no congressional
confirmation from the Commission on Appointment 13 as is usual in the case of Cabinet
members. Even the salaries of the top Ombudsman officials have been insulated from

Based on the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Jose C. Colayco during the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explaining the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
9
International Framework of the Ombudsman Institution. Rafael Ribó (Catalan Ombudsman and member ofthe Board of the International Ombudsman Institute), et al. Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya. April 2016.
10
Section 5, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Republic Act No. 6770.
11International Framework of the Ombudsman Institution. Rafael Ribó (Catalan Ombudsman and memberof the Board of the International Ombudsman Institute), et al. Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya. April 2016.
12
Venice Commission is the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law providing legal
advice to its Member States.
13
Section 8, Article 10 – Accountability of Public Officers. 1987 Philippine Constitution.
8- 120 - 120 -pressure and undue threats by stipulating in the Constitution that their salaries shall not bedecreased during their term of office. 14
The fourth is on dismissal. The mode of removing an Ombudsman is only by
impeachment, and the Ombudsman cannot be forcibly dismissed unless for culpableviolation of the Constitution. 15 Since the Ombudsman is not subject to the disciplinary
authority of the President, the Ombudsman is not beholden to anyone, even the appointing
authority.
The fifth is on guarantees of activity, pertaining to cooperation with the Ombudsman.
As part of its official functions and duties, the Office of the Ombudsman may “request any
government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.” 16The sixth is on organizational autonomy. The Office’s position structure and staffing
pattern is to be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman, who is also the appointing
authority of Ombudsman employees. 17 Direct recruitment of staff by the Ombudsman isthe preferred solution to preserve independence. 18
The seventh is on budgetary autonomy. The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
grants fiscal autonomy to the Office of the Ombudsman. Its approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released, 19 and Congress cannot slash its budget. Thisis an additional constitutional guarantee to further strengthen and insulate the Office of the
Ombudsman from politics and other pressures.
Based on the research made on the International Frameworks of Ombudsman
Institution, some earlier international texts have “minimal reference” or “lesser intensity”
as to the need for an ombudsman to be endowed with adequate resources. 20 Whenombudsman institutions, however, are not given the rightful resources to discharge theirfunctions, it will not only pose a threat to its independence, but budgetary reasons may
potentially be used to justify its disappearance, 21 if pursued by certain parties.
As can be seen, in the case of the Philippines, the legal background is adequate to afford
independence to the Office of the Ombudsman. Perhaps, the real challenge is its honest-togoodness application, including the willpower and conviction to assert independence at all
times, and to stand by it even in the midst of tremendous pressure. 22
Ibid., Section 10, Article 10.
Ibid., Section 8.
16
Ibid., Section 5.
17
Ibid., Section 11.
18
Organizational Autonomy, pages 17-18. International Framework of the Ombudsman Institution. Rafael
Ribó (Catalan Ombudsman and member of the Board of the International Ombudsman Institute), et al. Síndic
de Greuges de Catalunya. April 2016.
19
Section 14, Article 10 – Accountability of Public Officers. 1987 Philippine Constitution; and Section 38.
The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Republic Act No. 6770.
20
Budgetary Autonomy. Page 18. International Framework of the Ombudsman Institution. Rafael Ribó
(Catalan Ombudsman and member of the Board of the International Ombudsman Institute), et al. Síndic de
Greuges de Catalunya. April 2016.
21
Ibid.
22
Panel Discussion on Maintaining Independence and Surviving Threats by Samuel R. Martires, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court (Ret.) and Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines during the1415- 121 - 121 -This brings us to another level of addressing threats to the independence of our Office.
Although our laws guarantee independence, these laws, however, need to be complemented
with measures that treat the sources of threat. Thus, our Office has developed programmaticinterventions aimed to eradicate corruption – the evil that ombudsmans’ offices fight andalso the source of threats to their independence. 23
B. Programmatic Intervention 24
Among the programmes implemented by our Office, the following are the most relevant
ones in addressing threats sprouting from corruption:
1. Integrity, Transparency, Accountability in Public Service (ITAPS) Program
On corruption education, one of the notable initiatives of the Office is the Integrity,
Transparency, Accountability in Public Service Program, or the ITAPS. Offered togovernment officials and employees, ITAPS uses interactive adult learning methods withmodules which have been designed to provide a good understanding of corruption,accountability of public officers, penalizing corruption, and integrity in the public service.
It is the belief of the Office that certain maladministration and misconduct resulting tocorruption offences are by-products of an under- or misinformed workforce, especially therank-and-file employees who are usually underexposed to capacity-building opportunities.
With the conduct of ITAPS, it is envisioned that government employees would be better
informed, and that this would lessen, if not eliminate, corruption in government.
2. Integrity Management Program
In partnership with the Office of the President, our Office is implementing the Integrity
Management Program, or the IMP, the flagship anti-corruption programme of thePhilippine Government. It reviews and assesses the systems and processes of key
government agencies in terms of their risks and vulnerabilities to corruption, and assists
them in drawing up corrective and preventive measures with the aim of establishing asystematic approach in building, improving, reinforcing and sustaining a culture of
integrity in the agency. In 2018, the implementation of the IMP covered fourteen (14)volunteer agencies and was initially introduced to thirteen (13) other public sector
institutions.
At present, the IMP is at the pilot stage of implementation. After its assessment andevaluation, a closer look at its efficacy will be undertaken in order to advocate for its rollout to the rest of the bureaucracy. Once integrity measures are established in the whole ofgovernment, we believe that a significant decrease in corruption incidence can be expected.
3. National Household Survey on Experience with Corruption in the Philippines
In collaboration with the Philippine Statistics Authority (formerly the National
Statistics Office), rider questions to measure the extent or pervasiveness of petty orbureaucratic corruption in the Philippines have been included in our country’s national
household survey. It was successfully done in 2010, followed by surveys in 2013, 2016 andInternational Seminar Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Thai Ombudsman
and Signing Ceremony for the Memorandum of Intent of the South East Asian Ombudsman Forum (SEAOF),
12 February 2020.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.

- 122 - 122 -2017, and the latest of which is the survey in July 2019. Unlike most domestic andinternational surveys on corruption, the extent or pervasiveness of corruption is measured
not on perception but on actual experience with corruption. The results of these surveys aid
the Office of the Ombudsman in making targeted decisions when it comes to focusing its
limited resources on various anti-corruption work.
4. Values-Formation Program
To institute lasting change, there is a need to focus on the root of the problem ofcorruption – our decaying values system. There is a need to go back to the basics, there isa need to once again promote good morals and right conduct, and there is a need to remind
our countrymen to integrate values in our daily lives. As such, our Office runs certain
values-formation programmes echoing this call.
The general belief is that another way to institute lasting change is to focus on the rootof the problem, which is the Filipino values system. The identified solution is to strike abalance between fear and inspiration such that integrity-building and institutional values
formation become prime and the vision is for inspiration to stem from the example set by
an institution. The challenge then is for the Office to be an acceptable and indomitable
example of moral ascendancy directly drawn from observable practice in order to serve as
inspiration to the people of the Philippines. 25
As such, a return to values already started within the halls of the Office of the
Ombudsman by capacitating its personnel through the Values Enrichment Seminars being
conducted by its training arm and through an active enrolment of its relevant personnel toEthical Leadership Training. Apart from this, systems are also being improved to make it
conducive to the workings of an institution of integrity, i.e. the centralization of a records
repository system and of administrative services. 26
In an effort to ensure a capacitated workforce, continuous capacity-building initiatives
are being held, particularly for our lawyers and investigators on trial advocacy skills, legal
draftsmanship, case analysis and specialized investigative areas such as fraud audit,
forensic accounting, forensic engineering, environmental assessment tools and anti-moneylaundering laws. 27
Monitoring and tracking of cases is essential to anti-corruption efforts. Anotheropportunity for the institution is to strengthen a database system and other tracking systems,
which can effectively detect and flag cases that may be deliberately delayed. This could
prevent internal corruption, such as alleged internal corrupt practices conducted todeliberately delay cases. 28
The Campus Integrity Crusaders programme of our Office aims to empower students
in their involvement in corruption prevention initiatives by developing their leadershipskills and instilling the values of integrity and social responsibility. For those in the private
sector, on the other hand, our Office conducts Integrity Caravans and multi-sectoral
Country Report on Anti-Corruption Best Practices, Success Stories, Challenges, Strategies and Others byRodolfo M. Elman, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Office of the Ombudsman during 15th Southeast
Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC), 8-10 October 2019.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
25

- 123 - 123 -meetings wherein stakeholders air their views on how to better fight corruption and, more
importantly, commit to implementing these measures.
At this point, it is also worth mentioning that a key anti-corruption strategy that has
worked for the Office for so many years is interagency collaboration. Just recently, thePresident has ordered the creation of a Mega Task Force to pin down corruption among all
government agencies. There may have been camps looking at this as duplication of work,overstepping boundaries or creating unclear grounds but for institutions that have worked
closely for several years now, rapport and respect of jurisdiction is both a written andunwritten rule. In interagency cooperation, the focus should not only be on good work but
on institutional relationships that mature over time such that the work never becomes acompetition but a complementation. 29
II. CONCLUDING NOTE
The understanding of the pervasiveness of threats among ombudsman institutions
should steer continuous studies and exchanges on (1) the dimensions of threat, (2) the
different means to address and manage them, and (3) the available aid or assistance to ward
them off. 30
In addition to legal measures, the independence of Prosecutors – and even Judges and
Law Enforcement Officials – depends on the individual’s integrity and core values toinsulate them from outside pressure and improper influence. Hence the need for promotionof good morals and right conduct, integration of values in our daily lives, continuous
education, training and study of the best practices and strategies of other agencies andcountries, regular monitoring of the cases, and transparency in the conduct of investigations,prosecutions and trial of cases.
Vital to this endeavour is also cooperation from all the concerned parties in order toensure the detection and prevention of corruption. Each and every one of us must always
do the right thing in accordance with the law and ethical standards and contribute in ourown way in order to win the fight against corruption.

Presentation of Anti-Corruption Progress by Cornelio L. Somido, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Officeof the Ombudsman during the 16th Principals Meeting of the ASEAN Parties Against Corruption (ASEANPAC), 9 December 2020.
30
Panel Discussion on Maintaining Independence and Surviving Threats by Samuel R. Martires, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court (Ret.) and Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines during theInternational Seminar Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Thai Ombudsman
and Signing Ceremony for the Memorandum of Intent of the South East Asian Ombudsman Forum (SEAOF),
12 February 2020.
29- 124 - 124 -INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF PUBLIC AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN SINGAPORE
Khoo Wei Quan, Wilson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Safeguarding the integrity of criminal justice institutions, including the judiciary,prosecution service and law enforcement institutions, is essential to the preservation of therule of law. In most countries, integrity and the rule of law are fundamental to governanceand economic success, which in turn translates to better lives for the people. The term
“integrity” in Article 11 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
in its application to members of the judiciary and prosecution, refers to the ability of thesystem or an individual member of the system to resist corruption, while fully respecting
the core values of independence, impartiality, personal integrity, propriety, equality,competence and diligence. 1 According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), police integrity refers to normative and other safeguards that keep police frommisusing their powers and abusing their rights and privileges. 2 Indeed, integrity and theability to resist corruption and abuse of power among the various institutions of the criminal
justice system are key components for a successful country. Integrity is closely linked toSingapore’s key public governance principle of incorruptibility, which in turn safeguards
the sovereignty, independence, security and prosperity of Singapore, and upholds justiceand equality.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE FOR PUBLIC
OFFICERS 3
The relatively clean and efficient country which Singaporeans live in today has notalways been like this. Corruption thrived in Singapore during the early period ofSingapore’s history as it was perceived that corrupt offenders were unlikely to be detected
and punished. In this regard, understanding Singapore’s historical development vis-à-vis
its struggle against corruption and abuse of power is essential to appreciate Singapore’s
anti-corruption instruments and policies.
A. Deep-seated and Widespread Corruption in the Early Colonial Years
According to Jon S.T. Quah, 4 corruption was criminalized as early as in 1871 with theenactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore
Senior Assistant Director, Investigations Operations Division, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
Singapore.
1
See <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/judicial-integrity.html>.
2
See UNODC’s Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity, pp iv, in<https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prisonreform/crimeprevention/PoliceAccountability_Oversight_and_Integrity_10-57991_Ebook.pdf>.
3
Law Enforcement Officers are considered public officers in Singapore.
4
See Quah J.S.T. (2007). Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Countries.
Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. No. 2 - 2007(189).
*- 125 - 125 -by the British colonial rulers. However, enforcement was almost non-existent, and theenactment of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) in December 1937 did little
to address the situation. The POCO was enforced by the Singapore Police Force (SPF)’s
Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) and was also ineffective as it was limited in scope, andcorruption remained a non-arrestable offence. Although corruption was made an arrestableoffence in 1946, Singapore was still unable to deal with corruption and abuse of power
effectively as the ACB of the SPF was unable to investigate corruption cases within the
Police Force without fear or favour. In 1951, a gang of robbers in Singapore hijacked aconsignment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth about S$400,000, and it was found that police
detectives and some senior police officers were among the thieves. However, the officers
involved were only dismissed or forced into retirement. The British colonial government,
dissatisfied with the investigation results, formed a special team to inquire into the matter.
Upon the conclusion of its inquiry in September 1952, the team was retained to replace the
ACB as an independent organization to look into corruption offences in Singapore. Thus,
the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was born.
B. The Birth of an Independent Agency Backed by Strong Political Will
Despite the changes, corruption, especially in its syndicated form among law
enforcement officers, continued to thrive. CPIB’s small number of staff and limited powers
were perhaps manifestations of the colonial government’s lack of political will in
eradicating corruption. The turning point came in 1959 when Singapore attained selfgovernment. When founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew led his People’s Action Party(PAP) to take the oath of office in June 1959, they wore the party uniforms of white-onwhite to symbolize their determination to keep the Government clean and incorruptible,
and this is still the same position today. Upon assuming office, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew
promised to “establish a clean and effective government”. Correspondingly, the PAP
government retained CPIB as the only Anti-Corruption Agency in Singapore and enacted
the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) in June 1960 to enhance its legal powers, budget
and personnel which eliminated the deficiencies of the POCO. Under the new Act, thedefinition of corruption was revised to explicitly include various forms of gratification andthe penalty for corrupt behaviours became more severe. In addition, CPIB officers werevested with extensive powers to carry out their investigations. These included the authority
to arrest a person suspected of corruption as well as the ability to access the suspect’s
financial accounts or premises to search for evidence. By enacting the PCA andstrengthening the CPIB, the PAP government was determined to change the public’s
perception that corruption is a low-risk and high-reward crime. The PAP government’s
deep sense of mission back in the day to establish a clean and ethical government led to thegradual diminution of the threat posed by corruption in Singapore’s society.
Today, Singapore is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world. The lowlevels of corruption in the public sector, reflected accordingly in indicators such as the
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited’s Report on Corruption in Asia,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the World Justice Project’sRule of Law Index and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, arealso generally seen as a hallmark of Singapore’s good governance by the international
community. Statistically, corruption in the public sector has remained constantly low in thepast few years, accounting for no more than 14 per cent of cases registered for investigation
by CPIB between 2015 and 2019. This had led to an environment that is conducive toattracting businesses and investments into Singapore, as observed from former U.K. Prime
Minister David Cameron’s remarks when he noted that “Singapore’s climb to the top end- 126 - 126 -of the global indices for anti-corruption and for ease of doing business”, which have “gonehand-in-hand with its great global economic success”. 5
III. KEY FACTORS THAT SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
There are several factors enabling Singapore to become one of the least corrupt
countries in the world and these measures build on the strong political will by the incumbent
government to eradicate corruption. Strong and effective legislative provisions areembedded within the PCA with a view of maintaining the integrity and independence of
public officers, including officers from Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). CPIB, as thesole anti-corruption agency in Singapore, is responsible for eradicating corruption andsafeguarding integrity. The Singapore Public Service is guided by a Code of Conduct,
which sets out the high standards of behaviour expected of public officers, including law
enforcement officers, based on the principles of integrity, incorruptibility and transparency.
Beyond rules and regulations, CPIB also engages in outreach and prevention efforts
targeted at LEAs and frontline officers on a regular and continual basis to stress theimportance of integrity.
A. Legislative Provisions to Safeguard Integrity and Independence of Public Officers
Singapore relies on two key legislations to fight corruption: the PCA, andthe Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits)
Act (CDSA). The PCA has a wide scope which applies to persons who give or receive
bribes in both the public and private sectors. The CDSA, when invoked, confiscates illgotten gains from corrupt offenders. Together, the two laws ensure that corruption remains
a high-risk and low-reward activity.
Public officers are heavily scrutinized and are expected to abide by higher standards ofintegrity. When a person is convicted of a corruption offence relating to a contract or a
proposal for a contract with the Government or any related public agency, he or she is liable
on conviction to a fine not exceeding S$100,000 or to imprisonment for a term notexceeding 7 years or to both. The punishment is significantly higher than the maximum of
5 years’ imprisonment for other corruption offences. Further, the Court shall also order him
or her to pay as a penalty a sum which is equal to the amount of that gratification. 6 In
addition, when proven that gratification has been received by a person holding public office,or when proven that gratification is given by a person seeking to have dealings with thegovernment under the PCA, the gratification is assumed to have been given corruptly until
the contrary is proven, thus placing the burden of proof on those holding public office or
those who seek to bribe a public officer. Further, disproportionate wealth which cannot bereasonably explained in the Courts may be taken to stem from criminal acts. 7 Thesesections relating to presumption and disproportionate wealth are believed to havecontributed to a clean and ethical government and appears to have served as an effective
deterrent measure against public sector corruption. A public officer is also duty-bound toarrest a person who has offered a bribe or report the bribe offer, and failure to do so carries
a punishment which may include a fine not exceeding S$5,000 or to imprisonment for aterm not exceeding 6 months or to both.
David Cameron’s speech at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (2015).
Section 13 of the PCA.
7
Ibid., Section 24.
56- 127 - 127 -Significantly, these laws apply equally to everyone including Singaporeans who
commit corruption offences overseas. Senior public officials and appointment holders are
similarly expected to uphold even higher standards of integrity and will be dealt with ifthey are found to have fallen short. In 2012, the CPIB was alerted to a possible offence
under the PCA involving a technical officer of the Public Utilities Board (“PUB”), one
Mohamed Sa’ad Bin Mohamed Ali (“Sa’ad”), colluding with vendors involved in PUB
projects. Investigation revealed that Sa’ad had cheated his colleagues from the PUB into
approving purchase orders worth approximately S$1.9 million to business entities
controlled by him. The case involved some 718 transactions that took place between 2005
to 2012. Investigation further revealed that Sa’ad had spent some S$470,000 of theseillegally obtained proceeds on a sports car, an insurance policy, a Gold Certificate, a factory
unit and his mortgage loans. Through the CDSA, CPIB then proceeded to seize anddisgorge the proceeds of crime from Sa’ad, and the assets seized were liquidated andreturned to the PUB. In November 2018, Sa’ad was sentenced to 45 months’ imprisonment
for his offences.
In 2013, the former Commissioner of the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), Peter
Lim Sin Pang, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for corruptly obtaining sexual
gratification from two female vendors and one potential female vendor to the SCDF on a
total of ten occasions as an inducement for showing favour by advancing the businessinterest of their respective companies with the SCDF.
In July 2020, a former Deputy Group Director of the Land Transport Authority(“LTA”), 8 Henry Foo Yung Thye, was charged in Court for obtaining and attempting toobtain some S$1.24 million in bribes in the form of loans in return for advancing thebusiness interest of contractors and sub-contractors of LTA. He was also charged forcheating his colleagues at LTA.
In 1986, the then Minister for National Development, Tey Cheang Wan, was alleged tohave received bribes totalling S$1 million and was thoroughly investigated by CPIB. He
committed suicide before he could be charged in Court. The investigation into Tey and his
eventual demise sent an important message that no individual, regardless of their power or
status, can be above the law.
B. A Functionally Independent Anti-Corruption Agency with Extensive
Responsibilities and Powers
The functionally independent CPIB, with its mandate to combat corruption in both the
public and private sectors and armed with extensive responsibilities and powers, is a key
factor in keeping corruption at bay. Notwithstanding the fact that the SPF is considered oneof the cleanest police institutions in the world today, Singapore’s experience with the ACB
in earlier days suggested that an independent agency should be given the anti-corruption
mandate. CPIB is under the Prime Minister’s Office and reports directly to the Prime
Minister, enabling CPIB to operate independently. As a safeguard to ensure that thepolitical leadership remains clean and above-board, Article 22G of the Singapore
Constitution provides for CPIB to seek the concurrence of the elected President ofSingapore to proceed with investigations should the government of the day interfere or
Agency responsible for the planning, designing, building and maintenance of Singapore’s land transport
infrastructure and systems.

8- 128 - 128 -block CPIB’s investigation. Over the decades, CPIB’s function has expanded to include
investigation of corruption cases beyond the public sector, with approximately ninety percent of its cases involving private sector corruption. Nonetheless, CPIB remains committed
to keeping the public sector and LEAs in check despite the low incidence of public sector
corruption in Singapore. Although the primary function of CPIB is to investigate corruption
under the PCA, it is also empowered to investigate any other arrestable offence under any
written law disclosed in the course of a corruption investigation.
In a recent case involving former Staff Sergeant Mahendran Selvarajoo, a former
Investigation Officer with the Clementi Police Division, Mahendran had, in 2019, corruptly
obtained sexual gratifications from women he was investigating in return for helping these
women to avoid criminal prosecution for the offences they had committed. Apart frombeing investigated for two counts of corruption, Mahendran was also investigated by CPIB
for performing unauthorized modification to the contents of a computer, as well as being
in possession of obscene material in his mobile phone and USB flash drive. Additionally,
Mahendran had also accessed without authority the photo gallery in a woman’s mobile
phone to snap three of her personal photographs. CPIB’s powers to investigate otheroffences in the course of a corruption investigation empowered it to uncover these otherheinous crimes which are not under the purview of the PCA. Mahendran was eventuallysentenced to two years’ imprisonment in 2020 for his offences.
The Bureau is also charged with the responsibility of checking on malpractice by public
officers and reporting such cases to the appropriate government departments and publicbodies for disciplinary action. In October 2018, CPIB was notified by the National
Environment Agency (NEA) of a complaint it received which alleged that Environmental
Health Attendants working in the Mandai Crematorium and Columbarium have been
receiving red packets from employees of Funeral Services Companies in return for giving
the latter preferential treatment. Upon completion of its investigation, and in consultation
with the AGC, CPIB administered stern warnings to these NEA officers, and also directed
NEA to take disciplinary actions against them for violating public sector rules. Two senior
NEA officers, who were not part of the scheme but had failed to report these practices eventhough they were fully aware of it, were referred to the relevant Ministry for disciplinary
action.
CPIB may, in the course of its investigations, come across cases revealing corruptionprone areas or loopholes in government departments’ procedures. CPIB can conduct
procedural reviews for these government agencies and make recommendations to theagencies concerned to address the procedures vulnerable to corruption. The modern-day
CPIB is operationally independent and well-equipped with the necessary tools to deal withcorrupt and unethical acts in all forms.
C. Government Guidelines Targeted at Maintaining Integrity in the Public Sector
The Singapore Public Service is guided by a Code of Conduct, which sets out the highstandards of behaviour expected of public officers based on principles of integrity,
incorruptibility and transparency. The practice of meritocracy in the public service, together
with regular reviews of administrative rules and processes to improve efficiency, also
reduces the opportunities for corruption.
1. Regulation on General Conduct & Discipline
In relation to prevention of fraud and corruption, the Government Instruction Manual- 129 - 129 -(IM) on Conduct & Discipline states that a Permanent Secretary has to make officers awareof the serious efforts by the Government to get rid of corrupt practices. A Permanent
Secretary also has to make sure that reasonable and adequate measures to prevent
fraudulent and corrupt acts are implemented. This may include improving work procedures
or instituting more effective supervision.
2. Regulation on Conflict of Interest
On public duties and private interests, officers must declare any conflicts of interest. In
the course of an investigation when no corruption offences are uncovered, CPIB could stillrefer the case to the relevant Ministries for disciplinary action if the acts by the public
officer constitute an infringement of the IM, such as conflict of interest. The relevant
Ministries shall keep CPIB informed on the outcome of the disciplinary actions meted out.
An officer’s private interests should be kept separate from his public duties. In the courseof an officer’s work, when decisions are taken on issues which an officer has, or may bedeemed to have, a personal interest in, he must declare his interest to the Chairman at themeeting or his Permanent Secretary.
3. Regulation on Financial Embarrassment
On the issue of financial embarrassment, the IM states that public officers must not fall
into financial embarrassment, which is defined as having total unsecured debts andliabilities of more than three months of the officer’s pay at any time. Any officer who isfinancially embarrassed is liable to face disciplinary proceedings which may lead todismissal. A Permanent Secretary must ensure that every officer in his Ministry makes adeclaration of indebtedness, whether or not he is financially embarrassed when (i) he is first
appointed or re-employed to the public service; (ii) before he is put on the pensionableestablishment; and (iii) annually on 1 January for the preceding one year. An officer who
makes a false declaration of non-indebtedness demonstrates a lack of integrity and is liable
to be dismissed.
4. Regulation on Gambling and Casino Visits
The establishment and opening of the Integrated Resorts 9 (IRs) in 2010 marked a newchapter in Singapore’s tourism growth and strategy. The IRs housed, among otherattractions and amenities, gambling facilities. To curb possible social ills associated withgambling, the Singapore Government rolled out a slew of initiatives such as daily andannual entry levies for Singaporeans prior to entering casino premises to deter
Singaporeans from gambling. In line with expectations that public officers must adhere tohigher standards of integrity, the public service responded swiftly and introduced further
safeguards for public officers. Since 1 October 2013, all public officers are required todeclare within seven days whenever they visit the local casinos more than four times amonth or if they purchase an annual pass. For certain groups of officers, tighter rules apply.
Officers who enforce operations in the local casinos, or regulate the activities of, or
negotiate business arrangements with the local casino operators will be prohibited fromvisiting the local casinos, unless they are doing so as part of their official duties. The aimof having such regulations is to (i) prevent officers who regulate casino operators frombeing placed in situations of conflict of interest; (ii) reduce the incidence of officers being
exploited if they are indebted; and (iii) reduce the incidence of officers being indebted andfalling into financial embarrassment.
Positioned as a development with a comprehensive range of amenities, such as hotels, convention
facilities, entertainment shows and facilities, theme parks, luxury retail and fine dining.

9- 130 - 130 -5. Regulation on Gifts and Entertainment
The IM stipulates strict regulations regarding the receipt of gifts and entertainment. A
public officer may not receive any gift offered to him on account of his or her official
position or his or her official work. Where there is any doubt whether or not any gift ismotivated by, or is related to, an officer’s official position or his or her official work, he or
she must decline to accept. Where it is impractical or inappropriate to refuse the gift, theofficer may accept but must immediately report it to his Permanent Secretary. When an
officer receives an invitation from the public to attend a function as a representative of his
Ministry because of his or her official position, he or she must also consult his Permanent
Secretary. The regulations not only govern the actions between public officers and theprivate sector but also relations among public officers. No officer may, except when he or
she retires, receive from his subordinates any gifts or token of value, whether in the formof money, goods, free passage or other personal benefits; or accept invitations to beentertained, because of his or her official status, by subordinate officers or any association
comprising them.
6. Regulation on Mandatory Job Rotation and Block Leave
The Public Service Division, which sets the policy direction for shaping the Singapore
Public Service, has implemented mandatory job rotations and block leaves for public
officers in positions with higher risks of corruption as a fraud prevention and deterrence
measure. Since 1 January 2014, job rotation and block leave have been enforced for officers
holding positions which are more susceptible to being suborned and exploited if theincumbent were to remain in the same job for too long. Depending on the nature of theirwork, these officers are subjected to either or both measures. Under the new rules, theseofficers should not serve in the posts for more than five years. Some of these officers whose
work is more transactional in nature 10 will also be subject to block leave of at least fiveconsecutive working days per calendar year.
D. Outreach and Prevention Efforts Stressing the Importance of Integrity
1. Public Education Talks and Training to Reinforce Anti-Corruption Messages
In order to allow public officers as well as members of the public to better understandthe impact of corruption on lives and how they should do their part in flagging out corrupt
practices, CPIB has been actively engaging Singaporeans and non-Singaporeans alikethrough informative public education talks, roadshows and other publicity materials. With
regard to public education talks, CPIB has conducted some 147 of such talks to public
sector agencies between 2015 and 2019, with a reach of more than 9,000 public officers.
Beginning in 2017, CPIB also rolled out a series of videos targeting four groups of people,
namely public officers, the general public, the private sector and students to educate themon different facets of corruption which may be applicable to the respective groups ofindividuals. The video for public officers, entitled “Integrity, a Key Public Service Value”,
was designed with the aim of reminding public officers of the importance of having
integrity when executing their duties.
2. Working with the Media: Increased Publicity to Encourage Reporting
CPIB has increased its engagement with the local media through press releases andfeature stories to reinforce messages such as the values of integrity and incorruptibility, as
They include officers whose core responsibilities relate to finance or procurement, or officers authorized
to perform cash transactions or disbursement of grants on a recurring and regular basis, or officers in
regulatory roles with high risk of being suborned and exploited.

10- 131 - 131 -well as pertinent information to include when making a corruption report. In this regard,
CPIB is appreciative of the media’s support in raising public awareness on corruption cases
and related issues. Aside from emphasizing CPIB’s tough stance against LEAs and public
officers who abuse their position of authority to cause undue harm to the public and tarnish
the image of the public service, it also serves to reiterate the various channels through which
corruption complaints and reports can be made to the Bureau, with the hope that theincreased public awareness will lead to the reporting of similar cases, which will in turnkeep public officers on their toes. Media coverage of CPIB’s press release relating to
Mahendran’s prosecution helped raise public awareness, and in turn led to CPIB receiving
information relating to offences of a similar nature involving another police officer.
3. Multiple and Convenient Avenues for Everyone to Report Corruption
Additionally, public officers and members of the public are strongly encouraged toreport corruption. This is especially so for public officers since failure to report corrupt acts
as a public officer constitutes an offence under the PCA. Indeed, CPIB recognizes theimportance of creating touch points with the public and, in this regard, has put in place anarray of different avenues to report corruption. Members of the public may choose to callthe toll-free 24-hour duty hotline which will be attended by a duty Investigation Officer,
lodge an e-complaint via CPIB website, e-mail CPIB via the generic reporting e-mail, or
fax to CPIB. Importantly, CPIB emphasises that the identity of informers will be protectedunder the PCA. Regardless of whether the complainant is named or anonymous, CPIB
treats all reports received seriously. This is to maintain public trust and confidence in
CPIB’s objectivity in assessing reports based on the merits of the information received. Of
the 350 corruption-related reports received in 2019, 139 (approximately 40%) wereanonymous. More recently in 2017, the Corruption Reporting & Heritage Centre (CRHC)
was launched in the heart of Singapore to serve as an additional touch point for membersof the public to lodge complaints against corrupt individuals. The CRHC is also an ideal
location for members of the public to learn more about corruption and Singapore’s journeyin the fight against corruption by pacing through the exhibition at the heritage area.
Given that the detection of corruption is often challenging since bribes are usually given
and taken surreptitiously between willing parties with no direct victims and few witnesses,
it is of paramount importance that CPIB continues to create awareness about the ills ofcorruption and trigger conversations about related issues. For LEAs and frontline public
officers, the expectation is that they will have internalized CPIB’s messages and continue
to say no to corruption. Fortunately, many have stood tall when offered bribes to do acts
against their duties and conscience. CPIB has been holding annual commendation
ceremonies since 2015 to recognize these public officers, as well as private sector
individuals, who had rejected bribes during the course of duty.
In a recent case which occurred in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, a patrol teamfrom the Public Transport Security Command (PTSC) had spotted one Chen Long at theBoon Lay MRT train station with his mask pulled down. Under the Covid-19 (Temporary
Measures) Act 2020, anyone caught not wearing a mask outside their ordinary place ofresidence faces a penalty. The patrol team approached Chen Long and subsequently
interviewed him. In the midst of the interview, Chen Long opened his wallet, showed themoney in his wallet to one of the PTSC officers and offered him S$50 to let him go. The
PTSC officer refused this offer and subsequently reported this matter to CPIB. Had the
PTSC officer taken the bribe and had Chen Long been a Covid-19 patient, the incident
could have negative knock-on effects on public health and safety in Singapore.
- 132 - 132 -IV. CONCLUSION
Singapore has come a long way since its humble beginnings as a colonial outpost miredin crime and corruption to a modern nation-state with a government and criminal justicesystem admired for its integrity, trustworthiness and low levels of corruption. Today, thecorruption situation in Singapore remains firmly under control. While the incidence ofcorruption among law enforcement officers and in the public service remains consistently
low and the Singapore Public Service continues to be well-regarded as being clean andefficient, Singapore must not lull into a sense of complacency. The low level of corruptionin Singapore today means that a new generation of Singaporeans are now less aware of theharm corruption can cause. CPIB and the public service must therefore continue to work
even harder to engage Singaporeans and ensure that the attitude of zero-tolerance towards
corruption remains part of the DNA of every Singaporean. That said, the efforts of theSingapore Public Service and CPIB will be futile in the absence of political will as thedriving force. Notwithstanding that the CPIB is determined and committed to keep
Singapore clean and corruption free, it is imperative that the government of the day
continues to be that engine that drives home the message of integrity and incorruptibility.

- 133 - 133 -- 134 - 134 -DISSUADING AND DETERRING ACTS OF CORRUPTION BY
PARTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (JUDGES,PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS) – THE
SINGAPORE APPROACH
Hon Yi *I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the steps which Singapore has taken to minimize the occurrenceof incidents of corruption among its judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, andthe safeguards are in place to ensure that, even if incidents of corruption occur, the effects
on the criminal justice process are nullified.
However, even the best systems formulated by man are not fool-proof – incidents ofcorruption among law enforcement officers will, and have, occurred in Singapore. Strong
action, in the form of court prosecution and deterrent sentences, has served to deal withsuch incidents as and when they happen.
This paper is divided into the following three aspects:
a. A brief survey of the remuneration packages for judges and prosecutors in
Singapore;b. Discussion on the independence of judges and prosecutors in the criminal justicesystem, and the procedural safeguards in place; andc. Examination of the principles and procedural rules applicable to the prosecution ofcorruption cases in Singapore, with particular focus on cases of corruption
involving law enforcement officers, and the doctrine of general deterrence, which
guides the court in sentencing such offences.
II. A FAIR PAY PACKAGE TO TACKLE CORRUPTION
Before going into the remuneration schemes of judges and prosecutors, it is necessary
to give a broad overview on the organizational structure of judges and prosecutors in
Singapore. This will give context to the differences and similarities in the respective
remuneration schemes.
All judges in the Supreme Court (made up of the Court of Appeal and the High Court)
are appointed under the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. 1
Deputy Public Prosecutor, Director, Technology Crimes, Commercial and Technology Crimes Cluster,
Crime Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore.
1
Article 95(1) of the Constitution.
*- 135 - 135 -The Legal Service Commission 2 (“LSC”) is a specialized commission under theumbrella of the Singapore Civil Service, and is the body which controls the appointment
and posting of lawyers who join the public service and are deployed, inter alia, as 3:a. Judges in the State Courts (made up of the District and Magistrate Courts) (alsoknown as “judicial officers”); orb. Deputy Public Prosecutors (“DPP”) in the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”).
All judicial officers and DPPs are civil servants under the charge of the LSC, and arecollectively also known as Legal Service Officers (“LSO”), regardless of the department towhich they are deployed.
A. Fair Remuneration Is One of the Principles Guiding the Pay Scales of Civil
Servants
One of the principles which guides the setting of salary scales for the Singapore Civil
Service is that civil servants should be remunerated fairly, with reference to the pay
packages for similar work in the private sector. As recently as 2020, Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong commented, in response of a question by American billionaire andphilanthropist David Rubenstein at an online dialogue held on 28 July 2020 by UnitedStates think tank Atlantic Council, that “it is best to pay the person according to what he isworth, and according to what he is contributing”. Elaborating further, PM Lee alluded to
the risk that underpaid civil servants may engage in corrupt behaviour to make up for thedifference 4:
If you don’t do that, either you compromise on the quality of your civil service, or
people will find ways to make up and compensate, camouflage forms ofcompensation, or you have a revolving door and you have something when you goout, after you retire, and that will lead to other kinds of big problems.
The principle above is applicable to the salaries for uniformed police officers, eventhough they are not part of the civil service. This is because they are nevertheless part ofthe public service, and their salaries are based off the civil service salary scales, withadjustments and allowances specific to the work they undertake (for example, additional
allowances for investigation officers with the Police).
Non-uniformed enforcement officers, for instance, with the specialized branches in the
Singapore Police Force, and enforcement officers with the Ministries, are salaried based on
the civil service scales. Their salaries are thus also guided by the above principle, which
has held true since Singapore’s independence.
As the LSC is part of the civil service, the salary scales of LSOs are guided by the civil
service principles, but with regular review and adjustments to ensure that the scales are

Constituted under Article 111 of the Constitution.
Structure of the LSC can be found at <https://www.lsc.gov.sg/structure/structure-of-legal-service>.
4Kayla Wong (29 July 2020), “PM Lee: Pay public officials what they’re worth, or people will find ways
to camouflage compensation”, Mothership. <https://mothership.sg/2020/07/high-government-paycorruption-lee-hsien-loong/>.
2
3- 136 - 136 -competitive with lawyers in the private sector. For example, in 2000, following a review ofthe salary scales of LSOs, the following components were introduced 5:
a. An additional Market Adjustment Component (MAC) which will enable the Legal
Service to follow changes in market conditions more quickly;b. Additional functional allowances for advocacy and night court duties. These areallowances for prosecutors handling litigation in court, and for judges who sit incourt matters after office hours;c. Additional “loyalty bonuses” over and above regular performance bonuses. This
meant that LSOs who stay with the LSC for extended periods of time receive
additional bonuses which are accumulated over the years.
Over the last decade, additional allowances and incentives have been added to the
remuneration package for LSOs. 6 In contrast to the above, Judges in the Supreme Court are
not under the civil service pay scales, but have their salaries and benefits set out clearly instatute and subsidiary legislation, namely, the Judges’ Remuneration Act (Chapter 147) andthe Judges’ Remuneration (Annual Pensionable Salary) Order.
III. PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Article 35(8) of the Singapore Constitution vests prosecutorial discretion wholly in the
Attorney-General (“AG”), 7 who may exercise his discretion as he sees fit. This means thatall prosecutions in court are overseen and controlled by the AG and his deputies, i.e. DPPs,
who have been delegated with the power to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
Once the AG has exercised prosecutorial discretion:a. The court will not interfere unless the discretion has been exercised unlawfully 8;
andb. Though the prosecutorial power may be part of the powers under the Executive
branch of Government, but, under existing constitutional practice, it isindependently exercised by the AG and not the Minister (of Law). 9 As such, theMinister cannot interfere with the AG’s exercise of discretion. 10
The power to independently exercise prosecutorial discretion means that no otherpersons, whether or not in positions of power, may seek to overbear or override the AG’s
The Honourable the Chief Justice’s speech at “Investing in people in the new Legal Service”, 30 June
2000, <https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/news/speeches/investing-in-people-in-the-new-legal-service--speech-by-the-chief-justice>.
6
Singapore Legal Service Commission, Organisational Excellence.
<https://www.lsc.gov.sg/data/AR/2010/LSC/organisational-excellence-promotions.html>.
7
Article 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore states: The Attorney-General shall havepower, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence.
8
Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49, at [44].
9
Ibid.
10
Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General and another appeal [2020] SGCA 77, at [50].
5- 137 - 137 -decision. This is an especially important safeguard when prosecution is mounted against a
law enforcement officer, prosecutor or judge.
A. Safeguards Are Organic to the Processes Involved in the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion
When a file is referred to the AGC, there are multiple layers of checks to ensure that allcases which are prosecuted in court are properly and fairly assessed. Every matter in whicha DPP gives the direction to charge the suspect in court, that direction will be scrutinized
and countersigned by his or her supervisor.
For corruption cases, there are even more procedural safeguards to ensure fairness andconsistency in decisions. There are multiple levels of assessment for corruption cases,
which serve a vital purpose of avoiding and eliminating bias or partiality at any stage in theprocess.
To illustrate the various procedural safeguards in place, we follow the life of ahypothetical case, involving a police officer who had accepted a bribe, when it is sent to
the AGC. All cases involving corruption are investigated by the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”), and cases submitted by the CPIB will be assessed by a DPP
at the AGC.
a. The CPIB makes the recommendation on whether prosecution is warranted for thecase. This recommendation is supported by at least one superior officer of the CPIB.
b. The file is assigned to a DPP who is trained and experienced in handling corruption
offences. If the DPP knows the police officer personally, whether as a personalacquaintance or in the course of jointly handling other cases in the past, the DPP
will inform his or her supervisor of the conflict of interest. The DPP will be recusedfrom handling the file, which will be re-assigned to another DPP. The need for thisself-check for any potential conflict is briefed to all DPPs when they are appointed,
and all DPPs will do this as a matter of course. This internal procedure acts as asafeguard for fairness – the case against the offender will be assessed fairly, without
being skewed by friendship with the assessing DPP, or conversely, by bias against
the offender possibly due to previous poor performance by the offender in a priorcase.
c. The DPP assesses the case, in an impartial manner, for sufficiency of evidence, andalso considers the public interest in deciding on the appropriate action to be taken
against the offender.
d. The DPP’s supervisor will critically examine the DPP’s assessment of the case. If
the supervisor agrees with the assessment, he or she will sign off on the file.
e. As all corruption cases which are prosecuted in court require the written consent 11
of a Chief Prosecutor, 12 the file will be circulated to the Chief Prosecutor.
Section 33 of the PCA states: “A prosecution under this Act shall not be instituted except by or with theconsent of the Public Prosecutor.” In practice, this power has been delegated to the Chief Prosecutor by theAG.
12
The Chief Prosecutor is the highest ranking DPP in the Crime Division of the Attorney-General’sChambers and is the head of the Division.
11- 138 - 138 -f. Cases involving high-profile public service officers, or particularly sensitive issues,
are also circulated to the Attorney-General or one of the Deputy Attorneys-Generalfor his attention and input.
g. Similarly, if at any of the above steps, the officer examining the case knows or isconnected to the offender in any way, he or she will be recused from looking at thefile, and it will be shunted to an officer of similar rank or seniority.
h. After the above stages are completed, the file is then sent back to the CPIB withdirections on the action to be taken. If the direction is to tender charges against theoffender in court, the DPP will also give instructions on the number and nature of
the charges.
It bears noting that, where an investigation needs to be conducted against an officer of
the CPIB, they do not “investigate their own”. Instead, to “ensure an impartial and thoroughinvestigation”, the investigations will be handled by a specialist investigation department
from the Police. 13
B. Procedural Safeguards Are Present in the Judicial System
When an offender is charged, the case would have entered the court system. Even then,there are multiple safeguards in place to ensure that cases are adjudicated independently at
all levels. The basic premise is that the judiciary in Singapore is independent from the
Executive and Legislature. This separation of powers is enshrined in Article 93 ofSingapore’s Constitution. 14 As mentioned above, the judiciary in Singapore comprises theSupreme Court (made up of the Court of Appeal and the High Court) and the State Courts(made up of the District and Magistrate Courts). Parties to criminal cases tried by the State
Courts have the right of appeal to the High Court.
Judges are not supposed to hear cases in which they are, or may be perceived to be,biased to or for any party.
a. For judges in the State Courts, this rule is statutorily encapsulated – a judge in theState Courts is not allowed to hear any proceedings in which he is personallyinterested, unless the parties agree and the Chief Justice gives his approval. 15
b. For judges in the Supreme Court, the above principle, though not enacted in statute,is nevertheless stated and explained in the Judicial Code of Conduct – judges should
recuse themselves from a case if they believe that “they will be unable, or be
Bryna Singh (24 July 2013), CPIB assistant director facing 21 charges of fraud involving at least $1.7m,
Assistant director at CPIB alleged to have started siphoning CPIB funds from 2008, starting with an initialamount of $1,200, AsiaOne, The Straits Times.:<https://www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20130724-439467.html>
The matter was reported to the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) of the Singapore Police Force,as the accused was a CPIB officer and the alleged financial impropriety could have amounted to acriminal offence. This was to ensure an impartial and thorough investigation. The Prime Minister
appointed an independent review panel to investigate how this case happened, and to strengthen thefinancial procedures and audit system in CPIB to prevent a recurrence.
14
Article 93 states: “The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such
subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force.”
15
Section 65 of the State Courts Act (Chapter 321).
13- 139 - 139 -perceived to be unable, to judge impartially, unless the failure to hear any suchcase would necessarily result in irreparable injustice being occasioned to any ofthe parties in the case or any such other persons to whose interests the Judges inquestion may properly have regard”. 16 Either of the formulations of the principle
above would logically include recusal from hearing a case where the accused person
is personally known to the judge.
Parties to a case may also apply for the judge hearing a case to recuse himself, on thebasis that there is apparent bias, i.e. there are circumstances that gave rise to a reasonablesuspicion or apprehension in a fair-minded person with knowledge of the relevant facts thatthe judge, was biased. 17 As such, the applicant does not need to show that the judge was infact biased, but only needs to show that there was basis for reasonable suspicion orapprehension that the judge could be biased. The latter is a significantly lower standard
than proving actual bias.
Furthermore, even within the judiciary itself, in so far as the State Courts have theirown organizational structure and hierarchy (as opposed to court level hierarchy, which isthat of superior courts having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of lower courts), there
is independence of judges within the State Courts. In Goh Kah Heng (alias Shi Ming Yi) v
Public Prosecutor and another criminal motion [2009] 3 SLR(R) 409, the accused personsought to have the trial heard in the High Court instead of the State Courts, as the SeniorDistrict Judge (heading the State Courts) was previously the Director of the Commercial
Affairs Department (“CAD”). The accused person claimed that, as his case had been
investigated by the CAD, there existed two fears: (a) that the trial judge would defer to the
Senior District Judge because he was formerly the head of the CAD; and (b) as the SeniorDistrict Judge has the power to assess the trial judge’s performance, the judge may not dare
disagree with the views of the Senior District Judge. The High Court rejected theapplication, and commented that the individual judges were independent, make theirdecisions freely, and must not be afraid to express a view just because another judge may
hold a different view. 18
Judicial Code of Conduct for the Judges and Judicial Commissioners of the Supreme Court of Singapore<https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/(domestic-code-ofconduct)-version-for-uploading-(22-february-2019).pdf>, at page 7.
17
Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v Attorney-General [2013] 2 SLR 1108, at [34]. The court also enunciatedseveral principles on recusal –(a) An application to a judge to recuse himself must be based on credible grounds.
(b) A claim that there is apparent bias on the part of a judge must be based on facts that are substantiallytrue and accurate. The fact that an allegation of bias has been made against a judge is not enough;otherwise, a party could secure a judge of his choice by merely alleging bias on the part of other judges.
(c) In determining the application, the judge must have regard to the quality of the allegation. A judge
would be as wrong as to yield to a tenuous or frivolous objection as he would to ignore an objectionof substance.
18
Goh Kah Heng (alias Shi Ming Yi) v Public Prosecutor and another criminal motion [2009] 3 SLR(R)409, at [6]: The formation and expression of the court’s opinion is a critical aspect of a judge’s work. He is
required by the oath that he takes to administer the law without fear or favour. It is a requirement to conduct
his case impartially. It is also a requirement that he makes his decisions concerning the case freely andboldly. When “the interests of justice” are being considered, one must also take into account the ideal ofindependence of the judiciary. It is an ideal that means little if individual judges cannot be independent. A
judge must not be afraid to express a view just because another judge holds a different view. Every judge is
mindful by virtue of the oath of office that he has taken, that in reaching his verdict he does not take
instruction from a superior judge except in the form of the binding authority of precedent cases; for heknows that when the trial starts, he is the boss.
16- 140 - 140 -IV.

PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE PROSECUTION, ADJUDICATION ANDSENTENCING OF CORRUPT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALSThis part of the paper examines the various principles which guide the prosecution andsentencing of corrupt law enforcement officials in Singapore. Thankfully, there have beenno cases involving corrupt judges or prosecutors to date. It is anticipated that the same
principles applicable to corrupt law enforcement officers will be equally applicable tocorrupt judges or prosecutors.
As mentioned above, all prosecution for corruption offences will be under thePrevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) (“PCA”), and investigations are conducted by
the CPIB. The legislative intent behind the enactment of the PCA was the “public service
rationale” – the act was aimed to eradicate corruption, especially in the public service. This
principle also guides prosecutorial decisions concerning corrupt law enforcement officers.
The “public service rationale” was developed with the protection of Singapore’s public
service in mind. Under the “public service rationale”, the public interest at stake was that apublic servant bears the duty to ensure the administration of Singapore, and if he wascorrupt, this will affect the efficacy of public administration. 19 The threat that a corrupt
public servant, whose duty was to ensure the administration of “this country”, poses to theadministration that the public of Singapore are dependent on, had been repeatedlyemphasized by the courts. A succinct example of this pronouncement can be seen in Chua
Tiong Tiong v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 515, at [17]: “… Dependent as we areupon the confidence in those running the administration, any loss of such confidence
through corruption becomes dangerous to its existence and inevitably leads to the corrosionof those forces, in the present case the police force, which sustain democratic institutions.”
The “public service rationale” can also be simply stated as “the public interest in preventing
a loss of confidence in Singapore’s public administration”. 20
Consistent with the strong emphasis placed on the need to protect Singapore’s public
administration from the scourge of corruption, there are provisions in the PCA which makeit simpler for the Prosecution to prove corruption in cases involving public officers. The
courts have also interpreted the provisions in a manner consistent with the objectives of the
PCA. These developments are:a. The presumption of corrupt intent for Governmental dealings, which shifts theburden to the accused person to prove lack of corrupt intent;
b. Expressly legislating that mere payors of bribes are not to be treated as“accomplices” whose evidence may be presumed to be less worthy of credit;c. No requirement to prove an actual act was done by the public servant to benefit thegiver of the bribe. It is sufficient to show that the bribe was to purchase therecipient’s service generally;d. Enhanced punishment for Governmental corruption; and19
20

Public Prosecutor v Tan Kok Ming Michael and other appeals [2019] 5 SLR 926, at [70] and [72].
Public Prosecutor v Ang Seng Thor [2011] 4 SLR 217, at [33(a)].

- 141 - 141 -e. The principle of general deterrence guides the courts in sentencing, coupled withcomparatively severe sentences, for corruption involving law enforcement officers.
A. Presumption of Corrupt Intent for Governmental Dealings
Section 8 of the PCA presumes that gratification, given to or received by a public
servant or in relation to any government department, was done so with corrupt intent. Thissection states:
Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence under section 5 or 6, it isproved that any gratification has been paid or given to or received by a person in
the employment of the Government or any department thereof or of a public bodyby or from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks to have any dealing with
the Government or any department thereof or any public body, that gratification
shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement
or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved.
The ambit of the presumption in section 8 is wide, as sections 5 and 6 of the PCA are
the general provisions which all prosecutions for corruption come under. This presumption
has been widely used in the prosecution of corrupt law enforcement officers and would
likely be applicable in any corruption cases involving judicial officers or prosecutors.
The courts have interpreted the presumption in the following manner – when theProsecution seeks to rely on the presumption in section 8, it bears the burden of proving
three elements 21:
a. a gratification was paid or given to or received by the accused person;b. at the time of the payment, gift or receipt, he was in the employment of theGovernment or any department thereof or of a public body; andc. the payment, gift or receipt was from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks
to have any dealing with the Government or any department thereof or any public
body.
Upon proof of these three elements the existence of the fourth element, namely, thatthe gratification was paid or given or received corruptly as an inducement or reward for
doing or forbearing to do an act in relation to the affairs of the Government or a department
thereof or of a public body as the case may be, is to be presumed until the contrary is proved.
In practice, the above means that accused persons who are:a. public servants who received gratification from anyone who had or sought to havedealing with the Singapore government; orb. persons who had or sought to have dealings with the Singapore government andgave gratification to a public servant,21

Wee Toon Boon v Public Prosecutor [1974-1976] SLR(R) 761, at [38].

- 142 - 142 -had to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the gratification was not received or given
with corrupt intent on their part.
B. Mere Payors of Bribes Are Not “Accomplices” Whose Evidence May Be Presumed
to Be Less Credible
In common law jurisdictions, it is a common principle of evidence that the testimony
of a witness, who is an accomplice to the offence, is generally treated with caution, and/or
requires corroboration from other sources before the court accepts the testimony as being
credible. This usually means that the court would be hesitant to convict an accused person
if the only evidence implicating him is the uncorroborated testimony of his accomplice.
Section 25 of the PCA expressly removes the applicability of this presumption or principle,
so long as the witness is merely a “payor” of the bribe.
Section 25 of the PCA states:
Notwithstanding any rule of law or written law to the contrary, no witness shall, in
any such trial or inquiry as is referred to in section 24, be presumed to be unworthyof credit by reason only of any payment or delivery by him or on his behalf of any
gratification to an agent or member of a public body.
As to what is a mere payor, the courts have clarified that such a person is one who madethe payment(s) to the accused person but did nothing more. Someone who goes beyond
mere payment, perhaps by procuring the corrupt act, would not fall under thiscategorization. 22 This would mean, for example, that persons who gave bribes to public
servants who asked for the bribe would not be considered as “accomplices”. However,persons who offered and then gave bribes to public servants would be considered“accomplices”, and their evidence would not come under the exclusion of the presumption.
In legislatively removing the application of the presumption, the Singapore Parliament
recognized that the main evidence against the receiver of a bribe would most likely be fromthe giver of the bribe. Any reduction to the credibility of the giver’s testimony would mean
greater difficulties in proving the offence against the receiver. The court in Tan Khee Koonv Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 404, at [57], explained the rationale for removing thepresumption of unworthiness of credit, in the context of proving corruption offences:If, on the other hand, mere payors were treated as full accomplices, and required
cautious treatment, it would be difficult to establish the guilt of the accused. The
evidence of the person who paid the money to the accused is often the best evidenceof an offence being committed. To impose any greater burden than normal on theProsecution in regard to such evidence would be to place an unjustified hindrance
on the Prosecution. [emphasis added]
C. No Necessity to Prove an Actual Act Was Done by the Public Servant to Benefit
the Giver of the Bribe, and It Is Sufficient to Show That the Recipient Was“Bought Over”
The Singapore courts have accepted that corruption may take many forms. Acts ofcorruption may be as simple as a bribe to a police officer in return for avoiding arrest for
an offence, for which the bribe is directly relatable to the act which the public servant is
22

Tan Khee Koon v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 404, at [55].

- 143 - 143 -forbearing to do. At the other end of the spectrum, it may be a long-term cultivation of a
relationship with a law enforcement official with a constant flow of benefits and payments,
in return for information at an opportune time in the future. The full gamut of such corrupt
acts is recognized as offences under the PCA. By not imposing a requirement that any
corrupt gratification be relatable to a specific benefit or act in return, it is thus easier toshow that gratification to a public servant was corrupt in nature. We explore this aspect ingreater depth in two cases involving corrupt police officers.
The court explained the concept of a public servant being “bought over” in the case of
Hassan bin Ahmad v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 567, which involved an offender
who started receiving money from a well-known illegal moneylender, known as Chua
Tiong Tiong (“Chua”), from 1993, before he commenced training as a police officer. Overthe course of more than five years, the offender continued to receive money from Chua,even as he rose up the ranks, becoming a senior police officer. The evidence showed thatwhile the offender was a police officer, he had, on two occasions, acted upon Chua’s request
and made use of his official position in the police force to obtain information for Chua. The
judge concluded that the offender had received the monies from Chua corruptly with theintention of being “bought over” by the latter.
On appeal, the court accepted that the public servant could be “bought over”, effectively
being on a retainer for services to be rendered to the giver as and when required. There wasno need to link the corrupt payments to specific acts of the offender benefitting Chua. The
court explained as follows 23:
the appellant would periodically receive sums of money from Chua, in exchange
for which the appellant would perform favours as and when required. The methodof payment was not transactional in the sense that the appellant would be paid acertain sum to do a certain favour. Rather, the arrangement was more akin to amonthly retainer for services from time to time. It was therefore not necessary for
the Prosecution to prove a nexus between each receipt and a particular act; it only
sufficed to demonstrate that the payments were not made innocently, but topurchase the recipient’s servitude. This is the essence of being “bought over” –that the recipient of the gratification be at the beck and call of the payor, prodded
into action by his recollection of the payor’s generosity even when no specific act
was demanded at the time of payment. [emphasis added]
There is also no requirement to prove that an actual act was done by the public servant
to benefit the giver of the bribe. This is encapsulated in section 9(1) of the PCA, whichstates:
Where in any proceedings against any agent for any offence under section 6(a), it
is proved that he corruptly accepted, obtained or agreed to accept or attempted toobtain any gratification, having reason to believe or suspect that the gratification
was offered as an inducement or reward for his doing or forbearing to do any act orfor showing or forbearing to show any favour or disfavour to any person in relation
to his principal’s affairs or business, he shall be guilty of an offence under that
section notwithstanding that he did not have the power, right or opportunity to doso, show or forbear or that he accepted the gratification without intending to do so,
23

Hassan bin Ahmad v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 567, at [20].

- 144 - 144 -show or forbear or that he did not in fact do so, show or forbear or that the act,
favour or disfavour was not in relation to his principal’s affairs or business.
The above principle was demonstrated in yet another case involving the infamous
illegal moneylender Chua. The case of Fong Ser Joo William v Public Prosecutor [2000]
3 SLR(R) 12 involved an offender, a police officer, who received payments on two
occasions from Chua, as an inducement to help enquire into police investigations which
Chua was interested in. The court reiterated that “it was not necessary for the Prosecution
to prove that the appellant’s receipt of money from Chua was an inducement for a specificcorrupt act or favour. It was sufficient for the Prosecution to show that the gratification wasgiven in anticipation of some future corrupt act being performed”. 24
The court in Fong Ser Joo William further explained that it is the receipt of thegratification, together with the intention of the giver and the recipient, that is material. It is
not even necessary to prove the actual act of showing favour. 25
D. Enhanced Punishment for Governmental Corruption
In line with the “public service rationale” underpinning the PCA, in addition to making
it easier to prove corruption in cases involving public servants or governmental bodies, theAct also provides for enhanced punishment where the corruption is in relation to contracts
with, or work involving, the Government.
Section 7 of the PCA states:
A person convicted of an offence under section 5 or 6 shall, where the matter ortransaction in relation to which the offence was committed was a contract or a
proposal for a contract with the Government or any department thereof or with any
public body or a subcontract to execute any work comprised in such a contract, beliable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 7 years or to both.
E. General Deterrence Applies for Sentences in Corruption Cases Involving Law
Enforcement Officers
Even where the corruption is not in relation to contracts with the Government, butnevertheless involves public officers, the courts have held that general deterrence is thedominant sentencing consideration. This is especially so where law enforcement officers
are involved. Correspondingly severe sentences have thus been imposed for such cases.
This sentencing approach is completely consistent with the strong emphasis placed on theneed to protect Singapore’s public administration from the scourge of corruption.
Sentencing based on the principle of general deterrence aims to educate and deter otherlike-minded members of the general public by making an example of a particularoffender. 26 Among the categories of situations which the courts have held that generaldeterrence assumes significance and relevance is in respect of offences against or relating
to public institutions, such as the courts, the police and the civil service. 27 This form ofFong Ser Joo William v Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 SLR(R) 12, at [24].
Ibid., at [26].
26
Meeran bin Mydin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 522, at [9].
27
Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR(R) 814, at [24(a)].
2425- 145 - 145 -deterrence applies both to members of the public (who need to be deterred from offering
bribes to public servants), and the public servants themselves.
1. Deterring Persons from Corrupting Law Enforcement Officers
Members of the public in Singapore are deterred from offering bribes to law
enforcement officers. Such offences generally attract imprisonment sentences, even if theamount of the bribe offered is small. The following cases illustrate this point.
In Public Prosecutor v Lim Teck Choon [2009] 2 SLR(R) 577, the offender was placed
under arrest by Sergeant Pah for dangerous driving. While waiting for the escort vehicle,
Sergeant Pah and the offender conversed with each other, during which the offender
exclaimed abruptly, “Why want to do this? Be enemy? You should let me go. We can befriends. Next time you come to Malaysia I would take care of you. Still got good things”.
The offender also made a gesture with his hands, which signified money. The court heldthat for corruption offences which involve government servants, the norm is a custodial
sentence. Where there is a voluntary attempt to bribe a police officer without solicitation,
there is “no doubt that a custodial sentence is warranted”.
There are two reasons for this strong sentencing stance 28:
a. First, the significance of deterrence as a sentencing consideration is particularlyhigh for this genre of offences. It is crucial that the present ethical fabric and theintegrity of the police force be scrupulously maintained. The public (Singaporeans
and foreigners alike) must understand that offences of this nature, if allowed to takeroot, will quickly become endemic and be extremely difficult to, once again, bringunder control, if not eradicate. It is not unimportant that such offences also
undermine the proper administration of justice.
b. Second, the fact that such offences usually involve the giving of some considerationin exchange for the receipt of an advantage or benefit usually militates against the
meting out of just a fine. Simply imposing a fine, particularly on the well-heeled,
may not adequately deter those contemplating such a course of conduct in future.
The above principles were also present in the case of Public Prosecutor v Chew Suang
Heng [2001] 1 SLR(R) 127, where the offender was arrested on suspicion for the offenceof loitering for illegal gambling. While the offender was being brought to the police stationin the police car, he told the police officers that he would give them $1,000 if they let him
go. The offender repeated his offer and was warned that it was an offence to bribe police
officers. Regardless, at the police station, the offender took out a $1,000 note and again
attempted to bribe one of the police officers. The police officer refused the bribe andarrested the offender for trying to bribe him. The court held that attempting to bribe a law
enforcement officer and interfering in the proper course of police investigations is a serious
offence, and that “corruption offences involving law enforcement officers or other public
servants attract harsher penalties and custodial sentences as compared to similar offences
committed in commercial dealings and in the private sector”. 29 The court also emphasizedthat a deterrent sentence for such offences is justified, due to the public interest in stampingout bribery and corruption in the country, especially in the public service.
28
29

Public Prosecutor v Lim Teck Choon [2009] 2 SLR(R) 577, at [19].
Public Prosecutor v Chew Suang Heng [2001] 1 SLR(R) 127, at [9].

- 146 - 146 -2. Law Enforcement Officers Who Solicit or Receive Gratification also Receive Deterrent
Sentences
When law enforcement officers solicit or receive gratification from suspects or persons
under investigation, this is an extremely serious offence, as it undermines the integrity ofthe badge of authority which is held by the officer and betrays the public’s trust andconfidence in the officer and his agency. The courts have consistently taken the view thatsuch cases require a healthy dose of general deterrence in calibrating the appropriate
sentence.
In the case of Pandiyan Thanaraju Rogers v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 217,
the offender was a senior officer in the Singapore Police Force who corruptly accepted
gratification of $2,000 from one “Manjit” as an inducement to render assistance to Manjit
in his police case involving assault (in which Manjit was a victim). The offender gave hisname card to Manjit and told the latter to contact him if he encountered any problems with
police matters. On a subsequent occasion, the offender asked Manjit for a loan of $2,000,
to which Manjit acceded. This was despite the fact that the offender knew that Manjit wassuspected to be an illegal moneylender and that, as a police officer, he was not permitted
to take a loan from such persons.
The court also commented that the sentences for corruption offences involving police
officers were consistently higher than those for non-police officers. 30 This was because“crimes involving corruption on the part of police officers are extremely grave in nature
and are viewed severely by the courts”. The aggravating feature in this case was the factthat the offender undermined the integrity of his office for his personal benefit and, in theprocess, betrayed the public’s trust and confidence in the police force.
It does not matter whether the gratification is monetary in nature, or in other forms (forexample, sexual favours). The courts have nevertheless imposed deterrent sentences onpolice officers who obtain such gratification from persons in return for tampering withinvestigations. 31
3. Deterrence Is Also Relevant Even When the Corruption Does Not Affect Members of
the Public
Even when the corrupt gratification did not involve police–public relationships, butother aspects of police work, the courts have also dealt with such incidents severely. Thisis because it is also important to protect the integrity of the police force from being
undermined, both from without and from within.
In the case of Public Prosecutor v Tay Sheo Tang Elvilin [2011] 4 SLR 206, theoffender (a police officer) corruptly gave gratification to four of his fellow police officers
as inducement for forbearing to report him to his supervisor for misappropriating a walletcontaining a stack of $50 notes and a carton of cigarettes which were found during anunscheduled raid. The court held, at [20], that:

Pandiyan Thanaraju Rogers v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 217, at [49].
For example, see “Investigating officer jailed for obtaining sexual gratification from women involved in
his cases”, Channel News Asia, 23 September 2020, where a police officer obtained sexual gratificationfrom women he was investigating for various offences. Deterrence was a factor in his sentence of two
years’ imprisonment <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/spf-investigating-police-officerjailed-sex-women-suspects-13137766>.
30
31- 147 - 147 -Although the respondent’s corrupt conduct did not involve solicitation ofgratification from members of public, this did not mean the integrity of the police
force was not being seriously undermined. Corruption within the police force is noless serious than corruption involving the solicitation of gratification by a police
officer from members of the public, and both have the effect of publicly
undermining the integrity of the police force. Indeed, if anything, it is even moredisturbing. If police officers such as the respondent who engage in corrupt activities
within the police force itself to cover up their wrongdoings are left unchecked, theabuse of trust and confidence placed in the police force could … result in
enforcement agencies, in general, having diminished legitimacy and public
acceptance.
Furthermore, the court also noted the aggravating factor of the offender being senior inrank to the recipients of the bribes, and he was setting a bad example to his junior officers
by “drawing them into the web of corruption”.
V. CONCLUSION
Singapore has taken a holistic approach in ensuring that corruption among judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement officers is minimized. We are gratified that the efforts
over the decades appear to have paid off, to a certain extent – there have been no cases ofcorruption involving prosecutors or judges in Singapore. This approach starts with a fairpay package for judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, in which the need toprevent corruption is already one of its guiding principles.
On the ground, as cases are handled by the various departments and agencies, there are
multiple levels of procedural safeguards to ensure that cases are not mishandled, or worse,
manipulated by officers who have a personal interest in the case. Finally, even the bestsystems are not fool proof. Where cases of corruption arise among law enforcement officers,
they are dealt with severely, to deter other officers from engaging in corrupt activities.
Deterrent sentences are the norm, guided by the need to protect public administration frombeing undermined.

- 148 - 148 -INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THAI
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ROLES INPROSECUTING CORRUPTION CASES
Sutthi Sookying *I. INTRODUCTION
Thai public prosecutors have gone through a long history of struggle to improve theirrole in protecting society and the people by performing their duties professionally, with
dignity and with pride under the safeguard of the laws. In the old days, they faceddifficulties due to the lack of laws and organs to protect them. At the beginning, the role ofThai public prosecutors was unclear; it depended on the directives issued by those who
were in power (the rulers). Later, during the time of reform, when the country adopted theWestern model about one hundred years ago, 1 the “Public Prosecution Department” wasestablished. Yet, the office was transferred under the supervision of the Minister of Justice,then the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister. Until recent years, starting in 2007,
the Office of the Attorney General of Thailand has been an independent agency withautonomy in personnel administration, budget and other activities, of which thesuperintendent is the Attorney General. However, on certain matters, it must report to the
Cabinet, the Senate or the parliament, depending on the issue.
This paper will explain the background of Thai public prosecutors, their organizational
structure, authorities and functions, including the related laws that promote integrity byproviding Thai public prosecutors with independent status. Also, this paper will touch upon
the roles of Thai public prosecutors in prosecuting corruption cases by describing theprocess of prosecuting corrupt politicians and state officials.
II. BACKGROUND OF THAI PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
A. History
1. Ancient Times
The history of the Office of the Attorney General of Thailand (the Thai OAG) can betraced back to the 14th century when Ayutthaya was the capital of Siam (the former nameof Thailand). This is evident from the Royal Family Law enacted in A.D. 1358 during thereign of King Boromtriloknat, the eighth king of Ayutthaya. At that time, the official who
had a similar function and authority as present-day public prosecutors was called “YokKra-Bat”. The most important role of “Yok-Kra-Bat” was to protect or guard the laws.
According to the writing of M. De Laluber, the French Ambassador to Siam under the
mission of King Louis XIV who came to Ayutthaya in the reign of King Narai (A.D. 1656
Senior Expert Public Prosecutor, International Affairs Department, Office of the Attorney General of
Thailand.
1
The legal reform in Thailand was initiated in the reign of King Rama V (1853 – 1910), which was the same
period of Emperor Meiji of Japan. The Office of the Attorney General of Thailand (at that time called “Public
Prosecution Department”) was established in 1893 as part of the results of the reform.
*- 149 -

– 1688), the title of “Yok-Kra-Bat” was more or less equal to that of “Procureur General”
in France. 2
2. Modern History
The modern history of the Thai OAG began on 1 April 1893, during the reign of King
Chulalongkorn (Rama V), an office under the name “Public Prosecution Department” wasestablished. Later, on 1 April 1916, the title of “Yok-Kra-Bat” was changed to “Ai-YaKarn” by the Royal Decree of King Wachirawut (Rama VI). One of the meanings of “AiYa-Karn” is the “Guardian of the Law.”
In the early days, the office was an agency within the Ministry of Justice. Later on, in
1922, it was transferred to be part of the Ministry of Interior and remained there until 1991.
Then, the office underwent a major structural and organizational change when the office
was separated from the Ministry of Interior and assumed independent status as anautonomous agency under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister. In addition, its namewas changed from the “Public Prosecution Department” to the “Office of the Attorney
General”.
In October 2002, the government reformed its organization by passing a law on
bureaucratic reform. The Office was then again transferred to be under the supervision of
the Minister of Justice.
Later, the 2007 Constitution of Thailand 3 came into effect. The Constitution defines the
new status of the Office of the Attorney General as an “Other Organization” under theConstitution. Public prosecutors have powers and duties as provided in the Constitution
and the law on powers and duties of public prosecutors and other laws. Public prosecutors
exercise independence in their consideration and disposition of cases, as well as inperforming their duties fairly. The Office of the Attorney General has a secretariat withautonomy in personnel administration, budget and other activities, of which thesuperintendent is the Attorney General.
Even though, the Constitution of Thailand was amended in 2010 and 2017, the Officeof the Attorney General and the public prosecution officials have retained their independent
status.
B. Authorities and Functions 4
The Thai OAG has several main authorities and functions, namely: to administer
criminal justice, to safeguard the national interest, to protect civil rights and provide legal
aid, and to enhance international cooperation.

<http://www.ago.go.th/agoen/history.php>.
<http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/outsitedata/outsite21/file/Constitution_of_the_Kingdom_of_Thailand.pdf>.
4
According to the Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) and
the Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) also the Criminal Procedural Codeand other specific laws.
23- 150 - 150 -1. Criminal Justice Administration(a) Investigation
Inquiry officials of the Royal Thai Police play the principal role in investigation in
general. However, public prosecutors have the authority to conduct investigations in certain
situations, including, special case investigation, extraterritorial investigation, certain
juvenile cases and post-mortem inquiry.
In the investigation of serious transnational crime or organized crime, the Special Case
Investigation Act B.E. 2547 requires that public prosecutors shall jointly investigate thecase with inquiry officials of the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) of the Ministryof Justice.
In cases where an offence punishable under the Thai law is committed outside theKingdom of Thailand, the Attorney General shall be the responsible inquiry official andmay delegate duties to any public prosecutor or inquiry official to conduct the inquiry on
his behalf. The public prosecutor assigned to conduct a joint investigation may provide
guidance on the process of collection of evidence to the inquiry official.
In certain juvenile cases where the witness, the injured person or the offender is notover 18 years of age, the Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that a public prosecutor,
together with a psychologist or a social welfare worker and any person requested by thechild or adolescent, shall participate in the investigation.
In a post-mortem inquest of an extrajudicial killing, a public prosecutor shall participate
in conducting the inquiry with the inquiry official.
(b) Prosecution and trial
The Thai OAG is the principal prosecuting authority in Thailand. Upon receipt of an
inquiry file from responsible inquiry officials, a public prosecutor will examine the file,which contains all the evidence of the case, and will consider if the case should beprosecuted or not. However, if the inquiry file is considered incomplete, the publicprosecutor may request further investigations to be conducted by the inquiry official or tobring forth any witnesses to be examined before the public prosecutor prior to issuing aprosecution or non-prosecution order. When the prosecution order is made, the publicprosecutor will file an indictment against the alleged offender with the court. Thereafter,
the case will be presented before the court where public prosecutor adduces all relevant
evidence to support the prosecution. Once the court renders its judgment, if the publicprosecutor does not agree with the court’s judgment, the public prosecutor can appeal the
judgment to a higher court.
2. National Interest Safeguard 5
In order to safeguard the national interest, the Thai OAG assigns the Department ofLegal Counsel to act as a legal counsellor to government agencies and state enterprises
upon negotiating government-related contracts with their counterparts. In doing so, thepublic prosecutor will offer legal advice and review the draft contracts purported to besigned by all the parties concerned. In addition, when a government agency is one of the

The Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010), section 23 (2), (3),(4).

5- 151 - 151 -parties in a lawsuit, the public prosecutor in related offices will represent such an agency
on its behalf.
3. Civil Rights Protection and Provision of Legal Aid 6
The public prosecutor at the Department of Civil Rights Protection and Legal Aid
provides legal aid and advice to people and also represents any person seeking a court orderto endorse his/her rights, such as the right of an heir to manage their late relative's property,
seeking the court permission for child adoption or seeking the court appointment of a legal
guardian for an orphaned child. In a case where a person is barred by the law from bringing
an action against his or her parents, a public prosecutor may pursue the case on behalf ofsuch person.
The Thai OAG focuses its attention on the civil rights and legal aid provision forunderprivileged Thais living both in the country and abroad. The Office of International
People's Rights Protection has been designated to provide legal services and assistance tothem, as well as to foreigners residing in Thailand.
4. International Cooperation 7
The Thai OAG plays a significant role in international cooperation concerning theprevention and suppression of transnational organized crime that pervades many areas ofcriminality, including drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking andcybercrime. In fulfilling this role, the Thai OAG acts as the Central Authority forcooperation with foreign counterparts in the matters of mutual assistance in criminal
matters and extradition. Moreover, the Thai OAG is designated as the Central Authority
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
In the area of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, Thailand concluded bilateraland multi-lateral treaties with following countries, namely: ASEAN countries, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, China, France, India, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Peru, Poland, Sri
Lanka, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. As for extradition,
Thailand concluded extradition treaties with the following countries: Bangladesh, Belgium,
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Lao PDR, the Philippines, theUnited Kingdom and the United States of America.
C. The Organizational Structure
The organizational structure of the Thai OAG can be divided into two main areas:
central offices in Bangkok and regional offices in provinces. 8
1. Central Offices
The central offices are the Head Office of the Attorney General of Thailand and otheroffices which are located in Bangkok and have jurisdiction over cases that occurred in
Bangkok. These include the specific departments such as the Department of Legal Counsel,
International Affairs Department, Department of Technical Affairs, the Training Centre,
etc.

Ibid., section 23 (1).
The Extradition Act B.E. 2551 (A.D. 2008) and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, B.E. 2535 (A.D.
1992).
8<http://www.ago.go.th/agoen/office.php>.
6
7- 152 - 152 -2. Regional Offices
The regional offices outside Bangkok are grouped into 9 regions. The Departments of
the Regional Public Prosecutor, (Regions 1-9) cover and oversee the work of all provincial
offices in their jurisdictions. There are 111 Provincial Public Prosecutor Offices establishedin 76 provinces, excluding Bangkok. The large provinces, such as Chiangmai, Nakorn
Ratchasima, Ubon Ratchatani, and Nakorn Si Thammarat, have more than one office. There
are also the Offices of Provincial Juvenile and Family Litigation to take care of juvenile
offenders and family matters and Offices of Provincial Civil Rights Protection and legal
aid to ensure that rights of Thai people are protected.
D. Qualifications of Applicants for the Public Prosecutor Test 9
The applicants for the public prosecutor test must have qualifications and have no
forbidden characteristics as described by the Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act,
B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010). After passing the test, the applicants will be trained for one year
and appointed to be assistant public prosecutors. After finishing the one-year training, thePublic Prosecutor Commission will evaluate and appoint them to be public prosecutors at
the offices throughout the country.
E. The Titles or Positions and Ranks of Thai Public Prosecutors
The officials of the Thai OAG are divided into two types:-

the Public Prosecutor under the Public Prosecution Organization and Public
Prosecutors law;and the General Administrative Officer under the Public Prosecution Official
Regulation law. 10

The Thai Public Prosecutors have 17 titles or positions and are divided into 8 ranks orlevels as follows:(1) Public Prosecutor level 8: Attorney General(2) Public Prosecutor level 7: Deputy Attorney General and Inspector General(3) Public Prosecutor Level 6: Director General, Deputy Director General, Executive
Director and Senior Expert Public Prosecutor(4) Public Prosecutor level 5: Expert Public Prosecutor(5) Public Prosecutor level 4: Provincial Chief Public Prosecutor and Provincial Public
Prosecutor attached to the Office of the Attorney General(6) Public Prosecutor level 3: Public Prosecutor attached to the Office of the Attorney
General and Deputy Provincial Chief Public Prosecutor(7) Public Prosecutor level 2: Divisional Public Prosecutor and Assistant Provincial
Public Prosecutor(8) Public Prosecutor level 1: Assistant Public Prosecutor.
There is also a position of Senior Public Prosecutor who is 65 – 70 years old with noexecutive power but handling cases or work as assigned by the head of the office.

The Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010).
The Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) and the Public
Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010).
910- 153 - 153 -III. RELATED LAWS TO ENSURE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF
THAI PROSECUTORS
A. The Constitution: Guaranteeing the Independence of the Prosecutors
The 2017 Constitution, 11 Section 248 provides that:“The State Attorney Organ has the duties and powers as provided in theConstitution and laws.
State attorneys are independent in considering and making orders in cases
and in performing duties expeditiously and justly and without any prejudice,and such act shall not be deemed an administrative order.
The personnel management, budgetary affairs and other acts of the State
Attorney Organ shall be independent, with a specific system of salary andremuneration as may be appropriate. The personnel management in relation
with State attorneys shall be carried out by the State Attorney Committee,
which shall at least consist of the Chairperson who is not a State attorneyand qualified members selected by State attorneys; at least two of suchqualified members shall not be or have been State attorneys, as provided bylaw.
The law under paragraph three shall contain measures to prevent State
attorneys from carrying out any act or holding any position which may
cause the making of orders in cases or the performance of duties to be notin accordance with paragraph two, or may cause conflict of interest. In thisregard, such measures shall be prescribed explicitly and be of generalapplication without any delegation of power to consider the matters on caseby-case basis.”
B. The Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D.
2010): The Mechanisms to Establish Integrity, Independence and the Quasijudicial Nature of Prosecutors
The Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010)provides the mechanisms to establish integrity, independence and quasi-judicial nature of
the prosecutors in many sections such as:
Section 7 The Public Prosecution Organization consists of the Public
Prosecutor Commission (the PPC), the Attorney General, and other publicprosecutors whereby the Office of the Attorney General serves as its
secretariat.
The Office of the Attorney General is a government agency having
autonomy in its personnel administration, budget and other activities, andis a juristic person with the Attorney General as its superintendent andrepresentative, etc.

11

<http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/outsitedata/outsite21/file/Constitution_of_the_Kingdom_of_Thailand.pdf>.

- 154 - 154 -Section 10 The appointment and removal of the Attorney General shall bein accordance with the resolution of the PPC together with approval of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall countersign the Royal Command
appointing the Attorney General. The appointment and removal of otherpublic prosecutors shall be in accordance with the Law on Public
Prosecution Official Regulation.
Section 21 Public prosecutors are independent in considering and directing
cases and the performance of their duties with good faith and fairness inaccordance with the Constitution and laws.
Section 22 The justified discretion of public prosecutors for the casedecisions and performance of duties in accordance with Section 21 shall be
immuneC. The Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010): The
Mechanism to Maintain Integrity, Discipline, Codes of Conduct, and Abilities ofThai Public Prosecutors
The Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) provides themechanisms to maintain integrity, disciplines, codes of conduct, and abilities of Thai publicprosecutors in many sections such as:
Section 7 Payroll and Position Allowance System of Judicial Service
Officer shall be applied to Public Prosecutor mutatis mutandis. Rate ofsalary and position allowance of Public Prosecutor shall be complied withthe payroll attached to this Act.
Section 14 Code of Ethics of Public Prosecutor shall be complied with thedetermination of Office of Attorney General which is approved by PPC.
Office of Attorney General by the approval of PPC, shall prepare Morals
Code of Public Prosecutor.
Code of Ethics as specified in paragraph one and Code of Morals specifiedin paragraph two, shall come into force upon their publication in
Government Gazette.
Section 83: Public Prosecutor shall abide and comply with Code of
Ethics and Morality.
Any defiance or non-compliance with Codes of Ethics shall be deemed as
violation of discipline.
If there is any defiance or non-compliance with Code of Morality, Superior
shall report to PPC which shall be used accompanying the consideration inappointment by PPC.

- 155 - 155 -IV. THE ROLES OF THAI PUBLIC PROSECTORS IN PROSECTING
CORUPTION CASES
A. Investigation Stage: The Powers of the NACC 12
According to the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption B.E. 2561 (2018), the National AntiCorruption Commission (NACC) has the powers to conduct an inquiry and prepare opinion
in a case there is an allegation that a person holding a political position, a person holding a
position in an independent agency or a state official is involved in circumstances of unusual
wealth, corruption, or deliberate performance of duties or exercise of powers in contrary to
the laws, or such person has committed an offence of malfeasance in public office or in
judicial office, or seriously violated or failed to comply with the ethical standards.
After finishing the investigation and having the resolution of the case, the NACC will
send a report, inquiry file, document, evidence and opinion, including their electronic
copies, to the Attorney-General (AG) to review and file a case against such person to thecompetent Court. 13
B. The Joint Committee between the NACC and the AG
In case the Attorney General (AG) finds that the inquiry file is incomplete forjustification of initiation of a prosecution, the AG shall inform the NACC of the matter
along with specification of all the incomplete issues. In this case, the AG and the NACC
shall appoint a joint committee consisting of representatives of each side of an equal
number, with no more than five representatives on either side. 14
The joint committee shall collect evidence to completion as well as perform any
undertaking in order to complete the inquiry file for further prosecution. In case the jointcommittee fails to reach a mutual agreement on the matter, the NACC shall further proceed
by initiating the prosecution by itself.
C. Prosecution and Trial
In case the AG (or the public prosecutor designated by the AG) finds that the inquiry
file is complete for justification of initiation of a prosecution, the AG (or the publicprosecutor designated by the AG) will initiate the case in the competent court. 15
If the alleged culprit is a person holding a political position, the Supreme Court ofJustice’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions will have jurisdiction
over the case. If the alleged culprit is a state official, the Criminal Court for Corruption and
Misconduct Case will have jurisdiction over the case.
D. When the AG is the Alleged Culprit
If the alleged culprit is in the position of Attorney General during the commission of an
offence or during the allegation, the President of the NACC has the power to initiate thecase or submit the complaint to the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct Cases.

The Organic Act on Anti-Corruption B.E. 2561 (2018) sections 46 - 75.
Ibid., sections 76, 77, 91, 93.
14
Ibid., sections 77, 93.
15
Ibid., sections 77, 93.
1213- 156 - 156 -E. Confiscation of Property 16
In filing a case in the competent court, if the alleged culprit or the person participatingin the commission of the offence has used or acquired property in an unlawful manner as aresult of the commission of corruption, or deliberately performed duties or exercised
powers contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or laws, the AG or the NACC, as thecase may be, may file a motion with the court for the confiscation of the following
properties, unless it is the property of another person who has no connivance with thecommission of the offence:(1) Property which any person used or had in his or her possession for use in thecommission of the offence;(2) Property or interest that can be calculated into monetary value, which has been given,
requested to give or pledged to give to the alleged culprit by any person in an unlawfulmanner(3) Property or interest that can be calculated into monetary value which a person has
obtained from the commission of or from his involvement as an instigator, an aider andabettor or a publisher or announcer in order for another person to commit the offence;(4) Property or interest that can be calculated into monetary value which a person has
obtained from a disposal, distribution or transfer in any manner of the property orinterest under (1) or (3).
(5) Fruits or any other interests occurring from the property or interest under (1), (3) or(5).
V. CONCLUSION
In 2007, the Thai Constitution established the new status of the Thai OAG withautonomy in personnel administration, budget and other activities. This status remains thesame even though the Constitution of Thailand has been amended in 2010 and 2017. The
Public Prosecution Organization and Public Prosecutors Act B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) and
the Public Prosecution Official Regulation Act, B.E. 2553 (A.D. 2010) are the mechanisms
to maintain integrity, discipline, codes of conduct, and the abilities of Thai publicprosecutors. By those laws, as well as the welfare and the status received from thegovernment and the public, the Thai public prosecutors remain independent in theirconsideration and disposition of cases as well as in performing their duties fairly.
However, a public prosecutor is a human being not a robot or a machine; therefore, heor she as an individual, might have engaged in wrongdoing. In fact, in these recent two or
three years, there are 2 - 3 cases in which the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct
Cases has convicted public prosecutors who were involved in corruption or exercised
powers contrary to the laws. 17 There are also 2 - 3 cases involving corruption that are under
the investigation of the NACC. 18 The number of public prosecutors who engaged inwrongdoing may be considered as only a few cases when compared to the total number of
4,167 public prosecutors who work throughout the country. 19

Ibid., sections 83, 93.
<www.isaranews.org>.
18<www.thaipublica.org>.
19
The statistics at the end of the year 2020.
16
17- 157 - 157 -Therefore, other measures to prevent corruption are still needed, such as asset
declaration or financial disclosure. Public awareness and public participation are also very
important tools to prevent corruption in the justice system.

- 158 - 158 -THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSET DECLARATION FOR THE LAWENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN TIMOR-LESTE
Augusto da Costa Castro *I. INTRODUCTION
As we know that in the life of the nation and State, there is no single institution that is
free from potential risks of corruption. Currently, corruption has undermined all aspects oflife of every individual and institution, including law enforcement institutions and theirofficers. As the Transparency International 2019 Global Corruption Barometer – Africa
survey showed, 47 per cent of Africans believe that most or all police are corrupt, with 28
per cent also saying they had paid a bribe to a police officer in the previous year; the police
also earned the highest bribery rates in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle
East and North Africa, where 24 and 22 per cent, respectively, said they had paid a bribe
to a law enforcement officer in the past year. 1 Police corruption broadly refers to “acts of
misconduct by police officers aimed at obtaining financial benefits or other personal gains
in exchange for selectively enforcing or manipulating rules, as well as the conduct ofinvestigations and arrests” (Chêne 2010).
The impact of law enforcement corruption on the public interest is devastating, because
it denies people accessibility to legal protection, and corruption can protect other criminal
activity such as drug dealing, human trafficking, prostitution, illegal gambling and illegal
logging, which consequently diminish public faith and confidence in the law enforcement
authorities, themselves. This is because the public relies on the law enforcement officers to
uphold the law, protect the community and assist it in times of need. In Timor-Leste,
corruption was widespread among government officials. Transparency International ranked
Timor-Leste at 93 out of 180 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2019, and theGovernment of Timor-Leste is continuing to take steps to combat corruption. There wereaccusations of police, including border police and immigration officials, involvement incorruption–most commonly bribery and abuse of power. Allegations of nepotism ingovernment hiring were common. The customs service was under scrutiny for alleged
corruption related to incoming goods.2 The Anti-Corruption Commission in its 2019 annual
report reported that, in 2019, there were four corruption cases that occurred in two law
enforcement authorities, where two cases involved members of the Timor-Leste National
Police (PNTL) and two other cases occurred in the customs service. 3 As a law enforcement
officer, they should keep away from corrupt behaviour because when officers act illegally,
they dishonour both themselves and the law and the entire justice system that they represent.

Senior Criminal Investigator of the Anti-Corruption Commission (CAC), Timor-Leste.
Transparency International 2019 Global Corruption Barometer Survey, retrieved from<https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/fix-the-police>.
2
Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/timorleste/>.
3
Comissão Anti-Corrupção, Relatório Anuál CAC 2019, Dili, 2019, p. 25.
*
1- 159 - 159 -In order to effectively fight corruption crime within the law enforcement authorities,
there must be a serious effort to identify the root of the corruption itself. Thus, urgent andconcrete action with a progressive approach needs to be introduced by the State.
Law No. 8/2009 (15 July) on the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission(CAC) does not provide any direct or concrete preventive measures to be in place for theprevention of corruption in Timor-Leste. Although criminal offences against corruption arecontained in the Penal Code, the purpose of which is to deter public officials from engaging
in corrupt acts, no system for effective corruption prevention efforts has been designed yet.
Whereas in article 4 of law number 8/2009 it states that, “The mission of the Commission
is to undertake the preventive action and criminal investigation action against corruption in
any of its forms”. However, the preventive actions that were taken so far by the CAC are
still very general in nature, such as directing an anti-corruption campaign to the public,
public awareness raising, and inspection and monitoring of the implementation of
government projects.
There are several causes for the occurrence of corruption within the law enforcement
authorities, one of which is the absence of a transparency and accountability mechanism
for the public officials regarding their income, assets and interests during their tenure.
Without asset declaration procedures, it is difficult to exert control over state losses, which
can accumulate through corruption involving public officials. In Timor-Leste, corruption
prevention efforts are generally only internal, namely from and by the superiors of an
institution, so this is considered less effective and efficient because there is still room for
manipulation and collaboration between corrupt officials and their superiors.
Corruption, which is known as a multidimensional crime, should not only be dealt withby prosecution but also through preventive mechanisms, one of which is through asset
declaration, monitoring and control of the assets of public officials. Asset declaration will
limit the ability of public officials to accept illegal assets, accept bribes and practiceextortion and corruption. According to the World Bank, asset declaration is regarded as “apowerful tool to prevent corruption, detect illicit enrichment and conflicts of interests” 4 andsubsequently to identify ill-gotten gains among public officials. Around the world there are“more than 150 countries have introduced asset disclosure requirements for their public
officials.” 5
In this paper, I will discuss the mechanisms for preventing criminal acts of corruption
through the asset declaration regime in Timor-Leste, which will increase the transparency
and integrity of public officials to the public, especially law enforcement officers. This is
expected to be an external monitoring mechanism for all forms of conflict of interest,
lifestyles and assets of every public official who carries out public duties for the welfare of
the whole Timorese society.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2016/09/26/asset-declarations-a-threat-to-privacy-or-apowerful-anti-corruption-tool>.
5
Ibid.
4

- 160 - 160 -II. THE RATIONALE OF ASSET DECLARATION
The declaration of assets by public officials can be a powerful mechanism for both theprevention and investigation of public-sector corruption. Based on the experience of several
countries that have implemented this mechanism, they are able to control corruption that
occurs in the public sector. Thus, this mechanism is recommended to be implemented incountries with very high levels of corruption. This mechanism was first started in UnitedStates and was initiated by President Truman in 1951 amidst rampant corruption in the
public sector. It was then followed by several countries in Western Europe in the 1980s,
and it was put into practice by all European members in 2000 (OECD 2011, pp. 22-23).
The principles behind this mechanism are transparency, accountability and integrity.
As the bedrock of clean and corruption-free government, these principles are recognized as
the important elements in regulating the relationship between the State and its people. By
relying on these principles, an atmosphere of mutual trust can be created so that, in carryingout its duties, the public does not suspect that public officials are engaged in corrupt
practices. Article 8, Chapter II of the UNCAC provides that in order to fight corruption,
each State Party shall promote, inter alia, integrity, honesty and responsibility among its
public officials, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system. Moreparticularly, the Convention encourages each State Party:. . . where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its
domestic law, to establish measures and systems requiring public officials to makedeclarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities,
employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a
conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials. 6
Furthermore, in article 52(5) it is stated that:
Each State Party shall consider establishing, in accordance with its domestic law,effective financial disclosure systems for appropriate public officials and shallprovide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Each State Party shall also
consider taking such measures as may be necessary to permit its competentauthorities to share that information with the competent authorities in other States
Parties when necessary to investigate, claim and recover proceeds of offences
established in accordance with this Convention. 7
III. THE ASSET DECLARATION REGIME IN TIMOR-LESTE
In Timor-Leste for years, there have been calls for transparency and asset declarationof elected and public officials, as these will improve the confidence of the people andforeign investors in the government’s integrity and good governance. Therefore, throughits National Parliament, Timor-Leste enacted Law No. 7/2020 (26 August) on Prevention
Measures and Combating of Corruption, which established a regime of asset declaration
for public officials.

6
7Article 8. Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, Section 5, Chapter II, UNCAC.
Ibid.

- 161 - 161 -The asset declaration regime in Timor-Leste is a mechanism that can be said to be amodern and progressive approach towards fighting against corruption because it includes
and adopts all universal principles and good practices which have been applied in various
countries. As applied in many countries, an effective and legally binding asset declaration
mechanism must have such fundamental elements as described as follows.
A. Legal Basis
The legal basis for asset declaration in Timor-Leste is divided into two categories,
namely international conventions and national laws.
1. International Conventions
For the Timor-Leste context, the main source of law which forms the basis for thecreation of the asset declaration regime is the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (UNCAC) which is stipulated in article 8 (5) and article 52 (5). Timor-Lestefully ratified UNCAC in 2008 through Parliamentary resolution number 25/2008. Pursuant
to article 9 (2) of the Timor-Leste Constitution, which states that: “The norms contained ininternational conventions, treaties and agreements are in force in the domestic legal order
upon approval of ratification or adherence by the respective competent bodies and after
being published in the official gazette.” Therefore, with the resolution of the National
Parliament, UNCAC has become legally binding on Timor-Leste and will be implemented
gradually by the competent state institutions.
2. National Laws
The national laws which serve as the basis of asset declaration are, first, Law No. 5/2009
concerning the civil service statute as stipulated in article 10 (4) about conflicts of interest,
where it is clearly stated that,. . . in case of suspicion of corruption, fraud, embezzlement or, in general, diversionof assets or public money, the public official, within the scope of the competent
process, is obliged to provide access to his assets before the administrative andjudicial authorities, acting in accordance with the law and in accordance with thepowers of inspection and supervision.
Second, chapter II of Law No. 7/2020 (26 August) on Prevention Measures andCombating of Corruption establishes the asset declaration regime for public officials.
According to article 27 of this law, the ultimate goal of the asset declaration regime is to,one, detect and prevent conflicts of interest; and two, monitor the fluctuation of wealth todetect significant and unjustified increases of the assets of people subject to declaration. In
addition to the two goals above, it also tacitly aims to prevent other related crimes such as
tax evasion and money laundering.
B. The Content of Declarations
Good asset declaration regimes spell out clearly and specifically the income, assets,interests, obligations and expenditures that should be declared by public officials.
According to article 34 (2) of Law No. 7/2020, the declaration must be detailed and cover
all types of income; movable and immovable assets; precious objects with a value above
US$1,500; all types of investments; commercial company ownership; current accountbalances and deposits, as well as other financial products; securities including stocks andother financial instruments; debts and other financial obligations; gifts including travel andother leisure or entertainment activities over US$250; foreign travel and other luxury- 162 - 162 -expenses above US$2,500; participation in executive management bodies, administrative
councils, supervisory or consultation bodies or any collegial body of a commercial
company; and participation in private organizations, including political parties, politicalassociations, associations and other non-profit organizations.
C. Covered Officials
In practice, the coverage of public officials who must report their assets is applieddifferently from country to country. Some require declarations from all civil servants; someonly require declarations from civil servants in certain positions; some only requiredeclarations from elected officials. This depends on the level of responsibility in dealing
with the powers and functions of a public official and the potential corruption risks involved.
According to article 29, a wide group of public officials is covered. This includes allheads and members of the four branches of the estate sovereign bodies such as the Presidentof the Republic; Members of Parliament; members of the Government; members of the
judiciary magistrate and all of their high-ranking officials. The obligation to declare assets
also includes heads of management and leadership positions in local and national public
administration as well as armed and police officers, elective bodies of local government,
holders of management positions and leadership of public companies, officials and officersof the customs, taxation, state asset management, state inspection and audit service,ambassadors, consuls and holders of direction and leadership positions in Timor-Leste’sembassies in foreign countries and also members of the criminal investigation police andmigration services.
Apart from the people mentioned above, other people who also have to declare theirassets are their family members. Family members of the declarant covered by this law are
the spouse or person with whom he/she lives in marital union, minor or economicallydependent children, and other economically dependent persons.
D. Period of Declaration
As a mechanism to monitor changes in assets, the period of the submission of thedeclaration must be tightly regulated. According to article 32 of the Law No. 7/2020, theperiod of declaration is defined in four categories, such as the initial declaration done within
30 days after taking office, the annual declaration due by 31 January of the following year,
the final declaration up to 30 days after termination of office and the post-exercise
declaration annually during the three years following the termination of the term of office.
However, the declaration can be presented at any time, at the initiative of the declarant,
whenever there is a substantial change in the declarant’s assets and interests. For lower
level declarants, instead of the annual declaration, they are required to submit a declaration
every three years as referred to in article 29, lines u), v), w), x), y), z), and aa).
E. Verification
A good asset declaration regime should have a mechanism for verification. A thoroughand careful verification process will have the power to test and explore the truth, accuracy,
authenticity, clarity and validity of the documents, source and existence of a declaration
against the standard and specifications that are required by law. There are two types ofverification: formal verification as stipulated in article 41, and risk-based audits asmentioned in article 44 with the aim to determine whether there have been significant andunjustified increases in the assets of the declarant or members of the declarant’s family, as
well as the existence of conflicts of interest. These two verification procedures are- 163 - 163 -mandatory and applied to all declarations undertaken by oversight bodies every two years
as set forth in article 43.
For the purpose of verification, the oversight bodies may request additional information,
data and explanation from the declarant and the declarant’s family members andgovernment institutions that have the authority over asset registration and other private
natural or juridical institutions with whom the declarant or member of the declarant’s
family has carried out transactions or who is in possession of information on a transaction
subject to the declaration as clearly stipulated in article 46. The additional information will
be used as a comparison to the information and documents submitted by the declarant andthe declarant’s family members in the declaration form.
F. Oversight Bodies
According to article 28, there are two oversight bodies to oversee the receiving andverification of asset declarations, namely the CAC and the Supreme Court of Justice,whereas the Supreme Court of Justice will receive and verify the declarations that arecoming from the President of the Republic, the Members of the National Parliament andmembers of the Government Cabinet including public officials of the CAC. The
declarations of all other public officials will be receive and verified by the CAC. In thisasset declaration process, these two oversight bodies also have the authority to impose fines
on declarants and their family members who do not comply with the rules and regulations
as regarded in the asset declaration regime.
G. Cooperation
Cooperation is one of the fundamental factors for the success of an asset declaration
system. Due to limitations in the availability and accessibility of information, eachoversight body must have a wide range of networks of cooperation either with individual
people or institutions in order to be able to access accurate and credible information about
the subject and object of the declaration and to facilitate the verification process to detect
ill-gotten assets and the application of sanctions.
Pursuant to articles 46 (2) and (3), cooperation of the oversight bodies with otherinstitutions is necessary with regard to the following institutions: civil registration office,land, sea and aero transportation registration office, commercial entity registration office,non-governmental registration office, land and property registration office, tax
administration office, banks and other financial institutions, casinos and the Financial
Intelligence Unit.
The oversight bodies may also obtain information abroad through access to freedatabases or through cooperation with foreign authorities. As stated in article 46 (4) and(5), the oversight bodies may resort to international cooperation in order to obtain
information from banks, legal persons and foreign governments if the declared assets areoutside of the country.
H. Accessibility
One of the mechanisms to ensure effectiveness in controlling assets and conflicts ofinterest of public officials is by involving the public through disclosing asset declaration
data to the public. Experience shows that most successful investigations are triggered bycomplaints of citizens, NGOs and journalists with knowledge about the true situation of an- 164 - 164 -unfaithful public official. Therefore, asset declarations should be publicly available online. 8
Contrary to the principle of transparency, the asset declaration regime in Timor-Leste does
not permit public access to data and information on the content of the asset declaration
itself. Article 56 of Law No. 7/2020 criminalizes the negligent or intentional disclosure of
information contained in a declaration. Officials from oversight authorities who areconvicted of such conduct may be sentenced to imprisonment between 2 to 5 years or afine.
I. Sanctions
In order to be able to demonstrate the effectiveness, strength and binding power of anasset declaration regime, it must have an element of sanctions. The asset declaration regime
in Timor-Leste follows a two-pronged system of sanctions, namely administrative
sanctions and criminal sanctions. Administrative sanctions in the form of fines are imposed
for several violations such as late declaration of assets (article 48), failure to declare assets
after notification (article 49), incomplete declaration (article 51), omission of information(article 52), and the declaration of false information (article 53). Criminal sanctions can be
imposed for several acts of violation such as a refusal to declare by a family member (article50), incomplete declaration (article 51 (2)), the declaration of false information (article 53(2)), obstruction of verification (article 54) and breach of obligation by an agent of theoversight body (article 55).
J. Reporting
Although there is a question in terms of transparency, reports on the asset declaration
regime in Timor-Leste are open to the public. As stipulated in article 28 (3), the oversight
body is required to produce a biennial statistical report containing the number of people
required to declare, the number of people who did not submit the declaration within thedeadline, the number of people who were sanctioned administratively, disciplinarily or
criminally by indicating the violations and sanctions applied as well as the number ofpeople whose verification of the declaration led to the adoption of measures to prevent or
resolve a conflict of interest. This report can be accessed by the public as required by article
9 (1) of the law. Regarding public complaints on the illegal gain or any other violation of apublic official, the law precisely follows the norms contained in article 13 (2) of UNCAC.
Thus, Article 109 (1) of Law No. 7/2020 expressly permits anonymous complaints.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public sector corruption that involves law enforcement officers has become a reality inmany countries, including Timor-Leste. There are various factors behind it, both from theindividual and from the legal environment, that limit the ability of the State to control thecorrupt behaviour of that individual. This must be addressed immediately. As law
enforcement officers are the guardians, protectors and enforcers of the law, they should beclean and free from all forms of corruption. If law enforcement officers are infected withthe corruption virus, it will facilitate the occurrence of other serious crimes because they
are the gatekeepers who take action against any perpetrator of crime that occurs in society.
One of the mechanisms that is believed to have the power to prevent corruption in the
public sector is the enactment of an asset declaration regime for public officials, including
8

Transparency International Principles on Asset Declaration.

- 165 - 165 -law enforcement officials, because the asset declaration regime is regarded as an effective
and efficient mechanism to prevent corruption, conflicts of interest, illicit enrichment andensuring public accountability, transparency and increasing institutional integrity.
Thus, Timor-Leste has learned from and reflected on the good experiences of countries
which were successful in combating corruption in the public sector through theestablishment of an asset declaration regime. Accordingly, Timor-Leste enacted its own
asset declaration regime for public officials, which is regarded as a modern and progressive
approach in the fight against corruption.
As a standard that has been adopted by various countries, the asset declaration regime
in Timor-Leste also adheres to fundamental principles such as, first, establishment of theregime based on a sound legal basis and for the purpose of detecting both illicit enrichment
and conflicts of interest; second, the content of the declaration must cover all essential
information regarding a public official’s income, assets, interests and expenditures; third,
the asset declaration should cover all public officials at risk for corruption including theirfamily members; fourth, the period of declaration should cover the time that the official
first assumes public office and during and after the term of office; fifth, the declaration
submitted should be verified rigorously and audited; sixth, the oversight body should beequipped with sufficient human and financial resources to verify and audit the declarations;seventh, the oversight body should cooperate with other State and private institutions for
obtaining comparative information; eighth, the declarations must be accessible to the
public; ninth, there must be administrative and criminal sanctions against misreporting ofassets, including declarations that are incomplete, inaccurate, intentionally erroneous, orthat omit or conceal any substantial amount of wealth; and, tenth, the oversight body must
produce regular reports containing, inter alia, case statistics and an analysis of trends.
With the enactment of this asset declaration regime, it is hoped that it will be able toeffectively prevent and eradicate corruption in the public sector, especially within the law
enforcement apparatus in Timor-Leste.

- 166 - 166 -FOURTEENTH REGIONAL SEMINAR ON GOOD GOVERNANCE

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS, VISITING EXPERTS & ORGANIZERS
A. International Participants
Name

Title and Organization

Ms. Norfarisah Mohd Harris

Senior Special Investigator
Anti-Corruption Bureau
Brunei Darussalam

Ms. Rashidah binti Haji Rashid

Assistant Special Investigator
Anti-Corruption Bureau
Brunei Darussalam

Mr. Tong Heng

Assistant to the President
Anti-Corruption Unit
Cambodia

Mr. Lie Putra Setiawan

Prosecutor
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
Indonesia

Mr. Sounthala Khemphilath *Deputy Director General of International Relations Department
State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA)
Lao PDR

Mr. Asrul Ridzuan Bin Ahmad Rustami

Senior Assistant Commissioner, Head of AMLA Unit
Anti-Money Laundering Division
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission（MACC）
Malaysia

Mr. Mohamad Faizal Bin Sadri

Head of Planning, Coordination & Strategic BranchAnti-Money Laundering Division
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission（MACC）
Malaysia

Ms. Hazel Canet Decena-Valdez

Senior Assistant State Prosecutor
Department of Justice - National Prosecution Service, Manila
Philippines

Ms. Lyn Gaa Dimayuga

Assistant Special Prosecutor, II
Office of the Ombudsman
Philippines

Mr. Renato Aviles Peralta Jr.

Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer, III
Office of the Ombudsman
Philippines

Mr. Khoo Wei Quan, Wilson

Senior Assistant Director, Investigations Operations Division
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
Singapore

Mr. Hon Yi

Deputy Public Prosecutor / Director, Technology Crimes
Attorney General's Chambers
Singapore

Mr. Sutthi Sookying

Senior Expert Public Prosecutor
International Affairs Department
The Office of the Attorney General
Thailand- 167 - 167 -Mr. Augusto Da Costa Castro

Deputy Commissioner
Anti-Corruption Commission
Timor-Leste* Mr. Sounthala Khemphilath participated in the seminar in lieu of Mr. Thongkham Soumaloun, Senior International Relations Officer.

B. Visiting Experts
Name
Mr. Lawrence Chung

Title and Organization
Principal International Liaison and Training Officer
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, China

C. Organizers: UNAFEI
Name

Title and Organization

Mr. SETO Takeshi

Director
UNAFEI

Ms. ISHIHARA Kayo

Deputy Director
UNAFEIMr. OTANI Junichiro

Professor
UNAFEI

Mr. FUTAGOISHI Ryo

Professor
UNAFEI

Ms. WATANABE Machiko

Professor
UNAFEIMr. HOSOKAWA Hidehito

Professor
UNAFEI

Mr. Thomas L. Schmid

Linguistic Adviser
UNAFEI

Ms. MUKAI Saori

Officer
UNAFEI

Mr. FUJISAKI Takuma

Officer
UNAFEI- 168 - 168 -Fourteenth Regional Seminar on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries
Integrity and Independence of Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement Officials

SEMINAR SCHEDULE
23-24 March 2021
OnlineHost
United Nations Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI)
Tuesday, 23 March
10:50-11:00 Opening Address by Mr. SETO Takeshi, Director, UNAFEI
11:00-12:30 Presentation by Visiting Expert
12:30-12:40 Break
12:40-13:10 Individual Presentation by Brunei Darussalam
13:10-14:30 Lunch Break
14:30-15:00 Individual Presentation by Cambodia
15:00-15:30 Individual Presentation by Indonesia
15:30-15:45 Break
15:45-16:15 Individual Presentation by Japan
16:15-16:45 Individual Presentation by Lao PDR
Wednesday, 24 March
10:50-11:30 Presentation by UNAFEI
11:30-12:00 Individual Presentation by Malaysia
12:00-12:10 Break
12:10-12:40 Individual Presentation by Philippines
12:40-13:10 Individual Presentation by Singapore
13:10-14:30 Lunch Break
14:30-15:00 Individual Presentation by Thailand
15:00-15:30 Individual Presentation by Timor-Leste
15:30-15:45 Break
15:45-16:15 Discussion
16:20-16:30 Closing Address by Mr. SETO Takeshi, Director, UNAFEI
End of the Seminar- 169 - 169 -- 170 - 170 -APPENDIX- 171 - 171 -- 172 - 172 -PHOTOGRAPHS•The Seminar•

Director of UNAFEI, Mr. SETO Takeshi•

Special Lecture by Mr. Lawrence Chung•

Closing of the Seminar- 173 - 173 -- 174 - 174 -The Seminar

Director of UNAFEI, Mr. SETO Takeshi- 165 - 175 -Special Lecture by Mr. Lawrence Chung

Closing of the Seminar- 166 - 176 -