Principles regarding the Custody ofCollective Investment Schemes’ Assets
Consultation Report

The Board
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS

CR07/2014

OCTOBER 2014

This paper is for public consultation purposes only. It has not been approved for any otherpurpose by the IOSCO Board or any of its members.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions www.iosco.org© International Organization of Securities Commissions 2014. All rights reserved. Brief
excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated.

iiForeword
The Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has
published this Consultation Report with the aim of outlining principles against which both theindustry and regulators can assess the quality of regulation and industry practices concerning
the custody of CISs’ assets. Generally, the proposed principles reflect a level of common
approach and a practical guide currently acknowledged by regulators and industry
practitioners.
How to submit comments?
Comments may be submitted by one of the two following methods on or before 10
December 2014. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, please use
only one method.
Important: All comments will be made available publicly, unless anonymity is specificallyrequested. Comments will be converted to PDF format and posted on the IOSCO website.
Personal identifying information will not be edited from submissions.
1.

Email

Send comments to Mr. Mohamed BEN SALEM, Senior Policy Advisor, IOSCO General
Secretariat, C/ Oquendo 12, 28006 Madrid, +34 91 417 55 49, at:consultation-2014-07@iosco.org
 The subject line of your message MUST indicate “Principles regarding the Custody ofCollective Investment Schemes’ Assets”
 If you attach a document, indicate the software used (e.g., Microsoft WORD,) to create
the attachment.
 DO NOT submit attachments as PDF, HTML GIFG, TIFF, PIF, ZIP or EXE files.
2. PaperSend 3 copies of your paper comment letter to:
Mr. Mohamed BEN SALEM,
Senior Policy Advisor
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Calle Oquendo 1228006 Madrid
SpainYour comment letter should indicate prominently that it is a “Public Comment on Principles
regarding the Custody of Collective Investment Schemes’ Assets”iiiContents

Chapter

Page

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1

Chapter 2 - Role and responsibilities of custodians

3

Chapter 3 – Key risks around the custody of client assets

6

Chapter 4 – Principles relating to the custody of CIS assets

9

Chapter 5 – Principles relating to the appointment and 14
ongoing engagement of custodiansiv

Chapter 1 - Introduction
Background
1.

IOSCO Committee 5, the committee responsible for Investment Management (C5), last
examined the "safekeeping" of collective investment scheme (CIS) assets by"custodians" in 1996 when it issued a discussion paper, “Guidance on Custody
Arrangements for Collective Investment Schemes”.1 There have been notabledevelopments in the CIS custody space since 1996, especially following the events ofthe 2008 global financial crisis.2

2.

This consultation paper seeks to clarify, modernise and further develop principles
regarding the custody of “CIS assets” and obtain stakeholders’ views on issues related
to the custody3 of CIS assets consistent with the core IOSCO’s “Objectives andPrinciples of Securities Regulation June 2010” (IOSCO Principles)4.

3.

The paper looks at the role and function of entities which provide safekeeping and insome cases also provide ancillary services (e.g. fund administration, mandate
monitoring and record keeping) to a CIS, and the responsibilities of the entity or entities
responsible for the overall operation of the CIS (responsible entity) in relation toappointing and monitoring these entities.

4.

C5 recognises that the regulatory regimes for the safekeeping of CIS assets are diverse
and the responsibilities and regulatory status of the entities that provide suchsafekeeping services are also varied (from custodians providing pure asset safekeepingwith no ancillary services to authorised depositaries providing safekeeping services andan additional oversight role)5.

5.

In formulating this consultation document, C5 has drawn on existing IOSCO
Principles6, previous IOSCO papers on the subject7 and responses from a recent survey

1

See Guidance on Custody Arrangements for Collective Investment Schemes IOSCO Discussion Paper,
Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, September 1996. Available at:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD60.pdf.

2

Please see Appendix A for a summary of the recent regulatory development in relation to CIS custody.

3

Custody in this paper is taken to mean the safekeeping of CIS assets, see also definition of safekeeping
in the Glossary (Appendix B).

4

See Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCO, June 2010. Available at:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf.

5

In some European jurisdictions a single entity (usually referred to as the "Depositary") is tasked withboth the safekeeping of CIS assets and the oversight of the responsible entity. In other jurisdictions,e.g. Australia, the 'custodian' is responsible for the safekeeping of CIS assets and a 'responsible entity'
is separately tasked with oversight of the CIS. In jurisdictions where CIS are formed as trusts, thesafekeeping function may be undertaken by a "Trustee".

6

Principle 25 and 31 of the IOSCO Principles. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,,
IOSCO, June 2010, supra fn 4.

7

See "Guidance on Custody Arrangements for Collective Investment Schemes" 1996, supra fn 1 and
FR01 “Recommendations Regarding the Protection of Client Assets,” Final Report, IOSCO Board, 29January 2014 available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD436.pdf.

-1-which twenty-eight C5 members from twenty-seven jurisdictions participated.8 The
survey sought information about the legal, regulatory and operational landscape for CIS
asset safekeeping in each of those jurisdictions.

Market update
6.

A number of market developments have occurred since the 1996 Paper, which has led
IOSCO to consider it necessary to revisit its guidance with regard to the custody of CIS
assets.

7.

Events like the Lehman Brothers and MF Global insolvencies or the Madoff fraud havefocused the attention on CIS asset protection regimes. In particular the Madoff fraudbrought the issues of the depositary's liability and potential conflict of interests to thefore, and showed the risks associated with the use of local sub-custodians when thosedefault or fail to perform their duties appropriately. These events have been asignificant political driver in financial services regulation, especially in Europe.

8.

CIS managers tend to invest in more complex instruments than was the case in the
1990s. In certain jurisdictions, this can be the result of changes in the regulatory
framework applying to CIS having extended the scope of eligible assets to classes ofassets like derivatives, index-based funds, etc. The enlargement of eligible investment
instruments therefore raises the question of the extent of the custodian’s safekeepingrole and duties.

9.

Over the past two decades, there has been a trend toward recording ownership in
financial instruments by means of an electronic book entry, instead of through physicalstock certificates. The widespread use of electronic book entry to register and keep
track of ownership changes in securities has led to a major change in market practices
and processes creating new challenges and risks.

10.

Lastly, there has been a significant increase in the diversification andinternationalisation of CIS portfolios since 1996. With CIS increasingly choosing toseize investment opportunities in a growing number of foreign jurisdictions, the need toappoint sub-custodians in these jurisdictions has developed. It is therefore important toconsider the implications notably in terms of the delegation of safe-keeping functions,as custody chains now tend to be longer and more complex, involving many foreign
jurisdictions.
Consultation question 1: Do you have views on the recent trends identified above andare there any other relevant market developments that should be taken into account indeveloping the principles regarding the custody of CIS assets?

8

The C5 participants who responded to this survey: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Panama, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
Unites States - Commodity Futures Trading Commission, United States – Securities & Exchange
Commission.

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Chapter 2 - Role and responsibilities of custodians
11.

Custodians are appointed by the responsible entity to safekeep CIS assets.

12.

All C5 members’ regulation seeks to protect the physical and legal integrity of theassets of the CIS. The results of the survey showed that the primary role of thecustodian appears to be largely consistent across different jurisdictions to the extent
custodians are responsible for safekeeping of the CIS’s assets. In addition, the survey
showed that the rules on safekeeping and asset segregation are often provided in therelevant local laws and regulations.

13.

In addition to the primary function of safekeeping of CIS assets, the survey shows that
custodians in some jurisdictions may also be responsible for certain monitoring andoversight functions and other administrative services in addition to their safekeeping
duties. These functions are identified below.

A.

Safekeeping of CIS assets

14.

The principal activity for which a custodian is engaged in by a CIS or responsible entity
is the custody, or safekeeping, of CIS assets. There is no global or uniform definitionof the term "custody". It may refer to different obligations in various jurisdictions,
including ensuring that the CIS assets are maintained and segregated in a securearrangement and are not misappropriated by persons with access to the assets9, ensuring
CIS assets are subject to due skill care and protection10, or the appropriate management
and keeping of assets by proxy to prevent loss or damage11. In almost all thejurisdictions, however, custody or safekeeping involves the holding, keeping,possession or control of the relevant CIS assets by the custodians. Every jurisdiction
responded that the segregation of CIS assets is required under their regulatory regime.
Consultation question 2: What is your understanding of the role of custodians withrespect to CIS assets?
Consultation question 3: What is your understanding of term “segregation” in relation
to the safekeeping / custody of CIS assets?

15.

The custody function applies to all assets which can be held in custody, whether byphysical delivery to the custodian or by way of registration in book-entry form in theaccounts of the CIS opened with the custodian. CIS assets entrusted to a custodian are
generally financial instruments such as equity securities or fixed income securities, butthey may also include physical assets in certain jurisdictions (e.g. gold, property, andprecious metals).

9

Section 17(f) of the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 governs the custody of a CIS's assets,
including its portfolio securities.

10

In EU jurisdictions, the AIFMD and the UCITS regime.

11

Japan.

-3-

16.

Assets that are physically delivered to and held (‘custodied’) by the custodian itself, arein the minority of situations. More frequently, assets are not directly held by thecustodian but they are recorded in book entry systems or held by other parties such as
Central Securities Depositories (CSDs), International Central Securities Depositories(ICSDs), sub custodians, registrars or collateral agents. In addition, all other assets
which by their nature cannot be held in custody (e.g. derivative instruments) are subject
to the custodian's record-keeping obligation, i.e. the custodian must maintain and keep
up-to-date a record of all the CIS’ open positions.
Consultation question 4: Are there any special considerations or operational issues
when holding non-standard assets such as physical commodities (e.g. gold bullion),
financial derivative instruments, private placements, wine, arts etc.?
Consultation question 5: Should there be specific regulatory requirements for holding
non-standard assets?

17.

It should be noted that custodians may not be contractually involved when third parties
are engaged to maintain CIS positions, e.g. when placing cash deposits with third party
deposit taking institutions, concluding derivative contracts with (prime) brokers andreceiving collateral into accounts of the CIS with third party lending agents whenlending out the CIS’s securities. It is hence important to distinguish between the
different asset types and contractual situations when clarifying the risks andresponsibilities applicable to CIS custodians attached to each asset type.

18.

For the purposes of this paper, safekeeping does not include services such as securities
lending. It should be noted, however, that a CIS custodian may be called, for example,
to hold assets (as CIS assets that are owned by the CIS) that have been delivered to the
CIS (i.e. to its custodian) as collateral under a securities lending arrangement. For the
purposes of this paper, collateral (depending on the arrangement, i.e. whether the CIS
owns the collateral) may be considered as CIS assets subject to safekeeping included asclient assets.
Consultation question 6: Should additional consideration be given to the treatment ofderivative instruments, collateral arrangements, etc., and, more in particular, to the roleof custodians in this regard? If yes, what special issues should be addressed?

Monitoring and oversight functions
19.

It is noted that in some jurisdictions, it is a legal or regulatory requirement that thecustodian shall exercise monitoring and oversight functions over client assets. For
example, the EU rules require the depositary to oversee the responsible entity’scompliance with the relevant AIFM and UCITS regulations (as transposed into nationalrules by EU member jurisdictions). Such oversight is conducted ex post and cannot bedelegated.

20.

In some jurisdictions, such monitoring and oversight functions include ensuring thatinvestments made by the CIS managers comply with the objectives and provisions
outlined in the constitutive documents of the CIS, monitoring the investment andoperational activities of the CIS, ensuring compliance with laws and regulations-4-

applicable to the CIS, monitoring the sale and redemption of CIS shares and / orvaluation of units etc., in variable degrees.12
21.

In some jurisdictions (e.g. the EU jurisdictions), the custodian may also be required toensure that the cash flow of the CIS is properly monitored.13

Administration / ancillary services
22.

In addition to the safekeeping of client assets, custodians may also provide otherservices to a CIS ("administrative" or "ancillary" services). Typically these services areprovided by the custodian under a contractual arrangement with the responsible entity(usually in the custody agreement) rather than as a result of legal or regulatory
requirements. Some of the common ancillary services provided by CIS custodians
include fund administration (e.g. corporate actions), investment administration(e.g. fund accounting) and other services such as compliance monitoring.

23.

The extent to which a CIS or the responsible entity engages a custodian to provide
administrative or ancillary services will depend on various factors, including the
responsible entity's specific needs, sophistication of its own systems and the costbenefit analysis of the proposed delegation arrangement.
Consultation question 7: To what extent or under what circumstances should
administration / ancillary services form part of the role of a custodian? What are thebenefits of having a custodian perform these services? Are there other ancillary services
provided by custodians that are critical to the operation / function of a CIS?

12France, Germany, Hong Kong, Switzerland, United Kingdom (and other EU jurisdictions pursuant to
the AIFMD and UCITS regimes).

13

Article 21(7) of the AIFMD and article 21(4) of the consolidated UCITS V Directive.

-5-

Chapter 3 – Key risks around the custody of client assets
24.

C5 has sought to identify the key risks associated with the custody of client assets. The
risks identified below are not meant to be an exhaustive list, and it is recognised thateach custodian may have its own unique risk management system, which reflects thenature, scale and complexity of its business.

25.

The responsible entity should be mindful of the following risks when selecting acustodian as well as during its relationship with the custodian. Chapter 4 and 5 of thispaper set out some principles in relation to the safekeeping of CIS assets and theappointment and ongoing monitoring of custodians.

A.

Risk of co-mingling / misuse of CIS assets / segregation

26.

There is a risk that CIS assets in the custodian’s care can become co-mingled with(i) assets of the responsible entity; (ii) assets of the custodian; or (iii) the assets of otherclients of the custodian (unless CIS assets are held in a permissible "omnibus
account"). There is also a risk that CIS assets may be misused by the custodian (e.g. tosettle the liabilities of another client).

27.

The consequences of these risks could result in the ownership of the assets being called
into question in the event of misuse or insolvency of the custodian, which may create
difficulties differentiating ownership of the assets.

B.

Operational risk

28.

Operational risk is the risk of loss of CIS assets resulting from inadequate or failed
processes, people and systems or from external events. While this risk cannot becompletely eliminated due to its nature, it can be mitigated with appropriate risk
controls. Some of the more common operational risks potentially faced by CIS
custodians are identified below:(i) Risk of fraud or theft

29.

Risk of loss of CIS assets if an employee of the custodian acts in a fraudulent manner(e.g., falsifying records) or steals from client accounts. CIS assets could also be placedat risk if a third party acts in a fraudulent manner e.g. submitting fake withdrawal
instructions to the custodian purporting to be the responsible entity.
(ii) Information technology risk

30.

Given that most CIS assets are held by way of registration in book-entry form in theaccounts of the CIS opened with the custodian, an important aspect of a custodial
business involves the security and reliability of its information technology (IT). Key IT
risks include (i) vulnerabilities in IT security which can open the gate for fraud and lossof data integrity; (ii) existence of legacy systems which can give rise to other risks suchas human error due to a higher reliance on manual input; and (iii) IT system failures
which could result in the custodian failing to act on corporate events or incorrectly
calculating asset values, interests, dividends and taxes.

-6-

(iii) Inadequate record keeping
31.

Appropriate segregation of CIS assets depends on the custodian maintaining proper
books and records. Title of CIS assets may be lost or incorrect if the custodian fails tokeep or retain proper and adequate records of the identity and status of investments heldor their beneficial ownership. This risk is often heightened where there is a change tothe custodian’s way of operation e.g. changes to internal processes and / or updates tothe IT systems used to record assets and client information.
(iv) Holding non-standard assets

32.

Some assets, often non-financial securities (e.g. physical commodities such as goldbullion, art work or wine etc.), may call for specialist custodians. For example, thesafekeeping of gold bullion would require a custodian with appropriate vault facilities.
The holding of such assets may introduce additional operational risks e.g. physicalsecurity of assets or other proper storage.
(v) Conflicts of interest

33.

The safety and integrity of CIS assets may be at risk if the responsible entity or thecustodian fails to identify, address and monitor any conflicts of interests e.g. failure tosegregate custodial staff from persons performing other functions (such as investment
or trading functions) in a way that minimises conflicts of interest which may exist.
(vi) Legal and compliance risk

34.

Legal and compliance risk for the purposes of this paper is where the custodian fails tocomply with the applicable laws, the terms of any authorisation it holds, any regulatory
or industry requirements, or any contractual obligations.

35.

CIS assets may be at risk if a custodian breaches its legal and / or regulatory
obligations, which in some cases may result in the custodian being unable to provide
safekeeping services for the CIS e.g. from losing its regulatory status to provide
safekeeping service or due to insolvency.

36.

Compliance failures can originate from a lack of knowledge of the policies andprocedures (this could be from poor training, high staff turnover or a poor complianceculture), human error (simply missing steps in a procedure) or an intentional decision to
not comply.

37.

Breaches of legal and regulatory obligations and compliance failures could jeopardise
the safety of CIS assets and cause serious disruptions to the custodial arrangements.

Country risk
38.

Where assets are held in foreign jurisdictions, there may be specific country risks thatshould be taken into account e.g. the effectiveness of the local regulatory regime,
whether a judgement can be enforced effectively and other factors that may make it
difficult to repatriate CIS assets i.e., language barriers, time zones, lack of directoversight and political uncertainty that may impact the safekeeping of CIS assets.

-7-

Concentration risk
39.

A potential concentration risk was identified by some respondents to the survey as a
key risk in the custodian business in their jurisdiction.14 Concentration risk may arise if
all CIS assets are held by a single custodian or at a single physical location. The
provision of asset safekeeping services is already highly concentrated and the industry
continues to consolidate. With the global economy becoming more interconnected, afew large custodians are holding a significant portion of CIS assets globally.

Counterparty risk
40.

Typically where cash is placed on deposit with a custodian also in the capacity of adeposit taking institution, the CIS is exposed to the credit risk of that custodian insofar
as the cash deposit is concerned, and there is a risk that the custodian may default if it
becomes insolvent.

Reputational risk
41.

The crystallisation of any of the above-mentioned risks can have an adverse impact on
the reputation of those involved in the custody arrangement particularly the custodianand the responsible entity. Reputational damage could trigger a loss of investor
confidence and increased redemption at the CIS or litigation against the CIS,
responsible entity or custodian.
Consultation question 8: Do you agree with the risks presented above? Are there anyother key risks associated with the custody of CIS assets?

14

Australia, Jersey, Luxembourg.

-8-Chapter 4 – Principles relating to the custody of CIS assets
Principle 1 – The regulatory regime should make appropriate provisions for the custodial
arrangements of the CIS.
42.

The regulatory regime seeks to protect the physical and legal integrity of CIS assets.

43.

To achieve this, the regulatory regimes should consider (where applicable, as acomplement to separate regulation e.g. prudential and banking regulation that governs
the custodian) having appropriate provisions for the custodial arrangements of the CIS.

44.

Principle 1 is designed to ensure there is an appropriate regulatory framework in orderto address the key risks relating to the custody of CIS assets.
Consultation question 9: Would there be merit in requiring the appointment of asingle custodian in order to have certainty over who is ultimately responsible forsafekeeping all CIS assets within a given CIS?

Principle 2 – CIS assets should be segregated from:(i) the assets of the responsible entity, its related15 entities and other schemes;(ii) the assets of the custodian / sub-custodian throughout the custody chain; and(iii) the assets of other clients of the custodian throughout the custody chain (unless
CIS assets are held in a permissible omnibus account).
45.

Proper segregation of assets is essential in ensuring the safekeeping of CIS assets. This
fundamental principle of CIS safekeeping is embedded in principle 25 of the IOSCO
Principles which states that, "the regulatory system should provide for rules governing
the legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the segregation andprotection of client assets."

46.

In order to ensure that the ownership of the CIS's and other clients' assets remain
distinct, the custodian must ensure that appropriate segregation arrangements are inplace to allow for the identification of assets belonging to each party. Such segregation
should be observed throughout the custody chain i.e. where sub-custodians areappointed (regardless of how many levels of sub-delegation are involved), the subcustodians’ own assets should not be co-mingled with assets of the sub-custodian’sclients. A key objective of the segregation requirements all along the custody chain is toprevent the loss of assets as a result of the insolvency of a sub-custodian or custodian.

47.

Every jurisdiction responded to the survey that the segregation of CIS assets is required
under its regulatory regime with the most common segregations occurring between:
 CIS assets from the assets of the responsible entity and its related entities;
 CIS assets of a given CIS from the assets of other CIS clients;
 CIS assets from the assets of the custodian; and CIS assets from the assets of other clients of the custodian.

15

Also referred to as “affiliated” entities in the United States.

-9-

48.

Some jurisdictions allow CIS assets to be co-mingled with the assets of other clients inan omnibus account. An omnibus account typically refers to the holding of CIS assets
in an account in the name of the custodian or its nominee (and marked as CIS assets,
i.e. not as assets of the custodian or its nominee itself), rather than in individual
accounts for each underlying client. The segregation of assets among different clients
generally occurs operationally, through IT systems and books and records, rather than
through the use of separate individual client accounts.

49.

The survey results indicated that the term ‘omnibus accounts’ is generally used for comingled accounts at sub-custodian level although accounts co-mingling assets ofvarious clients may also be used at the custodian level subject to certain safeguards
such as daily reconciliation against the custodian’s records, i.e. where co-mingledaccounts are used, the custodian’s records should differentiate assets belonging to eachclient and ensure that records be accurately maintained with frequent reconciliations
being performed at the co-mingled account level. In any case, the custodians' or subcustodians’ own assets should not be co-mingled with CIS assets.

50.

Principle 2 is designed to address the risk of the misuse and / or co-mingling of CIS
assets and operational risk.
Consultation question 10: Should the custodian segregate assets only between its own
and CIS assets, or should it segregate assets through individual, separate accounts foreach client?
Consultation question 11: Should the rule of segregation apply throughout the custody
chain, i.e. through the different levels of delegation to sub-custodians?
Consultation question 12: Should the requirement of proper segregation be combinedwith an additional requirement of the recognition of the segregation at custodian or subcustodian level in the event of the insolvency of the custodian or sub-custodian?

Principle 3 – CIS assets should be entrusted to a third party custodian. In limited
circumstances where the regulatory regime permits self-custody of CIS assets, additionalsafeguards should be put in place to ensure proper segregation and protection of CIS
assets.
51.

To avoid conflicts of interest and ensure a high level of protection, CIS assets are
generally entrusted to a third party custodian, responsible for the safekeeping of theassets.

52.

In limited cases, as an alternative to the appointment of a formal third-party custodian,
the regulatory regime may allow "self-custody", under which the CIS or the responsible
entity may be permitted to hold the CIS assets.16 Some regimes permit self-custody for

16

Most regulatory regimes do not allow self-custody of CIS assets e.g. Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. In thecontext of this paper, self-custody does not include arrangements where custody is provided by a party
related to the CIS or the responsible entity (i.e., related bank).

- 10 -

certain types of assets only and require that these assets be handled separately byanother unit within the responsible entity.
53.

For jurisdictions17 which allow some form of self-custody, additional requirements areoften imposed on self-custodians, such as: additional disclosure requirements;
 additional capital requirements;
 holding the CIS assets in the safekeeping of a bank or other company that issupervised by regulatory authorities;
 physically segregating CIS assets from the assets of others; designating specific persons who are permitted access the CIS assets; and requiring an independent public accountant to verify the assets held by the selfcustodian and to conduct a certain number of examinations without giving priornotice to the responsible entity.

54.

Where self-custody is permitted by the regulatory regime, the following additional
minimum conditions should be considered :(a) the division of the responsible entity engaged in custody / administration must be
functionally independent of the fund management division of the responsible
entity;(b) conflicts of interest at the group level must be appropriately identified, managed
and monitored; and(c) proper disclosure to investors including what measures and safeguards have been
put in place to ensure proper segregation and protection of CIS assets must be
required.

55.

Principle 3 is designed to address the risks of self-custody.
Consultation question 13: Are there any other conditions that should be consideredwhen a CIS uses self-custody?

Principle 4 – The custodian should be functionally independent from the responsible
entity.
56.

Many jurisdictions require that CIS assets be held by an eligible third party custodian
appointed by the responsible entity, often with an additional requirement that suchcustodian be independent of the responsible entity.

57.

It is recognised that the concept of “independence” varies among jurisdictions, withsome regulatory regimes insisting upon there being no shareholding relationship of thecustodian with the responsible entity, while others allow cross shareholdings between
the responsible entity and the custodian. Instead of restricting shareholding
relationships, some regulatory systems achieve the required degree of independence by
the establishment of a separate corporate structure for the custodian, an independent
board and separate lines of reporting to the management of the custodian.

17

Australia, Jersey, United Kingdom, United States.

- 11 -

58.

In terms of performance of custodial functions, all regulatory regimes should seek toensure that the custodian is independent in the way it performs its obligations, i.e. acustodian should be functionally independent of the responsible entity.

59.

This functional independence may be achieved in a variety of ways provided each isappropriate to the broader regulatory framework of the relevant jurisdiction. Functional
independence as a minimum requirement is to be distinguished from a structural or“legal independence”. According to principle 25 of the IOSCO Principles, it is notmandatory for the custodian and the responsible entity to be legally separate entities orfor the custodian and the responsible entity to not have common shareholders ordirectors, although it is open to the regulatory regime to prohibit or restrict this.
A functional separation, however, necessarily implies a hierarchical separation, which
will involve assessing where key decisions are taken.

60.

As a general principle, the CIS or the responsible entity must therefore seek to ensure
the custodian it appoints is functionally independent of the responsible entity. Whether
or not the responsible entity and the custodian are related parties, the safekeeping
activities must be performed by officers who are separate from, and able to act
independently from, officers involved in investment or trading decisions. Consequently,
to be considered functionally independent, there should be systems and controls inplace to ensure that the persons fulfilling the custodial function (e.g., the safekeeping of
CIS assets) are functionally independent from the persons fulfilling the CIS’s
management or administration functions. As such, a custodian should not carry out
activities with regard to the CIS or the responsible entity that may create conflicts ofinterest between the CIS, the investors in the CIS, or the responsible entity and itself,
unless the custodian has functionally and hierarchically separated the performance of its
custodian tasks from its other potentially conflicting tasks, and the potential conflicts ofinterest are properly identified, managed, monitored and, possibly, disclosed to theinvestors of the CIS. Each regulatory regime is free to prescribe (or not) more detailed
requirements in this regard.18

61.

Principle 4 is designed to address operational risk (in particular, the risk of fraud andtheft and legal and compliance risk), conflicts of interest and the risk of the misuse and/ or co-mingling of CIS assets.

Principle 5 – The responsible entity should seek to ensure that the custody arrangements inplace are disclosed appropriately to investors in the CIS offering documents or otherwise
made transparent to investors.
62.

The safekeeping of CIS assets is a significant component of the CIS arrangement
between the custodian and the CIS / responsible entity. The responsible entity shouldseek to ensure that the custodial arrangements and any risks associated with thearrangements are properly disclosed to investors and any significant changes updated toinvestors. Where CIS assets are held in a foreign jurisdiction, the responsible entity
should consider disclosing this arrangement and the associated risks. Where self18

In the EU, under the new UCITS V directive, the European Commission is to specify the conditions forfulfilling this “independence requirement” within a period of four years from the entry into force of thedirective (which is 17 September 2014).

- 12 -

custody is being used, the responsible entity should also consider specifically disclosing
the existence of this arrangement and what additional safeguards have been put in place
to mitigate any potential conflicts of interest.
63.

As a matter of best practice, the responsible entity should also consider disclosing theidentity of the custodian and sub-custodian and their respective roles.

64.

Principle 5 is designed to address legal and compliance risk, reputational risk andcountry risk.
Consultation question 14: Do principles 1 to 5 adequately address the key risks
associated with the safekeeping of CIS assets?

- 13 -

Chapter 5 – Principles relating to the appointment and ongoingengagement of custodians
Principle 6 – The responsible entity should use appropriate care, skill and diligence when
appointing a custodian to safekeep CIS assets.
65.

The responsible entity should use appropriate care, skill and diligence in the selection,
instruction and monitoring of its custodian.19 The responsible entity may also consider
cost and service delivery, the regulatory status of the custodian (i.e. authorisation toundertake custody business), its place of establishment, its organisational competence(e.g. whether its systems are equipped to deal with specialised or non-custodiable
assets), reputation, financial soundness and, where custodial property may be held offshore, its network of or relationship with sub-custodians, and the complianceframework in relation to this. The responsible entity may also consider the custodian’s
management of potential conflict of interest to ensure it is satisfied they are properly
identified and mitigated. Where relevant, it may consider examining other activities
conducted by the entity providing custodial services.

66.

In addition, given the importance of the custodian’s role, the responsible entity shouldtake into consideration the custodian’s business continuity plans, and its own
contingency arrangements for the recovery of assets held with the custodian, in theevent of disruption or cessation of the custodian’s operations (e.g. due to financial
difficulty or natural disasters), as part of its selection process for custodians. If
appropriate, the responsible entity may procure the services of a suitable third party toassist it with the selection process.

67.

In turn, the responsible entity should consider whether the custodian it appoints uses all
care and skill in the selection and monitoring of its sub-custodians (e.g. handling of
illiquid assets, volume of assets, some kind of diversification, proportionality,
reasonable approach) and consider the matters referred to above particularly in relation
to segregation processes.

68.

Principle 6 is designed to provide coverage of the risks identified in Chapter 3 as the
responsible entity should consider the key risks during its assessment of a custodian.
Consultation question 15: Are there any other selection criteria that may be relevant
for the proper selection and appointment of a custodian?
Consultation question 16: Should additional consideration be given to the selection of
specialist custodians? If so, what factors should a responsible entity take into accountwhen selecting a specialist custodian?

19

What is appropriate would depend on a number of factors including size, capital and whether thecustodian itself is subject to or under a regulatory regime.

- 14 -

Principle 7 – The responsible entity should at a minimum, consider a custodian's legal /regulatory status, financial resources and organisational capabilities during the due
diligence process.
69.

The responsible entity should be able to demonstrate why the appointed custodian isappropriate for the CIS.20 For example, based on the due diligence conducted on thecustodian, the responsible entity should consider the appropriateness of eachappointment after considering the CIS’ strategy and the types of assets which the CIS
needs the custodian to hold.

70.

While the results of the survey showed that most regulatory regimes do not impose aparticular selection process with respect to selecting a custodian or sub-custodian, it isopen to each regime to do so. The responsible entity may wish to consider thefollowing factors prior to formal appointment:

A.

Legal and regulatory status

71.

The survey results showed that the type of entity which can act as a CIS custodian isvaried, ranging from credit institutions which are often subject to prudential regulation,broker / dealers and trust companies. Most regulatory regimes require CIS custodians to
be licensed, authorised or approved and to be subject to some form of ongoingregulatory oversight. A responsible entity should consider whether the custodian meetsthe necessary legal and regulatory requirements to act as a custodian in the jurisdictionin which it is operating. This could be satisfied by obtaining an undertaking from thecustodian as to its regulatory status.

B.

Capital / financial resource requirements

72.

Most regulatory regimes have a minimum capital or financial resource requirement for
CIS custodians. While the amount varies between jurisdictions, as part of its due
diligence, the responsible entity may wish to make enquiries into the custodians'
financial capacity to safekeep CIS assets. The responsible entity may also want toconsider the credit worthiness of the custodian especially if cash assets are being placedon deposit with the custodian.

C.

Organisational capabilities

73.

Whether a custodian has ability to safekeep CIS assets is largely dependent on thecustodian's infrastructure and operational capabilities. The responsible entity may wish
to give some consideration to the following factors during its due diligence process:

20

Human resources – is the custodian able to cover the time zones required and does
the custodian have the human capital to properly record and preserve the physicaland legal integrity of CIS assets? If services are outsourced to offshore third
parties, has the responsible entity considered whether the arrangement isappropriate and has it considered additional risks is poses?

The responsible entity may consider several factors when considering the appropriateness of acustodian. For example, the fact that a custodian is a large credit institution does not automaticallymean that it is able to handle the recording keeping and custody of an unlisted property fund or a hedge
fund.

- 15 -








Management – does the custodian have a competent management team in place?
Is there an appropriate governance structure in place to ensure that any conflicts ofinterests are properly managed, and does it facilitate breach reporting or
whistleblowing?
IT systems and processes – are the custodian's IT systems up to date, secure andsufficiently sophisticated? Is there a heavy reliance on manual procedures? Does
the custodian engage in regular system testing and system and data backups?
Infrastructure – does the custodian have suitable infrastructure in place e.g. fornon-standard CIS assets such as physical commodities, is the custodian equipped
to hold the assets and ensure its safety?
Global network – if the CIS requires global custodian coverage, does thecustodian have the capabilities to meet this demand and what is the sub-custodian
network that it uses?
Risk management – does the custodian have a robust risk management frameworkin place to ensure that where possible, CIS custody risk is mitigated? Does thecustodian regularly reconcile records to mitigate the risk of CIS assets being
misused / co-mingled?

74.

In the absence of separate regulation, to support the above requirements, eachregulatory regime may want to consider some kind of monitoring of compliance withthese requirements.

75.

Principle 7 is an extension of Principle 6 and designed to provide coverage of the key
risks identified in Chapter 3 especially operational risks.

Principle 8 – The responsible entity should formally document its relationship with thecustodian and the agreement should seek to include provisions about the scope of thecustodian's responsibility and liability.
76.

The responsible entity or the CIS and the custodian should document their relationshipand formulate custody arrangements with care and clarify the duties and responsibilitiesof the various parties to the custodial arrangements. These provisions could include, forexample:(a)designated individuals at the CIS or responsible entity authorised to provide
instructions;(b) provisions for termination of the agreement (e.g. from breach of contract); and(c) (where it is not already provided for under law or as a regulatory requirement)
defaults and liability and indemnity provisions as appropriate.
77.

As a matter of best practice, any agreement should seek to contain clear provisions
concerning the custodian's liability for losses suffered by investors.

78.

Where a custodian delegates to a sub-custodian, a written agreement should be in place
to document this relationship which should seek to include appropriate liability andindemnity provisions. As a general matter, the custodian's liability will not be affectedby the fact that it has entrusted to a third party all or some of the assets in its
safekeeping.
- 16 -

79.
Consultation question 17: What should be the scope of a custodian's liability
to the responsible entity as its client? What should be the scope of a sub-custodian's
liability to the master custodian or responsible entity (if any)? And what are theappropriate limitations of this liability, if any?
80.

While it is not mandatory for regulatory regimes to impose content requirements forsuch agreements or to impose specific terms in relation to the appointment of thecustodian or sub-custodian, it is open to each regime to do so.

81.

For example, the regulatory regime may provide, either directly or through mandatory
terms in the custody agreement, that the custodian is liable only to the responsible
entity or CIS itself for breach of the terms of the agreement or other negligenceconnected with the performance of its functions. Alternatively, as in certain EU
countries, the law and the agreement may both provide that the custodian is directly
liable to CIS investors and extends beyond breach and negligence to loss of assets,
subject to conditions.

82.

Principle 8 is designed primarily to address operational risk and in particular, legal andcompliance risk.

Principle 9 – Custody arrangements should be monitored on an ongoing basis forcompliance with the terms of the custody agreement.
83.

Custody arrangements, once established, should be monitored to ensure the custodian's(and in some cases, the sub-custodian's) compliance with the terms of the contract. This
may involve regular liaison with key staff, frequent reporting (e.g. asset reconciliation),
physical access on request, independent audit of custodian and the provision by thecustodian of assistance and information.

84.

In turn, where applicable, the custodian must have the ability to monitor the subcustodian's compliance with the terms of the relationship.

85.

The responsible entity should also consider taking reasonable steps to satisfy itself on
an ongoing basis as to the continued suitability of any appointed custodian, in respect of
its regulatory status, its organisational competence, reputation, financial soundness and,
where custodial property may be held off-shore, its network of or relationship with subcustodians, and the compliance framework in relation to this.

86.

The responsible entity should also seek to ensure that up-to-date contingency
arrangements are in place, pre-agreed with the custodian, for the recovery of assets
from the custodian, in the event of disruption or cessation of the custodian’s operations.
The responsible entity should also remain cognisant of actual or potential risks facing
the custodian, and have in place contingency plans for moving CIS assets to anothercustodian should the necessity arise. Where the responsible entity lacks the resources toadequately monitor its custodian, it may consider appointing a third party (e.g. an
auditor) with the capacity to do so.

87.

Regulatory regimes may, as appropriate, impose requirements in relation to themonitoring and audit of, and access to, custodians and sub-custodians (e.g. an- 17 -

obligation on the custodian to report any inappropriate asset use). However, it is open
to each regime to do so.

88.
Consultation question 18: Are there any other steps that the responsible
entity can take to ensure proper monitoring of its custodian? Are there any other steps
the custodian can take to ensure proper monitoring of sub-custodians?
89.

Principle 9 is designed to address operational risk and in particular, legal andcompliance risk.
90.
Consultation question 19: Do principles 6 to 9 adequately address the key
risks associated with the appointment and monitoring of CIS custodians and subcustodians?

- 18 -

APPENDIX A
Recent regulatory developments in CIS custody1.

The implications from events related to the 2008 financial crisis and several corporate
collapses (such as the Madoff affair) have led to increased concerns generally about thesafekeeping of CIS assets, including in relation to CIS. As such, these events became asignificant political driver in financial services regulation, especially in Europe.
Europe2.

The most notable result of this was the initiative to regulate alternative investment fundmanagers and, consequently, the introduction of the Alternative Investment FundManagers Directive (2011/61/EU) of 8 June 2011 (AIFMD). A key component of the
AIFMD is the clarification and harmonisation of the rules relating to the appointment,functions and liability of depositaries of alternative investment funds (AIFs) (seebelow). This was then followed by a revision of the UCITS directive (UCITS V)(i.e. Directive 2014/91/EU of 23 July 2014), with the stated aim to further enhanceretail investor protection and effectively bring the UCITS regime into line with the new
AIFMD standards through the introduction of a range of corresponding measures (suchas the harmonisation of the duties and liabilities of UCITS depositaries across the EU)
in areas that, in a UCITS retail investors’ context, had previously been regulated in lessprescriptive terms and that had led to different approaches across the European Union21.

3.

The new depositary regime under the AIFMD and UCITS V22 includes a clarification of
the eligibility, duties, responsibilities and liabilities of depositaries of AIFs and UCITS
and a set of rules under which they can delegate tasks and responsibilities. The mainfeatures of this regime are summarised below:
Depositary safekeeping duties and corresponding liability

4.

Under the AIFMD and UCITS V, the depositary’s duty to safekeep consists of either
custody or record-keeping depending on the type of asset owned by the AIF/UCITS. As
such, the AIFMD and UCITS V distinguish between:(i)financial instruments that are capable of being held in custody (whether byphysical delivery to the depositary or by way of registration in book-entry form in
the accounts of the AIF/UCITS opened with the depositary or with another entity
further down the custody chain), where the depositary will be liable for the loss ofsuch assets on a strict liability basis (i.e. irrespective of fault or negligence) unlessthe depositary can prove that the loss of assets is due to an “external event
beyond its reasonable control, the consequences of which would have been
unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary”; and21

The UCITS IV regime provided, for example, that a UCITS’ assets must be « entrusted to a depositary
for safekeeping », without giving any indication as to the ambit of this duty of safekeeping and making
reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of the duties of the depositaries.

22

Upon the entry into force of the UCITS V directive (i.e. 17 September 2014), EU Member States will
have 18 months (i.e. until 18 March 2016) to transpose it into national law; however, the existing EU
UCITS depositaries will have a longer transition period (42 months, i.e. until 18 March 2018) tocomply with the new requirements.

- 19 -

(ii)5.

all other assets (such as over the counter (OTC) derivatives), which are subject tothe depositary’s record-keeping obligations (i.e. the depositary must maintain andkeep up-to-date a record of all the AIF’s/UCITS’ open positions) and its duty toverify the AIF’s/UCITS ownership of these assets. The depositary will only beliable for the loss of these assets, if such loss is suffered as a result of its
negligence or intentional failure to properly fulfil its obligations under the
AIFMD/UCITS V.

In the case of (i) above, a AIF/UCITS depositary is obliged to return a financial
instrument of the identical type or corresponding amount to the AIF/UCITS, without
undue delay, if it is deemed liable for the loss. In addition, the depositary’s liability will
not be affected by the fact that it has entrusted to a third party all or some of its custodytasks. Therefore, the depositary will be liable for the loss of assets even where the loss
occurred at the level of the sub-custodian. Unlike depositaries of AIFs, which arepermitted under AIFMD to transfer liability for the loss of financial instruments held incustody to the relevant sub-custodian under certain conditions, depositaries of UCITS
will not be permitted to exclude or limit their liability under contract.23
Delegation

6.

The AIFMD and UCITS V introduce new requirements in relation to the delegation ofsafekeeping duties by a depositary to sub-custodians. The new requirements generally
relate to the operation of sub-custodians and require that sub-custodians:(i) have structures and expertise that are adequate for the safekeeping of the assetsthat are entrusted to them;(ii) are subject to effective prudential regulation and regulatory supervision;(iii) are subject to an external periodic audit; and(iv) take all necessary steps to ensure that in the event of the sub-custodians’
insolvency that the assets of the AIF/UCITS are not available for distribution tocreditors.

7.

Furthermore, the depositary should not delegate its safekeeping duties unless it candemonstrate that: (i) there is an objective reason for the delegation; (ii) it has exerciseddue skill and care in the selection and ongoing monitoring of the sub-custodian; and(iii) the delegation is not made with the intention of avoiding the requirements of the
AIFMD/UCITS V.
Additional duties of the depositary8.

In addition to the new safekeeping requirements which, as described above, distinguishbetween (i) financial instruments that can be held in custody by the depositary and(ii) record-keeping and ownership verification requirements relating to other assets, theAIFMD and UCITS V include an additional uniform list of oversight duties (which
typically involves conducting ex-post controls and verifications of processes andprocedures that are under the responsibility of the AIF/UCITS operator or the
AIF/UCITS itself24) as well as new cash flow monitoring requirements. As to the latter,23

In its original proposal, the European Commission noted that it would be inappropriate and unfeasible
to require retail investors to understand the consequences of such contracts.

24

These oversight duties include (i) verifying that units are sold, issued, repurchased, redeemed andcancelled in compliance with applicable rules; (ii) ensuring that the value of units is calculated in- 20 -

AIFMD and UCITS depositaries are/will be required to ensure that the cash flows of
AIFs/UCITS are properly monitored and to ensure that all payments made by or on
behalf of an investor upon the subscription of units have been received and that all cash
has been booked in cash accounts that meet certain conditions.
9.

These developments, which have resulted, inter alia, in a new European standard
concerning the safekeeping of CIS assets (as described above), trigger the question
whether the existing IOSCO principle in relation to the protection of investors’ assets
where these are invested in CIS25 requires further clarification or guidance for the
purpose of enhancing investors’ protection and at the same time allowing theInternational Monetary Fund to better assess the implementation of the IOSCO
principles by the IOSCO jurisdictions.
Australia

10.

The safety of CIS assets, the duty of care custodians’ exercise and whether custodians
have appropriate internal controls to ensure the safety of assets held for others were
examined in Australia after the global financial crisis.

11.

In 2012, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) released areport on custodial and depositary services.26 The review identified a number of key
risks to the safety of CIS assets for example:








12.

unauthorised debiting of omnibus accounts;
stability and safety of it systems;
operational risks created by manual and disparate systems;
whistleblowing culture and framework;
reporting in relation to suspicious third party valuations;breach reports relating to custodial and investment administration services; andthe risks inherent in corporate actions such as share buy-backs and rights.

Recommendations of good practices were made for each risk (in line with existing
regulatory guidance) for custodians and the responsible entity to consider. ASIC also
foreshadowed its intention to consult with industry about updating existing regulatory
requirements for holding CIS assets and possibly proposing (i) changes to the financial
resource requirements of custodians; and (ii) requiring the responsible entity to provide
clearer disclosure about the role of custodians in retail marketing material.

accordance with applicable rules; (iii) carrying out instructions of the AIFM/UCITS unless they
conflict with applicable rules; (iv) verifying that considerations are remitted within the usual time
limits; and (v) verifying that an AIF’s/UCITS’ income is applied in accordance with applicable rules.
25

Principle 25 in “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation” IOSCO, June 2010,p.10, supra,
fn 4, which provides that “the regulatory system should provide for rules governing the legal form andstructure of collective investment schemes and the segregation and protection of client assets”, cf.
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf.

26

http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep291-published-5-July-2012.pdf.

- 21 -

APPENDIX B
GlossaryCIS

a registered / authorised open-ended27 collective investment schemethat issues redeemable units and invests primarily in transferable
securities or money market instruments. For the purposes of this paper,
this excludes private funds such as hedge funds which use prime
brokers28 and schemes which invest in private equity and venture
capital.29

CIS assets

assets owned by the CIS (including cash), held on behalf of clients,
which are either (i) assets which can be held in custody ("custodiable
assets"), whether by physical delivery to the custodian or by way ofregistration in book-entry form in the accounts of the CIS opened withthe custodian, or (ii) other assets which by their nature cannot be heldin custody ('non-custodiable assets', e.g. derivative instruments) which
are subject to the custodian's record-keeping obligation, i.e. thecustodian must maintain and keep up-to-date a record of all the CIS’open positions. For the purposes of this paper, collateral (depending on
the arrangement) may be included as CIS assets.

Custodian

includes a "trustee" or "depositary", but not a sub-custodian. It is theentity which the responsible entity has entrusted with the safekeepingof the assets of the CIS. In some jurisdictions additional functions andduties are carried out by the custodian.

Depositaryan entity which is responsible for the custody / safekeeping of theassets of a CIS, which could also be imposed with other additionaloversight responsibilities of the investment manager of the CIS.

Omnibus accountholding of CIS assets in an account in the name of the custodian or its
nominee, rather than in individual accounts for each underlying client.

Responsible entity

the entity or entities that has / have overall responsibility for the
management and performance of the functions of the CIS, in particular,
its compliance with the legal and regulatory framework in its
respective jurisdiction.30

27

This paper may also be relevant for closed-ended collective investment schemes.

28

Assets held with prime brokers (as an intermediary holding client assets) are covered in FR01/2014
Recommendations Regarding the Protection of Client Assets, IOSCO, January 2014, supra fn 7;
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD436.pdf.

29

While the primary focus of this paper is on publicly offered, open-ended CIS, the principles set out inthis paper may be applied to a broader range of funds, including for example, non-publicly offeredfunds and hedge funds.

30

The identification of the “responsible entity” may vary among jurisdictions and types of CIS. In somejurisdictions, the responsible entity could be the management company or the CIS itself. In others, themanagement company may play a role in carrying out the principles, but may be overseen by anindependent body (e.g. board of directors, depositary or custodian).

- 22 -

Sub-custodiana third party entity appointed by another custodian typically by way ofwritten agreement to safekeep CIS assets on behalf of that custodian.

Safekeeping

consists of either custody or record-keeping depending on the type of
asset owned by the CIS (the CIS assets). For the purposes of this paper,safekeeping does not include services such as securities lending.

Trusteethe entity responsible for holding the CIS assets of a CIS on trust for
the holder of the CIS, which is structured as a unit trust.

- 23 -

APPENDIX C
Principles regarding theCustody of Collective Investment Scheme Assets
Principle 1:

The regulatory regime should make appropriate
provisions for the custodial arrangements of the CIS.

Principle 2:

CIS assets should be segregated from: the assets of the responsible entity, its related
entities and other schemes;
 the assets of the custodian / sub-custodian
throughout the custody chain; and the assets of other clients of the custodian
throughout the custody chain (unless CIS assets areheld in a permissible omnibus account).

Principle 3:

CIS assets should be entrusted to a third party
custodian. In limited circumstances where theregulatory regime permits self-custody of CIS assets,additional safeguards should be put in place to ensure
proper segregation and protection of CIS assets.

Principle 4:

The custodian should be functionally independent fromthe responsible entity.

Principle 5:

The responsible entity should seek to ensure that thecustody arrangements in place are disclosed
appropriately to investors in the CIS offering documents
or otherwise made transparent to investors.

Principle 6:

The responsible entity should use appropriate care, skill
and diligence when appointing a custodian to safekeep
CIS assets.

Principle 7:

The responsible entity should at a minimum, consider acustodian's legal / regulatory status, financial resourcesand organisational capabilities during the due diligenceprocess.

Principle 8:

The responsible entity should formally document its
relationship with the custodian and the agreement
should seek to include provisions about the scope of thecustodian's responsibility and liability.

Principle 9:

Custody arrangements should be monitored on an
ongoing basis for compliance with the terms of thecustody agreement.

- 24 -

APPENDIX D
List of consultation questions
1.

Do you have views on the recent trends identified above and are there any otherrelevant market developments that should be taken into account in developing theprinciples regarding the custody of CIS assets?

2.

What is your understanding of the role of custodians with respect to CIS assets?

3.

What is your understanding of term “segregation” in relation to the safekeeping /custody of CIS assets?

4.

Are there any special considerations or operational issues when holding non-standard
assets such as physical commodities (e.g. gold bullion), financial derivative
instruments, private placements, wine, arts etc.?

5.

Should there be specific regulatory requirements for holding non-standard assets?

6.

Should additional consideration be given to the treatment of derivative instruments,
collateral arrangements, etc., and, more in particular, to the role of custodians in thisregard? If yes, what special issues should be addressed?

7.

To what extent or under what circumstances should administration / ancillary services
form part of the role of a custodian? What are the benefits of having a custodian
perform these services? Are there other ancillary services provided by custodians thatare critical to the operation / function of a CIS?

8.

Do you agree with the risks presented above? Are there any other keys risks associatedwith the custody of CIS assets?

9.

Would there be merit in requiring the appointment of a single custodian in order to havecertainty over who is ultimately responsible for safekeeping all CIS assets within agiven CIS?

10.

Should the custodian segregate assets, only between its own and CIS assets, or should it
segregate assets through individual, separate accounts for each client?

11.

Should the rule of segregation apply throughout the custody chain, i.e. through thedifferent levels of delegation to sub-custodians?

12.

Should the requirement of proper segregation be combined with an additional
requirement of the recognition of the segregation at custodian or sub-custodian level inthe event of the insolvency of the custodian or sub-custodian?

13.

Are there any other conditions that should be considered when a CIS uses self-custody?

14.

Do principles 1 to 5 adequately address the key risks associated with the safekeeping of
CIS assets?

15.

Are there any other selection criteria that may be relevant for the proper selection andappointment of a custodian?
- 25 -

16.

Should additional consideration be given to the selection of specialist custodians? If so,
what factors should a responsible entity take into account when selecting a specialist
custodian?

17.

What should be the scope of custodian's liability to the responsible entity as its client?
What should be the scope of a sub-custodian's liability to the master custodian or
responsible entity (if any)? And what are the appropriate limitations of this liability, if
any?

18.

Are there any other steps that the responsible entity can take to ensure propermonitoring of its custodian? Are there any other steps the custodian can take to ensure
proper monitoring of sub-custodians?

19.

Do principles 6 to 9 adequately address the key risks associated with the appointment
and monitoring of CIS custodians and sub-custodians?

- 26 -

Appendix E
List of Working Group Members
C5 Member jurisdiction

Organisation

Australia

Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Co-Chair

Luxembourg

Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) Co-Chair

Belgium

Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)

BrazilBrazilian Financial and Capital Markets Association(ANBIMA)FranceAutorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) - Chair of C5

Germany

Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFIN)

Hong Kong

Securities and Futures Commission (SFC)

IrelandCentral Bank of Ireland (CBI)

Italy

Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa(CONSOB)

JerseyJersey Financial Services Commission (JFSC)

MexicoComisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV)

Nigeria

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Romania

Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară (ASF).

Singapore

Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

Spain

Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)South Africa

Financial Services Board (FSB)

Switzerland

Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)

TurkeyCapital Markets Board (CMB)

United Kingdom

Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)

United States of America

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)- 27 -