Community-based Rural Development and the Politics
of Redistribution: The Experience of the Gurage Road
Construction Organization in Ethiopia

MAKOTO NISI-n

Kyoto U11iversity

Since the 1990s, the idea of participation has become a p op ular norm in implementing devel­
opment cooperation. Community-based organizations (CBOs) are widely thought ro promotelocal democratic participation effectively in the development process. However, the potential
relationship between CBOs and development agencies raises questions about the rel ationshipbetween a CBO and the people whom it claims to rep resen t. De termining whether the or gani ­zation benefits only the local elite or provides a discussion forum among groups with different
positions is critical.
The Gur age Road Construction Organization (GRCO), whicl1 has been operating since
1962, is one of the most successful CB Os in Ethiopia. J t was established in Addis Ababa as an
association of Gurage migrants from southern Ethiopia to raise funds for the construction ofroads and schools in their homeland. GRCO ac quired a wide support base through negotiations
with members of urban and rural communities. GRCO leaders sough t not only to construct
mas sive public works in the ir villages but also to develop alte rnatve social relationships for thefairer redistribution of development fundsi.

Key words: community-based organization, developmen t, ethnicity, redistribution

1. INTRODUCTION
In many Mrican societies, in which the state plays only a limited role in organizing public life, theactivities of commurliry-based organizations (CBOs, also referred to as indigenous or voluntary asso­
ciations) constitute an im p ort ant aspect of people's livelihoods. CBOs reallocate resources, such as
money and labor. CBO activities also provide a means for various groups to define and express theircollective identities. CBOs play important roles in promoting rural devel opment by constructing
roads, bridges, and scho ols (McNulty and Lawrence 1996). Mrican CBOs, or more generally indig­
enous social organizations, are often thought to represent the most democratic dimension of Mrican
society (Smit 2001; Bahru 2002c).
In this paper, I briefly explore the attempts of one of the most successful CBOs in Ethiopia toengage in the politics of redistribution." The Gurage Road Construction Organization (GRCO,"

renamed the Gurage People s Self- Help Development Organization in 1988) was established in'

1962 under the leadership of Gu rage< 1 l immigrants to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. Theiraim was to construct roads in their homeland, the Sebat Bet District (the western part of the present-

Nilo-Ethiopian Studies 12: 13-25 (2008)
Copyright© 2008.Japan Association for Nilo-Ethiopian Sn1dies
13

Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

14

day Gurage Zone in the Southern Region), which is located approximately 150 km south of Addis
Ababa (see map). Over the last 40 years, the GRCO has helped to construct more than 450 km of
all -weather gravel roads, in addition to dozens of elementary and secondary schools, while also con­solidating support from communities and national and international development agencies. In short,the GRCO has successfull y reallocated development funds among the Gurage.C2l

The GRCO is best described as an "aggregation" of different social fabrics, rather than a monolithic
organization. The executive committee, which comprises "elite" Gurage migrants in Addis Ababa, isthe core body of the organization. Tribal committees under the executive committee represent thetraditional social organization of the Gurage homeland, which consists of a dozen "tribes," eacb ofwhich is a highly autonomous political entity. These committees also play key roles in promoting
negotiations between "elite" Gurage migrants in Addis Ababa and traditional leaders (local chiefs andelders) in the homeland. In addition, burial associations formed by urban Gurage migrants (includ­ing "nonelites") work very closely with the organization. Later in this paper, a case study of the Ezha
Committee illustrates how tribal committees develop close relationships with burial associations toraise funds for their activities.
Categorizing the GRCO as a community-based organization may seem questionable. Given its
social-service functions and diverse range of activities, it might better be considered a nongovern­
mental organization (NGO). However, the GRCO is best described as a CBO for several reasons. In
Ethiopia and most parts of Mrica, NCO usually refers to an organization that provides professional
services for various communitiesYl NGO staffs are paid, and their activities are heavUy subsidized
by international aid. In contrast, the GRCO is managed by unpaid volunteers from urban and rural
Gurage communities. Moreover, it raises most of its revenue from its own people. Unlike mostNGOs in Ethiopia, the GRCO also has a strong constituency within the rural and urban Gm·age
communities. Thus, although the GRCO is not based on a community of people living in a smallFederal Democratic Republicof Ethiopia

Gurage Zone

Butajira
LegendNational Highway

Roads constructedby the GRCO
0

10

20km

Map. Roads constructed by the GRCO [Source: GRCO]NISHI: Community-based Rural Development and the Politics of Redistribution

15

geographical area, it is still community-based in that it is supported by"extended" or "multiple" com­munities of the Gurage.
The GRCO is one of several CBOs established in southern Ethiopia in the early 1960s for simi­
lar purposes. Among them, Alemgena-Walamo Road Construction Organization was establishedmainly by the Soddo Gurage, who reside in the northern part of the present-day Gurage Zone
(northeast of the former Sebat Bet District).

The Wolayta Development Association supported

construction of feeder roads and primary schools in rural Wolayta Prefecture (now Wolayta Zone).
The Mecha-Tuloma Self-help Association was established by Oromo elites to promote education
and welfare goals. Thus, all of these CB Os are largely related to the ethnic identities of southern
Ethiopian peoples.
Below, I address two interrelated problems regarding the political aspects of CBO activity. My
major focus is the relationship between a CBO and the people whom it claims to represent. Thus,
does the GRCO, one of the"ethnic-based" CB Os established in the 1960s, promote the fair redistri­bution of development resources, or does it mainly advance nepotism and the interests of the ethnic
elite? The second question concerns the relationship of CB Os with the state. Given state failmes inredistributing development resources, can CB Os provide alternative venues for redistribution?

2. DEMOCRACY OR TYRANNY?

Since the 1990s, the idea of"participation" has become a popular norm of development cooperation.
CBOs are widely thought to effectively promote local democratic participation in the development
process. As a result, CBOs have been given more access to development funds. However, the poten­
tial relationship between CBOs and development brings into question the relationship between the
CBO and the people whom it claims to represent. Cooke and Kothari (2001) argued that participa­
tory development methods may represent another form of "tyranny" that promotes the interests oflocal elites and reinforces existing power differentials.
One recurring question is whether an "ethnic-based" organization, such as the GRCO, has thecapacity to undertake the fair redistribution of development funds. Ethnicity, which is a crucial factor
in Mrican politics, is often thought to represent a "paternalistic" relationship between ethnic elites as
patrons and th.eir client members. Such a view inevitably leads to the conclusion that the politics of
ethnicity in Mrica must give way to other forms of social integration, such as a civil society that con­sists of"public political activity'' (Bratton 1994: 56) and accommodates contesting interests among
different groups of people.
However, this is a serious misunderstanding about the nature of ethnicity in Mrica. Bratton's view
derives from the assumption that ethrucity represents a"private" realm of society essentially definedby "affective ties" and that it occupies the same political space (the private sphere) as that of"family"(Bratton 1989: 41 1). His discussion is based on the Western concept of a public/private dichotomy.
Political philosophers often dispute this idea (Geuss 2001), and its application to Mrican societies issomewhat tenuous.
Moreover, efforts to introduce a strong civil society to Mrica during the last decade have little toshow, despite extensive talk about the roles of "African civil society" and international community
support (Berman et al. 2004). Rather than cling to civil society ideals, we might better focus on
tl1e "dense networks of indigenous institutions" and their "historical experiences and socio-culturallandscape" (Berman 2004: 51). 'Dus perspective seems particularly apt when considering the "exercise
of popular agency'' against tyranny (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 3) in the context of modern and con­temporary Mrican societies. The process of development and participation can be"tyrannical" if itreflects only the interests of local elites and/or development agencies, whereas "popular agency" mayrefer to those who resist existing power relationships, based on tl1eir own experience and knowledge.
Here, I examine the agency of those in the GRCO who worked to redistribute development funds
fairly and the importance of the local knowledge they used to organize.

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Nilo-Ethiopirm Studies

Henry (2004: 140, 147) maintains that "researchers must ground their understanding of participa­
tory development in ... cultures and identities of indigenous agencies of development." Based on
his observations of the GRCO, he suggested that participation in GRCO activities, which was notforced, meant that one was "a good Gurage citizen."
However, Henry's (2004) discussion on the moral basis of GRCO activities is far from convinc­ing. 'TI1e statements of GRCO activists appear tyrannical in Henry's (2004) interpretation of themas a moral imperative for every Gm·age. He reports that some GRCO leaders suggested that various
communal sanctions (rebukes, fines, and even ostracism) be employed against those who did not con­tribute (Henry 2004). However, the GRCO probably could not implement such sanctions because
it is basically a volunteer association, run by a small number of individuals. Although GRCO leadeis
are influential figures, including high officials, wealthy mercl1ants, and sons of traditional chiefs, it isunlikely that they could force every "good citizen" of the Gurage to contribute to their organization.

I argue that the GRCO has successfully built a wide base of support not because it represents anexisting moral community, but because of its patience in negotiating with potential supporters, who
may openly criticize or even reject their proposals. Despite Henry's (2004) communitarian assump­tion of the GRCO's monolithic moral basis, the focus of the organization is in negotiating withgroups of people living in a heterogeneous society.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDThe Gurage were among the societies subsumed within the state of Ethiopia during its southern
expansion in the late 19'h century. An agrarian culture characterized by intensive cultivation ofenset,<4J traditional Gurage society is highly segmented, consisting of a dozen "tribes," eacl1 of whicl1
is divided into clans and lineages<5l (Shack 1966).
Prior to incorporation into Ethiopia, no single political authority could claim sovereignty over the
Gurage; instead, local leaders, such as clan heads and elders, maintained social order. Each tribe wasa highly autonomous political unit that claimed its own territory, and tribal members bore collective
responsibility for protecting their land f rom neighboring tribes. The traditional territorial divisions
are reflected in the administrative divisions drawn by the state. For example, the Sebat Bet District
was formerly divided into subdistricts, each of which represented one or two tribal territories.
The term sebat bet means "seven houses," indicating that traditional Gurage society was composedof seven tribes.<6> According to oral tradition, the tribes were in the state of constant warfare witheach other. To remedy this, they established (perhaps in the first half of the 19'11 century) the yejoka,
an intertribal council of elders who met to solve disputes and institute customary laws (Shack 1966;
Bah.ru 2002c). The Gurage tribes discussed here, such as the Chaha, Ezha, Muhur, Ener, and Enamor,
are members of the yejoka. Although the GRCO and the yejoka are distinct organizations, the exis­
tence of the latter and the long experience with intertribal negotiations may have provided importantsocial and cultural background to the establishment and maintenance of the GRCO.
Mter the Gurage and other groups in southern Ethiopia were incorporated into Ethiopia, mem­bers of the Ethiopian aristocracy administered their lands. These aristocrats, often holding important
administrative positions, such as prefectural governor or district head, were mostly of Amhara origin
and claimed extensive tenure rights over the southern lands. 1he traditional leaders of the south­
ern societies were appointed as balabbat (local chiefs) or chiqa shum (village headmen). Thus, theEthiopian empire established a form of"indirect rule" over the south by absorbing local leaders into
the bottom of the administrative ladder.
Soon after state incorporation, the Gurage began to migrate to Addis Ababa in search of job
opportunities. The construction of Addis Ababa began in the mid-1880s, and the city formed around
two main centers: the Emperor's Palace (gibbi) and the Areda open market (gabaya), which is approxi­
mately 2 km northwest of tl1e palace. 'TI1e compounds of influential Ethiopian aristocrats and foreign
diplomatic missions were built on the hills surrounding the palace. 'The aristocrats distributed wealthNISHI: Community-based Rural Development and the Politics of Redistribution

17

derived from their rural lands to their clients and soldiers i n Addis Ababa (Bahru 2002a: 69), while
Gurage migrants generally made their living as petty traders in the marketplace or on the streets as
casual labor. Most Gurage lived in the slums surrounding the Areda market.
The political and economic domination by Ethiopian aristocrats and, in particular, their extensive
tenure rights over rural lands persisted until Emperor Haile Sillase I was overthrown by the De1g
(military committee) in the confusion of the popular upheaval of 1974. State ownership of rural land
was proclaimed the following year. However, the social structure of Addis Ababa had undergone
considerable changes since the 1950s.
Shortly after the period of Italian occupation (1936-1941), the emperor issued a proclanntion
defining the powers of tl1e ministriesY> Although 11 ministries existed before the occupation, they
were more nominal authorities than administrative bodies (Howard 1956). The Emperor sought
to introduce a "modern" administrative system while maintaining the old aristocracy, which was his
own source of power (Bahru 2002a). For tl1e Gurage migrants who had received a modern educa­tion in Addis Ababa, the new administrative system opened an alternative pathway to accessing state
privileges.
Another important change prior to the establishment of tl1e GRCO was the formation of anational economy, which was encouraged by the growing number of Addis Ababa residents (Marcus
1995: 98-99). By the 1950s, Gurage migrants accounted for a considerable part of the trade activi­
ties conducted in Mercato, the new commercial center of the city (Bahru 2002a: 197). The GRCO
was established by Gurage migrants who found their way into me state bureaucracy or the national
economy. Of the 55 founding members of me GRCO, at least 46 lived i.n Addis Ababa, with 26 ofthese public officials and 9 otl1ers wealthy merchants.

4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GRCO
According to Abebe Hailu, a Ministry of Education official and early leader of the GRCO, discus­
sions about establishing me GRCO were held in a series of secret meetings at the Catholic Church
in Addis Ababa. The meetings were secret because the Public Security Office of the Ministry oftl1e Interior could have interpreted them as "antistate." By 1960, tension between "reformers" andthe "old guard" within the Ethiopian political establishment was increasing (Bal1ru 2002b). The oldguard wanted to preserve the political and economic interests of the traditional aristocracy, whereas
the reformers represented the emerging class of bureaucrats and some "progressive" aristocrats who
advocated the modernization of the state polity. Sayfu Dubabe, an elite public official of Gurage
origin and a key figure in the early days of GRCO, was placed under house arrest in his rural homebetween 1951 and 1959 because of suspected involvement in an alleged plot led by BitwaddadNegashi
Bazaneh, the senate president at the time, to assassinate the emperor and proclaim a republic.
Sayfu was appointed department head of tlle Ministry of Public Works when he returned to Addis
Ababa. He soon started lobbying tl1e Imperial Highway Autllority (IHA), which was mandated todevelop the national road network. The IHA was established in 1951, after the Ethiopian govern­
ment and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) agreed on a proj­
ect to rehabilitate the major trunk roads in the country. 'Through 1957, 20 million USD in projectloans were provided, and the U.S. Bureau of Roads provided technical assistance. The United States,
largely motivated by its geopolitical interests in the Middle East, was a prominent donor of economic
and military assistance to Ethiopia during the 1950s and 1960s (Marcus 1995: 79-114).
On May 10, 1962, Sayfu told tlle GRCO preparatory committee tllat tlle IHA had agreed tosupport road construction in tlle Sebat Bet District (Weldesillase 1979EC). The IHA proposed toprovide engineers and bulldozers if the GRCO covered all remaining costs (including fuel for thebulldozers). In addition to Sayfu's skills of persuasion and his position in the government, the abun­dant supply of funds from an external institution appears to have been an important factor in the
IHA's generous offer to the GRCO.

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Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

However, the GRCO could not launch an open fi.mdraising campaign without alerting the
Ministry of the Interior. On July 1, 1962, the GRCO submitted a registration application to the
Public Security Office. The application was accepted only on the condition that all GRCO meetings
take place .in the presence of a security officer (Weldesillase 1979EC: 34-35).
Although the GRCO was successful in obtaining recognition from the Public Security Office, thesustainability of .its activities was far from guaranteed, given the volatility of the political environment
in Ethiopia. Among the many contemporary CBOs, the Mecha-Tuloma Self-Help Association wasvery popular among the Oromo, the most populous ethnic group but a political minority. The Mecha­
Tuloma Self-Help Association was registered in 1963 and started raising funds for development
activities in areas such as education. 1he Oromo population supported the group so enthusiasticallythat the Ministry of the lnterior considered the CBO to have gone "beyond the acceptable limits"(Markakis 197 4: 178). The association leaders were suspected of covert political motives and charged
with "subversive activities against the state."Two were sentenced to death (Markakis 1974: 179).
1he activities of the GRCO were no less political than those of the Mecha-Tuloma Association
leaders who sought to change the Ethiopian polity by empowering the marginalized. In Ethiopia
in the1960s, the GRCO leaders had to appear to be working on apolitical development projects toavoid direct collision with the political establishment.

5. NEGOTIATIONS OF THE GRCO WITH RURAL COMMUNITIESOn July 5, 1962, the GRCO launched its fundraising campaign by organizing an open conference at
the National Stadium in Addis Ababa. Thousands of Gurage attended and enthusiastically endorsed
the GRCO's proposals. GRCO leaders suggested that tribes raising the greatest amount of funds
should receive priority in road construction, and donations pledged that day exceeded 85,000 birr.(S)1lus "competition of tribes" proved very successful. Committees representing tribal identities, suchas the Chaha, Ezha, and Muhur, were formed to facilitate fundraising. Seventeen committees operat­
ing in Addis Ababa and the homeland pledged 1.5 million birr, of wruch nearly 95 percent had been
paid to the GRCO by 1987 (Weldesillase 1979EC; GRCO 1980EC; GPSDO 1985EC). With
IHA assistance, the GRCO constructed about 400 km of roads connecting homeland villages in lessthan three decades.
However, this was not achieved without argument or opposition. According to Abebe Hailu, the
GRCO leaders faced severe opposition from the Muhur tribal committee. Despite the tribal compe­
tition idea, road construction was planned to start in Chaha territory. An alternative plan presented
by the Muhur Comnuttee was rejected by the GRCO, whose active leaders were mostly of Chal1an
origin. The Muhur Committee responded by virtually halting fundraising for more than a decade,until the GRCO decided to begin road construction in Muhur territory. 1lus case indicates that
the GRCO's achievement did not result from simple collective action, but from patient negotiation
among rival political units.
Another witness to tlUs process was Weldesillase Bereka, the founding chairman of the GRCO, whopublished a memoir titled Ihe Outcome ofCoope-rativeActivities (Weldesillase 1979EC). Although theprimary purpose of the work was to honor the contributions of the GRCO, Weldesillase devoted 74
pages of the total195 pages to discussing problems he encountered mainly from the balabbat (local
chiefs) of his homeland.
For example, in 1962 the balabbat of Ener attended a GRCO .fundraising conference and approveda tribal committee pledge of 310,000 birr for road construction. However, when the committee
started collecting money from the Ener, the balabbat appealed to the Provincial Office of Shewa,
saying, "hizib tebaddiroal," wruch means "my people are maltreated" (Weldesillase 1979EC: 109).
At that time, the Sebat Bet District was part of Shewa, one of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia. "Hizib
tebaddiroa/" is an Amharic phrase used to accuse an oppressive ruler who abuses his people. Politicians
often use the phrase to condemn their political enemies. In his appeal, the balabbat of Ener accused•

NISI-II: Conununity-based Rural Development and rhe Politics of Redistribution

19

GRCO leaders of"forcing" people to make"unlawful" contributions.
According to Weldesillase, the Provincial Office credited rhe appeal "without investigation" andordered the GRCO to terminate its fundraising activities (Weldesillase 1979EC: 110). This incident
can be best understood in the context of the discord existing between GRCO leaders and the influen­
tial aristocrat who controlled the provincial administration. A member of the Ethiopian nobility, Ras
Mesfin Silasi made his fortune between 1945 and 1955 while governor of Kaffa,a coffee-producing
province.<9> He acquired thousands of hectares of coffee farms, often illegally and almost always inviolation of traditional tenw·e rules (Marcus 1995: 118). He later became vice-governor of Shewa
and harassed the GRCO in various ways.
Weldesillase used the case of the Blabbat of Ener to illustrate how conspiracies of the Ethiopian
nobility hindered GRCO activities and to show how local chiefs were often obliged to demonstrateloyalty to their superiors in the state administration. Although Ras Mesfin was executed during the1974 revolution,GRCO leaders still remember him as among the most "ignorant" of the Ethiopian
nobility. One of my informants explained that he was"jealous" of Weldesillase, the chairman of the
GRCO, who was becoming increasingly popular among the Gurage.
As a noble, Ras Mesfin acquired his position without the necessity of formal education. Despite
his "ignorance", he was highly skilled in political posturing, and he must have understood how the
GRCO's activities could influence the local polity.
In the 1960s, rural Ethiopian societies were dominated by nobles such as Ras Mesfin, who used
local chiefs as their agents. The GRCO leaders pitted themselves against these aristocrats by bypass­ing the administrative ladder and negotiating directly with local chiefs, a process largely facilitatedthrough the mediation of the GRCO tribal committees. 'Ihus, the GRCO's relationship with thehomeland became a political asset, as did the support of the IHA and Gurage migrants in Addis
Ababa. These relationships were valuable not only in supporting road construction projects but also
in countering the local polity of rural Gurage society in the 1960s.

6. SUPPORT FOR THE GRCO BY URBAN GURAGE COMMUNITIESIn this section, I examine the current activities of the GRCO and the support of the urban Guragecommunity. In 1988, after the major homeland road networks were completed, the GRCO was
renamed the Gurage People's Self-Help Development Organization (GPSDO). The focus of theorganization shifted to other development priorities, such as education. For example, in 1995, theEzha Committee, one of the most active GPSDO tribal committees,launched a project to construct
a high school in the rural town of Agenna .Oo)
The sociopolitical changes that have surrounded the GPSDO since its estabUshment are notable.
First, the Ethiopian aristocracy was abolished as a result of the 1974 socialist revolution. Ethiopia'scentralized administrative structure also went through radical reforms beginning in 1995, when a
new constitution established an "ethnic federalism."<11>Administrative boundaries were redrawn

along ethnic inl es,so that local governments represented ethnic groups. 11ms, the government of theGurage Zone is supposed to represent the interests of the Gurage (Nishi 2005).
However, the fragmentation of farmland, which resulted from population increases in the home­land, and the relative economic progress of Addis Ababa residents led to increasing economic dis­parity between Gurage rural and urban societies. As a result, economic redistribution to the ruralcommunities became more important for the GPSDO.
Of the 2.4 million birr<12l raised by the Ezha Committee to construct Agenna High Schoo� 1.0
million birr ( 43 percent) came from urban Gurage, and 1.3 million birr (54 percent) was coveredby economic assistance from the Japanese government. The rural community raised the remaining
3 percent (EDC 1996EC). Fundraising for Agenna High School took place at the annual general
assembly of the Ezha Committee. For the wealthy merchants in Addis Ababa, this event was anopportunity to demonstrate their generosity. Tn 1995,12 wealtl1y merchants of Ezha origin pledged

20

Nilo-Ethiopia1! StudieJ

50,000 birr each.
Burial associations organized by Ezha migrants in Addis Ababa are also important contributors to
the EzhaCommittee. The involvement of burial associations in development projects may seem odd,
but the Ezha Committee depends greatly on their contributions. Except for an executive commit­
tee of no more than 20 members, the Ezha Committee does not have a fixed membership. Except
for a few dozen merchants who contributed regularly to its projects, the committee had no concrete
constituency until it formed collaborations with the burial associations.
Burial associations are the most popular form ofCBO in Addis Ababa, and each keeps a member­ship roster. Members make monthly contributions (usually 10-20 birr) toward their burial expenses.
A burial association can remove a member for not attending meetings or making monthly contribu­
tions. In Addis Ababa, most burial associations remove members who fail ro attend the monthly
meetings three times in a row.
Various types of burial associations exist in Addis Ababa, including those for neighborhoods,
women, and clans.

Most Addis Ababa residents belong to several different burial associations tomaximize their social network.<13l Often, these associations take on functions beyond funeral cover­age: the collaboration of the Ezha Committee with burial associations is one example.
This collaboration dates back to at least 1989, when two burial associations, Ezha Iddir No.1 andEzha Iddir No. 2, contributed 50,000 birr and 30,000 birr, respectively, to an ongoing project of theEzha Committee. 'TI1e Ezha iddir burial associations were organized by Ezha migrants to Addis
Ababa (iddit is Amharic for a burial or mutual help association). Each iddir has its own ledger sheet,accountant, and bank account. The organizations are numbered in order of their establishment, andthus a larger number indicates that tl1e association belongs to a younger generation.
For the Ezha Committee, cooperation with burial associations has many advantages. About 40-60
percent of all the Ezha who reside in Addis Ababa are thought to be members of one of the eight
Ezha iddirs, with a total membership of nearly 3,900 households (see Table 1). The Ezha Committee
invites the Ezha iddirs to participate in its general assemblies. Each iddir is expected to check theattendance of its members, just as it does at its own meetings. During their monthly meetings, theiddirs collect contributions for the Ezha Committee, as well as their own monthly dues.
Although the Ezha Committee has found the iddirs to be very "useful" in achieving its goals, thecommittee cannot dictate iddir decisions. Instead, decisions are made through prolonged negotia­
tions between the committee and iddir members.
In 1995, 12 burial associations (Ezba IddiJ·s No. 1-8 and four others) pledged funds toward theconstruction of Agenoa High School. 1he iddirs then asked their members to contribute a certainsum (100 birr each in most cases). However, the payment terms were largely left up to the individual
members. 1he contribution could be paid over many years, and no concrete time frame was imposed.
As a result, few members had met their "obligation" 6 years after the pledge was made.

Table 1. Ezha iddirs
Year of establishment

Number of members

Ezha No.l

1973

312

Ezha No.2

1985

520

Ezha No.3

1989

500

Ezha No.4

1989

525

Ezha No.S

1992

402

Ezha No.6

1992

647

Ezha No. 7

1994

537

Ezha No. 8

1994

425

total

3,868

Source: Ezha Committee

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N1SH1: Community-based Rural Development and the Politics of Redistribution

Table 2. Funds raised for the Ezha Committee through Ezha iddirs
Projecr (Year)

f:;

Total
Trainin for HighSchool radtlates (Ethiopian birr)(2002)County Hall
Construction(1989)

Health Post
Construction(1993)High School
Construction(1995)

Ezha No.l

50,00025,00049,253

15,600139,853

Ezha No.2

30,0004,000

43,9583,000

80,95866,095Ezha No.3

3,000

56,0957,000

Ezha No.4

3,000

71,1395,000

Ezha No.5

3,000

31,53034,530Ezha No. 6

3,000

58,352

61,352

79,139Ezha No . 7

57,962

57,962Ezha No. 8

42,742

42,742

Total

80,00041,000411,031

30,600562,631

Source: Ezha Committee

This frustrated the Ezha Committee leaders. At its general assembly14l in June 2001, the com­mittee proposed the introduction of a regular "development fee" to support its rural development
activities. A fee of 2 birr (less than 0.2 USD) per month, which was about the price of two cups ofcoffee in town, would be collected equally from all burial association members. However, assembly
attendees from the Ezha iddirs opposed the proposal, saying that "life in town is even more unstable
than life in the villages."The committee finally got the proposal accepted by reducing the fee to 1 birr
per month.
The negotiations between the Ezha Committee and Ezha iddirs were notable in many respects.
TI1e committee is primarily composed of urban elites, such as bankers, lawyers, and wealthy mer­chants, whereas the burial associations include "many others," such as petty traders and the unem­
ployed.

Despite this power asymmetry, the Ezha Committee is greatly dependent on the iddirs

because of their large membership. Thus, the decisions of the committee's general assembly arelargely controlled by the burial associations.
This arduous bargaining over less than 0.1 USD a month may seem inconsequential, but it was
important for assembly participants to express their disapproval of the idea of"egual liability" for ruraldevelopment, in light of the economic disparity among urban dwellers. The committee also profited
because participants finally endorsed its proposal (and perhaps its activities in general) by pledging
to pay 1 birr per month.
The results of such negotiations among the urban Ezha community can be seen in Table 2, whichshows the amounts contributed by Ezha iddi.rs to the major projects of the Ezha Committee. The
older iddirs (with more established members) tended to contribute more than younger iddirs. The
Ezha Committee has not only favored rural communities in allocating development resources (therural Ezha commtmity bore only 3 percent of the Agenna high school construction cost), but has also
recognized the economic discrepancy among the w·ban Ezha community.

7. CONCLUSIONSIn the early 20'" century, the Gurage were caught in the politico-economic system of imperial Ethiopia,
during which northern, urban aristocrats established exploitative latifundism over tl1e south. This
resulted in widening economic disparity between urban and rural Etlliopia, including traditional
Gurage society.
By the 1950s, some Gurage migrants in Addis Ababa had achieved social and economic success.

Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

22

However, they were aware that their success played into the state system of the time. This was thesocial background to the decision by the Addis Ababa Gurage to start developing the infrastructureof their homeland. This was one of the first attempts at economic and social redistribution fromurban to rural Ethiopia. To the imperial regime, the development of the road network was a way tomaintain itself. However, the GRCO used resources and technology for its own purposes in coun­
tering the existing, inequitable sociopolitical order and demonstrating the "popular agency" of theGurage people.
111e GRCO was founded by several dozen individuals and soon gained wide support from bothrural and urban Gurage communities. By 1988, the total amount invested in road construction was
estimated at $5.7 million USD, of which 65 percent was raised from urban and rural Gurage com­munities (IHA covered the other 35 percent). The sense of"ethnic solidarity" among the Gurage was
the most salient factor in this achievement.
However, not all Gurage shared the norm that "good" Gurage citizens contribute to the GRCO.
As I have demonstrated, GRCO/GPSDO activities have been characterized by controversies, suchas those between competing tribes and between elite and nonelite migrants in Addis Ababa. Gurage
who support the organization do so as the result of patient negotiations.
Thus, the GRCO experience cannot be understood through the conventional view of a moral com­munity in which everyone obeys "shared" rules. It is better understood through the idea of rules as
the basis of democratic consensus. According to Mouffe (2000: 72), the view that rules and the inter­
pretation of rules determines the meaning of a practice should be abandoned. Qy.oting Wittgenstein,
she argues that rules are always abridgements of practices and are inseparable from specific ways oflife (Mouffe 2000: 68).
111e GRCO's existence as an "ethnic-based" association does not permit ethnic elites to compel
people to participate. Its decisions have not been based on an a priori assumption that every Gurage
shares the same interests and sense of morality. 111e GRCO has survived for more than half a century
because of its continuous effort to set rules for fai1· redistribution of development resources throughpatient negotiations between G RCO leaders and the people it claims to represent.
The GRCO has tried to shape "fairness" at two different levels of social relationships. The first is
the relationship between the GRCO and the state. The GRCO intervened in the national distribu­
tion system by establishing its own economic and social redistribution system from urban to rural
Ethiopia. This can be understood as a countermovement against the national establishment (thearistocracy) of1960s Ethiopia.
The GRCO has also expended considerable effort in establishing fair redistribution among differ­
ent Gurage groups and tribal affiliations and between the urban elites and nonelites. The negotiations
between the Ezha Committee and the burial associations demonstrate this effort. Such negotiations
are essential to the decision-making process, since the GRCO is not a monolithic organization, butrather an inn·icate conjunction of social fabrics including tribal committees and bmial associations
that reflect the indigenous social relationships of the Gurage.
These indigenous social fabrics serve as a sustainable constituency for G RCO activities and a fund­ing source through tribal committees. Similarly, the Ezha Committee benefited greatly from work­ing with burial associations. However, these indigenous networks can also generate controversy, since
they represent different groups with different interests. 111e GRCO's pursuit of fair redistribution andits commitment to patient negoti ation are the keys to explaining its success.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Ato Tammru Mane, Ato Bekkele Azmach, Ato Abebe Hailu, and other members of theGurage People's Self-help Development Organization for their great assistance. 111e fieldwork forthis study was funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan,
under the "21" Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program: AinUng for COE of lntegrated AreaNISI-I!: Community-based Rural Development and the Politics of Redistribution

23

Studies" and "Area Studies on Local Knowledge in Mrica and its Positive Practice (Grant-in-Aid for
Scientific Research)."NOTES(1) GRCO was organized primarily by d1e Sebat Bet Gurage, one of many groups who share Gurage iden­tity.
(2) My accounts of GRCO activities are based on interviews with active members (including a founding
member), published and unpublished documents provided by the GRCO secretariat, and me publishedmemoir written in Amharic by the founding chainmn (Weldesillase 1979EC). I conducted fieldwork
during Oetober-December 2004, August 2005-February 2006, and August 2007.
(3) See Smit (2001: 237-238) for a Soum Mrican case.
(4) Enset (En.sete ventricosum), a perennial crop, is the main crop of millions of people in southwestern Ethio­
pia, including the Gurage. It resembles the banana plant and is grown primarily for the large quantity ofcarbohydrate-rich food found in the false stem (pseudostem) and underground bulb (corm) (Brandt et al.
1997).
(5) I use Shack's terminology to explain the traditional social stratification of the Gurage (Shack 1966).
(6) More than seven tribes claim to be part of me "seven houses. "Today, me Sebat Bet Gurage are considered
to be a conglomerate of at least 1 1 different subgroups (Dinberu et al. 1987EC).
(7) "Ministers Definition of Powers Order," Negarit Gazeta, 215 (1943), Order No. 1 , January 29, 1943.
(8) The birr is the Ethiopian currency. In the mid-1960s, 1 birr was equivalent to 0.4 USD.
(9) Marcus notes that Ras Mesfin was the "archetypal exploiter." Ras Mesfin made considerable contributions
to the Emperor (M arcus 1995: 118).
(10) Agenna is located in the Ezha District ofme Gw·age Zone. The former Sebat Bet District is now divided
into several districts, each of which represents one or more of the tribal territories of traditional Gurage
society.
(11) "The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1/1 (1995),
Proclamation No. 1, August 21, 1995. Article 39 of the constitution ensures ilie "unconditional rightof self determination" for all of the nationalities (ethnic groups) of Ethiopia. 'l11e paradoxical nature of
Emiopia's ethnic federalism and its consequences for Gw·age society are discussed in Nishi (2005).
(12) 1 birr was equivalent to 0.18 USD in 1995.
(13) See Dejene (1993) and Pankhurst (2003) for more information about social fimctions and the historicalbackground of the burial associations in Ethiopia.
(14) I attended this assembly.

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