The Emissions Gap Report 2016
A UNEP Synthesis Report1Published by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), November 2016
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United Nations Environment Programme

The Emissions Gap Report 2016
A UNEP Synthesis Report
November 2016

Acknowledgements
The United Nations Environment (UNEP) would like tothank the members of the steering committee, the lead andcontributing authors, reviewers and the secretariat for theircontribution to the preparation of this assessment report.

Chapter 4

Authors and reviewers have contributed to the report in theirindividual capacities. Their affiliations are only mentioned
for identification purposes.

Contributing authors: Fatemeh Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU
Partnership), Sander Chan (German Development Institute),
Ann Gardiner (Ecofys), Thomas Hale (University of Oxford Blavatnik School of Government), Angel Hsu (Yale University- Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies),
Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), Daniel Puig
(UNEP DTU Partnership), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency), Sebastian Sterl(NewClimate Institute)

Project steering committee
Jacqueline McGlade (United Nations Environment), John
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Mónica Araya (Nivela),
Navroz K. Dubash (Centre for Policy Research, India), Simon
Maxwell (Climate and Development Knowledge Network),
Surabi Menon (ClimateWorks Foundation), Bert Metz
(European Climate Foundation), Yacob Mulugetta (University
College London), Bouzekri Razi (Ministry of Environment,
Morocco), Katia Simeonova (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change), Merlyn van Voore (United
Nations Environment)

Chapter 1
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Chapter 2
Lead authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute),
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate
Institute)
Contributing authors: Greet Janssens-Maenhout (Joint
Research Centre, European Commission), Anne Olhoff(UNEP DTU Partnership), Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency)

Chapter 3
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency), Niklas Höhne(NewClimate Institute), Joeri Rogelj (International Institutefor Applied Systems Analysis)
Contributing authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources
Institute), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Sebastian Sterl (NewClimate Institute)iv

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Acknowledgements

Lead authors: Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute), Philip
Drost (United Nations Environment)

Chapter 5
Lead authors: Subash Dhar (UNEP DTU Partnership), Timothy
Clifford Farrell (UNEP DTU Partnership), Rana Ghoneim(United Nations Industrial Development Organization),
Diana Urge-Vorsatz (Central European University)
Contributing authors: Elisabeth Boles (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology), Benigna Boza-Kiss (Central
European University), Marco Matteini (United Nations
Industrial Development Organization), Jyoti Painuly (UNEPDTU Partnership), Minal Pathak (Center for Environmental
Planning and Technology University), Ksenia Petrichenko(UNEP DTU Partnership), Bettina Schreck (United Nations
Industrial Development Organization), PR Shukla (Indian
Institute of Management, Ahmedabad)

Chapter 6
Lead authors: Frank Sperling (University of Oxford), Ilmi
Granoff (Overseas Development Institute)
Contributing authors: Eliza Northrop (World Resources
Institute), Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), Andrew
Scott (Overseas Development Institute)

Reviewers
Swati Agarwal (The Energy and Resources Institute),Jennifer Bansard (University of Potsdam), Maria Belenky(Climate Advisers), Thomas Black Arbeláez (Centro Andinopara la Economía en el Medio Ambiente), Tyler Bryant(International Energy Agency), Laura Cozzi (International
Energy Agency), Steffen Dockweiler (Danish Energy Agency),

Patty Fong (European Climate Foundation), Brendan Guy(Natural Resources Defense Council), Matthew Hoffmann(University of Toronto - Munk School of Global Affairs),
Angel Hsu (Yale University - Yale School of Forestry andEnvironmental Studies), Jan Kersting (Fraunhofer Institutefor Systems and Innovation Research), Gary Kleiman (WorldBank Group), Rob Kool (Netherlands Enterprise Agency),
Benoit Lebot (International Partnership for Energy Efficiency
Cooperation), Franck Lecocq (Centre International deRecherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement),
Perry Miles (European Commission), Karsten Neuhoff(German Institute for Economic Research), Lars J. Nilsson(Lund University - Environmental and Energy Systems
Studies), He Ping (Energy Foundation China), Ian Ponce(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change),
Céline Ramstein (World Bank Group), Oliver Rapf (Building
Performance Institute Europe), David Reidmiller (USDepartment of State), Lisa Ryan (University College Dublin),
Yamina Saheb (OpenExp), Reed Schuler (US Department ofState), Laura Segafredo (2° Investing Initiative), Jigar Shah(Institute for Industrial Productivity), Ralph Sims (Massey
University), Robert Tromop (Efficient Energy International),
Harro van Asselt (Stockholm Environment Institute), Lutz
Weischer (Germanwatch), Oscar Widerberg (Vrije University
Amsterdam - Institute for Environmental Studies), WilliamWills (Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de Pós-Graduação e
Pesquisa de Engenharia - Universidade Federal do Rio deJaneiro), Jim Wolfe (independent consultant)

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Nicklas
Forsell)
Joint Research Centre, European Commission (Alban Kitous,
Kimon Keramidas and Giacomo Grassi)
London School of Economics and Political Science (JoeCranston Turner and Rodney Boyd)
National Center for Climate Change Strategy andInternational Cooperation, China (Fu Sha)
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency(Annemiek Admiraal and Heleen van Soest)
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Gokul Iyer)
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Louise
Jeffery)
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Secretariat
University of Melbourne (Malte Meinshausen)

Media and launch support
Shereen Zorba (United Nations Environment), Mette Annelie
Rasmussen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Evelyn Ongige (United
Nations Environment), Sami Dimassi (United Nations
Environment), UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre

Design, layout and printing
Caren Weeks (independent consultant), Kailow

Translation of Executive summary

Cheif scientific editors

Strategic Agenda

Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen(UNEP DTU Partnership)

Financial contributors

Editorial team
Daniel Puig (UNEP DTU Partnership), Lars Christiansen (UNEPDTU Partnership), Cecilie Larsen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Project coordination

Climate Works Foundation, The Netherlands Ministry of
Infrastructure and the Environment

Thanks also to
Astrid Solvej Lund Andersen (UNEP DTU Partnership),Thomas Hebo Larsen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Lars Christiansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Cecilie
Larsen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Anne Olhoff (UNEPDTU Partnership), Volodymyr Demkine (United Nations
Environment)

INDC assessment and gap calculations
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Hanna Fekete (NewClimate Institute),
Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute), Joeri Rogelj(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)

External global and national modelling data
contributors
Climate Analytics, Climate Action Tracker (Marcia Rocha, Bill
Hare and Michiel Schaeffer)
Climate Interactive (Lori Siegel and Elisabeth Sawin)
Danish Energy Agency (Steffen Dockweiler)
Ecofys (Pieter van Breevoort)
Energy Research Institute, China (Chenmin He and Kejun
Jiang)
International Energy Agency (Laura Cozzi and Fabian
Kesicke)

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Acknowledgementsv

Contents
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................................................................iv
Glossary....................................................................................................................................................................................vii
Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................................................x
Foreword....................................................................................................................................................................................xi
Executive summary...................................................................................................................................................................xii
Chapter 1: Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1
1.2
1.3

The Emissions Gap Reports...................................................................................................................................... 1
The context of the 2016 Emissions Gap Report........................................................................................................1
Aim, key questions, and approach of the report......................................................................................................2

Chapter 2: Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency.......................................................................................................... 3
2.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................ 3
2.2
Trends in current global emissions.....................................................................................................................................3
2.3
Progress towards achieving the Cancun Pledges: an update focusing on G20 members...................................................4
2.4
Amplified urgency of enhanced pre-2020 action...............................................................................................................9
Chapter 3: 2030 trends and ambition.........................................................................................................................................10
3.1
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................... 10
3.2
Pathways limiting warming to below 2 and 1.5 degrees Celsius......................................................................................10
3.3
The 2030 emissions gap....................................................................................................................................................13
3.4
Understanding the mitigation efforts of the INDCs – A closer look at G20 members......................................................16
3.5
Summary of findings ........................................................................................................................................................22
Chapter 4: Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action.........................................................................................................23

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

Introduction............................................................................................................................................................ 23

Non-state actors and the climate change negotiations....................................................................................................23
Overview of initiatives......................................................................................................................................................24
Estimated emission reductions of non-state actor actions...............................................................................................28
Issues for the future.........................................................................................................................................................30

Chapter 5: Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency.........................................................................................................31
5.1
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................... 31
5.2
Building Sector.................................................................................................................................................................. 32
5.3
Industry............................................................................................................................................................................. 35
5.4
Transport.......................................................................................................................................................................... 36
5.5
Opportunities through systems thinking and integration.................................................................................................38
5.6
Emerging Opportunities...................................................................................................................................................39
Chapter 6: Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation.............................................40
6.1
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................... 40
6.2
The SDG-mitigation nexus................................................................................................................................................40
6.3
The role of the SDGs in reducing greenhouse gas emissions: path-alignment and path-contingency.............................42
6.4
Summing up...................................................................................................................................................................... 47
References................................................................................................................................................................................48vi

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Contents

Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authorsof the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources
available on the websites of the following organizations,networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (Switzerland), Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
Action (Germany), United Nations Environment (Kenya),
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(Germany) and World Resources Institute (United States).
Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expectedclimate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks tomoderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.
In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitateadjustment to expected climate and its effects.
Avoid Shift Improve: A framework proposed for mitigationfrom the transport sector. Avoid refers to the need to
improve the efficiency of the transport system such as
through integrated land-use planning. Shift involves
servicing demand using low-carbon modes like using public
transport instead of motorized private vehicles. Improve
relies on vehicle efficiency improvement or alternative
vehicle technologies to reduce emissions such as using avehicle powered by alternative fuels.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change ismeasured. In the context of transformation pathways, theterm ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are basedon the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures
will be implemented beyond those that are already in force
and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline
scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future,
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve tohighlight the level of emissions that would occur without
further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are thencompared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed
to meet different goals for greenhouse gas emissions,
atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The
term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with‘reference scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of
the literature the term is also synonymous with the term
‘business as usual (BAU) scenario’, although the term ‘BAU’
has fallen out of favour because the idea of ‘business as

usual’ in century-long socioeconomic projections is hard tofathom.
Bottom-up model: In the context of this assessment, a modelthat represents a system by looking at its detailed underlying
parts. Compared to so-called top-down models, which focus
on economic interlinkages, bottom-up models of energy use
and emissions can provide greater resolution with regards tosectors or mitigation technologies.
Cancun Pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted
their existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas emissions
to the Climate Change Secretariat and these proposals
were formally acknowledged under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Developed countries presented their plans in the shape of
economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to2020, while developing countries proposed ways to limit
their growth of emissions in the shape of plans of action.
Carbon dioxide budget (or carbon budget): For a given
temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C longterm limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects thetotal amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted fortemperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently,
a carbon budget is the area under a carbon dioxide (CO2)emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain levelof global mean surface temperature rise.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to place emissionsof various radiative forcing agents on a common footing byaccounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a given
mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of
CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, whenmeasured over a specified time period. For the purpose ofthis report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise
specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases
listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e
assuming a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO2 released
per unit of another variable such as gross domestic product,
output energy use or transport.
The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Glossaryvii

Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO2 or CO2eemissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax or the
price of emission permits. In many models that are used toassess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices areused as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation
policies.
Carbon sequestration: The process of removing carbon fromthe atmosphere and depositing it in a reservoir.
Carbon stock: The quantity of carbon contained in a carbon
pool or reservoir.
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels.
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately
emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax
on CO2 emissions.
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives,
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social
welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty
and depend on, among others, local circumstances andimplementation practices. Co-benefits are often referred toas ancillary benefits.
Conditional INDC: INDC proposed by some countries thatare contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as theability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws,
ambitious action from other countries, realisation of financeand technical support, or other factors.
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of theConvention. It currently meets once a year to review theConvention’s progress.
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic
trends and current policy approaches including policies atleast through 2012. Estimates may be based on either official
data or independent analysis.
Double counting: In the context of this assessment, double
counting refers to a situation in which the same emission
reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’
pledges.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhouse gas
emission levels consistent with having a likely chance (>66
per cent) of limiting the mean global temperature rise to
below 2°C/1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the
GHG emission levels consistent with the global effect of the
INDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas
emissions over time.
Global warming potential: An index representing the
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness inabsorbing outgoing infrared radiation.

viii

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Glossary

Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible forcausing global warming and climatic change. The major
greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4)and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent, but very powerful,
GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Gross domestic product: The sum of gross value added, atpurchasers’ prices, by all resident and non-resident producers
in the economy, plus any taxes and minus any subsidies notincluded in the value of products in a country or geographic
region for a given period, normally one year. Gross domestic
product is calculated without deducting for depreciation of
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural
resources.
Integrated Assessment Models: Models that seek tocombine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the formof equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex
environmental problems. As such, they describe the fullchain of climate change, from production of greenhousegases to atmospheric responses. This necessarily includes
relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic andbiophysical processes.
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC):
Submissions by Parties which identify actions each national
government intends to take under the Paris Agreement.
INDCs are, in effect, the basis of post-2020 global emission
reduction commitments included in the Paris Agreement.
International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs): Initiatives
outside the UNFCCC aimed at reducing emissions ofclimate forcers by, for example, promoting actions thatare less greenhouse gas intensive, compared to prevailingalternatives. Cooperative initiatives also involve national andsub-national partners (they are often referred to as, simply,‘cooperative initiatives’).
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on its
own, and requiring separate ratification by governments,
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among otherthings, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhousegas emissions by industrialized countries.
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions andremovals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct humaninduced land use, land use change and forestry activities.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 per cent chance.
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities ofmeeting temperature limits.
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with astandard even though participants would be better off withan alternative.
Medium chance: A likelihood of 50–66 per cent chance.
Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting
temperature limits.

Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a humanintervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks ofgreenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation,
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving theinsulation of buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’
to remove greater amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere.
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/conceptthat potentially supports greater transparency in the climatechange regime.
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international treaty thatwas designed to reduce the production and consumptionof ozone-depleting substances in order to reduce theirabundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the
Earth’s ozone layer.
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): By its decision
1/CP.21, paragraph 22, the Conference of the Parties (COP)
invited Parties to communicate their first NDC no later
than when the Party submits its respective instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Paris
Agreement. In the same paragraph, the COP further statedthat if a Party has communicated an INDC prior to joining theAgreement, that Party shall be considered to have satisfied
the provision of decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 22, unless that
Party decides otherwise.
Non-state actor: In the context of climate action, ‘non-state
actor’ includes companies, cities, subnational regions andinvestors. More broadly, non-state actors have been definedas entities that participate or act in international relations.
They are organizations with sufficient power to influenceand cause a change even though they do not belong to any
state institution.

Sustainable development: Development that meets theneeds of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.
Tipping point: A level of change in system properties beyond
which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not
return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change
are abated. For the climate system, it refers to a criticalthreshold when global or regional climate changes from one
stable state to another stable state. The tipping point event
may be irreversible.
Top-down model: A model that applies macroeconomic
theory, econometric and/or optimization techniques
to aggregate economic variables. Using historical dataon consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, topdown models assess demand and emissions for goods andservices from main sectors, such as energy conversion,transportation, buildings, agriculture and industry.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge thatcan result from a lack of information or from disagreement
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections ofhuman behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting
the judgement of a team of experts).
Unconditional INDCs: INDCs proposed by countries without
conditions attached.
2020 pledge: See Cancun Pledge.

Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2e emissions thatis reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate foremissions occurring elsewhere.
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organizationsuch as the EU) that agrees to be bound by a treaty and forwhich the treaty has entered into force.
Pledge case: This case identifies the maximum level ofgreenhouse gas emissions that each country or Party could
emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering
the use of offsets.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold basedon ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initialsocio-economic situation and a description of the key driving
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature orother climate change-related variables.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases agreenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhousegas or aerosol into the atmosphere.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – GlossaryixAcronyms
°C
BAU
CO2
CO2e
COP
EJ
EU
GHG
Gt
ICI
INDC
IPCC
km
kt
kWh
LULUCF
m2
Mt
NDC
OECD
SDG
UNFCCC
USA/USx

degrees Celsius
business as usual
carbon dioxidecarbon dioxide equivalent
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
exajoules
European Union
greenhouse gas
gigatonne
international cooperative initiative
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
kilometrekilotonne
kilowatt hour
Land use, land-use change and forestry
square metres
million tonne
Nationally Determined Contribution
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Sustainable Development Goal
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
United States of America

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Acronyms

Foreword
There is a troubling paradox at the heart of climate policy.
On the one hand, nobody can doubt the historic success of
the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, everybody willing
to look can see the impact of our changing climate. People
already face rising seas, expanding desertification andcoastal erosion. They take little comfort from agreements
to adopt mitigation measures and finance adaptation in the
future. They need action today.

None of this will be the result of bad weather. It will be theresult of bad choices by governments, private sector andindividual citizens. Because there are choices. This reporthighlights plenty of them. For example, it shows how UN
Environment can help governments to ensure that every
dollar they invest and every regulation they introduce will
help to increase the scale and speed with which thosechoices deliver results.

That is why the Emissions Gap Report tracks our progress in
restricting global warming to 1.5 - 2 degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels by the end of this century.

Even beyond government, the report shows many regions,cities and industrial sectors are choosing to target emissions
reductions above those pledged by governments. Investors
and bankers are choosing a more inclusive green economy.
Authorities and legislators are choosing to improve energy
efficiency, building codes and operating standards. Whilesmall scale businesses, farmers and families are choosing
better production and consumption habits, like less waste
and smarter travel.

This year’s data shows that overall emissions are still rising,but more slowly, and in the case of carbon dioxide, hardly
at all. The report foresees further reductions in the shortterm and increased ambition in the medium term. Make no
mistake; the Paris Agreement will slow climate change. The
recent Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol will dothe same.
But not enough: not nearly enough and not fast enough.
This report estimates we are actually on track for global
warming of up to 3.4 degrees Celcius. Current commitments
will reduce emissions by no more than a third of the levels
required by 2030 to avert disaster. The Kigali Amendment
will take off 0.5 degrees Celcius, although not until well after
2030. Action on short-lived climate pollutants, such as black
carbon, can take off a further 0.5 degrees Celcius. This means
we need to find another one degree from somewhere tomeet the stronger, and safer, target of 1.5 degrees Celcius
warming.
So, we must take urgent action. If we don’t, we will mournthe loss of biodiversity and natural resources. We will regret
the economic fallout. Most of all, we will grieve over the
avoidable human tragedy; the growing numbers of climate
refugees hit by hunger, poverty, illness and conflict will be aconstant reminder of our failure to deliver.

So, the choices are ours. The historic deals of last year are
within reach, but we must redouble our effort. That’s why
today, as the Paris Agreement legally enters into force, we
sincerely hope this report will be a wakeup call to the world.

Erik Solheim
Head of UN Environment

Jacqueline McGlade
UN Environment Chief Scientist

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – ForewordxiExecutive summary
1.

The strengthened long-term objectivesof the Paris Agreement require evenstronger actions than previously
identified, calling for accelerated efforts
pre-2020, as well as increasing theambition of the Nationally Determined
Contributions.

The Paris Agreement has very specific language about thelong-term goals and how to get there, including:•••

A long-term goal of keeping the increase in global
average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius(°C) above pre-industrial levels.
An aim to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, asthis would significantly reduce the risks and impactsof climate change.
The need for global emissions to peak as soon as
possible, followed by a rapid decline – recognisingthat this will take longer for developing countries.

Compared to the 2°C goal that was the reference point ofearlier Emissions Gap Reports, these new objectives require
stronger short-term action and deeper cuts in the medium
and longer term, as the remaining carbon dioxide budget
is now considerably lower. Against the background of thelarge emissions gap that was identified in previous reports,
this further amplifies the need for ambitious early actionthat accelerates and strengthens the Nationally Determined
Contributions of countries.
Enhanced pre-2020 and pre-2030 action will reduce theso-called transitional challenges associated with thenecessary shift in emissions pathways, and:•xii

Reduce the lock-in of carbon and energy intensive
infrastructure in society and the energy system,encourage the rapid deployment of state of theart technologies, and spur near-term learning and

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

•

•

•
•

development of technologies that will be essential in
the long term.
Reduce the overall costs and economic challenges
during the transitional period, for example, in termsof upscaling energy investments.
Reduce future dependence on unproven technologies,
including negative emissions technologies, andincrease the options to achieve stringent emission
reductions.
Reduce climate risks, for example, by reducing thepace of the global temperature increase.
Realise immediate co-benefits through enhanced
early action on climate change mitigation, suchas improved public health as a result of lower air
pollution, improved energy security, and reduced
crop yield losses.

Additional early action will be essential to keeping the door
open to limit warming to below 1.5°C by 2100.

2.

Record speed of entry into force of
the Paris Agreement signals strong
commitment to action

The adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change by
195 countries and the global agreement on the Sustainable
Development Goals, made 2015 a landmark year. The
Paris Agreement is the first climate deal with universal
contributions to mitigation action. With ratification having
surpassed the agreed minimum of 55 countries, representing
at least 55 per cent of global emissions, the Agreement willenter into force before the Conference of Parties to theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change inMarrakesh (COP 22). This sends a strong signal that countries
are committed to action.
The need for urgent action has been reinforced by the factthat 2015 was the hottest year since modern record keeping
began. Although high temperatures were exacerbated by theeffect of El Niño, it is notable that 10 of the warmest years onrecord have occurred since 2000, and the trend continues,

with the first six months of 2016 all being the warmest everrecorded.

3.

Focus of the 2016 Emissions Gap Report

The United Nations Environment (UNEP) Emissions Gap
Report 2016 provides an authoritative assessment of theextent to which the current and planned national emissions
reductions, as specified in the submitted Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions, will contribute towards the Paris
Agreement goals. It does so by providing an estimate of theadditional reductions – the Gap - required by 2030 to be on aleast-cost path that is likely to ensure the global temperature
goals.
The assessment focuses on the 2°C goal, as well as on theimplications for limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C.
The key new features and results of the 2016 Report are:•

The assessment is based on Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions submitted by almost all
countries in the world, and a large number of studies
supporting robustness of the estimates.
The key quantitative results stay within the ranges
presented in the 2015 assessment.
The results underpin the urgency of immediateand strong action, and the need to build on the
momentum of the entry into force of the Paris
Agreement. Since the results are not likely to change
in the next two years, enhanced action need not wait
for the facilitative dialogue in 2018.
The report identifies where solutions are available
to deliver low-cost emission reductions at scale,including three major areas of action: contributions•••

by non-state actors, energy efficiency acceleration,and synergies with achievement of the sustainable
development goals.
The report has been prepared by an international team ofleading scientists who assessed all available information,
including those reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change in its fifth assessment report, as well as
more recent scientific literature. The assessment production
process has been transparent and participatory, andgovernments of the countries with specific mention in thereport have been invited to comment on the assessment
findings before finalisation.

4.

Global greenhouse gas emissions
continue to increase

Total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue
to show a steady increase, reaching approximately 52.7
gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2014.
There have been small variations around this longer trend.
Notably, the rate of global greenhouse gas emissions increaseduring the period 2000 to 2010 was faster (2.2 per cent peryear) than during the period 1970 to 2000 (1.3 per cent peryear), increasing in 2010 and 2011 (3.5 per cent per year)
and then slowing in 2012 to 2013 (1.8 per cent per year).

Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil
fuel use and industry seem to stabilise
Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion,
cement production and other industrial processes are themajor source of total global greenhouse gas emissions.
Currently, they account for about 68 per cent of total global
greenhouse gas emissions, and were estimated to be 36.2

Figure ES1: Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel use and industry.
GtCO2/year
40

30

USA
EU
India
Japan
Russian Federation
Other OECD countries*

China
Other G20 countries**
Other big countries and areas***Remaining non-OECD countries
International transport

20

10

0
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

* Other OECD countries include Australia; Canada; Mexico; Republic of Korea and Turkey.
** Other G20 countries include Argentina; Brazil; Indonesia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa and Turkey.
*** Other big countries and areas include Egypt; Iran; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Nigeria; Taiwan, Province of China; Thailand and Ukraine.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

xiii

GtCO2 in 2015. Figure ES1 presents a detailed overview ofthe development in global carbon dioxide emissions fromfossil fuel use and industry for the period 1970 to 2015.
In 2015, global carbon dioxide emissions from these sources
stagnated for the first time and showed signs of a weak
decline. Prior to 2015, global carbon dioxide emissions
increased by roughly 1.3 per cent per year for the period
2012 to 2014, which was significantly slower than that of
the 12 preceding years, where the average increase was 2.9
per cent per year (2000-2011), but higher than the average
growth rate of around 1 per cent per year during the 1990s.
These findings are in line with other studies on trends inglobal energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.
In summary, global greenhouse gas emissions continue togrow, and while the indications are encouraging that thegrowth rate of global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil
fuel use and industry is slowing, it is still too early to say
whether this is likely to be permanent.
The continued growth of global emissions and the underlying
trends show that the world is not yet on a trajectory thatallows for a transition to stringent low emissions development
pathways consistent with the stated temperature goals.

5.

Collectively, members of the G20 are on alikely track to meet their Cancun Pledges
for 2020, but these pledges do not deliver
the necessary early emission reductions

From a global perspective, early action is especially
important for the major economies of the world; cruciallythese countries, as members of the G20, account for
approximately three quarters of global emissions. Mostof the G20 members at COP 16 in Cancun formalised theemission reduction pledges they had put forward as afollow up to the Copenhagen Accord. Since then, the annual
Emissions Gap Reports have consistently assessed theprogress countries are making towards delivering on thesepledges, as they represent the main formalised early action
commitment, and their timely achievement will send very
positive signals to other countries.
It should be noted that not all pledges demand the samelevel of effort. A country currently on track to achieve its
pledge has not necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate
emissions than a country not yet on track. The projections
assessed are subject to the uncertainty associated withmacroeconomic trends, such as changes in gross domestic
product, and population trends, as well as the impact of eachcountry’s climate policy action. The emission trajectories
analysed here do not quantify the potential impact of using
offsets to achieve pledges, which is considered to be quite
limited.
The assessment shows that according to all available
estimates three of the G20 members – China, the European
Union, and India – are on track to meet their pledges withoutpurchasing offsets. Three more – Brazil, Japan, and Russia –are on track according to most estimates.

xiv

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

According to both government and independent estimates,
Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America are likely torequire further action, possibly supplemented by purchased
offsets, in order to meet their pledges. Mexico’s Cancun
Pledge is conditional on the provision of adequate financial
and technological support from developed countries as partof a global agreement, and the fulfilment of this condition
has not been assessed.
Government and independent sources have found a gap
between Australia’s projected 2020 emissions and its
target level for that year. However, Australia’s latest official
projections find that for the budget period, and including
carry-over from its first commitment period under the Kyoto
Protocol, the country is now on track to meet its Kyoto target.
According to independent analysis, the Republic of Korea will
also require further action to meet its pledge. This cannot be
verified using available official projections. The Republic ofKorea has domestically abandoned its 2020 target, replacing
it with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
target in the amended Green Growth Act. However, its
earlier pledge has not been officially withdrawn.
Sufficient information is currently unavailable to determine
whether Indonesia and South Africa are on track to meet theirpledges. In the case of Indonesia, independent projections
span a wide range, and official projections reflecting current
policies are unavailable.
Finally, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not madegreenhouse gas reduction pledges for 2020. All three
countries submitted post-2020 pledges to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change as part of their
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions.
Overall, there is general progress on pledge achievement,
but several countries will need to accelerate action to meettheir Cancun Pledge by 2020. It must be underlined that,collectively, these pledges are not ambitious enough tohave a better starting point in 2020 to meet the 2030 levelsof global greenhouse gas emissions consistent with thelonger-term goals of below 2 or 1.5°C.
The urgency of enhancing pre-2020 mitigation action is,therefore, indisputable:
•
•

•

•

It strengthens the likelihood that countries will meetand exceed their Cancun Pledges.
It provides a more solid foundation for implementing
the Nationally Determined Contributions from 2020,and for continuously strengthening their ambition.
It supports the transition towards a least-costemissions reduction trajectory after 2020 that is
consistent with the 2°C goal.
It is likely the last chance to keep the option of limiting
global warming to 1.5°C in 2100 open, as all available
scenarios consistent with the 1.5°C goal imply that
global greenhouse gas emissions peak before 2020.

6.

Pathways for staying well below 2 and
1.5°C require deep emission reductions
after, and preferably also before, 2020and lower levels of emissions in 2030
than earlier assessed 2°C pathways.

The central aim of the Paris Agreement is to keep the global
temperature increase by the end of the century to well below
2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, with an ambition tolimit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C. Whilethese global goals are quite clear, there is a need to interpret
what they mean. For example, what if the global averagetemperature exceeds these goals during the century, but
is below the goals by end of it? Similarly, it is necessary todefine an acceptable probability for achieving the goals,
which in the end is a political rather than scientific question,
as it requires value judgments about what is acceptableand desirable to society. In line with the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s definition of “likely”, this report
generally uses a 66 per cent or higher probability.
A large body of literature is available on least-cost pathways
that limit warming to below 2°C with a 66 per cent or higher
probability. This issue has been covered extensively by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and earlier
Emissions Gap Reports. For a 1.5°C goal, the body of literature
is much more sparse and there are no published scenariosthat meet the 1.5°C limit permanently with more than 66
per cent probability. Therefore, the studies assessed operatewith a 50 per cent probability, which in Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change terminology is considered “about
as likely as not”. The 2018 Special Report on the impactsof global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels andrelated global greenhouse gas emission pathways by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will provide amore comprehensive picture as it will cover new studies.
Table ES1 presents the pathway characteristics for achieving
the two different temperature goals, showing the median
acceptable emission levels for key years between 2020 and
2100.
As in the earlier Emissions Gap Reports, it is importantto highlight that most scenarios that are available in theliterature, and that limit warming to below 2 or 1.5°C,
assume the use of so-called negative emissions technologies
in the second half of the century -- that is the active andpermanent removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
This can be achieved, for example, through sustainableafforestation and reforestation, enhanced soil carbon
absorption, biochar, and the combination of bio-energy withcarbon capture and storage. Important challenges have been
identified for large-scale application of negative emissions
technologies. For example, with biomass there is a challenge
to produce enough biomass without harming biodiversity
and a potential for competition between energy and foodproduction over land and water resources.

Table ES1: Overview of pathway characteristics for two global temperature targets.
1.5°C (>50% in 2100)

Pathways limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with >50% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards

Number of available scenarios: 6; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:Kyoto-GHGs: (2060-2080); total CO2 (including LULUCF): (2045-2050); CO2 from energy and industry: (2045-2055)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO2e/year]Year
median*range and spread**

2020
56
53(-/-)56

2025
47
46(-/-)48

2030
39
37(-/-)402050
84(-/-)14

2100-5-5(-/-)-3

Time period
median*range and spread**

2015-2030
552
503(-/-)567

2075-2100-353-288(-/-)-372

2015-2100
217
71(-/-)383

2°C (>66% in 2100)

Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with >66% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards

CO2 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO2 emissions in GtCO2]
2030-2050
236
178(-/-)259

2050-2075-199-146(-/-)-277

Number of available scenarios: 10; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 4
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:Kyoto-GHGs: 2085 (2080-2090); total CO2 (including LULUCF): 2070 (2060-2075); CO2 from energy and industry: 2070 (2060-2075)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO2e/year]Year
median*range and spread**2020
52
49(49/53)55

2025
48
44(46/50)532030
42
29(31/44)442050
23
17(18/27)292100-3-11 (-9/-1)02075-2100-288-120(-146/-327)-342

2015-2100
553
483(490/934)988

CO2 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO2 emissions in GtCO2]
Time period
median*range and spread**

2015-2030
533
481(499/582)572

2030-2050
362
242(258/431)447

2050-207570-97(-52/175)187* Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO2e/year** Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO2e/year. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value – no percentiles are provided if less than
10 scenarios are available.
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile); (minimum – maximum) if less than 10 scenarios are available.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summaryxv

Some studies have examined options for hedging against
a strong reliance on negative emissions in the long-term.
These studies find that this is only possible by reducing

emissions more steeply in the very near-term that is over the
coming 5 to 15 years.

Table ES2: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios.
Emissions estimates (GtCO2e/year)
Scenario

Global total emissions in 2025

Global total emissions in 2030

Number of scenarios in set

Baseline

61.0 (56.7-64.3)

64.7 (59.5-69.5)

179

Current policy trajectory

56.2 (54.8-59.4)

59.4 (57.9-63.1)

3

Unconditional INDCs

53.9 (50.6-56.3)

55.5 (51.9-57.5)

10aConditional INDCs

53.0 (49.3-54.9)

53.4 (49.5-54.7)

10 (6+4)

2°C pathwaysb (least-cost from 2020)

47,7 (46.2-50.2)

41.8 (30.6-43.5)

10

1.5°C pathwaysc (least-cost from 2020)

47.2 (45.8-48.2)

38.8 (37.7-40.0)

6

FigureES2:
2.1Global
GlobalCO2 emissions
fromunder
fossildifferent
fuel andscenarios
industry
Figuregreenhousegas emissions
and the emissions gap in 2030.
Annual Global Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GtCO2e)70

Baseline

60

Current policy trajectory
Unconditional
INDC caseRemaining gap
to stay within
2°C limit

1.5°C
range

40
Blue area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 2°C by
2100 with > 66% chance

17
GtCO2e15

INDC case uncond.

Purple area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 1.5°C by
2100 with > 50% chance

INDC case cond.

GtCO2e

GtCO2e

GtCO2eMedian estimateof level consistent
with 2°C:
42 GtCO2e(range 31-44)

INDC case cond.

12

50

14
INDC case uncond.

Conditional
INDC caseRemaining gap
to stay within
1.5 °C limit
Median estimateof level consistent
with 1.5°C:
39 GtCO2e(range 38-40)

2°C
range
70
Baseline

60

Current policy trajectory

30
2015

2020

2025

Unconditional INDC case
Conditional INDC case

2030
50

40

Sources: The 20th–80th-percentile ranges are shown for the baseline and the
2°C and 1.5°C scenarios. For current-policy and INDC scenarios, the minimum–
maximum and 10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed studies are given,
respectively.

2°C
range

30

1.5°C
range

20

10

0
2010

xvi

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

2020

2030

2040

2050

7.

The emissions gap for 2030 is 12 to 14
GtCO2e compared with 2°C scenarios, for
1.5°C the gap is three GtCO2e larger. Evenif fully implemented, the unconditional
Intended Nationally Determined Contri­
butions are only consistent with staying
below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C
by 2100 and 3.0°C, if conditional Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions areincluded.

In the period up to COP 21 in Paris, United Nations
Environment had, as part of the preparation of the Emissions
Gap Report 2015, engaged a team of independent experts
to assess the mitigation impacts of the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions. The results were presented asa key part of the Emissions Gap Report and covered the
118 countries having submitted an Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution by 1 October 2015. This year,
new international studies are available that include the 160
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted,
representing 187 out of 195 Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The assessment
is based on 10 different global level Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution studies that all provide analysisof the unconditional contributions and six that cover bothconditional and unconditional pledges. The scenarios
presented describe the following cases:•••

The baseline scenario reflects emission projections
that assume no additional climate policies have been
put in place from 2005 onwards.
The current policy trajectory scenario reflects thebest estimates of global emissions taking into accountcurrently adopted and implemented policies.
The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
describe how global greenhouse gas emissions mightevolve under full implementation of two Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution cases:° Unconditional Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution case: assuming full implementationof unconditional Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions.
° Conditional Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution case: assuming full implementationof both unconditional and conditional Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions.

The 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios represent least-costs global
scenarios consistent with a likely chance of limiting warming
to below 2°C and 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels consistent
with the estimates presented in table ES2.
Figure ES2 shows that full implementation of theunconditional
IntendedNationally
Determined
Contributions – using rounded numbers – will reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 by nine GtCO2e (range:7-13) relative to the median in the no-policy baseline
scenario, and by four GtCO2e (range: 2-7) relative to themedian in the current policy trajectory. Comparing thecost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios to the unconditional

Figure ES3: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030 and alltime 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets. Cumulative global total carbon
dioxide emissions for the conditional INDC case, the unconditional
INDC case and the current policies scenario, and carbon budgets
from the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC AR5) (IPCC, 2014a). The carbon budget
ranges show the values based on the range of scenarios assessedby Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b). The solid horizontal line at
1,000 GtCO2 shows the estimate based on complex Earth-System
Models, assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a).

Cumulative CO2 emissions 2011–2030 [GtCO2]
1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

All-timebudget

2 °C

1,000

(>66%
chance)
range

900

800

700

All-timebudget600

1.5 °C(>50%
chance)
range

500

400

300

200

100

0

Emittedfrom
2011-2015

ImpliedImplieduntil 2030 by until 2030 byconditional unconditional
INDC
INDC

Implieduntil 2030
by current
policies

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summaryxvii

Intended Nationally Determined Contribution projections
shows a gap in 2030 of 14 GtCO2e (range: 10-16) between theunconditional Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
scenario and the 2°C scenario. Comparing the unconditional
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution scenario withthe 1.5°C scenario would further increase the gap by three
GtCO2e, as shown in figure ES2.
If countries were to fully implement the conditional Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions, the estimated global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 would be about 2.4
GtCO2e (range: 1.2−4.8) lower in 2030 compared to theunconditional Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
scenario case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 12 (range: 8–13)
GtCO2e between the conditional Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution scenario and the cost-optimal 2°C
scenario. When comparing with the 1.5°C scenario, the gap
would increase by an additional three GtCO2e.
Interestingly, a number of countries have Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution targets suggesting emission
levels in 2030 above their estimated no-policy baseline orcurrent policy scenario. These countries are, thus, assumed
to overachieve on their Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution targets, and the different model teams treat
this issue in different ways, which adds an uncertainty of

one GtCO2e (range: 0-1) by 2030, to the estimated Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution and gap projections.
Compared to last year’s report, the estimates of the emission
levels that would be realised under full implementation of
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions have notchanged significantly. In summary, the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions represent a first start to initiate
the required transition, but are far from being consistent
with the agreed upon long-term temperature goals.
The full implementation of the unconditional Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions is consistent withstaying below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C (median,range: 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels
with greater than 66 per cent probability. This is lower
than current policies, which imply staying below warmingof 3.6°C (median, range: 3.4–3.7°C) by 2100 with greaterthan 66 per cent probability. Full implementation of theconditional Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
would lower the temperature projections relative tothe unconditional Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions by about 0.2°C.
Under the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
scenarios, the carbon dioxide budget estimated by the

Figure ES4: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 economies, and G20 as a whole, by 2030 for the businessas usual (BAU) emissions projection from the INDC submission (third bar), for the current policies scenario from official and national
studies (fourth bar), from global model studies used for our analysis (fifth bar), for the unconditional INDC scenario (sixth bar), and forthe conditional INDC scenario (seventh bar). The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions
projections for China, EU, India and USA are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axes. The
Figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies),
current policies (all studies) and the unconditional INDC and conditional INDC (all studies).
Figure ES4aEmissions (GtCO2e/year)
20
18

1990
2010

16

National BAU reported in INDC

14

Current policies (national studies)12

Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional INDC (all studies)

10

Conditional INDC (all studies)

8
6
4

4

2
0

China

EU28

India

USA*

2 5 10 -1 3 6 -

1 5 7 8
Number of studies

1 5 9 -* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025.

xviii

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for limiting
warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per cent probability
will be close to depleted by 2030, and the similar budgetaligned with limiting warming to below 1.5°C with at least
50 per cent probability will already be well exceeded by
2030. Figure ES3 shows the cumulative carbon dioxide
emissions implied by the Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution scenarios.

8.

Assessments of Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions from individual
G20 members show ambition, but also
reveal that for some countries current
policies are estimated to deliver greater
reductions than the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions. This
indicates that there might be room forstrengthening the ambition of Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions,noting that the analytical uncertainties
are fairly large.

Reflecting on the dominant share of global emissions
coming from the G20 members, this year’s Emissions Gap
Report presents a more detailed assessment of the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions from this group ofcountries.

The calculation of the G20 members’ median emission
projections resulting from full implementation of theIntended Nationally Determined Contribution is based on thesame data as the 2015 Emissions Gap Report, complemented
with: a) the data from two new studies, and b) the estimates
for the three G20 economies, Argentina, Saudi Arabia andTurkey, that were not included in the previous report.
Results of this assessment are presented for all the individual
countries and the European Union in figure ES4, noting thatdata is not available for all countries.
The figure shows that for many countries the implementationof the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution would
lead to lower emissions than the current policies scenariothat is additional policies would have to be implemented tomeet the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. It
is interesting to note that for some countries the Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution is above the current
policies scenario, indicating that it should be possible toenhance ambition quite easily. However, additional researchis necessary because for many countries the uncertainty
ranges overlap, and the number of studies for the current
policies and Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
cases vary significantly.

Figure ES4b
Emissions (GtCO2e/year)
4
1990

3.5

2010
National BAU reported in INDC

3

Current policies (national studies)
2.5

Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional INDC (all studies)

2

Conditional INDC (all studies)

1.5
1
0.5
0

Argentina Australia

BrazilCanada Indonesia

Japan

MexicoRussiaSaudi
ArabiaSouth Republic
Africa** of Korea

Turkey- 2 3 3- 3 6 -

1 4 6 -

1 4 7 - - 3 4 4
Number of studies

1 3 6 -

1 3 3 -

1 5 - 4- 3 3 -

1 4 5 -

- 3 4 5

- 3 6 -** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

xix

9.

Non-state actor initiatives could likely
reduce emissions in 2020 and 2030 witha few additional gigatonnes. It is difficult
to assess the overlap with Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions
as these are often not detailed enough.
State and non-state actions can both
overlap and mutually reinforce eachother.

and sustainable future. More emphasis is put on increasingtransparency, tracking results and demonstrating credibilityof non-state action.
Some open questions remain, for example how can theinternational process best formally recognise, support, andcatalyse non-state action? Equally important will be how
non-state action relates to national governments’ efforts
to implement their Nationally Determined Contributions,and to the development of future Nationally Determined
Contributions.

Global climate governance has become substantially morediverse, with many actors other than national governments
undertaking climate actions. Such actors include: the private National action and Intended Nationally Determined
4.2 Figure
Figuresector, 4.2:
cities and regions and other subnational actors like Contributions, on the one hand, and non-state actions, on
citizen groups, referred to here as “non-state actors”. Their the other, can reinforce each other and together create
actions could be both individual (for example, a company a virtuous cycle of increasing ambition. Many initiatives
or Figurecity taking
on Regionala particulardistribution
target), as wellas cooperative
4.2a:of initiatives
in percentage
address issues like financing, technology deployment and(for example, an international cooperative initiative for capacity building that may have important indirect effects
city action). In some instances, national governments also on emissions. They can go hand-in-hand with policies ofparticipate and sometimes even drive the action. Figure ES5 national governments.
shows the broad sector engagement of major cooperative
mitigation initiatives.
In relation to the emissions gap, the interest is focused on

70

6

5

the potential and actual contribution of actions by non-state
During COP 20 in 2014, the Non-state Actor Zone for actors to enhance global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
Climate Action was launched – an online platform to emissions.
Europeshowcase non-state climate actions, both by individual
Globaland cooperative
North entities.
AmericaIt currently contains more than A growing number of studies are available,
estimating the
11,000 commitments, mostly from individual actors. The potential contribution from actions by non-state actors to
Lima-Paris Action Agenda was also launched in 2014, by global efforts of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Figure
West Asia
Peru, France, the United Nations Framework Convention ES6 illustrates
the results from eight different studies. The
on Climate Change Secretariat and the office of the United data still has significant gaps concerning actual impacts,
Nations Secretary General, and was given a prominent overlaps and relation with Intended Nationally Determined
position during COP 21 to showcase the commitmentof Contributions; the figure is, therefore, only indicative of
Africaandboth state and non-state actors. These initiatives have now information about the potentialAsia
of non-state
action. The
the
Paciﬁcbeen integrated, for
COPAmerica
22, as part of a new Global Climate arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at
Latin
Action Agendaandto theboostcommitments and cooperative different levels, because the individual studies use different
Caribbean
action between governments, cities, businesses, investors baselines, and the last three studies explicitly estimate
and citizens to cut emissions and help vulnerable nations the impact additional to Intended Nationally Determined
adapt to climate impacts and build their own clean energy Contributions.

4

6

3

6

FigureES5:
4.2b:Sectoral
distribution
FigureOverviewof sectoral
distributionof
ofinitiatives
203 mitigation-focused International Cooperative Initiatives.

37

40
35

37

31

30

13

26

25

20

18

20
15
10

8

4

5

2

12

10

22

0

ngs

i
uild

B

er

Oth

an

Urb

y

str

u
Ind

try

es
For

l
rt
nce lture
ora
po
t
s
c
u
n
e
s
ric
Tra
ssAg
Cro

a
Fin

y

erg

En

Note: Some initiatives cover more than one sector.

Figure 4.2c:

Figure 4.2d:

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary
xxPermanent
secretariat
Regular reporting

Figure 4.2e:Type of commitment

renewableenergyenergyeﬃciency
generic

The data indicates that the aggregated impact of theinitiatives are in the order of a few GtCO2e in 2030 beyond
the current Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
that is potentially a significant contribution to closing thegap, if the initiatives reach their stated goals and if these
reductions do not displace actions elsewhere. At the sametime, many initiatives, in addition to their direct actions andcontributions, provide political momentum and exercisepressure on governments to take further action.

while an additional 25 per cent are related to the power
generation providing electricity to these end users.
If scaled-up, globally, the assessed energy efficiency policies
can dramatically reduce energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions in these key sectors. Sector-specific estimatesof emission reduction potentials are highly dependent on
the underlying assumptions and approaches. Studies basedon the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change show that for a cost range of
between US$20 and 100 per tonne of carbon dioxide, theestimates of both direct and indirect emissions reduction
potentials in 2030 are (in GtCO2e): 5.9 for buildings, 4.1 forindustry and 2.1 for transport. The study notes that theseestimates are conservative and the real potential in eachsector is likely bigger.

10. Ambitious action on energy efficiency
becomes more urgent given that the longterm objective in the Paris Agreement
is more stringent. Well-documented
opportunities exist to strengthen national
policies and deliver deeper reductions
through more effective delivery of energy
efficiency policies.

A more recent analysis by the International Energy Agency
indicates that the cumulative direct and indirect emissions
estimates to 2035 are (in GtCO2e): 30 for buildings, 22
for industry and 12 for transport. The two studies are notcomparable due to basic differences in approaches, but,collectively, illustrate the significant potential in the threesectors.

When examining the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, it is evident that 167 countries have included
energy efficiency as one of their priority action areas. It
is also important to note that despite generally declining
fossil energy prices, global investments in energy efficiency
increased by six per cent to US$221 billion in 2015, indicatingthat action is already happening.

Beyond mitigation, improved energy efficiency also offers
many other benefits like reduced air pollution and local
employment. Energy efficiency is an integral part of Sustainable
Development Goal seven, which aims to ‘ensure access toaffordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’.
The energy efficiency target is to double the global rate of
improvement in energy efficiency by 2030, from 1.3 per centper year to 2.6 per cent. The achievement of this goal will be
important for achieving many of the other goals.

Energy efficiency has been included in earlier Emissions
Gap Reports reflecting the significant potential for emission
reductions. This year’s report presents policies that have
proven to accelerate energy efficiency gains in three key
sectors: buildings, industry and transport (see figure ES7).
About 40 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions are
generated from direct energy use in these three sectors,

Figure ES6: Illustration of impact of initiatives by study.
Current individual commitments and/or initiatives goals

Global emissions (GtCO2e/year)

Cities

INDCs

ct
o

Th

UP

pa

C4
0
GtCO2eand17Current
policiesCom

Current
policies

58-62

AR

60

Increasing coverage of initiatives
Regions
Companies
Cross-sectoral

Ci
tie
s(
20
fM
14
e
ay
)
Cl
or
im
s
at
(2
CD
e
0
15
P
G
Bu an
ro
)
up
sin d
(
es We
s ( M 201
5)
20 e
Hs
16 an
u
et
)
a
l. (
Ro
20
el
fse
15
)
m
ae
UN
ta
EP
l. (
20
(2
01
15
5)
Gr
)
ai
ch
en
et
al
.(
20
16
)

70

14

52-57
Remaining
gap to staywithin
2°C limit

INDCs Gap

31-44

Current Policies Gap

GtCO2e

INDCs

50

2°C

40

2°C

30
2010

2020

2030

Note: The arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at different levels because the individual studies use different baselines(the last three studies explicitly estimate the impact additional to INDCs).

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summaryxxi

Figure ES7: Sectoral energy efficiency policies assessed.

Buildings• Energy codes• Information andenergy performancecertification• Highly energy
efficient buildings

Industry• EnergyManagement, ISO
50001 and Energy
Performance
Monitoring• Energy performancestandards forindustial equipment• Energy service
companies

Many policy options exist in the three sectors; thisassessment has focused on a small number of policies
already implemented or under implementation in many
countries where good results have been achieved.
Not all mitigation options can be associated with individual
sectors, and it is important to consider the wider energy
system as an integration between different elements. For
example, design of housing efficiency needs to be closely
integrated with the selection of heating and coolingtechno­logies and lighting.
While most emissions in cities originate from the building,industry and transport sectors, a sizeable share of theseemissions could be avoided through city-level mitigation
options, such as spatial planning, improving transit options,increasing and co-locating employment and residential
densities, and increasing green spaces.
More sustainable lifestyles, behaviours, cultures andconsumption patterns are equally important to consider
when designing policies – for example, for transport, building
and appliance efficiency. While traditional policymaking has
focused on technological and economic solutions, changes
in energy behaviour are increasingly recognised as a key
focus area when aiming for transformative action.

11. The Paris Agreement defines theSustainable Development Goal (SDG) on
climate change. Making the right choices
in implementing all goals will be crucial toachieving the Paris Agreement objectives
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in2015, defines the international development agenda of thexxii

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary

Transport• Vehicle Fuel
EconomyStandards• Electric Mobility
for Passenger
Transport• Sustainable
Logostics/FreightTransportationnext 15 years. The 2030 Agenda expressly recognizes theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
as the authoritative body for defining the sustainable
development goal thirteen on climate change, providing a
direct link between the Paris Agreement and the goal on
climate change.
Climate action is not only a sustainable development goalin its own right; it also directly affects and is affected byefforts to achieve many of the other goals. In some cases,
interactions between the different goals may be mutually
reinforcing, or path-aligned, while in other cases they may
be conflicting, or path-contingent. This means that strategic
choices matter. Successful implementation of both theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Sustainable Development Goal agendas will,
therefore, depend on the ability of national governments todevelop and implement a set of national targets that serveboth agendas, optimise benefits, exploit synergies, andreconcile trade-offs.
Among the key findings of analyses to date is that theearliest impacts of climate change may undermine ourability to deliver the goals by 2030, and that failure todeliver on the climate action goals will have even larger
implications for maintaining development progress post2030.
Exploring a complementary approach, the nature of therelationship between seven Sustainable Development
Goals, selected based on their relevance for mitigation in key
sectors, and the mitigation action required under the Paris
Agreement is investigated. Table ES3 presents an overview
of the findings. Of the four path-aligned goals, three
directly relate to sustainability and ecosystems and would,
therefore, be expected to align well with climate changemitigation goals. Encouragingly, the report additionally findsthat achieving universal access to energy is compatible
with emission reduction targets, as this is associated withlow energy demands and, in most cases, best achieved
through expansion and reliance on low-carbon distributed
technologies.
For the path-contingent goals, there is often general oreven specific knowledge of how to overcome many of thechallenges, as well as longstanding experience of particularpolicies and practices that can help to minimize trade-offs
and maximize synergies between different interests.

While it is too early to provide an assessment of thequantitative emissions implications of pursuing the
Sustainable Development Goals, and vice versa, emerging
results from integrated assessment models provide
insights into the available “solution space” that allows for
simultaneous achievement of multiple goals and targets.
An emphasis on measures that reduce energy andother consumption demands generally benefits overall
development concerns by freeing up the solution space forother goals, for example, food security and infrastructure.

Table ES3: Overview of path-aligned and path-contingent Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) covered in the report.
Alignment

SDG

Topic

Path-aligned

SDG7

Sustainable Energy Access

SDG11

Sustainable Cities

SDG12

Sustainable consumption and production

SDG15

Terrestrial Ecosystems

SDG2

Hunger and food security

SDG8

Growth and employment

SDG9

Infrastructure, industrialization, and innovation

Path-contingent

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summaryxxiii

Chapter 1

Introduction
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

1.1 The Emissions Gap Reports
Since 2010, United Nations Environment (UNEP) has
produced annual Emissions Gap Reports based on requests
by countries for an independent scientific assessment of
how actions and pledges by countries affect the global
greenhouse gas emissions trend, and how this comparesto emissions trajectories consistent with the long-term goalof the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). The difference has become known as theemissions gap. In addition to estimating the emissions gap,
the reports focus on key options for achieving the emissions
reductions necessary to bridge the gap, and provide anassessment of how these can be accelerated and scaled
up. Countries have found these emissions gap assessments
useful in informing the political process. This seventh
Emissions Gap Report is based on requests by countries for
an update that focuses on some of the key issues emerging
with the adoption of the Paris Agreement and its specificlong-term temperature goal.

1.2 The context of the 2016 Emissions Gap
Report
The adoption of the Paris Agreement – the first agreement
on climate change with universal contributions on mitigation– at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties(COP 21) to the UNFCCC has been called a landmark ininternational efforts to address climate change. The objectiveof the Paris Agreement of “holding the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 22)translates directly into urgency of enhanced and immediate
mitigation action.
The Paris Agreement has been ratified with record speed andwill enter into effect on 4 November 2016, 30 days after thethreshold of more than 55 Parties, representing at least 55
per cent of global emissions, ratified or otherwise joined theagreement. This threshold was achieved on 5 October 2016.

Together with the September 2015 unanimous adoption
by United Nations member countries of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030, theParis Agreement provides a new, strengthened frameworkfor global climate change action. Moreover, the Agreement
accentuates the urgency of action and the context ofsustainable development and poverty eradication.
The Paris Agreement builds on the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by countries
in advance of COP 21 as requested in the Lima Call for
Climate Action (UNFCCC, 2014). The 2015 Emissions Gap
Report (UNEP, 2015) undertook a thorough assessment of
the aggregate effect of the INDCs on global greenhouse gas
emissions in 2025 and 2030, based on the INDCs submitted
by 1 October 2015. It concluded that while the INDCs
represent a real increase in ambition compared to global
greenhouse gas emission levels resulting from a projectionof current policies, the contributions are far from what isrequired for an emissions pathway consistent with staying
below 2°C. More specifically, the 2015 Emissions Gap Report
estimated that full implementation of both unconditionaland conditional INDCs would imply an emissions gap of 12
gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030
between what the INDCs contribute and the least-costemission level for a pathway to stay below 2°C. This estimate
is in line with the findings of the synthesis report of theaggregate effects of the INDCs by the UNFCCC (2015b).
Recognising the need to bridge the significant gap between
the ambition levels in the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) and the level of ambition required
to meet the Paris Agreement goal of staying well below 2°C
and pursuing a 1.5°C target, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement
specifies that “Each Party shall communicate a nationallydetermined contribution every five years” (UNFCCC 2015a, p.
23) and, furthermore, that “Each Party’s successive nationallydetermined contribution will represent a progression beyond
the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Introduction1and reflect its highest possible ambition” (UNFCCC 2015a,
p. 22). The Agreement also decides to convene a facilitative
dialogue among Parties in 2018, “to take stock of thecollective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards
the long-term goal…and to inform the preparation ofnationally determined contributions” (UNFCCC 2015a, p. 4).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was
invited to produce a special report by 2018 on the impactsof global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels andrelated global greenhouse gas emission pathways. The
facilitative dialogue and special report by the IPCC meansthat 2018 presents important opportunities to strengthen
the nationally determined contributions and the global
mitigation ambition by 2020.
Two recent events have provided additional momentum
to the acceleration of global mitigation efforts. Under the
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation,
governments, with the support of industry, and civil society
representatives have agreed in early October on a new
global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation, which will begin witha pilot phase from 2021 through 2023, followed by a firstphase from 2024 through 2026. A few weeks later, the 197
governments meeting as parties to the Montreal Protocol
reached an agreement on the so-called Kigali Amendment,
under which developed countries will start to phase down
the use of hydrofluorocarbons by 2019. Developing countries
will follow with a freeze of consumption levels in 2024, withsome countries freezing consumption in 2028. By the late
2040s, all countries are expected to consume no more than
15-20 per cent of their respective baselines.
Studies on the impact of these agreements on emissions andfuture temperature increase are still scarce. However, early
indications are that the contributions will be significant;although with the stipulated timeframes for implementation
the short-term impacts on the 2030 emissions gap will belimited. The two agreements do, however, send strong
signals on the willingness to take political action.

1.3 Aim, key questions, and approach of thereportIn line with previous reports, the objective of the 2016
Emissions Gap Report is to provide an up-to-date scientificassessment of the global progress towards the emissions
reductions required to be on track to meet the long-term goalof the UNFCCC. In particular, this year the report emphasizes
the implications of the Paris Agreement’s strengthened goalof holding the increase in the global average temperature towell below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for immediateand longer-term mitigation action (Chapters 2 and 3).

2

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Introduction

In line with previous years, the report assesses actions inselected areas that can contribute to bridging the emissions
gap, and how these can be accelerated and scaled up.
Previous reports have covered a wide range of areas,
including agriculture, forestry, and renewable energy.
The areas selected this year are non-state action (Chapter4); energy efficiency (Chapter 5); and the nexus between
the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change
mitigation (Chapter 6).
Non-state action and energy efficiency have been examinedin earlier reports, but increased political focus on these
options and availability of new studies that provide better
understanding of their large emissions reduction potential,
in combination, provides a strong rationale for revisitingthese options.
The report asks four principal questions:
1.
2.

3.

4.

What is the current status of pre-2020 mitigation
action?
What is the gap between the estimated level ofglobal emissions in 2030 if the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions are fully implemented,
and the range consistent with the well below 2oC or
1.5oC temperature goal?
What are the possible emissions reduction
contributions of non-state action and increased
energy efficiency, and how can action in these areas
be accelerated to enhance the ambition of nationallydetermined contributions?
What do we know about the nexus between the
Sustainable Development Goals and mitigation, andareas of alignment and conflict between the two?

This year, the assessment is based on submissions ofIntended Nationally Determined Contributions by almost all
countries in the world, and more international studies now
support the robustness of the Gap estimates. The conclusion
is that the results remain within the ranges of the 2015
assessment, and that countries should not wait for further
evidence but start to act immediately.
As in previous years, the report adopts an assessment
approach and has been prepared by a wide range ofscientists from around the world. This year, 34 scientists
from 18 institutions in 17 countries have contributed to thereport.
United Nations Environment hopes that this seventh editionof the Emissions Gap Report will help inform discussions at
COP 22 and support the enhanced and accelerated mitigation
ambition required to meet the goal of the Paris Agreement.

Chapter 2

Pre-2020 action: trends, progress andurgency
Lead authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) andTakeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute)
Contributing authors: Greet Janssens-Maenhout (Joint Research Centre, European Commission), Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and
Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)

2.1 Introduction•

The strengthened language of the Paris Agreement ofholding the increase in the global average temperature towell below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels translates into a need for even stronger andmore immediate mitigation action than previously assessed.
This chapter looks into pre-2020 action, focusing on trends,
progress and urgency. It provides an overview of the state ofplay of global emission trends and progress towards achieving
the Cancun Pledges by G20 members as two key indicators of
the level of pre-2020 action. Trends in current performanceand progress are, furthermore, likely to influence theextent to which parties are positioned to implement their
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and transition
to the stringent least-cost emissions reduction trajectories
after 2020, required to reach the temperature target of theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). The chapter presents an update, based on thelatest available scientific literature, on the following critical
topics:••Do emissions show signs of peaking? Section 2.2
gives an overview of current trends in total global
emissions of greenhouse gases, and of energy-related
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels andindustry as a major driver of total greenhouse gas
emissions.
Are G20 members on track to meet their Cancun
Pledges? Section 2.3 provides an update of the2015 assessment (UNEP, 2015), based on current
policy portfolios of G20 members, and plausible
assumptions regarding macroeconomic trends andoffsets.

What are the implications for urgency of action?
Based on the two preceding sections, Section 2.4
reiterates the urgency of immediately enhancing
mitigation actions to facilitate a transition towards
least-cost emission reduction trajectories after 2020
that are aligned with 2°C and 1.5°C targets.

2.2 Trends in current global emissions
Total global greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase.
In 2014, they reached approximately 52.7 gigatonnes CO2e
(GtCO2e) (range: 47.9-57.51) (UNEP, 2015).2 Over the past
decades the trend in global greenhouse gas emissions has
been one of steady increase with small variations aroundthis longer-term trend. Notably, global greenhouse gas
emissions increased at a faster rate (2.2 per cent per year)
during the period 2000 to 2010 than they did during theperiod 1970 to 2000, where the growth rate was 1.3 per centper year (IPCC, 2014b). Considering the period from 2010,
the emissions growth slowed to 1.8 per cent on average in2012 to 2013, from a 3.5 per cent increase in 2010 and 2011
(JRC/PBL, 2014).
Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry3 are
the major source of total global greenhouse gas emissions.
Currently, they account for about 68 per cent of total global
greenhouse gas emissions, and were estimated at a totalof 36.2 GtCO2 for 2015 (range: 32.7-39.9) (Olivier et al.,12
3

90 per cent confidence interval based on the uncertainty range assessedin The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b).
Data for this year is available from EDGAR and PRIMAP. Sources: JRC/PBL(2014), Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (2016).
It covers the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement
production and other processes, including flaring of waste gas during gas
and oil production, cement clinker production and other limestone uses,
feedstock and other non-energy uses of fuels, and several other small
sources.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

3

Figure 2.1: Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel use and industry (Olivier et al., forthcoming).
GtCO2/year
40

30

USA
EU
India
Japan
Russian Federation
Other OECD countries*

China
Other G20 countries**
Other big countries and areas***Remaining non-OECD countries
International transport

20

10

0
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

* Other OECD countries include Australia; Canada; Mexico; Republic of Korea and Turkey.
** Other G20 countries include Argentina; Brazil; Indonesia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa and Turkey.
*** Other big countries and areas include Egypt; Iran; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Nigeria; Taiwan, Province of China; Thailand and Ukraine.

forthcoming).4 Given their share of total greenhouse gas
emissions, it is relevant to look more closely at the trend
in CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry. Figure 2.1
shows the development in global CO2 emissions from fossil
fuels and industry for the period 1970 to 2015.
In 2015 global CO2 emissions stagnated for the first time andshowed signs of a weak decline compared to 2014 (-0.1 percent). This was preceded by a slowdown in the growth rateof CO2 emissions, from 2.0 per cent in 2013 to 1.1 per cent in2014 (Olivier et al., forthcoming). These findings are in linewith the studies of the Global Carbon Project on trends inglobal energy-related CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2015;
Jackson et al., 2016).5
Global CO2 emissions increased by roughly 1.3 per centannually for the period 2012 to 2014, a pace significantly
slower than that of the 12 preceding years, where theaverage annual increase was 2.9 per cent (2000-2011), buthigher than the average annual growth rate of around 1 percent during the 1990s.
In summary, global greenhouse gas emissions continue
to grow, and while there is an encouraging indication of ahalting of the growth rate of global CO2 emissions from fossil
fuels and industry, it is still too early to say whether this is
likely to be permanent.
4
5

4These results are based on IEA (2016) statistics and preliminary estimates
based on the latest BP statistics, including the recent revision of coal statistics
in China.
The changes in the growth rate of global CO2 emissions in 2015 compared
to 2014 comprise very different growth rates and show differences amongst
top CO2 emitters. For example, growth rates in CO2 emissions decreased in
China and the US in 2015, compared to 2014, whereas they increased in the
EU and India in 2015, compared to 2014. Olivier et al. (forthcoming) provide
additional insights into whether the changes in growth rate for the top
emitters are of a structural, and therefore more permanent, nature or not.

2.3 Progress towards achieving the Cancun
Pledges: an update focusing on G20
members
As the Emissions Gap Report has done since 2013, thissection provides an update on the progress towards
achieving the Cancun Pledges, focusing on members of theG20.6 These economies, collectively, generate around threequarters of global greenhouse gas emissions.7 Although it iscritical that all countries advance as far as possible towards
achieving – and ideally exceeding – their Cancun Pledges thisis particularly the case for the highest-emitting economies,
given their large share of total global greenhouse gas
emissions.

2.3.1 Assessment of G20 members’ 2020 emissions
under three cases

To assess G20 members’ progress towards their Cancun
Pledges, this section compares current emissions trajectories
with those associated with the achievement of these parties’
pledges. Three cases are considered: a pledge case, basedon official data; a current policy trajectory case, based on
official data; and a current policy trajectory case, basedon independent analysis. These three cases are further
described in box 2.1, while the findings are presented intable 2.1.
6

7

The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the United States ofAmerica (USA), and the European Union (EU). In our analysis, the EU including
all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) is considered as a single Party,
and EU Member States are not considered individually. In general, evaluating
the pledges of other countries is limited by a lack of data.
In 2012, these parties accounted for 77 per cent of global emissions, excluding
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), and 75 per cent of global
greenhouse gas emissions, including LULUCF (CAIT WRI, 2015).

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 –Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

Box 2.1: Assumptions of the assessment of progress towards Cancun Pledges
For each G20 member, table 2.1 compares estimates for 2020 emissions under three cases:
1. Pledge case (official data): Identifies the maximum level of greenhouse gas emissions that each country or Party
could emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering the use of offsets. If a pledge is presented as arange (Australia, Brazil, China, India), the less ambitious end of the range is adopted as the official pledge estimate.
If a country has both a conditional and an unconditional pledge (Indonesia), only the unconditional pledge is used. If
a country has only a conditional pledge (Mexico, South Africa), the conditional pledge is used. For countries whose
pledges are framed relative to a baseline scenario, it is assumed that baselines are not adjusted in the future. For
countries whose pledges are framed as greenhouse gas intensity targets, economic growth consistent with official
projections is assumed.8 Where available, the 2020 emission level described by the country or Party as the pledge
level is used; alternatively, these levels are calculated working from official base-year or baseline data.
2. Current policy trajectory case (official data): Identifies official estimates of 2020 emissions, considering projectedeconomic trends and current policy approaches, as identified by each modelling study cited in our analysis, including
policies at least through 2012.
3. Current policy trajectory case (independent analysis): Similarly identifies estimates of 2020 emissions considering
the best current estimates of projected economic trends and current policy approaches, but is based on independent
analysis rather than official data. Figures are drawn from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2015) and den Elzen
et al. (2015) for all countries, as well as other country-specific sources, where noted. Current policy trajectory(independent analysis) supplements the official sources described in point two by providing data that aims forconsistency across countries and political independence.
Projections considering only a limited subset of sectors and gases, for example CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, areomitted, as they cannot be compared to projections and targets that include the full set of greenhouse gases acrossthe entire economy.
Source: UNEP (2015).

2.3.2. Summary of progress of G20 members9

According to the assessment presented in table 2.1, six
G20 members are on track to meet their Cancun Pledges
according to the most available analyses. Four members
are likely to require further action, to purchase offsets or
use a combination of the two to meet their targets. For
two 20 members there is currently insufficient information
to assess whether they are on track to meet their pledges,

illustrating that better data is necessary to adequately
track progress in some countries. For another member,no conclusion is drawn due to differing interpretationsof what would constitute pledge attainment. The threeremaining G20 members have no Cancun Pledges. Further
details are provided below. As highlighted in box 2.2,
three important caveats should be kept in mind whenassessing country progress towards the Cancun Pledges.

Box 2.2: Assessing progress towards achieving the Cancun Pledges: three caveats
1. Pledges do not necessarily demand the same level of effort to achieve. In other words, a country currently on trackto achieve its pledge has not necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate emissions than a country not yet on track.
2. Projections are subject to uncertainty associated with macroeconomic trends, such as changes in gross domestic
product, and population trends, as well as the impact of each country’s climate policy action.
3. The potential impact of using offsets to achieve pledges is not quantified for the emission trajectories considered.
If offsets are traded internationally, and are counted towards the pledges of both buying and selling parties, theglobal impact of the pledges will be weakened. Most countries have not clarified their intentions concerning theiruse of offsets to meet their Cancun Pledges. G20 members, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, and the USA have
explicitly not excluded the possibility; other members have not formally commented (CAIT WRI, 2015).
Source: UNEP (2015).
89For China, the gross domestic product is assumed to reach 61.6 trillion yuan
in 2020, consistent with China’s National Communication (People’s Republicof China, 2012). For India, the gross domestic product is assumed to reach
120.41 trillion rupees (2006–2007 rupee value) in 2020, consistent with theaverage of the scenarios presented in Planning Commission Government ofIndia (2014).
This section builds on Section 2.3.2 of UNEP (2015). Updates are included
where these are available.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

5

Table 2.1: Emissions in 2020 under Cancun pledge case and current policy trajectory cases for G20 members categorised alphabeticallyby status of progress in million tonnes CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e).10
Parties

Cancun Pledge case(based on official
data)

Current policy
trajectory(based on
official data)

Current policy trajectory(based on independent
estimates)11

Mitigation pledge and current policy trajectory details

G20 members assessed to be on track to meet their Cancun Pledges
Brazil

2,070a(Government ofBrazil, 2010)

N/A

1,750-2,075a (CAT, 2014)12
1,470-1,520a (den Elzen etal., 2015)

Baseline scenario pledge

China*

14,500a(People’s Republic ofChina, 2012)

N/A

12,200-12,600a (CAT, 2015)
12,535-13,420a (den Elzen
et al., 2015)

Intensity pledge

EuropeanUnion

4,500b(EEA, 2014)

4,235b,c(EEA,
forthcoming)

4,115-4,375b (CAT, 2015)
4,105-4,370b (den Elzen etal., 2015)

Base year pledge

India*

3,815b(Planning Commission
Government of India
2011, 2014)

N/A

3,575-3,610b (CAT, 2015)
3,535-3,960a (den Elzen etal., 2015)

Intensity pledge

Japan

1,345b,c(Government ofJapan, 2016)13

N/A

1,230-1,330b (CAT, 2015)
1,135-1,330b (den Elzen etal., 2015)
1,350-1,400b (Kuramochi,
2014)

Base year pledge

RussianFederation

2,515b(Government of
Russia, 2014)

2,410b(Government of
Russia, 2015)

2,415-2,455b (CAT, 2015)
2,295-2,375b (den Elzen etal., 2015)

Base year pledge

Cancun Pledge case assumes 40% reduction ingreenhouse gas intensity calculated based on the 2020
gross domestic product cited in People’s Republic ofChina (2012). The CO2 projection is complemented for
non-CO2 projections from CAT (2015).

Cancun Pledge case is calculated based on an assumed
20% reduction in greenhouse gas intensity (Planning
Commission Government of India, 2011), the 2020
gross domestic product from Planning Commission
Government of India (2014), and exclusion of theemissions from agriculture and land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) (Planning Commission
Government of India, 2011).

Cancun Pledge case reflects 25% reduction calculated
based on national inventory data (Government of
Russia, 2014).

G20 members likely to require further action or purchased offsets
Canada620b,c(Government of
Canada, 2016)

770b,c(Government of
Canada, 2016)745b (CAT, 2015)
720-760b (den Elzen et al.,2015)

Base year pledge

Mexico670a(NCCS, 2013)

830a(Government of
Mexico, 2012;
NCCS, 2013)785-800a (CAT, 2015)
770-810a (den Elzen et al.,2015)

Baseline scenario pledge
In the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution(INDC) (Government of Mexico, 2015), Mexico has
updated its baseline14 to 792, and if the Cancun Pledge
is calculated based on this baseline, it would be: 555a.
Current Policy Trajectory (Official Data) is based on
Government of Mexico (2012), adjusted per NCCS
(2013).

Republic of
Korea

550a
(Republic of Korea,
2015)

N/A

745-755b (CAT, 2015)585-620b (den Elzen et al.,2015)

Baseline scenario pledge

6,360-6,600b (CAT, 2015)
5,445-6,170a (den Elzen etal., 2015)
5,340-5,610a,c (Belenky,
2016)
5,225-5,815a,c (Larsen etal., 2016)

Base year pledge

545a(Republic of Korea,
2014)
UnitedStates ofAmerica

65,345a,c(U.S. Department ofState, 2015)

5,450-5,600a,c(U.S.
Department ofState, 2015)

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 –Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

Cancun Pledge case of 550a is calculated from INDC
(Republic of Korea, 2015) baseline of 783.

Parties

Cancun pledge case(based on official
data)

Current policy
trajectory(based on
official data)

Current policy trajectory(based on independent
estimates)11

Mitigation pledge and current policy trajectory details

G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn regarding Cancun Pledge alignment
Australia

520a,c(Department ofEnvironment andEnergy Australia,
2016)

580a,c(Departmentof Environment
Australia,
2016)15575b (CAT, 2015)
600a (Kuramochi et al.,
2016)
570 (Reputex, 2016)

Base year pledge

Indonesia

1,335a(BAPPENAS, 2015)

N/A

820b (CAT, 2015)
1,910-1,950a (den Elzen etal., 2015)

Baseline scenario pledge

2,185a(Ministry ofEnvironment
Indonesia, 2010;
Ministry ofEnvironment andForestry Indonesia,
2015)
South
Africa585a(Department ofEnvironmental Affairs
Republic of South
Africa, 2011a, 2011b)

Cancun Pledge case of 1,335a is calculated based on
the baseline from BAPPENAS (2015).16
2,185a is calculated based on the baseline from the
Ministry of Environment Indonesia (2010) and theMinistry of Environment and Forestry Indonesia(2015).

N/A

730b (CAT, 2015)
560-885b (PBL, 2015)

Baseline scenario pledge

G20 members with no Cancun Pledge
Argentina

No pledge

465 (Ministryof theEnvironment
and Sustainable
Development
Argentina,
2015)

365-460b (CAT, 2015)

Saudi
ArabiaNo pledge

N/A

840b (CAT, 2015)

TurkeyNo pledge

600a,c670b,c(Republic of
Turkey Ministryof Environment
andUrbanisation,
2016)625b (CAT, 2015)
485-690b (den Elzen et al.,2015)

Notes:
aFigures including LULUCF
b
Figures excluding LULUCF
cFigures based on global warming potentials from IPCC (2007)*China and India have greenhouse gas intensity targets based on the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to gross domestic product. For consistency, we have converted
these to absolute emission numbers based on the official documentation cited above, but a determination of whether each country has achieved its pledge should bebased on intensity rather than absolute emissions.
Estimates are rounded to the nearest 5 MtCO2e.

10 Figures do not consider the possible purchase or sale of offsets. Figures including LULUCF indicated witha, excluding LULUCF indicated withb.
11 References to den Elzen et al. (2015) in this column represent PBL estimates based on the method of den Elzen et al. (2015). Some numbers presented here havebeen updated per latest estimates available from http://infographics.pbl.nl/indc/ [Accessed 19 October 2016].
12 The most recent Climate Action Tracker (November 2015) (CAT, 2015) analysis does not include LULUCF.
13	In the revised 2nd Biennial Report (Government of Japan, 2016), Japan revised its accounting approach on LULUCF, which is now accounted for not only the target
year but also the base year
14	The INDC baseline is based on a new methodology with global warming potentials from IPCC (2014a); it is, therefore, not comparable to any other sources citedhere. All other sources use global warming potentials from IPCC (1995); the NCCS (2013) also uses a previous methodology.
15 Due to conflicting information, Australia is placed under the category “G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn regarding Cancun Pledge alignment”.
16 The INDC baseline is based on a revised national inventory that shows significantly lower 2010 emissions than those shown in the National Communication andassumed by other studies cited here. See BAPPENAS (2015) for a comparison of 2010 emissions.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

7

10111213141516

G20 members that are on track to meet their Cancun
PledgesThree of the G20 parties – China, the EU, and India – areon track to meet their pledges without purchasing offsets,according to all available analyses. Three more – Brazil, Japan,
and Russia – are on track, according to most estimates.
China and India’s pledges are framed in terms of greenhousegas intensity reductions from 2005 levels, and several
sources indicate that both countries are currently on track toachieve them. Studies indicate that China, which pledged areduction of 40-45 per cent in emissions intensity, is on trackto achieve a reduction of at least 42 per cent (CAT, 2015; PBL,
2015; Sha et al., 2015). India reports that it achieved a 12
per cent reduction in emissions intensity from 2005 to 2010
(Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change India,
2015), while Garg et al. (2014) show a 17 per cent reduction
from 2005 to 2012 (out of a pledged reduction of 20–25 percent from 2005 to 2020). The CAT (2015) and PBL (2015)
show India on track for intensity reductions of 36 per centand 28 per cent by 2020, respectively.17
Japan announced an adjustment to its pledge in November
2013 from a 25 per cent reduction on 1990 levels to a 3.8
per cent reduction on 2005 levels – similar to an increase ofabout 6 per cent on 1990 levels. There is no official
current policy projections available, but CAT (2015) shows
Japan on track to meet its revised pledge, whereas den Elzen
et al. (2015) estimates a range in 2020 from slightly below
to slightly above the pledge level. Japan’s actual trajectory,
however, will depend significantly on the respective roles ofnuclear power and coal-fired power to meet future needs.18

G20 members that are likely to require further action orpurchased offsets
Canada, Mexico, and the United States are likely to require
further action and/or purchase offsets in order to meettheir pledges, according to government and independent
estimates. Mexico’s Cancun Pledge is conditional on theprovision of adequate financial and technological support
from developed countries as part of a global agreement(Government of Mexico, 2015).
According to independent analysis, the Republic of Korea
will also require further action to meet its pledge, but
this cannot be verified based on publicly available official
projections. Independent estimates of 2020 emissions
range from well below to well above the pledge level (CAT,
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 Calculated for China based on an assumed gross domestic product growthrate of 8.5 per cent (PBL, 2015) and 7.0 per cent (CAT, 2015), and for India
based on an assumed gross domestic product growth rate of 7.5 per cent(PBL, 2015) and 6.4 per cent (CAT, 2015).
18 A study commissioned by Japan’s Ministry of Environment (Ministry ofEnvironment Japan, 2015) projected that by 2030, the share of renewableenergy in the electricity sector could reach around 25-30 per cent in a
‘medium deployment’ case and 30-35 per cent in a ‘high deployment’ case.

8

2015; den Elzen et al., 2015).19 The Republic of Korea has
domestically abandoned the 2020 target by replacing it with
the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)
target in the amended Green Growth Act (The Law National
Information Center, 2016). As of August 2016, the country’s
2020 mitigation target submitted to the UNFCCC has notbeen withdrawn.

G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn
regarding pledge attainment
Government and independent sources also find a gap
between Australia’s projected 2020 emissions and its target
level for that year. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol,
Australia uses a carbon budget approach that accounts forcumulative emissions over the period of 2013 to 2020 inorder to assess progress against its target. Australia’s latest
official projections (Department of Environment Australia,
2016) find that for the budget period, including carry-overfrom its first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol,
Australia is now on track to meet its Kyoto target.
Insufficient information is currently available to determine
whether Indonesia and South Africa are on track to meet theirpledges. In the case of Indonesia, independent projections
span a wide range, and official projections reflecting current
policies are unavailable. The Ministry of Environment andForestry Indonesia (2015) identifies baseline 2020 emissions
as 2.95 GtCO2e, and the abatement necessary to achieve theunilateral 26 per cent reduction target as 0.767 GtCO2e. It
further identifies a suite of mitigation activities both underand outside of Perpres No. 61/2011. A subset of these
activities has reported abatement of 46.38 MtCO2e (of which
41.29 MtCO2e occurred under Perpres No. 61/2011) from2010-2012, or an average of 15.46 MtCO2e per year. The
remainder of the activities, however, have not reported theiremissions reductions, nor have future emissions reductions
been forecast.
In the case of South Africa, independent estimates of 2020
emissions vary widely, from well below the pledge level
to well above it. Moreover, these projections exclude landuse, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), whereas South
Africa’s pledge includes LULUCF. Official projections are notavailable. South Africa’s pledge is conditional.

G20 members with no Cancun Pledge

Three G20 member states, Argentina, Saudi Arabia andTurkey, have not proposed greenhouse gas reduction pledges
for 2020. However, all three countries have submitted
post-2020 Pledges to the UNFCCC as part of their INDCs. In
addition, Turkey has submitted a Biennial Report including
its projected emissions for 2020 (Republic of Turkey Ministryof Environment and Urbanisation, 2016).

19 It has been reported that the 2020 target was abandoned domestically(Carbon Pulse, 2016), but to date there is no report that the Republic of Korea
abandoned its pre-2020 Pledge made under the UNFCCC.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 –Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

To summarise, this section has examined the extent to which
G20 members are proceeding towards the minimum level of
their Cancun Pledges. The cumulative impact of the progressof G20 members towards achieving their Cancun Pledges
is not calculated, as there is limited information on theCO2 emission projections for the current policies scenario.
However, as Chapter 3 shows, 2020 emissions under current
global policy trajectories – which take progress by the G20
members into account – roughly align with those associatedwith implementation of the high end of the estimated 52–54
GtCO2e emissions range of the Cancun Pledges (UNEP, 2014).

2.4 Amplified urgency of enhanced pre-2020
actionThe strengthened long-term objective of the Paris Agreement
amplifies the urgency of enhancing early mitigation action.
Enhanced early action facilitates a transition to the stringent,long-term emission reductions required to hold the increasein the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2014).
Furthermore, it is critical for pursuing the 1.5°C target (seealso Section 3.2).
The previous sections clearly demonstrate that although
there are encouraging signs of mitigation action, the current
level of action is very far from what is required to movetowards alignment with the strengthened objective of theParis Agreement. Total global greenhouse gas emissions
continue to increase, and although the growth in global CO2
emissions – a major contributor to total global greenhousegas emissions – has shown encouraging signs of levellingout over the past two years, it is too soon to tell whether
this is likely to be permanent. G20 member countries andstates continue to make progress towards achieving their
Cancun Pledges, but current trends indicate that, overall,the continuation of current levels of action is likely to result
in total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 that are inline with the weakest Cancun Pledge scenario consideredin previous Emissions Gap Reports (see for example UNEP
(2013)).

In addition to these critical aspects of pre-2020 action,enhanced early action (both pre-2020 and pre-2030) is
associated with a number of other important outcomes anda wide range of additional economic, technological, societal,
and climate outcome benefits. For example, enhanced
early action will reduce climate risks and impacts. It will,furthermore, enable the realisation of near-term co-benefitsof climate change mitigation, including health-related
benefits associated with lower air pollution; improved energy
security; and reduced crop yield losses. These, and otherbenefits and trade-offs between immediate and delayed
mitigation action, have been assessed in detail in previous
Emissions Gap Reports (UNEP, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).
Building on these, the most important implications of failingto respond to the increased urgency of early action include:
•

•

•

•

•

•

Delaying action implies that significantly higher
rates of global emission reductions are required in
the medium- and long-term to meet the well below
2°C target. The order of magnitude of these rates is
without historic precedent.
Delaying action reduces the ‘solution space’ andoptions available to society to achieve stringent
emission reductions.
Delaying action will result in greater lock-in ofcarbon- and energy-intensive infrastructure in theenergy system and society, as a whole. It will also be
a disincentive for near-term learning and technology
development that will be essential in the long-term.
Delaying action translates into greater dependence
on negative emissions technologies in the mediumterm – technologies that so far are unproven on alarger scale.
Delaying action increases the costs of mitigation in
the medium- and long-term, and implies greater risksof economic disruption.
Importantly, delaying action is associated with greaterrisks of failing to meet the well below 2°C target and islikely to be incompatible with meeting a 1.5°C target.

The urgency of enhancing pre-2020 mitigation action is,thus, indisputable:
•
•

•

•

It bolsters the likelihood that countries meet andexceed their Cancun Pledges.
It provides a more solid foundation for implementing
the Nationally Determined Contributions and forcontinuously strengthening their ambition.
It supports the transition towards a least-costemissions reduction trajectory after 2020 that is
consistent with the well below 2°C target.
It is likely the last chance to keep the option of limiting
global warming to 1.5°C in 2100 open, as all available
scenarios consistent with the 1.5°C target imply that
global greenhouse gas emissions peak before 2020.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency

9

Chapter 32030 trends and ambition
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute) and Joeri
Rogelj (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)
Contributing authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
and Sebastian Sterl (NewClimate Institute)

3.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting global averagetemperature increase to well below 2°C relative topre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to further limit
global average temperature increase to 1.5°C. This chapter
provides an update of the mitigation challenge associatedwith the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and theestimated global emission levels under various assumptions
regarding the implementation of policies and Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).

3.2 Pathways limiting warming to below 2
and 1.5 degrees Celsius
The Paris Agreement is clear about its aim to keep warming
well below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) and pursue efforts to limit
it to 1.5°C, but it does not provide a specific probability
with which these limits are to be avoided. Deciding on theappropriate level of probability is a political rather thanscientific question, as it requires value judgments about whatis acceptable and desirable to society (Schleussner et al.,2016). However, clarity regarding the working assumptions
about these probabilities is required to enable comparable
quantification and exploration of pathways consistent with
the Paris Agreement’s temperature target. Therefore, allresults in this report are accompanied by unambiguous
descriptions of the quantitative temperature goals they
inform, acknowledging that other interpretations are
possible and valid. In line with last year’s Emissions Gap
Report (UNEP, 2015), the scenarios considered are least-cost
pathways starting in 2020 that limit warming to below 2°C,
with at least 66 per cent probability by 2100 (never resulting
in a probability of below 60 per cent), and which return
warming to below 1.5°C with at least 50 per cent probability
by 2100, respectively (table 3.1).

10

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

A large body of literature is available on pathways that
limit warming to below 2°C with 66 per cent or higher
probabilities. This has been covered extensively by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Clarke
et al., 2014) and earlier Emissions Gap Reports. Summary
statistics for least-cost pathways starting from 2020, in linewith limiting warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per centprobability, are provided in table 3.1.

The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC also covered 1.5°C
pathways to a limited extent (IPCC, 2014a; IPCC 2014b).
These included least-cost pathways starting from 2010 in linewith a 66 per cent probability of limiting warming to below
1.5°C in 2100.1 Currently, there are no scenarios available
that assume least-cost pathways starting from 2020 thatcan return warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with at least
66 per cent probability. Therefore, this report describes thecharacteristics of scenarios that assume least-cost pathways
starting from 2020 and return warming to below 1.5°C in
2100 with a lower, 50 per cent probability.
Following the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, adedicated review of the 1.5°C scenarios appeared in theliterature (Rogelj et al., 2015), and other reports, including
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effectof Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)(UNFCCC, 2016e), have additionally provided more specificinformation about global emission pathways in line with1

The IPCC reports that global CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emissions in these 1.5°C
scenarios are reduced by 70-95 per cent and 110-120 per cent below 2010
levels in 2050 and 2100, respectively. CO2 equivalence in the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC was computed using 100-year Global Warming Potentials
reported in the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC. CO2e emissions
include all greenhouse gases and are derived from Integrated Assessment
Model scenarios which also include consistent evolutions of radiatively active
air pollutants.

Table 3.1: Overview of pathway characteristics for two global temperature targets. A detailed overview of scenario names is provided in
Annex A.1. available online. Source: UNEP (2015) and additional calculations.
1.5°C (>50% in 2100)

Pathways limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with >50% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards

Number of available scenarios: 6; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs): (2060-2080); total CO2 (including land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)): (2045-2050); CO2 fromenergy and industry: (2045-2055)
Annual emissions of global total GHGs [GtCO2e/year]Year
median*range and spread**

2020
56
53(-/-)56

2025
47
46(-/-)48

2030
39
37(-/-)402050
84(-/-)14

2100-5-5(-/-)-3

Time period
median*range and spread**

2015-2030
552
503(-/-)567

2075-2100-353-288(-/-)-372

2015-2100
217
71(-/-)383

2°C (>66% in 2100)

Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with >66% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards

CO2 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO2 emissions in GtCO2]
2030-2050
236
178(-/-)259

2050-2075-199-146(-/-)-277

Number of available scenarios: 10; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 4
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:Kyoto-GHGs: 2085 (2080-2090); total CO2 (including LULUCF): 2070 (2060-2075); CO2 from energy and industry: 2070 (2060-2075)
Annual emissions of global total GHGs [GtCO2e/year]Year
median*range and spread**2020
52
49(49/53)55

2025
48
44(46/50)532030
42
29(31/44)442050
23
17(18/27)292100-3-11 (-9/-1)02075-2100-288-120(-146/-327)-342

2015-2100
553
483(490/934)988

CO2 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO2 emissions in GtCO2]
Time period
median*range and spread**

2015-2030
533
481(499/582)572

2030-2050
362
242(258/431)447

2050-207570-97(-52/175)187* Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO2e/year** Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO2e/year. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value – no percentiles are provided if less than
10 scenarios are available.
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile); (minimum – maximum) if less than 10 scenarios are available.

1.5°C. Each of these publications draws upon scenarios
published earlier (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a;
Rogelj et al., 2013b).

(4) Temperature overshoot: almost all available scenarios
consistent with this definition, temporarily exceed
the 1.5°C limit during the 21st century.

More literature is forthcoming and will be assessed in theframework of a Special Report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related
global greenhouse gas emission pathways by the IPCC.
This report will be finalized by 2018, in time to inform thefacilitative dialogue under the UNFCCC.

The issues of negative emissions and temperature overshootare discussed in more detail in the following.

Based, on the available literature, it is possible to identify
four key characteristics of 1.5°C scenarios that start a leastcost pathway from 2020 and limit warming to below 1.5°C
in 2100 with greater than 50 per cent probability. These are:(1) Immediate mitigation action: all available scenarios
consistent with this definition, peak global
greenhouse gas emissions around 2020.
(2) The rapid up-scaling of the full portfolio of mitigation
technologies: this includes widespread adoption ofrenewables, the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels,
and the use of negative emissions technologies thatallow for the active removal of carbon dioxide (CO2)from the atmosphere.
(3) Development along a low-energy demand trajectory.

A large proportion of the scenarios that limit warming
to below 2°C, available in the literature, assume the useof so-called negative emissions technologies (Tavoni andSocolow, 2013; Williamson, 2013; UNEP, 2014; UNEP, 2015;
Smith et al., 2016) – the active removal and permanent
sequestration of CO2 from the atmosphere. This canbe achieved, for example, through the combination of
bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (Obersteiner
et al., 2001). Scenarios with significantly lower amounts ofnegative emissions exist, but the exclusion of this mitigation
option at times renders ambitious climate goals unattainable(IPCC, 2014a; Riahi et al., 2015). The IPCC (2014a) reported
that all scenarios currently available that limit warming to
below 1.5°C by 2100, require CO2 removal in the second
half of the century (see table 3.1). Furthermore, virtually
all scenarios currently available in the literature for limiting
warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 temporarily exceed the
1.5°C limit during the 21st century, and, thus, peak anddecline temperatures in order to again fall below 1.5°C in

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

11

2100. For this to happen at the scale and rate required,global negative emissions are required. A large overshootcan be avoided through strong near-term action.
Important challenges have been identified for negativeemissions technologies (Smith et al., 2016) which have to beaddressed, for example, the potential competition between
biomass and food production over land and water (Bonsch
et al., 2016). In most cases, the amounts of bio-energy
assumed in scenarios limiting median warming to below
1.5°C in 2100 are within the assessed limits of estimatedsustainable biomass production, that is, they do not impede
on sufficient global food production (Creutzig et al., 2015;
Bonsch et al., 2016). However, this can change over time,for example, if local climate impacts happen to be more
severe than currently anticipated. Furthermore, in absenceof strong local institutions that can provide good governanceand prevent illegal deforestation and illegal expropriation,
the sustainable potentials might be lower.

Because of uncertainties in availability of future technology,
studies have explored how the absence of a specifictechnology would influence the attainability of temperature
goals (Kriegler et al., 2013; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al.,2013b; Krey et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2015). These studies
focus on a 2°C temperature goal, but found that a limitation
or absence of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage
significantly limits the feasibility of keeping temperature rise
to low levels. At the same time, hedging against a strong
reliance on bio-energy with carbon capture and storage inthe long-term is possible by reducing emissions more steeply
in the very near-term, that is, over the coming 5 to 15 years.
Further research that explores the trade-offs and synergies
of negative emissions technologies in relation to limiting
warming to 1.5°C would be extremely valuable.

Box 3.1: Integrated Assessment Models’ strengths and opportunities.
The IPCC defines Integrated Assessment as “a method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical,
biological, economic, and social sciences, and the interactions among these components in a consistent framework
to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it” (IPCC, 2014b).
Integrated Assessment Models are the models used in such a scientific exercise.
For the study of climate change mitigation scenarios, Integrated Assessment Models often include a representationof: (1) the socioeconomic driving forces, (2) the level of climate change mitigation and, (3) the physics of the climate
system to estimate the impact on global temperature rise. To systematically explore socioeconomic driving forces, theresearch community recently developed a set of five narratives that describe worlds with very differing adaptation andmitigation challenges. These are referred to as the “Shared Socioeconomic Pathways” (O’Neill et al., 2014; O’Neill et al.,2015). Subsequently, these narratives are used to explore if and how stringent mitigation targets can be reached (Riahi
et al., in Press).
Most commonly, Integrated Assessment Models are used to create scenarios, which attempt to achieve global mitigation
at minimum cost. Such “cost-optimal” (or “least-cost”) scenarios let the model decide when (now, in a decade, or at theend of the century) and where (in which geographical region and/or in which sector) emissions are reduced. The model
user can also add additional constraints regarding which mitigation technologies are available in the model. Ultimately,
the model chooses between different alternatives based on their relative cost, and the social discount rate, which makes
investing in the near-term more expensive than in the longer term.
Integrated Assessment Models are powerful tools, which allow the assessment of trade-offs and synergies between
various mitigation options. Importantly, Integrated Assessment Model scenarios provide the costs of reducing
emissions, for example, the costs to transform the energy system or limit the emissions from land-use and land-use
change. However, they typically do not cover the economic and social costs of avoided climate change impacts or side
effects. Recent studies have shown that these benefits can be significant and easily outweigh the costs of reducing
emissions (West et al., 2013). Furthermore, Integrated Assessment Model scenarios provide detailed technologicaltransformation pathways that allow keeping emissions within a specific limit. Such transformation is often based on
our understanding of transformations that took place in the past, like the transition of horse carriages to cars. However,Integrated Assessment Models typically do not contain much information on how to achieve the required pace oftransformation in the future. Social science research can help to further understand the determinants and the key steps
required to achieve a global low-carbon transition (Geels et al., 2016).

12

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

3.3 The 2030 emissions gapof global greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 (JRC/PBL,
2014). Here, the INDC scenario draws on individual
INDC scenarios from the ten global analyses (table
3.2). The resulting composite INDC scenario comprises
the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile global
estimates for 2025 and 2030 from all of these sources.
Compared to the previous Emissions Gap Report(UNEP, 2015), three new studies have been included(JRC, PNNL and the UNFCCC synthesis Report – seetable 3.2), while global estimates of the official or
independent country-specific sources have been
excluded, since for many countries there was no data
available. The official or independent country-specificsources are now only used for the national estimates(Section 3.4).

3.3.1 Overview of scenarios

To assess the impact of the INDCs2 on future global
greenhouse gas emissions, global greenhouse gas emissions
in 2025 and 2030 are compared under four scenarios (Rogelj
et al., 2016). The assessment draws on multiple individual
scenarios from the published literature. Each scenario is
global in scope, reflecting possible actions from all countries.
•

•

•

2
3

The baseline scenario reflects emission projections
that assume no additional climate policies are put inplace from 2005 onwards. It is the medium projection
estimate from around 180 baseline scenarios fromthe scenario database that accompanied the Fifth
Assessment Report of the IPCC (Clarke et al., 2014).

The INDC scenario comprises unconditional andconditional INDC cases. As discussed in the 2015
Gap Report (UNEP, 2015), some countries place
conditions on all or part of their INDCs. Of the INDCs
submitted by 12 December 2015, roughly 45 percent came with both conditional and unconditional
components; about a third was conditional only
and the remainder did not specify conditions (WRI,2015). Consequently, two cases are explored in thisassessment: unconditional INDCs and conditional
INDCs. In the unconditional INDC case, Parties with
INDCs are assumed to implement only those portionsof their targets without conditions, while Parties thatsolely have a conditional target are assumed to follow
a current policy trajectory. In the conditional INDC
case, all Parties with INDCs are assumed to implement
their conditional targets, and Parties that only have an
unconditional target are assumed to implement thattarget. In both the unconditional and conditional INDC
cases, it is assumed that for any traded international
offsets, each unit is counted towards the INDC of asingle country only – either the buyer or the seller.4

The current policy trajectory scenario reflects
the best estimates of the global emissions – taking
currently adopted and implemented policies into
account. Current policy trajectory scenarios assume
that no additional mitigation action is taken beyond
current climate policies – regardless of whether thisresults in 2020 Pledges not being achieved or being
overachieved. Current policy trajectories reflect
all adopted and implemented policies, which forthe purpose of this report are defined as legislativedecisions, executive orders, or their equivalent. Thisimplies that publicly announced plans or strategies
alone would not qualify, while individual executive
orders to implement such plans or strategies would
qualify. Ultimately, however, these definitions
may be interpreted differently in the different
underlying studies. This assessment is bound by theinterpretations used by individual research groups.
The current policy trajectory scenario is based on
the current policies scenarios from four3 of the ten
available global INDC analyses that provide suchcurrent policy trajectory scenarios, as detailed in table
3.2.

•

The INDC scenario portrays how global greenhousegas emissions might evolve under full implementationof INDCs. It is sourced from ten global INDC analyses,
which updates the work of UNEP (2015), and is
described in more detail in Rogelj et al. (2016). The
number of INDCs considered by the studies that wereassessed here ranges from the 118 INDCs submitted
by 1 October 2015 to the 160 INDCs submitted by 12
December 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015a) (table 3. 2). These
118 to 160 INDCs cover emissions from 145 to 187
out of 195 Parties to the UNFCCC, which in turn were
responsible for roughly 88 to more than 96 per cent
INDCs were submitted before the Paris summit; under the Paris Agreement,
future mitigation contributions will be referred to as National Determined
Contributions (NDCs), without the ‘Intended’.
These four groups with current policy scenarios are: (i) the Climate Action
Tracker by Climate Analytics, NewClimate Institute, Ecofys and Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research; (ii) International Energy Agency; (iii)
Joint Research Centre; and (iv) PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency. The groups from London School of Economics and Danish Energy
Agency also have current policy scenarios that are calibrated at theInternational Energy Agency current policies scenario.

4

The 1.5°C and 2°C scenario represent least-costs
global scenarios consistent with a likely chance oflimiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. The 2°C scenario comprises thesubset of scenarios from the Fifth Assessment Reportof the IPCC scenario database (Clarke et al., 2014)
that: (i) have a greater than 66 per cent chance of
keeping global temperature increase to below 2°C
by 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels, (ii) areconsistent with full implementation of 2020 Pledges
that are anchored in the Cancun Agreement, and(iii) distribute emission reductions across regions,gases and sectors after 2020 in such a way that
global mitigation costs of necessary reductions areminimised. The 1.5°C scenario data is selected fromthe literature and comprises scenarios which: (i)have a greater than 50 per cent chance of keeping

This is in line with the intention of countries not to double the count ofoffsets, which is consistent with the Paris Agreement.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

13

Table 3.2: Overview of global INDC studies included in the Gap assessment (in alphabetical order). Source: Rogelj et al. (2016).

aReference

Sector andgas coverage

Cut-Off Date forAnalysis andCountries Included

Scenario
coverage

Unconditional
INDC case

Conditional
INDC case

Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker,
2015)

All

8 Dec. 2015

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

X

X

Climate & Energy College / University of
Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2015)

All

15 Dec. 2015

INDC

X

X

Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 2015)

All

20 Oct. 2015

INDC

X

—

Danish Energy Agency (DEA, 2015)

All

8 Dec. 2015

INDC

X

—

International Energy Agency - World Energy
Outlook (IEA, 2015)

Alla

15 Dec. 2015

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

X—

Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous andKeramidas, 2015; Kitous et al., 2016)

All

Mid-Oct. 2015

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

X

X

London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE) (Boyd et al., 2015)

All

Mid-Oct. 2015

INDC

X

X

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)(Fawcett et al., 2015)

All

Mid-Oct. 2015

INDC

X

—

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016)All

15 Dec. 2015

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

X

X

UNFCCC Synthesis Report on the Aggregate
Effect of INDCs (UNFCCC, 2016e)

All

4 April 2016

INDC

X

X

Only available at the global level. Here the International Energy Agency current policies scenario is used.

global temperature increase to below 1.5°C by 2100
compared to pre-industrial levels, (ii) have emissions
in 2020 above 53 gigatonnes CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e)
per year, and (iii) distribute emission reductions
across regions, gases and sectors after 2020 in sucha way that global mitigation costs of necessary
reductions are minimised (Rogelj et al., 2015).
The studies from which the current policy trajectory
scenario and the INDC scenario are drawn differ in a numberof ways, such as: conditional versus unconditional INDCs;
assumptions regarding non-covered sectors and gases;
treatment of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
and surplus emission units; different bases for calculating
Global Warming Potentials (table 3.2). The methodologicaldifferences between the groups cannot be fully harmonized,
which leads to some uncertainty as indicated in the resultspresented in Section 3.4, where the implications of thedifferences between studies are also further explored.

Table 3.3: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile
range). Ranges are computed as described in Rogelj et al. (2016). In cases where estimates are based on less than 10 scenarios, theminimum-maximum range is provided. The row of “Conditional INDCs” is only provided for information, as a direct comparison with the“Unconditional INDCs” ranges is not possible due to arbitrary model sampling differences. Source: Rogelj et al. (2016).
Emissions estimates (GtCO2e/year)
Scenario

Global total emissions in 2025

Global total emissions in 2030

Number of scenarios in set

Baseline

61.0 (56.7-64.3)

64.7 (59.5-69.5)

179

Current policy trajectory

56.2 (54.8-59.4)

59.4 (57.9-63.1)

3

Unconditional INDCs

53.9 (50.6-56.3)

55.5 (51.9-57.5)

10

Conditional INDCsa

53.0 (49.3-54.9)

53.4 (49.5-54.7)

10 (6+4)

2°C pathways (least-cost from 2020)

47,7 (46.2-50.2)

41.8 (30.6-43.5)

10

1.5°C pathwaysc (least-cost from 2020)

47.2 (45.8-48.2)

38.8 (37.7-40.0)

6

b

a

 ssuming full implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs. Six studies provided an estimate for the conditional INDC case. The median estimate ofA
influence derived from these six studies is used to adjust the unconditional INDC estimate of the four remaining studies that did not include conditional INDC estimates.
The estimated improvement of moving from the unconditional to the conditional case is in the range of 2.4 (1.2-4.8 GtCO2e per year full range).
bAs in UNEP (2015): limiting global average temperature increase to below 2°C with greater than 66 per cent probability in 2100 (probabilities never drop below 60 per
cent during the entire century).
cAs in UNEP (2015): limiting global average temperature increase to below 1.5°C with greater than 50 per cent probability in 2100 (allowing median temperatures to
exceed the 1.5°C limit during some period before 2100).

14

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

3.3.2 The effect of INDCs on global greenhouse gas
emissionsThis section presents the findings regarding the aggregate
effect on total global greenhouse gas emissions of full
implementation of the INDCs in 2025 and 2030, compared tothe emissions implied by baseline, current policy trajectory,
and 2oC and 1.5oC scenarios. The results are shown in table
3.3 and figure 3.1.

It is apparent from figure 3.1 that current policies lead toemissions that are markedly lower than the baseline, whichassumes that no additional climate policies are put in placefrom 2005. This indicates that the baseline will become
increasingly less useful as a reference case.

Figure2.1Global
GlobalCO2 emissions
from underfossil different
fuel andscenarios
industry
Figure 3.1:
greenhousegas emissions
and the emissions gap in 2030.
Annual Global Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GtCO2e)70

Baseline

60

Current policy trajectory
Unconditional
INDC caseRemaining gap
to stay within
2°C limit

1.5°C
range

40
Blue area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 2°C by
2100 with > 66% chance

GtCO2e17
GtCO2e15

INDC case uncond.

Purple area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 1.5°C by
2100 with > 50% chance

INDC case cond.

GtCO2e14

GtCO2eMedian estimateof level consistent
with 2°C:
42 GtCO2e(range 31-44)

INDC case cond.

12

50

INDC case uncond.

Conditional
INDC caseRemaining gap
to stay within
1.5 °C limit
Median estimateof level consistent
with 1.5°C:
39 GtCO2e(range 38-40)

2°C
range
70
Baseline

60

Current policy trajectory

30
2015

2020

2025

Unconditional INDC case
Conditional INDC case

2030
50

40

2°C
range

30

Sources: The 20th–80th-percentile ranges are shown for the baseline and the
2°C and 1.5°C scenarios. For current-policy and INDC scenarios, the minimum–
maximum and 10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed studies are given,
respectively.

1.5°C
range

20

10

0
2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

15

Figure 3.1 shows that full implementation of theunconditional INDCs will reduce global greenhouse gas
emissions in 2030 by nine GtCO2e (range: 7-13) relative
to the median no-policy baseline, and by four GtCO2e5(range: 2-7) relative to the median current policy trajectory.
Comparing these cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios to theunconditional INDC projections shows a large discrepancy.
More specifically, there is a gap in 2030 of 14 GtCO2e (range:
10-16) between the unconditional INDC scenario and the 2oC
scenario. Comparing the unconditional INDC scenario withthe 1.5 C scenario further increases the gap by three GtCO2e,which is in the same order as found in UNFCCC (2016e).
In comparison, if countries were to also fully implement
the conditional INDCs, estimated global greenhouse gas
emissions in 2030 would end up about 2.4 GtCO2e (range:
1.2−4.8) lower in 2030 compared to the unconditional INDC
scenario case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 12 (8–13) GtCO2e
between the conditional INDC scenario and the cost-optimal
2oC scenario. Comparing the conditional INDC scenario withthe 1.5oC scenario increases the gap by three GtCO2e.
For a number of countries, the INDC targets suggest
emission levels above their estimated no-policy baseline orcurrent policy scenario. These countries are, thus, expected
to overachieve their INDC targets (see Section 3.4 for further
details on G20 members). Different model teams treat thesesurpluses in different ways, which adds an uncertainty of
one GtCO2e (range: 0-1) by 2030 to the estimated INDC andgap projections here.
The gap calculations assume that there is no double countingof reductions. In other words, transferred reductions are
only counted towards the achievement of one country’s
INDCs, not towards both the country buying and selling.
However, as the Paris Agreement allows the possibility ofvoluntary use of “internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes”, it is possible that a system of trading offset
credits will be developed and used. This could imply a risk of
double counting, which could increase the global emissions
by 2030 by 0.8 GtCO2e in the unconditional and conditional
INDC case.6

3.3.3 The carbon budget implications of INDCs

To give an indication of the carbon budget implications of
the INDC scenarios, figure 3.2 shows the cumulative CO2
emissions implied by the INDC scenarios until 2030. Figure
3.2 shows that under the INDC scenarios, the IPCC CO2 budget
for limiting warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per centprobability will be close to depleted by 2030, and the IPCC
CO2 budget in line with limiting warming to below 1.5°C withat least 50 per cent probability will already be well exceededby 2030. The figure also illustrates the limited CO2 budget
5
6

16

The gap numbers and ranges in the text are rounded to the nearest gigatonne.
Consistent with the earlier analysis of double counting in the UNEP 2014
Emissions Gap Report, for the INDC cases it is assumed that internationalemission offsets could account for 33 per cent of the difference between
current policies trajectory and emission levels for the INDC cases by 2030
for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries. This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many Parties have
yet to specify any limits to the use of transferable units.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

implications of the INDC scenarios compared to the current
policy scenario. If the CO2 budget is exceeded, negativeemissions at a global scale are required to capture the excess
CO2. As highlighted in Section 3.2, limitations or absence ofnegative emissions technologies would significantly limit
the feasibility of keeping temperature rise to low levels in
2100. Steep emission reductions would be required over the
coming 5 to 15 years to hedge against a strong reliance on
negative emissions technologies later in this century.

3.3.4 The global temperature effect of INDCs

Estimates of what level of temperature increase theimplementation of the INDCs would result in depends on theassumptions made about what happens after 2030, and theprobability assigned to the temperature increase. The Paris
Agreement indicates that consecutive National Determined
Contributions (NDCs) have to represent a progression overtime. Here, the same approach is adopted as in a recent study(Rogelj et al., 2016) which assumes that, as a minimum, thisentails that the level of climate mitigation effort implied by
the actions to achieve INDCs by 2030 is continued after 2030,
until the end of the century.7 Under these assumptions, thefull implementation of the unconditional INDCs is consistent
with staying below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C(median, range: 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100 relative to pre-industrial
levels with greater than 66 per cent probability. This is lower
than current policies, which imply staying below an increaseof 3.6°C (median, range: 3.4–3.7°C) by 2100 with greaterthan 66 per cent probability. Full implementation of theconditional INDCs would lower the temperature projections
relative to the unconditional INDCs by about 0.2°C.

3.4 Understanding the mitigation effortsof the INDCs – A closer look at G20
members
This section presents country-specific findings for themembers of the G20.8 As mentioned in Chapter 2, these
economies, collectively, generate around three quarters ofglobal greenhouse gas emissions, and their emission levels
and INDCs have the largest impact on the aggregate, global
findings of this assessment.

3.4.1 Overview of scenarios

For each of the G20 members, median emission projections
resulting from the full implementation of the INDC are
calculated. The calculation is based on the same data as in
the 2015 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2015), complemented
with data from two new studies of the Joint ResearchCentre (Kitous et al., 2016) and Pacific Northwest National

7

8”Continued effort” in this context is approximated by estimating the global
carbon price implied by the INDCs in 2030 and projecting this price further
until the end of the century in a way consistent with the scenarios available
in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC Working Group III Scenario
Database. See Rogelj et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the method.
The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), theUnited States of America (USA), and the European Union (EU). In our analysis,the EU including all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) is considered
as a single Party, and EU Member States are not considered individually.

Figure 3.2: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030
and alltime 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets. Cumulative
global total carbon dioxide emissions for the conditional
INDC case, the unconditional INDC case and the current
policies scenario, and carbon budgets from the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC AR5) (IPCC, 2014a). The carbon
budget ranges show the values based on the range of
scenarios assessed by Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b).
The solid horizontal line at 1,000 GtCO2 shows theestimate based on complex Earth-System Models,assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a).Historicalemissions until 2015 are based on Le Quéré et al. (2015).

Cumulative CO2 emissions 2011–2030 [GtCO2]
1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

All-timebudget

2 °C

1,000

(>66%
chance)
range

900

800

700

All-timebudget600

1.5 °C(>50%
chance)
range

500

400

300

200

100

0

Emittedfrom
2011-2015

ImpliedImplieduntil 2030 by until 2030 byconditional unconditional
INDC
INDC

Implieduntil 2030
by current
policies

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

17

Laboratory (Fawcett et al., 2015), and with estimates for thethree G20 economies, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
that were not included in the previous Emissions Gap
Report. More specifically, the data is sourced from:(i)

The official estimates included in the INDCs (UNFCCC,
2016a).
(ii) Calculations based on the INDCs and otherdocuments submitted by countries to the UNFCCC(such as national greenhouse gas inventories,
national communications, biennial reports, andbiennial update reports).
(iii) Estimates published in country-specific studies.
(iv) Eight independent global analyses,9 described further
in detail in table 3.4.
Figure 3.3 presents the greenhouse gas emission projections
for G20 economies for current policy trajectories, andfor unconditional and conditional (in the case of India,
Indonesia and Mexico) INDC cases for 2030, noting that for
the United States of America (USA), the 2025 unconditional

INDC is shown. The Figure provides an indication of whether
or not a country needs to implement policies additional tothe current policy trajectory to meet its INDC target, butdoes not attempt to indicate the level of ambition of the
INDC targets. It is also important to note that the current
policy trajectory scenarios, which attempt to reflect themost recent mitigation policies, differ from the baselineor business as usual (BAU) scenarios employed by somecountries, which typically assume that no new policies
are adopted or implemented after a given cut-off year.
Figure 3.3 shows that for many countries the implementationof their INDC would lead to lower emissions than the current
policies scenario, or in other words that additional policies
would have to be implemented to meet the INDC target.
However, it should be noted that additional research isnecessary, as the uncertainty ranges overlap for many countries
and since the number of studies available for the current
policy trajectory case and the INDC cases vary significantly.

Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 economies, and G20 as a whole, by 2030 for the business as
usual (BAU) emissions projection from the INDC submission (third bar), for the current policies scenario from official and national studies(fourth bar), from global model studies used for our analysis (fifth bar), for the unconditional INDC scenario (sixth bar), and for theconditional INDC scenario (seventh bar). The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions
projections for China, EU, India and USA are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axes. The
Figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies),
current policies (all studies) and the unconditional INDC and conditional INDC (all studies).
Figure 3.3aEmissions (GtCO2e/year)
20
18

1990
2010

16

National BAU reported in INDC

14

Current policies (national studies)12

Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional INDC (all studies)

10

Conditional INDC (all studies)

8
6
4

4

2
0

China

EU28

India

USA*

2 5 10 -1 3 6 -

1 5 7 8
Number of studies

1 5 9 -* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025.
918

The UNFCCC synthesis report and the Danish Energy Agency study are
excluded here, as these studies do not provide national estimates.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

3.4.2 The effect of INDCs on G20 members’
greenhouse gas emissions

Cross-cutting information regarding national emissions(relative to various base years), emissions per grossdomestic product and emissions per capita for G20
economies is summarised in figures 3.4a-c. The projectionsof the latter two indicators are influenced by many factors.
For example, economic and population growth will generally
result in an increase in emissions, while energy intensity
improvements in the global economy and reductions ofcarbon intensity in energy production will generally resultin a decrease in emissions. The population and the grossdomestic product projections are based on the medium UN
population scenario and the International Energy Agency
World Energy Outlook Report 2014 (IEA, 2014) -- if available
for the selected countries -- and the Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways database (scenario SSP2) (Dellink et al., 2016),
which is consistent with the current policies scenarios.
Figure 3.4a illustrates the change in emissions by 2030
compared to different historical years -- 1990 and 2010, themost recent year for which comprehensive data is available.
It indicates that the various countries have had different
phases of rapid emissions increase.
Figure 3.4b illustrates the wide range of likely per capita
emissions in 2030. It also illustrates a general trend thatcountries starting from a lower base level in 2010 tend toincrease more by 2030.

Figure 3.4c shows the emissions intensity of the economies.
This is useful as an indicator of the extent to which INDCs
lead to a convergence in emissions intensity among
countries, and to a decoupling of economic growth andemissions. As figure 3.4b shows, emissions per capita areprojected to decline between 2010 and 2030 in all G20
economies except Argentina, China, India, the RussianFederation, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as a result of theimplementation of unconditional INDCs. At the same time,
income levels are projected to increase in this time period,
indicating a decoupling of economic growth and greenhousegas emissions. In total, decoupling is projected for 15 to
16 of the G20 economies, depending on the conditionalityof their INDCs. Only Turkey shows an increase in emission
per gross domestic product. The largest reductions areprojected for countries with the highest emission intensities
in 2010, such as Brazil, China, and Indonesia. Furthermore,
emission intensities of all G20 economies are projected
to lead to levels between about 200 and 900 tonnes CO2e
per million US$ in 2030, independent of these countries’
emission intensity levels in 2010 and income levels in 2030.
This convergence, again, reflects a decoupling of economic
growth and greenhouse gas emissions.
Providing an assessment of whether the magnitude ofchange in these indicators as a result of INDCs is consistent
with ambition and fairness requires explicit benchmarking
across alternative normative indicators of burden-sharing,and is beyond the scope of the Emissions Gap Report.

Figure 3.3b
Emissions (GtCO2e/year)
4
1990

3.5

2010
National BAU reported in INDC

3

Current policies (national studies)
2.5

Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional INDC (all studies)

2

Conditional INDC (all studies)

1.5
1
0.5
0

Argentina Australia

BrazilCanada Indonesia

Japan

MexicoRussiaSaudi
ArabiaSouth Republic
Africa** of Korea

Turkey- 2 3 3- 3 6 -

1 4 6 -

1 4 7 - - 3 4 4
Number of studies

1 3 6 -

1 3 3 -

1 5 - 4- 3 3 -

1 4 5 -

- 3 4 5

- 3 6 -** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

19

Table 3.4: Overview of INDC studies included in the G20 member assessment by type of source (in alphabetical order).
Reference

Geographic coverage

Sector andgas coverage

Scenario
coverage

Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker,
2015)

All G20 economies included

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Climate & Energy College / University of
Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2015)

All G20 economies included

All

INDC

Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 2015)

About nine countries, that is: Australia, Canada, EU,
India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Republic of Korea, USAa

All

INDC

International Energy Agency - World Energy
Outlook (IEA, 2015)

China, India

CO2 from
energy useb

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous andKeramidas, 2015; Kitous et al., 2016)

All G20 economies included

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE) (Boyd et al., 2015)

All G20 economies, except Australia

All

INDC

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)(Fawcett et al., 2015)

China, India, Russiac

All

INDC

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016)

All G20 economies included

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Australian Government (2015)

Australia

All

Current policy
trajectory

Biennial Report/Biennial Update Report(UNFCCC, 2016b)aBrazil, Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russia andSwitzerland

VariesCurrent policy
trajectory

Department of Environmental Affairs (2014)

South Africa

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

EEA (2014)

EU

All

Current policy
trajectory

Government of Canada (2014)

CanadaAll

Current policy
trajectory

INDCs (UNFCCC, 2016a)

Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea,
South Africa, Turkey and the USA

VariesINDC

National Climate Change Strategy (2013)

MexicoAll

Current policy
trajectory

National Communications (UNFCCC, 2016c;
UNFCCC 2016d)

Indonesia, USA

Varies

INDC

Centre for Policy Research (Dubash et al.,
2015)

India

CO2

Current policy
trajectory

Climate Advisers (Belenky, 2015)

USAa

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Energy Research Institute Low carbon
scenarios (based on Jiang et al., 2013)

China

CO2d

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad(Garg et al., 2014)

India

All

Current policy
trajectory

Institut du Développement Durables et desRelations Internationales (Garg et al., 2014)

Japan

All

INDC

King Abdullah University of Science andTechnology, (2014)

Saudi Arabia

CO2d

Current policy
trajectory

National Center for Climate Strategy andInternational Cooperation (Sha et al., 2015)

China

CO2d

INDC

World Resources Institute (Kuramochi, 2014)

Japan

All

INDC

World Resources Institute (Hausker et al.,
2015)

USA

All

Current policy
trajectory, INDC

Global INDC analyses

Official country-specific data sources

Independent country-specific data sourcesa ompared to last year, we have deleted the INDC estimate of China for the studies Climate Interactive and Climate Advisers because of data inconsistency, but this doesC
not affect the INDC estimate of China, as the number of studies included is still 10 (instead of 12).
b
Augmented with US Environmental Protection Agency (2012), JRC/PBL (2014) and den Elzen et al. (2015) to produce economy-wide figures.
cNot all countries’ projections of the studies are included for this analysis.
dAugmented with Tavoni et al. (2015) and Government of China (2012) to produce economy-wide figures.

20

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

Figure 3.4: Greenhouse gas emissions for the INDCs for G20 members relative to 2010 levels (a), per capita emissions (b), emission
intensity of the economy (that is, emissions per unit of real gross domestic product – US$ 2005) (c).
Figure 3.4a: Greenhouse gas emissions relative to base year (in percentage) for G20 members under the INDCs in 2030.

EU28
CanadaUSA*
Australia
Republicof Korea

tCO2e

Japan
BrazilMexicoDEC

31

RussiaIndonesia
South
Africa**range**

range**

China

331

Saudi
Arabia

466

India

353
289
314

Turkey
-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

≥200

Figure 3.4b: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita for G20 members under the INDCs in 2030 (tCO2e/capita).

India

2010

MexicoBraziltCO
tCO2e2

EU28
Indonesia
Japan
China
Republicof Korea
TurkeySouth
Africa**range**USA*
CanadaAustralia
RussiaSaudi
Arabia
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025.
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e including LULUCF
over the period 2025-2030.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

21

Figure 3.4c: Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of gross domestic product (US$ 2005) for G20
members under the INDCs in 2030 (in MtCO2e/US$ billion).

EU28

2010

Japan
Republicof Korea

MtCO
tCO2e2USA*
MexicoCanadaBrazilAustralia
India
China
TurkeySouth
Africa**range**

Indonesia
RussiaSaudi
Arabia
0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025.
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.

However, a number of recent studies attempt this task usinga range of different effort-sharing allocations according todifferent equity principles (Climate Action Tracker, 2015;
Climate Equity Reference Project, 2015; Meinshausen et al.,2015; Hof et al., 2016). These include studies that explicitly
draw on the data from the IPCC effort-sharing allocation
database (Höhne et al., 2014), which comprises data frommany effort-sharing studies reviewed for the IPCC.

3.5 Summary of findings
The decisions of the Paris Agreement on “well below 2°C”
and “pursuing efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C”
requires a redefinition of the emissions gap. Moving from
2°C to 1.5°C increases the gap by around three GtCO2e in
2030 with significantly more stringent emissions reductions
required afterwards.
INDCs are a first start to initiate this required transition, but
are still far from being in line with the agreed long-termgoals. Ambition of the existing INDCs, with target years
through 2030, would have to be increased. Continuing on
the emissions trajectory implied by the current INDCs would
mean that the budget for 1.5°C is already overspent by 2030,

22

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – 2030 trends and ambition

and the budget for 2°C is almost depleted. Due to the pathdependence of technology and the risk of lock-in, the earlier
these targets are enhanced, the easier and less costly it will
be to achieve them. The more ambitious early mitigationis, the less the world will have to rely on socially contested
negative emissions technologies and high-cost emission
reduction options in the future.
The estimates of the emission levels that would be realised
under full implementation of the INDCs have not changed
significantly compared to last year’s report. Countries
show wide differences in the need to implement additional
policies to meet their INDCs. In general, differences of percapita emissions and emission intensity narrow (with some
exceptions), but these levels are still well above the global
average level needed to be compatible with a 1.5°C or 2°C
temperature target.

Chapter 4

Bridging the gap – the role ofnon-state action
Lead authors: Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute) and Philip Drost (United Nations Environment Programme)
Contributing authors: Fatemeh Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU Partnership), Sander Chan (German Development Institute), Ann Gardiner (Ecofys),
Thomas Hale (University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government), Angel Hsu (Yale University - Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies), Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), Daniel Puig (UNEP DTU Partnership), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency) and Sebastian Sterl (NewClimate Institute)

4.1 Introduction
Global climate change governance is becoming increasingly
diverse, with many actors, other than national governments,
undertaking climate change management actions. In
this chapter, the focus is on actors like the private sector,
civil society organisations, cities and regions, and othersubnational actors, often referred to as non-state actors.
Their actions could be either individual or cooperative.1
The 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
showed a growing institutionalisation of processes aimed
at engaging non-state actors in efforts to manage climatechange. This chapter assesses the role of non-state actors inbridging the emissions gap and summarises the role of theiractions in the UNFCCC process. The chapter describes key
features of a sample of around 200 cooperative initiatives,and provides a synthesis of recent estimates of emission
reduction potentials by non-state actor actions. Finally, ithighlights a number of issues where additional research is
required.

4.2 Non-state actors and the climate change
negotiations
Over the past decades, non-state actors have been taking
measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases(Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Bulkeley et al.,2014).2 While they unarguably played a key role in putting
climate change issues firmly on the international agenda,
their place within the international climate regime has long
been limited to roles as observers and lobbyists.3 Over theyears, the role of non-state actors in international climatechange negotiations has shifted towards a more structural,long-term engagement.

4.2.1 Non-state actor actions in recent years

Early efforts include the Momentum for Change campaign
by the UNFCCC secretariat, to “shine a light on the enormous
groundswell of activities underway across the globe thatare moving the world toward a highly resilient, low-carbon
future” (UNFCCC, 2016c).4
The Peruvian government, in collaboration with the
UNFCCC secretariat, launched the Non-State Actor Zone for
Climate Action, an online platform to showcase non-statecommitments, both by individual and cooperative entities.
The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action provides thebroadest overview of non-state and subnational climate
action to date, and includes data from multiple partnerorganisations (UNEP, 2015).5

2

3

4
1

In some instances, national governments also participate in cooperative
initiatives lead by non-state actors, sometimes even driving the action.

5

These efforts go back at least 25 years, with the launch of the Rainforest
Alliance in 1980, and fall under the broader pattern of international
governance schemes, which emerged in the mid-1970s, partly as a resultof the increasing globalisation spurred by the liberalisation of international
financial markets.
In some instances, representatives from non-state actor initiatives havejoined a UNFCCC party delegation team. This may have helped raiseawareness among UNFCCC Parties about the breadth of actions undertaken
by non-state actors.
Additional information about the campaign is available online at: http://
unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/6214.php [Accessed
11 October 2016]
The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action database is available online at:
http://climateaction.unfccc.int/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action

23

The so-called Technical Examination Process on Mitigation,a multi-stakeholder forum within the UNFCCC negotiation
process, was started in 2014 and expert meetings havebeen organized around specific themes such as transport,
renewable energy and land use. Relevant non-state actors
are engaged in the process.6
At the UNFCCC COP 20 in Peru, the host government, thegovernment of France (as host of the 2015 conference),
the UNFCCC secretariat, and the office of the UN SecretaryGeneral launched the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.7 Focusing on
12 thematic areas, the Agenda seeks to: (i) mobilize “robust
global action towards low carbon and resilient societies”, (ii)provide “enhanced support to existing initiatives”, and (iii)
mobilize “new partners” and provide “a platform for thevisibility of their actions” (UNFCCC, 2016b).
France declared the Lima-Paris Action Agenda to be the‘fourth pillar’ of the Paris climate conference, together
with a universal legal agreement, Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) from UNFCCC Parties, and finance andtechnology.8•

Ensuring a degree of continuity of the Lima-Paris Action
Agenda by establishing two high-level champions,
who are tasked to “facilitate through strengthened
high-level engagement in the period 2016-2020 thesuccessful execution of existing efforts and the scalingup and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary
efforts, initiatives and coalitions” (UNFCCC, 2016, p. 18)(paragraph 121).

Building on the above decision, and drawing on themultiplicity of previous efforts it echoes, a Global Climate
Action Agenda was launched in May 2016.11 The Global
Climate Action Agenda has two priorities:12••

Engage with interested parties and non-party
stakeholders, including furthering the voluntary
initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.
Provide guidance to the UNFCCC secretariat on theorganisation of technical expert meetings focused on
specific policies, practices and actions, and coordinate
annual high-level events.

4.2.2 The Paris outcomes and beyond

There is little doubt that the growing engagement of nonstate actors has contributed to the successful conclusionof the Paris Agreement (Jacobs, 2016).9 Section IV of thedecision that accompanies the Paris Agreement (decision 1/
CP.21) illustrates the growing institutionalisation of non-state
actor engagement within the climate regime. Addressing
pre-2020 action, the decision introduces changes onprevious ad hoc mobilization efforts, with a view to ensuringa more structured engagement (UNFCCC, 2016h). The mainchanges are:

The process around COP 21 has brought a much higher levelof recognition than before to the role of non-state actors’in the intergovernmental climate change process. However,many open questions remain related to how the international
process can best recognise, support, and catalyse non-state
actor actions. Furthermore, how do non-state actor actions
relate to national governments’ efforts to implement their
NDCs, and to the development of future NDCs? Regarding
the latter question, it has been argued that some kind offormal coordination mechanism could be implemented(Betsill et al., 2015).

•

4.3 Overview of initiatives

•

•

•

6

The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform isanchored in the decision (paragraph 117).
High-level events for state and non-state climate action
until 2020 are expected to further ensure the visibility
and recognition at the highest level of non-state climate
actions (paragraph 121).
The Technical Examination Process on mitigation is
maintained (paragraph 109), with a view to broadening
the interface between state and non-state actors within
the UNFCCC process.10
UNFCCC Parties and non-party stakeholders areencouraged to continue catalysing efforts to strengthen
climate change action (paragraph 118).

Additional information about the forum is available online at: http://unfccc.
int/focus/mitigation/technical_expert_meetings/items/8179.php [Accessed
11 October 2016]
7 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/about/[Accessed 11 October 2016]
8 The speech of Laurent Fabius, the conference’s president, is available onlineat:
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lima/laurent-fabius-scientific-conferenceclosing-speech-our-common-future/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]
9 Hale (2016) argues that “following the Copenhagen summit of 2009, the[international climate change] regime has been shifting from a “regulatory”
model of binding, negotiated emissions targets to a “catalytic and facilitative”
model that seeks to create conditions under which actors progressively
reduce their emissions through coordinated policy shifts.” He further
suggests that “the December 2015 Paris Agreement and related decisions
confirm this evolution” (p. 12).
10 In paragraph 12, the document calls for the launch of a parallel process on
adaptation.

24

Non-state climate action comes in many forms. One
category that has attracted particular attention is theso-called International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs). The
reason is that the high number of participants in ICIs canlead to a considerable emission reduction impact.
There is no single definition of what constitutes an ICI.13
What is clear, however, is that over the past two decades thenumber of ICIs has grown significantly, and has experienced
a renewed impetus ahead of COP 21.14

11 The Road Map for Global Climate Action is available online at: http://
newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658505/high-level-champions-climate-actionroadmap.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2016]
12 The climate change champions will present a report of their work at the 2016
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.
13 Most often, ICIs are characterised as initiatives outside the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change aimed at reducing emissionsof climate forcers by, for example, promoting actions that are less GHG
intensive, compared to prevailing alternatives. Cooperative initiatives also
involve national and sub-national partners.
14 Note, for example, that between September 2014 and December 2015,
the number of local government signatories to the Compact of Mayors
increased from 228 to 428 (and up to 568 when this report went to press).
Similarly, between May 2015 and December 2015, more than 400 investors,
representing US$25 trillion in assets, joined the Investor Platform for Climate
Action.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action

Figure 4.1: Number of initiatives launched per year between 2000 and 2015. Source: Climate Initiatives Platform database.
Number of initiatives launched per year
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Table 4.1: Overview of features of 203 mitigation-focussed ICIs.
Features

Observed trends

Sectoral focus

Some initiatives (37) focus on more than one sector. For single-sector ICIs, the dominant sectors are transport(31), agriculture (22), and energy (20).

Geographic scope

Most initiatives (163) are global in scope. By region, the number of ICIs is highest in Europe (15), and Asia andthe Pacific (14), and lowest in West Asia (7), and Latin America and the Caribbean (6).

Permanent secretariat

Most initiatives (178) have a permanent secretariat. In many instances the secretariat is hosted by a related,larger organisation.

Regular reporting15

The extent to which initiatives report regularly on their activities is unclear in half (102) of the initiatives. Regular
reporting occurs in 73 instances (and irregular reporting in 28).

Type of commitment

Only some initiatives (61) have quantitative commitments. Twice as many (128) have qualitative commitments.
The nature of the commitment is unclear in all other instances (14).

Type of activities16

Climate Initiatives Platform registers three types of activities: technical dialogue, political dialogue, andimplementation. Many initiatives conduct more than one such activity. Implementation is the most common
activity (125), followed by technical dialogue (109), and political dialogue (49).

Type of membership

Industry is involved in over half (112) of the initiatives, followed by intergovernmental organisations (94),national-level government agencies (91), non-governmental organisations (78), subnational-level government
agencies (51), and academia (37).

Creation of ICIs

The annual creation of new initiatives rose from only a handful (4) in 2006, to a first peak in 2010 (20). It
reached a low point in 2013 (2), and swelled again in 2014 (33) and 2015 (27).

1516

Throughout 2016, the number of non-state commitments
and actions continued to increase. The Non-State Actor
Zone for Climate Action platform currently records over
11,000 climate commitments, mostly from individual cities,
regions and companies, but also from investors, civil society
organisations, and cooperative initiatives.
A number of databases collect information on ICIs. Because
definitions vary, the various databases record very different
numbers of entries.17 On the basis of their own set of criteria
15 Regular reporting refers to planned reporting, irrespective of its periodicity
16 Implementation refers to actions that directly lead to emission reductions(as opposed to the indirect impact on emissions that technical or political
dialogues are expected to have).
17 The purpose of the database and the level of effort devoted to keeping it upto-date are further reasons why the number of entries differ.

which an ICI database should meet, Widerberg and Stripple(2016) identified and reviewed five such databases.18+19
These are: the Non-state Action Zone for Climate Action,
the Climate Initiatives Platform,20 the Portal on Cooperative

18 The criteria used by Widerberg and Stripple require that the database: (i)collects information on ICIs and their participants, (ii) focus on transnational
initiatives, and (iii) focus on initiatives that have climate change mitigation as
their main focus (Widerberg and Stripple, 2016).
19 The databases were created for different purposes and, therefore, differ intheir criteria for including a specific initiative. For example, the Non-state
Action Zone for Climate Action database intends to showcase the breadthof non-state actor actions, whereas the Transnational Climate Change
Governance database was created for academic purposes, to analyse a welldefined, small selection of initiatives. The Global Aggregator for Climate
Actions serves a dual, political and academic purpose.
20 The Climate Initiatives Platform database is available online at: http://
climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Welcome [Accessed 11 October
2016]

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action25

4.2 Figure
Figure4.2:
Figure 4.2: Overview of features of 203 mitigation-focused ICIs.

70

Figure 4.2a: Regional distribution of initiatives in percentage

65EuropeNorth America

4

6

3

Global6West Asia

AfricaAsia andthe Paciﬁc

Latin America
and the Caribbean

Figure 4.2b: Sectoral distribution of initiatives

37

40
35

37

31

30

13

26

25

20

18

20
15
10

8

4

5

2

12

10

renewableenergyenergyeﬃciency
generic

22

0

s

ing

ild
Bu

er

Oth

an

Urb

ry

ust

Ind

y

str

e
For

rt
re
ce
ral
an cultu
spo
cto
n
e
i
a
s
r
Tr
ssAg
Cro

Fin

y

erg

En

Note: Some initiatives cover more than one sector.

Figure 4.2c:
Permanent secretariat

Figure 4.2d:
Regular reporting

Figure 4.2e:Type of commitment
Non-speciﬁc

178
yes
25
no

26

yes
no
unclear

14

73

28

102

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action

qualitative

128

61 quantitative

Table 4.2: Greenhouse gas emission reduction impacts of selected initiatives (in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) per year, bystudy).
Actors and sectors

Current individual commitments and/or initiatives’ goals
UNEP, 2015)

Target year
Initiatives forindividual
entities

Sector-wide
initiatives(Hsu et al.,2015)

(CISL andEcofys, 2015)(Roelfsema et al., 2015)(Graichen et al., 2016)

2020

2020

2030

2020

2030

600ii

700

55iii

55

2020

2020

Cities and municipalities

1,080

454i

Regions

760

Individual companies

630

Energy efficiency

60ix

Efficient cook stoves120

Renewable energy

51 – 100v
10 – 30vi
1,750x0.2xiii

Reduced deforestation andafforestation

100xxii

Agriculture

300

331xxiii

2,900

Range

2,500 – 3,300

660

280xi

1,180

270xii270

460xiv

1,360

240xvi520

500xvii

1,300

0xviii1,400

0.0 – 0.7xix

0

700xx

50xxi

140

20 – 200

300xxiv

700

800xxv

2,380xxvi

200xxvii

500~100-1,000~100-1,000200

Midpoint

270

500

Shipping and aviation
Total expected
reduction below
study’s baseline360

540viii

200xv
90

Fluorinated gases

Overlap between initiatives

1 400

60

Transport
Methane and other shortlived climate pollutants

800vii

iv

200

300

2,540

No totalxxviii

2,500

5,500

Part which is already covered bynational pledges / (I)NDCs

33%

Not
quantified

Not
quantified

70%

Not
quantified

Not
quantifiedxxix

Notquantified

Total expected reduction below
national pledges / (I)NDCs

1,700 – 2,200 Not
quantified

Not
quantified

750

Not
quantified

2,800 (range
1,600 – 4,000)

8,000 (range
5,400 – 10,600)

Note: The table summarises findings from studies that include more than one sector or actor.

Initiatives,21 initiatives collected in the context of theTransnational Climate Change Governance22 project, and the
Global Aggregator for Climate Actions23. A further overview
is presented in Graichen et al. (2016).
Widerberg and Stripple (2016) found that both the NonState Actor Zone for Climate Action and the Portal on
Cooperative Initiatives lack clear criteria, and noted that the
Global Aggregator for Climate Actions is no longer active.24
Moreover, the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
covers relatively few ICIs. The analysis presented here draws
on the Climate Initiatives Platform, because this databaseis updated more regularly and is publicly accessible.25
At present, the Climate Initiatives Platform records 203
initiatives focussed on mitigation. The remainder of this21 The Portal on Cooperative Initiatives database is available online at: http://
unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7785.php [Accessed 11 October 2016]
22 The Transnational Climate Change Governance database is available online
at: http://community.dur.ac.uk/tccg/downloads/ [Accessed 11 October
2016, password protected]
23 The Global Aggregator for Climate Actions database is available online at:
http://www.climategroundswell.org/blog-test/2015/7/16/galvanizing-agroundswell-of-solutions-to-support-cop21 [Accessed 11 October 2016]
24 The Global Aggregator for Climate Actions records all initiatives announced
during the 2014 United Nations Climate Summit.
25 The Climate Initiatives Platform database is continuously being updated, withthe goal of inventorying all initiatives that meet the following criteria:i Irrespective of what its main focus might be, the initiative contributes toreducing emissions of greenhouse gases (that is, initiatives that have no
discernible climate change goals – and approaches to reach them – are notincluded).
ii The initiative is international in scope (that is, initiatives promoting
emission reductions in only one country are not included).
iii The initiative involves cooperation between two or more non-state parties(that is, initiatives involving only one party, or only state actors, are notincluded).

section summarises trends observed in the selection of
initiatives currently inventoried in the Climate Initiatives
Platform database (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1).

iCompact of Mayors (currently “Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate &Energy”)ii
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) – Top 500 Companies and Cement
Sustainability Initiatives
iii
C40
iv
Under2MOUv
Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBCSD)vi
The World Wildlife Fund’s Climate Savers programmevii
C40 and Covenant of Mayors (currently “Global Covenant of Mayors for
Climate & Energy”)
viii American Business Act on Climate Pledge (ABAOCP), Caring for Climate,
RE100; does not take into account that these initiatives are expected to
grow by 2020/2030.
ix
En.lighten initiativex
Energy Efficiency Accelerator
xi
Global Buildings Performance Network (GBPN) and Super-EfficientEquipment and Appliance Deployment Initiativexii
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC)
xiii Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Lighthouse Initiativexiv European Wind Initiative, Solar Europe Industry Initiative, US Wind Program,
SunShot Initiativexv
Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI)
xvi International Union of Railways (UIC) Low Carbon Rail Transport Challenge
and Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI)
xvii Global Methane Initiative and Zero Routine Flaring by 2030
xviii Clime and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) and Global Methane Initiative (GMI)
xix Refrigerants Naturally!
xx
North American 2013 HFC Submission to the Montreal Protocol
xxi Clime and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)
xxii Tropical Forestry Alliancexxiii New York Declaration on Forests
xxiv New York Declaration on Forests
xxv Bonn Challenge and Governor’s Climate and Forest Task Force (GCFTF)
xxvi New York Declaration on Forests and Governor’s Climate and Forest Task
Force (GCFTF)
xxvii International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation
Organization
xxviii No total given as study was not intended to be exhaustive.
xxix All numbers were calculated with respect to an INDC baseline.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action27

26 27

Several initiatives were launched in 2015.26 These include,for example, the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, andthe Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity
Producers and Traders.
Geographically, ICI engagement is rather unbalanced: 70-90
per cent of them are led by developed country actors (Chanet al., 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions,
2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Bansard et al., 2016;
Hsu et al., 2016). Participants based in the Middle East andNorth Africa, Africa, Oceania, South East Asia, and China, areparticularly underrepresented (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Hsu etal., 2016).
Most initiatives that set quantitative commitments proposea target and time frame to which – in principle – all members
should commit, provide guidance and coordination support,
and conduct outreach campaigns to recruit additional
members27
Most of the initiatives that report regularly on theiractivities bring together governmental agencies – at the
local or national level – with one or more of the following
actors: industry, intergovernmental organisations, andnon-governmental environmental organisations. Typically,
industry provides some form of technical support, whileintergovernmental organisations and non-governmental
environmental organisations provide legitimacy (throughendorsement). In some instances, intergovernmentalorganisations provide financial support.28

Some of the initiatives that report regularly on theiractivities entail industry-only partnerships of European or
global reach, in which members impose reporting duties
on themselves. In these partnerships, reporting is seldom
verified by a third party.29
A small number of the initiatives that report regularly on
their activities are long-established efforts that were createdwith a very specific purpose, climate change mitigation only
being an ancillary benefit of the activity. Typically, they areorganisations with well-developed governance mechanisms,
which require regular reporting beyond financial reporting.30

4.4 Estimated emission reductions of
non-state actor actions
A growing number of analyses are available, which seek toestimate the potential and actual contribution of non-state
actor action to the global effort of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. However, the evidence base remains fragmented,
as outlined in this section.
National action, Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) and non-state actions may reinforce
each other and, together, create a virtuous cycle of raisingambition. Many initiatives address issues like financing,technology deployment, and capacity building, which may
have important indirect effects on emissions.
However, for analysing the overall global impact it isimportant to analyse the ambition level of both actions toTable 4.3: Greenhouse gas emission reduction impacts of selected initiatives (in MtCO2e per year, by study).

Sector-wide
initiatives

2020

2030

500

740

Regions
Business sector

2030

2020

2030

1,000

(Circle Economy
and Ecofys, 2016)

2030
402

(Erickson andTempest, 2014)(The Climate
Group, 2015)(Compact ofMayors, 2015)

2020
454

(CDP and We Mean
Business, 2016)

2030
Cities andmunicipalities

Systemic impact(Yale University,
2015)

Target year
Initiatives forindividual
entities(ARUP and C40
Cities, 2014)

Current individual commitments and/or initiatives’ goals(CDP and We Mean
Business, 2016)

Actors and sectors

2030

2030

3,700

1,200
3,9004,900i> 10,000ii

Circular economy

6,0007,500

Overlap between initiatives

700

Total expected impact below
study’s baseline

3,2004,200

454

402

500

740

1,200

None

Not
quantified

1,000

10,0003,700

6,0007,500

Note: The table summarises findings from studies that include only one sector or actor.
i
Science-Based Targets, RE100, EP100, Zero-deforestation pledges; taking into account that these initiatives are expected to grow by 2020/2030.
ii
Overlaps between initiatives mean the impact is smaller than the sum of the individual initiatives, as initiatives are complementary to each other. In this study, they
were not estimated in detail.

26 At the time of writing, the Climate Initiatives Platform database did notcontain any initiatives launched in 2016 (that is, 2015 was the latest year forwhich the database had any entries).
27 Examples include the Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Partnership, RE100, andthe Lima Challenge.
28 Examples include the Climate Group’s States and Regions Alliance and theAsia Forest Partnership.

28

29 Examples include the Airport Accreditation initiative and the Ultra-Low CO2
Steelmaking initiative.
30 Examples include the Forest Stewardship Council and the Global Reporting
Initiative.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of non-state action

Figure 4.3: Illustration of impact of initiatives by study.

Current individual commitments and/or initiatives goals

Global emissions (GtCO2e/year)

CitiesIncreasing coverage of initiatives
Regions
Companies
Cross-sectoral

17

Current
policies

GtCO2e

INDCs

fM

Th
e

pa
ct
o

Co
m

UP

Current
policies

58-62

AR

60

an
d

C4
0

Ci
ti

es
(2
01
4)
a
yo
Cl
im
rs
a
(
CD
20
te
15
Gr
Bu P a n)ou
s in d
p
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(
es e
2
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s( M
15
20 e
Hs
)
16 a n
u
et
)
a
l. (
Ro
20
el
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15
)
m
ae
UN
ta
EP
l. (
20
(2
01
15
5)
Gr
)
ai
ch
en
et
al
.(
20
16
)

70

14

52-57
Remaining
gap to staywithin
2°C limit

INDCs Gap

31-44

Current Policies Gap

GtCO2e

INDCs

50

2°C

40

2°C

30
2010

2020

2030

Note: The arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at different levels because the individual studies use different baselines (the last three studies explicitly
estimate the impact additional to INDCs).

understand if one adds more ambition than the other and,
therefore, helps close the emissions gap (Hale, 2016). While
doing so is analytically challenging, a number of studies
have made some inroads (see, for example, Höhne et al.,2015; Graichen et al., 2016).31 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 andfigure 4.3 provide overviews of the estimates available.
The studies vary significantly in scope, in particular whichkind of impact they analyse. We identified several categoriesof impact, but studies are not always clear about which
impact they estimate:Individual commitments: Reductions that would occur if allparticipants of the initiatives (individual companies, cities,
etcetera) fulfil their individually set targets.
Initiatives’ goals: Reductions that would occur if theinitiatives achieve their stated collective goals (in terms ofparticipants of companies and cities).

31 Analyses of the actual performance of non-state actor actions (as opposed
to simply analysing the targets, in the assumption that they will be met)
are emerging, but remain limited in number (see, for example, Khan andSovacool, 2016). Additional emission reductions that could potentially beachieved by non-state actors, should they receive support from national
governments, have not been studied to date.

Systemic impact: Reductions that would occur if theinitiatives achieve a transformative impact at sector levelor economy-wide level beyond the participants of theinitiatives themselves.
Studies on the actual performance of non-state actors inmeeting their voluntarily set targets (not only analysing thetargets themselves) are emerging, but are very limited in
number (for example Khan and Sovacool, 2016). Moreover,to the authors’ knowledge, additional reductions that canpotentially be delivered by initiatives through supporting
measures by national governments have not been studied
to date.
The compilation of available studies shows:•

Aggregated impact of individual non-state action,
initiatives, and national efforts cannot yet be
estimated with precision. More studies are available
compared to last year, in particular on cities, but large
data gaps remain as not all sectors are sufficiently
studied, and the overlaps and relation with INDCs arestill unclear. Key data shortcomings include:°	While emissions reductions are published,assumptions about greenhouse gas emission
baseline scenarios are often missing, as are

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

29

•

•

the baseline scenario projections. This makes
comparisons across studies challenging.
°	All studies assume full implementation. This
assumption leads to overestimates, if full
implementation is not achieved (Khan andSovacool, 2016). It follows that transparent data on
implementation levels, and the capacity to verify
the data, are needed (IVM and FORES, 2015).
The evidence available suggests that both activity
levels and actual emission reductions are increasing.
This trend is especially marked in the area of cities,
and ambitious plans of company initiatives are also
emerging.
The limited evidence available indicates that theaggregated impact of the initiatives to closing theemissions gap can be in the order of a few gigatonnesof carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO2e) in 2030. This
would represent a major contribution, if the initiatives
reach their stated goals and the emission reductions
do not displace actions elsewhere.

4.5 Issues for the futureThis section summarises a number of issues where additional
research is needed.

4.5.1 Integrate state and non-state action

To capture the full impact of non-state actor action, and to
maximise complementarity action, national governments
should take into account the potential impact of non-state
actor actions and initiatives. This would help national
governments obtain a better understanding of the size ofthe mitigation opportunities, while promoting heightened
ambition and capacity to realise those opportunities.32

4.5.2 Increase data on non-state action, inparticular on targets and impact

More data and analysis are needed to fully understand thescope of non-state actions. More and better greenhouse gas
and energy-use inventories for cities, companies and othernon-state actors would be especially useful.34
A clearer definition of the goals and targets of the initiatives
is needed, ideally indicating levels of ambition andadditionality in relation to other actions. Less than a thirdof the initiatives have quantitative targets. Analysing theemission reductions potential of initiatives that only havequalitative commitments is even more challenging.35
The Global Climate Action Agenda calls on non-state
actor initiatives to set targets that are consistent with thelong-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and to achieve
the commitments they make.36 Monitoring, reporting andverification procedures are instrumental in this process,but they vary widely among initiatives. Only a small, but
increasing, number of initiatives evaluate their impact.37
One-third of the initiatives registered in the Climate
Initiatives Platform regularly report on progress towardmeeting their goals and targets. For most of the initiatives,
the extent to which regular reporting of implementation
occurs is unclear.38 Nonetheless, the trend appears to be apositive one, and some non-state actor actions apply what
could be qualified as good practice in reporting.39

4.5.3 Further issues

Studies of the lessons learned from the initiatives are scarce(see, for example, CISL and Ecofys, 2015). Both new andexisting initiatives could benefit from this kind of analysis in
the formulation of commitments and the establishment ofeffective governance structures.

In areas where state and non-state actions overlap, non-state
actor actions may be able to “reinforce, implement, andgive credibility to the national pledges” (Hale, 2016, p. 20).
The reverse may also be true: non-state actor actions could
benefit from enhanced national government support – forexample through the removal of barriers, and supportive
legislation.33

Further research is needed to understand the reasons
behind the geographic imbalance in non-state action
leadership. At present, the focus is on short-term mitigation
potentials. Chan et al. (2016) emphasize the importance ofsmaller-scale innovative solutions that – initially – may onlyoffer limited mitigation potential, but have large mitigation
potential in the longer term – that is, 2050 and beyond.

32 Not least, non-state actor actions can also serve as important vehicles forpolicy experimentation and knowledge diffusion.
33 Development of guidance is underway, to help governments and initiatives
engage with each other more effectively (see, for example, the Initiative
for Climate Action Transparency, available online at: http://www.
climateactiontransparency.org/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]).

34 The Global Reporting Initiative has made some headway toward achieving
this.
35 It is worth noting that the emission reductions potential of non-state actor
actions with qualitative commitments may, in principle, be large.
36 Additional information about the Global Climate Action Agenda is available
online at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/global-climate-actionagenda/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]
37 It is worth noting that such evaluations are challenging to undertake,particularly in the case of initiatives involving multiple diffuse sources ofemissions.
38 It is worth noting that what constitutes ‘good reporting practice’ may be very
different from one sector to another.
39 For example, Graichen et al. (2016) find that the Bonn Challenge, the New
York Declaration on Forests and RE100, among others, follow above-averagereporting practices. They provide detailed descriptions of the initiatives,
and the members’ activities and targets, in addition to preparing their own
estimate of impact, and making available reporting guidance for potential
new members.

30

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

Chapter 5

Bridging the gap – the roleof energy efficiency
Lead Authors (alphabetical): Subash Dhar (UNEP DTU Partnership), Timothy Clifford Farrell (UNEP DTU Partnership), Rana Ghoneim (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and Diana Urge-Vorsatz (Central European University)
Contributing authors (alphabetical): Elisabeth Boles (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Benigna Boza-Kiss (Central European
University), Marco Matteini (United Nations Industrial Development Organization), Jyoti Painuly (UNEP DTU Partnership), Minal Pathak(CEPT University), Ksenia Petrichenko (UNEP DTU Partnership), Bettina Schreck (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) andPR Shukla (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad)

5.1 Introduction
Improving energy efficiency is essential to meeting theobjectives of the Paris Agreement and is a greenhouse gas
mitigation option offering many economy-wide benefits (IEA,
2014; IPCC, 2014; von Stechow et. al., 2015). Out of the 189
countries that submitted Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs), 168 countries included energy efficiency
as one of their priorities (Fenhann, 2016). Countries that
already have strong energy efficiency policies can testify to
the multiple benefits, including improved air quality, increasedsocial welfare, competitiveness and the creation of jobs (IEA,
2014; Puig and Farrell, 2015).
Investments in energy efficiency have shown a positive
net return for governments, businesses and households.
Importantly, end-use energy efficiency investments release
upstream cost reductions in power supply systems, with
examples of: 300 per cent return on investments from national
benefits in appliance standards and labelling programmes (4E,2016); electricity companies achieving 240 per cent returnon customer energy efficiency investments from reduced
upstream costs in generation, transmission and peak supply
costs (IEA, 2014). Despite falling global oil, gas and coal energy
prices, global investments in energy efficiency increased by
six per cent to US$221 billion between 2014 and 2015 (IEA,
2016a). If access to credit and bond markets is increased,
and transaction costs are lowered, even more investment will
be mobilized, especially if the climate benefits can also be
capitalized upon in the investments, such as through climate
financing or internalized cost of carbon (for example, reinvested
carbon taxes).
Energy efficiency policies struggle to work effectively against
a context of energy price subsidies, as low energy prices
undermine the essential economics of energy efficiency. Global

fossil fuel subsidies were estimated at US$490 billion in 2014
(IEA, 2015a), with a growing number of countries committing
to reforming these subsidies. Some countries with direct orindirect energy subsidies should explore options to shifting
subsidies from energy supply to end-use services.
This chapter offers policy makers an assessment of selected
policies that have been proven to accelerate energy efficiency
gains in three key sectors: buildings, industry and transport. In
2010, the buildings sector accounted for around 32 per centof final energy use and annual emissions of 8.8 gigatonnes
carbon dioxide (GtCO2) (direct and indirect); the industry
sector accounted for around 28 per cent of final energy use andemissions of 13 GtCO2, (direct and indirect, as well as process
emissions); while the transport sector accounted for 27 percent of final energy use and emissions of 6.7 GtCO2 (IPCC 2014).
If scaled-up, globally, the assessed energy efficiency policies
can dramatically reduce energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions in these key sectors. Sector-specific estimates ofemission reduction potentials are highly dependent on theunderlying assumptions and approaches. Therefore, studies
often result in different estimates of the potentials offeredby energy efficiency options. Numbers from two studies havebeen included to illustrate the scale of the possible reductions
for each sector.
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) shows that for a cost range of
between US$20 and 100 per tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2),
the estimates of both direct and indirect emissions reduction
potentials in 2030 are (in GtCO2e) 5.9 for buildings, 4.1 forindustry and 2.1 for transport (Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova,
2008). The authors note that these estimates are conservative
and the real potential in each sector is likely bigger. A more
recent analysis in the World Energy Outlook’s (IEA, 2012)

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

31

efficient world scenario1 indicates that the cumulative direct
and indirect emissions estimates in 2035 are (in GtCO2e) 30 forbuildings, 22 for industry and 12 for transport. The two studies
are not comparable due to basic differences in approaches,but collectively illustrate the significant potential in the threesectors.
Efficiency gains are evidently also possible in the energy
supply sector with, for example, more efficient generators,
transmission, and distribution systems. This chapter does,
however, focus on end-use efficiency because emissions
reductions are generally more cost-effective for demand-side
investments.
The chapter first assesses experience with key policy options in
the three sectors: buildings, industry and transport. These arethen followed by sections focusing wider on systems thinking
and integration, and emerging opportunities.
In addition to the mitigation effects, improved energy
efficiency offers other important benefits, for instance byplaying an important role in the achievement of many of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Goal seven specificallyaims to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and1

The core assumption in the Efficient World Scenario is that policies are put
in place to allow the market to realise the potential of all known energy
efficiency measures which are economically viable. This scenario includes thefull range of available energy efficiency policies and measures but no carbon
price is expressed in the results (IEA, 2012). These estimates aren’t potentials(like Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova (2008) based on a carbon price) but rather
scenarios of what is achievable under the economic conditions the World
Energy Outlook runs.

modern energy for all’, and includes an energy efficiency target(to double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency
by 2030). Achievement of goal seven impacts the deliveryof many other goals, such as good health and well being,sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption
and production, and climate action. This is further discussed
in Chapter 6.
As an example of the importance of energy efficiency in theimplementation of the various goals, the benefits of energy
efficiency related to goal eleven, sustainable cities andcommunities, are presented in box 5.1.

5.2. Building Sector
The building sector offers major opportunities to bridge theemissions gap, due to its large share in global energy use, thedynamics of population growth, urbanisation and housingneeds, and its large cost-effective mitigation potentials (IEA,
2013; IPCC, 2014). In 2013, the 212 billion square metres (m2)of global building stock accounted for almost 125 Exajoulesof final energy use (IEA, 2016b), up from 102 Exajoules in2000 (IPEEC, 2015). Thermal energy uses, including heating,cooling, and water heating, comprise the largest energy
service, with 55 per cent of total building energy use (IEA,
2016b).
Top-down estimates, obtained using integrated assessment
models, often show limited potential for energy savings up
to 2050. Conversely, bottom-up studies conclude that majorsavings (up to 75 per cent in 2050, compared to a referenceBox 5.1: Examples of the multiple benefits of energy efficiency that support SDG 11(Sustainable Cities and Communities).
Energy savings. Jakarta, Indonesia. The Jakarta Green Building Code was introduced in 2012 to reduce energy
consumption in large commercial and high-rise residential buildings. It is expected to cut 2.7 million tonnes of CO2
emissions per year by 2020 (IFC, 2016).
Improvements in air quality. Curitiba, Brazil. Integrated urban planning that encouraged high density commercial
and residential development, combined with the city’s public transportation network, reduced traffic congestion andenhanced air quality (Suzuki et al., 2010).
Impacts on public budgets. Los Angeles, United States of America (USA). Over a four-year period, the LED Streetlight
Replacement Programme has replaced over 140,000 existing streetlights in the city with LED units. It cost US$57 million,
but now saves US$9 million a year in energy costs and 60,000 metric tonnes of CO2 emissions, with a payback of six toseven years. Excess capacity freed up by the investment is being used to power as many as 100 electric charging stations(Davies, 2016).
Creation of jobs. Melbourne, Australia. The city of Melbourne launched a 1200 Buildings Programme in 2010, to improvethe energy and water consumption of 1,200 commercial buildings. An analysis of the economic benefits estimated that,by 2020, it could increase employment by 5,800 to 11,800 (Lawler, no date).
Improvement in human health and well being. Bogota, Colombia. The TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit system in Bogota
has replaced 2,100 old public service buses with ones that have improved operational efficiencies. The Bus Rapid Transit
system has delivered 40 per cent reduction in air emissions, 92 per cent reduction in accidents, and delivered fuelsavings of 47 per cent (ESMAP, 2009).
Increased access to energy and reduced fuel poverty. Tyrol, Austria. A 2007 housing subsidy was introduced thatprovides funding for social housing to overcome the additional costs of a passive design. Tyrol has the highest density ofpassive houses in the world, with a 21 per cent share in 2014 (Passive House Institute, 2015).
Benefits to energy providers. Johannesburg, South Africa. The city of Johannesburg has partnered with City Power toreduce peak load and household electricity consumption. About 65,000 smart meters have been deployed to monitor
consumption in real-time and alert high energy-using households to reduce consumption (Writer, 2015).

32

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

33

10%

33%

80%

34%

65%

Only space heating, cooling and hot waterDiﬀerence between baseline and mitigation scenario
Mitigation scenario

BOTTOM-UP MODELSAll end-uses
Diﬀerence between baseline and mitigation scenario
Mitigation scenario

Showing maximum scale for the regions% Energy saving potential

Includes integration of solar energy

13%

23%
38%

12%
30% 82%

EU

32%

67%

12%

25%

20%

9%

79%
39%

30%

World

10%
24%

4%
3%
32%

India

73%

43%

71%

29%

75%

33%

66%

l
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V.4 E 2.4 12.2 3.0 tota RVEY tota eace CHW CHW CHW0
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120

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160

180

200

220

240

Exajoules/yearll
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INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELS
Diﬀerence between baseline and mitigation scenario
Mitigation scenarioll
V.4 E 2.4 12.2 3.0 tota tota CHW CHWGE
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20 CAM '16- ISE- 6-H P-H
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30

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40

40

31%

50

50

Exajoules/year
60

USA

60

Exajoules/year

8%

31%

21%
15%

37%

China

61%

34%

61%

Derived from Harvey (2010), Lausten (2010), Ürge-Vorsatz et al.
(2012), IPCC (2014), Petrichenko (2014), IEA (2016b).

ll
V.4 E 2.4 12.2 3.0 tota tota CHW CHWGE
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Figure 5.1: Building energy demand in 2050, as projected by different Integrated Assessment Models and bottom-up models, contrasting baseline and mitigation scenarios.

scenario) are possible due to recent advances in technology,architecture and know-how – mainly with regard to heating
and cooling (figure 5.1). The difference between these two
types of analysis lies in the coverage of mitigation options,and the assumed rate of up-take. Bottom-up estimates
are mainly driven by technical and economic potentials,
whereas top-down estimates mostly reflect assumed market
adoption rates for certain technologies and investment
dynamics.

However, the existence of a building energy codes alone
does not guarantee emission reductions. To ensure theireffectiveness, the following principles need to also be adopted:••

With the sector orientation here, focus is on bottom-up
studies where well-designed policy packages are critical toachieving the stated potentials combining building energy
codes, building energy certification programs, together
with appropriate incentives and information campaigns(Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a).

5.2.1 Building energy codes

Building energy codes and standards are among the mostcost-effective instruments for reducing building-related
emissions (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b). These regulatory tools
set minimum requirements for parameters determining
building energy demand, such as energy performanceor resource use in new and/or existing buildings(Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b; Becqué et al., 2016). A strong and well
implemented building energy code will take the building
stock to a higher energy performance, and will be able
to avoid locking-in obsolete solutions and high-emitting
technologies, especially in rapidly developing regions(Becqué et al., 2016).
Building energy codes are increasingly being applied
worldwide. In late 2015, mandatory and/or voluntarybuilding energy codes were in place in over 60 countries ateither national or subnational levels (IEA, 2016c), making
this one of the most widely used energy efficiency policy
instruments.2 Building energy codes are expanding theircoverage from new construction to renovations of existingbuildings, which is particularly important for regionswith mature building stocks. For instance, the European
Directive on the Performance of Buildings requires energy
performance improvements for major retrofits throughout
the European Union (EU) (European Parliament, 2010).3+4
Building energy codes have also been expanding in theircoverage of requirements – moving towards more complex,
whole-building approaches, and requiring the integration ofrenewable energy generation (IEA, 2013).
2

3

4

34

California provides an excellent example of how building energy codes candrive emission reductions. Between the 1970s and 2016 the state’s thermalbuilding energy use (and thus the corresponding emissions) has been reducedby more than 90 per cent. California continues to increase the stringency ofits building regulations aiming at achieving zero net energy performanceby 2020 for new residential buildings, and by 2030 for new non-residentialbuildings (Shirakh et al., 2015).
However, countries such as Germany also set energy performancerequirements for minor retrofits (CA EPBD, 2015). Hong Kong also uses
similar requirements to upgrade the energy performance of existing buildings
undergoing major retrofits (Chan et al., 2014).
There are also building energy codes for “retro-commissioning”, which require
periodic mandatory audits, followed by obligatory improvement of energy
performance for low-performing buildings. Such a regulation (Local Law 87) isin place in New York City, where buildings over 50,000 gross square feet must
undergo selected measures as part of a retro-commissioning process (Becquéet al., 2016). Austin, Texas also requires efficiency improvements in the caseof low-performing multi-family buildings.

•

Compliance monitoring and enforcement are
essential (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a; GBPN, 2014).5
Typically, limited human and financial resources forthis activity will be a key barrier to the successful
implementation of building codes.
The design of building energy codes should follow
a holistic approach, covering energy performance,
quality and safety, and utilisation of renewableenergy (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b).
The stringency of building energy codes should be
regularly revisited and strengthened. Leapfrogging tovery high efficiency performance standards have also
been demonstrated and avoid lock-in.

Building energy codes are a key policy instrument, but may
not be sufficient in overcoming all the barriers to thermalenergy efficiency improvements in buildings. Capacity
building activities, supply-chain development, and otherpolicy instruments – like credible building performance
information or energy certification and financial incentives– all complement building codes. In fact, more integrated
policy packages can often better overcome the many diverse
barriers prevailing in this sector (Brown and Sovacool, 2011).

5.2.2 Building information and energy
performance certification

Certification of building energy performance is currently
being used in at least 35 countries, worldwide (IEA,
2016d).6 Labelling schemes enable policy makers to tailor
incentive schemes and other policy instruments, fosteringa market transformation towards high-energy performancebuilding stock. Certification may exist with or without alabel, and can be combined with the provision of a set ofrecommendations for improvement (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a).
Mandatory schemes are expected to have a higher overall
impact, while voluntary schemes can be considered as
information measures. Voluntary schemes may enhancethe effectiveness of other policies, or be a transitional step
towards a mandatory system. The effectiveness of certificationand labelling schemes also depends on effective monitoringand enforcement, which should be an integral part of theirdesign.
Many countries have developed their own building
energy performance certification schemes, like the Home
Energy Rating (Chile), Greenship (Indonesia) and GreenMark (Singapore). Many other countries have adaptedinternational certification systems to the local conditions.
However, many of these schemes were developed before

5

6

Nevertheless, compliance is often problematic. For instance, in some statesof the USA the compliance rate was as low as 20 per cent, and in Japan about
30 per cent (Liu et al., 2010). Even in established building energy codes
regimes, such as the EU, compliance rate ranges between 60-97 per cent for
new buildings and 45-93 per cent for retrofits (ICF, 2015).
Most of these schemes are voluntary. In the case of the European Union, its
mandatory Energy Performance Certification is required when buildings are
sold or rented, or when they undergo major renovations.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

a stringent climate goal was universally accepted and,
therefore, operate with less ambitious energy, or emissions
performance levels than would be consistent with theglobal goal. Therefore, it is important that countries, before
adopting energy performance certification programmes
for buildings developed in the past, carefully examine theirstringency from the perspective of carbon lock-in, andthe energy and emissions performance requirements arebrought as close to the state-of-the-art as possible (BozaKiss et al., 2013b).

5.2.3. Highly energy efficient buildings

The passivehaus standard. In terms of energy performance,
one of the most ambitious building energy certification
schemes is the so-called “Passivehaus” standard.7 This
standard encourages very low-energy buildings from aheating and cooling perspective, with low thermal losses
and optimized thermal gains (Schnieders, 2003; Feist etal., 2005). The Passivehaus standard has been adapted todifferent climate zones worldwide and further developedwith the common target that annual final energy use forheating and cooling – not exceeding 15 kilowatt hour (kWh)per m2 per year.8 This target represents a reduction of up to
90 per cent in energy demand for heating and cooling formost existing buildings (Feist et al., 2005). The standard has
become popular in several countries, and is experiencing a
dynamic market adoption in several regions. The global floorarea of Passivehauses has grown from 10 million m2 in 2010
to 46 million m2 in 2016, with the most activity occurring inEurope (personal correspondence: Passive House Instituteand Gunter Lang). Presently, the price premium for new
Passivehauses in several countries is comparable to standard
construction costs (Treberspurg and Djalili, 2013).
Net-zero energy buildings. The minimal remaining energy
needs of highly efficient buildings can often be supplied withon-site renewable energy, thus creating a net zero energy
building (Torcellini and Crawley, 2006). The global market of
this type of building reached US$630 million in 2014, andis expected to continue its growth, to reach US$1.4 trillion
by 2035 (Navigant Research, 2014). Numerous examples ofnet zero energy buildings exist around the world (IEA, 2013;
Erhorn and Erhorn-Kluttig, 2014; New Buildings Institute,2016). 9
Energy positive (or e+) buildings. These are buildings thatgenerate more (renewable) energy on-site than they use.
Examples can be found in a number of countries, including
Australia, France, Germany, Norway, the UK and the USA.
These highly efficient buildings can play an important andmore active role in the overall energy system, since they can
act as potential micro-energy hubs, supplying energy to local
neighbourhoods through peer-to-peer networks. This offers
opportunities to generate and store renewable energy (both789Passivehaus originated in Germany, with the pilot project launching in 1990
(Ebel and Feist, 1997).
The average building stock levels in most developed countries score well
above 100-150 kWh per m2 (Schnieders et al., 2015).
The concept can also be applied at a scale that is greater than individual
buildings. For example, in 2015 California established its first net zero energy
community (‘Sierra Crest’), consisting of 20 NZEBs (Movellan, 2015).

thermal and electric) on-site, as well as deliver significant
distributed demand response(De Groote et al., 2016).10
Recognizing the promise of highly energy efficient buildings
and their societal co-benefits (Treberspurg Djalili, 2013;
Schnieders and Hermelink, 2006), some jurisdictions are
now recommending or mandating them as standards fordifferent building types. For instance, since 2010, in Brussels(Belgium) all new public buildings are mandated to be built
to the Passivehaus standard, and as of January 2015 it is amandatory requirement for all new buildings and major
retrofits (EnEffect, 2014). Hanover, Germany does not havemandatory Passivehaus policies, however the local housing
market has transformed to offer high efficiency as a standard
option, and approximately one-third of all new construction
voluntarily conforms to the Passivehaus standard (Passive
House Institute, 2015).

5.3. Industry
Industrial energy demand, leading to 2030, is expected
to increase at a rate of 1.3 per cent annually, primarily inemerging economies (IEA, 2015a). Decision making priorities
differ significantly between the building and industry sectors
where short-term energy prices for industries often have alarge impact on energy efficiency decisions, particularly at
the point of in-plant investment (Steinbuks and Neuhoff,2014).

5.3.1 Energy Management, ISO 50001 and Energy
Performance Monitoring

Energy management systems help to reduce energy use by
optimizing energy consumption across the entire production
process through a suite of procedures and practices that
ensure systematic tracking, analysis, and planning of energy
use. This is done while keeping up with core industry
priorities such as reduced costs, increased productivity,
environmental compliance, and enhanced competitiveness.
Energy management systems are an essential tool forsustaining continuous energy efficiency improvements insmall- and medium-sized enterprises, as well as in large
process-intensive industries (IEA, 2015b). ISO 50001 is theglobally accepted standard for energy management systems.
Many governments mandate large energy end-users to
implement energy management systems.11 The recent Clean
Energy Ministerial meeting in June 2016 put forward theaspirational goal of achieving global ISO 50001 certifications
by 2020,12 providing a new momentum to the promotionof energy management. Early pilot implementation of ISO
50001 showed that for companies with no existing energy
10 Demand response is the ability to shift energy demand by reducing peakconsumption and grid imbalance.
11 Most countries in Europe have made energy management central in theirenergy efficiency programmes. In Germany, companies implementing energy
management and obtaining ISO 50001 may apply for a tax reduction. This has
driven the adoption of ISO 50001 by the German industry, which accounts formore than 50 per cent of the 6,778 certificates issued in 2014 (ISO, 2014).
12 The CEM estimates that the worldwide implementation of ISO 50001 by large
energy-using organizations could achieve cumulative energy savings of 62
Exajoules by 2030, cost savings of US$600 billion, and 6,500 Mt of avoided
CO2 emissions (CEM, 2016).

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

35

Box 5.2: Steam Systems in China.
In 2012, the economic emission reductions potential associated with industrial coal-fired steam systems in China
was 1,687 PJ (or 23 per cent of the total fuel used in industrial coal-fired steam systems in the country in 2012). This
corresponds to savings in CO2 emissions of 165,817 kilotonnes of CO2 (UNIDO, 2014). Optimization of the entire steam
system (as opposed to boilers only) would result in much larger energy savings.

management system, the average energy performance gains
in the first one-to-two years ranged between 10 and 20 per
cent of baseline consumption (UNIDO, 2015).

5.3.2 Energy performance standards for industrial
equipment

Many industrialized countries already have mandatory
minimum energy performance standards in place for a range
of energy consuming equipment within industry. Emerging
economies are following suit with the introduction of similar
standards for motors and boilers (box 5.2). 13
While individual efficient components may often only bringabout gains of up to five per cent, system optimization
measures can attain more durable average efficiency gains of
20 to 30 per cent. The payback period for operational energy
efficiency projects is often less than two years (UNIDO and
UN Energy, 2010). This broader potential requires policy
support, such as awareness raising, technical support andcapacity building, which can break down the barriers for
optimizing energy efficiency in the design, operation andmaintenance of industrial systems.

5.3.3. Delivering industrial energy efficiency
through energy service companies

An energy service company is a business that provides
a range of energy services, including implementation ofenergy efficiency technologies and projects. In the industry
sector, the most significant energy service company
activities tend to focus on buildings.
Utility programmes for industrial energy efficiency provide
an additional avenue for identifying projects that energy
service companies could implement.14 A good example is in
Denmark, where utilities are responsible for actively seeking
projects improving the energy efficiency of their end-users.15

13 Electric motors use two-thirds of the electrical consumption in industry(IEA, 2011), whereas steam generation represents 30 per cent of global final
industrial energy use (UNIDO, 2014).
14 Unlike the ratepayer-funded programmes that are popular for households
and commercial users, a utility programme for industrial energy efficiency
should: (i) provide low-cost technical assistance in terms of training,
networking and sharing of knowledge and best practices; (ii) offer a packageof incentives providing both technical and financial support to industrial
users; and (iii) develop long-term relationships/agreements with theindustrial users to deliver sustained energy improvements.
15 Large industrial end-users are obliged to conduct energy audits andimplement all energy efficiency projects with a payback period of up to four
years. The Danish Energy Agency provides links to approved consultants
and standards for the audits. It also compiles and shares best practice casestudies.

36

5.4. Transport
In developed countries, passenger transport demand grows
with income, until a certain income threshold has beenreached (Dhar and Shukla, 2015), while freight transportdemand appears to grow as a function of the type ofcommodity concerned. Demand for both passenger andfreight transport in developing countries is likely to follow
a similar trend.
To date, transport has relied almost exclusively on fossil
fuels. Given likely trends in demand for transport indeveloping countries, emissions from the sector in thesecountries could grow substantially. For this reason,
implementing sustainable transport solutions is critical.
Seventy-seven per cent of the INDCs submitted before the 21stConference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change identified transport as a key
target sector for mitigation (Gota et al., 2015). Interventions
quoted in these INDCs focus on actions to “improve” (141
INDCs), “shift” (66) or “avoid” (17), compared to current
transport forms (Gota et al., 2015). Across national
submissions, policy options like fuel economy standards,
regulations for cleaner fuels, and reorienting development
plans, play a key role.

5.4.1 Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards and CO2
emissionsStandards that specify fuel economy (average fuelconsumption, for example, expressed as litre (L) per 100km) and/or CO2 emissions for new vehicles have been
implemented in most industrialized countries and several
developing countries (table 5.1). These policies havegenerally been successful, and the average fuel economy
of new vehicles sold has improved significantly. However,standards are most effective when complemented with user
charges that reflect actual road and environmental costs,
levied according to vehicles’ usage and emissions intensity
performance.
Compliance monitoring and enforcement are necessary toensure that the purported performance levels are being
achieved (IEA, 2016c), and consumers can have confidence
in energy efficiency. Fuel economy improvements will alsodeliver benefits related to improved public health frombetter air quality, reduced fuel costs, and increased energy
security.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

Table 5.1: CO2 Emission targets and fuel economy standards for cars.
Country

Emission standards1(grams of CO2/km)

Japan

Fuel economy standards1(L/100 km)

Average fuel economy 20132
of new vehicles (L/100 km)

Reduction 2005-20132(L/100 km)

5.95 by 2015
4.93 by 2020

4.9

-1.4

Canada135 by 2016
98 by 2025

8.2

-1.3

European Union

130 by 2015
95 by 2021

6.8

-1.5

USA

132 by 201789 by 2025

6.4 by 2016
4.2 by 2025

8.6

-1.7

6.9 by 2015
5.0 by 2021

7.3

-0.1

China
Republic of Korea

97 by 2020

4.2 by 2020

6.0

-2.7

India

130 by 2017
113 by 2021

2016

5.6

+0.2

Source: 1 UNEP, 2010, The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2016, 2 GFEI, 2016.

Regulations on fuel economy and emissions have also
helped promote other types of vehicles, such as Battery
Electric Vehicles and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles.
Similarly, higher fuel and road taxes have encouraged thepurchase of more efficient vehicles. Labelling, to informconsumers about the fuel consumption and CO2 emissionsof a vehicle, thus allowing them to make more informed
purchasing decisions, is implemented in the EU, theUSA and other countries (Haq and Weiss, 2016). Vehicle
maintenance, low rolling resistant tyres, tyre pressure, roadmaintenance, and driver behaviour, all influence the fuelefficiency of a vehicle. Combining policies and measures, as
has been done in France, for example, makes it possible toachieve results in a more cost-effective manner.

In 2015, to increase the up-take of electric vehicles, a range
of enabling policies were in place in 16 selected countries(IEA, 2016e). Policies that help increase the up-take ofelectric vehicles can be grouped in three areas:•••

5.4.2. Electric Mobility for Passenger Transport

In 2015, the global stock of electric cars was 1.26 million(IEA, 2016e). Electric vehicles use energy 70 per cent more
efficiently than non-electric vehicles (Sims et al., 2014).
However, when power generation losses are taken into
account, the overall system efficiency balance needs to beconsidered on a case-by-case basis. In the long-term, electricvehicles are an important mitigation option through both
end-use efficiency and decarbonisation of electricity supply(Dhar et al., 2016). They also bring about substantial cobenefits, such as improved urban air quality.

Economic incentives: purchase incentives (France,
Germany, Japan, UK, USA); tax exemptions, including
waivers on excise tax (China); lower purchase tax, or
lower registration tax (Netherlands, Portugal); anddifferential taxation on the basis of emissions.
Urban initiatives: e-mobility plans in cities; increased
network of charging stations; incorporation ofelectric vehicles in urban plans and bylaws; waivers
on parking charges; and priority in urban traffic.
Policy continuity: An important lesson from thesuccess of Norway was that in addition to strong
incentives, there was effective policy sequencing overmany years (box 5.3).

Globally, the movement of electrification has beentransitioning into other transport modes, including
two-wheelers, three-wheelers and public transport.
Electrification of transport has grown rapidly in China andIndia, where electric two-wheelers and three-wheelers are
increasingly common, highlighting a need to offer diverse
efficient travel modes and vehicles. China leads with aroundBox 5.3: Incentives for electric vehicles in Norway.
Norway has one of the most ambitious programmes to foster the adoption of electric vehicles. In 2015, battery electricvehicles represented 18 per cent of the total car sales, which has been achieved through: (i) collaboration between
government, private players and non-government organizations, (ii) publicly-supported charging stations (Figenbaum etal., 2015), and (iii) strong incentives for purchase and ownership of battery vehicles (Bjerkan et al., 2016). The case fordecarbonisation from electric vehicles is strong, as over 95 per cent of the electricity in Norway is supplied by hydroelectric power. The Norwegian government has supported the transition to electric mobility on a continuous basis andadjusted the policies with time to encourage adoption of electric cars.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

37

200 million electric two-wheelers (IEA, 2016e). The saleof electric scooters in China started rising due to a ban onconventional vehicles in cities, to reduce air pollution. Other
contributing factors were policies to allow e-bikes up to acertain weight limit to share right-of-way on bicycle lanes,
and investments in charging stations in cities. The Chinese
government has also implemented aggressive policies andincentives for electrification of public transport, including
subsidies and investments in charging infrastructure forbuses. Presently, China has over 170,000 electric buses(IEA, 2016e). Recently, India has announced policies andincentives to enable the adoption of electric vehicles.
The near-term challenges for electric vehicles include thecurrently high up-front costs, compared to conventional
vehicles, and addressing the technical issues related tobattery capacity, reuse and recycling. Battery costs haveundergone significant reduction, from nearly US$1,000 per
kWh in 2007, to nearly US$300 per kWh in 2015 (Nykvist
and Nilsson, 2015), and are expected to further decease
to less than US$150 per kWh in the future (Bruce et al.,2012). Estimated cost reductions for cars could be nearly
50 per cent for battery electric vehicles, and 60 per cent forplug-in hybrid electric vehicles (Wolfram and Lutsey, 2016).
These lower battery costs will significantly reduce the costof electric vehicles and the amount of subsidies required in
the future. Further improvements in battery technologies
and vehicle performance are expected to ease the existing
limitations of driving range and battery costs. The driving
range issue is also being addressed by local governments
through the provision of charging infrastructure. Efforts arealso underway to find solutions for the re-use and recyclingof batteries, including utilisation of used car batteries as asource of storage within electric grids.

5.4.3. Sustainable Logistics/Freight Transportation

Freight transport accounted for 45 per cent of transport
sector energy demand in 2009 (Sims et al., 2014), and asimilar share of CO2 emissions. More than 50 per cent offreight-related CO2 emissions come from road transport,
especially heavy-duty vehicles (IPCC, 2014; Sims et al., 2014).
Efficiency of freight transport can be improved through better
utilisation of freight capacity, decisions regarding siting oflogistics facilities, routing of freight corridors, and a shift tomore efficient and cleaner modes of transport, such as railor water-borne transport. A modal shift away from road torail can lead to substantial emissions reductions, since theemissions from rail are only a fraction per km, comparedto heavy-duty vehicles (Sims et al., 2014). This modal shift
can deliver additional benefits, in the form of reduced local
air pollution and accidents (Machado-Filho, 2009). India’s
Dedicated Freight Corridor project is an example of an
integrated plan that aims to increase efficiency of freighttransport, while ensuring overall economic development(box 5.4).

5.5. Opportunities through systems thinking
and integration
Some mitigation opportunities are difficult to cover ina sectoral breakdown, but can still be very important.
In general, the opportunities for increasing energy
efficiency are moving from perfecting individual products tooptimizing systems. This section highlights a couple of suchopportunities.

5.5.1 Urban systems: efficient settlement formsCities are one of the biggest consumers of energy in theworld, representing almost two-thirds of global primaryenergy demand, and accounting for 70 per cent ofgreenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector (IEA,
2016b). While most emissions in cities originate from thebuilding, industry and transport sectors, a sizable shareof these emissions could be avoided through city-level
mitigation options, such as spatial planning (to ensure
connectivity, accessibility, mixed land-use, and a certain
level of density), improving transit options, increasing andco-locating employment and residential densities, andincreasing green spaces. A growing number of cities are
joining various non-state actor partnerships, in an effort tobecome more efficient, sustainable and low emitting. The
growing role of non-state actors is discussed in Chapter 4.

5.5.2 Lifestyles, behaviour, culture andconsumption patterns

More sustainable lifestyles in the form of changes inbehaviour and consumption patterns, along with embedded
cultural traditions and habits, are increasingly in focus asimportant means to achieving climate goals that cut acrosssectors. While policy making has traditionally focused ontechnological and economic solutions, changes in behaviour
can often result in large energy savings (Allcott andMullainathan, 2010; EEA, 2013).

Box 5.4: Dedicated freight corridors in India.
The Indian government is prioritizing policies that help to shift freight transport from road to rail. This ambition was
highlighted in India’s INDC as an important strategy for decarbonizing the transport sector (UNFCCC, 2015). The INDC
specifies a target of increasing the share of rail in land transportation (from 36 to 45 per cent by 2030) through investment
in Dedicated Freight Corridors. These corridors will develop separate rail networks for freight transport (DFCCIL, 2016).
India’s INDC estimates that these corridors could reduce emissions by about 457 million tonnes of CO2 over 30-years, afigure that could increase if electricity were decarbonized.

38

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

Most studies agree that mitigation strategies involving
lifestyles and behaviour do not need to imply compromises
in living standards. Recent research points out that domesticenergy saving potentials through behavioural measures
range from 20-30 per cent, but could be substantially larger
in the longer term (Karlin et al., 2015).16
While both the understanding of and the policy
toolbox addressing behavioural and lifestyle changes as
mitigation strategies are very rudimentary, a few
conclusions can be derived. Policies that can influence
the choices of consumers typically focus on price signals(notably: subsidies, tax rebates, and taxes) and information
disclosure – for example, mandated energy labels (Allcottand Mullainathan, 2010).

5.6. Emerging Opportunities
Advances in information communication technology,
including the internet, big data, smart technologies andsystems, and shared economy platforms, social media,
are revolutionising human activities and, consequently,
energy consumption. While the impact of these is still being
understood, it appears as though the economic emissions
reduction potential is high, if these trends can be
intelligently guided and opportunities seized.

The concept, based on a regenerative design principle, turns
goods that are at the end of their service life into resources
for others, closing loops in industrial ecosystems andminimizing waste (Stahel, 2016).18 Companies engaging inthese production paradigms are inherently drawn to efficient
production, distribution, recycling and materials supply chain
practices. Large economies, such as the EU, are on their way
to adopting the circular economy as the standard approachto material production and use.

5.6.2. Information and communication technology

New information and communication technologies are
expected to improve the efficiency of services with minimal
environmental impacts, and also imply a certain degree ofautomation in decision making. Such systems can be applied
to buildings to control heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting
and utilities,19 as well as in the industry and transport sectors.
In the industry sector, instantaneous tracking of energy
performance and a real-time measurement of energy use
and savings allows for significant reduction in energy use. Intransport, real-time access to traffic information allows forsafer and more efficient uses of transport networks.20

5.6.1. Circular and sharing Economy

Recent developments enable opportunities to utilise
capacities to a much higher degree, which in turn helps theworld move towards a more “shared economy”, as people
are increasingly using assets such as cars, bicycles, andapartments on a regular basis.17 Similarly, dematerialisation
can shift manufacturing away from a linear to a circular
economy.

16 Based on the review of behavioural measures across the EU, it was foundthat behavioural measures could achieve around 5-20 per cent reduction
in energy consumption compared to previous consumption (EEA, 2013). A
meta‐analysis found that of the 29 energy feedback studies they surveyed
with sample sizes over 100, energy savings ranged from 0.5 to 13 per cent ofprevious consumption (Ehrhardt‐Martinez et al., 2010).
17 For example, in 2015, 980 cities globally had some type of public bikesharing programme (May, 2016). Public bike-sharing is the fastest growing
mode of public transportation and has grown at an annual growth rate of
37 per cent since 2009 (Campbell et al., 2016). Similarly, many mainstream
car manufacturers are promoting sharing electric vehicles, such as Daimler’s
Car2Go, BMW’s Drivenow, among others.

18 Several developed countries including Germany, Japan and the USA havecomprehensive regulations in place. Sharing and recycling are closely linked
to behaviour and cultural issues, therefore, incentives for energy saving
behaviour, including tax breaks, market levers and government support, willencourage higher adoption. In the last decade, China has taken initiatives topromote recirculation of waste materials through targets, policies, financial
measures and legislation (Mathews and Tan, 2016).
19 Smart buildings can help deliver 10-15 per cent reduction in building energy
use in the USA (Agarwal et al., 2010). Digitalization and building integrated
modelling can help to design buildings with optimized material use andenergy savings through the entire life cycle (WEF and Boston Consulting
Group, 2016).
20 Increasingly, Information and Communication Technology is defining the needfor travel through online shopping and ride-sharing, and has the potential todeliver emission reductions. For instance, online shopping could reduce CO2
emissions by 22 per cent from shopping trips in Sweden in 2030 compared to2012 (Rosqvist and Hiselius, 2016).

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency

39

Chapter 6

Bridging the gap – the Sustainable
Development Goals and climatechange mitigation
Lead authors: Frank Sperling (University of Oxford, Ilmi Granoff (Overseas Development Institute)
Contributing authors: Eliza Northrop (World Resources Institute), Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), Andrew Scott (Overseas
Development Institute)

6.1 Introduction
The international development agenda for the next 15
years was defined by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (the 2030 Agenda), adopted by 193 countries
at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 (UN,2015). The agenda succeeds the United Nations Millennium
Declaration, which established the Millennium Development
Goals, and represents a considerable expansion in scope andambition. It comprises 17 Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) (see figure 6.1) and 169 associated targets, and takes
a global perspective – seeking to provide a comprehensive,
strategic direction to the economic, social and environmental
dimensions of development.
Acknowledging the interdependence of the challenges, theSDGs are to be regarded as “integrated and indivisible”,
according to paragraph 18 of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015).
The need for an integrated approach to the SDGs is nowheremore relevant than in the context of climate change. This
chapter provides a brief overview of the challenges climatechange poses to the SDGs. It then gives an initial qualitative
assessment of key areas of alignment, trade-offs andopportunities between the SDGs and the climate change
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement, focusing on
selected SDGs and associated targets.
SDG13 constitutes the 2030 Agenda’s climate change goal.
It does not provide concrete mitigation targets or proposed
limits to global warming. It, instead, targets strengthening
the resilience to climate-related hazards, mainstreaming
climate change into policy and strategic planning processes,
awareness building and capacity development, andfunding. For more concrete and measurable mitigation andadaptation objectives, the 2030 Agenda expressly
recognizes the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the authoritative body fordefining global policies on climate change (see UN, 2015).

40

The Paris Agreement, thereby, frames a boundary condition
for the implementation of the SDGs.

6.2 The SDG-mitigation nexus
During the period of dialogue and negotiation for theSDGs, a number of studies sought to catalogue theinterrelationships, synergies and trade-offs between the
proposed goals and climate change (WWF and CARE, 2015;
Scott and Picot, 2014; Picot and Moss, 2014; Munro, 2014;
Marston, 2014; Leong, 2015; Ansuategi et al., 2015). Thesestudies considered relevance from both SDG impacts on
climate, and climate impacts on the SDG, with a range of
methodologies and results. Some studies focused on the
explicit mentioning and recognition of climate change in thetarget formulation of different SDGs, while others placedstronger emphasis on sector specific linkages.

6.2.1 Climate change jeopardizes maintenance ofprogress against the SDGs

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
assessment reports have identified the human impacts ofclimate change with increasing confidence (IPCC 2001, 2007,2014a). This has led to growing concern for the long-termsustainability of development progress, and impacts on
the poor, in particular, in the absence of appropriate risk
management practices and steep reductions in greenhousegas emissions (see for example AfDB et al., 2003; Stern
Review, 2007; World Bank, 2010; Hallegatte et al., 2016;
Granoff et al., 2015).
The need to strengthen resilience to climate change isa repeated concern in the SDGs. It is not only reflected in
SDG13 on climate change, but also under several othergoals, such as those related to ending poverty (SDG1),
ending hunger (SDG2), building infrastructure (SDG9), andimproving cities and human settlements (SDG11). Adaptation

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation

to climate change is a necessary, complementary measure to
mitigation, but does not substitute for closing the emissions
gap, as with progressive levels of warming, adaptive
capacities of several natural and human systems may
no longer be able to cope with the rate and magnitudeof change, and the risk of crossing tipping points withlarge-scale irreversible consequences may increase(Schneider et al., 2007; Lenton et al., 2008; Schleussner etal, 2016).
Among the chief findings of analyses to date is that the
impacts of climate change may undermine our ability
to deliver the SDGs by 2030. Analysis by the World Bank(Hallegatte, 2016) estimates that absent, rapid and inclusive
development practices, climate change could result in an
additional 100 million people living in extreme poverty by
2030, slowing progress against SDG1.
Ansuategi et al. (2015) assessed the risk of failure toachieve the SDGs under high- and low-ambition climatechange agreement outcomes at Paris. Their analysis
identified a medium risk, even under the high-ambition
scenario, of failing to achieve the SDGs related to health(SDG3); gender equality (SDG5); clean water and
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development
Goals
sanitation (SDG6); sustainableconsumption
andAs impacts become increasingly certain in the post-2030
period, they also become highly likely to undermine theability to maintain progress against many of the SDGs
beyond 2030. Looking only at the best understood pathways
by which climate change impacts poverty targets—
agricultural productivity, climate extremes, and corollarychildhood malnutrition and developmental stunting—
Granoff et al. (2015) found that these factors alone could
impact up to 750 million people in extreme or moderate
poverty by 2050.
Climate-exacerbated extreme weather events will also
likely impact urban populations severely. Half of humanity
lives less than 60 kilometres (km) from the coast, andthree-quarters of all large cities are located in coastal
areas (UNEP, 2016). Urban impacts of climate change
have been well noted, if less well quantified (Hallegatte,2016), but clearly interfere directly with targets to improve
infrastructure (SDG9) and develop sustainable cities(SDG11), and will have consequent drags on poverty
eradication (SDG1) and other goals.

Figure 6.1: The Sustainable Development Goals (Source: UN, 2015).

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

End poverty in all its forms everywhere
End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Reduce inequality within and among countries
Reduce inequality within and among countries
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

End hunger, achieve food security andEnd hunger,
achieveandfoodsecuritysustainableandimproved
nutrition
promoteimproved nutrition and promote sustainableagriculture
agriculture
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
Make cities
human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilientandandsustainable
resilient and sustainable

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being
Ensurefor
all athealthy
all ageslives and promote well-being
for all at all ages

elopment Goals
elopment Goals

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Ensure sustainable consumption and production
Ensure sustainable consumption and production
patterns
patterns

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Ensure inclusive and equitable quality
Ensure inclusive
and equitableeducationand promote
lifelongquality
learning
education andforpromotelifelong learning
opportunities
allopportunities for
allThe Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10:Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Take urgent action to combat climate change and its
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its
impacts*
impacts*
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Achieve gender equality and empower all
Achieve andgenderwomen
girlsequality and empower all
women
and
girls
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

ource: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas andConserveand sustainably
use thedevelopment
oceans, seas andmarineresources
for sustainablemarine resources for sustainable development

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

ource: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

mber 21, 2015)

production (SDG12); life below water (SDG14); and life onland (SDG15). With the low-ambition scenario there would
be a high risk of failing to achieve 10 of the 17 SDGs.

Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
Fig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Ensure availability and sustainable
Ensure availability
and andsustainable
managementof watersanitation for all
management of water and sanitation for all
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

mber 21, 2015)

Ensure access to affordable, reliable,
Ensure accesstomodernaffordable,
reliable,sustainable
andenergyfor allsustainable and modern energy for allig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals
ig 10: The Sustainable Development Goals

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable
Promote sustained,
inclusiveand sustainableeconomic
growth, fulland productive
economic growth,
full andwork
productive
employment
and decent
for all
employment and decent work for all
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Build resilient infrastructure, promote
Build resilient
infrastructure,promoteinclusiveand sustainableindustrialization
inclusive
sustainable industrializationandfosterand
innovationand foster innovation

Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)
Source: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

Protect, restore and promote sustainable use ofProtect, restore
and promotesustainableofterrestrial
ecosystems,
sustainably
manageuse
forests,
terrestrial
ecosystems, sustainably
managecombatdesertification,and halt andreverseforests,
land
combat desertification,and halt anddegradationand halt biodiversity
lossreverse landdegradation and halt biodiversity loss
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for
Promote peacefuland inclusive
societies
sustainable
development,
provideaccess forto justicesustainable
development,
provide accessjusticeforall and build
effective, accountable
andtoinclusive
for all and build
institutions
at alleffective,
levels accountable and inclusive
institutions at all levels
Strengthen the means of implementation andStrengthen
meansof implementation
andrevitalize
thetheGlobalPartnershipfor Sustainable
revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development
Development

Notes: The SDGs are global goals on the economic, social andNotes: The SDGs
are global forgoals
on the economic,
socialThey
and are further
environmental
dimensions
sustainable
development.
environmental
dimensions
for sustainablespecifiedthrough
169 associatedtargets. development. They are further
specified through 169 associated targets.
* Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on* Acknowledging
the United
Nations Framework
Conventionforum
on forClimateChange isthat
the primaryinternational,
intergovernmental
Climate Change
is the primaryintergovernmental forum fornegotiating
the global
responseinternational,
to climate change.
negotiating the global response to climate change.

ource: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

ource: www.globalgoals.org (accessed September 21, 2015)

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation

41

6.3 The role of the SDGs in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions: pathalignment and path-contingency
While the SDGs are highly interdependent, the relationships
are not always inherently mutualistic (Nilsson et al., 2016).
Prior authors have emphasized the potential for conflict
between certain SDGs and climate change objectives.
The remainder of this chapter explores a complementary

approach, analysing the SDGs particularly relevant for
mitigation, divided into two key areas: agriculture, forestry
and other land-uses, and energy-related emissions. Certain
goals and associated targets are defined in ways that aresynergistic, or “path-aligned”. Their achievement will
generally facilitate the achievement of the mitigation
objectives of the Paris Agreement. Others are definedin ways that may or may not be antagonistic with thesemitigation objectives, depending on how they are pursued.

Table 6.1: Path-alignment and path-contingency of selected SDGs

42

SDG

Topic

Alignment

Analysis

SDG2

Hunger and foodsecurity

Path-contingent

Target 2.4 emphasizes the need for alignment of improvements in sustainability andproductivity, and pursuit of hunger and food security objectives, and increases inagricultural productivity envisioned in targets 2.3 and 2.a have the potential to materially
increase emissions if they lead to extensification, soil degradation and other effects at odds
with reduction of agriculture, forestry and other land-use emissions. Alternatively, these
could align effectively with climate goals if pursued in an integrated fashion with target 2.4,
and taking into account the opportunities to reduce food losses and improve distributional
considerations. Impacts of improvements to productivity depend on technology, policy andcontext significantly, and thus alignment of the SDG is contingent upon these factors.

SDG7

Sustainable Energy
AccessPath-aligned

The specific energy demands of universalizing energy access under target 7.1 are low,
and there is formidable evidence that the preponderance are best served by low-carbon
distributed technologies. The risk of potential trade-offs between expanded energy
consumption and climate objectives are embedded within other SDGs, such as SDGs 8 and9 discussed below. Targets 2.2 and 2.3 aim to promote increases in renewable energy andenergy efficiency, and greater success against these targets directly serves the mitigation
objectives of the Paris Agreement.

SDG8

Growth andemployment

Path-contingent

Historic economic growth has been strongly correlated with greenhouse gas emissions.
While the goal heading itself makes reference to sustainability, the only target levelreference to sustainability is with respect to “sustained growth” under target 8.1, leaving
open the mitigation implications of growth pathways on its face. Target 8.4 discusses
decoupling of growth from environmental degradation generally but focusing on thesustainability of consumption and production as per SDG15. Growth’s historic correlation
with increased greenhouse gas emissions underscores that the compatibility of this SDG
with the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement hinges on the ability of growing
economies to accelerate the decoupling economic output from emissions.

SDG9

Infrastructure,industrialization,and innovation

Path-contingent

Targets 9.1, 9.4 and 9.a focus on the expansion of infrastructure. Infrastructuredevelopment is paradoxically a strong correlate of emissions growth, and a criticalrequirement to decarbonization. This is because incumbent infrastructure choices havebeen associated with increases in energy demand and intensity and land use change:
decarbonization will require both the replacement of incumbent infrastructure andexpansion of infrastructure services through low-carbon options. Some infrastructure locks
in patterns of inefficiency, other choices lead to decarbonization, energy efficiency, andpollution reduction. The result of these targets on emissions will be highly contingent on
the nature of these infrastructure choices.
Targets 9.2 and 9.3. focus on the promotion of industrialization. While target 9.2
does acknowledge the need for “sustainable” industrialization, historic processes ofindustrialization have been drivers of emissions growth. New paths of industrialization,
particularly if enabled by innovation promoted under targets 9.5, 9.b and supplied with
low-carbon energy sources, have the potential change this historical pattern if innovationis geared toward decarbonizing technologies and processes. The emissions implications of
the target are therefore contingent upon realizing this potential.

SDG11

Sustainable Cities

Path-aligned

The 10 targets of the goal are generally well-aligned as seven of the ten targets as-drafted
focus on measures that expressly improve the resource efficiency of urban form, and thus
also ones that benefit climate: factors to achieve them would be policies that improve,for example, compactness, public transport, and other efficiency inducing measures.
Target 11.1 on access to housing does leave open the possibility of climate-conflicting
approaches, but the goal taken as a whole emphasizes that improvements to urban form
entail measures that are sustainability enhancing.

SDG12

Sustainableconsumption andproduction

Path-aligned

Improving the resource-use efficiency of production, reducing pollution and promoting
more sustainable consumption patterns diminish the pressure on the environment,
including impacts on the climate. This makes the targets under this goal well aligned with
SDG14. Achievement of these targets will also further the scope for the climate-alignmentof agricultural production, industrialization, and corollary economic growth under SDGs 2,
8 and 9, respectively.

SDG15

Terrestrial
Ecosystems

Path-aligned

Terrestrial ecosystems, particularly forests, hold large carbon stocks that, if disrupted,
could have severe consequent emissions. The halting of deforestation is an important lever
for agriculture, forestry and other land-use mitigation. While carbon stock preservation
does not necessarily serve all of the objectives of terrestrial ecosystems preservations
found in SDG 15’s targets, the targets are largely salutary to mitigation efforts.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation

Hence, they are considered to be “path-contingent”. With
these goals and targets, strategic choices matter. Once thesechoices about how to achieve these SDGs are made, they
may be difficult or costly to reverse.
Table 6.1 identifies SDGs that fall under each category,with a brief rationale. The approach focuses on the specificdefinition of SDG goals and targets, and what this means fortheir ability to align or conflict with the mitigation objectivesof the Paris Agreement. Goals are regarded as path-aligned,
where both the overarching SDG and individual targets are
expressly defined in a way that reinforces the mitigation
objectives of the Paris Agreement. Goals are also regarded
as path-aligned if several associated targets are synergistic
to mitigation objectives and others primarily neutral -that is, collective progress on the goal does not impede
simultaneous progress towards the mitigation objectives of
the Paris Agreement. Goals are regarded as path-contingent,
where either the goal or one or more targets are defined in a
way capable of undermining the mitigation objectives of theParis Agreement, depending on how it is pursued.

6.3.1. SDG implications for agriculture, forestry
and other land-use based greenhouse gas
emissions

Agriculture, forestry and other land-uses account for around
25 per cent of annual global greenhouse gas emissions (Smithet al., 2014). The goals and targets related to universal foodsecurity (SDG2) and sustainable management of terrestrial
ecosystems (SDG15) are specific examples of areas wheremultiple interests in the land-use context converge. How
these interests are integrated in development policies andpractice will have implications for progress towards the
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement.

Hunger and food security (SDG2): Path-contingency
Food security improved during the Millennium Development
Goals, but close to 800 million people continue to suffer fromhunger, and the global community fell short of the statedMillennium Development Goal ambition of halving the
proportion of chronically undernourished people between
1990 and 2015 (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015).
While ending extreme hunger and achieving food security
remain central concerns of the SDGs, SDG2 also represents
an expansion in scope. The goal now targets the eradicationof all forms of malnutrition, taking both undernourishment
and nutritional quality into account. It also targets the
improvement of agricultural productivity, especially forsmall-scale producers (target 2.3, UN, 2015), and provides
strategic guidance on how to achieve this, assigning particularimportance to sustainable food production systems andresilience of agriculture practices (target 2.4, UN, 2015).
How societies decide to meet food security and nutrition
targets will have direct implications for agriculture-related
emissions, and indirect implications through agriculture’s
impact on maintaining forests and sustaining terrestrial
ecosystem functions (SDG15). While more quantitative

understanding of SDG interactions is needed, early resultsfrom integrated assessments highlight that single sector
policies may harbour considerable policy trade-offs, whilea system’s perspective informing policy formulation canhelp anticipating and minimizing these (Obersteiner etal, 2016; see also von Stechow et al, 2016 on climate andenergy related SDGs). For example, Obersteiner et al. (2016)
show that for land-use decisions, the interactions between
environmental and food security outcomes are more tightly
associated with each other than population and economic
growth scenarios.1 Furthermore, an emphasis on measuresthat reduces energy and other consumption demand,
generally benefits overall development concerns by freeing
up solution space for other SDGs, including on food security
and infrastructure (Obersteiner et al., 2016; von Stechow etal., 2016).
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) project substantial
increases in global food consumption accompanied withstructural changes in diets, expecting that by 2050 around
52 per cent (or 4.7 billion people) of the world population
will live in countries with a national average of 3000
kilocalories per person per day in comparison to 28 per cent(1.9 billion people) today. How malnourishment—related toboth over- and under-consumption—is addressed throughagricultural practices, land-use choices and distributional
choices will have implications for aligning mitigation efforts
with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The choice ofpolicies and measures that integrate productivity demands
with an advancement of sustainable agricultural practices
will influence the level of emissions from land-use (Valin etal., 2013), as well as the pressure on biodiversity, natural
ecosystems, and forests (SDG15).
As Section 3.2 showed, almost all 1.5 and 2°C pathways
currently available assume negative emission technologies
during the second half of the century. This has consequences
for available land-use options and, hence, the ability
to achieve other SDGs that depend on the ecosystem
goods and services provided by land. Land-use based
technologies, such as bioenergy carbon capture and storage,
afforestation and reforestation, and biochar are among themost promising negative emission technologies. Dependingon the type and scale of negative emission technologies
deployed, there may be synergies or trade-offs with landdemand for food security and environmental conservation
targets. For example, soil carbon sequestration and biochar
applications can be applied on existing agricultural lands,
do not require specific land-use changes, and are also
considered to have beneficial impacts on soil nutrientsand land productivity, while having negligible impacts onwater-use and albedo (Smith, 2016). By contrast, increased
deployment of bioenergy carbon capture and storage, as
well as afforestation and reforestation activities, may requireland-use changes. Locally, their deployment may conflictwith certain means to achieve food security targets, and viceversa (Hasegawa et al., 2015).
1

The existing literature on the food-energy-water-environment nexus offers
further insights on policies and practices aimed at managing interactions in
the land-use space (Biggs et al., 2015; Howells et al., 2013; Ringler et al.,2013).

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The supply-side mitigation options focusing on changes intechnologies and practices in the land-use context, discussed
above, may support or compete with food security. Demandside measures addressing consumption levels, by contrast,
are expected to synergistically address both food security
and climate change concerns, but require large-scale
behavioural change if their potential is to be realized (Smithet al., 2013).

6.3.2 Implications of SDGs for energy-related
emissionsHence, the consequences of pursuing SDG2 will be pathcontingent. The multiple objectives in the land-use context
need to be carefully integrated, taking into accountdevelopment needs, livelihood security and environmental
sustainability.

Energy-related emissions are responsible for just over threequarters of global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2014a;
also see Chapter 2). Energy is also critical for development.
In addition to SDG7 on energy, a number of other goals havesubstantial energy and, therefore, climate change mitigation
implications. In particular, these include SDG8 on growthand employment, SDG9 on infrastructure, industrialization,and innovation, SDG11 on sustainable cities, and SDG12
on sustainable consumption and production. The following
sections look at where energy-intensive SDGs are pathaligned or path-contingent with climate change mitigation
objectives.

Sustainable management of terrestrial ecosystems(SDG15): Path-alignment

Universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable andmodern energy (SDG7): Path-alignment

SDG15 on sustainable management of terrestrial ecosystems
emphasizes reversing and halting trends in forest loss, landdegradation and biodiversity (UN, 2015). The advancementof the specific targets of the goal are well aligned withenabling progress towards the mitigation objectives of theParis Agreement.
Target 15.2 stipulates that by 2020 deforestation should
be stopped, and accompanied by restoration of degraded
forests and an increase in the global area under afforestation
or reforestation. Target 15.2 is unusual in aiming forcompletion of the target a decade earlier than most SDGs.
Its timely achievement will be critical for the SDG on climatechange, in light of the important role that forests play as
stores of terrestrial carbon (Smith et al., 2014; UNEP, 2015),
and the importance of early action outlined in Chapters 2
and 3 of this report.
While well aligned with mitigation objectives, SDG15 also
leaves some challenges to be resolved. The target implies zerodeforestation on a global scale, but does not specify whether
this is achieved by conservation of existing forest stocks, orby achieving zero “net” deforestation through offsetting
afforestation and reforestation. The world community iscalled upon to realize a “substantial increase afforestation
and reforestation globally” (see target 15.2, UN, 2015).
However, it is not specified what a “substantial” increasemeans, and the extent to which there is a differentiation
between primary and secondary forest is similarly unclear.
Target 15.5 is focused on reducing the degradation of natural
habitats, halting the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020,
protecting and preventing the extinction of threatened
species (UN, 2015). While there are regional differences,
there is generally a strong association between natural forestsand high levels of biodiversity and carbon stocks (Strassburg
et al., 2010). This makes achievement of target 15.5 further
the goal of avoiding emissions related to land-use conversion
from forest stocks. However, SDG15 also illustrates thattargets need to be considered collectively: while highbiodiversity forest protection may help achieve SDG13, a
focus on forest cover and afforestation for mitigation value,
alone, may overlook important biodiversity considerations.

44

SDG7 comprises a universal access target, a renewableenergy target and an energy efficiency target (see also
Chapter 5). Given the importance of energy to climatechange, SDG7 is closely interdependent with the mitigation
objectives of the Paris Agreement.
Target 7.1 aims to achieve universal access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy by 2030. One in six
people lack access to modern electricity services, and two infive lack access to modern cooking services (IEA and World
Bank, 2015). Although delivering basic access to energy forpoor people—defined for electricity as 250 kilowatt hours
annually for rural households, and 500 kilowatt hours
annually for urban households—will result in an increasein energy consumption by people currently living below
the poverty line, achieving the target will not have material
implications for global emissions. Flat economies of scale
for renewable energy (unit costs change relatively little for
installations below a few megawatts) means that they are
effective at delivering electricity services with small, off-gridor distributed installations appropriate to the rural areas
where most of those lacking access today live. This flexibility,
along with the rapid decline in costs, has made sustainabledistributed energy open a tremendous opportunity toachieve universal access, even before 2030 (Power for All,
2016). Aggressive strategies for universal electricity accessare climate compatible, since they require much greater
investment in the diffusion of flexible, easily distributed, andpredominantly renewable energy technologies, like minihydro, solar-pv, and solar-diesel hybrids (IEA, 2011; Szabó etal., 2011). The objective of universal access to safe, modern
and reliable energy services by 2030 is, therefore, alignedwith the promotion of low-carbon, renewable technologies,
particularly decentralized ones (Hogarth and Granoff, 2015).
Even if universal access to modern energy services wasachieved using older carbon intensive technologies, theInternational Energy Agency estimates that it would result ina modest increase in global greenhouse gas emissions of 0.7
per cent (IEA, 2011).
Targeting universal access focuses on a benchmark ofbasic access to ensure that no one is left behind, much
like benchmarking against extreme poverty or hunger

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation

goals. This, of course, does not capture the broader energy
demands associated with development across the full rangeof SDGs. Most projected growth in energy demand is driven
by consumption from wealthier income groups, and forindustrial and commercial uses in emerging economies. In
1990, consumption in high-income countries accounted for
63 per cent of the world’s total primary energy supply. By
2014 this share had fallen to 48 per cent, while the share ofupper middle-income countries had risen to 34 per cent (IEA
and the World Bank, 2015). According to the International
Energy Agency’s New Policies Scenario, by 2040, energy
consumption in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation andDevelopment (OECD) countries will be three per cent lower
than it is today—all of the growth in demand is in non-OECD
countries (IEA, 2015a; also see Section 3.4 and Chapter 5).
However, per capita energy consumption in these countries
will still be less than half the OECD average. The energy
consumption of this cohort of middle-income countries,
and the growing middle class and industries within them,will be very important for meeting climate targets. In thiscontext, the transformation of the energy sector toward
low-carbon and renewable supply will also be critical, as will
improvements in energy efficiency that dampen demand
growth for the same or better energy services.
Targets 7.2 and 7.3 aim at the material increase of renewableenergy and energy efficiency, respectively. Both avenues tomitigation have been identified by the IPCC as critical forthe energy sector (IPCC, 2014b). Therefore, achieving thesegoals is entirely aligned with, albeit not alone sufficientfor, the transformation of the energy system necessary forachieving the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement.
Target 7.2 does not specify a measureable objective,
but most countries have adopted the objective of the
Sustainable Energy for All initiative, launched in 2011 andsupported by most governments. It aims to double theproportion of renewables in the global energy mix, between
2010 and 2030 (IEA and World Bank, 2015). Althoughgeneration capacity, globally, is still dominated by incumbent
high-carbon technologies, the use of low-carbon energy is
growing rapidly. Renewables accounted for about half of
new power generation capacity in 2014 (Frankfurt SchoolUNEP Centre and BNEF, 2016); over half (53.6 per cent) of thecapacity installed in 2015 was in renewables (BNEF, 2016).
In 2014, 85 per cent of the increase in power generated
was from renewables (IEA, 2015a). Sustainable Energy for
All estimates that between 2010 and 2012, the share of
renewable energy in total final energy consumption globally
increased from 17.8 per cent to 18.1 per cent. However,this rate of increase is well below what will be required
to achieve the Sustainable Energy for All target, which isequivalent to a renewables share of 36 per cent (IEA andthe World Bank, 2015). Only eight of the 20 largest energyconsuming countries increased their renewables sharebetween 2010 and 2012 (IEA and the World Bank, 2015).
Comparing projections to 2030, the International Renewable
Energy Agency concluded that, “even ambitious scenarios
aimed to drastically mitigate emissions and climate change

leave significant gaps if compared to the Sustainable Energy
for All objectives” (IRENA, 2013).
The SDG energy efficiency target (7.2) implies a 2.6 per centannual rate of reduction in energy intensity (IEA and World
Bank, 2015). According to the International Energy Agency,
energy intensity globally reduced by 2.3 per cent in 2014,
which was more than double the average over the previous
decade (IEA, 2015b). To drive higher rates of improvement
in energy efficiency, the Global Commission on the Economy
and Climate recommend the convergence across countries of
the current best energy efficiency standards for appliances,transport, buildings and industry (Bishop, 2015).

Growth and employment (SDG8) and infrastructure,industrialization and innovation (SDG9): Pathcontingency
Energy, and concomitant climate impacts, is implicit but
critical to two other SDGs: growth and employment (SDG8)
and infrastructure, industrialization and innovation (SDG9).
The implications of achieving the targets under these goals
are largely conditional on the pathway by which those goals
are achieved. At a global level, the link between economic
output and greenhouse gas emissions has weakened (IEA,
2015b), suggesting the potential for low-carbon economic
growth (see Chapters 2 and 3). For developed countries,
the rate at which they can decouple their economic output
from emissions will be critical to meeting SDG8, together
with SDG13. The energy intensity of economic growth must
decline by four to 10 per cent per year between now and
2050 (Loftus et al., 2015).
For low- and middle-income economies, the industrialization
and urbanization associated with economic transformation
have generally been linked with increases in emissions,primarily via increases in energy consumption and intensity.
Declines in emissions associated with industrialization andurbanization tend to be related to high-income countries (Liand Lin, 2015). The difference between these two effects
has been attributed to the energy implications of durable
infrastructure development and structural changes to lessenergy-intensive sectors (Li and Lin, 2015). This, in turn, leads
to the path-contingent implications of infrastructure targets.
Development of low-carbon infrastructure is regarded as
critical to most mitigation scenarios, and yet infrastructuredevelopment is most closely associated with increased
emissions, as countries have historically developed.
The mitigation challenge for infrastructure is that it will needto meet both demand growth and the replacement of legacy
high-carbon infrastructure stocks at an accelerated pace
(Granoff et al., forthcoming). This challenge occurs in thecontext of a global infrastructure gap, with infrastructure
falling short of optimal levels by 70 per cent (IMF, 2014).
Most governments face political hurdles to allocating
sufficient resources – by raising revenue or financing – tomeet infrastructure needs, while poor countries face an
inadequate tax base and little ability to raise debt.

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Evidence, however, suggests that future economic growth,underpinned by urbanization, industrialization andassociated infrastructure development, is enhanced by lowcarbon pathways (New Climate Economy, 2014). Historicpatterns have occurred in a context of vastly different
technological options. Consider, for example, the limited
availability of low-carbon technologies at the time ofFrance’s rapid decarbonisation, compared to the wider rangeof available technologies today. Further, close analysis of
the relationship between urbanization and industrialization
show the potential for each to be associated with either
increases or declines in energy intensity (Sadorsky, 2013).
Further progress with respect to the energy goal (SDG7), by
improving low-carbon energy supply and diminishing energy
intensity through efficiency measures, would expand the“operating space” for progress on growth and employment(SDG8) and infrastructure, industrialization and innovation(SDG9) in a manner more compatible with achieving the
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise,
though, the alignment of SDG8 and SDG9 with climate
goals is contingent on the emissions intensity of energy
consumption implicit within those goals.

Sustainable cities and consumption and produc­tion(SDG11 and SDG12): Path-alignment
SDG11 addresses issues central to any long-term mitigation
strategies, focusing on affordable housing, universal accessto public transport, reducing the per capita environmental
impact of cities, and providing access to safe, inclusive, andaccessible green and public spaces. SDG12 on sustainableconsumption and production is similarly path-aligned withthe mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement through afocus on improving the resource-use efficiency of production,
reducing pollution and promoting more sustainableconsumption patterns. Not only will achievement of thesetargets reduce emissions, but also further the scope foralignment between agricultural production, industrialization,and economic growth under SDGs 2, 8 and 9, respectively.
The two goals are inextricably interlinked. SDGs 11 and12 aim to address demand-side emission reductions bytransforming the way people live, and how they produce
and consume.
Cities and human settlements are critical to emissions
reductions, as well as to adaptation and building resilience
to climate impacts. Cities consume 60–70 per cent of theworld’s energy supply, and account for 70–80 per cent of
total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions due to energy
generation, transport, industry, and biomass use (Tsay andHerrmann, 2013). In 2014, the commitments made by
228 global cities (representing 436 million people) were
estimated to result in cumulative emissions reductionsof 6.1 gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO2e)by 2030 and 13 GtCO2e by 20502 (ARUP and C40 Cities,
2014; see also Chapter 4). Harnessing these commitments
will be crucial to achieving the mitigation goals of the
2

46

This corresponds to annual emission reductions of 0.402 GtCO2e/year in 2030
and 0.43 GtCO2e/year in 2050 as reported in Chapter 4.

Paris Agreement (Articles 2 and 24, UNFCCC, 2015).
Transport in particular, much of it in urban areas, is a key
sector for climate change mitigation. In 2010, the transport
sector accounted for 27 per cent of final energy use, andemissions of 6.7 GtCO2 (IPCC, 2014). The World Energy
Council warns that, without strong global action, carownership worldwide is on track to more than double, toover two billion vehicles by 2050, with a correlated increasein the demand for diesel and fuel oil of up to 200 per cent(World Energy Council, 2011). According to the Paris Processof Mobility and Climate (2015) nearly three-quarters ofcountries prioritize the transport sector and 61 per centinclude transport sector specific mitigation measures intheir Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
under the Paris Agreement.
SDG11 comprises 10 targets, of which nine are well alignedwith the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement.
Seven of them are drafted with express attention tosustainability and efficiency considerations, while two of
the remaining address disasters and impacts on cultural andnatural heritage sites. Of the 10 targets, only one relating
to ensuring universal access to housing and basic services
has the potential for material climate implications without
making specific reference to sustainability considerations.
The challenge for achieving this and other targets relating
to universal and inclusive access to housing, sustainableurbanization and safe green and public spaces in a mannerthat is path-aligned with SDG is to reconcile the short-term
demand with longer-term sustainability requirements.
Governments must adopt approaches that support theconstruction of homes and urban spaces using green
building techniques in suitable locations that also provide
a range of transportation choices to avoid undermining theachievement of other targets under SDG11. Implementationof the targets under SDG11 must be undertaken holisticallyto avoid perverse outcomes, such as building affordable
homes in areas vulnerable to climate impacts like risingseas or extreme weather events, or in dispersed housingdevelopment lots.
Transforming consumption and production patterns under
SDG12 is also a core component of the goal under the Paris
Agreement to reach net zero emissions in the second halfof this century (Article 4, UNFCCC, 2015). According to the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,the energy used for the global production, harvesting,transporting and packaging of wasted food generates
4.4 GtCO2e annually, or about eight per cent of total
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (FAO, 2016). Thismeans that the contribution of food wastage emissions
to global emissions is almost equivalent to that of global
road transport (IPCC, 2014a), which emphasizes the central
importance of both SDG11 and SDG12 to achieving the
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement.
The final target under SDG12 addresses the market
distortions that prevent a shift to sustainable patterns ofconsumption and production, and calls for rationalizing
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (target 12.c, UN, 2015). In

The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation

2015, around 13 per cent of global energy-related CO2
emissions were from subsidized fossil fuels (IEA, 2015b). The
International Energy Agency estimates that this provides
an average incentive to emit CO2 of US$115 per tonne of
CO2. According to the IEA (2015b) efforts have been madein developing countries to reduce consumption subsidies,and in developed countries to reduce producer subsidies
for investment in fossil fuel extraction. Fossil fuel subsidies
remain a significant impediment to sustainable development
and climate change mitigation.

6.4 Summing up
This chapter has outlined how selected SDGs and associatedtargets are aligned, while others potentially conflict with theclimate change mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement.
For SDGs that are path-contingent, there is often generalor even specific knowledge of the “dos” and “don’ts” ofparticular policies and practices that can help to minimize
trade-offs and maximize synergies between different
interests. Previous United Nations Environment (UNEP)
Emissions Gap Reports have discussed such best practices
for a number of key sectors and issues including agriculture,buildings, energy, forestry, and transport (UNEP 2012, 2013,2014 and 2015).
The need for an integrated approach to the sustainable
development and the realization of the SDGs is nowheremore relevant than in the context of climate change. The
potential to meet the long-term temperature objective of
the Paris Agreement rests within the framework that theSDGs provide. Equally, the potential to achieve the SDGs rests
with our ability to address the climate change mitigation
challenge.

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47

References
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ISBN: 978-92-807-3617-5
Job Number: DEW/2061/NA
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The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Scoping the 2016 report