The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 31 (2020)
Copyright © 2020 Koji Ito. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with this noticeincluded, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

Contesting Alaskan Salmon: Fishing Rights,
Scientific Knowledge, and a US-Japanese Fishery
Dispute in Bristol Bay in the 1930s

Koji ITO*INTRODUCTION
In 1938 the US Bureau of Fisheries dispatched two ichthyologists, George
B. Kelez and Joseph T. Barnaby, to Bristol Bay off Southwest Alaska to
conduct intensive research on Alaskan salmon. The purpose was to deepen
understanding of the mysterious fish, as even ichthyologists had very limitedscientific knowledge about the fish’s life cycles, habits, and migration
patterns.1 This five-year research project started in the aftermath of theBristol Bay crisis, a dispute over Alaskan salmon between the United States
and Japan in the 1930s. Kelez and Barnaby were sent to the Bristol Bay
region because the dispute made Washington officials realize that they knew
little about Alaskan salmon and that they needed to have more detailed
scientific information about the fish if they were to protect them fromJapanese pelagic fishermen.
In this article I reconsider the Bristol Bay crisis by examining how
Washington officials perceived, handled, and solved the fishery dispute.
Historians have heretofore viewed the fishery controversy as a question of
clashing fishing rights and have studied it in relation to the development of
the law of the sea. At the time, Bristol Bay was defined by two structurally*PhD candidate, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Figure 1. Map of the Bristol Bay region of Southwest Alaska. Alaska Public Media website.

different legal regimes: US national laws within its three-mile territorial
waters and the law of the sea on the high seas outside the territorial waters.
In this oceanic legal borderland, the United States and Japan contested
jurisdiction over Alaskan salmon, which migrated transnationally. The
freedom of the seas doctrine constituted the core of the law of the sea andallowed Japanese deep-sea fishermen to catch as many salmon as theywanted in the extraterritorial waters of Bristol Bay without observing
America’s tough conservation standards. By looking at US fishing-industry
leaders, the mass media, and members of Congress, earlier scholarship has

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emphasized that US claims to proprietary rights to Alaskan salmon was a
revolutionary step to birthing the modern law of the sea, expanded afterWorld War II, which is characterized by extended jurisdiction of coastal
states and their enclosure of oceanic common-pool resources.2
A close investigation of America’s policymaking process, however, with afocus on Washington officials, reveals that the fishery problem was not justabout who had legal authority to catch Alaskan salmon but also greatly
rested on scientific understanding of the fish. By exploring the US
policymaking process, I show that Washington officials’ discussions
centered on their concerns about America’s poor marine research in Alaska
and that their limited scientific knowledge of Alaskan salmon cruciallydetermined the way they settled the fishery controversy and preserved thefish. I argue that the Bristol Bay crisis was fundamentally a US-Japan
contest over scientific understanding of Alaskan salmon, because
Washington officials found that access to the fish in Bristol Bay hinged
ultimately on the amount of available scientific information about them. I
also would like to suggest that the fishery dispute historically matteredbecause it drove the United States to initiate measures to become a leading
scientific power in the field of Alaskan salmon research.
My work differs from the previous studies because it assumes thatconservation has both a political and a technical aspect. The Bristol Bay
crisis presented the question of the need for the United States to preserve
Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-sea fishermen. US fishing-industry
leaders, their media spokespersons, and members of Congress demandedthat the United States assert exclusive possession of Alaskan salmon byunilaterally revising the law of the sea to extend US jurisdiction over all thefish in Bristol Bay. But US government officials rejected this demand andtried to settle the Bristol Bay crisis without compromising the traditional lawof the sea. The solution to the fishery controversy finally depended onnegotiating among actors with clashing political intentions. Althoughoverlooked in earlier scholarly research, Washington officials had to deal
with the technical question of how to protect Alaskan salmon from Japanesepelagic fishermen. The lack of scientific data about the migration of salmon
from Bristol Bay to local rivers for spawning was one reason why it wastechnically impossible for the United States to preserve Alaskan salmon by
expanding its jurisdiction over the fish. Washington officials first had tomaintain access to Alaskan salmon by making them de facto American fish
through a gentleman’s agreement in which Tokyo voluntarily promised not
to catch salmon in Alaskan waters.

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KOJI ITOThis article consists of four parts. The first section looks at salmon
fisheries in Bristol Bay before 1930, when Japanese deep-sea fishermen first
appeared there. It describes how the US government managed them by
imposing strict regulations in the White Act of 1924. The second section
focuses on Washington officials’ initial reactions to Japanese pelagic
fishermen’s activities in Bristol Bay after 1930. It demonstrates how
Washington’s bureaucratic politics were inconsistent and ineffective forpreempting an emerging fishery row with Japan, which showed its fishinginterest by surveying the waters of Bristol Bay in June 1936. The third
section addresses the Japanese government’s three-year scientificinvestigation of Bristol Bay, revealing that the Japanese research program
was part of an advanced comprehensive project to understand the habits andmigration routes of salmon swimming in the Bering Sea. The last section
explores how Washington officials handled and finally solved the fisherycontroversy in March 1938, revealing their limited scientific information
about Alaskan salmon compared to Japan’s, which made the gentleman’s
agreement a practical necessity.
I.

REGULATING SALMON FISHERIES IN BRISTOL BAY BEFORE 1930

Before Japanese deep-sea fishermen began operating in Bristol Bay in1930, the Fisheries Bureau of the US Department of Commerce had
imposed severe restrictions on salmon fisheries there. The production of red
salmon, which constituted almost all salmon caught in Bristol Bay, dropped
by almost 70 percent from more than 23 million in 1918 to almost 7.2
million in 1919.3 Since the dramatic decline in salmon catches appeared in
the whole Bristol Bay region in the same season, officials of the Fisheries
Bureau decided that overfishing was the primary cause, though they were
not entirely certain that was the reason. As the bureau’s Alaska service agent
Ward T. Bower put it, “The cause of this sudden and serious falling off in thesalmon runs of Western Alaska, and especially Bristol Bay, is not known,
but in the absence of a better reason it may be attributed to overfishing inrecent years.”4
Consequently, Congress passed the White Act on June 6, 1924, which set
strict restrictions on salmon fishing in Alaska. They included allowing forescapement of more than 50 percent of ascending salmon and a closed
period of thirty-six hours or more every weekend.5 More crucially, the act
greatly expanded the authority of the secretary of commerce to limit salmon
fisheries in Alaskan waters. Beyond the basic restrictions, Secretary of

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Commerce Herbert Hoover introduced further regulations in Bristol Bay. He
prohibited all fishing apparatus except drift gill nets, specified the maximum
length and mesh size of those gill nets, limited the red salmon fishing season
to only one month—from June 25 to July 25—every year, and banned theuse of motor-propelled boats in Bristol Bay.6 These regulations werechanged according to the conditions of salmon runs. Indeed, they became
stricter by the end of the 1920s. The point is that no American could becertain if Alaskan salmon were recovering or still declining nor to what
extent human agency had been responsible for the sudden, mysterious dropin the salmon catch in 1919. This ecological uncertainty and scientificignorance were key elements in the context of the US-Japanese dispute oversalmon that broke out and developed in Bristol Bay in the 1930s.
II. AN EMERGING US-JAPANESE FISHERY DISPUTE
IN BRISTOL BAY, 1930–1936
Earlier studies have often portrayed the problem as the US government
not having taken measures to stop Japanese fisheries in Bristol Bay before
1936, when American fishing-industry leaders began vocally demanding it.
It is more accurate to say, however, that Washington officials failed at theirpreemptive attempts to avert fishery trouble in Bristol Bay. In June 1930,
Henry O’Malley, commissioner of the Bureau of Fisheries, first reported to
the Department of Commerce news of Japanese pelagic fishermen’s
operations in Alaskan waters. He cautioned that an 8,000-ton Japanese
factory ship, Taihoku Maru, had been catching cod, halibut, and crabs at Port
Moller at the southern entrance of Bristol Bay.7 Soon afterward, Acting
Secretary of Commerce E. F. Morgan shared this information with the US
State Department and suggested that the government immediately formulatea policy regarding this development. Morgan was concerned that Japanesefishing activities, even if they were not extended to include salmon, mightinterfere with US salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay.8
Bureaucratic politics made the government’s initial response to the fisheryquestion ineffective. To protect Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-sea
fishermen, the Department of Commerce insisted that the United States
preemptively conclude a fishery treaty with Japan that would restrain
Japanese nationals’ fishing operations in Alaskan waters.9 The State
Department concurred and asked the Department of Commerce to “prepare
an outline of (1) what measures are considered practical and necessary toprotect the American fisheries, and (2) what we might be willing to offer in

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return for the concessions which the Japanese interests might be asked to
make.”10The US Bureau of Fisheries, however, was lukewarm about negotiatingwith Tokyo because the bureau did not want to make any concessions toJapan over a situation that might not happen in the future. One possible
concession was that the United States would allow Japan to dominate crab
fisheries in Alaska in return for Japan’s abandonment of salmon fisheries in
Alaska.11 But Commissioner O’Malley did not want to lose both salmon andcrab fisheries in Alaska. O’Malley also felt “grave apprehension” that “there
might develop, with the decrease in the catch of crab, danger to the salmon
industry, as there would be nothing to prevent Japanese or American fishers
from netting salmon on the high seas in their run to the rivers of Alaska.”12
He hoped that “some agreement might be reached with the Japanese toprevent interference with the salmon run.”13 But he was unwilling to makeconcessions to Japan for something that might not even happen. He believedthat the salmon problem might not be lasting, while any US concessions
probably would be.14 Thus, he insisted that “no action [should be]contemplated at the present time” and that it was improbable that “anyfurther action [would] be taken on this matter for some time to come unlessthere [is] some decided change in the situation.”15 The bureau’s careful but
opportunistic approach changed little until fishing-industry leaders on the
Pacific Coast became vocal about an emerging fishery dispute with Japan inBristol Bay in late 1936. Facing the bureau’s continuous procrastination, theState Department finally concluded in June 1936 that “nothing further
should be done in the matter for the time being and until there had beenfurther developments.”16
III.

JAPAN’S SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF BRISTOL BAY AND
THE OUTBREAK OF “ALASKA’S SALMON WAR,” 1936–37

The Japanese Bureau of Fisheries was also not ready to discuss regulating
Japanese fishermen’s operations in Alaskan waters. Japan’s policy towardsalmon fisheries in Alaska was an outcome of negotiations between theAmerican Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Fisheries
Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Foreign Ministrysought to maintain friendly relations with the United States and tried to
avoid a “subtle problem” that might result from promoting Japanesenationals’ fishing activities in Alaska.17 Because the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry understood the Foreign Ministry’s concerns, it consistently

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refused to allow Japanese fishing companies permission to catch salmon in
Alaskan waters.18 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, nevertheless,had to handle growing pressure from the Japanese fishing industry, thepublic, and the Imperial Diet after the mid-1930s. Faced with declining
salmon runs in northern Japan’s coastal waters along with Russia’s voidingof Japan’s fishing rights off the Siberian coast, Japanese fishing-industry
leaders and their allies in the media and the Imperial Diet fiercely demandedthat the Japanese government find alternative fishing grounds in Alaska.19
Caught in the dilemma between foreign relations and the fishing industry,
the Japanese government continued to prohibit Japanese nationals fromfishing salmon in Alaska while launching a three-year survey of Bristol Bay
in April 1936, which showed its commitment to developing new fishinggrounds in Alaska in the future.20
The mid-1930s thus saw the Japanese government researching the habitsof salmon swimming in the Bering Sea. The Ministry of Agriculture andForestry made annual salmon tagging experiments off the Siberian coast
after 1935 in order to learn where salmon caught off the Kamchatka
Peninsula came from and which routes they followed to reach there. Rokuji
Sato, a leading fisheries scientist at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
analyzed the results of these experiments and mapped probable migrationroutes of the fish (fig. 2).21 Moreover, Susumu Sugano, another fisheriesscientist at the Imperial Fisheries Institute (currently, Tokyo University ofMarine Science and Technology), provided three-dimensional data about
salmon migration by adding the depth from the sea surface and distancefrom the shore the fish traveled off the Kamchatka Peninsula.22 He also
discovered the relationship between oceanic conditions—such astemperature, specific gravity, salinity, and transparency of seawater—andmigration patterns of salmon near the Kamchatka Peninsula.23 In addition,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry conducted similar salmon researchalong the Aleutian Islands in 1935 and on the US side of the Bering Sea in1936 (fig. 3).24 Significantly, Japanese fisheries scientists knew by the early
1920s that Alaskan salmon did not stay in Alaskan waters; rather, theymigrated outside Alaskan waters and traveled across the Bering Sea for one
and a half months during the summer (fig. 3).25 Although the Japanesefisheries scientists could not determine complete migration routes of salmon
swimming in the Bering Sea,26 they scientifically understood the habits ofthe fish much better than the Americans.
These experiments were important to Tokyo officials because getting
access to salmon swimming in the Bering Sea depended on scientific

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Figure 2. Results of salmon tagging experiments conducted off the Kamchatka Peninsula
by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in 1937

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Figure 3. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, “Kitataiheiyō ni okeru Sake Masu” (Salmon
in the North Pacific), ca. 1937

knowledge about the fish’s habits and migration patterns. When Americans
insisted that the United States claim proprietary rights to Alaskan salmon tosolve the Bristol Bay crisis, their logic was that “the salmon is born in
American waters and must return to American waters to complete his life
cycle. [Therefore], he is, in effect, an American citizen.”27 Although Willis
H. Rich, a Pacific salmon expert working for the US Fisheries Bureau, was“very confident” that this “homing” theory was accurate,28 it was still only ahypothesis, and some distinguished Anglo-American ichthyologists evenchallenged it.29 Fisheries scientist Sato critiqued the “homing” theory
because too little was known about the salmon’s life cycle and habits in theocean.30 He also asserted that Japan, the United States, Canada, and theSoviet Union must conduct more comprehensive research on North Pacificsalmon migration; otherwise, the four powers would have to keep competingfor access to the fish.31 Sato and other officials of the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry well understood the core problem of disputes over salmon:
only scientific knowledge about the fish could determine who should have

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access to them.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry began studying Bristol Bay inJune 1936. It not only aimed to gather detailed scientific data about the
habits and migration patterns of Alaskan salmon but wanted to discover how
American fishermen would react to Japan’s efforts to catch salmon in Bristol
Bay.32 The ministry employed a 660-ton research vessel and a 60-ton
auxiliary ship. They spent about 88,000 yen (equivalent to roughly 160
million yen in 2017) on the survey.33 The ministry discovered that salmon
runs in Bristol Bay were “relatively large” and that there were “fishinggrounds with entrepreneurial values” that were “larger than expected” in thebay.34 The ministry concluded that the scale of their investigation was “notbig enough” to comprehensively understand the Bristol Bay fishing grounds
and evaluate their commercial value.35
Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry decided to make a more
intensive survey of Bristol Bay in 1937 with better equipment, a larger
budget, and more human resources. It increased the number of auxiliary
ships to three. It almost doubled the budget to 169,000 yen (approximately
270 million yen in 2017) in 1937. To offset the increase in the researchcosts, the ministry planned to catch about 100,000 Alaskan salmon in 1937,
compared to 25,000 in 1936, and to sell them to a Japanese fishing company
for 113,000 yen (roughly 180 million yen in 2017).36 The number ofparticipants in the survey was nearly doubled from fifty-one in 1936 toninety-five in 1937.37
The Japanese decision to increase the scale of the survey aroused
vehement opposition from US fishing-industry leaders, their spokesmen in
the media and Congress, and the public. West Coast fishing-industry leaders
petitioned the White House and Congress to oust Japanese deep-sea
fishermen from Alaskan waters. They advocated a radical revision of the lawof the sea through renouncing the freedom of the seas doctrine andexpanding US jurisdiction over Alaskan salmon into the entire Bristol Bay.
Harold Grotle, secretary of the Deep Sea Fishermen’s Union, for example,
claimed ambitiously, “We would like to have the entire Bering Sea.”38
American newspapers and magazines conceptualized the Japanese research
vessels’ advance into Bristol Bay as an “invasion” or “encroachment,”39 anda short film called this US-Japan fishery dispute “Alaska’s salmon war.”40
These sensational terms heightened the American public’s awareness of thefishery controversy and effectively gathered nationalistic support for thefishing industry’s demands.41 Lawmakers elected from the Pacific Coastbacked the fishing industry. Anthony J. Dimond, Alaskan delegate toCONTESTING ALASKAN SALMON

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Congress, and Senator Homer T. Bone (D-WA) proposed House Resolution
7552 and the Senate Resolution 2679, respectively, on June 15, 1937. These
declared that the United States must extend its jurisdiction over Alaskansalmon into the entire eastern half of the Bering Sea.42 Although theseresolutions did not become law, the debate pressured the State Department
to find a solution to the fishery controversy as quickly as possible.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of these vigorous
reactions to Japan’s efforts to investigate Bristol Bay and develop its fishinginterests there. But the ministry did not abort its three-year survey of thewaters and instead chose to wait and see what would develop. Kensuke
Horinouchi, chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, strongly
opposed the research project and warned that it would badly impact USJapan relations.43 But the Foreign Ministry finally conceded to the Ministryof Agriculture and Forestry. Vice Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu
wrote to Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Teiichi Nagase in May
1936 that “given the domestic situation your ministry has faced, we consider
undertaking the survey inevitable.”44 Thus, when Japanese consuls in
Portland and Seattle repeatedly reported to Tokyo that anti-Japanesesentiment on the West Coast was rising and stressed the importance ofquickly settling the fishery row,45 the Foreign Ministry ignored theirsuggestions. Foreign Minister Naotake Sato replied to the consuls that, sincesalmon fishing was a crucial Japanese industry worth 30 million yen peryear (approximately 49 billion yen currently). Tokyo could not determine its
policy until the three-year investigation was completed in mid-1938.46
Therefore, Sato instructed the consuls to “pretend to be ignorant of anything
except that Japan will conduct research in Bristol Bay in 1937” and to“avoid making any commitment” to ending the fishery controversy “without
offending Washington officials as much as possible by showing a seemingly
cooperative attitude.”47 The Foreign Ministry maintained this wait-and-see
policy until December 1937, when the US State Department finally put
enormous pressure on the Foreign Ministry to grant concessions in thefishery controversy.
IV. THE US-JAPAN CONTEST FOR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUTALASKAN SALMON, 1937–1938
While American fishing industry leaders sought to possess Alaskansalmon by abandoning the freedom of the seas principle and remaking thelaw of the sea, Washington officials opposed claiming proprietary rights to190

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the fish for five reasons. The first was legal precedent. In the 1890s theUnited States made a similar claim about protecting fur seals and declared
that, since the Bering Sea was a “closed” ocean, Washington could exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over fur seals in the eastern half of the Bering Sea. But
in 1893 the international arbitration committee that was established toarbitrate conflicting claims to fur seals in the Bering Sea between the UnitedStates and Britain decided that US jurisdiction over fur seals in the Bering
Sea was restricted to the ordinary three-mile limit.48 Referring to this legal
precedent, Eugene H. Dooman of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of theState Department concluded that expanding America’s jurisdiction over
Alaskan salmon into the high seas of Bristol Bay was “not a tenable”
argument.49 Attorney General Homer S. Cummings agreed on this point.50
Second, unilaterally transforming the law of the sea would be economicallydisadvantageous. The freedom of the seas doctrine was essential toAmerican deep-sea fishermen as it guaranteed America’s worldwide
offshore fishing interests. Thus, if another country followed America’s
precedent and one-sidedly expanded its oceanic jurisdiction, it would be
difficult for the United States to oppose and overturn such an effort.51 Third,
Washington could not morally support the unilateral extension of its
jurisdiction in Bristol Bay. Since the United States had advocated thefreedom of the seas principle from the beginning of the Republic, the policyof enclosing Bristol Bay was “not in line with the traditional attitude andpolicy of the United States.”52 Fourth, it was technically impossible tomonitor all Japanese fishing boats during the season in entire Bristol Bay.
Bower claimed that the US patrol service could not be “effective, owing to
the number of Japanese vessels operating, extent of the fishing areas, andvariable weather conditions.”53 Fifth, if the United States insisted on
excluding foreign fishing boats from Bristol Bay, it might lead to an armed
conflict with foreign powers, most likely Japan. Leo D. Sturgeon of theDivision of Far Eastern Affairs warned, “The exercise of such jurisdiction
would undoubtedly require a show of force by this Government if foreign
vessels were interfered with.”54
State Department officials pursued a solution that would not upset thestatus quo of the law of the sea. The best option for them was a multilateralsalmon conservation treaty that included Japan as a contracting party. But
they had to consider the geostrategic relationship with Japan. In April 1937,
Edward W. Allen, a Seattle-based lawyer and a public spokesman for thefishing industry, proposed to Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre
that Washington first conclude a multilateral salmon conservation agreement

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with Ottawa and London. Then, if Tokyo refused to join this conservation
regime, the three Anglo-American powers could collaboratively close theirmarkets to Japanese canned salmon and thus force Tokyo to join the salmon
conservation treaty.55 But such high-handed diplomacy, founded on thethreat of embargo, was too risky for State Department officials for whompreventing further deterioration in US-Japan relations was the top priority.
Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs warned that
Allen’s plan “would be likely to invite reprisals [from Japan] and injure
good relations [with it].”56 Sayre concurred and added that Allen’s solution
would be “likely to be considered by Japanese as being like pointing a gun
toward them.”57 Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. Roper agreed to approach
Tokyo cautiously in addressing this question. He insisted, “We should bearin mind that we are dealing with a country which is considerably wrought up
and in a nervous state, and in which the question of a food supply,
particularly fish food, is highly important.”58
These Washington discussions reveal that although Japan’s voluntary
participation in an Anglo-American multilateral salmon conservation regime
might theoretically be the best way for the United States to keep Alaskansalmon from Japanese pelagic fishermen, it was not considered to be aneffective solution. Even if Japan were to join such a multilateralconservation arrangement, it would be difficult to implement because US
marine scientists knew too little about Alaskan salmon. The State
Department as well as the Bureau of Fisheries had limited data about
Alaskan salmon’s life cycle, habits, and migration patterns. For example,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull straightforwardly confessed to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “We do not . . . understand that the salmon resourcesof Alaskan waters have thus far been depleted or are in imminent danger of
early depletion.”59 In a Congressional hearing in June 1937, moreover,
Elmer Higgins, chief of the Division of Scientific Inquiry of the Bureau ofFisheries, admitted, “We know nothing about the life and growth of salmon
during their life outside territorial waters.”60
In the face of this situation, Gardner Poole, chairman of the Fishery
Advisory Committee of the Business Advisory Council, stressed that theUnited States must have as “thorough” scientific data and facts about the fish
as Japan had before starting negotiations toward a multilateral salmon
conservation agreement. Poole wrote:
We are somewhat at a disadvantage as we lack thorough scientificknowledge and facts as to the habits and movement of Salmon and192

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Halibut in their migration from the sea to our shores. On the other
hand, the Japanese, through a very definite policy, have a thoroughknowledge of these matters based on scientific surveys which they havemade through the operations of a fully equipped and modern research
vessel. . . . As a result of their work, the Japanese are in possession ofdata and facts today not known to any other nation. . . . If, by any
chance, we should be called upon to approach this Pacific Coasttroublesome situation in any manner leading up to treaty relationships. . . we would be seriously handicapped because of the definite lack ofauthoritative data based on scientific investigations. . . . We should atleast follow the example of the other countries in providing for proper
facilities for securing scientific data and knowledge which we do not
now have on our deep sea fisheries.61
State Department officials agreed that the United States must immediately
study the topographical features of Bristol Bay and the biologicalcharacteristics of Alaskan salmon as comprehensively as its competitor,
Japan. Ballantine suggested to Stanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political
relations to the State Department that, “as the Japanese investigations are
more recent than some of ours appear to be and as the habits of some fish, atleast, have been known to change, I think we should overlook no possibilityof having our information as up to date and scientifically sound as
possible.”62 Ballantine highlighted the urgency of the problem andconcluded, “Action should be taken as speedily as possible to remedy thesituation” “in view of the possibility that we should have to bear the brunt of
any criticism for failure arising from insufficient knowledge of the facts.”63
Washington changed from its traditional neglect of studying the oceanic
ecology of Alaska and immediately began intensive scientific research in
Bristol Bay and on Alaskan salmon. Roosevelt had neglected investigating
Alaskan waters and in June 1936 vetoed a congressional plan for
constructing and operating a special research vessel for $500,000(approximately $9.3 million in 2019). The president viewed such researchrelated expenses as “wholly unnecessary” and insisted that it would beenough to transfer some out-of-date naval or Coast Guard ships to theFisheries Bureau to convert into research vessels.64 A June 1937
congressional hearing revealed that the government had no ships that could
be transformed into research vessels.65 To address this situation, Roperincluded in the budget of the Fisheries Bureau $95,000 (roughly $1.7
million in 2019) for chartering one or two survey vessels.66 The Congress of

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1938 approved a five-year investigation of Bristol Bay and Alaskan salmon
and appropriated $76,000 (approximately $1.4 million in 2019) for the firstyear of the research.67 This shift in Washington’s attitude toward surveying
Bristol Bay and studying Alaskan salmon aimed to counter Tokyo’s threeyear scientific project for investigating the same waters and the same fish.
But a problem was that this American research program would take many
years to conduct and would not help in providing a quick solution to theongoing fishery problem with Japan.
Lack of scientific knowledge about Alaskan salmon restricted the State
Department’s options in settling the fishery controversy. One crucial
question was how far the United States should expand its jurisdiction oversalmon in Bristol Bay. State Department officials were originally convincedthat the United States would be able to protect salmon in Bristol Bay if itbanned Japanese pelagic fishermen’s operations within fifty miles ofAmerica’s coastlines. They believed that “salmon fishing cannot bepractically conducted more than twenty miles from our coastline.”68 Theysoon found their ideas too optimistic and conjectural to effectively preserve
Alaskan salmon. State Department counselor Robert Walton Moore wrote to
Roosevelt:
It seems very certain from the information available that a fifty milelimit or even a substantially higher mile limit would not effectively
protect the [salmon] industry. The run of the salmon into our rivers
could be intercepted in Bristol Bay, for instance by Japanese fishingvessels using long gill nets, say seventy-five or one hundred miles off
the coast. We can have no assurance of the industry being maintained
unless the Japanese will forego their fishing activities a very
considerable distance beyond the coast line.69
State Department officials also realized that they were ignorant ofgeographical features of Bristol Bay and that they needed to study how theshallowness of the waters for a long way offshore affected salmon habits andtheir migration routes.70 Therefore, the State Department decided, “Until
such an investigation [of Alaskan salmon and Bristol Bay] is made, we arein no position to conclude definitive negotiations with Japan. All we can doin that direction would seem to be limited to endeavoring to obtain Japan’s
agreement in principle.”71
The State Department increasingly leaned toward concluding a bilateralinterim fishery agreement with Japan until the US government could

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complete a scientific investigation of Alaskan salmon in Bristol Bay. State
Department officials were nevertheless willing to discuss any solution thatwould not overturn the freedom of the seas doctrine. Ernest W. Sawyer,
former assistant secretary of the interior, offered a unique idea of building
artificial islands in Bristol Bay and gradually extending America’s
sovereignty in the waters within the existing international legal framework.
Sawyer suggested that Army engineers “drop a few barges of rock out on the
tideflats of Bristol Bay and build a fish boat refuge where we could run up
the flag and step by step ease the japs out of Bristol Bay.”72 Although State
Department officials gave careful consideration to this intriguing idea, theirconclusion was negative due to America’s limited scientific information
about Bristol Bay and the salmon swimming there. Sturgeon answered:
The shallow area of Bristol Bay, in a fishing sense, covers almost theentire Bay. . . . The snag is that we do not have sufficient scientific data
to say just how far offshore it would be possible for alien fishermen to
break up or intercept the salmon runs. Neither do we have adequate
information as to the various routes followed by the salmon as theyhead from the open sea to the rivers which they eventually enter for
spawning purposes.73
After October 1937, when the State Department began addressing thefishery controversy more seriously because of the strong possibility of ananti-Japanese boycott on the West Coast, Tokyo’s noncommittal attitude
toward the fishery question also began changing. The Foreign Ministry gave
up its wait-and-see attitude and took the initiative toward settling the fisherytrouble. The Foreign Ministry was deeply concerned about a possible antiJapanese boycott and how it might affect the Second Sino-Japanese War,which had begun in July 1937. Foreign Ministry officials, who believed thatpublic opinion was decisive in US foreign policymaking, worried that
American fishing-industry union workers, in cooperation with other labor
unions, would take advantage of the fishery situation to agitate for anationwide boycott of Japanese goods.74 Such a boycott would impact
Japan’s silk exports to the United States, which were worth 400 million yen(roughly 650 billion yen in 2017).75 This foreign trade revenue was essential
for Japan’s empire-building projects in China. Foreign Ministry officials
were also concerned that a boycott would further arouse anti-Japanesesentiment and invite America’s intervention in the war in China. Because
they believed that America’s attitude and behavior could significantly affectCONTESTING ALASKAN SALMON

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the war in China, the Foreign Ministry sought to keep the United Statescalm.76 When Vice Foreign Minister Horinouchi claimed that it was urgently
necessary to suspend the survey of Bristol Bay in order to appease theAmerican public and improve relations with the United States, the Ministryof Agriculture and Forestry reluctantly heeded the request in the “wideperspective of Japan-US reconciliation and cooperation.”77
In March 1938, Washington and Tokyo finally settled the fisherycontroversy through a gentleman’s agreement. In the past, the United States
and Japan had employed this informal convention to resolve or preempt USJapan problems, such as a question of Japanese immigration to the UnitedStates in 1907–8.78 In the agreement of 1938, Tokyo offered three
concessions. First, Japan would suspend its three-year scientificinvestigation of Bristol Bay. Second, Japan would continue restraining
Japanese nationals from fishing for salmon in Alaskan waters. Third, Japan
would withhold their fishing permits if Japanese nationals were foundcatching salmon in Alaskan waters.79 Although earlier scholarship has
undervalued the importance of the first concession, it was the mostsignificant factor for Washington officials because protecting Alaskansalmon hinged on the scientific understanding of the habits and migration
patterns of the fish. Despite these three concessions, Washington officials
and American fishing-industry leaders were far from satisfied. This was
because, as Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Hiroya Inoemphasized in December 1937, although Japan voluntarily refrained fromexercising its legitimate right, according to the law of the sea, to fish in
Alaskan waters, Japan never renounced this right nor recognized entire
Bristol Bay as US sovereign waters.80 The gentleman’s agreement was, atthe time, the only practical way for Washington to temporarily protect thesalmon from Japanese pelagic fishermen. The United States indeed obtained
significant concessions from Japan over salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay.81
CONCLUSION
In this article I have reconsidered the nature of the Bristol Bay crisis byexamining how Washington officials perceived, addressed, and solved thefishery dispute. The fishery controversy contained a political question of
how the United States ought to go about protecting Alaskan salmon fromJapanese deep-sea fishermen. It provoked considerable discussion among
Americans as to how to transform Bristol Bay from an oceanic legal
borderland, where Japanese pelagic fishermen could catch as many salmon

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KOJI ITO

as they wanted, to legally bordered American waters where the UnitedStates could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fish. While American
fishing-industry leaders and their allies in the media and Congress
demanded that the United States unilaterally abandon the freedom of theseas doctrine and expand its jurisdiction over Alaskan salmon into entire
Bristol Bay, Washington officials rejected this demand.
The Bristol Bay crisis was, structurally, a US-Japan contest for the legal
authority to exploit Alaskan salmon in the waters. It was not only a legal
matter, however, but it rested on the technical question of how the UnitedStates might be able to preserve Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-sea
fishermen. This question occupied the center of Washington officials’
discussions about settling the fishery controversy. US government officials
found that access to Alaskan salmon depended ultimately on available
scientific information about the fish. Indeed, Washington officials’ very
limited scientific knowledge about Alaskan salmon compared to Japan’s
made it necessary for Washington to rely on Tokyo’s voluntary promise notto catch salmon in Alaskan waters, which had the effect of changing Bristol
Bay into de facto American waters and Alaskan salmon into de facto
American fish.
NOTES
The research for this article was made possible by generous financial
support from the Japanese Association for American History, the Suntory
Foundation, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I
appreciate their assistance.
1
Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries, 1938,” in Report of the United States
Commissioner of Fisheries for the Fiscal Year 1939 with Appendixes, ed. Charles E. Jackson(Washington, DC: GPO, 1941), 36.
2
Ann L. Hollick, US Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1981), chap. 2; Harry N. Scheiber, “Origins of the Abstention Doctrine in
Ocean Law: Japanese–US Relations and the Pacific Fisheries, 1937–1958,” Ecology Law
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1989): 29–36; Itsunori Onodera and Katsuji Hiroyoshi, “Nichibei
Gyogyō Masatsu no Kigen to sono Haikei: Iwayuru ‘Burisutoru–wan Jiken’ ni kansuru
Subyō to Ichi–kōsatsu,” Hokkaidō Daigaku Suisan Gakubu Kenkyū Shūhō 47, no. 1 (1996):
13–29; Harry N. Scheiber, “Japan, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific Fisheries: A
Perspective on the Origins of Modern Ocean Law, 1930–1953,” San Diego International Law
Journal 6 (2004): 38–51; Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Occupation Policy and the JapaneseFisheries Management Regime, 1945–1952,” in Democracy in Occupied Japan: The US
Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society, ed. Mark E. Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita(London: Routledge, 2007), 50–53; Mary C. Finley, “The Tragedy of Enclosure: Fish,
Fisheries Science, and US Foreign Policy, 1920–1960” (PhD diss., University of California,

CONTESTING ALASKAN SALMON

197

2007), chap. 3; Ross Coen, “Owning the Ocean: Environment, Race, and Identity in theBristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery, 1930–1938,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 104, no. 3(2013): 133–50.
3Willis H. Rich and Edward M. Ball, “Statistical Review of the Alaska Salmon Fisheries,
pt. 1, “Bristol Bay and Alaska Peninsula,” in Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Fisheries
64 (1928), ed. Henry O’Malley (Washington, DC: GPO, 1929), 57.
4
Ward T. Bower, Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1919 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1920), 38.
5
Ward T. Bower, Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industries in 1924 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1925), 68–69.
6
Ibid., 74–75.
7
E. F. Morgan to Cordell Hull, July 8, 1930, State Department Decimal File (hereafter DF)
1930–39, 894.628/40, box 7334, Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, National Archives andRecords Administration, College Park (hereafter NACP).
8
Ibid.
9
Morgan to Hull, September 29, 1930, DF 1930–39, 894.628/46, box 7334, RG 59, NACP;
Morgan to Hull, October 4, 1930, DF 1930–39, 894.628/47, box 7334, RG 59, NACP.
10William R. Castle, Jr. to Robert P. Lamont, January 29, 1931, DF 1930–39, 894.628/52,
box 7334, RG 59, NACP.
11“Amerika dewa Waga Kanikōsen ni Enjo: Sake Masu Gyogyō tono Bunya o Meihakuni,”Ōsaka Jiji Shimpō, December 4, 1931.
12
Memorandum by Lawrence E. Salisbury, October 17, 1932, DF 1930–39, 894.628/93–
4/5, box 7334, RG 59, NACP.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Memorandum by Ransford S. Miller, January 4, 1932, DF 1930–39, 894.628/79, box
7334, RG 59, NACP.
16
Memorandum by Eugene H. Dooman, June 4, 1936, DF 1930–39, 894.628/154, box
7334, RG 59, NACP.
17
Suemasa Okamoto to Kijuro Shidehara, July 8, 1930, Ajia Rekishi Shiryō Sentā (Japan
Center for Asian Historical Records, hereafter JACAR), ref. B09042208000 (slides #35–37),
Honpō Gyogyō Kankei Zakken / Chūnanhokubei Engan Gyogyō Kankei / Beikoku no Bu(hereafter Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku), Daiikkan, Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan (hereafter GGS).
18
Teiichi Nagase to Toshihiko Taketomi, August 15, 1930, JACAR, ref. B09042208000(slide #50), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS.; “Arasuka Hōmen e Shutsuryō
Fukyoka,” Asahi Shimbun, August 25, 1935.
19“Tenki ni Tatsu Okitori Arasuka Mezasu,” Asahi Shimbun, September 16, 1934; “Shūgiin
Tōbu Kitataiheiyō Gyogyō Kaihatsu ni kansuru Kengi,” May 11, 1936, JACAR, ref.
B09042208400 (slides # 229–30), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS.
20
“Arasuka Kōkai e Yakushin no Daiichidan,” Asahi Shimbun, May 30, 1936; Nagase to
Mamoru Shigemitsu, “‘Burisutoru’wan Hōmen Sake Masu Gyogyō Chōsa ni kansuru Ken,”
April 2, 1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208400 (slides #198–99), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku,
Daiikkan, GGS.
21
Rokuji Sato, “Shōwa Jūni Jūsannen Ryōnendo ni okeru Hokuyō Sakemasuzoku Gyorui
no Hyōshiki Hōryū Shiken ni tsuite,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 8, no. 4 (1939): 183.
22
Susumu Sugano, “Sake Masu Yūei no Suishin to Kyogan Kyori,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi
4, no. 5 (1936): 318–20.
23
Susumu Sugano, “Kamusatsuka Nishikaigan ni okeru Sake Masu Raiyū to Kaikyō tono
Kankei,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 4, no. 6 (1936): 407–8.
24
Nōrinshō, (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), “Hokubei Gasshūkoku ni okeru

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KOJI ITO

Ggyogyō Kotoni Gaikoku Ryōdo Okiai ni okeru Gyogyō no Gaiyō,” undated (c. 1937),
JACAR, ref. B09042210300 (slide #23), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., slide #11, Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.
27
“A Serious Situation,” Alaska Weekly, July 31, 1936.
28
Willis H. Rich, “‘Homing’ of Pacific Salmon,” Science 85, no. 2211 (1937): 477–78.
29
See, e.g., Archibald G. Huntsman, “‘Migration’ and ‘Homing’ of Salmon,” Science 85,
no. 2204 (1937): 313–14.
30
Rokuji Sato, “Kitataiheiyō Kokusai Sake Masu Kyōdō Chōsa Kikan Setsuritsu no
Teishō,” Kaiyō Gyogyō 3, no. 11 (1938): 11.
31
Ibid., 12.
32
Masataka Ide, “‘Arasuka’ ‘Burisutoru’wan Gyojō Chōsa Kitataiheiyō Hokubu Gyogyō
Chōsei Kaihatsu ni kansuru Keihi Setsumei Sankōsho,” February 5, 1936, JACAR, ref.
B09042208300 (slide #169), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS; Masataka Ide,
“Hokubu Taiheiyō Gyojō Chōsa Yōkō,” April 28, 1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208400 (slide#201), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS.
33
Iwao Fujita to Gaimushō, “Hoppō Gyojō Chōsei Kaihatsu ni kansuru Ken,” December 26,
1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208600 (slides #439–40), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan,
GGS.
34
Fujita to Gaimushō, “Kitataiheiyō Hokubu Gyojō Chōsei Kaihatsu ni kansuru Keihi no
Zōka Setsumei Sankōsho,” December 26, 1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208600 (slide #446),
Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid., (slides #443, #446–47).
37
Nōrinshō, “Hoppō Gyojō Chōsei Kaihatsu Chōsa no Gaiyō,” February 5, 1938, JACAR,ref. B09042210600 (slide #377), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.
38
Memorandum by Leo D. Sturgeon, June 30, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific124, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
39
For example, “Firm Stand Is Necessary: Against Alien Invasion of Our Salmon
Resources,” Pacific Fisherman 34, no. 11 (1936): 19; “Fish Industry in Northwest Is
Threatened: US, Canada Alarmed by Japanese Encroachment,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
October 8, 1936.
40
Edgar Anstey, “Alaska’s Salmon War” in March of Time, vol. 4, episode 4 (New York:
Home Box Office, 1937).
41
Members of the American public sent many letters to the White House suggesting that theUnited States even fight a war with Japan, if necessary, to protect Alaskan salmon. See, e.g.,
H. T. Dureen to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 15, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/235, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
42
Anthony J. Dimond to Green H. Hackworth, October 19, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008
North Pacific/199, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
43
Kensuke Horinouchi to Tatsuji Hara, “‘Burisutoru’ wan Okitori Gyogyō Mondai,” May 8,
1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208400 (slides #227–28), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan,
GGS.
44
Shigemitsu to Nagase, “‘Burisutoru’wan Hōmen Sake Masu Gyojō Chōsa ni kansuru
Ken,” May 21, 1936, JACAR, ref. B09042208400 (slides #232–33), Honpō Gyogyō
Beikoku, Daiikkan, GGS.
45
Ken Tsurumi to Naotake Sato, “Kitataiheiyō Honpō Sake Shutsuryō Mondai ni kansuru
Ken,” April 16, 1937, JACAR, ref. B09042209200 (slide #365), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku,
Dainikan, GGS; Issaku Okamoto to Sato, “Hōjin no Arasuka Shutsuryō Mondai ni kanshi Bei
Tōgyōsha to Kaidan no Ken,” May 5, 1937, JACAR, ref. B09042209300 (slide #422), Honpō

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199

Gyogyō Beikoku, Dainikan, GGS.
46
Sato to Okamoto, “‘Burisutoru’wan ni okeru Sake Okitori ni kansuru Ken,” April 28,
1937, JACAR, ref. B09042209200 (slides #376–77), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Dainikan,
GGS.
47
Ibid.
48
William Williams, “Reminiscences of the Bering Sea Arbitration,” American Journal ofInternational Law 37, no. 4 (1943): 582.
49
Memorandum by Dooman, September 30, 1936, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific 1/2,
box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
50
Memorandum by Sturgeon, January 13, 1938, DF 1930–1939, 711.008 North Pacific/267
1/2, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
51
Hull to Royal S. Copeland, August 4, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/170, box
3912, RG 59, NACP.
52
Memorandum by Dooman, January 15, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/3, box
3912, RG 59, NACP.
53
Memorandum by Sturgeon, January 13, 1938, DF 1930–1939, 711.008 North Pacific/267
1/2, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
54
Memorandum by Sturgeon, January 7, 1938, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/342,
box 3914, RG 59, NACP.
55
Edward W. Allen to Francis B. Sayre, April 20, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/61, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
56
Joseph W. Ballantine to Sayre, April 24, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/61
GDG, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
57
Ballantine to Sayre, May 4, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/72, box 3912, RG
59, NACP.
58
Memorandum by Sturgeon, January 13, 1938, DF 1930–1939, 711.008 North Pacific/267
1/2, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
59
Hull to Roosevelt, July 17, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/152 GDG, box
3912, RG 59, NACP.
60
Memorandum by Ballantine, July 28, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/164, box
3912, RG 59, NACP.
61
Gardner Poole to William R. Vallance, July 9, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/147, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
62
Ballantine to Stanley K. Hornbeck, July 22, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/152, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
63
Memorandum by Ballantine, July 28, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/164, box
3912, RG 59, NACP; Ballantine to Hornbeck, August 4, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/164, box 3912, RG 59, NACP.
64
Memorandum by Ballantine, July 28, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/164, box
3912, RG 59, NACP
65
Ibid.
66
Sturgeon to Sayre, October 25, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/203 1/2, box
3913, RG 59, NACP.
67
Jackson to Maxwell M. Hamilton, June 30, 1938, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/399, box 3914, RG 59, NACP.
68
Dooman to Sayre, April 15, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/92, box 3912, RG
59, NACP.
69
Robert Walton Moore to Roosevelt, November 24, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North
Pacific/266A, box 3913, RG 59, NACP.
70
Memorandum by Sturgeon, October 4, 1937, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/198,

200

KOJI ITObox 3913, RG 59, NACP.
71
Hamilton to Hornbeck and Hull, September 29, 1937, 711.008 North Pacific/185 1/2, box
3913, RG 59, NACP. Italics in original.
72
Ernest W. Sawyer to Harry A. McBride, December 18, 1937, DF 1930–39, 811.0145/322,
box 4783, RG 59, NACP.
73
Sturgeon to McBride, December 31, 1937, DF 1930–39, 811.0145/322, box 4783, RG 59,
NACP.
74
Horinouchi to Hiroya Ino, December 8, 1937, “Burisutoruwan Sakeryō Jōkyō Chōsa no
Ichiji Uchikiri ni tsuki Shōkai (hereafter “Burisutoruwan”),” in Nihon Gaikō Bunsho,
Shōwaki, 3, ed. Gaimushō (Tokyo: Hakuhōsha, 2014), 1792–93.
75
Ibid., 1792. Japan’s silk exports to the United States constituted about 13% of its totalexports. Kazuyoshi Oku, “Nihon Bōeki no Hatten to Kōzō: Ryōtaisenkanki,” Seisaku Sōzō
Kenkyū 5 (2011): 7–8.
76
Horinouchi to Ino, December 8, 1937, “Burisutoruwan,” 1792.
77
Ino to Horinouchi, “‘Arasuka’ ‘Burisutoru’wan ni okeru Hōjin Sake Masu Gyogyō nikansuru Ken,” December 11, 1937, JACAR, ref. B09042210400 (slides #172–73), Honpō
Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.
78
Guthrie-Shimizu, “Occupation Policy and the Japanese Fisheries Management Regime,
1945–1952,” 52.
79
State Department, “Confidential Release for Publication: The Alaska Salmon Fishery
Situation,” March 25, 1938, DF 1930–39, 711.008 North Pacific/324, box 3914, RG 59,
NACP.
80
Ino to Horinouchi, “‘Arasuka’ ‘Burisutoru’wan ni okeru Hōjin Sake Masu Gyogyō nikansuru Ken,” December 11, 1937, JACAR, ref. B09042210400 (slide #172), Honpō
Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.
81
State Department, “Confidential Release for Publication,” March 25, 1938, DF 1930–39,
711.008 North Pacific/324, box 3914, RG 59, NACP.