The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 33 (2022)

Copyright © 2022 The Japanese Association for American Studies. All rights reserved.

Mobilizing Party Participation:
Defending the Iowa Caucuses

Masahito WATANABE*

INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Iowa Democratic Party caucuses were a chaotic debacle
because the voting results were not reported as is customary on the day ofthe caucuses. One of the most important roles of Iowa in the presidential
nomination process is selecting candidates before the New Hampshire
primary. In that sense, Iowa’s impact in 2020 was limited. Before 2020, theIowa caucuses had already been criticized not only by political scientists
but also by party elites in Washington, DC. What caused the failure of
the 2020 Iowa caucuses? Is there sufficient reason to terminate them? Is
the problem caused by Iowa being the first state in the nation’s sequential
nomination process? Is it because of the unique voting system of the Iowa
caucuses? Is it caused by administrative deficiencies?
The objective of primary elections and campaigns is more than simply
getting the votes for selecting potential winners. If there are relatively
unknown ways that could enhance robust party participation in the primaryprocess, the caucuses should be reevaluated in terms of how they embrace
activists and provide advocacy opportunities for fringe candidates. In thisarticle I examine the pros and cons of the qualitative value of the Iowa
caucuses as well as suggesting ways to repair administrative deficiencies.
* Associate Professor, Hokkaido University

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To defend the importance of having the Iowa caucuses in the US primaryelection process, I will present three exploratory examinations. First, I
will provide a detailed assessment of where the 2020 Democratic Iowa
caucuses went wrong by adding third-party reviews to the qualitative
research of my participatory observations. Second, to differentiate thevarious administrative dysfunctions, including the reporting app issue fromfundamental questions of Iowa caucuses, I will discuss the 2020 case inrelation to existing literature on Iowa caucuses. Third, by interpretating
the Iowa caucuses in the context of party decline and resurgence, I will
examine recent examples of how the nomination process of the existing
caucus format might contribute to nonelite participation and diversificationof voices in the US two-party system. Finally, I will probe directions forpotential reforms. In conclusion, I will discuss how campaigning in thecaucus state in a sequential nomination process has provided opportunities
for enhancing the mobility and dynamism of parties. Without a campaign
arena such as Iowa, the diversity of actors and voices in the two parties
might be limited.
I. THE 2020 IOWA DEMOCRATIC CAUCUSES: THE DEBACLE
In the 2020 Iowa caucuses held on February 3, the winner was Pete
Buttigieg with 26.2% of the votes (14 delegates), which almost tied
him with Bernie Sanders with 26.1% (12 delegates).1 Unlike other Iowa
caucuses, which are held every four years, the impact in 2020 on selecting
candidates was diminished because the results did not come out on the dayof the caucuses. Because the last-minute local poll that was expected tobe conducted by the Des Moines Register was accidentally cancelled,2 thecandidates were able to downplay the gap between their actual popularity
in Iowa and media expectations, and this led to the New Hampshire primaryignoring the results of Iowa’s decision.3 The vast majority of media outlets
in the United States criticized the Iowa Democratic Party (IDP), and adysfunction of the mobile smartphone app was widely reported.
The law firms Bonnie Campbell and Faegre Drinker Biddle and Reath
LLP issued their “Internal Review Report for the Iowa Democratic Party:
2020 Iowa Caucuses” on November 10, 2020.4 The report confirmed thatthe smartphone app was the main reason for the delay in reporting theelection results due to app development delays and lack of training. The
report revealed that the delay in development happened because of the
Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) aggressive interjection into allMOBILIZING PARTY PARTICIPATION

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of the IDP’s technology endeavors related to the 2020 Iowa caucuses. As
the report points out, the IDP was not able to contract with a vendor todevelop the app until August 2019 because they were waiting for approval
from the DNC to hold virtual caucuses.5 Virtual caucuses were intended toovercome the logistical inconvenience of being physically present, as theywould provide an opportunity to vote via telephone, online, or other secure
methods (Redlawsk 2019).6 The final rejection of the virtual caucus by
the DNC may be understandable considering cybersecurity concerns after
the alleged Russian hacking during the 2016 presidential election,7 which
created a delay in the app development. The tension between the DNC andthe IDP, namely the DNC’s uncooperative relationship with the first-in-the
nation state, played a negative role in preparations that were inefficient andmisguided.
Although the “Internal Review Report” states that “there were multiple
reasons why the reporting of the results was delayed,”8 the analysis
basically refers to only the app-related matters and the DNC’s intervention.
Through extensive interviews with precinct captains, party insiders, andcaucus goers, during my twelve years of participatory observation in Iowa
of Republican and Democratic caucuses in 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020,
it is my understanding that the 2020 Democratic debacle happened not
only because of the app but because of additional complicating reasons.
Therefore, in this article I will fill the missing gaps in the “Internal Review
Report” and the major arguments reported in the mainstream US media.
First, there is the complicated procedure of vote counting during thecaucuses. The Democrats use a realignment process in which votersfavoring a candidate must reach a designated viability line, which is usually
15 percent. Those voters whose candidate does not meet the test make asecond choice from among the candidates who have passed the viabilityline. Following this procedure, caucus goers tend to use their first voting
option for their favorite candidate, regardless of the candidate’s viability
or potential electability in the general election. In addition, strategic votingin the second round gives caucus goers another chance for expressing theirpriorities. In a situation in which hypothetical candidates A, B, and C all
become viable in the first round, and D becomes nonviable, a supporterof candidate D has several options after the first vote, after watching the
progress of other three competing candidates. If a voter dislikes the leading
candidate A because of a particular issue, and B is neck and neck with A
at the first round, the voter may choose B, even though the voter’s actual
second choice is C. To stop or help a candidate, a caucus goer can vote

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strategically in the second round because of knowing who is leading andby what margin. Caucus goers who first choose a candidate who wins over
15 percent of the votes cannot change their choice, but they can persuadeundecided voters to join them in the next round. If such persuasions andnegotiations work, the priorities of strategic voting may change. Activists
may even plan alliances between different campaigns in advance to preventa particular candidate from getting chosen. As such, the final results absorb
a wide variety of voter preferences on issues and candidates, and thecomplications of this process are a problem.
Second, the rule is not fully understood and is even often unknown
among new caucus goers. College students take part in the primary process
in their school states, not in their home states. This means not all firsttime participants have had the experience of engaging in caucuses with
their parents in Iowa. Many campaign staffers who have the responsibilityof teaching the rules actually come from other states. Some campaigns
organize their own training seminars, as did Ron Paul’s campaign in 2012,
in which it taught activists how to gain delegate seats in after-caucus
discussions.9 The 2008 Obama campaign staffers also knew the rules welland focused more on voter education.10 Historically, all campaigns that had
a strong knowledge base of the rules and took advantage of them ended
up boosting their candidates to victory. As Barbara Trish and William
J. Menner say, “understanding the rules of the game is key” (Trish andMenner 2021). If knowing the rules proficiently is part of the game in
Iowa, campaigns and activists may hesitate to disseminate the rules widely
beyond their potential base and may even have incentives to downplay therules to mislead competitors. In a sense, the results represent their campaign
efforts. But in fairness, local parties may have the most responsibility forsufficiently informing participants about the rules. In 2020, Andrew Yang,an underdog candidate in Iowa, suffered from this problem because his
campaign staffers had limited knowledge about the caucuses and the rules.
Third, there has been longstanding local and national intraparty tension
and debates between the IDP and the DNC about the role of Iowa,
especially in 2016 and 2020. Trish and Menner (2021) note that a push forreform becomes strongest when a candidate or party has undergone a loss.
Since the Sanders campaign challenge of requesting a recount of the resultsin 2016, the DNC put strong pressure on the IDP to change the rules bymaking them clearer and more transparent, thus making them fair to all.
One of the IDP’s reforms was to try to institute virtual caucuses, which was
turned down by DNC five months before the caucuses. Another was theMOBILIZING PARTY PARTICIPATION

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Fig. 1. Front page of presidential preference card used in the Iowa caucuses in 2020 (Iowa
Democratic Party). “Module 8: Presidential Preference Cards,” https://iowademocrats.
org/2020-caucus-training-module-8/.

Fig 2. Back page of presidential preference card used in the Iowa caucuses in 2020 (Iowa
Democratic Party).

introduction of preference cards (Figs. 1 and 2). As a backup for possible
recounts, all participants receive a small card on which to mark their choice.
But because of the complicated design of the cards and the lack of sufficient
explanations by captains at caucus sites, these cards were misused and evenmade the final counting more difficult than before.
The intent of the card was for everyone to fill in their first choice on
the first side, and only those who supported nonviable first choices were
supposed to fill out the back side of the card. But when participantsreceived the card and were about to vote, they started filling them out witha “first preference” and a “second preference.” Although the card indicates,

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MASAHITO WATANABE“(P)rint the first and last name of the candidate you support during thesecond/final expression of preference,” this instruction was too ambiguous
about making a second/final preference choice. A precinct captain said,“The minute you hand out a card that’s got a 1 on one side and a 2 on theother, people assume that this is my first choice, and this is my second
choice.”11
Finally, the app problem manifested itself due to the lack of training
and preparation as shown in the “Internal Review Report.” The app was
designed so that precinct chairs could automatically calculate the awardeddelegates and submit their precincts’ caucus results to the IDP. In 2016,
the caucus app, developed by Microsoft, was a trial version, and the IDP
conducted at least two statewide comprehensive dry runs. The first one
failed, and they fixed it. Because Microsoft declined to develop the app
for 2020, the IDP had to find a different vendor. The Nevada Democratic
Party, as another caucus state, recommended a political tech company called
Shadow. However, in 2020, the precinct captains did not obtain the Shadow
app until just two weeks before the caucuses. The captains received emails
after January 18 with “a convoluted installation and login process set out
in a 34-page ‘user manual.’”12 According to my interviews with precinct
captains, the installation and login processes were too confusing. As thereport stated, if the user was on an Apple device, they were required to use
Apple’s app store to install TestFlight, an app that allows users to download
and install beta versions of apps for testing purposes, while Android
device users had to manually install the application using TestFairy, asimilar testing platform. Android installation required the user “to disable
the default security settings on their Android device because, by default,
Android devices do not allow installation of apps from ‘unknown sources,’i.e., Shadow.” And, to add insult to injury, for security purposes, users wererequired to set up two-factor authentication (2FA) and verify their login andpassword with a six-digit 2FA code before entering a precinct ID.13
One captain said after the caucuses:
I had a lot of people who were having trouble downloading it.
The initial email they got to download it looked like spam. It had
something about “You need to change our［your］password,” andit looked like Vladimir Putin had sent it or something like that. So,
people were scared of it. And after about last Thursday or so, I was justtelling people, “Just phone it in.” Well, they should have anticipated
that, and then what happened was the phone lines got overwhelmed.

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Many captains gave up on the app and tried to use the hotline but could
not get through. This captain continued:
Somebody had gotten through on the phone to the hotline, and they
were not letting go of that phone line. What they did was they would
give a result from a precinct, hand the phone off to the next precinct,
and the next person would give the next results. And then, eventually,
it became we got our turn. We reported our results, and then we handed
it off to the next person, since we had that line and we were not goingto give it up.14
II. THE 2020 IOWA DEMOCRATIC CAUCUSES: OBSERVATION
I observed the caucuses of the precinct called “Iowa City 5” of Johnson
County at the Iowa Memorial Union. Iowa City is a liberal college town
where the University of Iowa is located. Iowa City 5 consists of a nearly
all-student caucus. Since the chair was a student at the university, an
experienced party activist, John Deeth, supported the chair as voluntarycochair. On the first alignment, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren
were viable. Pete Buttigieg was five people short of viability, and Andrew
Yang was about seventeen people short of viability. Buttigieg’s supporters
understood the rules. The cochair said of them:
They knew they needed to keep their people there and recruit five
more people. Yang’s people started collecting their cards and sending
people home. They thought, “Okay. We can collect our cards and sendpeople home.” I’m looking at the back of those cards. Those people
had already written down a second choice, but they didn’t turn thatcard in to their new preference group. Then we couldn’t count thosepeople anymore, and they were angry.15
It was because of the second problem as indicated above. Deeth added:
The Yang group didn’t understand the realignment system. It’s hard
to tell how well people understand because everybody in the room wewere in last time was brand-new. Only a tiny handful of people in thatroom had ever even caucused before, and so—but the cards were very,
very, very confusing. It was like one more thing to ask the chairs to do,
and nobody really—people weren’t getting it.16

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As soon as the caucus staff knew they were going to be reporting thefirst-round results, a lot of people in the nonviable groups, Joe Biden and
Amy Klobuchar supporters in particular, simply checked “I choose notto realign” and left saying “Joe Biden is not viable? I don’t care about asecond choice. My vote for Joe got counted.”
At the Iowa City 5 site, eighty-five people left between the first andsecond vote, and that made the math complicated. The captain andvolunteers tried to figure out which person rounded up to the next delegate.
Deeth recollects:
We had nine delegates, when we had only allocated eight, and it was
hard to figure out who got that extra delegate. It turned out to be Pete.
We had to actually look at the printed rulebook. I had an out-of-state
Sanders volunteer, who was absolutely convinced that Sanders wasgoing to get the next extra delegate. I had it wrong, but we figured itout.17
The participants totaled 765, and 754 voted on the first alignment. On
the final vote, they only had 670, which means everybody who filled out afirst ballot preference card got their first preference reported, but 84 people
did not realign. The viability number to reach in the precinct was 115 votes;that was 15 percent of the original check-in. Even when the people left, itremained at 115. The preference card was too confusing for participants tofill out. As explained, participants were supposed to make a second choiceafter the first alignment was done. At Iowa City 5, this is why anybody who
was in the (viable) Warren group should not have put down a second choiceat all. Deeth said:
What they wanted us to do was destroy out all those cards andissue new ones. There was no way we could do that. It was too
overwhelming. We also had trouble handing them out in sequence
because, I mean, we had 765 people. The intent was to hand them out
in sequence, one at a time. I know that some of our volunteers, they
flipped their stack over. They started from the back instead of the front.
So, we had gaps, which is something that the IDP is not going to be
happy about. By the time we figured out—“Oh, you’re handing it fromthe bottom of the pile instead of the top”—[it was] too late.18
The guilty verdict on the app was assessed by the US media after caucus

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day in 2020 and in the intraparty investigation report, but the preferencecard issue about requiring complete comprehension of the realignment rule
was not mentioned as much as the app problem.
III. THE CRITICAL LITERATURE ON THE IOWA CAUCUSESAs seen here and in other scholarly published arguments, the 2020 Iowa
Democratic caucus was riddled with administrative problems. Rachael V.
Cobb states, “The debacle of the 2000 election exposed significant flaws
in our system of election administration, from technological issues aroundthe design of Florida’s ‘punch card’ voting machines to observing theimpact of partisan election officials manipulating rules to achieve partisan
advantage” (Cobb 2020). This assessment should not be overlooked when
considering the necessity of using online technologies in elections in thepost COVID-19 pandemic era and the opportunity for abuse in polarized
politics.
There is a long history of significant scholarly literature on the
Iowa caucuses. The most fundamental criticism of them is that Iowa’s
demography and ideology are unrepresentative of the country or evenof the two parties. Iowa is racially homogeneous, with an almost 90%
white population (2019 Census). African Americans make up less than5%. As well, it is an aging state. The over-sixty-five-year-old population
is 17.1% as of 2018, which is seventeenth among all fifty states. It is asmaller state as well, ranking 33 out of 50 in total population numbers.
The economy is dependent on agricultural products such pork, corn, andsoybeans (Abramowitz and Stone 1984; Winebrenner 1998; Hull 2008; US
Census 2019).19
Critics of the Iowa primary also say there are fundamental problems
with functionality, which can result in biased results. The Iowa caucuses
were conducted at 7 p.m. for about two hours. Night-shift workers cannot
vote in them, and handicapped people with serious disabilities as well as
senior citizens who are not mobile on their own are also left out. Iowans
who happen to be overseas because of military service are not able to join
the voting either. In addition, participants must publicly state their politicalpreferences that represent their ideology. One has to reveal party affiliation
automatically because of the way the caucuses are conducted. On the
Republican side, there is a secret vote, even though supporters of somecandidates make speeches to try to influence others before voting. On the
Democratic side, one has to reveal candidate preferences in front of one’s

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neighbors. It is not a private vote but an open meeting as people meet anddiscuss the vote. Considering the possibility that bosses and colleagues
might live in the same precinct or the pastor of one’s church could bepresent, there are intricate social pressures that can prevent a person fromvoting for who they really want.
Tendencies to sway a vote or stop a vote altogether have been a problem
in Iowa caucuses over the years. The average voter was an older person.
In 2004, 65% of participants were over fifty. Even in 2008, the year of
Obama’s victory by the enthusiastic youth supporters, 60% of Democratic
participants were over forty-five.20 Socioeconomically, people with higher
education and higher income tend to participate. “Midwest bias” is alsoprevalent, as characterized in the established presence of Tom Harkin andDick Gephardt. Ideologically, marginal candidates can be influential inboth parties such as Pat Robertson, Pat Buchanan, Mike Huckabee, Rick
Santorum on the Republican side and Jessie Jackson and Howard Dean on
the Democratic side (Mayer 1996; Wang 2007).
IV.

STUDIES ON PARTY RESURGENCE

Despite of all those operational problems, however, if larger participationin campaigns for Iowa caucuses are reevaluated in the context of party
resurgence and dynamism, the value of caucuses in a smaller state like Iowa
cannot be ignored.
The loss of control over the nomination was characterized as “party
decline” in past literature. As Daniel Shea and Michael John Burton havewritten, campaigns were party centered from the 1830s to the 1960s (Sheaand Burton 2001). Suburbanization following the economic developmentof urban immigrants resulted in demographic changes to the base ofparty-centered campaigns. In addition to the loss of party control overthe nominating process, another result of party decline up until the 1980s
was a significant decrease in party identification as seen in spilt-ticket
voting (Wattenberg 1991). Such party decline, however, only means adecline in the “party in the electorate” (voters), which is merely one of thethree-part political-party model formulated by V. O. Key, with the others
being the “party in office” (candidates and office holders) and the “party
organization” (party leaders and organizations) (Key 1952; Sorauf 1967).
As Leon D. Epstein has stated, as long as the two-party competition andvoter registration system are regulated by individual states, a decline in
the “party in the electorate” is not enough to result in whole-party decline

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119(Epstein 1986).
Arguments against party decline after the 1980s were made mainly fromthe perspective of the resurgence of “party organization.” Paul S. Herrnson
pointed out that the national party organizations started functioning as“intermediaries” of PACs (political action committees) and politicalconsultants in service to candidates (Herrnson 1988).21 Further evidence ofparty renewal is seen in local party organizations, such as state committees
and county committees that have maintained a certain influence in theelection process (Cotter et al. 1989). In response to the understanding thatparty reforms of the 1970s have made the political parties weaker becauseof the lessened influence of the party establishment over the candidate
nomination process (Polsby 1983; Kirkpatrick and Miller 1976), Denise
Baer and David Bositis saw the outcome of party reform in a morepositive way. Their theory called “Party Elite Theory of Democracy” argues
that nonelite participants, such as minorities and progressive activists, areindispensable “new elites” in the parties and could lead to party resurgencethrough integrating social movements into party politics (Baer andBositis 1988).
Critical analyses of party decline have led to redefining the US party
structure through modifying Key’s three-part party theory. John Aldrichexplains that weaker “party in the electorate” and stronger “party
organization” is not a contradictory phenomenon because the positionof major political actors was taken by policy-motivated “amateurs” or“purists” in the wave of candidate-centered campaigns and decline ofmachine politics (Aldrich 1995). Following Aldrich’s theory, though, newdefinitions of parties in a broader concept are debated. Beyond the topics
of candidates and public officeholders, Masket has enlarged the theoryof parties to include political insiders such as interest groups, legislative
leaders, and activists, which he terms the “informal party organization.”
Old machine politics was based on economic interests, but in Masket’s
model the new informal party organization is the gatekeeper of nominations
and is driven by ideological motivations (Masket 2011). In addition, in
terms of strategic allocation of campaign financial resources, Brian Brox
has introduced the parties-as-partners framework whereby political parties
develop closer relations with candidates beyond Herrnson’s “service
provider” notion. Even after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
banned “soft money,” the national organizations of the Democratic andRepublican parties have transferred money to selected candidates, mainly
for symbolic effect, which strengthened the unique influence of these

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political parties (Brox 2013).
V.

REEVALUATION OF THE IOWA CAUCUSES ANDIMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

As part of the party-resurgence arguments, the Iowa caucuses haveplayed an important role because of their uniqueness in the party primaries.
First, the requirement of commitment to a candidate has to be higher
in caucuses than simply casting a vote at a polling place because of thecondition that people have to show their partisanship and preferences inpublic. It enhances the development of stronger organization by activists
with high enthusiasm. In the 2008 Obama campaign, for example, thecampaign organization developed Organizing for America and 501 (c)(4)Organization for Action, to provide a supportive network for the Obamaadministration. Although the network was created for Obama and not for
the Democratic Party, it helped promote many Democratic agendas suchas the Affordable Care Act (Melber 2010; Bykowicz and Lerer 2013;
Zeleny 2013).22
The primary process itself is not about political party partisanshipbecause it is basically internal fighting. As Aldrich has said, policymotivated “amateurs” or “purists” have taken larger spaces in the parties,
where old partisan supporters such as the labor union members showedvirtually automatic partisan loyalty. Issues are becoming more important
than party affiliation. Because the main interest of policy-motivated“amateurs” is not a party but a single issue, the core supporters of outsider
candidates are not reliable party loyalists. Their passion on issues, however,
could lead to mass mobilization to defeat candidates of the opposite party.
To implement policies in action beyond just advocacy, gaining actual
power in the party and changing the party ideologically have become
mandatory tasks. In 2008, Obama campaigned, especially in Iowa, with afocus on opposing the Iraq war.23 In 2012, on the Republican side, fiscallyconservative issues such as opposition to TARP (Troubled Assets Relief
Program) and the Affordable Cares Act boosted Ron Paul among Tea Party
activists in a socially conservative state such as Iowa.24 Opposing the TPP(Trans Pacific Partnership) was crucial for Bernie Sanders and even for
Donald Trump (for different reasons) in the primary.25
Second, the first-in-the-nation status of Iowa in the sequential nomination
process matters as the state has been traditionally looked on as a place
for advocacy. Candidates with small campaign organizations and less

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money can disseminate their messages nationally, thanks to the massive
media attention on early states, realignment on the Democratic side, andcaucus day registration on the Republican side. Advocacy candidates
with no chance for the nomination such as Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich
understand the importance of Iowa in a campaign and have used it wisely
to convey their political messages. As previously discussed, in the caseof 2020, the Democrats use a realignment process in which voters favora candidate who fails to reach a viability line. Caucus goers join the
campaign based on their single issues and use their first voting option
for their favorite choice, regardless of viability or even electability in thegeneral election. This could even help a weak candidate pass the 15 percent
viability line. The first-in-the-nation status provides longer campaignsof advocacy such as the Iowa State Fair and straw poll (organized on
the Republican side in the past) in the summer of the year before thepresidential elections. Skipping early states, especially Iowa, as Rudy
Giuliani did in 2008, could result in voters forgetting about the candidate
until the next stop, which was Florida in his case. In the social media age,
local campaigns in the primary process became virtual national campaigns,
including side effects from negative campaigning.26
Third, the intense competition involved in mobilization and persuasion
has energized “retail” politics, such as the in-person democracy strategy,
aside from paid advertising. David Redlawsk says, “It is harder forcandidates to reach caucus participants because there are fewer of themin the population. Retail politics is critical as opposed to mass media
campaigns” (Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Donovan 2010). Some scholars
argue that ground games have had no effect on changing voters’ minds as
demonstrated by field experiments. But this refers only to “persuasion”
in the general elections (Kalla and Broockman 2018). The effects on“mobilization,” especially in the primary, which Donald Green and Alan
Gerber demonstrated in their experiment, is still worthy of consideration(Green and Geber 2004). The long campaigns in a small state provide
opportunities for candidates to learn about the concerns of ordinary votersat smaller events. Timothy Hagle stressed that having candidates come to asmall state with inexpensive media markets
allows candidates that are lesser-known or with fewer resources
to make their case and possibly build a credible campaign. It also
gives candidates an opportunity to meet with voters to find out what
they are thinking, what issues are important to them, etcetera. As a

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counterpoint, consider if California went first. A candidate would needhuge amounts of money right from the start and would have to havea fully functioning campaign organization nearly immediately to be
viable. That would eliminate a lot of potential candidates.27
The implications of Iowa being a factory for developing campaign
strategy cannot be underestimated. The canvasing for caucuses was atest bed for community organizing in the 2008 Obama campaign, and theinterviews were absorbed into big data that detailed voter patterns, which
can prove to be useful in later cycles for the parties. As Trish and Mennerargue, campaign staffers with extensive experience on the ground in
Iowa are regarded as precious campaign assets (Trish and Menner 2021).
Campaigns in caucus states do train young political talents. Although,historically, community organizers stayed away from partisan politics until
the 2008 Obama campaign, Iowa field staffers have always operated like
community organizers.28 In larger states or in states with nonsequential
nomination or only a noncaucus primary, the way of contacting andmessaging would be more centered on advertising and would require large
sums of money. This might work for winning, but it might not be of longterm benefit to the parties.
VI.

PARTY RENEWAL AND MOBILITY WITH NEW PARTY ELITES

Because of these major caucus happenings, especially after Obama, themobility of parties has intensified throughout the campaigns in Iowa. Aninteresting phenomenon occurred after 2016 when third-party outsiders
enlarged the political domain by digging up core supporters. In pastpresidential elections, third-party candidates, such as Ross Perot in 1992
and Ralph Nader in 2000, were simply spoilers and were never thought
about in the caucuses and primaries. Both Trump and Sanders, however,
became serious candidates in the Republican and Democratic parties in2016 after strong showings in Iowa. A great number of passionate activists
had been recruited during the primary process, especially in Iowa.
In 2016, the Republican Party absorbed white blue-collar workers who
were formerly Democratic Party supporters because of their support for
Trump’s hybrid positions that did not seem to have the traditional smallgovernment flavor.29 Iowa, where Trump overcame Jeb Bush, was a baseof the Tea Party, and Tea Party candidates such as Ted Cruz were very
popular. In Iowa, Trump came to symbolize opposition to establishment-

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type administrations like those of George H. W. and George Bush andBill Clinton. After the primary he behaved like a party leader and sought
help from the Republican National Committee and allied organizations in
traditional Republican bases.30 Social conservatives in Iowa chose to be hisbase strategically for Roe v. Wade and FFC (Faith and Freedom Coalition),a 501(c)4 Christian-based organization, joined Trump’s machine in the2016 general election, with GOTV (get-out-the-vote) operations on the
ground, conducted by its 1.8 million members, and wielding a hefty $20
million in funds. An interesting outcome of this organization is the bridgebuilding between traditional social conservatives and Tea Party–style fiscal
conservatives focusing on smaller government.31 As Boris Heersink points
out, Trump maintains control of the Republican National Committee bytaking advantage of the nominating privilege of the chair (Heersink 2018).
On the Democratic side, Sanders had a clear vision to move the party left
with his brand of democratic socialism. In a sense, winning the presidency
was a secondary objective for Sanders who had a disguised principal goalof reforming the party with the help of energetic grassroots millennials.
As Baer and Bositis state, social movements can create a “new party elite”
as in the 1970s. In 2016, the Sanders movement gained coherent power inthe primary process especially in Iowa, with a clear issue focus: defeating
the proposed TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement).32 By thetime of the 2016 primaries, anti-TPP activists from various voting blocs
were strongly united.33 The first bloc was the labor movement. AFL-CIO
director Damon Silvers states that “a successful progressive coalition of thetwenty-first century” should be assembled for dealing with climate change,
economic insecurity, a majority minority society, and a very rapid change inpublic attitudes around issues of gender and sexuality. Beyond traditional
labor union concerns, namely jobs and pay, current union leaders are
joining the progressive coalition to try to survive the seemingly unstoppabledecline in union membership. On TPP, Silver says, “Our concern about
the TPP is not that we are opposed to forming a trade agreement in the
Pacific Rim. It’s that the substance of what this agreement is contributes tocorporate-dominated globalization and downward pressure on wages.”34
The second bloc to enter this scenario was the environmental groups.
They were concerned with the environmental chapter of TPP, which is
supposed to be about how countries must be committed to combating things
such as illegal forestry.35 An official of the Responsible Trade Program of
the Sierra Club told me they were very concerned about “the impacts offracking and of unconventional resource extraction that more and more

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studies are showing have huge emissions associated with them.”36 One of
the interesting dynamics the anti-TPP movement brought forward was theunusual collaboration between labor and environmentalists sharing a focus
on opposing global corporatism. The official told me, “The Sierra Club,as well as some of our labor allies, for example, work on the Democracy
Initiative, which really pushes to help limit the influence of corporations in
the political processes.”37
The third key bloc of anti-TPP activism was consumer organizations
such as Public Citizen. When it comes to TPP, their biggest concern was
the investor-state dispute mechanism.38 Since Public Citizen is a 501(c)4
nonprofit organization, it was not affiliated with any particular candidate
during the campaign season. But it applied pressure as a lobbyingorganization. As Jessa Boehner of Global Trade Watch of Public Citizen
states, “We definitely talk to them [the candidates], and when they say
helpful things, we push it out and things like that. We have on one side
Bernie Sanders, who is extremely liberal, and then we have Donald Trump,
who is quite the opposite, and they have both come out very, very strong
against the TPP. Hillary Clinton, because of all the opposition to the TPP,
hasn’t totally come out against the TPP, but she’s had to kind of backtrackon her position.”39
In lobbying against the TPP, Public Citizen allied with the Sierra Cluband the AFL-CIO, which resulted in a Twitter storm that attracted 8 million
views in a short period of time. Without this progressive coalition against
TPP being operative in early 2016, the Sanders movement was not able todevelop a huge following, but it remained active in Iowa until his second
run in 2020. Those “new party elites” of policy-motivated “amateurs” or“purists” engendered from social movements inspired Sanders support
teams in Iowa and other early primary states.40 For instance, Evan Burger,
an environment organizer in Iowa, joined the Sanders campaign in Iowa as
the deputy state director in 2016 and Iowa caucus director in 2020. Burger
and his colleague in Iowa established an organization to support progressive
campaigns.41 Many of Obama’s campaign volunteers continue to be activein politics. Aletheia Henry, a caseworker for children’s services, joined
Obama’s campaign in Iowa as a field organizer in 2008. After the election,
she served as the Michigan director for Organizing for America and was
the Northeastern states regional director at the DNC. Then, she became anadviser to Hillary Clinton’s campaign in 2016.42
If Sanders and Trump did not run as candidates in the two major
parties, they could not appeal to voters wanting real party reforms. This

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125

is why the Sanders campaign took advantages of the TPP as a decisive
single issue during the primary and even requested to coauthor the party
platform.43 The Democratic platform of 2016 became “the most progressive
platform ever” because of the party accepting key changes promised to the
Sanders campaign.44 Keith Ellison from the Sanders camp was elected as
deputy chair of the DNC in 2017. In 2020, the Biden campaign embraced
the Sanders campaign to win the general election. By maintaining an
ongoing two presidential election cycles project, environmental activists
successfully made climate change a top priority of the Democratic Party
and the Biden administration, thanks to the formidable Sanders campaigns
in Iowa and other early states in 2020.
The Sanders campaign illustrates the co-opting of the outsider by the
party. In addition, some of the previous problems in Iowa, such as thedemographics and age issue, have changed with more younger participantsin 2020. Those caucus goers over forty-five still make up 55 percent ofall voters, but among the Sanders voters, 81 percent were under fortyfour.45 And it mattered as a successful youth movement with the age gap
in enthusiasm. When policy-motivated “amateurs” are not satisfied withadvocacy outside the parties, they move toward active responsibilities
within the parties, as was the case when “the new elites” joined the party inthe 1970s. Thus, the role of the Iowa caucuses should be reevaluated in theparty-resurgence literature.
VII.

IDEAL REFORM PATH

In order to maintain a fair and balanced perspective on the Iowa caucuses
reform debate it is important to remember the tendency for that debate to
be politicized.Various actors propose reforms that will benefit them. The
national party organizations focus on winning in the general election andhesitate to give up control over state party organizations. State parties
compete to have first-in-the-nation status, which has bipartisan interests incoordination between the Republican and Democratic parties. Other earlystates, such as New Hampshire, and larger states have good reasons toclaim against Iowa’s first in the nation status, but they do not oppose thesequential primary. It is simply bipartisan competition between the earlystates over the first seat in the primary process.46 Debates on the nomination
calendar in national party organizations are influenced by presidents andparty leaders. A successful outcome in Iowa can help shape the viewsof future candidates and spin-doctors to include Iowa on their campaign

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trail and be viewed as beneficial. Even though they were not eventual
winners like Obama, phenomena makers such as Paul, Sanders, and Trump(in 2016) have favorable views on Iowa. But not all presidents have had afavorable experience in Iowa, as evidenced by the Clintons. Bill Clintonskipped the Iowa primary in 1992 because candidate Tom Harkin was a
local political titan in Iowa. Neither of the Clintons likes Iowa, and neither
has ever been serious about organizing there.47 Considering this trend and
Biden’s shallow relationship with Iowa, the IDP’s prospects for 2024 may
not be good. In 2020, the Biden campaign did not make a massive effort toorganize in Iowa, unlike the Obama campaign in 2008.48
Aside from political noises from various actors, the chaotic debacle ofthe 2020 Democratic Iowa caucuses was indeed a problem of operation
and administration that should be criticized and fixed. Accepting therecommendations regarding the apps in “Internal Review Report” is anecessity. The suggestions include:
The IDP should consider (1) setting hard internal deadlines for alltechnology and software projects to complete development with
sufficient advance time to test, debug, and secure the software; (2)ensuring all users will receive training and assistance with securely
installing the app on their devices; and (3) prioritizing buy-in andcommitment to the use of the app in all circumstances barring the needfor emergency backup reporting methods.49
On cybersecurity, the report stresses the importance of “the developmentof its own internal technology expertise and experience, which is necessary
to manage technology projects and cybersecurity threats, and continuing
to coordinate on cybersecurity measures and exercises with trusted third
parties”.50
This may require fixing the unpopular volunteers-based administrationof the caucuses in both parties to some degree, although the grassroots
voluntary operation has been one of the key traditions of the caucuses at
local party events.
Some reforms may be possible through using online technologies.
The virtual caucus, planned originally by the IDP for the 2020 caucuses,
could be reconsidered if a higher level of security is developed. It is
understandable that the DNC rejected the idea for security reasons,considering the risk of hacking. However, if it is discussed since the
COVID-19 pandemic, when online communications are indispensable,

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127

the DNC might come up with a different decision instead of dumping thevirtual caucus plan.
The campaigning in caucuses in smaller states like Iowa requires in-depth
examination of the candidates as Iowa voters take time to learn about them.
This process takes a certain amount of commitment as coming to a precinct
caucus takes more effort than just casting a ballot (Hull 2008; Redlawsk,
Tolbert, and Donovan 2010; Hagle 2015). This demand of commitment for
persuasion works in tandem even with the digital campaigns (Kreiss 2012.).
This paper, however, does not deal with the debates on how effective doorknocking canvasing was for voter turnout compared to the phone bank andtext bank, as well as the ground games vs. advertising. As Dylan Matthews
points out, “Campaigns have turned to ‘relational voter turnout,’ where
instead of phone banking or canvasing strangers, volunteers try to turn out
people close to them, such as friends and family” (Matthews 2020). In recent
cycles, even surrogate strategies have been changing from old-fashioned
celebrity campaigns to more effective use of nano-influencers (Goodwin,
Joseff, and Woolley 2020). Following this trend, the organization built by
intimate relationships forged in caucus campaigns, sometimes over a year,
would be the source of a useful database and allied network for the parties
while inspiring the motivation of participants through voter-campaign
experiences beyond advertising.
This is why reforms should not miss this point: the 2020 administrative
failure does not negate the relatively unappreciated democratic value ofthe Iowa caucuses, especially in mobilizing more vibrant and robust party
participation. Although the rules define campaigns and advantage particular
candidates, denying the caucuses would mean denying the victories andmovements of Obama, Sanders, Paul, and Trump, like it or not. The“Internal Review Report” recommends that the IDP consider “simplifying
the caucus process” to make it similar to the caucuses held by the
Republican Party of Iowa and in other states.51 A better way of conducting
the realignment needs to be seriously examined, especially to make therules easier to understand. But in doing so, the core values of the caucusesshould not be sacrificed.
In defending caucuses in a sequential primary process, the bad news for
Iowa is that a first-in-the-nation state would not necessarily be Iowa. The
problem of representation of average American voters remains. In moredemographically diverse states, with more Asians, Latinos, and African
Americans, outreach strategies conducted by a diverse group of activists,
often in languages other than English, would be welcome, and this would

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benefit all candidates.
Changing the first-in-the-nation state to a more diverse state might befairer, but in terms of operation, it would be unrealistic. Maintaining thepresent caucus states as it is may be easier. In caucus states such as Iowa
and Nevada, voters are familiar with how their caucuses operate, despitewhat may seem complicated for some first-time participants. Nonetheless,the debate over more balanced representation should be continued.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the primary process is an open system, functioning
as “different parties” within the two parties by diversification of participants
with different political positions that sustain mobility of the parties tosome degree. The downside of the Iowa caucuses, such as giving a boost
to candidates who some may view as extreme, is undeniable. Hoever, there
are positive reasons for having at least one caucus state having a wide
variety of nomination methods within primaries. In sum, as suggested by
the discussions in previous sections, denigrating caucuses in a small stateand sequential primary voting could be a bad idea, although the significant
question of whether the first-in-the-nation state should be Iowa remains.
By holding caucuses in sequential nomination, even whether digital or inperson, US party politics may keep its mobility to some degree. Campaigns
and elections are not just for deciding who gets the most votes, they serve alarger purpose of making sure the democratic process is inclusive. Focusing
on short-term efficiency does not lead to a better democracy. The way inwhich new technologies are utilized depends on nomination rules and party
administration. Maintaining mobility within parties should be encouraged,
but this process will require time and effort to produce a positive outcome.
NOTES
1“Iowa Democratic Caucus Results,” Des Moines Register, https://www.
desmoinesregister.com/elections/results/primaries/democratic/iowa/, accessed September 1,
2020; “2020 Iowa Democratic Caucuses Live Results,” Washington Post, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/elections/election-results/iowa/, accessed September 1, 2020.
2
Here is the explanation from the editor of Des Moines Register: “It appears a candidate’s
name was omitted in at least one interview in which the respondent was asked to nametheir preferred candidate. While this appears to be isolated to one surveyor, that could
not be conﬁrmed with certainty. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the partners
made the diﬃcult decision not to move forward with releasing the poll.” https://www.
desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2020/02/01/des-moines-register-cnn-cancels-release-

MOBILIZING PARTY PARTICIPATION

129

iowa-poll-over-respondent-concerns/4637168002/, accessed January 25, 2022.
3
From the editor: Des Moines Register, “Partners Cancel Release of Iowa Poll after
Respondent Raises Concerns,” Des Moines Register, February 1, 2020, https://www.
desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2020/02/01/des-moines-register-cnn-cancels-releaseiowa-poll-over-respondent-concerns/4637168002/, accessed September 1, 2020.
4“Internal Review Report for the Iowa Democratic Party: 2020 Iowa Caucuses,” Campbell
law ﬁrm and Faegre Drinker, Biddle, and Reath LLP, November 10, 2020. The lead authors are
Bonnie Campbell (former Iowa Attorney General) and Nick Klinefeldt (former US Attorney).
https://iowademocrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-11-10-Internal-Review-Reportfor-the-Iowa-Democratic-Party-2020-Iowa-Caucuses.pdf, accessed September 1, 2020.
5
Ibid., 21.
6Personal interview, Dave Redlawsk, October 28, 2019, Iowa City, IA.
7
Brianne Pfannenstiel, “Iowa Democrats propose ‘satellite’ caucus system to replace virtual
caucuses in 2020,” Des Moines Register, September 19, 2019, https://www.desmoinesregister.
com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2019/09/19/election-2020-iowa-democratssatellite-caucus-replace-virtual-plan/2380096001/, accessed September 1, 2020.
8“Internal Review Report for the Iowa Democratic Party,” 24.
9Personal interview, Randi Shannon, Travis Heﬂin, and Matt Heﬂin, January 2, 2012,
Iowa City, IA.
10
Personal interviews, Terry Walsh, June 2, 2009, and February 19, 2013, Evanston
IL; Larry Grisolano, February 4, 2016, Chicago, IL; Peter Giangreco, February 19, 2013,
Evanston IL and February 4, 2016, Chicago, IL.
11
Personal interview, a Democratic Party activist, February 4, 2020, Iowa City, IA.
12“Internal Review Report for the Iowa Democratic Party,” 7.
13
Ibid.
14
Personal interview, a Democratic Party activist, February 4, 2020, Iowa City, IA.
15
Personal interview, John Deeth, February 4, 2020, Iowa City, IA.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/IA, accessed September 1, 2021.
20
ABC News, “Iowa Dem Caucus Exit Poll” https://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/
IADemHorizontal.pdf accessed January 30, 2021.
21
The national party organizations include the following six institutions: DNC(Democratic National Committee), DSCC (Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee),
DCCC (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee), RNC (Republican National
Committee), NRSC (National Republican Senatorial Committee), NRCC (National
Republican Congressional Committee).
22
Public comment, Jeremy Bird, “High-Tech and Highly Targeted: Inside the ObamaCampaign’s Digital War Room.” University of Chicago, Institute of Politics, February 23,
2013, Chicago, IL.
23
Personal interviews, Bettylu K. Saltzman, May 12, 2009, Chicago, IL; Janice D.
Schakowsky, April 2, 2009, Washington, DC.
24
Personal interviews, Rand Paul, April 2, 2011, Iowa City, IA and August 13, 2011,
Ames, IA; Kim Pearson, August 13, 2011, Ames, IA; Tim Pawlenty, August 5, 2011, Iowa
City, IA; Sandra McLaughlin, January 3, 2012, Iowa City, IA.
25
Personal interviews, Bria Dunham, February 6, 2016, Manchester, NH; Myra Hacket,
February 6, 2016, Manchester, NH; Mike Lux, March 11, 2016, Washington, DC.
26
Personal interview, Simon Rosenberg, November 15, 2016, Washington, DC.
27
Conversation via email, Timothy Hagle, August 28, 2021.

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MASAHITO WATANABE

28
Personal interviews, David T. Kindler, May 12, 2009, Chicago, IL; Mike Kruglik, June18, 2009, Chicago, IL; Abner Mikva, May 13, 2009, Chicago, IL; Gerald Kellman, May 22,
2009, Philadelphia, PA; Peter Giangreco, February 19, 2013, Evanston IL and February 4,
2016, Chicago, IL.
29
Personal interviews, Ben Kriz, November 18, 2016, Iowa City, IA; Jim Glasgow,
November 18, 2016, Iowa City, IA.
30
Personal interview, John Gizzi, November 16, 2016, Washington, DC.
31
See the website of the Faith and Freedom Coalition at https://www.ﬀcoalition.com/,
accessed March 1, 2019.
32
See “Broken Promises: Decades of Failure to Enforce Labor Standards in Free Trade
Agreements” (Prepared by the Staﬀ of Sen. Elizabeth Warren) and David Dayen, “Elizabeth
Warren Sees Broken Promises in Obama’s Trade Agenda,” New Republic, May 18, 2015.
33
Personal interview, John Deeth, November 19, 2016, Iowa City, IA.
34
See AFL-CIO, “The US-China Economic Relationship: TPP Is Not the Answer” March
16, 2016; personal interview, Damon Silvers, September 29, 2015, Washington, DC.
35
See “Raw Deal: How the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Could Threaten Our Climate,” Sierra
Club, December 2013.
36
Personal interview with an oﬃcial of Responsible Trade Program, September 30, 2015,
Washington, DC.
37
Ibid.
38
See Memo: “Administration Desperate for Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Deal: There May
Be an Announcement, But a Real Deal? One That Could Pass in an Election Year?” Public
Citizen, September 25, 2015.
39
Personal interview, Jessa Boehner, October 3, 2015, Washington, DC.
40
Personal interviews, Bria Dunham, February 6, 2016, Manchester, NH; Myra Hacket,
February 6, 2016, Manchester, NH.
41
See the website of Hegemony Strategies, https://hegemonystrategies.com/, accessed
November 1, 2021. “Des Moines Register’s 50 Most Wanted Democrats,” https://features.
desmoinesregister.com/news/politics/50-most-wanted/evan-burger-election-2020-iowacaucus-democrats-key-people-to-know.html, accessed November 1, 2021.
42
Scott Horsley, “Obama’s Legacy: His Army of Campaign Volunteers Continues toServe,” NPR, January 5, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/01/05/507927467/obamas-legacyhis-army-of-campaign-volunteers-continues-to-serve, accessed November 1, 2021.
43
The chair of the DNC nominated four other members.
44
Personal interviews, Robert Creamer, August 15 and November 15, 2016, Washington,
DC.
45
CNN Exit Poll. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2020/primaries-caucuses/entrance-andexit-polls/iowa/democratic, accessed September 1, 2021.
46
Personal interviews, Bill Keettel, April 1, 2011, Coralville, IA; David Redlawsk,
October 18, 2007, and September 24, 2010, Iowa City, IA; Brian Flaherty, January 3, 2008,
Iowa City, IA.
47
Personal interview Peter Giangreco, February 19, 2013, Evanston IL and February 4,
2016, Chicago, IL.
48
Personal interview, ﬁeld staﬀers for the Biden 2020 campaign in Iowa, October 27, 2019,
Iowa City, IA; personal interview, ﬁeld staﬀers for the Harris 2020 campaign in Iowa, October27, 2019, Iowa City, IA. Kamala Harris could not even keep a place in the race until the 2020
Iowa caucuses, despite her local campaign in Iowa being vibrant until she dropped out.
49
“Internal Review Report for the Iowa Democratic Party: 2020 Iowa Caucuses,” 21–26.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.

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