A New Framework for US-Japan
Development Cooperation

James Gannon

US-Japan Papers
December 2011

Japan Center for International ExchangeCopyright © 2011 Japan Center for International Exchange
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A New Framework for US-Japan
Development Cooperation
James Gannon

EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT US that rich countries have a large stake in the emergence of stability, prosperity, and good governance in the developing world and, moreover, that effectively promoting sustainable development requires greater cooperation and coordination among a wider range of actors than we are accustomed toseeing. Considering their close bilateral relations, it seems natural that two of the world’s largest economic powers, the United States and Japan, should seek to combine forces and better coordinate their efforts on this front.
Indeed, the two countries have been working together on development issues over the past two decades, mostnotably through the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective and, later, through such initiatives
as the US-Japan Partnership for Global Health. Nonetheless, despite some successes, the level of US-Japandevelopment cooperation has remained relatively limited, and in recent years the degree of energy and political
momentum driving it has largely dissipated.
While the track record has been mixed, there is considerable potential for concerted and targeted joint
efforts by Japan and the United States to make an important difference in key areas of vital concern to bothcountries. Nowhere is this truer than in East Asia, where the two countries’ capabilities best complement eachother and where they share important strategic interests.1 Accordingly, one of the most important steps that theUnited States and Japan can take together is to launch a new framework for enhanced cooperation on foreignassistance, one that focuses primarily on the development of a strong, stable, and open East Asia.

Jim Gannon is the executive director of JCIE/USA, the North American affiliate of the Japan Center for International Exchange, where
he focuses on US-Japan relations, the role of transnational civil society, and Asia’s evolving regional order. Before joining JCIE in 2001, Mr.
Gannon worked with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and participated in the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program. He received
an MA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and his BA from the University of Notre Dame.

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆

1

Why Cooperate? Why East Asia?

healthcare workers outside of the capital of Phnom

Today, major donor countries such as the United

to maintain their living standards, but the salaries that

States and Japan increasingly recognize that in or-

they received from the government-run health centers

der to better meet the needs of aid recipients they

were in the range of US$30 to US$100 per month—must work more closely with other donors, both inless than half of their living expenses at best.3

a multilateral fashion and, in some instances, bilater2Penh required roughly US$200 to US$400 per month

Several years prior, the United States Agency

ally. As global interconnectedness has deepened, thefor International Development (USAID) had begun

scope and intensity of transnational challenges havefunding tuberculosis education and vaccination ini-

complicated development approaches. Regardless oftiatives by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

their size and wealth, individual donors are simply

throughout Cambodia. The goal of USAID was to

not effective if they operate as if in a vacuum. For

support NGOs that can reach rural residents more

one thing, the problems that they are compelled toeffectively than the government health system, andtackle are often too massive for a single funder to re-the only reasonable way to do this has been to include

alistically afford on its own. Also, without sufficientsufficient salary support for the healthcare workers

coordination, well-intentioned donors run the risk ofthat they employ. However, this allowed these NGOs

operating at cross purposes, siphoning limited humanto provide considerably higher salaries than the JICA-

resources from one pet project to another, distorting

supported health centers, and one inadvertent result

incentives for local involvement, and overburdening

was that many healthcare workers were lured away

local governments that are already likely to be suffer-from their previous jobs at the health centers to join

ing from a lack of technical expertise. Or they may

them, undermining long-term efforts by JICA andsimply duplicate one another’s programs, wastingothers to help the government build up the healthprecious resources.

center system. In the end, even though they shared

A concrete example from a few years ago il-similar broad objectives and their interventions may

lustrates the risks of insufficient coordination. The

have been well designed in their own right, the United

United States and Japan provide roughly one-third

States and Japan found themselves unintentionallyof all official development assistance (ODA) for

operating at cross purposes by fueling a competition

health and population issues in Cambodia, both withfor healthcare workers.

the objective of expanding healthcare to communi-

Similar examples of well-intentioned donors un-

ties around the country. The Japan Internationaldermining one another or failing to take advantage

Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been playing a key

of important opportunities due to a lack of coordi-role in strengthening the Cambodian national healthnation pop up time and time again in the field. Thissystem by funding the country’s nearly 1,000 healthhas given rise to calls for greater coordination andcenters, which provide basic healthcare and typically

led to the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid

operate with four to six professional staff. However,Effectiveness in 2005. Fortunately, efforts are now

by 2008, the health centers were finding it difficult

underway in most developing countries to promote

to retain staff due to a chronic shortage of health-the multilateral coordination of donor activities, withcare workers. This was exacerbated by the fact thatvarying degrees of success.

2◆

Japan Center for International ExchangeThere are many situations, however, in whichsuch as PEPFAR. However, from a US perspective,

truly multilateral efforts are simply not feasible forthere are now limited incentives for investing the timepolitical, financial, or logistical reasons. In these cases,

and energy in partnering with such a comparatively

bilateral cooperation, while not ideal, can be the mostsmall player, especially one that has slipped from be-

pragmatic approach, provided it is undertaken withing the world’s top ODA provider to fifth place oversufficient consideration of the activities of otherthe past decade. Of course, there are clearly benefits

players in the aid community. This often comes down

in maintaining and, in some cases, expanding US-

to the simple fact that it tends to be easier to reachJapan development cooperation in Africa when op-

agreement on concrete schemes with just two donor
countries at the negotiating table. It is also easier for
two donor countries to match their comparative advantages and coordinate joint projects than it is forlarger numbers of donors. This rings particularly true
for the United States and Japan, which increasingly
share similar strategic objectives. They also tend tohave philosophies and approaches that are closer to
one another than to other major donors.4
In the past, the most notable successes of USJapan development cooperation have been in Africa, aregion to which both countries have rightly been paying greater attention in recent years. However, there
is a large mismatch between US and Japanese funding
levels and operational capacities there. This is particularly apparent when one looks at each country’s activities on a sector-by-sector basis. Historically, the areaof greatest US-Japan collaboration in Africa has beenon health and population issues, but with the growthof US initiatives such as the President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the funding has become increasingly lopsided. As of 2009, the top five

portunities present themselves. In addition, there area few non-PEPFAR countries where Japanese andAmerican health funding is relatively well matched.
Nonetheless, the type of intensive interactions thatgenuine development cooperation requires in termsof planning and implementation means that bothpartners should be equally committed to working
together, and even if there is a spurt of interest on
both sides in partnering on African development, it is
not clear how the motivation and political will might
be sustained at sufficiently high levels over the longterm, especially on the US side. Overall, the many obstacles that each country needs to regularly overcome
to work together make it difficult to envision how
Africa can be the central rallying point for a robust
and meaningful program of US-Japan development
cooperation over the long run.
In contrast, the arguments for strengthening USJapan cooperation on development issues are very
compelling in East Asia—a region where deeper USJapan collaboration can now make a major difference.

African recipients of Japanese ODA—Sudan, Ghana,

The strategic rationale for investing in development

Tanzania, Zambia, and Kenya—were receiving nearlyin East Asia is crystal clear for Japan. The region is

30 times the amount of health-related funding fromJapan’s home, Japan’s fortunes have become increas-

the United States as from Japan.5

ingly entwined with those of its poorer neighbors,

Naturally, some Japanese officials speculate thatand Japan’s future international role is dependent

this means it is in Japan’s interest to try to expand

upon the emergence of a stable regional order that in-cooperation with the United States in Africa so that

tegrates rising powers such as China and allows Japan

Japan can leverage massive US funding initiatives

to project a degree of leadership.

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 3

For the United States, the reasons may be lessimmediately apparent, but they are similarly persua-

focus more on encouraging sustainable developmentin the region.

sive. East Asia has been going through a period ofGranted, the United States has already started todramatic growth and change as countries throughout

devote greater resources to East Asia in recent years,

the region have benefited from economic growth andand it is clear that this trend should be continued. At

closer links with world markets. Now it is in a crucial

the same time, however, in an era of intense fiscal

period where shifts in the regional balance of power,pressures, it is important for the United States to ex-

emerging gaps between rich and poor, and the poten-

plore ways to make its current aid most effective, andtial for transnational threats and economic instability

one of the most important ways it can do this is by

to roll back development gains can fuel regional de-working more closely with other donors, and espe-

stabilization. The changes in the region and its grow-cially with the region’s leading bilateral donor, Japan.

ing relative weight in world affairs mean that a key

In fact, Japan and the United States have at least

foreign policy objective of both the United States andthree strong reasons to partner more closely in pro-Japan in the 21st century needs to be the encourage-

moting development in East Asia: 1) their shared inter-ment of a regional order characterized by stability,

est in shaping the future of the region, 2) their unique

openness, and democratic governance. Clearly, one

capacity to make a difference, and 3) the potential for

important means to do this is through promoting theenhanced development cooperation to help strengthen

sustainable development of the poorest countries inand reenergize the US-Japan bilateral alliance.

the region and helping consolidate the transitions ofother developing countries in healthy directions.

Shared US and Japanese Interests in East Asia

In light of this, it is remarkable how little at-Japanese and US strategic interests in the future shapetention the United States has accorded to support-of East Asia are more closely aligned than those ofing development in East Asia. Despite being home

any other major actors in the region. Both have highto nearly one-third of the world’s population, East

stakes in maintaining a regional order that is stable

Asia receives the smallest amount of US aid of any

and peaceful and that is not dominated by any otherregion in the world—only 3 percent of total US

regional power. Both wish to see further economic

foreign assistance according to the Congressional

growth in the region, paired with continued progress

6

Research Service. In fact, seven countries and ter-

toward a more liberal, rules-based trade and invest-

ritories—Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, thement climate. And both countries share a commit-

Palestinian Authority, Ethiopia, and Kenya—indi-

ment to the spread of democratic values, in part

vidually received more American ODA in 2009 thanbecause these are linked to greater political stability

did all of East Asia. The relative lack of resources

over the long run. While it is true that the other ma-

devoted to East Asia compared to regions such as

jor bilateral donors in East Asia—such as Germany,

Africa can be explained in part by the fact that pov-

France, and the United Kingdom—generally shareerty is deeper and the humanitarian situation is direr

these interests, the stakes are much higher for thein Africa. However, there continue to be important

United States and Japan as a result of their sheer

needs in East Asia too, and its growing strategic im-

proximity and the scope of their political, military,

portance makes it imperative for the United States toand economic commitments to the region.

4◆

Japan Center for International Exchange

The strategic imperative that is rooted in theseshared interests is given added urgency by the ris-

Potential Gains From Greater US-Japan
Partnershiping influence of regional powers such as China. The

A second important consideration for the United

growth of the Chinese economy over the past two

States and Japan should be that they have a greater

decades is a most welcome development and it is nat-

capacity to make a difference in East Asia by work-ural for its influence to expand as a result. However,ing together than do any other two bilateral donors.

there is no denying that, in some instances, its grow-

Together they account for roughly half of all bilateraling regional influence may run counter to Japanese

aid to the region.7 Japan is by far the leading donor to

and American visions for East Asia. While China is

countries in the region, and its own rapid economic

not alone in using foreign assistance to further its

development after being an aid recipient itself in theeconomic interests and its geopolitical strategy, it has

wake of World War II strikes a particular chord inbegun doing this to a greater degree than most other

other Asian countries. Meanwhile, the United Statescountries. Many observers now cite Chinese foreignis the second most generous bilateral donor in theassistance and business practices as major factors

region when the special case of aid to China is dis-

reinforcing unhealthy tendencies in developing coun-

counted.8 Either Japan or the United States rank astries in Africa and Asia—in some instances prop-

the top bilateral donor for almost every country inping up authoritarian governments and undermining

East Asia, and the two countries combined have ac-

moves toward good governance. US and Japanesecounted for more than 50 percent of bilateral ODA

aid officials in East Asia certainly feel pressure fromfor most countries in the region over the most recent

China, and some complain that their efforts to im-

five-year period for which data is available. As the fig-

prove governance are countered by a flood of money

ures in table 1 show, Japan and the United States playcoming out of China.

a dominant role in the aid community in countries

It appears that Japan and the United States havethroughout the region.

a window of opportunity (while the regional role ofSome skeptics might note that Japanese ODA is

China is still evolving) to minimize the potentiallyroughly five times the size of US aid to the region, andharmful impacts of its expanding influence. This iswhile this might encourage the United States to try

not to imply that they should use aid dollars to com-to leverage Japan’s greater resources, it could reduce

pete with China, but rather that the careful application

Japan’s incentive to collaborate with the United States.

of Japanese and American ODA can help consolidate

However, the regional role of the United States as atrends toward good governance in the region. This

military, political, and economic power gives it moreis only half of the solution, however. The United

influence than the dollar amount of its ODA might

States and Japan also have a golden opportunity be-otherwise indicate. In addition, when one looks morefore them to engage China (and other emerging Asianclosely at what is happening at the country level, it

donors) and to encourage them to bring their ODA

becomes clear that US and Japanese capabilities andpractices in line with international standards. Politicalfunding are more balanced in a number of key sectors

and practical considerations make it appear that bothwhere there is potential for joint work.

of these tasks can be most effectively accomplishedthrough US-Japan cooperation.

It is not just the size of the Japanese and US presence or the similarity of their approaches that makes

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 5

Table 1. Bilateral ODA commitments as portion of total bilateral funding, 2005–2009 (percent)DonorsRecipients

Japan

US

Australia

FranceGermany

Korea

UK

US-Japan
combined

Burma
Cambodia
China
DPRK
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Mongolia
Philippines
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam

18
31
35
—
47
32
80
45
38
71
9
51

14
15
3
56
11
2
8
25
16
10
14
3

9
5
1
4
12
7
—
1
15
1
34
2

2
7
13
1
5
10
2
1
—
7
—
12

5
8
29
6
7
9
3
9
8
5
3
4

2
10
—
—
2
14
—
7
8
—
—
2

19
7
7
—
3
—
5
—
1
1
1
4

33
46
38
56
58
35
88
70
55
81
23
54

Source: Based on data from the QWIDS Database, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/.
Note: Dark grey indicates the top bilateral donor and light grey indicates the second largest donor. In the case of the DPRK and Timor-Leste, the second largest donor is a country not included in the graph (Sweden for the DPRK and Portugal for Timor-Leste).
The figures include the ODA commitments of the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which includes all of the major bilateral
donors. China is not included in these figures as it is not a DAC member. There are no definitive figures for China’s ODA to the region which, while growing,
would not significantly change the overall calculations.

them a good fit for bilateral cooperation in East Asia.

US-Japan relationship. The most deeply rooted US-

In addition, their strengths and weaknesses tend to be

Japan collaboration currently takes place on militarycomplementary, providing opportunities for them tomatters in the context of the US-Japan alliance.

leverage each other’s networks and experiences. For

Deepening alliance cooperation in other areas such

example, Japan tends to have strong ties with national

as development would help make US-Japan relations

governments in the region, while US relations withmore resilient to setbacks in the military realm, whichsome governments or individual ministries tend to be
more at arm’s length.9 Meanwhile, strong US ties toNGOs and its years of experience working with themcan be an asset to Japan, which has a more limited
track record in this area. The ability to take advantage of each other’s relative strengths by teaming up
for joint initiatives also extends to the two countries’
funding practices and restrictions. For example, Japantends to find it easier to fund infrastructure and theprovision of equipment, while the United States isbetter equipped to offer salary, operating support,
and technical expertise in a number of areas.
Broadening and Strengthening the US-Japan
Alliance

are inevitable from time to time. It would also better
equip both countries to respond to the growing number of nontraditional security challenges in the region,
which increasingly overlap with development issues.
Furthermore, the extension of bilateral cooperation
into nonmilitary areas has another merit that is in
keeping with both countries’ overall strategic goals in
the region: it could help dispel damaging perceptions
that the US-Japan alliance is primarily targeted at arising China.

Two Decades of US-Japan
Development Cooperation
There is clearly a strong rationale for deepening US-Japan development cooperation in East Asia.

A third argument for pursuing US-Japan cooperation

Reviewing the history of Japanese and American ef-

on foreign assistance in East Asia is that it would

forts to do similar things elsewhere provides someplay an important role in strengthening the overall

clues as how to best proceed.

6◆Japan Center for International Exchangeinterests and different institutional cultures make it

The Common Agenda
As the Cold War drew to an end in the early 1990s,
the United States and Japan began striving to work
together on various “global issues,” including development, partly to help deflect attention away from
economic tensions. In 1992, President George Bushand Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced thelaunch of the US-Japan Global Partnership, whichgrouped together a handful of existing joint development projects with more extensive measures related toeconomics and national security. This was superseded
and expanded in July 1993 when Miyazawa and the
new US president, Bill Clinton, reached agreement on
a more ambitious bilateral framework for US-Japan
cooperation on global issues, the Common Agenda for
Cooperation in Global Perspective, as part of the USJapan Framework for a New Economic Partnership.
The Common Agenda eventually involved five pillars of joint initiatives, covering more than 20 specific areas that ranged from educational technology
to coral reef initiatives and to communicable diseases.

hard even for bureaucratic agencies from the same
country to cooperate, but this challenge was magnified by the two countries’ different languages, cultures, budgetary processes, bureaucratic practices,and conceptions of their roles in global affairs. Muchof the burden of turning cooperation into real action
fell on the shoulders of staff at the two development
agencies—JICA and USAID—who found that they
were expending considerably more energy and staff
time than expected on learning about each other’soperations, exchanging information, and reaching
agreement on cooperative initiatives. This starts to
explain why many officials in the two main development agencies are still ambivalent as to whether thestrenuous efforts involved in building cooperation
were justified by the results.
Nevertheless, diplomats focusing on the political aspects of US-Japan relations tend to praise theCommon Agenda and from a broader perspective it
is clear that this joint work yielded a number of im-

Detractors have pointed to this breadth of topics andportant benefits. According to Hideki Wakabayashi, a

the resultant lack of focus as a central reason why

former MOFA official (and later a Diet member) who

many of these initiatives failed to have a deep impact.

was involved firsthand with the Common Agenda,

However, there were a number of notable successes,

the joint project identification and planning process

and most observers argue that the greatest contribu-

that Japan and the United States carried out throughtion of the Common Agenda was its encouragement

the Common Agenda gave birth to a number of suc-of US-Japan cooperation on development issues, in-cessful projects that would not have materialized if

cluding on issues such as combating the global spreadthe two had been operating on their own.10
The exercise in cooperation also helped improveof HIV/AIDS.
The officials at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign

how the aid agencies operated. Japanese ODA had

Affairs (MOFA), JICA, the US State Department,

been roundly criticized for its overemphasis on

and USAID who were responsible for translating thephysical infrastructure projects, and working with

Common Agenda’s mandate for cooperation into re-Americans helped Japanese aid workers develop

ality quickly realized that bridging the divide between

expertise in “softer” areas. According to one JICA

US and Japanese practices, capacities, and objectives

official involved with the Common Agenda, “the big-

required an even greater investment of time and en-gest impact on the Japanese side was the amount ofergy than anticipated. Sensitivities about institutional

learning that grew out of cooperation with USAID,”A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 7

particularly in terms of dealing with HIV/AIDS andorder to more effectively meet developing countries’

reproductive health issues. For its part, the US side

real needs. For example, in the latter years of thewas happy to see Japan, which was then the world’s

Common Agenda, Japan and the United States began

largest provider of foreign assistance, begin mov-dispatching joint project formulation missions froming into areas such as health, where it could bolster

Tokyo and Washington to begin the project planning

American efforts.11

phase, but this was eventually dropped under the

There was another benefit as well. Prior to thePartnership for Global Health in favor of encour-

Common Agenda, Japan had almost exclusively

aging staff in the field to come forward with ideas

worked with governments in formulating and imple-

for US-Japan collaboration. Unsurprisingly, by thementing its aid programs, while the United States also

end of the Bush administration, US-Japan coopera-

involved a wide range of NGOs. However, their jointtion had lost steam as political pressure from above

initiatives encouraged Japanese government officials

evaporated, largely disappearing from the diplomaticto learn how to work with international development

agenda—particularly on the US side.

NGOs, both in the field and at home in Japan. This

Currently, USAID and JICA continue to col-has helped make Japan’s aid programs more effective

laborate on a number of initiatives, but these projects

and has given further impetus to the development oftend to be small in scope, and the amount of true

12

Japanese civil society.

The US-Japan Partnership for Global Health

US-Japan collaboration involved is less than under
the Common Agenda or even under the Partnershipfor Global Health in its early stages. One reason is

When George W. Bush took office in 2001, thethat institutional linkages between the two countries

Clinton administration’s Common Agenda washave declined. Under the Common Agenda, the State

phased out and the most prominent US-Japan ODA

Department was closely involved in US-Japan ODA

projects were clustered under a new initiative, the US-

cooperation but for the past decade it has played aJapan Partnership for Global Health, which has beenminimal role, ostensibly in order to leave development-

carried out by USAID, JICA, and MOFA. (Althoughrelated issues to the development experts in USAID

they have tended to have a lower profile, several otherand JICA. This approach has certain merits, but one

joint efforts were undertaken outside of the healtheffect has been to further weaken diplomatic pres-field. These include a number of initiatives involving

sure for greater US-Japan cooperation. Meanwhile,

MOFA and the State Department under the rubric

from the late 1990s the main institutional links be-of the US-Japan Strategic Development Alliance, as

tween JICA and USAID had been regular meetings

well as the Clean Water for People Initiative under-of American and Japanese headquarter staff who

taken by USAID and the Japan Bank for International

work on global health issues and a JICA liaison offi-

Cooperation.) Whereas the Common Agenda had

cer who was posted in the USAID headquarters. The

started out as a strictly top-down affair, driven byhuman networks these spawned have played an im-pressure from high levels of the administration

portant role in facilitating consultations between thereaching up to the office of Vice President Al Gore,

two agencies and bridging their activities. However,the Partnership for Global Health was designed to

JICA ended its practice of posting the liaison in the

be more of a bottom-up, field-driven program in

USAID offices from 2009, and soon afterward the8◆Japan Center for International ExchangeUnited States began deemphasizing the importancepast two decades, US-Japan development cooperationof the development staff that it had long placed in its

has suffered from a sort of Goldilocks syndrome inTokyo embassy. Unsurprisingly, as the pressure fromwhich the degree of high-level pressure for coopera-

Washington and Tokyo has diminished, US-Japan in-tion was either too hot or too cold, but never just right.

teractions in the field have declined. In fact, in some

When the Common Agenda started, it was operated

countries, representatives from USAID and JICA

as a top-down affair, driven by pressure from the up-

rarely meet one-on-one, instead coming into contact

per echelons of the Clinton administration and theprimarily through multilateral consultations involving

Japanese foreign ministry. In addition to limiting theall of the key donors operating in the country. The

involvement of recipient governments, this proved

result has been that while Japan and the United States

stifling to USAID and JICA staff, who were alreadycontinue to pursue bilateral cooperation on a handful

overstretched and felt that the inordinate amount ofof issues such as health and public-private partner-

time they spent on reporting distracted them fromships, focusing particularly on a few target countries

effectively implementing their programs. In fact, thein Africa and South Asia, their joint efforts are no

2002 program review of the Common Agenda foundlonger systematic or high profile, but are rather morethat one of its greatest faults was that its top-down

fragile ventures that depend on the resolve and en-

approach often meant that development objectives

ergy of a few committed individuals.

were given a back seat to political imperatives.13
However, the subsequent absence of high-level

Lessons Learned

involvement also proved to be a liability. From 2002,

The record of US-Japan development cooperation

the Partnership for Global Health shifted to a bot-yields a number of important lessons that need to be

tom-up approach in which the annual bilateral meet-

considered in thinking about how the two countries

ings on cooperative initiatives were downgraded, thecan work together more effectively and efficiently.

State Department pulled back from active engage-First, it is important to formulate US-Japan initiatives

ment, and Tokyo and Washington stopped pressuringin such a way that they do not compete with or un-

their respective country offices to explore how theydermine broader multilateral coordination. Although

could effectively work together. There have been athere are a number of areas where joint US-Japan ef-

number of merits to this approach, but in the final

forts may be more feasible or effective than multilat-

calculus it is clear that, absent external pressure, coun-eral efforts in meeting overall development objectives,

try offices that already face so many other demands

it is important for both countries to keep in mind thathave few incentives to invest the additional energy

such bilateral initiatives can be taken as challenges toneeded for successful US-Japan cooperation. Under

multilateral initiatives. Efforts should be made both in

the Partnership for Global Health, collaborative

the planning and implementation stages to avoid thisinitiatives have tended to be undertaken only when

whenever possible.

individual aid workers have personal ties with one an-

Second, Japan and the United States cannot takeother. Some information sharing inevitably has takena cookie-cutter approach to cooperation, but instead

place between US and Japanese officials throughneed to maintain a degree of flexibility that allows joint

country-level donor roundtables or because of per-efforts to be tailored to local circumstances. Over thesonal friendships, but there have been few regular

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 9

forums for bilateral US-Japan consultations at thecountry level. The end result has been that the mo-

A New Framework for US-Japan
Cooperation

mentum behind US-Japan cooperation on development has largely dissipated.

It is ironic that, while the momentum for coopera-

These experiences with top-down and bottom-up

tion has diminished, both countries’ objectives haveapproaches point to the need to find some workable

converged substantially in recent years, and they now

balance in which there is high-level political leader-have a stronger rationale than ever to cooperate, es-

ship and commitment to US-Japan cooperation on

pecially in Asia. Meanwhile, the budgetary situation indevelopment issues, but it is structured in a way thatboth countries also makes it more important for themgives people working on the ground the maximum
flexibility to respond to local needs and opportunities.
In particular, it is important to ensure that the reintroduction of stronger political leadership does notcreate more bureaucracy for the already overstretchedstaff of JICA and USAID country offices so that theadditional costs of collaboration do not outweighits benefits.
Finally, the most important lesson of all thatto seek ways to operate more efficiently and to sharethe financial burden of their development initiatives.
This means it is a particularly opportune time to establish a new framework for US-Japan development
cooperation—one that focuses primarily on strengthening East Asia by helping to advance sustainable
development in the region. (As mentioned previously,
joint US-Japan led initiatives in other regions such as

emerges out of the last two decades is the need for

Africa and South Asia would also be welcome, butboth countries to share a clear rationale for coopera-

East Asia is the most promising target for a concert-tion and a degree of harmonization in policy objec-

ed, collaborative effort.) Within this new framework,

tives. Obviously, the ultimate strategic objective of

the United States and Japan would work together

US-Japan cooperation needs to be the sustainable

more intensely at the headquarters and country levels

development of the countries in which they are work-

to formulate and implement development initiatives

ing; cooperation just for cooperation’s sake does little

in a targeted set of areas.

good. The Common Agenda was initially conceivedof as a diplomatic tool for strengthening US-Japan
relations at a time of heightened bilateral tensions,and in its early years its development objectives were
only vaguely articulated. The Partnership for Global
Health provided greater focus on development results, but the rationale for expending additional effort
on US-Japan cooperation has remained difficult for
staff in both aid agencies to discern, even when they

Their bilateral cooperation should be carried out
in as inclusive a manner as possible, meaning that while
Japan and the United States might be at the core ofvarious initiatives, these would need to be undertaken
in consultation with other actors in the aid community
and in such a way as to allow other donors to become
involved when appropriate. In fact, this bilateral cooperation could be useful in some cases as a rallying point

recognize instances where better coordination would

for broader efforts by the aid community. And one key

benefit them and the people they are trying to help. A

contribution of bilateral US-Japan cooperation would

new initiative needs a clearer vision that encompasses

be to articulate a long-term vision for East Asia’s de-both development and political goals.

velopment as a strong, stable, and open region.

10 ◆Japan Center for International ExchangeThis framework would ideally comprise activi-

and dealing with systemic corruption is a way of life

ties in a small number of pillars, or key issue areas,for small business owners and entrepreneurs in awhere greater US-Japan cooperation can play a spe-

number of countries throughout the region.14

cial role. At a minimum, these should include good

The economic rationale for battling corruption

governance, global health, humanitarian and disasteris overwhelming. It acts as a drag on economic de-relief, and regional contingency planning. All of thesevelopment domestically by hampering the emergenceareas involve emerging challenges with critical impli-of vibrant and healthy small and medium-sized busi-

cations for the region’s sustainable development andnesses, and it hobbles countries trying to compete in

East Asia’s further integration into the international

the international marketplace for trade and invest-

system. Of course, there are numerous other issues

ment. It also poses a major liability for donors. In

that Japan and the United States should also continue

systems characterized by pervasive corruption, it isto prioritize individually, and perhaps a few additional

harder for economic development projects to get theones that should be taken up jointly. However, there

traction they need to be successful. Meanwhile, theis a need for focus, and these four pillars represent

risk that aid may be diverted or abused undermines

areas in which US-Japan cooperation and collabora-

political support for foreign assistance. This dangertion are likely to be more productive than individual

became real when Japan temporarily suspended ODA

action or broader multilateral efforts.

to Vietnam in December 2008 when a corruption
scandal was unearthed involving kickbacks for a ma-

1. Governance and the Rule of Law

jor highway construction project funded by Japan.

The modern history of Asia’s most advanced econo-

As the two donors with the potential to exer-

mies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—cise the greatest influence in the region, the United

suggests that the key to battling poverty, developing

States and Japan can make an important contribution

a stable society, and eventually moving toward politi-

by teaming up to play a leadership role in the donor

cal liberalization is the development of a vibrant andcommunity in promoting good governance and bat-globally competitive economy that widely distributes

tling corruption. Many officials in East Asia are tired

the benefits of growth. Obviously, this should be oneof what they perceive as “lectures” on the rule of lawof the ultimate strategic objectives of Japanese andfrom the United States, and they are likely to be much

US involvement in the region, and a key element inmore attentive when there is simultaneous Japanese

ensuring that this kind of development has a chancepressure on this topic. Still, it is difficult to effectivelyof succeeding is the spread of good governance andmeet developmental and humanitarian needs while

the rule of law.

strictly adhering to the letter rather than the spirit of

Corruption, in particular, poses a major barrier topractices designed to discourage corruption. Rather,development in many places in the region. According

this requires a nuanced application of regulations

to Transparency International, all of the developing

based on a judgment about the particular situation

countries in East Asia have serious problems withat hand.

public sector corruption. In 2007, for example, more

Starting from the ambassadorial level in eachthan 20 percent of people in the Asia Pacific region

country, Japan and the United States should makereported having paid bribes during the previous year,

it clear that sound business practices and goodA New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 11

governance are a top priority. This would entail em-

United States in refusing to provide politically mo-phasizing that they stand together on this front andtivated ODA could decrease their influence vis-à-vis

jointly applying pressure to rid the ODA process andChina and other countries. However, the real issue atthe sectors they are funding of corruption. Regular

hand is how to encourage emerging donors such as

high-level consultations on how to promote good

China to meet international standards for develop-

governance should be a feature of US-Japan consul-

ment assistance and how to engage them in interna-tations at the country level.

tional institutions working on these issues, particular-

Also, it bears keeping in mind that the examples

ly the OECD’s Development Assistance Committeethat Japan and the United States set are critical.

(DAC). South Korea’s transition to a donor country,

Therefore, they should review their own practices

its 2010 accession to the DAC, and the work of thewith an eye toward eliminating funding that is primar-

United States, Japan, and other DAC members to en-

ily motivated by the intent to curry favor with recipi-

gage Korea on development issues provides a modelent governments or key political leaders. This type offor engaging with China on this front.15 The Unitedfunding tends to have political and diplomatic objec-

States and Japan have much to benefit from working

tives that often can be justified when taken up on a

together more closely in this area, using their consid-

case-by-case basis, but in aggregate it helps create aerable influence with China and other emerging do-

climate where cynical practices are accepted.

nors to encourage greater transparency and sounderIn addition, there appears to be considerable

practices in East Asia in terms of both foreign as-

room for Japan and the United States to undertake

sistance and business practices. Through greater pres-greater coordination and cooperation in implement-

sure and engagement—perhaps starting with coordi-

ing aid projects specifically designed to promote goodnated bilateral approaches or perhaps in the context

governance, better business practices, and a moreof trilateral China-Japan-US discussions—they canfriendly business environment. The United States ismake an important difference.

already quite active on this front in countries aroundthe region, and it may be helpful for both counties

2. Working Together to Improve Healthto work more closely on these efforts while coordi-

Both Japan and the United States have increasingly

nating with initiatives operated by other development

prioritized health in their development policies be-agencies such as the Asian Development Bank andcause they recognize it has critical, long-term impli-

the World Bank.

cations for macroeconomic development and social

Of course, foreign assistance has a strategic as-

stability. Indeed, they have found this to be the mostpect, and US and Japanese planners would be disin-natural area for collaboration in recent years, particu-

genuous to pretend that ODA does not play a role

larly in their efforts in Africa. It is clear that there arein competing for influence with other countries inconsiderable benefits to strengthening coordination

the region. Large sums of funds are coming into theand cooperation in this field in East Asia, too.

lesser-developed countries in East Asia from China,

Combined, the two countries provide more than

Korea, and other countries through business ventures

one-quarter of all ODA for health and population

as well as through foreign assistance, and there isissues—both from bilateral donors and from mul-

the possibility that stricter stances by Japan and thetilateral institutions such as the World Bank—for

12 ◆Japan Center for International Exchange

5 of East Asia’s 10 largest ODA recipients. The

set of strengths that can be complementary if skill-

United States has expanded its health funding in East

fully coordinated. The track record of JICA-USAID

Asia—especially in Vietnam, the first Asian country

cooperation in Africa backs up this assertion—bilat-

to benefit from PEPFAR—and it appears there are

eral cooperation has been most successful on proj-

numerous untapped opportunities for greater US-

ects where the United States and Japan could com-

Japan cooperation. However, even though they play

plement each other’s respective strengths in dealing

key roles in the donor communities in East Asia,with the governmental and nongovernmental sectors,

JICA and USAID’s approaches to health funding dif-or in making up for the funding restrictions of thefer considerably, and these disparities have given riseother partner.

to a sense of distance between their staff in the field,

An initial step to expand US-Japan cooperationoccasionally fueling feelings that their initiatives werewould be to reinforce headquarter-level coordinationcompeting against one another. Japan has tradition-by adding (or in some cases reinstating) regularized

ally worked closely with national governments, mainly

country-level discussions where Japanese and US

funding hospital systems and other government-run

officials could talk generally about their overall ob-

initiatives through national health ministries in or-

jectives, identify areas where their priorities overlap,

der to build up the health infrastructure. Meanwhile,and ultimately lay the groundwork for a resumption

leery of government corruption, the United Statesof the joint formulation of cooperative initiatives.

tends to fund NGOs and development contractors

These discussions should focus on overall strategies

to implement programs. In addition, while Japan has

for strengthening the recipient country’s health sys-

historically focused on developing countries’ overall

tem and how individual US and Japanese initiatives fit

national health infrastructures, the United States has

into the big picture. There are several issues that seema strong mandate to concentrate on HIV/AIDS andparticularly amenable to US-Japan cooperation.

other deadly communicable diseases.

First, there has been a heated debate in the global

Nevertheless, aid recipients in the region insist

health field about how to balance general efforts

that these differing approaches are associated with ato strengthen health systems (typified by Japanese

Table 2. Japanese and US funding for global health, 2005–2009

Recipient
Timor-Leste
Cambodia
Philippines
Mongolia
VietnamThailandLaos
Burma
Indonesia
China

US-Japan share of
DAC bilateral health funding(percent)
52
47
59
46
40
60
40
30
26
17

US-Japan share of
all health-related ODA(percent)
33
32
31
29
25
21
18
18
15
7

Source: Based on data from the QWIDS Database, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/.
Note: Figures reflect ODA commitments for health- and population-related activities and only include recipients of more than US$40 million in such funding
during the five-year period of 2005–2009. “DAC bilateral health funding” includes all major bilateral donors, while “all health-related ODA” adds in funding
from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 13

initiatives to build up hospital networks) with disease-of thousands and prompted large-scale international

specific approaches (such as large-scale US funding

relief efforts. One need only ponder the scope offor HIV/AIDS programs16) that some experts fear

suffering associated with the 2004 Indian Ocean

can skew the development of health systems. The

tsunami, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, or the March 2011

United States and Japan are particularly well posi-

earthquake and tsunami in Japan to appreciate howtioned to find practical ways to better integrate theirpressing the issue of disaster relief and humanitar-

activities, and thus to take a leading role in striking a

ian assistance has become for the region. While thisbalance between these approaches.

has been an extraordinary period, it seems that the

A second area where they can make important

likelihood of devastating natural and manmade disas-

contributions is on the issue of health workforces.

ters striking the region is only growing. Widespread

There is a chronic shortage of health workers in manyindustrialization and urbanization in Asia’s develop-

countries in the region, and this tends to be one ofing countries has led to higher population densities,

the main bottlenecks in efforts to strengthen healthparticularly in vulnerable coastal regions. Meanwhile,

systems over the long term. Japan and the Unitedenvironmental degradation is making countries inStates can start addressing this issue by better coor-

the region more susceptible to disasters by increas-

dinating their programs in order to minimize com-

ing their likelihood and exacerbating their impact.

petition for the same pool of workers, explore new

Then there is climate change, which is expected to

ways of combining funds to supplement or “top off ”

cause an increase in the kind of extreme weather thatthe health workers’ salaries in programs that they run,is associated with natural disasters, with potentiallyand project leadership in long-term efforts to expand

dire consequences for countries such as Vietnam andtraining for various types of health workers.

Burma (Myanmar).17

A third issue where they can have considerable

Recent experience has highlighted the need for

impact as the two most influential bilateral donors

greater international coordination to make humanitar-is by projecting joint leadership in focusing on the

ian and disaster relief more effective and timely. Whilesustainability of health financing. This should include

relief efforts typically end up with multilateral partici-

efforts to encourage the transitioning of core healthpation, the coordination that makes them possible isprograms into recipient countries’ national budgets

built up at the bilateral level, and there is a clear andand other efforts to make national health systems

pressing rationale for the United States and Japan tomore self-sustaining over the long term. The ultimate

take the lead in this regard. Their longstanding alliancegoal should be to reduce the dependency of devel-

relationship makes them the best matched countries

oping countries on external financing for their healthin the region to partner on these efforts, both in terms

systems while ensuring this transition is done in aof capacity and working relations, and their deft re-smooth and responsible manner.

sponse to the March 2011 tsunami has demonstrated
their ability to work together effectively. The US Navy

3. Greater Coordination and Cooperation on
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

provides the only large-scale airlift capacity in the re-

In recent years, Asia has been struck by a string ofand Japan is becoming better positioned to makemassive natural disasters that have killed hundreds

substantial contributions now that its Self-Defense

14 ◆Japan Center for International Exchange

gion capable of mounting massive rescue missions,Forces (SDF) have started to expand their capacity toStates should also expand the dialogues they have re-participate in humanitarian operations and Japanese

cently begun with Australia and others in the region

leaders have become increasingly willing to authorize

on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Finally,both countries would do well to make disaster pre-18

these activities.

There is a political dimension to this as well,paredness a higher priority in their ODA, building

which relates to their shared strategic objectives foron the lessons that Japan has learned from its experi-

the region. Having seen the diplomatic benefits of US

ences. US efforts to establish an Asia Pacific disaster

relief efforts in Indonesia after the tsunami, Japanese

preparedness center are a good step that hopefullyand American leaders are very aware of the politi-

can be built upon with greater Japanese involvement.

cal gains to be had from expanding their contributions on this front and of how their relief efforts can

4. Planning for Aid to Fragile States

strengthen their strategic role in the region. Similarly,

Japan and the United States should also be talking

they realize that there are many instances, such as

regularly in a discreet manner about how they mightwith the tsunami in Indonesia or Cyclone Nargis in

work together to deal with fragile states with closed

Burma, when political considerations and concerns

societies—namely North Korea and Burma—with anover sovereignty make it awkward for the United

eye toward contingency planning.19 Widespread re-States or Japan to act alone; teaming up makes theirpression in both countries and their strained relations

efforts more palatable to the recipient country.

with the outside world have precluded Japan and theJapan and the United States are already moving

United States from providing them with foreign as-

to make coordination on humanitarian and disastersistance of any meaningful magnitude. However, therelief more of a priority in the alliance, and there are

United States and Japan have important interests inseveral steps they should consider. One is to estab-

what happens with these countries, and they bothlish a joint interagency group to create and regularly

share an interest in the evolution of these countries

review plans for coordinated efforts in different sce-

in a more open direction.

narios. One aim of this planning could be to analyze

While Japanese and US officials have spoken of-where Japan can best supplement the US military’s

ten about these states in bilateral security talks as wellsubstantial capabilities and then further develop SDF

as in multilateral forums such as the Six-Party Talks,capacity in those areas. The discussions should not just

it would be useful to quietly convene regular bilat-

be limited to defense officials, however; they shoulderal discussions that focus specifically on long-term

also include representatives of the respective foreign

humanitarian and development issues and that bringministries and development agencies, as well as ofin experts from the development agencies as well as

NGOs in each country that play key roles in address-

the military and other relevant agencies. The best way

ing humanitarian issues. It would also be particularly

to do this may be to set up a joint working group or

useful for Japan and the United States to regularly use

groups. One aim would be to discuss how to bettersome of their joint military exercises to practice andalign US and Japanese humanitarian and development

refine their capacity to coordinate their responses topolicies toward Burma and North Korea. However,humanitarian crises. In addition, using their bilateral

the main thrust should be to undertake joint plan-

cooperation as a foundation, Japan and the United

ning for contingencies. This would involve planning

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 15

as to how they might together play a leadership role,for bilateral initiatives to adapt and evolve in response

whether publicly or behind the scenes, in deploying

to new developments on the ground.

humanitarian assistance quickly in the case of a natu-

The first ingredient needs to be high-level politi-

ral disaster or some opening that might encourage thecal leadership. Ideally, a new framework for US-Japanregime to move in a constructive direction. The inter-cooperation on development issues would benational community’s difficulties in 2008 in formulat-

launched by the US president and the Japanese prime

ing a response to Cyclone Nargis in the face of resis-

minister as one outcome of a joint summit agree-

tance from the Burmese regime highlighted the needment on the future course of bilateral relations. Theirfor this type of contingency planning. Meanwhile,backing would be critical in providing the broad vision

Burma’s recent moves toward political openness

needed for a meaningful US-Japan initiative on thismake US-Japan discussions about coordinating the

topic and in mobilizing the aid agencies and foreign

resumption of ODA even more pressing.

ministries in both countries to seriously explore how

In addition, these discussions should aim to de-

to implement greater coordination and cooperation.

velop joint plans for the possibility of sudden regime

This top-down pressure should set out clear goals—change, which may necessitate rapid and skillful ac-

including development-related goals as well as thetion to stabilize humanitarian crises and help trans-

political goal of deepening US-Japan ties. The devel-

form the country’s relations with the outside world.

opment goals should be kept broad enough to give

Of course, all of this will need to be done underaid officials and diplomats in the region license to takethe radar, and particular care will have to be taken inadvantage of the best opportunities for meaningfuldealing with other key stakeholders—such as South

cooperation and to avoid forcing them to manufac-

Korea in the case of North Korea—so that they areture “cooperation” where it may not be useful.

not overly threatened by bilateral discussions on is-Some degree of accountability is critical to keepsues that are critical to their own welfare. However,

the momentum of cooperation alive, so it would bethat should certainly not prevent the United States

best to have an annual review of US-Japan coopera-

and Japan from moving forward in a prudent fashion

tion that brings together key officials from thewith bilateral planning on issues such as this that haveheadquarters and the region to measure progress,

potentially critical ramifications for the future shaperecalibrate their objectives, and explore future plans.

of the region.

Under the Common Agenda, officials from bothcountries gathered annually for an elaborate review

Structuring Bilateral Cooperation

chaired by the US undersecretary of state for global

Bringing cooperation to life and making it meaningful

recent years, the annual review of the Partnership forrequires striking a balance between top-down and bot-

Global Health has been lower in stature, involving

tom-up approaches. To do this, it is important to have

mid-level officials from JICA and USAID. Befitting

an institutional structure that encourages key officials

the renewed priority that should be placed on bilateralfrom both countries to explore where joint action isdevelopment cooperation, it would be useful to bringdesirable, sustains and reinforces the momentum forback high-level participation in an annual meeting,cooperation, and yet provides the necessary flexibility

although it is important to structure the meeting

16 ◆Japan Center for International Exchangeaffairs and a deputy foreign minister from Japan; inso that there continues to be a frank, working-levelsupport efforts at coordination has steadily declined.

discussion between officials who have front-line

Moreover, a related obstacle on the US side has been

responsibilities on development issues. In essence, it

the growing number of agencies besides USAID thatwould be best to involve high-level political leadership

are involved in foreign assistance. This may change

primarily to give their imprimatur to the proceedings,

if proposals to reconsolidate aid programs within awhile taking measures to ensure that the bulk of thesingle agency move forward, but for the time being it

review is action-oriented and concrete in nature.

is important to find some way of involving other US

There should also be some high-level mechanism

agencies in US-Japan liaison activities.

to maintain development cooperation and coordina-

While reinvigorated leadership from the top levels

tion as a priority in overall bilateral relations. Top US

of both governments is crucial, the most important

officials such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

determinant of the success of US-Japan development

have spoken about the “three Ds,” rhetorically plac-

coordination and cooperation is what happens on

ing development on the same level as defense andthe ground in USAID and JICA country offices anddiplomacy as the third pillar of US foreign policy, andembassies in East Asia. A new initiative on US-Japan

sentiments about the importance of development

cooperation would need to be flexible enough to al-

are even more widespread in Japan. In keeping withlow aid workers and diplomats in the field to focus on

this, both governments should expand their focus onwhat is most appropriate in each country and tailor

development cooperation and cooperation on related

programs to local needs. Instead of dictating which

global issues in their regular cabinet- and sub-cabinet-

joint initiatives should be pursued, it would be morelevel discussions. In particular, it would be useful toeffective for Tokyo and Washington to encourage US

have an annual meeting on these topics that brings

and Japanese officials in the field to meet on a regular

together the Japanese and American foreign minis-

basis to exchange information and explore a few ofters and the heads of the development agencies fromthe most promising areas for deeper coordination andeach country.

cooperation in their recipient countries that fall under

Additional measures to strengthen the support

the four pillars of the proposed US-Japan framework.

system for development coordination are advisable

Progress at the country level would eventually be re-within the JICA and USAID headquarters. The dis-ported at the annual review meeting.

patch of a young Japanese official to sit in USAID

It would be best if this exploration were capped byand serve as a liaison from the late 1990s until 2009

annual country-level meetings between the Japanese

proved very useful in facilitating cooperative initiatives,and US ambassadors to formally identify key agenda

and it would be helpful to reinstate this posting. The

items and objectives for development cooperation at

creation (or more accurately, resumption) of a similar

the country level. The example set by ambassadors

post for a US official at JICA should also be consid-

carries great weight, and their direct involvement

ered and, most importantly, more resources should be

could provide the necessary leadership to encourage

allocated for the facilitation of donor coordination incountry offices to work together more closely.

both agencies. Perversely, as the importance of do-

Of course, with aid officials and diplomats innor coordination has become more obvious in recent

both countries facing so many competing pressures,years, the number of staff on the US side assigned to

it is difficult to sustain the momentum of initiatives

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 17

without dedicated resources—even initiatives thateach country’s long-term national security and well-ultimately make funding more effective, such as de-being, and if we are truly committed to building avelopment coordination and cooperation. For thisbroader partnership, then both countries should bereason, it is advisable to look at innovative financ-willing to back up their rhetoric with a comparatively

ing mechanisms to facilitate US-Japan development

modest commitment such as this.

cooperation. Past efforts have never included special

The time is now ripe for the United States andfunding for joint initiatives, but it is time for Japan

Japan to launch a new framework for enhanced bilat-

and the United States to seriously consider creatingeral cooperation on development issues, with a spe-a special pool of matching funds that is dedicatedcial focus on the crucial region of East Asia. This will

to supporting collaborative US-Japan aid projects innecessitate a thoughtful restructuring of current insti-

20

the region.

Country or regional offices could betutional linkages, a commitment of sufficient humanencouraged to request funding from this pool sepa-

and financial resources, and, most importantly, high-rately from their regular budgets, and the pool could

level political leadership from both sides. While thebe designed with the flexibility to allow funding to beneeds in the region are great, successful cooperation

allocated to the most promising projects that involvein the four areas where Japanese and American capac-

US-Japan collaboration anywhere in East Asia. Such a

ities and approaches are particularly well matched andfunding pool should consist of new resources for col-where US-Japan collaboration has the potential to belaborative US-Japan initiatives, perhaps in the range

especially effective—good governance, global health,of US$10–US$20 million annually from each coun-

humanitarian and disaster relief, and regional contin-

21

try, for a total of US$20–US$40 million per year. To

gency planning—would help reinvigorate US-Japan

put things in perspective, the US contribution would

partnership and give new significance to the bilateralroughly be equivalent to the cost of a single hour of

relationship. Even more important, it would go a long

US military operations to deal with state failure in

way in helping realize both countries’ vision of the

Afghanistan.22 If development is truly so critical for

emergence of a strong, stable, and open East Asia.

18 ◆Japan Center for International Exchange

NOTES
1. For the purpose of this chapter, East Asia is considered as comprising the ASEAN+3 countries (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, plus China, Japan, and South Korea) as well as North Korea,
Timor-Leste, and Mongolia.
2. In this chapter, “bilateral cooperation” refers to bilateral US-Japan cooperation vis-à-vis a recipient country. It is important that thiscooperation be carried out in such a way as to incorporate the needs of the recipient country and the recipient government’s views, as
one danger of such cooperation is that initiatives that are not entirely appropriate can be foisted upon the recipients simply because
they are politically appealing for the donor countries.
3. Interviews with Cambodian, Japanese, and US government officials and NGO representatives, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, September
8–9, 2008.
4. For example, many of the European aid agencies have increasingly moved toward disbursing their funding as “budget support” provided directly to the recipient governments or through Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) that pool their funds with other donors.
However, legislative regulations and an emphasis on accountability keep Japan and the United States from adopting those approaches, leaving them instead as the leading major donors that operate almost exclusively on a project-by-project basis. Furthermore,
Japanese and American aid philosophies also tend to be closer to one another than to the European donor agencies, particularly the
Nordic donors, giving them more common ground for cooperation and making it more likely that their bilateral efforts will bear fruit.
5. Based on statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), QWIDS Database, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Differing ODA statistics are produced by individual countries andsometimes even by different agencies in the same country, but the data reported in keeping with OECD standards is best suited forinternational comparisons and thus is used throughout this chapter unless otherwise noted.
6. Figures are for FY2008. Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (February 10, 2011), 15.
7. According to the OECD-DAC, in the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, the United States and Japan made total new ODA commitments of US$28 billion for East Asia, which is equivalent to 52 percent of total bilateral funding from all of the DAC member
countries. The recipients of these funds included Burma, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, North Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, and regional programs. OECD-DAC, QWIDS Database, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/.
8. The United States cannot provide most types of ODA to China due to legislative restrictions dating from the Tiananmen Square
Incident.
9. For example, Japan has stronger ties to the governments, or some elements of the governments, in places such as Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, where US ties have historically been strained.
10. Hideki Wakabayashi, The US-Japan Alliance: A New Framework for Enhanced Global Security (Washington DC: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, October 2008).
11. Interviews with current and former Japanese and US government officials, Tokyo and Washington DC, June and July 2008.
12. Interview with Sumie Ishii, executive director, Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP),
Tokyo, June 24, 2008.
13. Sally Craig Huber, “A Review of the Japan–United States Collaboration in Population and Health under the Common Agenda andGlobal Issues Initiative,” Management Sciences for Health report to USAID, 2002.
14. From Transparency International’s 2007 survey of global corruption; Transparency International, Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2007)
15. In addition to joining the DAC, South Korea, which has been notable for the commercial orientation of its aid, has taken measures
to increase the transparency of its overseas giving. Meanwhile, China has begun working with the Asian Development Bank and the
UN Development Programme, which can be seen as a small step toward coordinating its efforts with the international donor community.
16. Some experts and practitioners argue that the amount of funding going into HIV/AIDS programs, malaria initiatives, and otherdisease-specific approaches through US programs, as well as through multilateral initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, can distort developing countries’ health systems by encouraging human and technical resources to focus
on one set of problems to the detriment of broader health issues.
17. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns that climate change is likely to bring increased flooding in coastal
regions, especially in “heavily populated mega-delta regions” such as Vietnam and Burma, while some inland areas will see moredroughts. (See www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-science/consequences-for-the-future)
18. Japan’s recent deployment of Hyuga-class ships that can act as “helicopter carriers” gives Japan airlift capacity that can be utilized forhumanitarian and disaster relief.
19. There is also considerable appetite and potential for US-Japan cooperation in terms of ODA in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but efforts
in this area would naturally be more multilateral in nature, with other donors also playing important leadership roles.
20. This approach has not been intensely explored in the past because concerns about a lack of accountability have made the US Congress and the Japanese government reluctant to allow aid agencies to engage in pooled funding. However, the atmospherics sur-

A New Framework for US-Japan Development Cooperation◆ 19

rounding this issue have shifted considerably and there is reason to believe that this kind of small step toward pooled funding witha close ally may be acceptable to both sides.
21. A pool of funding roughly in the range of a combined US$20–US$40 million per year might allow the United States and Japan tomake grant commitments to perhaps three to six new mid-sized, multiyear projects throughout the region each year, yet presumably the overall cost might be small enough to make this type of commitment feasible in terms of the budgetary processes in bothcountries.
22. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the expenses of military operations in Afghanistan for FY2011 will reach US$120
billion, more than $300 million per day and roughly $13 million per hour. Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (March 29, 2011), 18–19.

20 ◆Japan Center for International ExchangeAbout the Japan Center for International Exchange
Founded in 1970, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) is one of the few truly independent think tanks inthe field of international affairs in Japan. With offices in Tokyo and New York, JCIE conducts political exchange programs
for leading American and Japanese policymakers, carries out policy research and dialogue projects on pressing international
issues, and works to promote a greater understanding of civil society and philanthropy in Japan and the Asia Pacific region.

About the Project
From 2008 to 2011, JCIE managed a multiyear study on an “Enhanced Agenda for US-Japan Partnership,” which explored
how revitalized US-Japan cooperation can better address common challenges, strengthen regional and global stability, andultimately make the bilateral alliance more robust and versatile. The project has brought together a group of promising
young policy experts to focus on emerging issue areas where there is the potential for deeper bilateral cooperation between
the two countries. The findings of some of the participants are being published as part of this working paper series. Thisinitiative has been made possible by the generous support of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.
As a rule, JCIE creates opportunities for informed policy discussions and does not take policy positions. In keeping with
this, the views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positionof JCIE.

Japan Center for International Exchange

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