113

History, Ecosystems, and Human Agency in Restoration Ecology
Christian HAAK
Department of Conservation Biology, UFZ-Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research
Permoser Str. 15, 04818 Leipzig, Germany
present address: Karl König Weg 48, 65929 Frankfurt, Germany
e-mail: christian.haak@ufz.de

Abstract
Restoration ecology has been accused of “faking nature,” meaning it pretends that natural systems canbe replaced by artificial ones with equal value. The argument is flawed in that it assumes that the reference
state for restoration projects is always pristine nature. Mostly, however restoration tries to improve degradedsystems and the reference states are formed by human interaction with the environment. Restoration ecology
operates on a different scale than other disciplines in ecology as it necessarily involves judgement about thevalue of nature, and here lies its benefit for conservation.
Key words: conservation, pragmatism, restoration thesis, scales, wilderness

1. Introduction
While restoration ecology is still struggling to findits role among the ecological disciplines, the restorationof degraded habitats is becoming increasingly important.
Thus, instead of wondering where restoration ecology
fits into the traditional academic system it is important
to show what it has to offer to expand ecology. One concern is that restoration ecology could contribute to thecreation of an artificial nature, a theme park called“nature.” By rejecting this claim the true value of
restoration ecology can be emphasized.

2. The Restoration Thesis
In his highly influential paper on restoration ecology
Robert Elliot (1982) performs a thought experiment:
Imagine an ecosystem that is entirely destroyed by mining activities and then completely reconstructed. Elliot
claims that restoration ecology implies the new system
would have the same value as the original. According to
Elliot, the restoration thesis (later called replacement
thesis) is: “The destruction of what has value is compensated for by the later creation of something of equalvalue.”
Elliot rejects the idea that compensation is possible.
He does not argue against measures that are improving
ecosystems but he claims that “replacing a rich naturalenvironment with a rich artificial one is a bad thing”(Elliot, 1997 quoted from Light forthcoming). The aimof Elliot’s thought experiment is to show that “wildnature has intrinsic value” (Elliot, 1997) which cannever be replaced and any effort to do so is “faking.”
Global Environmental Research
11: 113-117 (2007)
printed in Japan

It is granted that restoration should not serve as ajustification for the destruction of pristine ecosystems.
But the assumption that the reference state for, or theaim of restoration projects always has to be wild nature
is flawed. “Whose wilderness?” one might ask.
Cronon (1996) describes how the notion of wilderness has changed over time from being “a place ofsatanic temptations” to become a “sacred temple.” Thischange in attitude toward wilderness does not entail that
we should not care about mostly untouched ecosystems.
The point is that wilderness is “quite profoundly ahuman creation” (Cronon, 1996: p. 69) and as a reference state “wild nature” does not come without preconceptions. Even if there would be a consensus about
the meaning of “wilderness” it would be a reference
state on a par with other possible reference states and assuch open to negotiation. Using the example of therestoration of a floodplain forest at the Elbe river near
Dessau in Germany by my colleague at the Helmholtz
Centre for Environmental Research, Judith Glaeser, I
will develop a different view towards restoration thanthe one suggested by Elliot. The following is not a
historically accurate account of what has been done in
the project but the example is supposed to illustrate
which decisions have to be made to determine the reference state in floodplain restoration.

3. Restoring a Floodplain
The reasons for the recreation of floodplains are
manifold. Due to their heterogeneity they are hotspots
for biodiversity, they provide recreational opportunity
and, an aspect that is becoming increasingly relevant,©2007 AIRIES114

C. HAAKlowland riparian forests can serve as a natural flood defence. The aim of the restoration project to be describedhere is to recreate partly the composition, structure andfunction of the floodplain forest. At the outset of the
project, following the guidelines by Hobbs and Norton(1996) the processes leading to the degradation of theforests were identified as the building of dams and theuse of the floodplain areas as pasture.
Some of the ecological knowledge needed for the
restoration of the floodplain can be summarized using agraph by Koenzen (2005). Koenzen (2005) generated
ecogrammes about which vegetation types can be expected at specific sites depending on morphodynamics
and water level (Fig. 1). The diagram shows that the oak
elm forest is to be expected as the main floodplain forest
accompanied by oak beech forest at areas with a shorter
duration of inundation and by willow forests at areas
with a longer duration of inundation. The ecogrammealso tells us where no vegetation can be expected,
especially at sites with high morphodynamics. As
Koenzen (2005) writes, the ecogramme describes anideal image of what could happen under the conditions
at the site. It is not a historically accurate description
and restorationists are aware of the idealizations made.
To determine realistic goals in terms of species
composition of the floodplain forest a multitude ofapproaches have to be used, for example historical data,
pollen analyses, maps and interviews with locals (for an
overview of the methodology see Egan & Howell 2001).
Adjacent to the restoration site we find stands of poplars.
Their planting was encouraged during the first half ofthe 20th century because of their fast growth(Anonymous, 1933; Glaeser, 2005; Glaeser & Schmidt,
2007). During the Middle Ages additional Oak trees,
naturally belonging into the floodplain, were planted toprovide food, bark, and wood. During the planning of
the project there also were debates whether ash trees
belong into the floodplain forest. According to thehistorical record, ash trees were present in former times
so it was decided that the aim of the restoration project
would be to recreate a mixed oak elm forest with mixed
in ash trees
How was this aim to be achieved? To speed up theprocess of succession it was decided that the trees had tobe planted in the meadow. However, from the outset it
was apparent that speeding up succession would not beenough, there further was the need to avoid alternative
stable states to the desired climax state. As an alternative
stable state the establishment of different shrub species
were observed because deer grazing on trees resulted instifled growth of oak trees or complete loss of trees. An
experimental set-up now consists of planting thorny
bushes to prevent deer from damaging the trees and thus
enable them to grow and reach maturity. Although thepresence and the abundance of ash trees in the floodplain forest was a matter of discussion the restoration of
the oak elm forest, given the natural conditions is arealistic goal.

4. Finding a Reference Point: Demystifying
Restoration
When discussing the aim of the restoration of floodplains with the ecologists involved, the idea of returning
to a more natural state never is employed. As mentioned
above, the aim of the project is to partly restore
composition, structure, and function of a floodplain forest and it is not expected that either aspect will be
returned to a previous state. There are two reasons for
this: Firstly the original conditions of structure andFig. 1 Vegitation types expected at specific site depending on morphodynamics and water level.
From Koenzen (2005), translation by the author.

History, Ecosystems, and Human Agency in Restoration Ecology

composition can hardly be determined as the floodplain
forests have been altered by humans since at least the
Middle Ages. Secondly, even if the original state of thefloodplain could be determined, reaching it would bemeaningless because other conditions have changed in
the meantime, the morphology of the river and the nutrient load among others. Bringing back pristine habitats is
not what the floodplain restoration is about. The reference point for restoration is determined by us.
Restoration ecologists seem to interpret the fact thatfinding a reference point involves human decisions as
inviting arbitrariness. Recently, for example, Cabin(2007) wrote: “I discovered […] that people, including
many scientists themselves will often advocate using‘objective science’ to settle their disputes until that science suggests something that conflicts with a strongly
held belief or value.” Here we find the notion that values distort science and because restoration has to dowith values it cannot be scientific. Cabin’s argument
carries similar connotations about restoration to Elliot’s.
While the latter equates the involvement of human values as leading to fake the former interprets values as
unscientific inviting arbitrariness.
4.1 Values
I would suggest a different interpretation of the involvement of values in restoration ecology. Restoration
ecology has to be sensitive to values and preferences insociety but this does not make its results arbitrary. The
conservationist and pioneer of restoration George
Perkins Marsh provides a good example. Hall (2005)
describes how Marsh was guided by an appreciation of
the pristine nature of North America compared to nature
in Italy which was very much shaped by culture andwhere these cultural modifications were seen as improvements. In this sense, diverging views about reference states existed. Marsh not only understood thathumans were to blame for the degradation of the environment, he also believed that humans could restore
the systems to a less degraded state, although he wasaware that wilderness as a reference point was notnecessarily achievable. An appreciation of nature and a
distinction of degraded nature and less degraded natureis the driving force of restoration projects as well as anunderstanding how values influence the desired reference state.
4.2 Pragmatism – the human factor
Environmental pragmatism suggests a way to reconcile values and science in restoration ecology and meetthe concerns voiced by Cabin and Elliot. Pragmatism
here is not meant as a simple “the end justifies themeans” (Parker, 1996) approach. Rather, leaning on
pragmatist philosophers such as William James or John
Dewey, environmental pragmatists argue that knowledge about the environment is generated through all of
our interactions with nature and not only based on
experiments and replication. The epistemology, the theory of knowledge, underlying pragmatism is interaction-

115

istic meaning pragmatists see the mind as part of theworld (Parker, 1996: p. 23) not detached from it. Thus,
our knowledge is a product of our interaction with theenvironment, “a mutual transaction between the organism and its surroundings.” This means that as we arealways in the environment, the change from a wild to acultural landscape is gradual.
Regarding human interaction with the environment
not necessarily as detrimental to the protection of naturedoes not imply that intrinsic values of nature of no placein environmental ethics. Rather, it opens the path topluralism of values as demanded by McShane (2007).
The benefit of environmental pragmatism is that it supplies us with an interactionist ethics and epistemology,
which understands knowledge of the environment being
the product of active, often too active, human beings.
Pragmatism is relevant for restoration ecology because,
as observed by Young (2000), restoration projects areoften grass-roots-initiated or implemented by people
living in the community, and it is experimentally based(Gross, 2006).
There are differences between pristine landscapesand humanly influenced ones but they do not differ invalue a priori just because some are touched by humans
and others are not. The degraded ski slope ecosystemdeserves the same attention as a forest. In that pragmatism does not distinguish between valuable habitats andless valuable ones based on human interference it avoids
the misunderstanding that results from Elliot’s strict
interpretation of the “re” in restoration. It is too strict
because it assumes that the reference state of restoration
is some form of “wilderness” that can be found in thepast. The aims of restoration projects, though, mirror ourown preferences and our models of these aims lie in the
future. By only allowing wild and untouched nature as areference, Eliot mystifies restoration which often is ahands-on problem-solving enterprise. But Eliot not only
mystifies finding a reference he also simplifies the roleof history, a simplification that has been questioned in
ecology itself.

5. Path Dependent History
Eliot insistence that the “re” in restoration shouldrefer to the history of the ecosystem is well taken. However, history not always acts in uniform ways. Taking
the pragmatic viewpoint helps to understand that human
involvement is part of the history of a landscape, humandesires, values and needs have shaped the landscape, forexample the floodplain that serves as a reference. The
conception of environmental history that emanates fromrestoration ecology is not new to ecology. Sharon
Kingsland (1995) claims that since the late 1980s ecologists have increasingly doubted the usefulness ofdeterministic models such as predator prey equations by
Lotka and Volterra or others. Their importance notwithstanding, it was now understood that local conditions
and contingencies can alter the path of succession andlead to alternative stable states. Ecological processes

116

C. HAAKthus were analysed in terms of the “longer term effects
of a regions history” (Kingsland, 1995: p. 221). Underlying the “new natural history,” as Kingsland calls it, isa different conception of causality in nature. The
development of a plant community, is path dependent.
Instead of leading to a fixed climax state, succession canbe understood as setting the stage for a “historic rangeof variation” as Egan and Howell describe it. Different
trajectories are possible. Depending on the ecosystem,
human intervention is more or less part of these trajectories.

6. Scales
From the pragmatic viewpoint and with a conceptionof path dependent history we can see how restoration
ecology can achieve more than “cleaning up” after thedestruction of habitats. It can be interpreted as a research programme for environmental management. I use
the term research programme in loose analogy to how
the philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos (1970) definedit. Like many other philosophers and historians of science Lakatos understood that scientific theories consistof statements about the world based on many background assumptions. As a simplification one could saythat Lakatos’ notion of research programme shares elements of what Thomas Kuhn called a “paradigm,” anotion scientists often use to grasp the elements ofscientific theories that transcend mere observation. A
systemic view of theories makes it questionable whether
one observation can falsify a theory. Rather, all background assumptions would have to be put to test which
is impossible. Scientific theories are systems of rules
and assumptions and if they exhibit some form ofcontinuity, Lakatos calls them research programmes, anexample being the Cartesian system of a mechanistic
theory of the universe (Lakatos, 1970: p. 132). Lakatos
claimed that a good research programme can provide us
with a a progressive problem shift “which will lead tothe discovery of novel facts” (Lakatos, 1970: p. 133).
One reason why restoration ecology can lead to a
progressive problem shift is that it operates on a different scale than for example conservation ecology. As
Young (2000) shows, conservation ecology mostly
focuses on the population level while restoration often
centres around the community, ecosystem, or landscapescale. The notion of “scale” here can be understood geographically, in that field or genetic experiments often
cannot address the scope of the questions asked forexample regarding the function of biodiversity in afloodplain (Carpenter et al., 2006). There is also a
conceptual understanding of “scale.” Restoring the function of a floodplain in terms of flood protection requires
a different conceptual scale if it is acknowledged thatthe biodiversity of a floodplain is relevant. The engineering scale, building dams, is changed to a scale inwhich ecological factors are important as well. This
example shows how the notions of “functions” and “services” should be understood as part of a progressive

problemshift in conservation ecology, not as a “sellingout on nature” as McCauley (2006) suspects.
An indication of the importance of these problem
shifts is that most restoration projects take place onabandoned and degraded agricultural areas, certainly nota habitat often investigated in traditional conservation
biology. The degradation of these habitats is oftencaused by exploitation, followed by human migration.
Migration is not only a problem for degraded lands thatare abandoned but also for the ecosystems people are
migrating to (Meyerson et al., 2007). A consequence of
migration could be an increasing, pressure on urban
ecosystems often leading to an increase of urban sprawl
leading to higher rates of run-off and sealed surfaces andoften increasing settlement in floodplain areas, again
resulting in degraded lands.

7. Conclusion
The argument that restoration is fake only addresses
cases where all that matters is an artificial recreation ofsomething natural with the explicitly or implicitly madeclaim that the result of the restoration is “wilderness.”
Often, however, restoration projects have a different aim
and thus demand a more complex understanding of therole of history and human agency. Here environmental
pragmatism can help.
The appearance of restoration ecology is a symptomof novel demands to conservation. There are pressing
reasons why the restoration approach is worth pursuing.
The degradation of ecosystems and disputes about theuse of land are likely to increase in the future, for example in the debate about biofuels. Restoration ecology canprovide useful insights if it makes human choices
transparent and if it focuses on levels of analysis that
integrate human activities and natural processes.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Stefan Hotes for inviting me to theworkshop on wetland restoration in Laufen and for critical comments on the paper. Further I would like to thank
Judith Gläser for providing me with insights about her
floodplain restoration project. The comments of ananonymous referee were helpful as well.
References
Anonymous (1933) Weiden- und Pappelanpflanzungen beiöffentlichen Arbeiten. Forstwissenschaftliches Centralblatt, 55:
540.
Cabin, R. J. (2007) Science-driven restoration: A square grid on around earth? Restoration Ecology, 15: 1-7.
Carpenter, S.R., R. DeFries, T. Dietz, H.A. Mooney, S. Polasky,
W.V. Reid and R.J. Scholes (2006). Millennium ecosystemassessment: research needs. Science, 314(5797): 257-258.
Cronon, W. (1996) The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Backto the Wrong Nature. In: W. Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground,
W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 69-90.

History, Ecosystems, and Human Agency in Restoration Ecology
Egan, D. and E. A. Howell (eds.) (2001) The Historical Ecology
Handbook. Island Press, Washington.
Elliot, R. (1982) Faking Nature. Inquiry–an interdisciplinary.
Journal of Philosophy, 25: 81-93.
Elliot, R. (1997) Faking nature. The Ethics of Environmental
Restoration. Routledge, London.
Glaeser, J. (2005) Untersuchungen zur historischen Entwicklung
und Vegetation mitteldeutscher Auenwälder. Ph. D. Dissertation at the Helmhotz Centre for Envirnomental Research, 9,
1-163.
Glaeser, J. and P.A. Schmidt (2007) Zur historischen Entwicklung
des Baumartenbestandes von Hartholz-Auenwäldern – dargestellt
am Beispiel des Leipziger Auenwaldes. Allgemeine Forst- undJagdzeitung, 178, 90-97.
Gross, M. (2006) Beyond expertise: Ecological science and themaking of socially robust restoration strategies. Journal for
Nature Conservation, 14: 172.
Hall, M. (2005) Earth repair. A transatlantic history of environmental restoration. University of Virginia Press, Charlottesvilleand London.
Hobbs, R. J. and D. A. Norton (1996) Towards a conceptual
framework for restoration ecology. Restoration Ecology, 4:93-110.
Kingsland, S. (1995) Modeling Nature. Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
Koenzen, U. (2005) Fluss– und Stromauen in Deutschland –117

Typologie und Leitbilder – Ergebnisse des F+E-Vorhabens
Typologie und Leitbildentwicklung für Flussauen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland des Bundesamtes für Naturschutz
FKZ: 803 82 100. Münster-Hiltrup, LV Druck im
Landwirtschaftsverlag GmbH.
Lakatos, I (1970) Falsification and the methodology of scientificresearch programmes. In: Lakatos I. and Musgrave A., eds.,
Criticism and the growth of knowledge, London Cambridge
University Press.
Light, A. (forthcoming) “Faking nature” revisited. The Beauty
Around Us: Einvironmental Aesthetics in the Scenic Landscapeand Beyond Faking Nature (revis). D. Michelfelder and B.
Wicox. SUNY Press, Albany.
McCauley, D. J. (2006) Selling out on nature. Nature, 443(7107):
27-28.
McShane, K. (2007) Why environmental ethics shouldn’t give up
on intrinsic value. Environmental Ethics, 29: 43-61.
Meyerson, F. A. B., L. Merino and J. Durand (2007) Migrationand environment in the context of globalization. Frontiers in
Ecology and the Environment, 5: 182-190
Parker, K. A. (1996) Pragmatism and environmental thought.
Environmental Pragmatism, Routledge, Londen and New York,
21-37.
Young, T. P. (2000) Restoration ecology and conservation biology.
Biological Conservation, 92: 73.

(Received 13 December 2007, Accepted 20 March 2008)