FIGHTING CORRUPTION FROM THE BACKYARD:
ENSURING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Hazel Canet Decena-Valdez *I. INTRODUCTION
Every country has its own approach to control graft and corruption in government. The
Philippines has its own. In fact, it would even seem that all sorts of anti-corruption
strategies and measures have been done over the years, from one administration to another.
Studies about this phenomenon in Philippine governance also abound – conducted not only
by scholars, journalists, think-tanks, advocates, but by the government itself – all with theend in view of finding the most effective way to “cure” this so-called “social cancer”.
One area of focus in the fight against graft and corruption is the government’s
machinery that enforces the country’s anti-corruption laws and ensures that violators arebrought to justice and eventually punished – the criminal justice system, more specificallylaw enforcement, the prosecution and the judiciary. These government institutions per se(and the people that run and compose them of course) need to practice what they preachbecause the effectiveness of this machinery that they are part of depends largely on theirindividual and collective integrity and independence. Thus, at the core of every anticorruption worker, whether a public officer or employee or an entire government office oragency, is their adherence to sound moral and ethical values and principles.
This paper seeks to examine the structures of the law enforcement, prosecution andjudicial institutions in the Philippines, as well as the mechanisms, processes and measurespeculiar to these institutions that impact and reflect on their integrity and independence inthe context of their role in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of graft andcorruption cases, both within their respective institutions as well as in the entirety of thegovernment. A presentation of existing anti-corruption mechanisms among these agenciesof the government will also be made, along with some past efforts that may be considered
as best practices in addressing the corruption menace in the Philippines.
II. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. National and Local Governments; Government Corporate Sector
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. The three principal powers of thegovernment, namely the legislative, executive and judicial powers, are clearly delineatedand exercised among its three co-equal branches. The legislative or law-making power isSenior Assistant State Prosecutor, Department of Justice - National Prosecution Service, Manila,
Philippines.

*- 91 - 91 -

vested in a bicameral Congress that consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 1
The executive branch is headed by the President who has control over all the departments,
bureaus, and offices, and ensures that the laws are faithfully executed. 2 Finally, the judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court and other lower courts established by law. 3 The
independence of the three branches of government through a system of strict separation of
powers is one of the most significant corruption prevention mechanisms in place in thePhilippines.
The exercise of government powers is decentralized through a local government
structure composed of (from the biggest to the smallest unit) provinces, cities,municipalities or towns, and barangays. Each of these local government units has its own
local chief executive and a local legislative body. For purposes of administrative
governance of the various departments under the executive branch, and to some extent, of
the judiciary, contiguous groups of local government units are clustered into administrative
regions. The seventeen administrative regions of the country, however, do not have local
chief executives or local legislative bodies similar to those of the local government units.
The government corporate sector, considered as the third level of the executive branchof the government, is composed of government owned or controlled corporations (GOCC),
including government instrumentalities with corporate powers or government corporate
entities and government financial institutions, that are vested with functions relating to
public needs, whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Philippine
government either wholly or to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capitalstock in the case of stock corporations. 4 A government office, the Governance Commission
for GOCCs (GCG), acts as the central advisory, monitoring, and oversight body over this
sector. It also plays an important role in protecting valuable government resources in these
GOCCs against graft and corruption.
B. Independent Constitutional Bodies
The Philippine Constitution established independent bodies which are called“Constitutional Commissions” that exercise specific powers and functions. They are as
follows: the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which administers the civil service covering
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and thus acts as thecentral personnel agency of the government 5; the Commission on Elections, which as its
name connotes, takes exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest, peacefuland credible elections 6; and the Commission on Audit (COA), which holds the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue andreceipts and expenditures or uses of the funds and properties of the Philippine government. 7
Aside from the three Constitutional Commissions, there are two other Constitutional
bodies whose mandates, powers and functions, as well as composition, are specifically
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Ibid., Sects. 1 and 17, Art. VII.
3
Ibid., Sect. 1, Art. VIII.
4
Sect. 3(o), Republic Act No. 10149.
5
Ibid., Sects. 2.1 and 3, Art. IX-B.
6
Ibid., Sect. 2, Art. IX-C.
7
Ibid., Sect. 2.1, Art. IX-D.
1
2- 92 - 92 -

provided for in the Constitution itself: the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) as the principal
agency of the government responsible for ensuring propriety and accountability of public
officers, and is thus primarily responsible for investigating and prosecuting graft andcorruption cases; and the Commission on Human Rights, which is mandated to promote
and protect human rights.
The three Constitutional Commissions, the OMB and theCommission on Human Rights do not fall under any branch of the government and enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations are automatically and regularly
released. Furthermore, the tenure of the members of the Constitutional Commissions, theOmbudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen is fixed by the Constitution. The establishment andpresence of these Constitutional bodies, more particularly those involved in monitoring theaccountability of public officers and employees – the CSC, COA and OMB – are significant
corruption prevention mechanisms that are manifest in the structure of the Philippine
government.
III. CLEANING THEIR OWN BACKYARDS
Like most democratic countries, the Philippines adheres to the age-old principle that“public office is a public trust”. Thus, no less than the Constitution exhorts that “public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them withutmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, andlead modest lives.” 8 Moreover, there is an abundance of legislation that seeks to advancethe policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. As a matter offact, there are at least seventy-seven corruption-specific laws and executive issuances 9 thathave been enacted to date in order to combat corruption, starting with the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines that was enacted in 1932, which criminalized certain acts andomissions of public officers. Excluded from this number are other special penal laws which
provide for sanctions on public officers who participate one way or the other in thecommission of crimes. Among the most significant of these laws are Republic Act (RA)No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials andEmployees”, and RA 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
On top of these laws that apply to all public officers and employees across all branches
and levels of the government, each law enforcement, prosecution and judicial institution
involved in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of graft and corruption in thegovernment has its own internal mechanism and processes, as well as programmes andcampaigns, that seek to ensure and promote the integrity of the institution per se and of its
own anti-corruption-related work. Cleaning their own backyards, so to speak, is a norm
among these institutions.
A. Law Enforcement
The Philippines has two major law enforcement agencies, both of which are under the
executive branch of the government. These are the Philippine National Police, which isunder the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the National Bureau of
Investigation, which is an agency under the Department of Justice.

Ibid., Sect. 1, Art. XI.
Sixty-one were identified and listed by Prof. Danilo R. Reyes in “Chronicling Corruption in the Philippines:
A Brief Historical Background Up to 2004”.

8
9- 93 - 93 -

1. Philippine National Police and National Police Commission
The Philippine National Police (PNP) was first established in 1990 through Republic
Act (RA) No. 6975, the law which organized the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and its component offices, including the National Police Commission(NAPOLCOM), a constitutionally mandated body tasked to administer and control anational police force. The PNP was initially composed of members of the old police
organization and of the military who sought absorption into the newly organized civilian
police force.
The PNP’s principal power and function is to “investigate and prevent crimes, effectthe arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution”. 10
It has a national presence through its police stations in every city and municipality/town of
the country, as well as provincial and regional offices in all provinces and regions of thecountry. Bigger cities even have additional satellite stations or police community precincts
in barangays. While its jurisdiction in the investigation of crimes is more general comparedto that of the National Bureau of Investigation, the PNP’s role in the investigation of graft
and corruption incidents nonetheless becomes more relevant in places where no other law
enforcement agency of the government is present.
The NAPOLCOM is a six-member collegial body composed of the Secretary of the
DILG as the ex officio chairperson, four civilian (non-military or law enforcement agencyconnected) commissioners, and the PNP Chief as an ex officio member. It is attached to
the DILG only for policy and programme coordination purposes. Its power to haveadministrative control and operational supervision over the PNP include the development
and promulgation of policies and standards involving police procedures, performance,
facilities and activities including recruitment, selection, promotion, and training. It also
exercises disciplinary authority over PNP officers and personnel through its appellate
jurisdiction over personnel disciplinary actions.
(a) PNP Ethical Doctrine (PNP Code of Professional Conduct and Ethical Standards)
The “PNP Code of Professional Conduct and Ethical Standards” serves as the national
police force’s basic moral and ethical guidance to its members. In 2014, the PNP“rebranded” this Code into what is now called “The PNP Ethical Doctrine” in order toremind the police force of its provisions and to continue its propagation to, andinternalization by, all its members. The PNP Ethical Doctrine is anchored on the divine andmoral precepts, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and relevant provisionsof the Revised Penal Code, RA 6713, RA 3019, RA 6975 and other related special laws.
All new entrants to the PNP are provided with copies of the PNP Ethical Doctrine andthe doctrines and principles embodied in the code are part of academic courses given to
PNP personnel. All PNP members are enjoined to fully adhere to its provisions in theperformance of their duties and to commit to uphold its intent and spirit at all times.
Violations of such provisions are made punishable under the applicable penal laws andadministrative regulations issued by NAPOLCOM, the PNP, Civil Service Commission or
the DILG.

10

Sect. 24(c), RA 6975.

- 94 - 94 -(b) People’s Law Enforcement Board
The People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) is an innovation under RA 6975; a checkand balance mechanism where ordinary citizens can have redress of their grievances against
law enforcers who abuse their authority and lodge their complaints against them. It is also
a strategy to empower the community in general to instil discipline in the PNP ranks.
The PLEB is a five-member collegial body that is created in every city and municipality
through their local legislative bodies. It is composed of the following: a member of thelocal legislative body, a barangay captain of the city or municipality, and three respected
members of the community known for their probity and integrity chosen by the local peaceand order council, one of whom must be a woman and another a member of the Bar, or, in
the absence of the latter, a college graduate, or the school principal of the central elementary
school in the locality.
As the central receiving entity for complaints from the public against PNP members, ittakes cognizance of complaints involving offences punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension of forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof,
for a period exceeding thirty days, or by dismissal, 11 and refers the rest to the appropriate
disciplinary or adjudicatory authority depending on the imposable penalty for the offence
complained of.
(c) Internal Affairs Service (IAS)
Pursuant to its objective to reform the PNP, RA 8551 introduced the Internal Affairs
Service (IAS) and gave it the following mandates:(i) pro-actively conduct inspections and audits on PNP personnel and units;(ii) investigate complaints and gather evidence in support of open investigations;(iii) conduct summary hearings on administrative charges against PNP members;(iv) submit periodic reports on the assessment, analysis, and evaluation of thecharacter and behaviour of PNP personnel and units to the PNP chief and the
NAPOLCOM;(v) file appropriate criminal cases against PNP members before the courts and assist
in the prosecution of the case;(vi) provide assistance to the OMB in cases involving PNP personnel;(vii) conduct, motu proprio, automatic investigation of the following cases:• incidents where a PNP personnel discharges a firearm;• incidents where death, serious physical injury, or any violation of humanrights occurred in the conduct of police operations;• incidents where evidence was compromised, tampered with, obliterated, orlost while in the custody of PNP personnel;• incidents where a suspect in the custody of the police was seriously injured;and• incidents where the established rules of engagement have been violated; and(viii) provide documents or recommendations concerning promotions ordesignations of PNP members to any key position.

11

Sect. 41(a)(3), RA 6975.

- 95 - 95 -

The IAS is present in every regional and provincial PNP office throughout the country,
as well as in the head office or PNP headquarters. It is headed by an Inspector General who
is a civilian appointed by the President.
(d) Administrative Disciplinary Machinery
Aside from the PLEB, local police chiefs, the local chief executives of provinces, cities
and municipalities/towns also exercise administrative disciplinary authority over PNP
officers and members.
Minor offences of police officers are dealt with through an internal mechanism where
local police chiefs may summarily impose administrative punishment depending on theinfraction involved. Offences considered as minor are acts or omissions that affect theinternal discipline of the organization and do not involve moral turpitude, like simple
misconduct or negligence, insubordination, frequent absences or tardiness, habitual
drunkenness, and engaging in unlawful gambling. Depending on the disciplinary authority,summary penalties that may be imposed range from admonition or reprimand, withholdingof privileges, forfeiture of salary or suspension, or a combination of any of these penalties,
up to demotion or even dismissal from the service. The PNP Chief and regional police
chiefs both have summary dismissal powers when the charge is serious and the evidenceof guilt is strong, or when the erring police officer is a recidivist, or has been repeatedly
charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the officer is guilty of the charges,
or is guilty of a serious offence involving conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
(e) Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement GroupIn 2019, the PNP created the Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement Group (IMEG) asa strategy to strengthen its campaign against corrupt policemen, especially those involved
in illegal drugs. IMEG “upgraded” the Counter-Intelligence Task Force, a comparatively
smaller office that was originally formed as part of the internal cleansing mechanism in theorganization. As a bigger office than its predecessor, IMEG has been given more resources,
including personnel, and a wider latitude of authority and more functions. Among others,
it assists the public in filing criminal complaints before the prosecution offices against
erring police officers, more particularly those that arise from drug operations of the PNP.
To further reinforce its internal cleansing programme and to curb graft and corruption in
the organization, the PNP leadership recently gave IMEG an additional task – to conduct
lifestyle checks among its personnel. 12
2. National Bureau of Investigation
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is the second major law enforcement
agency of the government. It is the Philippine’s version of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the United States of America. From its original creation in 1936 as a mere
“Division of Investigation” under the DOJ, the NBI has undergone a number ofreorganizations and expansions over the years.
Among its original principal mandates was to undertake investigation of crimes andother offences upon its own initiative and as public interest may require, and to renderassistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes andother offences. 13 It was reorganized in 1960 in order to promote maximum efficiency in the
1213<https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1354327/pnp-to-undertake-lifestyle-checks-to-fight-corruption>.
RA 157.

- 96 - 96 -

discharge of its duties and to secure full implementation of its functions, especially thosepertaining to investigation of graft and corruption cases. 14
The NBI was recently reorganized and modernized under a recent law 15 wherein thepositions and compensation of its officers and personnel were upgraded, while the scopeof its investigatory authority was limited to specialized crimes like human trafficking,cybercrimes, extrajudicial or extralegal killings and transnational crimes. As regards graft
and corruption cases, the NBI shall only take cognizance of those that are referred to it by
the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council. 16 Similar to the PNP, the NBI also has
nationwide presence through its regional as well as district offices. Unlike the PNP though,the NBI has no local offices in cities and municipalities or towns.
(a) Internal Affairs Division
The NBI also has an Internal Affairs Division under the Office of the Director. Unlike
the PNP, however, its regional offices do not have an administrative disciplinary
mechanism or machinery. Hence, complaints against its officers and personnel are filed
with, and investigated and adjudicated by, the Office of Director at the head office.
B. Prosecution
There are also two government offices that conduct preliminary investigation 17 andprosecution of graft and corruption cases – the National Prosecution Service under the
Department of Justice and the OMB.
1. National Prosecution Service
The National Prosecution Service (NPS) is the office primarily responsible for the
conduct of preliminary investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations ofpenal laws in the Philippines. Established by virtue of RA 10071, the NPS is composed ofa Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice headed by a Prosecutor General,
regional prosecution offices, as well as field prosecution offices in every province and cityof the country. It is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice.
The investigative authority of the NPS over complaints involving alleged commissionof crimes is akin to the PNP’s “general jurisdiction” to investigate crimes. This is so
because the OMB holds the primary jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases, especiallythose falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 18 The NPS exercises concurrent
jurisdiction over complaints falling outside Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction which it canresolve without the need for OMB’s approval. Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement
between the DOJ and the OMB, 19 the latter may likewise refer cases to the NPS for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the first and second level courts.

RA 2678.
RA 10867.
16
Discussed further under IV.B.1.
17
Defined under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”
18
Also discussed in part III.C.2 of this paper.
19
Signed 29 March 2012.
14
15- 97 - 97 -(a) Selection and Promotion Board
RA 10071 expressly requires that prosecutors of the NPS shall be selected from among
the qualified and professionally trained members of the legal profession who are of provenintegrity and competence. 20 To this end, the NPS Selection and Promotion Board,
composed of the highest-ranking officials of the NPS and chaired by no less than theProsecutor General, require applicants for position in the NPS to submit clearances fromthe NBI, OMB, Sandiganbayan, and Civil Service Commission in order to apprise themwhether candidate prosecutors have been charged or are facing any criminal oradministrative cases, and the nature and details of those cases if any. Results of neuropsychiatric examination are likewise required from applicants. As an added measure toensure compliance with the statutory qualification standards for prosecutors, the Board
invites as resource persons during the deliberation of applications, the chiefs of prosecution
offices of the place where an applicant is seeking appointment. A shortlist of applicants is
submitted to the Secretary of Justice, who in turn endorses it to the President, who appoints
prosecutors of the NPS.
(b) Code of Conduct of Prosecutors
The Code of Conduct of Prosecutors of the NPS sets down the core values as well as
the mandatory standards for professional and individual conduct that prosecutors shouldobserve in the performance of their duties as public servants and pillars of the criminal
justice system. More specifically, the Code emphasizes the following:(i) Commitment to the Rule of Law and Public Interest;(ii) Prompt, Effective and Efficient Service;(iii) Dedication, Diligence and Competence;(iv) Impartiality, Independence, and Fidelity to Duty; and(v) Honesty, Integrity and Professionalism.
(c) Internal Affairs Unit
The Secretary of Justice exercises disciplinary authority over prosecutors of the NPS
through an Internal Affairs Unit (IAU), which assists the Secretary in acting on
administrative complaints, or motu proprio, initiating proceedings, against prosecutors andpersonnel of the NPS. The offences that may be subject of administrative charges include
violations of the provisions of the following:(i) Revised Penal Code as amended, on crimes committed by public officers;(ii) RA 3019 as amended;(iii) RA 6713;(iv) Administrative Code of 1987;(v) Civil Service Law and its Omnibus Rules and Regulations;(vi) Code of Conduct for Prosecutors; and(vii) Pertinent DOJ policies, other special laws, rules and regulations. 21
2. Office of the Ombudsman
As previously mentioned, the OMB is a constitutional body designed to be the principal
agency of the government responsible for ensuring propriety and accountability of public
officers and has the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute graft and corruption
20
21

Section 16, RA 10071.
Department Circular No. 010 dated 25 March 2015.

- 98 - 98 -

cases. It is composed of the Ombudsman, an Overall Deputy Ombudsman, four deputies[one deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (the Philippines’ major island groups),
a deputy for the military and other law enforcement offices (MOLEO)], and several
assistant ombudsmen. Also under the OMB is an Office of the Special Prosecutor which
serves as its prosecution arm. The Ombudsman, his deputies and the Special Prosecutor are
all presidential appointees and serve specific fixed terms. 22
As “protectors of the people”, 23 the OMB has the following powers, functions andduties:(i)

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omissionof any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act oromission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(ii) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
(iii) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(iv) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and reportany irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(v) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary
in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents.
(vi) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances sowarrant and with due prudence.
(vii) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for theirelimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(viii) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. 24(a) Internal Affairs Board
The Internal Affairs Board (IAB) of the OMB does not only act on all complaints
against its incumbent officials and employees. It also plays a big role in recommending to
the Ombudsman policies, programmes and procedures that ensure compliance by OMB
officials and employees with RA 6713 and all laws, rules and regulations concerning civil
service and public accountability. The IAB also has the authority to offer
recommendations regarding the promulgation of a code of conduct and ethical standards
for all officials and employees of the OMB, as well as of a manual of operations for its
various offices to ensure faithful performance of its mandated functions in accordance
Please see related discussion about the Judicial and Bar Council in part III.C.3.
Ibid., Sect. 12, Art. XI.
24
Ibid., Sect. 11, Art. XI.
22
23- 99 - 99 -with the norms of conduct of public officials and employees under RA 6713. Finally, theIAB may request any intelligence or investigating agency to direct any official, employee
or unit of the OMB to conduct an intelligence operation or fact-finding investigation on
any of its officials or employees.
The IAB is mandated to act on all complaints cognizable by it, whether filed by the
public or by any official or employee of the OMB, and in whatever form it may be filed –orally or in writing, signed or unsigned, or verified or not. Depending on the merits, orlack thereof, complaints go through a series of processes – evaluation, preliminary
investigation and/or administrative adjudication, fact-finding investigation, evenintelligence operation – are finally decided by the Ombudsman. 25
C. Courts
1. Regular Courts
The hierarchy of the judicial branch of the Philippine government starts with first level
courts stationed in cities and municipalities/towns, namely the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and Metropolitan Trial
Courts. In criminal cases, these courts take cognizance of minor infractions of the law.
Second level courts, on the other hand, are composed of Regional Trial Courts that are
scattered throughout the country’s administrative regions, provinces and cities. They havejurisdiction to try offences that carry more severe penalties. All proceedings in both firstand second level courts are presided by only one judge.
Decisions of first and second level courts as well as of other quasi-judicial bodies canbe elevated to the Court of Appeals, a collegiate court which exercises appellate jurisdiction
on all cases not falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Considered as the second highest tribunal of the land, it sits by divisions of three justicemembers. Currently, it is composed of twenty-three divisions.
At the top of the judicial hierarchy is the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of legal issues
and controversies of the land. It is composed of a Chief Justice and fifteen Associate
Justices. Besides adjudicating cases that fall within its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
likewise exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel.
2. Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan is a special court under the judicial branch which has original andappellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices andother offences committed by public officers and employees (including those ingovernment-owned or controlled corporations) in relation to their office. It was originallycreated under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1486 issued in 1978 with the same rank as asecond level court but was shortly later elevated to the same level as the Court of Appeals
via PD 1606.
Over the years, the Sandiganbayan underwent several reorganizations and expansions.
From an original eight-member court, it now has twenty-one justices who sit in sevendivisions of three members. Its jurisdiction has likewise undergone revisions.

25

Administrative Order No. 23, Series of 2016, of the OMB.

- 100 - 100 -The jurisdiction to try corruption cases is shared among the first and second level courts
and the Sandiganbayan depending on the offence committed or the salary grade of the
public officer at the time of commission of the offence. Generally, public officers
occupying positions classified as Salary Grade (SG) 27 and above pursuant to thegovernment’s system of compensation and position classification, are tried before the
Sandiganbayan, while those below SG 27 are tried before the first and second level courts,
unless they are charged together with officers whose positions are classified as SG 27 andabove. Cases decided by first and second level courts are appealable to the Sandiganbayan.
Its decisions may be elevated on appeal before the Supreme Court.
3. Judicial and Bar Council
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is another independent Constitutional office whose
primary task is to recommend appointees to the judiciary and the OMB to the President. It
is composed of representatives of the three branches of government as ex officio members(the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and a member from the legislature), a
representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 26 a professor of law, a retired
member of the Supreme Court, and a representative from the private sector. 27
The JBC is a mechanism that ensures the independence of the judicial branch of
government, for while the President ultimately appoints the members of the judiciary andthe OMB, appointments could not be done arbitrarily since the choice is limited to the listof nominees submitted by the JBC. It, therefore, ensures as well that the selection process
for the judiciary and the OMB is not politicized. Furthermore, the highly stringent
application, screening, selection and nomination process of the JBC ensures that only
persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence as required by no lessthan the Constitution, are appointed to the judiciary.
In screening applications for the judiciary and the OMB, the JBC ensures the existenceof the minimum qualifications pertaining to length of practice of law, age and experience
as required by the Constitution. In addition, competency requirements are determined bylooking at the individual applicant’s educational preparation as reflected in scholastic
records, performance on the bar examination and prejudicature programme, academic
awards, scholarships. Work performance ratings as well as the results of psychological andpsychiatric evaluations are likewise scrutinized. Finally, exemplary accomplishments ofapplicants are likewise considered, such as awards for judicial excellence, authorship ofbooks, treatises, articles and other legal writings, as well as leadership in professional orcivic organizations.
As a measure to ensure that members of the judiciary and the OMB are of provenhonesty, integrity, probity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to soundmoral and ethical standards, the JBC requires the submission of testimonials from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations, as well as certifications orclearances from relevant government offices – courts, law enforcement agencies, the IBP,
Office of the Bar Confidant, including the OMB. Moreover, the JBC may likewise orderthe conduct of discreet background checks on the integrity, reputation and character ofapplicants and validate the results of such efforts. Feedback from the public in the form of

26
27

The national organization of lawyers in the Philippines.
Ibid., Sect. 8, Art. VIII.

- 101 - 101 -complaint or opposition is encouraged through the publication of the list of applicants for
positions in the judiciary and the OMB in two newspapers of general circulation.
In determining the independence of applicants for positions in the judiciary and the
OMB, the JBC scrutinizes their decisions (for incumbent judges) if they are reflective of
the wisdom and soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, impartiality, cold
neutrality, fortitude and strength of character. Validated testimonials from reputableofficials and impartial organizations or outstanding citizens are likewise considered.
Finally, to determine potential conflicts of interest that may impede these applicants’
impartiality or ability to remain independent once appointed, the JBC looks into theirpersonal, social and professional relationships, business interests and financial
connections. 28
4. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
As a reaction to the adoption in 2002 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore
Draft”) by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, 29 the Philippine Supreme
Court updated the then existing Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics,
and eventually adopted, in 2004, a New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. The New Code’s first two canons emphasize independence and integrity, thus:
Canon 1
Independence
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial
independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1
Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of theirassessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understandingof the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat orinterference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 2
In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to makeindependently.
Section 3
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Section 4
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to28
29

The 2020 Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC No. 2020-01).
A group of Chief Justices and Superior Court Judges from around the world.

- 102 - 102 -advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Section 5
Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influenceby, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear
to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Section 6
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to
the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 7
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial
duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
independence of the judiciary.
Section 8
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order toreinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to themaintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1
Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2
The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice musty not merely be done but must also beseen to be done.
Section 3
Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers
or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may havebecome aware.
5. Judicial Integrity Board and Corruption Prevention Investigation Office
To prevent corruption in the judiciary and further strengthen its integrity, the Supreme
Court created in 2018 the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention
Investigation Office (CPIO). 30 The JIB is composed of retired justices of the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan or Court of Tax Appeals. It has the mandate to act
on complaints (whether verified or anonymous) for disciplinary action against justices of30

A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC.

- 103 - 103 -the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, judges and personnel offirst and second level courts, including the Shari’a courts, and officials and employees of
the Offices of the Jurisconsult and the Court Administrator. The Supreme Court may also
motu proprio initiate proceedings before the JIB against the justices, judges, officers andpersonnel of the foregoing courts and offices. The JIB is also tasked to motu proprio initiate
disciplinary actions in the Supreme Court against the foregoing officials and personnel ofthe judiciary on account of either a conviction or even a mere charge for any crime. As forcomplaints that involve graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards against
members of the Supreme Court, they are referred to its Committee on Ethics and EthicalStandards which is tasked to conduct a preliminary investigation before the submission of
its findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court en banc.
The CPIO on the other hand, has the authority to conduct intelligence, surveillance orentrapment (undercover) operations, as well as lifestyle checks and discreet investigations
on the foregoing justices, judges, officers and personnel of the judiciary, for purposes ofdetection or identification of those who commit, appear to be involved in, or are liable forviolations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary or of any of
the charges enumerated under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 31 The disciplinary powersof the judiciary among its ranks, however, does not deprive the law enforcement agenciesof the government to take cognizance of complaints for alleged commission of crimes(including graft and corruption) filed against justices, judges and court personnel.
Otherwise said, investigation on criminal complaints against them may be conductedindependent of, and may proceed separately from, any disciplinary or administrative
proceedings before the Supreme Court or the JIB.
6. Compensation Package and Other Benefits
Positions in the judiciary are among those highly paid in the government. In the 33level salary grade (SG) hierarchy, salaries of the members of the Supreme Court are at SG
31-32 (SG 33 is assigned solely to the President), while salaries of justices of the othercollegiate courts are at SG 30-31, and those of judges of first and second level courts, at
SG 28-29. On top of their basic salary, members of the judiciary regularly receive various
allowances as well as hazard pay.
IV. BEST PRACTICES IN ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
A. Utilizing the Cabinet System, the “Cory Way”
The administration of former President Corazon “Cory” Aquino (1986-1992)
succeeded what has been known to be the most corrupt regime in Philippine history – themore than two decades of the Marcos regime. Among the efforts done by the Aquino
administration to get the country back on its feet was to recover ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their cronies, to restore democratic institutions and to “cleanse” thegovernment of graft and corruption.
President Aquino’s anti-corruption strategy consisted of integrating the initiatives into
the regular structure of the executive branch, or the cabinet. Each department head/cabinet
member was directed to study their organization and to formulate and implement an anti“Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts, Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals, Court Administrator, Deputy Court Administrator, and Assistant Court Administrator”.

31- 104 - 104 -corruption plan based on such study. Cabinet members reported to the President on thestatus of their department’s anti-corruption campaign or programme during cabinet
meetings. As each department dealt with its own problems, various offices within thecabinet likewise came up with joint or multilateral solutions for interrelated orinterconnected concerns.
According to an assessment of President Aquino’s anti-corruption strategy, theapproach which allowed cabinet members to tackle their own office’s problem of graft andcorruption proved successful. The strategy which they called “The Cory Way” amplified
the government’s cleansing process as each and every office in the executive department
simultaneously undertook varied strategies that were appropriate and unique to theiroffice’s situation at the time. The accomplishments of the campaign also differed from one
department to another – from improvement of existing policies and procedures toformulation of new ones, creation of new programmes, monitoring of personnel, todischarge or dismissal of officials. Other departments implemented organizational changes
and improvements in efficiency which limited opportunities for corruption. On the whole,
it is believed that it is possible to make substantial progress against corruption within theexisting framework of government institutions without creating a new anti-corruption
agency. 32
B. Inter-Agency Cooperation Mechanisms
While the “Cory Way” of dealing with corruption in the government (at least in theexecutive) was an effective strategy, the need for inter-agency cooperation was also
recognized. Hence, inter-office resources were pooled together to address problems thatnecessitated multi-agency response.
1. The Inter-Agency Anti-Graft and Corruption Council
The Inter-Agency Anti-Graft and Corruption Council (IAAGCC) is a voluntary allianceof government agencies aimed at preventing or eliminating graft and corruption ingovernment services through strategic cooperation in the prevention, detection,
investigation and prosecution of these cases. It was originally established in 1997 througha memorandum of agreement among the heads of the agencies that have been mandated to
uphold integrity and accountability in the public service, namely the OMB, COA, CSC,NBI and the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The
alliance mutually agreed to share information and closely coordinate with one another, toundertake inter-agency-skills-training programms and to promote inter-agency conferences.
In 1998, the DOJ joined the IAAGCC, and in 1999, the President of the Republic
officially recognized its establishment through Administrative Order No. 79. The Order
likewise enjoined all government agencies to extend full support and assistance to
IAAGCC in the implementation of its programmes and projects for which the President
made available the amount of Five Million Pesos from the Social Fund of the Office of the
President.

32

Prof. Leonor Magtolis Briones, “Framework for a National Anti-Corruption Program”.

- 105 - 105 -(a) Guidelines of Cooperation
Since several of the mandates and functions of IAAGCC member agencies overlap with
one another, and may therefore result to potential areas of conflict and confusion, IAAGCC
operations are governed by a Guidelines of Cooperation.
The IAAGCC’s governance body is well-structured, viz. the IAAGCC itself, composedof the head of the member agencies; the Consultative Committee (CONSULCOM) whichis composed of representatives of the member agencies and acts as an advisory body to theCouncil; the Secretariat which provides administrative support to both the IAAGCC andthe CONSULCOM; an auditor from COA; a coordinator; an Operations Group, which iscomposed of a research team, task forces and the investigation and prosecution teams; andan Administrative Group. The “hosting” of IAAGCC rotates among the member agencies
every two years, during which time period the host agency serves as chairman of both the
IAAGCC and the CONSULCOM.
The Guidelines of Cooperation establishes a mechanism of cooperation through theestablishment of an Inter-Agency Coordinating Center (IACC), coordinating andmonitoring centres in each member agency (at the head office and in regional or local
offices nationwide), and inter-agency task forces. Besides creating a clear organizational
structure and prescribing a cooperation mechanism, the Guidelines categorically prescribe
the scope of authority of each member agency in criminal cases, civil as well as
administrative cases.
The IACC has the following functions:(i)serve as the central repository of all records/information of concerning interagency activities;(ii) coordinate with monitoring units of member-agencies;(iii) maintain files on the modus operandi in the commission of fraud related cases;(iv) maintain a computer database of case profiles and statistics;(v) disseminate information/instructions among member agencies;(vi) monitor the activities of the inter-agency task forces;(vii) maintain and compile all reference materials for use of member agencies;(viii) serve as a hotline centre;(ix) promote public awareness and involvement in inter-agency programmes
against the incidence of graft and corruption by:• establishing hotlines in member agencies;• immediately responding to complaints;• assuring confidentiality of information;• disseminating information on causes and effects of graft and modus operandi
in the commission of graft;• emphasizing the primary responsibility of agency head in the prevention anddetection of graft and corruption; and• coordinating with the Philippine Information Agency and other public
offices in disseminating information on the evils of graft and corruption.
The IACC, being equipped with the latest communication facilities in order to expedite
actions on complaints and requests for information/statistics on graft cases, also facilitates
the information exchange among the member agencies by keeping track of requests for- 106 - 106 -information and inquiries from one another, and monitoring response/reaction time of
member agencies and reminding them to promptly address requests/inquiries.
This network between the IACC on one hand, and the coordinating and monitoring
centres within each IAAGCC member agency on the other, facilitates the communicationand information exchange among the member agencies and ensures that graft andcorruption-related matters are acted upon efficiently.
IAAGCC, however, does not take on all graft and corruption cases. The CONSULCOM
only certifies and refers to the task forces for investigation cases that meet the following
criteria:(i) complex fraud-related government transactions with national impact;(ii) involving the amount of P50 million pesos or higher; and(iii)involving high-ranking public officials with the position of bureau director or
higher.
(b) IAAGCC’s Gains
Since its establishment in 1997, investigators, prosecutors, and other personnel frommember-agencies have been jointly trained on fraud investigation, prevention, detection
and prosecution of graft and corruption cases, and asset forfeiture. Furthermore, when thePhilippine government was shaken by the Priority Development Assistance Fund 33 (PDAF)
scam in 2013, the IAAGCC’s cooperation mechanism was quickly activated with thecreation of an inter-agency task force composed of investigators, technical experts andprosecutors from the OMB, DOJ and COA that was tasked to conduct a joint investigation
into the misuse of the PDAF. The task force’s collaborative work resulted in the filing ofcases against several senators and members of the House of Representatives before the
Sandiganbayan.
V. CONCLUSION
The Philippine institutions involved in the investigation, prosecution and adjudicationof graft and corruption cases may be lauded for their separate and individual drives not only
to promote and strengthen integrity and independence within their ranks, but also to cleanse
their organizations of misfits. For instance, it was seen above that most of these agencies
have their respective codes of ethical standards. Most of them, too, have their own internalaffairs unit/division/board and mechanism that serve as the first avenue for taking action
against errant members of their organization. It will be noted as well that most of these
disciplinary or internal affairs structures are collegial, which is an added measure to ensure
the integrity of their decisions. Moreover, these institutions periodically intensify their anticorruption programmes which trumpet earnest desires for a corrupt-free office.
With these measures in place, however, along with other corruption-prevention
standards not mentioned but which are certainly present in these institutions, like theincreased level of remuneration and additional benefits for government workers (lawenforcement officials, investigators and prosecutors included), reward and promotion
These are discretionary funds available to members of Congress which aim to support small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects which are not included in the national infrastructure
programme involving massive and costly projects.

33- 107 - 107 -procedures, and continuing education and training, it cannot be denied that graft andcorruption still disturb the country’s criminal justice system. Perhaps a more focused,
intense, sincere and sustained cleaning of the backyard is needed.

- 108 - 108 -