Engaging in Asia:
The Evolving US Approach
to Regional Community
Building

J G

W O  officials began proclaiming that “theUnited States is back in Asia,” they were scoffed at by some Asia handsfrom previous administrations who wondered aloud when the UnitedStates had ever left. But the sentiment was greeted enthusiastically bymany of America’s friends throughout the region, even if they had heard
similar slogans before.
One reason for their sense of relief was that it had become obviousthat something important was changing in the region. Asia’s economic
dynamism has started to make it a more central player in global affairs. At
the same time, China’s rising power, coupled with impressive economic
development in countries elsewhere around Asia, has been driving afundamental shift in the regional balance of power. Meanwhile, thetraditional concept of sovereignty and state-to-state relations has beenchallenged even in this most Westphalian of regions by globalization,
both in the form of the steady integration of regional economies and the
explosion of nontraditional security challenges that cross borders and are
too complex to be tackled by individual governments on their own.
Immediately after the – Asian financial crisis, East Asianleaders launched a new round of efforts to build up regional institutions that could better manage their growing interdependence. The aim
was not political integration as in Europe, but merely to build regional
cooperation. And to the surprise of many skeptics, these took root in

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a way that earlier initiatives had not. A decade later, it was clear thatthe new alphabet soup of forums was becoming an integral part of theemerging regional order, even if the terms rolled out to describe it—“East Asia community,” “regional architecture,” and so on—were vague
and imprecise.
By the time the Obama administration came into office, it had become
apparent that a competition to shape the regional order was playing out
in the various efforts to build up an East Asia community. However, theUnited States, which had long been the predominant military, economic,
and political force in the region, was still not actively involved in the new
Asia-centered institutions, instead sticking to its longtime approach of
relying primarily on broader Asia Pacific forums and bilateral relationships. To many observers who shared America’s values or believed that
the US presence brought greater stability to the region, it seemed thatwhile the United States had not actually left the region, it was nevertheless being left behind as the region moved ahead.
In this context, it is encouraging that the Obama administration has
dipped its toe into the waters of Asian multilateralism with its policy to“engage” more with regional institutions. Its initial moves have generally succeeded in furthering American strategic interests by making theUnited States more relevant in the debate over the emerging regional
order, even if these steps have been fundamentally reactive and tentative.
However, an examination of US interests in Asia’s trajectory makes it
clear that an even more proactive approach to East Asia community–
building efforts is needed as part of a broader US effort to shape thefuture of this dynamic and vital region and to make good on its promise
to be “back in Asia.”E US V  R
 E A
America’s experience with regionalism goes back  years to its initialefforts to build ties with its Latin American neighbors. Later, in theimmediate aftermath of World War II, it also became active in regional
multilateralism outside of the Americas, encouraging the creation of aEuropean community that could both ensure that future wars on thecontinent would be unthinkable and serve as a bulwark against Soviet
expansion. It strongly supported the creation of regional institutions thatEngaging in Asia

did not include the United States, such as the European Common Market
and the European Coal and Steel Community—to such an extent thatpolicy experts began to worry that too much US pressure in this direction might be counterproductive. In marked contrast to later fears of a“Fortress Europe,” in  the US Congress even went so far as to declare
European unification to be the policy goal of the United States.
The United States made similar, although much less successful, efforts
during the Cold War to encourage the development of regional organizations in Asia, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
However, by the end of the Cold War, the United States had become
openly hostile to Asian efforts to build regional institutions. In ,when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the establishmentof an East Asia Economic Caucus, the United States reacted vehemently,
with some labeling it the “caucus without Caucasians.” Secretary of StateJames Baker characterized it as a dangerous idea that would “draw a line
down the Pacific” and famously worked to kill the proposal.
Throughout the s, the United States maneuvered to channel theimpulse for regional community building into “Asia Pacific” institutions
rather than Asia-only ones. Early in the decade, the Clinton administration combated Asia-only proposals by actively supporting efforts tobridge the Pacific with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Later, when Asian countries came forward with proposals for Asia-onlygroupings, such as the Japanese plan to establish an Asian Monetary
Fund during the depths of the  financial crisis, they were met withreflexive hostility. Even though it was not clear if it was ever a serious
proposal, the Asian Monetary Fund was perceived by the US Treasury
as a threat to US influence in the region and was quickly quashed.
However, by the advent of the George W. Bush administration, theUS approach to East Asia community–building efforts had evolved into
something that could best be described as being closer to benign neglectmixed with skepticism. While the / terror attacks brought home
the reality of nontraditional security threats that were transnationalin nature, the Bush administration quickly became preoccupied with
Islamic terrorism and the Iraq War and never mustered the attention orenergy to address long-term issues in Asia in a sustained manner. At thetime, there was some concern in policy circles, particularly among the“China threat” theorists, that initiatives such as the East Asia Summit
were stealth attempts by China to chip away at US influence in the region. However, most Asia experts viewed the emerging efforts to build aA PACIFIC NATION

regional community as just “talk shops,” concluding that no meaningful
movement toward building regional institutions was likely in the near
future in a region as diverse as Asia.

American Attitudes toward Community Building in East Asia
Today, US attitudes toward regional community building in Asia have
evolved markedly from the hostility of the s. Foreign policy elites in
the United States have become aware that important developments are
unfolding in the region, and even if they are unclear on what it all adds
up to, they seem increasingly concerned about being left out of anythingimportant. These attitudes are inextricably tied up with complex feelings about China, which is portrayed in the American media as making
gains in the region that are likely to come at the expense of the UnitedStates. All the same, the number of pressing foreign policy challenges
that confront the United States—from war in Afghanistan to instability
in Yemen—tends to relegate longer-term questions about the shape ofAsia to the second or third tier of priorities among foreign policy elites,and even further down in the consciousness of the general public.
To gain a clearer understanding of the currents and crosswinds affecting US approaches to community building in East Asia, it is useful
to look at how regional issues are perceived in different circles that havean impact on America’s Asia policy: the general public, policy elites, the
US Congress, and the Obama administration.
 : Asia accounts for an increasingly significant portionof America’s economic well-being, Asian cultural influences have become omnipresent in day-to-day life in the United States, and humanconnections with Asia have grown. However, it appears that the average American still remains less comfortable with Asia and less knowledgeable about it compared with other regions of the world. No major
polling organization has surveyed US public attitudes toward regional
community-building efforts in Asia, presumably because this is suchan unfamiliar issue, but it is safe to assume that the average American
has neither heard of “East Asia community” nor is familiar with any of
the acronyms in Asia’s alphabet soup of regional organizations. This
has left US public attitudes toward regional community-building efforts
preliminary and unformed.
Engaging in Asia

Looking ahead, however, one issue that has the potential to color
public opinions of regional community-building efforts is US-China
relations and the perception that China may be aiming to dominate
the region. In a  poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs,  percent of Americans surveyed indicated that they were “veryworried” or “somewhat worried” that China is likely to pose a military
threat to the United States in the future.
Another trend that may someday have implications for US approaches
to community building in East Asia is American’s tendency to be skeptical and suspicious of regional institutions and multilateral organizations
in general. To an extent, this is linked to vague fears that the UnitedStates—a country where “states’ rights” movements to limit the domestic
authority of the central government still resonate deeply—may eventually feel compelled to cede a degree of sovereignty to supranational
institutions. While these concerns may not be firmly rooted in reality,
those holding such views still vote. As one illustration, US ambivalence
about the UN runs so deep that a person as publicly critical of its very
existence as John Bolton could be dispatched to represent the UnitedStates in its deliberations. Similarly, American attitudes toward regional
institutions and agreements in which it participates are also complex
enough that a majority of Americans believe that US membership in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has hurt theircountry.
For the time being, though, the emergence of an East Asia community seems such a peripheral issue for the American public that
there is little danger of attitudes being swayed by the American ambivalence about multilateral organizations or perceptions of China.
However, it is possible to envision scenarios in which perceptionsof these issues could begin to shape public opinion on regional
community-building efforts.
   : In the absence of deeply held public opinions on East Asia community building, it would be natural toexpect that the attitudes of policy elites would shape US approaches.
However, the concept of an East Asia community also seems to be a
relatively unfamiliar and low-priority issue for most US foreign policy
experts who do not specialize in Asian affairs.
Among the generalists who do pay attention to efforts to build an East
Asia community, their interest is linked to the debate over a rising China
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and fears that it may be a scheme for China to dominate the region.
These attitudes tend to color media reporting, which often portrays any
show of support for Asia-centric regional community building—suchas Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s  statements on thematter—as an indication of whether leaders or countries are leaning
more toward China or the United States. In this sense, it appears that
elite US attitudes toward an East Asia community are linked to the
dynamics of the trilateral China-Japan-US relationship.
Meanwhile, among Asia specialists, one gets the sense that there are
growing sentiments that the United States should be paying more attention to community-building efforts and that these may be positive
for the region as a whole. This is given credence by a  Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) poll of “strategic elites” aroundthe Asia Pacific region, which found that more than  percent of US
policy experts support the concept of building an East Asia community,
a number that is surprisingly high. This thaw in attitudes toward regional
community-building efforts has been accompanied by a concern that
if the United States does not engage more in regional institutions, its
influence in the region will eventually diminish.
 : By and large, there is little understanding in the US
Congress of the nature of regional community-building efforts in East
Asia, and people tend to overestimate the substance of these initiatives,
conjuring up images of an Asian analogue to the former European
Economic Community. More generally, there is minimal political appetite for bilateral or multilateral initiatives, such as trade agreements,that can be portrayed as hurting US jobs or as ceding any modicum of US
sovereignty. Even when the United States acceded to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in , the Senate Foreign Relations Committee andthe Obama administration agreed that this would come into force as
an executive agreement rather than as a treaty, which would normallyrequire a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Its obligations were seen as flexible enough and its priority low enough that there was consensus thatit did not require a vote, but the fact that this course was quietly taken
also implies that there were concerns that it would not easily pass in the
Senate. In fact, this was only the second time that the US Senate has everagreed to allow an international agreement with the term “treaty” in its
formal title to be exempted from the constitutional requirement of a
Senate vote, and the first time was on a narrow, technical agreement.
Engaging in Asia

Fortunately, some of the key figures associated with the Congressional
committees most relevant to foreign relations are well attuned to theneed for the United States to be more engaged in Asia, and a small
handful of legislators seem to have a relatively good grasp of the development of Asian regional institutions. Nonetheless, the Congress’s
greatest impact on the US regional approach comes through its role intrade policy, where it has hampered full-fledged US involvement in regional institutionalization. For example, it is well known that influential
Democrats have insisted on strong labor and environmental standards
that make it difficult for the United States to keep pace with the othercountries forging FTAs in the region.
 : By the time the Obama administration cameinto office, the United States had been bogged down in taxing wars, in
Iraq for nearly six years and in Afghanistan for more than seven. The
American people had grown weary of hearing how much resentment
had built up toward the United States around the world and even if they
may be fundamentally inclined toward unilateral action, they seemed
painfully aware of how it had failed for the Bush administration. Thesefeelings were compounded by the traumatic economic crisis of –, which at least for some pundits and policy analysts underscoredthe limits of US power. Against this backdrop, it was natural for the
new president to make openness to multilateralism and an emphasison greater burden sharing by other countries two cornerstones of his
foreign policy.
These principles have naturally been reflected in the Obama administration’s Asia policy, both in the conviction that the United Statesshould participate more fully in regional multilateralism and in theadministration’s wish for regional cooperation to play a greater role indealing with the challenges of the day. The desire to be more engagedin Asia has, at the very least, gained the rhetorical support of all of the
key players in the administration. President Barack Obama has played
up his personal ties to Asia, forged through childhood experiencesin Indonesia, in explaining why deeper US ties to Asia are critical.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has consistently placed priority on
being more involved in the region, and most of the cabinet members
heading the other agencies relevant to foreign policy are well attuned
to the key issues in Asia. Meanwhile, the senior officials under them
who are charged specifically with handling Asia policy have nuancedA PACIFIC NATION

views on the implications of China’s rise, tend to be of the opinion that
greater regional cooperation can be beneficial for the United Statesand its friends, and are sincere about the need for the United States tobecome more engaged. For instance, the administration’s point person
on Asia policy, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, has long
been a strong proponent of the argument that the United States needs
to play a greater role in Asia’s multilateralism.

US I  C
American policymakers’ attitudes toward multilateralism in East Asia
have evolved in recent years precisely because many have started torecognize that the United States has a growing set of interests in Asia
that cannot be pursued solely through bilateral means and that, in fact,
require greater regional cooperation. The considerations described
below carry particular weight in their thinking.
  : Over the long run, a top priority of the United Statesin Asia is to shape the regional security environment so that no major
power effectively challenges the United States on military terms andto ensure that the regional balance of power remains conducive to US
interests. The rise of China is the key issue over the long term. Despite
periodic rhetoric from the right, containment has not been a viable
policy option for the United States over the past three decades. Rather,successfully shaping the regional security environment seems to require
integrating a rising China into a regional and global system as a “responsible stakeholder” while hedging against the possibility that Chinese
foreign policy could evolve in a more hostile and assertive direction.
As became starkly apparent during the – financial crisis, theprospects of the United States and China are deeply interlinked, making the maintenance of cooperative bilateral relations a high priority forboth countries. Against this backdrop, some US policymakers seem to
be increasingly convinced that involvement in community building in
East Asia can be one means to help integrate China into the region in
a way that is beneficial for everybody.
 : Another priority is maintaining regional stability. Much attention is given to the need to ensure that the two majorEngaging in Asia

flashpoints in the region—Taiwan and North Korea—do not erupt into
violence, but there is also a need to guard against major power conflictin the region, particularly between Japan and China. US leaders became
more attuned to the need to keep China-Japan relations on an even keelin , when bilateral tensions reached fever pitch over maritime territorial disputes and disagreements over the interpretations of war history,
culminating in anti-Japanese riots throughout China. American officials
realized that the United States would ultimately be dragged into any
conflict between the two countries, and they worked feverishly behindthe scenes to encourage both countries to ratchet down tensions. Fora long time, though, it was difficult for Chinese and Japanese officials
to meet bilaterally on any issue without the dispute over history issues
derailing their discussions; the only venues in which they could makeprogress on other issues were multilateral ones. While China-Japan
relations have recovered to some degree since then, there are limits
to how fast and far the two countries can move at the bilateral level.
In this sense, it seems that regional initiatives that encourage ChinaJapan cooperation in a multilateral context can play a role in making a
resumption of tensions less likely and more costly.
  : Asia faces an increasingly
complex set of nontraditional security challenges that cross borders
and cannot be effectively handled by individual countries on theirown. The  severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreakdemonstrated how vulnerable the region is to communicable diseases;
the devastation wrought by the  tsunami and Cyclone Nargis in drove home the point that Asia is increasingly susceptible tonatural and manmade disasters; and North Korea’s involvement in
the A. Q. Khan smuggling network has pushed the issue of weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) proliferation up higher on the regional
agenda. American policymakers realize that such nontraditional security challenges have real implications for US interests in the region,and leaders in the region recognize that the United States possesses
the unique capacity and resources to make regional cooperation in
dealing with these issues effective. In the past, the United States has
tended to resort to ad hoc initiatives to respond to crises as they happen, but the growth of nontraditional security challenges is helping
make a stronger case for institutionalizing regional cooperation in amore sustainable manner.
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 : The United States also has important and growing economic interests in the region. East Asia accounts for nearly athird of its trade and an increasing proportion of its investment, and theregion has started playing a role as an engine of global economic growth.
China is projected to surpass the United States as the world’s largest
economy at some point before , and it is clear that other East Asian
countries will continue assuming greater weight in the world economy
as well. The United States thus has a fundamental interest in ensuringthat it is not disadvantaged in Asian markets and in encouraging thedevelopment of trading and financial rules that play to its economic
strengths. If all else were equal, this might argue for encouraging theregion to take a World Trade Organization (WTO)–centric or APECcentric approach toward trade liberalization. However, the paralysisof the WTO process and the lack of momentum in APEC make these
options increasingly problematic, even as regional efforts to provide an
institutional framework for economic integration threaten to leave theUnited States behind.
    : In theend, economic development and the spread of norms of democratic
governance, respect for the rule of law, and the protection of humanrights provide the only sustainable way to achieve the regional stability
that is in the interest of the United States and other countries in the region. Also, progress in these areas better equips the region to effectively
respond to the increasingly diverse and complex transnational security
challenges it faces. Regional institutions can serve as one channel tospread norms and encourage the type of sustainable development thatis in the interest of the United States.
   : As a global power, the UnitedStates cannot afford to focus on regional issues alone; it also needs toconsider them in a global context. It is natural that US policymakers
tend to approach regional institutions from the standpoint of how they
can be leveraged to move forward on global objectives and challenges.
The linkage between global issues and regional cooperation in East
Asia has grown even stronger in recent years as developments in theregion have become increasingly consequential for the entire world.
For example, progress on the transnational security threats in which
the United States feels it has the greatest stake—climate change, WMDEngaging in Asia

proliferation, and infectious disease—depends largely on what can bedone in East Asia.
The linkages between regional and global forums have been further
strengthened by the growing economic clout of the region, which is starting to result in a greater voice for Asia in global institutions, particularlyin the aftermath of the – financial crisis. Eight members of theG (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Korea, andthe United States) either are resident in East Asia or are key participantsin regional institutions, and a pattern of “baton passing” has emerged inwhich the same set of individuals who are meeting in the G format
then pick up their discussions in regional forums, such as APEC or the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as in bilateral settings before
their discussions eventually rotate back to global forums.
    : The growing interests that theUnited States has in focusing on Asian multilateralism are matched byconstraints on its action—most critically, the fundamental limits on
the attention of US leaders. All US presidents face the “tyranny of the
in-box,” as the demand for action on issues around the globe competewith pressing domestic needs and political imperatives. However,President Obama inherited a set of domestic and foreign policy challenges even more daunting and diverse than those that have faced any
new president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, running the gamut fromthe imminent collapse of the US financial system to two hot wars. The
need to respond to these crises makes it difficult for the administration
to invest much high-level energy in long-term issues such as the future
shape of East Asia. The limits on the amount of attention that key figures in the administration can afford to devote to any long-term issue
are compounded by the economic crisis and the need to battle budget
deficits, which also constrain the financial resources that the UnitedStates is capable of mobilizing for new initiatives.

T O A’E AGiven the interests and constraints shaping US policy on Asia, the newly
elected Obama administration could have pursued a range of options in
response to the apparent emergence of a regional community. For one,

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it could have quietly sought to undermine efforts to build up regional
institutions, especially those without US involvement, as the UnitedStates had done in several instances in the past. Alternately, it could havecontinued the Bush administration’s low-key approach to the region,
relying almost exclusively on bilateral relations and ad hoc coalitions todeal with common challenges and help shape the future of the region.
Third, it could have expanded its engagement with existing institutions,working to strengthen them and create habits of cooperation in theregion. Lastly, it could have championed its own vision for a regional
Asia Pacific architecture and played an active role in inducing its allies
and other key players to follow its lead in implementing it.
For the time being, the Obama administration has taken preliminary
steps toward the third option, although it has yet to do the real heavy
lifting necessary to make this a success. And even when it does, there
will be natural limits to this approach.
The current US approach can be described as having four main elements: the maintenance of bilateral relations, the projection of a more
active presence at the strategic level of regional architecture, and the
exploration of deeper US engagement in the field of economics, and asimilar exploration in the field of security broadly defined.

Bilateral Relations as the Foundation of US Involvement
Any discussion of US involvement in Asia has to begin with bilateralrelationships, which have been practically the only thing that reallymattered for the United States over the past half century. The US “huband-spoke” approach, which is predicated on alliances with five countries in the region—Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and thePhilippines—proved successful during the Cold War and its aftermath
in providing a security guarantee to the region and in helping to create conditions conducive to the extraordinary economic and politicaldevelopment that many of the region’s countries have experienced.
Continuing the policy of its predecessors, the Obama administration
has sought to consolidate its alliance relationships while deepening
cooperation with other countries in the region. So far, it appears to havesucceeded in improving relations with most countries in East Asia. It
has made great strides toward closer alliance cooperation with Seoul.
Its relations with Southeast Asia have also strengthened dramatically.
Engaging in Asia

Perceptions of the United States have improved throughout the region,ties with major regional players such as Indonesia and Vietnam aremarkedly stronger, and the United States even has gone to lengths
to forge a new strategy of “pragmatic engagement” with the junta in
Burma. There have been some tensions with China, but building on
initiatives undertaken by the Bush administration, it has instituted
a strategic and economic dialogue with Beijing and placed special
priority on expanding US-China cooperation. The only prominent
exception has been Japan, where official relations initially suffered
due to mutual miscalculations and difficulties adapting to domestic
political change.
US engagement in East Asia will clearly continue to be based on thefoundation of its bilateral relations. In a January  speech at theEast-West Center in Hawaii that outlined the US approach to Asia’s
regional architecture, Secretary Clinton noted, “The United States’ alliance relationships are the cornerstone of our regional involvement.”
This is not solely because the United States continues to find bilateralrelations to be the most effective and reliable tools to meet its regional
interest. It is also because there is a growing appreciation in the UnitedStates and around the region of the way that stable and strong bilateralrelations can help create an environment in which regional cooperation
can flourish.
For example, over the past several years, policy thinkers in US allies such as Japan and Korea have begun to question how much theUnited States is willing to risk in order to meet its alliance obligations
to defend their countries. This has important implications for theirrelations with other regional powers. As one illustration, tensions
between China and Japan have run high partly because of China’s
growing assertiveness and partly due to an understandable Japanese
unease about the growing military clout of its neighbor, especially ata time when Japan’s relative power is in decline. Any US moves to reassure Japan about its security are likely to encourage Japan to interact
more calmly with China, decrease the probability that China will be
tempted to behave more assertively toward Japan, and help avert thepossible escalation of China-Japan tensions, misperceptions, andoverreactions. The net result is likely to be the creation of space forregional cooperation to emerge, including the types of cooperationthat can further American interests.
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Showing the Flag
Woody Allen famously quipped that  percent of success is just showing up. In keeping with this wisdom, the most noticeable shift in the US
stance toward East Asia under the Obama administration has been its
concerted effort to project a greater US presence in the region. President
Obama addressed concerns about the US absence from regional forums
in a November  speech in Tokyo, declaring, “I know the UnitedStates has been disengaged from these organizations in recent years.
So let me be clear: those days have passed.” Calling the United Statesa “Pacific nation” and characterizing himself as “America’s first Pacificpresident,” he essentially pledged that the United States is back in
Asia to stay.
So far, his administration has managed to get the symbolism right.
The first foreign head of state invited to the White House was an Asian,
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, and for the first time in nearly 
years, the inaugural overseas trip by a new US secretary of state wasto Asia. In her first year, Secretary Clinton scheduled four trips to theregion (although the fourth was cancelled at the last minute due to theJanuary  Haiti earthquake). And, in , President Obama helped
inaugurate the first US-ASEAN leaders meeting and the United States
named its first resident ambassador to ASEAN.
In her January  address, Secretary Clinton outlined five principles
to guide the renewed engagement with the region. Two of these should
be considered more important than the others. One is that the central
regional institutions should be results oriented, and the other is that allof the region’s key stakeholders—starting, of course, with the UnitedStates—should be involved in the region’s defining institutions. Thisechoed President Obama’s declaration a few months earlier in Tokyo
that “the United States expects to be involved in the discussions thatshape the future of this region.”
To make good on the promise to play a more active role in the region’s emerging institutional framework, the United States acceded to
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the first step toward full US
participation in the East Asia Summit. Then, in July , President
Obama’s intention to participate in the summit the following year was
made known. This move to be reengaged in the region was reinforcedthat same month in Hanoi, at the annual ARF meeting, by a remarkableshow of coordination between the United States and other countriesEngaging in Asia

in the region in presenting a unified front toward China regarding theSouth China Sea.

Muddling through on Trade and Finance
While the Obama administration has talked about its desire to be actively engaged in community building in East Asia at the overarchingstrategic level, it has not articulated a vision for US involvement in theregional institutions dealing with trade and economics. This seems tobe partly rooted in the domestic political constraints that the Obamaadministration faces in pushing forward trade agreements and partly
due to the fact that it is not clear to the Obama administration how best
to pursue its economic interests in the region.
In a sense, the key achievement so far for the Obama administration
regarding trade is a story about what did not happen. Taking office inthe midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression andhaving won the election with strong support from unions and otherconstituencies skeptical of free trade, there were intense pressures on the
Obama administration to institute protectionist measures, especially inresponse to massive trade imbalances with China. Some gestures weremade in this direction with the “Buy America” provisions of the February economic stimulus bill, but by and large the new administration
managed to hold the line against protectionism.
When one ventures beyond this, though, the picture of the Obamaadministration’s trade policy is murky. There seems to be concern about
the proliferation of FTAs in Asia that do not include the United States, if
not because there is evidence that trade is actually being diverted, thenperhaps because of the contrast between America’s relative silence andChina’s activity on multiple fronts. Meanwhile, the lack of US enthusiasm for APEC as a vehicle for trade liberalization has become palpable.
While American officials give lip service to the goal of establishing aFree Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), they readily admit it is
not achievable in the foreseeable future and are doing little concrete topush it forward. Meanwhile, the United States is pushing forward withnegotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement (TPP), which currently includes the small economies ofBrunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore but may be expanded toinclude Australia, Peru, and Vietnam. This effort appears to contradictA PACIFIC NATION

the FTAAP goals, at least in the short term, by focusing just on a handful of the smaller countries in the region.
Congressional politics have made it very difficult for the UnitedStates to make concrete progress on the types of trade deals that havebecome so popular in East Asia, and Asian leaders are well aware thatthey need to be careful about how much political capital to invest in
negotiating FTAs that may never be approved by the US Congress. It
is not clear whether—at least without the kind of strong presidential
leadership that has not been forthcoming so far—the United States
will be able to bring any significant trade deals with Asian powers tofruition in the near future. In this context, all eyes are on the Korea-US
FTA (KORUS), which, although signed in June  at considerable
political expense to then President Roo Moo-hyun, was still waiting tocome to the floor of the US Congress at the end of . If this agreement does not win approval, it is difficult to envision how President
Obama could manage to pursue other meaningful bilateral or regional
trade deals in Asia.
This leaves the United States facing a dilemma. Movement on tradeliberalization in the WTO is stalled. In the absence of any progress on
the global level, the United States faces pressures to project its strategicpresence by showing it is more deeply engaged in Asia on the economic
front, and it also feels compelled to ensure it is not put at a disadvantage
in the region’s evolving economic architecture. However, there are strict
limits as to how fast and far the United States can move on trade. So at
the moment, it seems that the United States has settled for a strategyof trying to compete in terms of setting and harmonizing standards for
FTAs through the TPP. By taking this approach, the United States seems
to be trying to pluck the low-hanging fruit by negotiating a regional
agreement with countries with which it already has achieved bilateral
FTAs or could theoretically do so with little difficulty. Of course, it is
not clear that the United States can even conclude and ratify a workable
TPP deal. There will be intense pressures, for instance, to ensure thatany agreement that includes potential TPP members such as Vietnam
will have guarantees of workers’ rights, which those countries will findvery difficult to accept. However, for the time being, the US push on
the TPP is at least providing evidence that it is more committed to being a player in regional trade liberalization and it also has the benefit of
putting pressure on others in the region to focus on a higher standard
for FTAs.
Engaging in Asia

On the financial side, the Obama administration is continuing thelong-running US policy of emphasizing global action over regional
initiatives, particularly through its reliance on the G and other global
institutions. The main US initiatives in the region will likely need to be
on exchange rates, which the United States considers to be a global issue, but which will play out primarily on the bilateral level with China.
Pressures for the United States to aggressively address the undervalued
Chinese yuan are likely to persist for the time being, and the dynamics
surrounding the yuan debate may complicate the US approach to an East
Asia community, even though US officials are going to great lengths tokeep bilateral tensions under control.

Expanding Nontraditional Security Cooperation
The mantra among American specialists speaking about East Asia haslong been that meaningful regional security cooperation is especiallychallenging given the divergent interests, political systems, and histories of the region’s powers. Moreover, it is in the realm of security
that the United States has been most prominently dependent on a
hub-and-spoke approach. Nevertheless, this is one area in which the
Obama administration seems intent on pushing forward more thanits predecessors.
In fact, in listing its basic policies in the February  report on the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the US Department of Defense,
which has been historically associated with a heavy reliance on bilateralrelations in Asia, noted that even while the foundation of the US presence in Asia remains its alliance relationships, “the regional and global
security environments are more complex today,” and this “requires amore widely distributed and adaptive US presence in Asia that relies on
and better leverages the capabilities of our regional allies and partners.”
The  QDR goes on to note that one aim of the United States in Asia
is “encouraging the continued development of multilateral institutions
and other integrated approaches to regional security affairs.” This is
the first time since its inception in  that the QDR has ever cited thepromotion of multilateral institutions in Asia as a priority. (Tellingly, theterm “multilateral” comes up  times in the  QDR. In contrast, it
was only used  times total in the previous three QDRs, signaling how
much Defense Department thinking has shifted in this direction.)A PACIFIC NATION

One reason for the increasing US emphasis on multilateral security
cooperation in Asia is that US diplomacy in the region is moving beyond
a sole focus on traditional “balance of power” considerations to place
greater priority on transnational, nontraditional security challenges.
Invariably, Obama administration officials’ statements on the security
challenges facing the region give high billing to nontraditional issues
such as climate change, WMD proliferation, natural disasters, and thesocietal destabilization that tends to accompany poverty and extreme
income inequality. To some degree, this could be interpreted as an effort
to avoid too great of a focus on tensions with China, which would becounterproductive, or on the on-again, off-again negotiations with North
Korea, which seem bound to continue frustrating the United Statesand its allies. But there has also been a substantive shift in US threat
perceptions toward giving greater weight to the types of transnational
problems that have become more pressing in Asia in recent years. This
has led US policymakers to the conclusion that, as Assistant Secretaryof State Kurt Campbell has put it on several occasions, a more multilateral American approach to security in Asia is needed because “ourstrength cannot be a substitute for cooperation. The rapid emergenceof transnational security challenges demands collective action.”
The growing desire to push multilateral security cooperation on
nontraditional issues as a complement to America’s bilateral alliances ismanifested in the increasing US support for the ARF. So far, this ranks
as the Obama administration’s most notable shift in its approach to theregion’s security architecture. In Secretary Clinton’s East-West Center
address, she identified the strengthening of the ARF as a leading exampleof how the United States wishes to expand regional security cooperation.
This represented a significant break with her predecessor, Secretary
Condoleezza Rice, who ruffled feathers by missing two of the annual
ARF ministerial meetings in her four-year tenure. The main thrust of
Secretary Clinton’s new engagement in the ARF is to encourage it tomove beyond dialogue to “focus increasingly on action.”
In particular, one of the key areas where the United States is eager tostrengthen capacity in regional institutions is on disaster relief. In fact,
the  QDR notes that one priority for the US military in the region
will now be to “build the capacity of Asian partners to respond more
effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural
disasters.” This is the area where the United States has been pushinghardest for the ARF to assume greater responsibility, and there haveEngaging in Asia

already been signs of progress, most notably the first-ever ARF joint
disaster relief exercise, held in May . Another area of growing focus
in the region is liable to be on climate change. This has been telegraphedby the State Department’s inclusion in its  budget request of a sevenfold increase for official development assistance funding allocated for
activities related to climate change in Asia.

A I A U
So far, the Obama administration’s recalibration of US Asia policy has
succeeded insofar as it has started to create a sense that the UnitedStates really is “back” in Asia. The new administration has gotten thesymbolism right in projecting a more active US presence in the region,
which has changed the dynamics of regional perceptions. This alone
counts as an important accomplishment.
For all that has changed tonally, though, there is still considerable
continuity with the approaches of previous US administrations, both forbetter and for worse. US involvement in the region is still firmly based on
the foundation of its bilateral alliances and partnerships, although now
it has moved further in the direction of a “bilateralism plus” approachthat reserves a supplementary role for multilateral initiatives. Also, likeits predecessors, the Obama administration has strongly emphasized
the pursuit of concrete, attainable results over consensus building andvague, ambitious, long-term goals. However, in contrast to the Bushadministration, which took the shortcut of relying almost exclusively
on ad hoc coalitions, the Obama administration at times seems willing
to bet on a more farsighted approach of encouraging existing institutions to expand their capacity to deal with the challenges that bedevil
the region.
Another area of continuity involves the lack of a coherent and proactive US vision for regional multilateralism. Although many American
leaders, starting with the president, are quick to cite the growing importance of Asia in global affairs, the rhetoric of public pronouncements
has yet to be matched by the articulation of a long-term strategy forthe region or convincing evidence of a deep US commitment to project
leadership in nurturing sustainable regional institutions. Instead, theUnited States seems stuck in a reactive mode, carried along by developments on the ground rather than taking more proactive, long-term stepsA PACIFIC NATION

to channel the forces emerging in the region. As a result, the Obamaadministration’s effort to show it is “back in Asia” can best be seen asa welcome, but fundamentally defensive, measure to keep its options
open in the emerging competition to shape Asia’s future.
To be fair, the current US approach of maintaining just enoughinvolvement in regional community-building efforts to ensure it is
not left behind has been a perfectly understandable response to thestate of affairs in East Asia. As a global power with an overloaded
domestic and international agenda, there has been only a limited
amount of attention and political capital to spare for regional community building. Plus, there have been good reasons to be skeptical
about the significance and staying power of the various initiatives tobuild regional institutions.
However, fundamental changes in the region and in US-Asia relations are likely to force the hand of the United States, requiring it totake a more concerted and proactive approach or risk the erosion of its
ability to help shape the regional order. The last decade has provided
ample evidence that East Asia has progressed to the point where someof the various regional community-building initiatives are likely tohave a lasting impact. This is reinforced by the sense that stronger andmore effective institutions are needed to help manage developmentsin the region. Moreover, the rise of China, the increased complexity of
the nontraditional threats to regional security, and the fact that a new
fiscal austerity in American foreign policy is likely to make burden
sharing even more crucial for the United States are all likely to raise
the stakes that the United States has in the course of multilateralism
in East Asia.
In particular, there are four areas where the limitations of the current US approach are likely to become increasingly evident, helping
push the United States to a point where it needs to decide whether totake a more proactive stance on regional institutions. First, the Obamaadministration’s approach to regional community building has thus far
relied heavily on symbolism, but it is nearing the time when it will haveto match rhetoric with action to retain its credibility. Now that Asian
expectations of a more active US role have been raised, it is importantfor American leaders to actually follow through on their promise toshow up at regional forums. President Obama’s postponement of two
trips to Asia during the first half of  highlights how easy it can be
for America’s regional involvement to slip to the back burner whenEngaging in Asia

there are so many other domestic and foreign policy priorities competing for attention.
Still, merely showing up is not enough over the long run. Some Asianleaders may be satisfied just to see top US leaders attending regional
meetings year after year, but a growing number will become jaded before
long if this is not backed up by concrete US action to help strengthen
regional cooperation. From the standpoint of the United States, too,
it is not sustainable for the president or secretary of state to spend somuch energy visiting the region without having some “deliverables” toshow for this.
A second fundamental issue involves the question of how the UnitedStates will react if—and most likely when—Asia’s existing institutions
prove incapable of responding effectively to the challenges of the times.
For example, while it is both admirable and wise for the United States
to push for the ARF to become a more action-oriented institution, it isdifficult to imagine how it might move far enough in this direction to
respond sufficiently to the pressing nontraditional security challenges
facing the region. The ARF is fundamentally a consensus-based organization. Members such as Burma and China, which need to sign off on
its activities, are likely to continue giving priority to the principle ofnonintervention over efficacy. In light of how the Burmese junta tried tolimit access for relief workers and supplies in  after Cyclone Nargis,
it is doubtful that the US commitment to encouraging the ARF to playa key role in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance would survive
the paralysis of the forum under similar circumstances in the future.
Third, one of the main drivers of East Asia is the creeping integration of the region’s economies, and much of the discussion of regional
community is fundamentally about economics. However, the Obamaadministration has not yet articulated a compelling trade policy, andthe president is bound to continue having difficulties in navigating thedomestic politics of this issue. This leaves the United States in an awkward position, and it is unclear whether initiatives such as the TPP will
be enough for it to further its economic interests in Asia.
Finally, the divergence in American and Chinese views about the future shape of the region is likely to become starker as time passes. For
one, it would be natural for regional community building to become
an additional area of US-China rivalry as the United States works to
become more involved in Asia and as China becomes stronger andmore assertive. The region has already witnessed disagreements over

A PACIFIC NATION

the membership in regional institutions between Japan and China, with
China backing narrower, Asia-only groupings while Japan pushed toinclude countries with more democratic values such as Australia, New
Zealand, and India. It would be no surprise were similar jockeying toemerge between China and an increasingly engaged United States.
Moreover, it is hard to avoid the fact that one of the key issues at theheart of regional multilateralism is the question of how to best adapt
to and manage China’s rise. Most Asian leaders seem to desire greater
US engagement in the region as a counterbalance to potential Chinese
domination. Meanwhile, many in the United States and elsewhere are
increasingly inclined to think of regional community in terms of how
it can help embed China into a web of rules and interdependence thatblunts major power rivalries and turns China into more of a “responsible
stakeholder.” However, it is natural for Chinese leaders to chafe at US
efforts to balance their influence by promoting an American vision ofregional community, even while welcoming US cooperation on sharedchallenges. It is worth recalling that, when the foundations for European
community were laid in the aftermath of World War II, the main “target,” Germany, was a defeated power that saw community as its path
to redemption. China, on the other hand, is a rising power. Although
it is clearly in the interest of all parties that China be part and parcelof any meaningful community-building efforts, it is not likely to easilyacquiesce to many of the initiatives that an impatient United States may
champion in order to make its own investment in regional community
building worthwhile.

CThe United States has managed to paper over these issues, but it can only
do this for so long without sacrificing its potential to shape the futureof the region. The global economic crisis that originated in the UnitedStates has fueled the perception of America’s decline among Asian elites
and, while talk of the demise of the United States is perhaps exaggerated, its relative power will surely slip over the next several decades ascountries such as China continue to grow. For the time being, though,the United States remains the dominant power in Asia and it enjoys
the goodwill of most countries in the region. This gives it a window ofopportunity in which it can successfully pivot from its current reactiveEngaging in Asia

stance to a more forward-thinking role in shaping the emerging regional
community, helping build up the kinds of regional institutions that cancomplement its efforts at the bilateral, subregional, and global levels.
At the moment, the United States is not prepared to lay out a fullblown vision for a new regional architecture and, regardless, trying toimpose something like that from the other side of the Pacific would
likely backfire. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd learned this when his proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community ran into a wall of opposition
from around the region. Instead, the United States is likely to be mosteffective by investing in the development of a network of multiple
overlapping institutions that can help further its long-term interestsand values.
There are a number of reasons why a network of multiple overlapping
institutions is better suited to the region than a single, more coherent
body. The complexity and diversity of East Asia means that one size
does not fit all, and that no single institution can be a silver bullet for
all of the region’s ills. Countries that can participate effectively in one
regional institution on a given issue may not have the capacity to do soin other areas. In Asia, the tradeoff for having the full participation of
all countries in an organization typically means it becomes a consensusbased forum that cannot take quick, concrete action. Therefore, having
overlapping institutions—some which involve the full participation of
all in the region and others led by subsets of countries with sufficient
capacity and will to take concrete action in providing public goods—canallow progress to be made on the key challenges facing the region while
keeping countries from being permanently excluded from the broader
regional community. The task before the United States, therefore, is tohelp strengthen and inject substance into the existing institutions thatare most useful on key issues while also helping to fill gaps in the region’s
institutional architecture.
Success at this is likely to require a more nuanced and humble styleof leadership, through which the United States works in partnershipwith like-minded allies in the region. Increasingly, there are influential
proponents of regional community building in countries throughout
East Asia who are working to promote regional institutions that canhelp further democratic and responsive governance, promote economic
openness, and deliver concrete results on pressing transnational challenges. If the United States can engage them in targeted initiatives tohelp improve the capacity and effectiveness of key regional institutions,A PACIFIC NATION

it is likely to make more progress than by coming up with some boldproposal for a new regional architecture. In some instances, this will
require the United States to concentrate on working behind the scenes,
encouraging allies to spearhead and take credit for important initiatives.
In other instances, it behooves the United States to be confident enoughto avoid being threatened by forums that do not include it when they canultimately serve its purposes, whether directly through their actions or
indirectly by buttressing the sense of regional participation. In the end,by playing a less flashy and more substantive role, the United States canprovide much-needed leadership for regional community building in a
way that does not wrest ownership from Asian countries.
The Obama administration has already taken some initial steps down
this road, but it needs to demonstrate a more sustained commitment toregional community building, one that moves beyond just “engaging”
with regional institutions—with all the ambiguity the term involves—toprojecting greater leadership. This is bound to be an arduous and sometimes frustrating task, but it is possible to envision the components of amore farsighted US approach to regional community building.
Clearly, one key element should be consistent presidential leadership. The United States still has a special ability to inspire people in theregion, and regular demonstrations of support by the US president for
more robust regional institutions can go a long way in strengthening theresolve of leaders throughout the region. Meanwhile, at home, the US
president would do well to regularly pressure the US government to place
greater priority on thinking comprehensively about the future shape ofthe region. Only the White House can knit together the diverse efforts
that will need to be undertaken by different US government agencies on
the key issues facing the emerging web of regional institutions.
A second component of US efforts should be active participation ina high-level regional forum on broad strategic issues. The ARF helps
build confidence among senior leaders from Asia and the United States
on security issues, but there is considerable utility in a forum where the
US president and other heads of state from around the region are able
to talk about a broad range of interconnected issues that are particularly
relevant for Asia. Now that the United States has decided to join the
East Asia Summit, this can probably be achieved by pushing for thesummit to evolve into this role.
A third component might be a series of focused initiatives to institutionalize regional cooperation by a broad range of governments—as wellEngaging in Asia

as NGOs, international organizations, and others—in taking concrete
action to deal with nontraditional security issues, from disaster relief toenvironmental cooperation. Some experts have argued that the UnitedStates should focus on ad hoc initiatives since these have historically
been the most effective in the region. However, the long-term andcomplex nature of many of the nontraditional security challenges facing the region and the need to build permanent capacity to respond tothe crises they can trigger makes it important to also institutionalize
regional cooperation. The aim would be to start working from the bottom up to lay the foundations for a regional institution that can serve asa hub for mobilizing and coordinating substantive action on many of themost pressing challenges in the region in a way that existing consensusdriven institutions such as the ARF cannot. One appealing proposal is
Hitoshi Tanaka’s idea for an action-oriented East Asia Security Forumthat would be designed to mobilize different sets of regional actors todeal with different nontraditional security challenges, yet which would
involve all of the region’s nations in a broader secretariat.
Finally, domestic politics make any dramatic push on the economic
front more difficult, but the United States needs to somehow demonstrate that efforts to incorporate US objectives into the evolving regional
trade and financial rules will pay off in the end. The first step is the ratification of KORUS. Without this it will be difficult for the United States
to claim any credibility in trade negotiations with other Asian countries.
Meanwhile, over the long term American political leaders need to gettheir domestic house in order by working to rebuild a bipartisan consensus in support of free trade. In addition, the United States needs towork toward a clearer vision of how to reconcile APEC, the TPP, andits bilateral initiatives in the region, although it may be able to moveahead on these in parallel for the time being.
The next decade promises to be a transformative period with lasting
implications for the future shape of the region. The United States has a
growing interest in encouraging the development of effective regional
institutions, many Asians want a stronger US presence in the region, andthe reality is that the United States may never have as much influencein the region as it does now. This makes it imperative for the UnitedStates to move beyond mere engagement to a more proactive and nuanced leadership. To repeat a common refrain of President Obama, “Ifnot now, when?”A PACIFIC NATIONN. In , the United States made its first major foray into regional cooperation by playing a key role in the establishment of the International Union of American Republics,
a forerunner the present-day Organization of American States (OAS) that aimed topromote cooperation among Latin American countries and the United States.
. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Constrained Internationalism: Adapting to New
Realities (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, ). The poll, conductedin June , entailed a random sampling of , American adults with a sampling
error of .–. percent.
. Fifty-five percent of US respondents to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ Global Views poll were of the opinion that US membership in NAFTA is bad for
the US economy and  percent thought it was bad for Americans’ job security. See
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views : Anxious Americans Seek a
New Direction in United States Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global
Affairs, ), .
. For example, in May  testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Kurt Campbell, who later became assistant secretary of state for East Asian andPacific affairs, insisted that for the United States, “active participation in the newmultilateral structures of Asia is necessary and important for effective managementof bilateral ties and impending security challenges in the region.” Kurt Campbell,“China’s Challenge and Asia’s Rise: The Case for US Strategic Reengagement in the
Asia-Pacific Region” (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May , ).
. Saadia Pekkanen, “Asianism Rising: Assessing China-Japan-US Dynamics in Regional
Trade and Investment Realities,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing ChinaJapan-US Relations, ed. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Tadashi Yamamoto(Tokyo: JCIE, ), .
. See, for example, Uri Dadush and Bennet Stancil, World Order in  (Washington
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ); and Dominic Wilson andRoopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to ,” Goldman Sachs
Global Economics Paper no.  ().
. For a useful explanation on the way that US officials try to tackle global issues inregional forums, see Scott Snyder, “Domestic Politics and Regionalism: What Are
the Domestic Influences That Drive or Inhibit Multilateral Security Cooperation in
Northeast Asia” (unpublished draft paper for a Council on Foreign Relations workshop
on regional security architecture, ).
. For example, the world’s five top emitters of carbon dioxide—China, the United States,
Russia, Japan, and India—are all located in Asia or on its periphery, and Asia is also
home to some of the countries that will suffer most from the impact of climate change.
Any meaningful response to climate change will require the active participation ofcountries in the region, and it is a great advantage in the eyes of US policymakers if
regional institutions can contribute by building momentum for global action.
. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt
Campbell before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian andPacific Affairs, “US Policy Toward Burma: Its Impact and Effectiveness,” September, .



Engaging in Asia

. Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on “Regional Architecture in Asia:
Principles and Priorities,” January , .
. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan, November ,.
. Ibid.
. The Obama administration’s principles for US engagement in regional multilateralism are that, first, this is intended to build upon bilateral relationships. Second, theUnited States believes that regional institutions should be working to advance the“shared objectives” of the United States and other countries in the region, meaning
peace and stability, economic liberalization and sustainable growth, and the spreadof democratic values, at least as seen from a long-term perspective. Third, regional
institutions should move from being just “talk shops” to delivering concrete results.
Fourth, the United States will strive to be more flexible in its support of multilateral
cooperation, signaling that it will remain more focused on results than process andbe more accepting of an overlapping, multilayered architecture, including subregional
and ad hoc initiatives that can deliver results that regionwide institutions cannot. The
fifth principle is that the United States needs to be included in the region’s key institutions. Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton on “Regional Architecture in Asia.”
. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall.
. US officials argue that a successful TPP can lay the groundwork for an FTAAP byproviding a mechanism that can be expanded beyond the small group of initial members to all countries in the region. However, it is difficult to envision how agreements
can be reached with many of the countries in the region, and even proponents admitthat this is only feasible over the long term.
. US Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February), .
. Ibid.
. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt
Campbell before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia,
the Pacific, and the Global Environment, “Regional Overview of East Asia and thePacific,” March , . Assistant Secretary Campbell made a similar argument on
January , , in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.
. Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton on “Regional Architecture in Asia.”
. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, .
. Nonetheless, it is still unclear how much support the Obama administration willthrow behind the innovative Asia Pacific Partnership on Climate Change and Clean
Development that it inherited from its predecessors.
. Some ASEAN leaders are also liable to see East Asia community-building initiatives
as a way to blunt US-China rivalry and keep it from dominating regional affairs.
. Victor Cha presents a particularly thoughtful analysis of the role of ad hoc initiatives in Asia, contrasting them with formal attempts at institutionalization, which
he notes have been “spectacularly unsuccessful” in Northeast Asia. Victor Cha, “TheNew Geometry of Asian Architecture: What Works and What Does Not” (paper
prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC,
January ).
. Hitoshi Tanaka, “East Asia Community Building: Toward an East Asia Security
Forum,” East Asia Insights , no.  (April ).

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