SIPRI Fact Sheet
May 2019

MILITARY SPENDING AND
ARMS IMPORTS BY IRAN,SAUDI ARABIA, QATARAND THE UAE

KEY FACTS

pieter d. wezeman and alexandra kuimova

w With a total of $67.6 billion,
Saudi Arabia was the thirdlargest military spender in theworld in 2018. Iran spent$13.2 billion on its military in
2018.

INTRODUCTION

Tense relations between Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates (UAE) are a major cause for concern regarding stability, security
and peace in the Gulf region and in the Middle East more generally.1 Thesestates seek to play a major role in the Middle East and use arms as a key tool in
the pursuit of this aim. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deployed their armed
forces in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthi rebels and in Syria against theIslamic State. Qatar and the UAE have been involved militarily in the conflictin Libya. Iran has sent military forces to support the Iraqi and Syrian governments. Some anti-government rebel groups in Syria have been supported by
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In add­ition, all four states have provided
arms to non-state armed groups in various parts of the Middle East and North
Africa. These military deployments take place amid long-standing rivalries
and tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Iran,on the other. Moreover, in 2017 a dispute arose in which Saudi Arabia and theUAE cut all ties with Qatar and imposed sanctions.
To illustrate the importance given to military capability in these fourstates, this fact sheet provides a concise overview of trends and patterns ofmilitary expenditure and of arms imports—the main source of modern majorarms for these states—in the period 1994–2018. 2 It sketches a pattern of rapid
military build-ups in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE over the past 15 years,
high levels of military spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)in all four countries, and growing military asymmetry in which Saudi Arabia
and the UAE continue to build diverse and advanced military capabilities
while Iran is unable to do the same. This raises concerns about the potential
effects of these developments on the volatile security situation in the Middle
East, the military intentions of these four states and the role of the countries
that supply them with arms. The fact sheet also highlights the absence of
1 For an overview of the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa in which these four states
are involved and the related interstate rivalries see Davis, I., ‘Armed conflict in the Middle East andNorth Africa’, SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2018), pp. 66–82.
2 This fact sheet brings together data from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database and the
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. They provide further detail on military expenditure and arms
imports in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East, as well as full information on the method­
ologies used.

w Available data indicates that
Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia andthe United Arab Emirates(UAE) had high levels of
military expenditure as a shareof gross domestic product(GDP) in 1994–2018.

w Saudi Arabia and the UAE
have built diverse and advanced
military capabilities byimporting arms, mainly fromthe United States and countries
in Western Europe. Saudi
Arabia was the world’s largest
arms importer in 2014–18.
Iran’s arms imports have been
at a much lower level. Qatar has
rapidly increased its arms
imports since 2009.
w There is no governmenttransparency on militaryspending in Qatar and the UAE,
while questions remain about
the exact military expenditureof Iran and Saudi Arabia.

2sipri fact sheet

80

government transparency in military
matters in these countries by discussing the lack of detailed official data on
military expenditure.

60

IRAN

Military expenditure(constant 2017 US$ billion)

100

Iran’s military spending in the period
1994–2018 peaked in 2006, after which
it fell by 30 per cent between 2006 and2014 (see figure 1). The fall was steep20
est in 2012–13, after the European
Union imposed economic and finan0
cial sanctions on Iran. These sanc05
00
10
95
15
18
20
20
20
19
20
20
tions and some of those imposed by
the United States were lifted in 2015,
Iran
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
which benefited the Iranian economy.
Figure 1. Military expenditure by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE,
Iran’s military spending subsequently
1994–2018
increased by 25 per cent between 2015
Note: Data is unavailable for the UAE for 1994–96 and 2015–18, and Qatar for and 2017. However, in 2018 military
1994–2001 and 2011–18.
spending decreased again, by 9.5 per
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Apr. 2019.
cent, to $13.2 billion, as the Iranian
economy went into recession andinflation increased from 10 per cent30
in 2017 to 30 per cent in 2018. In 2018
military spending was 2.7 per cent of
25
GDP, the 25th highest in the world.
The level of Iran’s arms imports
20
decreased significantly between 1994
and 2018 (see figures 2 and 3). The
15
volume of Iran’s arms imports in thisperiod was relatively small compared
10
with the volumes imported by manyother states in the Middle East. For
5example, the total value of Iran’s arms
imports in 2009–18 was equivalent0
1994–98
1999–2003 2004–2008
2009–132014–18
to just 3.5 per cent of Saudi Arabianarms imports in the same period. This
Iran
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
can partly be explained by the limits
on funding linked to Iran’s economic
Figure 2. Major arms imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE,
problems. In addition, since 2010,
1994–2018
United Nations Security Council resoSource: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2019.
lutions have restricted the transfer ofmajor arms to Iran. These restrictions are scheduled to remain in force until the end of 2020. 3 The sanctions
allow exemptions on exports of certain arms. The delivery of four S-300 air
defence systems by Russia in 2016 was Iran’s first significant import of majorarms since 2007. Whereas other states in the Gulf region procure arms from
Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)40

3 See the SIPRI arms embargoes database.

military spending and arms imports in the gulf region
a wide variety of states, 96 per cent of
Iran’s imports in 2014–18 came from
Russia and the rest from China.
Iran has the capability to develop andpro­duce certain types of major arms,
includ­ing ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles and unmanned aerial veh­
icles. This has to some extent off­set the
restric­tions on its arms imports. How­ever, the level of per­form­ance of thesearms as well as other arms prod­uced or
upgraded by Iran has been questioned.4

3

IRAN
1994–98

1999–2003

2004–2008

2009–132014–18342 TIV

447 TIV

994 TIVSAUDI ARABIA
1 918 TIV

1 982 TIVIn 2018 Saudi Arabia’s militaryspend­
ing amounted to an estimated$67.6 billion. It was the third-­largest
mili­tary spender globally and by far
the largest military spender in the Gulf
region. There have been three periodsin the past 25 years in which there weremajor increases in Saudi Arabia’s mili­Arms suppliers
tary expenditure (see figure 1). Mili­tary
Belarus
China
North Korea
expenditure increased by 57 per cent
OthersUkraineRussiabetween 1996 and 1998, by 76 per centbetween 2003 and 2007 and by 63 per
Figure 3. Imports of major arms by Iran, 1994–2018
cent between 2011 and 2015. The fallin oil prices at the end of 2014 caused a TIV = millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values.
Note: Where applicable, up to the four largest suppliers in each period are named.
decline in govern­ment revenues, which
Further information on the countries categorized as ‘Others’ in each period is
are highly dependent on oil exports. available from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
Military spending fell by 28 per cent
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2019.
in 2016. 5 There was then an increase of
11 per cent in 2017 followed by anotherdrop, of 6.5 per cent, in 2018.
A clear indication of the high priority that Saudi Arabia gives to militarycapability is the fact that Saudi Arabian military spending was 8.8 per centof GDP in 2018. At its peak in 2015, military spending was 13 per cent of GDP.
In contrast, all other countries among the 15 largest military spenders in
the world allocated less than 4 per cent of GDP to the military in 2018. At$2014, Saudi Arabia’s per capita military spending in 2018 was higher thanany other country in the world.
After a low point in 1999–2008, arms imports increased rapidly (seefigure 4). They rose by 192 per cent between 2009–13 and 2014–18, making
Saudi Arabia the world’s largest arms importer in 2014–18. The USA and4 Binnie, J., ‘Proving grounds: assessing Iranian weapon performance in Syria and Yemen’, Jane’s

Defence Weekly, 1 Aug. 2018, pp. 22–27; and Reuters, ‘Iran starts producing local fighter jet for its airforce’, 2 Nov. 2018.
5 For a discussion on the link between the price of oil and military expenditure see Tian, N. andLopes da Silva, D., ‘Debt, oil price and military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2018 (note 1), pp. 171–78.

4

sipri fact sheet

the United Kingdom were by far thelargest arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia
in 2014–18 (see figure 4). A number ofcountries in Europe, most notably Germany, have been critical of Saudi Ara1994–98
1999–2003 2004–2008
2009–132014–18
bia’s use of military force in Yemen andtherefore restricted their arms exports
to Saudi Arabia in 2018. 6 However, this2 164 TIV
2 460 TIV
is likely to have little effect on Saudi
5 777 TIV
Arabia’s access to arms as the main,
9 377 TIV
long-standing arms sup­pliers to Saudi
Arabia—the USA, the UK and France—
16 868 TIV
have continued to supply arms. In
addition, China and Russia have madeSAUDI
significant efforts to sell arms to Saudi
ARABIA
Arabia in recent years.7
Saudi Arabia’s substantial investment in its military means that it has
the largest inventory of advanced
weapons among the states in the Gulf
region. Imports included arms such ascombat and tanker aircraft, which haveincreased the reach and strike power ofArms suppliers
the Saudi Arabian Air Force. The USA
CanadaFranceBelgium
Italy
Spain
commenced delivery of 154 F-15SAUK
Switzerland
OthersTurkeyUSAcombat aircraft in 2016, which will add
to the delivery of 72 Typhoon combat
Figure 4. Imports of major arms by Saudi Arabia, 1994–2018
aircraft by the UK in 2009–17. Both
TIV = millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values.
aircraft types are equipped with cruise
Note: Where applicable, up to the four largest suppliers in each period are named.
missiles and other guided weapons. The
Further information on the countries categorized as ‘Others’ in each period is
six tanker aircraft delivered from Spainavailable from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
between 2011 and 2015 increase theSource: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2019.
range of Saudi Arabia’s combat aircraft.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is
improv­ing its capability to defend against air and missile attacks. In 2014–18
it received 23 Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defence systems from the USA.
In 2018 it ordered seven highly advanced THAAD missile defence systems
from the USA.
Saudi Arabia’s land and naval forces have been and continue to be modernized and expanded. In the period 2014–18, a total of over 4000 armoured
vehicles were delivered from Austria, Canada, France, Georgia, South
Africa and Turkey, and 338 tanks were delivered from the USA. Saudi Arabia
ordered three large patrol boats from France in 2015, four frigates from the
USA in 2017 and five frigates from Spain in 2018.

6 Wezeman, P. D., ‘Saudi Arabia, armaments and conflict in the Middle East’, SIPRI Back-grounder, 14 Dec. 2018; and Jacobsen, S., ‘Denmark suspends Saudi weapon export approvals over
Khashoggi, Yemen concerns’, Reuters, 22 Nov. 2018.
7 Kuimova, A., ‘Russia’s arms exports to the MENA region: trends and drivers’, Euro-Mediter­
ranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) Policy Brief no. 95 (1 Apr. 2019).

military spending and arms imports in the gulf region
In a change from past practice, sev­
eral of the current major arms importprojects involve final assembly ofimported arms in Saudi Arabia. For
example, 68 of the F-15SA combat
aircraft procured from the USA will beassembled in Saudi Arabia.
QATAR

1994–98

1999–2003 2004–2008

119 TIV
764 TIV

5

2009–132014–18

27 TIV906 TIV

Military expenditure by Qatar cannot
2 949 TIVbe estimated for the years after 2010,
QATAR
when its military expenditure was$1.9 billion (current US dollars) or
1.5 per cent of GDP (see figure 1).
Between 2002 and 2010, the years forwhich data is available, Qatari mili­tary
spend­ing was much lower in absoluteterms and as a share of GDP than suchspend­ing in the other three countries
discussed.
However, in around 2010 Qatar’s foreign policy and the role of its mili­tary
Arms suppliers
dramatic­
ally altered. Qatar became
China
Germany
FranceBelgiumItaly
actively involved in the conflicts in
USA
Netherlands
UK
TurkeyOthers
Libya and Syria and started to reshape
its armed forces completely, which had
Figure 5. Imports of major arms by Qatar, 1994–2018
until then been quite small. Although
Qatar’s current level of military spend- TIV = millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values.
Note: Where applicable, up to the four largest suppliers in each period are named.
ing is not known, public data showing a
Further information on the countries categorized as ‘Others’ in each period isrise in the number and size of arms con- available from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
tracts with foreign suppliers sug­gests
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2019.
that there has been a large increase in
Qatari military expenditure over the
past five years. The total value of the contracts signed in the decade 2001–10
is estimated to be at least $1.5 billion but the value of the contracts signed in
2014–18 was at least $50 billion. 8 However, actual payment schedules, which
can be spread over many years, and other spending by the Qatari military,such as on salaries, training linked to the new equipment and the costs ofoperations, are not known.
Between 2009–13 and 2014–18, the volume of Qatar’s arms imports
increased by 225 per cent (see figure 5). The USA was the largest arms supplier
to Qatar in 2014–18, followed by Germany. Deliveries in 2014–18 included
9 Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defence systems from the USA, 62 Leopard-2
tanks from Germany, and short-range ballistic missiles from China. In thesame period, a number of contracts for even larger volumes were signed
for arms for all branches of the armed forces. Among these were orders for
36 F-15QA combat aircraft from the USA, 24 Typhoon combat aircraft from
8 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 2).

6

1994–98

1999–2003

2004–2008

sipri fact sheet

2009–132014–18

5 762 TIV

5 425 TIV

1 777 TIV
2 911 TIV
7 077 TIV

UAE

the UK and 36 Rafale combat aircraftfrom France. Once these aircraft
have been delivered, by around 2025,
Qatar will have 96 advanced combat
aircraft, equipped with cruise missiles
and other guided weapons. These
will replace Qatar’s current fleet (asof 2018) of 12 combat aircraft. Other
major procurements include 4 frigatesfrom Italy, 490 armoured vehicles
from France and 641 armoured vehicles from Turkey.
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The most recent available estimateof military spending by the UAE was$22.8 billion (current US dollars) in2014 (see figure 1), or 5.6 per cent of
GDP. In 2014 the UAE was the secondlargest military spender in the Middle
East and ranked 14th in the world. The
increase in its military expenditure
Arms suppliers
was particularly large between 2006
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
Franceand 2014 (136 per cent).
RussiaUSA
OthersTurkeyFor two reasons it is likely that the
UAE’s military spending in 2018 was
Figure 6. Imports of major arms by the UAE, 1994–2018
either of the same order of magnitude
TIV = millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values.
or higher than in 2014. First, it wasNote: Where applicable, up to the four largest suppliers in each period are named.
involved in major military operations
Further information on the countries categorized as ‘Others’ in each period isin Yemen in 2018, which was not theavailable from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
case in 2014, and remained militarily
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2019.
involved in Libya, as it was in 2014.
Second, it has continued to importlarge volumes of arms, as it did in 2014.
The UAE has invested heavily in new arms since 2000. The volume of its
arms imports was almost four times larger in 2004–2008 than in 1999–2003(see figure 6). This was followed by decreases in the volume of arms imports
in 2009–13 and in 2014–18. However, the UAE was still the fifth-largest arms
importer worldwide in the period 2009–18. After enlarging and modernizing its fleet of combat aircraft in 2003–2008, in 2009–18 the UAE procured
equipment that enhanced the reach of its armed forces, including 3 tanker
aircraft, 8 long-range transport aircraft and 10 corvettes. It also acquired anadvanced air and missile defence capability, comprising nine Patriot PAC-3
systems and two THAAD systems from the USA. It is currently expanding
its intelligence, reconnaissance and target-acquisition capabilities, mostnotably with the procurement of five airborne radar systems and two surveillance satellites for delivery from 2019. The largest suppliers to the UAE in
2014–18 were the USA and France (see figure 6).

military spending and arms imports in the gulf region

7

The UAE has invested in its arms industry in the past two decades, which
for example assembles armoured vehicles and missiles from South Africa
and corvettes from France.
MILITARY EXPENDITURE TRANSPARENCYSIPRI military expenditure data reflects the official data reported by national
governments in official publications such as budget documents and reporting to international organizations. However, government transparency inmilitary spending in Qatar and the UAE is almost non-existent and in Saudi
Arabia is very limited. There are also doubts about the reliability of government reporting on military spending by Iran. The lack of military expenditure data is a symptom of the general lack of transparency and accountability
on military matters in the Middle East.
IranWithin the Gulf region, Iran is the most transparent in its public reportingon military expenditure. The most comprehensive document is publishedannually in December by the Iranian Government. It sets out the proposed
government budget for the coming year, the budget adopted for the ongoingyear and actual spending in previous years. The document has separate lines
for each component of the regular armed forces, the Armed Forces Social
Security Organization and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council(IRGC). Nonetheless, there are questions about whether the public document shows all the relevant spending according to the SIPRI definition of
military expenditure. For example, Iran reportedly provides military aid to
the Syrian Government.9 However, it is not clear in which budget line this
support is included, or if it is included at all. There is also speculation that
the IRGC has access to funding that is not reported in the public government
documents. This would involve part of the surpluses or profits of companies
controlled by the IRGC being used to fund the military activities of the
IRGC.10 However, the size of these businesses and their revenues, profits or
surpluses are unknown.11 The significance of IRGC business activities for
Iranian military spending is therefore unclear.
Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance has published data on the total
budget and actual spending of the ‘military sector’ and the ‘security andregional administration sector’ since December 2016. However, the figure
9 Daragahi, B., ‘Iran wants to stay in Syria forever’, Foreign Policy, 1 June 2018; and Lake, E., ‘Iran

spends billions to prop up Assad’, Bloomberg, 15 June 2015.
10 Chandler, J., ‘Decoding Iran’s defence spending: pitfalls and new pointers’, Military Balance
blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 Nov. 2018. See also the section on ‘Militarycommercial activities’ in ‘Middle East and North Africa’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014 (Routledge: Abingdon, 2014), p. 306.
11 Bozorgmehr, N., ‘Iran cracks down on Revolutionary Guards business network’, Financial
Times, 14 Sep. 2017; and Harris, K., ‘All the Sepah’s men’, eds Z. Abul-Magd and E. Grawert, Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the MENA Region (Rowman andLittlefield: Lanham, MD, 2016).

SIPRI is an independentinternational institutededicated to research into
conflict, armaments, arms
control and disarmament.
Established in 1966, SIPRI
provides data, analysis andrecommendations, based on
open sources, to policymakers,
researchers, media and theinterested public.

for ‘security’ is not broken down. SIPRI assumes that a significant proportion of ‘security’ involves paramilitary forces and it therefore includes total
spending on security in military spending. In the years before 2016, the only
publicly available information was a single line in the government budget for‘defence and security’. The figures in this budget line, however, are unlikely
to be very accurate. In the period 2010–14, total actual government spending was on average 31 per cent higher than planned for in the budget, and in2015 it was 13 per cent higher.12 Given that defence and security spending
accounted for 30 per cent of government expenditure in these years, it islikely that the overspend involved higher-than-budgeted-for spending on the
military.

GOVERNING BOARD
Ambassador Jan Eliasson,
Chair (Sweden)
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar(Indonesia)
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky(Russia)
Espen Barth Eide (Norway)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Dr Radha Kumar (India)
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/
United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews(United States)

DIRECTOR
Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

Qatar and the UAE do not publicly report on their military spending. Data on‘defence spending’ by Qatar was reported in the Government Finance Stat­
istics published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) most recently
for 2010.13 Data is available on the budget of the UAE Ministry of Defence(MOD).14 However, the UAE MOD has only administrative functions andits budget accounts for only a small proportion of total military spending.
The military expenditure of the UAE is therefore uncertain. Until 2014, IMF
reports provided figures on spending on ‘Abu Dhabi Federal Services’, whichrefers to government funding from the Emirate of Abu Dhabi that the IMF
has described as mainly for military and security purposes.15 In combination
with the budget for the MOD, these figures are used by SIPRI to estimate
total military spending in the UAE up until 2014.
12 Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance, Statements on the national budget for 2011–15; andSaudi Arabian Ministry of Finance, ‘Recent economic developments and highlights of fiscal years
1436/1437 (2015) and 1437/1438 (2016)’, Press release, 28 Dec. 2015.
13 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2011 (IMF:
Washington, DC, 2012), p. 389.
14 Saleh, Y., ‘UAE raises defence spending by around 41% in 2019 federal budget’, Zawya, 2 Oct.
2018.
15 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘United Arab Emirates: statistical appendix’, IMF Country Report no. 07/348, Oct. 2007, p. 12.

The SIPRI trend-indicator value
The SIPRI trend-indicator value (TIV) is a measure of the volume of internationaltransfers of major arms. The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of acore set of arms and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather
than the financial value of the transfer. The method used to calculate the SIPRI TIV
is described in detail on the Arms Transfers Database web page.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org

Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands/Sweden) is a senior researcher and Alexandra
Kuimova (Russia) is a research assistant with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure

Programme.

© SIPRI 2019