NIST Special Publication 800-53
Revision 5

Security and Privacy Controls for
Information Systems and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

NIST Special Publication 800-53
Revision 5

Security and Privacy Controls for
Information Systems and Organizations
JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

September 2020

INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 12-10-2020; SEE PAGE XVIIU.S. Department of Commerce

Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Authority
This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under theFederal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law(P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines,
including minimum requirements for federal information systems. Such information security
standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express
approval of the appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This
guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-130.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines mademandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory
authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing
authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, OMB Director, or any other federal official. Thispublication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not
subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5
Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-53, Rev. 5, 492 pages (September 2020)
CODEN: NSPUE2This publication is available free of charge from:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document to describe
an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply
recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or
equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by
NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication,
including concepts, practices, and methodologies may be used by federal agencies even before thecompletion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current
requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning andtransition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new
publications by NIST.
Organizations are encouraged to review draft publications during the designated public comment
periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST publications, other than the ones noted above,
are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

Comments on this publication may be submitted to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
Email: sec-cert@nist.gov

All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [FOIA96].
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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information Technology Laboratory(ITL) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the
Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, referencedata, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development
and productive use of information technology (IT). ITL’s responsibilities include the developmentof management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the costeffective security of other than national security-related information in federal information
systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreachefforts in information systems security and privacy and its collaborative activities with industry,
government, and academic organizations.

Abstract
This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for information systems andorganizations to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations,and the Nation from a diverse set of threats and risks, including hostile attacks, human errors,
natural disasters, structural failures, foreign intelligence entities, and privacy risks. The controls
are flexible and customizable and implemented as part of an organization-wide process tomanage risk. The controls address diverse requirements derived from mission and businessneeds, laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Finally,
the consolidated control catalog addresses security and privacy from a functionality perspective(i.e., the strength of functions and mechanisms provided by the controls) and from an assurance
perspective (i.e., the measure of confidence in the security or privacy capability provided by thecontrols). Addressing functionality and assurance helps to ensure that information technology
products and the systems that rely on those products are sufficiently trustworthy.

Keywords
Assurance; availability; computer security; confidentiality; control; cybersecurity; FISMA;
information security; information system; integrity; personally identifiable information; Privacy
Act; privacy controls; privacy functions; privacy requirements; Risk Management Framework;
security controls; security functions; security requirements; system; system security.

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Acknowledgements
This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Interagency Working Group. The group
includes representatives from the civil, defense, and intelligence communities. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the senior leaders fromthe Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency
working group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to this publication.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Department of Defense

Office of the Director of National
Intelligence

Dana Deasy
Chief Information Officer

Matthew A. Kozma
Chief Information Officer

John Sherman
Principal Deputy CIO

Michael E. Waschull
Deputy Chief Information Officer

Mark Hakun
Deputy CIO for Cybersecurity and DoD SISO

Clifford M. Conner
Cybersecurity Group and IC CISO

Kevin Dulany
Director, Cybersecurity Policy and Partnerships

VacantDirector, Security Coordination Center

National Institute of Standards
and Technology

Committee on National Security
Systems

Charles H. Romine
Director, Information Technology Laboratory

Mark G. Hakun
Chair

Kevin Stine
Acting Cybersecurity Advisor, ITL

Susan Dorr
Co-ChairMatthew Scholl
Chief, Computer Security Division

Kevin Dulany
Tri-Chair—Defense Community

Kevin Stine
Chief, Applied Cybersecurity Division

Chris Johnson
Tri-Chair—Intelligence Community

Ron Ross
FISMA Implementation Project Leader

Vicki Michetti
Tri-Chair—Civil Agencies

Joint Task Force Working Group
Victoria Pillitteri
NIST, JTF Leader

McKay Tolboe
DoD

Dorian Pappas
Intelligence Community

Kelley Dempsey
NIST

Ehijele Olumese
The MITRE Corporation

Lydia Humphries
Booz Allen Hamilton

Daniel Faigin
Aerospace Corporation

Naomi Lefkovitz
NIST

Esten Porter
The MITRE Corporation

Julie Nethery Snyder
The MITRE Corporation

Christina Sames
The MITRE Corporation

Christian Enloe
NIST

David BlackThe MITRE Corporation

Rich Graubart
The MITRE Corporation

Peter Duspiva
Intelligence Community

Kaitlin Boeckl
NIST

Eduardo Takamura
NIST

Ned Goren
NIST

Andrew Regenscheid
NIST

Jon Boyens
NIST

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to Jeff Brewer, Jim
Foti, and the NIST web team for their outstanding administrative support. The authors also wish
to recognize Kristen Baldwin, Carol Bales, John Bazile, Jennifer Besceglie, Sean Brooks, Ruth
Cannatti, Kathleen Coupe, Keesha Crosby, Charles Cutshall, Ja’Nelle DeVore, Jennifer Fabius, Jim
Fenton, Hildy Ferraiolo, Ryan Galluzzo, Robin Gandhi, Mike Garcia, Paul Grassi, Marc Groman,
Matthew Halstead, Kevin Herms, Scott Hill, Ralph Jones, Martin Kihiko, Raquel Leone, Jason
Marsico, Kirsten Moncada, Ellen Nadeau, Elaine Newton, Michael Nieles, Michael Nussdorfer,
Taylor Roberts, Jasmeet Seehra, Joe Stuntz, Jeff Williams, the professional staff from the NIST
Computer Security Division and Applied Cybersecurity Division, and the representatives fromthe Federal CIO Council, Federal CISO Council, Federal Privacy Council, Control Baseline
Interagency Working Group, Security and Privacy Collaboration Working Group, and Federal
Privacy Council Risk Management Subcommittee for their ongoing contributions in helping to
improve the content of the publication. Finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge thecontributions from individuals and organizations in the public and private sectors, bothnationally and internationally, whose insightful and constructive comments improved theoverall quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.

HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53
The authors wanted to acknowledge the many individuals who contributed to previous versionsof Special Publication 800-53 since its inception in 2005. They include Marshall Abrams, Dennis
Bailey, Lee Badger, Curt Barker, Matthew Barrett, Nadya Bartol, Frank Belz, Paul Bicknell, Deb
Bodeau, Paul Brusil, Brett Burley, Bill Burr, Dawn Cappelli, Roger Caslow, Corinne Castanza, Mike
Cooper, Matt Coose, Dominic Cussatt, George Dinolt, Randy Easter, Kurt Eleam, Denise Farrar,
Dave Ferraiolo, Cita Furlani, Harriett Goldman, Peter Gouldmann, Tim Grance, Jennifer Guild,
Gary Guissanie, Sarbari Gupta, Priscilla Guthrie, Richard Hale, Peggy Himes, Bennett Hodge,
William Hunteman, Cynthia Irvine, Arnold Johnson, Roger Johnson, Donald Jones, Lisa Kaiser,
Stuart Katzke, Sharon Keller, Tom Kellermann, Cass Kelly, Eustace King, Daniel Klemm, Steve
LaFountain, Annabelle Lee, Robert Lentz, Steven Lipner, William MacGregor, Thomas Macklin,
Thomas Madden, Robert Martin, Erika McCallister, Tim McChesney, Michael McEvilley, Rosalie
McQuaid, Peter Mell, John Mildner, Pam Miller, Sandra Miravalle, Joji Montelibano, Douglas
Montgomery, George Moore, Rama Moorthy, Mark Morrison, Harvey Newstrom, Sherrill Nicely,
Robert Niemeyer, LouAnna Notargiacomo, Pat O’Reilly, Tim Polk, Karen Quigg, Steve Quinn,
Mark Riddle, Ed Roback, Cheryl Roby, George Rogers, Scott Rose, Mike Rubin, Karen Scarfone,
Roger Schell, Jackie Snouffer, Ray Snouffer, Murugiah Souppaya, Gary Stoneburner, Keith
Stouffer, Marianne Swanson, Pat Toth, Glenda Turner, Patrick Viscuso, Joe Weiss, Richard
Wilsher, Mark Wilson, John Woodward, and Carol Woody.

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Patent Disclosure Notice
NOTICE: The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) has requested that holders of patentclaims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of thispublication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated torespond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify
which, if any, patents may apply to this publication.
As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose
use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, nosuch patent claims have been identified to ITL.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent
infringement in the use of this publication.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________RISK MANAGEMENT

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Organizations must exercise due diligence in managing information security and privacy risk. Thisis accomplished, in part, by establishing a comprehensive risk management program that uses
the flexibility inherent in NIST publications to categorize systems, select and implement security
and privacy controls that meet mission and business needs, assess the effectiveness of thecontrols, authorize the systems for operation, and continuously monitor the systems. Exercising
due diligence and implementing robust and comprehensive information security and privacy risk
management programs can facilitate compliance with applicable laws, regulations, executive
orders, and governmentwide policies. Risk management frameworks and risk management
processes are essential in developing, implementing, and maintaining the protection measuresnecessary to address stakeholder needs and the current threats to organizational operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Employing effective risk-based
processes, procedures, methods, and technologies ensures that information systems andorganizations have the necessary trustworthiness and resiliency to support essential mission andbusiness functions, the U.S. critical infrastructure, and continuity of government.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________COMMON SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOUNDATIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

In working with the Office of Management and Budget to develop standards and guidelines
required by FISMA, NIST consults with federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, andprivate sector organizations to improve information security and privacy, avoid unnecessary andcostly duplication of effort, and help ensure that its publications are complementary with thestandards and guidelines used for the protection of national security systems. In addition to acomprehensive and transparent public review and comment process, NIST is engaged in acollaborative partnership with the Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, Department of Defense, Committee on National Security Systems, Federal
CIO Council, and Federal Privacy Council to establish a Risk Management Framework (RMF) for
information security and privacy for the Federal Government. This common foundation provides
the Federal Government and their contractors with cost-effective, flexible, and consistent ways
to manage security and privacy risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation. The framework provides a basis for the reciprocal acceptance of
security and privacy control assessment evidence and authorization decisions and facilitates
information sharing and collaboration. NIST continues to work with public and private sector
entities to establish mappings and relationships between the standards and guidelines
developed by NIST and those developed by other organizations. NIST anticipates using these
mappings and the gaps they identify to improve the control catalog.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND SERVICES

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

With a renewed emphasis on the use of trustworthy, secure information systems and supply
chain security, it is essential that organizations express their security and privacy requirementswith clarity and specificity in order to obtain the systems, components, and services necessary
for mission and business success. Accordingly, this publication provides controls in the System
and Services Acquisition (SA) and Supply Chain Risk Management (SR) families that are directed
at developers. The scope of the controls in those families includes information system, systemcomponent, and system service development and the associated developers whether thedevelopment is conducted internally by organizations or externally through the contracting andacquisition processes. The affected controls in the control catalog include SA-8, SA-10, SA-11,
SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-20, SA-21, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-6, SR-7, SR-8, SR-9, and SR-11.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________INFORMATION SYSTEMS — A BROAD-BASED PERSPECTIVE

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

As we push computers to “the edge,” building an increasingly complex world of interconnected
systems and devices, security and privacy continue to dominate the national dialogue. There isan urgent need to further strengthen the underlying systems, products, and services that we
depend on in every sector of the critical infrastructure to ensure that those systems, products,
and services are sufficiently trustworthy and provide the necessary resilience to support theeconomic and national security interests of the United States. NIST Special Publication 800-53,
Revision 5, responds to this need by embarking on a proactive and systemic approach to develop
and make available to a broad base of public and private sector organizations a comprehensive
set of security and privacy safeguarding measures for all types of computing platforms, including
general purpose computing systems, cyber-physical systems, cloud systems, mobile systems,
industrial control systems, and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Safeguarding measures include
both security and privacy controls to protect the critical and essential operations and assets oforganizations and the privacy of individuals. The objective is to make the systems we depend on
more penetration resistant to attacks, limit the damage from those attacks when they occur,and make the systems resilient, survivable, and protective of individuals’ privacy.

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CONTROL BASELINES
The control baselines that have previously been included in NIST Special Publication 800-53 havebeen relocated to NIST Special Publication 800-53B. SP 800-53B contains security and privacy
control baselines for federal information systems and organizations. It provides guidance for
tailoring control baselines and for developing overlays to support the security and privacy
requirements of stakeholders and their organizations. CNSS Instruction 1253 provides control
baselines and guidance for security categorization and security control selection for national
security systems.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________USE OF EXAMPLES IN THIS PUBLICATION
Throughout this publication, examples are used to illustrate, clarify, or explain certain items inchapter sections, controls, and control enhancements. These examples are illustrative in nature
and are not intended to limit or constrain the application of controls or control enhancements
by organizations.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________FEDERAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT COLLABORATION
Federal records management processes have a nexus with certain information security andprivacy requirements and controls. For example, records officers may be managing records
retention, including when records will be deleted. Collaborating with records officers on theselection and implementation of security and privacy controls related to records management
can support consistency and efficiency and ultimately strengthen the organization’s security andprivacy posture.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................... 2
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE .................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES......................................................................................... 3
1.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PUBLICATIONS................................................................................... 5
1.5 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS .................................................................................................... 5
1.6 PUBLICATION ORGANIZATION .................................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS ............................................................................................ 7
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

2.1 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS .............................................................................................. 7
2.2 CONTROL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION .............................................................................. 8
2.3 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES ............................................................................. 11
2.4 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS ......................................................................................... 13
2.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ASSURANCE ..................................................................................... 14

CHAPTER THREE THE CONTROLS ................................................................................................. 16
3.1 ACCESS CONTROL .................................................................................................................. 18
3.2 AWARENESS AND TRAINING ................................................................................................... 59
3.3 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................................. 65
3.4 ASSESSMENT, AUTHORIZATION, AND MONITORING ................................................................. 83
3.5 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................... 96
3.6 CONTINGENCY PLANNING .................................................................................................... 115
3.7 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ............................................................................... 131
3.8 INCIDENT RESPONSE ............................................................................................................ 149
3.9 MAINTENANCE.................................................................................................................... 162
3.10 MEDIA PROTECTION .......................................................................................................... 171
3.11 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION .................................................................... 179
3.12 PLANNING ........................................................................................................................ 194
3.13 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................. 203
3.14 PERSONNEL SECURITY ........................................................................................................ 222
3.15 PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TRANSPARENCY ....................... 229
3.16 RISK ASSESSMENT.............................................................................................................. 238
3.17 SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION .................................................................................. 249
3.18 SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION ................................................................... 292
3.19 SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY .............................................................................. 332
3.20 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT..................................................................................... 363

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 374
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................. 394
APPENDIX B ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................ 424
APPENDIX C CONTROL SUMMARIES .......................................................................................... 428

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Executive Summary
As we push computers to “the edge,” building an increasingly complex world of connected
information systems and devices, security and privacy will continue to dominate the national
dialogue. In its 2017 report, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence [DSB 2017], the Defense Science
Board (DSB) provides a sobering assessment of the current vulnerabilities in the U.S. criticalinfrastructure and the information systems that support mission-essential operations and assets
in the public and private sectors.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5“…The Task Force notes that the cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure is outpacing
efforts to reduce pervasive vulnerabilities, so that for the next decade at least the United States
must lean significantly on deterrence to address the cyber threat posed by the most capable
U.S. adversaries. It is clear that a more proactive and systematic approach to U.S. cyberdeterrence is urgently needed…”

There is an urgent need to further strengthen the underlying information systems, component
products, and services that the Nation depends on in every sector of the critical infrastructure—ensuring that those systems, components, and services are sufficiently trustworthy and provide
the necessary resilience to support the economic and national security interests of the UnitedStates. This update to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 responds to the call by the DSB byembarking on a proactive and systemic approach to develop and make available to a broad baseof public and private sector organizations a comprehensive set of safeguarding measures for all
types of computing platforms, including general purpose computing systems, cyber-physicalsystems, cloud-based systems, mobile devices, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, weaponssystems, space systems, communications systems, environmental control systems, supercomputers, and industrial control systems. Those safeguarding measures include implementing
security and privacy controls to protect the critical and essential operations and assets oforganizations and the privacy of individuals. The objectives are to make the information systems
we depend on more penetration-resistant, limit the damage from attacks when they occur,
make the systems cyber-resilient and survivable, and protect individuals’ privacy.
Revision 5 of this foundational NIST publication represents a multi-year effort to develop thenext generation of security and privacy controls that will be needed to accomplish the above
objectives. It includes changes to make the controls more usable by diverse consumer groups(e.g., enterprises conducting mission and business functions; engineering organizations
developing information systems, IoT devices, and systems-of-systems; and industry partners
building system components, products, and services). The most significant changes to thispublication include:• Making the controls more outcome-based by removing the entity responsible for satisfying
the control (i.e., information system, organization) from the control statement;• Integrating information security and privacy controls into a seamless, consolidated control
catalog for information systems and organizations;• Establishing a new supply chain risk management control family;• Separating control selection processes from the controls, thereby allowing the controls to be
used by different communities of interest, including systems engineers, security architects,
software developers, enterprise architects, systems security and privacy engineers, andmission or business owners;

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________• Removing control baselines and tailoring guidance from the publication and transferring thecontent to NIST SP 800-53B, Control Baselines for Information Systems and Organizations;• Clarifying the relationship between requirements and controls and the relationship between
security and privacy controls; and• Incorporating new, state-of-the-practice controls (e.g., controls to support cyber resiliency,
support secure systems design, and strengthen security and privacy governance andaccountability) based on the latest threat intelligence and cyber-attack data.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

In separating the process of control selection from the controls and removing the control
baselines, a significant amount of guidance and other informative material previously containedin SP 800-53 was eliminated. That content will be moved to other NIST publications such as SP
800-37 (Risk Management Framework) and SP 800-53B during the next update cycle. In the near
future, NIST also plans to offer the content of SP 800-53, SP 800-53A, and SP 800-53B to a webbased portal to provide its customers interactive, online access to all control, control baseline,
overlay, and assessment information.

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Prologue“…Through the process of risk management, leaders must consider risk to US interests fromadversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our own efforts to employ the global
nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations… ““…For operational plans development, the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts
must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where effort should beapplied to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities; eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities; and assess,coordinate, and deconflict all cyberspace operations…”
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5“…Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree as
in any other domain…"
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONSOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE__________“Networking and information technology [are] transforming life in the 21st century, changing
the way people, businesses, and government interact. Vast improvements in computing, storage,
and communications are creating new opportunities for enhancing our social wellbeing;
improving health and health care; eliminating barriers to education and employment; andincreasing efficiencies in many sectors such as manufacturing, transportation, and agriculture.
The promise of these new applications often stems from their ability to create, collect, transmit,
process, and archive information on a massive scale. However, the vast increase in the quantityof personal information that is being collected and retained, combined with the increased ability
to analyze it and combine it with other information, is creating valid concerns about privacy andabout the ability of entities to manage these unprecedented volumes of data responsibly…. A key
challenge of this era is to assure that growing capabilities to create, capture, store, and process
vast quantities of information will not damage the core values of the country….”“…When systems process personal information, whether by collecting, analyzing, generating,disclosing, retaining, or otherwise using the information, they can impact privacy of individuals.
System designers need to account for individuals as stakeholders in the overall development of
the solution.…Designing for privacy must connect individuals’ privacy desires with system
requirements and controls in a way that effectively bridges the aspirations with development….”
THE NATIONAL PRIVACY RESEARCH STRATEGYNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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ErrataThis table contains changes that have been incorporated into SP 800-53, Revision 5. Errata
updates can include corrections, clarifications, or other minor changes in the publication thatare either editorial or substantive in nature. Any potential updates for this document that are
not yet published in an errata update or revision—including additional issues and potential
corrections—will be posted as they are identified; see the SP 800-53, Revision 5 publication
details.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

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REVISION
Acknowledgements (ODNI): Add “Matthew A. Kozma, Chief
Information Officer”
Acknowledgements (ODNI): Add “Michael E. Waschull, Deputy Chief
Information Officer”
Acknowledgements (ODNI): Add “Clifford M. Conner, Cybersecurity
Group and IC CISO”
Call Out Box: Change “Special Publication 800-53B contains control
baselines” to “SP 800-53B contains security and privacy control
baselines”
Chapter One (Footnote 7): Add “[SP 800-53A]”
Section 1.4: Delete “The controls have also been mapped to therequirements for federal information systems included in [OMB A130].”
Section 1.4 (Footnote 23): Delete “[OMB A-130] establishes policy
for the planning, budgeting, governance, acquisition, andmanagement of federal information, personnel, equipment, funds,
IT resources, and supporting infrastructure and services.”
Section 2.4 (first paragraph): Change “personally identifiable
information (PII)” to “PII”
Control AC-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control AC-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement AC-3(2) Discussion: Change “authorization
duties to other individuals” to “authorization duties”
Control Enhancement AC-3(9) Discussion: Change “mitigating
control” to “mitigation measure”
Control Enhancement AC-3(14) Related Controls: Add “, PT-6”
Control Enhancement AC-4(17): Change “organization, system,
application, service, individual” to “organization; system;
application; service; individual”
Control Enhancement AC-4(25): Change “Selection (one or more:” to“Selection (one or more):”Control AC-12: Change “conditions,” to “conditions”
Control AC-14 Discussion: Change “assignment” to “assignment
operation”
Control AC-19 Discussion: Change “the organizational network” to“its network”

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Control AC-19 Discussion: Change “Many controls for mobile
devices are reflected in other controls allocated to the initial control
baselines as starting points for the development of security plansand overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be someoverlap by the security controls within the different families ofcontrols.” to “Many safeguards for mobile devices are reflected inother controls.”
Control AC-20 Discussion: Change “organizational systems” to“organizational systems,”
Control Enhancement AC-20(3) Discussion: Change “AC-20(6)” to“AC-20 b.”
Control AT-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control AT-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control AT-2d.: Change “security or privacy incidents” to “security
incidents or breaches”
Control AT-2 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control AT-3c.: Change “security or privacy incidents” to “security
incidents or breaches”
Control AT-3 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control AT-3 Related Controls: Change “IR-10” to “IR-4”
Control AT-6 Discussion: Change “assessment and update” to“evaluation and update”
Control AT-6 Discussion: Change “organization training” to“organizational training”
Control AU-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control AU-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control CA-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control CA-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control CA-1 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control CA-1 References: Add “[SP 800-137A],”
Control Enhancement CA-2(2): Change “data loss assessment” to“data loss assessment;”
Control CA-3 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control CA-7 Discussion: Change “SC-18c” to “SC-18b”
Control CM-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control CM-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control CM-2b.2.: Change “Assignment” to “Assignment:”
Control Enhancement CM-7(4) Title: Change “UNAUTHORIZEDSOFTWARE” to “UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE – DENY-BYEXCEPTION”

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Control Enhancement CM-7(5) Title: Change “AUTHORIZEDSOFTWARE” to “AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE – ALLOW-BY-EXCEPTION”
Control CM-8 Related Controls: Add “CP-9,”
Control CP-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control CP-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control CP-3 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement CP-9(7) Title: Change “DUAL
AUTHORIZATION” to “DUAL AUTHORIZATION FOR DELETION OR
DESTRUCTION”
Control Enhancement CP-10(3): Change “tailoring procedures” to“tailoring”
Control IA-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control IA-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement IA-2(1) Discussion: Change “Common AccessCard” to “Common Access Card (CAC)”
Control Enhancement IA-2(7) Title: Change “ACCESS” to “NETWORKACCESS”
Control Enhancement IA-8(5) Discussion: Change “Personal Identity
Verification (PIV)” to “PIV”
Control IR-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control IR-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement IR-2(1) Discussion: Delete “Incident response
training includes tabletop exercises that simulate a breach. See IR2(3).”Control IR-4 Related Controls: Add “IR-5,”
Control IR-5 Related Controls: Add “IR-4, IR-6,”
Control Enhancement IR-5(1) Related Controls: Change “AU-7, IR-4”
to “None”
Control IR-10: Change “Incident Analysis” to “Integrated
Information Security Analysis Team”
Control IR-10: Change “Incorporated into” to “Moved to”
Control MA-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control MA-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement MA-4(2): Change “MA-1, MA-4” to “MA-1 andMA-4”
Control MP-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control MP-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control MP-3 References: Add “[EO 13556],”

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Control PE-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control PE-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement PE-3(8) Discussion: Delete “, or mantrap,”
Control Enhancement PE-3(8) Discussion: Change “Mantraps” to“Vestibules”
Control Enhancement PE-19(1) Title: Delete ”AND TEMPEST”
Control PL-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control PL-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control PL-2 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PL-7 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PL-11 Discussion: Change “[FISMA] and [PRIVACT]” to“[FISMA], [PRIVACT], and [OMB A-130]”
Control PM-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control PM-2 References: Add “, [SP 800-181]”
Control PM-5 References: Add “[OMB A-130],”
Control PM-8 References: Add “[EO 13636],”
Control PM-10 References: Add “, [SP 800-181]”
Control PM-11 Related Controls: Add “RA-9,”
Control PM-12 References: Add “[NITP12],”Control PM-17 References: Add “[SP 800-172],”
Control PM-19 Related Controls: Add “, PM-27”
Control PM-22 References: Add “[OMB M-19-15],”
Control PM-24 Related Controls: Add “PT-2,”
Control PM-24 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PM-25 Related Controls: Add “, SI-12”
Control PM-25 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PM-29 References: Add “, [SP 800-181]”
Control PM-30 References: Add “[CNSSD 505],”
Control PM-31 Discussion: Change “SC-18c” to “SC-18b”
Control PM-31 References: Add “, [SP 800-137A]”
Control PM-32 References: Change “[SP 800-137]” to “[SP 800-1601], [SP 800-160-2]”
Control PS-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control PS-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement PS-3(3) Title: Change “WITH” to “REQUIRING”
Control PT-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control PT-1 Discussion: Change “privacy breaches” to “breaches”

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Control Enhancement PT-2(1): Change “permissible” to“authorized”
Control PT-2 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PT-3a.: Change “[Assignment organization-defined
purpose(s)]” to “[Assignment: organization-defined purpose(s)]”Control PT-3 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control PT-5 Related Controls: Add “SC-42,”
Control Enhancement PT-6(2): Change “[Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]” to “[Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]”
Control PT-7 References: Add “, [NARA CUI]”
Control PT-8 References: Add “[CMPPA],”Control RA-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control RA-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control RA-2 References: Add “, [NARA CUI]”
Control RA-3 Related Controls: Add “PT-2,”
Control RA-8 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control RA-9 Related Controls: Add “PM-11,”
Control SA-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control SA-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control SA-2 References: Add “[SP 800-37], ”Control SA-4 References: Add “[ISO 29148], ”Control Enhancement SA-9(5) Discussion: Change “security or
privacy incidents” to “security incidents or breaches”
Control Enhancement SA-10(2) Title: Change “ALTERNATIVECONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT” to “ALTERNATIVECONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES”
Control SA-11a.: Change “assessments” to “control assessments”
Control Enhancement SA-12(13): Change “MA-6, RA-9” to “MA-6
and RA-9”
Control Enhancement SA-12(14): Change “SR-4(1), SR-4(2)” to “SR4(1) and SR-4(2)”Control Enhancement SA-17(4)(b): Change “informal
demonstration,” to “informal demonstration;”Control SA-23: Change “design modification, augmentation,
reconfiguration” to “design; modification; augmentation;
reconfiguration”
Control SC-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control SC-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control SC-6: Change “Selection (one or more);” to “Selection (oneor more):”

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Control SC-7 Discussion: Add “[SP 800-189] provides additional
information on source address validation techniques to prevent
ingress and egress of traffic with spoofed addresses.”
Control Enhancement SC-7(4) Discussion: Delete “Unauthorized
control plane traffic can occur through a technique known as
spoofing.”
Control Enhancement SC-7(4) Discussion: Change “routing” to“Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing“
Control Enhancement SC-7(4) Discussion: Change “management” to“management protocols“
Control Enhancement SC-7(4) Discussion: Add “See [SP 800-189] for
additional information on the use of the resource public key
infrastructure (RPKI) to protect BGP routes and detect unauthorized
BGP announcements.”
Control Enhancement SC-7(4) Related Controls: Add “, SC-20, SC-21,
SC-22”
Control Enhancement SC-7(5): Change “Selection (one or more);” to“Selection (one or more):”Control SC-14: Change “SI-7,” to “SI-7, and”
Control SC-17 Discussion: Change “Public Key Infrastructure” to“Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)”
Control SC-19: Change “addressed by other controls for protocols”
to “addressed as any other technology or protocol”
Control Enhancement SC-30(4) Related Controls: Change “SC-26” to“None”
Control Enhancement SC-31(2): Change “Selection (one or more);”to “Selection (one or more):”Control SC-42b.: Change “class of users” to “group of users”
Control SI-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control SI-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control SI-3c.1.: Change “Selection (one or more);” to “Selection(one or more):”Control SI-9: Change “AC-5,” to “AC-5, and”
Control SI-10 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control Enhancement SI-12(1): Change “PII” to “personallyidentifiable information”
Control Enhancement SI-12(1) Related Controls: Delete “PT-2, PT-3,
RA-3”
Control Enhancement SI-12(3) Related Controls: Change “MP-6” to“None”
Control SI-12 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control SI-18 Related Controls: Add “PT-2,”
Control Enhancement SI-18(1) Related Controls: Delete “PM-22,”
Control Enhancement SI-18(4) Related Controls: Change “PM-22” to“None”
Control SI-18 References: Add “[OMB M-19-15],”
Control SI-19 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”
Control SI-20 References: Change “[OMB A-130, Appendix II]” to“[OMB A-130]”

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Control SR-1a.1.: Change “organization-level; mission/businessprocess-level; system-level” to “Organization-level; Mission/businessprocess-level; System-level”
Control SR-1 Discussion: Change “security or privacy incidents” to“security incidents or breaches”
Control SR-1 References: Add “[CNSSD 505],”
Control SR-2 References: Add “[SP 800-181],”Control SR-2 References: Add “[CNSSD 505],”
Control Enhancement SR-5(2) Related Controls: Delete “SR-9”
Control Enhancement SR-6(1): Change “organizational analysis,
independent third-party analysis, organizational testing,independent third-party testing” to “organizational analysis;
independent third-party analysis; organizational testing;independent third-party testing”
References [ATOM54]: Change “Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 107)” to“Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 83-703)”
References [ISO 15026-1]: Change “International Organization forStandardization/International Electrotechnical Commission(ISO/IEC) 15026-1:2013, Systems and software engineering —Systems and software assurance — Part 1: Concepts andvocabulary, November 2013.
https://www.iso.org/standard/62526.html” to “International
Organization for Standardization/International ElectrotechnicalCommission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers(ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15026-1:2019, Systems and software engineering —Systems and software assurance — Part 1: Concepts andvocabulary, March 2019.
https://www.iso.org/standard/73567.html”
References: Delete “[ISO 28001]”
References [ISO 29148]: Change “International Organization forStandardization/International ElectrotechnicalCommission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers(ISO/IEC/IEEE) 29148:2011, Systems and software engineering—Life
cycle processes—Requirements engineering, December 2011.
https://www.iso.org/standard/45171.html” to “International
Organization for Standardization/International ElectrotechnicalCommission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers(ISO/IEC/IEEE) 29148:2018, Systems and software engineering—Life
cycle processes—Requirements engineering, November 2018.
https://www.iso.org/standard/72089.html”
References [SP 800-53B]: Change “Draft NIST” to “NIST”
References [SP 800-53B]: Change“https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53B-draft” to“https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53B”
References: Delete “[SP 800-58]”
References: Add “[SP 800-137A] Dempsey KL, Pillitteri VY, Baer C,
Niemeyer R, Rudman R, Urban S (2020) Assessing Information
Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) Programs: Developing an
ISCM Program Assessment. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800137A. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-137A”
References: Delete “[SP 800-161-1]”

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REVISION
References [SP 800-181]: Change “Newhouse WD, Witte GA,
Scribner B, Keith S (2017) National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-181.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-181” to “Petersen R, Santos D,
Smith MC, Wetzel KA, Witte G (2020) Workforce Framework for
Cybersecurity (NICE Framework). (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-181, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-181r1”
References [DODTERMS]: Change“http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485800.pdf” to“https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/diction
ary.pdf”
Appendix A Glossary (counterfeit): Change “[SP 800-161-1]” to [SP
800-161]”
Appendix A Glossary (supplier): Delete “[SP 800-161-1]”
Appendix A Glossary (supply chain): Delete “[SP 800-161-1]”
Appendix A Glossary (supply chain risk): Delete “[SP 800-161-1]”
Appendix A Glossary (supply chain risk assessment): Delete “[SP800-161-1]”
Appendix A Glossary (supply chain risk management): Delete “[SP800-161-1]”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “BGP Border Gateway Protocol”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “CAC Common Access Card”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “CONOPS Concept of Operations”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “DSB Defense Science Board”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “FICAM Federal Identity, Credential, andAccess Management”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “IEEE Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “ISAO Information Sharing and Analysis
Organizations”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “ITL Information Technology
Laboratory”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “MLS Multilevel Secure”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “ODNI Office of the Director of National
Intelligence”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “OPM Office of Personnel Management”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “PDS Position Designation System”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “RPKI Resource Public Key
Infrastructure”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “SCRM Supply Chain Risk Management”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “SDLC System Development Life Cycle”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “SIEM Security Information and EventManagement”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “SWID Software Identification”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “TIC Trusted Internet Connections”
Appendix B Acronyms: Add “UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware
Interface”

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Appendix B Acronyms: Add “UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply”
Appendix C Control Summaries: Change “w” to “W”
Table C-1 (AC-3(1)) Title: Change “FUNCTION” to “FUNCTIONS”
Table C-1 (AC-3(6)): Change “MP-4, SC-28” to “MP-4 and SC-28”
Table C-1 (AC-13): Change “AC-2, AU-6” to “AC-2 and AU-6”
Table C-3 (AU-7(2)) Title: Change “SEARCH AND SORT” to “SORTAND SEARCH”
Table C-3 AU-15: Change “Incorporated into” to “Moved to”
Table C-4 (CA-3(1)) Title: Change “CONNECTIONS” to “SYSTEMCONNECTIONS”
Table C-5 (CM-7(4)) Title: Change “UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE” to“UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE – DENY-BY-EXCEPTION”
Table C-5 (CM-7(5)) Title: Change “AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE” to“AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE – ALLOW-BY-EXCEPTION”
Table C-5: Delete duplicate row CM-8(5).
Table C-6 (CP-9(7)) Title: Change “DUAL AUTHORIZATION” to “DUAL
AUTHORIZATION FOR DELETION OR DESTRUCTION”
Table C-7 (IA-5(11)): Change “IA-2(1)(2)” to “IA-2(1) and IA-2(2)”Table C-8 (IR-10) Title: Change “Integrated Information Security
Analysis” to “Integrated Information Security Analysis Team”
Table C-9 (MA-4(2)): Change “MA-1, MA-4” to “MA-1 and MA-4”
Table C-11 (PE-7): Change “PE-2, PE-3” to “PE-2 and PE-3”
Table C-11 (PE-19(1)) Title: Delete ”AND TEMPEST”
Table C-14 (PS-3(1)) Title: Change “INFORMATION” to “INFORMATION”
Table C-14 (PS-3(3)) Title: Change “WITH” to “REQUIRING”
Table C-17 (SA-6): Change “CM-10, SI-7” to “CM-10 and SI-7”
Table C-17 (SA-7): Change “CM-11, SI-7” to “CM-11 and SI-7”
Table C-17 (SA-12(13)): Change “MA-6, RA-9” to “MA-6 and RA-9”
Table C-17 (SA-12(14)): Change “SR-4(1)(2)” to “SR-4(1) and SR-4(2)”Table C-17 (SA-12(15)) Title: Change “PROCESS” to “PROCESSES”
Table C-18 (SC-7(25)) Title: Change “CONNECTIONS” to “SYSTEMCONNECTIONS”
Table C-18 (SC-12(4)): Change “SC-12” to “SC-12(3)”Table C-18 (SC-12(5)): Change “SC-12” to “SC-12(3)”Table C-18 (SC-14): Change “SI-7,” to “SI-7, and”
Table C-18 (SC-19): Change “addressed by other controls for
protocols” to “addressed as any other technology or protocol.”Table C-19 (SI-9): Change “AC-5,” to “AC-5, and”
Table C-19 (SI-19(7)) Title: Change “SOFTWARE” to “ANDSOFTWARE”

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
THE NEED TO PROTECT INFORMATION, SYSTEMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Modern information systems 1 can include a variety of computing platforms (e.g., industrial
control systems, general purpose computing systems, cyber-physical systems, super computers,
weapons systems, communications systems, environmental control systems, medical devices,
embedded devices, sensors, and mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets). These
platforms all share a common foundation—computers with complex hardware, software andfirmware providing a capability that supports the essential mission and business functions oforganizations. 2
Security controls are the safeguards or countermeasures employed within a system or an
organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
information and to manage information security 3 risk. Privacy controls are the administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards employed within a system or an organization to manage
privacy risks and to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements. 4 Security andprivacy controls are selected and implemented to satisfy security and privacy requirements
levied on a system or organization. Security and privacy requirements are derived fromapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and mission needs
to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information processed, stored, ortransmitted and to manage risks to individual privacy.
The selection, design, and implementation of security and privacy controls 5 are important tasks
that have significant implications for the operations 6 and assets of organizations as well as thewelfare of individuals and the Nation. Organizations should answer several key questions whenaddressing information security and privacy controls:•

What security and privacy controls are needed to satisfy security and privacy requirements
and to adequately manage mission/business risks or risks to individuals?

•

Have the selected controls been implemented or is there a plan in place to do so?

•

What is the required level of assurance (i.e., grounds for confidence) that the selected
controls, as designed and implemented, are effective? 7

1 An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing,maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information [OMB A-130].
2 The term organization describes an entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any of its operational elements).
3 The two terms information security and security are used synonymously in this publication.
4 [OMB A-130] defines security and privacy controls.
5 Controls provide safeguards and countermeasures in systems security and privacy engineering processes to reducerisk during the system development life cycle.
6 Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation.
7 Security and privacy control effectiveness addresses the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly,
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the designated security andprivacy requirements [SP 800-53A].

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The answers to these questions are not given in isolation but rather in the context of a risk
management process for the organization that identifies, assesses, responds to, and monitors
security and privacy risks arising from its information and systems on an ongoing basis. 8 The
security and privacy controls in this publication are recommended for use by organizations tosatisfy their information security and privacy requirements. The control catalog can be viewed
as a toolbox containing a collection of safeguards, countermeasures, techniques, and processes
to respond to security and privacy risks. The controls are employed as part of a well-defined risk
management process that supports organizational information security and privacy programs. Inturn, those information security and privacy programs lay the foundation for the success of themission and business functions of the organization.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

It is important that responsible officials understand the security and privacy risks that could
adversely affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the
Nation. 9 These officials must also understand the current status of their security and privacy
programs and the controls planned or in place to protect information, information systems, andorganizations in order to make informed judgments and investments that respond to identified
risks in an acceptable manner. The objective is to manage these risks through the selection andimplementation of security and privacy controls.

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
This publication establishes controls for systems and organizations. The controls can be
implemented within any organization or system that processes, stores, or transmits information.
The use of these controls is mandatory for federal information systems 10 in accordance with
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 [OMB A-130] and the provisions of theFederal Information Security Modernization Act 11 [FISMA], which requires the implementationof minimum controls to protect federal information and information systems. 12 This publication,
along with other supporting NIST publications, is designed to help organizations identify the
security and privacy controls needed to manage risk and to satisfy the security and privacy
requirements in FISMA, the Privacy Act of 1974 [PRIVACT], OMB policies (e.g., [OMB A-130]),and designated Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), among others. It accomplishes
this objective by providing a comprehensive and flexible catalog of security and privacy controls
to meet current and future protection needs based on changing threats, vulnerabilities,
requirements, and technologies. The publication also improves communication amongorganizations by providing a common lexicon that supports the discussion of security, privacy,
and risk management concepts.

8 The Risk Management Framework in [SP 800-37] is an example of a comprehensive risk management process.
9 This includes risk to critical infrastructure and key resources described in [HSPD-7].
10 A federal information system is an information system used or operated by an agency, a contractor of an agency, or

another organization on behalf of an agency.

11 Information systems that have been designated as national security systems, as defined in 44 U.S.C., Section 3542,

are not subject to the requirements in [FISMA]. However, the controls established in this publication may be selected
for national security systems as otherwise required (e.g., the Privacy Act of 1974) or with the approval of federal
officials exercising policy authority over such systems. [CNSSP 22] and [CNSSI 1253] provide guidance for national
security systems. [DODI 8510.01] provides guidance for the Department of Defense.
12 While the controls established in this publication are mandatory for federal information systems and organizations,other organizations such as state, local, and tribal governments as well as private sector organizations are encouraged
to consider using these guidelines, as appropriate. See [SP 800-53B] for federal control baselines.

CHAPTER ONE

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Finally, the controls are independent of the process employed to select those controls. The
control selection process can be part of an organization-wide risk management process, asystems engineering process [SP 800-160-1], 13 the Risk Management Framework [SP 800-37],
the Cybersecurity Framework [NIST CSF], or the Privacy Framework [NIST PF]. 14 The control
selection criteria can be guided and informed by many factors, including mission and businessneeds, stakeholder protection needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and requirements to comply withfederal laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. The
combination of a catalog of security and privacy controls and a risk-based control selection
process can help organizations comply with stated security and privacy requirements, obtainadequate security for their information systems, and protect the privacy of individuals.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

1.2 TARGET AUDIENCEThis publication is intended to serve a diverse audience, including:•Individuals with system, information security, privacy, or risk management and oversight
responsibilities, including authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior agency
information security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy;•

Individuals with system development responsibilities, including mission owners, program
managers, system engineers, system security engineers, privacy engineers, hardware andsoftware developers, system integrators, and acquisition or procurement officials;•

Individuals with logistical or disposition-related responsibilities, including program
managers, procurement officials, system integrators, and property managers;•

Individuals with security and privacy implementation and operations responsibilities,
including mission or business owners, system owners, information owners or stewards,
system administrators, continuity planners, and system security or privacy officers;•

Individuals with security and privacy assessment and monitoring responsibilities, including
auditors, Inspectors General, system evaluators, control assessors, independent verifiersand validators, and analysts; and•Commercial entities, including industry partners, producing component products andsystems, creating security and privacy technologies, or providing services or capabilities that
support information security or privacy.

1.3 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIESManaging security and privacy risks is a complex, multifaceted undertaking that requires:•

Well-defined security and privacy requirements for systems and organizations;•

The use of trustworthy information system components based on state-of-the-practice
hardware, firmware, and software development and acquisition processes;

13 Risk management is an integral part of systems engineering, systems security engineering, and privacy engineering.
14 [OMB A-130] requires federal agencies to implement the NIST Risk Management Framework for the selection ofcontrols for federal information systems. [EO 13800] requires federal agencies to implement the NIST Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity to manage cybersecurity risk. The NIST frameworks are also available
to nonfederal organizations as optional resources.

CHAPTER ONE

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
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Rigorous security and privacy planning and system development life cycle management;•

The application of system security and privacy engineering principles and practices tosecurely develop and integrate system components into information systems;•

The employment of security and privacy practices that are properly documented andintegrated into and supportive of the institutional and operational processes oforganizations; and•Continuous monitoring of information systems and organizations to determine the ongoing
effectiveness of controls, changes in information systems and environments of operation,and the state of security and privacy organization-wide.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Organizations continuously assess the security and privacy risks to organizational operations andassets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Security and privacy risks arise from theplanning and execution of organizational mission and business functions, placing information
systems into operation, or continuing system operations. Realistic assessments of risk require athorough understanding of the susceptibility to threats based on the specific vulnerabilities in
information systems and organizations and the likelihood and potential adverse impacts ofsuccessful exploitations of such vulnerabilities by those threats. 15 Risk assessments also require
an understanding of privacy risks. 16
To address the organization’s concerns about assessment and determination of risk, security
and privacy requirements are satisfied with the knowledge and understanding of theorganizational risk management strategy. 17 The risk management strategy considers the cost,schedule, performance, and supply chain issues associated with the design, development,
acquisition, deployment, operation, sustainment, and disposal of organizational systems. A risk
management process is then applied to manage risk on an ongoing basis. 18
The catalog of security and privacy controls can be effectively used to protect organizations,individuals, and information systems from traditional and advanced persistent threats andprivacy risks arising from the processing of personally identifiable information (PII) in varied
operational, environmental, and technical scenarios. The controls can be used to demonstratecompliance with a variety of governmental, organizational, or institutional security and privacy
requirements. Organizations have the responsibility to select the appropriate security andprivacy controls, to implement the controls correctly, and to demonstrate the effectiveness ofthe controls in satisfying security and privacy requirements. 19 Security and privacy controls canalso be used in developing specialized baselines or overlays for unique or specialized missions orbusiness applications, information systems, threat concerns, operational environments,
technologies, or communities of interest. 20

15 [SP 800-30] provides guidance on the risk assessment process.
16 [IR 8062] introduces privacy risk concepts.
17 [SP 800-39] provides guidance on risk management processes and strategies.
18 [SP 800-37] provides a comprehensive risk management process.
19 [SP 800-53A] provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of controls.
20 [SP 800-53B] provides guidance for tailoring security and privacy control baselines and for developing overlays tosupport the specific protection needs and requirements of stakeholders and their organizations.

CHAPTER ONE

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
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Organizational risk assessments are used, in part, to inform the security and privacy control
selection process. The selection process results in an agreed-upon set of security and privacy
controls addressing specific mission or business needs consistent with organizational risk
tolerance. 21 The process preserves, to the greatest extent possible, the agility and flexibility thatorganizations need to address an increasingly sophisticated and hostile threat space, mission
and business requirements, rapidly changing technologies, complex supply chains, and many
types of operational environments.

1.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PUBLICATIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

This publication defines controls to satisfy a diverse set of security and privacy requirementsthat have been levied on information systems and organizations and that are consistent withand complementary to other recognized national and international information security andprivacy standards. To develop a broadly applicable and technically sound set of controls for
information systems and organizations, many sources were considered during the developmentof this publication. These sources included requirements and controls from the manufacturing,
defense, financial, healthcare, transportation, energy, intelligence, industrial control, and audit
communities as well as national and international standards organizations. In addition, thecontrols in this publication are used by the national security community in publications such as
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction No. 1253 [CNSSI 1253] to provide
guidance specific to systems designated as national security systems. Whenever possible, thecontrols have been mapped to international standards to help ensure maximum usability andapplicability. 22 The relationship of this publication to other risk management, security, privacy,
and publications can be found at [FISMA IMP].

1.5 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONSThe security and privacy controls described in this publication represent the state-of-thepractice protection measures for individuals, information systems, and organizations. The
controls are reviewed and revised periodically to reflect the experience gained from using thecontrols; new or revised laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, and standards;
changing security and privacy requirements; emerging threats, vulnerabilities, attack andinformation processing methods; and the availability of new technologies.
The security and privacy controls in the control catalog are also expected to change over time ascontrols are withdrawn, revised, and added. In addition to the need for change, the need forstability is addressed by requiring that proposed modifications to security and privacy controls
go through a rigorous and transparent public review process to obtain public and private sector
feedback and to build a consensus for such change. The review process provides a technicallysound, flexible, and stable set of security and privacy controls for the organizations that use thecontrol catalog.

1.6 PUBLICATION ORGANIZATIONThe remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:
21 Authorizing officials or their designated representatives, by accepting the security and privacy plans, agree to thesecurity and privacy controls proposed to meet the security and privacy requirements for organizations and systems.
22 Mapping tables are available at [SP 800-53 RES].

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5•

Chapter Two describes the fundamental concepts associated with security and privacy
controls, including the structure of the controls, how the controls are organized in the
consolidated catalog, control implementation approaches, the relationship between security
and privacy controls, and trustworthiness and assurance.

•

Chapter Three provides a consolidated catalog of security and privacy controls including a
discussion section to explain the purpose of each control and to provide useful information
regarding control implementation and assessment, a list of related controls to show the
relationships and dependencies among controls, and a list of references to supporting
publications that may be helpful to organizations.

•

References, Glossary, Acronyms, and Control Summaries provide additional information on
the use of security and privacy controls. 23

23 Unless otherwise stated, all references to NIST publications refer to the most recent version of those publications.

CHAPTER ONE

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALSSTRUCTURE, TYPE, AND ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

This chapter presents the fundamental concepts associated with security and privacy controls,
including the relationship between requirements and controls, the structure of controls, howcontrols are organized in the consolidated control catalog, the different control implementation
approaches for information systems and organizations, the relationship between security andprivacy controls, the importance of the concepts of trustworthiness and assurance for security
and privacy controls, and the effects of the controls on achieving trustworthy, secure, andresilient systems.

2.1 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLSIt is important to understand the relationship between requirements and controls. For federal
information security and privacy policies, the term requirement is generally used to refer toinformation security and privacy obligations imposed on organizations. For example, [OMB A130] imposes information security and privacy requirements with which federal agencies mustcomply when managing information resources. The term requirement can also be used in a
broader sense to refer to an expression of stakeholder protection needs for a particular systemor organization. Stakeholder protection needs and the corresponding security and privacy
requirements may be derived from many sources (e.g., laws, executive orders, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, mission and business needs, or risk assessments). The term
requirement, as used in this guideline, includes both legal and policy requirements, as well as an
expression of the broader set of stakeholder protection needs that may be derived from othersources. All of these requirements, when applied to a system, help determine the necessary
characteristics of the system—encompassing security, privacy, and assurance. 24
Organizations may divide security and privacy requirements into more granular categories,
depending on where the requirements are employed in the system development life cycle(SDLC) and for what purpose. Organizations may use the term capability requirement to describe
a capability that the system or organization must provide to satisfy a stakeholder protection
need. In addition, organizations may refer to system requirements that pertain to particular
hardware, software, and firmware components of a system as specification requirements—that
is, capabilities that implement all or part of a control and that may be assessed (i.e., as part ofthe verification, validation, testing, and evaluation processes). Finally, organizations may use theterm statement of work requirements to refer to actions that must be performed operationallyor during system development.

24 The system characteristics that impact security and privacy vary and include the system type and function in termsof its primary purpose; the system make-up in terms of its technology, mechanical, physical, and human elements;
the modes and states within which the system delivers its functions and services; the criticality or importance of thesystem and its constituent functions and services; the sensitivity of the data or information processed, stored, ortransmitted; the consequence of loss, failure, or degradation relative to the ability of the system to execute correctly
and to provide for its own protection (i.e., self-protection); and monetary or other value [SP 800-160-1].

CHAPTER TWO

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Controls can be viewed as descriptions of the safeguards and protection capabilities appropriate
for achieving the particular security and privacy objectives of the organization and reflecting theprotection needs of organizational stakeholders. Controls are selected and implemented by theorganization in order to satisfy the system requirements. Controls can include administrative,
technical, and physical aspects. In some cases, the selection and implementation of a control
may necessitate additional specification by the organization in the form of derived requirements
or instantiated control parameter values. The derived requirements and control parametervalues may be necessary to provide the appropriate level of implementation detail for particular
controls within the SDLC.

2.2 CONTROL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Security and privacy controls described in this publication have a well-defined organization andstructure. For ease of use in the security and privacy control selection and specification process,controls are organized into 20 families. 25 Each family contains controls that are related to thespecific topic of the family. A two-character identifier uniquely identifies each control family(e.g., PS for Personnel Security). Security and privacy controls may involve aspects of policy,
oversight, supervision, manual processes, and automated mechanisms that are implemented bysystems or actions by individuals. Table 1 lists the security and privacy control families and theirassociated family identifiers.
TABLE 1: SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROL FAMILIESIDFAMILY

ID

AC
AT
AU
CA
CM
CP
IA
IR
MA
MP

Access Control
Awareness and Training
Audit and Accountability
Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
Identification and Authentication
Incident Response
MaintenanceMedia Protection

PE
PL
PM
PS
PT
RA
SA
SC
SI
SR

FAMILY
Physical and Environmental Protection
Planning
Program Management
Personnel Security
PII Processing and Transparency
Risk Assessment
System and Services Acquisition
System and Communications Protection
System and Information Integrity
Supply Chain Risk Management

Families of controls contain base controls and control enhancements, which are directly related
to their base controls. Control enhancements either add functionality or specificity to a basecontrol or increase the strength of a base control. Control enhancements are used in systems
and environments of operation that require greater protection than the protection provided by
the base control. The need for organizations to select and implement control enhancements isdue to the potential adverse organizational or individual impacts or when organizations require
additions to the base control functionality or assurance based on assessments of risk. The
25 Of the 20 control families in NIST SP 800-53, 17 are aligned with the minimum security requirements in [FIPS 200].

The Program Management (PM), PII Processing and Transparency (PT), and Supply Chain Risk Management (SR)families address enterprise-level program management, privacy, and supply chain risk considerations pertaining tofederal mandates emergent since [FIPS 200].

CHAPTER TWO

PAGE 8NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
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selection and implementation of control enhancements always requires the selection andimplementation of the base control.
The families are arranged in alphabetical order, while the controls and control enhancements
within each family are in numerical order. The order of the families, controls, and control
enhancements does not imply any logical progression, level of prioritization or importance, ororder in which the controls or control enhancements are to be implemented. Rather, it reflects
the order in which they were included in the catalog. Control designations are not re-used whena control is withdrawn.

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Security and privacy controls have the following structure: a base control section, a discussionsection, a related controls section, a control enhancements section, and a references section.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of a typical control.
Control Identifier

AU-4
Base
Control

Control Name

AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

Organization-defined Parameter

Control: Allocate audit record storage capacity to accommodate [Assignment: organizationdefined audit record retention requirements].
Discussion: Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit
processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit
storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in thepotential loss or reduction of auditing capability.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12, AU-14, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

Organization-defined Parameter

Off-load audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto a different
system or media than the system being audited.

Control
Enhancement

Discussion: Off-loading is a process designed to preserve the confidentiality andintegrity of audit records by moving the records from the primary system to a secondaryor alternate system. It is a common process in systems with limited audit storage
capacity; the audit storage is used only in a transitory fashion until the system cancommunicate with the secondary or alternate system designated for storing the audit
records, at which point the information is transferred.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

Sources for additional information related to the control

FIGURE 1: CONTROL STRUCTURE

The control section prescribes a security or privacy capability to be implemented. Security andprivacy capabilities are achieved by the activities or actions, automated or nonautomated,
carried out by information systems and organizations. Organizations designate the responsibility
for control development, implementation, assessment, and monitoring. Organizations have theCHAPTER TWO

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flexibility to implement the controls selected in whatever manner that satisfies organizational
mission or business needs consistent with law, regulation, and policy.
The discussion section provides additional information about a control. Organizations can use
the information as needed when developing, tailoring, implementing, assessing, or monitoring
controls. The information provides important considerations for implementing controls basedon mission or business requirements, operational environments, or assessments of risk. The
additional information can also explain the purpose of controls and often includes examples.
Control enhancements may also include a separate discussion section when the discussion
information is applicable only to a specific control enhancement.
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The related controls section provides a list of controls from the control catalog that impact or
support the implementation of a particular control or control enhancement, address a related
security or privacy capability, or are referenced in the discussion section. Control enhancements
are inherently related to their base control. Thus, related controls that are referenced in thebase control are not repeated in the control enhancements. However, there may be related
controls identified for control enhancements that are not referenced in the base control (i.e.,
the related control is only associated with the specific control enhancement). Controls may also
be related to enhancements of other base controls. When a control is designated as a related
control, a corresponding designation is made on that control in its source location in the catalog
to illustrate the two-way relationship. Additionally, each control in a given family is inherently
related to the -1 control (Policy and Procedures) in the same family. Therefore, the relationshipbetween the -1 control and the other controls in the same family is not specified in the related
controls section for each control.
The control enhancements section provides statements of security and privacy capability thataugment a base control. The control enhancements are numbered sequentially within eachcontrol so that the enhancements can be easily identified when selected to supplement thebase control. Each control enhancement has a short subtitle to indicate the intended function orcapability provided by the enhancement. In the AU-4 example, if the control enhancement isselected, the control designation becomes AU-4(1). The numerical designation of a control
enhancement is used only to identify that enhancement within the control. The designation is
not indicative of the strength of the control enhancement, level of protection, priority, degree ofimportance, or any hierarchical relationship among the enhancements. Control enhancements
are not intended to be selected independently. That is, if a control enhancement is selected,
then the corresponding base control is also selected and implemented.
The references section includes a list of applicable laws, policies, standards, guidelines, websites,
and other useful references that are relevant to a specific control or control enhancement. 26 The
references section also includes hyperlinks to publications for obtaining additional information
for control development, implementation, assessment, and monitoring.
For some controls, additional flexibility is provided by allowing organizations to define specificvalues for designated parameters associated with the controls. Flexibility is achieved as part of a
tailoring process using assignment and selection operations embedded within the controls and
26 References are provided to assist organizations in understanding and implementing the security and privacy

controls and are not intended to be inclusive or complete.

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enclosed by brackets. The assignment and selection operations give organizations the capability
to customize controls based on organizational security and privacy requirements. In contrast to
assignment operations which allow complete flexibility in the designation of parameter values,
selection operations narrow the range of potential values by providing a specific list of items
from which organizations choose.

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Determination of the organization-defined parameters can evolve from many sources, including
laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and mission orbusiness needs. Organizational risk assessments and risk tolerance are also important factors indetermining the values for control parameters. Once specified by the organization, the values
for the assignment and selection operations become a part of the control. Organization-defined
control parameters used in the base controls also apply to the control enhancements associatedwith those controls. The implementation of the control is assessed for effectiveness against thecompleted control statement.
In addition to assignment and selection operations embedded in a control, additional flexibility
is achieved through iteration and refinement actions. Iteration allows organizations to use acontrol multiple times with different assignment and selection values, perhaps being applied indifferent situations or when implementing multiple policies. For example, an organization may
have multiple systems implementing a control but with different parameters established toaddress different risks for each system and environment of operation. Refinement is the processof providing additional implementation detail to a control. Refinement can also be used tonarrow the scope of a control in conjunction with iteration to cover all applicable scopes (e.g.,
applying different authentication mechanisms to different system interfaces). The combinationof assignment and selection operations and iteration and refinement actions when applied tocontrols provides the needed flexibility to allow organizations to satisfy a broad base of security
and privacy requirements at the organization, mission and business process, and system levelsof implementation.

SECURITY AS A DESIGN PROBLEM“Providing satisfactory security controls in a computer system is….a system design problem. A
combination of hardware, software, communications, physical, personnel and administrativeprocedural safeguards is required for comprehensive security….software safeguards alone are
not sufficient.”-- The Ware Report
Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security, 1970

2.3 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES
There are three approaches to implementing the controls in Chapter Three: (1) a common(inheritable) control implementation approach, (2) a system-specific control implementation
approach, and (3) a hybrid control implementation approach. The control implementation
approaches define the scope of applicability for the control, the shared nature or inheritabilityof the control, and the responsibility for control development, implementation, assessment, and

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authorization. Each control implementation approach has a specific objective and focus thathelps organizations select the appropriate controls, implement the controls in an effective
manner, and satisfy security and privacy requirements. A specific control implementation
approach may achieve cost benefits by leveraging security and privacy capabilities acrossmultiple systems and environments of operation. 27

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Common controls are controls whose implementation results in a capability that is inheritableby multiple systems or programs. A control is deemed inheritable when the system or program
receives protection from the implemented control, but the control is developed, implemented,
assessed, authorized, and monitored by an internal or external entity other than the entity
responsible for the system or program. The security and privacy capabilities provided bycommon controls can be inherited from many sources, including mission or business lines,
organizations, enclaves, environments of operation, sites, or other systems or programs.
Implementing controls as common controls can introduce the risk of a single point of failure.
Many of the controls needed to protect organizational information systems—including many
physical and environmental protection controls, personnel security controls, and incident
response controls—are inheritable and, therefore, are good candidates for common control
status. Common controls can also include technology-based controls, such as identification andauthentication controls, boundary protection controls, audit and accountability controls, andaccess controls. The cost of development, implementation, assessment, authorization, andmonitoring can be amortized across multiple systems, organizational elements, and programs
using the common control implementation approach.
Controls not implemented as common controls are implemented as system-specific or hybrid
controls. System-specific controls are the primary responsibility of the system owner and theauthorizing official for a given system. Implementing system-specific controls can introduce risk
if the control implementations are not interoperable with common controls. Organizations canimplement a control as hybrid if one part of the control is common (inheritable) and the otherpart is system-specific. For example, an organization may implement control CP-2 using apredefined template for the contingency plan for all organizational information systems withindividual system owners tailoring the plan for system-specific uses, where appropriate. The
division of a hybrid control into its common (inheritable) and system-specific parts may vary byorganization, depending on the types of information technologies employed, the approach usedby the organization to manage its controls, and assignment of responsibilities. When a control isimplemented as a hybrid control, the common control provider is responsible for ensuring theimplementation, assessment, and monitoring of the common part of the hybrid control, and thesystem owner is responsible for ensuring the implementation, assessment, and monitoring of
the system-specific part of the hybrid control. Implementing controls as hybrid controls canintroduce risk if the responsibility for the implementation and ongoing management of thecommon and system-specific parts of the controls is unclear.
The determination as to the appropriate control implementation approach (i.e., common,
hybrid, or system-specific) is context-dependent. The control implementation approach cannot
be determined to be common, hybrid, or system-specific simply based on the language of the
27 [SP 800-37] provides additional guidance on control implementation approaches (formerly referred to as control

designations) and how the different approaches are used in the Risk Management Framework.

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control. Identifying the control implementation approach can result in significant savings toorganizations in implementation and assessment costs and a more consistent application of thecontrols organization-wide. Typically, the identification of the control implementation approachis straightforward. However, the implementation takes significant planning and coordination.

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Planning for the implementation approach of a control (i.e., common, hybrid, or system-specific)
is best carried out early in the system development life cycle and coordinated with the entities
providing the control [SP 800-37]. Similarly, if a control is to be inheritable, coordination isrequired with the inheriting entity to ensure that the control meets its needs. This is especially
important given the nature of control parameters. An inheriting entity cannot assume that
controls are the same and mitigate the appropriate risk to the system just because the control
identifiers (e.g., AC-1) are the same. It is essential to examine the control parameters (e.g.,assignment or selection operations) when determining if a common control is adequate to
mitigate system-specific risks.

2.4 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLSThe selection and implementation of security and privacy controls reflect the objectives of
information security and privacy programs and how those programs manage their respective
risks. Depending on the circumstances, these objectives and risks can be independent oroverlapping. Federal information security programs are responsible for protecting informationand information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction (i.e., unauthorized activity or system behavior) to provide confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. Those programs are also responsible for managing security risk and for ensuring
compliance with applicable security requirements. Federal privacy programs are responsible formanaging risks to individuals associated with the creation, collection, use, processing, storage,
maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, or disposal (collectively referred to as “processing”) of
PII and for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements. 28 When a systemprocesses PII, the information security program and the privacy program have a shared
responsibility for managing the security risks for the PII in the system. Due to this overlap in
responsibilities, the controls that organizations select to manage these security risks will
generally be the same regardless of their designation as security or privacy controls in control
baselines or program or system plans.
There also may be circumstances in which the selection and/or implementation of the control orcontrol enhancement affects the ability of a program to achieve its objectives and manage its
respective risks. The control discussion section may highlight specific security and/or privacy
considerations so that organizations can take these considerations into account as they
determine the most effective method to implement the control. However, these considerations
are not exhaustive.
For example, an organization might select AU-3 (Content of Audit Records) to support
monitoring for unauthorized access to an information asset that does not include PII. Since the28 Privacy programs may also choose to consider the risks to individuals that may arise from their interactions withinformation systems, where the processing of personally identifiable information may be less impactful than theeffect that the system has on individuals’ behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individualautonomy, and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security andprivacy risks.

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potential loss of confidentiality of the information asset does not affect privacy, security
objectives are the primary driver for the selection of the control. However, the implementationof the control with respect to monitoring for unauthorized access could involve the processingof PII which may result in privacy risks and affect privacy program objectives. The discussionsection in AU-3 includes privacy risk considerations so that organizations can take thoseconsiderations into account as they determine the best way to implement the control.
Additionally, the control enhancement AU-3(3) (Limit Personally Identifiable Information
Elements) could be selected to support managing these privacy risks.

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Due to permutations in the relationship between information security and privacy program
objectives and risk management, there is a need for close collaboration between programs to
select and implement the appropriate controls for information systems processing PII.
Organizations consider how to promote and institutionalize collaboration between the two
programs to ensure that the objectives of both disciplines are met and risks are appropriately
managed. 29

2.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ASSURANCE
The trustworthiness of systems, system components, and system services is an important partof the risk management strategies developed by organizations. 30 Trustworthiness, in thiscontext, means worthy of being trusted to fulfill whatever requirements may be needed for acomponent, subsystem, system, network, application, mission, business function, enterprise, orother entity. 31 Trustworthiness requirements can include attributes of reliability, dependability,
performance, resilience, safety, security, privacy, and survivability under a range of potential
adversity in the form of disruptions, hazards, threats, and privacy risks. Effective measures oftrustworthiness are meaningful only to the extent that the requirements are complete, welldefined, and can be accurately assessed.
Two fundamental concepts that affect the trustworthiness of systems are functionality andassurance. Functionality is defined in terms of the security and privacy features, functions,mechanisms, services, procedures, and architectures implemented within organizational
systems and programs and the environments in which those systems and programs operate.
Assurance is the measure of confidence that the system functionality is implemented correctly,
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security
and privacy requirements for the system—thus possessing the capability to accurately mediate
and enforce established security and privacy policies.
In general, the task of providing meaningful assurance that a system is likely to do what is
expected of it can be enhanced by techniques that simplify or narrow the analysis by, forexample, increasing the discipline applied to the system architecture, software design,specifications, code style, and configuration management. Security and privacy controls address
functionality and assurance. Certain controls focus primarily on functionality while othercontrols focus primarily on assurance. Some controls can support functionality and assurance.
29 Resources to support information security and privacy program collaboration are available at [SP 800-53 RES].
30 [SP 800-160-1] provides guidance on systems security engineering and the application of security design principles

to achieve trustworthy systems.
31 See [NEUM04].

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Organizations can select assurance-related controls to define system development activities,
generate evidence about the functionality and behavior of the system, and trace the evidence tothe system elements that provide such functionality or exhibit such behavior. The evidence isused to obtain a degree of confidence that the system satisfies the stated security and privacy
requirements while supporting the organization’s mission and business functions. Assurancerelated controls are identified in the control summary tables in Appendix C.

EVIDENCE OF CONTROL IMPLEMENTATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

During control selection and implementation, it is important for organizations to consider theevidence (e.g., artifacts, documentation) that will be needed to support current and futurecontrol assessments. Such assessments help determine whether the controls are implemented
correctly, operating as intended, and satisfying security and privacy policies—thus, providing
essential information for senior leaders to make informed risk-based decisions.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTROLSSECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS AND CONTROL ENHANCEMENTS

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

This catalog of security and privacy controls provides protective measures for systems,
organizations, and individuals. 32 The controls are designed to facilitate risk management andcompliance with applicable federal laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, andstandards. With few exceptions, the security and privacy controls in the catalog are policy-,technology-, and sector-neutral, meaning that the controls focus on the fundamental measuresnecessary to protect information and the privacy of individuals across the information life cycle.
While the security and privacy controls are largely policy-, technology-, and sector-neutral, that
does not imply that the controls are policy-, technology-, and sector-unaware. Understanding
policies, technologies, and sectors is necessary so that the controls are relevant when they are
implemented. Employing a policy-, technology-, and sector-neutral control catalog has many
benefits. It encourages organizations to:•

Focus on the security and privacy functions and capabilities required for mission andbusiness success and the protection of information and the privacy of individuals,
irrespective of the technologies that are employed in organizational systems;•

Analyze each security and privacy control for its applicability to specific technologies,
environments of operation, mission and business functions, and communities of interest;
and•Specify security and privacy policies as part of the tailoring process for controls that havevariable parameters.

In the few cases where specific technologies are referenced in controls, organizations are
cautioned that the need to manage security and privacy risks may go beyond the requirements
in a single control associated with a technology. The additional needed protection measures are
obtained from the other controls in the catalog. Federal Information Processing Standards,
Special Publications, and Interagency/Internal Reports provide guidance on selecting security
and privacy controls that reduce risk for specific technologies and sector-specific applications,
including smart grid, cloud, healthcare, mobile, industrial control systems, and Internet of Things(IoT) devices. 33 NIST publications are cited as references as applicable to specific controls in
Sections 3.1 through 3.20.
Security and privacy controls in the catalog are expected to change over time as controls arewithdrawn, revised, and added. To maintain stability in security and privacy plans, controls are
not renumbered each time a control is withdrawn. Rather, notations of the controls that havebeen withdrawn are maintained in the control catalog for historical purposes. Controls may be
withdrawn for a variety of reasons, including when the function or capability provided by thecontrol has been incorporated into another control, the control is redundant to an existing
control, or the control is deemed to be no longer necessary or effective.
32 The controls in this publication are available online and can be obtained in various formats. See [NVD 800-53].
33 For example, [SP 800-82] provides guidance on risk management and control selection for industrial control

systems.

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________New controls are developed on a regular basis using threat and vulnerability information andinformation on the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries. In addition, newcontrols are developed based on a better understanding of how to mitigate information security
risks to systems and organizations and risks to the privacy of individuals arising from information
processing. Finally, new controls are developed based on new or changing requirements in laws,
executive orders, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. Proposed modifications to thecontrols are carefully analyzed during each revision cycle, considering the need for stability ofcontrols and the need to be responsive to changing technologies, threats, vulnerabilities, types
of attack, and processing methods. The objective is to adjust the level of information security
and privacy over time to meet the needs of organizations and individuals.
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3.1 ACCESS CONTROL
Quick link to Access Control Summary Table
AC-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] access control policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and theassociated access controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current access control:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Access control policy and procedures address the controls in the AC family that are
implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an importantfactor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security
and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborateon the development of access control policy and procedures. Security and privacy program
policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate theneed for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as partof the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies reflecting thecomplex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy
programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe
how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is
the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans
or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to access control
policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, orchanges in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: IA-1, PM-9, PM-24, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100], [IR 7874].

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AC-2

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
Control:a.

Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use
within the system;b.

Assign account managers;c.

Require [Assignment: organization-defined prerequisites and criteria] for group and role
membership;d.

Specify:

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1.

Authorized users of the system;

2.

Group and role membership; and3.

Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and [Assignment: organization-defined attributes(as required)] for each account;e.

Require approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests tocreate accounts;f.

Create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts in accordance with [Assignment:
organization-defined policy, procedures, prerequisites, and criteria];g.

Monitor the use of accounts;h.

Notify account managers and [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within:i.

1.

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] when accounts are no longer required;

2.

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] when users are terminated ortransferred; and3.

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] when system usage or need-to-knowchanges for an individual;

Authorize access to the system based on:
1.

A valid access authorization;

2.

Intended system usage; and3.

[Assignment: organization-defined attributes (as required)];j.

Review accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency];k.

Establish and implement a process for changing shared or group account authenticators (ifdeployed) when individuals are removed from the group; andl.

Align account management processes with personnel termination and transfer processes.

Discussion: Examples of system account types include individual, shared, group, system, guest,
anonymous, emergency, developer, temporary, and service. Identification of authorized systemusers and the specification of access privileges reflect the requirements in other controls in the
security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on system accounts receive additional
scrutiny by organizational personnel responsible for approving such accounts and privileged
access, including system owner, mission or business owner, senior agency information security
officer, or senior agency official for privacy. Types of accounts that organizations may wish toprohibit due to increased risk include shared, group, emergency, anonymous, temporary, andguest accounts.

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Where access involves personally identifiable information, security programs collaborate withthe senior agency official for privacy to establish the specific conditions for group and role
membership; specify authorized users, group and role membership, and access authorizations foreach account; and create, adjust, or remove system accounts in accordance with organizational
policies. Policies can include such information as account expiration dates or other factors thattrigger the disabling of accounts. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or otherattributes by account, type of account, or a combination of the two. Examples of other attributes
required for authorizing access include restrictions on time of day, day of week, and point oforigin. In defining other system account attributes, organizations consider system-related
requirements and mission/business requirements. Failure to consider these factors could affectsystem availability.
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Temporary and emergency accounts are intended for short-term use. Organizations establish
temporary accounts as part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need forshort-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations
establish emergency accounts in response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid accountactivation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization
processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently usedaccounts, including local logon accounts used for special tasks or when network resources areunavailable (may also be known as accounts of last resort). Such accounts remain available andare not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions for disabling or deactivating
accounts include when shared/group, emergency, or temporary accounts are no longer required
and when individuals are transferred or terminated. Changing shared/group authenticators whenmembers leave the group is intended to ensure that former group members do not retain accessto the shared or group account. Some types of system accounts may require specialized training.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, AC-24, AU-2, AU-12, CM-5, IA-2, IA-4,
IA-5, IA-8, MA-3, MA-5, PE-2, PL-4, PS-2, PS-4, PS-5, PS-7, PT-2, PT-3, SC-7, SC-12, SC-13, SC-37.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
Support the management of system accounts using [Assignment: organization-defined
automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated system account management includes using automated mechanisms
to create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts; notify account managers when an
account is created, enabled, modified, disabled, or removed, or when users are terminatedor transferred; monitor system account usage; and report atypical system account usage.
Automated mechanisms can include internal system functions and email, telephonic, andtext messaging notifications.
Related Controls: None.
(2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
Automatically [Selection: remove; disable] temporary and emergency accounts after[Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].
Discussion: Management of temporary and emergency accounts includes the removal or
disabling of such accounts automatically after a predefined time period rather than at theconvenience of the system administrator. Automatic removal or disabling of accounts
provides a more consistent implementation.
Related Controls: None.
(3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS
Disable accounts within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when theaccounts:

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Discussion: Disabling expired, inactive, or otherwise anomalous accounts supports theconcepts of least privilege and least functionality which reduce the attack surface of thesystem.
Related Controls: None.
(4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal
actions.
Discussion: Account management audit records are defined in accordance with AU-2 andreviewed, analyzed, and reported in accordance with AU-6.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6.
(5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT
Require that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time period of
expected inactivity or description of when to log out].
Discussion: Inactivity logout is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physicalaction to log out when they are expecting inactivity longer than the defined period.
Automatic enforcement of inactivity logout is addressed by AC-11.
Related Controls: AC-11.
(6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic privilege management
capabilities].
Discussion: In contrast to access control approaches that employ static accounts andpredefined user privileges, dynamic access control approaches rely on runtime access
control decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management, such as attribute-based
access control. While user identities remain relatively constant over time, user privileges
typically change more frequently based on ongoing mission or business requirements andthe operational needs of organizations. An example of dynamic privilege management is theimmediate revocation of privileges from users as opposed to requiring that users terminate
and restart their sessions to reflect changes in privileges. Dynamic privilege management canalso include mechanisms that change user privileges based on dynamic rules as opposed to
editing specific user profiles. Examples include automatic adjustments of user privileges ifthey are operating out of their normal work times, if their job function or assignmentchanges, or if systems are under duress or in emergency situations. Dynamic privilege
management includes the effects of privilege changes, for example, when there are changes
to encryption keys used for communications.
Related Controls: AC-16.
(7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | PRIVILEGED USER ACCOUNTS(a) Establish and administer privileged user accounts in accordance with [Selection: a rolebased access scheme; an attribute-based access scheme];(b) Monitor privileged role or attribute assignments;(c) Monitor changes to roles or attributes; and(d) Revoke access when privileged role or attribute assignments are no longer
appropriate.

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Discussion: Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow
those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are notauthorized to perform. Privileged roles include key management, account management,
database administration, system and network administration, and web administration. A
role-based access scheme organizes permitted system access and privileges into roles. In
contrast, an attribute-based access scheme specifies allowed system access and privileges
based on attributes.
Related Controls: None.
(8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
Create, activate, manage, and deactivate [Assignment: organization-defined system
accounts] dynamically.
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Discussion: Approaches for dynamically creating, activating, managing, and deactivating
system accounts rely on automatically provisioning the accounts at runtime for entities thatwere previously unknown. Organizations plan for the dynamic management, creation,
activation, and deactivation of system accounts by establishing trust relationships, businessrules, and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate related authorizations andprivileges.
Related Controls: AC-16.
(9) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED AND GROUP ACCOUNTS
Only permit the use of shared and group accounts that meet [Assignment: organizationdefined conditions for establishing shared and group accounts].
Discussion: Before permitting the use of shared or group accounts, organizations consider
the increased risk due to the lack of accountability with such accounts.
Related Controls: None.
(10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED AND GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL CHANGE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2k.](11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS
Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage conditions] for[Assignment: organization-defined system accounts].
Discussion: Specifying and enforcing usage conditions helps to enforce the principle of leastprivilege, increase user accountability, and enable effective account monitoring. Accountmonitoring includes alerts generated if the account is used in violation of organizationalparameters. Organizations can describe specific conditions or circumstances under which
system accounts can be used, such as by restricting usage to certain days of the week, timeof day, or specific durations of time.
Related Controls: None.
(12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING FOR ATYPICAL USAGE(a) Monitor system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage]; and(b) Report atypical usage of system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles].
Discussion: Atypical usage includes accessing systems at certain times of the day or fromlocations that are not consistent with the normal usage patterns of individuals. Monitoring
for atypical usage may reveal rogue behavior by individuals or an attack in progress. Accountmonitoring may inadvertently create privacy risks since data collected to identify atypicalusage may reveal previously unknown information about the behavior of individuals.
Organizations assess and document privacy risks from monitoring accounts for atypical

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usage in their privacy impact assessment and make determinations that are in alignment
with their privacy program plan.
Related Controls: AU-6, AU-7, CA-7, IR-8, SI-4.
(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALSDisable accounts of individuals within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of
discovery of [Assignment: organization-defined significant risks].

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Discussion: Users who pose a significant security and/or privacy risk include individuals forwhom reliable evidence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to systems tocause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Such harm includes adverse
impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations,or the Nation. Close coordination among system administrators, legal staff, human resource
managers, and authorizing officials is essential when disabling system accounts for high-risk
individuals.
Related Controls: AU-6, SI-4.
References: [SP 800-162], [SP 800-178], [SP 800-192].

AC-3

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT
Control: Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resourcesin accordance with applicable access control policies.
Discussion: Access control policies control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users
or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (i.e., devices, files, records,
domains) in organizational systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the system level
and recognizing that systems can host many applications and services in support of mission andbusiness functions, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application andservice level to provide increased information security and privacy. In contrast to logical access
controls that are implemented within the system, physical access controls are addressed by thecontrols in the Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) family.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC24, AC-25, AT-2, AT-3, AU-9, CA-9, CM-5, CM-11, IA-2, IA-5, IA-6, IA-7, IA-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5,
MP-4, PM-2, PS-3, PT-2, PT-3, SA-17, SC-2, SC-3, SC-4, SC-12, SC-13, SC-28, SC-31, SC-34, SI-4, SI-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6.](2) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION
Enforce dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands
and/or other organization-defined actions].
Discussion: Dual authorization, also known as two-person control, reduces risk related toinsider threats. Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorizedindividuals to execute. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual
authorization duties. Organizations consider the risk associated with implementing dual
authorization mechanisms when immediate responses are necessary to ensure public andenvironmental safety.
Related Controls: CP-9, MP-6.
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Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over the setof covered subjects and objects specified in the policy, and where the policy:(a) Is uniformly enforced across the covered subjects and objects within the system;(b) Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained
from doing any of the following;(1) Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects;(2) Granting its privileges to other subjects;(3) Changing one or more security attributes (specified by the policy) on subjects,
objects, the system, or system components;(4) Choosing the security attributes and attribute values (specified by the policy) tobe associated with newly created or modified objects; andThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(5) Changing the rules governing access control; and(c) Specifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted[Assignment: organization-defined privileges] such that they are not limited by any
defined subset (or all) of the above constraints.
Discussion: Mandatory access control is a type of nondiscretionary access control.
Mandatory access control policies constrain what actions subjects can take with information
obtained from objects for which they have already been granted access. This prevents the
subjects from passing the information to unauthorized subjects and objects. Mandatory
access control policies constrain actions that subjects can take with respect to the
propagation of access control privileges; that is, a subject with a privilege cannot pass thatprivilege to other subjects. The policy is uniformly enforced over all subjects and objects towhich the system has control. Otherwise, the access control policy can be circumvented. This
enforcement is provided by an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept as
described in AC-25. The policy is bounded by the system (i.e., once the information is passed
outside of the control of the system, additional means may be required to ensure that theconstraints on the information remain in effect).
The trusted subjects described above are granted privileges consistent with the concept ofleast privilege (see AC-6). Trusted subjects are only given the minimum privileges necessary
for satisfying organizational mission/business needs relative to the above policy. The control
is most applicable when there is a mandate that establishes a policy regarding access tocontrolled unclassified information or classified information and some users of the system
are not authorized access to all such information resident in the system. Mandatory access
control can operate in conjunction with discretionary access control as described in AC-3(4).
A subject constrained in its operation by mandatory access control policies can still operate
under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3(4), but mandatory access control policies takeprecedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3(4). For example, while a mandatory
access control policy imposes a constraint that prevents a subject from passing information
to another subject operating at a different impact or classification level, AC-3(4) permits the
subject to pass the information to any other subject with the same impact or classificationlevel as the subject. Examples of mandatory access control policies include the Bell-LaPadulapolicy to protect confidentiality of information and the Biba policy to protect the integrity of
information.
Related Controls: SC-7.
(4) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] over the setof covered subjects and objects specified in the policy, and where the policy specifies thata subject that has been granted access to information can do one or more of the following:(a) Pass the information to any other subjects or objects;

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components;(d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects;or(e) Change the rules governing access control.

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Discussion: When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects are notconstrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they havealready been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information
are not prevented from passing the information to other subjects or objects (i.e., subjects
have the discretion to pass). Discretionary access control can operate in conjunction withmandatory access control as described in AC-3(3) and AC-3(15). A subject that is constrainedin its operation by mandatory access control policies can still operate under the less rigorous
constraints of discretionary access control. Therefore, while AC-3(3) imposes constraints thatprevent a subject from passing information to another subject operating at a different
impact or classification level, AC-3(4) permits the subject to pass the information to any
subject at the same impact or classification level. The policy is bounded by the system. Oncethe information is passed outside of system control, additional means may be required toensure that the constraints remain in effect. While traditional definitions of discretionary
access control require identity-based access control, that limitation is not required for thisparticular use of discretionary access control.
Related Controls: None.
(5) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION
Prevent access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information] except
during secure, non-operable system states.
Discussion: Security-relevant information is information within systems that can potentially
impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a mannerthat could result in failure to enforce system security and privacy policies or maintain theseparation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes access control lists,
filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services, andcryptographic key management information. Secure, non-operable system states include thetimes in which systems are not performing mission or business-related processing, such as
when the system is offline for maintenance, boot-up, troubleshooting, or shut down.
Related Controls: CM-6, SC-39.
(6) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28.](7) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Enforce a role-based access control policy over defined subjects and objects and control
access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined roles and users authorized toassume such roles].
Discussion: Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that enforces accessto objects and system functions based on the defined role (i.e., job function) of the subject.
Organizations can create specific roles based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e.,
privileges) to perform needed operations on the systems associated with the organizationdefined roles. When users are assigned to specific roles, they inherit the authorizations or
privileges defined for those roles. RBAC simplifies privilege administration for organizations
because privileges are not assigned directly to every user (which can be a large number ofindividuals) but are instead acquired through role assignments. RBAC can also increase

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privacy and security risk if individuals assigned to a role are given access to information
beyond what they need to support organizational missions or business functions. RBAC canbe implemented as a mandatory or discretionary form of access control. For organizations
implementing RBAC with mandatory access controls, the requirements in AC-3(3) define thescope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.
Related Controls: None.
(8) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS
Enforce the revocation of access authorizations resulting from changes to the security
attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules
governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations].
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Discussion: Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of access revoked. For
example, if a subject (i.e., user or process acting on behalf of a user) is removed from agroup, access may not be revoked until the next time the object is opened or the next time
the subject attempts to access the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels
may take effect immediately. Organizations provide alternative approaches on how to makerevocations immediate if systems cannot provide such capability and immediate revocationis necessary.
Related Controls: None.
(9) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | CONTROLLED RELEASE
Release information outside of the system only if:(a) The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined system or system component]
provides [Assignment: organization-defined controls]; and(b) [Assignment: organization-defined controls] are used to validate the appropriatenessof the information designated for release.
Discussion: Organizations can only directly protect information when it resides within thesystem. Additional controls may be needed to ensure that organizational information isadequately protected once it is transmitted outside of the system. In situations where thesystem is unable to determine the adequacy of the protections provided by external entities,
as a mitigation measure, organizations procedurally determine whether the external systems
are providing adequate controls. The means used to determine the adequacy of controls
provided by external systems include conducting periodic assessments (inspections/tests),
establishing agreements between the organization and its counterpart organizations, orsome other process. The means used by external entities to protect the information received
need not be the same as those used by the organization, but the means employed are
sufficient to provide consistent adjudication of the security and privacy policy to protect the
information and individuals’ privacy.
Controlled release of information requires systems to implement technical or proceduralmeans to validate the information prior to releasing it to external systems. For example, if
the system passes information to a system controlled by another organization, technicalmeans are employed to validate that the security and privacy attributes associated with theexported information are appropriate for the receiving system. Alternatively, if the system
passes information to a printer in organization-controlled space, procedural means can be
employed to ensure that only authorized individuals gain access to the printer.
Related Controls: CA-3, PT-7, PT-8, SA-9, SC-16.
(10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS
Employ an audited override of automated access control mechanisms under [Assignment:
organization-defined conditions] by [Assignment: organization-defined roles].

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Discussion: In certain situations, such as when there is a threat to human life or an eventthat threatens the organization’s ability to carry out critical missions or business functions,an override capability for access control mechanisms may be needed. Override conditions
are defined by organizations and used only in those limited circumstances. Audit events aredefined in AU-2. Audit records are generated in AU-12.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-10, AU-12, AU-14.
(11) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICT ACCESS TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION TYPES
Restrict access to data repositories containing [Assignment: organization-defined
information types].

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Discussion: Restricting access to specific information is intended to provide flexibility
regarding access control of specific information types within a system. For example, rolebased access could be employed to allow access to only a specific type of personallyidentifiable information within a database rather than allowing access to the database in its
entirety. Other examples include restricting access to cryptographic keys, authentication
information, and selected system information.
Related Controls: CM-8, CM-12, CM-13, PM-5.
(12) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ASSERT AND ENFORCE APPLICATION ACCESS(a) Require applications to assert, as part of the installation process, the access needed to
the following system applications and functions: [Assignment: organization-definedsystem applications and functions];(b) Provide an enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized access; and(c) Approve access changes after initial installation of the application.
Discussion: Asserting and enforcing application access is intended to address applications
that need to access existing system applications and functions, including user contacts,
global positioning systems, cameras, keyboards, microphones, networks, phones, or otherfiles.
Related Controls: CM-7.
(13) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Enforce attribute-based access control policy over defined subjects and objects and control
access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined attributes to assume accesspermissions].
Discussion: Attribute-based access control is an access control policy that restricts systemaccess to authorized users based on specified organizational attributes (e.g., job function,
identity), action attributes (e.g., read, write, delete), environmental attributes (e.g., time ofday, location), and resource attributes (e.g., classification of a document). Organizations cancreate rules based on attributes and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed
operations on the systems associated with organization-defined attributes and rules. Whenusers are assigned to attributes defined in attribute-based access control policies or rules,
they can be provisioned to a system with the appropriate privileges or dynamically granted
access to a protected resource. Attribute-based access control can be implemented as either
a mandatory or discretionary form of access control. When implemented with mandatory
access controls, the requirements in AC-3(3) define the scope of the subjects and objects
covered by the policy.
Related Controls: None.
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Provide [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to enable individuals to haveaccess to the following elements of their personally identifiable information: [Assignment:
organization-defined elements].

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Discussion: Individual access affords individuals the ability to review personally identifiable
information about them held within organizational records, regardless of format. Accesshelps individuals to develop an understanding about how their personally identifiable
information is being processed. It can also help individuals ensure that their data is accurate.
Access mechanisms can include request forms and application interfaces. For federal
agencies, [PRIVACT] processes can be located in systems of record notices and on agency
websites. Access to certain types of records may not be appropriate (e.g., for federal
agencies, law enforcement records within a system of records may be exempt fromdisclosure under the [PRIVACT]) or may require certain levels of authentication assurance.
Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel
to determine appropriate mechanisms and access rights or limitations.
Related Controls: IA-8, PM-22, PM-20, PM-21, PT-6.
(15) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL(a) Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over theset of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy; and(b) Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] overthe set of covered subjects and objects specified in the policy.
Discussion: Simultaneously implementing a mandatory access control policy and adiscretionary access control policy can provide additional protection against theunauthorized execution of code by users or processes acting on behalf of users. This helps
prevent a single compromised user or process from compromising the entire system.
Related Controls: SC-2, SC-3, AC-4.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], [SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-162],[SP 800-178], [IR 7874].

AC-4

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT
Control: Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within thesystem and between connected systems based on [Assignment: organization-defined
information flow control policies].
Discussion: Information flow control regulates where information can travel within a system andbetween systems (in contrast to who is allowed to access the information) and without regard to
subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include blocking externaltraffic that claims to be from within the organization, keeping export-controlled informationfrom being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, restricting web requests that are not fromthe internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations basedon data structures and content. Transferring information between organizations may require anagreement specifying how the information flow is enforced (see CA-3). Transferring information
between systems in different security or privacy domains with different security or privacy
policies introduces the risk that such transfers violate one or more domain security or privacy
policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy
enforcement points between connected systems. Organizations consider mandating specificarchitectural solutions to enforce specific security and privacy policies. Enforcement includes
prohibiting information transfers between connected systems (i.e., allowing access only),verifying write permissions before accepting information from another security or privacy
domain or connected system, employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information

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flows, and implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign security or privacy
attributes and labels.

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Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms
to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations within systems
and between connected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information
and/or the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices
that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict system services, provide apacket-filtering capability based on header information, or provide a message-filtering capability
based on message content. Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering and/or
inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical toinformation flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 32 primarily address crossdomain solution needs that focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, andstronger flow enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, such as highassurance guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelfproducts. Information flow enforcement also applies to control plane traffic (e.g., routing and
DNS).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, AU-10, CA-3, CA-9, CM-7, PL-9, PM-24,
SA-17, SC-4, SC-7, SC-16, SC-31.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES
Use [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] associated with
[Assignment: organization-defined information, source, and destination objects] to enforce[Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow
control decisions.
Discussion: Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security and privacy
attributes associated with information (i.e., data content and structure) and source anddestination objects and respond appropriately when the enforcement mechanisms
encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. For
example, an information object labeled Secret would be allowed to flow to a destination
object labeled Secret, but an information object labeled Top Secret would not be allowed toflow to a destination object labeled Secret. A dataset of personally identifiable information
may be tagged with restrictions against combining with other types of datasets and, thus,
would not be allowed to flow to the restricted dataset. Security and privacy attributes canalso include source and destination addresses employed in traffic filter firewalls. Flow
enforcement using explicit security or privacy attributes can be used, for example, to control
the release of certain types of information.
Related Controls: None.
(2) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS
Use protected processing domains to enforce [Assignment: organization-defined
information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions.
Discussion: Protected processing domains within systems are processing spaces that havecontrolled interactions with other processing spaces, enabling control of information flows
between these spaces and to/from information objects. A protected processing domain canbe provided, for example, by implementing domain and type enforcement. In domain andtype enforcement, system processes are assigned to domains, information is identified bytypes, and information flows are controlled based on allowed information accesses (i.e.,
determined by domain and type), allowed signaling among domains, and allowed processtransitions to other domains.

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Related Controls: SC-39.
(3) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies].
Discussion: Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control include
allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions or mission oroperational considerations. Changing conditions include changes in risk tolerance due tochanges in the immediacy of mission or business needs, changes in the threat environment,
and detection of potentially harmful or adverse events.
Related Controls: SI-4.
(4) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | FLOW CONTROL OF ENCRYPTED INFORMATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Prevent encrypted information from bypassing [Assignment: organization-defined
information flow control mechanisms] by [Selection (one or more): decrypting theinformation; blocking the flow of the encrypted information; terminating communications
sessions attempting to pass encrypted information; [Assignment: organization-definedprocedure or method]].
Discussion: Flow control mechanisms include content checking, security policy filters, anddata type identifiers. The term encryption is extended to cover encoded data not recognizedby filtering mechanisms.
Related Controls: SI-4.
(5) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES
Enforce [Assignment: organization-defined limitations] on embedding data types within
other data types.
Discussion: Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced flow
control effectiveness. Data type embedding includes inserting files as objects within otherfiles and using compressed or archived data types that may include multiple embedded datatypes. Limitations on data type embedding consider the levels of embedding and prohibit
levels of data type embedding that are beyond the capability of the inspection tools.
Related Controls: None.
(6) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA
Enforce information flow control based on [Assignment: organization-defined metadata].
Discussion: Metadata is information that describes the characteristics of data. Metadata can
include structural metadata describing data structures or descriptive metadata describing
data content. Enforcement of allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler
and more effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadataregarding data accuracy (i.e., knowledge that the metadata values are correct with respect
to the data), data integrity (i.e., protecting against unauthorized changes to metadata tags),
and the binding of metadata to the data payload (i.e., employing sufficiently strong binding
techniques with appropriate assurance).
Related Controls: AC-16, SI-7.
(7) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS
Enforce one-way information flows through hardware-based flow control mechanisms.
Discussion: One-way flow mechanisms may also be referred to as a unidirectional network,
unidirectional security gateway, or data diode. One-way flow mechanisms can be used toprevent data from being exported from a higher impact or classified domain or system while
permitting data from a lower impact or unclassified domain or system to be imported.
Related Controls: None.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(8) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY AND PRIVACY POLICY FILTERS(a) Enforce information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined security or
privacy policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment:
organization-defined information flows]; and(b) [Selection (one or more): Block; Strip; Modify; Quarantine] data after a filter
processing failure in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security or
privacy policy].

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Discussion: Organization-defined security or privacy policy filters can address data
structures and content. For example, security or privacy policy filters for data structures cancheck for maximum file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured andunstructured data). Security or privacy policy filters for data content can check for specificwords, enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data
permits the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data refers todigital information without a data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate
the development of rule sets to address the impact or classification level of the information
conveyed by the data or the flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists ofbitmap objects that are inherently non-language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files) andtextual objects that are based on written or printed languages. Organizations can implement
more than one security or privacy policy filter to meet information flow control objectives.
Related Controls: None.
(9) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS
Enforce the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined information
flows] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Discussion: Organizations define security or privacy policy filters for all situations where
automated flow control decisions are possible. When a fully automated flow control decision
is not possible, then a human review may be employed in lieu of or as a complement toautomated security or privacy policy filtering. Human reviews may also be employed as
deemed necessary by organizations.
Related Controls: None.
(10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE AND DISABLE SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTERS
Provide the capability for privileged administrators to enable and disable [Assignment:
organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] under the following conditions:[Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Discussion: For example, as allowed by the system authorization, administrators can enablesecurity or privacy policy filters to accommodate approved data types. Administrators also
have the capability to select the filters that are executed on a specific data flow based on thetype of data that is being transferred, the source and destination security domains, andother security or privacy relevant features, as needed.
Related Controls: None.
(11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTERS
Provide the capability for privileged administrators to configure [Assignment:
organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] to support different security or
privacy policies.
Discussion: Documentation contains detailed information for configuring security or privacy
policy filters. For example, administrators can configure security or privacy policy filters toinclude the list of inappropriate words that security or privacy policy mechanisms check inaccordance with the definitions provided by organizations.
Related Controls: None.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPE IDENTIFIERS
When transferring information between different security domains, use [Assignment:
organization-defined data type identifiers] to validate data essential for information flow
decisions.
Discussion: Data type identifiers include filenames, file types, file signatures or tokens, andmultiple internal file signatures or tokens. Systems only allow transfer of data that iscompliant with data type format specifications. Identification and validation of data types isbased on defined specifications associated with each allowed data format. The filename andnumber alone are not used for data type identification. Content is validated syntactically andsemantically against its specification to ensure that it is the proper data type.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICY-RELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS
When transferring information between different security domains, decompose
information into [Assignment: organization-defined policy-relevant subcomponents] forsubmission to policy enforcement mechanisms.
Discussion: Decomposing information into policy-relevant subcomponents prior to
information transfer facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates,classification, attachments, and other security- or privacy-related component differentiators.
Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or sanitization rules to thepolicy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow enforcement prior totransferring such information to different security domains.
Related Controls: None.
(14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS
When transferring information between different security domains, implement[Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] requiring fully
enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content.
Discussion: Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential maliciousor unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security or privacy policy filters that
restrict data structures include restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data content policy
filters include encoding formats for character sets, restricting character data fields to only
contain alpha-numeric characters, prohibiting special characters, and validating schema
structures.
Related Controls: None.
(15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED INFORMATION
When transferring information between different security domains, examine theinformation for the presence of [Assignment: organization-defined unsanctioned
information] and prohibit the transfer of such information in accordance with the[Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy].
Discussion: Unsanctioned information includes malicious code, information that is
inappropriate for release from the source network, or executable code that could disrupt or
harm the services or systems on the destination network.
Related Controls: SI-3.
(16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-4.](17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATIONCHAPTER THREE

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Uniquely identify and authenticate source and destination points by [Selection (one ormore): organization; system; application; service; individual] for information transfer.
Discussion: Attribution is a critical component of a security and privacy concept ofoperations. The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing
within systems allows the forensic reconstruction of events and encourages policy
compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations or individuals. Successfuldomain authentication requires that system labels distinguish among systems, organizations,and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating information.
Attribution also allows organizations to better maintain the lineage of personally identifiable
information processing as it flows through systems and can facilitate consent tracking, as
well as correction, deletion, or access requests from individuals.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-3, IA-9.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-16.](19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | VALIDATION OF METADATA
When transferring information between different security domains, implement[Assignment: organization-defined security or privacy policy filters] on metadata.
Discussion: All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata applies)
is subject to filtering and inspection. Some organizations distinguish between metadata anddata payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do
not make such distinctions and consider metadata and the data to which the metadata
applies to be part of the payload.
Related Controls: None.
(20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | APPROVED SOLUTIONS
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined solutions in approved configurations] to control
the flow of [Assignment: organization-defined information] across security domains.
Discussion: Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in cross-domain
policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across classification
boundaries. The National Security Agency (NSA) National Cross Domain Strategy andManagement Office provides a listing of approved cross-domain solutions. Contact
ncdsmo@nsa.gov for more information.
Related Controls: None.
(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL OR LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS
Separate information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: organization-definedmechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organization-defined required
separations by types of information].
Discussion: Enforcing the separation of information flows associated with defined types ofdata can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit
and by enabling flow control by transmission paths that are not otherwise achievable. Typesof separable information include inbound and outbound communications traffic, service
requests and responses, and information of differing security impact or classification levels.
Related Controls: SC-32.
(22) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ACCESS ONLY
Provide access from a single device to computing platforms, applications, or data residing
in multiple different security domains, while preventing information flow between the
different security domains.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Discussion: The system provides a capability for users to access each connected security
domain without providing any mechanisms to allow users to transfer data or information
between the different security domains. An example of an access-only solution is a terminalthat provides a user access to information with different security classifications while
assuredly keeping the information separate.
Related Controls: None.
(23) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | MODIFY NON-RELEASABLE INFORMATION
When transferring information between different security domains, modify non-releasable
information by implementing [Assignment: organization-defined modification action].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Modifying non-releasable information can help prevent a data spill or attack
when information is transferred across security domains. Modification actions include
masking, permutation, alteration, removal, or redaction.
Related Controls: None.
(24) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INTERNAL NORMALIZED FORMAT
When transferring information between different security domains, parse incoming data
into an internal normalized format and regenerate the data to be consistent with its
intended specification.
Discussion: Converting data into normalized forms is one of most of effective mechanisms
to stop malicious attacks and large classes of data exfiltration.
Related Controls: None.
(25) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA SANITIZATION
When transferring information between different security domains, sanitize data tominimize [Selection (one or more): delivery of malicious content, command and control ofmalicious code, malicious code augmentation, and steganography encoded data; spillageof sensitive information] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined policy]].
Discussion: Data sanitization is the process of irreversibly removing or destroying datastored on a memory device (e.g., hard drives, flash memory/solid state drives, mobile
devices, CDs, and DVDs) or in hard copy form.
Related Controls: MP-6.
(26) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | AUDIT FILTERING ACTIONSWhen transferring information between different security domains, record and audit
content filtering actions and results for the information being filtered.
Discussion: Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a crossdomain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. Content
filtering actions and the results of filtering actions are recorded for individual messages toensure that the correct filter actions were applied. Content filter reports are used to assist introubleshooting actions by, for example, determining why message content was modified
and/or why it failed the filtering process. Audit events are defined in AU-2. Audit records are
generated in AU-12.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-3, AU-12.
(27) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | REDUNDANT/INDEPENDENT FILTERING MECHANISMS
When transferring information between different security domains, implement content
filtering solutions that provide redundant and independent filtering mechanisms for eachdata type.
Discussion: Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a crossdomain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. Redundant

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________and independent content filtering eliminates a single point of failure filtering system.
Independence is defined as the implementation of a content filter that uses a different codebase and supporting libraries (e.g., two JPEG filters using different vendors’ JPEG libraries)
and multiple, independent system processes.
Related Controls: None.
(28) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | LINEAR FILTER PIPELINES
When transferring information between different security domains, implement a linear
content filter pipeline that is enforced with discretionary and mandatory access controls.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a crossdomain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined policy. The use of
linear content filter pipelines ensures that filter processes are non-bypassable and always
invoked. In general, the use of parallel filtering architectures for content filtering of a single
data type introduces bypass and non-invocation issues.
Related Controls: None.
(29) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | FILTER ORCHESTRATION ENGINES
When transferring information between different security domains, employ content filter
orchestration engines to ensure that:(a) Content filtering mechanisms successfully complete execution without errors; and(b) Content filtering actions occur in the correct order and comply with [Assignment:
organization-defined policy].
Discussion: Content filtering is the process of inspecting information as it traverses a crossdomain solution and determines if the information meets a predefined security policy. An
orchestration engine coordinates the sequencing of activities (manual and automated) in acontent filtering process. Errors are defined as either anomalous actions or unexpected
termination of the content filter process. This is not the same as a filter failing content due
to non-compliance with policy. Content filter reports are a commonly used mechanism toensure that expected filtering actions are completed successfully.
Related Controls: None.
(30) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | FILTER MECHANISMS USING MULTIPLE PROCESSES
When transferring information between different security domains, implement content
filtering mechanisms using multiple processes.
Discussion: The use of multiple processes to implement content filtering mechanisms
reduces the likelihood of a single point of failure.
Related Controls: None.
(31) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | FAILED CONTENT TRANSFER PREVENTION
When transferring information between different security domains, prevent the transfer
of failed content to the receiving domain.
Discussion: Content that failed filtering checks can corrupt the system if transferred to thereceiving domain.
Related Controls: None.
(32) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION TRANSFER
When transferring information between different security domains, the process thattransfers information between filter pipelines:(a) Does not filter message content;(b) Validates filtering metadata;

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PAGE 35NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) Ensures the content associated with the filtering metadata has successfully completed
filtering; and(d) Transfers the content to the destination filter pipeline.
Discussion: The processes transferring information between filter pipelines have minimum
complexity and functionality to provide assurance that the processes operate correctly.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP-800-160-1], [SP 800-162], [SP 800-178], [IR 8112].

AC-5

SEPARATION OF DUTIES
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Identify and document [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals requiring
separation]; andb.

Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

Discussion: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges andhelps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes
dividing mission or business functions and support functions among different individuals or roles,
conducting system support functions with different individuals, and ensuring that security
personnel who administer access control functions do not also administer audit functions.
Because separation of duty violations can span systems and application domains, organizations
consider the entirety of systems and system components when developing policy on separationof duties. Separation of duties is enforced through the account management activities in AC-2,
access control mechanisms in AC-3, and identity management activities in IA-2, IA-4, and IA-12.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AU-9, CM-5, CM-11, CP-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-12, MA-3, MA-5,
PS-2, SA-8, SA-17.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

AC-6

LEAST PRIVILEGE
Control: Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (orprocesses acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizationaltasks.
Discussion: Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and systems. The principle of
least privilege is also applied to system processes, ensuring that the processes have access tosystems and operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish organizational
missions or business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles,
and accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations apply least privilege to thedevelopment, implementation, and operation of organizational systems.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-16, CM-5, CM-11, PL-2, PM-12, SA-8, SA-15, SA-17, SC-38.
Control Enhancements:(1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS
Authorize access for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles] to:(a) [Assignment: organization-defined security functions (deployed in hardware, software,and firmware)]; and(b) [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information].

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Discussion: Security functions include establishing system accounts, configuring accessauthorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), configuring settings for events to be audited,and establishing intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes
filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services,
cryptographic key management information, and access control lists. Authorized personnel
include security administrators, system administrators, system security officers, system
programmers, and other privileged users.
Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AU-9, PE-2.
(2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Require that users of system accounts (or roles) with access to [Assignment: organizationdefined security functions or security-relevant information] use non-privileged accounts orroles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.
Discussion: Requiring the use of non-privileged accounts when accessing nonsecurity
functions limits exposure when operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The
inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control
policies, such as role-based access control, and where a change of role provides the same
degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for the user and the processes
acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and nonprivileged account.
Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, PL-4.
(3) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS
Authorize network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands]
only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and document
the rationale for such access in the security plan for the system.
Discussion: Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of local access(i.e., user being physically present at the device).
Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19.
(4) LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS
Provide separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocation of user privileges.
Discussion: Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation of user
privileges includes using virtualization techniques to permit additional user privileges withina virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to the underlying
physical machine, implementing separate physical domains, and employing hardware orsoftware domain separation mechanisms.
Related Controls: AC-4, SC-2, SC-3, SC-30, SC-32, SC-39.
(5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS
Restrict privileged accounts on the system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel
or roles].
Discussion: Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described assystem administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems.
Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users fromaccessing privileged information or privileged functions. Organizations may differentiate in
the application of restricting privileged accounts between allowed privileges for local
accounts and for domain accounts provided that they retain the ability to control system
configurations for key parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk.
Related Controls: IA-2, MA-3, MA-4.

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PAGE 37NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(6) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS
Prohibit privileged access to the system by non-organizational users.
Discussion: An organizational user is an employee or an individual considered by theorganization to have the equivalent status of an employee. Organizational users include
contractors, guest researchers, or individuals detailed from other organizations. A nonorganizational user is a user who is not an organizational user. Policies and procedures for
granting equivalent status of employees to individuals include a need-to-know, citizenship,
and the relationship to the organization.
Related Controls: AC-18, AC-19, IA-2, IA-8.
(7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGESThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Review [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to[Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need forsuch privileges; and(b) Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission
and business needs.
Discussion: The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time to reflectchanges in organizational mission and business functions, environments of operation,technologies, or threats. A periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to
determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be
revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions.
Related Controls: CA-7.
(8) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION
Prevent the following software from executing at higher privilege levels than users
executing the software: [Assignment: organization-defined software].
Discussion: In certain situations, software applications or programs need to execute withelevated privileges to perform required functions. However, depending on the software
functionality and configuration, if the privileges required for execution are at a higher level
than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking such applications or programs,
those users may indirectly be provided with greater privileges than assigned.
Related Controls: None.
(9) LEAST PRIVILEGE | LOG USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS
Log the execution of privileged functions.
Discussion: The misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally byauthorized users or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system
accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts onorganizations. Logging and analyzing the use of privileged functions is one way to detectsuch misuse and, in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced
persistent threat.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-3, AU-12.
(10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSPrevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions.
Discussion: Privileged functions include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented
security or privacy controls, establishing system accounts, performing system integrity
checks, and administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users
are individuals who do not possess appropriate authorizations. Privileged functions that
require protection from non-privileged users include circumventing intrusion detection and

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms. Preventing nonprivileged users from executing privileged functions is enforced by AC-3.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

AC-7

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Enforce a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon
attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; andb.

Automatically [Selection (one or more): lock the account or node for an [Assignment:
organization-defined time period]; lock the account or node until released by anadministrator; delay next logon prompt per [Assignment: organization-defined delay
algorithm]; notify system administrator; take other [Assignment: organization-defined
action]] when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

Discussion: The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the
maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a
local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts
initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined,organization-defined time period. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may employ
different algorithms for different components of the system based on the capabilities of thosecomponents. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at the operating
system and the application levels. Organization-defined actions that may be taken when thenumber of allowed consecutive invalid logon attempts is exceeded include prompting the user toanswer a secret question in addition to the username and password, invoking a lockdown modewith limited user capabilities (instead of full lockout), allowing users to only logon from specified
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, requiring a CAPTCHA to prevent automated attacks, or applying
user profiles such as location, time of day, IP address, device, or Media Access Control (MAC)
address. If automatic system lockout or execution of a delay algorithm is not implemented insupport of the availability objective, organizations consider a combination of other actions to
help prevent brute force attacks. In addition to the above, organizations can prompt users to
respond to a secret question before the number of allowed unsuccessful logon attempts is
exceeded. Automatically unlocking an account after a specified period of time is generally not
permitted. However, exceptions may be required based on operational mission or need.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-9, AU-2, AU-6, IA-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-7.](2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE OR WIPE MOBILE DEVICE
Purge or wipe information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices] basedon [Assignment: organization-defined purging or wiping requirements and techniques]
after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon
attempts.
Discussion: A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it
can be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection;possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained
power source. Purging or wiping the device applies only to mobile devices for which theorganization-defined number of unsuccessful logons occurs. The logon is to the mobile

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device, not to any one account on the device. Successful logons to accounts on mobile
devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Purging or wiping may be unnecessary if
the information on the device is protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms.
Related Controls: AC-19, MP-5, MP-6.
(3) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | BIOMETRIC ATTEMPT LIMITING
Limit the number of unsuccessful biometric logon attempts to [Assignment: organizationdefined number].
Discussion: Biometrics are probabilistic in nature. The ability to successfully authenticate
can be impacted by many factors, including matching performance and presentation attack
detection mechanisms. Organizations select the appropriate number of attempts for users
based on organizationally-defined factors.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: IA-3.
(4) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | USE OF ALTERNATE AUTHENTICATION FACTOR(a) Allow the use of [Assignment: organization-defined authentication factors] that are
different from the primary authentication factors after the number of organizationdefined consecutive invalid logon attempts have been exceeded; and(b) Enforce a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid
logon attempts through use of the alternative factors by a user during a [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].
Discussion: The use of alternate authentication factors supports the objective of availability
and allows a user who has inadvertently been locked out to use additional authentication
factors to bypass the lockout.
Related Controls: IA-3.
References: [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-124].

AC-8

SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION
Control:a.

Display [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or banner] tousers before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices
consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards,
and guidelines and state that:
1.

Users are accessing a U.S. Government system;

2.

System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;

3.

Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties;
and4.

Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;b.

Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage
conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system; andc.

For publicly accessible systems:

CHAPTER THREE

1.

Display system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before
granting further access to the publicly accessible system;

2.

Display references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent withprivacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; andPAGE 40NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________

3.

Include a description of the authorized uses of the system.

Discussion: System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners
displayed before individuals log in to systems. System use notifications are used only for access
via logon interfaces with human users. Notifications are not required when human interfaces do
not exist. Based on an assessment of risk, organizations consider whether or not a secondary
system use notification is needed to access applications or other system resources after the
initial network logon. Organizations consider system use notification messages or banners
displayed in multiple languages based on organizational needs and the demographics of systemusers. Organizations consult with the privacy office for input regarding privacy messaging and the
Office of the General Counsel or organizational equivalent for legal review and approval of
warning banner content.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-14, PL-4, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

AC-9

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION
Control: Notify the user, upon successful logon to the system, of the date and time of the last
logon.
Discussion: Previous logon notification is applicable to system access via human user interfaces
and access to systems that occurs in other types of architectures. Information about the last
successful logon allows the user to recognize if the date and time provided is not consistent withthe user’s last access.
Related Controls: AC-7, PL-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS
Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since
the last successful logon.
Discussion: Information about the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last
successful logon allows the user to recognize if the number of unsuccessful logon attempts is
consistent with the user’s actual logon attempts.
Related Controls: None.
(2) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS
Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the number of [Selection: successful logons;
unsuccessful logon attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Discussion: Information about the number of successful and unsuccessful logon attempts
within a specified time period allows the user to recognize if the number and type of logon
attempts are consistent with the user’s actual logon attempts.
Related Controls: None.
(3) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT CHANGES
Notify the user, upon successful logon, of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined
security-related characteristics or parameters of the user’s account] during [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].
Discussion: Information about changes to security-related account characteristics within a
specified time period allows users to recognize if changes were made without theirknowledge.

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Related Controls: None.
(4) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION
Notify the user, upon successful logon, of the following additional information:[Assignment: organization-defined additional information].
Discussion: Organizations can specify additional information to be provided to users upon
logon, including the location of the last logon. User location is defined as information thatcan be determined by systems, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which network
logons occurred, notifications of local logons, or device identifiers.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

AC-10 CONCURRENT SESSION CONTROL
Control: Limit the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: organization-defined
account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].
Discussion: Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for system
accounts globally, by account type, by account, or any combination thereof. For example,
organizations may limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or otherindividuals working in particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. Concurrent
session control addresses concurrent sessions for system accounts. It does not, however, address
concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts.
Related Controls: SC-23.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

AC-11 DEVICE LOCK
Control:a.

Prevent further access to the system by [Selection (one or more): initiating a device lock after[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity; requiring the user to initiate adevice lock before leaving the system unattended]; andb.

Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification andauthentication procedures.

Discussion: Device locks are temporary actions taken to prevent logical access to organizational
systems when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of those systems but
do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Device locks can be
implemented at the operating system level or at the application level. A proximity lock may be
used to initiate the device lock (e.g., via a Bluetooth-enabled device or dongle). User-initiateddevice locking is behavior or policy-based and, as such, requires users to take physical action toinitiate the device lock. Device locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of systems,
such as when organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-7, IA-11, PL-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) DEVICE LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS
Conceal, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly
viewable image.

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Discussion: The pattern-hiding display can include static or dynamic images, such as
patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life
indicator, or a blank screen with the caveat that controlled unclassified information is not
displayed.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION
Control: Automatically terminate a user session after [Assignment: organization-definedconditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Session termination addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions (incontrast to SC-10, which addresses the termination of network connections associated with
communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect)). A logical session (for local, network, andremote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses anorganizational system. Such user sessions can be terminated without terminating network
sessions. Session termination ends all processes associated with a user’s logical session except
for those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after
the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events that require automatic termination of thesession include organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain
types of incidents, or time-of-day restrictions on system use.
Related Controls: MA-4, SC-10, SC-23.
Control Enhancements:(1) SESSION TERMINATION | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS
Provide a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions wheneverauthentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information
resources].
Discussion: Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include local
workstations, databases, and password-protected websites or web-based services.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SESSION TERMINATION | TERMINATION MESSAGE
Display an explicit logout message to users indicating the termination of authenticatedcommunications sessions.
Discussion: Logout messages for web access can be displayed after authenticated sessions
have been terminated. However, for certain types of sessions, including file transfer protocol(FTP) sessions, systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating
sessions.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SESSION TERMINATION | TIMEOUT WARNING MESSAGE
Display an explicit message to users indicating that the session will end in [Assignment:
organization-defined time until end of session].
Discussion: To increase usability, notify users of pending session termination and prompt
users to continue the session. The pending session termination time period is based on theparameters defined in the AC-12 base control.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

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AC-13 SUPERVISION AND REVIEW — ACCESS CONTROL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6.]

AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION
Control:a.

Identify [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on thesystem without identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission andbusiness functions; andb.

Document and provide supporting rationale in the security plan for the system, user actions
not requiring identification or authentication.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Specific user actions may be permitted without identification or authentication if
organizations determine that identification and authentication are not required for the specified
user actions. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification orauthentication, including when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible
federal systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles arereceived. Organizations identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but
may, under certain circumstances, allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be
bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch thatcommands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored
use. Permitting actions without identification or authentication does not apply to situations
where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated but rather
to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may
decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational systems without
identification and authentication, and therefore, the value for the assignment operation can be“none.”
Related Controls: AC-8, IA-2, PL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1) PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION | NECESSARY USES
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14.]
References: None.

AC-15 AUTOMATED MARKING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3.]

AC-16 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES
Control:a.

Provide the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security andprivacy attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributevalues] for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission;b.

Ensure that the attribute associations are made and retained with the information;c.

Establish the following permitted security and privacy attributes from the attributes definedin AC-16a for [Assignment: organization-defined systems]: [Assignment: organization-defined
security and privacy attributes];

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Determine the following permitted attribute values or ranges for each of the establishedattributes: [Assignment: organization-defined attribute values or ranges for establishedattributes];e.

Audit changes to attributes; andf.

Review [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] for applicability[Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Information is represented internally within systems using abstractions known asdata structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of entities, both active andpassive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated with individuals, devices,or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known as objects, are typicallyassociated with data structures, such as records, buffers, tables, files, inter-process pipes, andcommunications ports. Security attributes, a form of metadata, are abstractions that represent
the basic properties or characteristics of active and passive entities with respect to safeguarding
information. Privacy attributes, which may be used independently or in conjunction with security
attributes, represent the basic properties or characteristics of active or passive entities withrespect to the management of personally identifiable information. Attributes can be either
explicitly or implicitly associated with the information contained in organizational systems or
system components.
Attributes may be associated with active entities (i.e., subjects) that have the potential to send or
receive information, cause information to flow among objects, or change the system state. These
attributes may also be associated with passive entities (i.e., objects) that contain or receive
information. The association of attributes to subjects and objects by a system is referred to asbinding and is inclusive of setting the attribute value and the attribute type. Attributes, whenbound to data or information, permit the enforcement of security and privacy policies for access
control and information flow control, including data retention limits, permitted uses of
personally identifiable information, and identification of personal information within data
objects. Such enforcement occurs through organizational processes or system functions ormechanisms. The binding techniques implemented by systems affect the strength of attributebinding to information. Binding strength and the assurance associated with binding techniques
play important parts in the trust that organizations have in the information flow enforcement
process. The binding techniques affect the number and degree of additional reviews required byorganizations. The content or assigned values of attributes can directly affect the ability of
individuals to access organizational information.
Organizations can define the types of attributes needed for systems to support missions orbusiness functions. There are many values that can be assigned to a security attribute. By
specifying the permitted attribute ranges and values, organizations ensure that attribute values
are meaningful and relevant. Labeling refers to the association of attributes with the subjects
and objects represented by the internal data structures within systems. This facilitates systembased enforcement of information security and privacy policies. Labels include classification of
information in accordance with legal and compliance requirements (e.g., top secret, secret,confidential, controlled unclassified), information impact level; high value asset information,access authorizations, nationality; data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration),
personally identifiable information processing permissions, including individual consent topersonally identifiable information processing, and contractor affiliation. A related term tolabeling is marking. Marking refers to the association of attributes with objects in a humanreadable form and displayed on system media. Marking enables manual, procedural, or processbased enforcement of information security and privacy policies. Security and privacy labels may
have the same value as media markings (e.g., top secret, secret, confidential). See MP-3 (MediaMarking).

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Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-21, AC-25, AU-2, AU-10, MP-3, PE-22, PT-2, PT-3, PT-4,
SC-11, SC-16, SI-12, SI-18.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION
Dynamically associate security and privacy attributes with [Assignment: organizationdefined subjects and objects] in accordance with the following security and privacy policies
as information is created and combined: [Assignment: organization-defined security andprivacy policies].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Dynamic association of attributes is appropriate whenever the security or
privacy characteristics of information change over time. Attributes may change due toinformation aggregation issues (i.e., characteristics of individual data elements are different
from the combined elements), changes in individual access authorizations (i.e., privileges),changes in the security category of information, or changes in security or privacy policies.
Attributes may also change situationally.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSProvide authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) the capability
to define or change the value of associated security and privacy attributes.
Discussion: The content or assigned values of attributes can directly affect the ability of
individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for systems to beable to limit the ability to create or modify attributes to authorized individuals.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONS BY SYSTEM
Maintain the association and integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined security andprivacy attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects].
Discussion: Maintaining the association and integrity of security and privacy attributes tosubjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations
can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. The integrity of specific items, such as
security configuration files, may be maintained through the use of an integrity monitoringmechanism that detects anomalies and changes that deviate from “known good” baselines.
Automated policy actions include retention date expirations, access control decisions,information flow control decisions, and information disclosure decisions.
Related Controls: None.
(4) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSProvide the capability to associate [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy
attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorizedindividuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals).
Discussion: Systems, in general, provide the capability for privileged users to assign security
and privacy attributes to system-defined subjects (e.g., users) and objects (e.g., directories,
files, and ports). Some systems provide additional capability for general users to assign
security and privacy attributes to additional objects (e.g., files, emails). The association of
attributes by authorized individuals is described in the design documentation. The support
provided by systems can include prompting users to select security and privacy attributes tobe associated with information objects, employing automated mechanisms to categorize
information with attributes based on defined policies, or ensuring that the combination of
the security or privacy attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation,
deletion, or modification of attributes when defining auditable events.

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Related Controls: None.
(5) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS ON OBJECTS TO BE OUTPUT
Display security and privacy attributes in human-readable form on each object that thesystem transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-defined special
dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organizationdefined human-readable, standard naming conventions].
Discussion: System outputs include printed pages, screens, or equivalent items. System
output devices include printers, notebook computers, video displays, smart phones, andtablets. To mitigate the risk of unauthorized exposure of information (e.g., shoulder surfing),
the outputs display full attribute values when unmasked by the subscriber.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(6) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION
Require personnel to associate and maintain the association of [Assignment: organizationdefined security and privacy attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects
and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy
policies].
Discussion: Maintaining attribute association requires individual users (as opposed to thesystem) to maintain associations of defined security and privacy attributes with subjects andobjects.
Related Controls: None.
(7) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION
Provide a consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes transmitted between
distributed system components.
Discussion: To enforce security and privacy policies across multiple system components indistributed systems, organizations provide a consistent interpretation of security and privacy
attributes employed in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions. Organizations
can establish agreements and processes to help ensure that distributed system components
implement attributes with consistent interpretations in automated access enforcement andflow enforcement actions.
Related Controls: None.
(8) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and technologies] in associating
security and privacy attributes to information.
Discussion: The association of security and privacy attributes to information within systems
is important for conducting automated access enforcement and flow enforcement actions.
The association of such attributes to information (i.e., binding) can be accomplished withtechnologies and techniques that provide different levels of assurance. For example, systems
can cryptographically bind attributes to information using digital signatures that support
cryptographic keys protected by hardware devices (sometimes known as hardware roots oftrust).
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(9) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT — REGRADING MECHANISMS
Change security and privacy attributes associated with information only via regradingmechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or procedures].
Discussion: A regrading mechanism is a trusted process authorized to re-classify and re-label
data in accordance with a defined policy exception. Validated regrading mechanisms are

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used by organizations to provide the requisite levels of assurance for attribute reassignment
activities. The validation is facilitated by ensuring that regrading mechanisms are single
purpose and of limited function. Since security and privacy attribute changes can directly
affect policy enforcement actions, implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms isnecessary to help ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent and correct mode ofoperation.
Related Controls: None.
(10) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSProvide authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type and value of
security and privacy attributes available for association with subjects and objects.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The content or assigned values of security and privacy attributes can directly
affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Thus, it is important forsystems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify the type and value of attributes
available for association with subjects and objects to authorized individuals only.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 186-4], [SP 800-162], [SP 800-178].

AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS
Control:a.

Establish and document usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, andimplementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; andb.

Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections.

Discussion: Remote access is access to organizational systems (or processes acting on behalf ofusers) that communicate through external networks such as the Internet. Types of remote accessinclude dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations use encrypted virtual private networks(VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity for remote connections. The use of encrypted
VPNs provides sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat suchconnections as internal networks if the cryptographic mechanisms used are implemented inaccordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards,
and guidelines. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does
not enhance the availability of remote connections. VPNs with encrypted tunnels can also affectthe ability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote
access controls apply to systems other than public web servers or systems designed for publicaccess. Authorization of each remote access type addresses authorization prior to allowing
remote access without specifying the specific formats for such authorization. While organizations
may use information exchange and system connection security agreements to manage remote
access connections to other systems, such agreements are addressed as part of CA-3. Enforcing
access restrictions for remote access is addressed via AC-3.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, CM-10, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, MA-4, PE17, PL-2, PL-4, SC-10, SC-12, SC-13, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING AND CONTROL
Employ automated mechanisms to monitor and control remote access methods.
Discussion: Monitoring and control of remote access methods allows organizations todetect attacks and help ensure compliance with remote access policies by auditing theconnection activities of remote users on a variety of system components, including servers,

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notebook computers, workstations, smart phones, and tablets. Audit logging for remote
access is enforced by AU-2. Audit events are defined in AU-2a.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, AU-14.
(2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
remote access sessions.
Discussion: Virtual private networks can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrityof remote access sessions. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an example of a cryptographic
protocol that provides end-to-end communications security over networks and is used forInternet communications and online transactions.
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS
Route remote accesses through authorized and managed network access control points.
Discussion: Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative [DHSTIC] requirements for external network connections since limiting the number of access
control points for remote access reduces attack surfaces.
Related Controls: SC-7.
(4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS AND ACCESS(a) Authorize the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant
information via remote access only in a format that provides assessable evidence andfor the following needs: [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and(b) Document the rationale for remote access in the security plan for the system.
Discussion: Remote access to systems represents a significant potential vulnerability thatcan be exploited by adversaries. As such, restricting the execution of privileged commands
and access to security-relevant information via remote access reduces the exposure of theorganization and the susceptibility to threats by adversaries to the remote access capability.
Related Controls: AC-6, SC-12, SC-13.
(5) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4.](6) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF MECHANISM INFORMATION
Protect information about remote access mechanisms from unauthorized use anddisclosure.
Discussion: Remote access to organizational information by non-organizational entities canincrease the risk of unauthorized use and disclosure about remote access mechanisms. The
organization considers including remote access requirements in the information exchange
agreements with other organizations, as applicable. Remote access requirements can also be
included in rules of behavior (see PL-4) and access agreements (see PS-6).
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, PS-6.
(7) REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY FUNCTION ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-3(10).](8) REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7.](9) REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT OR DISABLE ACCESSCHAPTER THREE

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Provide the capability to disconnect or disable remote access to the system within[Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Discussion: The speed of system disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of
missions or business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote accessto systems.
Related Controls: None.
(10) REMOTE ACCESS | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to authenticate [Assignment:
organization-defined remote commands].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Authenticating remote commands protects against unauthorized commands andthe replay of authorized commands. The ability to authenticate remote commands isimportant for remote systems for which loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation
would have immediate or serious consequences, such as injury, death, property damage,loss of high value assets, failure of mission or business functions, or compromise of classified
or controlled unclassified information. Authentication mechanisms for remote commands
ensure that systems accept and execute commands in the order intended, execute only
authorized commands, and reject unauthorized commands. Cryptographic mechanisms canbe used, for example, to authenticate remote commands.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SC-23.
References: [SP 800-46], [SP 800-77], [SP 800-113], [SP 800-114], [SP 800-121], [IR 7966].

AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS
Control:a.

Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation
guidance for each type of wireless access; andb.

Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections.

Discussion: Wireless technologies include microwave, packet radio (ultra-high frequency or very
high frequency), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols thatprovide authenticator protection and mutual authentication.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-9, CM-7, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SC-40, SC-43, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION
Protect wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection (one or more):users; devices] and encryption.
Discussion: Wireless networking capabilities represent a significant potential vulnerability
that can be exploited by adversaries. To protect systems with wireless access points, strong
authentication of users and devices along with strong encryption can reduce susceptibility tothreats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(2) WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4.](3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKINGDisable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within
system components prior to issuance and deployment.

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Discussion: Wireless networking capabilities that are embedded within system components
represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. Disabling
wireless capabilities when not needed for essential organizational missions or functions can
reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.
Related Controls: None.
(4) WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS
Identify and explicitly authorize users allowed to independently configure wirelessnetworking capabilities.
Discussion: Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wirelessnetworking capabilities are enforced, in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms
employed within organizational systems.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: SC-7, SC-15.
(5) WIRELESS ACCESS | ANTENNAS AND TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELS
Select radio antennas and calibrate transmission power levels to reduce the probability
that signals from wireless access points can be received outside of organization-controlled
boundaries.
Discussion: Actions that may be taken to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications
outside of organization-controlled boundaries include reducing the power of wirelesstransmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be captured
outside of the physical perimeters of the organization, employing measures such as
emissions security to control wireless emanations, and using directional or beamforming
antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept
signals. Prior to taking such mitigating actions, organizations can conduct periodic wirelesssurveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational systems as well as othersystems that may be operating in the area.
Related Controls: PE-19.
References: [SP 800-94], [SP 800-97].

AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES
Control:a.

Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation
guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices, to include when such devices areoutside of controlled areas; andb.

Authorize the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.

Discussion: A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it caneasily be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection;possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained powersource. Mobile device functionality may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board
sensors that allow the device to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing
local data with remote locations. Examples include smart phones and tablets. Mobile devices are
typically associated with a single individual. The processing, storage, and transmission capabilityof the mobile device may be comparable to or merely a subset of notebook/desktop systems,
depending on the nature and intended purpose of the device. Protection and control of mobile
devices is behavior or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to protect andcontrol such devices when outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are spaces for whichorganizations provide physical or procedural controls to meet the requirements established forprotecting information and systems.

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Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different characteristics and capabilities,
organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes or types of such devices. Usage
restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include configuration
management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory protective
software, scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning forcritical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly otherresident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Usage restrictions and authorization to connect may vary among organizational systems. For
example, the organization may authorize the connection of mobile devices to its network andimpose a set of usage restrictions, while a system owner may withhold authorization for mobile
device connection to specific applications or impose additional usage restrictions before allowing
mobile device connections to a system. Adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond therequirements specified in AC-19. Many safeguards for mobile devices are reflected in othercontrols. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-7, AC-11, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, CA-9, CM-2, CM-6, IA-2, IA-3,
MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, MP-7, PL-4, SC-7, SC-34, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE AND PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7.](2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7.](3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO
IDENTIFIABLE OWNER[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7.](4) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION(a) Prohibit the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems
processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted
by the authorizing official; and(b) Enforce the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official
to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing,or transmitting classified information:(1) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified systems is prohibited;(2) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified systems requires
approval from the authorizing official;(3) Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified
mobile devices is prohibited; and(4) Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are
subject to random reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined
security officials], and if classified information is found, the incident handlingpolicy is followed.
(c) Restrict the connection of classified mobile devices to classified systems in accordancewith [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: CM-8, IR-4.
(5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE OR CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION

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Employ [Selection: full-device encryption; container-based encryption] to protect theconfidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile
devices].
Discussion: Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to data andinformation encryption on mobile devices, including encrypting selected data structures
such as files, records, or fields.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SC-28.
References: [SP 800-114], [SP 800-124].

AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

b.

[Selection (one or more): Establish [Assignment: organization-defined terms and conditions];
Identify [Assignment: organization-defined controls asserted to be implemented on external
systems]], consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations
owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to:1.

Access the system from external systems; and2.

Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems;orProhibit the use of [Assignment: organizationally-defined types of external systems].

Discussion: External systems are systems that are used by but not part of organizational systems,
and for which the organization has no direct control over the implementation of required
controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External systems include personally owned
systems, components, or devices; privately owned computing and communications devices incommercial or public facilities; systems owned or controlled by nonfederal organizations;systems managed by contractors; and federal information systems that are not owned by,operated by, or under the direct supervision or authority of the organization. External systems
also include systems owned or operated by other components within the same organization andsystems within the organization with different authorization boundaries. Organizations have theoption to prohibit the use of any type of external system or prohibit the use of specified types ofexternal systems, (e.g., prohibit the use of any external system that is not organizationally ownedor prohibit the use of personally-owned systems).
For some external systems (i.e., systems operated by other organizations), the trust relationshipsthat have been established between those organizations and the originating organization may besuch that no explicit terms and conditions are required. Systems within these organizations may
not be considered external. These situations occur when, for example, there are pre-existing
information exchange agreements (either implicit or explicit) established between organizations
or components or when such agreements are specified by applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, or standards. Authorized individuals include organizational
personnel, contractors, or other individuals with authorized access to organizational systems andover which organizations have the authority to impose specific rules of behavior regarding
system access. Restrictions that organizations impose on authorized individuals need not be
uniform, as the restrictions may vary depending on trust relationships between organizations.
Therefore, organizations may choose to impose different security restrictions on contractors
than on state, local, or tribal governments.
External systems used to access public interfaces to organizational systems are outside the scopeof AC-20. Organizations establish specific terms and conditions for the use of external systems inaccordance with organizational security policies and procedures. At a minimum, terms andconditions address the specific types of applications that can be accessed on organizational

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systems from external systems and the highest security category of information that can beprocessed, stored, or transmitted on external systems. If the terms and conditions with theowners of the external systems cannot be established, organizations may impose restrictions onorganizational personnel using those external systems.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, PL-2, PL-4, SA-9, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE
Permit authorized individuals to use an external system to access the system or to process,store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Verification of the implementation of controls on the external system as specified in
the organization’s security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans; or(b) Retention of approved system connection or processing agreements with theorganizational entity hosting the external system.
Discussion: Limiting authorized use recognizes circumstances where individuals using
external systems may need to access organizational systems. Organizations need assurance
that the external systems contain the necessary controls so as not to compromise, damage,or otherwise harm organizational systems. Verification that the required controls have been
implemented can be achieved by external, independent assessments, attestations, or othermeans, depending on the confidence level required by organizations.
Related Controls: CA-2.
(2) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — RESTRICTED USE
Restrict the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorizedindividuals on external systems using [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].
Discussion: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external
systems include restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions thedevices may be used.
Related Controls: MP-7, SC-41.
(3) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS — RESTRICTED USE
Restrict the use of non-organizationally owned systems or system components to process,store, or transmit organizational information using [Assignment: organization-defined
restrictions].
Discussion: Non-organizationally owned systems or system components include systems or
system components owned by other organizations as well as personally owned devices.
There are potential risks to using non-organizationally owned systems or components. In
some cases, the risk is sufficiently high as to prohibit such use (see AC-20 b.). In other cases,
the use of such systems or system components may be allowed but restricted in some way.
Restrictions include requiring the implementation of approved controls prior to authorizing
the connection of non-organizationally owned systems and components; limiting access totypes of information, services, or applications; using virtualization techniques to limit
processing and storage activities to servers or system components provisioned by theorganization; and agreeing to the terms and conditions for usage. Organizations consult with
the Office of the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using personallyowned devices, including requirements for conducting forensic analyses during
investigations after an incident.
Related Controls: None.
(4) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES — PROHIBITED USE

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Prohibit the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible storage devices]in external systems.
Discussion: Network-accessible storage devices in external systems include online storage
devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based systems.
Related Controls: None.
(5) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — PROHIBITED USE
Prohibit the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorizedindividuals on external systems.
Discussion: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external
systems include a complete prohibition of the use of such devices. Prohibiting such use isenforced using technical methods and/or nontechnical (i.e., process-based) methods.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: MP-7, PL-4, PS-6, SC-41.
References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-171], [SP 800-172].

AC-21 INFORMATION SHARING
Control:a.

Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing
partner match the information’s access and use restrictions for [Assignment: organizationdefined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required]; andb.

Employ [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] toassist users in making information sharing and collaboration decisions.

Discussion: Information sharing applies to information that may be restricted in some mannerbased on some formal or administrative determination. Examples of such information include,
contract-sensitive information, classified information related to special access programs orcompartments, privileged information, proprietary information, and personally identifiable
information. Security and privacy risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, andpolicies can provide useful inputs to these determinations. Depending on the circumstances,sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information
may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program or compartment.
Access restrictions may include non-disclosure agreements (NDA). Information flow techniquesand security attributes may be used to provide automated assistance to users making sharing
and collaboration decisions.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16, PT-2, PT-7, RA-3, SC-15.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms] to enforce
information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on access authorizations ofsharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.
Discussion: Automated mechanisms are used to enforce information sharing decisions.
Related Controls: None.
(2) INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL
Implement information search and retrieval services that enforce [Assignment:
organization-defined information sharing restrictions].
Discussion: Information search and retrieval services identify information system resources
relevant to an information need.

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Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-150], [IR 8062].

AC-22 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Designate individuals authorized to make information publicly accessible;b.

Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain
nonpublic information;c.

Review the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible
system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; andd.

Review the content on the publicly accessible system for nonpublic information[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and remove such information, if discovered.

Discussion: In accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations,standards, and guidelines, the public is not authorized to have access to nonpublic information,
including information protected under the [PRIVACT] and proprietary information. Publicly
accessible content addresses systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible tothe public, typically without identification or authentication. Posting information on nonorganizational systems (e.g., non-organizational public websites, forums, and social media) iscovered by organizational policy. While organizations may have individuals who are responsiblefor developing and implementing policies about the information that can be made publicly
accessible, publicly accessible content addresses the management of the individuals who makesuch information publicly accessible.
Related Controls: AC-3, AT-2, AT-3, AU-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT].

AC-23 DATA MINING PROTECTION
Control: Employ [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention and detection
techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to detect and protect
against unauthorized data mining.
Discussion: Data mining is an analytical process that attempts to find correlations or patterns inlarge data sets for the purpose of data or knowledge discovery. Data storage objects include
database records and database fields. Sensitive information can be extracted from data mining
operations. When information is personally identifiable information, it may lead to unanticipatedrevelations about individuals and give rise to privacy risks. Prior to performing data mining
activities, organizations determine whether such activities are authorized. Organizations may besubject to applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that address data
mining requirements. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy
and legal counsel regarding such requirements.
Data mining prevention and detection techniques include limiting the number and frequency of
database queries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of databases,
limiting types of responses provided to database queries, applying differential privacy techniques
or homomorphic encryption, and notifying personnel when atypical database queries or accesses
occur. Data mining protection focuses on protecting information from data mining while suchinformation resides in organizational data stores. In contrast, AU-13 focuses on monitoring fororganizational information that may have been mined or otherwise obtained from data stores

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or social media websites.
[EO 13587] requires the establishment of an insider threat program for deterring, detecting, andmitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of sensitive information from exploitation,
compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure. Data mining protection requires organizations to
identify appropriate techniques to prevent and detect unnecessary or unauthorized data mining.
Data mining can be used by an insider to collect organizational information for the purpose of
exfiltration.
Related Controls: PM-12, PT-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [EO 13587].

AC-24 ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS
Control: [Selection: Establish procedures; Implement mechanisms] to ensure [Assignment:
organization-defined access control decisions] are applied to each access request prior to accessenforcement.
Discussion: Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur whenauthorization information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement occurs
when systems enforce access control decisions. While it is common to have access control
decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not required, and it is
not always an optimal implementation choice. For some architectures and distributed systems,
different entities may make access control decisions and enforce access.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION
Transmit [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization information] using[Assignment: organization-defined controls] to [Assignment: organization-definedsystems] that enforce access control decisions.
Discussion: Authorization processes and access control decisions may occur in separate
parts of systems or in separate systems. In such instances, authorization information istransmitted securely (e.g., using cryptographic mechanisms) so that timely access control
decisions can be enforced at the appropriate locations. To support the access control
decisions, it may be necessary to transmit as part of the access authorization information
supporting security and privacy attributes. This is because in distributed systems, there arevarious access control decisions that need to be made, and different entities make thesedecisions in a serial fashion, each requiring those attributes to make the decisions.
Protecting access authorization information ensures that such information cannot bealtered, spoofed, or compromised during transmission.
Related Controls: AU-10.
(2) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY
Enforce access control decisions based on [Assignment: organization-defined security or
privacy attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalfof the user.
Discussion: In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can be madewithout information regarding the identity of the users issuing the requests. These are
generally instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In other

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situations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions,and especially in the case of distributed systems, transmitting such information with theneeded degree of assurance may be very expensive or difficult to accomplish. MAC, RBAC,
ABAC, and label-based control policies, for example, might not include user identity as an
attribute.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-162], [SP 800-178].

AC-25 REFERENCE MONITOR

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Implement a reference monitor for [Assignment: organization-defined access control
policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be subject to analysis andtesting, the completeness of which can be assured.
Discussion: A reference monitor is a set of design requirements on a reference validation
mechanism that, as a key component of an operating system, enforces an access control policy
over all subjects and objects. A reference validation mechanism is always invoked, tamper-proof,
and small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured(i.e., verifiable). Information is represented internally within systems using abstractions known asdata structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of entities, both active andpassive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are associated with individuals, devices, orprocesses acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known as objects, are associatedwith data structures, such as records, buffers, communications ports, tables, files, and interprocess pipes. Reference monitors enforce access control policies that restrict access to objects
based on the identity of subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The system enforces
the access control policy based on the rule set established by the policy. The tamper-proof
property of the reference monitor prevents determined adversaries from compromising thefunctioning of the reference validation mechanism. The always invoked property prevents
adversaries from bypassing the mechanism and violating the security policy. The smallness
property helps to ensure completeness in the analysis and testing of the mechanism to detect
any weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., latent flaws) that would prevent the enforcement of the
security policy.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-16, SA-8, SA-17, SC-3, SC-11, SC-39, SI-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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3.2 AWARENESS AND TRAINING
Quick link to Awareness and Training Summary Table
AT-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] awareness and training policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the awareness and training policy andthe associated awareness and training controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the awareness and training policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current awareness and training:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Awareness and training policy and procedures address the controls in the AT family
that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an
important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contributeto security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs
collaborate on the development of awareness and training policy and procedures. Security andprivacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, andmay obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update toawareness and training policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security
incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute anorganizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-50], [SP 800-100].

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AT-2

LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS
Control:a.

Provide security and privacy literacy training to system users (including managers, senior
executives, and contractors):
1.

As part of initial training for new users and [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] thereafter; and2.

When required by system changes or following [Assignment: organization-defined
events];This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5b.

Employ the following techniques to increase the security and privacy awareness of systemusers [Assignment: organization-defined awareness techniques];c.

Update literacy training and awareness content [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; andd.

Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches into
literacy training and awareness techniques.

Discussion: Organizations provide basic and advanced levels of literacy training to system users,
including measures to test the knowledge level of users. Organizations determine the content ofliteracy training and awareness based on specific organizational requirements, the systems towhich personnel have authorized access, and work environments (e.g., telework). The content
includes an understanding of the need for security and privacy as well as actions by users tomaintain security and personal privacy and to respond to suspected incidents. The content
addresses the need for operations security and the handling of personally identifiable
information.
Awareness techniques include displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security andprivacy reminders, displaying logon screen messages, generating email advisories or notices fromorganizational officials, and conducting awareness events. Literacy training after the initialtraining described in AT-2a.1 is conducted at a minimum frequency consistent with applicablelaws, directives, regulations, and policies. Subsequent literacy training may be satisfied by one ormore short ad hoc sessions and include topical information on recent attack schemes, changes toorganizational security and privacy policies, revised security and privacy expectations, or a subset
of topics from the initial training. Updating literacy training and awareness content on a regularbasis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant. Events that may precipitate an update toliteracy training and awareness content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit
findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-22, AT-3, AT-4, CP-3, IA-4, IR-2, IR-7, IR-9, PL-4, PM-13, PM-21,
PS-7, PT-2, SA-8, SA-16.
Control Enhancements:(1) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES
Provide practical exercises in literacy training that simulate events and incidents.
Discussion: Practical exercises include no-notice social engineering attempts to collectinformation, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious
email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3.
(2) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT
Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.

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Discussion: Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include
behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction; attempts to gain access to
information not required for job performance; unexplained access to financial resources;
bullying or harassment of fellow employees; workplace violence; and other serious violationsof policies, procedures, directives, regulations, rules, or practices. Literacy training includes
how to communicate the concerns of employees and management regarding potential
indicators of insider threat through channels established by the organization and inaccordance with established policies and procedures. Organizations may consider tailoring
insider threat awareness topics to the role. For example, training for managers may befocused on changes in the behavior of team members, while training for employees may befocused on more general observations.
Related Controls: PM-12.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND MINING
Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances ofsocial engineering and social mining.
Discussion: Social engineering is an attempt to trick an individual into revealing information
or taking an action that can be used to breach, compromise, or otherwise adversely impact asystem. Social engineering includes phishing, pretexting, impersonation, baiting, quid proquo, thread-jacking, social media exploitation, and tailgating. Social mining is an attempt togather information about the organization that may be used to support future attacks.
Literacy training includes information on how to communicate the concerns of employees
and management regarding potential and actual instances of social engineering and data
mining through organizational channels based on established policies and procedures.
Related Controls: None.
(4) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEMBEHAVIOR

Provide literacy training on recognizing suspicious communications and anomalous
behavior in organizational systems using [Assignment: organization-defined indicators ofmalicious code].
Discussion: A well-trained workforce provides another organizational control that can be
employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect against malicious code coming
into organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look forindications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected email, receiving anemail containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an unfamiliar senderthat appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are also trained on how
to respond to suspicious email or web communications. For this process to work effectively,
personnel are trained and made aware of what constitutes suspicious communications.
Training personnel on how to recognize anomalous behaviors in systems can provide
organizations with early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of
anomalous behavior by organizational personnel can supplement malicious code detection
and protection tools and systems employed by organizations.
Related Controls: None.
(5) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT
Provide literacy training on the advanced persistent threat.
Discussion: An effective way to detect advanced persistent threats (APT) and to preclude
successful attacks is to provide specific literacy training for individuals. Threat literacy
training includes educating individuals on the various ways that APTs can infiltrate theorganization (e.g., through websites, emails, advertisement pop-ups, articles, and social

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engineering). Effective training includes techniques for recognizing suspicious emails, use ofremovable systems in non-secure settings, and the potential targeting of individuals at
home.
Related Controls: None.
(6) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | CYBER THREAT ENVIRONMENT(a) Provide literacy training on the cyber threat environment; and(b) Reflect current cyber threat information in system operations.
Discussion: Since threats continue to change over time, threat literacy training by theorganization is dynamic. Moreover, threat literacy training is not performed in isolation fromthe system operations that support organizational mission and business functions.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: RA-3.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-50], [SP 800-160-2], [SP 800-181], [ODNI CTF].

AT-3

ROLE-BASED TRAINING
Control:a.

Provide role-based security and privacy training to personnel with the following roles andresponsibilities: [Assignment: organization-defined roles and responsibilities]:
1.

Before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties,
and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter; and2.

When required by system changes;b.

Update role-based training content [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] andfollowing [Assignment: organization-defined events]; andc.

Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches intorole-based training.

Discussion: Organizations determine the content of training based on the assigned roles andresponsibilities of individuals as well as the security and privacy requirements of organizations
and the systems to which personnel have authorized access, including technical training
specifically tailored for assigned duties. Roles that may require role-based training include seniorleaders or management officials (e.g., head of agency/chief executive officer, chief information
officer, senior accountable official for risk management, senior agency information security
officer, senior agency official for privacy), system owners; authorizing officials; system security
officers; privacy officers; acquisition and procurement officials; enterprise architects; systems
engineers; software developers; systems security engineers; privacy engineers; system, network,and database administrators; auditors; personnel conducting configuration management
activities; personnel performing verification and validation activities; personnel with access tosystem-level software; control assessors; personnel with contingency planning and incident
response duties; personnel with privacy management responsibilities; and personnel with accessto personally identifiable information.
Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles andresponsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical controls. Role-based training also
includes policies, procedures, tools, methods, and artifacts for the security and privacy roles
defined. Organizations provide the training necessary for individuals to fulfill their responsibilities
related to operations and supply chain risk management within the context of organizational
security and privacy programs. Role-based training also applies to contractors who provide
services to federal agencies. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training,classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Updating role-based

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training on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant and effective.
Events that may precipitate an update to role-based training content include, but are not limited
to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-22, AT-2, AT-4, CP-3, IR-2, IR-4, IR-7, IR-9, PL-4, PM-13, PM-23,
PS-7, PS-9, SA-3, SA-8, SA-11, SA-16, SR-5, SR-6, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Provide [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operationof environmental controls.
Discussion: Environmental controls include fire suppression and detection devices orsystems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, smoke detectors,
temperature or humidity, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and power within the facility.
Related Controls: PE-1, PE-11, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15.
(2) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
Provide [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operationof physical security controls.
Discussion: Physical security controls include physical access control devices, physicalintrusion and detection alarms, operating procedures for facility security guards, andmonitoring or surveillance equipment.
Related Controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4.
(3) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES
Provide practical exercises in security and privacy training that reinforce training
objectives.
Discussion: Practical exercises for security include training for software developers that
addresses simulated attacks that exploit common software vulnerabilities or spear or whale
phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders or executives. Practical exercises for privacy
include modules with quizzes on identifying and processing personally identifiable
information in various scenarios or scenarios on conducting privacy impact assessments.
Related Controls: None.
(4) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR[Withdrawn: Moved to AT-2(4)].
(5) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | PROCESSING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
Provide [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operationof personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls.
Discussion: Personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls include
the organization’s authority to process personally identifiable information and personallyidentifiable information processing purposes. Role-based training for federal agencies
addresses the types of information that may constitute personally identifiable informationand the risks, considerations, and obligations associated with its processing. Such training
also considers the authority to process personally identifiable information documented in
privacy policies and notices, system of records notices, computer matching agreements and

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notices, privacy impact assessments, [PRIVACT] statements, contracts, information sharing
agreements, memoranda of understanding, and/or other documentation.
Related Controls: PT-2, PT-3, PT-5, PT-6.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-50], [SP 800-181].

AT-4

TRAINING RECORDS
Control:a.

Document and monitor information security and privacy training activities, including security
and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security and privacy training; andb.

Retain individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors
at the discretion of the organization. The National Archives and Records Administration provides
guidance on records retention for federal agencies.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-3, IR-2, PM-14, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

AT-5

CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PM-15.]

AT-6

TRAINING FEEDBACK
Control: Provide feedback on organizational training results to the following personnel[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]: [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].
Discussion: Training feedback includes awareness training results and role-based training results.
Training results, especially failures of personnel in critical roles, can be indicative of a potentiallyserious problem. Therefore, it is important that senior managers are made aware of suchsituations so that they can take appropriate response actions. Training feedback supports theevaluation and update of organizational training described in AT-2b and AT-3b.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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3.3 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Quick link to Audit and Accountability Summary Table
AU-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] audit and accountability policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy andthe associated audit and accountability controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the audit and accountability policy and procedures;
andc.

Review and update the current audit and accountability:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Audit and accountability policy and procedures address the controls in the AU family
that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an
important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contributeto security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs
collaborate on the development of audit and accountability policy and procedures. Security andprivacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, andmay obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update toaudit and accountability policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security
incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute anorganizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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EVENT LOGGING
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Identify the types of events that the system is capable of logging in support of the audit
function: [Assignment: organization-defined event types that the system is capable oflogging];b.

Coordinate the event logging function with other organizational entities requiring auditrelated information to guide and inform the selection criteria for events to be logged;c.

Specify the following event types for logging within the system: [Assignment: organizationdefined event types (subset of the event types defined in AU-2a.) along with the frequency of(or situation requiring) logging for each identified event type];d.

Provide a rationale for why the event types selected for logging are deemed to be adequate
to support after-the-fact investigations of incidents; ande.

Review and update the event types selected for logging [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Discussion: An event is an observable occurrence in a system. The types of events that requirelogging are those events that are significant and relevant to the security of systems and theprivacy of individuals. Event logging also supports specific monitoring and auditing needs. Eventtypes include password changes, failed logons or failed accesses related to systems, security or
privacy attribute changes, administrative privilege usage, PIV credential usage, data actionchanges, query parameters, or external credential usage. In determining the set of event types
that require logging, organizations consider the monitoring and auditing appropriate for each of
the controls to be implemented. For completeness, event logging includes all protocols that areoperational and supported by the system.
To balance monitoring and auditing requirements with other system needs, event logging
requires identifying the subset of event types that are logged at a given point in time. For
example, organizations may determine that systems need the capability to log every file accesssuccessful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific circumstances dueto the potential burden on system performance. The types of events that organizations desire to
be logged may change. Reviewing and updating the set of logged events is necessary to help
ensure that the events remain relevant and continue to support the needs of the organization.
Organizations consider how the types of logging events can reveal information about individuals
that may give rise to privacy risk and how best to mitigate such risks. For example, there is thepotential to reveal personally identifiable information in the audit trail, especially if the logging
event is based on patterns or time of usage.
Event logging requirements, including the need to log specific event types, may be referenced inother controls and control enhancements. These include AC-2(4), AC-3(10), AC-6(9), AC-17(1),CM-3f, CM-5(1), IA-3(3.b), MA-4(1), MP-4(2), PE-3, PM-21, PT-7, RA-8, SC-7(9), SC-7(15), SI-3(8),SI-4(22), SI-7(8), and SI-10(1). Organizations include event types that are required by applicablelaws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. Audit records
can be generated at various levels, including at the packet level as information traverses the
network. Selecting the appropriate level of event logging is an important part of a monitoring
and auditing capability and can identify the root causes of problems. When defining event types,
organizations consider the logging necessary to cover related event types, such as the steps in
distributed, transaction-based processes and the actions that occur in service-oriented
architectures.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-7, AC-8, AC-16, AC-17, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU11, AU-12, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-13, IA-3, MA-4, MP-4, PE-3, PM-21, PT-2, PT-7, RA-8, SA-8, SC7, SC-18, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, SI-10, SI-11.

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Control Enhancements:(1) EVENT LOGGING | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12.](2) EVENT LOGGING | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12.](3) EVENT LOGGING | REVIEWS AND UPDATES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-2.](4) EVENT LOGGING | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6(9).]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-92].

AU-3

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS
Control: Ensure that audit records contain information that establishes the following:a.

What type of event occurred;b.

When the event occurred;c.

Where the event occurred;d.

Source of the event;e.

Outcome of the event; andf.

Identity of any individuals, subjects, or objects/entities associated with the event.

Discussion: Audit record content that may be necessary to support the auditing function
includes event descriptions (item a), time stamps (item b), source and destination addresses(item c), user or process identifiers (items d and f), success or fail indications (item e), andfilenames involved (items a, c, e, and f) . Event outcomes include indicators of event success or
failure and event-specific results, such as the system security and privacy posture after the event
occurred. Organizations consider how audit records can reveal information about individuals that
may give rise to privacy risks and how best to mitigate such risks. For example, there is thepotential to reveal personally identifiable information in the audit trail, especially if the trail
records inputs or is based on patterns or time of usage.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, AU-14, MA-4, PL-9, SA-8, SI-7, SI-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION
Generate audit records containing the following additional information: [Assignment:
organization-defined additional information].
Discussion: The ability to add information generated in audit records is dependent on
system functionality to configure the audit record content. Organizations may consider
additional information in audit records including, but not limited to, access control or flow
control rules invoked and individual identities of group account users. Organizations may
also consider limiting additional audit record information to only information that is
explicitly needed for audit requirements. This facilitates the use of audit trails and audit logs
by not including information in audit records that could potentially be misleading, make it
more difficult to locate information of interest, or increase the risk to individuals' privacy.
Related Controls: None.

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Limit personally identifiable information contained in audit records to the following
elements identified in the privacy risk assessment: [Assignment: organization-definedelements].
Discussion: Limiting personally identifiable information in audit records when suchinformation is not needed for operational purposes helps reduce the level of privacy riskcreated by a system.
Related Controls: RA-3.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [OMB A-130], [IR 8062].

AU-4

AUDIT LOG STORAGE CAPACITY
Control: Allocate audit log storage capacity to accommodate [Assignment: organization-defined
audit log retention requirements].
Discussion: Organizations consider the types of audit logging to be performed and the audit log
processing requirements when allocating audit log storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit
log storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in thepotential loss or reduction of audit logging capability.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12, AU-14, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT LOG STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE
Transfer audit logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to a different system,
system component, or media other than the system or system component conducting thelogging.
Discussion: Audit log transfer, also known as off-loading, is a common process in systems
with limited audit log storage capacity and thus supports availability of the audit logs. The
initial audit log storage is only used in a transitory fashion until the system can communicate
with the secondary or alternate system allocated to audit log storage, at which point theaudit logs are transferred. Transferring audit logs to alternate storage is similar to AU-9(2) inthat audit logs are transferred to a different entity. However, the purpose of selecting AU9(2) is to protect the confidentiality and integrity of audit records. Organizations can selecteither control enhancement to obtain the benefit of increased audit log storage capacity andpreserving the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of audit records and logs.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

AU-5

RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES
Control:a.

Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] in the event of an audit logging process failure; andb.

Take the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined additional actions].

Discussion: Audit logging process failures include software and hardware errors, failures in audit
log capturing mechanisms, and reaching or exceeding audit log storage capacity. Organizationdefined actions include overwriting oldest audit records, shutting down the system, and stopping

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the generation of audit records. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for audit
logging process failures based on the type of failure, the location of the failure, the severity of
the failure, or a combination of such factors. When the audit logging process failure is related tostorage, the response is carried out for the audit log storage repository (i.e., the distinct systemcomponent where the audit logs are stored), the system on which the audit logs reside, the total
audit log storage capacity of the organization (i.e., all audit log storage repositories combined), or
all three. Organizations may decide to take no additional actions after alerting designated roles
or personnel.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-4, AU-7, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12, AU-14, SI-4, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES | STORAGE CAPACITY WARNING
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Provide a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations]
within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit log storage
volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository maximum
audit log storage capacity.
Discussion: Organizations may have multiple audit log storage repositories distributed
across multiple system components with each repository having different storage volume
capacities.
Related Controls: None.
(2) RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS
Provide an alert within [Assignment: organization-defined real-time period] to[Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] when the following
audit failure events occur: [Assignment: organization-defined audit logging failure events
requiring real-time alerts].
Discussion: Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide
these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert
occurs in seconds or less).
Related Controls: None.
(3) RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS
Enforce configurable network communications traffic volume thresholds reflecting limits
on audit log storage capacity and [Selection: reject; delay] network traffic above thosethresholds.
Discussion: Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of network
communications traffic if audit logging information about such traffic is determined to
exceed the storage capacity of the system audit logging function. The rejection or delay
response is triggered by the established organizational traffic volume thresholds that can be
adjusted based on changes to audit log storage capacity.
Related Controls: None.
(4) RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON FAILURE
Invoke a [Selection: full system shutdown; partial system shutdown; degraded operationalmode with limited mission or business functionality available] in the event of [Assignment:
organization-defined audit logging failures], unless an alternate audit logging capability
exists.
Discussion: Organizations determine the types of audit logging failures that can trigger
automatic system shutdowns or degraded operations. Because of the importance ofensuring mission and business continuity, organizations may determine that the nature of
the audit logging failure is not so severe that it warrants a complete shutdown of the system

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supporting the core organizational mission and business functions. In those instances, partial
system shutdowns or operating in a degraded mode with reduced capability may be viable
alternatives.
Related Controls: AU-15.
(5) RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES | ALTERNATE AUDIT LOGGING CAPABILITY
Provide an alternate audit logging capability in the event of a failure in primary audit
logging capability that implements [Assignment: organization-defined alternate audit
logging functionality].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Since an alternate audit logging capability may be a short-term protection
solution employed until the failure in the primary audit logging capability is corrected,
organizations may determine that the alternate audit logging capability need only provide a
subset of the primary audit logging functionality that is impacted by the failure.
Related Controls: AU-9.
References: None.

AU-6

AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING
Control:a.

Review and analyze system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] forindications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual activity] and thepotential impact of the inappropriate or unusual activity;b.

Report findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; andc.

Adjust the level of audit record review, analysis, and reporting within the system when there
is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or othercredible sources of information.

Discussion: Audit record review, analysis, and reporting covers information security- and privacyrelated logging performed by organizations, including logging that results from the monitoring ofaccount usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration
settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and non-local maintenance,
physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at
system interfaces, and use of mobile code or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Findings can bereported to organizational entities that include the incident response team, help desk, andsecurity or privacy offices. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and analyzing audit
records or unable to conduct such activities, the review or analysis may be carried out by otherorganizations granted such authority. The frequency, scope, and/or depth of the audit record
review, analysis, and reporting may be adjusted to meet organizational needs based on new
information received.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-7, AC-17, AU-7, AU-16, CA-2, CA-7, CM-2, CM-5,
CM-6, CM-10, CM-11, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, IR-5, MA-4, MP-4, PE-3, PE-6, RA-5, SA-8, SC-7, SI-3,
SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED PROCESS INTEGRATION
Integrate audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Organizational processes that benefit from integrated audit record review,
analysis, and reporting include incident response, continuous monitoring, contingency
planning, investigation and response to suspicious activities, and Inspector General audits.

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Related Controls: PM-7.
(2) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY ALERTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4.](3) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT RECORD REPOSITORIES
Analyze and correlate audit records across different repositories to gain organization-widesituational awareness.
Discussion: Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all threelevels of risk management (i.e., organizational level, mission/business process level, andinformation system level) and supports cross-organization awareness.
Related Controls: AU-12, IR-4.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(4) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
Provide and implement the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records frommultiple components within the system.
Discussion: Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include Security
Information and Event Management products.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-12.
(5) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF AUDIT RECORDS
Integrate analysis of audit records with analysis of [Selection (one or more): vulnerability
scanning information; performance data; system monitoring information; [Assignment:
organization-defined data/information collected from other sources]] to further enhance
the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.
Discussion: Integrated analysis of audit records does not require vulnerability scanning, thegeneration of performance data, or system monitoring. Rather, integrated analysis requiresthat the analysis of information generated by scanning, monitoring, or other data collection
activities is integrated with the analysis of audit record information. Security Informationand Event Management tools can facilitate audit record aggregation or consolidation frommultiple system components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use ofstandardized audit record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script
adjustments, as necessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit
record information collected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability
scanning information is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans of thesystem and in correlating attack detection events with scanning results. Correlation withperformance data can uncover denial-of-service attacks or other types of attacks that resultin the unauthorized use of resources. Correlation with system monitoring information can
assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit information to operational situations.
Related Controls: AU-12, IR-4.
(6) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH PHYSICAL MONITORING
Correlate information from audit records with information obtained from monitoring
physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate,
unusual, or malevolent activity.
Discussion: The correlation of physical audit record information and the audit records fromsystems may assist organizations in identifying suspicious behavior or supporting evidence ofsuch behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual’s identity for logical access tocertain systems with the additional physical security information that the individual waspresent at the facility when the logical access occurred may be useful in investigations.
Related Controls: None.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(7) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONSSpecify the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): system process; role; user]
associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit record information.
Discussion: Organizations specify permitted actions for system processes, roles, and users
associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records through system accountmanagement activities. Specifying permitted actions on audit record information is a way to
enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced by the system andinclude read, write, execute, append, and delete.
Related Controls: None.
(8) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF PRIVILEGED
COMMANDS
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Perform a full text analysis of logged privileged commands in a physically distinct
component or subsystem of the system, or other system that is dedicated to that analysis.
Discussion: Full text analysis of privileged commands requires a distinct environment for the
analysis of audit record information related to privileged users without compromising suchinformation on the system where the users have elevated privileges, including the capability
to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers the fulltext of privileged commands (i.e., commands and parameters) as opposed to analysis thatconsiders only the name of the command. Full text analysis includes the use of patternmatching and heuristics.
Related Controls: AU-3, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12.
(9) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH INFORMATION FROMNONTECHNICAL SOURCES

Correlate information from nontechnical sources with audit record information to enhanceorganization-wide situational awareness.
Discussion: Nontechnical sources include records that document organizational policy
violations related to harassment incidents and the improper use of information assets. Suchinformation can lead to a directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider
activity. Organizations limit access to information that is available from nontechnical sources
due to its sensitive nature. Limited access minimizes the potential for inadvertent release ofprivacy-related information to individuals who do not have a need to know. The correlationof information from nontechnical sources with audit record information generally occurs
only when individuals are suspected of being involved in an incident. Organizations obtainlegal advice prior to initiating such actions.
Related Controls: PM-12.
(10) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUDIT LEVEL ADJUSTMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-6.]
References: [SP 800-86], [SP 800-101].

AU-7

AUDIT RECORD REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION
Control: Provide and implement an audit record reduction and report generation capability that:a.

Supports on-demand audit record review, analysis, and reporting requirements and afterthe-fact investigations of incidents; andb.

Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.

Discussion: Audit record reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit log informationand organizes it into a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit record

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reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same system orfrom the same organizational entities that conduct audit logging activities. The audit record
reduction capability includes modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to
identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by thesystem can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be an issue if the
granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient.
Related Controls: AC-2, AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-12, AU-16, CM-5, IA-5, IR-4, PM-12, SI4.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT RECORD REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING
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Provide and implement the capability to process, sort, and search audit records for eventsof interest based on the following content: [Assignment: organization-defined fields within
audit records].
Discussion: Events of interest can be identified by the content of audit records, including
system resources involved, information objects accessed, identities of individuals, event
types, event locations, event dates and times, Internet Protocol addresses involved, or event
success or failure. Organizations may define event criteria to any degree of granularity
required, such as locations selectable by a general networking location or by specific systemcomponent.
Related Controls: None.
(2) AUDIT RECORD REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORT AND SEARCH[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-7(1).]References: None.

AU-8

TIME STAMPSControl:a.

Use internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; andb.

Record time stamps for audit records that meet [Assignment: organization-defined
granularity of time measurement] and that use Coordinated Universal Time, have a fixed
local time offset from Coordinated Universal Time, or that include the local time offset aspart of the time stamp.

Discussion: Time stamps generated by the system include date and time. Time is commonly
expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time
(GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to thedegree of synchronization between system clocks and reference clocks (e.g., clocks synchronizing
within hundreds of milliseconds or tens of milliseconds). Organizations may define different time
granularities for different system components. Time service can be critical to other security
capabilities such as access control and identification and authentication, depending on thenature of the mechanisms used to support those capabilities.
Related Controls: AU-3, AU-12, AU-14, SC-45.
Control Enhancements:(1) TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-45(1).](2) TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

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AU-9

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION
Control:a.

Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification,and deletion; andb.

Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon detection of unauthorizedaccess, modification, or deletion of audit information.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Audit information includes all information needed to successfully audit system
activity, such as audit records, audit log settings, audit reports, and personally identifiable
information. Audit logging tools are those programs and devices used to conduct system audit
and logging activities. Protection of audit information focuses on technical protection and limits
the ability to access and execute audit logging tools to authorized individuals. Physical protectionof audit information is addressed by both media protection controls and physical andenvironmental protection controls.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6, AU-6, AU-11, AU-14, AU-15, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6, SA-8,
SC-8, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE MEDIA
Write audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media.
Discussion: Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media applies to the initial
generation of audit trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the information
to be used for detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit
trails. Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media does not apply to theinitial generation of audit records prior to being written to an audit trail. Write-once, readmany (WORM) media includes Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R), Blu-Ray Disc Recordable(BD-R), and Digital Versatile Disc-Recordable (DVD-R). In contrast, the use of switchable
write-protection media, such as tape cartridges, Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives, Compact
Disc Re-Writeable (CD-RW), and Digital Versatile Disc-Read Write (DVD-RW) results in writeprotected but not write-once media.
Related Controls: AU-4, AU-5.
(2) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | STORE ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTSStore audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] in a repository that ispart of a physically different system or system component than the system or component
being audited.
Discussion: Storing audit records in a repository separate from the audited system or systemcomponent helps to ensure that a compromise of the system being audited does not also
result in a compromise of the audit records. Storing audit records on separate physicalsystems or components also preserves the confidentiality and integrity of audit records andfacilitates the management of audit records as an organization-wide activity. Storing audit
records on separate systems or components applies to initial generation as well as backup or
long-term storage of audit records.
Related Controls: AU-4, AU-5.
(3) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

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Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information andaudit tools.
Discussion: Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit information
include signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography. This enables the distributionof the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of thesecret key used to generate the hash.
Related Controls: AU-10, SC-12, SC-13.
(4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS
Authorize access to management of audit logging functionality to only [Assignment:
organization-defined subset of privileged users or roles].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Individuals or roles with privileged access to a system and who are also thesubject of an audit by that system may affect the reliability of the audit information by
inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. Requiring privileged access to befurther defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges limits the number ofusers or roles with audit-related privileges.
Related Controls: AC-5.
(5) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION
Enforce dual authorization for [Selection (one or more): movement; deletion] of[Assignment: organization-defined audit information].
Discussion: Organizations may choose different selection options for different types of audit
information. Dual authorization mechanisms (also known as two-person control) require theapproval of two authorized individuals to execute audit functions. To reduce the risk ofcollusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to other individuals.
Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms when immediate responses arenecessary to ensure public and environmental safety.
Related Controls: AC-3.
(6) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ-ONLY ACCESS
Authorize read-only access to audit information to [Assignment: organization-defined
subset of privileged users or roles].
Discussion: Restricting privileged user or role authorizations to read-only helps to limit thepotential damage to organizations that could be initiated by such users or roles, such as
deleting audit records to cover up malicious activity.
Related Controls: None.
(7) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | STORE ON COMPONENT WITH DIFFERENT OPERATINGSYSTEMStore audit information on a component running a different operating system than thesystem or component being audited.
Discussion: Storing auditing information on a system component running a different
operating system reduces the risk of a vulnerability specific to the system, resulting in acompromise of the audit records.
Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-11, SC-29.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 202].

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AU-10 NON-REPUDIATION
Control: Provide irrefutable evidence that an individual (or process acting on behalf of anindividual) has performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by nonrepudiation].

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Discussion: Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include creating information,
sending and receiving messages, and approving information. Non-repudiation protects against
claims by authors of not having authored certain documents, senders of not having transmitted
messages, receivers of not having received messages, and signatories of not having signed
documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information originated from anindividual or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an email, signing a contract,approving a procurement request, or receiving specific information). Organizations obtain nonrepudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms, including digital signaturesand digital message receipts.
Related Controls: AU-9, PM-12, SA-8, SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-16, SC-17, SC-23.
Control Enhancements:(1) NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIES(a) Bind the identity of the information producer with the information to [Assignment:
organization-defined strength of binding]; and(b) Provide the means for authorized individuals to determine the identity of the
producer of the information.
Discussion: Binding identities to the information supports audit requirements that provide
organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in
the event of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of
attribute binding between the information producer and the information based on the
security category of the information and other relevant risk factors.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-16.
(2) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER IDENTITY(a) Validate the binding of the information producer identity to the information at[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and(b) Perform [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.
Discussion: Validating the binding of the information producer identity to the information
prevents the modification of information between production and review. The validation ofbindings can be achieved by, for example, using cryptographic checksums. Organizations
determine if validations are in response to user requests or generated automatically.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.
(3) NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Maintain reviewer or releaser credentials within the established chain of custody for
information reviewed or released.
Discussion: Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence through its
collection, safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each individual who handled
the evidence, the date and time the evidence was collected or transferred, and the purpose
for the transfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but
separate from the release or transfer function, the system associates the identity of thereviewer of the information to be released with the information and the information label.
In the case of human reviews, maintaining the credentials of reviewers or releasers provides

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the organization with the means to identify who reviewed and released the information. In
the case of automated reviews, it ensures that only approved review functions are used.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-16.
(4) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY(a) Validate the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at thetransfer or release points prior to release or transfer between [Assignment:
organization-defined security domains]; and(b) Perform [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Validating the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information attransfer or release points prevents the unauthorized modification of information between
review and the transfer or release. The validation of bindings can be achieved by using
cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to user
requests or generated automatically.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-16.
(5) NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7.]
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 186-4], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-177].

AU-11 AUDIT RECORD RETENTION
Control: Retain audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent withrecords retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of incidents and tomeet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.
Discussion: Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that the records are nolonger needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes theretention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests,
subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of audit
records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of action.
The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules provide
federal policy on records retention.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-9, AU-14, MP-6, RA-5, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT RECORD RETENTION | LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined measures] to ensure that long-term audit
records generated by the system can be retrieved.
Discussion: Organizations need to access and read audit records requiring long-term storage(on the order of years). Measures employed to help facilitate the retrieval of audit records
include converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment capable of reading therecords, and retaining the necessary documentation to help personnel understand how tointerpret the records.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

AU-12 AUDIT RECORD GENERATION
Control:

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a.

Provide audit record generation capability for the event types the system is capable ofauditing as defined in AU-2a on [Assignment: organization-defined system components];b.

Allow [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select the event types thatare to be logged by specific components of the system; andc.

Generate audit records for the event types defined in AU-2c that include the audit record
content defined in AU-3.

Discussion: Audit records can be generated from many different system components. The event
types specified in AU-2d are the event types for which audit logs are to be generated and are asubset of all event types for which the system can generate audit records.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-14, CM-5, MA-4, MP-4,
PM-12, SA-8, SC-18, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, SI-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUDIT RECORD GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE AND TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL
Compile audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined system components] into asystem-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time-correlated to within [Assignment:
organization-defined level of tolerance for the relationship between time stamps ofindividual records in the audit trail].
Discussion: Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records
can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time orderingof the records within organizational tolerances.
Related Controls: AU-8, SC-45.
(2) AUDIT RECORD GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS
Produce a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit records in astandardized format.
Discussion: Audit records that follow common standards promote interoperability andinformation exchange between devices and systems. Promoting interoperability andinformation exchange facilitates the production of event information that can be readily
analyzed and correlated. If logging mechanisms do not conform to standardized formats,systems may convert individual audit records into standardized formats when compilingsystem-wide audit trails.
Related Controls: None.
(3) AUDIT RECORD GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSProvide and implement the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals orroles] to change the logging to be performed on [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria] within[Assignment: organization-defined time thresholds].
Discussion: Permitting authorized individuals to make changes to system logging enables
organizations to extend or limit logging as necessary to meet organizational requirements.
Logging that is limited to conserve system resources may be extended (either temporarily or
permanently) to address certain threat situations. In addition, logging may be limited to a
specific set of event types to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and reporting. Organizations
can establish time thresholds in which logging actions are changed (e.g., near real-time,within minutes, or within hours).
Related Controls: AC-3.

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INFORMATION

Provide and implement the capability for auditing the parameters of user query events fordata sets containing personally identifiable information.
Discussion: Query parameters are explicit criteria that an individual or automated system
submits to a system to retrieve data. Auditing of query parameters for datasets that containpersonally identifiable information augments the capability of an organization to track andunderstand the access, usage, or sharing of personally identifiable information by authorized
personnel.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

AU-13 MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Control:a.

Monitor [Assignment: organization-defined open-source information and/or informationsites] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for evidence of unauthorized disclosureof organizational information; andb.

If an information disclosure is discovered:1.

Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and2.

Take the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined additional
actions].

Discussion: Unauthorized disclosure of information is a form of data leakage. Open-source
information includes social networking sites and code-sharing platforms and repositories.
Examples of organizational information include personally identifiable information retained by
the organization or proprietary information generated by the organization.
Related Controls: AC-22, PE-3, PM-12, RA-5, SC-7, SI-20.
Control Enhancements:(1) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLSMonitor open-source information and information sites using [Assignment: organizationdefined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms include commercial services that provide notifications
and alerts to organizations and automated scripts to monitor new posts on websites.
Related Controls: None.
(2) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | REVIEW OF MONITORED SITES
Review the list of open-source information sites being monitored [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Reviewing the current list of open-source information sites being monitored ona regular basis helps to ensure that the selected sites remain relevant. The review also
provides the opportunity to add new open-source information sites with the potential toprovide evidence of unauthorized disclosure of organizational information. The list of sites
monitored can be guided and informed by threat intelligence of other credible sources of
information.
Related Controls: None.
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Employ discovery techniques, processes, and tools to determine if external entities are
replicating organizational information in an unauthorized manner.
Discussion: The unauthorized use or replication of organizational information by external
entities can cause adverse impacts on organizational operations and assets, including
damage to reputation. Such activity can include the replication of an organizational website
by an adversary or hostile threat actor who attempts to impersonate the web-hostingorganization. Discovery tools, techniques, and processes used to determine if
external entities are replicating organizational information in an unauthorized mannerinclude scanning external websites, monitoring social media, and training staff to recognize
the unauthorized use of organizational information.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: None.

AU-14 SESSION AUDITControl:a.

Provide and implement the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined users or roles]
to [Selection (one or more): record; view; hear; log] the content of a user session under[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances]; andb.

Develop, integrate, and use session auditing activities in consultation with legal counsel andin accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines.

Discussion: Session audits can include monitoring keystrokes, tracking websites visited, andrecording information and/or file transfers. Session audit capability is implemented in addition to
event logging and may involve implementation of specialized session capture technology.
Organizations consider how session auditing can reveal information about individuals that may
give rise to privacy risk as well as how to mitigate those risks. Because session auditing can
impact system and network performance, organizations activate the capability under welldefined situations (e.g., the organization is suspicious of a specific individual). Organizations
consult with legal counsel, civil liberties officials, and privacy officials to ensure that any legal,
privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties issues, including the use of personally identifiable
information, are appropriately addressed.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-8, AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-8, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP
Initiate session audits automatically at system start-up.
Discussion: The automatic initiation of session audits at startup helps to ensure that the
information being captured on selected individuals is complete and not subject tocompromise through tampering by malicious threat actors.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SESSION AUDIT | CAPTURE AND RECORD CONTENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-14.](3) SESSION AUDIT | REMOTE VIEWING AND LISTENING
Provide and implement the capability for authorized users to remotely view and hearcontent related to an established user session in real time.
Discussion: None.

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Related Controls: AC-17.
References: None.

AU-15 ALTERNATE AUDIT LOGGING CAPABILITY[Withdrawn: Moved to AU-5(5).]AU-16 CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDIT LOGGING
Control: Employ [Assignment: organization-defined methods] for coordinating [Assignment:
organization-defined audit information] among external organizations when audit information istransmitted across organizational boundaries.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: When organizations use systems or services of external organizations, the audit
logging capability necessitates a coordinated, cross-organization approach. For example,
maintaining the identity of individuals who request specific services across organizationalboundaries may often be difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant performance andprivacy ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational audit logging simply
captures the identity of individuals who issue requests at the initial system, and subsequentsystems record that the requests originated from authorized individuals. Organizations consider
including processes for coordinating audit information requirements and protection of audit
information in information exchange agreements.
Related Controls: AU-3, AU-6, AU-7, CA-3, PT-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDIT LOGGING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION
Preserve the identity of individuals in cross-organizational audit trails.
Discussion: Identity preservation is applied when there is a need to be able to trace actions
that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8.
(2) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDIT LOGGING | SHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATION
Provide cross-organizational audit information to [Assignment: organization-definedorganizations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined cross-organizational sharing
agreements].
Discussion: Due to the distributed nature of the audit information, cross-organization
sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the auditing being
performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide sufficient
information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational information
resources by individuals in other organizations. In some instances, only individuals’ homeorganizations have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations, thus requiring
the sharing of audit information among organizations.
Related Controls: IR-4, SI-4.
(3) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | DISASSOCIABILITY
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined measures] to disassociate individuals fromaudit information transmitted across organizational boundaries.
Discussion: Preserving identities in audit trails could have privacy ramifications, such as
enabling the tracking and profiling of individuals, but may not be operationally necessary.
These risks could be further amplified when transmitting information across organizationalboundaries. Implementing privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques can disassociateindividuals from audit information and reduce privacy risk while maintaining accountability.

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Related Controls: None.
References: None.

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3.4 ASSESSMENT, AUTHORIZATION, AND MONITORING
Quick link to Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring Summary Table
CA-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the assessment, authorization, andmonitoring policy and the associated assessment, authorization, and monitoring
controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy
and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current assessment, authorization, and monitoring:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy and procedures address thecontrols in the CA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk
management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies
and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that
security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of assessment, authorization, andmonitoring policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at theorganization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or systemspecific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security andprivacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature oforganizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission orbusiness processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls
are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure.
Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate
documents. Events that may precipitate an update to assessment, authorization, and monitoring
policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, orchanges in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, andguidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.

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References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53A], [SP
800-100], [SP 800-137], [SP 800-137A], [IR 8062].

CA-2

CONTROL ASSESSMENTS
Control:a.

Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of assessment to be
conducted;b.

Develop a control assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

1.

Controls and control enhancements under assessment;

2.

Assessment procedures to be used to determine control effectiveness; and3.

Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;c.

Ensure the control assessment plan is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official ordesignated representative prior to conducting the assessment;d.

Assess the controls in the system and its environment of operation [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are
implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome withrespect to meeting established security and privacy requirements;e.

Produce a control assessment report that document the results of the assessment; andf.

Provide the results of the control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined
individuals or roles].

Discussion: Organizations ensure that control assessors possess the required skills and technicalexpertise to develop effective assessment plans and to conduct assessments of system-specific,
hybrid, common, and program management controls, as appropriate. The required skills include
general knowledge of risk management concepts and approaches as well as comprehensive
knowledge of and experience with the hardware, software, and firmware system components
implemented.
Organizations assess controls in systems and the environments in which those systems operateas part of initial and ongoing authorizations, continuous monitoring, FISMA annual assessments,
system design and development, systems security engineering, privacy engineering, and thesystem development life cycle. Assessments help to ensure that organizations meet information
security and privacy requirements, identify weaknesses and deficiencies in the system design anddevelopment process, provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions as partof authorization processes, and comply with vulnerability mitigation procedures. Organizations
conduct assessments on the implemented controls as documented in security and privacy plans.
Assessments can also be conducted throughout the system development life cycle as part ofsystems engineering and systems security engineering processes. The design for controls can beassessed as RFPs are developed, responses assessed, and design reviews conducted. If a design
to implement controls and subsequent implementation in accordance with the design areassessed during development, the final control testing can be a simple confirmation utilizing
previously completed control assessment and aggregating the outcomes.
Organizations may develop a single, consolidated security and privacy assessment plan for thesystem or maintain separate plans. A consolidated assessment plan clearly delineates the roles
and responsibilities for control assessment. If multiple organizations participate in assessing asystem, a coordinated approach can reduce redundancies and associated costs.
Organizations can use other types of assessment activities, such as vulnerability scanning andsystem monitoring, to maintain the security and privacy posture of systems during the system

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life cycle. Assessment reports document assessment results in sufficient detail, as deemednecessary by organizations, to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports andwhether the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing thedesired outcome with respect to meeting requirements. Assessment results are provided to theindividuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example,
assessments conducted in support of authorization decisions are provided to authorizing
officials, senior agency officials for privacy, senior agency information security officers, andauthorizing official designated representatives.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

To satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from thefollowing sources: initial or ongoing system authorizations, continuous monitoring, systems
engineering processes, or system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure thatassessment results are current, relevant to the determination of control effectiveness, andobtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing control assessment
results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented
with additional assessments as needed. After the initial authorizations, organizations assess
controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations also establish the frequency for ongoingassessments in accordance with organizational continuous monitoring strategies. External audits,
including audits by external entities such as regulatory agencies, are outside of the scope of CA-2.
Related Controls: AC-20, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, PM-9, RA-5, RA-10, SA-11, SC-38, SI-3, SI-12, SR-2, SR3.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTROL ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS
Employ independent assessors or assessment teams to conduct control assessments.
Discussion: Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who
conduct impartial assessments of systems. Impartiality means that assessors are free fromany perceived or actual conflicts of interest regarding the development, operation,
sustainment, or management of the systems under assessment or the determination ofcontrol effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, assessors do not create a mutual or conflicting
interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted, assess theirown work, act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving, or place
themselves in positions of advocacy for the organizations acquiring their services.
Independent assessments can be obtained from elements within organizations or becontracted to public or private sector entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials
determine the required level of independence based on the security categories of systems
and/or the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing
officials also determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance
that the results are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. Assessor
independence determination includes whether contracted assessment services havesufficient independence, such as when system owners are not directly involved incontracting processes or cannot influence the impartiality of the assessors conducting theassessments. During the system design and development phase, having independent
assessors is analogous to having independent SMEs involved in design reviews.
When organizations that own the systems are small or the structures of the organizations
require that assessments be conducted by individuals that are in the developmental,
operational, or management chain of the system owners, independence in assessment
processes can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed andanalyzed by independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity,
and reliability of the results. Assessments performed for purposes other than to support

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authorization decisions are more likely to be useable for such decisions when performed byassessors with sufficient independence, thereby reducing the need to repeat assessments.
Related Controls: None.
(2) CONTROL ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS
Include as part of control assessments, [Assignment: organization-defined frequency],[Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth monitoring;security instrumentation; automated security test cases; vulnerability scanning; malicious
user testing; insider threat assessment; performance and load testing; data leakage ordata loss assessment; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of assessment]].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations can conduct specialized assessments, including verification andvalidation, system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and otherforms of testing. These assessments can improve readiness by exercising organizational
capabilities and indicating current levels of performance as a means of focusing actions toimprove security and privacy. Organizations conduct specialized assessments in accordancewith applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, andguidelines. Authorizing officials approve the assessment methods in coordination with theorganizational risk executive function. Organizations can include vulnerabilities uncovered
during assessments into vulnerability remediation processes. Specialized assessments canalso be conducted early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during initial design,development, and unit testing).
Related Controls: PE-3, SI-2.
(3) CONTROL ASSESSMENTS | LEVERAGING RESULTS FROM EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
Leverage the results of control assessments performed by [Assignment: organizationdefined external organization] on [Assignment: organization-defined system] when theassessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].
Discussion: Organizations may rely on control assessments of organizational systems byother (external) organizations. Using such assessments and reusing existing assessment
evidence can decrease the time and resources required for assessments by limiting theindependent assessment activities that organizations need to perform. The factors thatorganizations consider in determining whether to accept assessment results from externalorganizations can vary. Such factors include the organization’s past experience with theorganization that conducted the assessment, the reputation of the assessment organization,
the level of detail of supporting assessment evidence provided, and mandates imposed byapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Accredited testing laboratories that support the Common Criteria Program [ISO 15408-1],
the NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), or the NIST Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) can provide independent assessment results thatorganizations can leverage.
Related Controls: SA-4.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199], [SP 800-18], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53A], [SP
800-115], [SP 800-137], [IR 8011-1], [IR 8062].

CA-3

INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Control:a.

CHAPTER THREE

Approve and manage the exchange of information between the system and other systems
using [Selection (one or more): interconnection security agreements; information exchange
security agreements; memoranda of understanding or agreement; service level agreements;

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user agreements; nondisclosure agreements; [Assignment: organization-defined type ofagreement]];b.

Document, as part of each exchange agreement, the interface characteristics, security andprivacy requirements, controls, and responsibilities for each system, and the impact level ofthe information communicated; andc.

Review and update the agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: System information exchange requirements apply to information exchanges
between two or more systems. System information exchanges include connections via leasedlines or virtual private networks, connections to internet service providers, database sharing or
exchanges of database transaction information, connections and exchanges with cloud services,
exchanges via web-based services, or exchanges of files via file transfer protocols, network
protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6), email, or other organization-to-organization communications.
Organizations consider the risk related to new or increased threats that may be introduced whensystems exchange information with other systems that may have different security and privacy
requirements and controls. This includes systems within the same organization and systems thatare external to the organization. A joint authorization of the systems exchanging information, as
described in CA-6(1) or CA-6(2), may help to communicate and reduce risk.
Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with system information exchange and thecontrols needed for appropriate risk mitigation. The types of agreements selected are based on
factors such as the impact level of the information being exchanged, the relationship between
the organizations exchanging information (e.g., government to government, government tobusiness, business to business, government or business to service provider, government orbusiness to individual), or the level of access to the organizational system by users of the othersystem. If systems that exchange information have the same authorizing official, organizations
need not develop agreements. Instead, the interface characteristics between the systems (e.g.,
how the information is being exchanged. how the information is protected) are described in therespective security and privacy plans. If the systems that exchange information have different
authorizing officials within the same organization, the organizations can develop agreements orprovide the same information that would be provided in the appropriate agreement type from
CA-3a in the respective security and privacy plans for the systems. Organizations may incorporate
agreement information into formal contracts, especially for information exchanges establishedbetween federal agencies and nonfederal organizations (including service providers, contractors,
system developers, and system integrators). Risk considerations include systems that share thesame networks.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-20, AU-16, CA-6, IA-3, IR-4, PL-2, PT-7, RA-3, SA-9, SC-7, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-7(25).](2) SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-7(26).](3) SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-7(27).](4) SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-7(28).](5) SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONSCHAPTER THREE

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[Withdrawn: Moved to SC-7(5).](6) INFORMATION EXCHANGE | TRANSFER AUTHORIZATIONSVerify that individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems havethe requisite authorizations (i.e., write permissions or privileges) prior to accepting suchdata.
Discussion: To prevent unauthorized individuals and systems from making informationtransfers to protected systems, the protected system verifies—via independent means—
whether the individual or system attempting to transfer information is authorized to do so.
Verification of the authorization to transfer information also applies to control plane traffic(e.g., routing and DNS) and services (e.g., authenticated SMTP relays).
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(7) INFORMATION EXCHANGE |TRANSITIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGES(a) Identify transitive (downstream) information exchanges with other systems throughthe systems identified in CA-3a; and(b) Take measures to ensure that transitive (downstream) information exchanges ceasewhen the controls on identified transitive (downstream) systems cannot be verified orvalidated.
Discussion: Transitive or “downstream” information exchanges are information exchanges
between the system or systems with which the organizational system exchanges informationand other systems. For mission-essential systems, services, and applications, including highvalue assets, it is necessary to identify such information exchanges. The transparency of thecontrols or protection measures in place in such downstream systems connected directly or
indirectly to organizational systems is essential to understanding the security and privacy
risks resulting from those information exchanges. Organizational systems can inherit risk
from downstream systems through transitive connections and information exchanges, which
can make the organizational systems more susceptible to threats, hazards, and adverse
impacts.
Related Controls: SC-7.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199], [SP 800-47].

CA-4

SECURITY CERTIFICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2.]

CA-5

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES
Control:a.

Develop a plan of action and milestones for the system to document the planned
remediation actions of the organization to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during
the assessment of the controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in thesystem; andb.

Update existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
based on the findings from control assessments, independent audits or reviews, andcontinuous monitoring activities.

Discussion: Plans of action and milestones are useful for any type of organization to trackplanned remedial actions. Plans of action and milestones are required in authorization packages
and subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, PM-4, PM-9, RA-7, SI-2, SI-12.

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Control Enhancements:(1) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY AND CURRENCY
Ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones for thesystem using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Using automated tools helps maintain the accuracy, currency, and availability ofthe plan of action and milestones and facilitates the coordination and sharing of security andprivacy information throughout the organization. Such coordination and information sharing
help to identify systemic weaknesses or deficiencies in organizational systems and ensurethat appropriate resources are directed at the most critical system vulnerabilities in a timely
manner.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37].

CA-6

AUTHORIZATION
Control:a.

Assign a senior official as the authorizing official for the system;b.

Assign a senior official as the authorizing official for common controls available forinheritance by organizational systems;c.

Ensure that the authorizing official for the system, before commencing operations:1.

Accepts the use of common controls inherited by the system; and2.

Authorizes the system to operate;d.

Ensure that the authorizing official for common controls authorizes the use of those controls
for inheritance by organizational systems;e.

Update the authorizations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: Authorizations are official management decisions by senior officials to authorize
operation of systems, authorize the use of common controls for inheritance by organizational
systems, and explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of agreed-upon controls. Authorizing
officials provide budgetary oversight for organizational systems and common controls or assume
responsibility for the mission and business functions supported by those systems or common
controls. The authorization process is a federal responsibility, and therefore, authorizing officials
must be federal employees. Authorizing officials are both responsible and accountable forsecurity and privacy risks associated with the operation and use of organizational systems.
Nonfederal organizations may have similar processes to authorize systems and senior officialsthat assume the authorization role and associated responsibilities.
Authorizing officials issue ongoing authorizations of systems based on evidence produced from
implemented continuous monitoring programs. Robust continuous monitoring programs reduce
the need for separate reauthorization processes. Through the employment of comprehensive
continuous monitoring processes, the information contained in authorization packages (i.e.,
security and privacy plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on
an ongoing basis. This provides authorizing officials, common control providers, and systemowners with an up-to-date status of the security and privacy posture of their systems, controls,
and operating environments. To reduce the cost of reauthorization, authorizing officials canleverage the results of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as thebasis for rendering reauthorization decisions.

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Related Controls: CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, PM-9, PM-10, RA-3, SA-10, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUTHORIZATION | JOINT AUTHORIZATION — INTRA-ORGANIZATION
Employ a joint authorization process for the system that includes multiple authorizing
officials from the same organization conducting the authorization.
Discussion: Assigning multiple authorizing officials from the same organization to serve as
co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of independence in the risk-based
decision-making process. It also implements the concepts of separation of duties and dual
authorization as applied to the system authorization process. The intra-organization joint
authorization process is most relevant for connected systems, shared systems, and systems
with multiple information owners.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-6.
(2) AUTHORIZATION | JOINT AUTHORIZATION — INTER-ORGANIZATION
Employ a joint authorization process for the system that includes multiple authorizing
officials with at least one authorizing official from an organization external to theorganization conducting the authorization.
Discussion: Assigning multiple authorizing officials, at least one of whom comes from anexternal organization, to serve as co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of
independence in the risk-based decision-making process. It implements the concepts ofseparation of duties and dual authorization as applied to the system authorization process.
Employing authorizing officials from external organizations to supplement the authorizing
official from the organization that owns or hosts the system may be necessary when theexternal organizations have a vested interest or equities in the outcome of the authorization
decision. The inter-organization joint authorization process is relevant and appropriate forconnected systems, shared systems or services, and systems with multiple information
owners. The authorizing officials from the external organizations are key stakeholders of thesystem undergoing authorization.
Related Controls: AC-6.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-137].

CA-7

CONTINUOUS MONITORING
Control: Develop a system-level continuous monitoring strategy and implement continuous
monitoring in accordance with the organization-level continuous monitoring strategy that
includes:a.

Establishing the following system-level metrics to be monitored: [Assignment: organizationdefined system-level metrics];b.

Establishing [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and[Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessment of control effectiveness;c.

Ongoing control assessments in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy;d.

Ongoing monitoring of system and organization-defined metrics in accordance with thecontinuous monitoring strategy;e.

Correlation and analysis of information generated by control assessments and monitoring;f.

Response actions to address results of the analysis of control assessment and monitoring
information; andCHAPTER THREE

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Reporting the security and privacy status of the system to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Continuous monitoring at the system level facilitates ongoing awareness of thesystem security and privacy posture to support organizational risk management decisions. The
terms “continuous” and “ongoing” imply that organizations assess and monitor their controls
and risks at a frequency sufficient to support risk-based decisions. Different types of controls may
require different monitoring frequencies. The results of continuous monitoring generate risk
response actions by organizations. When monitoring the effectiveness of multiple controls thathave been grouped into capabilities, a root-cause analysis may be needed to determine thespecific control that has failed. Continuous monitoring programs allow organizations to maintainthe authorizations of systems and common controls in highly dynamic environments of operation
with changing mission and business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having
access to security and privacy information on a continuing basis through reports and dashboards
gives organizational officials the ability to make effective and timely risk management decisions,
including ongoing authorization decisions.
Automation supports more frequent updates to hardware, software, and firmware inventories,
authorization packages, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced whencontinuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable,
actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance withthe security categories of systems. Monitoring requirements, including the need for specificmonitoring, may be referenced in other controls and control enhancements, such as AC-2g, AC2(7), AC-2(12)(a), AC-2(7)(b), AC-2(7)(c), AC-17(1), AT-4a, AU-13, AU-13(1), AU-13(2), CM-3f, CM6d, CM-11c, IR-5, MA-2b, MA-3a, MA-4a, PE-3d, PE-6, PE-14b, PE-16, PE-20, PM-6, PM-23, PM31, PS-7e, SA-9c, SR-4, SC-5(3)(b), SC-7a, SC-7(24)(b), SC-18b, SC-43b, and SI-4.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-17, AT-4, AU-6, AU-13, CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6,
CM-11, IA-5, IR-5, MA-2, MA-3, MA-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, PE-20, PL-2, PM-4, PM-6, PM-9,
PM-10, PM-12, PM-14, PM-23, PM-28, PM-31, PS-7, PT-7, RA-3, RA-5, RA-7, RA-10, SA-8, SA-9,
SA-11, SC-5, SC-7, SC-18, SC-38, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4, SI-12, SR-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
Employ independent assessors or assessment teams to monitor the controls in the system
on an ongoing basis.
Discussion: Organizations maximize the value of control assessments by requiring thatassessments be conducted by assessors with appropriate levels of independence. The levelof required independence is based on organizational continuous monitoring strategies.
Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To
achieve such impartiality, assessors do not create a mutual or conflicting interest with theorganizations where the assessments are being conducted, assess their own work, act as
management or employees of the organizations they are serving, or place themselves inadvocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their services.
Related Controls: None.
(2) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2.](3) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TREND ANALYSES
Employ trend analyses to determine if control implementations, the frequency ofcontinuous monitoring activities, and the types of activities used in the continuous
monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.

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Discussion: Trend analyses include examining recent threat information that addresses thetypes of threat events that have occurred in the organization or the Federal Government,
success rates of certain types of attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in technologies, evolvingsocial engineering techniques, the effectiveness of configuration settings, results frommultiple control assessments, and findings from Inspectors General or auditors.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | RISK MONITORING
Ensure risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy that
includes the following:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a)Effectiveness monitoring;(b)Compliance monitoring; and(c)Change monitoring.

Discussion: Risk monitoring is informed by the established organizational risk tolerance.
Effectiveness monitoring determines the ongoing effectiveness of the implemented risk
response measures. Compliance monitoring verifies that required risk response measures
are implemented. It also verifies that security and privacy requirements are satisfied. Changemonitoring identifies changes to organizational systems and environments of operation that
may affect security and privacy risk.
Related Controls: None.
(5) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | CONSISTENCY ANALYSIS
Employ the following actions to validate that policies are established and implemented
controls are operating in a consistent manner: [Assignment: organization-defined actions].
Discussion: Security and privacy controls are often added incrementally to a system. As aresult, policies for selecting and implementing controls may be inconsistent, and the controls
could fail to work together in a consistent or coordinated manner. At a minimum, the lack ofconsistency and coordination could mean that there are unacceptable security and privacy
gaps in the system. At worst, it could mean that some of the controls implemented in one
location or by one component are actually impeding the functionality of other controls (e.g.,encrypting internal network traffic can impede monitoring). In other situations, failing toconsistently monitor all implemented network protocols (e.g., a dual stack of IPv4 and IPv6)
may create unintended vulnerabilities in the system that could be exploited by adversaries.
It is important to validate—through testing, monitoring, and analysis—that the implemented
controls are operating in a consistent, coordinated, non-interfering manner.
Related Controls: None.
(6) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR MONITORING
Ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system using[Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Using automated tools for monitoring helps to maintain the accuracy, currency,
and availability of monitoring information which in turns helps to increase the level ofongoing awareness of the system security and privacy posture in support of organizationalrisk management decisions.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-115],[SP 800-137], [IR8011-1], [IR 8062].

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PENETRATION TESTING
Control: Conduct penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] on[Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on systems orindividual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries.
Penetration testing goes beyond automated vulnerability scanning and is conducted by agentsand teams with demonstrable skills and experience that include technical expertise in network,
operating system, and/or application level security. Penetration testing can be used to validate
vulnerabilities or determine the degree of penetration resistance of systems to adversaries
within specified constraints. Such constraints include time, resources, and skills. Penetration
testing attempts to duplicate the actions of adversaries and provides a more in-depth analysis of
security- and privacy-related weaknesses or deficiencies. Penetration testing is especially
important when organizations are transitioning from older technologies to newer technologies(e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols).
Organizations can use the results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing
activities. Penetration testing can be conducted internally or externally on the hardware,
software, or firmware components of a system and can exercise both physical and technicalcontrols. A standard method for penetration testing includes a pretest analysis based on fullknowledge of the system, pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on the pretest
analysis, and testing designed to determine the exploitability of vulnerabilities. All parties agree
to the rules of engagement before commencing penetration testing scenarios. Organizations
correlate the rules of engagement for the penetration tests with the tools, techniques, andprocedures that are anticipated to be employed by adversaries. Penetration testing may result in
the exposure of information that is protected by laws or regulations, to individuals conducting
the testing. Rules of engagement, contracts, or other appropriate mechanisms can be used tocommunicate expectations for how to protect this information. Risk assessments guide thedecisions on the level of independence required for the personnel conducting penetration
testing.
Related Controls: RA-5, RA-10, SA-11, SR-5, SR-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) PENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING AGENT OR TEAM
Employ an independent penetration testing agent or team to perform penetration testingon the system or system components.
Discussion: Independent penetration testing agents or teams are individuals or groups who
conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational systems. Impartiality implies thatpenetration testing agents or teams are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest
with respect to the development, operation, or management of the systems that are thetargets of the penetration testing. CA-2(1) provides additional information on independent
assessments that can be applied to penetration testing.
Related Controls: CA-2.
(2) PENETRATION TESTING | RED TEAM EXERCISES
Employ the following red-team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries tocompromise organizational systems in accordance with applicable rules of engagement:[Assignment: organization-defined red team exercises].
Discussion: Red team exercises extend the objectives of penetration testing by examining
the security and privacy posture of organizations and the capability to implement effective
cyber defenses. Red team exercises simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise
mission and business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the security and

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privacy posture of systems and organizations. Such attempts may include technology-based
attacks and social engineering-based attacks. Technology-based attacks include interactions
with hardware, software, or firmware components and/or mission and business processes.
Social engineering-based attacks include interactions via email, telephone, shoulder surfing,or personal conversations. Red team exercises are most effective when conducted bypenetration testing agents and teams with knowledge of and experience with current
adversarial tactics, techniques, procedures, and tools. While penetration testing may be
primarily laboratory-based testing, organizations can use red team exercises to provide morecomprehensive assessments that reflect real-world conditions. The results from red teamexercises can be used by organizations to improve security and privacy awareness andtraining and to assess control effectiveness.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) PENETRATION TESTING | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING
Employ a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] [Selection: announced; unannounced] attempts to bypass or circumvent
controls associated with physical access points to the facility.
Discussion: Penetration testing of physical access points can provide information on criticalvulnerabilities in the operating environments of organizational systems. Such information
can be used to correct weaknesses or deficiencies in physical controls that are necessary toprotect organizational systems.
Related Controls: CA-2, PE-3.
References: None.

CA-9

INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONSControl:a.

Authorize internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined system components orclasses of components] to the system;b.

Document, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security and privacy
requirements, and the nature of the information communicated;c.

Terminate internal system connections after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions];
andd.

Review [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the continued need for each internal
connection.

Discussion: Internal system connections are connections between organizational systems andseparate constituent system components (i.e., connections between components that are part ofthe same system) including components used for system development. Intra-system connections
include connections with mobile devices, notebook and desktop computers, tablets, printers,
copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each internal
system connection individually, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of
system components with common characteristics and/or configurations, including printers,
scanners, and copiers with a specified processing, transmission, and storage capability or smart
phones and tablets with a specific baseline configuration. The continued need for an internal
system connection is reviewed from the perspective of whether it provides support fororganizational missions or business functions.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-18, AC-19, CM-2, IA-3, SC-7, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:

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Perform security and privacy compliance checks on constituent system components prior
to the establishment of the internal connection.
Discussion: Compliance checks include verification of the relevant baseline configuration.
Related Controls: CM-6.
References: [SP 800-124], [IR 8023].

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3.5 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Quick link to Configuration Management Summary Table
CM-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] configuration management policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy
and the associated configuration management controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the configuration management policy and procedures;
andc.

Review and update the current configuration management:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Configuration management policy and procedures address the controls in the CM
family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is
an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures
contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy
programs collaborate on the development of configuration management policy and procedures.
Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in
general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The
policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented bymultiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be establishedfor security and privacy programs, for mission/business processes, and for systems, if needed.
Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at theindividual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in systemsecurity and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an
update to configuration management policy and procedures include, but are not limited to,assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating
controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SA-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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CM-2

BASELINE CONFIGURATION
Control:a.

Develop, document, and maintain under configuration control, a current baseline
configuration of the system; andb.

Review and update the baseline configuration of the system:
1.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

2.

When required due to [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances]; and3.

When system components are installed or upgraded.

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Discussion: Baseline configurations for systems and system components include connectivity,
operational, and communications aspects of systems. Baseline configurations are documented,
formally reviewed, and agreed-upon specifications for systems or configuration items withinthose systems. Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, or changes tosystems and include security and privacy control implementations, operational procedures,information about system components, network topology, and logical placement of components
in the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating new baselines
as organizational systems change over time. Baseline configurations of systems reflect thecurrent enterprise architecture.
Related Controls: AC-19, AU-6, CA-9, CM-1, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, CP-9, CP-10, CP-12,
MA-2, PL-8, PM-5, SA-8, SA-10, SA-15, SC-18.
Control Enhancements:(1) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-2.](2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY AND CURRENCY
Maintain the currency, completeness, accuracy, and availability of the baseline
configuration of the system using [Assignment: organization-defined automatedmechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline
configurations for systems include configuration management tools, hardware, software,
firmware inventory tools, and network management tools. Automated tools can be used at
the organization level, mission and business process level, or system level on workstations,servers, notebook computers, network components, or mobile devices. Tools can be used to
track version numbers on operating systems, applications, types of software installed, andcurrent patch levels. Automation support for accuracy and currency can be satisfied by the
implementation of CM-8(2) for organizations that combine system component inventory andbaseline configuration activities.
Related Controls: CM-7, IA-3, RA-5.
(3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONSRetain [Assignment: organization-defined number] of previous versions of baseline
configurations of the system to support rollback.
Discussion: Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support rollback
include hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, configuration records, andassociated documentation.
Related Controls: None.
(4) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE

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Maintain a baseline configuration for system development and test environments that is
managed separately from the operational baseline configuration.

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Discussion: Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing, andoperational environments protects systems from unplanned or unexpected events related todevelopment and testing activities. Separate baseline configurations allow organizations toapply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type of configuration.
For example, the management of operational configurations typically emphasizes the needfor stability, while the management of development or test configurations requires greater
flexibility. Configurations in the test environment mirror configurations in the operational
environment to the extent practicable so that the results of the testing are representative of
the proposed changes to the operational systems. Separate baseline configurations do notnecessarily require separate physical environments.
Related Controls: CM-4, SC-3, SC-7.
(7) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS(a) Issue [Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components] with
[Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals traveling to locations
that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and(b) Apply the following controls to the systems or components when the individuals
return from travel: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: When it is known that systems or system components will be in high-risk areas
external to the organization, additional controls may be implemented to counter theincreased threat in such areas. For example, organizations can take actions for notebook
computers used by individuals departing on and returning from travel. Actions include
determining the locations that are of concern, defining the required configurations for thecomponents, ensuring that components are configured as intended before travel is initiated,
and applying controls to the components after travel is completed. Specially configured
notebook computers include computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, andmore stringent configuration settings. Controls applied to mobile devices upon return fromtravel include examining the mobile device for signs of physical tampering and purging andreimaging disk drives. Protecting information that resides on mobile devices is addressed in
the MP (Media Protection) family.
Related Controls: MP-4, MP-5.
References: [SP 800-124], [SP 800-128].

CM-3

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL
Control:a.

Determine and document the types of changes to the system that are configurationcontrolled;b.

Review proposed configuration-controlled changes to the system and approve or disapprove
such changes with explicit consideration for security and privacy impact analyses;c.

Document configuration change decisions associated with the system;d.

Implement approved configuration-controlled changes to the system;

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Retain records of configuration-controlled changes to the system for [Assignment:
organization-defined time period];f.

Monitor and review activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to thesystem; andg.

Coordinate and provide oversight for configuration change control activities through[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element] that convenes[Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; when [Assignment:
organization-defined configuration change conditions]].

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Discussion: Configuration change control for organizational systems involves the systematic
proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of system changes,
including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes tobaseline configurations, configuration items of systems, operational procedures, configuration
settings for system components, remediate vulnerabilities, and unscheduled or unauthorizedchanges. Processes for managing configuration changes to systems include Configuration Control
Boards or Change Advisory Boards that review and approve proposed changes. For changes that
impact privacy risk, the senior agency official for privacy updates privacy impact assessments andsystem of records notices. For new systems or major upgrades, organizations consider including
representatives from the development organizations on the Configuration Control Boards or
Change Advisory Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are
made to systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes. See also SA-10.
Related Controls: CA-7, CM-2, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-9, CM-11, IA-3, MA-2, PE-16, PT-6, RA-8,
SA-8, SA-10, SC-28, SC-34, SC-37, SI-2, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, SI-10, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENTATION, NOTIFICATION, AND
PROHIBITION OF CHANGESUse [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms] to:(a) Document proposed changes to the system;(b) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined approval authorities] of proposed changes
to the system and request change approval;(c) Highlight proposed changes to the system that have not been approved or
disapproved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];(d) Prohibit changes to the system until designated approvals are received;(e) Document all changes to the system; and(f) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] when approved changes to thesystem are completed.
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
(2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TESTING, VALIDATION, AND DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES
Test, validate, and document changes to the system before finalizing the implementationof the changes.
Discussion: Changes to systems include modifications to hardware, software, or firmware
components and configuration settings defined in CM-6. Organizations ensure that testing
does not interfere with system operations that support organizational mission and business
functions. Individuals or groups conducting tests understand security and privacy policies
and procedures, system security and privacy policies and procedures, and the health, safety,
and environmental risks associated with specific facilities or processes. Operational systems

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may need to be taken offline, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be
conducted. If systems must be taken offline for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur
during planned system outages whenever possible. If the testing cannot be conducted on
operational systems, organizations employ compensating controls.
Related Controls: None.
(3) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION
Implement changes to the current system baseline and deploy the updated baseline acrossthe installed base using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].

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Discussion: Automated tools can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability ofconfiguration baseline information. Automation can also provide data aggregation and data
correlation capabilities, alerting mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based
decision-making within the organization.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPRESENTATIVES
Require [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy representatives] to bemembers of the [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element].
Discussion: Information security and privacy representatives include system security
officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, or
system privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy
expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side
effects, some of which may be security- or privacy-relevant. Detecting such changes early inthe process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affectthe security and privacy posture of systems. The configuration change control element
referred to in the second organization-defined parameter reflects the change control
elements defined by organizations in CM-3g.
Related Controls: None.
(5) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED SECURITY RESPONSE
Implement the following security responses automatically if baseline configurations arechanged in an unauthorized manner: [Assignment: organization-defined security
responses].
Discussion: Automated security responses include halting selected system functions, halting
system processing, and issuing alerts or notifications to organizational personnel when there
is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.
Related Controls: None.
(6) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENT
Ensure that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide the following controls are underconfiguration management: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: The controls referenced in the control enhancement refer to security andprivacy controls from the control catalog. Regardless of the cryptographic mechanisms
employed, processes and procedures are in place to manage those mechanisms. For
example, if system components use certificates for identification and authentication, aprocess is implemented to address the expiration of those certificates.
Related Controls: SC-12.
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Review changes to the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or when
[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether unauthorizedchanges have occurred.
Discussion: Indications that warrant a review of changes to the system and the specificcircumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out byorganizations during the configuration change process or continuous monitoring process.
Related Controls: AU-6, AU-7, CM-3.
(8) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | PREVENT OR RESTRICT CONFIGURATION CHANGESPrevent or restrict changes to the configuration of the system under the following
circumstances: [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances].
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Discussion: System configuration changes can adversely affect critical system security andprivacy functionality. Change restrictions can be enforced through automated mechanisms.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-124], [SP 800-128], [IR 8062].

CM-4

IMPACT ANALYSES
Control: Analyze changes to the system to determine potential security and privacy impacts
prior to change implementation.
Discussion: Organizational personnel with security or privacy responsibilities conduct impact
analyses. Individuals conducting impact analyses possess the necessary skills and technicalexpertise to analyze the changes to systems as well as the security or privacy ramifications.
Impact analyses include reviewing security and privacy plans, policies, and procedures tounderstand control requirements; reviewing system design documentation and operational
procedures to understand control implementation and how specific system changes might affectthe controls; reviewing the impact of changes on organizational supply chain partners withstakeholders; and determining how potential changes to a system create new risks to the privacyof individuals and the ability of implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Impact analyses
also include risk assessments to understand the impact of the changes and determine if
additional controls are required.
Related Controls: CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, CM-9, MA-2, RA-3, RA-5, RA-8, SA-5, SA-8, SA-10, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1) IMPACT ANALYSES | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS
Analyze changes to the system in a separate test environment before implementation inan operational environment, looking for security and privacy impacts due to flaws,
weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.
Discussion: A separate test environment requires an environment that is physically or
logically separate and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient
to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational
environment and that information in the operational environment is not inadvertently
transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or
logical means. If physically separate test environments are not implemented, organizations
determine the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation.
Related Controls: SA-11, SC-7.
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After system changes, verify that the impacted controls are implemented correctly,
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with regard to meeting thesecurity and privacy requirements for the system.
Discussion: Implementation in this context refers to installing changed code in theoperational system that may have an impact on security or privacy controls.
Related Controls: SA-11, SC-3, SI-6.
References: [SP 800-128].

CM-5

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE
Control: Define, document, approve, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions
associated with changes to the system.

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Discussion: Changes to the hardware, software, or firmware components of systems or theoperational procedures related to the system can potentially have significant effects on the
security of the systems or individuals’ privacy. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified andauthorized individuals to access systems for purposes of initiating changes. Access restrictions
include physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), software libraries, workflow
automation, media libraries, abstract layers (i.e., changes implemented into external interfaces
rather than directly into systems), and change windows (i.e., changes occur only during specified
times).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, CM-9, PE-3, SC-28, SC-34, SC-37, SI-2, SI-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT AND AUDIT RECORDS(a) Enforce access restrictions using [Assignment: organization-defined automatedmechanisms]; and(b) Automatically generate audit records of the enforcement actions.
Discussion: Organizations log system accesses associated with applying configuration
changes to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support afterthe-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-12, CM-6, CM-11, SI-12.
(2) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | REVIEW SYSTEM CHANGES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-3(7).](3) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS[Withdrawn: Moved to CM-14.](4) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | DUAL AUTHORIZATION
Enforce dual authorization for implementing changes to [Assignment: organizationdefined system components and system-level information].
Discussion: Organizations employ dual authorization to help ensure that any changes toselected system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals
approve and implement such changes. The two individuals possess the skills and expertise todetermine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. The
individuals are also accountable for the changes. Dual authorization may also be known as
two-person control. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual
authorization duties to other individuals. System-level information includes operational
procedures.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-5, CM-3.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(5) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | PRIVILEGE LIMITATION FOR PRODUCTION AND OPERATION(a) Limit privileges to change system components and system-related information withina production or operational environment; and(b) Review and reevaluate privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: In many organizations, systems support multiple mission and business functions.
Limiting privileges to change system components with respect to operational systems isnecessary because changes to a system component may have far-reaching effects on mission
and business processes supported by the system. The relationships between systems andmission/business processes are, in some cases, unknown to developers. System-related
information includes operational procedures.
Related Controls: AC-2.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(6) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGESLimit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.
Discussion: Software libraries include privileged programs.
Related Controls: AC-2.
(7) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7.]
References: [FIPS 140-3]; [FIPS 186-4].

CM-6

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS
Control:a.

Establish and document configuration settings for components employed within the systemthat reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements using[Assignment: organization-defined common secure configurations];b.

Implement the configuration settings;c.

Identify, document, and approve any deviations from established configuration settings for[Assignment: organization-defined system components] based on [Assignment: organizationdefined operational requirements]; andd.

Monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational
policies and procedures.

Discussion: Configuration settings are the parameters that can be changed in the hardware,
software, or firmware components of the system that affect the security and privacy posture orfunctionality of the system. Information technology products for which configuration settings canbe defined include mainframe computers, servers, workstations, operating systems, mobile
devices, input/output devices, protocols, and applications. Parameters that impact the security
posture of systems include registry settings; account, file, or directory permission settings; andsettings for functions, protocols, ports, services, and remote connections. Privacy parameters areparameters impacting the privacy posture of systems, including the parameters required tosatisfy other privacy controls. Privacy parameters include settings for access controls, dataprocessing preferences, and processing and retention permissions. Organizations establish
organization-wide configuration settings and subsequently derive specific configuration settings
for systems. The established settings become part of the configuration baseline for the system.
Common secure configurations (also known as security configuration checklists, lockdown andhardening guides, and security reference guides) provide recognized, standardized, andestablished benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings for information technology

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products and platforms as well as instructions for configuring those products or platforms tomeet operational requirements. Common secure configurations can be developed by a variety oforganizations, including information technology product developers, manufacturers, vendors,
federal agencies, consortia, academia, industry, and other organizations in the public and private
sectors.
Implementation of a common secure configuration may be mandated at the organization level,
mission and business process level, system level, or at a higher level, including by a regulatory
agency. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration
Baseline [USGCB] and security technical implementation guides (STIGs), which affect theimplementation of CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content
Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol provide an effective
method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings.
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Related Controls: AC-3, AC-19, AU-2, AU-6, CA-9, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, CM-11, CP-7, CP-9,
CP-10, IA-3, IA-5, PL-8, PL-9, RA-5, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SC-18, SC-28, SC-43, SI-2, SI-4, SI-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED MANAGEMENT, APPLICATION, AND VERIFICATIONManage, apply, and verify configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components] using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated tools (e.g., hardening tools, baseline configuration tools) can
improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of configuration settings information.
Automation can also provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities, alerting
mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.
Related Controls: CA-7.
(2) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGESTake the following actions in response to unauthorized changes to [Assignment:
organization-defined configuration settings]: [Assignment: organization-defined actions].
Discussion: Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings include alerting
designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or—in
extreme cases—halting affected system processing.
Related Controls: IR-4, IR-6, SI-7.
(3) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7.](4) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-4.]
References: [SP 800-70], [SP 800-126], [SP 800-128], [USGCB], [NCPR], [DOD STIG].

CM-7

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY
Control:a.

Configure the system to provide only [Assignment: organization-defined mission essential
capabilities]; andb.

Prohibit or restrict the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, software, and/or
services: [Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, system ports,
protocols, software, and/or services].

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Discussion: Systems provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions andservices routinely provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational
missions, functions, or operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple
services from a single system component, but doing so increases risk over limiting the services
provided by that single component. Where feasible, organizations limit component functionality
to a single function per component. Organizations consider removing unused or unnecessary
software and disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports and protocols to prevent
unauthorized connection of components, transfer of information, and tunneling. Organizations
employ network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and end-point
protection technologies, such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection systems, to identify
and prevent the use of prohibited functions, protocols, ports, and services. Least functionality
can also be achieved as part of the fundamental design and development of the system (see SA8, SC-2, and SC-3).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, CM-2, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, RA-5, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-15, SC2, SC-3, SC-7, SC-37, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW(a) Review the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify
unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, software, and services; and(b) Disable or remove [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols,
software, and services within the system deemed to be unnecessary and/or
nonsecure].
Discussion: Organizations review functions, ports, protocols, and services provided bysystems or system components to determine the functions and services that are candidates
for elimination. Such reviews are especially important during transition periods from older
technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transition from IPv4 to IPv6). These technology
transitions may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously
during the transition period and returning to minimum essential functions, ports, protocols,and services at the earliest opportunity. Organizations can either decide the relative securityof the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on theassessment of other entities. Unsecure protocols include Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer
networking.
Related Controls: AC-18.
(2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION
Prevent program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined policies, rules of behavior, and/or access agreements regarding
software program usage and restrictions]; rules authorizing the terms and conditions ofsoftware program usage].
Discussion: Prevention of program execution addresses organizational policies, rules of
behavior, and/or access agreements that restrict software usage and the terms andconditions imposed by the developer or manufacturer, including software licensing andcopyrights. Restrictions include prohibiting auto-execute features, restricting roles allowed
to approve program execution, permitting or prohibiting specific software programs, or
restricting the number of program instances executed at the same time.
Related Controls: CM-8, PL-4, PL-9, PM-5, PS-6.
(3) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE
Ensure compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration requirements forfunctions, ports, protocols, and services].

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Discussion: Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and provide
oversight for systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and services.
Related Controls: None.
(4) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE — DENY-BY-EXCEPTION(a) Identify [Assignment: organization-defined software programs not authorized to
execute on the system];(b) Employ an allow-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution ofunauthorized software programs on the system; and(c) Review and update the list of unauthorized software programs [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Unauthorized software programs can be limited to specific versions or from a
specific source. The concept of prohibiting the execution of unauthorized software may also
be applied to user actions, system ports and protocols, IP addresses/ranges, websites, and
MAC addresses.
Related Controls: CM-6, CM-8, CM-10, PL-9, PM-5.
(5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE — ALLOW-BY-EXCEPTION(a) Identify [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to executeon the system];(b) Employ a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorizedsoftware programs on the system; and(c) Review and update the list of authorized software programs [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Authorized software programs can be limited to specific versions or from a
specific source. To facilitate a comprehensive authorized software process and increase thestrength of protection for attacks that bypass application level authorized software, software
programs may be decomposed into and monitored at different levels of detail. These levels
include applications, application programming interfaces, application modules, scripts,
system processes, system services, kernel functions, registries, drivers, and dynamic link
libraries. The concept of permitting the execution of authorized software may also be
applied to user actions, system ports and protocols, IP addresses/ranges, websites, and MAC
addresses. Organizations consider verifying the integrity of authorized software programs
using digital signatures, cryptographic checksums, or hash functions. Verification of
authorized software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup. The
identification of authorized URLs for websites is addressed in CA-3(5) and SC-7.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6, CM-8, CM-10, PL-9, PM-5, SA-10, SC-34, SI-7.
(6) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGES
Require that the following user-installed software execute in a confined physical or virtual
machine environment with limited privileges: [Assignment: organization-defined userinstalled software].
Discussion: Organizations identify software that may be of concern regarding its origin or
potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user installations occur inconfined environments of operation to limit or contain damage from malicious code that
may be executed.
Related Controls: CM-11, SC-44.
(7) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

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Allow execution of binary or machine-executable code only in confined physical or virtual
machine environments and with the explicit approval of [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles] when such code is:(a) Obtained from sources with limited or no warranty; and/or(b) Without the provision of source code.
Discussion: Code execution in protected environments applies to all sources of binary or
machine-executable code, including commercial software and firmware and open-source
software.
Related Controls: CM-10, SC-44.
(8) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no
warranty or without the provision of source code; and(b) Allow exceptions only for compelling mission or operational requirements and withthe approval of the authorizing official.
Discussion: Binary or machine executable code applies to all sources of binary or machineexecutable code, including commercial software and firmware and open-source software.
Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code or from sources
with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address the factthat software products without the provision of source code may be difficult to review,
repair, or extend. In addition, there may be no owners to make such repairs on behalf oforganizations. If open-source software is used, the assessments address the fact that there is
no warranty, the open-source software could contain back doors or malware, and there may
be no support available.
Related Controls: SA-5, SA-22.
(9) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PROHIBITING THE USE OF UNAUTHORIZED HARDWARE(a) Identify [Assignment: organization-defined hardware components authorized forsystem use];(b) Prohibit the use or connection of unauthorized hardware components;(c) Review and update the list of authorized hardware components [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Hardware components provide the foundation for organizational systems andthe platform for the execution of authorized software programs. Managing the inventory of
hardware components and controlling which hardware components are permitted to beinstalled or connected to organizational systems is essential in order to provide adequate
security.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 186-4], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-167].

CM-8

SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY
Control:a.

CHAPTER THREE

Develop and document an inventory of system components that:1.

Accurately reflects the system;

2.

Includes all components within the system;

3.

Does not include duplicate accounting of components or components assigned to any
other system;

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4.

Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and5.

Includes the following information to achieve system component accountability:[Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effective
system component accountability]; andReview and update the system component inventory [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

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Discussion: System components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets that
include hardware, software, and firmware. Organizations may choose to implement centralized
system component inventories that include components from all organizational systems. In suchsituations, organizations ensure that the inventories include system-specific information requiredfor component accountability. The information necessary for effective accountability of systemcomponents includes the system name, software owners, software version numbers, hardware
inventory specifications, software license information, and for networked components, themachine names and network addresses across all implemented protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6).
Inventory specifications include date of receipt, cost, model, serial number, manufacturer,
supplier information, component type, and physical location.
Preventing duplicate accounting of system components addresses the lack of accountability that
occurs when component ownership and system association is not known, especially in large orcomplex connected systems. Effective prevention of duplicate accounting of system components
necessitates use of a unique identifier for each component. For software inventory, centrally
managed software that is accessed via other systems is addressed as a component of the systemon which it is installed and managed. Software installed on multiple organizational systems andmanaged at the system level is addressed for each individual system and may appear more thanonce in a centralized component inventory, necessitating a system association for each software
instance in the centralized inventory to avoid duplicate accounting of components. Scanningsystems implementing multiple network protocols (e.g., IPv4 and IPv6) can result in duplicatecomponents being identified in different address spaces. The implementation of CM-8(7) can
help to eliminate duplicate accounting of components.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-7, CM-9, CM-10, CM-11, CM-13, CP-2, CP-9, MA-2, MA-6, PE-20, PL9, PM-5, SA-4, SA-5, SI-2, SR-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL
Update the inventory of system components as part of component installations, removals,
and system updates.
Discussion: Organizations can improve the accuracy, completeness, and consistency ofsystem component inventories if the inventories are updated as part of component
installations or removals or during general system updates. If inventories are not updated atthese key times, there is a greater likelihood that the information will not be appropriately
captured and documented. System updates include hardware, software, and firmware
components.
Related Controls: PM-16.
(2) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE
Maintain the currency, completeness, accuracy, and availability of the inventory of systemcomponents using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Organizations maintain system inventories to the extent feasible. For example,
virtual machines can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the
network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and

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accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. Automated maintenance can be achieved by
the implementation of CM-2(2) for organizations that combine system component inventory
and baseline configuration activities.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION(a) Detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components
within the system using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms][Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and(b) Take the following actions when unauthorized components are detected: [Selection(one or more): disable network access by such components; isolate the components;
notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Automated unauthorized component detection is applied in addition to themonitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring forunauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by theperiodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms may also be used toprevent the connection of unauthorized components (see CM-7(9)). Automated mechanisms
can be implemented in systems or in separate system components. When acquiring andimplementing automated mechanisms, organizations consider whether such mechanisms
depend on the ability of the system component to support an agent or supplicant in order tobe detected since some types of components do not have or cannot support agents (e.g., IoT
devices, sensors). Isolation can be achieved , for example, by placing unauthorized systemcomponents in separate domains or subnets or quarantining such components. This type ofcomponent isolation is commonly referred to as “sandboxing.”
Related Controls: AC-19, CA-7, RA-5, SC-3, SC-39, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
(4) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION
Include in the system component inventory information, a means for identifying by[Selection (one or more): name; position; role], individuals responsible and accountable foradministering those components.
Discussion: Identifying individuals who are responsible and accountable for administeringsystem components ensures that the assigned components are properly administered andthat organizations can contact those individuals if some action is required (e.g., when thecomponent is determined to be the source of a breach, needs to be recalled or replaced, orneeds to be relocated).
Related Controls: AC-3.
(5) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATE ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8.](6) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED CONFIGURATIONS AND APPROVED DEVIATIONS
Include assessed component configurations and any approved deviations to current
deployed configurations in the system component inventory.
Discussion: Assessed configurations and approved deviations focus on configuration settings
established by organizations for system components, the specific components that havebeen assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any
approved deviations from established configuration settings.
Related Controls: None.
(7) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | CENTRALIZED REPOSITORY
Provide a centralized repository for the inventory of system components.

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Discussion: Organizations may implement centralized system component inventories that
include components from all organizational systems. Centralized repositories of component
inventories provide opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware,
software, and firmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify
the location and responsible individuals of components that have been compromised,breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. Organizations ensure that theresulting centralized inventories include system-specific information required for propercomponent accountability.
Related Controls: None.
(8) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED LOCATION TRACKING
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Support the tracking of system components by geographic location using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of system components
can increase the accuracy of component inventories. Such capability may help organizations
rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system components that havebeen compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. The use of
tracking mechanisms can be coordinated with senior agency officials for privacy if there are
implications that affect individual privacy.
Related Controls: None.
(9) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS(a) Assign system components to a system; and(b) Receive an acknowledgement from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles] of this assignment.
Discussion: System components that are not assigned to a system may be unmanaged, lack
the required protection, and become an organizational vulnerability.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], [SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-128], [IR 8011-2],[IR 8011-3].

CM-9

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
Control: Develop, document, and implement a configuration management plan for the system
that:
a.

Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;b.

Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items;c.

Defines the configuration items for the system and places the configuration items underconfiguration management;d.

Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; ande.

Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure andmodification.

Discussion: Configuration management activities occur throughout the system development life
cycle. As such, there are developmental configuration management activities (e.g., the control ofcode and software libraries) and operational configuration management activities (e.g., control
of installed components and how the components are configured). Configuration management
plans satisfy the requirements in configuration management policies while being tailored to

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individual systems. Configuration management plans define processes and procedures for how
configuration management is used to support system development life cycle activities.
Configuration management plans are generated during the development and acquisition stage ofthe system development life cycle. The plans describe how to advance changes through change
management processes; update configuration settings and baselines; maintain component
inventories; control development, test, and operational environments; and develop, release, andupdate key documents.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Organizations can employ templates to help ensure the consistent and timely development andimplementation of configuration management plans. Templates can represent a configuration
management plan for the organization with subsets of the plan implemented on a system bysystem basis. Configuration management approval processes include the designation of key
stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to systems, andpersonnel who conduct security and privacy impact analyses prior to the implementation ofchanges to the systems. Configuration items are the system components, such as the hardware,
software, firmware, and documentation to be configuration-managed. As systems continue
through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified, and someexisting configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, PL-2, RA-8, SA-10, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Assign responsibility for developing the configuration management process toorganizational personnel that are not directly involved in system development.
Discussion: In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned withinorganizations, system developers may be tasked with developing configuration management
processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or system
integration. This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain asufficient degree of independence between the system development and integration
processes and configuration management processes to facilitate quality control and more
effective oversight.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-128].

CM-10 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONSControl:a.

Use software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements andcopyright laws;b.

Track the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses tocontrol copying and distribution; andc.

Control and document the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that thiscapability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or
reproduction of copyrighted work.

Discussion: Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual or automated methods,
depending on organizational needs. Examples of contract agreements include software license
agreements and non-disclosure agreements.
Related Controls: AC-17, AU-6, CM-7, CM-8, PM-30, SC-7.

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Control Enhancements:(1) SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE
Establish the following restrictions on the use of open-source software: [Assignment:
organization-defined restrictions].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Open-source software refers to software that is available in source code form.
Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided undersoftware license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve thesoftware. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open-source software is thatit provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. In some cases, there isan online community associated with the software that inspects, tests, updates, and reports
on issues found in software on an ongoing basis. However, remediating vulnerabilities inopen-source software may be problematic. There may also be licensing issues associatedwith open-source software, including the constraints on derivative use of such software.
Open-source software that is available only in binary form may increase the level of risk inusing such software.
Related Controls: SI-7.
References: None.

CM-11 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE
Control:a.

Establish [Assignment: organization-defined policies] governing the installation of softwareby users;b.

Enforce software installation policies through the following methods: [Assignment:
organization-defined methods]; andc.

Monitor policy compliance [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: If provided the necessary privileges, users can install software in organizational
systems. To maintain control over the software installed, organizations identify permitted andprohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations include
updates and security patches to existing software and downloading new applications fromorganization-approved “app stores.” Prohibited software installations include software withunknown or suspect pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious.
Policies selected for governing user-installed software are organization-developed or provided bysome external entity. Policy enforcement methods can include procedural methods andautomated methods.
Related Controls: AC-3, AU-6, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-8, PL-4, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8(3).](2) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | SOFTWARE INSTALLATION WITH PRIVILEGED STATUS
Allow user installation of software only with explicit privileged status.
Discussion: Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the role of systemadministrator.
Related Controls: AC-5, AC-6.
(3) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING

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Enforce and monitor compliance with software installation policies using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Organizations enforce and monitor compliance with software installation
policies using automated mechanisms to more quickly detect and respond to unauthorizedsoftware installation which can be an indicator of an internal or external hostile attack.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

CM-12 INFORMATION LOCATION
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Identify and document the location of [Assignment: organization-defined information] andthe specific system components on which the information is processed and stored;b.

Identify and document the users who have access to the system and system components
where the information is processed and stored; andc.

Document changes to the location (i.e., system or system components) where theinformation is processed and stored.

Discussion: Information location addresses the need to understand where information is being
processed and stored. Information location includes identifying where specific information types
and information reside in system components and how information is being processed so that
information flow can be understood and adequate protection and policy management provided
for such information and system components. The security category of the information is also afactor in determining the controls necessary to protect the information and the systemcomponent where the information resides (see FIPS 199). The location of the information andsystem components is also a factor in the architecture and design of the system (see SA-4, SA-8,
SA-17).
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-23, CM-8, PM-5, RA-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-17, SC-4, SC16, SC-28, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION LOCATION | AUTOMATED TOOLS TO SUPPORT INFORMATION LOCATION
Use automated tools to identify [Assignment: organization-defined information by
information type] on [Assignment: organization-defined system components] to ensure
controls are in place to protect organizational information and individual privacy.
Discussion: The use of automated tools helps to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
the information location capability implemented within the system. Automation also helps
organizations manage the data produced during information location activities and sharesuch information across the organization. The output of automated information location
tools can be used to guide and inform system architecture and design decisions.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 800-60-2].

CM-13 DATA ACTION MAPPING
Control: Develop and document a map of system data actions.
Discussion: Data actions are system operations that process personally identifiable information.
The processing of such information encompasses the full information life cycle, which includes
collection, generation, transformation, use, disclosure, retention, and disposal. A map of system

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data actions includes discrete data actions, elements of personally identifiable information being
processed in the data actions, system components involved in the data actions, and the owners
or operators of the system components. Understanding what personally identifiable information
is being processed (e.g., the sensitivity of the personally identifiable information), how personallyidentifiable information is being processed (e.g., if the data action is visible to the individual or isprocessed in another part of the system), and by whom (e.g., individuals may have different
privacy perceptions based on the entity that is processing the personally identifiable information)
provides a number of contextual factors that are important to assessing the degree of privacy
risk created by the system. Data maps can be illustrated in different ways, and the level of detail
may vary based on the mission and business needs of the organization. The data map may be an
overlay of any system design artifact that the organization is using. The development of this map
may necessitate coordination between the privacy and security programs regarding the covered
data actions and the components that are identified as part of the system.
Related Controls: AC-3, CM-4, CM-12, PM-5, PM-27, PT-2, PT-3, RA-3, RA-8.

CM-14 SIGNED COMPONENTS
Control: Prevent the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware
components] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificatethat is recognized and approved by the organization.
Discussion: Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed withrecognized and approved certificates include software and firmware version updates, patches,
service packs, device drivers, and basic input/output system updates. Organizations can identify
applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of
both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures is a method of code
authentication.
Related Controls: CM-7, SC-12, SC-13, SI-7.
References: [IR 8062].

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3.6 CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Quick link to Contingency Planning Summary Table
CP-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] contingency planning policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and theassociated contingency planning controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the contingency planning policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current contingency planning:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Contingency planning policy and procedures address the controls in the CP family
that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an
important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contributeto security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs
collaborate on the development of contingency planning policy and procedures. Security andprivacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, andmay obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update tocontingency planning policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security
incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy
or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-34], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-50], [SP 800-100].

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CONTINGENCY PLAN
Control:a.

Develop a contingency plan for the system that:

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1.

Identifies essential mission and business functions and associated contingency
requirements;

2.

Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;

3.

Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact
information;

4.

Addresses maintaining essential mission and business functions despite a system
disruption, compromise, or failure;5.

Addresses eventual, full system restoration without deterioration of the controls
originally planned and implemented;

6.

Addresses the sharing of contingency information; and7.

Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];b.

Distribute copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key
contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];c.

Coordinate contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;d.

Review the contingency plan for the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];e.

Update the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, system, or
environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan
implementation, execution, or testing;f.

Communicate contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key
contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];g.

Incorporate lessons learned from contingency plan testing, training, or actual contingency
activities into contingency testing and training; andh.

Protect the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Discussion: Contingency planning for systems is part of an overall program for achieving
continuity of operations for organizational mission and business functions. Contingency planning
addresses system restoration and implementation of alternative mission or business processes
when systems are compromised or breached. Contingency planning is considered throughout thesystem development life cycle and is a fundamental part of the system design. Systems can be
designed for redundancy, to provide backup capabilities, and for resilience. Contingency plansreflect the degree of restoration required for organizational systems since not all systems needto fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of operations desired. System recovery
objectives reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards,
guidelines, organizational risk tolerance, and system impact level.
Actions addressed in contingency plans include orderly system degradation, system shutdown,
fallback to a manual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved forwhen systems are under attack. By coordinating contingency planning with incident handling
activities, organizations ensure that the necessary planning activities are in place and activated in
the event of an incident. Organizations consider whether continuity of operations during an
incident conflicts with the capability to automatically disable the system, as specified in IR-4(5).
Incident response planning is part of contingency planning for organizations and is addressed in
the IR (Incident Response) family.

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Related Controls: CP-3, CP-4, CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, CP-11, CP-13, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, IR-9,
MA-6, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-2, PM-8, PM-11, SA-15, SA-20, SC-7, SC-23, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS
Coordinate contingency plan development with organizational elements responsible forrelated plans.
Discussion: Plans that are related to contingency plans include Business Continuity Plans,
Disaster Recovery Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis
Communications Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plans, Data Breach Response Plans,
Cyber Incident Response Plans, Breach Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING
Conduct capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information processing,telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency operations.
Discussion: Capacity planning is needed because different threats can result in a reductionof the available processing, telecommunications, and support services intended to support
essential mission and business functions. Organizations anticipate degraded operations
during contingency operations and factor the degradation into capacity planning. For
capacity planning, environmental support refers to any environmental factor for which theorganization determines that it needs to provide support in a contingency situation, even if
in a degraded state. Such determinations are based on an organizational assessment of risk,
system categorization (impact level), and organizational risk tolerance.
Related Controls: PE-11, PE-12, PE-13, PE-14, PE-18, SC-5.
(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
Plan for the resumption of [Selection: all; essential] mission and business functions within[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.
Discussion: Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities to resume
mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or as part of business
impact analyses. Organizations prioritize the resumption of mission and business functions.
The time period for resuming mission and business functions may be dependent on theseverity and extent of the disruptions to the system and its supporting infrastructure.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2(3).](5) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
Plan for the continuance of [Selection: all; essential] mission and business functions withminimal or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full system
restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.
Discussion: Organizations may choose to conduct the contingency planning activities tocontinue mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or business
impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part ofcontingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with thecontingency.
Related Controls: None.
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Plan for the transfer of [Selection: all; essential] mission and business functions toalternate processing and/or storage sites with minimal or no loss of operational continuity
and sustain that continuity through system restoration to primary processing and/or
storage sites.
Discussion: Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities foralternate processing and storage sites as part of business continuity planning or business
impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part ofcontingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with thecontingency.
Related Controls: None.
(7) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
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Coordinate the contingency plan with the contingency plans of external service providers
to ensure that contingency requirements can be satisfied.
Discussion: When the capability of an organization to carry out its mission and business
functions is dependent on external service providers, developing a comprehensive andtimely contingency plan may become more challenging. When mission and business
functions are dependent on external service providers, organizations coordinate contingency
planning activities with the external entities to ensure that the individual plans reflect theoverall contingency needs of the organization.
Related Controls: SA-9.
(8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS
Identify critical system assets supporting [Selection: all; essential] mission and business
functions.
Discussion: Organizations may choose to identify critical assets as part of criticality analysis,business continuity planning, or business impact analyses. Organizations identify criticalsystem assets so that additional controls can be employed (beyond the controls routinely
implemented) to help ensure that organizational mission and business functions cancontinue to be conducted during contingency operations. The identification of criticalinformation assets also facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Criticalsystem assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include systemcomponents, information technology services, information technology products, andmechanisms. Operational aspects include procedures (i.e., manually executed operations)and personnel (i.e., individuals operating technical controls and/or executing manual
procedures). Organizational program protection plans can assist in identifying critical assets.
If critical assets are resident within or supported by external service providers, organizations
consider implementing CP-2(7) as a control enhancement.
Related Controls: CM-8, RA-9.
References: [SP 800-34], [IR 8179].

CP-3

CONTINGENCY TRAINING
Control:a.

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Provide contingency training to system users consistent with assigned roles andresponsibilities:
1.

Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency roleor responsibility;

2.

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3.
b.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter; andReview and update contingency training content [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events].

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Discussion: Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles andresponsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level ofdetail is included in such training. For example, some individuals may only need to know when
and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected;
system administrators may require additional training on how to establish systems at alternate
processing and storage sites; and organizational officials may receive more specific training on
how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish
communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on contingencyrelated activities. Training for contingency roles or responsibilities reflects the specific continuity
requirements in the contingency plan. Events that may precipitate an update to contingency
training content include, but are not limited to, contingency plan testing or an actual contingency(lessons learned), assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes inlaws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. At thediscretion of the organization, participation in a contingency plan test or exercise, including
lessons learned sessions subsequent to the test or exercise, may satisfy contingency plan training
requirements.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, AT-4, CP-2, CP-4, CP-8, IR-2, IR-4, IR-9.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS
Incorporate simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective response by
personnel in crisis situations.
Discussion: The use of simulated events creates an environment for personnel to experience
actual threat events, including cyber-attacks that disable websites, ransomware attacks thatencrypt organizational data on servers, hurricanes that damage or destroy organizational
facilities, or hardware or software failures.
Related Controls: None.
(2) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | MECHANISMS USED IN TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS
Employ mechanisms used in operations to provide a more thorough and realistic
contingency training environment.
Discussion: Operational mechanisms refer to processes that have been established toaccomplish an organizational goal or a system that supports a particular organizational
mission or business objective. Actual mission and business processes, systems, and/or
facilities may be used to generate simulated events and enhance the realism of simulated
events during contingency training.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-50].

CP-4

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING
Control:a.

Test the contingency plan for the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using
the following tests to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the readiness to executethe plan: [Assignment: organization-defined tests].

b.

Review the contingency plan test results; andCHAPTER THREE

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c.

Initiate corrective actions, if needed.

Discussion: Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans
and identify potential weaknesses include checklists, walk-through and tabletop exercises,
simulations (parallel or full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct
testing based on the requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of theeffects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals due to contingency operations.
Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective
actions.
Related Controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-3, CP-8, CP-9, IR-3, IR-4, PL-2, PM-14, SR-2.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS
Coordinate contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for relatedplans.
Discussion: Plans related to contingency planning for organizational systems include
Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis
Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, andOccupant Emergency Plans. Coordination of contingency plan testing does not requireorganizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align suchelements with specific plans. However, it does require that if such organizational elements
are responsible for related plans, organizations coordinate with those elements.
Related Controls: IR-8, PM-8.
(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE
Test the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:(a) To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and(b) To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency
operations.
Discussion: Conditions at the alternate processing site may be significantly different thanthe conditions at the primary site. Having the opportunity to visit the alternate site andexperience the actual capabilities available at the site can provide valuable information on
potential vulnerabilities that could affect essential organizational mission and business
functions. The on-site visit can also provide an opportunity to refine the contingency plan toaddress the vulnerabilities discovered during testing.
Related Controls: CP-7.
(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING
Test the contingency plan using [Assignment: organization-defined automatedmechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms facilitate thorough and effective testing of contingency
plans by providing more complete coverage of contingency issues, selecting more realistic
test scenarios and environments, and effectively stressing the system and supported mission
and business functions.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION
Include a full recovery and reconstitution of the system to a known state as part ofcontingency plan testing.
Discussion: Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational
mission and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes

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activities for returning systems to fully operational states. Organizations establish a known
state for systems that includes system state information for hardware, software programs,
and data. Preserving system state information facilitates system restart and return to theoperational mode of organizations with less disruption of mission and business processes.
Related Controls: CP-10, SC-24.
(5) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | SELF-CHALLENGE
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to [Assignment: organizationdefined system or system component] to disrupt and adversely affect the system or systemcomponent.

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Discussion: Often, the best method of assessing system resilience is to disrupt the system insome manner. The mechanisms used by the organization could disrupt system functions or
system services in many ways, including terminating or disabling critical system components,changing the configuration of system components, degrading critical functionality (e.g.,
restricting network bandwidth), or altering privileges. Automated, on-going, and simulated
cyber-attacks and service disruptions can reveal unexpected functional dependencies andhelp the organization determine its ability to ensure resilience in the face of an actual cyberattack.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-34], [SP 800-84], [SP 800-160-2].

CP-5

CONTINGENCY PLAN UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2.]

CP-6

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE
Control:a.

Establish an alternate storage site, including necessary agreements to permit the storage
and retrieval of system backup information; andb.

Ensure that the alternate storage site provides controls equivalent to that of the primarysite.

Discussion: Alternate storage sites are geographically distinct from primary storage sites andmaintain duplicate copies of information and data if the primary storage site is not available.
Similarly, alternate processing sites provide processing capability if the primary processing site is
not available. Geographically distributed architectures that support contingency requirements
may be considered alternate storage sites. Items covered by alternate storage site agreements
include environmental conditions at the alternate sites, access rules for systems and facilities,
physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery and retrievalof backup media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so thatorganizations can maintain essential mission and business functions despite compromise, failure,or disruption in organizational systems.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MP-4, MP-5, PE-3, SC-36, SI-13.
Control Enhancements:(1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE
Identify an alternate storage site that is sufficiently separated from the primary storagesite to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
Discussion: Threats that affect alternate storage sites are defined in organizational risk
assessments and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, and errors of

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omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree ofseparation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats thatare of concern. For threats such as hostile attacks, the degree of separation between sites isless relevant.
Related Controls: RA-3.
(2) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME AND RECOVERY POINT OBJECTIVES
Configure the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in accordance withrecovery time and recovery point objectives.

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Discussion: Organizations establish recovery time and recovery point objectives as part ofcontingency planning. Configuration of the alternate storage site includes physical facilities
and the systems supporting recovery operations that ensure accessibility and correct
execution.
Related Controls: None.
(3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY
Identify potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of anarea-wide disruption or disaster and outline explicit mitigation actions.
Discussion: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in
geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational
assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include duplicating backup information atother alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites
or planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to
the alternate site is disrupted.
Related Controls: RA-3.
References: [SP 800-34].

CP-7

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE
Control:a.

Establish an alternate processing site, including necessary agreements to permit the transfer
and resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined system operations] for essential
mission and business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period
consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives] when the primary processing
capabilities are unavailable;b.

Make available at the alternate processing site, the equipment and supplies required totransfer and resume operations or put contracts in place to support delivery to the site
within the organization-defined time period for transfer and resumption; andc.

Provide controls at the alternate processing site that are equivalent to those at the primarysite.

Discussion: Alternate processing sites are geographically distinct from primary processing sites
and provide processing capability if the primary processing site is not available. The alternate
processing capability may be addressed using a physical processing site or other alternatives,
such as failover to a cloud-based service provider or other internally or externally provided
processing service. Geographically distributed architectures that support contingency
requirements may also be considered alternate processing sites. Controls that are covered byalternate processing site agreements include the environmental conditions at alternate sites,
access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and the coordination for thetransfer and assignment of personnel. Requirements are allocated to alternate processing sites

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that reflect the requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential mission and business
functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational systems.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MA-6, PE-3, PE-11, PE-12, PE-17, SC-36, SI-13.
Control Enhancements:(1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE
Identify an alternate processing site that is sufficiently separated from the primaryprocessing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Threats that affect alternate processing sites are defined in organizational
assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, anderrors of omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficientdegree of separation between primary and alternate processing sites based on the types of
threats that are of concern. For threats such as hostile attacks, the degree of separation
between sites is less relevant.
Related Controls: RA-3.
(2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY
Identify potential accessibility problems to alternate processing sites in the event of anarea-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.
Discussion: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in
geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational
assessments of risk.
Related Controls: RA-3.
(3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE
Develop alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions inaccordance with availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).
Discussion: Priority of service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service
providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with theiravailability requirements and the availability of information resources for logical alternate
processing and/or at the physical alternate processing site. Organizations establish recovery
time objectives as part of contingency planning.
Related Controls: None.
(4) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE
Prepare the alternate processing site so that the site can serve as the operational site
supporting essential mission and business functions.
Discussion: Site preparation includes establishing configuration settings for systems at thealternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primarysite and ensuring that essential supplies and logistical considerations are in place.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6, CP-4.
(5) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-7.](6) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY SITE
Plan and prepare for circumstances that preclude returning to the primary processing site.
Discussion: There may be situations that preclude an organization from returning to theprimary processing site such as if a natural disaster (e.g., flood or a hurricane) damaged or

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destroyed a facility and it was determined that rebuilding in the same location was notprudent.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-34].

CP-8

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
Control: Establish alternate telecommunications services, including necessary agreements topermit the resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined system operations] for essential
mission and business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when the
primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate
processing or storage sites.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Telecommunications services (for data and voice) for primary and alternate
processing and storage sites are in scope for CP-8. Alternate telecommunications services reflect
the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential mission and business
functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify
different time periods for primary or alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services
include additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits or lines, network-based
approaches to telecommunications, or the use of satellites. Organizations consider factors suchas availability, quality of service, and access when entering into alternate telecommunications
agreements.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-7, CP-11, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS(a) Develop primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that containpriority-of-service provisions in accordance with availability requirements (including
recovery time objectives); and(b) Request Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used
for national security emergency preparedness if the primary and/or alternate
telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.
Discussion: Organizations consider the potential mission or business impact in situations
where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar
priority of service provisions. Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) is a Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) program that directs telecommunications service
providers (e.g., wireline and wireless phone companies) to give preferential treatment tousers enrolled in the program when they need to add new lines or have their lines restored
following a disruption of service, regardless of the cause. The FCC sets the rules and policies
for the TSP program, and the Department of Homeland Security manages the TSP program.
The TSP program is always in effect and not contingent on a major disaster or attack taking
place. Federal sponsorship is required to enroll in the TSP program.
Related Controls: None.
(2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE
Obtain alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single
point of failure with primary telecommunications services.
Discussion: In certain circumstances, telecommunications service providers or services may
share the same physical lines, which increases the vulnerability of a single failure point. It is
important to have provider transparency for the actual physical transmission capability fortelecommunication services.

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Related Controls: None.
(3) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE PROVIDERS
Obtain alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated fromprimary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

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Discussion: Threats that affect telecommunications services are defined in organizational
assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, cyber or physicalattacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations can reduce common
susceptibilities by minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service
providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations
may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider can
provide alternate telecommunications services that meet the separation needs addressed in
the risk assessment.
Related Controls: None.
(4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN(a) Require primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to havecontingency plans;(b) Review provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational
contingency requirements; and(c) Obtain evidence of contingency testing and training by providers [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of suchplans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficientevidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service
providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security and state and local governments. Organizations may
use these types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider
contingency plan reviews, testing, and training.
Related Controls: CP-3, CP-4.
(5) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING
Test alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Alternate telecommunications services testing is arranged through contractual
agreements with service providers. The testing may occur in parallel with normal operations
to ensure that there is no degradation in organizational missions or functions.
Related Controls: CP-3.
References: [SP 800-34].

CP-9

SYSTEM BACKUP
Control:a.

Conduct backups of user-level information contained in [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery
time and recovery point objectives];b.

Conduct backups of system-level information contained in the system [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];

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c.

Conduct backups of system documentation, including security- and privacy-related
documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery timeand recovery point objectives]; andd.

Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information.

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Discussion: System-level information includes system state information, operating system
software, middleware, application software, and licenses. User-level information includes
information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed to protect the integrityof system backups include digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system
backup information while in transit is addressed by MP-5 and SC-8. System backups reflect therequirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up
information. Organizations may be subject to laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or
policies with requirements regarding specific categories of information (e.g., personal healthinformation). Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy andlegal counsel regarding such requirements.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-10, MP-4, MP-5, SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SI-4, SI-13.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY AND INTEGRITY
Test backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify media
reliability and information integrity.
Discussion: Organizations need assurance that backup information can be reliably retrieved.
Reliability pertains to the systems and system components where the backup information isstored, the operations used to retrieve the information, and the integrity of the information
being retrieved. Independent and specialized tests can be used for each of the aspects ofreliability. For example, decrypting and transporting (or transmitting) a random sample of
backup files from the alternate storage or backup site and comparing the information to thesame information at the primary processing site can provide such assurance.
Related Controls: CP-4.
(2) SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING
Use a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected system functions as partof contingency plan testing.
Discussion: Organizations need assurance that system functions can be restored correctly
and can support established organizational missions. To ensure that the selected system
functions are thoroughly exercised during contingency plan testing, a sample of backup
information is retrieved to determine whether the functions are operating as intended.
Organizations can determine the sample size for the functions and backup information
based on the level of assurance needed.
Related Controls: CP-4.
(3) SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATIONStore backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical system software andother security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire rated container that is
not collocated with the operational system.
Discussion: Separate storage for critical information applies to all critical information
regardless of the type of backup storage media. Critical system software includes operating
systems, middleware, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection
systems. Security-related information includes inventories of system hardware, software,and firmware components. Alternate storage sites, including geographically distributed
architectures, serve as separate storage facilities for organizations. Organizations may

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provide separate storage by implementing automated backup processes at alternative
storage sites (e.g., data centers). The General Services Administration (GSA) establishes
standards and specifications for security and fire rated containers.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6, CM-8.
(4) SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-9.](5) SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE
Transfer system backup information to the alternate storage site [Assignment:
organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time andrecovery point objectives].
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Discussion: System backup information can be transferred to alternate storage sites either
electronically or by the physical shipment of storage media.
Related Controls: CP-7, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5.
(6) SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM
Conduct system backup by maintaining a redundant secondary system that is notcollocated with the primary system and that can be activated without loss of information
or disruption to operations.
Discussion: The effect of system backup can be achieved by maintaining a redundantsecondary system that mirrors the primary system, including the replication of information.
If this type of redundancy is in place and there is sufficient geographic separation between
the two systems, the secondary system can also serve as the alternate processing site.
Related Controls: CP-7.
(7) SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATION FOR DELETION OR DESTRUCTION
Enforce dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of [Assignment: organizationdefined backup information].
Discussion: Dual authorization ensures that deletion or destruction of backup information
cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals deleting or
destroying backup information possess the skills or expertise to determine if the proposeddeletion or destruction of information reflects organizational policies and procedures. Dualauthorization may also be known as two-person control. To reduce the risk of collusion,organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to other individuals.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-5, MP-2.
(8) SYSTEM BACKUP | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure andmodification of [Assignment: organization-defined backup information].
Discussion: The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect theconfidentiality and integrity of backup information. The strength of mechanisms selected iscommensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Cryptographic
protection applies to system backup information in storage at both primary and alternate
locations. Organizations that implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect information
at rest also consider cryptographic key management solutions.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SC-28.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 186-4], [SP 800-34], [SP 800-130], [SP 800-152].

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CP-10 SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION
Control: Provide for the recovery and reconstitution of the system to a known state within[Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point
objectives] after a disruption, compromise, or failure.

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Discussion: Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational mission
and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for
returning systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflectmission and business priorities; recovery point, recovery time, and reconstitution objectives; andorganizational metrics consistent with contingency plan requirements. Reconstitution includes
the deactivation of interim system capabilities that may have been needed during recovery
operations. Reconstitution also includes assessments of fully restored system capabilities,
reestablishment of continuous monitoring activities, system reauthorization (if required), andactivities to prepare the system and organization for future disruptions, breaches, compromises,
or failures. Recovery and reconstitution capabilities can include automated mechanisms andmanual procedures. Organizations establish recovery time and recovery point objectives as partof contingency planning.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-4, CP-6, CP-7, CP-9, IR-4, SA-8, SC-24, SI-13.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-4.](2) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERY
Implement transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.
Discussion: Transaction-based systems include database management systems andtransaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include
transaction rollback and transaction journaling.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS[Withdrawn: Addressed through tailoring.](4) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD
Provide the capability to restore system components within [Assignment: organizationdefined restoration time periods] from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected
information representing a known, operational state for the components.
Discussion: Restoration of system components includes reimaging, which restores thecomponents to known, operational states.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6.
(5) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-13.](6) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPONENT PROTECTION
Protect system components used for recovery and reconstitution.
Discussion: Protection of system recovery and reconstitution components (i.e., hardware,
firmware, and software) includes physical and technical controls. Backup and restoration
components used for recovery and reconstitution include router tables, compilers, and othersystem software.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-3, PE-6.

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References: [SP 800-34].

CP-11 ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS
Control: Provide the capability to employ [Assignment: organization-defined alternative
communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations.
Discussion: Contingency plans and the contingency training or testing associated with thoseplans incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of establishingresilience in organizational systems. Switching communications protocols may affect software
applications and operational aspects of systems. Organizations assess the potential side effects
of introducing alternate communications protocols prior to implementation.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-8, CP-13.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

CP-12 SAFE MODE
Control: When [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] are detected, enter a safe mode ofoperation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions of safe mode of operation].
Discussion: For systems that support critical mission and business functions—including military
operations, civilian space operations, nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control
operations (especially real-time operational environments)—organizations can identify certain
conditions under which those systems revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe
mode of operation, which can be activated either automatically or manually, restricts theoperations that systems can execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction
includes allowing only selected functions to execute that can be carried out under limited poweror with reduced communications bandwidth.
Related Controls: CM-2, SA-8, SC-24, SI-13, SI-17.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

CP-13 ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS
Control: Employ [Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental security
mechanisms] for satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined security functions] when the
primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.
Discussion: Use of alternative security mechanisms supports system resiliency, contingency
planning, and continuity of operations. To ensure mission and business continuity, organizations
can implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. The mechanisms may be lesseffective than the primary mechanisms. However, having the capability to readily employ
alternative or supplemental mechanisms enhances mission and business continuity that mightotherwise be adversely impacted if operations had to be curtailed until the primary means of
implementing the functions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide
such alternative capabilities, the alternative or supplemental mechanisms are only applied to
critical security capabilities provided by systems, system components, or system services. For
example, an organization may issue one-time pads to senior executives, officials, and systemadministrators if multi-factor tokens—the standard means for achieving secure authentication—
are compromised.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-11, SI-13.

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Control Enhancements: None
References: None.

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3.7 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Quick link to Identification and Authentication Summary Table
IA-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] identification and authentication policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication
policy and the associated identification and authentication controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current identification and authentication:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Identification and authentication policy and procedures address the controls in the
IA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy
is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures
contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy
programs collaborate on the development of identification and authentication policy andprocedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are
preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies andprocedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be
represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures canbe established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to identification and authentication policy and procedures
include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicablelaws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply
restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: AC-1, PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-63-3], [SP
800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4], [SP 800-100], [IR 7874].

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IA-2

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)Control: Uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique
identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.
Discussion: Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements bycomplying with the requirements in [HSPD 12]. Organizational users include employees orindividuals who organizations consider to have an equivalent status to employees (e.g.,contractors and guest researchers). Unique identification and authentication of users applies toall accesses other than those that are explicitly identified in AC-14 and that occur through theauthorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Since processes
execute on behalf of groups and roles, organizations may require unique identification ofindividuals in group accounts or for detailed accountability of individual activity.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Organizations employ passwords, physical authenticators, or biometrics to authenticate user
identities or, in the case of multi-factor authentication, some combination thereof. Access toorganizational systems is defined as either local access or network access. Local access is any
access to organizational systems by users or processes acting on behalf of users, where access isobtained through direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access toorganizational systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where access is obtained
through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type of network accessthat involves communication through external networks. Internal networks include local area
networks and wide area networks.
The use of encrypted virtual private networks for network connections between organizationcontrolled endpoints and non-organization-controlled endpoints may be treated as internal
networks with respect to protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information traversing
the network. Identification and authentication requirements for non-organizational users aredescribed in IA-8.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, AU-1, AU-6, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-4, MA5, PE-2, PL-4, SA-4, SA-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | MULTI-FACTORAUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.
Discussion: Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors toachieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you
know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physicalauthenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric).
Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware
authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards suchas the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card or the Department of
Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC). In addition to authenticating users at the systemlevel (i.e., at logon), organizations may employ authentication mechanisms at the applicationlevel, at their discretion, to provide increased security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e.,
local, network, remote), privileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options
appropriate for the level of risk. Organizations can add additional security measures, such asadditional or more rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access.
Related Controls: AC-5, AC-6.
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Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.

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Discussion: Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors toachieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you
know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physicalauthenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric).
Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware
authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards suchas the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card or the DoD Common Access Card.
In addition to authenticating users at the system level, organizations may also employ
authentication mechanisms at the application level, at their discretion, to provide increased
information security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network, remote), nonprivileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options appropriate for the level ofrisk. Organizations can provide additional security measures, such as additional or more
rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access.
Related Controls: AC-5.
(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED
ACCOUNTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-2(1).](4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | LOCAL ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-2(2).](5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | INDIVIDUAL AUTHENTICATIONWITH GROUP AUTHENTICATION

When shared accounts or authenticators are employed, require users to be individuallyauthenticated before granting access to the shared accounts or resources.
Discussion: Individual authentication prior to shared group authentication mitigates the riskof using group accounts or authenticators.
Related Controls: None.
(6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS —SEPARATE DEVICE

Implement multi-factor authentication for [Selection (one or more): local; network;
remote] access to [Selection (one or more): privileged accounts; non-privileged accounts]
such that:(a) One of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access;and(b) The device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism
requirements].
Discussion: The purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the system to which theuser is attempting to gain access for one of the factors during multi-factor authentication isto reduce the likelihood of compromising authenticators or credentials stored on thesystem. Adversaries may be able to compromise such authenticators or credentials andsubsequently impersonate authorized users. Implementing one of the factors on a separate
device (e.g., a hardware token), provides a greater strength of mechanism and an increased
level of assurance in the authentication process.
Related Controls: AC-6.

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Implement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to [Selection (one ormore): privileged accounts; non-privileged accounts].
Discussion: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve
successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistanttechniques include protocols that use nonces or challenges such as time synchronous or
cryptographic authenticators.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
(9) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | NETWORK ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-2(8).](10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | SINGLE SIGN-ON
Provide a single sign-on capability for [Assignment: organization-defined system accounts
and services].
Discussion: Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple system
resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided by single sign-on
capabilities with the risk introduced by allowing access to multiple systems via a single
authentication event. Single sign-on can present opportunities to improve system security,for example by providing the ability to add multi-factor authentication for applications andsystems (existing and new) that may not be able to natively support multi-factor
authentication.
Related Controls: None.
(11) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | REMOTE ACCESS — SEPARATE
DEVICE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-2(6).](12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIVCREDENTIALS

Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials.
Discussion: Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV)-compliant credentials applies
to organizations implementing logical access control and physical access control systems.
PIV-compliant credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to
FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. The adequacy and reliability of PIV
card issuers are authorized using [SP 800-79-2]. Acceptance of PIV-compliant credentials
includes derived PIV credentials, the use of which is addressed in [SP 800-166]. The DOD
Common Access Card (CAC) is an example of a PIV credential.
Related Controls: None.
(13) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | OUT-OF-BAND
AUTHENTICATION

Implement the following out-of-band authentication mechanisms under [Assignment:
organization-defined conditions]: [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band
authentication].

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Discussion: Out-of-band authentication refers to the use of two separate communication
paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. The first path
(i.e., the in-band path) is used to identify and authenticate users or devices and is generally
the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band path) isused to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example, auser authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires
access and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently,
the server contacts the user via the user’s cell phone to verify that the requested action
originated from the user. The user may confirm the intended action to an individual on thetelephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. Out-of-band authentication
can be used to mitigate actual or suspected “man-in the-middle” attacks. The conditions orcriteria for activation include suspicious activities, new threat indicators, elevated threat
levels, or the impact or classification level of information in requested transactions.
Related Controls: IA-10, IA-11, SC-37.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 201-2], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP
800-78-4], [SP 800-79-2], [SP 800-156], [SP 800-166], [IR 7539], [IR 7676], [IR 7817], [IR 7849], [IR7870], [IR 7874], [IR 7966].

IA-3

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Control: Uniquely identify and authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined devices and/or
types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network]
connection.
Discussion: Devices that require unique device-to-device identification and authentication are
defined by type, device, or a combination of type and device. Organization-defined device types
include devices that are not owned by the organization. Systems use shared known information(e.g., Media Access Control [MAC], Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP]
addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., Institute ofElectrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP],RADIUS server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify andauthenticate devices on local and wide area networks. Organizations determine the required
strength of authentication mechanisms based on the security categories of systems and mission
or business requirements. Because of the challenges of implementing device authentication on alarge scale, organizations can restrict the application of the control to a limited number/type ofdevices based on mission or business needs.
Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AU-6, CA-3, CA-9, IA-4, IA-5, IA-9, IA-11, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION
Authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined devices and/or types of devices] before
establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection usingbidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.
Discussion: A local connection is a connection with a device that communicates without theuse of a network. A network connection is a connection with a device that communicatesthrough a network. A remote connection is a connection with a device that communicatesthrough an external network. Bidirectional authentication provides stronger protection tovalidate the identity of other devices for connections that are of greater risk.
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3(1).](3) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATION(a) Where addresses are allocated dynamically, standardize dynamic address allocationlease information and the lease duration assigned to devices in accordance with
[Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease duration]; and(b) Audit lease information when assigned to a device.
Discussion: The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is an example of a means bywhich clients can dynamically receive network address assignments.
Related Controls: AU-2.
(4) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DEVICE ATTESTATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Handle device identification and authentication based on attestation by [Assignment:
organization-defined configuration management process].
Discussion: Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a device
based on its configuration and known operating state. Device attestation can be determined
via a cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification andauthentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via aconfiguration management process such that the patches and updates are done securely
and do not disrupt identification and authentication to other devices.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-6.
References: None.

IA-4

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT
Control: Manage system identifiers by:a.

Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign
an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier;b.

Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device;c.

Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; andd.

Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Discussion: Common device identifiers include Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. The management of individual
identifiers is not applicable to shared system accounts. Typically, individual identifiers are theusernames of the system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the accountmanagement activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. Identifier management also
addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with system accounts. Preventing thereuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role,
service, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, services, or devices.
Related Controls: AC-5, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-12, MA-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PL-4, PM-12, PS3, PS-4, PS-5, SC-37.
Control Enhancements:(1) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS
Prohibit the use of system account identifiers that are the same as public identifiers forindividual accounts.
Discussion: Prohibiting account identifiers as public identifiers applies to any publicly
disclosed account identifier used for communication such as, electronic mail and instant

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messaging. Prohibiting the use of systems account identifiers that are the same as somepublic identifier, such as the individual identifier section of an electronic mail address, makes
it more difficult for adversaries to guess user identifiers. Prohibiting account identifiers as
public identifiers without the implementation of other supporting controls only complicatesguessing of identifiers. Additional protections are required for authenticators and credentials
to protect the account.
Related Controls: AT-2, PT-7.
(2) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-12(1).](3) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-12(2).](4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS
Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as [Assignment:
organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].
Discussion: Characteristics that identify the status of individuals include contractors, foreign
nationals, and non-organizational users. Identifying the status of individuals by thesecharacteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational
personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee
to know that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor.
Related Controls: None.
(5) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENTManage individual identifiers dynamically in accordance with [Assignment: organizationdefined dynamic identifier policy].
Discussion: In contrast to conventional approaches to identification that presume static
accounts for preregistered users, many distributed systems establish identifiers at runtime
for entities that were previously unknown. When identifiers are established at runtime forpreviously unknown entities, organizations can anticipate and provision for the dynamic
establishment of identifiers. Pre-established trust relationships and mechanisms withappropriate authorities to validate credentials and related identifiers are essential.
Related Controls: AC-16.
(6) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT
Coordinate with the following external organizations for cross-organization managementof identifiers: [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations].
Discussion: Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability to identify
individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving
the processing, storage, or transmission of information.
Related Controls: AU-16, IA-2, IA-5.
(7) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON REGISTRATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-12(4).](8) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PAIRWISE PSEUDONYMOUS IDENTIFIERS
Generate pairwise pseudonymous identifiers.
Discussion: A pairwise pseudonymous identifier is an opaque unguessable subscriber
identifier generated by an identity provider for use at a specific individual relying party.
Generating distinct pairwise pseudonymous identifiers with no identifying information abouta subscriber discourages subscriber activity tracking and profiling beyond the operational

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requirements established by an organization. The pairwise pseudonymous identifiers are
unique to each relying party except in situations where relying parties can show ademonstrable relationship justifying an operational need for correlation, or all parties
consent to being correlated in such a manner.
Related Controls: IA-5.
(9) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | ATTRIBUTE MAINTENANCE AND PROTECTION
Maintain the attributes for each uniquely identified individual, device, or service in[Assignment: organization-defined protected central storage].
Discussion: For each of the entities covered in IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, and IA-9, it is important tomaintain the attributes for each authenticated entity on an ongoing basis in a central(protected) store.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4].

IA-5

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT
Control: Manage system authenticators by:a.

Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual,group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator;b.

Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization;c.

Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;d.

Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator
distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking
authenticators;e.

Changing default authenticators prior to first use;f.

Changing or refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period byauthenticator type] or when [Assignment: organization-defined events] occur;g.

Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;h.

Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect
authenticators; andi.

Changing authenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts
changes.

Discussion: Authenticators include passwords, cryptographic devices, biometrics, certificates,
one-time password devices, and ID badges. Device authenticators include certificates andpasswords. Initial authenticator content is the actual content of the authenticator (e.g., the initial
password). In contrast, the requirements for authenticator content contain specific criteria orcharacteristics (e.g., minimum password length). Developers may deliver system components
with factory default authentication credentials (i.e., passwords) to allow for initial installationand configuration. Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable,and present a significant risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be
implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and bycontrols AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored in organizational systems, including
passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats or files containing encrypted or hashedpasswords accessible with administrator privileges.
Systems support authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions forvarious authenticator characteristics (e.g., minimum password length, validation time window for

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time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification
stage of biometric authentication). Actions can be taken to safeguard individual authenticators,
including maintaining possession of authenticators, not sharing authenticators with others, andimmediately reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators. Authenticator management
includes issuing and revoking authenticators for temporary access when no longer needed.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-2, IA-4, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, MA-4, PE-2, PL-4, SC-12, SC-13.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION
For password-based authentication:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Maintain a list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update
the list [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and when organizational
passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly;(b) Verify, when users create or update passwords, that the passwords are not found on
the list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords in IA-5(1)(a);(c) Transmit passwords only over cryptographically-protected channels;(d) Store passwords using an approved salted key derivation function, preferably using akeyed hash;(e) Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery;(f) Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all
printable characters;(g) Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password
authenticators; and(h) Enforce the following composition and complexity rules: [Assignment: organizationdefined composition and complexity rules].
Discussion: Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they
are used in single-factor or multi-factor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are
preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security
benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain
rules for password generation (e.g., minimum character length for long passwords) undercertain circumstances and can enforce this requirement in IA-5(1)(h). Account recovery canoccur, for example, in situations when a password is forgotten. Cryptographically protectedpasswords include salted one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The list of commonly
used, compromised, or expected passwords includes passwords obtained from previous
breach corpuses, dictionary words, and repetitive or sequential characters. The list includes
context-specific words, such as the name of the service, username, and derivatives thereof.
Related Controls: IA-6.
(2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PUBLIC KEY-BASED AUTHENTICATION(a) For public key-based authentication:(1) Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and(2) Map the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and(b) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:(1) Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an
accepted trust anchor, including checking certificate status information; and(2) Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery andvalidation.

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Discussion: Public key cryptography is a valid authentication mechanism for individuals,
machines, and devices. For PKI solutions, status information for certification paths includes
certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, certificate
validation involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common
Policy Root trust anchor, which includes certificate policy processing. Implementing a local
cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation also supports system
availability in situations where organizations are unable to access revocation information via
the network.
Related Controls: IA-3, SC-17.
(3) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTY REGISTRATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-12(4).]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(4) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH
DETERMINATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-5(1).](5) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR TO DELIVERY
Require developers and installers of system components to provide unique authenticatorsor change default authenticators prior to delivery and installation.
Discussion: Changing authenticators prior to the delivery and installation of systemcomponents extends the requirement for organizations to change default authenticators
upon system installation by requiring developers and/or installers to provide uniqueauthenticators or change default authenticators for system components prior to delivery
and/or installation. However, it typically does not apply to developers of commercial off-theshelf information technology products. Requirements for unique authenticators can be
included in acquisition documents prepared by organizations when procuring systems or
system components.
Related Controls: None.
(6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS
Protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information towhich use of the authenticator permits access.
Discussion: For systems that contain multiple security categories of information without
reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant
access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of
information on the systems. Security categories of information are determined as part of the
security categorization process.
Related Controls: RA-2.
(7) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORS
Ensure that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or otherforms of static storage.
Discussion: In addition to applications, other forms of static storage include access scripts
and function keys. Organizations exercise caution when determining whether embedded orstored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in
the manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators.
Related Controls: None.
(8) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE SYSTEM ACCOUNTS
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] to manage the risk ofcompromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple systems.

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Discussion: When individuals have accounts on multiple systems and use the sameauthenticators such as passwords, there is the risk that a compromise of one account may
lead to the compromise of other accounts. Alternative approaches include having different
authenticators (passwords) on all systems, employing a single sign-on or federation
mechanism, or using some form of one-time passwords on all systems. Organizations canalso use rules of behavior (see PL-4) and access agreements (see PS-6) to mitigate the risk ofmultiple system accounts.
Related Controls: PS-6.
(9) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | FEDERATED CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT
Use the following external organizations to federate credentials: [Assignment:
organization-defined external organizations].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Federation provides organizations with the capability to authenticate individuals
and devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage,or transmission of information. Using a specific list of approved external organizations forauthentication helps to ensure that those organizations are vetted and trusted.
Related Controls: AU-7, AU-16.
(10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC CREDENTIAL BINDING
Bind identities and authenticators dynamically using the following rules: [Assignment:
organization-defined binding rules].
Discussion: Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity and theauthenticator that is used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, binding isestablished by pre-provisioning both the identity and the authenticator to the system. For
example, the binding between a username (i.e., identity) and a password (i.e., authenticator)
is accomplished by provisioning the identity and authenticator as a pair in the system. New
authentication techniques allow the binding between the identity and the authenticator to
be implemented external to a system. For example, with smartcard credentials, the identityand authenticator are bound together on the smartcard. Using these credentials, systems
can authenticate identities that have not been pre-provisioned, dynamically provisioning theidentity after authentication. In these situations, organizations can anticipate the dynamic
provisioning of identities. Pre-established trust relationships and mechanisms withappropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential.
Related Controls: AU-16, IA-5.
(11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-2(1) and IA-2(2).](12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCEFor biometric-based authentication, employ mechanisms that satisfy the following
biometric quality requirements [Assignment: organization-defined biometric quality
requirements].
Discussion: Unlike password-based authentication, which provides exact matches of userinput passwords to stored passwords, biometric authentication does not provide exact
matches. Depending on the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism, there is
likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and the stored biometric thatserves as the basis for comparison. Matching performance is the rate at which a biometricalgorithm correctly results in a match for a genuine user and rejects other users. Biometricperformance requirements include the match rate, which reflects the accuracy of thebiometric matching algorithm used by a system.
Related Controls: AC-7.

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Prohibit the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment: organization-defined time
period].
Discussion: Cached authenticators are used to authenticate to the local machine when the
network is not available. If cached authentication information is out of date, the validity of
the authentication information may be questionable.
Related Controls: None.
(14) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUST STORESFor PKI-based authentication, employ an organization-wide methodology for managing thecontent of PKI trust stores installed across all platforms, including networks, operating
systems, browsers, and applications.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: An organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores
helps improve the accuracy and currency of PKI-based authentication credentials across theorganization.
Related Controls: None.
(15) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | GSA-APPROVED PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
Use only General Services Administration-approved products and services for identity,
credential, and access management.
Discussion: General Services Administration (GSA)-approved products and services areproducts and services that have been approved through the GSA conformance program,where applicable, and posted to the GSA Approved Products List. GSA provides guidance forteams to design and build functional and secure systems that comply with Federal Identity,
Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) policies, technologies, and implementation
patterns.
Related Controls: None.
(16) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTY AUTHENTICATORISSUANCE

Require that the issuance of [Assignment: organization-defined types of and/or specificauthenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted external party] before[Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Issuing authenticators in person or by a trusted external party enhances andreinforces the trustworthiness of the identity proofing process.
Related Controls: IA-12.
(17) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION FOR BIOMETRICAUTHENTICATORS

Employ presentation attack detection mechanisms for biometric-based authentication.
Discussion: Biometric characteristics do not constitute secrets. Such characteristics can beobtained by online web accesses, taking a picture of someone with a camera phone toobtain facial images with or without their knowledge, lifting from objects that someone has
touched (e.g., a latent fingerprint), or capturing a high-resolution image (e.g., an iris
pattern). Presentation attack detection technologies including liveness detection, canmitigate the risk of these types of attacks by making it difficult to produce artifacts intended
to defeat the biometric sensor.
Related Controls: AC-7.
(18) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD MANAGERS

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(a) Employ [Assignment: organization-defined password managers] to generate andmanage passwords; and(b) Protect the passwords using [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: For systems where static passwords are employed, it is often a challenge toensure that the passwords are suitably complex and that the same passwords are not
employed on multiple systems. A password manager is a solution to this problem as it
automatically generates and stores strong and different passwords for various accounts. A
potential risk of using password managers is that adversaries can target the collection ofpasswords generated by the password manager. Therefore, the collection of passwords
requires protection including encrypting the passwords (see IA-5(1)(d)) and storing thecollection offline in a token.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 201-2], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-73-4], [SP
800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4], [IR 7539], [IR 7817], [IR 7849], [IR 7870], [IR 8040].

IA-6

AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK
Control: Obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process toprotect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals.
Discussion: Authentication feedback from systems does not provide information that would
allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types ofsystems, such as desktops or notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (referred to asshoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems, such as mobile devices withsmall displays, the threat may be less significant and is balanced against the increased likelihoodof typographic input errors due to small keyboards. Thus, the means for obscuring authentication
feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring authentication feedback includes displaying asterisks
when users type passwords into input devices or displaying feedback for a very limited time
before obscuring it.
Related Controls: AC-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

IA-7

CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION
Control: Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet therequirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards,
and guidelines for such authentication.
Discussion: Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module toauthenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized toassume the requested role and perform services within that role.
Related Controls: AC-3, IA-5, SA-4, SC-12, SC-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3].

IA-8

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)Control: Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on
behalf of non-organizational users.

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Discussion: Non-organizational users include system users other than organizational users
explicitly covered by IA-2. Non-organizational users are uniquely identified and authenticated foraccesses other than those explicitly identified and documented in AC-14. Identification andauthentication of non-organizational users accessing federal systems may be required to protect
federal, proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security
systems). Organizations consider many factors—including security, privacy, scalability, andpracticality—when balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal informationand systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, AU-6, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-10, IA-11, MA-4, RA3, SA-4, SC-8.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIVCREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES

Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials fromother federal agencies.
Discussion: Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal
agencies applies to both logical and physical access control systems. PIV credentials arethose credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 andsupporting guidelines. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card issuers are addressed andauthorized using [SP 800-79-2].
Related Controls: PE-3.
(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF EXTERNALAUTHENTICATORS(a) Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and(b) Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators.
Discussion: Acceptance of only NIST-compliant external authenticators applies toorganizational systems that are accessible to the public (e.g., public-facing websites).
External authenticators are issued by nonfederal government entities and are compliant
with [SP 800-63B]. Approved external authenticators meet or exceed the minimum Federal
Government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity requirements.
Meeting or exceeding Federal requirements allows Federal Government relying parties totrust external authenticators in connection with an authentication transaction at a specified
authenticator assurance level.
Related Controls: None.
(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | USE OF FICAM-APPROVED
PRODUCTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-8(2).](4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | USE OF DEFINED PROFILES
Conform to the following profiles for identity management [Assignment: organizationdefined identity management profiles].
Discussion: Organizations define profiles for identity management based on open identity
management standards. To ensure that open identity management standards are viable,robust, reliable, sustainable, and interoperable as documented, the Federal Government
assesses and scopes the standards and technology implementations against applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: None.

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CREDENTIALS

Accept and verify federated or PKI credentials that meet [Assignment: organizationdefined policy].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Acceptance of PIV-I credentials can be implemented by PIV, PIV-I, and othercommercial or external identity providers. The acceptance and verification of PIV-I-compliant
credentials apply to both logical and physical access control systems. The acceptance andverification of PIV-I credentials address nonfederal issuers of identity cards that desire tointeroperate with United States Government PIV systems and that can be trusted by Federal
Government-relying parties. The X.509 certificate policy for the Federal Bridge Certification
Authority (FBCA) addresses PIV-I requirements. The PIV-I card is commensurate with the PIV
credentials as defined in cited references. PIV-I credentials are the credentials issued by a
PIV-I provider whose PIV-I certificate policy maps to the Federal Bridge PIV-I Certificate
Policy. A PIV-I provider is cross-certified with the FBCA (directly or through another PKI
bridge) with policies that have been mapped and approved as meeting the requirements of
the PIV-I policies defined in the FBCA certificate policy.
Related Controls: None.
(6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | DISASSOCIABILITY
Implement the following measures to disassociate user attributes or identifier assertion
relationships among individuals, credential service providers, and relying parties:[Assignment: organization-defined measures].
Discussion: Federated identity solutions can create increased privacy risks due to thetracking and profiling of individuals. Using identifier mapping tables or cryptographic
techniques to blind credential service providers and relying parties from each other or to
make identity attributes less visible to transmitting parties can reduce these privacy risks.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FED PKI], [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-79-2], [SP 800-116], [IR8062].

IA-9

SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Control: Uniquely identify and authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined system services
and applications] before establishing communications with devices, users, or other services orapplications.
Discussion: Services that may require identification and authentication include web applications
using digital certificates or services or applications that query a database. Identification andauthentication methods for system services and applications include information or code signing,
provenance graphs, and electronic signatures that indicate the sources of services. Decisions
regarding the validity of identification and authentication claims can be made by services
separate from the services acting on those decisions. This can occur in distributed systemarchitectures. In such situations, the identification and authentication decisions (instead of actual
identifiers and authentication data) are provided to the services that need to act on thosedecisions.
Related Controls: IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, SC-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION EXCHANGE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-9.]

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References: None.

IA-10

ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION
Control: Require individuals accessing the system to employ [Assignment: organization-defined
supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under specific [Assignment:
organization-defined circumstances or situations].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms employed byorganizations and subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. To address this threat,organizations may employ specific techniques or mechanisms and establish protocols to assess
suspicious behavior. Suspicious behavior may include accessing information that individuals do
not typically access as part of their duties, roles, or responsibilities; accessing greater quantities
of information than individuals would routinely access; or attempting to access information fromsuspicious network addresses. When pre-established conditions or triggers occur, organizations
can require individuals to provide additional authentication information. Another potential use
for adaptive authentication is to increase the strength of mechanism based on the number ortypes of records being accessed. Adaptive authentication does not replace and is not used to
avoid the use of multi-factor authentication mechanisms but can augment implementations ofmulti-factor authentication.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-63-3].

IA-11

RE-AUTHENTICATION
Control: Require users to re-authenticate when [Assignment: organization-defined
circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication].
Discussion: In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with device locks,
organizations may require re-authentication of individuals in certain situations, including whenroles, authenticators or credentials change, when security categories of systems change, whenthe execution of privileged functions occurs, after a fixed time period, or periodically.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-11, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

IA-12

IDENTITY PROOFING
Control:a.

Identity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate
identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines;b.

Resolve user identities to a unique individual; andc.

Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence.

Discussion: Identity proofing is the process of collecting, validating, and verifying a user’s
identity information for the purposes of establishing credentials for accessing a system. Identity
proofing is intended to mitigate threats to the registration of users and the establishment of

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their accounts. Standards and guidelines specifying identity assurance levels for identity proofing
include [SP 800-63-3] and [SP 800-63A]. Organizations may be subject to laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, or policies that address the collection of identity evidence. Organizational
personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding suchrequirements.
Related Controls: AC-5, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, IA-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) IDENTITY PROOFING | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION
Require that the registration process to receive an account for logical access includes
supervisor or sponsor authorization.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Including supervisor or sponsor authorization as part of the registration processprovides an additional level of scrutiny to ensure that the user’s management chain is awareof the account, the account is essential to carry out organizational missions and functions,and the user’s privileges are appropriate for the anticipated responsibilities and authorities
within the organization.
Related Controls: None.
(2) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE
Require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority.
Discussion: Identity evidence, such as documentary evidence or a combination of
documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent
identification to establish an identity or at least increases the work factor of potential
adversaries. The forms of acceptable evidence are consistent with the risks to the systems,roles, and privileges associated with the user’s account.
Related Controls: None.
(3) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through[Assignment: organizational defined methods of validation and verification].
Discussion: Validation and verification of identity evidence increases the assurance that
accounts and identifiers are being established for the correct user and authenticators arebeing bound to that user. Validation refers to the process of confirming that the evidence isgenuine and authentic, and the data contained in the evidence is correct, current, andrelated to an individual. Verification confirms and establishes a linkage between the claimed
identity and the actual existence of the user presenting the evidence. Acceptable methods
for validating and verifying identity evidence are consistent with the risks to the systems,roles, and privileges associated with the users account.
Related Controls: None.
(4) IDENTITY PROOFING | IN-PERSON VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
Require that the validation and verification of identity evidence be conducted in person
before a designated registration authority.
Discussion: In-person proofing reduces the likelihood of fraudulent credentials being issued
because it requires the physical presence of individuals, the presentation of physical identity
documents, and actual face-to-face interactions with designated registration authorities.
Related Controls: None.
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Require that a [Selection: registration code; notice of proofing] be delivered through an
out-of-band channel to verify the users address (physical or digital) of record.
Discussion: To make it more difficult for adversaries to pose as legitimate users during theidentity proofing process, organizations can use out-of-band methods to ensure that theindividual associated with an address of record is the same individual that participated in theregistration. Confirmation can take the form of a temporary enrollment code or a notice of
proofing. The delivery address for these artifacts is obtained from records and not selfasserted by the user. The address can include a physical or digital address. A home address is
an example of a physical address. Email addresses and telephone numbers are examples ofdigital addresses.
Related Controls: IA-12.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(6) IDENTITY PROOFING | ACCEPT EXTERNALLY-PROOFED IDENTITIESAccept externally-proofed identities at [Assignment: organization-defined identity
assurance level].
Discussion: To limit unnecessary re-proofing of identities, particularly of non-PIV users,
organizations accept proofing conducted at a commensurate level of assurance by otheragencies or organizations. Proofing is consistent with organizational security policy and theidentity assurance level appropriate for the system, application, or information accessed.
Accepting externally-proofed identities is a fundamental component of managing federated
identities across agencies and organizations.
Related Controls: IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8.
References: [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-63A], [SP 800-79-2].

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3.8 INCIDENT RESPONSE
Quick link to Incident Response Summary Table
IR-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] incident response policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and theassociated incident response controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current incident response:1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Incident response policy and procedures address the controls in the IR family thatare implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an
important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contributeto security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs
collaborate on the development of incident response policy and procedures. Security and privacy
program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may
obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update toincident response policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents
or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, andguidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-50], [SP 800-61], [SP
800-83], [SP 800-100].

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IR-2

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING
Control:a.

b.

Provide incident response training to system users consistent with assigned roles andresponsibilities:
1.

Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident responserole or responsibility or acquiring system access;2.

When required by system changes; and3.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter; andThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Review and update incident response training content [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events].

Discussion: Incident response training is associated with the assigned roles and responsibilities
of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail are
included in such training. For example, users may only need to know who to call or how torecognize an incident; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle
incidents; and incident responders may receive more specific training on forensics, datacollection techniques, reporting, system recovery, and system restoration. Incident response
training includes user training in identifying and reporting suspicious activities from external andinternal sources. Incident response training for users may be provided as part of AT-2 or AT-3.
Events that may precipitate an update to incident response training content include, but are notlimited to, incident response plan testing or response to an actual incident (lessons learned),
assessment or audit findings, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, AT-4, CP-3, IR-3, IR-4, IR-8, IR-9.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS
Incorporate simulated events into incident response training to facilitate the required
response by personnel in crisis situations.
Discussion: Organizations establish requirements for responding to incidents in incident
response plans. Incorporating simulated events into incident response training helps toensure that personnel understand their individual responsibilities and what specific actions
to take in crisis situations.
Related Controls: None.
(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS
Provide an incident response training environment using [Assignment: organizationdefined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms can provide a more thorough and realistic incident
response training environment. This can be accomplished, for example, by providing more
complete coverage of incident response issues, selecting more realistic training scenariosand environments, and stressing the response capability.
Related Controls: None.
(3) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | BREACH
Provide incident response training on how to identify and respond to a breach, including
the organization’s process for reporting a breach.

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Discussion: For federal agencies, an incident that involves personally identifiable
information is considered a breach. A breach results in the loss of control, compromise,
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or a similar occurrence where a person
other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable
information or an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses such information forother than authorized purposes. The incident response training emphasizes the obligation ofindividuals to report both confirmed and suspected breaches involving information in any
medium or form, including paper, oral, and electronic. Incident response training includes
tabletop exercises that simulate a breach. See IR-2(1).
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB M-17-12], [SP 800-50].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

IR-3

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING
Control: Test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] using the following tests: [Assignment: organization-definedtests].
Discussion: Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine their effectivenessand identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes the use ofchecklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, and simulations (parallel or full interrupt). Incident
response testing can include a determination of the effects on organizational operations andassets and individuals due to incident response. The use of qualitative and quantitative data aids
in determining the effectiveness of incident response processes.
Related Controls: CP-3, CP-4, IR-2, IR-4, IR-8, PM-14.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING
Test the incident response capability using [Assignment: organization-defined automatedmechanisms].
Discussion: Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively
test incident response capabilities. This can be accomplished by providing more complete
coverage of incident response issues, selecting realistic test scenarios and environments, andstressing the response capability.
Related Controls: None.
(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS
Coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for relatedplans.
Discussion: Organizational plans related to incident response testing include business
continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, continuity of operations plans, contingency plans,
crisis communications plans, critical infrastructure plans, and occupant emergency plans.
Related Controls: None.
(3) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
Use qualitative and quantitative data from testing to:(a) Determine the effectiveness of incident response processes;(b) Continuously improve incident response processes; and(c) Provide incident response measures and metrics that are accurate, consistent, and in a
reproducible format.

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Discussion: To help incident response activities function as intended, organizations may use
metrics and evaluation criteria to assess incident response programs as part of an effort tocontinually improve response performance. These efforts facilitate improvement in incident
response efficacy and lessen the impact of incidents.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-84], [SP 800-115].

IR-4

INCIDENT HANDLING
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Implement an incident handling capability for incidents that is consistent with the incident
response plan and includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication,and recovery;b.

Coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities;c.

Incorporate lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response
procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting changes accordingly; andd.

Ensure the rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident handling activities are comparable
and predictable across the organization.

Discussion: Organizations recognize that incident response capabilities are dependent on thecapabilities of organizational systems and the mission and business processes being supported bythose systems. Organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, anddevelopment of mission and business processes and systems. Incident-related information canbe obtained from a variety of sources, including audit monitoring, physical access monitoring,and network monitoring; user or administrator reports; and reported supply chain events. An
effective incident handling capability includes coordination among many organizational entities(e.g., mission or business owners, system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices,
physical security offices, personnel security offices, legal departments, risk executive [function],
operations personnel, procurement offices). Suspected security incidents include the receipt ofsuspicious email communications that can contain malicious code. Suspected supply chain
incidents include the insertion of counterfeit hardware or malicious code into organizational
systems or system components. For federal agencies, an incident that involves personallyidentifiable information is considered a breach. A breach results in unauthorized disclosure, theloss of control, unauthorized acquisition, compromise, or a similar occurrence where a person
other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable
information or an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses such information for otherthan authorized purposes.
Related Controls: AC-19, AU-6, AU-7, CM-6, CP-2, CP-3, CP-4, IR-2, IR-3, IR-5, IR-6, IR-8, PE-6, PL2, PM-12, SA-8, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES
Support the incident handling process using [Assignment: organization-defined automatedmechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms that support incident handling processes include online
incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data,
full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.
Related Controls: None.
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Include the following types of dynamic reconfiguration for [Assignment: organizationdefined system components] as part of the incident response capability: [Assignment:
organization-defined types of dynamic reconfiguration].
Discussion: Dynamic reconfiguration includes changes to router rules, access control lists,
intrusion detection or prevention system parameters, and filter rules for guards or firewalls.
Organizations may perform dynamic reconfiguration of systems to stop attacks, misdirect
attackers, and isolate components of systems, thus limiting the extent of the damage frombreaches or compromises. Organizations include specific time frames for achieving thereconfiguration of systems in the definition of the reconfiguration capability, considering thepotential need for rapid response to effectively address cyber threats.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-4, CM-2.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
Identify [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and take the following
actions in response to those incidents to ensure continuation of organizational mission andbusiness functions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response toclasses of incidents].
Discussion: Classes of incidents include malfunctions due to design or implementation
errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted malicious attacks. Incident
response actions include orderly system degradation, system shutdown, fall back to manualmode or activation of alternative technology whereby the system operates differently,
employing deceptive measures, alternate information flows, or operating in a mode that isreserved for when systems are under attack. Organizations consider whether continuity ofoperations requirements during an incident conflict with the capability to automaticallydisable the system as specified as part of IR-4(5).
Related Controls: None.
(4) INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION
Correlate incident information and individual incident responses to achieve anorganization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response.
Discussion: Sometimes, a threat event, such as a hostile cyber-attack, can only be observedby bringing together information from different sources, including various reports andreporting procedures established by organizations.
Related Controls: None.
(5) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF SYSTEM
Implement a configurable capability to automatically disable the system if [Assignment:
organization-defined security violations] are detected.
Discussion: Organizations consider whether the capability to automatically disable thesystem conflicts with continuity of operations requirements specified as part of CP-2 or IR4(3). Security violations include cyber-attacks that have compromised the integrity of thesystem or exfiltrated organizational information and serious errors in software programs
that could adversely impact organizational missions or functions or jeopardize the safety of
individuals.
Related Controls: None.
(6) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS
Implement an incident handling capability for incidents involving insider threats.
Discussion: Explicit focus on handling incidents involving insider threats provides additional
emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling capabilities toprovide appropriate and timely responses.

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Related Controls: None.
(7) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS — INTRA-ORGANIZATION COORDINATION
Coordinate an incident handling capability for insider threats that includes the following
organizational entities [Assignment: organization-defined entities].
Discussion: Incident handling for insider threat incidents (e.g., preparation, detection andanalysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires coordination among manyorganizational entities, including mission or business owners, system owners, humanresources offices, procurement offices, personnel offices, physical security offices, senioragency information security officer, operations personnel, risk executive (function), senioragency official for privacy, and legal counsel. In addition, organizations may require external
support from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
(8) INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
Coordinate with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] to correlate
and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a crossorganization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.
Discussion: The coordination of incident information with external organizations—including
mission or business partners, military or coalition partners, customers, and developers—canprovide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination can serve as an important risk
management capability. This capability allows organizations to leverage information from avariety of sources to effectively respond to incidents and breaches that could potentiallyaffect the organization’s operations, assets, and individuals.
Related Controls: AU-16, PM-16.
(9) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic response capabilities] to respond toincidents.
Discussion: The dynamic response capability addresses the timely deployment of new or
replacement organizational capabilities in response to incidents. This includes capabilities
implemented at the mission and business process level and at the system level.
Related Controls: None.
(10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION
Coordinate incident handling activities involving supply chain events with otherorganizations involved in the supply chain.
Discussion: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include product developers,
system integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, andresellers. Supply chain incidents can occur anywhere through or to the supply chain andinclude compromises or breaches that involve primary or sub-tier providers, information
technology products, system components, development processes or personnel, anddistribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations consider including processes
for protecting and sharing incident information in information exchange agreements andtheir obligations for reporting incidents to government oversight bodies (e.g., Federal
Acquisition Security Council).
Related Controls: CA-3, MA-2, SA-9, SR-8.
(11) INCIDENT HANDLING | INTEGRATED INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM
Establish and maintain an integrated incident response team that can be deployed to any
location identified by the organization in [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

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Discussion: An integrated incident response team is a team of experts that assesses,
documents, and responds to incidents so that organizational systems and networks canrecover quickly and implement the necessary controls to avoid future incidents. Incident
response team personnel include forensic and malicious code analysts, tool developers,
systems security and privacy engineers, and real-time operations personnel. The incident
handling capability includes performing rapid forensic preservation of evidence and analysisof and response to intrusions. For some organizations, the incident response team can be across-organizational entity.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

An integrated incident response team facilitates information sharing and allows
organizational personnel (e.g., developers, implementers, and operators) to leverage teamknowledge of the threat and implement defensive measures that enable organizations todeter intrusions more effectively. Moreover, integrated teams promote the rapid detectionof intrusions, the development of appropriate mitigations, and the deployment of effective
defensive measures. For example, when an intrusion is detected, the integrated team canrapidly develop an appropriate response for operators to implement, correlate the newincident with information on past intrusions, and augment ongoing cyber intelligencedevelopment. Integrated incident response teams are better able to identify adversary
tactics, techniques, and procedures that are linked to the operations tempo or specificmission and business functions and to define responsive actions in a way that does not
disrupt those mission and business functions. Incident response teams can be distributed
within organizations to make the capability resilient.
Related Controls: AT-3.
(12) INCIDENT HANDLING | MALICIOUS CODE AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS
Analyze malicious code and/or other residual artifacts remaining in the system after theincident.
Discussion: When conducted carefully in an isolated environment, analysis of malicious codeand other residual artifacts of a security incident or breach can give the organization insight
into adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. It can also indicate the identity or somedefining characteristics of the adversary. In addition, malicious code analysis can help theorganization develop responses to future incidents.
Related Controls: None.
(13) INCIDENT HANDLING | BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Analyze anomalous or suspected adversarial behavior in or related to [Assignment:
organization-defined environments or resources].
Discussion: If the organization maintains a deception environment, an analysis of behaviors
in that environment, including resources targeted by the adversary and timing of theincident or event, can provide insight into adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures.
External to a deception environment, the analysis of anomalous adversarial behavior (e.g.,changes in system performance or usage patterns) or suspected behavior (e.g., changes insearches for the location of specific resources) can give the organization such insight.
Related Controls: None.
(14) INCIDENT HANDLING | SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER
Establish and maintain a security operations center.
Discussion: A security operations center (SOC) is the focal point for security operations andcomputer network defense for an organization. The purpose of the SOC is to defend andmonitor an organization’s systems and networks (i.e., cyber infrastructure) on an ongoingbasis. The SOC is also responsible for detecting, analyzing, and responding to cybersecurity
incidents in a timely manner. The organization staffs the SOC with skilled technical and

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operational personnel (e.g., security analysts, incident response personnel, systems security
engineers) and implements a combination of technical, management, and operational
controls (including monitoring, scanning, and forensics tools) to monitor, fuse, correlate,analyze, and respond to threat and security-relevant event data from multiple sources.
These sources include perimeter defenses, network devices (e.g., routers, switches), andendpoint agent data feeds. The SOC provides a holistic situational awareness capability tohelp organizations determine the security posture of the system and organization. A SOC
capability can be obtained in a variety of ways. Larger organizations may implement a
dedicated SOC while smaller organizations may employ third-party organizations to provide
such a capability.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(15) INCIDENT HANDLING | PUBLIC RELATIONS AND REPUTATION REPAIR(a) Manage public relations associated with an incident; and(b) Employ measures to repair the reputation of the organization.
Discussion: It is important for an organization to have a strategy in place for addressing
incidents that have been brought to the attention of the general public, have cast theorganization in a negative light, or have affected the organization’s constituents (e.g.,partners, customers). Such publicity can be extremely harmful to the organization and affectits ability to carry out its mission and business functions. Taking proactive steps to repair theorganization’s reputation is an essential aspect of reestablishing the trust and confidence ofits constituents.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [OMB M-17-12], [SP 800-61], [SP 800-86], [SP 800-101], [SP
800-150], [SP 800-160-2], [SP 800-184], [IR 7559].

IR-5

INCIDENT MONITORING
Control: Track and document incidents.
Discussion: Documenting incidents includes maintaining records about each incident, the statusof the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics as well as evaluating
incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from a variety ofsources, including network monitoring, incident reports, incident response teams, usercomplaints, supply chain partners, audit monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user andadministrator reports. IR-4 provides information on the types of incidents that are appropriate
for monitoring.
Related Controls: AU-6, AU-7, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, PE-6, PM-5, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING, DATA COLLECTION, AND ANALYSIS
Track incidents and collect and analyze incident information using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms for tracking incidents and collecting and analyzing
incident information include Computer Incident Response Centers or other electronic
databases of incidents and network monitoring devices.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-61].

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IR-6

INCIDENT REPORTING
Control:a.

Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response
capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; andb.

Report incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].

Discussion: The types of incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and thedesignated reporting authorities reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines. Incident information can inform risk assessments, control
effectiveness assessments, security requirements for acquisitions, and selection criteria fortechnology products.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: CM-6, CP-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, IR-9.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING
Report incidents using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: The recipients of incident reports are specified in IR-6b. Automated reporting
mechanisms include email, posting on websites (with automatic updates), and automatedincident response tools and programs.
Related Controls: IR-7.
(2) INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS
Report system vulnerabilities associated with reported incidents to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Reported incidents that uncover system vulnerabilities are analyzed byorganizational personnel including system owners, mission and business owners, senioragency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, authorizing officials,
and the risk executive (function). The analysis can serve to prioritize and initiate mitigation
actions to address the discovered system vulnerability.
Related Controls: None.
(3) INCIDENT REPORTING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION
Provide incident information to the provider of the product or service and otherorganizations involved in the supply chain or supply chain governance for systems or
system components related to the incident.
Discussion: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include product developers,
system integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, andresellers. Entities that provide supply chain governance include the Federal Acquisition
Security Council (FASC). Supply chain incidents include compromises or breaches that involve
information technology products, system components, development processes or personnel,
distribution processes, or warehousing facilities. Organizations determine the appropriate
information to share and consider the value gained from informing external organizations
about supply chain incidents, including the ability to improve processes or to identify theroot cause of an incident.
Related Controls: SR-8.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [USCERT IR], [SP 800-61].

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IR-7

INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE
Control: Provide an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident
response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users of the system for the handling andreporting of incidents.
Discussion: Incident response support resources provided by organizations include help desks,
assistance groups, automated ticketing systems to open and track incident response tickets, andaccess to forensics services or consumer redress services, when required.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, PM-22, PM-26, SA-9, SI-18.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION AND

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SUPPORT

Increase the availability of incident response information and support using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms can provide a push or pull capability for users to obtain
incident response assistance. For example, individuals may have access to a website to query
the assistance capability, or the assistance capability can proactively send incident response
information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding ofcurrent response capabilities and support.
Related Controls: None.
(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS(a) Establish a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability
and external providers of system protection capability; and(b) Identify organizational incident response team members to the external providers.
Discussion: External providers of a system protection capability include the Computer
Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of Defense. External providers help toprotect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational
information systems and networks. It may be beneficial to have agreements in place withexternal providers to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each party before an incident
occurs.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [IR 7559].

IR-8

INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
Control:a.

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Develop an incident response plan that:1.

Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response
capability;

2.

Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;

3.

Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into theoverall organization;

4.

Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size,
structure, and functions;

5.

Defines reportable incidents;

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6.

Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;

7.

Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain andmature an incident response capability;

8.

Addresses the sharing of incident information;

9.

Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles][Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and10. Explicitly designates responsibility for incident response to [Assignment: organizationdefined entities, personnel, or roles].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5b.

Distribute copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident
response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];c.

Update the incident response plan to address system and organizational changes orproblems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;d.

Communicate incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident
response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; ande.

Protect the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Discussion: It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach toincident response. Organizational mission and business functions determine the structure ofincident response capabilities. As part of the incident response capabilities, organizations
consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including
external service providers and other organizations involved in the supply chain. For incidents
involving personally identifiable information (i.e., breaches), include a process to determine
whether notice to oversight organizations or affected individuals is appropriate and provide that
notice accordingly.
Related Controls: AC-2, CP-2, CP-4, IR-4, IR-7, IR-9, PE-6, PL-2, SA-15, SI-12, SR-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN | BREACHES
Include the following in the Incident Response Plan for breaches involving personallyidentifiable information:(a) A process to determine if notice to individuals or other organizations, including
oversight organizations, is needed;(b) An assessment process to determine the extent of the harm, embarrassment,inconvenience, or unfairness to affected individuals and any mechanisms to mitigate
such harms; and(c) Identification of applicable privacy requirements.
Discussion: Organizations may be required by law, regulation, or policy to follow specificprocedures relating to breaches, including notice to individuals, affected organizations, andoversight bodies; standards of harm; and mitigation or other specific requirements.
Related Controls: PT-1, PT-2, PT-3, PT-4, PT-5, PT-7.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-61], [OMB M-17-12].

IR-9

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE
Control: Respond to information spills by:a.

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Assigning [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with responsibility for
responding to information spills;

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b.

Identifying the specific information involved in the system contamination;c.

Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the information spill using
a method of communication not associated with the spill;d.

Isolating the contaminated system or system component;e.

Eradicating the information from the contaminated system or component;f.

Identifying other systems or system components that may have been subsequently
contaminated; andg.

Performing the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Information spillage refers to instances where information is placed on systems thatare not authorized to process such information. Information spills occur when information that isthought to be a certain classification or impact level is transmitted to a system and subsequently
is determined to be of a higher classification or impact level. At that point, corrective action isrequired. The nature of the response is based on the classification or impact level of the spilled
information, the security capabilities of the system, the specific nature of the contaminatedstorage media, and the access authorizations of individuals with authorized access to thecontaminated system. The methods used to communicate information about the spill after thefact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual spill to minimize the risk offurther spreading the contamination before such contamination is isolated and eradicated.
Related Controls: CP-2, IR-6, PM-26, PM-27, PT-2, PT-3, PT-7, RA-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IR-9.](2) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING
Provide information spillage response training [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
Discussion: Organizations establish requirements for responding to information spillage
incidents in incident response plans. Incident response training on a regular basis helps toensure that organizational personnel understand their individual responsibilities and what
specific actions to take when spillage incidents occur.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-3, IR-2.
(3) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS
Implement the following procedures to ensure that organizational personnel impacted byinformation spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems areundergoing corrective actions: [Assignment: organization-defined procedures].
Discussion: Corrective actions for systems contaminated due to information spillages may
be time-consuming. Personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems while
corrective actions are being taken, which may potentially affect their ability to conductorganizational business.
Related Controls: None.
(4) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL
Employ the following controls for personnel exposed to information not within assigned
access authorizations: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: Controls include ensuring that personnel who are exposed to spilled information
are made aware of the laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards,

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Related Controls: None.
References: None.

IR-10

INTEGRATED INFORMATION SECURITY ANALYSIS TEAM
[Withdrawn: Moved to IR-4(11).]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
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3.9 MAINTENANCE
Quick link to Maintenance Summary Table
MA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] maintenance policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and theassociated maintenance controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current maintenance:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Maintenance policy and procedures address the controls in the MA family that are
implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an importantfactor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security
and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborateon the development of maintenance policy and procedures. Security and privacy program
policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate theneed for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as partof the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect thecomplex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy
programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe
how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is
the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans
or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to maintenancepolicy and procedures assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes inapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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MA-2 CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Schedule, document, and review records of maintenance, repair, and replacement on
system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/ororganizational requirements;b.

Approve and monitor all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely andwhether the system or system components are serviced on site or removed to anotherlocation;c.

Require that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve theremoval of the system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site
maintenance, repair, or replacement;d.

Sanitize equipment to remove the following information from associated media prior to
removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement:[Assignment: organization-defined information];e.

Check all potentially impacted controls to verify that the controls are still functioning
properly following maintenance, repair, or replacement actions; andf.

Include the following information in organizational maintenance records: [Assignment:
organization-defined information].

Discussion: Controlling system maintenance addresses the information security aspects of thesystem maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to system components
conducted by local or nonlocal entities. Maintenance includes peripherals such as scanners,
copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes
the date and time of maintenance, a description of the maintenance performed, names of theindividuals or group performing the maintenance, name of the escort, and system components
or equipment that are removed or replaced. Organizations consider supply chain-related risks
associated with replacement components for systems.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, MA-4, MP-6, PE-16, SI-2, SR-3, SR-4, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2.](2) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES(a) Schedule, conduct, and document maintenance, repair, and replacement actions forthe system using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms]; and(b) Produce up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance, repair, andreplacement actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.
Discussion: The use of automated mechanisms to manage and control system maintenanceprograms and activities helps to ensure the generation of timely, accurate, complete, andconsistent maintenance records.
Related Controls: MA-3.
References: [OMB A-130], [IR 8023].

MA-3 MAINTENANCE TOOLS
Control:a.

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Review previously approved system maintenance tools [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

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Discussion: Approving, controlling, monitoring, and reviewing maintenance tools address
security-related issues associated with maintenance tools that are not within systemauthorization boundaries and are used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions onorganizational systems. Organizations have flexibility in determining roles for the approval of
maintenance tools and how that approval is documented. A periodic review of maintenancetools facilitates the withdrawal of approval for outdated, unsupported, irrelevant, or no-longerused tools. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items and may be
pre-installed, brought in with maintenance personnel on media, cloud-based, or downloaded
from a website. Such tools can be vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally orunintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into systems. Maintenance tools can include
hardware and software diagnostic test equipment and packet sniffers. The hardware andsoftware components that support maintenance and are a part of the system (including thesoftware implementing utilities such as “ping,” “ls,” “ipconfig,” or the hardware and software
implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch) are not addressed by maintenancetools.
Related Controls: MA-2, PE-16.
Control Enhancements:(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS
Inspect the maintenance tools used by maintenance personnel for improper orunauthorized modifications.
Discussion: Maintenance tools can be directly brought into a facility by maintenancepersonnel or downloaded from a vendor’s website. If, upon inspection of the maintenancetools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper manner or
the tools contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational
policies and procedures for incident handling.
Related Controls: SI-7.
(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA
Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media
are used in the system.
Discussion: If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance, diagnostic, and test
programs, organizations determine that the media contains malicious code, the incident ishandled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.
Related Controls: SI-3.
(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL
Prevent the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:(a) Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;(b) Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;(c) Retaining the equipment within the facility; or(d) Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.
Discussion: Organizational information includes all information owned by organizations andany information provided to organizations for which the organizations serve as information
stewards.
Related Controls: MP-6.

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Restrict the use of maintenance tools to authorized personnel only.
Discussion: Restricting the use of maintenance tools to only authorized personnel applies tosystems that are used to carry out maintenance functions.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-5, AC-6.
(5) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | EXECUTION WITH PRIVILEGE
Monitor the use of maintenance tools that execute with increased privilege.
Discussion: Maintenance tools that execute with increased system privilege can result inunauthorized access to organizational information and assets that would otherwise beinaccessible.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6.
(6) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | SOFTWARE UPDATES AND PATCHES
Inspect maintenance tools to ensure the latest software updates and patches are installed.
Discussion: Maintenance tools using outdated and/or unpatched software can provide athreat vector for adversaries and result in a significant vulnerability for organizations.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6.
References: [SP 800-88].

MA-4 NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE
Control:a.

Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;b.

Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent withorganizational policy and documented in the security plan for the system;c.

Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic
sessions;d.

Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; ande.

Terminate session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.

Discussion: Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are conducted by individuals who
communicate through either an external or internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic
activities are carried out by individuals who are physically present at the system location and notcommunicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used to establish
nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2.
Strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ
multi-factor authentication. Strong authenticators include PKI where certificates are stored on atoken protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. Enforcing requirements in MA-4 isaccomplished, in part, by other controls. [SP 800-63B] provides additional guidance on strong
authentication and authenticators.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-2, MA-5, PL-2,
SC-7, SC-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | LOGGING AND REVIEW(a) Log [Assignment: organization-defined audit events] for nonlocal maintenance anddiagnostic sessions; andCHAPTER THREE

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anomalous behavior.
Discussion: Audit logging for nonlocal maintenance is enforced by AU-2. Audit events aredefined in AU-2a.
Related Controls: AU-6, AU-12.
(2) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-1 and MA-4.](3) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY AND SANITIZATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Require that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from asystem that implements a security capability comparable to the capability
implemented on the system being serviced; or(b) Remove the component to be serviced from the system prior to nonlocal maintenanceor diagnostic services; sanitize the component (for organizational information); andafter the service is performed, inspect and sanitize the component (for potentiallymalicious software) before reconnecting the component to the system.
Discussion: Comparable security capability on systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment
providing maintenance services implies that the implemented controls on those systems,
tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the system being
serviced.
Related Controls: MP-6, SI-3, SI-7.
(4) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION AND SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONS
Protect nonlocal maintenance sessions by:(a) Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay
resistant]; and(b) Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the system byeither:(1) Physically separated communications paths; or(2) Logically separated communications paths.
Discussion: Communications paths can be logically separated using encryption.
Related Controls: None.
(5) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS(a) Require the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session by [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles]; and(b) Notify the following personnel or roles of the date and time of planned nonlocal
maintenance: [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of nonlocal
maintenance is accomplished by personnel with sufficient information security and systemknowledge to determine the appropriateness of the proposed maintenance.
Related Controls: None.
(6) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Implement the following cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity andconfidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications: [Assignment:
organization-defined cryptographic mechanisms].
Discussion: Failure to protect nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications canresult in unauthorized individuals gaining access to organizational information. Unauthorized

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access during remote maintenance sessions can result in a variety of hostile actions,
including malicious code insertion, unauthorized changes to system parameters, andexfiltration of organizational information. Such actions can result in the loss or degradationof mission or business capabilities.
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(7) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DISCONNECT VERIFICATION
Verify session and network connection termination after the completion of nonlocal
maintenance and diagnostic sessions.
Discussion: Verifying the termination of a connection once maintenance is completed
ensures that connections established during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions
have been terminated and are no longer available for use.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-12.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 197], [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-63-3], [SP 800-88].

MA-5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
Control:a.

Establish a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintain a list of
authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;b.

Verify that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the system possess therequired access authorizations; andc.

Designate organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technicalcompetence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess therequired access authorizations.

Discussion: Maintenance personnel refers to individuals who perform hardware or software
maintenance on organizational systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals
whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems.
Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on thesystems, while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near thesystems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel—such as
information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants—mayrequire privileged access to organizational systems, such as when they are required to conduct
maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk,organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may
be for one-time use or for very limited time periods.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, IA-2, IA-8, MA-4, MP-2, PE-2, PE-3, PS-7, RA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESS(a) Implement procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate
security clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:(1) Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations,clearances, or formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during theperformance of maintenance and diagnostic activities on the system by approved
organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate accessauthorizations, and are technically qualified; and(2) Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do nothave needed access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all

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volatile information storage components within the system are sanitized and all
nonvolatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from thesystem and secured; and(b) Develop and implement [Assignment: organization-defined alternate controls] in theevent a system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from thesystem.
Discussion: Procedures for individuals who lack appropriate security clearances or who are
not U.S. citizens are intended to deny visual and electronic access to classified or controlled
unclassified information contained on organizational systems. Procedures for the use ofmaintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the systems.
Related Controls: MP-6, PL-2.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(2) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS
Verify that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on a systemprocessing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security clearances andformal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for compartments
of information on the system.
Discussion: Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed
to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. To mitigate theinherent risk of such exposure, organizations use maintenance personnel that are cleared(i.e., possess security clearances) to the classification level of the information stored on thesystem.
Related Controls: PS-3.
(3) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS
Verify that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on a systemprocessing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.
Discussion: Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed
to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. If access toclassified information on organizational systems is restricted to U.S. citizens, the same
restriction is applied to personnel performing maintenance on those systems.
Related Controls: PS-3.
(4) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS
Ensure that:(a) Foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances are used to conduct
maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems only when the systems arejointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied governments, orowned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and(b) Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign
nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems are
fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements.
Discussion: Personnel who conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on organizational
systems may be exposed to classified information. If non-U.S. citizens are permitted toperform maintenance and diagnostics activities on classified systems, then additional vetting
is required to ensure agreements and restrictions are not being violated.
Related Controls: PS-3.
(5) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | NON-SYSTEM MAINTENANCE

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Ensure that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities not directly
associated with the system but in the physical proximity of the system, have required
access authorizations.
Discussion: Personnel who perform maintenance activities in other capacities not directly
related to the system include physical plant personnel and custodial personnel.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE
Control: Obtain maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations specify the system components that result in increased risk toorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when thefunctionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain
maintenance support include having appropriate contracts in place.
Related Controls: CM-8, CP-2, CP-7, RA-7, SA-15, SI-13, SR-2, SR-3, SR-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
Perform preventive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].
Discussion: Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and the servicing of systemcomponents to maintain organizational equipment and facilities in satisfactory operating
condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic inspection, tests, measurements,
adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of incipient failures either before
they occur or before they develop into major defects. The primary goal of preventive
maintenance is to avoid or mitigate the consequences of equipment failures. Preventive
maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment reliability by replacing worn
components before they fail. Methods of determining what preventive (or other) failuremanagement policies to apply include original equipment manufacturer recommendations;
statistical failure records; expert opinion; maintenance that has already been conducted on
similar equipment; requirements of codes, laws, or regulations within a jurisdiction; ormeasured values and performance indications.
Related Controls: None.
(2) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE
Perform predictive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].
Discussion: Predictive maintenance evaluates the condition of equipment by performing
periodic or continuous (online) equipment condition monitoring. The goal of predictive
maintenance is to perform maintenance at a scheduled time when the maintenance activity
is most cost-effective and before the equipment loses performance within a threshold. The
predictive component of predictive maintenance stems from the objective of predicting thefuture trend of the equipment's condition. The predictive maintenance approach employs
principles of statistical process control to determine at what point in the future maintenanceactivities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance inspections are performed while
equipment is in service, thus minimizing disruption of normal system operations. Predictive
maintenance can result in substantial cost savings and higher system reliability.
Related Controls: None.

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Transfer predictive maintenance data to a maintenance management system using[Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: A computerized maintenance management system maintains a database of
information about the maintenance operations of organizations and automates theprocessing of equipment condition data to trigger maintenance planning, execution, andreporting.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

MA-7 FIELD MAINTENANCE
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Restrict or prohibit field maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined systems or
system components] to [Assignment: organization-defined trusted maintenance facilities].
Discussion: Field maintenance is the type of maintenance conducted on a system or systemcomponent after the system or component has been deployed to a specific site (i.e., operational
environment). In certain instances, field maintenance (i.e., local maintenance at the site) may not
be executed with the same degree of rigor or with the same quality control checks as depot
maintenance. For critical systems designated as such by the organization, it may be necessary to
restrict or prohibit field maintenance at the local site and require that such maintenance be
conducted in trusted facilities with additional controls.
Related Controls: MA-2, MA-4, MA-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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3.10 MEDIA PROTECTION
Quick link to Media Protection Summary Table
MP-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] media protection policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and theassociated media protection controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the media protection policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current media protection:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Media protection policy and procedures address the controls in the MP family thatare implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an
important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contributeto security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs
collaborate on the development of media protection policy and procedures. Security and privacy
program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may
obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update tomedia protection policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents
or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy
or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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MEDIA ACCESS
Control: Restrict access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital
media] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash
drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state,magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper andmicrofilm. Denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless theindividuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers is an example ofrestricting access to non-digital media. Limiting access to the design specifications stored oncompact discs in the media library to individuals on the system development team is an example
of restricting access to digital media.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-19, AU-9, CP-2, CP-9, CP-10, MA-5, MP-4, MP-6, PE-2, PE-3, SC-12, SC-13,
SC-34, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4(2).](2) MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28(1).]References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199], [SP 800-111].

MP-3

MEDIA MARKING
Control:a.

Mark system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicablesecurity markings (if any) of the information; andb.

Exempt [Assignment: organization-defined types of system media] from marking if the media
remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].

Discussion: Security marking refers to the application or use of human-readable security
attributes. Digital media includes diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk
drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), flash drives, compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Nondigital media includes paper and microfilm. Controlled unclassified information is defined by the
National Archives and Records Administration along with the appropriate safeguarding anddissemination requirements for such information and is codified in [32 CFR 2002]. Security
markings are generally not required for media that contains information determined byorganizations to be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. Some organizations may
require markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable.
System media marking reflects applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations,standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AC-16, CP-9, MP-5, PE-22, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EO 13556], [32 CFR 2002], [FIPS 199].

MP-4

MEDIA STORAGE
Control:

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Physically control and securely store [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital
and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; andb.

Protect system media types defined in MP-4a until the media are destroyed or sanitizedusing approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash
drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state,magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper andmicrofilm. Physically controlling stored media includes conducting inventories, ensuring
procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the library, andmaintaining accountability for stored media. Secure storage includes a locked drawer, desk, orcabinet or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with thesecurity category or classification of the information on the media. Controlled areas are spacesthat provide physical and procedural controls to meet the requirements established forprotecting information and systems. Fewer controls may be needed for media that contains
information determined to be in the public domain, publicly releasable, or have limited adverse
impacts on organizations, operations, or individuals if accessed by other than authorized
personnel. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection.
Related Controls: AC-19, CP-2, CP-6, CP-9, CP-10, MP-2, MP-7, PE-3, PL-2, SC-12, SC-13, SC-28,
SC-34, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28(1).](2) MEDIA STORAGE | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS
Restrict access to media storage areas and log access attempts and access granted using[Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms include keypads, biometric readers, or card readers on
the external entries to media storage areas.
Related Controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-6, AU-9, AU-12, PE-3.
References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-56A], [SP 800-56B], [SP 800-56C], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2],[SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-111].

MP-5

MEDIA TRANSPORT
Control:a.

Protect and control [Assignment: organization-defined types of system media] duringtransport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined controls];b.

Maintain accountability for system media during transport outside of controlled areas;c.

Document activities associated with the transport of system media; andd.

Restrict the activities associated with the transport of system media to authorized
personnel.

Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash
drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state andmagnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes microfilm andpaper. Controlled areas are spaces for which organizations provide physical or procedural
controls to meet requirements established for protecting information and systems. Controls toprotect media during transport include cryptography and locked containers. Cryptographic

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mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending on the mechanisms
implemented. Activities associated with media transport include releasing media for transport,
ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes, and the actual transport.
Authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals external to the organization.
Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes restricting transport activities toauthorized personnel and tracking and/or obtaining records of transport activities as the media
moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering.
Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities associated with the transportof system media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk. Organizations maintainthe flexibility to define record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as partof a system of transport-related records.
Related Controls: AC-7, AC-19, CP-2, CP-9, MP-3, MP-4, PE-16, PL-2, SC-12, SC-13, SC-28, SC-34.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements:(1) MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5.](2) MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5.](3) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS
Employ an identified custodian during transport of system media outside of controlledareas.
Discussion: Identified custodians provide organizations with specific points of contact during
the media transport process and facilitate individual accountability. Custodial responsibilities
can be transferred from one individual to another if an unambiguous custodian is identified.
Related Controls: None.
(4) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28(1).]References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 800-60-2].

MP-6

MEDIA SANITIZATION
Control:a.

Sanitize [Assignment: organization-defined system media] prior to disposal, release out oforganizational control, or release for reuse using [Assignment: organization-definedsanitization techniques and procedures]; andb.

Employ sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with thesecurity category or classification of the information.

Discussion: Media sanitization applies to all digital and non-digital system media subject todisposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include digital
media in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components,
mobile devices, and non-digital media (e.g., paper and microfilm). The sanitization process
removes information from system media such that the information cannot be retrieved orreconstructed. Sanitization techniques—including clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, deidentification of personally identifiable information, and destruction—prevent the disclosure of
information to unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal.
Organizations determine the appropriate sanitization methods, recognizing that destruction issometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization.

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Organizations use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques andprocedures for media that contains information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly
releasable or information deemed to have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if
released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization of non-digital media includes destruction, removing aclassified appendix from an otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections orwords from a document by obscuring the redacted sections or words in a manner equivalent in
effectiveness to removing them from the document. NSA standards and policies control thesanitization process for media that contains classified information. NARA policies control thesanitization process for controlled unclassified information.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-7, AU-11, MA-2, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PM-22, SI-12, SI-18, SI-19, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW, APPROVE, TRACK, DOCUMENT, AND VERIFY
Review, approve, track, document, and verify media sanitization and disposal actions.
Discussion: Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure compliancewith records retention policies. Tracking and documenting actions include listing personnel
who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, types of media sanitized, files
stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date and time of the sanitization actions,personnel who performed the sanitization, verification actions taken and personnel who
performed the verification, and the disposal actions taken. Organizations verify that thesanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal.
Related Controls: None.
(2) MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING
Test sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to ensure that the intended sanitization is being achieved.
Discussion: Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted byqualified and authorized external entities, including federal agencies or external service
providers.
Related Controls: None.
(3) MEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
Apply nondestructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior toconnecting such devices to the system under the following circumstances: [Assignment:
organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage devices].
Discussion: Portable storage devices include external or removable hard disk drives (e.g.,solid state, magnetic), optical discs, magnetic or optical tapes, flash memory devices, flash
memory cards, and other external or removable disks. Portable storage devices can beobtained from untrustworthy sources and contain malicious code that can be inserted intoor transferred to organizational systems through USB ports or other entry portals. Whilescanning storage devices is recommended, sanitization provides additional assurance thatsuch devices are free of malicious code. Organizations consider nondestructive sanitizationof portable storage devices when the devices are purchased from manufacturers or vendors
prior to initial use or when organizations cannot maintain a positive chain of custody for thedevices.
Related Controls: None.
(4) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6.](5) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONCHAPTER THREE

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Enforce dual authorization for the sanitization of [Assignment: organization-definedsystem media].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations employ dual authorization to help ensure that system media
sanitization cannot occur unless two technically qualified individuals conduct the designatedtask. Individuals who sanitize system media possess sufficient skills and expertise todetermine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal and organizational
standards, policies, and procedures. Dual authorization also helps to ensure that sanitization
occurs as intended, protecting against errors and false claims of having performed thesanitization actions. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. To reduce
the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to otherindividuals.
Related Controls: AC-3, MP-2.
(8) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING OR WIPING OF INFORMATION
Provide the capability to purge or wipe information from [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components] [Selection: remotely; under the following
conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions]].
Discussion: Remote purging or wiping of information protects information on organizational
systems and system components if systems or components are obtained by unauthorizedindividuals. Remote purge or wipe commands require strong authentication to help mitigate
the risk of unauthorized individuals purging or wiping the system, component, or device. The
purge or wipe function can be implemented in a variety of ways, including by overwriting
data or information multiple times or by destroying the key necessary to decrypt encrypted
data.
Related Controls: None.
References: [32 CFR 2002], [OMB A-130], [NARA CUI], [FIPS 199], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 800-60-2],[SP 800-88], [SP 800-124], [IR 8023], [NSA MEDIA].

MP-7

MEDIA USE
Control:a.

[Selection: Restrict; Prohibit] the use of [Assignment: organization-defined types of system
media] on [Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components] using[Assignment: organization-defined controls]; andb.

Prohibit the use of portable storage devices in organizational systems when such devices
have no identifiable owner.

Discussion: System media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes
diskettes, magnetic tapes, flash drives, compact discs, digital versatile discs, and removable harddisk drives. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Media use protections also apply tomobile devices with information storage capabilities. In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user
access to media, MP-7 restricts the use of certain types of media on systems, for example,
restricting or prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations use
technical and nontechnical controls to restrict the use of system media. Organizations may
restrict the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations
to prohibit access to certain external ports or disabling or removing the ability to insert, read, or

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write to such devices. Organizations may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only
approved devices, including devices provided by the organization, devices provided by otherapproved organizations, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may
restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, such as by prohibiting
the use of writeable, portable storage devices and implementing this restriction by disabling or
removing the capability to write to such devices. Requiring identifiable owners for storage
devices reduces the risk of using such devices by allowing organizations to assign responsibility
for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices.
Related Controls: AC-19, AC-20, PL-4, PM-12, SC-34, SC-41.
Control Enhancements:(1) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7.](2) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIA
Prohibit the use of sanitization-resistant media in organizational systems.
Discussion: Sanitization resistance refers to how resistant media are to non-destructive
sanitization techniques with respect to the capability to purge information from media.
Certain types of media do not support sanitization commands, or if supported, the interfaces
are not supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant media
includes compact flash, embedded flash on boards and devices, solid state drives, and USB
removable media.
Related Controls: MP-6.
References: [FIPS 199], [SP 800-111].

MP-8

MEDIA DOWNGRADING
Control:a.

Establish [Assignment: organization-defined system media downgrading process] that
includes employing downgrading mechanisms with strength and integrity commensuratewith the security category or classification of the information;b.

Verify that the system media downgrading process is commensurate with the security
category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the accessauthorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information;c.

Identify [Assignment: organization-defined system media requiring downgrading]; andd.

Downgrade the identified system media using the established process.

Discussion: Media downgrading applies to digital and non-digital media subject to releaseoutside of the organization, whether the media is considered removable or not. When applied tosystem media, the downgrading process removes information from the media, typically by
security category or classification level, such that the information cannot be retrieved orreconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable wider releaseand distribution. Downgrading ensures that empty space on the media is devoid of information.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements:(1) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS
Document system media downgrading actions.

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Discussion: Organizations can document the media downgrading process by providing
information, such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification number of thedowngraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or performed thedowngrading action.
Related Controls: None.
(2) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING
Test downgrading equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] to ensure that downgrading actions are being achieved.
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Downgrade system media containing controlled unclassified information prior to public
release.
Discussion: The downgrading of controlled unclassified information uses approved
sanitization tools, techniques, and procedures.
Related Controls: None.
(4) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Downgrade system media containing classified information prior to release to individuals
without required access authorizations.
Discussion: Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization tools,
techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified fromclassified systems to unclassified media.
Related Controls: None.
References: [32 CFR 2002], [NSA MEDIA].

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3.11 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Quick link to Physical and Environmental Protection Summary Table
PE-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] physical and environmental protection policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental
protection policy and the associated physical and environmental protection controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the physical and environmental protection policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current physical and environmental protection:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Physical and environmental protection policy and procedures address the controls in
the PE family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management
strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies andprocedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security
and privacy programs collaborate on the development of physical and environmental protection
policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies
and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or
be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures
can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to physical and environmental protection policy and procedures
include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicablelaws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply
restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: AT-3, PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONSControl:a.

Develop, approve, and maintain a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility
where the system resides;b.

Issue authorization credentials for facility access;c.

Review the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; andd.

Remove individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Physical access authorizations apply to employees and visitors. Individuals withpermanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization
credentials include ID badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine thestrength of authorization credentials needed consistent with applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Physical access authorizations may not
be necessary to access certain areas within facilities that are designated as publicly accessible.
Related Controls: AT-3, AU-9, IA-4, MA-5, MP-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-8, PM-12, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5,
PS-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION OR ROLE
Authorize physical access to the facility where the system resides based on position orrole.
Discussion: Role-based facility access includes access by authorized permanent andregular/routine maintenance personnel, duty officers, and emergency medical staff.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6.
(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION
Require two forms of identification from the following forms of identification for visitor
access to the facility where the system resides: [Assignment: organization-defined list of
acceptable forms of identification].
Discussion: Acceptable forms of identification include passports, REAL ID-compliant drivers’
licenses, and Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. For gaining access to facilities using
automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-4, IA-5.
(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESS
Restrict unescorted access to the facility where the system resides to personnel with[Selection (one or more): security clearances for all information contained within thesystem; formal access authorizations for all information contained within the system; needfor access to all information contained within the system; [Assignment: organizationdefined physical access authorizations]].
Discussion: Individuals without required security clearances, access approvals, or need toknow are escorted by individuals with appropriate physical access authorizations to ensurethat information is not exposed or otherwise compromised.
Related Controls: PS-2, PS-6.
References: [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4].

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PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL
Control:a.

Enforce physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry and exit
points to the facility where the system resides] by:1.

Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and2.

Controlling ingress and egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined physical access control systems or devices]; guards];

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5b.

Maintain physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry or exit
points];c.

Control access to areas within the facility designated as publicly accessible by implementing
the following controls: [Assignment: organization-defined physical access controls];d.

Escort visitors and control visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances
requiring visitor escorts and control of visitor activity];e.

Secure keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;f.

Inventory [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; andg.

Change combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or whenkeys are lost, combinations are compromised, or when individuals possessing the keys or
combinations are transferred or terminated.

Discussion: Physical access control applies to employees and visitors. Individuals with permanent
physical access authorizations are not considered visitors. Physical access controls for publicly
accessible areas may include physical access control logs/records, guards, or physical accessdevices and barriers to prevent movement from publicly accessible areas to non-public areas.
Organizations determine the types of guards needed, including professional security staff, systemusers, or administrative staff. Physical access devices include keys, locks, combinations, biometricreaders, and card readers. Physical access control systems comply with applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. Organizations have flexibility inthe types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural, automated, or some combination
thereof. Physical access points can include facility access points, interior access points to systems
that require supplemental access controls, or both. Components of systems may be in areas
designated as publicly accessible with organizations controlling access to the components.
Related Controls: AT-3, AU-2, AU-6, AU-9, AU-13, CP-10, IA-3, IA-8, MA-5, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE4, PE-5, PE-8, PS-2, PS-3, PS-6, PS-7, RA-3, SC-28, SI-4, SR-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | SYSTEM ACCESS
Enforce physical access authorizations to the system in addition to the physical access
controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing
one or more components of the system].
Discussion: Control of physical access to the system provides additional physical security for
those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of system components.
Related Controls: None.
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Perform security checks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] at the physicalperimeter of the facility or system for exfiltration of information or removal of systemcomponents.
Discussion: Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of security
checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration.
Related Controls: AC-4, SC-7.
(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS
Employ guards to control [Assignment: organization-defined physical access points] to thefacility where the system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Employing guards at selected physical access points to the facility provides amore rapid response capability for organizations. Guards also provide the opportunity forhuman surveillance in areas of the facility not covered by video surveillance.
Related Controls: CP-6, CP-7, PE-6.
(4) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS
Use lockable physical casings to protect [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] from unauthorized physical access.
Discussion: The greatest risk from the use of portable devices—such as smart phones,
tablets, and notebook computers—is theft. Organizations can employ lockable, physicalcasings to reduce or eliminate the risk of equipment theft. Such casings come in a variety ofsizes, from units that protect a single notebook computer to full cabinets that can protect
multiple servers, computers, and peripherals. Lockable physical casings can be used inconjunction with cable locks or lockdown plates to prevent the theft of the locked casing
containing the computer equipment.
Related Controls: None.
(5) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined anti-tamper technologies] to [Selection (one ormore): detect; prevent] physical tampering or alteration of [Assignment: organizationdefined hardware components] within the system.
Discussion: Organizations can implement tamper detection and prevention at selected
hardware components or implement tamper detection at some components and tamper
prevention at other components. Detection and prevention activities can employ many
types of anti-tamper technologies, including tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper
coatings. Anti-tamper programs help to detect hardware alterations through counterfeiting
and other supply chain-related risks.
Related Controls: SA-16, SR-9, SR-11.
(6) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-8.](7) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | PHYSICAL BARRIERSLimit access using physical barriers.
Discussion: Physical barriers include bollards, concrete slabs, jersey walls, and hydraulicactive vehicle barriers.
Related Controls: None.
(8) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | ACCESS CONTROL VESTIBULES
Employ access control vestibules at [Assignment: organization-defined locations within thefacility].

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Discussion: An access control vestibule is part of a physical access control system thattypically provides a space between two sets of interlocking doors. Vestibules are designed toprevent unauthorized individuals from following authorized individuals into facilities with
controlled access. This activity, also known as piggybacking or tailgating, results inunauthorized access to the facility. Interlocking door controllers can be used to limit the
number of individuals who enter controlled access points and to provide containment areas
while authorization for physical access is verified. Interlocking door controllers can be fully
automated (i.e., controlling the opening and closing of the doors) or partially automated(i.e., using security guards to control the number of individuals entering the containmentarea).
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4], [SP 800-116].

PE-4

ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION
Control: Control physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined system distribution andtransmission lines] within organizational facilities using [Assignment: organization-defined
security controls].
Discussion: Security controls applied to system distribution and transmission lines prevent
accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. Such controls may also be necessary to
prevent eavesdropping or modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security controls used tocontrol physical access to system distribution and transmission lines include disconnected or
locked spare jacks, locked wiring closets, protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays, andwiretapping sensors.
Related Controls: AT-3, IA-4, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-5, PE-9, SC-7, SC-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PE-5

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES
Control: Control physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output
devices] to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.
Discussion: Controlling physical access to output devices includes placing output devices inlocked rooms or other secured areas with keypad or card reader access controls and allowing
access to authorized individuals only, placing output devices in locations that can be monitoredby personnel, installing monitor or screen filters, and using headphones. Examples of output
devices include monitors, printers, scanners, audio devices, facsimile machines, and copiers.
Related Controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-18.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-5.](2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | LINK TO INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
Link individual identity to receipt of output from output devices.
Discussion: Methods for linking individual identity to the receipt of output from output
devices include installing security functionality on facsimile machines, copiers, and printers.
Such functionality allows organizations to implement authentication on output devices prior
to the release of output to individuals.

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Related Controls: None.
(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | MARKING OUTPUT DEVICES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-22.]
References: [IR 8023].

PE-6

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Monitor physical access to the facility where the system resides to detect and respond tophysical security incidents;b.

Review physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and uponoccurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events];
andc.

Coordinate results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response
capability.

Discussion: Physical access monitoring includes publicly accessible areas within organizational
facilities. Examples of physical access monitoring include the employment of guards, video
surveillance equipment (i.e., cameras), and sensor devices. Reviewing physical access logs canhelp identify suspicious activity, anomalous events, or potential threats. The reviews can besupported by audit logging controls, such as AU-2, if the access logs are part of an automatedsystem. Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of physical security
incidents and responses to the incidents. Incidents include security violations or suspicious
physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities include accesses outside of normal
work hours, repeated accesses to areas not normally accessed, accesses for unusual lengths oftime, and out-of-sequence accesses.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-9, AU-12, CA-7, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
Monitor physical access to the facility where the system resides using physical intrusion
alarms and surveillance equipment.
Discussion: Physical intrusion alarms can be employed to alert security personnel when
unauthorized access to the facility is attempted. Alarm systems work in conjunction withphysical barriers, physical access control systems, and security guards by triggering a
response when these other forms of security have been compromised or breached. Physicalintrusion alarms can include different types of sensor devices, such as motion sensors,
contact sensors, and broken glass sensors. Surveillance equipment includes video cameras
installed at strategic locations throughout the facility.
Related Controls: None.
(2) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION AND RESPONSES
Recognize [Assignment: organization-defined classes or types of intrusions] and initiate[Assignment: organization-defined response actions] using [Assignment: organizationdefined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Response actions can include notifying selected organizational personnel or law
enforcement personnel. Automated mechanisms implemented to initiate response actions
include system alert notifications, email and text messages, and activating door locking
mechanisms. Physical access monitoring can be coordinated with intrusion detection

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systems and system monitoring capabilities to provide integrated threat coverage for theorganization.
Related Controls: SI-4.
(3) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE(a) Employ video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational areas];(b) Review video recordings [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and(c) Retain video recordings for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Video surveillance focuses on recording activity in specified areas for the
purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant. Video recordings are typicallyreviewed to detect anomalous events or incidents. Monitoring the surveillance video is not
required, although organizations may choose to do so. There may be legal considerations
when performing and retaining video surveillance, especially if such surveillance is in a public
location.
Related Controls: None.
(4) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO SYSTEMS
Monitor physical access to the system in addition to the physical access monitoring of the
facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing one or morecomponents of the system].
Discussion: Monitoring physical access to systems provides additional monitoring for thoseareas within facilities where there is a concentration of system components, including serverrooms, media storage areas, and communications centers. Physical access monitoring can becoordinated with intrusion detection systems and system monitoring capabilities to provide
comprehensive and integrated threat coverage for the organization.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-7

VISITOR CONTROL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3.]

PE-8

VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS
Control:a.

Maintain visitor access records to the facility where the system resides for [Assignment:
organization-defined time period];b.

Review visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; andc.

Report anomalies in visitor access records to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].

Discussion: Visitor access records include the names and organizations of individuals visiting,visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure times, purpose ofvisits, and the names and organizations of individuals visited. Access record reviews determine if
access authorizations are current and are still required to support organizational mission andbusiness functions. Access records are not required for publicly accessible areas.
Related Controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE AND REVIEW

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Maintain and review visitor access records using [Assignment: organization-defined
automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Visitor access records may be stored and maintained in a database management
system that is accessible by organizational personnel. Automated access to such records
facilitates record reviews on a regular basis to determine if access authorizations are current
and still required to support organizational mission and business functions.
Related Controls: None.
(2) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2.](3) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Limit personally identifiable information contained in visitor access records to thefollowing elements identified in the privacy risk assessment: [Assignment: organizationdefined elements].
Discussion: Organizations may have requirements that specify the contents of visitor accessrecords. Limiting personally identifiable information in visitor access records when suchinformation is not needed for operational purposes helps reduce the level of privacy riskcreated by a system.
Related Controls: RA-3, SA-8.
References: None.

PE-9

POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING
Control: Protect power equipment and power cabling for the system from damage anddestruction.
Discussion: Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for the power equipment
and cabling employed at different locations that are both internal and external to organizational
facilities and environments of operation. Types of power equipment and cabling include internal
cabling and uninterruptable power sources in offices or data centers, generators and power
cabling outside of buildings, and power sources for self-contained components such as satellites,
vehicles, and other deployable systems.
Related Controls: PE-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING
Employ redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by [Assignment:
organization-defined distance].
Discussion: Physically separate and redundant power cables ensure that power continues toflow in the event that one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.
Related Controls: None.
(2) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS
Employ automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined critical systemcomponents].
Discussion: Automatic voltage controls can monitor and control voltage. Such controls
include voltage regulators, voltage conditioners, and voltage stabilizers.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

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PE-10 EMERGENCY SHUTOFF
Control:a.

Provide the capability of shutting off power to [Assignment: organization-defined system orindividual system components] in emergency situations;b.

Place emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location
by system or system component] to facilitate access for authorized personnel; andc.

Protect emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.

Discussion: Emergency power shutoff primarily applies to organizational facilities that contain
concentrations of system resources, including data centers, mainframe computer rooms, serverrooms, and areas with computer-controlled machinery.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: PE-15.
Control Enhancements:(1) EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL AND UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10.]
References: None.

PE-11 EMERGENCY POWER
Control: Provide an uninterruptible power supply to facilitate [Selection (one or more): anorderly shutdown of the system; transition of the system to long-term alternate power] in theevent of a primary power source loss.
Discussion: An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is an electrical system or mechanism thatprovides emergency power when there is a failure of the main power source. A UPS is typicallyused to protect computers, data centers, telecommunication equipment, or other electricalequipment where an unexpected power disruption could cause injuries, fatalities, serious
mission or business disruption, or loss of data or information. A UPS differs from an emergency
power system or backup generator in that the UPS provides near-instantaneous protection fromunanticipated power interruptions from the main power source by providing energy stored inbatteries, supercapacitors, or flywheels. The battery duration of a UPS is relatively short but
provides sufficient time to start a standby power source, such as a backup generator, or properly
shut down the system.
Related Controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) EMERGENCY POWER | ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY — MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
Provide an alternate power supply for the system that is activated [Selection: manually;
automatically] and that can maintain minimally required operational capability in theevent of an extended loss of the primary power source.
Discussion: Provision of an alternate power supply with minimal operating capability can besatisfied by accessing a secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply.
Related Controls: None.
(2) EMERGENCY POWER | ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY — SELF-CONTAINEDProvide an alternate power supply for the system that is activated [Selection: manually;
automatically] and that is:(a) Self-contained;

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Discussion: The provision of a long-term, self-contained power supply can be satisfied byusing one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-12 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Employ and maintain automatic emergency lighting for the system that activates in theevent of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes
within the facility.
Discussion: The provision of emergency lighting applies primarily to organizational facilities that
contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, andmainframe computer rooms. Emergency lighting provisions for the system are described in thecontingency plan for the organization. If emergency lighting for the system fails or cannot beprovided, organizations consider alternate processing sites for power-related contingencies.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONSProvide emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential mission andbusiness functions.
Discussion: Organizations define their essential missions and functions.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-13 FIRE PROTECTION
Control: Employ and maintain fire detection and suppression systems that are supported by anindependent energy source.
Discussion: The provision of fire detection and suppression systems applies primarily toorganizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers,
server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire detection and suppression systems that may
require an independent energy source include sprinkler systems and smoke detectors. An
independent energy source is an energy source, such as a microgrid, that is separate, or can beseparated, from the energy sources providing power for the other parts of the facility.
Related Controls: AT-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION SYSTEMS — AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION
Employ fire detection systems that activate automatically and notify [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined
emergency responders] in the event of a fire.
Discussion: Organizations can identify personnel, roles, and emergency responders if
individuals on the notification list need to have access authorizations or clearances (e.g., toenter to facilities where access is restricted due to the classification or impact level of

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information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require independent energy
sources to ensure that the notification capability is not adversely affected by the fire.
Related Controls: None.
(2) FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS — AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION(a) Employ fire suppression systems that activate automatically and notify [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined
emergency responders]; and(b) Employ an automatic fire suppression capability when the facility is not staffed on acontinuous basis.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders
if individuals on the notification list need to have appropriate access authorizations and/or
clearances (e.g., to enter to facilities where access is restricted due to the impact level orclassification of information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require
independent energy sources to ensure that the notification capability is not adversely
affected by the fire.
Related Controls: None.
(3) FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-13(2).](4) FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS
Ensure that the facility undergoes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] fire
protection inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors and identified deficiencies
are resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Discussion: Authorized and qualified personnel within the jurisdiction of the organization
include state, county, and city fire inspectors and fire marshals. Organizations provide
escorts during inspections in situations where the systems that reside within the facilities
contain sensitive information.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-14 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
Control:a.

Maintain [Selection (one or more): temperature; humidity; pressure; radiation; [Assignment:
organization-defined environmental control]] levels within the facility where the system
resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels]; andb.

Monitor environmental control levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: The provision of environmental controls applies primarily to organizational facilities
that contain concentrations of system resources (e.g., data centers, mainframe computer rooms,
and server rooms). Insufficient environmental controls, especially in very harsh environments,
can have a significant adverse impact on the availability of systems and system components thatare needed to support organizational mission and business functions.
Related Controls: AT-3, CP-2.
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Employ the following automatic environmental controls in the facility to prevent
fluctuations potentially harmful to the system: [Assignment: organization-defined
automatic environmental controls].
Discussion: The implementation of automatic environmental controls provides animmediate response to environmental conditions that can damage, degrade, or destroyorganizational systems or systems components.
Related Controls: None.
(2) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH ALARMS AND NOTIFICATIONS
Employ environmental control monitoring that provides an alarm or notification ofchanges potentially harmful to personnel or equipment to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The alarm or notification may be an audible alarm or a visual message in realtime to personnel or roles defined by the organization. Such alarms and notifications canhelp minimize harm to individuals and damage to organizational assets by facilitating atimely incident response.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-15 WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION
Control: Protect the system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing mastershutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and known to key personnel.
Discussion: The provision of water damage protection primarily applies to organizational
facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms,
and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu ofmaster shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern without affecting
entire organizations.
Related Controls: AT-3, PE-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT
Detect the presence of water near the system and alert [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles] using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms include notification systems, water detection sensors,
and alarms.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PE-16 DELIVERY AND REMOVAL
Control:a.

Authorize and control [Assignment: organization-defined types of system components]
entering and exiting the facility; andb.

Maintain records of the system components.

Discussion: Enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of system components may require
restricting access to delivery areas and isolating the areas from the system and media libraries.
Related Controls: CM-3, CM-8, MA-2, MA-3, MP-5, PE-20, SR-2, SR-3, SR-4, SR-6.

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Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PE-17 ALTERNATE WORK SITE
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Determine and document the [Assignment: organization-defined alternate work sites]
allowed for use by employees;b.

Employ the following controls at alternate work sites: [Assignment: organization-defined
controls];c.

Assess the effectiveness of controls at alternate work sites; andd.

Provide a means for employees to communicate with information security and privacy
personnel in case of incidents.

Discussion: Alternate work sites include government facilities or the private residences of
employees. While distinct from alternative processing sites, alternate work sites can provide
readily available alternate locations during contingency operations. Organizations can define
different sets of controls for specific alternate work sites or types of sites depending on thework-related activities conducted at the sites. Implementing and assessing the effectiveness oforganization-defined controls and providing a means to communicate incidents at alternate worksites supports the contingency planning activities of organizations.
Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, CP-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-46].

PE-18 LOCATION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Control: Position system components within the facility to minimize potential damage from
[Assignment: organization-defined physical and environmental hazards] and to minimize theopportunity for unauthorized access.
Discussion: Physical and environmental hazards include floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes,
hurricanes, terrorism, vandalism, an electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and otherforms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. Organizations consider the location of entry points
where unauthorized individuals, while not being granted access, might nonetheless be nearsystems. Such proximity can increase the risk of unauthorized access to organizational
communications using wireless packet sniffers or microphones, or unauthorized disclosure of
information.
Related Controls: CP-2, PE-5, PE-19, PE-20, RA-3.
(1) LOCATION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE
[Withdrawn: Moved to PE-23.]
References: None.

PE-19 INFORMATION LEAKAGE
Control: Protect the system from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals
emanations.
Discussion: Information leakage is the intentional or unintentional release of data or information
to an untrusted environment from electromagnetic signals emanations. The security categories

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leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.
Related Controls: AC-18, PE-18, PE-20.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Protect system components, associated data communications, and networks in accordancewith national Emissions Security policies and procedures based on the security category orclassification of the information.
Discussion: Emissions Security (EMSEC) policies include the former TEMPEST policies.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 199].

PE-20 ASSET MONITORING AND TRACKING
Control: Employ [Assignment: organization-defined asset location technologies] to track andmonitor the location and movement of [Assignment: organization-defined assets] within[Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].
Discussion: Asset location technologies can help ensure that critical assets—including vehicles,
equipment, and system components—remain in authorized locations. Organizations consult with
the Office of the General Counsel and senior agency official for privacy regarding the deployment
and use of asset location technologies to address potential privacy concerns.
Related Controls: CM-8, PE-16, PM-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PE-21 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE PROTECTION
Control: Employ [Assignment: organization-defined protective measures] againstelectromagnetic pulse damage for [Assignment: organization-defined systems and systemcomponents].
Discussion: An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a short burst of electromagnetic energy that is
spread over a range of frequencies. Such energy bursts may be natural or man-made. EMP
interference may be disruptive or damaging to electronic equipment. Protective measures used
to mitigate EMP risk include shielding, surge suppressors, ferro-resonant transformers, and earth
grounding. EMP protection may be especially significant for systems and applications that arepart of the U.S. critical infrastructure.
Related Controls: PE-18, PE-19.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PE-22 COMPONENT MARKING
Control: Mark [Assignment: organization-defined system hardware components] indicating theimpact level or classification level of the information permitted to be processed, stored, ortransmitted by the hardware component.

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Discussion: Hardware components that may require marking include input and output devices.
Input devices include desktop and notebook computers, keyboards, tablets, and smart phones.
Output devices include printers, monitors/video displays, facsimile machines, scanners, copiers,
and audio devices. Permissions controlling output to the output devices are addressed in AC-3 orAC-4. Components are marked to indicate the impact level or classification level of the system towhich the devices are connected, or the impact level or classification level of the information
permitted to be output. Security marking refers to the use of human-readable security attributes.
Security labeling refers to the use of security attributes for internal system data structures.
Security marking is generally not required for hardware components that process, store, ortransmit information determined by organizations to be in the public domain or to be publicly
releasable. However, organizations may require markings for hardware components thatprocess, store, or transmit public information in order to indicate that such information is
publicly releasable. Marking of system hardware components reflects applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16, MP-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [IR 8023].

PE-23 FACILITY LOCATION
Control:a.

Plan the location or site of the facility where the system resides considering physical andenvironmental hazards; andb.

For existing facilities, consider the physical and environmental hazards in the organizationalrisk management strategy.

Discussion: Physical and environmental hazards include floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes,
hurricanes, terrorism, vandalism, an electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and otherforms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. The location of system components within thefacility is addressed in PE-18.
Related Controls: CP-2, PE-18, PE-19, PM-8, PM-9, RA-3.
References: None.

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3.12 PLANNING
Quick link to Planning Summary Table
PL-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] planning policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the planning policy and the associatedplanning controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the planning policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current planning:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Planning policy and procedures for the controls in the PL family implemented within
systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishingsuch policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy
assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on theirdevelopment. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are
preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission level or system-specific policies andprocedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be
represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures canbe established for security and privacy programs, for mission/business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to planning policy and procedures include, but are not limited to,assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does notconstitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-18], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY PLANS
Control:a.

Develop security and privacy plans for the system that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

1.

Are consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;

2.

Explicitly define the constituent system components;

3.

Describe the operational context of the system in terms of mission and businessprocesses;

4.

Identify the individuals that fulfill system roles and responsibilities;

5.

Identify the information types processed, stored, and transmitted by the system;

6.

Provide the security categorization of the system, including supporting rationale;

7.

Describe any specific threats to the system that are of concern to the organization;

8.

Provide the results of a privacy risk assessment for systems processing personallyidentifiable information;

9.

Describe the operational environment for the system and any dependencies on orconnections to other systems or system components;

10. Provide an overview of the security and privacy requirements for the system;
11. Identify any relevant control baselines or overlays, if applicable;
12. Describe the controls in place or planned for meeting the security and privacy
requirements, including a rationale for any tailoring decisions;
13. Include risk determinations for security and privacy architecture and design decisions;
14. Include security- and privacy-related activities affecting the system that require planningand coordination with [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups]; and
15. Are reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative
prior to plan implementation.
b.

Distribute copies of the plans and communicate subsequent changes to the plans to[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];c.

Review the plans [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];d.

Update the plans to address changes to the system and environment of operation or
problems identified during plan implementation or control assessments; ande.

Protect the plans from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Discussion: System security and privacy plans are scoped to the system and system components
within the defined authorization boundary and contain an overview of the security and privacy
requirements for the system and the controls selected to satisfy the requirements. The plansdescribe the intended application of each selected control in the context of the system with asufficient level of detail to correctly implement the control and to subsequently assess theeffectiveness of the control. The control documentation describes how system-specific andhybrid controls are implemented and the plans and expectations regarding the functionality ofthe system. System security and privacy plans can also be used in the design and development ofsystems in support of life cycle-based security and privacy engineering processes. System security
and privacy plans are living documents that are updated and adapted throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle (e.g., during capability determination, analysis of alternatives, requests for
proposal, and design reviews). Section 2.1 describes the different types of requirements that are

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relevant to organizations during the system development life cycle and the relationship between
requirements and controls.
Organizations may develop a single, integrated security and privacy plan or maintain separate
plans. Security and privacy plans relate security and privacy requirements to a set of controls andcontrol enhancements. The plans describe how the controls and control enhancements meet the
security and privacy requirements but do not provide detailed, technical descriptions of thedesign or implementation of the controls and control enhancements. Security and privacy plans
contain sufficient information (including specifications of control parameter values for selection
and assignment operations explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementationthat is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations ofrisk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if
the plan is implemented.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Security and privacy plans need not be single documents. The plans can be a collection of various
documents, including documents that already exist. Effective security and privacy plans makeextensive use of references to policies, procedures, and additional documents, including design
and implementation specifications where more detailed information can be obtained. The use ofreferences helps reduce the documentation associated with security and privacy programs andmaintains the security- and privacy-related information in other established management andoperational areas, including enterprise architecture, system development life cycle, systems
engineering, and acquisition. Security and privacy plans need not contain detailed contingency
plan or incident response plan information but can instead provide—explicitly or by reference—
sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans.
Security- and privacy-related activities that may require coordination and planning with otherindividuals or groups within the organization include assessments, audits, inspections, hardware
and software maintenance, acquisition and supply chain risk management, patch management,
and contingency plan testing. Planning and coordination include emergency and nonemergency(i.e., planned or non-urgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to planand coordinate security- and privacy-related activities can also be included in other documents,
as appropriate.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-20, CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, CM-9, CM-13, CP-2, CP-4,
IR-4, IR-8, MA-4, MA-5, MP-4, MP-5, PL-7, PL-8, PL-10, PL-11, PM-1, PM-7, PM-8, PM-9, PM-10,
PM-11, RA-3, RA-8, RA-9, SA-5, SA-17, SA-22, SI-12, SR-2, SR-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY PLANS | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7.](2) SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY PLANS | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8.](3) SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY PLANS | PLAN AND COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL
ENTITIES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2.]
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-18], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-160-2].

PL-3

SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2.]

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RULES OF BEHAVIOR
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

Establish and provide to individuals requiring access to the system, the rules that describe
their responsibilities and expected behavior for information and system usage, security, andprivacy;b.

Receive a documented acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have
read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to
information and the system;c.

Review and update the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; andd.

Require individuals who have acknowledged a previous version of the rules of behavior toread and re-acknowledge [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]; when the rules are revised or updated].

Discussion: Rules of behavior represent a type of access agreement for organizational users.
Other types of access agreements include nondisclosure agreements, conflict-of-interest
agreements, and acceptable use agreements (see PS-6). Organizations consider rules of behavior
based on individual user roles and responsibilities and differentiate between rules that apply toprivileged users and rules that apply to general users. Establishing rules of behavior for some
types of non-organizational users, including individuals who receive information from federal
systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of theirinteractions with the systems. Rules of behavior for organizational and non-organizational users
can also be established in AC-8. The related controls section provides a list of controls that are
relevant to organizational rules of behavior. PL-4b, the documented acknowledgment portion of
the control, may be satisfied by the literacy training and awareness and role-based training
programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Documented
acknowledgements for rules of behavior include electronic or physical signatures and electronic
agreement check boxes or radio buttons.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-8, AC-9, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AT-2, AT-3, CM-11, IA-2,
IA-4, IA-5, MP-7, PS-6, PS-8, SA-5, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND EXTERNAL SITE/APPLICATION USAGE RESTRICTIONS
Include in the rules of behavior, restrictions on:(a) Use of social media, social networking sites, and external sites/applications;(b) Posting organizational information on public websites; and(c) Use of organization-provided identifiers (e.g., email addresses) and authentication
secrets (e.g., passwords) for creating accounts on external sites/applications.
Discussion: Social media, social networking, and external site/application usage restrictions
address rules of behavior related to the use of social media, social networking, and externalsites when organizational personnel are using such sites for official duties or in the conductof official business, when organizational information is involved in social media and social
networking transactions, and when personnel access social media and networking sites fromorganizational systems. Organizations also address specific rules that prevent unauthorized
entities from obtaining non-public organizational information from social media andnetworking sites either directly or through inference. Non-public information includes
personally identifiable information and system account information.
Related Controls: AC-22, AU-13.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-18].

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PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-8.]

PL-6

SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITY PLANNING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2.]

PL-7

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSControl:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the system describing how the organization
intends to operate the system from the perspective of information security and privacy; andb.

Review and update the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: The CONOPS may be included in the security or privacy plans for the system or inother system development life cycle documents. The CONOPS is a living document that requires
updating throughout the system development life cycle. For example, during system design
reviews, the concept of operations is checked to ensure that it remains consistent with thedesign for controls, the system architecture, and the operational procedures. Changes to the
CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security and privacy plans, security and privacy
architectures, and other organizational documents, such as procurement specifications, systemdevelopment life cycle documents, and systems engineering documents.
Related Controls: PL-2, SA-2, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PL-8

SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURES
Control:a.

Develop security and privacy architectures for the system that:1.

Describe the requirements and approach to be taken for protecting the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of organizational information;2.

Describe the requirements and approach to be taken for processing personallyidentifiable information to minimize privacy risk to individuals;

3.

Describe how the architectures are integrated into and support the enterprisearchitecture; and4.

Describe any assumptions about, and dependencies on, external systems and services;b.

Review and update the architectures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to reflectchanges in the enterprise architecture; andc.

Reflect planned architecture changes in security and privacy plans, Concept of Operations(CONOPS), criticality analysis, organizational procedures, and procurements and acquisitions.

Discussion: The security and privacy architectures at the system level are consistent with theorganization-wide security and privacy architectures described in PM-7, which are integral to anddeveloped as part of the enterprise architecture. The architectures include an architecturaldescription, the allocation of security and privacy functionality (including controls), security- andprivacy-related information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across theinterfaces, and the protection mechanisms associated with each interface. The architectures can

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also include other information, such as user roles and the access privileges assigned to each role;
security and privacy requirements; types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by
the system; supply chain risk management requirements; restoration priorities of informationand system services; and other protection needs.
[SP 800-160-1] provides guidance on the use of security architectures as part of the systemdevelopment life cycle process. [OMB M-19-03] requires the use of the systems security
engineering concepts described in [SP 800-160-1] for high value assets. Security and privacy
architectures are reviewed and updated throughout the system development life cycle, fromanalysis of alternatives through review of the proposed architecture in the RFP responses to thedesign reviews before and during implementation (e.g., during preliminary design reviews andcritical design reviews).
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

In today’s modern computing architectures, it is becoming less common for organizations tocontrol all information resources. There may be key dependencies on external information
services and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the security and privacy
architectures is necessary for developing a comprehensive mission and business protection
strategy. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control abaseline configuration for organizational systems is critical to implementing and maintaining
effective architectures. The development of the architectures is coordinated with the senioragency information security officer and the senior agency official for privacy to ensure that thecontrols needed to support security and privacy requirements are identified and effectively
implemented. In many circumstances, there may be no distinction between the security andprivacy architecture for a system. In other circumstances, security objectives may be adequately
satisfied, but privacy objectives may only be partially satisfied by the security requirements. In
these cases, consideration of the privacy requirements needed to achieve satisfaction will resultin a distinct privacy architecture. The documentation, however, may simply reflect the combinedarchitectures.
PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations to ensure that architectures are developed for thesystem and, moreover, that the architectures are integrated with or tightly coupled to theenterprise architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at the external information
technology product and system developers and integrators. SA-17, which is complementary to
PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of systems or components toexternal entities and when there is a need to demonstrate consistency with the organization’s
enterprise architecture and security and privacy architectures.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6, PL-2, PL-7, PL-9, PM-5, PM-7, RA-9, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA-17, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURES | DEFENSE IN DEPTH
Design the security and privacy architectures for the system using a defense-in-depth
approach that:(a) Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined controls] to [Assignment: organizationdefined locations and architectural layers]; and(b) Ensures that the allocated controls operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing
manner.
Discussion: Organizations strategically allocate security and privacy controls in the security
and privacy architectures so that adversaries must overcome multiple controls to achieve
their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple controls makes it more difficult to
attack information resources by increasing the work factor of the adversary; it also increases
the likelihood of detection. The coordination of allocated controls is essential to ensure thatan attack that involves one control does not create adverse, unintended consequences byinterfering with other controls. Unintended consequences can include system lockout and

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cascading alarms. The placement of controls in systems and organizations is an important
activity that requires thoughtful analysis. The value of organizational assets is an importantconsideration in providing additional layering. Defense-in-depth architectural approaches
include modularity and layering (see SA-8(3)), separation of system and user functionality(see SC-2), and security function isolation (see SC-3).
Related Controls: SC-2, SC-3, SC-29, SC-36.
(2) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURES | SUPPLIER DIVERSITY
Require that [Assignment: organization-defined controls] allocated to [Assignment:
organization-defined locations and architectural layers] are obtained from different
suppliers.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Information technology products have different strengths and weaknesses.
Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings. For example,
vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at different times,
often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms based on their priorities
and development schedules. By deploying different products at different locations, there isan increased likelihood that at least one of the products will detect the malicious code. With
respect to privacy, vendors may offer products that track personally identifiable informationin systems. Products may use different tracking methods. Using multiple products may resultin more assurance that personally identifiable information is inventoried.
Related Controls: SC-29, SR-3.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-160-2].

PL-9

CENTRAL MANAGEMENT
Control: Centrally manage [Assignment: organization-defined controls and related processes].
Discussion: Central management refers to organization-wide management and implementationof selected controls and processes. This includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing,and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed controls and processes. As thecentral management of controls is generally associated with the concept of common (inherited)
controls, such management promotes and facilitates standardization of control implementations
and management and the judicious use of organizational resources. Centrally managed controls
and processes may also meet independence requirements for assessments in support of initialand ongoing authorizations to operate and as part of organizational continuous monitoring.
Automated tools (e.g., security information and event management tools or enterprise security
monitoring and management tools) can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of
information associated with centrally managed controls and processes. Automation can also
provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities; alerting mechanisms; and dashboards
to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.
As part of the control selection processes, organizations determine the controls that may besuitable for central management based on resources and capabilities. It is not always possible tocentrally manage every aspect of a control. In such cases, the control can be treated as a hybrid
control with the control managed and implemented centrally or at the system level. The controls
and control enhancements that are candidates for full or partial central management include but
are not limited to: AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-2(3), AC-2(4), AC-4(all), AC-17(1), AC-17(2), AC-17(3), AC17(9), AC-18(1), AC-18(3), AC-18(4), AC-18(5), AC-19(4), AC-22, AC-23, AT-2(1), AT-2(2), AT-3(1),AT-3(2), AT-3(3), AT-4, AU-3, AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-6(9), AU-7(1), AU-7(2), AU11, AU-13, AU-16, CA-2(1), CA-2(2), CA-2(3), CA-3(1), CA-3(2), CA-3(3), CA-7(1), CA-9, CM-2(2),CM-3(1), CM-3(4), CM-4, CM-6, CM-6(1), CM-7(2), CM-7(4), CM-7(5), CM-8(all), CM-9(1), CM-10,
CM-11, CP-7(all), CP-8(all), SC-43, SI-2, SI-3, SI-4(all), SI-7, SI-8.

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Related Controls: PL-8, PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37].
PL-10

BASELINE SELECTION
Control: Select a control baseline for the system.

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Discussion: Control baselines are predefined sets of controls specifically assembled to address
the protection needs of a group, organization, or community of interest. Controls are chosen forbaselines to either satisfy mandates imposed by laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines or address threats common to all users of the baseline under
the assumptions specific to the baseline. Baselines represent a starting point for the protectionof individuals’ privacy, information, and information systems with subsequent tailoring actions tomanage risk in accordance with mission, business, or other constraints (see PL-11). Federal
control baselines are provided in [SP 800-53B]. The selection of a control baseline is determinedby the needs of stakeholders. Stakeholder needs consider mission and business requirements aswell as mandates imposed by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations,standards, and guidelines. For example, the control baselines in [SP 800-53B] are based on therequirements from [FISMA] and [PRIVACT]. The requirements, along with the NIST standards andguidelines implementing the legislation, direct organizations to select one of the control
baselines after the reviewing the information types and the information that is processed,
stored, and transmitted on the system; analyzing the potential adverse impact of the loss orcompromise of the information or system on the organization’s operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation; and considering the results from system andorganizational risk assessments. [CNSSI 1253] provides guidance on control baselines for national
security systems.
Related Controls: PL-2, PL-11, RA-2, RA-3, SA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [FIPS 200], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53B], [SP 80060-1], [SP 800-60-2], [SP 800-160-1], [CNSSI 1253].

PL-11

BASELINE TAILORING
Control: Tailor the selected control baseline by applying specified tailoring actions.
Discussion: The concept of tailoring allows organizations to specialize or customize a set ofbaseline controls by applying a defined set of tailoring actions. Tailoring actions facilitate suchspecialization and customization by allowing organizations to develop security and privacy plansthat reflect their specific mission and business functions, the environments where their systems
operate, the threats and vulnerabilities that can affect their systems, and any other conditions orsituations that can impact their mission or business success. Tailoring guidance is provided in [SP
800-53B]. Tailoring a control baseline is accomplished by identifying and designating common
controls, applying scoping considerations, selecting compensating controls, assigning values tocontrol parameters, supplementing the control baseline with additional controls as needed, andproviding information for control implementation. The general tailoring actions in [SP 800-53B]
can be supplemented with additional actions based on the needs of organizations. Tailoring
actions can be applied to the baselines in [SP 800-53B] in accordance with the security andprivacy requirements from [FISMA], [PRIVACT], and [OMB A-130]. Alternatively, othercommunities of interest adopting different control baselines can apply the tailoring actions in [SP
800-53B] to specialize or customize the controls that represent the specific needs and concernsof those entities.

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Related Controls: PL-10, RA-2, RA-3, RA-9, SA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [FIPS 200], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53B], [SP 80060-1], [SP 800-60-2], [SP 800-160-1], [CNSSI 1253].

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3.13 PROGRAM MANAGEMENTPROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[FISMA], [PRIVACT], and [OMB A-130] require federal agencies to develop, implement, andprovide oversight for organization-wide information security and privacy programs to help
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information processed, stored,
and transmitted by federal information systems and to protect individual privacy. The program
management (PM) controls described in this section are implemented at the organization leveland not directed at individual information systems. The PM controls have been designed tofacilitate organizational compliance with applicable federal laws, executive orders, directives,
policies, regulations, and standards. The controls are independent of [FIPS 200] impact levels
and, therefore, are not associated with the control baselines described in [SP 800-53B].
Organizations document program management controls in the information security and privacy
program plans. The organization-wide information security program plan (see PM-1) and privacy
program plan (see PM-18) supplement system security and privacy plans (see PL-2) developed
for organizational information systems. Together, the system security and privacy plans for theindividual information systems and the information security and privacy program plans cover
the totality of security and privacy controls employed by the organization.

Quick link to Program Management Summary Table
PM-1

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM PLAN
Control:a.

Develop and disseminate an organization-wide information security program plan that:1.

Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of
the security program management controls and common controls in place or planned
for meeting those requirements;

2.

Includes the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management
commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;

3.

Reflects the coordination among organizational entities responsible for information
security; and4.

Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being
incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, andreputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;b.

Review and update the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events];
andc.

Protect the information security program plan from unauthorized disclosure andmodification.

Discussion: An information security program plan is a formal document that provides an
overview of the security requirements for an organization-wide information security program

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management plans are addressed separately in PM-18 and SR-2, respectively.
An information security program plan documents implementation details about program
management and common controls. The plan provides sufficient information about the controls(including specification of parameters for assignment and selection operations, explicitly or byreference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of theplan and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plan is implemented as intended.
Updates to information security program plans include organizational changes and problems
identified during plan implementation or control assessments.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Program management controls may be implemented at the organization level or the mission orbusiness process level, and are essential for managing the organization’s information security
program. Program management controls are distinct from common, system-specific, and hybrid
controls because program management controls are independent of any particular system.
Together, the individual system security plans and the organization-wide information security
program plan provide complete coverage for the security controls employed within theorganization.
Common controls available for inheritance by organizational systems are documented in an
appendix to the organization’s information security program plan unless the controls areincluded in a separate security plan for a system. The organization-wide information security
program plan indicates which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls.
Events that may precipitate an update to the information security program plan include, but are
not limited to, organization-wide assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, orchanges in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: PL-2, PM-18, PM-30, RA-9, SI-12, SR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FISMA], [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39].

PM-2

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM LEADERSHIP ROLE
Control: Appoint a senior agency information security officer with the mission and resources tocoordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information security
program.
Discussion: The senior agency information security officer is an organizational official. For
federal agencies (as defined by applicable laws, executive orders, regulations, directives, policies,
and standards), this official is the senior agency information security officer. Organizations may
also refer to this official as the senior information security officer or chief information security
officer.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB M-17-25], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-181].

PM-3

INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY RESOURCES
Control:

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Include the resources needed to implement the information security and privacy programsin capital planning and investment requests and document all exceptions to thisrequirement;b.

Prepare documentation required for addressing information security and privacy programsin capital planning and investment requests in accordance with applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards; andc.

Make available for expenditure, the planned information security and privacy resources.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations consider establishing champions for information security and privacy
and, as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources asneeded. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board or similargroup to manage and provide oversight for the information security and privacy aspects of thecapital planning and investment control process.
Related Controls: PM-4, SA-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PM-4

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES PROCESS
Control:a.

b.

Implement a process to ensure that plans of action and milestones for the information
security, privacy, and supply chain risk management programs and associated organizational
systems:
1.

Are developed and maintained;

2.

Document the remedial information security, privacy, and supply chain risk
management actions to adequately respond to risk to organizational operations andassets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and3.

Are reported in accordance with established reporting requirements.

Review plans of action and milestones for consistency with the organizational risk
management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Discussion: The plan of action and milestones is a key organizational document and is subject toreporting requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget. Organizations
develop plans of action and milestones with an organization-wide perspective, prioritizing risk
response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organization. Planof action and milestones updates are based on findings from control assessments and continuous
monitoring activities. There can be multiple plans of action and milestones corresponding to theinformation system level, mission/business process level, and organizational/governance level.
While plans of action and milestones are required for federal organizations, other types oforganizations can help reduce risk by documenting and tracking planned remediations. Specificguidance on plans of action and milestones at the system level is provided in CA-5.
Related Controls: CA-5, CA-7, PM-3, RA-7, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37].

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SYSTEM INVENTORY
Control: Develop and update [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] an inventory oforganizational systems.
Discussion: [OMB A-130] provides guidance on developing systems inventories and associatedreporting requirements. System inventory refers to an organization-wide inventory of systems,
not system components as described in CM-8.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM INVENTORY | INVENTORY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Establish, maintain, and update [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] aninventory of all systems, applications, and projects that process personally identifiable
information.
Discussion: An inventory of systems, applications, and projects that process personallyidentifiable information supports the mapping of data actions, providing individuals withprivacy notices, maintaining accurate personally identifiable information, and limiting theprocessing of personally identifiable information when such information is not needed for
operational purposes. Organizations may use this inventory to ensure that systems only
process the personally identifiable information for authorized purposes and that thisprocessing is still relevant and necessary for the purpose specified therein.
Related Controls: AC-3, CM-8, CM-12, CM-13, PL-8, PM-22, PT-3, PT-5, SI-12, SI-18.
References: [OMB A-130], [IR 8062].

PM-6

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Control: Develop, monitor, and report on the results of information security and privacy
measures of performance.
Discussion: Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by an organization tomeasure the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security and privacy programs and thecontrols employed in support of the program. To facilitate security and privacy risk management,
organizations consider aligning measures of performance with the organizational risk tolerance
as defined in the risk management strategy.
Related Controls: CA-7, PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-55], [SP 800-137].

PM-7

ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
Control: Develop and maintain an enterprise architecture with consideration for information
security, privacy, and the resulting risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation.
Discussion: The integration of security and privacy requirements and controls into the enterprisearchitecture helps to ensure that security and privacy considerations are addressed throughout
the system development life cycle and are explicitly related to the organization’s mission andbusiness processes. The process of security and privacy requirements integration also embeds
into the enterprise architecture and the organization’s security and privacy architecturesconsistent with the organizational risk management strategy. For PM-7, security and privacy
architectures are developed at a system-of-systems level, representing all organizational

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systems. For PL-8, the security and privacy architectures are developed at a level that represents
an individual system. The system-level architectures are consistent with the security and privacy
architectures defined for the organization. Security and privacy requirements and control
integration are most effectively accomplished through the rigorous application of the Risk
Management Framework [SP 800-37] and supporting security standards and guidelines.
Related Controls: AU-6, PL-2, PL-8, PM-11, RA-2, SA-3, SA-8, SA-17.
Control Enhancements:(1) ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE | OFFLOADING
Offload [Assignment: organization-defined non-essential functions or services] to othersystems, system components, or an external provider.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Not every function or service that a system provides is essential toorganizational mission or business functions. Printing or copying is an example of a nonessential but supporting service for an organization. Whenever feasible, such supportive but
non-essential functions or services are not co-located with the functions or services that
support essential mission or business functions. Maintaining such functions on the same
system or system component increases the attack surface of the organization’s missionessential functions or services. Moving supportive but non-essential functions to a noncritical system, system component, or external provider can also increase efficiency byputting those functions or services under the control of individuals or providers who aresubject matter experts in the functions or services.
Related Controls: SA-8.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-160-2].

PM-8

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN
Control: Address information security and privacy issues in the development, documentation,and updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan.
Discussion: Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and resources.
The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and for
preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-4, PE-18, PL-2, PM-9, PM-11, PM-18, RA-3, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EO 13636], [OMB A-130], [HSPD 7], [DHS NIPP].

PM-9

RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Control:a.

Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage:
1.

Security risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations,and the Nation associated with the operation and use of organizational systems; and2.

Privacy risk to individuals resulting from the authorized processing of personallyidentifiable information;b.

Implement the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; andc.

Review and update the risk management strategy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] or as required, to address organizational changes.

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Discussion: An organization-wide risk management strategy includes an expression of the
security and privacy risk tolerance for the organization, security and privacy risk mitigation
strategies, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, a process for evaluating security andprivacy risk across the organization with respect to the organization’s risk tolerance, andapproaches for monitoring risk over time. The senior accountable official for risk management(agency head or designated official) aligns information security management processes withstrategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes. The risk executive function, led by thesenior accountable official for risk management, can facilitate consistent application of the risk
management strategy organization-wide. The risk management strategy can be informed by
security and privacy risk-related inputs from other sources, both internal and external to theorganization, to ensure that the strategy is broad-based and comprehensive. The supply chain
risk management strategy described in PM-30 can also provide useful inputs to the organizationwide risk management strategy.
Related Controls: AC-1, AU-1, AT-1, CA-1, CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CM-1, CP-1, IA-1, IR-1, MA-1,
MP-1, PE-1, PL-1, PL-2, PM-2, PM-8, PM-18, PM-28, PM-30, PS-1, PT-1, PT-2, PT-3, RA-1, RA-3,
RA-9, SA-1, SA-4, SC-1, SC-38, SI-1, SI-12, SR-1, SR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-161], [IR 8023].

PM-10 AUTHORIZATION PROCESS
Control:a.

Manage the security and privacy state of organizational systems and the environments inwhich those systems operate through authorization processes;b.

Designate individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizational risk
management process; andc.

Integrate the authorization processes into an organization-wide risk management program.

Discussion: Authorization processes for organizational systems and environments of operation
require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process and associatedsecurity and privacy standards and guidelines. Specific roles for risk management processes
include a risk executive (function) and designated authorizing officials for each organizational
system and common control provider. The authorization processes for the organization are
integrated with continuous monitoring processes to facilitate ongoing understanding andacceptance of security and privacy risks to organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Related Controls: CA-6, CA-7, PL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-181].

PM-11 MISSION AND BUSINESS PROCESS DEFINITION
Control:a.

Define organizational mission and business processes with consideration for information
security and privacy and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; andb.

Determine information protection and personally identifiable information processing needs
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c.

Review and revise the mission and business processes [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Protection needs are technology-independent capabilities that are required tocounter threats to organizations, individuals, systems, and the Nation through the compromiseof information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, or privacy). Information
protection and personally identifiable information processing needs are derived from the mission
and business needs defined by organizational stakeholders, the mission and business processes
designed to meet those needs, and the organizational risk management strategy. Information
protection and personally identifiable information processing needs determine the required
controls for the organization and the systems. Inherent to defining protection and personallyidentifiable information processing needs is an understanding of the adverse impact that could
result if a compromise or breach of information occurs. The categorization process is used tomake such potential impact determinations. Privacy risks to individuals can arise from thecompromise of personally identifiable information, but they can also arise as unintended
consequences or a byproduct of the processing of personally identifiable information at any
stage of the information life cycle. Privacy risk assessments are used to prioritize the risks thatare created for individuals from system processing of personally identifiable information. Theserisk assessments enable the selection of the required privacy controls for the organization andsystems. Mission and business process definitions and the associated protection requirements
are documented in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.
Related Controls: CP-2, PL-2, PM-7, PM-8, RA-2, RA-3, RA-9, SA-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199],[SP 800-39], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 800-60-2], [SP 800-160-1].

PM-12 INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM
Control: Implement an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline insider threat
incident handling team.
Discussion: Organizations that handle classified information are required, under Executive Order
13587 [EO 13587] and the National Insider Threat Policy [ODNI NITP], to establish insider threat
programs. The same standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified
environments can also be employed effectively to improve the security of controlled unclassified
and other information in non-national security systems. Insider threat programs include controls
to detect and prevent malicious insider activity through the centralized integration and analysisof both technical and nontechnical information to identify potential insider threat concerns. A
senior official is designated by the department or agency head as the responsible individual to
implement and provide oversight for the program. In addition to the centralized integration andanalysis capability, insider threat programs require organizations to prepare department or
agency insider threat policies and implementation plans, conduct host-based user monitoring ofindividual employee activities on government-owned classified computers, provide insider threatawareness training to employees, receive access to information from offices in the department
or agency for insider threat analysis, and conduct self-assessments of department or agency
insider threat posture.
Insider threat programs can leverage the existence of incident handling teams that organizations
may already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. Human resources
records are especially important in this effort, as there is compelling evidence to show that some
types of insider crimes are often preceded by nontechnical behaviors in the workplace, including
ongoing patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues.
These precursors can guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted monitoring efforts.
However, the use of human resource records could raise significant concerns for privacy. The

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participation of a legal team, including consultation with the senior agency official for privacy,
ensures that monitoring activities are performed in accordance with applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AC-6, AT-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-10, AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, IA-4, IR-4, MP-7, PE-2, PM16, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-7, PS-8, SC-7, SC-38, SI-4, PM-14.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EO 13587], [NITP12], [ODNI NITP].

PM-13 SECURITY AND PRIVACY WORKFORCE
Control: Establish a security and privacy workforce development and improvement program.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Security and privacy workforce development and improvement programs include
defining the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform security and privacy duties andtasks; developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned security and privacy roles
and responsibilities; and providing standards and guidelines for measuring and building individual
qualifications for incumbents and applicants for security- and privacy-related positions. Such
workforce development and improvement programs can also include security and privacy career
paths to encourage security and privacy professionals to advance in the field and fill positions
with greater responsibility. The programs encourage organizations to fill security- and privacyrelated positions with qualified personnel. Security and privacy workforce development andimprovement programs are complementary to organizational security awareness and training
programs and focus on developing and institutionalizing the core security and privacy capabilitiesof personnel needed to protect organizational operations, assets, and individuals.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-181].

PM-14 TESTING, TRAINING, AND MONITORING
Control:a.

b.

Implement a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security andprivacy testing, training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational systems:
1.

Are developed and maintained; and2.

Continue to be executed; andReview testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the organizational risk
management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Discussion: A process for organization-wide security and privacy testing, training, and monitoringhelps ensure that organizations provide oversight for testing, training, and monitoring activities
and that those activities are coordinated. With the growing importance of continuous monitoring
programs, the implementation of information security and privacy across the three levels of therisk management hierarchy and the widespread use of common controls, organizations
coordinate and consolidate the testing and monitoring activities that are routinely conducted aspart of ongoing assessments supporting a variety of controls. Security and privacy training
activities, while focused on individual systems and specific roles, require coordination across allorganizational elements. Testing, training, and monitoring plans and activities are informed bycurrent threat and vulnerability assessments.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3, PM-12, SI-4.

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Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-115], [SP 800-137].

PM-15 SECURITY AND PRIVACY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONSControl: Establish and institutionalize contact with selected groups and associations within the
security and privacy communities:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

To facilitate ongoing security and privacy education and training for organizational
personnel;b.

To maintain currency with recommended security and privacy practices, techniques, andtechnologies; andc.

To share current security and privacy information, including threats, vulnerabilities, andincidents.

Discussion: Ongoing contact with security and privacy groups and associations is important in anenvironment of rapidly changing technologies and threats. Groups and associations include
special interest groups, professional associations, forums, news groups, users’ groups, and peergroups of security and privacy professionals in similar organizations. Organizations select security
and privacy groups and associations based on mission and business functions. Organizations
share threat, vulnerability, and incident information as well as contextual insights, compliancetechniques, and privacy problems consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives,
policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: SA-11, SI-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PM-16 THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM
Control: Implement a threat awareness program that includes a cross-organization informationsharing capability for threat intelligence.
Discussion: Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries,
especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it may be more likely that adversaries can
successfully breach or compromise organizational systems. One of the best techniques toaddress this concern is for organizations to share threat information, including threat events (i.e.,tactics, techniques, and procedures) that organizations have experienced, mitigations thatorganizations have found are effective against certain types of threats, and threat intelligence(i.e., indications and warnings about threats). Threat information sharing may be bilateral or
multilateral. Bilateral threat sharing includes government-to-commercial and government-togovernment cooperatives. Multilateral threat sharing includes organizations taking part in threatsharing consortia. Threat information may require special agreements and protection, or it may
be freely shared.
Related Controls: IR-4, PM-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM | AUTOMATED MEANS FOR SHARING THREAT INTELLIGENCE
Employ automated mechanisms to maximize the effectiveness of sharing threat
intelligence information.
Discussion: To maximize the effectiveness of monitoring, it is important to know whatthreat observables and indicators the sensors need to be searching for. By using well-

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established frameworks, services, and automated tools, organizations improve their ability
to rapidly share and feed the relevant threat detection signatures into monitoring tools.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PM-17 PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON EXTERNAL SYSTEMS
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

Establish policy and procedures to ensure that requirements for the protection of controlled
unclassified information that is processed, stored or transmitted on external systems, areimplemented in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies,
regulations, and standards; andb.

Review and update the policy and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: Controlled unclassified information is defined by the National Archives and Records
Administration along with the safeguarding and dissemination requirements for such informationand is codified in [32 CFR 2002] and, specifically for systems external to the federal organization,
32 CFR 2002.14h. The policy prescribes the specific use and conditions to be implemented inaccordance with organizational procedures, including via its contracting processes.
Related Controls: CA-6, PM-10.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [32 CFR 2002], [SP 800-171], [SP 800-172], [NARA CUI].

PM-18 PRIVACY PROGRAM PLAN
Control:a.

b.

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Develop and disseminate an organization-wide privacy program plan that provides an
overview of the agency’s privacy program, and:1.

Includes a description of the structure of the privacy program and the resources
dedicated to the privacy program;2.

Provides an overview of the requirements for the privacy program and a description of
the privacy program management controls and common controls in place or planned formeeting those requirements;

3.

Includes the role of the senior agency official for privacy and the identification andassignment of roles of other privacy officials and staff and their responsibilities;

4.

Describes management commitment, compliance, and the strategic goals and objectivesof the privacy program;

5.

Reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects
of privacy; and6.

Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the privacy risk
being incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, andreputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; andUpdate the plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and to address changes infederal privacy laws and policy and organizational changes and problems identified during
plan implementation or privacy control assessments.

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Discussion: A privacy program plan is a formal document that provides an overview of anorganization’s privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program,the resources dedicated to the privacy program, the role of the senior agency official for privacy
and other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program,and the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting
applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks. Privacy program plans can be
represented in single documents or compilations of documents.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for designating which privacy controls theorganization will treat as program management, common, system-specific, and hybrid controls.
Privacy program plans provide sufficient information about the privacy program management
and common controls (including the specification of parameters and assignment and selection
operations explicitly or by reference) to enable control implementations that are unambiguously
compliant with the intent of the plans and a determination of the risk incurred if the plans are
implemented as intended.
Program management controls are generally implemented at the organization level and areessential for managing the organization’s privacy program. Program management controls are
distinct from common, system-specific, and hybrid controls because program management
controls are independent of any particular information system. Together, the privacy plans forindividual systems and the organization-wide privacy program plan provide complete coveragefor the privacy controls employed within the organization.
Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization’s privacy program planunless the controls are included in a separate privacy plan for a system. The organization-wideprivacy program plan indicates which separate privacy plans contain descriptions of privacy
controls.
Related Controls: PM-8, PM-9, PM-19.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130].

PM-19 PRIVACY PROGRAM LEADERSHIP ROLE
Control: Appoint a senior agency official for privacy with the authority, mission, accountability,
and resources to coordinate, develop, and implement, applicable privacy requirements andmanage privacy risks through the organization-wide privacy program.
Discussion: The privacy officer is an organizational official. For federal agencies—as defined byapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines—thisofficial is designated as the senior agency official for privacy. Organizations may also refer to thisofficial as the chief privacy officer. The senior agency official for privacy also has roles on the data
management board (see PM-23) and the data integrity board (see PM-24).
Related Controls: PM-18, PM-20, PM-23, PM-24, PM-27.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PM-20 DISSEMINATION OF PRIVACY PROGRAM INFORMATION
Control: Maintain a central resource webpage on the organization’s principal public website thatserves as a central source of information about the organization’s privacy program and that:a.

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Ensures that the public has access to information about organizational privacy activities andcan communicate with its senior agency official for privacy;

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Ensures that organizational privacy practices and reports are publicly available; andc.

Employs publicly facing email addresses and/or phone lines to enable the public to provide
feedback and/or direct questions to privacy offices regarding privacy practices.

Discussion: For federal agencies, the webpage is located at www.[agency].gov/privacy. Federal
agencies include public privacy impact assessments, system of records notices, computer
matching notices and agreements, [PRIVACT] exemption and implementation rules, privacy
reports, privacy policies, instructions for individuals making an access or amendment request,
email addresses for questions/complaints, blogs, and periodic publications.
Related Controls: AC-3, PM-19, PT-5, PT-6, PT-7, RA-8.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) DISSEMINATION OF PRIVACY PROGRAM INFORMATION | PRIVACY POLICIES ON WEBSITES,APPLICATIONS, AND DIGITAL SERVICES

Develop and post privacy policies on all external-facing websites, mobile applications, andother digital services, that:(a) Are written in plain language and organized in a way that is easy to understand andnavigate;(b) Provide information needed by the public to make an informed decision about
whether and how to interact with the organization; and(c) Are updated whenever the organization makes a substantive change to the practices it
describes and includes a time/date stamp to inform the public of the date of the mostrecent changes.
Discussion: Organizations post privacy policies on all external-facing websites, mobile
applications, and other digital services. Organizations post a link to the relevant privacy
policy on any known, major entry points to the website, application, or digital service. In
addition, organizations provide a link to the privacy policy on any webpage that collects
personally identifiable information. Organizations may be subject to applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that require the provision of specificinformation to the public. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official
for privacy and legal counsel regarding such requirements.
Related Controls: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [OMB M-17-06].

PM-21 ACCOUNTING OF DISCLOSURES
Control:a.

Develop and maintain an accurate accounting of disclosures of personally identifiable
information, including:1.

Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure; and2.

Name and address, or other contact information of the individual or organization towhich the disclosure was made;b.

Retain the accounting of disclosures for the length of the time the personally identifiable
information is maintained or five years after the disclosure is made, whichever is longer; andc.

Make the accounting of disclosures available to the individual to whom the personallyidentifiable information relates upon request.

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Discussion: The purpose of accounting of disclosures is to allow individuals to learn to whom
their personally identifiable information has been disclosed, to provide a basis for subsequently
advising recipients of any corrected or disputed personally identifiable information, and toprovide an audit trail for subsequent reviews of organizational compliance with conditions fordisclosures. For federal agencies, keeping an accounting of disclosures is required by the[PRIVACT]; agencies should consult with their senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel
on this requirement and be aware of the statutory exceptions and OMB guidance relating to theprovision.

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Organizations can use any system for keeping notations of disclosures, if it can construct fromsuch a system, a document listing of all disclosures along with the required information.
Automated mechanisms can be used by organizations to determine when personally identifiable
information is disclosed, including commercial services that provide notifications and alerts.
Accounting of disclosures may also be used to help organizations verify compliance withapplicable privacy statutes and policies governing the disclosure or dissemination of informationand dissemination restrictions.
Related Controls: AC-3, AU-2, PT-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130].

PM-22 PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Control: Develop and document organization-wide policies and procedures for:a.

Reviewing for the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of personallyidentifiable information across the information life cycle;b.

Correcting or deleting inaccurate or outdated personally identifiable information;c.

Disseminating notice of corrected or deleted personally identifiable information toindividuals or other appropriate entities; andd.

Appeals of adverse decisions on correction or deletion requests.

Discussion: Personally identifiable information quality management includes steps thatorganizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information
throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection,use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition of personallyidentifiable information. Organizational policies and procedures for personally identifiable
information quality management are important because inaccurate or outdated personallyidentifiable information maintained by organizations may cause problems for individuals.
Organizations consider the quality of personally identifiable information involved in business
functions where inaccurate information may result in adverse decisions or the denial of benefits
and services, or the disclosure of the information may cause stigmatization. Correct information,in certain circumstances, can cause problems for individuals that outweigh the benefits oforganizations maintaining the information. Organizations consider creating policies andprocedures for the removal of such information.
The senior agency official for privacy ensures that practical means and mechanisms exist and areaccessible for individuals or their authorized representatives to seek the correction or deletion of
personally identifiable information. Processes for correcting or deleting data are clearly definedand publicly available. Organizations use discretion in determining whether data is to be deleted
or corrected based on the scope of requests, the changes sought, and the impact of the changes.
Additionally, processes include the provision of responses to individuals of decisions to denyrequests for correction or deletion. The responses include the reasons for the decisions, a means

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to record individual objections to the decisions, and a means of requesting reviews of the initialdeterminations.
Organizations notify individuals or their designated representatives when their personallyidentifiable information is corrected or deleted to provide transparency and confirm thecompleted action. Due to the complexity of data flows and storage, other entities may need to
be informed of the correction or deletion. Notice supports the consistent correction and deletionof personally identifiable information across the data ecosystem.
Related Controls: PM-23, SI-18.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [OMB M-19-15], [SP 800-188].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

PM-23 DATA GOVERNANCE BODY
Control: Establish a Data Governance Body consisting of [Assignment: organization-definedroles] with [Assignment: organization-defined responsibilities].
Discussion: A Data Governance Body can help ensure that the organization has coherent policies
and the ability to balance the utility of data with security and privacy requirements. The Data
Governance Body establishes policies, procedures, and standards that facilitate data governanceso that data, including personally identifiable information, is effectively managed and maintainedin accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards,
and guidance. Responsibilities can include developing and implementing guidelines that support
data modeling, quality, integrity, and the de-identification needs of personally identifiable
information across the information life cycle as well as reviewing and approving applications torelease data outside of the organization, archiving the applications and the released data, andperforming post-release monitoring to ensure that the assumptions made as part of the data
release continue to be valid. Members include the chief information officer, senior agency
information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy. Federal agencies are required
to establish a Data Governance Body with specific roles and responsibilities in accordance withthe [EVIDACT] and policies set forth under [OMB M-19-23].
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, PM-19, PM-22, PM-24, PT-7, SI-4, SI-19.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EVIDACT], [OMB A-130], [OMB M-19-23], [SP 800-188].

PM-24 DATA INTEGRITY BOARD
Control: Establish a Data Integrity Board to:a.

Review proposals to conduct or participate in a matching program; andb.

Conduct an annual review of all matching programs in which the agency has participated.

Discussion: A Data Integrity Board is the board of senior officials designated by the head of afederal agency and is responsible for, among other things, reviewing the agency’s proposals to
conduct or participate in a matching program and conducting an annual review of all matching
programs in which the agency has participated. As a general matter, a matching program is acomputerized comparison of records from two or more automated [PRIVACT] systems of records
or an automated system of records and automated records maintained by a non-federal agency(or agent thereof). A matching program either pertains to Federal benefit programs or Federal
personnel or payroll records. At a minimum, the Data Integrity Board includes the Inspector
General of the agency, if any, and the senior agency official for privacy.
Related Controls: AC-4, PM-19, PM-23, PT-2, PT-8.

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Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [OMB A-108].

PM-25 MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION USED IN TESTING,
TRAINING, AND RESEARCH
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Develop, document, and implement policies and procedures that address the use of
personally identifiable information for internal testing, training, and research;b.

Limit or minimize the amount of personally identifiable information used for internal testing,training, and research purposes;c.

Authorize the use of personally identifiable information when such information is requiredfor internal testing, training, and research; andd.

Review and update policies and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: The use of personally identifiable information in testing, research, and training
increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of such information. Organizations
consult with the senior agency official for privacy and/or legal counsel to ensure that the use of
personally identifiable information in testing, training, and research is compatible with theoriginal purpose for which it was collected. When possible, organizations use placeholder data to
avoid exposure of personally identifiable information when conducting testing, training, andresearch.
Related Controls: PM-23, PT-3, SA-3, SA-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PM-26 COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT
Control: Implement a process for receiving and responding to complaints, concerns, or questions
from individuals about the organizational security and privacy practices that includes:a.

Mechanisms that are easy to use and readily accessible by the public;b.

All information necessary for successfully filing complaints;c.

Tracking mechanisms to ensure all complaints received are reviewed and addressed within[Assignment: organization-defined time period];d.

Acknowledgement of receipt of complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; ande.

Response to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].

Discussion: Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as valuable sourcesof input to organizations and ultimately improve operational models, uses of technology, datacollection practices, and controls. Mechanisms that can be used by the public include telephone
hotline, email, or web-based forms. The information necessary for successfully filing complaints
includes contact information for the senior agency official for privacy or other official designatedto receive complaints. Privacy complaints may also include personally identifiable information
which is handled in accordance with relevant policies and processes.
Related Controls: IR-7, IR-9, PM-22, SI-18.

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Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PM-27 PRIVACY REPORTING
Control:a.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5b.

Develop [Assignment: organization-defined privacy reports] and disseminate to:1.

[Assignment: organization-defined oversight bodies] to demonstrate accountability withstatutory, regulatory, and policy privacy mandates; and2.

[Assignment: organization-defined officials] and other personnel with responsibility formonitoring privacy program compliance; andReview and update privacy reports [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: Through internal and external reporting, organizations promote accountability andtransparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting can also help organizations todetermine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy controls, compare
performance across the federal government, discover vulnerabilities, identify gaps in policy andimplementation, and identify models for success. For federal agencies, privacy reports include
annual senior agency official for privacy reports to OMB, reports to Congress required by
Implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and other public reports required by law,regulation, or policy, including internal policies of organizations. The senior agency official for
privacy consults with legal counsel, where appropriate, to ensure that organizations meet all
applicable privacy reporting requirements.
Related Controls: IR-9, PM-19.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FISMA], [OMB A-130], [OMB A-108].

PM-28 RISK FRAMING
Control:a.

Identify and document:
1.

Assumptions affecting risk assessments, risk responses, and risk monitoring;2.

Constraints affecting risk assessments, risk responses, and risk monitoring;3.

Priorities and trade-offs considered by the organization for managing risk; and4.

Organizational risk tolerance;b.

Distribute the results of risk framing activities to [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel]; andc.

Review and update risk framing considerations [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Discussion: Risk framing is most effective when conducted at the organization level and in
consultation with stakeholders throughout the organization including mission, business, andsystem owners. The assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance, priorities, and trade-offs identified
as part of the risk framing process inform the risk management strategy, which in turn informs
the conduct of risk assessment, risk response, and risk monitoring activities. Risk framing results
are shared with organizational personnel, including mission and business owners, information

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owners or stewards, system owners, authorizing officials, senior agency information security
officer, senior agency official for privacy, and senior accountable official for risk management.
Related Controls: CA-7, PM-9, RA-3, RA-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-39].

PM-29 RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM LEADERSHIP ROLES
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

Appoint a Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management to align organizational
information security and privacy management processes with strategic, operational, andbudgetary planning processes; andb.

Establish a Risk Executive (function) to view and analyze risk from an organization-wide
perspective and ensure management of risk is consistent across the organization.

Discussion: The senior accountable official for risk management leads the risk executive(function) in organization-wide risk management activities.
Related Controls: PM-2, PM-19.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-37], [SP 800-181].

PM-30 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Control:a.

Develop an organization-wide strategy for managing supply chain risks associated with thedevelopment, acquisition, maintenance, and disposal of systems, system components, andsystem services;b.

Implement the supply chain risk management strategy consistently across the organization;andc.

Review and update the supply chain risk management strategy on [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] or as required, to address organizational changes.

Discussion: An organization-wide supply chain risk management strategy includes anunambiguous expression of the supply chain risk appetite and tolerance for the organization,
acceptable supply chain risk mitigation strategies or controls, a process for consistently
evaluating and monitoring supply chain risk, approaches for implementing and communicating
the supply chain risk management strategy, and the associated roles and responsibilities. Supply
chain risk management includes considerations of the security and privacy risks associated withthe development, acquisition, maintenance, and disposal of systems, system components, andsystem services. The supply chain risk management strategy can be incorporated into theorganization’s overarching risk management strategy and can guide and inform supply chain
policies and system-level supply chain risk management plans. In addition, the use of a risk
executive function can facilitate a consistent, organization-wide application of the supply chain
risk management strategy. The supply chain risk management strategy is implemented at theorganization and mission/business levels, whereas the supply chain risk management plan (seeSR-2) is implemented at the system level.
Related Controls: CM-10, PM-9, SR-1, SR-2, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-6, SR-7, SR-8, SR-9, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:

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Identify, prioritize, and assess suppliers of critical or mission-essential technologies,
products, and services.
Discussion: The identification and prioritization of suppliers of critical or mission-essential
technologies, products, and services is paramount to the mission/business success oforganizations. The assessment of suppliers is conducted using supplier reviews (see SR-6)
and supply chain risk assessment processes (see RA-3(1)). An analysis of supply chain risk
can help an organization identify systems or components for which additional supply chain
risk mitigations are required.
Related Controls: RA-3, SR-6.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [PRIVACT], [FASC18], [EO 13873], [41 CFR 201], [OMB A-130], [OMB M-17-06][CNSSD 505], [ISO 27036], [ISO 20243], [SP 800-161], [IR 8272].

PM-31 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY
Control: Develop an organization-wide continuous monitoring strategy and implement
continuous monitoring programs that include:a.

Establishing the following organization-wide metrics to be monitored: [Assignment:
organization-defined metrics];b.

Establishing [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and[Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessment of control effectiveness;c.

Ongoing monitoring of organizationally-defined metrics in accordance with the continuous
monitoring strategy;d.

Correlation and analysis of information generated by control assessments and monitoring;e.

Response actions to address results of the analysis of control assessment and monitoring
information; andf.

Reporting the security and privacy status of organizational systems to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: Continuous monitoring at the organization level facilitates ongoing awareness of the
security and privacy posture across the organization to support organizational risk management
decisions. The terms “continuous” and “ongoing” imply that organizations assess and monitor
their controls and risks at a frequency sufficient to support risk-based decisions. Different typesof controls may require different monitoring frequencies. The results of continuous monitoring
guide and inform risk response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs allow
organizations to maintain the authorizations of systems and common controls in highly dynamic
environments of operation with changing mission and business needs, threats, vulnerabilities,
and technologies. Having access to security- and privacy-related information on a continuingbasis through reports and dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to makeeffective, timely, and informed risk management decisions, including ongoing authorization
decisions. To further facilitate security and privacy risk management, organizations consider
aligning organization-defined monitoring metrics with organizational risk tolerance as defined in
the risk management strategy. Monitoring requirements, including the need for monitoring, may
be referenced in other controls and control enhancements such as, AC-2g, AC-2(7), AC-2(12)(a),AC-2(7)(b), AC-2(7)(c), AC-17(1), AT-4a, AU-13, AU-13(1), AU-13(2), CA-7, CM-3f, CM-6d, CM-11c,
IR-5, MA-2b, MA-3a, MA-4a, PE-3d, PE-6, PE-14b, PE-16, PE-20, PM-6, PM-23, PS-7e, SA-9c, SC5(3)(b), SC-7a, SC-7(24)(b), SC-18b, SC-43b, SI-4.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-17, AT-4, AU-6, AU-13, CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CM-3, CM-4,
CM-6, CM-11, IA-5, IR-5, MA-2, MA-3, MA-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, PE-20, PL-2, PM-4, PM-6,

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PM-9, PM-10, PM-12, PM-14, PM-23, PM-28, PS-7, PT-7, RA-3, RA-5, RA-7, SA-9, SA-11, SC-5, SC7, SC-18, SC-38, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4, SI-12, SR-2, SR-4.
References: [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-137], [SP 800-137A].

PM-32 PURPOSING
Control: Analyze [Assignment: organization-defined systems or systems components] supporting
mission essential services or functions to ensure that the information resources are being usedconsistent with their intended purpose.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Systems are designed to support a specific mission or business function. However,
over time, systems and system components may be used to support services and functions thatare outside of the scope of the intended mission or business functions. This can result in
exposing information resources to unintended environments and uses that can significantly
increase threat exposure. In doing so, the systems are more vulnerable to compromise, which
can ultimately impact the services and functions for which they were intended. This is especially
impactful for mission-essential services and functions. By analyzing resource use, organizations
can identify such potential exposures.
Related Controls: CA-7, PL-2, RA-3, RA-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-160-2].

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3.14 PERSONNEL SECURITY
Quick link to Personnel Security Summary Table
PS-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] personnel security policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and theassociated personnel security controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the personnel security policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current personnel security:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Personnel security policy and procedures for the controls in the PS family that are
implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an importantfactor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security
and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborateon their development. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission level or system-specificpolicies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy
policy or be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of organizations.
Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission/business processes,
and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented
and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures canbe documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents.
Events that may precipitate an update to personnel security policy and procedures include, but
are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes inapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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POSITION RISK DESIGNATION
Control:a.

Assign a risk designation to all organizational positions;b.

Establish screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; andc.

Review and update position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management (OPM) policy andguidance. Proper position designation is the foundation of an effective and consistent suitability
and personnel security program. The Position Designation System (PDS) assesses the duties andresponsibilities of a position to determine the degree of potential damage to the efficiency or
integrity of the service due to misconduct of an incumbent of a position and establishes the risk
level of that position. The PDS assessment also determines if the duties and responsibilities ofthe position present the potential for position incumbents to bring about a material adverse
effect on national security and the degree of that potential effect, which establishes thesensitivity level of a position. The results of the assessment determine what level of investigationis conducted for a position. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations
that individuals receive when accessing organizational information and information systems.
Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements.
Parts 1400 and 731 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, establish the requirements fororganizations to evaluate relevant covered positions for a position sensitivity and position risk
designation commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of those positions.
Related Controls: AC-5, AT-3, PE-2, PE-3, PL-2, PS-3, PS-6, SA-5, SA-21, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [5 CFR 731], [SP 800-181].

PS-3

PERSONNEL SCREENING
Control:a.

Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the system; andb.

Rescreen individuals in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined conditions
requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of rescreening].

Discussion: Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and specific criteria established forthe risk designations of assigned positions. Examples of personnel screening include backgroundinvestigations and agency checks. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions andfrequencies for personnel accessing systems based on types of information processed, stored, ortransmitted by the systems.
Related Controls: AC-2, IA-4, MA-5, PE-2, PM-12, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, SA-21.
Control Enhancements:(1) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Verify that individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified
information are cleared and indoctrinated to the highest classification level of theinformation to which they have access on the system.
Discussion: Classified information is the most sensitive information that the Federal
Government processes, stores, or transmits. It is imperative that individuals have therequisite security clearances and system access authorizations prior to gaining access to such

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information. Access authorizations are enforced by system access controls (see AC-3) andflow controls (see AC-4).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4.
(2) PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION
Verify that individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting types ofclassified information that require formal indoctrination, are formally indoctrinated for all
the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.
Discussion: Types of classified information that require formal indoctrination include Special
Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Verify that individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting information
requiring special protection:(a) Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official
government duties; and(b) Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].
Discussion: Organizational information that requires special protection includes controlled
unclassified information. Personnel security criteria include position sensitivity backgroundscreening requirements.
Related Controls: None.
(4) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Verify that individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting [Assignment:
organization-defined information types] meet [Assignment: organization-defined
citizenship requirements].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
References: [EO 13526], [EO 13587], [FIPS 199], [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 800-60-2], [SP
800-73-4], [SP 800-76-2], [SP 800-78-4].

PS-4

PERSONNEL TERMINATION
Control: Upon termination of individual employment:a.

Disable system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];b.

Terminate or revoke any authenticators and credentials associated with the individual;c.

Conduct exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined
information security topics];d.

Retrieve all security-related organizational system-related property; ande.

Retain access to organizational information and systems formerly controlled by terminatedindividual.

Discussion: System property includes hardware authentication tokens, system administration
technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure thatterminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees
and that proper accountability is achieved for system-related property. Security topics at exit
interviews include reminding individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations
on future employment. Exit interviews may not always be possible for some individuals, including

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in cases related to the unavailability of supervisors, illnesses, or job abandonment. Exit
interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. The timely execution oftermination actions is essential for individuals who have been terminated for cause. In certain
situations, organizations consider disabling the system accounts of individuals who are being
terminated prior to the individuals being notified.
Related Controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PM-12, PS-6, PS-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS(a) Notify terminated individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment
requirements for the protection of organizational information; andThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(b) Require terminated individuals to sign an acknowledgment of post-employment
requirements as part of the organizational termination process.
Discussion: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding mattersof post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.
Related Controls: None.
(2) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED ACTIONS
Use [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms] to [Selection (one ormore): notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of individual
termination actions; disable access to system resources].
Discussion: In organizations with many employees, not all personnel who need to know
about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications, or if such notifications arereceived, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms can be used tosend automatic alerts or notifications to organizational personnel or roles when individuals
are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways,
including via telephone, electronic mail, text message, or websites. Automated mechanisms
can also be employed to quickly and thoroughly disable access to system resources after an
employee is terminated.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

PS-5

PERSONNEL TRANSFER
Control:a.

Review and confirm ongoing operational need for current logical and physical accessauthorizations to systems and facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred toother positions within the organization;b.

Initiate [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within[Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action];c.

Modify access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational needdue to reassignment or transfer; andd.

Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].

Discussion: Personnel transfer applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals arepermanent or of such extended duration as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define
actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended.
Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within

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organizations include returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, and building
passes; closing system accounts and establishing new accounts; changing system accessauthorizations (i.e., privileges); and providing for access to official records to which individuals
had access at previous work locations and in previous system accounts.
Related Controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PM-12, PS-4, PS-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PS-6

ACCESS AGREEMENTS
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Develop and document access agreements for organizational systems;b.

Review and update the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
andc.

Verify that individuals requiring access to organizational information and systems:
1.

Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and2.

Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational systems when accessagreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion: Access agreements include nondisclosure agreements, acceptable use agreements,
rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access agreements include an
acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to abide by the constraints
associated with organizational systems to which access is authorized. Organizations can use
electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless specifically prohibited byorganizational policy.
Related Controls: AC-17, PE-2, PL-4, PS-2, PS-3, PS-6, PS-7, PS-8, SA-21, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3.](2) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION
Verify that access to classified information requiring special protection is granted only toindividuals who:(a) Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official
government duties;(b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and(c) Have read, understood, and signed a nondisclosure agreement.
Discussion: Classified information that requires special protection includes collateral
information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: None.
(3) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS(a) Notify individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements forprotection of organizational information; andCHAPTER THREE

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Discussion: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding mattersof post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.
Related Controls: PS-4.
References: None.

PS-7

EXTERNAL PERSONNEL SECURITY
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

Establish personnel security requirements, including security roles and responsibilities forexternal providers;b.

Require external providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures
established by the organization;c.

Document personnel security requirements;d.

Require external providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] ofany personnel transfers or terminations of external personnel who possess organizational
credentials and/or badges, or who have system privileges within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period]; ande.

Monitor provider compliance with personnel security requirements.

Discussion: External provider refers to organizations other than the organization operating or
acquiring the system. External providers include service bureaus, contractors, and otherorganizations that provide system development, information technology services, testing or
assessment services, outsourced applications, and network/security management. Organizations
explicitly include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. External
providers may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or
system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of external personnel changes ensure theappropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers andterminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include functions, roles,
and the nature of credentials or privileges associated with transferred or terminated individuals.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, MA-5, PE-3, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, SA-5, SA-9, SA-21.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-35], [SP 800-63-3].

PS-8

PERSONNEL SANCTIONSControl:a.

Employ a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with establishedinformation security and privacy policies and procedures; andb.

Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated,
identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.

Discussion: Organizational sanctions reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Sanctions processes are described in accessagreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies for organizations and/or
specified in security and privacy policies. Organizations consult with the Office of the GeneralCounsel regarding matters of employee sanctions.

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Related Controls: All XX-1 Controls, PL-4, PM-12, PS-6, PT-1.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PS-9

POSITION DESCRIPTIONSControl: Incorporate security and privacy roles and responsibilities into organizational position
descriptions.
Discussion: Specification of security and privacy roles in individual organizational position
descriptions facilitates clarity in understanding the security or privacy responsibilities associatedwith the roles and the role-based security and privacy training requirements for the roles.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-181].

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3.15 PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION PROCESSING AND
TRANSPARENCY
Quick link to Personally Identifiable Information Processing and Transparency table
PT-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy that:(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personally identifiable information
processing and transparency policy and the associated personally identifiable
information processing and transparency controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the personally identifiable information processing andtransparency policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current personally identifiable information processing andtransparency:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy andprocedures address the controls in the PT family that are implemented within systems andorganizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies
and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore,
it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of personallyidentifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures. Security and privacy
program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may
obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update topersonally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures include
assessment or audit findings, breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does notconstitute an organizational policy or procedure.

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Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

PT-2

AUTHORITY TO PROCESS PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
Control:a.

Determine and document the [Assignment: organization-defined authority] that permits the[Assignment: organization-defined processing] of personally identifiable information; andb.

Restrict the [Assignment: organization-defined processing] of personally identifiable
information to only that which is authorized.

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Discussion: The processing of personally identifiable information is an operation or set ofoperations that the information system or organization performs with respect to personallyidentifiable information across the information life cycle. Processing includes but is not limited tocreation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, anddisposal. Processing operations also include logging, generation, and transformation, as well as
analysis techniques, such as data mining.
Organizations may be subject to laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that
establish the organization’s authority and thereby limit certain types of processing of personallyidentifiable information or establish other requirements related to the processing. Organizational
personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding such
authority, particularly if the organization is subject to multiple jurisdictions or sources ofauthority. For organizations whose processing is not determined according to legal authorities,
the organization’s policies and determinations govern how they process personally identifiable
information. While processing of personally identifiable information may be legally permissible,
privacy risks may still arise. Privacy risk assessments can identify the privacy risks associated withthe authorized processing of personally identifiable information and support solutions to manage
such risks.
Organizations consider applicable requirements and organizational policies to determine how to
document this authority. For federal agencies, the authority to process personally identifiable
information is documented in privacy policies and notices, system of records notices, privacy
impact assessments, [PRIVACT] statements, computer matching agreements and notices,
contracts, information sharing agreements, memoranda of understanding, and otherdocumentation.
Organizations take steps to ensure that personally identifiable information is only processed forauthorized purposes, including training organizational personnel on the authorized processing of
personally identifiable information and monitoring and auditing organizational use of personallyidentifiable information.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, CM-13, IR-9, PM-9, PM-24, PT-1, PT-3, PT-5, PT-6, RA-3, RA-8, SI12, SI-18.
Control Enhancements:(1) AUTHORITY TO PROCESS PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | DATA TAGGING
Attach data tags containing [Assignment: organization-defined authorized processing] to[Assignment: organization-defined elements of personally identifiable information].
Discussion: Data tags support the tracking and enforcement of authorized processing by
conveying the types of processing that are authorized along with the relevant elements of

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personally identifiable information throughout the system. Data tags may also support theuse of automated tools.
Related Controls: AC-16, CA-6, CM-12, PM-5, PM-22, PT-4, SC-16, SC-43, SI-10, SI-15, SI-19.
(2) AUTHORITY TO PROCESS PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | AUTOMATIONManage enforcement of the authorized processing of personally identifiable information
using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms augment verification that only authorized processing isoccurring.
Related Controls: CA-6, CM-12, PM-5, PM-22, PT-4, SC-16, SC-43, SI-10, SI-15, SI-19.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [IR 8112].
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PT-3

PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION PROCESSING PURPOSES
Control:a.

Identify and document the [Assignment: organization-defined purpose(s)] for processing
personally identifiable information;b.

Describe the purpose(s) in the public privacy notices and policies of the organization;c.

Restrict the [Assignment: organization-defined processing] of personally identifiable
information to only that which is compatible with the identified purpose(s); andd.

Monitor changes in processing personally identifiable information and implement[Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to ensure that any changes are made inaccordance with [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

Discussion: Identifying and documenting the purpose for processing provides organizations witha basis for understanding why personally identifiable information may be processed. The term“process” includes every step of the information life cycle, including creation, collection, use,
processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal. Identifying anddocumenting the purpose of processing is a prerequisite to enabling owners and operators of thesystem and individuals whose information is processed by the system to understand how the
information will be processed. This enables individuals to make informed decisions about their
engagement with information systems and organizations and to manage their privacy interests.
Once the specific processing purpose has been identified, the purpose is described in theorganization’s privacy notices, policies, and any related privacy compliance documentation,
including privacy impact assessments, system of records notices, [PRIVACT] statements,
computer matching notices, and other applicable Federal Register notices.
Organizations take steps to help ensure that personally identifiable information is processed only
for identified purposes, including training organizational personnel and monitoring and auditingorganizational processing of personally identifiable information.
Organizations monitor for changes in personally identifiable information processing.
Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel toensure that any new purposes that arise from changes in processing are compatible with the
purpose for which the information was collected, or if the new purpose is not compatible,
implement mechanisms in accordance with defined requirements to allow for the newprocessing, if appropriate. Mechanisms may include obtaining consent from individuals, revising
privacy policies, or other measures to manage privacy risks that arise from changes in personallyidentifiable information processing purposes.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AT-3, CM-13, IR-9, PM-9, PM-25, PT-2, PT-5, PT-6, PT-7, RA-8, SC43, SI-12, SI-18.

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Control Enhancements:(1) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION PROCESSING PURPOSES | DATA TAGGING
Attach data tags containing the following purposes to [Assignment: organization-definedelements of personally identifiable information]: [Assignment: organization-definedprocessing purposes].
Discussion: Data tags support the tracking of processing purposes by conveying the
purposes along with the relevant elements of personally identifiable information throughout
the system. By conveying the processing purposes in a data tag along with the personallyidentifiable information as the information transits a system, a system owner or operator
can identify whether a change in processing would be compatible with the identified anddocumented purposes. Data tags may also support the use of automated tools.
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Related Controls: CA-6, CM-12, PM-5, PM-22, SC-16, SC-43, SI-10, SI-15, SI-19.
(2) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION PROCESSING PURPOSES | AUTOMATION
Track processing purposes of personally identifiable information using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms augment tracking of the processing purposes.
Related Controls: CA-6, CM-12, PM-5, PM-22, SC-16, SC-43, SI-10, SI-15, SI-19.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [IR 8112].

PT-4

CONSENT
Control: Implement [Assignment: organization-defined tools or mechanisms] for individuals toconsent to the processing of their personally identifiable information prior to its collection thatfacilitate individuals’ informed decision-making.
Discussion: Consent allows individuals to participate in making decisions about the processing of
their information and transfers some of the risk that arises from the processing of personallyidentifiable information from the organization to an individual. Consent may be required byapplicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines.
Otherwise, when selecting consent as a control, organizations consider whether individuals canbe reasonably expected to understand and accept the privacy risks that arise from theirauthorization. Organizations consider whether other controls may more effectively mitigate
privacy risk either alone or in conjunction with consent. Organizations also consider any
demographic or contextual factors that may influence the understanding or behavior ofindividuals with respect to the processing carried out by the system or organization. Whensoliciting consent from individuals, organizations consider the appropriate mechanism forobtaining consent, including the type of consent (e.g., opt-in, opt-out), how to properly
authenticate and identity proof individuals and how to obtain consent through electronic means.
In addition, organizations consider providing a mechanism for individuals to revoke consent once
it has been provided, as appropriate. Finally, organizations consider usability factors to help
individuals understand the risks being accepted when providing consent, including the use ofplain language and avoiding technical jargon.
Related Controls: AC-16, PT-2, PT-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONSENT | TAILORED CONSENT
Provide [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms] to allow individuals to tailor
processing permissions to selected elements of personally identifiable information.

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Discussion: While some processing may be necessary for the basic functionality of the
product or service, other processing may not. In these circumstances, organizations allow
individuals to select how specific personally identifiable information elements may beprocessed. More tailored consent may help reduce privacy risk, increase individual
satisfaction, and avoid adverse behaviors, such as abandonment of the product or service.
Related Controls: PT-2.
(2) CONSENT | JUST-IN-TIME CONSENT
Present [Assignment: organization-defined consent mechanisms] to individuals at[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and in conjunction with [Assignment:
organization-defined personally identifiable information processing].
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Discussion: Just-in-time consent enables individuals to participate in how their personallyidentifiable information is being processed at the time or in conjunction with specific typesof data processing when such participation may be most useful to the individual. Individualassumptions about how personally identifiable information is being processed might not be
accurate or reliable if time has passed since the individual last gave consent or the type ofprocessing creates significant privacy risk. Organizations use discretion to determine when
to use just-in-time consent and may use supporting information on demographics, focus
groups, or surveys to learn more about individuals’ privacy interests and concerns.
Related Controls: PT-2.
(3) CONSENT | REVOCATION
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined tools or mechanisms] for individuals to
revoke consent to the processing of their personally identifiable information.
Discussion: Revocation of consent enables individuals to exercise control over their initialconsent decision when circumstances change. Organizations consider usability factors inenabling easy-to-use revocation capabilities.
Related Controls: PT-2.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [SP 800-63-3].

PT-5

PRIVACY NOTICE
Control: Provide notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information
that:
a.

Is available to individuals upon first interacting with an organization, and subsequently at[Assignment: organization-defined frequency];b.

Is clear and easy-to-understand, expressing information about personally identifiable
information processing in plain language;c.

Identifies the authority that authorizes the processing of personally identifiable information;d.

Identifies the purposes for which personally identifiable information is to be processed; ande.

Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information].

Discussion: Privacy notices help inform individuals about how their personally identifiable
information is being processed by the system or organization. Organizations use privacy notices
to inform individuals about how, under what authority, and for what purpose their personallyidentifiable information is processed, as well as other information such as choices individuals
might have with respect to that processing and other parties with whom information is shared.
Laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies may require that privacy notices
include specific elements or be provided in specific formats. Federal agency personnel consult
with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding when and where to provide

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privacy notices, as well as elements to include in privacy notices and required formats. In
circumstances where laws or government-wide policies do not require privacy notices,
organizational policies and determinations may require privacy notices and may serve as a sourceof the elements to include in privacy notices.
Privacy risk assessments identify the privacy risks associated with the processing of personallyidentifiable information and may help organizations determine appropriate elements to include
in a privacy notice to manage such risks. To help individuals understand how their information is
being processed, organizations write materials in plain language and avoid technical jargon.
Related Controls: PM-20, PM-22, PT-2, PT-3, PT-4, PT-7, RA-3, SC-42, SI-18.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) PRIVACY NOTICE | JUST-IN-TIME NOTICE
Present notice of personally identifiable information processing to individuals at a timeand location where the individual provides personally identifiable information or in
conjunction with a data action, or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Just-in-time notices inform individuals of how organizations process theirpersonally identifiable information at a time when such notices may be most useful to theindividuals. Individual assumptions about how personally identifiable information will beprocessed might not be accurate or reliable if time has passed since the organization lastpresented notice or the circumstances under which the individual was last provided notice
have changed. A just-in-time notice can explain data actions that organizations haveidentified as potentially giving rise to greater privacy risk for individuals. Organizations canuse a just-in-time notice to update or remind individuals about specific data actions as theyoccur or highlight specific changes that occurred since last presenting notice. A just-in-time
notice can be used in conjunction with just-in-time consent to explain what will occur ifconsent is declined. Organizations use discretion to determine when to use a just-in-time
notice and may use supporting information on user demographics, focus groups, or surveys
to learn about users’ privacy interests and concerns.
Related Controls: PM-21.
(2) PRIVACY NOTICE | PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS
Include Privacy Act statements on forms that collect information that will be maintained ina Privacy Act system of records, or provide Privacy Act statements on separate forms thatcan be retained by individuals.
Discussion: If a federal agency asks individuals to supply information that will become partof a system of records, the agency is required to provide a [PRIVACT] statement on the form
used to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual.
The agency provides a [PRIVACT] statement in such circumstances regardless of whether the
information will be collected on a paper or electronic form, on a website, on a mobile
application, over the telephone, or through some other medium. This requirement ensuresthat the individual is provided with sufficient information about the request for information
to make an informed decision on whether or not to respond.
[PRIVACT] statements provide formal notice to individuals of the authority that authorizes
the solicitation of the information; whether providing the information is mandatory or
voluntary; the principal purpose(s) for which the information is to be used; the publishedroutine uses to which the information is subject; the effects on the individual, if any, of notproviding all or any part of the information requested; and an appropriate citation and linkto the relevant system of records notice. Federal agency personnel consult with the senioragency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding the notice provisions of the [PRIVACT].
Related Controls: PT-6.

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Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [OMB A-108].
PT-6

SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICE
Control: For systems that process information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system ofrecords:

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a.

Draft system of records notices in accordance with OMB guidance and submit new andsignificantly modified system of records notices to the OMB and appropriate congressional
committees for advance review;b.

Publish system of records notices in the Federal Register; andc.

Keep system of records notices accurate, up-to-date, and scoped in accordance with policy.

Discussion: The [PRIVACT] requires that federal agencies publish a system of records notice in
the Federal Register upon the establishment and/or modification of a [PRIVACT] system ofrecords. As a general matter, a system of records notice is required when an agency maintains agroup of any records under the control of the agency from which information is retrieved by thename of an individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifier. The noticedescribes the existence and character of the system and identifies the system of records, thepurpose(s) of the system, the authority for maintenance of the records, the categories of records
maintained in the system, the categories of individuals about whom records are maintained, theroutine uses to which the records are subject, and additional details about the system as
described in [OMB A-108].
Related Controls: AC-3, PM-20, PT-2, PT-3, PT-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICE | ROUTINE USES
Review all routine uses published in the system of records notice at [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] to ensure continued accuracy, and to ensure that routine
uses continue to be compatible with the purpose for which the information was collected.
Discussion: A [PRIVACT] routine use is a particular kind of disclosure of a record outside of
the federal agency maintaining the system of records. A routine use is an exception to the[PRIVACT] prohibition on the disclosure of a record in a system of records without the priorwritten consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. To qualify as a routine use,the disclosure must be for a purpose that is compatible with the purpose for which theinformation was originally collected. The [PRIVACT] requires agencies to describe eachroutine use of the records maintained in the system of records, including the categories ofusers of the records and the purpose of the use. Agencies may only establish routine uses by
explicitly publishing them in the relevant system of records notice.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICE | EXEMPTION RULES
Review all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records at [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] to ensure they remain appropriate and necessary inaccordance with law, that they have been promulgated as regulations, and that they areaccurately described in the system of records notice.
Discussion: The [PRIVACT] includes two sets of provisions that allow federal agencies toclaim exemptions from certain requirements in the statute. In certain circumstances, theseprovisions allow agencies to promulgate regulations to exempt a system of records fromselect provisions of the [PRIVACT]. At a minimum, organizations’ [PRIVACT] exemption

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regulations include the specific name(s) of any system(s) of records that will be exempt, thespecific provisions of the [PRIVACT] from which the system(s) of records is to be exempted,
the reasons for the exemption, and an explanation for why the exemption is both necessary
and appropriate.
Related Controls: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-108].

PT-7

SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
Control: Apply [Assignment: organization-defined processing conditions] for specific categories of
personally identifiable information.

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Discussion: Organizations apply any conditions or protections that may be necessary for specificcategories of personally identifiable information. These conditions may be required by laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. The requirements may
also come from the results of privacy risk assessments that factor in contextual changes that may
result in an organizational determination that a particular category of personally identifiable
information is particularly sensitive or raises particular privacy risks. Organizations consult withthe senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding any protections that may benecessary.
Related Controls: IR-9, PT-2, PT-3, RA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS
When a system processes Social Security numbers:(a) Eliminate unnecessary collection, maintenance, and use of Social Security numbers,
and explore alternatives to their use as a personal identifier;(b) Do not deny any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because ofsuch individual’s refusal to disclose his or her Social Security number; and(c) Inform any individual who is asked to disclose his or her Social Security number
whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or otherauthority such number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.
Discussion: Federal law and policy establish specific requirements for organizations’processing of Social Security numbers. Organizations take steps to eliminate unnecessary
uses of Social Security numbers and other sensitive information and observe any particularrequirements that apply.
Related Controls: IA-4.
(2) SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | FIRST AMENDMENTINFORMATION

Prohibit the processing of information describing how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by theindividual or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity.
Discussion: The [PRIVACT] limits agencies’ ability to process information that describes how
individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Organizations consult withthe senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding these requirements.
Related Controls: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [OMB A-108], [NARA CUI].

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PT-8

COMPUTER MATCHING REQUIREMENTS
Control: When a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting amatching program:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Obtain approval from the Data Integrity Board to conduct the matching program;b.

Develop and enter into a computer matching agreement;c.

Publish a matching notice in the Federal Register;d.

Independently verify the information produced by the matching program before taking
adverse action against an individual, if required; ande.

Provide individuals with notice and an opportunity to contest the findings before taking
adverse action against an individual.

Discussion: The [PRIVACT] establishes requirements for federal and non-federal agencies if they
engage in a matching program. In general, a matching program is a computerized comparison ofrecords from two or more automated [PRIVACT] systems of records or an automated system ofrecords and automated records maintained by a non-federal agency (or agent thereof). A
matching program either pertains to federal benefit programs or federal personnel or payroll
records. A federal benefit match is performed to determine or verify eligibility for payments
under federal benefit programs or to recoup payments or delinquent debts under federal benefit
programs. A matching program involves not just the matching activity itself but also theinvestigative follow-up and ultimate action, if any.
Related Controls: PM-24.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [CMPPA], [OMB A-130], [OMB A-108].

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3.16 RISK ASSESSMENT
Quick link to Risk Assessment Summary Table
RA-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] risk assessment policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and theassociated risk assessment controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the risk assessment policy and procedures; andc.

Review and update the current risk assessment:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Risk assessment policy and procedures address the controls in the RA family that are
implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an importantfactor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security
and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborateon the development of risk assessment policy and procedures. Security and privacy program
policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate theneed for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as partof the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies reflecting thecomplex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy
programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe
how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is
the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans
or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to risk assessment
policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, orchanges in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.
Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100].

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SECURITY CATEGORIZATION
Control:a.

Categorize the system and information it processes, stores, and transmits;b.

Document the security categorization results, including supporting rationale, in the security
plan for the system; andc.

Verify that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews
and approves the security categorization decision.

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Discussion: Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts or negative consequences
to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational informationand systems are compromised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Security
categorization is also a type of asset loss characterization in systems security engineering
processes that is carried out throughout the system development life cycle. Organizations canuse privacy risk assessments or privacy impact assessments to better understand the potential
adverse effects on individuals. [CNSSI 1253] provides additional guidance on categorization for
national security systems.
Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity withthe direct involvement of chief information officers, senior agency information security officers,
senior agency officials for privacy, system owners, mission and business owners, and information
owners or stewards. Organizations consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations
and, in accordance with [USA PATRIOT] and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential
national-level adverse impacts.
Security categorization processes facilitate the development of inventories of information assets
and, along with CM-8, mappings to specific system components where information is processed,
stored, or transmitted. The security categorization process is revisited throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle to ensure that the security categories remain accurate and relevant.
Related Controls: CM-8, MP-4, PL-2, PL-10, PL-11, PM-7, RA-3, RA-5, RA-7, RA-8, SA-8, SC-7, SC38, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY CATEGORIZATION | IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION
Conduct an impact-level prioritization of organizational systems to obtain additional
granularity on system impact levels.
Discussion: Organizations apply the “high-water mark” concept to each system categorizedin accordance with [FIPS 199], resulting in systems designated as low impact, moderate
impact, or high impact. Organizations that desire additional granularity in the system impact
designations for risk-based decision-making, can further partition the systems into subcategories of the initial system categorization. For example, an impact-level prioritization ona moderate-impact system can produce three new sub-categories: low-moderate systems,
moderate-moderate systems, and high-moderate systems. Impact-level prioritization andthe resulting sub-categories of the system give organizations an opportunity to focus theirinvestments related to security control selection and the tailoring of control baselines in
responding to identified risks. Impact-level prioritization can also be used to determine
those systems that may be of heightened interest or value to adversaries or represent a
critical loss to the federal enterprise, sometimes described as high value assets. For suchhigh value assets, organizations may be more focused on complexity, aggregation, andinformation exchanges. Systems with high value assets can be prioritized by partitioning
high-impact systems into low-high systems, moderate-high systems, and high-high systems.

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Alternatively, organizations can apply the guidance in [CNSSI 1253] for security objectiverelated categorization.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [FIPS 200], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-60-1], [SP 80060-2], [SP 800-160-1], [CNSSI 1253], [NARA CUI].

RA-3

RISK ASSESSMENT
Control:a.

Conduct a risk assessment, including:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

1.

Identifying threats to and vulnerabilities in the system;

2.

Determining the likelihood and magnitude of harm from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the system, the information it
processes, stores, or transmits, and any related information; and3.

Determining the likelihood and impact of adverse effects on individuals arising from theprocessing of personally identifiable information;b.

Integrate risk assessment results and risk management decisions from the organization andmission or business process perspectives with system-level risk assessments;c.

Document risk assessment results in [Selection: security and privacy plans; risk assessment
report; [Assignment: organization-defined document]];d.

Review risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];e.

Disseminate risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]; andf.

Update the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or when there are
significant changes to the system, its environment of operation, or other conditions that may
impact the security or privacy state of the system.

Discussion: Risk assessments consider threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact toorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Risk
assessments also consider risk from external parties, including contractors who operate systems
on behalf of the organization, individuals who access organizational systems, service providers,and outsourcing entities.
Organizations can conduct risk assessments at all three levels in the risk management hierarchy(i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information system level) and at any
stage in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be conducted at various
steps in the Risk Management Framework, including preparation, categorization, control
selection, control implementation, control assessment, authorization, and control monitoring.
Risk assessment is an ongoing activity carried out throughout the system development life cycle.
Risk assessments can also address information related to the system, including system design,
the intended use of the system, testing results, and supply chain-related information or artifacts.
Risk assessments can play an important role in control selection processes, particularly during
the application of tailoring guidance and in the earliest phases of capability determination.
Related Controls: CA-3, CA-6, CM-4, CM-13, CP-6, CP-7, IA-8, MA-5, PE-3, PE-8, PE-18, PL-2, PL10, PL-11, PM-8, PM-9, PM-28, PT-2, PT-7, RA-2, RA-5, RA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SC-38, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) RISK ASSESSMENT | SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ASSESSMENT

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system components, and system services]; and(b) Update the supply chain risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency], when there are significant changes to the relevant supply chain, or whenchanges to the system, environments of operation, or other conditions may
necessitate a change in the supply chain.

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Discussion: Supply chain-related events include disruption, use of defective components,
insertion of counterfeits, theft, malicious development practices, improper delivery
practices, and insertion of malicious code. These events can have a significant impact on theconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system and its information and, therefore, canalso adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or
reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The
supply chain-related events may be unintentional or malicious and can occur at any point
during the system life cycle. An analysis of supply chain risk can help an organization identify
systems or components for which additional supply chain risk mitigations are required.
Related Controls: RA-2, RA-9, PM-17, PM-30, SR-2.
(2) RISK ASSESSMENT | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
Use all-source intelligence to assist in the analysis of risk.
Discussion: Organizations employ all-source intelligence to inform engineering, acquisition,and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence consists of information derived fromall available sources, including publicly available or open-source information, measurement
and signature intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence.
All-source intelligence is used to analyze the risk of vulnerabilities (both intentional andunintentional) from development, manufacturing, and delivery processes, people, and theenvironment. The risk analysis may be performed on suppliers at multiple tiers in the supply
chain sufficient to manage risks. Organizations may develop agreements to share all-source
intelligence information or resulting decisions with other organizations, as appropriate.
Related Controls: None.
(3) RISK ASSESSMENT | DYNAMIC THREAT AWARENESS
Determine the current cyber threat environment on an ongoing basis using [Assignment:
organization-defined means].
Discussion: The threat awareness information that is gathered feeds into the organization’s
information security operations to ensure that procedures are updated in response to thechanging threat environment. For example, at higher threat levels, organizations maychange the privilege or authentication thresholds required to perform certain operations.
Related Controls: AT-2.
(4) RISK ASSESSMENT | PREDICTIVE CYBER ANALYTICS
Employ the following advanced automation and analytics capabilities to predict andidentify risks to [Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components]:[Assignment: organization-defined advanced automation and analytics capabilities].
Discussion: A properly resourced Security Operations Center (SOC) or Computer Incident
Response Team (CIRT) may be overwhelmed by the volume of information generated by the
proliferation of security tools and appliances unless it employs advanced automation andanalytics to analyze the data. Advanced automation and analytics capabilities are typicallysupported by artificial intelligence concepts, including machine learning. Examples include
Automated Threat Discovery and Response (which includes broad-based collection, contextbased analysis, and adaptive response capabilities), automated workflow operations, andmachine assisted decision tools. Note, however, that sophisticated adversaries may be able

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to extract information related to analytic parameters and retrain the machine learning toclassify malicious activity as benign. Accordingly, machine learning is augmented by humanmonitoring to ensure that sophisticated adversaries are not able to conceal their activities.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-161], [IR 8023], [IR 8062], [IR 8272].

RA-4

RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3.]

RA-5

VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING

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Control:a.

Monitor and scan for vulnerabilities in the system and hosted applications [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-definedprocess] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified andreported;b.

Employ vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among
tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:1.

Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;2.

Formatting checklists and test procedures; and3.

Measuring vulnerability impact;c.

Analyze vulnerability scan reports and results from vulnerability monitoring;d.

Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] inaccordance with an organizational assessment of risk;e.

Share information obtained from the vulnerability monitoring process and control
assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate
similar vulnerabilities in other systems; andf.

Employ vulnerability monitoring tools that include the capability to readily update thevulnerabilities to be scanned.

Discussion: Security categorization of information and systems guides the frequency andcomprehensiveness of vulnerability monitoring (including scans). Organizations determine therequired vulnerability monitoring for system components, ensuring that the potential sources ofvulnerabilities—such as infrastructure components (e.g., switches, routers, guards, sensors),
networked printers, scanners, and copiers—are not overlooked. The capability to readily update
vulnerability monitoring tools as new vulnerabilities are discovered and announced and as new
scanning methods are developed helps to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not missed by
employed vulnerability monitoring tools. The vulnerability monitoring tool update process helps
to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the system are identified and addressed as quickly as
possible. Vulnerability monitoring and analyses for custom software may require additional
approaches, such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three
approaches. Organizations can use these analysis approaches in source code reviews and in avariety of tools, including web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, and binary
analyzers.
Vulnerability monitoring includes scanning for patch levels; scanning for functions, ports,
protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users or devices; and scanning for flow
control mechanisms that are improperly configured or operating incorrectly. Vulnerability

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monitoring may also include continuous vulnerability monitoring tools that use instrumentation
to continuously analyze components. Instrumentation-based tools may improve accuracy andmay be run throughout an organization without scanning. Vulnerability monitoring tools thatfacilitate interoperability include tools that are Security Content Automated Protocol (SCAP)validated. Thus, organizations consider using scanning tools that express vulnerabilities in the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that employ the Open
Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine the presence of vulnerabilities. Sources
for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) listing and the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Control assessments, such as red team exercises, provide
additional sources of potential vulnerabilities for which to scan. Organizations also consider using
scanning tools that express vulnerability impact by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System(CVSS).
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Vulnerability monitoring includes a channel and process for receiving reports of security
vulnerabilities from the public at-large. Vulnerability disclosure programs can be as simple as
publishing a monitored email address or web form that can receive reports, including notification
authorizing good-faith research and disclosure of security vulnerabilities. Organizations generally
expect that such research is happening with or without their authorization and can use publicvulnerability disclosure channels to increase the likelihood that discovered vulnerabilities arereported directly to the organization for remediation.
Organizations may also employ the use of financial incentives (also known as “bug bounties”) tofurther encourage external security researchers to report discovered vulnerabilities. Bug bounty
programs can be tailored to the organization’s needs. Bounties can be operated indefinitely orover a defined period of time and can be offered to the general public or to a curated group.
Organizations may run public and private bounties simultaneously and could choose to offer
partially credentialed access to certain participants in order to evaluate security vulnerabilities
from privileged vantage points.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, CM-2, CM-4, CM-6, CM-8, RA-2, RA-3, SA-11, SA-15, SC-38,
SI-2, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-5.](2) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | UPDATE VULNERABILITIES TO BE SCANNED
Update the system vulnerabilities to be scanned [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; prior to a new scan; when new vulnerabilities are
identified and reported].
Discussion: Due to the complexity of modern software, systems, and other factors, newvulnerabilities are discovered on a regular basis. It is important that newly discovered
vulnerabilities are added to the list of vulnerabilities to be scanned to ensure that theorganization can take steps to mitigate those vulnerabilities in a timely manner.
Related Controls: SI-5.
(3) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | BREADTH AND DEPTH OF COVERAGE
Define the breadth and depth of vulnerability scanning coverage.
Discussion: The breadth of vulnerability scanning coverage can be expressed as apercentage of components within the system, by the particular types of systems, by thecriticality of systems, or by the number of vulnerabilities to be checked. Conversely, thedepth of vulnerability scanning coverage can be expressed as the level of the system designthat the organization intends to monitor (e.g., component, module, subsystem, element).

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Organizations can determine the sufficiency of vulnerability scanning coverage with regard
to its risk tolerance and other factors. Scanning tools and how the tools are configured may
affect the depth and coverage. Multiple scanning tools may be needed to achieve thedesired depth and coverage. [SP 800-53A] provides additional information on the breadthand depth of coverage.
Related Controls: None.
(4) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION
Determine information about the system that is discoverable and take [Assignment:
organization-defined corrective actions].

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Discussion: Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could obtainwithout compromising or breaching the system, such as by collecting information that thesystem is exposing or by conducting extensive web searches. Corrective actions include
notifying appropriate organizational personnel, removing designated information, orchanging the system to make the designated information less relevant or attractive toadversaries. This enhancement excludes intentionally discoverable information that may bepart of a decoy capability (e.g., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) deployed by theorganization.
Related Controls: AU-13, SC-26.
(5) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS
Implement privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] for [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities].
Discussion: In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be more
intrusive, or the system component that is the subject of the scanning may contain classified
or controlled unclassified information, such as personally identifiable information. Privileged
access authorization to selected system components facilitates more thorough vulnerability
scanning and protects the sensitive nature of such scanning.
Related Controls: None.
(6) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES
Compare the results of multiple vulnerability scans using [Assignment: organizationdefined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: Using automated mechanisms to analyze multiple vulnerability scans over time
can help determine trends in system vulnerabilities and identify patterns of attack.
Related Controls: None.
(7) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF
UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8.](8) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS
Review historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in a [Assignment:
organization-defined system] has been previously exploited within an [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].
Discussion: Reviewing historic audit logs to determine if a recently detected vulnerability ina system has been previously exploited by an adversary can provide important information
for forensic analyses. Such analyses can help identify, for example, the extent of a previous
intrusion, the trade craft employed during the attack, organizational information exfiltrated
or modified, mission or business capabilities affected, and the duration of the attack.
Related Controls: AU-6, AU-11.

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Correlate the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multivulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors.

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Discussion: An attack vector is a path or means by which an adversary can gain access to asystem in order to deliver malicious code or exfiltrate information. Organizations can use
attack trees to show how hostile activities by adversaries interact and combine to produce
adverse impacts or negative consequences to systems and organizations. Such information,
together with correlated data from vulnerability scanning tools, can provide greater clarity
regarding multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors. The correlation of vulnerability
scanning information is especially important when organizations are transitioning from older
technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols).
During such transitions, some system components may inadvertently be unmanaged andcreate opportunities for adversary exploitation.
Related Controls: None.
(11) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PROGRAM
Establish a public reporting channel for receiving reports of vulnerabilities inorganizational systems and system components.
Discussion: The reporting channel is publicly discoverable and contains clear language
authorizing good-faith research and the disclosure of vulnerabilities to the organization. The
organization does not condition its authorization on an expectation of indefinite nondisclosure to the public by the reporting entity but may request a specific time period toproperly remediate the vulnerability.
Related Controls: None.
References: [ISO 29147], [SP 800-40], [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-70], [SP 800-115], [SP 800-126], [IR7788], [IR 8011-4], [IR 8023].

RA-6

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY
Control: Employ a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at [Assignment: organizationdefined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; when
the following events or indicators occur: [Assignment: organization-defined events orindicators]].
Discussion: A technical surveillance countermeasures survey is a service provided by qualified
personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices and hazards and to identify
technical security weaknesses that could be used in the conduct of a technical penetration of thesurveyed facility. Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys also provide evaluations of thetechnical security posture of organizations and facilities and include visual, electronic, andphysical examinations of surveyed facilities, internally and externally. The surveys also provide
useful input for risk assessments and information regarding organizational exposure to potential
adversaries.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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RISK RESPONSE
Control: Respond to findings from security and privacy assessments, monitoring, and audits inaccordance with organizational risk tolerance.

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Discussion: Organizations have many options for responding to risk including mitigating risk byimplementing new controls or strengthening existing controls, accepting risk with appropriate
justification or rationale, sharing or transferring risk, or avoiding risk. The risk tolerance of theorganization influences risk response decisions and actions. Risk response addresses the need todetermine an appropriate response to risk before generating a plan of action and milestones
entry. For example, the response may be to accept risk or reject risk, or it may be possible tomitigate the risk immediately so that a plan of action and milestones entry is not needed.
However, if the risk response is to mitigate the risk, and the mitigation cannot be completed
immediately, a plan of action and milestones entry is generated.
Related Controls: CA-5, IR-9, PM-4, PM-28, RA-2, RA-3, SR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [FIPS 200], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-160-1].

RA-8

PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Control: Conduct privacy impact assessments for systems, programs, or other activities before:a.

Developing or procuring information technology that processes personally identifiable
information; andb.

Initiating a new collection of personally identifiable information that:
1.

Will be processed using information technology; and2.

Includes personally identifiable information permitting the physical or virtual (online)
contacting of a specific individual, if identical questions have been posed to, or identicalreporting requirements imposed on, ten or more individuals, other than agencies,
instrumentalities, or employees of the federal government.

Discussion: A privacy impact assessment is an analysis of how personally identifiable informationis handled to ensure that handling conforms to applicable privacy requirements, determine theprivacy risks associated with an information system or activity, and evaluate ways to mitigate
privacy risks. A privacy impact assessment is both an analysis and a formal document that details
the process and the outcome of the analysis.
Organizations conduct and develop a privacy impact assessment with sufficient clarity andspecificity to demonstrate that the organization fully considered privacy and incorporated
appropriate privacy protections from the earliest stages of the organization’s activity andthroughout the information life cycle. In order to conduct a meaningful privacy impact
assessment, the organization’s senior agency official for privacy works closely with program
managers, system owners, information technology experts, security officials, counsel, and otherrelevant organization personnel. Moreover, a privacy impact assessment is not a time-restrictedactivity that is limited to a particular milestone or stage of the information system or personallyidentifiable information life cycles. Rather, the privacy analysis continues throughout the systemand personally identifiable information life cycles. Accordingly, a privacy impact assessment is aliving document that organizations update whenever changes to the information technology,changes to the organization’s practices, or other factors alter the privacy risks associated withthe use of such information technology.
To conduct the privacy impact assessment, organizations can use security and privacy risk
assessments. Organizations may also use other related processes that may have different names,

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including privacy threshold analyses. A privacy impact assessment can also serve as notice to the
public regarding the organization’s practices with respect to privacy. Although conducting andpublishing privacy impact assessments may be required by law, organizations may develop suchpolicies in the absence of applicable laws. For federal agencies, privacy impact assessments may
be required by [EGOV]; agencies should consult with their senior agency official for privacy andlegal counsel on this requirement and be aware of the statutory exceptions and OMB guidance
relating to the provision.
Related Controls: CM-4, CM-9, CM-13, PT-2, PT-3, PT-5, RA-1, RA-2, RA-3, RA-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EGOV], [OMB A-130], [OMB M-03-22].
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RA-9

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
Control: Identify critical system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for[Assignment: organization-defined systems, system components, or system services] at[Assignment: organization-defined decision points in the system development life cycle].
Discussion: Not all system components, functions, or services necessarily require significant
protections. For example, criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management andinforms the prioritization of protection activities. The identification of critical system components
and functions considers applicable laws, executive orders, regulations, directives, policies,
standards, system functionality requirements, system and component interfaces, and system andcomponent dependencies. Systems engineers conduct a functional decomposition of a system toidentify mission-critical functions and components. The functional decomposition includes theidentification of organizational missions supported by the system, decomposition into thespecific functions to perform those missions, and traceability to the hardware, software, andfirmware components that implement those functions, including when the functions are sharedby many components within and external to the system.
The operational environment of a system or a system component may impact the criticality,
including the connections to and dependencies on cyber-physical systems, devices, system-ofsystems, and outsourced IT services. System components that allow unmediated access to criticalsystem components or functions are considered critical due to the inherent vulnerabilities thatsuch components create. Component and function criticality are assessed in terms of the impactof a component or function failure on the organizational missions that are supported by thesystem that contains the components and functions.
Criticality analysis is performed when an architecture or design is being developed, modified, or
upgraded. If such analysis is performed early in the system development life cycle, organizations
may be able to modify the system design to reduce the critical nature of these components andfunctions, such as by adding redundancy or alternate paths into the system design. Criticality
analysis can also influence the protection measures required by development contractors. In
addition to criticality analysis for systems, system components, and system services, criticality
analysis of information is an important consideration. Such analysis is conducted as part of
security categorization in RA-2.
Related Controls: CP-2, PL-2, PL-8, PL-11, PM-1, PM-11, RA-2, SA-8, SA-15, SA-20, SR-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [IR 8179].

RA-10 THREAT HUNTING
Control:

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a.

b.

Establish and maintain a cyber threat hunting capability to:1.

Search for indicators of compromise in organizational systems; and2.

Detect, track, and disrupt threats that evade existing controls; andEmploy the threat hunting capability [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

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Discussion: Threat hunting is an active means of cyber defense in contrast to traditional
protection measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, quarantining
malicious code in sandboxes, and Security Information and Event Management technologies andsystems. Cyber threat hunting involves proactively searching organizational systems, networks,
and infrastructure for advanced threats. The objective is to track and disrupt cyber adversaries as
early as possible in the attack sequence and to measurably improve the speed and accuracy oforganizational responses. Indications of compromise include unusual network traffic, unusual filechanges, and the presence of malicious code. Threat hunting teams leverage existing threat
intelligence and may create new threat intelligence, which is shared with peer organizations,
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO), Information Sharing and Analysis Centers(ISAC), and relevant government departments and agencies.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, RA-3, RA-5, RA-6, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-30].

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3.17 SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION
Quick link to System and Services Acquisition Summary Table
SA-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] system and services acquisition policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition
policy and the associated system and services acquisition controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the system and services acquisition policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current system and services acquisition:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: System and services acquisition policy and procedures address the controls in the SA
family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is
an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures
contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy
programs collaborate on the development of system and services acquisition policy andprocedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are
preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies andprocedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be
represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures canbe established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to system and services acquisition policy and procedures include
assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does notconstitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SA-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-100], [SP 800-160-1].

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SA-2

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Control:a.

Determine the high-level information security and privacy requirements for the system orsystem service in mission and business process planning;b.

Determine, document, and allocate the resources required to protect the system or systemservice as part of the organizational capital planning and investment control process; andc.

Establish a discrete line item for information security and privacy in organizational
programming and budgeting documentation.

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Discussion: Resource allocation for information security and privacy includes funding for systemand services acquisition, sustainment, and supply chain-related risks throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle.
Related Controls: PL-7, PM-3, PM-11, SA-9, SR-3, SR-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-160-1].

SA-3

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
Control:a.

Acquire, develop, and manage the system using [Assignment: organization-defined systemdevelopment life cycle] that incorporates information security and privacy considerations;b.

Define and document information security and privacy roles and responsibilities throughout
the system development life cycle;c.

Identify individuals having information security and privacy roles and responsibilities; andd.

Integrate the organizational information security and privacy risk management process into
system development life cycle activities.

Discussion: A system development life cycle process provides the foundation for the successful
development, implementation, and operation of organizational systems. The integration of
security and privacy considerations early in the system development life cycle is a foundational
principle of systems security engineering and privacy engineering. To apply the required controls
within the system development life cycle requires a basic understanding of information security
and privacy, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical mission and business
functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 help individuals properly design, code, andtest systems and system components. Organizations include qualified personnel (e.g., senioragency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, security and privacy
architects, and security and privacy engineers) in system development life cycle processes toensure that established security and privacy requirements are incorporated into organizational
systems. Role-based security and privacy training programs can ensure that individuals with key
security and privacy roles and responsibilities have the experience, skills, and expertise to
conduct assigned system development life cycle activities.
The effective integration of security and privacy requirements into enterprise architecture also
helps to ensure that important security and privacy considerations are addressed throughout thesystem life cycle and that those considerations are directly related to organizational mission andbusiness processes. This process also facilitates the integration of the information security andprivacy architectures into the enterprise architecture, consistent with the risk management
strategy of the organization. Because the system development life cycle involves multiple
organizations, (e.g., external suppliers, developers, integrators, service providers), acquisition

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management of the system during the life cycle.
Related Controls: AT-3, PL-8, PM-7, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-11, SA-15, SA-17, SA-22, SR-3, SR-4, SR5, SR-9.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE | MANAGE PREPRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT
Protect system preproduction environments commensurate with risk throughout thesystem development life cycle for the system, system component, or system service.

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Discussion: The preproduction environment includes development, test, and integration
environments. The program protection planning processes established by the Department of
Defense are examples of managing the preproduction environment for defense contractors.
Criticality analysis and the application of controls on developers also contribute to a moresecure system development environment.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-4, RA-3, RA-9, SA-4.
(2) SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE | USE OF LIVE OR OPERATIONAL DATA(a) Approve, document, and control the use of live data in preproduction environments
for the system, system component, or system service; and(b) Protect preproduction environments for the system, system component, or systemservice at the same impact or classification level as any live data in use within the
preproduction environments.
Discussion: Live data is also referred to as operational data. The use of live or operational
data in preproduction (i.e., development, test, and integration) environments can result insignificant risks to organizations. In addition, the use of personally identifiable information in
testing, research, and training increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of suchinformation. Therefore, it is important for the organization to manage any additional risks
that may result from the use of live or operational data. Organizations can minimize suchrisks by using test or dummy data during the design, development, and testing of systems,
system components, and system services. Risk assessment techniques may be used todetermine if the risk of using live or operational data is acceptable.
Related Controls: PM-25, RA-3.
(3) SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE | TECHNOLOGY REFRESH
Plan for and implement a technology refresh schedule for the system throughout thesystem development life cycle.
Discussion: Technology refresh planning may encompass hardware, software, firmware,
processes, personnel skill sets, suppliers, service providers, and facilities. The use of obsolete
or nearing obsolete technology may increase the security and privacy risks associated with
unsupported components, counterfeit or repurposed components, components unable toimplement security or privacy requirements, slow or inoperable components, components
from untrusted sources, inadvertent personnel error, or increased complexity. Technology
refreshes typically occur during the operations and maintenance stage of the systemdevelopment life cycle.
Related Controls: MA-6.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-171], [SP 800-172].

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ACQUISITION PROCESS
Control: Include the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference,using [Selection (one or more): standardized contract language; [Assignment: organizationdefined contract language]] in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or
system service:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Security and privacy functional requirements;b.

Strength of mechanism requirements;c.

Security and privacy assurance requirements;d.

Controls needed to satisfy the security and privacy requirements.

e.

Security and privacy documentation requirements;f.

Requirements for protecting security and privacy documentation;g.

Description of the system development environment and environment in which the system
is intended to operate;h.

Allocation of responsibility or identification of parties responsible for information security,
privacy, and supply chain risk management; andi.

Acceptance criteria.

Discussion: Security and privacy functional requirements are typically derived from the highlevel security and privacy requirements described in SA-2. The derived requirements include
security and privacy capabilities, functions, and mechanisms. Strength requirements associatedwith such capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness,
resistance to tampering or bypass, and resistance to direct attack. Assurance requirements
include development processes, procedures, and methodologies as well as the evidence fromdevelopment and assessment activities that provide grounds for confidence that the required
functionality is implemented and possesses the required strength of mechanism. [SP 800-160-1]
describes the process of requirements engineering as part of the system development life cycle.
Controls can be viewed as descriptions of the safeguards and protection capabilities appropriate
for achieving the particular security and privacy objectives of the organization and for reflecting
the security and privacy requirements of stakeholders. Controls are selected and implemented inorder to satisfy system requirements and include developer and organizational responsibilities.
Controls can include technical, administrative, and physical aspects. In some cases, the selection
and implementation of a control may necessitate additional specification by the organization in
the form of derived requirements or instantiated control parameter values. The derived
requirements and control parameter values may be necessary to provide the appropriate level of
implementation detail for controls within the system development life cycle.
Security and privacy documentation requirements address all stages of the system development
life cycle. Documentation provides user and administrator guidance for the implementation andoperation of controls. The level of detail required in such documentation is based on the security
categorization or classification level of the system and the degree to which organizations dependon the capabilities, functions, or mechanisms to meet risk response expectations. Requirements
can include mandated configuration settings that specify allowed functions, ports, protocols, andservices. Acceptance criteria for systems, system components, and system services are defined in
the same manner as the criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement.
Related Controls: CM-6, CM-8, PS-7, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-21, SR-3,
SR-5.
Control Enhancements:

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF CONTROLS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to provide a
description of the functional properties of the controls to be implemented.
Discussion: Functional properties of security and privacy controls describe the functionality(i.e., security or privacy capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of thecontrols and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operationof the controls.
Related Controls: None.
(2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR CONTROLSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to provide
design and implementation information for the controls that includes: [Selection (one ormore): security-relevant external system interfaces; high-level design; low-level design;source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment: organization-defined design andimplementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].
Discussion: Organizations may require different levels of detail in the documentation for thedesign and implementation of controls in organizational systems, system components, or
system services based on mission and business requirements, requirements for resiliency
and trustworthiness, and requirements for analysis and testing. Systems can be partitioned
into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem within the system can contain one or more
modules. The high-level design for the system is expressed in terms of subsystems and theinterfaces between subsystems providing security-relevant functionality. The low-level
design for the system is expressed in terms of modules and the interfaces between modules
providing security-relevant functionality. Design and implementation documentation can
include manufacturer, version, serial number, verification hash signature, software libraries
used, date of purchase or download, and the vendor or download source. Source code andhardware schematics are referred to as the implementation representation of the system.
Related Controls: None.
(3) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS, TECHNIQUES, AND PRACTICES
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service todemonstrate the use of a system development life cycle process that includes:(a) [Assignment: organization-defined systems engineering methods];(b) [Assignment: organization-defined [Selection (one or more): systems security; privacy]
engineering methods]; and(c) [Assignment: organization-defined software development methods; testing,evaluation, assessment, verification, and validation methods; and quality control
processes].
Discussion: Following a system development life cycle that includes state-of-the-practice
software development methods, systems engineering methods, systems security and privacy
engineering methods, and quality control processes helps to reduce the number and severityof latent errors within systems, system components, and system services. Reducing thenumber and severity of such errors reduces the number of vulnerabilities in those systems,
components, and services. Transparency in the methods and techniques that developers
select and implement for systems engineering, systems security and privacy engineering,
software development, component and system assessments, and quality control processes
provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of the system, systemcomponent, or system service being acquired.
Related Controls: None.
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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8(9).](5) ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM, COMPONENT, AND SERVICE CONFIGURATIONS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Deliver the system, component, or service with [Assignment: organization-defined
security configurations] implemented; and(b) Use the configurations as the default for any subsequent system, component, orservice reinstallation or upgrade.
Discussion: Examples of security configurations include the U.S. Government Configuration
Baseline (USGCB), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), and any limitations onfunctions, ports, protocols, and services. Security characteristics can include requiring that
default passwords have been changed.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
(6) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS(a) Employ only government off-the-shelf or commercial off-the-shelf information
assurance and information assurance-enabled information technology products thatcompose an NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the
networks used to transmit the information are at a lower classification level than theinformation being transmitted; and(b) Ensure that these products have been evaluated and/or validated by NSA or inaccordance with NSA-approved procedures.
Discussion: Commercial off-the-shelf IA or IA-enabled information technology products used
to protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSAapproved key management. See [NSA CSFC].
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(7) ACQUISITION PROCESS | NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILES(a) Limit the use of commercially provided information assurance and information
assurance-enabled information technology products to those products that have beensuccessfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (NIAP)approved Protection Profile for a specific technology type, if such a profile exists; and(b) Require, if no NIAP-approved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology typebut a commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic
functionality to enforce its security policy, that the cryptographic module is FIPSvalidated or NSA-approved.
Discussion: See [NIAP CCEVS] for additional information on NIAP. See [NIST CMVP] for
additional information on FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.
Related Controls: IA-7, SC-12, SC-13.
(8) ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN FOR CONTROLS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to produce aplan for continuous monitoring of control effectiveness that is consistent with thecontinuous monitoring program of the organization.
Discussion: The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the planned,
required, and deployed controls within the system, system component, or system service
continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer
continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information canbe incorporated into continuous monitoring programs implemented by organizations.
Continuous monitoring plans can include the types of control assessment and monitoring

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activities planned, frequency of control monitoring, and actions to be taken when controls
fail or become ineffective.
Related Controls: CA-7.
(9) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES IN USE
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to identify thefunctions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.

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Discussion: The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the systemdevelopment life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design stages)
allows organizations to influence the design of the system, system component, or systemservice. This early involvement in the system development life cycle helps organizations
avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily
high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, orservices or requiring system service providers to do so. Early identification of functions,ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of controls after the system,component, or system service has been implemented. SA-9 describes the requirements forexternal system services. Organizations identify which functions, ports, protocols, andservices are provided from external sources.
Related Controls: CM-7, SA-9.
(10) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS
Employ only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational systems.
Discussion: Products on the FIPS 201-approved products list meet NIST requirements for
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. PIV cards are used
for multi-factor authentication in systems and organizations.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-8, PM-9.
(11) ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM OF RECORDS
Include [Assignment: organization-defined Privacy Act requirements] in the acquisition
contract for the operation of a system of records on behalf of an organization toaccomplish an organizational mission or function.
Discussion: When, by contract, an organization provides for the operation of a system ofrecords to accomplish an organizational mission or function, the organization, consistent
with its authority, causes the requirements of the [PRIVACT] to be applied to the system ofrecords.
Related Controls: PT-6.
(12) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DATA OWNERSHIP(a) Include organizational data ownership requirements in the acquisition contract; and(b) Require all data to be removed from the contractor’s system and returned to theorganization within [Assignment: organization-defined time frame].
Discussion: Contractors who operate a system that contains data owned by an organization
initiating the contract have policies and procedures in place to remove the data from theirsystems and/or return the data in a time frame defined by the contract.
Related Controls: None.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [ISO 15408-1], [ISO 15408-2], [ISO 15408-3], [ISO 29148],[FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 201-2], [SP 800-35], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-70], [SP 800-73-4], [SP 800-137], [SP
800-160-1], [SP 800-161], [IR 7539], [IR 7622], [IR 7676], [IR 7870], [IR 8062], [NIAP CCEVS], [NSA
CSFC].

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SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION
Control:a.

b.

Obtain or develop administrator documentation for the system, system component, or
system service that describes:
1.

Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;2.

Effective use and maintenance of security and privacy functions and mechanisms; and3.

Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative or privileged
functions;This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Obtain or develop user documentation for the system, system component, or system service
that describes:
1.

User-accessible security and privacy functions and mechanisms and how to effectively
use those functions and mechanisms;2.

Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component,or service in a more secure manner and protect individual privacy; and3.

User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service
and privacy of individuals;c.

Document attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation
when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and take [Assignment:
organization-defined actions] in response; andd.

Distribute documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Discussion: System documentation helps personnel understand the implementation andoperation of controls. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine thequality and completeness of the content provided. System documentation may be used tosupport the management of supply chain risk, incident response, and other functions. Personnel
or roles that require documentation include system owners, system security officers, and systemadministrators. Attempts to obtain documentation include contacting manufacturers or suppliersand conducting web-based searches. The inability to obtain documentation may occur due to theage of the system or component or the lack of support from developers and contractors. When
documentation cannot be obtained, organizations may need to recreate the documentation if it
is essential to the implementation or operation of the controls. The protection provided for the
documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system.
Documentation that addresses system vulnerabilities may require an increased level ofprotection. Secure operation of the system includes initially starting the system and resuming
secure system operation after a lapse in system operation.
Related Controls: CM-4, CM-6, CM-7, CM-8, PL-2, PL-4, PL-8, PS-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-8, SA-9, SA-10,
SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SI-12, SR-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4(1).](2) SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4(2).](3) SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4(2).]CHAPTER THREE

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[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4(2).]References: [SP 800-160-1].

SA-6

SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7.]

SA-7

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7.]

SA-8

SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
Control: Apply the following systems security and privacy engineering principles in thespecification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system and systemcomponents: [Assignment: organization-defined systems security and privacy engineering
principles].
Discussion: Systems security and privacy engineering principles are closely related to andimplemented throughout the system development life cycle (see SA-3). Organizations can apply
systems security and privacy engineering principles to new systems under development or tosystems undergoing upgrades. For existing systems, organizations apply systems security andprivacy engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the extent feasible, given
the current state of hardware, software, and firmware components within those systems.
The application of systems security and privacy engineering principles helps organizations
develop trustworthy, secure, and resilient systems and reduces the susceptibility to disruptions,hazards, threats, and the creation of privacy problems for individuals. Examples of systemsecurity engineering principles include: developing layered protections; establishing security andprivacy policies, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design and development;
incorporating security and privacy requirements into the system development life cycle;
delineating physical and logical security boundaries; ensuring that developers are trained on how
to build secure software; tailoring controls to meet organizational needs; and performing threat
modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors and patterns, design patterns, andcompensating controls needed to mitigate risk.
Organizations that apply systems security and privacy engineering concepts and principles canfacilitate the development of trustworthy, secure systems, system components, and systemservices; reduce risk to acceptable levels; and make informed risk management decisions. Systemsecurity engineering principles can also be used to protect against certain supply chain risks,
including incorporating tamper-resistant hardware into a design.
Related Controls: PL-8, PM-7, RA-2, RA-3, RA-9, SA-3, SA-4, SA-15, SA-17, SA-20, SC-2, SC-3, SC32, SC-39, SR-2, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | CLEAR ABSTRACTIONS
Implement the security design principle of clear abstractions.
Discussion: The principle of clear abstractions states that a system has simple, well-definedinterfaces and functions that provide a consistent and intuitive view of the data and how thedata is managed. The clarity, simplicity, necessity, and sufficiency of the system interfaces—

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combined with a precise definition of their functional behavior—promotes ease of analysis,
inspection, and testing as well as the correct and secure use of the system. The clarity of an
abstraction is subjective. Examples that reflect the application of this principle include
avoidance of redundant, unused interfaces; information hiding; and avoidance of semantic
overloading of interfaces or their parameters. Information hiding (i.e., representationindependent programming), is a design discipline used to ensure that the internal
representation of information in one system component is not visible to another systemcomponent invoking or calling the first component, such that the published abstraction is
not influenced by how the data may be managed internally.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | LEAST COMMON MECHANISMThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Implement the security design principle of least common mechanism in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of least common mechanism states that the amount of mechanism
common to more than one user and depended on by all users is minimized [POPEK74].
Mechanism minimization implies that different components of a system refrain from using
the same mechanism to access a system resource. Every shared mechanism (especially amechanism involving shared variables) represents a potential information path between
users and is designed with care to ensure that it does not unintentionally compromise
security [SALTZER75]. Implementing the principle of least common mechanism helps toreduce the adverse consequences of sharing the system state among different programs. A
single program that corrupts a shared state (including shared variables) has the potential tocorrupt other programs that are dependent on the state. The principle of least common
mechanism also supports the principle of simplicity of design and addresses the issue ofcovert storage channels [LAMPSON73].
Related Controls: None.
(3) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | MODULARITY AND LAYERING
Implement the security design principles of modularity and layering in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principles of modularity and layering are fundamental across systemengineering disciplines. Modularity and layering derived from functional decomposition are
effective in managing system complexity by making it possible to comprehend the structureof the system. Modular decomposition, or refinement in system design, is challenging andresists general statements of principle. Modularity serves to isolate functions and related
data structures into well-defined logical units. Layering allows the relationships of theseunits to be better understood so that dependencies are clear and undesired complexity can
be avoided. The security design principle of modularity extends functional modularity toinclude considerations based on trust, trustworthiness, privilege, and security policy.
Security-informed modular decomposition includes the allocation of policies to systems in a
network, separation of system applications into processes with distinct address spaces,
allocation of system policies to layers, and separation of processes into subjects with distinct
privileges based on hardware-supported privilege domains.
Related Controls: SC-2, SC-3.
(4) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | PARTIALLY ORDERED DEPENDENCIES
Implement the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of partially ordered dependencies states that the synchronization,
calling, and other dependencies in the system are partially ordered. A fundamental concept
in system design is layering, whereby the system is organized into well-defined, functionally

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related modules or components. The layers are linearly ordered with respect to inter-layer
dependencies, such that higher layers are dependent on lower layers. While providing
functionality to higher layers, some layers can be self-contained and not dependent on lower
layers. While a partial ordering of all functions in a given system may not be possible, if
circular dependencies are constrained to occur within layers, the inherent problems ofcircularity can be more easily managed. Partially ordered dependencies and system layering
contribute significantly to the simplicity and coherency of the system design. Partiallyordered dependencies also facilitate system testing and analysis.
Related Controls: None.
(5) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | EFFICIENTLY MEDIATED ACCESSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Implement the security design principle of efficiently mediated access in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of efficiently mediated access states that policy enforcement
mechanisms utilize the least common mechanism available while satisfying stakeholder
requirements within expressed constraints. The mediation of access to system resources(i.e., CPU, memory, devices, communication ports, services, infrastructure, data, andinformation) is often the predominant security function of secure systems. It also enables
the realization of protections for the capability provided to stakeholders by the system.
Mediation of resource access can result in performance bottlenecks if the system is notdesigned correctly. For example, by using hardware mechanisms, efficiently mediated accesscan be achieved. Once access to a low-level resource such as memory has been obtained,
hardware protection mechanisms can ensure that out-of-bounds access does not occur.
Related Controls: AC-25.
(6) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | MINIMIZED SHARING
Implement the security design principle of minimized sharing in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of minimized sharing states that no computer resource is shared
between system components (e.g., subjects, processes, functions) unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so. Minimized sharing helps to simplify system design and implementation.
In order to protect user-domain resources from arbitrary active entities, no resource isshared unless that sharing has been explicitly requested and granted. The need for resource
sharing can be motivated by the design principle of least common mechanism in the case ofinternal entities or driven by stakeholder requirements. However, internal sharing iscarefully designed to avoid performance and covert storage and timing channel problems.
Sharing via common mechanism can increase the susceptibility of data and information tounauthorized access, disclosure, use, or modification and can adversely affect the inherent
capability provided by the system. To minimize sharing induced by common mechanisms,
such mechanisms can be designed to be reentrant or virtualized to preserve separation.
Moreover, the use of global data to share information is carefully scrutinized. The lack of
encapsulation may obfuscate relationships among the sharing entities.
Related Controls: SC-31.
(7) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | REDUCED COMPLEXITY
Implement the security design principle of reduced complexity in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple
and small as possible. A small and simple design is more understandable, more analyzable,
and less prone to error. The reduced complexity principle applies to any aspect of a system,
but it has particular importance for security due to the various analyses performed to obtainevidence about the emergent security property of the system. For such analyses to be

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successful, a small and simple design is essential. Application of the principle of reduced
complexity contributes to the ability of system developers to understand the correctness
and completeness of system security functions. It also facilitates the identification ofpotential vulnerabilities. The corollary of reduced complexity states that the simplicity of thesystem is directly related to the number of vulnerabilities it will contain; that is, simpler
systems contain fewer vulnerabilities. An benefit of reduced complexity is that it is easier tounderstand whether the intended security policy has been captured in the system design
and that fewer vulnerabilities are likely to be introduced during engineering development.
An additional benefit is that any such conclusion about correctness, completeness, and theexistence of vulnerabilities can be reached with a higher degree of assurance in contrast to
conclusions reached in situations where the system design is inherently more complex.
Transitioning from older technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 toIPv6) may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously during thetransition period. This may result in a temporary increase in system complexity during thetransition.
Related Controls: None.
(8) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SECURE EVOLVABILITY
Implement the security design principle of secure evolvability in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of secure evolvability states that a system is developed to facilitate
the maintenance of its security properties when there are changes to the system’s structure,interfaces, interconnections (i.e., system architecture), functionality, or configuration (i.e.,
security policy enforcement). Changes include a new, enhanced, or upgraded systemcapability; maintenance and sustainment activities; and reconfiguration. Although it is notpossible to plan for every aspect of system evolution, system upgrades and changes can be
anticipated by analyses of mission or business strategic direction, anticipated changes in thethreat environment, and anticipated maintenance and sustainment needs. It is unrealistic to
expect that complex systems remain secure in contexts not envisioned during development,
whether such contexts are related to the operational environment or to usage. A system
may be secure in some new contexts, but there is no guarantee that its emergent behavior
will always be secure. It is easier to build trustworthiness into a system from the outset, andit follows that the sustainment of system trustworthiness requires planning for change as
opposed to adapting in an ad hoc or non-methodical manner. The benefits of this principle
include reduced vendor life cycle costs, reduced cost of ownership, improved systemsecurity, more effective management of security risk, and less risk uncertainty.
Related Controls: CM-3.
(9) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | TRUSTED COMPONENTS
Implement the security design principle of trusted components in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of trusted components states that a component is trustworthy toat least a level commensurate with the security dependencies it supports (i.e., how much itis trusted to perform its security functions by other components). This principle enables thecomposition of components such that trustworthiness is not inadvertently diminished andthe trust is not consequently misplaced. Ultimately, this principle demands some metric bywhich the trust in a component and the trustworthiness of a component can be measured
on the same abstract scale. The principle of trusted components is particularly relevant
when considering systems and components in which there are complex chains of trust
dependencies. A trust dependency is also referred to as a trust relationship and there may
be chains of trust relationships.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________The principle of trusted components also applies to a compound component that consists of
subcomponents (e.g., a subsystem), which may have varying levels of trustworthiness. The
conservative assumption is that the trustworthiness of a compound component is that of its
least trustworthy subcomponent. It may be possible to provide a security engineering
rationale that the trustworthiness of a particular compound component is greater than theconservative assumption. However, any such rationale reflects logical reasoning based on aclear statement of the trustworthiness objectives as well as relevant and credible evidence.
The trustworthiness of a compound component is not the same as increased application of
defense-in-depth layering within the component or a replication of components. Defense-indepth techniques do not increase the trustworthiness of the whole above that of the least
trustworthy component.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(10) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | HIERARCHICAL TRUST
Implement the security design principle of hierarchical trust in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of hierarchical trust for components builds on the principle oftrusted components and states that the security dependencies in a system will form a partial
ordering if they preserve the principle of trusted components. The partial ordering provides
the basis for trustworthiness reasoning or an assurance case (assurance argument) when
composing a secure system from heterogeneously trustworthy components. To analyze asystem composed of heterogeneously trustworthy components for its trustworthiness, it isessential to eliminate circular dependencies with regard to the trustworthiness. If a moretrustworthy component located in a lower layer of the system were to depend on a lesstrustworthy component in a higher layer, this would, in effect, put the components in thesame “less trustworthy” equivalence class per the principle of trusted components. Trust
relationships, or chains of trust, can have various manifestations. For example, the root
certificate of a certificate hierarchy is the most trusted node in the hierarchy, whereas theleaves in the hierarchy may be the least trustworthy nodes. Another example occurs in alayered high-assurance system where the security kernel (including the hardware base),
which is located at the lowest layer of the system, is the most trustworthy component. The
principle of hierarchical trust, however, does not prohibit the use of overly trustworthy
components. There may be cases in a system of low trustworthiness where it is reasonable
to employ a highly trustworthy component rather than one that is less trustworthy (e.g., due
to availability or other cost-benefit driver). For such a case, any dependency of the highly
trustworthy component upon a less trustworthy component does not degrade thetrustworthiness of the resulting low-trust system.
Related Controls: None.
(11) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | INVERSE MODIFICATION THRESHOLD
Implement the security design principle of inverse modification threshold in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of inverse modification threshold builds on the principle of trusted
components and the principle of hierarchical trust and states that the degree of protection
provided to a component is commensurate with its trustworthiness. As the trust placed in acomponent increases, the protection against unauthorized modification of the component
also increases to the same degree. Protection from unauthorized modification can come in
the form of the component’s own self-protection and innate trustworthiness, or it can comefrom the protections afforded to the component from other elements or attributes of the
security architecture (to include protections in the environment of operation).
Related Controls: None.

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Implement the security design principle of hierarchical protection in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of hierarchical protection states that a component need not beprotected from more trustworthy components. In the degenerate case of the most trusted
component, it protects itself from all other components. For example, if an operating systemkernel is deemed the most trustworthy component in a system, then it protects itself fromall untrusted applications it supports, but the applications, conversely, do not need toprotect themselves from the kernel. The trustworthiness of users is a consideration for
applying the principle of hierarchical protection. A trusted system need not protect itself
from an equally trustworthy user, reflecting use of untrusted systems in “system high”
environments where users are highly trustworthy and where other protections are put inplace to bound and protect the “system high” execution environment.
Related Controls: None.
(13) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | MINIMIZED SECURITY ELEMENTS
Implement the security design principle of minimized security elements in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of minimized security elements states that the system does nothave extraneous trusted components. The principle of minimized security elements has two
aspects: the overall cost of security analysis and the complexity of security analysis. Trusted
components are generally costlier to construct and implement, owing to the increased rigor
of development processes. Trusted components require greater security analysis to qualify
their trustworthiness. Thus, to reduce the cost and decrease the complexity of the security
analysis, a system contains as few trustworthy components as possible. The analysis of theinteraction of trusted components with other components of the system is one of the mostimportant aspects of system security verification. If the interactions between components
are unnecessarily complex, the security of the system will also be more difficult to ascertain
than one whose internal trust relationships are simple and elegantly constructed. In general,
fewer trusted components result in fewer internal trust relationships and a simpler system.
Related Controls: None.
(14) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | LEAST PRIVILEGE
Implement the security design principle of least privilege in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of least privilege states that each system component is allocatedsufficient privileges to accomplish its specified functions but no more. Applying the principleof least privilege limits the scope of the component’s actions, which has two desirable
effects: the security impact of a failure, corruption, or misuse of the component will have aminimized security impact, and the security analysis of the component will be simplified.
Least privilege is a pervasive principle that is reflected in all aspects of the secure systemdesign. Interfaces used to invoke component capability are available to only certain subsetsof the user population, and component design supports a sufficiently fine granularity ofprivilege decomposition. For example, in the case of an audit mechanism, there may be aninterface for the audit manager, who configures the audit settings; an interface for the audit
operator, who ensures that audit data is safely collected and stored; and, finally, yet anotherinterface for the audit reviewer, who only has need to view the audit data that has beencollected but no need to perform operations on that data.
In addition to its manifestations at the system interface, least privilege can be used as a
guiding principle for the internal structure of the system itself. One aspect of internal leastprivilege is to construct modules so that only the elements encapsulated by the module are

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directly operated on by the functions within the module. Elements external to a module that
may be affected by the module’s operation are indirectly accessed through interaction (e.g.,
via a function call) with the module that contains those elements. Another aspect of internal
least privilege is that the scope of a given module or component includes only those systemelements that are necessary for its functionality and that the access modes for the elements(e.g., read, write) are minimal.
Related Controls: AC-6, CM-7.
(15) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | PREDICATE PERMISSION
Implement the security design principle of predicate permission in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of predicate permission states that system designers consider
requiring multiple authorized entities to provide consent before a highly critical operation oraccess to highly sensitive data, information, or resources is allowed to proceed. [SALTZER75]
originally named predicate permission the separation of privilege. It is also equivalent toseparation of duty. The division of privilege among multiple parties decreases the likelihoodof abuse and provides the safeguard that no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is
sufficient to enable an unrecoverable action that can lead to significantly damaging effects.
The design options for such a mechanism may require simultaneous action (e.g., the firing of
a nuclear weapon requires two different authorized individuals to give the correct commandwithin a small time window) or a sequence of operations where each successive action isenabled by some prior action, but no single individual is able to enable more than one
action.
Related Controls: AC-5.
(16) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SELF-RELIANT TRUSTWORTHINESS
Implement the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of self-reliant trustworthiness states that systems minimize theirreliance on other systems for their own trustworthiness. A system is trustworthy by default,
and any connection to an external entity is used to supplement its function. If a system wererequired to maintain a connection with another external entity in order to maintain its
trustworthiness, then that system would be vulnerable to malicious and non-malicious
threats that could result in the loss or degradation of that connection. The benefit of theprinciple of self-reliant trustworthiness is that the isolation of a system will make it lessvulnerable to attack. A corollary to this principle relates to the ability of the system (orsystem component) to operate in isolation and then resynchronize with other components
when it is rejoined with them.
Related Controls: None.
(17) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SECURE DISTRIBUTED COMPOSITION
Implement the security design principle of secure distributed composition in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of secure distributed composition states that the composition of
distributed components that enforce the same system security policy result in a system thatenforces that policy at least as well as the individual components do. Many of the designprinciples for secure systems deal with how components can or should interact. The need tocreate or enable a capability from the composition of distributed components can magnify
the relevancy of these principles. In particular, the translation of security policy from astand-alone to a distributed system or a system-of-systems can have unexpected or
emergent results. Communication protocols and distributed data consistency mechanisms
help to ensure consistent policy enforcement across a distributed system. To ensure a

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system-wide level of assurance of correct policy enforcement, the security architecture of a
distributed composite system is thoroughly analyzed.
Related Controls: None.
(18) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS
Implement the security design principle of trusted communications channels in[Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of trusted communication channels states that when composing asystem where there is a potential threat to communications between components (i.e., theinterconnections between components), each communication channel is trustworthy to alevel commensurate with the security dependencies it supports (i.e., how much it is trusted
by other components to perform its security functions). Trusted communication channels
are achieved by a combination of restricting access to the communication channel (to ensure
an acceptable match in the trustworthiness of the endpoints involved in the communication)and employing end-to-end protections for the data transmitted over the communication
channel (to protect against interception and modification and to further increase theassurance of proper end-to-end communication).
Related Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(19) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | CONTINUOUS PROTECTION
Implement the security design principle of continuous protection in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of continuous protection states that components and data used to
enforce the security policy have uninterrupted protection that is consistent with the security
policy and the security architecture assumptions. No assurances that the system can provide
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy protections for its design capability canbe made if there are gaps in the protection. Any assurances about the ability to secure adelivered capability require that data and information are continuously protected. That is,there are no periods during which data and information are left unprotected while undercontrol of the system (i.e., during the creation, storage, processing, or communication of thedata and information, as well as during system initialization, execution, failure, interruption,and shutdown). Continuous protection requires adherence to the precepts of the referencemonitor concept (i.e., every request is validated by the reference monitor; the referencemonitor is able to protect itself from tampering; and sufficient assurance of the correctness
and completeness of the mechanism can be ascertained from analysis and testing) and theprinciple of secure failure and recovery (i.e., preservation of a secure state during error,
fault, failure, and successful attack; preservation of a secure state during recovery to normal,
degraded, or alternative operational modes).
Continuous protection also applies to systems designed to operate in varying configurations,
including those that deliver full operational capability and degraded-mode configurations
that deliver partial operational capability. The continuous protection principle requires thatchanges to the system security policies be traceable to the operational need that drives theconfiguration and be verifiable (i.e., it is possible to verify that the proposed changes will not
put the system into an insecure state). Insufficient traceability and verification may lead toinconsistent states or protection discontinuities due to the complex or undecidable nature of
the problem. The use of pre-verified configuration definitions that reflect the new security
policy enables analysis to determine that a transition from old to new policies is essentiallyatomic and that any residual effects from the old policy are guaranteed to not conflict with
the new policy. The ability to demonstrate continuous protection is rooted in the clear
articulation of life cycle protection needs as stakeholder security requirements.
Related Controls: AC-25.

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Implement the security design principle of secure metadata management in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of secure metadata management states that metadata are “firstclass” objects with respect to security policy when the policy requires either complete
protection of information or that the security subsystem be self-protecting. The principle ofsecure metadata management is driven by the recognition that a system, subsystem, orcomponent cannot achieve self-protection unless it protects the data it relies on for correct
execution. Data is generally not interpreted by the system that stores it. It may havesemantic value (i.e., it comprises information) to users and programs that process the data.
In contrast, metadata is information about data, such as a file name or the date when thefile was created. Metadata is bound to the target data that it describes in a way that thesystem can interpret, but it need not be stored inside of or proximate to its target data.
There may be metadata whose target is itself metadata (e.g., the classification level or
impact level of a file name), including self-referential metadata.
The apparent secondary nature of metadata can lead to neglect of its legitimate need forprotection, resulting in a violation of the security policy that includes the exfiltration of
information. A particular concern associated with insufficient protections for metadata is
associated with multilevel secure (MLS) systems. MLS systems mediate access by a subject toan object based on relative sensitivity levels. It follows that all subjects and objects in thescope of control of the MLS system are either directly labeled or indirectly attributed withsensitivity levels. The corollary of labeled metadata for MLS systems states that objects
containing metadata are labeled. As with protection needs assessments for data, attention is
given to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity protections are individually assessed,
specified, and allocated to metadata, as would be done for mission, business, and system
data.
Related Controls: None.
(21) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SELF-ANALYSIS
Implement the security design principle of self-analysis in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of self-analysis states that a system component is able to assess its
internal state and functionality to a limited extent at various stages of execution, and that
this self-analysis capability is commensurate with the level of trustworthiness invested in thesystem. At the system level, self-analysis can be achieved through hierarchical assessmentsof trustworthiness established in a bottom-up fashion. In this approach, the lower-levelcomponents check for data integrity and correct functionality (to a limited extent) of higherlevel components. For example, trusted boot sequences involve a trusted lower-levelcomponent that attests to the trustworthiness of the next higher-level components so that atransitive chain of trust can be established. At the root, a component attests to itself, whichusually involves an axiomatic or environmentally enforced assumption about its integrity.
Results of the self-analyses can be used to guard against externally induced errors, internal
malfunction, or transient errors. By following this principle, some simple malfunctions or
errors can be detected without allowing the effects of the error or malfunction to propagate
outside of the component. Further, the self-test can be used to attest to the configuration of
the component, detecting any potential conflicts in configuration with respect to the
expected configuration.
Related Controls: CA-7.
(22) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRACEABILITY

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Implement the security design principle of accountability and traceability in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of accountability and traceability states that it is possible to trace
security-relevant actions (i.e., subject-object interactions) to the entity on whose behalf theaction is being taken. The principle of accountability and traceability requires a trustworthy
infrastructure that can record details about actions that affect system security (e.g., an audit
subsystem). To record the details about actions, the system is able to uniquely identify theentity on whose behalf the action is being carried out and also record the relevant sequenceof actions that are carried out. The accountability policy also requires that audit trail itself be
protected from unauthorized access and modification. The principle of least privilege assistsin tracing the actions to particular entities, as it increases the granularity of accountability.
Associating specific actions with system entities, and ultimately with users, and making theaudit trail secure against unauthorized access and modifications provide non-repudiation
because once an action is recorded, it is not possible to change the audit trail. Anotherimportant function that accountability and traceability serves is in the routine and forensic
analysis of events associated with the violation of security policy. Analysis of audit logs may
provide additional information that may be helpful in determining the path or component
that allowed the violation of the security policy and the actions of individuals associated withthe violation of the security policy.
Related Controls: AC-6, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-9, AU-10, AU-12, IA-2, IR-4.
(23) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SECURE DEFAULTS
Implement the security design principle of secure defaults in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of secure defaults states that the default configuration of a system(including its constituent subsystems, components, and mechanisms) reflects a restrictive
and conservative enforcement of security policy. The principle of secure defaults applies tothe initial (i.e., default) configuration of a system as well as to the security engineering anddesign of access control and other security functions that follow a “deny unless explicitly
authorized” strategy. The initial configuration aspect of this principle requires that any “asshipped” configuration of a system, subsystem, or system component does not aid in theviolation of the security policy and can prevent the system from operating in the default
configuration for those cases where the security policy itself requires configuration by theoperational user.
Restrictive defaults mean that the system will operate “as-shipped” with adequate selfprotection and be able to prevent security breaches before the intended security policy andsystem configuration is established. In cases where the protection provided by the “asshipped” product is inadequate, stakeholders assess the risk of using it prior to establishing asecure initial state. Adherence to the principle of secure defaults guarantees that a system isestablished in a secure state upon successfully completing initialization. In situations where
the system fails to complete initialization, either it will perform a requested operation using
secure defaults or it will not perform the operation. Refer to the principles of continuous
protection and secure failure and recovery that parallel this principle to provide the ability todetect and recover from failure.
The security engineering approach to this principle states that security mechanisms denyrequests unless the request is found to be well-formed and consistent with the security
policy. The insecure alternative is to allow a request unless it is shown to be inconsistent
with the policy. In a large system, the conditions that are satisfied to grant a request that isdenied by default are often far more compact and complete than those that would need to
be checked in order to deny a request that is granted by default.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-6, SA-4.

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Implement the security design principle of secure failure and recovery in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of secure failure and recovery states that neither a failure in asystem function or mechanism nor any recovery action in response to failure leads to aviolation of security policy. The principle of secure failure and recovery parallels the principleof continuous protection to ensure that a system is capable of detecting (within limits) actual
and impending failure at any stage of its operation (i.e., initialization, normal operation,
shutdown, and maintenance) and to take appropriate steps to ensure that security policies
are not violated. In addition, when specified, the system is capable of recovering from
impending or actual failure to resume normal, degraded, or alternative secure operations
while ensuring that a secure state is maintained such that security policies are not violated.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Failure is a condition in which the behavior of a component deviates from its specified or
expected behavior for an explicitly documented input. Once a failed security function isdetected, the system may reconfigure itself to circumvent the failed component while
maintaining security and provide all or part of the functionality of the original system, or it
may completely shut itself down to prevent any further violation of security policies. For thisto occur, the reconfiguration functions of the system are designed to ensure continuous
enforcement of security policy during the various phases of reconfiguration.
Another technique that can be used to recover from failures is to perform a rollback to asecure state (which may be the initial state) and then either shutdown or replace the service
or component that failed such that secure operations may resume. Failure of a component
may or may not be detectable to the components using it. The principle of secure failure
indicates that components fail in a state that denies rather than grants access. For example,
a nominally “atomic” operation interrupted before completion does not violate security
policy and is designed to handle interruption events by employing higher-level atomicity androllback mechanisms (e.g., transactions). If a service is being used, its atomicity properties
are well-documented and characterized so that the component availing itself of that service
can detect and handle interruption events appropriately. For example, a system is designed
to gracefully respond to disconnection and support resynchronization and data consistency
after disconnection.
Failure protection strategies that employ replication of policy enforcement mechanisms,
sometimes called defense in depth, can allow the system to continue in a secure state evenwhen one mechanism has failed to protect the system. If the mechanisms are similar,
however, the additional protection may be illusory, as the adversary can simply attack inseries. Similarly, in a networked system, breaking the security on one system or service may
enable an attacker to do the same on other similar replicated systems and services. By
employing multiple protection mechanisms whose features are significantly different, thepossibility of attack replication or repetition can be reduced. Analyses are conducted toweigh the costs and benefits of such redundancy techniques against increased resource
usage and adverse effects on the overall system performance. Additional analyses are
conducted as the complexity of these mechanisms increases, as could be the case fordynamic behaviors. Increased complexity generally reduces trustworthiness. When aresource cannot be continuously protected, it is critical to detect and repair any security
breaches before the resource is once again used in a secure context.
Related Controls: CP-10, CP-12, SC-7, SC-8, SC-24, SI-13.
(25) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | ECONOMIC SECURITY
Implement the security design principle of economic security in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].

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Discussion: The principle of economic security states that security mechanisms are notcostlier than the potential damage that could occur from a security breach. This is the
security-relevant form of the cost-benefit analyses used in risk management. The cost
assumptions of cost-benefit analysis prevent the system designer from incorporating
security mechanisms of greater strength than necessary, where strength of mechanism is
proportional to cost. The principle of economic security also requires analysis of the benefitsof assurance relative to the cost of that assurance in terms of the effort expended to obtainrelevant and credible evidence as well as the necessary analyses to assess and draw
trustworthiness and risk conclusions from the evidence.
Related Controls: RA-3.
(26) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | PERFORMANCE SECURITY
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Implement the security design principle of performance security in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of performance security states that security mechanisms areconstructed so that they do not degrade system performance unnecessarily. Stakeholder
and system design requirements for performance and security are precisely articulated andprioritized. For the system implementation to meet its design requirements and be foundacceptable to stakeholders (i.e., validation against stakeholder requirements), the designers
adhere to the specified constraints that capability performance needs place on protectionneeds. The overall impact of computationally intensive security services (e.g., cryptography)
are assessed and demonstrated to pose no significant impact to higher-priority performance
considerations or are deemed to provide an acceptable trade-off of performance fortrustworthy protection. The trade-off considerations include less computationally intensive
security services unless they are unavailable or insufficient. The insufficiency of a security
service is determined by functional capability and strength of mechanism. The strength ofmechanism is selected with respect to security requirements, performance-critical overhead
issues (e.g., cryptographic key management), and an assessment of the capability of thethreat.
The principle of performance security leads to the incorporation of features that help in theenforcement of security policy but incur minimum overhead, such as low-level hardware
mechanisms upon which higher-level services can be built. Such low-level mechanisms areusually very specific, have very limited functionality, and are optimized for performance. For
example, once access rights to a portion of memory is granted, many systems use hardware
mechanisms to ensure that all further accesses involve the correct memory address andaccess mode. Application of this principle reinforces the need to design security into thesystem from the ground up and to incorporate simple mechanisms at the lower layers thatcan be used as building blocks for higher-level mechanisms.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SI-2, SI-7.
(27) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | HUMAN FACTORED SECURITY
Implement the security design principle of human factored security in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of human factored security states that the user interface forsecurity functions and supporting services is intuitive, user-friendly, and provides feedback
for user actions that affect such policy and its enforcement. The mechanisms that enforce
security policy are not intrusive to the user and are designed not to degrade user efficiency.
Security policy enforcement mechanisms also provide the user with meaningful, clear, andrelevant feedback and warnings when insecure choices are being made. Particular attention
is given to interfaces through which personnel responsible for system administration andoperation configure and set up the security policies. Ideally, these personnel are able to

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understand the impact of their choices. Personnel with system administrative andoperational responsibilities are able to configure systems before start-up and administerthem during runtime with confidence that their intent is correctly mapped to the system’s
mechanisms. Security services, functions, and mechanisms do not impede or unnecessarily
complicate the intended use of the system. There is a trade-off between system usability
and the strictness necessary for security policy enforcement. If security mechanisms are
frustrating or difficult to use, then users may disable them, avoid them, or use them in ways
inconsistent with the security requirements and protection needs that the mechanisms were
designed to satisfy.
Related Controls: None.
(28) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | ACCEPTABLE SECURITY
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Implement the security design principle of acceptable security in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of acceptable security requires that the level of privacy andperformance that the system provides is consistent with the users’ expectations. The
perception of personal privacy may affect user behavior, morale, and effectiveness. Basedon the organizational privacy policy and the system design, users should be able to restrict
their actions to protect their privacy. When systems fail to provide intuitive interfaces ormeet privacy and performance expectations, users may either choose to completely avoid
the system or use it in ways that may be inefficient or even insecure.
Related Controls: None.
(29) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | REPEATABLE AND DOCUMENTED PROCEDURES
Implement the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures in[Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of repeatable and documented procedures states that thetechniques and methods employed to construct a system component permit the same
component to be completely and correctly reconstructed at a later time. Repeatable anddocumented procedures support the development of a component that is identical to thecomponent created earlier, which may be in widespread use. In the case of other system
artifacts (e.g., documentation and testing results), repeatability supports consistency and theability to inspect the artifacts. Repeatable and documented procedures can be introduced atvarious stages within the system development life cycle and contribute to the ability toevaluate assurance claims for the system. Examples include systematic procedures for codedevelopment and review, procedures for the configuration management of development
tools and system artifacts, and procedures for system delivery.
Related Controls: CM-1, SA-1, SA-10, SA-11, SA-15, SA-17, SC-1, SI-1.
(30) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | PROCEDURAL RIGOR
Implement the security design principle of procedural rigor in [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of procedural rigor states that the rigor of a system life cycle
process is commensurate with its intended trustworthiness. Procedural rigor defines thescope, depth, and detail of the system life cycle procedures. Rigorous system life cycle
procedures contribute to the assurance that the system is correct and free of unintended
functionality in several ways. First, the procedures impose checks and balances on the life
cycle process such that the introduction of unspecified functionality is prevented.
Second, rigorous procedures applied to systems security engineering activities that produce
specifications and other system design documents contribute to the ability to understand

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the system as it has been built rather than trusting that the component, as implemented, isthe authoritative (and potentially misleading) specification.
Finally, modifications to an existing system component are easier when there are detailed
specifications that describe its current design instead of studying source code or schematics
to try to understand how it works. Procedural rigor helps ensure that security functional andassurance requirements have been satisfied, and it contributes to a better-informed basis
for the determination of trustworthiness and risk posture. Procedural rigor is commensuratewith the degree of assurance desired for the system. If the required trustworthiness of thesystem is low, a high level of procedural rigor may add unnecessary cost, whereas when hightrustworthiness is critical, the cost of high procedural rigor is merited.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(31) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SECURE SYSTEM MODIFICATION
Implement the security design principle of secure system modification in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of secure system modification states that system modification
maintains system security with respect to the security requirements and risk tolerance of
stakeholders. Upgrades or modifications to systems can transform secure systems into
systems that are not secure. The procedures for system modification ensure that if thesystem is to maintain its trustworthiness, the same rigor that was applied to its initialdevelopment is applied to any system changes. Because modifications can affect the abilityof the system to maintain its secure state, a careful security analysis of the modification isneeded prior to its implementation and deployment. This principle parallels the principle ofsecure evolvability.
Related Controls: CM-3, CM-4.
(32) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | SUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION
Implement the security design principle of sufficient documentation in [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: The principle of sufficient documentation states that organizational personnel
with responsibilities to interact with the system are provided with adequate documentationand other information such that the personnel contribute to rather than detract fromsystem security. Despite attempts to comply with principles such as human factored security
and acceptable security, systems are inherently complex, and the design intent for the use of
security mechanisms and the ramifications of the misuse or misconfiguration of security
mechanisms are not always intuitively obvious. Uninformed and insufficiently trained users
can introduce vulnerabilities due to errors of omission and commission. The availability of
documentation and training can help to ensure a knowledgeable cadre of personnel, all ofwhom have a critical role in the achievement of principles such as continuous protection.
Documentation is written clearly and supported by training that provides security awarenessand understanding of security-relevant responsibilities.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, SA-5.
(33) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | MINIMIZATION
Implement the privacy principle of minimization using [Assignment: organization-definedprocesses].
Discussion: The principle of minimization states that organizations should only process
personally identifiable information that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish an
authorized purpose and should only maintain personally identifiable information for as longas is necessary to accomplish the purpose. Organizations have processes in place, consistent
with applicable laws and policies, to implement the principle of minimization.

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Related Controls: PE-8, PM-25, SC-42, SI-12.
References: [PRIVACT], [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199], [FIPS 200], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-53A], [SP 80060-1], [SP 800-60-2], [SP 800-160-1], [IR 8062].

SA-9

EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5a.

Require that providers of external system services comply with organizational security andprivacy requirements and employ the following controls: [Assignment: organization-defined
controls];b.

Define and document organizational oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard
to external system services; andc.

Employ the following processes, methods, and techniques to monitor control compliance by
external service providers on an ongoing basis: [Assignment: organization-defined processes,
methods, and techniques].

Discussion: External system services are provided by an external provider, and the organization
has no direct control over the implementation of the required controls or the assessment ofcontrol effectiveness. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in avariety of ways, including through business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements,
lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, joint ventures, and supply chain
exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external system services
remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust requiresthat organizations establish and retain a certain level of confidence that each provider in the
consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The
extent and nature of this chain of trust vary based on relationships between organizations andthe external providers. Organizations document the basis for the trust relationships so that therelationships can be monitored. External system services documentation includes government,
service providers, end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements.
Service-level agreements define the expectations of performance for implemented controls,
describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified
instances of noncompliance.
Related Controls: AC-20, CA-3, CP-2, IR-4, IR-7, PL-10, PL-11, PS-7, SA-2, SA-4, SR-3, SR-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | RISK ASSESSMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS(a) Conduct an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of
information security services; and(b) Verify that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services isapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Information security services include the operation of security devices, such as
firewalls or key management services as well as incident monitoring, analysis, and response.
Risks assessed can include system, mission or business, security, privacy, or supply chain
risks.
Related Controls: CA-6, RA-3, RA-8.
(2) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES
Require providers of the following external system services to identify the functions, ports,
protocols, and other services required for the use of such services: [Assignment:
organization-defined external system services].

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Discussion: Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions,ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be useful when theneed arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions and services
or blocking certain ports and protocols.
Related Controls: CM-6, CM-7.
(3) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERS
Establish, document, and maintain trust relationships with external service providers
based on the following requirements, properties, factors, or conditions: [Assignment:
organization-defined security and privacy requirements, properties, factors, or conditions
defining acceptable trust relationships].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Trust relationships between organizations and external service providers reflect
the degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level.
Trust relationships can help organizations gain increased levels of confidence that service
providers are providing adequate protection for the services rendered and can also be usefulwhen conducting incident response or when planning for upgrades or obsolescence. Trust
relationships can be complicated due to the potentially large number of entities participatingin the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships and levels of trust, andtypes of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree of trust is based on thelevel of control that organizations can exert on external service providers regarding thecontrols necessary for the protection of the service, information, or individual privacy andthe evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of the implemented controls. The level ofcontrol is established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or service-levelagreements.
Related Controls: SR-2.
(4) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES |CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS
Take the following actions to verify that the interests of [Assignment: organizationdefined external service providers] are consistent with and reflect organizational interests:[Assignment: organization-defined actions].
Discussion: As organizations increasingly use external service providers, it is possible thatthe interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In suchsituations, simply having the required technical, management, or operational controls inplace may not be sufficient if the providers that implement and manage those controls are
not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming organizations.
Actions that organizations take to address such concerns include requiring backgroundchecks for selected service provider personnel; examining ownership records; employing
only trustworthy service providers, such as providers with which organizations have had
successful trust relationships; and conducting routine, periodic, unscheduled visits to service
provider facilities.
Related Controls: None.
(5) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATION
Restrict the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing; information or
data; system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations] based on[Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].
Discussion: The location of information processing, information and data storage, or systemservices can have a direct impact on the ability of organizations to successfully execute their
mission and business functions. The impact occurs when external providers control thelocation of processing, storage, or services. The criteria that external providers use for theselection of processing, storage, or service locations may be different from the criteria thatorganizations use. For example, organizations may desire that data or information storage

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locations be restricted to certain locations to help facilitate incident response activities incase of information security incidents or breaches. Incident response activities, including
forensic analyses and after-the-fact investigations, may be adversely affected by thegoverning laws, policies, or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur
and/or the locations from which system services emanate.
Related Controls: SA-5, SR-4.
(6) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | ORGANIZATION-CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS
Maintain exclusive control of cryptographic keys for encrypted material stored ortransmitted through an external system.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Maintaining exclusive control of cryptographic keys in an external systemprevents decryption of organizational data by external system staff. Organizational controlof cryptographic keys can be implemented by encrypting and decrypting data inside theorganization as data is sent to and received from the external system or by employing acomponent that permits encryption and decryption functions to be local to the external
system but allows exclusive organizational access to the encryption keys.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SI-4.
(7) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | ORGANIZATION-CONTROLLED INTEGRITY CHECKING
Provide the capability to check the integrity of information while it resides in the external
system.
Discussion: Storage of organizational information in an external system could limit visibility
into the security status of its data. The ability of the organization to verify and validate theintegrity of its stored data without transferring it out of the external system provides such
visibility.
Related Controls: SI-7.
(8) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | PROCESSING AND STORAGE LOCATION — U.S. JURISDICTION
Restrict the geographic location of information processing and data storage to facilities
located within in the legal jurisdictional boundary of the United States.
Discussion: The geographic location of information processing and data storage can have a
direct impact on the ability of organizations to successfully execute their mission andbusiness functions. A compromise or breach of high impact information and systems canhave severe or catastrophic adverse impacts on organizational assets and operations,individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Restricting the processing and storage ofhigh-impact information to facilities within the legal jurisdictional boundary of the UnitedStates provides greater control over such processing and storage.
Related Controls: SA-5, SR-4.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-35], [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-161], [SP 800-171].

SA-10 DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Control: Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:a.

Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one ormore): design; development; implementation; operation; disposal];b.

Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organizationdefined configuration items under configuration management];c.

Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;

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Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential
security and privacy impacts of such changes; ande.

Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and reportfindings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].

Discussion: Organizations consider the quality and completeness of configuration management
activities conducted by developers as direct evidence of applying effective security controls.
Controls include protecting the master copies of material used to generate security-relevant
portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware from unauthorized modification or
destruction. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the system, system component, or systemservice requires strict configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to
track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

The configuration items that are placed under configuration management include the formal
model; the functional, high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data;
implementation documentation; source code and hardware schematics; the current runningversion of the object code; tools for comparing new versions of security-relevant hardware
descriptions and source code with previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation.
Depending on the mission and business needs of organizations and the nature of the contractual
relationships in place, developers may provide configuration management support during theoperations and maintenance stage of the system development life cycle.
Related Controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-7, CM-9, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-15, SI-2, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5,
SR-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to enable
integrity verification of software and firmware components.
Discussion: Software and firmware integrity verification allows organizations to detect
unauthorized changes to software and firmware components using developer-provided
tools, techniques, and mechanisms. The integrity checking mechanisms can also address
counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity ofsoftware and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided
by developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates tosuch components.
Related Controls: SI-7, SR-11.
(2) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENTPROCESSES

Provide an alternate configuration management process using organizational personnel in
the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.
Discussion: Alternate configuration management processes may be required whenorganizations use commercial off-the-shelf information technology products. Alternate
configuration management processes include organizational personnel who review andapprove proposed changes to systems, system components, and system services andconduct security and privacy impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes tosystems, components, or services.
Related Controls: None.
(3) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to enable
integrity verification of hardware components.

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Discussion: Hardware integrity verification allows organizations to detect unauthorizedchanges to hardware components using developer-provided tools, techniques, methods, andmechanisms. Organizations may verify the integrity of hardware components with hard-tocopy labels, verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, and by requiring the use ofanti-tamper technologies. Delivered hardware components also include hardware andfirmware updates to such components.
Related Controls: SI-7.
(4) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED GENERATION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ
tools for comparing newly generated versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions,source code, and object code with previous versions.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The trusted generation of descriptions, source code, and object code addresses
authorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware components between versions
during development. The focus is on the efficacy of the configuration management processby the developer to ensure that newly generated versions of security-relevant hardware
descriptions, source code, and object code continue to enforce the security policy for thesystem, system component, or system service. In contrast, SA-10(1) and SA-10(3) allow
organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware
components using tools, techniques, or mechanisms provided by developers.
Related Controls: None.
(5) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | MAPPING INTEGRITY FOR VERSION CONTROL
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to maintainthe integrity of the mapping between the master build data describing the current versionof security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of thedata for the current version.
Discussion: Mapping integrity for version control addresses changes to hardware, software,and firmware components during both initial development and system development life
cycle updates. Maintaining the integrity between the master copies of security-relevant
hardware, software, and firmware (including designs, hardware drawings, source code) andthe equivalent data in master copies in operational environments is essential to ensuring theavailability of organizational systems that support critical mission and business functions.
Related Controls: None.
(6) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to executeprocedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates
distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by the master copies.
Discussion: The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware
updates help to ensure that the updates are correct representations of the master copies
maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.
Related Controls: None.
(7) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPRESENTATIVES
Require [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy representatives] to be
included in the [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change management andcontrol process].
Discussion: Information security and privacy representatives can include system security
officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, andsystem privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy

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expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side
effects, some of which may be security- or privacy-relevant. Detecting such changes early inthe process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affectthe security and privacy posture of systems. The configuration change management andcontrol process in this control enhancement refers to the change management and control
process defined by organizations in SA-10b.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-128], [SP 800-160-1].

SA-11 DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service, at all postdesign stages of the system development life cycle, to:a.

Develop and implement a plan for ongoing security and privacy control assessments;b.

Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] at [Assignment: organization-defined depth
and coverage];c.

Produce evidence of the execution of the assessment plan and the results of the testing andevaluation;d.

Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; ande.

Correct flaws identified during testing and evaluation.

Discussion: Developmental testing and evaluation confirms that the required controls are
implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security and privacy
policies, and meeting established security and privacy requirements. Security properties ofsystems and the privacy of individuals may be affected by the interconnection of systemcomponents or changes to those components. The interconnections or changes—including
upgrading or replacing applications, operating systems, and firmware—may adversely affectpreviously implemented controls. Ongoing assessment during development allows for additional
types of testing and evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential
flaws. Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as manual code
review, security architecture review, and penetration testing, as well as and static analysis,
dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three analysis approaches.
Developers can use the analysis approaches, along with security instrumentation and fuzzing, in avariety of tools and in source code reviews. The security and privacy assessment plans include
the specific activities that developers plan to carry out, including the types of analyses, testing,evaluation, and reviews of software and firmware components; the degree of rigor to be applied;the frequency of the ongoing testing and evaluation; and the types of artifacts produced during
those processes. The depth of testing and evaluation refers to the rigor and level of detailassociated with the assessment process. The coverage of testing and evaluation refers to thescope (i.e., number and type) of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts
specify the acceptance criteria for security and privacy assessment plans, flaw remediation
processes, and the evidence that the plans and processes have been diligently applied. Methods
for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence, and documentation are commensuratewith the security category or classification level of the system. Contracts may specify protection
requirements for documentation.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-15, SA-17, SI-2, SR-5, SR-6, SR-7.
Control Enhancements:

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Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ
static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of theanalysis.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews
and includes checking for weaknesses in the code as well as for the incorporation of libraries
or other included code with known vulnerabilities or that are out-of-date and not supported.
Static code analysis can be used to identify vulnerabilities and enforce secure coding
practices. It is most effective when used early in the development process, when each codechange can automatically be scanned for potential weaknesses. Static code analysis canprovide clear remediation guidance and identify defects for developers to fix. Evidence ofthe correct implementation of static analysis can include aggregate defect density for critical
defect types, evidence that defects were inspected by developers or security professionals,
and evidence that defects were remediated. A high density of ignored findings, commonlyreferred to as false positives, indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or the
analysis tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence
from other sources.
Related Controls: None.
(2) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT MODELING AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSES
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to performthreat modeling and vulnerability analyses during development and the subsequenttesting and evaluation of the system, component, or service that:(a) Uses the following contextual information: [Assignment: organization-defined
information concerning impact, environment of operations, known or assumed
threats, and acceptable risk levels];(b) Employs the following tools and methods: [Assignment: organization-defined tools
and methods];(c) Conducts the modeling and analyses at the following level of rigor: [Assignment:
organization-defined breadth and depth of modeling and analyses]; and(d) Produces evidence that meets the following acceptance criteria: [Assignment:
organization-defined acceptance criteria].
Discussion: Systems, system components, and system services may deviate significantly
from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design
stages of the system development life cycle. Therefore, updates to threat modeling andvulnerability analyses of those systems, system components, and system services during
development and prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems,
components, and services. Threat modeling and vulnerability analyses at this stage of thesystem development life cycle ensure that design and implementation changes have beenaccounted for and that vulnerabilities created because of those changes have been reviewed
and mitigated.
Related controls: PM-15, RA-3, RA-5.
(3) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS AND
EVIDENCE(a) Require an independent agent satisfying [Assignment: organization-definedindependence criteria] to verify the correct implementation of the developer security
and privacy assessment plans and the evidence produced during testing andevaluation; andCHAPTER THREE

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the verification process or granted the authority to obtain such information.
Discussion: Independent agents have the qualifications—including the expertise, skills,
training, certifications, and experience—to verify the correct implementation of developer
security and privacy assessment plans.
Related Controls: AT-3, RA-5.
(4) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | MANUAL CODE REVIEWS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to perform amanual code review of [Assignment: organization-defined specific code] using thefollowing processes, procedures, and/or techniques: [Assignment: organization-definedprocesses, procedures, and/or techniques].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Manual code reviews are usually reserved for the critical software and firmware
components of systems. Manual code reviews are effective at identifying weaknesses that
require knowledge of the application’s requirements or context that, in most cases, isunavailable to automated analytic tools and techniques, such as static and dynamic analysis.
The benefits of manual code review include the ability to verify access control matrices
against application controls and review detailed aspects of cryptographic implementations
and controls.
Related Controls: None.
(5) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | PENETRATION TESTING
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to perform
penetration testing:(a) At the following level of rigor: [Assignment: organization-defined breadth and depthof testing]; and(b) Under the following constraints: [Assignment: organization-defined constraints].
Discussion: Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors, using all
available information technology product or system documentation and working under
specific constraints, attempt to circumvent the implemented security and privacy features of
information technology products and systems. Useful information for assessors who conduct
penetration testing includes product and system design specifications, source code, andadministrator and operator manuals. Penetration testing can include white-box, gray-box, or
black-box testing with analyses performed by skilled professionals who simulate adversary
actions. The objective of penetration testing is to discover vulnerabilities in systems, systemcomponents, and services that result from implementation errors, configuration faults, orother operational weaknesses or deficiencies. Penetration tests can be performed inconjunction with automated and manual code reviews to provide a greater level of analysis
than would ordinarily be possible. When user session information and other personallyidentifiable information is captured or recorded during penetration testing, such informationis handled appropriately to protect privacy.
Related Controls: CA-8, PM-14, PM-25, PT-2, SA-3, SI-2, SI-6.
(6) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | ATTACK SURFACE REVIEWS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to perform
attack surface reviews.
Discussion: Attack surfaces of systems and system components are exposed areas thatmake those systems more vulnerable to attacks. Attack surfaces include any accessible areas
where weaknesses or deficiencies in the hardware, software, and firmware components
provide opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack surface reviews
ensure that developers analyze the design and implementation changes to systems and

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mitigate attack vectors generated as a result of the changes. The correction of identified
flaws includes deprecation of unsafe functions.
Related Controls: SA-15.
(7) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING AND EVALUATION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to verify thatthe scope of testing and evaluation provides complete coverage of the required controls at
the following level of rigor: [Assignment: organization-defined breadth and depth of
testing and evaluation].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Verifying that testing and evaluation provides complete coverage of required
controls can be accomplished by a variety of analytic techniques ranging from informal toformal. Each of these techniques provides an increasing level of assurance that corresponds
to the degree of formality of the analysis. Rigorously demonstrating control coverage at thehighest levels of assurance can be achieved using formal modeling and analysis techniques,
including correlation between control implementation and corresponding test cases.
Related Controls: SA-15.
(8) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODE ANALYSIS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ
dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of theanalysis.
Discussion: Dynamic code analysis provides runtime verification of software programs using
tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege issues, andother potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs runtime tools to ensurethat security functionality performs in the way it was designed. A type of dynamic analysis,known as fuzz testing, induces program failures by deliberately introducing malformed or
random data into software programs. Fuzz testing strategies are derived from the intended
use of applications and the functional and design specifications for the applications. To
understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and the assurance provided, organizations
may also consider conducting code coverage analysis (i.e., checking the degree to which thecode has been tested using metrics such as percent of subroutines tested or percent ofprogram statements called during execution of the test suite) and/or concordance analysis(i.e., checking for words that are out of place in software code, such as non-English language
words or derogatory terms).
Related Controls: None.
(9) DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION | INTERACTIVE APPLICATION SECURITY TESTING
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ
interactive application security testing tools to identify flaws and document the results.
Discussion: Interactive (also known as instrumentation-based) application security testing isa method of detecting vulnerabilities by observing applications as they run during testing.
The use of instrumentation relies on direct measurements of the actual running applications
and uses access to the code, user interaction, libraries, frameworks, backend connections,and configurations to directly measure control effectiveness. When combined with analysis
techniques, interactive application security testing can identify a broad range of potential
vulnerabilities and confirm control effectiveness. Instrumentation-based testing works inreal time and can be used continuously throughout the system development life cycle.
Related Controls: None.
References: [ISO 15408-3], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-154], [SP 800-160-1].

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SA-12 SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SR Family.]
Control Enhancements:(1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS / METHODS[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-5.](2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-6.](3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SR-3.]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(4) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-3(1).](5) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM
[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-3(2).](6) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SR-5(1).](7) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-5(2).](8) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3(2).](9) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-7.](10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-4(3).](11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND
ACTORS[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-6(1).](12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-8.](13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-6 and RA-9.](14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITY[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-4(1) and SR-4(2).](15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SR-3.]

SA-13 TRUSTWORTHINESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-8.]

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SA-14 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-9.]
Control Enhancements:(1) CRITICALITY ANALYSIS | CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-20.]

SA-15 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS
Control:a.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5b.

Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to follow a
documented development process that:1.

Explicitly addresses security and privacy requirements;

2.

Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;3.

Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development
process; and4.

Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools
used in development; andReview the development process, standards, tools, tool options, and tool configurations[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools,
tool options and tool configurations selected and employed can satisfy the following security
and privacy requirements: [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy
requirements].

Discussion: Development tools include programming languages and computer-aided design
systems. Reviews of development processes include the use of maturity models to determine thepotential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools andprocesses facilitates effective supply chain risk assessment and mitigation. Such integrity requires
configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes
and prevent unauthorized changes.
Related Controls: MA-6, SA-3, SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-6, SR-9.
Control Enhancements:(1) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY METRICS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and(b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-definedprogram review milestones]; upon delivery].
Discussion: Organizations use quality metrics to establish acceptable levels of system
quality. Metrics can include quality gates, which are collections of completion criteria or
sufficiency standards that represent the satisfactory execution of specific phases of thesystem development project. For example, a quality gate may require the elimination of allcompiler warnings or a determination that such warnings have no impact on theeffectiveness of required security or privacy capabilities. During the execution phases ofdevelopment projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress.
Other metrics apply to the entire development project. Metrics can include defining theseverity thresholds of vulnerabilities in accordance with organizational risk tolerance, such

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as requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered system with a Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) severity of medium or high.
Related Controls: None.
(2) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY AND PRIVACY TRACKING TOOLS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to select andemploy security and privacy tracking tools for use during the development process.
Discussion: System development teams select and deploy security and privacy tracking
tools, including vulnerability or work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment,sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with
development processes.
Related Controls: SA-11.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to perform a
criticality analysis:(a) At the following decision points in the system development life cycle: [Assignment:
organization-defined decision points in the system development life cycle]; and(b) At the following level of rigor: [Assignment: organization-defined breadth and depthof criticality analysis].
Discussion: Criticality analysis performed by the developer provides input to the criticality
analysis performed by organizations. Developer input is essential to organizational criticality
analysis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation forsystem components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf products. Such design
documentation includes functional specifications, high-level designs, low-level designs,
source code, and hardware schematics. Criticality analysis is important for organizational
systems that are designated as high value assets. High value assets can be moderate- or
high-impact systems due to heightened adversarial interest or potential adverse effects on
the federal enterprise. Developer input is especially important when organizations conduct
supply chain criticality analyses.
Related Controls: RA-9.
(4) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT MODELING AND VULNERABILITYANALYSIS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-11(2).](5) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to reduce
attack surfaces to [Assignment: organization-defined thresholds].
Discussion: Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with threat and vulnerability analyses
and system architecture and design. Attack surface reduction is a means of reducing risk toorganizations by giving attackers less opportunity to exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e.,
potential vulnerabilities) within systems, system components, and system services. Attack
surface reduction includes implementing the concept of layered defenses, applying theprinciples of least privilege and least functionality, applying secure software development
practices, deprecating unsafe functions, reducing entry points available to unauthorizedusers, reducing the amount of code that executes, and eliminating application programming
interfaces (APIs) that are vulnerable to attacks.
Related Controls: AC-6, CM-7, RA-3, SA-11.
(6) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

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Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to implement
an explicit process to continuously improve the development process.
Discussion: Developers of systems, system components, and system services consider theeffectiveness and efficiency of their development processes for meeting quality objectives
and addressing the security and privacy capabilities in current threat environments.
Related Controls: None.
(7) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] to:(a) Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-definedtools];
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(b) Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities;(c) Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and(d) Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Automated tools can be more effective at analyzing exploitable weaknesses ordeficiencies in large and complex systems, prioritizing vulnerabilities by severity, andproviding recommendations for risk mitigations.
Related Controls: RA-5, SA-11.
(8) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF THREAT AND VULNERABILITY
INFORMATION

Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to use threat
modeling and vulnerability analyses from similar systems, components, or services toinform the current development process.
Discussion: Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can inform
potential design and implementation issues for systems under development. Similar systems
or system components may exist within developer organizations. Vulnerability information isavailable from a variety of public and private sector sources, including the NIST National
Vulnerability Database.
Related Controls: None.
(9) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | USE OF LIVE DATA[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-3(2).](10) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to provide,
implement, and test an incident response plan.
Discussion: The incident response plan provided by developers may provide information notreadily available to organizations and be incorporated into organizational incident responseplans. Developer information may also be extremely helpful, such as when organizations
respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf products.
Related Controls: IR-8.
(11) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ARCHIVE SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
Require the developer of the system or system component to archive the system orcomponent to be released or delivered together with the corresponding evidence
supporting the final security and privacy review.

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Discussion: Archiving system or system components requires the developer to retain key
development artifacts, including hardware specifications, source code, object code, andrelevant documentation from the development process that can provide a readily available
configuration baseline for system and component upgrades or modifications.
Related Controls: CM-2.
(12) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE
INFORMATION

Require the developer of the system or system component to minimize the use of
personally identifiable information in development and test environments.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by using
techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personallyidentifiable information in development and test environments helps reduce the level ofprivacy risk created by a system.
Related Controls: PM-25, SA-3, SA-8.
References: [SP 800-160-1], [IR 8179].

SA-16 DEVELOPER-PROVIDED TRAINING
Control: Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to provide
the following training on the correct use and operation of the implemented security and privacy
functions, controls, and/or mechanisms: [Assignment: organization-defined training].
Discussion: Developer-provided training applies to external and internal (in-house) developers.
Training personnel is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the controls implemented withinorganizational systems. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training,classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Organizations can also
request training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer self-training toorganizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and may
require different types of training for different security and privacy functions, controls, andmechanisms.
Related Controls: AT-2, AT-3, PE-3, SA-4, SA-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SA-17 DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN
Control: Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to produce
a design specification and security and privacy architecture that:a.

Is consistent with the organization’s security and privacy architecture that is an integral partthe organization’s enterprise architecture;b.

Accurately and completely describes the required security and privacy functionality, and theallocation of controls among physical and logical components; andc.

Expresses how individual security and privacy functions, mechanisms, and services work
together to provide required security and privacy capabilities and a unified approach toprotection.

Discussion: Developer security and privacy architecture and design are directed at external
developers, although they could also be applied to internal (in-house) development. In contrast,
PL-8 is directed at internal developers to ensure that organizations develop a security and privacy

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architecture that is integrated with the enterprise architecture. The distinction between SA-17
and PL-8 is especially important when organizations outsource the development of systems,
system components, or system services and when there is a requirement to demonstrateconsistency with the enterprise architecture and security and privacy architecture of theorganization. [ISO 15408-2], [ISO 15408-3], and [SP 800-160-1] provide information on security
architecture and design, including formal policy models, security-relevant components, formal
and informal correspondence, conceptually simple design, and structuring for least privilege andtesting.
Related Controls: PL-2, PL-8, PM-7, SA-3, SA-4, SA-8, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL POLICY MODEL
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal policy model
describing the [Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security
and privacy policy] to be enforced; and(b) Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce
the defined elements of the organizational security and privacy policy when
implemented.
Discussion: Formal models describe specific behaviors or security and privacy policies using
formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors and policies to beformally proven. Not all components of systems can be modeled. Generally, formal
specifications are scoped to the behaviors or policies of interest, such as nondiscretionary
access control policies. Organizations choose the formal modeling language and approachbased on the nature of the behaviors and policies to be described and the available tools.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-25.
(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITY-RELEVANTCOMPONENTS

Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Define security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and(b) Provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, andfirmware is complete.
Discussion: The security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the portionof the system, component, or service that is trusted to perform correctly to maintainrequired security properties.
Related Controls: AC-25, SA-5.
(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal top-levelspecification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, andfirmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;(b) Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration asnecessary, that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy
model;(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the formal top-level specification completely
covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling.
It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, andthat any additional code or implementation details that are present have no impact on the
behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the highlevel security properties are satisfied by the formal system description, and that the formal
system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, including a
hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the formal
policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination offormal and informal methods may be needed to demonstrate such consistency. Consistency
between the formal top-level specification and the actual implementation may require theuse of an informal demonstration due to limitations on the applicability of formal methods
to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software,and firmware mechanisms internal to security-relevant components include mapping
registers and direct memory input and output.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-25, SA-4, SA-5.
(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | INFORMAL CORRESPONDENCE
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, an informal descriptive toplevel specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware,
software, and firmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;(b) Show via [Selection: informal demonstration; convincing argument with formal
methods as feasible] that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with theformal policy model;(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the descriptive top-level specification
completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, andfirmware;(d) Show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of theinterfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and(e) Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms notaddressed in the descriptive top-level specification but strictly internal to the securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware.
Discussion: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling.
It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, andthat additional code or implementation detail has no impact on the behaviors or policies
being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e., highlevel/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being fully
proven. Therefore, a combination of formal and informal methods may be needed to showsuch consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal tosecurity-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include mapping registers and direct
memory input and output.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-25, SA-4, SA-5.
(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to:

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple
and small as possible (see SA-8(7)). A small and simple design is easier to understand andanalyze and is also less prone to error (see AC-25, SA-8(13)). The principle of reduced
complexity applies to any aspect of a system, but it has particular importance for security
due to the various analyses performed to obtain evidence about the emergent security
property of the system. For such analyses to be successful, a small and simple design isessential. Application of the principle of reduced complexity contributes to the ability ofsystem developers to understand the correctness and completeness of system security
functions and facilitates the identification of potential vulnerabilities. The corollary of
reduced complexity states that the simplicity of the system is directly related to the numberof vulnerabilities it will contain. That is, simpler systems contain fewer vulnerabilities. An
important benefit of reduced complexity is that it is easier to understand whether the
security policy has been captured in the system design and that fewer vulnerabilities arelikely to be introduced during engineering development. An additional benefit is that any
such conclusion about correctness, completeness, and existence of vulnerabilities can bereached with a higher degree of assurance in contrast to conclusions reached in situations
where the system design is inherently more complex.
Related Controls: AC-25, SA-8, SC-3.
(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR TESTING
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to structure
security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate testing.
Discussion: Applying the security design principles in [SP 800-160-1] promotes complete,consistent, and comprehensive testing and evaluation of systems, system components, andservices. The thoroughness of such testing contributes to the evidence produced to generate
an effective assurance case or argument as to the trustworthiness of the system, systemcomponent, or service.
Related Controls: SA-5, SA-11.
(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to structure
security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate controlling access withleast privilege.
Discussion: The principle of least privilege states that each component is allocated sufficientprivileges to accomplish its specified functions but no more (see SA-8(14)). Applying theprinciple of least privilege limits the scope of the component’s actions, which has twodesirable effects. First, the security impact of a failure, corruption, or misuse of the systemcomponent results in a minimized security impact. Second, the security analysis of thecomponent is simplified. Least privilege is a pervasive principle that is reflected in all aspectsof the secure system design. Interfaces used to invoke component capability are available to
only certain subsets of the user population, and component design supports a sufficiently
fine granularity of privilege decomposition. For example, in the case of an audit mechanism,
there may be an interface for the audit manager, who configures the audit settings; aninterface for the audit operator, who ensures that audit data is safely collected and stored;
and, finally, yet another interface for the audit reviewer, who only has a need to view theaudit data that has been collected but no need to perform operations on that data.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________In addition to its manifestations at the system interface, least privilege can be used as a
guiding principle for the internal structure of the system itself. One aspect of internal leastprivilege is to construct modules so that only the elements encapsulated by the module are
directly operated upon by the functions within the module. Elements external to a modulethat may be affected by the module’s operation are indirectly accessed through interaction(e.g., via a function call) with the module that contains those elements. Another aspect ofinternal least privilege is that the scope of a given module or component includes only thosesystem elements that are necessary for its functionality, and the access modes to theelements (e.g., read, write) are minimal.
Related Controls: AC-5, AC-6, SA-8.
(8) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | ORCHESTRATIONThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Design [Assignment: organization-defined critical systems or system components] withcoordinated behavior to implement the following capabilities: [Assignment: organizationdefined capabilities, by system or component].
Discussion: Security resources that are distributed, located at different layers or in different
system elements, or are implemented to support different aspects of trustworthiness caninteract in unforeseen or incorrect ways. Adverse consequences can include cascading
failures, interference, or coverage gaps. Coordination of the behavior of security resources(e.g., by ensuring that one patch is installed across all resources before making a
configuration change that assumes that the patch is propagated) can avert such negativeinteractions.
Related Controls: None.
(9) DEVELOPER SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | DESIGN DIVERSITY
Use different designs for [Assignment: organization-defined critical systems or systemcomponents] to satisfy a common set of requirements or to provide equivalentfunctionality.
Discussion: Design diversity is achieved by supplying the same requirements specification tomultiple developers, each of whom is responsible for developing a variant of the system orsystem component that meets the requirements. Variants can be in software design, in
hardware design, or in both hardware and a software design. Differences in the designs of
the variants can result from developer experience (e.g., prior use of a design pattern), design
style (e.g., when decomposing a required function into smaller tasks, determining what
constitutes a separate task and how far to decompose tasks into sub-tasks), selection oflibraries to incorporate into the variant, and the development environment (e.g., different
design tools make some design patterns easier to visualize). Hardware design diversity
includes making different decisions about what information to keep in analog form and what
information to convert to digital form, transmitting the same information at different times,
and introducing delays in sampling (temporal diversity). Design diversity is commonly used
to support fault tolerance.
Related Controls: None.
References: [ISO 15408-2], [ISO 15408-3], [SP 800-160-1].

SA-18 TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-9.]
Control Enhancements:(1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-9(1).]

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SA-19 COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-11.]
Control Enhancements:(1) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-11(1).](2) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE AND REPAIR
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-11(2).](3) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | COMPONENT DISPOSAL[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-12.](4) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING[Withdrawn: Moved to SR-11(3).]SA-20 CUSTOMIZED DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Control: Reimplement or custom develop the following critical system components:[Assignment: organization-defined critical system components].
Discussion: Organizations determine that certain system components likely cannot be trusted
due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components for which there are no viablesecurity controls to adequately mitigate risk. Reimplementation or custom development of suchcomponents may satisfy requirements for higher assurance and is carried out by initiatingchanges to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that thestandard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative
sourcing is available and organizations choose not to reimplement or custom develop criticalsystem components, additional controls can be employed. Controls include enhanced auditing,restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system andapplication files.
Related Controls: CP-2, RA-9, SA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1].

SA-21 DEVELOPER SCREENING
Control: Require that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined system, systemcomponent, or system service]:a.

Has appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organizationdefined official government duties]; andb.

Satisfies the following additional personnel screening criteria: [Assignment: organizationdefined additional personnel screening criteria].

Discussion: Developer screening is directed at external developers. Internal developer screening
is addressed by PS-3. Because the system, system component, or system service may be used in
critical activities essential to the national or economic security interests of the United States,organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that developers are trustworthy. The degree of

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trust required of developers may need to be consistent with that of the individuals who accessthe systems, system components, or system services once deployed. Authorization andpersonnel screening criteria include clearances, background checks, citizenship, and nationality.
Developer trustworthiness may also include a review and analysis of company ownership andrelationships that the company has with entities that may potentially affect the quality andreliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Satisfying the required
access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes providing a list of all individuals
who are authorized to perform development activities on the selected system, systemcomponent, or system service so that organizations can validate that the developer has satisfied
the authorization and screening requirements.
Related Controls: PS-2, PS-3, PS-6, PS-7, SA-4, SR-6.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements:(1) DEVELOPER SCREENING | VALIDATION OF SCREENING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-21.]
References: None.

SA-22 UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Control:a.

Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available fromthe developer, vendor, or manufacturer; orb.

Provide the following options for alternative sources for continued support for unsupported
components [Selection (one or more): in-house support; [Assignment: organization-defined
support from external providers]].

Discussion: Support for system components includes software patches, firmware updates,
replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. An example of unsupported components
includes when vendors no longer provide critical software patches or product updates, which can
result in an opportunity for adversaries to exploit weaknesses in the installed components.
Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components include systems that provide criticalmission or business capabilities where newer technologies are not available or where thesystems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an option.
Alternative sources for support address the need to provide continued support for systemcomponents that are no longer supported by the original manufacturers, developers, or vendors
when such components remain essential to organizational mission and business functions. If
necessary, organizations can establish in-house support by developing customized patches forcritical software components or, alternatively, obtain the services of external providers who
provide ongoing support for the designated unsupported components through contractual
relationships. Such contractual relationships can include open-source software value-added
vendors. The increased risk of using unsupported system components can be mitigated, forexample, by prohibiting the connection of such components to public or uncontrolled networks,
or implementing other forms of isolation.
Related Controls: PL-2, SA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS | ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-22.]
References: None.

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SA-23 SPECIALIZATION
Control: Employ [Selection (one or more): design; modification; augmentation; reconfiguration]
on [Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components] supporting mission
essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.
Discussion: It is often necessary for a system or system component that supports missionessential services or functions to be enhanced to maximize the trustworthiness of the resource.
Sometimes this enhancement is done at the design level. In other instances, it is done postdesign, either through modifications of the system in question or by augmenting the system withadditional components. For example, supplemental authentication or non-repudiation functions
may be added to the system to enhance the identity of critical resources to other resources that
depend on the organization-defined resources.
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Related Controls: RA-9, SA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1], [SP 800-160-2].

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3.18 SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION
Quick link to System and Communications Protection Summary Table

SC-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] system and communications protection policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications
protection policy and the associated system and communications protection controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the system and communications protection policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current system and communications protection:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: System and communications protection policy and procedures address the controls
in the SC family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management
strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies andprocedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security
and privacy programs collaborate on the development of system and communications protection
policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies
and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or
be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures
can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to system and communications protection policy and procedures
include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicablelaws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply
restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SA-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-100].

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SEPARATION OF SYSTEM AND USER FUNCTIONALITY
Control: Separate user functionality, including user interface services, from system management
functionality.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: System management functionality includes functions that are necessary toadminister databases, network components, workstations, or servers. These functions typicallyrequire privileged user access. The separation of user functions from system management
functions is physical or logical. Organizations may separate system management functions fromuser functions by using different computers, instances of operating systems, central processing
units, or network addresses; by employing virtualization techniques; or some combination ofthese or other methods. Separation of system management functions from user functions
includes web administrative interfaces that employ separate authentication methods for users of
any other system resources. Separation of system and user functions may include isolating
administrative interfaces on different domains and with additional access controls. The
separation of system and user functionality can be achieved by applying the systems security
engineering design principles in SA-8, including SA-8(1), SA-8(3), SA-8(4), SA-8(10), SA-8(12), SA8(13), SA-8(14), and SA-8(18).
Related Controls: AC-6, SA-4, SA-8, SC-3, SC-7, SC-22, SC-32, SC-39.
Control Enhancements:(1) SEPARATION OF SYSTEM AND USER FUNCTIONALITY | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERS
Prevent the presentation of system management functionality at interfaces to nonprivileged users.
Discussion: Preventing the presentation of system management functionality at interfaces
to non-privileged users ensures that system administration options, including administrator
privileges, are not available to the general user population. Restricting user access also
prohibits the use of the grey-out option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to suchinformation. One potential solution is to withhold system administration options until users
establish sessions with administrator privileges.
Related Controls: AC-3.
(2) SEPARATION OF SYSTEM AND USER FUNCTIONALITY | DISASSOCIABILITYStore state information from applications and software separately.
Discussion: If a system is compromised, storing applications and software separately fromstate information about users’ interactions with an application may better protect
individuals’ privacy.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-3

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION
Control: Isolate security functions from nonsecurity functions.
Discussion: Security functions are isolated from nonsecurity functions by means of an isolation
boundary implemented within a system via partitions and domains. The isolation boundary
controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that
perform system security functions. Systems implement code separation in many ways, such as
through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel
code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that protect
the code on disk and address space protections that protect executing code. Systems can restrict
access to security functions using access control mechanisms and by implementing least privilege

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capabilities. While the ideal is for all code within the defined security function isolation boundary
to only contain security-relevant code, it is sometimes necessary to include nonsecurity functions
as an exception. The isolation of security functions from nonsecurity functions can be achieved
by applying the systems security engineering design principles in SA-8, including SA-8(1), SA-8(3),SA-8(4), SA-8(10), SA-8(12), SA-8(13), SA-8(14), and SA-8(18).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6, AC-25, CM-2, CM-4, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-15, SA-17, SC-2, SC-7, SC32, SC-39, SI-16.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION
Employ hardware separation mechanisms to implement security function isolation.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Hardware separation mechanisms include hardware ring architectures that are
implemented within microprocessors and hardware-enforced address segmentation used tosupport logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (i.e., readable, writeable).
Related Controls: None.
(2) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS AND FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONSIsolate security functions enforcing access and information flow control from nonsecurity
functions and from other security functions.
Discussion: Security function isolation occurs because of implementation. The functions canstill be scanned and monitored. Security functions that are potentially isolated from accessand flow control enforcement functions include auditing, intrusion detection, and malicious
code protection functions.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY FUNCTIONALITY
Minimize the number of nonsecurity functions included within the isolation boundary
containing security functions.
Discussion: Where it is not feasible to achieve strict isolation of nonsecurity functions fromsecurity functions, it is necessary to take actions to minimize nonsecurity-relevant functions
within the security function boundary. Nonsecurity functions contained within the isolation
boundary are considered security-relevant because errors or malicious code in the software
can directly impact the security functions of systems. The fundamental design objective isthat the specific portions of systems that provide information security are of minimal sizeand complexity. Minimizing the number of nonsecurity functions in the security-relevant
system components allows designers and implementers to focus only on those functions
which are necessary to provide the desired security capability (typically access enforcement).
By minimizing the nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundaries, the amount of codethat is trusted to enforce security policies is significantly reduced, thus contributing tounderstandability.
Related Controls: None.
(4) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING AND COHESIVENESS
Implement security functions as largely independent modules that maximize internalcohesiveness within modules and minimize coupling between modules.
Discussion: The reduction of inter-module interactions helps to constrain security functions
and manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important with respect
to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one module hason other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between functions within a module.
Best practices in software engineering and systems security engineering rely on layering,

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minimization, and modular decomposition to reduce and manage complexity. This produces
software modules that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled.
Related Controls: None.
(5) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES
Implement security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions between
layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or
correctness of higher layers.
Discussion: The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions among
security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on
higher-layer functions) enables the isolation of security functions and the management ofcomplexity.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-4

INFORMATION IN SHARED SYSTEM RESOURCES
Control: Prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system
resources.
Discussion: Preventing unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system
resources stops information produced by the actions of prior users or roles (or the actions ofprocesses acting on behalf of prior users or roles) from being available to current users or roles(or current processes acting on behalf of current users or roles) that obtain access to sharedsystem resources after those resources have been released back to the system. Information inshared system resources also applies to encrypted representations of information. In othercontexts, control of information in shared system resources is referred to as object reuse andresidual information protection. Information in shared system resources does not address
information remanence, which refers to the residual representation of data that has been
nominally deleted; covert channels (including storage and timing channels), where shared system
resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or components within
systems for which there are only single users or roles.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, SA-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION IN SHARED SYSTEM RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4.](2) INFORMATION IN SHARED SYSTEM RESOURCES | MULTILEVEL OR PERIODS PROCESSING
Prevent unauthorized information transfer via shared resources in accordance with
[Assignment: organization-defined procedures] when system processing explicitly switches
between different information classification levels or security categories.
Discussion: Changes in processing levels can occur during multilevel or periods processing
with information at different classification levels or security categories. It can also occur
during serial reuse of hardware components at different classification levels. Organizationdefined procedures can include approved sanitization processes for electronically stored
information.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

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DENIAL-OF-SERVICE PROTECTION
Control:a.

[Selection: Protect against; Limit] the effects of the following types of denial-of-service
events: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial-of-service events]; andb.

Employ the following controls to achieve the denial-of-service objective: [Assignment:
organization-defined controls by type of denial-of-service event].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes,
such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs withrespect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network
protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate theorigination and effects of denial-of-service events. For example, boundary protection devices canfilter certain types of packets to protect system components on internal networks from being
directly affected by or the source of denial-of-service attacks. Employing increased network
capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy also reduces the susceptibility todenial-of-service events.
Related Controls: CP-2, IR-4, SC-6, SC-7, SC-40.
Control Enhancements:(1) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT ABILITY TO ATTACK OTHER SYSTEMS
Restrict the ability of individuals to launch the following denial-of-service attacks against
other systems: [Assignment: organization-defined denial-of-service attacks].
Discussion: Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial-of-service attacks requires
the mechanisms commonly used for such attacks to be unavailable. Individuals of concern
include hostile insiders or external adversaries who have breached or compromised thesystem and are using it to launch a denial-of-service attack. Organizations can restrict theability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary information on the transport medium(i.e., wired networks, wireless networks, spoofed Internet protocol packets). Organizations
can also limit the ability of individuals to use excessive system resources. Protection against
individuals having the ability to launch denial-of-service attacks may be implemented on
specific systems or boundary devices that prohibit egress to potential target systems.
Related Controls: None.
(2) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE PROTECTION | CAPACITY, BANDWIDTH, AND REDUNDANCYManage capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the effects of information
flooding denial-of-service attacks.
Discussion: Managing capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available to counterflooding attacks. Managing capacity includes establishing selected usage priorities, quotas,
partitioning, or load balancing.
Related Controls: None.
(3) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION AND MONITORING(a) Employ the following monitoring tools to detect indicators of denial-of-service attacks
against, or launched from, the system: [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring
tools]; and(b) Monitor the following system resources to determine if sufficient resources exist to
prevent effective denial-of-service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined system
resources].

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Discussion: Organizations consider the utilization and capacity of system resources whenmanaging risk associated with a denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial-of-service
attacks can originate from external or internal sources. System resources that are sensitive
to denial of service include physical disk storage, memory, and CPU cycles. Techniques used
to prevent denial-of-service attacks related to storage utilization and capacity include
instituting disk quotas, configuring systems to automatically alert administrators when
specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using file compression technologies tomaximize available storage space, and imposing separate partitions for system and user
data.
Related Controls: CA-7, SI-4.
References: [SP 800-189].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SC-6

RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Control: Protect the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment: organization-definedresources] by [Selection (one or more): priority; quota; [Assignment: organization-defined
controls]].
Discussion: Priority protection prevents lower-priority processes from delaying or interferingwith the system that services higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent users or processes fromobtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources.
Related Controls: SC-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB M-08-05], [DHS TIC].

SC-7

BOUNDARY PROTECTION
Control:a.

Monitor and control communications at the external managed interfaces to the system andat key internal managed interfaces within the system;b.

Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection:
physically; logically] separated from internal organizational networks; andc.

Connect to external networks or systems only through managed interfaces consisting ofboundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security andprivacy architecture.

Discussion: Managed interfaces include gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based
malicious code analysis, virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within asecurity architecture. Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal
networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces
within organizational systems includes restricting external web traffic to designated web servers
within managed interfaces, prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing internal
addresses, and prohibiting internal traffic that appears to be spoofing external addresses. [SP
800-189] provides additional information on source address validation techniques to prevent
ingress and egress of traffic with spoofed addresses. Commercial telecommunications services
are provided by network components and consolidated management systems shared bycustomers. These services may also include third party-provided access lines and other service
elements. Such services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security
provisions. Boundary protection may be implemented as a common control for all or part of anorganizational network such that the boundary to be protected is greater than a system-specificboundary (i.e., an authorization boundary).

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Related Controls: AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AU-13, CA-3, CM-2, CM-4, CM-7, CM-10, CP8, CP-10, IR-4, MA-4, PE-3, PL-8, PM-12, SA-8, SA-17, SC-5, SC-26, SC-32, SC-35, SC-43.
Control Enhancements:(1) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7.](2) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7.](3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTSLimit the number of external network connections to the system.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates monitoring of
inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection [DHS TIC]
initiative is an example of a federal guideline that requires limits on the number of external
network connections. Limiting the number of external network connections to the system isimportant during transition periods from older to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning
from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols). Such transitions may require implementing the older
and newer technologies simultaneously during the transition period and thus increase thenumber of access points to the system.
Related Controls: None.
(4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES(a) Implement a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;(b) Establish a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;(c) Protect the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted acrosseach interface;(d) Document each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission orbusiness need and duration of that need;(e) Review exceptions to the traffic flow policy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and remove exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission
or business need;(f) Prevent unauthorized exchange of control plane traffic with external networks;(g) Publish information to enable remote networks to detect unauthorized control plane
traffic from internal networks; and(h) Filter unauthorized control plane traffic from external networks.
Discussion: External telecommunications services can provide data and/or voicecommunications services. Examples of control plane traffic include Border Gateway Protocol(BGP) routing, Domain Name System (DNS), and management protocols. See [SP 800-189]
for additional information on the use of the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) to
protect BGP routes and detect unauthorized BGP announcements.
Related Controls: AC-3, SC-8, SC-20, SC-21, SC-22.
(5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT — ALLOW BY EXCEPTION
Deny network communications traffic by default and allow network communications
traffic by exception [Selection (one or more): at managed interfaces; for [Assignment:
organization-defined systems]].
Discussion: Denying by default and allowing by exception applies to inbound and outboundnetwork communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications
traffic policy ensures that only those system connections that are essential and approved are

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allowed. Deny by default, allow by exception also applies to a system that is connected to an
external system.
Related Controls: None.
(6) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7(18).](7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE DEVICES
Prevent split tunneling for remote devices connecting to organizational systems unless the
split tunnel is securely provisioned using [Assignment: organization-defined safeguards].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Split tunneling is the process of allowing a remote user or device to establish a
non-remote connection with a system and simultaneously communicate via some otherconnection to a resource in an external network. This method of network access enables auser to access remote devices and simultaneously, access uncontrolled networks. Split
tunneling might be desirable by remote users to communicate with local system resources,
such as printers or file servers. However, split tunneling can facilitate unauthorized external
connections, making the system vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational
information. Split tunneling can be prevented by disabling configuration settings that allow
such capability in remote devices and by preventing those configuration settings from being
configurable by users. Prevention can also be achieved by the detection of split tunneling (orof configuration settings that allow split tunneling) in the remote device, and by prohibiting
the connection if the remote device is using split tunneling. A virtual private network (VPN)
can be used to securely provision a split tunnel. A securely provisioned VPN includes locking
connectivity to exclusive, managed, and named environments, or to a specific set of preapproved addresses, without user control.
Related Controls: None.
(8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERS
Route [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications traffic] to [Assignment:
organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy servers at managed
interfaces.
Discussion: External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A proxy serveris a server (i.e., system or application) that acts as an intermediary for clients requesting
system resources from non-organizational or other organizational servers. System resourcesthat may be requested include files, connections, web pages, or services. Client requests
established through a connection to a proxy server are assessed to manage complexity andprovide additional protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices
are one of the most common proxy servers that provide access to the Internet. Proxy servers
can support the logging of Transmission Control Protocol sessions and the blocking ofspecific Uniform Resource Locators, Internet Protocol addresses, and domain names. Web
proxies can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized and unauthorizedwebsites. Note that proxy servers may inhibit the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) andcreate the potential for “man-in-the-middle” attacks (depending on the implementation).
Related Controls: AC-3.
(9) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC(a) Detect and deny outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external systems;and(b) Audit the identity of internal users associated with denied communications.
Discussion: Detecting outgoing communications traffic from internal actions that may posethreats to external systems is known as extrusion detection. Extrusion detection is carriedout within the system at managed interfaces. Extrusion detection includes the analysis of

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incoming and outgoing communications traffic while searching for indications of internal
threats to the security of external systems. Internal threats to external systems include
traffic indicative of denial-of-service attacks, traffic with spoofed source addresses, andtraffic that contains malicious code. Organizations have criteria to determine, update, andmanage identified threats related to extrusion detection.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, SC-5, SC-38, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
(10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT EXFILTRATION(a) Prevent the exfiltration of information; and(b) Conduct exfiltration tests [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Prevention of exfiltration applies to both the intentional and unintentional
exfiltration of information. Techniques used to prevent the exfiltration of information fromsystems may be implemented at internal endpoints, external boundaries, and acrossmanaged interfaces and include adherence to protocol formats, monitoring for beaconing
activity from systems, disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly
needed, employing traffic profile analysis to detect deviations from the volume and types oftraffic expected, call backs to command and control centers, conducting penetration testing,monitoring for steganography, disassembling and reassembling packet headers, and using
data loss and data leakage prevention tools. Devices that enforce strict adherence toprotocol formats include deep packet inspection firewalls and Extensible Markup Language(XML) gateways. The devices verify adherence to protocol formats and specifications at theapplication layer and identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices that operate
at the network or transport layers. The prevention of exfiltration is similar to data loss
prevention or data leakage prevention and is closely associated with cross-domain solutions
and system guards that enforce information flow requirements.
Related Controls: AC-2, CA-8, SI-3.
(11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC
Only allow incoming communications from [Assignment: organization-defined authorized
sources] to be routed to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized destinations].
Discussion: General source address validation techniques are applied to restrict the use ofillegal and unallocated source addresses as well as source addresses that should only be
used within the system. The restriction of incoming communications traffic provides
determinations that source and destination address pairs represent authorized or allowed
communications. Determinations can be based on several factors, including the presence ofsuch address pairs in the lists of authorized or allowed communications, the absence of suchaddress pairs in lists of unauthorized or disallowed pairs, or meeting more general rules for
authorized or allowed source and destination pairs. Strong authentication of network
addresses is not possible without the use of explicit security protocols, and thus, addresses
can often be spoofed. Further, identity-based incoming traffic restriction methods can be
employed, including router access control lists and firewall rules.
Related Controls: AC-3.
(12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection
mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined system components].
Discussion: Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include host-based firewalls.
System components that employ host-based boundary protection mechanisms include
servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices.
Related Controls: None.

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Isolate [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, mechanisms, andsupport components] from other internal system components by implementing physicallyseparate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.
Discussion: Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful in isolating
computer network defenses from critical operational processing networks to prevent
adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques employed byorganizations.
Related Controls: SC-2, SC-3.
(14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Protect against unauthorized physical connections at [Assignment: organization-definedmanaged interfaces].
Discussion: Systems that operate at different security categories or classification levels may
share common physical and environmental controls, since the systems may share spacewithin the same facilities. In practice, it is possible that these separate systems may sharecommon equipment rooms, wiring closets, and cable distribution paths. Protection against
unauthorized physical connections can be achieved by using clearly identified and physicallyseparated cable trays, connection frames, and patch panels for each side of managed
interfaces with physical access controls that enforce limited authorized access to these
items.
Related Controls: PE-4, PE-19.
(15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | NETWORKED PRIVILEGED ACCESSES
Route networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed interface forpurposes of access control and auditing.
Discussion: Privileged access provides greater accessibility to system functions, including
security functions. Adversaries attempt to gain privileged access to systems through remote
access to cause adverse mission or business impacts, such as by exfiltrating information orbringing down a critical system capability. Routing networked, privileged access requests
through a dedicated, managed interface further restricts privileged access for increased
access control and auditing.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AU-2, SI-4.
(16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Prevent the discovery of specific system components that represent a managed interface.
Discussion: Preventing the discovery of system components representing a managed
interface helps protect network addresses of those components from discovery throughcommon tools and techniques used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are
not available for discovery and require prior knowledge for access. Preventing the discoveryof components and devices can be accomplished by not publishing network addresses, using
network address translation, or not entering the addresses in domain name systems.
Another prevention technique is to periodically change network addresses.
Related Controls: None.
(17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL FORMATS
Enforce adherence to protocol formats.
Discussion: System components that enforce protocol formats include deep packet
inspection firewalls and XML gateways. The components verify adherence to protocol

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formats and specifications at the application layer and identify vulnerabilities that cannot be
detected by devices operating at the network or transport layers.
Related Controls: SC-4.
(18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE
Prevent systems from entering unsecure states in the event of an operational failure of aboundary protection device.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing mechanisms to ensure that in
the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices at managed interfaces,
systems do not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer
hold. Managed interfaces include routers, firewalls, and application gateways that reside onprotected subnetworks (commonly referred to as demilitarized zones). Failures of boundary
protection devices cannot lead to or cause information external to the devices to enter thedevices nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-12, SC-24.
(19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCK COMMUNICATION FROM NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGUREDHOSTSBlock inbound and outbound communications traffic between [Assignment: organizationdefined communication clients] that are independently configured by end users andexternal service providers.
Discussion: Communication clients independently configured by end users and external
service providers include instant messaging clients and video conferencing software andapplications. Traffic blocking does not apply to communication clients that are configured byorganizations to perform authorized functions.
Related Controls: None.
(20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION AND SEGREGATION
Provide the capability to dynamically isolate [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] from other system components.
Discussion: The capability to dynamically isolate certain internal system components isuseful when it is necessary to partition or separate system components of questionable
origin from components that possess greater trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces
the attack surface of organizational systems. Isolating selected system components can also
limit the damage from successful attacks when such attacks occur.
Related Controls: None.
(21) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Employ boundary protection mechanisms to isolate [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components] supporting [Assignment: organization-defined missions and/or
business functions].
Discussion: Organizations can isolate system components that perform different mission orbusiness functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information flows among systemcomponents and provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of protection for selected
system components. Isolating system components with boundary protection mechanisms
provides the capability for increased protection of individual system components and to
more effectively control information flows between those components. Isolating systemcomponents provides enhanced protection that limits the potential harm from hostile cyberattacks and errors. The degree of isolation varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen.
Boundary protection mechanisms include routers, gateways, and firewalls that separate
system components into physically separate networks or subnetworks; cross-domain devices

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that separate subnetworks; virtualization techniques; and the encryption of information
flows among system components using distinct encryption keys.
Related Controls: CA-9.
(22) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINS
Implement separate network addresses to connect to systems in different security
domains.
Discussion: The decomposition of systems into subnetworks (i.e., subnets) helps to provide
the appropriate level of protection for network connections to different security domainsthat contain information with different security categories or classification levels.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(23) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE
Disable feedback to senders on protocol format validation failure.
Discussion: Disabling feedback to senders when there is a failure in protocol validation
format prevents adversaries from obtaining information that would otherwise be
unavailable.
Related Controls: None.
(24) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
For systems that process personally identifiable information:(a) Apply the following processing rules to data elements of personally identifiable
information: [Assignment: organization-defined processing rules];(b) Monitor for permitted processing at the external interfaces to the system and at key
internal boundaries within the system;(c) Document each processing exception; and(d) Review and remove exceptions that are no longer supported.
Discussion: Managing the processing of personally identifiable information is an important
aspect of protecting an individual’s privacy. Applying, monitoring for, and documenting
exceptions to processing rules ensure that personally identifiable information is processed
only in accordance with established privacy requirements.
Related Controls: PT-2, SI-15.
(25) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS
Prohibit the direct connection of [Assignment: organization-defined unclassified national
security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment: organizationdefined boundary protection device].
Discussion: A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or
more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks,
including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers)
mediate communications and information flows between unclassified national security
systems and external networks.
Related Controls: None.
(26) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS
Prohibit the direct connection of a classified national security system to an external
network without the use of [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection
device].
Discussion: A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or
more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks,

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including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers)
mediate communications and information flows between classified national security systems
and external networks. In addition, approved boundary protection devices (typicallymanaged interface or cross-domain systems) provide information flow enforcement fromsystems to external networks.
Related Controls: None.
(27) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS
Prohibit the direct connection of [Assignment: organization-defined unclassified nonnational security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment:
organization-defined boundary protection device].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or
more systems. Organizations typically do not have complete control over external networks,
including the Internet. Boundary protection devices (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and routers)
mediate communications and information flows between unclassified non-national security
systems and external networks.
Related Controls: None.
(28) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS
Prohibit the direct connection of [Assignment: organization-defined system] to a public
network.
Discussion: A direct connection is a dedicated physical or virtual connection between two or
more systems. A public network is a network accessible to the public, including the Internet
and organizational extranets with public access.
Related Controls: None.
(29) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS TO ISOLATE FUNCTIONS
Implement [Selection: physically; logically] separate subnetworks to isolate the following
critical system components and functions: [Assignment: organization-defined criticalsystem components and functions].
Discussion: Separating critical system components and functions from other noncriticalsystem components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to
reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results insystem failure. For example, physically separating the command and control function fromthe in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial aircraft
provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of critical system functions.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 199], [SP 800-37], [SP 800-41], [SP 800-77], [SP 800-189].

SC-8

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
Control: Protect the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of transmitted
information.
Discussion: Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information applies tointernal and external networks as well as any system components that can transmit information,
including servers, notebook computers, desktop computers, mobile devices, printers, copiers,
scanners, facsimile machines, and radios. Unprotected communication paths are exposed to thepossibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of
information can be accomplished by physical or logical means. Physical protection can beachieved by using protected distribution systems. A protected distribution system is a wireline or
fiber-optics telecommunications system that includes terminals and adequate electromagnetic,

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acoustical, electrical, and physical controls to permit its use for the unencrypted transmission ofclassified information. Logical protection can be achieved by employing encryption techniques.
Organizations that rely on commercial providers who offer transmission services as commodity
services rather than as fully dedicated services may find it difficult to obtain the necessary
assurances regarding the implementation of needed controls for transmission confidentiality andintegrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of confidentiality or integrity
services are available in standard, commercial telecommunications service packages. If it is not
feasible to obtain the necessary controls and assurances of control effectiveness throughappropriate contracting vehicles, organizations can implement appropriate compensating
controls.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AC-17, AC-18, AU-10, IA-3, IA-8, IA-9, MA-4, PE-4, SA-4, SA-8, SC-7, SC-16, SC20, SC-23, SC-28.
Control Enhancements:(1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more): prevent unauthorized
disclosure of information; detect changes to information] during transmission.
Discussion: Encryption protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification
during transmission. Cryptographic mechanisms that protect the confidentiality and integrityof information during transmission include TLS and IPSec. Cryptographic mechanisms used toprotect information integrity include cryptographic hash functions that have applications indigital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(2) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PRE- AND POST-TRANSMISSION HANDLING
Maintain the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of information during
preparation for transmission and during reception.
Discussion: Information can be unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during
preparation for transmission or during reception, including during aggregation, at protocol
transformation points, and during packing and unpacking. Such unauthorized disclosures ormodifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.
Related Controls: None.
(3) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE
EXTERNALS

Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals unless otherwise
protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical controls].
Discussion: Cryptographic protection for message externals addresses protection from theunauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include message headers androuting information. Cryptographic protection prevents the exploitation of message
externals and applies to internal and external networks or links that may be visible toindividuals who are not authorized users. Header and routing information is sometimes
transmitted in clear text (i.e., unencrypted) because the information is not identified byorganizations as having significant value or because encrypting the information can result in
lower network performance or higher costs. Alternative physical controls include protecteddistribution systems.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
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Implement cryptographic mechanisms to conceal or randomize communication patterns
unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physicalcontrols].

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Discussion: Concealing or randomizing communication patterns addresses protection fromunauthorized disclosure of information. Communication patterns include frequency, periods,
predictability, and amount. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information
with intelligence value, especially when combined with other available information related
to the mission and business functions of the organization. Concealing or randomizing
communications prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns
and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals
who are not authorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting in continuous, fixed, or
random patterns prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications
patterns. Alternative physical controls include protected distribution systems.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(5) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined protected distribution system] to [Selection(one or more): prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes toinformation] during transmission.
Discussion: The purpose of a protected distribution system is to deter, detect, and/or makedifficult physical access to the communication lines that carry national security information.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 197], [SP 800-52], [SP 800-77], [SP 800-81-2], [SP 800-113], [SP
800-177], [IR 8023].

SC-9

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8.]

SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT
Control: Terminate the network connection associated with a communications session at theend of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity.
Discussion: Network disconnect applies to internal and external networks. Terminating network
connections associated with specific communications sessions includes de-allocating TCP/IP
address or port pairs at the operating system level and de-allocating the networking assignments
at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single operating system-levelnetwork connection. Periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include time
periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.
Related Controls: AC-17, SC-23.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-11 TRUSTED PATH
Control:a.

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Permit users to invoke the trusted communications path for communications between theuser and the following security functions of the system, including at a minimum,
authentication and re-authentication: [Assignment: organization-defined security functions].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users can communicate (using input devices
such as keyboards) directly with the security functions of systems with the requisite assurance tosupport security policies. Trusted path mechanisms can only be activated by users or the security
functions of organizational systems. User responses that occur via trusted paths are protectedfrom modification by and disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ trusted
paths for trustworthy, high-assurance connections between security functions of systems andusers, including during system logons. The original implementations of trusted paths employed
an out-of-band signal to initiate the path, such as using the <BREAK> key, which does nottransmit characters that can be spoofed. In later implementations, a key combination that could
not be hijacked was used (e.g., the <CTRL> + <ALT> + <DEL> keys). Such key combinations,however, are platform-specific and may not provide a trusted path implementation in every case.
The enforcement of trusted communications paths is provided by a specific implementation thatmeets the reference monitor concept.
Related Controls: AC-16, AC-25, SC-12, SC-23.
Control Enhancements:(1) TRUSTED PATH | IRREFUTABLE COMMUNICATIONS PATH(a) Provide a trusted communications path that is irrefutably distinguishable from othercommunications paths; and(b) Initiate the trusted communications path for communications between the[Assignment: organization-defined security functions] of the system and the user.
Discussion: An irrefutable communications path permits the system to initiate a trusted path,
which necessitates that the user can unmistakably recognize the source of the communication asa trusted system component. For example, the trusted path may appear in an area of the displaythat other applications cannot access or be based on the presence of an identifier that cannot be
spoofed.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130].

SC-12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT
Control: Establish and manage cryptographic keys when cryptography is employed within thesystem in accordance with the following key management requirements: [Assignment:
organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, anddestruction].
Discussion: Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using manual
procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations define
key management requirements in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and specify appropriate options, parameters, andlevels. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust anchors are part ofsuch trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational systems andcertificates related to the internal operations of systems. [NIST CMVP] and [NIST CAVP] provide
additional information on validated cryptographic modules and algorithms that can be used in
cryptographic key management and establishment.
Related Controls: AC-17, AU-9, AU-10, CM-3, IA-3, IA-7, SA-4, SA-8, SA-9, SC-8, SC-11, SC-12, SC13, SC-17, SC-20, SC-37, SC-40, SI-3, SI-7.

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Control Enhancements:(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | AVAILABILITY
Maintain availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys by users.
Discussion: Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring availability inthe event of key loss. A forgotten passphrase is an example of losing a cryptographic key.
Related Controls: None.
(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | SYMMETRIC KEYS
Produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NIST FIPSvalidated; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: [SP 800-56A], [SP 800-56B], and [SP 800-56C] provide guidance on cryptographic
key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], and[SP 800-57-3] provide guidance on cryptographic key management.
Related Controls: None.
(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | ASYMMETRIC KEYS
Produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NSAapproved key management technology and processes; prepositioned keying material;
DoD-approved or DoD-issued Medium Assurance PKI certificates; DoD-approved or DoDissued Medium Hardware Assurance PKI certificates and hardware security tokens that
protect the user’s private key; certificates issued in accordance with organization-definedrequirements].
Discussion: [SP 800-56A], [SP 800-56B], and [SP 800-56C] provide guidance on cryptographic
key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], and[SP 800-57-3] provide guidance on cryptographic key management.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12(3).](5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12(3).](6) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PHYSICAL CONTROL OF KEYS
Maintain physical control of cryptographic keys when stored information is encrypted byexternal service providers.
Discussion: For organizations that use external service providers (e.g., cloud service or data
center providers), physical control of cryptographic keys provides additional assurance that
information stored by such external providers is not subject to unauthorized disclosure or
modification.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [SP 800-56A], [SP 800-56B], [SP 800-56C], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2],[SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-63-3], [IR 7956], [IR 7966].

SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Control:a.

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Implement the following types of cryptography required for each specified cryptographic
use: [Assignment: organization-defined types of cryptography for each specified
cryptographic use].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions, including
the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information, the provisionand implementation of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation whenauthorized individuals have the necessary clearances but lack the necessary formal accessapprovals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number and hash generation.
Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography and NSAapproved cryptography. For example, organizations that need to protect classified information
may specify the use of NSA-approved cryptography. Organizations that need to provision andimplement digital signatures may specify the use of FIPS-validated cryptography. Cryptography isimplemented in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-7, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AU-9, AU-10, CM-11, CP-9, IA-3, IA-5,
IA-7, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-4, SA-8, SA-9, SC-8, SC-12, SC-20, SC-23, SC-28, SC-40, SI-3, SI7.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13.](2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13.](3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL ACCESS APPROVALS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13.](4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13.]
References: [FIPS 140-3].

SC-14 PUBLIC ACCESS PROTECTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, and SI-10.]

SC-15 COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES AND APPLICATIONSControl:a.

Prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing devices and applications with thefollowing exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation
is to be allowed]; andb.

Provide an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.

Discussion: Collaborative computing devices and applications include remote meeting devices
and applications, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. The explicit indication ofuse includes signals to users when collaborative computing devices and applications areactivated.
Related Controls: AC-21, SC-42.
Control Enhancements:

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Provide [Selection (one or more): physical; logical] disconnect of collaborative computing
devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
Discussion: Failing to disconnect from collaborative computing devices can result in
subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods todisconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session ensures thatparticipants carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex andtedious procedures. Disconnect from collaborative computing devices can be manual or
automatic.
Related Controls: None.
(2) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

TRAFFIC[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7.](3) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING AND REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREAS
Disable or remove collaborative computing devices and applications from [Assignment:
organization-defined systems or system components] in [Assignment: organization-defined
secure work areas].
Discussion: Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices and applications
from systems or system components can result in compromises of information, including
eavesdropping on conversations. A Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) isan example of a secure work area.
Related Controls: None.
(4) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS
Provide an explicit indication of current participants in [Assignment: organization-defined
online meetings and teleconferences].
Discussion: Explicitly indicating current participants prevents unauthorized individuals fromparticipating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of otherparticipants.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-16 TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES
Control: Associate [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy attributes] withinformation exchanged between systems and between system components.
Discussion: Security and privacy attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with theinformation contained in organizational systems or system components. Attributes are
abstractions that represent the basic properties or characteristics of an entity with respect toprotecting information or the management of personally identifiable information. Attributes are
typically associated with internal data structures, including records, buffers, and files within thesystem. Security and privacy attributes are used to implement access control and information
flow control policies; reflect special dissemination, management, or distribution instructions,
including permitted uses of personally identifiable information; or support other aspects of theinformation security and privacy policies. Privacy attributes may be used independently or in
conjunction with security attributes.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.
Control Enhancements:

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Verify the integrity of transmitted security and privacy attributes.
Discussion: Part of verifying the integrity of transmitted information is ensuring that security
and privacy attributes that are associated with such information have not been modified in
an unauthorized manner. Unauthorized modification of security or privacy attributes canresult in a loss of integrity for transmitted information.
Related Controls: AU-10, SC-8.
(2) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | ANTI-SPOOFING MECHANISMS
Implement anti-spoofing mechanisms to prevent adversaries from falsifying the security
attributes indicating the successful application of the security process.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Some attack vectors operate by altering the security attributes of an information
system to intentionally and maliciously implement an insufficient level of security within thesystem. The alteration of attributes leads organizations to believe that a greater number of
security functions are in place and operational than have actually been implemented.
Related Controls: SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
(3) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTES | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BINDING
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms or techniques] to bind security
and privacy attributes to transmitted information.
Discussion: Cryptographic mechanisms and techniques can provide strong security andprivacy attribute binding to transmitted information to help ensure the integrity of suchinformation.
Related Controls: AC-16, SC-12, SC-13.
References: [OMB A-130].

SC-17 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES
Control:a.

Issue public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization-defined certificate policy] or
obtain public key certificates from an approved service provider; andb.

Include only approved trust anchors in trust stores or certificate stores managed by theorganization.

Discussion: Public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates are certificates with visibility external toorganizational systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, such as
application-specific time services. In cryptographic systems with a hierarchical structure, a trust
anchor is an authoritative source (i.e., a certificate authority) for which trust is assumed and notderived. A root certificate for a PKI system is an example of a trust anchor. A trust store or
certificate store maintains a list of trusted root certificates.
Related Controls: AU-10, IA-5, SC-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-32], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], [SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-63-3].

SC-18 MOBILE CODE
Control:a.

Define acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies; andb.

Authorize, monitor, and control the use of mobile code within the system.

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Discussion: Mobile code includes any program, application, or content that can be transmitted
across a network (e.g., embedded in an email, document, or website) and executed on a remotesystem. Decisions regarding the use of mobile code within organizational systems are based on
the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile codetechnologies include Java applets, JavaScript, HTML5, WebGL, and VBScript. Usage restrictions
and implementation guidelines apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed onservers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices,
including notebook computers and smart phones. Mobile code policy and procedures address
specific actions taken to prevent the development, acquisition, and introduction of unacceptablemobile code within organizational systems, including requiring mobile code to be digitally signed
by a trusted source.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-12, CM-2, CM-6, SI-3.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements:(1) MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Identify [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code] and take[Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].
Discussion: Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include blocking,quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes preventing the transmission ofword processing files with embedded macros when such macros have been determined to
be unacceptable mobile code.
Related Controls: None.
(2) MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT, AND USE
Verify that the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be deployed in thesystem meets [Assignment: organization-defined mobile code requirements].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
(3) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING AND EXECUTION
Prevent the download and execution of [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptablemobile code].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
(4) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION
Prevent the automatic execution of mobile code in [Assignment: organization-defined
software applications] and enforce [Assignment: organization-defined actions] prior to
executing the code.
Discussion: Actions enforced before executing mobile code include prompting users prior to
opening email attachments or clicking on web links. Preventing the automatic execution ofmobile code includes disabling auto-execute features on system components that employ
portable storage devices, such as compact discs, digital versatile discs, and universal serial
bus devices.
Related Controls: None.
(5) MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS
Allow execution of permitted mobile code only in confined virtual machine environments.

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Discussion: Permitting the execution of mobile code only in confined virtual machine
environments helps prevent the introduction of malicious code into other systems andsystem components.
Related Controls: SC-44, SI-7.
References: [SP 800-28].

SC-19 VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL[Withdrawn: Technology-specific; addressed as any other technology or protocol.]SC-20 SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE)
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control:a.

Provide additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along withthe authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external
name/address resolution queries; andb.

Provide the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports
secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and childdomains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.

Discussion: Providing authoritative source information enables external clients, including remote
Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the
host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service.
Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DNS)
servers. Additional artifacts include DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) digital signatures andcryptographic keys. Authoritative data includes DNS resource records. The means for indicating
the security status of child zones include the use of delegation signer resource records in the
DNS. Systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host and service names
and network addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response
data.
Related Controls: AU-10, SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-21, SC-22.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-20.](2) SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN AND
INTEGRITY

Provide data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal name/address resolution
queries.
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 186-4], [SP 800-81-2].

SC-21 SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER)
Control: Request and perform data origin authentication and data integrity verification on thename/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.
Discussion: Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or
has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Systems that provide name and

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address resolution services for local clients include recursive resolving or caching domain namesystem (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, orclients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Systems
that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host and service names and network
addresses provide some other means to enable clients to verify the authenticity and integrity of
response data.
Related Controls: SC-20, SC-22.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1) SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN
AND INTEGRITYThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21.]
References: [SP 800-81-2].

SC-22 ARCHITECTURE AND PROVISIONING FOR NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE
Control: Ensure the systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an
organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal and external role separation.
Discussion: Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain namesystem (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure in systems and enhance redundancy,
organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers—one configured as
the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. Additionally, organizations
typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network subnetworks (i.e., notlocated in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with internal roles only
process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., from internalclients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution information
requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks, including theInternet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in certain roles(e.g., by address ranges and explicit lists).
Related Controls: SC-2, SC-20, SC-21, SC-24.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-81-2].

SC-23 SESSION AUTHENTICITY
Control: Protect the authenticity of communications sessions.
Discussion: Protecting session authenticity addresses communications protection at the session
level, not at the packet level. Such protection establishes grounds for confidence at both ends ofcommunications sessions in the ongoing identities of other parties and the validity of transmitted
information. Authenticity protection includes protecting against “man-in-the-middle” attacks,
session hijacking, and the insertion of false information into sessions.
Related Controls: AU-10, SC-8, SC-10, SC-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT
Invalidate session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination.
Discussion: Invalidating session identifiers at logout curtails the ability of adversaries tocapture and continue to employ previously valid session IDs.

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Related Controls: None.
(2) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS AND MESSAGE DISPLAYS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-12(1).](3) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SYSTEM-GENERATED SESSION IDENTIFIERS
Generate a unique session identifier for each session with [Assignment: organizationdefined randomness requirements] and recognize only session identifiers that are systemgenerated.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Generating unique session identifiers curtails the ability of adversaries to reusepreviously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation ofunique session identifiers protects against brute-force attacks to determine future session
identifiers.
Related Controls: AC-10, SC-12, SC-13.
(4) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-23(3).](5) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES
Only allow the use of [Assignment: organization-defined certificate authorities] forverification of the establishment of protected sessions.
Discussion: Reliance on certificate authorities for the establishment of secure sessions
includes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after
verification by their respective certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment ofprotected sessions between web clients and web servers.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
References: [SP 800-52], [SP 800-77], [SP 800-95], [SP 800-113].

SC-24 FAIL IN KNOWN STATE
Control: Fail to a [Assignment: organization-defined known system state] for the following
failures on the indicated components while preserving [Assignment: organization-defined system
state information] in failure: [Assignment: list of organization-defined types of system failures onorganization-defined system components].
Discussion: Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the mission
and business needs of organizations. Failure in a known state prevents the loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational systems or systemcomponents. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from failing to a state that
may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving system state information
facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode with less disruption of mission andbusiness processes.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-4, CP-10, CP-12, SA-8, SC-7, SC-22, SI-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-25 THIN NODES
Control: Employ minimal functionality and information storage on the following systemcomponents: [Assignment: organization-defined system components].

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Discussion: The deployment of system components with minimal functionality reduces the needto secure every endpoint and may reduce the exposure of information, systems, and services toattacks. Reduced or minimal functionality includes diskless nodes and thin client technologies.
Related Controls: SC-30, SC-44.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-26 DECOYS
Control: Include components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the targetof malicious attacks for detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.
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Discussion: Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract
adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational
mission and business functions. Use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures toensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. Depending on
the specific usage of the decoy, consultation with the Office of the General Counsel before
deployment may be needed.
Related Controls: RA-5, SC-7, SC-30, SC-35, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1) DECOYS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-35.]
References: None.

SC-27 PLATFORM-INDEPENDENT APPLICATIONSControl: Include within organizational systems the following platform independent applications:[Assignment: organization-defined platform-independent applications].
Discussion: Platforms are combinations of hardware, firmware, and software components used
to execute software applications. Platforms include operating systems, the underlying computerarchitectures, or both. Platform-independent applications are applications with the capability to
execute on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution ondifferent platforms. Application portability and the ability to reconstitute on different platforms
increase the availability of mission-essential functions within organizations in situations where
systems with specific operating systems are under attack.
Related Controls: SC-29.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST
Control: Protect the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of the following
information at rest: [Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].
Discussion: Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is not in process or intransit and is located on system components. Such components include internal or external harddisk drives, storage area network devices, or databases. However, the focus of protecting
information at rest is not on the type of storage device or frequency of access but rather on thestate of the information. Information at rest addresses the confidentiality and integrity of

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information and covers user information and system information. System-related informationthat requires protection includes configurations or rule sets for firewalls, intrusion detection andprevention systems, filtering routers, and authentication information. Organizations may employ
different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the use of
cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity protection can be achieved, forexample, by implementing write-once-read-many (WORM) technologies. When adequate
protection of information at rest cannot otherwise be achieved, organizations may employ othercontrols, including frequent scanning to identify malicious code at rest and secure offline storage
in lieu of online storage.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-19, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CP-9, MP-4, MP-5, PE-3, SC8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-34, SI-3, SI-7, SI-16.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements:(1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure andmodification of the following information at rest on [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components or media]: [Assignment: organization-defined information].
Discussion: The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect theconfidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism iscommensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Organizations
have the flexibility to encrypt information on system components or media or encrypt data
structures, including files, records, or fields.
Related Controls: AC-19, SC-12, SC-13.
(2) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | OFFLINE STORAGE
Remove the following information from online storage and store offline in a secure
location: [Assignment: organization-defined information].
Discussion: Removing organizational information from online storage to offline storage
eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorized access to the information
through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move information to offline
storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage.
Related Controls: None.
(3) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS
Provide protected storage for cryptographic keys [Selection: [Assignment: organizationdefined safeguards]; hardware-protected key store].
Discussion: A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an example of a hardware-protected datastore that can be used to protect cryptographic keys.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-56A], [SP 800-56B], [SP 800-56C], [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-572], [SP 800-57-3], [SP 800-111], [SP 800-124].

SC-29 HETEROGENEITY
Control: Employ a diverse set of information technologies for the following system components
in the implementation of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined system components].
Discussion: Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational systems
reduces the impact of potential exploitations or compromises of specific technologies. Suchdiversity protects against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply
chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means

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adversaries use to compromise one system component will be effective against other systemcomponents, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned
attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead that could
ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations.
Related Controls: AU-9, PL-8, SC-27, SC-30, SR-3.
Control Enhancements:(1) HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES
Employ virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity of operating
systems and applications that are changed [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: While frequent changes to operating systems and applications can posesignificant configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased
work factor for adversaries to conduct successful attacks. Changing virtual operating systems
or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems or applications, provides
virtual changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management
efforts. Virtualization techniques can assist in isolating untrustworthy software or softwareof dubious provenance into confined execution environments.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-30 CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION
Control: Employ the following concealment and misdirection techniques for [Assignment:
organization-defined systems] at [Assignment: organization-defined time periods] to confuse andmislead adversaries: [Assignment: organization-defined concealment and misdirection
techniques].
Discussion: Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting
capabilities of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate
and complete attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with theability to disguise systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks without thecost of having multiple platforms. The increased use of concealment and misdirection techniquesand methods—including randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization—may sufficiently confuse
and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing
tradecraft. Concealment and misdirection techniques may provide additional time to perform
core mission and business functions. The implementation of concealment and misdirection
techniques may add to the complexity and management overhead required for the system.
Related Controls: AC-6, SC-25, SC-26, SC-29, SC-44, SI-14.
Control Enhancements:(1) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-29(1).](2) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to introduce randomness into
organizational operations and assets.
Discussion: Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding
the actions that organizations take to defend their systems against attacks. Such actions may
impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations
that support critical missions or business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries
to hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques that involve

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randomness include performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing
different information technologies, using different suppliers, and rotating roles andresponsibilities of organizational personnel.
Related Controls: None.
(3) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING AND STORAGE LOCATIONS
Change the location of [Assignment: organization-defined processing and/or storage][Selection: [Assignment: organization-defined time frequency]; at random time intervals]].

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Discussion: Adversaries target critical mission and business functions and the systems that
support those mission and business functions while also trying to minimize the exposure of
their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and deterministic nature oforganizational systems targeted by adversaries make such systems more susceptible toattacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful. Changing processing and storage
locations (also referred to as moving target defense) addresses the advanced persistent
threat using techniques such as virtualization, distributed processing, and replication. This
enables organizations to relocate the system components (i.e., processing, storage) that
support critical mission and business functions. Changing the locations of processing
activities and/or storage sites introduces a degree of uncertainty into the targeting activities
of adversaries. The targeting uncertainty increases the work factor of adversaries and makes
compromises or breaches of the organizational systems more difficult and time-consuming.
It also increases the chances that adversaries may inadvertently disclose certain aspects of
their tradecraft while attempting to locate critical organizational resources.
Related Controls: None.
(4) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION
Employ realistic, but misleading information in [Assignment: organization-defined systemcomponents] about its security state or posture.
Discussion: Employing misleading information is intended to confuse potential adversaries
regarding the nature and extent of controls deployed by organizations. Thus, adversaries
may employ incorrect and ineffective attack techniques. One technique for misleading
adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specificcontrols deployed in external systems that are known to be targeted by adversaries. Anothertechnique is the use of deception nets that mimic actual aspects of organizational systems
but use, for example, out-of-date software configurations.
Related Controls: None.
(5) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Employ the following techniques to hide or conceal [Assignment: organization-definedsystem components]: [Assignment: organization-defined techniques].
Discussion: By hiding, disguising, or concealing critical system components, organizations
may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries target and successfully compromise
those assets. Potential means to hide, disguise, or conceal system components include theconfiguration of routers or the use of encryption or virtualization techniques.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-31 COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS
Control:

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Perform a covert channel analysis to identify those aspects of communications within thesystem that are potential avenues for covert [Selection (one or more): storage; timing]channels; andb.

Estimate the maximum bandwidth of those channels.

Discussion: Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within systems thatmight lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when there is thepotential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, such as in the case of
systems that contain export-controlled information and have connections to external networks(i.e., networks that are not controlled by organizations). Covert channel analysis is also useful for
multilevel secure systems, multiple security level systems, and cross-domain systems.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, SA-8, SI-11.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements:(1) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOR EXPLOITABILITY
Test a subset of the identified covert channels to determine the channels that are
exploitable.
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
(2) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH
Reduce the maximum bandwidth for identified covert [Selection (one or more): storage;
timing] channels to [Assignment: organization-defined values].
Discussion: The complete elimination of covert channels, especially covert timing channels,
is usually not possible without significant performance impacts.
Related Controls: None.
(3) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
Measure the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of identified covert
channels] in the operational environment of the system.
Discussion: Measuring covert channel bandwidth in specified operational environments
helps organizations determine how much information can be covertly leaked before suchleakage adversely affects mission or business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may besignificantly different when measured in settings that are independent of the specificenvironments of operation, including laboratories or system development environments.
Related Controls: None.
References: None.

SC-32 SYSTEM PARTITIONING
Control: Partition the system into [Assignment: organization-defined system components]
residing in separate [Selection: physical; logical] domains or environments based on [Assignment:
organization-defined circumstances for physical or logical separation of components].
Discussion: System partitioning is part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations
determine the degree of physical separation of system components. Physical separation options
include physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, critical components inseparate rooms, and geographical separation of critical components. Security categorization canguide the selection of candidates for domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit
network access and information flow among partitioned system components.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-6, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7, SC-36.

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Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM PARTITIONING | SEPARATE PHYSICAL DOMAINS FOR PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSPartition privileged functions into separate physical domains.
Discussion: Privileged functions that operate in a single physical domain may represent asingle point of failure if that domain becomes compromised or experiences a denial ofservice.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FIPS 199], [IR 8179].

SC-33 TRANSMISSION PREPARATION INTEGRITYThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8.]

SC-34 NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS
Control: For [Assignment: organization-defined system components], load and execute:a.

The operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media; andb.

The following applications from hardware-enforced, read-only media: [Assignment:
organization-defined applications].

Discussion: The operating environment for a system contains the code that hosts applications,
including operating systems, executives, or virtual machine monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It canalso include certain applications that run directly on hardware platforms. Hardware-enforced,
read-only media include Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R) and Digital Versatile Disc-Recordable(DVD-R) disk drives as well as one-time, programmable, read-only memory. The use of nonmodifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point of creation of the read-only
image. The use of reprogrammable, read-only memory can be accepted as read-only media
provided that integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initial writing to theinsertion of the memory into the system, and there are reliable hardware protections against
reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational systems.
Related Controls: AC-3, SI-7, SI-14.
Control Enhancements:(1) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined system components] with no writeable storage
that is persistent across component restart or power on/off.
Discussion: Disallowing writeable storage eliminates the possibility of malicious code
insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated system components. The
restriction applies to fixed and removable storage, with the latter being addressed either
directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile devices.
Related Controls: AC-19, MP-7.
(2) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION ON READ-ONLY MEDIA
Protect the integrity of information prior to storage on read-only media and control the
media after such information has been recorded onto the media.
Discussion: Controls prevent the substitution of media into systems or the reprogrammingof programmable read-only media prior to installation into the systems. Integrity protection
controls include a combination of prevention, detection, and response.
Related Controls: CM-3, CM-5, CM-9, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SC-28, SI-3.

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SC-35 EXTERNAL MALICIOUS CODE IDENTIFICATION
Control: Include system components that proactively seek to identify network-based malicious
code or malicious websites.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: External malicious code identification differs from decoys in SC-26 in that thecomponents actively probe networks, including the Internet, in search of malicious code
contained on external websites. Like decoys, the use of external malicious code identification
techniques requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any malicious code
discovered during the search and subsequently executed does not infect organizational systems.
Virtualization is a common technique for achieving such isolation.
Related Controls: SC-7, SC-26, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-36 DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE
Control: Distribute the following processing and storage components across multiple [Selection:
physical locations; logical domains]: [Assignment: organization-defined processing and storage
components].
Discussion: Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations or logicaldomains provides a degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations. The redundancy andoverlap increase the work factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations,assets, and individuals. The use of distributed processing and storage does not assume a single
primary processing or storage location. Therefore, it allows for parallel processing and storage.
Related Controls: CP-6, CP-7, PL-8, SC-32.
Control Enhancements:(1) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES(a) Employ polling techniques to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises to thefollowing processing and storage components: [Assignment: organization-defined
distributed processing and storage components]; and(b) Take the following actions in response to identified faults, errors, or compromises:[Assignment: organization-defined actions].
Discussion: Distributed processing and/or storage may be used to reduce opportunities foradversaries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of organizational
information and systems. However, the distribution of processing and storage components
does not prevent adversaries from compromising one or more of the components. Pollingcompares the processing results and/or storage content from the distributed components
and subsequently votes on the outcomes. Polling identifies potential faults, compromises, orerrors in the distributed processing and storage components.
Related Controls: SI-4.
(2) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | SYNCHRONIZATION
Synchronize the following duplicate systems or system components: [Assignment:
organization-defined duplicate systems or system components].

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Discussion: SC-36 and CP-9(6) require the duplication of systems or system components indistributed locations. The synchronization of duplicated and redundant services and data
helps to ensure that information contained in the distributed locations can be used in the
mission or business functions of organizations, as needed.
Related Controls: CP-9.
References: [SP 800-160-2].

SC-37 OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Employ the following out-of-band channels for the physical delivery or electronictransmission of [Assignment: organization-defined information, system components, or devices]
to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or systems]: [Assignment: organization-defined
out-of-band channels].
Discussion: Out-of-band channels include local, non-network accesses to systems; network paths
physically separate from network paths used for operational traffic; or non-electronic paths, suchas the U.S. Postal Service. The use of out-of-band channels is contrasted with the use of in-bandchannels (i.e., the same channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels do
not have the same vulnerability or exposure as in-band channels. Therefore, the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise or adversely affectthe out-of-band channels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery ortransmission of organizational items, including authenticators and credentials; cryptographic key
management information; system and data backups; configuration management changes for
hardware, firmware, or software; security updates; maintenance information; and malicious
code protection updates.
Related Controls: AC-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, SC-12, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY AND TRANSMISSION
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined controls] to ensure that only [Assignment:
organization-defined individuals or systems] receive the following information, systemcomponents, or devices: [Assignment: organization-defined information, systemcomponents, or devices].
Discussion: Techniques employed by organizations to ensure that only designated systems
or individuals receive certain information, system components, or devices include sending
authenticators via an approved courier service but requiring recipients to show some formof government-issued photographic identification as a condition of receipt.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-57-1], [SP 800-57-2], [SP 800-57-3].

SC-38 OPERATIONS SECURITY
Control: Employ the following operations security controls to protect key organizational
information throughout the system development life cycle: [Assignment: organization-defined
operations security controls].
Discussion: Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential adversaries
can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying,
controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates to theplanning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves five
steps: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities,
assessment of risks, and the application of appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC controls are

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applied to organizational systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC
controls protect the confidentiality of information, including limiting the sharing of information
with suppliers, potential suppliers, and other non-organizational elements and individuals.
Information critical to organizational mission and business functions includes user identities,
element uses, suppliers, supply chain processes, functional requirements, security requirements,
system design specifications, testing and evaluation protocols, and security control
implementation details.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, PL-1, PM-9, PM-12, RA-2, RA-3, RA-5, SC-7, SR-3, SR-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SC-39 PROCESS ISOLATION
Control: Maintain a separate execution domain for each executing system process.
Discussion: Systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process byassigning each process a separate address space. Each system process has a distinct address
space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled throughthe security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process.
Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example,
by implementing separate address spaces. Process isolation technologies, including sandboxingor virtualization, logically separate software and firmware from other software, firmware, anddata. Process isolation helps limit the access of potentially untrusted software to other system
resources. The capability to maintain separate execution domains is available in commercial
operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-25, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SI-16.
Control Enhancements:(1) PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION
Implement hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate process isolation.
Discussion: Hardware-based separation of system processes is generally less susceptible tocompromise than software-based separation, thus providing greater assurance that the
separation will be enforced. Hardware separation mechanisms include hardware memory
management.
Related Controls: None.
(2) PROCESS ISOLATION | SEPARATE EXECUTION DOMAIN PER THREAD
Maintain a separate execution domain for each thread in [Assignment: organizationdefined multi-threaded processing].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1].

SC-40 WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION
Control: Protect external and internal [Assignment: organization-defined wireless links] from thefollowing signal parameter attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of signal parameterattacks or references to sources for such attacks].
Discussion: Wireless link protection applies to internal and external wireless communication
links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized system users. Adversaries can

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exploit the signal parameters of wireless links if such links are not adequately protected. There
are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service,or spoof system users. Protection of wireless links reduces the impact of attacks that are uniqueto wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers for transmission
services as commodity items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be possible toimplement wireless link protections to the extent necessary to meet organizational security
requirements.
Related Controls: AC-18, SC-5.
Control Enhancements:(1) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve [Assignment: organization-definedlevel of protection] against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference.
Discussion: The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms for electromagnetic
interference protects systems against intentional jamming that might deny or impair
communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms used to provide antijam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The implementation of
cryptographic mechanisms may also coincidentally mitigate the effects of unintentional
jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters that share the same spectrum.
Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and laws, executive orders,
directives, regulations, policies, and standards determine levels of wireless link availability,
cryptography needed, and performance.
Related Controls: PE-21, SC-12, SC-13.
(2) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potential of wireless links
to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction].
Discussion: The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to reduce detection potential
is used for covert communications and to protect wireless transmitters from geo-location. It
also ensures that the spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve a low probability ofdetection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected
threats, concept of operations, and applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, and standards determine the levels to which wireless links are undetectable.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(3) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions thatare deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception
based on signal parameters.
Discussion: The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject
imitative or manipulative communications ensures that the signal parameters of wirelesstransmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability reduces
the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal
parameters alone.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13, SI-4.
(4) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of [Assignment:
organization-defined wireless transmitters] by using the transmitter signal parameters.
Discussion: The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identificationof wireless transmitters protects against the unique identification of wireless transmitters

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for the purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting alterations
to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. It also provides
anonymity when required. Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal
parameters of transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking andmission or user identification.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
References: None.

SC-41 PORT AND I/O DEVICE ACCESSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: [Selection: Physically; Logically] disable or remove [Assignment: organization-definedconnection ports or input/output devices] on the following systems or system components:[Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: Connection ports include Universal Serial Bus (USB), Thunderbolt, and Firewire (IEEE1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include compact disc and digital versatile disc drives. Disablingor removing such connection ports and I/O devices helps prevent the exfiltration of informationfrom systems and the introduction of malicious code from those ports or devices. Physicallydisabling or removing ports and/or devices is the stronger action.
Related Controls: AC-20, MP-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SC-42 SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA
Control:a.

Prohibit [Selection (one or more): the use of devices possessing [Assignment: organizationdefined environmental sensing capabilities] in [Assignment: organization-defined facilities,
areas, or systems]; the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities onorganizational systems or system components with the following exceptions: [Assignment:
organization-defined exceptions where remote activation of sensors is allowed]]; andb.

Provide an explicit indication of sensor use to [Assignment: organization-defined group ofusers].

Discussion: Sensor capability and data applies to types of systems or system components
characterized as mobile devices, such as cellular telephones, smart phones, and tablets. Mobile
devices often include sensors that can collect and record data regarding the environment where
the system is in use. Sensors that are embedded within mobile devices include microphones,
cameras, Global Positioning System (GPS) mechanisms, and accelerometers. While the sensors
on mobiles devices provide an important function, if activated covertly, such devices canpotentially provide a means for adversaries to learn valuable information about individuals andorganizations. For example, remotely activating the GPS function on a mobile device could
provide an adversary with the ability to track the movements of an individual. Organizations may
prohibit individuals from bringing cellular telephones or digital cameras into certain designatedfacilities or controlled areas within facilities where classified information is stored or sensitive
conversations are taking place.
Related Controls: SC-15.
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Verify that the system is configured so that data or information collected by the[Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only reported to authorized individuals orroles.
Discussion: In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals, it is still
possible that the data or information collected by the sensors will be sent to unauthorized
entities.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | AUTHORIZED USE
Employ the following measures so that data or information collected by [Assignment:
organization-defined sensors] is only used for authorized purposes: [Assignment:
organization-defined measures].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose could be
misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors that are used to support
traffic navigation could be misused to track the movements of individuals. Measures tomitigate such activities include additional training to help ensure that authorized individuals
do not abuse their authority and, in the case where sensor data is maintained by external
parties, contractual restrictions on the use of such data.
Related Controls: PT-2.
(3) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-42.](4) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | NOTICE OF COLLECTION
Employ the following measures to facilitate an individual’s awareness that personallyidentifiable information is being collected by [Assignment: organization-defined sensors]:[Assignment: organization-defined measures].
Discussion: Awareness that organizational sensors are collecting data enables individuals tomore effectively engage in managing their privacy. Measures can include conventional
written notices and sensor configurations that make individuals directly or indirectly aware
through other devices that the sensor is collecting information. The usability and efficacy ofthe notice are important considerations.
Related Controls: PT-1, PT-4, PT-5.
(5) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | COLLECTION MINIMIZATION
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] that are configured to minimize thecollection of information about individuals that is not needed.
Discussion: Although policies to control for authorized use can be applied to information
once it is collected, minimizing the collection of information that is not needed mitigates
privacy risk at the system entry point and mitigates the risk of policy control failures. Sensor
configurations include the obscuring of human features, such as blurring or pixelating flesh
tones.
Related Controls: SA-8, SI-12.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-124].

SC-43 USAGE RESTRICTIONSControl:a.

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Authorize, monitor, and control the use of such components within the system.

Discussion: Usage restrictions apply to all system components including but not limited tomobile code, mobile devices, wireless access, and wired and wireless peripheral components(e.g., copiers, printers, scanners, optical devices, and other similar technologies). The usage
restrictions and implementation guidelines are based on the potential for system components tocause damage to the system and help to ensure that only authorized system use occurs.
Related Controls: AC-18, AC-19, CM-6, SC-7, SC-18.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-124].
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SC-44 DETONATION CHAMBERS
Control: Employ a detonation chamber capability within [Assignment: organization-definedsystem, system component, or location].
Discussion: Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, allow
organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, andexecute Universal Resource Locator requests in the safety of an isolated environment or avirtualized sandbox. Protected and isolated execution environments provide a means ofdetermining whether the associated attachments or applications contain malicious code. Whilerelated to the concept of deception nets, the employment of detonation chambers is notintended to maintain a long-term environment in which adversaries can operate and theiractions can be observed. Rather, detonation chambers are intended to quickly identify malicious
code and either reduce the likelihood that the code is propagated to user environments ofoperation or prevent such propagation completely.
Related Controls: SC-7, SC-18, SC-25, SC-26, SC-30, SC-35, SC-39, SI-3, SI-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-177].

SC-45 SYSTEM TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
Control: Synchronize system clocks within and between systems and system components.
Discussion: Time synchronization of system clocks is essential for the correct execution of manysystem services, including identification and authentication processes that involve certificates
and time-of-day restrictions as part of access control. Denial of service or failure to deny expired
credentials may result without properly synchronized clocks within and between systems andsystem components. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a
modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. The
granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between system clocks
and reference clocks, such as clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or tens of
milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for system components. Time
service can be critical to other security capabilities—such as access control and identification andauthentication—depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support the capabilities.
Related Controls: AC-3, AU-8, IA-2, IA-8.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM TIME SYNCHRONIZATION | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE(a) Compare the internal system clocks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]; andCHAPTER THREE

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Discussion: Synchronization of internal system clocks with an authoritative source provides
uniformity of time stamps for systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected
over a network.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SYSTEM TIME SYNCHRONIZATION | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE(a) Identify a secondary authoritative time source that is in a different geographic region
than the primary authoritative time source; and(b) Synchronize the internal system clocks to the secondary authoritative time source if
the primary authoritative time source is unavailable.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: It may be necessary to employ geolocation information to determine that thesecondary authoritative time source is in a different geographic region.
Related Controls: None.
References: [IETF 5905].

SC-46 CROSS DOMAIN POLICY ENFORCEMENT
Control: Implement a policy enforcement mechanism [Selection: physically; logically] between
the physical and/or network interfaces for the connecting security domains.
Discussion: For logical policy enforcement mechanisms, organizations avoid creating a logicalpath between interfaces to prevent the ability to bypass the policy enforcement mechanism. For
physical policy enforcement mechanisms, the robustness of physical isolation afforded by thephysical implementation of policy enforcement to preclude the presence of logical covert
channels penetrating the security domain may be needed. Contact ncdsmo@nsa.gov for more
information.
Related Controls: AC-4, SC-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1].

SC-47 ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS PATHS
Control: Establish [Assignment: organization-defined alternate communications paths] forsystem operations organizational command and control.
Discussion: An incident, whether adversarial- or nonadversarial-based, can disrupt establishedcommunications paths used for system operations and organizational command and control.
Alternate communications paths reduce the risk of all communications paths being affected by
the same incident. To compound the problem, the inability of organizational officials to obtaintimely information about disruptions or to provide timely direction to operational elements after
a communications path incident, can impact the ability of the organization to respond to such
incidents in a timely manner. Establishing alternate communications paths for command andcontrol purposes, including designating alternative decision makers if primary decision makers
are unavailable and establishing the extent and limitations of their actions, can greatly facilitate
the organization’s ability to continue to operate and take appropriate actions during an incident.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-34], [SP 800-61], [SP 800-160-2].

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SC-48 SENSOR RELOCATION
Control: Relocate [Assignment: organization-defined sensors and monitoring capabilities] to[Assignment: organization-defined locations] under the following conditions or circumstances:[Assignment: organization-defined conditions or circumstances].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they movelaterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt
to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set ofmonitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or likely infiltration
or exfiltration paths. By using communications paths that the organization typically does notmonitor, the adversary can increase its chances of achieving its desired goals. By relocating its
sensors or monitoring capabilities to new locations, the organization can impede the adversary’s
ability to achieve its goals. The relocation of the sensors or monitoring capabilities might be done
based on threat information that the organization has acquired or randomly to confuse theadversary and make its lateral transition through the system or organization more challenging.
Related Controls: AU-2, SC-7, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) SENSOR RELOCATION | DYNAMIC RELOCATION OF SENSORS OR MONITORING CAPABILITIESDynamically relocate [Assignment: organization-defined sensors and monitoring
capabilities] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations] under the following
conditions or circumstances: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or
circumstances].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-160-2].

SC-49 HARDWARE-ENFORCED SEPARATION AND POLICY ENFORCEMENT
Control: Implement hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms
between [Assignment: organization-defined security domains].
Discussion: System owners may require additional strength of mechanism and robustness toensure domain separation and policy enforcement for specific types of threats and environmentsof operation. Hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement provide greater strength ofmechanism than software-enforced separation and policy enforcement.
Related Controls: AC-4, SA-8, SC-50.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1].

SC-50 SOFTWARE-ENFORCED SEPARATION AND POLICY ENFORCEMENT
Control: Implement software-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms between[Assignment: organization-defined security domains].
Discussion: System owners may require additional strength of mechanism to ensure domain
separation and policy enforcement for specific types of threats and environments of operation.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-4, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SC-49.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-1].

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SC-51 HARDWARE-BASED PROTECTION
Control:a.

Employ hardware-based, write-protect for [Assignment: organization-defined systemfirmware components]; andb.

Implement specific procedures for [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals]
to manually disable hardware write-protect for firmware modifications and re-enable thewrite-protect prior to returning to operational mode.

Discussion: None.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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3.19 SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY
Quick link to System and Information Integrity Summary Table

SI-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] system and information integrity policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity
policy and the associated system and information integrity controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the system and information integrity policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current system and information integrity:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: System and information integrity policy and procedures address the controls in the SI
family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is
an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures
contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy
programs collaborate on the development of system and information integrity policy andprocedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are
preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies andprocedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be
represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures canbe established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and forsystems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and canbe directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be
documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events
that may precipitate an update to system and information integrity policy and procedures
include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicablelaws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply
restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PS-8, SA-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-100].

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FLAW REMEDIATION
Control:a.

Identify, report, and correct system flaws;b.

Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness andpotential side effects before installation;c.

Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period] of the release of the updates; andd.

Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: The need to remediate system flaws applies to all types of software and firmware.
Organizations identify systems affected by software flaws, including potential vulnerabilities
resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel
with information security and privacy responsibilities. Security-relevant updates include patches,
service packs, and malicious code signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered duringassessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. By
incorporating flaw remediation into configuration management processes, required remediation
actions can be tracked and verified.
Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware mayvary based on a variety of risk factors, including the security category of the system, the criticalityof the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw), the organizationalrisk tolerance, the mission supported by the system, or the threat environment. Some types offlaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the typeof testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and thetypes of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may
determine that the testing of software or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, such as
when implementing simple malicious code signature updates. In testing decisions, organizations
consider whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized
sources with appropriate digital signatures.
Related Controls: CA-5, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-8, MA-2, RA-5, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SI-3, SI5, SI-7, SI-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-9.](2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS
Determine if system components have applicable security-relevant software and firmware
updates installed using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms][Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: Automated mechanisms can track and determine the status of known flaws for
system components.
Related Controls: CA-7, SI-4.
(3) FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS AND BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS(a) Measure the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and(b) Establish the following benchmarks for taking corrective actions: [Assignment:
organization-defined benchmarks].
Discussion: Organizations determine the time it takes on average to correct system flaws
after such flaws have been identified and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks

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Related Controls: None.
(4) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Employ automated patch management tools to facilitate flaw remediation to the following
system components: [Assignment: organization-defined system components].
Discussion: Using automated tools to support patch management helps to ensure thetimeliness and completeness of system patching operations.
Related Controls: None.
(5) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE UPDATESThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Install [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant software and firmware
updates] automatically to [Assignment: organization-defined system components].
Discussion: Due to system integrity and availability concerns, organizations consider the
methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Organizations balance the need toensure that the updates are installed as soon as possible with the need to maintainconfiguration management and control with any mission or operational impacts that
automatic updates might impose.
Related Controls: None.
(6) FLAW REMEDIATION | REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE
Remove previous versions of [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware
components] after updated versions have been installed.
Discussion: Previous versions of software or firmware components that are not removed
from the system after updates have been installed may be exploited by adversaries. Some
products may automatically remove previous versions of software and firmware from thesystem.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 186-4], [SP 800-39], [SP 800-40], [SP 800-128], [IR7788].

SI-3

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION
Control:a.

Implement [Selection (one or more): signature based; non-signature based] malicious code
protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious
code;

b.

Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available inaccordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;c.

Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:

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1.

Perform periodic scans of the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] andreal-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more): endpoint;
network entry and exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed inaccordance with organizational policy; and2.

[Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; take[Assignment: organization-defined action]]; and send alert to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles] in response to malicious code detection; andPAGE 334

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Address the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication andthe resulting potential impact on the availability of the system.

Discussion: System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote access servers, workstations,electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices.
Malicious code includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be
encoded in various formats contained within compressed or hidden files or hidden in files using
techniques such as steganography. Malicious code can be inserted into systems in a variety ofways, including by electronic mail, the world-wide web, and portable storage devices. Malicious
code insertions occur through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. A variety of technologies
and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code.

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Malicious code protection mechanisms include both signature- and nonsignature-based
technologies. Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include artificial intelligence
techniques that use heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of
malicious code and to provide controls against such code for which signatures do not yet exist or
for which existing signatures may not be effective. Malicious code for which active signatures do
not yet exist or may be ineffective includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes
signatures when it replicates). Nonsignature-based mechanisms also include reputation-based
technologies. In addition to the above technologies, pervasive configuration management,
comprehensive software integrity controls, and anti-exploitation software may be effective inpreventing the execution of unauthorized code. Malicious code may be present in commercial
off-the-shelf software as well as custom-built software and could include logic bombs, backdoors,and other types of attacks that could affect organizational mission and business functions.
In situations where malicious code cannot be detected by detection methods or technologies,
organizations rely on other types of controls, including secure coding practices, configuration
management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to ensurethat software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may
determine that, in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be
warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code
detection during periodic scans, the detection of malicious downloads, or the detection ofmaliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.
Related Controls: AC-4, AC-19, CM-3, CM-8, IR-4, MA-3, MA-4, PL-9, RA-5, SC-7, SC-23, SC-26, SC28, SC-44, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7, SI-8, SI-15.
Control Enhancements:(1) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-9.](2) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-3.](3) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6(10).](4) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED USERS
Update malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by a privileged user.
Discussion: Protection mechanisms for malicious code are typically categorized as securityrelated software and, as such, are only updated by organizational personnel withappropriate access privileges.
Related Controls: CM-5.
(5) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7.](6) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING AND VERIFICATION(a) Test malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] by introducing known benign code into the system; and(b) Verify that the detection of the code and the associated incident reporting occur.
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.
(7) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-3.]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(8) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS(a) Detect the following unauthorized operating system commands through the kernel
application programming interface on [Assignment: organization-defined system
hardware components]: [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating
system commands]; and(b) [Selection (one or more): issue a warning; audit the command execution; prevent theexecution of the command].
Discussion: Detecting unauthorized commands can be applied to critical interfaces otherthan kernel-based interfaces, including interfaces with virtual machines and privileged
applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include commands for kernel
functions from system processes that are not trusted to initiate such commands as well as
commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though commands of that type arereasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define the malicious commands to be
detected by a combination of command types, command classes, or specific instances ofcommands. Organizations can also define hardware components by component type,component, component location in the network, or a combination thereof. Organizations
may select different actions for different types, classes, or instances of malicious commands.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.
(9) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS[Withdrawn: Moved to AC-17(10).](10) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS(a) Employ the following tools and techniques to analyze the characteristics and behaviorof malicious code: [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques]; and(b) Incorporate the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident
response and flaw remediation processes.
Discussion: The use of malicious code analysis tools provides organizations with a more indepth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) andthe functionality and purpose of specific instances of malicious code. Understanding thecharacteristics of malicious code facilitates effective organizational responses to current andfuture threats. Organizations can conduct malicious code analyses by employing reverse
engineering techniques or by monitoring the behavior of executing code.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-83], [SP 800-125B], [SP 800-177].

SI-4

SYSTEM MONITORING
Control:

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Monitor the system to detect:
1.

Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring
objectives: [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring objectives]; and2.

Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;b.

Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods:[Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods];c.

Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:

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1.

Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential information;
and2.

At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest
to the organization;d.

Analyze detected events and anomalies;e.

Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation;f.

Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; andg.

Provide [Assignment: organization-defined system monitoring information] to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed; [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]].

Discussion: System monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring
includes the observation of events occurring at external interfaces to the system. Internalmonitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the system. Organizations
monitor systems by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects
such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives
guide and inform the determination of the events. System monitoring capabilities are achieved
through a variety of tools and techniques, including intrusion detection and prevention systems,
malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, andnetwork monitoring software.
Depending on the security architecture, the distribution and configuration of monitoring devices
may impact throughput at key internal and external boundaries as well as at other locations
across a network due to the introduction of network throughput latency. If throughput
management is needed, such devices are strategically located and deployed as part of anestablished organization-wide security architecture. Strategic locations for monitoring devices
include selected perimeter locations and near key servers and server farms that support criticalapplications. Monitoring devices are typically employed at the managed interfaces associatedwith controls SC-7 and AC-17. The information collected is a function of the organizational
monitoring objectives and the capability of systems to support such objectives. Specific types oftransactions of interest include Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP
proxies. System monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring andincident response programs, and output from system monitoring serves as input to those
programs. System monitoring requirements, including the need for specific types of systemmonitoring, may be referenced in other controls (e.g., AC-2g, AC-2(7), AC-2(12)(a), AC-17(1), AU13, AU-13(1), AU-13(2), CM-3f, CM-6d, MA-3a, MA-4a, SC-5(3)(b), SC-7a, SC-7(24)(b), SC-18b, SC43b). Adjustments to levels of system monitoring are based on law enforcement information,
intelligence information, or other sources of information. The legality of system monitoring
activities is based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines.

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Related Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AC-8, AC-17, AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9, AU-12, AU-13, AU-14,
CA-7, CM-3, CM-6, CM-8, CM-11, IA-10, IR-4, MA-3, MA-4, PL-9, PM-12, RA-5, RA-10, SC-5, SC-7,
SC-18, SC-26, SC-31, SC-35, SC-36, SC-37, SC-43, SI-3, SI-6, SI-7, SR-9, SR-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
Connect and configure individual intrusion detection tools into a system-wide intrusion
detection system.
Discussion: Linking individual intrusion detection tools into a system-wide intrusion
detection system provides additional coverage and effective detection capabilities. The
information contained in one intrusion detection tool can be shared widely across theorganization, making the system-wide detection capability more robust and powerful.
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Related Controls: None.
(2) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS
Employ automated tools and mechanisms to support near real-time analysis of events.
Discussion: Automated tools and mechanisms include host-based, network-based,transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools and mechanisms or security
information and event management (SIEM) technologies that provide real-time analysis ofalerts and notifications generated by organizational systems. Automated monitoring
techniques can create unintended privacy risks because automated controls may connect toexternal or otherwise unrelated systems. The matching of records between these systems
may create linkages with unintended consequences. Organizations assess and document
these risks in their privacy impact assessment and make determinations that are inalignment with their privacy program plan.
Related Controls: PM-23, PM-25.
(3) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL AND MECHANISM INTEGRATION
Employ automated tools and mechanisms to integrate intrusion detection tools andmechanisms into access control and flow control mechanisms.
Discussion: Using automated tools and mechanisms to integrate intrusion detection tools
and mechanisms into access and flow control mechanisms facilitates a rapid response toattacks by enabling the reconfiguration of mechanisms in support of attack isolation andelimination.
Related Controls: PM-23, PM-25.
(4) SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC(a) Determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for inboundand outbound communications traffic;(b) Monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency] for [Assignment: organization-defined unusual or unauthorized
activities or conditions].
Discussion: Unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions related to system inbound andoutbound communications traffic includes internal traffic that indicates the presence ofmalicious code or unauthorized use of legitimate code or credentials within organizational
systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and theunauthorized exporting of information. Evidence of malicious code or unauthorized use of
legitimate code or credentials is used to identify potentially compromised systems or systemcomponents.
Related Controls: None.

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Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the following systemgenerated indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment:
organization-defined compromise indicators].

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Discussion: Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including audit records orinputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention
mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers. Alerts
can be automated and may be transmitted telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by
text messaging. Organizational personnel on the alert notification list can include systemadministrators, mission or business owners, system owners, information owners/stewards,
senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, systemsecurity officers, or privacy officers. In contrast to alerts generated by the system, alerts
generated by organizations in SI-4(12) focus on information sources external to the system,
such as suspicious activity reports and reports on potential insider threats.
Related Controls: AU-4, AU-5, PE-6.
(6) SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6(10).](7) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTS(a) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel (identified byname and/or by role)] of detected suspicious events; and(b) Take the following actions upon detection: [Assignment: organization-defined leastdisruptive actions to terminate suspicious events].
Discussion: Least-disruptive actions include initiating requests for human responses.
Related Controls: None.
(8) SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4.](9) SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING TOOLS AND MECHANISMS
Test intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
Discussion: Testing intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms is necessary to ensure thatthe tools and mechanisms are operating correctly and continue to satisfy the monitoring
objectives of organizations. The frequency and depth of testing depends on the types oftools and mechanisms used by organizations and the methods of deployment.
Related Controls: None.
(10) SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
Make provisions so that [Assignment: organization-defined encrypted communications
traffic] is visible to [Assignment: organization-defined system monitoring tools andmechanisms].
Discussion: Organizations balance the need to encrypt communications traffic to protect
data confidentiality with the need to maintain visibility into such traffic from a monitoring
perspective. Organizations determine whether the visibility requirement applies to internal
encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic intended for external destinations, or a subset of thetraffic types.
Related Controls: None.
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Analyze outbound communications traffic at the external interfaces to the system andselected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the system] to discoveranomalies.
Discussion: Organization-defined interior points include subnetworks and subsystems.
Anomalies within organizational systems include large file transfers, long-time persistentconnections, attempts to access information from unexpected locations, the use of unusual
protocols and ports, the use of unmonitored network protocols (e.g., IPv6 usage during IPv4transition), and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.
Related Controls: None.
(12) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ORGANIZATION-GENERATED ALERTS
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms] when the following indications of
inappropriate or unusual activities with security or privacy implications occur:[Assignment: organization-defined activities that trigger alerts].
Discussion: Organizational personnel on the system alert notification list include systemadministrators, mission or business owners, system owners, senior agency information
security officer, senior agency official for privacy, system security officers, or privacy officers.
Automated organization-generated alerts are the security alerts generated by organizations
and transmitted using automated means. The sources for organization-generated alerts arefocused on other entities such as suspicious activity reports and reports on potential insider
threats. In contrast to alerts generated by the organization, alerts generated by the system
in SI-4(5) focus on information sources that are internal to the systems, such as audit
records.
Related Controls: None.
(13) SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC AND EVENT PATTERNS(a) Analyze communications traffic and event patterns for the system;(b) Develop profiles representing common traffic and event patterns; and(c) Use the traffic and event profiles in tuning system-monitoring devices.
Discussion: Identifying and understanding common communications traffic and event
patterns help organizations provide useful information to system monitoring devices tomore effectively identify suspicious or anomalous traffic and events when they occur. Suchinformation can help reduce the number of false positives and false negatives during systemmonitoring.
Related Controls: None.
(14) SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTION
Employ a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices and to
detect attack attempts and potential compromises or breaches to the system.
Discussion: Wireless signals may radiate beyond organizational facilities. Organizations
proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections, including the conduct of thoroughscans for unauthorized wireless access points. Wireless scans are not limited to those areas
within facilities containing systems but also include areas outside of facilities to verify thatunauthorized wireless access points are not connected to organizational systems.
Related Controls: AC-18, IA-3.
(15) SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS
Employ an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications traffic as the
traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks.

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Discussion: Wireless networks are inherently less secure than wired networks. For example,
wireless networks are more susceptible to eavesdroppers or traffic analysis than wireline
networks. When wireless to wireline communications exist, the wireless network could
become a port of entry into the wired network. Given the greater facility of unauthorizednetwork access via wireless access points compared to unauthorized wired network accessfrom within the physical boundaries of the system, additional monitoring of transitioning
traffic between wireless and wired networks may be necessary to detect malicious activities.
Employing intrusion detection systems to monitor wireless communications traffic helps toensure that the traffic does not contain malicious code prior to transitioning to the wireline
network.
Related Controls: AC-18.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(16) SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATION
Correlate information from monitoring tools and mechanisms employed throughout thesystem.
Discussion: Correlating information from different system monitoring tools and mechanisms
can provide a more comprehensive view of system activity. Correlating system monitoring
tools and mechanisms that typically work in isolation—including malicious code protection
software, host monitoring, and network monitoring—can provide an organization-widemonitoring view and may reveal otherwise unseen attack patterns. Understanding thecapabilities and limitations of diverse monitoring tools and mechanisms and how to
maximize the use of information generated by those tools and mechanisms can helporganizations develop, operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs. The correlationof monitoring information is especially important during the transition from older to newer
technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols).
Related Controls: AU-6.
(17) SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Correlate information from monitoring physical, cyber, and supply chain activities toachieve integrated, organization-wide situational awareness.
Discussion: Correlating monitoring information from a more diverse set of information
sources helps to achieve integrated situational awareness. Integrated situational awarenessfrom a combination of physical, cyber, and supply chain monitoring activities enhances thecapability of organizations to more quickly detect sophisticated attacks and investigate themethods and techniques employed to carry out such attacks. In contrast to SI-4(16), whichcorrelates the various cyber monitoring information, integrated situational awareness isintended to correlate monitoring beyond the cyber domain. Correlation of monitoring
information from multiple activities may help reveal attacks on organizations that areoperating across multiple attack vectors.
Related Controls: AU-16, PE-6, SR-2, SR-4, SR-6.
(18) SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC AND COVERT EXFILTRATION
Analyze outbound communications traffic at external interfaces to the system and at thefollowing interior points to detect covert exfiltration of information: [Assignment:
organization-defined interior points within the system].
Discussion: Organization-defined interior points include subnetworks and subsystems.
Covert means that can be used to exfiltrate information include steganography.
Related Controls: None.
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Implement [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of individuals who
have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an increased
level of risk.
Discussion: Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from different
sources, including personnel records, intelligence agencies, law enforcement organizations,and other sources. The monitoring of individuals is coordinated with the management, legal,
security, privacy, and human resource officials who conduct such monitoring. Monitoring is
conducted in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines.
Related Controls: None.
(20) SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USERS
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Implement the following additional monitoring of privileged users: [Assignment:
organization-defined additional monitoring].
Discussion: Privileged users have access to more sensitive information, including securityrelated information, than the general user population. Access to such information meansthat privileged users can potentially do greater damage to systems and organizations than
non-privileged users. Therefore, implementing additional monitoring on privileged users
helps to ensure that organizations can identify malicious activity at the earliest possible time
and take appropriate actions.
Related Controls: AC-18.
(21) SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS
Implement the following additional monitoring of individuals during [Assignment:
organization-defined probationary period]: [Assignment: organization-defined additional
monitoring].
Discussion: During probationary periods, employees do not have permanent employment
status within organizations. Without such status or access to information that is resident on
the system, additional monitoring can help identify any potentially malicious activity or
inappropriate behavior.
Related Controls: AC-18.
(22) SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK SERVICES(a) Detect network services that have not been authorized or approved by [Assignment:
organization-defined authorization or approval processes]; and(b) [Selection (one or more): Audit; Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]] when detected.
Discussion: Unauthorized or unapproved network services include services in serviceoriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation and may therefore
be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services.
Related Controls: CM-7.
(23) SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES
Implement the following host-based monitoring mechanisms at [Assignment:
organization-defined system components]: [Assignment: organization-defined host-based
monitoring mechanisms].
Discussion: Host-based monitoring collects information about the host (or system in which it
resides). System components in which host-based monitoring can be implemented include
servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Organizations may consider employing
host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple product developers or vendors.
Related Controls: AC-18, AC-19.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________(24) SYSTEM MONITORING | INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Discover, collect, and distribute to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles],indicators of compromise provided by [Assignment: organization-defined sources].

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Discussion: Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are
identified on organizational systems at the host or network level. IOCs provide valuable
information on systems that have been compromised. IOCs can include the creation ofregistry key values. IOCs for network traffic include Universal Resource Locator or protocol
elements that indicate malicious code command and control servers. The rapid distribution
and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by reducing the time that systems
and organizations are vulnerable to the same exploit or attack. Threat indicators, signatures,tactics, techniques, procedures, and other indicators of compromise may be available via
government and non-government cooperatives, including the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, the Defense
Industrial Base Cybersecurity Information Sharing Program, and the CERT Coordination
Center.
Related Controls: AC-18.
(25) SYSTEM MONITORING | OPTIMIZE NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
Provide visibility into network traffic at external and key internal system interfaces tooptimize the effectiveness of monitoring devices.
Discussion: Encrypted traffic, asymmetric routing architectures, capacity and latency
limitations, and transitioning from older to newer technologies (e.g., IPv4 to IPv6 network
protocol transition) may result in blind spots for organizations when analyzing network
traffic. Collecting, decrypting, pre-processing, and distributing only relevant traffic tomonitoring devices can streamline the efficiency and use of devices and optimize traffic
analysis.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 140-3], [SP 800-61], [SP 800-83], [SP 800-92], [SP 800-94], [SP
800-137].

SI-5

SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES
Control:a.

Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: organizationdefined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;b.

Generate internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;c.

Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-definedelements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined externalorganizations]]; andd.

Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify theissuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.

Discussion: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) generates security alerts
and advisories to maintain situational awareness throughout the Federal Government. Security
directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility andauthority to issue such directives. Compliance with security directives is essential due to thecritical nature of many of these directives and the potential (immediate) adverse effects onorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the
directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include supply chain

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partners, external mission or business partners, external service providers, and other peer or
supporting organizations.
Related Controls: PM-15, RA-5, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIES
Broadcast security alert and advisory information throughout the organization using[Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].

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Discussion: The significant number of changes to organizational systems and environmentsof operation requires the dissemination of security-related information to a variety oforganizational entities that have a direct interest in the success of organizational mission andbusiness functions. Based on information provided by security alerts and advisories, changes
may be required at one or more of the three levels related to the management of risk,
including the governance level, mission and business process level, and the information
system level.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-40].

SI-6

SECURITY AND PRIVACY FUNCTION VERIFICATION
Control:a.

Verify the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security and privacy
functions];b.

Perform the verification of the functions specified in SI-6a [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined system transitional states]; upon command by user withappropriate privilege; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]];c.

Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to failed security and privacy
verification tests; andd.

[Selection (one or more): Shut the system down; Restart the system; [Assignment:
organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.

Discussion: Transitional states for systems include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.
System notifications include hardware indicator lights, electronic alerts to system administrators,
and messages to local computer consoles. In contrast to security function verification, privacy
function verification ensures that privacy functions operate as expected and are approved by thesenior agency official for privacy or that privacy attributes are applied or used as expected.
Related Controls: CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1) SECURITY AND PRIVACY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6.](2) SECURITY AND PRIVACY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTEDTESTING

Implement automated mechanisms to support the management of distributed security
and privacy function testing.

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Discussion: The use of automated mechanisms to support the management of distributed
function testing helps to ensure the integrity, timeliness, completeness, and efficacy of suchtesting.
Related Controls: SI-2.
(3) SECURITY AND PRIVACY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION RESULTS
Report the results of security and privacy function verification to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles].
Discussion: Organizational personnel with potential interest in the results of the verificationof security and privacy functions include systems security officers, senior agency information
security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy.
Related Controls: SI-4, SR-4, SR-5.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

References: [OMB A-130].

SI-7

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY
Control:a.

Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to the following software,
firmware, and information: [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, andinformation]; andb.

Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, andinformation are detected: [Assignment: organization-defined actions].

Discussion: Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due toerrors or malicious activity. Software includes operating systems (with key internal components,
such as kernels or drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware interfaces include Unified
Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) and Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). Information includes
personally identifiable information and metadata that contains security and privacy attributes
associated with information. Integrity-checking mechanisms—including parity checks, cyclical
redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes, and associated tools—can automatically monitor the
integrity of systems and hosted applications.
Related Controls: AC-4, CM-3, CM-7, CM-8, MA-3, MA-4, RA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-10, SC-8, SC-12,
SC-13, SC-28, SC-37, SI-3, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-6, SR-9, SR-10, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKS
Perform an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, andinformation] [Selection (one or more): at startup; at [Assignment: organization-definedtransitional states or security-relevant events]; [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]].
Discussion: Security-relevant events include the identification of new threats to whichorganizational systems are susceptible and the installation of new hardware, software, or
firmware. Transitional states include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.
Related Controls: None.
(2) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITYVIOLATIONS

Employ automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.

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Discussion: The employment of automated tools to report system and information integrity
violations and to notify organizational personnel in a timely matter is essential to effective
risk response. Personnel with an interest in system and information integrity violations
include mission and business owners, system owners, senior agency information security
official, senior agency official for privacy, system administrators, software developers,
systems integrators, information security officers, and privacy officers.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLY MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLS
Employ centrally managed integrity verification tools.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Centrally managed integrity verification tools provides greater consistency in theapplication of such tools and can facilitate more comprehensive coverage of integrity
verification actions.
Related Controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-8.
(4) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPER-EVIDENT PACKAGING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SR-9.](5) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO INTEGRITYVIOLATIONS

Automatically [Selection (one or more): shut the system down; restart the system;
implement [Assignment: organization-defined controls]] when integrity violations are
discovered.
Discussion: Organizations may define different integrity-checking responses by type of
information, specific information, or a combination of both. Types of information include
firmware, software, and user data. Specific information includes boot firmware for certain
types of machines. The automatic implementation of controls within organizational systems
includes reversing the changes, halting the system, or triggering audit alerts when
unauthorized modifications to critical security files occur.
Related Controls: None.
(6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to software,
firmware, and information.
Discussion: Cryptographic mechanisms used to protect integrity include digital signatures
and the computation and application of signed hashes using asymmetric cryptography,
protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, and using the public key
to verify the hash information. Organizations that employ cryptographic mechanisms also
consider cryptographic key management solutions.
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION ANDRESPONSE

Incorporate the detection of the following unauthorized changes into the organizational
incident response capability: [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant changes
to the system].
Discussion: Integrating detection and response helps to ensure that detected events aretracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical
records is important for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an
extended time period and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include

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unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or the unauthorized elevation ofsystem privileges.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.
(8) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANTEVENTS

Upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provide the capability to audit the event
and initiate the following actions: [Selection (one or more): generate an audit record; alert
current user; alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment:
organization-defined other actions]].
Discussion: Organizations select response actions based on types of software, specificsoftware, or information for which there are potential integrity violations.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.
(9) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY BOOT PROCESS
Verify the integrity of the boot process of the following system components: [Assignment:
organization-defined system components].
Discussion: Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting system components
in known, trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide a level of assurance
that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.
Related Controls: SI-6.
(10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION OF BOOT FIRMWARE
Implement the following mechanisms to protect the integrity of boot firmware in[Assignment: organization-defined system components]: [Assignment: organizationdefined mechanisms].
Discussion: Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may indicate a sophisticated,targeted attack. These types of targeted attacks can result in a permanent denial of service
or a persistent malicious code presence. These situations can occur if the firmware iscorrupted or if the malicious code is embedded within the firmware. System components
can protect the integrity of boot firmware in organizational systems by verifying the integrity
and authenticity of all updates to the firmware prior to applying changes to the systemcomponent and preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware.
Related Controls: SI-6.
(11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITEDPRIVILEGES[Withdrawn: Moved to CM-7(6).](12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
Require that the integrity of the following user-installed software be verified prior to
execution: [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed software].
Discussion: Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution to
reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or programs that contains errors fromunauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches toverifying software integrity, including the availability of trustworthy checksums fromsoftware developers and vendors.
Related Controls: CM-11.
(13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTEDENVIRONMENTS

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[Withdrawn: Moved to CM-7(7).](14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE
[Withdrawn: Moved to CM-7(8).](15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE AUTHENTICATION
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the following software or firmware
components prior to installation: [Assignment: organization-defined software or firmware
components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Cryptographic authentication includes verifying that software or firmware
components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and approved byorganizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious code.
Organizations that employ cryptographic mechanisms also consider cryptographic key
management solutions.
Related Controls: CM-5, SC-12, SC-13.
(16) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTIONWITHOUT SUPERVISION

Prohibit processes from executing without supervision for more than [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].
Discussion: Placing a time limit on process execution without supervision is intended toapply to processes for which typical or normal execution periods can be determined andsituations in which organizations exceed such periods. Supervision includes timers on
operating systems, automated responses, and manual oversight and response when systemprocess anomalies occur.
Related Controls: None.
(17) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | RUNTIME APPLICATION SELF-PROTECTION
Implement [Assignment: organization-defined controls] for application self-protection at
runtime.
Discussion: Runtime application self-protection employs runtime instrumentation to detectand block the exploitation of software vulnerabilities by taking advantage of informationfrom the software in execution. Runtime exploit prevention differs from traditional
perimeter-based protections such as guards and firewalls which can only detect and blockattacks by using network information without contextual awareness. Runtime application
self-protection technology can reduce the susceptibility of software to attacks by monitoring
its inputs and blocking those inputs that could allow attacks. It can also help protect theruntime environment from unwanted changes and tampering. When a threat is detected,
runtime application self-protection technology can prevent exploitation and take otheractions (e.g., sending a warning message to the user, terminating the user's session,
terminating the application, or sending an alert to organizational personnel). Runtime
application self-protection solutions can be deployed in either a monitor or protection
mode.
Related Controls: SI-16.
References: [OMB A-130], [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS 180-4], [FIPS 186-4], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-70], [SP
800-147].

SI-8

SPAM PROTECTION
Control:

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Employ spam protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and act on
unsolicited messages; andb.

Update spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance withorganizational configuration management policy and procedures.

Discussion: System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote-access servers, electronic mailservers, web servers, proxy servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices.
Spam can be transported by different means, including email, email attachments, and web
accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include signature definitions.
Related Controls: PL-9, SC-5, SC-7, SC-38, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(1) SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-9.](2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATESAutomatically update spam protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
Discussion: Using automated mechanisms to update spam protection mechanisms helps toensure that updates occur on a regular basis and provide the latest content and protection
capabilities.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SPAM PROTECTION |CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY
Implement spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability to more effectively
identify legitimate communications traffic.
Discussion: Learning mechanisms include Bayesian filters that respond to user inputs that
identify specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm parameters and thereby
more accurately separating types of traffic.
Related Controls: None.
References: [SP 800-45], [SP 800-177].

SI-9

INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, and AC-6.]

SI-10

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION
Control: Check the validity of the following information inputs: [Assignment: organizationdefined information inputs to the system].
Discussion: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of system inputs—including character set,
length, numerical range, and acceptable values—verifies that inputs match specified definitions
for format and content. For example, if the organization specifies that numerical values between
1-100 are the only acceptable inputs for a field in a given application, inputs of “387,” “abc,” or“%K%” are invalid inputs and are not accepted as input to the system. Valid inputs are likely tovary from field to field within a software application. Applications typically follow well-defined
protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between
software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured
data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attackersupplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages,
then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data

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to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component
that receives the corrupted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret thedata incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing them to interpreters prevents the content
from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation ensures accurate andcorrect inputs and prevents attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY(a) Provide a manual override capability for input validation of the following information
inputs: [Assignment: organization-defined inputs defined in the base control (SI-10)];
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(b) Restrict the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organizationdefined authorized individuals]; and(c) Audit the use of the manual override capability.
Discussion: In certain situations, such as during events that are defined in contingency plans,a manual override capability for input validation may be needed. Manual overrides are used
only in limited circumstances and with the inputs defined by the organization.
Related Controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-12.
(2) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW AND RESOLVE ERRORS
Review and resolve input validation errors within [Assignment: organization-defined time
period].
Discussion: Resolution of input validation errors includes correcting systemic causes oferrors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. Input validation errors are thoserelated to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control (SI-10).
Related Controls: None.
(3) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR
Verify that the system behaves in a predictable and documented manner when invalid
inputs are received.
Discussion: A common vulnerability in organizational systems is unpredictable behavior
when invalid inputs are received. Verification of system predictability helps ensure that thesystem behaves as expected when invalid inputs are received. This occurs by specifying
system responses that allow the system to transition to known states without adverse,
unintended side effects. The invalid inputs are those related to the information inputs
defined by the organization in the base control (SI-10).
Related Controls: None.
(4) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | TIMING INTERACTIONS
Account for timing interactions among system components in determining appropriate
responses for invalid inputs.
Discussion: In addressing invalid system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing
interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error
response on other protocols in the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wirelessnetwork protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when
packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses
are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to noiseor collisions on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes the wrong action in
response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use what appear to be acceptable
individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse effects through suitable

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construction of invalid input. The invalid inputs are those related to the information inputs
defined by the organization in the base control (SI-10).
Related Controls: None.
(5) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | RESTRICT INPUTS TO TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVEDFORMATS

Restrict the use of information inputs to [Assignment: organization-defined trusted
sources] and/or [Assignment: organization-defined formats].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Restricting the use of inputs to trusted sources and in trusted formats applies
the concept of authorized or permitted software to information inputs. Specifying known
trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable formats for such inputs can reduce
the probability of malicious activity. The information inputs are those defined by theorganization in the base control (SI-10).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6.
(6) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | INJECTION PREVENTION
Prevent untrusted data injections.
Discussion: Untrusted data injections may be prevented using a parameterized interface or
output escaping (output encoding). Parameterized interfaces separate data from code sothat injections of malicious or unintended data cannot change the semantics of commands
being sent. Output escaping uses specified characters to inform the interpreter’s parser
whether data is trusted. Prevention of untrusted data injections are with respect to theinformation inputs defined by the organization in the base control (SI-10).
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-6.
References: [OMB A-130].

SI-11

ERROR HANDLING
Control:a.

Generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without
revealing information that could be exploited; andb.

Reveal error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Discussion: Organizations consider the structure and content of error messages. The extent towhich systems can handle error conditions is guided and informed by organizational policy andoperational requirements. Exploitable information includes stack traces and implementation
details; erroneous logon attempts with passwords mistakenly entered as the username; mission
or business information that can be derived from, if not stated explicitly by, the information
recorded; and personally identifiable information, such as account numbers, social security
numbers, and credit card numbers. Error messages may also provide a covert channel fortransmitting information.
Related Controls: AU-2, AU-3, SC-31, SI-2, SI-15.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SI-12

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION
Control: Manage and retain information within the system and information output from thesystem in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, guidelines and operational requirements.

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Discussion: Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle ofinformation, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may
also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, andother types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration(NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations
have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel.
Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management andretention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, AC-6(9), AT-4, AU-12, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6,
CA-7, CA-8, CA-9, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, CM-12, CM-13, CP-2, IR-6, IR-8, MA-2,
MA-4, PE-2, PE-8, PE-16, PE-17, PL-2, PL-4, PL-7, PL-8, PM-5, PM-8, PM-9, PM-18, PM-21, PM-27,
PM-28, PM-30, PM-31, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, PT-2, PT-3, PT-7, RA-2, RA-3, RA-5, RA-8, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8,
SA-10, SI-4, SR-2, SR-4, SR-8.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: All XX-1 Controls, AC-16, AU-5, AU-11, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-9, CM5, CM-9, CP-2, IR-8, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-6, PL-2, PL-4, PM-4, PM-8, PM-9, PS-2, PS-6, PT-2, PT3, RA-2, RA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SR-2.
Control Enhancements:(1) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONELEMENTS

Limit personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle tothe following elements of personally identifiable information: [Assignment: organizationdefined elements of personally identifiable information].
Discussion: Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the
information life cycle when the information is not needed for operational purposes helps toreduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. The information life cycle includes
information creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination,
disclosure, and disposition. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, andpolicies can provide useful inputs to determining which elements of personally identifiable
information may create risk.
Related Controls: PM-25.
(2) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE
INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH

Use the following techniques to minimize the use of personally identifiable information forresearch, testing, or training: [Assignment: organization-defined techniques].
Discussion: Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by employing
techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personallyidentifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is notneeded for research, testing, or training helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by asystem. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide
useful inputs to determining the techniques to use and when to use them.
Related Controls: PM-22, PM-25, SI-19.
(3) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | INFORMATION DISPOSAL
Use the following techniques to dispose of, destroy, or erase information following theretention period: [Assignment: organization-defined techniques].
Discussion: Organizations can minimize both security and privacy risks by disposing of
information when it is no longer needed. The disposal or destruction of information applies
to originals as well as copies and archived records, including system logs that may containpersonally identifiable information.

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Related Controls: None.
References: [USC 2901], [OMB A-130].

SI-13

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION
Control:a.

Determine mean time to failure (MTTF) for the following system components in specificenvironments of operation: [Assignment: organization-defined system components]; andb.

Provide substitute system components and a means to exchange active and standby
components in accordance with the following criteria: [Assignment: organization-defined
MTTF substitution criteria].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended
to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure
rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations
define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF value withconsideration for the potential harm from component failures. The transfer of responsibilities
between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or
security capabilities. The preservation of system state variables is also critical to help ensure a
successful transfer process. Standby components remain available at all times except for
maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.
Related Controls: CP-2, CP-10, CP-13, MA-2, MA-6, SA-8, SC-6.
Control Enhancements:(1) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIESTake system components out of service by transferring component responsibilities tosubstitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction or
percentage] of mean time to failure.
Discussion: Transferring primary system component responsibilities to other substitutecomponents prior to primary component failure is important to reduce the risk of degradedor debilitated mission or business functions. Making such transfers based on a percentage ofmean time to failure allows organizations to be proactive based on their risk tolerance.
However, the premature replacement of system components can result in the increased costof system operations.
Related Controls: None.
(2) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7(16).](3) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTS
Manually initiate transfers between active and standby system components when the useof the active component reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of themean time to failure.
Discussion: For example, if the MTTF for a system component is 100 days and the MTTF
percentage defined by the organization is 90 percent, the manual transfer would occur after
90 days.
Related Controls: None.
(4) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION AND NOTIFICATION
If system component failures are detected:

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within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and(b) [Selection (one or more): Activate [Assignment: organization-defined alarm];
Automatically shut down the system; [Assignment: organization-defined action]].
Discussion: Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode canoccur upon the detection of component failures.
Related Controls: None.
(5) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY
Provide [Selection: real-time; near real-time] [Assignment: organization-defined failover
capability] for the system.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate system upon the
failure of the primary system. Failover capability includes incorporating mirrored system
operations at alternate processing sites or periodic data mirroring at regular intervals
defined by the recovery time periods of organizations.
Related Controls: CP-6, CP-7, CP-9.
References: None.

SI-14

NON-PERSISTENCE
Control: Implement non-persistent [Assignment: organization-defined system components andservices] that are initiated in a known state and terminated [Selection (one or more): upon end ofsession of use; periodically at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].
Discussion: Implementation of non-persistent components and services mitigates risk fromadvanced persistent threats (APTs) by reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e.,
window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. By
implementing the concept of non-persistence for selected system components, organizations canprovide a trusted, known state computing resource for a specific time period that does not give
adversaries sufficient time to exploit vulnerabilities in organizational systems or operating
environments. Since the APT is a high-end, sophisticated threat with regard to capability, intent,
and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period, a percentage of attacks will
be successful. Non-persistent system components and services are activated as required using
protected information and terminated periodically or at the end of sessions. Non-persistence
increases the work factor of adversaries attempting to compromise or breach organizational
systems.
Non-persistence can be achieved by refreshing system components, periodically reimaging
components, or using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent services canbe implemented by using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or as new
instances of processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent). The benefit ofperiodic refreshes of system components and services is that it does not require organizations tofirst determine whether compromises of components or services have occurred (something that
may often be difficult to determine). The refresh of selected system components and services
occurs with sufficient frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact of attacks, but notwith such frequency that it makes the system unstable. Refreshes of critical components andservices may be done periodically to hinder the ability of adversaries to exploit optimum
windows of vulnerabilities.
Related Controls: SC-30, SC-34, SI-21.
Control Enhancements:(1) NON-PERSISTENCE | REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCES

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Obtain software and data employed during system component and service refreshes fromthe following trusted sources: [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources].
Discussion: Trusted sources include software and data from write-once, read-only media orfrom selected offline secure storage facilities.
Related Controls: None.
(2) NON-PERSISTENCE | NON-PERSISTENT INFORMATION(a) [Selection: Refresh [Assignment: organization-defined information] [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; Generate [Assignment: organization-defined
information] on demand]; and(b) Delete information when no longer needed.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Retaining information longer than is needed makes the information a potential
target for advanced adversaries searching for high value assets to compromise throughunauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, or exfiltration. For system-related
information, unnecessary retention provides advanced adversaries information that can
assist in their reconnaissance and lateral movement through the system.
Related Controls: None.
(3) NON-PERSISTENCE | NON-PERSISTENT CONNECTIVITY
Establish connections to the system on demand and terminate connections after[Selection: completion of a request; a period of non-use].
Discussion: Persistent connections to systems can provide advanced adversaries with paths
to move laterally through systems and potentially position themselves closer to high value
assets. Limiting the availability of such connections impedes the adversary’s ability to movefreely through organizational systems.
Related Controls: SC-10.
References: None.

SI-15

INFORMATION OUTPUT FILTERING
Control: Validate information output from the following software programs and/or applications
to ensure that the information is consistent with the expected content: [Assignment:
organization-defined software programs and/or applications].
Discussion: Certain types of attacks, including SQL injections, produce output results that are
unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would be expected from software
programs or applications. Information output filtering focuses on detecting extraneous content,
preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and then alerting monitoring toolsthat anomalous behavior has been discovered.
Related Controls: SI-3, SI-4, SI-11.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SI-16

MEMORY PROTECTION
Control: Implement the following controls to protect the system memory from unauthorizedcode execution: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executableregions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Controls employed to protect
memory include data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data

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execution prevention controls can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced withhardware enforcement providing the greater strength of mechanism.
Related Controls: AC-25, SC-3, SI-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SI-17

FAIL-SAFE PROCEDURES
Control: Implement the indicated fail-safe procedures when the indicated failures occur:[Assignment: organization-defined list of failure conditions and associated fail-safe procedures].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Failure conditions include the loss of communications among critical systemcomponents or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures
include alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps totake. Subsequent steps may include doing nothing, reestablishing system settings, shutting down
processes, restarting the system, or contacting designated organizational personnel.
Related Controls: CP-12, CP-13, SC-24, SI-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

SI-18

PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY OPERATIONSControl:a.

Check the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of personally identifiable
information across the information life cycle [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
andb.

Correct or delete inaccurate or outdated personally identifiable information.

Discussion: Personally identifiable information quality operations include the steps thatorganizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information
throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection,use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of personallyidentifiable information. Personally identifiable information quality operations include editing
and validating addresses as they are collected or entered into systems using automated address
verification look-up application programming interfaces. Checking personally identifiable
information quality includes the tracking of updates or changes to data over time, which enables
organizations to know how and what personally identifiable information was changed shoulderroneous information be identified. The measures taken to protect personally identifiable
information quality are based on the nature and context of the personally identifiable
information, how it is to be used, how it was obtained, and the potential de-identification
methods employed. The measures taken to validate the accuracy of personally identifiable
information used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals
covered under federal programs may be more comprehensive than the measures used tovalidate personally identifiable information used for less sensitive purposes.
Related Controls: PM-22, PM-24, PT-2, SI-4.
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Correct or delete personally identifiable information that is inaccurate or outdated,
incorrectly determined regarding impact, or incorrectly de-identified using [Assignment:
organization-defined automated mechanisms].
Discussion: The use of automated mechanisms to improve data quality may inadvertently
create privacy risks. Automated tools may connect to external or otherwise unrelated
systems, and the matching of records between these systems may create linkages with
unintended consequences. Organizations assess and document these risks in their privacy
impact assessments and make determinations that are in alignment with their privacy
program plans.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

As data is obtained and used across the information life cycle, it is important to confirm theaccuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information. Automated mechanisms canaugment existing data quality processes and procedures and enable an organization tobetter identify and manage personally identifiable information in large-scale systems. For
example, automated tools can greatly improve efforts to consistently normalize data or
identify malformed data. Automated tools can also be used to improve the auditing of data
and detect errors that may incorrectly alter personally identifiable information or incorrectly
associate such information with the wrong individual. Automated capabilities backstop
processes and procedures at-scale and enable more fine-grained detection and correction ofdata quality errors.
Related Controls: PM-18, RA-8.
(2) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY OPERATIONS | DATA TAGS
Employ data tags to automate the correction or deletion of personally identifiable
information across the information life cycle within organizational systems.
Discussion: Data tagging personally identifiable information includes tags that note
processing permissions, authority to process, de-identification, impact level, information life
cycle stage, and retention or last updated dates. Employing data tags for personallyidentifiable information can support the use of automation tools to correct or delete
relevant personally identifiable information.
Related Controls: AC-3, AC-16, SC-16.
(3) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY OPERATIONS | COLLECTION
Collect personally identifiable information directly from the individual.
Discussion: Individuals or their designated representatives can be sources of correct
personally identifiable information. Organizations consider contextual factors that may
incentivize individuals to provide correct data versus false data. Additional steps may benecessary to validate collected information based on the nature and context of thepersonally identifiable information, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. The
measures taken to validate the accuracy of personally identifiable information used to makedeterminations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals under federal programs
may be more comprehensive than the measures taken to validate less sensitive personallyidentifiable information.
Related Controls: None.
(4) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY OPERATIONS | INDIVIDUAL REQUESTS
Correct or delete personally identifiable information upon request by individuals or theirdesignated representatives.
Discussion: Inaccurate personally identifiable information maintained by organizations may
cause problems for individuals, especially in those business functions where inaccurate
information may result in inappropriate decisions or the denial of benefits and services toindividuals. Even correct information, in certain circumstances, can cause problems for

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individuals that outweigh the benefits of an organization maintaining the information.
Organizations use discretion when determining if personally identifiable information is to becorrected or deleted based on the scope of requests, the changes sought, the impact of thechanges, and laws, regulations, and policies. Organizational personnel consult with thesenior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding appropriate instances ofcorrection or deletion.
Related Controls: None.
(5) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION QUALITY OPERATIONS | NOTICE OF CORRECTION OR
DELETION

Notify [Assignment: organization-defined recipients of personally identifiable information]and individuals that the personally identifiable information has been corrected or deleted.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: When personally identifiable information is corrected or deleted, organizations
take steps to ensure that all authorized recipients of such information, and the individualwith whom the information is associated or their designated representatives, are informedof the corrected or deleted information.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB M-19-15], [SP 800-188], [IR 8112].

SI-19

DE-IDENTIFICATION
Control:a.

Remove the following elements of personally identifiable information from datasets:[Assignment: organization-defined elements of personally identifiable information]; andb.

Evaluate [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for effectiveness of de-identification.

Discussion: De-identification is the general term for the process of removing the association
between a set of identifying data and the data subject. Many datasets contain information about
individuals that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social
security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records. Datasets
may also contain other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical,
educational, financial, and employment information. Personally identifiable information isremoved from datasets by trained individuals when such information is not (or no longer)
necessary to satisfy the requirements envisioned for the data. For example, if the dataset is onlyused to produce aggregate statistics, the identifiers that are not needed for producing thosestatistics are removed. Removing identifiers improves privacy protection since information that isremoved cannot be inadvertently disclosed or improperly used. Organizations may be subject tospecific de-identification definitions or methods under applicable laws, regulations, or policies.
Re-identification is a residual risk with de-identified data. Re-identification attacks can vary,
including combining new datasets or other improvements in data analytics. Maintaining
awareness of potential attacks and evaluating for the effectiveness of the de-identification overtime support the management of this residual risk.
Related Controls: MP-6, PM-22, PM-23, PM-24, RA-2, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1) DE-IDENTIFICATION | COLLECTION
De-identify the dataset upon collection by not collecting personally identifiable
information.
Discussion: If a data source contains personally identifiable information but the information
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data elements that contain the personally identifiable information. For example, if anorganization does not intend to use the social security number of an applicant, thenapplication forms do not ask for a social security number.
Related Controls: None.
(2) DE-IDENTIFICATION | ARCHIVING
Prohibit archiving of personally identifiable information elements if those elements in adataset will not be needed after the dataset is archived.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: Datasets can be archived for many reasons. The envisioned purposes for thearchived dataset are specified, and if personally identifiable information elements are notrequired, the elements are not archived. For example, social security numbers may havebeen collected for record linkage, but the archived dataset may include the requiredelements from the linked records. In this case, it is not necessary to archive the social
security numbers.
Related Controls: None.
(3) DE-IDENTIFICATION | RELEASE
Remove personally identifiable information elements from a dataset prior to its release if
those elements in the dataset do not need to be part of the data release.
Discussion: Prior to releasing a dataset, a data custodian considers the intended uses of thedataset and determines if it is necessary to release personally identifiable information. If thepersonally identifiable information is not necessary, the information can be removed using
de-identification techniques.
Related Controls: None.
(4) DE-IDENTIFICATION | REMOVAL, MASKING, ENCRYPTION, HASHING, OR REPLACEMENT OF DIRECTIDENTIFIERS

Remove, mask, encrypt, hash, or replace direct identifiers in a dataset.
Discussion: There are many possible processes for removing direct identifiers from adataset. Columns in a dataset that contain a direct identifier can be removed. In masking,the direct identifier is transformed into a repeating character, such as XXXXXX or 999999.
Identifiers can be encrypted or hashed so that the linked records remain linked. In the caseof encryption or hashing, algorithms are employed that require the use of a key, including
the Advanced Encryption Standard or a Hash-based Message Authentication Code.
Implementations may use the same key for all identifiers or use a different key for eachidentifier. Using a different key for each identifier provides a higher degree of security andprivacy. Identifiers can alternatively be replaced with a keyword, including transforming“George Washington” to “PATIENT” or replacing it with a surrogate value, such astransforming “George Washington” to “Abraham Polk.”
Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(5) DE-IDENTIFICATION | STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE CONTROL
Manipulate numerical data, contingency tables, and statistical findings so that noindividual or organization is identifiable in the results of the analysis.
Discussion: Many types of statistical analyses can result in the disclosure of information
about individuals even if only summary information is provided. For example, if a school thatpublishes a monthly table with the number of minority students enrolled, reports that it has
10-19 such students in January, and subsequently reports that it has 20-29 such students in
March, then it can be inferred that the student who enrolled in February was a minority.
Related Controls: None.

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Prevent disclosure of personally identifiable information by adding non-deterministic
noise to the results of mathematical operations before the results are reported.
Discussion: The mathematical definition for differential privacy holds that the result of adataset analysis should be approximately the same before and after the addition or removalof a single data record (which is assumed to be the data from a single individual). In its mostbasic form, differential privacy applies only to online query systems. However, it can also be
used to produce machine-learning statistical classifiers and synthetic data. Differential
privacy comes at the cost of decreased accuracy of results, forcing organizations to quantify
the trade-off between privacy protection and the overall accuracy, usefulness, and utility ofthe de-identified dataset. Non-deterministic noise can include adding small, random values
to the results of mathematical operations in dataset analysis.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Related Controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(7) DE-IDENTIFICATION | VALIDATED ALGORITHMS AND SOFTWARE
Perform de-identification using validated algorithms and software that is validated to
implement the algorithms.
Discussion: Algorithms that appear to remove personally identifiable information from adataset may in fact leave information that is personally identifiable or data that is reidentifiable. Software that is claimed to implement a validated algorithm may contain bugs
or implement a different algorithm. Software may de-identify one type of data, such as
integers, but not de-identify another type of data, such as floating point numbers. For thesereasons, de-identification is performed using algorithms and software that are validated.
Related Controls: None.
(8) DE-IDENTIFICATION | MOTIVATED INTRUDER
Perform a motivated intruder test on the de-identified dataset to determine if theidentified data remains or if the de-identified data can be re-identified.
Discussion: A motivated intruder test is a test in which an individual or group takes a data
release and specified resources and attempts to re-identify one or more individuals in thede-identified dataset. Such tests specify the amount of inside knowledge, computational
resources, financial resources, data, and skills that intruders possess to conduct the tests. A
motivated intruder test can determine if the de-identification is insufficient. It can also be auseful diagnostic tool to assess if de-identification is likely to be sufficient. However, the test
alone cannot prove that de-identification is sufficient.
Related Controls: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-188].

SI-20

TAINTING
Control: Embed data or capabilities in the following systems or system components todetermine if organizational data has been exfiltrated or improperly removed from theorganization: [Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components].
Discussion: Many cyber-attacks target organizational information, or information that theorganization holds on behalf of other entities (e.g., personally identifiable information), andexfiltrate that data. In addition, insider attacks and erroneous user procedures can remove
information from the system that is in violation of the organizational policies. Tainting
approaches can range from passive to active. A passive tainting approach can be as simple asadding false email names and addresses to an internal database. If the organization receives
email at one of the false email addresses, it knows that the database has been compromised.
Moreover, the organization knows that the email was sent by an unauthorized entity, so any

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packets it includes potentially contain malicious code, and that the unauthorized entity may havepotentially obtained a copy of the database. Another tainting approach can include embedding
false data or steganographic data in files to enable the data to be found via open-source analysis.
Finally, an active tainting approach can include embedding software in the data that is able to“call home,” thereby alerting the organization to its “capture,” and possibly its location, and thepath by which it was exfiltrated or removed.
Related Controls: AU-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-160-2].

SI-21

INFORMATION REFRESHThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Control: Refresh [Assignment: organization-defined information] at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequencies] or generate the information on demand and delete the information when
no longer needed.
Discussion: Retaining information for longer than it is needed makes it an increasingly valuable
and enticing target for adversaries. Keeping information available for the minimum period oftime needed to support organizational missions or business functions reduces the opportunity
for adversaries to compromise, capture, and exfiltrate that information.
Related Controls: SI-14.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [OMB A-130], [SP 800-160-2].

SI-22

INFORMATION DIVERSITY
Control:a.

Identify the following alternative sources of information for [Assignment: organizationdefined essential functions and services]: [Assignment: organization-defined alternative
information sources]; andb.

Use an alternative information source for the execution of essential functions or services on[Assignment: organization-defined systems or system components] when the primary sourceof information is corrupted or unavailable.

Discussion: Actions taken by a system service or a function are often driven by the information it
receives. Corruption, fabrication, modification, or deletion of that information could impact theability of the service function to properly carry out its intended actions. By having multiple
sources of input, the service or function can continue operation if one source is corrupted or nolonger available. It is possible that the alternative sources of information may be less precise orless accurate than the primary source of information. But having such sub-optimal information
sources may still provide a sufficient level of quality that the essential service or function can be
carried out, even in a degraded or debilitated manner.
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-2].

SI-23

INFORMATION FRAGMENTATION
Control: Based on [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances]:

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Fragment the following information: [Assignment: organization-defined information]; andb.

Distribute the fragmented information across the following systems or system components:[Assignment organization-defined systems or system components].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: One objective of the advanced persistent threat is to exfiltrate valuable information.
Once exfiltrated, there is generally no way for the organization to recover the lost information.
Therefore, organizations may consider dividing the information into disparate elements anddistributing those elements across multiple systems or system components and locations. Suchactions will increase the adversary’s work factor to capture and exfiltrate the desired information
and, in so doing, increase the probability of detection. The fragmentation of information impacts
the organization’s ability to access the information in a timely manner. The extent of thefragmentation is dictated by the impact or classification level (and value) of the information,
threat intelligence information received, and whether data tainting is used (i.e., data taintingderived information about the exfiltration of some information could result in the fragmentationof the remaining information).
Related Controls: None.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [SP 800-160-2].

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3.20 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT
Quick link to Supply Chain Risk Management Summary Table

SR-1

POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control:a.

Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

[Selection (one or more): Organization-level; Mission/business process-level; Systemlevel] supply chain risk management policy that:

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the supply chain risk management policy
and the associated supply chain risk management controls;b.

Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development,
documentation, and dissemination of the supply chain risk management policy andprocedures; andc.

Review and update the current supply chain risk management:
1.

Policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events]; and2.

Procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment:
organization-defined events].

Discussion: Supply chain risk management policy and procedures address the controls in the SR
family as well as supply chain-related controls in other families that are implemented within
systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishingsuch policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy
assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on thedevelopment of supply chain risk management policy and procedures. Security and privacy
program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may
obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be
included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies
that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security andprivacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures
describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual orrole that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security andprivacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update tosupply chain risk management policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings,
security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute anorganizational policy or procedure.
Related Controls: PM-9, PM-30, PS-8, SI-12.
Control Enhancements: None.

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References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [CNSSD 505], [SP 800-12], [SP 800-30], [SP 80039], [SP 800-100], [SP 800-161].

SR-2

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
Control:This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

a.

Develop a plan for managing supply chain risks associated with the research anddevelopment, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations andmaintenance, and disposal of the following systems, system components or system services:[Assignment: organization-defined systems, system components, or system services];b.

Review and update the supply chain risk management plan [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency] or as required, to address threat, organizational or environmental
changes; andc.

Protect the supply chain risk management plan from unauthorized disclosure andmodification.

Discussion: The dependence on products, systems, and services from external providers, as wellas the nature of the relationships with those providers, present an increasing level of risk to anorganization. Threat actions that may increase security or privacy risks include unauthorized
production, the insertion or use of counterfeits, tampering, theft, insertion of malicious softwareand hardware, and poor manufacturing and development practices in the supply chain. Supply
chain risks can be endemic or systemic within a system element or component, a system, anorganization, a sector, or the Nation. Managing supply chain risk is a complex, multifacetedundertaking that requires a coordinated effort across an organization to build trust relationships
and communicate with internal and external stakeholders. Supply chain risk management(SCRM) activities include identifying and assessing risks, determining appropriate risk response
actions, developing SCRM plans to document response actions, and monitoring performanceagainst plans. The SCRM plan (at the system-level) is implementation specific, providing policy
implementation, requirements, constraints and implications. It can either be stand-alone, orincorporated into system security and privacy plans. The SCRM plan addresses managing,
implementation, and monitoring of SCRM controls and the development/sustainment of systems
across the SDLC to support mission and business functions.
Because supply chains can differ significantly across and within organizations, SCRM plans are
tailored to the individual program, organizational, and operational contexts. Tailored SCRM plansprovide the basis for determining whether a technology, service, system component, or system isfit for purpose, and as such, the controls need to be tailored accordingly. Tailored SCRM plans
help organizations focus their resources on the most critical mission and business functions
based on mission and business requirements and their risk environment. Supply chain risk
management plans include an expression of the supply chain risk tolerance for the organization,
acceptable supply chain risk mitigation strategies or controls, a process for consistently
evaluating and monitoring supply chain risk, approaches for implementing and communicating
the plan, a description of and justification for supply chain risk mitigation measures taken, andassociated roles and responsibilities. Finally, supply chain risk management plans address
requirements for developing trustworthy, secure, privacy-protective, and resilient systemcomponents and systems, including the application of the security design principles implemented
as part of life cycle-based systems security engineering processes (see SA-8).
Related Controls: CA-2, CP-4, IR-4, MA-2, MA-6, PE-16, PL-2, PM-9, PM-30, RA-3, RA-7, SA-8, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN | ESTABLISH SCRM TEAM

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Establish a supply chain risk management team consisting of [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel, roles, and responsibilities] to lead and support the following SCRM
activities: [Assignment: organization-defined supply chain risk management activities].

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Discussion: To implement supply chain risk management plans, organizations establish acoordinated, team-based approach to identify and assess supply chain risks and manage
these risks by using programmatic and technical mitigation techniques. The team approachenables organizations to conduct an analysis of their supply chain, communicate withinternal and external partners or stakeholders, and gain broad consensus regarding theappropriate resources for SCRM. The SCRM team consists of organizational personnel withdiverse roles and responsibilities for leading and supporting SCRM activities, including risk
executive, information technology, contracting, information security, privacy, mission orbusiness, legal, supply chain and logistics, acquisition, business continuity, and otherrelevant functions. Members of the SCRM team are involved in various aspects of the SDLC
and, collectively, have an awareness of and provide expertise in acquisition processes, legal
practices, vulnerabilities, threats, and attack vectors, as well as an understanding of thetechnical aspects and dependencies of systems. The SCRM team can be an extension of the
security and privacy risk management processes or be included as part of an organizationalrisk management team.
Related Controls: None.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [CNSSD 505], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-39], [SP-800160-1], [SP 800-161], [SP 800-181], [IR 7622], [IR 8272].

SR-3

SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROLS AND PROCESSES
Control:a.

Establish a process or processes to identify and address weaknesses or deficiencies in the
supply chain elements and processes of [Assignment: organization-defined system or systemcomponent] in coordination with [Assignment: organization-defined supply chain personnel];b.

Employ the following controls to protect against supply chain risks to the system, systemcomponent, or system service and to limit the harm or consequences from supply chainrelated events: [Assignment: organization-defined supply chain controls]; andc.

Document the selected and implemented supply chain processes and controls in [Selection:
security and privacy plans; supply chain risk management plan; [Assignment: organizationdefined document]].

Discussion: Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools employed for the
research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations
and maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes
include hardware, software, and firmware development processes; shipping and handlingprocedures; personnel security and physical security programs; configuration management tools,
techniques, and measures to maintain provenance; or other programs, processes, or procedures
associated with the development, acquisition, maintenance and disposal of systems and systemcomponents. Supply chain elements and processes may be provided by organizations, system
integrators, or external providers. Weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain elements orprocesses represent potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries to cause harmto the organization and affect its ability to carry out its core missions or business functions.
Supply chain personnel are individuals with roles and responsibilities in the supply chain.
Related Controls: CA-2, MA-2, MA-6, PE-3, PE-16, PL-8, PM-30, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-9,
SA-10, SA-15, SC-7, SC-29, SC-30, SC-38, SI-7, SR-6, SR-9, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:

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Employ a diverse set of sources for the following system components and services:[Assignment: organization-defined system components and services].
Discussion: Diversifying the supply of systems, system components, and services can reduce
the probability that adversaries will successfully identify and target the supply chain and can
reduce the impact of a supply chain event or compromise. Identifying multiple suppliers for
replacement components can reduce the probability that the replacement component will
become unavailable. Employing a diverse set of developers or logistics service providers can
reduce the impact of a natural disaster or other supply chain event. Organizations consider
designing the system to include diverse materials and components.
Related Controls: None.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION CONTROLS AND PROCESSES | LIMITATION OF HARM
Employ the following controls to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying andtargeting the organizational supply chain: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: Controls that can be implemented to reduce the probability of adversaries
successfully identifying and targeting the supply chain include avoiding the purchase ofcustom or non-standardized configurations, employing approved vendor lists with standing
reputations in industry, following pre-agreed maintenance schedules and update and patch
delivery mechanisms, maintaining a contingency plan in case of a supply chain event, using
procurement carve-outs that provide exclusions to commitments or obligations, using
diverse delivery routes, and minimizing the time between purchase decisions and delivery.
Related Controls: None.
(3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION CONTROLS AND PROCESSES | SUB-TIER FLOW DOWN
Ensure that the controls included in the contracts of prime contractors are also included in
the contracts of subcontractors.
Discussion: To manage supply chain risk effectively and holistically, it is important thatorganizations ensure that supply chain risk management controls are included at all tiers inthe supply chain. This includes ensuring that Tier 1 (prime) contractors have implemented
processes to facilitate the “flow down” of supply chain risk management controls to sub-tiercontractors. The controls subject to flow down are identified in SR-3b.
Related Controls: SR-5, SR-8.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [ISO 20243], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-161], [IR7622].

SR-4

PROVENANCE
Control: Document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of the following systems, systemcomponents, and associated data: [Assignment: organization-defined systems, systemcomponents, and associated data].
Discussion: Every system and system component has a point of origin and may be changed
throughout its existence. Provenance is the chronology of the origin, development, ownership,
location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include
personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component,or associated data. Organizations consider developing procedures (see SR-1) for allocating
responsibilities for the creation, maintenance, and monitoring of provenance for systems andsystem components; transferring provenance documentation and responsibility between
organizations; and preventing and monitoring for unauthorized changes to the provenancerecords. Organizations have methods to document, monitor, and maintain valid provenancebaselines for systems, system components, and related data. These actions help track, assess,

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configuration, and help ensure non-repudiation of provenance information and the provenancechange records. Provenance considerations are addressed throughout the system development
life cycle and incorporated into contracts and other arrangements, as appropriate.
Related Controls: CM-8, MA-2, MA-6, RA-9, SA-3, SA-8, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1) PROVENANCE | IDENTITY

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Establish and maintain unique identification of the following supply chain elements,
processes, and personnel associated with the identified system and critical systemcomponents: [Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements, processes, andpersonnel associated with organization-defined systems and critical system components].
Discussion: Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is critical togaining visibility into supply chain activities. Visibility into supply chain activities is also
important for monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonablevisibility into supply chains elements, processes, and personnel, it is very difficult fororganizations to understand and manage risk and reduce their susceptibility to adverse
events. Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools used for the researchand development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations,maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes
include development processes for hardware, software, and firmware; shipping and handlingprocedures; configuration management tools, techniques, and measures to maintainprovenance; personnel and physical security programs; or other programs, processes, orprocedures associated with the production and distribution of supply chain elements. Supply
chain personnel are individuals with specific roles and responsibilities related to the secure
the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration,
operations and maintenance, and disposal of a system or system component. Identification
methods are sufficient to support an investigation in case of a supply chain change (e.g. if a
supply company is purchased), compromise, or event.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-8, PE-16.
(2) PROVENANCE | TRACK AND TRACE
Establish and maintain unique identification of the following systems and critical systemcomponents for tracking through the supply chain: [Assignment: organization-definedsystems and critical system components].
Discussion: Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during
development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for theestablishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may belabeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels andtags can help provide better visibility into the provenance of a system or system component.
A system or system component may have more than one unique identifier. Identification
methods are sufficient to support a forensic investigation after a supply chain compromise
or event.
Related Controls: IA-2, IA-8, PE-16, PL-2.
(3) PROVENANCE | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED
Employ the following controls to validate that the system or system component received isgenuine and has not been altered: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: For many systems and system components, especially hardware, there aretechnical means to determine if the items are genuine or have been altered, including
optical and nanotechnology tagging, physically unclonable functions, side-channel analysis,

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cryptographic hash verifications or digital signatures, and visible anti-tamper labels or
stickers. Controls can also include monitoring for out of specification performance, which
can be an indicator of tampering or counterfeits. Organizations may leverage supplier andcontractor processes for validating that a system or component is genuine and has not beenaltered and for replacing a suspect system or component. Some indications of tampering
may be visible and addressable before accepting delivery, such as inconsistent packaging,broken seals, and incorrect labels. When a system or system component is suspected ofbeing altered or counterfeit, the supplier, contractor, or original equipment manufacturer
may be able to replace the item or provide a forensic capability to determine the origin of
the counterfeit or altered item. Organizations can provide training to personnel on how to
identify suspicious system or component deliveries.
Related Controls: AT-3, SR-9, SR-10, SR-11.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5(4) PROVENANCE | SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY — PEDIGREE
Employ [Assignment: organization-defined controls] and conduct [Assignment:
organization-defined analysis] to ensure the integrity of the system and systemcomponents by validating the internal composition and provenance of critical or missionessential technologies, products, and services.
Discussion: Authoritative information regarding the internal composition of systemcomponents and the provenance of technology, products, and services provides a strong
basis for trust. The validation of the internal composition and provenance of technologies,
products, and services is referred to as the pedigree. For microelectronics, this includes
material composition of components. For software this includes the composition of opensource and proprietary code, including the version of the component at a given point intime. Pedigrees increase the assurance that the claims suppliers assert about the internal
composition and provenance of the products, services, and technologies they provide arevalid. The validation of the internal composition and provenance can be achieved by various
evidentiary artifacts or records that manufacturers and suppliers produce during the
research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration,
operations and maintenance, and disposal of technology, products, and services. Evidentiary
artifacts include, but are not limited to, software identification (SWID) tags, software
component inventory, the manufacturers’ declarations of platform attributes (e.g., serial
numbers, hardware component inventory), and measurements (e.g., firmware hashes) thatare tightly bound to the hardware itself.
Related Controls: RA-3.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [ISO 27036], [ISO 20243], [SP 800-160-1], [SP
800-161], [IR 7622], [IR 8112], [IR 8272].

SR-5

ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND METHODSControl: Employ the following acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods
to protect against, identify, and mitigate supply chain risks: [Assignment: organization-definedacquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods].
Discussion: The use of the acquisition process provides an important vehicle to protect the
supply chain. There are many useful tools and techniques available, including obscuring the end
use of a system or system component, using blind or filtered buys, requiring tamper-evident
packaging, or using trusted or controlled distribution. The results from a supply chain risk
assessment can guide and inform the strategies, tools, and methods that are most applicable tothe situation. Tools and techniques may provide protections against unauthorized production,
theft, tampering, insertion of counterfeits, insertion of malicious software or backdoors, andpoor development practices throughout the system development life cycle. Organizations also

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consider providing incentives for suppliers who implement controls, promote transparency into
their processes and security and privacy practices, provide contract language that addresses theprohibition of tainted or counterfeit components, and restrict purchases from untrustworthy
suppliers. Organizations consider providing training, education, and awareness programs for
personnel regarding supply chain risk, available mitigation strategies, and when the programs
should be employed. Methods for reviewing and protecting development plans, documentation,and evidence are commensurate with the security and privacy requirements of the organization.
Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.
Related Controls: AT-3, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-10, SA-15, SR-6, SR-9, SR-10, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND METHODS | ADEQUATE SUPPLYThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Employ the following controls to ensure an adequate supply of [Assignment: organizationdefined critical system components]: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].
Discussion: Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by disrupting the
supply of critical system components or corrupting supplier operations. Organizations may
track systems and component mean time to failure to mitigate the loss of temporary or
permanent system function. Controls to ensure that adequate supplies of critical systemcomponents include the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for theidentified critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during
mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar componentsthat may be used, if necessary.
Related Controls: RA-9.
(2) ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND METHODS | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION,ACCEPTANCE, MODIFICATION, OR UPDATEAssess the system, system component, or system service prior to selection, acceptance,
modification, or update.
Discussion: Organizational personnel or independent, external entities conduct assessmentsof systems, components, products, tools, and services to uncover evidence of tampering,
unintentional and intentional vulnerabilities, or evidence of non-compliance with supply
chain controls. These include malicious code, malicious processes, defective software,
backdoors, and counterfeits. Assessments can include evaluations; design proposal reviews;
visual or physical inspection; static and dynamic analyses; visual, x-ray, or magnetic particle
inspections; simulations; white, gray, or black box testing; fuzz testing; stress testing; andpenetration testing (see SR-6(1)). Evidence generated during assessments is documented forfollow-on actions by organizations. The evidence generated during the organizational or
independent assessments of supply chain elements may be used to improve supply chain
processes and inform the supply chain risk management process. The evidence can beleveraged in follow-on assessments. Evidence and other documentation may be shared inaccordance with organizational agreements.
Related Controls: CA-8, RA-5, SA-11, SI-7.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [ISO 27036], [ISO 20243], [SP 800-30], [SP 800161], [IR 7622], [IR 8272].

SR-6

SUPPLIER ASSESSMENTS AND REVIEWS
Control: Assess and review the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers orcontractors and the system, system component, or system service they provide [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].

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Discussion: An assessment and review of supplier risk includes security and supply chain risk
management processes, foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI), and the ability of the
supplier to effectively assess subordinate second-tier and third-tier suppliers and contractors.
The reviews may be conducted by the organization or by an independent third party. The reviews
consider documented processes, documented controls, all-source intelligence, and publicly
available information related to the supplier or contractor. Organizations can use open-source
information to monitor for indications of stolen information, poor development and quality
control practices, information spillage, or counterfeits. In some cases, it may be appropriate or
required to share assessment and review results with other organizations in accordance with any
applicable rules, policies, or inter-organizational agreements or contracts.
Related Controls: SR-3, SR-5.
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Control Enhancements:(1) SUPPLIER ASSESSMENTS AND REVIEWS | TESTING AND ANALYSIS
Employ [Selection (one or more): organizational analysis; independent third-party analysis;organizational testing; independent third-party testing] of the following supply chain
elements, processes, and actors associated with the system, system component, or systemservice: [Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors].
Discussion: Relationships between entities and procedures within the supply chain,including development and delivery, are considered. Supply chain elements include
organizations, entities, or tools that are used for the research and development, design,
manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal ofsystems, system components, or system services. Supply chain processes include supply
chain risk management programs; SCRM strategies and implementation plans; personnel
and physical security programs; hardware, software, and firmware development processes;
configuration management tools, techniques, and measures to maintain provenance;
shipping and handling procedures; and programs, processes, or procedures associated withthe production and distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain actors are individuals
with specific roles and responsibilities in the supply chain. The evidence generated andcollected during analyses and testing of supply chain elements, processes, and actors is
documented and used to inform organizational risk management activities and decisions.
Related Controls: CA-8, SI-4.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [ISO 27036], [ISO 20243], [FIPS 140-3], [FIPS
180-4], [FIPS 186-4], [FIPS 202], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-161], [IR 7622], [IR 8272].

SR-7

SUPPLY CHAIN OPERATIONS SECURITY
Control: Employ the following Operations Security (OPSEC) controls to protect supply chainrelated information for the system, system component, or system service: [Assignment:
organization-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) controls].
Discussion: Supply chain OPSEC expands the scope of OPSEC to include suppliers and potential
suppliers. OPSEC is a process that includes identifying critical information, analyzing friendly
actions related to operations and other activities to identify actions that can be observed bypotential adversaries, determining indicators that potential adversaries might obtain that could
be interpreted or pieced together to derive information in sufficient time to cause harm toorganizations, implementing safeguards or countermeasures to eliminate or reduce exploitable
vulnerabilities and risk to an acceptable level, and considering how aggregated information may
expose users or specific uses of the supply chain. Supply chain information includes user
identities; uses for systems, system components, and system services; supplier identities;
security and privacy requirements; system and component configurations; supplier processes;
design specifications; and testing and evaluation results. Supply chain OPSEC may require

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organizations to withhold mission or business information from suppliers and may include theuse of intermediaries to hide the end use or users of systems, system components, or systemservices.
Related Controls: SC-38.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [EO 13873], [SP 800-30], [ISO 27036], [SP 800-161], [IR 7622].

SR-8

NOTIFICATION AGREEMENTS

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Control: Establish agreements and procedures with entities involved in the supply chain for thesystem, system component, or system service for the [Selection (one or more): notification of
supply chain compromises; results of assessments or audits; [Assignment: organization-defined
information]].
Discussion: The establishment of agreements and procedures facilitates communications amongsupply chain entities. Early notification of compromises and potential compromises in the supply
chain that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational systems or
system components is essential for organizations to effectively respond to such incidents. The
results of assessments or audits may include open-source information that contributed to adecision or result and could be used to help the supply chain entity resolve a concern or improve
its processes.
Related Controls: IR-4, IR-6, IR-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: [FASC18], [41 CFR 201], [EO 13873], [ISO 27036], [SP 800-30], [SP 800-161], [IR7622].

SR-9

TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION
Control: Implement a tamper protection program for the system, system component, or systemservice.
Discussion: Anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques provide a level of protection forsystems, system components, and services against many threats, including reverse engineering,
modification, and substitution. Strong identification combined with tamper resistance and/or
tamper detection is essential to protecting systems and components during distribution andwhen in use.
Related Controls: PE-3, PM-30, SA-15, SI-4, SI-7, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-10, SR-11.
Control Enhancements:(1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE STAGES OF SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
Employ anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle.
Discussion: The system development life cycle includes research and development, design,
manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal.
Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques for tamper resistanceand detection. Organizations use obfuscation and self-checking to make reverse engineeringand modifications more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for adversaries. The
customization of systems and system components can make substitutions easier to detectand therefore limit damage.
Related Controls: SA-3.

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References: [ISO 20243].

SR-10 INSPECTION OF SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS
Control: Inspect the following systems or system components [Selection (one or more): at
random; at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], upon [Assignment: organizationdefined indications of need for inspection]] to detect tampering: [Assignment: organizationdefined systems or system components].

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Discussion: The inspection of systems or systems components for tamper resistance anddetection addresses physical and logical tampering and is applied to systems and systemcomponents removed from organization-controlled areas. Indications of a need for inspection
include changes in packaging, specifications, factory location, or entity in which the part ispurchased, and when individuals return from travel to high-risk locations.
Related Controls: AT-3, PM-30, SI-4, SI-7, SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-9, SR-11.
References: [ISO 20243].

SR-11 COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY
Control:a.

Develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means todetect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the system; andb.

Report counterfeit system components to [Selection (one or more): source of counterfeit
component; [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting organizations];[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].

Discussion: Sources of counterfeit components include manufacturers, developers, vendors, andcontractors. Anti-counterfeiting policies and procedures support tamper resistance and provide alevel of protection against the introduction of malicious code. External reporting organizations
include CISA.
Related Controls: PE-3, SA-4, SI-7, SR-9, SR-10.
Control Enhancements:(1) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING
Train [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit systemcomponents (including hardware, software, and firmware).
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: AT-3.
(2) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE AND REPAIR
Maintain configuration control over the following system components awaiting service orrepair and serviced or repaired components awaiting return to service: [Assignment:
organization-defined system components].
Discussion: None.
Related Controls: CM-3, MA-2, MA-4, SA-10.
(3) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING
Scan for counterfeit system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Discussion: The type of component determines the type of scanning to be conducted (e.g.,
web application scanning if the component is a web application).
Related Controls: RA-5.

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References: [ISO 20243].

SR-12 COMPONENT DISPOSAL
Control: Dispose of [Assignment: organization-defined data, documentation, tools, or systemcomponents] using the following techniques and methods: [Assignment: organization-definedtechniques and methods].

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Discussion: Data, documentation, tools, or system components can be disposed of at any time
during the system development life cycle (not only in the disposal or retirement phase of the life
cycle). For example, disposal can occur during research and development, design, prototyping, or
operations/maintenance and include methods such as disk cleaning, removal of cryptographic
keys, partial reuse of components. Opportunities for compromise during disposal affect physicaland logical data, including system documentation in paper-based or digital files; shipping anddelivery documentation; memory sticks with software code; or complete routers or servers that
include permanent media, which contain sensitive or proprietary information. Additionally,
proper disposal of system components helps to prevent such components from entering the graymarket.
Related Controls: MP-6.
References: None.

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LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES 34
LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS[ATOM54]

Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 83-703), August 1954.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-68/pdf/STATUTE-68-Pg919.pdf[CMPPA]

Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-503),
October 1988.

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https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE-102Pg2507.pdf[EGOV]

E-Government Act [includes FISMA] (P.L. 107-347), December 2002.

[EVIDACT]Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-435),January 2019.

https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ347/PLAW-107publ347.pdf

https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ435/PLAW-115publ435.pdf[FASC18]

Secure Technology Act [includes Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security
Act] (P.L. 115-390), December 2018.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3085[FISMA]

Federal Information Security Modernization Act (P.L. 113-283), December
2014.
https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ283/PLAW-113publ283.pdf[FOIA96]

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public
Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ231/pdf/PLAW104publ231.pdf[PRIVACT]Privacy Act (P.L. 93-579), December 1974.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf[USA PATRIOT]USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), October 2001.

https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf[USC 552]

United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 4, Title 5 - Government
Organization and Employees, January 2011.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-title5/pdf/USCODE-2010title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552a.pdf[USC 2901]

United States Code, 2008 Edition, Title 44 - Public Printing and Documents,
Chapters 29, 31, and 33, January 2012.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title44/pdf/USCODE-2011title44-chap29-sec2901.pdf

34 The references cited in this appendix are those external publications that directly support the FISMA and Privacy
Projects at NIST. Additional NIST standards, guidelines, and interagency reports are also cited throughout thispublication, including in the references section of the applicable controls in Chapter Three. Direct links to the NIST
website are provided to obtain access to those publications.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[USC 3502]“Definitions,” Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3502. 2011 ed.

[USC 11101]“Definitions,” Title 40 U.S. Code, Sec. 11101. 2018 ed.

[EO 13526]

Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, December
2009.

https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2011-title44/USCODE-2011-title44chap35-subchapI-sec3502
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2018-title40/USCODE-2018-title40subtitleIII-chap111-sec11101

https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html[EO 13556]
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Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November
2010.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/04/executiveorder-13556-controlled-unclassified-information[EO 13587]

Executive Order 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security ofClassified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding ofClassified Information, October 2011.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/07/executiveorder-13587-structural-reforms-improve-security-classified-net[EO 13636]

Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
February 2013.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executiveorder-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity[EO 13800]

Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal
Networks and Critical Infrastructure, May 2017.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-orderstrengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure[EO 13873]

Executive Order 13873, Executive Order on Securing the Information andCommunications Technology and Services Supply Chain, May 2019.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securinginformation-communications-technology-services-supply-chain
REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, PLANS, AND POLICIES[HSPD 7]Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December 2003.
https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7[HSPD 12]Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August
2004.
https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-12[NITP12]Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments andAgencies, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for
Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, November 2012.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/21/presidentialmemorandum-national-insider-threat-policy-and-minimum-stand

REFERENCES

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[5 CFR 731]

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Administrative Personnel, Section
731.106, Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative
Requirements (5 C.F.R. 731.106).

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2012-title5-vol2/pdf/CFR-2012-title5vol2-sec731-106.pdf[32 CFR 2002]

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Controlled Unclassified Information(32 C.F.R. 2002).

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/09/14/2016-21665/controlledunclassified-information[41 CFR 201]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5“Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act; Rule,” 85 Federal Register54263 (September 1, 2020), pp 54263-54271.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-18939 [or as published in Title 41 Code ofFederal Regulations, Sec. 201 (forthcoming)][ODNI NITP]

Office of the Director National Intelligence, National Insider Threat Policy[OMB A-108]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum Circular A-108, Federal
Agency Responsibilities for Review, Reporting, and Publication under thePrivacy Act, December 2016.

https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/nittf/National_Insider_Threat_Policy.
pdf

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A108/omb_circular_a-108.pdf[OMB A-130]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum Circular A-130, Managing
Information as a Strategic Resource, July 2016.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a13
0revised.pdf[OMB M-03-22]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-03-22, OMB Guidancefor Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002,
September 2003.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2003/
m03_22.pdf[OMB M-08-05]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-08-05, Implementationof Trusted Internet Connections (TIC), November 2007.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/memo
randa/fy2008/m08-05.pdf[OMB M-17-06]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-06, Policies forFederal Agency Public Websites and Digital Services, November 2016.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/
m-17-06.pdf[OMB M-17-12]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-12, Preparing for
and Responding to a Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, January
2017.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2017/m-17-12_0.pdf

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[OMB M-17-25]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-25, Reporting
Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal
Networks and Critical Infrastructure, May 2017.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/
M-17-25.pdf[OMB M-19-03]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-03, Strengthening
the Cybersecurity of Federal Agencies by Enhancing the High Value Asset
Program, December 2018.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/M-19-03.pdf[OMB M-19-15]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-15, Improving
Implementation of the Information Quality Act, April 2019.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-15.pdf[OMB M-19-23]

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-23, Phase 1
Implementation of the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of
2018: Learning Agendas, Personnel, and Planning Guidance, July 2019.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/M-19-23.pdf[CNSSD 505]

Committee on National Security Systems Directive No. 505, Supply Chain
Risk Management (SCRM), August 2017.
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Directives.cfm[CNSSP 22]

Committee on National Security Systems Policy No. 22, Cybersecurity Risk
Management Policy, August 2016.
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Policies.cfm[CNSSI 1253]

Committee on National Security Systems Instruction No. 1253, Security
Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, March2014.
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm[CNSSI 4009]

Committee on National Security Systems Instruction No. 4009, Committee
on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary, April 2015.
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm[DODI 8510.01]

Department of Defense Instruction 8510.01, Risk Management Framework(RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT), March 2014.

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/851001p.pdf?ver=2019-02-26-101520-300[DHS NIPP]

Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), 2009.
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf
STANDARDS, GUIDELINES, AND REPORTS[ISO 15026-1]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15026-1:2019, Systems and software engineering— Systems and software assurance — Part 1: Concepts and vocabulary,
March 2019.
https://www.iso.org/standard/73567.html

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PAGE 377

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[ISO 15408-1]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-1:2009, Information technology —Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1:
Introduction and general model, April 2017.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf[ISO 15408-2]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-2:2008, Information technology —Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2: Security
functional requirements, April 2017.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[ISO 15408-3]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-3:2008, Information technology—
Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, April 2017.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf[ISO 15288]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15288:2015, Systems and software engineering —Systems life cycle processes, May 2015.
https://www.iso.org/standard/63711.h1ml[ISO 20243]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 20243-1:2018, Information technology —Open Trusted Technology ProviderTM Standard (O-TTPS) — Mitigating
maliciously tainted and counterfeit products — Part 1: Requirements andrecommendations, February 2018.
https://www.iso.org/standard/74399.html[ISO 25237]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 25237:2017, Health informatics —Pseudonymization, January 2017.
https://www.iso.org/standard/63553.html[ISO 27036]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 27036-1:2014, Information technology—
Security techniques—Information security for supplier relationships, Part 1:
Overview and concepts, April 2014.
https://www.iso.org/standard/59648.html[ISO 29100]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 29100:2011, Information technology—Security
techniques—Privacy framework, December 2011.
https://www.iso.org/standard/45123.html[ISO 29147]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 29147:2018, Information technology—Security
techniques—Vulnerability disclosure, October 2018.
https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html

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PAGE 378

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[ISO 29148]

International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 29148:2018, Systems and software engineering—Life cycle processes—Requirements engineering, November 2018.
https://www.iso.org/standard/72089.html[FIPS 140-3]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2019) Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C.), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication(FIPS) 140-3.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[FIPS 180-4]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2015) Secure Hash
Standard (SHS). (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 180-4.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4[FIPS 186-4]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013) Digital SignatureStandard (DSS). (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 186-4.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4[FIPS 197]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2001) Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 197.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197[FIPS 199]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) Standards for
Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems.
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199[FIPS 200]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2006) Minimum Security
Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems. (U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 200.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.200[FIPS 201-2]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013) Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. (U.S. Departmentof Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS) 201-2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.201-2[FIPS 202]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2015) SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions. (U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 202.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202

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PAGE 379

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-12]

Nieles M, Pillitteri VY, Dempsey KL (2017) An Introduction to Information
Security. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-12, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-12r1[SP 800-18]

Swanson MA, Hash J, Bowen P (2006) Guide for Developing Security Plans
for Federal Information Systems. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-18, Rev.
1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-18r1[SP 800-28]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Jansen W, Winograd T, Scarfone KA (2008) Guidelines on Active Content
and Mobile Code. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-28, Version 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-28ver2[SP 800-30]

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2012) Guide for Conducting Risk
Assessments. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-30, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-30r1[SP 800-32]

Kuhn R, Hu VC, Polk T, Chang S-J (2001) Introduction to Public Key
Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-32.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-32[SP 800-34]

Swanson MA, Bowen P, Phillips AW, Gallup D, Lynes D (2010) Contingency
Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-34, Rev. 1, Includes updates as of November 11, 2010.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-34r1[SP 800-35]

Grance T, Hash J, Stevens M, O'Neal K, Bartol N (2003) Guide to Information
Technology Security Services. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-35.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-35[SP 800-37]

Joint Task Force (2018) Risk Management Framework for Information
Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security andPrivacy. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2[SP 800-39]

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2011) Managing Information
Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-39.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-39

REFERENCES

PAGE 380

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-40]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2013) Guide to Enterprise Patch Management
Technologies. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-40, Rev. 3.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-40r3[SP 800-41]

Scarfone KA, Hoffman P (2009) Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-41, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-41r1[SP 800-45]

Tracy MC, Jansen W, Scarfone KA, Butterfield J (2007) Guidelines on
Electronic Mail Security. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-45, Version 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-45ver2[SP 800-46]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2016) Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote
Access, and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-46, Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-46r2[SP 800-47]

Grance T, Hash J, Peck S, Smith J, Korow-Diks K (2002) Security Guide forInterconnecting Information Technology Systems. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-47.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-47[SP 800-50]

Wilson M, Hash J (2003) Building an Information Technology Security
Awareness and Training Program. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-50.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-50[SP 800-52]

McKay KA, Cooper DA (2019) Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration,and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-52, Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2[SP 800-53A]

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2014) Assessing Security andPrivacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building
Effective Assessment Plans. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53A, Rev.
4, Includes updates as of December 18, 2014.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4[SP 800-53B]

Joint Task Force (2020) Control Baselines and Tailoring Guidance for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53B.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53B

REFERENCES

PAGE 381

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-55]

Chew E, Swanson MA, Stine KM, Bartol N, Brown A, Robinson W (2008)
Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-55, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-55r1[SP 800-56A]

Barker EB, Chen L, Roginsky A, Vassilev A, Davis R (2018) Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56A, Rev. 3.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[SP 800-56B]

Barker EB, Chen L, Roginsky A, Vassilev A, Davis R, Simon S (2019)
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56B, Rev.
2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2[SP 800-56C]

Barker EB, Chen L, Davis R (2020) Recommendation for Key-Derivation
Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56C,
Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2[SP 800-57-1]

Barker EB (2020) Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 – General.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-57 Part 1, Rev. 5.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5[SP 800-57-2]

Barker EB, Barker WC (2019) Recommendation for Key Management: Part 2– Best Practices for Key Management Organizations. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-57 Part 2, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt2r1[SP 800-57-3]

Barker EB, Dang QH (2015) Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3:
Application-Specific Key Management Guidance. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-57 Part 3, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt3r1[SP 800-60-1]

Stine KM, Kissel RL, Barker WC, Fahlsing J, Gulick J (2008) Guide for
Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security
Categories. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-60, Vol. 1, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v1r1

REFERENCES

PAGE 382

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-60-2]

Stine KM, Kissel RL, Barker WC, Lee A, Fahlsing J (2008) Guide for Mapping
Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories:
Appendices. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-60, Vol. 2, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v2r1[SP 800-61]

Cichonski PR, Millar T, Grance T, Scarfone KA (2012) Computer Security
Incident Handling Guide. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-61, Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2[SP 800-63-3]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Grassi PA, Garcia ME, Fenton JL (2017) Digital Identity Guidelines. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-63-3, Includes updates as of March 2, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3[SP 800-63A]

Grassi PA, Fenton JL, Lefkovitz NB, Danker JM, Choong Y-Y, Greene KK,
Theofanos MF (2017) Digital Identity Guidelines: Enrollment and Identity
Proofing. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63A, Includes updates as of March 2,
2020.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63a[SP 800-63B]

Grassi PA, Fenton JL, Newton EM, Perlner RA, Regenscheid AR, Burr WE,
Richer, JP, Lefkovitz NB, Danker JM, Choong Y-Y, Greene KK, Theofanos MF(2017) Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle
Management. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63B, Includes updates
as of March 2, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b[SP 800-70]

Quinn SD, Souppaya MP, Cook MR, Scarfone KA (2018) National Checklist
Program for IT Products: Guidelines for Checklist Users and Developers.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-70, Rev. 4.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-70r4[SP 800-73-4]

Cooper DA, Ferraiolo H, Mehta KL, Francomacaro S, Chandramouli R,
Mohler J (2015) Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-73-4, Includes updates as of February 8, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-73-4[SP 800-76-2]

Grother PJ, Salamon WJ, Chandramouli R (2013) Biometric Specifications
for Personal Identity Verification. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-76-2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-76-2[SP 800-77]

Barker EB, Dang QH, Frankel SE, Scarfone KA, Wouters P (2020) Guide to
IPsec VPNs. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-77, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-77r1

REFERENCES

PAGE 383

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-78-4]

Polk T, Dodson DF, Burr WE, Ferraiolo H, Cooper DA (2015) Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-78-4.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4[SP 800-79-2]

Ferraiolo H, Chandramouli R, Ghadiali N, Mohler J, Shorter S (2015)
Guidelines for the Authorization of Personal Identity Verification Card
Issuers (PCI) and Derived PIV Credential Issuers (DPCI). (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-79-2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-79-2

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[SP 800-81-2]

Chandramouli R, Rose SW (2013) Secure Domain Name System (DNS)
Deployment Guide. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-81-2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-81-2[SP 800-82]

Stouffer KA, Lightman S, Pillitteri VY, Abrams M, Hahn A (2015) Guide to
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82,
Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2[SP 800-83]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2013) Guide to Malware Incident Preventionand Handling for Desktops and Laptops. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-83,
Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-83r1[SP 800-84]

Grance T, Nolan T, Burke K, Dudley R, White G, Good T (2006) Guide to Test,
Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-84.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-84[SP 800-86]

Kent K, Chevalier S, Grance T, Dang H (2006) Guide to Integrating Forensic
Techniques into Incident Response. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-86.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-86[SP 800-88]

Kissel RL, Regenscheid AR, Scholl MA, Stine KM (2014) Guidelines for Media
Sanitization. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-88, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1[SP 800-92]

Kent K, Souppaya MP (2006) Guide to Computer Security Log Management.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-92.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-92

REFERENCES

PAGE 384

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-94]

Scarfone KA, Mell PM (2007) Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDPS). (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-94.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94[SP 800-95]

Singhal A, Winograd T, Scarfone KA (2007) Guide to Secure Web Services.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-95.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-95[SP 800-97]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Frankel SE, Eydt B, Owens L, Scarfone KA (2007) Establishing WirelessRobust Security Networks: A Guide to IEEE 802.11i. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-97.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-97[SP 800-100]

Bowen P, Hash J, Wilson M (2006) Information Security Handbook: A Guidefor Managers. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-100, Includes updates
as of March 7, 2007.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-100[SP 800-101]

Ayers RP, Brothers S, Jansen W (2014) Guidelines on Mobile Device
Forensics. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-101, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-101r1[SP 800-111]

Scarfone KA, Souppaya MP, Sexton M (2007) Guide to Storage Encryption
Technologies for End User Devices. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-111.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-111[SP 800-113]

Frankel SE, Hoffman P, Orebaugh AD, Park R (2008) Guide to SSL VPNs.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-113.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-113[SP 800-114]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2016) User's Guide to Telework and Bring YourOwn Device (BYOD) Security. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-114, Rev.
1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-114r1[SP 800-115]

Scarfone KA, Souppaya MP, Cody A, Orebaugh AD (2008) Technical Guide toInformation Security Testing and Assessment. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-115.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-115

REFERENCES

PAGE 385

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-116]

Ferraiolo H, Mehta KL, Ghadiali N, Mohler J, Johnson V, Brady S (2018) A
Recommendation for the Use of PIV Credentials in Physical Access Control
Systems (PACS). (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-116, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-116r1[SP 800-121]

Padgette J, Bahr J, Holtmann M, Batra M, Chen L, Smithbey R, Scarfone KA(2017) Guide to Bluetooth Security. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-121, Rev.
2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-121r2

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[SP 800-124]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2013) Guidelines for Managing the Security ofMobile Devices in the Enterprise. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-124, Rev.
1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-124r1[SP 800-125B]

Chandramouli R (2016) Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual
Machine (VM) Protection. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-125B.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-125B[SP 800-126]

Waltermire DA, Quinn SD, Booth H, III, Scarfone KA, Prisaca D (2018) The
Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol(SCAP): SCAP Version 1.3. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-126, Rev. 3.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-126r3[SP 800-128]

Johnson LA, Dempsey KL, Ross RS, Gupta S, Bailey D (2011) Guide for
Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-128, Includes updates as of October 10, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-128[SP 800-130]

Barker EB, Smid ME, Branstad DK, Chokhani S (2013) A Framework for
Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-130.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-130[SP 800-137]

Dempsey KL, Chawla NS, Johnson LA, Johnston R, Jones AC, Orebaugh AD,
Scholl MA, Stine KM (2011) Information Security Continuous Monitoring(ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-137.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-137[SP 800-137A]

Dempsey KL, Pillitteri VY, Baer C, Niemeyer R, Rudman R, Urban S (2020)
Assessing Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) Programs:
Developing an ISCM Program Assessment. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-137A.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-137A

REFERENCES

PAGE 386

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-147]

Cooper DA, Polk T, Regenscheid AR, Souppaya MP (2011) BIOS Protection
Guidelines. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-147.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-147[SP 800-150]

Johnson CS, Waltermire DA, Badger ML, Skorupka C, Snyder J (2016) Guide
to Cyber Threat Information Sharing. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-150.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-150[SP 800-152]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Barker EB, Branstad DK, Smid ME (2015) A Profile for U.S. Federal
Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS). (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-152.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-152[SP 800-154]

Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2016) Guide to Data-Centric System Threat
Modeling. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), Draft NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-154.
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-154/draft[SP 800-156]

Ferraiolo H, Chandramouli R, Mehta KL, Mohler J, Skordinski S, Brady S(2016) Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-156.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-156[SP 800-160-1]

Ross RS, Oren JC, McEvilley M (2016) Systems Security Engineering:Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering ofTrustworthy Secure Systems. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-160, Vol.
1, Includes updates as of March 21, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v1[SP 800-160-2]

Ross RS, Pillitteri VY, Graubart R, Bodeau D, McQuaid R (2019) Developing
Cyber Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-160, Vol. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v2[SP 800-161]

Boyens JM, Paulsen C, Moorthy R, Bartol N (2015) Supply Chain Risk
Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-161.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-161[SP 800-162]

Hu VC, Ferraiolo DF, Kuhn R, Schnitzer A, Sandlin K, Miller R, Scarfone KA(2014) Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition andConsiderations. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-162, Includes updates
as of August 2, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-162

REFERENCES

PAGE 387

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-166]

Cooper DA, Ferraiolo H, Chandramouli R, Ghadiali N, Mohler J, Brady S(2016) Derived PIV Application and Data Model Test Guidelines. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-166.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-166[SP 800-167]

Sedgewick A, Souppaya MP, Scarfone KA (2015) Guide to Application
Whitelisting. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-167.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-167[SP 800-171]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Ross RS, Pillitteri VY, Dempsey KL, Riddle M, Guissanie G (2020) Protecting
Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems andOrganizations. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-171, Rev. 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2[SP 800-172]

Ross RS, Pillitteri VY, Graubart RD, Guissanie G, Wagner R, Bodeau D (2020)
Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified
Information: A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171 (Final Public
Draft). (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD),NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-172.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-172-draft[SP 800-177]

Rose SW, Nightingale S, Garfinkel SL, Chandramouli R (2019) Trustworthy
Email. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD),NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-177, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-177r1[SP 800-178]

Ferraiolo DF, Hu VC, Kuhn R, Chandramouli R (2016) A Comparison of
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Standards for Data Service
Applications: Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and
Next Generation Access Control (NGAC). (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-178.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-178[SP 800-181]

Petersen R, Santos D, Smith MC, Wetzel KA, Witte G (2020) Workforce
Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework). (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-181, Rev. 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-181r1[SP 800-184]

Bartock M, Scarfone KA, Smith MC, Witte GA, Cichonski JA, Souppaya MP(2016) Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-184.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-184[SP 800-188]

Garfinkel S (2016) De-Identifying Government Datasets. (National Instituteof Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), Second Draft NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-188.
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-188/draft

REFERENCES

PAGE 388

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[SP 800-189]

Sriram K, Montgomery D (2019) Resilient Interdomain Traffic Exchange:
BGP Security and DDoS Mitigation. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-189.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-189[SP 800-192]

Yaga DJ, Kuhn R, Hu VC (2017) Verification and Test Methods for AccessControl Policies/Models. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-192.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-192[IR 7539]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Cooper DA, MacGregor WI (2008) Symmetric Key Injection onto Smart
Cards. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD),NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 7539.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7539[IR 7559]

Singhal A, Gunestas M, Wijesekera D (2010) Forensics Web Services (FWS).
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 7559.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7559[IR 7622]

Boyens JM, Paulsen C, Bartol N, Shankles S, Moorthy R (2012) Notional
Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 7622.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7622[IR 7676]

Cooper DA (2010) Maintaining and Using Key History on Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) Cards. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 7676.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7676[IR 7788]

Singhal A, Ou X (2011) Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise Networks Using
Probabilistic Attack Graphs. (National Institute of Standards andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR)7788.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7788[IR 7817]

Ferraiolo H (2012) A Credential Reliability and Revocation Model for
Federated Identities. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 7817.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7817[IR 7849]

Chandramouli R (2014) A Methodology for Developing Authentication
Assurance Level Taxonomy for Smart Card-based Identity Verification.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 7849.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7849[IR 7870]

Cooper DA (2012) NIST Test Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Cards.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 7870.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7870

REFERENCES

PAGE 389

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[IR 7874]

Hu VC, Scarfone KA (2012) Guidelines for Access Control System Evaluation
Metrics. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 7874.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7874[IR 7956]

Chandramouli R, Iorga M, Chokhani S (2013) Cryptographic KeyManagement Issues & Challenges in Cloud Services. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal
Report (IR) 7956.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7956[IR 7966]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Ylonen T, Turner P, Scarfone KA, Souppaya MP (2015) Security ofInteractive and Automated Access Management Using Secure Shell (SSH).
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 7966.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7966[IR 8011-1]

Dempsey KL, Eavy P, Moore G (2017) Automation Support for Security
Control Assessments: Volume 1: Overview. (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report(IR) 8011, Volume 1.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8011-1[IR 8011-2]

Dempsey KL, Eavy P, Moore G (2017) Automation Support for Security
Control Assessments: Volume 2: Hardware Asset Management. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency
or Internal Report (IR) 8011, Volume 2.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8011-2[IR 8011-3]

Dempsey KL, Eavy P, Goren N, Moore G (2018) Automation Support for
Security Control Assessments: Volume 3: Software Asset Management.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 8011, Volume 3.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8011-3[IR 8011-4]

Dempsey KL, Takamura E, Eavy P, Moore G (2020) Automation Support for
Security Control Assessments: Volume 4: Software Vulnerability
Management. (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 8011, Volume
4.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8011-4[IR 8023]

Dempsey KL, Paulsen C (2015) Risk Management for Replication Devices.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 8023.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8023[IR 8040]

Greene KK, Kelsey JM, Franklin JM (2016) Measuring the Usability andSecurity of Permuted Passwords on Mobile Platforms. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal
Report (IR) 8040.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8040

REFERENCES

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Brooks S, Garcia M, Lefkovitz N, Lightman S, Nadeau E (2017) An
Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal
Systems. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) 8062.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8062[IR 8112]

Grassi P, Lefkovitz N, Nadeau E, Galluzzo R, Dinh, A (2018) AttributeMetadata: A Proposed Schema for Evaluating Federated Attributes.
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NISTInteragency or Internal Report (IR) 8112.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8112

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[IR 8179]

Paulsen C, Boyens JM, Bartol N, Winkler K (2018) Criticality Analysis Process
Model: Prioritizing Systems and Components. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal
Report (IR) 8179.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8179[IR 8272]

Paulsen C, Winkler K, Boyens JM, Ng J, Gimbi J (2020) Impact Analysis Toolfor Interdependent Cyber Supply Chain Risks. (National Institute ofStandards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal
Report (IR) 8272.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8272

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS AND WEBSITES[USCERT IR]

Department of Homeland Security, US-CERT Federal Incident Notification
Guidelines, April 2017.
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/incident-notification-guidelines[DHS TIC]

Department of Homeland Security, Trusted Internet Connections (TIC).
https://www.dhs.gov/trusted-internet-connections[DSB 2017]

Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force on Cyber
Deterrence, February 2017.
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/DSB-CyberDeterrenceReport_02-2817_Final.pdf[DOD STIG]

Defense Information Systems Agency, Security Technical Implementation
Guides (STIG).

https://public.cyber.mil/stigs[DODTERMS]

Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf[FED PKI]

General Services Administration, Federal Public Key Infrastructure.
https://www.idmanagement.gov/topics/fpki[FISMA IMP]

Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Implementation
Project.
https://nist.gov/RMF[IETF 4949]

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Request for Comments: 4949,
Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, August 2007.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949

REFERENCES

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[IETF 5905]

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Request for Comments: 5905,
Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification,
June 2010.
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc5905.pdf[LAMPSON73][NARA CUI]

B. W. Lampson, A Note on the Confinement Problem, Communications of
the ACM 16, 10, pp. 613-615, October 1973.
National Archives and Records Administration, Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI) Registry.
https://www.archives.gov/cui[NIAP CCEVS]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

National Information Assurance Partnership, Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
https://www.niap-ccevs.org[NIST CAVP]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program. Available athttps://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program[NIST CMVP]National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) Cryptographic
Module Validation Program. Available athttps://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program[NIST CSF]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2018) Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1. (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD).
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04162018[NIST PF]National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) Privacy Framework:
A Tool for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management, Version
1.0. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD).
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020[NCPR]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) National Checklist
Program Repository. Available athttps://nvd.nist.gov/ncp/repository[NVD 800-53]

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) National
Vulnerability Database: NIST Special Publication 800-53 [database ofcontrols]. Available athttps://nvd.nist.gov/800-53[NEUM04]

Principled Assuredly Trustworthy Composable Architectures, P. Neumann,
CDRL A001 Final Report, SRI International, December 2004.
http://www.csl.sri.com/users/neumann/chats4.pdf[NSA CSFC]

National Security Agency, Commercial Solutions for Classified Program(CSfC).
https://www.nsa.gov/resources/everyone/csfc[NSA MEDIA]

National Security Agency, Media Destruction Guidance.

https://www.nsa.gov/resources/everyone/media-destruction

REFERENCES

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NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS_________________________________________________________________________________________________[ODNI CTF]

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Cyber Threat
Framework.
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/cyber-threat-framework[POPEK74][SALTZER75][SP 800-53 RES]

G. Popek, The Principle of Kernel Design, in 1974 NCC, AFIPS Cong. Proc.,Vol. 43, pp. 977-978.
J. Saltzer and M. Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer
Systems, in Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), September 1975, pp. 1278-1308.
NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5 Resource Center.
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final[USGCB]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) United States
Government Configuration Baseline. Available athttps://csrc.nist.gov/projects/united-states-government-configuration-baseline

REFERENCES

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APPENDIX AGLOSSARYCOMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONSAppendix A provides definitions for terminology used in NIST Special Publication 800-53. Sources
for terms used in this publication are cited as applicable. Where no citation is noted, the sourceof the definition is Special Publication 800-53.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

access control

The process of granting or denying specific requests for
obtaining and using information and related information
processing services; and to enter specific physical facilities (e.g.,
Federal buildings, military establishments, and border crossing
entrances).

adequate security

Security protections commensurate with the risk resulting fromthe unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information. This includes
ensuring that information hosted on behalf of an agency andinformation systems and applications used by the agency
operate effectively and provide appropriate confidentiality,
integrity, and availability protections through the application of
cost-effective security controls.

advanced persistent
threatAn adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise andsignificant resources which allow it to create opportunities toachieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors, including
cyber, physical, and deception. These objectives typically include
establishing and extending footholds within the IT infrastructureof the targeted organizations for purposes of exfiltrating
information, undermining or impeding critical aspects of a
mission, program, or organization; or positioning itself to carryout these objectives in the future. The advanced persistent
threat pursues its objectives repeatedly over an extended
period; adapts to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and isdetermined to maintain the level of interaction needed to
execute its objectives.

agencyAny executive agency or department, military department,
Federal Government corporation, Federal Governmentcontrolled corporation, or other establishment in the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government, or any independent
regulatory agency. See executive agency.

all-source intelligenceIntelligence products and/or organizations and activities thatincorporate all sources of information, most frequently including
human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence,measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence,and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence.

[FIPS 201-2][OMB A-130][SP 800-39][OMB A-130][DODTERMS]

APPENDIX A

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application

A software program hosted by an information system.

assessment

See control assessment or risk assessment.

assessment plan

The objectives for the security and privacy control assessments
and a detailed roadmap of how to conduct such assessments.

assessor

The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting
a security or privacy control assessment.

assignment operation

A control parameter that allows an organization to assign a
specific, organization-defined value to the control or control
enhancement (e.g., assigning a list of roles to be notified or avalue for the frequency of testing).
See organization-defined control parameters and selection
operation.

assurance

Grounds for justified confidence that a [security or privacy] claim
has been or will be achieved.

[SP 800-37]

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[ISO/IEC 15026, Adapted]

Note 1: Assurance is typically obtained relative to a set of specific claims. The
scope and focus of such claims may vary (e.g., security claims, safety claims)
and the claims themselves may be interrelated.
Note 2: Assurance is obtained through techniques and methods that generatecredible evidence to substantiate claims.

attack surface

The set of points on the boundary of a system, a systemcomponent, or an environment where an attacker can try toenter, cause an effect on, or extract data from, that system,component, or environment.

audit

Independent review and examination of records and activities toassess the adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliancewith established policies and operational procedures.

audit log

[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record of system activities, including records ofsystem accesses and operations performed in a given period.

audit record

An individual entry in an audit log related to an audited event.

audit record reduction

A process that manipulates collected audit information andorganizes it into a summary format that is more meaningful toanalysts.

audit trail

A chronological record that reconstructs and examines thesequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specificoperation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to result.

authentication

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as aprerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.

[CNSSI 4009][FIPS 200]

APPENDIX A

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authenticator

Something that the claimant possesses and controls (typically acryptographic module or password) that is used to authenticate
the claimant’s identity. This was previously referred to as atoken.

authenticity

The property of being genuine and being able to be verified andtrusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, message, ormessage originator. See authentication.

authorization

Access privileges granted to a user, program, or process or theact of granting those privileges.

authorization boundary

All components of an information system to be authorized for
operation by an authorizing official. This excludes separately
authorized systems to which the information system isconnected.

authorization to operate

The official management decision given by a senior Federal
official or officials to authorize operation of an information
system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on
the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security andprivacy controls. Authorization also applies to common controls
inherited by agency information systems.

authorizing official

A senior Federal official or executive with the authority toauthorize (i.e., assume responsibility for) the operation of an
information system or the use of a designated set of common
controls at an acceptable level of risk to agency operations(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

availability

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

baseline

See control baseline.

baseline configuration

A documented set of specifications for a system, or aconfiguration item within a system, that has been formallyreviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which canbe changed only through change control procedures.

boundary

Physical or logical perimeter of a system. See also authorization
boundary and interface.

boundary protection

Monitoring and control of communications at the externalinterface to a system to prevent and detect malicious and otherunauthorized communications using boundary protection
devices.

[CNSSI 4009]
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boundary protection
deviceA device (e.g., gateway, router, firewall, guard, or encrypted
tunnel) that facilitates the adjudication of different systemsecurity policies for connected systems or provides boundary
protection. The boundary may be the authorization boundary fora system, the organizational network boundary, or a logicalboundary defined by the organization.

breachThe loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure,unauthorized acquisition, or any similar occurrence where: aperson other than an authorized user accesses or potentiallyaccesses personally identifiable information; or an authorizeduser accesses personally identifiable information for anotherthan authorized purpose.

breadthAn attribute associated with an assessment method that
addresses the scope or coverage of the assessment objects
included with the assessment.

capability

A combination of mutually reinforcing security and/or privacy
controls implemented by technical, physical, and proceduralmeans. Such controls are typically selected to achieve a common
information security- or privacy-related purpose.

central management

The organization-wide management and implementation of
selected security and privacy controls and related processes.
Central management includes planning, implementing,assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined,
centrally managed security and privacy controls and processes.

checksum

A value that (a) is computed by a function that is dependent on thecontents of a data object and (b) is stored or transmitted together withthe object, for detecting changes in the data.

chief information officer

The senior official that provides advice and other assistance tothe head of the agency and other senior management personnelof the agency to ensure that IT is acquired and information
resources are managed for the agency in a manner that achieves
the agency’s strategic goals and information resourcesmanagement goals; and is responsible for ensuring agency
compliance with, and prompt, efficient, and effective
implementation of, the information policies and information
resources management responsibilities, including the reductionof information collection burdens on the public.

chief information security
officerclassified information

See senior agency information security officer.

classified national
security information

Information that has been determined pursuant to Executive
Order (E.O.) 13526 or any predecessor order to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked toindicate its classified status when in documentary form.

[OMB M-17-12]

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See classified national security information.

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commodity service

A system service provided by a commercial service provider to alarge and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring or
receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into
the management structure and operations of the provider, andwhile the organization may be able to negotiate service-levelagreements, the organization is typically not able to require thatthe provider implement specific security or privacy controls.

common carrier

A telecommunications company that holds itself out to the
public for hire to provide communications transmission services.

common control

A security or privacy control that is inherited by multiple
information systems or programs.

common control provider

An organizational official responsible for the development,
implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common
controls (i.e., security or privacy controls inheritable by systems).

common criteria

Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous
method for specifying security function and assurance
requirements for products and systems.

common secure
configuration

A recognized standardized and established benchmark that
stipulates specific secure configuration settings for a given
information technology platform.

compensating controls

The security and privacy controls employed in lieu of thecontrols in the baselines described in NIST Special Publication
800-53B that provide equivalent or comparable protection for asystem or organization.

component

See system component.

confidentiality

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access anddisclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy andproprietary information.

configuration control

Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware,
software, and documentation to protect the system against
improper modifications before, during, and after system
implementation.

configuration item

An aggregation of system components that is designated for
configuration management and treated as a single entity in theconfiguration management process.

configuration
management

A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining
the integrity of information technology products and systems,
through control of processes for initializing, changing, andmonitoring the configurations of those products and systems
throughout the system development life cycle.

[OMB A-130][SP 800-37][CNSSI 4009][SP 800-128][FISMA][SP 800-128][SP 800-128][SP 800-128]

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configuration settings

The set of parameters that can be changed in hardware,
software, or firmware that affect the security posture and/or
functionality of the system.

continuous monitoring[SP 800-137]

Maintaining ongoing awareness to support organizational risk
decisions.

control

See security control or privacy control.

control assessment

The testing or evaluation of the controls in an information
system or an organization to determine the extent to which thecontrols are implemented correctly, operating as intended, andproducing the desired outcome with respect to meeting thesecurity or privacy requirements for the system or theorganization.

control assessor

See assessor.

control baseline

Predefined sets of controls specifically assembled to address theprotection needs of groups, organizations, or communities ofinterest. See privacy control baseline or security control baseline.

control effectivenessA measure of whether a security or privacy control contributes
to the reduction of information security or privacy risk.

control enhancement

Augmentation of a security or privacy control to build in
additional but related functionality to the control, increase thestrength of the control, or add assurance to the control.

control inheritance

A situation in which a system or application receives protection
from security or privacy controls (or portions of controls) thatare developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, andmonitored by entities other than those responsible for thesystem or application; entities either internal or external to theorganization where the system or application resides. See
common control.

control parameterSee organization-defined control parameter.

controlled area

Any area or space for which an organization has confidence thatthe physical and procedural protections provided are sufficient
to meet the requirements established for protecting theinformation and/or information system.

controlled interface

An interface to a system with a set of mechanisms that enforces
the security policies and controls the flow of information
between connected systems.

[SP 800-128][SP 800-37]

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controlled unclassified
information

Information that the Government creates or possesses, or thatan entity creates or possesses for or on behalf of theGovernment, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy
requires or permits an agency to handle using safeguarding or
dissemination controls. However, CUI does not include classified
information or information a non-executive branch entity
possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not comefrom, or was not created or possessed by or for, an executive
branch agency or an entity acting for an agency.

counterfeit

An unauthorized copy or substitute that has been identified,marked, and/or altered by a source other than the item's legallyauthorized source and has been misrepresented to be an
authorized item of the legally authorized source.

countermeasures

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that
reduce the vulnerability of a system. Synonymous with security
controls and safeguards.

covert channel

An unintended or unauthorized intra-system channel thatenables two cooperating entities to transfer information in a waythat violates the system's security policy but does not exceed theentities' access authorizations.

covert channel analysis

Determination of the extent to which the security policy modeland subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow
unauthorized access to information.

covert storage channel

A system feature that enables one system entity to signal
information to another entity by directly or indirectly writing to a
storage location that is later directly or indirectly read by thesecond entity.

covert timing channel

A system feature that enables one system entity to signal
information to another by modulating its own use of a system
resource in such a way as to affect system response timeobserved by the second entity.

credential

An object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity,
via an identifier or identifiers, and (optionally) additional
attributes, to at least one authenticator possessed andcontrolled by a subscriber.

critical infrastructure

Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to theUnited States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.

cross domain solution

A form of controlled interface that provides the ability to
manually and/or automatically access and/or transfer
information between different security domains.

[32 CFR 2002][SP 800-161]
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[FIPS 200]

[CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009, Adapted][SP 800-63-3][USA PATRIOT][CNSSI 1253]

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cryptographic module

The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements
Approved security functions (including cryptographic algorithms
and key generation) and is contained within the cryptographic
boundary.

cybersecurity

Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration ofcomputers, electronic communications systems, electronic
communications services, wire communication, and electronic
communication, including information contained therein, toensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,and nonrepudiation.

cyberspace

The interdependent network of information technology
infrastructures that includes the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors andcontrollers in critical industries.

data action

A system operation that processes personally identifiable
information.

data mining

An analytical process that attempts to find correlations or
patterns in large data sets for the purpose of data or knowledge
discovery.

de-identification

General term for any process of removing the association
between a set of identifying data and the data subject.

defense in breadth

A planned, systematic set of multidisciplinary activities that seek
to identify, manage, and reduce risk of exploitable vulnerabilities
at every stage of the system, network, or subcomponent life
cycle, including system, network, or product design anddevelopment; manufacturing; packaging; assembly; system
integration; distribution; operations; maintenance; andretirement.

defense in depth

An information security strategy that integrates people,
technology, and operations capabilities to establish variablebarriers across multiple layers and missions of the organization.

depth

An attribute associated with an assessment method that
addresses the rigor and level of detail associated with theapplication of the method.

developer

A general term that includes developers or manufacturers ofsystems, system components, or system services; systems
integrators; vendors; and product resellers. The development ofsystems, components, or services can occur internally withinorganizations or through external entities.

digital media

A form of electronic media where data is stored in digital (asopposed to analog) form.

[FIPS 140-3][OMB A-130]

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discretionary access
control

An access control policy that is enforced over all subjects andobjects in a system where the policy specifies that a subject thathas been granted access to information can do one or more of
the following: pass the information to other subjects or objects;
grant its privileges to other subjects; change the security
attributes of subjects, objects, systems, or system components;choose the security attributes to be associated with newlycreated or revised objects; or change the rules governing access
control. Mandatory access controls restrict this capability.

disassociability

Enabling the processing of personally identifiable information or
events without association to individuals or devices beyond theoperational requirements of the system.

[IR 8062]

domainAn environment or context that includes a set of system
resources and a set of system entities that have the right toaccess the resources as defined by a common security policy,
security model, or security architecture. See security domain.

enterprise

An organization with a defined mission/goal and a definedboundary, using systems to execute that mission, and withresponsibility for managing its own risks and performance. An
enterprise may consist of all or some of the following businessaspects: acquisition, program management, human resources,financial management, security, and systems, information andmission management. See organization.

enterprise architecture

A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission;
the information necessary to perform the mission; thetechnologies necessary to perform the mission; and thetransitional processes for implementing new technologies in
response to changing mission needs; and includes a baselinearchitecture; a target architecture; and a sequencing plan.

[OMB A-130]

environment of operation

The physical surroundings in which an information systemprocesses, stores, and transmits information.

event

Any observable occurrence in a system.

executive agency

An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 101; amilitary department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 102; anindependent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 104(1);and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to theprovisions of 31 U.S.C., Chapter 91.

exfiltration

The unauthorized transfer of information from a system.

external system (orcomponent)

A system or component of a system that is used by but is not apart of an organizational system and for which the organization
has no direct control over the implementation of required
security and privacy controls or the assessment of control
effectiveness.

[CNSSI 4009][OMB A-130][SP 800-61, Adapted][OMB A-130]

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external system service

A system service that is provided by an external service provider
and for which the organization has no direct control over the
implementation of required security and privacy controls or theassessment of control effectiveness.

external system service
providerA provider of external system services to an organization
through a variety of consumer-producer relationships, including
joint ventures, business partnerships, outsourcing arrangements(i.e., through contracts, interagency agreements, lines ofbusiness arrangements), licensing agreements, and/or supply
chain exchanges.

external network

A network not controlled by the organization.

failoverThe capability to switch over automatically (typically without
human intervention or warning) to a redundant or standby
system upon the failure or abnormal termination of thepreviously active system.

federal information
systemAn information system used or operated by an executive agency,
by a contractor of an executive agency, or by anotherorganization on behalf of an executive agency.

FIPS-validated
cryptography

A cryptographic module validated by the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP) to meet requirements specified in
FIPS Publication 140-3 (as amended). As a prerequisite to CMVP
validation, the cryptographic module is required to employ acryptographic algorithm implementation that has successfully
passed validation testing by the Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP). See NSA-approved cryptography.

firmware

Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically inread-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory(PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be
dynamically written or modified during execution of the
programs. See hardware and software.

hardware

The material physical components of a system. See software andfirmware.

high-impact system

A system in which at least one security objective (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of high.

hybrid control

A security or privacy control that is implemented for an
information system in part as a common control and in part as asystem-specific control.
Unique data used to represent a person’s identity and associatedattributes. A name or a card number are examples of identifiers.
A unique label used by a system to indicate a specific entity,
object, or group.

[OMB A-130][CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009][FIPS 200]

[OMB A-130]

identifier[FIPS 201-2]

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impact

The effect on organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including thenational security interests of the United States) of a loss ofconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or asystem.

impact value

The assessed worst-case potential impact that could result froma compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information expressed as a value of low, moderate or high.

incident

An occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without
lawful authority, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or an information system; or constitutes a violation
or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security
procedures, or acceptable use policies.

industrial control system

General term that encompasses several types of control systems,
including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control
system configurations such as programmable logic controllers(PLC) found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures.
An industrial control system consists of combinations of control
components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic)that act together to achieve an industrial objective (e.g.,
manufacturing, transportation of matter or energy).

information

Any communication or representation of knowledge such asfacts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual,numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, electronic, oraudiovisual forms.

information flow control

Controls to ensure that information transfers within a system ororganization are not made in violation of the security policy.

information leakage

The intentional or unintentional release of information to an
untrusted environment.

information owner

Official with statutory or operational authority for specified
information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its
generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.

information resources

Information and related resources, such as personnel,
equipment, funds, and information technology.

information security

The protection of information and systems from unauthorizedaccess, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destructionin order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

information security
architecture

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior of the enterprise security
processes, security systems, personnel and organizational
subunits, showing their alignment with the enterprise’s mission
and strategic plans.

[FIPS 199]

[FISMA]This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5[SP 800-82][OMB A-130][SP 800-37][OMB A-130][OMB A-130][OMB A-130]

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information security
policyAggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices thatprescribes how an organization manages, protects, anddistributes information.

information security
program plan

Formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an organization-wide information security
program and describes the program management controls andcommon controls in place or planned for meeting thoserequirements.

information security risk

The risk to organizational operations (including mission,functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential forunauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information and/or systems.

information steward

An agency official with statutory or operational authority forspecified information and responsibility for establishing thecontrols for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination,and disposal.

information system

A discrete set of information resources organized for thecollection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination,or disposition of information.

information technology

Any services, equipment, or interconnected system(s) or
subsystem(s) of equipment, that are used in the automatic
acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display, switching,interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by
the agency. For purposes of this definition, such services or
equipment if used by the agency directly or is used by acontractor under a contract with the agency that requires its
use; or to a significant extent, its use in the performance of aservice or the furnishing of a product. Information technology
includes computers, ancillary equipment (including imaging
peripherals, input, output, and storage devices necessary forsecurity and surveillance), peripheral equipment designed to becontrolled by the central processing unit of a computer,software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including
cloud computing and help-desk services or other professional
services which support any point of the life cycle of theequipment or service), and related resources. Information
technology does not include any equipment that is acquired by acontractor incidental to a contract which does not require its
use.

information technology
product

See system component.

[CNSSI 4009][OMB A-130][SP 800-30]

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information type

A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical,
proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security
management) defined by an organization or in some instances,by a specific law, Executive Order, directive, policy, or regulation.

insider

Any person with authorized access to any organizational
resource, to include personnel, facilities, information,equipment, networks, or systems.

insider threat

The threat that an insider will use her/his authorized access,wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security oforganizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation. This threat can include damage
through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure ofnational security information, or through the loss or degradationof organizational resources or capabilities.

insider threat program

A coordinated collection of capabilities authorized by theorganization and used to deter, detect, and mitigate theunauthorized disclosure of information.

interface

Common boundary between independent systems or modules
where interactions take place.

integrity

Guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation
and authenticity.

internal network

A network where the establishment, maintenance, andprovisioning of security controls are under the direct control oforganizational employees or contractors. Cryptographic
encapsulation or similar security technology implemented
between organization-controlled endpoints provides the same
effect (at least regarding confidentiality and integrity). An
internal network is typically organization-owned yet may beorganization-controlled while not being organization-owned.

label

See security label.

least privilege

The principle that a security architecture is designed so that each
entity is granted the minimum system resources andauthorizations that the entity needs to perform its function.

local access

Access to an organizational system by a user (or process acting
on behalf of a user) communicating through a direct connection
without the use of a network.

[FIPS 199]

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted][CNSSI 4009, Adapted]
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logical access control
systemAn automated system that controls an individual’s ability toaccess one or more computer system resources, such as aworkstation, network, application, or database. A logical access
control system requires the validation of an individual’s identity
through some mechanism, such as a PIN, card, biometric, orother token. It has the capability to assign different accessprivileges to different individuals depending on their roles andresponsibilities in an organization.

low-impact system

A system in which all three security objectives (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of low.

malicious code

Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorizedprocess that will have adverse impacts on the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of a system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse,
or other code-based entity that infects a host. Spyware andsome forms of adware are also examples of malicious code.

managed interface

An interface within a system that provides boundary protection
capabilities using automated mechanisms or devices.

mandatory access control

An access control policy that is uniformly enforced across all
subjects and objects within a system. A subject that has been
granted access to information is constrained from: passing theinformation to unauthorized subjects or objects; granting its
privileges to other subjects; changing one or more security
attributes on subjects, objects, the system, or systemcomponents; choosing the security attributes to be associatedwith newly created or modified objects; or changing the rules forgoverning access control. Organization-defined subjects may
explicitly be granted organization-defined privileges (i.e., they
are trusted subjects) such that they are not limited by some or
all of the above constraints. Mandatory access control isconsidered a type of nondiscretionary access control.

marking

See security marking.

matching agreement

A written agreement between a recipient agency and a source
agency (or a non-Federal agency) that is required by the Privacy
Act for parties engaging in a matching program.

media

Physical devices or writing surfaces including magnetic tapes,
optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale Integration memory
chips, and printouts (but excluding display media) onto which
information is recorded, stored, or printed within a system.

metadata

Information that describes the characteristics of data, including
structural metadata that describes data structures (i.e., data
format, syntax, semantics) and descriptive metadata that
describes data contents (i.e., security labels).

[FIPS 200]

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mobile code

Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remotesystems, transmitted across a network, and executed on a local
system without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.

mobile code technologies

Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the
production and use of mobile code.

mobile device

A portable computing device that has a small form factor suchthat it can easily be carried by a single individual; is designed tooperate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit
or receive information); possesses local, non-removable data
storage; and is powered on for extended periods of time with aself-contained power source. Mobile devices may also include
voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow
the device to capture (e.g., photograph, video, record, or
determine location) information, and/or built-in features forsynchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include
smart phones, tablets, and e-readers.

moderate-impact system

A system in which at least one security objective (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of moderate and nosecurity objective is assigned a potential impact value of high.
An authentication system or an authenticator that requires morethan one authentication factor for successful authentication.
Multi-factor authentication can be performed using a single
authenticator that provides more than one factor or by a
combination of authenticators that provide different factors.
The three authentication factors are something you know,
something you have, and something you are. See authenticator.

[FIPS 200]

multi-factor
authentication[SP 800-63-3]

multilevel security

Concept of processing information with different classifications
and categories that simultaneously permits access by users withdifferent security clearances and denies access to users who lackauthorization.

multiple security levels

Capability of a system that is trusted to contain, and maintainseparation between, resources (particularly stored data) ofdifferent security domains.

[CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009]

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national security system

Any system (including any telecommunications system) used or
operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or otherorganization on behalf of an agency—(i) the function, operation,or use of which involves intelligence activities; involves
cryptologic activities related to national security; involves
command and control of military forces; involves equipment thatis an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or is criticalto the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions(excluding a system that is to be used for routine administrativeand business applications, for example, payroll, finance, logistics,
and personnel management applications); or (ii) is protected at
all times by procedures established for information that havebeen specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in theinterest of national defense or foreign policy.

network

A system implemented with a collection of connectedcomponents. Such components may include routers, hubs,
cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution
centers, and technical control devices.

network access

Access to a system by a user (or a process acting on behalf of auser) communicating through a network, including a local area
network, a wide area network, and the Internet.

nonce

A value used in security protocols that is never repeated with thesame key. For example, nonces used as challenges in challengeresponse authentication protocols are not repeated until theauthentication keys are changed. Otherwise, there is a possibilityof a replay attack.

nondiscretionary access
control

See mandatory access control.

nonlocal maintenance

Maintenance activities conducted by individuals who
communicate through either an internal or external network.

non-organizational user

A user who is not an organizational user (including public users).

non-repudiation

Protection against an individual who falsely denies having
performed a certain action and provides the capability todetermine whether an individual took a certain action, such as
creating information, sending a message, approving information,or receiving a message.

NSA-approved
cryptography

Cryptography that consists of an approved algorithm, animplementation that has been approved for the protection ofclassified information and/or controlled unclassified information
in a specific environment, and a supporting key management
infrastructure.

[OMB A-130]

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objectPassive system-related entity, including devices, files, records,
tables, processes, programs, and domains that contain or receive
information. Access to an object (by a subject) implies access tothe information it contains. See subject.

operations security

Systematic and proven process by which potential adversaries
can be denied information about capabilities and intentions byidentifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified
evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities.
The process involves five steps: identification of criticalinformation, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities,
assessment of risks, and application of appropriate
countermeasures.

organization

An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an
organizational structure, including federal agencies, private
enterprises, academic institutions, state, local, or tribal
governments, or as appropriate, any of their operational
elements.

organization-defined
control parameter

The variable part of a control or control enhancement that is
instantiated by an organization during the tailoring process byeither assigning an organization-defined value or selecting avalue from a predefined list provided as part of the control orcontrol enhancement. See assignment operation and selection
operation.

organizational user

An organizational employee or an individual whom theorganization deems to have equivalent status of an employee,
including a contractor, guest researcher, or individual detailed
from another organization. Policies and procedures for granting
the equivalent status of employees to individuals may include
need-to-know, relationship to the organization, and citizenship.

overlay

A specification of security or privacy controls, control
enhancements, supplemental guidance, and other supporting
information employed during the tailoring process, that is
intended to complement (and further refine) security control
baselines. The overlay specification may be more stringent orless stringent than the original security control baseline
specification and can be applied to multiple information systems.
See tailoring.

parameter

See organization-defined control parameter.

penetration testing

A test methodology in which assessors, typically working under
specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security
features of a system.

[CNSSI 4009]

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periods processing

A mode of system operation in which information of different
sensitivities is processed at distinctly different times by the same
system with the system being properly purged or sanitized
between periods.

personally identifiable
information

Information that can be used to distinguish or trace anindividual’s identity, either alone or when combined with otherinformation that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.

personally identifiable
information processing[ISO/IEC 29100, Adapted]

An operation or set of operations performed upon personallyidentifiable information that can include, but is not limited to,the collection, retention, logging, generation, transformation,use, disclosure, transfer, and disposal of personally identifiable
information.

personally identifiable
information processing
permissions

The requirements for how personally identifiable information
can be processed or the conditions under which personallyidentifiable information can be processed.

personnel security

The discipline of assessing the conduct, integrity, judgment,
loyalty, reliability, and stability of individuals for duties andresponsibilities that require trustworthiness.

physical access control
system

An electronic system that controls the ability of people orvehicles to enter a protected area by means of authentication
and authorization at access control points.

plan of action andmilestones

A document that identifies tasks that need to be accomplished.
It details resources required to accomplish the elements of theplan, milestones for meeting the tasks, and the scheduled
completion dates for the milestones.

portable storage device

A system component that can communicate with and be added
to or removed from a system or network and that is limited todata storage—including text, video, audio or image data—as its
primary function (e.g., optical discs, external or removable hard
drives, external or removable solid-state disk drives, magnetic or
optical tapes, flash memory devices, flash memory cards, andother external or removable disks).

potential impact

The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be
expected to have a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199low); a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 moderate);
or a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199high) on organizational operations, organizational assets, orindividuals.

privacy architecture

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s privacy
protection processes, technical measures, personnel andorganizational sub-units, showing their alignment with theenterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

[OMB A-130]

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[SP 800-37]

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privacy control

The administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employedwithin an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy
requirements and manage privacy risks.

privacy control baseline

The set of privacy controls selected based on the privacy
selection criteria that provide a starting point for the tailoringprocess.

privacy domain

A domain that implements a privacy policy.

privacy impact
assessment

An analysis of how information is handled to ensure handlingconforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements
regarding privacy; to determine the risks and effects of creating,collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, disseminating,disclosing, and disposing of information in identifiable form in anelectronic information system; and to examine and evaluate
protections and alternate processes for handling information to
mitigate potential privacy concerns. A privacy impact assessment
is both an analysis and a formal document detailing the process
and the outcome of the analysis.

privacy plan

A formal document that details the privacy controls selected for
an information system or environment of operation that are inplace or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements
and managing privacy risks, details how the controls have been
implemented, and describes the methodologies and metrics thatwill be used to assess the controls.

privacy program plan

A formal document that provides an overview of an agency’s
privacy program, including a description of the structure of theprivacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy
program, the role of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy andother privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals andobjectives of the privacy program, and the program
management controls and common controls in place or planned
for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing
privacy risks.

privileged accountA system account with the authorizations of a privileged user.

privileged command

A human-initiated command executed on a system that involves
the control, monitoring, or administration of the system,
including security functions and associated security-relevant
information.

privileged user

A user that is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to performsecurity-relevant functions that ordinary users are notauthorized to perform.

[OMB A-130][OMB A-130]
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protected distribution
systemWire line or fiber optic system that includes adequate safeguards
and/or countermeasures (e.g., acoustic, electric,
electromagnetic, and physical) to permit its use for thetransmission of unencrypted information through an area oflesser classification or control.

provenanceThe chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location,and changes to a system or system component and associateddata. It may also include the personnel and processes used tointeract with or make modifications to the system, component,or associated data.

public key infrastructure

The architecture, organization, techniques, practices, andprocedures that collectively support the implementation andoperation of a certificate-based public key cryptographic system.
Framework established to issue, maintain, and revoke public key
certificates.

purge

A method of sanitization that applies physical or logical
techniques that render target data recovery infeasible usingstate of the art laboratory techniques.

reciprocity

Agreement among participating organizations to accept eachother’s security assessments to reuse system resources and/or
to accept each other’s assessed security posture to share
information.

records

All recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics,
made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or inconnection with the transaction of public business and preserved
or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate
successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of theUnited States Government or because of the informational valueof data in them.

red team exercise

An exercise, reflecting real-world conditions that is conducted asa simulated adversarial attempt to compromise organizational
missions or business processes and to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the security capabilities of an organization and its
systems.

reference monitor

A set of design requirements on a reference validation
mechanism that, as a key component of an operating system,
enforces an access control policy over all subjects and objects. A
reference validation mechanism is always invoked (i.e., complete
mediation), tamperproof, and small enough to be subject toanalysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured(i.e., verifiable).

[CNSSI 4009]

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regraderA trusted process explicitly authorized to re-classify and re-label
data in accordance with a defined policy exception. Untrusted or
unauthorized processes are such actions by the security policy.

remote access

Access to an organizational system by a user (or a process acting
on behalf of a user) communicating through an external
network.

remote maintenance

Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating
through an external network.

replay attack

An attack in which the Attacker is able to replay previously
captured messages (between a legitimate Claimant and a
Verifier) to masquerade as that Claimant to the Verifier or viceversa.

replay resistanceProtection against the capture of transmitted authentication oraccess control information and its subsequent retransmission
with the intent of producing an unauthorized effect or gaining
unauthorized access.

resilience

The ability of an information system to operate under adverse
conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,while maintaining essential operational capabilities, and to
recover to an effective operational posture in a time frame
consistent with mission needs.

restricted data

All data concerning (i) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (ii) the production of special nuclear material;or (iii) the use of special nuclear material in the production ofenergy, but shall not include data declassified or removed fromthe Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 [of theAtomic Energy Act of 1954].

risk

A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by apotential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i)the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if
the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of
occurrence.

risk assessment

The process of identifying risks to organizational operations(including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting
from the operation of a system.
Risk management includes threat and vulnerability analyses aswell as analyses of adverse effects on individuals arising frominformation processing and considers mitigations provided by
security and privacy controls planned or in place. Synonymouswith risk analysis.

[CNSSI 4009][SP 800-63-3]

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risk executive (function)

An individual or group within an organization that helps toensure that security risk-related considerations for individual
systems, to include the authorization decisions for thosesystems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspective withregard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of theorganization in carrying out its mission and business functions;and managing risk from individual systems is consistent acrossthe organization, reflects organizational risk tolerance, and isconsidered along with other organizational risks affecting
mission or business success.

risk management

The program and supporting processes to manage risk to agency
operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation),
agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation,and includes: establishing the context for risk-related activities;
assessing risk; responding to risk once determined; andmonitoring risk over time.

risk mitigation

Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate riskreducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk
management process.

risk response

Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk toagency operations, agency assets, individuals, otherorganizations, or the Nation.

risk tolerance

The level of risk or the degree of uncertainty that is acceptable
to an organization.

role-based access control

Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of accessauthorizations that a user receives based on an explicit or
implicit assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be
inherited through a role hierarchy and typically reflect thepermissions needed to perform defined functions within an
organization. A given role may apply to a single individual or toseveral individuals.

runtime

The period during which a computer program is executing.

sanitization

A process to render access to target data on the media infeasible
for a given level of effort. Clear, purge, and destroy are actions
that can be taken to sanitize media.

scoping considerations

A part of tailoring guidance that provides organizations withspecific considerations on the applicability and implementationof security and privacy controls in the control baselines.
Considerations include policy or regulatory, technology, physicalinfrastructure, system component allocation, public access,scalability, common control, operational or environmental, andsecurity objective.

[SP 800-37]

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security

A condition that results from the establishment andmaintenance of protective measures that enable an organization
to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed bythreats to its use of systems. Protective measures may involve a
combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection,
recovery, and correction that should form part of theorganization’s risk management approach.

security attributeAn abstraction that represents the basic properties orcharacteristics of an entity with respect to safeguarding
information. Typically associated with internal data structures—
including records, buffers, and files within the system—and used
to enable the implementation of access control and flow control
policies; reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution
instructions; or support other aspects of the information security
policy.

security categorization

The process of determining the security category for information
or a system. Security categorization methodologies are describedin CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security systems and in
FIPS Publication 199 for other than national security systems.
See security category.

security category

The characterization of information or an information system
based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss ofconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or
information system would have on agency operations, agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

security control

The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an
information system or an organization to protect theconfidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
information.

security control baseline

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact,
moderate-impact, or high-impact information system.

security domain

A domain that implements a security policy and is administeredby a single authority.

security functionality

The security-related features, functions, mechanisms, services,
procedures, and architectures implemented withinorganizational information systems or the environments inwhich those systems operate.

security functions

The hardware, software, or firmware of the system responsible
for enforcing the system security policy and supporting theisolation of code and data on which the protection is based.

security impact analysis

The analysis conducted by qualified staff within an organization
to determine the extent to which changes to the system affectthe security posture of the system.

[CNSSI 4009]

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security kernel

Hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted
computing base implementing the reference monitor concept.
Security kernel must mediate all accesses, be protected frommodification, and be verifiable as correct.

security label

The means used to associate a set of security attributes with a
specific information object as part of the data structure for that
object.

security marking

The means used to associate a set of security attributes with
objects in a human-readable form in order to enableorganizational, process-based enforcement of information
security policies.

security objective

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

security plan

A formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an information system or an information
security program and describes the security controls in place orplanned for meeting those requirements. The system security
plan describes the system components that are included within
the system, the environment in which the system operates, how
the security requirements are implemented, and therelationships with or connections to other systems.
See system security plan.

security policy

A set of criteria for the provision of security services.

[SP 800-160-1 adapted]

A set of rules that governs all aspects of security-relevant systemand system component behavior.

security policy filter

A hardware and/or software component that performs one ormore of the following functions: content verification to ensure
the data type of the submitted content; content inspection to
analyze the submitted content and verify that complies with adefined policy; malicious content checker that evaluates thecontent for malicious code; suspicious activity checker that
evaluates or executes the content in a safe manner, such as in a
sandbox or detonation chamber and monitors for suspicious
activity; or content sanitization, cleansing, and transformation,
which modifies the submitted content to comply with a definedpolicy.

[CNSSI 4009]

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security requirement[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A requirement levied on an information system or an
organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, procedures,or mission/business needs to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information that is being processed,
stored, or transmitted.
Note: Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from highlevel policy-related activities to low-level implementation-related activities insystem development and engineering disciplines.

security service

A security capability or function provided by an entity that
supports one or more security objectives.

security-relevant
information

Information within the system that can potentially impact theoperation of security functions or the provision of security
services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce thesystem security policy or maintain isolation of code and data.

selection operation

A control parameter that allows an organization to select a value
from a list of predefined values provided as part of the control orcontrol enhancement (e.g., selecting to either restrict an action
or prohibit an action).
See assignment operation and organization-defined control
parameter.

senior agency
information security
officer

Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information Officer
responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief
Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing
officials, information system owners, and information systemsecurity officers.

[SP 800-160-1]

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Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term senior
information security officer or chief information security officer to denoteindividuals who fill positions with similar responsibilities to senior agency
information security officers.

senior agency official for
privacy

Senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who hasagency-wide responsibility for privacy, including implementationof privacy protections; compliance with Federal laws,
regulations, and policies relating to privacy; management ofprivacy risks at the agency; and a central policy-making role in
the agency’s development and evaluation of legislative,
regulatory, and other policy proposals.

senior information
security officer
sensitive compartmented
information

See senior agency information security officer.

[OMB A-130][CNSSI 4009]

APPENDIX A

Classified information concerning or derived from intelligencesources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required tobe handled within formal access control systems established by
the Director of National Intelligence.

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service-oriented
architecture

A set of principles and methodologies for designing anddeveloping software in the form of interoperable services. These
services are well-defined business functions that are built assoftware components (i.e., discrete pieces of code and/or data
structures) that can be reused for different purposes.

shared control

A security or privacy control that is implemented for an
information system in part as a common control and in part as asystem-specific control. See hybrid control.

software

Computer programs and associated data that may be
dynamically written or modified during execution.

spam

The abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately
send unsolicited bulk messages.

special access program

A program established for a specific class of classified
information that imposes safeguarding and access requirementsthat exceed those normally required for information at the sameclassification level.

split tunneling

The process of allowing a remote user or device to establish a
non-remote connection with a system and simultaneously
communicate via some other connection to a resource in an
external network. This method of network access enables a user
to access remote devices, and simultaneously, access
uncontrolled networks.

spywareSoftware that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an
information system to gather information on individuals ororganizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code.

subject

An individual, process, or device that causes information to flow
among objects or change to the system state. Also see object.

subsystem

A major subdivision or component of an information system
consisting of information, information technology, andpersonnel that performs one or more specific functions.

supplier

Organization or individual that enters into an agreement withthe acquirer or integrator for the supply of a product or service.
This includes all suppliers in the supply chain, developers or
manufacturers of systems, system components, or systemservices; systems integrators; vendors; product resellers; andthird party partners.

supply chain

Linked set of resources and processes between and among
multiple tiers of organizations, each of which is an acquirer, thatbegins with the sourcing of products and services and extends
through their life cycle.

[CNSSI 4009]
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supply chain element

Organizations, entities, or tools employed for the research anddevelopment, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery,
integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal ofsystems and system components.

supply chain risk

The potential for harm or compromise that arises as a result of
security risks from suppliers, their supply chains, and theirproducts or services. Supply chain risks include exposures,
threats, and vulnerabilities associated with the products andservices traversing the supply chain as well as the exposures,
threats, and vulnerabilities to the supply chain.

supply chain risk
assessment

A systematic examination of supply chain risks, likelihoods oftheir occurrence, and potential impacts.

supply chain risk
management

A systematic process for managing cyber supply chain risk
exposures, threats, and vulnerabilities throughout the supply
chain and developing risk response strategies to the riskspresented by the supplier, the supplied products and services, orthe supply chain.

systemAny organized assembly of resources and procedures united andregulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a setof specific functions.

[CNSSI 4009]

Note: Systems also include specialized systems such as industrial control
systems, telephone switching and private branch exchange (PBX) systems, andenvironmental control systems.

[ISO 15288]

Combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one ormore stated purposes.
Note 1: There are many types of systems. Examples include: general andspecial-purpose information systems; command, control, and communication
systems; crypto modules; central processing unit and graphics processor
boards; industrial control systems; flight control systems; weapons, targeting,and fire control systems; medical devices and treatment systems; financial,banking, and merchandising transaction systems; and social networking
systems.
Note 2: The interacting elements in the definition of system include hardware,
software, data, humans, processes, facilities, materials, and naturally occurring
physical entities.
Note 3: System-of-systems is included in the definition of system.

system component

A discrete identifiable information technology asset that
represents a building block of a system and may include
hardware, software, and firmware.

system of records

A group of any records under the control of any agency fromwhich information is retrieved by the name of the individual orby some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.

system of records notice

The notice(s) published by an agency in the Federal Register
upon the establishment and/or modification of a system ofrecords describing the existence and character of the system.

[SP 800-128][USC 552][OMB A-108]

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system owner(or program manager)

Official responsible for the overall procurement, development,
integration, modification, operation, and maintenance of asystem.

systemsecurity officer

Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining theappropriate operational security posture for a system or
program.

system security plan

See security plan.

system service

A capability provided by a system that facilitates information
processing, storage, or transmission.

system-related security
risk

Risk that arises through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, oravailability of information or systems and that considers impacts
to the organization (including assets, mission, functions, image,or reputation), individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
See risk.

system-specific control

A security or privacy control for an information system that is
implemented at the system level and is not inherited by anyother information system.

systems engineering

An engineering discipline whose responsibility is creating andexecuting an interdisciplinary process to ensure that thecustomer and all other stakeholder needs are satisfied in a highquality, trustworthy, cost-efficient, and schedule-compliant
manner throughout a system’s entire life cycle.

systems security
engineering

A specialty engineering field strongly related to systems
engineering. It applies scientific, engineering, and information
assurance principles to deliver trustworthy systems that satisfy
stakeholder requirements within their established risk tolerance.

tailored control baseline

A set of controls that result from the application of tailoring
guidance to a control baseline. See tailoring.

tailoring

The process by which security control baselines are modified by:identifying and designating common controls, applying scoping
considerations on the applicability and implementation of
baseline controls, selecting compensating security controls,
assigning specific values to organization-defined security control
parameters, supplementing baselines with additional security
controls or control enhancements, and providing additional
specification information for control implementation.

tampering[CNSSI 4009]

An intentional but unauthorized act resulting in the modificationof a system, components of systems, its intended behavior, ordata.

[SP 800-37]

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threatAny circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
impact organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system
via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, and/or denial of service.

threat assessment

Formal description and evaluation of threat to an information
system.

threat modeling

A form of risk assessment that models aspects of the attack anddefense sides of a logical entity, such as a piece of data, anapplication, a host, a system, or an environment.
The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitationof a vulnerability or a situation and method that may
accidentally trigger a vulnerability. See threat agent.

[SP 800-30][CNSSI 4009][SP 800-154]

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threat source[FIPS 200]transmission

The state that exists when information is being electronicallysent from one location to one or more other locations.

trusted path

A mechanism by which a user (through an input device) can
communicate directly with the security functions of the systemwith the necessary confidence to support the system security
policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the user or the
security functions of the system and cannot be imitated byuntrusted software.

trustworthiness

The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence
to others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that
entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned
responsibilities.

[CNSSI 4009][CNSSI 4009]

trustworthiness(system)

The degree to which an information system (including theinformation technology components that are used to build thesystem) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information being processed,
stored, or transmitted by the system across the full range of
threats. A trustworthy information system is believed to operate
within defined levels of risk despite the environmental
disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and purposefulattacks that are expected to occur in its environment ofoperation.

user

Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual,
authorized to access a system.
See organizational user and non-organizational user.

virtual private network

Protected information system link utilizing tunneling, security
controls, and endpoint address translation giving the impressionof a dedicated line.

[CNSSI 4009]

APPENDIX A

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vulnerability[SP 800-30]

Weakness in an information system, system security procedures,internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or
triggered by a threat source.

vulnerability analysis

See vulnerability assessment.

vulnerability assessment

Systematic examination of an information system or product todetermine the adequacy of security measures, identify security
deficiencies, provide data from which to predict theeffectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm theadequacy of such measures after implementation.

[CNSSI 4009]

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APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX BACRONYMS
COMMON ABBREVIATIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

ABAC

Attribute-Based Access Control

API

Application Programming Interface

APT

Advanced Persistent Threat

BGP

Border Gateway Protocol

BIOS

Basic Input/Output System

CA

Certificate Authority/Certificate Authorities

CAC

Common Access Card

CAVP

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation ProgramCD

Compact Disc

CD-R

Compact Disc-Recordable

CIPSEA

Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act

CIRTComputer Incident Response TeamCISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

CMVP

Cryptographic Module Validation Program

CNSSD

Committee on National Security Systems Directive

CNSSI

Committee on National Security Systems Instruction

CNSSP

Committee on National Security Systems Policy

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

CUI

Controlled Unclassified Information

CVE

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

CVSS

Common Vulnerability Scoring System

CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

DHCP

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

DNS

Domain Name System

DNSSEC

Domain Name System Security Extensions

DoD

Department of Defense

DSB

Defense Science Board

DVD

Digital Versatile DiscAPPENDIX B

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DVD-R

Digital Versatile Disc-Recordable

EAP

Extensible Authentication Protocol

EMP

Electromagnetic Pulse

EMSEC

Emissions Security

FASC

Federal Acquisition Security Council

FBCA

Federal Bridge Certification Authority

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FICAM

Federal Indentity, Credential, and Access Management

FIPPs

Fair Information Practice Principles

FIPS

Federal Information Processing Standards

FISMA

Federal Information Security Modernization Act

FOCI

Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

GMT

Greenwich Mean TimeGPS

Global Positioning System

GSA

General Services Administration

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HTTP

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

ICS

Industrial Control System

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

I/O

Input/Output

IOC

Indicators of Compromise

IoTInternet of Things

IP

Internet Protocol

IRInteragency Report or Internal Report

ISAC

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers

ISAO

Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations

IT

Information Technology

ITL

Information Technology Laboratory

MAC

Media Access Control

MLS

Multilevel Secure

MTTF

Mean Time To Failure

APPENDIX B

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NARA

National Archives and Records Administration

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDA

Non-Disclosure Agreement

NIAP

National Information Assurance Partnership

NICE

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NOFORN

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NSA

National Security Agency

NVD

National Vulnerability Database

ODNI

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

OPSEC

Operation Security

OVAL

Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language

PDF

Portable Document Format

PDS

Position Designation System

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PIN

Personal Identification Number

PIV

Personal Identity Verification

PIV-I

Personal Identity Verification-Interoperable

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

RBAC

Role-Based Access Control

RD

Restricted Data

RFID

Radio-Frequency Identification

RFP

Request For Proposal

RPKI

Resource Public Key Infrastructure

SAP

Special Access Program

SCAP

Security Content Automation Protocol

SCI

Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCIF

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SCRM

Supply Chain Risk Management

SDLC

System Development Life Cycle

SIEM

Security Information and Event Management

APPENDIX B

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SME

Subject Matter Expert

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol

SOC

Security Operations Center

SP

Special Publication

STIG

Security Technical Implementation Guide

SWID

Software Identification

TCP

Transmission Control Protocol

TCP/IP

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol

TIC

Trusted Internet Connections

TLS

Transport Layer Security

TPM

Trusted Platform Module

TSP

Telecommunications Service Priority

UEFI

Unified Extensible Firmware Interface

UPS

Uninterruptible Power Supply

USGCB

United States Government Configuration Baseline

USB

Universal Serial Bus

UTC

Coordinated Universal Time

VoIP

Voice over Internet Protocol

VPN

Virtual Private Network

WORM

Write-Once, Read-ManyXML

Extensible Markup Language

APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX CCONTROL SUMMARIESIMPLEMENTATION, WITHDRAWAL, AND ASSURANCE DESIGNATIONS

Tables C-1 through C-20 provide a summary of the security and privacy controls and control
enhancements in Chapter Three. Each table focuses on a different control family.

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5•

A control or control enhancement that has been withdrawn from the control catalog is
indicated by a “W” and an explanation of the control or control enhancement disposition inlight gray text.

•

A control or control enhancement that is typically implemented by an information systemthrough technical means is indicated by an “S” in the implemented by column.

•

A control or control enhancement that is typically implemented by an organization (i.e., by
an individual through nontechnical means) is indicated by an “O” in the implemented bycolumn. 35•

A control or control enhancement that can be implemented by an organization, a system, ora combination of the two is indicated by an “O/S.”•

A control or control enhancement marked with a “√” in the assurance column indicates thecontrol or control enhancement contributes to the grounds for confidence that a security or
privacy claim has been or will be achieved. 36

Each control and control enhancement in Tables C-1 through C-20 is hyperlinked to the text forthat control and control enhancement in Chapter Three.
Families of controls contain base controls and control enhancements, which are directly related
to their base controls. Control enhancements either add functionality or specificity to a basecontrol or increase the strength of a base control. In both cases, control enhancements are usedin systems and environments of operation that require greater protection than provided by thebase control. This increased protection is required due to the potential adverse organizational orindividual impacts or when organizations require additions to the base control functionality or
assurance based on organizational assessments of risk. The use of control enhancements always
requires the use of the base control.
The families are arranged in alphabetical order, while the controls and control enhancements
within each family are arranged in numerical order. The alphabetical or numerical order of thefamilies, controls, and control enhancements does not imply any type of prioritization, level ofimportance, or order in which the controls or control enhancements are to be implemented.
35 The indication that a certain control or control enhancement is implemented by a system or by an organization in

Tables C-1 through C-20 is notional. Organizations have the flexibility to implement their selected controls and control
enhancements in the most cost-effective and efficient manner while simultaneously complying with the intent of thecontrols or control enhancements. In certain situations, a control or control enhancement may be implemented by
the system, the organization, or a combination of the two entities.
36 Assurance is a critical aspect in determining the trustworthiness of systems. Assurance is the measure of confidence
that the security and privacy functions, features, practices, policies, procedures, mechanisms, and architecture oforganizational systems accurately mediate and enforce established security and privacy policies.

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IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE√This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

AC-1
AC-2
AC-2(1)AC-2(2)AC-2(3)AC-2(4)AC-2(5)AC-2(6)AC-2(7)AC-2(8)AC-2(9)AC-2(10)AC-2(11)AC-2(12)AC-2(13)AC-3
AC-3(1)AC-3(2)AC-3(3)AC-3(4)AC-3(5)AC-3(6)AC-3(7)AC-3(8)

Policy and Procedures
Account ManagementO

AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENTOAUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENTSDISABLE ACCOUNTSS

AC-3(9)AC-3(10)AC-3(11)AC-3(12)AC-3(13)AC-3(14)AC-3(15)AC-4
AC-4(1)AC-4(2)AC-4(3)AC-4(4)AC-4(5)AC-4(6)AC-4(7)AC-4(8)AC-4(9)AC-4(10)APPENDIX COAUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONSSINACTIVITY LOGOUTO /S

DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENTSPRIVILEGED USER ACCOUNTSODYNAMIC ACCOUNT MANAGEMENTSRESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED AND GROUP ACCOUNTSSHARED AND GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL CHANGEO

W: Incorporated into AC-2k.

USAGE CONDITIONSSACCOUNT MONITORING FOR ATYPICAL USAGEO /SDISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALSO

Access Enforcement
RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSS

W: Incorporated into AC-6.

DUAL AUTHORIZATIONSMANDATORY ACCESS CONTROLSDISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROLSSECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATIONSPROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM INFORMATION

W: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28.

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROLO /SREVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONSO /SCONTROLLED RELEASEO /S

AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMSORESTRICT ACCESS TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION TYPESSASSERT AND ENFORCE APPLICATION ACCESSSATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROLSINDIVIDUAL ACCESSSDISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROLSInformation Flow EnforcementS

OBJECT SECURITY AND PRIVACY ATTRIBUTESS

PROCESSING DOMAINSS

DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW CONTROLSFLOW CONTROL OF ENCRYPTED INFORMATIONSEMBEDDED DATA TYPESSMETADATAS

ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMSSSECURITY AND PRIVACY POLICY FILTERSSHUMAN REVIEWSO /S

ENABLE AND DISABLE SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTERSSPAGE 429

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

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AC-4(11)AC-4(12)AC-4(13)AC-4(14)AC-4(15)AC-4(16)AC-4(17)AC-4(18)
AC-4(19)AC-4(20)AC-4(21)

CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTERSSDATA TYPE IDENTIFIERSSDECOMPOSITION INTO POLICY-RELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTSS

SECURITY OR PRIVACY POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS

S

AC-4(22)AC-4(23)AC-4(24)AC-4(25)AC-4(26)AC-4(27)AC-4(28)AC-4(29)AC-4(30)
AC-4(31)AC-4(32)
AC-5
AC-6
AC-6(1)AC-6(2)AC-6(3)AC-6(4)AC-6(5)AC-6(6)AC-6(7)AC-6(8)AC-6(9)AC-6(10)ACCESS ONLYS

MODIFY NON-RELEASABLE INFORMATIONO /SINTERNAL NORMALIZED FORMATS

DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED INFORMATIONINFORMATION TRANSFERS ON INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMSDOMAIN AUTHENTICATIONSECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING

ASSURANCES

W: Incorporated into AC-4.
S

W: Incorporated into AC-16.

VALIDATION OF METADATAS

APPROVED SOLUTIONSOPHYSICAL OR LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWSO /SDATA SANITIZATIONS

AUDIT FILTERING ACTIONSO /SREDUNDANT/INDEPENDENT FILTERING MECHANISMSSLINEAR FILTER PIPELINESSFILTER ORCHESTRATION ENGINESO /SFILTER MECHANISMS USING MULTIPLE PROCESSESSFAILED CONTENT TRANSFER PREVENTIONSPROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION TRANSFER

S

Separation of Duties
Least PrivilegeO

AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONSONON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONSONETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDSOSEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINSO /SPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTSOPRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERSOREVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGESOPRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTIONSLOG USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSSPROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGEDSOFUNCTIONS

AC-7
AC-7(1)AC-7(2)AC-7(3)AC-7(4)AC-8
AC-9
AC-9(1)APPENDIX C

Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCKS

W: Incorporated into AC-7.

PURGE OR WIPE MOBILE DEVICESBIOMETRIC ATTEMPT LIMITINGOUSE OF ALTERNATE AUTHENTICATION FACTOR

O /SSystem Use Notification
Previous Logon Notification

O /S

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONSS

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

AC-9(2)AC-9(3)AC-9(4)
AC-10
AC-11
AC-11(1)AC-12
AC-12(1)AC-12(2)AC-12(3)AC-13

SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONSSNOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT CHANGESSADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATIONS

Concurrent Session Control
Device Lock
PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS
Session Termination
USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS

S

O /S

TERMINATION MESSAGE

S

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

AC-14(1)
AC-15
AC-16
AC-16(1)AC-16(2)AC-16(3)AC-16(4)AC-16(5)AC-16(6)AC-16(7)AC-16(8)AC-16(9)AC-16(10)AC-17
AC-17(1)AC-17(2)AC-17(3)AC-17(4)AC-17(5)AC-17(6)AC-17(7)AC-17(8)AC-17(9)AC-17(10)AC-18
AC-18(1)AC-18(2)AC-18(3)AC-18(4)AC-18(5)

NECESSARY USES

W: Incorporated into AC-14.

Automated Marking
Security and Privacy Attributes

W: Incorporated into MP-3.

APPENDIX CTIMEOUT WARNING MESSAGE

Supervision and Review-Access Control

S
S
S

S

W: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6.
OO

DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONSATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSSMAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONS BY SYSTEMSASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSSATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS ON OBJECTS TO BE OUTPUT

S

MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONOCONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATIONOASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIESSATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT – REGRADING MECHANISMSOATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSO

Remote AccessO

MONITORING AND CONTROLO /SPROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTIONSMANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTSSPRIVILEGED COMMANDS AND ACCESSOMONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONSPROTECTION OF MECHANISM INFORMATION

W: Incorporated into SI-4.
O

ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY FUNCTION ACCESS

W: Incorporated into AC-3(10).

DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLSW: Incorporated into CM-7.

DISCONNECT OR DISABLE ACCESSOAUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDSS

Wireless AccessO

AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTIONMONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONSS

W: Incorporated into SI-4.

DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKINGO /SRESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERSO

ANTENNAS AND TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELSOPAGE 431

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

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AC-19
AC-19(1)AC-19(2)AC-19(3)AC-19(4)AC-19(5)AC-20
AC-20(1)AC-20(2)AC-20(3)AC-20(4)Access Control for Mobile Devices

AC-20(5)AC-21
AC-21(1)AC-21(2)
AC-22
AC-23
AC-24
AC-24(1)AC-24(2)
AC-25

APPENDIX C

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEO

USE OF WRITABLE AND PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

W: Incorporated into MP-7.

USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

W: Incorporated into MP-7.

USE OF PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

W: Incorporated into MP-7.

RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONOFULL DEVICE OR CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTIONO

Use of External Systems

O

LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USEO

PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — RESTRICTED USEO

NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS — RESTRICTED USE

O

NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES — PROHIBITED USEO

PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — PROHIBITED USE

OInformation SharingO

AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORTSINFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVALSPublicly Accessible Content
Data Mining Protection
Access Control Decisions

O

TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION INFORMATIONSNO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

S

Reference Monitor

S

O
O

√

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AT-1
AT-2
AT-2(1)
AT-2(2)AT-2(3)AT-2(4)AT-2(5)AT-2(6)
AT-3
AT-3(1)AT-3(2)AT-3(3)AT-3(4)AT-3(5)
AT-4
AT-5
AT-6

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Literacy Training and AwarenessO

PRACTICAL EXERCISESOINSIDER THREATO

SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND MININGOSUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOROADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATOCYBER THREAT ENVIRONMENTO

Role-Based TrainingO

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSOPHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

PRACTICAL EXERCISESSUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOROO

W: Incorporated into AT-2(4).

PROCESSING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONO

Training Records
Contacts with Security Groups and Associations
Training Feedback

O√√

W: Incorporated into PM-15.
O√

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AU-1
AU-2
AU-2(1)
AU-2(2)AU-2(3)AU-2(4)
AU-3
AU-3(1)AU-3(2)AU-3(3)
AU-4
AU-4(1)
AU-5
AU-5(1)AU-5(2)AU-5(3)AU-5(4)AU-5(5)
AU-6
AU-6(1)AU-6(2)AU-6(3)AU-6(4)AU-6(5)AU-6(6)AU-6(7)
AU-6(8)AU-6(9)AU-6(10)
AU-7
AU-7(1)AU-7(2)
AU-8
AU-8(1)AU-8(2)
AU-9
AU-9(1)AU-9(2)AU-9(3)AU-9(4)AU-9(5)AU-9(6)APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Event Logging

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEO√OCOMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

W: Incorporated into AU-12.

SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT

W: Incorporated into AU-12.

REVIEWS AND UPDATESW: Incorporated into AU-2.

PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

W: Incorporated into AC-6(9).

Content of Audit Records
ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATIONCENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENTSS

W: Incorporated into PL-9.

LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS

O

Audit Log Storage Capacity

O /S

TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

O /S

Response to Audit Logging Process Failures

S

STORAGE CAPACITY WARNINGSREAL-TIME ALERTSSCONFIGURABLE TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDSSSHUTDOWN ON FAILURESALTERNATE AUDIT LOGGING CAPABILITYO

Audit Record Review, Analysis, and ReportingO

AUTOMATED PROCESS INTEGRATIONOAUTOMATED SECURITY ALERTS

W: Incorporated into SI-4.

CORRELATE AUDIT RECORD REPOSITORIESOCENTRAL REVIEW AND ANALYSISSINTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF AUDIT RECORDSOCORRELATION WITH PHYSICAL MONITORINGOPERMITTED ACTIONSOFULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF PRIVILEGED COMMANDSOCORRELATION WITH INFORMATION FROM NONTECHNICAL SOURCES
AUDIT LEVEL ADJUSTMENTOS

AUTOMATIC PROCESSINGSTime Stamps

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into AU-6.

Audit Record Reduction and Report Generation
AUTOMATIC SORT AND SEARCH

√
√

√
√

W: Incorporated into AU-7(1).
S

SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

W: Moved to SC-45(1).

SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

W: Moved to SC-45(2).

Protection of Audit Information
HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE MEDIASSTORE ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTSS

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONSSACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERSODUAL AUTHORIZATIONO /SREAD-ONLY ACCESSO /SPAGE 434

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

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AU-9(7)
AU-10
AU-10(1)AU-10(2)AU-10(3)AU-10(4)AU-10(5)
AU-11
AU-11(1)
AU-12
AU-12(1)

STORE ON COMPONENT WITH DIFFERENT OPERATING SYSTEM

O

Non-repudiationS

ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIESSAudit Record Retention
LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY
Audit Record Generation
SYSTEM-WIDE AND TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAILO

AU-12(2)AU-12(3)AU-12(4)AU-13
AU-13(1)AU-13(2)AU-13(3)
AU-14
AU-14(1)AU-14(2)AU-14(3)
AU-15
AU-16
AU-16(1)AU-16(2)AU-16(3)

STANDARDIZED FORMATS

SCHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSSAPPENDIX CVALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER IDENTITYS

CHAIN OF CUSTODYO /SVALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY
DIGITAL SIGNATURES

S

O
S

S
O

USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLSO /SREVIEW OF MONITORED SITESOUNAUTHORIZED REPLICATION OF INFORMATIONO /S

Session Audit
SYSTEM START-UP

S

Alternate Audit Logging Capability
Cross-Organizational Audit Logging√

S

Monitoring for Information Disclosure

REMOTE VIEWING AND LISTENING

√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into SI-7.

QUERY PARAMETER AUDITS OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONCAPTURE AND RECORD CONTENT

ASSURANCE

S

√
√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into AU-14.
S√

W: Moved to AU-5(5).
O

IDENTITY PRESERVATIONOSHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATIONODISASSOCIABILITYO

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CA-1
CA-2
CA-2(1)
CA-2(2)CA-2(3)
CA-3
CA-3(1)CA-3(2)CA-3(3)CA-3(4)CA-3(5)CA-3(6)CA-3(7)
CA-4
CA-5
CA-5(1)
CA-6
CA-6(1)CA-6(2)
CA-7
CA-7(1)CA-7(2)
CA-7(3)CA-7(4)CA-7(5)
CA-7(6)
CA-8
CA-8(1)CA-8(2)
CA-8(3)
CA-9
CA-9(1)APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Control AssessmentsO

INDEPENDENT ASSESSORSOSPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS

O

LEVERAGING RESULTS FROM EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

O

√
√
√
√
√
√

CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Information Exchange

O

O

UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

W: Moved to SC-7(25).

CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

W: Moved to SC-7(26).

UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

W: Moved to SC-7(27).

CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

W: Moved to SC-7(28).

RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

W: Incorporated into SC-7(5).

TRANSFER AUTHORIZATIONSTRANSITIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGES

Security Certification
Plan of Action and Milestones

O /S
O /S

W: Incorporated into CA-2.
O

AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY AND CURRENCY

O

AuthorizationO

JOINT AUTHORIZATION — INTRA-ORGANIZATIONOJOINT AUTHORIZATION — INTER-ORGANIZATIONO

Continuous MonitoringO

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTO

TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into CA-2.

TREND ANALYSESORISK MONITORINGO /SCONSISTENCY ANALYSISO

AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR MONITORING

O /S

Penetration TestingO

INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING AGENT OR TEAMORED TEAM EXERCISESO

FACILITY PENETRATION TESTINGOInternal System ConnectionsO

COMPLIANCE CHECKS

O /S

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

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CM-1
CM-2
CM-2(1)
CM-2(2)CM-2(3)CM-2(4)CM-2(5)CM-2(6)CM-2(7)
CM-3
CM-3(1)

CONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Baseline Configuration
REVIEWS AND UPDATESAUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY AND CURRENCY
RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONSIMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

O

√
√

O

W: Incorporated into CM-2.
OO

UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE

W: Incorporated into CM-7.

AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE

W: Incorporated into CM-7.

√
√

O

√
√
√
√

TESTING, VALIDATION, AND DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGESO√AUTOMATED CHANGE IMPLEMENTATIONOSECURITY AND PRIVACY REPRESENTATIVESO

DEVELOPMENT AND TEST ENVIRONMENTSOCONFIGURE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS

O

Configuration Change Control
AUTOMATED DOCUMENTATION, NOTIFICATION, AND PROHIBITION OFOCHANGES

CM-3(2)CM-3(3)CM-3(4)CM-3(5)CM-3(6)CM-3(7)CM-3(8)
CM-4
CM-4(1)
CM-4(2)
CM-5
CM-5(1)
CM-5(2)CM-5(3)CM-5(4)CM-5(5)CM-5(6)
CM-5(7)
CM-6
CM-6(1)
CM-6(2)CM-6(3)CM-6(4)
CM-7
CM-7(1)
CM-7(2)CM-7(3)CM-7(4)CM-7(5)
CM-7(6)APPENDIX C

AUTOMATED SECURITY RESPONSES

CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENTOREVIEW SYSTEM CHANGESOPREVENT OR RESTRICT CONFIGURATION CHANGESS

Impact AnalysesO

SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTSOVERIFICATION OF CONTROLSOAccess Restrictions for ChangeO

AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT AND AUDIT RECORDSSREVIEW SYSTEM CHANGESW: Incorporated into CM-3(7).

SIGNED COMPONENTS

W: Moved to CM-14.

DUAL AUTHORIZATIONO /SPRIVILEGE LIMITATION FOR PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONO

LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGESAUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

Configuration Settings
AUTOMATED MANAGEMENT, APPLICATION, AND VERIFICATIONRESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES

√
√
√

O /S

W: Incorporated into SI-7.
O /S
O
O

UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION

W: Incorporated into SI-7.

CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION

W: Incorporated into CM-4.

Least Functionality

O /S

PERIODIC REVIEWO /SPREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTIONSREGISTRATION COMPLIANCEO

UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE — DENY-BY-EXCEPTIONO /SAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE — ALLOW-BY-EXCEPTIONO /SCONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGESO√PAGE 437

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IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

CM-7(7)
CM-7(8)
CM-7(9)
CM-8
CM-8(1)
CM-8(2)CM-8(3)CM-8(4)CM-8(5)CM-8(6)
CM-8(7)CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

O /S

BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODEO /SPROHIBITING THE USE OF UNAUTHORIZED HARDWARE

O /S

System Component InventoryO

UPDATES DURING INSTALLATION AND REMOVALOAUTOMATED MAINTENANCEO

AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

O

CM-8(8)
CM-8(9)CM-9
CM-9(1)
CM-10
CM-10(1)
CM-11
CM-11(1)CM-11(2)
CM-11(3)
CM-12
CM-12(1)
CM-13
CM-14

APPENDIX CACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATIONNO DUPLICATE ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTSO

W: Incorporated into CM-8.

ASSESSED CONFIGURATIONS AND APPROVED DEVIATIONSOCENTRALIZED REPOSITORYO

AUTOMATED LOCATION TRACKINGOASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMSO

Configuration Management PlanO

ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITYO

Software Usage Restrictions
OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE
User-Installed SoftwareO

ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONSSOFTWARE INSTALLATION WITH PRIVILEGED STATUS

√
√
√
√

O
O

W: Incorporated into CM-8(3).
S

AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORINGS

Information LocationO

AUTOMATED TOOLS TO SUPPORT INFORMATION LOCATIONO

Data Action Mapping
Signed Components

O
O /S

√
√
√
√

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CP-1
CP-2
CP-2(1)CP-2(2)CP-2(3)CP-2(4)CP-2(5)CP-2(6)CP-2(7)CP-2(8)CP-3CP-3(1)CP-3(2)CP-4
CP-4(1)CP-4(2)CP-4(3)CP-4(4)CP-4(5)CP-5CP-6CP-6(1)CP-6(2)CP-6(3)CP-7
CP-7(1)CP-7(2)CP-7(3)CP-7(4)CP-7(5)CP-7(6)CP-8
CP-8(1)CP-8(2)CP-8(3)CP-8(4)CP-8(5)CP-9CP-9(1)CP-9(2)CP-9(3)CP-9(4)

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Contingency PlanO√

COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANSOCAPACITY PLANNINGOCONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAMERESUME MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONSRESUME ALL MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONSOOW: Incorporated into CP-2(3).

CONTINUE MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONSOALTERNATE PROCESSING AND STORAGE SITESOCOORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERSOIDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETSOContingency TrainingO

SIMULATED EVENTSOMECHANISMS USED IN TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

O

Contingency Plan TestingO

COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANSO

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITEO

AUTOMATED TESTINGOFULL RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTIONO

SELF-CHALLENGE

Contingency Plan Update
Alternate Storage Site

O /S

W: Incorporated into CP-2.
O

SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITEORECOVERY TIME AND RECOVERY POINT OBJECTIVESOACCESSIBILITYO

Alternate Processing SiteO

SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITEOACCESSIBILITYOPRIORITY OF SERVICEOPREPARATION FOR USEO

EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

W: Incorporated into CP-7.

INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY SITE

O

Telecommunications Services

O

PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONSOSINGLE POINTS OF FAILUREOSEPARATION OF PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE PROVIDERSOPROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLANO

ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTINGO

System Backup

O

TESTING FOR RELIABILITY AND INTEGRITYOTEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLINGOSEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATIONPROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

O

W: Incorporated into CP-9.

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IMPLEMENTED
BY

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CP-9(5)CP-9(6)CP-9(7)CP-9(8)CP-10
CP-10(1)CP-10(2)CP-10(3)CP-10(4)CP-10(5)CP-10(6)TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITEOREDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEMODUAL AUTHORIZATION FOR DELETION OR DESTRUCTIONOCRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONOCOMPONENT PROTECTION

O

CP-11
CP-12
CP-13

Alternate Communications Protocols
Safe Mode
Alternative Security Mechanisms

O

APPENDIX C

System Recovery and Reconstitution
CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING
TRANSACTION RECOVERYCOMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLSRESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIODFAILOVER CAPABILITYASSURANCEO

W: Incorporated into CP-4.
O

W: Addressed through tailoring.
O

W: Incorporated into SI-13.

S

√

O /S

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IA-1
IA-2
IA-2(1)
IA-2(2)
IA-2(3)
IA-2(4)IA-2(5)IA-2(6)
IA-2(7)IA-2(8)IA-2(9)IA-2(10)IA-2(11)IA-2(12)IA-2(13)
IA-3
IA-3(1)
IA-3(2)
IA-3(3)IA-3(4)
IA-4
IA-4(1)IA-4(2)IA-4(3)IA-4(4)IA-4(5)IA-4(6)
IA-4(7)
IA-4(8)IA-4(9)IA-5
IA-5(1)IA-5(2)IA-5(3)IA-5(4)IA-5(5)IA-5(6)
IA-5(7)IA-5(8)IA-5(9)IA-5(10)IA-5(11)APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTSMULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

O

√

O /S
S
S

LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

W: Incorporated into IA-2(1).

LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

W: Incorporated into IA-2(2).

INDIVIDUAL AUTHENTICATION WITH GROUP AUTHENTICATIONACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — SEPARATE DEVICENETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS — SEPARATE DEVICEACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT
NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANTSINGLE SIGN-ON
REMOTE ACCESS — SEPARATE DEVICEO /SS

W: Incorporated into IA-2(6).
S

W: Incorporated into IA-2(8).
S

W: Incorporated into IA-2(6).

ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALSS

OUT-OF-BAND AUTHENTICATIONS

Device Identification and Authentication

S

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATIONCRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATIONS

W: Incorporated into IA-3(1).

DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATIONODEVICE ATTESTATIONO

Identifier Management

O

PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERSOSUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

W: Incorporated into IA-12(1).

MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION

W: Incorporated into IA-12(2).

IDENTIFY USER STATUSO

DYNAMIC MANAGEMENTSCROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT
IN-PERSON REGISTRATIONO

W: Incorporated into IA-12(4).

PAIRWISE PSEUDONYMOUS IDENTIFIERSOATTRIBUTE MAINTENANCE AND PROTECTION

O /SAuthenticator Management
PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATIONPUBLIC KEY-BASED AUTHENTICATION
IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTY REGISTRATION

O /S

W: Incorporated into IA-12(4).

AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATION

W: Incorporated into IA-5(1).

O /SSCHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR TO DELIVERYOPROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORSONO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORSOMULTIPLE SYSTEM ACCOUNTSOFEDERATED CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENTODYNAMIC CREDENTIAL BINDING
HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATIONS

W: Incorporated into IA-2(1) and IA-2(2).

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IA-5(12)IA-5(13)
IA-5(14)IA-5(15)
IA-5(16)IA-5(17)IA-5(18)
IA-6
IA-7
IA-8

BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCE

IA-8(1)
IA-8(2)
IA-8(3)IA-8(4)IA-8(5)
IA-8(6)
IA-9
IA-9(1)IA-9(2)
IA-10
IA-11
IA-12
IA-12(1)IA-12(2)IA-12(3)IA-12(4)IA-12(5)IA-12(6)APPENDIX C

IMPLEMENTEDBYSEXPIRATION OF CACHED AUTHENTICATORSSMANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUST STORESO

GSA-APPROVED PRODUCTS AND SERVICESO

IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTY AUTHENTICATOR ISSUANCEO

PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION FOR BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATORSSPASSWORD MANAGERSS

Authentication Feedback
Cryptographic Module Authentication
Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational
Users)S

ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIESSACCEPTANCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATORSUSE OF FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS
USE OF DEFINED PROFILESSSS

W: Incorporated into IA-8(2).
S

ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALSSDISASSOCIABILITYO

Service Identification and Authentication

ASSURANCEO /SINFORMATION EXCHANGE

W: Incorporated into IA-9.

TRANSMISSION OF DECISIONSW: Incorporated into IA-9.

Adaptive Authentication
Re-authentication
Identity Proofing

O /SSUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATIONOIDENTITY EVIDENCEOIDENTITY EVIDENCE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATIONOIN-PERSON VALIDATION AND VERIFICATIONOADDRESS CONFIRMATIONOACCEPT EXTERNALLY-PROOFED IDENTITIES

O

O

O

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IR-1
IR-2
IR-2(1)IR-2(2)IR-2(3)IR-3IR-3(1)IR-3(2)IR-3(3)IR-4
IR-4(1)IR-4(2)IR-4(3)IR-4(4)IR-4(5)IR-4(6)IR-4(7)IR-4(8)IR-4(9)IR-4(10)IR-4(11)
IR-4(12)IR-4(13)IR-4(14)IR-4(15)
IR-5
IR-5(1)
IR-6
IR-6(1)IR-6(2)IR-6(3)IR-7
IR-7(1)IR-7(2)IR-8
IR-8(1)
IR-9
IR-9(1)IR-9(2)IR-9(3)IR-9(4)

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Incident Response TrainingO

SIMULATED EVENTSOAUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTSO

BREACHO

Incident Response TestingO

AUTOMATED TESTINGO

COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANSO

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Incident HandlingO

AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSESODYNAMIC RECONFIGURATIONOCONTINUITY OF OPERATIONSOCONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAMEOINFORMATION CORRELATIONOAUTOMATIC DISABLING OF SYSTEM

O /SINSIDER THREATSOINSIDER THREATS — INTRA-ORGANIZATION COORDINATIONOCORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONSODYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITYO

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATIONOINTEGRATED INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMO

MALICIOUS CODE AND FORENSIC ANALYSISOBEHAVIOR ANALYSISO

SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTERO /S

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND REPUTATION REPAIROIncident Monitoring
AUTOMATED TRACKING, DATA COLLECTION, AND ANALYSIS
Incident ReportingO

AUTOMATED REPORTINGO

VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTSO

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATIONO

Incident Response AssistanceO

AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION AND SUPPORTOCOORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS

O

Incident Response PlanO

BREACHESO

Information Spillage ResponseO

RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

O

√
√

O

W: Incorporated into IR-9.

TRAININGOPOST-SPILL OPERATIONSOEXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNELOPAGE 443

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CONTROLNUMBER
IR-10

CONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Integrated Information Security Analysis Team

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

W: Moved to IR-4(11).

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MA-1
MA-2
MA-2(1)MA-2(2)
MA-3
MA-3(1)MA-3(2)MA-3(3)MA-3(4)MA-3(5)MA-3(6)MA-4
MA-4(1)MA-4(2)MA-4(3)MA-4(4)MA-4(5)MA-4(6)MA-4(7)MA-5
MA-5(1)MA-5(2)MA-5(3)MA-5(4)MA-5(5)
MA-6
MA-6(1)MA-6(2)MA-6(3)
MA-7

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Controlled Maintenance
RECORD CONTENT

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEO√O

W: Incorporated into MA-2.

AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIESOMaintenance Tools

O

INSPECT TOOLSOINSPECT MEDIAOPREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVALORESTRICTED TOOL USE

O /S

EXECUTION WITH PRIVILEGEO /S

SOFTWARE UPDATES AND PATCHES

O /SNonlocal MaintenanceO

LOGGING AND REVIEWDOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCEO

W: Incorporated into MA-1 and MA-4.

COMPARABLE SECURITY AND SANITIZATIONOAUTHENTICATION AND SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONSOAPPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONSOCRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONO /SDISCONNECT VERIFICATIONS

Maintenance Personnel

O

INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESSOSECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMSOCITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMSOFOREIGN NATIONALSO

NON-SYSTEM MAINTENANCE

O

Timely MaintenanceO

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

O

PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCEO

AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

O

Field MaintenanceO

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MP-1
MP-2
MP-2(1)
MP-2(2)MP-3
MP-4
MP-4(1)MP-4(2)MP-5
MP-5(1)MP-5(2)MP-5(3)MP-5(4)
MP-6
MP-6(1)MP-6(2)MP-6(3)MP-6(4)MP-6(5)MP-6(6)MP-6(7)MP-6(8)
MP-7
MP-7(1)MP-7(2)
MP-8
MP-8(1)MP-8(2)MP-8(3)MP-8(4)

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and ProceduresMedia Access

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEO√OAUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS

W: Incorporated into MP-4(2).

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

W: Incorporated into SC-28(1).

Media Marking
Media Storage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESSMedia TransportOO

W: Incorporated into SC-28(1).
OO

PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS

W: Incorporated into MP-5.

DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIESW: Incorporated into MP-5.

CUSTODIANSCRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONO

W: Incorporated into SC-28(1).

Media Sanitization
REVIEW, APPROVE, TRACK, DOCUMENT, AND VERIFYOEQUIPMENT TESTINGONONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUESOOCONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

W: Incorporated into MP-6.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

W: Incorporated into MP-6.

MEDIA DESTRUCTION

W: Incorporated into MP-6.

DUAL AUTHORIZATIONOREMOTE PURGING OR WIPING OF INFORMATIONOMedia Use
PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNERO

W: Incorporated into MP-7.

PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIAOMedia DowngradingO

DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESSOEQUIPMENT TESTINGOCONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATIONOCLASSIFIED INFORMATIONOPAGE 446

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PE-1
PE-2
PE-2(1)PE-2(2)PE-2(3)PE-3PE-3(1)PE-3(2)PE-3(3)PE-3(4)PE-3(5)PE-3(6)PE-3(7)PE-3(8)PE-4PE-5
PE-5(1)PE-5(2)PE-5(3)
PE-6
PE-6(1)PE-6(2)PE-6(3)PE-6(4)PE-7
PE-8
PE-8(1)PE-8(2)PE-8(3)PE-9
PE-9(1)PE-9(2)
PE-10
PE-10(1)
PE-11
PE-11(1)PE-11(2)PE-12
PE-12(1)
PE-13
PE-13(1)PE-13(2)APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Physical Access AuthorizationsO√

ACCESS BY POSITION AND ROLEOTWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATIONORESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESSO

Physical Access Control

O

SYSTEM ACCESSOFACILITY AND SYSTEMSOCONTINUOUS GUARDSO

LOCKABLE CASINGSOCONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAMETAMPER PROTECTION
FACILITY PENETRATION TESTINGOO

W: Incorporated into CA-8.

PHYSICAL BARRIERSOACCESS CONTROL VESTIBULES

O

Access Control for Transmission
Access Control for Output Devices

O

ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSLINK TO INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
MARKING OUTPUT DEVICESO

W: Incorporated into PE-5.
S

W: Incorporated into PE-22.

Monitoring Physical AccessO

INTRUSION ALARMS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENTOAUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION AND RESPONSESO

VIDEO SURVEILLANCEOMONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO SYSTEMS

Visitor Control
Visitor Access Records
AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE AND REVIEWPHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDSO

W: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3.
OOOPower Equipment and CablingO

REDUNDANT CABLINGO

AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLSOACCIDENTAL AND UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION√

W: Incorporated into PE-2.

LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS

Emergency Shutoff

√
√
√
√
√

O

W: Incorporated into PE-10.

Emergency PowerO

ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY — MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITYO

ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY — SELF-CONTAINEDO

Emergency Lighting

O

ESSENTIAL MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONSOFire ProtectionO

DETECTION SYSTEMS — AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATIONO

SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS — AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATIONOPAGE 447

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

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PE-13(3)PE-13(4)PE-14
PE-14(1)PE-14(2)PE-15
PE-15(1)
PE-16
PE-17
PE-18
PE-18(1)

AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION

PE-19
PE-19(1)
PE-20
PE-21
PE-22
PE-23

Information Leakage

O

NATIONAL EMISSIONS POLICIES AND PROCEDURESO

Asset Monitoring and Tracking
Electromagnetic Pulse Protection
Component Marking
Facility LocationO

APPENDIX C

W: Incorporated into PE-13(2).

INSPECTIONSO

Environmental Controls

O

AUTOMATIC CONTROLSOMONITORING WITH ALARMS AND NOTIFICATIONSOWater Damage ProtectionO

AUTOMATION SUPPORTODelivery and Removal
Alternate Work Site
Location of System Components

O

FACILITY SITE

ASSURANCEOO

W: Moved to PE-23.

O
O
O

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PL-1
PL-2
PL-2(1)
PL-2(2)PL-2(3)PL-3
PL-4
PL-4(1)
PL-5
PL-6
PL-7
PL-8
PL-8(1)PL-8(2)
PL-9
PL-10
PL-11

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
System Security and Privacy Plans

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

O

√
√

O

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

W: Incorporated into PL-7.

FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

W: Incorporated into PL-8.

PLAN AND COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIESW: Incorporated into PL-2.

System Security Plan Update
Rules of Behavior
SOCIAL MEDIA AND EXTERNAL SITE/APPLICATION USAGE RESTRICTIONS
Privacy Impact Assessment
Security-Related Activity Planning
Concept of Operations
Security and Privacy Architectures

W: Incorporated into PL-2.
O
O

√
√

W: Incorporated into RA-8.
W: Incorporated into PL-2.
OO

DEFENSE IN DEPTHO

SUPPLIER DIVERSITYO

Central Management
Baseline Selection
Baseline Tailoring

O

√
√
√
√

O
O

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PM-1
PM-2
PM-3
PM-4
PM-5
PM-5(1)
PM-6
PM-7
PM-7(1)
PM-8
PM-9
PM-10
PM-11
PM-12
PM-13
PM-14
PM-15
PM-16
PM-16(1)
PM-17
PM-18
PM-19
PM-20
PM-20(1)
PM-21
PM-22
PM-23
PM-24
PM-25
PM-26
PM-27
PM-28
PM-29
PM-30
PM-30(1)
PM-31
PM-32

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

Information Security Program Plan
Information Security Program Leadership Role
Information Security and Privacy Resources
Plan of Action and Milestones Process
System InventoryO

INVENTORY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONO

Measures of PerformanceEnterprise ArchitectureO

OFFLOADINGO

Critical Infrastructure Plan
Risk Management Strategy
Authorization Process
Mission and Business Process Definition
Insider Threat Program
Security and Privacy Workforce
Testing, Training, and Monitoring
Security and Privacy Groups and Associations
Threat Awareness ProgramO

AUTOMATED MEANS FOR SHARING THREAT INTELLIGENCE

O

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information on External
Systems
Privacy Program Plan
Privacy Program Leadership Role
Dissemination of Privacy Program Information
PRIVACY POLICIES ON WEBSITES, APPLICATIONS, AND DIGITAL SERVICES
Accounting of Disclosures
Personally Identifiable Information Quality Management
Data Governance Body
Data Integrity Board
Minimization of Personally Identifiable Information Usedin Testing, Training, and ResearchComplaint Management
Privacy Reporting
Risk Framing
Risk Management Program Leadership Roles
Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy
SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL OR MISSION-ESSENTIAL ITEMS
Continuous Monitoring Strategy
PurposingO

ASSURANCE

O
O
O
O

√

O

O
O

√
√

O
O

√

O
O

√

O
O

√
√
√

O
O
O
O

√

O
O
O
O

√
√
√

O
O
O
O

√

O
O
O

√
√

O
O

√

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PS-1
PS-2
PS-3
PS-3(1)
PS-3(2)PS-3(3)PS-3(4)PS-4
PS-4(1)
PS-4(2)
PS-5
PS-6
PS-6(1)
PS-6(2)PS-6(3)
PS-7
PS-8
PS-9

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Position Risk Designation
Personnel ScreeningO√

CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONOFORMAL INDOCTRINATIONOINFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURESO

CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS

O

Personnel Termination
POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTSO

AUTOMATED ACTIONSOPersonnel Transfer
Access Agreements

O

CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

O
O

O

O

√

W: Incorporated into PS-3.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTIONOPOST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTSO

External Personnel Security
Personnel Sanctions
Position Descriptions

O

√
√
√

O
O

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PT-1
PT-2
PT-2(1)
PT-2(2)
PT-3
PT-3(1)
PT-3(2)
PT-4
PT-4(1)
PT-4(2)
PT-4(3)
PT-5
PT-5(1)
PT-5(2)
PT-6
PT-6(1)
PT-6(2)
PT-7
PT-7(1)
PT-7(2)
PT-8

APPENDIX CCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Authority to Process Personally Identifiable Information

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

O

√
√
√
√

O

DATA TAGGINGSAUTOMATIONO

Personally Identifiable Information Processing Purposes

O

DATA TAGGINGSAUTOMATIONO

Consent

O

TAILORED CONSENTOJUST-IN-TIME CONSENTOREVOCATIONOPrivacy Notice
JUST-IN-TIME NOTICEOPRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS

O

System of Records NoticeO

ROUTINE USESOEXEMPTION RULES

O

Specific Categories of Personally Identifiable InformationO

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERSO

FIRST AMENDMENT INFORMATIONO

Computer Matching Requirements

O

√
√

O

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RA-1
RA-2
RA-2(1)
RA-3
RA-3(1)
RA-3(2)RA-3(3)RA-3(4)RA-4
RA-5
RA-5(1)RA-5(2)RA-5(3)RA-5(4)RA-5(5)RA-5(6)
RA-5(7)

CONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Security Categorization
IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION
Risk AssessmentO√

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ASSESSMENTOUSE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCEO

DYNAMIC THREAT AWARENESSOCONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

PREDICTIVE CYBER ANALYTICS

O
O
O

O

Risk Assessment Update
Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning

W: Incorporated into RA-3.

UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY

W: Incorporated into RA-5.

O

UPDATE VULNERABILITIES TO BE SCANNEDO

BREADTH AND DEPTH OF COVERAGEO

DISCOVERABLE INFORMATIONOPRIVILEGED ACCESSOAUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES
AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into CM-8.

COMPONENTS

RA-5(8)RA-5(9)RA-5(10)RA-5(11)
RA-6
RA-7
RA-8
RA-9
RA-10

APPENDIX CREVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGSPENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSESO√

W: Incorporated into CA-8.

CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATIONO

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PROGRAMOTechnical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey
Risk Response
Privacy Impact Assessments
Criticality Analysis
Threat Hunting

O
O
O

√
√
√
√
√

O
O /S

√

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SA-1
SA-2
SA-3
SA-3(1)
SA-3(2)
SA-3(3)
SA-4
SA-4(1)
SA-4(2)
SA-4(3)SA-4(4)SA-4(5)
SA-4(6)
SA-4(7)
SA-4(8)
SA-4(9)SA-4(10)
SA-4(11)
SA-4(12)
SA-5
SA-5(1)
SA-5(2)
SA-5(3)SA-5(4)SA-5(5)
SA-6
SA-7
SA-8
SA-8(1)
SA-8(2)
SA-8(3)SA-8(4)SA-8(5)
SA-8(6)
SA-8(7)
SA-8(8)
SA-8(9)SA-8(10)
SA-8(11)
SA-8(12)
SA-8(13)
SA-8(14)APPENDIX CCONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Allocation of Resources
System Development Life Cycle

O

MANAGE PREPRODUCTION ENVIRONMENTOUSE OF LIVE OR OPERATIONAL DATAOTECHNOLOGY REFRESH

O

Acquisition ProcessO

FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF CONTROLSODESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR CONTROLSODEVELOPMENT METHODS, TECHNIQUES, AND PRACTICES

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAMEASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMSOOW: Incorporated into CM-8(9).

SYSTEM, COMPONENT, AND SERVICE CONFIGURATIONSOUSE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS

O

NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILESOCONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN FOR CONTROLSOFUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES IN USEOUSE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTSOSYSTEM OF RECORDSODATA OWNERSHIPO

System Documentation

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLSW: Incorporated into SA-4(1).

SECURITY-RELEVANT EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES

W: Incorporated into SA-4(2).

HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN

W: Incorporated into SA-4(2).

LOW-LEVEL DESIGN

W: Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SOURCE CODE

W: Incorporated into SA-4(2).

Software Usage Restrictions
User-Installed Software
Security and Privacy Engineering Principles

W: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7.
W: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7.
O

CLEAR ABSTRACTIONSO /SLEAST COMMON MECHANISM

O /SMODULARITY AND LAYERINGO /SPARTIALLY ORDERED DEPENDENCIESO /SEFFICIENTLY MEDIATED ACCESSO /SMINIMIZED SHARINGO /S

REDUCED COMPLEXITYO /S

SECURE EVOLVABILITYO /S

TRUSTED COMPONENTS

O /SHIERARCHICAL TRUSTO /SINVERSE MODIFICATION THRESHOLDO /SHIERARCHICAL PROTECTIONO /SMINIMIZED SECURITY ELEMENTS

O /S

LEAST PRIVILEGE

O /S

√
√
√
√
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√
√
√
√
√
√
√
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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

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IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

SA-8(15)
SA-8(16)
SA-8(17)
SA-8(18)
SA-8(19)
SA-8(20)
SA-8(21)
SA-8(22)
SA-8(23)
SA-8(24)
SA-8(25)

PREDICATE PERMISSIONO /S

SELF-RELIANT TRUSTWORTHINESSO /SSECURE DISTRIBUTED COMPOSITIONO /S

TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELSO /SCONTINUOUS PROTECTION

O /S

SECURE METADATA MANAGEMENTO /S

SELF-ANALYSISO /SACCOUNTABILITY AND TRACEABILITYO /S

SECURE DEFAULTS

O /S

SECURE FAILURE AND RECOVERYO /SECONOMIC SECURITY

O /S

SA-8(26)
SA-8(27)
SA-8(28)
SA-8(29)
SA-8(30)
SA-8(31)
SA-8(32)
SA-8(33)
SA-9
SA-9(1)
SA-9(2)
SA-9(3)SA-9(4)SA-9(5)
SA-9(6)
SA-9(7)
SA-9(8)
SA-10
SA-10(1)SA-10(2)
SA-10(3)
SA-10(4)SA-10(5)
SA-10(6)
SA-10(7)
SA-11
SA-11(1)
SA-11(2)
SA-11(3)
SA-11(4)
SA-11(5)
SA-11(6)PERFORMANCE SECURITYO /S

HUMAN FACTORED SECURITYO /S

ACCEPTABLE SECURITYO /S

REPEATABLE AND DOCUMENTED PROCEDURESO /SPROCEDURAL RIGORO /SSECURE SYSTEM MODIFICATIONO /SSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATIONO /SMINIMIZATIONO /SExternal System Services

O

RISK ASSESSMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALSOIDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICESOESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERSOCONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERSO

PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATIONOORGANIZATION-CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYSOORGANIZATION-CONTROLLED INTEGRITY CHECKINGOPROCESSING AND STORAGE LOCATION — U.S. JURISDICTIONO

Developer Configuration Management

O

SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONOALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSESOHARDWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONO

TRUSTED GENERATIONOMAPPING INTEGRITY FOR VERSION CONTROLO

TRUSTED DISTRIBUTIONOSECURITY AND PRIVACY REPRESENTATIVESO

Developer Testing and EvaluationO

STATIC CODE ANALYSISO

THREAT MODELING AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSESOINDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS AND EVIDENCEOMANUAL CODE REVIEWSOPENETRATION TESTINGOATTACK SURFACE REVIEWSOAPPENDIX C

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE√√√This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SA-11(7)
SA-11(8)
SA-11(9)
SA-12
SA-12(1)SA-12(2)
SA-12(3)
SA-12(4)SA-12(5)SA-12(6)
SA-12(7)VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING AND EVALUATIONODYNAMIC CODE ANALYSISOINTERACTIVE APPLICATION SECURITY TESTINGO

SA-12(8)SA-12(9)SA-12(10)
SA-12(11)Supply Chain Protection
ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND METHODS

W: Moved to SR Family.

SUPPLIER REVIEWS

W: Moved to SR-6.

TRUSTED SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING

W: Incorporated into SR-3.

DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS

W: Moved to SR-3(1).

LIMITATION OF HARM

W: Moved to SR-3(2).

MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME

W: Incorporated into SR-5(1).

ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE

W: Moved to SR-5(2).

USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

W: Incorporated into RA-3(2).

OPERATIONS SECURITY

W: Moved to SR-7.

VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED

W: Moved to SR-4(3).

PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND

W: Moved to SR-6(1).

W: Moved to SR-5.

ACTORS

SA-12(12)SA-12(13)
SA-12(14)
SA-12(15)
SA-13
SA-14
SA-14(1)
SA-15
SA-15(1)SA-15(2)
SA-15(3)
SA-15(4)SA-15(5)
SA-15(6)
SA-15(7)SA-15(8)SA-15(9)SA-15(10)
SA-15(11)SA-15(12)
SA-16
SA-17
SA-17(1)
SA-17(2)
SA-17(3)
SA-17(4)
SA-17(5)APPENDIX CINTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS

W: Moved to SR-8.

CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

W: Incorporated into MA-6 and RA-9.

IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITY

W: Moved to SR-4(1) and SR-4(2).

PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

W: Incorporated into SR-3.

TrustworthinessCriticality Analysis

W: Incorporated into SA-8.

CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCING

W: Incorporated into SA-20.

W: Incorporated into RA-9.

Development Process, Standards, and Tools

O

QUALITY METRICSOSECURITY AND PRIVACY TRACKING TOOLSOCRITICALITY ANALYSISTHREAT MODELING AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSISO

W: Incorporated into SA-11(2).

ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTIONOCONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENTOAUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSISO

REUSE OF THREAT AND VULNERABILITY INFORMATIONUSE OF LIVE DATA

√
√
√
√

O

√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into SA-3(2).

INCIDENT RESPONSE PLANO

ARCHIVE SYSTEM OR COMPONENTOMINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONO

Developer-Provided Training
Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design

O

FORMAL POLICY MODELOSECURITY-RELEVANT COMPONENTSOFORMAL CORRESPONDENCEO

INFORMAL CORRESPONDENCEO

CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN

O

O

√
√
√
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√
√
√
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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE√√√√This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SA-17(6)
SA-17(7)
SA-17(8)
SA-17(9)SA-18
SA-18(1)
SA-18(2)
SA-19
SA-19(1)
SA-19(2)
SA-19(3)

STRUCTURE FOR TESTINGOSTRUCTURE FOR LEAST PRIVILEGEO

ORCHESTRATIONO

SA-19(4)
SA-20
SA-21
SA-21(1)
SA-22
SA-22(1)
SA-23

APPENDIX CDESIGN DIVERSITYO

Tamper Resistance and Detection

W: Moved to SR-9.

MULTIPLE PHASES OF SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

W: Moved to SR-9(1).

INSPECTION OF SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS

W: Moved to SR-10.

Component Authenticity
ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING

W: Moved to SR-11.

CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE AND REPAIR

W: Moved to SR-11(2).

COMPONENT DISPOSAL

W: Moved to SR-12.

ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING

W: Moved to SR-11(3).

Customized Development of Critical Components
Developer Screening
VALIDATION OF SCREENING

Unsupported System Components
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORTSpecialization

W: Moved to SR-11(1).

O
O

√
√

W: Incorporated into SA-21.
O√

W: Incorporated into SA-22.
O√

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SC-1
SC-2
SC-2(1)
SC-2(2)
SC-3
SC-3(1)
SC-3(2)SC-3(3)SC-3(4)SC-3(5)SC-4
SC-4(1)
SC-4(2)
SC-5
SC-5(1)
SC-5(2)SC-5(3)SC-6
SC-7
SC-7(1)SC-7(2)SC-7(3)SC-7(4)SC-7(5)SC-7(6)SC-7(7)SC-7(8)SC-7(9)SC-7(10)SC-7(11)SC-7(12)SC-7(13)

CONTROL NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

Policy and Procedures
Separation of System and User Functionality
INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERSODISASSOCIABILITYS

Security Function IsolationS

HARDWARE SEPARATIONSACCESS AND FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONSSMINIMIZE NONSECURITY FUNCTIONALITY

O /S

MODULE COUPLING AND COHESIVENESSO /SLAYERED STRUCTURES

O /S

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Information in Shared System Resources
SECURITY LEVELSSSSW: Incorporated into SC-4.

MULTILEVEL OR PERIODS PROCESSINGS

Denial-of-Service Protection

S

RESTRICT ABILITY TO ATTACK OTHER SYSTEMSSCAPACITY, BANDWIDTH, AND REDUNDANCYS

DETECTION AND MONITORINGS

Resource Availability
Boundary ProtectionS
S

PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS

W: Incorporated into SC-7.

PUBLIC ACCESS

W: Incorporated into SC-7.

ACCESS POINTSSEXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICESO

DENY BY DEFAULT — ALLOW BY EXCEPTIONRESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES√S

W: Incorporated into SC-7(18).

SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE DEVICESS

ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERSSRESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFICSPREVENT EXFILTRATIONSRESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFICSHOST-BASED PROTECTIONSISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS, MECHANISMS, AND SUPPORTSCOMPONENTS

SC-7(14)SC-7(15)
SC-7(16)
SC-7(17)
SC-7(18)
SC-7(19)

PROTECT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONSSNETWORKED PRIVILEGED ACCESSESSPREVENT DISCOVERY OF SYSTEM COMPONENTSS

AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL FORMATS

S

FAIL SECURESBLOCK COMMUNICATION FROM NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGURED

S

√

HOSTS

SC-7(20)
SC-7(21)

APPENDIX CDYNAMIC ISOLATION AND SEGREGATIONSISOLATION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS

O /S

√

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAME

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IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

SC-7(22)
SC-7(23)
SC-7(24)
SC-7(25)
SC-7(26)
SC-7(27)
SC-7(28)
SC-7(29)
SC-8
SC-8(1)
SC-8(2)

SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINSS√DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURESPERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATIONO /S

UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONSOCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONSOUNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONSOCONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKSOSEPARATE SUBNETS TO ISOLATE FUNCTIONSSTransmission Confidentiality and Integrity

S

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

S

PRE- AND POST-TRANSMISSION HANDLINGS

SC-8(3)SC-8(4)SC-8(5)
SC-9
SC-10
SC-11
SC-11(1)
SC-12
SC-12(1)SC-12(2)SC-12(3)SC-12(4)SC-12(5)SC-12(6)SC-13
SC-13(1)SC-13(2)SC-13(3)SC-13(4)SC-14

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALSSCONCEAL OR RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

S

SC-15
SC-15(1)SC-15(2)SC-15(3)SC-15(4)SC-16
SC-16(1)SC-16(2)Collaborative Computing Devices and Applications

SC-16(3)
SC-17
SC-18
SC-18(1)APPENDIX CPROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Transmission Confidentiality
Network Disconnect
Trusted PathS

W: Incorporated into SC-8.
SS

IRREFUTABLE COMMUNICATIONS PATH

S

Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management

O /S

AVAILABILITYO /S

SYMMETRIC KEYS

O /S

ASYMMETRIC KEYSO /S

PKI CERTIFICATES

W: Incorporated into SC-12(3).

PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS

W: Incorporated into SC-12(3).

PHYSICAL CONTROL OF KEYS

√
√

O /S

Cryptographic Protection
FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY
NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY

W: Incorporated into SC-13.

INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL ACCESS APPROVALS

W: Incorporated into SC-13.

DIGITAL SIGNATURES

W: Incorporated into SC-13.

Public Access Protections

W: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, SI3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, and SI-10.

PHYSICAL OR LOGICAL DISCONNECT
BLOCKING INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFICS

W: Incorporated into SC-13.

S
S

W: Incorporated into SC-7.

DISABLING AND REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREASO

EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

S

Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes

S

INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONSANTI-SPOOFING MECHANISMSSCRYPTOGRAPHIC BINDING

S

Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
Mobile CodeO /SIDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONSSOPAGE 459

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

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SC-18(2)SC-18(3)SC-18(4)SC-18(5)SC-19

ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT, AND USEOPREVENT DOWNLOADING AND EXECUTIONSPREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION

S

SC-20

Secure Name/Address Resolution Service(Authoritative Source)

SC-20(1)SC-20(2)
SC-21

CHILD SUBSPACES

SC-21(1)SC-22

DATA ORIGIN AND INTEGRITY

SC-23
SC-23(1)SC-23(2)SC-23(3)SC-23(4)SC-23(5)
SC-24
SC-25
SC-26
SC-26(1)
SC-27
SC-28
SC-28(1)SC-28(2)SC-28(3)SC-29
SC-29(1)SC-30
SC-30(1)SC-30(2)SC-30(3)SC-30(4)SC-30(5)SC-31
SC-31(1)SC-31(2)SC-31(3)SC-32
SC-32(1)APPENDIX CALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS

Voice over Internet Protocol

S

W: Technology-specific; addressed as anyother technology or protocol.
S

W: Incorporated into SC-20.

DATA ORIGIN AND INTEGRITYS

Secure Name/Address Resolution Service(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

S

Architecture and Provisioning for
Name/Address Resolution Service
Session Authenticity
INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT
USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS AND MESSAGE DISPLAYSUNIQUE SYSTEM-GENERATED SESSION IDENTIFIERSUNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION

W: Incorporated into SC-21.
SS
S

W: Incorporated into AC-12(1).
S

W: Incorporated into SC-23(3).

ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIESSFail in Known State
Thin Nodes
DecoysS

DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE

Platform-Independent Applications
Protection of Information at Rest√

SS

W: Incorporated into SC-35.
S
S

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONSOFFLINE STORAGEOCRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS

O /S

HeterogeneityO

VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUESO

Concealment and MisdirectionO

VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUESASSURANCE√√√

W: Incorporated into SC-29(1).

RANDOMNESSOCHANGE PROCESSING AND STORAGE LOCATIONSOMISLEADING INFORMATIONOCONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS

O

Covert Channel Analysis

O

TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOR EXPLOITABILITYOMAXIMUM BANDWIDTHOMEASURE BANDWIDTH IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

O

System Partitioning

O /S

SEPARATE PHYSICAL DOMAINS FOR PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

O /S

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
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SC-33
SC-34
SC-34(1)SC-34(2)SC-34(3)
SC-35
SC-36
SC-36(1)SC-36(2)SC-37
SC-37(1)Transmission Preparation Integrity
Non-Modifiable Executable Programs

SC-38
SC-39
SC-39(1)SC-39(2)SC-40
SC-40(1)SC-40(2)SC-40(3)SC-40(4)
SC-41
SC-42
SC-42(1)SC-42(2)SC-42(3)SC-42(4)SC-42(5)
SC-43
SC-44
SC-45
SC-45(1)SC-45(2)
SC-46
SC-47
SC-48
SC-48(1)
SC-49
SC-50
SC-51

APPENDIX CNO WRITABLE STORAGE
INTEGRITY PROTECTION AND READ-ONLY MEDIA
HARDWARE-BASED PROTECTION

IMPLEMENTED
BY
W: Incorporated into SC-8.
S
O
O

O

POLLING TECHNIQUESOSYNCHRONIZATIONO

Out-of-Band Channels

O

ENSURE DELIVERY AND TRANSMISSIONO

Operations Security
Process IsolationO

HARDWARE SEPARATIONSSEPARATE EXECUTION DOMAIN PER THREAD

S

Wireless Link Protection

S

ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCESREDUCE DETECTION POTENTIALSIMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

S

S

S

SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATIONSPort and I/O Device AccessSensor Capability and DataO /SREPORTING TO AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS OR ROLESOPROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES√√√

W: Moved to SC-51.

External Malicious Code Identification
Distributed Processing and Storage

AUTHORIZED USE

ASSURANCE

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

S
O

W: Incorporated into SC-42.

NOTICE OF COLLECTIONOCOLLECTION MINIMIZATIONOUsage Restrictions
Detonation Chambers
System Time Synchronization

O /S

SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCESSECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCES

Cross Domain Policy Enforcement
Alternate Communications Paths
Sensor Relocation

O /S

DYNAMIC RELOCATION OF SENSORS OR MONITORING CAPABILITIESO /SHardware-Enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
Software-Enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
Hardware-Based Protection

O /S

S
S

S
O /S

O /S
O /S

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√
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SI-1
SI-2
SI-2(1)
SI-2(2)SI-2(3)

CONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Flaw Remediation
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCEO√O

W: Incorporated into PL-9.

AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUSOTIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS AND BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVEOACTIONSThis publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

SI-2(4)SI-2(5)SI-2(6)
SI-3
SI-3(1)
SI-3(2)SI-3(3)SI-3(4)SI-3(5)SI-3(6)SI-3(7)SI-3(8)SI-3(9)SI-3(10)SI-4
SI-4(1)SI-4(2)SI-4(3)SI-4(4)SI-4(5)SI-4(6)SI-4(7)SI-4(8)SI-4(9)SI-4(10)SI-4(11)SI-4(12)SI-4(13)SI-4(14)SI-4(15)
SI-4(16)
SI-4(17)
SI-4(18)
SI-4(19)
SI-4(20)
SI-4(21)

APPENDIX C

AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLSO /SAUTOMATIC SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE UPDATESO /SREMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE

O /S

Malicious Code Protection

O /S

CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

W: Incorporated into PL-9.

AUTOMATIC UPDATESW: Incorporated into SI-3.

NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

W: Incorporated into AC-6(10).

UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED USERSPORTABLE STORAGE DEVICESTESTING AND VERIFICATIONNONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

O /S

W: Incorporated into MP-7.
O

W: Incorporated into SI-3.

DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDSSAUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

W: Moved to AC-17(10).

MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSISO

System Monitoring
SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMO /S

AUTOMATED TOOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSISS

AUTOMATED TOOL AND MECHANISM INTEGRATIONSINBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFICSSYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS
RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS
AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTSPROTECTION OF MONITORING INFORMATIONTESTING OF MONITORING TOOLS AND MECHANISMS

O /S

S

√
√
√
√
√
√

W: Incorporated into AC-6(10).
S√

W: Incorporated into SI-4.
O

VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONSOANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC ANOMALIESO /SAUTOMATED ORGANIZATION-GENERATED ALERTS

O /S

ANALYZE TRAFFIC AND EVENT PATTERNSO /SWIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTIONSWIRELESS TO WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONSSCORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATIONO /S

INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL AWARENESSOANALYZE TRAFFIC AND COVERT EXFILTRATIONO /SRISK FOR INDIVIDUALSOPRIVILEGED USERSSPROBATIONARY PERIODS

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
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IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

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SI-4(22)SI-4(23)
SI-4(24)
SI-4(25)
SI-5
SI-5(1)
SI-6
SI-6(1)SI-6(2)SI-6(3)
SI-7

UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK SERVICESS

HOST-BASED DEVICESOINDICATORS OF COMPROMISESOPTIMIZE NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSISS

Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives

O

AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIESOSecurity and Privacy Function Verification
NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTSS

W: Incorporated into SI-6.

AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTED TESTINGSREPORT VERIFICATION RESULTSO

Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity

O /S

√

SI-7(1)SI-7(2)SI-7(3)SI-7(4)SI-7(5)SI-7(6)
SI-7(7)
SI-7(8)SI-7(9)SI-7(10)SI-7(11)SI-7(12)SI-7(13)
SI-7(14)SI-7(15)
SI-7(16)
SI-7(17)
SI-8
SI-8(1)SI-8(2)SI-8(3)
SI-9

INTEGRITY CHECKSSAUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

S

√
√
√

SI-10
SI-10(1)SI-10(2)SI-10(3)SI-10(4)SI-10(5)Information Input ValidationS

MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY

O /S

SI-10(6)
SI-11
SI-12
SI-12(1)APPENDIX CCENTRALLY MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLSTAMPER-EVIDENT PACKAGING
AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONSO

W: Incorporated into SR-9.
S

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONS

INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSEO

AUDITING CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTSSVERIFY BOOT PROCESSSPROTECTION OF BOOT FIRMWARECONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGESINTEGRITY VERIFICATIONS

W: Moved to CM-7(6).
O /S

CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

W: Moved to CM-7(7).

BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

W: Moved to CM-7(8).

CODE AUTHENTICATIONSTIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISIONORUNTIME APPLICATION SELF-PROTECTION

O /SSpam Protection
CENTRAL MANAGEMENTAUTOMATIC UPDATESCONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY

Information Input Restrictions

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

O

W: Incorporated into PL-9.
S
S

W: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, and
AC-6.

REVIEW AND RESOLVE ERRORSOPREDICTABLE BEHAVIORO /S

TIMING INTERACTIONSSRESTRICT INPUTS TO TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

S

√
√
√
√
√
√

INJECTION PREVENTIONS√

Error Handling
Information Management and Retention

O

LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTSOSPAGE 463

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CONTROLNUMBERCONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

IMPLEMENTED
BY

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SI-12(2)MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING,O

SI-12(3)SI-13
SI-13(1)SI-13(2)SI-13(3)SI-13(4)SI-13(5)SI-14
SI-14(1)SI-14(2)SI-14(3)
SI-15
SI-16
SI-17
SI-18
SI-18(1)
SI-18(2)
SI-18(3)SI-18(4)SI-18(5)SI-19
SI-19(1)
SI-19(2)SI-19(3)SI-19(4)

INFORMATION DISPOSAL

O

Predictable Failure Prevention

O

TRAINING, AND RESEARCH

TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIESTIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

ASSURANCEO√√

W: Incorporated into SI-7(16).

MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTSOSTANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION AND NOTIFICATIONO /SFAILOVER CAPABILITYO

Non-Persistence

O

REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCESO

NON-PERSISTENT INFORMATIONONON-PERSISTENT CONNECTIVITYO

Information Output Filtering
Memory Protection
Fail-Safe Procedures
Personally Identifiable Information Quality Operations

S

O /S

AUTOMATION SUPPORTO /SDATA TAGSO /SCOLLECTIONO /S

INDIVIDUAL REQUESTSO /SNOTICE OF CORRECTION OR DELETION

O /S

De-Identification

O /S

COLLECTION

O /S

ARCHIVING

O /S

RELEASEO /S

REMOVAL, MASKING, ENCRYPTION, HASHING, OR REPLACEMENT OF

S

S
S

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

DIRECT IDENTIFIERS

SI-19(5)SI-19(6)SI-19(7)SI-19(8)
SI-20
SI-21
SI-22
SI-23

APPENDIX CSTATISTICAL DISCLOSURE CONTROLO /SDIFFERENTIAL PRIVACYO /SVALIDATED ALGORITHMS AND SOFTWAREO

MOTIVATED INTRUDERO /STainting
Information Refresh
Information Diversity
Information Fragmentation

O /S
O /S
O /S
O /S

√
√
√
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SR-1
SR-2
SR-2(1)
SR-3
SR-3(1)SR-3(2)SR-3(3)SR-4
SR-4(1)SR-4(2)SR-4(3)SR-4(4)SR-5
SR-5(1)SR-5(2)

CONTROL NAMECONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME

Policy and Procedures
Supply Chain Risk Management Plan

IMPLEMENTED
BY

ASSURANCE

O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

O

ESTABLISH SCRM TEAMO

Supply Chain Controls and Processes

O /S

DIVERSE SUPPLY BASEO

LIMITATION OF HARMO

SUB-TIER FLOW DOWN

O

ProvenanceO

IDENTITYO

TRACK AND TRACEOVALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTEREDO

SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY — PEDIGREE

O

Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods

O

ADEQUATE SUPPLYOASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION, ACCEPTANCE, MODIFICATION, ORO

UPDATE

SR-6
SR-6(1)
SR-7
SR-8
SR-9
SR-9(1)
SR-10
SR-11
SR-11(1)SR-11(2)SR-11(3)SR-12APPENDIX C

Supplier Assessments and Reviews

O

TESTING AND ANALYSISO

Supply Chain Operations Security
Notification Agreements
Tamper Resistance and DetectionO

MULTIPLE STAGES OF SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

O

Inspection of Systems or Components
Component Authenticity
ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAININGOCONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE AND REPAIRO

ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNINGO

Component Disposal

O

O
O

O
O

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
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