Bad Reputation
Suspected Russian Actors Leverage Alternative Tech Platforms in
Continued Effort to Covertly Influence Right-Wing U.S. Audiences
Graphika and The Stanford Internet Observatory

Executive Summary
Suspected Russian actors have leveraged alternative social media platforms to target right-wing
U.S. audiences with divisive political narratives to a greater extent than previously known. This
report describes ongoing activity by a set of 35 newly-discovered and previously-attributed
inauthentic accounts on Gab, Gettr, Parler, and Truth Social, building on previous foreign influence
operations (IO) likely conducted by the same actors since at least 2020.
The content and behaviors closely mirror those of earlier operations. The actors created a
network of fake personas on platforms popular with right-wing communities, which act in acoordinated manner to spread political messages. These include narratives common within thesecommunities, such as allegations of voter fraud in the 2020 U.S. presidential election and 2022
midterms, as well as attempts to undermine public support for Ukraine in the context of theRussia-Ukraine war.
Based on the technical, behavioral, and content indicators detailed in this report, we assess withhigh confidence that this activity is linked to the actors behind the Newsroom for American andEuropean Based Citizens (NAEBC), a fake right-wing news outlet that targeted U.S. audiences
ahead of the 2020 presidential election. NAEBC has been attributed by Meta to individuals
associated with past activity of Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA), an assessment
reportedly shared by U.S. law enforcement.
The newly-identified activity illustrates the extent to which suspected Russian actors are able toleverage social media platforms that lack robust policies on foreign IO. Some of the accounts inthis network were first exposed in 2020, again in 2021, and most recently ahead of the 2022 U.S.
midterms. Due to an apparent lack of enforcement, the actors have established a degree of
persistence unavailable on most mainstream platforms and are able to conduct their operations
with relative ease.
Our analysis of the fake personas’ follower network shows they largely operated in an echochamber of highly-dense overlapping follower relationships on fringe platforms. However, the1

operation also experienced moments of significant “break out,” when content created by theactors was amplified organically to large audiences on mainstream social media platforms.
On June 15, 2022, for example, Donald Trump Jr. shared a screenshot with his 6.1 million
Instagram followers of a post by a Gettr account in the operation that purported to be a fan pagefor musician Kid Rock. Screenshots of another post by the same Gettr account criticizing
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy were also widely shared on Facebook, Instagram, andTwitter in October 2022, prompting Reuters news agency to release a fact check.
Lastly, we assess the actors engaged in a deliberate effort to capitalize on public concerns about
foreign interference in U.S. elections - a recurring IRA tactic known as “perception hacking.”
Following media reporting on a part of this network’s activity ahead of the U.S. midterms, which
included naming some of the operation’s personas, multiple assets “outed” themselves as“Russian trolls” and sarcastically apologized for “being too aggressive with our political stance.” At
the same time, Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin - who U.S. prosecutors say has funded
and directed IRA operations since at least 2014 - claimed, without citing any evidence, to be
successfully interfering in the U.S. midterms.
This report aims to provide a fact-based analysis of the tactics, techniques, and procedures
employed by these actors, the reach those afforded them, and the limitations they faced. We hope
this and other reports we publish on similar activity will provide the foundation for an informed
discussion about the realities of online influence operations, rather than relying on unverified
claims by the threat actors themselves.

Actors & Attribution
Based on the technical, behavioral, and content indicators detailed below, we assess with highconfidence that the activity discussed in this report is linked to the actors behind the Newsroom
for American and European Based Citizens (NAEBC), an operation Meta previously attributed toindividuals associated with past activity of the IRA. These indicators include:●●●●

Repurposing accounts that previously posed as staff and editors at NAEBC
Sharing identical content in close coordination with accounts previously attributed to
NAEBC, including unique content that has been publicly connected to IRA-linked actors
Activity indicating the accounts’ operators viewed social media platforms in Russian
Repeated English-language errors typical of non-native speakers

We also observed multiple network assets engaging with Gab, Gettr, and Parler accounts thatused the same name, profile picture, and bio as a persona identified by the Atlantic Council’s
Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) in 2020. The DFRLab report analyzed this persona as partof a “coordinated inauthentic behavior” network focused on the U.S. that Meta suspended inAugust 2020 and attributed to unknown actors in Romania. While we have previously analyzed

2IRA-linked operations that claimed to operate from Romania during the same time period, we do
not currently have sufficient open-source information to assess the nature of the connection – if
any – between the 2020 network and the activity discussed in this report.

American Bad Ass?
Three of the most influential assets in the network purport to be fan pages for American
singer-songwriter Robert James Ritchie, better known by his stage name, Kid Rock. The accounts
are active on Gab, Gettr, and Truth Social, where they all use near-identical bios, the same profile
picture, and matching cover photos. All three assets repeatedly post identical content withinminutes and sometimes seconds of each other, strongly suggesting they are operated by thesame actors. On Dec. 8, 2022, for instance, each of the three accounts posted the exact samecontent five times. On each occasion, the posts occurred in the space of one minute across all
three platforms.
These accounts provide a high-confidence connection between the newly-identified assets andthe 2020 NAEBC operation. Until late October 2022, the “Kid Rock” account on Gab operated as
the NAEBC persona “Niels Holst,” who claimed to be an editor at the fake media outlet based in
Amsterdam. Our assessment that a previously-attributed NAEBC account was repurposed in thisway is supported by a comparison of posts by the account from April 2021. Archived versions ofa post from April 2021 show the account operating as “Niels Holst,” while the same post viewed
today shows the Kid Rock fan page persona. Importantly, Gab’s unique data-ids and matchingtimestamps prove it is the same post by the same asset, not two different accounts. Commentson posts by the account in October and November 2021, which now display as coming from theKid Rock fan page, also reference the handle of the defunct Niels Holst persona.

Screenshots of accounts in the network using fake Kid Rock fan page personas on Gettr (left) and Gab (right)3

Screenshots showing the unique data-id of an April 14, 2021, post by the same Gab account, as viewed on Dec. 8, 2022
(top), and April 19, 2021 (bottom).

Perhaps due to concerns about being suspended for false impersonation, the operators state in
the bios of all three accounts that they are “fan pages” and use the “parody” account label on Gab.
However, the account handles - which, unlike bios, appear in users' timelines – use variations of
the word “official.” This deception appears to have worked and after screenshots of a post by the“Kid Rock” Gettr account achieved widespread engagement across Twitter, Facebook, andInstagram in October this year, Reuters news agency released a fact check debunking claims thatthe post was from the real Kid Rock.

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Screenshots of a separate post by the Gettr account were also amplified by influential figures on
the American right, including conspiracy theorist and raw food advocate David “Avocado” Wolfe(10.5k retweets) and Donald Trump Jr., who shared the screenshot to his 6.1 million Instagram
followers in June (222k likes). This widespread engagement and celebrity amplification represent
a category five incident on Ben Nimmo’s breakout scale, a framework for assessing the reach andimpact of online influence operations.
Interestingly, this is not the first time IRA-linked actors have attempted to tap into a readymade
audience of Kid Rock fans: In 2018, DFRLab reported on an operation it said was run by the IRA
and included a Kid Rock fan page on Instagram.

Donald Trump Jr. posted a screenshot of a post by the “Kid Rock” Gettr account to his Instagram profile in June 2022

Telltale Toilet Paper
Assets in the network repeatedly share identical content in a coordinated manner, including withaccounts previously attributed to NAEBC. While content sharing on its own never amounts to astrong attribution signal, in this case we observed a consistent pattern of behavior with accounts
posting identical images, links, text, and videos, sometimes within minutes and seconds of eachother - a behavioral signal that was supported by multiple other indicators in our assessment.
Frequently, this coordinated posting promoted unique content that has been publicly connected to
IRA-linked actors. At least nine assets in the set, for instance, shared distinctive political cartoons
bearing the artist signature “Schmitz” - a hallmark of IRA-linked operations targeting the U.S. since52021. Other examples include repeatedly posting links to electiontruth[.]net, which analysts at
Recorded Future told the New York Times in November 2022 was “almost certainly” linked to
Russian IO efforts, and the “Foundation to Battle Injustice” [Фонда Борьбы с Репрессиями] - a
self-proclaimed human rights organization that says it was “founded with the assistance ofRussian entrepreneur Yevgeny Prigozhin.”
Additionally, on April 14, 2021, four accounts in the network posted the same set of photos inrapid succession over a period of 23 minutes, showing a man on Times Square in New York City
handing out rolls of toilet paper printed with the face of President Joe Biden. The photos show thesame incident from different angles, documenting a real-world event from April 8, 2021, that
Graphika has assessed may have been orchestrated by the actors. The four accounts included
two that previously posed as NAEBC staff and two newly-identified personas.

A post by a newly-identified persona in the network sharing photos from the April 8, 2021, “toilet paper incident”

Language Lapses
Notably, a large amount of content shared by assets in the network consists of text copied fromother social media users without attribution, possibly in an effort to avoid making
English-language mistakes. Supporting this hypothesis, posts that do appear to be originalcontent created by the actors often included grammatical errors common among native Russian
speakers, such as incorrect use of definite and indefinite articles. In May 2021, for example, anaccount in the network that presents itself as a supporter of U.S. far-right militias posted: “Fakenews media is unbearable. America under Democrats is on it's [sic] way to a [sic] ruin.” In May
2022, another account posted a cartoon criticizing EU limits on Russian oil imports with thecomment: “This is how partial embargo looks like [sic].”

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In one instance, we also saw a network asset post a Twitter screenshot to Gettr in which Twitter’s
automatic translation prompt is visible in Russian under the English text. This display suggests
the user is browsing Twitter in Russian or using an operating system set to Russian.

A tweet screenshot posted by a Gettr account in the network shows the Twitter auto-translate option in
Russian under the English text

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Network Overview
The operation discussed in this report revolves around a core group of 19 Gab and 10 Gettr
accounts. We analyzed the follower and following networks of these accounts in order tounderstand the key structural characteristics of the audience the actors cultivated on those
platforms. For each network, we describe the audience’s size, average followership of the assets,
and the degree of reciprocal relationships at varying levels of connectedness.
Our investigation of the operation’s activity on Gab identified a primary network of 19 accounts five accounts previously attributed to NAEBC and 14 additional accounts that display
near-identical posting patterns, content promotion, and highly correlated network behavior.
While a simple tally of the assets’ follower counts at the time of investigation totaled just over 93k,
the actual size of the network’s entire audience is considerably smaller, coming in at just over 33k
unique accounts connected by around 195,000 links (arcs). On average, each asset has around 5k
followers but follows just under 10k accounts, nearing the Gab-imposed limit for non-pro users.
This suggests the actors may engage in the practice of mass following - topping out near theplatform-imposed limit – in order to elicit “follow backs” from other Gab users.
Our network analysis shows the operation has cultivated a core group of thousands ofinterlocking following relationships on Gab, building an audience of largely authentic users. About
15,200 users follow two or more actor-linked accounts, 5,700 follow five or more, and 2,200 follow
10 or more. These numbers do not differ greatly when examining mutuals (accounts that follow
each other). About 13,000 Gab users are engaged in reciprocal following relationships with two or
more actor-linked accounts, around 5,000 follow and are following at least five, and around 2,000
share follower/following relationships with at least 10.
Regarding follower relationships between actor-linked accounts, the median asset is connected tothree of the 19 accounts we identified in the operation. This pattern of relationships may indicate
the operators want to create interlocking ties between assets but have not attempted to create amaximally connected network, possibly in an effort to avoid detection.

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Map of the follower network on Gab, showing all users connected to two or more accounts in the operation. Node size
corresponds to number of followers. Color represents cluster affiliation as determined by follower relationships.

On Gettr, our investigation identified a primary network of 10 accounts that exhibit the same
behavior patterns described above and also show connections to operation assets on Gab, suchas using the same user names and profile pictures, coordinated posting, and identical creation
dates. The network’s audience on Gettr is larger than on Gab but less dense. In total, the 10
accounts have a total audience of around 62.1k followers, the bulk of which only follow one of theassets.
On average, the actor-linked accounts on Gettr have around 8.3k followers and follow 4.8k
accounts. In contrast to Gab, this Gettr network is dominated by a single account - the Kid Rock“fan page” (51.2k followers) - whose audience outstrips the other assets by tens of thousands offollowers.
The network on Gettr is far less dense than on Gab. About 12,400 users follow two or more of theactor-linked accounts, 1,000 follow five or more, and no users follow 10 or more. Bidirectional
follower/following relationships are also more sparse: around 5,600 users follow and are followedby two or more actor-linked accounts, fewer than 100 follow and are followed by at least five, andno users share follow/follower relationships with all of the assets. Lastly, the accounts in the9operation on Gettr are less likely to follow each other. Of the 10 accounts we identified on Gettr,
only seven follow or are followed by another account in the operation.

Image of the follower network on Gettr showing all users connected to two or more accounts in the operation. Node size
corresponds to number of followers. Color represents cluster affiliation as determined by follower relationships.

Behaviors
Meta Trolling
As discussed previously, we assess the actors behind this operation engaged in a deliberate effort
to capitalize on public concerns about foreign interference in U.S. elections - a recurring IRA tactic
known as “perception hacking.”
Most notably, following media reporting on a part of this network’s activity ahead of the U.S.
midterms, which included naming some of the operation’s personas, multiple assets posted
identical statements between Nov. 12-29 “outing” themselves as “Russian trolls.” This included

10accounts previously-attributed to NAEBC, as well as newly-identified accounts that were notnamed in the media coverage, and received minimal reaction from authentic online users.
These posts followed widely-reported comments by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has previously
denied U.S. allegations of orchestrating IRA operations but claimed in November to be
successfully interfering in the U.S. midterms. Prigozhin did not cite any evidence to support his
claims of success, and his comments and the subsequent behavior of accounts in the network
closely mirror past “meta trolling” activity by IRA-linked actors. In 2018, for example, the IRA
created a website shortly before the U.S. midterms, claiming to expose a network of accounts
they were using on Instagram to swing the vote.

An “admission” statement posted by Nora Berka, a persona previously attributed to NAEBC

We also observed sarcastic disclaimers that the text in posts and articles shared by network
assets was copied from other outlets, a possible reference to previous tactics employed by thesame actors to avoid English-language grammar and syntax errors. On the website
electiontruth[.]net, for instance, which Record Future has linked to IRA actors, at least two articles
ironically deny that the text was copied from unaffiliated media outlets.

Text at the bottom of an electiontruth[.]net article copied from The Federalist11Masked as a Minuteman
As seen in past IRA-linked operations, the actors behind this activity use fake personas to pose as
members of the community they are attempting to infiltrate and influence. The Kid Rock “fanpage” accounts were by far the most successful in this regard, building a large follower base andreportedly viewed online as genuine Kid Rock accounts. However, we also identified otherpersonas presenting as authentic right-wing users on Gab, Getter, Parler, and Truth Social.
These accounts typically embraced themes popular with conservative audiences, such as
freedom, patriotism, and loyalty. Others presented as overtly anti-left-wing personas, using vulgar
variations of “Joe Biden” as their screen names. Echoing the Kid Rock pages, one account on
Gettr posed as a fan of actor and film director Mel Gibson, who has been widely criticized for his
reportedly antisemitic views.
Additionally, we observed assets in the network that appear to mimic specific groups within the
broader right-wing online community. One account on Gab, for instance, purports to be a
supporter of far-right militias, using a name referencing the Minutemen and a handle thatreferences the Oath Keepers. Another claims to be a Black member of the Republican party,
displaying a profile picture of former President Donald Trump and the American eagle, and callingon “Ignorant leftist, (esp black leftists) … to follow for emancipation from the democratic mentalslavery.”

Profile pictures used by network accounts posing as a supporter of far-right militia groups (left) and a Black supporter offormer President Donald Trump (right)

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Cross Platform & Coordinated
Assets in the network exhibit clear and repeated signs of coordination, including
near-simultaneous posting and the use of identical images and media links across accounts andplatforms. Often, one or more assets will publish posts containing the same text, image, or
website link within minutes of each other.
In three cases, we identified pairs of “sibling” assets on Gab and Gettr that consistently mirror
each other’s posting activity, despite sometimes adopting seemingly incongruent personas. One
pair split across Gab and Gettr is made up of an account that identifies as “Pro White - 100%
antisemitic” and another using the persona of a Black Trump supporter.
We observed this type of coordination between newly-discovered assets and accounts previously
attributed to NAEBC. This is clearly shown in the below heat charts, which display posting times
by four accounts in the network. All four accounts posted almost exclusively between 09:00 16:00 UTC (04:00 - 11:00 EST) Monday to Friday, atypical behavior for authentic internet users
based in the U.S. Similar behavior is exhibited by nearly every other account in the network.

Identical images posted to Gab (left) and Gettr (right) by two assets within seconds of each other on Sept. 6, 202213

Heat charts showing posting activity by four Gab accounts in the network. Note the significant overlap in peak activity
periods (09:00 - 16:00 UTC, Monday - Friday)

At times, the actors appear to have attempted to obfuscate this coordination by posting identicalcontent across multiple accounts over a period of hours or days rather than in close succession.
In October 2022, for instance, two accounts shared an identical passage of text about “American
Big Tech companies” interfering in the U.S. 2022 midterms in two posts made three days apart. In
the first of these posts, the text aligns with the headline of a linked article from the “Foundation toBattle Injustice.” In the second, the account operator links to an unrelated article fromelectiontruth[.]net, possibly by mistake.

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Two posts by network assets on Gettr with the exact same text but linking to different articles three days apart15

Copy & Paste
Assets in the network consistently repurpose content from elsewhere on the internet, typicallywithout giving credit to the original posters. On Gab, Gettr, and Truth Social, for example, accounts
operated by the actors often post text that appears to have been plagiarized from unconnected
users on Twitter. And in at least one instance, one of the Kid Rock fan page accounts posted atext passage about an alleged “sprawling network of secret biological labs” in Ukraine that was
copied verbatim from an earlier article by Russian state media outlet RT.
On the website electiontruth[.]net, which is repeatedly shared by assets in the network, articles areoften lifted wholesale from authentic right-wing media outlets such as the Gateway Pundit andthe Washington Examiner, sometimes with a sarcastic editor’s note denying this has happened.

An Aug. 19, 2022, Twitter post by an unconnected user (top) that was partially copied bya network asset the next day (bottom)

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The actors also repurpose images from publicly-available sources as profile pictures for theiraccounts. The Kid Rock fan page accounts all use an image of the singer performing at the
Daytona 500 motor race which has been edited to add a pro-Trump slogan to his t-shirt. Similarly,
another account which presents as a female Trump supporter uses an Apple Memoji avatar thathas very likely been altered to add “MAGA” to its baseball cap.
Furthermore, the Black Trump supporter persona has posted a photo of a Black man posing withan AR15 assault rifle, which the account implies shows its operator after visiting a shooting range.
The original image was first posted online over six years ago and was subsequently edited byunknown internet users to include an anti-taxation slogan on the man’s t-shirt.

Left: Original image of Kid Rock at the 57th Annual Daytona 500. Right: The edited image subsequently used by the Kid
Rock fan page accounts on Gab, Gettr, and Truth Social

Left: Original Apple Memoji found on Pinterest. Right: An altered version of the Memoji used by network
assets on Gab and Gettr

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Top left: A post by a network asset implying its operator is the man in the image. Top right: First occurrence of the image
online, from 2016. Bottom: First occurrence of the image in 2016 with “AND TAXATION IS THEFT” added to the t-shirt.

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Content Analysis
We analyzed content posted by assets in the network between January 2021 and December,
2022, surfacing several distinct narratives in the run-up to, and during, the 2022 U.S. midterm
elections. As discussed in the behaviors section, much of the content shared by the operation iseither text copied from unconnected social media users without attribution, or screenshots ofsocial media posts on other platforms.
Broadly, content posted by the operation promotes Russian state interests and attempts toundermine U.S. public support for Ukraine, criticizes left-wing politicians and cultural figures, andexpresses support for right-wing politicians, especially Republican candidates who havequestioned or cast doubt on the result of the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
It is important to note, however, that we have previously seen the same actors amplify narratives
from left-wing voices, as part of a long-standing pattern of behavior in which they play both sidesof the U.S. political divide. In 2020, for instance, IRA-linked actors created a fake left-wing media
outlet that promoted narratives critical of right-wing and center-left politicians, highlighted alleged
U.S. human rights abuses, and railed against capitalism. In 2016, the IRA posed as Black Lives
Matter activists to exacerbate online tensions over racial injustice in the U.S and promote Russianstate interests, such as support for Moscow’s military intervention in Syria.
We have no evidence to suggest that any group or individual who was promoted by the actors or
shared their content is aware of, or complicit in, the activity detailed in this report.

Post by a network asset on Gettr criticizing President Joe Biden and casting doubt on the result of the 2020 U.S. election

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#VoterFraud
Accounts in the network promoted a range of narratives about alleged electoral fraud in U.S.
elections, both before and after the 2022 midterms. Prior to Nov. 8, posts raised concerns thatvoting in the midterms would be rigged against right-wing candidates, calling on users to monitor
polling stations and “watch for red flags.” Subsequently, the accounts reacted to abetter-than-expected showing by the Democratic Party by questioning the validity of the vote.
“Republicans start off winning, end up losing, slow count every time. Coincidence?” asked one of
the Kid Rock fan page accounts shortly after the election.

A network asset on Gab shares an article from electiontruth[.]net telling users to watch for ‘red flags’ in Pennsylvania

Denigrating Democrats
In the run-up to the 2022 midterms, accounts in the network consistently denigrated Democratic
candidates, particularly focusing on those in Pennsylvania, Georgia, New York, and Ohio.
Pennsylvania Democratic Senate candidate John Fetterman, for instance, was regularly criticizedas unfit for office, with posts highlighting his state of health and faltering performance during a
televised debate. Often, the accounts attempt to draw comparisons between Fetterman andPresident Joe Biden, who they consistently depict as old and senile.

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In another tight race in Georgia, the accounts accused Democratic candidate Raphael Warnock ofbeing a “wife beater” and stoking a “race war,” while his fellow party candidate Stacey Abrams was
portrayed as an overly progressive “woke” politician intent on defunding the police.

A meme shared by accounts in the network mocking Democratic Senate candidate John Fetterman

Promoting Republicans
As well as criticizing Democrats ahead of the midterms, the operation consistently promoted theirRepublican rivals, repeating widespread assertions that right-wing candidates would perform wellat the polls. In early November, for instance, multiple accounts in the network shared the same
article from electiontuth[.]net reporting a “massive 18-point lead” for the Republicans alongside
the image of a red wave sweeping through Washington, D.C.
All of the Republican figures promoted by the network were candidates endorsed by former
President Trump who have questioned or cast doubt on the results of the U.S. 2020 election.
Prominent among those was Arizona gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake, who the accounts
predicted would easily defeat her “woke” Democratic opponent and “make Arizona red.” One
network asset on Gab even styled itself as a Kari Lake “war room” and following her defeat has
spread claims that the election was rigged.

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A network asset on Gab shares an electiontruth[.]net article supporting Kari Lake with the comment “Arizona will be red!”

Image used to illustrate multiple electiontruth[.]net articles shared by the network to express support for Republican
candidates in the 2022 U.S. midterms

Cheerleaders for Putin
In addition to posting about U.S. politics, the operation notably focuses on Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Content shared by the accounts is uniformly supportive of Russian President Vladimir
Putin while seeking to undermine U.S. public support for Ukraine and portray President Volodymyr
Zelenskiy as a far-right extremist who is embezzling money sent by Western allies.

22One prominent anti-Ukraine narrative in recent weeks concerns the collapse of cryptocurrency
exchange FTX, which accounts in the network have alleged was funded by Ukraine using themoney it received from the U.S. and other allies to support its war effort against Russia. Someposts go on to allege that money given to FTX by officials in Kyiv was then passed on to
Democratic candidates.

Post by a Gab account in the network claiming Presidents Biden and Zelenskiy are complicit in amoney laundering scheme

Lastly, accounts in the network regularly use the hashtag #PutinsFault, part of a meme thatmocks people who blame things on Russia to deflect from their own culpability. One post on Gab,
for instance, copied a tweet from an unconnected Twitter user about Biden catching COVID-19
and added the text “Can't wait to start him [sic] blaming Putin #Putinsfault.” This echoes previous
memes used by IRA-linked accounts to deride media coverage about Russian interference in the2016 U.S. presidential election.

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Graphika is an intelligence company that maps the world’s online communities and conversations.
Graphika helps partners worldwide, including Fortune 500 companies, Silicon Valley, human rights
organizations, and universities, discover how communities form online and understand the flow of
information and influence within large-scale social networks. Customers rely on Graphika for aunique, network-first approach to the global online landscape.

The Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching andpolicy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus onsocial media. The Stanford Internet Observatory was founded in 2019 to research the misuse of theinternet to cause harm, formulate technical and policy responses, and teach the next generation
how to avoid the mistakes of the past.

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