IAEA Safety Standards
for protecting people and the environment

Regulatory Controlof Radioactive Discharges
to the Environment
Jointly sponsored byGeneral Safety Guide
No. GSG-9

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS AND RELATED PUBLICATIONSIAEA SAFETY STANDARDSUnder the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish or adopt
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property, andto provide for the application of these standards.
The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in the
IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport
safety and waste safety. The publication categories in the series are Safety Fundamentals,
Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.
site

Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme is available on the IAEA Internet
http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

The site provides the texts in English of published and draft safety standards. The texts
of safety standards issued in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, the IAEA Safety
Glossary and a status report for safety standards under development are also available. For
further information, please contact the IAEA at: Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria.
All users of IAEA safety standards are invited to inform the IAEA of experience in theiruse (e.g. as a basis for national regulations, for safety reviews and for training courses) for the
purpose of ensuring that they continue to meet users’ needs. Information may be provided via
the IAEA Internet site or by post, as above, or by email to Official.Mail@iaea.org.
RELATED PUBLICATIONSThe IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of Articles III
and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of information relating
to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among its Member States for thispurpose.
Reports on safety in nuclear activities are issued as Safety Reports, which provide
practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in support of the safety standards.
Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Emergency Preparedness andResponse publications, Radiological Assessment Reports, the International Nuclear Safety
Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports
on radiological accidents, training manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety
related publications.
Security related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
The IAEA Nuclear Energy Series comprises informational publications to encourage
and assist research on, and the development and practical application of, nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes. It includes reports and guides on the status of and advances in technology,
and on experience, good practices and practical examples in the areas of nuclear power, thenuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management and decommissioning.

REGULATORY CONTROLOF RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGESTO THE ENVIRONMENTThe following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTANALBANIA
ALGERIAANGOLA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIAAZERBAIJAN
BAHAMAS
BAHRAINBANGLADESHBARBADOSBELARUSBELGIUM
BELIZEBENIN
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL
STATE OFBOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINABOTSWANABRAZILBRUNEI DARUSSALAM
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDICAMBODIACAMEROONCANADACENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHAD
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIACONGOCOSTA RICA
CÔTE D’IVOIRECROATIACUBACYPRUSCZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
DENMARKDJIBOUTIDOMINICADOMINICAN REPUBLICECUADOREGYPTEL SALVADORERITREAESTONIA
ESWATINIETHIOPIAFIJI
FINLANDFRANCEGABONGEORGIAGERMANYGHANA
GREECE
GRENADAGUATEMALAGUYANAHAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURASHUNGARYICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OFIRAQIRELANDISRAELITALY
JAMAICAJAPANJORDANKAZAKHSTANKENYAKOREA, REPUBLIC OFKUWAITKYRGYZSTANLAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLICLATVIALEBANONLESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIALUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCARMALAWI
MALAYSIAMALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICOMONACOMONGOLIAMONTENEGRO
MOROCCOMOZAMBIQUE
MYANMAR
NAMIBIANEPAL
NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALANDNICARAGUANIGERNIGERIANORWAYOMANPAKISTAN

PALAU
PANAMAPAPUA NEW GUINEAPARAGUAYPERU
PHILIPPINESPOLANDPORTUGALQATARREPUBLIC OF MOLDOVAROMANIARUSSIAN FEDERATIONRWANDASAINT VINCENT AND
THE GRENADINESSAN MARINOSAUDI ARABIASENEGALSERBIASEYCHELLESSIERRA LEONESINGAPORESLOVAKIASLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICASPAIN
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SWEDENSWITZERLANDSYRIAN ARAB REPUBLICTAJIKISTANTHAILANDTHE FORMER YUGOSLAVREPUBLIC OF MACEDONIATOGOTRINIDAD AND TOBAGOTUNISIA
TURKEYTURKMENISTANUGANDAUKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATESUNITED KINGDOM OFGREAT BRITAIN ANDNORTHERN IRELAND
UNITED REPUBLICOF TANZANIAUNITED STATES OF AMERICAURUGUAYUZBEKISTANVANUATU
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OFVIET NAMYEMEN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. GSG-9

REGULATORY CONTROLOF RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGESTO THE ENVIRONMENTGENERAL SAFETY GUIDEJOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMMEINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2018

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October 2018
STI/PUB/1818

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Names: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Title: Regulatory control of radioactive discharges to the environment / International
Atomic Energy Agency.
Description: Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2018. | Series: IAEA
safety standards series, ISSN 1020–525X ; no. GSG-9 | Includes bibliographicalreferences.
Identifiers: IAEAL 18-01188 | ISBN 978–92–0–102418–3 (paperback : alk. paper)
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FOREWORD
by Yukiya Amano
Director General
The IAEA’s Statute authorizes the Agency to “establish or adopt…
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life andproperty” — standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which
States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation
safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of theUnited Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive
set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable andsustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA’s assistance in their application.
The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The
emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement
has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The
Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles,
which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high levelof protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety
Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its
standards.
Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice.
The IAEA’s safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety,
operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material andsafe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization,
regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist
Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experienceand insights to be shared.
Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States havedecided to adopt the IAEA’s standards for use in their national regulations. For
parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide
a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations
under the conventions. The standards are also applied by regulatory bodies andoperators around the world to enhance safety in nuclear power generation and innuclear applications in medicine, industry, agriculture and research.
Safety is not an end in itself but a prerequisite for the purpose of theprotection of people in all States and of the environment — now and in the
future. The risks associated with ionizing radiation must be assessed andcontrolled without unduly limiting the contribution of nuclear energy to equitable
and sustainable development. Governments, regulatory bodies and operators
everywhere must ensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are usedbeneficially, safely and ethically. The IAEA safety standards are designed tofacilitate this, and I encourage all Member States to make use of them.

PREFACE
Requirements for the protection of people from harmful consequencesof exposure to ionizing radiation, for the safety of radiation sources and forprotection of the environment are established in the IAEA Safety Requirements for
Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety
Standards (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3). GSR Part 3 is jointly
sponsored by the European Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organization, theOECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization, theUnited Nations Environment Programme and the World Health Organization.
Three related Safety Guides were prepared to provide generic guidanceon meeting the requirements of GSR Part 3 for protection of the public andprotection of the environment, as follows:—— IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-8, Radiation Protection of the
Public and the Environment, which provides guidance on the frameworkfor protection of the public and the environment;—— IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-9, Regulatory Control ofRadioactive Discharges to the Environment, which provides guidanceon application of the principles of radiation protection and the safety
objectives associated with the control of discharges and on the process for
authorization of discharges;—— IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-10, Prospective Radiological
Environmental Impact Assessment for Facilities and Activities, which
describes a framework and methodologies for prospective radiologicalenvironmental impact assessment.
These three Safety Guides are jointly sponsored by the IAEA and
UN Environment, the leading global environmental authority, which sets theglobal environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of theenvironmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations
system, and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.
The recommendations provided in these three Safety Guides, together withthe requirements of GSR Part 3, provide a basis for including environmental
considerations in the assessment and management of radioactive releases. In thiscontext, UN Environment encourages the application of these recommendations
in all its Member States, and their use as a foundation for the development of
national regulations on protection of the environment from harmful effects ofionizing radiation.

THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSBACKGROUNDRadioactivity is a natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation arefeatures of the environment. Radiation and radioactive substances have many
beneficial applications, ranging from power generation to uses in medicine,industry and agriculture. The radiation risks to workers and the public and to theenvironment that may arise from these applications have to be assessed and, if
necessary, controlled.
Activities such as the medical uses of radiation, the operation of nuclear
installations, the production, transport and use of radioactive material, and the
management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to standards of safety.
Regulating safety is a national responsibility. However, radiation risks may
transcend national borders, and international cooperation serves to promote andenhance safety globally by exchanging experience and by improving capabilities
to control hazards, to prevent accidents, to respond to emergencies and to mitigate
any harmful consequences.
States have an obligation of diligence and duty of care, and are expected tofulfil their national and international undertakings and obligations.
International safety standards provide support for States in meeting their
obligations under general principles of international law, such as those relating toenvironmental protection. International safety standards also promote and assure
confidence in safety and facilitate international commerce and trade.
A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously
improved. IAEA safety standards, which support the implementation of binding
international instruments and national safety infrastructures, are a cornerstoneof this global regime. The IAEA safety standards constitute a useful toolfor contracting parties to assess their performance under these international
conventions.
THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSThe status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA’s Statute,which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt, in consultation and, whereappropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations
and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection ofhealth and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for theirapplication.

With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish
fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the radiation
exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, torestrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear
reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source ofradiation, and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.
The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks,
including nuclear installations, the use of radiation and radioactive sources, thetransport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.
Safety measures and security measures1 have in common the aim ofprotecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures andsecurity measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated mannerso that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do notcompromise security.
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what
constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series, which has three categories (see Fig. 1).
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles
of protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety requirements.
Safety Requirements
An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes
the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and theenvironment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by theobjective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements are notmet, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The
format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment, in aharmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework. Requirements, including
numbered ‘overarching’ requirements, are expressed as ‘shall’ statements. Manyrequirements are not addressed to a specific party, the implication being that theappropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them.

1

See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

Safety Fundamentals

Fundamental Safety Principles
General Safety Requirements

Specific Safety Requirements

Part 1. Governmental, Legal andRegulatory Framework for Safety

1. Site Evaluation for
Nuclear Installations

Part 2. Leadership and Management
for Safety

2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

Part 3. Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources

2/1 Design
2/2 Commissioning and Operation

Part 4. Safety Assessment for
Facilities and Activities

3. Safety of Research Reactors

Part 5. Predisposal Managementof Radioactive Waste

4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facilities

Part 6. Decommissioning andTermination of Activities

5. Safety of Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities

Part 7. Emergency Preparedness
and Response

6. Safe Transport ofRadioactive Material

Collection of Safety Guides
FIG. 1. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series.

Safety Guides
Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply
with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that itis necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative
measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, andincreasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve highlevels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressedas ‘should’ statements.
APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSThe principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are
regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety
standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations and by many organizations
that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as organizations
involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.

The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire
lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for peacefulpurposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They can beused by States as a reference for their national regulations in respect of facilities
and activities.
The IAEA’s Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in
relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted
operations.
The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA’s safety review
services, and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence building,including the development of educational curricula and training courses.
International conventions contain requirements similar to those in
the IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties.
The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international conventions, industry
standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent basis forprotecting people and the environment. There will also be some special aspectsof safety that need to be assessed at the national level. For example, many of
the IAEA safety standards, in particular those addressing aspects of safety inplanning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new facilities and activities.
The requirements established in the IAEA safety standards might not be fully
met at some existing facilities that were built to earlier standards. The way inwhich IAEA safety standards are to be applied to such facilities is a decision for
individual States.
The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards provide
an objective basis for decisions concerning safety; however, decision makers
must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to balance
the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation risks andany other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSThe preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA
Secretariat and five safety standards committees, for emergency preparedness
and response (EPReSC) (as of 2016), nuclear safety (NUSSC), radiation
safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the safe
transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on Safety
Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme(see Fig. 2).
All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards
committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership ofOutline and work plan
prepared by the Secretariat;
review by the safety standards
committees and the CSS

Secretariat andconsultants:
drafting of new or revisionof existing safety standard
Draft

Review bysafety standards
committee(s)DraftMember States
Comments

Final draft

Endorsementby the CSS

FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.

the Commission on Safety Standards is appointed by the Director General andincludes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishingnational standards.
A management system has been established for the processes of planning,developing, reviewing, revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards.
It articulates the mandate of the IAEA, the vision for the future application of
the safety standards, policies and strategies, and corresponding functions andresponsibilities.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effectsof Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international

expert bodies, notably the International Commission on Radiological Protection(ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety standards. Some
safety standards are developed in cooperation with other bodies in the United
Nations system or other specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Environment Programme,
the International Labour Organization, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the
Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization.
INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety
Glossary (see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.htm). Otherwise,
words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest
edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. For Safety Guides, the English versionof the text is the authoritative version.
The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series and its objective, scope and structure are explained in Section 1,
Introduction, of each publication.
Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text
(e.g. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text, is included
in support of statements in the body text, or describes methods of calculation,
procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or annexes.
An appendix, if included, is considered to form an integral part of thesafety standard. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text,
and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. Annexes and footnotes to the main text,
if included, are used to provide practical examples or additional information or
explanation. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the main text. Annex
material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued under its authorship;
material under other authorship may be presented in annexes to the safety
standards. Extraneous material presented in annexes is excerpted and adapted asnecessary to be generally useful.

CONTENTS
1.

INTRODUCTION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1

Background (1.1–1.7)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Objective (1.8, 1.9)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Scope (1.10–1.14)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Structure (1.15)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1
2
3
4

THE PRINCIPLES OF RADIATION PROTECTION FORCONTROL OF DISCHARGES (2.1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5

Justification of facilities and activities (2.2, 2.3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Optimization of protection (2.4, 2.5)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Application of dose limits (2.6, 2.7)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

56
6

SAFETY OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS RELEVANT TO
THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGES  . . . . . . . . . . 

7General (3.1–3.6)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Justification (3.7, 3.8)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Optimization of protection and safety (3.9–3.14)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Authorization (3.15, 3.16)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Dose limitation (3.17)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Transboundary impacts (3.18)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Periodic review (3.19)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Source monitoring and environmental monitoring (3.20, 3.21)  . . . . . 
Graded approach (3.22)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7
9
9
10
11
11
12
12
13

4.

ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR AN AUTHORIZATION FOR
DISCHARGES (4.1–4.4)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13

5.

THE PROCESS FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES(5.1–5.12)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

15

2.

3.

Development of an authorization for discharges (5.13, 5.14)  . . . . . . 
Establishment of a dose constraint for the control of discharges(5.15–5.19)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Characterization of discharges and exposure scenarios (5.20–5.24)  . 
Consideration of optimization of protection and safety (5.25–5.42)  . 

19
21
22
24

Assessment of the dose to the representative person (5.43–5.58)  . . . 
Authorization for discharges and operational limits and conditions(5.59–5.74)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Demonstration of compliance (5.75–5.91)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Inspection and enforcement (5.92–5.98)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Involvement of interested parties (5.99–5.102)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6.

29
33
37
41
42

CONSIDERATION OF EFFLUENTS CONTAINING
RADIONUCLIDES OF NATURAL ORIGIN IN DIFFERENTINDUSTRIES (6.1–6.6)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

43

7.

CONTROL OF DISCHARGES DURING DECOMMISSIONING(7.1–7.6)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

47

8.

PREVIOUSLY UNREGULATED PRACTICES (8.1–8.7)  . . . . . . . . 

48

REFERENCES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

50

ANNEX: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GRANTING AN
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

55

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

71

1. INTRODUCTIONBACKGROUND
1.1. Facilities and activities1 that give rise to radiation risks are required to be
designed, built, authorized, operated and maintained so as to prevent radioactive
releases to the environment or to minimize the consequences of such releases andto provide adequate levels of protection of the public and the environment [3].
1.2. Some facilities and activities, during normal operation, generate gaseousand liquid effluents that contain small amounts of radionuclides that may expose
the public and the environment to low levels of radiation. In many cases, thecomplete prevention of the release of such effluents is technically difficult or
extremely costly to achieve. In all cases, the resulting doses to any member of the
public must be below established limits.
1.3. In accordance with the requirements for optimization of radiation
protection, it can be concluded that, if releases are controlled such that “themagnitude of individual doses, the number of individuals (workers and membersof the public) subject to exposure and the likelihood of exposure [are] ‘as low
as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account’(ALARA)” [3], then such releases may be acceptable in terms of protection andsafety, considering the very low radiological significance of the releases and thepossibly high costs that may be associated with reducing them further.
1.4. Facilities and activities that generate controllable radioactive releases
are regulated in different ways through a graded approach. In many cases, theregulation of facilities and activities generating radioactive releases during normal
operation that result in very low doses to the public and for which there is no riskof an unexpected accidental release can be managed through the application of
the concept of exemption or by means of notification [3]. However, some releases
may result in doses with a higher level of radiological significance or the facilityor activity may present potentially higher radiation risks. In such cases, it may beappropriate for the regulation of the releases from such facilities or activities to
1

The term ‘facilities and activities’ is defined in IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles [1], and the IAEA Safety Glossary [2]. It is a generalterm encompassing all nuclear facilities and uses of all sources of ionizing radiation. The
recommendations of this Safety Guide apply to certain facilities and activities, as described inpara. 1.13.

1be managed by means of an authorization (registration or licensing, as relevant)that establishes stringent technical and regulatory conditions, including forthe adequate management and control of these effluents and their radiologicalconsequences. For a practice that is justified, the decision to authorize suchreleases should take into account the radiation protection principles of
optimization and dose limitation, and other relevant safety principles.
1.5. Dose limits and dose constraints are established for the doses received
by the public due to the authorized releases of effluents [3]. In accordance with
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles [1], andthe requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3,
Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety
Standards [3], effluents are required to be properly managed by the licensee inorder to ensure the optimized protection of the public and the environment.
1.6. A ‘discharge’ is a planned and controlled release of gaseous, aerosol or
liquid radioactive substances to the environment and, as such, the term does notinclude releases to the environment in an accident. Strictly, the term ‘discharge’refers to the act or process of releasing material to the environment, but it isalso used in this Safety Guide to describe the material being released or to bereleased [2].
1.7. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the application of thesafety requirements established in GSR Part 3 [3] to the regulatory control ofdischarges and takes account of the recommendations provided in a number of
relevant Safety Guides [4–10] and the experience of Member States. This Safety
Guide supersedes IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.3, Regulatory
Control of Radioactive Discharges to the Environment2.
OBJECTIVE
1.8. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide governments, regulatory
bodies, applicants and operating organizations with a structured approachto controlling radiation exposures of the public resulting from discharges
from normal operations of facilities and activities, and for the optimization of

2

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory Control ofRadioactive Discharges to the Environment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.3,
IAEA, Vienna (2000).

2

protection and safety. Guidance is provided on authorizations for discharges,
demonstrating compliance with the authorization and enforcing the authorization.
1.9. This Safety Guide is for use by those applying for an authorization
for discharges to the environment and by those reviewing applications andauthorizing discharges as part of an authorization process [3]. It may also be
relevant for other interested parties.
SCOPE
1.10. The scope of this Safety Guide is limited to discharges to the atmosphere ofairborne effluents and to surface aquatic media of liquid effluents from facilities
and activities during normal operation in planned exposure situations [3]. The
disposal of solid radioactive waste, releases of radioactive substances in the
post-closure period of a waste disposal facility, the migration of liquids containing
radionuclides into underground water and releases to the environment due toaccidents are not addressed in this Safety Guide; relevant guidance is provided inother Safety Guides [11–14].
1.11. This Safety Guide provides guidance on the regulatory control of discharges
in connection with an authorization process.3 More specifically, this Safety Guide
addresses authorizations for discharges from new and modified facilities andactivities, and the review of established authorizations for discharges.
1.12. This Safety Guide addresses the derivation of operational limits andconditions for discharges, the demonstration of compliance with the authorizationand the need for a radiation monitoring programme. An important initial input
into the process of controlling discharges is the prospective assessment of theprotection of the public and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing
radiation. A separate Safety Guide provides recommendations on suchprospective radiological impact assessments for protection of both the public andthe environment [7]. Only limited reference is made in this Safety Guide to the3

Requirements for the authorization process for facilities and activities, as it relates tothe system of protection and safety, are established in GSR Part 3 [3].

3

methodology used in dose assessments and the models and data that may be usedin the derivation of authorized limits, such as those described in Ref. [15].4
1.13. This Safety Guide applies to different types of facilities and activities thatdischarge liquid and gaseous effluents containing radionuclides that may give rise
to radiation risks to the public. Such facilities and activities range from nuclear
installations5 to applications of radioisotopes in industry, medicine and research.
This Safety Guide also covers the controllable releases during normal operation
to the atmosphere and to surface waters that may result from the mining andprocessing of ores for the extraction of uranium or thorium as part of the nuclear
fuel cycle. Consideration is also given to discharges of naturally occurring
radioactive material6 in non-nuclear industries.
1.14. This Safety Guide focuses on setting discharge limits for the protection of
the public; the radiation protection of workers is considered only as part of the
optimization of protection and safety, especially in connection with the on-sitemanagement of radioactive waste and effluents. Recommendations on theassessment and control of occupational exposures are provided in IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. GSG-7, Occupational Radiation Protection [16].
STRUCTURE
1.15. Section 2 sets out the principles of radiation protection applicable to thecontrol of discharges. Section 3 presents the safety objectives, requirements andconcepts relevant to the control of discharges, including the general responsibilitiesof the government, the regulatory body, the operating organization and otherrelevant parties. Section 4 provides guidance on the decision making process
for establishing the need for an authorization for discharges. Section 5 provides
4

A revision of Safety Reports Series No. 19 [15] is in preparation and will cover
screening assessments of public exposure, generic models and parameters for use in assessing
the impact of radioactive discharges, and generic models and parameters for assessing exposuresof flora and fauna due to radioactive discharges from facilities and activities.
5
The term ‘nuclear installation’ includes nuclear power plants, research reactors(including subcritical and critical assemblies) and any adjoining radioisotope production
facilities, spent fuel storage facilities, facilities for the enrichment of uranium, nuclear fuelfabrication facilities, conversion facilities, facilities for the reprocessing of spent fuel, facilities
for the predisposal management of radioactive waste arising from nuclear fuel cycle facilities,
and nuclear fuel cycle related research and development facilities [2].
6‘Naturally occurring radioactive material’ is radioactive material containing no
significant amounts of radionuclides other than naturally occurring radionuclides [2].

4recommendations on the process for authorization for discharges, including
the development of an authorization for discharges and the setting of discharge
limits, the establishment and use of dose constraints, the characterization ofdischarges and the exposure scenarios used in specifying discharge limits,
the consideration of optimization of protection and safety, the assessment ofdoses to the public, the operational limits and conditions associated with theauthorization, the demonstration of compliance, inspection and enforcement, andthe involvement of interested parties. Section 6 covers discharges of naturally
occurring radionuclides. In Section 7, the aspects relating to the control ofdischarges during decommissioning are presented. Finally, Section 8 provides
recommendations on the regulation of discharges from previously unregulated
practices. The Annex provides practical considerations that can be taken into
account when setting authorizations for discharges.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF RADIATION PROTECTION
FOR CONTROL OF DISCHARGES
2.1. The radiation protection and safety principles established in the IAEA
safety standards (see Refs [1, 3]), on the basis of the recommendations of theInternational Commission on Radiological Protection [17], relevant for thecontrol of radioactive discharges to the environment from a facility or activity inplanned exposure situations are the principles of justification, optimization anddose limitation.
JUSTIFICATION OF FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
2.2. For a facility or activity to be authorized, it is required to be demonstrated
that the introduction of that practice will produce a positive net benefit (i.e. theexpected benefits to individuals and to society from the practice outweigh theharm, including radiation detriment) [3]. Decisions regarding justification should
be taken at a sufficiently high governmental level to enable all the considerations
that may be related to the benefits and detriments to be taken into account [6].
Any decision on justification should always involve consideration of the radiation
doses expected either to be incurred or to be averted or reduced, according to
the circumstances. The radiation dose to the public is only one of the factors
involved in the justification process. Many other factors, well beyond radiation5

protection considerations, will need to be considered in determining whether apractice is justified.
2.3. Justification applies to the overall practice and not to individual aspectsof the practice, such as discharges, which can be authorized or exempted fromthe requirement for an authorization only if the practice as a whole is alreadyregarded as justified.
OPTIMIZATION OF PROTECTION
2.4. The principle of optimization of protection and safety should be applied
when setting discharge limits. Optimization of protection and safety is defined in
GSR Part 3 [3] as:“The process of determining what level of protection and safety would
result in the magnitude of individual doses, the number of individuals(workers and members of the public) subject to exposure and the likelihoodof exposure being ‘as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social
factors being taken into account’ (ALARA).”2.5. The protection and safety measures should provide the highest level ofsafety that can reasonably be achieved throughout the lifetime of the facilityor activity without unduly limiting the operation of the facility or activity. The
optimization of protection and safety involves the balancing of all costs, not justfinancial costs, associated with achieving a particular level of protection andsafety, against the benefit in terms of reduction in dose. Further guidance on the
optimization process relating to the control of discharges is provided in Section 5,
and additional information is provided in the Annex to this Safety Guide.
APPLICATION OF DOSE LIMITS
2.6. For planned exposure situations, exposures and risks are subject to control
to ensure that the specified dose limits are not exceeded and that optimization isapplied to attain the desired level of protection and safety [3].
2.7. The dose limits that are relevant for members of the public in connection
with discharges during normal operation are [3]:

6

(a)
(b)

An effective dose of 1 mSv in a year;
In special circumstances7, a higher value of effective dose in a single year
could apply, provided that the average effective dose over five consecutive
years does not exceed 1 mSv per year.

These dose limits represent the maximum acceptable dose to any member of the
public from all authorized radiation sources to which he or she is exposed inplanned exposure situations.8 The use of dose limits to set discharge limits for a
specific source is described in Section 5 and the Annex.

3. SAFETY OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
RELEVANT TO THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVEDISCHARGES
GENERAL
3.1. SF-1 [1] establishes principles to be applied to achieve the fundamental
safety objective of protecting the public and the environment, now and in the
future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This safety objective has to beachieved without unduly limiting the operation of facilities and the conduct ofactivities that give rise to radiation risks.
3.2. The requirements for a governmental, legal and regulatory framework forsafety are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1),
Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [18].
3.3. GSR Part 3 [3] describes the concepts and establishes requirements forthe protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing
radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. GSR Part 3 also establishes
requirements relevant to the various interested parties (e.g. the government, theregulatory body, the operating organization) for the control of discharges.
7

For example, in authorized, justified and planned operating conditions that lead totransitory increases in exposures.
8
GSR Part 3 [3] also establishes dose limits for the public for the equivalent dose to
the lens of the eye and to the skin. Because of the conditions in which such exposures would
typically occur, these dose limits are not relevant for discharges to the environment during
normal operation.

7

3.4. Paragraph 1.6 of GSR Part 3 [3] specifies that the system of protection
and safety aims to “assess, manage and control exposure to radiation so thatradiation risks, including risks of health effects and risks to the environment, arereduced to the extent reasonably achievable.” For planned exposure situations,para. 1.17 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “exposures and risks are subject to control
to ensure that the specified dose limits…for public exposure are not exceeded,and optimization is applied to attain the desired level of protection and safety.”3.5. Although the system of protection and safety required by the IAEA safety
standards is founded primarily on considerations of the radiation protection ofhumans, it also aims to provide for appropriate protection of the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation [3].
3.6. The establishment of discharge limits for facilities and activities, as
described in this Safety Guide, is primarily for optimization of the protectionof members of the public (i.e. the objective of the assessment to determine
discharge limits is control of the effective dose to the representative person9,
with appropriate consideration given to the radiation protection of workers
at the discharging facility). This approach is based on the conclusion that theenvironment is protected by means of the conditions under which the practice isauthorized.10

9
The representative person is defined for the purposes of radiation protection as “An
individual receiving a dose that is representative of the doses to the more highly exposed
individuals in the population” (italic denotes a term in the IAEA Safety Glossary) [2].
The representative person will generally be a hypothetical construct and not an actual memberof the population. The representative person can be considered to be the same concept as thecritical group, and similar methods can be used for assessing doses to the representative person
as have been used previously for assessing doses to the critical group [15].
10Some States consider that, in addition to the optimization of the protection of
the public, there may be a need to assess and verify more explicitly the protection of theenvironment, including, for instance, estimating the impact of radiation exposure on populationsof flora and fauna. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-10, Prospective Radiological
Environmental Impact Assessment for Facilities and Activities [7], provides guidance onprospective radiological environmental impact assessment that includes, as an example in anannex, a methodology for assessing exposures of flora and fauna and the relevant criteria.
Usually, explicit consideration of the exposure of flora and fauna will not influence the settingof discharge limits.

8

JUSTIFICATION
3.7. Paragraph 2.8 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “For planned exposure
situations, each party with responsibilities for protection and safety shall ensure,when relevant requirements apply to that party, that no practice is undertaken
unless it is justified.”
3.8. Requirement 10 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “The government or the
regulatory body shall ensure that only justified practices are authorized.”
OPTIMIZATION OF PROTECTION AND SAFETY
3.9. Requirement 31 of GSR Part 3 [3] on radioactive waste and discharges statesthat “Relevant parties shall ensure that radioactive waste and discharges ofradioactive material to the environment are managed in accordance with theauthorization.”
3.10. GSR Part 3 [3] establishes a number of requirements for the management ofradioactive waste, notably including in para. 3.131(a) the requirement to ensurethat “radioactive waste generated is kept to the minimum practicable in termsof both activity and volume”. The need to meet these requirements on waste
management will have a direct impact on the volume of the waste generated andthe radionuclides and their quantities in the waste and in the effluents resulting
from the normal operation of a facility or conduct of an activity.
3.11. Paragraph 3.119 of GSR Part 3 [3] specifies that “The government or the
regulatory body shall establish and enforce requirements for the optimizationof protection and safety for situations in which individuals are or could be
subject to public exposure.” Paragraph 3.120 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “Thegovernment or the regulatory body shall establish or approve constraints on doseand constraints on risk to be used in the optimization of protection and safety formembers of the public.”
3.12. Paragraph 3.22(c) of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “The government or the
regulatory body: …Shall establish or approve constraints…on dose…or shallestablish or approve a process for establishing such constraints, to be used in the
optimization of protection and safety.”3.13. Requirement 11 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “The government or
the regulatory body shall establish and enforce requirements for the9

optimization of protection and safety, and registrants and licensees shallensure that protection and safety is optimized.”
3.14. Paragraph 3.126 of GSR Part 3 [3] specifies that in applying the principleof optimization of protection and safety in relation to public exposure:“Registrants and licensees…shall take into account:
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)

Possible changes in any conditions that could affect exposure ofmembers of the public, such as changes in the characteristics anduse of the source, changes in environmental dispersion conditions,changes in exposure pathways or changes in values of parameters
used for the determination of the representative person;
Good practice in the operation of similar sources or the conduct ofsimilar practices;
Possible buildup and accumulation in the environment of radioactive
substances from discharges during the lifetime of the source;
Uncertainties in the assessment of doses, especially uncertainties incontributions to doses if the source and the representative person are
separated in space or in time.”

AUTHORIZATION
3.15. Paragraph 3.132 of GSR Part 3 [3] establishes requirements regarding
discharges that underpin the recommendations provided in this Safety Guide andstates that:“Registrants and licensees, in cooperation with suppliers, in applying for an
authorization for discharges, as appropriate:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

10

Shall determine the characteristics and activity of the material to bedischarged, and the possible points and methods of discharge;
Shall determine by an appropriate pre-operational study all significant
exposure pathways by which discharged radionuclides could give rise
to exposure of members of the public;
Shall assess the doses to the representative person due to the planned
discharges;
Shall consider the radiological environmental impacts in an integrated
manner with features of the system of protection and safety, as
required by the regulatory body;(e)Shall submit to the regulatory body the findings of (a)–(d) above as
an input to the establishment by the regulatory body, in accordancewith para. 3.123, of authorized limits on discharges and conditions
for their implementation.”

3.16. Paragraph 3.123 of GSR Part 3 [3] establishes the following requirements
relating to the control of discharges:“The regulatory body shall establish or approve operational limits andconditions relating to public exposure, including authorized limits fordischarges. These operational limits and conditions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Shall be used by registrants and licensees as the criteria fordemonstration of compliance after the commencement of operationof a source;
Shall correspond to doses below the dose limits with account taken of
the results of optimization of protection and safety;
Shall reflect good practice in the operation of similar facilities or
activities;
Shall allow for operational flexibility;
Shall take into account the results of the prospective assessment forradiological environmental impacts that is undertaken in accordancewith requirements of the regulatory body”.

DOSE LIMITATION
3.17. Requirement 12 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that “The government or
the regulatory body shall establish dose limits for…public exposure,and registrants and licensees shall apply these limits.” Paragraph 3.26 of
GSR Part 3 [3] goes on to state that “The government or the regulatory body...
shall enforce compliance with the dose limits…[for] public exposures in planned
exposure situations.”
TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS
3.18. Paragraph 3.124 of GSR Part 3 [3] establishes requirements for theassessment of radiological impacts and the control of discharges when a source
within a practice could cause public exposure outside the territory or other area11

under the jurisdiction of control of the State in which the source is located. Insuch situations:“the government or the regulatory body:(a)Shall ensure that the assessment for radiological impacts includes
those impacts outside the territory or other area under the jurisdiction
or control of the State;
…….

(c)

Shall arrange with the affected State the means for the exchange of
information and consultations, as appropriate.”

PERIODIC REVIEW
3.19. Paragraph 3.134 of GSR Part 3 [3] establishes requirements for registrants
and licensees (operating organizations) to:“review and modify their discharge control measures…taking into account:(a)(b)

Operating experience [11];Any changes in exposure pathways or in the characteristics of therepresentative person that could affect the assessment of doses due tothe discharges.”

SOURCE MONITORING AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
3.20. Requirement 32 and para. 3.135 of GSR Part 3 [3] require the regulatory
body and relevant parties to ensure that programmes for source monitoring andenvironmental monitoring are in place.12 The programmes are required to be
sufficient to verify compliance with the requirements for the control of public
exposures. These requirements include “Making provision for maintaining recordsof discharges, results of monitoring programmes and results of assessments of11

For example, changes in the characteristics of the source term.
Guidance on source monitoring and environmental monitoring for use in defining
the monitoring programmes relating to public exposure control is provided in IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. RS-G-1.8, Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes ofRadiation Protection [9].
1212public exposure” (para. 3.135(e) of GSR Part 3 [3]). Similar requirements arealso placed on registrants and licensees (operating organizations), including therequirement to “Verify the adequacy of the assumptions made for the assessmentof public exposure and the assessment for radiological environmental impacts”(para. 3.137(g) of GSR Part 3 [3]).
3.21. Registrants and licensees (operating organizations) are required bypara. 3.137(a) of GSR Part 3 [3] to:“Establish and implement monitoring programmes to ensure that public
exposure due to sources under their responsibility is adequately assessed
and that the assessment is sufficient to verify and demonstrate compliancewith the authorization.”
GRADED APPROACH
3.22. The specific requirements relating to a graded approach are established in
GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [18], GSR Part 3 [3] and IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1), Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities [19]. In
relation to the control of discharges, the graded approach should be reflected in theapplication of Requirement 6 of GSR Part 3 [3] for planned exposure situations, thatis the resources devoted to assessing and controlling discharges and the scope andstringency of the regulations are required to be commensurate with the magnitudeof the radiation risk and the extent to which the exposure is amenable to control.

4. ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR AN
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES
4.1. Figure 1 illustrates a scheme for deciding whether an authorization
for discharges is necessary. Radioactive discharges can be considered forauthorization only if the overall practice is justified. In order to decide whether
an authorization for discharges is necessary, a key factor is whether the exposuresdue to the discharges are excluded from regulatory control or whether thedischarges can be exempted from the requirement for an authorization.
4.2. Authorization for discharges is not necessary for (a) practices that are
excluded from regulatory control because they result in exposures of the public
13

Need forauthorization for
discharges

Yes
Is practice justified?

Is exposure
excluded or candischarges be
exempted?

No

Yes

No

Conduct anauthorization for
discharges process

Practice anddischarges not
authorized
No need forauthorization for
discharges

FIG. 1. Decision process to determine the need for an authorization for discharges.

that are deemed to be not amenable to control or (b) situations where the criteria
for exemption are fulfilled. The regulatory body should specify when the radiation
exposures due to discharges are excluded from regulatory control13 or when the
discharges are exempted from the requirement for an authorization, in accordancewith the definitions and criteria established in schedule I of GSR Part 3 [3]14.
4.3. Exemption from the requirement for an authorization for discharges may
be granted generically for certain types of practice (e.g. certain uses of short
lived radionuclides in medicine for diagnosis or as radiotracers in small research
13
The regulatory body should consider, on the basis of the actual characteristics of theradiological impact on the public, whether those practices that have historically been excluded
from regulatory control should indeed be incorporated into the regulatory system.
14
Schedule I of GSR Part 3 [3] also provides information on levels of activity andactivity concentration for a large number of radionuclides to assist with determining whether
moderate amounts of materials and bulk amounts of solid materials can be exempted fromthe requirements. However, those levels are not intended for and should not be applied tothe control of discharges. Further information is provided in IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. RS-G-1.7, Application of the Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption and Clearance [20].

14laboratories) or on a case by case basis. If exemption is to be granted generically,
the regulatory body should specify the conditions under which the exemption ofdischarges is warranted for the particular practice. Exemption is a decision madewithin the regulatory system, and the provisions for exemption may be amended
by the regulatory body. In cases in which exemption is granted, no authorization
for discharges is necessary and the regulatory body may decide to verify bysimple checks that the conditions for granting exemption to the discharges still
apply, for example from records on acquisitions of radionuclides that permit theactivity released to the environment to be estimated.
4.4. In some cases, the regulatory body could decide that a practice and theassociated discharges need only notification (and not authorization). Notification
alone should be used only when the doses to the public expected from normal
operation are low (e.g. a small fraction of the relevant dose constraint), thelikelihood and magnitude of potential exposures are negligible and the regulatory
body does not consider exemption to be appropriate. This can usually be
determined on the basis of previous experience or by means of a preliminary
qualitative assessment. Notification makes the regulatory body aware of thedischarges and provides an opportunity for the regulatory body to keep the
discharges under review. If notification is to be used, the regulatory body should
consider developing clear criteria based on, for example, the radionuclides
involved or the maximum activities that are permitted to be acquired in a given
time period.

5. THE PROCESS FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR
DISCHARGES
5.1. ‘Authorization’ is defined in GSR Part 3 [3] as “The granting by aregulatory body or other governmental body of written permission for a person ororganization…to conduct specified activities.” The control of discharges is one
important aspect that should be addressed within the authorization process for a
facility or activity and at different stages throughout the lifetime of the facilityor activity. Authorization applies to practices for which exemption cannot be
granted and notification is not sufficient.
5.2. The regulatory body should establish the authorization process for facilities
and activities, including provisions for discharges, using the concept of a graded15

approach, in accordance with the expected radiological impact on the public andthe environment.15
5.3. An authorization can be granted by means of registration or licensing.
Depending on national arrangements, the choice should depend on the level of
exposure associated with the facility or activity and the likelihood and possible
consequences of an accidental release of radioactive material to the environment.
5.4. Authorization by means of registration should be used for facilities andactivities for which:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Safety can largely be ensured by the design of the facility and the equipment;
The operating procedures are simple to follow and operations do not varysignificantly;
The need for training on safety is minimal;
Past experience has shown that there are few problems with safety in suchtypes of operation [3].

Registrations are usually expressed in generic terms but may have specificconditions or limits attached. Registration is best suited to those practices forwhich the risk of exposure is very low and for which operations do not varysignificantly. Examples of practices for which registration may be adequate
are those in which small quantities of short lived radionuclides are used forstandardized bioassays (e.g. radioimmunoassay). The regulatory body should
specify the practices that may be authorized through registration.
5.5. Authorization by means of licensing should be applied in all other cases,
with the stringency of the associated operational limits and conditions gradedin accordance with the expected exposure of the public during normal operationand the likelihood and magnitude of potential exposures, evaluated on the basisof a prospective assessment. The regulatory body should establish the level ofstringency of the operational limits and conditions attached to the authorization
for discharges, taking into account (a) the likelihood and expected magnitude
of exposures; (b) the characteristics of the facility or activity; and (c) a numberof additional factors, such as the characteristics of the source term, the level of15

GSG-10 [7] provides guidance on determining whether a simple or complex
radiological environmental impact assessment is appropriate for a particular facility or activity;
table 1 of GSG-10 [7] sets out relevant factors. The same factors could also be used in applying
a graded approach to determining the necessary level of detail in the provisions for discharges
to be included in the authorization for a facility or activity.

16

expected exposures, the safety characteristics of the activity or facility (e.g. thetypes of safety barriers and engineering features present in the design), and thecharacteristics of the location.
5.6. For simple facilities or activities, such as those with limited amounts ofradionuclides with the potential to cause a significant radiological impact on the
public and the environment, the authorization process should normally consist ofa single stage. The regulatory body could provide generic guidance identifying
the necessary elements to be included in the process to determine the discharge
limits and, when possible, should provide the methodology for the necessary
assessments.
5.7. For complex facilities such as nuclear installations, there may be multiple
stages in the full authorization process, associated with the different stages in
the lifetime of the facility, from siting and site evaluation to decommissioning
and release from regulatory control. Figure 2, which is adapted from figure 1of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-12, Licensing Process for Nuclear
Installations [4], describes schematically the stages in the lifetime of a complex
facility, such as a nuclear installation, and the points at which the control ofdischarges should be considered. The horizontal arrow indicates the evolutionof time. The solid vertical arrows indicate the stages at which the control of

Siting and site
evaluation

Authorized discharge
limitsDesignDecommissioning
discharge limits

Construction

Commissioning
Operation
Decommissioning
Release from
regulatory
control
Discussions about control of discharges

Provisional discharge limits

Updateddischarge limits
for operation

Updated discharge
limits fordecommissioning

FIG. 2. Example of stages in the lifetime of a facility and the points at which the control ofdischarges should be considered.

17

discharges can be part of the preliminary discussions with the regulatory body andillustrate when, prior to operation, the discharge limits are set by the regulatory
body. The dashed vertical arrows indicate when a review of the discharge limits
can be considered as a result of operating experience if significant changes
have occurred during the operational stage. In some cases, the regulatory bodymay consider a generic design proposed by a designer of the facility (e.g. thenuclear power plant vendor) to set generic provisional discharge limits prior to
identification of a specific site. This would help to make a subsequent site specificauthorization process more efficient, especially if the same type of facility is tobe built on a number of sites.
5.8. During the siting, design and construction stages of a complex facility,
the applicant should provide the regulatory body with information relevant to
the optimization of protection of the public, such as information on (a) possible
discharges to the atmosphere and to surface water bodies and the radiologicalimpact of those discharges on the public and the environment; (b) the generationof waste; and (c) waste management on the site and its impact on workers. This
information should be sufficient to allow the regulatory body to form an opinion
about the suitability of the optimization procedure.
5.9. GSR Part 3 [3] states that, for setting discharge limits, the results ofa prospective radiological environmental impact assessment conducted inaccordance with the requirements of the regulatory body are required to beconsidered. Guidance on prospective radiological environmental impact
assessments for facilities and activities that should be conducted during or
prior to the siting, design and construction stages is presented in IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. GSG-10, Prospective Radiological Environmental Impact
Assessment for Facilities and Activities [7].
5.10. The authorization for discharges should be reviewed during the operation
stage, for example as part of a periodic safety review of the facility or activity [3].
Significant changes in any condition that could affect public exposure should betaken into account during the review of an existing authorization. Such significant
changes could include changes in the characteristics and operation of the facility,changes in the characteristics of the discharges, changes in the parameters thatare input into the models used to calculate doses, changes in the habits or locationof the population or changes in the environmental dispersion conditions.
5.11. A new or revised authorization for discharges may be required when theoperational stage ends, in order to take into account the likely changes to thedischarges during the decommissioning process. New discharge limits should be18

established prior to the start of the decommissioning activities. In some situations,operation and decommissioning activities may overlap; due consideration should
be given to this eventuality when relevant discharge limits are set.
5.12. The release of a facility from regulatory control after decommissioning
depends, in part, on whether an authorization for discharges is still necessary.
For some practices (e.g. uranium mining or processing), some form of controlof public exposures may be necessary after decommissioning, because exposure
to residual discharges to the environment may still occur. For such situations,the regulatory body should specify the control measures necessary after
decommissioning to minimize public exposure and, when relevant and on a caseby case basis, the necessary environmental monitoring programme.
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES
5.13. The regulatory body should establish the process to be followed by
an applicant seeking an authorization for discharges once the need for an
authorization for discharges has been established. The steps of the authorization
process may be as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)
(e)

The regulatory body should specify the relevant dose constraint for thefacility or activity under consideration (see paras 5.15–5.19 and the Annex).
The applicant should characterize the discharges and the main exposure
pathways identified, in order to assess adequately the exposure of therepresentative person.
The applicant should present the measures to be used for the optimizationof protection and safety of the public, having given consideration tomeasures for keeping the exposures due to discharges as low as reasonably
achievable and having taken into account all relevant factors.
The applicant should assess the doses to the representative person. This
may involve a number of iterations, starting with a simple, cautious genericassessment and, if necessary, a more detailed, site specific study.
The applicant should submit the results of the assessment to the regulatory
body. The regulatory body should evaluate whether the models andassumptions used by the applicant are appropriate, should compare theresults of the assessment with dose limits and dose constraints, and should
evaluate whether the assessed doses are in accordance with the need toprovide optimized protection of the public.

19

(f)

(g)

The regulatory body should set the discharge limits and should establish
conditions by which compliance during operation is to be demonstrated,
including by means of source monitoring and environmental monitoring
systems and programmes.
The regulatory body should issue an authorization for discharges upon its
satisfaction that the models and assumptions are valid and that the doses
will not be higher than the optimized levels.

Figure 3 illustrates the process for setting discharge limits in accordance with thesteps described above. The various elements in the process are described in thefollowing subsections.
5.14. The process illustrated in Fig. 3 identifies actions of the regulatory body andactions of the applicant. In setting the discharge limits, there should be regular
engagement and discussion between the applicant and the regulatory body withregard to the validity of the assumptions made to estimate doses, the optimization

Determine appropriate
constraints

Authorization for
discharges process

Characterize
discharges andexposure
scenarios

Consideroptimization ofprotection

Assess doses torepresentative
person using
progressive levelof detail
Submissionof results toregulatory body

Are models andassumptions valid,and doses optimized
and below the definedconstraints?
Discussion between
Noapplicant andregulatory body

Actions of the regulatory body
Actions of the applicant

Yes

Set discharge limits &establish conditions todemonstrate compliance;
issue authorization for
discharges

FIG. 3. Steps in setting discharge limits, indicating those responsible.

20

process and the implications that the discharge limits and the operational limits
and conditions under discussion may have for the operation of the facility or
the conduct of the activity. The safety implications of the storage of any liquid
or gaseous radioactive waste that is not discharged to the environment and theassociated doses to workers should also be considered. This process should be
conducted in an iterative manner in order to reach an acceptable optimal solution
from the point of view of safety and radiation protection.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DOSE CONSTRAINT FOR THE CONTROLOF DISCHARGES
5.15. The government or regulatory body is responsible for establishing or
approving the source related dose constraints to be used in the optimization of
the protection of the public during normal operation. The dose constraint foreach particular source is intended, among other things, to ensure that the sum ofdoses from planned operations of that source and of all the authorized sourcesthat may contribute to the exposure of the public remains within the dose limit. In
specifying the dose constraint, the contribution to exposure due to local sources
and regional sources may be considered.
5.16. The dose constraint, set for a single source, should be expressed in termsof the annual effective dose; the dose constraint should be below the limit set
for the effective dose to the public in planned exposure situations from all
regulated sources (i.e. 1 mSv in a year, as required by GSR Part 3 [3]) and higher
than a dose of the order of 10 µSv in a year. Therefore, in practical terms, dose
constraints should be selected within the range of 0.1 to <1 mSv in a year16 [7].
5.17. Dose constraints should be used in planning measures for protection andsafety as part of a prospective assessment and should not be used as alternative
dose limits to be applied during facility operation. More specifically, exceeding adose constraint should not represent a regulatory infraction, as would be the caseif the dose limit were to be exceeded.
5.18. In setting a dose constraint, the government or the regulatory body shouldtake the following into account:
16

The regulatory body may determine what additional restrictions, if considerednecessary, are required to ensure that the dose limits specified in GSR Part 3 [3] for the public
in planned exposure situations are not exceeded through possible combinations of doses fromexposures due to different authorized practices.

21

(a)
(b)

The characteristics of the location that are of relevance for the level of
public exposure, for example exposure pathways, habit data and time
occupation factors;
The possible contribution to the dose from other authorized facilities andactivities or foreseeable future facilities and activities.

5.19. Although dose constraints should be set at a value that depends on
the specific facility or activity and the expected exposure conditions at its
location, national authorities may choose to develop generic dose constraints
for facilities or activities of a similar design or with similar characteristics(e.g. nuclear installations, uranium mining and processing, industrial and medical
applications). The specification and use of generic and specific dose constraints
in the process of optimization of the protection of the public is described further
in the Annex.
CHARACTERIZATION OF DISCHARGES AND EXPOSURESCENARIOS
5.20. A pre-operational analysis should be carried out to identify the inventoriesof radionuclides that would result in discharges during the operation of a facilityor the conduct of an activity, the possible discharge routes, the amounts thatwould be discharged to the environment and the radiation exposure pathways,
and other relevant data that could be used to estimate doses to members of the
public. This pre-operational analysis could be based on specific analysis for thepractice under consideration or on experience in similar practices.
5.21. The need for a detailed characterization of the discharges should depend on
the expected magnitude of the dose to members of the public, in accordance witha graded approach. For small facilities or activities using unsealed radioactive
material, such as research laboratories or nuclear medicine departments in
hospitals, consideration should be given to whether the discharges can beassessed on the basis of the estimated throughput, with allowance made forradioactive decay. For nuclear fuel cycle facilities, estimates of discharges should
be made from consideration of the design, proposed operating characteristics
and efficiency of the techniques used to reduce the discharges. Informationfrom similar facilities or activities already in operation elsewhere could also be
used [21].
5.22. The relative importance of different exposure pathways is dependent on thenature and route of the discharges and the physical and chemical characteristics of22

the radionuclides. The characterization of the radiation exposure pathways shouldtake into account whether discharges are to the air or to water, and in the case of
liquid discharges, whether the discharge is to a marine, estuarine or freshwater
environment. In the case of discharges to the atmosphere, consideration should begiven to the meteorological data for the site and its surroundings and the possible
deposition of radioactive substances on land and subsequent transfer to crops
and animals. In the case of discharges to water, consideration should be given to
the uses of the water, such as consumption, fisheries and production of aquaticfood, irrigation, and recreation. Some facilities, such as hospitals and small
research laboratories, may discharge radionuclides to sewerage systems, which
could lead to exposures of individuals through their occupation (e.g. sewage
treatment plant workers17) or through the use of treated sewage sludge for landfill
or agricultural purposes. Guidance on the selection of exposure pathways, theuse of meteorological and hydrological data and environmental transfer, and theestimation of doses can be found in GSG-10 [7].
5.23. Pre-operational studies should also be carried out to determine the existinglevels of background radiation in the area surrounding the facility prior to its
operation and should include a determination of the external radiation levels aswell as the concentrations of radionuclides in the environment (e.g. water, soil,
plants, crops, food). These studies should be used to establish a baseline above
which the actual impact of the discharges can be determined. This baseline canvary from site to site because of variations in natural background radiation andpossible residual contamination from past practices, accidents or global fallout
after nuclear weapon tests. The establishment of a baseline is particularly
important for practices that discharge naturally occurring radionuclides (seeSection 6). Detailed guidance on undertaking pre-operational surveys is given
in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.8, Environmental and Source
Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection [9], and Ref. [22].
5.24. If a discharge could cause significant public exposure outside the territory
or other area under the jurisdiction or control of the State in which the discharge
takes place, the operating organization should make an assessment of theradiological impacts of the discharges on the public and the environment in theseareas. Such an assessment is particularly important when the individuals likely
to receive the highest doses could live in a neighbouring State, for example if
a facility is to be constructed close to a national border or on an international
waterway.
17

Such workers are subject to the same dose limits as for members of the public; seepara. 3.78 of GSR Part 3 [3].

23

CONSIDERATION OF OPTIMIZATION OF PROTECTION
AND SAFETY
5.25. Optimization of protection and safety is the key process in establishing an
authorization for discharges, and it involves a number of different aspects. In
relation to a discharging facility that may cause public exposure, optimization
should be part of the design and planning process and should also be kept underreview throughout the lifetime of a facility. Optimization in relation to discharges
forms part of the optimization of protection and safety for the practice as a whole.
5.26. Optimization of protection with respect to radioactive discharges is
not simply a matter of considering the balance between the radiation risks
associated with the discharges during normal operation and the costs of making
any reductions. The impact of waste management decisions on the exposure ofworkers and on the safety of the facility as a whole should also be considered. For
example, a reduction in discharges may lead to an increase in radioactive waste
stored on the site, with related increases in occupational exposures; therefore,such a reduction might not be the optimal solution. Guidance on the optimizationof the design of a facility or an activity with respect to the management ofradioactive waste can be found in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-3,
The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Predisposal Management ofRadioactive Waste [23].
5.27. Optimization should involve examining the available options for reducing
discharges and all aspects of the impact of these options. Much can be achievedat the early stages of siting and design, when account can be taken of goodtechniques and practices applied in other facilities and activities. In the case of
liquid and gaseous radioactive waste that might be generated during operation,
consideration should be given to keeping the waste to a minimum and to thesubsequent treatment of the radioactive effluents.
5.28. The main types of treatment of radioactive effluents are either storage, so
that, for example, short lived radionuclides present in liquid and gaseous forms
can decay before they are released to the environment, or abatement techniquesthat remove radionuclides from the effluent stream (e.g. ion exchange resins,
HEPA filters). Within these two broad categories, there may be a numberof different options available; these options should be identified, and theiradvantages and disadvantages should be examined.
5.29. The optimization of protection and safety should be conducted inconsideration of the dose constraints and the range of available protection
24options. An iterative analysis should be performed of the impact on the doses tothe public and to the workers of each selected protection option.
5.30. There are generally a number of trade-offs between various options, andother factors, that should be considered in the optimization process. These
include the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

A trade-off between doses from discharges and future doses associated withthe disposal of solid waste, if a decision was made to solidify the residues;
A trade-off between public exposure and occupational exposure (i.e. thereduction in public exposure at the expense of an increase in occupational
exposure due to an improved effluent treatment system);
Choices between options whose characteristics are known with different
degrees of certainty;
Non-radiological impacts and conventional health and safety;
An increased risk of accidental releases (e.g. if a large storage tank leaks).

5.31. Irrespective of the approach used in determining the optimal option, it
should be recognized that judgements regarding the relative significance of thefactors involved are necessary. Making those judgements should involve dialogue
between the regulatory body and the operating organization. The discussions
on optimization could also involve different authorities, such as authorities
responsible for nuclear safety, the protection of workers, the protection of the
public and the protection of the environment.
5.32. When the projected doses to members of the public are of the order of
10 μSv per year or below, a process for optimization should not normally berequired, on the basis that the efforts for further dose reduction would generally
not fulfil the requirement for optimization.
Optimization of protection and regulatory control of specific radionuclides
5.33. While the requirements for the optimization of protection and regulatory
control must be applied to all types of facilities, activities and radionuclides, incarrying out the optimization of protection, particular consideration should begiven to the special characteristics of certain effluents containing radionuclides
used in some practices. These characteristics include the technical difficulties
in managing radioactive waste from applications of radioisotopes in medicine
or from the operation of certain facilities or the conduct of certain activities.
Examples are the use of unsealed sources in nuclear medicine, which areadministered to patients as part of medical treatment, or the management of large
25

volumes of gaseous or liquid effluents containing very low levels of activity
concentration of certain radionuclides resulting from, for example, neutron
activation in the coolant system of nuclear power plants.
5.34. For such practices, the discharge of some specific radionuclides may require
special consideration by the operating organization and the regulatory body at thetime of specifying and agreeing the optimal solution in terms of protection andsafety. This consideration may also result in the need for an adapted approachfor the regulatory control of these discharges. Examples of such radionuclides
are tritium and 14C discharged from some nuclear installations and 131I used in
hospitals for nuclear medicine therapy.
5.35. For these particular practices and radionuclides, the operating organization
should specify, in discussion with the regulatory body, the optimal option for
discharges, taking into account the following:
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Technical characteristics relating to the control of discharges of theseradionuclides, such as the availability of abatement techniques on ascale consistent with the needs of the particular practice (in particular forlarge volumes of liquid or gaseous effluents with low concentrations ofradionuclides);Economic characteristics, such as the cost of the waste abatement
techniques, which might be excessive and unjustified in the framework of
the general optimization of protection and safety for the type of practice;Societal considerations, such as public acceptance of the type of practiceunder consideration, as well as individual and societal benefits derived
from the type of facility or activity;
Environmental and efficiency considerations, such as the effects of any
releases of hazardous chemical substances or high energy consumption
entailed by the waste abatement techniques;
Safety considerations, such as those relating to the safe storage of large
amounts of solid, liquid or gaseous radioactive material for long times, aswell as the risk of accidental releases;
Issues relating to the management of radioactive waste, such as issues
relating to the transport and storage of large quantities of low level waste18;

18‘Low level waste’ is waste that is above clearance levels but that has limited amountsof long lived radionuclides (see IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-1, Classification ofRadioactive Waste [24]).

26

(g)

Radiation protection considerations, such as individual doses and collective
doses received by workers in connection with the abatement process andwith the storage of waste.

5.36. The regulatory body and the operating organization should take into accountthat, for the above mentioned specific practices and radionuclides, the optimal
management option from a radiation protection perspective might not resultin the application of costly waste abatement techniques, but in the applicationof more stringent measures for the verification of compliance by the operatingorganization and the regulatory body, as relevant. The optimal management
option and the justification of the selection of this option should be presented
by the operating organization and endorsed, if acceptable, by the regulatory
body. Examples of more stringent measures for verification of compliance forcomplex facilities, including nuclear installations, are a radionuclide specificsource monitoring and environmental monitoring programme; more detailed
assessment of the dose to the representative person, including the identificationof relevant exposure pathways; and more frequent reporting of discharges tothe regulatory body.
Decision aiding techniques
5.37. Depending on the circumstances, the process of optimization of theprotection of the public can include the use of a variety of quantitative andqualitative techniques. Formal decision aiding techniques should be used as
appropriate in the optimization process. The advantage of formal decision aiding
techniques is that they allow each of the elements involved in making a decision
to be explicitly identified. If the doses to the representative person are assessed tobe very low (e.g. of the order of 10 µSv or less in a year), a formal analysis of the
optimization of protection will generally not be necessary.
5.38. Various analytical techniques have been proposed to assist in determining
the optimized level of protection, and these techniques may be applied fordischarges [25]. Decision aiding techniques include cost–benefit analysis andmulticriteria methods. The main limitation of cost–benefit analysis is that it
requires explicit valuation of all factors in monetary terms. This tends to restrict
the range of factors that can be included in the optimization process. Multicriteria
methods do not necessarily require such explicit valuation and are potentiallymore flexible decision aiding techniques because they allow additional factors
to be considered. For example, equity in time and space, risk perception of the
public and the potential for an accidental release are additional factors that can be27

taken into account by means of multicriteria methods. The distributions over timeof investments and operating costs can also be considered.
Best available techniques
5.39. In optimizing the protection of the public, the measures used in the
management of radioactive waste and effluents and the way those measures
are applied should be considered and compared with other possible options.
Concepts such as ‘best available techniques’ are applied in some States [26]and under certain international frameworks [27, 28], and in other industries forcontrolling pollutants generally. The use of best available techniques corresponds
to optimization if the techniques are verified and their use is not simply a matterof considering what techniques are or could be available for reducing discharges,
but rather considering the situation as a whole to determine the optimal level ofprotection, including the availability of the options and the costs involved. The
application of the concept of best available techniques to particular processes,
facilities or methods of operation to reduce discharges of radionuclides to theenvironment is described in more detail in the Annex in the framework of the
optimization of protection.
Use of collective dose
5.40. The estimation of collective doses to members of the public resulting fromalternative options for managing discharges, and the comparison of those options,is another approach that could be included in the optimization process.
5.41. The collective dose is the total radiation dose from a source incurredby a given group of the population [3], and it can be obtained by multiplying
the average dose to the exposed group by the number of individuals in thegroup [25, 29]. When estimating the collective dose to the public, care should
be taken to avoid inappropriate aggregation of, for example, very low individual
doses over extended time periods and wide geographical regions (i.e. truncating
conditions should be set) [25]. Collective dose should be used only in thecomparison of options, and any truncation applied to the calculations has to beconsistent for the comparisons to be meaningful.
5.42. Use has been made of collective dose in different ways to assist in theselection of an optimal level of protection of the public, for instance to assign amonetary cost to the radiation detriment and to compare this with the cost of each
option to reduce discharges. This Safety Guide does not provide detailed guidanceon the use of collective dose; however, with adequate consideration and care,28the use of collective dose could be a practical means of applying optimizationby comparing the protection outcome of different technologies. Collective dosemust not be used to predict health effects [30]. International Commission on
Radiological Protection Publication 101 [25] describes optimization and the useof collective dose in more detail.
ASSESSMENT OF THE DOSE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE PERSON
5.43. The establishment of an authorization for discharges should take into
account the results of an assessment of the radiological environmental impacts
commensurate with the radiation risk associated with the facility or activity [3, 7].
To set the discharge limits, prospective estimates of the dose to members of the
public should be used to determine acceptable optimized discharge levels thatmeet the established radiological criteria.
5.44. The estimate of the effective dose that may be incurred by members of the
public depends on a number of factors, such as the characteristics of the source
term, the behaviour of radionuclides in the environment and their transfer topeople, the duration of exposure and other relevant factors. These factors cause
a wide variation in the effective dose among the exposed population. For the
purpose of setting discharge limits, the dose to an individual receiving a dosethat is representative of the doses to the more highly exposed individuals in the
population (i.e. the representative person) should be assessed. The dose to therepresentative person “is the equivalent of, and replaces, the mean dose in the‘critical group’” [25].
5.45. Before starting the estimation of doses to the representative person, ajudgement should be made by the applicant regarding the scope and level ofdetail and the resources that should be allocated to the assessment. These mattersshould be discussed with and subject to the agreement of the regulatory body.
5.46. The level of detail of the assessment model should depend on the type of
facility under consideration, the nature of the discharges and the availability of
information, and should be consistent with a graded approach. In order to makeeffective use of assessment resources, a structured iterative approach for assessing
doses to the representative person may be useful. Such an approach should startwith a simple assessment based on very cautious (conservative) assumptions andshould be refined with each iteration, using progressively more complex models
with more realistic assumptions and site specific data, as necessary.

29

5.47. Consistent with a graded approach, the use of generic assessments should
be limited to assessing the impacts from small and simple facilities or activities
with standardized practices that result in foreseeable low to very low discharges.
GSG-10 [7] provides guidance on conducting assessments at different levels ofdetail and realism. Depending on its characteristics, the facility or activity canhave discontinuous discharges that can lead to the exposure of members of the
public within its premises (e.g. hospitals using 131I for diagnosis and therapy)
or to the exposure of workers who are not normally subject to monitoring foroccupational exposure (e.g. workers in external plants treating the effluents fromthe facility or activity); such situations should be considered carefully in theassessments.
5.48. To estimate doses to the representative person, a generic approach may also
be used at the early stages in the lifetime of a complex nuclear installation (seeFig. 2), such as during initial discussions about the control of discharges or thesetting of provisional discharge limits. This generic approach should be followed
by a more site specific, realistic assessment once more information becomes
available during the authorization process. GSG-10 [7] provides guidance on
the level of detail and the type of information needed to conduct a prospective
radiological environmental impact assessment for different facilities and activities
during the process of authorization, which also applies to the assessments used toestablish discharge limits.
5.49. When estimated doses to the representative person are above thedose constraint, the reduction of projected discharges or a change in theircharacteristics (e.g. a change in the location of the point of discharge) should
be considered. Otherwise, a more detailed assessment (using site specific dataor more realistic models) should be conducted. In any case, if a generic cautious
assessment is used, then it should be ensured that its use does not unduly affectthe optimization process. Adopting cautious assumptions in the calculations thatare likely to significantly overestimate the doses could lead to decisions that do
not meet the radiation protection principle of optimization.
5.50. The habits (e.g. consumption of foodstuffs, indoor or outdoor occupation
factors, consumption of locally produced foods) adopted to characterize therepresentative person should be typical habits or characteristics of a small
number of individuals representative of those more highly exposed. The highest
percentiles (e.g. the 95th percentile) in the distribution of the habit data of certain
exposure pathways, such as the consumption of milk and crops, should be
used to characterize the representative person. However, not all extreme habits
should be used to represent a single member of the population, so as to avoid
30

overestimation. Extreme or unusual habits should not dictate the characteristicsof the representative person considered [25].
5.51. In assessing doses to the representative person from discharges to theenvironment, the following three main exposure pathways should be considered:
(a)
(b)
(c)

External exposure from radionuclides present in the environmental media;
Internal exposure from the inhalation of radionuclides present in air;Internal exposure from the ingestion of radionuclides incorporated in waterand foods.

External exposure may be caused by radioactive substances suspended in the
air or deposited on the ground or other surfaces. For the assessment of doses
resulting from internal exposure, the committed dose19 should be considered.
More details on the exposure pathways relevant for the assessment of doses tothe representative person are provided in Refs [7, 15].
5.52. In some facilities or activities, radiation sources can contribute to theexternal exposure of members of the public located in the immediate vicinity,
through direct gamma irradiation and, in some cases, sky scattered gamma ray
radiation (sky shine). Examples are sources of radiation stored at the facility(e.g. spent fuel, radioactive waste), sources used in the facility or activity (e.g.
industrial irradiators) and components of the facility (e.g. nuclear reactors,
coolant systems, steam systems). When direct irradiation influences the exposure
conditions of the representative person, the resulting doses should be estimatedand taken into account when setting discharge limits, so that the established dose
constraint is not exceeded.
5.53. Given that the initial authorization for discharges from a facility or activity
is based on a prospective assessment, mathematical environmental models should
be used to assess the activity concentrations in the air or water. Subsequently,
environmental transfer models and parameters should be used to assess theactivity concentrations in other environmental media relevant for the estimationof doses (e.g. sediments or food products). Dispersion and transfer parameters
are given in Ref. [15]. The possible accumulation or buildup of long lived

19

The committed dose is the lifetime dose expected to result from an intake. Further
information is provided in previous IAEA guidance: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGYAGENCY, Principles for Limiting Releases of Radioactive Effluents into the Environment,
IAEA Safety Series No. 77, IAEA, Vienna (1986).

31

radionuclides and the ingrowth of radioactive progeny in environmental media
should be taken into account.
5.54. Models for the assessment of dispersion and transfer in the environment
should be adequate for the situation in which they are being applied to ensurethat the assessment methodologies are suitable for demonstrating that there is ahigh likelihood that all compliance requirements can be met under all reasonably
foreseeable conditions. Models should be verified. Where possible, the selectedmodels should be validated through comparison of the results with data forsimilar exposure scenarios or, at least, by means of benchmarking procedures
against other adequate models. Different methods, including different calculation
tools and input data, can be used to carry out an assessment [15]. The regulatory
body should decide, in discussion with the applicant and other interested parties,
which methodology is best suited to carrying out a particular assessment andshould agree that the methodology adopted is adequate for its proposed purpose.
GSG-10 [7] provides more information on the assessment methodologies andthe characteristics of models and data to be used in the assessment of discharges
during normal operation.
5.55. Different age groups should be considered when determining the exposureof the representative person. It is generally sufficient to consider the exposures ofthree age groups (1 year old infants, 10 year old children and adults). Exposureof the embryo or fetus and of breastfed infants may also need to be considered insome limited circumstances [25], for example when, owing to the radionuclides
to be discharged, the exposure of the embryo or fetus and of breastfed infants
may be more significant (e.g. discharges of radioiodine).
5.56. When identifying the representative person, it should be ensured that thegroups of individuals closest to the facility or activity are not the only groups
considered. Population groups at more distant locations which could be more
exposed owing to their specific living habits should be considered. For example,
this could be a group of individuals who live in a town at some distance from theplant but who eat fish from a catchment area close to the discharge point.
5.57. The location and lifestyle habits of the representative person should bespecified with regard to present and, as far as is reasonably foreseeable, futureenvironmental conditions, land use, spatial distribution of population, foodproduction, distribution and consumption, and other relevant factors, withaccount taken of the projected lifetime of the facility or activity.

32

5.58. When determining the location and lifestyle habits of the representative
person for remote sites with only a small local population or no local population,
consideration should be given to developing a theoretical representative personon the basis of a reasonable exposure scenario that captures land use practices
such as fishing, hunting or other seasonal or periodic land use practices that may
be associated with a nearby community.
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES AND OPERATIONAL LIMITSAND CONDITIONS
5.59. The authorization for discharges should take the form of written permission
from the regulatory body. The regulatory body may grant an authorization for
discharges on a justified basis or may impose additional conditions or operational
limitations that it deems appropriate for the purposes of protection and safety.
5.60. The regulatory body should record formally the basis for its decision on
an authorization for discharges, or on the amendment, renewal, suspension or
revocation of the authorization for discharges, and should inform the applicant, ina timely manner, of its decision, including the reasons and justification.
5.61. In granting an authorization for discharges, the regulatory body should
establish or approve authorized limits for discharges. These limits should take
into account the results of the optimization of protection and safety and should be
set in accordance with a graded approach.
5.62. Large complex facilities such as nuclear installations are subject to an
extensive authorization process, which should include provisions for discharges
and establish in detail the relevant operational limits and conditions. Operational
limits and conditions associated with the authorization for discharges for such
facilities should be expressed in terms that the operating organization canreasonably be expected to control, for example in terms of measured discharges(total activity or activity concentrations and gaseous or liquid volume discharged)
rather than doses to the public, which can only be estimated. The operational
limits and conditions associated with the authorization for discharges for simpler
facilities, such as hospitals with small nuclear medicine departments, industrial
applications or small laboratories, should be less onerous. The choice of discharge
limits expressed in terms of dose versus discharge limits expressed in terms ofactivity amounts is described further in the Annex.

33

5.63. Discharge limits should be attached or incorporated into the authorization
granted to the facility or activity so that they become regulatory limits with which
the operating organization or licensee should comply.
5.64. The period of validity of the discharge limits should be specified in theauthorization for discharges or in another related regulatory document, with aprovision for their review whenever deemed appropriate by the regulatory body,
but at least once every ten years. The period of validity of discharge limits forcomplex facilities, such as nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel reprocessing
facilities and radioisotope production facilities, should be the same as the periodof validity of the authorization for the facility, subject to a periodic review.
5.65. A review of the authorization for discharges should be conducted whenevermodification of the facility or of the operational limits and conditions attachedto the authorization is expected to affect significantly the characteristics of thedischarges. Nuclear facilities and other complex installations have periodic safety
reviews, typically after intervals of ten years, that should include the review of
the authorization for discharges. Simpler facilities, such as facilities or activities
using limited amounts of radioisotopes, should be reviewed periodically but atlonger intervals. The discharge limits for a new practice for which experience islimited should be reviewed by the regulatory body after an adequate time, whensufficient operational experience has been gathered, for instance within the first
three years.
5.66. The operational limits and conditions in an authorization for discharges
should include, as appropriate, some or all of the following:
(a)

(b)

34

Restrictions relating to different operational states of the facility (e.g.
separate authorized limits for maintenance and for normal operation),different seasonal conditions and different environmental dispersion
conditions. For example, a restriction may be specified for facilities
discharging into a river when the river is prone to flooding or when the waterlevel is low because of very dry weather in a particular season. Similarly,
in the case of discharges to a tidal marine environment, the regulatory bodymay specify the period of the tidal cycle at which the discharge should takeplace to ensure maximum dispersion.
Limits on the activities or activity concentrations of radionuclides or groupsof radionuclides that can be discharged in a given time period (e.g. monthly,quarterly, annually).

(c)

(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Requirements for source monitoring and environmental monitoring
programmes and systems and the frequency for reporting of results to
the regulatory body (the regulatory body should specify the form and therequired content of the reports).
Requirements for the maintenance of the appropriate records.
Requirements for the reporting to the regulatory body of proposed
modifications and of any revisions to the radiological environmental impact
assessment.
Actions to be taken in the event of exceeding authorized discharge limits or
breaching operational limits and conditions.
Period of validity of the authorization for discharges for the facility or
activity and interval for the periodic review.

5.67. The discharge limits should include a margin for flexibility to provide for
operational variability and for anticipated operational occurrences. How muchoperational flexibility should be permitted is a matter of judgement on the partof the regulatory body, but as a minimum it should allow for discharges that are
anticipated for normal operation, such as an increase in the throughput of patientsin a nuclear medicine department or an increase in atmospheric discharges froma nuclear power plant during maintenance. Previous experience from similar
facilities can provide useful information on the minimum allowance for flexibility
that should be permitted [31]. The need for operational flexibility should beconsidered in setting the discharge limits as part of the optimization process.
5.68. Discharge limits should be specified for different radionuclides, or groupsof radionuclides, depending on:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The feasibility of measurement of the individual radionuclides;
The significance of the radionuclides in terms of dose to the representative
person;The relevance of the measurement of the individual radionuclides as anindicator of the performance of the facility or activity.

5.69. In addition to the discharge limits for groups of radionuclides, discharge
limits could be specified for particular radionuclides. These radionuclides
should be identified on the basis of their special significance, for instancetheir radiological importance (e.g. 137Cs, 60Co) or other aspects, such as theinvolvement of large volumes of liquid or gaseous waste with very low levels ofactivity concentration (e.g. 14C, tritium; see paras 5.33–5.36). In some cases, theregulatory body may also impose limits on specific radionuclides that have low
radiological significance but that provide early indications of important changes
35

in the operational or safety status of the facility (e.g. tritium and noble gases frompurges in the coolant systems or steam systems in nuclear reactors).
5.70. Discharge limits for groups of radionuclides rather than for individual
radionuclides may be appropriate when the radionuclides share relevantcharacteristics so that they can be measured with gross counting techniques.
The use of scaling factors for relating one measured radionuclide to others
should be applied for radionuclides that cannot be promptly analysed as partof routine measurements at a nuclear installation (e.g. 63Ni, 55Fe, 90Sr). Scaling
factors should be derived from a sufficient number of detailed measurements
to determine the characteristic radionuclide composition in the effluents, using
adequate methods and taking into account detection limits. The scaling factors
should be reviewed periodically.
5.71. The grouping of radionuclides should take into account not only thedifferent ways of sampling and quantifying the discharges but also dosimetricconsiderations. For example, airborne discharges from nuclear installations areoften grouped as noble gases, halogens or iodine radioisotopes, and particulates.
This grouping reflects that noble gases result in external exposure of the whole
body, that iodine radioisotopes result in thyroid doses and that particulates
usually present a potential hazard from inhalation or ingestion to all the organs
and tissues of the body.
5.72. The grouping may also be extended to include gross alpha and gross beta
activities. When limits are specified for groups of radionuclides measured bygross alpha or gross beta counting, the discharge limit for the group should be seton the basis of the characteristics of the radionuclide that gives the highest dose
per unit activity discharged. In the case of uranium discharges, a limit expressed
as a mass in kilograms per year, with consideration of the contribution of eachuranium isotope, may be more appropriate than a limit on gross alpha activity.
5.73. The regulatory body should include in the authorization for discharges, orin other regulatory documents, conditions and anomalies to be reported, such as:
(a)
(b)

36

Any levels exceeding the operational limits and conditions relating to
public exposure, including authorized limits on discharges, in accordancewith reporting criteria established by the regulatory body;
Any significant increase in dose rate or concentrations of radionuclides
in the environment that could be attributed to the authorized practice, in
accordance with reporting criteria established by the regulatory body.

Further recommendations on records and reporting are provided inparas 5.88–5.91.
5.74. The operating organization should make available, on request, results fromsource monitoring. This request may be incorporated within the operational limits
and conditions of the authorization or specified in other regulatory documents.
The Annex provides further information on the possible forms of an authorization
for discharges.
DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE
5.75. In order to demonstrate that discharges are in compliance with the limits
and in order to check the assumptions used to evaluate doses to the representative
person, monitoring programmes should be established [9]. Two general types ofmonitoring are appropriate in the context of the control of discharges and therelated public exposure:(a)(b)

Monitoring of the source, which involves measuring activity concentrations
or dose rates at the discharge point or within the activity or facility (i.e. at
the stack or the discharging pipelines or at the reservoirs prior to discharge);
Monitoring of the environment, which involves the measurement ofradionuclide concentrations in environmental media (including foodstuffs
and drinking water) and of doses or dose rates due to sources in theenvironment.

5.76. The requirements for source monitoring and environmental monitoringshould be specified in the authorization for discharges by the regulatory body.
The necessity for and frequency of monitoring should be determined by theassessed level of risk of radiological impact.
5.77. Monitoring programmes should be developed and conducted in linewith a graded approach. For example, routine environmental monitoring is
unlikely to be necessary in the case of discharges from a hospital with a nuclear
medicine department or from a small research laboratory using short lived
radionuclides [9]. Rather, a single monitoring campaign, close to the facility prior
to and at the beginning of operations may be considered by the regulatory bodyas sufficient to verify compliance. However, even for such simpler facilities,changes in operational procedures can lead to increased discharges and as suchmay necessitate a review of the need for monitoring.

37

5.78. Source monitoring and environmental monitoring should normally beundertaken for facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle [9].
5.79. For complex facilities, such as nuclear power plants or reprocessing
facilities, monitoring programmes should also provide an additional means ofchecking the operating conditions of the facility and provide a warning of unusualor unforeseen conditions that might result in unexpected releases.
Monitoring by the operating organization
5.80. The operating organization should establish and use the monitoring
programme to verify and demonstrate compliance with the authorization andto enable adequate assessment of public exposures due to sources for which theoperating organization is responsible. The monitoring programmes developedby operating organizations should be subject to approval by the regulatory
body. RS-G-1.8 [9] provides comprehensive guidance on source monitoring andenvironmental monitoring applicable to the control of discharges. Additional
technical information on programmes and systems for source monitoring andenvironmental monitoring is available in Ref. [22].
5.81. Some secondary objectives, which should usually be fulfilled by amonitoring programme, are to provide information for the public, to maintaina record of the impacts of a facility or an activity on radionuclide levels in theenvironment, and to check the predictions of environmental models in orderto reduce uncertainties in the dose assessment [9]. In accordance with theseobjectives, the monitoring programme should also include the collection of
relevant supporting information, such as meteorological and hydrological datawhen this is considered necessary, in accordance with the radiation risk presented
by the level of discharges.
5.82. The operating organization should establish an appropriate quality
assurance programme covering the control of discharges and the monitoring
programme. The programme should set out the corrective actions that should betaken in the event that deficiencies in control and monitoring are identified. It
should cover both sample collection and measurement.
5.83. Measures to satisfy the following specific conditions should be incorporated
into the quality assurance programmes, as relevant:

38

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Requirements relating to source monitoring and environmental monitoring
and to the collection of representative samples, including the identificationof the environmental media and the associated sampling frequency;
Requirements relating to the accreditation or qualification of analyticallaboratories;20
Procedures for the calibration and performance testing of measurement
equipment;
A programme for the intercomparison of measurements;
A record keeping system;
A reporting procedure that is in compliance with requirements of theregulatory body.

Independent monitoring by the regulatory body
5.84. The regulatory body should make provision for independent monitoring.
The characteristics of independent monitoring and the resources devoted toindependent monitoring should be based on a graded approach and shouldincorporate best practices and scientifically sound analytical methods.
Such monitoring may be undertaken by the regulatory body or on behalfof the regulatory body by another organization that is independent of theoperating organization.
5.85. The purpose of such independent monitoring may be one or more of
the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

To verify the quality of the results provided by the operating organization;
To verify the assessment of doses to the representative person;
To determine the consequences of any unforeseen release ofradioactive material;
To undertake research into exposure pathways, including the contributions
to dose from other sources of exposure;
To provide public reassurance.

Retrospective assessment
5.86. An additional means of demonstrating compliance is to carry out aretrospective assessment of the radiological impact of the discharges. This should
include the assessment of doses to the representative person from measurements
20

If accreditation is used as a means to demonstrate qualification, the related requisites
should be made available to the laboratory concerned.

39

taken as part of the source monitoring or environmental monitoring programmes
and should consider the relevance of the exposure pathways and related
information that were assumed in the prospective assessment of the possible
discharges when setting the limits originally.
5.87. The results of retrospective assessments using environmental monitoringdata should only be compared with the doses used to derive the discharge
limits with careful consideration. Because of the cautious nature of models forenvironmental dispersion and transfer used in prospective dose assessments,
the doses to the representative person determined retrospectively using
environmental monitoring data will, in general, be lower than those calculatedusing data from source monitoring. Measurements in the environment may also
be below limits of detection; may include contributions from other installations,past accidental releases or global fallout from past nuclear weapon tests; or might
not be representative because of the characteristics in the frequency and spatial
coverage of the environmental sampling techniques (which result in data that arelimited in time and space).
Records and reporting
5.88. Records of the results of source monitoring and environmental monitoring
and verification of compliance, including retrospective assessment of theradiological impact of the discharges, should be retained by the operatingorganization [9]. The regulatory body should establish the content and thefrequency of the reporting of such results.
5.89. Reports from the discharge monitoring programmes should include themain operational and discharge data in the period covered by the report and aconclusion on trends observed from a comparison with previous results. Such
reports should indicate whether the discharges are within the authorized limits
established by the regulatory body or as approved for particular operating
conditions. Results of audits and inspections, as well as documents relating to thequality assurance or quality control of laboratory analytical procedures and data,
should be included in the reports, as relevant.
5.90. The operating organization should make provisions to report promptly to theregulatory body any releases exceeding specified reporting levels or authorizeddischarge limits, in accordance with criteria specified in the authorization for
discharges or in other applicable documents issued by the regulatory body.

40

5.91. The operating organization should also report any significant abnormal
increase in dose rate or concentrations of radionuclides in the environment that
could be attributed to the facility or activity.
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
5.92. The regulatory body should verify compliance with the regulatory
requirements and the operational limits and conditions of the authorization
for discharges. This should involve, as appropriate, auditing of the operatingorganization’s records (including those setting out the results of discharge
monitoring and environmental monitoring), review of the periodic reports on the
results of the radiological environmental impact assessment review, of the resultsof the independent monitoring programmes, and inspection.
5.93. The regulatory body should establish a process for identifying and managing
any identified non-compliance with the regulatory requirements on discharges.
When a regulatory requirement, including a condition of the authorization, has
not been met, the operating organization should, as appropriate:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Investigate the breach and its causes, circumstances and consequences;
Take appropriate action to remedy the circumstances that led to the breachand to prevent a recurrence of similar breaches;
Promptly communicate to the regulatory body the causes of the breach andthe corrective or preventive actions taken or to be taken;
Take whatever other actions are required by the regulatory body.

5.94. The actions to be taken by the regulatory body in response to non-complianceshould be graded in accordance with the seriousness of the failure. Depending on
the national legal and regulatory system, such actions may range from a simple
warning, to legal procedures (including prosecution) and the imposition of fines,
through to the suspension or withdrawal of the authorization.
5.95. The setting of discharge limits takes into account the relevant dose
constraints and the process of optimization, so any breach of discharge limits
will generally not result in a breach of the dose limit. However, any breach ofdischarge limits should be reported to the regulatory body and should result in an
investigation and, if necessary, follow-up actions to improve the situation.

41

Amendment, renewal, suspension or revocation of an authorization
5.96. The regulatory body should establish procedures for any subsequent
amendment, renewal, suspension or revocation of an authorization for discharges.
The date of renewal should be specified in the authorization issued to theoperating organization.
5.97. The results of regulatory actions, such as inspections, reviews andassessments, and feedback from operational performance (e.g. feedback on theexceeding of operational limits and conditions or on incidents) should be taken
into account in making decisions on the amendment, renewal, suspension or
revocation of an authorization.
5.98. The approval of the regulatory body should be obtained before any changes
that may significantly affect doses or the safety of operations are made. Whensuch changes may affect the discharges from the facility, the regulatory bodyshould review the authorization for discharges and revise it as necessary. Anychanges to authorized discharge limits should be communicated to all interested
parties.
INVOLVEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES
5.99. Because the regulatory control of radioactive discharges takes into accountboth operational and societal aspects, such as radioactive waste management in
the facility and the optimization of the level of protection of the public, there are
a number of different interested parties whose views should be considered, as
appropriate. A process resulting in the granting of an authorization for discharges
is likely to necessitate an exchange of information between the regulatory body,the applicant and other interested parties21. Some interested parties may belocated in other States, especially in neighbouring States.
5.100. Any exchange of information relating to the control of discharges may
form part of other decision making processes, for example a governmental
21

In the context of this Safety Guide, ‘interested parties’ typically include individuals
or organizations representing members of the public; industry; government agencies ordepartments whose responsibilities cover public health, nuclear energy and the environment;scientific bodies; the news media; environmental groups [2, 3]; and groups in the population withparticular habits that may be affected significantly by the discharges, such as local producers
and indigenous peoples living in the vicinity of the facility or activity under consideration.

42

decision making process on a major undertaking, such as the constructionof a large nuclear installation.22 Such exchange of information should include
consideration of societal aspects, for example public concern over the risks
associated with radiation exposure, and consideration of the doses to the publicthat might result from discharges during operation.
5.101. In some cases, there may be specific requirements for the exchange of
information with interested parties before the authorization for discharges has
been finalized. One means of doing this is through the establishment of a groupreflecting local public concerns for liaison with both the operating organizationand the regulatory body. Among other things, the results of the prospective
radiological environmental impact assessment [7] should be a focal point of the
discussions.
5.102. Paragraph 3.124 of GSR Part 3 [3] establishes a requirement to exchange
information with other States when a discharge could cause public exposuresin these States, for example if a facility will discharge into an international
waterway or when the representative person is located in a neighbouring State.23

6. CONSIDERATION OF EFFLUENTS CONTAINING
RADIONUCLIDES OF NATURAL ORIGIN IN
DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES
6.1. In general, for facilities and activities authorized in accordance with therequirements established in GSR Part 3 [3], there is no distinction in the generalapproach for controlling the release of effluents containing radionuclides ofartificial origin or radionuclides of natural origin, for example discharges from
nuclear installations and from uranium and thorium mining and processing
facilities within the nuclear fuel cycle. This same general approach involves theuse of dose limits, dose assessment, dose constraints and optimization of the22

GSG-10 [7] addresses the information relevant for different interested parties, in theframework of governmental decision making and authorization processes relating to facilities
and activities.
23
Information exchange and, in some cases, consultation with the public and otherinterested parties are policy requirements for environmental decisions in some States, forexample for parties to the Aarhus Convention [32].

43protection and safety  or best available techniques as relevant  in accordancewith the national regulations.
6.2. Some non-nuclear industries may release effluents containing radionuclides
of natural origin. In some States, some of these industries involving naturally
occurring radioactive material are controlled by national authorities other than
the regulatory body; therefore, discharges might not be subject to regulatory
control with respect to radioactive substances. When necessary, the regulatory
body should cooperate with other national authorities with responsibilities forthe regulation of those industries and should coordinate actions regarding thecontrol of releases to ensure that radiation protection is taken into account in the
management of any effluents.24
6.3. Non-nuclear industries that could generate controlled releases of effluentscontaining radionuclides of natural origin include onshore and offshore facilities
for oil and gas extraction, surface and underground mineral mines, mills andprocessing facilities outside the nuclear fuel cycle, and the production of rare earth
metals, fertilizers, phosphogypsum, thorium, titanium and ceramics using zircon
sands. Effluents from the extraction processes used for heavy metals usually also
contain naturally occurring radionuclides. Most of the radionuclides of natural
origin associated with these industries are found in products, by-products andsolid waste. For example, in the phosphate industry, fertilizers contain enhanced
levels of uranium, while phosphogypsum waste usually contains enhanced levelsof radium. During the production of rare earth elements, radionuclides from theuranium and thorium series are enhanced in the residues.
6.4. Within non-nuclear industries involving naturally occurring radioactive
material, atmospheric or liquid releases should be controlled in accordance withthe requirements for discharges from planned exposure situations if the activity
concentration in the material of any radionuclide in the uranium decay chain or
the thorium decay chain is greater than 1 Bq/g or if the activity concentration of40
K is greater than 10 Bq/g [3]. In cases in which the activity concentrations are
below 1 Bq/g or 10 Bq/g, as relevant, the regulatory body may still require an
assessment of the doses delivered based on actual exposure scenarios.

24

Safety Reports and a Technical Report have been issued on radiation protection andradioactive waste management in industrial activities involving naturally occurring radioactive
material (see Refs [33–39]).

44

6.5. Paragraph I.4 of schedule I of GSR Part 3 [3] states:“For radionuclides of natural origin, exemption of bulk amounts of material
is necessarily considered on a case by case basis…by using a dose criterionof the order of 1 mSv in a year, commensurate with typical doses due tonatural background levels of radiation.”
It should be taken into account that the criterion used for the exemption of bulk
amounts of material containing radionuclides of natural origin is higher thanthe criterion normally adopted in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-8,
Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment [6], and in this Safety
Guide, for defining the possible range of values of dose constraints for public
exposure (i.e. below the dose limit for an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year andhigher than a dose of the order of 10 µSv in a year). This higher criterion forradionuclides of natural origin should be taken into account when dose constraints
are specified for these situations, as appropriate. The specification and use ofdose constraints is described in the Annex.
6.6. Some important differences that should be taken into account in specifying
the operational limits and conditions associated with an authorization for
discharges for facilities and activities discharging radionuclides of natural origin
or for non-nuclear industries releasing naturally occurring radioactive material tothe environment, as relevant, are the following:
(a)

(b)

(c)

The releases are not always from a point source and often originate fromlarge surface areas of stored material. This means that the determinationof source terms and dispersion in the environment may be quite difficult
and uncertain. For existing facilities, surveys should therefore be conducted
to determine the geometry and characteristics of the release (point source
versus area source). Alternatively, use may be made of appropriate models
for assessing the impact of area sources.
Greater reliance may need to be placed on environmental monitoring inassessing and verifying doses to the representative person. However, inregions with a relatively high level of natural background radiation, any
increment in environmental levels of radiation caused by the discharge
may be masked by the natural variability in natural background levels ofradiation.
Specific assessments should be carried out to identify media to be includedin the environmental monitoring programme so that any increment inenvironmental levels of radiation may be followed in time.

45

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Doses from radon may need to be assessed where large quantities ofmaterials containing uranium or radium are handled or stored, including
waste piles. Radioactive dust may be released through ventilation systems
or resuspended from waste piles. In this case, monitoring of radon and dust
near venting stacks and waste piles should be performed.
The cleaning of tanks and pipes (such as those used within some oil andgas industries) that contained residues with elevated levels of radium may
result in liquid, aerosol or solid radioactive waste; the need for regulationof such waste should be considered.
Seasonal variation in rainfall may affect the radioactive releases and theradiological impact of liquid effluents from mining and processing facilities
or activities (e.g. when the storage or processing of minerals in open pits
is part of the process). For example, in the dry season, the dilution of thereleases may be lower and the releases of aerosols and gases such as radon
may be higher. Furthermore, sedimentation in periods of low water flow
may be followed by remobilization of deposited sediments in periods ofhigh rainfall.
The hazard associated with the non-radioactive components of thedischarge may be more significant than the hazard associated with theradioactive components; in these cases the non-radioactive components ofthe discharge will normally determine the stringency of the controls to be
exercised over the discharge.

The discharge of radionuclides from facilities involving large amounts of naturally
occurring radioactive material is the result of a complex interaction of geological,
climatic and technological factors. Radiation exposure of members of the public
resulting from such discharges involves many exposure pathways, and the levelof exposure per unit discharge rate depends on quite a number of site specificconditions. Such site specific conditions can result in very large differences in thedose per unit discharge rate between different sites. Consequently, no simple andgeneral relationship exists between the discharge rate and the effective dose tomembers of the public. However, a detailed site specific analysis is not warranted
when, on the basis of a generalized and cautious (conservative) approach, it canbe concluded that the discharges are of no radiological significance.25

25

Reference [40] provides information on the use of reference discharge situations for
effluents from industries involving naturally occurring radioactive material.

46

7. CONTROL OF DISCHARGES DURING
DECOMMISSIONING
7.1. Decommissioning is a post-operational situation that should be considered
as a different practice subject to authorization, requiring specific regulatory
provisions [41], including for discharges. In general, two main options fordecommissioning should be considered:(a)(b)

Permanent shutdown of the facility, followed by its immediate dismantling;
Permanent shutdown of the facility, with dismantling deferred to a laterdate.

7.2. It is typical for effluent discharges to vary through the different phases ofdecommissioning. For example, as the removal of radioactive hazards progresses
through decommissioning, the radioactive discharges may decrease.
7.3. Immediate dismantling of the facility increases the likelihood of mobilizing
and potentially releasing radionuclides that might not otherwise have beenreleased. Deferred dismantling will allow time for some radioactive decay tooccur.
7.4. The anticipated discharge levels following permanent shutdown of a facility
are usually much lower than during the operational period, since any short lived
radionuclides will have decayed. Furthermore, the likelihood of large accidental
releases is reduced. However, for some dismantling activities, there may be anincreased likelihood of low level unplanned liquid or gaseous releases.
7.5. Whichever of the two main options is chosen, consideration should begiven to the following aspects:
(a)

(b)
(c)

The possibility of additional radionuclides being discharged that were
not present in routine discharges during normal operation. For example,alpha emitters, which might not have been present in the discharge during
operation, might be discharged when a nuclear installation is dismantled.
The need for a survey of these additional radionuclides in the environment
to determine pre-existing levels.
The possibility that any contamination on the site that resulted from incidents
during operation may affect the discharges during decommissioning.

47

(d)
(e)

(f)

The need to revise the radiological environmental impact assessment prior
to dismantling of the facility to determine, in particular, if new exposure
pathways need to be included.
The need to revise the authorization for discharges, including any
conditions relating to the source monitoring and environmental monitoring
programmes to take account of any differences identified. The monitoring
programmes should be sufficiently robust to detect abnormal orunauthorized discharges.
The need for more frequent inspections by the regulatory body, particularly
while radioactive liquids remain in the facility.

7.6. The dismantling of nuclear installations usually takes place progressively
over several years and is usually divided into different stages. Discharges of
effluents containing radionuclides typically vary through these steps, and theregulatory control should be applied on a case by case basis. Protection and safety
should be optimized at each step in the decommissioning process, with accountbeing taken of the experience gained in the previous steps. Because unexpecteddifficulties and changing conditions may arise during each step, the regulatory
control of discharges should reflect the prevailing conditions in each step.

8. PREVIOUSLY UNREGULATED PRACTICES
8.1. The regulatory body may identify existing practices or sources that alreadydischarge radionuclides to the environment, but not under an authorization as
described in this Safety Guide or under less stringent regulations with respect
to the control of public exposure. This may be the case for some facilities andactivities that began operating prior to the development and full application of
the national regulatory infrastructure that meets the requirements of the IAEA
safety standards [18].
8.2. The regulatory body should, first, establish whether the exposure due to thepractice or source may fall within the scope of regulatory control (i.e. whether
it is excluded from the application of safety standards). If the exposure is not
excluded, the regulatory body should determine whether the provisions for
exemption of the practice can be applied.
8.3. If an authorization for discharges is necessary, as for a new practice,discharges should be adequately characterized, exposure pathways should be48

identified, a prospective radiological environmental impact assessment should
be carried out [7], and a process for defining discharge limits as part of theauthorization for discharges should be conducted.
8.4. The applicability of dose constraints to this previously unregulated source
should be established. Dose constraints for new practices should not be usedwithout proper consideration for previously unregulated practices because, in astrict sense, dose constraints apply only prospectively. However, the regulatory
body may choose also to establish dose constraints for the future operation of an
existing practice.
8.5. In any case, the operating organization should be required to demonstratethat the dose in a year to the representative person from all sources is below
the effective dose limit of 1 mSv. Furthermore, consideration should be given towhether protection and safety can be further optimized.
8.6. Exceptionally, if the assessed annual dose is found to be greater than
1 mSv, the regulatory body should consider setting authorized discharge limits
and operational conditions to ensure that the average annual dose over a five year
period is not more than 1 mSv and that the maximum annual dose is lower than
5 mSv in any single year. During this period in which the averaging of doses isapplied, investigations should be carried out to determine how the discharges canbe reduced so that, within a few years, the dose to the representative person is
below the annual limit of 1 mSv. The authorization should be reviewed after thisperiod, and the regulatory body should consider withdrawing the authorization
for discharges or revising the limits and conditions.
8.7. The limits on effective dose to the representative person should be applied
only to future discharges from the facility. They should not take into account the
total dose resulting from past unregulated operations of the facility. If appropriate,
the contributions to the effective dose from past operations should be addressed
within a framework of remedial actions for an existing situation [3].

49REFERENCES[1] EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMICENERGYAGENCY,INTERNATIONALLABOURORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGYAGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONSENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, IAEA,
Vienna (2006).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety Glossary:
Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 2016 Revision, IAEA,
Vienna (in preparation).
[3] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGYAGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONSENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation
Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Licensing Process for Nuclear
Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-12, IAEA, Vienna (2010).
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operational Limits and Conditions
and Operating Procedures for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. NS-G-2.2, IAEA, Vienna (2000).
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, UNITED NATIONSENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Radiation Protection of the Public and theEnvironment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-8, IAEA, Vienna (2018).
[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, UNITED NATIONSENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Prospective Radiological Environmental Impact
Assessment for Facilities and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-10,
IAEA, Vienna (2018).
[8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection Aspects of
Design for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.13, IAEA,
Vienna (2005).
[9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental and Source
Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. RS-G-1.8, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
[10] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Predisposal Management ofRadioactive Waste from Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors, IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. SSG-40, IAEA, Vienna (2016).
[11] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Near Surface Disposal Facilities forRadioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-29, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

50

[12] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Geological Disposal Facilities forRadioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-14, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
[13] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Borehole Disposal Facilities forRadioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-1, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[14] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOURORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear orRadiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA,
Vienna (2007).
[15] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic Models for Use in
Assessing the Impact of Discharges of Radioactive Substances to the Environment,
Safety Reports Series No. 19, IAEA, Vienna (2001).
[16] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, Occupational Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-7,
IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).
[17] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
Publication 103, Elsevier, Oxford and New York (2007).
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal andRegulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1(Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2016).
[19] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Assessment for Facilities
and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna(2016).
[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Application of the Concepts of
Exclusion, Exemption and Clearance, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.7,
IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[21] UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMICRADIATION, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report to
the General Assembly, with Scientific Annexes, United Nations, New York (2010).
[22] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Programmes and Systems for
Source and Environmental Radiation Monitoring, Safety Reports Series No. 64, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
[23] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Safety Case and Safety
Assessment for the Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. GSG-3, IAEA, Vienna (2013).
[24] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Classification of Radioactive
Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-1, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[25] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Assessing
Dose of the Representative Person for the Purpose of Radiation Protection of the Public
and the Optimisation of Radiological Protection: Broadening the Process, Publication
101, Elsevier, Oxford and New York (2006).

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[26] ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, Radioactive Substances Regulation: Environmental
Principles, Regulatory Guidance Series No. RSR 1, Environment Agency,
Bristol (2010).
[27] Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic(the OSPAR Convention), OSPAR Commission, London (1992).
[28] Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (Codified version), Official
Journal of the European Union L 24, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg (2008).
[29] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 1990
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
Publication 60, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1990).
[30] UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMICRADIATION, Source, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation, Report to the General
Assembly, with Scientific Annexes A and B, UNSCEAR 2012 Report to the General
Assembly, United Nations, New York (2015).
[31] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Setting Authorized Limits forRadioactive Discharges: Practical Issues to Consider, IAEA-TECDOC-1638, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
[32] Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making andAccess to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention), United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva (1998).
[33] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Assessing the Need for Radiation
Protection Measures in Work Involving Minerals and Raw Materials, Safety Reports
Series No. 49, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[34] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and theManagement of Radioactive Waste in the Oil and Gas Industry, Safety Reports Series
No. 34, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[35] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and NORM
Residue Management in the Zircon and Zirconia Industries, Safety Reports Series
No. 51, IAEA, Vienna (2007).
[36] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and NORM
Residue Management in the Production of Rare Earths from Thorium Containing
Minerals, Safety Reports Series No. 68, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
[37] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and NORM
Residue Management in the Titanium Dioxide and Related Industries, Safety Reports
Series No. 76, IAEA, Vienna (2012).
[38] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection andManagement of NORM Residues in the Phosphate Industry, Safety Reports Series
No. 78, IAEA, Vienna (2013).

52

[39] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Extent of Environmental
Contamination by Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) andTechnological Options for Mitigation, Technical Reports Series No. 419, IAEA,
Vienna (2003).
[40] DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSPORT, Effluent and DoseControl from European Union NORM Industries: Assessment of Current Situation and
Proposal for a Harmonised Community Approach, European Commission, Brussels(2003).
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IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 6, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

53

Annex
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GRANTING AN
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES
SPECIFICATION AND USE OF CONSTRAINTS
A–1. Dose constraints for public exposure in planned exposure situations are
required to be set or approved by the government or the regulatory body [A–1].
Dose constraints are set for the specific facility or activity; however, national
authorities may develop generic dose constraints for facilities or activities withsimilar characteristics. In some cases, the applicant for an authorization for
discharges proposes a dose constraint for a particular facility or activity, whichneeds to be defensible, discussed with the regulatory body and agreed on in atimely manner by the regulatory body.
A–2. In order to establish a generic dose constraint, the regulatory body may
consider previous IAEA guidance that suggested 0.3 mSv in a year as an
appropriate default value on the basis of the maximum levels of individual
exposures generally used for optimization in nuclear fuel cycle facilities invarious countries.1 The International Commission on Radiological Protection has
not explicitly recommended a dose constraint for the control of discharges to theenvironment but has also suggested a value of 0.3 mSv per year in relation to thedisposal of radioactive waste and prolonged exposures (see Refs [A–2 to A–4]
and table 8 of Ref. [A–5]). In the requirements for disposal of radioactive waste
established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5, Disposal of Radioactive
Waste [A–6], a dose constraint of 0.3 mSv per year for optimization of theprotection of the public is established, to be used in the design, construction,
operation and closure of a disposal facility.
A–3. When setting a specific dose constraint for a particular activity or facility,
the following need to be considered:(a)

The characteristics of the site and of the facility or activity that are relevant
for public exposure;

1

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory Control ofRadioactive Discharges to the Environment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.3,
IAEA, Vienna (2000).

55

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Good practices and experience in the operation of similar facilities or
activities;
The location of the facility or activity;
Dose contributions from other authorized practices and foreseeable future
practices;
The expected exposure conditions.

Other factors, such as economic and societal factors, as well as the views ofinterested parties, would also need to be taken into account.
A–4. When considering the contribution to the exposure of the public fromother authorized sources of radiation, local and distant practices and existingand projected practices need to be considered. For example, for a nuclear
installation, other nuclear installations collocated on the same site or discharging
to the same body of water (particularly rivers and small lakes) could contributeto the exposure of the representative person under consideration; for hospitals
in urban areas, other sources of radiation from other practices in the same area
(e.g. industrial applications, other medical applications) can contribute to the
exposure. On the other hand, in the case of practices in remote areas (e.g. uranium
mining and processing), the assumption that additional local sources of radiation
contribute to the dose might not be appropriate.
A–5. In the case of sites with multiple facilities or for facilities and activities in anarea where more than one source is present that could contribute to the exposureof the representative person, the specific dose constraint may need to be set at an
appropriately low value. On the other hand, for individual facilities or activities
located in extremely remote areas (e.g. a uranium mine), it may be reasonable
to assume that there are no other contributing sources and that, consequently, ahigher specific dose constraint could be set.
A–6. Considering that the dose constraint is set not only to take account ofother existing or planned sources of exposure to the public but also to guidethe optimization of protection for each specific facility or activity, in thecase of multiple facilities or activities on the same site it might not always beappropriate to apportion the generic dose constraints by dividing exactly by
the number of facilities. A specific dose constraint needs to be assigned to eachfacility or activity on the basis of its particular contribution to the exposure of
the representative person, to ensure that, once the protection is optimized withrespect to each source, the resulting combination of doses does not exceed thedose limit.

56

A–7. In the case of a hospital discharging radionuclides to the sewerage system,
the specific dose constraint value may need to be set to take account of the
exposure conditions of workers at a sewage treatment works2 used to collect andprocess liquid discharges from the hospital and from other hospitals using thesame treatment facility.
A–8. As described in previous paragraphs and in Section 5, there are different
aspects to be considered and different options for specifying discharge limits
that can optimize the level of protection of the public; these may include using
best available techniques (see para. 5.39), possibly in combination with theapplication of a dose constraint. States may adopt such different options for the
optimization of protection subject to national regulations, as far as is consistent
with the concept of ensuring that the sum of doses from planned operations forall sources under control remains within the dose limit.
A–9. A scheme illustrating the possible use of a generic dose constraint andspecific dose constraints in establishing discharge limits is presented in Figs A–1
and A–2. The generic dose constraint is to be set below the dose limit of 1 mSv
in a year and above a dose of the order of 10 µSv in a year. Figure A–1 illustrates
Dose limit(1 mSv/a)
Dose lower than limit

Generic dose constraint(e.g. 0.3 mSv/a)Range for specificdose constraint

Dose higher than ~10 µSv/a)(~10 µSv/a)
FIG. A–1. Relationship between a generic dose constraint and a specific dose constraint.

2

Such workers are not normally monitored for occupational exposure and are subject
to the same dose limits as for public exposure (see para. 3.78 of IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic
Safety Standards [A–1]); the representative person may be such a worker.

57

that the specific dose constraint for a facility or activity could be higher or lower
than the generic dose constraint, depending on different factors determining
the exposure conditions at the location of the representative person, such as
the presence of other sources of radiation that can contribute to the dose to therepresentative person, if relevant.
A–10. Figure A–2 illustrates how a specific dose constraint set for a facilityor activity is used as a starting point within the process of optimization to find alevel of discharges that is optimal in terms of protection of the public. A marginfor operational flexibility needs to be allowed, depending on the characteristicsof the activity or facility and its operational features. The dose corresponding
to the discharge limit is set below the specific dose constraint and slightly
above the dose to the public in accordance with which protection is considered
optimized. The margin for flexibility needs to be determined on the basis of thecharacteristics of the facility or activity influencing the discharges and may be
proposed by the applicant and is subject to approval by the regulatory body.
A–11. Figure A–2 also indicates with an arrow the region below the specificdose constraint that is considered for the optimization process, in which best
available techniques could also be used to find the optimal discharge limit.
Optimization and best available techniques are addressed in paras A‒13 to A‒21.

1 mSv/aSpecific dose
constraint

Dose
corresponding
to discharge
limit

Region for processof optimization/BAT
Margin for
operational
flexibility~10 µSv/a
FIG. A–2. Dose to be used for setting discharge limits.

58

A–12. When the technical characteristics of certain facilities and activities
with respect to the retention of radionuclides (e.g. high efficiency containment
and filtering systems in nuclear installations such as nuclear power plants) areconsidered, and particularly when best available techniques for the confinement
and abatement of radionuclides are used, it is possible that the estimateddischarges result in assessed doses below the order of 10 µSv per year. In suchcases, the regulatory body could consider not requiring that a formal process of
optimization, as described in Section 5, be applied.
OPTIMIZATION
A–13. The extent to which a formal process of optimization is applied depends
on the operational status of the facility involved and the doses and risks that
could potentially be involved. As described in Section 5, many options forminimizing discharges may lead to increased generation of solid radioactive
waste and a corresponding trade-off between reduced public exposures andreduced occupational exposures. There could also be safety considerations, suchas an increased risk of accidental spillages or releases from storage tanks [A–7].
A–14. Different considerations will also be involved in the optimizationof protection and safety for proposed and existing facilities or activities. The
design stage of a new facility or activity is likely to involve complex technicaldecisions that may require the use of formal decision aiding techniques. At thisstage, there may be a broad range of possible designs and there is the potential for
designing the facility such that waste and discharges arising from its operation
are reduced, thereby reducing both occupational exposure and public exposure.
However, during the operational stage, the options for reducing public exposures
are more restricted than during design, owing to the more limited possibilities
of introducing changes in the systems and processes for reducing radioactive
waste and effluents. Optimization of public protection for ongoing discharges
is often undertaken by considering the configurations of the available technicaloptions and the associated procedures, based on the operational experience,in an interactive manner between the regulatory body and the operatingorganization [A–8].
A–15. Consideration of management options for radioactive waste andeffluents includes the evaluation of requirements for design and operationalfeatures, storage and treatment (including radionuclide abatement techniques),
and the prevention of spills. For new facilities, protection and safety canbe optimized through the design. Before decommissioning is commenced,
59

protection and safety can be optimized through the selection of appropriate
options for decommissioning. In the operational and decommissioning stagesof the facility, there may be fewer options available to optimize protection andsafety. However, during operation there may be opportunities to review options
for the management of discharges. The management option may then consistof reconfiguring the storage and radionuclide abatement systems of the facility,
or backfitting or upgrading the existing system features. Possible abatement
techniques for the removal of radionuclides and control methods for effluents aredescribed elsewhere [A–8].
A–16. Different decision aiding techniques may be employed to facilitate theoptimization process. The most common decision aiding techniques addressedin the literature are cost–benefit analysis and multi-attribute analysis, althoughother techniques also exist. Information on decision aiding techniques is provided
in Ref. [A–9], and further information is given in Ref. [A–8] in relation to thecontrol of discharges.
A–17. A number of societal and economic factors may influence the decisionon the optimized level of discharge. The effects on future generations, the ability
to control exposures, the amount of information available for making informed
decisions, and the views of interested parties may also be considered. The needto accommodate and balance the requirements of different strategies also needs
to be considered (e.g. the requirements to reduce discharges, with associatedrequirements for waste treatment measures that will increase the generation ofsolid waste, and the principle of waste minimization).
A–18. Societal and economic factors that need to be considered are dependent
on the characteristics of the activity or facility under consideration and on site
specific attributes, as well as on the political and social pressures within a State.
A list of such considerations is provided in Ref. [A–8].
A–19. An important aspect that has to be taken into account is the international
obligations of the State established through binding regional and international
conventions relating to the protection of people and the environment. Conventions
for the prevention of marine environment pollution, such as the Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR
Convention) [A–10], the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environmentof the Baltic Sea Area (the Helsinki Convention) [A–11] and the Convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (theLondon Convention) [A–12], may impose additional requirements that have to
be included as part of the optimization process. For example, Contracting Parties60

to the OSPAR Convention have committed to applying best available techniques
and best environmental practice including, where appropriate, clean technology,
in their efforts to prevent and eliminate marine pollution due to discharges fromland based installations [A–13].
USE OF BEST AVAILABLE TECHNIQUES
A–20. When properly specified, the use of best available techniques is aneffective approach to optimization that focuses on techniques and technology forprotection. The International Commission on Radiological Protection recognizes
that for the control of radioactive emissions to the environment, best available
techniques not entailing excessive cost may be used [A–7].
A–21. Within the context of European Union Directive 2008/1/EC on integrated
pollution prevention and control [A–14]3, the term ‘best available techniques’ isdefined as follows:—— ‘Best’, as used in relation to techniques, means the most effective inachieving a high general level of protection of the environment as a whole.
—— ‘Available techniques’ means those techniques developed on a scale thatallows implementation in the relevant class of activity under economicallyand technically viable conditions, taking into consideration the costs andadvantages, whether or not the techniques are used or produced within theState, as long as they are reasonably accessible to the person carrying out
the activity.
—— ‘Techniques’ includes both the technology used and the way in which
the installation is designed, built, managed, maintained, operated anddecommissioned.

3

The European Commission has developed a series of reference documents on theapplication of best available techniques to specific industries, such as the reference documents
under the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive and the Industrial
Emissions Directive (IED); these documents provide information on relevant techniques,
processes used, current emission levels, techniques to consider in determining best available
techniques and emerging techniques. See: http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reference/.

61

CHARACTERIZATION OF DISCHARGES
A–22. As outlined in paras 5.20–5.24 of this Safety Guide, once the need for an
authorization has been confirmed, the applicant should characterize the nature of
the discharges. For instance, this characterization could be in terms of:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

The industrial process or activity and the assumptions made about thedischarges it generates;
The radionuclide composition;
The chemical and physical form of the radionuclides (relating to behaviourin the environment);
Routes of discharge and discharge points, including aspects such as
stack height, exit velocity, exit temperature, maximum and average
discharge rates;
The total amount of the various radionuclides expected to be discharged in
one year;
The expected time pattern of discharge, including the need for andlikelihood of increased short term discharges if a constant release ratecannot be assumed.

A–23. For existing regulated facilities, information on the characteristics ofactual discharges will already exist as a result of the monitoring programmes, andthese characteristics may be considered to support the process of periodic safety
review [A–8]. For new or previously unregulated facilities, it may be possible
to characterize the discharges on the basis of knowledge of similar facilities
elsewhere or on the basis of engineering analysis. In either case, it is generally
necessary to understand the way in which particular effluents are produced todetermine the relationship between the discharges and operational parameters,such as energy production figures for nuclear power plants, and the possible
effect that waste treatment or waste abatement techniques might have on theamount discharged.
FORMS OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCHARGES
A–24. Authorized discharge limits can be set in a number of ways and canbe based on limiting either the dose to the representative person, the amount ofradionuclides discharged or the activity concentration in the liquid and gaseous62

effluents.4 In most cases, the choice is a matter of preference and practicality on
the part of the regulatory body, as well as the manner in which the regulatory
body requires the licensee to demonstrate compliance.
A–25. Some regulatory bodies prefer to express the limit in terms of a dose,
because it relates directly to the actual radiological impact and makes theobjective of the system of limitation of discharges more evident. Setting limits
in terms of amounts of activity or activity concentration of radionuclides to bedischarged, on the other hand, is viewed by other regulatory bodies to reflect
more closely the quantity that is to be controlled and measured, and is therefore
more closely connected to the actions that the operating organization needs totake to control discharges.
A–26. Expressing limits in terms of a dose (i.e. in millisieverts per year) orin terms of an amount of activity or activity concentration of radionuclides
discharged (e.g. becquerels per year or becquerels per litre) does not represent
a fundamental difference. The use of either approach is justified, because adose to the representative person and an amount of radionuclides (or activity
concentration) are broadly proportional, and one can be converted to the otherwithout difficulty. However, while an amount or a concentration of radionuclides
is a directly measurable quantity, the dose to members of the public is always
based on an assessment [A–8].
Grouping of radionuclides
A–27. When discharge limits are specified in terms of the quantity ofradionuclides discharged, separate limits are usually specified for different
radionuclides. Exceptions are cases in which the facility discharges only a few
radionuclides, such as a hospital using only iodine or 99mTc. For most facilities
and activities, a mixture of radionuclides is discharged. In such cases, it isunusual to set limits for each individual radionuclide, because such an approachis considered cumbersome and unnecessary; instead, one limit for a group ofradionuclides may be used. Factors influencing the choice of radionuclide groups
include the feasibility of measuring one or more radionuclides within the group,
their use as indicators of the performance of the facility and their contribution to
the dose to the representative person.

4

If the discharge limit is set in terms of activity concentration, it has to be related to a
total activity or a total volume of the effluents for a given period, usually per year.

63

A–28. For larger facilities that discharge a variety of radionuclides, limits are
generally imposed on groups of radionuclides that share similar characteristics,
although limits may also be imposed on specific radionuclides that are deemed to
be of special significance. Guidance on the grouping of radionuclides is provided
in paras 5.70–5.72. Tritium and 14C are of special significance and should beconsidered for specific limits and consideration (see para. 5.69).
A–29. The grouping of radionuclides is appropriate in situations in which
members of some radionuclide groups are usually discharged in fairly fixedproportions and, therefore, the occurrence of one radionuclide indicates thepresence of the others in the group. Such grouping has the merit of simplicity
both in the formulation of the limits and in their application. The radionuclideof the group that is most easily detected at the desired sensitivity is often used in
specifying the discharge limit for the group.5
A–30. In some cases, a regulatory body may include in the authorization for
discharges limits on specific radionuclides that provide early indications ofchanges in the operational status of the facility or that make an exceptionallyhigh contribution to the total dose to the representative person. When limits are
specified for groups of radionuclides, the approach is usually to set the limit for
the group on the basis of the characteristics of the most radiotoxic radionuclideof the group.
Site specific or facility specific limits
A–31. Discharge limits may be specified either for the whole site, for each unit
within a site, or even for each discharge point, such as a stack or a pipe. A unit inthis context means an identifiable entity that generates airborne or liquid waste.
For example, at a large hospital there may be a nuclear medicine facility, a waste
treatment facility and an incinerator, each of which has its own discharge pointand each of which could be considered as a separate and independent unit onwhich discharge limits may be imposed. At a nuclear power plant site, each unit
may be a nuclear reactor. In general, the regulatory body will impose discharge
limits for each individual unit, but in some cases the regulatory body will impose
only a site limit, with no limits for individual units [A–8].

5

Periodic review may need to be undertaken if there is reason to believe that the ratioof the various radionuclides in the group might change.

64

Time interval for demonstrating compliance
A–32. The basic interval over which compliance is expected to be shown isnormally one year, usually a calendar year, although a rolling 12 month period
is also used. The advantage of the latter approach is that it may permit closer
supervision of the facility by the regulatory body, but it is administratively morecumbersome to implement. In some cases, the interval can be tied to operating
cycles of the activity, which may be longer than one year.
A–33. Although annual discharge limits are almost always used and areconsidered as the primary means of regulatory control, some regulatory bodies
consider the need to establish discharge limits for shorter periods (e.g. on amonthly or quarterly basis). This could be justified if there is concern that thevalidity of the averaging assumptions used in setting annual discharge limits (e.g.
in the estimation of the dose to the representative person) is not applicable if
short term increased discharges occur. For such cases, dose assessments using
assumptions valid for the shorter periods need to be carried out.
A–34. Parameters used to estimate the doses that form the basis for setting
discharge limits are typically chosen to be representative of annual averages.
For example, the prevailing wind direction and speed, the stability category of
the atmosphere, and the dietary habits assumed are usually annual averages.
It is possible that a facility may discharge a significant fraction of its annual
allowance over a short period or a series of short periods. Short term limits are
therefore often specified in addition to annual limits. Short term limits also allow
the regulatory body to more closely monitor the facility’s performance and to
take action if operations fail to meet the short term limits. Short term limits are
generally higher than the prorated value for the applicable duration, to allow for
operational flexibility [A–8].
A–35. Consideration also needs to be given to setting discharge limits for
those facilities at which total discharges are generally low but at which specific
events can result in short term discharges without markedly affecting the longterm average discharges (e.g. replacement of the molybdenum generators in atechnetium production facility or discharges from hospitals treating patients withradioiodine).
Operational flexibility
A–36. Discharge limits are set by taking account of dose constraints and theneed for optimization, so a breach of a discharge limit might not result in a breach65

of the dose limit; indeed, the main intent of the regulatory control of discharges
is to avoid the breaching of the dose limit. Exceeding discharge limits would
normally initiate actions by the licensee and the regulatory body (e.g. a report, aninvestigation, corrective measures, inspections), even if the resulting doses to the
public were assessed to be below the dose limits. To avoid frequent contraventionsof regulatory requirements that would result in significant and unnecessary
expenditure of resources, public misperception and frequent interference with theoperation of the facility, some margin for operational flexibility may be allowed
when setting discharge limits.
A–37. The margin for operational flexibility needs to allow for what would be
anticipated under normal operating events [A–8]. Such events include practices
or facility conditions that lead to a temporary increase in discharge levels of
relatively short duration, usually hours to days, but which are not consideredabnormal events. Examples are an increased number of patients in a nuclear
medicine department or a temporary failure or loss of efficiency of an effluent
treatment system.
A–38. Specific guidance cannot be provided to assist in determining theappropriate margin to allow for operational flexibility. Previous experience withsimilar facilities can provide useful information on the minimum allowancefor flexibility that needs to be permitted, in accordance with the regulatory
framework [A–8].
Period of validity of the authorization for discharges
A–39. While in principle the authorization for discharges could have the same
validity period as the authorization of the facility or activity, some regulatory
bodies issue authorizations for discharges that have a shorter period of validity
or specify that the discharge limits are subject to revision within the frameworkof a periodic safety review. In such cases, at the end of the period of validity, theauthorization for discharges is reviewed, and updated as necessary, on the basis ofcurrent information relating to public exposure and operational experience. The
usual period for the periodic safety review of more complex installations is ten
years. The appropriate period is generally selected by the regulatory body on thebasis of, for example, the likelihood of the occurrence of changes at the site andits surrounding environment that might affect the conditions according to which
the authorization for discharges was initially issued. Some regulatory bodies may
decide to review and update the authorizations at any time, as necessary, and do
not apply a specified limit on the validity of the authorization for discharges.

66

A–40. Operating organizations are required to obtain approval from theregulatory body before making any changes to the operation of the facility or
the conduct of the activity that may affect doses significantly or affect the safetyof operations. If a number of changes are made over a period of time, there may
be a change in the safety performance of the facility or activity that can only
be evaluated through a complete review of the overall operation. The periodof validity is also influenced by the degree of ongoing review and supervision
provided by the regulatory body, and by the breadth and depth of such ongoing
reviews. In some cases, such ongoing reviews are of such a depth and scope thatthey constitute, in themselves, a formal review of the authorization for the facilityor activity.
A–41. In other cases, the period of validity of the authorization for discharges
may be equal to the expected life of the facility or activity. Such practices would
normally have stringent ongoing review and audit requirements imposed in theirauthorization, for example a requirement that a periodic safety review be carriedout irrespective of whether there have been any significant changes in operation
or in dose assessment factors such as the demographics or land use in the areas
surrounding the facility. The ongoing reviews and audits would ensure that theassumptions used to estimate doses to the representative person, such as thesource term, the location where the representative person lives, the habit dataand other assumptions (e.g. the locations of dairy farms and vegetable gardens)
remain valid. Any significant changes are generally required to be reported to theregulatory body, which may decide to initiate a formal review of the authorization
for discharges, if relevant.

67

REFERENCES TO THE ANNEX[A–1] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGYAGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONSENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety
Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
[A–2] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION,
Radiological Protection Policy for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Publication 77,
Pergamon Press, Oxford (1997).
[A–3] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION,
Radiation Protection Recommendations as Applied to the Disposal of Long-Lived
Solid Radioactive Waste, Publication 81, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1998).
[A–4] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION,
Protection of the Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation Exposure, Publication
82, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1999).
[A–5] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION,
The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on RadiologicalProtection, Publication 103, Elsevier, Oxford and New York (2007).
[A–6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Disposal of Radioactive Waste,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
[A–7] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION,
Assessing Dose of the Representative Person for the Purpose of Radiation Protectionof the Public and The Optimisation of Protection: Broadening the Process, Publication
101, Elsevier, Oxford and New York (2006).
[A–8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Setting Authorized Limits forRadioactive Discharges: Practical Issues to Consider, IAEA-TECDOC-1638, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
[A–9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Optimization of Radiation
Protection in the Control of Occupational Exposure, Safety Reports Series No. 21,
IAEA, Vienna (2002).
[A–10] Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic(the OSPAR Convention), OSPAR Commission, London (1992).
[A–11] Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area(the Helsinki Convention), HELCOM, Helsinki (1992).
[A–12] Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (the London Convention), International Maritime Organization,
London (1972).
[A–13] PARCOM Recommendation 91/4 of 20 June 1991 on Radioactive Discharges (1991),
OSPAR Commission, London (1991)

68

[A–14] Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January
2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (Codified version),
Official Journal of the European Union L 24, Office for Official Publications of theEuropean Communities, Luxembourg (2008).

69

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Asfaw, K.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Berkovskyy, V.

Ukrainian Radiation Protection Institute, Ukraine

Boal, T.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Bonchuk, I.

Ukrainian Radiation Protection Institute, Ukraine

Cabianca, T.

Public Health England, United Kingdom

Chartier, M.

Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety,
FranceConatser, R.L.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States ofAmerica

Dehmel, J.-C.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States ofAmerica

Hamlat, M.S.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canada

Harman, N.

Amec, United Kingdom

Iimoto, T.

University of Tokyo, Japan

Jones, K.

Public Health England, United Kingdom

Kliaus, V.

Republican Scientific and Practical Centre of Hygiene,
Belarus

Linsley, G.

Consultant, United Kingdom

Proehl, G.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Robinson, C.

United Nations Environment Programme

Rochedo, E.

National Nuclear Energy Commission, Brazil

Simmonds, J.

Consultant, United Kingdom

Telleria, D.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Thompson, P.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canada

Walker, J.

Consultant, Canada

Wrixon, A.D.

Consultant, Austria

71

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Safety through international standards“Governments, regulatory bodies and operators everywhere mustensure that nuclear material and radiation sources are usedbeneficially, safely and ethically. The IAEA safety standards aredesigned to facilitate this, and I encourage all Member States tomake use of them.”
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