Joint Publication 2-0

Joint Intelligence

22 October 2013

This revised edition of JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, reflects the current guidance for
conducting joint and multinational intelligence activities across the range of military
operations. This vital keystone publication forms the core of joint intelligence doctrine andlays the foundation for our forces’ ability to fully integrate operations, plans, and intelligence
into a cohesive team. The overarching constructs and principles contained in this publication
provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint intelligence operations
in cooperation with our multinational partners, other US Government agencies, andintergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.
As our Nation continues into the 21st century, joint intelligence organizations andcapabilities will continue to evolve as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges.
The guidance in this publication will enable current and future leaders of the Armed Forcesof the United States to organize, train, and execute worldwide missions to counter the threats
posed by adaptive adversaries.
I encourage all leaders to study and understand the doctrinal concepts and principles
contained in this publication and to teach these to your subordinates. Only then will we beable to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. To that
end, I request you ensure the widest possible distribution of this keystone joint publication. I
further request that you actively promote the use of all joint publications at every
opportunity.

MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army

PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication is the keystone document for joint intelligence. It provides
fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis
for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during
operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military
guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force
commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It
provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing theforce and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unityof effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components ofthese commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents ofService publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally incoordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (allianceor coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified
by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine andprocedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

iPreface

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JP 2-0SUMMARY OF CHANGESREVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 2-0
DATED 22 JUNE 2007•

Clarified the term “intelligence interrogation” and provided specificpublications for guidance.

•

Explained the joint intelligence process and rewrote the section to better
develop its characteristics.

•

Added the term “sociocultural analysis (SCA).” The phrase “other relevant
actors” was included in the SCA explanation to cover not only directadversaries, but any person or group that may aid the adversary.

•

Added a description of “identity intelligence” and grouped it under production
categories.

•

Added the definition “collection strategy” and modified the terms “collectionplan” and “collection requirement.”•

Changed the term “indication and warning” to “warning” and modified thedefinition of “warning.”•

Clarified the distinction between the term “red cell” and “red team.”iii

Summary of Changes

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JP 2-0TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE
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Introduction ................................................................................................................. I-1
The Roles and Responsibilites of Joint Intelligence ................................................... I-3
The Joint Intelligence Process .................................................................................... I-5
Intelligence and the Levels of War ........................................................................... I-23
Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations ................................................... I-25
The Role of Intelligence in Military Operations ....................................................... I-27

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE
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Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1
Perspective .................................................................................................................II-1
Synchronization—Synchronize Intelligence with Plans and Operations ..................II-2
Integrity—Remain Intellectually Hones ....................................................................II-3
Unity of Effort—Cooperate to Achieve a Common Objective .................................II-4
Prioritization—Prioritize Requirements Based on Commander’s Guidance.............II-6
Excellence—Strive to Achieve the Highest Standards of Quality.............................II-6
Prediction—Accept the Risk of Predicting Adversary Intentions .............................II-9
Agility—Remain Flexible and Adapt to Changing Situations ................................II-10
Collaboration—Leverage Expertise of Diverse Analytic Resources.......................II-11
Fusion—Exploit All Sources of Information and Intelligence ................................II-12

CHAPTER III
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIESDefense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community ............................................ III-1
Defense and Joint Intelligence Organizations.......................................................... III-6
Intelligence Federation............................................................................................. III-9
Command and Staff Intelligence Responsibilities .................................................. III-9

CHAPTER IVINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PLANNING, EXECUTING, AND ASSESSINGJOINT OPERATIONSSECTION A. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING Overview .................................................................................................................. IV-1
SECTION B. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING Joint Operation Planning.......................................................................................... IV-2v

Table of Contents
SECTION C. THE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS Intelligence Planning Lines of Effort ....................................................................... IV-2
 Intelligence Planning Activities During Strategic Guidance .................................. IV-4
 Intelligence Planning Activities During Concept Development .............................. IV-7
 Intelligence Planning Activities During Plan Development .................................... IV-8
SECTION D. PLAN ASSESSMENT AND EXECUTION
 Intelligence Support to Plan Assessment and Decision Making ............................. IV-9
 Intelligence Support to the Assessment Process .................................................... IV-10
 Intelligence Support to Strategic and Operational-Level Assessment ................... IV-12
 Tactical-Level Assessment .................................................................................... IV-14
SECTION E. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO EXECUTION BY PHASE General ................................................................................................................... IV-17
 Intelligence Support During the Shape Phase (Phase 0) ........................................ IV-18
 Intelligence Support During the Deter Phase (Phase 1)......................................... IV-19
 Intelligence Support During the Seize the Initiative Phase (Phase II) ................... IV-21
 Intelligence Support During the Dominate Phase .................................................. IV-22
 Intelligence Support During the Stabilize Phase ................................................... IV-22
 Intelligence Support During the Enable Civil Authority Phase ............................. IV-24
CHAPTER V
JOINT, INTERAGENCY, AND MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING
AND COOPERATION
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An Intelligence Sharing Environment ...................................................................... V-1
Principles for Multinational Intelligence Sharing ..................................................... V-2
Principles for Interorganizational Intelligence Collaboration................................... V-4
Requirements and Standards for an Intelligence Sharing Architecture .................... V-5
Components of an Intelligence Sharing Architecture ............................................... V-8

APPENDIXABCDIntelligence Confidence Levels in Analytic Judgments ............................ A-1
Intelligence Disciplines ..............................................................................B-1
References ..................................................................................................C-1
Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... D-1

GLOSSARY
Part I
Part II

Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1
Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE
I-1
I-2
I-3
vi

Relationship of Data, Information, and Intelligence ................................... I-2
Responsibilities of Joint Intelligence ......................................................... I-3
The Intelligence Process.............................................................................. I-6
JP 2-0Table of Contents
I-4
I-5
I-6
I-7
I-8
II-1
II-2
III-1
III-2
III-3
III-4
IV-1
IV-2
IV-3
IV-4
IV-5
IV-6
IV-7
IV-8
IV-9
V-1
V-2
V-3
A-1
B-1

Relationship Between Intelligence Requirements
and Information Requirements .................................................................... I-8
Joint Intelligence Preparation and the
Operational Environment .......................................................................... I-17
Catergories of Intelligence Products ......................................................... I-18
Levels of Intelligence ................................................................................ I-24
The Paradox of Warning ........................................................................... I-29
Principles of Joint Intelligence ...................................................................II-1
Attributes of Intelligence Excellence .........................................................II-7
National Intelligence Leadership Structure .............................................. III-4
Intelligence Support Missions .................................................................. III-8
Commanders’ Intelligence Responsibilites ............................................ III-10
Joint Force Intelligence Directorate of Joint
Staff Responsbilites ................................................................................ III-12
Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions,and Products ............................................................................................. IV-3
Intelligence Planning Lines of Effort ....................................................... IV-4
Notional Intelligence Planning Teamand Related Functions .............................................................................. IV-6
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
and Assessments ..................................................................................... IV-11
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment Support to Plan Assessment ............................................. IV-12
Assessment Levels and Measures .......................................................... IV-13
Identifying Centers of Gravity ............................................................... IV-14
Systems-Oriented Event Template ......................................................... IV-15
Phasing Model ........................................................................................ IV-18
Principles for Multinational Intelligence Sharing ..................................... V-3
Principles for Interorganizational Intelligence Collobation ...................... V-5
Notional Multinational Intelligence Architecture ..................................... V-9
Expressing Confidence in Analytic Judgments ......................................... A-2
Intelligence Disciplines, Subcatergories, and Sources ...............................B-2

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JP 2-0EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEWDescribes the Nature of IntelligencePresents the Principles of Joint IntelligenceDescribes Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities

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Explains Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint
Operations



Addresses Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing andCooperation
The Nature of Intelligence

Information on its own may
be of utility to thecommander, but whenrelated to other information
about the operational
environment andconsidered in the light ofpast experience, it gives rise
to a new understanding of
the information, which may
be termed “intelligence.”

The management and integration of intelligence into
military operations are inherent responsibilities ofcommand. Information is of greatest value when it
contributes to the commander’s decision-making process
by providing reasoned insight into future conditions orsituations. Intelligence provides the commander a varietyof assessments and estimates that facilitate understanding
the operational environment (OE). Intelligence includes
the organizations, capabilities, and processes involved in
the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, anddissemination of information or finished intelligence.
Intelligence products provide users with the informationthat has been collected and analyzed based on theirrequirements.

The Roles andResponsibilities of Joint
Intelligence

The primary role of joint intelligence is to provide
information and assessments to facilitate mission
accomplishment. This role is supported by a series of
specific responsibilities to guide the intelligence
directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and supportingorganizations. These include: inform the commander,
describe the OE; identify, define, and nominate
objectives; support planning and execution of operations;counter adversary deception and surprise; support friendly
deception efforts; and assess the effectiveness ofoperations.

The Joint Intelligence
Process

The joint intelligence process provides the basis forcommon intelligence terminology and procedures. It

ix

Executive Summary
consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence
operations characterized by broad activities conducted byintelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose ofproviding commanders and national-level decision
makers with relevant and timely intelligence. The six
categories of intelligence operations are: planning anddirection; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis
and production; dissemination and integration; andevaluation and feedback. Joint intelligence preparationof the operational environment (JIPOE) is thecontinuous process through which J-2 manages theanalysis and development of products that help thecommander and staff understand the complex andinterconnected OE—the composite of the conditions,circumstances, and influences that affect the employmentof capabilities that bear on the decisions of thecommander.
Intelligence and the Levelsof War...three levels of war:strategic, operational, andtactical...All levels of war
have corresponding levels
of intelligence operations.

Strategic Intelligence consist of the national strategic
intelligence produced for the President, the National
Security Council, Congress, Secretary of Defense(SecDef), senior military leaders, combatant commanders(CCDRs), and other US Government departments andagencies, and theater strategic intelligence that supports
joint operations across the range of military operations,assesses the current situation, and estimates futurecapabilities and intentions of adversaries that could affectthe national security and US or allied interests.
Operational intelligence is primarily used by CCDRs
and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) and theircomponent commanders. Tactical intelligence is used bycommanders, planners, and operators for planning andconducting battles, engagements, and special missions.

Principles of Joint Intelligence
PerspectiveIntelligence analysts should strive to understand all
relevant aspects of the OE. This understanding should
include not only the adversary’s disposition, but also thesociocultural nuances of individuals and groups in the
OE.

Synchronization—(Synchronize Intelligencewith Plans and Operations)Intelligence should be synchronized with operations andplans in order to provide answers to intelligencerequirements in time to influence the decision they areintended to support.

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JP 2-0Executive Summary
Integrity—(RemainIntellectually Honest)

Integrity requires adherence to facts and truthfulness withwhich those facts are interpreted and presented.
Intelligence analysts should take active measures torecognize and avoid cognitive biases which affect theiranalysis.

Unity of Effort—(Cooperate Unity of effort is facilitated by centralized planning anddirection and decentralized execution of intelligenceto Achieve a Common
operations, which enables JFCs to apply all available
Objective)
collection capabilities and processing, exploitation, anddissemination systems, efficiently and effectively.
Prioritization—(Prioritize
Requirements Based on
Commander’s Guidance)

Prioritization offers a mechanism for addressing
requirements and effectively managing risk by identifying
the most important tasks and applying available resources
against those tasks.

Excellence—(Strive to
Achieve the Highest
Standards of Quality)

To achieve the highest standards of excellence,
intelligence products must be: anticipatory, timely,
accurate, usable, complete, relevant, objective, andavailable.

Prediction—(Accept the
Risk of Predicting
Adversary Intentions)

JFCs require and expect timely intelligence estimates that
accurately identify adversary intentions, support offensive
and/or defensive operations, and predict adversary future
courses of action (COAs) in sufficient detail as to beactionable.

Agility—(Remain Flexible
and Adapt to Changing
Situations)

Agility is the ability to quickly shift focus and bring tobear the skill sets necessary to address the new problem athand while simultaneously continuing critical preexistingwork. Intelligence structures, methodologies, databases,
products, and personnel should be sufficiently agile andflexible to meet changing operational situations, needs,
priorities, and opportunities.

Collaboration—(Leverage
Expertise of Diverse
Analytic Resources)

By its nature intelligence is imperfect (i.e., everythingcannot be known, analysis is vulnerable to deception, andinformation is open to alternative interpretations). The
best way to avoid these obstacles and achieve a higher
degree of fidelity is to consult with, and solicit theopinions of, other analysts and experts, particularly inexternal organizations.

xi

Executive SummaryIntelligence Organizations and Responsibilities
Defense Intelligence andthe Intelligence Community

The intelligence community
consists of the 17 member
organizations (DefenseIntelligence Agency,
National Security Agency,
National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance
Office, Army Intelligence,
Navy Intelligence, Air
Force Intelligence, Marine
Corps Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency,
Department of State,
Department of Energy,
Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Departmentof the Treasury, Coast
Guard Intelligence,
Department of Homeland
Security, the Drug
Enforcement
Administration, and the
Office of Director of
National Intelligence).

Defense and Joint
Intelligence Organizations

xii

There are a variety of Department of Defense (DOD) andnational intelligence organizations capable of providing
support to joint operations. During most joint operations,
JFCs will require federated support from the intelligencecommunity (IC) to develop a full understanding of the
OE. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has
overall responsibility for intelligence support to the
President and the day-to-day management of the IC.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I])exercises SecDef’s authority, direction, and control overthe DOD agencies and DOD field activities that are
defense intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), security,
exercise, planning, policy, and strategic oversight over all
DOD intelligence, CI, and security policy, plans, andprograms. The Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) advises SecDef and Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),CCDRs, and USD(I) on all matters concerning militaryand military-related intelligence and is the principal DOD
intelligence representative in the national foreign
intelligence process. Director DIA is the Defense
Collection Manager; Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (JFCC-ISR); Program Manager for the
Joint Reserve Intelligence Program; Defense CI Manager;
and Defense Human Intelligence Manager. The Joint
Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, provides
continuous intelligence support to the CJCS, Joint Staff,
National Military Command Center, and combatantcommands (CCMDs) in the areas of targeting, global
warning intelligence, and current intelligence. The J-2
also has the responsibility for coordinating theintelligence planning (IP) activities of the Services andintelligence combat support agencies (CSAs) in supportof CCDRs. The Service Chiefs, their intelligence and CI
chiefs, and staffs provide intelligence and CI support for
departmental missions related to military systems,
equipment, and training.
In addition to the J-2 staffs at every joint level ofcommand, the key organizations in the defense
intelligence architecture are the CCMD joint intelligence
operations centers (JIOCs), the joint task force (JTF) joint
intelligence support elements (JISEs), JFCC-ISR, and theJP 2-0Executive Summary
joint reserve intelligence centers (JRICs). At the JTF
level, a JISE is normally established; however, a JIOC
may be established at the direction of the JFC based on
the scope, duration, and mission of the unit or JTF. The
National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center isan integrated Joint Staff J-2/Operations Directorate/Plans
Directorate element that monitors the global situation on acontinual basis and provides the CJCS and SecDef a DOD
planning and crisis response capability. The CCMD
JIOCs are the primary intelligence organizations
providing support to joint forces. The JIOC integrates thecapabilities of DNI, Service, CSA, and CCMD
intelligence assets to coordinate IP, collection
management, analysis, and support. Under the directionof the joint force J-2, a JTF JISE normally manages theintelligence collection, production, analysis, anddissemination for a joint force. A JRIC is an intelligenceproduction and training capability enabling Reserve
Component intelligence forces to meet Service
components, CCMDs, CSAs, and IC training, readiness,and operational requirements.
Intelligence Federation

Intelligence federation enables CCMDs to form support
relationships with other theater JIOCs, Service
intelligence centers, JRICs, or other DOD intelligenceorganizations to assist with the accomplishment of thejoint force’s mission. These support relationships, calledfederated partnerships, are preplanned agreements(formalized in operation plans [OPLANs], national
intelligence support plans, or memorandums ofagreement) intended to provide a rapid, flexible, surge
capability enabling personnel from throughout the IC toassist the CCMD while remaining at their normal duty
stations.

Commanders have key roles and responsibilities in theCommand and Staff
Intelligence Responsibilities planning and conduct of intelligence operations. JFCs
organize their joint force staff and assign responsibilities
as necessary to ensure unity of effort and mission
accomplishment.
Commanders’intelligence
responsibilities include: understand intelligence doctrine,
capabilities, and limitations; provide planning guidance;
define the area of interest (AOI); and specify intelligence
priorities. The J-2 assists the JFC in developing strategy,planning operations and campaigns, and tasking
intelligence assets, for effective joint and multinationalxiii

Executive Summary
operations. Additionally, the J-2 is responsible fordetermining the requirements and direction needed toensure unity of the intelligence effort and to support thecommander’s objectives. The CCMD J-2 provides
higher echelons and subordinate commands with a single,
coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national andtheater intelligence into all-source estimates andassessments.
Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
Joint Operation Planning

During the joint operation planning process, CCMD J-2s
lead development of annex B (Intelligence). Annex B is
the intelligence annex to a plan or order that provides
detailed information on the adversary situation,
establishes priorities, assigns intelligence tasks, identifies
required intelligence products, requests support fromhigher echelons, describes the concept of intelligence
operations, and specifies intelligence procedures. The
joint force J-2 products normally include but are notlimited to the following: a description of the operational
area; an evaluation of the adversary; identification ofadversary centers of gravity; prioritized adversary COAs;
event templates; named AOIs and target AOIs; a decision
support template; wargame support; and an intelligencesynchronization matrix.

The Intelligence Planning
Process

IP activities are generally organized along two lines ofeffort (LOEs): providing intelligence support to joint
operation planning and planning intelligence operations.
IP activities along the providing intelligence support tojoint operation planning LOE include the production of
intelligence assessments and estimates of adversary
intentions, capabilities, and COAs. Specific outputs ofthis LOE are the DIA-produced dynamic threat
assessment, or theater intelligence assessment, and thedevelopment of tailored products from the CCMD’s
JIPOE process that culminate in the production andmaintenance of the intelligence estimate. IP activities
along the planning intelligence operations LOE include
identifying information gaps, prioritizing intelligencerequirements, developing federated production andintegrated collection plans, and assessing intelligencecapabilities for the purpose of identifying shortfalls andmitigation strategies. Specific outputs of this LOE are the
CCMD J-2 staff estimate, which identifies availablexiv

JP 2-0Executive Summary
CCMD intelligence capabilities and anticipated shortfalls,
CSA and Service intelligence center estimates, the annex
B (Intelligence) to a campaign or a contingency plan, andwhen appropriate a national intelligence support plan or
the joint intelligence posture assessment.
Intelligence Support to Plan Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progressof their campaigns, and then compare them to their initial
Assessment and Decisionvision and intent. The joint force J-2, through the CCMD
Making
JIOC, assesses adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, andintentions and monitors the OE. The J-2 helps thecommander and staff decide what aspects of the OE tomeasure and how to measure them to determine progress
toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or
achieving an objective. Intelligence personnel use theJIPOE process to provide JFCs and their staffs with adetailed understanding of the adversary and other relevant
aspects of the OE.
Intelligence Support to
Execution by Phase

Intelligence staffs must be familiar with specific phasingarrangements of each command OPLAN because thephasing may differ for specific types of operations.
During execution, intelligence must stay at least one stepahead of operations and not only support the current
phase of the operation, but also simultaneously lay the
informational groundwork required for subsequent
phases. Execution of joint operations requires optimizing
the use of limited intelligence assets and maximizing theefficiency of intelligence production resources and is theultimate test of the efficacy of intelligence support
planning.

Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation
An Intelligence Sharing
Environment

The success of joint and multinational operations andinterorganizational coordination hinges upon timely andaccurate information and intelligence sharing. To prevail,the JFC’s decision and execution cycles must be
consistently faster than the adversary’s and be based on
better information. Being faster and better requires
having unfettered access to the tasking, collection,
processing, analysis, and dissemination of information
derived from all available sources.
Cooperation,
collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an
intelligence and information environment that integrates

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Executive Summary
joint, multinational, and interagency partners in acollaborative enterprise.
Principles for Multinational In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required
to share intelligence with foreign military forces and toIntelligence Sharing
coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. The
principles for multinational intelligence sharing are: alignwith national disclosure policy; maintain unity of effort;
make adjustments to resolve significant differences in
intelligence doctrine and procedures; plan early and plan
concurrently; share necessary information; and conduct
complementary operations.
Principles forInterorganizational
Intelligence Collaboration

Interagency intelligence collaboration should be
encouraged whenever possible consistent with applicablenational, agency, or organizational procedures andclassification guidelines.
The principles forinterorganizational intelligence collaboration are:establish strong relationship networks; build mutual trust
and respect for colleagues; share a common vision;
minimize territorial issues; establish continuous
communication; and eliminate impediments.
CONCLUSION
This publication is the keystone document for joint
intelligence. It provides fundamental principles andguidance for intelligence support to joint operations.

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JP 2-0CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE“By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his
country—the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.”
Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

1. Introduction
The management of and integration of intelligence into military operations are inherent
responsibilities of command. These responsibilities are performed at every echelon ofcommand and across the range of military operations. Technology enables joint force andcomponent commanders and their staffs to access in near-real-time, very large amounts of
information relating to aspects of the operational environment (OE)—the composite of theconditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bearon the decisions of the commander. Information covering a wide range of issues relating tofriendly, neutral, and adversary forces and the civilian populace will be available throughout
the joint force. There will also be a large volume of information concerning weather, terrain,cultural influences, and other aspects of the OE. This mass of information can be distilled
into intelligence to support a predictive estimate of the situation, as well as adversarycapabilities and intentions. It is this estimative nature of intelligence that distinguishes itfrom the mass of other information available to the commander.
a. Information is of greatest value when it contributes to the commander’s
decision-making process by providing reasoned insight into future conditions or situations.
This may occur as a result of its association with other information from the commander’sexperience. Raw data by itself has relatively limited utility. However, when data iscollected from a sensor and processed into an intelligible form, it becomes information andgains greater utility. Information on its own may be of utility to the commander, but whenrelated to other information about the OE and considered in the light of past experience, it
gives rise to a new understanding of the information, which may be termed “intelligence.”
The foundation of the process that produces intelligence is built by analysts relating orcomparing information against other information or a database, and drawing conclusions.
The relationship between data, information, and intelligence is graphically depicted in FigureI-1. Ultimately, intelligence has two critical features that distinguish it from information.
Intelligence allows anticipation or prediction of future situations and circumstances, and it
informs decisions by illuminating the differences in available courses of action (COAs).
b. Intelligence provides the commander a variety of assessments and estimates thatfacilitate understanding the OE. Assessments are situational, for example some assessments
will be threat-based providing an analysis of threat capabilities and intentions; others are
population-based, providing the commander an analysis of sociocultural factors. Withpredictive, accurate, and relevant intelligence estimates, commanders gain an advantage in
the OE by understanding an adversary’s decision-making cycle, and possibly predicting and

I-1

Chapter I

Relationship of Data, Information, and Intelligence

Operational
Environment

Data

Collection

Information

Processing
andExploitation

Intelligence

Analysis
andProduction

Figure I-1. Relationship of Data, Information, and Intelligence

countering adversarial operations. Regardless of the situation, intelligence assessments andestimates enable commanders to formulate plans and make better decisions based on thisknowledge. Thus, predictive, accurate, and relevant intelligence can mitigate the risks
inherent in military operations and increase the likelihood of success.
c. Intelligence is not an exact science; intelligence analysts will have some uncertainty
as they assess the OE, as should the commander and staff as they plan and execute
operations. Intelligence, as the synthesis of quantitative analysis and qualitative judgment issubject to competing interpretation. It is therefore important that intelligence analysts
communicate the degree of confidence they have in their analytic conclusions. Suchcommunication of analytic confidence helps intelligence consumers in deciding how muchweight to place on intelligence assessments when making a decision. One methodology
intelligence personnel may use to assign a confidence level to their analytic conclusions or
intelligence assessments is discussed in Appendix A, “Intelligence Confidence Levels in
Analytic Judgments.”
d. Intelligence includes the organizations, capabilities, and processes involved in thecollection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information or finishedintelligence. Intelligence, however, is not an end in itself. To increase the operational
relevance of intelligence, intelligence planners and managers should anticipate consumer
needs. Thus, an examination of whether intelligence is effective or influential not only
depends on the intelligence organizations, processes, and products, but must also examineusers’ intelligence needs. Explicit user requirements, identified and properly communicatedI-2

JP 2-0

The Nature of Intelligence
to intelligence organizations by intelligence planners, initiate the appropriate intelligence
activities. Intelligence products provide users with the information that has been collected
and analyzed based on their requirements. It is important to remember that because the OE
is dynamic, intelligence is a continuous activity.
2. The Roles and Responsibilities of Joint Intelligence
The primary role of joint intelligence is to provide information and assessments tofacilitate mission accomplishment. This role is supported by a series of specificresponsibilities to guide the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and supportingorganizations (see Figure I-2).
For further information, see Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Operational Environment.
a. Inform the Commander. Intelligence directly supports the joint force commander(JFC) in planning, executing, and assessing the impact of those operations. The J-2 analyzes
the adversary and other relevant aspects of the OE, and produces assessments on acontinuing basis to support the commander in creating and/or exploiting opportunities toaccomplish friendly force objectives. For example, to maintain the initiative, the JFC willseek to understand and potentially influence the adversary’s decision-making process (e.g.,
the JFC will seek new and accurate intelligence that will enable friendly forces to takeeffective action faster than the adversary). The J-2 should assess the characteristics of theadversary’s decision-making process and identify weaknesses that may be exploited. The
J-2 should disseminate intelligence in a timely manner to the JFC, staff, and components.
b. Describe the OE. Present the OE as a confluence of the conditions, circumstances,and influences that affect the employment of friendly and adversary forces. Describing thisOE to the commander and staff affects the commander’s COA assessment, as well as future
operations.

Responsibilities of Joint IntelligenceInform the commander.

Describe the operational environment.



Identify, define, and nominate objectives.



Support the planning and execution of operations.

Counter adversary deception and surprise.

Support friendly deception efforts.

Assess the effectiveness of operations.
Figure I-2. Responsibilities of Joint Intelligence

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c. Identify, Define, and Nominate Objectives. All aspects of military planning aredependent on the determination of clearly defined, achievable, and measurable objectives.
When identifying and nominating objectives, the J-2 should understand the command’s
responsibilities; the JFC’s mission and intent; means available, including host nation andmultinational forces, interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), andintergovernmental organizations (IGOs); the adversary; weather; and characteristics of theoperational area. Intelligence should increase the commander’s understanding of the threat
and adversary’s probable intentions, end states, objectives, most likely and most dangerous
COAs, strengths, and critical capabilities. This allows the J-2 to recommend objectives,
requirements, and centers of gravity (COGs). Once these objectives are approved by thecommander, the J-2 must continuously review them with respect to the adversary and thechanging situation to determine whether they remain relevant to the commander’s intent.
d. Support the Planning and Execution of Operations. Commanders and staffs at alllevels require intelligence to plan, direct, conduct, and assess operations. This intelligence is
crucial to commanders, staffs, and components in identifying and selecting specificobjectives and targets, associating them with desired effects, and determining the means toaccomplish the JFC’s overall mission. The J-2 supports the execution of the plan with thestrategic, operational, and tactical intelligence needed to sustain the operation.
e. Counter Adversary Deception and Surprise. Joint force vulnerability to threat
denial and deception will be determined, in large part, by the threat efforts to deny anddeceive collection efforts. Intelligence analysts should remain sensitive to the possibility thatthey are being deceived and should consider all possible adversary capabilities andintentions. Similarly, analytical approaches that emphasize anomalies characterized by alack of activity (e.g., absence of seasonal training, important persons missing from
ceremonial events) are particularly valuable. To counter adversary deception efforts,
intelligence analysts must confirm their analysis using multiple and proven analyticalmethods and processes (e.g., use of red teams, devil’s advocates, alternative hypotheses).
f. Support Friendly Deception Efforts. Altering the perception of an adversary—tomislead or delude—helps achieve security and surprise. Intelligence and counterintelligence(CI) support effective friendly information operations (IO) through sociocultural analysis(SCA) of adversary leadership characteristics. The J-2 also assesses how the adversary isreacting to the friendly deception effort. Identifying deception objectives to complement
operational objectives should be an interactive process, which is aided by the use of a redteam or red cell.
For further information, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.
g. Assess the Effectiveness of Operations. Intelligence helps evaluate military
operations by objectively assessing their impact on the adversary and other relevant aspectsof the OE with respect to the JFC’s intent and objectives. Intelligence should assist JFCs indetermining if operations are producing desired or undesired effects, when objectives havebeen attained, and when unforeseen opportunities can be exploited or require a change inplanned operations to respond to adversary (enemy) actions.

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The Nature of Intelligence3. The Joint Intelligence Process
The joint intelligence process provides the basis for common intelligence terminology
and procedures. It consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations
characterized by broad activities conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations for the
purpose of providing commanders and national-level decision makers with relevant andtimely intelligence. The six categories of intelligence operations are: planning and direction;collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination andintegration; and evaluation and feedback. In many situations, various intelligence operations
occur almost simultaneously or may be bypassed. For example, a request for imagery
requires planning and direction activities but may not involve new collection, processing, or
exploitation. In this case, the imagery request could go directly to a production facility
where previously collected and exploited imagery is reviewed to determine if it will satisfy
the request. Likewise, during processing and exploitation, relevant information may be
disseminated directly to the user without first undergoing detailed all-source analysis andintelligence production. Significant unanalyzed operational information and criticalintelligence should be simultaneously available to both the commander (for time-sensitive
decision-making) and to the all source intelligence analyst (for the production anddissemination of intelligence assessments and estimates). Additionally, the activities withineach type of intelligence operation are conducted continuously and in conjunction withactivities in each intelligence operation category. For example, intelligence planning (IP)occurs continuously while intelligence collection and production plans are updated as a resultof previous requirements being satisfied and new requirements being identified. New
requirements are typically identified through analysis and production and prioritized
dynamically during the conduct of operations or through joint operation planning. The joint
force’s mission is determined during joint operation planning and provides the focal pointaround which the intelligence process is organized. A conceptual model of the intelligenceprocess is depicted in Figure I-3.
The joint intelligence process is encompassed within the 2.0 series of tasks in Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04, Universal Joint Task Manual, which
provides a common language and reference system to communicate mission requirements.
a. Planning and Direction. IP and direction is best understood as the development ofintelligence plans and the continuous management of their execution. Planning and direction
activities include, but are not limited to: the identification and prioritization of intelligencerequirements; the development of concepts of intelligence operations and architectures
required to support the commander’s mission; tasking subordinate intelligence elements forthe collection of information or the production of finished intelligence; submitting requests
for additional capabilities to higher headquarters; and submitting requests for collection,
exploitation, or all-source production support to external, supporting intelligence entities. IP
and direction occurs continuously as the intelligence component of the command’s campaign
and contingency adaptive planning effort. IP for campaign plans allows for the prioritizationof intelligence support across all ongoing operations and simultaneous planning efforts. On
the other hand, IP for contingency plans informs the development of joint capabilities andenhances the readiness to respond to potential crises. The most likely threat scenarios areused as the core of the deliberate planning effort for potential contingency operations.

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The Intelligence Process
Evaluation

Dissemination
andIntegration

Analysis
andProduction

Planning
andDirection

MissionCollection

Processing
andExploitation

and Feedback

Figure I-3. The Intelligence Process

Through this effort, intelligence planners determine the personnel, equipment, andintelligence architecture essential for support to joint operations. When a particular crisis
unfolds, commanders and their staffs develop an operation order (OPORD). Intelligence
input to the OPORD includes an adjusted and updated threat scenario and an intelligenceannex that tailors intelligence support to the nature and scope of operations to be conducted.
Assessments conducted by intelligence personnel provide operation planners feedback for
future planning for subsequent operations.
Intelligence support to joint operation planning is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV,“Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations.”(1) Intelligence Requirement and Information Requirement Planning. During
mission analysis, the joint force staff identifies significant information gaps about theadversary and other relevant aspects of the OE. After gap analysis, the staff formulates
intelligence requirements, which are general or specific subjects upon which there is a needfor the collection of information or the production of intelligence. All staff sections may
recommend intelligence requirements for designation as priority intelligence requirements

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The Nature of Intelligence
KEY TERM:
Planning and Direction. In intelligence usage, the determination of
intelligence requirements, development of appropriate intelligencearchitecture, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders andrequests to information collection agencies.

(PIRs). However, the J-2 has overall staff responsibility for consolidating intelligencerequirement nominations from the staff and for making the overall recommendation to thecommander regarding their approval and their relative order of priority. Intelligencerequirements designated as PIRs receive increased levels of intelligence support and priority
in the allocation of intelligence resources while those not designated as PIR are satisfied astime and resources allow. Ultimately, the commander designates PIRs, which together withfriendly force information requirements (FFIRs), constitute the commander’s criticalinformation requirements (CCIRs). Based on identified intelligence requirements (to include
PIRs), the staff develops a series of more specific questions known as information
requirements—those items of information that must be collected and processed to develop
the intelligence required by the commander. A subset of information requirements that are
related to and would answer a PIR are known as essential elements of information(EEIs)—the most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the OE
needed by the commander to assist in reaching a decision. The development of information
requirements (to include EEIs) leads to the generation of requests for information (RFIs). If
the required information is already available, a production requirement may be initiated, andif the required information is not available, a collection requirement is initiated. Figure I-4
illustrates this process.
(a) The JFC uses PIRs as a tool to designate intelligence that is critical todecision making, and to focus the intelligence system and the allocation of available
intelligence capabilities. PIR nominations consider the mission, commander’s intent,
operational objectives, and the time frame of expected operations. The JFC develops PIRs
that support critical decisions over the course of an operation, and for complex phased
operations, develops separate PIRs for each phase. As an operation ensues, the commander
updates PIRs to address new requirements or concerns, and as the situation changes, either
eliminates some or develops others. A JFC’s total number of PIRs for any phase of an
operation should reflect a reasonable balance between mission critical requirements andfinite intelligence support capability. Because of this, PIRs should be ranked anddisseminated in priority of importance. Other valid intelligence requirements are submitted,
but receive lower levels of intelligence support.
(b) Using PIRs as the basis, the intelligence staff develops the command’s
EEIs. To satisfy information requirements (to include EEIs), intelligence staffs should
identify the specific indicators that could fill a gap in the command’s knowledge andunderstanding of adversary activities and other relevant aspects of the OE.

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Relationship Between Intelligence Requirements andInformation Requirements
CCIRs
FFIRs
PIRs
Intelligence Requirements“Any subject, general or
specific, upon which there is aneed for the collection of
information, or the productionof intelligence.”"An intelligence requirement
stated as a priority for
intelligence support, that thecommander and staff need tounderstand the adversary or
operational environment."

EEIs
Information Requirements“In intelligence usage, those
items of information regarding
the adversary and otherrelevant aspects of theoperational environment thatneed to be collected andprocessed in order to meet the
intelligence requirements of acommander.”"The most critical information
requirements regarding theadversary and theenvironment needed by thecommander by a particulartime to relate with otheravailable information andintelligence in order to reacha logical decision."

Requests for Information

Collection
Requirements

Either/Or

Production
Requirements

Legend
CCIR
EEI
FFIR
PIR

commander’s critical information requirement
essential element of information
friendly force information requirement
priority intelligence requirement

requirements flow
response flow

Figure I-4. Relationship Between Intelligence Requirements
and Information Requirements(c) In addition to joint forces intelligence requirements, the intelligence staff
must be aware of the intelligence requirements of higher, adjacent, subordinate, andI-8

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The Nature of Intelligence
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT (PIR)/ESSENTIAL ELEMENTOF INFORMATION (EEI)
For example, if the PIR is “Will the enemy attack within the next 72
hours?”, the EEIs will be questions such as “Where is the XX Armored
Division?” “Has the artillery subordinate to the XX Corps deployedforward?” “Are aircraft being loaded with air-to-ground munitions at theforward airfields?” and “Where are the major surface combatants?”
A PIR for a non-state actor may be, “What is the level of local support for
the adversary network?” The corresponding EEIs could be, “Whatresources does the local population provide the adversary?” “Whatcoercive tactics does the adversary use to control the population?” “Whatis the nature of the relationship of the local power brokers to theadversary network?”

supported elements, the operational requirements of supported elements, as well as
national-level intelligence requirements.
(d) Subordinate units expand on the joint forces intelligence requirements bymaking them specific enough to support their portion of the overall operation or campaign
and also develop intelligence requirements based on their own operational requirements.
The JFC’s PIRs should encompass and prioritize the most urgent intelligence requirementsof subordinate and supporting elements. Subordinate force intelligence requirements are
addressed and prioritized during planning. Conflicts for resources must be resolved andunnecessary redundancies eliminated.
(e) PIRs assist the J-2 in determining and prioritizing the type and level ofintelligence resources required to support the joint force. Intelligence staffs use intelligencerequirements as a basis for: formulating statements of intelligence interest to the intelligencecommunity (IC); justifying tasking of national collection resources through the DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA); and justifying requests for intelligence capabilities.
(f) Intelligence personnel review existing intelligence databases for potential
solutions to intelligence and information requirements. If the intelligence does not alreadyexist, the requestor issues an RFI—a specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for
information or intelligence products, distinct from standing requirements or scheduled
intelligence production. An RFI can be initiated at any level of command, and is validated inaccordance with the combatant command’s (CCMD’s) procedures. An RFI leads to a
production requirement, if the request can be answered with information on hand, or acollection requirement, if the request requires collection of new information. Anticipatedproduction requirements are typically articulated in the form of analytic tasks and subtasks
KEY TERM:
Specific Information Requirement. A basic question that must be
answered to satisfy a collection request.

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during planning and entered into the appropriate RFI management system during execution.
On the other hand, if an RFI leads to the initiation of a collection requirement, requestors ofintelligence collection support should provide specific information requirements (SIRs) toallow the formulation of collection requirements and the allocation collection capabilities tosatisfy them. If the requestor does not provide SIRs, the collection manager should consult
with the requestor to determine the indicators of activity against which to focus collection
capabilities so that appropriate SIRs can be developed.
(g) To the extent possible, identify PIRs, EEIs, associated analytic tasks, andSIRs in advance for each operational phase to provide the basis for synchronizing thereception and integration of required intelligence capabilities. Collection capability
shortfalls identified during planning may form the basis for requests for forces (RFFs) andrequests for support from national intelligence resources. This information ensures that theemployment of defense intelligence capabilities is prioritized on supporting commanders inachieving their operational objectives.
(2) Analysis and Production Planning. All-source intelligence production isfacilitated through a collaborative or federated effort in which information is rapidly shared
among geographically dispersed organizations. This approach involves dividing the analysis
and production effort among US and partner nation (PN) intelligence facilities andorganizations worldwide to meet the intelligence needs of the joint force. Analysis andproduction responsibilities assigned during joint operation planning establish the anticipatedflow of information and the development of the appropriate intelligence disseminationarchitecture.
(a) Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP). The DIAP establishes
policy, procedures, and responsibilities for intelligence analysis and production within
defense intelligence. The DIAP recognizes the overwhelming complexity of providing
intelligence for worldwide operations, and therefore divides the analytic effort according toprioritized categories of defense topics, transnational issues, and countries.
(b) In many situations, the level of production, uniqueness of the product, oravailability of personnel may require extensive lead time. For this reason, theater level andbelow intelligence planners should anticipate analytic tasks and identify the need to federate
production with outside commands and agencies as early as possible. This includes
production requirements that should be coordinated from tactical through national levels andaccess to intelligence and non-intelligence databases such as an automated biometric
information system. Additionally, they should also work with the component intelligenceelements to minimize confusion and duplication of effort by coordinating their respectiveroles and responsibilities with regard to analysis, production, and associated resources.
(3) Collection and Exploitation Planning. Collection planning matches
anticipated collection requirements with appropriate theater and national collection
capabilities. It is a continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of allcollection units and agencies. This multi-echelon collaboration helps identify collection gaps
and redundant coverage in a timely manner to optimize the employment of all available
collection capabilities.

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The Nature of Intelligence(a) The IP component of the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) systemestablishes collection planning procedures to be applied during joint operation planning.
Conceptually, collection planning performed during joint operation planning precedes
collection management performed during execution.
(b) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Collection
operations are carried out during either surveillance or reconnaissance missions. While
reconnaissance missions are specifically conducted to obtain information about the threat or
the OE, surveillance missions consist of the systematic observation of places, persons, orthings. To ensure these two types of missions are fully integrated into the overall joint
operation, J-2 and operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) staffs must continuously
collaborate to synchronize the employment of assigned and allocable platforms and sensors
against specified collection targets. They must also ensure raw data is routed to theappropriate processing and exploitation system so that it may be converted into useable
information and disseminated to the user in a timely fashion. The J-2 is responsible for
identifying potential collection targets and prioritizing anticipated collection requirementsthat are then used to drive surveillance and reconnaissance mission planning. The J-3
manages the operational area on behalf of the commander and deconflicts the physicalemployment of the various platforms with other operations to be conducted within the land,
air, and maritime domains. Additionally, as the command’s overall force manager, the J-3
recommends to the commander the apportionment of platforms to subordinate echelons so as
to inform their planning efforts and in collaboration with the J-2 makes recommendations
regarding their allocation during execution. Priorities for the apportionment and allocationof collection and exploitation capabilities to subordinate JFCs is typically based on the
missions they’ve been assigned and the operational priorities set by the combatantcommander (CCDR). Adaptive collection planning by the J-2 and continuous collaboration
between the J-2 and J-3 staffs during reconnaissance and surveillance mission planningprovides for the effective management and optimal employment of all available platforms,
sensors, and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) systems.
(c) Federated exploitation planning is typically conducted during joint
operation planning based on anticipated single-source analytic throughput. It provides theappropriate intelligence systems architecture to route raw data to predetermined exploitation
nodes or the end user.
(4) Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture Planning.
Intelligence dissemination requirements, systems, and procedures must be coordinated inadvance with subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and higher intelligence organizations andcommands, and with the communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6). The
management of information transmitted over communications paths is an important
KEY TERM:

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
An activity thatsynchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors,
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct
support of current and future operations. This is an integrated
intelligence and operations function.

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consideration to be made during joint operation planning. J-2 staffs must consider
intelligence requirements when prioritizing information dissemination in terms of the
product, foreign disclosure requirements, the available communications paths, and the time
sensitivity of the product. Dissemination priorities must be updated throughout the course of
the operation. Communications and intelligence systems architecture planning must ensure
survivability, protection (or assurance), and interoperability of both information architectures
and the information contained therein for all combinations of government and commercial
configurations.
(5) CI Planning. CI focuses on the activities to protect against the harmful
activities of outside entities. Coordination of CI activities must be accomplished during joint
operation planning. Identification of ongoing and planned intelligence activities and JFC
intentions will allow CI specialists to assess physical and personnel vulnerabilities andhostile forces capability to target military operations using technical means, terrorism,
espionage, and sabotage, or to evoke a response such as a demonstration or strike. CI
activities may also provide formal liaison with host nation, intelligence law enforcement, andsecurity activities to support joint operations and to enhance the command’s force protection
efforts. The CI coordinating authority is appointed at the CCMD and joint task force (JTF)
levels, and is responsible for synchronizing, coordinating, and deconflicting all CI activities
within their respective operational areas.
(6) Planning Intelligence Support to the Joint Targeting Cycle. Target
development and IP are interrelated. The intelligence staff of the JFC designated as asupported commander will lead the lethal and nonlethal target IP effort. During IP, the
JFC should assess organic capabilities to support joint force selected COAs, determine
related target intelligence shortfalls, and federate analytic tasks as required to support thejoint targeting cycle. The intelligence staff develops supporting guidance in a targeting
guidance message that delineates responsibilities for each phase of the joint targeting
cycle. Based on the commander’s objectives, and desired and undesired effects, targeteers
begin a process of target system analysis (TSA) and target development. The target
development process applies analysis and intelligence products developed through the joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process to evaluate
relevant target systems and identify potential targets. As objects or entities are identified,they are vetted with the IC to verify their accuracy and characterization, validated by thecommander to ensure they are valid and support military objectives, and added to the joint
target list (JTL), the restricted target list (RTL), or no-strike list (NSL). If not validated,
they are returned to the nominating organization for further development. The JTL
contains targets which have military significance and do not have any employment
restriction placed against them. The RTL contains targets which have military value, but
because of operational considerations have specific restrictions placed on the actions
authorized on them. Targets are approved by the JFC or directed by higher authorities.
The NSL contains a list of objects or entities which are protected by the law of war,international law, or theater rules of engagement, national policy, or other restrictions, and,so long as they remain on the NSL, may not be struck. As targeteers develop these lists,they coordinate with all-source analysts and collection managers to gather additional
information, imagery, and other intelligence products to provide a more complete pictureof the enemy capabilities to fill intelligence gaps.
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The Nature of Intelligence
For further information on targeting, target development, target lists, and federated
targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3370.01, Target Development Standards, and CJCSM
3314.01A, Intelligence Planning.
(7) Other Planning(a) Administration and Logistics Planning. To ensure intelligence staffs areadequately filled, the J-2 should submit required joint intelligence manning document
positions through the manpower and personnel directorate of the joint staff to ensure
individual augmentee slots are filled with qualified personnel. Likewise, logistic
requirements should be identified as early as possible to the joint forces logistics directorate,
lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment data to the J-3,
and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the J-6. Additional
functions that should be addressed as part of the planning and direction effort include:
financial, contracting, training, and personnel support; physical and personnel security
matters; intelligence and CI oversight compliance; inspector general issues; releasability anddisclosure policy; and Freedom of Information Act guidance.
Additional guidance on augmentation is provided in JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.
(b) Future Joint Intelligence Architecture Planning. Shortfalls identified
during the IP process may help determine intelligence organizational changes, personnel, andequipment requirements, and establish requirements for future capabilities and associatedjoint intelligence architectures.
(8) Collection Management. If during the conduct of operations, it is determinedthat an RFI must be converted into a collection requirement, a nomination for collection is
submitted and collection management begins. Collection management is the process of
converting intelligence-related information requirements into collection requirements,
establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources oragencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. Anchored on the appropriate
collection management authority (CMA), collection management is composed of two
components, collection requirements management (CRM) and collection operations
management (COM).
(a) CRM is the authoritative development and control of collection,
processing, exploitation, and information reporting requirements. This process normally
results with the collection manager either tasking requirements to units over which thecommander has authority, or generating requests to CMAs at a higher, lower, or lateralechelons to accomplish the collection mission. During CRM all collection requirements areprioritized and appropriately registered. Prioritization should be based on the commander’sintent, objectives, approved PIRs, and the current situation to ensure that limited assets orresources are directed against the most critical requirements. A coordinated, coherent,
target-specific strategy is developed to satisfy validated and prioritized collection
requirements. The collection strategy is a scheme for collecting information from allavailable sources to satisfy SIRs. The scheme is applied as discipline-specific collection

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requirements are sent to internal intelligence organizations for tasking, or are submitted forvalidation and tasking requests to external organizations or agencies. Activities thentransition from CRM to COM.
(b) COM is the authoritative direction, scheduling, and control of specificcollection operations and associated processing, exploitation, and information reporting
resources. This includes the selection and tasking of specific assets and sensors. The
collection operations manager synchronizes the timing of collection with the operational
scheme of maneuver and with other intelligence operations such as processing andexploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination. The collection operations manager
then selects assets best suited to collect the information needed to satisfy the SIR. The
collection operations manager prepares or revises the command’s intelligence collection plan
to efficiently and effectively meet collection requirements and tasks collection assets with
sufficient direction to accomplish the mission. The collection operations manager develops
and coordinates sensor employment guidance that helps to refine collection plans andstrategies and enables the optimum employment of collection capabilities to collection
requirements.
(c) Collection managers must know of the capabilities, limitations,
survivability, and lead times of available collection systems, as well as the processing andexploitation, analysis, and production timelines to complete and disseminate a product.
Collection managers must be able to coordinate the employment of all available collection
capabilities. This includes requesting external theater and national level resources to acquireneeded information.
(d) To minimize the effects of enemy deception, and provide the JFC the mostaccurate intelligence possible, analysis of information from a variety of collection sources isrequired so information from one source can be verified or confirmed by others. Multiple
collection sources enable collection managers to cross-cue between different sources (e.g.,using signals intelligence [SIGINT] direction finding to focus collection by geospatialintelligence [GEOINT] systems). A challenge inherent to using a multidiscipline collectionis the need to avoid an ad hoc approach and to establish procedures beforehand that support
tipping, hand-off, cross-cueing, or retasking of one asset in support of another. Collection
systems also need redundancy so that the loss or failure of one collection capability can becompensated for by alternate capabilities. However, careful consideration must be given to
having multiple collection sources performing redundant collection, as collection
requirements will usually exceed collection, processing, and exploitation capacity. This
supports the collection management principle of using a multidiscipline approach.
(e) To effectively integrate intelligence support to operations, the intelligencestaff and the operations staff must work closely together. Collection managers, targeteers,and intelligence analysts collaborate to anticipate collection requirements, validate
preplanned collection tasks, and update adaptive collection plans. The joint force may
establish a joint collection management board (JCMB) to monitor and update collection
requirements and asset status, and recommends the revised collection plan for approval by
the commander. Active involvement of targeteers, analysts, and J-3 personnel in concert
with the collection managers is critical to the success of the JCMB. Collection managers in

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The Nature of Intelligence
coordination with (ICW) CCMD intelligence planners must ensure that the collection plan is
synchronized with the operation plan (OPLAN) so that collection efforts are focusedcorrectly at critical times. Additionally, reconnaissance and surveillance operations
should be integrated with other forms of intelligence collection operations and coordinatedwith CI activities.
(f) There are numerous legal considerations associated with intelligencecollection on US persons. Commanders and their intelligence staffs must be fully cognizantof their intelligence oversight responsibilities as delineated in Department of Defense (DOD)
5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect
United States Persons. Prior to conducting collection on US persons, the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) will designate specific ISR platforms and associated PED capabilities tosupport incident awareness and assessment (IAA) requirements. Intelligence collection
activities should be coordinated with the servicing staff judge advocate to ensure compliancewith the law and any existing rules of engagement.
See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for morediscussion on intelligence requirements and collection.
b. Collection. Collection includes those activities related to the acquisition of datarequired to satisfy the requirements specified in the collection strategy. This is managed bycollection managers, whose duties include selecting the most appropriate, available asset(s)and associated PED and then tasking selected asset(s) and associated PED to conduct
collection missions. Collection managers also develop and coordinate sensor employment
guidance, exercise authoritative control of specific collection operations, revise collection
activities as required, monitor the overall satisfaction of requirements, and assess theeffectiveness of the collection plan to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.
When opportunities arise, collection managers may direct dynamic cross-cueing of sensors to
obtain a multidiscipline approach and obtain higher confidence data. When adjustments tothe collection plan (or dynamic retasking of assets) are made, collection managers will
inform other relevant stakeholders of the changes. Collectors, whether conducting
reconnaissance and surveillance via technical means or human ones, obtain the data needed
to satisfy the information requirements within the collection requirements tasked to them.
Collected data is distributed via appropriately classified media/circuits to processing andexploitation elements. Collection managers continuously monitor the results not only ofintelligence collection, but also processing and exploitation, and information reporting todetermine if SIRs are being satisfied. Collection managers continuously assess theeffectiveness of the collection plan in meeting the JFC’s requirements as part of thecommand’s evaluation and feedback portion of the intelligence process.
c. Processing and Exploitation. During processing and exploitation, raw collected
data is converted into forms that can be readily used by commanders, decision makers at alllevels, intelligence analysts and other consumers. Processing and exploitation includes firstphase imagery exploitation, data conversion and correlation, document and media
translation, and signal decryption, as well as reporting the results of these actions to analysis
and production elements. Processing and exploitation may be federated or performed by thesame element that collected the data. Federated exploitation planning is typically conducted

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during joint operation planning based on anticipated single-source analytic throughput and it
ensures appropriate intelligence systems architecture is in place to route raw data topredetermined exploitation nodes.
(1) An example of processing and exploitation occurs when the technicalparameters (frequency, pulse repetition frequency, and bandwidth) detected by an electronic
intelligence (ELINT) collection system are compared and associated with the known
parameters of a particular radar system. Rather than providing an analyst with an
overwhelming mass of raw ELINT data, the analyst is provided with the essential fact.
(2) Different types of data require different degrees of processing before they canbe intelligible to the recipient. In the area of SIGINT, processing and exploitation are
increasingly automated and are being quickly performed by the collection systems.
Similarly, captured enemy documents may only require translating before they can be usedby analysts. On the other hand, the technical exploitation of an item of enemy equipment
may require months of intensive effort before its full capabilities can be determined.
d. Analysis and Production. During analysis and production, intelligence is produced
from the information gathered by the collection capabilities assigned or attached to the joint
force and from the refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate
units and external organizations. All available processed information is integrated,evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted to create products that will satisfy the commander’s
PIRs or RFIs. Intelligence products can be presented in many forms. They may be oralpresentations, hard copy publications, or electronic media. Intelligence production for joint
operations is accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon. Federated
production plans developed through IP are intended to provide reachback support to meet the
CCDR’s intelligence requirements. Whereas collection, processing, and exploitation are
primarily performed by specialists from one of the major intelligence disciplines, analysis
and production is done primarily by all-source analysts that fuse together information fromall intelligence disciplines. The product of multidiscipline fusion effort is all-source
intelligence. All source intelligence should comply with Intelligence Community Directive#203, Analytic Standards.
(1) A key methodology or process for conducting intelligence analysis andproduction is the JIPOE process.
(a) JIPOE is the continuous process through which J-2 manages the analysis
and development of products that help the commander and staff understand the complex andinterconnected OE—the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that
affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. The J-2
manages the JIPOE process with input from intelligence planners and other staff directorates
or elements, such as medical and engineering, see Figure I-5.
(b) Analysts use the JIPOE process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information
pertaining to all relevant aspects of the OE (e.g., political, military, economic, social,information, and infrastructure [PMESII] systems). The process is also used to analyze
adversary capabilities, identify potential adversary COAs, and assess the most likely andI-16

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The Nature of Intelligence

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Step 1
Define the operational
environment.
Step 2
Describe the impactof the operational
environment.
Step 3
Evaluate theadversary and otherrelevant actors.
Step 4
Determine adversary
and other relevant
actor courses ofaction.



A systematic methodology used by intelligence personnel.

Used to analyze information about the operational environment andthe adversary.



A key tool for conducting joint intelligence analysis.

Can be applied to the full range of military operations.



Identifies courses of action by probability.
Figure I-5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

most dangerous adversary COAs. The process can be applied to the full range of military
operations and to each level of war.
(c) Throughout the JIPOE process, at every echelon and production category,
one of the most important, but least understood, aspects of analysis is SCA. SCA is thestudy, evaluation, and interpretation of information about adversaries and relevant actors
through the lens of group-level decision making to discern catalysts of behavior and thecontext that shapes behavior. SCA informs the commander’s understanding of adversaries
and other relevant actors by analyzing societies, populations, and other groups of people,
including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and space at varying
scales of analysis. SCA includes the graphic representation of social and cultural
information for a given area presented spatially (on a map) and temporally. SCA also

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Chapter I
includes the systematic mapping of human factors affecting a leader’s or key actor’s
decision-making influences. SCA considers: relationships and activities of the population;social network analysis (looking at the interpersonal, professional, and social networks tied
to an individual); as well as small and large group dynamics.
The JIPOE process is described in detail in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.
(2) Intelligence products are generally placed in one of eight production categories:
warning, current, general military, target, scientific and technical (S&T), CI, identity
intelligence (I2), and estimative intelligence (see Figure I-6). The categories are
distinguished from each other primarily by the purpose for which the intelligence wasproduced. The categories can and do overlap, and the same intelligence and information canbe used in each of the categories.
(a) Warning Intelligence. Warning provides a distinct communication to adecision maker about threats against US security, interests, or citizens. Warning carries asense of urgency, implying the decision maker should take action to deter or mitigate thethreat’s impact. Warning analysis focuses on the opportunities to counter and alter only thosethreats that have detrimental effects for the US. This includes US military or politicaldecision cycles, infrastructure, COA, or loss of governance. Defense intelligence recognizes
two types of warning: emerging and enduring. “Emerging warning concerns” and “enduring
warning problems” discuss issues relevant to national security warranting DOD leadership
attention. Emerging warning issues may be ambiguous, and may be formalized as an“enduring warning problem” based on a risk evaluation to national security and planningguidance. The latter is usually linked to contingency plans, which are defined andlongstanding potential threats to US interests.
(b) Current Intelligence. Current intelligence provides updated support for
ongoing operation. It involves the integration of time-sensitive, all-source intelligence andCategories of Intelligence Products

Warning intelligenceCurrent intelligenceGeneral military intelligenceTarget intelligenceScientific and technical intelligenceCounterintelligenceEstimative intelligenceIdentity intelligence
Figure I-6. Categories of Intelligence Products

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The Nature of Intelligence
information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. The
term “current” is relative to the time sensitivities of the decision maker and the context of thetype of operation being supported. For example, in some contexts intelligence may beconsidered “current,” whereas other circumstances may require intelligence in near real time.
(c) General Military Intelligence (GMI). GMI focuses on the militarycapabilities of foreign countries and organizations, to include non-state actors, and othertopics that could affect potential US or multinational military operations. This broad
category of intelligence is normally associated with long-term planning, and attempts to
identify and monitor trends affecting national security to facilitate the efficient application offinite resources. GMI is tailored to specific subordinate joint force missions and includes
information on the organization, operations, facilities, and capabilities of selected foreign
military forces. GMI also includes other relevant characteristics of the OE.
See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for moredetailed discussion of GMI. See JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for more information on
medical intelligence (MEDINT).
(d) Target Intelligence. Target intelligence portrays and locates thecomponents of a target or target complex, networks, and support infrastructure, and indicatesits vulnerability and relative importance to the adversary. Target intelligence includes thecharacterization of a target and indicates its vulnerability, placement in larger systems or
networks, and relative importance to the adversary. Characterization includes analyses ofphysical and virtual attributes (including the biographic, biologic, behavioral, andreputational attributes of human targets, to support weaponeering) and signatures (to support
target detection and positive identification). Target intelligence also includes battle damage
assessment (BDA) composed of physical damage/change assessment, functional
damage/change assessment, and functional assessment of the higher level target system
resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. It is critical that
intelligence analysis supporting targeting remain consistent throughout the joint force.
Target intelligence must holistically analyze the target so it can support all target engagement
options. Throughout the targeting process, intelligence personnel should ensure thatavailable information is considered to support proper target nomination, target development,
and assessment. Target intelligence includes nominations for the NSL and RTL.
See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards, for further
information.
(e) Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI). S&TI examines foreign
developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential,
particularly enhancements to weapon systems. It includes S&TI characteristics, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and limitations of weapon systems, subsystems, and associated material, as
well as related research and development. S&TI also addresses overall weapon systems,
tactics analysis, and equipment effectiveness.
(f) CI. CI is information gathered and activities conducted to identify,
deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage,

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Chapter I
or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, ortheir agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. CI includes conducting
strategic CI analysis to identify and produce finished intelligence on the foreign intelligence
entities threat to DOD. CI develops and implements strategies and action plans to counterthe CI threat, tasks CI collection capabilities, and leverages human intelligence (HUMINT),
SIGINT, GEOINT, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and open-source
intelligence (OSINT) to fill CI collection gaps.
(g) Estimative Intelligence. Estimates are forecasts of current or potential
situations with implications for planning and executing military operations. Estimative
intelligence includes a description of relevant actors’ capabilities, and reporting of theiractivities, and it analyzes known factors using techniques such as pattern analysis, inference,and statistical probability to address unresolved variables. A key to this predictive art is toprovide commanders and planners with an assessment of relevant actors’ responses based onfriendly force actions.
(h) I2. I2 results from the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic,
behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information andintelligence associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines. I2
utilizes enabling intelligence activities, like biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI), forensicsenabled intelligence (FEI), and document and media exploitation (DOMEX), to discover the
existence of unknown potential threat actors by connecting individuals to other persons,places, events, or materials, analyzing patterns of life, and characterizing their level ofpotential threats to US interests.
e. Dissemination and Integration. During dissemination and integration, intelligenceis delivered to and used by the consumer. Dissemination is facilitated by a variety of means.
The means are determined by the needs of the user and the implications and criticality of theintelligence. Personal, networked, and database data transfers are all means ofdissemination. The diversity of dissemination paths reinforces the need for communications
and computer systems interoperability among joint and multinational forces, component
commands, DOD organizations, and the interagency community.
(1) The Global Command and Control System and the DOD Distributed Common
Ground/Surface Systems portray an integrated common operational picture (COP), built on afoundation of geospatial information, that displays the disposition of friendly, neutral, andadversary forces throughout the OE. Command and control, initiative, flexibility, anddecision making are enhanced by an accurate and timely COP.
(2) The globally integrated architecture for intelligence dissemination should
facilitate the timely communication of collected data, processed information, and fused
intelligence among dispersed producers and consumers. The dissemination architecture
allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to address joint force intelligenceneeds through preplanned PIRs. Additionally, intelligence organizations should pushintelligence to the consumer (using the most expeditious means available), and accommodate
the consumer’s pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national
databases). This construct delivers timely intelligence and ISR-derived information, makes

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The Nature of Intelligencemaximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of RFI messages and intelligencereports. The integrated broadcast service and the tactical related applications are examplesof over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders.
Chapter V, “Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation,”provides a more comprehensive discussion of intelligence dissemination architectures andrequirements.
(3) Supporting intelligence organizations should provide intelligence to theconsumer using the best available, and most secure, technology. Intelligence organizations
at all levels should use precise terminology to minimize the possibility of confusion on thepart of users reviewing assessments and estimates.
(4) Intelligence organizations should initiate and maintain close contact with users,
ensure users are receiving their products promptly, and confirm those products fulfill
requirements. The follow-up is a key part of the feedback process detailed in Figure I-3.
(5) After intelligence products are delivered, intelligence personnel andorganizations are responsible for continuing to support users as they integrate the intelligence
into their decision-making and planning processes. Products may require further
clarification or they may raise new issues that need to be addressed. Additionally, products
may need to be related to a larger intelligence picture, or may require reinterpretation due tochanges in the OE.
(6) Rather than being the end of a process, the integration of intelligence is acontinuous dialogue between the user and the producer. How intelligence is used isultimately up to the user. The role of the producer is to provide the user with the best
intelligence possible.
f. Evaluation and Feedback. Evaluation and feedback occur continuously throughout
the intelligence process and as an assessment of the intelligence process as a whole.
Intelligence personnel at all levels should assess the execution of the intelligence tasks they
perform and gauge their impacts. Evaluation and feedback requires a collaborative dialogue
between intelligence planners, collection managers, collectors, single and all-source analysts,
and intelligence systems architects to identify deficiencies within the intelligence process. It
also requires consultation with intelligence consumers to determine if intelligencerequirements are being satisfied. Immediate applications of evaluation and feedback may
include, but are not limited to, the rephrasing of an intelligence requirement for clarity, thedynamic retasking of a sensor, the rerouting of data to an alternate exploitation node, or therevision of an information report or a finished intelligence product. The goal of evaluationand feedback is to identify issues as early as possible to minimize information gaps and to
mitigate capability shortfalls.
(1) Information gathered during evaluation and feedback may inform broader
assessments of the intelligence staff function. Assessments provide leaders with theinformation to make decisions about reprioritization of intelligence requirements, shifts in

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collection emphasis, changes to analytic levels of effort, reallocation of available intelligence
assets, training of intelligence personnel, and the development of new intelligence capabilities.
(2) To perform assessments of the intelligence staff function, intelligence personnel
develop intelligence measures of performance (MOPs) and intelligence measures ofeffectiveness (MOEs). These measures are informed by a variety of indicators related to the
conduct of intelligence tasks or their impact. Task-related metrics are informed by indicatorsthat are quantitative in nature. They determine whether a particular platform or sensor is
performing according to technical specifications, the number of sorties conducted, thenumber of images taken, or the number of interrogations conducted or all-source products
generated. On the other hand, effectiveness of intelligence operations is determined bygauging the impact of intelligence tasks performed within the intelligence process.
Effectiveness-related metrics are informed by indicators that tend to be qualitative in nature.
Factors considered in determining the effectiveness of intelligence operations include thereliability of a source, whether a particular information reported is considered actionable, orif a particular product is cited in finished intelligence as contributing to an increase inanalytic confidence. Establishing MOEs requires addressing the question of intelligence orinformation value. The value of information or intelligence is tied to the decision which itsupports and the amount of uncertainty it clarifies or resolves. Ultimately, the effectivenessof intelligence operations is assessed by devising metrics and indicators associated with theattributes of intelligence excellence discussed in Chapter II, “Principles of Joint
Intelligence.” The ability of the intelligence staff to assess the totality of intelligence
operations relies on product satisfaction as determined by the user. For this reason, a
feedback mechanism from the user should be consistent and of a formal nature with someelement of systematic analysis to offer some rigor to the process.
(3) The establishment of formal assessment methods and procedures for theintelligence staff provides decision makers with actionable data backed by analytical rigor.
Assessors must collect, evaluate, and understand the significance of data regarding both theconduct of intelligence tasks (intelligence MOPs) and the effectiveness of intelligence(intelligence MOEs) in satisfying the requirements of the commander and staff. Data
resulting from assessments will support the identification and resolution of procedural issues
and contribute to advocacy in resolving gaps and shortfalls.
(4) Sharing. Identify issues and lessons learned and report them. CJCSI 3150.25,
Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), provides basic guidance and direction on
establishing internal lessons learned programs and how to enter issues into a resolution
process.
(5) Advocating Resolution. The goal of the evaluation and feedback step is thatissues are identified and addressed within the joint intelligence process. Following theprocedures of the JLLP facilitates issue tracking until resolved.
(6) CCMDs, Services, and combat support agencies (CSAs) are responsible toprovide specific guidance to enable collection and distribution of observations of joint
operations with assigned forces or personnel. It is essential that intelligence organizations

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The Nature of Intelligenceoutside the joint force fully participate in the JLLP process to ensure that the benefits oflessons learned are disseminated as widely as possible.
4. Intelligence and the Levels of War
a. Levels of War. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, discusses three levels of war: strategic,
operational, and tactical. Figure I-7 shows how intelligence operations support each level ofwar. The levels clarify links between strategic objectives, effects, and tactical actions andenable commanders to visualize a logical flow of operations, resource allocation, and tasks.
Often, the accuracy of strategic, operational, or tactical labels can only be determined during
post-mission analysis or historical studies.
(1) All levels of war have corresponding levels of intelligence operations. The
construct of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence helps commanders andtheir J-2s visualize the flow of intelligence from one level to another. This constructfacilitates the allocation of required collection, analytical, and dissemination resources andpermits the assignment of appropriate intelligence tasks to national, theater, component, andsupporting intelligence elements.
(2) Intelligence operations support commanders at all levels, both horizontally andvertically. Strategic intelligence operations provide continuity and depth of coverage evenwhile the joint force is deploying. During campaign planning, strategic and operational
intelligence operations focus on providing to the JFC information required to identify theadversary’s COGs, COAs, vulnerabilities, and high-value targets (HVTs). During execution,
operational intelligence operations provide the JFC with relevant, timely, and accurate
intelligence relating to the accomplishment of campaign or major operation objectives.
(3) Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces orcomponents are not associated with a particular level of intelligence operations. National
assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, usually considered in a strategic
context, are an important enabler of tactical operations. Conversely, troops operating in thefield can gather intelligence of strategic importance.
(4) Operational and tactical intelligence operations provide the JFC the information
required to identify adversary critical vulnerabilities, COGs, and critical nodes for the
optimum application of all available resources, thereby allowing the JFC to most effectively
employ the joint force. Figure I-7 depicts the levels of intelligence.
b. Strategic Intelligence(1) National strategic intelligence is produced for the President, the National
Security Council, Congress, SecDef, senior military leaders, CCDRs, and other US
Government departments and agencies. It is used to develop national strategy and policy,
monitor the international and global situation, prepare military plans, determine major
weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations.
Strategic intelligence operations also produce the intelligence required by CCDRs to prepare
strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish missions assigned by higher
authorities. In addition to this focus primarily on the military instrument of national power,
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Chapter I

Levels of Intelligence
Strategic
Senior Military and Civilian Leaders
Combatant CommandersAssist in developing national strategy and policy.
Monitor the international or global situation.
 Assist in developing military plans.
 Assist in determining major weapon systems and force structure requirements.
 Support the conduct of strategic operations.


Operational
Combatant and Subordinate Joint Force Commanders
and Component CommandersFocus on military capabilities and intentions of enemies and adversaries.
Analyze the operational environment.
 Identify adversary centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
 Monitor events in the joint force commander’s area of interest.
 Support the planning and conduct of joint campaigns.
TacticalCommandersSupport planning and the execution of battles, engagements, and other joint
force activities.
 Provide commanders with information on imminent threats to their forces andchanges in the operational environment.
 Provide commanders with obstacle intelligence.

Figure I-7. Levels of Intelligencestrategic intelligence also allows for national leadership to determine potential options using
the nonmilitary instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic)
based on estimated opposing force or adversary reaction to US actions.
(2) Theater strategic intelligence supports joint operations across the range ofmilitary operations, assesses the current situation, and estimates future capabilities andintentions of adversaries that could affect the national security and US or allied interests.
Theater strategic intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength theadversary will stage and conduct theater level campaigns and strategic unified operations.
c. Operational Intelligence(1) Operational intelligence is primarily used by CCDRs and subordinate JFCs andtheir component commanders. Operational intelligence focuses on answering thecommander’s PIRs, assessing the effectiveness of operations, maintaining situationalawareness of adversary military disposition, capabilities, and intentions, and other relevant
aspects of the OE. Operational intelligence helps commanders keep abreast of events within

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The Nature of Intelligence
their area of interest (AOI) and helps them determine when, where, and in what strength theadversary might stage and conduct campaigns and major operations.
(2) Operational intelligence also includes monitoring terrorist incidents and natural
or man-made disasters and catastrophes. During counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations, operational intelligence is increasingly concerned with stability operations andhas a greater focus on PMESII factors. It also assists commanders in assessing andevaluating actions and possible implications associated with noncombat operations such as
foreign humanitarian assistance.
d. Tactical Intelligence(1) Tactical intelligence is used by commanders, planners, and operators forplanning and conducting battles, engagements, and special missions. Relevant, accurate, andtimely tactical intelligence allows tactical units to achieve positional and informational
advantage over their adversaries. Precise threat location, tracking, and target capabilities andstatus, in particular, are essential for success during actual mission execution. In addition, a
key element of tactical intelligence is post-strike combat assessment, which is used bycommanders and planners to determine the need to dynamically retask assets to restrike
identified targets.
(2) Tactical intelligence addresses the threat across the range of military operations.
Tactical intelligence operations identify and assess the adversary’s capabilities, intentions,and vulnerabilities, as well as describe the physical environment. Tactical intelligence seeks
to identify when, where, and in what strength the adversary will conduct tactical level
operations. During counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, tactical intelligenceis increasingly focused on identifying threats to stability operations. Together with CI,
tactical intelligence will provide the commander with information on the imminent threats tothe force from terrorists, saboteurs, insurgents and their networks, and foreign intelligencecollection. The physical identification of the adversary and their operational networks allow
for enhanced situational awareness, targeting, and watchlisting to track, hinder, or prevent
insurgent movements within the region, nation, or international levels.
5. Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, divides the range of military operations into three major
types: military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response andlimited contingency operations; and major operations and campaigns. While intelligence
operations continue throughout the range of military operations, peacetime intelligence
operations provide national and military leadership the information needed to accomplish
missions, realize national goals and objectives, and implement the national security
strategy. During peacetime, intelligence helps commanders identify instability, project
future adversary capabilities, make acquisition decisions, protect technological advances,
define weapons systems and ISR systems requirements, shape organizations, and design
training to ready the joint force and PNs. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states,
volatile regions, and transnational issues to identify threats to US interests in time for

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senior military leaders to respond effectively. Intelligence support is equally criticalthroughout the range of military operations.
a. Intelligence Support During Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, andDeterrence Operations. Maintaining a forward presence enables US forces to gain regionalfamiliarity and develop a common understanding of important cultural, historical,
interpersonal, and social differences. Activities such as professional military exchanges,
forward basing, and cooperative relationships with multinational partners enhance US
forces’ ability to shape potential military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
operations, gain an understanding of multinational tactics and procedures, enhance
information sharing, and establish mutual support with host country nationals. Intelligencesupport is essential to activities such as emergency preparedness, arms control verification,
combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones,
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, nation assistance, protection of shipping,shows of force, and support to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. Intelligence
provides information on the OE in relation to the JFC’s questions concerning actual andpotential threats, terrain, climate and weather, infrastructure, cultural characteristics, medical
conditions, population, and leadership. Intelligence helps the JFC determine which forces to
employ and assists in estimating the duration of the operation. GEOINT that informs the
JFC on the spatial and temporal relationships and patterns of the local population and theirinteractions with the environment supports this process.
b. Intelligence Support During Crisis Response and Limited Contingency
Operations. Intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces todeploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that
accomplishes the mission. The intelligence requirements in support of crisis response andlimited contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations, peace
operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, recovery operations, chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear response actions, and threats or incidents, strikes and raids,
homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) are similar to thoserequired during major operations. During disaster relief operations, intelligence can play animportant role in surveying the extent of damage and can assist in planning for the
deployment of relief forces. Intelligence is essential to protect joint forces participating inthese operations. While intelligence efforts are supporting peacekeeping operations,
intelligence should also provide the JFC with warning of any possible escalation of violence
and a basis upon which to develop necessary plans and orders. Intelligence professionals
providing support for homeland defense and DSCA shall comply with intelligence oversightpolicies and regulations. Commanders and staffs should carefully consider the legal andpolicy limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of DSCA, and on intelligence
activities involving US citizens and entities. This oversight extends to IAA products. IAA is
SecDef approved use of DOD ISR and intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence
activities during DSCA missions.
c. Intelligence Support During Major Operations and Campaigns. Intelligenceidentifies enemy capabilities, COGs, and vulnerabilities, projects probable COAs, and assists
in planning friendly force employment. By determining the symmetries and asymmetries
between friendly and enemy forces, intelligence assists the JFC and operational planners in

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The Nature of Intelligenceidentifying the best means to accomplish the joint force mission. For example, intelligence
provides the JFC and component commanders with information on the relevant physical,
informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment and their impact on
military operations; estimates of what the enemy’s information capabilities are; when, where,
and how the joint force can exploit its information superiority; and the threat the enemy
poses to friendly information and information systems.
(1) Intelligence that enables the JFC to focus and leverage combat power and to
determine acceptable risk is key to allowing the JFC to achieve powerful, dynamic
concentrations when and where the enemy is vulnerable, and permits the JFC to exploit the
maximum range of joint fires. Intelligence provides key elements to targeting by providing
identification of HVTs, collection to develop these targets, weapons and platform delivery
recommendations, collateral damage estimates, and BDA of the extent of damage to, or
effect on, the targets.
(2) Intelligence support to the commander should be anticipatory, timely, relevant,and precise. Intelligence personnel maximize and synchronize support to the commander byfocusing on PIRs. The result of the intelligence process should be a product or service thatenhances planning, decision making, and assessment.
6. The Role of Intelligence in Military Operations
Intelligence constitutes one of six basic groups of joint functions (related capabilities
and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint
operations). Other joint functions include command and control, fires, movement andmaneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as command and control
and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as required by the
JFC’s mission.
a. Intelligence plays a critical and continuous role in supporting military operations.
Technology, precise global positioning, and telecommunications provide commanders withthe capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as tocollect, process, and disseminate relevant data to thousands of locations. These capabilities,
combined with the ability to deny or degrade the enemy’s ability to collect, process, anddisseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, provide the JFC with information
superiority. Likewise, the fusion of all-source intelligence along with the integration of
sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers allows a greaternumber of operational tasks to be accomplished faster, and enhances awareness of the OE—a
key component of information superiority.
b. The most important role of intelligence in military operations is to provide
commanders and their staffs with analysis of key aspects of the OE to assist them in theirdecision-making process. This includes determining adversary capabilities and intentions;
identifying adversary critical COGs and vulnerabilities; and estimating the adversary COAs
by probability. Visualization of the OE requires a thorough understanding of thecharacteristics of the operational area and the current dispositions and activities of adversaryand neutral forces. It requires knowing the adversary’s current and future capability to

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operate throughout the OE based on a detailed analysis of the impact of weather, geography,
and other relevant considerations. Most important, visualization requires understanding theadversary’s objectives, identifying how they might fulfill them, and their readiness toachieve them. Together, all these factors make a critical contribution to the JFC’s capability
to achieve information superiority. However, intelligence must also enable the JFC to know
the potential and probable future state of events well in advance of the adversary. Based on
this intelligence, the JFC may anticipate adversary actions and plan detailed
countermeasures.
c. Red Teams and Red Cells. Command red teams are organizational elements
comprised of trained, educated, and practiced experts that provide the JFC an
independent capability to conduct critical reviews and analysis, explore plans andoperations, and analyze adversary capabilities from an alternative perspective. Red
teams assist joint operation planning by validating assumptions about the adversary, as
well as participating in the wargaming of friendly and adversary COAs. In contrast, J-2
red cells perform threat emulation.
d. Determining adversary intent is one of the primary challenges confronting
intelligence. The factor that makes analyzing intent difficult is developing judgments based
upon the dynamic process of action and reaction between friendly and enemy forces. This
process requires the intelligence officer to assess the outcomes of future friendly actions,then simultaneously forecast the following factors: the likelihood of the adversary detecting
the action; how the adversary will interpret the action; the adversary’s future capabilities; andfinally, how the adversary is most likely to react. Moreover, an adversary will often use a
deception plan to mislead friendly analysts. A properly trained and augmented red team canreduce the risk associated with long-term prediction of enemy reaction by using red teammethodologies designed to analyze the situation from alternative perspectives. These
perspectives should be based on knowledge of the adversary’s culture, doctrine, capabilities,
and other relevant factors.
(1) A simple example of the process of action and reaction is the situation in which
an intelligence officer, having detected certain adversary actions and correctly determined
the adversary’s intent, forecasts that the adversary is preparing to attack. The commander
reacts by having friendly forces take appropriate defensive measures. However, theadversary commander detecting these actions decides attacking is no longer a desirable
COA, and cancels the attack. In this example, adversary actions produced a friendly reaction
resulting in changes to the adversary’s intent. This situation is known as the paradox ofwarning and is depicted in Figure I-8.
(2) Accurate estimates should inform the JFC of the full range of actions open to
the adversary and estimate the relative order of probability of their adoption. The confidence
placed on the analytic judgments contained in estimative intelligence products helps
commanders assess the risks associated in selecting friendly options.

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The Nature of Intelligence

The Paradox of Warning
Friendly intelligence
determines adversary
intention.

Friendly
intelligence
provideswarning.

Friendly
intelligencedetects
indications.

Adversary adopts different
course of action.

Friendly forces react
to adversary activity.
Adversary
intelligencedetects
indications.

Adversary
intelligence
provideswarning.

Adversary intelligence
determines friendly intention.

Figure I-8. The Paradox of Warning

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Intentionally Blank

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JP 2-0CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE“Tell me what you know…tell me what you don’t know…tell me what you
think—always distinguish which is which.”
General Colin Powell, US Army
Guidance to Joint Staff J-2 on 13 November 1992
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-1993

1. Introduction
This chapter combines intelligence theory and operating experience into fundamental
principles that are intended to contribute to effective and successful joint intelligence
operations. The following principles for conducting joint intelligence activities areappropriate at all levels of war across the range of military operations (see Figure II-1).
2. PerspectiveIntelligence analysts should strive to understand all relevant aspects of the OE. This
understanding should include not only the adversary’s disposition, but also the sociocultural
nuances of individuals and groups in the OE. The JFC should require the J-2 to assess all
proposed actions from the following perspective: “How will the adversary likely perceive
this action, and what are the adversary’s probable responses?” Carrying out these
intelligence responsibilities calls for sound judgment as well as expertise.
a. The ability to think like the adversary is predicated on a detailed understanding of theadversary’s goals, motivations, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods ofPrinciples of Joint IntelligencePerspective (Think like the adversary.)Synchronization (Synchronize intelligence with plans and operations.)Integrity (Remain intellectually honest.)

Unity of Effort (Cooperate to achieve a common end state.)

Prioritization (Prioritize requirements based on commander’s guidance.)Excellence (Strive to achieve the highest standards of quality.)Prediction (Accept the risk of predicting adversary intentions.)

Agility (Remain flexible and adapt to changing situations.)

Collaboration (Leverage expertise of diverse analytic resources.)Fusion (Exploit all sources of information and intelligence.)
Figure II-1. Principles of Joint Intelligence

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operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss. The J-2 should understand theadversary’s culture and pertinent actors in the OE. The ability of intelligence analysts tothink and react like the adversary and understand sociocultural factors is of particular value
during the wargaming of various COAs and the determination of enemy HVTs. Properly
trained personnel formed in structured or ad hoc red teams portray the adversary and theirmost probable or dangerous actions during the war game.
b. Understanding how an adversary will adapt to the environment, conceptualize thesituation, consider options, and react to our actions, should be an integral part of a continuinginteraction of the intelligence staff with the JFC and other staff elements. This
comprehensive understanding is essential to: recognizing challenges to our national security
interest; establishing security policy; when appropriate, formulating clear, relevant, andattainable military objectives and strategy; determining, planning, and conducting operations
that will help attain US policy objectives; and identifying the adversary’s strategic andoperational COGs.
“Great advantage is drawn from knowledge of your adversary, and when you
know the measure of his intelligence and character you can use it to play on his
weaknesses.”
King Frederick the Great of Prussia,
Instructions for His Generals, 1747

3. Synchronization—Synchronize Intelligence with Plans and Operations
Intelligence should be synchronized with operations and plans in order to provide
answers to intelligence requirements in time to influence the decision they are intended tosupport. Intelligence synchronization requires that all intelligence sources and methods beapplied in concert with the OPLAN and OPORD. OPLAN and OPORD requirements
therefore constitute the principal driving force that dictates the timing and sequencing ofintelligence operations. IP and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis
and production, and dissemination should all be accomplished with sufficient lead time topermit the integration of the intelligence product in operational decision making and plan
execution. Intelligence evaluation and feedback from commanders, operators, andintelligence personnel must also be accomplished in a timely manner to keep intelligence
operations focused to support the commander’s plan and intent. Effective synchronization
results in the maximum use of every intelligence asset where and when it will make thegreatest contribution to success. Intelligence synchronization is the coordination among eachtype and level of intelligence operation, and the integration of intelligence processes withplans and operations comprises intelligence synchronization.
a. The most common error in attempting to synchronize intelligence with operations andplans is the failure to build sufficient lead time for intelligence production and operational
decision making. To avoid late intelligence, the JFC, J-3, and the plans directorate of a joint
staff (J-5) in collaboration with the J-2, should establish a suspense or specify a timeframe
during which each intelligence requirement must be answered in order to support decision
making and operation planning. Likewise, the J-2 must provide sufficient lead time for thecollection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of the requisite intelligence to meet theII-2

JP 2-0Principles of Joint Intelligencecommander’s specified deadline. To facilitate synchronization, the J-2 should be involved as
early as possible in the operation planning effort and play an active role during thewargaming and analysis of all COAs and plans.
b. The commander drives the intelligence synchronization effort by determining thefriendly COA, PIRs, and points in time and space (decision points) where critical events andactivity would necessitate a command decision. Decision points are identified on a decision
support template developed during the JIPOE process and wargaming. This template
provides the basis for PIR development, optimized collection planning, and the formulationof an intelligence synchronization matrix.
4. Integrity—Remain Intellectually Honest
Intellectual integrity must be the hallmark of the intelligence profession. It is the
cardinal element in intelligence analysis and reporting, and the foundation on which
credibility with the intelligence consumer is built. Integrity requires adherence to facts andtruthfulness with which those facts are interpreted and presented. Moral courage is required
to remain intellectually honest and to resist the pressure to reach intelligence conclusions thatare not supported by facts. The methodology, production, and use of intelligence should not
be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result; institutional position;
preconceptions of a situation or an adversary; or predetermined objective, operation, or
method of operations. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors indetermining policy, but policy does not determine intelligence.
a. Intelligence analysts should take active measures to recognize and avoid cognitive
biases which affect their analysis. Cognitive bias results when intelligence analysts see theworld through lenses colored by their own perceptions and paradigms. Intelligence isfiltered through these paradigms and perceptions, and analysts are tempted to fit information
into pre-existing beliefs and discard information that does not fit.
b. Intelligence analysts must continuously guard against becoming rigidly committed toa specific interpretation of a set of facts (i.e., they must not ignore or downplay thesignificance of facts that do not fit a preferred hypothesis or that contradict a previous
assessment). Intelligence should be continuously reviewed and, where necessary, revised,taking into account all new information and comparing it with what is already known.
Intelligence professionals must have the integrity to admit analytic misjudgments and thecourage to change or adjust previously stated assessments when warranted by new
information. Intelligence analysts must avoid group think; a mode of thinking that occurs
when group members strive for agreement without examining alternatives. By definition,
indicators may be assessments that discourage creativity, have no individual responsibility or
uncritical acceptance, or are unanimous. Likewise, intelligence analysts must guard against
courting favor from superiors by following hypotheses that support established views or aleader’s biases and desires.
c. The same integrity and anlaytic process must extend to reporting what is not known.
Intelligence professionals must avoid the temptation to make assessments appear moredefinitive than may be warranted by the facts. Intellectual integrity requires the intelligence

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professional to distinguish for the commander those conclusions that are solidly grounded infact and those that are extrapolations or extensions of the fact. The commander cannot beleft with uncertainty regarding what is fact, what is opinion, and what is unknown.
INTEGRITY UNDER PRESSURE
At the outset of the Spanish-American War, Colonel Arthur L. Wagner washead of the Military Information Division (the War Department’s embryonic
intelligence organization). Driven by public sentiment, President
McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger were determined to attack
Spanish forces in Cuba not later than summer 1898. Wagner at once
prepared a careful assessment of the Spanish forces, terrain, climate andenvironmental conditions in Cuba—the basic intelligence needed for
operational planning. Wagner’s assessment also identified recurring
outbreaks of yellow fever in Cuba during the summer months as a crucial
planning consideration.
At a White House meeting, Wagnerrecommended postponement of any invasion until the winter months inorder to reduce what would otherwise be heavy American losses from thedisease. President McKinley reluctantly endorsed his view. As they left
the meeting, Secretary of War Alger was furious with Colonel Wagner.
“You have made it impossible for my plan of campaign to be carried out,”
he told Wagner. “I will see to it that you do not receive any promotions in
the Army in the future.”
The Secretary of War made good on his promise, for although Colonel
Wagner was promoted years later to brigadier general, the notice of his
appointment reached him on his death bed. Furthermore, Alger
influenced McKinley to reauthorize a summer invasion of Cuba.
Fortunately United States forces won a quick victory, but as Wagner
predicted, the effects of disease soon devastated the force. The ravagesof yellow fever, typhoid, malaria and dysentery accounted for more than85 percent of total casualties and were so severe that by August 1898 lessthan one quarter of the invasion force remained fit for service.
According to his peers, Wagner deliberately jeopardized his career inorder to satisfy a sense of duty, rather than bow to political pressure.
Information that American lives could be saved by avoiding the worst timeof the year for yellow fever was more important to him than currying favorwith the Secretary of War.
SOURCE: Various Sources

5. Unity of Effort—Cooperate to Achieve a Common Objective
Unity of effort is facilitated by centralized planning and direction and decentralized
execution of intelligence operations, which enables JFCs to apply all available collection
capabilities and PED systems, efficiently and effectively. It optimizes intelligence operations
by reducing unnecessary redundancy and duplication in intelligence collection andII-4

JP 2-0Principles of Joint Intelligenceproduction. Unity of effort requires intelligence operations, functions, and systems that arecoordinated, synchronized, integrated, and interoperable. Intelligence organizations (joint,
national, and multinational) operating in a JFC’s operational area must have a clear
understanding and common acceptance of the command’s desired effects, objectives, andend state. This is particularly important when employing distributed, reachback, andfederated capabilities, many of which are not forward deployed in a JFC’s operational area.
a. Organic and attached intelligence assets operating in the JFC’s operational area, as
well as national and theater intelligence resources supporting that force should be integrated
into an interoperable architecture so that appropriate elements have access to required
intelligence. This approach allows the JFC and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence
activities to meet the joint force’s intelligence requirements. The seamless provision of joint
intelligence support to operational forces as they deploy from one theater to another isparticularly important. To effectively plan and execute unit missions, deploying intelligence
personnel must know the supported commander’s concept of intelligence operations,
intelligence architecture, estimate of the situation, map standards, and other specificrequirements. This timely information should be provided to deploying forces in astandardized electronic format by intelligence producers. This focuses the ICs effort on
satisfying operational requirements.
b. Achieving unity of effort is most challenging during the coordination of multinational
operations or when supporting another lead federal agency. Unity of effort in thisenvironment requires establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. It also requires
understanding the PNs’ requirements, perceptions, and intelligence policies and procedures.

The allocation of high demand, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance resources, suchas the RQ-4A Global Hawk, should be based on prioritized requirements.

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Unity of effort should maximize the intelligence support provided to the JFC, while
simultaneously facilitating information sharing among other appropriate commanders, staffs,
and partners or coordinating with the multinational force.
6. Prioritization—Prioritize Requirements Based on Commander’s Guidance
Because operational needs for intelligence often exceed intelligence capabilities,
prioritization of collection and production efforts, and intelligence resource allocation areimportant aspects of the IP process. Prioritization offers a mechanism for addressing
requirements and effectively managing risk by identifying the most important tasks andapplying available resources against those tasks. Implicit in prioritization is the realizationthat some intelligence requirements are more important than others. Also implicit is arealization that some lower priority requirements might not be accomplished due to resource
limitations. Effective prioritization is absolutely dependent upon active cooperation andcoordination between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.
a. Intelligence consumers drive the intelligence prioritization effort by identifying theirintelligence needs and the relative importance of those needs. J-2s advise and assist in thiseffort by recommending intelligence priorities based on the commander’s guidance andoperational needs. At all levels, the commander’s identification of intelligence needs
determines prioritization.
b. An agreed upon prioritization framework provides the basis for optimizing theallocation of limited national intelligence resources among CCMDs, and for CCMD collection
and PED resources for a subordinate force. The Global Force Management (GFM) process
determines the allocation of collection and associated PED resources across the CCMDs based
upon the prioritization provided by SecDef. The allocation of national intelligence resources isbased upon the National Intelligence Priorities Framework established by the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) and should be consistent with DIAP established priorities and
CCMD PIRs. Without clear prioritization and understanding of risk at all levels, competition
for ISR resources not only reduces what intelligence could provide, it also inhibits fullcooperation among organizations that see themselves as competitors rather than teammates.
c. Military personnel requirements not associated with allocated PED force packages, aswell as the collection resources aligned with them, are submitted through RFFs. GFM
principles are applied to filling these requirements and result in coordination among force
providers and the Joint Staff, and approval by SecDef.
7. Excellence—Strive to Achieve the Highest Standards of Quality
Producers of intelligence should constantly strive to achieve the highest possible level of
excellence in their products. The quality of intelligence products is paramount to theintelligence professional’s ability to attain and maintain credibility with intelligence
consumers. The attributes of intelligence product quality (shown in Figure II-2) are
objectives for intelligence activities supporting joint operations and standards against which
the quality of intelligence products should be continuously evaluated. To achieve the highest
standards of excellence, intelligence products must be:

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JP 2-0Principles of Joint Intelligence

Attributes of Intelligence Excellence Anticipatory

 Complete Timely Relevant Accurate Objective

 Usable Available

Figure II-2. Attributes of Intelligence Excellencea. Anticipatory. Intelligence must anticipate the informational needs of thecommander and joint force staff in order to provide a solid foundation for operational
planning and decision-making. Anticipating the joint force’s intelligence needs requires theintelligence staff to identify and fully understand the command’s current and potential
missions, the commander’s intent, all relevant aspects of the OE, and all possible friendly
and adversary COAs. Most important, anticipation requires the aggressive involvement ofintelligence in operation planning at the earliest time possible.
b. Timely. Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it. Timely
intelligence enables the commander to anticipate events in the operational area. In turn, thisenables the commander to time operations for maximum effectiveness and to avoid being
surprised. Usually, the need to balance timeliness and completeness should favor timeliness,and if incomplete should be stated in the product, and followed up later. Recognizing andbalancing the subtle differences relative to timeliness and completeness is one of the critical
art forms for good intelligence.
c. Accurate. Intelligence must be factually correct, relay the situation as it actuallyexists, and provide an understanding of the OE based on the rational judgment of available
information. This judgment should evaluate the possibility of an adversary’s denial anddeception effort. The accuracy of intelligence products may be enhanced by placing
proportionally greater emphasis on information reported by the most reliable sources.
Evaluate source reliability through a feedback process in which past data received from asource is compared with the “ground truth” (for example, when subsequent events orinformation confirm the source’s accuracy).
d. Usable. Intelligence must be tailored to the commander’s specific needs, andprovided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension. Providing useful intelligencerequires its producers to understand the decisions facing the commander, the relevance andimpact of intelligence on those decisions, and how to deliver the intelligence to thecommander in context so that it balances efficiency and effectiveness. Commanders
operate under mission, operational, and time constraints that shape their intelligencerequirements and determine how much time they have to study the intelligence provided.
They must be able to quickly apply intelligence to the task, and may not have sufficient
time to analyze complex intelligence reports. Therefore the “bottom line” must be up front

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and understandable; oral presentations should be direct; and approved joint terms should be
used to effectively convey intelligence.
e. Complete. Complete intelligence answers the commander’s questions about theadversary and other aspects of the OE to the extent possible, and informs the commander ofsignificant intelligence gaps. To be complete, intelligence must identify relevant aspects of
the OE that may impact mission accomplishment or the joint operation execution and offer
alternative analysis. Complete intelligence informs the commander of all major COAs thatare available to the adversary, and identifies those assessed as most likely and mostdangerous. While providing available intelligence to those who need it when they need it,
the intelligence staff must give priority to the commander’s unsatisfied critical requirements.
Intelligence organizations must anticipate and respond to the commander’s existing andcontingent intelligence requirements by evaluating the intelligence process input and output
surrounding the mission.
f. Relevant. Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of theoperation at hand, and aid the commander in the accomplishment of the mission. It must
contribute to the commander’s understanding of the adversary and other significant aspectsof the OE, but not burden the commander with intelligence that is of minimal or no
importance to the current mission. To produce relevant intelligence, the J-2 staff mustremain cognizant of the commander’s intent and understanding of how the operational
concept inflicts desired effects upon the adversary to achieve the military objectives andsecure the end state. The J-2 staff must also update requirements as the friendly mission or
the adversary situation changes.
g. Objective. Due to the decisive and consequential impact of intelligence on
operations and reliance of planning and operations decisions on intelligence, it is important
for the J-2 to maintain objectivity and independence in developing assessments. When
informing the commander, joint intelligence must be vigilant in guarding against biases thatshade, slant, or frame assessments to favor the commander’s chosen COA or to fit thecommander’s preconceived notions. In particular, intelligence should recognize eachadversary as unique, and avoid mirror imaging while realizing the possible bias involved intheir assessment type. For example, current intelligence and warning intelligence estimates
may assess the same indicators differently. Red teams can be used to check analytical
judgments by ensuring assumptions about the adversary are sound and intelligenceassessments help minimize mirror imaging and cultural bias.
h. Available. Intelligence must be readily accessible to the commander. Availability isa function of not only timeliness and usability, but also appropriate security classification,interoperability, and connectivity. Intelligence producers must strive to provide information
at the most appropriate level of classification and least restrictive releasability caveats,
thereby maximizing the consumers’ access, while protecting sources of information andmethods of collection.

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JP 2-0Principles of Joint Intelligence
ANALYTIC BIAS: AN ENDURING PROBLEM
1945: “Furthermore, intelligence officers have sometimes been led in
extreme cases into pure crystal-gazing attempts to ascertain enemy
intentions on the basis of guess or intuition, unsupported by the available
evidence… Playing such hunches is not only dangerous in itself; it leads
intelligence officers who have committed themselves to guesses of thiskind to look for evidence that will corroborate their views and todepreciate contrary indications.”
Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary of War
to Study War Department Intelligence Activities,(Lovett Board Report)
5 December 1945
2004: “The Intelligence Community has long struggled with the need foranalysts to overcome analytic biases, that is, to resist the tendency to see
what they would expect to see in the intelligence reporting. In the case of
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the Committee foundthat intelligence analysts, in many cases, based their analysis more on
their expectations than on an objective evaluation of the information in
the intelligence reporting.”
Report on the US Intelligence Community’s
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,
Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate

8. Prediction—Accept the Risk of Predicting Adversary Intentions“In my opinion, a commander is not only entitled to a complete analysis ofrelative enemy capabilities, but to the views of the intelligence officer as to themost likely one to be anticipated, but of course is at liberty to accept or reject
those views.”
General Walter Krueger
Commanding General, Sixth US Army 1943-1945,
Response to US Army Command and General Staff College Survey on Enemy
Relative Capabilities, 28 July 1948

Although intelligence should identify and assess the full range of adversary capabilities,
it is most useful when it focuses on the future and adversary intent. JFCs require and expect
timely intelligence estimates that accurately identify adversary intentions, support offensive
and/or defensive operations, and predict adversary future COAs in sufficient detail as to beactionable. When justified by the available evidence, intelligence should forecast futureadversary actions and intentions. If there is inadequate information upon which to baseforecasts, the intelligence staff must ensure that the commander is aware of this shortcoming
and that the future contains much uncertainty.
a. The intelligence professional must base predictions on solid analysis using proventools and methodologies. In conventional analysis, the analyst examines, assesses, andII-9

Chapter II
compares bits and pieces of raw information, and synthesizes findings into an intelligenceproduct that usually reflects enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. However, predictive
analysis goes beyond the identification of capabilities by forecasting enemy intentions andfuture COAs. As discussed earlier, JIPOE provides an excellent methodology for assessing
adversary intentions and predicting the relative probability of enemy COAs.
b. Predictive analysis is both difficult and risky (i.e., it challenges the intellectual
resources of the analyst while at the same time entailing considerable risk that the events
predicted may not come to pass). This type of difficulty and risk apply less to the assessmentof adversary capabilities. Predictive analysis is riskier than capabilities analysis because it
deals more extensively with dynamic adversary characteristics, a greater range of unknown
factors, and possibly enemy deception plans. Therefore, the chances of analytic failure are
greater. As a consequence, there may be a tendency among overly cautious intelligence
personnel to avoid predictive analysis. However, JFCs need to know enemy intentions aswell as enemy capabilities. The analyst who successfully performs predictive analysis andaccurately assesses enemy intentions in advance of events performs an invaluable service tothe commander and staff.
c. Predictive intelligence is not an exact science and is vulnerable to incomplete
information, adversary deception, and the paradox of warning discussed earlier. JFCs must
understand that intelligence predictions are only estimates and that they accept an amount ofrisk in formulating plans based only on the J-2’s assessment of the adversary’s most probable
COA. The J-2 should ensure the JFC is aware of, and has taken into account, all potential
adversary COAs and should provide the JFC with an estimate regarding the degree ofconfidence the J-2 places in each analytic prediction.
9. Agility—Remain Flexible and Adapt to Changing Situations
Agility is the ability to quickly shift focus and bring to bear the skill sets necessary toaddress the new problem at hand while simultaneously continuing critical preexistingwork. Intelligence structures, methodologies, databases, products, and personnel should be
sufficiently agile and flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, andopportunities. Whether due to military contingencies or diplomatic and/or politicalchallenges, sudden changes in the OE and requirements of intelligence consumers allow
little reaction and recovery time. Therefore, the key to successful agility is preparation andorganization for all contingencies well in advance. Maintaining responsiveness under suchcircumstances requires considerable vigilance and foresight. Intelligence professionals
must anticipate not only the future decisions of adversaries, but of intelligence
consumers as well.
a. Agility is fundamentally a long-term project that requires a principled commitment
on the part of JFCs and an accurate vision of future requirements. Agility is built only byprior and continuous preparation. JFCs should continuously strive to increase thecompetence of the intelligence workforce through prior investment in technical training
and professional education. Intelligence organizations should be staffed with people who
possess an appropriate mix of skills and personal characteristics that enable them toquickly adapt to, and remain responsive in, a changing OE. Intelligence should employ

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JP 2-0Principles of Joint Intelligencemodularized automated data handling and communications systems that are capable ofresponding to changing circumstances, facilitating survivability and reliability, andenabling the seamless delivery of intelligence products to consumers regardless of theconditions in the OE. The processes that facilitate these aspects of agility require priorplanning and long lead times.
b. Intelligence managers should continuously assess what must be done to support
potential requirements, monitor changes in the OE, and adjust resources accordingly.
Agility requires anticipation and readiness, but for the most part, intelligence organizations
should be managed as if they were already “at war”—staffed, equipped, and organized forflexible responses to changing conditions in the OE.
10. Collaboration—Leverage Expertise of Diverse Analytic Resources
By its nature intelligence is imperfect (i.e., everything cannot be known, analysis isvulnerable to deception, and information is open to alternative interpretations). The best
way to avoid these obstacles and achieve a higher degree of fidelity is to consult with,and solicit the opinions of, other analysts and experts, particularly in externalorganizations.
a. Invaluable expertise on a diverse range of topics resides in governmental andnongovernmental centers of excellence. Likewise, PNs often possess in-depth capabilities ineither niche or multiple areas and valuable perspectives on diverse intelligence problems.
Without collaboration, intelligence products, and reports end up being one dimensional andthus less comprehensive.
b. Intelligence collaboration relies on unhindered access to and sharing of all relevant
information and can take many forms such as competitive analysis, brain storming, andfederation. The collaborative sharing of information should not be confused withinterorganizational documents coordination; collaboration is informal information sharing
among individuals while document coordination is a formal staff process in which officialorganizational positions are obtained or confirmed. Competitive analysis (in which multiple
teams use different or competing hypotheses to analyze the same intelligence problem) isuseful if sufficient resources are available. In competitive analysis, it is imperative that eachteam have access to the same information. In situations where competitive analysis isunfeasible, analysts should brainstorm all possible hypotheses with other analysts to gain
different perspectives. Collaboration on complex intelligence problems may benefit from afederated approach in which different organizations may assume responsibility for subtopics
within the larger problem. However, in the interest of both unity and simplicity, the joint
force J-2 should be the single focal point for assessing and presenting to the commander any
disparate intelligence assessments from outside agencies or analysts. The J-2 is responsible
for ensuring that the full spectrum of opinions and views obtained through collaboration are
considered in the formulation of the joint force’s intelligence products.

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Chapter II
11. Fusion—Exploit All Sources of Information and Intelligence
Fusion is a deliberate and consistent process of collecting and examining informationfrom all available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an assessment
as possible of detected activity. It draws on the complementary strengths of all intelligence
disciplines, and relies on an all-source approach to intelligence collection and analysis.
The JFC or J-2 might establish a specific staff organization to conduct fusion analysis.
a. Fusion relies on collection and analysis efforts that optimize the strengths andminimize the weaknesses of different intelligence disciplines. Information is sought fromthe widest possible range of sources to avoid any bias that can result from relying on asingle source of information and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.
The collection of information from multiple sources is essential to countering theadversary’s operations security (OPSEC) and deception operations. The operations of allcollection sources must be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cueing and tippingamong collectors. JFCs should develop methods to improve their own and staff’s
knowledge of the OE. This requires improving the integration of civil information into theplanning and operational processes, then sharing that information with external partners toenhance relationships and operational effectiveness.
b. All-source, fused intelligence results in a finished intelligence product that provides
the most accurate and complete picture possible of what is known about an activity. Whilethe level of detail in single-source reports may be sufficient to meet narrowly definedcustomer needs, fused reports are essential to gain an in-depth understanding. Because theadversary will engage in deception efforts, analysts should guard against placing
unquestioned trust in a single-source intelligence report. However, if such information isdisseminated to meet timeliness criteria, or if no supporting data is available, the singlesource nature of the reporting must be made known to the consumers.
LESSON IN FUSION: OPERATION BODENPLATTE
On 1 January 1945, the Luftwaffe conducted an attack (Operation
Bodenplatte) against Allied aircraft located on liberated airfields in
Belgium. In a postattack assessment, the intelligence staff of the 12th
Army Group Headquarters realized they had received adequate signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence reporting to have provided
tactical warning to the commander. The reports, however, had not been
fused. Highly compartmented SIGINT (based on Ultra communications
intercepts) received before the German attack indicated that an“Operation Bodenplatte” would be launched. However, the SIGINT
specialist had no further knowledge regarding this operation or what it
entailed. Filed elsewhere in the headquarters, a prisoner of war
interrogation report of a former Luftwaffe clerk in Berlin describedaspects of Operation Bodenplatte—a plan to employ low-flying aircraft inlarge numbers. This stove-piped compartmentalization of single source
intelligence resulted in the unnecessary destruction of several hundred
Allied aircraft.
SOURCE: RAND Corporation,“Notes on Strategic Air Intelligence in World War II,” October 1949

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JP 2-0CHAPTER III
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES“The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be
further urged.”
General George Washington,

Letter to Colonel Elias Dayton
26 July 1777

1. Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community
There are a variety of DOD and national intelligence organizations capable ofproviding support to joint operations. During most joint operations, JFCs will require
federated support from the IC to develop a full understanding of the OE. The IC provides
analysis of both military and nonmilitary aspects of the OE, as well as theinterrelationships which can be depicted in a systems perspective. To efficiently exploit
the knowledge and authority of the IC, JFCs and their J-2s should understand the IC roles
and responsibilities. This is increasingly important as technology facilitates collaborative
analysis and production throughout the IC, thus blurring the traditional distinction between
joint and national-level intelligence operations.
a. National Intelligence Leadership Structure(1) The DNI has overall responsibility for intelligence support to the President
and the day-to-day management of the IC. Specifically, the DNI establishes objectives andpriorities for the IC and manages and directs the tasking of national intelligence collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination. The DNI also develops and determines the annual
budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and monitors the implementation andexecution of the NIP by the heads of IC member organizations. The DNI implements
policies and procedures to ensure all-source intelligence includes competitive analysis andthat alternative views are brought to the attention of policy makers. Additionally, theOffice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) exercises control over the National
Intelligence Council, National CI Executive, National Counterterrorism Center, andNational Counterproliferation Center, and has authority to establish additional national
intelligence centers when deemed necessary to address other intelligence priorities, such as
regional issues.
(2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) is the principal
staff assistant and advisor to SecDef on all intelligence, CI, and security, and otherintelligence-related matters. The USD(I) exercises SecDef’s authority, direction, andcontrol over the DOD agencies and DOD field activities that are defense intelligence, CI,
security, exercise, planning, policy, and strategic oversight over all DOD intelligence, CI,
and security policy, plans, and programs. On behalf of SecDef, the USD(I) coordinateswith the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to ensure that defense intelligence,
CI, and security components within the operating forces (Services and CCMDs) are

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resourced to support DOD missions and are responsive to DNI requirements. The USD(I)also provides oversight and guidance for the annual budget for the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) and monitors the implementation and execution of the MIP by the Services
and the heads of the CSAs.
(3) The Director of the DIA advises SecDef and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
CJCS, CCDRs, and USD(I) on all matters concerning military and military-related
intelligence and is the principal DOD intelligence representative in the national foreign
intelligence process. The Director of DIA also serves in several additional capacities. The
Director coordinates intelligence support to meet CCMD requirements and reports to
SecDef through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As Defense Collection Manager, theDirector DIA, serves as the conduit for collection coordination with the joint intelligence
operations centers (JIOCs), interagency partners, and ODNI. SecDef-appointed Director,
DIA to be the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). As the Program Manager for the Joint
Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), the Director, DIA supports activities to leverage joint
reserve intelligence centers (JRICs) and Reserve Component capabilities in response tointelligence requirements. Finally, the Director serves as the Defense CI Manager and the
Defense HUMINT Manager and is responsible for coordinating all DOD CI and HUMINT
resources and requirements.
(4) The CJCS provides direction to the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2,
to ensure that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and CI support is available to the
JCS and the CCMDs.
(5) The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is a unique organization, inthat it is both a major component of DIA (a CSA) and a fully integrated element of the
Joint Staff. The J-2 provides continuous intelligence support to the CJCS, Joint Staff,
National Military Command Center (NMCC), and CCMDs in the areas of targeting, global
warning intelligence, and current intelligence. The J-2 also has the responsibility for
coordinating the IP activities of the Services and intelligence CSAs in support of CCDRs.
The Joint Staff J-2, ICW other IC elements, provides strategic warning, threat assessments,
and intelligence-related advice to the CJCS. It also exercises staff supervision of theintelligence alert center supporting the NMCC and keeps the CJCS apprised of foreignsituations that are relevant to current and potential national security policy, objectives, andstrategy. During crises, the intelligence support to the NMCC expands as necessary byutilizing DIA assets to form a working group, intelligence task force, or, in the case of amajor crisis, an expanded intelligence task force. The Joint Staff J-2 is also responsible forrepresenting and advocating CCMD views and intelligence requirements to the Joint Staff
and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Joint Staff J-2 is also responsible forcoordinating with the CCMDs to staff intelligence-related CJCS orders (e.g., alert orders,planning orders, warning orders) and coordinate RFFs in response to a CCMD request for
intelligence capabilities. To staff actions, the joint staff utilizes the Joint Staff Action
Process to obtain official CCMD, Service, and intelligence CSA coordination regarding
defense intelligence, CI, and security matters affecting the operating forces.

III-2

JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities(6) The Service Chiefs, their intelligence and CI chiefs, and staffs provide
intelligence and CI support for departmental missions related to military systems, equipment,
and training. They also support national intelligence activities in support of DOD entities,
including CCMDs, subordinate joint commands, and Service components of thosecommands. Service intelligence staffs and organizations produce a broad array of products
and services (such as weapons systems-specific targeting materials) as well as technicalexpertise in specialized areas such as military information support operations and foreign
weapons systems. At both the component and unit level, Service intelligence personnel are
involved in the operation of ISR assets and provide tailored intelligence support for weaponssystem employment.
b. The IC. The IC consists of the 17 member organizations (DIA, National Security
Agency [NSA], National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA], National Reconnaissance
Office [NRO], Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Marine CorpsIntelligence, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Department of State [DOS], Department ofEnergy [DOE], Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Department of the Treasury, Coast
Guard Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security [DHS], the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Office of DNI). The national intelligence leadership structure is
depicted in Figure III-1. Both DOD and non-DOD members of the IC routinely provide
support to JFCs while continuing to support national decision makers.
(1) Military Members of the IC. The military members of the IC consist of thefour defense agencies and the four Service intelligence organizations discussed below.
SecDef and USD(I) supervise the DOD portion of the IC and are assisted in their intelligence
management responsibilities by the ISR Integration Council and the Military Intelligence
Board (MIB). The ISR Integration Council assists the USD(I) with respect to mattersrelating to the integration of ISR capabilities and the coordination of related developmental
activities of DOD components and CCMDs. The MIB serves as the senior “board ofgovernors” for the DOD portion of the IC and works to develop cooperation and consensus
on CSA, Service, and CCMD intelligence issues.
(a) DIA. DIA has oversight of the DIAP and is the DOD focal point for
MASINT, HUMINT, and CI, and is the senior CMA for DOD within the IC, representing all
Service and CCMD requirements for national collection. Additionally, DIA analysts provide
support in areas such as: all-source military analysis, human factors analysis,counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), counterdrug
operations, information-related capabilities (IRCs), personnel recovery, peacekeeping, andmultinational support, noncombatant evacuation operations, warning intelligence, targeting,
BDA, current intelligence, systems analysis of the adversary, collection management,
intelligence architecture and systems support, intelligence support to operation planning,
defense critical infrastructure protection, and DOMEX, BEI, and FEI.
(b) NSA/Central Security Service (CSS). NSA/CSS is a unified organization
structured to provide for the SIGINT mission of the US and to ensure the protection ofnational security systems for all departments and agencies of the US Government. Per
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the Director NSA is designatedas the functional manager for SIGINT.

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Chapter III

National Intelligence Leadership Structure
President

Department of DefenseIntelligence
Community

NCPC

NCTC

DNI & PD/DNI

CIA

DIA

DOS

NGA

DOE

NSA

DOJ (FBI)

NRO

DEA

DHS

US Treasury

USCG

Secretary of Defense
Undersecretary of Defense(Intelligence)

Service Intelligence
Chiefs(US Army, US Navy,
USAF, USMC)

Legend
CIA
DEA
DHS
DIA
DNI
DOE
DOJ
DOS
FBI
NCPC
NCTC

Central Intelligence Agency
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Homeland Security
Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of National Intelligence
Department of Energy
Department of JusticeDepartment of State
Federal Bureau of Investigation
National Counterproliferation Center
National Counterterrorism Center

NGA
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NRO
National Reconnaissance Office
NSA
National Security Agency
PD/DNI Principal Deputy/Director of National Intelligence
USAF United States Air ForceUSCG United States Coast Guard
USMC United States Marine Corps

command authority
coordination

Figure III-1. National Intelligence Leadership Structure(c) NGA. NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate GEOINT support toinclude imagery intelligence (IMINT), geospatial information, national imagery collection
management, commercial imagery, imagery-derived MASINT, and some meteorological andoceanographic data and information. Per Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
Activities, the Director NGA is designated as the functional manager for GEOINT. See JP
2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, for information regarding the Director’sroles and responsibilities as the functional manager for GEOINT and the National System
for GEOINT.

III-4

JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities(d) NRO. NRO is responsible for integrating unique and innovative spacebased reconnaissance technologies, and the engineering, development, acquisition, andoperation of space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities.
(e) US Army Intelligence. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence is
responsible for policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management,
evaluation, and oversight of intelligence activities for the Department of the Army. The
Army Intelligence Staff Section exercises staff supervision over the US Army Intelligenceand Security Command.
(f) US Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence leads the Navyintelligence enterprise and is dual-hatted as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information Dominance. The Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence reports to the
Director of Naval Intelligence and leads the Service intelligence center that focuses onproviding intelligence products and services to inform Navy decision makers.
(g) US Air Force Intelligence. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR
is responsible for intelligence policy, planning, programming, evaluation, and resource
allocation and exercises staff supervision over the US Air Force ISR Agency. Through its
National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the Air Force ISR Agency provides intelligencesupport to strategic-and operational-level commanders in the areas of GEOINT, MASINT,SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, and technical intelligence (TECHINT), as well as integrated allsource intelligence estimates. In addition to the Air Force ISR Agency, the Air Force enables
the use of multiple assets from multiple geographic commands; collecting data across allareas of responsibility (AORs) that may satisfy strategic, operational, and tacticalrequirements; which may be used by national, joint, or Service specific personnel. The Air
Force’s globally integrated ISR enables the integration of this collected information todeliver intelligence to the right command at the right time. Lastly, the Air Force Office ofSpecial Investigations is the main focal point for Air Force CI activities.
(h) US Marine Corps Intelligence. The Director of Intelligence is theCommandant’s principal intelligence staff officer and exercises supervision over the Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity. The Headquarters Marine Corps Intelligence Department is
responsible for policy, plans, programming, budgets, and staff supervision of intelligenceand supporting activities within the United States Marine Corps. The Headquarters Marine
Corps Intelligence Department supports the Commandant as a member of the JCS andrepresents the Service in joint and IC matters. The Intelligence Department has Service staff
responsibility for GEOINT, advanced GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, CI, andtactical exploitation of national capabilities.
(2) Nonmilitary Members of the IC. Joint operations require understanding ofboth military and nonmilitary aspects of the OE. Much of this expertise falls outside thepurview of the DOD members of the IC. JFCs and their J-2s should be familiar with theroles and responsibilities of the following non-DOD members of the IC.
(a) CIA. CIA’s primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT collection, allsource analysis, and the production of political, economic, and biographic intelligence. Per

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Chapter III
Executive Order12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the Director CIA is designatedas the functional manager for HUMINT.
(b) DOS. The DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research performs intelligence
analysis and production on a wide range of political and economic topics essential to foreign
policy determination and execution.
(c) DOE. DOE analyzes foreign information relevant to US energy policies
and nonproliferation issues.
(d) FBI. The FBI has primary responsibility for CI and counterterrorism
operations conducted in the United States. The FBI shares law enforcement and CI
information with appropriate DOD entities and CCMDs. The FBI’s Terrorist Explosive
Device Analytical Center serves as the lead interagency organization to receive, analyze, andexploit terrorist improvised explosive devices of interest to the US.
(e) Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury analyzes
foreign intelligence related to economic policy and participates with DOS in the overt
collection of general foreign economic information.
(f) United States Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG operates as both amilitary Service and a law enforcement organization and provides general maritime
intelligence support to commanders from the strategic to tactical level in the areas of
HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, MASINT, OSINT, and CI. The USCG’s Intelligence
Coordination Center, co-located with the Office of Naval Intelligence, provides all-source,
tailored, and integrated intelligence.
(g) DHS. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is a member of the national
IC and ensures that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed,
and disseminated to the full range of the homeland security customers in the DHS, state,
local, and tribal levels, in the private sector and in the IC.
(h) Drug Enforcement Administration. The Office of National Security
Intelligence collects and analyzes information related to illegal drug production, smuggling,
and trafficking.
JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, provides additional
information regarding the support that national agencies such as DIA, CIA, NSA, NRO, and
NGA, as well as the intelligence and operational organizations of the Services and functional
CCMDs can provide to joint forces.
2. Defense and Joint Intelligence Organizations
In addition to the J-2 staffs at every joint level of command, the key organizations in the
defense intelligence architecture are the CCMD JIOCs, the JTF joint intelligence support
elements (JISEs), JFCC-ISR, and the JRICs. At the JTF level, a JISE is normallyestablished; however a JIOC may be established at the direction of the JFC based on thescope, duration, and mission of the unit or JTF. For the remainder of this document
III-6

JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities“JISE” will be used as the standard term to describe the intelligence organization at the
JTF level. Working together, these organizations play the primary role in managing andcontrolling the various types of intelligence functions and operations that comprise theintelligence process described in Chapter I, “The Nature of Intelligence.” These
organizations are linked by formal relationships that facilitate RFI management, optimize
complementary intelligence functions by echelon, and promote the timely flow of criticalintelligence up, down, and laterally. In addition to the support provided by joint intelligencestaffs and organizations, JFCs receive valuable support from the Service intelligenceorganizations and from the intelligence staffs and organizations belonging to the joint force
components. JFCs should consider the intelligence capabilities of these elements during theplanning and execution of all joint operations. Intelligence units and organizations assigned
to the joint force will receive at least one intelligence support mission (shown in Figure III-2)
from the JFC. Intelligence staffs and forces organic to a component command will remain
the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants the organic intelligence assets ofa component to support other components, the JFC will usually assign an intelligencesupport mission to that component commander.
Support relationships are further explained in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of theUnited States.
a. The National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC). The NJOIC is
an integrated Joint Staff J-2/J-3/Plans Directorate element that monitors the global situation
on a continual basis and provides the CJCS and SecDef a DOD planning and crisis response
capability. The intelligence component of the NJOIC maintains an alert center that consistsof the Deputy Director for Intelligence, regional desks corresponding to each geographic
CCMD, and representatives from each Service intelligence staff element, the intelligence
CSAs, and the CIA. The alert center is a continuously manned, all-source, multidiscipline
intelligence center providing defense intelligence situational awareness, early warning, andcrisis management intelligence support to the President of the United States, SecDef, JCS,
CCMDs, deployed forces, Services, and other intelligence consumers during peace, crisis,
and war. It provides planning, management, and infrastructure for intelligence working
groups and intelligence task forces that provide direct intelligence support during major
conflicts. To provide intelligence analytical depth, DIA maintains a 24/7 direct support
element at the NJOIC, tailored to the current global situation and operating tempo. The
NJOIC coordinates the intelligence response to immediate crises and contingencies.
b. CCMD JIOC. The CCMD JIOCs are the primary intelligence organizations
providing support to joint forces. The JIOC integrates the capabilities of DNI, Service, CSA,
and CCMD intelligence assets to coordinate IP, collection management, analysis, andsupport. The JIOC construct seamlessly combines intelligence functions, disciplines, andoperations into a single organization, ensures the availability of information sources from
CCMD, subordinate, and US intelligence resources, and fully synchronizes intelligence with
operation planning, execution, and assessment. Although a particular JIOC cannot be
expected to completely satisfy every RFI, it can coordinate support from other intelligenceorganizations. Each CCMD organizes, trains, and directs its JIOC in accordance with theneeds and guidance of the CCDR. The JIOC construct is intended to facilitate the agile

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Chapter III

Intelligence Support Missions
GeneralAn intelligence element in general support will provide support to the joint force asa whole and not to any particular subordinate unit. The intelligence element
responds to the requirements of the joint force as tasked by the intelligence
directorate of a joint staff (J-2).

DirectAn intelligence element in direct support provides intelligence support to a specificunit. The intelligence element is required to respond to the supported unit’s
intelligence requirements. As a second priority, the intelligence element will
respond to the intelligence requirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

Close
An intelligence element with a close support mission will provide intelligencesupport on targets and objectives sufficiently near the supported force as torequire detailed integration and coordination with the fire, movement, or otheractions of the supported unit.

MutualIntelligence elements receive a mutual support mission when their assigned tasks,
their position relative to each other, and their capabilities allow them to coordinate
their activities in order to assist each other to respond to the intelligencerequirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

Figure III-2. Intelligence Support Missions

management of all intelligence functions, disciplines, and operations according to theprinciple of centralized planning and direction decentralized execution.
c. JTF JISEs. At the discretion of a subordinate JFC, a JTF JISE may be establishedduring the initial phases of an operation to augment the subordinate joint force J-2 element.
Under the direction of the joint force J-2, a JTF JISE normally manages the intelligencecollection, production, analysis, and dissemination for a joint force.
See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters, for detailed discussion of JIOC and JISE structures, roles,
and responsibilities.
d. DIA Crisis Response Concept for National Intelligence Support. In response tocrisis and contingency operations, each CCMD must be prepared to provide deployed JTF
commanders a means to access national intelligence capabilities and facilitate interaction andcoordination among IC participants. This includes providing scalable and dedicated securecommunications for reachback into the national IC to leverage all intelligence collection andproduction agencies. For this purpose, DIA has prepositioned deployable, large-bandwidth,
secure satellite communications packages at each CCMD regional support center. Support to
JTF commanders should also include forward-deploying CCMD-based IC agency
representatives and subject matter experts (SMEs) to support CCMD intelligence operations
and facilitate access to their parent agencies. After assessing its capabilities, requirements,
III-8

JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities
and evaluating unfulfilled needs, CCMDs should submit an RFF to the Joint Staff
specifically stating manning and/or capability shortfalls.
The RFF should
specifically identify the skills required from each CSA. Special capabilities can also berequested to close gaps.
e. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
Commander,
USSTRATCOM, plans, integrates, and coordinates ISR in support of strategic and global
operations and advocate for ISR capabilities. Commander, USSTRATCOM, is the Joint
Functional Manager for ISR and associated PED capabilities. JFCC-ISR is a functional
component command of USSTRATCOM responsible for executing USSTRATCOM’s ISR
mission. It develops sourcing solutions for annual and emergent allocation of intelligencecollection and associated PED systems to satisfy strategic and high priority CCMD andnational operational and intelligence requirements. Allocation of collection capabilities andassociated PED systems are staffed through the GFM process to the Joint Staff and approved
by SecDef.
f. JRIC. A JRIC is an intelligence production and training capability enabling Reserve
Component intelligence forces to meet Service components, CCMDs, CSAs, and IC training,readiness, and operational requirements. JRICs are generally located within a Service
component-owned, managed, and maintained (Active Component or Reserve Component)
sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) and surrounding collateral andunclassified areas and use JRIP associated information technology infrastructure andconnectivity.
3. Intelligence Federation
During crises, joint forces may also garner support from the IC through intelligencefederation. Intelligence federation enables CCMDs to form support relationships with othertheater JIOCs, Service intelligence centers, JRICs, or other DOD intelligence organizations
to assist with the accomplishment of the joint force’s mission. These support relationships,
called federated partnerships, are preplanned agreements (formalized in OPLANs, national
intelligence support plans (NISPs), or memorandums of agreement) intended to provide a
rapid, flexible, surge capability enabling personnel from throughout the IC to assist the
CCMD while remaining at their normal duty stations. Federated support can be provided in
specific functional areas directly related to the crisis, or by assuming temporary
responsibility for noncrisis-related areas within the GCCs’ AORs, thereby freeing the
supported command’s organic assets to refocus on crisis support.
Detailed guidance on intelligence federation planning and support is discussed in JP 2-01,
Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
4. Command and Staff Intelligence Responsibilities
a. Joint Force and Component Commander Intelligence Responsibilities. JFCs andtheir component commanders are more than just consumers of intelligence. Commanders
have key roles and responsibilities in the planning and conduct of intelligence operations.
JFCs organize their joint force staff and assign responsibilities as necessary to ensure unity

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Chapter III
of effort and mission accomplishment. Additionally, commanders (as well as other users)
should continuously provide feedback on the effectiveness of intelligence in supporting
operations. Figure III-3 depicts commanders’ intelligence responsibilities.
(1) Understand Intelligence Capabilities and Limitations. Commanders must
know intelligence capabilities and limitations as well as procedures and products.
Commanders should understand that intelligence analysis provides only estimates tounderstand the OE, an adversary’s probable intention, and COAs—they cannot determine thecourse of future events.
(2) Provide Planning Guidance. Commanders focus the planning process throughthe commander’s intent, planning guidance, and initial CCIRs. The commander’s guidance
provides the basis for the formulation of PIRs, the concept of intelligence operations, andcoherent target development and target nominations.
(3) Define the AOI. Commanders should define their AOI based on mission
analysis, their concept of operations (CONOPS), and a preliminary analysis of relevant
aspects of the OE (prepared as part of the JIPOE process). Commanders should also give
clear guidance on the visualization tools and products that support understanding of the OE.
(4) Specify Intelligence Priorities. Commanders should specify the PIR
component of their CCIRs as early as possible to focus limited intelligence resources.
Commanders should not only specify what information is needed, but also when it is neededin order to be integrated into operation planning. Commanders should understand that insome situations, their PIRs will require ISR support from higher echelons that may entail
substantial lead time.
(5) Integrate Intelligence in Plans and Operations. Commanders are ultimately
responsible for ensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into their plans and operations.
The successful synchronization of intelligence operations with all other elements of joint

Commanders’ Intelligence Responsibilities
 Understand intelligence doctrine, capabilities, and limitations.
 Provide planning guidance.
 Define area of interest.
 Specify intelligence priorities.
 Integrate intelligence in plans and operations.
 Proactively engage the intelligence staff.
 Demand high quality, predictive intelligence.
 Protect and promote intelligence integrity and objectivity.

Figure III-3. Commanders’ Intelligence Responsibilities

III-10JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities
operations occurs in the JIOC and begins with commanders involving their intelligenceplanners in the earliest stages of the joint operation planning process (JOPP).
(6) Proactively Engage the Intelligence Staff. Commanders should actively
engage their intelligence officers in discussions of the OE, adversaries, force protection, andfuture operations. Frequent consultations between the JFC and the joint force intelligence
officer facilitates situational awareness and understanding.
(7) Demand High Quality, Predictive Intelligence. Commanders must expect theirintelligence personnel to provide predictive intelligence that meets the attributes of intelligenceexcellence. JFCs must also understand the challenges and limitations that confront intelligence
personnel in assessing the dynamic OE to include adversary intentions and future COAs thus
predictive intelligence is based on incomplete and changing information.
b. Joint Force J-2 Responsibilities. The J-2 assists the JFC in developing strategy,planning operations and campaigns, and tasking intelligence assets, for effective joint andmultinational operations. Additionally, the J-2 is responsible for determining therequirements and direction needed to ensure unity of the intelligence effort and to support thecommander’s objectives. The CCMD J-2 provides higher echelons and subordinate
commands with a single, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national and theater
intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments. The CCMD J-2’s responsibility also
includes applying national intelligence capabilities, optimizing the utilization of joint force
intelligence assets, and identifying and integrating additional intelligence resources. The
scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, andcomposition of the force. To plan, coordinate, and execute required intelligence operations,joint force J-2s have the following major responsibilities (see Figure III-4).
(1) Provide Threat Assessments and Warning. The J-2 is responsible foranalyzing all relevant aspects of the OE, determining adversary capabilities, and estimating
adversary intentions. The J-2 provides the resulting threat assessments and warning to thejoint force and its components in a manner consistent with the intelligence principle ofexcellence (i.e., the product must be anticipatory, timely, accurate, usable, complete,
relevant, objective, and available).
(2) Participate in all Decision Making and Planning. Using JIPOE as a basis,
the J-2 participates in the JFC’s decision-making and planning processes from the time that
operations are first contemplated or directed until the completion of the operation. The JFC
and the J-2 must conduct a continuous dialogue concerning the adversary’s relative
strengths, weaknesses, and ability to prevent the joint force from accomplishing its mission.
(3) Synchronize Intelligence With Operations and Plans. The J-2 intelligenceplanners should lead J-2 participation in the pertinent groups to ensure that intelligence
activities are synchronized to support the commander’s decision-making process and to meetthe planners’ requirements. This is particularly important in the field of target intelligence,
which provides a functional link between intelligence and operations. The commanders’desired effects provide the basis for target development, nomination, and prioritization, whileassessment will inform any changes in the commander’s objective and strategy.

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Chapter III

Joint Force Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff Responsibilities
 Provide threat assessment and warning.
 Participate in all decision making and planning.
 Synchronize intelligence with operations and plans.
 Formulate concept of intelligence operations.
 Develop detailed intelligence annexes.
 Integrate joint and national intelligence support.
 Exploit combat reporting from operational forces.
 Organize for continuous operations.
 Ensure accessibility of intelligence.
 Establish a joint intelligence architecture.

Figure III-4. Joint Force Intelligence Directorate of Joint Staff Responsibilities(4) Formulate Concept of Intelligence Operations. To communicate guidance
and requirements to higher and lower echelons of command, the joint force J-2 develops anddisseminates a concept of intelligence operations. The concept can include such information
as tasking authorities, reporting responsibilities, required coordination, obtaining
communications-related support and backups, and requirements for intelligence-relatedboards, centers, and teams.
For further information regarding the concept of intelligence operations, see JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to
Military Operations.
(5) Develop Detailed Intelligence Annexes. The JFC’s PIRs and the results ofwargaming serve as the basis for the intelligence annex of each directed OPLAN and concept
plan. The annex will list the JFC’s PIRs and the supporting information requirements. It
will identify the intelligence forces available for the operation, resolve shortfalls, and assign
or recommend tasks (as appropriate) that will best support the joint force’s requirements.
This annex should allocate available joint force and supporting intelligence assets among theelements of the joint force in accordance with the commander’s intent, main effort, and
CONOPS. The J-2 must ensure that component intelligence requirements critical to successof key component operations receive appropriate intelligence support. The annex also
addresses how any shortfalls between assigned or attached capabilities and requirements will
be met by national and supporting capabilities.
(6) Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support. The J-2 shouldplan for integrating national and theater intelligence elements and products into the joint
force’s intelligence structure. National and theater intelligence organizations will makeIII-12JP 2-0Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities
operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability,
capacity, or expertise.
Joint and national intelligence support is discussed in greater detail in JP 2-01, Joint andNational Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
(7) Exploit Combat Reporting from Operational Forces. Forward and engaged
combat forces have a responsibility to report information that can be integrated withintelligence obtained from reconnaissance and surveillance assets. In many situations, evennegative reporting from operational forces may be valuable (e.g., a lack of contact withadversary forces may be just as significant as positive contact). Likewise, special operations
forces (SOF) provide the JFC with a unique manned and unmanned deep look capability,
especially useful in areas where other sensors are not available, or cannot provide situationalawareness. Based on operational requirements, the J-2 must identify the PIRs and associatedreporting criteria to properly focus SOF assets.
(8) Organize for Continuous Operations. Intelligence organizations should be
structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. The J-2’s concept ofintelligence operations should provide for continuity of support even if communications areseverely stressed or temporarily lost. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications
must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable to ensure required intelligencesupport is available to the JFC. An important component of survivability is redundancy in
critical intelligence architectural components and capabilities.
(9) Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence. The J-2 must ensure that intelligence isreadily accessible throughout the joint force while still adhering to security standards (e.g.,security clearance and need-to-know requirements). All efforts must be made to ensure thatthe personnel and organizations that need access to required intelligence will have it in atimely manner. When operating in a multinational environment, personnel trained in foreign
disclosure regulations should be assigned to the joint force to facilitate the efficient flow ofintelligence to authorized multinational members.
(10) Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture. A truly joint intelligence
infrastructure must be created to provide the best possible intelligence to the JFC. It must be
constructed to ensure protection of information and intelligence from inadvertent disclosure,and guarantee integrity of the data and assured access to all sources. The joint force
intelligence architecture required to support the JFC’s CONOPS must be designed during the
IP process and refined during the pre-deployment phase. JTFs that are primarily composedof forces from a single Service should be provided the necessary personnel andcommunications to permit the implementation of a joint intelligence system.
Intelligence architecture requirements are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, “Joint,
Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation.”

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Intentionally Blank

III-14JP 2-0CHAPTER IVINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PLANNING, EXECUTING, AND ASSESSINGJOINT OPERATIONS“What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods,
nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained
from men who know the enemy situation.”
Chinese General and Tactician Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 400-320 BC

SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING
1. Overview
The planning of joint operations is accomplished through the APEX system. The
intelligence component of APEX is the IP process and it is conducted by the organizations
within the DOD component of the IC. IP procedures are fully integrated and synchronizedwith joint operation planning and apply to deliberate and crisis action planning. The IP
process is a methodology for coordinating and integrating available defense intelligencecapabilities to meet CCDR intelligence requirements. It ensures that prioritized intelligencesupport is aligned with CCDR objectives for each phase of an operation. The DOD portionof the IC develops products that are used by the joint force J-2 to provide the JFC and staff
with situational understanding of the OE.
a. Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA) or Theater Intelligence Assessment (TIA).
The DTA is a defense strategic intelligence assessment developed by DIA, which identifies
the capabilities and intentions of adversaries for top-priority plans. DIA produces andprovides the CCMD an updated DTA prior to mission analysis and updates DTAs as
strategic factors in the OE change. For theater campaign plans, DIA produces a TIA. The
TIA is a theater-wide defense strategic intelligence assessment that is scoped in accordancewith the actors of concern with particular emphasis on how these actors are affected by thestrategic environment. These DIA-produced strategic intelligence assessments enable
development of the CCMD intelligence staff estimate in order to conduct mission analysis
and develop COAs.
b. NISP. The NISP is a supporting plan to a CCMD plan that details how theintelligence capabilities of CSAs, Services, and other DOD Intelligence Enterpriseorganizations will be employed to meet the CCDR’s stated intelligence requirements. It
facilitates the integration of theater and national intelligence capabilities and synchronizes
intelligence operations. The NISP contains annexes from applicable defense intelligenceagencies/organizations that detail their concept for function support.
For additional information on IP, refer to CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, and JP
2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

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Chapter IV
SECTION B. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING
2. Joint Operation Planninga. Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including three broad
operational activities, four planning functions, and a number of related products (seeFigure IV-1). Each of these planning functions will include as many in progress reviews(IPRs) as necessary to complete the plan. IPR participants are based on the initiating
authority or level. IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue among strategic leaders (mostnotably the CCDRs, CJCS, SecDef, and, when approved, senior DOS and other key
department and agency leadership or their representatives) to shape the plan as it isdeveloped.
b. During JOPP, CCMD J-2s lead development of annex B (Intelligence). Annex B is
the intelligence annex to a plan or order that provides detailed information on the adversary
situation, establishes priorities, assigns intelligence tasks, identifies required intelligenceproducts, requests support from higher echelons, describes the concept of intelligence
operations, and specifies intelligence procedures. The joint force J-2 products normally
include but are not limited to the following: a description of the operational area; anevaluation of the adversary; identification of adversary COGs; prioritized adversary COAs;
event templates; named AOIs and target AOIs; a decision support template; wargame
support; and an intelligence synchronization matrix.
For additional information on JOPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 2-01,
Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
SECTION C. THE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS
3. Intelligence Planning Lines of Effort
Joint and national intelligence activities help identify and monitor threats to national
security that inform the development of policy and the DOD’s overall planning efforts.
Through joint operation planning, intelligence priorities are further refined to focus theemployment of limited DOD intelligence resources. Thus, IP activities are generallyorganized along two lines of effort (LOEs): providing intelligence support to joint operation
planning and planning intelligence operations as illustrated in Figure IV-2.
a. IP LOE # 1: Providing Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning. IP
activities along this LOE include the production of intelligence assessments and estimatesof adversary intentions, capabilities, and COAs. Specific outputs of this LOE are the DIAproduced DTA, or TIA, and the development of tailored products from the CCMD’s JIPOE
process that culminate in the production and maintenance of the intelligence estimate.
These finished intelligence products are disseminated to inform joint operation planningand the development of the commander’s estimate through which CCDRs provide SecDef
with military options to meet strategic objectives. Activities along this LOE arecontinuous and typically conducted in parallel with and in support of the CCMD’soperation planning and assessment.

IV-2

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations

Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products
Situational AwarenessOperational
Activities

Planning
Execution

Planning
Functions

Strategic
Guidance

Concept
Development

Plan
Development

Plan Assessment(Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute)
Review Cycle (IPR R)

IPR
A

IPR
C

IPR
F
Base Plan

Approved
MissionApproved
Concept

Approved
Plan

Concept Plan
Operation Plan

Products

Execute Order
Warning
Order

Planning
Order

Alert
Order

Operation
Order
Deployment Order

LegendIPRin-progress review
IPR A IPR mission analysis review
IPR C IPR concept development review

IPR F IPR final plan approval
IPR R IPR plan assessment review

Figure IV-1. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

b. IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations. IP activities along this LOE
include identifying information gaps, prioritizing intelligence requirements, developing
federated production and integrated collection plans, and assessing intelligence capabilities
for the purpose of identifying shortfalls and mitigation strategies. Specific outputs of thisLOE are the CCMD J-2 staff estimate, which identifies available CCMD intelligencecapabilities and anticipated shortfalls, CSA and Service intelligence center estimates, theannex B (Intelligence) to a campaign or a contingency plan, and when appropriate an NISPor the joint intelligence posture assessment. Additional outputs of this LOE may include
intelligence resource demand signals that may be articulated through the CCDR’s integrated
priorities list or RFF. Activities along this LOE are also continuous and are typicallyconducted internal to the command JIOC as facilitated by an intelligence planning team(IPT), or through the IP steering group ICW the Joint Staff J-2 to facilitate the integration ofnational-level intelligence support.

IV-3

Chapter IVIntelligence Planning Lines of Effort
Strategic
Guidance

Concept
Development

Plan
Plan
Development Assessment

IPR
A

IPR
C

IPR
F

Intelligence Planning Line of Effort #1:
Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning

IPR
R

Running intelligenceassessments and estimates

Produ
cts

ucts
Prod

Products

Refine,adapt,
terminate,executeCourse of Action

uirem
Req

Re
qu
i re
me
nts

MissionAnalysis

ent sIntelligence Planning Line of Effort #2:
Planning Intelligence Operations

Plan
Assessment

ents

Plan
Development

Development
Analysis and wargaming Comparison
 Approval

Requirem

Initiation

Running staff estimates andcapability assessments

LegendIPR A strategic guidance in process review
IPR C concept development in process review

IPR F plan approval in process review
IPR R plan assessment in process review

Figure IV-2. Intelligence Planning Lines of Effort

4. Intelligence Planning Activities During Strategic Guidance
a. IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning(1) DIA will validate, update, or produce a DTA or a TIA.
(2) At the CCMD level and below, intelligence planners orchestrate the command’s
continuous JIPOE effort for analysts to provide a baseline assessment of the OE, adversarycapabilities, COGs, vulnerabilities and estimated adversary COAs. The analytical cell of the
CCMD JIOC evaluates relevant databases and intelligence holdings to identify gaps relevantto the planning effort under consideration. This includes the status of targeting information.
The J-2 may form a JIPOE coordination cell to draw relevant information from other staff
elements, IC representatives, and PNs as appropriate, as well as request tailored products
from the defense IC. The JIPOE process culminates with the production of an intelligenceIV-4

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
estimate which is incorporated into the plan as appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) toannex B (Intelligence).
For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.
(3) As core members of the joint planning group (JPG), intelligence planners
contribute to the overall plan design and nominate operations objectives, desired effects andother mission success criteria. In nominating mission success criteria, intelligence planners
also advocate for the adoption of measurable and achievable objectives while considering
how intelligence capabilities might be employed to assess them.
b. IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations(1) Intelligence planners assemble an IPT or similar community of interest with allsource analysts and collection strategists as its core members (Figure IV-3). Intelligencesystems architects, single source analysts and representatives from CSAs, Service
components, and the joint reconnaissance center (JRC) may also collaborate with the IPT.
(2) The IPT develops an IP timeline that is synchronized with the command’splanning timeline. This ensures tailored JIPOE products, the initial intelligence estimate andthe initial J-2 staff estimate are developed to meet the JPG’s requirements.
(3) To generate the J-2 staff estimate, the IPT, ICW representatives from Service
component and subordinate JFCs, identifies and analyzes all intelligence capabilities undercombatant command (command authority) available to support the execution of the plan.
For contingency plans, this may include all assigned and apportioned forces. For ongoing
operations and campaign plans this may include all assigned and allocated forces.
Conducting this analysis for ongoing operations, campaigns, and crisis action planning, may
inform requests for additional forces.
(4) The IPT evaluates current theater collection and production postures to identify
available assets that may need to be redirected to support the planning effort or the executionof the plan under consideration. In collaboration with the CCMD’s collection managers,
joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element (J-2X), the JRC, andrepresentatives from JFCC-ISR, the IPT conducts a preliminary assessment of available
collection assets and capabilities. In collaboration with the CCMD production manager, andrepresentatives from the JIOC’s analytical cell, the IPT performs an initial assessment ofavailable analytic capabilities.
(5) Based on the list of all available intelligence capabilities, the IPT drafts andsubmits the initial J-2 staff estimate to the JPG to support the command’s overall force
structure analysis. In addition to listing all available intelligence capabilities, the initial J-2’s
staff estimate identifies all factors that may affect the employment of these capabilities.
Factors such as logistical supportability, basing rights, communications and intelligencesystems architecture, linguist availability, and legal restrictions should be considered.
Certain employment limitations can be mitigated during COA development ICW the JPG.
Other limitations however, may require mitigation through friendly actions outside theIV-5Chapter IV

Notional Intelligence Planning Team and Related Functions
Joint Planning Group/
Operation Planning TeamIntelligence
PlannerPIR
Development
Intelligence
SystemArchitects

EEI
Development

ISR
Synchronization
and Integration

Core
Members

Indicates
Development
All-source
AnalystAnnex B
Development

Collection Plan
Development
SIR
Development

Joint
Reconnaissance
Cell
Collection
Operations
ManagerCollection
Strategist

Collection
Requirements
Manager

ServiceComponent
Representative
Service
CSA
Component
Representative
Ad Hoc Members
Representative
Service
CSA
Component
Representative
Service
Representative
CSA
Component
Representative
Representative

LegendCSA combat support agency
EEI essential element of information

ISR
SIR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancespecific information requirement

Figure IV-3. Notional Intelligence Planning Team and Related Functions

immediate control of the command. In these instances, intelligence planners incollaboration with the JPG, may nominate appropriate planning assumptions. To validate
these planning assumptions prior to COA approval, they may nominate initial FFIRs. If
left unanswered prior to plan development, initial FFIRs, may be included as part of the
final CCIRs to be monitored during plan assessment to inform refine, adapt, terminate,execute (RATE) decisions.
(6) Considering all of the identified intelligence gaps relevant to the planning effort
and recognizing the uncertainties in analytical conclusions, intelligence planners incollaboration with the JPG, may nominate additional planning assumptions and initial PIRs

IV-6

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
for validation during the current planning cycle. Upon approval by the J-2 and the CCDR,
initial PIRs are then passed to the IPT or appropriate mission managers for action. If left
unanswered prior to plan development, initial PIRs, may be included as part of the final
CCIRs to be monitored during plan assessment to inform RATE decisions.
5. Intelligence Planning Activities During Concept Development
a. IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning(1) Intelligence planners evaluate JIPOE products to be disseminated to the JPG.
The intelligence planner or the analyst will present these products to the JPG in accordancewith the established planning timeline.
(2) Intelligence planners coordinate personnel to participate in COA analysis andwargaming. The J-2 may employ multiple representatives to support the JPG during thewargame. These may include:(a) Intelligence planner to develop and analyze the overall intelligencesupport strategy.
(b) Red cell personnel to play the role of an uncooperative adversary and redteam personnel to challenge planning assumptions and provide alternative viewpoints.
(c) Intelligence analyst to nominate indicators of progress or regression usedin the command’s assessment process.
(d) Collection strategists to initiate the development of a supportingcollection plan.
(3) Intelligence planners will determine intelligence governing factors andhighlight the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
b. IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations(1) During COA development, intelligence planners consider how theater
intelligence assets and external intelligence resources could be employed to support theexecution of the plan.
(2) Based on potential adversary reactions evaluated during COA analysis andwargaming, the intelligence planner and the collection strategist determine how the various
collection disciplines could be employed to monitor relevant indicators.
(3) The intelligence planner revises the J-2 staff estimate capturing additional
factors, unique to each of the proposed friendly COAs, which may limit the employment ofintelligence capabilities. Once identified, the intelligence planner ensures these factors are
considered during COA comparison.

IV-7

Chapter IV(4) The intelligence planner consolidates final PIR nominations from across thestaff and drafts PIRs as required to support CCDR decisions. During COA approval, theintelligence planner recommends PIRs through the J-2 for CCDR approval. PIR
nominations not approved by the CCDR are processed at a lower priority and satisfied whenintelligence resources become available.
(5) Following COA approval, the intelligence planner in collaboration with the IPT
develops EEIs and associated indicators required to satisfy the PIR. To maximize support tothe commander’s operational objectives, the IPT integrates and reconciles these requirementswith MOEs and their associated indicators.
(6) Based on intelligence requirements (to include PIRs), information requirements(to include EEIs), their associated indicators, and anticipated SIRs, the IPT then generates amatrix of anticipated production requirements to guide the development of federated
production plans and a matrix of anticipated collection requirements to guide thedevelopment of integrated collection plans.
(7) The J-2 staff estimate process culminates with the collection and production
capability assessments performed against anticipated requirements entered on the collection
and production requirements matrices.
(8) The CCMD J-2 will determine whether a NISP is required and will request IP
support from the Joint Staff J-2 to initiate NISP development, based on the CCMD J-2 staff
estimate, and in accordance with CJCSI 3110.02, Intelligence Planning Objectives,
Guidance, and Tasks. The Joint Staff J-2 is responsible for publishing a message
announcing the NISP effort and requesting points of contact from the relevant communities
of interest. Development of the NISP is based on the supported CCMD’s PIRs, EEIs,
concept of intelligence operations, production and collection requirements matrices, and the
J-2’s staff estimate of available capabilities to satisfy its requirements. Collaboration
between the CCMD, Joint Staff J-2, CSAs, and Service intelligence centers is encouraged
and can occur at any time during the planning process. However, the NISP process begins inearnest when the CCMD J-2 judges that the supported plan is sufficiently developed and that
requirements matrices are ready for submission to the Joint Staff J-2.
6. Intelligence Planning Activities During Plan Development
a. IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning(1) The JIOC’s analytical cell completes the intelligence estimate. Selected
portions of the intelligence estimate are used to complete the enemy situation paragraphs
throughout the plan.
Refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats andGuidance, for a complete intelligence estimate format.
(2) The CCMD J-2 may also provide analytical support and input to other portionsof the plan to include annex H, (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, and otherannexes as required.
IV-8

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
b. IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations(1) Intelligence planners develop the base annex B (Intelligence) which outlines theintelligence mission, concept of intelligence operations, PIRs, and guidance for how
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination andintegration, and evaluation and feedback will be performed during execution. The annex B(Intelligence) also specifies tasks to subordinate intelligence organizations and requirements
for external support.
(2) Intelligence planners evaluate whether targeting is necessary to accomplish theoperation. If so, the IPT facilitates TSA, target development, and target list management.
(3) Intelligence planners collaborate with discipline-specific managers and other
SME to develop required functional appendices to annex B (Intelligence) (i.e., J-2X for
appendix 3, [Counterintelligence]).
(4) To ensure the collection plan is fully integrated and synchronized with thecontemplated operation, intelligence planners and collection strategists contribute to otherportions of the plan such as appendix 9 (Reconnaissance) to annex C (Operations); annex S(Special Technical Operations); and other annexes as required.
(5) If the contingency plan will be supported by a NISP, the Joint Staff J-2 andCCMD J-2 will collaborate to lead the NISP development, production, completion, staffing,
and approval process.
For additional information on NISP development, IP support to campaign plans and crisis
action planning, refer to CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning.
SECTION D. PLAN ASSESSMENT AND EXECUTION
7. Intelligence Support to Plan Assessment and Decision Making
Continuous and timely assessments are essential to measure progress of the joint force
toward mission accomplishment (see Figure IV-4). Commanders continuously assess the OE
and the progress of their campaigns, and then compare them to their initial vision and intent.
Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and measures during
planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include
assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use
assessment considerations to help guide operational design in order to improve the sequenceand type of actions along lines of operation. During execution, they continually monitor
progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment
requirements, and the collection and analytic resources required to perform them are built
into plans and monitored. Plans for intelligence collection and analytic support to execution
and continuous plan assessment are based on the supported CCMD’s anticipatedrequirements reflected in appendix 1 (Priority Intelligence Requirements) to annex B(Intelligence) of the order. During execution, preplanned collection and production
requirements may change in response to dynamic changes to the CCDR’s PIRs.

IV-9

Chapter IV
a. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and alignfuture operations strategic and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader
tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state, while tactical-level assessment
focuses on task accomplishment. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessmentof progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment.
Normally, the joint force J-2 assists the J-3 or J-5 in coordinating assessment activities.
b. The joint force J-2, through the CCMD JIOC, assesses adversary capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and intentions, and monitors the OE. The J-2 helps the commander and staff
decide what aspects of the OE to measure and how to measure them to determine progress
toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Intelligence
personnel use the JIPOE process to provide JFCs and their staffs with a detailed
understanding of the adversary and other relevant aspects of the OE.
c. Intelligence personnel in the CCMD JIOC provide objective assessments to planners
that gauge the overall impact of military operations against adversary forces as well as
provide an assessment of likely adversary reactions and counteractions. The CCDR andsubordinate JFCs should establish an assessment management system that leverages andsynergizes the expertise of operations and intelligence staffs.
d. The assessment process is continuous and linked to the CCIR process by thecommander’s need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions during allphases of the operation or campaign as shown in Figure IV-4. Intelligence support to planassessment applies during shape as well as execution phases. By supporting assessments of
the impacts of shaping activities, the J-2 supports decisions to refine or adapt the campaign
plan or to refine, adapt, or terminate contingency plans. During execution, the J-2 continues
to provide support to assessments to inform fragmentary order development reflecting
decisions to refine, adapt, or terminate ongoing military operations. Intelligence assessmentsof the current situation provide the means for intelligence analysts to draw conclusions of apotential future situation and estimate the next series of adversary COAs. In so doing,
analysts revise and maintain a running intelligence estimate to facilitate continuous planning
across multiple timeframes during the conduct of operations.
8. Intelligence Support to the Assessment Processa. The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of war,and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOPs are used
to measure task accomplishment, and answer the question “was the action taken, were thetasks completed to standard?” to produce the desired effect. MOEs are used at the strategic,
operational, and tactical-level intelligence staffs to assess changes in adversary behavior,capabilities, or the OE. MOEs help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are
our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?” Well-devised
measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between
specific tasks and desired effects.
b. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful
quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective

IV-10

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Assessments
Commander's
CriticalInformation
Requirements

Priority Intelligence
Requirement

Effective
DecisionsIntelligence-led focus on
all facets of threat
PMESII

Assessment
Friendly Force Information
Requirement

Operational reporting toaddress all instrumentsof national power

LegendPMESII

political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

Figure IV-4. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Assessmentsinterpretation. Through these measures, the J-2 and the J-3 assist the commander indetermining if military operations are producing desired or undesired effects, when
objectives have been achieved and when unforeseen opportunities can be exploited or requirea change in planned operations to respond to unforeseen adversary actions.
c. MOE assessment is implicit in steps 1, 2, and 3 of the JIPOE process. By
continuously performing JIPOE, intelligence analysts have the ability to compare thebaseline intelligence estimate used to inform the plan with the current situation and facilitatecontinuous planning during execution. MOE assessment is informed through the detectionof observable or collectable indicators that provide evidence that certain conditions exist.
Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several MOEs may assist in measuring
progress toward achievement of an objective. Indicators may be either favorable orunfavorable. While favorable indicators reflect progress towards the achievement of an
objective, unfavorable indicators reflect regression and could provide warning of a potential
crisis and the need to execute a branch plan, see Figure IV-5.
d. Indicators are developed through the JIPOE process and detected throughintelligence disciplines and friendly unit reports (e.g., mission reports or situation reports).
Friendly unit reports are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since they typicallyoffer specific, quantitative data, or a direct observation of an event to determine
accomplishment of tactical tasks.
For more information on the relationships between the CCIR process, and the assessment
process, and continuous planning during execution, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning.

IV-11

Chapter IV

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Support to Plan Assessment(Planning During Execution)

JIPOE Steps 1, 2, 3
Continuous
intelligenceassessments (current
state)JIPOE Step 4
Continuous revisions to intelligence estimates (future state)
Multiple outlooks based on supported planning horizons

Based on measuredchanges tooperational
environment, systembehavior, adversarycapabilities

Long-term

Mid-term

Near-term

J-5
Strategy

J-5
Future Plans

J-3
FutureJ-3
Current
Operations“What after?”“What next?”“What if?”

“What is?”LegendJ-3
J-5

operations directorate of a joint staff
plans directorate of a joint staff

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of theoperational environment

Figure IV-5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment Support to Plan Assessment

9. Intelligence Support to Strategic and Operational-Level Assessment
Strategic and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broad tasks, effects,
objectives, and progress toward specified end states (Figure IV-6). Continuous assessment
helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing
the right things” to achieve objectives, not just “doing things right.” The use of a red team tocritically examine the MOE from the perspective of the adversary will help the JFC inmeasuring the correct information. The JFC can use MOEs to determine progress toward
success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, andmeasures do not apply.
a. A systems-oriented JIPOE effort is crucial to the identification of adversary COGs,
key nodes and links. A COG can be viewed as a source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. COG analysis requires knowledge of an
adversary’s physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses and how the adversaryorganizes, fights, and makes decisions. Human factors analysis of the adversary’s leadership
IV-12

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations

Assessment Levels and Measures
Levels

Guidance

National
strategic

End state andobjectives

Theaterstrategic

End state and mission
Objectives
Effects
Tasks

Operational

MissionObjectives
Effects
Tasks

TacticalMissionObjectives
Tasks

Assessed using measures ofeffectiveness(Are we doing the right things?)

Assessed using measures of
performance(Are we doing things right?)

Combat tasks (particularly fires)use combat assessment
Battle Damage
Assessment

Munitions
Effectiveness
Assessment

Reattack or
Future Targeting

Figure IV-6. Assessment Levels and Measurescharacterizes the assessment with strengths, weaknesses, and how decisions are made.
Analysts should evaluate biometric, biographic, forensic, and DOMEX data in concert with
the JIPOE. The JIPOE analyst must also have a detailed understanding of how each aspectof the OE links to the others and how various permutations of such links and nodes may
combine to form COGs. For example, Figure IV-7 shows strategic and operational COGs,
each consisting of a set of nodes and links. The operational COG resides in the militarysystem, while the strategic COG focuses in the political system but overlaps with theoperational COG.
For additional information on COGs, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
b. JIPOE analysts should assess the importance and vulnerabilities of all operationally
relevant nodes and all primary and alternative links to those nodes. This is accomplished by
combining an analysis of the constraints imposed by the OE with an evaluation of theadversary’s preferred method or means of conducting a specific type of operation or activity(e.g., attack, defense, proliferation, WMD production, financing terrorist cells). The
resulting product may take the form of a situation template or model that identifies all thenodes and links associated with individual COAs or options available to the adversary withina specific category of activity. The situation templates may be combined, modeled, andcompared to identify key nodes and primary and alternate links among nodes. The
consolidated template (event template) provides the means for determining specific events intime and space that if detected would indicate changes in adversary behavior, systems, or the
IV-13

Chapter IV

Identifying Centers of Gravity
Informational

Infrastructure

SocialMilitary

Operational
COG

Economic

Strategic
COG

Political

LegendCOG center of gravity

Decisive Point

COG Node

Node

Link

Figure IV-7. Identifying Centers of Gravity

OE. These events, or indicators of change, may be assigned qualitative or quantitative
thresholds and may be used as the basis for MOEs. Figure IV-8 is an example of a systemsoriented JIPOE event template demonstrating nodal and link analysis to identify potential
indicators of change.
The JIPOE process and its relationship to assessment is described in greater detail in JP
2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
10. Tactical-Level Assessment
Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. The
results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specificfunctions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phaselines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain, people, or resources; andIV-14

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations

Systems-Oriented Event Template

Program
1256

Minister of
National
DefenseResearch
in Uranium
Enrichment

Research inProcessing
Plutonium

Research
ReactorCentrifuge
Facility

Information
Systems

Research
in Ballistic
MissilesNuclearPower
Corporation

National Missile
Bank of Export
Z
Company

Processing
Facility

Commercial
ReactorResearch in
Reprocessing
Research in
Enrichment

Nuclear Power
Corporation

Military
Systems

National
Bank of Z

Program
1256

Economic
Systems

Infrastructure
Systems

Consolidated
Event Template(showing potential
links indicating
intent to develop
nuclear weapons)

Legendexisting links

potential links

Figure IV-8. Systems-Oriented Event Template

security or reconstruction tasks. Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-levelassessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions.
Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement(with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and is an important component of joint fires andthe joint targeting process. It helps the CCDR, the subordinate JFC, and component
commanders understand how the joint operation is progressing and assists in shaping future
operations. Combat assessments consist of a BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment(MEA), and reattack recommendation.

IV-15

Chapter IV
a. BDA. BDA should be a timely and accurate estimate of damage or degradation
resulting from the application of military force, lethal or nonlethal, against a target. BDA
is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination fromoperations and can be federated throughout the IC. The purpose of BDA is to determine
the effects of target engagement at the target element level, target level, and target systemlevel in order to support reattack recommendations and development of follow-on targets.
The most critical ingredient for effective BDA is a comprehensive understanding of the
JFC’s objectives and how they relate to a specific target. For BDA to be meaningful, the
JFC’s objectives and the supporting MOEs must be observable, measurable, andobtainable. The JFC should provide a comprehensive plan, together with an intelligencearchitecture, to support BDA. This plan must synchronize ISR resources and reporting toeffectively/efficiently support timely BDA. Preconflict planning requires collection
managers with a thorough understanding of collection systems capabilities (both organicand national) as well as their availability. BDA consists of a physical damage/change
assessment phase, functional damage assessment phase, and target system assessment
phase.
(1) Phase I—Physical Damage/Change Assessment. A physical damage
assessment is an estimate of the quantitative extent of physical damage (through munitions
blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage) to a target element based on observed orinterpreted damage. Change assessment is the estimate of measurable change to the target
resulting from weapons that do not create physical damage. This post-attack target
analysis should be a coordinated effort among combat units-supporting organizations. The
Joint Staff Targeting and BDA Cell, with J-2 as lead, serves as the national level BDA celland coordinates CCMD BDA requirements with the IC. Some representative sources fordata necessary to make a physical damage assessment include the air tasking order ormaster air attack plan, mission reports, aircraft cockpit video, weapon system video,visual/verbal reports from ground spotters or combat troops, controllers and observers,
artillery target surveillance reports, SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT, and OSINT.
Phase I BDA reporting contains an initial physical damage assessment of hit or miss based
usually upon single source data. When appropriate, a reattack recommendation is also
included.
(2) Phase II—Functional Damage/Change Assessment. The functional
damage assessment is an estimate of the effect of military force to degrade or destroy thefunctional/operational capability of a target to perform its intended mission. Functional
assessments are inferred from the assessed physical damage/change and all-source
intelligence information. This assessment must include an estimation of the time required
for recuperation or replacement of the target’s function. BDA analysts compare theoriginal objective for the attack with the current status of the target to determine if theobjective was met. Phase II BDA reporting builds upon the phase I initial report and is a
fused, all-source product addressing a more detailed description of physical damage, anassessment of the functional damage, inputs to functional assessment of the higher-leveltarget system (phase III), and any applicable MEA comments. When appropriate, areattack recommendation is also included.
(3) Phase III—Functional Assessment of the Higher-Level Target System

IV-16

JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations(a) Functional assessment of the higher-level target system is a broad
assessment of the overall impact on an adversary target system relative to the targeting
objectives established. These assessments may be conducted at the CCMD or national-levelby fusing all phases I and II BDA reporting on targets within a target system.
(b) BDA phase III produces a target system assessment for the theater ofoperations. SMEs compile the functional damage assessments of the individual targets
within a system and apply it to the current system analysis or enemy order of battle.
Although different weapons are involved, the process described above applies to BDA oftargets attacked with nonlethal fires as well. SIGINT will often be the most capablecollection asset of determining the actual functional damage to the target in these cases.
b. MEA. MEA is an assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon
system and munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to themethodology, tactics, weapon systems, munitions, fusing, and/or delivery parameters toincrease force effectiveness. MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA
assessments. MEA is primarily the responsibility of component operations, with inputs andcoordination from the IC. MEA targeting personnel seek to identify, through a systematic
trend analysis, any deficiencies in weapon system and munitions performance or combat
tactics by answering the question, “Did the systems (i.e., bomb or jamming) employedperform as expected?” Using a variety of intelligence and operations inputs, to include phase
II functional damage assessments, operators prepare a report assessing munitions
performance and tactical applications. The report details weapon performance against
specified target types. This information could have a crucial impact on future operations andthe quality of future BDA. MEA can continue years after the conflict using archived dataand information collected by on-site inspections of targets struck during the conflict.
c. Future Targeting and Reattack Recommendations. BDA and MEA provide
systematic advice on reattacking targets. This culminates in a reattack recommendation andguides further target development. Recommendations range from attacking different targets
to changing munitions and/or delivery tactics. The reattack recommendations and futuretargeting is a combined operations and intelligence function. The reattack recommendationconsiders if the desired effect was created. That effect is reassessed against its relative
importance in the targeting effort, considering if the target is damaged, will it remain
inoperable, or when will it be repaired. BDA applies equally to cyberspace operations.
For further information on combat assessment, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
SECTION E. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO EXECUTION BY PHASE
11. GeneralIntelligence support is crucial to all aspects of execution. For example, CI support toforce protection and OPSEC is important during mobilization and deployment; intelligenceassessments generated through JIPOE regarding the current status of foreign transportation
infrastructure (airfields, seaports, etc.) are vital to the success of deployment andredeployment operations; MEDINT enables decision makers to devise protection measures

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Chapter IV
to mitigate combat-related battle injuries and disease and nonbattle injuries during
deployment, employment, and redeployment; and intelligence analyses of threats to air, land,and sea lines of communications are critical to sustainment operations. Immediate, precise,and persistent intelligence support to force employment is a particularly important
prerequisite for military success throughout all phases of a joint operation regardless of how
the battle evolves, see Figure IV-9. Intelligence staffs must be familiar with specific phasingarrangements of each command OPLAN because the phasing may differ for specific types ofoperations. During execution, intelligence must stay at least one step ahead of operations
and not only support the current phase of the operation, but also simultaneously lay the
informational groundwork required for subsequent phases. Execution of joint operations
requires optimizing the use of limited intelligence assets and maximizing the efficiency ofintelligence production resources and is the ultimate test of the efficacy of intelligencesupport planning.
12. Intelligence Support During the Shape Phase (Phase 0)
JFCs are able to take actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shapeand character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds
between future multinational partners, increase regional understanding, ensure timely access,strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises. Intelligence activities

Phasing Model
Phase Action
0
Shape(Phase 0)
Enable Civil
Authority(Phase V)

I
Deter(Phase I)
II

PreparePrevent
Crisis defined
Assure friendly freedomof action
Access theater
infrastructure

Seize theInitiative(Phase II)

Stabilize(Phase IV)

III

Dominate(Phase III)IV

Establish dominant force
capabilities
Achieve enemy
culmination or joint force
commander's favorable
conditions for transition
Establish security
Restore services

Global
Shaping

Theater
Shaping

V

Transfer to civil
authorities
Redeploy

Figure IV-9. Phasing Model

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JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
conducted within the context of deliberate planning during the shape phase develop thebasics for intelligence operations in subsequent operational phases. Intelligence activities
should also be conducted to support phase 0 operations, including those supporting theater
campaign plans.
a. Intelligence liaison and the establishment of intelligence sharing arrangements withmultinational partners are critical aspects of the shape phase. Whenever possible, and ICW
the responsible DNI representative, JFCs should engage PNs by ensuring the participation of
US personnel in mutual intelligence training, temporary exchanges of intelligence personnel,
federated intelligence arrangements, and the integration and exercise of ISR support
architectures. National intelligence cells should be formed as early as possible and amultinational intelligence center established to coordinate their activities. Foreign disclosure
procedures should be established and exercised to the maximum extent feasible throughout
this phase and PNs participation in the JIPOE effort encouraged.
b. Theater intelligence collection capabilities should be optimized by integrating thevarious intelligence capabilities of the CCMD and its PNs. Many potential multinational
partners have capabilities that may prove invaluable to successful intelligence operations.
c. Information operations intelligence integration (IOII) activities are critical during theshape phase and rely heavily on accurate intelligence. Analysis and assessment of theadversary’s leadership capabilities and decision-making process should be performed early
to identify effective deterrent messages and actions. Units tasked with identifying hostnation audiences should assess messaging potential during all phases of operations,especially influence efforts during phase 0. Additionally, units should identify potential
audiences in subsequent phases while still in phase 0 to facilitate IO coordinating efforts.
Early identification of potential audiences allows greater responsiveness of IRCs.
d. Intelligence support, especially human sociocultural factors analysis, is essential tomaximize the effectiveness of civil-military operations (CMO). An analysis and assessmentof the civil dimension in targeted countries, that identifies civil society key influences,individuals, organizations, structures, and areas must be performed as early as possible todetermine what civil engagement actions may serve as effective points of influence.
Likewise, intelligence support to CMO should be assessed as early as possible to focus the
CMO effort and provide the lead-time necessary to provide timely planning, resource
allocation, and mission execution.
13. Intelligence Support During the Deter Phase (Phase 1)
Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC must gain a clear understanding of thenational and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; actions likely tocreate those effects; COGs and decisive points; and required joint, multinational, andnonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The joint force J-2 assists the JFC invisualizing and integrating relevant considerations regarding the OE into a plan that will leadto achievement of the objectives and accomplishment of the mission. It is therefore
imperative that the JIPOE effort (initiated during the shape phase) provide the JFC with anunderstanding of the OE at the outset of the deter phase.

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Chapter IV
a. IOII is also critical during the deter phase. The adversary structure and leadershipdecision-making process should be continuously monitored and assessed to determine what
influence activities may serve as effective deterrents. The receptivity of foreign target
audiences to specific messages and actions should also be continuously assessed to support
overall influence efforts.
b. During the deter phase, the ongoing JIPOE effort is accelerated to focus on
monitoring the current situation while simultaneously assessing adversary capabilities toaffect subsequent phases of the operation. JIPOE analysts support early warning by looking
for specific indications of imminent adversary activity that may require an immediate
response or an acceleration of friendly decision-making processes. JIPOE efforts also
concentrate on confirming adversary COGs and support the continuous refinement of
estimates of adversary capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within thecontext of the current situation. At the same time however, JIPOE analysts must look ahead
and prepare threat assessments to support future operations planned for the seizing theinitiative, dominance, and stabilization phases.
c. During the deter phase, COA development is dependent on detailed TSAs to identify
the functional components in the OE that may be affected to support the commander’sobjectives.
d. GEOINT support is critical during the deter phase. It is essential that any maps,
charts, imagery products, and support data to include datum coordinate systems, target
material used in a joint operation be coordinated with joint force components, the Joint Staff,
OSD, NGA, and PNs. The joint force J-2 works with the JFC staff and component command
staffs to identify requirements for updated GEOINT products and submits these requirements
through the NGA liaison team.
More detailed guidance regarding GEOINT procedures is contained in JP 2-03, Geospatial
Intelligence in Joint Operations.
e. Selected intelligence operations may also serve as a flexible deterrent option—apreplanned, deterrence-oriented action carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution
without armed conflict. For example, the deployment of additional intelligence resources in
the operational area not only increases intelligence collection capabilities and provides early
warning, but may also demonstrate US resolve without precipitating an armed response fromthe adversary. Likewise, intelligence sharing arrangements and exchanges with PNs may
reinforce US commitment to the host nation, deterring undesired adversary interactions.
Likewise, intelligence sharing arrangements and exchanges with PNs reinforce UScommitment to the host nation, deterring undesired adversary interactions
f. Intelligence also supports actions designed to isolate an adversary by identifying theirpotential allies and sanctuaries. Intelligence may also identify and assess the vulnerability of
the adversary’s sources of support to interdiction or disruption to include intelligence support
from other sources. Neutralizing the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities isparticularly important to reinforce their isolation, facilitates their susceptibility to deception
operations, and at the same time protects friendly forces from detection.

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JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations
g. Intelligence support to CMO during the deter phase can amplify operations to isolate
the adversary. An analysis and assessment of the civil dimension of potential allies orsupporters of the adversary may determine what civil engagement actions may serve as
effective points of influence. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension of friendly
countries, especially in countries where US forces will require access for subsequent phases,
will suggest appropriate civil engagement targets for CMO that may reduce enemy freedomof action while enhancing that of the US operational commander.
14. Intelligence Support During the Seize the Initiative Phase (Phase II)
As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly asymmetric advantages andcapabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy. The JFC seeks decisive advantage
through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain theinitiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in theenemy a mindset of inevitable failure. Additionally, the JFC coordinates with theappropriate interagency representatives through a joint interagency task force, joint
interagency coordination group (JIACG), or individually to facilitate coherent use of all
instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives. JFCs and their J-2s
should be on continuous guard against any enemy capability which may impede friendly
force deployment from bases, to ports of embarkation, to lodgment areas.
a. The JFC’s target intelligence element is more active during this phase compared toprevious phases in gathering target nominations, vetting targets, capabilities analysis andtarget list management all result in a completed joint integrated prioritized target list. During
this phase, targeteers monitor ongoing operations recommend changes to the plan, conduct
assessment, and provide input for further strategy and planning efforts.
b. IOII and OPSEC are particularly important during this phase. CI supports force
protection during deployment from home bases to lodgment areas. I2 supports theidentification of key adversary personnel, persons of interest, and their support andfacilitation networks. HUMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT sources may detect indications ofenemy demoralization and provide insight into the military information support operations
success or failure, and potential for exploitation of psychological vulnerabilities. Both the
CCMD red team and red cells add value to friendly deception planning efforts. The red teamanalyzes the proposed plan from the adversary’s perspective, and red cells provide insight
into the possible times and locations of the adversary’s intelligence collection plan. This
insight assists deception planners in determining the best times and locations to plant
deceptive information designed to mislead adversary intelligence analysts.
JIPOE support to deception planning is discussed in greater detail in JP 2-01.3, Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
c. Real-time surveillance and dynamic collection management are important throughout
the execution of joint operations, but are particularly critical during the seize initiative andthe dominate phases. Adversary capabilities must be tracked with a level of persistence andaccuracy sufficient to support retargeting and precision engagement. Active, key adversary
HUMINT identities should also be discovered, resolved, and tracked as an additional layer

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Chapter IV
for CI and force protection. An integrated collection strategy that fully optimizes the use of
all available US, PN, and host-nation collection capabilities assets is essential to persistentsurveillance. Furthermore, the CCMD JIOC facilitates collection management through ISR
visualization—the continuous real-time monitoring of the status, location, and reporting ofintelligence platforms and sensors. ISR visualization provides real-time cross cueing andprovides a basis for re-tasking and time-sensitive decision making.
Persistent surveillance and ISR visualization are discussed in greater detail in JP 2-01, Joint
and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
15. Intelligence Support During the Dominate Phase
During the dominate phase, JFCs conduct sustained combat operations bysimultaneously employing conventional, SOF, and information-related capabilities
throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. CMO is executed to preclude
civilian interference in attainment of operational objectives or to remove civilians fromoperational areas. Operations may be linear (i.e., combat power is directed toward theenemy in concert with adjacent units) or nonlinear (i.e., forces orient on objectives without
geographic reference to adjacent forces). Some missions and operations (i.e., strategic
attack, interdiction, and military information support operations) are executed concurrently
with other combat operations to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action, or
informational advantage. JFCs may design operations to cause the enemy to concentrate
their forces, thereby facilitating their attack by friendly forces, or operations may be designed
to prevent the enemy from concentrating their forces, thereby facilitating their isolation anddefeat in detail.
a. Intelligence must be equally prepared to support linear and nonlinear operations.
Nonlinear operations are particularly challenging due to their emphasis on simultaneous
operations along multiple lines of operations. The complexity of nonlinear operations places
a premium on a continuous flow of accurate and timely intelligence to help protect individual
forces. This flow of intelligence supports precise targeting, mobility, and freedom of action
and is enabled by persistent surveillance, dynamic ISR management, and a common
intelligence picture (the intelligence portion of the COP).
b. Intelligence must not only support operations during the dominate phase, but also
anticipate and address the information requirements for the subsequent stabilize phase. For
example, intelligence must be prepared to assist the JFC in determining how to fill the power
vacuum after the conclusion of sustained combat operations. In order to set the groundworkfor stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, the JFC will require detailed
intelligence regarding the status of key infrastructure, enemy government organizations andpersonnel, and anticipated humanitarian needs.
16. Intelligence Support During the Stabilize Phase
Stabilization typically begins with significant military involvement to include somecombat operations, then moves increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat
wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. As progress is made, military forces

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JP 2-0Intelligence Support to Planning, Executing, and Assessing Joint Operations

The use of long endurance, unmanned aircraft systems, such as the MQ-1 Predator, greatly
facilitates real-time, persistent surveillance.

increase their focus on supporting the efforts of host nation authorities, US Government
departments and agencies, IGOs, and/or NGOs.
a. During the stabilize phase, intelligence collection and analysis should transition fromsupporting combat operations to focus on actual or potential threats to the joint force (e.g.,
insurgent groups, criminal elements, terrorist cells). Particular attention should be paid to
identifying and assessing the leaders of groups posing potential threats to civil authority andreconstruction efforts. Intelligence should also identify critical infrastructure and analyze its
vulnerability to disruption by elements hostile to stabilization efforts. Critical infrastructure
vulnerability analysis may require coordination and assistance from other organizations.
b. CI support to force protection is critical during the stabilization phase. Host nation
authorities, other organizations, IGOs, and NGOs working closely with US forces may pass
information (knowingly or unknowingly) to hostile elements that enables them to interferewith stability operations. Likewise, members of the local populace may have access to US
bases in order to provide essential services and friendly forces may recruit former regime
officials to participate in stabilization efforts. CI elements help screen and vet foreign
personnel and investigate instances of compromised sensitive information.
c. Assessment assists the stabilize phase by assessing the relative effectiveness of IRCs
and other operations supporting civil authorities and reconstruction efforts. Additionally,
DIA’s human factors assessments of foreign leadership’s susceptibility to influence canassist commanders in determining the best COAs to achieve stability.

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Chapter IV
17. Intelligence Support During the Enable Civil Authority Phase
This phase is characterized by the establishment of a legitimate civil authority that is
enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In many cases,
the US will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the host nation toanother authority. The joint operation is normally terminated when the stated military end
states have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished.
a. In some situations, intelligence support may remain in place after termination of thejoint operation in order to support the civil authority and/or to continue to monitor thesituation. As in the deterrence phase, intelligence resources may serve as a valuable tool fordemonstrating US resolve and commitment to the host nation. To facilitate this critical rolein establishing friendly relations with the new civil authority, intelligence sharing agreements
should be promulgated as soon as practicable.
b. Before the operation is terminated, it is important that all intelligence lessons learned
are recorded in appropriate databases and are captured in joint doctrine. Likewise, the joint
force J-2 should ensure that all JIPOE products, intelligence assessments, collection plans,
and J-2X source registries are appropriately archived. This material may prove valuable tooperation planning in the event US forces are directed to redeploy to the area.

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JP 2-0CHAPTER VJOINT, INTERAGENCY, AND MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING
AND COOPERATION“One of the most gratifying features of recent work in intelligence, and one thatis quite unique in its long history, has been the growing cooperation establishedbetween the American intelligence services and their counterparts throughout
the Free World which make common cause with us as we face a common
peril.”
Former Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961) Allen Dulles,
The Craft of Intelligence, 1963

1. An Intelligence Sharing Environment
The success of joint and multinational operations and interorganizational coordination
hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. To prevail, the JFC’s
decision and execution cycles must be consistently faster than the adversary’s and be basedon better information. Being faster and better requires having unfettered access to thetasking, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from allavailable sources. Cooperation, collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an
intelligence and information environment that integrates joint, multinational, and interagency
partners in a collaborative enterprise. This type of collaborative intelligence sharing
environment should be capable of generating and moving intelligence, operational
information, and orders to users quickly. The architecture supporting this intelligenceenvironment should be dynamic and capable of providing multinational and interagency
participants rapid access to appropriate data. The intelligence sharing architecture isconfigured to provide the baseline data to support commanders at all levels, and should
facilitate the IC in supporting the JFC and subordinate components. CCDRs are responsible
for the intelligence sharing architecture within their commands. For contingency operations,
subordinate JFCs, supported by their joint force J-2s, are responsible for establishing thejoint force intelligence architecture required to accomplish the assigned mission.
a. An intelligence sharing architecture is integral to all intelligence operations. From
planning and direction through dissemination and integration, the architecture supports
intelligence functions through the Department of Defense information networks (DODIN).
The DODIN are the globally interconnected information capabilities, and associatedprocesses for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information for
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased
communications and computing systems and services.
b. A collaborative intelligence sharing architecture must support the full range ofmilitary operations and support the intelligence requirements of decision makers, from the
President down through the joint force’s tactical commanders. The architecture incorporates
the policies, procedures, reporting structures, trained personnel, automated information
processing systems, and connectivity to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence. It also
provides support to natural or man-made disaster relief efforts that require military support.
V-1

Chapter V
2. Principles for Multinational Intelligence Sharing“It’s not a technical issue any more. It’s really more about culture and the ‘need
to share’ rather than the ‘need to know.”
General James Cartwright, United States Marine Corps Commander,
United States Strategic Command
6 April 2005

In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence withforeign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces.
Intelligence efforts must be complementary and take into consideration the intelligencesystem’s strengths, limitations, and each nation’s unique and valuable capabilities. In somemultinational operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use existing international
standardization agreements (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) as a basis forestablishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each
multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified oramended based on the situation. A JFC participating in a multinational force develops theinformation sharing policy and procedures for that particular operation based on CCDR
guidance and national policy as contained in the National Policy and Procedures for theDisclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations (short title: National Disclosure Policy [NDP]-1). NDP-1 provides policy
and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms,
release arrangements, and other guidance. The following general principles (see Figure V-1)
provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures:
a. Align with NDP. CCMDs and the JFC’s foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) requireauthority before they share classified military information or national intelligence with aforeign entity. Classified military information, as defined in National Security Decision
Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified US Military Information to Foreign Governments
and International Organizations, is that set of information which is under the control orjurisdiction of the DOD, its departments or agencies, or is of primary interest to them.
b. Maintain Unity of Effort. Intelligence personnel of each nation need to view thethreat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of themultinational force by the common adversary must be considered a threat to all multinational
force elements. Success in intelligence sharing requires establishing a trusted partnershipwith foreign counterparts to counter a common threat and maintain a unity of effort.
c. Make Adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine andprocedures among the multinational partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence isreadiness, beginning with the highest levels of command, to make the adjustments required
to resolve significant differences. Major differences may include how intelligence isprovided to the commander (jointly or through individual Services or agencies), proceduresfor sharing information among intelligence agencies, and the degree of security afforded bydifferent communications systems and procedures. Administrative differences that need toV-2

JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation

Principles for Multinational Intelligence Sharing

Align with national disclosure policy.



Maintain unity of effort.



Make adjustments.

Plan early and plan concurrently.



Share all necessary information.

Conduct complementary operations.

Figure V-1. Principles for Multinational Intelligence Sharing

be addressed may include classification levels, personnel security clearance standards,
requirements for access to sensitive intelligence, and translation requirements.
d. Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. JFCs determine what intelligence may beshared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. NATO and the UnitedStates-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command have developed and exercised
intelligence policies and procedures that provide examples of how multinational planningcan be done in advance.
e. Share Necessary Information. The joint force should share relevant intelligence
about the situation and adversary with its multinational partners consistent with respective
NDP and JFC guidance. However, information about intelligence sources and methods
should not be shared among allies and PNs until approved by the appropriate national-levelagency.
(1) In order to share critical intelligence information with allies and PNs efficiently,
US intelligence information should be written for release at the most appropriateclassification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within foreign
disclosure guidelines. When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, theintelligence derived from that source may still be provided to other PNs, so long as theinformation itself does not compromise the source. The J-2 must establish procedures forseparating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence production agencies often
use a “tear line” in classified reports to separate compartmented information from
intelligence that can be widely disseminated (the J-2 and component intelligence staff
officers keep information above the tear line and disseminate the intelligence below).
Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligencesharing.
(2) The joint force J-2 must obtain the necessary foreign disclosure authorizationfrom DIA as soon as possible. J-2 personnel must be knowledgeable of the specific foreign
disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The efficient flow ofintelligence will be enhanced by the assignment of personnel training in foreign disclosure.

V-3

Chapter V(3) Intelligence support is critical to the commander’s inherent force protection
mission. Every effort must be made to share data that could impact the commander’s force
protection mission.
f. Conduct Complementary Operations. Intelligence efforts of each nation must becomplementary. Each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations as wellas unique and valuable capabilities. Host-nation security services’ capabilities, for example,
may contribute significantly to force protection. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations
to fill shortfalls, especially linguist requirements, may help overcome such limitations. All
intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for application to the wholeof the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection management element isessential for planning and coordinating multinational collection operations.
Additional guidance on intelligence operations in multinational operations can be found in
JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Information on
principles and constructs to support multinational operations can be found in JP 3-0, Joint
Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
3. Principles for Interorganizational Intelligence Collaboration
Interagency intelligence collaboration should be encouraged whenever possible
consistent with applicable national, agency, or organizational procedures and classification
guidelines. Successful interagency intelligence collaboration depends on many factors, toinclude: strong relationship networks, trust and respect among colleagues, sharing a common
vision, minimizing territorial issues, continuous communication, and eliminating
impediments (see Figure V-2). Liaison personnel are instrumental in bridging gaps andworking through barriers that may arise between organizations. An aggressive liaison effort
is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort from initial planning through theexecution of operations. However, analysts must base their collaboration on classification,need-to-know, responsibility to share, and applicable national, agency, or organizationalguidelines.
a. Establish Strong Relationship Networks. Collaboration is built upon therelationships and networks of colleagues that analysts develop throughout their careers.
Without knowledge of who one’s counterparts are in other intelligence organizations,collaboration on intelligence problems is nearly impossible. Techniques for building
relationship networks include attending or hosting conferences, visiting counterparts in otherorganizations, and exchanges of personnel through interorganizational rotational
assignments.
b. Build Mutual Trust and Respect for Colleagues. As analysts work intelligenceproblems, they count on one another to share all relevant data from within their particularfield of expertise. For example, imagery analysts should expect SIGINT analysts to provide
all relevant information for a particular intelligence problem that they are working and viceversa. Trust and respect is facilitated by proactively communicating information tocolleagues and counterparts and by ensuring they are recognized by their organizations fortheir expertise and contributions.

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JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation

Principles for Interorganizational Intelligence Collaboration
Establish strong relationship networks.

Build mutual trust and respect for colleagues.



Share a common vision.

Minimize territorial issues.

Establish continuous communication.

Eliminate impediments.

Figure V-2. Principles for Interorganizational Intelligence Collaborationc. Share a Common Vision. A shared common vision should include the goal ofproviding the most comprehensive, accurate product possible to the customer. Individuals
who develop or follow a personal agenda at the expense of other collaborators will, overtime, be excluded from the collaborating group. Sharing a common goal amongcollaborators is facilitated by taking the initiative to alert others when new information
becomes available, working together instead of competing, and providing tip-offs of possible
collection opportunities. By synchronizing efforts, the strengths of each organization can be
maximized for the benefit of all collaborators.
d. Minimize Territorial Issues. Reducing the potential for interorganizational
conflicts is vital to successful intelligence collaboration. It is important that collaborating
analysts recognize that organizational interests are likely to influence the situation andshould not be ignored. These issues may be minimized by anticipating their occurrence,developing a plan for addressing them as they emerge, and stressing the mutually beneficial
aspects of collaboration such as sharing organizational credit for the final product.
e. Establish Continuous Communication. Continuous communication among
intelligence colleagues and counterparts is critical to overcoming barriers to collaboration.
Formalizing communications mechanisms creates habits and venues of trust.
Communication may be enhanced through frequent meetings, teleconferences, phone calls,
mail, and e-mail, as well as less formal methods such as periodic working lunches.
f. Eliminate Impediments. The leadership of organizations involved in thecollaborative enterprise should demonstrate their commitment by taking prompt and decisive
action to eliminate any impediments to collaboration.
Organizations should
implement procedures to incentivize cooperative behavior and consequences to dissuade
uncooperative behavior.
4. Requirements and Standards for an Intelligence Sharing Architecture
a. Requirements. The intelligence sharing architecture must be capable of being
tailored to support a specific JFC’s information requirements. Intelligence must be

V-5

Chapter V
provided in a form that is readily understood and directly usable by the recipient without
providing the user irrelevant data.
(1) An effective intelligence sharing architecture requires a “reachback”
capability—a means by which deployed military forces rapidly access information from,receive support from, and conduct collaboration and information sharing with other units(deployed in theater and from outside the theater). Dissemination of intelligence consistsof both “push” and “pull” control principles. The “push” construct allows the higher
echelons to push intelligence down to satisfy existing lower echelon requirements or torelay other relevant information to the lower level. The “pull” construct involves directelectronic access to databases, intelligence files, or other repositories by intelligenceorganizations at all levels. “Push” updates must be based on the JFC’s PIRs and otherintelligence requirements to ensure that the JFC receives critical information andintelligence. Higher echelons should be aware of PIRs at lower echelons and push PIR
related intelligence rather than requiring lower echelons to pull the intelligence. Other
information must be available on an as needed “pull” basis so that the joint force J-2 avoids
information overload. From SecDef through the tactical commanders, the architecture
must provide complete, tailored, all-source intelligence to the decision maker.
“Push” and “pull” control principles are discussed in detail in JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
(2) The intelligence sharing architecture should be constructed so there is no
single point of failure. At the same time, the architecture must identify and eliminate any
unnecessary duplication of intelligence capabilities so that scarce resources can be focused
to meet prioritized requirements.
(3) The intelligence sharing architecture must accommodate the widest possible
range of missions and operational scenarios. It must respond to the JFC’s requirements for
information at any time and any place and support multinational operations with no loss intimeliness. The intelligence operational architecture must incorporate the capabilities of
the national and Service intelligence organizations, and provide to the JTF and its
components the capability to access national and Service capabilities when necessary.
(4) The intelligence sharing architecture must achieve a seamless integration of
the JFC’s decision-making and execution cycles with the intelligence process. In
developing the operational architecture, the IC should streamline the intelligence process toensure responsiveness to the JFC’s requirements.
(5) The intelligence sharing architecture must be developed so that users can train
and exercise with intelligence capabilities in peacetime. Intelligence systems, policies,
procedures, connectivity, security, and fusion requirements must be part of joint training
exercises and incorporated into simulations. During exercises, capabilities must function
exactly as in a real operation, so that the users train in a realistic, seamless environment.
The architecture must be configured so that real world databases are preserved and cannot
be accidentally or maliciously altered during an exercise.

V-6

JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation(6) The intelligence architecture should provide for integration with existing andprojected secure teleconferencing and other collaborative communication capabilities.
Secure teleconferencing will permit groups of dispersed users to collaborate during theplanning and execution of intelligence operations and to coordinate with operational users.
Dispersed users include, but are not limited to, JFCs and their subordinate commanders,
and theater JIOCs, JISEs, the multinational intelligence centers and/or appropriate
multinational partners, the Joint Staff, Services, CSAs, US Government departments andagencies, and national decision makers.
b. Standards. The intelligence sharing architecture must meet established standards
for survivability, interoperability, security, and compatibility.
(1) Survivability. The system design specified in the technical architecture must
be as survivable as the command structure it supports. Assets that are vulnerable todamage or destruction must have alternative means of providing required data withminimal risk.
(2) Interoperability. It is imperative that intelligence and operations systems
architectures be fully interoperable in order to facilitate a COP. The systems architecture
should comply with DOD joint net-centric standards and whenever possible, interoperablewith PNs systems. The technical architecture should be designed to accommodate
interoperability and integration with existing and projected intelligence information
systems and with those joint systems that must exchange information with the intelligence
technical architecture.
(3) Security. Information must be protected in accordance with mandatory
security policies. The architecture must be designed so that the widest possible access ispermitted without compromising security.
(4) Compatibility. The architecture must use common data formats whenreengineering existing systems or applications and developing new systems. As a midterm objective, all components’ intelligence systems must be capable of exchanging data,
information and intelligence products to allow all-source analysis and fusion. This
capability to share data and information must extend to applications, databases, andcommunications protocols to ensure that intelligence information is compatible with work
stations, file servers, and communications links. Both anticipated and unanticipatedauthorized users must have access to the discoverable, understandable information required
to adapt to situations more quickly than the enemy.
c. Responsibilities. ICW the Joint Staff, national intelligence agencies, OSD,
Defense Information Systems Agency, and Service intelligence organizations, DIA is
responsible for implementing, managing, and ensuring compliance with the configurationof information, data, and communications standards for DOD intelligence systems. DIA
establishes defense-wide intelligence priorities for attaining interoperability between thetactical, theater, and national intelligence systems and the respective communications
systems at each level.

V-7

Chapter V
5. Components of an Intelligence Sharing Architecturea. Organizational Structures(1) In multinational operations, the multinational force commander exercisescommand authority over a military force composed of elements from two or morenations. The President retains command authority over US forces, but may placeappropriate forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve
specific military objectives. However, any large-scale participation of US forces in a
major operation will likely be conducted under US command and operational control or
through accepted and stable regional security organizations such as NATO. Therefore, inmost multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign
military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. In somecircumstances, the JFC will need to seek authority to go outside the usual politicalmilitary channels to provide information to NGOs. Unique intelligence policy anddissemination criteria will have to be tailored to each multinational operation.
(a) A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging andprioritizing the intelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiringand fusing all nations’ intelligence contributions. Likewise, the center should coordinate
the intelligence collection planning and intelligence and surveillance operations of eachnation. The multinational intelligence center should include representatives from allnations participating in the multinational operation. Designating a single director of
intelligence for the multinational command will greatly assist in resolving potential
disagreements among the multinational members. Figure V-3 depicts a notional
multinational intelligence architecture.
(b) Intelligence liaison is critical between commands and among supportingand supported organizations. Liaison personnel are instrumental in resolving problems
resulting from language barriers and cultural and operational differences that normallyoccur in multinational operations. Because of the inherent complexities associated withmultinational operations, an aggressive liaison effort is critical to developing andmaintaining unity of effort. A robust liaison effort with sufficient communications isparticularly critical in the initial stages of planning and forming a coalition, particularly
when the US intelligence network is not yet established. US SOF may be assigned down
to coalition brigade level to act as coalition liaison elements or support teams. These
teams have the ability to receive and disseminate intelligence directly to and from theircounterparts. The team members are selected based upon their language and cultural
knowledge of the area and are in direct communication with either their combined joint
special operations task force, or the next higher special operations command andcontrol element.

V-8

JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation

Notional Multinational Intelligence Architecture

CombatantCommandJIOC
CJTF

National
Communications

National
Communications

JWICS
JDISS
SIPRNET

Allied National
Intelligence Support

CombatantCommandNational
Communications

US National
Intelligence
Support

NIC

CFACC

CFMCC

Intelligence Element

Intelligence Element

Intelligence Element

Multinational LAN

Multinational LAN

Multinational LAN

US
Force

US
Force

Multinational
Force

AlliedForceNational
Communications

CFLCC

National
Communications

Multinational
LAN

Allied
Force

NIC
NIC

JDISS
SIPRNET
Multinational LAN

JDISS
SIPRNET
Multinational LAN

US
Force

(e.g., BICES,CENTRIXS)Multinational
Intelligence
CenterNational
Communications

JISE

Multinational
LAN

AlliedForce

LegendBICES

Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System
CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional
Information Exchange System
CFACC
combined force air component command
CFLCC
combined force land component
command
CFMCC
combined force maritime component
command
CJTF
combined joint task force

JDISS

joint deployable intelligence support
system
JIOC
joint intelligence operations center
JISE
joint intelligence support element
JWICS
Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System
LANlocal area network
NIC
national intelligence cell
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

Figure V-3. Notional Multinational Intelligence Architecture(2) During interagency coordination, information and intelligence sharing are
facilitated by each CCMD’s JIOC, DNI representative, DIA forward element,
and JIACG.

V-9

Chapter V(a) The CCMD JIOC is the theater focal point to plan, synchronize, coordinate,
and integrate the full range of intelligence operations in the GCCs’ AOR. The JIOC works
with the DNI representative to the CCMD and liaison personnel from DOD and non-DOD
national intelligence organizations to ensure all relevant intelligence and information is fully
shared in the most timely manner possible.
(b) The JIACG facilitates the application of the instruments of national power
in a coherent manner and provides a means to integrate interagency perspective into militaryplanning and execution. The JIACG, consisting of various representatives from US
Government departments and agencies, serves as a multifunctional advisory element that canfacilitate information sharing, operational-level planning and coordination, and politicalmilitary synthesis across the interagency community for the CCDR and staff. A typical
JIACG may connect to the various US embassies and their country teams as well as tonational-level planners. Its primary role is to bridge the gap between civilian agency andmilitary campaign planning efforts for regional engagement and potential regional crises.
Specific objectives of the JIACG are to:
1. Improve operational interagency planning and execution.
2. Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures withparticipating agencies.
3. Promote continuous relationships among interagency planners.
Further information on the JIACG is contained in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination
During Joint Operations.
b. Systems Network. A network of integrated work stations, file servers, andcommunications links comprises the second component of an integrated intelligencearchitecture. The components of the systems network must work together and comply withthe evolving defense information infrastructure, COP, net centric data strategies, and DOD
Information Technology Standards Registry, to create the interoperable collaborative
information environment required to support joint and multinational operations andinteragency coordination. The network includes direct connectivity by appropriate
communications or communications relay link (landline, radio, satellite, and others as
appropriate) and broadcast capability to support time-sensitive needs.
(1) The DODIN allows data collected by any means to be communicated directly toa user or to a processing site or platform by the most efficient path, then passed on or
through to the user as appropriate. A critical aspect of the information network is its ability
to make all intelligence accessible by way of standardized file servers to standards-compliant
workstations.
(2) The DOD Intelligence Information System enterprise is the global set ofresources (people, facilities, hardware, software, and processes) that provide information
technology and information management services to the DOD military IC through a tightly
integrated, interconnected, and geographically distributed regional service center

V-10

JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperationarchitecture. The enterprise capabilities are centrally managed and decentrally executed
under the authority and direction of the DIA Chief Information Officer.
(3) To maximize the utility of the systems architecture, systems must be
interoperable. Standard communications protocols and standard encryption devices must be
available at all echelons. The systems architecture should have the flexibility toaccommodate, not replace, existing warning and direct support systems. The systems
architecture is intended to be sufficiently agile to allow updating with innovative technology
or to overlay additional capabilities using existing communications carriers. Until aneffective multilevel security system is in place with joint forces, the intelligence architecture
must support three possible levels of information: SCI, non-SCI (TOP SECRET and below),
and intelligence releasable to allies and PNs.
(a) SCI Support. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System(JWICS) is a SCI element of the Defense Information System Network. JWICS incorporates
advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint informationexchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Additionally, thejoint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) provides a transportable workstationand communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a JTF orother tactical user. Both systems currently form the common baseline for all SCI support
systems in the intelligence architecture.
1. JWICS satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, multimedia
transmission services for SCI. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that
permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of applications that takeadvantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Video-capable
JWICS nodes can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text,
graphics, and data. Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively among
JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be
managed by way of allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for
multiple applications.
2. JDISS provides the standard workstation server software configuration.
The basic backbone for the dissemination of intelligence to and from deployed JDISS nodes
is the JWICS network. Where JWICS is not required or not available, JDISS has a versatilecommunications capability that can interface with existing communications systems, such as
tri-Service tactical communications systems. The system architecture optimizes flexibility tofocus intelligence efforts efficiently and ensures that support is maximized for a joint force
engaged in military operations.
(b) Non-SCI Support. The SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network, and Global Command and Control System provide
common non-SCI support systems for joint forces and interagency partners.
(c) Multinational Support. Multinational intelligence sharing should befacilitated by establishing a shared local area network using systems such as the battlefield
information collection and exploitation system, the Combined Enterprise Regional

V-11

Chapter V
COMBINED ENTERPRISE REGIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGESYSTEM“US Central Command (USCENTCOM) established a Coalition Intelligence
Center…to leverage the access, intelligence expertise and perspectives ofour
68 Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM
coalition partners.
EXAMPLESOF MULTINATIONALINTELLIGENCE
SHARINGIntelligence
LEVELS
representatives from traditional Commonwealth and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
partners (United
Kingdom,
Canada,New forces
Zealand,Procedures establishedto support
US andUnitedAustralia,
Nations (UN)inGermany,
Denmark,
France)were
integrated
into
daily
operations
onaSomalia as members of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) effort
more
comprehensive
basis;
usefulterrorismexchange
relationships
wereused two levels of intelligence: Level 1 data could be shown to but notestablishedwith several
nontraditional
partners
resident
USCENTCOM
retained by coalition
forcesor the UN, whileLevel
2 dataatwas
cleared for
Headquarters,
to includeand
Russia,Uzbekistan
and Ethiopia.remained
The Combined
release to the coalition
the UN.
Level 1 intelligencewithinEnterprise
Regional
Information
Exchange(CENTRIXS)[was]
US-onlychannels,
while
Level 2 data
flowed toSystem
the UNOSOMII information
designedfor exactly thistypeof thescenario….CENTRIXS
intoUS
Globalcenterin Mogadishu
eitherfrom
UN Headquarters orlinks
via thejoint
CommandandControl
SystemCommonOperation
Pictureserversandintelligence support element.
facilitates operations/intelligence sharing at releasable levels through useof somemultilevel
database
guards,
CoalitionInsituations
therereplication
may be more
thanfacilitating
two levels rapidof intelligence
access to For
US databases
without
humanintervention.
Coalitionrequired.
example, anoperation
involvinga mixtureof Northpartners
Atlantic
have given
the systemhigh marks
and accessdailycould
products
local
andTreatyOrganization(NATO)and non-NATOforceshavefor“US
Only,”
national decision
maker andsituationalawareness….This
is a levels.
‘big deal’in“Releasable
to NATO,”“Releasable
to Non-NATO”
The
terms of information
superiority–we
simplycannotmoverole
veryinfar
ahead
multinational
force commander(MNFC)
will playa majoradvising
without
enforcedstandards,
discipline,
andintelligencesustained fundingemphasisthenational
intelligencecommunityon therequirements
for
in
this
regard.”each of the allies and coalition partners. The MNFC will need torecommend what intelligence should be provided to each member.
Brigadier General John F. Kimmons, US Army
Director of Intelligence, USCENTCOM
Testimony to the US House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
23 May 2002

Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), or other emerging multinational mission
networks. As the current DOD multinational information-sharing portion of the DODIN,CENTRIXS defines the standards for establishing and maintaining multinational
connectivity at the tactical and operational level, with reachback capability to the strategiclevel. Missions requiring information sharing with NGO partners can leverage the All
Partners Access Network which facilitates information sharing between military and nonmilitary organizations. The establishment of a collaborative environment for mission
partners will facilitate information sharing within a multinational force. Operations require
US forces and mission partners to understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures forestablishing and operating a collaborative network that is enabled by the technicalcapabilities that each PN brings to the operation. Within a collaborative environment with
PNs, the US commander needs to balance “need-to-know” with the responsibility to share,
and understand the associated risk.
c. Standardized procedures for disseminating and exchanging intelligence constitute thethird component of an intelligence sharing architecture. These procedures are critical to joint
and multinational operations and interagency coordination.

V-12

JP 2-0Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation(1) The procedures and methodology for intelligence and information sharing
should be conceived and exercised as part of multinational and interagency planning before
operations begin. Special attention should be paid to intelligence classification and levels ofaccess of multinational personnel. To this end, the J-2 should consider adding extra FDO
billets to facilitate information sharing. The effectiveness of the procedures andmethodology should be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meetchanging circumstances.
(2) Following established guidelines, data should be passed to standardized datastores as soon as possible. In some situations the data will require processing andexploitation to convert it into a format compatible with certain storage means. However,whenever possible, data not requiring prior conversion should be automatically passed to thestandardized data stores without processing. Automated posting of data, combined withflexible connectivity to computer systems at all echelons of the command structure andwithin the Services, allows intelligence analysts to access imagery and multiple databases
while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission
requirements. For example, high-resolution video collected by an unmanned aerial system
can be viewed in near-real time at a downlink processing site, but disseminating this video
requires high bandwidth. The unprocessed video can be relayed directly by fiber optic lineor satellite to a headquarters’ element or JTF JISE. At the same time, targeting information
can be reported to tactical elements by voice communications or message. Selected video
frames can be captured by JDISS and made available to all users over the intelligencearchitecture. Information processed by a headquarters element or JTF JISE could, in turn, betransmitted or made available by JWICS and/or JDISS. In this example, all the capabilities
linked to and by the intelligence sharing architecture are exercised including both “pull” and“push” dissemination. The information is made available for a variety of users’ needs and isincluded in products and reports that serve multiple purposes for the tactical users.

V-13

Chapter V

Intentionally Blank

V-14

JP 2-0APPENDIX AINTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE LEVELS IN ANALYTIC JUDGMENTS
a. Intelligence analysts should distinguish between what is known with confidence
based on the facts of the situation and the OE and what are untested assumptions.
Intelligence can be facts that have been observed, or it can be a conclusion based on facts ofsuch certainty that it is considered to be knowledge. Intelligence can also be conclusions andestimates deduced from incomplete sets of facts or induced from potentially related facts.
The commander’s determination of appropriate objectives and operations may rest on
knowing whether intelligence is “fact” or “assumption,” and knowing the particular logic
used to develop an intelligence estimate, as well as knowing the confidence level the J-2
places on the provided intelligence and related analytic conclusions.
b. The following chart (Figure A-1) is intended to illustrate confidence in analytic
judgments intelligence personnel may use to indicate a subjective judgment regarding thedegree of confidence they place on the analytic conclusions contained in intelligenceproducts. Confidence levels may be used by intelligence producers to present analysis andconclusions to decision makers in a uniform, consistent manner.

A-1

Appendix A

Expressing Confidence In Analytic Judgments
Confidence in a judgment is based on three factors: number of key assumptions
required, the credibility and diversity of sourcing in the knowledge base, and thestrength of argumentation. Each factor should be assessed independently andthen in concert with the other factors to determine the confidence level. Multiple
judgments in a product may contain varying levels of confidence. Confidence
levels are stated as Low, Moderate, and High.
Phrases such as “we judge” or “we assess” are used to call attention to a product’s key assessment.
Supporting assessments may use likelihood terms or expressions to distinguish them fromassumptions or reporting. Below are guidelines for likeliness terms and the confidence levels withwhich they correspond.

Low

Moderate

Uncorroborated
information from good or
marginal sources Many assumptions
 Mostly weak logicalinferences, minimal
methods application
 Glaring intelligence gaps
exist
Terms/Expressions
Possible
Could, may, might Cannot judge, unclear

Partially corroborated
information from goodsources Several assumptions
 Mix of strong and weakinferences and methods
 Minimum intelligence
gaps exist
Terms/Expressions
Likely, unlikely
Probable, improbable Anticipate, appearHigh
Well-corroborated
information from provensources Minimal assumptions
 Strong logical inferences
and methods
 No or minor intelligence
gaps exist
Terms/Expressions
Will, will not
Almost certainly, remote Highly likely, highly
unlikely Expect, assert, affirm













Figure A-1. Expressing Confidence in Analytic Judgments

A-2

JP 2-0APPENDIX BINTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINESIntelligence disciplines are well-defined areas that involve specific categories, collections,and analysis with emphasis on technical or human resources capabilities (see Figure B-1).
1. Geospatial Intelligence
GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information todescribe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced
activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information.
GEOINT encompasses a range of products from simple IMINT reports to complex sets oflayered foundation and intelligence/mission-specific data. GEOINT products are often
developed through a “value added” process, in which both the producer and the user of
GEOINT update a database or product with current information. Full motion video isanother GEOINT intelligence collection capability that has proven key to activity-based
intelligence collection by providing near-continuous or sustained collection on designatedtargets. The three components of GEOINT (imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information)
are discussed below.
a. Imagery is a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related
object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or
representation was acquired, including products produced by space-based national
intelligence reconnaissance systems, and likenesses or presentations produced by satellites,
airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (this does not include
handheld photography). It is used extensively to update GEOINT foundation data and serves
as GEOINT’s primary source of information when exploited through IMINT. The vast
majority of modern imagery products are created, processed, and disseminated in anelectronic still or motion format. A few film-based systems still exist to fulfill special
requirements.
b. IMINT is the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through theinterpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. It includes exploitation ofimagery data derived from electro-optical (EO), radar, infrared (IR), multi-spectral, and laser
sensors. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on
film, electronic display devices, or other media. A wide variety of platforms and sensors
support IMINT operations. IMINT is a product that is the result of processing and exploiting
raw imagery (information) and creating an analyzed product (intelligence). An image alone
is only information in the form of pixels, digits, or other forms of graphic representation andthe data behind that portrayal. Imagery source categories include commercial remotesensing, EO, ground photo, hyperspectral imagery (HSI), IR, lidar multispectral imagery(MSI), panchromatic, polarmetric, and synthetic aperture radar.
(1) EO sensors provide digital imagery data in the IR, visible, and/or ultraviolet
regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Panchromatic EO sensors detect a broad segmentof the visible spectrum, while other EO sensors focus on IR energy or detect multiple narrow
bands across the EO spectrum. EO sensors generally provide a high level of detail or

B-1

Appendix BIntelligence Disciplines, Subcategories, Sources,and Applications
GEOINT – Geospatial IntelligenceImagery
IMINT – imagery intelligence Geospatial information


HUMINT – Human Intelligence

Debriefings
Interrogation operations
 Source operations

SIGINT – Signals IntelligenceCOMINT – communications intelligence
ELINT – electronic intelligence technical ELINT operational ELINT
 FISINT – foreign instrumentation signals intelligenceMASINT – Measurement and Signature Intelligence E lectromagnetic dataRadar data
Radio frequency data Geophysical data Materials data
 Nuclear radiation data

OSINT – Open-source IntelligenceAcademia
Interagency
 Newspapers/periodicals
 Due diligence Media broadcasts
 Internet
 Alternative collections

TECHINT – Technical Intelligence

Weapon system intelligence
Scientific intelligence

CI – Counterintelligence
Applications


Biometrics-enabled intelligence
Forensics-enabled intelligence Document and media exploitation
 Identify intelligenceFigure B-1. Intelligence Disciplines, Subcategories, and Sources

B-2

JP 2-0Intelligence Disciplines
resolution as compared to radar or other sensors, but cannot successfully through bad
weather. Panchromatic sensors provide the highest level of resolution, but cannot image atnight. EO offers many advantages over non-digital (i.e., film-based) systems including
improved timeliness, greater dissemination options, imagery enhancement, and additional
exploitation methods.
(a) IR imaging sensors provide a pictorial representation of the contrasts inthermal IR emissions between objects and their surroundings, and are effective during
periods of limited visibility such as at night or in inclement weather. A unique capability
available with IR sensing is the ability to detect ongoing activity (based on heat levels) as
well as past activity through residual thermal effects.
(b) Spectral imagery sensors operate in discrete spectral bands, typically in
the IR and visible regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Spectral imagery is useful forcharacterizing the environment or detecting and locating objects with known material
signatures. A multispectral image is made from a set of images taken at different intervals ofcontinuous wavelengths, called “bands,” which when viewed together produce a color
image. It is similar to using a color filter when taking a black and white picture. Only therays of the color of the filter are allowed to reach the film. Traditionally, multispectral
sensors contain a red, green, and blue band, but can contain tens of bands that image regionsof the electromagnetic spectrum to which the human eye is not sensitive. The advantage oftaking multispectral images is the ability to discern different materials through their spectral
signature. This information can be transferred into intelligence and aid in the analysis oftargets. Some MSI sensors provide low resolution, large area coverage that may reveal
details not apparent in higher resolution panchromatic imagery. Map-like products can becreated from MSI data for improved area familiarization and orientation. HSI is derived
from subdividing the electromagnetic spectrum into very narrow bandwidths which may be
combined with, or subtracted from each other in various ways to form images useful in
precise terrain or target analysis. For example, HSI can analyze electromagnetic propagation
characteristics, detect industrial chemical emissions, identify atmospheric properties,
improve detection of blowing sand and dust, and evaluate snow depths.
(2) Radar imaging sensors provide all weather imaging capabilities and theprimary night capability. Radar imagery is formed from reflected energy in the radio
frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Some radar sensors provide moving
target indicator capability to detect and locate moving targets such as armor and othervehicles.
(3) Lidar sensors are similar to radar, transmitting laser pulses to a target andrecording the time required for the pulses to return to the sensor receiver. Lidar can be used
to measure shoreline and beach volume changes, conduct flood risk analysis, identify
waterflow issues, and augment transportation mapping applications. Lidar supports large
scale production of high-resolution digital elevation products displaying accurate, highly
detailed three-dimensional models of structures and terrain invaluable for operational
planning and mission rehearsal.

B-3

Appendix B
c. Geospatial information identifies the geographic location and characteristics ofnatural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth, including: statistical data;
information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying
technologies; and mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related products. This information isused for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planningand rehearsal, modeling and simulation, and targeting.
GEOINT is addressed in detail in JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.
2. Human Intelligence
HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided
by human sources. There are 15 defense HUMINT executors. Collectively, they are known
as the Defense HUMINT Enterprise. The Defense HUMINT Enterprise is capable ofproviding full-spectrum HUMINT support to military operations. The Defense HUMINT
Enterprise and its members also partner with multinational HUMINT elements duringmultinational operations.
For additional information on HUMINT, see JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and HumanIntelligence in Joint Operations.
a. Intelligence Interrogation. Intelligence interrogation is a systematic process ofusing interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable
information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements. Trained interrogators withcurrent certification operating under DOD authority are permitted to conduct intelligenceinterrogations.
For more information on interrogation, see Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collection Operations, which is the source for procedures on the conduct of intelligenceinterrogations. For guidance on debriefing and questioning, see Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, andTactical Questioning.
b. Source Operations. Designated and trained personnel in a unit with the “source
operations” mission may develop information through the direct and indirect questioning ofovert or clandestine sources. These personnel operate under the authority and direction of adesignated defense HUMINT executor.
For more information see DODD 5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense Human
There are important legal restrictions on interrogation and source
operations. Federal law and Department of Defense policy require thatthese operations be carried out only by trained and certified personnel ina unit with this mission. Violators may be punished under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
See DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, for moredetailed discussion on interrogation.

B-4

JP 2-0Intelligence Disciplines
Intelligence (HUMINT), and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD
Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.
(1) “Walk-in” sources are unsolicited personnel who volunteer information.
For more information, see Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3300.001, DIA HUMINT
Manual, Volume I, Collection Requirements, and Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual
3301.002, DIA HUMINT Manual, Volume II: Collection Operations.
(2) Developed sources that are met over a period of time and provide information
based on operational requirements.
(3) Unwitting persons, with access to sensitive information.
c. Debriefing. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperative human sources tosatisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source usually is not incustody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons andin all OEs. Through debriefing, face-to-face meetings, conversations, and elicitation,
information may be obtained from a variety of human sources, such as:(1) Friendly forces personnel, who typically include high-risk mission personnel
such as combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long range surveillance teams, and SOF, but
can include any personnel with information that can be used for intelligence analysis
concerning the adversary or other relevant aspects of the OE. Combat intelligence, if
reported immediately during an operational mission, can be used to redirect tactical assets to
attack enemy forces on a time sensitive basis.
(2) Refugees/displaced persons, particularly if they are from enemy controlledareas of operational interest, or if their former placement or employment gave them access to
information of intelligence value.
(3) Returnees, including returned prisoners of war, defectors, freed hostages, andpersonnel reported as missing in action.
(4) Volunteers, who freely offer information of value to US forces on their own
initiative.
HUMINT is addressed in detail in JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence
Support to Joint Operations.
3. Signals Intelligence
SIGINT is intelligence produced by exploiting foreign communications systems andnoncommunications emitters.
SIGINT provides unique intelligence information,complements intelligence derived from other sources and is often used for cueing othersensors to potential targets of interest. For example, SIGINT which identifies activity ofinterest may be used to cue GEOINT to confirm that activity. Conversely, changes detectedby GEOINT can cue SIGINT collection against new targets. The discipline is subdivided

B-5

Appendix B
into three subcategories: communications intelligence (COMINT), ELINT, and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).
a. COMINT is intelligence and technical information derived from collecting andprocessing intercepted foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or otherelectromagnetic means. COMINT also may include imagery, when pictures or diagrams are
encoded by a computer network/radio frequency method for storage and/or transmission.
The imagery can be static or streaming.
b. ELINT is intelligence derived from the interception and analysis of
noncommunications emitters (e.g., radar). ELINT consists of two subcategories; operational
electronic intelligence (OPELINT) and technical electronic intelligence (TECHELINT).
OPELINT is concerned with operationally relevant information such as the location,
movement, employment, tactics, and activity of foreign noncommunications emitters andtheir associated weapon systems. TECHELINT is concerned with the technical aspects offoreign noncommunications emitters such as signal characteristics, modes, functions,associations, capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and technology levels.
c. FISINT involves the technical analysis of data intercepted from foreign equipment
and control systems such as telemetry, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/firing
command systems, and video data links.
4. Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MASINT is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physicalattributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify them. MASINT exploits avariety of phenomenologies to support signature development and analysis, to perform
technical analysis, and to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events.
MASINT is derived from specialized, technically-derived measurements of physicalphenomenon intrinsic to an object or event and it includes the use of quantitative signatures
to interpret the data. The measurement aspect of MASINT refers to actual measurements ofparameters of an event or object such as the demonstrated flight profile and range of a cruise
missile. Signatures are typically the products of multiple measurements collected over timeand under varying circumstances. These signatures are used to develop target classification
profiles and discrimination and reporting algorithms for operational surveillance and weapon
systems. The technical data sources related to MASINT include:a. EO data—emitted or reflected energy across the visible/IR portion of theelectromagnetic spectrum (ultraviolet, visible, near IR, and IR).
b. Radar data—radar energy reflected (reradiated) from a target or objective.
c. Radio frequency data—radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse emissions associatedwith nuclear testing, or other high energy events for the purpose of determining power levels,
operating characteristics, and signatures of advanced technology weapons, power, andpropulsion systems.

B-6

JP 2-0Intelligence Disciplinesd. Geophysical data—phenomena transmitted through the Earth (ground, water,
atmosphere) and man-made structures including emitted or reflected sounds, pressure waves,vibrations, and magnetic field or ionosphere disturbances. Subcategories include seismic
intelligence, acoustic intelligence, and magnetic intelligence.
e. Materials data—gas, liquid, or solid samples, collected both by automatic
equipment, such as air samplers, and directly by humans.
f. Nuclear radiation data—nuclear radiation and physical phenomena associated with
nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities.
5. Open-Source Intelligence
OSINT is intelligence based on open source information that any member of the public
can lawfully obtain by request, purchase, or observation. Examples of open sources include
unofficial and draft documents, published and unpublished reference material, research, or‘cloud’ databases, and web-based networking platforms or repositories. OSINT complements
the other intelligence disciplines and can be used to fill gaps and provide accuracy andfidelity in classified information databases. OSINT is susceptible to manipulation anddeception, and thus requires tradecraft and review during processing.
a. OSINT supports warnings, tips, and cues other intelligence disciplines, and provides
the context for understanding classified information. It can also reduce large target sets,quickly filling information gaps, allowing the more efficient use of low-density technical and
HUMINT assets. OSINT can be employed in a number of ways, including gauging
population sentiment, discerning trends in foreign media, supporting sociocultural researchand humanitarian assistance efforts, tracking scientific and technological developments, andenhancing foreign partnerships. OSINT products and sharing arrangements must be
approved by JFC’s FDO and conform to standing guidance. To facilitate OSINT sharing andreview, the DIA’s Open Source Collection Acquisition Requirements Management System isused to register collection requirements for IC action.
b. Like other types of intelligence, OSINT is susceptible to adversary deception
attempts. Incorrect information may be deliberately planted in public sources. OSINT is
also subject to source bias and inaccuracy. All-source intelligence should combine, compare,and analyze classified and open source material and attempt to cross-verify information
obtained from different sources. In addition, OSINT requires tradecraft in the areas ofresearch expertise and OPSEC for Internet-based activities.
c. Gray Literature. A non-doctrinal term used by various professions. Gray literaturerefers to a subset of open source information usually produced by research establishmentsthat is neither published commercially nor universally accessible. Regardless of media, grayliterature can include data or primary source information, academic reports and institutionaldata, informal personal or draft papers, unofficial or government exchanges.
d. Intelink Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). Intelink SBU network, formerly known
as open source information system, is a government-wide private network connecting
members of the IC, DOD, DHS, law enforcement, and other information producers andB-7

Appendix B
consumers. Intelink-SBU is a community protected medium for the sharing of sensitive
unclassified and commercially obtained information.
e. Open-Source Acquisition. The act of gaining possession of, or access to, opensource information synonymous with “open-source collection.” The preferred term isacquisition because by definition, open sources are collected and disseminated by others.
Open-source exploiters acquire previously collected and publicly available information
second-hand. When traditional collection efforts fail, use of alternative collection is possible
with OSINT. Fee for service OSINT collection, while sometimes costly, assists in filling
gaps and meeting time requirements.
f. Open-Source Collection. See paragraph g, “Open-Source Acquisition.” The OSINT
functional manager for the IC is the CIA Director. Functional manager responsibilities arecarried out by the Director, National Open Source Center. The DOD lead for OSINT is the
Director, DIA.
g. Open-Source Collection Acquisition Requirement Management System. An IC
web-enabled application for performing OSINT CRM. This is the IC collection management“program of record” for OSINT collection requirements.
6. Technical Intelligence
TECHINT is derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel and scientificinformation. TECHINT begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or
foreign scientific/technological information. The item or information is then exploited by
specialized, multi-Service collection and analysis teams. These TECHINT teams assess thecapabilities and vulnerabilities of captured military materiel and provide detailed
assessments of foreign technological threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
a. TECHINT products are used by US weapons developers, countermeasure designers,
tacticians, and operational forces to prevent technological surprise, neutralize an adversary’s
technological advantages, enhance force protection, and support the development andemployment of effective countermeasures to newly identified adversary equipment. At thestrategic level, the exploitation and interpretation of foreign weapon systems, materiel, andtechnologies is referred to as S&TI.
b. The DIA provides enhanced S&TI to CCDRs and their subordinates through thetechnical operational intelligence (TOPINT) program. TOPINT uses a closed loop systemthat integrates all Service and DIA S&T centers in a common effort. The TOPINT programprovides timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of theater specific S&TI to CCDRs
and their subordinates for planning, training, and executing joint operations.
c. Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC), managed by the DIA Joint
Foreign Materiel Program Office, is the primary DOD contingency TECHINT capability.
Activities of a JCMEC include recovery of foreign materiel and captured enemy equipment,
and encompasses CCMD and national requirements. Subsequent exploitation of thismateriel provides critical information on adversary strengths and weaknesses that may

B-8

JP 2-0Intelligence Disciplines
influence operational planning and force protection. The identification, recovery, in-theater
analysis, and evacuation of this materiel is done by the JCMEC.
7. Counterintelligence
CI encompasses five functions (collection, analysis and production, investigations,operations, and functional services) conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international
terrorist organizations or activities. CI is both offensive (adversary penetration anddeception) and defensive (protection of vital US national security related information frombeing obtained or manipulated by an adversary’s intelligence organizations, activities, andoperations). This two-pronged approach forms a comprehensive CI strategy that feeds more
effective CI functions. CI should be factored in whenever US intelligence or national
security capabilities are deployed or when we are targeted by our adversaries. CI works
closely with intelligence, security, infrastructure protection, and law enforcement to ensure
an integrated approach to the protection of US forces, our intelligence and national assets;
US research, development and technology; and the US economy.
CI is addressed in detail in JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support
to Joint Operations.
8. Applications
a. I2. I2 operations combine the synchronized application of biometrics, forensics, and
DOMEX capabilities with intelligence and identity management processes to establish
identity, affiliations and authorizations in order to deny anonymity to the adversary andprotect US/PNs assets, facilities, and forces. The I2 operations process results in discoveryof true identities, links identities to events, locations and networks, and reveals hostile intent.
These outputs enable tasks, missions, and actions that span the range of military operations.
b. DOMEX. Captured documents and media, when processed and exploited, may
provide valuable information such as adversary plans, intentions, locations, capabilities, andstatus. The category of “captured documents and media” includes all media capable ofstoring fixed information to include computer storage material. DOMEX may be conductedby any intelligence personnel with appropriate technical exploitation and language support.
c. BEI. Applied BEI supports the identification of individuals and their disposition at
the point of encounter. Additionally, BEI and corresponding I2 products support thepersistent identification and targeting of adversaries, which enables a range of military andcivilian functions. While identity attributes (biographic, biologic, behavioral, andreputational) can be collected through intelligence disciplines, BEI provides additional layersof understanding and characterization of individuals and networks.
d. FEI. FEI results from the collection, processing, analysis, and interpretation offorensic material and data, as well as associated contextual data. This informs a decision
maker’s information needs with individualized information concerning events, ideology, andpersons of interest.
B-9

Appendix B

Intentionally Blank

B-10

JP 2-0APPENDIX CREFERENCES
The development of JP 2-0 is based upon the following primary references.
1. Generala. Title 10, US Code, Armed Forces.
b. Title 50, US Code, War and National Defense.
c. The National Security Act of 1947.
d. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
e. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945.
f. National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information
to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (short title National Disclosure
Policy-1).
g. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.
h. Director Central Intelligence Directive 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence
Community Related Activities.
i. National Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified US Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
2. Department of Defense
a. DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, andTactical Questioning.
b. DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO).
c. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.
d. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International Organizations.
e. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.
f. DODD 8521.01E, Department of Defense Biometrics.
g. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons.
h. DOD Instruction 3305.07, Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP).

C-1

Appendix C
i. DOD Instruction 3305.8, Management and Administration of the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program (JRIP).
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
a. CJCS Message DTG 031640Z April 06, Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)
Execute Order, Mod 3 DTG 040001Z October 11.
b. CJCSI 3110.02, Intelligence Planning Objectives, Guidance, and Tasks.
c. CJCSI 3150.25E, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
d. CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards.
e. CJCSI 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine Development System.
f. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance.
g. CJCSM 3314.01A, Intelligence Planning.
h. CJCSM 3500.04F, Universal Joint Task Manual.
i. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
j. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.
k. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
l. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
m. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
n. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
o. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.
p. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
q. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.
r. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
s. JP 3-13, Information Operations.
t. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
u. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.
v. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

C-2

JP 2-0References
w. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
x. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
y. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
z. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
aa. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

C-3

Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

C-4

JP 2-0APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint
Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis
Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should
address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, andappearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forIntelligence (J-2).
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 2-0, 22 June 2007, Joint Intelligence.
4. Change Recommendations
a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:
TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JE&D//
b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint
Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway,
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint ForceDevelopment, J-7/JE&D.
c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would changesource document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and otherorganizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.
However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD
Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification,
and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security
Program: Protection of Classified Information.

D-1

Appendix D
6. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions areavailable on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET),and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be
requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign
Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 203405100.
c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

D-2

JP 2-0GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AOI
AOR
APEX

area of interestarea of responsibility
Adaptive Planning and Execution

BDA
BEI

battle damage assessment
biometrics-enabled intelligence

CCDR
CCIR
CCMD
CENTRIXS
CI
CIA
CJCS
CJCSI
CJCSM
CMA
CMO
COA
COG
COM
COMINT
CONOPS
COP
CRM
CSA
CSS

combatant commander
commander’s critical information requirement
combatant command
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange SystemcounterintelligenceCentral Intelligence Agency
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manualcollection management authority
civil-military operations
course of action
center of gravity
collection operations management
communications intelligenceconcept of operations
common operational picturecollection requirements management
combat support agency
Central Security Service (NSA)

DHS
DIA
DIAP
DNI
DOD
DODD
DODIN
DOE
DOMEX
DOS
DSCA
DTA

Department of Homeland Security
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Analysis Program
Director of National Intelligence
Department of Defense
Department of Defense directive
Department of Defense information networks
Department of Energy
document and media exploitation
Department of Statedefense support of civil authorities
dynamic threat assessment

GL-1

Glossary
EEI
ELINT
EO

essential element of informationelectronic intelligenceelectro-optical

FBI
FDO
FEI
FFIR
FISINT

Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
foreign disclosure officer
forensic-enabled intelligencefriendly force information requirement
foreign instrumentation signals intelligence

GEOINT
GFM
GMI

geospatial intelligence
global force management
general military intelligence

HSI
HUMINT
HVT

hyperspectral imagery
human intelligencehigh-value target

I2
IAA
IC
ICW
IGO
IMINT
IO
IOII
IP
IPR
IPT
IR
IRC
ISR

identity intelligenceincident awareness and assessment
intelligence community
in coordination withintergovernmental organization
imagery intelligence
information operations
information operations intelligence integration
intelligence planningin-progress review
intelligence planning teaminfrared
information-related capability
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2
J-2X

intelligence directorate of a joint staff
joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff
element
operations directorate of a joint staff
plans directorate of a joint staff
communications system directorate of a joint staff
joint collection management board
Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (DIA)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
joint deployable intelligence support system
joint force commander
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USSTRATCOM)

J-3
J-5
J-6
JCMB
JCMEC
JCS
JDISS
JFC
JFCC-ISR

GL-2

JP 2-0Glossary
JIACG
JIOC
JIPOE
JISE
JLLP
JOPP
JP
JPG
JRC
JRIC
JRIP
JTF
JTL
JWICS

joint interagency coordination group
joint intelligence operations center
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
joint intelligence support element
Joint Lessons Learned Program
joint operation planning process
joint publication
joint planning group
joint reconnaissance center
joint reserve intelligence center
Joint Reserve Intelligence Program
joint task force
joint target list
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LOE

line of effort

MASINTMEAMEDINT
MIB
MIP
MOE
MOP
MSI

measurement and signature intelligencemunitions effectiveness assessment
medical intelligence
Military Intelligence Board
military intelligence programmeasure of effectivenessmeasure of performance
multispectral imagery

NATO
NDP
NGA
NGO
NIP
NISP
NJOIC
NMCC
NRO
NSA
NSL

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
national disclosure policy
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
nongovernmental organization
National Intelligence Program
national intelligence support plan
National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center
National Military Command Center
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency
no-strike list

ODNI
OE
OPELINT
OPLAN
OPORD
OPSEC
OSD
OSINT

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
operational environment
operational electronic intelligence
operation plan
operation order
operations security
Office of the Secretary of Defense
open-source intelligence

GL-3

GlossaryPED
PIR
PMESII
PN

processing, exploitation, and dissemination
priority intelligence requirement
political, military, economic, social, information, andinfrastructure
partner nation

RATE
RFF
RFI
RTL

refine, adapt, terminate, execute
request for forces
request for information
restricted target list

S&T
S&TI
SBU
SCA
SCI
SecDefSIGINT
SIR
SME
SOF

scientific and technicalscientific and technical intelligencesensitive but unclassifiedsociocultural analysis
sensitive compartmented information
Secretary of Defense
signals intelligencespecific information requirement
subject matter expert
special operations forces

TECHELINTTECHINTTIA
TOPINT
TSA

technical electronic intelligence
technical intelligencetheater intelligence assessment
technical operational intelligencetarget system analysis

USCG
USD(I)USSTRATCOM

United States Coast Guard
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
United States Strategic Command

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

GL-4

JP 2-0PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
acoustic intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection and processing of acoustic
phenomena. Also called ACINT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities thatincorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In
intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligencerequirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems andresources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (Approved
for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
application. 1. The system or problem to which a computer is applied. 2. In theintelligence context, the direct extraction and tailoring of information from an existing
foundation of intelligence and near real time reporting. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02.)
biometric. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
biometrics. The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical,
physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
biometrics-enabled intelligence. The intelligence derived from the processing of biologic
identity data and other all-source for information concerning persons of interest. Also
called BEI. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
burn notice. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
case. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
collate. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
collection management. In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligencerequirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking orcoordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, andretasking, as required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
collection operations management. The authoritative direction, scheduling, and control of
specific collection operations and associated processing, exploitation, and reporting
resources. Also called COM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
collection plan. A systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection
capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources tosatisfy specific information requirements. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
collection planning. A continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of allcollection units and agencies. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)

GL-5

Glossarycollection posture. The current status of collection assets and resources to satisfy identified
information requirements. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
collection requirement. A valid need to close a specific gap in intelligence holdings indirect response to a request for information. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
collection requirements management. The authoritative development and control ofcollection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements that normally resultin either the direct tasking of requirements to units over which the commander has
authority, or the generation of tasking requests to collection management authorities at ahigher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. Also called
CRM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
collection strategy. An analytical approach used by collection managers to determine
which intelligence disciplines can be applied to satisfy information requirements.
(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
combat intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
communications intelligence. Technical information and intelligence derived from foreigncommunications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
concept of intelligence operations. Within the Department of Defense, a verbal or graphic
statement, in broad outline, of an intelligence directorate’s assumptions or intent inregard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. (Approved forincorporation into JP 1-02.)
confirmation of information (intelligence). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities
needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or
unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. Also called CRITIC.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
critical intelligence. Intelligence that is crucial and requires the immediate attention of thecommander. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
current intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
database. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
declassification. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Department of Defense Intelligence Information System. The combination of
Department of Defense personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, andsupporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation andGL-6

JP 2-0Glossarypresentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level
decision makers. Also called DODIIS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
Department of Defense Intelligence Information System Enterprise. None. (Approvedfor removal from JP 1-02.)
Department of Defense intelligence production. None. (Approved for removal fromJP 1-02.)
direction. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
dynamic threat assessment. An intelligence assessment developed by the DefenseIntelligence Agency that details the threat, capabilities, and intentions of adversaries ineach of the priority plans in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Also called DTA.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
electro-optical intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
elicitation. In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information from a person or group in amanner that does not disclose the intent of the interview or conversation. (Approved for
replacement of “elicitation (intelligence)” and its definition in JP 1-02.)
essential elements of information. The most critical information requirements regarding
the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time torelate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a
logical decision. Also called EEIs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
estimative intelligence. Intelligence that identifies, describes, and forecasts adversarycapabilities and the implications for planning and executing military operations.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
foreign intelligence. Information relating to capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, orinternational terrorist activities. Also called FI. (Approved for incorporation into
JP 1-02.)
forensic-enabled intelligence. The intelligence resulting from the integration ofscientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization,
attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, andpersons of interest. Also called FEI. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
fusion. In intelligence usage, the process of managing information to conduct all-source
analysis and derive a complete assessment of activity. (Approved for incorporation into
JP 1-02.)
general military intelligence. Intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreigncountries or organizations, or topics affecting potential United States or multinational
military operations. Also called GMI. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

GL-7

Glossary
human factors. The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of anindividual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected andprovided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
identity intelligence. The intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes
concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest. Also called I2.
(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
indications. In intelligence usage, information in various degrees of evaluation, all of whichbear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 2-0)
indications and warning. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
indicator. In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention orcapability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 2-0)information requirements. In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding theadversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to becollected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.
Also called IR. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration,
evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential
operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged insuch activities. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
intelligence asset. Any resource utilized by an intelligence organization for an operational
support role. (Approved for replacement of “asset (intelligence)” and its definition in
JP 1-02.)intelligence community. All departments or agencies of a government that are concernedwith intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatoryrole. Also called IC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 2-0 as thesource JP.)
intelligence discipline. A well-defined area of intelligence planning, collection, processing,
exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or humanresources. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence
relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of

GL-8

JP 2-0Glossary
action open to the enemy or adversary and the order of probability of their adoption.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
intelligence planning. The intelligence component of the Adaptive Planning and Execution
system, which coordinates and integrates all available Defense Intelligence Enterprisecapabilities to meet combatant commander intelligence requirements. Also called IP.
(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
intelligence production. The integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of
information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known oranticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. (Approved forinclusion in JP 1-02.)
intelligence requirement. 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a needfor the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for
intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of theoperational environment or threat forces. Also called IR. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02.)
intelligence source. The means or system that can be used to observe and record
information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location,organization, or individual. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
joint deployable intelligence support system. A transportable workstation andcommunications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a jointtask force or other tactical user. Also called JDISS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
joint intelligence. Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the samenation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
joint intelligence architecture. A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of the Defense
Joint Intelligence Operations Center, combatant command joint intelligence operations
centers, and subordinate joint task force intelligence operations centers or joint
intelligence support elements to provide national, theater, and tactical commanders withthe full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
joint intelligence operations center. An interdependent, operational intelligenceorganization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (ifestablished) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable ofaccessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution,
and assessment. Also called JIOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. The sensitive compartmented
information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network, which incorporates
advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint informationexchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called
JWICS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
GL-9

Glossarylaser intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
measurement and signature intelligence. Information produced by quantitative andqualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate,and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived
measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. Also called
MASINT. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
Military Intelligence Board. A decision-making forum which formulates Department of
Defense intelligence policy and programming priorities. Also called MIB. (JP 1-02.
SOURCE: JP 2-0)
national intelligence support team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
National Reconnaissance Office. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
nuclear intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
open-source information. Information that any member of the public could lawfully obtainby request or observation as well as other unclassified information that has limited
public distribution or access. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
open-source intelligence. Relevant information derived from the systematic collection,
processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known oranticipated intelligence requirements. Also called OSINT. (Approved forincorporation into JP 1-02.)
operational architecture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
operational intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting
campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or
operational areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
persistent surveillance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
processing. A system of operations designed to convert raw data into useful information.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
production requirement. An intelligence requirement that cannot be met by current
analytical products resulting in tasking to produce a new product that can meet thisintelligence requirement. Also called PR. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
radar intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection
methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or tosecure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics
of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)

GL-10

JP 2-0Glossary
red team. An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members thatprovide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in
the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries andothers. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
request for information. 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence
information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related
to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. 2. A term used by the
National Security Agency/Central Security Service to state ad hoc signals intelligencerequirements. Also called RFI. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself
against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. (JP 3-10) 2. A
condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measuresthat ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. (JP 3-10) 3. With
respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons fromhaving access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national
security. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in
combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from
communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
sociocultural analysis. The analysis of adversaries and other relevant actors that integrates
concepts, knowledge, and understanding of societies, populations, and other groups ofpeople, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and spaceat varying scales. Also called SCA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to
produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In theintelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with theoperation plan to answer intelligence requirements in time to influence the decisions
they support. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
synthesis. In intelligence usage, the examining and combining of processed information
with other information and intelligence for final interpretation. (Approved forincorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 2-0 as the source JP.)tear line. A physical line on an intelligence message or document separating categories of
information that have been approved for foreign disclosure and release. (Approved forincorporation into JP 1-02.)
technical architecture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, andexploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the
GL-11

Glossary
purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technicalcapabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s
technological advantages. Also called TECHINT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)
technical operational intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
warning intelligence. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report timesensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostileactions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests. (Approved forinclusion in JP 1-02.)

GL-12

JP 2-0JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0JP
JP 2-02-0

JP 3-0

JP 4-0JP 5-0

JP 6-0PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCEINTELLIGENCEOPERATIONSLOGISTICS

PLANS

COMMUNICATIONSSYSTEMAll joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 2-0 is in the Intelligence series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
STEP #1 - Initiation

STEP #4 - Maintenancel

JP published and continuously
assessed by users
l Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publicationl Revision begins 3.5 years
after publicationl Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signaturelJoint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fillextant operational voidl Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis
l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validationl Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working groupl PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorshipl JS J-7 approves and releases PD tolead agent (LA) (Service, combatantcommand, JS directorate)

MaintenanceInitiation

ENHANCEDJOINTWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITYJOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Approval

Development

STEP #3 - Approvall

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
JS J-7 prepares publication for signaturel JSDS prepares JS staffing packagel JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signaturel

STEP #2 - Developmentl

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the firstdraft (FD)l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l FD comment matrix adjudicationl JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) systeml Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrixl FC joint working group