沙漠研究 22-1, 123 -126 (2012 )"ICAL 1 / DT X"

Journal of Arid Land Studies－Refereed Paper－First Steps in Addressing Land Degradation in Afghanistan
Michael J. JACOBS*1) and Catherine A. SCHLOEDER1)
Abstract: Farming and livestock production are the main economic livelihoods in Afghanistan and each depends on access to thecountry’s vast network of rangelands. Since the Soviet invasion in 1980, many of the rangeland areas have come under pressure in
the form of woody plant removal and their conversion to rain-fed agriculture. The result has been fewer options for extensive
livestock grazing and rangeland degradation and a loss of biodiversity in more extreme situations. The Afghanistan PEACE Project
was initiated in 2006 with the aim of helping to improve livestock production and management of Afghanistan’s rangeland areas.
One component of the PEACE Project addressing both goals involved the development of a conflict resolution program. The
purpose of this program was to help solve land-use conflicts between farmers and herders using non-traditional methods and it is basedon the premise that until these issues are resolved on the ground using skilled facilitators, there will be few opportunities forimprovement of Afghanistan’s livestock industry or its rangelands. The PEACE conflict resolution program involved training leadersfrom both sides of the issue, in communication, facilitation, conflict resolution and peace building techniques and supporting themwhile they worked to facilitate the resolution of the more important land-use conflicts. The training was accomplished in partnershipwith an Afghan non-governmental organization and the Government of Afghanistan. Since May 2010, 52 peace ambassadors havebeen working together in 6 regions of the country. To date, these ambassadors have successfully solved 244 land-use and 234 socialconflicts.
Key words: Afghanistan, Biodiversity, Conflict resolution, Degradation, Rangelands

1. Introduction
Currently, 80% of Afghanistan’s population resides in rural
areas and of these, 5% are considered to be transhumant
pastoralists (NRVA, 2005). The estimated percentage oflivestock owned by Afghanistan’s pastoralist’s, ranges from
50% to 75%. Key to the resilience of Afghanistan’s
pastoralists during times of conflict and peace is their capacity
to adapt to changing circumstances as well as living a relatively
mobile lifestyle to meet the dietary needs of their stock. With
70-85% of Afghanistan qualifying as rangeland, this use of thelandscape and lifestyle easily makes sense. Livestock
production in Afghanistan involves both intensive andextensive production strategies.
Intensive production
involves supplemental feeding of crop residues and grazing ofboth stubble fields and rangeland areas, with either type ofgrazing opportunity occurring primarily adjacent to a village orresidence. This strategy is primarily observed in settledcommunities and its purpose is to supply the dietary needs of ahousehold first. Extensive production, in contrast, involves
moving ones stock from one rangeland area to another in order
to meet the dietary needs of the stock. If there issupplemental feeding, it involves the collection and stockpilingof naturally cured native plants for supplemental feeding
during Afghanistan’s long and often harsh winters.
* Corresponding Author: mjacobs@cnrit.tamu.edu
P.O. Box 445 Fortine, Montana 59918-0445
1) Texas A&M University, Department of Ecosystem Science and Management

Afghanistan’s transhumant pastoralist’s, the Kuchi, rely on thismethod almost exclusively and for the majority, extensive
livestock production is their primary economic livelihood.
Extensive livestock production is also of import toAfghanistan’s national economy. In a survey conducted byTexas A&M University in 2010, it was observed that the Kuchi
were responsible for supplying approximately 75% of thesmall stock sold in Afghanistan’s livestock markets (Schloederand Jacobs, 2010). The Kuchi are also the principal suppliersto the wool and hide industries in Afghanistan as well asPakistan.
The Kuchi’s herding strategy is to move with their animals
in the spring from the lowland areas, where they winter, to themountainous high elevation areas where grazing opportunities
are best during the summer months. Since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, many of the rangeland areasthat the Kuchi have relied on for grazing have come underincreasing pressure as the search for fuel and tillable land
continues to intensify in response to the continued lack ofdevelopment. When the conversion to rain-fed agriculture
occurs in areas where rainfall is insufficient to support cropproduction, low rainfall becomes an indirect contributing factor
to land degradation. Historically positive relationships,
between the Kuchi and villagers, have deteriorated over the last
30 years in response to the various conflicts, to the extent thatareas adjacent to many villages no longer offer the safe haventhey once did for the Kuchi leaving them vulnerable tocriminals, insurgents and unscrupulous local leaders. An
increase in insecurity in the last 10 years is also impacting thelivelihood of the Kuchi (Desta and Schloeder, 2010).
Movement from lowland wintering areas to high elevation
summer pastures is now riskier as a result of a steady increasein crime and local insurgencies. The result is that the Kuchi are
finding it increasingly difficult to find land for grazing for theirlivestock and the competition for what remains is not just highbut on the increase from year to year due to competition among
the Kuchi for a diminishing resource, and between the Kuchi
and villagers as local farmers attempt to economically diversify
by branching out into livestock production. If this situation isto continue, it is likely that many of the Kuchi will lose theirherds thereby placing Afghanistan’s entire livestock, wool, hideand carpet industry in jeopardy as well. Numerous jobs will
also be lost for those indirectly involved in this industry (e.g.
truck drivers, fuel stations, restaurants, etc.).
The Afghanistan Pastoral Engagement Adaptation andCapacity Enhancement (PEACE) Project, led by Texas A&M
University (TAMU), was initiated in 2006 at the request of theGovernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA),
to address issues negatively affecting Afghanistan’s livestockindustry (www.afghanpeace.org). Since its inception, thePEACE Project has been working with the GIRoA Advisor on
Tribal Affairs. Eng. Wahidullah Sabawoon, in an effort torestore the Kuchi’s ability to move their livestock from one
seasonal grazing area to another. Primary to this effort has
been the belief that land degradation issues in Afghanistan
cannot be addressed by the GIRoA until there is peace amongits people (Jacobs et al., 2009). It was also felt that manyland-use issues could only be resolved at the community levelusing non-traditional techniques, due to the level of distrust of
the existing methods for solving disputes. Aside fromreestablishing positive relationships between the Kuchi and
Afghanistan’s settled communities, it was also believed that
communities engaged in resolving their own conflicts would
be motivated to resolve issues well beyond the intent of thePEACE Project.

2. Methods
In Afghanistan, the traditional way to resolve a conflict
between two parties involves the selection of individuals torepresent each party in the dispute, discussion among therepresentatives as to the best solution and the eventual
rendering of a decision to resolve the dispute, which bothparties have already agreed to abide by at the onset of themeeting. This method of resolving conflicts can work to end
a dispute between two parties but in many instances, it has

been reported that it doesn’t work for reasons including politics,economics and favoritism. It has also been reported, when
the dispute involves two different ethnic groups, that more
often than not the decision will favor the local group. The
result in both situations is that the hostility will persist between
the two sides until such time as an opportunity presents itself toengage in conflict once again.
The first step in the development of the conflict resolution
program involved the identification of specific areas withconflicts considered to be of extreme concern, such as some of
the recent armed conflicts between farmers and herders (IRIN2008). The next involved the identification of leaders, fromthe chosen areas, with demonstrated skills in communication
and a commitment to a fair and equitable resolution, andknown and respected by the community they were associatedwith. This part of the project was the sole responsibility ofEng. Wahidullah Sabawoon, Afghanistan’s Advisor on Tribal
Affairs, Eng. Sabawoon’s choices were based on discussions
with Provincial and District-level government leaders in
addition to his having the most knowledge of Afghanistan’s
tribal affairs. Leaders selected in this manner were thenbrought to Kabul for a series of trainings in communication,
conflict resolution, facilitation and peace building techniques
specific to resolving conflicts in a fair and equitable manner.
We employed a local Afghan non-government organization,
the Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) to deliver thetrainings in both Dari and Pashto.
SDO, and a representative from Eng. Sabawoon’s officeand the PEACE Project were then responsible for the final
selection, from the pool of trainees, of those leaders who would
serve in the capacity of “Peace Ambassador” (PA’s). Those
selected included individuals demonstrating patience, anexcellent grasp of and commitment to the conflict resolution
and peace-building process and quality communication skills.
The newly trained PA’s then returned to their communities towork either individually or collaboratively to facilitate andguide the process of resolution of conflicts related to land-use.
In addition to working with communities to resolve importantland-use conflicts, the PA’s also had the responsibility ofreporting on their efforts and successes and failures. To
evaluate whether or not they were doing what they said they
were doing, the PEACE Project conducted independent
evaluations in Provinces where they were working. The
evaluations consisted of gathering community members fromboth sides of the issue and asking the respondents questions
about the PA’s activities, techniques and successes.
Following, the evaluation team assigned one of three rankings
to each PA, with the assigned ranking indicating whether they
were considered highly effective, moderately effective, or justsomewhat effective.

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Neutrality was critical to the success of the program – it
was felt that the GIRoA Peace Commission had tocontinue to act in a neutral manner
New PA’s should be known to communities on both sidesof the conflict

4. Conclusions

Fig. 1. The number of conflicts solved among 15 Provinces in
Afghanistan. Conflicts resolved were categorized into 3types; Land-use, Social, or conflicts with the Government.

3. Results
As of February, 2011, there have been approximately 1900
meetings and 488 conflicts solved with the support of the PA’s.
Of the 488 conflicts solved, 50% involved conflicts overland-use issues (Fig. 1). The remaining 50% involved a variety
of social and government-related issues.
Reports have also been received regarding the ending ofseveral critical conflicts in Wardak Province where armed
conflicts have been the norm in recent years.
The facilitation of conflicts unrelated to land-use issues
came about at the specific requests of certain individuals andcommunities. This response reinforced our presumption thatdeveloping a skill-set and opportunities for community-basedland-use conflict resolution, using respected and trusted
community leaders, will translate to solving conflicts wellbeyond the intent of the PEACE Project. It also serves as anindication of how often communities needed help in resolving
their conflicts.
In total, 52% of the PAs were considered highly effective
while 29% and 17% were considered moderately to somewhat
effective, respectively.
Following this effort, all PA’s
receiving a somewhat effective rating were replaced by new
trained PA’s in an effort to maintain the trust and respect of thecommunities involved in this effort.
During the evaluations, respondents were also asked if they
had any recommendations to improve the conflict resolution
program. Their responses are summarized below, in order ofimportance:
 Communities overwhelmingly supported and encouraged
the continuance of the PA program There was a request for more PA’s - everyone seemed tomention this point (e.g. Governors, communities, and PA’s) PA training for community elders, government officials,and younger representatives
 The PA program should be supported for many years tocome rather than on a year-to-year basis

Technical solutions to reverse or mitigate the impacts ofdegradation are important for improving rangeland conditions
around the world. It is equally important, however, toidentify and facilitate the resolution of land-use conflicts at thesame time and even possibly, in advance of the technicalsolutions. Whether in advance or in combination, there is a
far better chance of producing meaningful and sustainable
results in combating degradation, losses of biodiversity, anddeclines in environmental quality if there is peace. The
PEACE Project has found a means of solving conflicts bytraining and empowering local leaders and communities tosolve their own conflicts.
This effort will continue for an additional 18 months. The
partnership between Wahidullah Sabawoon’s Commission,
Sanayee Development Organization and the PEACE Project
has initiated a solid program that builds grass-roots, conflict
resolution skills within respected community members. With
time this program will resolve many land-use issues between
Afghans.
Acknowledgement
This project is funded the United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID) under the terms of
Cooperative Agreement No. 306-A-00-06-00521-00. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views of USAID.

References
Afghanistan PEACE Project: http://www.afghanpeace.org
Desta, S., Schloeder C.A. (2010): Report on initiating a pilot
community-based risk management project with the Kuchi
in northern Afghanistan. Afghanistan PEACE Project. Texas
A&MUniversity.
http://cnrit.tamu.edu/peace/pdfs/
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Jacobs M.J., Naumovski I., Schloeder C.A., Dalili R.M.
(2009): Empowering Afghan Herders to Build Peace.
Research Brief 09-01-PEACE. Davis, California: Global
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Ministry of Rehabilitation and Development and the Central
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