SIPRI Fact Sheet
March 2024

TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARMS TRANSFERS, 2023
pieter d. wezeman, katarina djokic, mathew george,zain hussain and siemon t. wezeman

Imports of major arms by states in Europe increased by 94 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23, while the global volume of international arms trans­
fers decreased marginally, by 3.3 per cent (see figure 1).1 There were overall
decreases in arms transfers to all other regions, but states in Asia and Oceania
and the Middle East continued to import arms in much larger volumes thanthose in Europe. Nine of the 10 biggest arms importers in 2019–23, including
the top 3 of India, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were in Asia and Oceania or the
Middle East. Ukraine became the fourth biggest arms importer globally after
it received transfers of major arms from over 30 states in 2022–23.
Arms exports by the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, roseby 17 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while those by Russia fell by
more than half (–53 per cent). France’s arms exports grew by 47 per centand it moved just ahead of Russia to become the world’s second largest arms
supplier.
From 11 March 2024 the freely available SIPRI Arms Transfers Data­base
includes updated data on transfers of major arms for 1950–2023, which
replaces all previous data on arms transfers published by SIPRI. Based on

Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)

50

KEY FACTS
ș The volume of internationaltransfers of major arms in
2019–23 was 3.3 per cent lower
than in 2014–18 and 3.3 per centhigher than in 2009–13.
ș The five largest exporters
were the United States, France,
Russia, China and Germany.
ș Arms exports by the USA
went up by 17 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23, while
those by Russia went down by
53 per cent. France’s exportsrose by 47 per cent and it moved
just ahead of Russia to become
the world’s second largest arms
exporter.
ș The five largest arms
importers in 2019–23 wereIndia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Ukraine and Pakistan.
ș States in Asia and Oceania
accounted for 37 per cent of
all arms imports in 2019–23,
followed by states in the
Middle East (30 per cent),
Europe (21 per cent), theAmericas (5.7 per cent) and
Africa (4.3 per cent).
ș Arms imports by states in
Europe were 94 per cent higher
in 2019–23 than in 2014–18.
A total of 55 per cent ofEuropean arms imports camefrom the USA in 2019–23,
compared with 35 per cent in2014–18.

40

30

20

10

0

88

4–

8
19

3
–9
89
19

–
94
19

98
1

3

00

–2

9
99

08
20
4–
0
20

3
–1
09
20

8
–1

14

20

3
–2

19

20

Figure 1. The trend in international transfers of major arms, 1984–2023
Note: The bar graph shows the average annual volume of arms transfers for 5-year periods
and the line graph shows the annual totals. The SIPRI trend-indicator value (TIV) is ameasure of the volume of inter­national transfers of major arms. The method used for the
SIPRI TIV is described on the Arms Transfers Database web page.
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
1 In this fact sheet the terms ‘arms exports’ and ‘arms imports’ are used to refer to internationaltransfers of major arms, as defined by SIPRI.

ș The largest importer inEurope was Ukraine, which
received 23 per cent of theregion’s total arms imports
in 2019–23.

2sipri fact sheet

Table 1. The 25 largest exporters of major arms and their main recipients, 2019–23
Percentages below 10 are rounded to 1 decimal place; percentages over 10 are rounded to whole numbers.

Exporter

2019–23

2014–18

Per centchange from Main recipients and their share of exporter’s total exports (%),
2019–23
2014–18 toa
2019–23
1st
2nd
3rd

United States
FranceRussiaChina
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
Spain
IsraelSouth Korea
Türkiye
Netherlands
SwedenPolandCanadaAustralia
Switzerland
Ukraine
NorwayUAE
South Africa
Belgium
BelarusBrazil
Iran

42
11
11
5.8
5.6
4.3
3.7
2.7
2.4
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2

34
7.2
21
5.9
6.3
2.2
4.1
2.7
3.1
1.7
0.7
2.2
0.7
0.1
0.5
0.3
1.0
1.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
<0.05
0.4
0.2
0.1

17
47
–53
–5.3
–14
86
–14
–3.3
–25
12
106
–46
15
1 138
20
88
–47
–73
–16
–24
3.0
430
–34
–3.5
276

Share of global
arms exports (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Saudi Arabia
India
India
Pakistan
Egypt
Qatar
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
India
PolandUAE
USA
Brazil
UkraineSaudi Arabia
CanadaDenmark
China
USA
JordanUSA
Saudi Arabia
Viet NamFranceRussia

15
29
34
61
20
27
23
21
37
27
15
28
22
96
37
32
17
59
26
33
24
38
30
28
75

Japan
Qatar
China
Bangladesh
UkraineEgypt
USA
Australia
Philippines
Philippines
Qatar
MexicoUSA
SwedenUkraineChile
Spain
Saudi Arabia
Ukraine
Egypt
UAE
CanadaSerbiaNigeria
Venezuela

9.5
17
21
11
12
21
20
20
12
19
13
12
20
2.1
22
28
16
12
20
26
23
25
22
16
16

Qatar
Egypt
Egypt
ThailandIsrael
KuwaitUkraineTürkiyeUSA
India
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
India
UAE
USA
Australia
India
Lithuania
Algeria
India
Pakistan
UgandaPortugal
Houthisb

8.2
6.4
7.5
6.0
12
13
8.5
18
8.7
15
11
8.6
20
0.6
15
11
16
11
9.9
10
13
22
17
16
7.4

UAE = United Arab Emirates.
a Figures show the change in volume of the total arms exports per exporter between the two periods.
b These exports went to the Houthi non-state armed group based in Yemen.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.

the new data, this fact sheet presents global trends in arms exports and arms
imports, and highlights selected issues related to transfers of major arms.
THE EXPORTERS, 2019–23

SIPRI has identiﬁed 66 states as exporters of major arms in 2019–23. The fivelargest exporters of arms during that period—the USA, France, Russia, China
and Germany—accounted for 75 per cent of all arms exports (see figure 2 andtable 1). US and French arms exports rose between 2014–18 and 2019–23,
while Russian, Chinese and German arms exports fell (see figure 3). The USA
and states in Western Europe together accounted for 72 per cent of all arms
exports in 2019–23, compared with 62 per cent in 2014–18.

trends in international arms tr ansfers, 2023
The United States

Others10%
South Korea
2.0%

3

The USA’s arms exports grewby 17 per cent between 2014–18
Israel2.4%
and 2019–23 and its share of total
Spain
global arms exports rose from
2.7%
34 per cent to 42 per cent. The USA
United Kingdom
3.7%
United Statesdelivered major arms to 107 states
42%
Italy
in 2019–23, which was more than
4.3%
the next two biggest exporters
combined. The volume of arms
Germany
5.6%
exported by the USA in 2019–23
was 282 per cent higher than that
Chinaof France, the second biggest arms
5.8%
exporter globally.
In 2019–23 the largest share of
RussiaUS arms exports went to states in
11%
Francethe Middle East (38 per cent). This11%
was a much smaller proportion
than in 2014–18 (50 per cent), after Figure 2. Global share of exports of major arms by the 10 largest exporters,
an 11 per cent decrease in US arms 2019–23
exports to the region between the Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
two periods. Four Middle Easternstates were among the top 10
recipients of US arms in 2019–23:
17
United States
Saudi Arabia accounted for 15 perFrance47
cent of US arms exports, Qatar for
8.2 per cent, Kuwait for 4.5 per–53
Russiacent and Israel for 3.6 per cent.
China
–5.3
US arms exports to states in Asiaand Oceania increased by 14 per–14
Germany
cent overall between 2014–18 and86
Italy
2019–23, with the region account­ing for 31 per cent of all US arms
–14
United Kingdom
exports in 2019–23, roughly the
Spain
–3.3
same proportion as in 2014–18.
Three states in the region wereIsrael–25
among the 10 largest recipients
South Korea
12of US arms in 2019–23: Japanaccounted for 9.5 per cent of all US–60 –50 –40 –30 –20 –10
010 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
arms exports, Australia for 7.1 per
Change in volume of arms exports (%)
cent and South Korea for 5.3 percent. There were increases in US Figure 3. Changes in volume of exports of major arms since 2014–18 by thearms exports to Japan (+161 per 10 largest exporters in 2019–23
cent), South Korea (+35 per cent) Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
and Australia (+9.2 per cent)between 2014–18 and 2019–23,
which were mainly driven by a perception of a growing threat from China
shared by all three recipients and the USA.

4

sipri fact sheet

Box 1. Selected major arms on order or preselected for future orders from the 10 largest arms exporters, for delivery
after 2023
It is very difficult to make predictions about future trends in arms transfers. Nevertheless, data on orders and final negotiations oforders can give a rough indication of which states will be among the largest exporters in coming years. The data on combat aircraft
and major warships, which have a notably high military value, is particularly telling. As the table below shows, the United States
will continue to be by far the largest exporter of major arms beyond 2023. What the future holds for other top suppliers is lesscertain, but France, which became the second largest arms exporter in the world in 2019–23, also has relatively high numbers ofpending deliveries of combat aircraft and major warships compared with most other suppliers.

Combat aircraft a
Combat helicopters
Major warships b
SAM systems c
Tanks
Other armoured vehicles
Artillery

UnitedStatesFranceRussiaChina

Germany

Italy

UnitedKingdom

Spain

Israel

South
Korea

1 071
390
8
35
561
2 848+
718

223
1
20
2
–
498
141

78
–
5
16+
464
8
–

94
–
8
2
566
1
126+

–
–
25
37+
241
1 314
31

52
31
8
–
98
1 757
–

8
–
32
–
–
20
–

–
–
1
–
–
558
12

18
–
–
30+
19
45+
95+

142
–
6
10+
972
609+
1 233+– nil; SAM = surface-to-air missile.
a Combat aircraft here include combat/trainer aircraft and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

b Major warships here include aircraft carriers, corvettes, destroyers, frigates and submarines.

c SAM systems here include only land-based systems and exclude systems for portable/very short-range SAMs.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.

A total of 28 per cent of US arms exports went to states in Europe in
2019–23, which was up from 11 per cent in 2014–18. US arms exports to theregion increased by just over 200 per cent between the two periods. Ukraine
accounted for 4.7 per cent of all US arms exports and 17 per cent of those toEurope.
Deliveries of combat aircraft typically make up a significant part of the
USA’s total arms exports. It delivered 420 combat aircraft in 2019–23. Of
these, 249 were advanced F-35 aircraft, which were delivered to a total of
10 states and accounted for 24 per cent of all US arms exports. The USA
has many pending arms export deliveries, including a total of 1071 combat
aircraft (see box 1), of which 785 are F-35s.
FranceFrance narrowly overtook Russia to become the world’s second largest
exporter of major arms in 2019–23. French arms exports represented 11 percent of all arms transfers in this period, having increased by 47 per centbetween 2014–18 and 2019–23. France delivered major arms to 64 states in
2019–23, but India was by far the largest recipient, accounting for 29 per centof French arms exports.
The bulk of France’s arms exports in 2019–23 went to states in Asia andOceania (42 per cent of arms exports) and the Middle East (34 per cent).
France has been trying to expand its arms sales to other European states formany years; however, its exports to states in Europe in 2019–23 accounted for
only 9.1 per cent of its total arms exports. More than half of its European arms
exports (53 per cent) went to Greece, mostly made up of transfers of 17 Rafale
combat aircraft.

trends in international arms tr ansfers, 2023

5

A sharp rise in deliveries of Rafale combat aircraft accounted for most of
the growth in French arms exports in 2019–23. France exported 23 Rafales in
2014–18. This increased to 94 in 2019–23, representing just under one third(31 per cent) of French arms exports in the period. A further 193 Rafales wereon order for export as at the end of 2023. However, most of the aircraft France
has already delivered (96 out of 117) and those on order (178 out of 193) are forstates outside Europe—Egypt, India, Indonesia, Qatar and the United ArabEmirates. This highlights the chal­lenge France still faces in selling its majorarms to European states, especially in the con­text of the strong competition
from the USA. Notably, 8 out of the 10 Euro­pean states that preselected orordered combat aircraft in 2019–23 opted for US F-16s or F-35s, with only
Croatia and Greece opting for the Rafale.
In addition to building up its sales of combat aircraft, France increased
its exports of military ships (and the weapons to arm them) by 14 per centbetween 2014–18 and 2019–23.
RussiaRussia’s arms exports fell by 53 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and it
accounted for 11 per cent of total global arms exports. It delivered major arms
to 41 states and 1 non-state armed group in 2019–23.
In 2019 the annual volume of Russian arms exports was at a similar levelto that in each of the preceding 20 years. However, the export volumes in
2020, 2021 and 2022 were at much lower levels than in 2019, and in 2023 thevolume was 52 per cent lower than in 2022. Another indication of the declineof Russia as a global supplier of arms is that whereas 31 states received majorarms from Russia in 2019, only 14 did in 2022 and that number fell to 12 in
2023.
States in Asia and Oceania received 68 per cent of total Russian arms exports
in 2019–23, while Middle Eastern and African states received 13 per cent and10 per cent respectively. Just under two thirds of Russian arms exports went
to three states in 2019–23: India (34 per cent), China (21 per cent) and Egypt(7.5 per cent). India was also the largest recipient of Russian arms in 2014–18,
but exports to India decreased by 34 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23,
while exports to China decreased by 39 per cent and to Egypt by 54 per cent.
Algeria and Viet Nam were the third and fourth largest recipients of Russianarms in 2014–18; however, exports to Algeria (–83 per cent) and Viet Nam(–91 per cent) dropped significantly between the two periods.
The low volume of pending deliveries of major arms from Russia (see box 1)suggests that Russian arms exports are likely to remain well below the level
reached in 2014–18, for at least the short term.
Other major exporters

China accounted for 5.8 per cent of total global arms exports in 2019–23. Its
arms exports decreased by 5.3 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The
bulk of Chinese arms exports (85 per cent) went to states in Asia and Oceania,
followed by states in Africa (9.9 per cent). China delivered major arms to
40 states in 2019–23, but well over half of its arms exports (61 per cent) went
to just one state—Pakistan.

6

sipri fact sheet

Table 2. The 40 largest importers of major arms and their main suppliers, 2019–23
Percentages below 10 are rounded to 1 decimal place; percentages over 10 are rounded to whole numbers.
Per centchange from Main suppliers and their share of importer’s total imports (%),
2019–23
2014–18 toa
2019–23 2014–18 2019–23
1st
2nd
3rd
Share of global
arms imports (%)
Rank Importer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

India
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
UkrainePakistan
Japan
Egypt
Australia
South Korea
China
United States
KuwaitUnited Kingdom
UAE
IsraelNetherlands
Türkiye
NorwayPolandSingapore
Algeria
Philippines
Indonesia
Italy
GreeceBangladesh
BrazilThailand
MoroccoNATOb
BahrainRomania
Kazakhstan
Germany
CanadaFranceDenmark
Myanmar
New Zealand
Belarus

9.8
8.4
7.6
4.9
4.3
4.1
4.0
3.7
3.1
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.4
2.4
2.1
1.9
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5

9.1
11
1.5
0.1
2.9
1.5
5.3
4.6
2.8
4.9
1.6
1.0
1.6
3.3
2.0
0.2
2.2
0.8
0.4
1.3
4.8
0.5
2.4
1.4
0.9
1.2
0.6
1.1
1.4
<0.05
0.1
0.2
0.9
0.2
1.1
0.3
0.3
0.7
0.1
0.4

4.7
–28
396
6 633
43
155
–26
–21
6.5
–44
67
169
41
–31
5.1
751
–29
92
253
17
–77
105
–60
–37
–4.2
–31
26
–30
–46
1 638
562
180
–30
188
–44
112
99
–20
338
30

Russia
USA
USA
USA
China
USA
Germany
USA
USA
Russia
UK
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Spain
USA
USA
Germany
RussiaSouth Korea
USA
USA
FranceChina
FranceChina
USAFranceUSA
USA
RussiaUSA
Australia
UK
USA
RussiaUSA
Russia

36
75
45
39
82
97
27
80
72
77
25
70
89
57
69
99
31
89
45
32
48
37
27
95
58
72
40
44
69
68
93
71
94
63
32
38
70
38
69
100

FranceFranceFranceGermany
Sweden
UK
Italy
Spain
Germany
FranceNetherlands
Italy
South Korea
TürkiyeGermany
Finland
Italy
South Korea
South Korea
FranceGermany
IsraelSouth Korea
GermanyUSA
Türkiye
SwedenSouth Korea
FranceUSA
Türkiye
Switzerland
FranceIsraelUSA
USA
Switzerland
China
South Korea
..

33
7.6
25
14
4.0
1.8
22
15
15
13
12
20
4.0
9.9
30
0.6
23
4.8
34
27
15
28
18
1.8
21
9.7
23
13
14
17
3.0
11
1.4
16
27
20
16
26
12
..

USA
Spain
Italy
PolandTürkiyeGermany
RussiaSwitzerland
FranceUkraineFranceFranceIsraelFrance
Italy
Germany
Russia
Italy
UK
USA
China
USA
FranceFrance
UK
UK
Italy
USA
IsraelUK
Italy
Portugal
Spain
UK
Spain
Italy
Germany
India
UK
..

. . = data not available or not applicable; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UAE = United Arab Emirates.
a Figures show the change in volume of the total arms imports per importer between the two periods.
b The data is for imports by the organization itself, not the total imports by NATO member states.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.

13
7.0
15
13
3.8
0.4
20
2.3
9.3
8.2
10
8.6
2.7
9.2
0.9
0.6
15
3.6
4.4
26
14
14
17
1.4
11
5.5
13
9.9
11
15
1.9
6.3
1.4
5.7
22
18
10
18
11
..

trends in international arms tr ansfers, 2023

7

Arms exports by Germany madeup 5.6 per cent of the global total
India
9.8%
in 2019–23. They were 14 per centlower than in 2014–18. States in the
Saudi Arabia
Middle East received the largest
8.4%
share of all German arms exports in
2019–23 (39 per cent), followed bystates in Asia and Oceania (28 per
Qatar
7.6%
Otherscent) and Europe (25 per cent).
47%
Italy accounted for 4.3 per centof the world’s arms exports in
Ukraine4.9%
2019–23. Its arms exports were
Pakistan
86 per cent higher in 2019–23 than
4.3%
Japan
in 2014–18. A total of 71 per cent of
4.1%
Italian arms exports went to the
Egypt
4.0%
Middle East.
Australia
The 4 other suppliers making
3.7%
China
South Korea
up the top 10 arms exporters in
2.9%
3.1%
2019–23 were the United King­dom, Spain, Israel and South Figure 4. Global share of imports of major arms by the 10 largest importers,
Korea. Arms exports by the UK 2019–23(–14 per cent), Spain (–3.3 per Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
cent) and Israel (–25 per cent) all
decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while arms exports by South Korea
increased by 12 per cent.
THE IMPORTERS, 2019–23

SIPRI has identiﬁed 170 states as importers of major arms in 2019–23. The
top five arms importers—India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine and Pakistan—received 35 per cent of all arms imports in the period (see figure 4 and table 2).
States in Asia and Oceania accounted for 37 per cent of all arms imports in
2019–23 (see figure 5), followed by states in the Middle East (30 per cent),
Europe (21 per cent), the Americas (5.7 per cent) and Africa (4.3 per cent).
AfricaImports of major arms by African states fell by 52 per cent between 2014–18
and 2019–23, which was mainly due to decreases in the arms imports of thetwo largest importers in the region, Algeria (–77 per cent) and Morocco(–46 per cent). The main suppliers to Africa in 2019–23 were Russia, account­ing for 24 per cent of African imports of major arms, the USA (16 per cent),
China (13 per cent) and France (10 per cent).
Sub-Saharan Africa
States in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.2 per cent of all imports of majorarms in 2019–23. Their combined arms imports were 9.0 per cent lower thanin 2014–18. The three largest arms importers in the subregion in 2019–23
were Nigeria (with 16 per cent of sub-Saharan imports), Angola (9.2 per cent)and Senegal (9.2 per cent).

8

sipri fact sheet

Sub-Saharan Africa receives
major arms from a diverse set ofAmericas5.7%
Africasup­pliers vying to build up influ­
4.3%
ence in the subregion. With a 19 percent share of subregional arms
Middle East
EuropeAsia and Oceania
2019–23
imports, China narrowly over­took
30%
21%
37%
Russia, which had a 17 per centshare, to become the largest sup­plier of major arms to sub-SaharanAfrica in 2019–23. There were, how­ever, notable decreases in imports
EuropeAsia and Oceania
Middle East
Africa2014–18of arms from both China (–23 per
11%
41%
33%
8.8%
cent) and Russia (–44 per cent)between 2014–18 and 2019–23.
AmericasFrance was the third largest
5.9%
sup­
plier to sub-Saharan Africa
0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
in 2019–23 and had an 11 per centVolume of arms transfers
share of subregional arms imports.
(billions of trend-indicator values)
Türkiye was the fourth largest
Figure 5. The importers of major arms, by region, 2019–23 and 2014–18, per cent sup­plier, with a share of 6.3 perof global sharecent, mostly due to its deliveries
Note: The SIPRI trend-indicator value (TIV) is a measure of the volume of international of combat helicopters to Nigeria
transfers of major arms. The method used for the SIPRI TIV is described on the Arms and trainer/combat aircraft andTransfers Database web page.
uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
several states.
The Americas

Arms imports by states in the Americas decreased by 7.2 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23. The USA (accounting for 50 per cent of the regional
total), Brazil (15 per cent) and Canada (11 per cent) were the top threeimporters of major arms in the region in 2019–23. Canada’s arms imports
decreased by 44 per cent between the two periods, but it has large volumesof arms on order, including 102 combat aircraft from the USA and 15 frigatesfrom the UK.
Arms imports by states in South America decreased by 19 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23. Brazil’s arms imports were 26 per cent higher than in
2014–18 and accounted for 44 per cent of the subregional total in 2019–23.
The main suppliers to South America in 2019–23 were France, providing
23 per cent of subregional imports, the USA (14 per cent) and the UK (12 percent). Russia did not deliver any major arms to South America in 2019–23.
Asia and Oceania

Arms imports by states in Asia and Oceania decreased by 12 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23, mainly because of a sharp drop in Chinese arms
imports. However, it remained the region with the highest volume of arms
imports and 6 of the world’s 10 largest arms importers in 2019–23 were in
Asia and Oceania: India, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, South Korea and China.
The main suppliers to the region were the USA, with a 34 per cent share of
regional imports, Russia (19 per cent) and China (13 per cent).

trends in international arms tr ansfers, 2023

9

India and Pakistan
India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its arms imports.
India’s arms imports increased by 4.7 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23,
making it the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8 per centshare of all arms imports. Russia remained India’s main supplier, but its shareof Indian arms imports has shrunk from 76 per cent in 2009–13 to 58 percent in 2014–18 and then to 36 per cent in 2019–23. India has instead looked
to Western suppliers, most notably France and the USA, and its own arms
industry to meet its demand for major arms. This shift is also visible in India’s
new orders, many of which are placed with Western suppliers, and its arms
procurement plans, which seemingly do not include any Russian options.
Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 43 per cent between 2014–18 and2019–23 and accounted for 4.3 per cent of the world total, making it the fifthlargest arms importer globally. Pakistan continued to strengthen its arms
procurement relations with China: 82 per cent of its arms imports camefrom China in 2019–23, as against 69 per cent in 2014–18, and 51 per cent in2009–13.
East Asia, Oceania and South East Asia
Arms imports by states in East Asia (–6.1 per cent), Oceania (–10 per cent)and South East Asia (–43 per cent) decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23.
China’s arms imports fell by 44 per cent and accounted for 2.9 per centof the global total in 2019–23. The vast majority of Chinese arms imports(77 per cent) came from Russia. The drop in Chinese imports is due to China’s
growing ability to design and produce its own major arms. Its arms imports
will probably decrease further as it develops this capacity.
Japan and South Korea are expanding their military capabilities, mainly
because of tensions with China and North Korea. Japan (+155 per cent) andSouth Korea (+6.5 per cent) increased their arms imports between 2014–18
and 2019–23. The USA is the main supplier to both states, accounting for
97 per cent of Japan’s arms imports and 72 per cent of South Korea’s. The
two states are investing heavily in long-range strike capabilities. The USA
supplied 29 combat aircraft to Japan and 34 to South Korea in 2019–23. Japan
also ordered 400 long-range land-attack missiles from the USA in 2023 (seebox 2). These will, for the first time, give Japan the capability to reach targets
deep inside China or North Korea.
Taiwan’s arms imports dropped by 69 per cent between 2014–18 and2019–23 despite heightened tensions with China. However, major deliveries
are planned to take place over the next five years, including deliveries of
66 combat aircraft, 108 tanks and 460 anti-ship missiles. All these planneddeliveries are from the USA, which supplied over 99 per cent of Taiwanesearms imports in 2019–23.
Australia was the eighth largest arms importer in 2019–23 after its arms
imports dropped by 21 per cent. However, in 2023 it reached an agreementwith the UK and the USA to import at least six nuclear-powered submarines.
Arms imports by South East Asian states fell by 43 per cent between
2014–18 and 2019–23. However, tensions, mainly with China, continue todrive arms acquisitions by many states in the subregion. For example, arms
imports by the Philippines (+105 per cent) and by Singapore (+17 per cent)increased between the two periods. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia and10sipri fact sheet

Box 2. Transfers of long-range missiles
Long-range missiles, which here refer to those with a range of over 250 kilometres, are regularly used in combat and are widely
perceived as valuable components of long-range land-attack capabilities and conventional deterrence. At the same time, there areconcerns about the impact of missile proliferation on international stability. Despite these concerns, the numbers of recipientsand suppliers of such missiles have grown notably during the past decade, which is particularly visible in trends in deliveries ofland-attack missiles with a range of 250–999 km. Twelve states received such missiles from 7 supplier states in 2004–13, whereas
21 states and 1 non-state group received them from 12 supplier states in 2014–23. Data on the total numbers supplied is uncertain,
but SIPRI estimates that in each period around 2200 missiles were delivered.
In the category of land-attack missiles with a range of 1000 km or more, an increase in demand is visible when comparing thenumbers of orders between the two decades. The only order identified by SIPRI for such missiles in 2004–13 was placed by theUnited Kingdom, for 68 missiles from the United States. In 2014–23 eight states ordered or preselected such missiles, all from theUSA. The UK ordered another 20 missiles in 2014 and Poland ordered 60 in 2016. In 2023 Japan ordered 400 and planned to order
50 more, while Australia ordered over 300, Finland 200 and Germany 75. Canada and the Netherlands have also decided to acquire
them.

Singapore all placed substantial orders for combat aircraft and ships in
2019–23. Myanmar, which accounted for 10 per cent of all South East Asian
imports, used imported major arms in internal conflicts in 2019–23. Its arms
imports in the period mainly came from Russia (38 per cent), China (26 percent) and India (18 per cent).
EuropeArms imports by states in Europe were 94 per cent higher in 2019–23 thanin 2014–18. Ukraine received 23 per cent of the region’s arms imports in
2019–23. It was, by far, the largest arms importer in Europe and the fourthlargest in the world. The UK, which accounted for 11 per cent of European
arms imports, and the Netherlands (9.0 per cent) were the next biggest arms
importers in the region. A total of 55 per cent of European arms imports camefrom the USA in 2019–23, compared with 35 per cent in 2014–18. The next
largest suppliers to the region were Germany and France, which accounted
for 6.4 per cent and 4.6 per cent of European arms imports respectively.
Arms imports and the war in Ukraine
At least 30 states supplied major arms to Ukraine after the full-scale Russian
invasion in February 2022, mostly as military aid, meaning that Ukraine wasby some distance the world’s largest arms importer in the year 2023. The
USA supplied 39 per cent of Ukrainian arms imports in 2019–23, followed byGermany (14 per cent) and Poland (13 per cent). To broaden Ukraine’s mili­tary capabilities, suppliers began to deliver long-range systems in 2023. For
example, Poland and Slovakia donated 27 surplus combat aircraft, and France
and the UK supplied missiles with a range of 300 kilometres. During the year,
Belgium, Denmark, the Nether­lands and Norway also started to prepare thedelivery of over 50 surplus combat aircraft.
Russia relies primarily on its own industry for its major arms. However, in2022–23 it imported flying bombs from Iran and ballistic missiles from North
Korea, the latter in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on North
Korea.

trends in international arms tr ansfers, 2023

11West and Central European states
Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 increased the demand for armsin West and Central European states. For example, by the end of 2023 thesestates had a total of 791 combat aircraft and combat helicopters on orderfor import. After it launched the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia begana campaign of missile attacks against Ukraine. In response, many West andCentral European states supplied air defence systems to Ukraine and several
placed new import orders for them or accelerated existing procurement
processes. In 2023 Poland ordered 12 air defence systems from the USA, andGermany ordered a single but particularly high-value system from Israel. In
2022–23 Austria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia ordered air defence systems
from Germany, while Finland and Slovakia ordered Israeli systems, andLithuania and the Netherlands ordered Norwegian systems. In addition,some states ordered missiles for systems being produced domestically or toarm newly acquired imports or their existing systems. For example, in 2023
Poland and Norway ordered missiles from the UK and the USA, respectively,
for their new systems, while Germany ordered 500 missiles and Romania
200, all from the USA, for their existing systems.
The Middle East

Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 12 per cent lower in 2019–23
than in 2014–18. Three of the top 10 arms importers in 2019–23 were in the
Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The USA accounted for 52 percent of Middle Eastern arms imports. The next biggest suppliers were France(12 per cent), Italy (10 per cent) and Germany (7.1 per cent).
The Gulf region
Saudi Arabia was the world’s second largest arms importer in 2019–23, withan 8.4 per cent share of all arms imports. Its arms imports fell by 28 per centafter peaking at their highest point ever in 2014–18. The USA supplied 75 percent of Saudi Arabian arms imports in 2019–23, which included the deliveryof 67 combat aircraft and hundreds of land-attack missiles.
Qatar was the third largest arms importer in the world, with a global shareof 7.6 per cent, as its arms imports increased by 396 per cent between 2014–18
and 2019–23. Its main suppliers in 2019–23 were the USA, which accounted
for 45 per cent of Qatari arms imports, France (25 per cent) and Italy (15 percent). Qatar’s arms imports in the period included 36 combat aircraft from
France, 36 from the USA and 25 from the UK, as well as 4 frigates from Italy.
Iran’s arms imports have been at a very low level relative to those of otherarms importers in the Gulf region since around 1993. In 2023 Iran placed by
far its largest import order for major arms in 20 years, for 24 combat aircraftfrom Russia.
IsraelBetween 2014–18 and 2019–23, arms imports by Israel rose marginally(+5.1 per cent). The USA accounted for 69 per cent and Germany for 30 per
cent of Israeli arms imports. Imported weapons, in particular combat aircraft
received from the USA over several decades, have played a major role inIsrael’s military actions against Hamas and Hezbollah. At the end of 2023 theSIPRI is an independentinternational institutededicated to research into
conflict, armaments, arms
control and disarmament.
Established in 1966, SIPRI
provides data, analysis andrecommendations, based on
open sources, to policymakers,
researchers, media and theinterested public.

GOVERNING BOARD
Stefan Löfven, Chair (Sweden)
Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas(Ghana)Ambassador Chan Heng Chee(Singapore)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Dr Radha Kumar (India)
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/
United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews(United States)

USA rapidly delivered thousands of guided bombs and missiles to Israel, but
the total volume of Israeli arms imports from the USA in 2023 was almost
the same as in 2022. By the end of 2023, pending deliveries of major arms
to Israel included 61 combat aircraft from the USA and 4 submarines from
Germany.
Egypt
Egypt’s arms imports decreased by 26 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23,
having previously increased by 209 per cent between 2009–13 and 2014–18.
It moved from being the third largest importer globally in 2014–18 to seventhin 2019–23. Its main supplier in 2019–23 was Germany, accounting for 27 percent of Egyptian arms imports, followed by Italy (22 per cent), Russia (20 percent), France (17 per cent) and the USA (6.5 per cent). Against the back­dropof Egypt’s tensions with Ethiopia over water from the river Nile, its mili­tary
presence in Sudan and maritime disputes in the eastern Mediterranean,
Egypt has significantly strengthened its long-range military capabilities. In
2019–23 its imports included 3 frigates and 2 submarines from Germany;
2 frigates from Italy; 20 combat aircraft from Russia; and 3 frigates and longrange missiles from France. These added to imports in 2014–18 that included
23 combat aircraft and 2 frigates from France; 30 combat aircraft from Russia;
2 submarines from Germany; and 12 combat air­craft and 2 corvettes fromthe USA. By the end of 2023, Egypt’s pending deliveries included 30 combat
aircraft from France and 1 frigate from Germany.

DIRECTOR
Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

About SIPRI’s data on arms transfers
SIPRI’s statistical data on arms transfers relates to actual deliveries of major arms,
as defined by SIPRI. SIPRI measures the volume of international transfers of majorarms using a common unit—the trend-indicator value (TIV). The methodology for the
SIPRI TIV is described on the Arms Transfers Database web page.
As the volume of deliveries can fluctuate significantly year-on-year, SIPRI presents
data for five-year periods, giving a more stable measure of trends. Percentage sharespresented in this SIPRI Fact Sheet do not always add up to 100 per cent or to statedtotals because of the conventions of rounding.
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessible on the SIPRI website, is the only
public resource that provides consistent information, often estimates, on all inter­national transfers of major arms (including sales, gifts and production under licence)
to states, inter­national organizations and non-state groups since 1950. For a list of
states in each region see the ‘Regional coverage’ page of SIPRI’s website. The data­baseaims to contribute to an understanding of the effects of arms flows on peace, stability
and violent conflict. This fact sheet is intended to encourage the use of the database forfurther research, investigations, policymaking and public debate.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org

Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands/Sweden) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI
Arms Transfers Programme. Katarina Djokic (Serbia) is a Researcher, Dr Mathew
George (India) is the Director, Zain Hussain (United Kingdom) is a Researcher, andSiemon T. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a Senior Researcher with the programme.

© SIPRI 2024