Kaoru Iokibe

Historical Observations on the U.S.-Russia-China
Nuclear Cold War:In Search of a Domestic Foundation for Japan’s Security
Kaoru Iokibe
Abstract
Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine has led to a growing historical awareness that we may now
be in an interwar period like that between the two world wars, and that this period may be
coming to an end. At the same time, the presence of nuclear arms as the ultimate weapon
has reemerged. This paper is inspired by these repetitions of the past.
First of all, I confirm the present phase of international confrontation, taking George
Kennan as my guide.
Secondly, I survey the history of the “ultimate weapon.” Viewing the nation-state as thefirst ultimate weapon, I consider what sugggestions the efforts to prevent the outbursts of
its destructive power may provide in order to prevent the use of todayʼs ultimate weapon of
nuclear arms.
Thirdly, focusing on nuclear deterrence, I consider how the tripolar deterrence among
the U.S., China and Russia differs from the U.S.-Soviet bipolar deterrence that was the
keynote of the Cold War.
Fourthly, based on the above arguments, I discuss the domestic foundation needed forJapanʼs policy towards China.

1. 75th Anniversar y of George Kennan’s X Article
Guidance for Historical Obser vations

There have been numerous discussions on how the U.S., Japan, Europe, and other
Western countries should deal with the threat from Russia and China. I am a historianspecializing in Japanese political and diplomatic history, so I hope to contribute my twocentsʼ worth using past experience as guidance.
It is probably safe to say that the Western countries have entered a cold war with China andRussia. In light of Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine, they have imposed harsh economic sanctions on
Russia to support Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has even talked about the use of
nuclear weapons in his attempt to intimidate the Western countries. On the other hand, China isperceived as posing an even greater challenge to the international order than Russia.
While China and Russia have a cooperative relationship, they are not allies. This cooperative
relationship requires the West to pursue a balance with the combined military power of the twocountries. The absence of an alliance also compels the West to adopt a two-pronged conceptual
strategy on the assumption that these two countries will take independent actions.
Historical observations are precisely necessary for a complex and difficult situation like this.
Focusing solely on the current situation may result in short-sighted or inflexible responses.
This essay is a translation of an article published online on December 9th, 2022. It can be accessed at:https://www.jiia.or.jp/jic/20221209.html. The information in this essay is current as of December 2022.

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I will attempt to make historical observations based on the concepts of “ultimate weapon”
and “ultimate war.” From there, I would like to undertake a preliminary discourse on what is thedomestic foundation needed for the implementation of policy toward China.
However, first, I would like to refer to the experience of the previous Cold War for guidanceon the historical view to be adopted in order to arrive at policy conclusions.
The year 2022 happens to be the 75th anniversary of George Kennanʼs article published under
the pseudonym “X” which laid out the basic strategy for the Cold War. I would like to start mydiscussion using the 75th anniversary of the X Article as my vantage point.

The Life Histor y of George Kennan
Kennan was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in February 1904, the month the Russo-Japanese
War started. He stated in his memoirs that he hailed from a “family of settlers.” When he enteredPrinceton University, he recalls being very self-conscious, but he studied very hard. He joined theDepartment of State in 1925.
While he was an introvert academic type, he participated in the practice of diplomacy. These
two aspects meant that he achieved limited career advancement but was able to make uniqueintellectual contributions to U.S. diplomacy.
Kennan published his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs in 1947. (InGeorge Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition [Amerika Gaiko Goju-nen], Iwanami
Gendai Bunko, 2000) In consideration of his position as a State Department official, he used thepenname “X.” This X Article was highly acclaimed.
This was two years after the end of World War II. It was a time when optimism was waningand doubts were rising inside the U.S. government on whether it would be possible to work with
the Soviet Union, which had fought with the U.S. against the Axis powers, after the war.
Kennan studied Russia intensively. He became so knowledgeable of Russian literature that
he wanted to become an expert on Anton Chekhov. He knew about the Russian governmentʼshistory of suspicion, aggression, and expansionism against the outside world. The Soviet Unionʼsbelief in Marxism, which was antagonistic toward capitalism, aggravated such tendencies. Thisknowledge was also based on Kennanʼs own experience working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
The X Article argued that the U.S. should do away with its optimistic illusion about the USSRʼs
intent.
On the other hand, the USSRʼs overall national power was inferior to the Western camp,so war was not imminent. He advised “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of
Russian expansive tendencies.” The identity of X soon became known, and Kennan came to beremembered as the “father of the containment policy.”
It was important to rehabilitate West Europe and Japan to enable them to resist the infiltrationof Soviet communism (mostly the nonmilitary aspects). Kennan was deeply involved with theformulation of and messaging on the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe. He also
contributed to the shift in the occupation policy for Japan.
However, Kennan was in the mainstream of policymaking for only more than two years.
He was critical of the founding of NATO and West Germany, as well as the development of thehydrogen bomb. He believed that such confrontational military posture was neither patient nor
vigilant. Perhaps translating “containment” as advocated by Kennan as fujikome [confinement] inJapanese has a slightly stronger aggressive nuance than what he intended.
Kennan returned to Princeton University in 1950 to work as a scholar. While he did serve asambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia subsequently, he failed to establish good relations withthe host country governments and his home office, so his tenure was short-lived. He died in 2005.
Perhaps being a scholar is the secret to longevity.

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Difference with the Present (1) —Paradigm of Confrontation

Kennanʼs basic strategy under went many revisions even during the last Cold War, so it was
merely a basic doctrine. It goes without saying that this strategy cannot be applied unamended
today. First, I would like to examine the difference with the X Articleʼs assumptions to further our
understanding of the present.
First, the paradigm of confrontation is different.
The X Article was premised on a bipolar U.S.-Soviet confrontation. While the Cold War in Asia
became multipolar subsequently due to the intensifying China-Soviet confrontation, this was aprocess beneficial to the West. On the contrary, China and Russia today share a strong sense ofrivalry against the West, and they are in a cooperative relationship.

Difference with the Present (2) —Trust in the Enemy
Second, the level of trust in the challenger is different.
Kennanʼs assumption was that the USSR believed that time was on its side. According tocommunist doctrines, capitalism was bound to collapse. Regarding the Soviet Unionʼs perception,
the X Article stated: “The theor y of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has thefortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it.” It asserted that the USSR was in no rush,
so unless the West engaged in provocation out of impatience, the probability of a Soviet militaryattack was low.
In this connection, Kennan trusted the USSR of being capable of making rational decisions on
the power balance. Since the challenger was a country with inferior national power that reckoned
time was on its side, containment would be effective.
Do China and Russia today have time on their side?
No such confidence can be seen from Russia. Its main exports of oil and natural gas wereincreasingly being avoided amid the drive to decarbonize in response to climate change. Russia
appears to be attempting territorial expansion while there is still demand for these exports.
However, Europe is striving to reduce its dependence on Russian resources, so China and India
are buying them cheap. War and economic sanctions are accelerating Russiaʼs decline.
China is catching up with the U.S. in military and economic power, so it can be said that timeis on its side. However, what is the long-term outlook? Population decline is already taking its
toll in China. There is an estimate that even if its GDP overtakes the U.S. in 2033, there will be areversal in 2050, and China will never be able to catch up again. It will not be surprising if China isanxious to take whatever it can while it still has the momentum.
Therefore, rationality must not be overestimated. There will probably be different opinions
on China. However, as seen in its obsession with the zero Covid policy, the situation is such thatXi Jinpingʼs words are difficult to reverse, even by himself. It is highly possible that there will beeven less room for dissent inside the regime under the third term of the Xi regime which started
in October, rendering it more vulnerable. Needless to say, trust in Russiaʼs rationality is evenlower.
This might be the beginning of the end of authoritarianism. A regime that suppresses
disagreeable opinions will come to suppress even disagreeable information, resulting in its
making fatal mistakes eventually. While the advancement of sur veillance and information
manipulation technology may nip disagreeable opinions and information in the bud, this may
actually dig the regimeʼs own grave in the long run. That is to say, the global degeneration of
authoritarianism may be happening. However, this process is destabilizing the world for the time
being. The road to the end of the end will be long and tortuous, and there is no guarantee that
democracy will not end ahead of this end and that mankind will not be wiped out by a nuclear war.
Come to think of it, there was still time until victory or destruction in the situation understood byKennan 75 years ago.
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Difference with the Present (3) —Trust in Allies
Third, trust in the Western system is different.
How long would “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” take? When and how
would it bring about changes in Soviet conduct and its regime? This was the theme of anotherarticle published in 1951 dubbed the second X Article, “America and the Russian Future.” (InAmerican Diplomacy, Expanded Edition) Kennan asked for peopleʼs patience in this article. Since
the USSR was not a country that would change under outside pressure, people must wait for theRussian people to change their thinking. However, it would not do to simply wait. Kennan left
behind the inspiring words that this was a wait for “time to be gained for the working of more
hopeful forces.”
He was saying that if the U.S. made its democracy work properly, this information would
gradually penetrate the USSR and lead to changes. Kennan tended to take a pessimistic view of U.S.
diplomacy and the domestic political situation behind it. Will he be able to find a “more hopefulforces” in the polarized America today? The pride and hope he had in U.S. democracy 75 years
ago was so impressively strong.

The Effect of Area and Historical Studies
However, there is still something to learn from Kennan beyond the contexts cited above. This has
to do with Kennanʼs being an area studies scholar with a strong historianʼs leaning. Why is thisgood?
Nuclear deterrence used to be the centerpiece of the theories of Cold War strategy. In
particular, the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) theory claimed that there could be no nuclear
war because in an all-out nuclear war, attack by one side and retaliation by the other side would
result in fatal damages on both sides. This was based on the Game Theory premised on therationality of both sides.
However, with nuclear proliferation, there are more entities now that might resort to nuclear
attacks, rendering this assumption of rationality untenable. There might be countries which
would resort to intimidation or use of nuclear arms even at the expense of widespread casualties
among its own people. This is even more plausible in the case of non-state terrorists. For thisreason, the “tailored deterrence strategy” based on an intrinsic understanding of the challengerʼs
goals and values – what it hopes to gain and what it does not want to lose – is being advocated in
U.S. nuclear strategy since the beginning of the 21st Century. This will require an accumulationof a variety of area studies.
Furthermore, China has increased its nuclear arsenal. While its delivery systems are stillinferior to those of the U.S. and Russia, it has become the number three nuclear power. Greater
complexity brought to the Game Theory of nuclear deterrence by a tripolar paradigm, compared
to a bipolar structure, will be discussed below. Moreover, it appears to be difficult to have trust in
Chinaʼs and Russiaʼs rationality at a level comparable to that in the old Soviet Union. While the U.S.
is an ally, its mindset and interests may not be identical with those of Japan.
Universally costly bets – that losing may mean the annihilation of a countryʼs people – areplaced on the table of nuclear deterrence, so it would seem that analysis transcending thecharacter of individual actors is possible. Yet, the players at this table represent a diverse variety
of mentalities and cultures. There is no guarantee that they share the same view on the value ofthe bets let alone the rules. In areas other than nuclear deterrence, it is even more necessary to
make efforts to pursue security by constantly thinking in consideration of the actorsʼ character.

Kennan’s View of the Russians
It is particularly important to understand the Russian personality at present. I have engaged inacademic exchanges with Russians in the past. The discussions on the Russian side were very
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interesting. I came to know about their truly commendable genuine enthusiasm for democracy
and international cooperation. On the other hand, there was no lack of advocates of unabashedpower politics, and their uninhibited observations without concern for any taboos had the appealof the forbidden fruit. At the same time, they harbored a sense of rivalry against Western values
and opinions and displayed a rebelliousness at times, asserting that Russia was not bound by
them. A certain childishness arising from both admiration and inferiority complex could be felt.
Kennan was able to offer an explanation for such confusing impressions. For example, when
he was working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he submitted a memorandum entitled “Russia –Seven Years Later” to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman in September 1944. He later revealed in
his memoirs that he had been confident that this memorandum was even better than the X Article
and that he was hurt by the lack of response from his superior. (George F. Kennan Memoirs, I [Joji・
F・Kenan Kaikoroku Ⅰ], Chuokoron Shinsha, 2016)“To him [the Russian], contradiction is a familiar thing. It is the essence of Russia. West andEast, Pacific and Atlantic, arctic and tropics, extreme cold and extreme heat, prolonged slothand sudden feats of energy, exaggerated cruelty and exaggerated kindness, ostentatious
wealth and dismal squalor, violent xenophobia and uncontrollable yearning for contact withthe foreign world, vast power and the most abject slavery, simultaneous love and hate for thesame objects: these are only some of the contradictions which dominate the life of the Russian
people.” (pp. 477–478)“Lies” as Seen in Russia
Since the Russians lived in contradictions, there was no permanent truth. Truth was somethingthat changed according to the circumstances from time to time. The sublime pain of the “soul”
living with contradictions was the flip side of the coin of human opportunism. Kennan explained
the world ʼ s criticism of Russiaʼ s deception in the following terms at the risk of not being
understood by his readers.
“ What do we mean by this? We mean that right and wrong, reality and unreality, aredetermined in Russia not by any God, not by any innate nature of things, but simply by men
themselves. Here men determine what is true and what is false.
The reader should not smile. This is a serious fact. It is the gateway to the comprehension ofmuch that is mysterious in Russia.” (p. 479)

How Do Russians Resist?

We are watching with keen interest how the Russian people will respond to Putinʼs orders or
resist such orders. Since historically, the Russians had consistently received orders from despotic
governments, Kennan believed that the following prediction would be valid.
“The Russian people have dissembled for so many centuries that they have dignified thequality into a national virtue. In contrast to Western nations, they can dissemble graciously
and good-naturedly – without resentment, without bad manners, without impatience. In thisthey have challenged, and challenged successfully, the power of the Kremlin.
By this, I do not mean to say that they are politically dissatisfied. But when the influence of theregime comes too close to those mysterious recesses that we may call – at the risk of banality– the Russian “soul,” then the people quietly and politely disengage themselves behind an
impeccable series of superficial responses, leaving their masters not quite sure what they
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meant by the demure tone in which they murmured, ʻWhy, yes. Of course.ʼ”(pp. 443–444)

Half of the Expectation
I would not put all my bets on such an opinion. The more unequivocal observations on national
character are, the more they tend to be arbitrar y. I believe that in reality, there is a bigger
difference between individuals than between nations. Moreover, each individual with his own
character follows impersonal normal calculations of gains and losses in most situations in life. The
same is true for all countries, so it should be possible to find rational explanations for Chinaʼs andRussiaʼs maneuverings in most cases.
However, when it comes to crucial basic policies and decision-making, that is, in cases thatentail multiple serious conclusions and require thorough calculation of pros and cons, where theability to calculate falls short, the character of the decision-makers may become more dominant.
For example, Russiaʼs decision to withdraw from Kherson is reckoned to be a rational one.
Yet, its very decision to invade Ukraine was a mistake in terms of its realistic interests. Russia isalso making one decision after another and taking one action after another to continue its invasion
that will bring serious damages not only to Ukraine, but also to itself.
China ʼs specific maneuverings are even more rational than Russia ʼs. However, I do notbelieve that its current national policy of carrying out hardline diplomacy, expending enormous
resources for military expansion and to extend its international influence, and driving itself into
the role of challenger to the international order is in Chinaʼs interest.
There is a limit to putting trust in rationality. Therefore, we shall put half of our expectation on
Kennanʼs view of the world as an amalgamation of actors with diverse characters.

Militar y Preparedness but Not Militarization
To think in the opposite way from Kennan will mean ignoring individuality and applying a uniform
idea to various situations. It is probably appropriate to call such a way of thinking militarization.
All soldiers shoot when the commander gives the order. It will not be possible to shoot in unison
if each soldier thinks about whether the order was valid, who the targets are, what sort of life they
have lived, and who are their family members. Applying uniform ideas by ignoring individuality islike soldiers who are trained to shoot without thinking.
In his collection of philosophical writings published in 1993, Around the Cragged Hill: A
Personal and Political Philosophy [Nijisseiki wo Ikite̶Aru Kojin to Seiji no Tetugaku], (Chuko
Classics, 2015) Kennan stated:
There is, in military thinking, a certain absolutist quality that strongly resists anything thattends to obscure or to impair this purity of motive and action [to annihilate the enemyʼs forces– Iokibe].
Wariness of militarization was consistently behind Kennanʼs arguments. While military power
is necessary, militarization must not be tolerated. I think his excessive wariness of militarization
made him overly averse to militar y rivalr y against the Soviet Union. However, wariness of
militarization per se is valid.
Kennan was concerned that U.S. diplomacy after Hitler started the Russo-German War
was leaning excessively toward cooperation with the Soviet Union due to its focus on defeating
Germany and Japan. He advocated the reconstruction of Japan and Germany in order to stem
the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. This was accepted in U.S. diplomacy. However,
he went on to criticize U.S. preoccupation with military rivalry due to its confrontation with the
USSR, resulting in his fall from the mainstream of policymaking.
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There were also pitfalls in Kennan ʼ s arguments. Since the USSR had become a global
challenger, Kennanʼs understanding of Russia and the solutions drawn therefrom would appear
to be applicable to all areas in the world. Such solutions, however, did not exactly fit the specificcircumstances that var y by region, with insuf ficient militar y focus in cer tain regions andexcessive confrontation in others. There has been criticism that to the extent that the X Article
offered clearcut propositions, it was obviously an oversimplification, neglecting the uniquecontext of the East European countries. Even for someone knowledgeable of a national character,there is still a limit to the range of national characters that can be learned in depth, so there is aconstant risk of distorting and disregarding other characters based on such limited knowledge.
This is a common pitfall for area studies researchers.
The era when Kennan enjoyed influence was only a short period when the U.S. was movingfrom cooperation to confrontation with the USSR. But precisely for this reason, he had critical
viewpoints valid for both the era of cooperation and confrontation.
Kennan also came to criticize longer-term U.S. foreign policy. While he hoped that the U.S.
would become an ideal that inspired the world, he was against imposing the American ideal on theworld. The reason was this would either lead to ignoring the history and circumstances of othercountries and engaging in self-gratifying pontification or costly intervention in the worst case. On
the other hand, he criticized isolationism as well. While isolationism meant exercising restraint
regarding military intervention in other countries, Kennan might have sensed militarization in its
assumption that the outside world is a dangerous place contaminated by imperialism.
Kennanʼs American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition (Iwanami Gendai Bunko, 2000) discussed
U.S. diplomacyʼs unstable vacillation between isolationism and idealism. This work establishedhis reputation as a diplomatic historian.
Above all, Kennanʼs wariness of militarization shows the West how to fight. Military poweris important. When dealing with China or Russia, security cannot be attained merely throughdialogue. Dialogue cannot begin without possessing self-defense capability and making the otherside understand that it will face devastating retaliation if it attacks. However, to be dragged into
militarization by military necessity will mean becoming of the same ilk as China and Russia. The
West will lose its moral superiority and lose sight of the meaning of “hope” in the process of time
being “gained for the working of more hopeful forces.” This will not only be regrettable but will
also mean losing the Westʼs advantage.
The Allied forcesʼ air raids on Hamburg toward the end of World War II resulted in 70,000
deaths. When Kennan visited the ravages left behind, he wrote in his diar y: “ for moral
principles were a part of its [the Western worldʼs] strength. Shorn of this strength, it was nolonger itself; its victories were not real victories.” (Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal andPolitical Philosophy, p. 271)
Perception of the present may change if history is understood in light of a certain concept.
One may realize that the direction being taken at present tends to have been repeated in the past
– albeit in a different context and form – with unsatisfactory results. One may even find someform of indirect guidance on what needs to be done. Reading Kennan, one gets a feeling that this
could be possible.

2. Historical View Predicated on the Ultimate Weapon
Peace through the Ultimate Weapon
Until tension heightened with China and Russia, most people had thought that they could live in a
postwar period indefinitely. Yet, today, there is a sense that this could be an interwar period and astrong premonition that we are about to enter yet another period of war.
If we are in an interwar period, this has indeed been a long interwar period because with
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the advent of nuclear arms as the ultimate weapon, the superpowers have exercised restraint inorder not to trigger a war. Ironically, the ultimate weapon made this prolonged peace possible.
At present, Russiaʼs behavior has made the prospect of unleashing the ultimate weapon a realpossibility. While the probability of Russia actually using nuclear weapons is low in the present
situation, one cannot help but be conscious of this threat, and it is now feared that the interwar
period may be coming to an end.
If mankind never learns and war occurs repeatedly, history can be understood as a repetitionof interwar periods. The benefit or unleashing of the ultimate weapon will probably determine thecontinuation or end of the interwar period.

The Long Interwar Period after the Napoleonic Wars
The ultimate weapon before nuclear arms was the nation-state. Napoleon, who inherited the fruitsof the French Revolution, conquered almost the whole of Europe at one time. With the people
regarding their own fate as being tied to the state and accepting conscription, the state came to
be able to mobilize enormous human resources. Napoleonʼs talent in concentrated deployment of
massive forces was integrated with the nation-state.
Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and other great European powers had no choice but to accept
the concept and structure of the nation-state, albeit at different times. However, they strived to
avoid the full mobilization of the destructive power of the nation-state. These countries would
suffer intolerable damages if they fought a full-fledged war against each other. They were also
imperial powers that ruled over multiple nationalities in their own countries or possessed colonies
overseas, so bringing up the ideal of national independence would be rather troublesome. From
1815, following Napoleonʼs downfall after losing the Battle of Waterloo, the great powers includingFrance had paid attention to the balance of power among themselves, resulting in a prolonged
interwar period.
Wars also occurred even during this period. The Crimean War fought in 1853–56 between
Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia (Italy) on one side andRussia on the other resulted in 640,000 deaths, so it may not be valid to regard this as part ofthe inter war period. However, this war converged into a limited battle over the naval fort ofSevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula because under Austrian pressure, Russia was restrained in
its incitement of Balkan nationalism. In the end, it can be said that the imperial powers fought for
their pride in a running battle that lasted a whole year. This, aggravated by an epidemic, resulted
in an appalling number of casualties.
The wars that ended in the unification of Italy in 1861 and the unification of Germany in
1870, as well as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05
demonstrated the difficulty of stopping the forces of the awakening nation-states.

How Interwar Periods Come to an End
How do inter war periods end? Challengers to the international order are either formidable
enemies or dangerous enemies.
A formidable enemy is a force that possesses the ultimate weapon as well as other capabilities,
such as Germany which succeeded in industrialization, expanded overseas, and was becoming animperial power.
A dangerous enemy is a force that possesses only the ultimate weapon. The Balkan statesthat gained independence from the Ottoman Empire were a case in point. They were midsized and small nation-states that were unlikely to become imperial powers and their only goal
was to become consummated nation-states. For this reason, they waged wars repeatedly overcompatriots living outside the countr y or foreign elements inside the countr y. This situation
was made worse by the lack of agreement on the definition of nation due to the entanglement of
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different races and religions. Furthermore, Russia, which claimed to be a champion of the Slavic
people, was encouraging the Balkan states to assert themselves internationally.
The strategy for maintaining an interwar period where the ultimate weapon is involved iscomplicated. The dangerous enemy is more dangerous because it tends to resort to the ultimate
weapon. On the other hand, serious long-term confrontation is necessary in dealing with theformidable enemy. However, the formidable enemy has something to lose and it has othercapacities to choose than the ultimate weapon. Generally speaking, it is desirable to cooperatewith the formidable enemy to restrain the dangerous enemy.
Two Balkan Wars occurred from 1912–1913. In the first Balkan War, Serbia, Bulgaria, andGreece seized the Balkan territories, the Crete Island, and other parts of Turkey (Ottoman
Empire). In the Second Balkan War, Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Turkey took land from
Bulgaria, which was thought to have grabbed too much in the First Balkan War. While thisweakened Turkey and boosted Russiaʼs prestige, in reality, Russia and the other major powers
were beginning to have trouble controlling the Balkan states.
Serbian nationalism, in particular, came to regard the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had asizable Serbian population, as its main target after it defeated Turkey. On June 28, 1914, a Serbiannationalist assassinated Austriaʼs Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, Bosnia.
This would have been a situation in which the great powers should cooperate to prevent the
rampage of the nation-states of the Balkan Peninsula. However, the assassination of its heir to thethrone won Austria strong international sympathy for a while, resulting in a major discrepancy inthe major powersʼ policies.
Austria thought this was a golden opportunity to subjugate Serbia. With the consent of its ally
Germany, it presented extremely tough demands. Since Serbia rejected some of the demands,
war was declared on July 28. By that time, sympathy for Austria was waning.
Russia and its ally France had wanted Serbia to make concessions in order to avert a crisis.
Serbia had accepted its responsibility for the assassination incident but was only resisting
demands that might infringe on its sovereignty, such as allowing Austrian officials to participate
in the investigation of the incident. Therefore, Russia could not abandon Serbia. It ended up
issuing a general mobilization order.
Austro-Hungary and Russia and their respective allies Germany and France also went to war.
After the German forces violated Belgiumʼs neutrality, Britain also joined the war. Thus, WorldWar I started and lasted until 1918. There were 9.5 million casualties among the military forcesalone, and over 7 million noncombatants lost their lives.

Short Interwar Period after World War I
The interwar period after World War I was very short because the power of the ultimate weapon
was diminished. Several empires collapsed after the great war, and there was a proliferation ofnation-states. This brought about more small independent nations such as the Balkan states, thebreaking up of existing nations, and independence movements in other countries. This was alsoa source of weakness and instability that led to the rise of a new empire, which mobilized thecitizens making full use of the structures of the nation-state and aspired to expand beyond theterritory of the nation-state.
In Russia, a revolution occurred during World War I, which led to the founding of the Soviet
Union. The USSR handed over part of its territor y to Germany then dropped out from thefighting. However, Germany was also defeated in the war and lost large tracts of its territory.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved. Multiple independent nations came about amid
the resulting power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. It can be said that the impetuous
adoption of the ideology of nation-state rendered it difficult to maintain the balance of power.
Furthermore, a double standard was also applied in the division of German people between
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different nations, such as Germany and Austria. This facilitated Nazi Germanyʼs expansionism
beyond its national border in the 1930s on the pretext of unification with compatriots in othercountries.
Britain and France had adopted an appeasement policy for a period but declared war after
Germany invaded Poland. Thus, World War II started in September 1939.
Similar events occurred in East Asia, albeit under different circumstances. After Japan
succeeded in establishing a nation-state at an early stage, the national independence movementon the other side of the ocean spurred the military invasion of the continent.
Even at the time of the First Sino-Japanese War, there had already been advocates of taking
advantage of ethnic conflict to occupy the whole of China. Mitogaku [a school of Japanese
historical and Shinto studies] stressed differences by nation. This had a significant influence on
Kokugaku [National Learning] aimed at differentiation from the Sino-civilization and antiforeign
exclusionism that sought to expel Western powers. Naito Chiso, a kangaku [premodern studyof China] scholar who adhered to this line of thinking, argued that while Toyotomi Hideyoshi
was a great hero, he failed in his advance into the continent because he attempted the expedition
with Japanese samurais alone. He claimed that since the Manchus founded the Qing Dynasty, it
would have been possible to recruit forces in China with the “trick” of inciting the Han peopleʼs“heroic struggle to restore the ancient regime.” (Naito, “Open Up a New Japan in the Orient,”
Shin-Nippon, No. 2, 1894) If the Han people would not be subservient to the Manchurians, it isdoubtful if they would be subservient to Japan. Did he mean that this could be done with some
sort of “trick”?
The Xinhai Revolution of China occurred in 1911, prior to the start of World War I. The Qing
Dynasty collapsed, and the Republic of China was founded. The problem now was how the Hanpeople would control the minority nationalities. From time to time, the Japanese army took theopportunity to machinate cooperation with the independence movements in Manchuria and Inner
Mongolia. In 1931, the Kwantung Army instigated the Mukden Incident. The last Qing emperor,
Puyi, was installed as the emperor of Manchukuo.
The Japan-China relationship deteriorated. Japan advocated Pan-Asianism and anticommunism
in its attempt to draw China closer to Japan. Although it had little hope for long-term success aslong as it upheld Manchukuo as a fait accompli, Japan wanted to stir up Chinese nationalism andchannel the animosity toward Britain, the U.S., and the Soviet Union.
The Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937. Japan failed to win a total victory in the allout war against the Han people. As one strategy to reverse the unfavorable situation, it attempted
to cut off the supply route from the south for the Chiang Kai-shek regime supported by the West.
At that time, vast areas in Southeast Asia were colonies of Britain, France, and the Netherland.
Japan advanced southward using the local independence movements.
While the expansion of Japanʼs military actions to Manchuria, the Kannai region [all Chinese
territory south of the Great Wall], and Southeast Asia appeared to be suicidal, it can also be said
that this was in pursuit of people who would conveniently engage in “heroic struggle to restore
the ancient regime” and ultimately serve Japanʼs purpose. However, Japan probably did not see
the same potential in Siberia. While the start of Germanyʼs attack on the Soviet Union in June
1941 presented an excellent opportunity for Japan to advance northward, it did not make thismove.
Japanʼs advance southward was also motivated by the desire to obtain natural resources inSoutheast Asia. From the American point of view, Japan was not only challenging the international
order in Asia but was also grabbing the resources Britain needed for its resistance to Germany,
thus endangering the European battlefront. After Japan occupied the southern part of French
Indochina (Vietnam) in July, the U.S. imposed a total oil embargo. The Japanese navy depended
on the U.S. for oil so it was apprehensive that the situation would become even more unfavorable
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Kaoru Iokibewith time. Japan then attacked Pearl Harbor in December, plunging into war against the U.S.

How to Prevent the End of This Interwar Period
Some 55 million lives were lost in World War II, making this the most destructive war in history.
Moreover, the majority of casualties were civilians. This was because on top of Germanyʼsholocaust, both sides resorted to extensive air raids. Subsequently, the U.S. dropped the nuclear
weapons it developed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The USSR also succeeded in developing
nuclear arms, which led to a confrontation between two camps in the Cold War, both possessing
large numbers of the ultimate weapon.
Ironically, this prevented another great war. Both camps understood that an all-out nuclear
war would be suicidal, so a sort of cooperative relationship to prevent such war was built.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, an international
order centered on the Western camp was established.
This international order is facing a serious challenge today. The formidable enemy this time is
China. It possesses not only nuclear arms, the ultimate weapon, but also enormous conventional
forces and economic power. The typical dangerous enemy is North Korea, which surges ahead
in its development of nuclear arms and missiles. And now Russia is about to join the list ofdangerous enemies. Its conventional forces are fighting a desperate war of attrition against
Ukraine, while the process of breaking away from dependence on Russian energy resources is
progressing in Europe. Nuclear weapons are now one of the few advantages Russia has left.
The advent of low-yield nuclear weapons led to assertations that they will prevent a worldwide
nuclear war. Yet, I feel uneasy. This is because considering the example of the last ultimate
weapon, nation-states, failure to make serious efforts to control small nation-states like the Balkan
states, which would not be capable of starting a world war on their own, led to the first step
toward a world war.
The lesson learned from World War I is that the proper way to respond to a crisis is tocooperate with the formidable enemy to restrain the dangerous enemy. There are numerous
issues, such as climate change and epidemic prevention, that may further aggravate the plightof the West and mankind unless China cooperates. I believe that China is willing to makecontributions on these issues.
This is because unlike Russia, Chinaʼs national character is the product of a long history as thecenter of the Sino-civilization. While Russia shows strong antipathy and independence born out of
the contradiction between admiration of Western civilization and an inferior complex, China wants
to be the leader of universal values. If there is no likelihood of success, it may indeed behave like
Russia but it will not miss an opportunity to epitomize such values.
However, todayʼs ultimate weapon, nuclear arms, is different from the past ultimate weapon,
nation-states. In the sense that nuclear arms can annihilate an entire people or even mankind,
it is not only the strongest, but literally the ultimate weapon. It may bring about an ultimate
war that will mean the end of mankind or truly extensive irreparable damages. Therefore, it is
not only necessary to prevent war based on a historical perspective premised on the ultimate
weapon, but also to have a common understanding between allies and enemies on the predictableconsequences of an ultimate war and join hands in preventing such a war. That is, a historicalview predicated on the ultimate weapon must be supplemented with a historical view predicatedon an ultimate war.

3. Historical View Predicated on an Ultimate War
Why Is a Historical View Predicated on an Ultimate War?
Ishihara Kanji, who plotted the Mukden Incident, was a well-known proponent of a historical
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view predicated on an ultimate war. He believed that an ultimate world war would be carried out
by attacking the enemy population with powerful weapons carried on long-range aircraft. The
ultimate weapon Ishihara imagined was very similar to the nuclear arms developed subsequently.
He reckoned that eternal peace would come under the victor in an ultimate war. The Mukden
Incident was one of his answers when thinking of what needed to be done for Japan to become
the victor.
In a sense, Ishihara Kanji did what needs to be done in the nuclear age to a certain extent.
The MAD theory that came later followed the logic of Ishiharaʼs historical view predicated onan ultimate war in that the necessary actions under this theory were premised on an ultimate
war, although the goal was not to win the ultimate war but to prevent one. For this purpose, what
needed to be done was for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to possess retaliatory capability
to inflict fatal damages on the enemy if attacked with nuclear arms. (Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara estimated in 1964 that at least 400 nuclear bombs must survive a first attack.) Since
there could be no victor in an ultimate war, such a war would be avoided.
The idea of preventing an ultimate war also needs to be developed in the tripolar nuclear cold
war between the U.S., Russia, and China.

Is the Nuclear Threat Real?
I might be criticized for overestimating the probability of a nuclear war. There are as yet no signs
that Putin will actually make nuclear attacks. While the current situation is said to be the mostserious nuclear crisis since the Cuban Crisis, experts have concluded in their explanations thatfor now, such a probability is low. The Westʼs deterrence is still effective at present. Although
Putin may indeed use nuclear arms in a situation that may lead to his downfall, such as Ukraineʼsretaking the Crimean Peninsula, at this point, the Ukrainian forces have yet to achieve this on thebattlefield. It is a common tendency to turn to such optimistic talk, but is this a valid analysis of
the present situation?
It is said that even if Putin uses nuclear arms, he will probably use low-yield nuclear devices in
Ukraine. In such a case, NATO will use force against Russia, not in Russia itself, but on Russianforces in Ukraine or its Black Sea Fleet will be attacked with conventional weapons. That is, there
is unlikely to be an immediate nuclear war between Russia and NATO.
In other words, it is generally believed that only amateurs talk nervously about the nuclear
threat. I am a historian specializing in the late 19th century, so I am indeed an amateur. Yet, I do
have my concerns as an amateur.
First, I have a feeling that the asymmetry of Russia fighting on the one hand and NATO not
fighting on the other may lead to different understanding on the escalation of the confrontation.
For the West, Russiaʼs use of nuclear arms deserves a harsh punishment, so punishing it withconventional weapons is actually being considerate so as not to escalate the situation.
However, from the Russian point of view, it may see this as being attacked by NATO eventhough it has only attacked Ukraine. If Russia begins to use nuclear arms in reaction to this,it seems that no plan is in place to prevent escalation by Putin, who will become even more
irrational.
Ukraine cannot be counted on to cooperate in preventing an escalation because it is the party
that is most frustrated by the asymmetry, since it is the one resisting Russiaʼs aggression without
NATOʼs participation. Although Ukraine will be the first one to suffer damages if Russia uses lowyield nuclear arms, NATOʼs entering the war will tip the power balance in its favor overnight.
The explosion on the Crimean Bridge and drone attacks on air bases inside Russian territory
have seriously provoked Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinkenʼs remark three days ago(Dec. 6) that, “We have neither encouraged nor enabled the Ukrainians to strike inside of Russia”
appears to indicate that Ukraine is seen as a risky ally.
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Too much talk about a nuclear war crisis will lead to insensibility to the tragedy happening
on the battlefield. Ukraine and East Europe are already facing serious damages and threat from
Russian conventional forces. If Japan and the U.S. talk only of their fear of the use of nuclear
arms, they may be accused of being insensitive and unreliable allies. However, there is something
to be done from an objective distance. West Europe, the U.S., and Japan that bred the originatorof the historical view predicated on an ultimate war (Ishihara Kanji) should be the ones to deepen
the thinking on ultimate war even as they support Ukraine.
Second, the optimistic talk has too many caveats, such as “for the time being ” When amissile landed on Poland on Nov. 15, many people must have broken into a cold sweat andquestioned themselves as to whether they had not been complacent on account of these caveats.
Even in the past Cold War, the threat of an immediate nuclear war had not been constantly
present. Yet people continued to refine the theory of nuclear deterrence. There was a continuous
reciprocation of the thinking that the worst scenario could be avoided by preparing for it during
peacetime. Although this was drear y and unpleasant business, it was the wisdom needed tosurvive the Cold War, and it served as a galaxy that shone dimly on postwar history. Are we fully
putting our forebearsʼ wisdom into practice in the present Cold War?

Tripolar Nuclear Deterrence
To be fair, practicing such wisdom now is admittedly more difficult than before.
Several studies have already been published on nuclear deterrence under a tripolar structureof the nuclear powers. It has been pointed out that theoretically, this will be much more difficult
than in a bipolar paradigm. (Discussed expertly in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The New Nuclear
Age,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022）People tend to become optimistic in two cases: when
there is a plan and when there is no plan. I am worried that the latter may be the case at present.
Will thinking in terms of the actual confrontation and not along the line of the Game Theory
open up new prospects? Unlikely. If an all-out nuclear war occurs between the U.S. and Russia andboth sides come to suffer serious damages, Chinaʼs hegemony will be established. Since China is
not an ally of Russia, it will probably stay clear of the nuclear war.
Although mankind may perish from radioactivity and drastic climate change anyway, until that
day China will put pressure on other countries to secure all possible resources for its people andWestern countries will have little power left to resist Chinaʼs self-centered behavior. China too will
be desperate, so the threat or use of nuclear arms cannot be ruled out from its possible options.
China calls nuclear deterrence “weishe,” which means not only to stop the other party but also has
the nuance of forcing it to do something. Even greater misery and absurdity may persist after anultimate war that will even make the expression “ultimate war” seem too naive and exasperating.
Under a bipolar U.S.-Soviet rivalry, theoretically, the U.S. president would at least be able topush the nuclear button to stop the evil empire from dominating the world. His ability to push thisnuclear button deterred the USSR from launching nuclear attacks. However, under the tripolar
U.S.-Russia-China structure, pushing the nuclear button will hand over hegemony to China, whichis the greatest threat. I doubt if the U.S. president will be able to make such a decision.
This is because the U.S. is defined by democracy, and it has a strong aversion to plunging its
people into miserable and humiliating conditions. It is also not only a democracy, but its economy
also consists of free competition. The combination of these two tends to give rise to disparity anddiscontent with such disparity. A strong resentment that the elite unjustly neglected the citizens
has given rise to the Trump faction in the Republican Party. Can America tolerate a scenario in
which the Democratic president and his close aides board Air Force One (U.S. Air Force aircraft
used by the president) to sur vive after pushing the nuclear button and take command overthe nuclear war and the catastrophic postwar era while the people die violent deaths or hide innuclear shelters surviving on canned food?
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The world American politicians live in consists of two self-contained societies of the two
major parties. The U.S. president will always have to live with his reputation in his own party
and criticism from the opposition party throughout his life and even after he dies. Trump is a
traveling salesman roaming this self-contained society who has decided to leave his sense of
shame at home. That is why he was able to come up with clever, strange, and bad moves beyond
the imagination of the members of this society. Discounting such an exception, presidents are
sensitive about their posterior reputation. He will have to be prepared to face harsh criticism tostart a U.S.-Russia nuclear war under a U.S.-Russia-China tripolar setup. The psychological hurdle
to making the decision to launch a nuclear attack on Russia will be much higher than in the caseof a bipolar world.
Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against the other party unless preparations are madeto use nuclear arms when the necessity arises. I believe the U.S. will launch a nuclear attack if
Russia crosses the red line. However, there is no guarantee that Putin realizes that. Authoritarianleaders, while paying attention to and counting on the confusion and absurdity brought about by
democracy, tend to underestimate the determination of democratic countries. Prewar Japan also
made this mistake. If Russia comes to have lower regard for U.S. nuclear deterrence, this may
make it easier for Russia to take provocative action.
It is difficult to stop Russia from escalating the confrontation. If this is to be attempted, thesurest solution is to make Ukraine cease hostilities. Yet, it will be difficult to tell Ukraine to stop
fighting as long as it still has the will to fight. The next best solution is to reduce aid to Ukraine,
thus delaying its advance as a result, in order to avoid a situation where Putin will be tempted touse nuclear arms.
However, as long as a Russia with its current national character exists, even if the present
Ukraine war ends or Putin steps down, it will only mean deflecting a crisis for the time being.
Even so, this may still be an option since it will save many lives and livelihoods. However, thiswill be at the expense of losing the Westʼs moral superiority and give the challenger possessing
nuclear arms false hopes. Will this not lead to an even greater crisis?
Factors that evoke thoughts about such a scenario can be found in the media reports we
receive. They make us worry that the anchors securing the international order, such as nuclear
deterrence and aid to Ukraine, are being removed one after the other.

Inertial Thinking
Inability to think of an effective solution for tripolar nuclear deterrence is terrible but falling into
inertial thinking out of intellectual weariness is even worse.
The optimistic thinking cited above is an example of inertial thinking.
There may be even more sophisticated forms of inertia. Some may think of reducing the
tripolar paradigm into a bipolar one and reverting to the good old MAD theory. This is possible if
the U.S. declares that when an all-out nuclear war breaks out with Russia, similar nuclear attacks
will be launched on China as well. Since Chinaʼs not being an ally of Russia and not participatingin the U.S.-Russia nuclear war is complicating matters, lumping China and Russia together will
result in a bipolar arrangement.
This will be a precipitate and outrageous policy that is not even worth discussing. Yet sadly,
the policy of making such a declaration will be effective to some extent. While China will be
furious, above all, it will desperately try to stop Putin from escalation. Although Xi Jinping has
already expressed opposition to the use of nuclear arms, China should be able to make further
contributions. It can offer options that the Western countries are unable to provide, including
awesome economic inducements, providing political asylum, and abduction and confinement.
There are precedents of abduction and confinement by China even for a dignitary of Putinʼsstatus.
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Anti-Japanese riots known as the Imo Incident erupted in Korea in 1882. The Qing Dynasty
resolved this by abducting the Daewongun (the kingʼs father) Yi Ha-eung, who was thought to be
the mastermind behind the unrest, and taking him to Tianjin. In 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang took
Chiang Kai-shek prisoner to make him cooperate with the Communist Party of China to form ananti-Japanese united front. China has not only succeeded in abduction and confinement but has
also achieved the goal of such action.
The historical view predicated on an ultimate war can be restructured within certain limits
even under the U.S.-Russia-China tripolar paradigm. That is, on the premise of an ultimate war
and if China is forced to assume that it will be embroiled in this ultimate war, Russia can be
deterred to the extent that China can restrain Russia.
I am opposed to the policy of making such a declaration [of nuclear attack on China if anuclear war breaks out with Russia]. Either this will become a laughingstock because it will not
be taken seriously, or moral superiority will be decisively lost.
Will the Pentagonʼs experts be able to come up with a reliable prescription if this matter is left
in their hands? The “2022 Nuclear Posture Review” released by the Defense Department in late
October is cause for some concern.
It not only confirmed the intent to possess the capability to fight a nuclear war with both China
and Russia. The policy advocated by President Joe Biden during his presidential campaign that
nuclear weapons shall be used for the “sole purpose” of nuclear deterrence has been rejected.
It also stated clearly that the principle of “no first use” will not be adopted. This means that it ispossible that the U.S. may be the first to use nuclear arms in conventional warfare.
The principle of “no preemptive use” has not been negated, which means that the U.S. will
not start a war with nuclear attacks. However, the “Nuclear Posture Review” appears to haveeliminated any principle that will forbid a nuclear attack on China if, for example, China wages
war against Taiwan while there is a rising crisis of nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia.
That is to say, nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia is not completely reliable.
While a policy of U.S.-Russia-China nuclear war is not one that can be adopted, this may be usefulas a subject of hypothetical debate. Yet, it appears that safety mechanisms in policy have somehow
been removed without such a debate.

Security as an Independent Academic Field
Will Japan be able to contribute to the discourse on nuclear deterrence?
Since the invasion of Ukraine, comments by security experts have gained greater acceptanceand they are in greater demand. This is a good thing. However, perhaps because these experts
have been given a cold reception so far, Japanese experts, while very capable, are few in number.
This small number of experts are working very hard, appearing on TV, giving speeches, andparticipating in international conferences.
I think despite the manpower shor tage and their limited access to the latest militar y
information compared to U.S. and European experts, they are striving to obtain information andconveying what they know to us.
Naturally, they tend to tell us only what the situation looks like for now. While that is indeed
the first requirement, since they are somewhat removed from live information in the first place,
why not investigate various views of history and include contribution to broadening the Westʼsframework of thinking in their agenda? If they are not good at doing this, it will also be interestingfor scholars in other fields to brainstorm and make suggestions.
This is because discussions with a broader range than government policy needs to be
conducted by private citizens. This is no longer only a desirable undertaking in a general sense.
The Western governments must not adopt the policy of declaring a nuclear attack on China in theevent of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war. However, private discussions should include the fact that this17
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policy, despite its brutality, is a very likely offshoot of the historical view predicated on an ultimatewar.
The government must work for the relaxation of tension while enhancing the countr y ʼsdefense capability. Private citizens should argue that the challenge to the international orderhas become riskier with the start of a tripolar nuclear cold war and urge China to cooperatein averting an ultimate war. With substantial discussions at the private level, the government
will be able to minimize its provocative language. The best cooperation can be achieved withthe government and private citizens each accepting their different roles. Hence, the need forindependent scholarship.
Experts who are only able to quickly detect what is actually happening will not be enough.
Scholarship is the creation of knowledge (not the creation of facts). To know what somebody elseknows is not scholarship. Scholarship requires knowledge of what is not known to others basedon what everyone knows.
For sure, since information accessible to all is limited in the field of security, linkage with thepractice of security is important. Certain Japanese experts appear to refrain from imagination that
goes beyond actual practice because they are faithful to their mission and not because they makelight of independent scholarship. The Japanese government is also not restricting the freedom ofscholarship in the field of security. Both parties are preoccupied and seriously short of manpower.
Still, I am strongly advocating the independence of scholarship because I know that the experts I
respect are also independent scholars and they will not be bothered by my support.
I have forgotten to mention that improving the performance of missiles and strengthening
missile defense have also been cited as a solution to the tripolar nuclear cold war. That is true but
it will take time and money. In contrast, the independence of scholarship is an urgent requirement
for security.

4. Rise of the Silent Majority
Policy toward China from the Two Historical Views
While the historical view predicated on the ultimate weapon emphasizes the need to cooperatewith China, the historical view predicated on an ultimate war claims that China should begiven a strong warning. In order for Japan to sur vive, it needs a delicate package of carrot
and stick policies toward China, as well as a strong domestic consensus in support of thesepolicies. Considering the complexity and difficulty of the situation, this consensus must support
extraordinary balance of mind, resourcefulness, and perseverance. To use an analogy from theDoha Soccer World Cup, this is like seizing the chance for victory in the match against Germany,remaining calm in the game with Costa Rica, and not losing hope in the game against Spain –although I failed in all three counts.
Japanʼs policy toward China so far has been torn between two outspoken minority groups –the pacifists and people with anti-Chinese sentiments – and has navigated a narrow path in order
not to offend either group as much as possible. While this might be reasonable domestically, it
does not make sense internationally. Executing a delicate policy package is difficult.

The Emperor and Achilles
How can these vocal minorities be made to reconsider? The Emperor played a role in the
prewar period. Exactly 130 years have passed since the clash between the oligarchy government
dominated by feudal domain cliques and the opposition parties came to a head at the fourth
Imperial Diet (late 1892-early 1893). When such emotional exchanges as Diet Member Yukio
Ozaki asking if the budget could not be cut even by a single cent and Finance Minister Kunitake
Watanabe retorting “no” reached an impasse, the Emperor issued an edict calling for harmony,
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thus settling the situation. In response to the opposition partiesʼ criticism of the cost of naval
expansion, the edict indicated that part of the spending would be paid by savings from theimperial household expenses and urged the government to carry out administrative reforms andreduction of expenditures, thus expressing hope for the House of Representativesʼ cooperation.
With this, the opposition parties engaged in consultations with the government, resulting in anagreement on the budget. Japan won in the naval battle in the Sino-Japanese War 18 months after
this.
There is no doubt that the edict was using the Emperor for political purposes. In the firstplace, the presence of active minorities was desirable. Laying the groundwork to suppress
them came with serious side effects. Militarization moved ahead in the 20th Century using theEmperor as symbol, resulting in tragic consequences for Japan and its neighbors.
Achilles is known as the strongest warrior in the Trojan War. Yet in Homerʼs “Iliad,” he did notjoin the battle until the final part of the story. All the other warriors, such as Mycenaean Greek
King Agamemnon and Hector, son of Trojan King Priam, fought desperately even knowing thatthe appearance of Achilles would turn the tide. Achilles also had his weakness, which came tobe termed Achilles tendon today. He was prophesied to die if he joined the battle. That is how it
should be in a world created by mortals.

Silent Majority
Today, the Emperor cannot and should not play a role similar to that in the prewar years. The
only force that can overwhelm the minorities is probably the silent majority.
However, the silent majority will remain silent barring an earthshaking event, so it will
be difficult for it to play a political role. During the turmoil over the revision of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty in 1960, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi stated: “I must listen to the silent voices.”
When mass demonstrations protesting Kishiʼs revision of the treaty surrounded the Diet, it
would appear that all the vocal people were opposed to the treaty. Kishi reportedly said: “Thedemonstrators are a minority. The baseball stadiums and movie theaters are all full and nothing
has changed in the streets of Ginza.” That was an objectionable remark, more so because he
had a point. Even though there is a silent majority, there is no denying that normally, they do not
express their political views, and they are all in baseball stadiums, movie theaters, or Ginza.
I also appreciate the good aspects of old Japanese politics. Although the House ofRepresentatives censured the oligarchy government at the fourth Imperial Diet, Japan presented
a united front during the Sino-Japanese War. Regardless of their position on the war, the people
cooperated in an emergency. The demonstrations subsided after the Security Treaty revision
was approved by the Diet, and the new Security Treaty became the foundation of Japanʼs security
and prosperity. On the other hand, Kishi, whose high-handed political methods stood out, wasforced to step down. From the long-term point of view, it would seem that a balance was achieved.
However, this was in an era when the source of threat was in London or Paris or Moscow. The
threat at present is more imminent. Not only the providence of popular sentiment, which has
been exerting an influence without our realizing it, but also meticulous discussions by thepolicy community and the leadersʼ decisions, as well as the consensus supporting them, will benecessary.
As if in response to this age of crisis, I have a feeling that the silent majority left the baseballstadiums and showed up in public spaces after the fatal shooting of former Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe on July 8. Although many people opposed the state funeral on Sept. 27, when the funeral was
actually held, more than 25,000 people queued up to offer flowers at the Kudanzaka Park.
As many as 330,000 demonstrators surrounded the Diet during the protests over the Security
Treaty, so it can be said that 25,000 people is a small number. Yet, this was amid the Covid
pandemic on a hot weekday, and the silent majority is supposed to be silent. Even just the tip
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Historical Observations on the U.S.-Russia-China Nuclear Cold War: In Search of a Domestic Foundation for Japan’s Securityof the iceberg of this group was already quite impressive. For sure, there were fer vent Abe
supporters who added to the number. However, it is conceivable that people who were criticalof Abe, who resented the procedures leading to the state funeral, and who were not keen about
the state funeral were included. Yet the queue of people who came to send off the former prime
minister who had worked very hard for national administration and who met an untimely death
extended as far as Yotsuya. Their silence overwhelmed the protests against the state funeral.
It is interesting that the rightists also do not appear to be celebrating without reserve. They
might have felt that the queue of the silent majority was not the same as their own procession.
They might have also resented the fact that the highlight of the memorial service for Abe wasthe condolence speeches by Yoshihide Suga and Yoshihiko Noda. While Suga had assisted Abe
as the chief cabinet secretary, he is more of a pragmatist who has not inherited Abeʼs ideology.
Noda was prime minister during the Democratic Party administration. He was asked to deliver a
condolence speech because he was the political adversary of Abe, who led the opposition Liberal
Democratic Party at that time.

The Kishida Administration’s Mission
As the rightists look on with displeasure, the Kishida administration is also in confusion fromthe attacks of the leftists. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is not necessarily good at managing
the administration. In the first place, it is regrettable that his aspiration and will in steering theadministration to do something remains unclear. Yet, he could be representing the lethargy of thesilent majority through a mysterious bond. There is unlikely to be another leader in the politicalworld today who will listen to the voice of the silent majority while maintaining a balance of mind
like Kishida. Such is the prime minister we have today.
There will be no lack of forces wanting to use the silent majority for political ends. However,the silent majority has disappeared after forming long queues to offer flowers on that day. They
indeed made an appearance but did not stay. They are following Homerʼs script.
Japan is beginning to walk a critical tightrope with the other Western countries where
falling off will be fatal, but it might have made a good start. For now, we would like the Kishidaadministration to bounce back.

Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not represent the views of theJapan Institute of International Affairs.

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