Monika Chansoria

Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint
Military Exercises
Monika Chansoria*
Abstract
This paper delves into evaluating defense diplomacy as a foreign policy tool by exclusively
discussing the nature and scope of the Japan-India bilateral joint military exercises (JMEs).
While defense diplomacy and defense cooperation are concepts rooted in cooperative
security, the latter took shape as an overarching concept comprising defense partnerships
and collaboration via JMEs. It further highlights how the JMEs collaboration between
Japan and India impacts three distinct sub-regions in Asia; namely, South Asia, Southeast
Asia, and East Asia; along with the Indian Ocean Region and the Persian Gulf. The paper
traces the evolving course and debates on Japanʼs defense diplomacy and security policy,
highlighting Japanʼs implementation of a new proactive diplomatic policy tool – namely,
the official security assistance (OSA) framework to grant financial aid to the militaries oflike-minded countries. With the evolution of their respective security policies transiting toa phase wherein centrality of the Indo-Pacific is the focus, the paper provides an in-depth
understanding of the Japan-India defense cooperation [JMEs] graph. The paper concludes
by arguing that the Japan-India bilateral JMEs graph across Asia has proved instrumental intheir expanding acceptance as key regional strategic actors, and how the JMEs constitute asa key confidence-building measure (CBM) to enhance a securitized regional order, which
directly reflects upon the Indo-Pacificʼs balance-of-power politics.

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the term cooperative security has primarily been used todescribe a peaceful approach to security through increased international cooperation.
Its vitality got further pronounced, a decade later, following the 9/11 terror attacks on
the US in September 2001, which redefined terrorism, along with the need to strengtheninternational cooperation to combat it in a comprehensive and sustained manner. Largely,
cooperative security became a corresponding principle for international security, more so, in
terms of being an understanding/commitment among a group of nations with commonality ofinterests and values to protect the security of individual members within their joint spheres ofinterest.1 Resultantly, the role of international defense cooperation in meeting foreign policy goals
and supplementing diplomatic initiatives gained critical consequence and momentum. Whiledefense diplomacy and defense cooperation are concepts rooted in cooperative security, the latter
took shape as an overarching concept comprising defense partnerships and collaboration via joint
military exercises (JMEs), both bilaterally and multilaterally.

*

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo,
and a Senior Contributing Author on Asiaʼs geopolitics for the JAPAN Forward Association, Inc., Tokyo.

1

For more details see, Monika Chansoria, “Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific: Synergizing
Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western
Pacific,” Japan Review, vol. 1, no. 2, Winter 2017.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

Militar y Diplomacy, Defense Cooperation, and JMEs:
Offshoots of the Contemporar y Cooperative Security Paradigm
The overarching need for cooperative security provided defense cooperation with a new roleand broadened scope. Based essentially on the realist understanding of state behavior, andtraditionally employed for realpolitik purposes by liberal democratic states, defense cooperation is
the sum of many defense-related actions, collectively aimed at furthering oneʼs national interests
through active cooperation with friendly nations. Defense cooperation and military diplomacy
are critical pillars of the cooperative security agenda, which, over time, have emerged as ideal
tools to advance vital macro level foreign policy objectives with strategically important countries
and regions. The post-9/11 world witnessed the scope of defense cooperation widening more
towards a security-motivated-cooperative approach, with JMEs constituting as its most visible
and predominant component in peacetime. As bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs)
assumed shape of becoming the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation,2JMEs constituted their core. DCA formation saw states cooperating to obtain joint gains.3 Facedwith an increasingly complex security environment, states began to use DCAs4 to improvecoordinated responses to common security threats, and align themselves with communities oflike-minded collaborators. JMEs serve multiple political dimensions, with reassuring allies andpartners serving as one of the most crucial political aims.
In the post-9/11 world, confidence-building measures (CBMs), defense cooperation, andmilitary [defense] diplomacy and engagement became not only possible, but highly desirable,
given that they reduced transaction costs and made interstate relations more predictable.
Participation in international level militar y exercises, bilaterally and multilaterally, became
the highest CBM undertaken by a nation, or a group of nations. Operationally, JMEs enable
militaries to understand each otherʼs drills and procedures, and facilitate familiarization withequipment capabilities, and emerging technologies. This is particularly useful in the event ofjoint operations, whether in war, or, in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The gamutof defense cooperation ranges from JMEs and military-to-military training, strategic dialogues,
peacekeeping, deterring war, promoting peace, humanitarian aid and assistance, disaster relief,
and anti-piracy.
Above all, the most significant facet of JMEs, perhaps remains “strategic signaling” – beit bilaterally, or multilaterally. Strategic signaling in turn bolsters regional deterrence – in thecontext of understanding a nationʼs security policy, and the surrounding power politics in its
region. As such, there are revisionist states that attempt to achieve their goals through coercion,
which relies on the “threat of future military force to influence an adversaryʼs decision-making.”5
Coercion, or any stage short of actual war, is, thus, the optimal use of military as an instrument offoreign policy.6 Recall what John F. Kennedy stated on defense and diplomacy, “ the two are notsubstitutes for one another either alone would fail.”
Ranging from signaling militar y capability and resolve, to reinforcing the credibility of2

Brandon J. Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security
Network,” International Organization, vol. 72, no. 4, Fall 2018, pp. 799–837.

3

For additional reading see, Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security
Affairs,” World Politics, vol. 37, no. 1, 1984, pp. 1–23.

4

Kinne, n. 2.

5

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 3.

6

Sushant K. Singh, “Militar y as an instrument of Indiaʼs foreign policy: An expanding footprint,” in
Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, structures, and doctrines (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2016), p.
164.

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Monika Chansoria

joint defense commitments, JMEs contribute towards deterrence7 driven by factors, such as
geographic proximity, and/or a belief that an adversary is violating the “rules of the game” –either of which contribute to the perception of being “under threat.”8 Moreover, the geographicallocation of the JMEs is often read as an indication of engagement and trust within partner nations,especially in reference to the current and underlying territorial and sovereignty issues acrossAsia. It has been observed that to employ JMEs as a geopolitical messaging tool that signals
commitment, and/or deterrence, the visibility of JMEs remains essential.
Being the operation extended arm of defense diplomacy, defense cooperation aims at
sharing operational and doctrinal expertise between the armed forces in training and capability
enhancement of oneʼs own militar y. It also allows for the examination and imbibing of “bestpractices,” creating ability to operate alongside and enhance maritime domain awareness, througha variety of information sharing mechanisms. Additionally, defense cooperation activities signal
political commitment to develop cooperative relations, promote military transparency, reduce
misperception, and promote perception of common interests. Consequently, institutionalized
defense cooperation becomes instrumental in helping to prevent conflict, and being an ideal toolin advancing vital common foreign policy objectives9 with strategically important countries. When
governments create DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and preferredinstitutional designs,10 thereby providing transparency to mutual foreign policy initiatives andcommonality in approaches.

The Evolving Course in Japan’s Defense Diplomacy and Security Policy
The series of security policy announcements in and around the Indo-Pacific between 2011 and2014, including the US “rebalance” towards the Asia-Pacific (2011); Japanʼs reorientation to the
Indo-Pacific (2012); and Indiaʼs upgrade of its 1992 “Look East” Policy to the “Act East” Policy(2014) resulted in promotion of bilateral JMEs with regional stakeholders. Moreover, Japanʼsannouncement of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy found near overlap with therevival of the Quadrilateral Initiative (Quad) ahead of the East Asia Summit in 2017. Coining of
the term Indo-Pacific brought the Indian context to the fore as it links the Indian Ocean with theWestern Pacific, across the Malacca Straits, to form a seamless economic and security continuum.
The subsequent period witnessed purposeful redefining of the “Asia-Pacific” as the “Indo-Pacific”– succinctly identifying the geographic space and geostrategic significance between the Indianand Pacific Oceans. “Indo-Pacific” gained traction in the political lexicon and strategic thinking notjust among the Quad members, but also the ASEAN states. Accordingly, the rising scope in JapanIndiaʼs bilateral JMEs discussed in the later sub-section of this paper, indicates strategic realism11that simultaneously has contributed to their national security interests, as well as broader regional
security goals. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, India has adopted a maritime strategy with7

Jordan Bernhardt and Lauren Sukin, “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean
Peninsula,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 10, 2020, p. 5.

8Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 93, no. 1,
pp. 93–107.

9

Monika Chansoria, “Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements: A Contextual Study of India& Japanʼs First 2+2 Foreign & Defense Ministerial Meet,” Policy Brief, Japan Institute of International
Af fairs, March 30, 2020, available at https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_
Chansoria_200330.pdf

10

Ibid.

11

Thomas Schellingʼs idea of realism, termed Strategic Realism mainly focuses on foreign policy decisionmaking; Schelling argued that when state leaders face diplomatic and military challenges, they must
think strategically in the interest of their state.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

an interesting amalgamation of hard and soft power stretching from the Indian Ocean to theSouth China Sea.12
The changing geopolitical situation in an overcrowded Indo-Pacific – the new economic andpolitical center of gravity of the world has paved way for rapid shifts in the regional balance ofpower.13 The world is multipolar economically, broadly unipolar in military terms, and muddled
politically – i.e., a world that is in between orders, and adrift.14 Moreover, Chinaʼs growing
belligerence stemming out of its economic and military rise is challenging the existing rulesbased order. Beijingʼs relentless unilateral actions in the East and South China Seas, and quest
for distant Indian Ocean footholds have drawn sharp attention to the regionʼs maritime security.15
The new National Security Strategy document along with two other key defense-related strategic
documents announced by Japan in 2022 reflects upon the evolution of Japanese security policy inthe past decades. The National Security Strategy document identifies that Japan is facing the “mostsevere and complex security environment” since the end of World War II – labeling China as theunprecedented “greatest strategic challenge” and further predicting that a similar development
could occur in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia.
The centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century augurs a naval century wherein geography
illuminates and sets priorities for geostrategic vitality in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and theSouth and East China Seas. Making the Indo-Pacific space a larger regional objective enhances
the centrality of the Indian Ocean.16 In this reference, the January 2015 Joint Strategic Vision
for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean identified bridging the Asia-Pacific with the Indian
Ocean Region. Of this, Japan, and India, increasingly, are key players and drivers of regional andglobal growth, from Africa to East Asia, covering the sub-regions, South, Southeast, and Central
Asia. Importantly, the Joint Strategic Vision clearly suggested a shift in Indiaʼs strategic thinking
towards adopting a more public position against revisionist maritime threats, given its focus topromote partnerships in the region17 -- as does the latterʼs expanding JME graph in this region
suggests.
Countries that recognize the role defense can play in forging international relations actively
use their militar y capabilities to cooperate with other nations to enhance their influence andbuild a desirable security environment. It was only after the end of the Cold War that Japanbegan international peace cooperation activities and started defense exchanges with countries
other than the United States, but it now regards strengthening security cooperation as a pillar of
its basic defense policy.18 Japanese security scholars have come to define defense diplomacy as“the use of assets of the national defense authorities and armed forces to cooperate with othercountries mainly in peacetime to create an environment conducive to the achievement of foreign
policy and security objectives.” Among the activities that fall into this category include not only
“security cooperation,” “defense exchange,” and “defense cooperation” but also the dispatch of
12James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first
Century, (New York: Routledge, 2009).

13

Shivshankar Menon, “Indiaʼs Foreign Affairs Strategy,” Brookings India Impact Series, May 2020, p. 10.

14

Ibid.

15

Ar un Prakash, “East meets east,” The Indian Express, October 27, 2018, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/east-meets-east-5420476/

16

S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers,2020), p. 161.

17

 S-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, Office of the Press
U
Secretary, The White House, January 25, 2015.

18

For more details see, Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy, Sasakawa Peace Foundationʼs Policy
Proposal, Tokyo, March 2022, p. vi.

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Monika Chansoria

troops and personnel for international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief.19 It has also been suggested to build a framework for cross-decking and officer
exchanges during JMEs, which have proliferated in recent years among the major countries.20 To
date, Japanʼs involvement in cross-decking has largely been limited to the landing of shipboard
helicopters on the naval vessels of other countries, although the United States, Europe, andAustralia regularly dispatch helicopters and related personnel for joint maneuvers to foreign
ships for extended periods at a time.21 Cross-decking is seen on a larger, more expanded scale,for example, during the Pacific Partnership, a multinational preparedness mission led by the US
Indo-Pacific Command.
Unlike conventional diplomacy, defense diplomacy employs hard, militar y power as a
diplomatic tool to communicate and advance its strategic interests. More specifically, defense
diplomacy enables cooperation with other countries in crisis management and areas of common
interest by fostering friendly relations built on mutual understanding and trust. With countries
that share strategic interests, from a Japanese point of view, defense diplomacy can enhance
operational capability and deterrence, as coordination is strengthened through militar ycooperation frameworks and improved interoperability of forces.22 It is further argued fromJapanʼs side that joint military activities in politically disputed regions, such as the South China
Sea can be a powerful form of strategic communication, sending a message to China and thelittoral countries alike. The armed forces in many emerging and developing countries are often
powerful enough to exert an influence on both external relations and domestic politics. Defense
diplomacy can thus provide a direct diplomatic channel for military-to-military relations, withcapacity building assistance and the transfer of equipment ser ving as important means ofdeepening relations.23
Japan acknowledges that India is increasing its influence with its population (the worldʼssecond largest), its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in thecenter of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely
important country for Japan,24 that is reflected in Tokyo and New Delhiʼs cooperation in maritime
security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting.
In September 2022, the Defense Ministers of the two countries held a meeting to improve
interoperability between the two and confirmed that they would continue to work together on
defense equipment and technology cooperation. They also participated in the 2nd Japan-India“2+2” in Tokyo, during which it was confirmed that Japan and India would cooperate towards
the common goal of realizing FOIP. Furthermore, the importance of cooperation with ASEAN,
continued support for ASEANʼs unity and centrality, and providing concrete cooperation for FOIP,
Indiaʼs Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
was underlined.25 In addition, there is shared recognition to realize concrete cooperation in theareas of defense equipment and technology cooperation, coordination to launch the Joint Service
Staff Talks to strengthen cooperation between the Japan Joint Staff and the Indian Integrated
Defense Staff.
In the field of security affairs, Japan has introduced a new proactive diplomatic policy tool –19

Ibid., p. v.

20

For details see, Michito Tsuruoka, “Promptly Build a Framework for Joint Exercises and Collective
Action,” cited in Sasakawa Peace Foundationʼs Policy Proposal, n. 18, p. 4.

21

Ibid.

22

Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy, n. 18, p. v.

23

Ibid., pp. v–vi.

24

Defense of Japan 2023, Annual Report, Japanʼs Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, p. 410.

25

Ibid., p. 411.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

namely, implementing its new official security assistance (OSA) framework to grant financial aid
to the militaries of like-minded countries. The OSA is aimed at raising the security capabilitiesof developing countries, and provides assistance in areas such as intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance activities, counterpiracy operations, and international peacekeeping. Defense andother equipment to be used by militaries, including satellite communication systems and radars,
as well as materials necessary to build military infrastructure such as ports, could be offered aswell.26 While the OSAʼs potential strategic benefits for diplomacy include enhanced engagementand deterrence, it is primarily likely to be focused on covering logistics such as infrastructurebuilding, and material support to like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region and helping
them improve their sur veillance capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In fiscal year 2023,
feasibility studies are likely to be conducted for plans to provide assistance to the Philippines,
Malaysia, Bangladesh and Fiji – four strategically key nations spread across the Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific in India’s Doctrinal Thinking and Statecraft
Post-independence in 1947, India, beginning essentially as a reluctant player, has emerged inbeing a significant stakeholder in the remodeled multipolar architecture of the 21st centur y.
India ʼ s geography is open on three sides, with a histor y of the Indus and Gangetic valley.
According to Indiaʼs ancient and traditional theor y “circle of states” or rajamandala theor y,adversarial states border the rulerʼs state by forming a circle around it. As a reactive strategy inresponse, another set of states surround this set of hostile states to form an outer concentric circle
ring. The second circle of states are described as the natural allies of the rulerʼs state against thehostile states placed between them.27 Flowing from the above construct, Indiaʼs foreign policy
thinking and strategy in the 21st century places critical significance to its geographical spaces,
envisaging its neighborhood in the form of three concentric circles. The first encompasses the“immediate neighborhood” in the form of southern Asia; the second circle includes the “extended
neighborhood” stretching across Asia and the Indian Ocean Littoral; and, the third and final circle
covers the entire global stage – with India being a key player in every successive circle, reflecting
the Arthashastraʼs realist vision of geopolitics and statecraft.28
In the intricate and multifaceted interplay between all these three circles, India has sought tobalance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests, whilst
register its presence as one of the prominent powers and player in regional and international
peace and security, in line with its core national security and strategic interests. Since its
independence, what remained constant was Indiaʼs adoption of an independent strategic course
while adjusting tactically to the realism of world politics. In managing its relations with major
26

For more details see, Hirohito Ogi, “How Japan can make the most of its latest diplomatic tool,” The
Japan Times, August 27, 2023, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2023/08/27/
japan/new-security-policy-tool/

27

The theory of the “circle of states” entails that every ruler within the international system will find astate at the centre of its own circle of states – and this ruler is described as vijigishu; For more details
on the subject see, Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “Chanakya: Indiaʼs Truly Radical Machiavelli,” The National
Interest, January 29, 2015; also see, C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 85, no. 4, 2006, p. 18.

28

In the context of historical influences and motivations, the foundational premise and conceptual
underpinning of Indian diplomacy can be traced back to the end of fourth century BC. Arthashastra
delineates theories of statecraft, diplomacy, strategy, and prerequisites of politics and power, and restson the fundamental notion of pragmatism and utility to justify state actions; for more details and further
reading on this see, Monika Chansoria, “From Reluctance to Readiness: Indiaʼs Foreign Policy andStrategy for the 21st Century,” in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, ed., Diplomatic Strategies of Nationsin the Global South: The Search for Leadership (City University of New York and Palgrave Macmillan,2016).

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Monika Chansoria

and rising powers, India has opted for calibrated balancing behavior over band-wagoning and,also demonstrated a penchant for pragmatic issue-based partnerships on a case-to-case basis.29
Even though India now stands ready to assume a greater international role, it is only beginning to
break out of the bounds of a regional power.30
Commensurate with its “Act East” Policy announcement, Indiaʼs JMEs framework establishedand sustained across Southeast and East Asia has aided in improving regional security andcapacity-building, and created key linkages at the regional and global levels. Additionally, defense
cooperation executed through JMEs has facilitated demonstration of Indiaʼs commitment toregional stability, and showcased its defense/defense-industrial capabilities.31 While its coreinterests may be in the Indian Ocean Region, but a presence beyond also ensures a peacefulperiphery, and therefore, Indiaʼs participation in JMEs with Japan and other Southeast Asian
nations contributes to broader stability goals in Asia. Besides, the geopolitical realities in theregion called for Japan and India to adjust the thinking and formulation of their respective
security strategies in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, especially as territorial
and maritime disputes return to center stage.32 Consequently, India began institutionalizedmechanisms for bilateral army and naval JMEs with Japan and various other Southeast nations
including Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
The evolutionary enhancement of JMEs conducted by India post 9/11 in its immediate andextended neighborhood manifests a calibrated shift in its foreign policy orientation. The 1991
“Look East” policy which aimed primarily at promoting Indiaʼs integration with East and Southeast
Asia, was transformed into an “Act East” policy in 2014.33 Even though it would not ideally want
to be drawn into the ongoing power rivalries in the region, given its central location in the Indian
Ocean, India can ill-afford to ignore issues in its own strategic backyard. The peninsular shapeprovides India a coastline of about 7,600 kms, 1200 islands, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
of over 2.4 million sq. kms. Further, its island territories in the east are 1,300 kms away from themainland, with closer physical proximity to Southeast Asia.34 In the said reference, the expanse ofIndiaʼs JMEs, most significantly, with Japan highlights the relative importance of regional security
architectures and dialogues in strengthening defense cooperation across its eastern, far eastern,
and south-eastern Asian neighbors.35
In the economic realm, the Indo-Pacific is one of the worldʼs most dynamic regions accounting
for more than 60 percent of the global GDP.36 Further, more than half of Indiaʼs GDP depends on
its dealings with the rest of the world. This expanded definition of interests perfectly is in sync
with Japanʼs security and foreign policy agenda evident in its vision of a Free and Open Indo29

P.R. Chari and Vyjayanti Raghavan, Sino-Indian and Sino-South Korean Relations: Compulsions,Comparisons and Contrasts. (New Delhi: Routledge, 2015).

30

Aseema Sinha and Jon P. Dorschner, “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?”
Polity, vol. 42, no. 1, 2010, p. 90.

31

For more details and further reading see, Monika Chansoria, “Joint Military Exercises and ConfidenceBuilding: Theoretical and Applied Features,” CLAWS Journal, Summer 2015, pp. 59–69; and see,Chansoria, “Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements ” Policy Brief, n. 9.

32

For related details and further reading see, Menon, n. 13, p. 12.

33

The “Look East” Policy was first formulated under then-PM, P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1991 and sought tostrengthen Indiaʼs relationships with Southeast Asia specifically, and East Asia more generally.

34

Government of India, MoD, Annual Report 2002-2003, New Delhi.

35Bernhardt et al., n. 7, p. 7.

36

As cited in “The What, How and Why of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,” The Wire, May 27,
2022, available at https://thewire.in/economy/the-what-how-and-why-of-the-indo-pacific-economicframework

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Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

Pacific, based on free sea lanes and navigation, open markets, international law, and common
rules. Indiaʼs maritime trade flowing east through these waters account for 55 percent of Indiaʼs
total trade.37 As far as Japan is concerned, the Indo-Pacific houses three of the world ʼs largest
economies, i.e., the US, China, and Japan, with 60 percent of global maritime trade occurring
through its waters.

Japan-India Bilateral JMEs38
JMEs aid in safeguarding not just the individual maritime security interests of the nation inquestion, but also that of its littoral region – thereby enhancing the entire regionʼs net security
via enhanced interoperability and confidence building. By managing, conserving, sustaining, andsecuring the regional maritime domain, JMEs ensure regional security and stability by means ofa non-treaty-based, cooperative, and collaborative approach.39 In the contemporary context, India
and Japanʼs bilateral JMEs have become an instrumental tool in shaping a favorable and positiveenvironment for enhancing regional net security and maritime domain awareness across the IndoPacific by means of identifying cooperative activities, including, joint patrols, port visits, personnel
and information exchanges, staff talks and interactions, exercises with foreign navies, maritime
assistance, operational interactions, and high-level maritime strategic interactions.40
India and Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008, and this bilateralrelationship has witnessed significant progress in the realm of defense cooperation and security
affairs. Apart from operationalization of the Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of
Supplies and Services between Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Indian Armed Forces,
New Delhi and Tokyo signed up for the inaugural fighter exercise between the Japan Air SelfDefense Force (JASDF) and the Indian Air Force. In the realm of institutionalized bilateral JMEs,
the Dharma Guardian is an annual bilateral JME conducted between the Indian and JapaneseArmy since 2018, sharing experiences of counter-terrorism operations. The Dharma Guardian
2019 was held at the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School situated in Vairengte (northeastern state of Mizoram, India). Dharma Guardian is a platoon-level JME focusing on training
for counter-terrorism operations in the jungle and urban scenarios, enhancing interoperability
and practicing tactical drills.
Furthermore, bilateral naval cooperation between India and Japan has increased in scopeand complexity over the recent years and taken shape in the form of Japan-India Maritime
Bilateral Exercise (JIMEX) which commenced in 2012. With a special focus on maritime security
cooperation, the fifth edition of JIMEX between the Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) was held in the Arabian Sea in 2021. In addition to the indigenously built Guided
Missile Stealth Destroyer Kochi and Guided Missile Frigate Teg, representing the Indian Navy,
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was represented by JMSDF ships Kaga, an Izumo-Class
Helicopter Carrier and Murasame, a Guided Missile Destroyer. In addition to these ships, P-8I
Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Dornier Maritime Patrol Aircraft, integral helicopters,and MiG 29K fighter aircraft also participated in this edition of the JIMEX. The primary aim of
37

Ministry of External Affairs (India) (hereafter MEA), Rajya Sabha, Parliamentary Question no. 808,
“Trade through South China Sea,” February 9, 2017, available at https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.
htm?dtl/28041/QUESTION+NO808+TRADE+THROUGH+SOUTH+CHINA+SEA

38

For details cited in this section, further see, Government of India, MoD, “Defence Cooperation with
Foreign Countries,” Annual Reports 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2016-17, 2018-19, 2019-20, 202021, New Delhi.

39

Vice Admiral MP Muralidharan, “Significance of Joint Maritime Exercises,” Indian Defence Review, vol.
37, no. 4, Oct-Dec 2022, available at https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/significance-of-jointmaritime-exercises/

40

Ibid.

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this JME was developing a common understanding of operational procedures and enhancing
interoperability through conduct of a multitude of advanced exercises, across the entire spectrumof maritime operations, and tactical exercises involving weapon firings, cross-deck helicopter
operations and complex surface, anti-submarine, and air warfare drills.
More recently, in February–March 2023, the Japanese Army（Ground Self-Defense Force）
conducted the first bilateral field training exercise Dharma Guardian in Japan with the Indian
Army to further strengthen cooperation. Earlier, in July 2022, the Chief of Staff（Maritime SelfDefense Force）held a video teleconference with Indiaʼs Chief of the Naval Staff to confirm thedirection of strengthening future cooperation between the MSDF and Indian Navy. In fact, in
2022, the MSDF conducted a total of four Japan-India bilateral exercises, including JIMEX 2022.
In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff（Air Self-Defense Force）held a meeting with Indiaʼs
Chief of Air Staff during his visit to Japan, in which they agreed to further activate Japan-India
defense cooperation and exchanges. The Japan-India bilateral air exercise Veer Guardian 23 aswell as the Japan-India bilateral transport aircraft training Shinyuu Maitri 23 each was conducted
for the first time in Japan, in January, and March 2023 respectively.41
Further, India and Japan attach growing importance to nations in and around the Persian Gulf,
which could directly be attributed to the geostrategic significance and linkage of the Persian Gulf
region to maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. Peninsular India is adjacent to one of themost vital sea-lanes stretching from the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits
through which much of the oil from the Gulf region transits. The stability of the international oil
market renders the Persian Gulf vital for international security. Moreover, the lack of any regional
security architecture, and missing regional balance of power, given deep-rooted frictions among
regional states, render the region dependent on external military presence.42 In this reference,
Japan and India have deployed their naval ships to ensure security of international oil and cargoshipping passing through the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.
India ʼ s bilateral JMEs graph with Japan has brought out the expanding presence andfrequency of New Delhiʼs naval engagement with Tokyo, thereby improving capacity-building,and regional security linkages. Together, they augment a much-needed regional balance of powerin the Indian Ocean – the pivot of the Indo-Pacific region. While its core interests may be in the
Indian Ocean Region, but a presence beyond ensures a peaceful periphery, and therefore, Indiaʼsparticipation in JMEs with Japan and other Southeast Asian nations has contributed to Asiaʼsbroader stability goals.

Conclusion and Implications for the Regional Order

India and Japanʼs bilateral JMEs graph across Asia has proved instrumental in their expanding
acceptance as key regional strategic actors, be it within South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia,and the Indian Ocean Region and the Persian Gulf. Enhanced defense cooperation via the JMEs
is provenly a key foundation for strengthening regional diplomacy based on the bilateral JMEs
initiatives undertaken. JMEs directly reflect regional balance-of-power politics. In this case, there
is a visible coherence in the collective like-minded approach for a Free and Open Indo-Pacificstrategy, especially around its maritime rim.
An overcrowded Indo-Pacific has become ner ve center of geopolitical, geoeconomic, andgeostrategic activity of the world – thereby making way for rapid shifts in the regional balance of41

Defense of Japan 2023, n. 24, p. 411.

42

Md. Muddassir Quamar, “India and the Persian Gulf: Bilateralism, Regional Security and the China
Factor,” Issue Brief, May 10, 2022, The Institute for Security and Development Policy (Sweden), p. 2.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

power.43 Tokyo and New Delhi are indispensable players in the Indo-Pacific at a time when theregion is confronting stark shifts in its geopolitical reality. Given such uncertainties, proactive
defense diplomacy initiatives and other peacetime efforts including an expanding web of JMEs
are essential to ensure a secure strategic future for Japan and India.
As India and Japan work towards striving to secure and consolidate their maritime peripheries,
and play a greater proactive role in Asiaʼs regional balancing, the JMEsʼ formulation and policy
implementation is only beginning to be utilized and leveraged as a vital instrument of defense
diplomacy, and a promising micro-foundation of securing regional security priorities and order.
Tokyo and New Delhiʼs JMEs have contributed substantially in enhancing the net security of the
Indo-Pacific region, by means of leveraging cooperation via cooperative and collaborative bilateraland multilateral JMEs to augment interoperability and confidence-building, which, in turn, has
contributed in enhancing the Indo-Pacificʼs overall regional net security.

43

Menon, n. 13, p. 10; additionally, also see, James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,”International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3, 1995, pp. 379–414.

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