Step into My Parler
Suspected Russian Operation Targeted Far-Right American Users on Platforms
Including Gab and Parler, Resembled Recent IRA-Linked Operation that Targeted
Progressives
Graphika Team
Russian operators ran a far-right website and social media accounts that targeted Americanusers with pro-Trump and anti-Biden messaging, according to information from ​Reuters andGraphika’s investigation. This included the first known Russian activity on the platforms Gab andParler. The operation appeared connected to a ​recent Russian website that targeted progressives
in America with anti-Biden messaging.
The far-right “Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens,” naebc[.]com, pushed the
opposite end of the political spectrum from the ostensibly progressive ​PeaceData site, but thetwo assets showed such a strong family resemblance that they appear to be two halves of thesame operation. Both ran fake editorial personas whose profile pictures were generated byartificial intelligence; both claimed to be young news outlets based in Europe; both madelanguage errors consistent with Russian speakers; both tried to hire freelance writers to provide
their content; and, oddly enough, both had names that translate to obscenities in Russian.1
Reuters first tipped Graphika off to the existence of the NAEBC website and its likely relationshipto PeaceData. U.S. law enforcement originally alerted the social media platforms to the existenceof PeaceData. On September 1, Facebook ​attributed PeaceData to “individuals associated withpast activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA).” Twitter ​attributed it to Russian state
actors. Social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn) have taken similar action to stop
activity related to NAEBC on their platforms. To date, Parler and Gab have not taken action on
their platforms.
The NAEBC half of the operation was only created in June, and its ​most recent social media
account was just 11 days old at the time it was exposed. The website focused on race issues,
especially in the United States: despite claiming to be based in Europe, it posted five times morestories about the U.S. than about all European countries combined. On Gab and Parler - which​“PeaceData” s​ ounds like​ the Russian word “пиздато,” which means “f*cking awesome.” The acronym
NAEBC resembles the Russian “наёбка,” which means “a f*cking scam.” An IRA-linked operation that was
exposed in March this year, EBLA, matched the Russian word “Ебля,” or “f*cking.”
1were the main focus of its social media efforts - it posted strongly pro-Trump and anti-Biden
messaging and engaged with content from leading voices on the American far right.
Taken together, NAEBC and PeaceData echoed the IRA’s approach to targeting U.S. audiences in
2016-2017: they pushed users toward both ends of the political spectrum with divisive andhyper-partisan content. Both only posted a very small volume of content that directly referenced
the U.S. presidential election, but to the extent that they did so, the content also echoed the IRA’s
earlier efforts. PeaceData targeted progressive users with anti-Biden messaging; NAEBC targetedusers on the right with pro-Trump messaging. This echoes the U.S. Department of Justice’s
assessment of the 2016 IRA operation: “by early to mid-2016, Defendants’ operations included
supporting the presidential campaign of then-candidate Donald J. Trump (‘Trump Campaign’) anddisparaging Hillary Clinton.”
Unlike in 2016, however, neither effort built up a substantial audience. NAEBC’s various assets
attracted around 3,000 followers on ​Gab and 14,000 on ​Parler​, but in each case they were
following substantially more accounts than followed them in return: 11,000 on Gab, 22,000 on
Parler.2
For comparison, PeaceData’s main English-language Facebook page only had some 200
followers, and its Twitter account had around 3,000 followers. The PeaceData team shut down
their site after it was exposed on September 1, leaving a final sign-off headlined, ​“​Fucking
awesome​,” in apparent confirmation of the Russian-language pun.

Sign-off article by PeaceData, S​ eptember 7​, 2020. (The operators soon changed the headline to “Peacedata,”
but not before Graphika archived it.)

These two websites and the associated social media accounts continued Russian efforts totarget American audiences with divisive content. They also suggest a desire to “primarily
denigrate Vice President Biden,” echoing a recent U.S. ​intelligence assessment​.

2

Figures last updated September 30 at 17:00 ET.
2

Operationally, the greatest novelty of this “NAEBC” operation was the use of Gab and Parler, thefirst time Russian operators are known to have worked on these platforms. Both platforms are
popular among right-wing users: NAEBC’s decision to operate there suggests a desire to target a
specific audience. It may also indicate a more welcoming environment than the mainstream
platforms: NAEBC maintained an account on Twitter (already suspended), but as of ​August 26,
2020​, it only had 191 followers. Reuters said that Facebook had blocked an attempt to create one
NAEBC account. As of September 28, the NAEBC domain had been blocked on Facebook andTwitter; the latter labeled it as “potentially harmful.” As of October 1, NAEBC was still posting on
both Gab and Parler; the operation’s false personas had removed references to NAEBC from theirbiographies. Graphika will update this report if their situation changes.

Result of trying to post an NAEBC article on Twitter, September 28.

NAEBC posting on Parler (left) and Gab, September 28, 2020. The a​ rticle​ on the NAEBC website was copied,with attribution, from I​ ssues & Insights​. We have obscured the handles of the assets to avoid giving themundue prominence.

3

Newsroom for American and European Based
Citizens
Futhark You
The NAEBC website was registered on June 23, 2020, and posted its first articles on July 2. It
billed itself as “a news organization and a news aggregator site dedicated to bringing you
uncensored news and discussion on immigration, failures of modern liberalism, right-wing
politics, globalism and restrictions on freedom in America and Europe.”

Banner and dropdown menu options from the NAEBC website.

The operation employed symbolism that recalled national socialist (Nazi) and ultranationalist
themes. Its website was headed in heavy Gothic type ​similar to Fraktur​; its accounts on Gab andParler featured an eagle carrying a banner with the NAEBC logo and a collection of national flags,
with the U.S. and U.K. flags featured most prominently.

NAEBC’s profile on Gab; on the right, detail of the eagle.

One of its personas, called Leopold or Leo, used pagan symbolism in his profile pictures on Gab
and Parler, including the hammer of Thor and the ancient Germanic runic alphabet known as the
Elder Futhark - both of which receive ​heavy use from far-right extremists​. On Twitter, he used asymbol that is variously interpreted online as the ​Gates of Hell​, the symbol of a ​human praying​,
and a ​Viking triskelion​.

4

Profile pictures for the persona Leo on Parler (left) and Twitter (right). The left-hand image is the Hammer ofThor surrounded by the letters of the Elder Futhark; below, the same alphabet per ​Wikipedia​. The right-hand
image has been variously interpreted, including as a ​Viking symbo​l.

Location, Location, Mislocation
According to an American who wrote for the website, apparently without knowing it was an
influence operation, it was based in Hungary. Another individual who wrote for it, also apparently
unwittingly, said that it was based in Europe.

Post by an American who wrote for the website, giving its Hungarian location. Throughout this report,
Graphika has obscured details that could be used to identify the individuals who appear to have written forthe operation unwittingly.

5One of the personas claimed coyly that they were a “group of friends from certain [​sic​] European
country,” which may well have been literally true, assuming that the Russian troll team werefriends. It also claimed that they “prefer to keep anonymous because of the EU laws.”

Post on Parler by Leo, describing his “group of friends from certain European country.”

Alongside the website, the operation maintained five personas that claimed to be its editors andadministrative staff. At least three of them had accounts on LinkedIn that were taken down sometime before the end of September 2020, but enough traces remained in Google’s cache to confirm
that one of these, too, claimed a Hungarian location, and two more were ostensibly based in
Amsterdam.

Traces of the LinkedIn profiles for Nora (Hungary) and Alan and Niels (both Netherlands), from Google
Search.

Despite this claim of European origins, the vast majority of the articles that NAEBC published on
its website between July 2 and September 25 focused on race and politics in the United States.
6

One article each dealt with events in Canada (beheadings of Christian statues), Switzerland(Muslim radicalization), France (harassment by Muslims), and Turkey (bombing Christan villages).
Two articles each covered Germany (pedophilia; government support for Antifa) and Italy(violence by refugees). Three articles dealt with the UK (two cases of Muslim migrant violence,
one report on the BBC considering the imperialist overtones of the song “Rule Britannia”).
No articles focused on Hungary or the Netherlands; 53 covered the United States.

Articles on the NAEBC website, broken down according to the main country subject.

7

Content About Discontent
The website very largely posted content about discontent: it focused on racial tensions andviolence and always presented minorities and liberals in a negative light. Headlines about theUnited States included:
●

●
●
●
●

Left is celebrating unprovoked violence​: Macy’s Employee sucker-punched by Black man,Company denies claim he used racial slur [apparently written by the operation, and thesite’s very first headline]
White Lives and Black Crimes Don’t Matter​: Black Minor involved in MURDER of a WhiteGirl Receives 18 Month Sentence [apparently by the operation]
Seattle’s cop-free CHAZ has resulted in uncontrolled violence​, here are reasons why[apparently by the operation]
America’s Race Reality: Inhuman, Insane, Incoherent [​ commissioned from a freelancer]
Op-Ed: Leftists Want Our President Dismissed, Defeated, or Dead!​ [copied from a blog]

Asset Alan posting anti-BLM content to Gab, September 23, 2020; this content was created by a freelancer.

Some of these articles were copied from other websites, with attribution. Others were written byapparently unwitting authors that the operation contacted. Still others appear to have been
written by the operators themselves: they either carried the bylines of operation personas or were
published without bylines, and they did not appear to have been copied from elsewhere online.

8Asset Niels echoing an NAEBC post on Parler, claiming the left is planning a “coup d’etat” against President
Trump; the article was copied from an American b​ log​.

At the start of the operation, the NAEBC website exclusively published content that we attribute tothe operators themselves. These articles either had no byline or were bylined by operation
personas, but were not copied from elsewhere online. They were characterized by unidiomatic
English and specific language errors, notably confusion over the placing of “a” and “the,” that havepreviously been observed in IRA operations (Russian does not have linguistic articles that equate
to “the” and “a”). For example, early reports from the operation included the following passages:
●

●

●
●
●

We came into the time where unjustifiable violence is being celebrated on social media.
Unrest and discontentment are turning into pointless violence and property destruction.
First it was toppling any statue of a historical person with white skin, no matter what theydid. Now it’s celebrating the video of punching Macy’s employee. [The first paragraph of
NAEBC’s first article.]
American elites have succumbed to freedom-hating violent protesters and their enablers
from the Democratic Party. Will Donald Trump’s second term in the office finally help us
put them in restrains?
German Antifa stages regular violent attacks​ on the conservative politicians.
The way he talked about Black Lives Matter movement and antifa revealed the truly
destructive impact of media on the political landscape in the US.
Second is the way of the Confederate States of America​, with legal secession and ahorrific war of independence. Once more, sorted out huge scope opposition at such aninconvenient time appears to be impossible.

9Between July 31 and August 10, the website did not post any new articles (having posted 21 inJuly). When it resumed publishing, it had undergone a fundamental change: instead of articles by
operation assets, it interspersed articles that the operation had commissioned fromEnglish-speaking freelancers (discussed in more detail below) with articles that it had copied fromother websites. The external sources were usually right-wing sites but also ​included ​three ​copies
from Russian state outlet RT. Only twice after August 1 did the operation publish articles under
its own byline: one concerned allegations of crimes committed by a Muslim in ​Switzerland​, theother concerned accusations against Muslims in ​France​. It is likely that the operation planted
these posts to maintain at least the veneer of being a European outlet.

Graph showing the articles on naebc[.]com, broken down by source. In the early days, all the content camefrom the operators themselves. More recently, almost none did.

Alongside its web articles, the operation posted supporting commentary on its social media
channels. Even more than with the web articles, this content was typically focused on American
issues, especially race and politics.

10

Post by persona Leo on Parler, arguing that “Trump supporters are the ones who will bring change against theestablishment.” Note the claim of not being an American citizen.

Post by persona Nora on Parler, accusing the Democratic Party of using sexual misconduct for political gain,and engaging with the #metoo hashtag.

Posts on Parler by operation asset Alex, on BLM and Antifa.

11Parler posts on race, by assets run by the operation.

The operation paid particular attention to Kyle Rittenhouse, the teenager ​charged with shooting
dead two protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin. ​Two ​articles on the NAEBC website, bothcommissioned from freelancers, wrote about him in early September. One called Rittenhouse a“folk hero,” the other blamed the protesters and the local authorities for the shooting. The
operation’s social media assets amplified that argument.

12Top, Nora on Parler: “What are you gonna do when they come for you?” Bottom, NAEBC on Gab.

Little of the operation’s content mentioned the election explicitly. One post claimed that mail-in
ballots had been dumped and urged everyone to vote in person.

13

Post by Leo, September 26. The original image was posted to the Gateway Pundit, is appears that thewatermark was added by BlazeTV host @ElijahSchaffer

Other posts that commented on the election were outspokenly anti-Biden and anti-Harris, andpro-Trump; one post on Gab even referred to “our pro-Trump rally,” accusing “hateful leftists” of
attacking it. The video footage accompanying the latter post was copied from a ​YouTube video
posted by an authentic user the day before.

14

Gab posts by NAEBC (top) and persona Niels (bottom).

Overall, the tone was systematically pro-Trump and opposed to Biden, Harris, the Black Lives
Matter movement, and liberals more generally. Such positions are supported by many users on
Gab and Parler; as such, the operation’s efforts are likely to have served two purposes. One wasto build an audience on the platform by posting sentiments calculated to attract authentic users;
the other was to steer that audience toward positions or actions favored by the operation,
whether directly election-related or more generally divisive.

15

Parler attacks on Biden (“Dementd Joe”) by persona Leo. Screenshots taken on September 25.

Social Media Presence
Initially, NAEBC promoted its content on Twitter. Its main account, @naebc_official, was taken
down some time before Graphika began investigating, but a snapshot from August 26 remainedin the ​Google cache​. This account was created on July 14. A second account associated with thepersona Nora has been suspended without trace.
Graphika identified two more Twitter accounts associated with the operation. The first was
created on July 16, 2014 but only began posting on July 21, 2020: it only retweeted prominent
members of the American right. The gap between creation and activation and the lack of any
posting history suggests that this was a compromised account repurposed for this operation.
The second, @LeoW01753162, was created on July 15, 2020; it only posted one authored tweet(July 16) and one retweet (July 22) and attracted one follower by September 28. Its authored
tweet said that “we launched a new website, to continue the flow of uncensored news” after the
closure of anti-migrant blog Voice of Europe. Six days later, the persona Leo began posting on
Gab; one of its first two posts referenced Voice of Europe.
16Top, the only original tweet from @LeoW01753162, July 16, 2020. Bottom, Gab post from the persona Leo on
the day it started posting, also referencing Voice of Europe.

Between July 14 and July 27, the operation created or activated its first accounts on Gab and its
first account on Parler. This activity did not replace the Twitter accounts: it came simultaneously,
indicating that these platforms were not intended as replacements for Twitter, but additions.

17

Timeline of first activity of the assets in the NAEBC part of the operation, showing the major phases of asset
creation in mid-July and the week of August 24.

The operation went through another burst of account creation in the week of August 24. This time
it focused wholly on Gab and Parler, setting up four more Parler accounts, including an official
NAEBC one, and two more Gab accounts. A further Gab account came the following week, andanother Parler account two weeks later still.
This August activity came at around the same time that the FBI alerted the social media
platforms to the existence of PeaceData (and likely NAEBC at the same time), and LinkedIn andTwitter began taking down their assets. It may have indicated a desire to reinforce their presence
on more potentially welcoming platforms, as the major platforms began to crack down.
Despite that it was new to Parler, the operation attracted the largest following there. By
September 28, just over a month after it created its main presence on Parler, the operation totaled
14,000 followers, with around 4,000 accounts following the main NAEBC account and the otherpersonas attracting between 1,000 and 3,000 each. On Gab, the main account had 1,200
followers, and the other personas had between 150 and 800. In total, the operation had 3,000
followers on Gab.
On both platforms, however, every NAEBC asset was following more accounts than it had
followers itself. All together, the Parler assets followed 22,000 other accounts, and the Gab assets
followed 11,000. This suggests a degree of follow-for-follow activity, characteristic of someparticularly densely connected partisan communities (such as the “Trump core” and “Resist core”
networks on Twitter).

18

Follower numbers for each of the NAEBC assets on Gab and Parler (in blue) compared with the number ofaccounts they followed.

Fake Personas
At the heart of the operation lay five fake personas, each of which was active across multiple
platforms:
●
●
●
●
●

Alan, managing editor, ostensibly in Amsterdam
Niels, editor, ostensibly in Amsterdam
Nora, assistant editor, ostensibly in Gyor, Hungary
Alex, associate editor, no location named, but banner image of B
​ remen​, Germany
Leopold, no location given, but commented on Switzerland and later claimed to be “fromthe Alps”

Three of these personas had profile pictures of apparent human beings. Alex and Niels showedthese pictures on their social media assets. Nora did not, but her image remained on a ​Google
image search for her LinkedIn account. All three appear to have been generated by the type of
artificial intelligence known as Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), a technique that has
become increasingly popular among information operations since 2019. Indicators of GAN
imagery include distorted backgrounds, asymmetrical features, such as ears, eyeglasses, andearrings, and the identical alignment of eyeballs in each image. Neither Alan nor Leopold had aprofile picture that we have been able to discover.

19Top row, left to right: Alex, Niels, and Nora. Bottom, the three images superimposed and rendered opaque toshow the alignment of the eyes, an imperfect indicator but often a telling one. Inset, screenshot of the resultof a Google image search for Nora of NAEBC.

The personas did not have particularly well developed background stories. On Gab, Alex claimed
to be an “Writer | Activist | Political Commentator.” On Parler, Alan claimed to be a “Father of two.
Permanently banned on Twitter and Facebook” (this appears designed to appeal to Parler users
who really were banned). Nora said she was a “free speech activist.”
That said, they took some trouble over their appearance. The Gab account for Nora, who claimed
to be in Hungary, featured a photo of Budapest in the spring.

20

Left, Nora on Parler. Right, original ​photo​ by Daniel Olah.

The account for Alex included a photo of the ​city hall in Bremen​, Germany, and Leo, “the man fromthe Alps,” included a stock shot of the edelweiss.

Left, Twitter profile for Alex; right, Bremen town hall.

Left, Parler profile for Leo. Right, edelweiss.

These accounts formed a tight, self-reinforcing network on Parler. Each asset liked the otherassets’ posts numerous times, and they all liked, and were liked by, the operation’s central
account. They also liked prominent members of the American right, most probably in an attempt
to attract their target audience’s attention. There is no indication that these attempts succeeded.

21

Parler “likes” network showing accounts with posts liked by two or more of the NAEBC personas (NAEBC
personas in red). The thickness of the lines (edges) is proportionate to the number of likes.

Parler “likes” network showing all accounts with posts liked by NAEBC personas.

22

Baiting the Hook
The operation also took a more direct approach in its attempts to attract authentic Americanusers to write for it. Across platforms, the main NAEBC accounts and the various “editors” invitedusers to work for them. Some of these were generic, posted on the various assets’ timelines, andsometimes pinned to them.

Open invitations by NAEBC on ​Twitter​, Nora on her Parler profile (“Become a contributing at naebc[.]com!”),and Alex on Gab. We have obscured the actual email addresses.

23Increasingly, however, the assets reached out directly to bloggers and other social media users,
asking them to either share content with the website or write directly for it. The personas Alex,
Nora, and Leopold were the most active in this regard and appear to have been the primary
recruiters.

Conversation between Alex and a blogger on Gab; the blogger’s first comment was a reply to the Alex post
illustrated on the preceding page.

24

Conversation between Leo and a blogger on Parler (read bottom to top).

25

Post on Gab by Nora, replying to an authentic user. There was no reply to this post.

Post by Leo asking a vlogger to contribute “short stories” to accompany their videos so that NAEBC could
repost them.

At least some of this outreach appears to have borne fruit. As noted above, much of theoperation’s content from August onward was copied from other websites and blogs; in somecases, the re-posting followed engagement on Gab or Parler. We have also identified threeauthentic individuals who wrote for the NAEBC website: two were established right-wing bloggers

26with a strong focus on race, and the third was a novice who celebrated the publication of theirfirst-ever article on the website.
Emails seen by Reuters showed that the operation exercised close control over the author’s
pieces. They suggested the topic for the writer’s next article, emphasized the need to mention
Democratic policies, and indicated four main lines of argument - effectively providing the writerwith the structure of their article. Graphika verified the article that resulted: three of the four mainlines featured in it.

Post by an authentic user celebrating their first published article on naebc[.]com. We have obscured all
identifying information to protect this unwitting user.

27

Guilty Conscience
On September 28, Reuters contacted the operators via the NAEBC email addresses they had
provided. Within hours, the operation’s personas on social media began to remove every mentionof NAEBC from their personal bios.
On Parler, where it is possible to change a user’s handle, Leo and Alan dropped the letters“NAEBC” from their handles. Alan removed the claim to be the Managing Editor at naebc[.]com,
Leo removed the claim to be “working on” naebc[.]com, and Nora dropped her entire bio. Leo alsodeleted 8 of his 16 comments that had reached out directly to other users.

Parler profiles for Nora, Leo, and Alan before (left) and after (right) Reuters contacted the operation. Note thehandle change for Alan and the systematic removal of references to NAEBC.

On Gab, fewer of the operation’s assets had mentioned NAEBC in the first place, and it does notappear to have been possible to change their handles, but all those assets that had mentioned thewebsite or the “news” outlet removed the references to it from their bios. The Leo accountchanged its screen name twice in a few hours. Alex removed his surname.

28.

Gab profiles for Alex and Niels before (left) and after (right) Reuters contacted the operation.

As this report was preparing for publication, the NAEBC main accounts and website had notchanged or reacted to the upcoming news of their exposure.

29

Relationship with PeaceData
All the above features identify NAEBC as an operation using false personas to target a far-rightaudience in the U.S. According to Reuters, NAEBC and PeaceData are run by the same actor.
Facebook has attributed PeaceData to “individuals associated with past activity” by the Russian
IRA.
The open-source evidence cannot provide a definitive attribution, but it does show a strong family
likeness that supports the hypothesis that NAEBC is the latest in the IRA’s efforts to recruit
unwitting participants in operations targeting specific audiences in the U.S.3 First is the name of
the respective websites: as mentioned above, both “пиздато” and “наёбка” are Russian
obscenities. In similar vein, an earlier website attributed to the IRA, called ​EBLA (“Eliminating
Barriers to the Liberation of Africa”), approximated the Russian noun “ебля” (“f*cking”). Similarly
humorous comments on the practice of “trolling” can be found in the posts:“You won’t find any trolling there.” Post by Nora on Parler.

The conduct of the PeaceData and NAEBC operations was also extremely similar. Both createdfalse entities revolving around a website that was ostensibly based in Europe (Romania in thecase of PeaceData, Hungary in the case of NAEBC) and that had apparent editors in the
Netherlands. Both paid genuine freelance writers to provide their copy and appear to haveparticularly targeted writers who welcomed the chance to be published at all. Both ran personason LinkedIn, apparently to give their assets a more professional feel.

3

See Graphika’s reports on IRA operations​ D​ ouble Deceit​ ​and​ ​PeaceData​.
30

Personas from PeaceData (left) and NAEBC (right) on LinkedIn.

The excitement of publication: “my first paid article at PeaceData” on the left; “my first published article” on
NAEBC on the right.

Both operations - or both halves of the same operation - equipped their fake accounts with fakeprofile pictures generated by GAN. This is not, of course, unique to Russian operations, but it is afurther point of resemblance. It also bears noting that Graphika had already ​highlighted how manyof the PeaceData set had names that began with “Al”: Alice Schultz, Ali Ahmed Ghanem, Alex
Lacusta, and Albert Popescu. The NAEBC set added two more, Alan and Alex.

31

Profile pictures from PeaceData assets (top two rows) and NAEBC (bottom row). On the right, all nine
pictures superimposed to show the alignment of the eyes.

Both operations also focused heavily on events in the United States, despite claiming to be
European in origin. We have seen above the U.S.-centric coverage that NAEBC produced;
PeaceData’s content ranged more widely, but it, too, paid disproportionate attention to the U.S.

Countries mentioned by English-language articles on PeaceData.

32

Both provided a basic, if flimsy, cover story to explain why they were running fake personas. As
we have noted, Leo claimed that the operators were a “group of friends from certain European
country” who “prefer to keep anonymous because of EU laws.” When it was exposed, theostensibly progressive PeaceData ​claimed that it did so because its articles “shed the light ondirty deeds of many powerful and rich personalities who are willing to go to great lengths toneutralize us. Therefore, anonymity is only necessary.”
It added modestly, “Not all heroes wear masks, but some are required to do so.”Excuses for anonymity from PeaceData (top) and Leo (bottom).

Some behaviors were markedly different. The selection of content varied. PeaceData started out
by copying content from other websites (in December 2019 through March 2020) and thenprogressively shifted to publishing articles by real, unwitting authors (March through September).
NAEBC appears to have started out by writing its own content (in July) before shifting to the
publication of commissioned or copied works (August-September). This difference may indicate
different teams working on two projects or one team that started off with PeaceData and thenbegan writing for NAEBC once PeaceData had enough freelance writers to sustain its content.
More broadly, PeaceData primarily posted on Facebook and Twitter, and it targeted progressive
audiences, especially groups that identified themselves as Democratic Socialists or supporters of
Senator Bernie Sanders; it posted content that was anti-Turmp and criticized Vice President Joe
Biden and his running mate, Senator Kamala Harris, for being “too far to the right.” In keeping withthat posture, it tried to hire left-wing and progressive writers. According to the ​New York Times​,33

one PeaceData operator expressed a preference for Sanders in email correspondence with one of
the freelancers.
NAEBC, by contrast, primarily posted on Gab and Parler, with some activity on Twitter; it tried toengage with a right-wing and far-right audience and to hire right-wing and far-right bloggers. It
posted content that was pro-Trump and opposed to Biden and Harris, the Black Lives Mattermovement, and liberalism in general.
This targeting behavior is consistent with the instructions that were given to IRA employees (the“Specialists”) in 2016, according to the ​indictment unsealed by Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller
in February 2018: “use any opportunity to criticize Hillary and the rest (except Sanders andTrump—we support them).”
The operations were still relatively new when they were exposed, and still some weeks before theU.S. election; there is insufficient evidence to prove exactly what their intention was. Given theirresemblance to the original IRA, however, their purpose is likely to have been twofold: toexacerbate general tensions in the United States by posting inflammatory content to users on
opposite ends of the political spectrum, and more specifically, to depress support for Biden bytelling progressive voters that he was not progressive enough, while energizing Trump supporters
by telling them how dangerous a Biden presidency would be.

34