The Japan-China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism:
Operational and Strategic Considerations
Marta McLellan Ross

Introduction
On January 12, 2015, Japan and China reestablished discussions on a maritime communication
mechanism (MCM) to improve communication and crisis management and serve as a confidencebuilding mechanism. The last round of talks occurred in June 2012, but the discussions had beenstalled since September 2012 when the Government of Japan obtained ownership of three of the
Senkaku Islands. The negotiations in January were the fourth round, and officials expect to have one
more round to cement the agreement. i
Restarting negotiations on this mechanism has been a priority for Prime Minister Abe’s government,
evidenced by the attention PM Abe gave the issue at his November 2014 summit meeting with
Chinese President Xi Jinping. The 2014 Defense of Japan white paper noted that establishing a
Maritime Communication Mechanism was an “urgent matter,” in that it would help “avoid
unexpected collisions and prevent unforeseen consequences in waters and airspace from escalating
into military clashes or political problems, as well as increasing mutual understanding andrelationships of trust, and enhancing defense cooperation.” ii
However, since the negotiations began three years ago, the operational environment in the East China
Sea and around the Senkaku Islands has changed significantly. Maritime and air operations by
Chinese forces have increased, resulting in increased reliance upon the Japanese Coast Guard tomonitor the waters and near daily scrambles by Japanese aircraft to respond to aircraft approaching
Japanese air space. Increased activity has contributed to a number of incidents between Japanese andChinese actors, including an encounter in January 2013 in which a Chinese frigate directed firecontrol radar on a Japanese destroyer situated north of the Senkaku Islands. iii
Given that the risk of an unplanned incident or collision between Japan and China has increased, therestart of negotiations provides a timely opportunity to reassess the value of the MCM and its ability
to prevent collisions, reduce the risk of escalation, and serve as a confidence building mechanism.
This paper reviews existing maritime communication mechanisms between the United States andSoviet Union and the United States and China, and raises operational and strategic considerations forJapan in its negotiation of a similar mechanism with China. The paper argues that the MCM will
marginally improve an already tense operational environment. While it may provide an avenue for
dialogue, the MCM does not contain the tools needed to prevent the type of behavior that has resulted
in incidents and promoted mistrust. Moreover, the mechanism, as envisioned, does not create acommon political commitment to refrain from provocative behavior and does not address China’s
strategy to challenge Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, the MCM may
constrain Japan from responding to incursions because of the expectation that it will adhere to themechanism and refrain from escalation.
Maritime Communication Mechanisms
The MCM is purportedly modeled after the United States-China Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA), signed in 1998. The MMCA, in turn, grew out of the concept of the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold
War. During the Cold War, maritime competition between the United States and Soviet Unionflourished as both sought to establish a strategic presence in each other’s sphere of influence, gather
intelligence, and reinforce claims of sovereignty. Both powers became accustomed to encountering
each other on the high seas, resulting in confrontations, some collisions, and overall risky behavior.
The two countries entered into negotiations on a safety-at-sea agreement and concluded the agreementin 1972.
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INCSEA called on the two navies to cease aggressive behavior when in close proximity, andinstructed commanders to “observe strictly the letter and spirit of International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea.”iv It also required a set of flag signals for navy-to-navy communications,and established an annual meeting to review incidents. v The agreement relied on the self-control ofship commanders to refrain from behavior that could cause misunderstanding and miscalculation, andalso provided a channel for creating a common understanding. Both navies determined that it was intheir mutual interest to do so.
In 1998, China agreed to the MMCA with the United States, reflecting a new status of maritime
power—in essence, China’s coming of age. Unlike INCSEA, however, the MMCA only establishedchannel of communication to discuss maritime activities “for the purpose of promoting common
understandings regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and air forces when
operating in accordance with international law.” vi The two parties conduct annual dialogues, hold anexpert working group, and when necessary, convene meetings following a specific incident. vii
In practice, the MMCA has done little to prevent incidents at sea from occurring. viii The agreement
does not include a commitment by the two navies to refrain from risky behavior. Instead, it isprimarily a political tool to create a reliable opportunity for discussion between the U.S. and Chinese
militaries, and to put forward their respective viewpoints. However, the meetings are marginallyeffective. The U.S. side tends to speak in specifics—specific operations or tactics by the Chinese
forces that need clarification, but the Chinese side tends to speak about sovereignty—arguing that
Chinese forces acted because of U.S. operations in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).ix Unlike the
INCSEA meetings, when either side could admit fault, discuss specific tactical behavior, and move
forward with the relationship, the MMCA meetings appear more limited in utility.
This observation does not imply that the MMCA should not remain in effect, or that it has no value.
The MMCA serves a useful purpose in providing regular contact between the U.S. and Chinese
militaries, but the MMCA is significantly different from the INCSEA agreement in both design andfunction. If the purpose of a communications mechanism is to prevent collisions and increase thesafety of navigation by maritime and air vessels, then that mechanism should be designed to do justthat. Thus, basing the MCM between Japan and China on the MMCA raises questions as to whether
it can be an effective tool.
The Japan-China Maritime Communication Mechanism
At the last meeting in June 2012, the Japan-China Joint Working Group agreed in principle toestablish the MCM with three main components: 1) annual meetings; 2) a hotline between the twocountries; and 3) an agreement on common radio frequencies for use between military vessels andaircraft.x In January 2015, the two sides also agreed to change the name of the mechanism to a
“Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism,” reflecting the need to clearly indicate that air
activities as well as maritime behavior are covered by the mechanism. It does not apply to a collision
within territorial waters or airspace, an incident tantamount to an act of war. Both sides envision themechanism being used during situations in their respective EEZs, the open seas, and air defense
identification zones (ADIZs). xi
Looking at the structure of the mechanism, it appears similar to the U.S. arrangement with China.
The MMCA established annual meetings, and in 2014, the United States and China agreed to set-up asecure link for video conferencing in the case of a crisis—likened to a modern-day hotline. xii
The third component of the mechanism, an agreement to communicate in English via VHF radio
channel 16 or by international signal flags if in sight of the other vessel, is already the international
standard for at-sea behavior. This component codifies the use of common communication signals in abilateral mechanism, but in practice would be expected to have little effect on behavior at-sea. Japanand China are both signatories to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea(COLREGS) and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) agreement. According to these
agreements, their respective naval forces should already be operating at-sea using channel 16 tocommunicate with other vessels in English, or using international signal flags.
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Operational Considerations for the MCM
Establishing the MCM with China poses several operational questions, both in arranging the details of
the mechanism and in regulating at-sea or in-air behavior.
First, as noted above, the U.S. experience with the MMCA annual discussions has not been as
productive as officials would have hoped, given that both sides largely talked past each other. To
improve upon the U.S. experience, Japan could consider pressing for an agreement in the MCM to set
aside discussion on sovereignty-related matters during the annual meetings and focus only on specificincidents that occurred, and how to improve the safety of Japanese and Chinese vessels and aircraft.
Additionally, given that past incidents in the East China Sea involved non-military actors, the annual
meetings could benefit by having a whole-of-government approach with the full range of naval and airorganizations represented at the meetings. This could include maritime law enforcement, fishingministries, and possibly civil aviation in addition to the respective military forces from each country.
Second, given that technological advancements have rendered traditional hotlines nearly obsolete,
Japan may benefit from a more technologically savvy hotline mechanism with China, similar to thevideo teleconferencing link arranged between the United States and China. Given that the politicalstructure in China is significantly different from that of Japan, it will be important to find the rightinterlocutor in China who can speak with authority and who has access across governmental, party,
and military structures. A video link facilitating a face-to-face discussion in a time a crisis could
yield a more productive discussion.
As noted above, the third component of the mechanism, establishing a common language forcommunication at-sea and common radio frequency, is already the international standard—especiallysince China removed its opposition to CUES last year in April. xiii However, CUES does not apply to
air activities. Given the regular scrambles of military aircraft and frequent interaction in the airspace
above the East China Sea, more consideration may be needed to strengthen the incorporation of air
activities into the mechanism.
Japan could also increase the benefit of this component by encouraging China to agree to regularcommunications practice using CUES between their respective naval, maritime law enforcement, andair forces. As the two armed forces become more accustomed to communicating with each other onan operational level, this may help reduce tensions in the event of an unplanned encounter at-sea or in
the air.
Strategic Considerations for the MCM
From a strategic perspective, China may believe that Japan is more committed to following both theletter and spirit of the agreement. The perception is that Japan wants this agreement more than China
does. Over the years, Japan has repeatedly raised the mechanism in its bilateral engagement with
China, and pushed for the resumption of negotiations after 2012. Therefore, China could use thisagreement to constrain Japanese responses to Chinese actions around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese
forces, themselves, could be further emboldened to challenge Japan’s control waters around the
Senkaku Islands because of their confidence that Japan will rely on the mechanism to diffuse
escalation in the EEZ and that its primary objective is conflict avoidance. China would face little
repercussion for aggressive maneuvers, as long as they occurred outside of 12 nautical miles from thecoastline.
Signing the MCM may also diminish the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a Senkakus crisis scenario.
If a crisis occurred, the United States could cite Japan’s engagement with China through themechanism as a reason for deferring a response. This may also diminish the value of the U.S.
deterrent on Chinese actions. Japan’s relationship with the United States serves as a deterrent toconfrontation over the Senkaku Islands, especially as the United States has repeatedly stated that
Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the territories of the Senkaku Islands. However,
if Japan commits to prevent military escalation with this mechanism, then the U.S. deterrent is3

neutralized. In essence, China may perceive that escalation by Japan and U.S. involvement over anincident in the EEZ is taken off the table.
Although the two sides have agreed to set aside China’s territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands inorder to establish the mechanism, the mechanism itself may allow China to reinforce its claims byjustifying certain tactical operations. For example, during annual meetings or meetings during a crisis,
China may point to its claims or enforcement of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the
East China Sea as a justification for its actions This provides one more venue for China to argue its
political position and establish precedent for its behavior. Thus, if an incident occurs, it will be
important for Japan to get ahead of China’s interpretation of the incident and utilize public diplomacy
to broadcast its own understanding of what transpired and where the fault lies—before any meetings
between the two sides. In many respects, public attention to an incident and documentation of it could
have a greater effect on Chinese behavior than a military response.
In reality, however, a collision is unlikely to occur with air or naval operators from professional,
modern militaries unless one of the parties is engaged in behavior contrary to internationally accepted
Rules of the Road—either by negligence or intent. In most cases, the avoidance of a collision islargely a political problem. Either within this mechanism, or alongside it, Japan would benefit fromfinding a way to address China’s underlying political will to use force to resolve its claim. In thiscase, it is important to consider the quality and context of the commitment, as officials in Japan seemmuch more focused now on establishing the process. Without a political commitment to avoid
collisions and support crisis management, the process established by the MCM risks being derailed
every time political tensions between Japan and China flare up.
One possibility would be to include in the bilateral agreement a commitment to refrain from the use offorce or provocative behavior. The INCSEA agreement provides a useful reference for such acommitment. In particular, Article III (1) states, “In all cases ships operating in proximity to eachother, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain
well clear to avoid risk of collision;” and Article IV, states, “Commanders of aircraft of the Parties
shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party
operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, andin the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons
against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects
near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.” xiv
Given political realities, it is unlikely that China would agree to such language in the MCM, but
perhaps Japan could negotiate a political statement to be released in conjunction with the MCM
agreement that committed to preventing collisions. In the November 2014 statement, “Regarding
Discussions on Improving Japan-China Relations,” both parties “shared the view that, throughdialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation.”xv Japan could press
for a more explicit commitment by both parties agree to refrain from air and maritime tactics that
could result in a collision and crisis. Going one step further, Japan could negotiate a politicalcommitment from China to refrain from using force within overlapping areas of the Exclusive
Economic Zone claimed by each country.
A more likely scenario is that a collision would involve non-military vessels—law enforcement or
privately-owned—and perhaps operating outside of government direction but in an effort to assert anational agenda. With this scenario, if Japanese Coast Guard, Chinese maritime law enforcement
vessels, or other non-military actors are involved, the mechanism will not be triggered. A Japanese
defense official noted, in particular, that the hotline would not be used if a collision occurred between
non-military vessels and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be responsible for responding inthat case.xvi This is concerning because the Japanese Coast Guard bears primary responsibility for
responding to incursions in the territorial seas and are likely to be the first vessels engaged in an
incident. Limiting the mechanism to exclude the Coast Guard complicates the ability of the Japanese
government to respond in a timely way to a collision, especially if one party is military and the otheris not. Therefore, it is important to consider how the mechanism can be flexible enough to respond to4

incidents involving non-military parties, and what tools alongside the MCM can be established topromote communication between Japan and China’s law enforcement agencies.
Conclusion
The efforts of Japan and China to conclude a Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism arelaudable, particularly if it represents a shift in the Chinese attitude toward managing crisis in the East
China Sea. Operationally, the mechanism may have little impact on how the respective maritime andair forces maneuver in the East China Sea, but politically, this represents one avenue of cooperation
between Japan and China during lingering tensions, especially with the approaching 70th anniversaryof the end of World War II.
A number of changes in the past few years, however, raise concerns that China may be utilizing thesenegotiations to neutralize a Japanese response to an incident and bind the Japanese military to a lessthan proportional response. Thus, while establishing the process of the MCM is an important
diplomatic endeavor, it is just as important to think ahead about the operational and strategic
considerations laid forth in this paper so that the content and quality of the mechanism can bestrengthened in the years to come. In particular, creating an effective hotline and a mechanism that
can address non-military incidents in the East China Sea will be a significant factor. Moreover, theprocesses established by the mechanism can only promote confidence if they are accompanied by apolitical commitment from both sides to avoid the risk of collision.

Marta McLellan Ross was a Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) from
December 2014 to January 2015, studying territorial issues in Japan. In February, she began aCouncil on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship in Japan, sponsored by Hitachi Ltd.
and hosted by JIIA, and will be studying the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s defense policies.

iInterview, February 24, 2015.
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, p. 284.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_3-3-2_web_1031.pdf
iii“Chinese officials admit to MSDF radar-lock allegations,” The Japan Times, March 18, 2013.
iv
Agreement between the Government of United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, May 25, 1972.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm
vDavid F. Winkler, “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” Journal ofStrategic Studies, 28:2, April 2005, p. 369
vi
Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National
Defense of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military
Maritime Safety, January 19, 1998. http://fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-china98.htm
vii
Interview, January 21, 2016.
viii
David Griffiths, “U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building: Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects,” China
Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, No. 6, p. 2.
ix
Interview, January 21, 2016. James Przystup, John Bradford, and James Manicom, “Japan-China Maritime
Confidence Building and Communications Mechanisms,” PacNet, No. 67, August 20, 2013.
x
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, p. 284.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_3-3-2_web_1031.pdf
xi“Senkakus off Japan-China liaison plan,” The Japan News, June 15, 2015. http://the-japannews.com/news/article0002221507.
xii
Colin Clark, “US-China to Set Up Video Hotline, Talk of Joint Exercises,” Breaking Defense, May 15, 2014.
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/05/us-china-to-set-up-video-hotline-talk-of-joint-exercises/
xiii
Shannon Tiezzi, “Small but Positive Signs at Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” The Diplomat, April 24,
2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/small-but-positive-signs-at-western-pacific-naval-symposium/
ii

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xiv

Agreement between the Government of United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, May 25, 1972.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm
xv
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Regarding Discussions toward Improving China-Japan Relations,”
November 7, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.html
xviInterview, February 24, 2015.

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