Collin Koh Swee Lean

Beijing’s Reach in the South China Sea*
Collin Koh Swee Lean**

Abstract
This presentation posits that notwithstanding the phenomenal island-building andmilitarization efforts of Chinaʼs outposts in the Spratly Islands, their future is far fromabsolutely certain given Chinese military plannersʼ cognizance about their strategic andoperational utility. That aside, however, there is much greater certainty about Chinaʼsbuildup of long-range kinetic weapons and offshore-capable mobile platforms and perhaps
as significantly, noteworthy inroads made in Beijingʼs steady enhancement of its maritime
domain awareness in the South China Sea, especially in the underwater realm. This aspect,which has in recent times gained more attention, would significantly expand Chinaʼs
military reach into the South China Sea, helping cement its physical control and dominationof the area―especially when its Southeast Asian rivals contrast sharply with their shortfalls
in both kinetic projection as well as maritime domain awareness capabilities. In view ofthese developments, the role of allies and partners becomes even more important from bothmilitary and non-military perspectives.

Thank you. I think Greg has more or less covered so much, and I donʼt really see how
I could value add except probably touch on a few salient points and I think perhaps I
will first answer the question about what exactly is the South China Sea to China, andwhether we could shape Chinaʼs behavior in the South China Sea. I will go back to myoriginal argument, that instead of we trying to shape Chinese behavior, I think it is the other way
around. Beijing wants to shape our behavior instead, in the South China Sea.
But first of all is perhaps to acknowledge that the South China Sea is basically what theChinese will call “the blue territory.” It carries, strategic, economic, emotional, as well as historicalsignificance, and that gives rise to how China looks at the South China Sea on the whole. It is notjust about protecting your sovereignty and your rights but also to create what I will call a strategic
depth that can promote greater security for mainland China.
So it carries all these significance such that these are―cannot be viewed as interests to theother parties, but again, I would look at mostly the military aspects of the South China Sea―what
China has been doing over the past few years. We look at largely the projection of military assets
over the course of the past decade, and youʼll find that, on the whole, the number of ships, say forexample in the South Sea Fleet, and right now the Navy of the Southern Theater Command has
generally been hovering around the same numbers.
This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Chinaʼs Maritime
Ambitions in the First Island Chain and Beyond” held by JIIA and Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS) on November 18, 2019. For more information, please visit JIIA website at https://www.
jiia-jic.jp/en/events/2019/11/chinas-maritime-ambitions-in-the-first-island-chain-and-beyond.html.
** Collin Koh Swee Lean is research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is aconstituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity, Singapore.

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Beijing’s Reach in the South China Sea

But even that, it is important to look at the qualitative improvements that the Chinese Navyand Air Force has achieved over the past three years. Numbers may have remained static, but thetype of capabilities that have been infused into service has become increasingly more capable.
And we cannot forget also, in concurrence with the buildup of mobile assets, we are looking at
the buildup in missile arsenal that can allow force projection further afield, even beyond the South
China Sea.
And in the most recent years we have been seeing some ver y interesting developments
when it comes to the Peopleʼs Liberation Army (PLA) services trying to promote more jointness
amongst themselves. For example, the Rocket Force coordinating with the Support Force andcoordinating with the Navy in offshore training exercises, so that is of great significance.
And lastly the one other ver y important aspect would be the artificial islands that werebeing built so far. And suffice to say is minus a way to Scarborough Shoal, I think basically theconstruction has been done, and has been consolidated as well. And what we are seeing here in anext five to ten years will be the maintenance of these outposts and to beef up their capabilities.
Then I have some more nuanced argument towards that. There is news that talks about thedeployment of electronic warfare systems, such as HQ-9s, surface-to-air missile systems, antiship missiles. What is suffice to say is that those are essentially mobile systems. Very often weimagine that you put those systems on the islands and they stay there forever, but if you lookat the general Chinese military modernization, youʼll find that there has been greater emphasison essentially mobile and readily deployable systems. The fact that those artificial islands haveairstrips and harbors could allow the rapid deployment of these systems and in converse, rapid
withdrawal of these systems, allow the Chinese more flexibility in terms of areas like escalation
control as well as signaling.
So what is actually more important is not so much about the weapon systems which werebeing put in place, but more because of the existing infrastructure that allows China the freedomof options to pursue. And that of course raises a question of what we mean by militarization. If you
are talking about mobile systems that can be put into place and withdrawn anytime that you want,
how do you find ways to tackle that particular aspect?
Say, for example, I always want to argue in the current context of the negotiation over theCode of Conduct in the South China Sea. And of course for the Chinese, I wanted to just raisesome counterpoints to what most would see as the islands that could never go away down right―
unsinkable aircraft carriers.
I would be more uncertain to that. I think what is suffice to say is PLA officials privately andpublicly acknowledged that in a wartime situation these islands are practically close to useless.
They will be taken out almost immediately on onset of any conflict in the South China Sea. But
what we see here will be largely those islands being used for peacetime utility, for example, being
used for blockading actions, some limited forms of offensive operations, but more likely defensiveoperations.
And the bigger question that I think the Chinese are facing right now is how to viably
and sustainably operate those islands and ensure that they remain there. And currently, it isinteresting to note that the Chinese do actually have some questions as to whether those artificial
islands are geomorphologically stable in the longer term. Right now they are conducting studies,for example, looking at how coral and concrete can actually glue together properly so that they
will not be washed away, or they will not be corroded over time, by the natural elements of theweather and the climate.
China is also studying the whole big question of military assets operating in essentially saline
maritime environment. The one interesting thing is that the PLA acknowledges, and they are very
proud to say, that they have reached a stage where they could reduce and mitigate corrosion forairframes, but they have also acknowledged that in terms of preventing or mitigating corrosion
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Collin Koh Swee Leanon electronic systems, the situation is very separate.
We look at platforms not just in terms of the frame itself, but also electronics. For electronics,
the Chinese find themselves rather not so capable in terms of preventing and mitigating
corrosion, so they are trying to find ways and means to do that. In the next five to ten years there
is a high chance that the Chinese will find a way to get around with these challenges, but thenagain the bigger question will be how those islands or features will play a bigger role in the future
conflict or a limited conflict scenario in the South China Sea.
But what is certain to me is, if you put aside the question of whether those islands do exist in
the five to ten yearsʼ time, whether they get sunk by a natural disaster, or they just get corroded
naturally away, that the one area we have forgotten and we might not have been too focused on
is the area of what we call maritime domain awareness. That is part of a bigger picture of what
we call intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The Chinese have been
moving very resolutely into these directions, and the one area that I thought was interesting isthe very dual-use, sometimes very innocuous-sounding term called ocean observation network.
That ocean observation network has been acknowledged to be used not just to mitigate or
prevent natural disasters at sea, but more ostensibly used for military purposes. In that regard weare seeing here in the next five to ten years tremendous amount of effort by the Chinese in termsof improving especially the area of underwater observation.
The one area that has so far evaded much of the scrutiny is a collaborative R&D arrangementswith various key institutions that somehow indirectly fits into these programs. The Chinese could
actually benefit from a whole slew of these arrangements. These arrangements could allow themto have what I will call, not just domain awareness, but dominant awareness in the South China
Sea in the next five to ten years.
I am not so sure whether we can reach an equilibrium position. I think much of it depends
on a lot of things. Assuming that those islands will not get washed away by any geologicalphenomenon and the Chinese finally find a way to strengthen them and make them stay forever,I think much of it depends on a few factors. One is that I think in the next five to ten years we will
be envisaging the promulgation of a Code of Conduct, I mean because they were talking about
three years, right?
So letʼs assume that in the next five years―give them two years more―they have a Codeof Conduct. My very, not so sanguine thought is the moment they sign it, they will have theurgent handshake together, take the picture of it, and have the headlines being splashed withthe achievement; in less than one year time, youʼre going to see the Code of Conduct rendered
to be useless. And that, largely will be because the one big question we ask, and probably also
the Chinese are going to ask, once we sign the code of conduct is, “Would that be the end of
foreign military activities in the South China Sea?” And I donʼt think we are going to envisage that
happening actually because all of us agreed the South China Sea was an international medium,and the mere operation of military vessels in even the international waters within the South China
Sea could still be deemed as potentially provocative to China.
The point is that the Code of Conduct will never hold or will not hold at all. And that actually
may lead to a whole new round of potential escalation and crisis altogether. I am not trying toapportion any particular blame to anyone, but what I am tr ying to say is that the envisioned
structure of the Code of Conduct is not likely going to entail agreement that makes everybody
happy and yet makes everybody unhappy at the same time.
So that is one issue. The second is to have the equilibrium, we may need to ensure that
there is policy consistency on the part of Southeast Asian countries. If we are looking at certain
Southeast Asian Countries, like Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, you really have to look atelection cycle―the leaders that will be in power, and whether they change the policy in the firstplace. I think a lot of it is to have mercy to that aspect.
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Beijing’s Reach in the South China Sea

I think, perhaps, what is more important in this context is to empower the Southeast Asian
countries, and this is nothing new. I think what we are seeing here is basically a continued
enhancement of existing initiatives that help boost the Southeast Asiaʼs maritime awarenesscapability.
And I think perhaps close US allies and partners who have common interest in the SouthChina Sea, should at least to try coordinate or to synergize efforts in capacity building because
what we are seeing here right now is a hodgepodge of very different initiatives that are being
implemented. So, find the South China Sea and how we are going to harmonize all them together
to ensure there are no duplication and no overlaps in those capacity building. I thought that wasprobably the one area to at least try to minimize the adverse impact of, you know, responding tosuch a situation in the South China Sea.

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