Kenji Fujii

Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima–With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–*
Kenji Fujii**
Abstract
Prior studies have already made it amply clear that the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Treatyof San Francisco or San Francisco Peace Treaty) signed on September 8, 1951, officiallyconfirmed that Japan retains Takeshima. Nevertheless, as expressed in a public relations
booklet titled “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea” which was published by the Ministr yof Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, the ROK Government has a different view.
With respect to Treatyʼs Chapter II Territor y, Article 2(a), which provides that “Japan,
recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea,
including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,” South Korean government
insisted that “the mere fact that Dokdo [Korean name of Takeshima] is not explicitly
mentioned in the said article does not suggest that Dokdo is not included among thoseterritories of Korea that have been separated from Japan.” Furthermore, the South Korean
government continued to argue, “In consideration of the Allied Powersʼ stance, . . . it should
be understood that Dokdo is included among the territories of Korea separated from Japan.”It was during the working-level consultations between the United States and the United
Kingdom in April through May 1951 that the wording of this article was de facto finalized.
Therefore, in Part I of this paper, the author reviewed the working-level consultations inorder to verify the South Korean argument, the outcome of which follows below.
As a result of the authorʼs review, it was reconfirmed that, at the U.S.-U.K. workinglevel consultations, accepting British emphasis on the “desirability of disposing of islands
between Japan and Korea by specific mention,” the U.S. agreed to clearly specify theislands that belong to “Korea” which would be renounced by Japan. In return, the British
government withdrew its proposal to enclose Japan with a territorial demarcation line
and place Takeshima out of the line. Thus, Takeshima is not included in the term “Korea(including Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet)” in the U.S.-U.K. joint draft made after theabove-mentioned working-level consultations. Consequently, the U.S. governmentʼs position
that Takeshima should be retained by Japan was shared with Britain, making it the AlliedPowersʼ common understanding.
In Part II of the attached article, the author draws attention to the U.S. and Australian
repudiation of ROKʼs 1951 demand for Takeshima. The U.S. government understood thatJapanʼs territorial title over Takeshima was based on “continuous and peaceful displayof national authority.” By the same token, in July 1951, the U.S. turned down the ROK
governmentʼs demand for Tsushima that had been made in May the same year; the UnitedStates did not subscribe to the South Korean argument that Korea was a member of theAllied Powers and deserved to get a portion of victorʼs booty.

*

This article was originally published in Japanese on the webpage of JIIA on October 2021. The originalarticle “ サンフランシスコ平和条約の領土条項と竹島 - 1951 年の交渉経緯を中心に - can be found athttps://www.jiia.or.jp/column/20211005-takeshima.html.

** Kenji Fujii is Advisor on the Takeshima Island Issue at Shimane Prefecture.

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Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima –With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–

Then, the Republic of Korea requested Australia to support its alternative requests for
demilitarization of Tsushima and the ownership of Takeshima. South Korean lobbying to
the U.S. for Takeshima and South Korean démarche for Australian support was conductedalmost simultaneously. In both cases, South Korea cited the security need to counter the
threat of Japan as the grounds for its demands. Here, it is likely that South Korea had
intention to convince the Allied Powers countries Tsushimaʼs importance for Koreaʼssecurity in the face of the threat of Japan and to argue that the same reasoning could beapplied to its claims to Takeshima.
The South Korean demand for Takeshima was decided on very short notice after its
request for the ownership of Tsushima had been turned down by the U.S.. This probably
explains the reasons why the South Korean side referred to Takeshima only as Dokdo in its
request to the U.S. and Australia and even provided false information on the location of theisland. Bewildered by the sudden and unclear requests from South Korea, neither the U.S.
nor Australia responded affirmatively. Australia could not understand which island South
Korea was referring to. After South Korea had provided the precise coordinate of Dokdo,
the U.S. finally realized that the island that ROK was requesting was, as a matter of fact,
Takeshima. Immediately after that, the U.S. government notified South Korea of the AlliedPowersʼ common understanding that Japan was to retain Takeshima in an official letterby Assistant Secretary for State Dean Rusk in August 1951. Korea did not show any legal
grounds for its territorial rights over Takeshima and could not supersede the Allied Powersʼ
common understanding. And nothing indicates that Koreaʼs argument for sovereignty overTakeshima for security reasons was considered among the Allies.
Nevertheless, even when it was notified by the U.S. that Takeshima would be retainedby Japan and even though it could not find any legal grounds for its sovereignty over theisland, South Korea could not stop its greed for unlawful occupation of Takeshima. One
cannot but suspect that at the core of South Koreaʼs demand for Takeshima was the sameirresistible craving for obtaining a territory from Japan as a victorious member of the AlliedPowers that the ROK did not hide in its earlier demand for Tsushima.

Introduction
Part I: D iscussions on Takeshima during the U.S.-U.K. Working-level
Consultations
1. Discussions on Takeshima during the Peace Treaty Drafting Process
2. Discussions on Takeshima during the U.S.-U.K. Working-level Consultations
Part II: S outh Korea’s Failed Attempt to Demand Takeshima throughNegotiations
1. South Korea’s Demand for Tsushima and Its Rejection by the United States
and Britain
2. Logic behind South Korea’s Demand for Tsushima and Its Inconsistency with
International Law
3. South Korea’s Request for Status as a Member of the Allied Powers and Its
Rejection by the U.S. and Britain
4. South Korea’s Sloppy Demand for Takeshima
5. Shift of South Korea’s Demand from Tsushima to Takeshima
6. South Korea’s Moves toward Unlawful Occupation of Takeshima
Closing Remarks

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Kenji Fujii

Introduction

Prior studies1 have already made it amply clear that the Treaty of Peace withJapan (Treaty of San Francisco or San Francisco Peace Treaty hereafter) signed
on September 8, 1951, and taking effect on April 28 the following year, officiallyconfirmed that Japan retains Takeshima. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea
claims otherwise.
For instance, on page 30 of “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea,” a public relations booklet of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, it is stated:
Article 2(a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951 provides, “Japan, recognizing theindependence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands ofQuelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.” Of Koreaʼs some 3,000 islands, the said article refers
to only Jejudo (Quelpart), Geomundo (Port Hamilton), and Ulleungdo (Dagelet) as examples.
Therefore, the mere fact that Dokdo is not explicitly mentioned in the said article does notsuggest that Dokdo is not included among those territories of Korea separated from Japan.

It was during the working-level consultations between the United States and the United
Kingdom in 1951 that the wording of this article was de facto finalized. Therefore, in Part I of
this paper, the author reviews discussions on Takeshima during the U.S.-U.K. working-level
consultations in April and May 1951 for the purpose of reconfirming that the argument in “Dokdo,
Beautiful Island of Korea” is inconsistent with the relevant facts. The author corroborates hisargument with materials and documents he found in his recent overseas surveys.
Furthermore, “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea” argues that, “in consideration of the AlliedPowersʼ stance reflected in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and SCAPIN-677 of 1946, it is evident
that Dokdo is included among the territories of Korea separated from Japan.” With this South
Korean argument as backdrop, the author reviews in Part II on the discussions on Takeshima
in the drafting process of the treaty in 1951, in which the U.S. and Australia repudiated South
Korean demand. In contradiction to the South Korean assertion otherwise, it is clear that “theAllied Powers ʼ stance” on Takeshima was not consistent with South Korea ʼs argument that
“Dokdo is included among the territories of Korea separated from Japan.” Part II is devoted to
the reconfirmation of this historical fact. In particular, the author will focus on the shift in South
Koreaʼs territorial claim from Tsushima to Takeshima.
1

They include: Tsukamoto Takashi, “San Furansisuko Jōyaku to Takeshima―Bei gaikō bunshoshūyori” [Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima―as depicted from the compilation of U.S. diplomatic
documents], Reference no. 389 (June 1983) compiled by the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau,
National Diet Library; Tsukamoto Takashi, “Heiwa Jōyaku to Takeshima sairon” [Peace Treaty andTakeshima revisited], Reference no. 518 (March 1994); Tsukamoto Takashi, “Tainichi Heiwa Jōyaku to
Takeshima no hōteki chii” [Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshimaʼs legal status], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru2 no.1 (October 2012) compiled by the OPRI Center for Island Studies; Tsukamoto Takashi, “Takeshimani kansuru eibun setsumei shiryō (1947-nen Gaimushō sakusei) wo megutte” [On briefing material on
Takeshima in the English language prepared in 1947 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Toˉsho KenkyuˉJaˉ naru 4 no.1 (November 2014); Yamasaki Yoshiko, “Kankoku seifu ni yoru Takeshima ryōyū konkyono sōsaku” [The invention of a basis for the possession of Takeshima by the South Korean government],
Dai 2-ki Takeshima mondai ni Kansuru choˉsa kenkyu
ˉ saishuˉ hoˉ kokusho [Final report of the survey andresearch on the Takeshima issue phase 2], March 2012 compiled by General Affairs Division, Shimane
Prefecture; Fujii Kenji, “Tainichi Kōwa Jōyaku to Takeshima―Eikoku kokuritsu kōbunshokan shozō
shiryō no kentō” [Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima―examination of documents collected by the
National Archives (United Kingdom)], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru 8 no.2 (March 2019); and Fujii Kenji, “SanFuransisuko Heiwa Jōyaku ni okeru Takeshima no toriatsukai ni tsuite” [On how Takeshima is treatedin the Treaty of San Francisco], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru 10 no.1 (October 2020).

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Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima –With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–

It should be pointed out at the outset that many of the documents quoted were found inoverseas archives and collected by the author in the course of field research commissioned by
the Japan Institute of International Affairs.2

Part I: D iscussions on Takeshima during the U.S.-U.K. Working-level
Consultations
1. Discussions on Takeshima during the Peace Treaty Drafting Process
The drafts of the peace treaty with Japan, which the U.S. Department of State had been preparing
since 1947, proposed to take Takeshima away from Japan and to include it in a part of “Korea” thatJapan should renounce. This policy on Takeshima, however, was reversed in 1949. In the treaty
draft on the December 29, 1949, Article 3 of Chapter II “Territory” clauses included Takeshima
in the list of islands that Japan would retain, while in Article 6, a provision on the renunciation of
Korea, Takeshima was deleted from the list of islands belonging to Korea.
The Commentary made in July 1950 on the Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan on December 29,
1949 prepared by the U.S. Department of State contains the following statement with respect to
Article 3 (territorial clause) of the draft:
Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks)―the two uninhabited islets of Takeshima, almost equidistantfrom Japan and Korea in the Japan Sea―were formally claimed by Japan in 1905, apparently
without protest by Korea, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Officeof Shimane Prefecture. They are a breeding ground for sea lions, and records show that for along time Japanese fishermen migrated there during certain seasons. Unlike Dagelet Island ashort distance to the west, Takeshima has no Korean name and does not appear ever to havebeen claimed by Korea.3
The U.S. government ʼ s position that Japan was to retain Takeshima was based on theunderstanding that Japan has territorial title of “continuous and peaceful display of national
authority, ” or “effective occupation ” over the island. The “Continuous and peaceful displayof national authority ” has functioned as one of the criteria for judgment in international
adjudications. “Display of national authority” signifies that “a state actually treats a particularregion as its own territory,” including imposing taxes and providing approvals and licenses. One
can say the display is “continuous and peaceful” when this state can demonstrate its power andauthority in the said region repeatedly in a certain duration of time without protestations fromothers.4
Under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, who had been appointed Advisor to the Secretary2

The author conducted research in The National Archives United Kingdom (TNA henceforth), theNational Archives of Australia (NAA henceforth), the National Archives and Records Administration,
USA (NARA henceforth), and the Archives New Zealand (ANZ henceforth). Quoted in the text with *were documents obtained as images by Streamgraph Inc., commissioned by the Office of Policy
Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, Cabinet Secretariat, from which the author
benefitted. It should be stressed, however, that this paper is based on the authorʼs personal view anddoes not necessarily reflect views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Office of Policy
Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, Cabinet Secretariat, or Streamgraph Inc.

3

“COMMENTARY ON DRAFT OF PEACE WITH JAPAN” (NARA, RG59, Central Decimal File 1950–54
Box3006, 694.001/7-1750) and Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p. 44.

4

Tsukamoto Takashi, “Kokusaihō teki kenchi kara mita Takeshima mondai” [The Takeshima issue seenfrom the viewpoint of international laws], Fujoˉri to tatakau [Fighting the unreasonable] (Bungei Shunju
Kikaku Shuppanbu, August 2017), pp. 124–125.

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Kenji Fujii

of State of the U.S. government in April 1950, the text of the draft peace treaty prepared becamemuch simpler in comparison with previous versions. For instance, no longer did the draft include
an article defining Japanʼs territory or an enumeration of islands belonging to Japan or attachedmaps. The article stipulating Japanʼs renouncement of Korean territory did not include whichislands Japan was to abandon as a part of Korea. As shown in the October 1950 reply to Australia
on the Seven Principles of the Peace Treaty with Japan, however, the U.S. position that Takeshimabelonged to Japan remained unchanged.5
Meanwhile, the U.K. government was also in consultation with the Commonwealth memberson the peace treaty with Japan. It was during the U.S.-U.K. working-level consultations in April
through May 1951 that the two countries coordinated the texts of their respective treaty drafts.
In the consultations, both the U.S. draft peace treaty, which was made on March 23, 1951 (U.S.
March draft henceforth), as well as the U.K. draft peace treaty of April 7, 1951 (U.K. April draft
henceforth) were out on the table and a U.S.-U.K. joint draft of May 3, 1951 was made. The joint
draft treaty was further revised when Dulles visited London for U.S.-U.K. discussions in June
1951 to become the joint draft treaty of June 14, 1951 (revised U.S.-U.K. joint draft henceforth).
In the course of revisions, the wording of articles related to the renouncement of Korea has beensomewhat modified, but, after the draft of June 14,1951, the relevant text stayed the same when
the Treaty of San Francisco was finalized.

2. Discussions on Takeshima during the U.S.-U.K. Working-level Consultations

In the U.S.-U.K. working-level consultations6 convened on April 25 through May 4, 1951, the U.S.
and U.K. governments submitted their respective draft peace treaties.
In the U.S. March draft, Article 2 of Chapter 2 on sovereignty provided that “the Allied Powers
recognise the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.” Article
3 of Chapter 3 on territory provided that “Japan renounces all rights, titles, and claims to Korea,
Formosa and the Pescadores.”7 Article 1 of Part 1 on territorial clauses of the U.K. April draft,on the other hand, carried a map of Japan surrounded by a line within which Japanʼs sovereignty
would be retained. With respect to the Sea of Japan, the line was drawn from a point between
Korea and the island of Tsushima in the direction “with the islands of Oki-Retto to the south-east
and Take Shima to the north-west,” thereby putting Takeshima out of the areas that Japan would
retain territorial sovereignty. Article 2 of the same section called for Japan to renounce “any claim

5

For details, see Saitō Kōhei, “Shiryōgun (1): Beikoku tainichi kōwa 7 gensoku ni taisuru Gōshū noshitsumonsho oyobi soreni taisuru Beikoku no kaitōsho” [Document Group (1) Questions Submitted byAustralia to the United States Regarding the Seven Principles for a Peace Treaty with Japan, and the U.S.
Response] in the “Press Release on Collecting of Archive Materials on Territory and Sovereignty (Results
to date with Relation to Takeshima)” on the webpage of the Japan Institute of International Affairs on
September 10, 2019 (https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/JIC/10910-press_release_takeshima_attached.pdf).

6

On the U.S.-U.K. working-level consultations, see “Shiryōgun 2: Bei-Ei jimu reberu kyōgi oyobi 1951-nen
5-gatsu 3-nichi zuke Bei-Ei kyōdō sōan” [Document Group (2) Anglo-American Working-level Meetings
and the Joint U.S.-U.K. Draft of May 3, 1951] included in the earlier quoted “Press Release on Collectingof Archive Materials on Territory and Sovereignty (Results to date with Relation to Takeshima)” on the
webpage of the Japan Institute of International Affairs on September 10, 2019 (https://www2.jiia.or.jp/
pdf/JIC/10910-press_release_takeshima_attached.pdf).

7“Japanese Peace Treaty: Attaches Provisional draft which is to be sent to H. M. Ambassador at
Washington, intended to serve as preliminary working document” (TNA, FO371/92538, FJ1022/222)
p. 16 & p. 18.

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to sovereignty over, and all right, title, and interest in Korea.”8
The U.S.-U.K. joint draft produced as the result of the bilateral working-level consultations
provided, in its Article 2, Chapter 2 on “Territory,” that “Japan renounces all rights, titles, andclaims in connection with Korea (including Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet). Tsukamoto
Takashi points out that, “in the process of completing the U.S.-U.K. joint draft, not only the U.K.
idea of surrounding Japan with a line but also putting Takeshima out of this line were dropped,
thus retaining Takeshima as a part of Japanese territory.”9Tsukamoto based his interpretation on the following two grounds. The first was the commentson the bilateral joint draft provided by the U.S. government, which said:
In the discussions at Washington the U.K. agreed to drop this proposal when the U.S. pointed
to the psychological disadvantages of seeming to fence Japan in by a continuous line around
Japan.... U.S. willingness to specify in the treaty that Korean territory included Quelpart, Port
Hamilton and Dagelet also helped to persuade the British.10
8

Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p. 46, which was originally taken from the earlier quoted“Japanese Peace Treaty: Attaches Provisional draft which is to be sent to H. M. Ambassador at
Washington, intended to serve as preliminary working document” (FO371/92538, FJ1022/222), p. 15 &p. 17. In Chapter 6, Section 1, “Completion of the map attached to U.K. draft peace treaty with Japan in
March 1951 and reconfirmation of Koreaʼs territorial right over Dokdo” in his book titled 독도 1947: 전후 독도문제와 한미일 관계 [Dokdo 1947: The Postwar Dokdo Issue and Tripartite Relations of Korea,
the U.S. and Japan] (Paju: Dolbaege, August 2010) Jung Byung-Joon states that the attached map to
the U.K. April draft had six meanings. Of these six meanings, the third signified that this map was not
only a view of Britain, a major member of the Allies, alone but also a collective view held by membersof the Commonwealth including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, andCeylon. In other words, Jung insists that the said map depicted the content of consensus reached atleast among eight Commonwealth member countries as of March–April 1951, indicating that all of thesecountries had a common view that Dokdo was released from Japan to become a Korean territory (p.
579). Nevertheless, Jung failed to present grounds for his argument. Although the present author also
conducted research of the literature to find what could endorse Jungʼs conclusion, the search proved
to be futile. For instance, the New Zealand government expressed a view on the U.S. March draft that,in light of the need to assure that there would be no territorial dispute in the future over any islandin the vicinity of Japan, it would be desirable to accurately confirm Japanʼs territory with the aid of alatitude-longitude location as proposed by the first article of the U.K. draft peace treaty. In my judgment,
this merely indicated that the New Zealand government was in support of the British argument that
it would be desirable to ascribe islands located between Japan and Korea to either country in a clearcut fashion. It by no means argued that Takeshima should be taken out of Japanʼs territory. (While
the aforementioned Tsukamoto Takashi (1994) claimed that this New Zealand governmentʼs view was
attributed to FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1951 Vol. Ⅵ Part1 p. 1060, it was discoveredthat the original document was actually included in NAA, Item ID: 217102 Japanese Peace Settlement
1st May–31st May 1951.) (It is also recorded in Treaty, Draft, 23 Mar. 1951 (NARA, RG59, Lot File 56 D
527 Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan - Subject
File, 1945–51, Box No.6).) It should be pointed out that the text of Jung Byung-Joonʼs other work, “ 영국 외무성의 대일평화조약 초안 · 부속지도의 성립 (1951.3) 과 한국독도영유권의 재확인 ” [A Draft ofPeace Treaty with Japan by British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Formation of the Map attached to it(March, 1951) and Reconfirmation of Korean Possession of Dokdo], 한국독립운동사연구 [Journal of
Korean Independence Movement Studies] 24 (Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies,
August 2005) is almost identical with Chapter 6, Section 1 of aforementioned Dokuto 1947-sengo Dokuto
mondai to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei, but this treatise does not include the above-quoted argument (p. 153).

9

Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p. 47. The quoted portion of the U.S.-U.K. joint draft is foundin FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1951 Vol. Ⅵ Part1, p. 1025. It is also recorded in Parts
Ⅰ – Ⅱ : Peace Treaty (TNA, PREM8/1404).

10

FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1951 Vol. Ⅵ Part1, p. 1061.

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Kenji Fujii

The other was the summar y report of the seventh bilateral discussion on May 2, 1951,
prepared by the U.K. government. The report stated:
Both Delegations agreed that it would be preferable to specify only the territory over which
Japan was renouncing sovereignty. In this connection, United States Article 3 would require
the insertion of the three islands: Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.11
A record of the discussion with a party of Dutch officials on the draft Japan peace treaty on
May 29, 1951,12 whose presence was recently confirmed by the author, endorses the above viewof Tsukamoto. In the course of briefings on the U.S.-U.K. working-level consultations, the Britishside made the following explanation regarding the handling of Articles 2 and 3 of the U.S. Marchdraft:
Mr. Johnston [the Head of Japan and the Pacific Affairs, British Foreign Office] said that theUnited States representatives had agreed to drop this article. He added that United Kingdom
representatives had not insisted on Article 1 of the United Kingdom draft in view of theAmerican preference for and expanded version of Article 3 of the United States draft.
With this newly discovered document, it has been reconfirmed that, at the U.S.-U.K. workinglevel consultations, the United States agreed to drop Article 2 of its U.S. March draft in return forwhich the British side agreed to withdraw Article 1 of its U.K. April draft. The two sides agreed
to further articulating Article 3 of the U.S. March draft by specifying the islands to be returned to
Korea.
Additionally, the following record of discussions also endorses the view that Article 3 of the
U.S. March draft was revised to specify names of islands to be returned to Korea: “[The] British
mentioned the desirability of disposing of islands between Japan and Korea by specific mention.
(This might be done by inserting ʻ(including Quelpart)ʼ after ʻKoreaʼ in U. S. article 3).”13
This “desirability of disposing of islands between Japan and Korea by specific mention” hadbeen a consistent argument for Britain throughout the drafting process of the peace treaty withJapan. On August 26 through September 2, 1947, a Commonwealth conference was convened in
Canberra with the aim of exchanging views on drafting a peace treaty with Japan. The “Territorial,
Political and General Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Japan”14 of August 27, 1947, prepared by
the U.K. delegates pointed out that “(a) a large number of islands in waters immediately adjacent
to Japan which should clearly remain under Japanese sovereignty; and (b) a number of islands
between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, between Hokkaido and the Kuriles, and between Japan properand Korea in regard to the disposal of which some dispute may be expected.” Therefore, thisdocument stressed, “[v]ery careful drafting of this section will be necessary in order to ensure11“Anglo-American meetings on Japanese Peace Treaty. Summary record of seventh meeting” (TNA,
FO371/92547, FJ1022/376) p. 66. Also, “Anglo-American meetings on Japanese Peace Treaty” (Japanese
Peace Treaty (TNA, CO537/7103)), p. 240.

12“Discussion with a party of Dutch officials of the draft J.P.T. at the FO on 29th May” (TNA, FO
371/92553, FJ 1022/478) p. 21. Also, “Summar y record of meetings held at the foreign office on
29th May with the representatives of the Netherlands Government” (Japanese Peace Treaty (TNA,CO537/7104)), p. 134.

13

“Check List of Positions Stated by U.S. and U.K. at April 25–27 meetings” (NARA, RG59, Central
Decimal File 1950–54, BOX 3008, 694.001/4-2751).*

14“Territorial, Political and General Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Japan” (NAA, Item ID: 140452
Pacific affairs – Canberra Conference Agenda – [Commonwealth Conference on Japanese Peace
Settlement, Canberra, 1947]).

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that no islands are left in disputed sovereignty.”
On November 20, 1950, the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan （ de facto U.K.
Embassy to the occupied Japan）sent a document titled “Certain matters affecting the present
and future disposition of Japanʼs former island territories”15 to the British Foreign Office inLondon. This document was prepared in response to the Dulles-led drafting of the peace treaty
and influenced the drafting process of the British side. It should be noted that, in the section on“His Majestyʼs Governmentʼs policy,” this document referred to the above-mentioned part of the
document prepared for the 1947 Commonwealth Conference: “very careful drafting of this section
will be necessary in order to ensure that no islands are left in disputed sovereignty.”
In a document prepared on April 23, 1951, on the eve of the U.S.-U.K. working-level
consultations,16 the British Foreign Office deliberated the U.S. March draft. On Article 2 of this
U.S. draft, which provided, “[t]he Allied Powers recognise the full sovereignty of the Japanesepeople over Japan and its territorial waters,” the April 23 document stated, “Very careful draftingof this Section is essential in order to ensure that no islands near Japan are left in disputed
sovereignty,” and pointed out that “this Article [of the U.S. March draft] in its present form is
too imprecise to meet the criterion set out above.” The British Foreign Office was concernedthat disputes over sovereignty of islands near Japan “might benefit the Soviet Union or otherCommunist States in Asia.” One can detect in this document in 1951 a stronger sense of urgency
compared to the document prepared for the abovementioned Commonwealth Canberra
Conference in 1947.
In addition, in the same April 23 document, the British Foreign Office criticized that Article
2 and Article 3 ( “ Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa, and the
Pescadores”) of the U.S. March draft, when combined, could lead to a sovereignty dispute over
Quelpart and Takeshima as the draft failed to clarify who owned territorial rights to these islands.
The British Foreign Office noted that while the Japanese people themselves had perceived
Quelpart and Ulleungdo islands to be a part of Korea, “[i]f it is desirable to prevent future Koreanacquisition of the Hornet Islands which are uninhabited, they might be retained by Japan.” This
statement reveals that, while the U.K. had put Takeshima outside of Japanʼs territorial line in its
April draft, the position of the line in relation to Takeshima was arbitrary and the British side did
not have any concrete reason to put the island outside of it.
From this it can be conjectured that the U.K. government was concerned with clarifying
national boundaries, in hope of preventing sovereignty disputes over the islands. In other words,
it was not much concerned with the attribution of each island situated between Japan and Korea
itself. As soon as its concern of the boundary clarification was addressed, therefore, the U.K.
government withdrew Article 1 of its draft, thereby dropping its proposal to enclose Japan witha line and place Takeshima out of Japanʼs territorial line. Consequently, the U.S. governmentʼs
position that Takeshima should be retained by Japan was shared with Britain, making it the “AlliedPowersʼ stance.”
From the above process, it is obvious that, when Article 2 of Chapter 2 on “Territory” of the
U.S.-U.K. joint draft proposed that “Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to Korea (including
Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,)” the two governments meant “Korea” did not include
Takeshima. Thus, the fact that, in Article 2 (a), Chapter II on “Territory” of the Treaty of San
Francisco, which stipulates, “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right,
title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,” “Dokdo
15“Certain matters affecting the present and future disposition of Japanʼs former island territories” (TNA,
FO371/83825 J10114/5), p. 86.

16“Attaches new edition of draft brief on U.S. provisional draft peace treaty with Japan on which discussion
will be held in Washington” (TNA, FO371/92543, FJ1022/302), p. 63.

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is not explicitly mentioned” means Takeshima is not a Korean but a Japanese territory under theTreaty.

Part II: S outh Korea’s Failed Attempt to Demand Takeshima throughNegotiations
1. South Korea’s Demand for Tsushima and Its Rejection by the United States
and Britain
In May 1951, the South Korean government requested the United States to revise the U.S.
March draft; in July of the same year, it requested that the U.S.-U.K. joint draft be revised.17 It
should be pointed out that, as far as the “Territory” chapter of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
was concerned, South Korea had not demanded Takeshima from the beginning. Indeed, it was
Tsushima that the South Korean government demanded first.
On May 7, 1951, Kim Sae-Sun, acting South Korean Ambassador to the United States sent a
letter to the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Gooderham Acheson. In this letter, he attached South
Korean governmentʼs request dated April 27, 1951 concerning the U.S. March draft.18 In this
attachment, the South Korean government, in relation to Article 3 (on Japanʼs renouncement of
Korean territories), Chapter 3 on “Territory” of the draft, requested that Japan “return” Tsushima
to Korea (p. 3).
The “Comments on Korean Note Regarding U. S. Treaty Draft”19 with a handwritten “May 9”in the margin, which was found in the NARA, would be comments of the U.S. government to theSouth Korean requests on April 27, 1951. The South Korean requests were organized into elevenitems,20 of which the fifth was the request to return Tsushima to Korea. The U.S. governmentʼscomment to this fifth item was that the ground of the request was “extremely weak.” In his
meeting with Yang Yu-Chan, South Korean Ambassador to Washington, D.C., on July 9, 1951,
Dulles rejected the South Korean request to “return” Tsushima, upon which Yang acknowledged
17

The U.S. March draft was circulated in March 1951 to the South Korean government, while the revised
U.S.-U.K. joint draft was circulated to the South Korean government on July 3 in the same year. See“Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations – Alleged Cavalier Treatment of Other Allies by the United States”(NAA, Item ID: 140426 Japanese Peace Treaty – Drafts).

18

A letter from Kim Sae-Sun chargé dʼaffaires a.i. to Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State May 7, 1951
(NARA, RG59, Central Decimal File 1950–54, BOX 3008, 694.001/5-751). * The portion on the demand
for Tsushima is found on page 2 of the request letter. See also Jung Byung-Joon, Dokuto 1947-sengo
Dokuto mondai to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei [Dokdo 1947-postwar Dokdo dispute and Korea-U.S.-Japan
relations] (in Korean language), pp. 709–726.

19“Comments on Korean Note Regarding U. S. Treaty Draft” (NARA, RG59, Lot54 JAPANESE PEACE
TREATY FILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea). *20

According to Tsukamoto Takashi, “Kankoku no tai-Nichi heiwa jōyaku shomei mondai―Nicchō kōshō,sengo hoshō mondai ni kanren shite” [The issue of Koreaʼs signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan―
in relation to Japan-Korea negotiations and postwar compensation], Reference no. 494 (March 1992),
p. 97–98, South Korea made the following demands: (1) Korea should be specifically designatedas Allied Powers; (2) Korea should be permitted to sign the treaty, as Poland was [a signee of ] theVersailles Treaty; (3) Japanʼs admission to the UN should be tied to Koreaʼs; (4) Koreans in Japan
should be accorded the status of the Allied nationals; (5) Tsushima should be “returned” to Korea; (6)Korea should be included in any Pacific security system; (7) The “MacArthur (fishing) Line” between
Korea and Japan should be reserved in the treaty; (8) Korea should be permitted to seize all Japaneseproperties in Korea without regard to the exceptions listed in our draft; (9) Korea should have the sameright as the Allied Powers to the restoration of Korean property in Japan; (10)Korea requests that it bemade a party to the International Court of Justice; and (11) Korea should be specifically included as an
Allied Power. These eleven items are almost identical to the contents of requests from (1) through (11)
handwritten in the South Korean request documents on April 27.

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in a meeting on July 19 that South Korea withdrew its request for Tsushima.21
In the letter of I Myo-Mook, South Korean Minister to Britain, to U.K. Foreign Minister
Herbert Morrison dated July 20, 1951, the South Korean government conveyed its requests
regarding the peace treaty draft. The British Foreign Office reorganized the requests into thefollowing nine items22 (see table 1).
Table 1. South Korean governmentʼs requests submitted to the U.K. government on July 20,
1951
1. The term “Allied Power” should be defined specifically include Korea. (Preamble)
2. Any future status which may be acquired by Japan in connection with an application formembership in the United Nations should be limited to a status equivalent to that enjoyedby South Korea. (Preamble)
3. Korean residents in Japan should be treated as citizens of an Allied Powers member.
(Preamble)
4. The island of Tsushima should be transferred from Japan to Korea. (Chapter 3: Territory)
5. Special consideration should be given to the importance of Korea in the maintenance ofpeace and security in the Pacific. (Chapter 4: Security)
6. The MacArthur Line should be maintained. (Chapter 5: Political and Economic Clauses)
7. While Allied Powers can protect their rights through bilateral agreements, Korea does nothave such agreements due to forty years of the Japanese occupation. The relevant article
should be revised so that Korean rights are equally protected with other countries having
bilateral agreements with Japan. (Chapter 5: Politics and Economy)
8. It should be recognized that Japanese properties in Korea and Korean properties in Japanbelong to Korea. (Chapter 6: Claims and Property)
9. South Korea should be made a party to the International Court of Justice. (Chapter 7:
Settlement of Disputes)
These requests to Britain were almost identical to South Korea ʼ s requests to the U.S.
government on April 27, 1951. As can be detected from the South Korean reference to “Territory”
as Chapter 3, these requests were based not on the revised U.S.-U.K. joint draft but on the U.S.
March draft. (In the former, “Territory” constituted Chapter 2, instead.) Even though the revised
U.S.-U.K. joint draft of June 14, 1951, had already been shared with South Korea, South Korea did
not base its requests on that draft.
On August 2, 1951, the British Foreign Office tabulated requests regarding the peace treaty
with Japan submitted from various countries concerned and comments on them.23 In response
to South Koreaʼs demand for the return of Tsushima, the comment said, “This is unacceptablebecause Tsushima has been Japanese since the dawn of Japanese history and inhabitants are
21“Memorandum of Conversation on July 9 & 19, 1951” (NARA, RG59, Lot54 JAPANESE PEACE TREATYFILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea), FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1951
Vol.Ⅵ Part 1, pp. 1183–1184 and pp. 1202–1206, Tsukamoto Takashi (1983), supra note 1, pp. 58–63, andTsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, pp. 48–49.

22“Encloses Korean comments and suggestions on J.P.T.” (TNA, FO371/92570, FJ1022/799), pp. 27–28.
See pp. 33–39 for the South Korean request.

23“State Depar tment would still like Mr. Fitzmaurice to go the U States” (TNA, FO371/92574,
FJ1022/876), pp. 56–68 (see p. 56). An identical document is found in “JAPANESE PEACE TREATY:PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WITH COMMENTS” (TNA, CO 537/7106), pp. 269–283 and pp. 375–387(see p. 271 & p. 375). This document was produced for the benefit of Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice, legal
counsel to the British Foreign Office, who was on his way to the United States to assist finalization of
the peace treaty.

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Japanese by speech, race, and choice.” Subsequently on August 17, in a letter from the British
Foreign Office to Minister I Myo-Mook24 responding to the South Korean requests, the U.K.
government turned down South Koreaʼs demand for Tsushima, pointing out that “the island isJapanese and should remain part of Japan.”

2. Logic behind South Korea’s Demand for Tsushima and Its Inconsistency with
International Law

Well-known incidents surrounding South Koreaʼs demand for Tsushima occurred on August
17, 1948, and January 7, 1949, in the form of remarks made by I Seung-Man, the first presidentof South Korea, immediately following the founding of the Republic of Korea government. It
was, however, Chung Moon-Kee that had demanded the return of Tsushima earlier. Appointed
as Fisheries Bureau Chief of the Ministr y of Agriculture, the United States Army Militar y
Government in Korea, in July 1947, Chung was an expert in fisheries administration. In his
treatise entitled “the attribution of Tsushima to Korea and Perpetuation of Peace in the Orient,”
which was dated “October 15, 1945, National Fisheries University of Busan,” Chung stressed,“[i]n order to secure peace in East Asia in days to come, we must deprive Japan of a base for its
political and military conspiracies and schemes by confirming that Tsushima belongs to Korea.”25
Chung contributed a memoir to the daily Hankook Ilbo on December 10, 1977, in which hereminisced that, having read MacArthurʼs “statement on the range of Japanese territory” issued
immediately after Japanʼs defeat, he thought that Japanʼs territory would be limited to four mainislands and Tsushima would not be included in it. It is conjectured that Chung was referring to
the U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan issued on September 6, 1945, which stipulated,“Japanʼs sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku andsuch minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration andother agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.” This, however, did not at all
include a decision that Tsushima would be excluded from Japanese territory.
In a February 19, 1948, daily Dong-A Ilbo article titled “the Attribution of Tsushima to Korea
Proposed at Legislature,” it was reported that a member of the legislature Heo Gan-yong had
proposed that the issue of reinstituting Tsushima as a Korean territory should be submitted tothe peace conference with Japan lest an aggressive Japan might rise again, using Tsushima as abase for invading the Asian continent and disturbing the peace in East Asia. It was also reported
that fifty-nine of Hoʼs colleagues supported his proposal and that it had been submitted to thegeneral assembly of the legislature on February 17.26
The daily Chosun Ilbo issued on Januar y 8, 1949, reported that, at a press conference on
Januar y 7, 1949, a reporter asked how far back President I Seung-Man intended to demand
reparations from Japan. In reply, President I said, “While, personally, I wish to go back some
350 years to the Japanese invasions of Korea of 1592–1598 (Imjin War), I should first demand
reparations at least for the past forty years as well as the return of Tsushima.”
24“Encloses a confidential communication on Koreaʼs wish to participate in the JPT and request immediate
attention” (TNA, FO371/92572, FJ1022/847), pp. 130–135 (see p. 133).

25

Korea Fisheries Technology Association ed., 한국수산기술협회 [Treatises and essays of the Tosan Dr.
Chung Moon-Kee in commemoration of his 70th birthday] (in Korean language, April 1968), p. 170.
In an article in Hankook Ilbo on December 11 and 13, 1977, however, Chung complained that all the
influencers of the time were uninterested in the appeal for the “return” of Tsushima. He also complainedthat President I Seung-Manʼs 1948 statement was issued far too late.

26“The Stenographic Records of the Provisional Legislature of the Republic of Korea, No. 208” (February
17, 1948) in Volume 5 of the Stenographic Records of the Provisional Legislature of the Republic of Korea
compiled by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (May 1999) does not, for reasons unknown,
contain the record of deliberation on the demand to recover Tsushima (see pp. 371–393).

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All these arguments heard inside Korea based their demands for Tsushima either on the
security need to prevent another attempt by Japan at invasion or on the right to reparations fromJapan. A different argument for the “return” of Tsushima was included in the April 27, 1951
requests submitted to the U.S. government (which were almost identical to the July 20 requests
presented to the U.K. government):
In the firm belief that justice is the only basis for a lasting peace, the Government of the
Republic of Korea requests that a thorough study be given to the territorial status of theIslands of Tsushima. Historically, the two islands called Tsushima were Korean territory until
forcibly and unlawfully taken over by Japan. In paragraph number 5 [of the U.S. March draft],Japan is ordered to hand over to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the southern halfof Sakhalin, all adjacent islands and, in addition, the Kurile Islands. In the belief that Korea
should be accorded full and equal justice and equality of treatment, the Republic of Korea
requests that Japan specifically renounce all right, title and claim to the Islands of Tsushima
and return them to the Republic of Korea.
As this quote shows, the Republic of Korea argued that it had the same right as the Soviet
Union had and demanded the “return” of Tsushima. It argued that it was entitled to similar
treatment as the Soviet Union, which was proposed to be the recipient of “the southern half of
Sakhalin, all adjacent islands and, in addition, the Kurile Islands” by Article 5 of Chapter 3 on
27
“Territory” of the U.S. March draft.
Article 2(c) of Chapter 2 on “Territor y” of the revised U.S.-U.K. draft, however, merely
stipulated that Japan should abandon these territories.28 And this might be a key to understanding
South Koreaʼs mysterious choice of the U.S. March draft instead of the revised U.S.-U.K. joint
draft as the basis of its request made to the U.K. government on July 20, 1951. In any event, South
Koreaʼs demand for Tsushima was premised on its argument that it should be recognized as amember of the Allied Powers.
Thus, it can be said that South Korea did not base its demand for Tsushima on the groundthat it has the territorial title of “continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty.” Boththe United States and Britain, however, attached great importance to whether territorial claims
are based on the above-mentioned territorial title. A March 30, 1950, report produced by the
U.S. Department of State also concluded as follows: “Although Korea apparently held a dominantposition on the island before 500AD, its claim to control in subsequent periods is not supportedby the facts available. On the contrary, there is little doubt that during at least 350 years Japan has

27

In the April 26, 1951, request regarding the U.S. March draft from Yim Byung-Jick, South Koreaʼs
Ambassador to the United Nations, addressed to John Foster Dulles (National Institute of Korean
History ed., 이 승만 관계 서간 자료집 [Compilation of I Seung-Man–related letters and documents]
Vol. 3 (1951), pp. 333–336), which is believed to be the draft of the request on April 27, 1951, the phrase,“In the belief that Korea should be accorded full and equal justice and equality of treatment” was used inplace of “In view of this fact.” The South Korean side might have hesitated to equate itself to the Soviet
Union.

28

Hosoya Chihiro, in his San Furansisuko koˉ wa eno michi [Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty](Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1984), attributed this to: (1) the original proposal would give direct benefits
to the Soviet Union, which was feared to provoke heated arguments at the U.S. Senate, and (2) Dulles
explained to Morrison that, had Japan not openly abandoned sovereignty over these territories, it wasfeared that the United States, which was to conclude a security pact with Japan, might be entangled in
an unintended dispute (see pp. 239–240).

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exercised complete and effective control of Tsushima.”29 South Korea had no grounds on whichto override this conclusion.

3. South Korea’s Request for Status as a Member of the Allied Powers and Its
Rejection by the U.S. and Britain

To begin with, both the United States and Britain had rejected South Koreaʼs request to be asignee of the Treaty of San Francisco as a member of the Allied Powers (the war winners), which
underlay its demand for Tsushima. Although South Korea tenaciously repeated this request, it
was turned down for good in the following way.
On August 17, 1951, in a letter on from the British Foreign Office addressed to I Myo-Mook,
South Korean Minister to Britain, the U.K. government conveyed the reason for the rejectionof South Koreanʼs request as follows: “This decision is a necessary consequence of the fact that
Korea is not at war with Japan, having been part of the Japanese Empire throughout the war withJapan.”30 Furthermore, the British Foreign Office pointed out that Article 21 of the revised U.S.U.K. draft stated that Korea would benefit from Article 2 (renouncement of Korea by Japan),
Article 9 (fisheries), and Article 12 (conclusion of trade relations). In light of this, the U.K.
government turned down other requests from South Korea dated July 20.
On August 21, 1951, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yung-tae issued a statement that
said, “As Japanʼs closest neighbor and victim of 40 years suffering Korea should participate [inthe peace conference].”31 The next day, Yang Yu-Chan, South Korean Ambassador to the UnitedStates, told Dulles that South Koreaʼs signing of the peace treaty with Japan would “terminate thestate of war with Japan which had been declared by the Korean Provisional Government” andstressed that it would “have the most important effect raising the morale” of the South Korean
people in the midst of the destruction and confusion caused by the Korean War.32 Nevertheless,Dulles rejected Yangʼs pleas, putting an end to South Koreaʼs quest to become a signatory of theTreaty of San Francisco as a war victor.
As described, South Korea had pursued its wish to be recognized as a member of the AlliedPowers until only half a month before the San Francisco peace conference. South Korea had not
given up on this request despite repeated rejections by the United States and Britain because its
status as a member of the Allied Powers had been the premise of many of its requests regarding
the draft peace treaty. This can also be found from the following two incidents.
On July 25, 1951, regarding the South Korean request on the issue of claims, which later
became the thorniest issue in the bilateral Japan–South Korea Talks for the normalization of
diplomatic relations between the two countries, the British Foreign Office made the following
comment rejecting South Koreaʼs request:
The comments on Claims and Property are based on the assumption that Korea will be an
Allied Power and will be entitled to seize Japanese property under Article 14. This is not so.
Japanese property in Korea will be regulated by the special agreement between Japan and
29“KOREAʼS RECENT CLAIM TO THE ISLAND OF TSUSHIMA” (NARA, RG84, Records of the Foreign
Service Posts of State, Entry 2846, Korea, Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–55, Box,12) *
p. 6.

30

TNA document, supra note 24, pp. 130–135.(See p. 130.) This letter was also a reply of the British
government to the letter by I Myo-Mook dated July 25, 1951, in which South Korea had requested its
participation in the peace conference as a signee of the peace treaty.

31

A telegram from the U.S. Ambassador to Korea to the U.S. Secretary of State, Aug. 22, 1951 (NARA,
RG59, Central Decimal File 1950–54, BOX3011 694.001/8-2251). *32“Memorandum of conversation dated August 22, 1951” (NARA, RG59, Central Decimal File 1950–54,
BOX3011 694.001/8-2251). *67
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Korea provided for under Article 4. It is hardly possible at this stage to include in the Treaty
any detailed provisions for Korean property claims.33
Article 14 was about reparations to the Allied Powers both in the U.S. March draft and therevised U.S.-U.K. draft. In addition, on August 2, 1951, the British Foreign Office pointed out that34
“this request is based upon the false assumption that Korea is an Allied Power.”
Another incident was related to the request for continuation of the MacArthur Line (line
instituted in the sea around Japan while Japan was occupied by the Allied forces beyond which
Japanese fishing boats were not allowed to operate.) South Korea obstinately insisted on the lineʼscontinuation in conjunction with its argument for membership in the Allied Powers as follows:35
During the forty years in which Korea was under the domination of Japan, the Japanesemonopolized every means of livelihood, including the Korean fishing waters. Although unable
to enter into a bilateral treaty under these circumstances, Koreans living in and outside of
their own country maintained a status of belligerency with Japan which continued until 1945.
Therefore, the South Korean government argued that Article 10 of the U.S. March draft (“Eachof the Allied Powers within a year after the present treaty has come into force between it andJapan, will notify Japan which of its pre-war bilateral treaties with Japan it wishes to keep in for orrevive, and such treaties shall continue in force or be revived except for any provisions thereof
not in conformity with the present treaty, which provisions shall be deemed deleted. All suchtreaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.”) had to be revised. This was, according to
the South Korean side, because “[a]ny so-called ʻtreatiesʼ between Japan and Korea, entered into
prior to 1945 while Korea was under the Imperialistic domination of Japan, are not in fact treaties
and the Republic of Korea considers any or all such ʻtreatiesʼ to be null, void and of not effectwhatever. ”
It was South Koreaʼs position that only a treaty that South Korea concluded with Japan as amember of the Allied Powers deserved to be regarded as a genuine treaty and that all existingtreaties, including the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910 (Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty), should be
regarded as null and void from the beginning. This kind of argument from the South Koreanside later became a point of contention as the issue of the validities of pre-annexation treatiesin the Japan–South Korean negotiations toward diplomatic normalizations (the Japan–South
Korea Talks). On the other hand, the South Korean side insisted that the MacArthur Line wassomething that should never be null and void. It argued that the MacArthur Line represented
a “historic division line” between Japan and Korea and as such was tantamount to a “prewar
bilateral treaty.”This was why South Korea demanded continuation of the MacArthur Line. The MacArthur
Line was characterized as an “arbitrary line” in the August 1947 activity report of the United
33

TNA document, supra note 22, p. 28.

34

TNA document (FO371/92574), supra note 23, p. 62, and TNA document (CO 537/7106), supra note
23, p. 277 & p. 381. It should be pointed out that, in response to the South Korean request, the UnitedStates added an additional stipulation to Article 4 which satisfied the South Korean request. The U.K.
government, on the other hand, informed the South Korean government that the handling of Japanese
assets would be addressed by Article 4 in its letter on August 17, 1951. (“Encloses a confidential
communication on Koreaʼs wish to participate in the JPT and request immediate attention” (TNA,
FO371/92572, FJ1022/847), p. 134.) An Article 4 was added to items which Korea would benefit in the
final draft of the peace treaty.

35

NARA document, supra note 18, pp. 3–4 for South Koreaʼs request to the United States and, TNA
document, supra note 22, pp. 35–36 for the South Korean request to Britain.

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States Army Military Government in Korea36 (which governed the southern half of the Korean
peninsula after the end of Japanese rule), meaning it is simply not a fact that the MacArthur Linewas instituted in compliance with a “historic division line.” The South Korean argument was so
far-fetched as to be beyond comprehension. South Koreaʼs request on April 27, 1951, that Article
10 should be revised to something befitting Korea as a member of the Allied Powers was notincluded in the eleven items summarizing South Koreaʼs comments on the U.S. draft of May 9.
The United States government simply ignored it.

4. South Korea’s Sloppy Demand for Takeshima
In a letter dated July 19, 1951, Ambassador Yang Yu-Chan requested U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson to revise the following wording in Article 2(a) of the revised U.S.-U.K. joint draft:
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea,
including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
The South Korean government, through Ambassador Yang, proposed the following revised
wording instead:37
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, confirms that it renounced on August 9,1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its
annexation by Japan, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo andParangdo.
On the other hand, according to a telegram of John Joseph Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to South
Korea addressed to the U.S. State Department, dated July 17, 1951, 38 South Korean Foreign
Minister Byun Young-tae had requested Muccio to replace “Korea, including the islands ofQuelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet” in Article 2(a) of the revised U.S.-U.K. joint draft with “Korea
and all islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including Kuelpart, Port
Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Prangdo.”
On the July 20, 1951, in the telegram No. 38 sent from Busan to the Australian Department
of External Affairs39, James Plimsoll (an Australian diplomat who, at that time, was served as
the Australian representative to the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea) wrote that the South Korean Foreign Minister had asked the support of the Australian
government for four proposed amendments to the peace treaty draft. One of these four was arequest to insert “and all islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan” before
36“U.S. Army Military Government–South Korea: Interim Government Activities, No.1, August 1947”(NARA, RG331 GHQ/SCAP Records, Adjutant Generalʼs Section Administration Division; Mail andRecords Branch― Miscellaneous File, 1945–52 Box 762, Folder #6).

37

Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p. 48.

38

A telegram from John Joseph Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, to the U.S. Secretary of State, July 17,
1951 (NARA, RG59, Central Decimal File 1950–54, BOX3010, 694.001/7-1751). * In addition to Article 2,
Byun Young-tae also made requests on the handling of the Japanese properties in Korea (Article 4) andthe MacArthur Line (Article 9).

39“Amendments to Draft Japanese Peace Treaty 27th July, 1951” (NAA, Item ID: 140412, Japanese peace
settlement). The second of the four was dissatisfaction with Article 4 which could endorse Japanʼsclaims on the Japanese properties in Korea, the third was about demilitarization of Tsushima, and thefourth was a request to add continuation of the MacArthur Line to Article 9 until conclusion of fisheries
treaties between Japan and various countries. See Fujii Kenji (2020), supra note 1, pp. 60–62. Plimsoll
also wrote that Korea wished to be a signee of the peace treaty with Japan.

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Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima –With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–“including” in Article 2(a) of the revised U.S.-U.K. joint draft. The South Korean Foreign Minister
also insisted that the islands of “DOK DO and PRANG DO” should be specifically mentioned in
the treaty text.
In summary, Byun Young-tae requested the U.S. and Australian governments to accept thefollowing revision:
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea,
and all islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including Kuelpart,
Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Prangdo. (Note that in the request to the Australian
government “Dokdo and Prangdo” was rendered as “DOK DO and PRANG DO.”)
While Yang Yu-Chan requested the return of “ Dokdo and Parangdo, ” Byun Young-tae
demanded “Dokdo and Prangdo.” Parangdo is the Korean pronunciation of what is called Harōtō
in Japanese. Having heard of Socotra Rock located in the East China Sea, the Koreans mistook it
for an island. In actuality, it is a submerged rock located in the East China Sea. Thus, the South
Korean government claimed sovereignty over a nonexistent “island.”40 Moreover, the name of this“island” was not even consistent within the South Korean government.
Neither was the wording for the proposed revision consistent. It is not known whether theinsertion of “it renounced on August 9, 1945,” one of differences between Yangʼs text and Byunʼstext, was instructed by the home government or was based on Yangʼs own decision. August
9, 1945, was the day Japan notified the Allied Powers of its decision to accept the Potsdam
Declaration.41 Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration stipulated that the Cairo Declaration―which
said, “The aforesaid three great powers [the United States, Britain, and the Republic of China]. . . are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”―shall be
carried out. The insertion of this wording must have represented an outburst of emotion by
South Koreans rejoicing Japanʼs acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which was tantamount to
Koreaʼs liberation from Japan.
In a diplomatic note dated August 10, 1951 (The Rusk documents, also known as the RuskYang correspondence, which was the official diplomatic correspondence sent by Dean Rusk, theUnited States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Yang Yu-Chan, South Korean

40

For the details of this process, see Yu Jin-O, “ 한일회담이열리기까지 ( 상 )” [Process toward conveningof the Korea-Japan Talks Part 1], Sasanggye no.156 (Sasanggyesa, Februar y 1966) p. 96. After thisincident, Parangdo became in the minds of Koreans so synonymous with the image of Ieodo, animaginary island that existed only in folk songs and folklore among Quelpart islanders, that, today,
Socotra Rock is called Ieodo in South Korea. It is known as Suyan Islet in Chinese. In 2003, the South
Korean government built the Ieodo Ocean Research Station, triggering a protest from China.

41

According to “Bei-Ei-Ka sangoku sengen judaku ni kansuru wagakuni no mōshiire”[The Japanese
governmentʼs announcement of acceptance of the U.S.–Britain–Republic of China declaration] in
Nippon gaikoˉ nenpyoˉ narabini shuyoˉ bunsho gekan[Chronological tables and major documents ofJapanʼs diplomacy: part 2] compiled by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nippon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai,March 1955), the acceptance telegram was sent at 7:15 in the morning of August 10 (p. 631). Thus,
the telegram was likely to have reached the United States on August 9 at the latest. Since the UnitedStates Army Militar y Government in Koreaʼs ordinance #33 on December 6, 1945, recorded thatproperties that existed within the jurisdiction of United States Army Military Government in Korea asof September 25, 1945 and owned or controlled by the Japanese government and people in Korea onor since August 9, 1945 would be confiscated by the Military Government. Thus, August 9, 1945 might
have been a familiar date to the South Korean people.

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Ambassador to the United States)42, the U.S. government stated, “The United States Government
regrets that it is unable to concur in this proposed amendment. The United States Government
does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory that Japanʼs acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration on August 9, 1945, constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japanover the areas dealt with in the Declaration.” It was the U.S. intention to stress that it would be
only the peace treaty with Japan that would determine the handling of Japanʼs former territories.
The Rusk documents show that the U.S. government rejected South Koreaʼs demand for
Takeshima and that it understood that South Korea had withdrawn the claim to Parangdo. As forthe grounds for Japan to keep its sovereignty over Takeshima, the documents cite the following:
As regards (1) the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, thisnormally uninhabited rock formation was (2) according to our information never treated aspart of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch
Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been
claimed by Korea. (underscores applied by the author)
The reference to “ the island of Dokdo, other wise known as Takeshima or Liancour tRocks” itself reveals how the Rusk documents came about on the U.S. side. When South Korea
demanded Takeshima, it only referred to it as Dokdo, and, therefore, the U.S. side had a hardtime locating the island.
When, in a meeting on July 19, 1951, Ambassador John Foster Dulles asked about where
Dokdo and Parangdo were located, Han Pyo-wook, First Secretary of the South Korean Embassyin the United States, replied that “these were two small islands lying in the Sea of Japan, hebelieved in the general vicinity of Ulleungdo.” 43 The record of the U.S. Government dated
August 3, 1951, shows that, even though a Mr. Boggs, an expert on geography in the U.S. State
Department, “ʻhad tried all resources in Washington,ʼ he has been unable to identify Dokdo or
Parangdo.” Another State Department official in charge of Korea, “Frelinghuysen later reported
that an Embassy officer had told him they believed Dokdo was near Ulleungdo, or Takeshima
Rock, and suspected that Parangdo was too.”44
In a telegram sent to the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea in the name of Secretary of State
Dean Acheson on August 7, 1951, Dulles stated:“Neither our geographers nor Korean Embassy have been able locate Dokdo and Parangdo
Islands. Therefore unless we hear immediately cannot consider this Korean proposal to42

A note from Dean Rusk, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Yang
Yu-Chan, South Korean Ambassador to the United States (NARA, RG59, Lot54 JAPANESE PEACE
TREATY FILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea). *43“Memorandum of conversation dated July 19, 1951” (NARA, RG59, Lot54 JAPANESE PEACE TREATYFILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea) * and Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p.
49.

44“Office Memorandum, To: Allison From: Fearey, Date: August 3, 1951” (NARA, RG59, Lot54 JAPANESEPEACE TREATY FILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea)* and Tsukamoto Takashi,“Takeshima ni kansuru eibun setsumei shiryō (1947-nen Gaimushō sakusei) wo megutte” [On briefing
materials on Takeshima in the English language prepared in 1947 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] inToˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru 4 no.1 (November 2014) p. 63.

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confirm their sovereignty over these islands.”45
It is conjectured that it was through a telegram of August 8 from the U.S. Embassy in South
Korea that the U.S. government learned that Dokdo was Takeshima. The State Departmentʼs
record46 contains the summary of a telegram that said, “Dokto (Jpn. name Takeshima) situated at
37°15′N, 131°53′East.” It was also written in the same record that the South Korean Foreign
Ministry had withdrawn the claim to Parangdo.
A document dated December 2, 1953, compiled by the New Zealand Department of External
Affairs titled “Japanese-Korean Relations with Special Reference to the Dispute Concerning
Takeshima Island” had a section on “The Takeshima dispute,” which contained a record of theSouth Korean Foreign Ministerʼs request of the Australian government.47 The South Korean
Foreign Minister requested that Dokdo and Parangdo should become Korean territories,
explaining, “these two islands were some distance to the south of the mainland.”
Telegram No. 32 of the Australian Department of External Af fairs dated July 25, 1951,
addressed to James Plimsoll in Busan48 stated, “We are unable to locate the two islands you
mentioned on any maps of Korea in our possession.” The South Korean side could not evenprovide precise coordinates for these islands. It was only natural that the United States andAustralia decided to turn down South Koreaʼs request.

5. Shift of South Korea’s Demand from Tsushima to Takeshima
Although it remains unknown precisely when the South Korean government decided to take up
the issue of Takeshima in the peace treaty draft, one can make an educated guess. A telegramof Ambassador Muccio to the Department of State, dated July 17, 1951, is the very first recordof South Koreaʼs demand for Takeshima. In this telegram, it was reported that South Korean
Foreign Minister Byun Young-tae had criticized the peace treaty draft when asked about it at the45“Confidential Telegram Received: From Department of State, Washington, D.C., Date: August 7,
1951, NR:111” (NARA, RG84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of State, Entry 2846, Korea, Seoul
Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–55, Box,12) * and Tsukamoto Takashi (2014), supra note 1,
p. 64.

46“Correspondence regarding Tokto, island claimed by Japan” (NARA, RG84, Records of the Foreign
Ser vice Posts of State, Entr y 2846, Korea, Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–55,
Box,12).* This document is handwritten with the date of October 14, 1952, and it contains summariesof (1) John Joseph Muccioʼs telegram dated July 17, 1951; (2) Yang Yu-Chanʼs letter dated July 19, 1951;(3) dialogue between John Foster Dulles and Yang Yu-Chan on July 19, 1951;(4) Dullesʼ telegram dated
August 7, 1951; and (5) a telegram dated August 8, 1951 from the American ambassador to South Korea.
This document was also introduced in Jung Byung-Joon (2010), supra note 8, p. 776.

47

“JAPANESE - KOREAN RELATIONS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DISPUTE
CONCERNING TAKESHIMA ISLAND” (ANZ, Post-war settlement – Japanese peace settlement –Territorial (Code: R20107058)) p. 9. It is recorded that this summary is contained in a July 21, 1951,
telegram from South Korea to Australia, it must have been a telegram sent by an Australian diplomat
residing in South Korea to Australia.

48

NAA document, supra note 39. It was also reported in telegram No. 38 from Plimsoll in Busan to theAustralian Department of External Affairs that there was no “adequate information” about Dokdo andParangdo. Incidentally, a copy of telegram No. 32, which was sent to the Australian Embassy in the
United States on July 27, was attached to “Amendments to Draft Japanese Peace Treaty” (NAA, Item
ID: 217103 Japanese Peace Treaty – Japanese Peace Treaty 1st June–31 July 1951). In this telegram, theAustralian Department of External Affairs warned Ambassador to the United States Percy Spender ofSouth Koreaʼs approach.

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national assembly the previous day.49
After it was rejected by the United States on July 9, 1951, South Koreaʼs demand for Tsushima
had disappeared from Byun Young-taeʼs July 17 telegram and Yang Yu-Chanʼs letter dated July
19. It was under these circumstances that the South Korean government demanded Dokdo andParangdo in its letter to the United States on July 19 and the telegram sent to Australia on July 20.
It is inconceivable that South Korea had had ample time to prepare for this demand for Dokdo
and Parangdo, which was made immediately after its demand for Tsushima was rejected by theUnited States. It was as if South Korea sought to quickly replace the target territory. As a matterof fact, South Korea was unable even to specify the precise coordinates of these two islands.
In his telegram on July 17, 1951, Muccio disclosed that Byun Young-tae had stated that it
would be imperative for South Korea to own Dokdo and Parangdo because, the “two islands
claimed [are] important as they lie in an exposed and dangerous position if in unfriendly hands.”
The aforementioned document, “Japanese-Korean Relations with Special Reference to the Dispute
Concerning Takeshima Island” compiled by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs
recorded that Byun Young-tae had stated, “These two islands, . . . were of no economic value, butthey were of strategic importance to Korea.”50
Byun Young-tae cited security needs as the grounds for the demand for Takeshima. One canfind a commonality between this argument and the following request that South Korea made toAustralia around the same time.
According to the telegram No. 38 51 of Plimsoll in Busan addressed to the Australian
Department of External Affairs, dated the July 20, 1951, Byun Young-tae asked Australian support
for four revisions to the revised U.S.-U.K. draft. Of the four requests, the third was prohibition ofrearmament of Tsushima without the United Nationsʼ consent. On July 25, 1951, in the telegram
No. 32 addressed to Plimsoll,52 the Australian Department of External Affairs pointed out that itwas not in a position to express its view on demilitarization of Tsushima until the agreement on
the U.S. militaryʼs use of bases in Japan was disclosed. The Australian government turned down
this request along with the other three.
There must have been some calculation of its own on the part of South Korea to choose
Australia as the target of its request regarding the demilitarization of Tsushima. For one thing,
Australia had not been happy with a benevolent peace treaty pursued by Dulles, and it remained
apprehensive about the possible remilitarization of Japan.53 The Australian government kept therecord in a telegram dated the August 2, 1951 from Seoul, which said, “Foreign Minister statedyesterday that demilitarization of Tsushima Island would be demanded. Korean claims for theisland would however not be Pressed.”54 This fact in itself reveals the considerable interest theAustralian government had in this issue.
When its demand for Tsushima was rejected by the United States, the South Korean
government requested the Australian government to support its proposal on demilitarization
49

NARA document, supra note 38. * The stenographic record of the extraordinar y session of 11th
National Assembly session No. 27 compiled on July 16, 1951, by secretariat of the National Assembly
includes a report on Byun Young-taeʼs request regarding the peace treaty draft, but there is no recordof discussions on the Takeshima issue. It may be noteworthy that the daily Dong-A Ilbo on July 17, 1951,
reported that deliberations at the National Assembly on July 16 were a closed-door session.

50

ANZ document, supra note 47, p. 9.

51

NAA document, supra note 39.

52

Ibid.

53

Hosoya Chihiro, supra note 28, pp. 114–117 and pp. 192–196.

54

SUMMARY OF SHORTWAVE RADIO NEWS (NAA, Item ID: 584264 Japanese Peace Treaty–London
Working Party).

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Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima –With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–of Tsushima, stressing security needs. This reminds us of Chung Moon-Keeʼs aforementioned
comment―“We must deprive Japan of a base for its political and militar y conspiracies andschemes”―as well as the proposal in the daily Dong-A Ilbo issued on the February 19, 1948,
that the issue of reinstituting Tsushima as a Korean territory should be submitted to the peace
conference lest the aggressive Japan might rise again.
On the other hand, the following South Korean request to Australia regarding Tsushima
is found in “ Japanese-Korean Relations with Special Reference to the Dispute Concerning
Takeshima Island” compiled by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs:55
The South Korean Foreign Minister did not suggest that Tsushima should be Korean,
stating that while Korea would like sovereignty over the island he realized this was unlikely,
particularly since the majority of the islandʼs inhabitants were Japanese. He said that the
Korean Government had suggested to the United States that Tsushima become an American
trust territory, but the United States had declined.
It appears that South Korea took a cue from Article 3 of the revised U.S.-U.K. draft, which
proposed the Ryukyu and Bonin (Ogasawara) islands to be placed under a trusteeship systemwith the United States as the sole administering authority. Japan was expected to agree with this
proposal in relation to these islands.
There is, however, no record to endorse South Korean claim that Yang Yu-Chan proposedthat Tsushima should be put under U.S. trusteeship in his meeting with Dulles on July 19, 1951.
On the other hand, South Korea made the request for Tsushima to Britain, even though it had
already notified the United States and Australia of its withdrawal of the same request. Had theUnited States, Britain, and Australia compared notes on South Koreaʼs request for Tsushima, it
would have revealed the lack of coordination within the South Korean government concerning
its demand for Tsushima. The request to Britain was, thus, a risky act on the part of the South
Korean government that could have jeopardized trustworthiness of its diplomacy among theAllied Powers.
Behind the proposal to make Tsushima a U.S. trust territor y there seemed to be South
Koreaʼs wish to secure the countryʼs security by establishing a buffer zone between Japan anditself. If South Korea had succeeded in convincing the United States and Australia of the security
importance of Tsushima to counter the threat of Japan, it could have made it an excuse for thedemand for Dokdo and Parangdo. In the midst of its solicitations for deprivation of territories ofJapan with countries of the Allied Powers, it was not altogether unnatural for the South Korean
government to come up with this fancy idea.
There is, however, no trace of the United States having deliberated the sovereignty of “Dokdo
and Parangdo” from the viewpoint of security. In the meeting with Ambassador Yang Yu-Chan on
July 19, 1951, Dulles asked Yang whether “Dokdo and Parangdo” “had been Korean before theJapanese annexation.... If that were the case, Mr. Dulles saw no particular problem in includingthese islands in the pertinent part of the treaty which related to the renunciation of Japanese
territorial claims to Korean territory.”56
To Dullesʼ question on whether “Dokdo and Parangdo” had been Korean territories before
Korea ʼ s annexation by Japan, Yang “ replied in the af firmative. ” Never theless, the Korean
government failed to follow up with concrete evidence.
On the other hand, the Rusk documents said:
55

ANZ document, supra note 47, p. 9.

56

Tsukamoto Takashi (1994), supra note 1, p. 49, and NARA document, supra note 43. *74
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Kenji Fujii

As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, thisnormally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as partof Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch
Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been
claimed by Korea.
As can be detected from this quote, the U.S. government had had an accumulation of
information on Takeshima and, as a matter of fact, by December 1949 the U.S. government
had already decided on the policy to allow Japan to retain Takeshima. Furthermore, this policy
was shared with Britain during the U.S.-U.K. working-level consultations in April–May 1951.
Again, the South Korean government failed to present information that could overturn the “ourinformation” of the U.S. side. Thus, as soon as it was known on August 8, 1951, that Dokdo was
Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, the U.S. government drafted the Rusk documents, which weresent immediately to the South Korean government on August 10 as a reply.

6. South Korea’s Moves toward Unlawful Occupation of Takeshima

In the document compiled by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs titled “JapaneseKorean Relations with Special Reference to the Dispute Concerning Takeshima Island ” thesection titled “The Takeshima Dispute” concludes with the statement, “Despite this indication of
Korean dissatisfaction, the Peace Treaty was finally signed without amendment of Article 2(a) in
the sense desired by Korea.”57 The U.S. government conveyed to South Korea through the Rusk
documents the “Allied Powersʼ stance” that Japan should retain Takeshima. This should havesettled the issue for good.
As hard as it is to believe, though, the South Korean government launched a new search forevidence to prove that Takeshima had been Koreaʼs territory before annexation by Japan in spiteof the U.S. rejection. On August 31, 1951, the Interior Department of the Korean government
instructed the North Gyeongsang province government to urgently search for evidences that
could confirm Dokdo as Korean territor y. It was explained in a South Korean government
document that, in conjunction with the second draft peace treaty (i.e., the revised U.S.-U.K. joint
draft), although the South Korean government claimed sovereignty over Dokdo (Jukdo) in thevicinity of Ulleungdo under jurisdiction of North Gyeongsang province, it wished to urge theprovincial government to look into the issue further because Japan, too, made a similar claim.58
In response, the governor of North Gyeongsang province submitted “ 독 도 ( 죽 도 ) 에 관한 조 사 의 건 ” [On the investigation in the Dokdo (Jukdo) issue], drafted on September 1,
1951, which contained no document to indicate that “Dokdo” had been Koreaʼs territory before
annexation by Japan.59 While it might be noteworthy that the governorʼs reply refers to a report in1906 by a Shim Heung-Taeg, the head of Ul-do county, which reported Japanese officials who had
visited the island had notified that Japan had incorporated Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture in
1905, this report was not about the Korean Empireʼs protest against the Japanese governmentʼsannexation of Takeshima in the previous year nor was it to confirm grounds to Koreaʼs territorial
claim derived from the peaceful and continuous display of national sovereignty.
Although Foreign Minister Byun Young-tae insisted in his September 21, 1951, letter to57

ANZ document, supra note 47, p. 9.

58“ 독도 ( 죽도 ) 에 관한 조사의 건 ” [On the investigation in the Dokdo (Jukdo) issue] compiled by
Local Administration Division, Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Interior and Safety in 1951
(National Archives of Korea register number BA0182403). The instruction from the Ministr y ofInterior and Safety is found on p. 27. Since it is described to be “in the vicinity of Ulleungdo,” there is apossibility that the ministry confused Jukdo, a small island adjacent to Ulleungdo, with Dokdo.

59

Ibid. Copy of Shim Heung-Taegʼs report is found on p. 14.

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Muccio60 that “we have substantial documented evidence to prove that the isle has been in the
Korean procession for many hundred years,” he failed to present said “documented evidence.”
Instead, Byun called attention to two directives issued by General Headquarters, the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP). One was SCAPIN-677, which had suspended
Japan ʼ s administrative authority over Takeshima. The other was SCAPIN-1033, which had
instituted the MacArthur Line and prohibited Japanese access to or contact with Takeshima. In
particular, Byun claimed that SCAPIN-677 was a “conclusive factor” to determine sovereignty
over Takeshima. It should be recalled, however, that it was clearly stipulated in these directives
themselves that they were by no means the ultimate determination about Japanʼs territor y.
Therefore, Byunʼs claim was, simply, void.
In a letter from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to the State Department, dated the October
3, 1951,61 it is stated as follows, in regard to “substantial documented evidence” as Byon had
boasted:[A]n officer of the Embassy was orally informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs thatsuch evidence appears throughout Korean and Japanese historical archives. The implication
was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not possess a compliment of such “evidence” atthis time. Although it was pointed out to the Minister that the Embassy would welcome thesubmission of such “evidence” for transmittal to the Department, it appears doubtful that suchinformation will be forthcoming.
And this conjecture of the U.S. Embassy that South Korea did not possess “a compilation ofsuch evidence” was proven to be correct. In the exchange of views on the grounds for sovereignty
over Takeshima between the Japanese and South Korean governments launched in 1953, the60

A letter from Yung Tai PYUN, South Korean Foreign Minister to Muccio, the U.S. Ambassador to South
Korea, on September 21, 1951 (NARA, RG59, Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to theInternal Affairs of Korea, 1950–54 Department of State Decimal File 795.022/10-351).* The present
author had once referred to the possibility that the South Korean government had not obtained theRusk documents or the documents had not been shared inside the government. (Fujii Kenji, “Takeshima
mondai ni kansuru Nichi-Kan ryōkoku seifu no kenkai no kōkan ni tsuite (Ge)” [On exchange of viewson the Takeshima issue between the Japanese and Korean governments: Part 2], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru7, no.2 (March 2018) pp. 59–60). As of today, the latter seems more plausible. Byun referred to “Dokdo,
known as ʻLiancourt Rocksʼ and also as ʻ Takeshimaʼ in Japanese” in his letter, which is quite similar to “theisland of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks” in the Rusk documents, hintingthat at least Byun must have read the Rusk documents.

61

A letter from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to the State Department (NARA, RG59, Records of the U.S.
Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1950–54 Department of State Decimal File
795.022/10-351).*At this point, the U.S. Embassy in South Korea was not aware that Koreaʼs request
for Takeshima had been rejected. Thus, it is stated, “the Embassy would welcome the submission ofsuch ʻevidence.ʼ” It was in November 1952 that the Embassy was notified of this fact. See Tsukamoto
Takashi. “Takeshima ryōyūken funsō ni kanrensuru Beikoku Kokumushō bunsho (tsuiho)-shiryō” [U.S.
Department of State document related to the Takeshima territorial dispute (supplement) references],
Takeshima mondai ni kansuru choˉsa kenkyu
ˉ saishuˉ hoˉkokusho [Final report of the research on theTakeshima issue] compiled by Takeshima Mondai Kenkyūkai (General Affairs Division, General Affairs
Department, Shimane Prefecture, March 2007), pp. 82–83. The aforementioned NARA, RG84, Recordsof the Foreign Service Posts of State, Entry 2846, Korea, Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records,
1953–55, Box 12 also contains the same document.

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South Korean side was unable to refute the Japanese argument.62
Thus, the South Korean side could not discover grounds to support its sovereignty overTakeshima and it was confirmed by the Treaty of San Francisco that Takeshima would remain
a Japanese territory. These unfavorable circumstances notwithstanding, at the 98th session of
the State Council of the Republic of Korea on September 7, 1951, the South Korean government
passed a bill to institute a fisher y protection zone, in which Japanese fishing boats were notallowed to operate, and included Takeshima within this zone.63 On January 18, 1952, President
I Seung-Man issued the Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over Adjacent Seas coveringa vast sea area, including Takeshima at the east end of this sea zone.64 This was South Koreaʼs
attempt to obtain with a unilateral declaration what it had failed to gain diplomatically.

Closing Remarks
As it went through the drafting process of the Treaty of San Francisco, the U.S. government had
decided by 1950 on the policy to recognize Japanʼs sovereignty over Takeshima. Recognition
was given on the grounds to territorial claim derived from the “peaceful and continuous displayof national sovereignty. ” Accepting the U.K. argument during the U.S.-U.K. working-level
consultations in April–May 1951 that it would be desirable to dispose islands between Japan and
Korea by specific mention in order to prevent future disputes, the U.S. government agreed to
explicitly enumerate Korean island territories that Japan was to renounce. In return, the U.K.
government agreed to drop the idea of enclosing Japanʼs territory with a line and withdraw the
proposal to put Takeshima out of Japanʼs territor y. Consequently, the Korean territories that
the U.S.-U.K. joint draft proposed Japan renounce encompassed the islands of Quelpart, Port
Hamilton, and Dagelet but did not include Takeshima. The policy of the United States that Japan
should retain Takeshima was shared by the U.K. government, and this formed the “Allied Powersʼ
stance.”In May 1951, the South Korean government demanded Tsushima. In July, the United States
turned down this demand to take away the island from Japan. The South Korean demand had
made from the fictious position of itself as a member of the Allied Powers, the war victors. After
this U.S. rejection, South Korea requested Australia to support its quest for demilitarization of
Tsushima. The same month of July, when South Korea lobbied the United States for Takeshima
and requested Australiaʼs support, South Korea again cited the security need to counter the
threat of Japan as its grounds for its demand. Here, one can detect South Koreaʼs hidden agenda
62

Fujii Kenji, “Takeshima mondai ni kansuru Nichi-Kan ryōkoku seifu no kenkai no kōkan ni tsuite (Jo)”[On exchange of views on the Takeshima issue between the Japanese and Korean governments: Part1], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru 7, no.1 (October 2017), “Takeshima mondai ni kansuru Nichi-Kan ryōkoku
seifu no kenkai no kōkan ni tsuite (Ge)” [On exchange of views on the Takeshima issue between theJapanese and Korean governments: Part 2], Toˉsho Kenkyu
ˉ Ja
ˉ naru 7, no.2 (March 2018); Fujii Kenji,“Takeshima gyorō to 1970-nendai no Takeshima mondai: horon―Kankoku no Takeshima mondai eno
ninshiki” [Takeshima fishery and the Takeshima issue in the 1970s: addendum―Koreaʼs perceptionof the Takeshima issue], Dai 4-ki Shimaneken Takeshima Mondai Kenkyūkai ed., Dai 4-ki Takeshima
mondai ni kansuru choˉsa kenkyu
ˉ saishuˉ hoˉkokusho [Final report of the study on the Takeshima issue
phase 4], General Affairs Division, General Affairs Department, Shimane Prefecture (March 2020).

63한국의 어업보호정책 : 평화선 선포 , 1949–52 [Fishery protection policy of Republic of Korea: proclamationof peace line 1949–52] 1952. pp. 1485–93 (Collection of South Korean Diplomatic Archives catalogue
number 743.4, register number 458).

64

The Presidential Proclamation did not include the grounds for Koreaʼs territorial claim on Takeshima.
Although it proclaimed that welfare and defense of the state had to be eternally guaranteed (Extra issue
of official bulletin on January 18, 1952, collection of official archives of Republic of Korea), the UnitedStates had not approved Koreaʼs sovereignty over Takeshima on the grounds of security need, as
previously stated.

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Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco and Takeshima –With a Focus on the Negotiation Process in 1951–

to make the Allied Powers countries recognize Tsushimaʼs importance for Koreaʼs security in theface of the threat of Japan, so as to set a precedent which could be used as leverage to convince
them of the importance of Takeshima for Koreaʼs security.
The demand for Takeshima having been decided on ver y short notice might be why theSouth Korean side referred to Takeshima only as Dokdo and was, in fact, even unable to provide
precise coordinates for the island. Bewildered by these unfathomable requests from South Korea,
neither the United States nor Australia responded affirmatively. And once Dokdo was foundto be Takeshima, the U.S. government notified South Korea in August 1951 through the Rusk
documents of the “Allied Powersʼ stance” that Japan was to retain Takeshima. Thus notified, South
Korea no longer possessed grounds for territorial rights over Takeshima that could supersede
the “Allied Powersʼ stance.” And there is no trace of South Koreaʼs argument for sovereignty overTakeshima for security reasons being considered among the Allies.
Nevertheless, even when it was notified by the United States that Takeshima would be
retained by Japan and even though it could not produce grounds for its sovereignty over theisland, South Korea would not stop its drive for unlawful occupation of Takeshima. One cannot
but suspect that at the core of South Koreaʼs demand for Takeshima was the same irresistible
craving for acquiring a territory from Japan as a member of the Allied Powers (a war victor) as
was detected in its earlier demand for Tsushima.

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Japan Review Vol.4 No.2 Winter 2021