IAEA MINISTEM
ERIAL CONFE
C
RENCE
E
ON
O NUC
CLEAR SAFETYY
Vienna,, 20–24 Ju
une 2011

C
CHAIR
RPERSOONS’ SUMM
S
MARIE
ES

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The attached texts are the Chairpersons’ summaries of the main proposals that emerged fromthe Working Sessions and the issues that were discussed. Where appropriate, points raised at
the Plenary Sessions are also reflected in the texts.

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1. Preliminary Assessment of the Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Stations and Actions for Safety Improvements
Strengthening the IAEA Safety Standards
1. The IAEA was encouraged to review and strengthen, as appropriate, its Safety Standards
in all areas related to: design requirements, with particular emphasis on defence in depth, lowprobability beyond design basis accidents, singly and in combination, and severe accident
management for single-unit and, more especially, multi-unit sites, including extended loss ofultimate heat sink and essential supplies, hydrogen management, post-accident monitoringand safety of spent fuel storage. Further topics include, but are not limited to, the use of
hardened emergency response centres on sites, and the availability and capability of site staff
to work under severe accident conditions.
2. The IAEA was encouraged to play a leading role in collecting the results of all relevant
analyses of lessons learned in the assessment, management and communication of all theconsequences of the accident. This could serve as important input for the review and updatingof IAEA Safety Standards. To this end, consideration could be given to IAEA missions tolook in more detail at specific areas such as external hazard assessment, controlling public
exposure and remediation of evacuated areas.
3. All Member States were encouraged to make a firm commitment to apply the IAEA
Safety Standards in their national arrangements for ensuring nuclear safety in a transparent
and open way. This could ensure that the highest and most robust levels of nuclear safety are
in place in all Member States.
4. It is imperative for new countries embarking on nuclear programmes to fully implement
IAEA Safety Standards, to integrate lessons learned from the Fukushima accident into thedevelopment of their programmes and to demonstrate complete preparedness to operate
nuclear power plants (NPPs) before commissioning the first reactor.
5. Contracting parties to international conventions were encouraged to initiate an update of
the conventions in the light of the Fukushima accident. For example, the Convention on
Nuclear Safety (CNS) can be enhanced by taking into account areas such as transparency, theindependence of regulatory bodies, emergency preparedness and the peer review process.
Safety Reviews
6. It is important for all Member States to systematically review the safety of all NPPs,
including the safety margins and design basis assumptions for both new and operating plants.
It is important to take into account site specific characteristics and features, including low
probability extreme events previously not included in original design and engineering
considerations.
7. It was suggested that internationally harmonized review methodologies (e.g. stress tests)
be implemented by all Member States. The IAEA could play a leading role in thedevelopment of these methodologies on a coordinated basis.
8. Member States were strongly encouraged to report the results of safety reviews and their
responses to lessons learned at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the
CNS in 2012.

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9. It was suggested that the IAEA could assist in carrying out peer reviews of nationalsafety reviews, using the services of international expert teams and make the results publicly
available. This could enhance the openness and credibility of national safety reviews.
10. It was suggested that consideration be given to making the IAEA’s plant specific safety
review services (OSART, EPREV) and its Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
mandatory for all countries operating and constructing nuclear power plants and make theresults publicly available. The IAEA was asked to include in its plant specific safety review
services and IRRS missions the implications of the Fukushima accident and share the lessons
learned and good practices drawn from Member States.
11. A mechanism could be developed to select the particular NPPs to be reviewed by the
IAEA expert team and make the results publicly available. This may be a random process,but the initial focus should probably be put on older NPPs.
12. The IAEA was encouraged to establish a design peer review service based on commonly
accepted methodologies and criteria.
Role of Organizations in Nuclear Safety
13. While recognizing that the operator has prime responsibility for nuclear safety, all parties(governments, operating organizations, regulatory bodies, technical support organizations,research organizations, WANO, OECD/NEA, etc.) which have a role to play in nuclear safety
should work together, respecting their different roles and responsibilities, to maximize thebenefits of the lessons learned. The IAEA was encouraged to facilitate the dialogue andinteraction between the various stakeholders.
14. The IAEA was encouraged to give enhanced support to operating organizations, whichhave the prime responsibility for nuclear safety. This could include improving
communication between the IAEA and the representatives of the operators and establishing aforum for enhanced communication between the various parties.
15. In spite of all recent efforts there is still room for improvement in understanding theconcept of safety culture and implementing it effectively worldwide in the management of all
NPPs.
16. Mechanisms for responding to and managing a nuclear accident need to be enhanced,
both within and between countries. The mechanisms could include the sharing of
information, resources and emergency equipment, if necessary.
17. The existence of credible, competent and independent regulators is an essential elementof nuclear safety. All countries were encouraged to reinforce their regulatory bodies andensure that they are genuinely independent, with clarity of role and appropriate authority, inall circumstances, and staffed by well trained, experienced personnel.
18. Full scientific knowledge of the technology, including the integrity and behaviour ofsystems, structures and components, including fuel elements, is key in responding to an
emergency. All Member States were encouraged to utilize more effectively research anddevelopment in these areas and in those of nuclear safety, emergency preparedness andresponse.
19. In the event of a major nuclear accident, remediation measures may be needed in order toreduce exposures to acceptable levels. Member States are encouraged to utilize existing
experience in the application of remediation techniques and make it available to Japan. This2

could be coordinated by the IAEA. Such experience is available in a number of Member
States, which would be ready to help identify the most effective situation-specificcountermeasures.
Receiving and Disseminating Information
20. Continuous improvement is a foundation stone of nuclear safety. Sharing operational
experience feedback is a vital tool for guarding against complacency and for learning lessons
from incidents and events. The IAEA should strengthen its role in the consolidation ofoperator and regulatory experience and foster interaction with industry and other international
institutions that support the safety of operations.
21. In this regard, the IAEA and WANO were encouraged to establish a mechanism to
improve their cooperation in sharing experience, and in particular to learn lessons from the
Fukushima accident, while respecting each other’s roles and limitations.
22. Review and improvement of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale(INES) are needed to make the scale more effective from a communications point of view.
23. The IAEA was encouraged to institutionalize the practice of ‘fact finding missions’, inthe case of nuclear incidents/accidents. The criteria for invoking such missions could belinked to INES.
24. All Member States and the IAEA, WANO, WNA and other national and internationalorganizations were encouraged to improve public information on nuclear energy, radiationand other nuclear issues. This will help to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, fear andresistance against the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and help to build trust in the
global nuclear community.
25. Japan was encouraged to continue sharing the results, in the open way they already have,of evaluations of the accident and lessons learned. This, together with the comprehensive
report already provided by Japan1 to the IAEA, and the results of the fact finding mission2,
will enable a uniform understanding of the facts. It is also important that Japan keep theinternational community informed about the implementation of major actions, including
progress in the actions defined in TEPCO’s ‘Road Map’.
26. It was suggested that in response to an emergency the IAEA should expand its role toinclude engineering analysis, simulation of technological processes and prediction of how
systems, structures and components will behave. This could be achieved by increasing the
IAEA’s existing capacity or with the involvement of national and international engineeringand research institutions. This information should be shared on a timely basis with all
Member States.

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Report of the Japanese Government:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html
2Fact Finding Mission Report:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-FukushimaMission_Report.pdf

32. Emergency Preparedness and Response
International Emergency Preparedness and Response Framework
1. Legal instruments for the international emergency preparedness and response framework
were adopted 25 years ago and inevitably reflect the prevailing concerns at that time. Possible
ways to strengthen these instruments should be considered.
2. The IAEA’s role in response to a radiation emergency should be broadened to enable it to
conduct analysis of emergency conditions, progression, possible scenarios for emergency
development, consequences, associated radiological impact and response actions, and toshare this analysis with Member States. To fulfill this function effectively, a broader scope of
information (data, analysis and other information) should be provided to the IAEA. The
responsibility of States to promptly and continuously provide information needs to beemphasized.
3. A preliminary examination of the IAEA Safety Standards on preparedness and response
related to severe reactor emergencies such as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant indicates that the relevant standards address the issues adequately. However,these standards need to be carefully reviewed and enhanced, as appropriate, as understandingof the Fukushima accident develops. Additional guidance on taking protective and otheractions based on environmental data analysis and assessment following a release to ensure
public safety should be developed.
4. To better cope with serious emergencies, international assistance arrangements andcapabilities should be strengthened by enhancing the IAEA’s Response and Assistance
Network (RANET) and by implementing its improved guidelines to ensure assistancecompatibility and effectiveness. States may wish to extend national capabilities registeredunder RANET to cover special technical capabilities (e.g. remotely controlled equipment,
robots) and expertise in different areas (crisis management, nuclear power plant designs,etc.), thus establishing an international pool of experts. Regional RANET coverage needs tobe extended. Registered RANET capabilities and arrangements should be appraised throughregular review missions and through regional and international emergency exercises.
5. There is scope for reinforcement of emergency notification, reporting and information
sharing arrangements and capabilities. In addition, the newly developed protected web site of
the IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies, which
replaces the Early Notification and Assistance Convention web site, needs to be fully
implemented to ensure efficient and effective information sharing and to enable effective
activation of international assistance.
6. Strengthening of the international emergency preparedness and response framework
should take into account recommendations given in the International Action Plan forStrengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear andRadiological Emergencies.
7. Member States should consider making use of systematic and regular Emergency
Preparedness Review (EPREV) and follow-up missions to appraise national emergency
preparedness and response arrangements and capabilities to ensure their continuous
improvement.

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8. Real time on-line radiation monitoring systems are operational or planned in Statesworldwide. While the purposes of such systems may vary, the data from them could be usefulin emergency situations related to atmospheric radioactive releases. An integrated, worldwide
monitoring and display system using available national and international early warning
systems as the global radiation monitoring platform for displaying real time data onradioactive releases would benefit all States and relevant international organizations.
National and Regional Emergency Preparedness and Response
9. Universal implementation of the IAEA Safety Standards on emergency preparedness andresponse at the national level would improve preparedness and response, facilitatecommunication in an emergency and contribute to harmonization of national criteria forprotective and other actions. It was also noted that cooperation among national authorities,
utilities and technical support organizations could be strengthened. The capabilities andarrangements of national authorities to communicate risk to the public should be
strengthened. States may wish to consider establishing national rapid response teams that
could also be available internationally.
10. It would be helpful for standardized and reliable methodologies to be put in place in all
IAEA Member States to estimate the source term 1 , to analyse and evaluate radiologicalmonitoring data, and to assess radiological impacts to the population in affected areas via all
exposure pathways.
11. Timely estimates of exposure of the general public from accidental releases are importantfor both the planning and implementation of protective and other actions in local and regional
areas, and for the dissemination of information on the radiological impact of the accident atgreater distances, including the impact on neighbouring countries.
12. It would be helpful for knowledge and experience gained concerning the effectiveness ofprotective and other actions, as well as the interaction of national and local authorities withthe public, to be shared by an ‘Accident State’ with the IAEA and neighbouring countries.
13. Joint international studies to assess the possible long term implications and fullconsequences of a nuclear accident and associated radioactive releases to the environment at
the local, regional and global levels are important. Such studies should include an assessmentof the impacts on health, land use, agriculture, fishery, tourism, the environment and industry.
14. Training and emergency response exercises are a key component of a good emergency
preparedness programme and provide a powerful tool for verifying and improving the qualityof emergency arrangements and capabilities. All Member States are encouraged to enhance
training programmes and to participate in the international Convention Exercises (ConvEx).
Inter-agency Emergency Preparedness and Response
15. Experience from the Fukushima accident has shown the Inter-Agency Committee onRadiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) to be an effective and useful mechanism.
However, it should now be carefully reviewed and enhanced, and relevant organizations thatare not yet members of IACRNE should be encouraged to become members.

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The amount and isotopic composition of radioactive material released (or postulated to be released) from afacility during an accident.

516. The Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations(JPLAN) also demonstrated its usefulness. However, additional operational procedures andbilateral protocols to support its implementation and reduce the response times should be
developed.
17. The existing ConvEx exercise regime should be regularly used to test the level of
preparedness of relevant international organizations and to help ensure efficient andcoordinated interagency responses.

63. The Global Nuclear Safety Framework
1. In the light of the Fukushima accident, the strengthening of the global nuclear safety
framework is necessary to ensure the highest level of nuclear safety in every State that uses
nuclear energy. The prime responsibility for safety rests with the operators, subject toscrutiny by national regulators. Various international bodies, operating within an international
nuclear safety framework, monitor and reinforce their efforts.
2. The international framework for safety encompasses a variety of organizations, includingintergovernmental organizations, multinational networks among regulators, multinational
networks among operators, an increasingly international nuclear industry, non-governmentalorganizations, standard setting organizations, scientific and engineering societies, and others.
All must take responsibility for enhancing safety. These entities are linked with each other by
a cluster of conventions and other arrangements to achieve common safety objectives.
Role of the IAEA
3. The IAEA plays a central role and is the appropriate international focal point forstrengthening the global nuclear safety framework.
4. Improvements to the global nuclear safety framework will require a significant
enhancement of the IAEA’s budget dedicated to safety in order to respond to the Fukushima
accident and to help prevent future accidents.
IAEA Safety Standards
5. The IAEA Safety Standards represent the common reference for nuclear safety. However,
not all Member States apply them, and those States that do apply them may not always
implement them fully. All Member States were encouraged to commit to making nationalsafety standards consistent with those of the IAEA.
6. The details of the Fukushima accident will become clearer over time. The IAEA should
review and update its Safety Standards, as necessary, to incorporate the lessons learned fromthe Fukushima accident. Special attention needs to be paid to those standards pertaining tomultiple severe hazards, such as tsunamis and earthquakes, and their impact on single-unit
and multi-unit sites. Standards that deal with preparedness for prolonged power blackouts andwith cooling of both reactors and spent fuel storage facilities under severe accident conditions
should also be reviewed.
Convention on Nuclear Safety
7. In order to ensure that all safety issues are fully considered, it was suggested that there bea review of the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and its associated review
mechanisms, both of which form an important part of the global nuclear safety framework. A
proposal to amend the Convention has already been submitted to the IAEA by a Member
State for circulation to Contracting Parties. If an amendment to the Convention is undertaken,
it might appropriately incorporate, among other matters, stronger requirements related to theconcept of effective regulatory independence. However, the response to the Fukushima
accident should not await the amendment of the Convention.

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International Peer Reviews
8. The important role of independent international peer reviews of national regulatory
frameworks and nuclear installations should be reinforced as part of the process of ensuringthat there is continuous improvement of safety and proper regulation of nuclear installations.
These peer reviews provide recommendations to improve safety and serve to exert peerpressure to ensure that every State with nuclear installations recognizes its safety
responsibility and is able and committed to meet the IAEA Safety Standards. The IAEA
should include consideration of the implications of the Fukushima accident in its peer
reviews of regulatory frameworks and nuclear installations, and should seek to ensure that thelessons learned from the accident and resulting good practices developed by the Member
States are widely shared.
9. In addition, the IAEA’s safety review services are currently being carried out in Member
States on a purely voluntary basis. While safety review services are requested by someMember States, they have not been sought by all. Moreover, there are instances where
reviews have been carried out without follow-up to monitor implementation of previous
recommendations. Member States should take advantage of the review services and respondpromptly to the results.
10. It was felt that the IAEA peer review services needed to be accorded a greater profile toenhance public confidence in the national and international arrangements for safety. It wassuggested that the schedule of planned peer review missions should be published along withthe respective mission results and, if applicable, the associated follow-up results. Those
Member States with a nuclear power programme that have participated in the IAEA peer
review process could be identified, along with those that have yet to participate.
11. It was proposed that Member States with nuclear power programmes consider giving
prior consent to the IAEA to perform systematic, regular international peer reviews ofregulatory effectiveness, operational safety and emergency preparedness. There should also
be follow-up to review the implementation of previous recommendations.
12. The Fukushima accident has highlighted the need for thorough and transparent nationalsafety assessments (or ‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants. Many licensees and national
regulators are undertaking these assessments. The Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting
Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in August 2012 provides an opportunity for theinternational sharing of the lessons from these activities. There was a suggestion that the
IAEA develop a service that focuses on (a) safety margins against extreme natural hazards,
such as earthquakes, tsunamis and floods, and (b) the regulatory implications of the
Fukushima accident. Such assessments could be carried out within the next 12–18 months.
The lessons learned, including an assessment of the regulatory responses to the Fukushima
accident, should also be incorporated into existing services.
13. It was proposed that Member States with nuclear power programmes receive a peer
review of regulatory effectiveness (e.g. the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service)every 10 years. It was also suggested that, with some reinforcement of its present capabilities,
the IAEA could conduct an international safety review of one nuclear power plant in 10 overa period of three years, since reviewing all 440 operating nuclear reactors around the world ina short period of time is not realistic. The results of these assessments, which would include
operational safety peer reviews of nuclear power plants (e.g. OSART missions andsite/design reviews), could then be disseminated to Member States.

8International Cooperation
14. Member States were encouraged to recognize the importance of international cooperationand collaboration in enhancing safety and regulation. Member State expert participation wasconsidered vital for the IAEA’s peer review services and for the further development of the
IAEA Safety Standards.
Regulatory Independence
15. There is a need to strengthen national regulatory systems so that they have the necessarycompetence and power to ensure that there is a proper response to any safety concerns, and toensure their effective independence. Regulatory systems need to operate in an environment
without political influence and undue financial constraints, and regulators should be
empowered to make timely safety decisions. It was recognized that effective regulatory
independence is one of the main pillars for strengthening nuclear safety.
Newcomer Countries
16. Countries embarking on nuclear power programmes need to participate fully in the global
nuclear safety framework. They should become contracting parties to the relevantinternational legal instruments, apply the IAEA Safety Standards, and make use of theassociated IAEA review services. These activities will contribute to building the necessary
national infrastructure that is essential for safety. The newcomer countries need todemonstrate that an emergency preparedness and response programme is in place and thatthey have the capability to manage severe accidents before startup of the first nuclear
installation.
Research
17. The Fukushima accident will provide the opportunity for safety research on fuelperformance and accident progression, among other matters. This research should beundertaken and the results should be widely shared so that the necessary adjustments to safety
requirements can be made by all.
Operating Experience
18. There is now about 14 000 reactor-years of experience with nuclear power plants aroundthe globe. This wealth of operational experience should be made available in a user friendly
form so that all participants in the nuclear enterprise can benefit. The efforts undertaken by
the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) in this regard are important for
operators, and there should be parallel and substantive efforts by regulators to enhance theknowledge basis from operating experience.
Remediation
19. Japan confronts a major challenge in the remediation of contaminated land areas. It
should obtain the benefit of knowledge from international experts and, in turn, the lessons
from experience should be made available to the international community.
Transparency
20. The Fukushima accident has understandably shaken public confidence in the safety of
nuclear activities. These concerns should be publicly acknowledged and confronted honestly.
Transparency in dealing with safety related issues is an important component in building
public confidence.

9Abbreviations and Acronyms
ConvExConvention Exercises

CNS

Convention on Nuclear Safety

EPREV

Emergency Preparedness Review

IACRNEInter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies

INES

International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

JPLAN

Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International
Organizations

NPP

nuclear power plant

OECD/NEAOECD Nuclear Energy Agency

OSART

Operational Safety Review Team

RANET

Response and Assistance Network

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

WNA

World Nuclear Association

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