Territorial Conflicts in Europe: Possible Lessons for Japan?

Territorial Conflicts in Europe: Possible Lessons for Japan?
Valérie Niquet

Abstract
Territorial conflicts in Europe are complex and determined by geopolitical, strategic,
historical, and ideological factors. The European Union, consisting of member states, hasagreed to submit to certain principles and rules to limit escalation risks. These disputes aremanaged through diplomatic means and rules of law and arbitration, rather than force. Japan
faces conflicts in Asia, such as China and the Senkaku question, which are manifestations ofdeeper tensions. Comparing these conflicts is difficult but may be enlightening due to theirfundamental differences.

T

erritorial issues are complex issues that are determined by geopolitical and strategic
factors as well as historical and ideological factors. In Europe, even within theEuropean Union, there are or have been numerous territorial conflicts between nationstates constituted according to the Westphalian system. Some of these conflicts havebeen resolved, others remain unresolved, and the degree of tension, including military tension,varies. However, territorial disputes involving one or more members of the European Union arevery different from those facing Japan in its own geographical area.
One of the fundamental reasons for this is that the European Union, whatever its borders, iscomposed of member states that, in order to join, have agreed to submit to a certain number ofprinciples and rules that help to limit or control the risks of escalation. Territorial disputes are notsystematically resolved, but they are managed through diplomacy and the application of rules,
laws and arbitration rather than through the use or threat of force.
In this context, the question arises whether a comparison is possible. According to Diez,
Stetter, and Albert, four types of conflicts can be defined that involve or have involved EU states―conflict episodes, issue conflicts, identity conflicts, and subordination conflicts―with thelast two types having an existential dimension for the political regime or the population. 1 While
the first two types (conflict episodes and issue conflicts) are more common in Europe than thelast two, it is the last two (identity and subordination conflicts), sometimes combined with thesecond, that Japan faces in Asia. One of the fundamental differences is the general willingness ofEuropean member States―despite exceptions often related to the recent nature of the Europeansocialization process or to the involvement of a non-EU member State―to reach a settlement or atleast to avoid escalation. In Asia, on the other hand, conflicts express a fundamental disagreement
and allow the use of force (military or non-military) or tension as a means of managing bilateralrelations. In other words, the conflicts Japan faces in Asia are manifestations of deeper tensions
that have little to do with the object of the conflict itself. In the case of China and the Senkaku
issue, behind the territorial issue are threats of escalation, i.e., the intensification of military or
quasi-military activities on the part of the PRC (Peopleʼs Republic of China) aimed at establishing
1

Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, Mathias Albert, “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The
Transformative Power of Integration,” International organization, vol. 60, n°3 (Cambridge University
Press, Summer 2006).

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Valérie Niqueta balance of power with Japan in the region and beyond.
The comparison is therefore difficult, but perhaps instructive, because of these fundamental
differences.
Contrary to popular belief, there are more than twenty active conflicts involving EU states,
either among themselves, with entities not recognized as states (autonomist or independence
movements), or with non-EU states. Despite common elements, each conflict is dif ferent,
including in the number and characteristics of the actors involved, and we will not deal with all theconflicts facing the European Union. Because they are too different from the issues facing Japan,
we will also not deal with internal conflicts that historically have often been the most violent, witha dimension of cultural tension as well as terrorism or civil war, such as the Basque question,
Northern Ireland, or Catalonia. We have chosen to focus on conflicts within the European Union
using four examples: France and the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, Slovenia andCroatia, and one conflict involving an EU state (Greece) and a non-EU state (Turkey). These fourconflicts offer a gradation of tension, from the least tense (France–Netherlands) to the tensest(Greece–Turkey). In addition, we will focus not on the legal conditions, as views on legitimacy are
generally divided among possible interpretations, but on the resolution or non-resolution of theseconflicts and the determining factors in this resolution―or non-resolution―of the conflicts.

France and the Netherlands: a resolved conflict in the Caribbean
The conflict
Once again, contrary to popular belief, not all conflicts involving EU member States take place
on European territory; some arise in far-off lands. One conflict emblematic of this type involves
France and the Netherlands and is a legacy of the 17th century. On March 23, 1648, the Treaty ofConcordia (Traité du Mont des Accords in French), consisting of nine articles originally written
in Latin, defined the terms of coexistence between the two parts of Saint Martin, an island divided
between the Kingdom of France and the United Provinces (Netherlands).2 According to the textof the agreement, which was imprecise in its wording, France received 56 km2 of the territory of
the island, located in the Caribbean Sea 250 km from Guadeloupe, and the Netherlands 34 km2.
The nine articles of the treaty provide for the peaceful coexistence of the two populations, thesharing of resources, a form of judicial cooperation and the free settlement of each in its preferredzone. The Treaty of Concordia was confirmed and clarified by the Franco–Dutch Convention ofNovember 28, 1839, particularly with regard to the sharing of resources, judicial extradition andfree settlement. In 2015, a report submitted to the French National Assembly highlighted theneed to strengthen police cooperation between the two parts of the island, whose Dutch parthas been an autonomous state of the Netherlands since 2010 following referendums and whose
French part has become an overseas collectivity.3
While relations have long been functional, tensions rose in the 2010s, particularly over theissues of crime control and immigration, more important on the Dutch side. Due to the special
status of the Dutch part, which unlike the French part is not subject to the rules of the European
Union, the issue of money laundering linked to tax conditions in Sint Maarten has been raised, as
well as that of the difference in social rights, which encourages companies to set up in the Dutch
part.4 Although there are three border crossings, the border is open because of the constantly
invoked rule of free movement. The disputed territory is that of Oyster Pond, which is poorly
defined. In 2017, French police conducted a check on a Dutch reconstruction site after it was2

https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r2649.asp

3

Ibid.

4

https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/ile-de-saint-martin-le-business-cote-neerlandais-la-deglinguecote-francais-1233910

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Territorial Conflicts in Europe: Possible Lessons for Japan?

destroyed by a cyclone. The Dutch, who claim the entire bay, which is important for its tourist
resources, denounced this as a violation of its territory. France, which demanded that the dividing
line pass through the middle of the bay, took the issue to the UN while negotiations continued.
The current situation
After complex negotiations lasting more than six years, and despite the small size of the territory
concerned, an agreement was signed on May 26, 2023 between French Minister of the Interior
Gérald Darmanin and Prime Minister of the Autonomous Territor y of Sint Maarten Silveria
Jacobs. The French position of a median water sharing was accepted and the new agreement
renews the principle of cooperation established in the Treaty of Concordia.5
By fixing the border, the agreement, described as historic, has allowed the resumption ofwork and the development of tourism―the islandʼs main resource―in the Oyster Pond area,
which was severely affected by Hurricane Irma in 2017. It is intended to confirm the goodunderstanding between France and the Netherlands, two states of the European Union, statingthat “it illustrates the excellence of the friendly relations between France and the Netherlands.”6
The agreement also provides for the maintenance of freedom of movement and the creation ofa cross-border commission to manage issues related to tourism, fishing, education, health andsecurity.
The border conflict between France and the Netherlands, which lasted for several years, isthe lowest on the tension scale and can be defined as a conflict episode with elements of a conflictof interests.7

Spain and the United Kingdom: the insoluble question of Gibraltar
The question of Gibraltar between Spain and the United Kingdom, like the previous one, is partly
inherited from history, but it is more complex, oscillating between a conflict of identity in thetensest periods and a conflict of interests. An additional dimension is that of the will of the local
population concerned. This is a factor that the British never took into account when they handed
over their colony of Hong Kong to the PRC, as Beijing rejected the very principle of consulting
the population.
The conflict
Gibraltar is a British overseas territory that was ceded to the British Crown by the Treaty of
Utrecht on July 13, 1713, after having been captured in 1704. The Treaty of Utrecht ended thethe Spanish Succession War (1701–1713), in which Spain, France, Great Britain, Austria, and theNetherlands were involved. Under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, the King of Spain ceded
Gibraltar, the fortress and its port “forever” to the British Crown. In addition to Spainʼs regularlystated desire to see an end to “British colonization” and the return of Gibraltar to Spain, the most
specific points of contention today concern the portion of the territory extending from the citywalls as they existed in 1704 to the current border marked by the British in 1804 and materialized
in 1908.8 Spain also disputes the United Kingdomʼs right to territorial waters around Gibraltar

5

https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/signature-dun-accord-entre-france-etpays-bas-relatif-a-frontiere

6

Ibid.

7

Thomas Diez et. al. Op.cit.

8

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/36604.htm

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and its port.9 Today, 27% of the worldʼs maritime trade passes through the Strait of Gibraltar.
During World War II, Gibraltar played an important role for the Allies, while Francoʼs Spain was
officially neutral. Since 1945, however, Spain has reasserted its claim to Gibraltar. Under Francoʼs
dictatorship, Spain demanded the return of Gibraltar in gratitude for its neutrality during WorldWar II, and sought the support of the UN, which in fact favored “decolonization” before 1969.
The Spaniards demanded the return of Gibraltar to Spain, the annulment of the Treaty of Utrecht
while nonetheless allowing the British to maintain a military base in Gibraltar―at a time when,
especially during the Cold War, control of the Strait was vital for NATO, of which Spain was nota member10―and the guarantee of a special status for the inhabitants of Gibraltar under UN
guarantee. However, the will of the people of Gibraltar to remain British has been reaffirmed timeand again. The first referendum was held in 1967, and in 1969 Gibraltar was granted a form of
self-government by the Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969. The gist of the constitution was that “thesovereign status shall not be altered without the consent of the people of Gibraltar.”11 To protest
this rejection, the government in Madrid gradually closed the border and all points of land contact
with Gibraltar in 1967. Other referendums have been held, most notably in 2002, when the peopleof Gibraltar also rejected the principle of joint Spanish–UK sovereignty proposed by Spain.
In the name of the right of peoples to self-determination, the British authorities refuse to
discuss the sovereignty of Gibraltar and a bilateral agreement with Spain without the consent of
the inhabitants.
After Francoʼs death and the adoption of a democratic constitution in Spain in 1978, thesituation eased considerably, accentuated by Spain ʼ s gradual accession to the European
Community and NATO. In 1980, the Spanish and British foreign ministers signed the “Lisbon
Declaration,” in which both countries declared their willingness “to resolve the question of
Gibraltar in a spirit of friendship, to overcome differences, to re-establish communication and todevelop cooperation, while reaffirming their position on questions of sovereignty.”12 The border
was reopened in 1985, on the eve of Spainʼs entry into the European Community in 1986.
New plans for joint sovereignty were proposed by Spain in 1985, but were again rejected by
the people of Gibraltar. In 2006, Britain, Spain and Gibraltar signed a cooperation agreement, theCordoba Agreement, to improve communication, and in 2009 the Spanish foreign minister visited
Gibraltar for the first time.13
However, tensions have not gone away. In 2009, Britain denounced incursions by the Spanish
coastguard into what London considers its territorial waters, and the Spanish press criticized therestructuring of the Spanish military presence in the Strait to the benefit of the British.14 New
tensions over fishing rights emerged in 2013.

9

Gerry OʼReilly, “Gibraltar: Sovereignty Disputes and Territorial Waters”, IBRU Boundary and Security
Bulletin, Spring 1999 on https://www.durham.ac.uk/media/durham-university/research-/researchcentres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases/publications-database/boundary-ampsecurity-bulletins/bsb7-1_oreilly.pdf.

10Spain joined NATO in 1982.

11https://www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi/legislations/gibraltar-constitution-order-1969-1835

12

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/36604.htm

13

https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2006/09/19/34333-accords-historiques-sur-gibraltar.html

14“Espana cede el control del estrecho”, ABC, 09-03-2009 on https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-espanacede-control-estrecho-200903090300-913640194561_noticia.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.
com%2F

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Territorial Conflicts in Europe: Possible Lessons for Japan?

The current situation
The Gibraltar issue, which also involves two EU member States, although Spain only joined in1986 and the United Kingdom left the EU in 2020 after Brexit, is therefore unresolved, but has
not escalated dramatically and is still being managed by diplomatic means, especially since Spain
became a democratic power after the end of Francoism. At the time of Brexit, Spain used its status
as a member state of the European Union by threatening to use its veto until the President of theCommission, the President of the Council and all the member states signed a document statingthat “no agreement on Gibraltar can take place without the agreement of Spain.” The sovereignty
issue has not been resolved and the UK position remains that no agreement can be reachedwithout the consent of the people of Gibraltar. One of the reasons for Spainʼs opposition to thesetalks is also the question of separatism that the Madrid government is facing in other parts of thecountry.

Slovenia and Croatia: a legacy of the dissolution of Yugoslavia
Like other conflicts in the region, the conflict between Slovenia and Croatia over several border
points is a legacy of the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, but also of older tensions dating back to
the Austro–Hungarian Empire. Although Slovenia and Croatia have become two independent
states, there is no precise demarcation of the border, especially the maritime border in the Bay of
Piran.
The conflict
Croatia, citing the first part of Article 15 of UNCLOS, requests that the boundary in the Bay of
Piran be established at an equal distance from both shores. Slovenia, citing the second part ofArticle 15, which mentions exceptions based on historical rights or special circumstances, claims
the right of free access to the international waters it enjoyed when it was part of Yugoslavia.15
Discussions continued in 2000 and 2010. In 2001, the prime ministers of Slovenia andCroatia, Janez Drnovšek and Ivica Račan, signed an agreement (Drnovšek/Račan Agreement)
defining the border, including the maritime border, between the two countries in the name ofpeaceful cooperation and in the interest of both states and their citizens.16 The agreement was
ratified by the Slovenian parliament, but the Croatian parliament, influenced by nationalist andpopulist currents, refused to ratify the agreement. In 2005, the two countries signed the Brijuni
Declaration, which mentions the desire of both parties to avoid incidents at the border. In 2007,
two new prime ministers, meeting in Bled, agreed in principle to resolve the border issue bysubmitting it to the arbitration tribunal in The Hague.
Between 2008 and 2009, Slovenia blocked Croatiaʼs accession to the European Union until the
Croatian parliament passed a resolution accepting the principle of arbitration by the International
Court of Justice in The Hague. It did, and Croatia joined the European Union in 2013.
The current situation
On June 29, 2017, the Hague Court of Arbitration issued its ruling, awarding 80% of Piran Bay
to Slovenia and a high seas access corridor to Croatia.17 Slovenia has accepted the decision,
but Croatia has said it will not implement it.18 The situation between the two EU states remains
15

https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

16

https://www.assidmer.net/doc/Drnovsek-Racan_Agreement.pdf

17https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172

18

Luigi Lonardo, “Republic of Slovenia versus Republic of Croatia: Am I My Brotherʼs Keeper?
International Agreement by Member States and the Limits of the European Cour t of Justiceʼs
Jurisdiction,” European Law Review, 105 (2021)

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unresolved but, as in previous cases, does not cause major tensions between the two countries,
although nationalist sentiments are being expressed, particularly in the Croatian parliament.

Turkey and Greece: an almost existential conflict in the Aegean Sea
The fourth conflict we are considering, between a member state of the European Union and a
non-member state that has been a candidate for membership since 1999, is the one that remains
the tensest and includes a dimension of military tension, albeit limited. The conflict is neither arelatively simple conflict of interests nor an episodic one; it has a long history, going back to thehistorically conflictual relations between Christianity and Islam, between the Ottoman Empire
and Greece with the Greek War of Independence between 1821 and 1829, and continuing afterWorld War I and the partition and subsequent demise of the Ottoman Empire (1918–1922). Even
today, the relationship between Greece and Turkey is one of the tensest involving a European
Union state.
The conflict
The extremely complex conflict concerns the definition of the continental shelf, the status of theislets―former possessions of the Ottoman Empire―ceded to Greece by Italy after World War
II, and the unlawful occupation (according to Greece) by Turkey of some islets ceded directly to
Greece by the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
The conflict mobilizes divergent interpretations of the law of the sea but, as in the case ofJapan and China (Senkaku archipelago) or Japan and Korea (Takeshima), the rise of militarytensions and nationalist rhetoric is the consequence rather than the primary cause of tensions
between the two countries.
In the Aegean case, Turkey refused to sign the first continental shelf convention in 1964 and is
not a member of UNCLOS (1982) because of this territorial dispute with Greece.
Between 1987 and 1996, tensions between the two countries were particularly high, almost
reaching the level of militar y conflict, with numerous incidents around the island of Imia
(Kardak in Turkish). Between 1998 and 2010, as Turkey sought to begin the process of joining
the European Union, things calmed down. However, since 2010 and a move towards a moreauthoritarian and populist regime with the election of Recep Erdogan as president of the Republic
in 2014, tensions have flared up again.
According to Article 12 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), one of the treaties imposed on the
Ottoman Empire as a defeated power at the end of World War I, virtually all the islands, rocks
and islets in the Aegean Sea were allocated to Greece.19 Turkey was allowed to keep only those
islets that were within 2.6 nautical miles of its coastline. The most important of these are Imbros(Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Greece now accuses
Turkey of occupying 17 islets outside this 2.6 nautical mile zone, including the island of Imia/
Kardak.
In 1947, following the end of World War II, the Treaty of Ankara also ceded to Greece theDodecanese islands, which the Italians had seized from the Ottoman Empire in 1913. Turkey
believes that these islands should have been returned to Turkey at the end of World War II.
The current situation
Despite the fact that both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, the tensions between
Greece and Turkey, far from easing, are being raised by Turkey to an almost existential conflict.
The Turkish presidentʼs nationalism plays a major role in the rising tensions. Turkey denounces
the renewal of the mutual defense treaty to contribute to stability in the region signed between
19

There are approximately 1416 features.

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Territorial Conflicts in Europe: Possible Lessons for Japan?

Greece and the United States in 2021, as well as Greeceʼs “militarization of the islands” anddebates concerning the possibility of maintaining a militar y contingent on a Greek island in
the Aegean Sea, the Turkish argument being that these islands should remain demilitarized. In
October 2022, a political ally of President Erdogan declared: “The islands you occupy do not bindus...”20

Factors leading to tensions and failure to resolve crises
One of the main factors of tension remains the nationalism or national-populism of one or both ofthe parties, regardless of their common strategic interests.
For instance, in the case of South Korea with the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, relations withJapan remain highly dependent on the political evolutions in Seoul, as demonstrated by the verysignificant improvement in relations since the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol in 2022. In
Turkey also, Devlet Bahçeli, a supporter of Erdoganʼs coalition, took a particularly aggressive
stance on the issue of sovereignty over the Aegean islands on the eve of the 2023 elections. 21
In the conflict between Slovenia and Croatia, Zmago Jelinčičʼs role as leader of the nationalist
Slovenian National Party was instrumental in blocking for a time Croatiaʼs accession to theEuropean Union. In the case of Gibraltar, a nationalist dimension remains extant in Spain, albeit
less pronounced than under the dictatorship of General Franco, but it is also present in the fierce
opposition of the Gibraltarian population to being tied to Spain and their fervent desire to maintaintheir specific status as British subjects. On the other hand, this dimension was much less present
historically on the island of Saint Martin between France and the Netherlands, although this did
not prevent the conflict from requiring six years of negotiations to resolve.
In the case of Greece and Turkey, where tensions are at their highest, the membership ofboth states in NATO has not helped to resolve tensions, especially since Turkeyʼs position within
NATO and its relations with Russia have been the subject of debate, especially but not only since
the war in Ukraine began. Under these conditions, Washingtonʼs position is to express its wish
that the two parties avoid tensions.22

A peacemaking role for the European Union?
Despite its limitations, the European Union, in its various historical forms, was and is seen as animportant factor for peace on the European continent. The European framework encourages thepeaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiation and respect for international law.
Member states are expected to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner, favoring a peaceful,non-confrontational approach. After World War II, the Constitution of the European Union in its
initial form was first and foremost an instrument for bringing the Western camp closer together
and consolidating it, and it could be argued that the main factor bringing reconciliation between
France and Germany was their membership in the same “camp.”23 The resolution or preventionof conflicts on its eastern borders was also one of the main motivations for the enlargement of
the European Union after 1991. The question is whether this factor can play a role in resolving
all conflicts. Actually, the European Union has not played a significant role in resolving conflicts,
especially internal sovereignty conflicts, and it lacks the instruments to intervene in a binding
manner.
20

Ryan Gingeras, “Why Erdogan Might Choose War with Greece,” War on the Rocks, 05-10-2022.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

23

Valérie Niquet, “The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspond to the challenges of
the Japan-PRC relationship,” Japan Review, vol 5, 2022 on https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/japanreview/pdf/
JapanReview_Vol5_04_Niquet.pdf

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In matters of sovereignty internal to member states, it cannot itself mediate between member
states on issues of sovereignty, let alone impose a decision.24 Each member state determines
the boundaries of its own territory in accordance with international law.25 This does not mean,
however, that the European Union has no role to play, especially when both parties to a conflictask the European Union to mediate.
However, the European Union can act as a normative and reassuring example, not only for its
member states but perhaps even more so for those aspiring to join. For example, while Turkey
was hoping to join the European Union, tensions with Greece were lower. Similarly, Croatia
initially accepted arbitration by the Hague Tribunal to have Slovenia withdraw its veto on Croatiaʼs
accession to the European Union. However, these motivations were not strong enough to lead toreal solutions to the problems once the veto was lifted or Turkeyʼs hopes for rapid integration into
the European Union were dashed.
However, member states are also obliged to cooperate with each other and to resolve any
disputes promptly and in accordance with international law.26
Conclusion
Conflicts within the European Union involving member states are therefore by no means rare.
However, when such conflicts do occur, their level of tension―especially militar y tension―is essentially based on factors related to the political or ideological positioning of the parties
involved. Whatever legal arguments may be used or argued, including in international arbitration
at the UN or The Hague, it is the political will to defuse or even resolve the conflict that plays adecisive role. In Europe, the nationalist or populist dimension plays a role, as may be the casebetween Japan and South Korea. In conflicts involving the PRC, on the other hand, it is thedimension of power rivalr y and the Chinese regime ʼs determination to gradually change theregional status quo and the international order by force or the threat of force that is the primaryfactor in the rise or fall of tensions. In that case, the resolution and dealing with conflicts in
Europe, and particularly between European Union member States offers a very limited model.

24

Nikos Skoutaris, “Problematising the Role of the EU in Territorial Sovereignty Conflicts,” Revistas Idees,
15-02-2021 on https://revistaidees.cat/en/problematising-the-role-of-the-eu-in-territorial-sovereigntyconflicts/

25

Josef Weinzierl, “Territoriality Beyond the State: The EUʼs Territorial Claims and the Search for Their
Legitimacy,” German Law Journal, (2021)

26

Ibid.

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