The Challenges and Responses to Japan’s Maritime Security

The Challenges and Responses to Japan’s Maritime Security*
Masashi Murano**

Abstract
The challenges of maritime security facing Japan are extremely complex. During peacetimeand gray zone, the Japanese Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Force must conduct
intermittent presence patrols to dynamically deter the adversavyʼs opportunistic expansion.
However, when considering seamless escalation from low-intensity aggression to highintensity conflicts, the forward presence to address Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats needs to be deployed by distributed manner. These competing operational
demands complicate how to combine the best mix of defense posture and por tfolio
direction. The assessment of Japanʼs decision to introduce F-35Bs and modifying the Izumoclass helicopter carrier is emblematic of this complexity. Their combination of high anti-ship
attack capabilities can complicate the Peopleʼs Liberation Armyʼs fleet operations. At thesame time, however, high-value assets such as light aircraft carriers carrying latest stealthfighters will also be a priority target for China, which may in turn impose costs on Japan.
In recent years, China and Russia have also begun to conduct strategically coordinatedoperations, such as the joint patrol of Russian and Chinese bombers around Takeshima, adisputed territory between Japan and ROK. This behavior is seen as an attempt to probe theresponse of Japan and ROK and to further stimulate the deteriorating relations between thetwo countries. The U.S., Japan, and ROK need to work closely together on how to respondto these challenges.

Thank you very much for inviting me here. As some of you may know, the current Japanand China relationship is improving. For example, President Xi Jinping is scheduledto visit Japan as a state guest next year. However, looking at the East China Sea, theactivities of the Chinese Coast Guard and Peopleʼs Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and
PLA Air Force have become increasingly active rather than restrained. In other words, diplomatic
relations between Japan and China have been irrelevant to Chinaʼs behavior in the East ChinaSea.
So, what kind of activities especially is China doing in the East China Sea? I would like toat first talk about the low-intensity activities, which means these activities are not regularly
undertaken by armed forces. They are often of closed focus on the Chinese Coast Guard andmaritime police vessels.
The activities of the Chinese government vessels in the East China Sea, especially around theSenkaku Islands, have become more active and regular since Japanʼs decision to nationalize the*This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Chinaʼs Maritime
Ambitions in the First Island Chain and Beyond” held by JIIA and Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) on November 18, 2019. For more information, please visit JIIA website at https://www.
jiia-jic.jp/en/events/2019/11/chinas-maritime-ambitions-in-the-first-island-chain-and-beyond.html.

** Masashi Murano is Japan Chair Fellow at Hudson Institute.

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Masashi Murano

Senkaku Islands in 2012. The Chinese Coast Guard vessels navigate the contiguous zone almost
every day, when the weather is fine, and they enter into Japanese territorial waters three times amonth on the average―in the security and intelligence community in Tokyo, they have informallycalled these activities “3-3-2 Method.”This means that three Coast Guard vessels enter into the Japanese territorial water aroundthe Senkaku Islands three times each month, remaining in the water for two hours. But, since
September 2016, this method was upgraded to “3-4-2 Method.” In other words, the Chinese Coast
Guard increased the number of vessels from three to four.
In my understanding, the long-term Chinese objective is to create change in the status quo
and making it a fait accompli through their regular activities nearby the Senkaku and in the East
China Sea.
So, why has the Chinese Coast Guard been able to increase the number of the vessels inthe operation? This is because they are rapidly building the Coast Guard ships. For example, in2012, the Chinese Coast Guard had just 40 vessels weighing more than 1,000 tons, but now―now
meaning in 2019, this number has increased to 135.
At present, the average weight of the Chinese Coast Guard vessels operating in the East China
Sea is 3,000 tons while that of Japan Coast Guard vessels is 1,500 tons. It is obvious that JapanCoast Guard is inferior to the Chinese Coast Guard, both in quality and quantity in the East ChinaSea.
In addition to the hardware, another important point is the software, which means thecommand and control. In July 2018, the Chinese Coast Guard was placed under the commandof the Chinese Peopleʼs Armed Police Forces, under the Central Militar y Commissions. ThePeopleʼs Armed Police is a paramilitar y group, and the Chinese Coast Guard is expected tobe more closely coordinated with be the PLA than before. Japan has long sought to make thedefense posture seamless, but it cannot be overlooked that China is making progress in updating
its defense posture to be seamless and integrated.
Now, letʼs move on to the upgraded PLA forces and its characteristics. First, the intelligencegathering vessels and aircrafts are operating in the area closer to the Senkaku Islands. Second, as
the Pentagon annual reports pointed out, the over-water presence of the PLA Air Force bombers
is increasing. In particular, they are conducting joint exercise with PLA Navy vessels, including
aircraft carriers, more frequently, and most of these joint exercises go around Taiwan via Miyako
Strait and Bashi Channel.
In my understanding, those kind of strategic collaborations and operations between China andRussia had been expected as a near term potential by Japanʼs security and intelligence community.
From that perspective, couple of months ago, I had an opportunity to participate in Japan,
the U.S., and the Republic of Korea (ROK) trilateral track 1.5 and track 2 dialogue. At that time,
I mentioned and made recommendation about the potential that Chinese or Russian air force fly
over to Japanʼs air defense identification zone (ADIZ). In terms of the ADIZ in in the East China
Sea, a part of the area in Japanʼs ADIZ is overlapped with South Korean ADIZ, and Chinaʼs ADIZ.
So in that context, I recommended the ROK colleagues that Japan and South Korean air force
should have more prior discussion on how to deal with such contingencies and what the rule ofengagement would be like for our air forces if that occurs.
With some political struggle between the two countries, my perspective about the current
Japan–South Korean relationship is not so optimistic, but I think that is one of the possible areas
to cooperate with each other.
And third, the PLA operational area extended far beyond from the East China Sea. This
includes not only Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu of Japan. The concern is that most bomber,
like H-6Ks and Chinese surface ships and submarines bound for the Sea of Japan and the PacificIslands, Pacific side, can carry long-range cruise missiles.
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The Challenges and Responses to Japan’s Maritime Security

These activities are conducted in the peace time, and not necessarily in the wartime, but weneed to be aware that not only ballistic missile attack from mainland China, but also saturation
attack with the cruise missile from the mobile platforms of land, sea, and air, is becoming anemerging threat for Japan and the forward presence of the U. S.
So that is one of the major perspectives from the lower-intensity and the high-intensity
operations.
In that context, I would like to add in some other challenges. In my initial remarks, I pointed
out the low-intensity challenges and high-intensity challenges―I think it could be paraphrased as
the combination of the gray zone challenges and A2/AD challenges. The problem is how to deal
with such combination. When we face such kind of challenges, we have to consider the balance
between maintaining presence through patrol in the peacetime and reducing the vulnerabilities inthe wartime.
The issue of the gray zone has already been recognized in the security communities ofJapan by 2010. As a result, the 2010 version of the National Defense Program Guideline alreadydescribed the importance of the dynamic deterrence concept as one of the solutions for gray zone
challenges.
In my understanding of this concept, it increased the number of the intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) activities or the presence patrol by Japan ʼs Coast Guard and Self
Defense Forces in the area with concerns for gray zone challenges. It tried to prevent the makingof physical windows of opportunities.
I think that the 2018 version―the latest version of the National Defense Program Guideline―
basically followed the same directions. The problem is, however, that our resources are limited,
so we need to prioritize the defense investment for the most effective means. In that context arise
the challenges which I already mentioned―how do we deal with the combination of the grayzone challenges and A2/AD challenges.
So, why am I concerned especially about this area? It is because of the importance for Japanʼs
Coast Guard vessels and Self Defense Forces to continue their activities in order to prevent theChinese side from attempting to create a fait accompli or engaging in the probing activities.
I think that those kind of efforts as the refurbishment of the Izumo-class helicopter carriers,
and the potential combinations with the F-35B, which have been decided to the latest National
Defense Program Guideline, will enhance Japanʼs capabilities necessary for the presence patrols
in the peacetime and during the gray zone situations.
However, given Chinaʼs anti-access/area denial capabilities, it is extremely risky to deploy
these high-value platforms forward, as some contingencies happen at once. In particular, Beijing
has some incentive to use anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles carried by variety of platforms
early in the confrontation to counter Japanʼs advantages.
For instance, the stealth assets like F-35, are hard to detect and intercept in the air, andtherefore, the detection and neutralization have much higher probability of success while theseassets are on the ground or on ships. So, the forward presence in the peacetime and the reductionof its vulnerability, through some dispersal measures in the wartime, are very competing demand.
It is extremely difficult to balance them. So that is one of my current major concerns about
dealing with this combination.

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