The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.28 (2024): 54-65

Lawrence Weiner's “Statement of Intent”:
Comparing Sol LeWitt and Joseph Kosuth *OSAWA Yoshihisa
Tokyo University of the Arts, Tokyo
Abstract: Lawrence Weiner is well-known as a conceptual artist in America. He worked on a piece in 1968
that had a long title and linguistic feature. In the latter half of the 1960s in America, conceptual art became
active, and famous manifestos such as “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” by Sol LeWitt or “Art after Philosophy”
by Joseph Kosuth were published one after another. Weiner is one of those artists who expressed their attitudes
related to conceptual art. He presented his “Statement of Intent” in the catalogue for January 5–31, 1969 show
organized by Seth Siegelaub. It is stated as follows: 1. The artist may construct the piece; 2. The piece may befabricated; 3. The piece need not be built; Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist thedecision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership. This paper aims to consider
his “Statement of Intent,” comparing Sol LeWitt and Joseph Kosuth who emphasized artist’s idea or concept
especially among conceptual artists. Through this consideration, I suggest as follows: while Weiner transfers
the main role of the artist to the receiver, which is different from LeWitt and Kosuth who consider artist’s idea
or concept as the most important thing in art, he has some aspects in common with them.
Keywords: conceptual art, artist’s intention, dematerialization, receiver, responsibility for the work

Introduction
Lawrence Weiner (1942–2021), a widely recognized American conceptual artist, has a long
working career from the early 1960s until his later years. He began his career by creating craters
in a desert park of California, followed by a series of paintings Propeller and Removal, and awork with a long title that seemed to place more emphasis on language such as One pint gloss
white lacquer poured directly upon the floor and allowed to dry produced in 1968. The late 1960s
was a time when conceptual art was flourishing in the United States, and prominent manifestos
such as Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” (1967) and Joseph Kosuth’s “Art after
Philosophy” (1969) were being published in rapid succession. The basic stance underlying thesemanifestos was that the artist’s concept prior to the creation of the work is significant, and thatthe work is the realization of the concept, and therefore the artist’s actual work and aesthetic
concerns are irrelevant.
Weiner was also one of those who adhered to such an attitude at the same time. In the
catalog of exhibition January 5–31, 1969 organized by Seth Siegelaub in 1969, Weiner presented a* This paper is based on the Japanese version printed in Kallista, no. 27, 2021, pp.4–31, published by Association
for Aesthetics and Art Theory.

Lawrence Weiner's “Statement of Intent”

55“Statement of Intent” that would accompany subsequent exhibitions of his work. In this statement,
he gives the following instructions. 1. The artist may construct the piece; 2. The piece may befabricated; 3. The piece need not be built; Each being equal and consistent with the intent of theartist the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership. At
first glance, this could be seen as a declarative statement that emphasizes the artist’s intent for
the work. By contrast, however, it can also be read as a complete transfer of the artist’s role to
the recipient. How can we fully understand such declaration? This paper examines Weiner’s“Statement of Intent” by comparing it with those of LeWitt and Kosuth, who emphasized theimportance of the artist’s ideas and concepts more than any other artists in the field of conceptual art.
This paper is organized into four sections. The first section outlines their basic ideas on theimportance of artists’ ideas and concepts in LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” andKosuth’s “Art after Philosophy.” The second section draws the outline of Weiner’s “Statementof Intent” by referring to previous studies on the subject. The third section highlights some points
that have not been hitherto noted in the previous studies, thus focusing on key concepts such as“public freehold,” “aesthetic fascism,” “ownership,” and “responsibility,” drawn from several
Weiner’s interviews. The fourth section considers the differences and commonalities between
Weiner, LeWitt and Kosuth. This is accomplished by referencing additional texts by LeWitt andKosuth in order to enhance the argument. Through this analysis, the paper demonstrates that, akinto LeWitt and Kosuth, Weiner maintains his subjectivity as an intentional artist while abolishing
the traditional role of artist/viewer fundamentally.

1. Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” and Joseph Kosuth’s "Art after Philosophy”
1.1. Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art”
First, let us examine the main points of Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art”
published in Artforum in 1967. LeWitt begins his argument by declaring “In conceptual art theidea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual formof art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is aperfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.” 1 In other words, inconceptual art, it is the idea or concept that is important, and the process of bringing it torealization as a work of art is merely a mechanical process that is carried out according to a plan.
This idea led to the dispelling of the traditional view of the artist as an artisan. As LeWitt argues
that conceptual art “is usually free from the dependence on the skill of the artist as a craftsman,”2
it is also important to note that such art is meant to engage the viewer intellectually, notemotionally. To put it another way, “it is the objective of the artist who is concerned withconceptual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually hewould want it to become emotionally dry.” 3 Additionally, in LeWitt’s view, expressionism

1

Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” Artforum 5, no. 10 (June 1967), p. 80.
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
2

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OSAWA Yoshihisa“deter the viewer from perceiving this art,”4 and is incongruent with conceptual art, which aims
to be intellectually engaging.
1.2. Joseph Kosuth’s “Art after Philosophy”
For the next step, I would like to review the main points of Joseph Kosuth’s “Art after
Philosophy” written in 1969. Kosuth, like LeWitt’s approach, shares the perspective that theartist’s concept or idea is the most important aspect within their work, and that expressionism istotally irrelevant to conceptual art. However, Kosuth’s viewpoint diverges from LeWitt’s in asignificant manner for two reasons. In the first, Kosuth considers conceptual art as a result of thehistorical development in contemporary art after Marcel Duchamp. “This change——one from‘ appearance’ to ’conception’——was the beginning of ‘modern’ art and the beginning of‘conceptual’ art. All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists
conceptually.” 5 Here, the term “appearance” pertains to the discussion of color and form inartworks based on sensory and empirical aspects. Since Duchamp, art has shifted from formalism,
which concerns the visual qualities of a work, to the realm of “conception.” Kosuth elucidates
this shift by stating: “A work of art is a kind of proposition presented within the context of art asa comment on art.” 6 Second, drawing upon A.J. Ayer’s explanation based on Kant’sclassification, Kosuth defines this proposition as an “analytic” rather than a “synthetic” one.7
That is to say, it is not based on sensory or empirical aspect, but is presented in the context of art,
based on various propositions about art.8 In fact it is the artist, not the viewer or critic, who
presents these propositions. Therefore, a work of art “is the presentation of the artist’s intention.”9
A concrete example of this is exemplified in the case of Pollock given by Kosuth. He claims, “IfPollock is important it is because he painted on loose canvas horizontally to the floor. What isn’t
important is that he later put those drippings over stretchers and hung them parallel to the wall.”10
It means that Pollock did not just paint on a vertical canvas stretched on a wooden frame
according to convention, but he painted on a horizontal canvas on the floor, “presenting his
intention” to make it a work of art.
Furthermore, in alignment with LeWitt’s standpoint, Kosuth echoes a similar perspective on
expressionism. Following the above quote, Kosuth states, “What is even less important to art isPollock’s notions of ‘self-expression’ because those kinds of subjective meanings are useless toanyone other than those involved with him personally. And their ‘specific’ quality puts themoutside of art’s context.”11

4

Ibid.
Joseph Kosuth, “Art after Philosophy,” Studio International 178, no. 915 (October 1969), p. 135.
6
Ibid., p. 136.
7
Ibid.
8
Note that Kosuth’s quotes from Ayer as helping to explain his own argument, concerning the basic distinction
between analytic/comprehensive propositions, and that he declares his argument is only an “analogy” to it (ibid.).
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
5

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1.3. “Idea,” “Concept,” and “Intention” in LeWitt and Kosuth
Having discussed Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” and Joseph Kosuth’s “Artafter Philosophy,” we need to turn our attention to the meaning of “idea,” “concept,” and“Intention.” This is because, while they are used synonymously, “idea” and “concept” have a
special connotation that differs from “Intention,” and the difference is a matter that should be
noted in relation to their own positions.
First, LeWitt’s perspective on conceptual art. In his discussion of conceptual art which I
quoted above, LeWitt initially uses “idea” or “concept” interchangeably, in an equal manner.12
However, in his “Sentences on Conceptual Art” (1969), LeWitt gives the following stipulation:“9. The concept and idea are different. The former implies a general direction while the latter isthe component. Ideas implement the concept.”13 He continues “10. Ideas alone can be works ofart; they are in a chain of development that may eventually find some form.”14 In other words,
concept and idea are considered here to be as the relationship between the whole and its parts;
ideas are considered to be an important factor in carrying out the concept and bringing it to
fruition as a work of art. Then what is the case for “intention”? LeWitt does not specifically givecomments like “idea” or “concept, but this does not mean that the word “intention” isinappropriate in his text, as he says “The physicality of a three-dimensional object then becomesa contradiction to its [conceptual art’s] non-emotive intent.”15
Next, there are three types of words in Kosuth to be reviewed. Unlike LeWitt, he does notgive them any definite definition. However, if we note that Kosuth’s works from the late 1960ssuch as Titled, which is subtitled “Art as Idea as Idea,” we can perceive that “idea” was animportant concept for him. In an interview with Jeanne Siegel, Kosuth was asked about themeaning of the subtitle, and he answers that he intended to show the creative process by doubling
the term “idea,” while simply “art as idea” would be a reification of the idea. 16 From thestatement, we can assume that the word “idea” given to him implies the creativity of the artist
who produces a work of art. And as for “concept,” despite even if no special stipulation is given
to it, it can be understood as meaning “This change——one from ‘appearance’ to ‘conception’——was the beginning of ‘modern’ art and the beginning of ‘conceptual’ art. All art (after
Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually.”
To sum up, it is clear that LeWitt and Kosuth considered the presentation of ideas andconcepts by the artist as the most important aspect of the artwork, which is intellectual in the caseof LeWitt and conceptual in the case of Kosuth. The reasons why, they are intellectual andconceptual are, because they are irrelevant to one’s emotions or the senses. What makes the two
texts different is the perspective from which they are viewed. While LeWitt’s text focuses on theway ideas are created and realized as works of art without the handiwork and subjective concerns

12

LeWitt, op. cit. p. 80.
Sol LeWitt, “Sentences on Conceptual Art,” (1969) in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.),
Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 106.
14
Ibid., p. 107.
15
LeWitt, 1967, op. cit., p. 83.
16
Joseph Kosuth, “Art as Idea as Idea: An Interview with Jeanne Siegel,” in Gabriele Guercio(ed.), Art after
Philosophy and After. Collected Writings, 1966–1990 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 47.
13

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OSAWA Yoshihisa

of the craftsman artist, Kosuth's text emphasizes that the presentation of the artist's concept or
intention represents a historical development in contemporary art since Duchamp, and that this isdemonstrated within the context of art. In spite of these all differences, as I have repeatedly noted
throughout this chapter, the manifestoes et cetera are of greatest importance regarding the idea,
concept, and intention of the work by the artist. Then question arises: what is subsequent to
Weiner’s “Statement of Intent” made its first appearance in conjunction with LeWitt’s andKosuth’s texts, and what Weiner presented for his next show? In the next chapter, I will describe
its outline through analysis of previous studies.

2. Previous Studies
Weiner’s “Statement of Intent” first appeared in the catalog of exhibition January 5–31, 1969
organized by Seth Siegelaub in 1969. There were eight pieces of artworks consist of language. To
cite a couple of examples, Two minutes of spray paint directly upon the floor from a standard
aerosol spray can (1968) (hereafter abbreviated the work as Two minutes); Field cratered bysimultaneously exploded 1/3 lb. TNT charges (1968). Three minutes of forty pound pressure sprayof white highway paint upon a well tended lawn. The lawn is allowed to grow and not tended until
the grass is free of all vestiges of white highway paint (1968) (hereafter abbreviated the work as
Three minutes) and other works were shown. At the end of the catalog page devoted to Weiner, the“Statement of Intent” is presented, which has subsequently been included adjunct to his exhibitions.
1. The artist may construct the piece
2. The piece may be fabricated
3. The piece need not be built
Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist the decision as to condition rests withthe receiver upon the occasion of receivership17
This declaration is a kind of guideline for understanding Weiner’s works. Here, it is stated thateach of the listed conditions is “equal and consistent with the intent of the artist,” and it seems
that Weiner is adhering to his own intent as an artist. At the same time, it also states that “thedecision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership,” seemingly
leaving the artist’s role to the recipient. According to this guideline, for example, the Weiner ofThree Minutes may or may not actually produce the work. If not, the recipient may produce it or
it does not necessarily have to be produced and so forth. How did previous studies on Weinerinterpret his “Statement of Intent”?
2.1. Free Discretion of a Work
Anne Rorimer focuses on the “Statement of Intent,” especially on the freedom of thephysical realization of the work. “By means of this statement, the artist stipulates that the actual,physical realization of any one of his works is not a requirement but an option left open to the17

Lawrence Weiner, January 5–31, 1969, exh.cat. (New York: Seth Siegelaub, 1969), unpaginated.

Lawrence Weiner's “Statement of Intent”

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discretion of any perceiving subject, including the artist.”18 Coupled with its form of language,
this stipulation in the treatment of Weiner’s work, she tries to summarizes his work with thefollowing characteristics even further. Rorimer states as follow. “Although work by Weiner may
in principle be materially constructed, in all cases they must first be registered in the mind’s eye.
Because of the manner in which they are embodied in language, they are never conclusive
descriptions subject to one static mode of being constructed. Infinitely open-ended, they have thepotential for being visualized and/or realized in count-less ways and contexts.” 19 To put it
another way, Weiner’s works can be physically constructed, but what comes first is that they areconceived in his imagination, and then embodied in language. However, as they are expressed in
the abstract form of language, their actualization can occur in innumerable ways, depending on
the method and context. For example, in the case of Two minutes, there are countless ways inwhich this work can be actualized, relying on the floor on which the paint is sprayed directly, thecolors of the paint, the distance and angle between the sprayer and the floor, and even whether or
not the window is open to allow wind to enter during the spray process. The reason why Weiner’s
work does not lead to one particular conclusion is that it is an abstract form of language, and its
guideline, the “Statement of intent,” leaves the work open to the recipient’s own free will anddiscretion.
2.2. Decentering the Artist
In addition to the above, the “Statement of intent,” also raises some questions about thetraditional artist/audience relationship. Alexander Alberro makes three points regarding the issue.
First, it places the Weiner and the receiver equally in the production of the work. It is “thereby
abolishing the traditional notion of artist-centered production.”20 Second, it prompts to “diminish
the distance between beholding and production”21 by involving the viewer in the production of thework. Third, Weiner’s works “destabilize the myth of the authority and authorship,” and “the work
thus represents a method of art production, distribution, and consumption with a degree of
egalitarianism that is virtually unprecedented in the history of twentieth century art.”22 Alberro alsorelies on the third condition in the “Statement of Intent” and the sentence appended at the end, heparticularly focuses on the third point by commenting: “Now one of the explicit conditions of thework is that it need not be built, and the decision of whether to actually give the piece physical form
is left completely up to the viewer, or in the terminology of Weiner at the time, the‘receiver.’”23 In
his commentary on this quote, Alberro notes that “only a couple of years earlier than Weiner, Roland
Barthes theorized (and called for) this transition from author to reader in ‘The Death of the
Author,’” 24 thus succeeding in drawing an analogy between Weiner and Barthes. Alberro’s
18

Anne Rorimer, “Siting the Page: Exhibiting Works in Publications—Some Examples of Conceptual Art in
the USA,” in Michael Newman and Jon Bird (eds.), Rewriting Conceptual Art (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), p. 13.
19
Ibid.
20
Alexander Alberro, “Reconsidering Conceptual Art, 1966–1977,” in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson(eds.), Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1999), p. xxiii.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., p. xxxiii.

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particular focus on the “Statement of Intent” is therefore should be regarded as the homogenizationof the artist/viewer role and the de-centering of the traditional image of the artist as author.

3. “Statement of Intent”: From the BackgroundIn this chapter, I will first look at the background of the free discretion of works by recipientsand the de-centering of the traditional image of authorship as discussed so far, focusing on the
key concepts of “public freehold,” “ownership of works,” and “aesthetic fascism.” I will thenclarify Weiner’s idea of “responsibility of the recipient,” which has a different resonance fromthe claims made in these key concepts. Finally, I will summarize his intentions in the “Statementof Intent,” and discuss his subjectivity as an artist himself who bears those intentions.
3.1. Public Freehold
In an interview with Patricia Norvell in 1969, Weiner described The Xerox Book as the mostsuccessful exhibition he ever participated so far at the time. Xerox Book was organized by Seth
Siegelaub in 1968, with seven writers collaborated and each of them was given 25 pages. Weiner
recalls it as a “public freehold” work, and gives the following reasons. “Anybody who purchased
The Xerox Book owned the piece. It’s called public freehold for me.”25 In other words, The Xerox
Book is a publicly published publication, and anyone who wants it can buy it (though most copies
are limited). Since it is not a catalog for an exhibition, but a magazine exhibition intended to be
an exhibition per se, the purchase of the book constitutes ownership of the work. Thus, for Weiner,a work with “public freehold” is one whose ownership is open to the public, and The Xerox Book
is a good example of such intention reflected in his early work.26
The meaning of Weiner’s “public freehold,” however, is not a kind of work that can be freelypurchased and owned. In an interview with Lynn Gumpert in 1987, Weiner was asked about theorigin of the term, and he responded as follow. “In places like Britain which are autocratic, people
can’t own property; they can only lease it from the state. Common property that’s owned bypeople [...] become[s] public freeholds. It’s a comment on the fact that art is essentiallyauthoritarian in the sense that if you want to own it you have to buy it and there is no‘art for thepeople.’” 27 Weiner adds the adjective “public” to the term “freehold,” which refers to thepermanent ownership of real estate in England, and gives the meaning of something public thatcan be owned by anyone to it. In Weiner’s view, the art world is authoritative where there is no“art for the people,” so the concept of “public freehold,” or the free and permanent ownership ofa work by anyone without purchasing is therefore important for him.

25

Lawrence Weiner, interview by Patricia Norvell, in Alexander Alberro and Patricia Norvell (eds.), Recording
Conceptual Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 105.
26
In the same interview, Winner cites “The Xerox Book” as an example of his “public freehold” work, as wellas “Crater Piece,” a crater formed by TNT on California land, and a work exhibited at Windham College (A SERIESOF STAKES SET IN THE GROUND AT REGULAR INTERVALS TO FORM A RECTANGLE TWINE STRUNGFROM STAKE TO STAKE TO DEMARK A GRID A RECTANGLE REMOVED FROM THIS RECTANGLE).
27
Lawrence Weiner, “Lawrence Weiner: Interview by Lynn Gumpert,” in Lynda Benglis, Joan Brown, Luis
Jimenez, Gary Stephan, Lawrence Weiner: Early Work, exh. cat. (New York: The New Museum, 1982), p. 53.

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61

3.2. Ownership of Works
Weiner tries to guarantee the free “ownership” of his works by using the term “public
freehold,” but what does “own” mean to him? In an interview with Willoughby Sharpe in 1972,
Weiner said, “Once you know about a work of mine, you own it. There’s no way I can climb into
somebody’s head and remove it.” 28 Then Sharpe asked, “How one knows about a work?” 29
Weiner replied, “You yourself can be sitting and speaking to me and I can tell you of a work that
I’ve done at a certain time and you can say I like that or I don’t like it or I don’t understand thatand then you.”30 In short, to “know about a work” is to understand or interpret it to the extent
that one can form an opinion about it and judge whether it is good or bad. Thus, to “own” a workin Weiner’s context means not only to physically possess the work, but also to understand andinterpret it. If this were not the case, Weiner’s desired “freehold” would be limited to those who
could actually purchase his work, and his work would not be a “public freehold.” He seems to becareful in this regard, and in an earlier interview in 1982, he made a similar statement by sayingthat “Everything I was making could be owned by anyone who read it.”31
3.3. Aesthetic Fascism
Weiner’s active advocacy of the above-mentioned freedom for anyone to own and interpret
his works under the “public right of free ownership” is based on his critical awareness of a typeof art that “imposes” a way of reception upon people——to him it is a synonym for “aesthetic
fascism.” First, let me quote the following statement. “I will of course complain that art which
presents itself only in one context is a fascist gesture. I know the word fascist is very loaded, butsuch art imposes upon people a single condition for receiving it.”32 The one context referred tohere is the one meaning in which the work is interpreted. In other words, presenting a work in
only one meaning is the same as fascist behavior. Weiner also relates this thought toexpressionism. “I obviously say that anyone who imposes a unique condition for receivership,
for interpretation, for seeing a work, is placing art within a context that is almost 19th century.
There is the specific, unique, emotional object produced by a prophet, produced by the only
person who can make this. It becomes Expressionist to say: ‘I am the only one who can make thiswork. There’s no other viable means of doing it.’ I find Expressionism related to aesthetic
fascism.”33 For Weiner, expressionism refers to the artistic idea of the unique author as the originof a work of art. In such ideology, the meaning of a work, even if it can be interpreted in various
ways, converges on the uniqueness of its author. As a result, the work imposes only one meaningon the receiver. Weiner’s critical awareness of the inability to interpret a work of art is clearly
expressed in the term “aesthetic fascism.”28

Lawrence Weiner, “Lawrence Weiner at Amsterdam,” interview by Willoughby Sharp, Avalanche (New
York), no. 4 (Spring 1972), p. 67.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Weiner, interview by Gumpert, p. 53.
32
Weiner, interview by Sharp, p. 69.
33
Ibid., p. 70.

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3.4. Responsibility of the Recipient
As the above interviews reveal, it is clear that Weiner’s strong desire for the freedom of
every recipient to own and interpret his or her work in any case. In the “Statement of Intent,” thisdesire is expressed in the increased discretion and role of the recipient, and the accompanying decentering of the traditional image of the author. However, Weiner’s argument is somewhat
different from those that advocate freedom and equality in such a loud voice. He refers to the“responsibility” of the recipient. In an interview in 1969, Weiner said the following: “Whensomeone receives a piece of mine, assumes responsibility for the piece [...] They assume theresponsibility that this is art as well as I assume the responsibility.”34 Also, in an interview with
Sharpe in 1972, Sharpe said, "You’re saying: Even though I personally feel my work can exist
integrally as a statement, I accept the fact that other people would like to have it in another way”
to which Weiner replied, “if they will accept the responsibility.”35 And he continues “each person
will take it in his own way”36 on the condition that they accept the responsibility.
3.5. Intent in the “Statement of Intent” and the Artist’s Subjectivity
From what I have discussed so far, it should be clear that “intent” in the “Statement of Intent”
does not refer to the idea or concept that an artist gives to a work of art, however it is rather thefollowing: to seek the possibility of producing a work in a broad sense of the word, and its
ownership/interpretation to the recipient; moreover, to share the responsibility of judging thework as art with the recipient. It should be noted, however, that it is true that Weiner abandoned
the artist’s intention for the sake of freedom of reception of the work, but this does not mean that
he has completely given up the artist’s intention. Weiner’s stubborn retention of his intention canbe seen in the sentence after the three conditions of the “Statement of Intention,” which states,“Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist.” The fact that he presents thisdeclaration at each exhibition of his works also suggests that the certain attitude of an artist withan intention will emerge each time. If Weiner did not regard his own intention as important, hewould not have added the phrase “equal and consistent with the intent of the artist,” nor would
he have taken the trouble to present this declaration at every exhibition of his works. Thus, forWeiner, the artist’s intent——not the intent of the work as given by the artist, but the artist’s
intent in handling the work——is important.

4. LeWitt, Kosuth and Weiner
Taking account of what has been discussed so far, LeWitt, Kosuth and Weiner are now canbe fully analyzed, and compared for conclusion. In this chapter, I will discuss the differences andsimilarities among the three. As chapter I has already summarized some of the explanations of
LeWitt and Kosuth, I will proceed with the discussion by referring to their other texts in order tostrengthen their arguments as written in the introduction.

34

Weiner, interview by Norvell, p. 102.
Weiner, interview by Sharp, p. 68.
36
Ibid.
35

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4.1. About the Artist’s Intent
In LeWitt, the intention of the work, its idea or concept, is determined by the artist prior tothe creation of the work, and is more important than the process of creation or the resulting work.
By contrast, Kosuth places emphasis on the intention of the work that the artist presents within
the context of the art. Like LeWitt, Kosuth perceives the intention as the most important, but inhis 1996 essay “Intention(s),” Kosuth writes, “The reason we don’t really consider the paintingsby monkeys and children to be art is because of intention; without artistic intention there is noart.”37 For Kosuth, the intention of a work of art is important not only for conceptual art but for
art in general, and the essay was an announcement for his intention to part company from LeWitt,
who insists on the importance of intent in the context of conceptual art.
Weiner is by no means shared the same position as these two. For him, intention is not themeaning of the work as presented by the artist, and he does not aim to impose the work a meaningthat is conveyed to the receiver. For Weiner, it is the artist’s intention in handling his work, andin this respect, he differs significantly from LeWitt and Kosuth. Nevertheless, they both share thesame view on the importance of the artist’s intention. Similar to LeWitt, who urges that the artist
must precede a priori the idea or concept, Weiner’s intention as can be seen in the “Statement ofIntent” always precedes the presentation of his work in accordance with, or rather as it is presented
incidentally in the venue of the exhibition of his work taking place. It is clear that Weiner considers
his intention regarding the handling of his works is most important point above all.
With regard to the presentation of the artist’s intentions, I would like to add a comparative
analysis of the three artists on the issue of expressionism. In LeWitt’s view, the artist’s goal inconceptual art is to engage the viewer intellectually; therefore, the idea that the work is anexpression of the artist’s feelings prevents the viewer from perceiving the work intellectually. In
Kosuth’s case, the presentation of the intention of the work is accomplished within the context of
the art; however, expressionism which deals with the subjective expression of feelings, is by nomeans important to him. Weiner, like LeWitt and Kosuth, took a critical stance toward
expressionism, criticizing severely that it is an “aesthetic fascism.” But Weiner’s such criticalstance somewhat differs from that of LeWitt and Kosuth. In Weiner’s case, the work is not apresentation of meaning that belongs to an author as a unique existence. It must be open to freeinterpretation without any restrictions. Otherwise, the meaning would be imposed on the receiver.
4.2. On Responsibility
LeWitt can be said to consider the responsibility of the artist (as someone involved inconceptual art) in that he places the utmost importance on the artist’s ideas and concepts, urging
that the artist’s purpose is to show them in his or her work. This is also expressed in his “Sentences
on Conceptual Art” written in 1969. For example, rather strong assertions such as “6. If the artist
changes his mind midway through the execution of the piece he compromises the result andrepeats past results”38 and “29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with,”39

37

Joseph Kosuth, “Intention(s),” The Art Bulletin 78, no. 3 (September 1996), p. 412.
LeWitt, 1969, op. cit., p. 106.
39
Ibid., p. 107.
38

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OSAWA Yoshihisa

we can realize LeWitt’s thoughts on the responsibilities of the artist. Nonetheless, this is to someextent different from the tone in which Kosuth discusses the responsibility of the artist.
In “Intention(s),” cited above, Kosuth repeatedly argues for the responsibility of the artist.
That is to say, "If Conceptual art means more than a style, its defining difference is established here
in the rethinking of artistic responsibility in the production of meaning.”40 He also states that “the(making) process of putting a proposition (that signifying action which may or may not employ
the object, performance, video and text, et cetera) ‘into play’ is only one of the responsibilitiesof the artist.”41 He also comments the following: “The subjective presence which stands behinda work of art and which takes responsibility for its meaning something, which I have discussed
here, is what makes it authentic as a work.”42 Thus, in Kosuth, the artist must take responsibility
as the producer of the meaning of the work, situating it in the context of art. By taking the
responsibility, Kosuth believes that the artist can authenticate the work in its truest manner.
Finally, in Weiner’s view, the responsibility does not only belong to the artist, but must be
charged with the recipient equally. This is the key difference of Weiner in comparison with
LeWitt and Kosuth, who attribute the responsibility solely to the artist. However, if we replace
the artist with the creator of the work of art, Weiner and Lewitt, and especially Kossuth, overlap
in that the creator must assume the responsibility for making the work of art. It must be admitted
that there is a difference in tone between Kosuth and Weiner in terms of responsibility, andWeiner does not make as strong a statement about the responsibility as Kosuth does.

Conclusion
This paper has examined Lawrence Weiner’s “Statement of Intent,” comparing it with theideas of Sol LeWitt and Joseph Kosuth. Weiner’s “Statement of Intent,” which was accompanied
by his exhibitions, differs from the stance of LeWitt and Kosuth took, who consider the artist’s
ideas and concepts to be the most important aspect of his work, and regard the presentation ofsuch ideas and concepts to be the artist’s responsibility. Weiner’s “Statement of Intent” rather
assigns the role of the artist to the recipient of the work, speaking against the backdrop of ideas
such as freehold and aesthetic fascism. However, this is not limited to the free discretion of thework or the de-centering of the traditional image of the artist, as it has been pointed out in previous
studies. The recipient of Weiner’s work ought to assume responsibility as the interpreter or makerof art. In other words, the recipient must be the responsible subject who makes the judgment anddecision that such is art. This attitude is shared by LeWitt and Kosuth in particular, but Weiner
distinguishes himself from them by extending the recipient’s role. This does not mean that Weiner
abandons the artist’s intention, and the artist’s intention in handling his work is always taken into
consideration. The difference between Weiner, LeWitt and Kosuth lies in the difference between
the artist’s intention in the handling of the work and the intention of the work given by the artist.
Although at first glance the “Statement of Intent” seems to be a complete transfer of the artist’s

40

Kosuth, 1996, op. cit., p. 408.
Ibid.
42
Ibid., p. 412.
41

Lawrence Weiner's “Statement of Intent”

65role to the recipient, Weiner still retains his agency as an artist with intention. The “Statement ofIntent” may also seem to transfer the role of the artist entirely to the recipient, but Weiner still
posits his subjectivity as an artist with an intention, which is the common ground with LeWitt
and Kosuth.
Finally, I would like to conclude this paper by presenting a few further perspectives andissues that can be drawn from the above discussion. First is the issue of certificates. While Kosuth
pays attention to certificate as a guarantee of ownership of a work and, above all, as somethingthat makes it possible to reproduce the work,43 Weiner who transfers his role to the recipient
urged “The piece may be fabricated.” Second, because as this paper focuses on Kosuth’s earlyideas and their context, it did not foreground Kosuth after “The Artist as Anthropologist” (1975),
who considers art in a broader social and cultural context that surpasses art per se. Kosuth’s
attitude of immersing himself in a broader context and generating the meaning of a work of art
in the realm of art could be compared and examined with Weiner, who sometimes insists on acommitment to culture, shall be discussed in a separate paper.

43

While Kosuth acknowledges the role of his signed certificate as a guarantee of ownership of the work and asenabling its reproduction, he argues that the art is not in the certificate but in the idea itself, which is attributed to thework (Kosuth, op. cit., p. 407). This is in defiance of the idea that the certificate is the original of the work of art. On
the other hand, Weiner states that formal proof of ownership is exchanged on paper. He also urges that all
reproductions are originals (Weiner, interview by Norvell, p. 102). The relationship and position of the three parties
in Weiner’s work, i.e., the certificate-like document, the language work produced by Weiner himself and the reproduced work, is open to discussion.