TRACKING SDG7

THE ENERGYPROGRESS REPORT2023
A joint report of the custodian agencies

United Nations
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Report designed by: Duina Reyes
Cover photo: Getty Images/Me 3645 StudioTRACKING SDG7

THE ENERGYPROGRESS REPORT2023
A joint report of the custodian agencies

United Nations
Statistics Division

TA B L E O F

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

6CHAPTER 1
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY

32

CHAPTER 2
ACCESS TO CLEAN FUELS AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR COOKING

66

CHAPTER 3
RENEWABLES

98

CHAPTER 4
ENERGY EFFICIENCY

132

CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF CLEAN ENERGY160

CHAPTER 6
THE OUTLOOK FOR SDG 7194

CHAPTER 7
TRACKING PROGRESS TOWARD SDG 7 ACROSS TARGETS:
INDICATORS AND DATA222

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Partnership
The Energy Progress Report is a product of close collaboration among the five SDG 7 custodian agencies delivered
through a specially constituted Steering Group:•

International Energy Agency (IEA)•

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)•

United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD)•World Bank•World Health Organization (WHO)The Steering Group was supported by the SDG 7 Technical Advisory Group, composed as follows.

2•

African Development Bank (AfDB)•

Clean Cooking Alliance•Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)•

ENERGIA•

European Commission•

FIA Foundation•

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)•

Germany (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

•

Hivos

•

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis•

International Labour Organization (ILO)•

Islamic Development Bank•

Kenya (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum)•

Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE)•

Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)•

Pakistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)•

Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN 21)

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

•

Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL)•

TERI School of Advanced Studies•

The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)•

The United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS)•UAE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)•

United Nations Association of China•

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)•

United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN DESA)•

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)•

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)•

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)•

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)•

United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)•

United Nations Economic Programme for Europe (UNECE)•

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)•

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)•

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)•

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)•

United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)•

Vienna University of Technology

The financial and technical support of the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) is gratefully
acknowledged. A partnership between the World Bank and 24 entities, ESMAP helps low- and middle-income
countries reduce poverty and boost growth through sustainable energy. ESMAP’s analytical and advisory services are
fully integrated within the World Bank’s country financing and policy dialogue in the energy sector.

Acknowledgments

3

Authorship
The Steering Group’s work for the 2023 edition of the report was chaired by the World Health Organization (WHO) andmade possible by agreement among the senior management of the member agencies. Fatih Birol (IEA), Francesco
La Camera (IRENA), Stefan Schweinfest (UNSD), Demetrios Papathanasiou (World Bank), Maria Neira (WHO), andGabriela Elizondo Azuela (ESMAP) oversaw the development of the Energy Progress Report in collaboration with
Minoru Takada (UNDESA).
The technical co-leadership of the project by the custodian agencies was the responsibility of Laura Cozzi (IEA), Rabia
Ferroukhi (IRENA), Leonardo Souza (UNSD), Elisa Portale (World Bank), and Heather Adair-Rohani (WHO).
•The chapter on access to electricity was prepared by the World Bank (Jiyun Park and Clara Galeazzi), with
contributions from IRENA (Gerardo Escamilla and Divyam Nagpal), the Global Off-Grid Lighting Association(Oliver Reynolds and Susie Wheeldon), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Francesca
Coloni and Theresa Beltramo).

•

The chapter on clean cooking was prepared by the WHO (Heather Adair-Rohani, Alina Cherkas, Ryanne FujitaConrads, Josselyn Mothe, Tzu-Wei Joy Tseng, Karin Troncoso Torrez, and Kendra Williams), with substantial
contributions from Oliver Stoner (University of Glasgow).

•

The chapter on renewable energy was prepared by the IEA (Francois Briens, Roberta Quadrelli, Pouya Taghavi,
Jeremy Moorhouse, and Yannick Monschauer) and IRENA (Mirjam Reiner, Gerardo Escamilla, Diala Hawila,
Hannah Guinto, Faran Rana, and Divyam Nagpal), with substantial contributions from UNSD (Leonardo Souza andAgnieszka Koscielniak).

•

The chapter on energy efficiency was prepared by the IEA (Yannick Monschauer, Emi Bertoli, Pauline Henriot,
Vida Rozite, Nicholas Howarth, Kevin Lane, Roberta Quadrelli, and Pouya Taghavi), with contributions from UNSD
(Leonardo Souza and Agnieszka Koscielniak).

•

The chapter on financial flows was prepared by the IRENA (Gerardo Escamilla, Mirjam Reiner, Diala Hawila, Faran
Rana, and Hannah Guinto).

•

The Outlook chapter was prepared by the IEA (Daniel Wetzel, Gianluca Tonolo, Yannick Monschauer, Carlo
Starace, and Nouhoun Diarra), with IRENA (Ricardo Gorini, Nicholas Wagner, Mirjam Reiner, Hannah Guinto, andJinlei Feng).

•

The chapter on indicators and data was jointly prepared by the custodian agencies under the coordination of
WHO (Josselyn Mothe, Alina Cherkas, and Heather Adair-Rohani).

4

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Data Sources
The report draws on two meta databases of global household surveys—the Global Electrification Database managed
by the World Bank and the Global Household Energy Database and related estimates managed by WHO. Energybalance statistics and indicators for renewable energy and energy efficiency were prepared by IEA (Roberta Quadrelli
and Pouya Taghavi, with support from Alexandre Bizeul and Juha Koykka) and UNSD (Leonardo Souza, Agnieszka
Koscielniak, and Costanza Giovannelli). The indicator on international financial flows to developing countries was
prepared by IRENA (Gerardo Escamilla) based on the IRENA Public Investments Database and the OECD/DAC Creditor
Reporting System. Data on gross domestic product and value-added were drawn chiefly from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. Population data are from the United Nations Population Division.

Review and Consultation
The public consultation and peer review process was coordinated by WHO. Comments were provided by Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), European Union (EU), Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL),
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), United Nations Industrial Development Organization(UNIDO), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The IEA’s internal review process was led by Laura Cozzi with contributions from Yannick
Monschauer, Daniel Wetzel, Francois Briens, Pouya Taghavi, Roberta Quadrelli, and Gianluca Tonolo. IRENA’s internal
review process was led by Rabia Ferroukhi, with contributions from Ute Collier, Divyam Nagpal, Mirjam Reiner, andGerardo Escamilla. The UNSD’s internal review process was led by Leonardo Souza, with contributions from Agnieszka
Koscielniak. The World Bank’s internal peer review process was led by Demetrios Papathanasiou, with contributions
from Gabriela Elizondo Azuela, Dana Rysankova, Sandeep Kohil, Jan Friedrich Kappen, Alisha Noella Pinto, Carlos
Andres Guadarrama Gandara, Chiedza Portia Mazaiwana, Christophe de Gouvello, Dolf Jean Gielen, Henrik Rytter
Jensen, Johanna Christine Galan, Raluca Georgiana Golumbeanu, Sharmila Bellur, and Tarek Keskes.

Outreach
The communications process was led by Paul Safar (WHO) in coordination with the custodian agencies’ communication
focal points: Grace Gordon and Merve Erdem (IEA), Nanda Febriani Moenandar (IRENA), Lucie Cecile Blyth (WB), and,on behalf of UNSD: Francyne Harrigan, Martina Donlon (UN DGC), and Pragati Pascale (UN DESA). The online platform(http://trackingSDG7.esmap.org) was developed by Derilinx, Inc. The report was edited, designed, and typeset by
Duina Reyes and Steven Kennedy.

Acknowledgments

5

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

Photo: © Unsplash by Aboodi Vesakaran

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOVERVIEW
Since its inception in 2018, Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report has become the global reference point for
information on the realization of SDG 7. It is produced annually by five of the custodian agencies responsible for tracking
global progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7), which is to “ensure access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable, and modern energy for all.” The custodians developing the report are the International Energy Agency (IEA),
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the World Bank, and
the World Health Organization (WHO).
The report offers the international community a global summary of progress on energy access, energy efficiency,
renewable energy, clean cooking, and international cooperation to advance SDG 7. It presents updated statistics foreach of the indicators and provides policy insights on priority areas and actions needed to spur further progress on
SDG 7, as well as related SDGs. Figure ES.1 offers an updated snapshot of the primary indicators for the most recent year.
Despite some progress across the indicators, the current pace is not adequate to achieve any of the 2030 targets. As
in previous years, rates of progress vary significantly across regions, with some regions making substantial gains andsome slowing their progress or even moving backward. Among the major economic factors impeding the realization of
SDG 7 globally are the uncertain macroeconomic outlook, high levels of inflation, currency fluctuations, debt distressin a growing number of countries, lack of financing, supply chain bottlenecks, tighter fiscal circumstances, and soaring
prices for materials. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the steady rise in energy prices since summer 2021 are
expected to be a further drag on progress, particularly in the most vulnerable countries and those that were alreadylagging behind.
Although certain policy responses to the global energy crisis appear likely to improve the outlook for renewables andenergy efficiency, other necessary policy actions, as well as financial flows, continue to lag. This particularly concerns
lacking universal access to electricity and clean cooking in developing economies, with projections indicating that SDG
7 will not be reached by 2030.
This year marks the mid-point of the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The picture
on progress since the adoption of the Agenda in 2015 is mixed. Target 7.1 on ensuring universal access to affordable,
reliable, and modern energy services is off track, with an estimated 675 million people still without access to electricity
and 2.3 billion without access to clean cooking in 2021. Current trends suggest that the world’s shot on the target will
fall very wide of the mark in 2030.
The uptake of renewable energy (target 7.2) has grown since 2010, but efforts must be scaled up to substantially increase
the share of renewables in total final energy consumption. Likewise, despite steady progress, the rate of improvement
in energy efficiency (target 7.3) is not on track to double by 2030, with the current trend of 1.8 percent falling short of
the targeted increase of 2.6 percent each year between 2010-2030. To make up for the lack of progress, improvements
would need to accelerate further from now to 2030.
Finally, progress on target 7.a—to increase international public financial flows supporting clean energy in developing
countries—began to decline even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with financial resources more than athird lower since 2020 than the average of the previous decade (2010–19). As financial flows have contracted for thethird year in a row, they have become increasingly concentrated in a small number of countries. The decreasing trend ininternational public financial flows may delay achievement of SDG 7, especially for the least-developed countries (LDCs),
landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states.

7

FIGURE ES.1 • Primary indicators of global progress toward the SDG 7 targets

INDICATOR
7.1.1 Proportionof population withaccess to electricity

7.1.2 Proportionof population withprimary relianceon clean fuels andtechnology forcooking

7.2.1 Renewableenergy share in
total final energy
consumption

7.3.1 Energy
intensity measured
as a ratio ofprimary energy
and GDP

7.a.1 International
financial flows todeveloping countries
in support of clean
energy research anddevelopment andrenewable energy
production, including
in hybrid systems

8

2010

LATEST YEAR

1.1

675

billionmillionpeople without
access to electricity

people without
access to electricity(2021)

2.9

2.3

billionpeople without accessto clean cooking

16%billionpeople without accessto clean cooking(2021)

19.1%

share of total final
energy consumption
from renewables

share of total final
energy consumption
from renewables(2020)

5.53

4.63

MJ/USD

MJ/USD

11.9

10.8

primary energy
intensity

USD billion

international financial
flows to developing
countries in supportof clean energy

primary energy
intensity(2020)

USD billion
international financial
flows to developing
countries in supportof clean energy(2021)

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (SDG INDICATOR 7.1.1)
Recent progress is not on track to reach universal access by 2030. Globally, access to electricity grew by an annual
average of 0.7 percentage points between 2010 and 2021, rising from 84 percent of the world’s population to 91
percent. The number of people without electricity almost halved during the period, from 1.1 billion in 2010 to 675
million in 2021. The pace of annual growth slowed during 2019–21 to 0.6 percentage points.
To bridge the gap, especially for people living in poor and remote regions, the annual rate of growth in access must be
1 percentage point per year from 2021 onward—almost twice the current pace. If no additional efforts and measures
are put in place, some 660 million people, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, would still be unserved in 2030 (IEA 2022a).
Policies for energy access should demonstrate political commitment and maximize the socioeconomic benefits ofaccess, keeping the most vulnerable populations at the forefront of efforts to close the access gap.

CLEAN COOKING SOLUTIONS (SDG INDICATOR 7.1.2)
The global population lacking access to clean cooking fell from 2.9 billion in 2010 to 2.3 billion in 2021, but thegoal of universal access by 2030 remains elusive: some 1.9 billion people would still be without access to clean
cooking in 2030. If current trends continue, almost six out of ten people without access to clean cooking in 2030
would reside in Sub-Saharan Africa.
With the ongoing impact of COVID-19 and soaring energy prices, the IEA estimates that 100 million people who
recently transitioned to clean cooking may revert to using traditional biomass (IEA 2022a). Eastern Asia and Latin
America and the Caribbean were the only regions to sustain progress in access to clean cooking between 2019 and2021 (ESMAP 2022). Unless efforts are rapidly scaled up today, polluting cooking fuels and technologies will continue
to claim millions of lives each year while perpetuating gender inequity, deforestation, and climate damage. Integrating
clean cooking into broader energy planning, improving affordability, and devising better delivery mechanisms aresome of the key policy levers to drive clean cooking. If such efforts are paired with sustained financing at an adequatelevel, the world can get back on track to making clean cooking a reality for all.

RENEWABLE ENERGY (SDG INDICATOR 7.2.1)
Universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy depends on faster deployment of renewableenergy in electricity, heat, and transport. But unless the pace quickens, the share of renewable energy in total final
energy consumption (TFEC) will remain sluggish. In 2020, the share of renewable energy in TFEC stood at just
19.1 percent (or 12.5 percent if traditional use of biomass is excluded), not much more than the 16 percent a decade
earlier.
If the world is to be on track to limit the temperature rise to less than 1.5°C throughout the century, the share of
renewables must reach 33–38 percent by 2030 (In the power sector, renewables would need to account for 60-65
percent of electricity generation.). Much greater effort is needed to increase the use of renewables in transport andheating, both directly (through the use of bioenergy, solar thermal and geothermal, and ambient heat) and indirectly(through electrification), while progressing on energy conservation.
Enhancing renewables-based electricity supply in developing countries deserves particular attention. Positively,
developing countries saw a record-breaking renewable capacity growth in 2021 (+9.8 percent year-on-year), withcumulative installations reaching 268 watts per capita. Yet this growth is unevenly distributed, and further action isrequired in the least developed countries.

Executive Summary

9

ENERGY EFFICIENCY (SDG INDICATOR 7.3.1)
SDG target 7.3 calls for doubling the global rate of improvement in energy intensity over the average rate during
1990–2010—which means improving energy intensity by 2.6 percent per year between 2010 and 2030.1 Yet progress
between 2010 and 2020 averaged only 1.8 percent. To make up for lost ground, improvement in energy intensity
must now exceed 3.4 percent globally from 2020 to 2030—twice the rate achieved in the past decade. An evengreater improvement would be needed to be on track to limit the end-of-century temperature rise to less than 1.5°C.
The needed improvements will require more aggressive efficiency mandates—including bans on the sale of the mostinefficient equipment—and codes requiring that new buildings meet net-zero standards.

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL FLOWS (SDG INDICATOR 7.A.1)
International public financial flows in support of clean energy in developing countries began to drop before the onsetof the COVID-19 pandemic and continued to fall through 2021. In 2021, these flows amounted to USD 10.8 billion,an 11 percent drop from 2020, 35 percent less than the 2010–19 average and only about 40 percent of the 2017
peak of USD 26.4 billion. Commitments remain heavily concentrated in a handful of countries. It is expected thatthe downward trend in public investments continued in 2022. Data released in 2022 and 2023 will provide a clearer
picture of the effects on public financial flows of the energy crisis in Europe sparked by the war in Ukraine.
While there is no quantitative target for this indicator, IEA and IRENA scenarios estimate that staying in line withinternational climate and energy goals requires annual investments in renewable electricity generation and related
infrastructure of USD 1.4–1.7 trillion through 2030. Investments will be needed not only in technologies, but alsoin policy interventions and international cooperation. Although the private sector finances most renewable energy
investments, the public sector remains a critical source of finance, particularly for many developing countries. Overall,redirecting investments from fossil fuels, increasing aid commitments, introducing structural reforms in international
public finance, innovating funding mechanisms, and improving the transparency of commitment reporting are allnecessary steps.
***
As the path to realizing SDG 7 and related SDGs by 2030 narrows, the SDG 7 custodian agencies also emphasize
the need for stronger and more tangible commitments to close the gaps in access to electricity and clean cooking
fuels and technologies; the need for a fundamental transformation of the global energy system as a precondition forsustainable development and global energy security; and the importance of international cooperation and financing
to deliver on the vast promise of the energy transition.
Continued improvements on data and the tracking of global SDG 7 targets will be critical to ensure evidencedbased decision and policy making. The custodians will further enhance the global dashboard now freely accessible
online and continue to refine this annual report, which has strengthened institutional, organizational, and sectoralcollaboration.2 Results emerging from the joint work of the custodians have included joint publications (including
analytical guidebooks), capacity-building actions, and coordinated dissemination efforts.

101

Energy intensity is the ratio of the total energy supply to the annual GDP created—in essence, the energy used per unit of wealth created.

2

The global dashboard is available online here: https://trackingsdg7.esmap.org/

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

The custodian agencies further urge the international community and policy makers to safeguard the gains madetoward achieving SDG 7; to advance structural reforms to overcome obstacles to action on affordable, reliable,
sustainable, and modern energy for all; and to maintain a strategic focus on the vulnerable countries needing themost support.
***
The remainder of this summary is devoted to the major SDG 7 target areas: access to electricity, access to clean
fuels and technologies for cooking, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and international public financial flows todeveloping countries in support of clean energy.

Executive Summary11

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
Access to electricity is expected to improve through 2030, after the difficult economic conditions created by the
COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have stabilized. However, variations across countries will persist, andmany countries will not reach universal access by 2030 unless much more is done. Even then, progress may be limited
for countries with weak energy access–related institutions and policies. The outlook is better for countries with strong
institutional and policy support for access, most of which have already made historic progress in bringing the benefitsof electricity to their population.
According to IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 Scenario, annual investment of USD 30 billion will be required to achieve universal
access to electricity by 2030.
***
Globally, access to electricity (SDG 7.1.1) grew on average by 0.7 percentage points each year between 2010 and
2021, rising from 84 percent of the world’s population to 91 percent and raising the number of people with anelectricity connection by more than a billion. Over the past decade, access improved steadily, reducing the number ofpeople without access from 1.1 billion in 2010 down to 675 million in 2021, despite a growing population. The recent
slowdown in growth is leaving the poorest and hardest-to-reach people without access. In 2019–21, the number ofpeople with access increased by 114 million per year, fewer than the 129 million who had access each year between
2010 and 2019.3
To reach universal access by 2030, the world will have to scale up annual growth in electrification to 1 percentage
point per year from 2021 onward through investments and policy support, instead of the 0.6 percentage point pacerecorded between 2019 and 2021. If no additional efforts and measures are put in place, some 660 million people—560
million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 70 million in Developing Asia—will remain unserved in 2030 (IEA 2022a).4 Becauseof the continued negative impacts of COVID-19 on the global and national economies, compounded by the war in
Ukraine and the related energy crisis, urgent actions must be taken to prevent setbacks in access.
Globally, the number of unserved people fell steadily between 2010 and 2021. However, the trend differs acrossregions (figure ES.2). Fifty-one countries in the developing world have achieved universal access, 17 of them in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Another 95 countries, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, were still short of the target in
2021, despite progress in about one-quarter of them—including half of the 20 countries with the largest access deficits(defined as the population lacking access to electricity). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people without access
was roughly the same in 2021 as in 2010.
Most of the decline in the unserved population came in Asia. The number of people without access plummeted inCentral and Southern Asia, falling from 414 million in 2010 to 24 million in 2021, with much of the improvement
occurring in Bangladesh, India, and other populous countries. The number without access to electricity in Eastern andSouth-eastern Asia declined from 90 million to 35 million during the same period. In Northern Africa and Western Asia,
the unserved population decreased less markedly—falling from 37 million in 2010 to 30 million in 2021.

3
The annual change in access is calculated as the difference between the access rate in year 2 and the rate in year 1, divided by the number ofyears: (Access Rate Year 2 – Access Rate Year 1)/(Year 2 – Year 1).
4

12

The projected access rate of 92 percent in 2030 was calculated based on the UN population database and IEA World Energy Outlook (2022).

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

FIGURE ES.2 • Share of global population with access to electricity in 2021

Population with access to electricity (%):
Under 10%
10% to 49.9%
50% to 99.9%
100%
Not applicaple
Top 20 access-deficit countries
IBRD 47236 |MAY 2023

Source: World Bank 2023.
Disclaimer: This map was produced by the Geospatial Operations Support Team of the World Bank based on the Cartography Unit of the World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown do not imply any judgment on the part of the custodian agencies concerning
the legal status of or sovereignty over any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.  

In 2021, the 20 countries with the largest access deficits accounted for 75 percent of the world’s people lacking
electricity access (figure ES.3). The countries with the largest numbers without access were Nigeria (86 million), theDemocratic Republic of Congo (76 million), and Ethiopia (55 million). In 2021, these top three countries are the sameas in the previous edition of this report. India and South Sudan dropped out of the top 20, and Zambia and Mali joined
it. Increases in electrification did not keep up with population growth in the Democratic Republic of Congo between
2019 and 2021. As a result, the access deficit there increased by about 2 million people. In contrast, the number ofpeople without access in Nigeria and Ethiopia decreased by 2 million each year between 2019 and 2021, althoughthose countries are still in the top 3 in terms of unserved population. During the same period, as in Ethiopia, Kenya
increased its access rate by more than 3 percentage points, and its unserved population declined by about 2 million
a year.

Executive Summary

13

FIGURE ES.3 • The 20 countries with the largest access deficits in 2021 by region and income levels

Central Asia andSouthern AsiadAsia anEastern astern Asia
-e
South

Dem
Rep ocratithe ublic c
Con ofgo
76

Pakistan 12

ar 15
Myanm

2
ya 1
Ken

8
la 1
go
An
Un
of itedTan Rezan puia blic
36

75 percent (509 million)of the global population
without access

Nigeria 86

Low

me

d
an Asia
sia ernAt
rn as
ste -eEa outhS

a 25

No
an rthed W rnes Afriter ca
nA
sia

zam

Ni

7

ge

biq

ue

22

r2

1

n1

da

Chad 15

di 11
Burun

Zam

bia 1

0

0
li 1
Ma

9

r1

sca

ga

da
8

aso 1

Low income

ina F

Burk

Su

Ugand

Mo

Malawi 17

Source: World Bank 2023.

Sub-S
a
Africa haran

inco

Ma

c
bli
tic pucra s Reo'2m e
De eopl rea 1
P Ko
of

5

pia 5

Ethio

Low
inco er mid
dle
me

Sub-S
a
Africa haran

Lower middle income

Differences are also seen in urban versus rural access to electricity. In 2021, 98 percent of those living in urban areasof the world had access to electricity, contrasted with just 85 percent in rural areas. Between 2019 and 2021, however,the pace of electrification was rapid in rural areas, where the number of people with access grew by 33 million ayear, significantly outpacing population growth. This trend was driven by Central and Southern Asia. In Sub-SaharanAfrica, by contrast, rural electrification progress lagged behind population growth, with more than 80 percent of the
524 million people in rural areas living without access to electricity in 2021. Meanwhile, annual growth in the numberof connected rural dwellers slowed in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, a result of a steady decline in the overall rural
population. In Northern Africa and Western Asia, expansion of rural access kept pace with population growth.
Narrowing the gap between rural and urban access requires a better understanding of electricity end uses and greater
mobilization of public financing to make electricity more affordable and electricity infrastructure more resilient.

14

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Compared with the global average, the LDCs saw a relatively rapid increase in electrification, connecting about 32
million people a year in 2019–21 and bringing the rate of access up 3 percentage points from 53 percent in 2019 to56 percent in 2021, still leaving 481 million LDC residents without access. A gap of more than 30 percentage points
persists in access rates between LDCs and the global average. In countries marked by fragility, conflict, and violence,
access increased from 55 percent to 58 percent, leaving 421 million people still unserved in 2021.5
At the current pace of electrification, most people without access by 2030 will live in LDCs and countries affectedby fragility, conflict, and violence. Dedicated financial and regulatory support should be strengthened to increaseelectrification in these settings.
Stand-alone off-grid solutions hold potential for closing the access gap in remote and rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa,
where weak utility creditworthiness and other challenges, such as the absence of infrastructure and low population
densities, have impeded progress in grid electrification (ESMAP 2022a).
In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, mini-grid systems continued to expand access between 2019 and 2021 throughsupport from policy makers, private investors, and end users (IRENA 2022). The number of people connected to minigrids powered by solar, hydro, and biogas technologies reached 11 million in 2021.6 Solar mini-grids, which served
about a third of those connected, have become the least-cost way of bringing reliable electricity to communities living
far from the grid or experiencing regular power cuts (ESMAP 2022b). Even so, the number with access to stand-alone
off-grid solar solutions dropped from 107 million in 2019 to 101 million in 2021.7 To close the access gap by 2030,
however, off-grid renewable electrification will have to be scaled up rapidly through dedicated policies and strong
financial schemes.
Specific policies to expand infrastructure, upgrade technology, and achieve modern and sustainable energy service
targets under a given regulatory framework vary by country, but all countries need to establish an enabling environmentthat de-risks investments, supports innovation, promotes transparency and accountability, and offers benefits to local
economies. Technological innovation and digitalization offer the prospect of reducing costs, providing efficiencies
across the value chain, and improving accountability (thus encouraging the required investment and spurring large
cross-sectoral effects). Public financing will continue to play an important role in ensuring affordable access for all andsupporting the development of enabling environments through investments in skills and capacity building, planning,and market linkages for productive uses of electricity.

5
The list of countries affected by violent conflict is based on the World Bank classification. The list is updated annually and this report refers to thelist published in July 2022: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/69b1d088e3c48ebe2cdf451e30284f04-0090082022/original/FCSList-FY23.pdf
6According to ESMAP (2022b), 48 million people were connected to around 21,500 mini-grids powered by solar photovoltaic (PV), followed byhydro and fossil fuels in 2021.
7
The figure of 101 million people with current access is calculated based on sales from GOGLA and its affiliates, which include GOGLA members,companies with Verasol-certified products, and companies working with the Low Energy Inclusive Appliances program.

Executive Summary

15

ACCESS TO CLEAN FUELS AND TECHNOLOGIESFOR COOKING
The world is not on track to achieve universal access to clean cooking by 2030. Even though an estimated 71 percentof the global population had access to clean cooking fuels and technologies in 2021—an increase of 2 percentage
points since 2020 and 14 points since 20008—2.3 billion of the world’s people still use polluting fuels and technologies
for their cooking. This continues to put household members, particularly women and children, at greater risk of chronic
diseases, while also contributing to climate change, perpetuating gender inequity, and compromising actions forsustainable development. Efforts to accelerate the achievement of universal access to clean cooking by 2030 are
urgently needed. Sustained development aid and financing in low- and middle-income countries will be necessary
to ensure universal access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, alongside a long-term transition from LPG toelectricity that will require substantial investments in infrastructure and changes in cooking practices.
***
On a global scale, the number of people with access to clean cooking has risen consistently over the last two decades.
The total number of people lacking access to clean cooking—a measure of the number exposed to the damaging
health and socioeconomic effects of polluting fuels and technologies—began to fall substantially only after 2010,
dropping from its historic level of around 3 billion people in that year to 2.3 billion people in 2021.
The health consequences of household air pollution are stark and tragic. The use of inefficient stoves paired withsolid fuels and kerosene releases air pollution that puts household members, particularly women and children, atgreater risk of chronic disease. According to WHO (2022), 3.2 million deaths are attributable to household air pollution
created through the use of polluting fuels and technologies for cooking, including 240,000 pneumonia deaths inchildren under the age of five (WHO 2021). Failure to reach the target of universal access to clean cooking fuels andtechnologies will continue to claim millions of lives each year. The lack of access to clean fuels and modern energy
systems for cooking has impacts beyond health, preventing many from living life to the fullest. The drudgery posed byreliance on inefficient stoves and fuels (which must often be foraged) falls disproportionately on women and children,
particularly girls.
Improvement in the global access rate has been driven by progress in the most populous low- and middle-income
countries. Rapid progress in China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Pakistan, where the combined access rate rose from 49
percent in 2010 to 77 percent in 2021, stands in sharp contrast to the minimal progress in other countries (48 percent
in 2010 to 52 percent in 2021). Large regional variability exists (figure ES.4), as good progress in the largest countries
may obscure the lack of progress in a great many smaller countries. India alone accounts for the largest share of theaccess deficit, with 505 million people lacking access, followed by China at 296 million.

8
Clean fuels and technologies include stoves powered by electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas, biogas, solar, and alcohol. Clean
fuels and technologies are as defined by the normative technical recommendations in the WHO Guidelines for Indoor Air Quality: Household Fuel
Combustion (WHO 2014).

16

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

FIGURE ES.4 • Share of population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, 2021 (percent)Population with access to clean
cooking fuels and technologies (%):
0%–25%
25%–50%50%–75%75%–99%100%
Not applicable
IBRD 47237 |MAY 2023

Source: WHO 2023; Stoner and others 2021.
Disclaimer: This map was produced by the Geospatial Operations Support Team of the World Bank based on the Cartography Unit of the World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown do not imply any judgment on the part of the custodian agencies concerning
the legal status of or sovereignty over any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.  

In 2000, four in ten people lacking access to clean cooking lived in Central Asia and Southern Asia; another four inEastern Asia and South-eastern Asia; and two in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2021, four in ten people without access lived
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the access deficit shrank in the two Asian regions and grew sharply in Sub-Saharan Africa. If
current trends continue, almost six in ten people without access will reside in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030. The numberof people without access in that region is growing at a rate of almost 20 million people per year as gains in access failto keep pace with population growth. The growing access deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa could undermine increasing
trends in global access.
Large urban-rural discrepancies in access to clean cooking fuels and technologies are found worldwide. Urban areas
enjoy greater access to clean cooking than rural areas, but the gap is narrowing. The percentage of people withaccess in urban areas rose only slightly in the past decade—from 82 percent in 2010 to 86 percent in 2021, owing to ahigher baseline. Over the same period, the percentage with access in rural areas rose from 31 percent to 51 percent.
Between 2000 and 2010, the difference in access to clean cooking between urban and rural areas stood at around50 percentage points. By 2021 the gap had fallen to 35 percentage points; it is expected to narrow to 23 percentage
points in 2030 if current trends continue.
There is an ongoing shift in the fuel mix. Unprocessed biomass, once the most commonly used fuel in low- and middleincome countries, was overtaken by gas in around 2010 with the rapid growth of LPG programs in India, Indonesia,
and Peru, among other countries. However, in rural areas, biomass was still the principal cooking fuel of 49 percent
of people (1.5 billion) in 2021, more than any other type of fuel. Use of unprocessed biomass may be decreasing inboth urban and rural areas, but primary reliance on charcoal persists and is increasing in some areas, particularly urban
areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, where it was used by 30 percent of people or 140 million people in 2021.

Executive Summary17

In rural areas (and overall), the share of people who use gas as their primary fuel is rising more quickly than those whouse electricity, whereas the use of electricity is rising more quickly in urban areas. Among low- and middle-income
countries, the use of electricity is highest in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, at 24 percent.
Given current trends, the pledge made at the UN’s 2021 High-level Dialogue on Energy to ensure that an additional 1billion people would gain access to clean cooking solutions by 2025 will not be reached.9 Only 39 of the 128 countries
still lacking universal access to clean cooking have set clean cooking targets, and less than half of those aim to achieve
universal access by 2030 (IEA 2022a). Current policy ambitions are therefore far from the targets of SDG 7.
Focusing on the near term, the number of people with access to clean cooking is expected to increase by only 510
million people from 2021 to 2025. The expected access deficit is largely concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
almost 60 percent of the population is projected to still lack access to clean cooking in 2030. Because of the ongoing
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and soaring energy prices, 100 million people who recently transitioned to clean
cooking are expected to revert to using cheaper traditional biomass (IEA 2022a). Between 2019 and 2021, Eastern
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean were the only regions to sustain progress in access to clean cooking (ESMAP
2022a).
Considering the significant benefits of clean cooking for the health of people and the planet, it should be at the topof the sustainable development agenda. Without immediate and sustained political action, the world will arrive at
2030 with 1.9 billion people still using polluting stove and fuel combinations for most of their cooking, harming theenvironment, impeding economic development, and compromising human health, particularly among women andchildren. Scaling up clean cooking still faces supply-side challenges, including a lack of resources and infrastructure,
while, on the demand side, cost remains a deterrent and behavioral inertia persists. However, there are known
solutions, and a growing number of countries are exploiting them. The time is ripe to take action to keep the universal
target in reach.

9
Pledge made during the High-level Dialogue on Energy in 2021, as part of the Global Roadmap for Accelerated SDG 7 Action in Support of the2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (United Nations 2021).

18

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

RENEWABLE ENERGY
SDG target 7.2 for 2030 is “increasing substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.” In 2020,
the TFEC declined by 4.7 percent year-on-year as the COVID-19 pandemic and policy responses disrupted social andeconomic activities worldwide. In this context of declining energy demand, renewable energy consumption, including
traditional use of biomass, continued to progress at a modest pace, growing 2.6 percent year-on-year globally, andincreasing its share of TFEC to 19.1 percent. Yet the current trend is neither in line with the ambition of the target nor
with internationally agreed climate objectives, and the uptake of renewable energy must be accelerated.
***
The share of renewable sources in TFEC has remained relatively steady globally over the past three decades, with aslow upward trend in recent years (+3 percentage points over the past ten years), owing mostly to the accelerated
deployment of renewable electricity technologies. In 2020, to slow the spread of the pandemic, governments acrossthe world imposed restrictions on most social and economic activities, curtailing transport, industrial production andservices, and causing a significant dip in energy demand. At the same time, global renewable energy consumption
expanded to 68.6 exajoules (EJ) in 2020, pushing the share of renewables in TFEC to 19.1 percent, up from 17.7
percent in 2019 (figure ES.5).

Traditional use of biomass
Solar PV

Modern bioenergy
Other renewables

Hydropower% of renewables

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

0%

2005

0

2004

3%

2003

10

2002

6%

2001

20

2000

9%

1999

30

1998

12%

1997

40

1996

15%

1995

50

1994

18%

1993

60

1992

21%

1991

70

1990

Exajoules

FIGURE ES.5 • Renewable energy consumption and share in total final energy consumption, by technology, 1990-2020

Wind% of modern renewables

Source: IEA (2022c), UNSD (2022).

Ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all implies a substantial increase in theshare of renewable energy sources not only in the generation of electricity, but also in transport and heat.10

Exajoules

10

3.0

30%

2.5

25%

In 2020, the three categories accounted for 22 percent, 29 percent, and 49 percent of TFEC, respectively.

2.0

20%

1.5

15%

1.0

10%

Executive Summary

0.5

5%

19

The share of renewables in final consumption is greatest for electricity, rising from 26.2 percent in 2019 to 28.3 percent
in 2020. Renewable electricity accounts for a third of global renewable energy consumption, including traditional usesof biomass, and half of modern uses. It also accounts for about 90 percent of the year-on-year increase in the share of
renewables in the energy mix, driven by continuous expansion of capacity in wind and solar PV.
Heat is the largest energy end-use worldwide, accounting for half of global final energy consumption (175 EJ). The
sector remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, which meet more than three-quarters of global heat demand.
Renewable sources accounted for just 24 percent of the energy used for heat, and more than half of that is represented
by traditional uses of biomass, which increased 1 percent in 2020 in response to higher prices for modern forms ofrenewable energy. Despite its dominant share in final energy consumption, the heat sector has received limited policy
attention and support until very recently.
The transport sector is the end-use sector with the lowest renewable energy penetration, at only 4 percent of final
energy consumption in 2020 and only 9 percent of worldwide consumption of modern forms of renewable energy.
Liquid biofuels represented 90 percent of the renewable energy consumed for transport, with most of the remainder
coming from renewable electricity for vehicles and trains, which expanded by 0.02 EJ year-on-year in 2020. A fractionof this growth is attributable to the growing number of electric vehicles on the road—from 7.1 million in 2019 to 11.3
million in 2020, while the electricity that powers these vehicles comes increasingly from renewable sources.
The agri-food sector also has substantial linkages with renewable energy. About 30 percent of the world’s energy isconsumed within agri-food systems, from production to food consumption.11 The majority of that energy is fossil fuel–based (IRENA and FAO 2022). A joint approach to the renewable energy transition and the transformation of agri-foodsystems is necessary to meet their demand for electricity, heating, cooling, processing, and transport while advancing
the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (IRENA and FAO 2022).
There are strong regional disparities in the share of renewables in the energy mix (figure ES.6). In 2020, almost half ofthe global year-on-year increase in modern renewable energy consumption came from Eastern Asia, owing primarily
to the deployment of wind, hydropower and solar PV. Europe accounted for more than a quarter of the year-on-year
growth in modern renewable energy use, due to favorable conditions for hydropower and the expansion of windand solar PV capacity. The share of renewables in TFEC grew fastest in Latin America and in Europe (respectively+2.8 and +1.5 percentage points in 2020), supported in both cases by significant declines in TFEC (-7.7 percent and-5.5 percent, respectively—the largest declines after Northern America). Modern use of bioenergy declined 8 percent
year-on-year in North America, owing partly to reduced consumption by the pulp and paper industry and in theresidential heating sector due to a mild winter in 2019–2020. While traditional use of biomass continued to decline
in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, this was offset by increasing consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa, partly driven by
population growth.

11
The energy used in agri-food systems includes direct energy for primary production as well as shares of the energy demands for fertilizer
manufacturing, food processing, storage, and other inputs.

20

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Exajoules

FIGURE ES.6 • Renewable energy consumption and share in total final energy consumption, by region, 1990 and 2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1990

2020

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

1990

2020

Sub-SaharanAfrica1990

2020

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

1990

2020

Europe1990

2020

Northern
America1990

Tide
Solar thermalWind
Traditional use of biomass% of renewables (incl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC
Source: IEA (2022c), UNSD (2022).

2020

Latin America andthe Caribbean

1990

2020

Western Asia

1990

2020

Northern Africa

1990

2020

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Oceania

Geothermal
Solar PV
Modern bioenergy
Hydropower% of modern renewables (excl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC

2015–20

6,000

6.0

5,000

5.0

Progress on SDG indicator 7.b.1, which tracks renewables-based generating capacity in developing countries, has
Percentage point change

beenon the rise since 2007, when the share of renewables-based capacity stood at 24.8 percent. In 2021, that
share
4,000
4.0
Exajoules

reached3,000 a record high of 38 percent, with 268 watts per capita of cumulative renewable capacity installed (figure
3.0ES.7),
close
to the world average of 38.3 percent. Additions of renewables-based capacity in developing countries peaked
2,000
2.0
in 2020,
1,000 with 186 GW added, before contracting to 174 GW in 2021.

1.0

0

0.0

FigureES.7 • Growth in renewable energy-generating capacity per capita by technology across regions, 2010–21-1,000300

Watts
per capita
Exajoules

250

Eastern Asia and Europe
South-eastern Asia

Central Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanSouthern Asia and the Caribbean Africa

Northern
AfricaOceania

-2.0

9.8%
268

9.6%

2020 year-on-year change

244
5.0

8.8%

600
150
400

-200
50
-400

Northern
America

CAGR

1,000
200
800

200
100
0

Western Asia

4.6%
64

101

154

4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0

-1.0

-2.0
Eastern Asia and Europe Central Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanWestern
Northern
Northern
Oceania
AfricaAsia
America
AfricaSouthern Asia and the Caribbean
0 South-eastern Asia
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Tide
Geothermal
Solar thermal
Traditional biomass
Hydropower
Renewable hydropower
Solar energy
Wind energy
Bioenergy
Geothermal energy
Marine energy
Solar PV
Wind
Modern bioenergy
Change in the share of renewables
Change in the share of modern(incl. TUoB) in TFEC (right axis)
renewables in TFEC (right axis)

Percentage point change-2,000-1.0

Source: IRENA (2022a).
Note: CAGR = compound annual growth rate.

30

30%

25

25%

ules

Executive
20 Summary

20%

21

But the positive global and regional trends hide the fact that the countries most in need of support are being left
behind, even within the broader category of developing countries. Closing the gap in the deployment of renewablesbased generating capacity will require tailored policies and investments to ensure that the energy transition is justand sustainable in the long term. More needs to be done to meet the SDG target 7.b: to “expand infrastructure andupgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular
least developed countries, small island developing states and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with
their respective programmes of support.”
The ambitious deployment of renewables-based generating capacity across regions is crucial to avoid locking inunsustainable and polluting energy choices and investing scarce fiscal resources in assets that are likely to become
stranded. Long-term commitments to renewable energy from policy makers—supported by well-designed targets,comprehensive plans, and timelines for the short, medium, and long term—are needed to set clear directions aroundwhich stakeholders can plan their activities. The more detailed, specific, and credible the target, the more it cancatalyze public and private investments and support. Renewable energy targets also need to be ambitious enoughto break free of historical trends and align renewable energy deployment with international climate ambitions. The
targets then need to be implemented through a range of instruments, including regulations, fiscal incentives, andbehavioral measures. These policies to support the ramp-up of renewable energy must be underpinned by structuralchanges, as countries endeavor to transform entire energy systems through the use of sustainable sources of energy
to power economies and improve lives and livelihoods.

22

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Progress on energy efficiency is measured by tracking the year-on-year percentage change in “energy intensity”— theenergy used per unit of economic output. Initially, the United Nations recommended an annual improvement rate of
2.6 percent between 2010 and 2030 to achieve the target, but global progress has been slower than that in all years
except 2015.12 For 2020, in fact, the annual improvement in energy intensity was just 0.6 percent, the lowest figure
since 2010, mainly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. The poor showing to date means that global
energy intensity must now improve from 2020 to 2030 at an annual rate of no less than 3.4 percent (up 0.2 percent
from last year's recommendation) to reach SDG target 7.3 and 4.2 percent to reach the International Energy Agency’s(IEA’s) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (IEA 2021a).
***
Globally, energy intensity has improved gradually since 1990 (figure ES.8). But it improved only 0.6 percent in 2020,
to 4.63 MJ/USD (2017 PPP [purchasing power parity]), in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, as GDP and total energy
supply fell by 3.2 and 3.8 percent, respectively (IEA 2021b). The COVID-19 crisis worsened an already undesirable
trend, with the 2020 result well below the average annual growth of 1.2 percent recorded during 1990-2010, and 1.8
percent achieved between 2010 and 2020. Historical GDP and energy intensity data suggest that large declines inGDP, such as those occurring in 2020, tend to be followed by declines in future energy intensity improvement rates(IEA 2020a).

Annual change (left axis)

Period average

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

MJ/USD (2017) PPP

4

1999

-3%

1998

5

1997

-2%

1996

6

1995

-1%

1994

7

1993

0%

1992

8

1991

1%

1990

Annual change (%)

Figure ES.8 • Global primary energy intensity and its annual change, 1990–2020

Global primary energy intensity (right axis)

Source: IEA, UNSD, and World Bank. The energy data for the figures in this section come from a joint data set built by the International Energy Agency(https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/) and the United Nations Statistics Division (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/energystats/). GDP data are sourced
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/).
MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity.

At the regional level, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa
recorded the smallest average gains in energy intensity improvement over the period 2010–20 (1 percent per year

12
The 2.6 percent rate was calculated based on a goal of doubling the global rate of improvement in energy intensity between 2010 and 2030 over
the average rate achieved during 1990–2010.

0.0%
-0.5%
-1.0%
Executive Summary

-1.5%

-1.2%

-1.8%
-2.6%

23

or less). However, trends differed across these regions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, total energy supply
decreased slightly, and GDP growth was among the lowest worldwide. The region also consumes the least energy
in the world, at 3.3 MJ/USD (2017 PPP) (figure ES.9). On the other hand, total energy supply and GDP in Western
Asia and Northern Africa, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, grew at rates higher than the global average.13 Three regions—
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia and Northern Africa—saw energy
efficiency improvements double in 2010–20 compared with 1990-2010.

FIGURE ES.9 • Primary energy intensity at a regional level, 2010 and 2020
8

MJ/USD (2017) PPP

6

4

2

0

Latin America andthe Caribbean

Northern America
and Europe

2010 Primary energy intensity

Oceania

Western Asia andNorthern Africa

2020 Primary energy intensity

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

2010 Global primary energy intensity

Sub-SaharanAfrica2020 Global primary energy intensity

Source: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see note to figure ES.8).
MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity.

Improving energy intensity in the top 20 energy-consuming countries is central to meeting SDG target 7.3, in view of8%

the fact that they account for approximately three-quarters of global GDP and energy consumption. Over the period
2010–20,
6% 14 of the 20 achieved faster improvements in energy intensity than in the previous decade, although only
five (China, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Japan, and Germany) exceeded the level of 2.6 percent originally thought
Compound annual growth rate (%)

to be sufficientto achieve SDG 7.3. In addition, intensity improvement doubled in six countries in 2010–20 compared4%

with 1990–2010; these are Mexico, France, Indonesia, Japan, Türkiye, and Italy. That these groups of high achievers
2%both developed economies and major developing economies shows that all countries can double their energy
includeefficiency improvement rates, despite differences in their starting improvement levels.
0%

In the context of end-use trends, a variety of metrics can be used to examine energy intensity across key sectors,-2% industry, transport, buildings, and agriculture.14 Over the period 2010–20, energy intensity improved at ansuch asaccelerated rate across all sectors, except residential buildings (figure ES.10).
-4%-6%

United Kingdom

Japan

Italy

FranceGermany

United States

MexicoAustralia

BrazilRussiaCanadaKorea

ThailandIndonesia

Saudi Arabia

Nigeria

Iran

India

China

Turkey13
Sub-Saharan Africa is highly energy intensive, at 6.3 MJ/USD (2017 PPP). The figure for Western Asia and Northern Africa was 4.3 MJ/USD (2017
PPP).
14
The measures for energy intensity used for individual sectors (e.g., in figure ES.10) differ from those applied to global primary energy intensity.
Energy intensity for freight transport, for example, is defined as final energy use per metric ton-kilometer. For passenger transport, it is final energy use
per passenger-kilometer. For residential use, it is final energy use per square meter of floor area. In the service, industry, and agriculture sectors, energy
energysupplyPrimary energy(USD
intensity
SDGIn7.3
target(PEI)term, it would
Globalbeaverage(PEI) to develop more refined
intensity is defined as finalTotalenergyuse
per unitGDPof gross value-added2017 PPP).
thelongerdesirable
sectoral and end-use-level indicators to examine energy intensity by industry (e.g., cement, steel) or end use (e.g., heating, cooling). Doing so will not
be possible without more disaggregated data and statistical collaboration with relevant energy-consuming sectors.

24

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure ES.10 • Compound annual growth rate of energy intensity by sector, 2000–10 and 2010–20
Freight transport
Passenger transport
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Residential
-3.5%

-3.0%

-2.5%

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

Compound annual growth rate (%)
2010–20

2000–10Sources: IEA, UNSD, and World Bank (see note to figure ES.8).
Note: The measures for energy intensity used here for individual sectors differ from those applied to global primary energy intensity (seefootnote 12).

Chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, and metals lowered their energy intensity at an annual average rate of 1–2 percent
over 2010–20; less-intensive manufacturing did so by 2–4 percent per year over the same period (IEA 2022b). Energy
intensity fell the fastest in freight transport, at 2.2 percent annually, a drop much steeper than the 0.4 percent annual
decrease observed between 2000 and 2010. In the services sector, energy intensity improved by 1.8 percent annually
between 2010 and 2020. It also improved significantly for agriculture—from 0.7 percent a year in 2000–10 to 1.6 percent
50%

between 2010 and 2020 due to the sector’s economic output outpacing growth in energy demand. A backward
trend was observed in the residential sector, which accounts for nearly a third of global energy consumption. Energy
Generation efﬁciency (%)

intensity
improvements in the sector fell from 1.9 percent in the first decade of the new century to 1.1 percent annually45%
between 2010 and 2020.

The technology
and resources needed to double energy efficiency by 2030 are all available, including digitalization,
40%
which is already reshaping the energy landscape and facilitating progress toward improved energy efficiency. Wide-scale data collection, analysis, and application can help direct energy efficiency measures to where they can havethe greatest
impact. More refined sectoral and end-use-level indicators would make it possible to examine energy
35%
intensity by industry (e.g., cement, steel) or end use (e.g., heating, cooling). But developing those indicators will not be

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

30%

1990

possible without more disaggregated data and statistical collaboration with energy-consuming sectors.
For the time being, the slow pace of improvement in energy efficiency is a major missed opportunity for the global
community. Making energy efficiency a priority in policies and investments over the coming years can help achieve
Oil

Coal

Natural gas

All fossil fuel generation

SDG target 7.3, promote economic development, improve health and well-being, and ensure universal access to clean
energy.

Executive Summary25

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL FLOWSTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SUPPORTOF CLEAN ENERGYInternational public financial flows supporting clean energy in developing countries began dropping before the
COVID-19 pandemic and continued through 2021. While there is no quantitative target for such flows under indicator
7.a.1, their dwindling may delay achievement of SDG 7, especially for LDCs, landlocked developing countries, andsmall island developing states. International public flows must increase substantially and be targeted at countries mostin need of financial aid.15***
The volume of public international financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy research anddevelopment and renewable energy production (together referred to as renewables) decreased over 2020–2021. In
2021, these flows totaled USD 10.8 billion, down 11 percent from 2020 (figure ES.11). The 2021 figure was equal tothat of 2012 and among the lowest levels recorded over the past 10 years. It is 35 percent lower than the average of
USD 16.7 billion for 2010–19 and only 40 percent of the 2017 peak of USD 26.4 billion.

FIGURE ES.11 • Annual international public financial flows toward renewables in developing countries, by technology, 2000-21
30

26.4

Commitments (USD billion)

25

21.9

20

16.6

15

11.9 12.6

10
5
0

14.2
10.8

15.8
12.6

14.0
12.2

10.8

8.3

1.5

2.0

3.1
1.4

2.2

2.2

3.3

4.3

2.9

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

Geothermal energy

Multiple/other renewables

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.
Note: Multiple/other renewables include commitments whose descriptions are unclear in the financial databases; commitments that target morethan one technology with no details specifying the financial breakdown for each; bioenergy commitments, which are almost negligible; multipurpose
financial instruments such as green bonds and investment funds; and commitments targeting a broad range of technologies. Examples of thelatter include renewable energy and electrification programs, technical assistance, energy efficiency programs, and other infrastructure supporting
renewable energy.

20

26

mmitments (USD billion)

15
International public financial flows include official development assistance and other official flows that are transferred internationally to othercountries. Referred to as flows, commitments, or financing in this summary, they are reported when committed, not when disbursed. Sixty-eight
USD 15.8
institutions or donors made commitments through 236 agencies during the years between 2000 and 21. Unless stated otherwise, all commitment
amounts are expressed in US dollars in 2020 constantprices and exchange rates. Constant amounts are adjusted for changes in the inflation rate in the
2.6 times
country 15
in which the commitment was made, as well as changes in exchange rates between the provider’s currency and the US dollar over the same
period.

10

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

USD 6.2

Figure ES.12 reveals that commitments continued to shift from hydropower to solar energy in 2021. Solar attracted
the largest share of flows (43 percent), followed by multiple/other renewables (33 percent) and hydropower (16percent); wind and geothermal energy received less than 10 percent of total flows. Since 2018, an increasing shareof commitments has fallen into the multiple/other renewables category, which includes energy funds, green bonds,
and other government-led programs to support renewables, energy efficiency, and electricity access. This category
is growing in importance, as interest grows in funding mechanisms that target multiple energy technologies at once.

FIGURE ES.12 • Share of annual public flows by technology, 2010-21
100%

Share of commitment amounts (%)

24%
80%
6%
11%

60%

4%

27%

28%

21%

19%

25%

8%
7%

4%
6%

9%

10%

11%

49%
55%

54%

20%

24%

41%

47%

40%

28%

17%
0%

2010

2011

2012

Hydropower

2013

2014

2015

Solar energy

Wind energy

43%

28%

20%

53%
36%

6%

17%

40%

46%

7%
6%

17%

19%

27%

45%

5%
8%

9%

14%

33%

36%
5%
5%

9%

13%

24%

24%

2016

2017

2018

21%

20%

16%

2019

2020

2021

Geothermal energy

Multiple/other renewables

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.
Note: Multiple/other renewables are defined in the note to figure ES.11.

While international public flows decreased overall, several regions saw increases in 2021. Flows to Northern America
and Europe rose 81 percent (USD 180 million); flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose 45 percent (USD 1,213 million); flows
to Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia rose 23 percent (USD 251 million); and flows to “unspecified countries” rose 4
percent (USD 21 million).16 Meanwhile, flows to other regions declined: Latin America and the Caribbean experienced
the largest drop in international public finance, with a decrease of 62 percent (USD 2,295 million; Western Asia andNorthern Africa fell by about 59 percent (USD 582 million); Oceania fell 42 percent (USD 9 million); and Central Asia
$50

and Southern Asia fell 8 percent (USD 232 million).

100%

47.4

Although the distribution of flows has widened over the years, international public financial flows remain highly
39.1

27.0

35.1

Share of ﬂows to renewables (%)

Commitments (USD billion)$40
concentrated
among a small group of countries, with 23 countries receiving 80 percent of all commitments80%
in 2020. In

2021, the number of countries receiving most of the commitments was even smaller,
with only 19 countries receiving
14.4
30.0
the bulk of flows.
28.9the top recipient of for the past two years (USD 2.9 billion, with 66 percent
28.4 For 2020–2021, India was
$30

55%

60%

19.4
for solar energy); followed by Pakistan (USD 1.7 billion,
with25.482 percent for hydropower); Brazil (USD 1.4 billion for
24.4

18.3

17.2 and Mexico (almost USD 900 million, mainly for solar energy and modernizing hydropower plants).
infrastructure);
$20

16.9

15.3

12.7

10.2

40%

8.8

24.7

6.6

19.6

16
“Northern America and Europe” is included as a region for the first time this year. It captures flows to eight countries in Europe (Albania, Belarus,
BosniaUkraine). No data were included for Northern20%
America. The$10and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, and20.4
15.7 following the United Nations’ M49 regional 14.2
13.6and Europe,
region is nevertheless referred to as Northern America
classification. “Unspecified countries”
12.7
11.2
11.7
10.3 or commitments not directed to a specific region. Regional bonds and funds10.9
refers to commitments to multiple countries
and umbrella loans for
multiple projects usually fall into this category.

$0

2010

2011

2012

2013

Non-renewables
Executive Summary

2014
Renewables

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

0%

Share to renewables

27

th

Hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

Geothermal energy

Multiple/other renewables

Cumulative commitment

Historically, the world’s 46 LDCs have received a small share of international public flows, as illustrated in figure ES.13.
Flows to LDCs decreased in the past two years, dropping to USD 1.6 billion in 2020 and USD 2 billion in 2021.

25

100

20

80

15

60

10

40

5

13%

0

1.5
2010

13%
3.7
2011

4.9
0.8
2012

2013

4.1

3.0

2015

2016

2.5
2014

Commitments to LDCs

Non LDC

4.5
2017

18%

3.1

2.9

1.6

2.0

2018

2019

2020

2021

20

Share of commitments to LDCs (%)

Commitments (USD billion)

FIGURE ES.13 • International public financial flows to LDCs and non-LDCs for renewables, 2010-21

0

Share of Commitments to LDCs

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.
Note: LDCs = least developed countries.

Given the importance of off-grid renewable energy solutions in closing the energy access gap, it is encouraging thatflows for these solutions reached a record USD 558 million in 2021 (IRENA and CPI 2023). Although these investments
still represent a small portion of the overall financing of energy access and renewables, they are a crucial, and costeffective, part of the effort to close the access deficit.
In 2021, the combined public and private flows to renewable energy reached an estimated USD 430 billion (IRENA
and CPI 2023). Even so, the current level of investment falls far short of the investments required to limit the rise in
the average global temperature to 1.5°C by the end of the century while closing the energy gap and advancing
development imperatives. To meet the 1.5°C goal, at least USD 1.3 trillion a year in current prices must be directed
to renewable power and the direct use of renewables between 2021 and 2030, and at least USD 2 trillion a year isneeded for broader power sector investments, including power grids and flexibility (IRENA 2022; IEA 2022a).
Redirecting investments from fossil fuels, increasing official development assistance, innovating funding mechanisms,
harmonizing the reporting of commitments, and introducing structural reforms in international public finance will
also be necessary steps to elicit greater volumes of international public financial flows and to make the most of them.
Taking these steps will require strong political will and collaboration among global stakeholders. Happily, momentumis building for reform, as evidenced by the Bridgetown Initiative headed by Barbados (UN 2023).

28

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

TRACKING PROGRESS ACROSS TARGETS:
INDICATORS AND DATA
Monitoring progress toward the SDG 7 goals depends on a robust framework of indicators backed by statistical data.
Since this effort began back in 2013, improvements in reporting, advances in countries’ statistical capacities, andenhanced models have raised the quality, reliability, and consistency of data. The custodian agencies and international
community have spurred efforts to further improve data collection, analysis, and reporting. The definition of 232 initial
indicators (since expanded to 248) was an important step (UNSTATS n.d.). These indicators have resulted in a common
language and framework, aligning the efforts of governments, civil society, and the private sector toward shared goals.
These statistical tools and methods make it possible to track national, regional, and global progress based oncollaboration between national statistical offices and international and regional organizations using optimized andstandardized data-collection resources. For example, household surveys can be designed to support tracking acrossSDG 7 targets and even other SDG targets, such as health, air pollution, and quality of life.
Nonetheless, examination of each SDG 7 indicator reveals the need for additional information. The custodian
agencies emphasize the need to strengthen resources for enhanced national data collection within current andplanned international programs on energy transitions. Domestic statistical capacities, too, must be reinforced. To thisend, the World Bank and the WHO have prepared a guidebook to integrate energy access questions into existing
national household surveys (World Bank and WHO 2021). The custodial agencies responsible for this report also hostwebinars for statistical agencies, produce statistical guidance and reports on data collection, and regularly consult
with national statistical offices about the estimates they provide. Continuing efforts by the World Bank, WHO, andother custodians to mainstream energy access questions into national household surveys are an important form of
support for those offices.

Executive Summary29

References
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2021a. Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Paris: IEA.
https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
IEA. 2021b. Energy Efficiency 2021. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-2021.
IEA. 2021c. Achievements of Energy Efficiency Appliance and Equipment Standards and Labelling Programmes:
A Global Assessment in 2021. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/achievements-of-energy-efficiencyappliance-and-equipment-standards-and-labeling-programmes.
IEA. 2022a. World Energy Outlook 2022. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022.
IEA. 2022b. Energy Efficiency Market Report 2022. Paris: IEA.
IEA. 2022c. World Energy Balances. Paris : IEA
ESMAP (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program). 2022a. Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE)
2022: Building Resilience. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. https://esmap.org/RISE_2022_report.
ESMAP. 2022b. Mini Grids for Half a Billion People: Market Outlook and Handbook for Decision Makers. Washington,
DC: World Bank. https://www.esmap.org/Mini_Grids_for_Half_a_Billion_People_The_Report.
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2022. Off-grid Renewable Energy Statistics 2022. Abu Dhabi:
IRENA. https://www.irena.org/Publications/2022/Dec/Off-grid-renewable-energy-statistics-2022.
IRENA and CPI (Climate Policy Initiative). 2023. Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance. https://www.irena.
org/Publications/2023/Feb/Global-landscape-of-renewable-energy-finance-2023.
IRENA. 2022a. Renewable Energy Statistics. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://www.irena.org/publications/2022/Jul/
Renewable-Energy-Statistics-2022IRENA and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2022. Renewable
Energy for Agri-food Systems: Towards the Sustainable Development Goal and the Paris Agreement. https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Nov/Renewable-Energy-for-Agri-food-Systems.
UN (United Nations). 2023. With clock ticking for the SDGs, UN Chief and Barbados Prime Minister call for urgent
action to transform broken global financial system. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/blog/2023/04/press-release-with-clock-ticking-for-the-sdgs-un-chief-andbarbados-prime-minister-call-for-urgent-action-to-transform-broken-global-financial-system/.
UNSD (United Nation Statistics Division). 2022. Energy Balances.
UNSTATS (United Nations Statistics Division). n.d. “SDG Indicators: Global Indicator Framework for the Sustainable
Development Goals and Targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicatorslist/.
World Bank and WHO (World Health Organization). 2021. Measuring Energy Access: A Guide to Collecting Data
Using “The Core Questions on Household Energy Use”. Geneva. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/
WHO-HEP-ECH-AQH-2021.9

30

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

WHO (World Health Organization). 2021. Global Health Observatory (database). Geneva: World Health Organization.
https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/topic-details/GHO/household-air-pollution.
WHO. 2022. “Fact Sheets: Household Air Pollution.” Geneva: World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/household-air-pollution-and-health.

Executive Summary

31

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY

Photo: © Gettyimages by Nattrass

CHAPTER 1

Main Messages•

Global trend. Globally, access to electricity grew every year between 2010 and 2021, rising from 84 percentof the world’s population to 91 percent, raising the number of people with access by more than a billion. The
number without electricity dropped by almost half, from about 1.1 billion in 2010 to 675 million in 2021. The
pace of annual growth in access has slowed since 2019, however. Several factors may account for the slowdown,
including the COVID-19 pandemic. The current pace is not fast enough to reach the last mile.

•

Target for 2030. To reach universal access by 2030, the world will have to drastically increase efforts toward thetarget by scaling up investments and policy support. To bridge the gap, the annual rate of growth in access mustbe 1 percentage point per year from 2021 onward—almost twice the current pace of 0.6 percentage points in
2019–21. If no additional measures are taken, about 660 million people will still be unserved in 2030 (IEA 2022).
Some 75 million people were estimated to have lost the ability to pay for extended electricity services becauseof the pandemic and the energy crisis associated with the conflict in Ukraine (IEA 2022).

•

Regional highlights. Access to electricity remains a major barrier to socioeconomic development in SubSaharan Africa, where more than 80 percent of the global population lacking access to electricity lived in 2021.
Despite steady progress in the access rate over the past decade, the number of people without access in
the region remained stagnant because of population growth, leaving 567 million without access in 2021. In
contrast, Central and Southern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern and South-eastern Asia areon track to universal access, with access rates of more than 98 percent. Of these, Central and Southern Asia
made the fastest progress in electrification between 2019 and 2021. Northern Africa and Western Asia showed
consistent progress—94 percent of the population in the region enjoyed access in 2021. The access rate in
Oceania has remained at around 81 percent since 2010.

•Urban-rural divide. Electrification grew more rapidly in rural areas, where the bulk of the population without
access lives, than in urban areas. But because the access rate in rural areas improved from a very low level, thegap between rural and urban areas remains large. In 2021, roughly 8 of every 10 people without access were
living in rural communities, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. To narrow the access gap between urban andrural areas, a better understanding of electricity end uses and a greater mobilization of public financing areneeded to address affordability challenges and make electricity infrastructure more resilient. Moreover, bothgrid and off-grid electrification options should be deployed to ensure a rapid expansion of service to rural
areas. Geographic information systems (GIS) should be considered to identify areas in dire need of policy
support and investment.

•

Top 20 access-deficit countries. As of 2021, the 20 countries with the largest access deficits accounted for
75 percent of the global population without access. The countries with the largest number of people without
access were Nigeria (86 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (76 million), and Ethiopia (55 million).
In 2019–21, electrification progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo trailed population growth; as aresult, the number of unserved people in the country increased. On the contrary, the progress of electrification
outpaced population growth in Nigeria and Ethiopia. Among access-deficit countries, Kenya and Ethiopia
showed the most rapid improvement, extending electrification by more than 3 percentage points each year
between 2019 and 2021.

33

•

Decentralized renewable energy. The number of people served by renewable mini-grids powered by solar,hydro, and biogas technologies was 11 million globally in 2021 (IRENA 2022).17 Solar mini-grids, a viable option
for last-mile communities, accounted for one-third of connections in 2021. Around 101 million people had accessto stand-alone off-grid solar solutions in 2021, a decrease from 107 million in 2019 owing to a significant drop insales during the COVID-19 pandemic (GOGLA 2022).18 Off-grid renewable energy solutions continue to play a
key role in expanding electricity access in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

•

Interlinkages with other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Universal access to electricity is not a
stand-alone target. Particularly in low-income countries, electrification can help increase educational attainment,
improve healthcare, increase food security, and create business opportunities and jobs. It is therefore imperative,
when planning measures to accelerate electricity access, to consider interlinkages with other SDGs, notably SDG 1(poverty), SDG 3 (health), SDG 4 (education), SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 17 (climate action). To maximize
the chances of success, policy makers should work to build a legal and institutional environment that is conducive
to strong utilities, that attracts new mini-grid and off-grid business models (to help close the affordability gap), thatmobilizes adequate amounts public and private sector financing, and that focuses on poor and fragile regions
where progress has been slow.

17
According to ESMAP (2022b), 48 million people were connected to about 21,500 mini-grids in 2021, mostly first- and second-generation systems.
Approximately half of installed mini-grids are powered by solar photovoltaic (PV), followed by hydro and fossil fuels. Meanwhile, the IRENA figure
includes access under Tier 1 (access through a small PV mini-grid) or Tier 2 or better (access through a large PV mini-grid or non-PV mini-grid).
18
The data are a subset of the market—that is, a proxy for higher-quality products that are quality-certified and/or associated with GOGLA members.
The number of off-grid users is probably much larger. For example, OGS Market Trend Reports (Lighting Global/ESMAP et al. 2022) estimates nearly halfa billion. This topic is explored in more detail in the chapter.

34

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Are We on Track?
In 2021, 91 percent of the global population enjoyed access to electricity (figure 1.1).19 Over the past decade, access
improved steadily, reducing the number of unelectrified people from 1.1 billion in 2010 to 675 million in 2021, despitea growing population. But the COVID-19 pandemic and associated energy crisis are estimated to have caused 75 million
people to have lost the ability to pay for an extended bundle of electricity services (IEA 2022).20 Against the backdropof challenging macroeconomic conditions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical developments, andabsent urgent action by national governments and the international community, the share of the global population
projected to have access to electricity by 2030 will be 92 percent, leaving some 660 million people unserved, of whom
approximately 85 percent will be in Sub-Saharan Africa.21

Figure 1.1 • Percentage of population with access to electricity
0%

100%

Status as of baseline year (2000)

78%

Progress between 2000 and 2010

84%
91%
92%

Progress between 2010 and 2021
Projected progress up to 2030
Remaining gap to 2030 SDG 7 target

100%

Source: World Bank 2023; IEA 2022.

The pace of growth in electricity access has been slow in recent years, the main result being to leave the poorest andhardest-to-reach people without access. In 2019–21, the number of people with access increased by 114 million peryear, fewer than the 129 million per year observed between 2010 and 2019. Overall, access grew 0.7 percentage
points per year between 2010 and 2019, declining to 0.6 percentage points a year between 2019 and 2021 (figure1.2).22 To reach universal access by 2030, the annual rate of growth in electricity access will havetoincrease
be 1 inpercentage
Annualaccessreach universal
point per year from 2021 onward. The acceleration must be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa,requiredwith toprogressof moreaccess by 2030
than 5 1.00
percentage points a year on average over the next nine years. Given the continued impactsof COVID-19 on

the global and national economies, which have been compounded by the war in Ukraine and the related energy crisis,
Annualized average change (percentage points)

urgent actions must be taken to maintain energy access as a key priority and prevent setbacks.

19

0.75

The rate of access to electricity generally means either having or not having an electricity connection.

0.50

1.0a radio or televi20
An extended bundle of electricity services includes four lightbulbs operating for four hours per day, a fan for six hours per day,sion for four hours per day, and a refrigerator.
21

0.7

The projected access rate of 92 percent in 2030 was calculated based on UN population data and IEA (2022).

0.6

0.5 is calculated as the difference between the access rate in year 2 and the rate in year 1, divided by the number of
0.25
22
The
annual change in accessyears: (Access Rate Year 2 – Access Rate Year 1)/(Year 2 – Year 1)
0.00

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

2000–10Base period

2010 –19

2019 –21

2021 –30

35

Figure 1.2 • Average annual increase in access to electricity, 2000–21
Annual increase in accessrequired to reach universal
access by 2030

Annualized average change (percentage points)

1.00

0.75

0.50

1.0
0.7

0.25

0.00

0.6

0.5

2000–10Base period

2010 –19

2019 –21

2021 –30

Source: World Bank 2023.

Since 2010, 51 countries have achieved universal access, 17 of them in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 1.3).
Another 95 countries, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, were still short of the target in 2021. About one-quarter ofthese countries—which includes half of the 20 countries with the largest access deficits23—advanced their electrification
access by more than 2 percentage points each year, whereas declining annual access growth appeared in some of
the remaining three-quarters of the countries. To reverse these trends, governments and international organizations
should prioritize information-based electrification planning, mobilize capital, and deploy implementation programs,
focusing particularly on countries and areas with very low access rates and those that have made only limited progressin recent years.

23

36

In this chapter, the access deficit is defined as the population lacking access to electricity.

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 1.3 • Annual change in electricity access rates in access-deficit countries, 2010–21

Annual change in electricity access rates
between 2010 and 2021:
Annual access growth rate falling
Annual access growth rate between
0 and 2 percentage points
Annual access growth rate
above 2 percentage points
Universal access acheived between 2010-21
IBRD 47235 |MAY 2023

Not applicaple
Top 20 access-deficit countries

Source: World Bank 2023.
Disclaimer: This map was produced by the Geospatial Operations Support Team of the World Bank based on the Cartography Unit of the World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown do not imply any judgment on the part of the custodian agencies concerning
the legal status of or sovereignty over any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

37

Looking Beyond the Main Indicators
ELECTRICITY ACCESS AND POPULATION GROWTH
Between 2010 and 2021, the global rate of access to electricity increased from 84 percent to 91 percent (figure 1.4).
Over the past decade, the increase in the number of people with access to electricity outpaced population growth.
However, compared with the annual growth of 0.7 percentage points seen between 2010 and 2021, progress dipped
to 0.6 percentage points in 2019–21. The dip is not surprising: the home stretch usually involves connecting people
living in the most remote and poorest areas.

Figure 1.4 • Global electricity access and population growth, 2010–21

9

84%

85%

85%

86%

86%

87%

88%

89%

90%

90%

90%

91%

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

Population (billions)

8
7

1.1

6

1.1

1.1

1.0

1.0

1.0

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%

5

50%

4
3

5.8

2

5.9

6.1

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.9

6.7

6.6

7.0

7.1

7.2

40%
30%
20%

1

10%

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

With access to electricity

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Without access to electricity

2019

2020

2021

Share of population with access to electricity

100%

Share of population with access to electricity

Source: World Bank 2023.

In 2019–21, the population with access to electricity increased by 114 million a year on average, while the world’s
population grew by 73 million, helping to close the electrification gap (figure 1.5). Electrification efforts in most regions
outperformed or kept pace with population growth. Most of the annual increase in access came from Central andSouthern Asia, where 54 million people a year gained access between 2019 and 2021, outstripping the population
increase of 22 million. Southern Asia showed the fast growth in electricity access thanks to growing economies andurbanization. In Sub-Saharan Africa, electrification largely kept up with population growth in 2019–21. However,
although the trend resulted in a marginal decrease in the number of people without access, the region still has
the largest access deficits in the world. Because small national power systems predominate in the region, regional
1200
cooperation
among national electricity companies and regional electricity markets are important to manage prices

and ensure security of electricity supply (ESMAP 2022a).

Population (millions)

1000
800
600
400
200

38

0

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Figure 1.5 • Annual increase in total population and in population with access to electricity between 2019 and 2021
120

113.7

80

72.9

60
10

54.1

9
40
8

86%
32.8

85%

85%

84%

22.2

7
20
50

World

4
3

Central andSouthern Asia
6.1

5.9

5.8

2

1.0

1.1

1.1

1.1

6

87%

88%

89%

90%

90%

90%

91%

1.0
11.2

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

7.7

5.6

1.4

0.2

86%
28.6
1.0

7.7

8.3

4.8

1.6

Sub-SaharanAfricaEastern andNorthern Africa Latin America andEurope andSouth-eastern Asia and Western Asia the Caribbean Northern America
7.1
7.0
6.9
6.7
6.6
6.4 with access6.3in population
6.2 increase
AnnualAnnual increase in population

80%
70%

20%

1

2010

90%

0.560%
50%
Oceania
40%
7.2
30%

Source: World Bank 2023.

0

100%

10%

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

THE ACCESSWith
DEFICITSACROSS REGIONSAND MORE
access to electricity
Without access to electricity

2018

2019

2020

2021

Share of population with access to electricity

Population (billions)

Population (millions)

100

0%

Share of population with access to electricity

Globally, the number of unserved people fell every year between 2010 and 2021 (figure 1.6). However, the trend isdifferent across regions. Most of the decline came in Asia, while the pace was sluggish in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
2010

2019

2021

the number of people without access in 2021 was roughly the same as in 2010. The number of people without accessplummeted in Central and Southern Asia, falling from 414 million
in 2010 to 24 million in 2021, largely
10 due to a decline
12
13

in the number of the unserved in populous countries, such as Bangladesh and India in Southern Asia. The numberof people
90 million to 35 million from
190 and South-eastern Asia declined from186
179 without access to electricity in Eastern2010 to 2021. In Northern Africa and Western Asia, the access deficit decreased slowly: from 37 million in 2010 to 30
566

575(Total)272

million in 2021.
(Total)567(Total)251

244

Figure 1.6 • Number of people without access to electricity, in selected regions, 2010–21 (millions of people)
1200

101

127

123

Population (millions)

1000
800

Southern Africa

Eastern Africa

2012

2014

Central Africa

Western Africa

2016

2018

600
400
200
0

2010

2011

Central and Southern Asia

2013

Eastern and South-eastern Asia

2015

2017

Northern Africa and Western Asia

2019

Sub-Saharan Africa

2020

2021

Rest of the world

Source: World Bank 2023.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

39

Popula

40

32.8
22.2

20

28.6
11.2

8.3

7.7

7.7

0

5.6

4.8

1.6

1.4

0.2

0.5

In contrast, theWorld
access deficit
large inEastern
Sub-SaharanAfrica,aboutof thepopulation
Oceania
Centralhas
and remained
Sub-SaharanandNorthern
Africawhere
Latin America
andhalfEurope
andregional

Southern
Africa thanSouth-eastern
Asia andAsia theunserved
Caribbean lived
NortherninAmerica
still lacked access in 2021.
As aAsiaresult, more
80 percent
of Western
the world’s
Sub-Saharan Africa in
Annual increase
populationiswith
Annualin population
2021. The pattern of the access deficits
in theinregion
faraccessfrom uniform.
Inincrease
Centraland Western Africa, population

growth outpaced improvements in electrification in 2010–21, increasing the access deficit (figure 1.7). Meanwhile, theaccess deficit has fallen steadily in Eastern and Southern Africa. But poor reliability of electricity services is as serious a
problem in Africa as low rates of access and per capita consumption. Few utilities measures service quality. Therefore,
there is an urgent need for meaningful monitoring and reporting of reliability statistics at the end-user level.

Figure 1.7 • Number of people in Sub-Saharan Africa without access to electricity, by subregion, 2010, 2019, and 2021 (millions of people)
2010

2019

2021

13

12

10
186

190

179

566
(Total)575(Total)

272

101

567
(Total)

251

127

123

Southern Africa

Eastern Africa

244

Central Africa

Western Africa

Source: World Bank 2023.

Compared with the global average, LDCs saw a relatively rapid increase in electrification, connecting about 32 million
people a year in 2019–21 and bringing the rate of access up 3 percentage points, from 53 percent in 2019 to 56
percent in 2021 (figure 1.8). Nevertheless, a wide gap of more than 30 percentage points in access rates between LDCs
and the global average persists, leaving 481 million LDC residents without access. In countries marked by fragility,
conflict, and violence (FCV), access increased from 55 percent to 58 percent, leaving 421 million people still unservedin 2021.24 At the current pace of electrification, most people without electricity access by 2030 will live in LDCs andFCVs. Dedicated financial and regulatory support should be strengthened to increase electrification in these settings.

24
The list of countries affected by violent conflict is based on the World Bank classification. The list is updated annually. This report refers to the list
published in July 2022: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/69b1d088e3c48ebe2cdf451e30284f04-0090082022/original/FCSList-FY23.pdf

40Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

566

2.2

53%

1.6

56%

33%
619

555
278
2010

2019

2021

1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Fragile and conﬂict-affected countries

425
1.0

419

1.2

421
58%

55%

46%
358
2010

With access to electricity
Without access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity
Annual increase in access (percentage points)

530

578

2019

2021

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Share of population with access to electricity

481

493

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Population (millions)

Least-developed countries

1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Share of population with access to electricity

Population (millions)Figure 1.8 • Increases in global access to electricity in least-developed and conflict-affected countries, 2010, 2019, and 2021

With access to electricity
Without access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity
Annual increase in access (percentage points)

Source: World Bank 2023.

of population
with toaccessto electricity
Share ofSharepopulation
with accesselectricity

Population(millions)
Population(millions)

THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE

Population(millions)
Population(millions)Share of population with access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity

Urban areas
Rural areas
5,000
100%
100%
5,000
Least-developed
Fragile and conﬂict-affected countries
98%
97% countries
0.2
4,500
90%
0.2
96%
90%
4,500
85%
1200
100%
1200
100%
83%
103
0.9
114
4,000
80%
1.1
80%
4,000
1100
1100
73%
90%
90%
145
70%
3,500
70%
3,500
1000
1000
80%
80%
The 3,000
discrepancy
between access rates in urban
and rural areas
has been narrowing.
In 2019–21,
pace of
524 the60%
900
900
60%
586
481
3,000
493
70%
70%
886
421
800
800
electrification
was
rapid
in
rural
areas,
outpacing
population
growth.
In
urbanareas,
bycontrast,
itflattened,
50%
2,500
425
50% partly
2,500
1.2
56%
60%
60%
700
700
53% 1.6
4,157
4,316
1.0
2,000 most566
40%higher access.
40%
2,000
becauseurban2.2areas had already achieved
rapid urbanization coupled 58%
with population
50%
600 Also, 419
600
50%
3,416
55%
2,792
1,500
1,500
30%
500
500 has increased
growthenergy consumption andEvenso, electrification rates 2,859
in rural 30%
areas
still
40%
40%offset access gains.
2,383
33%
46%
20%
1,000
1,000
20%
400
400
30%
30%
trail farbehind those in urban areas. In619
2021, the share of the300
world’spopulation with access to electricity
was 85
300
10%
500
578
500
10%
555
530
20%
20%
200
2000in rural areas and 98 percent in urban areas
percent(figure1.9).
Narrowingthegap
between
rural
and
urban
0% access
0
358
0%
278
10%
2010
2019
2021
10%
100
2010
2019
2021
100
requiresa better understanding of electricity end uses and greater
mobilization of public and private financing
to
0
0%
0
0%
With access to electricity
With access to electricity
2010more affordable
2019
2021
2010
2019
2021
make electricity
andelectricity
infrastructuremoreresilient.
Gridand
off-grid
electrification
options
Without access to electricity
Without access to electricity
With accessto electricitya rapid expansion of service in rural areas. In With
access to electricity
should be deployedaddition,
GIS
Sharetoof ensure
population with access to electricity
Shareof population
withtechniques
access to electricitymust be more
Without access to electricity
Without access to electricity
Annual increase
access (percentage
Annual increase in access (percentage points)
widely applied to identify
ruralin areas
in dire points)
need of policy support and investment.
Share of population with access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity
Annual increase in access (percentage points)
Annual increase in access (percentage points)

Figure 1.9 • Increases in global access to electricity in urban and rural areas, 2010, 2019, and 2021
0.2

98%
103

4,157

4,316

3,416

1,000

50%
40%
30%
20%

500

0

80%
70%
60%

145

2,500
2,000
1,500

97%
114

10%
2010

2019

2021

With access to electricity
Without access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity
Annual increase in access (percentage points)

0%

5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0

Rural areas

73%
886

2,383

2010

1.1

83%

0.9

85%

586

524

2,792

2,859

2019

2021

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Share of population with access to electricity

3,500
3,000

0.2

96%

100%
90%

Population (millions)

4,000

Urban areas

Share of population with access to electricity

Population (millions)

5,000
4,500

With access to electricity
Without access to electricity
Share of population with access to electricity
Annual increase in access (percentage points)

Source: World Bank 2023.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

41

During this period, the number of people with access to electricity grew by 33 million a year in rural areas, significantly
outpacing population growth (figure 1.10). This trend was driven by Central and Southern Asia. In contrast, rural
electrification progress lagged behind population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. More than 80 percent of the 524
million rural dwellers without access in 2021 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the same period, annual growth in thenumber of rural residents served slowed in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, as the rural population shrank. In Northern
Africa and Western Asia, electrification progress in rural areas kept pace with population growth. In urban areas, 80
million people a year gained access to electricity over the period. Owing to rapid urbanization and population growth,
however, more than half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban population lived in informal settlements, where reliable accessto electricity is much lower than in other urban areas (UN 2022).25

Figure 1.10 • Annual increase in total population and population with access to electricity in urban and rural areas, globally and by region, 2019–21

33

2
Urban

Rural

35
19 17
5
Urban

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20

Rural

23 23

Rural

Urban

-13 -16

Average annual increase in number of people with access to electricity

Source: World Bank 2023.

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Sub-Saharan Africa

22

18

Urban

11

16

Population (millions)

74

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Eastern andSouth-eastern Asia

Population (millions)

80

Central andSouthern Asia

Population (millions)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Population (millions)

Population (millions)

World

Rural

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Northern Africa
and Western Asia

6 6
Urban

2 2
Rural

Average annual increase in population

Between 2010 and 2021, the number of unserved people in Central and Southern Asia plunged from 31 million toabout 1 million people in urban areas and from 383 million to 23 million in rural areas. In Eastern and South-eastern
Urban

Rural

1000
160the number of people without access in urban and rural
Asia,
areas dropped to a third of the access deficits in 2010,
Population without access (millions)

900 and Western Asia, the urban access deficit remained
falling
140 to 2 million and 21 million, respectively. In Northern Africa
800

Population without access (millions)almost
120 the same, while the number of rural population without access decreased from 33 million to 25 million. In Sub700

Saharan
100 Africa, the access deficit declined to 93 million in urban settings but increased to 444 million in rural areas,
600

with an annual increase of 6 million (figure 1.11). Central Africa, in particular, led the substantial increase in the region’s
80

500

rural access deficit over the period. Eastern Africa accounted400
for about half of the rural population without access in
60

Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021.
40
2002010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Central and Southern Asia

Eastern and South-eastern Asia

300
200
100
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Northern Africa and Western Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Rest of the world

25
According to the metadata for SDG indicator 11.1.1 (“proportion of urban living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing”) informal
settlements are recognized as synonymous with slums, with a particular focus on the formal status of land, structure, and services. They are defined bythree main criteria, including (1) inhabitants whose claim to land or housing is insecure, (2) neighborhoods that lack (or are cut off from) formal basic
services; and (3) housing that does not comply with current planning and building regulations.

42

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Urban

Rural

Urban

Rural

-10
-20

Rural

Urban

Urban

-13 -16

Average annual increase in number of people with access to electricity

Rural

Urban

Rural

Average annual increase in population

Figure 1.11 • Access deficits in urban and rural areas, globally and in selected regions, 2010–21
Urban

160

1000
900
Population without access (millions)

140
Population without access (millions)

Rural

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Central and Southern Asia

Eastern and South-eastern Asia

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Northern Africa and Western Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Rest of the world

Source: World Bank 2023.

ELECTRIFICATION USING DECENTRALIZED RENEWABLE ENERGY
Tracking progress in access to electricity produced using decentralized renewables depends on a complex mix ofelements, of which market structure and the multiplicity of players in value chains are two. This section reviews trends
in mini-grids and stand-alone off-grid solar solutions reported by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
and the Global Off-Grid Lighting Association (GOGLA) respectively.26
Stand-alone off-grid solutions are promising for closing the access gap in remote and rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa,
where weak utility creditworthiness and other challenges (such as the absence of infrastructure and low population
densities) have impeded progress in grid electrification in rural and remote areas (ESMAP 2022a). However, to close
the access gap by 2030, off-grid renewable electrification should be rapidly scaled up through dedicated policies andstrong public and private financial schemes.
In the context of the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, mini-grid supply continued to expand access between
2019 and 2021 through support from policy makers, private investors, and end users (IRENA 2022). The number ofpeople connected to mini-grids powered by solar, hydro, and biogas technologies reached 11 million in 2021 (figure1.12).27 In particular, solar Tier 2+ mini-grids have shown fast growth in recent years. Solar mini-grids served about athird of the connected and have become the least-cost way of bringing reliable electricity to communities living far
from the grid or experiencing regular power outages (ESMAP 2022b). Among the 20 countries with the highest ratesof access to mini-grid supply, about half were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Seychelles and Nepal served more than 5 percentof their population through mini-grids.

26
IRENA assesses Tier 1 (small PV mini-grid access) and Tier 2 access or better (large PV mini-grid access and non-PV mini-grids). GOGLA assesses
access to electricity from off-grid solar products, including portable lanterns, multi-light systems, and solar home systems.
27
According to the ESMAP’s market outlook and handbook "2022 mini grids for half a billion people”, 48 million people were connected to about
21,500 mini grids. Most of these systems are first- and second-generation mini-grids, and approximately half of installed mini-grids are powered bysolar, with hydro and fossil fuels.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

43

Figure 1.12 • Increase in number of people with access to mini-grid supply (Tier 1+) in 2010–21 and 20 countries with the highest rates of access to minigrid supply in 2021
Share of people connected to mini-grid supply

12

Millions of people connected to mini-grid supply

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
10

8

6

4

2

0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Connected to solar mini-grids (Tier 1)

Connected to solar mini-grids (Tier 2+)

Seychelles
Nepal
Sierra Leone
Afghanistan
Fiji
Liberia
EritreaMali
Guinea-Bissau
BhutanCameroon
Venezuela
Tajikistan
Algeria
Benin
Pakistan
Maldives
Kenya
Solomon Islands
Viet Nam

Connected to mini-hydro (Tier 2+)

Connected to biogas mini-grids (Tier 2+)

Source: IRENA 2022.
Note: More information on the Tier classification can be found in the last section of this chapter.

80

The numberof people with access to stand-alone off-grid solar solutions
dropped from 107 million in 2019 to 101
70
11
6 pandemic (GOGLA 2022).28 The13
million in 2021, as the sector was hit by the COVID-19
decrease in sales
14in 2020 was
60

significant compared with 2019 sales,
3 which represented a peak. The countries with the largest number of people
Population (millions)50
connected
to off-grid solar products were Kenya (23 million), India (15 million), and Ethiopia (7 million). Between 2019and 2021, access to Tier 2 solutions grew consistently from 11 million to 14 million, whereas Tier 1 access decreased40

2 million (figure 1.13).29 Since 2021, the sector has begun to recover from the COVID crisis, with afrom 63 million to 55
63

30
10 percent
increase in sales of solar56
energy kits and a617 percent increase in market turnover.
Still, significant
efforts are
59
55

required to recover the pre-COVID level and reach universal access by 2030 (box 1.1).
20

37

10
0

2016

2017

2018
Tier 1

2019

2020

2021

Tier 2

28
The figure of 101 million is calculated based on sales by GOGLA and its affiliates, which include GOGLA members, companies with Verasolcertified products, and companies working with the Low Energy Inclusive Appliances (LEIA) program. For these reasons, the impact figure captures only
a percentage of the customers reached with off-grid solar technologies. ESMAP reports 490 million off-grid solar users (Lighting Global/ESMAP et al.
2022), but the quality of many of the systems is unknown.
29
Tier 1 and Tier 2 do not add up exactly to the total of 101 million people with access to quality-verified off-grid solar products because calculationof the total reflects the “partial” or “full” household aspects of Tier 1 based on the estimator created by SEforALL. For example, when some products,
such as solar lanterns or multi-light kits, do not create full Tier 1 access, stacking of several products is considered in the current total of people withaccess.

44

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Solomon Islands
Viet Nam02010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Connected to solar mini-grids (Tier 1)

Connected to solar mini-grids (Tier 2+)

Connected to mini-hydro (Tier 2+)

Connected to biogas mini-grids (Tier 2+)

Figure 1.13 • People connected to off-grid solar products by access tier, 2016–21
80
70

11
6

Population (millions)

60

13

14

3

50
40

2

30
20

56

61

63

2018

2019

59

55

37

10
0

2016

2017

Tier 1

2020

2021

Tier 2

Source: GOGLA 2022.
Note: Tier classification is defined as Tier 1 (partial Tier 1 or full Tier 1 based on the system size and capacity of each product) and Tier 2 and above(at least 20 Wp, coupled with high-efficiency appliances or above 50 Wp even using conventional appliances). More information can be found in the
Methodology section of this chapter.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

45

Box 1.1 • Energy access beyond the pandemic: Findings from the Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report
The 2022 Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report was produced by Lighting Global/ESMAP, GOGLA, Efficiency for
Access, and Open Capital Advisors. This box explores the key findings from the report.
In a trajectory to achieve universal access to electricity by 2030, the recent findings of the report indicate that off-grid
solar technologies are expected to be the most cost-effective and feasible solution for 55 percent of new household
connections over the next five years. While the economic disruptions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic led toa decline of 22 percent in the sales of off-grid solar products during 2019–20, the sector has since demonstrated
resilience and nascent recovery, though sales remain below pre-COVID levels. The number of people accessing
solar energy kits grew from 420 million people in 2019 to more than 490 million by the end of 2021, with more
people gaining the higher Tier 2 level of access.a
Pay As You Go (PAYG), a business model that allows customers to pay for their system in smaller increments over
several months, can help by lowering the up-front cost of owning a solar home system, but this may be insufficient
to close the affordability gap. According to the report, even if PAYG were universally available, an estimated 177–277
million people currently without access would be unable to afford a Tier 1 system because of higher prices and lower
income, in part as a result of the economic repercussions of the current energy crisis in the wake of the pandemic.
Businesses in the sector create hundreds of thousands of jobs, more than half of which are created in rural areas
within the off-grid solar industry, boosting incomes in regions with relatively few employment opportunities. Manyjobs are filled by members of the burgeoning youth population, whose opportunities are particularly limited.
Governments, investors, and development partners are increasingly recognizing the potential of off-grid solar
solutions to power public institutions, including rural schools and health clinics. In addition, off-grid solar lighting
systems and packages designed to encourage productive uses of electricity are powering more than 10 million
micro- and small enterprises around the world. There is also a substantial opportunity to leverage solar energy
for productive uses in the agriculture sector. Expanding access to technologies like solar water pumping or solarpowered cold storage holds the promise to quickly improve the livelihoods of some 22 million smallholder farmers
across Sub-Saharan Africa and India.
According to the report, in order to achieve SDG 7, 1.1 billion people around the world will have to be served with
off-grid solar products at Tier 1 and above by 2030. This would include (i) 186 million customers of weak grids whowill need off-grid solar systems as a backup; (ii) 493 million current off-grid solar users who are expected to continue
replacing and upgrading their systems; and (iii) 464 million people connecting to off-grid solar for the first time.
To achieve this goal, an estimated USD 23.3 billion in public and private funding will be required. Based on historicalsales and investment trends, however, the off-grid sector is projected to raise only USD 7.8 billion in investments
between now and 2030. Moreover, current funding is highly concentrated in mature markets; only a fraction of private
investment is directed toward nascent and emerging markets, where the vast majority of unconnected households
are located. To unlock the sector’s full potential, bridge the affordability gap, and make products accessible tohouseholds in hard-to-reach areas, increases in both public and private funding will be needed.
Source: Lighting Global/ESMAP and others (2022).
a
The estimate of 490 million with access is based on sales of the broader industry, not just sales of GOGLA affiliates. The estimate
includes sales of component-based solutions.

46

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

COUNTRY TRENDS
In 2021, the 20 countries with the largest access deficits accounted for 75 percent of the world’s people lacking accessto electricity. The countries with the largest numbers without access were Nigeria (86 million), the Democratic Republicof the Congo (76 million), and Ethiopia (55 million) (figure 1.14). In 2021, the top three countries were the same as in
the previous edition of this report. India and South Sudan dropped out of the top 20, and Zambia and Mali joined it.
Increases in electrification did not keep up with population growth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between
2019 and 2021. As a result, the access deficit increased by about 2 million people annually. In contrast, the numberof people without access in Nigeria and Ethiopia fell by 2 million each year between 2019 and 2021, although thosecountries are still among the top 3 in terms of unserved population. During the same period, Kenya and Ethiopia
increased their access rates by more than 3 percentage points. Consequently, as in Ethiopia, the number of unserved
people declined by about 2 million a year in Kenya in 2019–21.

Figure 1.14 • Share and absolute size of population without access to electricity in the top 20 access-deficit countries and the rest of the world, 2021
100%

80%
70%
60%

0

31

60

91

Pakistan

Rest of world

Sudan

Myanmar
Kenya

Nigeria

Ethiopia

ZambiaUgandaTanzania

Burkina Faso

Niger

0%

Malawi

10%

Chad

20%

Madagascar

Democratic Republic of the Congo

30%

Mozambique40%

AngolaDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
Mali

50%

BurundiShare of population without access to electricity

90%

Nigeria: 86 million
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 76 million
Ethiopia: 55 million
United Republic of Tanzania: 36 million
Uganda: 25 million
Mozambique: 22 million
Niger: 21 million
Madagascar: 19 million
Burkina Faso: 18 million
Angola: 18 million
Sudan: 17 million
Malawi: 17 million
Chad: 15 million
Myanmar: 15 million
Kenya: 12 million
Democratic People's Republic ofKorea: 12 million
Pakistan: 12 million
Burundi: 11 million
Zambia: 10 million
Mali: 10 million
Rest of world: 166 million

121 152 182 213 244 274 305 335 366 397 425 456 486 517 547 578 609 639 670 700 731 762
Population without access (millions)
Low income

Lower-middle income

Rest of world

Source: World Bank 2023.

The lowest access rates were in Burundi (10 percent) and South Sudan (8 percent) (figure 1.15), where the pace ofelectrification was slow over the past decade. The electricity infrastructure in South Sudan has been underdeveloped
due to decades of conflict and insecurity. Burundi had the large access gap between urban (63 percent) and rural
areas (2 percent); thus, the country should prioritize rural electrification to help the poor and the most vulnerable
communities improve their livelihoods. In contrast, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, and Uganda expanded electrification byapproximately 3 percentage points a year between 2010 and 2021, although overall access rates remained low.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

47

Figure 1.15 • Access to electricity in countries with the lowest rates of electrification, 2021
Access deﬁcit, 2021 (millions)
0

20

40

60

80

Annualized increase in access,
2010–21 (percentage points)

Access rate, 2021 (percent)
0

20

40

60

80

100

0

1

South Sudan

10

8

0.6

Burundi

11

10

0.4

Chad

15

11

0.4

Malawi

17

14

0.5

16

0.5

Central African Republic

5

2

Niger

21

19

0.5

Burkina Faso

18

19

0.5

21

0.7

Democratic Republicof the Congo

76

Papua New Guinea

8

Sierra Leone

6

27

Liberia

4

30

1.5
2.2

22

31

Madagascar

19

35

1

1.1
2.1
2.7

36

Benin
United Republicof Tanzania

36
25

Uganda

0.7

42

8

4

0.1

21

Mozambique

Guinea-Bissau

3

2.5

43

3.0

45

Zambia10

47

Guinea

7

47

Haiti

6

47

World average

3

2.2
1.7
0.9
91

0.7

Source: World Bank 2023.

Timor-Leste and Kenya increased their access rates fast—by around 5 percentage points a year since 2010—thanks
to notable improvements in rural electrification. These countries have built strong access strategies tailored to theircountry contexts (figure 1.16). For example, Kenya developed regulatory and policy frameworks for grid and off-grid
solar expansion and extended them into several underserved countries in partnership with the private sector (ESMAP
2022a). Despite the fast-growing trends, the countries should continuously take action to address a concerning
challenge of improving the reliability and quality of electricity access.

48

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 1.16 • Access to electricity in countries with the largest increases in access, 2010–21

0

20

40

Annualized increase in access
2010–21 (percentage points)

Access rate,2021 (percent)Access deﬁcit, 2021 (millions)
60

0

20

40

60

80

100

Timor-Leste
12

Afghanistan

1

Cambodia

3

Bangladesh

2

Solomon Islands

0.2

77

5.2

Eswatini

0.2

Lesotho

1

4.7
99

4.0

76

3.7

49

3.5
83

Uganda

25

3.4

50

3.0

45

3.0

Lao People's
Democratic Republic

100
1

2.7

36

2.7

0.01

93

Ethiopia
36

2.7

54

55

United Republic of Tanzania

2.6

43

2.5

Bhutan100

Mali
Vanuatu

5.0

83

7

2.4

0.1

Sudan

70
17

Togo

4

World average

3

2.4

53

10

10.0
5.6

98

RwandaKiribati

5.0

100

Kenya

Guinea-Bissau

0.0

2.4

62

2.3

56

2.3
91

0.7

Source: World Bank 2023.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

49

Policy Insights: The Interlinkages Between
SDG 7 and Other SDGs
Policies for energy access should demonstrate political commitment and maximize the socioeconomic benefits ofaccess, keeping the most vulnerable populations at the forefront of efforts to close the access gap. Annual investment
of USD 30 billion is required to achieve universal access to electricity by 2030, according to IEA’s Net Zero by 2050
Scenario (IEA 2022). Expanding blended finance and establishing partnerships of humanitarian, development,
government, and private actors through impact investing and risk-mitigation instruments can attract new capital,
increase funding from existing investors, and improve the terms of both equity and debt financing (Prasad and others
2022; Gibson and others 2022).
Governments should strive to improve the legal and institutional environment so as to improve the financial viabilityof utilities to expand on-grid access and attract private sector investments in clean energy generation. A supportive
climate and the right policies would also serve to expand mini-grid and off-grid electrification to meet energy accessgoals. In the early stages of electrification, for example, PAYG energy service providers that provide lease-to-own,
usage-based payment services have benefited in some countries from low-cost public financing. Arranging publicprivate partnerships and project finance with long repayment periods and flexible payment schedules, especiallywhen interest rates are high, would provide a major boost to utilities, mini-grid operators, off-grid companies, andother energy service providers (ESMAP 2022b).
Coordination efforts should focus on strengthening and supporting partnerships between local and regional
stakeholders, the goal being to improve local conditions and lead to more sustainable and robust regional
effects. Collaboration among regulators, utilities, mini-grid operators, off-grid companies, community leaders, andnongovernmental organizations allows stakeholders to share experiences; pool resources, knowledge, and capacity
building; and set shared standards. Such collaboration can improve the security of supply, the broader diffusionof technological innovation, and the sustainability of new business models, ultimately leading to harmonization ofstandards and practices and more affordable energy services (African Development Bank 2022).
Affordable, reliable, modern energy is a prerequisite for the attainment of other SDGs. At the same time, it competes
for attention with other SDGs. This section explores how energy access is interlinked with several SDGs, notably SDG 1(zero poverty); SDG 3 (good health and well-being); SDG 4 (high-quality education); SDG 5 (gender equality); SDG 8(decent work and economic growth); SDG 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure), and SDG 13 (climate action).
Improvements to energy access take place within the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change,
which commits the world to holding the long-term mean global temperature to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial
levels and reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.

50

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

INCREASING ACCESS TO CLIMATE-RESILIENT ENERGY: INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN SDG 7 AND
SDG 13 (CLIMATE ACTION)
Expanding access to affordable, clean energy and meeting climate change obligations are interdependent. Achieving
these two goals is challenging, however, especially for the least-developed countries, which must build cleaner andmore resilient energy systems as a prerequisite to meet international climate change pledges. To manage the tradeoffs, policy makers must develop practical climate adaptation strategies and plans for energy infrastructure that areconnected to diverse climate justice considerations. The participation of public and private investors will be needed
to support initiatives in pursuit of both goals.
Electricity expansion through mini-grids or stand-alone systems could help developing countries to address electricity
access challenges in a climate-friendly manner and sustain livelihoods. Like other types of infrastructure, however,modern electrical capacity (grid, off-grid, and mini-grid) is vulnerable to climate change to varying extents (IEA 2021).
These vulnerabilities imperil the gains in access to affordable, reliable, modern energy achieved over the past decades(WMO 2022). Adapting to climate change can also increase demand for energy (Ruijven, de Cian, and Wing 2019).
Satisfying that demand with renewable energy will require tight integration of renewables in the adaptation agenda(IRENA 2021).
In the quest for affordable and clean energy access, therefore, integrated-least cost planning is important tomeet consumers’ needs for reliable and efficient energy services. Governments can and should build an enabling
environment to attract and manage private capital into clean on-grid electrification, while simultaneously leveraging
public funds to encourage private sector investment in decentralized electricity access. Integrating climate change
considerations into national access policies, strategies, and planning supports the concurrent goal of strengthening
resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters. Accounting for the detrimental effects
of climate change on energy access—by, for instance, making infrastructure more resilient, diversifying energy sources,and developing adequate insurance mechanisms—can help communities, utilities, and countries enable adaptation
action (United Nations Climate Change Secretariat 2017).
Acquiring high-resolution climate, energy system, and socioeconomic data remains a challenge, especially in Africa,
as does developing the capacity of private and public stakeholders to apply the data to energy access and businessplanning, financing, and related policy making (UN 2021a). Local, national, and regional stakeholders must improvetheir ability to acquire data, manage it (including by addressing data privacy, ownership and sharing between entities),
and to use it to expand climate-resilient energy access.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

51

INCREASING ACCESS TO ENERGY AT SCHOOLS AND HEALTH FACILITIES: INTERLINKAGESBETWEEN SDG 7 AND SDGS 4 (HIGH-QUALITY EDUCATION) AND 3 (GOOD HEALTH AND
WELL-BEING)
Increasing access to high-quality education is crucial for reducing poverty. Access to energy facilitates lighting, heating,cooling, cooking, and access to informational and communication technologies, all of which can improve learning (UN2019, 2021). Modern and dependable access to energy in schools can attract new teachers and increase teacher
retention, facilitate school administration, and increase access to teaching resources and classroom materials. Accessto electricity at home can free students of the time-consuming task of collecting fuel; improve health and education
outcomes; and allow students to study after dark, thereby increasing attendance, performance, literacy, and school
completion rates.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the shortcomings of a lack of energy and internet in schools and homes, which
prevented millions of children from continuing or accessing education, adversely affecting their learning and putting
them at risk of not returning (UNESCO 2020). In 2020, only 47 percent of lower-secondary schools in Sub-SaharanAfrica had access to electricity; globally, less than half the population had access to the internet (UNESCO 2022).
In 2021, rates of electricity access in primary schools were as low as 4 percent in Chad, 9 percent in Nepal, and 10
percent in Niger (UNESCO 2022).
Technology should be harnessed to address educational challenges through out-of-the-box programs, as somecountries are already doing. In Sierra Leone, for example, SMS Dictionary allows students with access to electricity but
not the internet to charge their phones and learn new words (Sengeh 2022). Radio instruction—first rolled out during
the 2014 Ebola crisis—helped keep children in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic (Behsudi 2021). Sierra Leoneis also using tablets—which can be charged with the same mini-grid and off-grid solutions that provide power to cellphones—to track budgets, grades, and other administrative priorities (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education of
Sierra Leone 2022).
Accelerating financing for affordable mini-grid and stand-alone systems, including battery storage technologies, isan important step toward providing education that has implications for many other SDGs. Using innovative solutions
to increase energy access in schools should be part of an integrated strategy to make education accessible andinclusive for all, including previously marginalized groups, such as pregnant students, rural students, and persons
with disabilities. In turn, investment in education will be needed to equip the next generation of tech leaders with thenecessary skills to perform this work. Green skills and other facets of energy education are important in preparing ageneration of young people to complete the energy transition.
Reliable electricity is also needed to power life-saving medical and emergency operations. Unreliable supplies
compromise medical equipment and instruments, water for sanitization, cold chain immunization systems, and otherfundamental amenities. A recent study presented data on electrification of health care facilities and key priority actions
for governments and development partners (box 1.2).

52

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 1.2 • Accelerating access to electricity by health-care facilities
Reliable electricity access is crucial for effective delivery of health care. In 2023, the World Health Organization,
the World Bank, the International Renewable Energy Agency, and Sustainable Energy for All published
Energizing Health: Accelerating Electricity Access in Health-Care Facilities. The report discusses the overlaps
between these two crucial SDGs, as summarized here.
Electricity access is essential to powering basic services in health-care facilities—among them lighting, cleanwater supply, childbirth and neo-natal care, immunization, storage, and power for medical equipment.
Unfortunately, this aspect of health infrastructure is often neglected, leading to inadequate access to electricity,
especially in low- and lower-middle-income countries (figure B1.2.1).

Figure B1.2.1 • Percentage of health-care facilities reporting unreliable electricity access in national surveys, 2015–22

Proportion of health-carefacilities (%):
0 - 19.9
20.0 - 39.9
40.0 - 59.9
60.0 - 79.9
80.0 - 100.0
Data not available or not national
Not applicable

Source: World Health Organization

Proportion of health-care
Proportion
facilities(%): of health-carefacilities (%):

0 - 19.9
0 - 19.9- 39.920.0 -20.0
39.9- 59.940.0 -40.0
59.9
60.0 - 79.9
60.0 -80.0
79.9- 100.0
not available or not national
80.0 -Data
100.0
Not applicable
Data
not available or not national
Source: World Health Organization
Not applicable
Source: World Health Organization

IBRD 47199 |APRIL 2023

IBRD was
47199produced| This map by
was producedby the Cartography
Unitofof theWorld
Bank Group.
boundaries,
colors,denominations andany other
information shown onand
this map
This mapthe Cartography
Unit
the
World
BankTheGroup.
Theboundaries,
colors,denominations
any other information shown on this map
do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
2023
do notAPRIL
imply,
on the part of the World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Source: World Health Organization 2023.

IBRD 47199 |This map was produced by the Cartography Unit of the World Bank Group. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map

do not imply,
on theAccelerating
part of the World Bank
Group, any judgmenton thestatus of any territory,or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
APRIL 2023
Note: This figure is extracted from the report
Energizing
Health:Electricity
Accessin legal
Health-Care
Facilities.

In low- and lower-middle-income countries of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 12 percent
and 15 percent of health-care facilities, respectively, have no access to electricity. Only half of Sub-SaharanAfrica’s hospitals have reliable access. These data translate to some 25,000 health facilities with no power and
68,000 with unreliable power. Overall, it is estimated that the health-care facilities of nearly 1 billion people
in low- and lower-middle-income countries lack reliable access to electricity (figure B1.2.2). The urban-rural
divide is sharp. For example, less than 5 percent of rural facilities in Senegal have reliable access, comparedwith almost 55 percent of urban facilities.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

53

The World Bank’s analysis shows that 64 percent of health-care facilities in 63 low- and middle-income countries
require immediate intervention, and USD 4.9 billion is urgently needed to bring these facilities up to a minimallevel of reliable electrification. Further comprehensive energy needs assessments in health services are cruciallyneeded.

Figure B1.2.2 • Estimated population served by health-care facilities with no electricity access or with unreliable electricity, disaggregatedby region
1 000
912 million

335 million
Middle Eastand North Africa

1 681 million
South Asia

800

912 million
Population withno or unreliable accessPopulation with no or
unreliable access, million

35 million
Latin America
and the Caribbean

500 million
Sub-Saharan Africa

470 million
600

Sub-Saharan Africa(unreliable)
Sub-Saharan Africa(no access)South Asia (no access)Middle East andNorth Africa (no access)Latin America andthe Caribbean (unreliable)
Latin America andthe Caribbean (no access)400
171 million

200
237 million

0

9 million
4 million

22 million

Source: World Health Organization 2023.
Note: This figure is extracted from the report Energizing Health: Accelerating Electricity Access in Health-Care Facilities.

RISE 2022 Electricity AccessIndicator Score (out of 100)
Decentralized renewable energy solutions, such as solar photovoltaics,
are cost-effective,
clean, and rapidly

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
100
deployable, making them a good solution for0 electrifying
health-carefacilities
without
waitingfor90arrivalof the2010 renewables also helps build climate resilience.
grid. Powering health-carefacilities
through
1. Electriﬁcation
planning
2019
2021

Building the capacity of local stakeholders,local skills, and local markets around the needs of energy in health is2010
2. Scope of ofﬁcially approved electriﬁcation plan 2019

essential. The “install and forget” approachto electrification must be transformed into “install and maintain,” with
2021
2010
accountability mechanisms and long-term
operation and maintenance, waste management, and replacement
3. Framework for grid electriﬁcation 20192021
of batteries and spare parts all included inbudget planning.
2010

4. Framework for minigrids 2019
Both the lack of electricity
and unreliable
2021supply are major barriers to wider health-care coverage. Reliable

electrification must be considered a priority
2010 because health is a public good and a human right. To make good
5. Framework for off-grid systems

2019
on that right, technical assistance, development
financing, and investments from governments, donors, and2021

development partners must be increased
2010through cooperation that avoids duplicate efforts and integrates
6. Consumer affordability of electricity 2019

specialized health knowledge, medical devices
and appliances, and energy systems at the country level.
2021
Source: WHO 2023.7. Utility transparency and monitoring 2010

2019
2021

2010
8. Utility creditworthiness 2019
2021

54

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

INCREASING ACCESS TO ENERGY WHILE LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND: INTERLINKAGES BETWEENSDG 7, SDG 5 (GENDER EQUALITY), AND FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE
Access to electricity is strongly associated with women’s economic empowerment and gender equality, just as
gender-sensitive electrification policies and regulations are more likely to succeed. A gender-sensitive approach toelectrification, with women involved in policy making, could help increase women’s participation in business activities
in the energy sector, despite social and other barriers, while also driving more inclusive solutions for electricity access.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, several countries have adopted gender-responsive energy policy frameworks for electrification
expansion (ESMAP 2022a). Because gender-disaggregated data and information are limited, strengthening genderinclusive energy policies and promoting women’s entrepreneurship will depend on stronger efforts by policy makers
and practitioners to develop gender statistics.
Fragility and energy poverty are closely interlinked. Instability and conflict inhibit the development of infrastructure
and investment for electrification, and the electricity access gap exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. People living
in FCV settings or along the “last mile” face special barriers to energy supply and higher access costs.30 Forcibly
displaced persons often experience minimal access to electricity, and when they do, they must often use sources ofelectricity that are costly, inefficient, unsafe, and harmful to the environment. Logistical and technical challenges makeit difficult to provide energy access in displacement settings, increasing project risks and diminishing potential returns(World Bank 2022).
Camps and settlements for forcibly displaced persons are among the areas that are hardest to reach with electricity
because their residents are poor, the settings are often remote, and the high upfront capital costs of energy are
typically hard to justify for settlements that are intended to be temporary. As a result, most water systems, healthcare facilities, and schools serving forcibly displaced persons and their host communities lack access to reliable andmodern energy. Solarization efforts are ongoing in 46 percent of water pumping stations in displacement settings, 37
percent of health-care facilities, and 13 percent of schools; most of the remainder still depend on unreliable, fossil
fuel–powered energy, or have no power at all (UNHCR 2022). Investing in solar and other renewable solutions in theseareas is paramount to advancing progress on SDG 7.
To sustainably address the vulnerabilities of forcibly displaced persons and their impacts on local communities, energy
access projects in displacement settings typically need to be addressed differently from standard development
initiatives (World Bank 2022). Evidenced-based least-cost programs—including programs supporting the deploymentof mini-grid and off-grid technologies—should recognize vulnerable populations, rather than emergency aid programs,
as the primary agents of decision-making, keeping people at the center of attention. Improvements might include
linking energy access to program incentives, integrating vulnerable populations in funding windows, and supporting
technologies and skill development that address the particular access challenges of vulnerable populations.
Focusing energy access efforts and financing on people suffering from fragility, conflict, and violence (before or after
displacement) and on women and girls has been shown to have multiplier effects on poverty reduction, educational
attainment, inequality, and the attainment of other SDGs (UNHCR 2020). National access and infrastructure plans,
regulatory frameworks, and efforts to strengthen the enabling environment around access should integrate these
populations into the broader energy access strategy in an inclusive, effective, and sustainable manner (UNHCR n.d.).

30
A staggering 90 percent of displaced people lack access to sustainable, reliable, affordable energy. This lack of access affects all areas of life inrefugee camps, including education, health care, hygiene, and safety (UNHCR 2022). This figure reflects only displaced people living in camps, rather
than other settings.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

55

INCREASING ACCESS TO ENERGY BY STIMULATING MARKETS AND IMPROVING REGULATORYFRAMEWORKS: INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN SDG 7 AND SDG 8 (DECENT WORK AND ECONOMICGROWTH) AND SDG 9 (INDUSTRY, INNOVATION, AND INFRASTRUCTURE)
COVID-19 brought new challenges to the advancement of all SDGs; it also created opportunities to recalibrate
spending, re-focused attention on new priorities, and highlighted possible connections among the goals (Shulla 2021).
In September 2021, for the first time in 40 years, the UN secretary-general convened the High-Level Dialogue on
Energy, this time with the objective of promoting an accelerated implementation of SDG 7, other targets of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the Paris Agreement (UN 2021). The Dialogue issued recommendations
to make universal access to electricity a political, economic, and environmental priority, aligned with an inclusive
COVID-19 recovery, by (i) reinforcing enabling policy and regulatory frameworks and (ii) catalyzing, harnessing, andredirecting energy-access financing as needed to deliver universal energy access by 2030 (UN n.d).
Many developing economies are hobbled by scarce financing, inadequate risk mitigation resources, financiallynonviable utilities, low capacity in critical agencies, and the absence of local financial institutions with access-related
expertise—all of which compromise the bankability of access projects. Specific policies to expand infrastructure,
upgrade technology, and achieve modern and sustainable energy service targets under a given regulatory framework
are country dependent, but all countries need to establish conditions that support new and innovative ways to promotetransparency, ensure accountability, and de-risk investments. The vitality of small and medium-size enterprises, inparticular, depends on closing the gap between commitments and disbursements, reducing inefficient subsidies, andidentifying predictable, practicable methods of leveraging public resources.
Regulatory and policy frameworks for electricity access should be designed to support innovations in energy
technology and to leverage financing—both for the ultimate purpose of providing affordable and reliable electricity
and maximizing economic growth. The World Bank’s Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) measure thepolicy and regulatory environment for public and private investment in the realm of sustainable energy. The mostrecent RISE survey results (ESMAP 2022a) provide performance scores on access to electricity in the aftermath of the
COVID-19 pandemic (box 1.3).
Good regulatory and policy frameworks will encourage productive uses of electricity, which generate income andemployment in local communities and thus help fight poverty. Integrated access planning, with special attention to
the expansion of mini-grid and off-grid systems, is a precondition for such frameworks. In addition to promoting
productive uses at the local level, regulatory and policy frameworks informed by integrated planning can meet theenergy demands of industry (especially small and medium-sized enterprises), attract private investment in the energy
sector, and multiply the effects of the sector on the rest of the economy. For example, an ongoing effort to mainstreammini-grid tariff settlement tools and methodologies across African regulators could broaden deployment of mini-grids
across the region, buoying economic activities that depend on access to modern and reliable energy (African Forumfor Utility Regulators 2021). To exploit the interlinkages with SDGs 8 and 9 the policy and regulatory environment forenergy access must integrate incentives for cross-sectoral collaboration.
Supporting technological innovation and digitalization could reduce costs, provide efficiencies across the value chain,
and improve collection and accountability, encouraging investments that widen opportunities to close the energy
access gap while having large cross-sectoral effects. Two examples: Technology platforms that connect developers
with investors and suppliers in large-scale mini-grid tenders can bring mini-grid projects to fruition (ESMAP 2022b).
And using machine learning and artificial intelligence for load management, planning, and upkeep can minimize
costs and free resources to expand and improve grid and other energy services. Governments should consider the
deployment of digital technologies and the interoperability of components when strengthening and updating national
institutional networks and legal frameworks that guide standards and regulations for energy products and services.

56

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 1.3 • Progress on the energy access pillar of the Regulatory
1 000 Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) 2022
912 million

The Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE), compiled by the Energy Sector Management
Assistance
Sub-Saharan Africa

Population with no or
unreliable access, million(unreliable)
Program (ESMAP), tracks electricity access policies across 54 access-deficit countries. RISE
uses “traffic light”
Sub-Saharan Africa
800
35 million
912 million
colorstorepresent
thelower,
middle,
and
upper
third
of
accessscores,normalizedtoatheoretical(no access) minimum of
Latin America
Population with
South Asia (no access)and the Caribbeanno or unreliable access0 and a maximum of 100.
Middle East and
470 million
North Africa (no access)335 millionThelatest
RISE
results(ESMAP
2022a)
showthat
althoughtheglobaleconomyslowedinAmerica
2019–21,many
600
Middle East
Latin
and
and Northgovernments
Africathe
Caribbean(unreliable)
continued to advance in their access-related regulations. In 2021, a quarter of the access-deficit
Latin America andcountries entered the green zone in their overall access scores, and about half were in theyellow(nozone.
the Caribbean
access)The

results are based on eight indicators that capture a comprehensive picture of regulatory incentives for mini400

grids and off-grid systems, including approaches to targeting low-income
171 million households (figure B1.3.1). The

steady overall improvement was primarily due to changes in the following indicators: electrification planning,
frameworks for mini-grids and500off-grid
million systems, and utility transparency and monitoring (Indicators 1, 4, 5, and
1 681 million
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
200 countries (along with the Democratic Republic of the7). Nigeria and Ethiopia, two of the largest access-deficit
237 million
Congo), made notable progress in policy and regulatory measures and reached the green 9zone
in their overall
millionelectricity access scores.
4 million
22 million
0
Further analysis illustrates the strong correlation between RISE scores and investment mobilization at thenational level (IRENA 2023) (figure B1.3.2).

Figure B1.3.1 • Electricity access: Progress by RISE indicators, 2010, 2019, and 2021
RISE 2022 Electricity Access Indicator Score (out of 100)
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2010
1. Electriﬁcation planning 2019
2021
2010
2. Scope of ofﬁcially approved electriﬁcation plan 2019
2021
2010
3. Framework for grid electriﬁcation 2019
2021
2010
4. Framework for minigrids 2019
2021
2010
5. Framework for off-grid systems 2019
2021
2010
6. Consumer affordability of electricity 2019
2021
2010
7. Utility transparency and monitoring 2019
2021
2010
8. Utility creditworthiness 20192021
Source: ESMAP 2022a.
Note: Among the indicators, utility creditworthiness (Indicator 8) reflects only results calculated from the financial statements of distribution
utilities, whereas the consumer affordability score (Indicator 6) considers both quantitative findings and policies. The other indicators measure
only policy frameworks or plans.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

57

Figure B1.3.2 • Investment with respect to RISE scores and populations served by off-grid renewables in access-deficit countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 2010–21$400

USD million (constant 2020)
USD million (constant 2020)

$400
$350
$350
$300

Nigeria$300$250

Kenya Nigeria

$250
$200

Kenya

$200
$150

United Republic of Tanzania
Ghana
United Republic of Tanzania
UgandaGhana
Ethiopia

$150
$100
$100
$50
$0
$50

$0

Madagascar
0

10

0

10

Mozambique
60

70

Uganda80 Ethiopia 90

Rise score - Electricity Access
40
50
60

70

80

Madagascar 40
30
Mozambique 50

20

20

30

100

90

100

Source: IRENA 2023.
- Electricity
AccessNote: Bubble size represents the population (households) servedRiseby score
off-grid
renewableenergy. Most off-grid renewable investment in Nigeria
is for commercial and industrial purposes; that investment is not reflected in the graph.

The 2022 edition of the RISE indicators includes a stand-alone “COVID-19 module” that monitors electricity
access policies and mechanisms for end users, suppliers, and public institutions during the pandemic. Financial
support for electricity consumption through grid, mini-grid, and off-grid systems was observed across all regions,but Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the strongest support response (figure B1.3.3). Additionally, although the
pandemic left some in Sub-Saharan Africa unable to pay for basic electricity services, consumer affordability
increased at the regional level in 2021 according to the consumer affordability indicator of the RISE survey. Latin
America and the Caribbean experienced the same change (ESMAP 2022a).

Figure B1.3.3 • The RISE COVID-19 module: Share of countries with supportive mechanisms, plans, and funding for access to electricity after theLatin America & Caribbean
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & Paciﬁcoutbreak of the pandemic
East 10%
Asia & Paciﬁc
24%
10%
10%
10%
24%

24%

24%

Latin 20%
America & Caribbean
30%
20%

7%

7%

30%

20%

20%

19%

19%

25%
19%

30%

14%
Sub-SaharanAfrica23%

19%South Asia
25%

19%

24%
30%
Funding for scaling-up access for such facilities
24%

19%

19%

23%

14%18%

14%

14%

18%

13% 18%18%
19%Plans for fostering electriﬁcation of public institutions

13%

Mechanism for ﬁnancial support to mini grid and off-grid service providers

Mechanism for ﬁnancial support to grid service providers

Mechanism for mini grid and off-grid end-users
Funding for scaling-up access for such facilities

Mechanism for grid end-users
Plans for fostering electriﬁcation of public institutions

Mechanism for ﬁnancial support to mini grid and off-grid service providers

Mechanism for ﬁnancial support to grid service providers

Mechanism for mini grid and off-grid end-users

Mechanism for grid end-users

Source: ESMAP 2022a.

58

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Methodological Notes
The subsections that follow expand on several methodological matters raised or implied in the text.

THE WORLD BANK’S GLOBAL ELECTRIFICATION DATABASE
The World Bank’s Global Electrification Database compiles nationally representative household survey data andcensus data for the period 1990–2021. It incorporates data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America andthe Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa Poverty Database, and the Europe and Central Asia Poverty Database,all of which are based on similar surveys. The database relies on the Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework, which classifies
access along a tiered spectrum, from Tier 0 (no access) to Tier 5 (the highest level of access). At the time of this analysis,
the database contained 1,375 surveys from 149 countries in 1990–2021.
A multilevel, nonparametric model is applied to extrapolate data for missing years (described below). The modelingapproach originally developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) to estimate clean fuel usage was adapted toproject electricity access and fill in missing data points.31 Where data were available, access estimates were weighted
by population. Multilevel, nonparametric modeling takes into account the hierarchical structure of data (country andregional levels), using the regional classification of the United Nations.
The model was applied in all countries with at least one data point. In order to use as much real data as possible, results
based on survey data were reported in their original form for all years available. The statistical model was used to fill indata for years in which data were missing and to conduct global and regional analyses. In the absence of survey data
for a given year, information from regional trends was used. The difference between real data points and estimatedvalues is clearly identified in the database. Countries classified as high-income are assumed to have electrification
rates of 100 percent for the years the countries belong to the category.
For 1990–2010, the statistical model was generally based on insufficient data points or outdated household surveys.
To avoid having electrification trends in this period overshadow efforts since 2010, the model was run twice, oncewith survey data and assumptions for 1990–2021 (for model estimates for 1990–2021) and once with survey data andassumptions for 2010–21 (for model estimates for 2010–21). The first run extrapolates electrification trends for 1990–
2021, given the available data points. The second considers only real data collected since 2010 and estimates thehistorical evolution in the most recent years. The outputs from the two model runs were then combined to generate afinal value for access to electricity. If survey data were available, the original observation remained in the final database.
Otherwise, the larger value generated by the model runs was chosen as the final data point.
Under the WHO methodology adapted for the purpose of assessing access, regional trends affect the estimation of
yearly values in countries with missing data points in certain years. Depending on the regional trend and how many
years have passed since the last available year of data for a certain country, the model can interpolate unrealistic
access rates of 100 percent. To avoid reporting unrealistic rates, the country’s latest survey data are extended. In thisversion of the report, this was done in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Nigeria.

31

The model draws on the modeling of solid fuel use for household cooking presented in Bonjour and others (2013).

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

59

COMPARISON BETWEEN DEMAND-SIDE DATA AND SUPPLY-SIDE DATA
While the World Bank’s Global Electrification Database collects data mainly from household surveys and censuses,
the IEA’s Energy Access Database draws from government reports of household electrification (usually based onconnections reported by utilities). IEA considers a household to have access if it receives enough electricity to powera basic bundle of energy services.
The two approaches sometimes yield different estimates. Estimates based on household surveys are moderately
higher than estimates based on energy sector data because they capture a wider range of phenomena, including offgrid access, “informal” connections (connections not made by or known to the utility), and self-supply systems.
Comparison of the two datasets in the previous edition of this report (updated in this edition) highlights theirrespective strengths. Household surveys, which are typically conducted by national statistical agencies, offer two
advantages for measuring electrification. First, thanks to efforts to harmonize questionnaire designs, electrificationquestions are largely standardized across country surveys. Although not all surveys reveal detailed information on
the forms of access, questionnaire designs capture emerging phenomena, such as off-grid solar access. Second, datafrom surveys convey user-centric perspectives on electrification. Survey data capture all forms of electricity access,painting a more complete picture of access than may be possible from data supplied by service providers. But greater
investment in data collection and capacity building is needed to generate a comprehensive and accurate surveybased understanding of electricity access.
Government data on electrification reported by national ministries of energy are supply-side data on utility connections.
They offer two principal advantages over national surveys. First, administrative data are often available on an annual
basis and may therefore be more up to date than surveys, which are conducted every two to three years. (Moreover,since 2010, only about 20 percent of countries have published or updated their electricity data at intervals of two to
three years in time for global data collection.) Second, administrative data are not subject to the challenges that canarise when conducting field surveys. Household surveys (particularly those implemented in remote and rural areas)
may suffer from sampling errors that may lead to underestimation of the access deficit.

MEASURING ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY PROVIDED THROUGH OFF-GRID SOLAR SOURCES
The rates and levels of access to off-grid solar energy shared in this chapter are based on data shared by affiliates inthe bi-annual data collection undertaken by GOGLA, Lighting Global, and Efficiency for Access.
Eligible off-grid solar lighting products included in the affiliate data collection are defined as systems that include asolar panel, a battery, and at least one light point. Every six months, affiliate companies fill out a questionnaire on theirproduct sales by country, system type/size, and business model; they also share product specifications and capacities.
Although companies are ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the self-reported data submitted, the data arechecked for quality by an independent consultancy (Berenschot), as well as by GOGLA, Lighting Global, and theEnergy Savings Trust.
Manufacturers and distributors of off-grid solar products report their sales, but the results shared in public reports
cover only products sold by manufacturers of off-grid solar products. This is to avoid double counting sales reported byboth manufacturers and distributors. The product sales reported by manufacturers include both business-to-business
transactions (e.g., sales to distributors, governments, and nongovernmental organizations) as well direct businesssales to customers. The latest Market Trends Report (Lighting Global/ESMAP and others 2022) estimates that sales of60

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

GOGLA affiliate companies represent 28 percent of the total off-grid solar market, although estimates of percentages
by country, as well as by system size and business model, vary significantly.
In addition to using standardized impact metrics32 created by the GOGLA Impact Working Group, additional steps aretaken to calculate tiers of energy access:Tier 1. To estimate Tier 1 energy access, a “SEforALL factor” is applied to the sales numbers.33 That factor estimates
the service-level impact of smaller technologies. This tool reviews the system size and capacity of each product andestimates whether it has helped to unlock either partial or full Tier 1 access. It then calculates the total number ofpeople who have achieved either partial or full Tier 1 access.
Tier 2. Products that have a capacity of more than 50 watts peak, or that are more than 20 watts peak and comepackaged with a television, are deemed to provide Tier 2 energy access. This approach is designed to align productspecifications or energy service with the requirements for Tier 2 access of the Multi-Tier Framework. Products that haveenabled a household to achieve Tier 2 access are not included in the final Tier 1 estimates.

MEASURING ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY PROVIDED THROUGH MINI-GRID SOURCES
IRENA collects off-grid capacity and generation data from a variety of sources. These include IRENA questionnaires;
national and international databases; and unofficial sources, such as project reports, news articles, academic studies,
and websites. For some countries, IRENA also estimates off-grid solar PV capacity, based on solar panel import statistics
obtained from the United Nations’ COMTRADE Database.
The agency’s 2022 decentralized energy database contains global data on off-grid renewable energy in Africa, Asia,
South America, Central America and the Caribbean, and Oceania. Its database covers off-grid renewable power
capacity (in megawatts), biogas production (in cubic meters), and energy access (in numbers of inhabitants). This
chapter uses energy access data estimated for people with access to hydropower, solar mini-grids (Tiers 1 and 2), andbiogas.
IRENA publishes off-grid statistics by the end of December each year. Details on the methodology used in this report
are set forth in IRENA (2018).

32

The Global Impact Metrics are available online here: https://www.gogla.org/impact/gogla-impact-metrics.

33
Where a product provides partial Tier 1 access a methodology devised by SEforALL can be applied to calculate how several products can be
combined to reach Tier 1 equivalency. The methodology was designed to account for “energy stacking” and so to prevent Tier 1 access from being
underrepresented in calculations.

Chapter 1 • Access to Electricity

61

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ACCESS TO
CLEAN FUELSAND TECHNOLOGIESFOR COOKING

Photo: © Adobe Stock by Joshua Resnick

CHAPTER 2

Main Messages•

Global trend. In 2021, 71 percent (67–75) of the global population had access to clean cooking fuels andtechnologies, an increase of 14 points since 2010.34 Despite the progress, some 2.3 billion people (2.0–2.6) still
use polluting fuels and technologies for most of their cooking.

•Target for 2030. Efforts to accelerate the achievement of universal access to clean cooking by 2030 are urgently
needed. Current trends suggest that only 77 (73-80) percent of the world’s people are expected to have accessto clean cooking fuels and technologies by 2030, leaving some 1.9 billion continuing to rely on traditional andinefficient stoves paired with solid fuels (wood, charcoal, coal, crop waste) and kerosene for cooking. Looking
beyond 2030 and accounting for population growth, the current business-as-usual trajectory shows that, by
2050, 2.3 billion people in 91 low- and middle-income countries will still lack access to clean cooking. Amongthe 91 are 45 out of the 47 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. If current trends continue, around 6 out of 10 people
without clean cooking access will reside in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030, with little or no improvement expectedby 2050.

•

Regional highlights. The access deficit has decreased consistently in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
since 2000, and in Central Asia and Southern Asia since 2010. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there has been aclear upward trend in the deficit, as access to clean cooking has failed to keep pace with growing populations.
There, it has more than doubled since 1990 and has increased by 60 percent since 2000, reaching a total of 0.9
billion people (0.9–1.0) in 2021. Without new policies or urgent interventions, the access deficit in Sub-SaharanAfrica is on course to reach 1.1 billion people in 2030, with no signs of slowing thereafter.

•

Urban-rural divide. Urban areas continue to have greater access to clean cooking than rural areas, but thedivide is narrowing over time. Over the last 10 years, access accelerated in rural areas and decelerated in urban
areas. The percentage of people with access in urban areas rose only slightly from 82 percent (78–84) in 2010
to 86 percent (83–89) in 2021. Meanwhile, over the same period, the percentage in rural areas rose from 31
percent (27–35) to 51 percent (46–56), five times the improvement seen in urban areas over the same period.
If the urban trends continue to decelerate, the percentage of the population with access to clean cooking inurban areas is on course to stall and possibly to begin dropping as soon as 2025.

•

The 20 countries with the largest access deficits. The 20 countries with the largest access deficits accounted
for 78 percent of the global population lacking access to clean cooking, including 10 countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica, where more than 600 million people still lacked access to clean cooking fuels and technologies in 2021.
In 16 of the 20 countries, less than half of the population had access to clean cooking fuels and technologies.
Moreover, in seven (all in Sub-Saharan Africa), less than 10 percent of the population had access.

34
Throughout the chapter, parenthetical figures appearing after estimates are 95 percent uncertainty intervals, as defined in the methodology
section at the end of the chapter. Clean fuels and technologies include stoves powered by electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas,
biogas, solar, and alcohol. Clean fuels and technologies are as defined by the normative technical recommendations in the WHO Guidelines for
Indoor Air Quality: Household Fuel Combustion (WHO 2014).

67

•

The 20 countries with the lowest access rates. Almost all of the 20 countries with the lowest rates of accessto clean cooking, with the exception of Rwanda, have shown little or no progress in increasing their access rates
between 2017 and 2021 (with an increase of less than 0.4 percentage points). Nineteen of these countries are in
Africa and are among the least-developed countries, with Haiti the only non-African country among them.

•

Global and regional fuel trends. In low- and middle-income countries in 2021, gaseous fuels (liquefied petroleumgas [LPG], natural gas, biogas) were used by 55 percent (49–60) of people (3.6 billion) as their main energy source
for cooking. Unprocessed biomass (wood, crop waste, dung) was the main fuel of 29 percent (24–34) of people(1.9 billion); electricity, of 10 percent (7–14) of people (660 million); and charcoal, of 4 percent (3–4) of people(240 million). Only 1 percent of people still used coal and kerosene as their main fuels in 2021.

•

Clean cooking as a cost-effective measure to tackle climate change. Clean cooking can and should be an
integral part of strategies for achieving the targets specified in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
under the Paris Agreement on climate change and advancing toward the goal of net zero emissions by 2050 andachieving Sustainable Development Goals 7, 9, and 13. New evidence on the climate, health, and social benefitsof transitioning to clean cooking strengthens the argument for universal clean cooking as a way to accelerate theenergy transition.

•

Energy compacts driving policy action and commitments for clean cooking. Energy compacts that leadto national clean cooking strategies and commitments are an important vehicle for countries to accelerate
the transition to clean cooking. Numerous state and non-state actors, such as companies, regional and local
governments, and nongovernmental organizations have joined in the commitment to accelerate access to clean
cooking. If realized, national targets to accelerate access to clean cooking, as spelled out in NDCs and energy
compacts, have the potential to improve human health, livelihoods, the climate, and the natural environment atlarge. Promoting the use of a range of cleaner cooking fuel options such as electricity, LPG, ethanol, and biogas
should thus be upheld as an important implementable action for countries to use to advance development
outcomes, preserve nature, and mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change.

68

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Are We on Track?
The world is not on track to achieve universal access to clean cooking by 2030. In 2021, only 71 percent (67–75)
of the global population had access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, the latter comprising stoves poweredby electricity, LPG, natural gas, biogas, solar energy, and alcohol. However, this leaves 2.3 billion people (2.0–2.6) stillrelying primarily on polluting fuels and technologies, such as simple stoves paired with charcoal, coal, crop waste,dung, kerosene, or wood.35
There has been some progress in the global access rate over the past two decades, as seen in figure 2.1. Yet if current
trends continue, only an estimated 77 percent (73–80) of the global population will have access to clean cooking fuels
and technologies by 2030, falling far short of the 2030 target of universal access and leaving 1.9 billion people to suffer
the damaging effects of polluting cooking fuels and technologies on human health, livelihoods and the environment.

Figure 2.1 • Percentage of the global population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, 2000–21

Population with access to clean fuels and technologies
for cooking (SDG 7.1.2)

100%

75%
57%

71%

50%

25%

0%
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Source: WHO 2023.
Note: Dashed lines are 95% uncertainty intervals.

Globally, the number of people without access to clean cooking continues to decrease each year. However, large
regional variability exists (figures 2.2 and 2.3). In fact, the number of people without access in Sub-Saharan Africa is
growing at a rate of almost 20 million people per year as gains in the share of people with access fail to keep pace witha. Population(billions)of the almost 1 billion people already sufferingb. Numbercountries
population growth, to thedetriment
theofnegative
effects of polluting
3.5

100

cooking in the region. The growing access deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa, if not reversed, could dampen or undermine
91
90

3 increasing trends in global
current
2.9 access.

80

2.5

2.2

70
60

2
35
Becauseof the data-driven nature of the analysis and limitations in the data, this chapter examines cooking fuel rather than cookstove and fuel50
combinations. The methodology section at the end of the chapter provides additional
details. Population estimates are from 2021. Population data from
1.5 revision of World Urbanization Prospects were used to derive the population-weighted
the 2018
regional and global aggregates. Low- and middle40
income countries
countries were excluded from aggregate calculation for
1 without data were excluded from all aggregate calculations;30high-income
26
1
specific fuels.

0

20

0.5

0.5

10

0.1
Before 2021

2021-2030

Central Asia and Southern Asia

2031-2040

2041-2050>2050

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand

Sub-Saharan Africa

0Before 2021

862021-2030

2031-2040

Latin America and the CaribbeanWestern Asia and Northern Africa

22041-2050>2050

Northern America and Europe

69Figure 2.2 • Share of population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, 2021 (percent)Population with access to clean
cooking fuels and technologies (%):
0%–25%
25%–50%50%–75%75%–99%100%
Not applicable
IBRD 47237 |MAY 2023

Source: WHO 2023.
Disclaimer: This map was produced by the Geospatial Operations Support Team of the World Bank based on the Cartography Unit of the World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown do not imply any judgment on the part of the custodian agencies concerning
the legal status of or sovereignty over any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Without much stronger efforts, the great majority of low- and middle-income countries will miss the 2030 universal
access target and beyond (figure 2.3). Eight countries with a total population of 500 million in 2021 are expected toachieve universal access36 in the period 2021–30. A further six countries with a combined population of 2.9 billion areon track to transition to universal clean cooking between 2031 and 2040. However, just two countries are on track to
cross this threshold between 2041 and 2050. Most alarmingly, 80 countries with a total population of 2 billion are notexpected to reach even 90 percent clean cooking coverage by 2050.

36
Due to the inherent uncertainty in input survey data and modelled estimates, for SDG 7.1.2 monitoring, countries are assumed to have universal
access if modelled estimates indicate that 95 percent or more primarily rely on clean fuels and technology for cooking.

70

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 2.3 • Total population and number of LMICs expected to achieve universal access to clean cooking, based on current trends by region
a. Population (billions)

3.5
3b. Number of countries

100

91

90

2.9

80

2.5

70

2.2

60

2

50

1.5

40
1

1

30
0.5

0.5
Before 2021

2021-2030

2031-2040

Central Asia and Southern Asia

2041-2050

0

>2050

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand862021-2030

2031-2040

10

0.1

0

26

20

Sub-Saharan Africa

Before 20212
2041-2050

Latin America and the Caribbean>2050

Northern America and Europe

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Source: WHO 2023.

An acceleration of progress is therefore urgently needed if the world is to achieve universal access by 2030. In 41
countries, predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa, additional increases of 8–11 percentage points per year above
the current trends are needed to reach 100 percent access from 2021 to 2030 (figure 2.4). Furthermore, without
an additional 1–3 percentage point increase in access per year, 82 countries will not reach universal access to clean
cooking by 2050, with 45 of these countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 2.4 • Additional annual rate of increase in access to clean cooking from 2021 to 2030 in access-deficit countries needed to universal clean
cooking by 2030
30

Number of countries

25

26
24

20
16

15
12
10

9

9
6

5
0

12

6

6
3

0

1

Central Asia and Southern Asia

2

3

4
5
6
7
8
Accelaration in annual access rate needed (percentage points per year)

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand

4

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

9

10

11

Northern America and Europe

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Source: WHO 2023.
Note: Additional increases are rounded to the nearest percentage point.

With current trends, the number of people with access to clean cooking will increase by 510 million people from 2021
to 2025. This demonstrates the considerable and urgent need to scale up action to ensure an additional 1 billion
people obtain access to clean cooking solutions by 2025, as pledged by the Global Roadmap for Accelerated SDG7
Climate Change.
7000

n (millions)

6000
Chapter5000
2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

90
80
70
60

with access to clean fuelsr cooking (%)

100
8000in Support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in effort to achieve the Paris Agreement
Actionon71

Number of countries

25

24

20
16

15

Looking Beyond the Main Indicators
12

10

9

6

5

6

6

4

3

0

0
1
2
ACCESS AND
POPULATION
Central Asia and Southern Asia

3

12
9

4
5
6
7
8
Accelaration in annual access rate needed (percentage points per year)

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

9

Latin America and the Caribbean

1011Northern America and Europe

The global
rateexcludingof access
toand
clean
fuels and technologies
reachedpercent
Oceania
Australia
New Zealand
Sub-Saharan Africafor cooking
Western
Asia and71
Northern
Africa (67–75) in 2021. Figure 2.5

shows a gradual increase in the access rate over the past two decades, with a total increase of around 22 percentage
points since 2000.

Figure 2.5 • Change in the absolute number of people (left axis, bars) and percentage of the global population (right axis, line) with access to clean
cooking, 2000–21

90

7000

80

Population (millions)

6000

70

5000

60
50

4000

40

3000

30

2000

20

1000
0

10
2000

2005

2010

Population without access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking

2015

2020

Percentage of global population with access to clean fuels
and technologies for cooking (%)

100

8000

0

Population with access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking

Source: WHO 2023.

Improvement in the global access rate has been predominantly driven by progress in the most populous low- andmiddle-income countries. Figure 2.6 illustrates a clear contrast between the progress in China, India, Indonesia, Brazil,
and Pakistan, where the combined access rate rose from 49 percent in 2010 to 77 percent in 2021, and the minimal
progress in other LMIC (48 percent in 2010 to 52 percent in 2021. This is a stark reminder that good progress in thelargest countries may obscure the lack of progress in a great many smaller countries.

72

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 2.6 • Percentage of population with access to clean cooking globally, in five most populous LMICs, and all other LMICs, 2000-21

Percentage of the population with access toclean fuels and technologies for cooking

100%
77%
75%
71%

57%
49%

50%

52%

48%
25%

0%

2005

2000

2010

Global average

2015

5 most populous LMICs

2020

Remaining LMICs

Source: WHO 2023.
LMICs = low- and middle-income countries.

THE ACCESS DEFICIT
On a global
1200 scale, the number of people with access to clean cooking has risen consistently over the last two decades(figure 2.5). However, the total number of people lacking access to clean cooking—a measure of the number exposed
Population without access to clean fuels and technologies(millions)1050
to the damaging
health and socioeconomic effects of polluting fuels and technologies,
referredhere as the “access
Australia
and New to
Zealanddeficit”—began to fall substantially only after 2010, dropping from its historic level of around 3 billion people to 2.3
900

Central Asia and Southern Asia

billion people (2.0–2.6) in 2021.

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

850 in the total number of people lacking access have been slowed by both population growth and an uneven
Reductions

geographic distribution of progress. Figure 2.7 shows how the deficit has decreased
consistentlyin Eastern Asia and
Latin
America & the Caribbean
600
South-eastern
Asia since 2000, and in Central Asia and Southern Asia since 2010. Alarmingly, however, the accessNorthern America and Europe

deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa has more than doubled since 1990, as population growth has outpaced limited progress450

in the percentage of the population with access to clean cooking. The deficit has
grown
60 Australia
percent
since
2000,
Oceania
excludingand New
Zealandreaching a total of 0.9 billion people (0.9–1.0) in 2021. Without new policies or interventions, the deficit is on track to
300

Sub-Saharan Africa

150

Western Asia and Northern Africa

reach 1.1 billion people by 2030, with no sign of abatement thereafter.

0
2000

2005

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

2010

2015

2020

73

Figure 2.7 • Number of people without access to clean fuels and technologies, by region, 2000–21

Population without access to clean fuels and technologies(millions)

1200
1050

Australia and New Zealand

900

Central Asia and Southern Asia

850

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Latin America & the Caribbean

600

Northern America and Europe
450

Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand300

Sub-Saharan Africa

150

Western Asia and Northern Africa

0
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Source: WHO 2023; Stoner and others 2021.

Figure 2.8 illustrates the changing regional composition of the global population lacking access to clean fuels forcooking between 2010 and 2021. In 2000, four in ten people lacking access to clean cooking lived in Central Asia andSouthern Asia; four in ten in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asian; and two in ten in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2021, fourin ten people without access lived in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of decreases in the access deficit in the two Asian
regions and a stark increase in the deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa. If current trends continue, almost six in ten people
without access will reside in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030.

Figure 2.8 • Proportion of the total global access-deficit in the three largest access-deficit regions and the rest of the world, 2000, 2010 and 2021
7%

5%
36%

19%

8%
32%

25%

2000

38%

2010

38%

41%

32%

Central Asia and Southern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Rest of the world

2021

19%

Central Asia and Southern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Rest of the world

Central Asia and Southern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Rest of the world

Source: WHO 2023; Stoner and others 2021.

Access rate (%)

Access deﬁcit (millions)
0

200

400

India

74

0

20

40

60

505

China
Nigeria

600

Bangladesh

128

Pakistan

107

Annualized increase (pp)-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

4
3.9

63
79

296
175

80

1.9
2.0

13

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress
1.5 Report 2023

24
48

1.6

7%

5%
36%

19%

8%
32%

25%

2000

38%

2010

ANALYSIS OF THE TOP 20 ACCESS-DEFICIT COUNTRIES
38%

41%

2021

32%

19%

More than three-quarters (78 percent) of the world’s people lacking access to clean cooking are found in the 20
countries shown in figure 2.9. India alone accounts for the largest share of the access deficit, with 505 million people
Asia andSouthern Asia
lackingCentral
access,followedby China at 296 million.Central Asia and Southern Asia

Central Asia and Southern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
In seven of the twenty countries, less than 10 percent of the population has access to clean
fuels and technologies;
Rest of the world
Rest of the world
Rest of the world

the seven are Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Uganda, and the United
Republic of Tanzania. Sixteen of the twenty countries have access rates below 50 percent.

Figure 2.9 • The 20 countries with the largest access deficit by absolute population (green) , 2017 - 2021 average
200

400

India

600

0

20

60

128

Pakistan

107

Ethiopia

103

6

83

5

United Republic of Tanzania

57

Indonesia

52

Uganda

45

Kenya

42

Myanmar35

Russian Federation

32

Mozambique

30

Madagascar

27

Afghanistan

25

23

Ghana

22

2.0
1.5

24

1.6

48
0.6
0.1

0.9

46

0.6

6

3.0

81
0.0

1

2.1

20

4.0

36
78

-2.3
0.3

5

0.1

1

1.3

33
12

23

Niger

1.9

13

Bangladesh

58

4
3.9

79

175

Democratic Republicof the Congo
Philippines

80
63

296

Nigeria

Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

40

505

China

Annualized increase (pp)-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3Access rate (%)

Access deﬁcit (millions)
0

0.6
0.2

3
28

1.5

Source: WHO 2023..
pp = percentage point.

Although India has the largest population without access to clean cooking, the rate of access in the country increasedby 3.9 percentage points per year on average between 2017 and 2021 (figure 2.10). Cambodia had the highest rate ofincrease, at 4.4 percentage points per year, followed by Myanmar at 4 percentage points. Other countries with annual
gains of at least 2 percentage points were India, Indonesia, Sudan, Tonga, Kenya, Nigeria, and Viet Nam.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

75

Figure 2.10 • The 20 countries with the largest annual increases in the percentage of people with access to clean fuels and technologies (blue), 2017–21
averageAccess rate (%)

Access deﬁcit (millions)Cambodia

0

100

200

300

400

60

80

18

Tonga

0

3

3.0
2.4
2.1

20

2.1

13

2.0
92

8

2.0

79

296

1.9

48

1.9

55

Congo

4

Georgia

1

Peru

6

1.7
1.7

32
87

1.7

82

Pakistan

1.6
1.6

48

107

1.5

50

2

Bangladesh

1.5

24

128
22
18

Source: WHO 2023.
pp = percentage point.

28

1.5

29

1.5

20

40

60

Annualized increase (pp)Access rate (%)

Access deﬁcit (millions)
0

80

0

5
4.0

81

China

4

3.9

58

175

1

2

63

42

0

Annualized increase (pp)

82

Kenya

Fiji

1

36

Nigeria

Eswatini

0

100

4.4

52

Sudan

Côte d'Ivoire

40
35

505

Indonesia

Ghana

20

35

India

Mongolia

0

600

11

MyanmarViet Nam

500

1

2

3

4

5

6

-0.2

0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

1

Nearly all ofthe
20 countries
with the lowest access rates
showed little or no sign of improvement(figure 2.11). In
0.00
South
Sudan
0.1
13.3
almost all of theseaccess between 2017 and 2021 was0.00
below 0.4 percentage
Burundicountries,
11.5 the average annual increase in 0.5

points per year;
accessincrease of 0.9
0.00
Liberia
4.9decreased in some countries. Only0.8Rwanda had a slightly higher average
percentage points-0.03These countries also have
Uganda per year. All of these
1.0 are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
45.3 countries except Haiti
some of theleastfinancing
SierraLeone
1.0 2021).
7.8 dedicated to clean cooking (SEforALL
Central African Republic

4.8

Mali

19.5

GuineaGuinea-Bissau

0.03
-0.03
0.05

19.3

-0.10

2.0

-0.05

2.1
22.5

0.20

3.0
3.4

0.25

15.1

3.5

0.28

Rwanda

12.3

3.6

Haiti
Democratic Republicof the Congo
Benin

10.7

Somalia

Mozambique

76

0.00

1.4

2.2

Niger
Sao Tome and Principe

0.03

1.2
1.3

26.6

Malawi

1.1
1.2

13.2
1.9

Madagascar
Gambia

0.03

0.2

82.6
11.2

0.90
4.5

0.08

4.8

0.08

5.0
29.8

5.2

-0.08
0.25

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Pakistan
Mongolia

107

Côte d'Ivoire

1.6

50

1.5

2

Bangladesh
Ghana

48

1.5

24

128
22

28

1.5

18

29

1.5

Figure 2.11 • The 20 countries with the lowest rates of access to clean fuels and technologies (orange), 2017-2021 average
0

20

40

South Sudan

13.3

Burundi11.5

Liberia

4.8

4

5

6

-0.2

0

13.2

0.00
-0.03
0.03

1.1

0.03

1.2

0.00
0.03

1.2
26.6

-0.03
0.05

1.4

19.3

-0.10

2.0

2.2

-0.05

2.1

Niger

22.5

0.20

3.0
3.4

0.25

Somalia

15.1

3.5

0.28

Rwanda

12.3

3.6

Haiti
Democratic Republicof the Congo
Benin

10.7

0.2

82.6
11.2

Mozambique

0.90
4.5

0.08

4.8

0.08

5.0
29.8

1

0.00

1.3

Madagascar

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.00

1.0

1.9

Malawi

3

1.0

19.5

Guinea2

0.8

Central African Republic
Mali

1
0.5

45.3
7.8

Sao Tome and Principe

0

4.9

Sierra Leone

Gambia80

0.1

UgandaGuinea-Bissau

60

Annualized increase (pp)Access rate (%)

Access deﬁcit (millions)

-0.08

5.2

0.25

Source: WHO 2023.
pp = percentage point.

URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE
Urban areas have greater access to clean cooking than rural areas, but the gap is narrowing. The percentage of people
with access in urban areas rose only slightly in the past decade—from 82 percent (78–84) in 2010 to 86 percent (83–89)
in 2021 (figure 2.12). Over the same period, the percentage in rural areas rose from 31 percent (27–35) to 51 percent(46–56). Between 2000 and 2010, by contrast, the difference in access to clean cooking between urban and rural areas
stood steadily at around 50 percentage points. By 2021 the gap had since fallen to 35 percentage points (29–41) andis expected to narrow further still to 23 percentage points in 2030 if current trends continue.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

77

Figure 2.12 • Percentage of people with access to clean cooking in urban areas, rural areas, and overall (solid lines), and discrepancy in access between
urban and rural areas (dashed line)
100

100
Discrepancy between urban and rural areas inDiscrepancy
betweenaccess to clean cooking(percentage
points)urban and rural areas inaccess to clean cooking (percentage points)

Share of the populationSharewith ofaccessthe population with accessto clean fuels and technologies
to clean fuels and technologies

90
80

75

70

100

100
60
90
50

50

80
40

75

70
30

20

60
20

50

0
2000
20

2005

2010
Urban

2015

Rural

2020

50
10
400
30
20

Overall

10

Source: WHO 2023.

0
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

0

The discrepancy in access between urban and rural areas is highest in Central Asia and Southern Asia (figure 2.13),
Urban

Rural

Overall

at 40 percentage points (29–52). The gap is narrowing in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, where it is increasing
Gap between urban andareas urbanin accesscleanareas
cooking(pp) to clean cooking (pp)Gapruralbetweenandtoruralin accesssharply.
60

Figure 2.13 • Discrepancy in access between urban and rural areas, by region

40
60

20
40

200

2000

2005
Australia and New ZealandLatin America and the Carribean
Sub-Saharan Africa

0

2000

2005
Australia and New ZealandLatin America and the Carribean
Sub-Saharan Africa

2010
Central Asia and Souhern Asia
Northern America and Europe
Western Asia and Northern Africa
2010
Central Asia and Souhern Asia
Northern America and Europe
Western Asia and Northern Africa

2015

2020

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand

2015

2020

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand

Source: WHO 2023.
pp = percentage point.

78

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

From 2010 to 2021, access to clean cooking improved at an annual rate of 2.0 (1.3–2.6) percentage points per year inrural areas and 0.5 percentage points per year (0.0–0.9) in urban areas. The regions with the fastest progress in rural
areas were Central Asia and Southern Asia, with an annual increase of 3.3 (2.0–4.3) percentage points since 2010, andEastern and South-eastern Asia, 3.4 (1.4–4.9) percentage points. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the access rate in rural areas
was stagnant, with annualized increases of just 0.1 percentage point over this period. Globally, progress in rural areas
has accelerated sharply in rural areas since 2000, though there has been a slight deceleration since 2017. In urban
areas, progress has steadily decelerated for more than 10 years. If these trends continue, the rate of access to clean
cooking in urban areas is on course to stall and possibly begin declining as early as 2025.

CHANGES IN THE FUEL MIX
Taking a deeper look at the specific fuels and technologies being used in 2021, gaseous fuels (LPG, natural gas,
biogas37) were the main energy source for cooking of 55 percent (49–60) of people (3.6 billion) (figures 2.14 and 2.15);
electricity was the man fuel for of 10 percent (7–14) of people (660 million). Unprocessed biomass (wood, crop waste,dung), a polluting alternative, was the main fuel for 29 percent (24–34) of people (1.9 billion); charcoal of 4 percent(3–4) (240 million). Only 1 percent of people used coal as their main fuel; a similar percentage used kerosene.
Unprocessed biomass, once the most commonly used fuel in low- and middle-income countries, was overtaken bygas around 2010 owing to the rapid growth of LPG programs in India, Indonesia, and Peru, among other countries.
However, in rural areas, biomass was still the principal cooking fuel of 49 percent (44–54) of people (1.5 billion) in
2021, more than any other type of fuel. Use of unprocessed biomass may be decreasing in both urban and rural areas,
but primary reliance on charcoal persists and is increasing in some areas, particularly urban areas of Sub-SaharanAfrica, where it was used by 30 percent (27–34) of people (140 million) in 2021.
The percentage of people who use gas as their primary fuel is rising more quickly than those who use electricity in rural
areas. Whereas the use of electricity is rising more quickly in urban areas. Among low- and middle-income countries,
the use of electricity is highest in Eastern Asia and South-eastern, at 24 percent (15-34) of people or about 500 million
people living in low- and middle-income countries of these regions in 2021.

Figure 2.14 • Percentage of people using each cooking fuel type in low- and middle- income countries, for urban areas, rural areas and overall
Urban

Percentage of the population
mainly using each fuel type

100

Rural

100

80

80

80

60

60

60

40

40

40

20

20

20

0
2000

2005

Biomass
Kerosene2010
Charcoal
Gas

2015

2020

Coal
Electricity

0
2000

2005

Biomass
Kerosene2010

Overall100

2015

Charcoal
Gas

2020

0
2000

Coal
Electricity

2005
Biomass
Kerosene2010
Charcoal
Gas

2015

2020

Coal
Electricity

Source: WHO 2023.

37

Gaseous fuels (or gas) refers to LPG, natural gas, and biogas together, as many input surveys do not differentiate among the three.

5%

3%

10%

13%

20%

29%
36%

43%

44%
2000

43%

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

5%

2021

2010

2030
4%

55%

1%
1%

1%

79

UrbanPercentage of the population
mainly using each fuel type

100

Rural

100

Overall

100

80

80

80

60

60

60

Progress in the percentage of people using clean fuels and technologies for cooking has been accompanied by40
40
steep declines
in the use of unprocessed coaland kerosene. In 2000, coal was40mainly used by 10 percent (6-15) of

the population (480 million people) in low- and middle-income countries, the overwhelming majority of whom (450
20

20

20

million) lived in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia (24 percent [13–38] of the population in this region). In 2000,
kerosene0 was the main cooking fuel of 5 percent(4–7) of the population in low00 and middle-income countries (260

2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2005
2010
2015
2020
2000
2005
2010
million people),
including18 percent(14–22)2000
of those(48 million)
in urbanareas of
Sub-SaharanAfrica2015
and 262020
percent
Biomass

Charcoal

Coal

Biomass

Charcoal

Coal

Biomass

Charcoal

Coal(15–39) of thosein urban
Oceania (excluding
Zealand). In Kerosene
2021, the use
Kerosene
Gasareas ofElectricity
KeroseneAustralia
Gas and New
Electricity
Gas of kerosene
Electricityor coalas the main fuel for cooking fell to a combined 2 percent of the population in LMICs.

Figure 2.15 • Comparison of the percentage of people in LMICs using various fuel types in 2000, 2010 and 2021, with projection for 2030
5%

3%

10%

13%

20%

29%
36%

43%

44%
43%

2000

5%

2021

2010

2030

1%

4%
55%
5%

10%

Biomass
Kerosene

Charcoal
Gas

Coal
Electricity

Biomass
Kerosene

60%

3%

2%

2%

1%
1%
1%

4%
Charcoal
Gas

Coal
Electricity

Biomass
Kerosene

Charcoal
Gas

Coal
Electricity

Biomass
Kerosene

Charcoal
Gas

Coal
Electricity

Source: WHO 2023.

Use of ﬁrewood in rural areas of El Salvador by income groups (EHPM, 2014)

If current
100 trends continue through to 2030, 60 percent of the population in low- and middle-income countries will
Percent of households using ﬁrewood for cooking

mainly use
90 gas; 20 percent unprocessed biomass; 12 percent electricity; 5 percent charcoal; 1 percent kerosene; and1 percent
80 coal. Gaseous fuels, rather than electricity, will account for most of the growth in the share of the population
using clean
70 fuels and technologies predominantly.
60

Fuel stacking (the simultaneous use of several different fuels and stoves) remains extremely common, but the statistics
50

presented here address only the primary cooking fuel, as survey data typically do not account for other fuels used. The
40

number of people relying exclusively on clean fuels is therefore likely to be much smaller than implied by the numbers
30

cited here. Analysis of all cooking fuels used will be possible with greater adoption of survey questions that capture all
20

fuels and technologies used for cooking (World Bank and WHO 2021).
10

0

2010
Lowest income

80

2011
Lower income

2012

2013

Middle income

Upper middle income

2014
Highest income

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Policy Insights
Clean cooking is a key element of sustainable development. Scaling it up saves lives, enhances well-being, andprotects the climate, but the world is falling behind in attaining the goal of universal access by 2030. Putting the worldback on track toward the goal will require an immediate boost in cross-sectoral collaboration and action. The needis urgent for public, private and nongovernmental actors working in health, energy, environment, finance, and social
development to come together to elevate political commitment, dramatically increase investment, and step up crosssectoral coordination. Advancing the transition to clean fuels and technologies is a guaranteed win-win for humanhealth and well-being and protection of the natural environment and the climate. The greater the investment, thequicker the win.

CLEAN COOKING: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT FOR IMPROVING LIVES AND GENDER EQUITY
Ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages (SDG 3) require not only actions that address wellknown health risk factors such as active and passive tobacco smoking, harmful use of alcohol, unhealthy diet, andinsufficient physical activity, but also other actions that protect people from breathing polluted air in their homes.
In 2021, almost one-third (29 percent) of the world’s population still lacked access to clean fuels and technologies forcooking. Such energy poverty puts the health and well-being of the poorest populations at risk, while also contributing
to climate change, perpetuating gender inequity, and compromising efforts for sustainable development.
The health consequences that result from household air pollution are stark and tragic. The use of inefficient stovespaired with solid fuels and kerosene releases high-levels of air pollution that puts household members, particularly
women and children, at greater risk of acute and chronic disease. The latest estimates for 2019 from the World HealthOrganization show that 3.2 million deaths are attributable to household air pollution each year (WHO 2022). About
240 000 deaths in children under the age of five are due to household air pollution (WHO 2021a). More than threequarters of the deaths attributed to household air pollution are from noncommunicable diseases like ischemic heartdisease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and lung cancer. Failure to reach the target of universal accessto clean cooking fuels and technologies will continue to claim millions of lives each year.
The lack of access to clean fuels and modern energy systems for cooking impacts beyond health, preventing many fromliving life to the fullest. The drudgery posed by reliance on inefficient stoves and fuels often falls disproportionately
on women and children, particularly girls. The time loss from collecting fuels and preparing meals using inefficientmethods keeps them from other social and productive activities like schooling or income-generation, thus hindering
the quest for quality education and gender equality for all (SDGs 4 and 5). Such tasks also put them at risk of violence.
Given that current estimates consider only the impact of fuels used for cooking (WHO 2016), the global health toll ofenergy poverty in households would likely be even greater if the use of polluting fuels and devices for lighting andheating were also accounted for. Household energy is an important source of ambient (outdoor) air pollution (SDG
11); in some communities it accounts for over half of ambient air pollution (WHO 2016; WHO 2021).

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

81

EMPOWERING WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS IN CLEAN COOKING: ADVANCING BOTH GENDER
EQUITY AND ACCESS TO ENERGY
Empowerment and mentorship programs for women entrepreneurs in the clean cooking value chain have proveneffective in promoting a more gender-inclusive workforce. Better representation of women in energy sector policyand decision-making and more active participation of women entrepreneurs in the clean cooking value chain areimportant ways to advance gender equity and ensure that efforts to expand access meet the needs of cookstoveusers (Clean Cooking Alliance 2023). For example, in Nepal, where a transition to e-cooking is underway, a lack ofavailability of after-sales services was becoming a challenge. To address this gap, the Women’s Network for Energy andEnvironment, with the support of the Gender and Energy Innovation Facility, trained women who owned or worked inelectrical appliance stores to provide maintenance and repair services for electric stoves. Such innovation promotes
clean cooking, and women’s participation in the energy value chain, all the while providing women with additional
income and customers a place to go for appliance repair (ENERGIA 2022).

THE URGENT NEED FOR CLEAN COOKING TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE
The lack of widespread access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking has been shown not only to imperil
health and exacerbate gender inequality, but also to damage the globe’s fragile climate through deforestationfrom unsustainable wood harvesting and burning of polluting fuels in inefficient stoves. These practices generate
greenhouse gases and climate pollutants such as black carbon, which is the second-largest contributor to climatechange after carbon dioxide (CO2) (Bond and others 2013).38 Household fuel combustion produces about half of the
global emissions of black carbon (WHO 2016; Floess and others 2023) and is responsible for many of the climatechange impacts seen today—disrupting regional environmental systems (such as the Arctic and the high mountainglaciers of the Himalayas) that are critical to human welfare, wildlife habitats, and surrounding ecosystems.

CLEAN ENERGY FOR COOKING: A PATHWAY TO CLIMATE AND HEALTH CO-BENEFITS
Expanding access to clean energy for cooking can immediately begin to mitigate these damages, offering an
unparalleled opportunity for climate and health co-benefits. Black carbon’s short lifespan in the atmosphere (on theorder of days to weeks) means that reducing its emissions can slow warming immediately. Replacing biomass withelectricity and LPG can thus bring large benefits to both human health and the climate by reducing greenhouse gas
emissions as well as black carbon (Floess and others 2023) (box 2.1). The avoided emissions of methane, black carbon,
carbon monoxide and other climate forcing pollutants released during the inefficient combustion of biomass (or othersolid fuels) in traditional stoves is higher than the additional emissions that may result from using a mix of LPG andelectricity, even after considering the total energy value chain from production to use. This would be true even without
accounting for the avoided black carbon emissions and the impact of the use of biomass on forests (IEA 2022a).
Alternative clean fuels such as biogas could facilitate transitions to clean fuels in rural areas while mitigating the impactof other sources of climate pollutants such as agricultural waste. For example, the West and Central Africa Alliancefor Biodigester Promotion was established to strengthen deployment of biodigesters across eight countries, buildingon the experience of the Africa Biogas Partnership Program. In 2021, across selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
household biodigester adoption increased to more than 27 000 systems—a 10 percent increase from 2020 (SNV 2022).
38
Black carbon is one of the most potent short-lived climate pollutants. It absorbs sunlight and heats the atmosphere. It has also been associatedwith cardiovascular damage and premature mortality.

82

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 2.1 • Clean household energy as a key climate change mitigation strategy
Transitioning from biomass to LPG and electricity for household energy is a net win for the climate, even after
considering the entire energy life-cycle (Floess and others 2023). The analysis was conducted in 77 countries whereat least 1 million people use polluting solid fuels and/or kerosene for cooking. Compared with a “business as usual”
scenario, transitioning to all LPG, a mix of LPG and electricity, or all electricity reduced emissions of greenhousegases by 17 percent, 31 percent, and 47 percent, respectively, and eliminated nearly all black carbon emissions
from household cooking. The clean cooking scenarios yielded an average 5 mK reduction in global temperature by2040 and a 6 Mt (99 percent) decrease in annual emissions of PM2.5 by 2040.
Another analysis found similar results, showing that transitions to universal access to clean cooking by 2030 whileleading to a slight increase in CO2 emissions, overall led to net benefits for climate. Due to the avoided methaneand nitrous oxide emissions from traditional biomass use, this analysis estimated that such a transition would resultin a savings of 870 Mt CO2-equivalents (IEA 2022a).
Such analyses add to the evidence base on the potential for clean household energy solutions to contributesignificantly to climate change mitigation. Findings on the costs and potential impacts of efforts to promote clean
household energy can be used not only to increase awareness and commitment to achieving clean householdenergy transitions but also to drive increased investment.
The mounting evidence on the climate, health, and social co-benefits of clean household energy transitions
highlights the importance of including commitments to wider access in Nationally Determined Contributions as a
key strategy for slowing climate change and advancing toward the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050.

KEEPING PACE WITH URBANIZATION
While the narrowing of the urban-rural disparity in access to clean cooking seen in most regions is encouraging,39
urban areas’ projected stalled progress in the next two years is important to note. Historically, households in rural areas
tend to rely on solid fuels such as charcoal and biomass because of their cheaper cost, their availability, and the relative
inaccessibility of cleaner alternatives. On the other hand, urban areas often have infrastructure in place, such as paved
roads and electricity grids, that can facilitate transportation and distribution of cleaner energy fuels and appliances.
However, with the rapid pace of urban population growth in many parts of the world, supplying clean energy services
is a looming challenge for cities, particularly in slums and informal settlements that are often characterized by poverty
and concentrated deprivation (UN Habitat 2022). To avoid such an unhealthy transition, recommendations are needed
for policies to deal effectively with intra-urban inequities and the constraints of the urban poor in accessing clean fuels
and technologies. Such policy insights can then inform governments and other stakeholders on how best to invest inclean cooking access in these impoverished areas so that poor and vulnerable populations are not forgotten.

39

The gap is narrowing in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, where it is increasing sharply.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

83

ENSURING CLEAN COOKING AS PART OF BROADER ENERGY PLANNING
Universalizing access to clean cooking will require the inclusion of clean cooking within broader energy planning
efforts. Integrated energy planning is a promising approach that takes a holistic look at a country’s energy system
when planning for household and institutional access to electricity and clean cooking (SEforALL 2023). A well-crafted
integrated energy plan can unlock actionable market intelligence for the private sector, policy makers, and funders
by identifying priority geographic areas for expanding energy access and the least-cost technology to be deployed.
Having such data maximizes efficiency in building infrastructure to provide services where they are most needed. The
new data-driven Nigeria Integrated Energy Planning Tool, developed under this framework, is powered by extensive
geospatial modeling and layers of data. Covering electrification, clean cooking, and productive uses of electricity, it
provides actionable intelligence for the government, donors, investors, and private sector stakeholders to plan anddeliver the least-cost access to electricity and clean cooking (SEforALL 2021).

BUILDING COMMITMENTS FOR ACTION THROUGH NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONSAND ENERGY COMPACTS
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement on climate change and national clean cooking
strategies and commitments, including energy compacts, can serve as opportunities or vehicles to pair political andfinancial commitments for scaling up action on clean cooking. As of October 2021, 67 countries included clean
cooking- and other household energy-related goals in their NDCs (Clean Cooking Alliance 2021). Energy compacts
have been mobilized since the United Nations (UN) High-Level Dialogue on Energy in September 2021 as a policy
instrument to accelerate actions on clean cooking and other energy goals.
Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have all pledgedin their energy compacts to accelerate access to clean cooking through 2030 and beyond. Not only low- and middleincome countries are committed. Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates have also pledged in their compacts
to support clean cooking efforts (United Nations 2023). The Netherlands has recognized that clean cooking is a key
solution to reducing carbon emissions and pledged its support for increased action to achieve universal accessthrough multi-stakeholder partnerships, innovative business models, and financing strategies such as carbon credit
markets to provide affordable clean cooking options to millions of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable (United
Nations 2023).
However, while the commitments are notable, most of the access targets specified in these compacts are below
what would be required to achieve the SDG 7.1.2 target of universal access to clean cooking by 2030 (IEA 2022a).
Nonetheless, countries pairing political and financial commitments to clean cooking have been able to show significant
progress in the short term. This includes Kenya, which has been notably active in its political commitments and social
enterprise efforts (box 2.2).
Other non-state actors, such as companies, regional and local governments, and nongovernmental organizations,have also joined in the commitment to accelerate access to clean cooking. For example, the Clean Cooking Alliance
has launched a multilateral energy compact that aims to catalyze commitment and investment for clean cooking;the compact has been endorsed by more than 60 governments and organizations around the world (Clean Cooking
Alliance 2023; United Nations 2023).
If realized, national targets to accelerate access to clean cooking, as spelled out in NDCs and energy compacts, havethe potential to improve human health, livelihoods, the climate, and the natural environment at large. Promoting the84

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 2.2 • Kenya: Championing clean cooking
Over the last decade, Kenya’s rate of access to clean cooking technologies rose by 15 percentage points, from 9
percent in 2012 to 24 percent in 2021. The increase translates into close to 10 million people gaining access. Kenya
has been active on the clean cooking front at all levels, from much needed political support by the government
and political leaders—including First Lady Rachel Ruto (Nation 2022)—to encouraging private enterprises that bringhigh-quality, energy-efficient, and affordable stoves and fuels to the most vulnerable and underserved populations(MECS 2021).
Although there have been setbacks in access to clean cooking as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous
countries, Kenya among them, remain committed to accelerating action on clean cooking, as recently evidenced
by their commitments in energy compacts (United Nations 2023).
Kenya has pledged in its energy compact to universalize household use of clean cooking technologies and fuelsby 2028 through actions such as communication strategies, targeted subsidies, and consumer financing. Kenya’s
clean cooking commitment goes beyond just universal access for households. The country additionally pledges in
the compact to transition all public institutions from the use of biomass cooking fuels by 2025. All micro, small, andmedium-sized enterprises in the cooking and hospitality sectors will similarly convert to clean cooking solutions by
2028. Kenya has set a budget of USD 605 815 000 to achieve these goals.
Kenya's target to reach universal clean cooking by 2028 aligns with the country’s announcement to developa National eCooking Strategy, one of the first electric cooking strategies of its kind in Africa. The strategy willencourage the use of electric cooking appliances through media campaigns, cooking classes, and demonstrations.
Kenya Power and Lighting Company has also begun to explore on-bill repayment for electric cooking devices toencourage households to switch (IEA 2022a).
Kenya’s ambitious compact, political engagement, and eCooking strategy set an excellent example of a holistic
approach to scaling up clean cooking to advance national agendas in health, development, and the environment.

use of a range of cleaner cooking fuel options such as electricity, LPG, ethanol, and biogas should thus be upheld as
an important implementable action for countries to use to advance development outcomes, preserve nature, andmitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change.

TACKLING AFFORDABILITY TO ENHANCE THE ADEQUACY OF POLICIESSubsidies can help bridge the affordability gap by reducing the upfront and recurring costs of clean cooking systems;
they have been instrumental in expanding LPG use in multiple Latin American countries (MECS 2020) (box 2.3). Throughthe Indian government’s Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana initiative, launched in 2016, hundreds of millions of dollars havebeen allocated to expand LPG coverage to over 50 million low-income households through targeted LPG subsidies,accompanied by the establishment of thousands of new LPG distributors to meet growth in demand (WHO 2018;
Singh, Pachauri, and Zerriffi 2017; Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2016). China’s coal-to-electricity program, inwhich a ban on household coal use was implemented alongside subsidies for new technologies, demonstrates policy
mechanisms that jointly consider clean fuel adoption and disincentives for the use of polluting fuel (Barrington-Leighand others 2019). The latter is an essential component of the clean energy transition process that is often overlooked,
but equally critical to reduce air pollution and reap benefits to health and the climate.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking85Box 2.3 • Affordability: Learning from the Latin American clean cooking transition
Over the last three decades, low- and middle-income countries in the Americas have made substantial progressin scaling up clean cooking. Almost 90 percent of the population in the Americas now rely chiefly on clean fuels
and technologies for cooking. Households in urban areas report almost exclusive use, with 97 percent of urbanhouseholds mainly using clean fuels and technologies for cooking (97 percent of the urban population and 74
percent of the rural population). As a region and with some 75 million in mainly 10 countries lacking access toclean cooking, the Americas is on its way to a complete regional transition to clean cooking.
Understanding the factors that have enabled the successful transition of a majority of the population over the
past 30 years can provide valuable lessons for other low- and middle-income countries working toward theelimination of polluting cooking practices.
Affordability of both stoves and recurring fuels costs is one of the greatest barriers for low-income households
considering clean cooking solutions. Households often face hard choices when it comes to spending limited
resources and, in many cases, clean cooking is often not prioritized. However, governments can take steps totackle the affordability barrier. In the case of Latin America, the most common step has been end-user subsidies.
End-user subsidies for cooking stoves and fuels have been used in many Latin American countries since the1970s, with variations in price point and delivery mechanism. Much can be learned from the historical record.
Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador each has a rural population of about 30 percent. All three countries haveprovided substantial subsidies for LPG fuel for cooking. The subsidies cover 60–95 percent of the cost of LPG(Gould and others 2018; OLADE 2013).
In El Salvador, a 65 percent universal LPG subsidy was put in place in 1974; it was replaced in 2011 with a targeted
subsidy of one 25-pound LPG cylinder per month per family, covering almost 70 percent of the population(Calvo-Gonzalez, Cunha, and Trezzi 2015). Access to clean fuels reached 93 percent in 2021, much higher thanneighboring Central American countries without an LPG subsidy: Guatemala, 48 percent; Honduras, 50 percent;Nicaragua, 57 percent; and Mexico, 85 percent.
Largely as a result of subsidy policies, 95 percent of Ecuador’s population uses LPG for cooking; Bolivia’s figure
is 82 percent. In comparison, Peru and Paraguay, neighboring countries with higher GDP per capita and similar
or higher rates of urbanization, stand at 76 percent and 66 percent, respectively.
Implementing the subsidies was not without challenges. Each country faced different implementation issues.
In Bolivia, for example, the lack of infrastructure to maintain a reliable distribution of LPG to remote and poorly
connected areas presented problems. In El Salvador, the 2011 shift of the subsidy from universal to targeted had
an almost immediate impact on fuel-use patterns, with many households reverting back to polluting cooking
stoves and fuels (figure B.2.3.1). In light of this, the government quickly adapted the policy to be more targetedby income group, resulting in an immediate shift back to LPG usage among the poorest populations. Likewise, in
Ecuador, because of the high costs of imported LPG, the government invested in a program to substitute local
renewable electricity for LPG in 2014 (Gould and others 2018). Massive protests made it impossible to remove
the LPG subsidy, however, and most households still cook with LPG.
These countries provide lessons on the use of end-user subsidies to support the transition to clean cooking:•In some countries, the sustained practice of clean cooking is highly dependent on subsidies and very
sensitive to changes in policy and price.

86

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

5%

3%

10%

13%

20%

29%
36%

•

43%

44%
43%

2000

2030

1%

Urbanization is a driver of change, but the urban-rural gap in access to 4%
clean fuels for cooking is also
55%

sensitive to fuel subsidy policies.
5%
•

5%

2021

2010

1%
1%

10%

1%

60%

3%and focused development aid to overcome infrastructure
Low-income
countries may needsustained2%
2%
4%

and resource constraints, particularly in the most remote areas.

Biomass
Charcoal
Coal
Biomass
Charcoal
Coal
Biomass
Charcoal
Coal
Biomass
Charcoal
Coal
Kerosene
Kerosene
Kerosene investment
KeroseneandGas
Gas
Electricity
Gas is complex,
Electricity requiring
Gas
Electricity•
Transitioning
from LPG toelectricity
in infrastructurechangesElectricity

in cooking practices.

Figure B.2.3.1 • Use of firewoodUse
in ofrural
areas of El Salvador by wealthﬁrewood in rural areas of El Salvador by income groups (EHPM, 2014)
Percent of households using ﬁrewood for cooking

100

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2010
Lowest income

2011
Lower income

2012

2013

Middle income

Upper middle income

2014
Highest income

Source: Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM 2014).

Scaling up investment in clean cooking is an investment in social goods. The timing is more critical than ever forpolicy makers and funders to redouble efforts to unlock finances for clean cooking. It is also important to understandlessons learned from past policies, such as those highlighted in the World Bank’s Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable
Development report (ESMAP 2022) and WHO’s Household Energy Policy Repository (WHO 2021c).40

40
The Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) assesses countries’ national policies and regulatory frameworks for sustainable energy
according to a set of standard indicators. These resources can serve as a useful knowledge base to draw valuable lessons and spark discussions onwhat policy mechanisms are most likely to be successful and which might be implemented at scale. WHO’s Clean Household Energy Policy Repositorycompiles national, regional, and local policies on clean household energy that include financial measures (such as taxes, subsides, or voucher programs),
regulatory instruments (such as limits or bans on specific fuels or technologies), trade policies, direct investments, codes and standards, and information
campaigns.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

87PATH FOR PROGRESS FOR SCALING UP CLEAN COOKING: URGENT ACTION REQUIRED FOR
UNIVERSAL ACCESS BY 2030
There are encouraging signs that efforts to scale up clean cooking access are moving forward in some places.
Transitioning to clean cooking is accelerating in certain countries—China, Ghana, Kenya, and India chief among
them—that have made good progress in recent years through increased political support and advocacy, matched byadequate financial commitments and actions on the ground.
While there has been some progress over the past two decades in expanding access to clean fuels and technologies
for cooking, there is an urgent need to further scale up ambition and action to achieve universal access to clean
cooking by 2030. Enhanced innovation in delivery mechanisms paired with large-scale public investment to crowd inprivate investment is needed to lower the cost of clean cooking needed to accelerate progress. Furthermore, clean
cooking needs to remain high on global political agendas. With the upcoming voluntary review of SDG 7 including
clean cooking at the High-Level Political Forum as well as the SDG Summit and Climate Ambition Summit in September
2023, global leaders and governments will have the opportunity to demonstrate their commitments to clean cooking
to achieve various health, climate and other cross-cutting goals.

Outlook
1.9 BILLION PEOPLE WILL STILL LACK CLEAN COOKING IN 2030
Regardless of whether one considers the current rate of progress in energy access, current policies, or pledged
policies, the world is far off pace to achieve the universal target to clean cooking by 2030. Based on current trends,
WHO estimates that 1.9 billion people will still lack access to clean cooking by 2030. The International Energy Agency’s(IEA) Stated Policies Scenario yields similar figures, even after accounting for the positive impacts of policies alreadyin place (IEA 2022b).
Under IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario,41 which assumes that all aspirational targets announced by governments
are met in full and on time, the outlook is less grim but still off-track, with an estimated 0.7 billion people still relying
on traditional stoves and fuels in 2030.
Given current trends, the pledge made at the UN’s 2021 High-level Dialogue on Energy to ensure that an additional
1 billion people would gain access to clean cooking solutions by 2025 will not be reached.42 The number of people
with access to clean cooking will increase by only 510 million from 2021 to 2025. The expected access deficit is largely
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where almost 60 percent of the population is projected to still lack access to clean
cooking in 2030.

41
IEA introduced the Announced Pledges Scenario in 2021. It aims to show to what extent the announced ambitions and targets, including themost recent ones, are on the path to deliver emissions reductions required to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 (IEA 2022b). Compared to the Stated
Policies Scenario, it includes announcements on pledges and targets, regardless of whether these have been anchored in legislation or in Nationally
Determined Contributions.
42
The pledge was made during the High-level Dialogue on Energy in 2021, as part of the Global Roadmap for Accelerated SDG7 Action in Supportof the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (United Nations 2021).

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

COVID-19 AND SOARING ENERGY PRICES THREATEN CLEAN COOKING ACCESS FOR MILLIONSThe IEA estimates that the combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and current soaring energy prices will put basic
electricity out of reach for almost 75 million people (IEA 2022a). The same affordability issues are expected to havean even more dramatic impact on the clean cooking transition, with 100 million people who recently transitioned toclean cooking expected to revert to using traditional biomass due to affordability issues. Between 2019 and 2021,
Eastern Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean were the only regions to sustain progress in access to clean cooking(ESMAP 2022).
The goal of achieving universal access to electricity and clean cooking will require a massive increase in governmental
efforts to regain the momentum. Yet only 39 of the 128 countries currently lacking universal access to clean cooking
have set clean cooking targets, and less than half of those aim to achieve universal access by 2030 (IEA 2022a). The
current policy ambitions are therefore far from the targets of SDG 7. It is necessary to improve implementation andraise the level of ambition in many countries to bridge the gap between the current situation and the SDG 7 targets.

CLEAN COOKING – AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT ON THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO
Clean cooking is a potent way to fight climate change. The unsustainable harvesting of fuelwood and high-levels ofemissions (particularly black carbon from inefficient household energy use) have detrimental effects on the climate,thus jeopardizing the future of humanity and the planet. Climate change is expected to cause approximately 250 000
additional deaths each year from 2030 to 2050 owing to malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea and heat stress alone (WHO2021b).
The pathway to arresting the rise in the world’s average temperature to +1.5 °C therefore requires immediate actions
from the entire energy sector, and clean cooking can play an important role. Accounting for the emissions of the fullenergy lifecycle (i.e. both upstream and end-use emissions), shifting households entirely to LPG could curb shortlived climate pollutants emission almost entirely (Floess and others 2023). But for that to happen, under IEA’s Net
Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (IEA 2022b), the rate of improvement in access to clean cooking will have to risedramatically from an annual increase of 1.7 percentage points between 2015 and 2019, to 2.7 percentage points,
nearly double the current rate of progress. Looking at regional trends is critical, as access rates vary greatly. While lowand middle-income countries in Asia will have to improve their rate by 1.5 times, improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa
will have to increase by a magnitude of 15 times (IEA 2022a).

CREATING A VOICE FOR CLEAN COOKING IN THE COMMUNITY
The benefits of clean cooking need to be better understood. From policy makers to the stove user, understanding
the benefits and advantages of clean cooking is an important element needed to drive a sustained transition to clean
cooking. Various efforts are underway to strengthen and coordinate positive messages about the environmental,
climate, and health benefits of clean cooking to a broad set of stakeholders. For example, in Bangladesh, messages
regarding the health benefits of clean cooking were mainstreamed into cooking TV shows to better reach younger
audiences (Clean Cooking Alliance 2023). Similar efforts are being used in Ghana to integrate the health andenvironmental impacts of traditional and clean cooking into the school curriculum. Enhanced messaging via social
media and local advertising is used in Kenya and Nepal, among other places, to broaden the uptake of clean cooking
solutions. Good communication about the benefits of clean cooking is an essential complement to any policy
or program.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

89COSTING THE CLEAN COOKING TRANSITION
According to the World Bank, the health costs alone from lack of clean cooking are estimated at USD 1.4 trillion peryear (ESMAP 2020). Women are particularly affected, and their loss of productivity amounts to USD 0.8 trillion every
year. When adding environmental costs, the price tag comes to USD 2.4 trillion a year, far greater than the cost oftransitioning to universal modern energy cooking services (USD 148–156 billion annually over the next 10 years, fora total of USD 1.5 trillion). Greater efforts should be made to calculate with precision the negative externalities offailing to universalize access to clean cooking in terms of productive time lost, missed opportunities for schooling, andenvironmental damage. Given the direct effect of polluting fuels and technologies on climate change funding could
be leveraged to fill at least part of the gap (UN DESA 2018).

NEED FOR ACTION FOR HEALTHIER LIVES AND ENVIRONMENT
The benefits of clean cooking are far too high to delay any further. Billions of the world’s people are sufferingfrom the adverse health, environmental, and economic effects of polluting cooking practices. The humanity faces
unprecedented challenges with triple planetary-crisis of pollution including household air pollution, biodiversity loss
and climate change. Clean cooking has been proving an effective entry-point to tackle and help mitigate the impacts,from economic losses to deterioration of life on our planet. The cost will continue to mount unless political and financial
commitments rise to meet the challenge. The moment to act is now.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Methodological Notes
DATA SOURCES
The WHO Household Energy Database contains nationally representative household survey data (WHO 2018).
Regularly updated, it relies on several sources (table 2.1) and serves as the basis for all modelling efforts in thisreport. The database contains more than 1,500 surveys conducted in 171 countries (including high-income countries)
between 1960 and 2022. A quarter of the surveys cover the years 2013 to 2018; 250 new surveys cover 2016 to 2022.
Modelled estimates are provided only if there is underlying survey data on cooking fuels, so there are no estimates for
Lebanon, Libya and Bulgaria.
Population data are from United Nations (2018).

Table 2.1 • Overview of data sources for clean fuels and technology

ENTITYNUMBER OF
COUNTRIESDISTRIBUTION OFDATA SOURCES (INPERCENT)

CensusNational statistical agencies

108

18.4

What is the main sourceof cooking fuel in yourhousehold?

Demographic and Health Survey(DHS)

Funded by USAID;
implemented by ICF
International

81

17.2

What type of fuel does yourhousehold mainly use forcooking?

Living Standards Measurement
Survey (LSMS), income
expenditure surveys, and othernational surveys

National statistical agencies,
supported by the World
Bank

26

3.00

Which is the main source ofenergy for cooking?

Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys(MICS)

UNICEF80

10.90

What type of fuel does yourhousehold mainly use forcooking?

Study on Global AGEing and Adult
Health (SAGE)

WHO

6

0.40

NA

World Health Survey

WHO

50

3.80

NA

National surveys

107

35.80

NA

Other

79

10.30

NA

NAME

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

QUESTION

91

MODELAs household surveys are conducted irregularly and reported heterogeneously, the WHO Global Household Energy
Model (developed in collaboration with the University of Glasgow) is used to estimate trends in household use of six
fuel types:•

unprocessed biomass (e.g., wood)•

charcoal

•

coal

•

kerosene•gaseous fuels (e.g., LPG)•

electricity

Trends in the proportion of the population using each fuel type are estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical model,
with urban and rural disaggregation, drawing on country survey data. Smooth time functions were the only covariate.
Estimates for total polluting fuel use (unprocessed biomass, charcoal, coal, and kerosene) and total clean fuel use(gaseous fuels, electricity, and an aggregation of other clean fuels, such as alcohol) are produced by aggregating
estimates of relevant fuel types. Estimates produced by the model automatically respect the constraint that the total
fuel use equals 100 percent.
GHEM is implemented using the R programming language and the NIMBLE software package for Bayesian modellingwith Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Summaries can be obtained to provide both point estimates (e.g., means)
and measures of uncertainty (e.g., 95 percent credible and 95 percent prediction intervals). The GHEM is applied
to the WHO household energy database to produce a comprehensive set of estimates, together with associatedmeasures of uncertainty, of the use of four specific polluting fuels and two specific clean fuels for cooking, by country,
for each year from 1990 to 2019. Further details on the modeling methodology and validation can be found in Stonerand others (2020), and more detailed analysis of individual fuel use can be found in Stoner and others (2021).
Only surveys with less than 15 percent of the population reporting “missing”, “no cooking,” and “other fuels” were
included in the analysis. Surveys were also discarded if the sum of all mutually exclusive categories reported was notwithin 98–102 percent. Fuel use values were uniformly scaled (divided) by the sum of all mutually exclusive categories,
excluding “missing,” “no cooking,” and “other fuels.” Countries classified by the World Bank as high-income (58countries) in the 2021 fiscal year were assumed to have transitioned to clean household energy. They are therefore
reported as having >95 percent access to clean fuel and technologies; no fuel-specific estimates were reported forhigh-income countries. In addition, no estimates were reported for low- and middle-income countries without data
suitable for modeling (Bulgaria, Lebanon, and Libya). Modeled specific-fuel estimates were reported for 130 lowand middle-income countries plus 3 countries with no World Bank income classification (Venezuela, Niue and Cook
Islands); estimates of overall clean fuel use were reported for 191 countries.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

UNCERTAINTY INTERVALS
Many of the point estimates we provide here are accompanied by 95 percent uncertainty intervals, which imply a
95 percent chance that the true value lies within the given range. Small annual changes in the point estimate may
be statistical noise arising from either the modeling process or survey variability and may therefore not reflect areal variation in th e numbers relying on different fuels between years. The uncertainty intervals should therefore beconsidered when assessing changes in the access rate, or in the use of specific fuels, between years.
Moreover, for some countries a lack of recent survey data (e.g., in the last 10 years) naturally leads to very wide
uncertainty intervals associated with estimates for 2021 and preceding years. For countries with very wide uncertainty
intervals, point estimates should be treated with some caution.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL AGGREGATIONSPopulation data from the United Nations Population Division (United Nations 2018) were used to derive the populationweighted regional and global aggregates. Low- and middle-income countries without data were excluded from all
aggregate calculations; high-income countries were excluded from aggregate calculation for specific fuels.
The aggregation methods used ensure that uncertainty in the percentage of people and absolute number of peopleusing different fuels for cooking in individual countries propagate into the uncertainty intervals accompanying global
and regional estimates.

ANNUALIZED GROWTH RATESThe annualized increase in the access rate is calculated as the difference between the access rate in year 2 and that inyear 1, divided by the number of years to annualize the value:(Access Rate Year 2–Access Rate Year 1) / (Year 2–Year 1)
This approach takes population growth into account by working with the final national access rate.

PROJECTIONS
Projected access rates, access deficits, and fuel use can be estimated using the GHEM, where uncertainty increases thefurther into the future estimates are calculated, reflecting how country trends may shift based on how unsettled they
were during the data period.
Projections in this chapter are hypothetical scenarios in which no new policies or interventions (positive or otherwise)
take place. As such, they are useful as baseline scenarios for comparing the effect of interventions. The scenarios arecalculated by extrapolating current trends into the future.
The estimated year each country will achieve 95 percent access to clean fuels and technologies is taken from theseprojections.

Chapter 2 • Access to Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking

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IEA (International Energy Agency). 2022a. World Energy Outlook 2022. Paris: International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022.
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RENEWABLES

Photo: © Unsplash by Karsten Wurth

CHAPTER 3

Main Messages•

Global trend. In 2020, renewable energy consumption, including traditional uses of biomass, continued to
grow at 2.6 percent year-on-year globally, despite a turbulent year due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This growth
was driven largely by increases in renewable power generation, notably due to record additions of solar PV andwind capacity. Reduced energy consumption during the Covid-19 pandemic made 2020 a statistical anomaly,causing the share of renewables in total final energy consumption (TFEC), the central metric for SDG7.2, toincrease by an unprecedented 1.4 percentage points to 19.1 percent.43 However, this notable increase is notexpected to repeat itself in 2021, as TFEC is anticipated to rebound close to pre-pandemic levels with therecovery of economic activity and restrictions of movements being lifted in most countries. When looking only
at modern uses of renewables, their share of TFEC stood at 12.5 percent in 2020, only 3.8 percentage points
more than a decade earlier, as the increase in TFEC exceeded those in modern uses of renewable energy
consumption, underscoring the importance of energy efficiency (SDG7.3) and energy conservation actions.

•Target for 2030. While no quantitative milestone has been set for SDG target 7.2 which calls for “increasing
substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix”, custodian agencies indicate that current
trends are neither in line with the target’s ambition nor with internationally agreed-upon climate objectives. To
meet these objectives, the share of modern uses of renewables in TFEC would need to almost triple to 33-38
percent by 2030 depending on different pathway assumptions. Reaching these levels requires sustaining theaccelerated renewables deployment seen in the electricity generation sector and considerably stepping up theshare of renewables in heating and transport, alongside substantial progress in energy conservation.

•

Electricity. Renewable electricity use grew more than 7 percent year-on-year in 2020, with the share of
renewables in global electricity consumption increasing from 26.3 percent in 2019 to 28.2 percent. This is
the largest annual progress recorded over the past three decades. Greater reliance on renewable electricity
combined with the stabilization of global electricity demand in 2020 allowed nonrenewable electricity
consumption to drop 2.8 percent year-on-year. Hydropower remains by far the largest source of renewableelectricity globally, followed by wind and solar photovoltaic (PV). Yet the deployment of both wind and solar PV
is accelerating; they recorded the largest absolute annual growth in 2020, and together represent two-thirds ofthe global increase in renewable electricity consumption observed since 2015.

•

Heat. Renewable energy consumed for heating increased 0.9 percent to 42 exajoules (EJ) in 2020. Unfortunately,
traditional uses of biomass represented almost 60 percent of this growth increasing the scale of negative
health, social and environmental impacts of the lack of access to clean cooking. This was mainly caused by the
Covid-19 pandemic that disrupted clean cooking fuel deliveries and imposed working restrictions reducing
consumer ability to afford modern fuels, pushing many back to the traditional uses of biomass. The traditional

43
This calculation for the heat sector does not include renewable electricity used for heating or ambient heat harnessed by heat pumps. This
exclusion reflects limited data availability at a global scale and the difficulty of quantifying the portion of electricity consumption devoted to heating.

99

use of biomass still accounted for nearly 14 percent (24 EJ) of global heating needs in 2020. In 2020, the shareof modern uses of renewables in the global energy consumed for heating reached just 10.4 percent, only 1.2
percentage points higher than in 2015. The most-energy-intensive industries, such as steel, cement, chemicals,
and aluminum, still rely heavily on fossil fuels for high-temperature heat. Processes based on renewable-derived
alternatives like hydrogen are being explored. Yet the penetration of renewable energy remains challenging inthese energy-intensive sectors, and it is therefore crucial to reduce the material intensity of industry, notably
construction, to achieve a greater share of renewables in heat.
•Transport. The transport sector, affected as it was by policy responses to the pandemic, saw a 14 percent(-16.6 EJ) decline in global final energy consumption in 2020. Biofuel for transport declined in lockstep with oil
consumption, leading to the largest reduction amongst renewable energy sources between 2020 and 2019, at
an estimated 4 percent (-0.16 EJ). This was the first reduction in annual production in two decades. Biofuels—
primarily crop-based ethanol and biodiesel—still supplied 90 percent of renewable energy used for transport. The
remainder was mostly from renewable electricity, with its share in the TFEC for transport increasing to 0.4 percent(0.41 EJ) owing to rising sales of electric vehicles and a larger share of renewables in electricity used for transport.
This brings the total share of renewable energy to 4 percent (up from 3.6 percent in 2019) for this sector, only 0.9
percentage point higher than in 2015.

•

Regional highlights. In 2020, almost half of the global year-on-year increase in modern uses of renewable energy
consumption was in Eastern Asia—led by China—where wind, hydropower, and solar PV dominated growth. Europe
accounted for more than one-quarter of this increase in modern uses of renewable energy consumption, owing
to favorable conditions for hydropower and the growth of wind and solar PV capacity. The share of renewables in
TFEC increased in all regions in 2020, and grew the fastest in Latin America and Europe, supported in both cases
by significant declines in TFEC. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the largest share of renewables in its energy
supply at 71 percent, due to the predominance of traditional uses of biomass for heating and cooking in thisregion. Meanwhile, Latin America and the Caribbean has the largest share of modern uses of renewables in TFEC
at 29%, owing to hydropower generation and the consumption of bioenergy in industrial processes and biofuels
for transport in this region.

•

Top 20 energy-consuming countries. Among the top 20 energy-consuming countries, Brazil and Canada
continued to have the largest shares of modern uses of renewables in 2020, owing to their heavy reliance onhydropower for electricity and bioenergy for heat and transport. Except Türkiye, all countries saw an increase in
the share of modern uses of renewables in their TFEC in 2020, with Indonesia achieving the largest year-on-year
growth, followed by Brazil and the United Kingdom. Between 2010 and 2020, this share had declined in 3 of the
20 countries (Nigeria, Pakistan, and Türkiye), despite growing consumption of modern uses of renewable energy
in all of them. In the same period, the consumption of nonrenewable energy increased in 11 of these countries.
This highlights the importance of containing overall energy consumption and expediting the shift away from fossil
fuels to achieve greater shares of renewables in the energy mix.

•

Installed renewable energy-generating capacity in developing countries.44 A record 268 watts per capita
of renewable capacity were installed in 2021, representing a year-on-year growth rate of 9.8 percent. Despite
this promising trend, more needs to be done toward indicator, 7.B.1, to “expand infrastructure and upgrade
technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular
least developed countries, small island developing states and landlocked developing countries, in accordancewith their respective programmes of support.” This is especially crucial because the positive global and regional
trends mask the reality that countries in the greatest need of support are being left behind, even among developing
nations. Only four developing countries have more than 1,000 watts per capita, and they are the same as last

44

100

See chapter 7 for a list of the developing countries considered under this indicator.

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

year: Bhutan, Paraguay, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [PDR], and Uruguay. While renewables capacity percapita registered high growth in the developing world (at a compound annual growth rate [CAGR] of 9.6 percent
over 2016–21), growth was lower for small island developing states (8.5 percent), least-developed countries (5.5
percent), and landlocked developing countries (3.8 percent). This trend underscores the urgent need for greater
policy support and investment to ensure that all developing countries have the capabilities to contribute to global
climate change mitigation efforts and meet SDG 7.
•

Recent trends. Economic recovery packages in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the global energy
crisis sparked by the war in the Ukraine led many countries to strengthen policy support for renewables in 2022.
In addition, high fossil fuel prices worldwide have made solar PV and wind generation more competitive against
other fuels, despite inflation, rising interest rates and component shortages contributing to renewable project
prices also being on the rise. In 2022, 295 GW renewable generation capacity was added globally, with renewables
accounting for 83% of all new power capacity added. Getting renewable deployment on track to reach SDG
indicators 7.2.1 and 7.B.1, as well as achieve the ambitions of the Paris Agreement, will require ambitious targets,stronger and sustained policy support for renewables and energy conservation in all sectors, greater mobilizationof public and private capital, as outlined in chapters 5 and 6, and holistic and concerted policy strategies todiversify and strengthen renewable technology supply chains which remain highly concentrated in just a small
number of countries.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

101

Are We on Track?
Globally, the share of renewable sources in TFEC remained relatively steady over the past three decades, with aslow upward trend in recent years (+3 percentage points over the past 10 years), owing mostly to the accelerated
deployment of renewable electricity technologies.
In 2020, governments worldwide imposed restrictions on most social and economic activities to slow the spread of
the pandemic. This curtailed transport, industrial production, and services, and prompted a significant energy demand
shock, with global TFEC dropping 4.7 percent year-on-year. At the same time, global renewable energy consumption,
including traditional uses of biomass,45 grew 2.6 percent from the year before to 68.6 EJ. This increased renewables’
share to 19.1 percent of TFEC in 2020, or 1.4 percentage points higher than the previous year (figure 3.1).46

Traditional use of biomass
Solar PV

Modern bioenergy
Other renewables

Hydropower% of renewables

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

0%

2005

0

2004

3%

2003

10

2002

6%

2001

20

2000

9%

1999

30

1998

12%

1997

40

1996

15%

1995

50

1994

18%

1993

60

1992

21%

1991

70

1990

Exajoules

Figure 3.1 • Renewable energy consumption and share in TFEC by technology, 1990–2020

Wind% of modern renewables

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic; TFEC = total final energy consumption.

45
The term “traditional uses of biomass” refers to the use of local solid biofuels (wood, charcoal, agricultural residues, and animal dung), which
are burned using basic methods, such as traditional open cookstoves and fireplaces. The low conversion efficiency of such methods can result inadverseused
3.0 environmental effects, as well as indoor pollution causing health hazards. The energy consumed in such practices, which are still widely30%
in households in parts of the developing world, is difficult to estimate due to their informal and noncommercial nature. For purposes of this report,“traditional
uses of biomass” refer to the residential consumption of primary solid biofuels and charcoal in non-OECD countries. Although biomass
2.5
25% oflow conversion efficiency is used in OECD countries as well—for example, in fireplaces burning split logs—such use is not covered by the phrase. Modern
uses 2.0
of bioenergy—along with solar PV, solar thermal, geothermal, wind, hydropower, and tidal energy—is one of the “modern uses of renewable”
20%sources analyzed in this report.

Exajoules

15%
46 1.5The data in this report reflect revisions from last year’s edition. Traditional uses of biomass for heat were revised upward by 0.13 EJ (+0.5 percent)globally for 2019, with the majority of the change accounted for by Vietnam (+0.10 EJ, +597 percent) and Indonesia (+0.05EJ, +8 percent), and to a
10%EJ,
lesser1.0
extent by Uganda (-0.06 EJ, -11 percent). Global modern uses of biomass were revised upward by 0.12 EJ (+0.6 percent), with Uganda (+0.17+102 percent) and Poland (+0.12 EJ, +40 percent) accounting for the largest upward revision and South Africa (-0.06 EJ, -53 percent) and the United
0.5 (-0.05 EJ, -16 percent) seeing the largest downward changes. Global solar thermal heat consumption was also revised slightly upward (+0.013
5%Kingdom
EJ, +0.9 percent for the year 2019), primarily due to changes in China. The regional groupings discussed in this section follow the United Nations’ M49
0.0 classification (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/).
0%regional
-0.5
-1.0

102

2010

2011
Hydropower

2012

2013

Traditional biomass

2014

2015

Modern bioenergy

Share of traditional use of biomass (right axis)

2016

2017

2018

2019

Wind

Solar PV

Other renewables

2020

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Share of modern renewables (right axis)

Traditional use of biomass
Solar PV

Modern bioenergy
Other renewables

Hydropower% of renewables

Wind% of modern renewables

From 2019 to 2020, wind, solar PV, and hydropower made the largest contributions to the growth of renewable energyuse, followed by traditional uses of biomass and geothermal energy (figure 3.2).

Exajoules

Figure 3.2 • Increase in renewable energy consumption by technology and share of modern uses of renewable energy and traditional uses of biomass in
TFEC, 2010–20
3.0

30%

2.5

25%

2.0

20%

1.5

15%

1.0

10%

0.5

5%

0.0

0%

-0.5
-1.0

2010

2011
Hydropower

2012

2013

Traditional biomass

2014

2015

Modern bioenergy

Share of traditional use of biomass (right axis)

2016

2017

2018

2019

Wind

Solar PV

Other renewables

2020

Share of modern renewables (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
Note: In 2020, modern uses of bioenergy consumption remained stable as declining consumption in the residential and transport sectors offset
increasing consumption in the electricity and industry sectors.
PV = photovoltaic.

Since 1990, global renewable energy consumption grew almost 80 percent, but this increase corresponds only to aquarter of the increase in TFEC over the same period. The share of renewable energy in TFEC has remained relatively
steady as a result (figure 3.3). Two trends have coexisted during the past decade and a half: the share of modern
uses of renewables—that is, excluding traditional uses of biomass—in TFEC increased from 8.7 percent in 2010 to 12.5
percent in 2020, with the strongest growth in the power sector, whereas traditional uses of biomass declined 7 percent
from their highest point in 2006, although stabilizing since 2016. Achieving SDG 7 and providing access to affordable,
reliable, and sustainable energy for all requires considerable and sustained acceleration in the uptake of modern usesof renewables, in the transition to more efficient uses of biomass and substantial progress in energy conservation.

Figure 3.3 • Impact of increase in TFEC on the growth of renewables’ share in TFEC globally, 1990–2020
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Share of rrenewables in TFEC in 1990 Growth in renewable energy consumption

Growth in TFEC

Share of renewables in TFEC in 2020

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
TFEC = total final energy consumption.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

103

Over the past decade, modern uses of bioenergy use saw the largest absolute increase, accounting for almost onethird of the increase in modern uses of renewable energy consumption, and followed by hydropower, wind, and solar
PV. In that period, solar PV and wind grew the fastest, with average annual growth rates of 39 percent and 17 percent,respectively.
Overall, bioenergy, including traditional use of biomass, remained the largest renewable source of energy. It accounted
for 13 percent of global final energy consumption and represented two-thirds of renewables’ portion in 2020, followedby hydropower, wind, and solar PV.
In developing countries, the share of installed renewable energy–generating capacity in electricity has continued to
grow over the past 10 years. It grew at an increasing CAGR of 8.8 percent in 2010–15 to 9.6 percent between 2015
and 2020, with growth being consistent, at 9.8 percent, in 2021 (as shown in figure 3.4). This growth is mainly driven
by the increasing affordability of solar and wind energy, which have become less expensive than the cheapest new
fossil fuel alternative (IRENA 2022a).

Figure 3.4 • Installed renewable energy–generating capacity in developing countries, 2000–21; and CAGR for selected periods
9.8%
300

268

CAGR

250

244

9.6%

Watts per capita

200

8.8%

150
100

4.6%

154

101

64

50
0

2000

2002

2004

Renewable hydropower

2006

2008

Solar energy

2010

Wind energy

2012

2014

Bioenergy

2016

2018

Geothermal energy

2020
Marine energy

Hydropower

104

Wind

Solar PV

Modern bioenergy

Other renewables

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

0%

2003

0

2002

5%

2001

5

2000

10%

1999

10

1998

15%

1997

15

1996

20%

1995

20

1994

25%

1993

25

1992

30%

1991

30

1990

Exajoules

Sources: International Renewable Energy Agency.
CAGR = compound annual growth rate.

Share of renewables (right axis)
Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Looking Beyond the Main Indicators
Ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all implies a substantial increase in theshare of renewable energy in all three main end-use categories: electricity, transport, and heat, which accounted,
respectively, for 22 percent, 29 percent, and 49 percent of TFEC in 2020 (figure 3.5).
Electricity has had the largest and most dynamic share of renewables in final consumption, increasing from 26.2
percent in 2019 to 28.3 percent in 2020. Renewable electricity accounts for one-third of global renewable energy
35%
consumption(half of modern uses of renewable energy consumption) and almost nine-tenths of its year-on-yearincrease.
The rapid increase in renewables’ share in the electricity sector is partly driven by continuous addition of new
30%

capacity,
most of it wind and solar PV. In 2020, this trend was also supported by a 0.2 percent decline in final electricity
25%
consumption.
20%

In15%
the heat sector, renewable sources accounted for 24 percent of the energy consumed. More than half of that

corresponds to traditional uses of biomass, which increased 1 percent in 2020. Excluding traditional uses of biomass,
10%

the consumption of modern uses of renewables for heat increased 0.9 percent year-on-year, whereas global heat5%

demand saw a modest decrease (-0.6 percent year-on-year), owing to reduced economic activity. This allowed0%
nonrenewableenergy used for heat to decline by 1 percent in 2020.
Share of rrenewables in TFEC in 1990 Growth in renewable energy consumption

Growth in TFEC

Share of renewables in TFEC in 2020

Including renewable electricity use, the transport sector represents only 9 percent of global modern uses of renewableenergy consumption. It is the end-use sector with the lowest renewable energy penetration, at only 4 percent of final
energy consumption in 2020. Biofuels supply the large majority (90 percent) of renewable energy consumption intransport, whereas renewable electricity use is slowly emerging, owing to the uptake of electric rail transport andelectric vehicles.

Figure 3.5 • Renewable energy consumption and share by end use, 1990–2020
30%
Share of renewable energy by end use

70
60
50

Heat, traditional use of biomass
Heat, industry
Transport

2020

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

20
10
0

1992

40
30

1990

Exajoules

90
80

Heat, buildings and other (modern)Electricity (excl. for transport)

25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020

100

Share of TUoB in heat
Share of renewables in heat
Share of renewables in transport
Share of renewables in electricity

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
Note: Electricity used for transport is included under transport.
TUoB = traditional use of biomass.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

105

Strong disparities exist across regions. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest share of renewable sources in its energy
supply, with traditional uses of biomass representing more than 60 percent of the total energy consumed in this region(figure 3.6). Meanwhile, Latin America and the Caribbean has the largest share of modern uses of renewables in TFEC
(29 percent of TFEC in 2020), owing to the significant use of hydropower in electricity generation and the consumptionof bioenergy for industrial processes (especially in the sugar and ethanol industry) and biofuels for transport.

Exajoules

Figure 3.6 • Renewable energy consumption and share in TFEC by region, 1990 and 2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1990

2020

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

1990

2020

Sub-SaharanAfrica1990

2020

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

1990

2020

Europe1990

2020

Northern
America

1990

2020

Latin America andthe Caribbean

Tide
Solar thermalWind
Traditional use of biomass% of renewables (incl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC

1990

2020

Western Asia

1990

2020

Northern Africa

1990

2020

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Oceania

Geothermal
Solar PV
Modern bioenergy
Hydropower% of modern renewables (excl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
2015–20
PV = photovoltaic; TFEC = total final energy consumption.

6,000

6.0

In 2020,
5,000 almost half of the global year-on-year increase in modern uses of renewable energy consumption
5.0 wasPercentage point change

accounted
for by Eastern Asia, due primarily to the deployment of wind, hydropower, and solar PV, as well4.0as, to a
4,000
Exajoules

lower
extent, geothermal (figure 3.7). Europe accounted for more than one-quarter of this year-on-year growth,
3,000
3.0owing

to favorable
conditions for hydropower and the expansion of wind and solar PV capacity. The share of renewables
in
2,000
2.0
TFEC1,000
grew the fastest in Latin America and Europe (respectively +2.8 and +1.5 percentage points in 2020), supported
1.0

0.0 afterin both0 cases by significant declines in TFEC (-7.7 percent and -5.5 percent, respectively—the largest declines-1,000 America). Consumption of modern uses of bioenergy declined 8 percent year-on-year in Northern-1.0
Northern
America-2.0 in the(due-2,000
in part to reduced activity, and, hence consumption, in the pulp and paper industry, and lower demand
Eastern Asia andEuropeCentral Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanWestern Asia

Northern

Northern

Oceania

residentialSouth-eastern
sector amid
inAsia2019–20).
While traditional
uses of biomass
and the Caribbean
AfricaAmericacontinued
Africato decline in Eastern andAsia a mild winterSouthern
South-eastern Asia, this trend was offset by increasing consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa, in part driven by population
growth.

5.0

600

3.0

4.0

Exajoules

800

2.0

400

1.0

200

0.0

0

-1.0

-200
-400

Eastern Asia and Europe
South-eastern Asia
Tide
Solar PV

106

Central Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanAfricaSouthern Asia and the Caribbean

Geothermal
Wind

Solar thermal
Modern bioenergy

Western
Asia

Traditional biomass

Northern
America

Change in the share of modern
renewables in TFEC (right axis)

Northern
AfricaOceania-2.0

Percentage point change

2020 year-on-year change

1,000

Hydropower
Change in the share of renewables(incl. TUoB) in TFEC (right axis)

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

South-eastern Asia

AfricaSouthern Asia

Americathe Caribbean

Tide
Solar thermalWind
Traditional use of biomass% of renewables (incl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC

Geothermal
Solar PV
Modern bioenergy
Hydropower% of modern renewables (excl. traditional use of biomass) in TFEC

Figure 3.7 • Change in renewable energy consumption and the share of renewables in TFEC by region, 2015–20; and year-on-year change, 2020

6.0

5,000

5.0

4,000

4.0

3,000

3.0

2,000

2.0

1,000

1.0

0

0.0

-1,000-1.0-2,000Eastern Asia and Europe
South-eastern Asia

Central Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanSouthern Asia and the Caribbean Africa

Western Asia

Northern
America

Northern
AfricaOceania

Percentage point change

Exajoules

2015–20
6,000

-2.0

1,000

5.0

600

3.0

4.0

Exajoules

800

2.0

400

1.0

200

0.0

0

-1.0

-200
-400

Eastern Asia and Europe
South-eastern Asia
Tide
Solar PV

Central Asia and Latin America Sub-SaharanAfricaSouthern Asia and the Caribbean

Geothermal
Wind

Solar thermal
Modern bioenergy

Western
Asia

Traditional biomass

Northern
America

Change in the share of modern
renewables in TFEC (right axis)

Northern
AfricaOceania-2.0

Percentage point change

2020 year-on-year change

Hydropower
Change in the share of renewables(incl. TUoB) in TFEC (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic; TFEC = total final energy consumption; TUoB = traditional use of biomass.

The share of renewable sources in national energy consumption varies widely depending on resource availability,
policy support, and the total energy demand due to consumption patterns and energy efficiency performance. Amongthe top 20 energy-consuming countries, Brazil and Canada still had the largest shares of modern uses of renewables
in 2020 (respectively 46 percent and 24 percent of TFEC), owing to heavy reliance on hydro for electricity, biofuels fortransport, and biomass for heating—especially in industry (figure 3.8). China alone accounted for more than one-fifth of
the global modern uses of renewable energy consumption, yet this represented just 11 percent of its TFEC.
Between 2010 and 2020, the share of modern uses of renewables in TFEC grew the fastest in the United Kingdom
and Germany, due to a decline in energy demand (in part due to the impact of the COVID-19 crisis) combined withthe development of wind, bioenergy, and solar PV. They were followed by Indonesia, which saw rapid deployment of
biofuels, and China, which saw large hydropower developments and the growth of solar PV, geothermal, and solar
thermal.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

107

Figure 3.8 • Renewable energy consumption, 2020; and share of modern uses of renewables in TFEC, 2010 and 2020, for the top 20 energy-consuming
countries

Solar PV
Hydro
Modern bioenergy
Wind
Traditional biomass% of modern renewables in TFEC 2020 (right axis)

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Korea

RussiaNigeria

PakistanJapan

Australia

0%

China

0

US

10%
Mexico2Indonesia

20%

UK

4

Türkiye30%

France

6

India

40%

Germany

8

Italy

50%

Canada10

Brazil60%

Exajoules

12

Tide

Geothermal

Solar thermal% of modern renewables in TFEC 2010 (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic; TFEC = total final energy consumption.

In 2020, most countries saw a declining energy demand resulting from disruption of social and economic activities
due to COVID-19 policy responses. Eighteen of the top 20 energy consumers (except China and Türkiye) recorded alower TFEC in 2020 than in 2019 (figure 3.9).
330%
Indonesia
recorded the largest year-on-year growth in the share of modern uses of renewables (+3.3 percentage

2 in 2020, followed by Brazil (+2.4 percentage points), and the United Kingdom (+2.1 percentage points).
20%
points)Exajoules

10%
This 1growth in Indonesia resulted from greater bioenergy consumption in transport and industry combined with
a
0

0%

-1

-10%

-2

-20%

-3

-30%

7 percent year-on-year decline in TFEC, whereas Brazil’s achievement came mostly from increased bioenergy use inindustry. Growth in the United Kingdom resulted mostly from the deployment of wind power, while TFEC was down
more than 8 percent year-on-year.

-4 20 energy-consuming countries (except Türkiye) had increased shares of modern uses of renewables in-40%
All toptheir
Türkiye

China

Pakistan

Iran

Korea

Australia

RussiaGermanyJapan

BrazilSaudi Arabia

India

USA

Nigeria

Indonesia

CanadaFranceUK

Italy

Mexico-50%
TFEC-5 in 2020. Between 2010 and 2020, this share declined in 3 of the 20 countries (Nigeria, Pakistan, and Türkiye)

despite growing consumption of modern uses of renewable energy in all of them. In the same period, the consumptionof nonrenewable energy increased in 11 of them. This highlights the importance of containing the overall energy
47
in modernrenewableenergyefficiency
consumtion and sufficiency,Change
use of biomass
consumptionChange
throughbothenergyandin traditional
expediting
the move away from fossil fuels to

Change in non renewable energy consumption
Y-o-y growth in non renewable energy consumtion (right axis)

achieve greater shares of renewables in the energy mix.

Y-o-y growth in modern renewable energy consumption (right axis)

47
Energy sufficiency corresponds to the actions of tailoring and scaling energy-related infrastructure, technology choices, social organizations,
lifestyles, and behaviors to fundamental needs, while selectively avoiding nonessential energy-intensive services and consumptions, in order to allow
affordable access to energy for everyone’s needs and fair access to energy wants, while keeping the impacts of energy use within environmental
limits. Sufficiency is meant not only as reducing consumption (conservation) but also the operating principle of limiting damage while also supporting
human and ecological well-being (Darby and Fawcett 2018; Marignac 2019). Energy efficiency and sufficiency are two complementary dimensions ofenergy conservation. While energy efficiency actions aim at reducing the energy consumption–energy service demand ratio, energy sufficiency aims at
containing energy services demand through frugality and alternative choices of satisfiers to meet human needs.

108

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Exajoules

Figure 3.9 • Annual change in renewable and nonrenewable energy consumption in the top 20 energy-consuming countries, 2020
3

30%

2

20%

1

10%

0

0%

-1

-10%

-2

-20%

-3

-30%

-4

-40%

9.6%

-50%

Türkiye

China

Pakistan

Iran

Korea

Australia

RussiaGermanyJapan

BrazilSaudi Arabia

India

USA

Nigeria

Indonesia

FranceChange in modern renewable energy consumtion
Change in non renewable energy consumption
Y-o-y growth in non renewable energy consumtion (right axis)

200
Watts per capita

CAGR

Canada

250

Italy

300

UK

9.8%
Mexico

-5

268

244

Change in traditional use of biomass
Y-o-y growth in modern renewable energy consumption (right axis)

8.8%

150

154

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
4.6%
Y-o-y = year-on-year.
101

100

64

ELECTRICITY
50
Electricity0 accounted for 22 percent of TFEC globally in 2020 and is the fastest-growing end use. Electricity consumption
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

doubled over the past 23 years, increasing 27 percent since 2010.48 Yet, global annual electricity consumption
Renewable hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

Bioenergy

Geothermal energy

Marine energy

remained steady at 80 EJ in 2020. Global renewable electricity consumption increased more than 7 percent (+1.5
EJ) year-on-year in 2020, whereas nonrenewable electricity consumption declined 2.8 percent (-1.6 EJ). The share of
renewables in electricity generation consequently increased by 1.9 percentage points to 28.2 percent in 2020—thelargest annual growth and the largest share among all end uses (figure 3.10).

Hydropower

Wind

Solar PV

Modern bioenergy

Other renewables

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

0%

2003

0

2002

5%

2001

5

2000

10%

1999

10

1998

15%

1997

15

1996

20%

1995

20

1994

25%

1993

25

1992

30%

1991

30

1990

Exajoules

Figure 3.10 • Global renewable electricity consumption by technology, 1990–2020

Share of renewables (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic.

48
Among the largest factors driving this trend is the rapidly growing use of electricity for space cooling, with air conditioners and electric coolingfans accounting for about 10 percent of the global electricity consumption in 2018 (IEA 2018).

Chapter 3 • Renewables

109

Wind, solar PV, and hydropower accounted for, respectively, 36 percent, 29 percent, and 28 percent of the annual
increase in renewable power generation in 2020. The majority of the remaining growth was accounted for bybioenergy. Hydropower remained the largest renewable source of electricity globally and for each region, accountingfor 59 percent of renewable power generation and 17 percent of total electricity generation.
Latin America and the Caribbean had the largest share of renewable sources in power generation, with hydropoweralone representing 45 percent of the regional electricity generation in 2020. That year, renewables’ share of electricity
generation grew the fastest in Europe, increasing by more than 4 percentage points year-on-year to account for nearly
36 percent of the total generation. This was mostly driven by favorable hydrological conditions for hydropower, rapid
growth of new wind and, to a lesser extent, solar PV capacity, as well as a 3 percent decline in annual electricity
demand. Thanks to rapidly declining costs and policy support, wind and solar PV together accounted for more than
60 percent of the increase in renewable electricity consumption over the past decade globally. This share exceeds 80
percent in Europe, Northern America, and Oceania (figure 3.11). However, soaring prices of energy and materials andshortages of critical minerals, semiconductors and other components are posing potential roadblocks to the scale up
of renewable electricity development in the future (Box 3.1).

10%

0

0%

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern
Asia

EuropeHydropower

Northern
America

Modern bioenergy

Latin America Central Asia andand theSouthern Asia
Caribbean
Wind

Solar PV

Western Asia

Sub-SaharanAfricaOther renewables

Oceania

2020

1
2010

20%

2020

2

2010

30%

2020

3

2010

40%

2020

4

2010

50%

2020

5

2010

60%

2020

6

2010

70%

2020

7

2010

80%

2020

8

2010

90%

2020

9

2010

Exajoules

Figure 3.11 • Renewable electricity consumption and share of renewables in electricity by region, 2010 and 2020

Northern Africa

Share of renewables in electricity (right axis)

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Korea

0%

Indonesia

0

US

10%
Japan

20%

1
Russia2

Mexico

30%

India

3

Australia

40%

France50%

4Nigeria

5

China

60%

Pakistan

6

Türkiye

70%

Italy

7

UK

80%

Germany

90%

8Canada110

9BrazilExajoules

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic.

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 3.1 • Building resilient supply chains: The case of wind and solar photovoltaic
Meeting international energy and climate goals requires solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind capacities to grow on an
unprecedented scale in the coming decades. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) Roadmap to Net Zero Emissions
1.2

60%

by 2050, for instance, depicts more than a quadrupling of global annual solar PV andwindcapacity
additionsto,Changein renewableelectricity
consumption
1.0
respectively,
630 gigawatts and 390 gigawatts by 2030 (IEA 2021).

50%

0.8

40%

Yet the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted
the vulnerabilityof
Change in nonrenewableelectricity
Exajoules

30%
0.6 energy and technology supply chains. Soaring prices of energy and materials
globalandshortages of critical minerals,
consumption

semiconductors, and other components are increasing uncertainty for investors and posing potential roadblocks for
20%

0.4

the energy transition. Between the first half of 2020 and that of 2022, rising material costs
contributed
toelectricity
a 25 percent
y-o-y growth
in renewable

0.2
consumption(right axis) outside China,
rise onaverage in PV modules’ prices, and up to a 20 percent increase in the10%
prices ofwind turbines

after0.0
years of sustained decline (IEA 2023).

0%y-o-y growth in nonrenewable electricity

consumption(rightaxis)
High-0.2levels of concentration make supply chains vulnerable to incidents, be-10%
they related
to anindividual
country’s
UK

BrazilMexicoItaly

Germany

FranceIndia

Canada

US

Japan

Korea

Australia

RussiaPakistanIndonesia

Iran

Saudi Arabia

China

TürkiyeNigeria

policyrenewable energy technology-0.4 choices, natural disasters, technical failures, or company decisions. Currently,-20%

supply chains, especially those for manufacturing solar PV and wind technologies, as well as the materials they rely on,
remain heavily concentrated geographically. For instance, China’s share of all the manufacturing stages of solar panels(such as polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells, and modules) exceeds 80 percent—more than double its share of global PV
demand (figure B3.1.1) (IEA 2022b). Manufacturing of wind turbines is also largely concentrated geographically, with
China alone accounting for 60 percent of global manufacturing capacity, and Europe having a leading role in markets
outside China. The top 15 wind turbine manufacturers accounted for almost 90 percent of the total capacity deployedin 2021 (IEA 2023).

Figure B3.1.1 • Solar PV manufacturing capacity by country and region, 2021
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

DemandModules
China

EuropeNorth America

Cells
Asia Paciﬁc (excl. China)

WafersIndia

Polysilicon

Rest of the world

Source: IEA 2022b.
APAC = Asia-Pacific region excluding India; NAM = North America ; RoW = rest of the world.

Strengthening and diversifying supply chains for both materials and manufacturing will be critical to reduce risk
exposure and build resilience into supply chains and ensure security of supply. For many countries, diversification canalso enhance local value creation and contribute to realizing the objectives under the 2030 Agenda. Industrial policies
can facilitate wider job creation beyond those in installation and operation by supporting efforts to leverage andfurther build local capabilities across solar and wind supply chains (IRENA 2017, 2018). This is especially important fordeveloping countries as they seek to move from being exporters of raw materials to producing higher-value products.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

111

Governments can leverage comprehensive risk assessments of supply chains and identify competitive advantages inorder to mobilize investment for key supply chain segments, for instance, through financing and fiscal incentives andderisking instruments. Furthermore, they need to support the development of workforce skills in anticipation of futureneeds.
In addition, countries can support innovations in product design that reduce and diversify material inputs, especiallyfor critical materials such as copper and silver, and make equipment more durable, reusable, and recyclable. Recycling
provides an opportunity to secure a reliable secondary source of materials, while helping avoid negative environmental,social, and health impacts associated with raw material mining.
Specific attention should be paid to raw material requirements for renewable technologies. Mining projects can facelead times of more than 10 years from when their development begins to when they achieve the first production. This
increases the risk of critical mineral supply becoming a major bottleneck in renewable energy supply chains. Reducing
permitting time, without compromising on environmental standards, or on engagement with local communities, canhelp ensure that mining capacity will be scaled up in line with the requirements of the energy transition. Consideringthat the natural endowment for minerals differs across countries, international cooperation and strategic partnerships
remain crucial.
At the same time, environmental and social risks along supply chains need to be considered and addressed. International
cooperation on the development of clear and stringent environmental and social sustainability standards will be key toensure worker protection, social inclusion, adhesion to labor rights, as well as the adoption of low-carbon and materialand energy-efficient manufacturing practices in facilities. Considering that bulk and critical material production is one of
the most-emission-intensive stages of supply chains, policies should also focus on expanding lead markets for near-zeroemission materials and increasing minimum recycled content requirements, traceability standards, and governanceregulations.

The top 20 energy-consuming countries show contrasting trends in terms of the share of renewables in electricity
generation, which varies from almost 0 percent to over 80 percent. Brazil and Canada are by far the countries with thelargest shares, owing to large hydropower capacities (figure 3.12). Wind and solar PV together (i.e., nondispatchable
renewables) constitute the largest renewable electricity sources in Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States. Their combined share in renewable power generation ranged between 45
percent and 74 percent in these countries. The share of renewables in electricity consumption grew the fastest in the
United Kingdom, Germany, Mexico, and France, with 6.4, 4.2, 4, and 3.7 percentage point increases, respectively. In
each of these countries, this growth was supported by a year-on-year decline of more than 3 percent in total electricity
demand.

112

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Hydropower

Modern bioenergy

Wind

Solar PV

Other renewables

Share of renewables in electricity (right axis)

0%Modern bioenergy

Nigeria

Pakistan

CanadaHydropower

Wind

Solar PV

Other renewables

Saudi Arabia

10%

0

Iran

1
Korea

20%

Indonesia

2

US

30%

Japan

40%

3

Russia4

Mexico

50%

India

5

Australia

60%

France

70%

6

China

7

Türkiye

80%

Italy

8

UK

90%

Germany

9BrazilExajoules

Figure 3.12 • Renewable energy consumption in electricity in the top 20 final energy consumers by source and country, 2020

Share of renewables (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
PV = photovoltaic.

Between 2019 and 2020, China accounted for 39 percent of the global annual increase in renewable electricity
generation, with wind and solar PV together accounting for more than half of the national growth. The United States,
the Russian Federation, Germany, and the United Kingdom were the next largest contributors to this growth, together
contributing one-quarter of it. In 2020, China was also responsible for the largest absolute increase in nonrenewableelectricity consumption, followed by Türkiye, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria, while the othertop 20 final energy consumer countries witnessed a decline in nonrenewable electricity consumption that year
(figure 3.13).

UK

Mexico-20%

Brazil-0.4

Germany

-10%
Italy

-0.2
France

0%

India

0.0

Canada

10%

Japan

0.2

US

20%

Australia

0.4

Korea

30%

Russia0.6

Pakistan

40%

Indonesia

0.8

Iran

50%

Saudi Arabia

1.0

China

60%

Türkiye

1.2

Nigeria

Exajoules

Figure 3.13 • Year-on-year change in renewable and nonrenewable electricity consumption for the top 20 final energy users by country, 2020
Change in renewable electricity consumption

Change in nonrenewable electricity
consumption
y-o-y growth in renewable electricity
consumption (right axis)
y-o-y growth in nonrenewable electricity
consumption (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
EJ = exajoule; y-o-y = year-on-year.

100%

Chapter 3 • Renewables

80%

113

Installed renewable energy-generating capacity in developing countries (in watts per capita)
Renewable electricity generation is becoming increasingly important in developing countries49 as electricity demandrises due to population growth, changing lifestyles, and development patterns. Reflecting this, SDG 7 includes atarget to “expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for
all in developing countries, in particular least-developed countries, small island developing states and landlocked
developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support” by 2030. Progress toward
SDG indicator 7.B.1, which measures the increase in renewable energy–generating capacity (in watts per capita) indeveloping countries, is tracked in this chapter for the third year.
The share of installed renewable energy–generating capacity in developing countries has been on the rise since 2007,
when it stood at 24.8 percent. In 2021, the share of renewables reached its peak, at 38 percent, with 268 watts per
capita of installed renewable capacity (see figure 3.14). This is close to the world average of 38.3 percent and the 38.8
percent of developed countries. Although 2020 saw a record for renewable energy–generating absolute capacity
additions, with 186 gigawatts (GW) added in developing countries, the 174 GW of renewable power added in thesecountries in 2021 represents a 6 percent contraction from the previous year. This could be attributed to the severe
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on many countries, which may have diverted public funds and attention awayfrom renewable power installations in 2021, as well as from supply chain disruptions and financing challenges in acontext of rising commodity prices. More detailed analysis would be needed to determine the specific factors behind
this decline.

Figure 3.14 • Annual growth of renewable energy–generating capacity in developing countries, and share of renewables, 2000–21
700

Watts per capita

600

30%

24.8%

25%

438

400

20%
15%

237

200

10%

268

100
0

35%

29.3%

27.2%

500

300

38.0% 40%706

Share of renewables (%)

800

5%
0%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Renewables
Nonrenewables

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency.

Additions to renewable energy–generating capacity have been growing at a steady pace over the past two decades
and have consistently outpaced population growth in developing countries. In the first decade of the 21st century, the
CAGR of renewable capacity was 4.6 percent per capita. This figure was surpassed by an 8.6 percent CAGR during
2010–15; then, in 2015–20, the CAGR increased further, to 9.6 percent. In 2021, the growth rate continued to accelerate,
reaching 9.8 percent (figure 3.15), whereas addition of nonrenewable capacity decreased by 2 percent between 2020
and 2021, from 77.1 GW to 75.7 GW. This trend of decreasing nonrenewable additions began in 2016 after reaching
CAGR

600
an all-timehigh of 137.7 GW in 2015.
525
14.6%
4.6%
500
Watts per capita

49

114

446

See chapter 7 for a list of the developing countries considered in this indicator.

400

285

300
200
100

135

10.2%
268

7.4%
7.5%

151
74

47

1.9%
96

60

72

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

4.8%

38

101

Figure 3.15 • Growth in renewable energy–generating capacity per capita by technology across regions, 2010–21
600

Watts per capita

500

CAGR

14.6%

525

4.6%

446

400

200
100
0

10.2%

285

300

7.5%

151

135

2010

268

7.4%

74
2020

Eastern andSouth eastern Asia

2010

2020

Latin America andthe Caribbean

Renewable hydropower

2010

47
2020

Western Asia andNorthern Africa

Geothermal energy

2010

1.9%
96

2020

60

72

2010

2020

Central andSouthern Asia

Oceania

Marine energy

Solar energy

4.8%
24

38

2010

2020

Sub-SaharanAfricaWind energy

101

2010

2020

Developing
countries
Bioenergy

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency.
CAGR = compound annual growth rate.

Over the past decade, growth in renewable energy–generating capacity varied across regions. The greatest capacity
growth was seen in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, from 135 to 525 watts per capita between 2010 and 2021, primarily
due to additions of wind and solar power. Lao PDR, China, and Korea showed the most growth in the region. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, capacity increased by 57 percent, from 285 to 446 watts per capita, primarily due to windenergy (35 percent), solar energy (28 percent), and hydropower (27 percent). Uruguay, Chile, and Panama recorded
the largest increase in renewables-fueled capacity per capita in this region.
Solar and wind power led to a doubling of per capita renewable energy–generating capacity in Western Asia andNorthern Africa, and Central and Southern Asia in 2010–21, with Bhutan, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates in thelead. The lowest renewable capacity per capita was recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa, which will require specific support.
Meanwhile, growth rates across country groups reveal concerning disparities, with small island developing states(SIDS), least-developed countries (LDCs), and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) lagging even behind otherdeveloping countries (figure 3.16). At current annual growth rates, LDCs would need almost 40 years, LLDCs would
need 25 years, and SIDS would need 13 years to reach a level of deployment similar to the average levels in developing
countries in 2021.
Closing the geographic gap in the deployment of renewables-based generating capacity will require tailoredpolicies and investment measures to ensure a just and sustainable energy transition in the long term. The ambitious
deployment of renewable energy–generating capacity across regions is crucial to avoid locking in unsustainable andpolluting energy choices and to prevent the creation of stranded assets.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

115

Figure 3.16 • Renewable energy–generating capacity per capita by country group, 2000–21
300
268

Watts per capita

250
200
150

103

100

90

50
0

39
2000

2002

2004

2006
LDCs

2008

2010
LLDCs

2012

2014

SIDS

2016

2018

2020

Developing

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency.
SIDS = small island developing state; LDC = least-developed country; LLDC = landlocked developing country.

HEAT
Heat is the largest energy end use worldwide, accounting for half of global final energy consumption (175 EJ). In
45 total energy consumption for heat declined by an
20%
2020,
estimated 350.6 percent compared with 2019. The heating
18%

40
30 of global heat demand is met with coal, gas,
sectorremains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, considering three-quarters
16%

35

25 accounting for almost 14 percent (24 EJ) of
and oil. Meanwhile, traditional uses of biomass grew 1 percent in 2020,
14%30

Exajoules

Exajoules

the global energy consumption for heat. Excluding traditional
12% uses of20biomass, as well as ambient heat harnessed by25heat pumps50 (for which data are scarce), direct renewable
increased 0.9 percent year-on-year to
15
10% heat consumption
20

8% total energy
just over 18 EJ in 2019. This represented 10.4 percent of the
10 consumed for heat, only 2 percentage points
15

6%

higher than ten years earlier (figure 3.17).
10

4%

5
0

5
2%
Despiteits dominant share in the final energy consumption,
the heat sector received limited policy attention and2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

0 until recently. In 2022, renewable heat received several
0%
supportsupporting policy updates based on energy security
Industry

Buildings

Other

considerations; however, progress toward SDG target 7.1 (ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable, andmodern energy
services—for
andbioenergy
water heating) and SDG target 7.2 requires
greater
Unspeciﬁed
Traditional
uses of biomass instance, for cooking and space
Modernambition andpolicy support. Such support includesGeothermal
significant improvements in sufficiency, energy efficiency
Solarstronger
thermalShare of traditionaluse of biomassin heat (right(especiallyaxis)
Share of direct use of modern
renewables
in heataxis) and steel, whichand conservation,and material
efficiency
for energy-intensive
materials,
such
as (right
cementcome from hard-to-decarbonize sectors) along with rapid deployment of renewable heat technologies to transition
away from fossil fuels and inefficient and unsustainable uses of biomass.

50
The rapid spread of heat pumps over the past decade is making ambient heat an increasingly important heat source, although its importanceglobally is difficult to estimate because data are unavailable for some markets. Because of scarce data, this report does not account for it, althoughambient heat (in excess of any nonrenewable electricity used to run the pumps) can be credited as a renewable source, and electric heat pumps are
expected to play a key role in decarbonizing the heat sector.

116

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 3.17 • Renewable heat consumption by source and sector, 1990–2020
45

18%

25

12%

25

10%

20

8%

15

Exajoules

14%30
Exajoules

30

16%

35

6%

10

4%

5
2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

2%
1990

0

35

20%

40

20
15
10
5
0

0%

2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020
Industry

Buildings

Traditional uses of biomass

Modern bioenergy

Share of traditional use of biomass in heat (right axis)

Share of direct use of modern renewables in heat (right axis)

Solar thermal

Geothermal

Other
Unspeciﬁed

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
Note: Indirect consumption of renewable heat through renewable electricity is not represented in this figure.

Bioenergy accounts for about 86 percent (15.6 EJ) of direct51 modern uses of renewables for heat globally. It accounts
for about one-tenth of the energy consumed for heat in industry and one-twentieth in the buildings sector. Industry
is responsible for two-thirds of modern uses of bioenergy, with the majority concentrated in subsectors producing
biomass residues on-site, such as wood, and pulp and paper industries, as well as the sugar and ethanol industries. In
2020, modern uses of bioenergy consumption for heat grew 1.8 percent year-on-year in industry while dropping 2.5
percent in the buildings sector. The growth in consumption was mostly due to increasing use of bioenergy in Brazil
and India’s sugar and ethanol industries, while the decline was due partly to mild winter conditions in large heating
markets. The increased use of bioenergy requires paying specific attention to potential trade-offs and synergies
amongst food-energy systems as discussed in box 3.2.
Global solar thermal consumption remained relatively steady in 2020 compared with 2019, accounting for 7.7 percent(1.4 EJ) of modern uses of renewables for heat; yet it still met less than 1 percent of the total final heat demand. China
continued to dominate solar thermal developments, accounting for 73 percent of the global solar thermal capacityin operation and 71 percent of newly installed capacity in 2020 (IEA-SHC 2021). However, the global market for solar
thermal declined further in 2020, partly due to COVID-19 lockdown measures disrupting construction and installation
activities, but also due to limited policy support and the increasing interest of policy makers in end-use electrification—
which meant that small-scale solar water heating systems face competition from not only heat pumps but also rooftop
PV systems in some key markets (IEA-SHC 2020). From this perspective, hybrid photovoltaic-thermal (PVT) systems
offer enormous potential.52 The global market for PVTsystems grew rapidly, at 13 percent, in 2021, reaching over
0.75 GW of thermal capacity and 0.25 GW of electricity capacity (IEA-SHC 2022). Although domestic solar water

51
Renewables also contribute to heat supply indirectly through renewable electricity used for heating and district heat networks. Accounting forthese indirect uses, and excluding ambient heat harnessed by air-source heat pumps, renewable electricity is actually the second-largest modern usesof renewable heat source after bioenergy, and the fastest-growing source. It accounted for almost half of the increase in the total (direct and indirect)
modern uses of renewable energy consumption for heating in 2018, owing to the increase in renewables’ penetration in the power sector along withheat electrification through the use of electric heat pumps and boilers. The buildings sector is responsible for the majority of electricity consumption forheating.
52
PV thermal systems combine PV cells with thermal collectors, which allow them to convert solar radiation into both usable thermal and electricalenergy.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

117Box 3.2 • Agri-food and renewable energy: Linkages between SDG 7 and SDG 2
Energy and food systems are deeply entwined. About 30 percent of the world’s energy is consumed within agri-foodsystems—from production to food consumption—the majority of which are fossil fuel–based (FAO 2011).a Energyrelated greenhouse gas emissions in agri-food systems alone are estimated at 1.6 metric gigatons of carbon dioxide
equivalent per year, or 12 percent of the total from the agriculture sector in 2018, and the number is growing (Tubielloand others 2021).
On-farm energy use is a significant component of agricultural productivity (Flammini and others 2022). Over the past
two decades, on-farm energy consumption in Europe and the Americas remained stable, despite growth in production—
thanks to increased efficiencies and agronomic progress. Meanwhile, on-farm energy use grew significantly in Asia
owing to increased mechanization of agriculture with irrigation pumps, farm machinery, and inputs such as chemicalfertilizers; Asia’s share accounted for over half the global total in 2018. Meanwhile, the African continent, where fooddemand continues to grow, has seen only marginal growth of on-farm energy use, which represented about 4 percentof the global total (IRENA and FAO 2022). The disparity in energy use around the world suggests untapped potential
to increase productivity, strengthen supply chains, reduce food and income losses, and improve food security.
Continuing to meet energy needs in agriculture through fossil fuels across continents poses significant challenges interms of accessibility, affordability, lack of resilience to supply and price shocks, and environmental impacts, particularly
climate change. A joint approach to the energy transition and the transformation of agri-food systems is necessary tomeet current and future demand in these sectors, while advancing the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change.
Renewable energy solutions can play an important role in meeting energy needs for electricity, heating, and transport
in agri-food systems. From primary production to processing, storage, and consumption, various renewable energy
applications are now being deployed to displace the use of fossil fuels. Solar irrigation, among the most matureapplications, is being adopted to improve access to water, thus enabling multiple cropping cycles, raising incomes,
and increasing resilience to changing rainfall patterns. In India, nearly half of the farmers using solar pumps reported anincrease of 50 percent or more in their annual incomes compared with rain-fed irrigation (GOGLA 2019). Meanwhile,in Rwanda, smallholder farmers adopting solar irrigation pumps improved their yields by about a third (Energy4Impact2021). The total installed capacity of solar pumps grew from 20 megawatts in 2012 to 670 megawatts in 2021. The
majority of this capacity is in Asia, led by irrigation programs (IRENA 2022d).
Renewables-based agro-processing systems are offering an increasingly cost-effective alternative to fossil fuels—one
that leads to cost reduction, encourages local value addition, and reduces food losses. In some regions, up to 21
percent of food is lost before reaching the market (FAO 2019). Alongside processing (e.g., drying), cold storage andrefrigeration are a necessity to increase shelf life; cut losses; and maintain the quality of products from crops, livestock,and fisheries. Improving access to refrigeration could prevent the spoilage of up to a quarter of the perishable foods
currently produced in countries with less-developed cold storage infrastructure (Lange and others 2016). Further,
global cold chains, which involve portable or stationary cold storage from production until retail, already account for
about 5 percent of food-system greenhouse gas emissions—a figure expected to rise, making a renewables-basedtransition a necessity (Tubiello and others 2021).
Integrated food–energy systems will be key to scale up bioenergy use while managing potential trade-offs between
climate-safe energy transitions and food security. For instance, the International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA’s)
1.5°C Pathway projects that the share of modern uses of biomass in total final energy consumption needs to increaseto 18 percent (from 3 percent in 2018) to meet the demand in the transport, industry, and buildings sectors (IRENA
2022c). Feedstock production from agriculture and forestry residues, as well as organic waste, needs to be scaled tomeet the bioenergy demand. Further opportunities also exist with the colocation of food and energy crops, as well

118

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

as with photovoltaics (i.e., agri-voltaics), to help reconcile potentially competing land uses as renewable energy
deployment accelerates.
Increasing renewables’ use in agri-food systems requires coordinated action across a range of areas, including
improving the data and information base, facilitating access to financing for investors (farmers and enterprises),
mainstreaming cross-sector integration and systemic thinking in policy and planning efforts, prioritizing low-risk,
high-impact actions in the near term (including renewable energy applications aiming at reducing food losses), andpromoting innovation in the development of technologies and energy-efficient appliances (e.g., agro-processing
equipment) (IRENA and FAO 2022).
a. The energy used in agri-food systems includes direct energy for primary production as well as shares of the energy demands for fertilizer
manufacturing, food processing, storage, and other inputs.

heaters still represent the large majority of installations, there is also growing interest in large-scale solar thermal
systems for industrial applications or connected to district heating networks, which continue to develop as a nichemarket while significant potential remains untapped. Solar thermal cooling offers great potential to decarbonize spacecooling, especially since the greatest demand coincides with the highest solar potential, reducing the load of electric
air conditioners at peak times during summer months. However, technology deployment is currently very limited.
Global geothermal heat consumption grew almost 11 percent in 2020 and represented 5.9 percent (1.1 EJ) of modern
uses of renewables for heat. This growth was driven almost exclusively by China. About 60 percent of geothermalheat is harnessed by ground-source heat pumps worldwide (Lund and Toth 2020). The large majority of applications
concern the buildings sector, with bathing, swimming, and space heating (primarily via district heating) being the mostprevalent end uses globally. China is responsible for more than four-fifths of the global geothermal heat consumption,
followed by Türkiye and the United States, which together account for almost one-tenth.
Traditional uses of biomass are primarily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (figure 3.18). These uses are
the most common in Nigeria, followed by India, China, Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, andUganda, and, together, these countries account for two-thirds of the global consumption. Even though traditional
uses of biomass showed a slightly declining trend since 2006, their levels in 2020 were still similar to those in 1990
on a global scale. Contrasted trends are observed across regions and countries over the past decade, with especiallysignificant declines in Eastern Asia (especially in China), as well as in Indonesia and Vietnam. These declines were partly
compensated by strong population-driven increases in Sub-Saharan Africa (especially in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo) as well as in Pakistan.

Chapter 3 • Renewables

119

16
14

Sub-Saharan Africa

Exajoules

12

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

North America andEuropeSolar thermal

Geothermal

Modern bioenergy

10% of direct modern renewables in heat (right axis)

8

Latin America andthe CaribbeanWestern Asia andNorthern Africa

2020

0%

1990

10%

0

2020

2
1990

20%

2020

30%

4

1990

6

2020

40%

1990

50%

8

2020

60%

10

1990

12

2020

70%

1990

80%

14

2020

16

1990

Exajoules

Figure 3.18 • Renewables consumption in heat by region, 1990 and 2020

Oceania

80%
70%
60%

Traditional uses of biomass

50%% of traditional biomass in heat (right axis)

40%

6 International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
Sources:
Note: Indirect
consumption of renewable energy through electricity for heat is not included in this figure.
4

30%
20%

2

10%
2020

1990

2020

1990

2020

1990

2020

1990

2020

1990

2020

1990

2020

1990

0
0%
Between2010 and 2020, China and India together represented more than two-thirds of the global increase in modern

uses of renewables consumed for heat. Together with the United States and Brazil, they were responsible for 45 percent
Sub-Saharan Africa

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

North America andEuropeLatin America andthe Caribbean

Solar thermal

Geothermal

Western Asia andNorthern Africa

Oceaniaof the global heat demand and accounted for half of global modern uses of renewable heat consumption in 2020
(figure 3.19). This results from large consumption of bioenergy in the “pulp and paper” industry and for residential
Modern bioenergy

Traditional uses of biomass

heating in the United States, extensive use of bagasse in the Brazilian and Indian sugar and ethanol industry, and% of direct modern renewables in heat (right axis)% of traditional biomass in heat (right axis)

notable deployment of solar thermal water heaters and geothermal heat in China. Europe is responsible for another
10

100%

quarter
90%and9 of global modern uses of renewable heat consumption, owing to the deployment of residential woodpellet8 stoves and boilers (e.g., in France, Germany, Italy) and the use of biomass in district heating (e.g., the Nordic
80%
Exajoules

7
and Baltic
countries, Germany, France, Austria). Further, renewable heat consumption was supported indirectly 70%
by the60% of6
growing
consumption of renewable electricity through electric heaters and heat pumps, as well as the harnessing
50%

5ambient heat with heat pumps in China, the United States, and the European Union – albeit the later is not quantified
40%

4in this report (IEA 2022a).

30%

3

20%

2

Exajoules

Iran

Russia

Korea

Japan

China

UK

Nigeria

Pakistan

Geothermal

Solar thermal

Share of renewables in heat (right axis)

5

TürkiyeUS

Indonesia

CanadaGermany

Spain

Italy

Modern bioenergy

6

Traditional uses of biomass

Saudi Arabia

7

France8

Mexico

9

India

0
10

BrazilFigure 13.19 • Renewable heat consumption and share of renewables in total heat consumption among the top 20 energy-consuming countries, 2020
10%
90%
80%
70%
60%

Share of modern renewables in heat (right axis)

50%
40%

4

30%

3

20%

2

10%

Geothermal

Traditional uses of biomass

Iran

Russia

Korea

Japan

China

UK

Nigeria

Pakistan

TürkiyeUS

Indonesia

CanadaSolar thermal

Share of renewables in heat (right axis)

Saudi Arabia

Modern bioenergy

Germany

Spain

Italy

FranceMexicoIndia

Brazil

1
0

0%
100%

0%

Share of modern renewables in heat (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
Note: Indirect consumption of renewable energy through electricity for heat is not included in this figure.

120

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

TRANSPORT
Global final energy consumed for transport declined by 14 percent(-16.6 EJ) in 2020. This resulted from COVID-19
policy responses curtailing economic activity and disrupting transport in most regions of the world. Meanwhile,
biofuel demand for transport declined less severely, with an estimated 4 percent drop in consumption (-0.16 EJ) in
2020 compared with 2019. There are three reasons behind this relative resilience of biofuel demand. First, biofuelscontinued to meet an increasing share of the energy demand, climbing from 3.3 percent to 3.6 percent of the final
energy consumed for transport. Second, in some large biofuel markets, transport demand declined less than the
global average. For instance, Brazil’s transport demand declined by only 7 percent, leading to a less severe percentage
drop in biofuel demand. In addition, biodiesel blended with diesel fuels actually grew 6 percent globally, offsetting
more severe drops in ethanol demand. Yet, 2020 saw the first reduction in annual biofuel production in two decades.
The biggest year-on-year declines in output were for US and Brazilian ethanol and European biodiesel.
Still, liquid biofuels, mainly crop-based ethanol and biodiesel blended with fossil transport fuels, represented 90
percent of the renewable energy consumed for transport. The majority of the remainder came from renewableelectricity used in vehicles and trains, which grew by 0.02 EJ year-on-year in 2020, the second-largest expansion
since 1990. Part of this growth was due to an expanding electric vehicle fleet. The number of electric vehicles on theroad grew from 7.1 million in 2019 to 11.3 million in 2020. The electricity powering these vehicles is also increasingly
coming from renewable sources. Renewables’ share of total electricity used for transport climbed from 20 percent in2010 to 28 percent in 2020.
The increasing use of renewable electricity in transport combined with an overall decline in fossil fuel demand fortransport led to the second-largest annual increase in the renewable fuel share in transport since 1990, reaching 4
percent in 2020, up from 3.6 percent in 2019 (figure 3.20).

5%

4

4%

3

3%

2

2%

1

1%

0

0%

Renewable electricity

Biofuels

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

%REST

5

1990

Exajoules

Figure 3.20 • Global renewable fuel share in transport and totals for renewable electricity and biofuels, 1990–2020

Share of renewable energy (right-axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.
RES-T = Renewable energy used for transport .

Chapter 3 • Renewables

1.6

32%

121

Over the past decade, the amount of renewable energy used for transport has grown by two-thirds. The growth
has
5%
5

been supported by country-level policies to expand biofuels, electrify transport, and increase renewable electricity
generation.
Biofuel policies have driven the largest growth in renewable energy, while renewable electricity has played
4%4
a smaller, but growing, role. But despite many successes at the country level, these policies have only marginally kept
%REST

Exajoules

3%ahead
3 of the growing fossil fuel demand, leading to only a small increase in the renewables share (1.5 percentage

points in the past ten years).

2%

2

From a regional and country perspective, the United States, Brazil, and Europe account for almost 80 percent of therenewableenergy used in transport. However, other regions, too, are seeing increasing shares (figure 3.21). In
1% the1

United States and Brazil, biofuels—primarily crop-based ethanol and biodiesel—provide 99 percent of the renewable
2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

0%
energyused in transport. By contrast, in Europe, renewable electricity represents 20 percent of the renewable energy0

consumed in transport. Meanwhile, in China, renewable energy in transport grew almost 80 percent between 2015
and 2020, with renewable electricity accounting
for two-thirds
growth.
Renewable
electricity represented more
Renewable electricity
Biofuels of thisShareof renewableenergy (right-axis)
than half of all renewable energy used in transport in this country in 2020—thanks to increasing shares of renewables

in power generation and electrification of transport efforts in parallel with only modest biofuel policy support. In 2020,
China had 48 percent of the global light-duty electric vehicle fleet, aside from over 500,000 electric buses. In India,
biofuel support policies have more than doubled renewable energy use in transport since 2015.
Expanding the share of renewable sources in the energy used for transport will require a combination of policies
that support biofuels, while ensuring that feedstock supplies meet the most stringent sustainability criteria: transport
electrification and renewable electricity generation, as well as active mobility, transit efficiency (efficiency by design),
and the phaseout of fossil fuels for transport. These policies must be steadily strengthened where they are already inplace and introduced where they are not yet.

Exajoules

Figure 3.21 • Renewable energy share in transport and total renewable energy for selected countries, 2010, 2015, and 2020
1.6

32%

1.4

28%

1.2

24%

1.0

20%

0.8

16%

0.6

12%

0.4

8%

0.2

4%

0.0

2009

2014
US

2019

2009
Biofuels

2014

Brazil

2019

2009

2014

Europe2019

Renewable electricity

2009

2014

China

2019

2009

2014
India

2019

2009

2014

2019

0%

Rest of the world

Renewable share (right axis)

Source: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.

Across all countries and regions, the United States, Brazil, Europe, China, and India together constitute an 86 percent
share of transport renewable energy consumption driven by policy support for biofuels and electrification. In 2020,
Brazil, Sweden, Albania, Norway, Indonesia, and Finland recorded the largest shares of renewables in transport energy
consumption, all above 10 percent (figure 3.22).

122

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

1 000

25%

200

25%

800

20%

160

20%

600

15%

120

15%

400

10%

80

10%

200

5%

40

5%

0%

0

0

BrazilPetajoules

Petajoules

Figure 3.22 • Top ten countries by renewable energy share in transport, 2020

SwedenAlbania

NorwayBiofuels

FinlandArgentina

Renewable electricity

ThailandAustria

Indonesia

France0%

Renewable share (right axis)

Sources: International Energy Agency and United Nations Statistics Division.

Policy Insights
Despite significant progress on SDG 7 over the past decade, the findings in this chapter underscore the need for greater
ambition to achieve this goal, which in turn will enable and influence the realization of most other SDGs, including
SDG 13 on climate targets, SDG 3 on health through pollution reduction, and SDG 8 on decent work and economic
growth, among others. To this end, long-term commitments, supported by well-designed targets, comprehensive
plans, and timelines, are needed to set clear directions and expectations for stakeholders to align their activities. The
more detailed, specific, and credible a target is, the more likely it can catalyze public and private investments. Targets
also need to be ambitious enough to step up from historical trends and align renewable energy deployment with
SDGs and international climate ambitions. This section provides an overview of key considerations for countries as
they design their renewable energy targets.53
Design elements of renewable energy targets. While designing renewable energy targets, decisions need to bemade regarding their statistical bases; scope and coverage in terms of sectors and end uses; indicators; technology
specificity; and implementation modalities (figure 3.23).
The statistical basis relates to whether targets are determined as a share of a mix relative to a baseline, that is,percentage-based targets (e.g., share of energy supply, electricity generation mix, percentage of vehicles) or a fixedabsolute amount (e.g., capacity added, number of solar water heaters installed). Although targets expressed as a shareof a mix may provide more clarity on how ambitious climate goals are, since they imply phasing out (or opting out of)fossil fuel–based energy and systems, they can be difficult to implement and monitor for multiple reasons. One suchreason is that both the renewable energy deployed and the total energy demand/supply change over time. Targets
expressed as absolute amounts can provide clearer commitment from policy makers and more certainty for market
53
The section is based on IRENA’s report Renewable Energy Targets in 2022: A Guide to Design. For more details, please refer to the full report(IRENA 2022b).

Chapter 3 • Renewables

123participants and investors as they stipulate a specific quantity that must be installed or produced by a specified time.
They are also easier to monitor than percentage-based targets.
Scope and coverage relate to whether a target covers the entire energy sector or specific end uses. While the former
provides a comprehensive view of the target’s impact with regard to climate goals and energy security, the latter may
provide a clearer signal for the development of local supply chains for specific technologies. Many countries haveused a combination of both.
Targets can be set based on a range of indicators that vary in terms of scope and coverage. For percentage-basedtargets covering the entire energy sector, their applicability to the TFEC or total energy supply needs to be decided.
For percentage-based targets in the power sector, a decision is needed on whether they represent a share of thegeneration or installed capacity. In end uses, a decision is needed on whether percentage-based targets represent
a share of the total number of systems added by/after a given year (e.g., bans on the sales of combustion engine
vehicles in the European Union and the state of California by 2035 correspond to a target of 100 percent of vehicles
added after 2035 to be electric) or a share of the total in use by a given year (e.g., Paris’s ban on all combustion engine
vehicles by 2030 corresponds to 100 percent of vehicles on the road being electric).
Technology specificity relates to whether a target should be technology neutral or technology specific. While
technology-neutral targets can be strategic in the early stages of renewable energy development, since they allow
markets to identify the most cost-effective technologies, technology-specific targets can enable further diversificationof the energy mix, with benefits such as resilient systems and fewer integration issues. They can also enable thedevelopment of local value chains for selected technologies. This can, for instance, help in addressing the risk thatpower-grid investments, including auxiliary services, storage, and flexibility measures, may not be identified earlyenough in current electricity markets, the importance of which is further explained in box 4.3.
Modalities for target implementation relate to whether a target is mandatory or aspirational, and short to medium term
or long term. They determine the process for reviewing and revising a target.

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Chapter 3 • Renewables

Monitoring progress

Aspirational

Capacity
installed(%)

Regional/
block

Law

Frequencyof revisions

RPS/RPO

Biofuelmandate

Short
term

Added

Long
term

Total

End
uses

capacityGreenhydrogen

Added Total Electrolyser Tonnes

Systems

Absolute
amountGeneration(GWh)

Electricity

Total

Capacity(GW)

Hydrogen/
Added
gas
(%)

Green
hydrogen

MandateSpecific

Biofuelblending
(%)

Fuels

End
uses

Binding

NeutralTotal
systems
installed(%)

Systems(EVs.
FCVs.,
SWHs)

Systems
added
(%)

Share
of a mix

Capacity
added(%)

Capacity(%)

Electricity

Final
Generation
consumption(%)(%)

Modality for implementation

Technology

Primary
supply(%)

Wholeeconomy(%) of the
power

Indicator

Indicator

Scope

Statistical basis

Renewable energy target

Figure 3.23 • Key decisions for setting renewable energy targets

Source: IRENA 2022b
EV = electric vehicle; FCV = fuel cell vehicle; GWh = gigawatt-hour; SWH = solar water heater.

125

Target design should begin with considering how the target(s) will serve the desired policy goal(s). Possible
objectives may include greenhouse gas emissions reduction in line with SDG 13 on climate; pollution reduction in linewith SDG 3 on health; energy access, reliability, and affordability in line with SDG 7; job creation and economic growthin line with SDG 8; and other socioeconomic development and environmental goals set out in the UN 2030 agenda.
Reductions of emissions and energy imports. Targets may be expressed as a share of the energy mix, covering theentire energy sector, in order to address the phasing out (or opting out of) of fossil fuel–based energy and systems.
This approach can provide greater clarity on the level of ambition related to the climate goals and the reduction ofenergy imports (for countries that are fossil fuel importers). Targets that reduce the supply of fossil fuels in their raw
form (defined as a share of the primary energy supply) have greater potential to reduce energy imports and emissions
across the entire process of energy conversion to consumption, including inefficiencies.
However, using primary energy as a statistical basis for setting a renewable energy target poses a problem related
to the methodology used to calculate the primary energy equivalents of renewables. To overcome this, they can betranslated into targets as shares in the final energy consumption. Once the overall target for the energy sector has
been defined and aligned with wider emissions reduction and energy import minimization goals, a target can be
broken down into the different sectors and end uses, such as the power, transport, and heating and cooling sectors,
taking into account electrification plans. For example, Portugal’s target of a 47 percent share of renewables in its final
consumption by 2030 translates into a share of 20 percent renewables in transport, 38 percent in heating and cooling,and 80 percent in electricity. When setting such targets, energy demand must be predicted taking into consideration
traditional variables that influence forecasts (e.g., population, economy, climate and weather, lifestyles and cultural
choices), in addition to many components of the energy transition, such as energy efficiency targets and measures andincreased electrification of end uses, among other factors.
In the power sector, targets expressed as renewables’ share in electricity generation are more effective than targets
expressed as renewables’ share in installed capacity for achieving emissions reductions or fossil fuel savings. This isbecause progress monitoring excludes projects that sit idle or get curtailed.
For end uses, regarding systems such as electric vehicles or solar water heaters, for instance, targets in the form of ashare of the total number of systems in use by a given year (for instance, X percent of vehicles on road must be electricvehicles) can help achieve climate and pollution goals, and energy security when fossil fuels are imported; yet targets
expressed as total number of systems (e.g., Paris’s ban on all combustion-engine cars by 2030) can be more effective,
since they can require the phaseout of fossil fuel alternatives (e.g., all combustion-engine cars).
Universal energy access and clean cooking. Access targets expressed as percentages of population with access toelectricity and clean cooking are independent of demographic changes. Additionally, separate targets specific toelectrification and clean cooking are required, which have to be translated into an absolute capacity or absolute
number of systems to deploy. Electricity access targets expressed as installed renewable capacity (including off-grid
technologies) are easier to plan, monitor, and achieve. However, it is difficult to assess how effective these targets
are in determining whether systems are being used and maintained. Output-based targets (e.g., renewables-based
gigawatt-hours of electricity representing a percentage of the total electricity generation) focus on production andtechnology utilization. For renewables-based clean cooking, targets framed as the total number of systems to deploy(e.g., total number of biodigesters introduced) by a given deadline are easier to define, monitor, and implement thanpercentage-based targets.

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Development of local industries for energy transition–related technologies. Translating percentage-based targets
into absolute-amount targets can provide further clarity to market participants and investors and plays a role in thedevelopment of local industries for these technologies. Examples of such targets include specific capacities that must
be installed (e.g., megawatts of power or number of solar water heaters) or produced (e.g., megawatt-hours generated).
In particular, technology-specific targets can be instrumental in developing or enhancing local value chains for thesetechnologies as well as leveraging local capacities. This was evident in countries that pursued technology-specifictargets, such as Morocco and South Africa, where, further bolstered by policies to aid local industries, the solar andwind sectors flourished across different parts of the value chain, leading to an increase in jobs and income.
Overall, when setting national climate targets, policy makers must account for the following considerations.
•First, a balanced combination of long-term targets, further segmented into a series of short- to medium-termtargets, is ideal for achieving a combination of policy objectives (in the presence of a robust policy framework to
support the targets). Long-term targets provide an indication of a country’s overall commitments and provide a
key signal to developers, investors, service providers, and manufacturers regarding the long-term trajectory in amarket. Short- to medium-term targets provide additional credibility as well as a pathway to achieving long-term
objectives. They also create a sense of urgency and motivate stakeholders to act. They enable more effective
implementation and rapid learning from the policy process and can coincide with investment and electoral cycles.
In the case of five-year plans (e.g., China’s), their periodic nature provides a high level of flexibility and adjustment.
Setting short- to medium-term targets by backcasting a long-term trajectory can reconcile short-term goals withlong-term objectives.

•

Second, for these targets to be effective, they should be implemented together with policy instruments that areincorporated into legislation and/or institutional mandates for government agencies, corporate institutions, andother stakeholders.

•

Finally, a key principle for effective renewable energy targets is to link them closely to the regular monitoring ofmarket conditions so as to make them more ambitious in line with changes in policy objectives and priorities thatcall for greater ambition, market dynamics, lower renewable energy costs, and learning curves.

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127

Methodological Notes
DEFINITIONS
Renewable energy sources. Total renewable energy from hydropower, wind, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal,
geothermal, tide/wave/ocean, renewable municipal waste, solid biofuels, liquid biofuels, and biogases.
Renewable energy consumption. Final consumption of direct renewables along with the amount of electricity and heatconsumption estimated from renewable energy sources. Ambient heat harnessed by heat pumps is not accounted forin this report, due to limited data availability.
Direct renewables. Bioenergy, and direct uses of solar thermal and geothermal energy.
Total final energy consumption. The sum of the final energy consumption in the transport, industry, and other sectors(equivalent to the total final consumption minus nonenergy use). Total final consumption excludes energy transformed
into other forms of energy (e.g., natural gas used to generate electricity), as well as energy used by energy industries.
Traditional uses of biomass. Biomass uses are considered traditional when biomass is consumed in the residential
sector in countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. International Energy
Agency statistics divide traditional uses of biomass into primary solid biomass, charcoal and unspecified primarybiomass, and waste.
Traditional consumption/use of biomass is a “conventional proxy” because it is estimated rather than measured directly.
Modern uses of renewable energy consumption. Total renewable energy consumption minus traditional consumption/use of biomass.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE MAIN INDICATOR
The indicator used in this report to track SDG target 7.2 is the share of renewable energy in total final energy
consumption (TFEC). Data from the International Energy Agency and the United Nations Statistics Division energybalances are used to calculate the indicator based on this formula:

The variables are derived from energy balance flows: TFEC is total final energy consumption as defined in table 3.1,
ELE is gross electricity production, and HEAT is gross heat production, while the subscript RES indicates renewableenergy sources.
The denominator is the TFEC of all energy products (as defined in table 3.1). The numerator, renewable final energy
consumption, is a series of calculations showing the sum of the direct consumption of renewable energy sources andthe final consumption of electricity and heat estimated to have come from renewable sources. To determine final
renewable energy consumption, the consumption of electricity and heat deemed to come from renewable sources is
assigned based on renewables’ share in gross production.

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METHODOLOGY FOR ADDITIONAL METRICS BEYOND THE MAIN INDICATOR
Renewable energy is consumed in mainly three sectors: electricity, heat, and transport. Consumption is calculated
based on the energy balance and defined as follows:
Electricity refers to the amount of electricity consumed by end users. Electricity used in transport is excluded from thisaggregation. Electricity used to produce heat is also excluded, because official data at the final energy service levelare unavailable.
Heat refers to the amount of energy consumed for heating in industry and other sectors, as well as other uses not inelectricity and transport, such as fuel used to pump water. Electricity used for heat is not included in this aggregate,
due to the scarcity of official data at the final energy service level. The heat category here is not equivalent to the final
energy end-use service. It is also important to note that in this chapter, in the context of an “end use,” heat does notrefer to the same quantity as the energy product, “heat,” in the energy balance used in the above formula.
Transport refers to the amount of energy consumed in the transport sector. The majority of the electricity used intransport is consumed in the rail and road sectors, and, in some cases, in pipeline transport. The renewable electricity
consumed in the transport sector is estimated by multiplying the annual shares of renewable sources in gross national
electricity production by the amount of electricity used nationally in the sector.

METHODOLOGY FOR INDICATOR SDG 7.B.1
Indicator 7.B.1 measures the installed renewable energy–generating capacity in developing countries (in watts per
capita). It is computed by dividing the maximum year-end installed capacity of renewable electricity–generating power
plants by the country’s midyear population. Data from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) are used
to calculate this indicator.
IRENA’s electricity capacity database contains information on installed electricity-generating capacity, measured inmegawatts. The data set covers all countries and areas from the year 2000, records whether capacity is on-grid oroff-grid, and is divided into 36 renewable energy types, which together constitute the six main sources of renewableelectricity. For the population part of this indicator, IRENA uses population data from the United Nations World
Population Prospects (UN 2021).
More details on the methodology used in this chapter can be found in the SDG indicators metadata repository (https://
unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-07-0b-01.pdf).

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129

References
Darby, S., and T. Fawcett. 2018. Energy Sufficiency—An Introduction: A Concept Paper for ECEEE. Stockholm: ECEEE.
https://www.energysufficiency.org/static/media/uploads/site-8/library/papers/sufficiency-introduction-finaloct2018.pdf.
Energy4Impact 2021. Solar Irrigation Rwanda – Developing a new Market for smallholder farmers. https://energy4impact.org/news/solar-irrigation-rwanda-%E2%80%93-developing-new-market-smallholderfarmers.
FAO 2011. Energy-Smart Food for People and Climate - Issue Paper, Rome, https://www.fao.org/publications/card/
en/c/322a07bf-b2e2-5b6a-8e1a-dbbff237a135/.
FAO 2019. The State of Food and Agriculture. Moving forward on food loss and waste reduction. www.fao.org/3/
ca6030en/ca6030en.pdf.
Flammini and others 2022. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Energy Use in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries:
1970–2019. Earth System Science Data, 14(2), 811–821.
GOGLA 2019. How solar water pumps are pushing sustainable irrigation. www.gogla. org/about-us/blogs/how-solarwater-pumps-are-pushing-sustainable-irrigation.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2018. The Future of Cooling: Opportunities for Energy-Efficient Air Conditioning,Technology Report. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-cooling.
IEA. 2021. Net Zero by 2050. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
IEA. 2022a. Renewables 2022—Analysis and Forecast to 2027. Paris: IEA. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/
ada7af90-e280-46c4-a577-df2e4fb44254/Renewables2022.pdf.
IEA. 2022b. Solar PV Global Supply Chains. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains.
IEA. 2023. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technologyperspectives-2023.
IEA-SHC (International Energy Agency–Solar Heating and Cooling Programme). 2020. Solar Heat Worldwide 2020.
Gleisdorf: IEA-SHC, AEE—Institute for Sustainable Technologies.
IEA-SHC. 2021. Solar Heat Worldwide 2021. Gleisdorf: IEA-SHC, AEE—Institute for Sustainable Technologies.
IEA-SHC. 2022. Solar Heat Worldwide 2022. Gleisdorf: IEA-SHC, AEE—Institute for Sustainable Technologies.
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2017. Renewable Energy Benefits: Leveraging Local Capacity for
Solar PV. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://www.irena.org/publications/2017/Jun/Renewable-Energy-BenefitsLeveraging-Local-Capacity-for-Solar-PV.
IRENA. 2018. Renewable Energy Benefits: Leveraging Local Capacity for Offshore Wind. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://www.irena.org/publications/2018/May/Leveraging-Local-Capacity-for-Offshore-Wind.
IRENA. 2022a. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2021. Abu Dhabi: IRENA.

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IRENA. 2022b. Renewable Energy Targets in 2022: A Guide to Design. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://www.irena.org/
Publications/2022/Nov/Renewable-energy-targets-in-2022.
IRENA. 2022c. World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022: 1.5°C Pathway. https://www.irena.org/-/media/
Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2022/Mar/IRENA_World_Energy_Transitions_Outlook_2022.
pdf?rev=353818def8b34effa24658f475799464.
IRENA. 2022d. Off-grid Renewable Energy Statistics 2022. https://www.irena.org/Publications/2022/Dec/Off-gridrenewable-energy-statistics-2022.
IRENA and FAO 2022. Renewable Energy for Agri-food Systems: Towards the Sustainable Development Goal and theParis Agreement. https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Nov/Renewable-Energy-for-Agri-food-Systems.
Lange and others 2016. Promoting food security and safety via cold chains: Technology options, cooling needs andenergy requirements. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. https://energypedia.info/
wiki/File:GIZ_(2016)_-_Promoting_Food_Security_and_Safety_via_Cold_Chains.pdf.
Lund, J. W., and A. N. Toth. 2020. Direct Utilization of Geothermal Energy 2020 Worldwide Review. Proceedingsof the World Geothermal Congress 2020. https://www.geothermal-energy.org/pdf/IGAstandard/
WGC/2020/01018.pdf.
Marignac, Y. 2019. Energy Sufficiency as Part of Climate Action. Publication of Climate Recon 2050 project. https://climatedialogue.eu/sites/default/files/2019-12/CR2050_TD3_Technical_note_Sufficiency_20191218.pdf.
Tubiello and others. 2021. Greenhouse gas emissions from food systems: Building the evidence base. Environmental
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ENERGY EFFICIENCY

Photo: © Unsplash by Chuttersnap

CHAPTER 4

Main Messages•

Global trend. Primary energy intensity54—defined as the percentage decrease in the ratio of total energy
supply per unit of gross domestic product (GDP)—improved at a consistently higher rate over the past decade(2010–20) than it did in the previous two (1990–2010). However, the rate of improvement declined to 0.6
percent in 2020, largely because of Covid-19–induced lockdowns and travel restrictions, and the radical shifts
in the global economy that accompanied the initial lockdowns in that year. This makes 2020 the worst year forenergy intensity improvement since the global financial crisis, with worldwide energy intensity declining to4.63 megajoules (MJ) per 2017 US dollar. The pandemic makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions regardingwhether the slowdown in 2020 reflects wider changes in the pace of structural energy efficiency improvements.
However, the low energy prices seen during the pandemic have quickly faded, replaced by record high energy
prices, prompting a renewed focus on improving energy efficiency, shielding consumers and industry, andimproving energy security and sustainability.

•

2030 target. The decade 2010–20 saw stronger energy intensity improvements on average, yet theseremained below the target set under the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), of achieving,on average, a doubling of the global energy efficiency improvement rate between 2010 and 2030, comparedwith the 1990–2010 level. Globally, energy intensity improved at 1.8 percent annually between 2010 and 2020,
surpassing the 1.2 percent rate seen between 1990 and 2010, although it remains well below the SDG target
7.3 of 2.6 percent on average required over the entire SDG time horizon (2010–30). Estimates for 2021 point tocontinued low progress in intensity improvement due to the COVID-19 crisis, although early estimates for 2022
suggest a rebound to higher levels of improvement, aided by renewed policy support and urgency in the wakeof the energy crisis. Future annual improvements would need to increase to over 3.4 percent per year to makeup for lost ground and meet SDG target 7.3 .

•Regional highlights. Eastern and South-eastern Asia came close to the initial target of 2.6 percent improvements
annually, reaching 2.3 percent on average between 2010 and 2020. This was driven by robust efforts to phaseout older, inefficient industrial capacity, improve the energy efficiency of buildings and industry, and shift
increasingly toward industries that are less energy intensive. Average annual improvement rates in Northern
America and Europe (2.0 percent), Central Asia and Southern Asia (2.0 percent), and Oceania (1.8 percent) werealso above the global average and historical trends. The lowest improvement rates were achieved in Western
Asia and Northern Africa (0.7 percent), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (1.0 percent) and SubSaharan Africa (1.0 percent). Data on absolute energy intensity reveal wide regional differences, especially inregions with low access levels, and where households must rely on the traditional use of bioenergy for cooking.
For example, energy intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa is close to double that in Latin America and the Caribbean.
This highlights the strong interlinkage between universal access to clean cooking and reaching SDG target
7.3. In a similar manner, increasing renewables’ shares in electricity generation improves supply efficiency byeliminating losses incurred in the conversion of primary (nonrenewable) fuels into electricity. This relationshiphighlights the synergies between SDG targets 7.2 and 7.3.

54

Hereafter referred to as “energy intensity.” See note to figure 4.8 for the definition of energy intensity by sector.

133

•

Trends in the top 20 energy-consuming countries. Comparing the periods 2000–10 and 2010–20, the annual
rate of energy intensity improvement increased in 14 of the 20 countries with the largest total energy supply inthe world. However, less than half of the top energy-consuming countries had improvement rates higher than
the global average. Energy intensity continued to improve the fastest in the United Kingdom and China, at anannual average of 3.5 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, between 2010 and 2020, followed by Indonesia, at
3.1 percent. Energy intensity also continued to improve at rates beyond SDG target 7.3 in Japan and Germany (at2.9 and 2.7 percent, respectively). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic slowed energy intensity improvements across
12 of the top 20 energy-consuming countries, including routine leaders in efficiency, such as China and Indonesia.

•

End-use trends. Energy intensity improved faster across all sectors, except the residential buildings sector, in
2010–20 compared with the previous decade. Intensity improvement was the fastest in the freight transport
sector, at 2.2 percent a year, followed by passenger transport, at 1.9 percent. Notable progress can also be seen inindustry (1.6 percent), which spans a range of energy-intensive economic activities. This is a major enhancement
since sectoral energy intensity had deteriorated in the preceding period. Sectoral improvement rates were thelowest in the residential sector, where energy intensity improvement slowed from 1.9 percent in the previous
period to 1.2 percent annually between 2011 and 2020.

•

Policies and investment in efficiency. The year 2020 saw only a slight decline in overall energy efficiency
investments (at nearly USD 380 billion) despite the COVID-19 crisis, even though trends differed widely acrosssectors and regions. Europe, China, and Northern America accounted for nearly 80 percent of the spending.
Moreover, in recent years, energy efficiency incentives, regulations, and information campaigns have received
major support from clean energy recovery spending and energy crisis packages. Over USD 250 billion of
government spending has been allocated to efficiency in buildings and industry, and an additional USD 180
billion has been allocated to low-carbon vehicles between 2020 and December 2022. It is important to continually
update energy efficiency standards and labels, building codes, and energy efficiency obligation (EEO) schemes toreflect the latest technology and market trends.

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Are We on Track?
SDG 7 commits the world to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy. Under
this goal, target 7.3 calls for global advances in energy efficiency by doubling the global rate of energy intensity
improvement relative to the average rate over the period 1990–2010—which meant improving energy intensity by 2.6
percent per year in 2010–30.55 Energy efficiency improvement and energy wastage reduction also play a part in thepace and cost of progress on universal access to energy and renewable energy. Energy intensity is the ratio of thetotal energy supply to the annual GDP created—in essence, the energy used per unit of wealth created. We can use thismeasure of energy intensity to observe how energy use rises or falls, while also looking for the (social and economic)
development factors that may affect the corresponding rates, along with other factors, such as weather and behavior
change. In general, energy intensity declines as energy efficiency improves.
Progress toward SDG target 7.3 is measured by tracking the year-on-year percentage change in energy intensity.
Initially, the United Nations recommended an annual improvement rate of 2.6 percent between 2010 and 2030 toachieve the target, although global progress has been slower than that in all years except 2015. This means thatenergy intensity now needs to improve at no less than 3.4 percent globally from 2020 to 2030. In other words, energy
intensity needs to improve at almost twice the rate in the past decade (which was itself almost 50 percent faster thanbetween 1990 and 2010). An even greater improvement, at 4.2 percent, is needed to reach the International Energy
Agency’s (IEA’s) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE)56 (figure 4.1).
Globally, energy intensity has improved gradually since 199057 (figure 4.2). Recent numbers show that global energy
intensity improved only 0.6 percent in 2020, to 4.63 MJ/USD (2017 PPP [purchasing power parity]), in the context of
the COVID-19 crisis. This was the lowest rate of improvement since the global financial crisis. Moreover, historical GDP
and energy intensity data suggest that large declines in GDP, such as those occurring in 2020, tend to be followed bydeclines in future energy intensity improvement rates (IEA 2020). For example, GDP was increasing at over 5 percent
per year globally in 2006 and 2007; it fell to 3 percent in 2008 and then to zero in 2009. Energy intensity data showcorresponding declines in energy intensity improvement rates not only in 2008 and 2009 but also 2010, when global
GDP growth returned to precrisis levels of about 5 percent. This is consistent with the low expected energy efficiency
improvement for 2021.

55
Revisions of underlying statistical data and methodological improvements explain the slight changes in growth rates in the base period (1990–
2010) from previous editions. SDG target 7.3 of improving energy intensity by 2.6 percent per year in 2010–30 remains the same, however.
56
The Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario maps out a path to stabilize the global average temperature rise to 1.5°C, alongside universal accessto modern energy by 2030.
57
The majority of the energy data in this chapter comes from a joint data set built by the International Energy Agency (https://www.iea.org/dataand-statistics/) and the United Nations Statistics Division (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/energystats/). GDP data are sourced from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/).

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Figure 4.1 • Growth of primary energy intensity by period and target rate, 1990–2030
0.0%
-0.5%

-1.2%

-1.8%

-1.0%

-2.6%

-1.5%
-2.0%

-4.2%

-2.5%
-3.0%

-0.8%

-3.5%
-4.0%
-4.5%

1990–2010
Base period

2020–30
Target rate

2010–20

2020–2030 IEA
Net-zero scenario

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).

Annual change (left axis)

Period average

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

MJ/USD (2017) PPP

4

1999

-3%

1998

5

1997

-2%

1996

6

1995

-1%

1994

7

1993

0%

1992

8

1991

1%

1990

Annual change (%)

Figure 4.2 • Global primary energy intensity and its annual change, 1990–2020

Global primary energy intensity (right axis)

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity.

0.0%
-0.5%
-1.0%
-1.5%

-1.2%

-1.8%
-2.6%

-2.0%

-4.2%

-2.5%

136

-3.0%
-3.5%

-0.8%

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Looking Beyond the Main Indicators
COMPONENT TRENDS
Between 2019 and 2020, for the first time since the global financial crisis in 2009, both GDP and total energy supply
decreased, by 3.2 and 3.8 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, GDP declining slightly less than energy supply, resulting ina small improvement in energy intensity. However, this improvement was the smallest since 2010, and in the aftermathof the global financial crisis. This trend is due to energy-intensive industry’s larger share of energy demand and slower
efficiency progress, especially in the buildings and industrial sectors (IEA 2021d).
Over the longer term, the impact of energy intensity improvement is revealed by trends in its underlying components(figure 4.3, left). Between 1990 and 2020, global GDP increased by a factor of 2.4, whereas global total energy supply58
grew 60 percent, signaling trends in the decoupling of energy use from economic growth. This resulted in a consistentimprovement in global energy intensity, which fell by more than a third between 1990 and 2020.
However, there has been a decline in energy intensity improvements more recently. Between 2010 and 2015, energy
intensity improved by 10.2 percent, but it grew much slower, at 6.8 percent, between 2015 and 2020 (figure 4.3, right).
Recent trends in energy efficiency are discussed in box 4.1.

Figure 4.3 • Trends in the underlying components of global primary energy intensity, 1990–2020; and growth rates of GDP, total energy supply, andprimary energy intensity, 2010–20
4.0%

300

3.0%

Index (1990 = 100)

250

2.0%

200

-1.0%

100

2.0%

1.2%

0.0%

150

0.6%

-

-1.4%

2.1%

-2.0%
-3.0%

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020

50

3.4%

1.0%

GDP

Total energy supply

2010–15

2015–20

Primary energy intensity

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 6).
GDP = gross domestic product.

0%

-1%

-1.9%

-1.7%

-1.5%

-1.9%

-2.3%

-0.6%

-1.0%
-1.6%

-0.5%
-2.0%

-3.1%

58
“Total primary energy supply” has been renamed “Total energy supply” in accordance with the International Recommendations for Energy
Statistics(UN 2018).
-2%-3%
Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

-4%

137

4.0%

300

3.0%

Index (1990 = 100)

250

2.0%

Box2004.1 • Recent energy efficiency trends

3.4%

1.0%

150

2.0%

1.2%

0.0%

0.6%

The COVID-19 pandemic and then the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have disrupted-1.4% energy-1.0%

and economic trends in recent years.
100

-

2.1%

-2.0%

The year 2020 was one of the worst in terms of advancement in energy efficiency. Energy intensity improved
50

-3.0%

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020

by a mere 0.6 percent owing to low energy demand and prices, technicalefficiency sluggish
improvements in2010–15
2015–20

technical efficiency, and a shift in economic activity away from less energy-intensive services, such as hospitality
Primary energy intensity
Totalevenenergy supply
and tourism. Initial estimates for 2021GDP
suggestless improvementof energy efficiency, at 0.5 percent, although

there may have been a turning point in 2022, with initial estimates suggesting progress at about 2 percent.

Figure B4.1.1 • Growth rate of global primary energy intensity, 2012–22
0%
-1.9%

-1%

-1.7%

-1.9%

-0.5%

-0.6%

-1.0%

-1.5%

-1.6%

-2.3%

-2.0%

-3.1%
-2%

-3%

-4%

-5%

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4); IEA 2022c.

Figure B4.1.2 • Change in energy demand and demand drivers in IEA countries, 2000–20
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%

Total ﬁnal energy consumption

Activity

Efﬁciency

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

-20%

Structure

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4); IEA 2022c.
Note: Change in total final energy consumption is the net effect of changes in activity, efficiency, and structure across buildings,
transport, and industry. For example, in residential buildings, activity refers to population, structure refers to per capita floor area, andefficiency
refers to energy use per floor area.
6%138

mpound annual growth rate (%)

5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

However, early estimates suggest that 2022 could be a turning point for energy efficiency. The energy crisis proveda strong reminder of the importance of energy efficiency for energy security as well as energy and carbon dioxide
emissions savings. Price increases also increased the value of energy efficiency, and diminished payback times.
This led to accelerated energy efficiency investments, a rising wave of energy awareness campaigns, strengtheningof building codes, and increased electrification of transport and heating (IEA 2022b). Improvement in energy
efficiency is therefore expected to rebound, at 2 percent. However, this is still slower than what is needed to reach
SDG 7 targets. Sustained effort is needed to accelerate that trend.

REGIONAL TRENDS
The COVID-19 crisis significantly affected both energy consumption and GDP in all regions. As a general trend, GDPdeclined in all regions in 2020. This was followed by a rebound in 2021, with regional variations depending on thetiming and length of pandemic-related restrictions. In 2020, these shifts brought about significant swings in energy
intensity, as energy consumption in Eastern Asia, South-eastern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania continued
to rise, putting upward pressure on energy intensity. And while energy consumption declined in Latin America, thedecline in GDP was greater, also leading to a slowdown in energy intensity improvements. In Northern America andNorthern Africa, energy intensity improved generally (that is, it decreased), although at lower rates than in the previous
years. In Europe, energy intensity worsened slightly (that is, increased), while remaining stable in Western Asia andNorthern Africa, and in Central Asia and Southern Asia.
Energy intensity has improved across the world since 2010, but significant differences in trends are observed acrossregions (figure 4.4). Economies in Central, Southern, Eastern, and South-eastern Asia have seen a rapid increasein economic activity, and the associated increase in total energy supply has been mitigated in part by significant
improvements in energy efficiency, which have put downward pressure on the global average.
Over the same period, economies in Northern America and Europe experienced a slight decrease in their total energy
consumption, which reflects slower economic growth and a decoupling of the economy from energy usage. This last
trend was enabled by a continued shift toward industrial activities consuming less energy and the greater energy
efficiency that is typically observed when mature policies are in place, especially in buildings (Northern America)
and industry (Europe). In these economies, energy intensity improved at rates slightly above global trends, leading
to absolute energy intensity levels slightly below the global average (figure 4.5). Similar trends and absolute energy
intensity levels have been observed for Oceania, where total energy supply increased modestly, whereas GDP grewfaster than in Northern America and Europe.
Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa recorded the smallest
average gains in energy intensity improvement over the period 2010–20 (1 percent per year or less). However, trends
differed across these regions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, total energy supply decreased slightly, and GDP
growth was among the lowest worldwide. The region is also the less energy-intensive in the world, at 3.3 MJ/USD (2017
PPP) (figure 4.5). On the other hand, in Western Asia and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, total energy supply
and GDP grew at rates higher than the global average. In absolute terms, economic output in Sub-Saharan Africa
is highly energy intensive, at 6.3 MJ/USD (2017 PPP). The figure for Western Asia and Northern Africa was 4.3 MJ/
USD (2017 PPP) (figure 4.5).

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

139

-10%
-15%
2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

-20%

Three regions (Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia and Northern
Total ﬁnal energy consumption

Activity

Efﬁciency

Structure

Africa) saw energy efficiency improvements double in 2010–20 compared with those in 1990-2010. However, theabsolute level remained relatively low, at 0.7 and 1 percent, respectively, for the last two regions.

Figure 4.4 • Growth rate of total energy supply, GDP, and primary energy intensity at a regional level, 2010–20
6%Compound annual growth rate (%)

5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
-1%
-2%
-3%
-4%

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

Northern America Central Asia andand Europe
Southern Asia
Total energy supply

GDP

OceaniaWorld

Primary energy intensity

Latin America andthe Caribbean

Sub-SaharanAfricaWestern Asia andNorthern Africa

SDG 7.3 target (Primary energy intensity)

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
GDP = gross domestic product; SDG = Sustainable Development Goal.

Figure 4.5 • Primary energy intensity at a regional level, 2010 and 2020
8

MJ/USD (2017) PPP

6

4

2

0

Latin America andthe Caribbean

Northern America
and Europe

2010 Primary energy intensity

Oceania2020 Primary energy intensity

Western Asia andNorthern Africa

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

2010 Global primary energy intensity

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

Sub-SaharanAfrica2020 Global primary energy intensity

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity.

8%

140

l growth rate (%)

6%
4%
2%

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

MAJOR COUNTRY TRENDS
Improving energy intensity in the top 20 energy-consuming countries is central to realizing SDG target 7.3, considering
these countries account for approximately three-quarters of the global GDP and energy consumption. Over the period
2010–20, 14 of these 20 countries achieved faster energy intensity improvements than the previous decade, although
only five (China, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Japan, and Germany) exceeded the level of 2.6 percent required
by SDG 7.3 (figure 4.6). In addition, intensity improvement doubled in six countries in 2010–20 compared with 1990–
2010. These are Mexico, France, Indonesia, Japan, Turkey, and Italy. This list includes both developed economies andmajor emerging economies, showing that all countries can double their energy efficiency improvement rates, despite
differences in their starting improvement levels.
However, in more than half of these 20 countries, the COVID-19 crisis reversed the trend, with energy intensity
worsening. For a quarter of them, including countries like China and the United Kingdom, which had significantly
decreased their energy intensity over the decade, 2020 turned out to be the worst year for energy efficiency.

Figure 4.6 • Primary energy intensity, 2010 and 2020; and average improvement in annual energy intensity, 1990–2010 and 2010–20, in the top 20
energy-consuming countries with the largest total energy supply
GlobalUnited Kingdom
Italy
TurkeyGermany
Indonesia
Japan
FranceMexicoBrazil
India
United States
Australia
Thailand
Korea
Saudi Arabia
China
Nigeria
CanadaRussia
Iran
0

2

4
6
8
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP USD 2017 PPP)

2020 Primary energy intensity

10

2010 Primary energy intensity

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

-4%

Average annual change in energy intensity improvement
2010-2020-5%

1990-2010

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
Note: Countries along the y-axis are ordered by total energy supply. The average annual change in energy intensity improvement is based on acompound annual growth rate.
GDP = gross domestic product; MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

141

8

6
MJ/USD (2017) PPP

In absolute terms, the energy intensity of 8 of the top 20 energy-consuming countries has remained above the global
average over the past decade (figure 4.6). Two of these, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, are also among the 25
4

countries with the highest energy intensities worldwide.
Countries where progress has been the slowest include those where energy-intensive fossil fuel extraction represents
a majorshare of GDP. These include the Islamic Republic of Iran, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation,
2and Canada. In this respect, a relatively high level of energy intensity reflects a challenge as well as an opportunity forstrategies to diversify to more knowledge-based or service-oriented economies. The annual rate of change in energy
intensity
therefore represents an important indicator and a potential policy target to track both diversification and0
Latin America andNorthern America

Oceaniaenergy efficiency
the Caribbeangoals. and Europe

Western Asia andNorthern Africa

Central Asia andSouthern Asia

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia

Sub-SaharanAfrica2010 Primaryenergyintensity countries
2020 Primary
intensity
Global primary energy
intensityintensity
2020further
Global primaryenergyintensity
On the otherhand,certainhaveenergy
madeprogress 2010
by diminishingenergybelow
theglobalaverage, including Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. While China still remains above theglobal average in energy intensity, it has diminished significantly over the past decade.

Figure 4.7 • Growth rate of total energy supply, GDP, and primary energy intensity in the 20 countries with the largest total energy supply, 2010–20
8%Compound annual growth rate (%)

6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%

SDG 7.3 target (PEI)

United Kingdom

Japan

Italy

FranceGermany

United States

MexicoAustralia

BrazilRussiaCanadaPrimary energy intensity

Korea

GDP

ThailandIndonesia

Total energy supply

Saudi Arabia

Nigeria

Iran

India

China

-6%

Turkey-4%

Global average (PEI)

Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
Note: Countries along the x-axis are ordered by total energy supply.
GDP = gross domestic product; PEI = primary energy intensity; SDG = Sustainable Development Goal.

Between 2010 and 2020, the economies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France
expanded as their energy use declined (figure 4.7). These trends suggest that economic growth is being decoupledfrom energy use. The economies of these countries have strong, decade-long records of policy action on energy
efficiency and have economic structures characterized by high-value, service-related activities that consume lessenergy. Meanwhile, in countries to the left in the above chart, such as China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, higher growth rates of energy demand are generally expected as new infrastructure
requiring energy-intensive industrial products, such as steel and cement, is being built. Many people may also be
gaining access to modern energy services for the first time, which also results in higher energy demand in the buildings
and transport sectors.

142

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

In 2020, GDP fell by approximately 3 percent globally and energy consumption declined by 4 percent due to thetemporary effects of COVID-19. This was followed by 6 percent global GDP growth and 5 percent growth in energy
demand in 2021. This means particular care must be taken while interpreting results that use 2020 as the latest year ofcomparison for energy consumption, considering it was an exceptional year.

END-USE TRENDS
A variety of metrics (as discussed in the note to figure 4.8) can be used to examine energy intensity across key sectors,
such as industry, transport, buildings, and agriculture. Over the period 2010–20, energy intensity improved at anaccelerated rate across all sectors, except the residential buildings sector (figure 4.8).
In the industry sector, which comprises highly energy-intensive economic activities, for example, cement, iron, andsteel manufacture, energy intensity improved by 1.6 percent per year, on average, during the 2010s. Energy intensity
improved at an annual average rate of 1–2 percent over 2010–20 for chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, and metals.
In manufacturing consuming less energy, annual efficiency improvements averaged at 2–4 percent per year overthe same period (IEA 2022b). This was a major improvement since sectoral energy intensity had deteriorated in thepreceding period. The progress was largely driven by emerging Asian economies, such as China and India, through,for example, more efficient manufacturing processes (IEA 2017). Furthermore, the framework for mandatory energy
efficiency policies tends to be more developed in the industry sector than any other sector around the world (IEA
2018). Industrial energy consumption declined 3 percent in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis. This decline was howevercushioned by the rising share of energy-intensive activities in China, which navigated the year with fewer restrictions.
This increase in energy-intensive activities also accounts for energy intensity deteriorating in the industry for the firsttime since the global financial crisis.
Between 2010 and 2020, energy intensity declined the fastest in the freight transport sector, at 2.2 percent annually.
This decline is steeper than the 0.4 percent annual decrease observed in 2000–10. Energy intensity for passenger
transport also improved slightly faster (at 1.9 percent a year) in the past decade than in the earlier one (1.8 percent).
In 2020, the largest decline in energy consumption was in the transport sector (falling 14%). Lower occupancy rates
in planes, trains, and public transport resulted in less efficient use of energy in the sector. Sales of new cars also fell,
resulting in an overall vehicle stock that was older and less efficient. However, electric car sales performed well in 2020,
with 3 million cars sold. This accounted for 5 percent of global car sales. To put this in context, however, sales of sportutility vehicles (SUVs) constituted about 40 percent of all passenger car sales in 2019, up from just 20 percent 10 years
earlier. Such vehicles are typically heavier and less efficient, consuming approximately 20 percent more energy than
medium-sized vehicles (IEA 2021b).
More broadly, electric vehicles saw a decade of rapid growth, which is expected to continue in the 2020s, thanks tosupportive policy frameworks, financial incentives, reducing cost, and expanding charging infrastructure. Based on
current trends and policies, the number of electric cars, vans, heavy trucks, and buses on the road is set to reach 145
million worldwide by 2030 (IEA 2021h).
The residential sector, which accounts for nearly a third of the global energy consumption, saw a slowdown in energy
intensity improvements, from 1.9 percent in the first decade of the new century to 1.1 percent annually between
2010 and 2020. The sectoral final energy demand was the least affected by the COVID-19 restrictions in 2020. It
decreased by just 0.3 percent, with a slight increase in floor area, 1.3 percent, and energy intensity improving at a pacecomparable to that in previous years.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

143

In the services sector, energy intensity improved by 1.8 percent annually between 2010 and 2020, a significant
improvement from the 0.4 percent rate in the previous decade. The sector was deeply affected by the COVID-19 crisis,with energy consumption down 6 percent and energy intensity down 3.1 percent.
Energy intensity also improved significantly for agriculture—from 0.7 percent a year in 2000–10 to 1.6 percent between
2010 and 2020. This resulted from the sector’s economic output outpacing the growth in energy demand.

Figure 4.8 • Compound annual growth rate of energy intensity by sector, 2000–10 and 2010–20
Freight transport
Passenger transport
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Residential
-3.5%

-3.0%

-2.5%

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

Compound annual growth rate (%)
2010–20

2000–10Sources: IEA, UN, and World Bank (see footnote 4).
Note: The measures for energy intensity used here differ from those applied to global primary energy intensity. Here, energy intensity for freighttransport is defined as the final energy use per tonne-kilometer. For passenger transport, it is defined as the final energy use per passenger-kilometer.
For residential use, it is defined as the final energy use per square meter of floor area. In the service, industry, and agriculture sectors, energy intensity
is defined as the final energy use per unit of gross value-added (USD 2017 PPP). In the longer term, it would be desirable to develop more refined
sectoral and end-use-level indicators that make it possible to examine energy intensity by industry (e.g., cement, steel) or end use (e.g., heating,cooling). Doing so will not be possible without more disaggregated data and statistical collaboration with relevant energy-consuming sectors.

Generation efﬁciency (%)

50%

45%

40%

Oil

144

Coal

Natural gas

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

30%

1990

35%

All fossil fuel generation

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 4.2 • Expanding the scope and scale of efficiency
The scope and scale of energy efficiency are being driven by a more systemic thinking, use of digitalization, andmore integrated policy making.
There is a growing necessity for energy efficiency given the mounting pressures to decarbonize and electrify inconjunction with emerging disruptions in clean technology supply chains and critical mineral supply risks (IEA
2023). System efficiency, encompassing circularity and efficient use of resources, can unlock energy efficiency
potential across the entire energy value chain and can reduce energy consumption in all sectors. Systematic reviewsof greenhouse gas emissions and resource flows indicate that material handling and use account for 70 percent
of greenhouse gases emitted (CGRi 2021). Driving down emissions requires expanding the boundaries of energy
efficiency beyond reducing the energy requirements of end uses such as buildings, appliances, industrial plants,
and vehicles. Circularity can dramatically improve the efficiency of systems through closing resource loops, slowing
resource loops or flows, and narrowing resource flows to reduce environmental and climate pressures, as well as
risks of raw material shocks to economies (OECD 2022). Systemwide efficiency is therefore crucial to enable costeffective decarbonization pathways.
Taking a more systemic approach—enabled by digitalization—is already showing significant improvements andpotential across a range of end uses and sectors. In this context, extending product policies to cover relevantenergy-consuming systems has the potential to reduce annual global consumption by 9 percent (17 exajoules)(4E IEA 2022b). In Europe alone, sensors and data analytics for optimizing motor-driven systems could bring
additional electricity savings of 50–100 terawatt-hours per year by 2030 (4E IEA 2022a). Further, the adoption ofenergy management systems has been shown to cut energy usage in industries and businesses by up to 30 percent(UNIDO n.d.). Buildings analytics and automation can cut energy use by one-quarter (ACEEE 2017), and smart
streetlighting can reduce energy demand by up to 80 percent (IEA 2021g).
Behavioral interventions to support energy efficiency can also be boosted by a digital inclusive systemic approach.
Behavioral interventions aim to trigger socially desirable behaviors—by removing barriers to such behaviors
or creating disincentives to socially damaging behaviors. Digital devices can simplify energy saving actions
and remove unnecessary barriers through automation and clear prompts (IEA 2021i). Successful behavioral
interventions to bolster energy efficiency have facilitated conservation by using techniques such as feedback
mechanisms, which track households’ energy consumption patterns, or targeted prompts, which alert consumers
to pay particular attention to their energy usage at peak times. Feedback mechanisms show consumers how theirenergy consumption patterns evolve throughout the day and across seasons. Consumers can be given real-time
feedback via in-home displays, mobile applications, or web portals receiving data from smart metering systems. A
2015 impact assessment by the Smart Metering Early Learning Project observed that consumers with smart meters
and in-home displays used 1.5 percent less natural gas and 2.2 percent less electricity in 2011 compared with thoseequipped with conventional meters (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 2015).
However, this is only scratching the surface of what digitally powered efficiency can do. Smarter electricity systems
can improve the productivity of renewable energy generation, reduce transmission and distribution losses, andextend asset lifetime, and they can increase systems’ efficiency, through making electricity demand more flexible.
Smarter cities can plan and orchestrate systems to reduce energy demand across buildings, transport, andservices. Moreover, digital technologies that allow for greater visibility of energy and resource usage and better
management can help deliver efficiency across resource extraction, material production, and component andtechnology manufacturing so as to enable use at different stages, including end-of-life. Digital technologies can beused to make data-driven decisions and optimize the performance of systems and processes, aside from creating
and capturing value throughout the life cycle of assets (OECD 2022). They help reduce the need for materials andChapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

145

critical minerals through resource-efficient manufacturing and product design, improve the productivity of assets,
extend products’ and assets’ life, and enhance resource recovery and material reuse. For example, the recovery
of waste heat generated by data centers, wastewater treatment, industries, and commercial sector can in somecases be connected to district heating systems through a circular economy approach. Recent research indicates thatcircular economy approaches could reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 39 percent and cut virgin resource
use by 28 percent (CGRi 2021).
Leveraging these energy efficiency opportunities requires new approaches to more integrated policies. However,Freight transport

here again, digitalization can provide part of the solution. Access to unprecedented volumes of data, which werepreviously unobservable or were only observable and collected at prohibitive costs, enables policy makers to better

Passenger
transport
understand and manage resources and waste, and this can be combined with advanced analytics to help
rethink
thedesign and operation of production and consumption systems, and energy and transportation systems.
Services
Agriculture

TRENDS IN EFFICIENCY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

Industry

The rate of improvement in global energy intensity is influenced not only by improvements in end-use
efficiency but
Residential
also by changes in the efficiency of electricity supply. These changes include reductions in transmission and distribution-3.5% due to-3.0%-2.5% supply-2.0%infrastructure-1.5%-0.5% in the0.0%
1.0%generation. After
lossesa modernized
and-1.0%
improvements
efficiency0.5%
of fossil fuelgrowth rate (%)
showing flat rates of improvement during theCompound
1990s, annual
the efficiency
of fossil fuel–based electricity generation improved

steadily between 2000 and 2020 (figure 4.9). Efficiency
improvements
in natural gas–based electricity generation
2010–20
2000–10balanced out slower improvements in the efficiency of coal- and oil-based electricity generation.

Another factor affecting the efficiency of global electricity supply is the share of renewable energy sources in the mix.
Statistically, most renewable energy technologies are treated as being 100 percent efficient, even though minor losses
do occur in the conversion of resources such as sunlight and wind into electricity. Thus, more renewable energy in theelectricity mix generally boosts the efficiency of electricity supply.

Figure 4.9 • Trends in the efficiency of global fossil fuel–based electricity generation, 1990–2020

Generation efﬁciency (%)

50%

45%

40%

Oil

Coal

Natural gas

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

30%

1990

35%

All fossil fuel generation

Sources: International Energy Agency; and United Nations Statistics Division.

146

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS
In 2020, overall energy efficiency investments declined only slightly (at nearly USD 380 billion) despite the COVID-19
crisis (figure 4.10). However, trends differed widely across sectors and regions, with Europe, China, and Northern
America accounting for nearly 80 percent of the spending. Unprecedented growth in the buildings sector, concentrated
in Europe, outweighed a substantial decrease in transport efficiency investments, whereas spending in the industry
sector remained largely unchanged. Investment in energy efficiency measures in buildings accounted for two-thirdsof the total efficiency spending in 2020. This was possible due to the scale-up of the efficiency policies implemented
before the COVID-19 crisis and the early effects of economic recovery measures (IEA 2021c).
The current energy crisis then led to accelerated energy efficiency investments, with governments, industry, andhouseholds investing USD 560 billion in 2022. This is a new record, yet it is little more than one-third of the more than
USD 1.5 trillion in yearly average investments required between 2026 and 2030 to achieve the IEA Net Zero Emissions
by 2050 Scenario. Energy efficiency–related spending constitutes two-thirds of all clean energy and energy recovery
spending, with USD 1.0 trillion mobilized between 2020 and 2022. However, there exists a regional imbalance ingovernment-approved energy efficiency spending, with the majority coming from developed economies. Governments
elsewhere have considerable potential to use recovery packages to boost spending, which would create jobs andpromote economic growth (IEA 2022b).

Figure 4.10 • Energy efficiency investment by sector, 2015–22; and by scenario, 2026–30
1,750

750

2021 USD billion

1,500
1,250

500

1,000
750
250

500
250

0

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022E

2026–30 STEPS 2026–30 NZEIndustry (energy efﬁciency)

Industry (electriﬁcation)

Buildings (energy efﬁciency)

Buildings (electriﬁcation)

Transport (energy efﬁciency)

Transport (electriﬁcation)0

Source: IEA 2022c.
NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

90%

Energy consumption covered (%)

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

10%

147

Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
Continued shortfalls in energy intensity improvement, especially in 2020 and 2021, imply that strengthened
government policies on energy efficiency are needed to meet SDG target 7.3 by 2030. Energy intensity is expected
to improve at a faster pace in 2022, but not on par with the rate now required to reach SDG 7. The current energy
crisis was a strong reminder that in addition to helping reach the target, well-designed and well-implemented energy
efficiency policies can deliver a range of benefits beyond energy and emissions savings. These include better energy
security, reduced exposure to global shifts in energy prices, reduced energy bills for households and businesses, newjobs in energy efficiency retrofits, and improved health owing to better air quality,
Strong policy action is also vital to signal investors that energy efficiency is a long-term priority. This will help to create
more certainty for investors and catalyze the transformative investments required to return the world to a path to meet
SDG target 7.3.

ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY
Governmental policy tools to improve energy efficiency can be grouped in three main categories (figure 4.11): (i)regulatory instruments mandating higher efficiency levels in buildings, appliances, vehicles, and industry; (ii) fiscal or
financial incentives to encourage installation of energy-efficient equipment and retrofits; and (iii) information programs
to help energy users make informed decisions. The following section describes some options and policies.59

Figure 4.11 • Policy package approach to strengthening energy efficiency

Source: IEA 2022e.

59
More information and examples can be found in IEA’s Global Policies Database (IEA 2022b), the World Bank’s Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable
Energy (RISE) (World Bank 2021), and the Global Status Report of Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21 2019).

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Standards and labels
More than a hundred countries now have mandatory performance standards and/or labels related to the energy
efficiency of key end uses such as air conditioners, refrigeration, lighting, industrial motors, and passenger cars (IEA
2021c). Additional or expanded standards and labeling schemes are under development in more than 20 countries,
mainly in Asia and East and Southern Africa. Regularly adjusting ambition levels to reflect the latest technological
1,750

750

progress, performance standards, and labels can add substantial reductions in energy consumption. This has been

1,500
demonstrated by well-established programs over recent decades, which delivered annual savings of about 15 percent(IEA 2021a). However, policies are still lacking in many markets seeing rapid growth in the ownership of appliances,
1,250
500

2021 USD billion

industrial equipment, and vehicles.

1,000

More broadly, performance standards and labels apply to more than a hundred types of appliances and equipment
750

in the 250
commercial, industrial, and residential sectors. However, policy coverage is often low. For example, only 40–50
500

countries have implemented minimum performance standards for washing machines, dishwashers, or TVs. As a result,250
expanding programs in countries where policies presently cover only a limited number of products offers significant

scope for0 further efficiency gains.
2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022E

2026–30 STEPS 2026–30 NZE

0Performance standards and labels
now
cover
a highIndustry
percentage
of key energy-consuming
Industry(energy
efﬁciency)(electriﬁcation)
Buildings (energy efﬁciency)end uses in Europe andNorthern America, which adopted
themearly. Globally,such
most(electriﬁcation)used for appliances. For example,
Buildings(electriﬁcation)
Transport(energypolicies
efﬁciency) areTransportminimum energy performance standards currently apply to more than 80 percent of the global energy use for air
conditioners and refrigerators; this is in comparison with less than half of the energy use for industrial motors and roadtransport (figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12 • Global energy use coverage of mandatory energy efficiency standards for key end uses, 2000, 2010, and 2022
90%

Energy consumption covered (%)

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Space cooling

Refrigeration

Lighting
2000

Displaytechnologies
2010

Wet appliances

Industrial motors

Road transport

2022

Source: IEA analysis for IEA (2022b based on CLASP (2021) and other sources.
Note: Coverage for space cooling, refrigeration, and lighting is shown for residential sectors.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

149

There is also significant variation in the strength of programs across countries. Significant scope exists for enhanced
international cooperation in this area to help governments introduce new standards, learn from others’ experience,
and adopt best practices. IEA published several policy toolkits summarizing the main tools policy makers can use toenhance energy efficiency across various sectors (IEA 2022d).

Building codes
Energy codes address a critical part of improving the energy performance of buildings. They set the minimum energy
standards for new buildings and can also trigger requirements for major refurbishments or renovations to meet
aspects of existing building codes. Building energy codes typically address operational energy use by focusing onenvelope performance standards, including for walls, windows, and roofs, as well as major end-use energy services
equipment, such as heating, cooling, lighting, and ventilation (IEA 2022b).
Thirty-one emerging and developing countries are actively developing new building codes . This is in addition to the
80 countries that already have fully operational building codes (of which 69 have mandatory requirements, and 11
use performance standards such as voluntary, model codes, or city-based standards). This means the total number ofcountries with building codes will soon be 111. Approximately 85 countries have no known building codes in placeor under development.

Energy efficiency obligation schemes
EEO schemes are commonly used market-based programs that are employed by policy makers to specify an outcome,for example, energy savings or cost-effectiveness to be delivered by a utility or another market participant (e.g., anenergy services company). Auction programs, which are related but less commonly used market mechanisms, allow
market actors to bid for funds to deliver specific energy savings.
As of 2022, there are 48 EEO programs in 23 jurisdictions. In the European Union, 16 countries are operating EEOs,
and in the United States alone, 24 states have EEOs, called Energy Efficiency Resource Standards. A new EEO waslaunched in Hungary in 2021, whereas no EEOs are being developed in Korea, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of the
EEOs in force, the vast majority encompasses multiple sectors. Only 4 percent of EEOs target the residential sector
and 2 percent are aimed exclusively for the industrial sector.

Behavior and awareness campaigns
The 2022 energy crisis also saw a new wave of behavior and awareness campaigns to help consumers reduce energy
expenditure and support energy security, especially in Europe. For example, the EU Save Energy Communication
outlined the European Commission’s two-pronged approach of promoting mid- to long-term efficiency improvements
while achieving immediate energy savings through behavioral changes. This is reflected in many national strategies,
including Denmark’s “Sammen sparer vi på energien” (Together we save energy) campaign and Germany’s “80 Millionen
gemeinsam für Energiewechsel” (80 million together for energy saving), which also provide citizens with information
to carry out home energy retrofits. In Japan, Tokyo Electric Power Company launched Power Saving Challenge 2022,
which awarded points for saving power, which could be exchanged for goods using online retailers such as Amazon.

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Box 4.3 • Recovery spending and energy efficiency
Between 2020 and April 2022, governments worldwide helped mobilize approximately USD 1 trillion for energy
efficiency–related actions. Of this, USD 270 billion was direct public spending by governments, which is projected
to mobilize a further USD 740 billion of private and other public spending (IEA 2022c). This amounts to two-thirds ofthe total clean energy recovery spending. The major share of energy efficiency–related spending targeted transport,
especially rail and urban transit, and buildings.

Figure B4.3.1 • Total energy efficiency–related government clean energy recovery spending from 2020, announced as of April 2022
Rail
Building retroﬁts
Urban transit
Low-carbon and efﬁcient vehicles
Industrial energy-efﬁciency
Other energy-efﬁciency
Vehicle charging infrastructure
AircraftEnergy-efﬁcient new buildings
Walkways and bike lanes
Freight (trucks and shipping)
Heat pumps and appliances
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

USD billion
Source: IEA 2022c.

At least 16 high-profile national plans are driving this progress on efficiency.
For instance, the energy efficiency provisions of the US Inflation Reduction Act are estimated at about USD 95 billion.
This includes
USD 20 billion of clean transportation tax credits for electric vehicles, investment in zero-emissions
2021

vehicles for the US Postal Service, public services, and zero-emissions equipment for port infrastructure. About USD 53
billion has been earmarked for energy efficiency in buildings, including tax credits for residential electrification and
2050

energy-efficient appliances. Another USD 16 billion is targeted toward the manufacturing sector, including grants and
STEPSelectric vehicle production, and tax credits for other clean manufacturing.
loans forEnergy savings is also one of the central pillars of the European REPowerEU plan. The plan foresees an increase in
2050

EU-wide energy savings from 9 percent to 13 percent of the target under the Energy Efficiency Directive, with the goal

APS the deployment rate of heat pumps to about 10 million cumulative units over 2023–27 and acceleratingof doubling

electrification, especially in industry.
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

In Japan, the Green Transformation Plan strengthened building codes and annual energy reporting systems for large-

Unabated fossilfor
fuelsdemand
Nuclearresponse
Hydro measures.
Other renewables
low emissions efficiency
Batteries investment
Demand response
scale consumers, including
ThroughOthera three-year
plan, it will

also provide subsidies of JPY 500 billion for replacing old facilities in factories and buildings.
The production-linked incentive in India aims at enhancing the competitiveness of the country’s manufacturers,
helping them attract investments in cutting-edge technology, create efficiencies and economies of scale and enhance
exports. Among others, it targets the automobile industry, specifically to encourage the manufacturing of electric andhydrogen-based vehicles.

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Campaigns have also been used to great effect outside of Europe to tackle past and current energy crises. In response
to a hydroelectricity supply crisis in Brazil during 2021, the government launched an awareness campaign alongside
financial incentives to reduce energy use at peak hours. In Korea, following large-scale blackouts in 2011, awarenesscampaigns used social media and popular culture channels, as well as conventional media and public advertisements.
The energy crisis has also seen a significant increase in support to consumers to switch to public transport. For example,
Luxembourg has implemented one of the world’s most generous public transport programs, making bus, tram, andfunicular second-class tickets free of charge in Luxembourg City and throughout the country.

POLICIES TO DRIVE DIGITALLY ENABLED SYSTEMWIDE EFFICIENCY
Digitalization is transforming the energy sector and promises to accelerate progress toward SDG target 7.3. With
proliferation of digital devices and low-cost sensors, a wealth of granular and continuously updated data is now
available to optimize energy supply and use. Over the past five years, there has been a 33 percent increase per year
in the deployment of energy-related connected devices with automated controls, the growth being for appliances,
devices, and sensors in end-users premises alone. Deployment is expected to reach 13 billion in 2023, up from 11 billion
the year before (4E EDNA 2021). Meanwhile, global smart meter deployment reached 1,134 million units, and it could
be at 1,598 million units in 2030 (IEA 2022b). Grids, appliances, smart charging, and distributed generation are also
being increasingly automated. Approximately 319 million distribution sensors are currently deployed globally, andgrid operators are steadily increasing their investments in digital grids.
Digitalization helps direct energy efficiency measures so they have the greatest effect and yield the greatest benefits.
For example, energy management systems and related technologies can significantly reduce energy consumption in
the buildings sector. In this context, smart energy management by the US General Services Administration, including
digitally enhanced energy efficiency and demand response management, could cut the operating costs of buildings by
20 percent (ACEEE 2019). The IEA 4E Technology Collaboration Programme estimates that smart home technologies
can help decrease household energy use by 20–30 percent (4E 2018).
Digitalization also offers system-wide benefits, including increased reliability and resilience, improved operational
efficiency, cost reductions, and investment optimization. This enables customers to participate more actively, including
in voluntary peak reduction schemes. In addition, digitalization can foster economic and social development. For
instance, digitally enabled mobile communication technology can play a crucial role in bringing decentralized clean
energy solutions to vulnerable urban or marginalized communities via innovative business models. These models,enabled by smart meters and two-way digital communication, have helped customers in urban, peri-urban, and rural
areas in developing countries to install efficient technologies in their dwellings by allowing them to pay back the costs
in instalments. Across Africa, 5 million people gained access to electricity through pay-as-you-go solar home electricity
systems in 2018 alone (IEA 2019). Digitalization can also help monitor and raise awareness on energy use. This canresult in actions to increase energy savings and reduce bills, which are of relevance in a number of regions, including
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Digitalization is also critical for accommodating growing shares of variable and distributed renewables. According
to IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, electricity networks will need four times more flexibility by 2050 toaccommodate increasing shares of variable renewable resources (wind, solar) (IEA 2022f). A growing share of theflexibility will be added by distributed resources and demand response (figure 4.13) .

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0

20

40

60

80

100

120

USD billion

Figure 4.13 • Electricity system flexibility by source and scenario, 2021 and 2050

2050

STEPS

2050

2021

APS

0%

20%
Unabated fossil fuels

40%
Nuclear

Hydro

Other renewables

60%
Other low emissions

80%
Batteries

100%
Demand response

Source: IEA 2022g.
Note: STEPS shows the trajectory implied by today’s policy settings. APS assumes that all aspirational targets announced by governments are met
on time and in full, including their long‐term net-zero and energy-access goals. Unabated fossil fuels include unabated coal and gas, and oil. Other
renewables include bioenergy, geothermal, and solar thermal. Other low-emissions sources include hydrogen and ammonia, and fossil fuels withcarbon capture, utilization, and storage.
APS = Announced Pledges Scenario; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

To take full advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalization, national and subnational governments should
consider developing policies to apply digital technologies comprehensively to improve efficiency and produce
positive social and economic outcomes across sectors and systems. They should, for example:•

Leverage digital tools to improve energy efficiency through behavioral change. For instance, providing consumers
with real-time energy use–related feedback helps them reduce their consumption. This can often be via connecteddigital devices, including smart meters, to alert consumers to their consumption patterns or, in cases where they
are subject to time-of-use rates, to variations in energy prices. Home energy reports are an example of a feedback
mechanism that can help reduce residential electricity consumption by 2.2 percent and natural gas consumption
by up to 1.6 percent (IEA 2021i). Japan worked with major utilities to send customized energy use reports to
300,000 households, resulting in a 2 percent sustained decrease in energy consumption. (Users TCP and IEA2020). Smart technologies such as connected thermostats also add cost-effective energy savings. Case studies
show that the installation of a thermostat alone can generate 10 percent savings on heating and space coolingcosts (US DoE n.d.).

•Leverage digital tools to increase energy savings at peak times. Several demand response programs werelaunched or expanded last year (IEA 2022e). For instance, the UK National Grid ESO launched a new program,
Demand Flexibility Service, in November to deliver more than 2 gigawatts of demand response when needed.

•

Build capacity to use digital tools. A range of actors can provide capacity building to meet differing needs. The
World Bank has set up the Utility Knowledge Exchange Platform to provide insights and peer-to-peer learning
opportunities for utilities in developing countries. In India, the India Smart Grid Forum published a smart grid
handbook for regulators and policy makers with the support of Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation. This was inresponse to a need to raise awareness about and build a common understanding of smart grids.

•

Chart the steps needed to make progress on standardization and embedded interoperability. They shouldsystematically address barriers to data access, sharing, and use, and ensure robust data protection and cyber
resilience mechanisms for the entire energy value chain. In this context, in 2021, the United Kingdom adopted acomprehensive energy system digitalization strategy and action plan (UK BEIS 2021).

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

153

•

Create innovative approaches to more integrated policies. These would also leverage data and analytics to better
design, implement, and monitor energy efficiency policies (IEA 2021f). In 2022, the European Union presented
its action plan on digitalization in energy systems to increase the efficient use of energy resources. The plan
included measures to increase consumers’ control over their energy use and ensure efficiency and circularity of
the information and communication technology sector (EC 2022), while strengthening cybersecurity.

Initiatives such as IEA’s Digital Demand-Driven Electricity Networks (3DEN) are developing recommendations for
how to accelerate the uptake of digital technologies for demand-side flexibility and energy efficiency. 3DEN outputs
include two reports:•

A report titled “Smart Grids in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies,” which is expected to be publishedin June 2023 and will focus on the near-term challenges that digitalization can help mitigate and how short- to
medium-term investments in physical and digital infrastructure can bring multiple benefits, such as grid resilienceand improved financial standing.

•A report titled “Grids of the Future,” which is expected to be published in Q4 2023 and focuses on thetransformational role that digitalization can play in supporting net-zero transitions and achieving higher powersystem efficiency.

Outlook
The rate of energy intensity improvement continues to remain below the annual 2.6 percent initially projected as aprerequisite for reaching SDG target 7.3. The COVID-19 crisis only worsened an already concerning trend, with energy
intensity improving by only 0.6 percent in 2020, compared with average annual growth of 1.2 percent over 2015–20,
and 1.8 percent between 2010 and 2015. To double the global rate of energy intensity improvement by 2030 (i.e.,
SDG target 7.3), energy intensity must improve at an average of 3.4 percent per year through 2030 to make up for slow
progress in the past. This rate would need to be even higher (consistently over 4.2 percent for the rest of this decade)to put the world on track to reach net-zero emissions from the energy sector by 2050, as envisioned in IEA’s Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 Scenario (IEA 2021d).
Estimates for 2021 point to sustained slow improvement of energy intensity as the effects of the COVID-19 crisis
continue. However, early estimates for 2022 suggest that the improvement rate will return to the average of theprevious decade, as the energy crisis puts more pressure on energy consumption. The energy crisis led to a swift
increase in energy efficiency–related investments, with USD 560 billion invested in energy efficiency by governments,
industry, and households in 2022, which is a new record (IEA 2022b).
Nevertheless, energy efficiency policies and investments in cost-effective energy efficiency measures must be scaled
up significantly to mitigate the consequences of the energy crisis, as well as bring SDG target 7.3 within reach.
Given the multiple benefits of energy efficiency, it is an obvious choice for government support, and this has beenreflected in a range of recent stimulus packages throughout the world. Energy efficiency–related spending constitutes
approximately two-thirds of the total USD 1 trillion mobilized by governments with their recovery measures between
2020 and 2022 (IEA 2022b).

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One of the benefits of energy efficiency is that improved efficiency at scale would be pivotal in achieving affordable
and sustainable energy access for all. Continued low levels of intensity improvement, the significant potential
opportunities for investment and economic recovery, and the pressing need for expanded access underline theurgency of government actions to foster annual intensity improvement of at least 3.4 percent. As underlined by therecommendations of the United Nations’ High-Level Dialogue on Energy, efficiency measures and strategies need toaddress the main barriers to the adoption of such measures and promote structural and behavioral change to support
the achievement of SDG target 7.3 (UN 2021).
Many national and subnational governments already have policies to reach their energy efficiency goals. Successfulpolicies of various types are in force around the world, including energy efficiency standards, financial incentives,
market-based mechanisms, capacity-building initiatives, and regulatory measures. All of these encourage investment
in energy efficiency and catalyze energy markets in favor of cleaner, more efficient operations. IEA published several
policy toolkits summarizing the main tools to use across various sectors (IEA 2022d).
Digitalization has also been an emerging trend reshaping the energy landscape and facilitating progress toward
improved energy efficiency. Wide-scale data collection, analysis, and application can help direct energy efficiency
measures to where they can be the most impactful. This will in turn offer significant opportunities to improve energy
efficiency outcomes. Digitalization can also support deep decarbonization by helping leverage power system flexibility
and widen energy access, thanks to innovative business models.
The technology and resources to double energy efficiency improvement by 2030 are all available. Given that, thecurrent low improvement rates and low investments point to a major missed opportunity for the global community.
Making energy efficiency a priority in policies and investments over the coming years can help achieve SDG target
7.3, promote economic development, improve health and well-being, and ensure universal access to clean andefficient energy.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

155

Methodological Notes
Total energy supply (TES) (MJ)

This represents the amount of energy available in the national territory during the reference period. It is calculated
as follows: TES = Primary energy production + Import of primary and secondary energy – Export of primary andsecondary energy – International (aviation and marine) bunkers – Stock changes (Definition consistent with International
Recommendations for Energy Statistics).
Data sources: Energy balances from the International Energy Agency (IEA), supplemented by United Nations
Statistics Division (UNSD) for countries not covered by IEA as of 2017

GDP in USD 2017 PPPThis sum is derived by adding the gross value added by all resident producers in an economy and any product taxes, thensubtracting from the result any subsidies not included in products’ value. It is calculated without making deductions for the
depreciation of fabricated assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources. GDP is measured in constant
USD 2017 PPP.
Data source: WDI database: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/

Primaryenergyinintensity
Primary energy
intensity
MJ/ inUSD (2017MJ/USD
PPP) (2017 PPP)

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
Primary energy intensity in
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =MJ/USD (2017 PPP)The ratio of TES to GDP is measured
MJ per2017
USD 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)(2017 PPP). Energy intensity indicates how
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺in (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
much
energyis usedto produce
one unitof economic
output.PPP).
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The
ratio
of TES
to GDP
is measured
in MJ
per USD (2017Energyintensitythat
indicates
how much energy is used tois usedproduceunitisofmeasured
economicThe
ratiotoone
of
TES
GDP
MJ
perratio
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intensity
indicates
how one unit of economic
produceunittoofone
economic
output.inAoutput.
lowerthat Energy
less energy
is usedto produce
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =much energy is used to produce one unit of economic output. A lower ratio indicates that less energy
output.

Energyis anindicator,output.
since changes, especially those in the structure of economic
isused intensity
to produce
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Average annual rate of
improvement in energy
intensity (%)
Averageannual rate of

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improvement
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intensity (%)
intensity (%)

Total final energy
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activity,intensity
are affected
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Calculatedusingiscompoundgrowthratechanges,(CAGR):especially those in the structure of economic
Energyintensity
an imperfectindicator,
since
activity, are affected by factors other than energy efficiency.

Calculated using
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Calculated
using
compoundannualgrowth(CAGR):
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸!" compound(!"%!#)#

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ?
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸!" is energy
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Negativevaluesintensity
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Industrial energy intensity
in MJ/USD (2017 PPP)𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
Value-added is the net output of a sector after adding
all outputsand(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Datasource:WDI
database
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 of
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)and degradation of natural resources.
without
makingdeductions
for the depreciation
fabricatedassetsor the2017
depletion
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
The
industrial𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
origin of𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
value-added
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼= is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification, revision 3.
Ratio of industrial TFEC to industrial value-added.
is measured
in MJ(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈per USD(2017
PPP).
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼It𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
2017
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)

Data source: WDI database

Services energy intensity
in MJ/USD (2017 PPP)
Services energy intensity
in MJ/USD (2017 PPP)

156

Agriculture energy
intensity in MJ/USD (2017
PPP)
Agriculture
energyData sources:
Energybalancesfrom value-added.
IEA and value-addedfrom WDI
Ratio
of industrial
TFEC
to industrial
It is measured
in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒= IEA and value-added from WDI
Data
sources:
Energy𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
balances from𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Ratio of services TFEC and services𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
value-added.
It is−measured
in MJ perUSD
(2017 PPP).
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2017
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)

Data sources:
Energyfrom value-added.
IEA and value-addedfrom WDI
Ratio
of services
TFECbalancesand services
It is measured
in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023
Data
sources: Energybalancesfrom =IEA𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
and value-addedfrom−WDI
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Value-added in 2017
USD
PPP in 2017
Value-added
Value-added
USD PPP in 2017
USD PPP

Industrial
energy inintensity
Industrial energy
intensity
in
MJ/USD(2017 intensity
PPP)
Industrial
MJ/USD (2017
PPP) energy
Industrial
in MJ/USDenergy(2017intensity
PPP)
in MJ/USD (2017 PPP)

Services energy intensity

in
MJ/USD(2017
PPP)
Services
energyServices energy
intensity
inintensity
MJ/
Services
energyintensity
in
MJ/USD(2017
PPP)
USD (2017inPPP)
MJ/USD (2017 PPP)

Agriculture energy
intensity
in MJ/USD
Agriculture
energy (2017
Agriculture
AgriculturePPP)
energy intensity
intensityin energy
MJ/USDin(2017intensity
PPP)PPP)in MJ/USD (2017
MJ/USD (2017PPP)

asof 2017Data
sources: Energy balances from IEA, supplemented by UNSD for countries not covered by IEA
Data
IEA,after
supplemented
by UNSDcountries intermediate
not covered by
IEA
as of sources:
2017 isEnergy
Value-added
the netbalances
output of froma sectoradding all outputs
andforsubtracting
inputs.
as
2017
ItValue-added
isofcalculated
makingofdeductions
for adding
the depreciation
fabricatedassetsor the depletionis without
the net output
a sector after
all outputsofand
subtracting
intermediate
inputs.
anddegradation
ofnet
naturalresources.
ofofandvalue-added
is intermediate
determinedby theValue-added
is theoutputofdeductions
a sectorTheafteraddingallorigin
outputs
subtracting
inputs.
It is calculated
without
makingforindustrial
the depreciation
fabricatedassetsor the depletion
International
Standard
Industrial
Classification,
revision3.
Itand
is calculated
without
makingdeductions
thedepreciation
fabricated assets
or the depletion
degradationof natural
resources.
Theforindustrial
originofofvalue-added
is determinedby theanddegradationof natural
resources.
The industrialof value-added is determined by theInternational
Standard
Industrial
Classification,
revision origin
3.
International
Standard
Industrial
Classification,
revision
3.
Data source: WDI database
Data source: WDI database
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Datasource: WDI
database
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼It𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
2017
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
Ratio ofof industrial
industrial TFEC
to industrial
measuredin MJ
perper
USD
(2017
PPP).
Ratio
TFEC toindustrialvalue-added.
value-added. is
It ismeasured
in MJ
USD
(2017
PPP).
Ratio of industrial TFEC to industrial value-added. It is measured in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
Ratio
ofindustrial
TFEC
toindustrial
value-added.
Itismeasured
in
MJ
per
USD
(2017
PPP).
Data sources:balancesfrom fromIEA andvalue-addedfrom WDI from WDI
Data
sources:Energy
Energybalances
IEA
and value-added
Data sources: Energy balances from IEA and value-added
WDI
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 from𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒= IEA and value-added from WDI
Data sources:
Energy𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
balances from𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2017
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
Ratio of services TFEC and services𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
value-added.
It is−measured
in MJ perUSD
(2017 PPP).
Ratio
of services TFEC and services value-added. It is measured in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
Ratio of services TFEC and services value-added. It is measured in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
Ratio
of services
TFECbalancesand services
value-added.
It is measured
in MJ per USD (2017 PPP).
Data sources:
Energyfrom IEA
and value-addedfrom WDI
Data sources: Energy balances from IEA and value-added from WDI
Data sources: Energy balances from IEA and value-addedfrom WDI𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Data sources: Energybalancesfrom =
IEA and value-added from WDI
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 2017 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
2017
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
Ratio of agriculture TFEC to agriculture 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
value-added. It 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
is measured
in MJ(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈per USD(2017
PPP).
Ratio of agriculture
agriculture TFEC
to agriculture
agriculture value-added.
measuredin in
MJMJ
per USD
(2017
PPP).
Ratio
TFEC tovalue-added.ItIt Itisis ismeasured
measured
(2017
PPP).
Ratio ofof agriculture TFEC
to agriculture
value-added.
in MJ
perper
USDUSD(2017
PPP).
Data sources: Energy balances from IEA and value-added from WDI

Data sources:balancesfrom fromIEA andfrom WDI from WDI
Data
sources:Energy
Energybalances
IEAvalue-added
and value-added
Data sources: Energy balances from IEA and value-added from WDI

Passenger transport
Passenger transportenergyinintensity
inPassenger
transport
energy intensity
MJ/
Passenger
transport
MJ/passenger-kilometerenergyinenergy intensity
intensityinpassenger-kilometer
Passenger
transport

23

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Passenger transport TFEC (MJ)

Passenger-kilometers
23
Passenger
transport
Passenger
transport TFEC
TFEC (MJ)(MJ)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
23 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ==Passenger-kilometerstransport TFEC (MJ)
Passenger
transport TFECPassenger(MJ)
Passenger transport
Passenger-kilometers
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
Ratio
passenger
transport
finalenergy
energyconsumption
to passenger
transport
activity.
It is measured in MJ per
Ratio ofofintensity
passenger
final
consumption
toPassenger-kilometers
passenger
transport
activity.
It is measured
energyin transport
Passenger-kilometers
in MJ perpassenger
passenger-kilometer.
MJ/passenger-kilometer
passenger-kilometer.
Ratio
Ratio ofof passenger transporttransport final
final energy
energy consumption
consumption toto passenger
passenger transporttransport activity.
activity. ItIt isis measured
measuredinpassenger-kilometer.
Ratio
of passenger
transport
final energy
consumption
in MJ
MJofperperpassenger-kilometer.
Ratio
passenger
transport final
energyconsumption
to passenger
transport
activity.toIt passenger
is measuredtransport activity. It is measuredDatasource:
IEA
MobilityModelsource:
IEA
Mobility
inModelMJ per passenger-kilometer.
inDataMJ perpassenger-kilometer.
Freight transport TFEC (MJ)
Data
source:
IEA
Mobility
Model
Freight transport energy
Datasource:
IEA
Mobility
Model
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =intensityin
MJ/tonneTonne-kilometers
Freighttransport TFEC (MJ)
Data
source:
IEA
MobilityModel
Datasource:
IEA
Mobility
Model
Freighttransport
energyFreight transportenergyFreighttransport energy
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = Freight transport TFEC (MJ)
kilometer
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
intensityinTonne-kilometers
Freight transport TFEC (MJ)
transport
TFEC (MJ)
Freighttransport
energy𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =Freight
intensity
in MJ/tonneMJ/tonnetransportenergyintensity inFreight
MJ/tonne-kilometer
Tonne-kilometers
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= It is measured in MJ
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
kilometer
Ratio of infreighttransport
final𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡
energyconsumption
to𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
freight transport
activity.
intensity
MJ/tonnekilometerin MJ/tonneintensity
Tonne-kilometers
Tonne-kilometers
per tonne-kilometer
Ratiooffreight
consumption
totransport
activity.
ItIt isinkilometer
kilometer
Ratio
transportfinal
finalenergy
energyconsumption
to freighttransport
activity.
It is measured
Ratio ofof freightfreight transporttransport
final
energyconsumption
to freightfreighttransport
activity.
is measured
measuredin MJ
MJ in MJ per tonne-kilometer
pertonne-kilometer
Ratio ofconsumption
freight transport
final energy
consumption
freight transport
per tonne-kilometer
Ratio
of freight transport final energy
to freighttransport
activity. It istomeasured
in MJ activity. It is measured in MJ
Data
source:
IEA
MobilityModeltonne-kilometer
pertonne-kilometer
Data
source: IEA Mobilityper
Model
Data
source:
IEA
Mobility
Model
Residential TFEC (MJ)
Residential energy
Datasource:
IEA
MobilityModel
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ="intensity in MJ/unitof floor Data
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
Residential
TFEC
(MJ)
Data
source:
IEA
Mobility𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓Modelsource:
IEA
Mobility
Model
Residential
energyResidential
TFEC(MJ)(𝑚𝑚 )energy in
ResidentialResidential
energy intensity
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
area"
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
intensityin
MJ/unitoffloor
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓")
Residential
TFEC𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(MJ)(𝑚𝑚
intensity
MJ/unit of floor Residential energy
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)Residential TFEC (MJ)
MJ/unit ofResidential
floor areain energy
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=(𝑚𝑚"area.
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=metersarea
Ratio of inresidential
to squareofresidentialbuilding
intensity
MJ/unitofTFECfloor
area in MJ/unit of floor 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
intensity
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚" )𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎floor
(𝑚𝑚
)
area
area
Ratio
building
floor
area.
Ratio
of residential
residentialTFEC
TFEC totosquaresquaremeters
metersof
residentialbuilding
Ratio ofofresidential
TFEC
tosquaremetersofofresidential
residentialbuilding
floorfloor
area.area.
Dataofsource:
IEA Mobility
Ratio metersof residential
TFEC tobuilding
squarefloor
metersof residential building floor area.
Ratio
residential
TFEC toModelsquareof residential
area.
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
Data
source:
IEA
Mobility
Model
Fossil fuel–basedDatasource:
IEA
MobilityModel
Datasource:
IEA
MobilityModel
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =(%)
electricity
generation
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
Datasource: IEA
Mobility
Model𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
Data source: IEA Mobility Model
Fossilfuel–based
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 (%)
Fossilfuel–based
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒=efficiency(%)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒=(%)
electricity
generation𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
Fossil fuel–based
electricity
generation
Fossilfuel–based
Fossil fuel–based
electricity
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(%)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(%)
efficiency(%)(%) toRatio of fossil
fuel–based (coal,oil, and gas)
power
and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
fossilfuel–based
input
electricity
generation
efficiency(%)
generation
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎TES
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, generation𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
generationelectricity
efficiency(%)
powerofgeneration.
efficiency(%) fuel–based (coal, oil, and gas) power generation and fossil fuel–based TES input toefficiency (%)
Ratio
fossilRatio of fossil fuel–based (coal, oil, and gas) power generation and fossil fuel–based TES input to
power
Ratio
fossilfuel–basedfuel–based(coal,(coal,
oil,ofandgas)powergeneration
generation
andfossilfuel–based
input
to power
generation.
Ratio
fossilfuel–based(coal, oil,and
and
gas)
power
generation
andtofossil
fuel–based
TES input topowerofofgeneration.
generation.
Ratio
fossil
oil,
and
gas)
power
fossilfuel–based
TESTES
input
Data source:
IEA Energy Balances
power generation.
power
generation.
MJ/passenger-kilometer
MJ/passenger-kilometerenergyintensity in
MJ/passenger-kilometer

Power transmission anddistribution losses (%)
PowerPower transmission
transmission andanddistribution
lossesdistribution
losses (%)
(%)
Power
transmission
andPower transmission anddistribution losses (%)
distribution losses (%)

Datasource:
IEA
EnergyBalances
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎Balances
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒Datasource:
IEA
EnergyDatasource:
IEA
EnergyBalances
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
source:IEA 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
EnergyBalancesData
source:
IEA
EnergyBalances
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑=(%)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎Data
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
Powertransmission
and
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
=
(%)
=
(%)
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜+ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
distribution
losses (%)((𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(%)= + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)(%)(%)=Where:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶++𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(+) + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
Electricity
lossesareelectricity
transmission
anddistribution
losses,
Where:
Where:
Electricity output are
main is electricity
output due to theprimary activity of producer electricity plants, andElectricity
transmission
Where:
Electricity losses
losses are electricity
electricityWhere:transmission andand distribution
distribution losses,
losses,
Where:
Electricity output
outputmain
CHP
is electricity
outputdue
fromcombinedheat
and power
plants(CHPs). losses,andElectricity
isoutputtotheprimary
activityofelectricity
Electricity
transmission
and distribution
Electricity
electricity
transmission
anddistribution
Electricitylosses
outputaremain
is electricity
electricity
outputlosses
due
toare
theelectricity
primary losses,
activityof producer
producerelectricity plants,
plants, andElectricity
lossesareelectricity
transmission
anddistribution
losses,Electricity
outputCHP
iselectricity
outputfromcombined
heat
and
power
plants(CHPs).
Electricity
outputmain
iselectricity
outputdue
totheprimaryplants,
activityandof producer electricity plants, andElectricity
outputmain
iselectricity
outputdue
totheprimary
activityofproducerelectricity
Electricity output CHP is electricity output from combined heat and power plants (CHPs).
Data source: IEACHPEnergyBalances
Electricity
outputCHPtoistheelectricity
fromand power
plantsElectricity
is electricity
outputfrom duecombinedheat
andoutput
power
plants(CHPs).heat
Electricityoutput
output mainis electricity
outputprimary
activity
ofcombined
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plants,and(CHPs).
Data
Data source:
source: IEA
IEA Energy
Energy Balances
Balances

Electricity output CHP is electricity output from combined heat and power plants (CHPs).

Data source: IEA Energy Balances
Data source: IEA Energy Balances
Data source: IEA Energy Balances

GDP = gross domestic product; MJ = megajoule; PPP = purchasing power parity; USD = US dollars; WDI = World Development Indicators.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

157

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worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/publication/rise---regulatory-indicators-for-sustainable-energy.

Chapter 4 • Energy Efficiency

159

Photo: © Gettyimages by Andrea Migliarini

CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
FINANCIAL FLOWS TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INSUPPORT OF CLEAN ENERGY

Main Messages•

Global trends. Tracking of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 7.a.1 reveals that international publicfinancial flows in support of clean energy in developing countries started decreasing before the COVID-19
pandemic and continued to do so through 2021. In 2021, these flows amounted to USD 10.8 billion, an 11.4
percent drop from 2020, 35 percent less than the 2010–19 average, and only about 40 percent of the 2017
peak of USD 26.4 billion. The downward trend in public investments is expected to have continued in 2022;
data released in 2023 will provide a clearer picture of the impacts of the energy crisis in Europe sparked by
the war in Ukraine on public financial flows. The decreasing trend in international public financial flows may
delay achievement of SDG 7, especially for least-developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries(LLDCs), and small island developing states (SIDS).

•

The target for 2030. There is no quantitative target for international public financial flows under indicator
7.a.1, but the declining trend in flows indicates that the world is not on track to meet the goal of enhancing
international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technologies for countries in need.
Given the role of financing for progress toward SDG 7 (as outlined in chapter 6, which discusses investment
needs in more detail), international public flows must increase substantially and be targeted to countries mostin need of financial aid. Directing international public flows toward clean energy solutions has become moredifficult since 2020 because of the reallocation of public resources to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic,
especially since the war in Ukraine.

•Technology highlights. Commitments continued to shift from hydropower to solar energy in 2021. Solar
attracted the largest share of flows (43 percent), followed by multiple/other renewables (33 percent) andhydropower (16 percent); wind and geothermal energy received less than 10 percent of total flows. Since 2018,
an increasing share of commitments has fallen into the multiple/other renewables category, which includes
energy funds, green bonds, and other government-led programs to support renewables, energy efficiency, andelectricity access. This category is growing in importance as interest in funding mechanisms that target multiple
energy technologies at once increases.

•

Regional highlights. International public flows declined by 13 percent in 2020 and by another 11.4 percent
in 2021, but several regions saw increases in 2021. In 2021, Northern America and Europe received 81 percent
more funding than in 2020 (an increase of USD 180 million); flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose 45 percent (anincrease of USD 1,213 million); and flows to Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia increased 23 percent (anincrease of USD 251 million). In other regions, flows declined. Latin America and the Caribbean experienced
the largest drop in international public finance, at 62 percent (a decline of USD 2,295 million). Flows declined byabout 59 percent (USD 582 million) in Western Asia and Northern Africa, 42 percent (USD 9 million) in Oceania,
and 8 percent (USD 232 million) in Central Asia and Southern Asia.

161

•

Country highlights and regional per capita flow distribution. Commitments are becoming marginally more
widely distributed, although they remain heavily concentrated. During 2010–19, 36 countries received 80
percent of all commitments; over the longer period of 2010–21, the number increases slightly to 38, including
commitments to unspecified countries and subregions without allocations.60 The share of countries that received
no commitments fell to less than 20 percent in 2021; over the past decade, only three countries received nointernational commitments. Flows to the countries most in need (LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS) fell in 2021, and thesecountries had lower flows in absolute terms than others. Their per capita allocations, however, were 1.85, 2.39 and3.23 USD per capita, all larger than the developing country average of 1.24 USD per capita.

•

Financing instrument highlights. The share of debt instruments in international public financing sources
declined steadily after 2018; in 2021, it stood at two-thirds of flows, down from nearly 90 percent in 2018. The
share of grants, equity, and guarantees increased. The increase in grants is a boon to recipient countries, asthese instruments do not carry the burden of future repayment. At the same time, the absolute decline in loan
flows—which typically make up a substantial portion of public financial flows for projects—makes it harder to secure
finance for both larger, commercially viable projects and start-ups with limited resources.

60
Such investments are termed “residual/unallocated” or “unspecified countries” when they are not specifically directed to countries. Whencommitments are residual/unallocated for a specific region, they are considered as part of the regional totals. When they are directed to unspecified
countries, this category is treated separately at the regional level.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Are We on Track?
The volume of public international financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy researchand development and renewable energy production (together referred to as renewables throughout this chapter)decreased in 2020 and 2021.61 In 2021, these flows totalled USD 10.8 billion, down 11.4 percent from 2020 (figure5.1). This level matched the investment levels of 2012, the lowest investment levels recorded over the last 10 years.
It is 35 percent lower than the average of USD 16.7 billion for 2010–19 and only about 40 percent of the 2017 peakof USD 26.4 billion.62 The trend of decreasing financial flows to support clean energy started before the COVID-19
pandemic and continued through 2021.

Figure 5.1 • Annual international public financial flows toward renewables in developing countries, by technology, 2000–2130
26.4

Commitments (USD billion)

25

21.9

20

16.6

15.8

14.2

15

11.9

10

14.0

12.6

12.6

12.2

10.8

10.8

8.3

5
1.5
0

2.0

3.1
1.4

2.2

2.2

3.3

4.3
2.9

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

Geothermal energy

Multiple/other renewables

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.
Note: The “multiple/other renewables” category is further explained on page 5 and in the methodology section at the end of this chapter.

Three main factors account for this decline. First, flows from specific donors are cyclical and variable. Second, large
shifts in public funds took place because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, methodological factors—such as changes
in exchange
rates and prices, updates to the methodology used to measure the indicator, and challenges in classifying
20
certain technologies—affect the value of commitments.

USD 15.8

2.6 times

Commitments (USD billion)

15

61
International public financial flows include official development assistance and other official flows that are transferred internationally to othercountries. They are referred to as flows, commitments, and financing in this chapter. These flows are reported at the time they were officially committed,
not at the time they were disbursed. Sixty-eight institutions or donors made commitments during the 2000–21, through 236 agencies. For more
10
information, see the methodology section of this chapter.
62
Unless stated otherwise, all commitment amounts are expressed in US dollars (USD) in 2020 constant prices and exchange rates. Constantamounts are adjusted for inflation rate changes in USD
commitment
provider countries as well as changes in exchange rates between the provider currency
6.2
and the USD over the same period. For more information, see the methodology section of this chapter.

50

Chapter 5 • International
Financial
Flows to Developing
Countries 2010
in Support2011of Clean Energy
2008
2009
2012
2005 Public
2006
2007

Renewables

Hydropower

Solar energy

2013

2014

Wind energy

2015

2016

2017

Geothermal energy

2018

2019

2020

2021

Multiple/other renewables

163

Commitments (USD

15.8
14.2

15

11.9

10

14.0

12.6

12.6

12.2

10.8

10.8

8.3

Change in the investment landscape for hydropower is one of the drivers behind the decline in international flow of
4.3

3.3 investments
5 finance. Historically,
publichydropower
made up about a third of all public investments. Except for three
3.1
2.9
2.2

2.0

2.2

1.5
1.4 from China in 2017, the number of investments in hydropower projects has been declining sincemajor commitments

2013. Over the past decade, excluding the exceptional flows in 2016 and 2017, annual commitments for hydropower0

investments
ranged
USD2007
17 billion.
2000 2001
2002 from2003 USD
2004 10
2005to2006
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

Geothermal energy

Multiple/other renewables

Public investment flows fluctuate widely, with hundreds of commitments, including multibillion-dollar ones, in someyears and fewer and smaller commitments in others. For this reason, a five-year moving average provides a moremeaningful analysis of the trend over time (figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 • Five-year moving average of international public financial flows to renewable energy, by technology, 2010–21
20
USD 15.8
2.6 times

Commitments (USD billion)

15

10
USD 6.2
5

0

2005

2006

2007

Renewables

2008

2009

Hydropower

2010

2011

Solar energy

2012

2013

2014

Wind energy

2015

2016

2017

Geothermal energy

2018

2019

2020

2021

Multiple/other renewables

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

The moving average for the five years ending in 2021 was USD 15.8 billion, 2.6 times larger than the moving averagefor the five years ending in 2010 of USD 6.2 billion. In 2021, it dropped by 12 percent, from USD 18 billion in 2020.
The trend toward smaller investments per commitment is reflected by the five-year moving average of USD 8.5 million
per commitment in 2021, down from USD11.4 million in 2020. The average commitment in 2021 was as low as it wasin 2008, during the global financial crisis.
The downward trend in public investments is expected to continue in 2022. The five-year moving average in 2022
will not include the all-time high of 2017, making it unlikely that 2022 flows will equal or surpass the USD 26.4 billion
five-year average of 2017. Flows might still outpace expectations and show resilience against the downward trend,
however, revitalizing public investment in countries in need of financial support. As a growing number of donor
countries and institutions are committing to ending support for fossil fuels, there is a chance for these resources to bechannelled into enhanced support for renewable energy in developing countries (COP26 Presidency 2021).

164

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Looking Beyond the Main Indicators
Looking at the 7.a.1 indicator in multiple ways helps identify the directions of international public flows in terms oftechnologies, geographical regions, countries,63 and financial mechanisms, as summarized below.

TECHNOLOGY TRENDSInternational public investors categorize international public flows to clean energy by the type of renewable energy
involved: hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, and multiple/other (figure 5.3).64 The categorization of multiple/otherrenewables is more complex because of unclear commitment descriptions in financial databases and a lack of detailon the financial breakdown for each technology. This category also includes bioenergy commitments which arealmost negligible; multipurpose financial instruments, such as green bonds and investment funds; and commitments
targeting a broader range of technologies, such as renewable energy and electrification programs, technical assistanceactivities, energy efficiency programs, and other infrastructure-supporting renewable energy.

Figure 5.3 • Share of international public financial flows to renewable energy, by type of energy, 2010–21
100%

Share of commitment amounts (%)

24%
80%
6%
60%

11%
4%

27%

28%

21%

19%

25%

8%
7%

4%
6%

9%

10%

9%

13%

5%
5%

55%

54%

24%
20%

53%
41%

36%

2010

2011
Hydropower

2012

2013
Solar energy

2014

2015
Wind energy

43%

28%

47%

40%

28%

17%
0%

6%
11%

49%

20%

46%

7%
6%

17%

40%

45%

5%
8%
17%

19%

33%

36%

9%

14%

27%

24%

24%

2016

2017

2018

Geothermal energy

21%

20%

16%

2019

2020

2021

Multiple/other renewables

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

The multiple/other renewables category is growing in importance as there is increasing interest in funding mechanismsthat target multiple energy technologies at once. Financing including public, private, international, and domestic flows
and issuances of green, social, sustainable, and sustainability-linked (GSSS) bonds in developing countries tripled

64

$50

The “multiple/other renewables” category is further explained in the methodology section at the end of this chapter.

39.1

$40
itments (USD billion)

100%

47.4

In this chapter, the word country refers to a territory, area, or other unspecified location within the scope of SDG 7.a.1.

35.1
$30

28.4

30.0
18.3

80%

14.4

28.9

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support19.4
of Clean Energy25.4

17.2

27.0

55%
24.4

60%

ows to renewables (%)

63

165

in 2021, reaching USD 159 billion (IRENA and CPI 2023).65 Lack of consensus among governments, internationalorganizations, and multilateral development banks on how to categorize climate financial flows based on technologies
is causing diverging classifications (Shishlov and Censkowky 2022) and increasing the share of flows grouped undermultiple/other renewables. This misalignment of classifications may exclude flows from this dataset altogether andreduce the accuracy of this tracking exercise. (This issue was briefly discussed in the 2020 edition of this report.)
The shift from hydropower to solar energy commitments continued in 2021. Solar energy attracted the largest shareof flows (43 percent), followed by flows to multiple/other renewables (33 percent) and hydropower (16 percent). Windand geothermal energy received less than 10 percent of flows. The dominance of solar power is also reflected acrossthe broader landscape of renewable energy investments globally (public and private investments, including domestic
flows across all countries). In 2021, solar technologies (mainly photovoltaic [PV]) accounted for 53 percent of global
investments, followed by wind (41 percent), bioenergy (4 percent), and hydropower (2 percent) (IRENA and CPI 2023).
Substantial changes in the distribution of flows in 2016 and 2017 reflected abnormally large commitments andincreases in the volume of investments. Since 2018, there have been no large single-project commitments to shift
the technology mix and skew the flows. Trends since 2018 therefore provide clearer insights into annual investments
across technologies: Flows to hydropower declined, overtaken by commitments to solar energy and multiple/otherrenewables.
The five-year averages are bell curve–shaped, with different time horizons. Wind energy and hydropower were thefirst to peak, in 2017, at USD 1.6 billion and USD 7.1 billion, respectively. The year after, geothermal energy peaked,
at USD 1.2 billion. In 2020, solar energy and multiple/other renewables peaked at USD 5 billion and USD 5.8 billion,
respectively. Unless large commitments manifest in the coming years, this pattern will continue, reflected by lower fiveyear averages for overall and technology-specific flows.
Some 675 million people still lack electricity access as highlighted in Chapter 1. Given the importance of off-grid
renewable energy solutions in closing the energy access gap, it is encouraging to see donors and other actors
increasing flows to these solutions. Although these investments still represent a small portion of the overall financing
of energy access and renewables, they are a crucial, and cost-effective, part of closing the access deficit.
At the same time, current investment levels fall far short of the USD 15 billion needed in the sector each year between
2021 and 2030 (ESMAP 2022; ESMAP and others 2022). Support will be needed on the supply side for off-grid solar
companies and on the demand side to enhance affordability for consumers (mainly through public funding). Box 5.1
provides an overview of investment trends in developing countries in the off-grid sector.

65
IRENA and CPI (2023)’s analysis of the global landscape of renewable energy finance has a broader coverage than the main indicator of interest in
this chapter under SDG 7.a.1. It covers renewable energy investments in both developed and developing economies and considers both (i) public andprivate investments, and (ii) domestic and international flows. International public financial flows (as analyzed in this report) therefore make up a small,
although important portion of overall financial activity for renewable energy globally.

166

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

50%

50

25
61

1 – 2.5 USD
less than 1 USD
No investment

29

25%
49
29

25

Box 5.1 • Off-grid renewable energy 0%
investments in developing countries, 2010–21
2010

2021

2010-21

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout, investments in the off-grid renewable energy sector
continued to grow in the last three years, bringing electricity to millions of people. Annual investments in off-grid
renewable energy reached a record high of USD 558 million in 2021 (Wood Mackenzie 2022). Recent growth has
been driven by investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly East Africa and more recently West Africa. The scopeof investments has gradually expanded from residential to commercial and industrial applications.

Figure B5.1.1 • Annual financial flows to renewable energy, by instrument, 2010–21
600

558

Commitments (USD billions)

500
409

400

438

467

438

331
300

264

200
110

100
0

23
2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Development Finance Institutions

Private equity, venture capital, and infrastructure funds

Institutional investors

Individuals (including crowdfunding platforms)

Government agencies and intergovernmental institutions

Corporations and business associations

Commercial ﬁnancial institutions

Other (including nonproﬁt/impact funding)

Undisclosed

Source: Adapted from Wood Mackenzie (2022a).

Support from international public financial institutions was vital for the sector in 2020–21, when the share of publicfinancing climbed from 30 percent in 2015–19 to 44 percent, as public financial institutions provided USD 435 billion
in support. Development finance institutions provided much of this capital. Their commitments exceeded those ofprivate equity, venture capitalists, and infrastructure funds, which dominated the sector before the pandemic. Morethan 80 percent of the investments were international flows, highlighting the importance of this source of publicfinancing for the off-grid sector.
Source: IRENA and CPI 2023.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

167

REGIONAL TRENDSInternational public flows decreased by 13 percent in 2020 and fell another 11.4 percent in 2021. Several regions saw
increases in 2021, however (figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4 • Annual international public financial flows to renewable energy, by region, 2010–21
$30
26.4
0.7
1.0

$25
21.9
1.0
0.5

Commitments (USD billion)

$20

3.3

3.4
3.1

16.6
$15

$10

$5

$0

11.9
0.9
1.1
2.1
0.8

4.9
1.9
2010

12.6
0.5
2.9
1.4
2.8
1.8
3.0
2011

14.2

1.9

2.2

2.7

10.8
0.5
1.6

1.0

3.2

3.3

2.0

3.4

5.2

1.9
2012

2013

2.0
6.6

3.4
12.6
0.8
1.4
2.4
2.2

4.8

7.6
4.2

2015

2016

15.8
0.5
0.9
2.3

14.0
0.6
1.2
0.9
1.9

2.9

2.6

2.2

2.2

4.4

4.5

2018

2019

2.5

5.7

5.3

2.9
2014

3.8

5.4

2017

12.2
0.5
1.1
1.0
3.0
3.7
2.7
2020

10.8
0.6
1.2
2.9
1.4
3.9
2021

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

Central Asia and Southern Asia

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Northern America and Europe

Unspeciﬁed countries

Oceania

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

Regional changes from 2020 to 2021. In 2021, flows to Northern America and Europe66 rose 81 percent (USD 180
Average for ﬁve years ending in year shown (USD billion)

6 flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose 45 percent (USD 1,213 million); flows to Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
million);rose 23 percent (USD 251 million); and flows to “unspecified countries”67 rose 4 percent (USD 21 million).
5

Flows to other regions declined. Latin America and the Caribbean experienced the largest drop in international publicfinance,
4 with a decrease of 62 percent (USD 2,295 million). Flows to Western Asia and Northern Africa fell by about

59 percent (USD 582 million), flows to Oceania fell 42 percent (USD 9 million), and flows to Central Asia and Southern
Asia fell
3 8 percent (USD 232 million).
2
1

66“Northern America and Europe” is included as a region for the first time this year. It captures flows to eight countries in Europe (Albania, Belarus,
0
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine). No data were recorded for Northern America. The
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
region is nevertheless referred to as Northern America and Europe, following the United Nations’ M49 regional classification.

Centralrefers
Asia andAsia to multiple countries
Eastern Asiaorand
South-easternnot
Asiadirected to a specific
Latin America
andthe Caribbean
67“Unspecified countries”
to Southerncommitments
commitments
region.
Regional
bonds and funds
and umbrella loans for multiple
usually
fall into this category.
Northernprojects
America andEuropeOceania
Sub-Saharan Africa
Unspeciﬁed countries

168

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

$0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

Central Asia and Southern Asia

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Northern America and Europe

Unspeciﬁed countries

Oceania

Given annual fluctuations, five-year averages provide a clearer picture of regional trends (figure 5.5)

Average for ﬁve years ending in year shown (USD billion)

Figure 5.5 • Five-year moving average of international public financial flows to renewable energy, by region, 2004–21
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Central Asia and Southern Asia

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

Northern America and Europe

Oceania

Sub-Saharan Africa

Unspeciﬁed countries

Western Asia and Northern Africa

2021

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

Sub-Saharan Africa was the top recipient in 2021, with a five-year average of USD 3.9 billion (36 percent of allcommitments). Annual commitments decreased by 1.2 percent in 2021, but the decrease was significantly less thanin other regions. The five-year average commitments to the region more than doubled between 2010 and 2021,
with hydropower projects attracting significant investment, especially from China, and notable commitments to solar
energy.
Funding for hydropower projects in Sub-Saharan Africa dropped to less than 10 percent of flows in 2021, and multiple/
other flows reached 45 percent, revealing significant diversification of investments. About 43 percent of 2021 flows(USD 1.7 billion) were in the form of grants – which do not add to the existing burden of debt for the region; standard
loans represented less than 15 percent of the total.
Considering the broader landscape of renewable energy investment (including both private and domestic flows
across developed and developing economies), Sub-Saharan Africa attracted less than 1 percent of overall investments
in 2021, despite its high renewable energy potential and unmet energy needs (IRENA and CPI 2023).
The five-year average for Central Asia and Southern Asia was USD 2.8 billion in 2021, more than any other region
except Sub-Saharan Africa. The figure dipped for the first time since 2010, dropping by 5.9 percent (from USD 3.5
billion in 2020 to USD 3.3 billion in 2021). These five-year average flows were almost five times greater in 2021 thanin 2010, thanks to steady increases in funding for solar and wind energy as well as occasional large hydropower
projects. Growth in the region is largely dependent on standard and concessional loans, with only some small equity
investments, however. The multimillion dollar debt agreements with banks, governments, and other development
agencies could lead to debt sustainability issues.
Looking at the broader renewable energy investment (including both private and domestic flows across developed
and developing economies), Central Asia and Southern Asia attracted less than 3.3 percent of global investments in
2021 (IRENA and CPI 2023).

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

169

Latin America and the Caribbean received commitments of USD 1.4 billion in 2021 (13 percent of the total), its
lowest inflow since 2009. The region experienced the largest annual decrease of any region in the last several years.
In 2021, public flows to the region were around one-third of the high of 2020 (USD 3.7 billion). In 2020, Latin America
and the Caribbean was the only region to experience an increase in flows, driven by a USD 400 million credit line toParaguay and a USD 300 million COVID-19 recovery package for Costa Rica.
The five-year average for the region decreased by over 23 percent, from USD 3.7 billion in 2020 to USD 2.9 billion in
2021, indicating that the slowdown in investment is worsening. The 108 percent growth in the five-year average overthe period was also lower than the global average of 157 percent.
The region saw large investments in renewable energy auctions and hydropower projects over the past decade, but
a global slowdown in these projects has reduced the interest of investors in targeting the region. Investors prefer touse standard and concessional loans in the region; provision of grants, equity, guarantees, and credit lines is limited.
Zooming out to the broader landscape of renewable energy investment (including both private and domestic flows
across developed and developing economies), Latin America and the Caribbean attracted 5 percent of global
investments in 2021 (IRENA and CPI 2023).
In 2021, Western Asia and Northern Africa, a region that has been experiencing a slowdown in international public
flows over the last decade received USD 400 million in commitments, a 59 percent decline from the USD 983 million
in 2020. In 2021, standard and concessional loans comprised the largest shares of flows. They went to solar energy(32 percent) and multiple/other renewables (67 percent). These flows took the form of credit lines to governments,
combined renewable energy investments, government support programs, and unclassified or improperly classified
commitments.
The five-year average confirms this trend. Although average annual commitments doubled between 2010 and
2021 (less than the average increase of 157 percent across regions), there was a 26 percent decrease in averagecommitments (the largest among regions), which fell from USD 2.3 billion in 2020 to USD 1.7 billion in 2021. Thisdeclining trend can be attributed to reduced commitments from top investors and the decline in interest in solar
energy investments, which dominated between 2014 and 2019.
In 2021, countries in Northern America and Europe received USD 400 million, up from USD 221 million in 2020
but down from the all-time high of USD 1.2 billion in 2019. The five-year average declined by 1.5 percent, from
USD 752 million in 2020 to USD 741 million in 2021. Most flows were directed to multiple/other renewables and windenergy, as the potential for renewable energy in these countries limits the attraction of flows to other technologies.
Funded projects included government programs for technology scale-ups, governance, international cooperation,
capacity building, and maintenance operations, as well as retro-fitting projects and various umbrella plans supporting
renewables. Debt instruments and equity were the main forms of investment in this region.
Commitments to Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia rose slightly to USD 1.3 billion, in 2021, up from USD 1.1
billion in 2020 and USD 912 million in 2019. This region received 12 percent of all investments in 2021, the same shareit has received since 2010.
The five-year average trend declined by 17 percent in 2021 to USD 1.9 million, down from USD 2.2 billion in 2020. It
has grown 121 percent since 2010.
Historically, the region attracted flows to hydropower projects. More recently, flows included more investments in solar,
wind, and geothermal energy. The region’s large hydropower and geothermal projects cause flows to vary widely fromyear to year. Standard and concessional loans continue to be the most common form of funding for this region.

170

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Reviewing the broader landscape of renewable energy investment globally (including both private and domestic
flows across developed and developing economies), the region attracted 56 percent of global investments in 2021
(IRENA and CPI 2023).
A total of USD 568 million went to unspecified countries in 2021, a 4 percent increase from the previous year but still
lower than the USD 609 million in 2019. Because of the multi-technology, regional, or global nature of these flows, thiscategory includes a larger proportion of equity investments (18 percent of flows in 2021 and 14 percent since 2000).
The five-year average of annual commitments to unspecified countries has been steady, at around USD 550 million,
since 2017. Because of their underlying financial mechanisms (green bonds, regional funds, and international grants),
these funds are often directed to multiple regions or countries. In recent years, some of these commitments havebeen directed to COVID-19 recovery packages for renewables and energy efficiency in multiple countries, as well as
technical assistance and knowledge products.
Oceania received the least investment of all regions, at just USD 12 million in 2021 (0.5 percent of the total), down 42
percent from the USD 21 million received in 2020. It received USD 135 million in 2019.
The five-year average shows an annual decrease of 6.5 percent in commitments to the region. Historically, commitments
were directed to solar energy and multiple/other renewables in the form of technical assistance and government
support programmes. Oceania stands out for the type of financial instruments used, with almost two-thirds of historiccommitments in the form of grants.
Box 5.2 describes the sources of international public flows by country and instrument, share of flows directed towards
technologies, as well as recipients’ share of flows.

Box 5.2 • International public flows to renewables: Who’s funding what and to whom?
Donors. Most international public flows to renewables since 2000 have come from China, followed closely byGermany, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), EU institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), the United States, Japan, the Asian Development Bank, and France. Together, these nineinvestors account for three-fourths of all funding; another 59 institutions supplied the remaining funds.
Figure B5.2.1 shows how much money is flowing from donors, by financial instrument, type of renewable energy,
and region. The sizes of the channels are proportional to the flow amounts, shown as values in 2020 USD billions.
Financial instruments. Debt instruments (including standard loans, concessional loans, bonds, reimbursable
grants, and other debt securities) have been the primary financial instrument. Debt finance is also common, because
investments tend to be capital-intensive, with a fixed element in the cost and revenue structure of the underlying
asset. Renewable energy projects require high initial capital expenditure and are often underpinned by long-term
power purchase agreements or regulated remuneration. Concerns about debt sustainability have increased in many
countries, particularly since COVID-19.
Grants are the second-largest instrument. Although they make up less than 10 percent of flows, they play a key rolein both funding projects and helping attract private capital. Going forward, grants; concessional debt financing(denominated in local currencies); and other innovative, non-debt funding mechanisms can help meet the fundingneeds of countries while ensuring that these flows do not increase their debt burden.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

171

Figure B5.2.1 • International public flows to renewables by donors, financial instrument, technology, and recipient region, 2000–21

Total USD 211 billion

China: 52.7

Sub-Saharan Africa: 57.8
IBRD: 12.8
Hydropower: 85.0

IFC: 14.7

Central Asia andSouthern Asia: 38.8

Japan: 11.1
Debt: 179.3

ADB: 9.4

Eastern Asia andSouth-eastern Asia: 28.4

Multiple/other renewables: 58.0
Germany: 17.5

Latin America andthe Caribbean: 45.1

France: 9.3
Solar energy: 43.2
Equity: 8.5

Northern America
and Europe: 6.6

Other donors: 59.0
Grants: 19.9

EU Institutions: 13.1

Mezzanine Finance: 0.5

Geothermal energy: 9.8

Unspecified countries: 6.1
Oceania: 1.2

Wind energy: 15.1

Guarantees and Other: 2.3

Western Asia andNorthern Africa: 26.9

United States: 11.3

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

Technologies. Hydropower projects received the highest level of debt financing, followed by multiple/otherrenewables and solar energy. They did so partly because of the underwriting process of multilateral developmentbanks, which assess project risks and profitability before approving loans so that commercial banks canunderwrite development projects, which must follow specific guidelines. Most grants went to multiple/otherrenewables, as they targeted multi-technology funds, programs, and grant requirements. Countries can meet
grant requirements with policy plans or programs to roll out multiple renewables.
Recipients. Over the last two decades, all regions received even amounts of commitments, except in the area ofhydropower investment, which is more predominant for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Renewable technology
choices for investment were also distributed equally across regions, except for hydropower.
The data highlight the significant role of China and other top investors in financing renewable energy, as well as
the dominance of debt as the preferred financial instrument.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

COUNTRY TRENDS
During 2010–19, 36 countries received 80 percent of all commitments. Over 2010–21, the number was 38 (figure 5.7),
including commitments to unspecified countries and subregions without allocations.
The slightly improved distribution is a result of several factors. First, fewer investments are now allocated to specificcountries; signalling that more commitments are distributed to multiple countries. Second, expanding the analysis tocover a longer period flattens the variability of flows and reveals a more even distribution. Third, although the numberof donors investing in renewables decreased in 2020–21, the top investors slightly increased the number of recipients
they support.

Figure 5.6 • International public financial flows to renewable energy by top recipients, by type of energy, 2010–21
100

20

90

18 17.2

80
70

14

60

12

11.2

50

10

40
30
4.8 4.6 4.54

4.4 4.1

3.7

3.4 3.2 3.0

Hydropower

Solar energy

Wind energy

ZambiaViet Nam
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of)GuineaColombia

South Africa

MexicoUgandaChile

EcuadorBrazil

China

Kenya

Argentina

Egypt

R/U: SSA

MoroccoUnspeciﬁed countries

Lao PDR

Indonesia

Türkiye

Ethiopia

Nigeria

India

0

Pakistan220
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2Geothermal energy

2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7

Kazakhstan

5.3 4.8 4.8

Nepal
the Democratic Republicof Congo
R/U: LatAm
Honduras

5.5

Cambodia

6.2 6.1

6

UkraineBolivia (Plurinational
State of)
Peru
Jordan

6.7

Cameroon

7.5 7.2

Costa Rica

7.9 7.7

8

Bangladesh

Commitments (USD billion)

16

Cumulative commitments (%)

22

Multiple/other renewables

100

Cumulative commitment

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.
Note: R/U = residual/unallocated official development assistance; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; LatAm = Latin America and the Caribbean; Lao PDR =the Lao People’s Democratic Republic"

TOP RECEIVING COUNTRIES IN RECENT YEARS
Although the distribution of flows is wider when averaged over several years, international public financial flows remain
100highly25
concentrated among a small group of countries, with 23 countries receiving 80 percent of all commitmentsin2020. In 2021, the number of countries receiving most of the commitments was even smaller, with only 19 countries
Commitments (USD billion)

Brazil, and Mexico.68
1560

Share of commitments to LDCs (%)

receiving
20 the bulk of flows. India was the top recipient of international flows for the past two years, followed by Pakistan,
80

68
The UN system does not define “developing country.” This chapter is based on a list of developing countries that the UN Statistics Division uses forstatistical
10uses (UNSD 2022). This report adapts that list to exclude countries that are not targeted by international aid and territorial entities associated40with high-income countries.

5

13%

13%

4.9
4.1
3.0
2.5
0.8
2010Public Financial
2011 Flows2012
2015Energy 2016
Chapter 5 • International
to Developing2013
Countries in2014
Support of Clean
0

1.5

3.7

Commitments to LDCs

Non LDC

4.5
2017

18%

3.1

2.9

1.6

2.0

2018

2019

2020

2021

Share of Commitments to LDCs

20
0

173

India received USD 2.9 billion in 2020–21, or more than 8 percent of all commitments in the past two years. Itsconsistent pipeline of a vast array of smaller projects reduces the volatility of flows from one year to another. India has
been the top recipient for 6 out of 22 years, more than any other country. The United States, the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), and Germany were the top donors. Solar energy received more than two-thirds of inflows. During 2020–
21, 90 percent of flows were debt, of which 76 percent were standard loans. This growing market for renewables
attracts large volumes of loans for project development, particularly on-grid solar PV (USD 1,093 million) and off-grid
solar PV (USD 616 million).
Pakistan was the second-largest recipient, with USD 1.7 billion in 2020–21. In 2020, 70 percent of commitments toPakistan went to hydropower, which increased to 82 percent in 2021. Debt instruments made up more than 90 percentof commitments between 2010 and 2021. During this period, various multilateral development banks, including the
IBRD, the ADB, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Islamic Development Bank, were the top
providers of funds.
Brazil is not typically a top recipient of international public financing, because its own development bank, BNDES,
channels significant domestic public flows to renewable energy projects. Nonetheless, the country received USD 1.4
billion in international public financial flows, in the form of concessional loans, in 2020–21. As Brazil’s development bankalready funds many infrastructural projects, the majority of international public flows support government programsor are used to capitalize climate action funds. Some international public money did flow to specific projects, such as
the Casablanca PV Bifacial Solar Power Project and the Neoenergia Green Renewable Energy Generation Framework
Loan. During 2020–21, the European Investment Bank (EIB), Japan, and the Inter-American Investment Corporation(IDB Invest) were the top international donors in Brazil.
Mexico has attracted increasing flows (predominantly loans) since 2010. Many fund new solar PV projects, likely driven
by the 2013 energy reform, which allowed more international developers into the country, and the subsequent roundsof successful renewable energy auctions. Notable flows during 2020–21 included a USD 241 million loan from the US
International Development Finance Corporation to finance half of the cost of 426 MW of solar PV, a USD 100 million
concessional loan from the Japan International Co-operation Agency to support a solar PV power plant, and a USD 226
million loan from the French Development Agency for the modernization and rehabilitation of hydropower plants.

Reaching those farthest behind
Analyzing the flow of international public finance to support renewable energy in the 46 LDCs, 32 LLDCs, and 40
SIDS69 yields insights into flows to the poorest countries.70
Historically, LDCs received a small share of international public flows (figure 5.7). Flows to LDCs decreased in the past
two years, dropping to USD 1.6 billion in 2020 and USD 2 billion in 2021.

69
The United Nations’ M49 regional classification includes 53 SIDS; this report excludes 13 of them from the SDG 7.a.1 classification, as explainedin the methodology section at the end of the chapter. The exclusion has a negligible effect on the analysis, as only Saint Kitts received financial flows(totaling to USD 19 million, or less than 0.6 percent of all flows received by SIDS since 2000).
70
The country categories are regularly updated in line with the United Nations’ latest M49 classification. There were no changes during 2022. Somecountries appear in more than one category.

174

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

25

100

20

80

Share of ﬂows (percentage)
Commitments (USD billion)

100

15
80
10

2%
7%
0.0%

4%
1%
8%
0.0%

2%
6%
0.0%

28%

17%

26%

4%
13%
0.0%
20%

60

5

13%

0

1.5

40

4%
2%
7%
0.0%

2%
5%

4%
0.0%

10%
0.0%

30%

2%
7%
0.2%

8%

6%
7%
1.9%

17%
21%

22%

27%

2%
7%

4%
5%

14%

15%

3.3%

0.6%

22%
40

18%
22%

1.8%
20
22%
0

17%
13%
3.7

2010

63%

4.9

2011

0.8
2012

69%

65%

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

2013

2.5
2014

Commitments to LDCs
62%

57%

4.1

3.0

2015

2016

4.5
2017

Non LDC

3.1

2.9

1.6

2.0

2018

2019

2020

2021

10%
60

Share of commitments to LDCs (%)

Figure 5.7 • International public financial flows to renewable energy in least-developed and non-least-developed countries, 2010–21

Share of Commitments to LDCs
73%

66%

61%

57%

56%

53%

20

44%

For the first time, all 46 LDCs received international public flows in 2020 (although 5 of them did not receive anyflows in 2021). These flows have been increasingly concentrated in a few countries, with the Lao People’s Democratic
0 Uganda, Zambia, Guinea, and Ethiopia attracting half of the flows in 2021, despite being home to just 19
Republic,
2010

2011

2012

percent of the people living in LDCs.
Loan

2013

Concessional loan

2014

2015

Other debt

2016

Grants2017

Equity2018

2019

Guarantees and Other

2020

2021

Mezzanine Finance

LLDCs and SIDS receive even less financial support than LDCs (figure 5.8). The 32 LLDCs face trade and development
challenges because of their lack of sea access and geographical remoteness. There has been a declining trend in
standard loans, from 83 percent in 2015 to 19 percent in 2021, and a concomitant rise in concessional loans, grants,
and equity investments. The share of flows to LLDCs increased slightly in 2020 before falling to 12 percent in 2021. All
LLDCs except Burundi and the Central African Republic received commitments in 2020 or 2021.

Figure 5.8 • International public financial flows to least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states,
2010–21
6

Commitments (USD billion)

5
4
3
2.0
2

1.3

1
0

0.2
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014
LDCs

2015

2016
LLDCs

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

SIDS

Source: IRENA and OECD 2023.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

175

The 40 SIDS are geographically remote, depend heavily on external markets, and are particularly vulnerable to climatechange. Historically, they received less than 2 percent of international public commitments. This share increasedslightly to 2.4 percent in 2020 and 2.5 percent in 2021. However, this relative increase hides an absolute decrease inflows from USD 338 million in 2019 to USD 300 million in 2020 and USD 198 million in 2021.
Flows to SIDS reflect an even distribution to the population, with 70 percent of flows going to countries where 70
percent of the population lives. However, four SIDS (Grenada, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, and French Polynesia)
have not received more than USD 10 million of international public flows since the start of the millennium. Positively,
45 percent of flows to SIDS since 2000 have been in the form of grants.
LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS struggle with high debt burdens, which limit their capacity to develop and mitigate thechallenges posed by climate change (box 5.3).
Distribution of financial flows among countries
Figure 5.9 shows the average distribution of per capita international public financial flows across countries between
2010 and 2021. The number of countries that did not receive any commitments decreased to less than 20 percent
in 2021. Over the past decade, only three countries received no international public commitments. Most countries
receiving more than USD 5 per capita are island countries in Oceania.

Figure 5.9 • Average per capita international public financial flows for renewable energy, by country, 2010–21

Average country commitment
per capita (USD), 2010-2021:
Less than 1
1–2.5
2.5–5
More than 5
No investment
Not applicable
IBRD 47238 |MAY 2023

Source: The data on international public financial flows to developing countries supporting clean energy underlying this map were drawn from IRENA
and OECD (2023).
Disclaimer: This map was produced by the Geospatial Operations Support Team of the World Bank based on the Cartography Unit of the World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown do not imply any judgment on the part of the custodian agencies concerning
the legal status of or sovereignty over any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

176

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

most climate-vulnerable nations – in debt distress or at highmade solutions to the rising debt vulnerabilities of Africa

risk of it. This concerns 19 of the 35 low-income countries inand other developing countries. Such endeavours towards

Sub-Saharan Africa.

structural debt management reforms must encompass all
major credits – that is, not only Paris Club members but also

The current multilateral system has so far not been able to

China and private creditors. This is possible, as illustrated bypropose comprehensive remedies.

the debt restructuring efforts in Zambia, for instance.

Box 5.3 • International public financial flows to countries most in need and least capable of paying back debt

The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) has proved
Europe and Africa should cooperate on identifying
The countries
most in needof international
financial flows
are LDCs,debt
LLDCs,and SIDS.
Theyneed debt-free
too limited
and unattractive
to many
indebted countries,
innovative
solutionswhilestimulating
inclusive andinstruments
to easethe
financialstress,especiallypost-COVID(Volz
and others2020).
who also
fear sending
wrong
signalto creditorsbysustainable
investment
and development endeavours

requesting
debt service
suspension.
andjointly
them attheandinternational
The proportionof countries
in or Prudential
at high risk measuresof debt distressmorethan promoting
doubled between
20152022 (figurelevel. In
for debt
management
shouldbe
actively
pursued,therebyparticular,
they
could:
5B.3.1). With debt risks increasing in low-income countries, vulnerabilities will affect both debtors and creditors andthe overall global economy.aFigure 5. Proportion of countries in debt distress, or at high risk of debt distress

Percentage of countries

Figure 5B.3.1 Percent of countries in or at high risk of debt distress, 2009–22

Source: IMF 2022.

Note: Percent of DSSI (Debt Service Suspension Initiative) countries with LIC DSAs (low-income countries debt sustainability analyses).
Source: IMF, based on LIC DSA database.

Around 80 percent of debt in lower-income countries is denominated in foreign currencies, making these countries
highly vulnerable to currency and international trade shocks. In many countries, expenditures for debt servicing

exceed expenditures for health, education, and other32social services (UN 2021). Middle-income economies
allocated a median of 41 percent of their government revenues to debt servicing in 2021; low-income economies
spent 28 percent of their revenues on repaying debt (Steinhauser 2022).
Support for increased public finance is particularly important for LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are eligiblefor debt-free assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. However, LDCs have historically received more than 80
percent of flows in the form of loans and concessional loans; only 16 percent have been in grants. The international
public financing architecture must change to avoid stressing governments even more with unsustainable debt.
a. The World Bank and IMF classify low-income countries for fiscal year 2023 as countries with a per capita GNI of $1,085 or less basedon the World Bank Atlas method. They include Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Yemen,
and Zambia.

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This year’s methodological change for inclusion and exclusion of countries from the list of recipients yields a moreaccurate reflection of the international distribution of public flows, weighted by population to compare investments
across countries.71 The global average per capita investment was USD 2.24 during 2010–21, a value in line with the last
two editions of this report.
These distributions highlight the fluctuating nature of international public financial flows, as one year may bring millions
to a particular country and the next year may bring none. Only by reviewing multiple years can one accurately assessthe distributions of these flows. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the decade-long flow distribution across countries,groups of countries, and geographical regions.

Table 5.1 • Distribution of international public financial flows by country group
USD PER CAPITA
COUNTRY GROUPPERCENTAGE CHANGE

2010–21

2020

2021

2010–212020–21

2.24

1.67

1.24

–45

–26

LDC

3.00

1.50

1.85

–38

–23

LLDC

4.81

3.31

2.39

–50

–38

SIDS

4.49

4.94

3.23

–28

–53

Sub-Saharan Africa

3.59

1.99

1.90

–47

–4

Latin America and the Caribbean

5.45

5.50

2.04

–63

–63

Central Asia and Southern Asia

1.44

1.46

1.34

–7

–9

Western Asia and Northern Africa

4.21

2.09

0.83

–80

–60

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

0.84

0.45

0.50

–40

–11

Northern America and Europe

4.95

1.28

5.09

3

298

Oceania

6.64

1.62

0.91

–86

–44

All recipients
Country grouping

RegionSource: IRENA and OECD 2023.

On average, recipients received USD 2.24 per capita during 2010–21. Oceania was the top regional recipient, at
USD 6.64 per capita. Central Asia and Southern Asia received USD 1.44 per capita and Eastern Asia and South-Eastern
Asia USD 0.84 per capita.
Looking at trends in the distribution of flows by population, a continuation of the decreasing trend in flows can beobserved over the past two years, with all recipient countries receiving on average USD 1.67 and USD 1.24 per capita,
respectively, during 2020 and 2021. Unfortunately, the countries most in need (LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS) received
smaller shares of flows in 2021 than in 2020. SIDS experienced the largest decrease in per capita flows, receiving
USD 3.23 per capita, a 53 percent drop from USD 4.94 per capita in 2020. LLDCs received USD 2.39 per capita in 2021
and LDCs USD 1.85 per capita. Per capita flows declined by 38 percent in LLDCs and 23 percent in LDCs in 2002. All
three country groups received a distribution of flows across populations that was more even than other regions or thanthe developing countries average. But investments are reaching fewer people, because of a decrease in overall flows;a larger share of commitments targeting entire regions; and, to a lesser degree, an increase in regional populations.

71

178

See the methodology section of this chapter for more information about the inclusion and exclusion of countries from the list of recipients.

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

INVESTMENTS BY FINANCING INSTRUMENTS
The flows of international public financing to recipient countries have been declining since 2019, with a mixed impact.
On the one hand, the flow of grants has remained strong—a boon to recipient countries, as grant instruments do notcarry the obligation of future repayment. On the other hand, an absolute decline in total flows presents a serious
concern for countries that urgently need funds to bring renewable energy projects online.
Figure 5.10 shows the main instruments used to finance international public flows. It shows that the mix of financial
instruments supporting renewable energy has been evolving in recent years. The proportion of debt instruments frompublic financing sources has declined to two-thirds of flows in 2021 from nearly 90 percent in 2018. At the same time,
the share of grants, equity, and guarantees has increased.

Figure 5.10 • International public financial flows to renewable energy, by instrument, 2010–21
100

80

2%
7%
0.0%

4%
1%
8%
0.0%

2%
6%
0.0%

28%

17%

26%

4%
13%
0.0%
20%

Share of ﬂows (percentage)

4%
2%
7%
0.0%

30%

2%
5%

2%
7%
0.2%

8%
4%
0.0%

10%
0.0%

17%

6%
7%
1.9%

21%

22%

27%

60

2%
7%

4%
5%

14%

15%

3.3%

0.6%

17%

22%

10%

22%
1.8%
22%

40
69%

63%

65%

62%

57%

73%

66%

61%

57%

56%

53%

20

0

2010

2011

Loan

2012

2013

Concessional loan

2014

2015

Other debt

2016

Grants2017
Equity2018

2019

Guarantees and Other

2020

44%

2021

Mezzanine FinanceSource: IRENA and OECD 2023.

In 2021, standard loans totalled USD 4.7 billion, down from USD 6.5 billion in 2020. They accounted for 44 percent of
all flows, the smallest share recorded during the last decade, down from an average of 64 percent between 2010 and
2020. The largest loan in 2021 was a USD 520 million loan to fund the Balakot Hydropower Development Project inPakistan. Other large loans focused on solar energy projects and programs.
Half of all loans went to solar energy, 20 percent to hydropower, 13 percent to multiple/other renewables, 10 percent
6
to windenergy, and 2 percent to geothermal energy. The distribution favored solar energy over hydropower. China

did not fund any hydropower projects in 2021. There are concerns about using loans to fund renewables in a post5

Commitments (USD billion)

pandemic recovery, especially in LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS, as overuse of loans could push these countries further into
unsustainable
external debt situations (IMF 2022).
4
Concessionalloans reached USD 2.3 billion in 2021, a 15 percent decrease from USD 2.7 billion in 2020; these loans
3
represented 22 percent of all flows in 2021. The distribution of concessional loans was similar to the distribution
2.0

2of standard
loans, with 44 percent going to solar energy, 27 percent to multiple/other renewables, 22 percent to
1.3

1
0

0.2
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy
LDCs
LLDCs

2017
SIDS

2018

2019

2020

2021

179

hydropower, and the rest to geothermal and wind energy. Among the top concessional loans are USD 369 million tofund solar energy access and lighting in Ethiopia, USD 226 million to modernize and rehabilitate hydropower plants
in Mexico, and USD 166 million for a Germany-India solar partnership program.
Grants reached USD 2.3 billion in 2021, up 30 percent from USD 1.8 billion in 2020. This increase was greater than thatof other flows, raising the share of grants from 15 percent of commitments in 2020 to 22 percent in 2021. Grants during
2020–21 went primarily to multiple/other renewables and solar energy. The largest grant in 2021 was USD 585 million
for the Common Provisioning Fund, a component of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Programme
Plus (EFSD+). It funds activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was followed by USD 168 million of investments in regional
Sub-Saharan Africa infrastructure, a USD 142 million Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project, and USD 120 million
for accelerating electricity access in Niger. Grants are essential for countries in need of public finance, because
they do not add to the existing burden of debt, help prove project viability, and reduce the perception of risk forinternational private finance actors (Polzin and Sanders 2020) and engage smaller local private investors in certain
contexts (Curtin, McInerney, and Gallachóir 2017).
Equity reached USD 1 billion in 2021, up 46 percent from USD 564 million in 2020; it represented 10 percent of allflows in 2021. In 2021, half of equity investment went to funds targeting multiple renewable energy technologies, withthe rest equally distributed between solar and hydropower energy. Equity is subdivided into two main instruments:
common equity and shares in collective investment vehicles. Common equity is normally directed to specific energy
sources; shares in collective investment vehicles normally target multiple renewables. The largest investments werea USD 147 million stake in Klinchenberg, a vehicle for Norfund’s joint venture with Scatec to develop hydropower inAfrica; USD 83 million to the UK Climate Investments (UKCI) fund; and a USD 80 million stake in Fourth Partner Energy
in India.
Guarantees and credit lines reached less than USD 10 million in 2021, a 98 percent decrease from USD 500 million
in 2020. They represented a negligible share of flows in 2021. In 2020, the credit line to promote sustainable energy
in Paraguay was the most prominent use of this financial instrument. In 2021, there was only one guarantee, worth
USD 9.6 million, for a loan to Punjab Renewable Energy Systems in India for the construction of seven biomass
briquetting plants.
Mezzanine finance reached USD 121 million in 2021, a 175 percent increase from USD 44 million in 2020.72 It represented 1 percent of flows in 2021. Mezzanine finance allows for the conversion of debt into equity in certain cases.

72
Mezzanine finance includes three instruments: subordinated loans, preferred equity, and other hybrid instruments, including convertible debt
or equity. In case of default, subordinated loans are repaid only after all senior obligations have been satisfied. For the increased risk, mezzanine debt
holders require a higher return for their investment than secured or more senior lenders. In the event of a default, preferred equity is repaid after all
senior obligations and subordinated loans have been satisfied and before common equity holders are paid. It is a more expensive source of financethan senior debt but a less expensive source than equity.

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Policy Insights
International public flows decreased in the past few years, jeopardizing efforts to achieve SDG 7 and implement thebroader 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (United Nations, 2015). Notwithstanding international initiatives torevamp these flows, the underlying issues in the global public finance landscape are complex and require increased
efforts to understand and address them.
The international public flows presented in this chapter represent just a fraction of the total global financial flows
supporting renewables. Domestic public flows, domestic and international private flows, and flows directed tocountries that are not included in the scope of indicator 7.a.1 must be added to the figures document here. In 2021,
these flows for renewables reached an estimated USD 430 billion (IRENA and CPI 2023).
Even with these flows, the current pace of investment falls far short of the investments required to limit the global
temperature increase to 1.5°C while closing the energy gap and advancing development imperatives. Scenarios
suggest that we may need investments of at least around USD 1.3 trillion a year (in current prices) must be directed
to renewable power and the direct use of renewables between 2021 and 2030, and at least USD 2 trillion a year isneeded for broader power sector investments, including power grids and flexibility (IRENA 2022; IEA 2022). Chapter
6 discusses investment needs across indicators in more detail.
The following recommendations identify actions policy makers could consider to narrow the financing gap in theenergy transition in a way that reaches those farthest behind.

Enhance international collaboration among countries, international donors, and private investors toaddress economic challenges and drive systemic reforms.
The uncertain macroeconomic outlook, high inflation levels, currency fluctuations, and tighter fiscal circumstances
around the world are stymying the energy transition. Given the high upfront cost of renewable energy projects,
higher costs of capital may also slow the transition, particularly for lower-income countries, which already have growing debt vulnerabilities and low sovereign credit ratings. International collaboration will be key to achieve equitable, inclusive, and resilient economies; realize SDG 7; and help countries recover from the economic shocks of the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Increase donor flows to regions and countries with vast untapped potential and immense needs, aswell as reevaluate their portfolios and disbursement processes.
The contraction, for the third year in a row, of international public flows to developing countries in support of clean
energy is concerning, as is its concentration in a small number of countries. International public flows in 2021 were
35 percent below the 2010–19 average. In 2000–21, three-quarters of international flows were from nine investors (amix of countries and MDBs) and fewer than 40 countries out of 151 received 80% of all commitments. High-income
countries should honor existing ODA obligations, significantly increase their international public flows, and ensure thatthese flows are fairly distributed to countries in need. This also means a larger push for portfolio diversification withmore grants, mezzanine finance, concessional debt, and export credits. Capitalization of multilateral and UN–linked
funds or programs from international organizations could improve fund allocation.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

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Redirect funds from fossil fuels to renewables.
About half of all international public flows during 2010–19 went to nonrenewable technologies, as highlighted in lastyear’s report. Donors must accelerate switching their investments from fossil fuels to renewables. As the urgency ofsuch a transition becomes more apparent, more investors—public and private—should pledge to stop funding fossil
fuels. Doing so is urgently needed given the global rebound in fossil fuels subsidies in 2021 (IRENA and CPI 2023).
One way to increase flows to renewables would be to redirect fossil fuel funds, while simultaneously providing a safety
net to ensure adequate standards of living for vulnerable populations. IRENA (2022) scenarios suggest that almost
USD 1 trillion in annual investments in fossil fuel–based technologies currently planned by governments should be
redirected toward energy transition technologies and infrastructure.

Transform lending to developing countries, including by enhancing collaboration through development
finance institutions and multilateral development banks, developing innovative products, andassessing risk appetites.
Many developing countries need both an increase in public finance for renewables and an increase the share ofnon-debt instruments. Debt burdens are rising, leading to distressed situations in low-income countries, stretching
many to the breaking point (see box 5.3). This makes non-debt instruments a preferred option for funding renewableenergy infrastructure in some contexts as they may carry the benefit of not adding to the existing debt-burden ofcountries. The international public financing architecture must thus change. The Bridgetown Initiative, spearheaded
by Barbados, calls for providing emergency liquidity, changing some terms regarding how funding to developing
countries is made and repaid, and expanding multilateral lending to governments to address systemic challenges
that are at the heart of the crises. A wide range of other options includes boosting multilateral development banks’
investing capacity (Léautier 2022) and developing innovative frameworks, such as liquidity facilities, to mobilize capitaland mitigate risks (IRENA and CPI 2023).

Encourage governments and international donors to rethink the way renewable energy investment
risk is defined, in order to increase the pool of public funds available to support renewables.
Private investments accounted for almost 70 percent of global renewable energy investment in 2020, most of it directed
to richer economies. This trend reflects the preference of mainstream private capital for lower-risk investments thatprioritize financial returns over social, environmental, and climate-related gains. As a result, private capital tends to go
to countries with lower real or perceived risks or to frontier markets only if risk-mitigation facilities are provided.
The current financing architecture needs a more comprehensive way to define risk to account for environmental,
planetary, and social risks. It should include the risk of leaving a large part of the population out of the energy transitionand locked into underdevelopment and the risk of failing to meet the SDGs (IRENA and CPI 2023). At the same time,
public funds should continue to be used to mobilize private capital, when possible. National governments can take arange of actions to attract more private sector investments, including regulatory interventions, making it easier to dobusiness and ensuring policy consistency in support of renewables.
Efforts like the Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative can help mobilize more investments by providing atoolkit that shows countries how to methodically address critical risks perceived by the private sector while increasingsocioeconomic benefits.

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Encourage donors to assess how to best leverage limited public resources, review risk-management
practices, and introduce innovative financing instruments.
Public funds are limited, so governments have been focusing on what is available on de-risking projects and improving
their risk-return profiles to attract private capital. Among risk-mitigation instruments, sovereign guarantees havedominated. Regulators, credit-rating agencies, and international institutions such as the IMF treat such guarantees as
contingent liabilities, however, possibly hampering a country’s ability to take on additional debt for critical infrastructuredevelopment and other investments (IRENA 2020a). Moreover, sovereign debt is already stressed to the breaking
point in many developing countries grappling with high inflation and currency fluctuations or devaluations in the wakeof the COVID-19 pandemic. In this macroeconomic environment, many countries cannot access affordable capital ininternational financial markets or provide sovereign guarantees as a risk-mitigation instrument.
Given the urgent need to step up the pace and geographic spread of the energy transition, and to capture its fullpotential in achieving socio-economic development goals, more innovative instruments such as blended financeinstruments are needed that help underinvested countries reap the long-term benefits of the energy transition without
putting their fiscally constrained economies at a further disadvantage (IRENA and CPI 2023).

Use public flows to continue to expand beyond project investments, with a view to increasing theireffectiveness to support a just energy transition, including closing energy access gaps.
Priority focus areas should include supporting areas such as education, awareness, and planning, as well as putting
in place a policy framework to enable the energy transition and close the energy access gap. Most assessments ofinvestment needs for the energy transition focus on the financing of technological avenues, overlooking the fact thatpolicy interventions and frameworks also require funding. A holistic framework encompasses not only deployment
policies that include direct investments in government-owned energy transition assets or policies to attract private
investments but also policies that support the integration of renewables into the energy system and the economy asa whole, including capacity building, training, structural change, and just transition policies. Governments need fiscal
space to enact such policies; international public flows in support of these policies will be crucial (IRENA and CPI2023).

Develop a standardized and more granular system for reporting on and tracking renewable energy
investments to better track public international flows, including disbursements.
One reason behind the growing share of commitments under the multiple/other renewables category is methodological:
unclear commitment descriptions in financial databases and a lack of detail on the financial breakdown for eachtechnology. The prevalence of multi-technology commitments, such as green bonds and investment funds, andtechnical/policy assistance activities reduce the classification accuracy of financial flows for the energy sector.
A standardized system for reporting on and tracking renewable energy investments would help better track
commitments. Such a system could include categories and subcategories identifying renewable energy technologies,
energy access initiatives (off-grid solutions for rural communities, mini-grids); project capacities (in energy units); andsocioeconomic impacts. Such a system would require collaboration between international organizations, governments,
private sector developers, and multilateral development banks to build guidelines, frameworks, and energy-basedclassification criteria (NGFS, 2019) In many cases, commitments do not translate to disbursements (SEforALL,
2020). Disbursements are more difficult to track and compare against commitments, further complicating analyses.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

183

International public finance stakeholders could do a better job of tracking disbursements, thereby deepening theunderstanding of gaps between commitments and disbursements. Detailed and transparent data should be compiled
and published to facilitate well-informed financing decisions, increase donor accountability, and help identify funding
gaps (Michaelowa and Namhata 2022).
Overall, achieving SDG7 by 2030 will require substantial investments in renewable energy. Redirecting investmentsfrom fossil fuels, increasing ODA commitments, innovating funding mechanisms, making commitment reporting moretransparent through robust international collaboration, and introducing structural reforms in international publicfinance are all necessary steps. This will require strong political will and collaboration among global stakeholders. Withconsistent and concerted effort, we have the tools to achieve the needed investments and meet the SDG7 targets.

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Methodological Notes
DATA SOURCES
SDG indicator 7.a.1 relies on two databases to track international public financial flows: the Creditor Reporting System(CRS) of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and IRENA’s Renewable Energy Public Finance
Database.
The CRS database includes ODA and other official flows provided by investors to countries for renewable energy.73
These flows include official loans, grants, and equity investments that DAC countries receive from foreign governments
and multilateral agencies to support renewable energy research and production, including hybrid systems. Investors
self-report these figures, which the OECD consolidates and categorizes. We extracted this data from the OECD/DAC
CRS from 2000 onward; removed private donor flows, mostly from philanthropic organizations; and filtered it toinclude clean energy investments per the following codes:•

23210: Energy generation, renewable sources from multiple technologies, renewable energy generation
programs that cannot be attributed to a single technology (codes 23220–23280 below); fuelwood/charcoal
production should be included under code 31261•

23220: Hydroelectric power plants, including energy-generating river barges•

23230: Solar energy for centralized grids•23231: Solar energy for isolated grids and standalone systems•

23232: Solar energy thermal applications•

23240: Wind energy for water lifting and electric power generation•

23250: Marine energy, including ocean thermal energy conversion and tidal and wave power•

23260: Geothermal energy for generating electric power or directly as heat for agriculture or other purposes•

23270: Biofuel-fired power plants, including the use of solids and liquids produced from biomass for direct
power generation. Also includes biogases from anaerobic fermentation (such as landfill gas, sewage sludge gas,
fermentation of energy crops and manure) and thermal processes (also known as syngas); waste-fired power
plants making use of biodegradable municipal waste (household waste and waste from companies and public
services that resembles household waste, collected at installations specifically designed for their disposal withrecovery of combustible liquids, gases, or heat). See code 23360 for nonrenewable waste-fired power plants.

•

23410: Hybrid energy electric power plants•

23631: Electric power transmission and distribution (isolated mini-grids).

IRENA’s database includes additional loans, grants, and equity investments received by countries from all foreign
governments, multilateral agencies, and development finance institutions for clean energy research and development
and renewable energy production, including in hybrid systems. It covers the same technologies and activities as the
CRS but excludes all flows extracted from the CRS to avoid duplication of data.
73

Find the data here: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1.

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

185

DEFLATION OF NOMINAL USD PRICES TO CONSTANT PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATESCommitments are measured in millions of US dollars at constant prices and an exchange rate for a base year. The baseyear is updated annually and usually reflects a two-year lag in the publication cycle (that is, the 2020 cycle will report2018 constant prices).
International finance flows expressed in nominal terms are deflated to remove the effects of inflation and exchange
rate changes so that all flows, from all donors and years, are expressed as the purchasing power of a US dollar in a
recent year (2020 in this report). A combination of the OECD DAC deflators for DAC donors and deflators calculatedby IRENA for other international donors not included in the CRS database is used. The formula below converts thenominal investment amounts in current USD to USD at constant prices and exchange rates:

where n is the current year (nominal) and m the constant year.
The OECD publishes DAC deflators for every donor. (For more information, see https://www.oecd.org/dac/financingsustainable-development/development-finance-standards/informationnoteonthedacdeflators.htm.)
In some cases, IRENA tracks flows from donors that are not identified in the DAC list and that do not have an allocated
DAC deflator. When this happens, IRENA follows the same methodology as the OECD to calculate country-specific
DAC deflators.

REGIONAL AGGREGATIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONSThis year, the countries included in this indicator were modified in order to track international financial flows tocountries in need of international financial assistance. The UN system does not define developing and developed
countries (or areas), but its Statistical Division publishes a list of countries classified as “developing” or “developed” forstatistical uses. In 2021, the UN discontinued this classification, raising questions about how to assign these countries
to development groupings.
The eight countries added starting in the 2023 edition represented around USD 4.9 billion of new flows over the
2000–21 period. The 36 countries removed represented USD 404 million of flows, mostly from Qatar and Saudi
Arabia. The eight added countries were historically excluded from the developing country list but are identified by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as ODA recipients and thus tracked in theirinternational public flows. It made sense to include them for this reason. Of the countries removed from the indicator,
high-income countries are not generally targeted by donors or investors for international aid purposes, mainly
because they have bountiful domestic resources. A second group no longer included are countries associated withhigh-income countries, as defined by the World Bank classification of countries by income levels. This group includes
territories of other high-income countries (such as American Samoa) or areas highly influenced by another country’s
central budgeting and planning (such as French Guiana).

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Table 5.1 Changes to country classification for the 7.a.1 indicator
COUNTRIES ADDED IN 2023
(NEW RECIPIENTS OF OFFICIALDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE)COUNTRIES REMOVED IN 2023
(BECAUSE PRIOR INCLUSIONWAS EXCEPTIONAL)

Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova,
North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine.

Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, the Republic of Korea,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United
Arab Emirates, Western Sahara.

TERRITORIES NO LONGER INCLUDED BECAUSE ASSOCIATED WITH
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
American Samoa, Aruba, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Indian
Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Curaçao, Falkland
Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, French Southern and Antarctic Territories,
Guadeloupe, Guam, Martinique, Mayotte, Northern Mariana Islands, Pitcairn,
Puerto Rico, Réunion, Saint Barthélemey, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin(French Part), Sint Maarten (Dutch Part), South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States minor outlying islands, UnitedStates Virgin Islands.

This modification was driven by the lack of formality of the “developing country” classification, personalized appeals
IRENA received over the years from countries requesting their exclusion from this indicator, and guidance by othercustodian agencies.
The United Nations introduced a distinction for the “developing” classification in the standard country or area codesfor statistical use (known as M49) in 1996. It removed it in December 2021 because it had become outdated and did
not reflect the reality in many countries. The UN Statistical Division still refers to “developing countries” in the SDG
indicators but notes that “the exact composition of the group may vary, depending on the mandate, membership or
analytical interest of the custodian agency responsible for the particular indicator or use other available groupings
such as by income-level” (UNSD 2022).
The developing country classification will continue to lose significance through the 2020s as countries self-identify as
more developed and ask to be taken out of this classification. Over the past few years, IRENA received requests bycountry officials to remove their countries from the 7.a.1 indicator, mainly because these countries do not perceive
themselves as needing international financial assistance to develop their renewable energy sectors.
After reviewing this situation with other custodian agencies of various SDG indicators that are designed for “developing
countries” and the UN Statistics Division, IRENA decided to make the changes shown above. Where commitments
could not be categorized under specific countries or territories, they were classified as “Residual/unallocated ODA,”
followed by the name of the region. Where the region was unclear, the commitment was classified under “Unspecified
countries.” (Last year this group was described as “Unspecified, developing countries.”). In terms of data aggregation,
residual flows to specific regions are aggregated under the geographical region aggregates. Residual flows to“unspecified countries” are aggregated directly under the totals, rather than under any region.
Chapter 7 discusses these classifications.

MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL FLOWS THROUGH COMMITMENTS
Financial flows are recorded as donors’ commitments. A commitment is defined as a firm obligation, expressed inwriting, and backed by the necessary funds. Bilateral commitments are recorded as the full number of expectedtransfers for the year in which commitments are announced, irrespective of the time required for the completion of
disbursements, which may occur over various weeks, months, or years.
Tracking financial commitments can yield quite different results than approaches that consider financial disbursements.
Although disbursement information would provide a more accurate picture of actual financial flows to renewableenergy each year, data on disbursements are often limited or not available. The focus on commitments allows for a

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy187more comprehensive and granular analysis of financial flows and ensures methodological consistency across different
data sources. Measuring commitments, however, may produce large annual fluctuations in financial flows when large
projects are approved. In addition, financial commitments may not always translate into disbursements, as contracts
may be voided, cancelled, or altered. Any changes must be reflected in annual values.

FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
The financial instruments used by public financial institutions were categorized based on the OECD list of financial
types and the IRENA classifications for concessional loans and credit lines (table 5.2). This taxonomy excludes debtrelief mechanisms. Not all these instruments have commitments allocated to them yet.

Table 5.2 Instruments used to finance renewable energy
INSTRUMENTDESCRIPTION

Debt

Standard loan

Legal debt obligations assumed by the recipient comprising transfers in cash or in kind (the creditor also acknowledges thenontradability of obligations should any claim arise from nonpayment). As payment obligations on a standard loan are seniorobligations (loans entitle creditors to receive payments against their claims before anyone else), they are referred to as seniorloans. These loans have better lending terms than those provided by private financial institutions, including longer payment
terms, lower interest rates, and low or negligible grant elements. These loans are not necessarily market-rate loans. In cases
where no concessional information is available, they are categorized as loans, not concessional loans.

Concessional loan

Loans that meet ODA criteria of at least a 45 percent grant element for LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS; 15 percent for lower-middle
income countries; and 10 percent for upper-middle- income countries and multilateral development banks within the
CRS database or when specified as “concessional” by the public donor itself in the IRENA Public Investments database.
Concessional loans also incur external debt from recipients after receiving transfers in cash or in kind, albeit at a significantly
lower interest rate than developed countries could get from commercial banks or private finance institutions.

Bonds

Fixed-interest debt instruments issued by governments, public utilities, banks, or companies that are tradable in financial
markets.

Asset-backed securities

Securities whose value and income is backed by a pool of underlying assets.

Reimbursable grantContribution provided to a recipient institution for investment purposes with the expectation of long-term reflows at
conditions specified in the financing agreement. The provider assumes the risk of total or partial failure of the investment; it
can also decide when to reclaim its investment.

Other debt securities

These are financial instruments that represent a debt obligation, which are neither standard loans, concessional loans,bonds, nor asset-backed securities. They can be issued by various entities, including governments, corporations, or financial
institutions. Other debt securities may include instruments such as promissory notes, commercial paper, or medium-term
notes. These securities typically have varying maturities, interest rates, and risk profiles, and they may be traded in secondary
markets, providing liquidity to investors. They serve as an alternative means of raising capital or financing projects, offering
issuers and investors additional options for diversifying their portfolios and managing risk.

Grants188

Standard grantTransfers in cash or in kind that create no legal debt for the recipient.

Interest subsidy

Payment to soften the terms of private export credits, loans, or credits by the banking sector.

Capital subscription on deposit
basis

Payments to multilateral agencies in the form of notes and similar instruments, unconditionally cashable on sight by therecipient institutions.

Capital subscription on encashment
basis

Payments to multilateral agencies in the form of notes and similar instruments, unconditionally cashable on sight by therecipient institutions.

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Mezzanine finance
Subordinated loan

A loan that, in the event of default, will be repaid only after all senior obligations have been satisfied. In return for thisincreased risk, mezzanine debt holders receive a higher return for their investment than secured or more senior lenders.

Preferred equity

Equity that, in the event of default, will be repaid only after all senior obligations and subordinated loans have been satisfied
but before common equity holders are paid. It is a more expensive source of finance than senior debt, a less expensive source
than equity.

Other hybrid instruments

Instruments include convertible debt or equity.

EquityCommon equity

Share of the ownership of a corporation that gives the owner claims on the residual value of the corporation after the
corporation meets creditors’ claims.

Shares in collective investment
vehiclesCollective undertakings through which investors pool funds for investment in financial and/or nonfinancial assets. Thesevehicles issue shares (for corporate structures) or units (for trust structures).

Reinvested earnings

Reinvested earnings are applicable only to foreign direct investment (FDI). Reinvested earnings on FDI consist of the retained
earnings of a direct foreign investment enterprise that are treated as if they were distributed and remitted to foreign direct
investors proportionally to their ownership of the equity of the enterprise and then reinvested by them in the enterprise.

Guarantees
Guarantees/
insurance

Promise of indemnification up to a specified amount in the case of default or nonperformance of an asset (such as a failure
to meet loan repayments or to redeem bonds or expropriation of an equity stake). Guarantees typically cover political and/orcommercial (credit, regulatory/contractual) risks that investors are unwilling or unable to bear.

Credit line

Arrangement between a bank and a borrower establishing a maximum loan balance that the bank will permit the client tomaintain. A credit line guarantees that funds will be available, but no financial assets exist until funds are advanced.

CHANGES TO THE DATA
Several revisions were made to this year’s public investments database. Some commitments were cancelled, somewere reclassified to different years, some recipient countries were removed from the dataset, and all figures were
updated to reflect 2020 prices and exchange rates.

Table 5.3 • International public flows to renewable energy before and after the 2023 revisions, 2000–19
YEAR

BEFORE REVISION(2019 USD MILLIONS)AFTER REVISION(2020 USD MILLIONS)DIFFERENCE(2020 USD MILLIONS)

2000

1,424

1,469

45

2001

1,668

2,038

370

2002

1,321

1,381

60

2003

3,097

3,102

5

2004

2,116

2,166

50

2005

1,961

2,218

257

2006

3,238

3,327

89

2007

4,272

4,349

77

2008

2,778

2,919

141

2009

8,145

8,263

118

Chapter 5 • International Public Financial Flows to Developing Countries in Support of Clean Energy

189

190

YEAR

BEFORE REVISION(2019 USD MILLIONS)AFTER REVISION(2020 USD MILLIONS)DIFFERENCE(2020 USD MILLIONS)

2010

11,171

11,912741

2011

11,68912,603914

2012

10,294

10,808514

2013

13,58014,176596

2014

15,691

16,626935

2015

12,66012,588-72

2016

20,41021,874

1,464

2017

24,65726,365

1,708

2018

14,24415,752

1,508

2019

12,526

13,987

1,461

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

References
COP26 Presidency. 2021. “Statement on international public support for the clean energy transition.” https://
ukcop26.org/statemeent-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/.
Curtin, J., C. McInerney, and B.Ó. Gallachóir. 2017. “Financial Incentives to Mobilise Local Citizens as Investors in
Low-Carbon Technologies: A Systematic Literature Review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 75:
534–47. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.020.
ESMAP. 2022. Mini Grids for Half a Billion People: Market Outlook and Handbook for Decision Makers. https://www.
esmap.org/mini_grids_for_half_a_billion_people_the_report.
ESMAP and others. 2022. Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report 2022: Outlook. Energy Sector Management
Assistance Program, World Bank, Washington, DC. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/099355110142233755/pdf/P17515005a7f550f1090130cf1b9f2b671e.pdf.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2022. World Energy Investment 2022. Paris.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). Debt Relief the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. https://www.
imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-PoorCountries-Initiative.
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2022. World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022: 1.5°C Pathway. Abu
Dhabi.
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency), and CPI (Climate Policy Initiative). 2023 Global of Renewable
Energy Finance. https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Feb/Global-landscape-of-renewable-energyfinance-2023.
IRENA and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). “Renewable Energy
Public Investments Database” (based on OECD and IRENA data). https://www.irena.org/Statistics.
Léautier, F. and others. Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks.
2022. Boosting MDBs' Investing Capacity. https://www.g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ChrisHumphrey-Presentation-.pdf.
Michaelowa, K., and C. Namhata 2022 “Climate as Development Aid.” In Handbook of International Climate Financeed. A. Michaelowa, and A.-K. Sacherer, Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing.
NGFS (Network for Greening the Financial System). 2019. A Call for Action: Cliamte Change as a Source of Financial
Risk. First Comprehensive Report. Paris.
Polzin, F., and M. Sanders 2020. “How to the to -Carbon Energy in Europe Energy Policy 147 111863. doi:10.1016/j.
enpol.2020.111863.
SEforALL (Sustainable Energy for All). 2020 Energizing Finance: Missing the Mark 2020. Vienna.
Shishlov, I., and P. Censkowky 2022. “Same but Understanding Definitions of and on Climate Finance.” In Handbookof International Climate Finance, ed. A. Michaelowa and A.-K. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.

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Steinhauser, G. 2022 “Global Poor Lose Services as Developing Countries Face Higher Debt Payments Wall Street
Journal, November 29. https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-poor-lose-services-as-developing-countriesface-higher-debt-payments-11669706234.
UN (United Nations). 2021. “Many Spending More on than , Health and Protection Combined.” April 1. https://news.
un.org/en/story/2021/04/1088852.
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Wood Mackenzie. 2022. “Off-Grid Renewable Investment database”, https://datahub.woodmac.com/app/main#/dashboards/5d3a1511d249d18c0f001758. (Subscription required).

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THE OUTLOOKFOR SDG 7

Photo: © Unsplash by Shruti Singh

CHAPTER 6

Main Messages•

Outlook for progress toward 2030 goals. The current energy and inflation crisis, triggered by the energy
crisis two years after the COVID-19 pandemic, has continued to impede global progress on Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) 7. Energy security concerns sparked government responses that have accelerated
the deployment of renewables and energy efficiency, improving the outlook to 2030 for SDG targets 7.2 and7.3. This momentum is already helping curb emissions, which rose less than initially feared in 2022, with growthin solar, wind, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and energy efficiency limiting the impacts of increased coal andoil use amid the global energy crisis. Without this progress, emissions could have grown three times faster in
2022. However, price pressures, reduced household income, continued supply chain bottlenecks, and strained
finances within developing economies are decelerating progress in access to electricity and clean cooking.
These trends and new policies are captured under the Stated Policies Scenario of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) and the Planned Energy Scenario of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), bothof which depict a trajectory that is off track for achieving SDG 7. IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario
and IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario lay out pathways to bridge the gap and put the world’s energy system on track toachieve or surpass the SDG targets most closely related to energy (those under SDG target 3.9, SDG 7, and
SDG 13).74•

Outlook for access to electricity. For the first time in decades, the number of people without electricity accessglobally is likely to have increased in 2022, due to the energy crisis. IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario projects that
660 million people would still lack access to electricity in 2030, of whom approximately 560 will be in SubSaharan Africa and approximately 70 million in Developing Asia. While there is limited progress on the horizon
for countries with weak energy access–related institutions and policies, the outlook is better for countries thathave strong institutional and policy support for access and have already made historic progress in bringing
access to their population (e.g., Ethiopia, Senegal, and Kenya in Sub-Saharan Africa and countries in Developing
Asia, which are still set to reach near-universal access by 2030). Between 2021 and 2030, 110 million people
globally must be connected each year to achieve SDG target 7.1, the majority of them being in Sub-SaharanAfrica.

•Outlook for access to clean cooking. According to IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, over 1.9 billion people
globally would continue to rely on traditional uses of biomass, kerosene, or coal for cooking in 2030 in theabsence of additional policies and measures. This reliance on polluting fuels will have dramatic consequences
for the environment, economic development, and health, especially of women and children. Similarly toelectricity access, clean cooking has seen limited progress due to rising energy prices, especially increases
in the costs of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders, which drove millions in Africa and Asia to revert totraditional fuels for cooking. Achieving universal access to clean cooking by 2030 requires tackling affordability
and cultural barriers, as well as administrative and infrastructure barriers, although technologies to help achieve
the goal are widely available. Meanwhile only one-third of the countries facing a lack of access to clean cooking
have dedicated programs and policies. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions in this regard.

74
The majority of this chapter is based on results from IEA’s World Energy Model and analysis in the World Energy Outlook (IEA 2022a), andthus uses certain geographical groupings used in the Outlook. “Developing Asia” refers to non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment) Asia countries.

195

•

Outlook for renewable energy. Several governments announced new policy packages that include substantial
support for renewable energy. These contribute to the share of modern renewables in the total final energy
consumption (TFEC) increasing from 12 percent in 2021 to 18 percent under IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario
and 16 percent in IRENA’s Planned Energy Scenario by 2030. Under both scenarios, the majority of the growth
in renewables-based electricity generation by 2030 is due to solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind. Although therenewable energy target under SDG 7 is not quantified, stated policies are inadequate to remain on track forachieving net-zero emissions in energy by 2050, consistent with the global objective to limit end-of-century
warming to 1.5°C. IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario shows that by 2030, there should be 33 percent
modern renewables in TFEC. In the power sector, renewables would need to account for over 60 percent ofelectricity generation by 2030. Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario, the renewables share in TFEC and electricity
generation would reach 38 percent and 65 percent respectively, by 2030. Greater efforts are also needed toincrease renewables penetration in transport and heating, both directly (through the use of biofuels and biogas)
and indirectly (through electrification). There are three times as many countries with renewable electricity targets
as there are with renewable heat targets, even though the second group has a considerable share in TFEC.75•

Outlook for energy efficiency. Energy intensity —total energy supply per unit of gross domestic product (GDP)—is expected to decrease by 2 percent in 2022 after two years of slow progress during the pandemic. Surging
energy costs and supply disruptions amid the energy crisis have led governments and consumers to specificallyfocus on improving efficiency. There has been an increase in government efforts to incentivize efficiency, including
incentives for building retrofits, strengthened efficiency standards for buildings and appliances, notably, to moveaway from natural gas for heating, support for electric vehicles, and incentives for behavior changes to reduceenergy use. These efforts are reflected under IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, according to which global energy
intensity improves at 2.4 percent annually in 2021–30 from 1.8 percent in 2010–20. However, global energy
intensity would need to improve at more than 3.4 percent annually to achieve SDG 7 by 2030. Under IEA’s Net
Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, this rate would increase to well over 4 percent a year, reflecting more aggressive
efficiency mandates, including bans on the sale of the most inefficient equipment in the coming decade andcodes mandating new buildings reach net-zero standards. Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario, energy intensity would
need to improve at over 3 percent per year in 2020–30.

•

Investment needs. Annual clean energy investments in renewable power, renewable fuels, efficiency, end-use
electrification, and grids and networks, as well as access to modern energy, reached almost USD 1.2 trillion in 2021,
a 15 percent growth as compared with the 2015–20 average. By 2030, annual clean energy investments under
IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario are expected to reach USD 2 trillion annually. However, clean energy investments
would need to reach USD 4 trillion annually by 2030 under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. Muchof this investment is directed to renewables and efficiency. Reaching universal energy access by 2030 requires
only a small share of this total, with annual investments of approximately USD 30 billion in electricity and USD 6
billion in clean cooking, according to IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario,
investments in energy transition technologies and related infrastructure amount to USD 4.7 trillion a year through2030, a 150 percent increase in these types of investments compared with the Planned Energy Scenario.

•

Energy projects addressing SDG 7, specifically access, still have insufficient public financing to mobilize
the larger volumes of investment required to reach SDG 7. International public finance to support developing
economies needs to increase. Key areas for action, especially in emerging and developing economies, include
improving models of concessional finance to derisk further investment and mobilizing more private capital into
climate solutions. (Chapter 5 discusses in more detail trends in international public financial flows in support ofclean energy in developing countries and key areas for action.)

75“Heat” in this chapter refers to the energy consumed to produce heat for industry, buildings, and other sectors. Heat as a final energy service refers
to the energy available to end users to satisfy their needs, after considering transformation losses.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Presentation of Scenarios
This chapter describes the results of global modeling exercises to determine whether current policy ambitions are
sufficient to meet the SDG 7 targets and identify what additional actions might be needed. It also examines what
investments are required to achieve the corresponding goals. Scenarios for the targets are taken from IEA’s World
Energy Outlook (IEA 2022a) and IRENA’s World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Scenario (IRENA 2022). Both explore
two types of scenarios: one in which energy trends evolve under today’s policies and another based on policies thatwould deliver on all energy-related SDGs, including substantially reducing air pollution that causes deaths and illness(SDG 3.9) and taking effective action to combat climate change (SDG 13). The wide gap between the two types ofscenarios is illustrated in box 6.1 (using the IEA scenarios).
IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario explores how energy trends would evolve under today’s policies; it does so assuming thatno additional policies are implemented. It helps policy makers evaluate their current plans in order to assess whether
they are sufficient to reach their long-term targets and goals. This scenario does not take countries’ decarbonization
pledges, Nationally Determined Contributions, or access targets as givens, but conducts bottom-up modeling thatconsiders how policies, pricing policies, efficiency standards and schemes, electrification programs, and specificinfrastructure projects would influence energy trends.
IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario takes the SDG targets for 2030 and net-zero emissions in the energy sector
by 2050 as its targets and works backward to determine what would be needed to achieve the outcomes in a costeffective and plausible manner.76 Under this scenario, by 2030, universal access to both electricity and clean cooking
would be achieved, modern renewables would reach 32 percent of TFEC, and energy efficiency gains would exceed
the SDG 7 targets, with average annual improvements in global energy intensity reaching 4.3 percent a year between
2021 and 2030. After this critical near-term period, the scenario emphasizes efficiency, renewables, and clean fuels,
bringing energy sector emissions to net zero by 2050 and limiting the end-of-century global temperature increase to
1.5°C over preindustrial levels.
IRENA’s Planned Energy Scenario provides a perspective on energy system development based on governments’energy plans and other planned targets and policies. IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario describes an energy transition pathway
aimed at limiting global average temperature increase to 1.5°C by the end of the 21st century relative to preindustrial
levels. It is underpinned by six technological avenues and measures that would achieve major emissions reductions
between today and 2050, paving the way toward a net-zero carbon world by mid-century. The scenario also provides
insights into the socioeconomic footprint of the global energy transition.

76
More information on IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario can be found at https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-model/net-zeroemissions-by-2050-scenario-nze.

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

197

Box 6.1 • IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario: How government ambitions stand against SDG 7
IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario assumes that all aspirational targets announced by governments are met on timeand in full, including their long‐term net-zero pledges and energy-access goals.
Assuming all countries fulfilled their national climate and access pledges, the world would progress about two-thirdsof the way toward achieving SDG targets 7.1 and 7.3, and 80 percent of the way toward meeting SDG target 7.2
for renewables. Comparing this trajectory to the Stated Policies Scenario highlights a growing implementation gap
requiring further policies and measures by countries to reach their goals, especially for access (figure B6.1.1).

Figure B6.1.1 • Level of advancement over SDG 7 by scenario as a percentage share of the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, 2030
100%

Improvement toreach SDG7.3

Share of NZE

75%

50%

25%
0%

Access to Electricity

Access to Clean Cooking
STEPS

Renewables

Energy efﬁciency

APS

Source: IEA 2022[a].
Notes: Hundred percent advancement is achieved under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, which is consistent with and more
ambitious than SDG 7. For access to electricity and clean cooking, the level of advancement is assessed as the number of people gaining
access by 2030. For SDG target 7.2 (renewables), this is assessed as the share of renewables in TES. For SDG target 7.3 (energy efficiency),
this is assessed as the average annual decrease of energy intensity.
APS = Announced Pledges Scenario; NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

Of the 113 countries without universal access to electricity, only 25 have targets to reach universal access prior to or
by 2030, while 29 have less ambitious targets. This leaves 59 countries without electricity access targets. Under the

Population
without
access to clean
cookingfuel used forin developing
countriesreceive it.
Announced
Pledges
Scenario,
only
two-thirds of the population stillPopulation
lackingbyaccesstocookingelectricity
by 2030
under 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario

in 2030 in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario

This translates into 290 million people without access in 2030—less than half the number under the Stated Policies
2000

Scenario (660 million).

Other
3%

1800

About 30 percent of countries without universal access to clean cooking have targets in place today, although only 15
1600

LPG Pledges Scenario,
percent have targets in line with SDG target 7.1. If all these targets, as stated under the Announced
22%
1400

Population (millions)are achieved, 780 million people would still be
Restwithoutof the worldelectricity access in 2030, 60 percent less than under the
1200Policies Scenario.
Stated1000

Developing Asia

Electric
29%

Under the Announced Pledges Scenario, the share of renewables in total final energy consumption would reach 26

800 by 2030—as against 33.6 percent under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, but Gas
percent
still higher than the
Sub-Saharan Africa
23%
22.7 percent
under the Stated Policies Scenario. SDG 7 has a target for substantially increasing renewables’
share in600
Modernbiomass
the global
energy mix. Significant advancement in this regard is achieved underbothscenarios, highlighting current
400
23%

focus on related technologies.
200

Energy 0intensity under the Announced Pledges Scenario would improve on average by 3 percent every year by2030—a significant improvement as compared with the Stated Policies Scenario (2.4 percent) but still below the 3.4
percent required to meet SDG target 7.3. Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, energy intensity improves
4.3 percent on average yearly, which is more ambitious than SDG target 7.3.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Australia and New ZealandCentral Asia and Souhern Asia

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Outlook for Access to Electricity
IEA estimated that the number of people without electricity access global likely increased in 2022, reversing decadesof decreasing trend. This increase is largely in Sub‐Saharan Africa, due to reasons including supply chain disruptions
and the energy crisis causing rising inflation levels and interest rates following two years of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Effects included higher costs for electricity systems (e.g., according to GOGLA, solar home systems prices increased
28–36 percent between 2020 and 2022 [Lighting Global/ESMAP and others 2022]) and for financing new electrification
projects, and, at the same time, a drastic increase in the number of people in extreme poverty (World Bank 2023),
making it more challenging to acquire and maintain access to electricity. Investment in power infrastructures is also
slowing down due to the rising debts that most utilities were already facing (IEA 2022[a]).
In the medium and long term, access to electricity is expected to improve through 2030, after the situation has
stabilized. Trends vary significantly across countries, many of which will not reach universal access by 2030 undercurrent conditions. Under the Stated Policies Scenario, 660 million people (roughly 8 percent of the global population)
would remain without access by 2030, 85 percent of whom are in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 6.1). Less than half of thecountries without universal access to electricity have official targets, and only about 22 percent have targets at least as
ambitious as SDG indicator 7.1.1 (see box 6.1). Countries without electrification plans and enabling frameworks are noton target. However, SDG target 7.1.1 remains within reach in countries with adequate policies, holistic electrificationplans, including both grid and off-grid solutions, and sufficiently resourced implementing institutions. The IEA's Net
Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario shows a pathway to achieve SDG7.1.1 where more than half of the population gaining
access by 2050 do so with off-grid solutions such as mini-grids and stand-alone systems.

Figure 6.1 • Global population without access to electricity under IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario and delivery of electricity connections under IEA’s Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 Scenario, as of 2030
Population without access to electricity in 2030
in Stated Policies Scenario

People gaining access by technology by 2030
in the Net - zero by 2050 Scenario

700

Population (millions)

600
500

Rest of the world
Rest of developing Asia
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa

400

Pakistan

300

Sudan

200
100
0

UgandaNigeria

Stand-alone systems
25%
On-grid44%

Mini-grids
31%Dem. Republic of the Congo

Source: IEA 2022[a].

Developing (non-OECD) Asia remains on track to reach near-universal access, with only 2 percent of the population
without electricity in 2030. According to IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, the highly populated countries of Bangladesh
and the Philippines are on a pathway to reach full access before 2030, whereas India and Indonesia already reached
universal access. IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario shows that efforts need to be stepped up in other Asian countries, such
as Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Pakistan, if the region is to achieve 100 percent access in 2030. In Central and South

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

120%

199

America, only the most remote population will remain without access by 2030, with the region reaching an access rateof 98 percent. The only exception is Haiti, one of the poorest countries in the world, which is expected to still see a large
share of its population without access in 2030.
Besides improvements in policies and electrification plans in some Sub-Saharan African countries, the prospects forachieving SDG 7.1.1 remain unlikely; about 40 percent of countries do not have official electrification plans or trackprogress periodically.
Access to finance is often more challenging for countries that have the greatest need to improve access quickly.
International support is essential especially under the current economic conditions, with concessional finance being aviable option to lower the perceived risk for private investors. However, country governments must implement robustelectrification plans and allocate capital to access projects accordingly (IEA 2022[a]).
IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario indicates that almost 90 percent of new connections will be renewablesbased. Although the component costs for solar and hybrid mini-grids, as well as solar home systems, increased between
20 and 36 percent in 2022, their costs are likely to begin declining in the near future.
To bridge the gap and achieve universal access by 2030, 110 million people must gain access to electricity on average
every year between 2021 and 2030—80 percent of whom in Sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts needs to be increased especiallyin the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, which together are home to half ofthe region’s population projected to lack access in 2030.
Delivery technology varies by region under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 percentof connections by 2030 would be directly to the grid, 31 percent would be connected to mini-grids, and the remainder
would be stand-alone systems (mostly solar home systems). In Developing Asia, just over half of new connections would
be directly to the grid, and almost a third would be connected to mini-grids.
IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario proposes a sustainable pathway to achieve universal access to electricity
by 2030. However, this implies that governments and donors increase the access focus of development plans andprograms. This includes addressing affordability issues (which remain the primary reason behind people not getting
electricity access or not benefiting from it), supporting the stand-alone and mini-grid sectors, implementing tracking
and monitoring, and use of geospatial data and models as the basis for electrification planning, and, finally yet
importantly, creating and providing resources to entities in charge of implementing these plans. Low-capacity off-gridenergy solutions, such as small off-grid solar systems, will play an important role, particularly in reaching households
in remote areas, but planning must include a strategy to support these households to benefit from energy services
by stimulating household and productive uses demand and so gradually extending access through the use of bigger
systems or connections to mini-grids or the national grid.
SDG 7.1.1 is achievable in theory with strong electrification plans. Between 2015 and 2019, seven countries in SubSaharan Africa (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Kenya, and Rwanda) reached or surpassed the required progress levels.
However, in 22 other countries, representing more than half the population without access in the region (including
Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, and Niger), there has been an increasein the number of people without access in the same period (IEA 2022b). Many of the successful electrification plans aim
to maximize the benefits of energy access by considering the needs of health facilities, schools, agricultural enterprises,
and similar organizations alongside those of households. Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, achieving
universal access to electricity by 2030 requires an annual investment of USD 30 billion through 2030 on generation,
electricity networks, and decentralized solutions through smart and efficient integrated delivery programs. However,in 2019, only approximately USD 10 billion were spent on improving electricity access globally. Recent trends reveal
an increase in domestic public financing, which is helping mobilize more private finance (SEforALL 2021). Ultimately,energy access must look beyond basic access to electricity and facilitate the increasing use of energy services sufficientto underpin socioeconomic prosperity and well-being, as also illustrated by the World Bank Multi-Tier Framework.

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Outlook for Access to Clean Cooking Fuels andTechnologies
100%

Improvement toRecent decades saw a decline in the number of people without access to clean cooking globally. This declinereflects
reach SDG7.3

efforts to reduce the reliance on biomass among vulnerable populations, with the aim of improving indoor air quality,
75%

Share of NZEat the same time reducing the time spent gathering fuel, and curbing deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions
from the incomplete combustion of biomass. Forest degradation, sometimes leading to outright deforestation, is yet
50%grave consequence of the unsustainable harvesting of fuelwood, chiefly for producing charcoal, to be used
anotherin cities.
25%has been uneven and was primarily driven by countries in Asia (e.g., China, India, Indonesia, and so on),
Progresswhereas Sub-Saharan Africa saw a continued increase in the number of people without access to clean cooking. The
current0%
energy crisis and the related inflationary environment in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have exposed
Accessthreat
to Electricity
Access andto Clean
Cooking prices of clean cooking
Renewables fuel (e.g., LPG). Some
Energy efﬁciency
consumers to a dualof reduced income
highercountries
APS
have implemented policies to counter this trend, although STEPS
millions, especiallyin Sub-Saharan Africa, have reverted

to traditional uses of biomass. This led improvements to slow down between 2020 and 2022. Although progress is
expected to return to historical levels in certain regions, the outlook for clean cooking remains of serious concern:under today’s policies, the world would be far from achieving universal access to clean cooking solutions by 2030, with
1.9 billion people still without access (figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2 • Population without modern cooking solutions in 2030 and population with clean cooking technologies under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by
2050 Scenario
Population without access to clean cooking
under 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario

Population by fuel used for cooking in developing countries
in 2030 in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario

2000

Other
3%

1800
1600
Population (millions)

1400

Rest of the world

1200

Developing Asia

1000
800

LPG
22%
Electric
29%

Sub-Saharan Africa

600

Gas
23%
Modern biomass
23%

400
200
0

Source: IEA 2022[a].
Note: The number of people without access to clean cooking in 2030 is significantly lower than that in previous editions of the World Energy Outlook.
This is due to a downward revision in the historic number of people cooking with traditional biomass in China. This revision by the World HealthOrganization is based on recent surveys.
LPG = liquefied petroleum gas.

Australia and New ZealandLatin America and the Carribean
Sub-Saharan Africa

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

Central Asia and Souhern Asia
Northern America and Europe
Western Asia and Northern Africa

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia
Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand201

In 2030, the population without access to clean cooking solutions is projected to be divided almost equally between
Developing Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In Developing Asia, the projected access rate in 2030 is 81 percent, leaving
821 million people without access. Significant progress is projected for India, where the number of people without
access is expected to reduce from 504 million in 2022 to 323 million in 2030, indicating an access rate of 80 percent
from the current rate of approximately 68 percent.
To achieve the objective of the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario in line with SDG 7, every household in the world
would have access to clean cooking by 2030. To do that a set of different clean cooking technologies and fuels needs
to be deployed (figure 6.2). A significant increase in policies and investments will be required to support the above
achievement, which would provide over 290 million people with access to clean cooking solutions each year.
Achieving the objective of the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario and SDG 7.1.2 would require rapid ramp-up ofaccess programs to reduce the upfront cost of stoves while ensuring affordability of clean cooking fuels, train people
to use new cooking equipment safely and effectively, and deliver awareness programs (e.g., cooking classes or recipesthat help adapt culinary practices to improved cookstoves). Supporting infrastructure (e.g., fuel delivery and storage
systems, a stable supply chain of cooking equipment within the country, and workers to help administer the above
programs) also needs to be ramped up (IEA 2021) to ensure accessibility and sustainably of supply. Many regions
have scalable LPG solutions but lack consistently available fuel distribution services; also, LPG remains exposed tomarket prices, leaving users vulnerable to price spikes without government intervention. Alternative fuels for cooking,such as biogas, must also play a role in rural areas, but biodigesters to produce biogas require support to cover thehigh upfront cost, the availability of sufficient feedstock, and training on their use and maintenance. Electric cooking
appliances such as microwaves or electric pressure cookers represent an increasingly popular mode of clean cooking,particularly in urban areas and areas powered with grid electricity. A World Bank report, for example, compared thecost of cooking with electricity with cooking with other fuels in Kenya (ESMAP 2020). At the time of publication, in
September 2020, electric stoves were found to be only marginally more expensive than LPG stoves. However, withcurrent surges in LPG prices and advances in electric stoves, electric cooking will continue to be increasingly attractive.
In some countries, utilities and off-grid solution providers offer all-electric cooking bundles and programs, sinceincreasing electric cooking can increase the profitability of providing electricity access. Improved biomass stoves(ISO Tier > 1) are of fundamental importance to reach SDG 7.1.2, especially in rural areas, and fuels such as ethanol
can help cover gaps in certain regions. Reaching universal access to clean cooking by 2030 requires an all-solutions
approach to meet the diverse needs in different countries and in rural and urban environments.

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Outlook for Renewable Energy
SDG target 7.2 calls for a substantial increase in the share of renewable energy in the energy mix. Although it does not
specify a quantitative objective, long-term scenarios charting various paths for the energy sector to reach net zero by2050 find that renewables would need to constitute a third of TFEC by 2030 to be on track.
Despite the impact of the current energy crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic on supply chains and components costs,
the outlook for renewables under IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario and IRENA’s Planned Energy Scenario remains positivein all regions, due to supportive policies. Under IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, the share of all renewables (including
traditional uses of biomass) in TFEC is projected to increase from 18.5 percent in 2021 to 23 percent in 2030, and theshare of modern renewables is projected to increase from 12 percent in 2021 to 18 percent in 2030. These projections
are higher than in previous outlooks because many countries accelerated renewable energy projects as part of theirplans to increase energy security amid the current energy crisis. By contrast, IRENA’s Planned Energy Scenario sees theshare of modern renewables in TFEC increasing to 16 percent in 2030, due to much wider deployment of renewablesin the power sector and in end-use electrification.
Power-sector renewables remain the fastest-growing source of energy globally. Renewable sources of electricity
remained resilient during the recent crisis period, experiencing only minor setbacks. Besides short-term concerns
about supply chains, renewables annual capacity additions in 2021–30 are poised to more than double the 2015–20
trends, thanks to increased government plans to expand renewables projects. This growth will be driven by solar PV
and wind. By 2025, renewables will surpass coal as the primary means of producing electricity. Of the renewablesources of electricity, solar PV would be the strongest performer, meeting almost half (46 percent) of the increased
electricity demand over the period. It is closely followed by wind (42 percent). Hydropower would remain the largest
low-emission source of electricity globally through 2030. It would also provide flexibility and other power systemservices.
Direct uses of renewables have grown steadily but slowly in end-use sectors. Modern bioenergy would account for
the largest share of growth in end-use renewables through 2030. In the transport sector, liquid biofuels see strong
growth, although their use will be limited if new blending requirements are not adopted in places where they do notcurrently exist. The transport sector would also see increased use of electricity, which will result from electromobility
leveraging the increasing renewables share in the mix. The use of renewables also increases for heating in the industry
and buildings sectors, with modern bioenergy accounting for the largest share of the growth, driven by renewables
requirements in Europe and some pilots in China. There is also an increase in the demand for biogas and modern
biomass for heating, driven by growth in industry (IEA 2022[a]).
The outlook for growth for end-use renewables depends to a large extent on further policy action at a time of
economic difficulty and competing budgetary pressures. There is a risk that some targets may not be enforced, but
end-use renewables can be a part of the toolkit for improving energy security especially when they are sourced locally.
Supportive policies may play an important role in new policy packages, especially for transport biofuels, which would
support agricultural production as well as emissions reductions.

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

203

INSIGHTS ON BRIDGING THE GAP FROM IEA’S NET ZERO EMISSIONS BY 2050 SCENARIO
The projected increases in the use of renewable energy that are likely to occur under stated policies fall short of what isrequired to achieve global goals for climate protection and sustainable development. Under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions
by 2050 Scenario, use of renewables increases twice as rapidly as under stated policies. Under this more ambitious
scenario, modern renewables would reach just over one-third of TFEC in 2030 (figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 • Share of renewables in total final energy consumption under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, 2010–30
2030 STEPS

26%

43%

28%
62%

2030 NZE

47%

10%

13%

61%

10%

22%

29%

62%

8%

4%

25%
59%

7%

11%

13%

55%

Industry heat

Buildings heat

Electricity generation

2021

16%
5%
88%

69%

10%

Road transporrt

82%

12%

Total ﬁnal consumption

95%

6%

11%

6%
79%
Fossil fuels without CCUS

81%

92%

6%

Direct renewables

19%

7%
75%

5%
Traditional use of biomass

14%
61%

6%

Indirect renewables

Other low-carbon

Source: IEA 2022[a].
CCUS = carbon capture, utilization, and storage; NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

As can be seen in figure 6.3, the share of renewables-based electricity generation would grow the fastest: fromthe current 28 percent to just over 60 percent by 2030, or almost 18 percentage points higher than in the Stated
Policies Scenario. Globally, renewables-based electricity generation would grow 12 percent a year to approximately
23,065 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030. This would result from unprecedented capacity additions of solar PV and wind,reaching annual averages of, respectively, 430 gigawatts (GW) and 240 GW between 2021 and 2030 (figure 6.4).
Annual investment in renewables-based power would triple over the decade to over USD 1.2 trillion a year by 2030;
this would be supported by additional spending on expanding and modernizing electricity networks and battery
storage and enhancing the operational flexibility of existing assets to better integrate renewables.

Figure 6.4 • Technology-based comparison of average annual renewables-based electricity capacity additions under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050
Scenario and the Stated Policies Scenario
400

Capacity additions (GW)

300

200

100

0

Solar PVWind
Historical (2015–20)

Hydro
STEPS (2020–30)

Other
NZE (2020–30)

Source: IEA 2022[a].
GW = gigawatt; NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; PV = photovoltaic; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

Under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, increased electrification of energy end uses is a primary means toincrease renewables’ share in TFEC. The share of electricity in final energy demand would increase to 31 percent by
2030, compared with about 24 percent under the Stated Policies Scenario. Electrification of transport and heat would
be the primary drivers of this growth.
Direct use of renewables, principally liquid biofuels, would account for, on average, 12 percent of road transport fuel;combined with growing electrification, the share of renewables in transport would increase to nearly 17 percent by
2030 (IEA 2022[a]).
The use of renewables for heat applies to space and water heating, cooking, industrial processes, and other uses. The
heat can be provided directly by bioenergy, solar thermal, or geothermal or indirectly through electricity and district
heat produced from renewable sources. Switching to direct use of renewables—through use of solar thermal water
heating, biomass, and low-carbon gases, for example—would also reduce the use of fossil fuels. In 2021, renewables
accounted for 9 percent of the total energy consumed for heating worldwide. By 2030, this share would increase to 20
percent under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

205

The share of traditional uses of biomass in TFEC would decline to 5 percent by 2030 under the Stated Policies Scenario
marking only a 1 percentage point decrease from 2021 levels and due to low achievements in clean cooking access.
Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, traditional uses of biomass would be phased out completely, sincedeveloping countries would replace them with more modern and efficient fuels and technologies.
Across regions, variations in energy policy, socioeconomic trends, and natural resource endowments result in different
growth trajectories for renewables. Developing economies would account for over 80 percent of the growth inelectricity generation through 2030 under the Stated Policies and almost 90 percent of this growth in the Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 Scenario. Under the Stated Policies Scenario, renewables-based electricity generation would growfrom 10 percent in the Middle East and 16 percent in Northern Africa, at the low end, to over 80 percent in Central andSouth America, where hydropower is the backbone of the power mix. Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario,
the share of renewable electricity generation would increase in every region, approaching or surpassing half of allelectricity generation by 2030 in many regions.
IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario sees the supply of low-emissions hydrogen77 increasing from 0.3 million
metric tons (Mt) today to 90 Mt in 2030 and 450 Mt in 2050, reaching 10 percent of TFEC. Achieving net-zero emissions
by 2050 would also require carbon-capture technologies. Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, carbon
dioxide (CO2) captured using carbon capture, utilization, and storage, as well as CO2 removal (CDR) technologies,
would amount to just above 1.2 metric gigatons (Gt) in 2030, excluding nature-based measures.

INSIGHTS ON BRIDGING THE GAP FROM IRENA’S 1.5°C SCENARIO
IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario requires a significant scale-up of renewable energy and energy-efficient solutions but also
other energy transition technologies and related infrastructure. It entails a transformation of how societies consume
and produce energy. The decade to 2030 will be crucial for scaling up no-regret options. IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenariodetails six key performance indicator categories, which provide a broad overview of the required level of transition(figure 6.5). This includes scaling the renewable energy share in TFEC to 28 percent and in electricity generation to65 percent by 2030, with a corresponding increase in the share of energy supplied from electricity to 30 percent.
Investments in improving energy efficiency need to increase by a factor of 9. Clean hydrogen production would needto increase to over 150 Mt by 2030. Finally, some investment in CDR technologies will also be required, namely, in
hard-to-decarbonize sectors, such as industry.

77
Low-emissions hydrogen refers to hydrogen that is produced from water using renewables- or nuclear-based electricity or derived from fossil
fuels with minimal methane emissions and processed in facilities equipped to avoid CO2 emissions, for example, using carbon capture, utilization,and storage technologies with a high capture rate. Low-emissions hydrogen is also derived from bioenergy. In this report, the total demand for low‐emissions hydrogen is greater than the total final consumption of hydrogen, because the former additionally includes hydrogen inputs to produce
low‐emissions hydrogen‐based fuels and biofuels, and generate power, and also for oil refining, and for producing hydrogen and consumed on-site inindustry.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Figure 6.5 • Key performance indicators for IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario in 2030
Recent years

2030

KPI.01

Electricity generation will need to expand
from 26 900 TWh in 2019 to more than
42 100 TWh by 2030, with 65% of thetotal electricity supply in 2030 comingfrom renewable sources, compared with
26% in 2019.

26 %

65 %

KPI.02The share of renewable energy in total ﬁnal energy
consumption (TFEC) must increase from 19% in 2019
to 38% by 2030.

19 %

38 %

KPI.03

Average annual investment in improving energy
intensity must increase by a factor of 9 by 2030,
implying a 5% decrease in TFEC in 2030 from 2019
levels.

KPI.04The share of direct electricity in TFEC must increase
from 21% in 2019 to 30%
by 2030.

KPI.05The production of clean hydrogen andits derivative fuels must ramp up fromnegligible levels in 2020 to 154 Mt by 2030.

KPI.06

The total CO2 captured from CO2
removal and storage measures must be aggressively
scaled up to reach 2.2 Gt CO2 by 2030, up from 0.04
Gt in 2020.

ca. 250 USD billion/yr> 2260 USD billion/yr

21 %0.8 Mt0.04 Gt

30 %154 Mt

2.2 GtSource: IRENA 2022.
CO2 = carbon dioxide; Gt = metric gigaton; KPI = key performance indicator; Mt = million metric tons; TWh = terawatt-hour.

Advancing the energy transition at the needed pace and scale would require almost complete decarbonization of
the electricity sector by mid-century. Under the 1.5°C Scenario, rapid electrification of heat and transport applications
along with the increased green hydrogen production would drive a significant growth in electricity demand. By 2030,
renewables would supply 65 percent of the total electricity needs (figure 6.6). Such a transition in the global electricity
sector could be realized by accelerating the deployment of all forms of renewable power technologies, including
wind (onshore and offshore), solar PV, hydro, biomass, and geothermal. At the same time, additional flexibility in the
power sector will be required. Although the types of technologies and solutions are specific to power systems, key
technologies include storage, greater interconnection, market and regulatory reforms, and demand response, among
many others.

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

207

Figure 6.6 • Electricity generation and capacity by source in 2018, 2030, and 2050 under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario

2050

Electricity generation (TWh)Electricity capacity (GW)

RE: 90%
VRE: 63%

90 0002030

60 00030 000

RE: 92%
VRE: 73%

30 00075 00045 0002050

35 0002018

25 000

RE: 65%
VRE: 42%

RE: 25%
VRE: 7%15 000
10 000

15 000

5 000

0

0
2018
Coal
Oil
Natural Gas
Nuclear2030

20 0002018

RE: 33%
VRE: 15%2030
2050
Where we need to be (1.5-S)
Hydro(excl. pumped)

2018
Biomass(solid)Biomass(waste)Biogas

RE: 76%
VRE: 60%

2030
2050
Where we need to be (1.5-S)

Solar PV

Wind offshore

Geothermal

CSP

Wind onshore

Tidal/Wave
HydrogenSource: IRENA 2022.
1.5-S = 1.5°C Scenario; CSP = concentrated solar power; GW = gigawatt; PV = photovoltaics; RE = renewable energy;
TWh = terawatt-hour; VRE = variable renewable energy.

Direct electricity consumption in end-use sectors would increase to 31,000 TWh by 2030, compared with approximately
23,000 TWh in 2020. This increase in electricity demand will be seen across all sectors, even though transport will by
far see the largest growth. In addition to the rapid growth in direct electrification needs, 3,100 TWh would be needed
to produce green hydrogen by 2030. In total, direct and indirect electrification would have a 32 percent share in the
final demand in 2030, an increase from approximately 21 percent in 2020.
Under the 1.5°C Scenario, the transport sector, and in particular road vehicles, would see rapid transition over the
decade. The stock of electric cars would grow from 26 million in 2022 (estimated) to over 380 million by 2030. The
share of electricity in final transport energy consumption would grow from 1 percent in 2020 to over 9 percent by2030.
Direct uses of renewables (e.g., bioenergy, solar thermal, and geothermal) are needed to bring much-needed solutions
to hard-to-electrify energy services in the transport, buildings, and industry sectors. Under the 1.5°C Scenario, direct
uses of renewable fuels in final energy would need to grow to 55 exajoules (EJ) in 2030, up from 45 EJ in 2020.
Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario, clean hydrogen production would grow from under 1 million metric tons today to 154
million metric tons by 2030.78 This hydrogen would largely be used in industrial applications in the corresponding
decade, although a small quantity would be used in the transport and buildings sectors.

78
Clean hydrogen here refers to the combination of hydrogen produced by electrolysis powered from renewables (green hydrogen) and hydrogenproduced from natural gas in combination with carbon capture and storage by steam methane reforming (blue hydrogen).

208

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Box 6.2 • Linkages between SDG 7 and SDG 12: Circular economy and end-of-life management for solar photovoltaic (PV)technologies
Solar PV is expected to play a pivotal role in energy transitions and support progress toward SDG 7 and SDG 13 on climatechange, as highlighted in this section. However, solar PV modules currently have an estimated average service lifetimeof 25–30 years, after which their performance can deteriorate and they can be prone to failure. Increasing quantities ofsolar PV equipment will thus reach the end of their lifetime in upcoming years: according to IRENA’s estimates, following
a pathway compatible with the 1.5°C Scenario, cumulative solar PV waste would exceed 3.9 million metric tons by 2030
and could reach more than 212 million metric tons globally by 2050 (IRENA 2023).
In line with SDG 12 (“responsible consumption and production”), these end-of-life flows of solar PV equipment need tobe managed proactively with a circular economy perspective.a In this light, solar PV design and manufacturing based on
circular approaches through reduced requirement of toxic and critical material and increased durability, performance, andrecyclability of PV panels, as well as reuse of PV modules and components, can reduce material flows and relevant impacts
on the environment. Moreover, the benefits of recycling are manifold: recycling provides an alternative to landfilling andassociated environmental pollution and health issues. It also provides an opportunity to recover valuable elements andsecure a reliable secondary source of raw materials, helping avoid adverse environmental, social, and health impacts
associated with raw material mining. It can also generate employment opportunities and support local economic activity.
IRENA estimates that by 2030, about 1.2 million metric tons of material can be recycled from solar PV waste, and 17.7
million metric tons by 2050. This recovered material could comprise a significant share of the future total material demand.
Assuming systematic collection of end-of-life modules and recovery rates of 85 percent, the recycling of solar PV modules
could meet almost 70 percent of the silver demand and more than 20 percent of the demand for aluminum, copper,
glass, and silicon. While recovered materials do not yet generate sufficient revenue to offset the costs of the recycling
processes,b they could nevertheless represent a significant market value, accounting for about USD 0.5 billion by 2030,
USD 3.3 billion by 2040, and more than USD 8.8 billion by 2050 (IRENA 2023).
However, there are barriers to address in order to tap the potential of solar PV recycling. These include technicalchallenges (e.g., inefficient recycling technologies), and lack of the required infrastructure, logistics, and services; lackof information and data on the accurate composition of PV modules, as well as the estimated quantities and location of
to-be-decommissioned PV panels, and their time to decommissioning; unclear regulations; low market confidence forproject investors or potential second-hand panel users; and lack of profitability. Industry and industry associations caninitiate voluntary programs to encourage and promote circularity practices, such as recycling programs or circularitybased product design. Voluntary industrial standards could also be used to enable companies’ action that supports acircular economy for solar PV (IRENA 2023).
Since PV recycling is yet to be a profitable business, policies and measures are urgently needed to address barriers andpromote circular economy pathways. Currently, only about 62 policies and programs from 16 countries are focused on thecircular economy of solar PV panels; these are primarily led by governments, industry, and industry associations. Available
policy tools for governments include landfill bans, extended producer responsibility, exemption from regulations,
government guidance, financial and fiscal support, product labeling, recycling programs, and working groups. Examples
can be found in Canada, China, the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States. It is particularly
crucial to develop and implement comprehensive regulatory frameworks to define stakeholders’ responsibilities,
financing models, and the minimum requirements for collection and recycling. These should cover PV recycling processes
as well as module designs for easier recyclability of future end-of-life equipment. Finally, recycling policies should becomplemented by strategies to extend a module’s overall service lifetime through reuse, repair, and manufacturing.
a. Circular economy principles include the reduction of consumption initially, for instance, by reducing energy and material needs throughsufficiency and efficiency measures. They then imply strategies to increase product lifetimes, for instance, by repairing and reusing solar PV
equipment, and recovering materials through recycling processes.
b. For example, in the United States, recycling costs range from USD 15 to USD 45 per solar panel, which exceeds the value of the recoveredmaterial, which currently stands at USD 2 in the country. Meanwhile, disposal at nonhazardous landfills can cost less than USD 1 per panel and lessthan USD 5 per panel at hazardous waste landfills (Curtis and others 2021).

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

209

Under the 1.5°C Scenario, the role of CDR is limited to targeting process emissions from cement, iron and steel,hydrogen, and chemical production, with limited deployment for waste incinerators. Total CO2 captured from carbon
capture and storage, carbon capture and utilization, bioenergy coupled with carbon capture and storage, and other
CDR measures79 must be scaled up aggressively to reach 2.2 metric gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) by 2030, from0.004 GtCO22,500
in 2019.
To ensure the energy transition is sustainable as renewable energy deployment accelerates, it will also be critical
2,000

Clean fuelsrenewable energy
to adopt circular economy approaches and plans for the end-of-life management of different
USD Billion

technologies. Box 6.2 provides more insights on this topic, focusing on the solar PV sector. Grids
1,500

Access to modern energy
Energy efﬁciency

1,000

Outlook for Energy Efficiency

End-use renewables

500
0

Historical(2015–20)

STEPS(2021–30)

Renewables electricity

NZE(2021–30)

Global energy intensity, measured by the ratio of the total energy supply and GDP, is the key indicator to measureglobal progress on energy efficiency. The ongoing energy crisis is expected to contribute to improving this metricby 2 percent in 2022 after two years of slow progress. Surging energy costs, energy security concerns, and supply
disruptions and looming shortages have as a matter of fact brought sharp focus on efficiency improvement, withgovernments worldwide looking to energy-saving measures to shield consumers from rising prices and secure supply.
This follows a significant slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and a stronger-than-expected rebound inenergy consumption in 2021. Early estimates for 2022 indicate, therefore, a slight recovery, with energy intensity
improving at a rate of 2 percent. Greater attention to energy efficiency policies and retrofits incentives in Europe,
Northern America, and Eastern Asia enhances the outlook towards 2030 to 2.4 percent under the Stated Policies
Scenario; this is slightly stronger than progress on energy intensity over the decade ending 2020 (figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7 • Historical and projected improvement in global annual energy intensity by scenario, 2010–30
Projections

Historical4%

Energy intensity yearly change

Improvement to reach SDG7.3
3%

2%

1%

0%

2010–20

2019–21STEPS 2021–30

NZE 2021–30

Source: IEA 2022[a].
NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; SDG = Sustainable Development Goal; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

79
CDR measures and technologies include nature-based measures such as reforestation, as well as direct carbon capture and storage, bioenergy
with carbon capture and storage, and other approaches that are currently experimental.

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

The improvement under the Stated Policies Scenario came against the backdrop of a previous slowdown, which
occurred in the wake of strong improvements in energy intensity in the mid-2010s. That slowdown was in large parttriggered by the significant slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as by slower trends in China, wheremodern production processes have now replaced inefficient industrial capacity after decades of progress in thelatter’s phaseout. Recent increased action has helped compensate for the slowdown, although annual improvements
are still far below where they need to be. Annual improvement until 2030 would now need to average 3.4 percent, as
compared to only 1.8% in the 2010-20 period, if the world is to meet the SDG 7.3.
The lingering effects of the energy crisis are deemed to have helped overall energy efficiency–related investments
increase by 16 percent in 2022, to just over USD 560 billion. This has reversed the effects caused by the pandemic on
the previous trends under the Stated Policies Scenario. In addition, the large increase in industrial activity in China due
to increased demand for durable goods worldwide during the pandemic subsided during 2022.
Volatile fuel prices have meanwhile also informed global policy responses and had an important influence on therate of energy efficiency improvements. Before the onset of the energy crisis, many energy-importing countries werealready implementing policies to shield consumers from price spikes in natural gas (concentrated in Europe), coal(concentrated in China), and LPG (concentrated in developing economies). These price shocks had resulted in many
governments providing financial support, which is draining government coffers and driving a renewed zeal for energy
efficiency projects. Enhanced energy efficiency mandates and incentives could however be seen as a more economicalalternative to household price supports and could inform the next phase of recovery response measures, alongsidemandates for fuel storage facilities, the increased use of renewables, and extensions of the life of existing plants,
all of which are under consideration in many countries to reduce dependence on oil and gas, especially Europe. In
developed economies, higher energy prices also drive energy efficiency investments and behavioral changes focusedon reducing consumption by private sectors and by citizens in their homes.
Energy efficiency is one of the building blocks of IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. The COVID-19 pandemic
resulted in a decline of TFEC in 2020 and 2021, but it is now set to recover. Under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050
Scenario, accelerated improvements in energy efficiency would occur across all energy end uses and would cause
global energy to peak before 2025 and decline rapidly thereafter. To realize the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario,
the world must overshoot SDG target 7.3, improving energy intensity by 4.3 percent between 2021 and 2030, insteadof the 3.4 percent needed to reach the target. This acceleration would require more stringent standards and incentives
as well as bans on the sale of inefficient stock.
Under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, global energy supply would decline 5.3 percent between 2021 and
2030, with advanced economies leading the way. This would decrease the total energy supply by 14 percent over thisperiod. This decline would occur despite strong economic growth highligting the importace of energy efficiency inthe scenario.
Early implementation of efficiency improvements across all sectors is essential to move to a more sustainable trajectory.
In the transport sector, improvements in efficiency mean that on average, conventional passenger cars sold in 2030
would consume 30 percent less energy than they did in 2019, and new trucks would consume 20 percent less fuel. By
2030, electric cars would account for over 60 percent of car sales (up from 4.6 percent in 2020), and fuel cell or electricvehicles would account for 30 percent of heavy truck sales (up from less than 0.1 percent in 2020). Meanwhile, othermodes of transportation common in developing countries would also see efficiency improvements. For example,
electric two/three-wheelers would see sales growth from 17 percent of the total today to 77 percent by 2030 under
the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario in emerging economies. Under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, by
2030, over 80 percent of household appliances and air conditioners sold in advanced economies will feature the mostefficient technologies available as of 2025 limiting electricity demand from the building sector. Emerging markets andChapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

211

developing economies will reach this 80 percent level by the mid-2030s. In industry, industrial facilities will become
more efficient due to the deployment of improved electric motors, heat pumps, and agricultural irrigation pumps, andthe wider implementation of energy management systems.
IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario also requires ramping up energy efficiency programs to incentivize
efficiency-focused construction of new buildings and retrofits. These programs would also help manufacturers
accelerate upgrades to production lines so as to produce more efficient equipment. Efficiency improvements acrossall end uses in the buildings sector, as well as the achievement of universal access to clean cooking, would cause adecline in the total energy demand by almost a quarter in residential buildings between 2020 and 2030, despitea 25 percent increase in the provision of energy services due to population and economic growth. In the existingbuildings stock, deep energy retrofits can reduce energy use by more than 60 percent. Approximately 30 percent of
the global building stock that will exist in 2030 is yet to be built. In some countries, including India, the figure is over 50
percent. However, nearly three-quarters of countries do not have mandatory energy codes for new buildings. Under
the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, all countries would introduce mandatory energy-related building codes,
and existing codes would become more rigorous. This will reduce the average energy intensity of new buildings bynearly 50 percent over 2020–30.
Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario, energy intensity would need improve at an average annual rate of over 3 percent per
year in 2020–30. To realize this, investments in improving energy efficiency need to increase by a factor of 9. A key stepin this regard is the deployment of energy efficiency measures that improve technical efficiency (e.g., more efficientboilers, air conditioners, motors, heat pump systems, and appliances), as well as the deployment of technologies that
promote end uses that consume renewables directly (e.g., solar thermal). In the buildings sector, all new construction
would need to be designed to achieve zero-energy consumption standards from 2030 onward. For existing buildings,
the rate of renovation would need to double, to 2 percent of the buildings stock a year, through 2030.

Investments Needed to Achieve SDG 7
Annual clean energy investments to reach SDG 7, which include renewable power, renewable fuels, efficiency, enduse electrification, and grids and networks, increased by 15 percent in 2021 as compared with the 2015–20 average. It
reached almost USD 1.2 trillion. These investments were key to step up progress in renewables and energy efficiency,
and partial offset the increased use of coal and oil. Without the record advancement in clean energy in 2021-22,
emissions could have grown three times.
Annual clean energy investments averaged about USD 1 trillion between 2015 and 2020, although outlooks fromboth IEA and IRENA emphasize the urgency of scaling up investments in the energy transition. Under IEA’s Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 Scenario, clean energy investments as defined above must average at USD 2.3 trillion a year andreach USD 4 trillion between 2021 and 2030 to achieve the SDG 7 targets (figure 6.8), while clean energy investments
under the Stated Policy Scenario would average at USD 1.4 trillion between 2022 and 2030.
The majority of the investment to meet SDG 7 under the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario would be directed
toward the generation of renewable electricity (including storage) and end-use efficiency, which account for USD 948
billion and USD 590 billion a year, respectively. Renewables-based power investment needs to be supported by anadditional average annual spending of USD 500 billion on the expansion and modernization of electricity networks.

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Under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, average annual investment of approximately USD 30 billion and
USD 6 billion, respectively, would be required from 2021 to 2030 to achieve full energy access and clean cooking
access in developing economies. More than half of this investment would have to be in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA
2022[a]), although Developing Asia would see the bulk of investment in clean cooking access. These investments foraccess represent only 10 percent of the annual spending of the upstream oil and gas sector; they are within reach of
the international community.
The financial resources available for advancing electricity and clean cooking access have been inadequate to achieve
full access. In 2019, investments in electricity access represented only a third of the required levels and were focusedon a few countries (IEA 2022[a]). Even more concerning were investments in access to clean cooking in the same
year, which represented only a fraction of the required levels (in Africa, they would need to increase 15 times thecurrent levels (IEA 2022[b])). International support through development aid and multilateral development banks willbe essential to mobilize, and boost, access- and other energy-related investments and derisk them for private andlocal actors in emerging markets and developing economies.

Figure 6.8 • Average annual investment in selected technologies under IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, 2020–30
2,500

USD Billion

2,000

Clean fuels
Grids

1,500

Access to modern energy
Energy efﬁciency

1,000End-use renewables
500
0

Renewables electricity

Historical(2015–20)

STEPS(2021–30)

NZE(2021–30)

Source: IEA 2022[a].
NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.

Under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario, annual investment in renewables, efficiency, related electricity infrastructure/grids andflexibility measures, and hydrogen and biofuel supply would amount to USD 4.7 trillion (USD2015) a year through2030 (figure 6.9).
In the power sector, increasing renewables generation capacity would require investment of USD 1.1 trillion a year.
Additional investments of USD 0.6 trillion a year would also be required for related infrastructure, including grid
extension and grid flexibility measures. The measures would range from better forecasting of renewable power
generation to integrated demand-side flexibility and stationary battery storage, among others.
Substantial investment would also be required outside the power sector. The buildings sector would require significant
energy efficiency investments (amounting to USD 1.6 trillion a year), aside from large investments (amounting to USD
Historical

Projections

0.15 trillion per year) in heat pumps. Energy efficiency will receive a considerable share of investments in the buildings
4%

sector. Meanwhile, energy efficiency investments in transport and industry would need to increase to USD 0.7 trillion
Improvement to reach SDG7.3

Energy intensity yearly change

per year, and investments in direct uses of renewables (solar thermal, geothermal, etc.) and fuels (bioenergy andothers)3% across all sectors would need to increase to USD 0.29 trillion per year. Investments in electrolyzers, hydrogen

supply infrastructure, and renewables-based hydrogen feedstocks would average USD 0.17 trillion a year. These
sectors would need to see average annual investments of over USD 3 trillion per year.
2%

1%

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0%

213

Figure 6.9 • Average annual investments by technology and measures required between 2021 and 2030 under IRENA’s 1.5°C Scenario

Power
Grids
and
ﬂexibility

Powergeneration
capacity

Annual average investments (USD billion/yr)

271

Electricity network

4

Flexibility measures(e.g. storage)

Biomass (total)

x 2.7

x 6.3

115

Solar PV(utility and rooftop)

3

CSP

x 20.080

18Wind offshore

3
41
0
43
0

x 2.9

338

70

Wind onshore

Marinex 21.6

86

22
59
13
82

Hydro - all(excl. pumped)

Geothermal

x 2.1

562

x 3.7

299

x 6.4

114

x 15.3
100

200

300

400

500

600

Historical, pre-Covid investments, 2017-19
1.5°C Scenario investments, 2021-30

x 3.2

Scaling factor comparing growth
for the 2017-19 period with the2021-30 level

Total - Power2017-19

528

Total - Power2021-30

USD
billion/
year

1 693

USD
billion/year

Continues next page

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Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

End uses anddistrict heat
Renewables
end uses anddistrict heat

Annual average investments (USD billion/yr)

2

Biofuels - supply
Renewables direct
uses and district heat

Energyefﬁciency

Heat pumps

86
12

Hydrogen - electrolysers
and infrastructure88

CO2 removals, captureand storage (CCS, BECCS)

41

Recycling andbio-based products

x 10.2 for the 2017-19 period with the

Scaling factor comparing growth2021-30 levelx 43.2x 12.815422
12

1.5°C Scenario investments, 2021-30

x 2.4

155

45

Bio-based methanol

Historical, pre-Covid
investments, 2017-19

x 12.1549

2Charging infrastructure
for electric vehicles

Bio-based ammonia

Circulareconomy1556 x 11.2

65

Hydrogen-basedammonia and methanol

Carbon removals,
capture andstorage

139

x 5.3

45

Transport

Innovation

x 51.5

Buildings
Industry

Electriﬁcation

124
31
161

25
0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Total - end uses and DH
2017-19

Total - end uses and DH
2021-30

296

3 018

USD
billion/year

USD
billion/year

Source: IRENA 2022.

BECCS = bioenergy coupled with carbon capture and storage; CCS = carbon capture and storage; CO2 = carbon
dioxide; CSP = concentrated solar power; DH = district heating; PV = photovoltaic.
Beyond investments in technology, policy makers also need to invest in implementing the required policy and regulatory
framework to enable the energy transition. Beyond deployment policies, policies supporting the integration of energy
transition–related technologies into the energy system are needed along with supporting policies for a conducive
environment for the energy transition. Importantly, wider policies are needed to address structural challenges torealize the benefits of the energy transition, including the opportunity to create new jobs (box 6.3).

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Box 6.3 • Linkages between SDG 7 and SDG 8: A focus on jobs
Achievement of SDG 7 is closely linked to the employment-related targets under SDG 8, which promotes full andproductive employment and decent work for all. Between 2012 and 2021, jobs in the renewable energy sector increased
from 7.3 million to 12.7 million (IRENA 2014; IRENA and ILO 2022). The energy transition will create millions of jobs,
although accelerating the transition at the scale and speed to achieve climate goals and development objectives
depends on creating a skilled workforce that taps a diverse pool of talents. IRENA estimates that jobs in the overall energy
sector could increase to 139 million by 2030 following an ambitious pathway suitable for limiting temperature increases
to 1.5°C. This is 31 percent more than the estimated jobs under current plans and commitments in the energy sector by
2030. The number of jobs in the renewable energy sector would increase from 12.7 million today to 38.2 million in 2030,
more than double the projected 17.4 million jobs under current plans. Additionally, a projected 74 million jobs would becreated in energy efficiency, electric vehicles, power systems/flexibility, and hydrogen (IRENA 2022).
However, the impact of the energy transition on the labor market would be manifold: it would lead to not only job
creation but also outright job loss, apart from relocation and transformation. Misalignments would likely occur acrossdifferent dimensions: job losses could exceed job gains at any given time (temporal). Further, there could be uneven job
gains geographically, with more job creation in one country and more job losses in another (space). Also, the current skillsof the labor force could be inadequate to meet the needs of the energy transition (educational). Further, changes in value
and supply chains could affect sectors (sectoral).
How well a country responds to these structural changes will depend on a variety of factors, for example, its economic
structure, demographics, skill base, and chosen policies, among others. Countries can design social and labor market
responses informed by earlier national employment assessments to prepare for the transition’s job impacts. Policy makers
should develop an overarching just transition framework designed to restructure the economy and labor market and tocomplement their strategies for climate action. These frameworks must be based on national development objectives,
specifically, maximizing employment and income opportunities while minimizing socioeconomic disruptions to theextent possible (IRENA and ILO 2022).
Efforts need to focus as much on the quality of jobs as on their quantity. Decent jobs are those that give fair compensationand have safe workplaces, where rights are respected. This entails adopting and implementing international labor
standards, institutionalizing labor rights, and creating conditions that allow for unionization and collective bargaining
arrangements within industries to ensure fair labor practices (ILO 2023).
Similarly, ensuring equal rights and adequate opportunities for women, youth, minorities, and marginalized groups iscritical. Doing so contributes to SDG 5 on gender equality and SDG 10 on reducing inequality. Policies are needed toovercome barriers to entering the workforce, as well as to job retention and career advancement. Furthermore, industries
must create supportive networks and systems to train and mentor women, youth, and minorities, to further develop theirskills and participation.
Finally, important questions concern the geographies in which jobs will be created. Currently, China, Brazil, India, the UnitedStates, and members of the European Union lead in equipment manufacturing, project engineering, and installations.
The bulk of renewable energy employment is in Asian countries, which accounted for 63.6 percent of jobs in 2021 (IRENA
and others 2022). Especially in traditionally disadvantaged regions, local industrial capacity needs to be leveraged toenjoy the socioeconomic benefits of the energy transition. The renewables industry needs to support local value chainsto stimulate local economies. Farsighted industrial policies can enable sustainable socioeconomic development in thelong run. These may involve education and training programs for employees in specific sectors, supplier development
programs, business incubation initiatives, incentives for small and medium enterprises, and the promotion of industrial
clusters. Such policies can also contribute to creating the structural underpinnings for robust supply chains throughinfrastructure investments, an increase in local firms’ access to finance and information, and an improvement in capacities
across the value chain and, ultimately, the realization of SDG 7 and SDG 8 (IRENA and ILO 2022).

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Conclusion
The energy sector continues to receive support through innovative policies and technologies, but the COVID-19
pandemic and the current energy crisis set progress back in ways that were not foreseen in 2019. Not only are current
and planned policies not aligned to achieve SDG 7, but progress toward some targets has also been even slower
than before.
For the first time in decades, the number of people without electricity access globally might have grown in 2022. At
the same time, there has been a considerably higher perceived risk of lending money to a number of developing
countries, making it more expensive for them to raise debt finance for energy technologies and improve energy access.
Meanwhile, the outlook looks more positive for renewables and efficiency. Low oil and gas prices were originallyprojected to be a barrier to the uptake of clean energy technologies and energy efficiency under IEA’s Stated Policies
Scenario. However, rising prices in 2022 and renewables- and efficiency-focused recovery plans in key economies
made the outlook for renewables and efficiency stronger than it was a year ago. Recent price spikes and the crisis in
Ukraine have also increased uncertainty in global oil and gas markets, putting renewed pressure on net importers to
reduce exposure. Renewables, efficiency, and electrification are likely to play major roles in the policy responses tothese events. These responses need to be substantial and reach beyond advanced economies if the world is to achieve
the energy-related SDGs.
Continued efforts are also required to double the global annual energy intensity improvement rate to an average of
3.4 percent if the world is to achieve SDG target 7.3. The ongoing slump in economic activity and lingering economic
uncertainty are likely to result in slower turnover of capital stock, but the inclusion of provisions for efficiency in somecountries’ economic recovery packages partially offsets that effect. Solar PV and wind remain the fastest-growing
sources of energy globally. More policy support for renewable integration, electrification, and decarbonization will beneeded to align with the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 and 1.5°C scenarios.
Getting on track to meet SDG 7 depends partly on how governments continue to support clean energy and energyaccess investments. In advanced economies, initial support from recovery plans needs to evolve to more nuanced
support that relies less on direct cash injections and more on derisking and guarantees to continue advancing theseobjectives. More pressingly, significant investments are needed in the energy transition in emerging markets anddeveloping economies, especially in light of diminishing fiscal leeway. International support will be essential to not only
directly mobilize investments but also catalyze higher private capital participation by derisking clean energy projects.
As policy makers chart the path ahead, it is worth bearing in mind that an energy transition ambitious enough to achieve
SDG 7 can also help meet other social and economic objectives. With holistic policies in place, the energy transition
can foster sustainable economic growth, create jobs, and improve welfare as emphasized throughout this report.

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Methodological Notes
All investment figures from IEA scenarios are in constant 2021 USD at market exchange rate. Investment figures fromIRENA scenarios are in constant 2015 USD at market exchange rate.

IEA METHODOLOGY
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on results from the World Energy Model (WEM) and IEA’s analysis in
the World Energy Outlook (WEO). Detailed documentation of the WEM methodology can be found at https://www.
iea.org/reports/world-energy-model/documentation#abstract.
IEA models two scenarios. The Stated Policies Scenario is designed to provide decision-makers with feedback about
their current course based on the stated policy ambitions. This scenario assumes that the COVID-19 pandemic
was brought under control in 2021. It incorporates IEA’s assessment of stated policy ambitions, including theenergy components of announced stimulus or recovery packages (as of mid-2020) and the Nationally Determined
Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Broad energy and environmental objectives (including country net-zerotargets) are not automatically assumed to be met. They are implemented in this scenario to the extent that they aresupported by specific policies, funding, and measures. The Stated Policies Scenario also reflects progress with theimplementation of corporate sustainability commitments.
The Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario is a normative IEA scenario that shows a narrow but achievable pathway forthe global energy sector to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050, with advanced economies reaching net-zeroemissions in advance of others. This scenario also achieves the key energy-related SDGs, achieving universal energy
access by 2030 and major improvements in air quality. The scenario is consistent with limiting the global temperaturerise to 1.5°C without a temperature overshoot (with a 50 percent probability), in line with reductions assessed by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C. This scenario is basedon the following assumptions:•

Uptake of all available technologies and emissions reduction options is dictated by cost, technology maturity,
policy preferences, and market and country conditions.

•

All countries cooperate toward achieving net-zero emissions worldwide.

•

An orderly transition occurs across the energy sector. It ensures the security of fuel and electricity supply at all
times, minimizes stranded assets where possible, and avoids volatility in energy markets.

METHODOLOGY FOR ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND CLEAN COOKING
The projections presented in the WEO and in this chapter focus on two elements of energy access, households’
access to electricity and clean cooking facilities, which are measured separately. IEA maintains databases on the levelsof national, urban, and rural electrification rates. For the proportion of the population without access to clean cooking,the main sources are the World Health Organization’s Household Energy Database and IEA’s Energy Balances. Bothdatabases are regularly updated and form the baseline for WEO energy-access scenarios to 2040.

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The projections under the Stated Policies Scenario consider current and planned policies; recent progress; andpopulation growth, economic growth, urbanization rate, and the availability and prices of different fuels. The Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 Scenario identifies least-cost technologies and fuels to reach universal access to both electricity
and clean cooking facilities. For electricity access, the analysis incorporates a Geographic Information Systems
model based on open-access geospatial data, with technology, energy prices, electricity-access rates, and demand
projections from the WEM. This analysis was developed in collaboration with the KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
Division of Energy Systems Analysis (KTH-dESA), in Stockholm. Further details about the IEA methodology for energyaccess projections can be found at https://www.iea.org/articles/defining-energy-access-2020-methodology.

METHODOLOGY FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTIONSAnnual updates to WEO projections reflect the broadening and strengthening of policies over time, including
renewables policies. Projections for renewable electricity generation are derived in the renewables submodule ofthe WEM, which projects the future deployment of renewable sources for electricity generation and the required
investment. The deployment of renewables is based on an assessment of the potential of each source and its cost(bioenergy, hydropower, photovoltaic, concentrated solar power, geothermal electricity, wind, and marine) in eachof the 25 WEM regions. In all scenarios, IEA modeling incorporates a process of learning by doing that affects costs.
The model calculates deployment and the consequent yearly investment required for each renewable source in eachregion by including financial incentives for using the renewables, as well as nonfinancial barriers in each market;
technical and social constraints; and the value added to systems by each technology in terms of energy, capacity, andflexibility.

METHODOLOGY FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECTIONSEnergy intensity calculated as Total Energy Supply [TES] divided by GDP, is the key indicator for energy efficiency.
Assumptions for short- to medium-term economic growth are largely based on estimates prepared by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Over the long term,
growth in each WEM region is assumed to converge to an annual long-term rate, which depends on demographic andproductivity trends, macroeconomic conditions, and the pace of technological change.
TES growth is based on the growth of Total final energy demand, which is calculated as the sum of energy consumption
for each end use in each final demand sector. At least six types of energy are shown in each subsector or end use: coal,oil, gas, electricity, heat, and renewables. The main oil products, LPG, naphtha, gasoline, kerosene, diesel, heavy fueloil, and ethane, are modeled separately for each final demand sector.
In the majority of equations, energy demand is a function of activity variables that are driven by the following factors:•

Socioeconomic variables: GDP and population are important drivers of sectoral activity variables that determine
energy demand for each end use within each sector.

•

Prices for end users: Historical time series data for coal, oil, gas, electricity, heat, and biomass prices within eachsector are compiled based on IEA’s Energy Prices and Taxes database and several external sources. Prices for end
users are then used as explanatory variables affecting the demand for energy services.

•

Technological parameters include recycling in industry and material efficiency.

Chapter 6 • The Outlook for SDG 7

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All 25 WEM regions for energy demand are modeled in considerable sectoral and end-use detail:•Industry is separated into six subsectors (with the chemicals sector disaggregated into six subcategories).

•

Buildings energy demand is segregated into demand of residential and services buildings, which are thenseparated into six end uses. Within the residential sector, appliances’ energy demand is segregated into fourtypes of appliances.

•

Transport demand is segregated into nine modes, with considerable detail for road transport.

IRENA METHODOLOGYIRENA scenarios
IRENA’s scenarios outlined in this report were developed by the Renewable Energy Roadmaps (REmap) team at
IRENA’s Innovation and Technology Centre, in Bonn. Since 2014, this team has produced a succession of road maps
with ambitious pathways for deploying low-carbon technologies to create a clean, sustainable energy future at the
global, regional, and country levels.
The findings in this report are based on IRENA’s 2022 flagship publication World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C
Pathway. The Planned Energy Scenario provides a perspective on energy system developments based on governments’energy plans and other planned targets and policies that were in place as of early 2022. The 1.5°C Scenario describes
an energy transition pathway aligned with the ambition of limiting the average end-of-century global temperature
increase to 1.5°C relative to preindustrial levels. For more information on the scenarios, methodology, and scope of
this work, please visit www.irena.org/remap.

IRENA socioeconomic modeling
IRENA has been analyzing the socioeconomic implications of transition road maps since 2016. Its methodology uses
a global econometric model with high regional and sectoral resolution (E3ME, from Cambridge Econometrics) toholistically capture multiple interactions between energy transition road maps with its accompanying policy baskets
and global and national economic systems.
The resulting socioeconomic footprint is evaluated at a high level of detail, generating insights that inform policy
making for a successful transition. Socioeconomic footprint results include GDP (aggregated economic activity),
employment (economy wide and with high resolution within the energy sector), and welfare (using an index with fivedimensions, economic, social, environmental, distributional, and access, each informed by two indicators).
A detailed drivers’ methodology is used to facilitate understanding of the mechanisms producing the socioeconomic
footprint results. Clearer insights on the links between transition goals and policies and their resulting impacts areprovided.

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References
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ESMAP (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program). 2020. “Cooking with Electricity: A Cost Perspective.” World
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IEA (International Energy Agency). 2021. World Energy Outlook 2021. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/worldenergy-outlook-2021.
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IEA. 2022b. Africa Energy Outlook 2022. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/Africa-energy-outlook-2022b.
IEA. 2022c. Government Energy Recovery Tracker. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable-recoverytracker.
IEA 2022d. Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains. International Energy Agency.
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IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2018. Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C. Geneva:
IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2014. Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2014. https://www.irena.org/publications/2014/May/Renewable-Energy-and-Jobs--Annual-Review-2014.
IRENA. 2022. World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Pathway. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://www.irena.org/
Publications/2022/Mar/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook-2022.
IRENA. 2023. “End-of-life Management of Solar Photovoltaic and Storage Batteries in the Energy Transition: Enabling
A Circular Economy”. Abu Dhabi. (forthcoming).
IRENA and ILO 2022. Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2022. https://www.irena.org/publications/2022/
Sep/Renewable-Energy-and-Jobs-Annual-Review-2022.
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Photo: © Gettyimages by Luis Alvarez

CHAPTER 7
TRACKING PROGRESSTOWARD SDG 7 ACROSSTARGETS: INDICATORSAND DATAPhoto: @ Gettyimages by Luis Alvarez

A robust framework of indicators backed by statistical data is essential for countries working to achieve theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Gathering the necessary data depends in turn on the existence of welldesigned and well-resourced statistical systems. The development of standardized indicators for tracking progress
toward policy goals helps countries compare their progress, identify areas where more work is needed, and makeevidence-based decisions about where to focus their resources.
The international community has spurred efforts to improve data collection, analysis, and reporting. The definition
and approval of 232 initial indicators (since expanded to 248) was an important step toward global monitoring.80
Establishing the indicators created a common language and framework for development, aligning the efforts ofgovernments, civil society, and the private sector toward shared goals. It also raised awareness of the importanceof data and monitoring in development. Since the need for comprehensive and accurate data has grown inimportance, the international community has spurred efforts to improve data collection, analysis, and reporting
through new technologies and innovative approaches, which has in turn helped to identify gaps in development
and track progress towards closing them. It has therefore played an important role in fostering consensus andenabling countries to track progress towards shared development goals.
Leveraging national data efforts worldwide, this annual report is a joint effort of the five custodian agencies
responsible for monitoring progress toward the targets of SDG 7—universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable,
and modern energy by 2030 (table 7.1). The World Bank and World Health Organization are responsible fortracking progress toward SDG target 7.1 (universal access to modern energy services). The International Energy
Agency (IEA), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) areresponsible for SDG target 7.2 (the share of renewable energy in the energy mix). IEA and UNSD are responsible for
SDG target 7.3 (improvements in energy efficiency). IRENA is also responsible for tracking target 7.a (international
cooperation, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and for target 7.b (promotion ofenergy infrastructure). The World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) produces andpublishes the report.
This chapter provides a description summary of data and methodological challenges for each of the indicators.
Further details can be found in the methodology section of each chapter and in the United Nations’ metadata
repository for SDG indicators (https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/).

80
For complete information, see “SDG Indicators: Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development”: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/

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Table 7.1 • SDG 7 targets, indicators, and custodian agencies
TARGET

7.1—By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable,
reliable, and modern energy services

7.2—By 2030, increase substantially the share of
renewable energy in the global energy mix

224

INDICATORCUSTODIAN AGENCY
OR AGENCIESRELEVANT CHAPTER
IN THIS REPORT

7.1.1—Proportion of population withaccess to electricity

World Bank

Chapter 1

7.1.2—Proportion of population withprimary reliance on clean fuels andtechnology for cooking

World Health Organization

Chapter 2

7.2.1—Renewable energy share in total
final energy consumption

International Energy Agency,
International Renewable
Energy Agency, UN Statistics
Division

7.b—By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade
technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy
services for all in developing countries, in particular least
developed countries, small island developing states, andlandlocked developing countries, in accordance with theirrespective programs of support

7.b.1—Installed [renewables-based]
generating capacity in developing
countries (in watts per capita)

International Renewable
Energy Agency

7.3—By 2030, double the global rate of improvement inenergy efficiency

7.3.1—Energy intensity measured interms of primary energy and GDP

International Energy Agency,
UN Statistics Division

Chapter 4

7.a—By 2030, enhance international cooperation tofacilitate access to clean energy research and technology,
including renewable energy, energy efficiency, andadvanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote
investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy
technology

7.a.1—International financial flows todeveloping countries in support ofclean energy research and development
and renewable energy production,
including in hybrid systems

International Renewable
Energy Agency, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation
and Development

Chapter 5

Chapter 3

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Access to Electricity
Measuring access to electricity (SDG indicator 7.1.1) is not as straightforward as simply counting the number ofpeople with electricity. It is a complex process involving data collection and validation efforts carried out by national
and international players, including governments, energy utilities, private companies, and multilateral development
organizations. Understanding the intricacies of electricity access in low-income countries and countries marked byfragility, conflict, or violence requires a comprehensive look at the multiple attributes of access in different settings.
Most microdata from household, enterprise, and agricultural surveys provide energy practitioners and ministries ofenergy with useful information but fail to capture the more nuanced aspects of electricity access in households—one
example being the economic activities of individual members of a given household. Further complexities arise whentrying to account for the scaling up of decentralized energy solutions that are not generally distinguished in routine
national surveys and energy statistics.
Because the concept of access to electricity does not lend itself to easy definition, efforts are underway, throughthe World Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework, to better capture the spectrum of energy services sought and used byhouseholds: capacity, availability, reliability, affordability, quality, formality, healthiness, and safety.81 Such information
can provide sharper and finer information about the number of people benefitting from interventions and the natureand magnitude of improvements in electrification. More detailed data from such efforts can provide important insights
to guide policy and decision-making. Where data are not available for multi-tier metrics, country-level surveys or
censuses complement data collection.
To improve the tracking of access, capacity-building activities, including bilateral and regional training of energy
statisticians, must be further developed. The usability of datasets should also be improved by helping governments andenergy practitioners apply new technologies and data analytics. For example, the Atlas of Sustainable Development
Goals published online by the World Bank presents interactive storytelling and data visualizations on the trends inaccess to electricity, among other key SDG indicators.82 Finally, exploring the use of large-scale open databases, suchas satellite-based data that could provide real-time information, will help clarify where and how electricity is being
used, as well as socioeconomic trends in its use.

81

Information on the Multi-Tier Framework can be found at https://mtfenergyaccess.esmap.org/

82
A new edition of the Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals will be published in 2023. The 2020 edition can be found at https://datatopics.
worldbank.org/sdgatlas/

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Access to Clean Cooking Fuels andTechnologies for Cooking
SDG indicator 7.1.2 measures the number of people using clean fuels and technologies as their main energy source
for cooking in the household. Households considered to have access to clean cooking are those primarily relying
on electricity, biogas, solar, alcohol fuels, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas for household cooking purposes.
Here, “clean” refers to the combinations of fuels and technologies that meet the emissions targets set out in the WHO(2014) guidelines for indoor air quality and household fuel combustion. Improved data collection on the parallel use
of multiple cooking solutions (also known as “stove stacking”) in low- and middle-income countries delivers a more
complete representation of the population exposed to pollution and the resultant diseases. Presently, however, suchdata are too limited in geographic coverage to be used in global tracking efforts.
Household surveys and censuses are currently the primary data source for global estimates. Such data serves as
primary input for the Global Household Energy Model applied to derive estimates on the use of clean cooking fuels
and technologies. Knowing the extent to which these surveys capture modes and duration of use is therefore vital for
designing, implementing, and monitoring the effectiveness and outcomes of clean cooking policies and programs.
By refining household surveys and censuses countries can gain a more complete picture of household energy use,
access to clean cooking fuels and technologies, and the effects of cooking practices on air pollution, gender, climate
and other impacts. WHO and WB developed a harmonized set of “Core questions on Household Energy Use” andthe Guidebook “Measuring Energy Access”. The questions improve upon previous surveys by not only establishingwhether a household has electricity access and what the main cooking fuel is, but also assessing the type of electricity
access; the quality of access; impediments to access; the type of fuels and devices used for cooking, heating andlighting; and important safety and livelihood impacts of household energy use.
Beyond the SDG7 indicators, additional and more comprehensive questions included in surveys will also help inmonitoring the trends and broader outcomes of clean cooking access. Currently, most household energy datacollected by national household surveys do not capture everything needed to understand the role of energy services
in poverty reduction and other impacts, therefore, do not permit extensive energy policy analysis. Including questions
on cooking time, fuel collection, and health implications would increase the granularity of clean cooking estimates andhelp national and global policy makers devise better policies (World Bank and WHO 2021).

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Renewable Energy
The share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption is the indicator used to track progress toward
the SDG 7.2 target of substantially increasing the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. Here, too,comprehensive data across all energy sources (renewable and nonrenewable) and stages of supply, transformation, andfinal consumption are needed for accurate tracking. The methodology used to derive total final energy consumption,
total energy supply, and energy balances is detailed in United Nations (2018).
To increase the accuracy of tracking renewables, two methodological challenges must be met: (1) monitoring the
rapid development of geographically distributed energy sources, such as off-grid and micro-grid solar PV and wind,and (2) improving the capacity of countries to measure traditional uses of biomass (solid biofuels) by households, thelargest share of renewable (if not clean) energy in low- and middle-income countries.
Better national-level household and industry surveys on how solid biomass fuels are used in households andorganizations could improve the reliability of renewable energy statistics. For example, including a broader rangeof questions about biomass use in households could help determine the extent to which its use can be considereda sustainable energy source. Traditional fuelwood harvesting is associated with deforestation, as a large fraction of
fuelwood is not sustainably harvested. Despite this, fuelwood is currently assumed to be renewable energy for lackof an agreed definition of sustainable harvesting and for lack of measurements on fuelwood harvests. Survey-based
data could prove valuable as a means to better quantifying the “renewable” fraction of biomass use. Such additional
information could lead to significant revisions of previous estimates.

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Energy Efficiency
Energy intensity, defined as the ratio of total energy supply to economic output, is used to track progress toward SDG
target 7.3—doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency (UN 2018). Measuring the total energy supply
requires solid information on primary energy production across all sources, as well as trade in all energy products,
among other things. The supply information is collected from administrative sources or through surveys of higher-levelplayers, such as energy suppliers.83 The information currently collected includes commercially traded energy sources
and is of fairly good quality in most countries.
To improve tracking of energy intensity it will be important to analyze the drivers of demand across sectors, such asindustry, transport, and buildings—both residential and commercial/industrial. The demand-side of data collection
is much more complex, time-consuming, and expensive than supply-side collection owing to the diversity of end
users. Therefore, consumer surveys can complement data-collection efforts when energy suppliers have limited or no
information on how much energy is consumed by different types of users.
To analyze energy efficiency within sectors, countries must monitor intensities at the end-use level. Efficiency indicators
might include energy expended per passenger-kilometer by vehicle type for transport; energy for space heating andcooling, by unit of area, for buildings; or energy per unit of physical production of a good for industry. More details
on a methodological framework for energy efficiency indicators, as well as country experiences, can be found in IEA(2014).
Along with finer disaggregation of data, better energy efficiency indicators will depend on more coordination acrossorganizations related to activities beyond the energy sector, encompassing building records, vehicle registrations,industrial reports, and so on. Many countries have already begun to collect end-use data and compile energy efficiency
indicators to support their policy-making and planning.84

83
Data collected by various agencies in response to legislation or regulation (not necessarily for statistical purposes) may be used to compile
energy statistics after ensuring their quality and addressing limitations related to their purpose.
84
An example, beyond the IEA energy efficiency indicators themselves (IEA 2014) is the Odyssee database for Europe, https://www.indicators.
odyssee-mure.eu/

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International Financial Flows to
Developing Countries in Support ofClean and Renewable Energy
Indicator 7.a.1 measures international public financial flows to developing countries for clean energy research,development, and renewable energy production, including in hybrid systems. It utilizes data from IRENA and theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Good measurement of international public investment flows has four components: (1) tracking financial flows; (2)standardizing commitment details; (3) centralizing data collection; and (4) presenting flows in a constant way.
To track public financial flows, it is critical to understand how aid recipients intend to spend the investments for enduse projects and programs. Recipients are defined as end-use organizations and projects run by public investors. The
amount of private finance leveraged through public funds, already tracked by OECD in its data on mobilizing private
finance, makes a good complement to analyses of public flows. International financial flows are generally disbursed
in multiple phases and through multiple stakeholders (local governments, ventures, or funds). Some commitments
may also be cancelled or modified after data have been gathered. Thus, where reporting institutions revise financial
investment figures, historical investment information covering several years should be included to disclose changes
in amounts.
Standardizing commitment details by sharing best practices among public investors and donors, refining reporting
directives, and encouraging public investors and donors helps ensure that collected data comply with international
standards. The standardization process also increases accuracy and granularity. For example, granular commitment
data may specify technology, type of finance (project-level finance, infrastructure, research, or technical assistance),
and type of financial mechanism, among attributes.
Collections of investment data often fail to gather energy-related details. Currently, the collection of most data on public
investments in clean energy and renewables remains decentralized, reducing consistency. For comparability acrosspublic donors, data collection must be centralized through the use of online data-entry portals and questionnaires
prefilled to the extent possible with data from other agencies. The OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System database is
exemplary in this regard and also allows for self-reporting by donors.
Exchange rates and inflation must be taken into account when comparing international commitments across countries.
The OECD methodology is used in this report to deflate international flows by adjusting for inflation from the year theflows occurred to a baseline year (2020) and by converting local-currency values to U.S. dollars using exchange rates
from the baseline year (2020).

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Installed Renewable Electricity:
Generating Capacity in Developing Countries
Indicator 7.b.1 tracks the installed capacity of power plants that generate electricity from renewable sources ofenergy (expressed in watts per capita). The 36 energy types disaggregated by IRENA as renewable fall into six broad
categories: hydropower; marine energy (ocean, tidal, and wave energy); wind energy; solar energy (photovoltaic andthermal energy); bioenergy; and geothermal energy.
Capacity is defined as the net maximum electrical capacity installed at year end. Assessing a country’s capacity to
produce electricity is a valuable way to track progress toward target 7.B because it is an actual reflection of efforts.
For many nations, the focus on increasing electricity production, especially from renewable sources, is a crucial step intheir journey toward sustainable and modernized services.
The capacity data are collected in the course of IRENA’s annual questionnaire cycle. Countries receive questionnaires
at the beginning of each year and report renewable energy data for the previous two years. To minimize the reporting
burden, the questionnaires for some countries are prefilled with data collected by other agencies (e.g., Eurostat) andare then sent out to countries to provide any additional details requested by IRENA. Validated data, by country, arepublished each year in late June in IRENA’s Renewable Energy Statistics Yearbook. Population data are extracted fromthe World Population Prospects (UN Population Division 2022). The population data represent the population of acountry at mid-year (July 1).
A measure of indicator 7.b.1 in watts per capita is computed by dividing renewable electricity generating capacity
at year end by the total population of the country for each country and year. The capacity data are drawn from thecomputation, and the data account for the immense variations in needs between countries. Population data are usedinstead of GDP, as population is the most basic indicator of country demand for modern and sustainable energy
services.
Importantly, the indicator’s focus on electricity capacity does not capture trends in the modernization of technologies
in important energy-intense sectors such as heat production and transport. Overall, electricity accounts for only about
a quarter of the energy used globally; the share is even lower in most developing countries. With electricity accesscontinuing to increase, however, the relevance of the focus on electricity capacity will rise.

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Conclusion
Since the first effort back in 2013, improvements in reporting, advances in countries’ statistical capacities, and enhanced
models have raised the quality, reliability, and consistency of data on progress toward SDG 7 targets. This progressshould be seen as a reminder of the value of pursuing a common framework using standardized methodologies of datacollection and estimation. Achieving the common framework will depend on cooperation among national statistical
offices and between those offices and relevant international bodies. International cooperation in the compilation of
global databases will harmonize estimates across regions and countries and raise awareness of the need for gooddata.
As the custodian agencies work together on global tracking of SDG 7, they have found ways to refine their collaborationand to strengthen their support to countries. For example, the custodial agencies responsible for this report hostwebinars for statistical agencies, produce statistical guidance and reports on data collection, and regularly consult
with national statistical offices about the estimates they provide. Continuing efforts by the World Bank, WHO, and othercustodians to mainstream energy access questions into national household surveys are an important form of support
to those offices. Workshops to support national and regional data-collection efforts have also contributed to stronger
capabilities. More such support is required to build national statistical capacities.
IEA and UNSD, in particular, have a long history of working together to build national reporting capacity. Bothagencies participate in a set of workshops led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change tohelp countries improve their compilation of energy balances. More accurate energy balances lead to more accuracy inthe estimation of indicators 7.2.1 and 7.3.1. Another example is the compilation of a policy brief by the SDG 7 Tracking
Group for the 2023 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. As a byproduct of this report, the policy
brief will contribute to the discussions of the High-Level Political Forum and support its work.
The SDG 7 custodian agencies emphasize the need to strengthen resources for enhanced national data collection
within current and planned international programs on energy transitions. Building on recent improvements in datacollection for the SDGs, domestic statistical capacities must be further strengthened. Resources should be increased
for this purpose.
Finally, the custodian agencies would like to express their appreciation of the work and dedication of the manycolleagues who collect national-level data around the world. Without their efforts, no precise estimates could be
produced, and no tracking would be possible. Their work underpins the international efforts culminating in this reportand ensures that the SDG 7 targets are kept in full view.

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231

References
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2014. Energy Efficiency Indicators: Fundamentals on Statistics. Paris. https://www.
iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-indicators-fundamentals-on-statistics.
UN (United Nations). 2018. International Recommendations for Energy Statistics. New York. https://unstats.un.org/
unsd/energystats/methodology/ires/
UN Population Division. 2022. World Population Prospects 2022 (online data). https://population.un.org/wpp/
WHO (World Health Organization). 2014. WHO Guidelines for Indoor Air Quality: Household Fuel Combustion. Geneva.
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241548885
World Bank and WHO (World Health Organization). 2021. Measuring Energy Access: A Guide to Collecting Data Using“The Core Questions on Household Energy Use”. Geneva. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-HEP-ECHAQH-2021.9

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Appendix: Regional Classifications ofCountries/Territories
This report classifies countries and territories according to the United Nations’ SDG classification for regions, the mostrecent classification for developing countries, and the special groupings for the least-developed countries (LDCs),
landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), and small island developing states (SIDS) (table 7.2). The SDG regionalgroupings are not the same as the M49 regional grouping of the United Nations, which focuses more closely on
geography. The United Nations discontinued its developing countries classification in late 2022. This report willcontinue to use the most recent UN classification of developing countries to ensure continuity for indicators 7.a.1 and7.b.1 (as well as 12.a.1).

Table 7.2 • Groupings of regions, countries, and territories as used in this report
CATEGORY

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES WITHIN THE CATEGORY

Northern America and EuropeÅland Islands, Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Channel Islands,
Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, Holy See,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola, Benin, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, FrenchSouthern and Antarctic Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Réunion, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome andPrincipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Eswatini, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Latin America and the
CaribbeanAnguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bonaire, Sint
Eustatius and Saba, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint
Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin (French Part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch
part), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States
Virgin Islands, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)Western Asia and Northern
AfricaAlgeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, Yemen

Oceania, excluding Australia
and New Zealand

American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru,
New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, United States minor outlying islands, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna Islands

Eastern Asia and South-eastern
Asia

Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, Macao Special Administrative
Region, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam

Central Asia and Southern Asia

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Australia and New ZealandAustralia, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, New Zealand, Norfolk Island

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data233

CATEGORY

234

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES WITHIN THE CATEGORY

Developed countriesÅland Islands, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Channel Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland,
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro,(Kingdom of the) Netherlands, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen
Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, Republic of North Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America

Developing countries

Afghanistan, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba,
Botswana, Brazil, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde,Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, China, Macao Special Administrative Region, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba,
Curaçao, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Fiji, French Guiana, French
Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated Statesof), Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Puerto
Rico, Qatar, Réunion, Rwanda, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin (French Part), Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sint
Maarten (Dutch part), Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, South Sudan,
Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Suriname, Eswatini, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,
United Republic of Tanzania, United States minor outlying islands, United States Virgin Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Least-developed countries(LDCs)

Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda,
United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia

Landlocked developing
countries (LLDCs)

Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Nepal,
Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Sudan, Eswatini, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Small island developing states(SIDS)

American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British
Virgin Islands, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, French Polynesia,
Grenada, Guam, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Montserrat, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Singapore, Sint Maarten(Dutch part), Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United States Virgin Islands, Vanuatu

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

CATEGORYCOUNTRIES/TERRITORIES WITHIN THE CATEGORY“Developing countries” under
the indicator 7.a.1. These area modified list of countries
specific to the international
public finance flows

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas (the), Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic (the), Chad, Chile, China, China, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, China, Macao Special Administrative Region, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Comoros (the), Congo (the), Cook
Islands (the), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the), Democratic Republic of the Congo(the), Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic (the), Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji,
French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia (the), Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's
Democratic Republic (the), Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands (the),Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niger (the), Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Palau,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines (the), Republic of Moldova (the), Residual/unallocated ODA: Central
Asia and Southern Asia, Residual/unallocated ODA: Eastern and South-eastern Asia, Residual/unallocated ODA: Latin America andthe Caribbean, Residual/unallocated ODA: Northern America and Europe, Residual/unallocated ODA: Oceania excl. Aus. and N.
Zealand, Residual/unallocated ODA: Sub-Saharan Africa, Residual/unallocated ODA: Western Asia and Northern Africa, Rwanda,
Saint Helena, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine (the), Sudan (the), Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic (the), Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan,Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania (the), Unspecified countries, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela(Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

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d
e

95
98
96
99
92
100
100

Anguilla

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Aruba

Australia

Austria

70
99

BhutanBolivia (Plurinational State of)Bosnia and Herzegovina

h

99

68

60

31

Bermuda
g

26
100

m

83

22

e

100

92

100

100

79

Belize

m

m

44

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

97

Benin

100

Barbados

Belgium

100

Bangladesh

Belarus32

Bahrain

89

100

Bahamas

d

c
m

99
100

Azerbaijan

m

m

96

24

Angola92

29

100

Andorra100

Algeriam

99

99

American Samoa

99

99

Albania

29

4

2000

Afghanistan

COUNTRY

Source: World Bank

2005

h

e

m

m

g

m

m

m

m

m

d

d

m

99

88

73

100

34

90

100

94

100

55

100

100

100

100

100

93

100

99

99

98

35

100

99

100

43

2010

c

m

g

e

m

m

g

m

m

m

m

e

d

e

m

d

72

100

92

95

100

30

92

100

97

100

74

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

42

100

99

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

k

h

m

k

c

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

d

m

d

m

k

d

100

99

100

100

42

98

100

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

48

100

100

100

98

2021

SDG 7.1.1 • Proportion of population with access to electricity

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

g

100

100

100

100

67

98

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

75

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

g

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

95

100

100

18

97

100

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

99

100

97

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

237

27
94
97
100
88
9
3
59
17
41
100
100
6
3
100
98
97
100
100
95
40
29
98
97
49
100

Botswana

BrazilBritish Virgin Islands

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

BurundiCabo VerdeCambodia

Cameroon

CanadaCayman Islands

Central African Republic

Chad

Channel Islands

Chile

China

China, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region

China, Macao Special Administrative
RegionColombia

Comoros

Congo

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

COUNTRY
2000

k

d

m

m

h

m

c

m

m

c

d

m

100

59

99

98

34

51

97

100

100

98

98

100

5

7

100

100

47

21

67

3

11

91

100

98

97

37

2005

d

h

d

d

m

m

m

m

m

d

d

c

m

h

100

58

99

99

40

70

97

100

100

100

100

100

6

10

100

100

53

31

81

5

13

94

100

98

99

52

2010

m

h

h

m

m

k

m

c

c

m

m

d

e

d

d

m

e

k

62

100

63

99

100

44

74

98

100

100

100

100

100

8

13

100

100

59

63

86

8

16

97

100

100

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

m

k

h

g

h

m

m

h

m

d

m

m

m

m

h

k

100

71

100

100

50

88

100

100

100

100

100

100

11

16

100

100

65

83

96

10

19

100

100

100

99

74

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

g

m

m

100

95

100

100

67

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

43

35

100

100

95

99

95

63

68

100

100

100

100

93

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

g

m

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

45

100

12

83

100

100

100

100

100

100

1

2

100

100

25

77

97

2

99

100

100

97

25

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

238

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29
100
20
13
100
77
100
100
100
74

Eritrea

Estonia

Eswatini

Ethiopia

Faroe Islands

Fiji

FinlandFranceFrench Polynesia

Gabon

100

65

Equatorial Guinea

Germany85

El Salvador

34

98

Egypt

100

94

EcuadorGeorgia89

Gambia81

Dominican Republic

m

c

d

m

m

m

m

d

h

d

h

100

98

30

82

100

100

100

82

100

14

34

100

34

65

88

99

96

90

86

m

c

c

g

m

m

m

m

d

h

d

h

h

100

100

47

89

100

100

100

92

100

25

46

100

40

66

92

99

97

98

91

58

100

Dominica

57

m

56

100

Djibouti

m

100

100

100

Denmark

g

m

13

6

100

100

98
100

29
c

97
100

7

100

Czechia

m

k

2005

Democratic Republic of the Congo

100

Cyprus2000

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

97
100

Cuba

Curaçao

COUNTRY
2010

m

k

m

m

m

m

c

m

h

h

h

m

m

m

m

99

100

100

55

87

100

100

100

93

100

29

64

100

46

66

95

99

99

99

97

59

100

17

40

100

100

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

m

k

m

m

m

m

d

m

h

k

h

h

m

m

m

m

100

100

64

92

100

100

100

92

100

54

83

100

53

67

98

100

100

98

100

65

100

21

53

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

c

m

m

g

g

m

m

m

m

100

100

83

99

100

100

100

96

100

94

95

100

76

90

99

100

100

99

100

73

100

44

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

c

m

m

g

m

m

m

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

31

27

100

100

100

87

100

43

79

100

36

1

94

100

100

95

100

37

100

1

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

239

69
85

100
60
86
98
97
100
100
100
100

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

IrelandIsle of Man

Israel

Italy

99
100
15

Japan

JordanKazakhstan

Kenya

25

100

99

88
100

m

84
100

100

100

100

100

97

98

100

100

Jamaica

m

m

m

d

g

m

100

69

35

Hungaryd

20

78

Honduras

Guinea

h

67

15

100

34

73

Guatemala

m

88

100

Haiti

100

Guam

m

78

86

Grenada

100

75

100

Greenland

m

100

41

Guyana100

Greecee

5100Gibraltar

2000

Guinea-Bissau

44

Ghana

COUNTRY
2005

k

m

m

m

m

m

m

h

d

d

m

m

m

k

19

100

100

100

92

100

100

100

100

98

99

94

76

100

100

81

37

83

6

28

84

100

89

100

100

100

64

2010

d

k

k

m

g

m

m

m

m

g

g

m

m

h

g

m

m

m

m

e

74

42

100

100

100

95

100

100

100

100

99

100

98

88

100

100

90

41

88

20

35

91

100

91

100

100

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

d

c

m

g

m

m

m

m

k

g

d

m

m

h

m

m

m

m

77

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

99

100

100

100

94

47

93

36

47

98

100

94

100

100

100

86

2021

k

k

m

m

m

m

m

k

m

m

m

m

m

m

e

98

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

82

98

61

90

98

100

100

100

100

95

2021

k

m

m

m

m

m

k

m

m

m

m

m

m

e

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

68

100

99

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

98

99

100

100

86

91

16

21

98

100

100

100

100

74

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

240

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

100
100
43
100
99
4

KuwaitKyrgyzstan

Lao People's Democratic Republic

LatviaLebanonLesotho

18
99

m
e

99
100
13
5
99
84
10
100
69
19
99
98
46
100
67
99
70

Luxembourg

Madagascar

MalawiMalaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

MexicoMicronesia (Federated States of)

MonacoMongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

e

h

e

m

e

d

m

79

100

86

100

55

99

76

100

18

91

99

7

16

100

99

100

Lithuania

m

100

90

10

99

100

57

99

100

Liechtenstein

k

c

m

70

Libya

2000

100

Liberia

56

Kiribati

COUNTRY
2005

c

g

m

h

f

m

m

m

e

c

m

e

96

99

79

100

65

99

99

34

89

100

27

99

99

9

12

100

100

100

82

5

17

99

100

70

99

100

63

2010

c

m

e

h

m

d

g

m

m

g

i

m

e

91

97

99

88

100

73

99

100

40

92

100

38

100

100

11

24

100

100

100

74

15

32

100

100

90

99

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

g

m

d

c

m

d

d

m

m

m

m

e

k

m

e

100

100

100

100

84

100

100

48

100

100

53

100

100

14

35

100

100

100

70

30

50

100

100

100

100

100

93

2021

m

e

m

m

m

m

m

m

100

100

100

100

98

100

99

90

96

100

97

100

100

54

73

100

100

100

100

50

81

100

100

100

100

100

88

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

99

100

100

79

100

100

100

100

18

100

100

6

11

100

100

100

8

38

100

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

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241

47
98

m
m

30
100
100
100
73
6
43
99
99
100
100
100
73
98
81
12
90
72

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Caledonia

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Niue

North Macedonia

Northern Mariana Islands

NorwayOman

Pakistan

Palau

PanamaPapua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

100

Puerto Rico

Qatar
m

100

Portugal

100

100

100

100

Poland
m

80
100

75
100

77

95

14

84

99

78

100

100

100

99

7

74

100

100

100

46

99

40

Philippines

h

e

m

m

c

m

99

d

37

Namibia

47

42

Myanmar

12

6

2000

Mozambique

COUNTRY
2005

m

m

m

h

h

e

m

g

h

m

m

m

100

100

100

100

85

88

97

20

87

99

87

100

100

100

99

99

48

14

80

100

100

100

69

99

44

49

19

2010

m

m

m

m

h

h

g

e

m

m

m

d

m

m

m

k

g

82

99

52

61

24

100

100

100

100

89

94

99

18

92

100

91

100

100

100

100

99

53

17

83

100

100

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

m

m

m

m

f

h

h

m

m

m

d

g

m

m

m

g

g

g

d

100

100

100

100

97

96

100

21

95

100

95

100

100

100

100

100

60

19

86

100

100

100

90

100

55

72

31

2021

m

m

m

m

g

g

m

m

m

c

d

m

m

m

c

m

100

100

100

100

99

99

100

65

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

89

66

100

100

100

100

94

100

75

94

77

2021

m

m

m

m

g

g

m

m

m

c

d

m

m

m

c

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

100

100

96

84

100

14

100

92

100

100

100

100

26

9

66

100

100

100

100

33

63

4

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

242

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5

100
86

6
95
86
100
80
88
100

RwandaSaint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Martin (French Part)Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

San Marino

96
11

100
100

100
94
8
100
100
100
100
5
2
72

SerbiaSeychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Sint Maarten (Dutch part)

Slovakia

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

SomaliaSouth Africa

78

85

70

Sri Lanka

g

m

100
m

Spain

100

100

South Sudan

m

m

m

m

c

e

c

g

m

m

m

e

d

m

e

52

35

100

100

100

100

11

97

100

57

100

61

100

96

93

100

94

100

10

99

97

99

100

g

g

m

m

c

c

d

m

m

d

d

m

2010

2

81

15

19

100

100

100

47

2005

83

m

m

m

c

38

Senegal

56
100

Saudi Arabia

c

53
100

100

91

90

96

96

Sao Tome and Principe

m

98

98

Russian Federationd

94

Romania

99

99

Republic of Moldova

100

100

2000

Republic of Korea

COUNTRY

94

100

5

85

51

55

100

100

100

100

20

100

100

61

100

67

100

98

99

100

99

100

23

96

99

100

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

m

g

d

m

m

m

m

m

k

d

m

m

m

m

d

k

m

100

100

8

89

49

76

100

100

100

100

27

100

100

68

100

78

100

98

100

100

100

100

49

100

100

100

100

2021

m

g

m

m

m

m

m

g

m

e

m

m

m

m

100

100

16

87

71

79

100

100

100

100

57

100

100

94

100

80

100

100

100

100

100

100

98

99

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

6

93

31

75

100

100

100

100

5

100

100

43

100

74

100

98

100

100

100

100

38

100

100

100

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

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243

89
95

c
d

d
e

93
98
82
18
17
86
91
95
100
100
96
95
7

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Tajikistan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

TürkiyeTurkmenistan

Turks and Caicos Islands

TuvaluUganda100

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland

98
99

98
100

Uruguay

Uzbekistanm100

United States Virgin Islands

14

100

100

United States of America
m

9
100

United Republic of Tanzania

100

100

m

100

99
100

9

96

96

100

100

99

27

Ukraine
m

g

e

c

34

93

99

92

100

100

Sweden
m

95
100

m

30

100

95

c

g

100

23

Sudan

2000

Suriname

100

State of Palestine

COUNTRY
2005

m

m

m

m

c

d

k

g

c

m

m

g

100

99

100

100

15

100

100

100

12

97

100

100

100

100

100

93

31

38

100

99

93

100

100

91

36

100

2010

g

m

m

d

m

m

g

m

i

i

j

m

c

d

f

g

m

m

c

g

100

100

100

100

26

100

100

100

19

98

100

100

100

100

100

100

45

67

100

98

90

100

100

95

48

100

TOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)
2015

h

m

m

m

m

d

m

c

e

k

m

k

e

c

k

m

m

g

100

100

100

100

43

100

100

100

45

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

56

100

100

100

89

100

100

99

62

100

2021

c

m

m

m

m

m

m

k

m

m

m

100

100

100

100

77

100

100

100

72

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

96

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

84

100

2021

c

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

100

100

23

100

100

100

36

99

100

100

100

100

100

100

25

100

100

100

75

100

100

97

49

100

2021

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

244

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

55
23

49
17
34

Yemen

ZambiaZimbabwe

99
94
69
94
90
29
81

99
92
61
92
88
26
82

Northern America and Europe

Latin America and the Caribbean

Central Asia and Southern Asia

Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia

Western Asia and Northern Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Oceania

d

39

22

61

97

99

44

82

33

92

96

77

96

100

84

2010

e

k

k

34

31

67

99

100

52

81

39

93

97

88

97

99

87

2015

a. Most surveys report data on the percentage of households with access to electricity rather than on the percentage of the population with access.
b. Rural data are calculated based on the urban and total population with access.
c. Based on Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
d. Based on Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)e. Based on Census
f. Based on Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
g. Based on other National Surveys conducted by national statistical agencies
h. Based on Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC)
i. Based on Europe and Central Asia Poverty Database (ECAPOV)
j. Based on Middle East and North Africa Poverty Database (MNAPOV)
k. Based on other official sources
l. Based on Multi-Tier Framework (MTF)
m. Based on assumption: where survey data were not collected, countries considered "high income" by the World Bank are assumed to reach universal access.

Note: Unless otherwise noted, data are World Bank estimates based on the statistical model described in Chapter 1.

81

78

36

96

2005

World

e

88

99

Viet Namh99

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

31

22

2000

Vanuatu

COUNTRYTOTAL ELECTRICITY ACCESS RATE (%)

d

g

g

49

47

75

100

100

70

81

50

94

98

99

98

100

91

2021

85

86

93

100

100

97

98

81

99

100

100

100

100

98

2021

URBAN ELECTRICITYACCESS RATE (%)

32

15

63

100

100

61

47

29

88

98

98

97

100

85

2021

RURAL
ELECTRICITY ACCESSRATE (%)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

245

39
97

Albania

Algeria

40

Angola96
80

Argentina

Armenia

70
100
100
8
100
94
100
79
1

Austria

Azerbaijan

BahamasBahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

BelarusBelgium

Belize

Benin

28
63

BhutanBolivia (Plurinational State of)

Bermuda

100

100

76

64

5

84

100

99

100

13

100

100

93

100

100

96

99

100

45

100

99

66

20

2010

Australia

Aruba

100

Antigua and Barbuda

Anguilla100

AndorraAmerican Samoa

7

2000

Afghanistan

COUNTRY

82

78

5

83

100

99

100

18

100

100

97

100

100

97

100

100

47

100

100

76

27

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

Source: World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory

88

87

5

83

100

100

100

26

100

100

98

100

100

98

100

100

50

100

100

84

35

2021

18

10

0

67

100

86

100

1

100

100

43

100

100

56

76

100

7

100

93

19

1

2000

38

49

1

73

100

96

100

2

100

100

87

100

100

90

93

100

7

100

98

44

6

2010

51

66

1

73

100

98

100

5

100

100

94

100

100

94

96

100

8

100

98

57

11

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

65

80

1

74

100

99

100

10

100

100

98

100

100

96

98

100

8

100

99

68

18

2021

SDG 7.1.2 • Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking

92

86

1

94

100

99

100

34

100

100

95

100

100

94

98

100

80

100

100

67

30

2000

96

96

9

96

100

100

100

42

100

100

99

100

100

99

100

100

78

100

100

86

69

2010

98

97

9

96

100

100

100

50

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

100

78

100

100

91

79

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

99

98

8

95

100

100

100

59

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

100

77

100

100

94

85

2021

246

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

89

Brazil

4
10
100
62

BurundiCambodia

Cameroon

CanadaCabo Verde

3

Chad

100
40
78
0
1
8
80
89
17
100

Chile

China

Colombia

Comoros

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

Congo

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Côte d'Ivoire

Croatia

Channel Islands

1

Central African Republic

Cayman Islands

0

0

100

19

92

82

17

3

3

86

58

100

3

1

70

100

19

12

6

3

100

94

58

45

2010

Burkina Faso

Bulgaria

Brunei Darussalam
100

44

Botswana

British Virgin Islands

52

2000

Bosnia and Herzegovina

COUNTRY

100

23

94

80

25

4

6

90

71

100

4

1

75

100

22

21

0

8

100

96

62

43

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

32

96

79

36

4

11

93

83

100

8

1

82

100

23

44

0

12

100

96

66

42

2021

100

3

78

42

1

0

0

33

21

100

2

0

30

100

1

1

0

1

100

55

20

32

2000

100

1

81

35

2

0

1

44

34

100

0

0

33

100

2

4

0

1

100

70

28

21

2010

100

1

84

30

3

0

2

54

50

100

0

0

40

100

2

10

0

1

100

76

28

18

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

1

88

25

4

1

4

67

70

100

0

0

53

100

2

34

0

1

100

82

26

14

2021

100

34

97

98

13

5

1

93

69

100

4

1

90

100

21

16

1

12

100

97

70

80

2000

100

37

98

98

26

9

7

97

81

100

10

1

91

100

37

45

0

21

100

98

82

70

2010

100

46

98

98

37

10

14

98

86

100

18

1

93

100

40

60

0

28

100

99

84

65

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

61

98

98

50

10

25

99

91

100

33

2

95

100

39

74

0

37

100

99

86

62

2021

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

247

88

4
81
83
88
83
58
25
18
4
100
1

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

EcuadorEgypt

El Salvador

Eswatini

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

100
100

FinlandFrance447100
6GambiaGeorgia

Germany

Ghana

Gibraltar

64

Gabon

French Polynesia

28

Fiji

Faroe Islands

88

100

Denmark

15

100

66

3

80

100

100

33

2

100

8

23

39

77

99

94

6

100

100

100

Czechia

100

90

2010

100

71

2000

CyprusCuraçao

Cuba

COUNTRY

21

100

79

2

86

100

100

40

4

100

10

24

48

85

100

94

89

90

8

100

100

100

93

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

30

100

91

2

90

100

100

51

8

100

12

24

58

93

100

95

92

89

10

100

100

100

94

2021

1

100

8

2

15

100

100

10

0

100

0

4

10

24

73

70

66

58

1

100

100

100

37

2000

4

100

35

1

30

100

100

14

0

100

1

5

23

48

99

83

70

71

1

100

100

100

78

2010

7

100

59

0

40

100

100

19

0

100

1

5

32

65

100

85

71

77

0

100

100

100

85

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

12

100

82

0

50

100

100

28

0

100

1

4

44

83

100

86

76

79

0

100

100

100

88

2021

14

100

85

5

79

100

100

47

2

100

11

30

60

83

96

99

95

95

4

100

100

100

85

2000

28

100

93

4

90

100

100

51

11

100

21

34

80

93

100

99

95

97

8

100

100

100

94

2010

36

100

96

3

93

100

100

59

18

100

23

33

86

96

100

99

95

97

10

100

100

100

96

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

46

100

97

2

95

100

100

69

27

100

24

31

90

97

100

99

96

97

12

100

100

100

97

2021

248

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

30

Haiti

Honduras

22
7
93
70
100

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

Ireland

100
100
75
100
100
85
2

IsraelItaly

JamaicaJapan

JordanKazakhstan

Kenya

Isle of Man

95
100

100

Iceland

7

92

100

100

86

100

100

97

41

36

100

100

100

42

Hungary

China, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region

2

Guyana
4

1
61

1

1

35

1

Guinea

38

93

100

2010

Guinea-Bissau

41

92

100

2000

GuatemalaGuamGrenadaGreenland

GreeceCOUNTRY

12

93

100

100

86

100

100

100

98

97

67

49

100

100

46

4

73

1

1

42

91

100

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

24

94

100

100

82

100

100

100

99

96

87

71

100

100

50

4

82

1

1

48

88

100

2021

0

69

99

100

52

100

100

100

53

86

2

7

100

100

9

1

27

0

0

17

93

100

2000

2

83

100

100

75

100

100

100

90

92

23

15

100

100

15

1

56

0

0

12

92

100

2010

3

87

100

100

81

100

100

100

96

92

50

28

100

100

19

1

70

0

0

12

90

100

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

8

90

99

100

86

100

100

100

99

92

78

57

100

100

24

1

81

0

0

12

87

100

2021

6

97

100

100

98

100

100

100

79

98

15

50

100

100

56

6

55

4

1

67

94

100

2000

20

98

100

100

96

100

100

100

98

99

61

71

100

100

70

7

75

3

1

63

95

100

2010

30

98

100

100

92

100

100

100

99

99

84

83

100

100

72

7

81

2

2

67

95

100

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

51

98

100

100

84

100

100

100

100

99

94

93

100

100

73

6

85

2

2

73

94

100

2021

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

249

2
100

Democratic People's Republicof Korea

Republic of Korea

54
1
100

Kyrgyzstan

Lao People's Democratic
Republic

Latvia1

Liberia

100

Luxembourg

1
2
98
48
1
100
12
29
93

Madagascar

MalawiMalaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

China, Macao Special
Administrative Region

100

Lithuania

Liechtenstein

Libya

16

LesothoLebanon100

KuwaitKosovo1

2000

Kiribati

COUNTRY

98

42

54

100

1

93

98

2

1

100

100

0

31

100

4

71

100

100

6

3

2010

98

45

64

100

1

98

96

2

1

100

100

0

36

100

6

76

100

100

9

6

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

99

48

67

100

1

100

94

2

1

100

100

0

41

100

9

78

100

100

12

12

2021

91

14

2

100

0

34

96

0

1

100

100

0

8

100

1

36

100

100

1

0

2000

97

19

2

100

0

90

94

1

1

100

100

0

15

100

1

58

100

100

1

1

2010

98

19

1

100

0

97

93

1

0

100

100

0

18

100

1

66

100

100

1

1

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

99

20

1

100

0

100

90

0

0

100

100

0

21

100

2

68

100

100

1

2

2021

97

53

17

100

2

94

100

12

3

100

100

1

47

100

3

86

100

100

2

1

2000

99

68

72

100

2

99

99

11

2

100

100

0

73

100

10

93

100

100

9

6

2010

99

71

84

100

2

100

99

10

2

100

100

0

78

100

15

94

100

100

13

11

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

99

74

87

100

2

100

98

6

4

100

100

1

82

100

21

95

100

100

19

20

2021

250

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

3

100
23
66
90
2
2
34
100
6
100

MonacoMongolia

Montenegro

MoroccoMozambique

MyanmarNamibia

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

34
1
1
75
56

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Niue

North Macedonia

100
100
24
54
100
5

NorwayOman

Pakistan

Palau

PanamaPapua New Guinea

Northern Mariana Islands

100

New Zealand

New Caledonia

96

64

Republic of Moldova

8

100

51

35

100

100

68

94

2

1

45

100

100

21

100

41

10

63

35

100

91

12

11

Micronesia (Federated States of)

85

2010

83

2000

MexicoCOUNTRY

9

100

47

42

100

100

73

97

6

2

51

100

100

28

100

44

21

4

98

62

44

100

96

13

85

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

10

100

43

51

100

100

79

98

17

3

57

100

100

35

100

47

44

5

98

62

53

100

98

13

85

2021

0

100

70

4

100

100

37

70

0

0

6

100

100

2

100

11

0

1

80

44

2

100

40

3

46

2000

3

100

59

11

100

100

44

92

1

0

8

100

100

10

100

12

3

0

92

41

7

100

86

5

52

2010

4

100

51

17

100

100

50

96

2

0

9

100

100

15

100

12

8

0

95

42

11

100

94

4

53

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

5

100

43

28

100

100

59

98

5

0

10

100

100

22

100

13

27

0

97

44

16

100

97

3

59

2021

39

100

50

66

100

100

69

87

1

4

55

100

100

24

100

77

5

5

100

83

40

100

96

28

98

2000

40

100

50

82

100

100

85

96

4

6

70

100

100

64

100

76

26

9

100

75

50

100

98

31

95

2010

38

100

47

86

100

100

90

98

11

9

78

100

100

67

100

75

53

11

100

72

60

100

99

33

93

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

36

100

42

87

100

100

92

98

33

13

86

100

100

63

100

72

82

14

99

71

71

100

99

34

91

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Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

251

100
100

Philippines

PolandPortugal

100
100
0
18
100
0
100
35
58
100
0
100

Romania

Russian Federation

RwandaSamoa

San Marino

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

SenegalSerbiaSeychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

8

100
9
0
56
0
100

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

SomaliaSouth Africa

South Sudan

Spain
100

0

77

1

100

100

100

100

0

100

68

33

100

1

100

27

0

96

100

100

100

Slovakia

Sint Maarten (Dutch part)

100

Qatar

Puerto Rico

41

38
100

66

42

Peru

57

2010

48

2000

Paraguay

COUNTRY

100

0

84

2

8

100

100

100

1

100

73

28

100

2

100

31

1

88

100

100

100

100

43

75

65

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

0

88

4

9

100

100

100

1

100

81

29

100

4

100

37

5

73

100

100

100

100

48

86

70

2021

100

0

30

0

4

100

100

100

0

100

30

7

100

0

100

9

0

100

100

100

100

100

19

4

17

2000

100

0

56

0

2

100

100

100

0

100

44

7

100

0

100

18

0

96

100

100

100

100

22

14

28

2010

100

0

64

0

2

100

100

100

0

100

53

6

100

0

100

23

0

89

100

100

100

100

23

24

36

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

0

70

0

1

100

100

100

0

100

66

6

100

1

100

30

1

76

100

100

100

100

28

45

42

2021

100

0

77

0

37

100

100

100

0

100

82

68

100

0

100

45

0

100

100

100

100

100

55

59

72

2000

100

0

89

2

37

100

100

100

1

100

86

64

100

2

100

57

1

97

100

100

100

100

62

84

77

2010

100

0

93

4

36

100

100

100

1

100

89

53

100

3

100

62

4

91

100

100

100

100

64

91

84

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

0

96

6

36

100

100

100

2

100

92

54

100

5

100

66

24

76

100

100

100

100

69

96

86

2021

252

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

96
7
76
100
100
98
36
1
59
1
0
34
100
94
90
99

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Sudan

Suriname

SwedenSwitzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Tajikistan

United Republic of Tanzania

Thailand

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

TürkiyeTurkmenistan

100
100
100

UkraineUnited Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

United States of America
100

100

100

1
94

1
91

47

100

94

99

100

60

3

5

73

2

69

99

100

100

87

32

Uganda12

TuvaluTurks and Caicos Islands

95

86
96

100

100

Saint Kitts and Nevis

22

2010

16

2000

Sri Lanka

COUNTRY

100

100

100

95

1

66

100

95

100

100

73

7

9

79

3

78

98

100

100

92

47

95

96

100

26

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

100

95

1

75

100

95

100

100

87

11

15

85

7

86

96

100

100

95

63

93

94

100

33

2021

100

100

100

85

0

9

99

78

91

100

22

0

0

46

0

21

98

100

100

57

6

97

94

100

10

2000

100

100

100

87

0

26

100

83

99

100

51

0

1

63

0

59

98

100

100

76

23

96

96

100

15

2010

100

100

100

88

0

35

100

84

99

100

67

1

3

70

1

71

97

100

100

84

37

96

95

100

18

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

100

88

0

41

100

85

100

100

84

1

5

79

2

81

95

100

100

91

55

95

94

100

24

2021

100

100

100

95

4

10

100

98

96

100

78

1

4

86

1

79

100

100

100

88

18

96

72

100

50

2000

100

100

100

98

3

64

100

99

100

100

89

8

12

88

4

95

100

100

100

94

54

96

94

100

58

2010

100

100

100

99

2

87

100

100

100

100

92

15

21

89

8

97

100

100

100

96

67

96

97

100

64

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

100

100

100

99

2

95

100

100

100

100

95

24

34

91

16

98

100

100

100

98

77

95

98

100

71

2021

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

253

83
16
98
13

Uzbekistan

Vanuatu

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republicof)Viet Nam

30

>95

12
12
89
57

14
34

>95
26
41
80
>95
10
9
80
49

ZambiaZimbabwe

Australia and New ZealandCentral Asia and Southern
Asia

Eastern Asia and Southeastern Asia

Latin America & the
Caribbean

Northern America andEuropeOceania excluding Australia
and New Zealand

Sub-Saharan Africa

Western Asia and Northern
Africa

World

>95

85

57

37

16

56

60

51

97

12

86

100

2010

Yemen

State of Palestine

United States Virgin Islands

100

2000

Uruguay

COUNTRY

64

91

14

13

>95

87

70

48

>95

30

14

61

79

97

9

85

100

2015

TOTAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

71

93

18

15

>95

88

82

65

>95

30

10

61

96

96

7

83

100

2021

24

65

<5

<5

>95

44

21

9

>95

5

1

42

4

79

4

72

100

2000

31

79

<5

<5

>95

53

33

16

>95

5

2

44

37

80

3

74

100

2010

39

82

<5

6

>95

57

49

26

>95

6

2

43

72

82

2

74

100

2015

RURAL CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

51

84

5

7

94

62

68

49

>95

7

2

42

95

84

2

73

100

2021

76

92

23

42

>95

93

66

57

>95

88

38

93

39

100

59

98

100

2000

82

>95

26

44

>95

95

79

73

>95

82

38

94

83

99

39

99

100

2010

84

>95

29

45

>95

95

86

82

>95

80

30

94

94

99

28

98

100

2015

URBAN CLEAN COOKINGACCESS RATE (%)

86

>95

36

46

>95

94

91

89

>95

78

20

93

99

98

19

98

100

2021

37.0

18.7
52.5

8.8
9.4

31.2
4.4

40.3
6.4

0.4
0.0
14.5
73.4
0.2
0.0
9.8
7.2
0.2
8.4
26.4
2.1
0.0
0.0
60.2
7.9
5.6
1.4

Albania

Algeria

American Samoa

AndorraAngolaAnguilla

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Aruba

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

BahamasBahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

BelarusBelgium
6.2

7.3

0.0

1.3

8.2

5.5

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.3

15.2

41.4

2000
45.0

2010

Afghanistan

UN COUNTRY NAME

9.4

6.8

2.1

31.1

0.0

1.5

2.3

34.8

9.3

6.7

10.7

9.4

0.4

0.3

47.8

19.3

0.2

0.1

38.5

17.5

2015

RENEWABLE ENERGY

12.3

8.4

4.6

28.0

0.0

1.4

1.2

35.8

10.9

8.7

8.4

9.8

0.7

0.8

61.0

21.9

0.5

0.2

44.6

17.6

4.6

7.9

3

27.6

0

1.4

0.4

16.8

4.7

0.4

3

2.7

0

0.1

51.8

0.5

0

0

8.8

2.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.7

0.1

0

0

1.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

5.6

0.6

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.3

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0.2

0

0.3

0

0

0.7

13

1.4

0

4.5

3.7

0

0

9.3

19.5

0

0

29.3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3.2

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.1

2.1

1.9

7.7

0

1.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.4

0.1

1.6

0.1

0

0

0

1.4

2.6

0.5

0.9

0.2

0.7

0.7

0

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.5

0

0

0

73.9

3.7

0.2

4.4

0

0

3.4

167.5

170.2

0.5

5.1

114.8

0

0

37.1

1.5

0

1.9

22.7

55.9

51.8

0.4

328.8

0

0.3

1.4

173.7

163.4

0

3.8

47.5

0

0

207.5

0

0

0.4

7.4

29.5

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.1

26

9.6

0

0.1

35.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

4.3

0

1297.9

663.8

13.3

1191.5

202.8

20.8

393.9

1026.43152.3

6.4

106.7

2005

5.7

1.3

401

7

3.2

1556.6

77.1

183.9

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

13.5

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

18.8

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0

TIDE
2020

0.3

WIND
2020
0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

10

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)
2020

7.4

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

Data provided by the IEA and UNSD
This table, including the data contained in it, must not be reproduced, disseminated or transferred, in whole or in part, without IEA’s and UNSD’s written permission. The data in thistable sourced to the IEA is subject to the IEA’s terms and conditions. This notice and any sourcing statements included in this table must not be removed from the table.

2020

SDG 7.2.1 • Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

SOURCE254

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

255

34.6
70.3
0.5
91.4
29.8
0.0
19.4
38.5
42.7
0.9
0.0
8.0
85.4
93.2
27.9
81.6
84.6
22.0
0.0
88.9
88.7
31.4
29.6

Benin

BermudaBhutanBolivia (Plurinational State of)

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

BrazilBritish Virgin Islands

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

BurundiCabo VerdeCambodia

Cameroon

CanadaCayman Islands

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

2000

BelizeUN COUNTRY NAME

2010
12.3

27.0

79.2

93.8

0.0

21.1

78.7

64.8

21.2

92.6

82.8

14.3

0.0

0.7

46.8

29.4

19.6

0.0

19.9

90.8

0.4

47.2

32.9

2015
12.2

25.1

72.7

92.9

0.0

21.8

78.1

60.6

26.3

91.2

74.5

17.9

0.0

1.0

43.6

25.6

25.2

13.5

14.2

86.7

0.6

49.9

30.3

2020
14.8

26.7

73.6

90.9

0.0

23.8

78.9

51.4

23.4

83.5

67.5

21.1

0.0

1.4

50.1

27.2

37.7

10.4

16.9

88.4

0.9

46.2

30.2

4.2

15.9

73.5

89.5

0

5.1

74.5

44.8

20.7

82.3

66.7

14.1

0

1

24.4

27.1

31.5

0.4

12.4

77.6

0.1

46.2

0

0.2

0

0

0

0

1.1

0

0

0

0

0

1.8

0

0

9.6

0

0

0

0.6

0

0.2

0

0.4

0.1

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5.1

6.4

0

1.3

0

15.8

4.4

6.1

0

1.1

0.5

1.8

0

0

13.2

0

5.8

0

3.4

10.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.8

1.6

0

0

0

1.5

0

0

2.5

0

0

1

0

0.3

1.9

0

0.3

7.7

0.1

0

0

0

2.1

2.6

0

0

0

0.2

0

0.5

0.3

0.1

0.3

1.3

0

0.1

0.9

0.1

0.1

2.3

0.4

0

0.2

0

1.1

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

6763.8

128.4

0

0.5

0

1244.4

15.1

19.8

0.2

0.7

1.6

18.8

0

0

1534.9

0

10.4

0.1

10.8

7.1

0

5219.4

160

62.8

33.2

0

342.5

250.7

131.6

1.4

48.5

125.6

56.6

0

0

2068.1

18.9

53.1

0

31.1

51

0

88.4

313.1

2.3

0

0

0

97.9

0

0

0

0

0

7.5

0

0

823

0

0.1

0

1.5

0

0

0

0

83028.7

1087.4

85.5

37.1

5.1

7065

336.7

294.5

6.5

59

188.3

393.6

41.4

1.4

8842.8

69.4

168.4

0.9

257.8

65.7

3.8

191.5

11.9

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

1.9

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

1.6

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020
0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

8.7

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)
2020

21.5

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

b

b

a

a

a

b

b

b

a

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

a

a

b

a

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

8.3

8.7

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Egypt

5.9

Czechia

19.4

3.1

Cyprus19.1

0.1

Curacao

Ecuador

34.4

Cuba

Dominican Republic

26.8

Croatia

11.1

63.7

Cote d'Ivoire

Dominica

32.9

Costa Rica

31.4

9.3

Cook Islands

Djibouti

64.9

Congo

10.7

69.9

Comoros

Denmark

27.9

Colombia

97.9

0.2

China, Macao Special Administrative
RegionDemocratic Republic of the Congo

0.0

2000

China, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region

UN COUNTRY NAME

2010
5.4

11.8

16.9

10.3

32.5

21.2

96.8

13.6

11.0

6.5

0.5

15.6

29.8

75.4

40.4

7.3

54.8

66.0

29.6

5.5

0.1

2015
5.3

13.1

14.9

8.7

28.2

32.5

95.8

23.3

14.8

10.4

1.3

21.1

33.1

64.5

38.3

7.4

64.2

64.1

31.5

5.4

0.2

2020
6.5

20.1

16.7

8.3

31.9

39.7

96.2

12.7

17.0

15.0

2.8

23.9

32.4

63.3

36.4

13.1

71.9

48.3

31.3

11.0

0.3

3.2

4.3

12.9

4

31.8

20

92.4

6.6

12.3

2.5

0

19.9

18.5

60.6

12

6.9

70.3

48.3

15.8

0.1

0

0.1

0

0

0

1.9

0

0

1.6

1.7

0

3.6

1

0

0

0

0

0

2.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1.4

0.7

0

0

0.8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2.1

15.5

1.6

4.1

0

0

3.8

6.1

0.6

0

0

0.1

8.7

2.7

17.6

0

1.6

0

12.9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

0

1.5

0.1

0

11.9

0

0

0.2

1.3

2.5

0

2.7

0

3.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

0

0.7

0

0.1

1.4

0

0

0.7

6.6

0.3

0.3

0.4

0

0.2

6.2

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

3.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3.5

0

0

0.3

2.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

10.9

68

72.9

9.8

0.1

0

90.2

32.1

33.4

25.7

1.9

0.7

2.4

34.8

9

35.6

0.1

1.3

0

155.4

3.1

66.4

18.7

32.7

0.1

2.2

111.1

778.7

37.4

124.6

6.3

0

56.5

48.8

194.5

16.5

0.1

55.9

3.8

176.8

0

0.1

0.2

0.5

0

0

0

11.5

0

1

16.4

1.1

0

0

3.4

0

0

0

0

0

28.7

0

0.3

2068.4

457.8

254.6

1.5

6.9

536.1

843.2

566.3

982.2

61.8

24

246.2

268.4

321.3

142.9

0.8

79.6

7.9

1153

28.8

327.7

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0.5

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020

0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0.1

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0.1

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

256

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b

b

b

a

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

b

a

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

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257

62.9
47.3
3.7
71.6
0.0
7.8
9.2
10.5
2.6

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Gibraltar

GreeceGreenland

GrenadaGuadeloupe

31.7

Finland

Gambia

50.1

Fiji

72.8

2.8

Faroe Islands

Gabon

1.4

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

8.8

95.6

Ethiopia

French Polynesia

59.4

Eswatini

9.3

19.8

Estonia

23.8

76.8

EritreaFrench Guiana

45.8

Equatorial Guinea

France33.5

2000

El Salvador

UN COUNTRY NAME

2010
3.0

10.5

10.1

11.4

0.0

51.9

11.6

39.1

56.6

85.8

7.5

29.4

12.0

33.4

27.9

3.4

3.8

94.1

72.4

25.3

80.9

5.7

32.6

2015
..

11.1

13.1

17.5

0.0

44.0

14.6

27.5

48.9

81.9

7.8

..

13.3

43.2

32.7

7.5

4.9

91.5

71.7

28.2

81.2

5.5

21.0

2020
..

10.4

11.5

20.1

0.0

40.3

18.6

23.5

49.7

90.1

8.1

..

16.9

47.5

31.8

5.3

4.7

89.5

66.0

40.0

80.9

7.0

23.7

..

10

0

5.7

0

34.1

5.7

5.4

49.7

88.2

0.3

..

7.2

33.9

21.4

0

1.1

87.2

61

33.4

80.7

5

..

0

0

1.5

0

0

1.9

0

0

0

0

..

2.4

1.8

0

0

0

0

0

1.4

0

0

..

0

0

0.5

0

0

2.2

0

0

0

0

..

0.4

0.6

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

0

0

..

0

11.1

2

0

6.1

0.7

17.4

0

1.9

5.5

..

3.3

6.7

10.2

3.7

0

2.2

4.9

0.1

0

2

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0

5.6

0

0

5

0.2

0

0

0

..

2.1

3.4

0

1.6

3.5

0.1

0

3.2

0

0

..

0.4

0

4.8

0

0

2.2

0.1

0.1

0

2.3

..

0.9

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

0

0.1

0.5

0.1

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

..

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0.4

0

0

0

0.9

0

0

0

0

..

0.4

1.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.8

0

0

..

0

0.9

62.1

0

22.2

745.6

30.2

0

3.4

0.7

..

343.2

141.5

1.9

0.5

0

40.4

4.6

12.2

0

1.5

..

0.3

0

47.8

0

122.3

596.9

10.2

5.3

151.8

0.1

..

424.3

291.7

3.7

0

0

1556.2

22.9

31.4

21.3

3.8

..

0

0

8.6

0

0

157.9

0.6

0

0

0

..

118.4

18.2

0

0

0

0.2

0

2.1

0

0

0

..

3.1

8.4

590.2

8.1

359.1

8064.7

175.4

10.7

172.2

9.7

..

5252.3

950.4

17.5

9.7

0.5

1783.7

41.7

114.4

26.4

76.2

101.5

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

5.8

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

18.2

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

5.2

TIDE
2020

3

WIND
2020
0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

7

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0.1

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)
2020

8.4

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

a

a

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

a

a

b

a

b

b

a

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

0.4
62.7
0.0
85.5
91.2
30.6
80.8
55.2
5.2
60.7
46.9
45.6
0.4
0.4
2.0
0.0
6.0
5.1
9.4
3.7
0.0
2.1
2.5

Guatemala

Guernsey

GuineaGuinea-Bissau

GuyanaHaiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

IrelandIsle of Man

IsraelItaly

JamaicaJapan

JerseyJordanKazakhstan

2000

Guam

UN COUNTRY NAME

2010
1.4

3.0

4.4

4.7

9.0

12.8

8.6

1.9

5.3

1.7

0.9

36.0

36.2

75.9

13.5

53.6

79.0

30.9

87.8

75.7

0.0

67.1

0.5

2015
1.7

3.2

14.4

6.2

12.1

16.6

3.7

2.2

9.5

0.8

0.9

26.6

33.4

77.8

15.6

50.7

76.1

24.9

87.2

76.2

0.0

63.3

1.8

2020
1.8

11.0

18.1

8.5

11.4

18.7

5.6

2.1

13.7

1.1

1.0

22.0

35.8

82.8

14.8

50.1

76.3

12.0

87.2

65.8

1.6

65.5

3.6

0.1

1.2

0

2.5

7.1

7.2

0.2

0

2

0.1

0.3

15.1

31.5

0

10

43.1

76

11.9

87.2

63.1

0

61.7

0

0

0

0

0.2

2.2

1.7

0

0

1.6

0

0

4.6

0.3

0.7

1.6

0

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.9

c

0

0.3

0

0

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.3

0

0

2.6

0.5

4

c

0.4

0.7

1

0.7

1.4

2

36.9

0.1

4

0.1

0

0

2.7

0

3.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

1.9

0

0.3

1.1

1.6

0.1

0

8.3

0

0

0

0.8

0

0.4

1

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0.1

0.2

7.9

0

2.7

0.5

2.3

5.2

0

0.2

0

0

0

1

0

1.5

1.5

0

0.1

0

0

1.6

0

0

0

0.2

0

0.6

0

0

0

0

0

0.9

0

45.1

0.7

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0

0

18.1

0.1

0

0.3

0.1

1.8

0.6

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

26.6

14

1.1

628.3

1.4

400.5

13.1

0

43.3

8.3

50

186.7

884.1

64.2

22.1

13.1

0.2

0.1

0

4.4

0

26.2

2.1

12.1

0

167.2

4.4

319

18.1

0

10.5

0.9

21.4

898.1

7165.9

34.1

74.2

66.9

106.4

3.5

25

103.3

0

301

0

1.2

0

0

30.6

1.4

68.2

0

0

7.4

0

0.1

238.1

73.2

1

12.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1673.4236.3

5.9

9769.963.3

4214.6

555.2

2.2

447.4

853.9

6924.36011.722678.8

120.1

736

159.8

139.7

29.7

28.7

163.7

1.2

499.9

5.5

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0.2

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

3

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020

0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)
2020

0.5

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

258

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

a

a

a

a

b

a

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

259

82.2
82.6
4.4
2.3
83.5
0.0
19.6
1.7
44.4

MalawiMalaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Martinique

Mauritania

91.3

Liberia

Madagascar

56.7

Lesotho

6.8

4.9

LebanonLuxembourg

35.8

Latvia17.2

81.5

Lao People's Democratic Republic

Lithuania

35.2

Kyrgyzstan

2.0

0.0

Kuwait53.9

28.3

KosovoLiechtenstein

54.7

Kiribati

Libya

78.1

2000

Kenya

UN COUNTRY NAME

2010
34.0

2.5

13.7

1.2

79.2

1.4

2.0

81.2

86.7

3.7

21.5

52.3

2.4

88.6

53.0

5.7

33.1

64.9

25.6

0.0

20.8

50.2

76.1

2015
28.2

..

11.7

6.0

81.1

1.4

3.4

81.0

83.0

9.1

29.0

55.5

3.1

91.9

44.9

4.2

38.1

53.3

23.5

0.0

20.4

47.3

72.0

2020
23.8

..

12.0

9.2

63.8

1.3

5.8

70.3

84.8

20.8

31.7

55.2

3.1

93.0

41.4

6.7

43.8

49.9

30.0

0.1

25.9

42.8

72.5

22.5

..

11.6

0.3

61.5

0.8

0.1

62.4

83.7

6.9

21.4

5.5

3.1

92.6

35.6

3.2

32.8

37.3

0

0

24.4

41.6

0

..

0

3

0

0

1.4

0.4

0

4.4

2

0

0

0

0

0

1.3

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

1

0.7

0.8

0

0

0

0

1.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0

2.2

0

3.9

6.8

1

1.2

1.1

33.8

0

0.3

5.9

2

6.7

12.6

30

0

1.1

0

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

..

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

4.6

5.6

0

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

0

0

0.4

0

0.6

..

0.3

5.6

0.1

0.4

0.4

0.7

0

2.2

0.5

15.1

0

0

0

1.5

0

0

0

0.1

0.1

1.1

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0.9

0

0

0

0

0

0.8

..

0

1

4.5

0.1

88.4

5.7

3

17

20.1

1.4

0

0.3

2.4

3.9

14.8

17.2

39.8

0.6

1

0

14.6

..

0.2

0.3

110.6

0.1

0

45.8

225.5

5.1

45

0.2

11.1

80.8

14.7

7.8

52.8

51

0.1

0

15.6

0.6

0

..

0

0.6

0

0

28.3

0.3

0

6.4

4.4

0

0

0

0

0

2.1

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

64.7

..

1.6

20.4

180.3

17.1

1996.7

73.6

269.6

137

219.5

3

355.8

87.3

41.3

174.6

159.1

136.7

132.7

633.9

63.8

1.4

747.5

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

511.8

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

30.1

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

1.9

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020
0.5

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

1.6

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)
2020

68.5

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

a

a

a

b

a

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

a

a

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

9.4

12.2
1.3
5.7

MexicoMicronesia (Federated States of)Mongolia

0.0

84.9
31.2

3.9
4.8

80.7
86.5

0.0
56.7

15.3
93.6
80.2
34.7
0.0
88.3
1.7
7.5
26.4
58.4
87.6
86.2
0.6
19.4
0.0
60.2

Montserrat

MoroccoMozambique

MyanmarNamibia

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Caledonia

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Niue

North Macedonia

Northern Mariana Islands

Norway

22.3

26.7

54.4

29.4

87.3

0.0

84.9

13.9

49.1

..
0.0

Montenegro

4.5

2.0

10.0

16.2

12.8

Mayotte

2000
20.4

2010

Mauritius

UN COUNTRY NAME

2015
57.3

0.0

23.9

22.4

82.2

78.9

50.0

29.3

5.1

5.7

85.0

0.1

29.3

70.4

80.9

11.3

0.0

43.0

3.6

1.7

9.2

..

11.5

2020
61.3

0.3

20.3

22.7

82.5

81.9

52.1

28.6

6.0

10.8

74.5

1.4

31.3

59.8

80.9

10.9

0.7

39.6

4.0

2.0

12.3

..

9.4
..

5.1

0

11.9

0.6

82.1

81.8

46

5.1

0.3

3.3

68.2

0

12.1

55

69.9

7.6

0

21.3

2.7

1.1

7.2

..

2.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0.3

0

0.3

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0.5

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

49.5

0

7

0

0.4

0

1.8

15

3.2

0

4.4

0

15.1

4.7

10.9

0.4

0

15

0.2

0.2

2.1

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

3.5

0

0.6

0

0

0

1.8

1.4

0.5

2.8

0

0

0.2

0

0

2.2

0

3.3

1

0.2

1.5

..

0

0.3

0.1

22.2

0

0.1

0.1

0.2

2

1.6

0

1.4

4

0

0

0.7

0.7

0.1

0.2

0.5

1.1

..

0

0

0.2

0

0

0

2.5

6.6

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

..

0.8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

395.5

0

6.2

0

23.8

0.2

9.2

112

1.8

102.8

26.8

0

13.1

38.6

37.1

20.7

0

5.3

2.3

0

185.9

45.4

0

9.3

0

4639.4

114.3

47

33

0.2

63.6

429.5

0

8.5

451.2

234.2

48.2

0

6.2

4.7

0

287.2

..

0.7

22.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

24.4

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.7

..

0

756.3

2.6

76.3

0.1

5652

139.8

107.8

508.4

33.5

1767.2

612.1

0.5

68.9

819.7

335.3

631.9

0.2

29.1

176.4

1.4

3843.1..

31.7

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

2.3

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

1.5

TIDE
2020

0.2

WIND
2020

0

SOLAR
2020

1.2

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0.3

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)
2020

6.2

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

260

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

b

a

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

a

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

261

0.0

63.6
32.2

27.8
0.7

0.0
27.7
66.4
70.4
38.6
33.8
6.9
20.1
0.5
0.1
0.7

Palau

PanamaPapua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

PolandPortugal

Puerto Rico

Qatar

Republic of Korea

90.5
9.2

1.6
5.1

16.4
3.5
86.8
7.1
26.4
24.1
0.4
8.5

ReunionRomania

Russian Federation

RwandaSaint Helena

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

13.2

1.0

3.3

24.1

20.0
16.4

5.7
11.7

Republic of Moldova

1.3

0.1

9.5

32.6

55.3

20.6

47.4

51.1

0.0

Pakistan

2000
0.0

2010

Oman

UN COUNTRY NAME

2015
4.3

1.0

11.5

1.6

13.0

86.3

3.2

23.7

..

24.7

2.7

0.0

1.9

27.2

11.9

30.8

27.4

60.5

55.1

21.9

0.4

45.9

0.0

2020
4.9

1.1

10.0

1.4

7.4

81.7

3.7

24.1

..

23.7

3.6

0.1

2.5

31.2

16.1

29.1

31.6

61.4

54.3

28.4

0.9

46.6

0.1

2

1.1

9.6

0

2.9

79.9

0.7

14.8

..

22.7

0.9

0.1

0

14.3

11.9

22.9

15.5

39.8

50.5

8.6

0

43.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2.1

..

0

0.6

0

0

1.8

1.5

1.5

1.9

2.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0.1

0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

0

2.6

0

0

0

0

1.8

3

4.5

..

0.7

0.2

0

0.3

6.5

0.2

1.6

12.9

19

2.7

17.7

0

2.8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.9

3

0

0

2

..

0.1

0.2

0

0.8

6.6

1.7

0.2

0.8

0

0

1.4

0

0.2

0.1

0.3

0

0.4

0.5

1.6

0.1

0

0.5

..

0

1.1

0

1.4

1.6

0.3

0.3

0.5

0

0

0.8

0.9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0.2

0

0

0.1

0

2.4

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

..

0

0.2

0

0

0.2

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

1.6

481.1

68.4

..

1.1

107.6

0

1.4

96.4

86.7

63.6

104.5

49.4

5.2

24.3

0

111.6

0.1

0

0.5

0

0

69.1

115.9

143.6

..

27.1

54.5

0.4

0

81.4

339.9

298.4

116.3

103.8

69.7

10.4

0

1534.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

55.4

22

..

0

27.9

0

0

11.1

45.6

17.7

12.5

6.9

0

0

0

0

0

2.7

0.6

5.3

1.9

0.2

86.5

17524.4

972.4

..

119

5238

617.8

57.7

605

2926.21306.2

737.8

260.5

138.1

122

2.2

3531.6775.3

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0.4

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0

TIDE
2020

0.1

WIND
2020
0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)2020

0

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

a

a

a

a

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

b

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

0.0

0.0
47.5
22.1

Saudi Arabia

SenegalSerbia0.3
0.0

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Sint Maarten (Dutch part)

9.6
..

14.1
61.3

20.6
1.3

55.3
93.3
16.2
..
7.9
64.2
17.5
80.4
23.6
39.8
18.2
2.0

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

SomaliaSouth Africa

South Sudan

Spain

Sri Lanka

State of Palestine

Sudan

Suriname

SwedenSwitzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

44.7

22.1

61.8

14.4

93.6

45.1

10.3
20.1

3.7
18.0

Slovakia

0.0

0.5

0.7
84.9

1.5
93.3

Seychelles

20.5

49.5

38.2

54.7

41.3

Sao Tome and Principe

2000
59.7

2010

Samoa

UN COUNTRY NAME

2015
0.6

23.9

51.9

11.6

61.9

11.0

51.3

16.3

27.5

7.7

94.5

48.6

21.4

13.4

0.0

0.6

74.0

1.4

21.2

39.1

0.0

39.2

37.5

2020
1.1

26.4

58.4

14.7

62.1

15.0

49.3

19.3

33.2

9.8

95.5

49.0

22.4

17.6

0.1

0.9

75.1

1.3

26.0

38.6

0.1

41.6

37.5

0.1

5.9

28.2

3.5

56.7

3.7

44.6

5.6

33.1

8

95.4

48.8

11.5

11.1

0.1

0.2

74

0.6

18.2

37.3

0

40.9

0

0

1.1

5.6

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

2.1

1.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

0.5

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

0

0

0

0.3

0.8

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

0

1

15.8

15.6

11.1

5.5

0

4.4

3.1

0

0.2

0

0

7.4

3.4

0

0

1

0

6.7

0

0

0.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

5.9

0

0

0

0.3

5.8

0

0.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

0.7

0.5

0

0

0

1.5

0.3

0.1

0

11.3

0.1

2.6

0.2

0.8

0.1

0.2

0.8

0.6

0

0.4

0

0.4

0

0.9

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

1.6

2.3

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.9

118.5

296.6

3.1

29.4

4.9

18.5

341

0

36.6

0.1

0

15.2

20.1

0

4.1

0.6

0

27.2

2

2.1

0.2

52.7

372.9

1

304.1

5.7

169.3

172.2

7.9

188.5

114.9

3.3

21.8

44.2

0

0

43

0

66.7

46.1

0.3

0.8

1.5

0

13.9

65.7

0

0

0

0

64

0

0.5

0

0

4.2

6.9

0

0.2

0

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

193.8

702.1

1258.9

28.2

536.8

70.8

380.7

2983.123.8

2311.7

120.4

6.7

183.5

404.2

7.5

476

58.1

5

362.2

124.6

4190.72

4.4

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0.2

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

1.8

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020

0

SOLAR
2020

3

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)
2020

32.6

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

262

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

a

a

b

b

b

a

a

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

263

34.8

0.0
77.1
2.5

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tonga

0.3
0.4

89.7
7.4

17.3
0.1
0.4
0.0
95.0
1.3
0.1
1.0
93.7
5.4
0.5
38.7

Tunisia

TürkiyeTurkmenistan

Turks and Caicos Islands

TuvaluUgandaUkraineUnited Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland

United Republic of Tanzania

United States of America

United States Virgin Islands

Uruguay

15.3
57.7

Vanuatu

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)Viet Nam
34.6

13.8

1.3
38.1

0.7
47.7

Uzbekistan

53.3

0.7

3.1

0.1

2.9

93.2

0.1

14.2

0.4
12.6

0.8
14.2

Trinidad and Tobago

1.0

65.8

22.8

21.8

61.8

Thailand

2000
62.4

2010

Tajikistan

UN COUNTRY NAME

2015
26.5

15.3

35.6

1.7

59.4

5.1

9.0

86.2

7.7

0.1

4.1

91.1

3.0

0.4

0.1

13.3

12.5

0.4

1.9

81.0

18.0

22.6

48.1

2020
19.1

23.3

26.0

1.0

61.1

5.1

11.2

84.0

13.5

0.9

8.7

92.9

6.7

0.5

0.1

13.7

12.9

0.5

1.9

76.6

11.4

20.8

38.8
15

8.9

1.5

23.8

0

43.4

1.3

3.6

82.8

4

0.1

6

91.8

0

0.4

0.1

1.7

11.3

0.5

0.6

75.5

11.3

0.1

0

0.1

0

2.1

0

2.7

0

1.4

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0.7

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

1.1

8.8

21.8

0.8

1

6.4

0

1.7

1.1

0.5

0

1.1

1.1

0

0

0

5.6

0

0

0

1.1

0.1

0.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0.6

0

8.5

0

2

0

5.5

0

0.5

0

0

0

0

1.8

0.4

0

0.4

0

0

0.4

1.2

0

0.7

0

0.7

3.8

0.9

0

1

0.8

0.9

0

6.7

0.2

0

1.6

1.1

0

1

0.1

0

0.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2.7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

278.2

151.6

0.1

13.8

38.4

0.1

2647.3

10

431.6

17.8

45.9

11.6

0

0

0

387.6

2.3

0

0

1.1

0

110.9

236.4

10.3

0.8

0.1

76.7

0

2095.5

719.2

103.1

1.8

110.5

927.9

0

0

0.4

186.6

38.8

0.5

0

71.7

0.7

446.7

2.7

0

0

0.3

3

0

1415.4

0

73

0

4.6

0

0

0

0

6.7

0

0

0

0

0

91.3

0

2706.8693.9

3.4

1378.3193.3

255205.6868.6

4501.62141.91846.11011.2

0.1

3.1

671.6

4234.2

319

99

2.2

95

6.3

3114.7

128.6

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

49.8

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020
0

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

38.8

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)2020

0

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

a

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

b

b

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

72.5
12.7

Oceania (M49)
12.4

70.9

11.1

4.5

6.2

Sub-Saharan Africa (M49)

13.5

15.0

Eastern Asia (M49) and South-eastern
Asia (MDG=M49)

31.0

Northern Africa (M49)

23.1

Southern Asia (MDG=M49)

2.8

6.1

39.5

Central Asia (M49)

27.5

Western Asia (M49)

3.6

Central Asia (M49) and Southern Asia
(MDG=M49)

29.2

8.4

34.4

Latin America and the Caribbean(MDG=M49)

11.0

Western Asia (M49) and Northern
Africa (M49)

28.4

Europe (M49)

9.0South-eastern Asia (MDG=M49)

7.4

Northern America (M49)

10.0

30.6

7.3

Northern America (M49) and Europe
(M49)

16.0

10.5

7.4

World

82.5

38.3

16.9

Zimbabwe

0.8
88.6

19.8

69.5

Zambia3.7

2010

Eastern Asia (M49)

1.0
90.0

Yemen

3.9

2000

Wallis and Futuna Islands

UN COUNTRY NAME

2015
13.6

68.7

10.0

3.9

5.4

25.5

11.0

13.0

29.0

3.3

26.5

28.5

13.1

10.7

11.9

16.7

81.0

83.1

2.0

4.0

2020
14.8

70.8

10.7

4.7

6.3

22.1

13.5

14.8

30.7

3.1

27.9

34.2

15.8

12.7

14.3

19.1

84.4

81.8

3.5

3.5
2.2

6.6

68.6

8.5

0.7

2.7

15

3.9

5.5

27.2

0.1

24.5

17.8

6.6

3.8

5.2

11.1

80.1

71.7

0.1

0

0

0

0

2.5

0.2

0.5

0.2

0

0.1

4.4

1.3

2.5

1.9

1.1

0.5

0

0

0.2

0

0

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.2

0

0.2

0

0.6

0.1

0.3

0.2

0

0

0

0

3.2

1.9

1.3

1.8

1.7

3.4

4.6

4.4

1.9

2.9

2

9.6

3.6

3.4

3.6

3.7

3.8

10.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.7

0.1

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.1

1.5

1.3

0.6

0.1

0.5

1.4

2.3

1.9

2.1

1.4

0

0

0

2.1

0.1

0.4

0.9

0.8

0.4

2.1

1.9

0.7

0.1

0.6

0.8

0.9

0.8

0.9

1.1

0

0.1

1.3

0.9

0.1

0

0.7

0.5

0.5

0.9

0.9

0

0

0

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.4

0.1

0.2

0.1

0

0

0

1.3

286.9

415.7

117.9

472.2

589.6

849.3

7573.78425.6

1136

118.9

1256.42753.64705.63987.78770.222500.9

15.5

35.3

276.6

12641.7

468.9

259.2

727.8

2514.15482.67996.7

9713.72.79716.43752.74376.92437

6814.141941.9

318.5

249

2.2

0

11.7

5.2

1

6.5

7.6

380.6

363.8

742.9

72.2

3.3

75.4

916

955.3

1504.52435.94226.6

1.9

0.1

0

0

3895.918440.95468.515719.2

21187.7

16910.6

99135.8116046.435585.83984.739570.421703.4

63495.1

62283.4

125778.5359061.5

398.1

347.5

100.4

0.3

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0.2

TIDE
2020

0

WIND
2020

0

SOLAR
2020

0.5

GEOTHERMAL
2020

0

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)
2020

2.8

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

264

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

b

b

b

a

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

265

8.7
83.3

Southern Europe (M49)

Western Africa (M49)

54.2

Melanesia (M49)

18.4

4.3

Eastern Europe (M49)

Southern Africa (M49)88.0

Eastern Africa (M49)

32.8

18.1

Central America (M49)

South America (M49)

25.2

Caribbean (M49)

17.3

11.8

Americas (M49)

Polynesia (M49)

24.2

Asia (M49)

15.4

60.7

Africa (M49)

Northern Europe (M49)43.6

Landlocked developing countries(LLDCs)4.8

25.2

Small island developing States (SIDS)

88.1

84.1

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Middle Africa (M49)

10.9

Australia and New Zealand (M49)

Micronesia (M49)

45.9

2000

Oceania (M49) excluding Australia and
New Zealand (M49)

UN COUNTRY NAME

2010
82.0

15.4

12.0

34.5

10.5

18.7

79.0

5.1

43.4

5.7

87.5

16.5

18.1

14.2

15.8

56.5

41.9

17.8

76.2

11.0

36.7

2015
77.6

18.1

9.9

33.2

12.5

25.2

75.9

5.5

43.8

6.3

84.8

16.4

20.4

15.5

15.2

54.8

44.9

18.4

73.2

12.0

38.4

2020
76.4

21.0

11.8

39.0

12.7

31.5

80.4

6.8

43.6

7.7

84.8

21.1

22.8

18.4

16.9

57.1

44.9

19.6

71.4

13.2

38.4

75.4

8.4

9.9

18.6

7.5

12.5

76

5.3

39

4.1

81.6

14.9

20.2

7.4

9.4

54.8

40.6

17.2

67.6

4.8

0

1.7

0

6

0

2.1

0

0

0

0.4

0

0

1.1

3

0.4

0

0.1

0.6

0

0.1

0

0.5

0

0

0

0.6

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0.1

0.2

0

0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.9

4.3

0.4

12.2

3.2

8.8

4.4

0

3.4

2.5

2.8

3.2

0.5

5.1

3.6

1.7

4

0.9

3.6

3.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3.4

0.7

1.5

0

5.3

0

0

0.1

0.3

0.1

1.4

0.6

1.8

1.1

0.2

0.1

0.4

0

1.8

0

2.2

0.8

0.7

2

0.6

0

1.5

0.4

0.2

0

1

0.4

0.8

1.5

0.2

0.1

0.4

0.1

2.2

0

0.3

0

0

0

0.6

0

0

0.7

0

0.2

0.6

0

0.1

0.6

0.1

0

0.1

0

0.9

0

0.2

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

72.4

1014.845.8

2410.611553.6

89.4

0.2

9.1

777.5

200.1

313.3

16.8

6842.810085.9

527

444.2

37.6

443.8

276.3

5786.5

833.8

253.4

2813.71.71095.81545.20.8

77.7

1092.15056.6

736.8

202.1

6189.617973.713110.74454.6

321.3

8026

196.5

0

164.8

0.6

914

0

209.1

0.1

0

0

170.1

2.5

1.1

1.5

2420.4

812.8

6.4

18.2

2.3

0.6

11.8

0

7671.79593.62533

15747.7

20.8

9082.92033.4

15.3

199.1

26567.96202.8

4989

966.7

83986.8

171336.1

23909.4

10940.4

1844.411858.4

3660.7235.2

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

80.1

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

10.2

BIOGASES
2020

0

HYDRO
2020

0.6

TIDE
2020

0.6

WIND
2020
0.1

SOLAR
2020

0

GEOTHERMAL
2020

3.1

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

0

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

0HEAT RAISING (2)
2020

34

TOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

TRANSPORT (3)2020FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(PJ)

2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGY

32.3
7.1

Developing regions (MDG)

Developed regions (MDG)

2010
9.6

23.0

11.8

2015
11.5

21.9

14.3

2020
13.9

23.8

18.0

5

15.9
0.3

0.2
3.5

4.1
0

0
2

1
1.1

1.2
0.2

0.6
0.2

0
9708.512791.5

7202.434725.6

1369.72478

1724.9371.1

139826.1

206797.2

18250.7ccc

SOURCERENEWABLE ENERGYNOTESAllocation of renewable electricity and heat to final energy consumption:
To establish the contribution of each technology to the final consumption, the aggregated figures for electricity and commercial heat have to be allocated to the relevant technology. This can be done based on the proportions exhibited in production data, attributing
the losses proportionally (GTF 2013). For instance, if total final consumption table reports 150 TJ for biogases, while total final consumption of electricity is 400 TJ and heat 100 TJ, and the share of biogases in total electricity output is 10 percent and 5 percent inheat, the total reported number for biogases consumption will be 195 TJ (150 TJ+400TJ*10%+100TJ*5%).

DEFINITIONS
Final consumption of renewable energy:(1) Electricity consumption: Covers final consumption of renewable electricity in all sectors excluding transport(2) Heat raising: Covers final consumption of renewable energy for heat raising purposes (excluding electricity) in manufacturing, construction and non fuel mining industries, household, commerce and public services, agriculture, forestry, fishing and not elsewhere
specified.
(3) Transport:Covers final consumption of renewable energy (including electricity) in the transport sector.

1.7

0.8

1551.3

SOLID BIOFUELS
2020

0.7

LIQUID BIOFUELS
2020

0.1

BIOGASES
2020

1.6

HYDRO
2020

3.4

TIDE
2020
0

WIND
2020

2.6

SOLAR
2020

1.2

GEOTHERMAL
2020

2

MUNICIPAL WASTE(RENEW)
2020

6.4

ELECTRICITYCONSUMPTION (1)2020

REFERENCE
a. Source: Energy Balances, UN Statistics Division (2021)
b. Source: IEA (2021), World Energy Balances
c. Sources: IEA (2021), World Energy Balances; Energy Balances, UN Statistics Division (2021)

6.7

2000

Western Europe (M49)

UN COUNTRY NAMETOTAL FINAL ENERGYCONSUMPTION (PJ)

HEAT RAISING (2)2020

FINAL CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY(PJ)
TRANSPORT (3)2020

SHARE IN TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)

2020

266

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

267

4.8
5.5

4.2
..
..
3.7
..
3.7
3.7
6.8
16.2
6.2
3.2
14.7
2.3
10.4
2.6
5.9
12.9
5.5
6.8
4.9
1.5

Algeria

American Samoa

AndorraAngolaAnguilla

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Aruba

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

BahamasBahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

BelarusBelgium

BelizeBenin

Bermuda

1.5

6.0

7.0

5.8

2.5

9.6

2.5

3.9

3.3

5.3

16.6

3.9

3.3

4.8

..

2.6

..

..

4.4

2.9

4.1

Albania

2.5

2010

1.6

2000

Afghanistan

UN COUNTRY NAME

1.6

5.8

5.9

4.0

6.1

5.1

2.3

9.1

2.4

4.3

3.0

4.7

3.4

4.1

3.4

4.7

..

2.9

..

..

5.1

2.7

2.4

2015

1.4

5.8

6.6

3.7

5.8

4.4

2.0

9.5

2.9

4.7

2.9

4.4

4.1

4.0

3.5

5.1

..

2.7

..

..

5.3

2.4

2.6

2020

0.1%

2.1%

-2.1%

-1.4%

-5.9%

-0.2%

-0.6%

-0.8%

0.7%

-12.5%

0.2%

-1.5%

0.3%

-5.4%

-1.2%

2.7%

..

-3.4%

..

..

0.6%

-3.7%

4.2%

2000-2010

0.7%

-0.7%

1.4%

-3.9%

-2.8%

-2.5%

-1.3%

-1.2%

-0.7%

1.9%

-1.8%

-2.6%

-27.4%

1.1%

0.6%

-0.4%

..

1.8%

..

..

2.7%

-1.2%

-0.7%

2010-2015

-2.3%

-0.1%

2.1%

-1.1%

-0.8%

-3.0%

-2.8%

0.9%

3.6%

2.0%

-1.0%

-1.3%

3.9%

-0.5%

0.6%

1.8%

..

-1.1%

..

..

1.0%

-2.2%

1.6%

2015-2020

a

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

SOURCE

Source: IEA and UNSD
This table, including the data contained in it, must not be reproduced, disseminated or transferred, in whole or in part, without IEA’s and UNSD’s written permission. The data in thistable sourced to the IEA is subject to the IEA’s terms and conditions. This notice and any sourcing statements included in this table must not be removed from the table.

SDG 7.3.1 • Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP

268

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

2.1
6.8

..
6.4
4.3
3.9
..
4.3
9.1
5.5
10.4
3.3
7.9
6.0
9.3
1.9
7.7
8.2
4.5
10.9
2.5
1.1
3.0
2.7
2.2
..

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

BrazilBritish Virgin Islands

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

BurundiCabo VerdeCambodia

Cameroon

CanadaCayman Islands

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

China, Hong Kong Special Administrative
RegionChina, Macao Special Administrative Region

Colombia

Comoros

Congo

Cook Islands

..

3.2

2.8

2.4

0.5

1.6

8.9

3.6

3.9

7.1

4.5

5.1

3.0

7.9

5.4

5.5

5.2

..

3.9

3.5

6.7

..

4.0

3.4

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

10.1

2010

18.4

2000

BhutanUN COUNTRY NAME

..

4.6

2.7

2.6

0.6

1.5

7.2

3.4

3.7

9.4

1.9

6.9

4.6

4.6

2.6

7.4

4.9

5.4

4.3

..

4.1

3.5

6.0

..

4.0

8.7

2015

..

7.1

3.6

2.5

1.0

1.3

6.4

3.6

4.1

8.4

2.0

6.8

4.4

5.1

2.6

7.8

4.4

4.7

6.1

..

4.0

2.9

6.2

..

3.6

8.3

2020

..

3.9%

0.4%

-2.2%

-7.2%

-4.4%

-2.0%

-2.2%

-7.1%

-1.3%

1.0%

-2.6%

-2.9%

-4.4%

-0.8%

-2.6%

-0.1%

-4.9%

1.7%

..

-0.1%

-2.1%

0.5%

..

1.7%

-5.8%

2000-2010

..

7.8%

-0.9%

1.2%

3.1%

-1.1%

-4.2%

-1.0%

-1.4%

6.8%

-1.8%

-0.7%

0.6%

-1.9%

-2.7%

-1.4%

-1.8%

-0.5%

-3.4%

..

1.0%

0.2%

-2.3%

..

-0.2%

-3.0%

2010-2015

..

8.9%

6.1%

-0.8%

10.4%

-3.2%

-2.5%

1.0%

2.2%

-2.2%

1.1%

-0.2%

-1.2%

2.1%

0.0%

1.0%

-2.2%

-2.6%

6.9%

..

-0.2%

-4.0%

0.9%

..

-2.2%

-1.0%

2015-2020

a

b

a

b

a

b

b

b

a

a

a

b

b

b

a

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

a

SOURCE

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

269

3.3
3.5
1.6
..
8.0
6.2
21.4

EcuadorEgypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Estonia

Eswatini

Ethiopia..

3.3

Dominican Republic

French Guiana

3.9

4.4

2.5

Dominica

France6.0

Djibouti

6.6

3.0

Denmark

Finland

16.5

Democratic Republic of the Congo

2.8

7.2

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Fiji

6.7

Czechia..

3.9

CyprusFaroe Islands

23.0

Curacao

..

2.6

3.5

Cuba

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

3.0

4.3

Croatia

..

4.0

6.2

2.2

..

..

12.7

5.2

7.1

..

2.4

3.9

3.7

3.5

4.4

2.9

14.9

6.0

5.4

3.3

20.3

1.9

3.7

4.5

4.2

Cote d'Ivoire

2.5

2010

2.4

2000

Costa Rica

UN COUNTRY NAME

..

3.7

5.5

2.3

..

..

9.2

5.0

4.9

..

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.3

2.2

3.1

2.4

2.3

14.9

3.2

4.6

2.9

24.8

1.6

3.4

4.0

2.2

2015

..

3.2

5.1

2.0

..

..

7.2

4.7

4.0

..

3.7

3.4

3.0

3.1

1.9

3.2

1.9

2.0

13.4

6.0

4.1

2.6

9.9

1.5

3.2

3.4

2.0

2020

..

-0.8%

-0.5%

-2.2%

..

..

-5.1%

-1.8%

-1.1%

..

4.2%

1.2%

1.1%

0.6%

-4.1%

2.0%

-3.2%

-0.3%

-1.0%

-1.8%

-2.2%

-1.9%

-1.2%

-6.1%

-1.4%

0.7%

0.3%

2000-2010

..

-1.8%

-2.4%

1.0%

..

..

-6.1%

-0.9%

-7.1%

..

6.9%

-2.8%

-1.1%

-1.3%

-2.9%

0.8%

-11.0%

-4.8%

0.0%

-12.0%

-3.1%

-2.1%

4.1%

-3.2%

-2.1%

-2.5%

-2.1%

2010-2015

..

-2.6%

-1.6%

-2.9%

..

..

-4.8%

-1.2%

-4.1%

..

2.0%

-0.1%

-2.8%

-0.9%

-3.0%

0.3%

-5.0%

-2.8%

-2.0%

13.3%

-2.4%

-2.6%

-16.8%

-0.9%

-1.3%

-2.8%

-2.4%

2015-2020

a

b

b

a

a

a

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

SOURCE270

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

..
4.0
..
9.1
11.0
5.8
5.1
4.7
5.3
11.2
6.4
5.4
7.1
5.2
3.2
..

Guatemala

Guernsey

GuineaGuinea-Bissau

GuyanaHaiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

IrelandIsle of Man

..

2.5

5.4

7.5

4.3

5.3

15.0

4.5

4.9

5.5

4.7

10.3

7.7

..

4.1

..

..

Guam

3.1

..

3.6

Greece..

Guadeloupe..

Gibraltar

3.3

Grenada

4.9

Ghana

3.6

..

4.0

Germany

3.6

2.8

6.0

Georgia

2.9

..

3.1

Gambia

9.1

2.5

3.0

Gabon

3.0

2010

Greenland

2.3

2000

French Polynesia

UN COUNTRY NAME

..

1.7

4.4

8.7

3.3

4.8

13.6

3.9

5.2

5.3

4.0

9.6

6.4

..

4.2

..

..

2.4

..

3.2

..

3.0

3.1

4.2

3.5

7.2

2.6

2015

..

1.2

5.0

8.8

3.1

4.3

12.9

3.6

4.4

5.3

2.7

8.7

5.4

..

4.2

..

..

2.7

..

2.9

..

3.0

2.7

4.0

3.2

6.4

2.6

2020

..

-2.4%

0.5%

0.5%

-2.4%

-1.8%

3.0%

-1.5%

0.4%

0.8%

-2.1%

-0.6%

-1.6%

..

0.3%

..

..

1.4%

..

-1.5%

..

-3.8%

-1.1%

-5.1%

-0.7%

11.6%

2.8%

2000-2010

..

-7.7%

-3.9%

2.9%

-5.2%

-2.1%

-2.0%

-3.0%

1.3%

-0.8%

-3.3%

-1.6%

-3.8%

..

0.1%

..

..

-2.9%

..

0.6%

..

-2.4%

-2.9%

3.4%

3.6%

-4.5%

-2.8%

2010-2015

..

-6.0%

2.6%

0.2%

-0.9%

-2.3%

-1.0%

-1.5%

-3.2%

0.0%

-7.9%

-1.8%

-3.3%

..

0.3%

..

..

2.1%

..

-2.2%

..

0.1%

-2.5%

-1.0%

-1.6%

-2.3%

0.2%

2015-2020

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

a

a

a

a

b

a

a

a

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

SOURCE

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

271

7.0
7.7

5.9
4.7
..
4.6
9.8
5.8
5.7
7.8
6.9
6.4
3.8
5.2
3.8
14.0
9.7
4.7
..
6.2
3.2
6.1
5.2
5.5
1.7
4.8
2.6

JamaicaJapan

JerseyJordanKazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

KosovoKuwaitKyrgyzstan

Lao People's Democratic Republic

LatviaLebanonLesothoLiberia

Libya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Madagascar

MalawiMalaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

2.6

4.9

2.3

5.2

3.8

6.1

3.1

4.0

..

4.2

13.1

11.1

2.8

4.3

3.3

5.1

7.4

5.3

8.6

3.6

..

4.3

3.8

2.9

2.9

Italy

3.8

2010

4.1

2000

IsraelUN COUNTRY NAME

1.5

5.2

2.3

4.7

3.3

7.4

2.4

3.3

..

6.5

11.2

8.3

3.3

3.4

3.8

5.8

7.1

6.3

6.0

5.5

5.4

3.8

..

3.5

3.9

2.6

2.9

2015

1.4

5.4

3.4

4.5

3.2

9.4

2.0

3.0

..

6.1

14.0

8.1

4.0

3.1

4.3

5.1

8.5

5.8

6.5

5.1

5.8

3.5

..

3.2

3.6

2.5

2.5

2020

-0.2%

0.1%

2.6%

-0.4%

-3.1%

0.0%

-0.6%

-4.3%

..

-1.2%

3.0%

-2.3%

-2.9%

-2.0%

-1.3%

-2.3%

0.7%

-0.1%

2.1%

-1.0%

-1.3%

-2.3%

..

-0.9%

-4.3%

-0.2%

-0.7%

2000-2010-10.0%

1.4%

0.8%

-2.1%

-2.6%

4.0%

-4.5%

-3.7%

..

9.2%

-3.1%

-5.6%

3.2%

-4.4%

2.9%

2.6%

-0.9%

-4.2%

-3.2%

0.8%

-8.8%

1.2%

..

-3.9%

0.4%

-1.9%

-4.9%

2010-2015

-1.9%

0.7%

7.9%

-0.9%

-0.9%

4.9%

-3.6%

-1.8%

..

-1.3%

4.6%

-0.5%

4.0%

-1.5%

2.5%

-2.7%

3.7%

-1.4%

1.7%

-1.3%

1.4%

-1.6%

..

-1.9%

-1.4%

-1.1%

-3.5%

2015-2020

b

a

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

SOURCE

272

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

12.1
3.6
17.4
6.8
4.2
7.9
5.6
5.2
5.8
10.0

Mozambique

MyanmarNamibia

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Caledonia

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

3.6

26.9

MoroccoOman

3.6

Montserrat

4.3

..

Norway..

Montenegro

..

9.3

Mongolia

Northern Mariana Islands

7.2

Micronesia (Federated States of)

5.4

3.6

MexicoNorth Macedonia..

Mayotte

..

..

3.0

Mauritius

Niue

4.6

2.6

Mauritania

6.6

4.6

..

4.3

..

6.8

5.5

4.7

4.6

10.8

4.0

5.9

8.7

3.6

4.2

12.7

3.5

8.1

4.1

3.7

..

2.6

2.8

..

..

Martinique

10.5

2010

9.4

2000

Marshall Islands

UN COUNTRY NAME

7.2

3.8

..

3.6

..

6.0

5.5

4.5

4.5

13.5

3.4

5.5

5.4

3.3

4.0

13.0

3.3

..

3.7

5.9

5.7

3.3

..

2.4

3.0

..

10.7

2015

7.2

3.4

..

3.3

..

6.6

5.0

4.6

3.9

14.1

3.1

5.7

5.1

3.5

3.6

11.8

3.4

..

3.8

6.6

5.6

3.2

..

2.2

3.4

..

9.7

2020

6.3%

0.7%

..

-2.2%

..

-3.8%

-0.6%

-1.0%

-2.0%

3.1%

-0.3%

-1.5%

-6.7%

0.0%

-10.1%

-7.3%

-0.4%

..

..

-1.3%

-5.5%

0.2%

..

-1.3%

1.0%

..

1.2%

2000-2010

1.6%

-3.6%

..

-3.9%

..

-2.4%

0.1%

-1.0%

-0.4%

4.7%

-3.3%

-1.4%

-9.2%

-1.7%

-0.9%

0.4%

-1.3%

..

-4.1%

-6.2%

6.7%

-2.2%

..

-1.8%

1.3%

..

0.4%

2010-2015

0.0%

-2.5%

..

-1.4%

..

1.7%

-2.0%

0.5%

-2.8%

0.8%

-2.0%

0.8%

-1.1%

1.4%

-2.0%

-1.9%

0.7%

..

0.4%

2.4%

-0.3%

-0.5%

..

-1.6%

2.6%

..

-2.0%

2015-2020

b

b

a

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

a

b

a

a

a

SOURCE

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

273

2.9
0.2

2.3
5.9
3.6
3.3
4.7
6.0
3.3
0.1
8.9
7.2
8.1
..
5.6
12.1
7.8
..
3.3
3.1
..
2.3
5.7
4.5
5.2
4.0
8.5

PanamaPapua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

PolandPortugal

Puerto Rico

Qatar

Republic of Korea

Republic of Moldova

ReunionRomania

Russian Federation

RwandaSaint Helena

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

SenegalSerbia

6.2

4.7

6.7

4.2

3.8

2.7

..

3.2

2.7

..

5.6

8.5

3.6

..

6.4

6.1

6.4

4.6

3.1

2.5

3.1

5.7

1.9

10.6

11.1

Palau

4.5

2010

5.1

2000

Pakistan

UN COUNTRY NAME

5.6

4.2

6.3

3.9

4.3

2.6

..

3.0

2.5

..

4.6

7.8

2.8

..

5.3

5.8

6.6

0.5

2.9

3.8

3.0

2.6

3.0

5.5

1.5

8.6

4.2

2015

5.3

3.5

6.2

3.4

4.1

2.6

..

3.4

2.6

..

3.9

8.2

2.4

..

5.1

5.3

7.2

0.5

2.6

3.5

2.8

2.5

3.3

5.5

1.5

10.5

4.0

2020

-3.1%

1.7%

2.7%

-0.8%

-4.1%

1.5%

..

0.4%

-1.8%

..

-3.3%

-3.5%

-4.4%

..

-2.4%

-1.6%

-3.3%

7.3%

-1.2%

-2.6%

-4.0%

-2.7%

-1.3%

-0.4%

-2.0%

-0.5%

-1.2%

2000-2010

-2.0%

-2.2%

-1.3%

-1.3%

2.8%

-0.3%

..

-1.0%

-1.8%

..

-3.8%

-1.7%

-4.6%

..

-3.7%

-1.3%

0.5%

16.1%

-0.5%

-4.0%

-1.2%

0.4%

-0.7%

-0.7%

-4.1%

-3.9%

-1.6%

2010-2015

-1.2%

-3.5%

-0.3%

-2.6%

-0.8%

0.1%

..

2.7%

0.6%

..

-3.3%

1.0%

-2.9%

..

-0.8%

-1.8%

1.8%

-0.3%

-2.1%

-1.6%

-1.2%

-0.8%

2.0%

0.2%

0.2%

4.0%

-1.0%

2015-2020

b

b

b

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

b

SOURCE

274

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

4.2
5.5
2.4
13.6
10.9
4.9
..

Sudan

Suriname

SwedenSwitzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Tajikistan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

29.9

4.3

State of Palestine

Turkmenistan

2.9

Sri Lanka

3.3

3.1

Spain

Türkiye

3.6South Sudan

4.0

..

Tunisia

9.2South Africa

18.8

11.2

Somalia

Trinidad and Tobago

7.0

Solomon Islands

3.0

5.2

Slovenia

Tonga

8.8

Slovakia

10.6

..

..

Sint Maarten (Dutch part)

Togo

8.0

3.5

Singapore

21.7

3.1

3.8

20.9

3.1

12.5

1.4

5.1

5.1

11.6

2.1

4.8

3.1

3.2

2.6

2.2

3.1

11.9

6.2

4.5

5.4

..

2.5

6.6

10.9

Sierra Leone

3.2

2010

2.9

2000

Seychelles

UN COUNTRY NAME

13.6

2.7

3.7

19.2

2.7

9.2

1.8

5.1

4.6

11.1

1.8

3.8

3.6

4.3

2.8

1.8

2.9

..

7.0

9.7

5.0

4.0

4.4

8.2

2.7

6.3

2.8

2015

11.1

2.6

3.7

17.7

4.0

8.7

1.8

4.6

4.4

10.7

1.6

3.6

4.7

4.8

3.2

1.7

2.7

..

7.0

8.5

4.4

3.5

4.2

8.3

2.5

5.4

3.2

2020

-3.2%

-0.7%

-0.7%

1.0%

0.4%

1.7%

..

0.3%

-7.4%

-1.6%

-1.5%

-1.5%

-2.8%

-2.8%

-0.9%

-3.4%

-1.6%

..

-1.4%

0.6%

-1.2%

-1.5%

-4.7%

..

-3.3%

-4.9%

1.2%

2000-2010

-8.9%

-2.8%

-0.6%

-1.7%

-2.6%

-6.0%

4.8%

-0.1%

-2.0%

-0.8%

-3.1%

-4.6%

2.6%

6.2%

1.4%

-4.4%

-1.4%

..

-2.8%

-3.9%

-4.2%

-2.6%

-4.1%

..

1.6%

-1.1%

-2.4%

2010-2015

-4.0%

-0.6%

0.1%

-1.6%

7.8%

-1.1%

0.2%

-1.8%

-0.8%

-0.8%

-1.9%

-1.1%

5.8%

2.0%

2.3%

-0.5%

-1.4%

..

0.0%

-2.7%

-2.4%

-2.6%

-1.1%

0.2%

-1.4%

-2.8%

2.4%

2015-2020

b

b

b

b

a

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

a

a

b

b

a

b

a

a

SOURCE

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

275

5.5
5.0

13.3
15.2
4.1
4.1
12.3
6.7
..
2.7
26.5
3.7
6.7
4.1
..
2.5
12.8
12.7
6.1
5.9
6.9
5.2
3.9
6.6
15.7
6.0

UgandaUkraineUnited Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
IrelandUnited Republic of Tanzania

United States of America

United States Virgin Islands

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Vanuatu

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)Viet Nam

Wallis and Futuna Islands

Yemen

ZambiaZimbabwe

World

Northern America (M49) and Europe (M49)

Northern America (M49)

Europe (M49)

Latin America and the Caribbean (MDG=M49)

Central Asia (M49) and Southern Asia
(MDG=M49)

Central Asia (M49)

Southern Asia (MDG=M49)

5.3

10.5

5.7

3.7

4.5

5.6

17.2

7.9

2.7

..

4.4

6.3

3.7

13.4

2.6

..

5.5

9.1

3.2

5.5

9.9

10.6

3.9

2.7

Tuvalu

5.4

2010

3.4

2000

Turks and Caicos Islands

UN COUNTRY NAME

4.9

6.7

5.1

3.5

3.9

5.1

4.4

5.0

13.9

7.4

1.9

..

3.5

5.0

3.6

7.5

2.8

..

4.9

7.4

2.6

5.9

8.1

10.2

2.9

4.8

2015

4.5

6.8

4.6

3.3

3.7

4.5

4.1

4.6

13.7

7.6

1.8

..

4.1

2.0

4.3

7.5

2.9

..

4.3

6.6

2.2

5.5

7.0

12.3

2.6

6.3

2020

-1.3%

-3.9%

-1.5%

-0.5%

-1.5%

-2.0%

-1.8%

-1.0%

3.1%

-4.7%

0.8%

..

0.7%

-0.6%

-0.1%

-6.6%

-0.3%

..

-2.0%

-3.0%

-2.3%

3.0%

-4.2%

-2.2%

3.6%

4.8%

2000-2010

-1.4%

-8.6%

-2.2%

-0.8%

-2.6%

-2.2%

-2.3%

-2.1%

-4.2%

-1.2%

-6.6%

..

-4.4%

-4.5%

-0.5%

-11.0%

0.9%

..

-2.3%

-4.0%

-4.3%

1.4%

-3.9%

-0.8%

-5.6%

-2.5%

2010-2015

-1.9%

0.2%

-1.7%

-1.3%

-1.1%

-2.2%

-1.6%

-1.4%

-0.3%

0.5%

-0.8%

..

2.7%

-16.6%

4.0%

0.2%

1.2%

..

-2.5%

-2.4%

-2.8%

-1.3%

-2.9%

3.8%

-2.3%

5.9%

2015-2020

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

b

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

a

b

b

b

b

b

a

a

a

SOURCE

276

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7.0
7.5
5.1
4.4
4.7
3.8
8.7
6.0
4.1
6.1
6.6
3.8
11.2
6.6
6.5
6.0
..
3.6
11.0
10.3
4.3
15.3
6.3
4.3
..
4.0

Eastern Asia (M49)

South-eastern Asia (MDG=M49)

Western Asia (M49) and Northern Africa (M49)

Western Asia (M49)

Northern Africa (M49)

Sub-Saharan Africa (M49)

Oceania (M49)

Oceania (M49) excluding Australia and New
Zealand (M49)

Australia and New Zealand (M49)

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Small island developing States (SIDS)

Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)

Africa (M49)

Asia (M49)

Americas (M49)

Caribbean (M49)

Central America (M49)

Eastern Africa (M49)

Eastern Europe (M49)

Melanesia (M49)

Micronesia (M49)

Middle Africa (M49)

Northern Europe (M49)

Polynesia (M49)

South America (M49)

2000

Eastern Asia (M49) and South-eastern Asia
(MDG=M49)

UN COUNTRY NAME

3.7

..

3.7

5.1

14.3

4.3

7.2

8.6

3.6

..

5.0

6.2

5.7

7.9

3.1

5.1

5.2

4.0

5.2

7.0

3.8

5.0

4.7

4.3

7.3

6.7

2010

3.7

..

2.9

5.5

13.3

4.3

6.3

7.7

3.3

..

4.5

5.4

5.5

6.2

3.0

4.9

4.7

4.1

4.6

6.3

4.0

4.6

4.5

3.7

6.2

5.7

2015

3.4

..

2.6

5.7

11.7

4.3

6.2

7.3

3.2

..

4.1

5.0

5.4

6.2

2.7

4.7

4.3

4.1

4.3

6.3

3.8

4.5

4.3

3.6

5.7

5.3

2020

-0.7%

..

-1.6%

-2.1%

-0.6%

-0.1%

-3.4%

-2.4%

0.2%

..

-1.8%

-0.5%

-1.5%

-3.5%

-2.0%

-2.5%

-1.5%

-0.2%

-1.5%

-2.3%

0.0%

0.7%

0.5%

-1.7%

-0.3%

-0.4%

2000-2010

-0.2%

..

-4.4%

1.6%

-1.5%

0.0%

-2.6%

-2.1%

-2.1%

..

-1.9%

-2.7%

-0.8%

-4.8%

-0.9%

-0.6%

-2.3%

0.1%

-2.3%

-2.0%

1.2%

-1.5%

-0.7%

-2.8%

-3.2%

-3.1%

2010-2015

-1.4%

..

-2.5%

0.5%

-2.5%

0.4%

-0.3%

-1.2%

-0.5%

..

-1.9%

-1.4%

-0.4%

0.1%

-1.9%

-1.0%

-1.5%

0.3%

-1.4%

0.0%

-1.1%

-0.5%

-0.7%

-0.7%

-1.7%

-1.5%

2015-2020

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

SOURCE

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

277

3.4
8.0
4.1
6.2
5.8

Southern Europe (M49)

Western Africa (M49)

Western Europe (M49)

Developing regions (MDG)

Developed regions (MDG)
4.3

5.3

3.3

5.5

2.9

6.7

2015

DEFINITIONSEnergy intensity: Energy intensity is defined as the energy supplied to the economy per unit value of economic output.

4.9

5.9

3.7

6.2

3.1

7.7

2010

REFERENCE
a. Source: Energy Balances, UN Statistics Division (2022)
b. Source: IEA (2022), World Energy Balances
c. Source: IEA (2022), World Energy Balances; Energy Balances, UN Statistics Division (2022)

8.9

2000

Southern Africa (M49)

UN COUNTRY NAME

4.0

5.0

2.9

5.7

2.7

6.7

2020

-1.7%

-0.6%

-0.9%

-2.5%

-0.8%

-1.5%

2000-2010

-2.5%

-2.2%

-2.7%

-2.4%

-1.5%

-2.8%

2010-2015

-1.6%

-1.2%

-2.4%

0.5%

-1.2%

-0.1%

2015-2020

c

c

c

c

c

c

SOURCE

278

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023
72
673

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.9
0.0
3.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.1
0.1
0.0
130
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
251
0.0

AngolaAntigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Azerbaijan

BahamasBangladesh

Barbados

BelizeBenin

BhutanBolivia (Plurinational State of)

Botswana

BrazilBurkina Faso

BurundiCabo VerdeCambodia

Cameroon

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

3.6

135

3.3

0.0

0.0

53

14

1.4

134

11

5.5

23

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

192

96

1.1

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

Algeria

38

2010

23

94

116

0.0

9.7

2.1

8.4

3.3

2.6

0.2

2.3

0.0

2.0

129

566

0.0

0.1

8.0

0.0

80

24

113

7.2

0.0

0.9

5.1

2015

50

115

1.0

11

6.0

45

28

2.5

112

163

972

0.0

3.1

0.8

1.8

0.0

0.0

23

190

0.0

26

88

6.5

0.1

0.0

49

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

0.0

2000

Afghanistan

COUNTRY

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

94

96

36

11

0.0

6.9

30

11

0.0

49

414

40

0.3

0.8

43

2.8

0.0

306

2.3

0.0

49

2.7

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

2021

112

216

206

5.4

4.9

98

83

7.2

23

22

210

2.8

96

15

42

1.2

2.0

101

8.8

13

26

220

1.7

4.5

0.4

32

2000-21

185

280

354

7.1

8.6

179

112

13

42

35

352

4.5

167

17

75

1.8

3.7

167

16

23

43

393

3.0

8.1

0.4

50

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)SDG 7.a.1 • International financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energyChapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

279

4.3
0.0

9.9
0.0

0.0
0.1
14
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12
2.3
11
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.3
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Côte d'Ivoire

Cuba

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

EcuadorEgypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Eswatini

EthiopiaFiji

French Polynesia

Gabon

GambiaGeorgia

Ghana

GrenadaGuatemalaGuineaGuinea-Bissau

0.0

0.0

25

8.6

0.0

6.5

0.0

0.0

95

0.0

0.1

0.0

58

1,058

2,781

81

0.0

13

0.4

0.9

7.9

0.0

0.0

0.2

Congo

0.0

2010

0.0

2000

0.0

1.3

0.0

1.8

63

7.1

0.0

13

0.0

1.8

317

1.1

112

0.0

79

247

32

0.1

0.0

1.0

0.6

0.0

77

0.9

448

19

0.0

1.0

2015

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

17

0.6

31

0.0

0.0

4.1

3.9

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.8

244

70

1.0

0.0

1.5

0.6

0.0

3.0

357

300

0.0

0.3

17

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

Comoros

COUNTRY

0.0

0.0

12

3.2

15

4.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

392

0.2

0.0

0.0

1.9

153

2.6

100

0.0

0.4

40

0.0

0.1

312

14

0.0

0.5

0.0

2021

0.8

112

11

0.4

75

29

9.6

21

0.0

5.4

339

1.1

9.2

21

59

251

200

19

1.6

5.1

80

0.2

12

61

109

2.4

29

2.1

2000-21

0.8

206

18

0.8

59

51

18

5.2

0.0

2.0

202

1.3

17

0.3

109

388

364

33

2.9

8.3

125

0.4

21

110

185

4.5

11

3.9

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

280

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

383

2.4
64
0.0
5.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
8.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.1
146

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

Jamaica

JordanKazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Kyrgyzstan

Lao People's Democratic Republic

LebanonLesothoLiberia

Madagascar

MalawiMalaysia

0.0
0.0

3.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.5
0.0
5.4

Mali

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

MexicoMicronesia (Federated States of)Mongolia

12

0.0

84

2.1

0.0

5.0

Maldives
10

0.2

16

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.7

11

1.5

1.0

750

1.4

7.1

0.2

164

0.0

47

133

34

2.4

500

0.9

Haiti

1.2

2010

0.9

4.2

218

9.8

0.1

4.3

9.7

6.4

0.2

66

4.9

256

0.0

38

82

0.0

0.0

547

50

260

89

0.0

0.2

392

930

411

50

1.5

2015

107

0.0

936

1.1

28

0.0

0.5

22

3.9

3.5

25

9.1

76

0.2

0.4

0.1

13

36

28

37

3.0

0.6

0.0

416

1,677

83

12

1.5

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

Honduras

0.0

2000

GuyanaCOUNTRY

2.2

0.1

307

0.0

0.0

2.6

9.1

26

0.0

16

9.7

3.4

0.4

2.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

105

43

23

14

1.9

0.0

350

1,275

17

12

2.9

2021

29

3.2

188

8.8

19

3.0

37

5.6

7.1

13

9.0

25

4.8

3.6

325

8.2

1.3

218

76

86

13

30

16

305

783

77

10

2.7

2000-21

48

4.2

336

16

33

4.3

60

9.8

0.8

23

14

46

8.7

6.4

509

14

2.0

374

105

156

22

46

0.4

444

1,223

139

18

4.5

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

281

93
0.1

0.0
0.1

0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
12
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
13
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0

Mozambique

MyanmarNamibia

Nauru

Nepal

New Caledonia

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Niue

Pakistan

Palau

PanamaPapua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

RwandaSaint Helena

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Sao Tome and Principe

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

9.5

0.0

1.1

0.0

0.0

2.2

83

94

0.1

0.0

9.1

0.0

272

0.0

0.6

0.0

136

0.0

24

0.0

49

8.8

0.3

Morocco

0.0

2010

0.0

2000

0.0

0.1

34

0.4

0.0

0.0

1.5

0.0

23

87

0.0

8.5

66

5.3

1,236

0.0

48

0.0

69

0.0

19

8.8

0.0

59

5.2

242

2.1

2015

1.5

0.0

109

14

0.0

0.0

0.0

279

1.7

24

401

0.1

265

0.1

871

0.0

269

131

144

0.0

59

0.1

0.0

63

163

252

0.0

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

Montserrat

COUNTRY

15

0.0

26

2.1

0.0

6.5

0.0

83

45

101

0.1

0.2

0.0

0.1

786

0.0

33

243

180

0.0

97

0.0

0.2

11

108

1.2

0.0

2021

8.2

0.1

42

1.1

1.6

0.8

0.1

34

41

96

33

4.0

54

0.8

507

0.5

358

37

60

2.8

83

1.8

8.8

39

40

281

1.0

2000-21

5.4

0.2

65

1.9

3.0

1.5

0.1

55

35

167

45

7.4

100

0.6

866

0.4

655

67

106

5.1

123

3.1

12

34

70

434

1.6

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

282

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268
0.0

7.3
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.6
135
0.0
0.0
27

South Africa

South Sudan

Sri Lanka

State of Palestine

Sudan

Suriname

Syrian Arab Republic

Tajikistan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tokelau

Tonga

Tunisia

TürkiyeTurkmenistan

TuvaluUganda

0.0
0.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.0
0.0

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Vanuatu

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)Viet Nam

Zimbabwe

0.0

105

1,306

1.2

0.2

United Republic of Tanzania
8.9

30

0.5

0.0

292

135

5.9

0.0

0.0

5.2

4.3

6.8

5.4

0.0

88

1.4

46

0.0

0.0

Somalia

0.0

2010

0.0

2000

0.0

6.5

0.4

7.5

0.3

212

38

517

8.8

0.1

443

9.2

15

0.0

5.0

0.0

57

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

24

0.5

0.1

740

0.3

7.0

2015

0.1

167

0.0

0.9

215

0.0

98

22

0.1

0.0

368

21

2.1

0.0

17

1.8

55

46

0.0

3.0

19

12

0.6

0.1

142

0.2

1.0

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

Solomon Islands

COUNTRY

0.0

362

0.0

2.0

170

0.0

322

3.9

2.8

0.0

123

2.6

2.1

0.0

31

2.9

164

56

0.0

0.5

0.3

24

0.5

0.2

81

142

1.7

2021

16

136

114

2.8

42

49

45

166

2.1

0.3

352

45

6.0

0.4

3.7

1.0

54

37

0.2

1.4

75

7.5

62

1.4

155

7.8

12

2000-21

28

164

139

4.0

74

87

76

250

3.9

0.5

574

46

11

0.8

6.9

1.1

97

59

0.5

2.6

30

13

74

2.6

279

14

22

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

283

0.1
0.0

37
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.0
3.6
2.4
0.0
11
0.0
0.0

Belarus

China, Hong Kong Special Administrative
RegionKosovoLibya

China, Macao Special Administrative Region

Republic of Moldova

Montenegro

SerbiaTrinidad and Tobago

UkraineNorth Macedonia

Wallis and Futuna Islands

Samoa

Yemen

ZambiaResidual/unallocated ODA: Central Asia andSouthern Asia

Residual/unallocated ODA: Latin America andthe Caribbean

Residual/unallocated ODA: Oceania excl. Aus.
and N. Zealand

Residual/unallocated ODA: Sub-Saharan Africa

Residual/unallocated ODA: Western Asia andNorthern Africa

Residual/unallocated ODA: Northern America
and Europe

8.6

7.5

25

0.9

10

1.8

393

0.3

0.2

1.2

0.0

94

0.2

19

0.0

0.0

0.0

97

0.0

Bosnia and Herzegovina

7.0

2010

0.2

2000

0.0

39

155

2.1

120

0.0

1,775

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

11

0.0

4.6

86

0.5

0.0

0.0

26

0.0

0.0

6.5

25

2015

125

0.0

483

0.1

117

2.3

13

1.1

0.0

0.0

22

41

0.3

11

17

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

3.7

0.0

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

Albania

COUNTRY

24

7.8

1,734

0.2

53

136

11

7.8

0.0

0.0

39

269

0.0

13

0.0

0.3

0.0

5.2

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.4

54

2021

58

18

239

1.7

80

9.1

146

8.3

1.8

0.0

8.1

98

0.0

42

11

2.4

0.0

0.2

6.5

0.0

20

27

25

2000-21

105

32

416

3.1

126

14

244

14

3.4

0.0

15

164

0.0

65

19

4.5

0.0

0.4

12

0.0

37

46

15

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

284

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023
0.0
20

64
77
24

Oceania excluding Australia and New
Zealand

Residual/unallocated ODA: Unspeciﬁed,
developing countries

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)

Small island developing States (SIDS)

0.0

0.5

EuropeOceania0.0

Northern America

0.5

591

Southern Asia

Northern America and Europe

8.7

Central Asia

600

141

Western Asia

Central and Southern Asia

16

157

Northern Africa

Northern Africa and Western Asia

165

South-eastern Asia

421

Eastern and South-Eastern Asia
256

192

Latin America and the Caribbean

Eastern Asia

78

1,469

World

Sub-Saharan Africa

22.69

0.0

2000

Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Residual/unallocated ODA: Eastern and Southeastern Asia

COUNTRY

186

1,029

1,543

862

9.4

9.4

264

0.0

264

796

9.6

806

769

1,289

2,059

954

147

1,101

4,865

1,946

11,912102.48

22

2010

339

3,090

4,099

224

91

91

160

0.0

160

2,334

50

2,384

911

499

1,410

683

95

779

2,230

5,310

12,588335.92

55

2015

300

1,779

1,609

548

21

21

221

0.0

221

2,703

289

2,992

447

536

983

876

222

1,098

3,676

2,692

12,229311.77137

2020

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS (2020 USD MILLIONS)

198

1,317

2,033

568

12

12

400

0.0

400

2,491

269

2,760

238

162

400

1,251

98

1,349

1,381

3,904

10,7752,412.79

149

2021

154

1,677

2,088

279

52

52

298

0.0

298

1,605

163

1,769

569

653

1,222

1,048

245

1,293

2,051

2,624

9,588

47

2000-21

259

2,334

2,899

482

82

82

482

0.0

482

2,530

253

2,782

953

898

1,851

1,493

329

1,821

3,507

3,967

14,9752,686.47

82

2010-21

AVERAGES (2020 USD MILLIONS PER YEAR)

Chapter 7 • Tracking Progress Toward SDG 7 Across Targets: Indicators and Data

285

0.0

Cabo Verde

14

6.0

2.2

3.0

21

456

0.1

8.6

2,110

Burundi586

Bhutan

0.1

2.7

0.1

Benin

197

Burkina Faso

129

Belize

3.6

0.0

0.0

Barbados

1.8

Brunei Darussalam

1.8

Bangladesh

0.6

0.0

0.0

Bahrain

0.8

British Virgin Islands

0.0

Bahamas

108

362

113

Azerbaijan

300

Brazil

0.0

Aruba

383

0.0

323

Armenia239

Botswana

235

Argentina

1.2

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba

0.0

Antigua and Barbuda

0.0

57

0.0

Anguilla

34

549

14

Angola

0.0

44

0.0

American Samoa

7.0

0.0

9.0

Algeria

8.6

2010

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

9.8

2000

Afghanistan

COUNTRY

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency

60

5.4

2.2

2.8

24

549

0.9

492

57

2,173

0.2

240

32

2.4

4.2

3.3

117

365

448

246

38

79

37

47

7.9

9.0

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

61

4.7

4.5

3.2

22

704

2.3

676

89

3,023

0.3

260

178

3.1

7.1

5.5

126

357

511

312

182

97

113

112

16

9.3

2020

60

4.6

4.4

11

22

746

2.3

662

103

3,004

0.3

257

178

3.4

8.2

5.5

127

358

545

332

181

96

110

115

16

9.3

2021

SDG 7.b.1 • Installed renewable electricity-generating capacity (watts per capita)

286

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2023

4.1
0.2

0.0
5.0
0.2
290
60
213
0.0
28
3.6
358
36
5.2
21
197
51
0.0
112
53

Cayman Islands

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Comoros

Congo

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Côte d'Ivoire

Cuba

Curaçao

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

5.1
0.3

41
97
8.2
0.0
101
6.1

Egypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Eswatini

Ethiopia

21

113

134

39

136

Ecuador

157

55

102

0.0

38

160

50

55

29

426

5.6

19

2.2

206

173

362

0.0

36

48

Cameroon

1.5

2010

0.8

2000

Cambodia

COUNTRY

26

149

2.6

93

148

37

160

72

100

0.3

32

178

236

55

26

482

166

41

2.0

250

344

473

0.2

4.0

0.0

32

63

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

40

143

6.5

80

253

56

301

130

99

0.3

30

190

315

111

33

610

280

40

1.8

243

631

654

0.2

3.6

189

31

103

2020

40

150

7.0

78

252

57

298

138

98

18

29

189

314

114

32

619

281

39

1.8

244

716

764

0.2

3.5

201

30

108

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287

178
100

137
25

698
192
134
0.0
600
60
0.0
114
0.0
62
15
0.0
29
6.7
66
24
26
31
27
21
2.9
148
25
0.7
0.0

French Guiana

French Polynesia

Gabon

GambiaGeorgia

Ghana

GrenadaGuadeloupe

Guam

GuatemalaGuineaGuinea-Bissau

GuyanaHaiti

Honduras

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

Jamaica

JordanKazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Kuwait

0.0

3.6

2.4

35

73

114

28

42

74

5.8

71

0.0

13

90

0.5

248

2.3

46

704

1.0

612

162

130

Fiji

728

2010

84

2000

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

COUNTRY

1.4

20

34

162

16

38

61

127

33

59

147

5.5

73

0.2

33

136

190

371

9.3

56

631

1.5

164

259

652

210

701

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

24

23

43

263

183

90

37

136

39

96

183

7.1

67

0.6

29

165

207

476

30

53

730

1.3

145

306

616

230

638

2020

25

22

45

369

195

90

37

136

41

105

181

7.0

66

0.6

61

163

206

503

30

52

762

1.3

142

304

602

238

635

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0.0
6.5
27
120
0.0
7.5
0.7
0.0
0.0
91
0.0
111
19
6.1
0.0

Liberia

Libya

Madagascar

MalawiMalaysia

Maldives

Mali

Marshall Islands

Martinique

Mauritania

Mauritius

MayotteMexicoMicronesia (Federated States of)Mongolia

Montserrat

117
3.9

124
7.6
132
0.0
12
361

Mozambique

MyanmarNamibia

Nauru

Nepal

New Caledonia

453

26

46

95

43

Morocco

48

0.0

13

4.9

120

39

128

0.0

75

6.0

19

4.4

97

20

6.0

0.6

36
1.0

57

38

65

Lebanon

387

1.4

99

Lao People's Democratic Republic

559

2010

Lesotho596

2000

Kyrgyzstan

COUNTRY

434

30

19

154

63

82

67

0.0

29

13

145

53

133

13

181

20

21

14

243

22

7.0

0.8

0.9

35

46

642

622

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

695

47

170

201

65

73

94

56

85

31

214

59

189

27

352

37

20

55

258

24

7.0

0.8

19

33

65

1,055

572

2020

692

70

168

198

64

71

95

226

84

30

237

57

189

26

357

39

21

62

265

27

6.8

0.9

18

33

66

1,143

564

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289

30
0.0

17
0.0
0.0
94
34
0.2
208
39

Nigeria

Niue

Oman

Other non-specified areas in Eastern Asia

Pakistan

Palau

PanamaPapua New Guinea

64
13

49
26
0.0
34
183
5.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
50
82
16
0.0
1.1
0.0

Philippines

Puerto Rico

Qatar

Republic of Korea

RéunionRwandaSaint BarthélemySaint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Martin (French Part)Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

0.0

2.3

0.1

52

0.0

0.1

46

0.0

4.9

316

58

0.0

43

51

120

109

Peru

1,527

1,442

Paraguay

40

264

16

36

125

13

0.1

0.0

Niger

64

2010

30

2000

Nicaragua

COUNTRY

75

2.4

0.7

12

70

60

74

4.3

76

0.0

9.4

412

142

9.5

124

55

151

1,432

38

519

51

39

171

0.5

185

12

0.3

97

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

122

22

3.1

12

135

72

15

22

87

2.2

12

462

394

8.7

181

62

191

1,334

34

548

97

55

388

36

485

10

1.1

109

2020

182

25

12

12

133

72

16

22

87

2.2

12

470

470

9.0

221

67

191

1,317

34

587

97

56

471

41

486

10

1.1

107

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0.4
10

0.7
0.0
27
0.0
62
0.0
15
376
94
647
57
0.0
13
13
0.6
4.0
7.4
176
0.3
0.0
0.6
11
0.0
18
0.0

Solomon Islands

SomaliaSouth Africa

South Sudan

Sri Lanka

State of Palestine

Sudan

Suriname

Syrian Arab Republic

Tajikistan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tokelau

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

TürkiyeTurkmenistan

Turks and Caicos Islands

TuvaluUgandaUnited Arab Emirates

United Republic of Tanzania

United States Virgin Islands

0.0

14

1.3

14

20

0.0

0.2

237

11

2.0

1.1

15

70

630

38

330

42

0.0

70

0.0

19

0.0

1.3

25

38

Singapore

8.4

2010

0.9

2000

Sierra Leone

COUNTRY

90

13

15

21

190

0.8

0.2

396

29

2.5

27

654

9.1

0.9

112

590

82

327

40

2.7

88

0.0

61

0.2

3.4

44

12

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

100

11

222

27

209

21

0.2

585

33

2.4

74

578

8.7

1.1

165

553

72

315

40

23

111

0.1

162

1.2

5.3

94

12

2020

101

11

275

26

206

21

0.3

628

33

2.3

73

571

14

1.1

166

541

70

312

40

35

117

0.1

172

1.6

5.1

110

12

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291

43
0.0
182
62

64

27
246
55

Viet Nam

Yemen

ZambiaZimbabwe

World

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

Eastern and South-Eastern Asia

100

Western Asia

17
78
31

Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)

Small island developing States (SIDS)

57

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Oceania (exc. Australia and New Zealand)

57

Southern Asia

Oceania

23

Central Asia

44

82

24

60

60

41

47
188

30

111

33

74

55

168

135

285

24

101

65

140

0.0

101

509

18

63

541

2010

194

Central and Southern Asia

28

65

Northern Africa

Northern Africa and Western Asia

38

541

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)South-Eastern Asia

3.1

Vanuatu

62

64

Uzbekistan

Eastern Asia

471

2000

Uruguay

COUNTRY

55

85

29

67

67

55

195

60

160

36

102

86

331

258

334

28

154

62

142

2.1

176

498

29

61

830

2015

WATTS PER CAPITA

85

97

37

72

72

84

214

89

228

49

143

134

611

466

422

37

244

77

134

7.8

397

583

38

60

1,091

2020

90

103

39

72

72

90

240

96

244

50

151

143

693

525

446

38

268

76

146

7.7

438

589

37

63

1,092

2021

Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: IEA, IRENA, UNSD, World Bank, WHO. 2023. Tracking SDG 7: The Energy
Progress Report. World Bank, Washington DC. © World Bank.
The Energy Progress Report is a joint report of the Custodian Agencies – the International Energy Agency (IEA), theInternational Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the World Bank, and
the World Health Organization (WHO).
It receives inputs from the SDG 7 Technical Advisory Group which comprises more than 30 organizations around theworld and has been made possible with the support of our partners.
Visit the SDG 7 Tracking website to download data and reports, as well as customized maps,
comparative graphics, timelines, and country reports.
http://trackingSDG7.esmap.org