The 4th Congress ofthe Asian Association of World Historians
Osaka, 5-6 January 2018

Plenary Keynote Speech I
Li Bozhong
1524: The End of the Silk RoadAbstract
In 1524, the imperial court of the Ming made a decision: to relocate seven frontier garrisonsin the country’s northwest border areas (Guanxi Seven Garrisons, 關西七衛) from their originalstations outside Jiayu Pass (嘉峪關) at the western end of the Great Wall to their new stations
within the pass. Though this decision with its implementation hasn’t attracted much attention ofhistorians, it is an event of far-reaching significance in world history: It marked the closing of theSilk Road which stretched across the Eurasia Continent and was seen a “great channel ofinternational trade” regarded by many scholars.
This decision was not an indiscretion of Jiajing Emperor of the Ming dynasty on impulse
without counting the cost, but the result of much thought of the top policymakers of the Ming
state: Years earlier, memorials were submitted to the throne to suggest to “Close the door [to thebarbarians in West China] and Suspend the tribute trade [with them], and never have dealings
with them (閉關絕貢，永不與通).” The suggestion was supported by the Board of War. Though
it was not indorsed by the crown then, it heralded the decision. Some deep-seated reasons stoodbehind the decision.
1. Economic consideration
In terms of trade volume and size, the trade of the Silk Road was not important as thought.
One of the main restrains of the expansion of the trade was the unendurably high costs of thetrade, which were caused with not just the extremely poor transportation, but very high risks thatthe merchants suffered from the unsafety caused with political instability in this area. Second, thetrade was highly unbalanced: China’s export dwarfed its import greatly and made the trade a oneway trade in some sense. Third, the trade was mainly official for political purposes and in chargeof the Chinese state. As a result, the size and frequency depended on policies of the Chinese state.
Moreover, during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, two great changes happened:climate changes and the rise of the maritime trade. Both of them, in particular the later, had great
effect on the trade of the Silk Road and accelerated the fall of it.
The Chinese maritime trade saw a great expansion during the sixteenth century, partly
because of the rise of Japan, the tapping of rich resources of Southeast Asia and the arrival of the1The 4th Congress of
the Asian Association of World Historians
Osaka, 5-6 January 2018
Portuguese and Spanish through whom China was linked with a great business world that theseWestern powers created. Quite different from the trade along the Silk Road on land, the maritime
trade was lucrative, though not in the official tribute trade. The prosperity of multinational private
trade resulted in troubles for the Ming state. The state had to take precedence over the troubles inthe trade along the Silk Road which was trivial in the size.
Second, security considerations.
The traditional threat to China came from the nomads in the steppes of Inner Asia, CentralAsia and Manchuria. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, however, saw the second
great wave of expansion of Islam, which reached Central Asia and reshaped the political andcultural map of this region completely. Though the plan of conquest of China of Tamerlane(“Timur the Lame”, 1336-1405) did not succeed because of his sudden death en route in themarch of his massive army to China before he ever reached the Chinese border, the rulers ofdifferent Muslin regimes in this region did not abandon their goals to convert China into Islamic,
and some of them took actions and waged Jihads against the Ming. Because these nomads
enjoyed the superiority in battle fields thanks to their excellent cavalries and took up the cause of
Jihad with evangelical fervor, they became very aggressive to Ming China.
Facing the increasing threat from the nomads in the Northwest, the military power of theMing declined after the disastrous defeat in the battle with Mongols at Tumubao in 1449. Throughthe Ming military force was recovered later, the threat from Mongols was still serious. Evenworse, in sixteenth century, old threats from ‘Japanese Pirates’ (倭寇) intensified, while new
threats from the Portuguese and Spaniards and from Luchuan (China’s another border area) andVietnam in the south appeared in the east in the south. These threats, old and new, put enormouspressures on the Ming state whose financial resources were quite limited. For the Ming
policymakers, the threats from the rivals and enemies in the east and south were more severe since
they were much closer to China’s political center and most prosperous areas as well as the major
sources of the revenue of the state.
Facing a stark choice, the Ming policymakers decided to take an ‘East and North First’strategy which was most reasonable. As for the northwest, the best way for the Ming state was totake a strategy of ‘passive defense,’ that is, resist the offensives of the enemies from Central Asiawith the help of the formidable Great Wall, as it did in the defense against the Mongols in theeast. For this consideration, the Ming state decided to withdraw the Guanxi Seven Garrisons backinto the Great Wall. The Jiayu Pass was the main entrance to China Proper from Central Asia
along the Silk Road, and the Guanxi Seven Garrisons, established in the early Ming, were themajor force to defend order and promote stability in the vast areas beyond the Jiayu Pass. It wasalso the major measure of the Ming state to keep safety of activities along the Silk Road. The
removal of the garrisons into the pass means that the Ming state abandoned its role of thesafeguard of the road. This action was “Close the door [to the barbarians in West China]” (閉關) ,and a necessary consequence of it was “Suspend the tribute trade [with them]” (絕貢). Since the2The 4th Congress ofthe Asian Association of World Historians
Osaka, 5-6 January 2018
tribute trade, no matter how small its size was, had been the majority of the trade along the SilkRoad, the suspension of the tribute trade was the end of the trade along the road. Moreover, sincethe road had been the major channel to connect China Proper and Central Asia, no trade means
the breaking off of the traditional link. In this sense, it is what the Ming policymakers wanted intheir proposal of “Never have dealings with them (永不與通).” The withdrawing of the Guanxi
Seven Garrisons in 1524, therefore, marks the end of the Silk Road as a major trans-Eurasianinternational trade channel. After then, the trade between China Proper and Central Asia along theSilk Road became negligible.
This situation didn’t change a lot in the following centuries. The Qing dynasty, the successorof the Ming, was much more powerful in military force and proactive in dealing with the frontieraffairs. Though the Qing established its effective rule over the vast region outside the Jiayu Passafter more than a century fighting, the trade along the previous Silk Road never prospered again.
The road was gradually forgotten. It didn’t come into view of the people until Ferdinand vonRichthofen a German traveler, geographer and scientist “re-discovered” it and coined the terms"Seidenstraße" and "Seidenstraßen," or "Silk Road(s)" and "Silk Route(s)" in English, in 1877.
Today when we talk about the Silk Road, we should have better knowledge of its history. Theroad was never a “great channel of international trade.” The trade along the road was never verylarge in size, and the business along the road was going on just on and off. Compared with themaritime trade routes, the Silk Road was not as important in history as many people haveimagined today. In a perspective of global history, the closing of the road in 1524 is an event ofgreat significance because it reveals the fact: The rise of the maritime world and the fall of theinland world in the early modern times.

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