The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspond to the challenges of the Japan-PRC relationship

The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspondto the challenges of the Japan-PRC relationship
Valérie Niquet*
Abstract
The Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) recurrently uses the argument of the Franco-German
model of reconciliation. Germanyʼs “moral” position is systematically opposed to that ofJapan, which is always denounced as the only party responsible for the lack of reconciliation
with China.
This analysis is often repeated without distance outside China. However, behind this
discourse, the reality is much more complex and the comparison of the two situations isparticularly hazardous. The real question is indeed that of strategic incentives, which, fromthe immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the present day, are divergent. This
paper will look into the complexities of the reconciliation process, beyond an idealized
Franco-German model.

T

he Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) recurrently uses the argument of the FrancoGerman model of reconciliation. Germanyʼs “moral” position is systematically opposedto that of Japan, which is always denounced as the only party responsible for the lackof reconciliation with China because̶according to Beijing̶it refuses to look backand apologize for its actions during the Second World War.
This analysis is often repeated without differentiation outside China, particularly in Westerncountries, both by non-specialist experts in Asia and by politicians. Thus, in his speech to theDiet during his visit to Japan in June 2013, President François Hollande of France was able to put
forward the example of Franco-German reconciliation, without contextualizing it or making a
distinction in the process between West Germany (formerly BRD) and East Germany (formerly
DDR).1
However, the reality behind this discourse is much more complex and the comparison of thetwo situations is particularly hazardous. The real question is indeed that of strategic incentives,
which, from the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the present day, are divergent.
In the case of the Franco-German relationship, as we shall see, West Germany yesterday,
Germany today, and France were both parts of the same liberal democracies grouping. In thecase of the Sino-Japanese relationship, the Peopleʼs Republic of China and its Party-State systemhave not shared Japanʼs interests and strategic vision since 1949. The onus is therefore on a
China whose leaders have a direct interest in maintaining Japan in a state of subordination that
limits its re-emergence on the international scene as a “normal” power. It is in this context thatthe impossible reconciliation between Tokyo and Beijing must be analyzed, and the main factor
remains Chinaʼs willingness̶today non-existent̶to accept a true permanent reconciliation with*

Valérie Niquet, Ph.D. (Sorbonne University) is Head of the Asia department at FRS (Fondation pour larecherche stratégique), and senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA).

1“Statement by Mr. François Hollande on Franco-Japanese relations, June 7, 2013,” speech delivered to
the Diet, Tokyo at https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/188124-francois-hollande-07062013-relationsfranco-japonaises

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Japan after 1945. Indeed, contrary to a commonly accepted position, it is not the capacity to lookback on a difficult history that precedes reconciliation but, as in the Franco-German or JapaneseAmerican case, the will to reconcile that constitutes the first condition. In the case of Germany,
France wanted this reconciliation for reasons that had little to do with the most recent past; all themore easily, no doubt, because France itself had difficulty, until the end of the 1970s, in coming
to terms with its own experience as a collaborationist state under the regime of Marshal Pétain
(1940–1944).

The Chinese position on taking Germany as a model

For Beijing, this constant reference to the Franco-German model and Germanyʼs just attitude
is a valuable foreign policy tool, mobilized against a Japan whose legitimacy today is no morequestioned in the whole of Asia except, for different reasons, in the PRC and the Republic ofKorea. In 2013, Chinaʼs ambassador to Germany published an op-ed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung denouncing Prime Minister Abe ʼ s visit to Yasukuni Shrine as a demonstration ofrevisionist nationalism as opposed to Germanyʼs ability to repent.2 China thus constantly uses theexample of Germany as opposed to that of Japan, which is always denounced as solely responsible
for the lack of “trust” and reconciliation between the two countries. 3 President Weizsäckerʼs
speech to the German Parliament on May 8, 1985, is often cited as a model of acknowledgmentof an inexcusable past.4 However, the incongruity of this rapprochement by a regime that has
made the expurgation of history and its most painful episodes a mode of social control is nevermentioned.5
Like historians, Chinese editorialists condemn Japan by using this misguided comparison
with Germany. For the Global Times, both Japan and Germany were defeated nations, but only
Germany was able to completely liquidate its past Nazi crimes. The author emphasizes the roleof the Franco-German axis as a factor of peace, prosperity, and stability in Europe, “an example
of resolving disputes through compromise and cooperation.” On the other hand, according tothis article, Japan has not learned the lessons of its war of aggression; Tokyo must learn from
Germany.6

Far from histor y: China’s geostrategic motivations
Several objectives explain this positioning of the PRC vis-à-vis Japan on questions of history. At
the bilateral level, there is a twofold objective of legitimizing the Communist Party within China
by constantly reactivating the memory of the war of resistance against Japan and by glorifying
the role of the Communist Party during the Second World War. On the international scene, the
PRC tries to deny Tokyo any legitimacy, particularly in its demand for reform of the UNSC. Asa defeated nation like Germany in 1945, Japan, in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, must be
maintained in this status. This is all the truer since the perception of the People ʼs Republic ofChina as a source of opportunity is deteriorating globally, including in Asia.
2

In Stanley Crossick, “Can China and Japan ever Forgive and Forget?” Politico, 09-11-2015.

3

Nicole Colin, Claire Demesmay, Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Post-war Reconciliation inInternational Perspectives, (Springer, 2020).

4

Speech by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker during the Ceremony Commemorating the40th Anniversary of the End of War in Europe and of National-Socialist Tyranny on 8 May 1985 at the
Bundestag.

5

In China, topics such as the Tiananmen Square massacre cannot be discussed and there is a crime of“historical nihilism” which condemns any criticism of the ruling Communist Party.

6

孙海潮 , “ 中日关系愈发的关系比较 ”(Comparison between Sino-Japanese relations and Franco-German
Relations), 环球网，30-04-2019.

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The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspond to the challenges of the Japan-PRC relationship

Defending the Partyʼs image of dominance, especially against Japan during the Second World
War, is in effect contributing to the Partyʼs posture of power today. To control and rewrite thehistory of the anti-Japanese struggle before 1949 is also to mask by an abundance of discourseon this period the total absence of authorized critical discourse on the history of the post-1949
period, which was particularly painful and costly in human lives for the Chinese people. The
contemporary legitimacy of the Communist Partyʼs undivided power has been increasingly based
since the end of the 1980s on historical reconstruction.
This instrumentalization of history in China takes place at various levels, notably in the writingof school textbooks and in the commemoration and promotion of memorial sites, the list of which
has grown very recently.
In France, attempts by the Parliament to “guide” the history curriculum in 2006 sparked aheated debate that led to the withdrawal of the contested project. Contrarily, Yang Dongliang,
former head of the Ministry of Educationʼs expert committee on Japanese issues, believes that
7“all countries in the world encourage young people to study history to nourish their patriotism.”
These are two radically dif ferent conceptions of histor y education that demonstrate theideological gap that continues to exist with the Chinese system.
The rules governing the writing and selection of authorized textbooks in China, especiallyhistor y textbooks, are defined by the Communist Par ty authorities, who are exclusively
responsible for ideological control, and their implementation is entrusted to the PRCʼs Ministryof Education. The mission of the Ministry is thus officially “to analyze and present educational
materials used in elementary and secondary schools, to organize the review and approval of sucheducational materials.”8 In 1986, taking into account the policy of reform and the opening up of thecountry, the production of history textbooks was decentralized, but the requirement to respect
the principles defined above was maintained. The textbooks are no longer composed by a single
centralized commission but by provincial or municipal departments of education, by educational
institutions themselves, and by individual experts or scholars. The system of text review and postproofing by a “state textbook review and approval commission” has been maintained to take into
account “the ideological content, scientific spirit and suitability of the textbooks for the relevant
audience.” History, as it is taught to children and youth today, and more so under Xi Jinping, isthus an instrument of official control and mobilization in the hands of the Chinese powers-that-be.
A textbook used in secondary schools in accordance with official guidelines is particularly
illuminating in this respect.9 The chapter on “the war of resistance against Japan” highlights
several essential and recurrent points in the process of constructing an eternally guilty Japan.
The presentation intends to highlight the “immense heroism of the struggle against theJapanese aggression.”10 The chapter on the “heroic actions of the 8th Route Army (Communist
forces)” stresses the major and leading role of the Communist Party alone in the struggle andvictory over the “Japanese oppressor.” It is thus repeatedly noted that the Party was the driving
force of the struggle against Japan, that it constituted the main element, and above all that it7

Xinhua, 17-05-2005.

8

Samuel Guex, “Les manuels dʼhistoire chinois vus du Japon,” Ebisu, Année 2008, 39.

9 enmin jiaoyi chubanshi kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo lishi kecheng jiaocai yanjiu kaifa zhongxin (History
R
Curriculum Materials Production and Study Center of the Institute of Curriculum Materials of Peopleʼs
Educational Publishing), Lishi (History), (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyi chubanshe, 2004).

10

Ibid.

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was by winning this victory thanks to the Communist Party that China took its place alongside
the great powers at the end of the conflict, conflating the Communist Party with the Republic ofChina. This was also the main theme of the 2015 parade organized for the first time to celebrate
the victory against Japan in China.
The chapter on the war of resistance against Japan also includes paragraphs, accompanied
by graphic photographs of war crimes, whose sources are never indicated.11 With such images,
forgiveness is impossible, and the aim seems to be to maintain in the youth an imprescriptible
feeling of hatred.
The aim is also to demonstrate, through these schoolbooks, the legitimacy of the leadershiprole of the Chinese Communist Party “which has awakened the country to the urgent need tobuild a united front of national unity.” The Chinese authorities thus proceeded to equate “China”
with the Communist Party, even though the role the latter played at the time was far from thecentrality it is given today in official mainland history.
This reconstruction of history, this insistence on highlighting the major, almost unique role
played by the Communist Party during the anti-Japanese war, is, in fact, all the more vital for thegovernment since, for the Communist apparatus that took refuge in Yanan in 1937, the priority
seems to have been, on the contrary, to conform to the strategic interests of the USSR in the
war against Japan and to give priority to the fight against the nationalist forces of the Republic ofChina.
Thus, to preserve the legitimacy of the Communist Party, historical “nihilism” is denounced;
the “justice” of past struggles must be prolonged in the present through a delegitimization of
todayʼs Japan, which implies the constant reminder of “past crimes” that prevent any long-termreconciliation whatever the number of excuses expressed by Tokyo.
The perpetuation of the past in the service of the interests of todayʼs Chinese regime is also
nourished by the multiplication of monuments and commemorations, all phenomena which are
relatively recent in scope. The three “stations” of Chinese martyrdom against Japan̶Shenyang,
the capital from 1931 of Manchukuo, a protectorate of Japan at the head of which the last emperor
Pu Yi had been installed; the Marco Polo Bridge, the site of the “incident” of July 7, 1937, whichmarked the beginning of the offensive by Japanese troops towards the south; and finally Nanjing,
the capital of the Chinese government abandoned by government troops after a siege of a few
weeks and also the site of the 1937 massacre̶have only relatively recently been provided withhuge museums. The “Memorial for the Patriotic Victims of Japanese Militarism” in Nanjing dates
from 1985 and was restored on a larger scale in 2005. The Marco Polo Bridge Museum wasconveniently built in 1989 as an instrument of national harmony after the events in Tiananmen
Square and renovated in 2005 to even greater dimensions, with the aim of “refreshing visitorsʼ
memories of the war” by highlighting “courage, heroism, resistance, patriotism and atrocities”
which should not be forgotten. As elsewhere in the museum, an engraved plaque placed at theentrance in August 2005 once again proclaims the leading role of the Communist Party in the warof resistance against Japan and the anti-fascist war.11
To maintain this memory and a sense of revenge, new websites were also created with theblessing of the authorities in a vast movement of “web nationalism.” With the same objective,
dozens of television programs, films and war series are constantly aired.
Japan cannot, therefore, cease to be confronted̶in the terms defined by China̶with its
history and no apology can be sincerely accepted despite Deng Xiaopingʼs 1979 call to look to the11This is also the case in museums where no source is indicated, fuelling Japanese critics who denounce
the fabrication of documents.

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The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspond to the challenges of the Japan-PRC relationshipfuture. Japan is also asked to “translate its remorse into action so that the feelings of the Chinese
people will never again be violated” and “to adopt a conscientious and serious attitude towards
history.”

Denouncing a “Cold War mentality”
Behind this desire to maintain Japan in a status of illegitimacy also lies the Chinese ambition to
weaken the system of bilateral alliances around the United States in Asia, of which the Japan-US
alliance is the cornerstone. The PRC constantly denounces a system “inherited from the Cold
War” that could be replaced by a Chinese-centric regional system. Beijing therefore denounces
the “ Cold War mentality ” displayed by both the media and political circles in Japan when
discussing defense issues, which is always equated with a so-called rise in “militarism.” Similarly,
the greater interest shown in Japan in strategic issues since the beginning of the 2010s, which has
not disappeared with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, is also the subject of constant criticism
in the Peopleʼs Republic of China.

The Franco-German reconciliation: A counterexample
The process of reconciliation between France and Germany, far from being the model that
China puts for ward, appears on the contrar y as in a mirror, the reverse of the situation thatcharacterizes the relationship between Japan and China. The reconciliation between France andGermany after 1945 was only possible because of a dual will in Paris as well as in Berlin, despite aparticularly difficult history. Since the end of the 19th century, Germany had been considered by
France the “hereditary enemy” and, after Franceʼs defeat in 1871 ending the Franco-Prussian War
and leading to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, it was the motive of all nationalist discourses in France.
This tension continued during the first half of the 20th century with the two world wars. However,after the German defeat in 1945, a complete reversal of this situation took place.
The movement in favor of reconciliation with Germany manifested itself early after theThird Reichʼs defeat in France. This movement, contrary to what one often hears, far preceded
the movements to re-evaluate history and responsibilities both in Germany and in France. It
is only from the 1970s onwards that, in both countries, real questioning of the compromises
and responsibilities during the Second World War occurred, notably in Germany with the
Vergangenheitbewältigung (Coping with the past) movement and in France with the shock
provoked by the publication of Robert O. Paxtonʼs book, La France de Vichy, in 1973.
Unlike the PRC, Gaullist France sought this Franco-German reconciliation. The first meeting
between General de Gaulle, who had just been appointed President of the Council on June 1,
1958, and Chancellor Adenauer, who initiated the process of Franco-German reconciliation,
took place on September 14, 1958, when the German chancellor was symbolically invited to La
Boisserie, General de Gaulleʼs private residence. The stated objective was to try to reverse thecourse of history, to reconcile the two peoples, and to combine their efforts and their capacities.
We find on both sides, and particularly on the French side, the same desire to establish direct
and preferential relations in all areas. This meeting marks the reconciliation between the twocountries and the beginning of a cooperation that led to the Elysée Treaty signed on January 22,
1963. When he went to Germany, where he gave ten speeches in German in September 1962, deGaulle did not insist on a necessary apology but a necessary reconciliation.

The weight of strategic interests
The situation between the PRC and Japan was also mirrored by the strategic stakes and the role of
the United States beyond the French desire for reconciliation. For President Truman and George
Marshall in the United States, it was a question of not repeating the errors of the Versailles Treaty(1919) and risk precipitating a move by the new “West Germany” into the communist camp while
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the Cold War was taking hold in Europe. France as well as the Federal Republic of Germany werepart of the same “camp” and this has been a crucial factor in the reconciliation between the twocountries. The Franco-German cooperation treaty, known as the Elysée Treaty, signed on January
22, 1963, provides for quarterly meetings between the ministers of defense, bi-monthly meetings
between the chiefs of staff, and consultations on all matters relating to defense and importantforeign policy issues “to reach a similar position” on East-West relations, European cooperation orNATO as well as on all armaments issues.12
At the level of civil society, exchanges were encouraged through the teaching of German in
French high schools, school trips, and later the creation of a Franco-German television channel,
Arte, in 1991.

The role of NATO and European construction
West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany), like France, was also a member of NATO, whichanchored their membership in the same alliance despite the Gaullist desire to preserve Franceʼs
strategic autonomy. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO on May 6, 1955, one year
after the Paris Agreement, which put an end to the occupation of Germany by the Allied powers.13
It is within this framework, and within that of the European construction, that all the debates on
the rearmament of Germany took place, contrary to the situation that prevails in Asia, where thePeopleʼs Republic of China and Japan are not part of the same bloc, neither during the time of theCold War nor since the fall of the USSR.
At the same time, the process of European construction, inaugurated in 1952 with theCommunauté européenne du charbon et de lʼacier (CECA) that had been proposed by Robert
Schuman to Konrad Adenauer as early as 1950, then followed by the Treaty of Rome (March 25,1957) that created the European Economic Community on January 1, 1958, bringing together
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, also facilitated the processof reconciliation between France and Germany. The objective at the European level was “toestablish a closer union” between the European peoples and to uphold, by the constitution of thisset of resources, the safeguarding of peace and freedom in the context of a world divided into two
blocs.
The Franco-German reconciliation and friendship is therefore taking place within theframework of multilateralism and European construction, which does not exist in Asia, where
the Peopleʼs Republic of China, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear, shares neither the values
nor the strategic objectives of Japan and its allies. On the other hand, despite these irreducible
differences, the choices made by Beijing at the end of the 1970s for economic reform and the
Sino-Soviet conflict were able to mask these fundamental differences and give the illusion of a
possible reconciliation, forgetting that, until the reunification of the two Germanys, East Germany,
which was part of the Warsaw Pact, had never been involved in this process.
On the other hand, the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China (ROC)
signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952, can be compared to the reconciliation process between Franceand West Germany in the 1950s. The text of the treaty indicates “a mutual desire for goodneighborliness given their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity.”14
When Japan decided to recognize the PRC in 1972 and then to sign the Treaty of Peace andFriendship in 1978, Beijing was very much in favor of this rapprochement, again for strategic
reasons, particularly in the face of the Soviet threat perceived as existential in Maoist China, butalso for economic reasons. Japan contributed massively to the economic development of the PRC
12https://www.france-allemagne.fr/Traite-de-l-Elysee-22-janvier-1963.html

13

Reunified Germany joined NATO on October 3, 1990.

14

http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm

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The Franco-German reconciliation model does not correspond to the challenges of the Japan-PRC relationshipby participating in the strategy of opening up launched by Deng Xiaoping. The PRC was thenlittle concerned with the past, officially refusing, as the Republic of China had done, to claim any
reparations.
Unlike the situation between France and Germany, though, any progress can only be regarded
as tactical by the Chinese regime and can be called into question according to Beijingʼs strategic
priorities. As such, any rapprochement can only be temporar y, depending on the priorities
defined by the regime in Beijing and not on a real desire to resolve the tensions inherited from
history as seen in Europe.
In this respect, the Franco-German reconciliation cannot serve as a model for a hypotheticalreconciliation between Japan and the Peopleʼs Republic of China. Japan must also agree to revisit
its histor y, notably by encouraging an education system that is conducive to a more criticalspirit, including on historical issues. It must develop an approach that takes into account allperspectives, as do the history books published in France and Germany, without seeking refuge
in a form of neo-nationalism that is ver y far from the orientation of the great contemporar y
democracies. However, the primary responsibility for the tensions that remain lies with China,
ruled by a regime for which history is not an object of study but an instrument, a weapon at theservice of its strategic interests and its survival.

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