Monika Chansoria

Japan-India at 70:
The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Future
Monika Chansoria*
Abstract
This paper tracks the trajectory of Japanʼs relations with India from the time when the latterremained peripheral as far as Tokyoʼs postwar “Asia vision” was concerned. From being
part of the “other Asia” for Japan, India has come a long way in figuring more prominently
in Japanese foreign policy thinking, formulation, and posture, be it economic, political,
or strategic. This paper chronicles the journey of Indo-Japan ties since their nascent
beginnings in history and outlines the conceptual underpinnings of this equation as politicalrealism which prioritizes national interest and security. Indiaʼs presence in Japanʼs economic
diplomacy and technological aid and assistance schematic capitalizes on strategic necessities
as the sub-continent exhibits its competitive and conflictual sides correspondingly,
especially in terms of the struggle for regional significance and power. In the past 70 years,
Tokyoʼs relationship with New Delhi has traveled a distance whereby it is no longer possible
to separate economics from politics (seikei bunri). Today, Japanʼs comprehensive security(sogo anzen hosho) strategy seeks to revolve more acutely around active politico-diplomatic
involvement, for which its policy interests and approaches, traditionally limited to East
Asia and Southeast Asia prior to the Cold War, have increasingly shifted towards the Indian
Ocean region, of which India remains the nucleus.

T

he year 2022 is momentous for Indo-Japanese relations as the two countries markthe 70th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. Indeed, it has been a sevendecade long journey of significant milestones and shared visions for the future. The
foundation of the contemporary Indo-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership
was laid by Japanese PM Yoshiro Mori when he visited India in 2000 and established the Global
Partnership in the 21st Century with Indian PM Atal Behari Vajpayee. Subsequently, Vajpayeeʼs
successor Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to Japan in 2006, during which the India-Japan
Strategic and Global Partnership was inked. The Indo-Japanese relationship remains firmly rooted
in history with common values being its mainspring for advancing shared strategic objectives andprogress for the benefit of the entire Indo-Pacific region.

The Historical Connect and Context of Japan’s Ties with India
When India declared its independence from British colonial rule and governance in August 1947,
Japan was among the first nations to recognize Indiaʼs sovereignty. India, on its part, declined
attending the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, arguing against the limitations being
placed on Japanʼs sovereignty. New Delhi also pointed out that the United States was failing togive due recognition to the wishes of the Japanese people. Instead, India chose to enter a bilateralpeace treaty with Japan in 1952, as part of which the former waived all reparation claims against*

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo,
and a Senior Contributing Author on Asiaʼs geopolitics for the JAPAN Forward Association, Inc., Tokyo.

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Japan-India at 70: The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Future

Japan. Moreover, India also became among the first Asian nations to establish diplomatic ties with
Tokyo in 1952.
It was in that same decade that Japanese PM Nobusuke Kishi visited India in 1957. Kishi,
who ser ved in office from Januar y 1957 to July 1960, became the first-ever Japanese PM tovisit New Delhi and it was following this visit that he launched Japanʼs first postwar overseas
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India with the grant of international yen loans thatTokyo began providing in 1958. Japan also began providing loans to India in 1958, the firstJapanese yen loan aid extended by the Japanese government. While development assistanceand aid ideally should be separated from foreign policy objectives, the former tends to focus on
the security concerns of developed nations in the politically fragile regions where aid is to be
granted. Specifically, the geostrategic importance and vulnerabilities of South Asia make it almost
impossible for a donor countr y to keep politics out of its development aid agenda to further
the politico-diplomatic goals of the donor, along with ensuring the developmental objectives ofrecipient nations.1
Since then, Japan has gone on to become India ʼ s largest bilateral lender and largest
humanitarian assistance provider, both directly and indirectly, through multilateral agencies. 2
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)̶the primary governmental agency thatcoordinates and delivers the bulk of Japanʼs ODA to developing countries̶views the stability
and development of India and South Asia as critical since it is a strategic region linking ASEAN
with the Middle East and Africa. Developing economic foundations and improving connectivity,
especially in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, in line with relevant intergovernmental jointstatements, JICA is implementing programs and projects that contribute to developing transport
infrastructure (railways, roads, and ports) that are essential elements for sustainable regional
growth.
In a display of decades-old personal ties with India, when Japan ʼs longest-ser ving prime
minister Shinzo Abe visited India in 2017, he recalled his familyʼs links with Indiaʼs first prime
minister Jawaharlal Nehru. “ My grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi, loved India. He wasintroduced personally by Prime Minister Nehru to the Indian people. Like my grandfather, I also
hope to have strong ties with the Indian people.” Abe said while addressing an audience as large
as the one that greeted his grandfather. During Prime Minister Kishiʼs 1957 visit to India, PM
Nehru introduced his guest in a public rally saying, “This is the prime minister of Japan, a country
I hold in greatest esteem.”3 “My grandfather visited India in the 1950s and, as you know, we were[then] still recovering from the defeat in the war,” said Abe, indicating that Nehruʼs gesture hadcreated a personal connect between the two prime ministers of postwar India and Japan. Earlier
as well, Abe recalled during his 2011 visit, “As a young boy seated on his knee, I would hear
grandfather telling me that PM Nehru introduced him to the biggest audience he had ever seen
in his lifetime̶that of a hundred thousand people.”4
The South Asian sub-continent remained peripheral as far as Japanʼs postwar “Asia vision”
1

For details on the subject see, A. Estache, “Emerging Infrastructure Policy Issues in Developing
Countries: A Survey of the Recent Economic Literature,” Background Paper, Meeting of the POVNETInfrastructure Working Group, October 2004; also see, S. Jones, “Contribution of Infrastructure
to Growth and Poverty Reduction in East Asia and the Pacific,” Background Paper, Oxford Policy
Management, October 2004; and see, Stephen Jones, “Infrastructure Challenges in East and SouthAsia,” IDS Bulletin, vol. 37, no. 3, May 2006, Institute of Development Studies, p. 29.

2

Sunil Chacko, “Japanese Investment to India: Possibilities and Constraints,” The Sunday Guardian, May
2, 2020.

3“Shinzo Abe recalls grandfatherʼs ties with Nehru,” The Hindu, September 15, 2017, available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/abe-recalls-grandfathers-ties-with-nehru/article19685815.ece

4

Ibid.

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Monika Chansoria

was concerned, especially in comparison to its far profounder engagement with East Asia andSoutheast Asia. During that period, South Asia professedly was the “other Asia” for Japan. In
Japanʼs foreign policy strategy after World War II, Southeast Asia was considered to include South
Asia. The mid-1960s marked the beginning of an era in which South Asia inclusive of India wasomitted from what Japan considered as Asia.5 Besides, Indiaʼs pursuit of an insular economic
system during that period was much in contrast to Japanʼs open market economy, which stymied
the development of close bilateral economic ties. A systemic dissection of the Asian continent into
its many sub-regions revealed that Japanʼs presence and influence in South Asia, be it economic,
political, or strategic, came nowhere close to the effect it wielded in the other sub-regions
mentioned above. Despite its dense population of 1.97 billion, which constitutes 24.9 percentof the globeʼs humanity, South Asiaʼs widespread poverty, limited industrialization, and inwardlooking economic policies placed limits on Japanʼs economic and diplomatic penetration of theregion.6 Furthermore, Japanʼs limited influence in South Asia was also reflected in the inadequate
coverage given the sub-region in books, special editions of academic journals, and magazines that
dealt with Japanʼs relations within Asia. For instance, a 1996 Far Eastern Economic Review article
on the changing role of Japanese sogo shosha (Japanʼs prominent companies involved in trade andbusiness) in Asia did not even mention South Asia.7
The three areas which remained particularly underdeveloped in Japan-South Asia ties wereaid, trade, and investment-commercial ties. South Asia and the South Pacific constituted two subregions where Japan was not involved in any striking conflicts, so both remained of lesser geoeconomic status. Foreign policymaking in Japan leans principally towards responding to external
developments and gravity. Since the start of the postwar period, Japan and South Asian nations
were best defined as distantly estranged Asian neighbors with a conventional view that Japancame to act under external determinant factors (gaiatsu). It remained the case that gaiatsu did,at times, play a critical role in bringing key Japanese foreign policy initiatives to fruition.8 Tokyoʼspostwar foreign policy between 1952 and 1973 followed a “separation of economics and politics”(seikei bunri) strategy, whereby it avoided involvement in almost all international issues. This
phase abruptly ended in late 1973, however, with the Organization of the Petroleum ExportingCountriesʼ (OPECʼs) quadrupling of oil prices and the oil embargo by the Arab states. It was here
when Japan arrived at comprehending that it was no longer possible to separate economics frompolitics, a consequence of which was its “comprehensive security” (sogo anzen hosho) strategy
entailing active diplomatic involvement.9
Rising from the aftermath of 1945, Tokyo ʼ s exponential growth miracle rendered it an
economic superpower enabling it to master a neo-mercantilist strategy that lasted from 1973 until
1990. The period saw Japanʼs foreign economic presence throughout the Third World (includingSouth Asia) expand rapidly as Tokyo confronted a range of issues in its quest for diversified
5

Hiroshi Sato, “New Relationship between Japan and India in the Postwar Period,” in Toshio Yamazaki
and Mitsuru Takahashi, eds., A History of India-Japan Relations, (Institute of Developing Economies,
1993) p. 165.

6

William R. Nester, Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, (New York: St. Martinʼs Press,
1992) pp. 271–274, as cited in, Monika Chansoria, “Japanʼs Relations with South Asia,” in Šumit Ganguly
and Frank OʼDonnell (eds.) Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia, (London:
Routledge, 2022).

7“Tokyoʼs Deal Makers,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Februar y 1, 1996, cited in Purnendra Jain,“Japanʼs Relations with South Asia,” Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 4, April 1997, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

8

Tanaka Akihiko, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, eds.,
Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), as cited in Chansoria, n.
6.

9Nester, n. 6, p. 15, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

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Japan-India at 70: The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Futuresources of markets, raw materials, cheap labor, and energy.10 The first signs of change in thissituation emerged in the 1980s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had visited Japanearlier in 1969, made another visit in 1982.11 This was followed by Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasoneʼs visit to India in 1984. This was the first visit in 23 years by a Japanese PM since
Hayato Ikeda had traveled to India in 1961. Nakasoneʼs trip was regarded as the starting point
for Japan-India relations and marked the revival of sustained political contacts.12 Japanʼs policy
toward the Third World became a foundational strategy through which Tokyo employed foreign
aid as a diplomatic tool to spread its influence across the Third World, including South Asia.
Interestingly, in February 1989 Thailandʼs Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan commented,
13“The world economic war is over; Japan has won.” That notwithstanding, Japanese investments
in South Asia were minuscule between 1979 and 1986, which could be gauged from the fact thatit constituted less than 0.1 percent of its total foreign investments globally during the period, andless than 0.5 percent of its total investments in Asia.14 Japanʼs interest in South Asia [particularly
India] grew very gradually post-1991 following several high-profile investment missions, including
one by officials from the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and a first-ever visit
from Ministey of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1995.15

Japan-India Relations Post–Cold War
It was the end of the Cold War that provided the real impetus for a further development of JapanIndia relations. Japan-India relations after World War II can be broadly divided chronologicallyinto two phases: the first phase lasting until the end of the 1980s and the second phase beginningin the 1990s.16 The decade of the 1990s saw relations between the global economic power (Japan)
and South Asia (particularly India) improve dramatically.17 The primary factors behind this wereJapanʼs ambition to re-emerge as an international actor with former premier Yasuhiro Nakasoneʼs
repeated call for the “internationalization of Japan.” His successor Noboru Takeshita, too, echoed
the view that Japan needed to revive and widen the ambit of its ties with other nations, and not
singularly deal with the West, which included the US. This approach seemingly stemmed fromthe friction that Japan was experiencing with Washington and Europe over matters pertaining totrade, tariffs, and investments that were seen as a serious challenge to Japanʼs economic growth.
In its search for newer markets and partners, South Asia as a region emerged as a naturalcontender with its enormous size and potential.
A highly symbolic tour of South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) was
undertaken by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in April–May 1990. This visit resulted in India
developing a more positive understanding of Japan. Successive Japanese PMs from Nakasone to
Toshiki Kaifu, who undertook a defining visit to South Asia in April 1990, reinforced the thought
10

Ibid., p. 18.

11

Takenori Horimoto, “Japan-India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues,” cited in Japan’s Diplomacy
Series, Toward the World’s Third Great Power: India’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy, (Iwanami Shoten
Publishers, 2015).

12

Sato, n. 5, p. 176.

13

Bruce Koppel and Michael Plummer, “Japan Ascendancy as a Foreign-Aid Power,” Asian Survey, vol. 29,
no. 11, 1989, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

14

Ibid., pp. 271–274.

15

Jain, n. 7.

16

Horimoto, n. 11

17

Badar Alam Iqbal, “Indo-Japanese Economic Relations in the 1990s,” India Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 1/2(January-June 1996); also see, Rajesh Mehta, “Indo-Japanese Trade: Recent Trends,” RIS Discussion
Papers, no. 12, May 2001, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

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Monika Chansoriathat “ peace and stability in Asia is a matter of great concern to Japan the development of thisregion inhabited by one fifth of all mankind, is in itself one of the major interests of the wholeworld ”18 Kaifu also made a keynote speech at the Indian Parliament covering Japanʼs Asia
policy19 and stressed that Japan would seek to deepen engagement on issues without limitingthese to agenda items on bilateral or Asian issues alone.20 It was for these reasons that, despite
the fact that Japanese premiers had previously visited the region in 1957, 1961, and 1984, thevisit of Prime Minister Kaifu to four South Asian countries in 1990, namely, India, Bangladesh,Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, became a landmark in the history of Japan–South Asia ties. By meansof this visit, Japan sought to convey that, having achieved “Asian economic powerhouse” status,
Tokyoʼs policy interests and approach, traditionally limited to East and Southeast Asia, wereincreasingly making a shift towards South Asia.
Subsequently, in 1991, Japan provided an emergency foreign exchange loan to India, giventhat the Gulf crisis and other factors had caused Indiaʼs foreign exchange reserves to plummet
to US $1.1 billion.21 Of all the countries asked by India for emergency assistance, only Japan
responded. Indian experts in Japan-India economic relations lauded Japanʼs emergency support.22
The emergency assistance was also a manifestation of Japanʼs proactive India policy. The speakerof Japanʼs Lower House, Yoshio Sakurauchi (1990–1993), responded to Ministr y of Foreign
Affairsʼ call for assistance to India with a view of placing greater priority on Asian diplomacy.
Sakurauchi later served as chairman of the Japan-India Association for many years (1997–2002)
and poured considerable effort into improving Japan-India relations based on India ʼs risingstrategic importance. Indiaʼs objective, on the other hand, was to garner more direct investment
from Japan as part of its economic liberalization policy launched in 1991. Alongside this economic
liberalization, India also announced its “Look East” foreign policy initiative in 1993, and had highexpectations from Japan vis-à-vis investment, trade, and technology.
The sub-continent was increasingly assuming greater significance for Japanʼs economic andpolitical interests, which stemmed from the fact that 70 percent of its oil imports from the Middle
East came via sea crossing the Indian Ocean. It was thus in Japanʼs interest that regional security
and stability be maintained by means of providing economic/development assistance. By thistime, Japan had already established its credentials in so far as investment and aid across theThird World was concerned. South Asia, for its part too, was seeking Japanʼs technological andeconomic development assistance as well as its foreign aid, which was the largest in absolute
dollar terms. Being a net creditor nation soon led to Japan becoming the leading single donor
to the development of this region.23 There came about a seeming convergence of Japanʼs overall
regional politico-economic strategies with South Asia per se in that the region (especially andmost notably India) was pursuing an economic liberalization and deregulation agenda.
Further, India in particular (and South Asia as a whole) began deriving benefits from Japanʼseconomic and technological assistance and acknowledged the imperatives of its economic
interdependence with Tokyo in view of the prevailing global economic realities. Economic
18

Speech by PM Toshiki Kaifu, Japan and South Asia: In Pursuit of Dialogue and Cooperation for Peaceand Prosperity (Parliament House, New Delhi) April 30, 1990.

19“Japanʼs Kaifu Starts South Asian Visit,” Los Angeles Times Archives, April 29, 1990, https://www.
latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-04-29-mn-530-story.html

20

Speech by Kaifu, n. 18.

21

Makoto Kojima, “An Analysis of the Indian Economy,” KOMEI, May 1993, pp. 199–200.

22

Srabani Roy Choudhur y, “India-Japan Economic Par tnership: Scope and Prospect,” in Takenori
Horimoto and Lalima Varma, eds., India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, (Manohar Publishers &Distributors, 2013) p. 223.

23

Saburo Okita, “Japanʼs Quiet Strength,” Foreign Policy, no. 75, Summer 1989, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

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Japan-India at 70: The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Futureassistance was an area where responsibility was24 and continues to be shared widely by various
ministries in Japan. The formation of the basic policy of ODA is made by the coordinated effortsof Japanʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI) and Economic Planning Agency (EPA). The influence of METI remains
the most pronounced among these in terms of yen loans, with MOFA playing a decisive role indetermining grant aid. MOFA divided Japanʼs aid policy regime into four25 different stages: firstly,a system development period (1954–76); secondly, a system expansion period (1977–91); thirdly,
a policy and philosophy enhancement period (1992–2002); and finally, a period for meeting thechallenges of a new era (2003 onward). Notably, the ODA Charter of 1992 stipulates few principles
for such political use.26 In the case of South Asia, official aid has been a more dominating featureof relations with Japan, given that the latter remains a top aid donor to most of the sub-continentʼsnations.
Despite the gradually ascending and reassuring graph of regional ties illustrated above, theend of the decade of the 1990s witnessed a steep decline and acrimony in Japanʼs ties with India
and Pakistan in particular following the nuclear tests conducted by both nations in May 1998 that
led to the nuclearization of the sub-continent. Given Japanʼs commitment to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, its censure came in the form of an immediate freeze on all grant aid andsubsequently on new yen loans.27 In addition, Japan became the first Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nation to impose a range of economic sanctions on both
India and Pakistan.28
Subsequently, the period 2000–2010 began witnessing a gradual thawing of ties between
Japan and India, with the two having traveled a long distance together since the mid-1960s whenSouth Asia (including India) was omitted from what Japan considered “Asia.” This embraceseemingly mirrors the regional and global geopolitics and geostrategies at play that had been
impacted by the strategic shifts in policy thinking and approaches occurring within Asia. Japanand India by now shared similar perceptions of the evolving environment in the region and theworld at large; recognized their common commitment to democracy, human rights, and the ruleof law for promoting stability and development in Asia and beyond; acknowledged their common
interest in the safety of sea lines of communications; committed to jointly fight against terrorism
and recognized each otherʼs counter-terrorism efforts; and sought to establish a “Strategic andGlobal Partnership” driven by converging long-term political, economic and strategic interests,
aspirations and concerns.29

Theoretical and Conceptual Basis of Indo-Japanese Dynamics

Indiaʼs evolution as a playing field in the Asian geostrategic landscape has transited multiple
phases. Beginning essentially as a reluctant player who achieved independence from many
decades of British colonial rule following the end of World War II, it emerged as a nation right inthe middle of the Indian Ocean̶a lifeline water body connecting the Far East with the Atlantic.
24

Purnendra Jain, “Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation,” in Inoguchi Takashi
et al., n. 8, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

25

Japan Ministr y of Foreign Af fairs on ODA, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/
cooperation/anniv50/pamphlet/index.html

26

Tanaka Akihiko, n. 8, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

27“Nuclear Anxiety: The Allies; Japan Freezes Some Grants; Other Nations Seem Doubtful,” The New YorkTimes, May 14, 1998.

28

Tanaka Akihiko, n. 8, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

29“Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan,” Ministry of External Affairs,India, October 22, 2008.

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This added to New Delhiʼs significance in a remodeled multipolar regional architecture with ablend of foreign policy approaches and strategies cited in the context of historical and current
influences and motivations. The conceptual underpinnings of this finds roots in realism (politicalrealism to be more precise) that prioritizes national interest and security. The notion is often
tantamount with power politics to a large extent, including extended variables such as the drivefor regional status, ambitions, and applied strategies including economic statecraft. 30 In therealist paradigm, security is primarily based on the principle of balance of power, as state-centric
approaches are placed in the traditional realist framework of security that essentially centeraround the concept of power. Indiaʼs, and for that matter South Asiaʼs, political realism exhibits
its competitive and conflictual sides equally, especially in terms of the struggle for regionalsignificance and power.31
While great powers often produce theories of international relations (IR), in the case of Japanand from a Japanese perspective, being embedded in a global governance system governed by the
US has inhibited theoretical advancement.32 This, combined with the relatively strong tradition ofdescriptive work, has tended to discourage the development of a Japanese IR theory.33 For Japan,
its style and form of integration holds three distinctive features that have developed step by stepon a domestic, regional, and global scale. Japanʼs approach to IR theories, among other planes,
needs to be identified and understood through the prism of identity as a key concept.
Nishida Kitaro has attempted to address the issue of Japanese identity in IR as Japan juggles
to fit in a space that lies somewhere between the East and the West. Nishida as an innate
constructivist makes identity the thrust of his philosophy.34 The constructivist analysis of IR
states that the notion of identity is ideational, shaped by complex factors such as history, wayof life, values, and interests. This seems to be particularly useful for analysis in East Asia as it
affects policy decisions, particularly in the case study of Japan. The latter seeks to approachregional politics and statecraft through regional economic integration. When combined withsustainable development, this places regional integration theories higher than state sovereignty
as economist Hirano Yoshitaro has argued.35 There are two competing ideological factors atwork in Japanʼs approach to the regional economic integration theory. The first is the desire forhistorical rapprochement with Japanʼs neighbors in Asia based on the postwar Franco-German
model. The other factor is a new nationalism in Japan, designated as the desire for greater“assertiveness” in foreign (especially Asian) affairs. This includes the desire for a stronger Asianrole in world affairs (if not Japanese dominance of that role). In the short term, Asian economic
30

Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism in International Theor y, (Victoria: Cambridge University
Press,1996); for related reading on the subject see, R. Harrison Wagner, War and the State: The Theoryof International Politics, (The University of Michigan Press, 2007), (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)31

The theoretical roots of South Asia as a sub-region in terms of its strategic thinking and orientation
can be traced back in history to the end of fourth century BCE, when the Indian treatise Arthashastra(meaning the “Science of Material Gain” or the “Science of Polity”)̶a voluminous seminal masterpiece
written in Sanskrit, delineating theories of statecraft, diplomacy, strategy, and prerequisites of politics
and power̶was penned by Kautilya. Arthashastra became a trailblazing document that contains arealist vision of politics. It is considered unique and defining in Indian literature (and erstwhile unitedSouth Asia) owing to the forthright advocacy of its cardinal virtue, realpolitik.

32

Inoguchi Takashi, “Why are there no non-Western theories of international relations? The caseof Japan,” in Barr y Buzan and Amitav Achar ya, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory:
Perspectives on and beyond Asia, (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

33

Ibid.

34

Kitaro Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness: Three Philosophical Essays, (International
Philosophical Research Association of Japan, and East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1958).

35

Inoguchi Takashi, n. 32.

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integration appears to have served both ideologies.36 It required Asian neighbors to put their past
relationships with Japan behind them in significant ways, it reoriented Japanese policy initiatives
towards Asia (away from the United States), and finally it placed Japan in the position of being avital player in the region.37
The classical theories on regionalism have focused on regional integration processes
explained via geostrategic rationality, realism, and economic interdependence, and throughtraditional material factors such as security, economic flows, and geostrategic choices. 38
Substantively, Japanʼs international relations have evolved to a stage of developing its own
Japan-centric world order, where Japan was envisaged as part of Asia but somewhat separate
from Asia.39 Based on these concepts and theories, wherein identity, norms, and interaction of
personalities remain vital components, the evolving equation and geostrategic dynamics between
Japan and India were evaluated, amidst contesting systemic conditions and statesʼ priorities, toshape a future geopolitical and economic order of Asia that could well be a new prospective dawnof an alternative regional Asian dynamic.

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Framework:
Influence of the 1655 Text “Majma-ul-Bahrain” (Confluence of the Two Seas)
Originally a geographic concept comprising the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean that shaped
linkages between the United States and East Asia, a free and open Indo-Pacific maritime zone
has evolved into a geostrategic concept and strategy. When stretched beyond the Indian Ocean,it paved the way for what more commonly came to be known by the new framework of the“Indo-Pacific”. At its heart, a strategic system can be understood as a set of geopolitical power
relationships among nations where major changes in one part of the system affect what happensin the other parts.40
The US policy pronouncements of “ pivot ” and later “ rebalance ” in Asia were almost
concurrently followed by PM Shinzo Abeʼs proposed Indo-Pacific concept and strategic framework
in 2012. When Abe penned his book Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country) in 2006,
he publicly advocated the concept of a “broader Asia” consisting of nations in the Pacific andIndian Oceans. Abe appeared to have anticipated Asiaʼs geostrategic future exclusively throughthe prism of political realism, and rightly so.41 The concept of a “broader Asia” appears to havetranscended geographical boundaries, with the Pacific and Indian Oceansʼ mergence becoming
far more pronounced and evident than ever. To catch up with the reality of broader Asia, the Abeadministration rehabilitated its focus on South Asia in general, and India in particular, within theambit of Japanʼs Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy launched and pushed during the second
tenure of the Abe administration in December 2012. Abeʼs bid to forge this vision, in fact, began
during his first term as Japanʼs PM, when he addressed the Indian Parliament in August 2007.
36

Adam S. Posen, “Japanʼs Distraction by Regional Economic Integration,” State Depar tment INR
Roundtable on Northeast Asian Regional Economic Integration, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, June 2002.

37

Ibid.

38

Sergio Caballero Santos, “Regional Integration Theories: The Suitability of a Constructivist Approach,”
Paper 383, Session on Globalization and Governance, IPSA-Chile, July 2009.

39

Inoguchi Takashi in Buzan, et al., n. 32, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

40

Rory Medcalf, “The Evolving Security Order in the Indo-Pacific,” in David Brewster, ed., Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, (National Security College, Crawford School of Public
Policy, Australian National University, July 2016); also see, Rory Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: Whatʼs in a
Name?” The American Interest, vol. 9, no. 2, Nov/Dec 2013, pp. 58–66.

41

Monika Chansoria, “Modi-Abe Personality Impacts Foreign Policy,” The Sunday Guardian, September
20, 2014.

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During this visit, he famously cited and quoted Majma-ul-Bahrain (Confluence of the Two Seas
published in 1655), a work authored by Mughal prince Dara Shikoh. This book is said to havebeen the inspiration, foundation, and title of Abeʼs vision to nurture an open and transparent IndoPacific maritime zone as part of a broader Asia.42
Analyzing these past decades of Asian politics and policies brings to the fore cer tain
momentous developments that have redefined Asian geopolitics, expectedly impacting South
Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). By 2030, Asia will contribute most of the global
growth,43 thus underscoring its importance and that of the Indo-Pacific. These security realities
have driven Japanʼs policies and approaches on operating in the IOR as they underwent a majortransformation. The first signal of this was the lifting of the ban on overseas deployments toenable its Self-Defense Forces to dispatch armed troops to Iraq in 1992.44 From that period, thetransition and evolution has reached a point when today, notably, nearly 40 percent of all Japanʼs
Self-Defense Forcesʼ missions have occurred in the IOR, and nearly half of Japanese ODA goes to
IOR countries.45

Conclusion

Japanʼs engagement with India symbolizes acknowledgment of the economic and strategic
dependence of developments across a much wider maritime region, at the heart of which lies
the Indian Ocean. The Indo-Pacific concept has been embraced, with many nations enunciating
their strategies and outlook for the region, as witnessed by the creation of partnerships andmechanisms as the opportunities, concerns, and stakes of these nations intersect with those ofsouthern Asia.46
Since the time India along with other sub-regions came up on Japanʼs foreign policy radar,it started becoming increasingly clear that Tokyoʼs “Third World policy” would serve as a vital
component of its overall comprehensive security thinking and approach.47 Despite the significanceof Japanese aid to India and South Asia, the rationales and results of development cooperation
activities that Japan has executed in the region remain underexplored. 48 It would further bereasonable to argue that, in formulating its foreign policy for India, Japan will likely position itself
in favor of closely engaging with India to achieve strategic deliverables. There is a concurrenceof thought in Tokyo that, in a world where it is no longer possible to separate economics frompolitics (seikei bunri), Japanʼs new comprehensive security (sogo anzen hosho) strategy should
revolve more acutely around active politico-diplomatic involvement. Tokyoʼs policy interests
and approach, traditionally limited to East Asia and Southeast Asia prior to the Cold War, haveincreasingly shifted towards the Indian Ocean region, with India still at its nucleus. Completing
70 years of bilateral relations, the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership remains
42

Ibid.

43

Praneeth Yendamuri and Zara Ingilizian, “In 2020 Asia Will Have the Worldʼs Largest GDP. Hereʼs What
That Means,” World Economic Forum, December 20, 2019, available at https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2019/12/asia-economic-growth/

44

John Hartle, “The Normalization of Japanese Policy in the Indian Ocean Region,” Policy Report, Analysis
and Policy Observatory, Australiaʼs Global Interests, June 21, 2018, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)45Peter Wyckoff, “Making Waves: Japan and the Indian Ocean Region,” Commentary, The Stimson Center,May 1, 2017.

46

For further reference and reading on this view, see remarks by V. Muraleedharan, Minister of State forExternal Affairs, International Workshop on “Quad in the Indo-Pacific,” MEA, New Delhi, April 29, 2021.

47

Nester, n. 6, p. 279, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

48

Sojin Shin, “Japanʼs Foreign Aid to South Asia: Addressing a Strategic Need,” NUS-ISAS Working Paper,
no. 318, March 8, 2019, (as cited in Chansoria, n. 6.)

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Japan-India at 70: The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Futurefirmly rooted in history with common values being the mainspring for advancing shared strategic
objectives and progress for the benefit of the entire Indo-Pacific region.

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Japan Review Vol.5 2022