Monika Chansoria

Japan’s Confluence of the Two Seas Conception:
The Influence of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s 1655 Text
“Majma’-ul-Bahrain” [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]
Monika Chansoria*
Abstract
In his March 2023 visit to India, Japanʼs Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida could not help
but feel a sense of destiny when he put forth his vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific(FOIP) in New Delhi. PM Kishida reminded the Indian audience that FOIP, as a concept,
was proposed by his esteemed friend and former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. It
was in India that former PM Abe delivered a speech in 2007 in which he linked the Pacificand the Indian Oceans for the first time. This research paper chronicles the conceptual
journey of Japanʼs FOIP strategy and of Indiaʼs centrality to it. In his historic 2007 speech
titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” Abe famously cited the title of the seminal 1655 book –Majmaʼ-ul-Bahrain [The Mingling of the Two Oceans] authored by the Mughal Prince, Dara
Shikoh, and said, “We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming
into being.” This 17th century book is said to have been the inspiration, foundation, and titleof Abeʼs vision to nurture an open and transparent Indo-Pacific maritime zone as part of a
“broader Asia.”In his March 2023 visit to India, Japanʼs Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could not help but
feel a sense of destiny when he put forth his vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific in New
Delhi. Kishida reminded the Indian audience that the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)
concept was proposed by his esteemed friend former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and stated:
Here in this country, former Prime Minister Abe delivered a speech that linked the Pacificand the Indian Oceans for the first time. India is the place where FOIP came into being.
I also traveled here in 2015 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and spoke at an event… about
how Japan and India should jointly lead the region and the world in the “Era of the IndoPacific.”1

Declaration of the “Confluence of the Two Seas” Notion [New Delhi, 2007]
Prime Minister Kishida highlighted the necessity of developing FOIP, arguing that theinternational community is at a historical turning point. The balance of power is shifting
dramatically, and the remarkable rise of India is one such example. With the “Global South”
rising and the world becoming more diverse, a good understanding of historical and cultural
backgrounds needs to be developed, which implies sharing responsibility for global governance.2*

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo,
and a Senior Contributing Author on Asiaʼs geopolitics for the JAPAN Forward Association, Inc., Tokyo.

1“The Future of the Indo-Pacific – Japanʼs New Plan for a ʻFree and Open Indo-Pacificʼ – Together with
India, as an Indispensable Partner,” Policy Speech by Japanʼs Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the IndianCouncil of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi, March 20, 2023. Text released by the Prime Ministerʼs
Office of Japan, available at https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202303/_00013.html

2

Ibid.

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Japan’s Confluence of the Two Seas Conception:
The Influence of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s 1655 Text “Majma’-ul-Bahrain” [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]

Kishida pointed towards the changing paradigm in international relations, and termed FOIP avision that is gaining rapid relevance. In this sense, FOIP (based on the Confluence of the Two
Seas notion) was a visionary concept. In his description of Japanʼs plan to develop and achievea Free and Open Indo-Pacific, PM Kishida unequivocally identified India as an “indispensable
partner” when he stated:
I believe that Japan and India are in an extremely unique position in the current
international relations and, furthermore, in the history of the world. India is the largest
democracy in the world. I have always viewed with great respect at the way such a hugeand diverse country as India has developed democracy. Japan, for its part, was the first
countr y in Asia to achieve modernization and embrace democracy…[B]oth Japan andIndia have unique historical backgrounds. The people of the two countries humbly
acknowledge that there are diverse values, cultures, and histories on this planet, and thatfully understanding them is not an easy task. We are the kind of people who understandintuitively that the best way forward is to respect the other party and cooperate throughdialogue.3
The ambit of Japanʼs Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy launched and pushed during thesecond tenure of the Abe administration in December 2012 was initially conceived and formulated
during his first term as prime minister, when he addressed the Indian Parliament in August
2007. During that visit, an interesting historical connect was established in reference to the
Indo-Pacific by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He stood in the Central Hall of the highest chamberof Indian democracy, to speak directly to the one billion-plus Indian population via its peopleʼs
representatives. Speaking at the Parliament of India in August 2007, Abe considered it his “greathonor of addressing the highest organ of state power in the largest democracy in the world.”4 Abe
presented himself on “behalf of the citizens of another democracy that is equally representing
Asia” and put forth his views on the future of Japan and India. While discussing Indo-Japan
relations, Abe said, “It gives me tremendous pleasure to be able to begin my address todaywith the words of Swami Vivekananda, the great spiritual leader that India gave the world – thedifferent streams, having their sources in different places, all mingle their water in the sea.”5
It was in this historic speech that Abe questioned and identified where Japan and India standhistorically and geographically. He answered this by borrowing a term from, and famously
citing the title of, a seminal 1655 book – Majma’-ul-Bahrain [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]
authored by the Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh6 and said, “We are now at a point at which the
Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being.” The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are bringing
about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity. This 17th century book is said tohave been the inspiration, foundation, and title of Abeʼs vision to nurture an open and transparent
Indo-Pacific maritime zone as part of a “broader Asia.”7 It needs to be recalled that, following his
3

Ibid.

4

Confluence of the Two Seas – Speech delivered by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliamentof the Republic of India, August 22, 2007, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
pmv0708/speech-2.html

5

Ibid.

6

Prince Muhammad Dara Shikoh, Majma’-ul-Bahrain: The Mingling of the Two Oceans, [Persian toEnglish Translation] ed., M. Mahfuz-Ul-Haq, (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal Publications, 1929).

7

For further reading and details on the subject see, Monika Chansoria, “Japanʼs Relations with SouthAsia,” in Šumit Ganguly and Frank OʼDonnell, eds., Routledge Handbook of the International Relations ofSouth Asia, (London: Routledge, 2022).

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2007 Confluence of the Two Seas speech delivered at the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Abe
declared his vision the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Suggesting that a “broader Asia” breaking away from geographical boundaries had begun
taking on a distinct form, Abe further stated that Japan and India have the ability and the
responsibility to ensure that they further broaden, nurture, and enrich these seas to make themseas of the clearest transparence.8 Stressing the importance of Japan-India strategic cooperationin carrying out the pursuit of freedom and prosperity in broader Asia, Abe averred:
By Japan and India coming together in this way, this “broader Asia” will evolve into
an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the US
and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, andknowledge to flow freely.9
Originally a geographic concept comprising the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean thatshaped linkages between the United States and East Asia, a free and open Indo-Pacific maritimezone has evolved into a geostrategic concept and strategy. When stretched beyond the Indian
Ocean, it paved the way for what more commonly came to be known by the new frameworkof the “Indo-Pacific.” At its heart, a strategic system can be understood as a set of geopoliticalpower relationships among nations where major changes in one part of the system affect what
happens in the other parts.10 The US policy pronouncements of “pivot” and later “rebalance” inAsia were almost concurrently followed by PM Shinzo Abeʼs proposed Indo-Pacific concept andstrategic framework in 2012. When Abe penned his book Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a Beautiful
Country) in 2006, he publicly advocated the concept of a “broader Asia” consisting of nationsin the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Abe appeared to have anticipated Asiaʼs geostrategic future
exclusively through the prism of political realism, and rightly so.11 The concept of a “broader
Asia” appears to have transcended geographical boundaries, with the Pacific and Indian Oceansʼmergence becoming far more pronounced and evident than ever. To catch up with the reality ofbroader Asia, the Abe administration rehabilitated its focus on South Asia in general, and India inparticular, within the ambit of Japanʼs Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Framework:
The Influence of the 1655 Text “Majma’-ul-Bahrain”[The Mingling of the Two Oceans]
The Majma’-ul-Bahrain (hereafter Majma) – a prose work written by Dara Shikoh in 1655 – dealt
with the cross-cultural doctrine, and remains of considerable importance to this day owing to its
deep-rooted historical connect.12 In the long history of cross-cultural exchange and discourse
between Islam and Hinduism, the comparative treatise Majma began to be regarded as a8

Confluence of the Two Seas Speech by Shinzo Abe, n. 4.

9

Ibid.

10

Rory Medcalf, “The Evolving Security Order in the Indo-Pacific,” in David Brewster, ed., Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, (National Security College, Crawford School of Public
Policy, Australian National University, July 2016); also see, Rory Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: Whatʼs in a
Name?” The American Interest, vol. 9, no. 2, Nov/Dec 2013, pp. 58–66.

11

As cited in, Monika Chansoria, “Modi-Abe Personality Impacts Foreign Policy,” The Sunday Guardian,
September 20, 2014.

12

R.P. Dewhurst, “Review: Majmaʼ-ul-Bahrain: or The Mingling of the Two Oceans,” The Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 2, (Cambridge University Press, April 1931), p. 460.

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Japan’s Confluence of the Two Seas Conception:
The Influence of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s 1655 Text “Majma’-ul-Bahrain” [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]significant dialogue contributing to the Indic traditionʼs rich pluralism.13 Majma, a comparative
hermeneutical attempt, illustrated how translations and interpretations can be textually rooted
and how they profoundly impact cross-religious conceptual expansions across traditions as aresult of translations.14
Muhammad Dara Shikoh (‫( )دارا ِشکوہ‬1615–1659), also known as Dārā Shikoh [and not Shikūh,which represents only the modern Persian pronunciation of the word], was the eldest son andheir-apparent of the fifth Mughal Emperor, Shah Jahan. Dara was never able to become king as hewas barbarically executed by his younger brother Aurangzeb. Born in 1615 in Ajmer, Rajasthan(north-western India), Dara Shikoh was widely renowned for being an enlightened paragon of
the harmonious coexistence of the heterodox cultural traditions and interactions of the Indian
subcontinent. Known to be a patron of fine arts and music, he also indulged in art in the formof paintings and as a calligrapher of scripts and, given his avid interest in comparative religion
and philosophies. Dara was identified as among the great synthesizers symbolizing the larger
encounter between the Islamic and Hindu worlds.15
Dara Shikoh was a scholar in his own right, having been recognized in histor y for histranslations of dozens of Sanskrit texts into Persian. He studied Sufi and Vedic philosophies
extensively. His name has been inscribed in Mughal history more so for his scholarly works
than for his understanding of the art of statecraft. He was devoted to finding a common mysticallanguage between Islam and Hinduism. Towards this goal, he completed the translation of many
Upanishads from the original Sanskrit into Persian by 1657.
However, perhaps his most celebrated and famous work to this day remains the 1655 treatise
in Persian, Majma’-ul-Bahrain [The Mingling of the Two Oceans], devoted to the mystical andpluralistic affinities between Sufism and Vedāntic speculations. The works of the young prince
became a major milestone of one of the greatest and longest movements of translations in humanhistory (from Sanskrit and Hindi to Persian and Arabic).16
For that matter, the Majma and translation of the Upanishads became the culminating projectsof his literary journey.17 The Majma includes 22 chapters/discourses in which Dara asserts that
religions and languages share important features as they both are “semiotic systems” with theability to “capture, preserve, and reify basic cultural values, to structure experience according
to shared conceptual elements.”18 The initial lines of Majma’s text spelt out Daraʼs emphasis on
describing ultimate reality through opposites.19 Dara Shikoh pointed out in his composition:… having collected the views of the two parties and having brought together their points –a knowledge of which is essential and useful for the seekers of Truth – he (i.e., the author)
has compiled a tract and entitled it Majma’-ul-Bah.rain, or The Mingling of the Two Oceans,
13

Doha Tazi Hemida, A Hindu-Islamic Translation: Retrieving Dārā Shikūh’s Confluence of the Two Oceans,(Columbia University, 2005), p. 38.

14

Ibid.

15

For further details see, Munis D. Faruqui, “Dara Shukoh, Vedanta, and Imperial Succession,” inVasudha Dalmia and Munis D. Faruqui, eds., Religious Interactions in Mughal India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2014), p. 32.

16

Carl W. Ernst, “Muslim Studies of Hinduism? A Reconsideration of Arabic and Persian Translations
from Indian Languages,” Iranian Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 2003, p. 173, cited in Hemida, n. 13.

17

Faruqui, n. 15, p. 40, cited in Hemida, n. 13.

18

Tony K. Stewart, “In Search of Equivalence: Conceiving Muslim-Hindu Encounter through Translation
Theory,” History of Religions, vol. 40, no. 3, 2001, p. 268, as cited in Hemida, n. 13.

19

Ibid. p. 42.

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20
as it is a collection of the truth and wisdom of two truth-knowing (H. ak. Shinās) groups.

Considered a strong threshold towards that search, Majma significantly talks about
expansion and of the two worlds overlapping. The book cites by example what water is to thewaves, and how existence or consciousness is the water while the supreme self is the totality ofwaves.21 The book has been identified as one of the most prominent and significant paradigmsof transcultural literature of early modern Indian histor y. The manuscript offers a discourse
having a distinct philosophical/metaphysical approach with the aim to establish commonalities
through observations of Hindu Vedānta philosophy and Sufism. In the framework of transculturalliterature, the text was considered an accomplishment since it managed to transcend different
boundaries, and eventually became identified as Majma’-ul-Bah.rain.22
The term “ transculture ” grossly encompasses a par ticular kind of paraphernalia that
expands beyond the boundaries. While discussing transcultural literature, the most significant
question that determines the transcultural character is what kind of boundar y/ies it crosses– topographical, social, religious, or linguistic.23 In the framework of transcultural literature,
Majmaʼs significance as a single text, and its voyage as well as purpose of transcending barriers
becomes far more pronounced in a contemporar y context when “The Mingling of the Two
Oceans” is interpreted and refurbished by Japan as the Confluence of the Two Seas.
The thrust of Majma indicates the path, which can broadly be divided into two categories:
the world around and the world beyond. Majma surpassed boundaries and became a pioneering
example of transcultural literature in the early modern age.24 It reflected the inner ethos of Indianspirituality with a distinct identity of divine harmony. Dara Shikoh acknowledged divine unity as
a boundless ocean, where the Truth is one for everybody. In fact, the title Majma’-ul-Bah.rain isperhaps a symbolical representation of this boundlessness, which transcends the limitations ofinstitutional religion, scriptural rules, lingual individuality, and doctrinal differences.25

The World and Politics Around, and the World and Politics Beyond:Contextualizing “Majma” in Contemporar y Asia

Majma was Dara Shikohʼs attempt to manifest the spiritual affinity between two distinct religious
traditions and cultures. The “Mingling of the Two Oceans” refers to the Hindu and Islamic
traditions, each of which was regarded by Dara as a repository of knowledge and wisdom. At a
maximalist level, Dara tried to create a syncretic Hindu and Islamic culture to promote greater
unity between the two. At a minimalist level, he brought home the point that Hindus and Muslims
have grossly misunderstood each otherʼs religion as well as their own.26
Following Shinzo Abeʼs 2007 reference to this seminal text, the current vice-president ofIndia, Jagdeep Dhankhar, unveiled an Arabic translation of the Majma’-ul-Bahrain in New Delhi
20

Haq, ed., n. 6, Majma’-ul-Bahrain: The Mingling of the Two Oceans, p. 38.

21

Dārā Shikūh and Asghar Ali Engineer, Majma’-ul-Bahrain, [Comingling of Two Oceans] Majma’-ulBahrain: A Discourse on Interreligious Understanding, (Gurgaon: Hope India Publications, 2006), p. 78;
also see, Daryush Shayegan, Les Relations de l’Hindouisme et du Soufisme d’après le Majma’ al-Bahrayn
de Dārā Shokūh (Paris: Editions de la Différence, 1979), p. 33, cited in Hemida, n. 13.

22

Gargi Bhattacharya, “Majma’-ul-Bah.rain: Transcending Cultural Boundaries in the Quest for ʻTruth of
Truths,ʼ” postScriptum: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Literary Studies [Special Issue on Transnational
and Transcultural Spaces] vol. 4, no. 2, July 2019, pp. 248–258.

23

Ibid., p. 249.

24

Ibid., p. 255.

25

Ibid., p. 257.

26

Haq, ed., n. 6, Majma’-ul-Bahrain: The Mingling of the Two Oceans.

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Japan’s Confluence of the Two Seas Conception:
The Influence of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s 1655 Text “Majma’-ul-Bahrain” [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]in September 2022. Speaking on the occasion, Vice-President Dhankhar defined Dara Shikoh asa genius, a skilled poet, and a scholar of Sanskrit. The vice president suggested that Dara wasa torchbearer of social harmony and religious unity. In the book Majma, all the commonalities
between Hinduism (Vedānta) and Islam (Sufism) pointed to the conclusion that the difference
between Islam and Hinduism is only verbal. Mentioning that Dara Shikoh strove for improving
dialogue between different religions, the vice-president called for the revival of Daraʼs legacy andthe application of his spiritual thought to strengthen contemporary social cohesion, stating that
the Majma threw invaluable light on the similarities between religions. Dhankhar recalled thatIndia has a glorious heritage not only of “tolerance” for othersʼ views but also a unique cultureof “engagement” with all views – a culture of pluralism and syncretism. He further said that thisspirit of mutual respect was exemplified by many Indian kings – ranging from King Ashoka morethan two millennia ago to Prince Dara Shikoh a few hundred years ago.27
For a long time, the geopolitical paradigm most widely used to denote the massive expanse
stretching from Northeast Asia to South Asia and vast oceans and seas – namely, the Pacific
Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean―was termed the “Asia-Pacific.” Subsequently,
the idea of the “Indo-Pacific” evolved over time, recognizing the seemingly blurring lines between
geoeconomics and geopolitics. It also demonstrates a gradual convergence of opportunities
and challenges in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Sustained economic growth, relative
political stability, and social cohesion have enabled major powers in Asia to exert expanding
influence in shaping agendas and global rule-making.28 Asia has ascended as a pivot amid thesechanging global economic and strategic realities. The resurgence of the Indo-Pacific, describedas the “maritime underbelly of Asia,” has become the locus of maritime activity in Asia. A gradualevolution of the Indo-Pacific concept has resulted in varied ideas and perspectives.29
While in 1941 Japan did not see, or at least hesitated to consider, India as par t of its
imagination of Asia, by the first decade of the next centur y Tokyo was seen attempting tointegrate India into its strategic landscape by introducing the concept of an Indo-Pacific region
due to the rise of China and its potential challenges to Japanʼs strategic interests. The idea ofconnecting the two oceans as a single geopolitical sphere continued to be at the center of Japanʼscontemporary foreign policy thinking. To promote this idea, Tokyo introduced various initiatives,
such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2007 (Australia, India, Japan, and theUnited States), the Democratic Security Diamond, and, most significantly, the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific framework and strategy.30
One of the most widely popular notions in geopolitical thinking is the postulate that geography
is destiny, leaving leaders with limited choices because of the landscape of their nations.31
However, even if the notion that geography is destiny is accepted, it is important to be aware that27

Indian Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankharʼs speech at the unveiling of the Arabic translation of the
Majma’-ul-Bahrain at the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, press release by Vice
Presidentʼs Secretariat, September 9, 2022, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi.

28

Rajeev Ranjan Chatur vedy and Ankush Ajay Wagle, “ASEAN, India, and the Indo-Pacific: Evolving
Regional Maritime Environment,” in Ceren Ergenç, ed., ASEAN as a Method: Re-centering Processes
and Institutions in Contemporary Southeast Asian Regionalism, (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 74; alsosee, Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “Indo-Pacific: One Region, Many Visions?” RSIS Commentary, no. 23,
February 2019.

29

Ibid., pp. 73–74.

30

Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad, “The confluence of the two seas: The rise of the Indo-Pacific region and
ASEAN Centrality,” in Ceren Ergenç, n. 28, p. 52.

31

For further reading and details on the subject see, Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That
Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics, (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2015), pp.
1–2, cited in Choiruzzad, n. 30.

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regions are not. Regions are constructed socially and politically by various actors for numerous
purposes, including governments, the epistemic community, and the private sector. 32 In thiscontext, “East Asia” is not always “East Asia.” Even the word Asia itself was, in the beginning, anancient Greek conception, referring exclusively to a region known today as the Near or Middle
East.33 It was only with the arrival of European colonialism that “Asia” became the term that
includes the large area from Japan to the Middle East because the colonial powers juxtaposed thesecolonized areas with Europeʼs own identity.34 Later, this Asian identity started to be embraced by“Asians” themselves, creating a shared identity to fight against European colonialism. A sense ofsolidarity against Western colonial rule gave birth to the strong connection between nationalism
and Pan-Asianism. For an instance, the Japanese victory against the Russians in the Battle of
Tsushima in 1905 was understood by many Asian nationalist leaders not only as Japanʼs victory
but also as their own.35
It was in this context that the concept of “East Asia” as a regional identity was introduced.
Despite the internal debate within Japan on whether the modernizing country should consider
itself as part of Asia for its cultural affinity, or, should it consider itself as “escaping Asia”
because it had been successfully modernizing itself,36 Tokyo campaigned for the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The promise of common prosperity and the support for nationalist
independence movements convinced many nationalist leaders of Asia to ally themselves with
Imperial Japan. However, “East Asia” faded away from the imagination of the newly independent
Asian countries post-WWII.37

Confluence of the Two Seas and ASEAN Centrality
The emergence of competing strategic visions related to areas surrounding the Pacific and Indian
Oceans has been one of the primary challenges to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Centrality. Both China and India see the Indian Ocean and East Asia as an integrated
stage for their strategic play. While China is not likely to concede to Indiaʼs primacy in South Asiaand the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the latter too, would not be willing to accept Southeast andEast Asia as Chinaʼs exclusive spheres of influence. If Chinaʼs navy is going south to the Indian
Ocean, the Indian navy is going east towards the Pacific Ocean.38
Contextualizing in the above reference, Japanʼs Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy matches
up with Indiaʼs Act East policy. Further, the strategic ties between Japan and India are pushingfor an Indo-Pacific vision that is “balanced, open, inclusive, stable, transparent, and rules-based
economic, political, and security driven.”39 In this joint strategic vision, Tokyo and New Delhi finda “confluence of the two seas.” Though ASEAN generally welcomes the initiatives of major powers
32

Choiruzzad, n. 30, p. 54.

33

David Camroux, “ʻAsia, Whose Asia?ʼ Evolving Conceptions of an Asian Community from the 1920s Till
Today,” in Heribert Dieter (ed.), The Evolution of Regionalism in Asia: Economic and Security Issues, (NewYork: Routledge, 2007), p. 12, cited in Choiruzzad, n. 30.

34

Camroux, ibid., pp. 12–13.

35

For further reading and details on the subject see, Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt
Against the West and the Remaking of Asia, (New York: Allen Lane, 2012).

36

As cited in, Kazuo Ogura, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy: A Legacy of Two Millennia, translated by David
Noble, (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2015), pp. 41–44.

37

Choiruzzad, n. 30, p. 54.

38

For further reading and details on the subject see, Mohan Malik, “China and India Today: Diplomats
Jostle, Militaries Prepare,” World Affairs, vol. 175, no. 2, 2012, pp. 76–78.

39

For further reading and details on the subject see, Vinay Kaura, “India-Japan Relations and AsiaʼsEmerging Geopolitics,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1/2, 2016, pp. 17–18.

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Japan’s Confluence of the Two Seas Conception:
The Influence of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s 1655 Text “Majma’-ul-Bahrain” [The Mingling of the Two Oceans]in the economic sense, ASEAN member states have been found warily navigating to manage
their relationships with all the major powers amidst these developments. While China and Japanare the main trading partners of the ASEAN countries, Indiaʼs rapidly growing economy is also
becoming increasingly important for them.40
Fur ther, ASEAN has welcomed Japan ʼ s “ Expanded Par tnership for High-Quality
Infrastructure, ”41 an initiative often seen as Japan ʼs answer to China ʼs Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt & Road Initiative.42 In terms of security, many ASEAN countries
remain worried about Chinaʼs growing assertiveness in the region creating a division within
ASEAN. For the first time in its 45-year history, for instance, ASEANʼs leaders failed in 2012
to agree on a Joint Communique due to diverging views on Chinaʼs actions in the South China
Sea. The move was described a “harbinger of future trends.”43 Just when the major powers andregional stakeholders are beginning to reimagine the map with an identified Indo-Pacific region,
ASEAN cohesion is increasingly coming under doubt.
This leads to the question “Will the emergence of an Indo-Pacific region as a consequenceof the inclusion of the Indian Ocean Region in the regional imagination of major Asian countries
degrade ASEAN Centrality?”. This puts the future of ASEAN Centrality in a major spot amidst
the rise of the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN could well view the Indo-Pacific region in a balancedmanner wherein its “Centrality” will likely dwindle, as few member states will deal with players
such as China, the US, Japan, and India in a flexible and à la carte manner.44 Another scenario
could be that of an Indo-Pacific region with ASEAN at its center, eventually finding a way to bringback its cohesiveness and being united to face the challenge of great power rivalries.45 The third
scenario could be that of two separated but connected regions, wherein the Indo-Pacificʼs regional
imagination will struggle to be fully realized.
The fundamental concept of FOIP remains that stakeholders will enhance the connectivityof the Indo-Pacific region, foster the region into a place that values liberty, the rule of law, andfreedom from force or coercion. A significant region that FOIP seeks to cover was outlinedin Kishidaʼs speech, namely, Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
and FOIP are visions that resonate with each other. Japan announced that it will make a newcontribution of $100 million to the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, being mindful of the ASEANJapan Commemorative Summit to be held in Tokyo in December 2023. Later this year, Japan will
also renew the comprehensive Japan-ASEAN Connectivity Initiative, which seeks to promote
efforts to strengthen hard and soft connectivity.

Conclusion
Analyzing the past decades of Asian politics and policies brings to the fore certain momentous
developments that have redefined Asian geopolitics, expectedly impacting South Asia and the40

Choiruzzad, n. 30, p. 64.

41“ASEAN, Japan renew commitment to strengthen cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore,
August 29, 2016, available at https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Overseas-Mission/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs--Permanent-Mission-of-the-Republic-of-Singapore/Past-Highlights/2016/08/ASEAN-Japan-renewCommitment-to-Strengthen-Cooperation42

As cited in, Masaaki Kameda, “Abe Announces $110 Billion in Aid for High Quality Infrastructure in
Asia,” The Japan Times, May 22, 2015, available at www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/22/business/abe-announces-110-billion-in-aid-for-high-quality-infrastructure-in-asia/#.WaEUfVFLfIU

43

For further reading and details on the subject see, Barry Desker, “ASEAN Integration Remains an
Illusion,” PacNet #17, March 16, 2015.

44

Choiruzzad, n. 30, pp. 65–66.

45

Ibid.

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Japan Review Vol.6 No.1 2023

Monika Chansoria

Indian Ocean Region. By 2030, Asia will contribute most to global growth,46 thus underscoring
its importance and that of the Indo-Pacific. These realities have driven Japanʼs policies andapproaches for operating in the IOR as they underwent a major phase of transformation. The firstsignal of this was the lifting of the ban on overseas deployments to enable Japanʼs Self-Defense
Forces to dispatch armed troops to Iraq in 1992.47 The subsequent transition and evolution hasreached a point when today, notably, nearly 40 percent of all Japanʼs Self-Defense Forcesʼ missions
have occurred in the IOR, and nearly half of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA)
goes to IOR countries.48
While cross-oceans initiatives will continue to be pushed by major and regional powers, what
remains to be seen is whether they will be able to truly transform the Indo-Pacific into a single,
integrated region.49 The evolution of ASEAN cohesion, the trajector y of great power rivalr y,and the progress of the various Indo-Pacific initiatives by stakeholders will be the primar y
determinants that decide the future of the Confluence of the Two Seas vision.
In his 2009 Foreign Affairsʼ essay, Robert Kaplan argued that the “center stage of the 21st
century” will be the Indian Ocean.50 The rise of China and India as well as their increasing needto secure energy sources and routes, together with the rising involvement of other important
players from East Asia, most significantly Japan, will ensure that this region has a tremendous
impact on global politics.51 However, Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad submits a modification to
Kaplanʼs argument that the Indian Ocean must increasingly be seen as a geopolitical complex,
an integrated region with East Asia and/or the Pacific Ocean.52 At least, that is what Japan,
Indonesia, Vietnam, and India seem to foresee in their strategic visions. While the future of the
Indo-Pacific region remains uncertain, the ability of ASEAN member-states to consolidate theirindividual and collective positions, the willingness of major powers to manage competition with
their rivals, and the ability of those major powers to materialize their grand initiatives53 regionallywill define the future of this 21st century center stage.

46

For further reading and details on the subject see, Praneeth Yendamuri and Zara Ingilizian, “In 2020
Asia Will Have the Worldʼs Largest GDP; Hereʼs What That Means,” World Economic Forum, December
20, 2019, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/asia-economic-growth/

47

John Hartle, “The Normalization of Japanese Policy in the Indian Ocean Region,” Policy Report, Analysis
and Policy Obser vator y, Australiaʼs Global Interests, June 21, 2018; also see, Chansoria, “Japanʼs
Relations with South Asia,” in Ganguly et al., n. 7.

48

Peter Wyckoff, “Making Waves: Japan and the Indian Ocean Region,” Commentary, The Stimson Center,May 1, 2017.

49

Choiruzzad, n. 30, pp. 65–66; for related reference and reading also see, Evan Laksmana, “An IndoPacific Construct with ‘Indonesian Characteristics,ʼ” [The Strategist], Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, February 6, 2018, available at www.aspistrategist.org.au/indo-pacific-construct-indonesiancharacteristics/

50

For further reading and details on the subject see, Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-first
Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2, 2009, pp. 16–32.

51

Ibid.

52

Choiruzzad, n. 30, pp. 66–67.

53

Ibid.

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