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THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTONMarch 9, 1994PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-23MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENTTHE SECRETARY OF STATETHE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURYTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSETHE ATTORNEY GENERALTHE SECRETARY OF COMMERCEDIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGETU. S . REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONSCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENTASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONALSECURITY AFFAIRSDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICYCHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCYDIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY POLICYADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATIONSUBJECT:

US Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing
Space Capabilities(U)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes anddirects the implementation of US policy on foreign access toremote sensing space capabilities. 1(U)Background
Remote sensing 2 from space provides scientific, industrial,
civil governmental, military and individual users with thecapacity to gather data for a variety of useful purposes.
The US
Government operates v ery high resolution space-basedl "Remote sensing space capabilities" refers "to all remotesensing space systems, technology, products, and data , other thanthose used for signals intelligence.
In this context, "spacesystem" consists of the spacecraft, the mission package(s),ground stations, data links, and associated command and control
facilities and ma y include data processing and exploitation
hardware and sOftware.~2Throughout this po~icy, "remote sensing" r e f ers in a
general sense to observation or information gathering , which cansupport a wide v ariety of purposes. (U)DECLASSIFIED
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reconnaissance 3 systems for intelligence and military purposes.
These systems are among the most valuable US national security
assets because of their high quality data collection, timeliness,and coverage and the capability they provide to monitor events
around the world on a- near real-time basis. More nations havediscovered the value of these satellites and are developing theirown indigenous capabilities, or are seeking the purchase of dataor systems.
(U)
Policy Goal
The fundamental goal of our policy is to support and to enhance
US industrial competitiveness in the field of remote sensing
space capabilities while at the same time protecting US national
security and foreign polic y interests.
Success in this endeavor
will contribute to maintaining our critical industrial base,advancing US technology, creating economic opportunities,
strengthening the US balance of payments, enhancing national
influence, and promoting regional stability.
(U)
Scope of Policy
The policy covers foreign access to remote sensing space systems,
technology, products, and data, other than those used for signals
intelligence. with respect to commercial licenses, this would
include operating licenses granted under the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act of 1992 and export licenses for certain items
controlled on the US Munitions List (USML).
While the policy
will define certain restrictions for export of items on the USML,
export of items on either the USML or the Commerce Control List(CCL) would continue to be licensed in accord with existing lawand regulations. ~Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems
License requests by US firms to operate private remote sensing
space systems will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis inaccordance with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (theAct).
There is a presumption that remote sensing space systems
whose performance capabilities and imagery quality
characteristics are available or are planned for availability inthe world marketplace (e.g. , SPOT, Landsat, etc.) will befavorably considered, and that the following conditions will
apply to any US entity that receives an operating license underthe Act.
(U)
1.

The licensee will be required to maintain a record of
all satellite tasking for the previous year and toallow the USG access to this record.
(U)3"Reconnaissance" refers to remote sensing to support
military or intelligence purposes. (U),.

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The licensee will not change the operational
characteristics of the satellite system from theapplication as submitted without formal notification
and approval_of the Department of Commerce, which would
coordinate with other interested agencies.
(U)

3.

The license being granted does not relieve the licenseeof the obligation to obtain export license(s) pursuant
to applicable statutes.
(U)

4.

The license is valid only for a finite period, and isneither transferable nor subject to foreign ownership,
above a specified threshold, without the explicit
permission of the Secretary of Commerce.
(U)5.

All encryption devices must be approved by the US
Government for the purpose of denying unauthorizedaccess to others during periods when national security,international obligations and/or foreign policies may
be compromised as provided for in the Act.
(U)

6.

A licensee must use a data downlink format that allows
the US Government access and use of the data during
periods when national security, international
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised
as provided for in the Act.
(U)

7.

During periods when national security or international
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised,
as defined by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaryof State, respectively, the Secretary of Commerce may,after consultation with the appropriate agency(ies),
require the licensee to limit data collection and/ordistribution by the system to the extent necessitatedby the given situation. Decisions to impose such
limits only will be made by the Secretary of Commercein consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the
Secretary of State, as appropriate.
Disagreements
between Cabinet Secretaries may be appealed to thePresident.
The Secretaries of State, Defense andCommerce shall develop their own internal mechanisms toenable them to carry out their statutory
responsibilities.
(U)

B.

Pursuant to the Act, the US Government requires US
companies that have been issued operating licenses
under the Act to notify the US Government of its intent
to enter into significant or substantial agreementswith new foreign customers.
Interested agencies shallbe given advance notice of such agreements to allow
them the opportunity to review the proposed agreement
in light of the national security, international
obligations and foreign policy concerns of the USGovernment.
The definition of a significant or
substantial agreement, as well as the time frames andother details of this process, will be defined in later\S~CR~T4Commerce regulations in consultation with appropriate
agencies.
(U)
Transfer of Advanced Remote Sensing Capabilities
1.

Advanced Remote Sensing System Exports:
The United States
will consider requests to export advanced remote sensing
systems whose performance capabilities and imagery quality
characteristics are available or are planned foravailability in the world marketplace on a case-by-casebasis.
(U)
The details of these potential sales should take into
account the following:
the proposed foreign recipient's willingness andability to accept commitments to the US Government
concerning sharing, protection, and denial ofproducts and data;(U)constraints on resolution, geographic coverage,timeliness, spectral coverage, data processing andexploitation techniques, tasking capabilities, andground architectures; and (U)the ability of the United States to counter or
defeat foreign use of such capabilities, if
national security conditions warrant. ~The following conditions will apply to any license for aturn-key system export:
Any system which is approved for export shallensure positive control over the system andprevent reception by entities other than theforeign recipient to whom the system is sold.

~Any system with significant military orintelligence utility which is approved for export
must have characteristics that guarantee US accessand use of the data and enable the United States
to deny its data to a~~dversary in the event ofcrisis or conflict.~)
Approval of requests for exports of systems would
also require certain diplomatic steps be taken,
such as informing other close friends in theregion of the request, and the conditions we would
likely attach to any sale; and informing therecipient of our decision and the conditions wewould require as part of the sale.
(U)
Any system made available to a foreign government
or other foreign entity may be subject to a formal
government-to-government agreement.
(U)
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Transfer of Sensitive Technology
The United States wi~l_consider applications to export sensitive
components, subsystems, and information concerning remote sensing
space capabilities on a restricted basis because it is not in thenational security interests of the United States to assist
foreign nations or entities to attain autonomous capabilities.
Sensitive technology in this situation consists of items oftechnology on the US Munitions List necessary to develop or to
support advanced remote sensing space capabilities and which are
uniquely available in the United States.
Such sensitivetechnology shall be made available to foreign entities only on
the basis of a government-to-government agreement.
Thisagreement may be in the form of end-use and retransfer assurances~Ch can be tailored to ensure the protection of US technology.
Government-to-Government Intelligence and Defense Partnerships
Proposals for intelligence or defense partnerships with foreigncountries regarding remote sensing that would raise questions
about US Government competition with the private sector or wouldchange the US Government's use of funds generated pursuant to a
US-foreign government partnership arrangement shall be submitted
for interagency review.
(U)
Implementing Actions
The State Department, with the participation of theSecretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, andother members of the Executive Branch as appropriate, shalldevelop an approach to use with potential foreign suppliersof remote sensing space capabilities to discuss possible
mutual constraints on foreign access for review by theDeputies Committee.
(U)
The State Department, with the participation of theSecretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Director ofCentral Intelligence and other members of the Executive
Branch as appropriate, shall prepare a list of those remotesensing space technologies deemed to be sensitive. They
shall ensure the list is updated on an annual basis.
(U)

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THE W~ITE HO uSi PRESIDENT HAS SEENWASHINGTON"'3 , ~ .~ v\March 9, 1994DENT:
Enclosed is a decision memo from Sandy Berger
recommending that you sign the attached
Presidential Decision Directive allowing forthe expanded sale of images taken from space.
Under the POD, U.S. companies licensed by theCommerce Department could sell such images toforeign and domestic customers.
In addition,
the state Department could license the exportof the satellite systems. National security
concerns would be protected by specificconditions in the licenses.
This POD would allow the U.S. to compete more
effectively in a fast-growing international
market and would consequently be very popularwith business.
This memo was initially cleared through on
March 3, but then pulled back when firststate and then DOD raised objections. Theirproblems have now been resolved and all
relevant agencies have cleared the POD, as
have all relevant White House offices.

If you approve, please sign the attached PDD.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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WASHINGTON

9q MAR 9

AU:' 7March 3, 1994

9'I MAR3 p 5 : 27

ACTIONMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BERGER~SIG

FROM:SAMUEL R .

SUBJECT:

US Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing
Space Capabilities

PurposeTo approve a Presidential Decision Directive on US polic y on
foreign access to remote sensing space capabilities .
Background
The attached PDD represents a significant change in current
policy b y allowing for the expansion of the commercial sale ofimages taken from space and the export of the s y stems themselves.
This polic y is intended to open the way for US firms to compete
aggressively in a growing international market, which Commerce
estimates could be a $5 to $15 billiori industry by the turn ofthe century.
This new policy should aid the defense industry in its efforts tofind new commercial applications for defense technologies andenhance US global competitiveness in the international remotesensing marketplace.
The policy also represents an e x ample of an
emerging commercial information technology being used as acataly st to create a new 21st century industry and long-term jobs
for Americans.
Under the terms of the policy, US companies will b e licensed by
the Secretary of Commerce to operate pri v ate remote sensing
systems and sell those images to domestic and foreign customers.
The export of entire satellite s y stems and technolog y --licensed
by the State Department--will also be considered under thispolic y . National security will be protected through specificconditions in the license.
For US owned and op e rated s y stems,
the Sec retar y of Defense or the Secretary of State, for nationalsecurity or foreign policy reasons, can seek an interruption inservi c e o r restrictions on the dissemination of data . For
exported s y stems, the United States will ensure that it retains
the ability to counter or defeat foreign us e o f s uch
capabilities , if national security conditions wa rrant.

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2Agencies disagree about whether the Land Remote Sensing Policy
Act of 1992 grants the Secretary of Commerce discretion to issue
a license or permit e~ercise of a license after the Secretary ofDefense and/or State have determined conditions necessary to meet
US national security, international obligations and/or foreignpolicies.
The statute is subject to different interpretations on
this point.
The PDD is not intended to resolve this issue.
It has been US Government practice both to deny the export of
remote sensing space systems and the technology which could leadto the development of highly capable "spy-like" systems by othercountries, and to not encourage the operation of private US
systems that would sell high-quality imagery data and products
commercially. A number of factors has forced the US Government
to undertake a review of its policy in this area.
Space-based images and imaging systems are increasingly
being recognized by commercial entities as a means ofsignificantly improving their productivity and business
operations.
Farmers, city planners, environmentalists,
news organizations, map makers, surveyors, geologists,mining companies, oil companies, timber harvesters,
taxing authorities, as well as foreign governments have
all recognized the utility of high-quality space-based
images for purely commercial purposes.
Satellite collection capabilities that once were themonopoly of a few countries are spreading to many
countries and the US lead is eroding.
In addition tothe United States, Russia, France, China, Japan and theEuropean Space Agency already have an indigenous spaceindustry. Several others--Israel, India, South Africa,
Canada and South Korea--are on their way to developing
such a capability,
As the technology has spread, fewer intelligencesources and methods remain truly sensitive, making it
harder to justify withholding exports on traditional
national security grounds.
As the Executive Branch has struggled with developing a policythat would balance economic and national security concerns, themarket has made commercial ventures more economically feasible
and a backlog of license applications has been generated.
This
policy will allow agencies to make expeditious decisions on these
pending licenses.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Presidential Decision Directive at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
PDD on Remote Sensing
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILWASHINGTON . D.C. 20506

March 9, 1994
ACTIONMEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:

GEORGE J. TENETFROM:REGINA A.

SUBJECT:PDD onAttached are a revised memo to the President and a revised PDD on
remote sensing which reflect the agreement you reached with John
Deutch last night.
Specifically, the following changes have been
made:
1.

Page 2 of the Memo to the President has been revised toreflect that the PDD is not intended to resolve theoutstanding legal dispute concerning the authorities of
the Secretary of Commerce to permit exercise of alicense after the Secretary of Defense and/or State
have determined that national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States may becompromised.

2.

A sentence has been added to condition seven on page 3of the PDD to state explicitly that in the event of adisagreement between Cabinet secretaries concerningwhether a commercial satellite system should be turned
off or interrupted, an appeal may be made to thePresident.

If you agree with these changes, we recommend that you send thememo forward to the President.
We need to have approval today sothat we can make the public announcement and brief the Hill andindustry tomorrow.
RECOMMENDATION
That you send the memo forward to the President.
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo for the President
Tab A
PDD on Remote Sensing

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