Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in
Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity
Based Disparities＊
Lee Woo-Youn1(Resercher of Naksungdae
Institute of Economic Research)
I. Introduction
When one takes the position that mobilized Korean workers were forcibly removed andcoerced into providing labor in wartime Japan (1937-1945), issues such as the wages paid tothe mobilized workers and wage disparities with Japanese workers end up not being discussed,and become blind spots for researchers. Prior research that approaches the subject exclusively
from a perspective of “forced removal of workers and forced labor” simply brushes away theissues considered in this paper by labeling them as the products of “slave labor and slave-likeliving conditions,” even though they deserve to be examined in connection with the subject ofmobilized labor.
Almost all published research on wartime-mobilized labor approaches the subject under thetwo assumptions of “forced removal of workers and forced labor” and “slave labor and slave-likeliving conditions.” These assumptions create a significant obstacle for researchers trying to recreate what the work and daily lives of the Korean laborers must have been like. Researchers
end up failing to look at the aspects of workers’ lives in which the laborers demonstrated
autonomy, as well as the wide-ranging and highly diverse events of daily life that may not accord
with the narrative of “slave labor” and “slave-like living conditions.” Perspectives of this type haveconsistently contributed to narrow the spectrum of subjects and topics in research on the historyof wartime mobilized labor.
The following questions are examined in this paper to bring more clarity to the subject ofmobilized Korean workers in wartime Japan. To what extent were wages actually paid to Korean
mineworkers who were working in coal and metal mines? How were their wages determined?
How large was the disparity in wages with Japanese workers? What was the trend in wartime
wage disparities and how did wartime disparities compare to prewar wage disparities? By
shedding light on these questions, this paper seeks to eliminate the obstacles that stand in theway of understanding the lives of mobilized Korean workers. However, as explained in this paper,
research on the wages paid to Korean workers must cope with the critically important issues ofremittances to family in Korea and forced saving. Specifically, were remittances to family being
handled properly, and were workers able to withdraw money from their savings on their own
discretion? If remittances and withdrawals from savings were being made against the will of
the workers, the payment of high wages would prove to be meaningless. This matter shall be＊ This article was originally published in Japanese as 李宇衍「戦時期日本へ労務動員された朝鮮人鉱夫（石炭、金属）の賃金と民族間の格差」『エネルギー史研究 : 石炭を中心として』 32, 2017-03-24. 63-87 頁
and was translated into English by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
1 Ph. D in Economics at Graduate School, Sungkyunkwan University (2010. 5). Email: wooyoun@skku.edu

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addressed in a future paper.
The present writer would like to point out that most of the materials used in this paper werecompiled by researchers who adhere to the viewpoint of “forced removal of workers and forcedlabor.” In Section II, an attempt will be made to examine the wage levels of Korean mineworkers(including those who worked at metal mines), and to see if, as widely believed, the miners were
working for basically no wages or for a pittance. Section III will explain the formulas used for
calculating wages by using examples from mines. Section IV compares the wages of Koreans andJapanese and will examine if discrimination in the payment of salaries based on ethnicity existed,
as is commonly believed. Section V builds on the previous section’s discussion and examines how
wage disparities between Koreans and Japanese evolved during wartime, as well as contrasting thechanges with disparities in the prewar period. The conclusion summarizes the points made in thispaper and presents topics that deserve to be examined in future research.
II. Wage Levels
Labor mobilization and relocation of Korean workers to Japan began in September 1939 with thestart of the “recruitment” of laborers. While it is frequently assumed that “wartime mobilized labor”
was unpaid, this is not true. Wages were in fact paid under the mobilization program and continued
to be paid under the “conscription” program launched in October 1944.2 The mineworkers examinedin this paper were no exception, which leads to the questions of how and how much they were paid.
In 1940, shor tly after the star t of the mobilization of Korean workers, the Japan Mining
Association [Nihon Kozan Kyokai] conducted a sur vey of Korean workers in 78 major mines(comprising both coal and metal mines; hereafter referred to as mines) throughout Japan. The
sur vey covered such matters as “Instruction and Training Facilities” for civic education, “Work
Conditions” of Korean workers, including wages, and “Remittance and Savings.” The findings were
published as a massive 300-page report entitled Survey Report of Workers from the Korean Peninsula(Hanto-jin rodosha ni kansuru chosa hokoku). (Japan Mining Association 1940; Pak Kyong-Sik, ed.,1981, Vol. II, pp. 1-300) Table 1 presents data from the 46 mines that provided a full response on
average monthly wage, and average savings and remittances per worker. The monthly cost of food
was calculated by multiplying the daily cost by 31. For mines that did not provide information on
the cost of food (indicated by an asterisk), the monthly cost of food was assumed to be 18.60 yen,calculated using the highest daily cost of food of any mine, which was 0.60 yen. The figures in the“Difference” column were calculated by subtracting savings, remittances and food costs from theaverage wage. The exclusion of food costs yields a high degree of dispersion, which indicates that
2 Regarding the wages of conscripted workers, the following explanation is given in Kokumin choyo no kaisetsu[Explanation of the national conscription system] (Yoshio Morita ed., Government-General of Korea, Mining Bureau,
Labor Section, editorial supervision). “Question: Roughly, how much are conscripted workers paid? Answer: In
the Japanese homeland, wages for respondents [persons responding to conscription] are controlled. Workers are
categorized by type of work, region and age, and basically the same rate applies to workers in the same category. For
example, in shipbuilding, about 60 yen is paid per month during the first three months. After three months, the rate
rises to above 100 yen. In coalmining, excavators generally earn a maximum of about 6 yen [per day], a minimumof 3 yen, and an average of 4.50 yen. The rate does not fall below 2.50 yen even during the training period. Wages
for respondents working in Korea are set to be somewhat higher than the general level of wages. It should be notedthat all wages for conscripted workers in both the Japanese homeland and Korea are subject to the approval of theGovernment-General of Korea.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei, 1944, pp. 42-43)

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wages, savings and remittances varied significantly among the mines surveyed.3 While this implies
that the averages may be of somewhat limited significance, these figures will be used here, as noother data is available.
One point should be made at the outset regarding calculations. “Monthly average remittance”
is not the average amount for all employed workers or workers who worked at the mine for at least
one day in that month, but rather signifies the average amount for workers who actually maderemittances. For example, consider the data from the Mitsui Sunagawa Coal Mine in the Sapporo
District. As of the end of July 1940, the mine employed 622 miners, and an average of 279 miners
made remittances during the four months between March and June (pp. 30-32). Calculating based onthese figures, 44.7 percent of the miners remitted an average amount of 32.34 yen. Although it does
not appear in Table 1, another notable case is the Akenobe Mine in the Osaka District. The response
from this mine shows the average monthly number of miners working at this mine during the firstsix months of 1940 and the average monthly number of miners making remittances, indicating that
71.8 percent were remitting funds (pp. 98-101). Similar data is available for the Ikuno Mine, also
in the Osaka District, showing that 72.8 percent were remitting funds (pp. 153-155). The response
from the Takaya Mine in the Sendai District provides the average monthly number of miners andremitters during the months between March and July, indicating that 70.1 percent were remitting
funds (pp. 54-54).4 A somewhat different picture emerges from a report compiled by the Institutefor Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] entitled Survey Report on the Working Conditions ofWorkers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romusha kinro jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku] (hereafter
Survey Report). According to this, only 34.0 percent of the miners working at a coalmine in Hokkaido
in 1941 were making remittances to their family in Korea. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943a;
Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 373, 482) It is also reported that among miners working at the
Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine in Hokkaido in early 1943, only 20 to 30 percent were remitting
funds. (Tadashi Kosho 2011, p. 358) It may be possible to explain the differences in the ratio ofremitters as follows. The data in Table 1 was gathered immediately after the start of wartime labormobilization, implying that the Korean workers were still unfamiliar with their work and work
conditions and were easily pressured by employers to make remittances. By contrast, the lower
ratios reported in the Survey Report and by Kosho reflect the possibility that workers were rejecting
the solicitation of employers and were remitting funds on their own.
It is well known that the cost of food, as well as savings, were withheld from wages. Moreover,because savings mostly constituted forced savings, it is ver y likely that the amounts of savings
appearing in Table 1 were withheld from wages. When remittances are subtracted, the averageremaining balance (difference) comes to 18.50 yen, which is equivalent to 25.7 percent of theaverage monthly wage of 71.95 yen. While the balance is obtained by subtracting savings, the costof food, and remittances from monthly wages, other amounts were also being deducted for suchitems as taxes, utilities, rationed goods, clothing and monthly installment payments. According todata for 1944, amounts deducted for these items came to about 16.7 percent of wages. (Table 2) Tosummarize these figures, 18.6 percent of wages were withheld as savings, 21.2 percent for the costof food, 16.7 percent for taxes and other items, and 25.7 percent for remittances. Thus, a total of 56.5
percent was being withheld or deducted from wages, meaning that any miner making remittances
3 Wages for Korean coalminers also varied significantly among mines during the 1920s. See Chong Jin-Song(1989).
4 As the number of participants in forced saving programs is thought to be roughly equal to the number of
employees or workers on payrolls, this issue can be ignored.

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was doing so out of the remaining 43.5 percent. Furthermore, the data for 1940 shown in Table 2
indicates that remitters were sending the equivalent of 34.5 percent included in the remaining 43.5
percent and were spending the equivalent of 9.3 percent on personal expenditures. On the other
hand, it can be calculated that those who did not remit funds retained 43.5 percent of their wages forspending at their own discretion.
Although the above estimates are based on fragmentar y information, they do not dif fer
significantly from materials published in the past. The following can be confirmed from theinformation summarized in Table 2. There is very little difference in the ratio of monthly wages
saved and remitted by workers at the Hitachi Mine in Ibaraki Prefecture between 1940 and 1941.
The figures for 1944 depict the breakdown of expenditures for an average coalminer in the Kyushu
District, whose daily wages ranged between 7 and 8 yen and monthly wages amounted to 150 yen. A
comparison between 1940 and 1944 points to a slightly lower remittance ratio and a higher balance
ratio. Other than that, there are almost no differences in deducted amounts and other ratios. The
figures for 1945 are based on materials from the Sumitomo Inaushi Mine that report on wages
earned, deducted amounts and remittances made by 44 Korean workers during a four-month
period. Average amounts for these three items are shown in Table 2. It is notable that here again, no
significant difference can be found in the breakdown of expenditures between 1940 and 1945.5
In other words, although Table 2 was compiled from different sources, the consensus is that evenafter subtracting forced savings, food costs and other expenses, workers were left with at least 40
percent of their wages as disposable income. Because workers were keeping more than 40 percentof their wages as disposable income, employers pressured workers to make remittances to theirfamilies. However, many Korean workers did not comply, simply because they preferred to spend
their money locally. It is believed that decisions on fund remittances were the subject of very intense
arguments between workers and on-site personnel managers who doubled as the dormitory masters
where the workers were housed. The abovementioned Survey Report that investigated 14 mines
touches on this matter in a section entitled “Promoting Savings,” which contains the following entry
regarding “Coalmine B.” “Monthly wages are paid by the dormitory master. The practice is to reachan agreement on how much would be saved and remitted, whereupon workers are handed their

5 Table 2 was compiled to examine the breakdown of wages and expenditures, but this table cannot be used in
discussing trends in wartime wages. Coal and metal mining wages were continuously rising. The “Price Freeze Order”
of September 19, 1939 prohibited any further increase in prices, rents, charges, transportation charges, wages andsalary. Thereafter, the order was renewed every year. (Cohen 1949, pp. 358-359) Wages were controlled after March
1939. However, due to chronic labor shortages, businesses found other ways to raise wages to attract workers. Thatis, aside from controlled wages, businesses paid a wide array of allowances that included temporary allowance, family
allowance and long-term employment allowance to effectively raise wages. (Akira Hara 1976, p. 242) Wages wereraised to retain workers and, as a result, the average daily wage for men increased from 3.08 yen in 1940 to 5.676
yen in 1944. (Cohen 1949, p. 166)

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remaining balance.” (Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1982, Vol. 1, p. 4716)
Prior research states that workers received nothing or very small amounts of “pocket money”
because all or most of the wages were withheld for forced savings, various types of installment
savings, food costs and other expenses, and concludes that workers had no possibility of making
remittances.7 However, more than 40 percent of wages remained in the hands of workers after the
deduction of forced savings and other items. Of this remaining amount, workers made remittances
to their families either on their own discretion or under pressure from personnel managers, orotherwise spent the money locally. On July 19, 1939, Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above
Guidelines [Migi no yoko toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] (“Above Guidelines” refers to Guidelines
6 Another example can be found in Coalmine A where records state, “Wages are paid through the dormitory master,
but no more than 10 yen per month is handed to workers. Workers are made to save or remit the remainder. (Intereston company savings is 6.5 percent per annum.) In some cases, workers have returned home at the end of their twoyear contract with 1,300 yen in savings. The 10 yen of pocket money is mostly spent on food, drink and gambling.
Some workers purchase clothes.” Another example is Coalmine C where records state, “All wages were paid throughthe dormitory master. As a rule, pocket money was kept within 10 yen per month, and the remaining money was
allocated to savings and remittance (as a rule, remittance amounted to no more than 20-30 yen.” The “10 yen rule”
was regularly applied to workers with a positive attitude toward remitting funds, but the company probably had
nothing it could do with workers who did not remit money. On the other hand, Table 1 shows that the upper limit of
the “rule” on remittances was also not always obeyed.
7 Pak Kyong-Sik quotes the account of a worker who was mobilized in 1941. “When I arrived at my work after being
conscripted, I found that my wage was 1.30 yen, which was only half the amount advertised. My plans immediately
fell through. There was no way I could think about remitting funds because I barely had enough to feed myself.” (1965,
p. 87) Shigeru Nagasawa writes in his study of the Joban Coalmine in Fukushima that little money was left after thecost of food and other expenses were deducted. “After paying for daily necessities and after money was withheld forthe company’s forced savings, there was absolutely no room left for the Korean workers to send money home. And if
there was some money left, it was a very small amount.” (1977, p. 131) In his study of the same region, Shoji Yamada
writes, “Wages were withheld for forced saving and the workers only received a small amount of pocket money. The
intent was to prevent workers from escaping to distant places.” (1978, p. 650) Eidai Hayashi claimed, “Out of thewages that they received, workers paid for food (0.60 – 0.65 yen per day), bedding, cigarettes, alcohol and soap. The
rest was taken away for Patriotic Savings, savings for retirement, normal savings, national bonds and forced savings.
As a result, not a single cent was paid to the workers.” (1991, p. 36) Cook and Cook also quote the account of amobilized worker. “Wages? They didn’t pay us anything. When we were coming from Korea, they told us we would
receive 1.50 yen. But we weren’t paid even for a single day of work.” (1992, p. 196) Kim Moon-Young takes a more
flexible position than the foregoing researchers and says that, after various expenses were deducted, “Not much wasleft to be paid to the workers. Not very many workers were able to remit more than the remittable amount of 15 yen.”(1995, pp. 86-87) While there is evidence of restrictions being placed on remittance amounts, it remains unknown
whether such restrictions were commonplace. Kim In-Dok writes, “Rarely did workers receive any money from theiremployers. It appears this was the general rule… Even if monthly wages were received, the amounts were extremely
small. Generally speaking, workers only received a small amount of pocket money from their employers.” (2002, pp.
49-50) Chon He-Gyon quotes the account of a mobilized worker as follows. Regarding monthly wages, “What was
paid to us was so little it would be finished with a single day’s outing.” Based on this he writes, “It can be concluded
that they received a small amount of pocket money each month.” (2006, p. 171) Ho Kan-Mu directly quotes the oral
account of a Korean worker. “The monthly wage was no more than pocket money. So, we could not even think about
sending money home.” (2014, p. 64) Unlike the foregoing researchers, Chon Gi-Ho expresses doubts about whether
the remittances made by Korean workers were properly paid to their families. (2003, pp.113-114) I San-Wi proposes
the theory that remittances that had not been made were included in the unpaid amounts held in deposit after the endof the war. (2014, p. 61) As noted above, the present writer plans to address issues related to remittances to families
in Korea and unpaid amounts in a future paper.

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on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko]) was announced. From thisdate onward through the end of the war, the general rule was that “with the exception of minimal
amounts, all wages must be remitted or saved.” (Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above
Guidelines) [Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko Jittai Chosa Hokokusho Henshu Iinkai] ed. 1999, p. 43).
However, due to the resistance of Korean workers, this rule was not enforced. Deductions included
the costs of work clothes and food, but rent was not charged to those who lived in the dormitory forsingle workers. Money remaining after the deduction of necessary living expenses and savings, if
not remitted, was spent on such items as clothes, various food items, gambling, alcohol and tobacco.
Details of such expenditures will be discussed in a future paper.
III. Methods for Calculating Wages
The methods used in calculating wages are discussed in this section with a focus on coalmines.8
As attested to by Eidai Hayashi, “While wages differed among mines, extremely complex methods
were used for calculating the wages of miners.” [Hayashi 1991: Bibliography [Kaidai], p. 34] The
most detailed explanation of wage calculation methods is provided by the Institute for Scienceof Labor (1943b) in Korean Peninsula Workers in Coalmines [Tanko ni okeru hanto-jin romusha],
the contents of which can be summarized as follows. First of all, “new arrivals” underwent “threemonths” of training during which they were paid a flat daily amount. At the end of this period,
workers were assigned to such tasks as excavating, tunneling, loading and hauling. For these tasks,
wage rates were normally based on the value of group output.9 Finally, workers were paid a flat daily
amount for such tasks as machine operation, machining, coal washing and miscellaneous tasks.
Output-based wage calculation for excavating, tunneling and related tasks is explained below.10(1) Determining the total wage pool: For excavating, the total wage amount was calculated bymultiplying a per-ton value by the net tonnage of coal produced. For tunneling, the total wage pool
was calculated by multiplying a per-tsubo (approx. 3.3 m2) value by the total area cleared (in tsubo). (2)Adjusting the total wage pool: A fixed bonus amount was added for every cart exceeding a previously
determined production norm. When miners performed any another task, the relevant amountwould also be added to the total wage pool. When a decline in production tonnage was anticipated
due to the assignment of National Labor Volunteers [Kinro Hokoku Tai] or new recruits, a certain
amount was added to the total wage pool under the heading of “Compensation for Diminished Skill.”
Additions were also made to the total wage pool when large numbers of Korean workers were mixed
into the teams, or allowances were added to the wage pool for training or accompanying newly
8 Between 1939 and 1945, a total of 144,004 Korean workers were mobilized and assigned to mines. Of thisnumber, 121,574 workers (84.4 percent) worked in coalmines. It is reported that, among such coalminers, a great
many of them worked inside the mines as excavators. (Lee Woo-Youn 2015, p. 6)
9 In Japanese, this system is referred to as dantai dekidaka-barai seido . Following the example of Chon Jin-Song,dekidaka-barai seido has been rendered as seisan daka chingin seido [output-based wage rate] in this paper. The term
dantai has been added because, as outlined below, the aggregate wage for the entire work group was first determined,
and this aggregate amount was then allocated among individual workers.
10 According to the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999, p299), wages at metal mines were as follows. Wages for workers working inside the mines were determined on acontract basis (output-based wage rate), while flat-rate wages were paid to those working outside the mines. Thesearrangements applied to both Korean and Japanese workers. During the training period, a “temporary employment”
wage was paid, amounting to 1.20–1.30 yen. After the end of the training period, performance pay was added
according to the type of work assignment.

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recruited unskilled miners. (3) Determining the per-ton value: Starting with the valuation on thelabor portion of per-ton production cost, various factors were taken into consideration in determining
the per-ton value of coal produced. First, consideration was given to maintaining a balance withwages paid for other tasks. Second, consideration was given to seasonal factors that made mining
more difficult. Third, consideration was given to diminished output when excavation reached apoor- quality working face or vein. (4) Determining the production tonnage: Production tonnage
was calculated based on the number of coal-filled carts removed from the mine. The weight of coal
per cart was estimated by sight. (It is reported that estimation by sight varied very little from actual
measurement.) A fixed-rate downward adjustment was made in the number of carts when the loads
contained large amounts of inferior-grade “waste.” (It should be noted that some Korean workers
suspected that the carts were not being properly counted.) (5) After calculating the total wage poolusing the above methods, wages were allotted to individual workers based on fixed ratios that took
into consideration each individual’s skill level and work assignment. The ratios calculated by onsite supervisors were referred to as buritsu, or “rate.” For instance, assume that rates ranged froma minimum of 10 to a maximum of 16. Each worker was then given a rate, and the individual’s wage
was calculated based on his rate. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943b, pp. 769-770)
The calculation process can be shown using the following example. Assume that on the day ofmeasurement, output came to 247 carts with a per-cart value of 0.75 yen. A total of 20 carts werededucted for “waste”, 1.9 carts were deducted for carrying less than the specified load, and 0.6
carts were added for carrying more than the specified load. As a result, net output equaled 226.15
carts (243 - 20 - 1.9 + 0.6), so that the total wage pool came to 162.83 yen (0.75 x 226.15). Assumingthat National Labor Volunteers were working in the mines on this day, compensation is made fordiminished productivity at the rate of 0.20 yen per cart. Hence, the total compensation amount fordiminished productivity comes to 45.20 yen (0.20 x 226.15). Next, a training allowance of 0.30 yen ispaid per inexperienced National Labor Volunteer, so that a training allowance of 5.40 yen (0.30 x 18
volunteers) is added to the wage pool. After deducting 21.42 yen for the cost of explosives used on
this day, the total wage pool comes to 192.01 yen. This total amount was divided among the workers
based on the following calculation method. Assuming that a Japanese worker, 16 to 18 years old withat least one month of experience, has a skill level of 10 points, the worker with the lowest skill level
who worked on this day is given a skill score of 11.5 points and the worker with the highest skill
level is given a skill score of 16.0 points. Adding the skill points for all workers yields 588.4 points intotal. Based on this, the wage payable per skill point is 0.328 yen (192.01 ÷ 588.4). Hence, the least
skilled worker with a skill score of 11.5 points received 3.77 yen (0.328 x 11.5), and the most skilledworker with a skill score of 16.0 points received 5.25 yen (0.328 x 16.0). (Institute for Science ofLabor 1943b, pp. 770-771)
While the same wage scale was applied to both Korean and Japanese workers, this complicatedcalculation method potentially gave rise to misunderstandings. In addition, the assessment(calculation) of the rate and other factors created room for ethnic discrimination.11 A review ofdisputes arising between Korean workers and their employers shows that wage disputes occurred
frequently during 1939 and 1940, but decreased to nearly zero after 1941. (Editorial Committee of
the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1999, p. 254) On the other hand, food-related
11 According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers [Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha ] compiled by the Editorial
Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999), wage calculations were complex, and its
structure gave rise to suspicions that wages were subject to ethnicity-based discrimination. (p. 253)

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disputes increased as dietar y conditions deteriorated.12 Both the Government-General of Korea
and the Japanese government were aware of these issues. On February 13, 1942, the “recruitment”
system of labor mobilization was replaced by “government-mediated recruitment.” At this time,
the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Labor issued Guidelines on Training and Treatment of
Incoming Workers [Inyu romusha kunren toriatsukai yoko], which contained the following provision.
“Workers shall be made to fully understand in advance that individual wages will differ according toindividual efficiency and diligence.” (Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Home Affairs 1942, p. 77)
Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment of Workers Relocated to the Homeland [Naichi inyu assen yoko]
dated February 20, 1942 and issued by the Government-General of Korea contains the following
provision. “In particular, terms of employment shall be thoroughly communicated… Have workers
fully understand and accept that individual wages will naturally differ according to ability.” (Maeda
1943, p. 51)13
Yutaka Nishinarita makes the following statement based on materials from the Sumitomo
Konomai Gold Mine in Hokkaido for 1942. “Non-payment of wages was by no means the exception.”(Nishinarita 1997, p. 277) The material used by Nishinarita is reproduced here as follows.
Date:
From:

July 8, 1942
Kiyoji Kimura, Chief Administrator of Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon,

To:		

Director of Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine

Re:		

Request on Payment of Worker’s Wages… This is in regard to a complaint filed by the worker named below who was employed by yourcompany on March 22, 1940 and departed your company at the end of his term of employment on
April 27, 1942, at which time he returned to his place of origin. The complaint states that his wages
could not be precisely determined and paid at the time of his departure due to the hassle, and that
he was given verbal assurances by the personnel manager during his voyage back that unpaid wages
for 24 days would be remitted to him at a later date. Although two months have passed since his
return, he has yet to receive any remittance. The worker has on several occasions requested that
12 According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers , with the passage of time, Korean workers “came to understand”
that wages differed depending on “diligence” and “capability” (the individual’s muscle power). (p. 254) It can be judgedthat this was not so much the result of gaining a better understanding of the wage system, but rather reflected thedevelopment of a certain relation of trust between Korean workers and their employers on matters related to wages.
Another cause of wage disputes was that recruiters had quoted the highest standards of pay to prospective recruits.
But once they arrived at their work, they found that wages were output-based or were flat daily rates. (Ministryof Justice, Criminal Affairs Bureau 1941, p. 1,233) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers , during January–
December 1944, there were 134 cases of labor disputes in Hokkaido involving immigrant Korean workers (10,166
participants). The largest number (48 cases) pertained to labor management issues (of which 24 involved use ofviolence). The second largest number (27 cases) pertained to contract extension issues and return to Korea (of which
23 involved opposition to contract extension). Also tied for second (27 cases) were cases pertaining to food andmedical issues. (p. 1,593) Wage-related disputes were frequent during the beginning of this period, but totaled only 7
cases (200 participants) in 1944. (p. 326)
13 Accounts from mobilized workers also contain statements that, “The more you worked, the more you were paid.”(Nittei Kyosen-ka Kyosei Doin Higai Shinso Kyumei Iinkai [Investigative Committee on Victims of Forced Mobilization
under Occupation by Imperial Japan; hereinafter, Investigative Committee] 2005, p. 287; 2007a, pp. 109, 159, 551;
2009, p. 164)

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this matter be pursued. While knowing well that you are busy, we request that you investigate thismatter and inform us of your findings.
Worker in question:
Chungcheong-do, Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon, Iin-ri
Che Geum-Ok
Nishinarita takes the above description “wages could not be precisely determined and paid” asproof that “wages payable to Korean workers were very sloppily managed.” However, it should be
noted that the above case involves the settlement of outstanding wages after the end of the term of
employment, and is not a problem that arose during the period of employment in the mine. It is also
important to note that, since the start of the mobilization of Korean workers in 1939, employers wererequired to file monthly reports with local government authorities regarding the work performed
by Korean workers, living conditions, wages and other matters related to labor management. Thisrequirement came into effect pursuant to a directive dated July 29, 1939 issued jointly by the Vice
Ministers of the Ministr y of Welfare and the Ministr y of Home Affairs. Entitled Guidelines on
Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko], the directive was forwarded to all
local authorities. Concurrent to this directive, Particulars Concerning Implementation of Guidelines[Toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removalof Koreans, 1999, p. 44) and Procedures for Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha
boshu tetsuzuki] (Investigative Group on the Truth of Forced Removal of Koreans ed. 1974, p.
622) were issued, which specified the obligations of employers. On the same day, Administrative
Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju
ni kansuru jimu tetsuzuki] was issued, which required all employers to file monthly reports withthe local chief of police regarding work conditions, wages, savings, remittances and other matters.
(Sumitomo Utashinai Mine 1940, pp. 15-16) Under these conditions, it would have been impossible
to systematically avoid payment of wages to Korean workers.14
It is also important to note that Che Geum-ok, the Korean worker in the case cited above, went
to the local government office to complain that his wages had not been remitted to him, whereupon
the local administrator issued a formal letter explaining the background of the case and sought a
response from the employer. Yoshihiko Moriya refers to a case where remittances from Japan had
not reached family members, which resulted in an exchange of letters between the local government
office and the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine (1996, pp. 134-135), leading one to believe that in thisinstance also, a response was received from the mining company. Because employers were obligatedto file monthly reports with local government authorities on the payment of wages to Korean
workers, it can be said that an established procedure was in place for resolving problems related
to the non-payment of outstanding wages. The case cited by Nishinarita should not be interpreted
to mean that wages payable to Korean workers in Japan “were sloppily managed.” Instead, thecase should be taken as evidence that the payment of wages was systematically managed andimplemented. The marks of systematic management can also be seen in a survey conducted in 1942
14 The following is an account of a worker relocated to Sakhalin in 1941. “Question: Did you receive your unpaid
wages when you were leaving? Answer: Where I was working, if you did your work, they would pay you for thatmonth. They paid the monthly amount, and never failed or refused to pay. Question: Were you paid for all the work
you did? Answer: Yes, for every month that I worked, I was basically paid in the same month.” (Investigative Committee
20071, p. 159)

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of Korean workers employed in a certain mine. Asked what they looked forward to, the leading
response was “payday.” [Sangyo Rodo Chosasho 1942, p. 18] Given the materials currently on hand,
this would be the most rational interpretation. The discovery of new materials related to coal andmetal mines may very well enable us to more accurately describe the diverse conditions that existed.
Due to changes in the war situation, all gold mines were closed in 1943, and the Korean workers
employed at the above-mentioned Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine were relocated to coal minesin the Kyushu area. Chon He-Gyon has focused on matters related to wages in the context of thisrelocation. Chon pointed out that wages, allowances and savings ranging across 18 to 20 items weresettled and paid to the workers, and argued that the regulations related to wages and other matters
during the process of relocation prove that there was “coercion.” [2011, pp. 574-575] This argument
is difficult to understand as it provides no basis for why the settlement and payment of theseamounts could be proof of “coerced labor.” It is quite clear that this case, too, should be interpreted
as evidence of systematic management of wage payment as was the case described above. For
example, Moriya points out that Korean and Japanese workers were treated equally in the settlementof wages, allowances and savings in the process of relocation, with the exception that Korean
workers received a relocation allowance equal to three months’ wages that was paid as a severance
allowance, as well as leave pay, food and drink allowances, and parting gifts. [1991, p. 29]
IV. Wage Disparities Between Korean and Japanese Workers
Wages were paid to Korean workers throughout the entire period of the mobilization andrelocation of Korean workers to Japan. This began with “recruitment” in September 1939 andcontinued through “government-mediated recr uitment” introduced in Febr uar y 1942 and“conscription” instituted in September 1944. Rules pertaining to “recruitment” were set down inthe directive dated July 29, 1939 issued jointly by the Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Welfare
and the Ministry of Home Affairs and addressed to all local government authorities under the titleof Policies Pertaining to the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin rodoshanaichi iju ni kansuru hoshin] (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of
Koreans 1999, p. 493) This document instructs Japanese employers to “avoid as much as possible
any discrimination in the treatment of Korean workers as compared to homeland workers.”15 The
mobilization of Korean workers through “government-mediated recruitment” was announced in
the Cabinet decision of February 13, 1942 entitled Policies Pertaining to the Employment of Korean
Workers [Chosen-jin romusha katsuyo ni kansuru hoshin] (pp. 24-25), which contains the following
directive. “At all levels, there shall be no difference in the treatment of such workers as compared
15 On the same day, a joint directive was issued by the vice-ministers of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry ofHome Affairs to local government authorities. Attached to Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin
rodosha boshu yoko ], this directive was entitled Administrative Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to
the Homeland [Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru jimu tetsuzuki ]. Article 13 of this directive instructs that, “There
must be no manner of discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers.” (Hajime Maeda 1943, p. 31) The
same phrase (“There must be no manner of discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers”) is repeatedin Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above Guidelines [Migi no yoryo toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku ]attached to Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko ]. (Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko
Jittai Chosa Hokokusho Henshu Iinkai ed. 1999, p. 43) Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers was issued in
September 1939, and included the provision that there must be “no discriminatory treatment compared to homeland
workers.” (Investigative Group on the Truth of Forced Removal of Koreans ed., Chosen-jin kyosei renko kyosei rodo
[Forced removal and forced labor of Koreans] 1974, p. 621)

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to homeland workers.”16 Finally, the same can be said for the rules on “conscription,” whichemphasized that “There is absolutely no discrimination between homeland and Korean workers inwages and in all other matters.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei 1944, pp. 41-42)17
Reports also can be found from individual mines stating that no wage discrimination existed
between Korean and Japanese workers. A total of 52 mines responded to the Survey Report ofWorkers from the Korean Peninsula outlined in the preceding section. (pp. 1-300) Among these, a totalof 21 mines either responded explicitly that “no difference whatsoever existed between the treatment
of Korean workers” and Japanese workers, or stated that the “same treatment” was accorded to
Korean and Japanese workers. Needless to say, this means that both groups were subject to thesame wage schedule, and not that everyone received the same amount. The 1940 Notice on Termsof Employment [Shugyo annai] of the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine (coalmine) states that, “wages shallbe based on performance [output level].” (Sumitomo Utashinai Mine 1940b, p. 22) The Rules of
Employment [Shugyo kisoku] of the Iwaki Mine contains the following: “3. Factors determining wages(1): Wages… shall be calculated based on predetermined unit value and output… Wages for jointly
performed tasks shall be calculated… proportionately.” (Shigeru Nagasawa 1987, p. 168) The pointthat the above Notice on Terms of Employment and Rules of Employment have in common is that no
distinction is made between Japanese and Korean workers. The fact is that no document exists toshow that the two groups of workers were treated differently.18 According to the Sumitomo Utashinai
Mine’s Terms Requested and Answer to the Terms Requested (Collection of Occupation Forces-relatedMaterials [Shinchu-gun kankei tsuzuri]), Korean workers who went on strike after the end of thewar demanded that they be paid “an additional 0.50 yen to compensate for the fact that they werereceiving 0.50 yen less than Japanese workers during the war.” The company responded to thisdemand by stating that no difference in wages existed between Korean and Japanese workers, andthat wages were calculated on the basis of experience, skill, and amount of work performed. (1945,
pp. 415-417) Following this response, this matter was never brought up again.
Materials of the Tokyo District Mining Association regarding the Sado Mine (metal mine) statethat the mine, “in compliance with government policy, adopted a non-discrimination policy in thetreatment of Korean and Japanese workers.” The treatment of Korean workers is stated to be thesame as “homeland workers.” [p. 147] The method for calculating wages is explained as follows.
“Most of the workers from the Korean Peninsula work at jobs inside the mine. As is the case withhomeland workers, wages for Korean workers working inside the mine is calculated based on output
volume and a unit value that is calculated in advance based on such factors as age, experience, typeof task performed and difficulty of task. The few Korean workers working outside the mine are paida flat wage.” (p. 150) Writing in the same year, Hajime Maeda, the head of the personnel department
16 The same is repeated in Guidelines on Training and Treatment of Incoming Workers [Inyu romusha kunren
toriatsukai yoko ], issued by the Ministry of Welfare on the same day, and in Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment ofWorkers Relocated to the Homeland [Naichi inyu assen yoko ] that was issued by the Government-General of Korea on
February 20, 1942. These documents both state, “Due attention shall be paid to avoid any sense of discrimination.”(Shigeru Nagasawa 1992, Vol. 2, p. 76; Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1976, Vol. 4, p. 1,254)
17 “Application for Requisition” filed by the Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Company with the Ministry of Munitions
and the Government-General of Korea contains a section entitled “Wages for Conscripted Workers,” which states,“Workers conscripted under the provisions of Article 18-2 of the National Requisition Ordinance shall receive wages
in accordance with the Ministry of Welfare’s Regulations Concerning Wages of Conscripted Workers . (“Application for
Requisition” reproduced in Yoshihiko Moriya 1995, p. 40)
18 Letter of Shigeru Nagasawa cited by Munehiro Miwa.

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The Question of Wages and Ethnicity Based Disparitiesof the Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Company, reported that there was no wage disparity between
Japanese and Korean workers, and that wages were determined based on levels of diligence andskill. (1943, p. 149)
Documents of the Japanese government, the Government-General of Korea and individual
mines all state that there was no wage discrimination based on ethnicity. But were these claims
accurate? Is it possible that Korean workers were being paid less than their Japanese counterpartsfor performing the same tasks? The first researcher to give an unambiguous answer to this question
was Pak Kyong-Sik. (1965) His work continues to be regarded in academic circles as representing
the mainstream of research and constitutes the generally accepted theory. Pak Kyong-Sik draws his
conclusions from the information summarized in Table 3, which outlines the distribution of wages(monthly wages) by ethnicity in a Hokkaido coalmine. The source of this information is the survey
conducted by the Institute for Science of Labor between Januar y 15 and Februar y 7, 1942, theresults of which were published as Survey Report of Working Conditions of Korean Peninsula Workers.
The information used by Pak Kyong-Sik is drawn from page 90 of the Survey Report, which provides
data on Coalmine D. (Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, p. 90)19
Table 3 shows that 82.3 percent of the Japanese workers received wages exceeding 50 yen, while
75.0 percent of the Korean workers earned less than 50 yen. Based on this information, Pak KyongSik concluded that Korean workers received about half the amount received by Japanese workers
and argued that this was proof of “ethnic discrimination.” This table is cited again in the “Summary
Table” [Sokatsuhyo] appearing on pages 173-174 of the Survey Report. However, immediately before
this table, “Korean Workers: Number of Years Employed” [Chosen-jin kinzoku nensu] and “Japanese
Workers: Numbers of Years Employed” [Naichi-jin kinzoku nensu] appear on pages 169 – 170. Basedon this information, Table 4 shows distribution of years employed among workers at Coalmine D.
In the case of Korean workers, 89.3 percent had been employed for less than two years, andonly 10.7 percent had been employed for more than two years. In the case of Japanese workers,
the corresponding figures were 42.8 percent and 57.2 percent, respectively.20 As can be surmised
from Table 4, Korean workers were highly concentrated in the wage range of below 50 yen, while
Japanese workers were concentrated in the relatively high wage range of above 50 yen. However,this skewed wage distribution reflects differences in work efficiency resulting from differences inyears of employment. Shigeru Nagasawa presented a survey conducted at the Iriyama Coal Company
in the Joban coal district that estimates differences in work efficiency resulting from differencesin the composition of work teams. According to this study, in the case of a team consisting of fourJapanese and three Korean workers, the average measure of tunneling advance per worker was 0.8
19 The survey covered the following 20 sites: 6 coalmines in Hokkaido, 3 metal mines in Honshu, 5 coalmines in
Kyushu, 3 construction companies in Honshu, 2 factories in Honshu, and 1 factory in Kyushu. The survey addressed
production management, labor management and worker welfare facilities. (Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku
Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), pp. 3-8)
20 There is also a significant difference between Korean and Japanese workers with less than one year of experience.
The vast majority of Koreans had worked for less than one year. The standard term of labor contracts was two years,
which applied to both “recruitment” and “government-mediated recruitment.” Employers made various efforts to retain
Korean workers at the end of their contract period. For example, mining companies defrayed the cost of several typesof options, which included bringing family members from Korea, paying for a temporary visit to Korea, or paying acontract extension bonus. This was done because the experience and skills gained by a Korean coalminer during thetwo-year period of his contract were considered by the employers to constitute extremely valuable assets.

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shaku (about 24 cm). The corresponding figure for a team consisting of eight Korean workers with
two years of experience was 0.51 shaku (about 15 cm: equivalent to 63.8 percent of the previous
mixed Japanese-Korean team). Moreover, a team of eight Korean workers who had just completed
three months of training achieved only 0.25 shaku (about 8 cm). (Shigeru Nagasawa 1987, p. 28
citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans [Chosen-jin kyosei renko ronbun shusei] 1993,
p. 170) This data indicates that the number of years of employment, or the accumulation of work
experience, was the determining factor in work efficiency.21
The abovementioned Survey Report contains two more surveys that report on distributions by
ethnicity and work experience, and the distribution of wages. Table 5 summarizes the informationfrom Coalmine B, which was located in Hokkaido as in the case of Coalmine D.
In terms of years of employment, unlike in the case of Coalmine D, the Korean workers wereconcentrated in the 1–2 year range, while 42 percent of the Japanese workers were new hands withless than one year of experience. On the other hand, Korean workers with more than two yearsof experience accounted for 23.0 percent, while Japanese workers with more than two years ofexperience accounted for a much higher proportion, or 42.3 percent. These two differences balanced
each other out so that, in comparison with Coalmine D, the distribution of wages among Korean andJapanese workers was very close to being identical. Thus, Korean and Japanese workers earning
less than 50 yen accounted for 20.8 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. The corresponding
figures for Korean and Japanese workers earning more than 50 yen were 79.2 percent and 73.8
percent, respectively.
In the case of Metal Mine I, there were no Korean workers with more than two years of work
experience, while 46.2 percent of the Japanese workers had been employed for more than two years.
As a result, the distribution of wages shows that Korean and Japanese workers earning less than
50 yen accounted for 35.0 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. Conversely, a substantially higher
proportion of Japanese workers earned more than 50 yen than their Korean counterparts. It can beseen that the conclusions Pak Kyong-Sik reached regarding the presence of “ethnic discrimination”
in wages is based on a one-sided interpretation of the data. As previously noted, wartime wages of
Korean and Japanese workers were basically determined by the level of work efficiency. Judging
logically, it is clear that wages were determined by work performance (coal output or metal ore
output) and that work performance was directly and significantly affected by years of employment.
This fact is borne out by data from Coalmine B and Metal Mine I on the distributions of work
experience and wages. Looking at this important material collected, collated and later compiled by
Pak Kyong-Sik himself, it seems that, instead of looking at the entire body of information available,
Pak Kyong-Sik extracted certain portions of the information and arrived at hastily formulated
conclusions.22
For more than 50 years, the assertions made by Pak Kyong-Sik were never critically examined.
21 In the prewar period, wages paid for principal mining tasks such as excavating and tunneling were outputbased. Chong Jin-Song(1989) points out that, when the details of the wage determination system are taken into
consideration, it is difficult to identify the existence of ethnicity-based wage differentials even during the 1920s.
22 Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romusha kinro jokyo
ni kansuru chosa hokoku ] is reproduced in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981) Chosen mondai shiryo sosho, dai ni maki: senjikyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on Korean issues, Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor
management policies II].

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Consequently, these errors have survived to the present and have been repeated time and again. For
example, Kim Moon-Young uncritically adopted Pak Kyong-Sik’s wage distribution from Coalmine D
in Hokkaido and added some fragmentary statements from witnesses to say that the wages paid to
Korean workers were one-half of those paid to Japanese workers, or slightly exceeded one-half. (1995,
pp. 138-141) Chon Gi-Ho used data from 18 mines operated by Nippon Mining Company (known for
its gold mines) to argue that “ethnicity-based wage discrimination” existed. (2013, pp. 102-104) The
salient points of his research are summarized in Table 7, consisting of the average wages of laborers
working inside the mines and those working outside the mines as of March 1943.
According to Chon Gi-Ho, wages paid to Koreans working inside the mines were equivalent to“75–85 percent of the wages paid to Japanese workers.” Having re-tabulated and re-calculated thedata used by Chon Gi-Ho, the present writer found that Korean wages were actually equivalent
to 86.8 percent of Japanese wages. It is questionable whether this level of disparity can be fairly
labeled to constitute ethnic discrimination. Moreover, very substantial variations are seen amongmines. Thus, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a low of 73.6 percent to a high of
112.2 percent. Instances of high Korean wages are found at the Bajo and Onoyama gold mines.
As for workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages amounted to 94.1 percent of Japanesewages. Notably, Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages at seven mines, including the Hokuryu
Mine. A comparison of mines indicates that the range of wage differentials was larger among thoseworking outside the mines than among those working inside the mines. Thus, in the case of workers
employed outside the mines, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a low of 67.8 percent
to a high of 129.7 percent.
As has been noted, among workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages exceeded
Japanese wages in certain instances. Chon Gi-Ho has attempted to explain this phenomenon in thefollowing manner. “The number of Japanese male workers employed outside the mines decreased,
and the number of Japanese female workers and temporary workers employed outside the mines
increased, resulting in an overall decline in Japanese wages. As a result, wages for Korean workers
employed outside the mines became relatively higher.” This is a plausible explanation. However,as previously stated, the nominal wages of both Korean and Japanese workers continued to climb
throughout the war years, and there are cases where Koreans working inside the mines were being
paid more than their Japanese counterparts. In other words, there is a possibility that wages for
Koreans working inside the mines for the Nippon Mining Company were higher than those of their
Japanese counterparts because Korean wages rose faster than Japanese wages, and not because
the wages of Japanese workers employed outside mines declined. If this explanation is correct, it
can then be argued that the figures in Table 7 do not really suggest a significant disparity in wages
based on ethnicity, but rather that they reflect the relatively small difference in labor efficiency thatexisted between Korean and Japanese workers. This is a highly significant conclusion that leads toanother question. Did the composition of Japanese mining teams change in a manner that lowered
the productivity of Japanese workers, or did Korean wages rise relatively faster than that of Japanese
workers? An effort must be made to determine which of these two possibilities more accuratelyreflects the course of events. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine data on changes
in the wages of specific workers, such as may be found in “payroll ledgers.” While this information
does exist, unfortunately it has not been made public.
The assertion that ethnicity-based wage discrimination did not exist in wartime Japan in asystematic and organized fashion, at least on an institutional level as indicated in the rules of

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employment of individual mines, is not necessarily new. The problem is that this position has been
ignored in Korean academic circles. Shigeru Nagasawa has written concerning the Joban Mine thatthe wages of Korean workers were based on a subcontracting system where wages were calculated
according to output, and that this arrangement applied to Japanese workers as well. Furthermore,
Nagasawa explains that the calculation of individual wages was based on the following three factors:
total output of the relevant work area, the proportional rate assigned to each individual worker (11points for a highly skilled veteran front-line coalminer known as an osakiyama; 10 points for a only
slightly less skilled front-line miner known as a sakiyama; 9.0 – 9.5 points for a back-end miner
known as an atoyama; 7.5 – 8 points for a new hand), and the number of days worked. (Nagasawa
1977, p. 101 citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1993, p. 130) Nagasawa affirms
the existence of the same arrangement in a paper published in 1987. Specifically, he notes thatthe wages of coalminers working in the Joban Mine were based on a contracted unit value andproduction tonnage, and that, as in the case of Japanese workers, wages were calculated according
to collective output. He adds that a fixed daily wage applied to other tasks, and that wages differedby type of work performed but not by ethnicity. Nagasawa concludes that a reading of “Terms ofWages” alone does not point to ethnic discrimination, and asserts that the same can be said aboutother companies as well. (Nagasawa 1987, citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans
1993, pp. 168-169)
Hiroshi Ichihara has argued that wages were determined based on productivity and type of job
performed, and asserts that wage-related disputes occurred because it was difficult to properly
explain this arrangement to Korean workers. Ichihara concludes that this should not be taken as
evidence of ethnic discrimination, and interprets this to have been a problem that originated in the
shortcomings of worker relocation organizations in Korea. (Ichihara, 1997, p. 25) The problem wasthat worker relocation organizations failed to properly inform Korean workers of why wages differedamong individuals. Ichihara points out that the Government-General of Korea was not responsible
for this misunderstanding and that the problem should be attributed to the personnel departmentsof Japanese coal and metal mines that were recruiting workers in Korea.
Kazumasa Aizawa is notable for his research on metal mines. When explaining the wage systemof the Mukuromi Gold Mine in Iwate Prefecture, Aizawa states that wages for Korean workers
were based on a grading system, which was also applied to calculating wages for Japanese workers.
Aizawa explains that equal pay was paid for equal work because the purpose of recruiting Koreans
was not to boost profits through payment of low wages, but to supplement the workforce andovercome labor shortages. (1988, p. 242) Although pursuing higher profit rates and supplementing
the workforce are not mutually exclusive, Aizawa should be credited for correctly recognizing thatthe primary purpose of Korean recruitment was to supplement the workforce and overcome thegeneral shortage of labor. On the other hand, Nishinarita concluded that, although Korean wages
were slightly lower than those of their Japanese counterparts, this essentially reflected differencesin skill levels and did not mean that the wage system discriminated based on ethnicity. However,Nishinarita states that the amounts received by Korean workers were actually very small due toforced savings, and that this is proof of exploitation. (1997, pp. 274-277)23
23 Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romusha kinro jokyo
ni kansuru chosa hokoku ] is reproduced in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981) Chosen mondai shiryo sosho, dai ni maki: senjikyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on Korean issues, Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor
management policies II].

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Hiroshi Ichihara’s research on coalminers in Hokkaido reveals that in 1940, Korean workers at
the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine were earning 30 percent less than Japanese workers. However, he
explains that the disparity was due to the lower efficiency of Korean workers resulting from thelanguage barrier and lower skill levels. (1991, p. 103) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers[Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha] compiled by the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on theForced Removal of Koreans, work at the coalmines operated by the Hokkaido Colliery & SteamshipCompany was conducted on a contract basis and, in accordance with the company’s internal
regulations, there was no discrimination in wages between Korean and Japanese workers. That is,
he writes that “wage differentials” resulted from differences in experience (years of employment) or,in other words, differences in work efficiency. (1999, pp. 248-251) Among more recent researchers,
Brandon Palmer concludes that Korean workers were subject to the same wage system as Japanese
workers. (2014, p. 300)24 In this connection, the following witness accounts are noteworthy. Accounts
from Kyushu coalmines recount that workers were told, “Work more and earn more; work less andearn less.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 2006b, p.
177) In the case of Hokkaido, this became, “Load more and wage will increase; load less and wage
will decrease.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 2006b,
p. 153)
V. Trends in Wage Differentials
What trends can be identified in wartime wage differentials between Korean and Japanese
workers? Did prewar wage differentials increase or decrease in wartime? While it is not easy toanswer these questions, the purpose of this section is to sketch a rough outline based on publishedmaterials. Table 8 presents data from the Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine located in
Fukuoka Prefecture. The data covers the period between July 1944 and October 1945, and records
the average daily wages of coalminers and installers (workers in charge of installing structuresto prevent collapse in mineshafts and other work areas) by ethnicity. Most of the Korean workers
employed in wartime coalmines worked inside the mines and, among these, the largest number
worked as excavators. (Lee Woo Youn, 2015) As important as the information in Table 8 is, as the
only source covering this period, and notwithstanding the fact that it was published in 1991, this data
has never been used by researchers. As previously noted, a complex array of charges was withheld
from wages, including forced savings and food costs. This has given rise to the generally accepted
theory that a mere pittance was paid in wages after the deduction of these considerable sums, andthat very serious ethnic discrimination existed in wages. It is likely that these assumptions haveclouded the vision of researchers and prevented them from using this available material.
The following can be surmised concerning wage differentials between Korean and Japanese
workers during a 14-month period leading to the end of the war. First, with regard to excavators, thewage differential ranged between 0.8 and 5.0 percent. With regard to installers, after excluding an
exceptionally high differential registered in March 1945, the wage differential ranged between 1.4
and 5.0 percent. This differential is far too small to be identified as evidence of ethnic discrimination,
24 Forced savings also applied to Japanese workers. This is because this system was adopted as a policy measure tocounter wartime inflation. During the war years, Korean workers were able to normally withdraw their savings at theend of their term of employment. However, immediately after the end of the war, some workers hurriedly returned
home before being able to settle accounts and withdraw their savings. This matter will be addressed in detail in a
future paper.

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and should be interpreted to reflect differences in work efficiency. It is also notable that Korean
wages exceeded Japanese wages during certain periods. For excavators, this occurred during
May and June 1945, and in November 1944 for installers. For the whole of 1944, wages for Korean
excavators were 2.9 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. However, in 1945, this relation
was reversed to give a slight advantage to Korean excavators.25 During 1944, wages for Korean
installers were 2.1 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. The differential increased to
4.2 percent in 1945. As of September 1943, of the total number of Korean workers working inside
coalmines, 54.2 percent were employed as excavators and 8.9 percent as installers. (Sekitan Toseikai Romu-bu 1943, p. 317) Taking these figures into consideration, it is possible to theorize that
ethnicity-based wage differentials in the Akaike Coalmine were lower in 1945 than in 1944.
In the following paragraphs, an attempt is made to sketch a rough outline of trends in ethnicitybased wage differentials using the fragmentary data that is available. First, a series of other available
sources shall be introduced. According to data covering 1942 from the Hitachi Coalmine in Ibaraki
Prefecture, monthly average wages for Korean and Japanese workers were 52.96 yen and 59.46
yen, respectively, indicating that Japanese workers were paid more. However, the average numberof workdays per month came to 21.9 days and 24.9 days, respectively, indicating that the Japanese
workers worked three more days than their Korean counterparts. This data can be used to calculate
the average daily wage for the two groups, which indicates that Korean workers earned 2.42 yen andJapanese workers earned 2.39 yen. That is, this calculation shows that Korean workers were earningslightly more per working day than their Japanese counterparts. (Rodo Jijo Chosasho, 1942, p. 90) At
this point, it cannot be determined whether this differential reflects differences in labor efficiency orsome other factor. However, among some Japanese labor managers, there was an understanding that
this situation resulted from the “special economic treatment” accorded to Korean workers.26 For thisreason, there was considerable dissatisfaction among some Japanese that they were being treatedthe “same as Koreans who had just completed their training period.” (Masaru Tonomura 2012, p.
67)27 In a survey of an unnamed coalmine located in Hokkaido, the Institute for Science of Labor
found that Korean wages were higher in all of the categories of excavators, installers and mechanics
working inside the mine, and that Japanese wages were higher for transporters, operators andmiscellaneous tasks. (1943c, Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1981, Vol. I, p. 19) Commenting on these examples,
E.W. Wagner has written, “Koreans were paid the standard wage scale for Japanese workers.” (1951,
p. 46)28 R. Mitchell points out that in certain instances, Korean workers “were not being treatedworse than Japanese conscripts, and that in some cases they were being treated better.” (1967, p. 85)
The following material from the Joban Coalmine in Fukushima Prefecture also seems to have
25 Although Table 8 indicates “0.0,” the actual figure is 0.03 percent. That is, in 1945, wages for Korean workers
were 0.03 percent higher than those for Japanese workers.
26 The following excerpt is from a document of Sumitomo Mining Company. “Workers from the Korean Peninsula
undergo three months of training upon recruitment. The Government-General of Korea shows a particularly strong
interest in the treatment of workers and their training and education during this period. This interest goes to theextent of becoming meddlesome. Regarding wages, the Government-General of Korea demands certain assurances.
From the perspective of the labor managers of this mine, these matters constitute special treatment (preferential
treatment that generally exceeds what is economically rational) accorded solely to workers from the Korean Peninsula.
Therefore, such workers must be treated separately from the other workers.” (Sumitomo Konomai Mining Company
1941, cited in Yoshihiko Moriya ed. 1991, III The Koreans [Chosen-jin ] Vol. 2, p. 1,483)
27 Tonomura cites the November 1940 issue of Tokudaka Monthly [Tokudaka geppo ] as his source.
28 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Coals and Metals in Japan’s War Economy

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never been used before. In December 1944, the company adopted a plan to raise wages in thefollowing year and estimated the increase in costs. The average daily labor cost used in thesecalculations is presented in Table 9. First, it is noted that the wage differential is larger than thatat the Akaike Coalmine. Once again, it can be assumed that the reason for the disparity lies in the
difference in the distribution of the number of years employed. Unfortunately, no data can be foundin this material to prove this inference. As a proxy for years of employment, Table 10 summarizes
the age structure of the miners working at the Joban Coalmine.
There is a significant difference in age distribution data available for the Iwaki Coalmine and the
Joban Coalmine. First, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine includes both Korean as well as Japanese
workers, who were in the majority, and presents the distribution for the entire workforce. Second,it should be noted that a comparison of the age distributions of Korean and Japanese workers
indicates that the age of Korean workers does not correspond to their years of employment, andmerely indicates the age at which they were mobilized and relocated to Japan. Korean workers were
employed under two-year contracts, very few extended their contract at the end of two years and avery large number of Korean workers escaped before the end of their two year contracts. In contrast,
Japanese coalminers mostly consisted of “on-site conscripts (gen-in choyo)” who were originally
hired by the employer but later assigned as national conscripted workers in the same workplace.
Therefore, the age distribution of Japanese workers more closely corresponds to their years of
employment. Table 10 shows that 62.1 percent of the Korean workers at the Joban Coalmine werein their twenties. Compared to this high level of concentration, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine
depicts a far more even age distribution. In other words, the Koreans working at the Joban Coalmine
were less experienced and less skilled than their Japanese counterparts because far fewer of themhad several years of actual experience in the mines. For this reason, the disparity in wages between
Korean and Japanese workers shown in Table 9 can be interpreted to reflect the relatively lower
productivity of Korean workers.
Table 9 also shows that the wage differential decreased between 1944 and 1945. Moriya hasreached the following conclusion using data from Sumitomo’s Konomai Mine in Hokkaido. “On the
grounds that Korean workers were less productive, wage increases were implemented six months
to one year later than for Japanese workers. However, in the latter stage of government-mediatedrecruitment, this discriminatory treatment was gradually removed, beginning with the most skilledworkers. Moreover, in the conscription stage, all discrimination was basically eliminated.” (2009,Vol. 3, pp. 37-38)29 While the implication is that ethnic discrimination gradually decreased during
wartime, it is not possible to generalize this conclusion based on currently available information.
Efforts must be made to discover new materials, and at the same time to carefully examine any datathat is found.
Another important challenge is to identify the characteristics of wartime wage differentials
between Korean and Japanese workers by comparing prewar wage disparities with war time
disparities. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to undertake such comparisons based on the
29 In exceptional cases, the standard work unit differed among companies. However, normally one work unit was
equivalent to nine hours of work inside the mines or ten hours outside the mines. “Government-mediated recruitment”
began in February 1942, and “conscription” began in September 1944. The source used by Shigeru Moriya is theSumitomo Konomai Mine’s Notice on Change in Wage by Job Description and Worker Number [Romu-in shokumei
bango kettei chingin henko tsuchi sho ].

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information available at this time. The primar y reason is the general paucity of wage data fromboth the prewar and wartime periods. As previously noted, data available from the Nippon Mining
Company only covers March 1943, while data from the Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine
is the only time-series data that covers a period of more than one year. Prewar data on wage
differentials by ethnicity at coal and metal mines in Japan is also extremely scarce. In light of the
scarcity of information, it is the hope of the present writer that the following observations on trends
in wage differentials may provide future researchers with valuable hints to be pursued.
First, Pak Kyong-Sik has written that, in 1921, the wages of Korean coalminers were equal to60 percent of the wages of Japanese coalminers. (1956, p. 35; 2008, Hangul edition, p. 39) If thisis correct, it would mean that wage differentials decreased substantially during the war years.
However, because Pak Kyong-Sik inexplicably fails to cite any sources for his calculation, this line ofinquiry cannot be pursued further. Second, the following can be found in materials prepared by the
Osaka Municipal Government’s Department of Social Affairs, Survey Section. Wages for coalminers
are presented by ethnicity in a list that divides wages into the three categories of “highest, standard
and lowest” as of June 1923. Wages for Korean workers are lower than those of Japanese workers by
23.3 percent in the highest category, 16.0 percent in the standard category and 11.1 percent in thelowest category. This level of disparity is significantly larger than what was observed at the Akaike
Coalmine during the war years. However, compared with data for wage differentials during the war
period from the Joban Coalmine of the Nippon Mining Company, the level of disparity is roughly thesame. This makes it difficult to discuss whether disparities were growing or narrowing.
The third relevant source is entitled Work Conditions of Korean Workers in the District [Kannai
Chosen-jin rodo jijo] and was compiled by the Fukuoka District Employment Agency (1929).
Already cited in the research of Chong Jin-Song, this source states that “in 1928, wages for Korean
coalminers were 20–30 percent lower than Japanese coalminers.” (Chong Jin-Song1989, p. 208)
As the previously mentioned Akaike Coalmine was also located in Fukuoka Prefecture, a
reduction in the wage differential between Korean and Japanese workers during the war years canbe ascertained by comparing data from the two mines. The fourth source again comes from Osakaand contains October 1930 wage data for manufacturing and construction jobs, which belong tojob categories very similar to mining. This data affirms a sizeable disparity, with wages for Korean
construction workers and manufacturing workers amounting to only 67.1 percent and 70.2 percent,respectively, of wages for corresponding Japanese workers. A comparison of these figures withwartime coalmining wages points to a narrowing of ethnicity-based wage differentials. It should be
noted, however, that manufacturing wages represent wages for craftsmen (skilled workers), so that
direct comparison with coalmining wages would not be appropriate. Due caution must be exercisedin undertaking such comparisons. The fifth and final source of information is entitled Conditions of
Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha ni kansuru jokyo] (1924), which was compiled by the Ministryof Home Affairs’ Department of Social Affairs, Section 1. This is the only comprehensive survey thatcovers the Japanese homeland in its entirety. The publication contains information on coalmine andmining wages for July 1924. The information on mining wages is excerpted and reproduced in Table
11.
The job categories in Table 11 consist of “extraction and metallurgy,” “extraction,” and “mining,”suggesting that the nationwide survey was not conducted using a common set of criteria. Fukushima
and Ibaraki Prefectures neighbor each other and sit astride the Joban coalfield, one of Japan’s three

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largest coalfields. Unlike Ibaraki Prefecture, there is hardly any evidence of ethnicity-based wage
disparity in Fukushima. Data for Hokkaido also points to either no disparity or higher wages for
Korean workers. While it is difficult to explain this result, what can be deduced from this table isthat wages for Korean and Japanese workers differed significantly among individual coal and metal
mines. This means that any effort to observe the trends in ethnic wage disparities between the
1920s and 1945 will ultimately have to await the publication of wage-related data from individualcompanies,30 analysis of which will allow us to verify whether prewar wage differentials decreased
during the war years. However, two additional points must be taken into consideration. As mentioned
before, the first point to bear in mind is the impact of changes in the composition of Japanese
workers on wage differentials with their Korean counterparts. Second, if a trend is actually identified
for this relatively short period of time, it will be important to determine the implication of such atrend. With these points in mind, it can be said that research on wartime ethnic wage disparity andtrends in this disparity has just started.
As Japan mobilized its resources for total war, the most important objective was to increase
output. To achieve this purpose, workers had to be incentivized. Employers on the other hand, were
flush with cash that came from the wartime increase in money supply and government support for
war industries. Putting these two factors together, it can be inferred that there was no monetary
rationale for employers to pay discriminatory wages to Korean workers for reasons unrelated tolabor productivity. In fact, discriminatory wages would have had a negative impact on the immediateobjectives of managing Japan’s wartime systems.
VI. Conclusion
Using materials published by researchers who have taken the position of “forced removal of
workers and forced labor,” we have observed that wartime wages paid to Korean coal and metalmine workers in Japan were high enough to allow a degree of choice in allocating earnings between
remittances to family in Korea and local expenditure. We were able to confirm that the assertion
made in prior research that “wages were either never paid, or amounted to a mere pittance” is notsupported by the available empirical data. Furthermore, we found that the wages of Korean coaland metal mine workers were not significantly different from the wages paid to Japanese workers.
Thus, we have shown in this paper that the assertion of “ethnicity-based wage discrimination” foundin prior research cannot be proven to be correct. In addition, various research and empirical data
exist suggesting that the wage differential between Korean and Japanese workers actually decreased
during the war years. Progress in research on this topic must await the publication of new materials
from individual companies.
It has been the contention of prior research that a ver y large part of receivable wages waswithheld through a system of forced savings. If this contention is accurate, it inevitably leads tothe question of whether such savings were equitably paid back to Korean workers. Similarly, it
must be determined whether remittances made to family members were properly delivered to the
30 According to Naoki Tanaka, the payroll ledgers [chingin daicho ] of the Nitchitsu Emukae Mining Company werearchived at Kyushu University’s Research Institute on Industrial Labor. (1978, p. 609) Payroll ledgers consisted of
separate sheets entered and kept for each individual worker, and covers both Korean and Japanese workers. Each
sheet contains detailed monthly records of work performed, wages paid and various allowances paid. It is presumed
that this material is currently held at Kyushu University’s archives. It is believed that large volumes of this type of
information exist. However, these have yet to be published.

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intended recipients. Although these are questions that cannot be avoided and must be answeredin considering the wages paid to Korean workers, the fact is that they have never been subjected
to rigorous and thorough research. This indeed is the area that the present writer hopes to
examine in future research. Parallel to a re-examination of remittances and forced savings, thefeatures and characteristics of “forced removal” of workers must be identified. Moreover, acts of
Korean resistance, including escape and disputes with employers, must be studied, and a better
understanding of the everyday life of Korean workers must be attempted by assessing the purchaseof a wide range of consumer goods and examining such behavior as drinking, gambling, use ofholidays, and excursions. Such research will allow us to more accurately re-create the everyday
life of Korean coal and metal miners who were mobilized to work in wartime Japan. These are thechallenges that the present writer looks forward to addressing in future research.

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Table 1: Wages and Expenditures at Major Mines in 1940
(Units: yen, %)Location

Name

Type

Averagemonthly
wage

Averagemonthlysavings

SapporoDistrict

Utashinai Coalmine

Coal

84.29

6.75

41.50

18.6*

17.44

Sorachi Coalmine

Coal

78.33

15.10

25.78

13.95

23.50

Yubetsu Coalmine

Coal

71.39

18.82

24.92

17.05

10.60

Harutori Coalmine

Coal

99.06

10.00

20.00

18.6*

50.46

Yubari Coalmine

Coal

68.89

8.18

26.10

14.57

20.04

Mitsui Sunagawa
Coalmine

Coal

80.37

20.16

23.49

13.95

22.77

Toyoha Mine

Metal

85.00

35.00

45.00

18.6*

-13.60

Shizukari Mine

Metal

80.04

20.17

24.93

16.28

18.67

Konomai Mine

Metal

85.46

36.78

31.94

17.05

-0.31

Takadama Mine

Metal

51.34

13.55

16.78

12.40

8.61

Hosokura Mine

Metal

58.42

2.50

16.00

15.50

24.42

Funauchi Mine

Metal

70.00

6.00

50.00

18.6*

-4.60

Sado Mine

Metal

66.77

11.44

21.16

12.40

21.77

Kawazu Mine

Metal

58.98

16.56

23.51

10.85

8.06

Tsuchikura Mine

Metal

80.00

10.00

30.00

18.60

21.40

Okuki Mine

Metal

70.00

5.00

20.00

18.6*

26.40

Shirataki Mine

Metal

67.57

23.04

19.47

10.85

14.21

Kishu Mine

Metal

67.09

4.20

6.10

15.50

41.29

Ooya Mine

Metal

85.50

7.50

17.00

18.6*

42.40

Wanibuchi Mine

Metal

64.10

3.70

40.00

13.95

6.45

Imade Mine

Metal

65.00

3.00

25.00

13.95

23.05

Besshi Mine

Metal

62.11

19.40

29.00

9.30

4.41

Sanyo Anthracite
Mine

Coal

79.64

38.13

57.28

12.40

-28.17

Iizuka Coalmine

Coal

76.10

10.39

21.13

16.43

28.15

Shinnyu Coalmine

Coal

74.67

15.00

25.00

14.88

19.79

Hojo Coalmine

Coal

76.48

11.00

35.00

14.88

15.60

Namazuta Coalmine

Coal

80.35

20.00

20.00

14.88

25.47

Kamiyamada
Coalmine

Coal

74.10

16.00

35.00

14.88

8.22

Sakito Coalmine

Coal

77.10

8.00

32.33

18.6*

18.17

Sendai
District

Tokyo
District
Osaka
DistrictFukuoka
District

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Averagemonthly
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Cost of food Difference

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Location

Name

Type

Averagemonthly
wage

Averagemonthlysavings

Fukuoka
District

Aso Company

Coal

72.00

22.50

22.50

15.50

11.50

Yoshikuma
Coalmine

Coal

50.61

6.73

27.50

15.50

0.88

Mineji – Himine
Coalmine

Coal

64.48

15.38

22.24

13.95

12.91

Shakanoo Coalmine

Coal

72.96

17.10

20.80

13.18

21.89

Shimoyamada
Coalmine

Coal

70.22

12.50

10.88

13.95

32.89

Hirayama Coalmine

Coal

73.87

11.07

25.00

15.50

22.30

Toyokuni Coalmine

Coal

65.61

10.00

20.00

15.50

20.11

Yamano Coalmine

Coal

40.00

6.23

21.30

17.05

-4.57

Inohana Coalmine

Coal

90.00

16.22

13.51

15.50

44.77

Nakatsuru No. 1
Mine

Coal

64.22

6.00

6.50

13.95

37.77

Onoura Coalmine

Coal

66.30

5.50

7.50

13.95

39.35

Iwaya Coalmine

Coal

72.88

11.92

23.29

18.6*

19.07

Yoshinoura
Coalmine

Coal

67.00

16.20

30.35

15.50

4.95

Senryu Coalmine

Coal

63.86

13.41

27.24

15.50

7.71

Ikeno Coalmine

Coal

76.64

6.01

14.96

15.50

40.17

Kanda Coalmine

Coal

85.47

10.29

28.75

15.50

30.93

Saganoseki Mine

Metal

75.64

12.73

16.72

12.40

33.79

71.95
(100.0)13.37(18.6)

24.84(34.5)

15.24(21.2)

18.50(25.7)

Average
Ratio (%)

Averagemonthly
remittance

Cost of food Difference

Source: Japan Mining Association [Nihon Kozan Kyokai] (1940), pp. 4-300, as excerpted in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981)
Chosen mondai shiryo sosho, dai ni kan: senji kyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on Korean issues,
Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor management policies II].

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Table 2: Breakdown of Wages and Expenditures(Units: yen, %)
Year
1940
1941

1944

Amounts withheld
Food
Savings
Other
15.24
13.37
11.78
(21.2)(18.6)(16.4)
11.50(Cannot becomputed)
18.00(12.0)

45.00(30.0)

Remitted
Sub-total
40.39(56.1)

25.00(16.7)

88.00(58.7)
67.16(53.8)

1945

24.84(34.5)
21.52(Cannot becomputed)
40.00(26.7)
36.88(29.6)

Balance

(9.3)

Total
6.72

22.00
(14.7)
20.75(16.6)

71.95(100.00)
52.96(Cannot becomputed)
150(100.00)
124.79(100.00)

Sources: Data for 1940 is from Japan Mining Association (1940), pp. 1-300. Data for 1941 is from Rodo Jijo Chosa Jo(1941), p. 90. This source provides no data on monthly average income, savings and remittance for 1941. Data for 1944is from Sekitan Tosei Kai Kyushu Chibu (1945), p. 209, and data for 1945 is from Yoshihiko Moriya (1996), p. 128.

Table 3: Wage Distribution by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido(Units: number of individuals, %)Japanese
KoreanLess than 30 yen 30-50 yen
50-70 yen
70-90 yen
90-110 yen 110-130 yen
Total
32
123
187
194
181
160
877
(3.6)
(14.0)(21.3)(22.1)(20.6)(18.2)(100.0)
117
126
40
22
7
12
324
(36.1)(38.9)(12.3)
(6.8)
(2.2)
(3.7)
(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), p. 90.

Table 4: Distribution of Years Employed by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido(Units: number of persons, %)KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year 1-2 years
2-3 years
3-4 years
4-5 years
5 years or more
Total
273
53
39
365
(74.8)(14.5)(10.7)(100.0)
276
123
106
101
42
285
933
(29.6)(13.2)(11.4)(10.8)(4.5)(30.5)(100.0)Source: See text

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Table 5: Years Employed and Wages at Coalmine B(Units: number of persons, %)A: Years employed
KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year 1-2 years
2-3 years
3-4 years
4-5 years
5 years or more
Total
194
524
215
933
(20.8)(56.2)(23.0)(100.0)
2,263
861
523
448
305
1,017
5,417
41.8
15.9
9.7
8.3
5.6
18.8
100.0

B: Wages
KoreanJapanese

Less than 30 yen 30-50 yen
50-70 yen
70-90 yen
90-110 yen 110 yen or more Total
130
68
98
134
147
375
952
(13.7)(7.1)(10.3)(14.1)(15.4)(39.4)(100.0)
443
655
611
753
1,179
1,435
5,076
(8.7)
(12.9)(12.0)(14.8)(23.2)(28.3)(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), pp. 169-170 for years employed, and pp. 80-81
for wages.

Table 6: Years Employed and Wages at Metal Mine I(Units: number of persons, %)A: Years employed
KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year 1-2 years
2-3 years
3-4 years
4-5 years
5 years or more
Total
96
188
284
(33.8)(66.2)(100.0)
654
450
324
298
257
70
2,053
(31.9)(21.9)(15.8)(14.5)(12.5)(3.4)(100.0)

B: Wages
KoreanJapanese

Less than 30 yen 30-50 yen
50-70 yen
70-90 yen
90-110 yen 110-130 yen
Total
38
53
69
47
34
19
260
(14.6)(20.4)(26.5)(18.1)(13.1)(7.3)(100.0)
73
222
469
403
299
256
1,722
(4.2)
(12.9)(27.2)(23.4)(17.4)(14.9)(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), p. 54 and pp. 169-170 for years employed, andpp. 173-174 for wages.

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Table 7: Wages at Nippon Mining Company(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Name of
Mine

In-mine workers

Outside workers

KoreanJapanese

Hokuryu

3.435

4.038

Toyoha

4.207

Eniwa

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

14.9

2.912

2.771

-5.1

5.586

24.7

3.171

3.055

-3.8

3.534

4.327

18.3

2.826

3.364

16.0

Ogane

3.806

5.091

25.2

2.712

3.251

16.6

Kamikita

3.631

4.273

15.2

2.695

2.868

6.0

Akaishi

3.395

3.493

2.8

-

2.572

-

Hanawa

3.127

4.149

24.6

2.378

2.475

3.9

Otani

3.050

3.232

5.6

2.551

2.079

-22.7

Takadama

2.342

3.091

24.2

1.524

1.958

22.2

Hitachi

3.112

4.226

26.4

2.823

2.688

-5.02

Nikko

2.321

2.797

17.0

2.293

2.169

-5.7

Mikawa

3.031

3.801

20.3

1.561

2.221

29.7

Minegasawa

2.804

2.843

1.4

2.283

2.250

-1.5

Ogoya

3.394

4.110

17.4

2.405

2.446

1.6

Shirataki

3.614

4.073

11.3

2.291

2.171

-5.5

Bajo

3.660

3.262

-12.2

1.322

1.900

30.4

Onoyama

3.170

2.998

-5.7

2.893

2.230

-29.7

Kasuga

2.696

2.880

6.4

2.512

2.986

15.9

Source: Chon Gi-Ho (2003), p. 103, based on data contained in Nippon Mining Company, Showa 17 nen shimohankijigyo gaikyo [Summary of operations during second half of Showa 17 (1942)].
Note: Wage differential in Tables 7 and 8 are computed as follows: (Japanese wages – Korean wages) x 100 / Japanesewages.

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Table 8: Average Daily Wages at Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)
Year

1944

1945

Month

Excavators

Installers

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

June

4.17

4.29

2.8

3.82

3.94

3.0

July

4.28

4.51

5.1

3.83

3.96

3.3

Aug

4.28

4.39

2.5

3.82

3.92

2.6

Sep

4.21

4.32

2.5

3.88

3.97

2.3

Oct

4.32

4.42

2.3

3.84

3.98

3.5

Nov

4.41

4.58

3.7

3.95

3.93

-0.5

Dec

4.49

4.56

1.5

4.01

4.04

0.7

Average

4.31

4.44

2.9

3.88

3.96

2.1

Jan

4.61

4.68

1.5

4.08

4.20

2.9

Feb

4.72

4.89

3.5

4.01

4.19

4.3

Mar

4.77

4.96

3.8

4.00

4.43

9.7

Apr

4.56

4.32

-5.6

4.96

5.21

4.8

May

4.62

4.39

-5.2

4.93

5.19

5.0

June

5.15

5.14

-0.2

5.04

5.11

1.4

July

5.29

5.33

0.8

5.20

5.29

1.7

Average

4.82

4.82

0.0

4.60

4.80

4.2

Source: Meiji kogyosho romu geppo [Meiji Mining Company monthly labor report], various issues, as cited in Eidai
Hayashi (1991), pp. 1153-1220.

Table 9: Daily Wages at Joban Coalmine(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Category

In-mine male workers

Outside male workers

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

Old average daily wage

4.127

4.998

17.4

2.797

3.805

26.5

New average daily wage

4.947

5.743

13.9

3.594

4.400

18.3

Source: Joban Coalmining Company (1944), p. 382.

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Table 10: Age Distribution of Coalminers(Units: number of persons, %)
Age
15-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56 and over
Total

Korean workers (Joban Coalmine)
435
1,587
1,365
614
475
197
66
11
4
4,754

Ratio
9.2
33.4
28.7
12.9
10.0
4.1
1.4
0.2
0.1
100.0

Total all workers (Iwaki Coalmine)
752
894
905
856
797
637

Ratio
13.6
16.2
16.4
15.5
14.3
11.6

671

12.2

5,212

100.0

Source: Shigeru Nagasawa (1987), p. 175.
Note: Data as of October 31, 1944 for Joban Coalmine and October 31, 1943 for Iwaki Coalmine

Table 11: Mining Related Wages(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Prefecture and Job
Fukuoka: Extraction and Metallurgy

Saga: Extraction

Yamaguchi: Extraction

Fukushima: Extraction and Metallurgy

Ibaraki: Mining

Hokkaido: Extraction and Metallurgy

Ethnicity
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential

HighestNormal
3.40
2.90

14.7

25.0
2.00
1.80

10.0

11.1

5.6

2.8

0.0

5.0

1.50
1.50
0.0

1.50
1.50
0.0

2.80
2.50
10.7

1.50
1.50

2.00
1.90

2.50
2.50
0.0

0.90
0.80

1.80
1.70

3.60
3.50

1.00
1.00
0.0

2.00
1.67
16.5

3.97
3.00
24.4

Lowest
2.00
1.50

1.20
0.70
41.7

2.50
2.50
0.0

1.60
1.80
-12.5

Source: Compiled from Ministr y of Home Affairs, Department of Social Affairs, Section 1, Chosen-jin rodosha ni
kansuru jokyo [Conditions of Korean workers], pp. 489-529.

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Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Professor Munehiro Miwa for his guidance on matters related to notation andcitation.

This paper was translated by JIIA from Japanese into English with the author’s consent in 2017.
JIIA takes full responsibility for the translation.
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