JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’
Version 1.1.0 – September 2020
Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS)

Contents
About JaNISS
2
Acknowledgement
2
Disclaimer
2
Abbreviations
3
Aims of this Guidebook and How to Use It
4
1. Aims of this Guidebook
4
2. What this Guidebook covers
5
3. What this Guidebook does not cover5
4. Structure of This Guidebook
6
5. Labelling of Information
6
6. How to Use This Guidebook
6
Background8
1. Professionalization of Security Management in Humanitarian and Development Field 8
2. A Brief History of Changes in the Security Environment
9
3. Safety & Security is an Enabler for Programmes
9Standard 1: Commitment to Safety and Security
11Standard 2: Organizational Safety and Security Policies and Plans
18
2.1. Safety and Security Policies
19
Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policy
28
2.2. Security Plan at Headquarters
29
Reference 2-II: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters
34
2.3. Security Plan in the Field
35
Reference 2-III: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts
44
Standard 3: Resources
45
Reference 3-I: Support Programme for Security Training
47
Reference 3-II. Security Costs that Can Be Funded by Japanese Donors
48
Standard 4: Human Resources Management
51
Standard 5: Accountability
56
Reference 5-I: Example Structure anesponsibilities
60
Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors
61Standard 7: Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations
64
References
67

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

About JaNISS
Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS) is an independent network of likeminded Japanese NGOs active in the field of international humanitarian and development
assistance. The objective of JaNISS is to support and coordinate capacity development so as
to ensure safety and security management under international standards in the Japanese
NGO community. To that end, it conducts activities such as drawing up safety and security
standards and organizing safety and security management training for Japanese NGOs, andit also carries out advocacy in Japanese society to promote safety and security management
by NGOs.
www.janiss.net
Acknowledgement
This Guidebook is a result of collaborative efforts by JaNISS member NGOs. Development of
the guidebook was managed by MOSS (Minimum Operating Security Standards) Task Forcemembers throughout the drafting process, comprising: ADRA Japan, Japan International
Volunteer Center, Japan Platform, Peace Winds Japan, Save the Children Japan, and World
Vision Japan, co-led by Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center, Shanti Volunteer
Association and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
JaNISS would like to thank UNHCR eCentre, InterAction and individual consultants, Randy
Martin, Basile “Laky” Pissalidis and John Campbell, for sharing their expertise with us, and inparticular, the UNHCR Representation in Japan for their extensive support. We are mostgrateful to attorney Miho Numata for her legal advice on Standard 1. Many existing manuals
and handbooks were helpful in the preparation of this Guidebook. Thanks also to all thoseJapanese NGOs who were involved and provided feedback throughout the drafting process.
Disclaimer
JaNISS is a member-led grouping and has no separate legal status under the laws of Japan or
any other jurisdiction, and references to ‘JaNISS’ in this disclaimer shall mean the member
organizations, observers and secretariat of JaNISS. While JaNISS endeavours to ensure thatthe information in this document is correct, JaNISS does not warrant its accuracy andcompleteness. This document is general in nature, and its contents may not be applicable inall situations. Its contents shall be modified and adapted as appropriate, to suit the needs ofparticular organizations and situations. JaNISS shall not be liable for any kind of loss ordamage whatsoever to you or a third party arising from reliance on the information containedin this document. This document may include the views or recommendations of third partiesand does not necessarily reflect the views of JaNISS or indicate a commitment to a particular
course of action.
© 2018 Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Abbreviations
CHS: Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CIMP: Critical Incident Management Plan
CIMT: Critical Incident Management TeameCentre: UNHCR Regional Centre for Emergency Preparedness
ECHO: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
GISF: Global Interagency Security Forum
GPR8: Good Practice Review 8
HF: High Frequency
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
INSO: International NGO Security Organization
ISAF: International Security Assistance ForceJaNISS: Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security
Medevac: Medical Evacuation
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOSS: Minimum Operating Security Standards
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSEA: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PTSD: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
R&R: Rest and Recreation
SIF: Safety in the Field
SLT: ‘Saving Lives Together’
SOPs: Standard Operating Procedures
SRA: Security Risk Assessment
SRM: Security Risk Management
TOR: Terms of Reference
UNDSS: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
VHF: Very High Frequency

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Aims of this Guidebook and How to Use It
1. Aims of this Guidebook
The 'NGO Standards for Safety and Security' (hereafter Standards) were adopted by themember NGOs of Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS). The Standards capture
the most common denominators in the internationally accepted safety and security standards,
where the signatory NGOs are expected to develop their own policies and mechanisms.
The Standards intend to complement existing safety and security frameworks of signatory
NGOs which should be specific and unique to each organization.
The Standards is made of following seven Standards: ‘Commitment to Safety and Security’,‘Organizational Safety and Security Policies and Plans’, ‘Resources’, ‘Human Resources
Management’, ‘Accountability’, ‘Collaboration with Other Actors’, and ‘Safety and Security ofLocal Partner Organizations’.
Each NGO is ultimately responsible for determining how the seven Standards will be met
within their own organization. How this is accomplished will be based on the mission,
mandate, values and risk tolerance of each organization.
This Guidebook on 'NGO Standards for Safety and Security' (hereafter Guidebook) has been
produced by the member NGOs of JaNISS to support Japanese NGOs in translating theseseven Standards into tangible actions. This Guidebook also includes following objectives:
To assist individual Japanese NGOs, self-evaluate the extent to which they have covered
the safety and security policies and procedures that should be considered according to
the Standards, and to locate suggested guidance, tools and resources when they identify
room for improvement.
● To provide Japanese NGOs with references to relevant documents and online information
accumulated by the United Nations organizations and international NGOs.
● To introduce, and encourage the introduction of, methods and ideas related to safety andsecurity which have not been fully incorporated by Japanese NGOs such as security risk
analysis, security planning and reviewing involving all relevant staff members, security
related training, and clear definition of the security roles and responsibilities of managers
and staff members.
●

Based on consultation with a wide range of humanitarian and development NGOs, thisGuidebook also aims to achieve following goals:
Applicable not only to Japanese NGOs working in conflict or high-risk areas but also to
those who work in the overseas humanitarian and development operations.
● Applicable to various Japanese NGOs regardless of their organizational size andoperational scale, category of staff (from paid to unpaid), presence in the field (expatriate
or mission-based), and organization’s mission and mandate (from emergency relief tostudy tour).
●

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’●

Informative to Japanese NGOs located outside the metropolitan area where access tomaterials on security management has been limited and to assist their capacity-building
efforts by providing relevant information on guidelines, tools and resources.

2. What this Guidebook covers
This Guidebook intends to cover following aspects of security management and practice:● This Guidebook intends to cover most aspects of security management and practice thatare commonly thought relevant to Japanese NGOs working in humanitarian anddevelopment operations.
● This Guidebook intends to cover both national/local and international staff equally, unless
it is explicitly referred to one or the other group.
● This Guidebook intends to focus mainly on ‘security’ rather than ‘health and safety’ issues(see the definitions of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ in Standard 2.1, Guidance Note 1).
● This Guidebook is comprised of existing good practices drawn extensively from security
policies and manuals produced by network NGOs such as InterAction and European
Interagency Security Forum (EISF), humanitarian NGOs, UN agencies and the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
3. What this Guidebook does not coverAt the same time, this Guidebook does not intend to cover following aspects of security
management and practice:
●

●

●

●

This Guidebook is general in nature, and its contents may neither be applicable to all
situations nor cover aspects of security management and practice that are specific toparticular locations, cultures, or type of humanitarian or development operations. Its
contents should be modified and adapted as appropriate, to suit the needs of particularorganizations and situations.
This Guidebook is intended neither to provided off-the-shelf safety and security
standards and policies for individual NGOs nor impose certain standards or policies on
individual NGOs. It offers suggested guideline, tools and resources, designed to assist
organizations to think through their security policies and procedures. Each organization
has different operational context, mission and mandate, operational period, financial
and human resources, and involvement into various aid and local networks, and theirsecurity policies and procedures should be established according to individualorganizational and operational contexts with the involvement of all relevantinternational and national/local staff.
At the moment, issues related to ‘safety’, such as health threats and natural disasters,
may not be the primary focus of this Guidebook, but it also draws attention to thematters associated to vehicle accidents, insurance and medical evacuation and the needof post-incident psychosocial support. It is important to remember that health and safety
threats also pose significant threats to aid workers and organizations, and should takeprecautions accordingly.
This Guidebook does not cover the security or protection of local populations, refugees
and displaced persons, women and children, or other vulnerable persons.
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’●

Most of all, this Guidebook is no guarantee of ‘security’. Using this Guidebook does not
replace the need for regular and inclusive planning, appropriate training, judgement
based on experience, coupled with the relevant equipment and procedures, applied aseach situation and operation requires.

4. Structure of This Guidebook
This Guidebook follows the examples of the Sphere Handbook, and is composed of several
standards, relevant key actions, key indicators, and guidance notes.
●

Key Actions: are suggested to attain the standard. Some actions may not be applicablein all contexts, and it is up to the organizations to select the relevant actions and devise
alternative actions that will result in the standard being met.

●

Key Indicators: serve as ‘signals’ that show whether a standard has been attained. They
provide a way of measuring and communicating the processes and results of the key
actions. The key indicators relate to the minimum standard, not to the key actions.

●

Guidance Notes: include context-specific points to consider when aiming at reaching the
key actions and key indicators. They provide knowledge, good practices, information andresources accumulated by the global humanitarian and development community.
Further details and references are provided at the end of each chapter.

5. Labelling of Information● Standards, Key Actions and Key Indicators are bordered.
● Guidance notes of particular importance are highlighted in blue.
● Information in Standard 2 that is of particular importance to those operating in conflictareas or high-risk areas are shaded.
6. How to Use This Guidebook
A) Senior Managers and Operational Managers of Organizations (Executive Board
Members): It is strongly recommended to refer at least the following sections of thisGuidebook in order to understand the general outline of security risk management
including the duty of care.
● Standard 1● Key Actions and Key Indicators for other standards (there are three Key Actions andIndicators in the Standard 2)● Sections that are highlighted in blueB) Security Managers/Officers of Humanitarian Organizations: It is recommended to readthrough this Guidebook. For those organizations operating in conflict or high-risk areas,
it is strongly encouraged to closely examine the sections that are shaded in Standard 2.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’C) Security Managers/Officers of Development Organizations: When appropriate, refer the
shaded sections in Standard 2 which are intended for organizations operating in conflictor high-risk areas, but otherwise it is recommended to read through the rest of thisGuidebook.
D) For a quick overview of the Guidebook: It is recommended to refer the following sections.
● Key Actions and Key Indicators of each Standard (there are three Key Actions and Key
Indicators in Standard 2)● The ‘Background’● Sections highlighted in blueE)

Those who plan to conduct a ‘Self-check’ on their organization’s Security Plans andProcedures, or those who plan to create Security Plans for their organizations:
Refer Guidance Notes and References in Standard 2 to assess the organization’s security
management, and take necessary measures and actions to improve the organization’s
security policies, procedures and plans.
It is highly recommended to compile reflections, measures and actions into a document
and to share it with relevant parties. The critical part of this exercise lies in the processof planning and reviewing the security plan with the involvement of all relevant staff, andnot the document itself that is produced by this exercise. Thus, the document should be
kept simple and concise.
Organizations that do not have field offices and that operate on a mission-basis arerecommended to take ‘2.3 Security Plan in the Field’ into consideration when they are
considering ‘2.2 Security Plan at Headquarters’ and the security plan for partnerorganizations.
● “Safety and Security Policies”, “Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety andSecurity Policies”● “Security Plan at Headquarters”, “Reference 2-II: Sample Outline of a Security
Plan for Headquarters”● “Security Plan in the Field”, “Reference 2-III: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for
Field Posts”

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Background
1. Professionalization of Security Management in Humanitarian and Development Field
Looking back on the history of Japanese NGOs, the first wave of emergence took place in theearly 1960s, when several organizations were founded aiming at addressing the social
development needs in Asian countries, followed by the second wave when a number ofexisting organizations were established around 1979 as a result of the Indochina refugee crisis.
1 In the 30 years since their advent, Japanese NGOs have expanded their operational size, andare now working in various sectors not only in Asian countries but also in countries in the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Quite a few NGOs do not limit themselves to working
in development, but are proactively engaged in the humanitarian response both in naturaland complex emergencies.
Regardless of whether working in a development context or a humanitarian context,
expansion of operational size increases the chance of encountering various threats. According
to the Humanitarian Outcomes report, the nature of the security environment has becomemuch more complex since the 1990s. For 10 years between 2005 and 2015, the number ofcasualties of aid workers has been steadily increasing. Japanese staff are not immune to thistrend. 2 Since the turn of the century, there have been reports of a number of cases in which
Japanese staff have been kidnapped or abducted, taken hostage, or become victims ofterrorism. Even excluding victims of security-related incidents, a number of aid workers havelost their lives due to contingent events such as road accidents and diseases.
Given the prevalence of security as well as safety related threats, what kind of security risks
could NGOs face in their working environment? Take the threat of malaria as an example.
Suppose that a Japanese staff managing a project in an area where malaria is endemic is
infected by malaria and hospitalized in a dazed condition. As long as the organization took
the decision to implement a project in such an area, it should have provided the staff withnecessary measures to prevent malaria as well as all possible means to protect their life incase of infection. In the worst-case scenario of loss of life, the top management of theorganization will inevitably have to explain the incident to the public.
As NGOs working in the field of international cooperation, we are responsible for ensuring
the safety and security of all concerned staff and stakeholders. This means that if any person
involved in our work – irrespective of whether an international staff or a national/local staff,
or whether a direct employee or a beneficiary – becomes a victim of any type of incident, weare morally and legally obliged to take institutional action. If the organization does notproperly respond to the incident, it may lead to serious consequences such as cessation of
the project or, in the worst case, dissolution of the organization. We are therefore required
to professionalize ourselves in term of security management.

1 Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). (n.d.). Understanding NGOs [Japanese article]. Retrieved on 21

March 2018 from www.janic.org/ngo/faq/.
2 The Aid Worker Security Database. (n.d.), Major attacks on aid workers: Summary statistics. Retrieved on 21 March 2018from https://aidworkersecurity.org.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’This chapter describes the threats that NGOs are facing, giving an overview of how the safety
and security environment has changed over the decades since the emergence of JapaneseNGOs, and describes the institutional responsibilities that organizations should take whenworking in high-risk environments, and concludes by stressing the importance of security
management as an enabler for programmes and accountability.
2. A Brief History of Changes in the Security Environment●

1960s to 1980s
Japanese NGOs emerged in this period. While a nuclear war was the main security threat
during the Cold War, the threat of ethnic or religious conflict was not so prevalent as
nowadays. The major safety and security concerns for NGOs therefore were mainly thoseof ordinary crime, traffic accidents, and diseases.

●

1990s
The end of the Cold War triggered the rise of political and religious radicalism as well as
ethnic cleansing, which led to ethnic and religious conflicts worldwide. Along with theincrease in humanitarian need in conflict affected areas, Japanese NGOs also began
entering the field of humanitarian assistance, which required those working in thehumanitarian arena to be well aware of the security concerns and to take necessary
measures. Incidents directly targeting Japanese staff, however, were still rare during thisperiod.

●2000s
The establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) became a controversial
issue, potentially increasing security threats to humanitarian workers particularly in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Kidnappings and assaults directly targeting Japanese nationals
frequently occurred between 2004 and 2008 in those countries. These incidents
compelled humanitarian agencies to re-assess their own security measures. This periodalso became a turning point in that the government of Japan shifted its stance andrestricted Japanese nationals from going to medium/high-risk areas.

●

2010s
Protracted conflicts in the Middle East and Africa exacerbated the security environment.
Japanese nationals continue to fall victim to kidnappings and assaults in countries suchas Syria, Algeria and Bangladesh, giving Japanese humanitarian workers little space tooperate in medium/high-risk areas. Widespread indiscriminate terrorism is anothersecurity concern; countries not affected by conflicts are no longer immune to terrorism.
It requires those involved in development, whose mandate is not necessarily of ahumanitarian nature, to raise their awareness of security management.

3. Safety & Security is an Enabler for Programmes
Each organization has its own respective mission and, in pursuit of it, we must continuously
weigh the outcomes we aim to achieve against the risks we may face. We are able to provide
assistance only when we judge that the expected outcome is larger than the risks we may
face.
9JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

The worldwide deterioration of the security environment since the 1990s tilts the scales
against the pursuit of our missions, meaning that the security risks are often higher than theoutcomes we may expect. While security threats have increased significantly over the
decades, humanitarian and development needs are also increasing more than ever before. In
such circumstances, it is the NGO itself that should make the decision whether or not to go
to a high-risk environment, and if it decides to go, the organization must be responsible forpotential outcomes that may occur as a result of taking security risks. As a result, thegoverning bodies of the NGO (such as the Board of Directors) will bear the duty of care for
their staff and operations.
While it may be true that we should avoid taking risks where possible, we should not give up
pursuing our missions simply because there is a security risk. This is because it is the missionof NGOs to address the challenges underlying the security threats. Security Risk Management(SRM) is therefore essential in order to pursue our mission. SRM is a way to properly manage
the risks rather than simply avoiding them, to minimize the negative effects, to establish anenvironment where we can operate, and to be accountable for ourselves. Facing the threats
does not necessarily mean we have to avoid them; rather, we are required to manage them.
The next chapters will introduce seven standards that enable organizations to operate in highrisk environments. These standards are not the goal per se, but are a means to the end.
Column: Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
PRT is a military-civilian structure designed to operate in insecure environments such as postconflict countries. It was initiated by the U.S. in post-Taliban Afghanistan in the early 2000s.
A number of PRTs were formulated mainly by the NATO states and their command authority
was delegated to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Under the command of thearmed forces of the countries in charge, military units engage in security enforcement
whereas civilian units provide aid assistance. As of July 2017, there are 26 PRTs led by 14
countries3. PRTs were also in operation from 2005 to 2011 in Iraq. While it has been said that
PRTs improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development,
criticisms also have been raised from civil society arguing that, because of the nature ofmilitary-oriented operation, there are concerns about the PRTs’ efficiency, speciality andequity in delivering aid assistance. Civil societies too are concerned that security threats tohumanitarian workers could increase as local people could mistake humanitarian workers formilitary-associated personnel.4

3 USAID. (2018). Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://www.usaid.gov/provincial-reconstruction-teams.
4 Kei’ichiro Tomita. (2007). Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) Operations in Afghanistan [Japanese article]. Reference

2007-03. Retrieved 21 March 2018 from http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/999764; Japan Afghan NGO Network (JANN).
(2009). On Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan Alternative to Japan’s Refuelling Mission in the Indian Ocean [Japanese
article]. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/notice/2010/data/20100219_afghanistan_lobby.pdf.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 1: Commitment to Safety and Security
The management of signatory organizations commits to ensure the safety and security of its
staff, volunteers, interns, and contractors in line with their duty of care and acceptedinternational standards for safety and security.
Primary Responsibility
Safety and security are not only an ethical and moral concern that may arise as a result of anindividual’s desire to engage in international cooperation, but are also an explicit legal
obligation. This requires the recognition and acceptance of responsibility and accountability
under the law, through a top-down approach driven by the organization’s governing bodies.
As a result, institutional policy should not be a condensed version of amalgamated fieldpractices. Thus, the primary responsibility of representatives of the organization is to ensure
the safety and security of its own staff members.
Duty of Care
Duty of care is an organizational obligation that has implications for SRM. The duty of carebenchmark has risen significantly over the past decade, and what was once considered goodenough would certainly not be considered adequate today. Although duty of care is a legal
term for the responsibilities that organizations have towards their staff, there is also a moral
obligation of duty of care that organizations should consider. As professionals engaged inhumanitarian and development activities, duty of care to aid workers should not be
undermined and indeed it should be complemented as far as possible.
Accepted International Standards
As humanitarian programmes expanded globally in the 1990s, there was a growing
recognition of the need to improve professional standards, to enhance the effectiveness ofinterventions, and to ensure accountability within the humanitarian system as a whole. In
response, major international standards on humanitarian work emerged such as
Humanitarian Principles, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief and Core
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). They guide humanitarian action
and their application is essential to distinguish humanitarian action from other forms ofactivities and action. There is a general consensus that compliance with these international
standards enhances organizational safety and security in both humanitarian anddevelopment field.
Key Actions:••

Make sure that the governing body of the organization (e.g. Executive board, annual
meeting) explicitly states and convey the organization’s Duty of Care to all employees
concerning safety and security in the workplace. (see explanations about Article 644of the Civil Code in Guidance Notes 1, 2 (P12))Make sure that the governing bodies of the organization delegate responsibilities
explicitly (e.g. to the chair of the board) to ensure legal and regulatory complianceconcerning safety and security in the workplace. (see Guidance Note 3 (P12) and
Reference 5-1 Example Structure and Responsibilities p. 60)
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’••

Recognize widely-accepted international standards by the organization (e.g. Code of
Conduct for IFRC and NGO, CHS). (see also Guidance Notes 4, 5, 6, 7 (P13-14))
Make all employees aware of their legal rights and obligations concerning safety andsecurity in the workplace. (see also Guidance Notes 1 (P12), 8 (P14), Standard 2.1
Guidance Notes 5 (P22), Standard 5 Guidance Notes 2 (P57))

Key Indicators:•••

Responsibility for legal compliance is known throughout the organization and to otherrelevant stakeholders.
Compliance with laws and regulations is reviewed in line with accepted international
standards on a regular basis.
If applicable to organizational mission and mandate, consider to become a signatoryof accepted international standards.

Guidance Notes:
1. Scope of Application: National laws of the country in which NGOs are registered apply toorganizations, associations, employers and employees. This includes national laws which
address health and safety in the workplace. NGOs owe a legal responsibility to theiremployees to ensure a safe work environment, whatever and wherever that may be, andto take reasonable practical steps to protect them against any foreseeable risks. This
responsibility is no less relevant to insecure field environments that often present
context-specific risks and NGOs are subject to the same legal obligations andresponsibilities as other organizations.
2. Duty of Care: The duty of care is a legal obligation imposed on an individual ororganization requiring them to adhere to a standard of reasonable care while performing
acts that present a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others. Negligence is often
defined as a failure to adhere to (or breach) a standard of reasonable care, resulting inboth organizational and individual loss, damage and injury. The standard of reasonablecare is typically assessed by reference to the actions of a person exercising reasonablecare and skill in the same or similar circumstances. The standard of reasonable care willvary from country to country.
NGOs owe legal obligations to ensure physical safety for employed staff as stipulated
under Article 5 of the Labour Contract Act, “In association with a labour contract, an
Employer is to give the necessary consideration to allow a Worker to work while ensuring
the employee's physical safety.” Employers are required to manage working time of staff
appropriately, to provide medical check-up and subsequent actions as needed, and toestablish a safety and health management system. This Guidebook mainly presents
organizational duties and responsibilities which derive from the duty of care as an
overarching concept to cover various types of contracts including those with board
members, contract workers, secondment staff, interns and volunteers, along with staff
employed outside of Japan.
3. Civil Code Article 644: In the Japanese context, the duty of care of an organization refers
to “Duty of Care of Mandatory” in Article 644 of the Civil Code. The organization and the12

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

governing bodies are in a relationship in which the responsibilities of the organization are
delegated to the governing bodies by the organization. In accordance with Article 644,
the governing bodies (referring to board directors, supervisors, auditors, etc.) to which
the organizational responsibilities are delegated “shall assume a duty to administer the
mandated business with the care of a good manager in compliance with the main purportof the mandate”, i.e. duty of care. Therefore, the governing bodies, according to theirposition and ability, no matter whether they are paid or unpaid, whether full-time or parttime, are required to perform their authority and responsibilities with duty of care.
4. Humanitarian Principles: Underlining all humanitarian action are the principles ofhumanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles, derived frominternational humanitarian law, have been taken up by the United Nations in General
Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114. Their global recognition and relevance arefurthermore underscored by the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief(Guidance Note 5) and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability(Guidance Note 7), and are relevant to both humanitarian and development agencies.
Because humanitarian action should be non-political, humanitarian and social, theorganization is guided by humanitarian principles in its response to all humanitarian
issues, whether caused by conflict, violence, natural disaster or poverty. The principle of“Do No Harm”, for example, obliges an organization to prevent and mitigate any negative
impact of its actions on affected populations. Humanitarian principles provide the basis
for warring parties to accept humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict. It is
important to ensure that organizational policies and operational decision-making on
issues such as funding, beneficiaries, modes of operation, and security measures are inline with humanitarian principles.
5. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief: The Code of Conduct sets out
ten core principles as well as three annexes with recommendations to governments ofaffected states, donor governments and intergovernmental organizations. Over theyears, adherence to the Code has become one important way for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC) and NGOs to define themselves ashumanitarians. Since the development of the Code of Conduct, there have been many
developments in terms of standards and mechanisms to improve the quality andaccountability of humanitarian response. However, the Code of Conduct remains acentral reference in the sector. The IFRC keeps a public listing of all the humanitarianorganizations that become signatories of the Code on its website and new signatories arewelcome to register at any time. The IFRC neither vets new signatories nor monitors theircompliance. However, in order to be listed on this site as a signatory, each organization
must: (1) affirm that it is a humanitarian organization; (2) provide and update all
requested contact details, including its website address; and (3) submit its request
through the head of the organization. Registration is accepted through the IFRC website.
6. InterAction’s Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS): Reflecting theoperational environment of NGOs and the rise of serious incidents such as killings,
kidnappings, and attacks that cause serious injuries, as well as politically-motivated13

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’attacks against humanitarian workers, InterAction, which is the largest alliance of U.S.based international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who focus on disaster relief
and sustainable development programmes, has established a Security Unit to help
members develop appropriate responses. In this context, InterAction’s MOSS wasdeveloped to assist InterAction’s members to develop their own security management
system in incorporating MOSS in their respective institutional approaches to security.
Recognizing that every organization will have differing needs, the “Suggested Guidance”
section for each standard below represents points to consider, rather than requirements,
for implementing InterActions' Security Standards. Not every point is necessarily
appropriate for every organization or for every situation. MOSS-introduced systematic
approaches to NGOs’ risk management and those security risk management systems
have become the industry standard, which many of InterAction’s members follow. JaNISS
referred to InterAction’s MOSS when developing its own NGO Standards for Safety andSecurity and this guidebook with technical cooperation from InterAction’s Security Unit.
7. Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS): The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality andAccountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organizations and individuals
involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of
the assistance they provide. It also facilitates greater accountability to communities andpeople affected by crisis: knowing what humanitarian organizations have committed towill enable them to hold those organizations to account. The CHS places communities
and people affected by crisis at the centre of humanitarian action and promotes respect
for their fundamental human rights. It is underpinned by the right to life with dignity, andthe right to protection and security as set forth in international law, including within theInternational Bill of Human Rights. As a core standard, the CHS describes the essential
elements of principled, accountable and high-quality humanitarian action. Humanitarianorganizations may use it as a voluntary code with which to align their own internal
procedures. It can also be used as a basis for verification of performance, for which a
specific framework and associated indicators have been developed to ensure relevanceto different contexts and types of organization.
8. Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Safeguarding Measures andStandards: In areas affected by conflict and natural disasters, risks of sexual exploitation
and abuse, domestic violence, child marriage, abuse against vulnerable people, andGender-Based-Violence (GBV) are increased. It is important for NGOs to recognize theserisks and take necessary preventive measures to protect staff and beneficiaries. Sexual
exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping forces come to international
attention in the 1990s. In 2000, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 wasadopted, highlighting the gender dynamics of armed conflicts and emergencies andstressing the need to protect vulnerable populations from sexual and gender-based
violence. In 2003, the UN secretary-general issued a bulletin outlining a zero-tolerance
policy on sexual exploitation and abuse applicable to all UN staff, and the responsibilities
of mission leadership to implement accountability, including through referral of cases tonational bodies for criminal prosecution. In the NGO sector, sexual misconduct by asenior manager working in earthquake-hit Haiti in 2010 came to light in 2018, leading to
sweeping calls for the promotion of an environment that keeps people safe.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

A number of safeguarding policies and guidelines have been adopted to date byinternational organizations including the following:
Minimum Operating Standards; protection from sexual exploitation and abuse by own
personnel
To provide protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) by own personnel, thecompliance with a set of Minimum Operating Standards for PSEA (MOS- PSEA) is required.
The MOS-PSEA were developed by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), modelling
after the Minimum Operating Security Standards for Staff Safety (MOSS) compliancemechanism, which is mandatory for the UN System to ensure there is a common set of
requirements that all agencies follow in order to ensure staff safety. The key elements of
the MOS-PSEA are: management and coordination, engagement with and support oflocal community population, prevention, and response.
PSEA Implementation Quick Reference Handbook
This Handbook provides a quick reference guide to measures for protection from sexual
exploitations and abuse and sexual harassment (PSEAH) in an organization or project.
Each chapter includes a case study sharing how specific organizations tackled thisimportant work. The guidelines can be used by organizations which are just beginning to
put PSEAH measures in place. It can also be used by more experienced organizations tocheck that their PSEAH work fully reflects current good practice. The original PSEA
handbook was updated in October 2020 to include sexual harassment.
Safeguarding children and young people
A group of Japanese NGOs developed this guidebook in 2020, with the aim of promoting
safeguarding measures among these organizations and beyond. Eleven standards arepresented to protect children and young people from various risks including exploitation
and abuse in NGO projects. Regular self-assessment is also recommended.

Column 1: Case Law on Duty of Care (Dennis vs Norwegian Refugee Council)
On 29 June 2012, Steve Dennis, an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), wasinjured and kidnapped, along with three other colleagues, following an attack during a VIP
visit to the IFO II refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Four days later the hostages were set freeduring an armed rescue operation carried out by Kenyan authorities and local militia. Three
years later, Dennis submitted a claim at the Oslo District Court against his former employer,
the NRC, for compensation for economic and non-economic loss following the kidnapping.
With a focus on determining negligence in relation to the incident, the Court considered andreached conclusions on the following: the foreseeability of risk, mitigating measures toreduce and avert risk, gross negligence, causation and loss.
The Court found that the risk of kidnapping was foreseeable. It also found that the NRC could
have implemented mitigating measures to reduce and avert the risk of kidnapping. The Court
furthermore found that the NRC acted with gross negligence and that the NRC's negligent
conduct was a necessary condition for the kidnapping to have occurred. In summary, theCourt found that the legal requirements for compensation for injury, as well as compensation
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’for pain and suffering were met. The Court ordered the NRC to pay Dennis approximately 4.4
million Norwegian Krone (approximately 465,000 euros (60 million yen)).
Although the terminology and approach used by the Court differ from a standard SRM
approach, the ruling refers to elements familiar to security experts and uses some of theevidence of failings in these areas to find that the NRC fell short of meeting due care standards
in this instance. For example, in terms of context and risk analyses, the Court found that there
was an insufficient understanding of the security situation in Dadaab by the NRC decisionmakers, which resulted in the risk of kidnapping not being properly analysed shortly before
the VIP visit. The Court also found weaknesses with regards to the identification andimplementation of mitigating measures, particularly in relation to the decision to not use anarmed escort, which was contrary to existing practice and security recommendations for
Dadaab at the time.
The fundamental conclusion that can be drawn from the court case is that duty of care is alegal obligation that organizations in the international aid sector must adhere to and that theymust do so to the same standard as any other employer. The ruling does not argue, despite
the context, that operating in Dadaab was contrary to the law. The case instead highlightsthat mitigating measures must be proportionate to the risk. Therefore, the ruling should notcause organizations to become more risk averse but rather cause them to institute stronger
SRM procedures in line with the context they are operating in. The ruling furthermore
highlights that an essential component of duty of care in high-risk environments is ‘informed
consent’. The Court found that informed consent was doubtful or entirely absent in someinstances leading up to the incident.
The case was covered widely in mainstream media and discussed at length by aid workers
and organizations in different forums and analytical reports. It was described as: a ‘landmark
case’, ‘precedent-setting’, a ‘game-changer’, and a ‘wake-up call’ for the aid industry, withsignificant remarks on duty of care.
Column 2: Insurance against risks
NGOs are encouraged to take actions to minimize any risks by carrying out risk assessments.
One option to minimize risk is to have an insurance policy. It is crucial for the organization’s
management team to consider the balance between risk management and affordability, as
the general rule is that the higher the associated risk is, the more expensive the cost is. Several
types of insurance policies are shown below:
1. Employer’s liability insurance
Employers’ liability insurance can pay the compensation amount and legal costs if an
employee claims compensation for a work-related illness or injury. Tokio Marine & Nichido
Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. offers this insurance policy for charities, NGOs, and individual businessowners. It also provides a policy called ‘Super T Protection’, in combination with the following
three policies.
2. Non-statutory compensation insurance

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

If an employee claims compensation for a work-related illness or injury, and the amount tobe paid exceeds a statutory amount, this insurance policy can pay the compensation amount.
3. Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O)
Directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance is intended to protect individuals frompersonal losses if they are sued as a result of serving as a director or an officer of anorganization. It can also cover the legal fees and other costs the organization may incur as aresult of such a suit. MS & AD Holdings, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., andothers offer such insurance policies. NGOs with the public corporation status are entitled tobuy this policy at a reduced price from Sompo Japan through a group insurance system byJapan Association of Charitable Organizations (JACO).
4. Employment practices liability coverage
This insurance provides coverage to employers against claims made by employees alleging
employment-related issues such as wrongful termination of contract and various types ofharassment.
As to overseas travel insurance, see Standard 4, Column 2 (p. 54).
References● Irish Aid. (2013). Irish Aid Guidelines for NGO Professional Safety and Security Risk
Management.
● Shaun Bickley. (2017). Security Risk Management: A Basic Guide for Smaller NGOs.
European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).
● Maarten Merkelbach and Edward Kemp. (2016). Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v
Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications. European Interagency Security
Forum (EISF).
● Kelsey Hoppe and Christine Williamson. (2016). Dennis vs Norwegian Refugee Council:
Implications for Duty of Care. Humanitarian Practise Network (HPN).

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 2: Organizational Safety and Security Policies and Plans
Signatories shall have an organization safety and security policies in accordance to theorganization’s mission, mandate, values and risk tolerance at headquarters’ level, and security
plans at both the headquarters and field levels based on a participatory security risk
assessment and analysis.
Standard 2 states that organizations shall have: (1) safety and security policies and (2)security plans at both headquarters and field levels. Safety and security policies are protocols
that guide all the agency’s security decisions. Security plan at the headquarters level defines
the relationship between the headquarters and field operations as well as security
procedures at the headquarters, and country-specific security plans are tailored to respondto a specific context to the location. This is shown in the figure below.
Safety and security policy・Purpose・Organization’s mission and value
・Basic policies on risk management
・Principles of staff safety (responsibility, right, risk
tolerance, default, plan, code of conduct)
・Monitoring and review procedure

Security plan at the headquarters level
・Purpose and scope
・Development of security plan based on Security
Risk Assessment (SRA)・Procedures (deployment of staff, resources,
chain or command, communication, and others)
・Reporting mechanism
・Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP)Country-specific security plan (Country A)

Country-specific security plan (Country B)

・Purpose, responsible person, scope
・Organization’s mission, field situation analysis
・Security Risk Assessment (SRA)・Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) (office,accommodation, vehicle, transportation,communication, and others )・Critical Incident Management Plan
(CIMP)(evacuation, medical evacuation, death,crisis management team, and others)

・Purpose, responsible person, scope
・Organization’s mission, field situation analysis
・Security Risk Assessment (SRA)・Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) (office,accommodation, vehicle, transportation,communication, and others )・Critical Incident Management Plan
(CIMP)(evacuation, medical evacuation, death,crisis management team, and others)

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

2.1. Safety and Security Policies
Safety and security policies apply to the entire organization. These policies will reflect theorganization’s unique mission, mandate, commitments, mode of operation and risk tolerance.
They should clearly articulate the expectations the organization has of its employees and theorganization’s responsibility to its employees, including redress in the event the organization
or its employees fail to adhere to security policies.
Key Actions:
•

•

•

•

The safety and security policy clearly defines organizational scope of safety andsecurity, mission, principles, roles of the organization’s management team, andorganization’ responsibilities for its staff. (see also Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (P1925), and Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policies (P28))
The safety and security policy clearly states the organization’s risk management
objectives and the rationale for managing security risks that are based on the security
risk assessment, linking with organization’s risk tolerance, mandate, andcommitments. (see also Guidance Notes 2 and 4 (P20, 21))
A mechanism is established to redress, remedy, and take disciplinary measures in theevent that the organization or its employees fail to adhere to the safety and security
policies. (see also the section ‘Failure to follow safety and security policies’ in
Guidance Notes 5 “Organization’s Security Principles” (P22), and Guidance Notes 6“Legal obligations related to staff safety” (P25))
The safety and security policy, including the above key actions, and taking account of
Guidance Notes 5 and the key issues shown in Reference 2-1 (P28) are documented
and are understood by all staff members including those in headquarters and field
locations. (see also Guidance Note 5 (P22))

Key Indicators:•••

The organization’s safety and security policies include a value statement relating tosafety and security of the organization’s staff, and a clear operational link between
this value statement and security related Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) at
the field level.
Both the management and staff (including employees, volunteers, interns, contractors
and others) understand their obligation to comply with the organization’s safety andsecurity policies and procedures.
Regular reviews of safety and security policies and procedures are conducted with theparticipation of all relevant staff.

Guidance Notes:
1. Definition of Safety and Security: ‘Safety’ refers to ‘freedom from risk or harm as a resultof unintentional acts, such as accidents, natural phenomena or illness’ whereas ‘security’19

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’refers to ‘freedom from risk or harm resulting from violence or other intentional acts’.5
While ensuring the security of staff, assets and programmes against assault, abduction,robbery, terrorism or sabotage necessarily requires the investment of considerable timeand resources, it is important to remember that safety threats such as vehicle accidents,
malaria, water-borne diseases, HIV and other health threats, mental health, natural
disasters such as floods and earthquakes, and pandemic outbreaks of infectious diseases
also pose significant threats to aid workers (see Column 1 below about pandemics).
2. Organization’s Mission, Mandate and Values: It is important for the organization’s
managers to understand that each organization needs to determine its risk tolerance forits staff in the field according to its mission, mandate and values. The vulnerabilities ofNGOs significantly vary with their overarching mandate and field operations. For example,
those organizations working for human rights protection and those for development may
face different security risks, and those organizations working for life-saving activities hasan ethical obligation to withstand higher level of security risk than an organization
involved in livelihood projects.
Each NGO has its own unique mission, mandate, and principles and operates in contextspecific environments, which is to say that all NGOs should develop their risk tolerance
frameworks reflecting their purposes and missions. Based on risk tolerance frameworks,
NGOs need to develop their own safety and security policies and plans. It is also importantthat all employees understand that risk tolerance is determined according to theorganization’s purpose and mission, and hence it should be part of safety and security
policies.
3. Security Strategies (Acceptance, Protection and Deterrence): The organization’s safety
and security policies should state which security strategy is adopted in general contexts
and in specific contexts respectively. There are typically three security strategies used byhumanitarian agencies in all contexts.
⮚ Acceptance: Building a safe operating environment through consent, approval andcooperation from individuals, communities and local authorities.
⮚ Protection: Reducing the risk, but not the threat, by reducing the vulnerability of theorganization, typically by increasing physical protection of buildings, compounds,
and/or distribution sites.
⮚ Deterrence: Reducing the risk by containing the threat with a counter threat, such as
armed protection, diplomatic and political leverage, and temporary suspension.
Given their mission and values, humanitarian agencies find that a far more appealing
security strategy is acceptance: acceptance can and should be the foundation for all
security strategies.6 In reality, the acceptance approach is usually not enough on its own,
and humanitarian agencies need at least some protection even when there is wide local
5 Overseas Development Institute. (2010). Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Good Practice

Review Number 8 (New Edition). Humanitarian Practice Network [hereafter GPR8 (2010)], London: Overseas Development
Institute, p.xvii.
6 GPR8 (2010), p.56.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’support. Deterrence is usually adopted as the last resort when acceptance and protection
have not been successful or have proven inadequate, but the range of measures is very
limited for humanitarian agencies.
In practice, a good security strategy is devised by combining the above-mentioned
approaches in a flexible manner. The point is that security management should be
proactive, involving conscious choices about the mix of approaches pursued in the lightof the threats identified, and the approaches other agencies are taking. It is also importantto remember that different approaches have different resource implications.
References● Overseas Development Institute (2010), Operational Security Management in Violent
Environments, Good Practice Review Number 8 (New Edition) [hereafter GPR8 (2010)].
Humanitarian Practice Network, Chapter 3 Security Strategy● James Davis. (2015), Security to Go: A Risk Management Toolkit for Humanitarian Aid
Agencies, Module 4 Security Strategies: Acceptance Protection and Deterrence [hereafter,
EISF (2015)]● European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). (2004).
Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations [hereafter ECHO (2004)], Section
2.3 Approaches to Security● Mercy Corps. (2011), Field Security Manual (March 2011). The Security Triangle
4. Security Risk Assessment (SRA): Definition of a framework for determining an
acceptable threshold of risk to staff, assets, and reputation of the organization
Proper assessment of risk is a critical component of good safety and security management.
SRAs are at the core of any security plan. Every security plan should identify threats andaddress them through appropriate risk mitigation measures and contingency plans, based
upon an appropriate SRA (see also Mitigation Measure in 2.3 Security Plan in the Field).
Contemporary thinking on good practice holds that organizations should conduct a SRA
before starting operations in a new location, and that this should inform programme
design from the very beginning.
The objective of conducting a risk assessment is to help determine the level of risk inundertaking a programme, and weigh this risk against the benefits the programme brings
to the beneficiaries. In this context, the SRA process should be considered as a central
part of the project design since exposure to risk and mitigation measures are both linked
to programme objectives and implementation.
The SRA can cover a broad range of threats including violence, conflict, natural disasters,
terrorism, health issues, political interference, crime and corruption. The SRA should
include context and programme analysis, threat and vulnerability assessment, and risk
analysis (impacts, likelihood, and mitigation measures and risk threshold).
The SRA is not something to be completed and put on the shelf, but should be treated asa living document that is frequently revisited and revised as the situation changes. The
SRA should be inclusive, drawing perspectives and information from all staff, in order to21

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’create a common understanding of the risk and a sense of shared responsibility for thenecessary security measures.
References● GPR8. (2010). Chapter 2. Risk Assessment● EISF. (2015). Module 3. Risk Assessment Tool
● ECHO. (2004). Section 2. Introduction to Security
5. Organization’s Security Principles: The following principles underlying safety and securityof the organization’s staff can be included in the organization’s safety and security
policies. They are extracts from safety and security policies of various humanitarianorganizations, and are not exhaustive. The organization should select and adopt thoseprinciples in its safety and security policies according to its mission, mandate and modeof operation.
⮚ Safety and Security Policy Scope: To whom the policy is applied. A general consensus
should be reached in advance as to whom the policy should be applied:international/local staff, immediate family members of expatriate and national/local
staff, local volunteers, contract staff from other NGOs, local government staff,
consultants, interns, and/or visitors. Since every member of the organization has acollective responsibility for their own and team’s security, a strong sense of ownershipof safety and security policies should be shared by people at every level of theorganization, from the Executive Director/CEO to the Country Representative, tolocally hired drivers and volunteers. It is also important to remember that every
member is expected to behave as a representative of his/her organization. As toapplication of safety and security policies for study tour programme participants, see
Column 1 below.
⮚ Responsibility for Security Management: Statement on the operational responsibility
for the security of staff7 following the line management structure – organizational,
headquarters, regional, country and day-to-day management. (see also Standard 5:
Accountability).
⮚ Responsibility for Safety and Security Policies: Statement on who will develop theorganization’s safety and security policies, monitor implementation of policies, andgive permission for exemption. (see also Standard 5: Accountability)⮚ Security Risk Management (SRM) Plan: A document which communicates issues
concerning how the organization’s security risk management plan should be
developed for each country/operation. Such SRM plan should include an operational
context and risk analysis (including threats and vulnerability assessment), andprocedures for review and approval. (see also Standard 5: Accountability)⮚ Primacy of Life: Organizations place maximum priority on human life overorganization’s physical assets such as facilities, vehicles, aid supply and materials.

7 In this guidebook, the term ‘staff’ means all the persons involved in any organization’s activities regardless of whether

paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, specialists or consultants, temporarily transferred employees, interns andvolunteers.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’⮚ Humanitarian Principles: The organization’s position on the core humanitarianprinciples of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. 8 Its
position on the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief could be
added as well.
⮚ Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: The organization’s measures toprotect its beneficiaries from sexual exploitation and abuse, including theimplementation of codes of conduct, training of the staff, and the establishment ofcomplaints mechanisms and investigation procedures.9 (see also Standard 1 GuidanceNote 8: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Safeguarding
Measures and Standards, p. 14)⮚ Risk tolerance: Definition of the organization’s threshold of acceptable risk to staff,
assets and reputation of the organization, the point beyond which the risk is
considered too high to continue operating. This may differ depending on the potential
benefits of having a presence and a programme, and on the mandate of theorganization.10⮚ Individual and Organizational Responsibility: The organization’s duty of care forsafety and security of employees and others who agree to adhere to the safety andsecurity policies, procedures and instructions. Furthermore, all those who haveagreed to adhere to the policies are expected to accept individual responsibility, on or
off duty, for their personal security as well as the security of other colleagues,
programmes and the organization. (see also Standard 1: Commitment to Safety andSecurity)⮚ Failure to Follow Safety and Security Guidelines: Statement on disciplinary action,
including dismissal, against staff who do not follow safety and security guidelines orwhose professional and personal behaviour puts themselves or others at risk while
deployed in the field.
⮚ Comprehensive Security Planning with Field-level Perspectives: It is recommended
that each country office develop a local security management plan that reflects theorganization’s global mandate and programme objectives in the country. The planshould be flexible enough to allow local realities to be addressed, and the process
should be inclusive involving the national/local staff. Procedures for approval,monitoring, and review/update should be specified. All staff must be made aware ofits contents 11 , practical application and authority of the security plan. (see alsoStandard 2.2: Security Plan at Headquarters, Guidance Note 1)⮚ Full Participation of National/Local Staff in Security Planning: Statement on how
national/local staff should be involved in the formulation, review and implementation
8 The first three principles were adopted in the General Assembly Resolution 46/182, Strengthening of the coordination ofhumanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, A/RES/46/182 (19 December 1991), available fromhttp://undocs.org/A/RES/46/182. The fourth principle was added in the General Assembly Resolution 58/114,
A/RES/58/114 (5 February 2004), available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/58/114.
9 For more details, see CHA Alliance (n.d.). Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA). Retrieved 21 March 2018from https://www.chsalliance.org/what-we-do/psea; and Corinne Davey and Lucy Heaven Taylor (2017), PSEA
Implementation Quick Reference Handbook. Retrieved 21 March 2018 from https://www.chsalliance.org/what-wedo/psea/psea-handbook.
10 See GPR8 (2010), Chapter 2 Risk Assessment.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’of safety and security policies and plans. National/local staff, and local partnerorganizations as appropriate, should be included in security preparedness, training
and human resources management procedures. (see also Guidance Note 5)⮚ Coordination and Information Sharing: Statement on the organization’s position on
coordination with humanitarian and other agencies in managing security, especiallyon sharing security incident reports, and participation in regular mechanisms forsharing information. (see also Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors).
Statement on a policy regarding the staff engagement to the press or government
authorities including police and military. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan at Field
Guidance Note 7)⮚ Personal Property: Statement on who will be responsible for the personal property ofthe organization’s staff.
⮚ Capacity-Building of Staff: Statement on the organization’s commitment to ensurethat all staff have the skills and capacity to analyse the security threats in their working
environment and to reduce their vulnerability to these threats. (see also Standard 4:
Human Resources Management)⮚ Gender, Ethnicity and Nationality: Statement on how the organization should deal
with risks associated with specific gender, ethnicity and/or nationality at various
levels. It also includes alternative and/or additional measures for its staff who
potentially face particular risks. (see also Standard 4: Human Resources Management)⮚ Requirement for Security Incident and Situation Reporting: Statement on therequirement for the organization’s staff to report security incidents, including threats
and near-misses, to the field office and headquarters in order to enable tracking,monitoring and analysis of security trends, and to inform security risk assessments(SRA) and decision-making.12⮚ Respect for Local Laws and Customs: Statement on the organization’s position on
dealing with local laws and customs, especially where local laws conflict withinternational law or widely held ethical standards.
⮚ Bribes, Incentives and Gifts: Statement on the organization’s position on offering
rewards, incentives, or bribes to local officials or people outside of the organization tocarry out their daily tasks or to perform illegal services; and on the acceptance of a giftor other benefits by providing services and fulfilling duties.
⮚ Kidnap and Abduction: Statement on the organization’s response to kidnapping andabduction, position on ransoms for the release of kidnapped staff, support to
immediate family, and post-incident support to the kidnapped staff. 13 (see alsoStandard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field, Guidance Note 14)⮚ Right to Withdrawal: Statement on the right of staff (and family members) to decline
to enter high-risk environments or to withdraw from such an area, irrespective of thejudgement of the line manager or organization on the risk in a particular situation,
without impacting employment or suffering disciplinary action, and consecutive
operational and human resource review processes at both local and headquarters
levels.

13 See GPR8 (2010), Chapter 14 Kidnapping and Hostage Situation.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’⮚ Order to Withdrawal and Return: Statement on the organization’s right to withdraw
its staff from situations that it considers to be dangerous, obligation of staff to obey
such instructions, and line of authority to decide the withdrawal from and return to a
programme area and country. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field,
Guidance Note 12)⮚ Evacuation: Statement on the extent of the organization’s responsibility to evacuate
its staff according to the types of contracts such as international or national/local,
along with their family members. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field,
Guidance Note 13)⮚ The Use of Armed Protection: Statement on the organization’s baseline position on
the use of armed protection, and procedure for approving the use or hire of armed
personnel in ad hoc and extreme situations. The statement may also cover theorganization’s position on staff carrying arms while on duty and firearms in theorganization’s vehicles.
⮚ Relationship with the Armed Forces: Statement on the organization’s position on
engagement (including information sharing) with military forces, such as national,
multinational and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. (see also Column 3,
below.)
6. Organization’s legal rights and responsibilities for staff safety: Organization’s staff isentitled to require of the organization to implement duty of care. They are also entitled
to exercise their rights which are recognized in organization’s rules and regulations.
Having adequate insurance, receiving a complete briefing on and training in security
management, and being informed on evacuation plans are examples. Employee also have
responsibilities towards the organization by respecting and adhering to organization’s
security management policies which are specified in its regulations, contracts, and TOR.
They are also responsible for fulfilling roles and duties designated in security and safety
management plans and other tasks ordered by their managers. Most organizations would
expect that their staff will be involved in office security and responses to emergencies anddisasters. The staff is also responsible for their own health. In some cases, roles specified
in the risk management plans are considered equivalent to their responsibilities.
Column 1: Response to outbreak of infectious diseases and pandemic
Infectious diseases have wreaked havoc on human communities since ancient times. Since
the 2000s, increasingly frequent epidemics have been observed, coincided with globalization,
urbanization and climate change. We have seen Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),
which originated in southern China in November 2002, reached Hong Kong in February 2003
and spread rapidly thereafter to 29 countries/regions on five continents. An outbreakof Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012, and the Ebola virus outbreak in West
Africa in 2014 are other examples. As of July 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is an ongoing
global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS CoV-2). Its impact has been broad, affecting general society,economy, politics, and other areas.
We have all faced disruption, change and uncertainty during the COVID-19 outbreak, and thislooks set to continue for a while. Hence it is not possible to provide any definitive
recommendation on how NGOs should respond to this situation. Nevertheless, we can draw
25

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’some general lessons from this experience. It has been reconfirmed that it is imperative forhumanitarian agencies to carry out risk assessment and to develop Critical IncidentManagement Plans (CIMP) in advance. This enables us to take actions in a flexible way withvarious scenarios so that we can continue our work and accomplish our missions even in
extraordinary circumstances. At the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, medical services
were severely stretched in many countries. At the same time, travel restrictions were placed
both within and between countries. In some cases, programme continuity could be broken.
It is very difficult to offer predictions on when the current pandemic will end. It is likely thatthe disease could return after some time and another pandemic or an isolated outburst of
epidemics will take place in the future. Hence it is important for humanitarian organizations
to assess various risks associated with evolution of the current pandemic and enhance theirrisk management plans with the assumption that the current pandemic will not be the last.
The following references by WHO and others are recommended:
World Health Organization（WHO）
Coronavirus disease(COVID-19) pandemic
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019（in Japanese）
https://extranet.who.int/kobe_centre/ja/news/COVID19_specialpage
Clinical care of severe acute respiratory infections – Tool kit
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/clinical-care-of-severe-acute-respiratoryinfections-tool-kit
The Sphere Standards and the Coronavirus response
https://spherestandards.org/coronavirus/
Column 2: Study tour programmes and safety management policies
Security and safety policies of those organizations which carry out study tours can be applied
to the participants. Nevertheless, some specific considerations for the participants are
required, differentiating them from the organization’s employees. In Japan, organizations
need to gain travel industry licences to conduct study tours. If the organization collaborates
with a travel company, it is important to clarify roles to be played by respective parties
including the company, the humanitarian organization, and the participants. It is also
important to provide information concerning risks and threats, give opportunities to prepare
as team members, and agree on rules in advance with the participants. It would be useful tocreate opportunities for peer-learning among organizations and travel companies which havecarried our study tours and experienced security- and safety-related incidences. In this way,
both organizations and participants can prepare adequately and raise awareness of theimportance of safety and security.
Column 3: Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
Since the 1990s, guidelines for civil and military coordination have been developed incollaboration between the United Nations and NGOs. This is a sensitive area, as there is alikelihood for NGOs to increase risks by collaborating military actors. Humanitarianorganizations’ use of military assets and their coordination with the military should focus on

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts. More details are found in
the following reference:https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/product-categories/use-military-and-civildefense-assets
References● InterAction. (2015). InterAction Minimum Operating Security Standards● Mercy Corps. (2010). Field Security Manual (March 2011)● Concern Worldwide. (2016). Concern’s Security Policy (March 2016)● Care International. (2008). Care International Safety and Security Principles● Care International. (2013). Care International Safety and Security Standards● Irish Aid. (2013). Irish Aid Guidelines for NGO Professional Safety and Security Risk
Management● People in Aid. (2008). Policy Guide and Template: Safety and Security (Revised)● Lutheran World Federation. (2016). LWF Safety and Security Policy (March 2016)

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Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policy
I.
●
●
●
●
●
●

Introduction
Purpose of safety and security policy
Organization’s statement on the importance of staff safety and security
Organization’s legal and moral obligation to manage workplace hazards and reduce therisk of harm to employees (duty of care)
Development of safety and security policy and identification of focal points
People who are aimed at by the policy
Organization’s definition of safety and security

II.
Organization’s Mission and Values● Rationale behind the inclusion of mission and value in safety and security policy● Mission statement● Organizational Values
III.
Organization’s Risk Management Strategies● Three basic security approaches: acceptance, protection and deterrence● Organization’s approach to Security Risk Management (SRM)
IV.
Organization’s Security Principles● Explanation of the organizational culture behind security arrangements, security risk
tolerance and the key security principles that shape the organization’s approach to safety
and security of staff, including the roles, responsibilities, redress in the event of noncompliance and organizational structures.
● See 2.1. Safety and Security Policies Guidance Note 3 “Organization's Security Principles”
for the list of key principles.
V.
Monitoring and Review Process● Timing and the scope of safety and security policy review● The responsibility for initiating and conducting the review and approving the reviewed
safety and security policies● Ensuring consultation and participation in the review process

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2.2. Security Plan at Headquarters
Security Plan at Headquarters: An organization is responsible for ensuring security for all thestaff and also for field operations. While a safety and security plan at the field level should betailored to the specific location’s context, a safety and security plan at the headquarters sets
out the relationship between the headquarters and field locations as well as security
procedures at the headquarters.
If your organization is a member of international federation or confederation, yourinterpretations of 'headquarters' may differ from those of Japanese NGOs.
Some organizations do not operate field office. Instead, the headquarter-level staff travels to
the field as necessary. Such organizations should adopt relevant part of the key actions andguidance notes in this section, and the following section 2.3., as appropriate.
Key Actions:
•

•

•
•
•

•

Clarify the relationship between the headquarters and field locations and theirrespective responsibilities. Operational security procedures at the headquarters andthose between the headquarters and field locations should be clearly defined. (seealso Guidance Note 1 and 2 (P30))
Based on the headquarters’ responsibilities to be clarified in the above, measures andprocedures concerning risk assessment and safety and security plan development at
the headquarters level are clearly defined (see also Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3, 4 (P3031), and Reference 2-II regarding the key issues to be considered in the safety andsecurity plan for headquarters (P34))
A mechanism to report situations and all accidents and incidents, with clear scope,line, frequency and format, is established. (see also Guidance Note 4 (P31))
A Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP) at headquarters is fully developed.
(Guidance Notes 5 (P31))
A safety and security plan at headquarters is fully developed, with reference to“Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters” (see also Standard 5 GuidanceNotes 2 (P57))
Conduct periodic reviews of the safety and security plan and reflection exercise afterincidence with participation of all relevant staff members. The safety security planshould be updated incorporating any lessons learnt. (see also Guidance Notes 3 (P30))

Key Indicators:••

The safety and security plan at headquarters is developed, reflecting the key actions
above, and it is fully disseminated among all the staff at headquarters and local offices.
Regular safety and security exercises and drills are carried out, based on the safety
and security plan.

Guidance Notes:

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

1. Clarification of relationship between the headquarters and field locations withrespective responsibilities. Headquarters’ actions and procedures according to its
responsibilities:
It is vital that the relationship between the headquarters and field locations is clearly
defined with respective responsibilities. Confusion and conflicts of responsibilities mightcause a security risk even though both sides are making efforts to respond to the original
security risk. In most cases, as security risk assessment and security planning based on
security risk assessment are pre-conditions for taking daily security measures anddelegating responsibilities for such measures to field locations, both headquarters andfield locations should cooperate with each other in making such assessment andplanning. In most cases, responsibilities for daily security measures can be delegated tofield locations as they have a better knowledge of the situation and so can make better
decisions more quickly. On the other hand, the headquarters should be also responsiblefor intervening in field security measures if field locations may have made or be about tomake errors or mistakes. The headquarters are usually also responsible for project
operations, which itself affect security and security management at field locations,monitoring and evaluation of security and security management, as well as organizational
decisions such as critical incident management, in close consultation with field locations.
There are also organizations which do not have field offices or Japanese staff members
based in the field. In such cases, the headquarters might be more responsible for security
measures than in cases where there are field offices or Japanese staff members based in
the field.
In all cases, both sides should make efforts to build confidence in each other throughgood communication as well as the exchange of human and financial resources.
In addition to clarifying the extent of responsibilities, it is also necessary to describe
security risk assessment, security planning and measures and procedures to be taken
according to the clarified responsibilities of the headquarters.
2. Operational security procedures at headquarters and those between headquarters andfield locations: These procedures are necessary in order for headquarters and field
locations to fulfil respective responsibilities indicated above. They include the key actions
illustrated below.
 Identification and appointment of security focal points at headquarters (see alsoStandard 5 Accountability); Human and financial resource management (see also Standard 3 Resources);
 Reporting and communication lines at headquarters and between the headquarters
and field locations; Operational security procedures between headquarters and field locations, based on
the security management plan in the field.
3. Security Risk Assessment (SRA):In developing security plans at headquarters, harm to the organization’s staff, property
or its reputation, as well as its vulnerabilities need to be assessed against possible
prevention and mitigation measures. Once prevention and mitigation measures are
identified, it is likely there will still be some residual risk, which should be checked againstorganizational risk threshold. As to threats in the field, mitigation measures should be
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proposed based on the in-country risk assessment and consequent risk management plan.
As to risk or harm at headquarters (e.g. crime, disasters, threat to domestic programmes,
data breaches, negative impact on reputation, operational problems), managers at
headquarters need to conduct assessment and to decide risk tolerance.
The risk assessment process should involve all staff members. They should first identify
all security threats and vulnerabilities within a given context, and discuss potential
measures. This process will enable participating staff members to raise their awarenessof security management and share the level of awareness. It depends on the size of theorganization and the security management plan, but in general staff representing
organizational management, safety and security focal points, and those members who
engaged with crisis incidents, if there have been any such incidents, should all participate
in the process.
4. Situation and incident reporting procedures (including the type of incidents to bereported, reporting line, frequency and formats): Information is vital to take necessary
and appropriate security measures, and so the headquarters needs to receive
information from field locations on time. In order to receive information of sufficientquality and quantity and to follow the situation regularly and promptly, there should bereporting procedures for individual incidents (type of incidents to be reported, reporting
line, frequency and formats to be included), in addition to regular reporting.
5. Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP): An organization might face serious incidents
such as:
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚
⮚

Death or serious injury of a staff member
Forceful Forced suspension of activities
Serious security deterioration or disasters that directly affect operation
Outbreak of infectious disease or pandemic
Major change such as relocation or evacuation
Communications disruption
Serious fraud
Compensation claims against the organization arising out of a security incident
Any incident which may attracts media interests
Bombing or other armed attack
Hostage-taking incident
Kidnapping and ransom demand

In case of any critical incident, headquarters must make an organizational response to
the situation based on the organization’s Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP), incoordination with all the relevant sections, officers and staff members at headquarters,
field locations and other offices. The CIMP must include the following: Development of the Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT), clarification of
responsibilities of relevant staff members;
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’ Key response procedures for crisis situations which are coordinated with local
security management plans; Emergency contact lists especially for out of business hours;
 Procedures for communicating with and supporting for affected family members(see also Column 1 below); Media management; Communication management procedures for headquarters and families and also formedia management to utmost effectiveness;
 Post-crisis management including psychological support (See Guidance Note 4).

References● GPR8. (2010). Chapter 5 Incident Reporting and Critical Incident Management● ECHO. (2004). Sections 3 (Security Preparation for the Field), 8 Headquarters
management of Security), and 10 (Donors); and Sections 5 (Security Incidents), 6(Suspension, Hibernation, Relocation, Evacuation), 7 (Closing a Programme) and 9(Learning and Training)
Column 1: Support to families and safety management
When a crisis incident takes place and if any staff member is involved, it is essential for theorganization to provide support to affected families. If a staff member gets infected withdisease, or if they are seriously injured by accident, the following actions will be required to
take:








Appoint a family support focal point and avoid multiple staff members contacting theaffected family;
The focal point should contact the family regularly even if there is no change in situations.
It would be desirable that those in the field contact headquarters each day;Have the consent from the affected family that the organization would contact at any
time of the day if and when there is a critical development;
Provide full and detailed explanations to the family about background of the incident,
measures being taken by the medical team in the field, and organization’s responses
including insurance aspects;
If there are decision to make in terms of response measures, fully explain each option
along with their pros and cons before reaching the decision;
Respect family’s wishes if they intend to travel to see the affected staff member.

Organizations should have contacts of staff’s family members and also inform family
members of associated risks, according to nature of activities and operational contexts.
Family consent is required to make needed medical treatment in some countries, and consent
in person in some cases.
It is also important to talk with affected family members in sympathetic ways, rather thanbusiness like ways. This will help them lift worries and concerns and even avoid any potential
troubles. The way in which organizations respond will directly affect its reputation too.

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It is often the case that staff families are not familiar with infectious diseases in tropical areas
or medical systems and security situations there. Hence it would be desirable to take steps
above even in non-critical cases.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Reference 2-II: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters
I. Introduction● Purpose of developing security plans at headquarters● The organization’s vision, mission, values, and safety and security policies● The scope of the plans and who they apply to (at headquarters and relationship between
the headquarters and field locations)
II. Relationship between headquarters and field locations with respective responsibilities.
Headquarters’ actions and procedures according to its responsibilities● Security risk assessment● Development of security plans based on security risk assessment● Daily security measures● Project management, security management monitoring and evaluation● Critical incident management (see V below for details.)
III. Operational security procedures at the headquarters and those between headquarters
and field locations● Appointment, clarification of responsibilities and management of security focal points at
headquarters● Human and financial resource management in security● Management lines: at headquarters and with field locations● Communication procedures between headquarters and field locations and at theheadquarters● Security procedures for staff movements between the headquarters and field locations
based on security plans at field locations
IV. Procedures for situation, incident and accident reporting● Scope● Reporting line
● Reporting frequency● Reporting Formats
V. Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP)● Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT), responsibilities of team members and otherrelevant staff members● Crisis response procedure based on field CIMP
● Contact list and communication tools outside of business hours● Procedures for contacting and maintaining communication with affected families● Media management in risk management● Procedures for maximizing communication effectiveness at headquarters, with affectedfamily, and with the media (especially for immediate aftermath of the incident)● Post-incident management including mental health and psychosocial support
VI. Review and Update of Security Plan

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

2.3. Security Plan in the Field
Security Plans in the Field: why it is needed
The organisation’s security plan is based on its safety and security policy that reflects its
overall approach to security. Each organization takes a different approach based on its
mission (if there is one), code of conduct, policy, programmes, as well as on its understandingof the context. It is important to conduct an SRA at the planned field location and establish
an appropriate security management plan when establishing a field office.
In many cases organizations do not have field offices in countries or areas where they work,
but their staff members travel there on a regular basis. In such cases organizations generally
fulfil their SRA remotely through researching possible security risks that their staff members
may encounter and by talking to other humanitarian actors. Risk mitigating measures and
CIMPs are then prepared at the headquarters level. There are cases where all the above
components of a security plan are addressed by lengthy email exchanges.
Planning Process
The process of developing, implementing and updating a plan is as important as the plan itself.
An individual should be designated to be responsible for leading the development of the
security plan and for periodic reviews and updating. Those staff members who are expected
to implement the plan should be involved in its development. This helps to foster consistent
implementation through ensuring that (1) the plan becomes more realistic in its assumption
about contexts and threats, (2) the staff understand all aspects of the plan, and (3) the plan
improves staff ownership, willingness and ability to implement the plan, thereby promoting
adherence to the plan. All staff members should be given a briefing on the situation andthreats, a copy of the plan, and any training required to implement the plan. The plan shouldbe tested and updated at regular intervals and whenever there is a change in the situation or
threats faced by the NGO.
Context Oriented
Organizations need to ensure that locally relevant measures and plans are established indifferent security contexts and risk environments. The security plan must be based on a SRA
and address identified threats. The security plan is based on the organization’s safety andsecurity policies, and so the security plan of each organization will differ depending on theoperating environment, and on the organization’s mission, mandate and values.
Ownership of the Plan
When implementing the security plan, each individual staff member should respect the SOPs
and line management (see Guidance Note 4). If he/she no longer feels comfortable with theplan for any reason, it is his/her responsibility to bring this to the attention of the country
representative. Individual staff members should also feel free to make observations andproposals to improve the plan. Finally, all staff should respect the confidentiality of the fieldsecurity plan.
Key Actions:

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

•

•

•

•

•

•

Conduct a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) for the operating environment to identify
any potential security risks and threats. Establish mitigation measures for all identified
risks based on security policies (see also Guidance Notes 1 and 3 (P36, 37), Standard
2.1 Guidance Notes 4 (P21))
Create Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that staff should adhere to in order toprevent incidents, and how to respond should problems arise. (see also GuidanceNotes 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (P38-40) for key issues to be considered in SOPs)
Create Critical Incident Management Plans (CIMPs) that identify the Critical IncidentManagement Team (CIMT) in field locations, staff members’ responsibilities, andstandard procedures in close liaison with headquarters. (see also Guidance Note 4(P37))
Introduce an incident and situation reporting system into field offices so that regularcommunication with and reporting to headquarters is materialized. (see also Standard
2.2 Guidance Notes 4 (P31))
Develop security plans for field locations by covering all the items in the above andreferring to “Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts (P44)” (see also GuidanceNote 1-15 (P36-41) and Standard 5 Guidance Notes 2 (P57))
Conduct periodic reviews of security plans with the participation of all relevant staff
members. Carry out a review after any incident takes place and incorporate all lessons
learned into the security plans. (see also Guidance Note 1 (P36) and Standard 2.2
Guidance Note 3 (P30))

Key Indicators:•••

Field-based security plans are developed incorporating all the above key actions. All
staff members at field locations and headquarters are made aware of the plans.
A policy regarding health and safety including staff’s stress management and R & R isestablished.
Security training is conducted on a regular basis based on the field-based security
plans.

Guidance Notes:
1. Security Risk Assessments (SRA): Organizations need to carry out a SRA before making a
final decision as to the deployment of its staff for a long term. A security risk assessment
is a fundamental element of the risk management process and must be viewed as anintegral part of the wider assessments involved in establishing operations or programmes
in any country. The risk assessment process first identifies the different security threats
within a given context, and how your staff, assets, the programmes being implemented,
or the organization could be vulnerable. It would be desirable if the assessment team
could spend some time to generate an understanding of the location situation, but it canalso be done remotely if visiting locations is not possible. The SRA can be done solely or
jointly with other organizations, and can be combined with needs assessments. For moredetails, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 2 (Risk Assessment), and ECHO (2004) A26 Security
Assessment. (see also Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors)

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2. Information Gathering: Gathering reliable security and safety information is key to a
successful SRA and to an establishment of security networks after programmes arelaunched. Embassies and foreign government agencies provide security notices and hostgovernments also share important security matters and other contextual background.
For example, U.S. and British embassies provide security information through theirwebsites. The Japanese government provides security information for travellers on its
website and allows any person to register with Tabi-Regi (Travel registration) to receive
security notices from local embassies. In many countries, humanitarian and development
actors including NGOs, the UN, and bilateral agencies have mechanisms for sharing
security information including incidents that have occurred in past projects. Apart fromthe government and NGOs, there are security consulting organizations for humanitarians
such as RedR and Safer Edge, as well as security firms which provide security services
including guards, vehicle escort and consulting services. Some insurance firms offer
consulting services on security risks and threat information in some areas of the world.
In addition to continuous efforts to collect information from international and national
media, it is recommended to gather information from the local government and local
community in the area of activity. It is important to note that organizations should utilize
various information resources and contact channels to collect enough information to
make appropriate decisions. For more details on security networks, see Standard 6:
Collaboration with Other Actors.
3. Mitigation Measures: A mitigation measure means to consider what can be done to
reduce risks to an acceptable level. In general terms, there are three possible courses ofaction: (1) Reduce the threat. If feasible, reach out to or have others negotiate on yourbehalf with potential adversaries; (2) reduce the consequences and lessen the impact of
the threat. These might usefully be termed ‘contingency measures’, such as first-aid
protocols, crisis response procedures and in extremis pre-emptive evacuation andguidance on how to behave in the event of a serious incident; (3) Reduce or eliminate
exposure by adopting additional protective measures or changing locations, for instance.
The extreme version of this would be ‘risk avoidance’, i.e. removing the organization
entirely from the threat, either permanently or temporarily. It is also important to notethat there may be unique security risks for national/local staff and female staff, and toprepare appropriate mitigation measures (see also Standard 4: Human Resources
Management). For more details, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 2.7 (Risk Analysis) on
mitigation measures, Standard 4: Human Resources Management on considerations fornational/local and female staff, and Standard 7: Safety and Security of Local Partner
Organizations on the involvement of local partner organizations.
4. Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP) and Critical Incident Management Team(CIMT): In order to respond to a critical incident, an organization should develop both a
CIMP and a CIMT. The CIMP should take into consideration possible critical incidents suchas evacuation, relocation, hibernation, business continuity, medical evacuation(Medevac) and death of staff (national and international), and clarify the response
processes. The CIMT should establish hierarchical responsibilities and draw a clear
distinction between the roles played at the country office level, the regional office andglobal headquarters. Everyone needs to understand where they fit in. For some incidents,
a CIMT may operate only at the field level, but there needs to be a clear understanding
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’of when to bring in the headquarters as necessary. Serious or prolonged incidents (anassassination, bomb attack, kidnapping, hostage situation or forced hibernation) or majorchanges such as a relocation or evacuation will typically require a dedicated CIMT. The
CIMT’s decisions include suspension of activities, personnel withdrawal, setting of acertain level of confidentiality, and the end-state objective (injured person evacuated,body repatriated, kidnapped staff member released). CIMT members consist ofrepresentatives of the organization, managers, and communicators at both theheadquarters and field level. Communication with authorities, media, donors, and familyof staff is important, and the CIMT must also include administrative, legal and financial
considerations especially for the people affected by an incident who need appropriate
psychological support. After an incident, the staff members involved should undergo
debriefing and counselling if necessary. An after-action review should be a standardpractice. For more details, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 5 (Incident Reporting and Critical
Incident Management).
5. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): Safety and security plans should clearly outline
the various SOPs. SOPs are designed to ensure that safety and security best practices aremaintained on a day-to-day basis and should set out clear parameters for staff (basicallythe ‘dos and don’ts’) which, if followed, will help staff to prevent or minimise safety andsecurity risks in particular locations. SOPs might be called “operation manuals” or“guidelines” depending on the organization. SOPs can cover a wide variety of issues, suchas: personal security; local laws and customs; site security and safety; staff travel andmovements; vehicle safety; communications; staff health and welfare; financial
management; reporting incidents; and managing information.
6. Communication: Communication equipment helps strengthen security if used properly.
The leader of a field team should ensure that the team’s communication requirements
are thought through in good time to allow the despatch of any vital equipment with theteam as it deploys. It is a good practice, in insecure situations, for staff to have two
independent means of communication (e.g. radio and satellite phone), so that if one
breaks down, communication will still be possible. In particular, avoid over-dependence
on mobile phones. In a crisis a cellular telephone system is particularly vulnerable tobecoming overloaded, damaged, or simply switched off by a belligerent. No
communication system is fully secure. All staff should be aware of the need for
information security, and the risks that can arise from interception of communications.
7. Media: The media can have an impact on the security management of the organizationand its staff. Contact between your organization and the media should ideally bechannelled through senior management or the media response office. As well asgathering information from aid agencies, the media often like to interview staff directlyin the field. Responding to media interviews requires a certain set of skills (answering
sensitive questions under pressure, providing contextual and correct information, etc.),
and therefore they should normally be handled by staff experienced at being
interviewed. After a security incident, the organization should disseminate accurate
reports and appropriate responses through the media in order to avoid the spread of
biased information and exaggerated rumours. The organization’s managers should

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therefore be aware of media reporting, and able to deal with the media effectively whenappropriate. It is essential to provide media training.
8. Travel and Movement Security: In many field operations, the greatest security risks tostaff occur during routine travel and movements, either while travelling in the field or
moving to and from the office (this applies to both humanitarian and development
agencies). Vehicle accidents, ambushes, shootings, carjacking, abductions, landmine
incidents and other incidents while on the road account for the majority of safety andsecurity incidents affecting aid workers. In insecure environments, vehicles are an
essential tool for avoiding potential danger. However, in some situations they can
actually be the cause of insecurity. An aid organization’s vehicle and its occupants can be
an easily identifiable target for those who want to vent their anger against a particularorganization, or against humanitarian organizations in general. The new and expensive
vehicles often used by organizations can also make them an ideal target for criminalgroups. All the organization’s vehicles, including rental vehicles, should be equipped withthe appropriate safety equipment (first aid kits, fire extinguishers, seat belts, etc.). Manyorganizations set up guidelines for visitors to determine whether in-country visits areappropriate and if so, the travel criteria and appropriate locations for visitor
accommodation.
9. Site Security: Organizations should determine the locations for offices, as well as
hotels/guest houses for temporary lodging of staff visitors with appropriate safety andsecurity equipment prior to project implementation. Site management includes: physicalconditions and strength of the building; examination of the boundaries of the site to
make sure that perimeter walls are secure; ensuring that all doors, gates and windows
have adequate locks; ensuring that access points and the street area outside are well lit;
considering possible escape routes; and considering vehicle parking and assembly areas.
The office also should have effective controls and procedures in place to manage access.
For field offices in high-risk environments, a guard force should be employed, either
through direct hire or by using the services of a reputable contractor.
10. Financial/Cash Security: The management of financial/cash security is one of the criticalissues in field operations, particularly in insecure environments. Operational managers
should be familiar with financial procedures. It is also important to provide financial
training for the staff to be deployed. Good financial management is a major subject,beyond the scope of this Guide. Detailed advice on financial procedures, including simple
guides to NGO accounting, can be found at www.mango.org.uk. Cash storage,
management, transfer, and distribution are significant points of vulnerability for a field
office. Cash management and transfer are security issues, with related standards,
policies, and guidelines that must be implemented and adhered to at all times. Every
office in a country must decide on a safe location for cash reserves (including a reservefor emergency evacuation) and a reliable way to receive funds. A field office should
consult with the financial and legal officers and advisors of local partner organizations
regarding what banks, if any, are used and for what purposes. The Country Office also
should assess the cash management possibilities in the area, such as the reliability andcash-withdrawal limitations of local banks or the availability of electronic payment tolocal businesses.
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11. Sexual Aggression: In any area, sexual harassment and assault are incompatible with
providing a safe and secure working environment and are unacceptable. Sexual
aggression can be directed at men or women, but women are more often the targets.
Staff members should be aware that everyone is a potential victim of sexual assault andsexual assault is the most under-reported violent crime. Each organization should clearlyset Sexual Harassment Guidelines and ensure that all staff know and comply with them.
Organizations will investigate all sexual harassment complaints in accordance with theirpolicies and procedures. All staff, regardless of their gender, should receive a briefing on
sexual aggression immediately upon hire. If there are security concerns for female staff,
organizations should consider upgrading the accommodation or arranging a sharedhouse for female staff members, taking into consideration the local culture and security
environment. (see also Column 1).
12. Medical Evacuation (Medevac): If a staff member is injured or falls ill and local medical
facilities cannot provide sufficient treatment, Medevac may be needed （In humanitarian
aid operations, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) refers to the emergency evacuation ofpatient to medical facility in country, whereas Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) means
evacuation of patient to outside of the country. This normally happens only when adoctor advises that it is necessary. Many humanitarian organizations insure against thecosts of Medevac, and have arrangements with specialist Medevac companies. If so, it isvital that all relevant staff know the procedure for making use of these. See also ECHO(2004) A20 (Medical Evacuation) for a suggested Medevac procedure.
13. Suspension or Hibernation of Project, Relocation or Reduction of Staff: Suspension orhibernation of a project, and relocation or reduction of staff have recently been used asmeasures to mitigate the security risk in insecure environments. Such action may benecessary in order to allow time for reflection on a changed security situation. It may also
be used to send a signal to local authorities or to other groups that threats tohumanitarian organizations are not acceptable. Suspension is likely to be more effective
if carried out by all humanitarian organizations at the same time, and for the same statedreasons. Suspension may be announced in the media. Alternatively, it may beunannounced, depending on the circumstances, the threats, and on the purpose of thesuspension. It is advisable to discuss the possible options for suspension with donors
during the project design phase, so that funding problems are minimised if such action
becomes necessary. A longer period of suspension, where staff remain at home or in asafe place for a considerable time in order to allow danger to subside, is sometimes
known as hibernation. Ensure that sufficient resources (water, food, essential goods, fuel,etc.) are available for the duration of the hibernation period. An alternative to suspension
or hibernation is to relocate staff to a safer location, without leaving the country. A
further alternative is to reduce the number of staff working, so as to reduce the securityrisk.
14. Evacuation Plan: Evacuation is conceived as the ultimate step in a gradual reduction of
exposure – from suspension of movements of certain types of staff, to suspension ofoperations, to partial withdrawal of staff from a site, to total withdrawal and the closureof activities. It is absolutely imperative to consider and establish the evacuation plan40

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

beforehand, especially in high-risk environments. Bear in mind, however, that events canovertake plans. Planning through security phases, although useful, can give theimpression of a linear progression, when this may not always be the case. In many
situations, evacuation routes are blocked, the logistical capacity for evacuation is
insufficient, or it simply becomes too dangerous to try to evacuate and staff have to stay
put and weather the crisis. Security plan should be an over-arching document which
includes relocation plan, hibernation plan and evacuation plan etc., thus, evacuation planshould not be considered as separated while it is one of the most important parts of
security plan. Relocation and especially evacuation are difficult decisions – not just froma programmatic but also from an ethical point of view. It needs to be clear not only underwhat conditions an organization will evacuate or relocate, but also who has the ultimate
authority to make that decision: headquarters or field representative? Can regional
offices make decisions by themselves? Who has the authority after withdrawal? Is it clear
to all staff that the decisions taken by management are mandatory? It is important toinclude evacuation in the organization’s safety and security policies and plans. As far as
possible, the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees should be laid downin employment contracts or in the safety and security policies. For international staff, it
should be considered with the organization’s human resources management. It is
encouraged to consult beforehand regarding measures related to evacuation withnational/local staff and local partner organizations. The evacuation/relocation planshould be regularly reviewed and discussed with staff, especially if it is becoming
increasingly likely that a withdrawal will be necessary. This can be carried out throughsimulation exercises or a simple team meeting to review policies, procedures and plans.
In the height of a crisis, individual staff may be tempted to take all sorts of unplanned
steps and go to places other than the planned assembly points. The effect is likely toincrease confusion, delay the evacuation and heighten the risk for everybody. No
individual initiatives that deviate from the plan should be taken without priorauthorization by the head of the CIMT. Key considerations are: feasible transportation
under difficult scenarios; utilising mitigation measures to reduce risks; availability oftransport for how many; and who can provide means of transport and otherrequirements including a charter plane in the absence of pre-agreement. Manyevacuations and relocations depend upon collaboration between different organizations.
Do not draw up a plan in isolation. While it is usually safer to travel in a vehicle convoy
with other NGOs, this also means less control over how the evacuation is carried out.
Discuss with other agencies beforehand, if possible, how these issues will be handled.
15. Kidnapping/Hostage Incident: Kidnapping refers to forced capture and detention withthe explicit purpose of obtaining something in return for the captive’s release. The
objective and hence the motive for kidnapping vary: often it is money, though kidnappers
may also demand political concessions. In other cases, what may ostensibly be a politicalcause may in fact be little more than an extortion racket. Globally, kidnapping has
become increasingly common in recent years, including in the aid world. High-riskcountries include Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Afghanistan, Pakistan and
the Philippines (Mindanao). Kidnapping can be hard to prevent, at least against a wellorganized and determined group of perpetrators, and can be a very effective way ofraising funds or increasing political visibility. It is therefore a very serious threat. Key
actions for reducing risks of kidnappings are: avoiding routines; reducing visibility; in41

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’country vetting of personnel; removing potential vulnerabilities; site protection;heightened awareness and counter-surveillance; seeking local support protection; armed
protection; etc. The organization’s attitude toward ransom (whether to pay or not)should be set in its safety and security policies. Personal security training covers
kidnapping situations. Generally speaking, kidnapping situations cannot be dealt with
only at field level, but must involve the organization’s headquarters and regional offices.
A kidnapping is a very complex and challenging situation, and inevitably requires theinvolvement of a wide range of people and organizations, including law enforcement,
government agencies, the media and insurance companies, and the victim’s family.
Critical incident management capabilities will be required, including training, planning,
preparedness exercises and the proper allocation of resources (financial, human,equipment, etc.). It is essential that NGOs make themselves aware of the resources
available e.g. hostage negotiators who will have to be called upon by NGO HQs at a very
early stage. Time will not be available to research this once a hostage incident isunderway.
Column 1: References on sexual aggression and harassment
The following guide by GISF is helpful to understand gender and safety:
Gender and Security: Guidelines for mainstreaming gender in security risk management
https://gisf.ngo/resource/gender-and-security/
GISF also has the guide below, aiming to support aid organizations in preventing, being
prepared for and responding to incidents to sexual violence against their staff. It is intended
as a good practice guide to help strengthen existing process and support organizations as they
set up their own protocols:
Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers: prevention, preparedness, response andaftercarehttps://gisf.ngo/resource/managing-sexual-violence-against-aid-workers/
See also the UN policy on sexual harassment below:
UN System Model Policy on Sexual Harassment
https://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system-model-policy-sexual-harassment-0

Column 2: Low-Profile Approach
Low-visibility programming has become an increasingly common protective tactic among aid
organizations in high-risk environments. It involves removing organizational branding fromoffice buildings, vehicles, residences and individual staff members. It can also involve the useof private cars or taxis, particularly vehicles that blend into the local context, limiting
movement and removing tell-tale pieces of equipment, such as Very High Frequency (VHF)
radios or satellite phones and HF antennas. In certain very high-risk environments, anythingthat might link staff to an organization – memory sticks, organization identity documents, cell
42

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’phones, and computers – may be ‘sanitised’. Staff likely to stand out from the local population
may be redeployed. In Iraq, more radical steps have included staff using false names, working
with no fixed operating address and not being told the identities of colleagues. Beneficiaries
were purposefully not made aware of the source of their assistance. Another tactic of a lowvisibility approach is to use removable (e.g. magnetic) logos for vehicles, which can beremoved in areas where visibility is discouraged. Knowing when to display a logo and when
to take it off demands a very good, localised and dynamic risk assessment. A low-profile, lowvisibility approach poses significant challenges. It can make programming more complicated,particularly in extreme cases, and can distance the organization from sources of informationthat might otherwise enhance its security. It might also lead to suspicions and misperceptionsof what the organization is doing, undermining acceptance.
Column 3: Use of Armoured Vehicles
Whether or not aid agencies should use armoured vehicles in environments requiring highsecurity has long been debated due to organizations having different approaches to security
concerns. The Generic Security Guide, produced by the Directorate-General for European Civil
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation (ECHO) under the European Commission,suggests that armoured vehicles should be used in extreme cases by some humanitarianorganizations. “They are expensive, heavy and require special training to drive. Most civilian
armoured vehicles provide protection against only a limited range of threats. In most casessuch vehicles are not necessary, and if they are necessary, it may be best not to work in thatarea at all. Seek experienced advice before deciding to procure them.” It is better to carefully
consider when to use them, for what purpose and for how long. See also, ECHO (2004) Section
4.10 (b) Vehicles.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Reference 2-III: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts
I.
●
●
●
●

Introduction
Purpose of the plan
Identification of the person(s) responsible for security and for leading the development,
review and updating of the plan
Intended users of the plan (which staff, locations, etc. are covered)
Location of master plan and distribution list

II.
Background● Organization’s mission, mandate, principles and safety and security policies● Context summary (political, economic, historical, military, etc.)
III.
Security Risk Assessment (SRA)● Current security situations● Identification of safety ans security threats● Mitigation measures (list of necessary responses to reduce risks)● Risk analysis (impacts, likelihood, and mitigation measures and risk threshold)IV.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Outline procedures for daily operations and routines, and individual responses to incidents.
For all procedures, include (1) do/don’t, (2) how to do it, as appropriate, (3) who does it/with
whom, (4) when it is to be done; frequency and sequence, and (5) where it is to be done.
● Site selection and management (offices, residences, etc.)● Movement and transport (vehicles, convoys, etc.)● Communications (regular use and during emergencies)● Post-incident actions (reporting, analysis, etc.)
V.
Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP)
Outline procedures for incidents requiring multi-layered, organizational responses. Include
same pieces of information covered by the SOPs above. Include also lines of communication
and reporting. Alternative options should be included.
● Evacuation● Medical evacuation (Medevac)● Death of staff● Other high risk, foreseeable incident● Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT)
VI.
Supporting Information● Warden system, emergency communication system● Contact information of cooperating agencies, government agencies, airport, hospital, etc.
(phone numbers, radio frequencies, etc.)● Maps showing assembly points, routes, and boundaries● Emergency supply inventory● Incident reporting forms● Business Continuity Plan (BCP)44

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 3: Resources
Signatories shall make available the appropriate financial, human and other resources tomitigate the safety and security risks identified through the organization’s security risk
analysis.
Key Actions:•••Set out clear guidelines to budget for safety and security purposes. The budget should
include: staff costs, training, investigation/monitoring/evaluation, networking,operation costs, and overhead costs . (see also Guidance Notes 2 and 3 (P43))
If sufficient resources are not secured for safety and security purposes, revise theoriginal programme plan so that the organization can implement the programmewithin available budget so as to avoid incurring safety risks beyond the threshold andcosts beyond its financial capacity. (See Guidance Note 4 (P47))
If the donor is not willing to fund necessary security costs, advocate towards the donor
to change its policies as an NGO community member. This will contribute to thedevelopment of whole NGO-wide resources. (See Guidance Note 4 (P47)).

Key Indicators:
•
•
•

•

•

•

Organizations have procedures to inform all relevant sections/persons in charge ofbudget planning of the results of security risk assessment.
Organizations allocate sufficient levels of resources for staff, pay and working
environment. This should be applied to partners organizations too.
Organizations secure resources research/needs assessment, local stakeholder
engagement 14 , networking with other humanitarian and development actors, andmonitoring/evaluation as part of project cycle management.
Fore remotely managed projects, organizations secure sufficient resources toestablish effective communication with partner organizations (e.g. meeting in a third
country or in Japan) and to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation. (Refer toStandard 7 Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations).
Organizations secure sufficient financial and human resources for their staff members
to participate in internal and external security training and capacity development
programmes, including those resources for local partner organizations.
Organizations adopt an open policy for sharing security costs with other NGOs topursue scale merit and cost effectiveness, i.e. security advisors, offices, special typesof vehicle, evacuation, etc.

Guidance Notes:
1. Resources to Meet the Standards - A Challenge for Japanese NGOs: Based on the resultsof security risk analysis, organizations inevitably need to take some mitigation measures
14 Stakeholders for project implementation by NGOs may include local authorities, non-state actors, local leaders, local

communities, local NGOs, local partners/staff, international NGOs, the UN and governmental organizations.

45

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’and this in turn requires financial, human and other resources. However, this Standard
may be one of the greatest challenges for most Japanese NGOs in comparison with thoseof the U.S. and Europe. Some deliberate and innovative approaches by the NGO
community are expected to fill the gap between the supply and demand of resources.
2. Budget Planning Policy: Budget planning based on proper security risk analysis is a crucialpart of security management in conceiving a project. As security management involves
human resources management and collaboration with other humanitarian anddevelopment actors, the planning requires not only expenses for facilities and equipment
but also other resources such as personnel as well as stakeholder engagement to fulfil all
the safety and security standards.
⮚ In some organizations, budgets are set independently by the staff in theadministration or finance section and thus costs associated with security measuresboth at headquarters and field levels may not be properly included. To avoid suchpractice, organizations should have procedures in place for sharing the results of
security risk analyses with all relevant persons and sections or should conduct ananalysis involving all persons and sections concerned with budget planning.
⮚ Costs associated with research, assessment, and stakeholder engagement which
involves local communities are essential for NGO security management from“acceptance” strategy perspectives. Such costs should be incorporated within projectplans.
⮚ Resources for collaboration with other humanitarian and development actors need
to be put aside as administrative/overhead costs at headquarters. These resources
are essential for security information sharing, training and coordination.
⮚ When implementing projects with local partner organizations, the organization
should analyse security risks specific to these local organizations, and secureresources required to take necessary measures.
3. Budget Designing: In projects funded by UN agencies and other institutional donors, costs
associated with the security of facilities, safe travels, communication, insurance, andsecurity positions can be incorporated in proposals and budgets. However, funding forassessment, evaluation, training, stakeholder engagement, and networking with otheractors need to be included as part of overhead (i.e. indirect) costs at headquarters.
⮚ Information on supporting programmes for security training is given in Reference 3I.
⮚ Organizations should discuss and share information with the NGO community on line
items accepted by donors to set standard practices. Information on items acceptedby major Japanese donors is given in Reference 3-II.
⮚ Cost sharing with other NGOs is one way of reducing security expenses. Costs can beshared by joining existing security networks in the field or by forming an ad hoc
consortium in response to particular crises. Examples of expenses include: security
related personnel, office or communication means, special type of transportation,
evacuation means including insurance, security information, etc.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

4. Project Review and Advocacy by the NGO Community: If organizations find it difficult tomobilize sufficient resources to take required security measures, they should revise thesecurity plan as well as project plan itself. If the difficulty is mainly on account of the donor
policy of funding for security expenses, organizations should express opinions as an NGO
community member to raise awareness and change the policy of donors. (see alsoStandard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors)⮚ Organizations need to be aware that project implementation without sufficient
resources for safety and security can pose intolerable risks and overcapacity on theirstaff members.
⮚ Organizations should work on or collaborate with a NGO community for advocacy for
donors that the costs of security measures should include personnel expenses withproper working conditions, training as well as stakeholder engagement andnetworking.
⮚ If Japanese donors do not fund any safety and security cost items, organizations could
work with network NGOs in Japan working for advocacy including JaNISS.
Reference 3-I: Support Programme for Security Training
1. UNHCR Regional Centre for Emergency Preparedness (eCentre)
●

●
●

●

●

eCentre annually hosts a Security Risk Management (SRM, mainly for senior managers)
and Safety in the Field (SIF, mainly for field staff members) workshops once or twice inThailand, as part of various programmes.
All costs for training, travel and accommodation are covered by eCentre.
As eCentre’s mission is to build and develop the capacity of people working for UN
agencies, government departments, and NGOs in the Asian Pacific region to prepare andrespond to emergencies, its programmes in Thailand are limited for those working in theregion. Two or three places on average are offered to Japanese NGOs in each workshop
and there usually is a large number of applicants. Nevertheless, there have been cases inwhich 4 or 5 NGO staff members were accepted, sometimes even those working in otherregions. Staff members, regardless of their duty stations, are encouraged to apply.
Since 2017, eCentre has been organizing SRM, SIF, and relevant training-of-trainer (TOT)
programmes in Japan for Japanese NGO staff members in collaboration with JaNISS. In
these programmes, 25 places for SRM and SIF and another 15 places for TOT programmes
are offered.
Workshop information can be obtained from UNHCR’s Tokyo Office and also from the
JaNISS website.

2. Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS)●

As of 2020, JaNISS organizes the following programmes in Japan:
 Security Risk Management (SRM) (3 days) and its TOT (2 days)
 Safety in the Field (SIF, 5 days) and its TOT (2 days)
 Security Risk Management for beginners (1 and a half days) First aid primary and intermediate courses (1 day each)47

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’●●●

Participants need to pay fees. Most programmes are held in Tokyo areas, but travel andaccommodation costs may be covered by JaNISS. Participations costs from overseas canbe funded by JaNISS.
In addition to training programmes, JaNISS organizes study seminars on infectious
diseases, insurance policies, security management, and other topics.
Information is available on the JaNISS website.

3. NGO Overseas Study Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)
●

●
●
●

This programme is offered by the NGO division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
to support Japanese NGOs to send their staff members overseas to attend capacitybuilding and human resource development training programmes. The MOFA outsources
the management of the programme (to JANIC in 2020) and applications are accepted twoto three times a year.
Participation in safety security training programmes overseas can be funded by thisprogramme.
Costs for training, travel and accommodation will be covered by the programme (eachline item has a maximum limit).
Information is available at the MOFA website.

4. Japan Platform (JPF)● JPF funds costs of attending training programmes organised by external organizations, if
the need to take part in such programme is recognized. This applies to everyone, includinginternational staff, national and local staff, and the staff of partner organizations.
● For the staff at headquarters, the costs associated with training for those who need totravel to the field are covered.
● When adequate training programme is not available in the project location, costs forattending a programme in a third country will be funded.
Reference 3-II. Security Costs that Can Be Funded by Japanese Donors
A. Japan Platform (funding the guideline revised on March 13, 2020)
●
●
●
●
●
●

Insurance: travel insurance including war-premium service can be included as “insurancecost”, and also insurance provision for evacuation in “security and labour safety cost”.
Visa: Visa issuance fees for third countries for evacuation purposes can be included in“visa expense”.
Office facility: Security related office facility cost can be included in “field post set-up
expenses” or “security and labour safety expenses”.
Office equipment: Security related equipment can be included in “security and labour
safety expenses”.
Vehicle: Security related vehicle cost can be included in “local transportation expense”.
Communication: Communication equipment necessary for security management can be
included in “field office admin equipment and supply expenses” and communication costin “communication and bank transfer expenses”.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

●

●
●
●
●

Personnel: Both for international and national/local staff, all personnel costs including
statutory welfare benefits covered by the employer can be included in personnel cost,
under the limit of the JPF personnel expense standard. Personnel costs for security
managers and security officers can also be included.
Security training cost: In some programmes, security training expenses can be includedin the budget. (refer to Article 4. of Reference 3-II above)
Expense for travel to headquarters during the project period and R&R: It can be included
in “travel expense”.
Guard and other security related expenses: Guard and other security related expenses
can be included in “security and labour safety expenses”.
Overhead cost: A maximum of 5% of the total expense in the field can be allocated as
overhead cost. Documented evidence must be submitted.

B. Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (N-Ren, based on guideline for fiscal year
2020)
●

●
●
●
●
●

●

●

●

Insurance: war-premium service and insurance for evacuation can be included in “travelcost” or in “expenses for other security measures”, when the need to include these isrecognized.
Visa: Visa issuance fees for third countries for evacuation purposes can be included in“expenses for other security measures”.
Office facility: Security related facility cost can be included in “expenses for other security
measures”.
Office equipment: Security related equipment can be included in “office supply expense”
or “expenses for other security measures”.
Vehicle: Security related vehicle cost can be included in “vehicle procurement/lease
expenses” or “expenses for other security measures”.
Communication: Communication equipment related to security can be included in“Office equipment procurement/lease expenses” or “expenses for other security
measures” and communication cost in “communication expense”.
Personnel: For international staff, basic salary with some allowances including that for
managerial positions can be included. However, statutory welfare benefits covered by
employers and other allowances including those for over-time or accommodation can
NOT be included. For national/local staff, only basic salary and statutory social benefits
including the cost covered by the employer can be included. They can be approved within
the limitation rate for MOFA’s standard both for international and local staff. The salaryfor paid holidays can NOT be included for either international or local staff.
Expense for travel to headquarters during the project period and rest and recreation(R&R): The expense for travel between the field and headquarters can be approved for
only one time at be beginning and end of a project period. In principle, the expense fortravel to headquarters for meetings and rest during the project period, as well as R&R ina third country, cannot be approved.
Security training: Security training expenses cannot be included. However, for the
security training and exercises provided by the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA), the travel expenses to the venue(s) can be included both in Japan and in a countryof activities, only for one person of Japanese nationality, once in one project, if the person
has not participated in the training before.
49

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’●●

Guard and other security measure expenses: Guard and other security related expenses
can be included in “expenses for other security measures”.
Overhead costs: A maximum of 5% of the total expenses in the field can be allocated as
overhead. Documented evidence must be submitted. Direct costs for the project can NOT
be included here.

50

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 4: Human Resources Management
Signatories shall have personnel guidelines and procedures that prepare employees to copewith safety and security issues at their post of assignment, support them during their service,
and address post assignment issues.
Organizations should work on hiring and retaining qualified staff and demonstrate their dutyof care to staff, through proper orientation, training, insurance and support. Organizations
should have policies and procedures in place that include national/local staff in the security
risk management systems and that address the unique security concerns of national/local
staff.
Key Actions:
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

Identify those positions that have a critical role in staff security and clearly define
security responsibilities and specific decision-making roles in their Terms of Reference(TOR) (Guidance Note 1 (P52)); ,Establish organizations’ personnel policies in which security responsibilities forindividual positions are explained (Guidance Note 2 and 4 (P52), Standard 2.1
Guidance Note 6 (P25));
Provide clear guidance as to stress management for international and national/local
staff members (e.g. safe working environment, appropriate working hours, measures
for international staff including R & R) (Guidance Note 3 (P52), see Guidance Note 6(P53) for support to staff’s family);
Consider gender-specific vulnerabilities for the staff, follow relevant international
standards and guidelines, and establish policies accordingly (Guidance Note 5 (P52));
Provide information on required security training for international and national/local
staff members (Guidance Notes 8 and 9 (P53));
Have clear policies as to health benefits and insurances for international andnational/local staff members (Guidance Note 10 (P53));
Consider context-specific vulnerabilities for the national/local staff and translate
security policies and plans into local languages as appropriate (Guidance Note 12(P54)).

Key Indicators:•••

Staff have access to the following documents:
 Organization’s safety and security policies, staff care and support policies;
 Each position’s clear ToR with scope of responsibilities;
 Project plans with outcomes of risk assessment of security, travel and health.
The above-mentioned policies and documents are reviewed on a regular basis.
The following training is given to staff at all levels:
 Organizational risk assessment; Global security situation surrounding humanitarian and development aid;
 Responses to the media and support to family during security incidents;
 Personal security management in the field.
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Guidance Notes:
1. Terms of Reference (TOR): It is desirable to outline the specific roles and responsibilities
for the different functions for all positions in the organization in writing. By clarifying
individual positions’ scope of work, it becomes possible to prevent unbalanced workload
to certain individuals and staff burnout. It is also useful to have each role’s responsibilities
before, during and after the incident clarified so as to avoid being dysfunctional duringcrisis.
2. Pre-assignment briefing: In advance of staff’s deployment, organizations must ensure
staff are provided with verbal and written briefings on all risks relevant to the role to beundertaken, and that measures are in place to mitigate those risks, including insurance
cover. The organization need to receive informed consent prior to departure. It is
important that the line management and security management structure are clear to all
staff so that communication between headquarters and field office flows smoothly. See
CHS for more details about human resources management. (see Standard 1: Guidancenote 7)
3. Stress Management: Managing stress is the responsibility of not only the individual but
also the organization. Organizations should be aware that more staff experience stressthan security threats, and that stress affects their performance, motivation, and also their
turnover. Staff often work long hours in risky and stressful conditions. An organization’s
duty of care to its workers includes actions to promote well-being and avoid long-term
exhaustion, burnout, injury or illness. When the organization deploys staff to a highpressure area, they are required to receive regular ‘rest and recreation (R&R)’ to help
prevent stress and illness and to improve efficiency. Post-deployment support including
PTSD response is also required if necessary. Speaking about managing stress may bereceived differently in some cultures, and organizations should be aware thatnational/local staff may have a different attitude towards stress. (see also Column 1
below)
4. Roles of Managers: Managers must make aid workers aware of the risks and protect
them from exposure to unnecessary threats to their physical and emotional health.
Measures that can be adopted include effective security management, preventive healthadvice, active support to work reasonable hours and access to psychological support
when required. Managers can promote a duty of care by demonstrating good practices
and personally complying with policy. Aid workers also need to take personal
responsibility for managing their own well-being. Psychosocial support should be
immediately available to workers who have experienced or witnessed extremely
distressing events.
5. Gender specific considerations: While the majority of victims of sexual violence arefemale, there exist specific threats and risks according to gender. Sexuality can have an
impact on vulnerability to threats too. Organization’s security risk assessment should
include these aspects. Generally women and gender-variant minority group are aware of
their vulnerabilities. It is also important to remember that male staff can also be victimsof sexual assault. (see also Sexual Assault in Standard 2.3)

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6. Family care: The organization’s security policy and plan should include care and support
for staff’s families during critical incidents. In some cases, staff’s families should be
informed about security risks associated with deployment in advance. While responding
to any critical incident involving staff, the organization must reassure families bycommunicating closely and providing support. Family care is an integral part of risk
management plan and it is important to select a focal point in the organization for
affected families as part of duty of care. (see Standard 2.2 Security Plan at Headquarters
Guidance Note 4 and Column 1)
7. Relocation and Evacuation: Staff policy regarding relocation and evacuation should
clearly be communicated to all staff in advance. International staff need to understandthat they must follow the decision of the organization to evacuate, while individual staff
members have the right to request to withdraw from risky areas when they feel insecure.
Should international staff refuse or decline to be evacuated they should be informed thatthey will no longer be covered by insurance and will be separated from the organization.
It is a good practice to discuss with national/local staff what their intentions would be in
the event of their being relocated within the country during the periods of emergency.
Would they wish to remain or relocated? Those remaining could be mobilized to
implement the continuity of operations after the international staff is evacuated. It isbetter to do this during a period of calm rather than when the emergency is imminent.
8. Providing Security Risk Management (SRM) training opportunities: Organizations
should provide security training opportunities according to individual staff members’ job
scopes and especially training related to the risks that they are expected to handle with.
It is critical to learn from other agencies and network organizations and also mobilize
experienced staff members for providing training, guidance, and advice. In programmes
offered by JaNISS and UNHCR eCentre, there are opportunities to exchange lessons andexperiences. (see also Standard 3 Resources, Reference 3-1)
9. First Aid Training: In addition to security training, all staff members should receive firstaid training, which can be highly useful for those who work in remote and difficult
environments. Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies in many countries offer
such training programmes. In Japan, local fire fighting departments organize training
programmes. JaNISS provides NGO with first aid training opportunities on a regular basis
too.
10. Insurance: All staff should be covered by appropriate insurance, and for those who are
deployed to higher risk destinations should be provided with special insurance which
refunds the costs incurred by an organization in supporting staff affected by conflict or
terrorist attacks. Insurance for repatriating seriously injured or sick staff members can bevery costly. Proper risk assessment should be carried out before arranging insurance
provision. Similarly, all local and national staff members should be provided withcomprehensive insurance packages. The availability of insurance policies and insurancecompanies vary from country to country, hence the organization need to takeappropriate measures according to local situations.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’More details are given in Column 2 and 3 below.
For staff members employed in Japan, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance
Act regulates that employers must provide insurance against staff’s potential injury,
disease, disability and death during work and commuting. This act can be applied to thestaff deployed overseas but a separate registration is needed in advance. This act does
not apply to the staff who travel to countries for a short period of time. For more details,
see the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s website.
https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/roudoukijun/rou
sai/kanyu.html
11. Staff recruitment: Recruiting the right national/local staff is crucial when an organizationis new to an environment and needs to respond urgently to an emergency. Backgroundcheck should be conducted, and short-term contracts may be appropriate depending on
the situation.
12. Special care for national/local staff: It is mandatory that national/local staff are involvedin formulating, reviewing and implementing security and safety policies and plans, tomake sure that their culture is considered. National/local staff should be given an
explanation of the organization’s rules and regulations on human resources in their own
language(s). Their TORs, evacuation plans and crisis management should also be
explained. The recruitment and assignment of staff requires consideration of a wellbalanced team, with respect for local culture and customs. National/local staff, on the
one hand, have a better understanding of the social, cultural and political environment
in the field and better access to local networks which help them to gather informationfrom the local context, but on the other hand, they may face various pressures from otheractors in society that should also be taken account of.

Column 1: Stress management
In recent years there has been growing recognition of the importance of workplace stressmanagement, as seen in a new piece of legislation of Japan’s Industrial Safety and Health Act
in 2015. In this legislation, all entities which hire more than 50 people must appoint
occupation physicians and conduct staff stress level surveys. Some NGOs make it mandatory
for those staff members who have returned to Japan to go through medical counselling. The
following websites provide information stress level surveys:
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare:https://kokoro.mhlw.go.jp/
National Information Center of Stress and Disaster Mental Health:
https://saigai-kokoro.ncnp.go.jp/index.html
Column 2: Travel insuranceThis section provides information on travel insurance which Japanese NGOs can arrange.
Insurance claims are usually made in countries where the policies are arranged, except for
travel insurance. For national local staff members, insurance needs to be arranged in the
countries where they work. Japanese insurance companies may able to recommend some54

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

local insurance companies when they have information. In countries where insurance
provision is absent or almost absent, NGOs still needs to take mitigation measures withconsideration for local customs. It is recommended to consult with local NGOs, internationalorganization offices, and private companies, as appropriate. One example is that theorganization deducts a certain amount from staff’s salaries for insurance premium.
Travel insurance policy items:
Accidental death, accident physical impediment, sickness death, medical and rescuer’s
expenses, personal liability, damage to personal belongings, and flight delay expenses.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ NGO grant scheme guideline provides information on
insurance policies which can be included in budgets:- Accidental death: benefit maximum JPY 50,000,000- Accident physical impediment: benefit maximum JPY 50,000,000- Medical and rescuer’s expenses: no limit- Sickness death: benefit maximum JPY 30,000,000- Personal liability: benefit maximum JPY 100,000,000
JANIC offers 20% reduced price insurance coverage for member NGOs, contracting with
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group. This service includes war-risk cover.
On management-related insurance policies, see Column 2 in Standard 1 in this guidebook.
Column 3: Repatriation and evacuation services
In deploying staff to high-risk areas or countries, NGOs need to consider arranging emergency
response and evacuation insurance, which potentially mobilizes chartered or other private
flights. British companies such as International SOS and Control Risk offer such services.
In Japan, Emergency Assistance Japan provides “Security Assistance Programme”, including
evacuation itself and associated consulting services. Aoi Nissay Dowa Insurance and Tokio
Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., LTD also offer similar services.
References● CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project. (2014). Core Humanitarian Standard on
Quality and Accountability, Commitment 8.
● People in Aid. (2003). Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid
Personnel, Principle Seven (Health, Safety and Security)● ECHO. (2004). A25 (Rest and Recreation) and A35 (Stress)● GPR8. (2010). Chapter 4 (Evacuation, Hibernation, Remote Management Programmingand Return), Chapter 6 (People in Security Management), and Annex 5 (Insurance).

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 5: Accountability
Signatories shall incorporate management systems that will ensure accountability for safety
and security at both headquarters and field levels, and all personnel understand theirrespective roles and responsibilities.
Setting standards for security and safety will be more likely to be sustained if there is a goodstructure of accountability in place with clear lines of responsibility for each of them, and aprocess by which people are held accountable for these responsibilities. Those withresponsibilities must have proportionate authorities. An effective security management
structure will foster a positive security culture and help the organization to fulfil its duty ofcare obligations.
Key Actions:•••

Assign an individual or a group of staff within the organization who can act as asecurity focal point and/or working group in order to take the lead in developing andimplementing the security management framework. (see also Guidance Note 1 (P56))
Provide briefing and introductory sessions on the organization's mission and values,
security roles and responsibilities to staff members at all levels both at headquarters
and the field locations. (see also Guidance Note 2 (P57))
Conduct a periodic organizational security review by a means such as evaluations of
employees’ and management performance on security related responsibilities, drillsof Critical Incident Management, and review of safety and security plan. (see also
Guidance Note 3 (P58), Planning Process at Standard 2.3 (P35))

Key Indicators:
•
•
•
•
•

Security management systems are established at headquarters and field offices, basedon the organization’s security policies and plans, regardless of the organization’s size.
Reporting lines for authority and decision-making are clearly established and all staff
members understand to whom they are accountable.
Staff at all levels within the organization, from the governing bodies to individual staff
members, share a collective responsibility for safety and security.
Procedures to address non-compliance and violations of established safety andsecurity policies and procedures are in place and made known to staff members.
Staff members comply with the organization’s safety and security policies and plan,and their procedures.

Guidance Notes:
1. Create an Effective Security Risk Management Structure: Ultimate accountability forstaff security and safety rests with the governing bodies, such as the Board of Trustees,
who then delegate responsibility to the Executive Director/CEO, or a position of similarseniority, to ensure that effective SRM is in place. Day-to-day management and56

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

responsibility for security is shared across different levels in the organization, following
the line of management.
Therefore, it is necessary to identify existing positions with a critical role in staff security
and safety, including managers based in the field and at the headquarters. Furthermore,
the security responsibilities and specific decision-making roles of each of these positions
should be defined in respective staff members’ job descriptions. Their security
responsibilities should be included in the organization’s safety and security policies so thatall staff members are informed.15
Many organizations appoint individual staff or a group of staff to act as a security working
group and/or security focal point to support the development of the organization’s SRM
framework, ensure there are agreed policies and procedures in place, as well as provide
advice to the line of management if required. The advantage of appointing a group of staff
representing different roles and levels within the organization is to bring a wide range ofexperience and perspectives, and encourage a greater sense of ownership. It is importantthat these people are given adequate time, support and training to do these tasks inaddition to their usual tasks. It is also important to note that the security focal point orworking group is not responsible for managing security risks. Instead, security
management responsibilities must remain embedded within the normal line management(see “Example Structure and Responsibilities” on the following page).
When identifying specific security roles and responsibilities, it is necessary to be realistic
for the organization considering its size, the complexity of its structure, and existing rolesand capacities.
2. Collective Responsibility for Safety and Security: Security awareness is an ongoingcollective responsibility. Each staff, therefore, is obliged to actively participate in andcontribute to the maintenance of security measures, be aware of and responsible for theirown security risks and team security, and understand and adhere to security measures. It
is important to develop a security-aware culture within the organization, and to treat
security as an organization-wide priority, not a sensitive management issue to be
discussed only by a few staff members behind closed doors. For example, the following
considerations could be useful to develop a culture of security in the organization:⮚ Staff designated as Security Focal Points must be encouraged to attend security
training courses as run by International Safety Organization (INSO), UNHCR orother NGOs and to enrol in online courses run by Global Inter-Agency Security
Forum (GISF).
⮚ Make sure that all staff members are familiar with the context, risk andcommitments of the organization in terms of risk reduction and security
management.

15 For concrete examples of security responsibilities, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 6 (People in Security Management); Care

International. (n.d.) Role of Safety and Security Management in an Emergency. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://www.careemergencytoolkit.org/management/14-safety-and-security/1-role-of-safety-and-security-managementin-an-emergency/; and Mercy Corps. (2011). Field Security Manual (March 2011).

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’⮚ Make sure that all staff members understand their individual responsibilities withregard to security, teamwork and discipline.
⮚ Advise and assist staff to address their medical, financial and personal insurance
matters prior to deployment to a high-risk environment.
⮚ Be clear about the expectations of managers and management styles undernormal and high-stress circumstances.
⮚ Ensure that security is a key consideration in all programme planning.
Mainstreaming a security culture means considering security implications involved ineverything the organization does, from discussions about programme design and public
messages to funding decisions and the hiring of external contractors. It is also crucial to
make sure that all staff, including national/local staff, know the organization and its
mission in any given context. Staff need to be told what the organization is about. Keyquestions include:⮚ Why is this organization here?
⮚ What is it doing here?
⮚ Where does it get its money from? What does it use that money for?
⮚ Who directs its activities?
⮚ Is it serving foreign political interests?
⮚ What is its political agenda?
⮚ Does it want to change local society, culture, values or religion?
Consider providing staff with some written materials in their own language(s), and go
through them with staff in an interactive way. Furthermore, periodically bring staff
together to hear from them what sorts of questions and comments they most regularly
get from those in the community and how they answer them. It is important to remind
every member that they should behave as a positive representative of the organization.
Each member is responsible for reporting to their line manager regarding any action or
behaviour that breaches policy or jeopardises team security.
3. Measures to Enhance Accountability: The following activities may enhance theorganization’s accountability for security.
⮚ Periodical security briefings and drills will enhance staff members’ knowledge of linesof responsibility and authority. Outcomes of drills will help review the organizational
effectiveness of management systems and structures (lines of responsibility, humanresources, technology, procurement, etc.).
⮚ All staff with security responsibilities must have their duties clearly articulated in theirjob description, and, for accountability, assessed in their performance review.
⮚ Violations of security policies and procedures have clear consequences for theviolators which are spelled out in the human resources policy. Procedures to address
non-compliance and violations of established safety and security policies andprocedures should be in place and made known to staff members at all levels.
References
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’● GPR8. (2010). Chapter 1.2 (Organizational Security Management)● InterAction. (n.d.). Security Risk Management – NGO Approach● Shaun Bickley. (2017). Security Risk Management: A Basic Guide for Smaller NGOs.
European Interagency Security Forum (EISF). Chapter 3 (Governance and Accountability)

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

Reference 5-I: Example Structure anesponsibilities

The Board of Trustees Provides
strategic direction and oversight to ensurethat security risks are appropriately
managed by the organization.

Executive Director/CEO
Ultimately responsible for security risk
management within the organization.
Ensures resources for security risk
management and advises the Board ofTrustees on security matters.

Security Working Group
Responsible for developing andrevising security policies, setting
minimum security requirements andreviewing the organization’s security
practices.
Supports managers in implementing,and monitoring compliance of, thesecurity risk management framework.
Ensures critical incident management
plans are developed, implemented, andperiodically tested.

Programme/Regional Director
Accountable for security risk
management within their respective
programmes/regions. Supports
countries in implementing theorganization’s security risk
management framework and ensuring

Security Focal Point

Country Director/Representative

Supports management in promoting
staff security and ensuring staff
knowledge of and compliance withsecurity policies and procedures inplace.
Responsible for gathering reliablesecurity information and keeping staff
informed and updated on security
issues.
Responsible for the training andsupervision of guards.

Responsible for security risk
management at the country level, e.g.
monitoring country-level risk, andestablishing and maintaining
appropriate security plans andarrangements for country-based staff.

Line Management

All Staff

Advisory & Support

Responsible for complying with all
security policies, plans, procedures anddirectives, and accountable for theirown actions. Must understand security
context and ensure their behaviour
does not increase risk to themselves

Source: Shaun Bickley. (2017). Security Risk Management: a Basic
Guide for Smaller NGOs. European Interagency Security Forum
Notes: Individual organizations need to decide where volunteers
and interns are placed in their structures.

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors
Signatories shall actively participate in safety and security related forums at both
headquarters and field levels and collaborate with other members of the humanitarian anddevelopment communities to advance their common safety and security interests.
Although security management is considered to be largely agency-centred, there are many
good reasons why the agencies should cooperate each other. Security will be dramaticallyenhanced through coordination, information sharing and the recognition that the behaviourof an individual NGO can impact on the security of the entire humanitarian community (which
could be described as a “sense of community”).
Key Actions:•••

The importance of safety and security collaboration with other agencies in thehumanitarian and development sector is understood within the organization. (see also
Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3 (P61-62))
A focal point person is appointed to attend safety and security forum meetings. Their
responsibilities are clearly described in their TOR. (see also Standard 5 Guidance Note
1 (P56) and Reference 5-I: Example Structure and Responsibilities (P60)).
Actively participates in security forums organized by NGOs and/or UN agencies at theheadquarters and/or field office levels. The organization is recognized as a member ofthe safety and security community both at headquarters and the field level (see also
Guidance Notes 3,4 (P63-64))

Key Indicators:••••

Official and non-official personal relationships increase the exchange of security
information from reliable sources.
The organization has a written list of security forums.
The responsibility to play an active part in security forums is clearly stated in the job
description of the person in charge.
Financial and human resources are secured for taking collaborative action.

Guidance Notes:
1.

Advantages of Collaboration: Some of the advantages of collaboration include:⮚ A better alert system: Agencies can receive a fuller picture of actual or possible
security threats or alerts in their environment, thus increasing the chance of avoiding
an incident (such as using a ‘communications tree’ for wireless radios, walkie-talkies,
satellite phones, etc.).
⮚ Better SRA: Maintaining a shared record of all incidents in an operating environment
provides a better basis for a risk assessment than a partial or incomplete record.
⮚ Strategic and tactical monitoring and analysis of the operating environment: Allagencies do this by contacting other agencies informally to obtain information. Trust
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’and confidentiality make it possible to collaborate in a more structured way.
⮚ Cost-effective services: For example, the costs for security training can be shared,
rather than each agency individually covering the costs of bringing in or hiring
specialists.
⮚ Liaison with the authorities: Rather than negotiating individually, agencies can makea stronger and more consistent case together. This would include exchanging
information with military actors.
⮚ Advocacy with donors: If the security situation deteriorates and several agencies
conclude that they need extra financial resources for additional mitigating measures,
they may be able to make a more effective case with donors collectively.
⮚ The operations of and/or conduct of one organization can impact the security of othermembers of the humanitarian and development communities. Actively seeking tominimize all the negative impacts that the organization’s operations have on others
can make a difference.
2.

Information Sharing: Making good decisions requires reliable and accurate information.
All information must be considered against the reliability of the source, the number ofindividuals and organizations reporting the same information, and any local bias. Sharingof significant information has many benefits, from corroboration and verification toincreasing the organization’s knowledge base. Examples of useful information that might
be shared include incident reports and analyses, situation reports, threat assessments,and security training. In order to share security related information with other actors, theorganization should establish policies and procedures for sharing such information (whodecides what information could be shared with whom and how).

3.

Participation in Security Forums: There are many security-related forums at both
headquarters and field office levels. Participation in these security forums provides
opportunities to share useful information, exchange good practices, and consider thelarger picture of safety and security in both the global and operational environments. It
is strongly advised that organizations join such security forums to gather information andto identify good practices for the particular operation. Security forums are usually chairedby one organization and attended by respective security focal points.
When appointing a staff member to attend the coordination meetings, ensure the person
is supported to dedicate time as a priority, and is fully briefed on the rules forparticipation. The staff should know how the information is to be shared and managed.
If there is no security forum, NGOs are encouraged to take the initiative with otheragencies to collaborate on holding a meeting. Security forums are useful mechanisms for
improving organizations' understanding of the current international standards related tosecurity management, and for improving awareness on security management for small
NGOs. Security forums can also share the costs of organizing training for staff, and act asa coordination point with other actors such as the United Nations Department of Safety
and Security (UNDSS).

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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’

When deemed appropriate by an organization, it can participate in “Saving Lives Together(SLT)” 16, which is a framework aimed at enhancing UN and NGO security collaboration infield operations. The objective of SLT is to enhance the ability of partner organizations tomake informed decisions and implement effective security arrangements to improve thesafety and security of personnel and operations, while operational decisions made on thebasis of such information remain the responsibility of the respective organizations. In
larger operations it will be found that UN OCHA conduct regular security/coordination
briefings at which NGOs are welcomed. Attendance at such gatherings is encouraged.
4.

Sources of Additional Information: There are a number of sources of additional
information that organizations can link into to improve the flow of information on
security incidents, find advice on how to mitigate security risks from various threats andimprove security capacity:⮚ Host government departments (national security forces including police whenappropriate);⮚ National governments, including donor governments and their embassies;⮚ United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), and other UN Agencies such as
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);⮚ Insurance providers, which often have a threat advisory service linked to various
countries and regions;⮚ NGO security consultants, such as International NGO Security Organization (INSO);⮚ Local commercial security providers (guard companies);⮚ International and national media;⮚ Other NGOs and their partner organizations – both national and international NGOs;⮚ Host and beneficiary communities; and⮚ National staff.

References● Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). (2015). Saving Lives Together: A Framework
for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (October
2015)● GPR8. (2010). Chapter 1.3 (Interagency Security Management), Annex 2 (The United
Nations Security Management System), Annex 3 (Saving Lives Together)● InterAction. (2015). InterAction Minimum Operating Security Standards● Mercy Corps. (2011). Field Security Manual (March 2011)● Care International. (2008). Care International Safety and Security Principles● ECHO. (2004). Section 4.5 (Relations with Other Organizations)

16 See Inter-Agency Standing Committee. (2015). Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements

Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (October 2015). Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://interagencystandingcommittee.org/collaborative-approaches-field-security/content/saving-lives-togetherframework-improving-security-0; and Christian Aid. (2010). Saving Lives Together: A Review of Security Collaboration
between the United Nations and Humanitarian Actors on the Ground. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://reliefweb.int/report/world/saving-lives-together-review-security-collaboration-between-united-nations-and.

63

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’Standard 7: Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations
Signatories shall endeavour to achieve the above six Standards in implementing a project witha local partner organization , based on mutual respect and shared responsibility.
Key Actions:•••

In implementing a project in partnership with a local organization, clarify roles andresponsibilities of both parties in case of critical incidents and for day-to-day
operations (see also Guidance Note 2 (P65), Standard 2.3 Guidance Notes 4 (P37))
When a staff member of the organization works with a local organization, both sides
provide information about potential security risks, staff’s roles and responsibilities,
and vulnerabilities, prior to project implementation. (see also Guidance Notes 1 (P64),
3 (P65), Standard 2.1 Guidance Note 5 Full Participation of National/Local Staff inSecurity Planning (P23)).
To work with local implementing partners in high-risk areas and countries, both sides
need to understand potential security risks for the local organization and the funding
NGO’s risk threshold (e.g. reputational risks). Transferring high risks to the localorganization in an unintended way should be avoided. (See Guidance Note 4 (P65),
Standard 2.1 Guidance Note 4 (P21), Standard 2.3 Guidance Note 1 (P36))

Key Indicators:•••

When implementing a project with a local partner entity, the organization should
understand the security risks that they may face, respect their safety and security
policies, and agree on the security risk measures to be taken. These arrangements
should also be written in a memorandum of understanding (MOU).
Close and smooth communication with local partners is ensured. Costs for
consultation meetings in a third country or invitation to the funding agency’s
headquarters are secured.
In accordance with the security compliance ability of local partner organizations, it isnecessary for funding organizations to secure human resources and training
opportunities, and to ensure there are sufficient resources for equipment andmaterials for security measures including crime prevention.

Guidance Notes:
1. Working with local partners:
Implementing projects with local organization is an effective way. The number of projects
implemented in such a way has been increasing, as the number of humanitarian crises isincreasing across the world. The employing organization still retains the legal duty of care
responsibilities and must ensure that the security risk management of the partnerorganization is appropriate to meet these responsibilities. Both parties need to understandeach other’s different security standards and risk attitudes.

64

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’⮚ International NGOs enter into implementation agreements with local partnerorganizations, regardless of the security situation. Even in such cases, all the above six
Standards should be met as there always exist risks associated with crimes, diseases,
and accidents.
⮚ When a project is managed remotely without international staff’s presence, bothorganizations need to agree on day-to-day security measures, in addition to travel
security risk management.
⮚ When a staff member of the organization is hosted by a local organization, or when aproject is implemented by a local organization and responsibilities for security are
under its management, it would be desirable to conduct a joint security risk
assessment to agree on security measures to be taken. These arrangements should be
written in the MOU.
⮚ It is important to maintain close communication with the local organization and to
make sure that necessary security arrangements are in place when the project is fully
remotely managed and no staff travel is involved.
2. Points to include in the agreement:⮚ Visibility: Depending on the security situation, organizations may refrain from using
logos and signs of donors, own organization, and local partner organizations.
⮚ Decision-making roles in the field: Clarify responsibilities of the local representative sothat they can make appropriate decisions.
⮚ Public relations: When ethnic and/or religious tensions are observed, the NGO must
be aware that they ways in which they write about these could potentially affect theirprogramme activities. Special attention needs to be paid to the ways in whichinternational staff movement is communicated.
⮚ Ensure that most updated information is shared between the funding organizationand the local organization, including SOP and security management planarrangements.
⮚ Emergency response: Clearly identify what triggers evacuation and programmesuspension, and also financial settlement mechanism.
3. Communication with Local Partner Organizations: Close communication is vital for taking
security measures among different organizations. It is necessary to formulate projectplans in collaboration with local partner organizations and to communicate frequently
during project implementation. It is also important to exchange opinions directly with thestaff of local partner organizations through business trips and on-site visits as well as usual
communication by e-mail, telephone, etc. Especially when organizations cannot visit the
project site due to deterioration of security, etc., it is necessary to try to meet the staff oflocal partner organizations in a different country.
4. Security Measures on Relocation: When the project is suspended temporarily or
terminated in the middle due to deterioration of the security situation, organizations
should take appropriate measures not only for their own staff but also the staff of thelocal partner organization. Even if the organization evacuates only its own staff and the65

JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’project continues with the local partner team staying, it is important to consider possible
security risks and take countermeasures.
References● ECHO. (2004). Section 4.5 (Relations with Other Organisations)● InterAction. (2015). InterAction Minimum Operating Security Standards.
● OCHA. (2011). Safety and Security for National Humanitarian Workers. Annex I to: To Stayand Deliver – Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environment. Section
5 (Organisational Policies and Approaches to Duty of Care)66

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References● Bickley, Shaun. (2017). Security Risk Management: A Basic Guide for Smaller NGOs.
European Interagency Security Forum (EISF). Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://www.eisf.eu/library/security-risk-management-a-basic-guide-for-smaller-ngos/.
● Care International. (2008). Care International Safety and Security Principles. Retrieved on
21 March 2018 from https://www.careemergencytoolkit.org/management/14-safetyand-security/3-complying-with-cares-safety-and-security-policies-and-procedures/.
● Care International. (2013). Care International Safety and Security Standards. Retrievedon 21 March 2018 from https://www.careemergencytoolkit.org/management/14safety-and-security/3-complying-with-cares-safety-and-security-policies-andprocedures/.
● Care International (n.d.) Role of Safety and Security Management in an Emergency.
Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://www.careemergencytoolkit.org/management/14-safety-and-security/1-role-ofsafety-and-security-management-in-an-emergency/.
● Christian Aid. (2010). Saving Lives Together: A Review of Security Collaboration between
the United Nations and Humanitarian Actors on the Ground. Retrieved on 21 March2018 from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/saving-lives-together-review-securitycollaboration-between-united-nations-and.
● CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project. (2014). Core Humanitarian Standard
on Quality and Accountability. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard/language-versions.
● Concern Worldwide (2016), Concern’s Security Policy (March 2016), Retrieved on 21
March 2018 from https://www.concern.net/resources/security-policy.
● Davis, James. (2015). Security to Go: A Risk Management Toolkit for Humanitarian Aid
Agencies. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF). Retrieved on 21 March 2018from https://www.eisf.eu/library/security-to-go-a-risk-management-toolkit-forhumanitarian-aid-agencies/.
● Davis, James and Reilly, Lisa (2015), Security to Go: A Risk Management Toolkit for
Humanitarian Aid Agencies, European Interagency Security Forum (EISF), Retrieved 21
March 2018 from https://www.eisf.eu/library/security-to-go-a-risk-managementtoolkit-for-humanitarian-aid-agencies/.
● European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). (2004).
Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations. Retrieved on 21 March 2018from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/generic-security-guide-humanitarianorganisations-enar.
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JaNISS – Guidebook on ‘NGO Standards for Safety and Security’● Hoppe, Kelsey and Williamson, Christine. (2016). Dennis vs Norwegian Refugee Council:
Implications for Duty of Care. Humanitarian Practise Network (HPN). Retrieved 21 March2018 from https://odihpn.org/blog/dennis-vs-norwegian-refugee-council-implicationsfor-duty-of-care/.
● InterAction. (2015). InterAction Minimum Operating Security Standards. Retrieved on 21
March 2018 from https://www.interaction.org/document/interaction-minimumoperating-security-standards-and-suggested-guidance-language.
● InterAction. (n.d.). Security Risk Management - NGO Approach. Retrieved on 21 March2018 fromhttps://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/2581/NGO_SRM_APPROACH_FINAL_SA
G_APPROVED.pdf.
● Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). (2015). Saving Lives Together: A Framework for
Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (October2015). Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://interagencystandingcommittee.org/collaborative-approaches-fieldsecurity/content/saving-lives-together-framework-improving-security-0.
● Irish Aid. (2013). Irish Aid Guidelines for NGO Professional Safety and Security Risk
Management. Retrieved 21 March 2018 from https://www.irishaid.ie/newspublications/publications/publicationsarchive/2013/august/guidelines-for-ngoprofessional-safety-security/.
● Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). (n.d.). Understanding NGOs
[Japanese article]. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from www.janic.org/ngo/faq/.
● Japan Afghan NGO Network (JANN). (2009). On Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan
Alternative to Japan’s Refuelling Mission in the Indian Ocean [Japanese article].
Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from http://www.ngojvc.net/jp/notice/2010/data/20100219_afghanistan_lobby.pdf.
● Lutheran World Federation. (2016). LWF Safety and Security Policy (March 2016).
Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/lwf_safety_and_security_policy__march_2016.pdf.
● Mercy Corps. (2011). Field Security Manual (March 2011). Portland: Mercy Corps.
● Merkelbach, Maarten and Kemp, Edward. (2016). Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v
Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications. Retrieved 21 March 2018 fromhttps://www.eisf.eu/library/duty-of-care-a-review-of-the-dennis-v-norwegian-refugeecouncil-ruling-and-its-implications/● Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2011). Safety and Security
for National Humanitarian Workers. Annex I to: To Stay and Deliver – Good Practice for
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Humanitarians in Complex Security Environment. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 fromhttps://reliefweb.int/report/world/safety-and-security-national-humanitarian-workers.
● Overseas Development Institute. （2010), Operational Security Management in Violent
Environment, Good Practice Review Number 8 （New Edition), London: Overseas
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