UNIDIRFEBRUARY 2024

OEWG on Reducing Space
Threats: Recap Report
A L M U D E N A A Z C Á R AT E O R T E G A· SARAH ERICKSONOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities.

This report was made possible thanks to the financial support of Norway. UNIDIR’s James
Revill and Ching Wei Sooi provided invaluable advice, support, and assistance on thispaper. The authors would also like to acknowledge in particular Hellmut Lagos for his criticalfeedback.

Photo credit for photographs in pages 1,6,8,16,19,23,29,31,34: NASA.
Design and layout by Trifecta Content Studio.

ABOUT UNIDIRUNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the
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and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR

assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed tofind solutions to critical security problems.

NOTE
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not

imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United
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or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the

publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarilyreflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

CITATION
Almudena Azcárate Ortega & Sarah Erickson. “OEWG on Reducing Space Threats: Recap
Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/Space/01.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT2

UNIDIRTABLE OFContents
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

4

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

5

INTRODUCTION

6

THE OEWG IN CONTEXT: WHAT, WHY, WHO AND HOW?

8

WHAT - THE MANDATE OF THE OEWG

9

WHY - THE GEOPOLITICS OF SPACE SECURITY THAT LED TO
THE CREATION OF THE OEWG

10

WHO - THE OPEN-ENDED NATURE OF THE OEWG

11

HOW - THE FOCUS ON RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOURS

16

TAKING STOCK OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW

17

CONSIDERING CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS

20RECOMMENDATIONS ON POSSIBLE NORMS, RULES AND
PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOURS

24

STATES’ PERSPECTIVES

26

INPUT FROM NON-GOVERNMENTAL STAKEHOLDERS

27

DRAFTING OF THE REPORT29

TAKEAWAYS FROM THE OEWG PROCESS

32

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS35

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIRABOUT THE AUTHORSALMUDENA AZCÁRATE ORTEGA
Researcher for the Space Security
and WMD Programmes at UNIDIR.

She has published widely and briefed UN Member States on the topics of space security

law and policy and has presented her research in multiple fora. She has led UNIDIR’s
participation in the UN Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats throughnorms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, established pursuant to UN General

Assembly resolution 76/231. Prior to joining UNIDIR, Almudena was a Research Assistant at

Georgetown University Law Center, where she is currently a doctoral candidate. She holds

an LL.M. in National Security Law from the same institution, and received her LL.B. from the
University of Navarra, Spain.

SARAH ERICKSON

Research Assistant for the Space Security
and WMD Programmes at UNIDIR.

She holds a dual master’s degree from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at

Monterey and Moscow State Institute of International Relations in WMD Nonproliferation,

Nuclear Policy and Global Security. Her research focuses on space security, the spacenuclear nexus, and the history and future development of national space strategies. She

has worked with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and received the IAEA
Marie-Sklodowska Curie Fellowship in 2021-2022, and a Fulbright Fellowship in 2019-2020.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMSASAT		

Anti-satellite

PAROS		

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

OEWG		UNODA

Open-ended Working Group

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIRINTRODUCTION
OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIRINTRODUCTIONSpace security has been a topic of importance for the international community for many
years. States are increasingly aware of the importance of space systems to humankind

and have put forth multiple initiatives that seek to preserve outer space as a peaceful andsecure environment. The 2023 Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space
Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours is one such initiative.
The OEWG was convened under General Assembly resolution 76/231 on Reducing space

threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours1, and was tasked

with “mak[ing] recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible

behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, including, as appropriate, how
they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including on theprevention of an arms race in outer space”.2 The OEWG was tasked with submitting a reportto the seventy-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Although the members of the OEWG did not agree on a report, the work that States andother stakeholders carried out throughout the four sessions held in 2022 and 2023 helped

advance multilateral space security discussions. Now, as the international community

moves forward and considers new initiatives and processes to prevent an arms race inouter space and achieve space security, it is also important to look back at the recent past.

This report therefore looks at the genesis of the OEWG, what its mandate was, and what theoutcome of the process was. Moreover, this report highlights some key takeaways for the

future, outlining what worked well in the OEWG process and what can be improved as States
continue their work to achieve space security.

1
2

G.A. Res. 76/231, 76th Sess. on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible
behaviours (24 Dec. 2021) [hereinafter ‘Res. 76/231’], https://undocs.org/A/RES/76/231
Ibid., ¶5 c).

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THE OEWG INCONTEXT: WHAT, WHY,
WHO AND HOW?
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THE OEWG INCONTEXT: WHAT, WHY,
WHO AND HOW?
WHAT - THE MANDATE OF THE OEWGThe Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing space threats through norms, rules
and principles of responsible behaviours was given a four-pronged mandate by the United
Nations General Assembly:

a. Take stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning
threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space;b. Consider current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities
and omissions that could be considered irresponsible;

c. Make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours
relating to threats by States to space systems, including, as appropriate, how they would

contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including on the preventionof an arms race in outer space;d. Submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session.3
The OEWG, convened under General Assembly resolution 76/231 of 24 December 2021, held

an organizational session on 7–9 February 2022. The four substantive sessions, which took

place in May 2022, September 2022, January 2023, and August 2023, respectively addressed
each of the items outlined in the mandate in turn. The OEWG was mandated to operate on

the basis of consensus, which it did not manage to reach, and thus was unable to submit areport to the General Assembly after its conclusion. Moreover, although the Group did notagree on a report, at the end of the fourth session, the Chairperson introduced a document
summarizing the proceedings, which was prepared under his sole authority and reflects his
understanding of the views expressed without prejudice to the positions of any State.4

3
4

Ibid., ¶5.
Chairperson of the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles
of responsible behaviours, Chairperson’s Summary, U.N. Doc. A/AC.294/2023/WP.22 (1 September. 2023)[hereinafter ‘Chairperson’s Summary’], available on the OEWG webpage here: https://meetings.unoda.org/
meeting/57866/documents

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WHY - THE GEOPOLITICS OF SPACESECURITY THAT LED TO THE CREATION
OF THE OEWG
Multilateral space security discussions are not new. The idea of the ‘prevention of an arms

race in outer space’ (PAROS) emerged for the first time in 1978 and not long thereafter PAROS
was added as an item to the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Space security
matters are also discussed by the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of theGeneral Assembly, which adopts multiple space-security related resolutions every year.5

Over the years, the international community has recognized the need for a secure andpeaceful space environment and has proposed multiple mechanisms to achieve this goal,with varying degrees of success.6 Traditionally, such proposals belonged to one of twogroups: (i) initiatives seeking to agree on a legally binding instrument specific to space
security and PAROS; or (ii) proposals pursuing the establishment of non-legally binding
mechanisms to complement already existing instruments, such as the Outer Space

Treaty.7 These two approaches have traditionally been seen as incompatible and mutually
exclusive, although in recent years, and partly due to the work done by the members of theOEWG, this irreconcilability has, in great part, been deemed a false dichotomy, as States

have increasingly realized the complementary and mutually reinforcing nature that suchdifferent initiatives have.8

Resolution 75/36 on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviours 9 —resolution 76/231’s predecessor, and the first to bear that title—
called on States to submit views to the Secretary-General on what activities “could beconsidered responsible, irresponsible or threatening”. This resolution urged States to “reacha common understanding of how best to act to reduce threats to space systems in orderto maintain outer space as a peaceful, safe, stable and sustainable environment” as a firststep towards formal discussions that could lead to “further consideration of legally binding

instruments in this area”.10 The reference to both legally binding and non-legally binding

approaches in the same resolution constituted a novel step forward towards bringing thetwo aforementioned traditionally opposed groups together.

5

Almudena Azcárate Ortega & Hellmut Lagos Koller, The Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats
through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours: The Journey so Far, and the Road Ahead, 48, Air
and Space Law, 19, 2023. https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/48.SI/AILA2023029
6 Ibid.
7 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including theMoon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 Jan. 1967, 18 UST 2410; 610 UNTS 205; 6 ILM 386.
8 OEWG, The Role of Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviour for Space Security, UNIDIR (24 Jan.
2023), U.N. Doc A/AC.294/2023/WP.3, https://undocs.org/en/A/AC.294/2023/WP.3
9 G.A. res. 75/36, 75th Sess., on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible
behaviours (7 Dec. 2020), https://undocs.org/A/RES/75/36
10 Ibid.

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Thirty States, the European Union, and nine non-State actors submitted substantive

comments. Key elements of these submissions were compiled in a Report of the SecretaryGeneral “without prejudice to their individual positions”.11 The submissions to the SecretaryGeneral served to highlight that, despite the diverse and sometimes diverging approaches

and priorities of States when it comes to space security, the desire to achieve PAROS isshared by all.12

WHO - THE OPEN-ENDED NATURE OF
THE OEWG
The OEWG process was open to participation by all States as well as non-governmental

entities, such as the commercial industry, civil society and academia. The Chair of the
OEWG encouraged States and other stakeholders to take advantage of the open-ended

nature of the process to participate actively and in a diverse manner to share their views in
the pursuit of common understandings on space security.

Over the years, these non-governmental stakeholders have become increasingly vocal in

expressing the need to maintain space security, and have contributed various governanceproposals over the decades, including ideas for a space code of conduct, and calls fora ban on the testing of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.13 Non-governmental entities,

particularly the commercial industry, make up around an 80 per cent of the space economy

and their unique perspective and know-how can aid in the shaping of space security byproviding States with valuable insight that could support the optimization of policymaking.14

11

Report of the Secretary-General A/76/77, on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviours, ¶¶ 14, 17 (13 Jul. 2021), https://undocs.org/en/A/76/77
12 Azcárate Ortega & Lagos Koller, supra note 5.
13 Jessica West & Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Space Dossier 7 – Norms for Outer Space: A Small Step or a Giant
Leap for Policymaking?, UNIDIR, 6-7 (Mar. 2022), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/Space/01 See also Michael
Krepon, Space: A Code of Conduct, The Henry L. Stimson Center (16 Sept. 2010), https://www.stimson.org/wpcontent/files/file-attachments/MKrepon_Final_Format_1.pdf; Nivedita Raju, A Proposal For a Ban on Destructive
Anti-Satellite Testing: a Role for the European Union?, 74, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers (Apr. 2021),
https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/proposal-bandestructive-anti-satellite-testing-role-european-union; Outer Space Institute, Letter to UNGA President Volkan
Bozkur (2 Sept. 2021), http://outerspaceinstitute.ca/docs/OSI_International_Open_Letter_ASATs_PUBLIC.pdf;
Daniel Porras, Space Dossier 2 – Towards ASAT Test Guidelines, UNIDIR (17 May 2018), https://unidir.org/sites/
default/files/publication/pdfs//-en-703.pdf
14 Manon Blancafort, Sarah Erickson & Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Commercial Actors and Civil Society
Consultation Report: How Can Non-Governmental Entities Contribute to Reducing Threats to Outer Space
Systems? (13 Mar. 2023), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/Space/02

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT11

UNIDIRATTENDANCEThe OEWG was attended by 115 different entities.15 State representation made up 67.8% of

total attendees. The remaining 32.3% of attendees were from international organizations
having received a standing invitation to participate to the UN General Assembly as observers

and other international organisations, commercial actors, and civil society. Out of the five
UN General Assembly regional groupings, the most represented regions by attending Statedelegations were Asia-Pacific States and Western European and Other States, followed by

the Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern European States and African States (seefig. 1).

8

AfricanStates11
EasternEuropeanStates23

23

WesternEuropean andOther States

Asia-PacificStates13
Latin American
andCarribeanStatesFigure 1. OEWG State Attendance

15 The list of attendance by State delegations, permanent observers, and international organizations and entities
that have received a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly
as observers can be found under UN document A/AC.294/2023/INF.3 on the OEWG webpage https://meetings.
unoda.org/meeting/57866/documents The attendance list of other international organizations, commercial
actors and civil society organizations attending the OEWG in accordance with resolution 76/231 can also befound on that webpage under UN document A/AC.294/2023/INF.2.
OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT12

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There was a total of 507 State delegates present. In regard to gender parity, out of all theState delegates, 62.7% were men 37.3% were women (see fig. 2).16

African States
Asia-Pacific States
Eastern European States
Women 37.3%

Latin American andCarribean States

Men 62.7%

Western European
and Other States
0

50

100

0

200

250

Figure 2. OEWG State Attendance by Gender

16 This report recognizes the risk of misgendering. In order to minimize this risk, the majority of the data on genderis pulled from the official participants list supra note 15, which includes the honorifics of representatives.

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ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
Participation by States and other entities varied across different formats including bothoral and written participation through delivered statements, dynamic responses, written
contributions, and working papers. The following participation data was gathered throughopen-source information available from the open sessions of the OEWG. The majority ofactive participation was in the form of spoken statements and oral responses, 43.7% of whichcame from Western European and Other States, 29.3% came from Asia-Pacific States, 12.7%

came from Latin American and Caribbean States, 7.2% came from Eastern European States,
3.7% came from African States, and 3.4% came from other non-governmental stakeholders(see fig. 3).

4

5

AfricanStatesEasternEuropeanStates20

16

WesternEuropean andOther States

Asia-PacificStates10
Latin American
andCarribeanStatesFigure 3. OEWG State Participation Breakdown
Regarding gender parity, out of the total oral interventions, 23.7% were by women and 76.3%
were by men (see fig. 4 below).

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600

400

200

0
Women 23.7%

Men 76.3%

Figure 4. OEWG Oral Interventions by Gender

African States
Asia-Pacific States
Eastern European States

Oral interventions

Latin American andCarribean States

Written contribution

Western European
and Other States
Others
0

100

200

300

400

Figure 5. OEWG State Participation by Oral Intervention and Written Submission

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIRHOW - THE FOCUS ON RESPONSIBLE
BEHAVIOURSThe OEWG’s focus on the behaviours of States when carrying out space activities is different
to previous initiatives to address space security, which had traditionally focused on thecapabilities of space systems. This novel approach to PAROS was partly motivated by theperceived challenges to arms control posed by the dual-use and dual-purpose nature17
of many space systems.18 Their growing prevalence blurs the conceptual boundaries of

weapons, making control through restrictions on hardware difficult.19 A focus on behaviours,

however, does not signify that capabilities should be disregarded, but that capabilities canoften be neutral and can be misused, thus making an approach that focuses on behaviours
more effective in ensuring space security in the eyes of certain States.20

Moreover, the emphasis on “responsible” and “irresponsible” sought to highlight that evenwhen certain activities might be considered to be within the threshold of legality, they do

not necessarily foster space security and sustainability. Rather, they can escalate tensions
and risk peace in outer space.21

17 In this report, dual-use objects are defined as those that have a military and security function, as well as acivilian or commercial function. Dual-purpose objects are defined as those designed to fulfil a benign objective(such as debris removal or on-orbit servicing), but which could potentially be repurposed to harm other space
objects. These two categories are commonly referred to as “‘dual-use” in a joint manner by many members of
the international community. See Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Statement to the Open-Ended Working Group on‘Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours’ - Topic 3: Current andfuture space-to-space threats by States to space systems, UNIDIR (14 Sept. 2022), https://documents.unoda.
org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Azcarate-Ortega-Almudena-OEWG-dual-use-presentation-FINAL.pdf
18 Azcárate Ortega & Lagos Koller, supra note 5.
19 West & Azcárate Ortega, supra note 13. See also Jessica West & Mehnaz Hossain, The Open-Ended Working
Group on Space Threats: Recap of the first meeting, May 2022, Project Ploughshares (6 Sept. 2022), https://www.
ploughshares.ca/reports/the-open-ended-working-group-on-space-threats-recap-of-the-first-meetingmay-2022
20 OEWG, Second session, Statement by Canada; UNIDIR supra note 8.
21 UNIDIR, supra note 8.

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TAKING STOCK
OF EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL LAw
OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT17

UNIDIR

TAKING STOCK
OF EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL LAw
The first substantive session of the OEWG was held in Geneva from 9 to 13 May 2022. The

focus of the session was the existing international legal and other normative frameworks
concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space. During thesession, five main topics were addressed: (i) existing international law; (ii) international law

relating to the use of force in international affairs; (iii) protection of civilians, civilian objects
and the natural environment; (iv) applicable elements of the legal regimes governingaviation and the sea; and (v) voluntary mechanisms and regimes applicable to outer space.
Several experts were invited to give presentations on the different topics addressed by thegroup to aid the discussion by providing context and fostering an understanding of theseissues. Their presentations covered the following matters (see table 1).
Day1

Topics addressed•International law applicable to military activities in outer space, including

gaps in currently applicable laws and regulations, and how these gaps
can contribute to creating uncertainty in the space regime and lead to the

•

2

•
•
•

increase of geopolitical tensions.22

The military and non-military duality of many space objects and the legal
implications of such intermingling of military and civilian functions under thelaws of armed conflict.23

The importance and applicability of the due regard principle.24

Meaning and relevance of the concept of use or threat of use of force.25

Existing gaps in currently applicable laws in relation to the placement of
conventional weapons in orbit26

22 Kuan-Wei (David) Chen, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 1: Existing international law concerning threats arisingfrom State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First session, Geneva, 9 May 2022.
23 David Koplow, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 1: Existing international law concerning threats arising from State
behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First session, Geneva, 9 May 2022.
24 Setsuko Aoki, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 1: Existing international law concerning threats arising from State
behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First session, Geneva, 9 May 2022.
25 Guoyu Wang, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 2: International law relating to the use of force in international affairs in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First
session, Geneva, 10 May 2022.
26 Andrey Malov, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 2: International law relating to the use of force in international
affairs in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a),First session, Geneva, 10 May 2022.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT18

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3

4•

How key principles of international humanitarian law, such as distinction,•

Protection of civilians and civilian objects as well as the natural environment

•

•
5

•

proportionality and neutrality, could apply to space.27

in the space domain, particularly within the context of military operations inspace.28

Similarities and differences that exist between space law and other areas ofthe law that can serve as inspiration in seeking to strengthen the space law
regime, particularly air law and the law of the sea29

Transparency and confidence-building measures, and how these tools could

be used to address threats to space systems arising from State behaviours.30
Transparency and confidence-building measures, and how these tools could
be used to address threats to space systems arising from State behaviours.31
Table 1. Expert Presentations to the OEWG (First Substantive Session)Expert presentations were followed by a general exchange of views between all membersof the OEWG (States and non-governmental participants alike). During this exchange,delegations reaffirmed the applicability of international law to the outer space domain,

including the Charter of the United Nations, customary international law and the treaties towhich States are a party. The need to reach a common understanding regarding perceived

gaps or grey areas in currently applicable laws was also discussed, and it was noted thatthe existing legal framework applicable to outer space by itself is not sufficient and would
need to be strengthened, particularly to deal with new threats.32

27 Cassandra Steer, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 3: Protection of civilians, civilian objects and the natural environment in relation to threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First
session, Geneva, 11 May 2022.
28 Wen Zhou, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 3: Protection of civilians, civilian objects and the natural environment
in relation to threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item 6(a), First session,
Geneva, 11 May 2022.
29 Almudena Azcárate Ortega & Charles Stotler, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Applicable elements of the legal
regimes governing aviation and the sea in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect toouter space, Agenda item 6(a), First session, Geneva, 12 May 2022.
30 Nivedita Raju, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Applicable elements of the legal regimes governing aviationand the sea in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item
6(a), First session, Geneva, 13 May 2022.
31 Nivedita Raju, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Applicable elements of the legal regimes governing aviationand the sea in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space, Agenda item
6(a), First session, Geneva, 13 May 2022.
32 Chair’s Summary of Discussions under Agenda Items 5 and 6 (a), U.N. Doc A/AC.294/2022/3 (20 May 2022),
https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/A-AC.294-2022-3-Chairs-summary-AdvancedUnedited-Version.pdf; Chairperson’s Summary, supra note 4.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT19

UNIDIRCONSIDERING
CURRENT AND FUTURE
THREATSTO SPACE SYSTEMSOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIRCONSIDERING
CURRENT AND FUTURE
THREATS TO SPACESYSTEMSThe second session of the OEWG took place in Geneva from 12 to 16 September 2022. Thissecond session was dedicated to discussing current and future threats to space systems.33
The discussion was structured around the different threat vectors to space systems, andthe following topics were addressed: (i) nature and uses of the outer space environmentand space systems in relation to current and future threats by States to space systems;(ii) current and future Earth-to-space threats by States to space systems; (iii) current andfuture space-to-space threats by States to space systems; (iv) current and future space-

to-Earth threats by States to space systems; and (v) current and future Earth-to-Earththreats by States to space systems.34

Experts were invited by the Secretariat to provide input to aid in the contextualization of thedifferent issues addressed by the Group (see table 2).
Day

Topics addressed

1

•

2

Earth-to-space threats•

General context on the physics of the space domain and of space systems
Distinction between space safety and security35•

Direct ascent kinetic ASAT capabilities36 and their dangerous debris-creating•

Non-kinetic ASAT capabilities to target the space components of a systemeffects

from Earth, underscoring how electromagnetic, cyber and non-kinetic
physical interference could compromise these systems and the services they•

provide by causing harmful interferences.37

Counterspace capabilities and the danger they pose for emerging spacefaring

33 Laetitia Cesari Zarkan, One Step Closer to Space Security: The Role of Multilateral Discussions, Global Policy Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Series, 90, 2022, https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/53187
34 Azcárate Ortega & Lagos Koller, supra note 5.
35 Kazuto Suzuki, James Black, Guoyu Wang & Clinton Clark, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 1: Nature and uses ofthe outer space environment and space systems in relation to current and future threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 12 Sept. 2022.
36 Victoria Samson, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 2: Current and future Earth-to-space threats by States tospace systems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 13 Sept, 2022.
37 Laetitia Cesari Zarkan, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 2: Current and future Earth-to-space threats by States tospace systems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 13 Sept. 2022.

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States, with new and expanding space programmes38

3

Space-to-space threats•

Placing and manoeuvring of co-orbital space systems to potentially attack•

The importance of distinguishing between dual-use and dual-purpose space•

The use of lasers in space and their possible repurposing into counterspace•

another satellite.39

assets.40

technologies.41

The role non-governmental entities —particularly the commercial industry—
can play in encouraging responsible behaviour in connection with rendezvous
and proximity operations, including standards for transparency.42

4Space-to-Earth threats•

Strategic advantage that could be derived from the deployment of space-•

The high cost of maintaining space-based strike capabilities.44•
5based strike capabilities.43

The placement of weapons in outer space and its relationship to geopolitics
on Earth.45

Earth-to-Earth threats•

The emergence and use of megaconstellations in low Earth orbit and the use•

The humanitarian consequences of using space assets during an armed•of other space assets during military operations and military conflicts.46

conflict, and the impact their targeting and disabling can have for civilian
populations.47

The dangers of targeting through cyber means and the threats posed bycyber counterspace capabilities due to their accessibility and their difficulty
in attribution.48

Table 2. Expert Presentations to the OEWG (Second Substantive Session)
38 Victoria Valdivia, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 2: Current and future Earth-to-space threats by States tospace systems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 13 Sept. 2022.
39 Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 3: Current and future space-to-space threatsby States to space systems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 14 Sept. 2022.
40 Azcárate Ortega, supra note 18.
41 Petr Boháček, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 3: Current and future space-to-space threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 14 Sept. 2022.
42 Aya Iwamoto, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 3: Current and future space-to-space threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 14 Sept. 2022.
43 Dmitry Stefanovich, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Current and future space-to-Earth threats by States tospace systems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 15 Sept. 2022.
44 Laura Grego, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Current and future space-to-Earth threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 15 Sept. 2022.
45 Bleddyn Bowen, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 4: Current and future space-to-Earth threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 15 Sept. 2022.
46 David Bertolotti, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 5: Current and future Earth-to-Earth threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 16 Sept. 2022.
47 Mauro Vignati, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 5: Current and future Earth-to-Earth threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 16 Sept. 2022.
48 Elina Morozova, Presentation to OEWG on Topic 5: Current and future Earth-to-Earth threats by States to spacesystems, Agenda item 6(b), Second session, Geneva, 16 Sept. 2022.

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UNIDIR
Discussions during the second substantive session of the OEWG highlighted that States,
despite having different priorities relating to how to tackle PAROS, largely share the same

set of concerns as to what constitutes a threat to space systems.49 Moreover, many
participants of the OEWG expressed concerns regarding threats to critical national security

infrastructure in outer space and the lack of transparency and common understanding inouter space. It was emphasized that measures —including norms, rules and principles—to mitigate threats to space systems must not impede the exploration and use of outerspace for peaceful purposes and the development of beneficial new technologies nor the
economic development of emerging spacefaring States.50

49 OEWG, Threats to the Security of Space Activities and Systems, UNIDIR, (12 Sept. 2022), U.N. Doc A/AC.294/2022/
WP.16, https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/20220817_A_AC294_2022_WP16_E_
UNIDIR.pdf
50 OEWG, Chair’s Summary of Discussions under Agenda Item 6 (b), U.N. Doc A/AC.294/2022/4 (5 Oct. 2022),
https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/A_AC294_2022_4_Chairs-Summ-2nd-Session2022-au.pdf; Chairperson’s Summary, supra note 4.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT23

UNIDIRRECOMMENDATIONSON POSSIBLENORMS, RULESAND PRINCIPLES
OF RESPONSIBLE
BEHAVIOURSOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT24

UNIDIRRECOMMENDATIONSON POSSIBLENORMS, RULESAND PRINCIPLES
OF RESPONSIBLE
BEHAVIOURSThe third substantive session took place in Geneva from 30 January to 3 February 2023,

where members of the Group considered “recommendations on possible norms, rules
and principles of responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems,

including, as appropriate, how they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding

instruments, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space” as established by
the mandate of the OEWG.51

The following topics were discussed:52
1. Norms, rules and principles derived from existing international legal and othernormative frameworks.

2. (a). Norms, rules and principles relating to counter-space capabilities, including
Earth-to-space and Earth-to-Earth threats.

3. (b). Norms, rules and principles relating to counter-space capabilities, including
space-to-Earth and space-to-space threats.

4. Norms, rules and principles relating to operations involving dual-use capabilities.53

5. Norms, rules and principles related to the prevention of the placement of weapons inouter space.

6. Norms, rules and principles related to the prevention of the use of force or threat of use
of force with regard to space objects or with their use.

7. Norms, rules and principles relating to outer space objects or activities that should
enjoy protection.

8. Norms, rules and principles relating to information exchange on space policies.

51 See Res. 76/231, supra note 1 at ¶5 c).
52 OEWG, Indicative Timetable, Third session (28 Dec. 2022), U.N. Doc A/AC.294/2023/INF.1/Rev.3, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Reducing_Space_Threats_-_(2022)/A_AC294_2023_
INF1_Rev.3.pdf
53 ‘Dual-use’ as used in the indicative timetable refers to both strictly dual-use systems and those that are dual
purpose.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT

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UNIDIR
9. Norms, rules and principles relating to information exchange and risk reduction
notifications related to outer space activities as well as to consultative mechanisms.

10. Norms, rules and principles relating to international cooperation, including with respect
to space surveillance and tracking and space situational awareness.

11. Approaches for further developing norms, rules and principles, including in relation to
how they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including
on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

12. Norms, rules and principles relating to other aspects of outer space activities.

STATES’ PERSPECTIVES
During the third session of the OEWG, States reaffirmed the importance of outer space forhumankind and the need to keep it as a peaceful and secure domain. In this context, Statesemphasized the applicability of international law to the space domain, in particular article

2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the use or threat of use of force.
They also highlighted the importance of existing United Nations space treaties, with severaldelegations indicating that there was a need to clarify the interpretation of certain principles

enshrined in the agreements, such as the principle of due regard, established in article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty.54

Several States underscored that many possible solutions and initiatives to address
space security concerns can exist simultaneously, and they can involve a combination oflegally binding mechanisms and non-legally binding instruments, which can operate in acomplementary manner. Various delegations also indicated that while non-legally binding
measures do not constitute a substitute to legally binding initiatives, they can contribute to

the interpretation of existing laws as well as to the consideration of concepts and proposals
for legally binding measures.55

The need for increased trust and confidence among stakeholders, particularly States,
was underscored as a key issue to address, especially in light of the rapid technologicaldevelopment and the ever-increasing number of actors in space. Members of the Groupdiscussed measures to build trust, including information exchange, providing assistanceand training, transferring technology, and the sharing of space situational awareness data.

Moreover, several States emphasized the importance of not limiting access to space andthe development of space systems for peaceful purposes by emerging States. Membersof the Group also discussed the importance of fostering transparency and indicated this

could be achieved through information exchange and the publication of space security

doctrines and policies, as well as on activities that could be perceived as threatening, suchas rendezvous and proximity operations.56

54 Azcárate Ortega & Lagos Koller, supra note 5; Chairperson’s Summary, supra note 4.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT26

UNIDIRINPUT FROM NON-GOVERNMENTALSTAKEHOLDERS
As highlighted above, the mandate of the OEWG enabled the participation of nongovernmental stakeholders. A number of non-State actors took this opportunity andmade written and oral contributions. Furthermore, the UNGA resolution establishing the
OEWG allowed the possibility for interested parties to exchange views on the issues within
the mandate of the OEWG with the Chair through consultations. To help facilitate such an

exchange of views, UNIDIR and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
co-organized an intersessional consultative meeting on 25 January 2023.57

Through these modes of participation, the OEWG was able to benefit from the perspectiveof non-State stakeholders on space security issues. These included threat perceptions on

cyber risks to more vulnerable aspects of space systems such as ground components
and supply chains. Additional threat perceptions were shared on information deficits
from insufficient monitoring systems and the assumption that there is enough scientificunderstanding to comprehensively grasp satellite behaviours and dangers to spacesystems. Moreover, non-State stakeholders expressed concern that a lack of trust among

States and geopolitical powers could lead to escalatory pathways towards conflict. These
recommendations included proposals for States to conduct joint exercises on debris removal
to increase trust, explore avenues for addressing violations —particularly of non-legallybinding commitments— and create cross-border academic cooperation for monitoring
and understanding satellite behaviour to create future mechanisms for compliance. There

were also recommendations for mandatory hardware requirements to improve tracking
and effective implementation.58

There was significant convergence on threat perceptions and recommendations between
State and non-State actors (see fig. 6). Participants shared similar concerns regarding theintentional creation of space debris and interference with space systems through cyberand other non-kinetic means. Moreover, similarly to States, non-governmental entities also
made recommendations such as establishing information-sharing mechanisms, callingfor common understanding and the clarification of terminology. The reiteration of opinions

expressed, and from different points of view, helped enable a more comprehensive andnuanced discussion.59

57 The consultation was held under the Chatham House Rule. However, a report of the discussions was made andis publicly available at https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/Space/02
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT27

UNIDIR

States• Agree on responsible
space behaviours• Commit not to place
weapons in outerspace• Commit not to
conduct destructive
direct-ascent• Limit thedeliberatecreationof spacedebris• Strengthen
monitoring systems• Identify National
Contact Points• Share national spacepolicies and doctrines• Strengthen national
legal implementation
and universalisationof instruments• Seek common
understanding andclarify terminology• Conduct joint spacedebris removal
operations• Establish, maintain, andutilise communications
channels• Seeknegotiations on
a legally binding
treaty on PAROS• Address harmful
kinetic and nonkinetic interference• Establish information
sharing mechanisms• Remedy absenceof trust between
geopolitical powers• Address informationand technology deficits
and asymmetries• Explore mechanisms
for norm violations• Assess cyber risks
to supply chains

Academia, Civil Society,and Industry

Figure 6. State and Non-State Perspectives

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT28

UNIDIR

DRAFTING OF
THE REPORTOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT29

UNIDIR

DRAFTING OF
THE REPORTThe fourth substantive session took place in Geneva from 28 August to 1 September 2023.
Following the mandate of the OEWG, it considered the fourth item, which was “to submit

a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session”.60 After deliberations andexchange on a draft substantive report, the Group was ultimately unable to reach consensus
due to a lack of political will to make the necessary concessions on both language andsubstance.61 Thus, the Group was unable to produce neither a substantive report on thediscussions, considerations and recommendations that took place within the OEWG, nor

a procedural report to take stock of the work that had been done. Despite the inability toadopt either report, the Chair of the OEWG released under his own authority a Chairperson’s
Summary to reflect his understanding of the views expressed, without prejudice to thepositions of any State.62

The Chairperson’s Summary presented a series of non-exhaustive elements which theGroup had discussed and had considered as possible recommendations for its report that
it was ultimately unable to agree on. These elements revolved around nine main topics:•

Damage and destruction of space objects or use of space objects as weapons –considerations related to this topic focused on refraining from any deliberate act thatcauses physical damage to or disabling or destruction of other States’ space objects,•

including where such acts are expected to result in the generation of space debris.

Development and deployment of space objects for hostile purposes – considerations inrelation to this topic advised against the development, production, testing or deploymentof weapons in space for any purpose, including counterspace capabilities of a non•kinetic nature.

Interference with the normal and safe operation of space objects – considerations
related to this topic indicated that States should avoid deliberate acts that can interferewith the functioning of space objects under the jurisdiction or control of other States, assuch acts of interference may give rise to tensions and increase the risk of escalation and•inadvertent conflict.

Protection of critical space-based services – considerations on this topic establishedthat States should refrain from any acts that would impair the provision of critical space-based services, especially to civilians, or that would endanger space objects crewed byhumans.

60 Res. 76/231, supra note 1.
61 Presentation by Hellmut Lagos, OS23 Panel II — Multilateral Efforts to Build Space Security, UNIDIR Outer Space
Security Conference 2023, 00:22:29, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYLEoOZACOM
62 Chairperson’s Summary, supra note 4.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT30

UNIDIR•

Assistance and encouragement in certain acts – considerations on this topic focused on
how States should refrain from assisting other entities from carrying out activities that

could endanger space operations, such as the ones cited above, and moreover Statesshould also strengthen supervision of private sector actors under their jurisdiction, in•

accordance with article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.

Military space policies, doctrines and strategies – considerations relating to this topic

focused on how States should consider committing, as a matter of policy, to PAROS,
to the prevention of conflict in outer space and to the peaceful exploration and use ofouter space for the benefit of all humankind, and avoid rhetoric that could jeopardize the••safety, security and sustainability of space activities.

Implementation of international obligations, commitments and measures – considerations
in relation to this topic highlighted that States should promote compliance with existing
international law applicable to outer space activities.

Notifications of defence and security exercises – considerations surrounding this topic
focused on how States should provide advance notification, to the greatest extent
practicable, regarding defence and security exercises that could have an impact on•

space systems and services.

Consultative mechanisms – considerations relating to this topic determined that, tofacilitate exchanges of notification and information, States should establish routine
channels of communication and designate points of contact, as appropriate.

Despite the lack of a consensus report, there was evidence of convergences on many issues.
Notably, a working paper on cross-regional support of the OEWG was submitted by 34

States.63 The working paper demonstrated that a diverse coalition of States agreed that the

OEWG was constructive to the goal of PAROS and complementary with other processes andapproaches. Furthermore, the idea that political commitments on responsible behaviors canbe developed in support of, and without prejudice to, the pursuit of legally binding measuresand that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive was expressed in a concluding jointstatement delivered on behalf 39 States.64

63 The working paper in support of the OEWG at the final session was delivered on behalf of Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ireland,
Italy, Finland, Germany, Japan, Malawi, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. It can befound under UN document A/AC.294/2023/WP.21.
64 The joint concluding statement was delivered on behalf of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,and Uruguay. It can be accessed here: https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Reducing_Space_Threats_-_(2022)/PHL-_STATEMENT_-__Concluding_Joint_Statement.pdf

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31

UNIDIRTAKEAWAYS FROMTHE OEWG PROCESSOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT32

UNIDIRTAKEAWAYS FROMTHE OEWG PROCESSThe OEWG is not the first initiative of the international community to address space security
concerns, nor will it be the last. Nonetheless, this process served to further advance thediscussion, highlighting points of convergence, such as the applicability of international law,

including the Charter of the United Nations, to outer space as established by article III of theOuter Space Treaty. The OEWG also underscored that there is more work to be done, andthat further discussions are needed to achieve common understanding on multiple space

security issues, such as the definition of certain terms including “armament” and “weapon”
in space.65

The debate among participants of the OEWG contributed to bringing together perspectives,

as many States reaffirmed that mechanisms for space security can take the form of both
legally and non-legally binding instruments. While many States recognized that the latterare not a substitute for legally binding arms control instruments, work in the developmentof both can be “pursued in a progressive, sustained and complementary manner, without
undermining existing legal obligations”.66

While the OEWG may not have ultimately achieved a consensus report, it contributed to thefurtherance of the international dialogue on space security issues. Rather than being seen

as a final destination in terms of a solution to threats to space, it should be seen as a step

forward, and be considered in conjunction with existing and new proposals and initiatives
by States and other stakeholders.

As the international community turns its gaze to future processes, there are several
takeaways from this OEWG processes which may contribute to the continuation of the
dialogue and success of new initiatives and proposals to come out of those processes.

65 Chairperson’s Summary, supra note 4.
66 Ibid.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT33

UNIDIR

Promote open and inclusive dialogue
The OEWG mandate allowed for various global actors to be involved.
Prioritizing diverse participation across regions, genders, andstakeholders is important for progress in multilateral security forums.

Work with the existing space governance framework
Taking stock of the existing space governance framework is essential
for building congruent pathways forward and avoiding the duplicationof efforts.

Take a comprehensive threat assessment approach
Stakeholders perceive a range of space security threats that arise
from capabilities and behaviours. Employing an extensive threat
assessment approach ensures the security concerns of the most are
addressed.

Involve practitioners and industry experts
Outer space assets are primarily owned and operated by thecommercial sector. Seeking input from space industry experts brings
practical insights, understanding on technical issues, and actionable
solutions.

Pursue recommendations in good faith
The OEWG produced an array of recommendations each with thepotential to serve as a basis for future solutions. Deliberating proposals
impartially and in good faith is conducive to achieving space security.

Benefit from mutually supportive initiatives
Applying a variety of approaches, such as non-legally and legallybinding instruments, ensures stakeholders take full advantage of the
diplomatic toolbox for successful prospective outcomes.

Ensure the continuity of dialogue
Reaching international space security goals is dependent on finding
synergies between processes and building on work and ideas ofprevious efforts.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT34

UNIDIRCONCLUDINGTHOUGHTSOE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT35

UNIDIRCONCLUDINGTHOUGHTSSpace security discussions are increasingly salient, as the global community recognizes theintegral role that space-enabled services play in our world. Multilateral security initiatives
strive to ensure that outer space remains a peaceful environment that is accessible to all.
The OEWG on Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible

behaviours was one such initiative. The OEWG provided a novel framework for structuring
space security discussions.

The OEWG opened multilateral space security discussions to a wide audience. Member
States from all five UN General Assembly regional groupings participated in the discussions.

In addition, a number of other actors, including UN permanent observers, internationalorganizations having received standing invitation to participate to the UN General Assembly
as observers, and other non-State stakeholders within academia, civil society, and industry

participated in the work of the Group. Diverse participation across regions, genders, andstakeholders is important to the inclusivity, impact, and success of multilateral security fora.
The Group took stock of the existing international space governance framework, ensuring thatefforts would not be duplicated and inspiring new discussions on the applicability of existingmechanisms to current issues. The OEWG also facilitated an exchange on considerations of
threats to space systems. In light of the mandate, the discussion on threat perceptions wasable to support a variety of concerns, beyond an encapsulated discussion on hardware andspecified technologies. Furthermore, an intersessional consultative meeting of interested
representatives from the commercial sector and civil society was held. Through this track two

dialogue, perspectives from the space industry on space security issues were brought into
the wider discussion. This was an important development, given the fact that the majorityof space assets are owned and operated by the commercial sector and their input opened
the door to new insights, understandings on technical issues, and actionable solutions.

Through group discussion, a number of recommendations were made on norms, rules

and principles of responsible behaviours. This dialogue on recommendation proposals,
including on how such recommendations could feed into a future legally binding instrument,

proved to be a useful exercise in considering non-legally and legally binding approaches

contemporaneously. As a result, many States noted the mutually reinforcing relationship ofthese approaches. Ultimately, the OEWG demonstrated some differences in perspectives aswell as convergences on many issues. Despite the fact that a final substantive report was not
adopted, the OEWG generated nuanced and novel ideas within space security discussions.

To ensure positive prospective outcomes in space security governance, it is paramount thatsynergies be made between multilateral space security fora. The resources used, efforts
made, and progress achieved by the international community in one initiative should not be

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT36

UNIDIR
stifled by the onset of another initiative. Rather, these discussions should bloom and flourish

from one process to the next. Through such an iterative and compounding progression can

the global community come closer to guaranteeing the peace and security of outer space.

OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT37

UNIDIR@unidir/unidir/un_disarmresearch/unidirgeneva/unidir

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OE WG ON REDUCING SPACE THREATS: RECAP REPORT38