E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 9, 2024

The “Weight” of the Existence of Me:“Shame” in Levinas
Rina KATO
Kyoto University
Abstract
This paper explores the ethical interplay between the “I” and the Other, particularly within Levinas’s
philosophical framework, focusing on the concept of “shame” as a lens to critique the theory of the
Other within the philosophy of education. Levinas challenged the legitimacy of power itself byexamining situations beyond its control through the lens of shame, highlighting that in thephenomenon of shame, we can find a situation in which the “I” is riveted to its own existence. This
paper explores how the sense of shame shifts with the Other’s “election,” reversing the burden fromthe absurd weight of “the I can only be me” to the ethical imperative weight of “the I must be me.”This discussion navigates the aporia inherent in the theory of the Other in the philosophy of education,
where conflicting views emerge—the impossibility of fully understanding the Other versus thenecessity of the educational “project.” It introduces the notion of education’s potential for generating“shame,” illustrating the tension wherein attempting to disengage from the aporia proves futile as it isconstitutive of education itself. It argues that this aporia, rather than a hindrance, defines the essenceof education. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the ethical bond between the educator and theeducand thrives in embracing the tension of this aporia, as educators persist in understanding educands
through educational intention while grappling with the weight of their own existence.
Key words: Emmanuel Levinas, shame, ethics, the Other, the weight of the existence

Introduction“The methodological ‘project’ of formulating principles, establishing grounds andsystematizing is emblematic of modern spirit” noted Hitoshi Imamura (Imamura 1994,
55). However, Imamura also highlights an aspect often overlooked: “people do not notice
Correspondence:
Rina KATO, Kyoto University. Email: kato.rina.105@gmail.com

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R. Katothat there is a characteristic of exclusion the foreign body in the inside (of the modern
spirit)” (55). The spirit of the “project” has permeated pedagogical discourse extensively.
With the advancement of educational technology, modern pedagogy often views humannature itself as an object that can be understood and controlled1. Reflecting on this aspectof modern pedagogy, efforts have emerged to unveil the coercive nature of educational“projects” and to challenge their legitimacy. One such endeavor is found in the theory of
the Other within the philosophy of education, influenced by post-colonialism. In thetheory of the Other, a tension arises from conflicting notions; firstly, despite attempts tocomprehend the Other through “projects,” complete understanding remains elusive dueto the inherent Otherness of the Other. Secondly, within educational contexts, it ischallenging to evade the pursuit of objectives and accountability, thus making theabandonment of “projects” in education impractical. Consequently, the theory of the
Other in the philosophy of education grapples with the dual challenge of acknowledging
the impossibility of fully understanding the Other while recognizing the necessity ofengaging in “projects” concerning the Other.
In this paper, we explore the tension inherent in the theory of the Other in thephilosophy of education, which we characterize as an aporia. We argue that the ethicalrelationship between the educator and the educand is truly established only within thetension of this aporia. To illustrate this, our paper focuses on the insights of EmmanuelLevinas (1906-1995), who pointed that human existence cannot be fully encapsulated by
the paradigm of the “project” emblematic of the modern spirit.
Levinas used the term “power (pouvoir)” to denote the capacity to autonomously
engage with and pursue goals through “projects.” According to Levinas, Western
philosophy has historically privileged the understanding of human beings in terms of their“power” (Œ2: 109). This philosophical tradition has labeled as “failures” events that defy
control through “power” and disrupt the spontaneous exercise of freedom (TI: 81-82=83).
However, beneath the labeling of such events as “failures,” there persists an implicit
affirmation of the legitimacy of “power” (TI: 81-82=83). Levinas challenges thisassumption by reframing events beyond the scope of “power” not as “failure” but asoccasions of “shame,” thereby casting doubt on the very legitimacy of “power” itself (TI:
82-83=83-84).

1

Tetsuo Okamoto (2012) highlights that in modern education, characterized by the dominance of “HumanCentered” worldview and the notion of autonomous individuals, a “mechanistic view of humans” based on“demonstrative scientism” has a prevalent perception of education as mere “conditioning” (22). Fumio Ono (2019)endeavors to reassess the modern educational paradigm, governed by technological rationality, through the lens of“knowledge of pathos.”The 9th Research Promotion Award Article (2023)

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Levinas pursued this inquiry within two primary contexts. Firstly, he engaged with
Heidegger’s concept of “facticity (Faktizität),” offering a critical reinterpretation. Here,
Levinas introduced the concept of “shame” to describe the existence of the “I” bearing“facticity.” Moreover, Levinas extended the application of the concept of “shame” to the
ethical dimension of relating to the Other. Thus, Levinas proposed that grappling with theexistence of the “I” in light of its facticity and navigating the ethical relationship with the
Other are intertwined endeavors, both aimed at questioning the legitimacy of “power”2.
However, most preceding studies overlook this aspect when addressing Levinas’squestion of “power” within the philosophy of education. This oversight is largely due tothe predominant focus of these studies on Levinas’s conception of the relationship with
the Other, originally developed within his philosophical framework 3 . While Levinas
indeed underscores the significance of questioning “power” within the context of the
Other, this paper argues that a deeper understanding emerges when we center ourattention on the concept of “shame,” revealing Levinas’s examination of the ethicalrelationship with the Other through the lens of human existence bearing “facticity”4.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine how the I engages in an ethicalrelationship with the Other while bearing its own “facticity,” using Levinas’s concept of“shame” as a guiding principle, and to describe this way of being of the I in terms of the“weight (poids)” of existence of me5. We seek to elucidate the essence of this existential“weight” of the I and demonstrate that the ethical connection with the Other is notestablished through the exertion of the I’s “power,” but rather is continuously shaped by
the I’s existence within the interconnected and reversing two “weight”6.
The term “the I,” frequently utilized in this paper, pertains to the concept of “the I” (le moi, je) as articulated by
Levinas. For further insights into Levinas’s exploration of “ipseity” as developed throughout the early and middle
phases of his career readers may refer to Hiroshi Hiraoka’s work (2019) on this subject.
3
Whether the term “power” is explicitly invoked or not, a significant portion of contemporary scholarship hasaddressed scenarios wherein my “power” is challenged by the Other. For instance, there is research examining thetension between the “power to interpret the Other” in education and Levinas’s critique of “power” (Ono 2002).
Additionally, studies explore the potential for a mode of thinking akin to “hearing” through an analysis of the
dynamics of relationships with the Other informed by Levinas’s critique of “power” (Williams and Standish 2018).
Moreover, investigations delve into the substance of Levinas’s critique of “power” by scrutinizing his objections
to the “maieutic method” (Hiraishi 2011). Finally, there are studies demonstrating, through an examination of
hyperbole—Levinas’s method of argumentation—, that Levinas’s manner of discourse itself serves a performative
function, prompting readers to critically reflect on their own “power” (Anjiki 2020).
4
In recent years, there have been critical examinations (Bernasconi 2012; Kotegawa 2015) of certain studies thatinterpret Levinas’s philosophy through the lens of the theory of the Other (Morgan 2009; Sato 2000).
5The discussion has largely focused on how Levinas incorporates and expands upon Heidegger’s notion of“facticity” (Calin 2011; Moati 2012; Rolland 2011). However, there has been insufficient examination of theconnection between the concept of “shame” introduced within his discourse on “facticity” and its role in his ethicaldiscussions. Additionally, the significance of the concept of “shame” has often been overlooked (Tonaki 2021, 373374).
6
Kazuya Wakabayashi (2021) also explores the dual significance of the “weight” of existence, with a particular
2

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R. KatoIn this paper, we first summarize the theory of the Other, a subject actively debatedin the field of the philosophy of education, as a discourse on “power,” and elucidate thetensions within the aporia inherent in the theory of the Other in educational philosophy(Section 1). Subsequently, drawing on Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger, we critique
Heidegger’s interpretation of “facticity,” which implicitly privileges “power” (Section 2).
Then, we delve into the nature of human existence burdened by “facticity,”
conceptualizing it as the “weight” of one’s being, through an analysis of Levinas’s
original interpretation of “facticity,” with a particular focus on the concept of “shame”(Section 3). Additionally, we elucidate how the implication of this existential “weight”
undergoes a reversal when the I, laden with “facticity,” is “elected” by the Other (Section
4). Building upon these discussions, this paper examines the implication of the tension
inherent in the aporia of the theory of the Other in the philosophy of education anddescribes the reality of the ethical relationship between the educator and the educand(Section 5). Finally, we illuminate the pedagogical significance of our finding(Conclusion).

1. The Discourse on “Power” in the Theory of the Other in the
Philosophy of Education
In this section, we delve into the theory of the Other within the philosophy ofeducation through the lens of the critique of “power.” This theory is discussed within two
key contexts: the theory of educational relationships, and the theory of human(trans)formation (Bildung) (Sakurai and Ozeki 2019). The theory of human(trans)formation emerged in a post-modern milieu characterized by skepticism towards
the simplistic valorization of educational aims. It represents an endeavor to relativize
education through the framework of “becoming” as an inherent aspect of human nature(Miyadera 2009). Against this backdrop, we emphasize that prior to delineating thedistinctions between the theory of educational relationships and the theory of human(trans)formation, a more fundamental issue arises from the different stances towards the“project” within the theory of the Other in the philosophy of education.
The theory of educational relationships addresses the dynamic between the educatorand the educand as the Other, while the theory of human (trans)formation explores thefocus on the concept of “shame.” However, his analysis lacks an explanation of the existential reality of the “weight”
that humans bear within ethical relationships while confronting “facticity.”
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educand’s relationship with the world and other individuals as the Other. Whenexamining the relationship with the Other in this broad sense, whether within the theoryof educational relationships or the theory of human (trans)formation, the stance of thetheory of the Other diverges based on its approach to educational intention. Essentially,
two positions emerge: one advocates for integrating educational intention into thediscourse to foster an ethical relationship with the Other, while the other criticallyscrutinizes intentionality in “project” due to its potentially coercive nature, recognizing it
paradoxically as a hindrance to establishing an ethical relationship with the Other.
We would like to present two notable studies that align with the former position
regarding the “project.” The first study, conducted by Yasushi Maruyama (2002) delves
into the ethical relationship between the educator and the educand. In the wake of theincreasing awareness prompted by post-colonialism, there is a growing recognition that
educational intentions directed towards the educand can often be entangled withcolonialistic tendencies of control. In response to this awareness, Maruyama seeks to
strike a balance between educational intention and respect for the Otherness of theeducand. He posits that when confronted with the incomprehensible, what is necessary
is “the cultivation of the ability to imagine beyond one's own framework forunderstanding” (10). The second study, conducted by Mai Takahashi (2003), proposes a
perspective wherein “one immerses oneself in the intersecting horizons” of twocontrasting “consciousnesses”: the consciousness that “feels the need to understand” theOther, and the consciousness that acknowledges that the Other “must not be understoodin their own framework” (60). Takahashi argues that embracing these dual
consciousnesses simultaneously serves as a valuable “tool for ‘understanding,’” a notionthat pedagogy should advocate (60).
In these studies, we observe an inclination towards transcending inherent limitations
through the “project,” rooted in the self-discipline and concerted effort, even when one’s
capacity to comprehend the Other remains constrained. However, it is crucial not toregard their positions merely reverting to the modern spirit’s paradigm of the “project.”Maruyama and Takahashi recognize the inherent difficulty for education to eschew aims
and responsibilities in understanding the educand and fostering the educand’s
development. Hence, they persist in maintaining an orientation towards the educational“project.” Consequently, the theory of the Other in the philosophy of education
unavoidably grapples with conflicting ideas. On the one hand, despite engaging in a“project” to comprehend the Other, full understanding remains elusive due to the
Otherness of the Other. On the other hand, abandoning the educational “project” proveschallenging. Thus, it becomes imperative to reconcile both the impossibility of fully
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understanding the Other and the necessity of the educational “project.” Considering thetension inherent in this aporia, Maruyama and Takahashi endeavor to confront it bycontinuing to pursue a “project” for an ethical relationship while acknowledging theimpossibility of fully understanding the Other. However, we can still scrutinize theirposition critically.
Maruyama locates ethical responsibility in the ongoing effort to comprehend the
Other, despite the Other’s inherent alienness. However, notably, he never questions the“project” itself from an ethical standpoint. In his discourse, regardless of the outcome of
one’s “project,” “the act is justified by the fact that one has done one’s best” in the process
of one’s effort (Maruyama 2002, 9). Similarly, Takahashi assigns a simplistic value to the“consciousness” (Takahashi 2003, 60) and the “intention” (61) to “feel the need tounderstand” the Other or acknowledge that the Other “must not be understood in theirown framework.” Yet, she fails to address the potential pitfalls of this naïve perspective,
particularly the inflated self-consciousness it engenders.
On the other hand, Naoko Saito (2002) sharply highlights the inherent violence
embedded within the notion of the “project.” Saito identifies “a closed state in the self inwhich one clings to make an effort to speak to the Other what one cannot speak, andtherefore, conversely, one cannot expose oneself to the voiceless voice from the Other”(32) within discussions aiming to realize ethical relationships through “projects.”
According to Saito, no matter how much individuals expand their “power” of selfconsciousness and effort, they cannot attain ethical relationships with the Other. Such
relationships transcend mere “project” endeavors.
The debate over whether ethical relationships are established through “projects” or
not has frequently surfaced in studies on Levinas within educational philosophy. Sharon
Todd (2001) argues that “the specifically ethical possibility of education, this possibility
for non-violent relation to the Other, can only ever emerge when knowledge is not ouraim” (73) within educational relationships 7 . Additionally, Todd suggests that whenteachers “teach with ignorance” (73), they “create a path toward an ethical horizon of
possibility” (73). However, Todd’s argument appears to leave open the possibility thatemphasizing teaching with “ignorance” might paradoxically be distorted into advocating
for achieving ethical relationships through “projects” by educators. Paul Standish (2001)
proposes that Todd’s argument could easily be manipulated into a discourse promoting“better interpersonal or communication skills” and “carefully calculated behaviors” (76).

7

The italicized text in quotations is the author’s own, unless otherwise specified.

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As we have observed in this section, the participants in the debate approach theaporia within the theory of the Other in educational philosophy in distinct manners.
Maruyama and Takahashi suggest that establishing an ethical relationship with the Otheris achievable by persisting in “projects” aimed at understanding the Other, despite
recognizing the inherent limitations. Todd posits that the potential for ethical relationships
with the Other emerges through engaging in “projects” that involve relating to the Other
with ignorance. These arguments, while acknowledging the limitations of projects, stillaffirmatively accept the paradox and endeavor to establish ethical relationships throughthem. Consequently, the legitimacy of the “project” itself remains unquestioned, and thetension inherent in the aporia is somewhat disregarded. On the contrary, Saito’s andStandish’s arguments necessitate questioning the legitimacy of the educational “project,”
thereby addressing the aporia in a manner that maintains its tension. Hence, this paper
aims to describe how ethical relationships with the educand can be achieved by skillfully
navigating within this tension. Thus, starting from the next section, we will delve into thecontext of Levinas’s critique of “power” and engage in deeper discussions to confront
this aporia and scrutinize the educational “project.”

2. The Failure of Power: Levinas’s Interpretation of Heidegger’s“Facticity”
Levinas challenges the legitimacy of human “spontaneity” in his seminal work
Totality and Infinity (1961). In Levinas’s framework, “spontaneity” refers to “the naïve
right of my powers” (TI: 83=83), thus his discussion on critiquing “spontaneity” can beinterpreted as a critique of “power.” According to Levinas, traditional Western
philosophy encounters the critique of “spontaneity” when the certainty of “power,” thebelief in our unrestricted freedom, falters, leading to “failure” (TI: 81=83). It was believedthat this “failure” would expose the “weakness” inherent in “power” (TI: 81=83),
previously perceived as absolute, thus prompting a reevaluation of “power.” However,labelling the inability to exercise one’s “power” as “failure” still implies an
acknowledgement of “the undiscussed value” of “power” (TI: 81=83). Therefore,
Levinas argues that the critique of “spontaneity” and “power” in Western philosophy has
not been sufficiently radical.
Levinas’s objection to the critique of “power” through “failure” is underpinned byhis skepticism towards Heidegger’s discourse on “facticity.” Levinas interprets “fact” as“being made, accomplished and past and hence irrevocable, which as such obstructs our
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R. Katospontaneity” (TI: 80=82), terming this characteristic of “fact” “facticity (facticité)”8. He
contends that “a consideration of the fact” has been discussed in Western philosophy as
the critique of “spontaneity” or “power” through “failure” (TI: 80-81=82). While notexplicitly mentioned, it is evident that Levinas is referring to Heidegger’s exploration of“Faktizität” as the Western philosophical discourse addressing “facticity.” In Heidegger’s
examination of the concept of “thrownness,” he considers the “facticity” of anindividual’s existence, acknowledging the inevitably of being thrown into the world
without choice (Heidegger 1957, 135=174). Levinas disagrees with Heidegger’s
characterization of “facticity” as the “failure” of “power,” a point that is elaborated onwhen Levinas examines “facticity” by drawing on Heidegger’s concept of “thrownness”9.
Heidegger articulates that “the expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest thefacticity of its being delivered over” (Heidegger 1957, 135=174). Furthermore, he defines“facticity” as “a characteristic of Dasein’s Being—one which has been taken up into
existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside” (Heidegger 1957, 135=174). From
this, it is evident that Heidegger suggests that human beings being already made to exist
in this world is not merely an experience; rather, “facticity” itself constitutes acharacteristic of Being that comprises human existence. While the I is free to exercise my“power” since “proximally” facticity “has been thrust aside” for me, this fact remains aninherent aspect of human existence that cannot be separated from oneself. Levinas
acknowledges this understanding of “facticity,” as he describes the characteristic of “fact”
as “irrevocable, which as such obstructs our spontaneity” (TI: 80=82).
However, Levinas take issue with Heidegger’s discussion of “projection (Entwurf)”
because he describes “facticity” which is “taken up into existence” (Heidegger 1957,
135=174) as something that can “be undertaken”. In his lecture “Power and Origin”(1949), Levinas thematically addresses this matter, stating that Heidegger emphasizes
that the “projection” “does not overcome the finite characteristic of thrownness, but
merely undertakes this characteristic by power to die” (Œ2: 131). However, within thisact of “undertaking” lurks “a power that can end” the self “in the finite itself” (Œ2: 129).
From Levinas’s perspective, whether it is the “overcoming” or “undertaking” of the“thrownness,” Heidegger’s thought still revolves around “power” while discussing“facticity.” Initially, according to Heidegger’s description, “facticity” is an intrinsic ofBeing that consists human existence, and thus one should not be able to distance oneself
8

His explanation of “fact (fait)” largely stems from linguistic considerations in French, where the word “fait”
originates from the past participle of the verb “faire,” meaning “make” or “do.”9This paper solely examines Heidegger’s thought within the framework of critiquing “power,” drawing heavily
from Levinas’s interpretations of Heidegger.
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9from it. However, beneath Heidegger’s notion that “facticity is undertaken,” there is an
assumption that we can maintain a distance from “facticity” and manage it in some way.
It is this contradiction in Heidegger’s framework that Levinas interrogates.
Heidegger appeared to question the legitimacy of “power” by exploring “facticity”
and revealing the condition of human beings who inevitably bear their own existence.
However, Levinas’s critique suggests that Heidegger ultimately did not transcend theframework of implicitly valuing “power” because he sought to maintain the possibilityof undertaking “facticity.”
The preceding discussion has illuminated Levinas’s critique regarding Heidegger’s
interpretation of “facticity.” Levinas’s critical perspective has already surfaced in his own
interpretation of “facticity” in the 1930s, predating his lecture “Power and Origin” (1949),
where he extensively examined how human existence bears “facticity” in a manner
distinct from the “failure” of “power.” In the subsequent section, we focus on thisalternative approach to “facticity.”

3. The Absurd “Weight” of the Existence of Me
Levinas discussed how human existence bears “facticity” in his early article “On
Escape” (1935). This article is often interpreted in light of Heidegger’s “philosophy of
being” (Ev: 94=51) 10 . While Heidegger’s philosophy maintains the possibility that
individuals can undertake “facticity,” Levinas, in this article, emphasizes that “the fact the
I is oneself” has the “most radical and unalterably binding of chains” (Ev: 98=55). In
essence, Levinas does not confine himself within the realm of “power” by contemplating
the prospect of human beings undertaking “facticity,” as Heidegger does. Instead, hethoroughly exposes the destiny of human beings who persistently bear “facticity,” namely,
their own existence, and endeavors to portray the human condition as something thattranscends mere the framework of “power.” At this juncture, Levinas introduces theconcept of “shame.” Thus, this section examines human existence grappling with“facticity” in a manner distinct from “failure” of “power” by focusing on the concept of“shame” in the article “On Escape.”
Incidentally, in his main work Totality and Infinity, Levinas also discusses “shame”
as “the consciousness of moral unworthiness” (TI: 82=83) and “a consciousness of guilt”
10Jacques Rolland asserts that the article “On Escape” should be interpreted as “an attempt of hermeneutics offacticity” (Rolland 2011, 27=13).

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R. Kato(TI: 81=83). Thus, the concept of “shame” can be understood to encompass “phenomenaof a moral order” (Ev: 111=63) according to Levinas. However, Levinas contends in theearly article “On Escape” that presenting “shame” merely as a specific morally
reprehensible act (Ev: 112=63) or as a form of social interaction with others (Ev: 112113=64) is an inadequate analysis of shame (Ev: 111-112=63). He endeavors to surpass
these limitations inherent in the analysis of “shame” and focuses on the notion that,
fundamentally, “if shame is present, it means that we cannot hide what we should like tohide” (Ev: 113=64). By emphasizing this aspect, Levinas suggests that “shame” arises
most fundamentally from “the fact of being riveted to oneself” (Ev: 113=64). In essence,
Levinas suggests that the “I” can only be itself, and since the “I” is itself, it cannot escapeor conceal itself from itself; thus, the facticity of existence is fundamental for the “I.”
The human condition of “shame,” so deeply intertwined with one’s existence thatthe “I” cannot escape, manifests as “malaise” (Ev: 114=66), resulting from being
enclosed on all sides with no way to flee. Levinas examines the phenomenon of “nausea”
as “a case in which the nature of malaise appears in all its purity” (Ev: 115=66) and seeks
to elucidate the human condition of “shame” concretely. According to Levinas, whenexperiencing “nausea,” the “I” is unable to distance itself from the feeling due to theimpossibility of escaping from one’s own body (Ev: 115=66). In this state, the “I” isriveted to its existence in a manner where it wishes to flee from itself but is incapable ofdoing so. Levinas underscores that “malaise” induced by “nausea” differs from “anobstacle” (Ev: 115=66). While “an obstacle” is external to one’s endeavors, allowing the“I” to exist while turning away from it even if insurmountable, “nausea” is inherent to the“I,” and the existence of the “I” experiencing “nausea” is intertwined with it. Essentially,in “nausea,” the “I” seeks to escape its own existence, yet simultaneously affirms its
connection to existence through the very experience of "nausea" itself. Levinas
characterizes this connection as a “relationship” (Ev: 118=68), wherein the very act ofattempting to flee one’s being becomes “the affirmation itself of being” (Ev: 118=68).
Thus, through the analysis of the phenomenon of “nausea,” Levinas offers a
concrete description of the human condition of “shame,” wherein the “I” is inexorably
riveted to its own existence. Levinas’s discussion elucidates that despite humanendeavors to surpass the limitations defining its existence, it remains entangled in the very
constraints that delineate it. In essence, there is no escape from the fate that “the I canonly be me.” Levinas encapsulates this notion by stating that “being is, at bottom, aweight for itself” (Ev: 114=65). For the individual, their existence becomes a “weight”
that must be borne indefinitely, an absurd “weight” that cannot be shed throughout life.
Amidst the unbearable absurdity, the I should like to hide one’s existence, acknowledging
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11that the I has no choice but to endure and cannot hide its own being. Thus, the individual
experiences “shame.” In this manner, Levinas depicts human existence as radicallybearing its own existence, offering an interpretation of “facticity” that diverges from
Heidegger’s perspective.

4. The Ethical “Weight” of the Existence of Me
As we have explored in the preceding section, the concept of “shame” in Levinas’s
early article “On Escape” (1935) suggests bearing the absurd “weight” that “I can only
be me.” Subsequently, in Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas discusses that the genesisof moral consciousness, found in the welcoming of the Other and measuring oneself
against infinity, is embodied as “shame” (TI: 82=84). Here, “shame” not only signifies
engagement with facticity but also holds moral significance. Moreover, Levinas
explicitly integrates his concept of “the Other” into the context where “shame” is utilized,
implying a close connection between the I being riveted to its existence and the ethicalrelationship with the Other within the concept of “shame.” This brings to question themanner in which they are linked. To address this inquiry, this section delves into how
Levinas elaborated on the “I” bearing “facticity” after the publication of “On Escape.”
Firstly, we examine the draft for his lecture “Teachings” (1950), crafted during thetransition from “On Escape” (1935) to Totality and Infinity (1961). In this lecture,
Levinas revisits the notion of the I being riveted to its existence from a perspective distinct
from the “absurdity” discussed in “On Escape.” This discussion offers a crucial viewpoint
revealing the interconnectedness of the I being riveted to its existence and its ethicalrelationship with the Other in moral consciousness.
Levinas raises a poignant question in his lecture “Teachings,” asking “Doesn’t thedrama of not having chosen one’s existence unravel when the I learns that the I has beenchosen?” (Œ2: 184). Here, he suggests the possibility that one “learns” that the I that is
riveted to its existence “is the I” that is “being created and elected” (Œ2: 184). By
examining existence through the lens of “creation,” Levinas underscores the inherent
connection with the origin, already inscribed in the fact of being riveted to one’s existence.
Within this framework, the notion of “my ipseity” finds residence in the “election,”signifying the creaturely nature of the I, fashioned by the Creator (Œ2: 186; Œ2: 184185). Through this reevaluation of existence, Levinas endeavors to reassess the absurdity

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R. Katoof the I being riveted to its existence in light of its election by the Creator11.
Thus, the absurdity of the I being riveted to its existence is reevaluated through thelens of “being elected.” However, the notion of “being elected” is not apprehended byrevisiting the origin and “the vision of God” to understand what the Creator is (Œ2: 186).
Following the lecture “Teachings,” Levinas delves into the concept of “election” further
in Totality and Infinity. Here, Levinas posits that the I is “an election” (TI: 274=245) andproceeds to elucidate the sense of being elected in Totality and Infinity. Specifically,
concerning the responsibility that the I bears towards the Other, Levinas asserts that “noone can replace me” in it and “no one can release me” from it; “to be unable to shirk: thisis the I” (TI: 275=245). While the concept of “election” portrays the I as “a creature” inthe lecture “Teachings,” it signifies the I as the one bearing responsibility to the Other inthese statements in Totality and Infinity. This shift in emphasis is rooted in Levinas’s
interpretation of the relationship between the Creator (God) and the Other. Levinas
contends that “the Other … is indispensable for my relationship with God” (TI: 77=78)
and “it is our relationships with men … that give to theological concepts the solesignification they admit of” (TI: 77=79). In essence, Levinas does not forsake theperspective of “election by the Creator” in his exploration of “election by the Other.”
Instead, he posits that it is precisely in being elected by the Other that one’s existence as“a creature” is imbued with sense12. Thus, the sense of the I’s existence is not derived
from getting out of absurdity by apprehending the Creator, but rather, it is conferred by
the Other when the I is needed and elected, bearing its existence as irreplaceable.
The implication of the absurd (non-sense) existence of me being given a sense by
the Other transforms the understanding of the fact that the I exist. This transformation canbe described by integrating discussions over the “weight” of existence found in both theearly article “On Escape” and Totality and Infinity.
As Levinas stated in the early article “On Escape,” the I is riveted to its existence,
regardless of one’s hopes, burdened by bearing the absurd “weight” that “I can only beme.” The I should like to hide and get out of its existence due to this absurdity, yet it
Yotetsu Tonaki (2021) suggests that Levinas “needs the concept of creation” for the purpose of“thinking beyond the limit of thrownness and facticity” within Heidegger (260). Behind Levinas’s
discussion of “creation,” there is considerable influence from the thought of Franz Rosenzweig. Levinas
himself acknowledges his familiarity with Rosenzweig’s philosophy as early as 1935 (Poirié 1987, 121),
suggesting that this encounter played a role in shaping Levinas’s departure from Heidegger (Cohen 1994,
236). Given these contexts, it is essential to explore how Levinas accepts and develops the concept of“creatureliness (Kreatürlichkeit)” from Rosenzweig in his depiction of human beings as “creatures.”This area warrants further analysis.

11

12

If we interpret it in this manner, there arises a need for further discussion. Specifically, we must explore how thesignificance of “election by the Creator” is reinterpreted through Levinas’s discussion of “election by the Other.”This aspect presents an avenue for future analysis.

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cannot hide it and must endure it, leading to a profound sense of “shame.” However, as
discussions of “election” inherited from the lecture “Teachings” to Totality and Infinity
reveal, the Other imparts a sense to the absurdity of the I’s existence; the sense is ethicalin nature. According to Levinas, when the I is needed and elected by the Other, it is“unable to shirk” the responsibility it bears towards the Other (TI: 275=245). In essence,the very existence of the I is a response to the “election” by the Other, as the I is alreadychosen by the Other before it even decides whether to accept this “election.” Therefore,
the I must embrace its existence. The I that bear its existence as an elected one experiences“shame” in the sense of “the consciousness of moral unworthiness” (TI: 82=83) for
existing as the mere absurd “weight” of “I can only be me.” The I should like to hide itself
due to “shame,” yet it cannot hide it because its very existence is a response to the Other.
The I must exist as a response to others because it is morally “ashamed” of itself. At thisjuncture, the I can be interpreted as bearing the “weight” of “the I must be me” while
experiencing “shame” as an irreplaceable being who has always borne the responsibilityof being elected by the Other.
Thus, the “weight” of the existence of me is reversed from the absurd “weight” that“the I can only be me” to the “weight” in the ethical sense that “the I must be me”;
therefore the manner in which the I exists is transformed13. As stated above, per Levinas,
being riveted to the existence of me is closely linked to having a relationship with the
Other in moral consciousness because of the possibility that the sense of the “weight” that
the I exists is reversed.

5. Addressing the Aporia in the Theory of the Other in the Philosophy of
Education
As established in Section 1, the theory of the Other encounters an aporia. This theory
acknowledges that, on one hand, despite efforts to undertake a “project” to comprehend
the Other, understanding remains elusive due to the inherent Otherness of the Other. On
the other hand, the educational “project” cannot be forsaken. Various arguments haveemerged concerning the tension inherent in this aporia within the philosophy of education.
In this section, drawing the preceding discussion of Levinas, we will confront the tension
13

Rodolphe Calin highlights Levinas’s identification of a distinct “weight” of existence in the relationship with the
Other, separate from the notion of “facticity,” through Levinas’s term “glory” (Calin 2011, 30-32). Nevertheless,Calin does not explicitly delineate the ways in which the “weights” of existence in these two contexts differ andresemble each other.

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R. Katostemming from this aporia once more and profoundly question the educational “project.”
Consequently, we will elucidate the ethical relationship between the educator and theeducand.
The conventional exploration of the theory of the Other in the philosophy ofeducation, as discussed in Section 1, continues to advance discussions aroundundertaking a “project” for fostering ethical relationships, while acknowledging inherent
difficulty in understanding the Other. They certainly consider conflicting dynamics.
However, when viewed through Levinas’s perspective, these discussions implicitly
frame the inability to comprehend the Other as a “failure” of education, while affirming
the educational significance of the “project” within the context of educational objectives
and responsibilities. Conversely, if we interpret the impossibility of understanding the
Other not as the “failure” of education but as education’s potential “shame,” the tension
inherent in the aporia of the theory of the Other in the philosophy of education takes on adifferent dimension. Even if one wished to get rid of the tension from the education, suchdetachment is impossible; instead, the tension constitutes the essence of education itself.
Consequently, the aporia is reframed as the absurdity that defines the very essence of
education.
The educator bears the inherent absurdity that defines the essence of education.
However, this acknowledgment does not preclude the possibility of the educator and theeducand establishing an ethical relationship. Considering what the educator should be in
the light of Levinas’s argument, the educator intends to establish the ethical relationshipby educational “project” with aims and responsibility but cannot understand the Other
because he or she is riveted to his or her own existence. The educator is a being accepting
one’s fate with resignation because they are forced to bear such absurd “weight.” At thesame time, however, the educator always already exists as an elected being by theeducand if we consider based on Levinas’s discussion of “election.” Therefore, even if
the aims that the educator set cannot be achieved through “project,” the words that he or
she speaks and the way that he or she is present are always already his or her very
response to the educand. That makes the educator, who regards the fact that one exists as
the absurd “weight” and has been bearing the “weight,” feel shame, and then gives the“weight” an ethical sense. Since no one else can replace the position that is elected by theeducand, the educator is called for readiness to bear its own “weight” by the educand. In
this way, when the resignation to the fact that “the I can only be me” is transformed to
the readiness to the fact that “I must be me,” the educator is neither naively affirming
educational “project” nor simply eliminating the orientation of educational “project” andleave it to chance. In this balance, a path to the ethical relationship between the educator
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and the educand is opening.
According to Levinas’s discussion, the ethical relationship between the educator andthe educand is not necessarily accomplished through the “project” undertaken by theeducator. Our examination of the concept of “shame” reveals that the aporia in the theoryof the Other in the philosophy of education—where conflicting views on theimpossibility of understanding the Other and the necessity of educational “project”
coexist—is not something to be overcome initially. Instead, it is what the educator must
bear, without resolving its conflicting nature, as the intrinsic “weight” of their existence.
In essence, the educator is tasked by the educand to shoulder the responsibility of existing
within this aporia. By embracing the dual “weight” of remaining within the tension of theaporia while striving to understand the educand through the educational “project,” rather
than attempting to resolve the tension outright, the educator’s very mode of existence
fosters an ethical relationship.

Conclusion
This paper explored the ethical relationship between the I and the Other, focusing
on the concept of “shame” in the context of the “weight” of existence of one’s own
existence. It elucidated that the aporia within the theory of the Other in the philosophy ofeducation should not be immediately overcome through educational “project.” Rather,
Levinas suggests that educators should embrace the aporia and carry the dual “weight”
of their existence, which diverges from simply relinquishing attempts to understand theeducand through the educational “project.” Only by doing so can an ethical relationshipbetween the educator and the educand truly flourish.
This perspective implies that the inherent paradox of education itself—where
educators continually strive towards an unattainable utopia—is not inherently ethicalbehavior. Our daily endeavors to understand the Other, whether in formal education
settings or in various interpersonal interactions—the relationship between adult and childand interactions among people who live in various cultures and speak different
languages—, are haunted by the impossibility of fully comprehending the Other.
However, when viewed through the lens of Levinasian philosophy, the act of engaging
in the educational “project” inherently expresses one’s response to the Other. Thus,
anyone involved in educational endeavors can cultivate an ethical relationship with the
Other by shouldering the existential “weight” inherent in the pursuit of ideals and by
existing as one elected by the Other.
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R. KatoReferences
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Kyoikugaku o Toinaosu: Kyoikutetsugaku wa nani o kyumei si, nani o tenbosuru ka(Now, Rethinking Education and Pedagogy: What does Philosophy of Education
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Saito, Naoko. 2002. Kyoiku no Kibo (Education’s Hope) Kindaikyoiku-forum 11:27-36.
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