GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION:
HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’SNATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGESBY EDMUND DOWNIE AND JEREMY LEE WALLACENOVEMBER 2021
China’s centrality in the climate crisis is hard to overstate. It overtook the United States as theworld’s leading emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) 15 years ago, and after slowing in the mid2010s, an uptick in 2018 signaled a return to significant carbon dioxide emissions growth. By
2020, China was responsible for 31 percent of global carbon emissions from fuel combustion,exceeding the combined emissions of the US, European Union, and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD; 41 countries).1 In the run-up to the Paris Agreementin 2015, China pledged that its carbon dioxide emissions would peak around 2030. In a
virtual address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 2020, president
and Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping surprised the world with a newpledge that China would scale up its Nationally Determined Contributions and “aim to have
CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” These “3060” targets serve as the high-level goals that structure China’s economic and environmental
planning at every level.
To implement their goals, China’s central authorities need the support of the provinces.2
Although China has experienced a strong centralizing trend during Xi’s tenure, the provinces
retain the potential to be key bottlenecks—or key partners—for the success of national
policies.3 But provincial interests and timelines do not always align with the center because
their circumstances, endowments, existing infrastructures, and economies vary widely.
Decarbonizing service-dominated megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai is unlike thechallenge facing impoverished Gansu or retooling the demographically shrinking agriculturalprovince of Heilongjiang.
This commentary examines provincial responses to the 30-60 neutrality and peaking pledges,
focusing on provinces that face different sets of pressures and opportunities around the lowcarbon transition to demonstrate the diversity of China’s challenges in addressing Xi’s carbon
pledges. In particular, the authors analyze carbon-intensive regions of the northern industrial
heartland such as Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Shanxi as well as eastern and southern provinces
that have historically relied on energy imports (particularly coal) from other provinces andcountries to guarantee their energy security. This latter group includes both economic
powerhouses such as Jiangsu, which is core to China’s innovation and wealth creation drives,and inland provinces such as Hunan, which has a more middling economy. This investigation
highlights two major themes:

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES●For central authorities, mandates, quantitative targets, and disciplinary inspections
around energy consumption and air pollution have been important tools for securingprovincial compliance with national environmental and energy goals, and they willremain so in the low-carbon transition. These tools are particularly important forprovinces that face the most economically difficult transitions. One major such groupis carbon-intensive northern heartland economies, such as Inner Mongolia, where acentral anti-corruption campaign against the provincial coal industry has heightened
the political salience of energy consumption control.
−●

That said, the political pressures used to force provincial compliance bring theirown risks: prompting, for instance, crude and unsustainable compliance strategies
such as residential heating cutoffs or industrial power rationing. This tension
will be important to watch as provincial and central leaders seek to balance
decarbonization and economic growth, especially given the power shortages thathave been afflicting most of the country since August.

Provinces historically reliant on coal imports to fuel local thermal plants are shifting
the energy security strategies in their five-year plans (FYPs) to emphasize alternatives
such as electricity imports and renewable generation—a trend particularly evident inparts of eastern and southern China. Power shortages in provinces across the country
since late 2020 can be solved without new coal additions, but coal will remain an
appealing short-term fix for provinces such as Hunan with tighter supply conditions.

To analyze these provinces, the authors reviewed official documents, plans, and media
coverage including leaders’ speeches. Official documents and plans contain a wealth of
information on the goals of higher levels of the government and the tasks of lower levels
to implement them. This information includes details about explicitly stated targets andexpectations, but a great deal of data can also be inferred from what is unsaid, especiallyby comparing newly released documents with prior iterations. The extent and content
of media coverage can show which issues are highlighted and how issues are framed. To
explore provincial-level variation in coverage, the authors used China National Knowledge
Infrastructure’s (CNKI’s) provincial newspaper database to examine original stories fromeach province’s leading newspaper during the first half of 2021. Together, these components
can clarify the paths being taken and avoided by provinces as they respond to Xi’s
decarbonization drive.
One brief note: this commentary was in production when a wave of power shortages struck
China in August and September 2021. The authors’ treatment of these shortages focuses on
central policy responses and their implications for initial provincial responses to the 30-60
pledges. Time and space constraints prevent us from examining the implications of provinciallevel responses to the shortages as well as any changes in provincial newspaper coverage
since these incidents. Both topics deserve further research.

Background
Chinese provinces are large socioeconomic units. In population terms, the median province,
Shaanxi, has 39 million people—more than Poland. The largest province, Guangdong, at 126

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million people, has an economy the size of Canada’s. In terms of global carbon emissions,
Chinese provinces are even more prominent. Emissions from fuel combustion and cement
production in Hebei in 2018 reached 912 million tons (mt), greater than Germany’s, largely due
to the province’s coal consumption, which accounts for around 90 percent of its emissions.4
While the scale of these numbers shows their significance, the governance challenge for China
comes as much from the wide range of circumstances that different provinces find themselves
in. Table 1 illustrates this diversity by showing data on the level of economic development,
power production, coal share, and renewable generation across 30 Chinese provinces. Map 1shows this diversity from another perspective, indicating per capita gross domestic product(GDP) as well as total emissions for each province.

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

Table 1: China’s provinces: Key CO2 emissions indicators

Province
Year

Estimatedemissions (mt)GDP(billion RMB)Electricity
generation (tWh)Non-fossil electricity
generation share

Coal output
(mt)

2018

2019

2019

2019

2019

Hebei

912

350

311.8

11.6%

50.8

Shandong

902

705

558.6

7.5%

118.8

Jiangsu

764

987

501.5

11.5%

11.0

Inner Mongolia

724

172

532.7

14.4%

1,035.2

Guangdong

568

1,080

472.6

29.2%

0.0

Shanxi

542

170

323.8

9.4%

971.1

Liaoning

521

249

199.6

26.1%

32.9

Henan

491

537

276.6

8.5%

108.7

Xinjiang

422

136

356.4

20.5%

237.7

Anhui

399

368

276.9

4.8%

109.9

Zhejiang

389

625

335.1

25.6%

0.0

Hubei

322

454

289.6

49.4%

0.4

Hunan

306

399

150.6

40.0%

13.7

Sichuan

296

464

367.1

86.3%

33.0

Shaanxi

276

258

211.9

12.1%

634.1

Fujian

261

423

240.6

41.6%

8.3

Guizhou

253

168

210.6

36.4%

129.7

Heilongjiang

248

135

105.7

13.8%

52.0

Jiangxi

237

247

124.2

11.7%

4.4

Guangxi

232

212

178.1

43.5%

3.6

Yunnan

212

232

325.2

90.4%

47.8

Jilin

196

117

87.2

17.4%

12.2

Ningxia

192

37

169.8

16.2%

71.7

Shanghai

191

380

79.3

1.2%

0.0

Gansu

163

87

148.0

46.5%

36.6

Chongqing

161

236

76.2

27.5%

11.5

Tianjin

154

141

71.3

1.5%

0.0

Beijing

90

354

43.1

2.5%

0.4

Qinghai

52

29

79.1

85.4%

10.1

Hainan

42

53

31.9

34.2%

0.0

Note: Emissions are estimates taken from the China Emissions Accounts and Datasets series (CEADs)
and only reflect energy combustion and process emissions in cement production. They are calculatedusing official annual provincial energy activity statistics. Non-fossil electricity production share includes
hydropower, nuclear, wind, and solar only.
Source: CEADs provincial and sectoral emissions data; National Bureau of Statistics data (indicators:
regional domestic GDP 地区生产总值, electricity generation—accumulated value 发电量—累计值,hydropower generation—accumulated value 水力发电量—累计值, solar generation—accumulated value
太阳能发电量—累计值, wind generation—accumulated value 风力发电量—累计值, nuclear generation—
accumulated value 核能发电量—累计值); see Appendix for full citations.

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Figure 1: Provincial CO2 emissions and GDP per capita

GDP per capita, 2019
(RMB)

Estimated CO2 emissions, 2018(mt)

>120,000
1,000 mt
80,000500 mt
100 mt<40,000
N/A

Heilongjiang

Jilin
Liaoning
Xinjiang

Inner Mongolia
TianjinBeijing

Hebei
ShanxiNingxia

Shandong

Qinghai
Gansu

Tibet

Jiangsu

Henan

Shaanxi

Shanghai

Anhui

Hubei
SichuanZhejiang
Chongoing

Jiangxi
Hunan
FujianGuizhou
YunnanGuangxi

Guangdong

HainanNote: As noted in the text, Chinese provincial CO2 emissions are often comparable to national CO2
emissions of other countries. In 2018, emissions from Hebei (912 mt) and Shandong (902 mt) were around
200 mt less than emissions from Japan (1,106 mt) and 200 mt greater than emissions from Germany (710
mt). Henan’s emissions (491 mt) were similar to Saudi Arabia’s and Mexico’s, and Jilin’s (196 mt) weresimilar to emissions from Pakistan and Ukraine. CO2 emissions reported in this figure and in this notereflect emissions from fuel combustion as well as cement production. International emissions estimates
are taken from the World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicators dataset (sector “total excluding
LUCF”). Chinese provincial emissions come from the CEADs database (Shan et al. 2018; Shan et al. 2020).
For more details on CEADs estimates, see Shan et al. 2018 and Shan et al. 2020.
Source: Yuli Shan et al., “China CO2 Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, 170201 (2018); Yuli

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

Shan, Qi Huang, Dabo Guan, and Klaus Hubacek, “China CO2 Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” ScientificData 7, 54 (2020); National Bureau of Statistics data; World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis
Indicators dataset, Climate Watch Platform, 2021, https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions (datasources include CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, OECD/IEA, 2021).

Provinces are more than just lines on a map and geographic groupings—they are key power
players in China’s political system. While Xi has centralized authority and decision-making power
to himself, one man cannot govern a complex society of 1.4 billion people alone. Governance in
China is dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, with party decisions guiding subsequent
state actions. While ultimate authority officially rests with the 2,300-odd members of the Party
Congress, in practice leadership emerges from the more elite groups of the Central Committee(about 200 people), the Politburo (25), the Politburo Standing Committee (7), and the party’s
leader since 2012, Xi Jinping. Inside the party-state, the central bureaucracies have relatively
few staff, forcing them to rely on provinces to rule over a hierarchy of officials ruling over cities,
counties, townships, and villages. Provinces serve as gatekeepers between these resource-poor
localities and the full coffers of the center. The political system’s design has tended to pushprovincial officials to favor investment-heavy development to accentuate their own interests.5
Annual evaluations based on highly quantified targets shape the promotion opportunities
and financial rewards of these officials. For decades, the most prominent of these targets has
been GDP. Environmental targets have appeared on evaluation forms since the mid-2000s,
and with the urban air pollution crises of the early 2010s, they came to be viewed as critical todomestic stability. Strict attention to urban air quality led to significant improvements on thatfront by the start of the current decade.6 The sources of much of the particulate matter that
led to such consternation—fossil fuel burning for electricity, transportation, and industry—are
also behind much of China’s carbon emissions, but the improvements in air quality have notbeen replicated in the carbon data.

Environmental Governance and Central-Local Tensions in the North
Across much of northern China, decarbonization will force major transitions for economies
with high concentrations of energy-intensive and carbon-intensive heavy industry. Provinces inthis swathe of the country served as China’s industrial heartland during much of the socialistera. China’s economic transformation since the late 1970s has weakened the north’s standingin heavy industry and, indeed, throughout the economy. The share of national secondary
industry output—comprising mining, manufacturing, energy, and construction—from 15 major
northern provinces dropped from 45 to 34 percent between 1992 and 2020, slightly outpacing
its drop in national GDP share over the same period (43 to 35 percent).7
Nonetheless, northern China remains an important hub for energy-intensive and carbon-intensive
heavy industry. Thirteen of the fifteen northern provinces cited above had energy intensities
above China’s national level of 0.50 tons of coal equivalent per RMB 1,000, including all nineof the country’s most energy-intensive provinces.8 The drivers of this high energy intensity
are diverse, reflecting the diversity of the provinces themselves. Some provinces benefit fromgood access to coal: more than three-quarters of national coal output comes from the northern
provinces of Shanxi (27 percent), Inner Mongolia (26 percent), Shaanxi (17 percent), and Xinjiang(7 percent).9 Others remain dominant industrial producers in specific energy-intensive and6 | ­­ ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | NOVEMBER 2021

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carbon-intensive sectors: the northern province of Hebei, for instance, produced around onefourth of national steel output in 2020, and another 20 percent came from its neighbors Shanxi,
Liaoning, and Shandong. Shandong and Henan are China’s two leading aluminum producers,
with combined annual national market shares in 2019 and 2020 of just under 40 percent.10
Figure 2: Provincial CO2 emissions intensity

Estimated emissions intensity, 2018
(t/1,000 RMB of provincial GDP)
> 0.5

0.25

Heilongjiang

<0.1
N/A

Jilin
Liaoning
Xinjiang

Inner Mongolia
TianjinBeijing

Hebei
ShanxiNingxia

Shandong

Qinghai
Gansu

Tibet

Jiangsu

Henan

Shaanxi

Shanghai

Anhui

Hubei
SichuanZhejiang
Chongoing

Jiangxi
Hunan
FujianGuizhou
YunnanGuangxi

Guangdong

HainanNote: Emissions intensity refers to emissions per unit of GDP. Emissions estimates are taken from the CEADs
database (Shan et al. 2018; Shan et al. 2020) and only reflect energy combustion and process emissions in
cement production. They are calculated using official annual provincial energy activity statistics. For moredetails, see Shan et al. 2018 and Shan et al. 2020.
Source: Yuli Shan et al., “China CO2 Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, 170201 (2018); Yuli
Shan, Qi Huang, Dabo Guan, and Klaus Hubacek, “China CO2 Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” ScientificData 7, 54 (2020); National Bureau of Statistics data.

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These circumstances will make decarbonization particularly demanding for China’s north,setting up clashes between central and local interests around the pace of the energy
transition. Indeed, these dynamics have already been at play in the tug-of-war between
central and local authorities in several northern provinces around energy consumption and air
pollution during the 13th FYP period (2016–2020). Over the past decade, Chinese authorities
have largely relied on energy consumption control, in particular, to implement their climate
goals. As the Chinese bureaucracy slowly operationalizes the neutrality pledge in the coming
years, its existing policy framework around energy consumption will remain central for nearterm carbon control, including for the peaking target.
Inner Mongolia represents an extreme example of provincial pushback to central energy
consumption priorities. The province relies on abundant natural resources (including coal)and cheap electricity to attract energy-intensive industries. Researchers at the Inner Mongolia
Macroeconomics Research Center report that nearly 50 percent of all large-scale industrial
firms (规上工业) in the province are in sectors with high levels of energy consumption(高能耗行业), and that 87 percent of industrial added value from large and medium-sized
firms in the province comes from the energy and raw materials sectors.11 These conditions
help explain why the province had overall carbon intensity in 2018 of almost four times thenational average (28.6 vs. 7.6). Provincial energy intensity trends are likewise an outlier. Data
from national statistical and energy authorities indicates a 21.7 percent decline in China’s
energy intensity between 2015 and 2019. Inner Mongolia, by contrast, saw an energy intensity
increase of 1.5 percent. It was the only province with an increase and the only province judged
by central authorities to have failed to meet centrally assigned “dual-control” targets for
reducing energy intensity and energy consumption in 2019.12
Inner Mongolia was also under pressure from central authorities at this time about corruption
in its coal industry.13 A series of corruption investigations were announced in the late 2010s,
targeting current and former senior officials in the province with coal industry ties.14 In February
2020, provincial officials announced a comprehensive investigation of corruption in the sector
over the past 20 years, with provincial secretary Shi Qinfeng describing corruption as “thebiggest ‘tumor’ and source of pollution in the political environment.”15 The central pressure
behind the investigation was made clear by the provincial party’s newspaper, which described
it as undertaken “according to suggestions from the Central Committee for Discipline andInspection,” the leader of Xi’s broader anti-corruption pushes since 2012.16 The investigation
was one of several drivers of supply disruptions that cut provincial coal output by 3.3 percent
in 2020, even as neighboring major producers Shanxi and Shaanxi saw 7–10 percent growth.17
The nexus of coal industry corruption and stubbornly high energy intensity across Inner
Mongolia’s economy had created pressure, even before the 30-60 pledge, for the province totransform its development model. Xi Jinping’s 2019 audience with Inner Mongolian delegatesto the influential “Two Sessions” central legislative meetings included a call for the province
to seek a “new high-quality development path guided by ecological prioritization and green
development,” though these remarks focused on issues such as environmental protection andair pollution rather than climate itself.18 A year later, in 2020, central authorities summoned
Inner Mongolian officials to Beijing over the province’s high energy consumption levels andpublicly instructed officials to implement central mandates “without talking about special
conditions or making accommodations or giving breaks.”19

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGESTransition pressures intensified in the months after the neutrality pledge. The pledge itself
strengthened the political mandate for energy consumption control nationwide. Xi reiterated
the anti-corruption campaign’s importance to Inner Mongolian delegates at the “TwoSessions” central legislative meetings in March 2021, saying that he himself had reviewed theprovince’s report to central authorities on their investigations.20 The authorities had reported
cases involving almost 1,000 cadres as of the end of April 2021.21 Inner Mongolia’s trailing
12-month coal output growth as of August 2021 was just 1.8 percent, again below Shaanxi (3.7
percent) and especially Shanxi (15.2 percent).22
Against this backdrop, provincial plans and regulatory pronouncements from 2021 signal
an acknowledgment, at least, of Inner Mongolia’s need for a new approach to growth. The
provincial FYP, released in 2021, features Xi’s mandate about “ecological prioritization andgreen development” as one of its leading themes. It is the sole task specific to the province inthe plan’s opening paragraph, listed alongside core national aims such as “comprehensively
building a moderately prosperous society.” The plan’s introductory overview explicitly criticizes
the province’s former industrial model as “crude” in its reliance on resource exploitation forindustrial development. The plan dedicates its third chapter to “a strategy for ecologicalcivilization construction,” placing the topic immediately after the introductory overview and thesecond chapter on innovation. The “ecological civilization construction” chapter encompasses
climate as well as a wide range of other priorities, with sections on “ecological protection
and restoration,” “consolidating and improving environmental quality,” and “advancing green,
circular, low-carbon development.”23 A later section on “transforming and improving traditional
industry,” in the plan’s fifth chapter, leads with an invocation of the neutrality and peaking goals:
Based upon energy resource advantages, and revolving around the carbon peaking
and neutrality medium- and long-term goals for confronting climate change,
strengthen the dual-control system of energy consumption and force the transition
and upgrading of the industrial structure.24

Provincial Five-Year Plans
Government authorities at a variety of levels in China—from central to local—publish
five-year plans, or FYPs, to define their major economic and social governance priorities
over five-year periods. Provincial FYPs, discussed in this commentary, are developedby provincial officials and are generally composed of chapters (篇), sections (章), andsubsections (节). As with most Chinese government documents, analysis benefits fromclose reading of structure and wording that goes beyond their generally uncontroversial
prose. For instance, how are priorities ordered, and how do those orders change over time?
(Most provincial 14th FYPs presented innovation as their second chapter, an indicator of
the national emphasis on technological upgrading for China’s development.) How muchdiscussion does a given topic receive, and where does that discussion take place? How
does wording vary across different topics? (The national 14th FYP calls for “developing
offshore wind in an orderly fashion [有序发展]” and “safely and appropriately advancing theconstruction of coastal nuclear plants”; the use of qualifiers such as “orderly” and “safely”
may suggest greater interest in a strong regulatory hand around growth in these sectors.25)

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Inner Mongolia’s treatment of green development and carbon emissions in its 2021 plans
stands out compared to its recent annual and five-year plans. The province’s 13th FYP had
its “green development” chapter sixth.26 The 14th FYP dedicates a subsection to “actively
confronting climate change,” whereas the 13th FYP discussed carbon emissions control
primarily within sections on energy conservation.27 The 2020 annual plan only uses the word
“carbon” (碳) once, in reference to carbon emissions trading; the 2021 plan uses it five times,
invoking neutrality and peaking work as part of the province’s “treatment of and assault upon
air pollution.”28 Both plans discuss the need to meet central energy consumption targets, but
the 2021 plan calls for a much broader array of actions toward that end: driving out excess
industrial capacity, canceling favorable electricity rates for high-energy industries, and energyefficiency retrofits for industrial facilities and buildings.29
More concretely, the province has also announced a series of regulations in 2021 associatedwith these priorities—particularly energy consumption control, for which the province waspublicly censured during the 13th FYP. Energy consumption control policies proposed ina February draft document aim to shut down small plants and carry out energy-efficiency
retrofits in major facilities within a host of industries by 2023.30 The province subsequently
released unit-by-unit lists of industrial facilities to be closed by 2023, including 11 blast
furnaces with 6.6 mt per annum of iron production capacity.31 (The province produced 31
mt of steel in 2020, up from 17 mt in 2015.32) Representatives of Inner Mongolia’s provincial
Development and Reform Commission, its leading economic policy body, told reporters thatthey had previously expected to peak around 2035 but will now target peaking before 2030.33
New energy consumption control policies do not directly mention carbon control. But Chinese
media reports on the neighboring province of Shaanxi cite the neutrality and peaking pledges
as drivers of stricter energy consumption control regulations in 2021. The pledges havealready helped force the suspension in Shaanxi of a $20 billion state-owned coal-chemicals
plant, which its sponsors have claimed is the largest under construction worldwide.34
Yet despite the active language in policy documents, the challenges that this transition
poses to the province are evident from media coverage, or in this case, the lack thereof.
Inner Mongolia saw fewer media references to the neutrality pledge than any of the othertop five emitting provinces during the first half of 2021.35 The stories that were run werethin, relative to other provinces’ coverage, on the challenges that taking actions consistent
with the pledges would entail for the province and its residents and businesses. The little
coverage that did touch on the subject tended to frame environmental activities in the more
traditional “particulate pollution” vein rather than writing directly about carbon and climatechange mitigation. Beyond these few ancillary mentions of carbon neutrality, the phrase only
comes up in what are essentially public relations materials for small projects by prominent
corporations, such as a “carbon neutral data center” built for Alibaba.36 An interesting
exception is a piece from February 9, 2021, in which a steel industry representative positively
describes policies, which in effect increase electricity prices for industry in Inner Mongolia(e.g., by canceling subsidies for specific high-electricity industries), for encouraging highquality development and firm quality improvement.37
The compliance challenges for central authorities illustrated so dramatically in Inner Mongolia
surface in a number of other provinces in northern China and beyond. Hebei has not seen the

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dramatic underperformance in energy intensity control that Inner Mongolia has witnessed.
But it has faced its own set of transition pressures around air quality and energy consumption,reflecting in part the fact that the province envelops Beijing and thus is bound up in efforts
to boost air quality within the capital.38 The neutrality pledge has intensified the enforcementof steel output restrictions used during the 13th FYP period to restrain air pollution fromlocal mills; the coastal city of Tangshan in Hebei, responsible for 13.5 percent of national steel
output in 2020, imposed production curbs of unprecedented severity for several months inspring 2021 after central inspectors found firms operating in violation of air pollution control
measures.39 Hebei’s 14th FYP—approved in February 2021 before the Tangshan cuts but notreleased until late May—dedicated an entire section to “accelerating progress on peaking andneutrality,” with subsections on peaking and neutrality policy design, renewable electricity
growth, and carbon emissions and air pollution control in industry.40 It also pronounced
an intention to be “in the front ranks” nationally in peaking emissions, though this may be
perfunctory; analysis of public data by the Energy Foundation suggests that Hebei and 13
other provinces have already seen peak emissions.41
Hebei’s media discourse on carbon neutrality was more extensive during the first half of2021 than Inner Mongolia’s. One newspaper story mentioned extreme weather not simply asa future threat but as already affecting everyone today, not as a “black swan” but instead a“gray rhino.”42 It acknowledged that cutting carbon emissions will be difficult for Hebei andthat most prior environmental efforts related to air quality have been “end of pipe” solutions
that reduce particulate pollution but are not well targeted to carbon. This story was soon
followed in the same newspaper by a series on new opportunities that this transition bringsfor companies and people in the province.
Hebei and Inner Mongolia’s neighbor, Shanxi Province, has more recently faced its own forcefulcentral censure over energy intensity and air pollution issues. In mid-July 2021, the Ministry of
Ecology and Environment published reports from central inspection teams visiting Shanxi andseven other provinces, mostly in China’s poorer interior.43 (All eight provinces had GDP per
capita figures in 2019 of at least 15 percent below the national average, with five of the eight
below the national median.) The reports—which followed similar inspection reports issued forthese provinces during the 13th FYP period—demanded rectification of a variety of failings
by provincial and subprovincial leaders on issues including ecological preservation, pollution
mitigation, and energy consumption control. Shanxi—a southern neighbor of Inner Mongolia andone of China’s big three coal producers—received particularly intense criticism for its handlingof energy consumption and air pollution issues.44 Notable findings included the following:●

The province has 178 planned projects in liang gao industries (两高行业)—energyintensive and pollution-intensive sectors. If these projects are implemented, their energy
consumption will “significantly exceed the space for energy usage increases during the
14FYP period.” Among the 178 planned projects, 101 are already under construction or
are finished; 72 of those 101 have “incomplete procedures” (手续不全), indicating a failure
to comply with bureaucratic requirements for their stages of construction.

●

Provincial economic and energy authorities “had not paid sufficient regard to coalconsumption control work, and the province’s actual coal consumption figures
were unclear.”

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Sixty percent of sub-300-megawatt (MW) thermal power units in the province did notmeet energy efficiency standards.

●

The province had approved 18 iron and steel projects since 2017 under national capacity
replacement regulations that required new capacity additions to be offset by capacity
retirements at specified ratios. Only one of these projects actually met those ratios.

Public inspection reports are important political tools that central authorities can use to pressure
local governments (and, in some cases, their allies in other central bodies) on energy and climate
issues. But they have drawbacks as well, as documented in a balanced review of this reporting
system by Shen and Jiang (2021).45 For instance, the threat of weakened promotion prospects
from failed inspections can encourage local authorities to adopt crude and unsustainablemeasures to meet central demands, such as cutting off residential coal heating access or
shutting off city lights.46 They can also encourage statistical distortion by local authorities, anongoing issue that has delayed the rollout of China’s national emissions trading scheme.47
Signals from central authorities in summer 2021 suggest an effort to ease some of thepressures that these tools create. At least 20 of China’s 31 provinces introduced power usage
restrictions during August and September 2021. These moves primarily reflected high coalprices that made generators unwilling or unable to operate as well as hydropower shortfalls
that hit southwestern China. But some provinces were also facing central pressure after
missing dual-control targets.48 (The role of these targets in the shortages is hotly debated,with some analysts suggesting that their impact has been exaggerated by domestic fossilintensive interests.49) In late July 2021, when shortages were affecting a narrower set ofprovinces, the Politburo called for “correcting campaign-style carbon reduction”; thisphrase was widely interpreted as an injunction against aggressive carbon-reduction pushes
undertaken by local governments without regard to other priorities.50 It has reiterated
this call as part of its response to the energy crisis, albeit as a lesser priority compared toboosting coal supply and relieving pressure on generator margins.51 Updated central guidancein September 2021 around the dual-control system stressed the need to control liang gao
projects but also added mechanisms for flexibility—for instance, exemptions for provinces thatexceed their energy intensity targets or centrally assigned targets for renewable generation.52
More generally, of course, central authorities remain concerned about balancing
decarbonization with economic growth and other state priorities. China’s immediate goalof peaking before 2030 should be met comfortably; the International Energy Agency (IEA),
for instance, projects nationwide peaking in the mid-2020s.53 These conditions give central
players latitude to decide how to prioritize different elements of the energy transition,with knock-on impacts for provincial economic transitions.54 (As of early October 2021, forinstance, Inner Mongolia has approved since late August 2021 additions of around 140 mt ofcoal production capacity, equivalent to around 15 percent of the province’s 2020 production,as part of national efforts to boost supply.55) These dynamics, as well as the trade-offs around“campaign-style carbon reduction” noted above, will be crucial to watch as both central andlocal players seek a stable framework for decarbonization policies.

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Decarbonization and Energy Security for Eastern and Southern
Energy Importers
China’s biggest economic powerhouses are concentrated in one of its most traditionallyenergy-insecure regions: its eastern and southeastern coasts.
Coal production is concentrated in the north and major hydropower resources in the inlandsouthwest. Onshore wind and solar—the fastest-growing sources of installed capacity in
China over the past decade—have reinforced the north’s energy advantages, with arid
and flat swathes of the north enjoying China’s strongest onshore wind and solar resource
potential. Inner Mongolia, for instance, was both China’s second-largest coal producer and its
largest wind and solar producer in 2020, accounting for 16 percent and 9 percent of national
production, respectively.56 In 2020, China’s top five solar- and wind-producing provinces—accounting for 46 percent and 41 percent of national production of each type, respectively—
were all located in either the north (Inner Mongolia and Hebei), the northwest (Xinjiang,
Gansu, and Qinghai), or the southwest (Yunnan).57
Yet China’s eastern and southeastern coasts include all four of China’s biggest provinces by
GDP and energy consumption: Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. These provinces
are also China’s richest (excluding provincial-level cities), along with Fujian, another coastal
province wedged between Zhejiang and Guangdong. These provinces have historically reliedon energy imports of various kinds—importing primary energy in the form of coal and, more
recently, electricity from long-distance power lines. Indeed, the four east-coast powerhouses
generated power equivalent to just 70–80 percent of their own consumption in 2020. They
were in the bottom six on this metric nationwide alongside their inland neighbors Jiangxi and
Hunan, middling economies in south-central China.
These circumstances make energy security a particularly important policy concern formany import-dependent eastern and southern provinces as they seek to adjust their energy
mixtures. Indeed, this past year has seen power shortages become an active concern across
China. Cold snaps in southern China as well as surging power demand last winter and (in atleast one province) pressures to meet 13th FYP dual-control targets prompted restrictions
on industrial and commercial electricity use across a number of provinces.58 The energy
shortages discussed previously have highlighted these concerns. The east-coast powerhouses
are by no means the only provinces suffering from this crisis; the worst-affected states havebeen in Northeast China, where grid operators have been forced to ration even residential
power use.59 But Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong introduced power usage
restrictions during August and September 2021, as did Hunan.
Unsurprisingly, then, energy security features prominently in FYP energy discussions
for several powerful energy-importing provinces. The 14th FYPs for both Jiangsu andGuangdong, for instance, invoke “energy security” in the titles of their sections on energy.60
For both provinces, however, local coal generation’s prominence among the listed steps forguaranteeing energy security has diminished since the last FYP. Jiangsu’s 13th FYP led off its
treatment of energy security with a call to “maintain safe production and optimize and adjust
the energy production capacity of traditional provincial [sources of] energy including coal, oil,

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and gas.”61 The corresponding discussion in the 14th FYP starts with the grid: “optimizing main
grid backbones and interprovincial transmission lines” and expanding electricity imports.62(Of course, electricity imports can include imports of coal power.) It subsequently discusses
Jiangsu’s goal of strengthening its gas sector to “become an important natural gas supply
pillar.” Coal is treated last, and discussion only covers coal supply chains rather than generation
capacity additions.63 To be sure, local coal generation is Jiangsu’s largest power source and will
likely remain so in the near term.64 But changes in the order of different topics within the plansignal a desire to reduce its reliance on this source for guaranteeing energy security.
Guangdong shows a similar shift. Its 13th FYP discussion of energy security begins with“safely developing nuclear energy” and “developing clean and efficient coal power.”65 But thediscussion in the 14th FYP starts from “implementing renewable energy replacement [of fossil
energy]” and invokes Xi Jinping’s call from March 2021 to “establish a new-type power systemwith new energy as the mainstay.”66 (“New energy” is often used in Chinese policy to refer torecently developed generation technologies such as wind and solar as opposed to traditional
fossil or hydro generation technologies.) Again, coal is treated last, though unlike Jiangsu,
Guangdong does explicitly reference “the clean and efficient use of coal power” as opposed
to just coal supply chains in its energy security discussion.67
The coastal powerhouses have seen some of the most robust discussion of climate change’s
implications and the need for carbon neutrality. Media in Jiangsu had one of the earliest
comprehensive discussions of carbon neutrality. A piece from January 2021 suggested
that the province should jump directly to net-zero carbon emissions and take the leadin China’s carbon peaking, arguing that doing so would help the country in “becoming a
powerful modern socialist country by 2050.”68 Many such stories appeared subsequently in
the Jiangsu provincial party mouthpiece (新华日报), discussing the need to reduce carbon
emissions in industry, construction, and transportation; connecting climate change withefforts to protect biodiversity; and positively framing carbon neutrality as an economic
opportunity (rather than just a costly move away from coal) through the promotion andexport of new energy equipment.
Coal’s reduced prominence in these provincial plans should not be attributed to the neutrality
pledge alone. The pipeline of coal power additions contracted nationwide in the late 2010sas central authorities tightened controls over new projects after a construction boom in the
mid-2010s driven by provincial interests. Open-source analysis by Global Energy Monitor(GEM) finds that new capacity proposals and new construction across the country dropped
80 percent and 72 percent, respectively, from 2015–2016 to 2018–2019.69 Severe overcapacity
within the coal sector can undercut profitability. State media reported that in 2018 aroundhalf of China’s coal power firms were loss making and that liabilities-to-asset ratios acrossthe country’s entire power sector stood at 78 percent.70 (Surging coal prices in 2021 arestraining these margins even further; the China Electricity Council, the generator industry
association, cites reports from some firms of 50 percent year-on-year increases in per-unit
coal costs as of June 2021.71) National air quality action plans in 2013 and 2018 also singled
out regions including Jiangsu (both years) and Guangdong (2013 only) for special treatment
such as higher air quality standards and coal consumption reduction targets.72 Since 2019, nocoal power projects have appeared on Jiangsu’s annual priority project lists, which provinces

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use to endorse major investment projects within their jurisdictions each year.73 Power-sector
projects have instead included zero-carbon sources such as nuclear plant expansions andoffshore wind additions, grid build-outs, and gas transmission and power generation facilities.
Still, shifts in FYP language should not be taken to indicate a cold-turkey break from coal.
A nationwide rebound in coal power construction and permitting activity happened in2019 and 2020 as authorities sought to weather headwinds from the US-China trade war
and COVID-19.74 As of January 2021, GEM data indicated a relatively small pipeline of new
permitted coal additions in Jiangsu: 0.5 gigawatts (GW) under construction and 2.1 GW
permitted against 75.2 GW operating.75 Guangdong’s 2021 major project list included no coal
power projects breaking ground, whereas after 2019 and 2020, the lists included 3.3 GW
and 3.5 GW of such projects, respectively.76 (To be fair, this was not just a coal phenomenon.
Guangdong included 4.9 GW of nuclear projects breaking ground in 2021, but no renewables
after including 4.8 GW and 1.8 GW of offshore wind breaking ground in 2019 and 2020,
respectively.) But it listed 2.6 GW of coal projects entering operation in 2021 and another 5.8
GW of continuing construction. Combined, these projects equaled 12.8 percent of the 65.7 GWof provincial coal capacity in operation recorded in GEM data as of January 2021.77
Nonetheless, as shares of their existing capacity, the planned coal additions among major
coastal powerhouses are modest compared to the aims of many provinces in interior China.
The three major coal-producing provinces of Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Shaanxi had 57
GW of coal additions permitted or under construction as of January 2021, around 29 percentof their operating capacity. But the largest shares—with pipelines equaling 36 percent ofoperating capacity each—came from the south-central provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, twoenergy importers that suffered from the December 2020 power shortages. Hunan’s wereparticularly severe; restrictions on commercial and industrial power use were announced aweek before they were adopted across most other affected provinces, and on December 19
grid operators announced a “wartime situation” (战时状况) in their efforts to protect residential
power access.78 The province’s straits reflected the cold snap and power demand surge
affecting much of southern and central China, as well as unique factors such as long-term
underperformance from the province’s ultra-high-voltage transmission line dedicated to power
imports. But they also reflected an unusually challenging climate for coal power operations,which face elevated coal prices from long-distance transportation as well as suppressed
operating hours from competition with the province’s plentiful hydropower resources.79
National installed thermal power capacity (almost entirely coal) grew by 12 percent from 2016
to 2019, but Hunan’s fell by 1.8 percent over the same period; it was one of only three provinces
to see a decline, along with fellow southern hydropower giants Sichuan and Yunnan.80
Hunan’s 14th FYP reflects its concerns about energy security, with endorsements of significant
fossil expansion and limited attention to carbon emissions. Its major energy subsection—“consolidate the energy security network” (夯实能源保障网)—leads with strengthening its
import access but proceeds to a detailed discussion of steps to ensure that coal can better
serve as the system’s backbone reliability guarantor.81 These steps included completing fourongoing coal-plant construction projects and advancing early stage work on another three;
the seven combined would entail 13.3 GW of total additions in a province with 22.8 GW of
operating coal capacity.82

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To be clear, the pipelines of coal projects in Hunan, Guangdong, and elsewhere do not meanthat coal additions are the only ways these provinces can address power shortages. Indeed, as
noted above, coal power across China suffers from severe overcapacity, and further additions
will only strain margins further. Power shortages reflect supply shortfalls for meeting peakdemand that, as many analysts have argued, could be met more effectively through institutional
reforms that strengthen grid flexibility—for instance, by strengthening incentives for retrofitting
existing coal plants for more flexible operations, reducing barriers to interprovincial power
trade, and boosting distributed renewables development.83 Ongoing reforms on these fronts
have proceeded unevenly amid resistance from vested interest groups, though the AugustSeptember crisis appears to have prompted real progress in some of these areas.84
Hunan’s 14th FYP also deals much less with carbon emissions than those of the otherprovinces reviewed in this report. The plan does not include a stand-alone paragraph orsubsection on climate change, as is done in the plans of Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Hebei,
Guangdong, and Jiangsu.85 Instead, the end of its subsection on “advancing circular, lowcarbon development” includes one sentence on carbon emissions containing five brief
injunctions: for instance, “cut emissions intensity,” “implement the national carbon emissions
peaking plan,” and “actively construct a national climate investment and finance pilot.”86
By contrast, Shanxi’s paragraph on advancing peaking and neutrality work includes six
sentences covering issues from accelerating coal consumption peaking to strengthening
emissions monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.87 Guangdong’s eight-sentence paragraphfeatures injunctions ranging from introducing a joint system for controlling emissions
intensity and total emissions (similar to the dual-control energy targets) to establishinga provincial carbon capture “testing platform.”88 Jiangsu’s four-sentence paragraphlikewise invokes the establishment of dual-control targets for carbon emissions and callsfor establishing greenhouse gas emissions standards for major industries and products.89
The gap between these provinces and Hunan in their FYP language is also consistent with
the Energy Foundation’s analysis on emissions trajectories, which includes Hunan among
the provinces set for “late peaks” owing to “unbalanced resource endowments” and“underdeveloped economies.”90

Conclusion
China’s 30-60 pledge was formulated in a highly centralized manner by senior leadership,
supported by a research team at Beijing’s elite Tsinghua University.91 But implementing thiscommitment will require decades of coordinated campaigns across China’s bureaucracy.
Provincial leaders are key power brokers in this system. The ability of central authorities
to bend national emissions toward zero will rest in part on their ability to enlist provincial
leaders in these efforts. But China’s provinces are diverse—ranging from depressed exindustrial hubs in the northeast to hydropower bases in the southwest and economic
powerhouses on the east coast—and the challenges and opportunities in their efforts todecarbonize can vary enormously.
Focused on two groups of provinces—the industrial heartlands of northern China and theenergy-importing provinces of eastern and southern China—this commentary has highlighted
several ways in which provinces will help determine the success of China’s decarbonization

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efforts. In the north, cutting carbon emissions requires a dramatic transformation of theenergy-intensive, carbon-intensive development models on which local officials have relied
for economic growth. Pressures around that transformation predate the 30-60 pledge but
have been intensified by the new targets. The most dramatic responses so far have come from
Inner Mongolia, the site of a major anti-corruption campaign in the provincial coal sector; its
development plans and regulatory announcements are signs of its intention to more seriously
tackle the painful work of economic transformation. Near-term implementation of thepledges—in the north and throughout the country—is likely to build on the center’s existing
mix of quantitative targets and disciplinary inspections. These strategies fit well with China’s
political system and have delivered improvements in air quality and energy intensity overthe past decade. But they may also incentivize sporadic short-term scrambles (or statisticalfudging) to meet targets and avoid discipline, rather than encourage consistent and forwardlooking measures that support the decarbonization pledge’s underlying goals. The central
leadership’s concerns about “campaign-style carbon reductions” during this year’s energy
crisis highlight this tension, even if fossil-sector lobbying may be bringing the dual-control
system under more criticism than it deserves.
Similarly, in the south and east, the neutrality pledge has intensified pressures on provinces
that have relied on physical coal imports to reframe their energy security strategies aroundelectricity imports and low-carbon electricity where available. The return of power shortages
across the country over the past year—including in these provinces—makes energy security an
immediate issue. Coal additions are not the only potential solution to these shortages. China
has other tools, including expanding interprovincial power trade, instituting more flexible
power dispatch protocols, and stimulating distributed renewable development. But thecontentious politics of these steps explain why the traditional playbook of capacity additions
may retain its appeal for at least the 14th FYP period. This playbook offers a short-term
supply fix and a source of stimuli for local economies amid slowing GDP growth, and it is notnecessarily incompatible with China meeting its immediate climate policy priority of peaking
emissions before 2030. But if China is to meet its more ambitious, longer-term carbon neutral
goals, the country will need a comprehensive shift in its energy system. It will succeed onlywith buy-in from the provinces—the gatekeepers of the transition.

Appendix
A. Emissions, Economic, and Energy Data Sources
This paper sources data from the following data sources for emissions, coal capacity, andenergy and economic activity in China.
●

Provincial and Sectoral Emissions in China: the China Carbon Emission Accounts andDatasets series (http://www.ceads.net/). Yuli Shan et al., “China CO2 Emission Accounts
1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, 170201 (2018), and Yuli Shan, Qi Huang, Dabo Guan, andKlaus Hubacek, “China CO2 Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” Scientific Data 7, 54 (2020).

●

Installed and Planned Coal Capacity: Global Energy Monitor, Global Coal Plant Tracker,

ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | NOVEMBER 2021 | 17

GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES“Coal Plants in China (MW),” January 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, https://web.
archive.org/web/20210422224242if_/https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mD
LafuvyiLYezFmV6VXEnjlPcMy5QftwW4J2U3Qujk0/edit#gid=0, and Global Energy
Monitor, Global Coal Plant Tracker, “Coal Plants in China (MW),” July 2021, accessed
September 10, 2021, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mDLafuvyiLYezFmV6V
XEnjlPcMy5QftwW4J2U3Qujk0/edit#gid=0.
−●

Global Energy Monitor’s Global Coal Plant Tracker reports on the global ownershipof coal plants greater than 30 MW based on open-source research and is the best
public, nonsubscription plant-level database of corporate coal capacity in China.

Energy and Economic Activity: these were sourced from the National Bureau of
Statistics or from government statistical yearbooks.
−

NBS data came from its website (https://data.stats.gov.cn/, accessed September
10, 2021) in the following locations:Indicator 指标DatasetDataset Group

Domestic GDP(国内生产总值)Domestic GDP(国内生产总值)Annual Data (年度数据)
Economic Accounts (国民经济核算)

Year-end permanent
population(年末常住人口)

Total Population(总人口)Annual Provincial Data (分省年度数据)
Population (人口)Regional GDP(地区生产总值)Regional GDP(地区生产总值)Annual Provincial Data (分省年度数据)
Economic Accounts (国民经济核算)

Secondary industry
added value(第二产业增加值)Regional GDP(地区生产总值)Annual Provincial Data (分省年度数据)
Economic Accounts (国民经济核算)

Raw coal production—
accumulated value(原煤产量——累计值)

Raw Coal(原煤)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Crude steel production(粗钢产量)

Industrial ProductOutput(工业产品产量)Annual Provincial Data (分省年度数据)
Industry (工业)Aluminum materials
production—accumulatedvalue(铝材产量——累计值)

Aluminum(铝材)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Industry (工业)Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Electricity generation—accumulated value(发电量——累计值)Electricity Generation(发电量)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Electricity consumption(电力消费量)

Major Energy ProductConsumption(主要能源产品消费量)Annual Provincial Data (分省年度数据)
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continued from previous page
Indicator 指标DatasetDataset Group

Hydropower generation—accumulated value(水力发电量——累计值)

Hydropower Generation(水力发电量)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Solar generation—
accumulated value(太阳能发电量——累计值)

Solar Generation(水力发电量)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)Wind generation—
accumulated value(风力发电量——累计值)Electricity Generation(风力发电量)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Nuclear generation—
accumulated value(核能发电量——累计值)

Nuclear Electricity
Generation(核能发电量)Monthly Provincial Data (分省月度数据)Energy (能源)
Major Energy Product Output (能源主要产品产量)

Data drawn from statistical yearbooks included the following:
Indicator 指标DatasetDataset Group

Total energy consumption(能源消费总量)“Energy Consumption
by Province and Type”(国内生产总值)2019: Liu Wenhua (刘文华) ed., China Energy
Statistics Yearbook 2020 (中国能源统计年鉴2020), 4-14
2015 to 2018: Liu Wenhua (刘文华) ed., China
Energy Statistics Yearbook 2019 (中国能源统计年鉴2019), 4-22 to 4-25.

Installed thermal capacity((发电装机容量（火电）)“Installed Thermal
Capacity by Region”(分地区发电装机容量（火电）)Yang Kun (杨昆) ed., China Electricity Statistics
Yearbook 2020 (中国电力统计年鉴2020), 2-5.

B. Five-Year Plans
The following provincial five-year plan outlines, annual plans, and major project lists (重大项目名单) are cited in this paper (note that the 13th FYP outlines cover 2016–2020 and the 14th
FYP outlines cover 2021–2025):
Guangdong Province●

13th FYP: “Guangdong Province Outline of 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic andSocial Development” (广东省国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要), January 13,
2018, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.gd.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/0/146/
post_146576.html#7.

●

14th FYP: “Guangdong Province Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term
Goals for Economic and Social Development” (广东省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), April 25, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.
gd.gov.cn/zwgk/wjk/qbwj/yf/content/post_3268751.html.

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2019–2021 Major Project Lists−

2019: “Guangdong Province 2019 Major Project Plan” (广东省2019年重点建设项目计划), March 21, 2019, accessed September 10, 2021, http://drc.gd.gov.cn/ywtz/
content/post_2264242.html.

−

2020: “Guangdong Province 2020 Major Project Plan” (广东省2020年重点建设项目计划), March 15, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, http://drc.gd.gov.cn/ywtz/
content/post_2915278.html.

−

2021: “Guangdong Province 2021 Major Project Plan” (广东省2021年重点建设项目计划表), March 15, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://drc.gd.gov.cn/gkmlpt/
content/3/3253/post_3253184.html#877.

Hebei Province●

14th FYP: “Hebei Province Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term Goals for
Economic and Social Development” (河北省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标纲要), May 29, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://hbrb.hebnews.cn/
pc/paper/c/202105/29/content_86825.html.

Hunan Province●

14th FYP: “Hunan Province Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term Goals
for Economic and Social Development” (湖南省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标纲要), March 25, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.hunan.
gov.cn/xxgk/tzgg/szbm/202103/t20210325_15073892.html.

●

2021 Major Project List: Hunan Province Development and Reform Commission,“2021 Major Project List” (2021年省重点建设项目名单), February 25, 2021, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://fgw.hunan.gov.cn/fgw/xxgk_70899/tzgg/202102/
t20210225_14611166.html.

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region●

13th FYP: “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Outline of 13th Five-Year Plan for
Economic and Social Development” (内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要), March 2021, accessed May 26, 2021, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/
dffzgh/201606/P020191104643414271152.pdf.

●

14th FYP: “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035
Long-Term Goals for Economic and Social Development” (内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会
发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), February 7, 2021, accessed September 10,
2021, http://www.nmg.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgk/zfxxgkml/202102/t20210210_887052.html.

●

2020 Annual Plan: “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 2020 Economic and Social
Development Plan” (2020年内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会发展计划), January 22, 2021,
accessed September 10, 2021, https://www.nmg.gov.cn/zfbgt/zwgk/zzqwj/202012/t20201208_315189.html.

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2021 Annual Plan: “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 2021 Economic and Social
Development Plan” (2021年内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会发展计划) February 5, 2021,
accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.nmg.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgk/zfxxgkml/202102/
t20210209_886583.html.

Jiangsu Province●

13th FYP: “Jiangsu Province Outline of 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social
Development” (江苏省国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要), March 18, 2016, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://www.jiangsu.gov.cn/art/2016/4/20/art_46606_2556039.html.

●

14th FYP: “Jiangsu Province Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term Goals
for Economic and Social Development” (江苏省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标纲要), February 19, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, https://baijiahao.
baidu.com/s?id=1693073223056161309&wfr=spider&for=pc (full text) and http://fzggw.
jiangsu.gov.cn/art/2021/3/1/art_284_9683575.html (plan publication date).

●

2019–2021 Major Project Lists−

2019: “Jiangsu Province 2019 Major Project List” (江苏省2019年重大项目名单),August 28, 2018, accessed September 10, 2021, http://fzggw.jiangsu.gov.cn/
art/2019/8/28/art_51014_8695033.html.

−

2020: “Jiangsu Province 2020 Major Project List” (江苏省2020年重大项目名单),
February 21, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, http://fzggw.jiangsu.gov.cn/
art/2020/2/21/art_4591_8979642.html.

−

2021: “Jiangsu Province 2021 Major Project List” (江苏省2020年重大项目名单), March
30, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.jiangsu.gov.cn/art/2021/3/30/
art_76852_9719921.html.

Shanxi Province●

14th FYP: “Shanxi Province Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term Goals for
Economic and Social Development”(山西省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年
远景目标纲要), April 9, 2021, accessed June 10, 2021, http://www.shanxi.gov.cn/sxszfxxgk/
sxsrmzfzcbm/sxszfbgt/flfg_7203/szfgfxwj_7205/202104/t20210414_899516.shtml.

Notes
1.

BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, accessed October 6, 2021, https://www.
bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/
statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.

2. China officially recognizes 34 provincial-level units, 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions,
4 municipalities, and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau) and claims
Taiwan as a twenty-third province. Our analysis focuses on and uses “provinces” to refer to

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

the 31 units of the People’s Republic of China mainland, although Tibet is usually excluded
due to missing data.
3. See, e.g., Kyle A. Jaros and Yeling Tan, “Provincial Power in a Centralizing China: The
Politics of Domestic and International ‘Development Space,’” China Journal 83 (2020):
79–104.
4. For Hebei emissions statistics, see the China Carbon Emission Accounts and Dataset
series (full citation in Appendix, Part A). German CO2 emissions from energy combustion
and industrial processes in 2018 were 710 mt. World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis
Indicators data set, Climate Watch Platform, 2021, https://www.climatewatchdata.org/
ghg-emissions (with data sourced from “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion,” OECD/
IEA, 2021).
5. Jaros and Tan, “Provincial Power,” 79–104.
6. Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, Air Quality Life Index project, “China:
National Air Quality Action Plan (2013),” accessed September 10, 2021, https://aqli.epic.
uchicago.edu/policy-impacts/china-national-air-quality-action-plan-2014/.
7.

National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data (indicators: secondary industry value added [第二产业增加值] and domestic GDP [国内生产总值]). Appendix, Part A, provides details on thelocations of all the indicators cited in this paper from the NBS or statistical yearbooks. The
provinces identified in this paper as “northern” are all provinces or provincial-level cities(excluding Tibet) in four economic regions defined by the NBS:●

Coastal North (北部沿海): Hebei and Shandong, as well as the provincial-level cities
of Beijing and Tianjin●

Northeast (东北地区): Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang●

Northwest (大西北地区): Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Gansu (this region also
includes Tibet)●

Yellow River Midstream (黄河中游): Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan

This definition roughly accounts for eastern China with the traditional use of the Qin
Mountains and the Huai River as the dividing line between north and south.
8. NBS data (indicator: regional GDP [地区生产总值]) and statistical yearbook data (indicator:
total energy consumption [能源消费总量]). The two northern provinces and cities withenergy intensities below China’s median level were Henan (0.40) and the provincial-levelcity of Beijing (0.21).
9. NBS data (indicator: raw coal production—accumulated value [原煤产量——累计值]).
10. NBS data (indicators: crude steel production [粗钢产量] and aluminum materials
production—accumulated value [铝材产量¬——累计值]).

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11. Xu Dawei (胥大伟), “Ten Difficult Years for a Major High-Carbon Province: How Much of aPrice Will Inner Mongolia Pay for Emissions Peaking?” (高碳大省的艰难十年：内蒙古将为碳达
峰付出多大的代价？), China News Weekly (中国新闻周刊), June 1, 2021, accessed September
10, 2021, https://www.chinanews.com/cj/2021/06-01/9489898.shtml. Central authorities
define these industries as including the processing of fuels including oil and coal;chemicals manufacturing; minerals processing, ferrous and nonferrous metals smelting,rolling, and processing, and electric power and heating production and supply. See, e.g.,“NDRC: Clarify the Scope of High-Energy Industries” (国家发展改革委：明确高耗能行业范围),China Power Online (中国电力网), March 6, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.
chinapower.com.cn/jnhb/zcdt/20200306/9888.html.
12. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Announcement Regarding Resultsof Examination of 2019 Energy Consumption Total and Energy Intensity Dual-Control Goals”(关于各地区2019年度能源消费总量和强度双控目标考核结果的公告), February 2, 2021, accessed
September 10, 2021 https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/gg/202102/t20210207_1267081.
html. These targets are publicized, but the authors do not compare provincial energy
intensity declines from public data against these targets because of data discrepancies thatthe authors were unable to reconcile. For instance, Guangdong Province reported in its 14th
Five-Year Plan that it experienced a 13.56 percent decline in energy intensity between 2016
and 2019. This is significantly below its decline of 16.77 percent for those years calculated
from public data. Guangdong Province 14th FYP, chapter 1, section 1, subsection 1; NBS data(indicator: regional domestic GDP [地区生产总值]); and statistical yearbook data (indicator:
total energy consumption [能源消费总量]). (Full citations for all five-year plans, annual plans,
and major project lists in this report are given in Appendix, Part B.)
13. The authors thank a pair of anonymous reviewers for noting the relevance of Inner
Mongolia’s anti-corruption campaign in the coal industry for this paper.
14. Huang Yuxin (黄雨馨), “Inner Mongolia Will Investigate Issues in Violation of Laws andRegulations in the Coal Resource Sector Going Back 20 Years” (内蒙古将倒查20年煤炭资源领域违规违法问题), Caixin (财新), March 1, 2020, accessed October 5, 2021, https://china.caixin.
com/2020-03-01/101522383.html.
15. Ding Yan (丁燕) and Dai Hong (戴宏), “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Party
Committee and Government Hold Meeting for Mobilization and Deployment around
Special Rectification Work Regarding Issues in Violation of Laws and Regulations in the
Coal Resource Sector” (内蒙古自治区党委政府召开煤炭资源领域违规违法问题专项整治工作动员部署会议 石泰峰讲话), Inner Mongolia Daily (内蒙古日报), February 29, 2021, accessed October
5, 2021, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0229/c117005-31610651.html.
16. Ibid.
17. NBS data (indicator: raw coal production—accumulated value [原煤产量——累计值]).
18. “Xi Jinping Participates in Inner Mongolia Representatives’ Deliberations” (习近平参加内蒙古代表团审议), Xinhua (新华社), March 5, 2019, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.
xinhuanet.com//politics/2019lh/2019-03/05/c_1124197105.htm.

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

19. NDRC, “NDRC Environmental Office Calls In for Discussions the Inner Mongolia
Departments Responsible for Energy Conservation” (国家发展改革委环资司约谈内蒙古节能主管部门), September 20, 2019, accessed September 10, 2021, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1678247438401700248&wfr=spider&for=pc.
20. Guo Xing, “Inner Mongolia Rectifies Coal-Related Corruption with an Iron First,
Disciplines and Punishes More than 1,400 Individuals” (内蒙古铁腕整治涉煤腐败，处理处
分1400余人), Central Commission for Discipline Investigation Online (中央纪委国家监委网站), March 6, 2021, accessed October 5, 2021, https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202103/
t20210306_237234_m.html, and William Zheng, “China Takes Aim at Corrupt Cadresand Officials in Expanded Inner Mongolia Campaign,” South China Morning Post,
March 18, 2021, accessed October 5, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/
article/3125867/china-takes-aim-corrupt-cadres-and-officials-expanded-inner.
21. Guo, “Inner Mongolia Rectifies.”
22. NBS data (indicator: raw coal production—accumulated value [原煤产量——累计值]).
23. Inner Mongolia 14th FYP, chapter 3.
24. Inner Mongolia 14th FYP, chapter 5, section 14.
25. National 14th FYP, chapter 3, section 11, subsection 3.
26. Inner Mongolia 13th FYP, chapter 6.
27. Inner Mongolia 13th FYP, chapter 6, section 27.
28. Inner Mongolia 2020 Annual Plan, section 7, section 3; Inner Mongolia 2021 Annual Plan,
section 3; Inner Mongolia 2021 Annual Plan, section 3, subsection 3; and Inner Mongolia
2021 Annual Plan, section 4, subsection 2.
29. Inner Mongolia 2020 Annual Plan, section 3, subsection 3.
30. Inner Mongolia Development and Reform Commission, “Regarding the Confirmation of
Steps for Securing the Completion of the 14th FYP Energy Consumption Dual-Control
Tasks (Draft for Comments)” (关于确保完成“十四五”能耗双控目标任务若干保障措施（征求意见稿）), February 25, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://database.caixin.com/202103-02/101669152.html.
31. Inner Mongolia Office of Industry and Informatization, “Announcement Regarding the
Publication of a Plan for Eliminating Backward Capacity and Resolving Excess Capacity”(关于印发淘汰落后化解过剩产能计划的通知), March 26, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021,
https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20210409/1146445.shtml.
32. NBS data (indicator: crude steel production [粗钢产量]).
33. Xu , “Ten Difficult Years?”
34. Zhou Run (周润) and Bi Huazhang (毕华章), “Total Investment of over 100 Billion! The

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Biggest Coal Chemicals Project under Construction in the World Temporarily Stops
Construction! What Happened?” (总投资超千亿！全球最大在建煤化工项目临时停工！怎么回
事？), 21st Century Business Herald (21世纪经济报道), July 5, 2021, accessed September
10, 2021, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-rbRMub9pGLAwoy_RDLt5w. Regarding claims
about the size of the project, see “Shaanxi Coal Group Yulin Chemicals Co. Ltd. General
Hiring Regulations” (陕煤集团榆林化学有限责任公司招聘简章), November 23, 2020, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://www.shccig.com/detail/1404852.
35. Based on searches of CNKI, China Core Newspaper Full-Text Database, accessed
September 13, 2021.
36. Huangfu Meixian (皇甫美鲜), “Alibaba Ulanqab Data Center Receives Title of ‘Carbon
Neutral Data Center Innovator’” (阿里巴巴乌兰察布数据中心获评“碳中和数据中心创新者”称号), Inner Mongolia Daily (内蒙古日报 ), May 23, 2021, accessed September 13, 2021, http://
nm.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0523/c196667-34740336.html.
37. Wang Lianying (王连英) and Feng Xueyu (冯雪玉), “Region Adjusts Electricity Priceand Trading Policies for Some Industries: Maintaining Green Development, Releasing
New Drivers of Transition and Upgrading” (我区调整部分行业电价政策和电力交易政策：
坚持绿色发展 激发转型升级新动能), Inner Mongolia Daily (内蒙古日报), February 9, 2021,
accessed September 13, 2021, http://szb.northnews.cn/nmgrb/html/2021-02/09/
content_27445_140614.htm.
38. The major national air quality action plan introduced in 2013, for instance, applied
special standards to most of Hebei as part of the greater Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Urban
Agglomeration (“Jing-Jin-Ji”). State Council, “Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan” (大气污染防治行动计划), September 10, 2013, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/content/2013-09/13/content_4561.htm.
39. Zhao Xuan (赵煊) and Luo Guoping (罗国平), “Tangshan Faces Its Most Severe Production
Restrictions” (唐山迎最严钢铁限产), Caixin (财新), March 29, 2021, accessed September
10, 2021, http://weekly.caixin.com/2021-03-27/101681295.html, and “Tangshan City
Recognizes Its Errors, Strictly Implements Emergency Response Steps for Heavy Air
Pollution, Comprehensively Improves Air Quality” (唐山市立行立改，严格落实重污染天气应急响应措施，全面改善空气质量), Tangshan City Government WeChat channel (唐山发布), March 13, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI0MTU2NTg2OQ==&mid=2247501344&idx=1&sn=b26fddeb82a28b28ef925d46e6
d885a9&chksm=e90b2fe2de7ca6f47a6e1b608a2248f8881a62b25232226184b710badd28
7d9f0fb58124c923#rd
40. Hebei 14th FYP, chapter 12, section 42.
41. Hebei 14th FYP, chapter 12, section 42, and Zou Ji “There Is a Possibility That China Can
Achieve Nationwide Carbon Peaking in 2025” (邹骥 | 中国存在2025年实现全国碳达峰的可能性), Energy Foundation WeChat channel (能源基金会), May 31, 2021, accessed September 10,
2021, http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__ biz=MzI0MTU2NTg2OQ==&amp;mid=2247501344&amp;idx= 1&amp;sn=b26fddeb82a28b28ef925d46e6d885a9&amp;chksm=e90b2fe2de
7ca6f47a 6e1b608a2248f8881a62b25232226184b710badd287d9f0fb58124c923#rd.

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42. Wu Yiqing (武义青) and Zhang Yun (张云), “Maintain Unswervingly the Path of Ecological
Prioritization and Green, Low-Carbon, High-Quality Development” (坚定不移走生态优先绿色低碳高质量发展道路), Hebei Daily (河北日报), April 14, 2021, accessed September 13,
2021. For the terms “black swan” and “gray rhino,” see Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The
Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007), and Michele Wucker,
The Grey Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 2016). For Xi’s incorporation of these ideas, see Melanie Hart andJordan Link, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Philosophy on Risk Management,” Center
for American Progress, February 20, 2020, accessed September 13, 2021, https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/02/20/480680/chinese-president-xijinpings-philosophy-risk-management/.
43. Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE), “The 8th Central Ecological andEnvironmental Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Yunnan Province on Its Supervision
Situation” (中央第八生态环境保护督察组向云南省反馈督察情况), July 15, 2021, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210715_847197.
shtml; MEE, “The 5th Central Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team Gives
Feedback to Henan Province on Its Supervision Situation” (中央第五生态环境保护督察组向
河南省反馈督察情况), July 15, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/
zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210715_847205.shtml; MEE, “The 6th Central Ecological andEnvironmental Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Hunan Province on Its Supervision
Situation” (中央第六生态环境保护督察组向湖南省反馈督察情况), July 16, 2021, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210716_847415.
shtml; MEE, “The 7th Central Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team Gives
Feedback to Guangxi Autonomous Region on Its Supervision Situation” (中央第七生态环境保护督察组向广西壮族自治区反馈督察情况), July 16, 2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/
dcjl/202107/t20210716_847414.shtml; MEE, “The 4th Central Ecological and Environmental
Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Jiangxi Province on Its Supervision Situation” (中央第四生态环境保护督察组向江西省反馈督察情况), July 17, 2017, accessed September 10, 2021, http://
mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210717_847513.shtml; MEE, “The 2nd Central
Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Liaoning Province on
Its Supervision Situation” (中央第二生态环境保护督察组向辽宁省反馈督察情况), July 20, 2021,
http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210720_849290.shtml; MEE, “The 3rdCentral Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Anhui Provinceon Its Supervision Situation” (中央第三生态环境保护督察组向安徽省反馈督察情况), July 20,
2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210720_849286.shtml; and MEE,
“The 1st Central Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team Gives Feedback to Shanxi
Province on Its Supervision Situation” (中央第一生态环境保护督察组向山西省反馈督察情况),July 20, 2021, http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/dcjl/202107/t20210720_849214.shtml.
44. MEE, “The 1st Central Ecological.”
45. Wei Shen and Dong Jiang, “Making Authoritarian Environmentalism Accountable?
Understanding China’s New Reforms on Environmental Governance,” Journal ofEnvironment & Development 30, no. 1 (2021): 41–67.
46. For the latter, see Yuan Ruiyang (原瑞阳), Chen Xuewan (陈雪婉), Bai Yujie (白宇洁), and

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGESLuo Guoping (罗国平), “Solving the Riddle of Power Rationing” (限电解题), Caixin (财新),December 25, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, https://weekly.caixin.com/2020-1225/101643327.html?p0#page2.
47. The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. For further discussion,see Kevin Tu, “COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impacts on China’s Energy Sector: A Preliminary
Analysis,” Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, June 4, 2020,
accessed October 5, 2021, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/commentary/
covid-19-pandemic-s-impacts-china-s-energy-sector-preliminary-analysis.
48. Song Jiayin (宋佳音) and He Miao (何苗), “Data | ‘Power Restriction Wave’ Expands to 20
Provinces (Regions and Cities), Northeast’s 3 Provinces Start to Restrict Residential Use” (数据 | “限电潮”扩充至全国20省（区、市），东北三省开始限制民用电), Jiemian News (界面新闻),September 27, 2021, accessed October 4, 2021, https://www.jiemian.com/article/6643996.
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Crisis,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2021, accessed October 13, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.
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Xuewan (陈雪婉), Zhao Xuan (赵煊), Bai Yujie (白宇洁), and Luo Guoping (罗国平), “Solving
the Power Shortages” (电荒何解) Caixin 财新, October 11, 2021, accessed October 13, 2021,
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50. “Chinese Communist Party Politburo Holds Meeting, Analyzes and Researchers Present
Economic Situation and Economic Work; Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping Leads Meeting” (中共中央政治局召开会议 分析研究当前经济形势和经济工作；中共”中央总书记习近平主持会议), Xinhua (新华), July 30, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-07/30/c_1127713888.htm. See the discussion in
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Caixin, May 31, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/South-China-facesmanufacturing-curbs-amid-power-shortages; Primrose Riordan and Christian Shepherd,“China’s Economic Boom Leaves Manufacturing Hubs Short of Power,” Financial Times,
June 2, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/80b35489-a18d-4e51-8665-167a7d9e7ce1; andChen, Zhao, Bai, and Luo, “Solving the Power Shortages.”
51. “Li Keqiang Holds State Council Standing Committee Meeting” (李克强主持召开国务院常务会议), People’s Daily (人民日报), October 9, 2021, accessed October 13, 2021, http://politics.
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Plan” (完善能源消费强度和总量双控制度方案), September 11, 2021, accessed October 4, 2021,
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53. IEA, “An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China,” September 2021,

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accessed October 4, 2021, https://www.iea.org/reports/an-energy-sector-roadmap-tocarbon-neutrality-in-china.
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Security, Stability, and Safety As Well As Increases of Green Development Support
Capabilities; Han Zheng Attends ” (李克强主持召开国家能源委员会会议强调 保障能源稳定供应
和安全 增强绿色发展支撑能力 韩正出席), Xinhua (新华), October 11, 2021, accessed October 13,
2021, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1011/c1024-32250209.html.
55. Zhu Yueyi (朱玥怡), “Examining Inner Mongolia’s ‘Land of Black Gold’ Tasked with
Approving and Adding 53.64 mt of Supply Guarantees” (实探内蒙古产能核增 5364
万吨保供任务下的“乌金之地”), BJNews.com (新京报), https://www.bjnews.com.cn/
detail/163405597214822.html.
56. NBS data (indicators: raw coal production—accumulated value [原煤产量——累计值], solar
generation—accumulated value [太阳能发电量——累计值], wind generation—accumulated
value [风力发电量——累计值]).
57. NBS data (indicators: solar generation—accumulated value [太阳能发电量——累计值] andwind generation—accumulated value [风力发电量——累计值]).
58. Yuan, Chen, Bai, and Luo, “Solving the Riddle,” and Cissy Zhou and Wang Zixu, “China
Suffers Worst Power Blackouts in a Decade, on Post-coronavirus Export Boom, Coal
Supply Shortage,” South China Morning Post, December 23, 2020, accessed September 10,
2021, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3115119/china-suffers-worstpower-blackouts-decade-post-coronavirus.
59. Song and He, “Data | ‘Power Restriction Wave’ Expands.”
60. Guangdong 14th FYP, chapter 7, section 3, and Jiangsu 14th FYP, chapter 9, section 29.
61. Jiangsu 13th FYP, chapter 3, section 11, subsection 2.
62. Jiangsu 14th FYP, chapter 9, section 29, subsection 1.
63. Jiangsu 14th FYP, chapter 9, section 29, subsection 1. The specific phrase used is “building
a modern coal logistics system that is economical, high-efficiency, green, and advanced.”
A subsequent box (Box 19) lists several coal storage and transportation projects but nocoal generation capacity projects, while including offshore wind and pumped storage
capacity additions.
64. Jiangsu’s thermal generation equaled 68.9 percent of its total consumption in 2020, withthe remainder mostly from imports as well as small shares of local nuclear and wind power.
Breakouts of different types of thermal generation are not available, but the vast majorityof this power is likely to be coal. The province reported using 10.1 billion cubic feet of gas
for electric power generation in 2020—enough for around 1.5 terawatt-hours (TWh) ofpower, assuming a very generous average heat rate of 7 metric million British thermal units
per megawatt hour. Total thermal generation in the province was around 440 TWh. NBS
data (indicators: electricity generation—accumulated value[发电量——累计值]; electricity

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

consumption [电力消费量]; hydropower generation—accumulated value [水力发电量——累
计值]; solar generation—accumulated value [太阳能发电量——累计值]; wind generation—
accumulated value [风力发电量——累计值]; and nuclear generation—accumulated value [核能发电量——累计值]) and Jiangsu Energy Supervision Office (江苏能源监管办), “Reporton Jiangsu 2020 Natural Gas Consumption Situation” (2020年度江苏省天然气消费情况简报), National Energy Administration (国家能源局), January 21, 2021, http://jsb.nea.gov.cn/
news/2021-1/2021121104413.htm.
65. Guangdong 13th FYP, chapter 8, section 2.
66. Guangdong 14th FYP, chapter 7, section 3, and “Chairman Xi Jinping Holds the 9th
Meeting of the Central Economic and Financial Committee” (习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第九次会议), Xinhua (新华), March 15, 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.gov.
cn/xinwen/2021-03/15/content_5593154.htm.
67. Guangdong 14th FYP, chapter 9, section 29, subsection 1. The plan’s box on priority projects
for the energy system (Box 7) does list a pair of coal capacity additions as part of its
projects for “securing energy supply,” but these projects are reported in Guangdong’s 2021
major project lists as being set to enter operation in 2021. Guangdong 14th FYP, box 7.
68. Chen Deng (陈澄), Shen Jiaxuan (沈佳暄), and Wu Qiong (吴琼), “‘Carbon Peaking’ and‘Carbon Neutrality’ Have Arrived, Is Jiangsu Ready? Four Questions about Carbon
Emissions” (‘碳达峰’‘碳中和’未来已来，江苏准备好了吗——碳排放四问), New China
Daily (新华日报), January 12, 2021, accessed September 13, 2021, http://xh.xhby.net/pc/
layout/202101/12/node_5.html#content_877039.
69. Christine Shearer, Aiqun Yu, and Ted Nace, “Out of Step: China Is Driving the Continued
Growth of the Global Coal Fleet,” Global Energy Monitor, November 2019, accessed
September 10, 2021, https://globalenergymonitor.org/report/out-of-step-china-is-drivingthe-continued-growth-of-the-global-coal-fleet/, p. 11.
70. “Losses Still around 50%, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Actions Frequent—How to Solve
Coal Power Companies’ Tricky Situation” (亏损面缩小仍在50%左右 破产清算动作频频——煤
电企业困局如何破解 ), Economic Information Daily (经济参考报), August 22, 2019, accessed
September 10, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/power/2019-08/22/c_1210252090.htm,
and Lauri Myllyvirta, Shuwei Zhang, and Xinyi Shen, “Analysis: Will China Build Hundredsof New Coal Plants in the 2020s?,” Carbon Brief, March 24, 2020, accessed September
10, 2021, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-will-china-build-hundreds-of-new-coalplants-in-the-2020s. High coal prices in 2021 have intensified these pressures. See, forinstance, Matthew Gray, “Feeling the Burn,” TransitionZero, August 12, 2021, https://www.
transitionzero.org/insights/feeling-the-burn.
71. “Analysis and Forecast Report for the National Electricity Supply and Demand Situation in
the First Half of 2021” (2021年上半年全国电力供需形势分析预测报告), China Electricity Council
WeChat channel (中国电力企业联合会), July 23, 2021, accessed October 4, 2021, https://
mp.weixin.qq.com/s/SCjHLZvE_Xoi7ZSb1-WR4w.
72. State Council, “Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan” (大气污染防治行动计划), September

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GATEKEEPERS OF THE TRANSITION: HOW PROVINCES ARE ADAPTING TO CHINA’S NATIONAL DECARBONIZATION PLEDGES

10, 2013, accessed September 10, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2013-09/13/
content_4561.htm, and State Council, “Three-Year Action Planning for Winning the Blue
Sky War” (打赢蓝天保卫战三年行动计划), July 3, 2018, accessed September 10, 2021, http://
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-07/03/content_5303158.htm?trs=1.
73. Jiangsu Major Project Lists, 2019–2021. Lauri Myllyvirta and Yedan Li explain the significanceof these lists: “every year, each Chinese provincial government compiles a list of ‘key projects’.
Inclusion on the list opens the doors for developers to obtain permits and project financing,by conveying a government-supported status. Appearing on the list is no guarantee that the
project will go ahead, but the lists do reveal the priorities of decision makers at provincial levelgovernments and state-owned enterprises.” Lauri Myllyvirta and Yedan Li, “Analysis: China’s
COVID Stimulus Plans for Fossil Fuels Three Times Larger than Low-Carbon,” Carbon Brief,
September 23, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysischinas-covid-stimulus-plans-for-fossil-fuels-three-times-larger-than-low-carbon.
74. Christine Shearer and Lauri Myllyvirta, “China Dominates 2020 Coal Development,” Global
Energy Monitor, February 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, https://globalenergymonitor.
org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/China-Dominates-2020-Coal-Development.pdf.
75. Global Energy Monitor, Global Coal Plant Tracker (GEM GCPT), January 2021 data. (SeeAppendix, Part A, for GEM GCPT full citations.) Local authorities in the Jiangsu city ofTongzhou announced a 2 GW project with coal power giant Huadian in summer 2020, but
the project has not yet been permitted per the GCPT database. See Global Energy Monitor
Wiki, “Huaneng Tongzhou Bay Power Station,” accessed September 10, 2021, https://www.
gem.wiki/Huadian_Tongzhou_Bay_power_station.
76. Guangdong Major Project Lists, 2019–2021.
77. GEM GCPT, January 2021 data. GEM records 5.2 GW of coal capacity under construction
and a further 1.9 GW of permitted coal additions in Guangdong.
78. Yuan, Chen, Bai, and Luo, “Solving the Riddle.”
79. Lu Bin (卢彬) and Zhao Ziyuan (赵紫原), “Hunan Electricity Rationing Reveals Hidden Risks
of Power Shortages over a Large Area (Investigative Report)” (湖南限电暴露大面积缺电隐患（记者调查) ), China Energy News (中国能源报), December 21, 2020, accessed September 10,
2021, http://paper.people.com.cn/zgnyb/html/2020-12/21/content_2025128.htm.
80. Statistical yearbook data (indicator: installed thermal capacity [发电装机容量（火电）]). See
Appendix for full citation.
81. Hunan 14th FYP, chapter 4, section 16, subsection 2.
82. GEM GCPT, January 2021 data. Of the four projects to be completed, three (Yongzhou,
Pingjiang, and Huarong) were listed as under construction in the GCPT database as ofAugust 9, 2021, and the fourth (Huaihua / Shenhua Yueyang) is listed as permitted. Of
the four projects that have yet to break ground, one is listed as pre-permit, one is listed
as announced, and one has two units listed as pre-permit and two as announced. The

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province’s 2021 major project list included the Yongzhou (2 GW, slated for completion in2021), Pingjiang (2 GW, 2023), and Huarong (2 GW, 2024) projects. GEM GCPT, July 2021
data, and Hunan 2021 Major Project List.
83. See, for instance, Rocky Mountain Institute and Energy Transitions Commission, “China ZeroCarbon Electricity Growth in the 2020s,” 2021, accessed September 10, 2021, https:// rmi.
org/insight/zero-carbon-electricity-growth-in-the-2020s/, chap. 4; Yuan Jiahai (袁家海) etal., “Research on Diverse Routes to Raising Power System Flexibility in China” (中国电力系
统灵活性的多元提升路径研究1中国电力系统灵活性的多元提升路径研究), Greenpeace, November
2020 updated version, accessed July 12, 2021, https://www.greenpeace.org.cn/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/%E3%80%902020%E5%B9%B411%E6%9C%88%E6%9B%B4%E6%96%
B0%E7%89%88%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A%E4%B8%8B%E8%BD%BD%E3%80%91.pdf;
and Ben Caldecott et al., “Managing the Political Economy Frictions of Closing Coal in
China,” discussion paper with the University of Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and theEnvironment Sustainable Finance Programme, February 2017, accessed September 10, 2021,
https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/publications/Managing-thepolitical-economy-frictions-of-closing-coal-in-China-SFP-Working-Paper.pdf.
84. Since the crisis, central authorities have introduced measures to expand market-based pricesetting in the power sector and strengthen flexibility retrofit mandates for coal power. The
more immediate solution for crisis, however, has been boosting coal production. Measureson this front have been largely presented as temporary, so observers should watch carefully
to see if authorities follow through on those claims after the winter heating crunch passes.
On steps to boost coal supply, see “China’s Coal Output Edges Up in August As Mines
Reopen,” Reuters, September 14, 2021, accessed October 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/article/china-economy-output-coal/chinas-coal-output-edges-up-in-august-as-minesreopen-idUSL4N2QF0Z7. On pricing reforms and coal-power flexibility mandates, see SongJiayin (宋佳音) and Meng Lingxi (孟令稀), “Data | 8 Provinces Nationwide Adjust Power Prices,
Currently Not Touching upon Residential Power” (数据 | 全国已有8省调整电价，暂不涉及民用电), Jiemian News (界面新闻), October 1, 2021, accessed October 6, 2021, https://www.jiemian.
com/article/6662717.html; Lantau Group, “Measures to Accelerate and Deepen Power Sector
Reforms Announced in China,” October 15, 2021, accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.
lantaugroup.com/file/brief_china_power_sector_oct21.pdf; and NDRC and the National
Energy Administration, “National Coal Unit Retrofit and Upgrading Implementation Plan” (全国煤电机组改造升级的通知), October 29, 2021, accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.ndrc.
gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202111/t20211103_1302856.html?code=&state=123.
85. Inner Mongolia 14th FYP, chapter 3, section 7, subsection 3; Shanxi 14th FYP, chapter 12,
section 5, fourth paragraph (“implement Shanxi’s actions on carbon peaking and carbon
neutrality”); Hebei 14th FYP, chapter 12, section 42; and Jiangsu 14th FYP, chapter 12, section
41, subsection 3, second paragraph (“accelerate and advance low-carbon development”).
86. Hunan 14th FYP, chapter 6, section 20, subsection 2.
87. Shanxi 14th FYP, chapter 12, section 5, fourth paragraph (“implement Shanxi’s actions oncarbon peaking and carbon neutrality”).

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88. Guangdong 14th FYP, section 14, subsection 1, first paragraph (“actively confront climatechange”).
89. Jiangsu 14th FYP, chapter 12, section 41, subsection 3, second paragraph (“accelerate andadvance low-carbon development”).
90. Zou, “There Is a Possibility.”
91. Lucille Liu and Jing Li, “The Secret Origins of China’s 40-Year Plan to End Carbon
Emissions,” Bloomberg, November 23, 2020, accessed September 10, 2021, https://phys.
org/news/2020-11-secret-china-year-carbon-emissions.html.

Acknowledgments
The authors thank David Sandalow as well as two anonymous reviewers for their feedback inthe drafting of this piece. They also thank the thoughtful editing support of Christina Nelson,
Matthew Robinson, Jeffrey Culang, and Andrea Brody-Barre, as well as Anna Gossett for
designing the maps and tables.
This commentary represents the research and views of the authors. It does not necessarily
represent the views of the Center on Global Energy Policy. The commentary may be subject tofurther revision.
This work was made possible by support from the Center on Global Energy Policy. Moreinformation is available at https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/about/partners.

About the Authors
Edmund Downie is a former nonresident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global
Energy Policy and a PhD student in public affairs within the Program in Science, Technology,
and Environmental Policy at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. He
previously worked in the energy and finance practice areas at the Analysis Group in Boston
and served as a Fulbright Scholar in China (Yunnan University). He received a master ofphilosophy in international relations from Nuffield College, Oxford, as a Marshall Scholar.
Jeremy Lee Wallace is an associate professor of government at Cornell University, currently
on sabbatical leave at Georgetown University’s Mortara Center for International Studies. He is
the author of Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China(Oxford University Press, 2014) and the forthcoming Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Ideology,
Information, and Authoritarianism in China (Oxford University Press, 2022).

32 | ­­ ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | NOVEMBER 2021

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