E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 1, 2016

Toward the Spiral of Questioning:
A Manner of Thinking and Writing for Philosophers of Education
after 3.11
Nobuhiko ITANI
Mukogawa Women’s University
Abstract
This paper investigates a manner of thinking and writing toward the future for philosophers of education
to adopt after huge catastrophes such as the Great East Japan Earthquake. The earthquake and tsunamithat struck Japan on March 11th, 2011 (hereafter called 3.11), followed by the nuclear disaster inFukushima, exposed the crucial problems of homelessness and human alienation in modern society
more vividly than ever before. This paper explores the ways in which philosophers of education canthink and write toward the future in such critical situations. This investigation is inspired by Otto
Friedrich Bollnow’s philosophy of education and Martin Heidegger’s ontology of technology as theyillustrate the existence of hope and a savior in an age of homelessness and human alienation. This paper
takes into account Bollnow’s theory on trust in the world and the future, alongside Heidegger’s theory
on technology and releasement. This paper reveals that Bollnow’s and Heidegger’s works containseveral impossible-to-ignore twists in their arguments and that these twists are the key devices in thetheory of each philosopher. The twists prevent the readers from representing the trust in the being andthe state of releasement as convenient ideals of human life, leading them to walk along a spiral way ofquestioning on the essence of the world and humans. The essential ambiguity between the feeling of
security and insecurity in the world, hope and despair toward the future, and yes and no to a world
dominated by technology manifests itself from the spiral way of questioning as the depth of the essenceof the world and humans. This paper concludes that philosophers of education today are expected tokeep walking on the spiral way of questioning, wherein twists in the arguments inevitably originate, so
as to listen and respond to the depth of the essence of the world and humans that is forcibly exposed
during critical situations such as that after 3.11.
Keywords
twists in philosophical arguments, trust in the world and the future, modern technology and releasement,
need for thinking and questioning

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How is it possible for philosophers of education to think and write toward the future
after huge catastrophes such as the Great East Japan Earthquake? We are confronted withthis critical question about the possibility of thinking and writing by philosophers ofeducation after the disaster in East Japan on March 11th, 2011 (hereafter called 3.11). The
serious damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami and the aftermath of the nuclear
disaster tore us apart: whatever anyone writes about after the big catastrophe, for example,
his/her words are inevitably evaluated by who he/she is, where he/she is from, where
he/she was on 3.11, and how he/she experienced the disaster. In addition, we are facedwith the sensitive problem of clarifying which area we are referring to when we say“stricken area” and whom we are referring to when we say “we.” One of the most serious
difficulties for each researcher in the field of human science today is that thoughts andwords after 3.11 always become carelessly linked and tightly bound to his/her individual
experience of the catastrophe. Thus, we need to confront a critical question: how is it
possible for philosophers of education to think and write toward the future, whileconstantly reconsidering the range of “the stricken area” and the classification of “we,”without withdrawing into their own experiences when facing such a crucial situation?
This paper investigates a manner of thinking and writing toward the future forphilosophers of education to adopt after such huge catastrophes that upset the foundationof human activities such as education.
1. Homelessness and Human Alienation
Many houses and school buildings completely destroyed by the earthquake andtsunami, extensive city areas reduced to rubble and debris, reactor pressure vessels withlost bottoms, and reactor buildings with outer walls blown to bits—these are the tragic
symbols of the experience of the loss of grounds and boundaries that has, at times,
depressed people into silence and, at other times, prompted people to talk too much.
The 9.0-magnitude earthquake and enormous tsunami destroyed hundreds ofthousands of buildings, including countless residences, and caused land subsidence andsoil liquefaction in many places in East Japan. Lifelines to the stricken areas wereseriously damaged and cut off. What made the situation so much worse was that thereactor buildings in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant were damaged by theearthquake and tsunami and, subsequently, exploded one after another, scattering
enormous quantities of radioactive material. People in areas that were expected to
become seriously contaminated by the radioactive fallout were forced to evacuate their
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houses. Over 15,000 people were killed in the disaster and more than 2,500 have been
missing since 3.11. The total number of completely and partially destroyed buildings
reached almost 400,0001. The number of refugees today, including those who lost theirhomes to the earthquake or tsunami and who left their hometowns to avoid radioactive
contamination, is still over 180,0002.
Otto Friedrich Bollnow once remarked on the importance of houses and hometowns
for humans. We cannot live without building houses. A house must have walls and a roof.
We can take root only when we are separated from the vast outside world and protectedagainst threats such as strong winds, heavy rains, storms, wild animals, and enemies by
our houses. Hometowns, like houses, are places that protect us and have certain
boundaries that make us feel safe and calm, even though they do not have actual physicalbarriers. They are our original central places in the world, where we begin our journey
and return to rest. Bollnow repeatedly outlined the importance of houses andhometowns—in other words, the construction of grounds and boundaries in our vast
world. Here, we see that a philosopher writes thoughtfully and sincerely on a subject that
seems self-evident in our everyday lives as if he were referring to something precious3.
When you lose your own house, you do not simply lose your property but also thepromise of safety and peace in your life. You lose the boundary that separates your spacefrom that of others, your foundation, the center of the world you live in, the mostimportant memorial of the history of your family, and even the order and rhythm of youreveryday life. Bollnow insisted that we cannot live without dwelling in houses and that
homelessness (Heimatlosigkeit) in modern society is a crucial problem for all people4.
The 3.11 catastrophe deprived many people of their living places and forcibly reminded
us of the significance of dwelling: the value of safety and peace derived from having ahouse and a hometown.
However, the destruction of houses and the radioactive contamination of hometowns
were not the only reasons for the loss of grounds and boundaries that we experienced dueto the catastrophe. As several thinkers have described, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima
revealed the great uncertainty of such dichotomies that we usually take for granted:
1

Keisatsucho (2016.1.8) Heisei 23 Nen Touhoku Chihou Taiheiyou Oki Zishin no Higai Zyoukyou to Keisatsu
Sochi (The damage of 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and the police measures against it).
https://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf (viewed on January 13th 2016).
2
Fukkoucho (2015.12.25) Zenkoku Hinansya-tou no Kazu (The number of the refugees in Japan).
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/20151225_hinansha.pdf (viewed on January 13th2016).
3
cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff.
4
cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff.
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natural disasters and man-made disasters, human and natural beings, stricken areas andunstricken areas, danger and safety, and present and future. Discrepancies among
specialists’ theories and opinions regarding the disaster demonstrate that modern science
does not always offer a definitive basis for our decisions and behaviors in such criticalsituations. When we discuss the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants—one of thebiggest fruits of modern science—we must consider the politics and economics that havebeen supporting the development of modern science and the principles and thoughts thathave been operating within modern science, politics, and economics. In fact, thisbroadened range of consideration had already been adopted by the professionals of thesefields as a matter of course, but the nuclear disaster forced even non-professional people
to face the complicated relationships among these fields. This differentiates the discussion
on the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants after 3.11 from that which took placeprior to the catastrophe.
After World War II, Martin Heidegger clarified the essence of modern technology as“Ge-stell” (en-framing), which he insisted is the hidden principle of modern science,
politics, and economics. Heidegger argued that modern technology tends to capture
everything in the world from a rationalist and functionalist point of view and exploit it asa useful standing-reserve. Usually, we believe that modern technology is based onmodern science and that developments in modern technology simply depend on
developments in modern science. However, Heidegger added the insight that thetendency of modern technology to utilize everything in the world for the benefit of humanbeings has been driving the development of modern science and making use of it as thegroundwork for technological development. The principle of technological exploitationthat regards all beings as tools for the achievement of goals and attempts to maximize
rationality and functionality was realized at the highest level in atomic bombs as weaponsof mass destruction and in nuclear power plants with the myth of safety5. Heidegger’s
concept of en-framing has enabled us to see the core of the multitude of problems facing
us after 3.11 more clearly by keeping a distance from the endless discussions about themerits and demerits of nuclear power plants and without being involved in the ongoingdiscrepancies among theories regarding the nuclear disaster and its aftermath.
Human beings, like natural resources, are captured for use as tools for the pursuit ofgoals by the essential principle of modern technology. Even though it is common practice
to believe that humans are leading the development and utilization of modern technology,
we, as human resources useful for its development, are also actually exploited by modern
5cf. Heidegger 2000: 5ff.

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technology. The cruel working environment in the nuclear power plants in Fukushima,
reported numerous times after 3.11, surprised many people, even though the issue hadalready been reported by several books and articles before the disaster. One of the greatest
matters of concern for many companies today is how to hire employees who can work
for longer hours and lower pay. The explosions at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima
enlightened people to the fact that the insatiable pursuit of economic profit based on theideas of rationality and functionality tends to reduce both human beings and natural
beings to disposable materials. Here, we are confronted with a critical contradiction: thepursuit of rationality and functionality for the betterment of human life actually exploits
and alienates human beings.
Many natural and man-made disasters that have deprived many people of their homes
and hometowns have occurred throughout history. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima is
not the only case of crisis caused by highly developed technology. World Wars I and II
were two of the greatest catastrophes that killed many people and destroyed many homes,
towns, and cities, employing weapons invented through modern technology. Whenhumans invented atomic bombs and other nuclear weapons, they created weapons ofmass destruction that can annihilate humanity. Bollnow’s theory on the significance of
dwelling and Heidegger’s theory on the essence of modern technology were deeply
influenced by the respective philosophers’ experiences of surviving two world wars andwitnessing the true menace of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, we are living in an age of homelessness and human alienation wherein safety
and peace in human life are continually threatened by natural and man-made disasters.
However, Bollnow outlined a ray of hope in human activities toward the future in such
critical situations and insisted that hope is the ultimate foundation of human life. This
reminds us that Heidegger also suggested that a savior grows where there is a danger thatthe being of all beings is veiled under the prosperity of the ideas of rationality andfunctionality. What is essential for the theme of this paper is the fact that Bollnow’s theory
on hope during crises and Heidegger’s theory on salvation during times of danger bothcontain contradictions, or twists, in their arguments that violate the basic principles of
traditional logic. The following sections aim to clarify that these contradictions in thearguments are not defects but key devices of Bollnow’s and Heidegger’s thoughtprocesses.
How is it possible for philosophers of education today to think and write toward thefuture? The following sections will focus on the twists in Bollnow’s and Heidegger’s
arguments to answer this question. This paper primarily explores how philosophers canthink and write on hope and salvation in an age of homelessness and human alienation
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N. ITANIso as to investigate the manner of thinking and writing toward the future in such criticalsituations. This paper also unravels some clues for clarifying the responsibilities that
present-day philosophers of education should assume in this historical age following 3.11
to ensure the future of subsequent generations.
2. The Twists in Bollnow’s Arguments about Crises and Hope
(1) Trust in the World and the Future
The restoration of the areas stricken by the Great East Japan Earthquake, including
the rebuilding of private and public housing, is still in progress today. Humans haveconstantly and indomitably built houses since ancient times, even though they havefrequently faced the menace of natural and man-made disasters that have destroyedcountless homes and hometowns. Bollnow discerned the moods (Stimmung) of security
and hope as trust in the world and the future behind the human activities in such criticalsituations. Bollnow insisted that humans could not repeatedly build houses after
experiences of irrepressible destruction if they did not have the moods of security andhope as vital foundations of human life6. He therefore declared that learning to trust in theworld and the future is a primal task for humans and located the concepts of security andhope at the center of his philosophy7.
The concept of security (Geborgenheit) in Bollnow’s theory means a mood or feelingthat we are protected by the space(s) surrounding us. He distinguished two dimensionsof security: one is trust in specific spaces with clear border lines, such as houses andhometowns, and the other is trust in the whole space without any limits, that is, the world
itself. Bollnow thought that it is especially important for humans to acquire security inthe world. He insisted that they should not be content with security in specific spaces.
Bollnow believed that humans can safely and peacefully dwell in houses and rebuild
these houses even after monumental disasters as long as they are sustained by theirabsolute trust in the world in its entirety8.
The concept of hope (Hoffnung) in Bollnow’s theory signifies a mood or feeling that
we will be mercifully accepted by the future. He clarified the characteristics of hope bycontrasting it with a similar feeling of expectation: to expect something is to anticipate
clearly with certain grounds that something specific will happen in the future, whereas to
6

Bollnow 1963: 138f.
cf. Bollnow 1964: 18ff. & 52ff.
8
Bollnow 1955: 145ff. & Bollnow 1963: 306ff.
7

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hope is to trust in an unpredictable future and open ourselves toward it without any certain
grounds. Bollnow explained that hope is a kind of belief that we will never tumble down
into the abyss and that a way out of difficulties will somehow be provided to us9. This
type of hopeful attitude toward the future is sometimes referred to as releasement(Gelassenheit)10. He insisted that hope is a vital foundation of human life and that all
human activities, including those of expectations and plans, would be entirely impossible
without it11.
What is especially important for the main topic of this paper is the point that Bollnow
strongly related trust in the world and the future to experiences of crises (Krise), such as
setbacks and ruin in human life. He insisted that the mood of security in the form of trustin the whole world must be clearly distinguished from a naïve belief in certain safety
since the former originates from tensions between safety and danger and, as such, cannot
sublate all threats to human life12. He also declared that only those people who have faced
serious adversity can learn to resign themselves to their fate and accept theunpredictability of human life and thus acquire the mood of hope as the belief that all
human activities will somehow be rewarded 13 . Here, one of the most importantcharacteristics of Bollnow’s theory regarding trust in the world and the future can be
identified: he closely connected the moods of security and hope as the vital foundationsof human life with serious crises that sometimes ruin it ruthlessly.
Therefore, it must be pointed out that Bollnow’s theory provides its readers with twotasks incompatible with each other when it asks them to acquire the moods of security
and hope. When we attempt to acquire trust in the world and the future, we must
recognize, on the one hand, that the world and the future can easily ruin our life by wayof crises, but on the other hand, we must believe that the world and the future can also
mercifully protect and accept us. The world is felt to be simultaneously filled with both
danger and safety for those people who have acquired the mood of security. The future
involves great unpredictability alongside a promise of mercy for those people who haveacquired the mood of hope. The moods of security and hope in Bollnow’s theory arealways in tension with desertion and despair and thus contain such indelible
contradictions and conflicts. Bollnow perceived trust in the world and the future, which
includes these lasting contradictions and conflicts, in human activities for restoration after9

cf. Bollnow 1955: 107ff.
Bollnow 1972: 22f.
11
cf. Bollnow 1955: 114ff.
12
Bollnow 1955: 24, 156f., 163.
13
Bollnow 1955: 122f. & Bollnow 1971: 143f.
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crises.
Bollnow’s theory on the significance of trust in the world and the future itself contains
strange contradictions or twists in its arguments as it reflects contradictions and conflicts
within the moods of security and hope. While, for example, he insisted in a book that we
can never eliminate the dangerous nature of the world against human life, he also declaredin another book that the world loses its dangerous character when we acquire trust in thewhole space14. Although he emphatically stated in a section of the former book that wemust build houses to protect ourselves, there is also a passage in his lecture (held in Japan)
stating that the environment (Umwelt) is not primarily hostile 15 . In addition, hedistinguished hope from expectation on the grounds that only the latter features thecertainty of future incidents, but he sometimes described the essence of hope by thecertainty that one’s actions somehow have meaning or that one can somehow find their
way out of difficulty16. It seems that when the mood of hope is evaluated as the vital
foundation of all human activities, it is reduced to a kind of expectation by thefunctionalist way of thinking that is embedded in Bollnow’s theory.
We can also find such twists in the arguments in Bollnow’s theory on humanmaturation through crises. The next subsection will investigate this theory in detail.
(2) Human Maturation through Crises
The Great East Japan Earthquake is often referred to as an unprecedented catastrophe
because of not only the enormous damage inflicted by the earthquake and tsunami but
also the serious aftermath of the nuclear disaster. The great disaster in the Fukushima I
Nuclear Power Plant destroyed the myth of safety promoted by the Japanese government
and electric power companies and raised an outcry among people against nuclear power
plants. Theorists from different fields began to claim that we should view the nuclear
disaster as a kind of lesson that admonishes the arrogance of humans in terms of the
exploitation of nuclear power and instructs us to moderate the endless development ofmodern science and technology. However, some insist that nuclear power plants arenecessary in modern society, stressing on the importance of a steady supply of electricity
and economic development. In any case, it is important to recognize that many people
who had previously not taken part in the discussion on the merits and demerits of nuclear
power plants have become very interested and deeply involved, regarding it as one of the
14

Bollnow 1955: 23f. & Bollnow 1963: 310.
cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff. & Bollnow 1988: 48.
16
cf. Bollnow 1964: 61 & Bollnow 1971: 143f. & Bollnow 1972: 108.
15

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most important issues of national elections.
However, since 3.11, there is much confusion arising from discrepancies among
specialists’ theories and opinions about critical issues such as the state of the reactors andthe level of danger due to radiation. To what extent were the reactors destroyed? Howhigh are the risks of low-dose radiation? Is it true that we would not have enoughelectricity if we stopped using nuclear power plants? Which areas are seriously
contaminated with radioactive fallout and which areas are not? Have the currently
operating nuclear power plants really been proven to be safe? We have an endless list ofsuch unanswered questions even today. The knowledge of modern science lost its
foundation as the reactors lost their foundation, and the myth of the safety of nuclear
power plants, which people believed in at least to some extent before 3.11, was debunked
by the great disaster. We are now in a maelstrom of incoherent information and are being
forced to take individual responsibility of judging the safety and danger of radiation andthe merits and demerits of nuclear power plants without any firm evidence. Given that
there are discrepancies between the information provided by the Japanese government
and the serious doubts voiced against it by some specialists, we are compelled to makedecisions on issues such as whether we should evacuate from East Japan to West Japanto escape any radioactive fallout and whether we can eat farm and marine produce from
East Japan. These are decisions closely linked to the stability and safety of our lives.
Bollnow insisted that ruinous crises in human life present opportunities for people toquestion their submission to mass opinion and acquire the competence for independentjudgment. Mass media, such as newspapers and television, as well as propaganda bynational governments, tend to deprive people—who hardly notice such machinations intheir daily lives—of the chance to judge anything on their own responsibility,
encouraging more compliance to mass opinion. People can easily become embroiled inthinking collectively, even though the individual tends to look down on the masses; thissimply implies that the masses dislike the masses in reality. Bollnow declared that theexperience of crises, which makes it impossible for people to continue upholding theirnaïve common sense and can even drive them to critique trite opinions, is an opportunity
for them to become independent of the masses. It is the fatal experience of crises in humanlife that awakens people from submission to the masses, urging them to develop thecompetence of independent judgment and take responsibility for this judgment17. The
3.11 catastrophe actually forced people to individually confront and reconsider crucial
issues, such as the merits and demerits of the exploitation of nuclear power, the pros and
17

Bollnow 1971: 168ff.

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cons of modern science and technology, the relationship between human beings and allother beings, the conjunction between culture and civilization, and the ideal future forhuman society.
Some thinkers therefore regard 3.11 as a great turning point in human history whenthe modern conceptions of the world and humans were crucially altered. This notion
reminds us of Bollnow’s insight that crises present new beginnings and opportunities torestart with renewed vigor, discarding situations in which we are exhausted bymonotonous daily lives and/or we cannot continue satisfactorily to develop further.
Bollnow’s theory on new beginnings refers to the renewal of human life through crises
such as ruins, collapses, setbacks, and deadlocks. The theory also refers to the renewal oftrends in a society, pointing out its close relationship with cultural criticism18. The 3.11
disaster aroused deep suspicions of many kinds of values that had been congealed andconsidered self-evident in modern society. For example, these values include the idea thathumans can and should control nature for their own sake, the capitalist tendency toexcessively promote the expansion of economic profit, and the concept of risk
management that allows us to estimate any risk numerically. As such, we have goodreason, based on Bollnow’s theory, to think that we have now made a new beginning
post-3.11, which is a great turning point in human history.
Bollnow evaluated human transformation through crises as a shift to a higher stageof maturity (Reife: perfection) and considered helping and supporting younger
generations achieve such maturation to be an important responsibility of education19.
However, his theory on maturation through crises, which considers transformation
through crises to be a valuable shift, also contains strange contradictions or twists in thearguments, just as his theory on the moods of security and hope does. Bollnow’s theory
demands people to regard life after crises as a new beginning, wherein they must abandon
the old concept of development on one hand and evaluate their new life as a higher stageof maturity on the basis of the accustomed concept of development on the other. The
theory expects its readers to acquire the competence of independent judgment throughcrises and by criticizing old values held by the masses. At the same time, the theory
suggests that we should preserve the accustomed idea of maturity—an idea that themasses favor and preach loudly—that places a high value on concepts such as criticism
and independency.

18
19

Bollnow 1971: 92ff.
Bollnow 1959: 36ff. & Bollnow 1971: 88ff.

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11(3) Sitting between the Two Chairs
As shown above, Bollnow’s discussions on trust in the world and the future and on
the higher stage of human maturation are interwoven with the experience of crises andinvolve impossible-to-ignore contradictions or twists in their arguments. If we interpretand accept the contradictions in Bollnow’s theory simply as contradictions and do not try
to sublate them, we can conclude that the world and the future are full of critical threats
and yet trustworthy enough to rely on at the same time. We can view crises as anopportunity to be reborn with new conceptions of the world and humans on one hand andto achieve a higher stage of maturity evaluated by the preserved concept of developmenton the other. Although Bollnow did not analyze the twists in his arguments in detail, we
can find an important description of the contradiction between two aspects of humanbeings in his book that the investigation of meanings of each phenomenon must
inevitably be confronted.
The difficulty is in that the one [the existential aspect of humans] does not
let itself simply be joined into the other [the hopeful aspect of humans] and thatthe balance between these two aspects does not let itself be established throughany harmonizing synthesis. There remains an unsublatable contradiction.
Humans must bear it in their lives and struggle with it over and over again. Thismay be unsatisfactory for formal systematic thinking but it is the necessary
expression of our inevitably contradictive Dasein [being-there] that can never be
captured in any logical system.20
Bollnow explained the unique characteristic of his own thoughts as being comparable
to “sitting between the two chairs” in a dialogue with his disciples. The two chairs suggest
two different fields of philosophy: the philosophy of life and existential philosophy.
According to Bollnow’s description, existential philosophy explores some aspects of theessence of human beings but overlooks other aspects clarified by the philosophy of life.
The opposite is true for the philosophy of life. Bollnow insisted that existential philosophy
focuses on the “dark” side of human life, symbolized by the moods of anxiety and despair,whereas the philosophy of life investigates the “light” side of human life, typically
represented by the moods of security and hope. He declared that these two fields of20

Bollnow 1971: 106.

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philosophy must complement each other 21 . Hence, the unique feature of Bollnow’s
theories is the way in which he attempted to clarify the essence of human beings more
broadly and deeply by maintaining the tension between the two different fields ofphilosophy without deviating to one fixed viewpoint. Bollnow’s theory on human life
after crises is exactly the point where the philosophy of life and existential philosophy
encounter each other, and it is here that we can recognize the characteristic comparable
to “sitting between the two chairs” most distinctly.
“Sitting between the two chairs” is obviously the primal factor underlying thecontradictions or twists in the arguments in Bollnow’s theory. However, while herepeatedly insisted that the philosophy of life and existential philosophy mustcomplement each other, he never explained the influence of the twists on the entire theory
in detail. Therefore, it is quite natural to assume that Bollnow’s theory on human life aftercrises can do nothing other than resign itself to such illogical twists so as to treat the two
incoherent conceptions of the world and humans as equally as possible without prejudice.
To investigate the possibilities for thinking and writing toward the future after
catastrophes, this paper must clarify the effects of the twists in the arguments in Bollnow’s
theory. The next section will explore Heidegger’s works that also contain strange twists
in their arguments with the intent to view the role of twists in philosophical thought.
Heidegger’s philosophy after World War II provided important inspiration for Bollnow’s
theory on security and dwelling and was the origin of the concept of releasement that
Bollnow adopted as the central characteristic of the hopeful attitude. The subsequent
section will investigate Heidegger’s philosophy on the relationship between modern
technology and human beings, focusing on both its contents and form, to clarify the origin
and influence of twists in the philosopher’s arguments.
3. Twists in Arguments and the Spiral of Questioning(1) Thinking on Technology by Heidegger
The tendency of modern technology to reduce everything, including human beings,
to mere tools for the achievement of goals is infiltrating modern society. Modern
technology attempts to maximize rationality and functionality through the insatiable
exploitation of resources and the development of technology itself. The tendency topursue rationality and functionality drives not only modern science as the groundwork
21

Göbbeler & Lessing 1983: 22, 28, 31, 43f.

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for technological development but also almost all human activities, including politicalstruggle and economic competition. Such extreme rationalism and functionalism has led
to a strange conundrum in contemporary times: it is difficult for us to decide whether or
not to abandon the profits from nuclear power even though we know that many people
have been forced to abandon their houses and hometowns because of nuclear disasters
and the serious threat of radioactive contamination is still spreading over the seas. The
endless controversies regarding the suppressed information of nuclear disasters and thepros and cons of restarting nuclear power plants reveal the fact that our society and weare deeply controlled by the essence of modern technology that Heidegger once referred
to as en-framing and that it is seriously difficult for us to change this rationalist andfunctionalist tendency. We are now living in a post-3.11 world wherein critical problems
stemming from the tendency of en-framing that pervasively reigns over our everyday
lives broadly and deeply are coming to light ever more clearly.
As the strong tendency to understand all beings as tools for goals permeates oversociety, everything in the world comes to be evaluated with a single criterion: “What is it
useful for?” Heidegger admonished the danger of this essential tendency of modern
technology by suggesting that it veils the possibility for beings to emerge as something
beyond rationalist and functionalist conceptions22. He did not directly criticize individual
products of modern technology, such as nuclear and other kinds of power plants, motor
vehicles, long railroads, large airplanes, and super computers. What he did do was castsuspicion over the essential tendency of modern technology itself that drives
technological innovation. Modern technology has been trying to maximize the rationality
and functionality and thereby drive us further into the endless development of technology
itself and exploitation of the world. Even if we abandoned all the nuclear power plants
around the world, the danger of the continuous exploitation of all beings in the world,
including humans, as standing-reserves would still remain, unless we commit toinvestigating and criticizing the essential tendency of en-framing in detail. Heidegger
insisted that we must liberate ourselves from en-framing and become independent oftechnology to be open to the possibility for beings to emerge as something beyond
rationalist and functionalist conceptions23.
Heidegger coined the term Gelassenheit (releasement) to denote this free relationshipwith technology. While the German term Gelassenheit usually refers to composure orcalmness, Heidegger suggested a different implication of this concept: “yes and no at the
22
23

Heidegger 2000: 24ff.
Heidegger 2000: 7.

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same time” to a world dominated by technology. We have no choice but to accept theinevitable use of the products of modern technology—saying “yes” to it—as we live andexist in a modern technological society. However, we must deny the tendency of modern
technology to evaluate all beings with the criterion of “What is it useful for?” and thus
effectively say “no” to it24. Indeed, it sounds like an arbitrary idea at first glance if wemiss the contradiction in the concept of releasement as “yes and no at the same time” toa world dominated by modern technology that may be too obvious to focus upon. The
concept of releasement as the free relationship with technology assigns us the task ofresigning ourselves to the absolutely inconsistent without insisting on a certain fixed
representation25. Here, we must recognize the fact that Heidegger plainly marked out the
self-contradiction in the concept of releasement as liberation from the control of modern
technology.
Heidegger’s theory on releasement also contains contradictions or twists in thearguments as it deals with self-contradiction in the concept of releasement and attempts
to maintain it. In his dialogical essay entitled “Toward the Conversation on the
Releasement,” for example, much illogical discourse can be found, such as obvious selfcontradictions, explanations with tautology, gaps between questions and answers,
exaggerated praise for naïve remarks, dodging and glossing, and arguments that go roundin circles. The dialogue written by Heidegger is full of irrationality. It seems that he wastrying to destruct the ideas of logicality and objectivity as important bases of traditional
philosophy26. He presented the irrational characteristics of the concept of releasement
while retaining the contradiction between “yes” and “no,” without reducing the concept
to a convenient ideal. The essay therefore prevents its readers from glorifying the conceptof releasement as a naïve objective of human life and education. A specialist in modern
science in the dialogue (Researcher), who is at the nearest standing point to the readers,becomes confused by such an illogical conversation with the Teacher and Scholar andsays candidly,
Researcher: Then what are we to wait for? Where are we to wait? I hardly know
anymore where and who I am.27
The Teacher responds significantly,
24

Heidegger 1959: 22f.
Heidegger 1959:22.
26
Heidegger 1959: 27ff. & cf. Itani 2013: 436ff.
27
Heidegger 1959: 35.
25

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Teacher: We all do not know it anymore once we give up trying to trick ourselves
into believing in something. 28
Here, it is implied that the twists in the arguments on releasement as the freerelationship with technology lead the readers to ask radical questions about releasement(What are we to wait for?) and the essence of the world and humans (Where and who arewe?). Actually, the question of releasement as “yes and no at the same time” to a world
dominated by modern technology naturally involves reconsideration about the present
state of the world and human beings: the world as the object of insatiable exploitation bytechnology and human beings as the subjects working for the development of technology.
The readers are expected to walk along a way of questioning on the essence of the worldand humans that lies between the rationalist and functionalist conception of the world andhumans and the conception of the world and humans out of rationalism and functionalism.
The way of questioning is the way of thinking for Heidegger. His dialogical essay, with
its illogical twists, brings the readers to walk along the way of thinking, keeping a distancefrom the simple dichotomy of object and subject, wherein the attraction to and repulsion
from the essential tendency of modern technology maintain the tension. The way of
thinking is the way of releasement in this sense. A specialist in the history of philosophy
in the dialogue (Scholar) comes to realize the hidden relationship between releasement
and the dialogue itself:
Scholar: But it means that it [the conversation] brings us to the path which seems
to be nothing but releasement itself…29
Heidegger’s theory on the free relationship with technology never explains
releasement as a certain ideal that we must and can represent clearly. His theory leads thereaders to the question about the essence of the world and humans and encourages themto walk along the way of releasement by themselves. Heidegger had no choice but toapply such an unusual strategy because if releasement were glorified as a convenient ideal
for human life and education, it would be understood in the light of rationalism andfunctionalism30. The essential self-contradiction contained in “yes and no at the same time”
would be eliminated and the free relationship with technology would, same as natural
28

Heidegger 1959: 35.
Heidegger 1959: 44.
30
cf. Itani 2013: 305ff.
29

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and human resources, be evaluated with the standard of “What is it useful for?” Theconcept of releasement as “yes and no at the same time” to a world dominated by modern
technology is not a specific answer that provides the readers with a clear direction ofliving. Releasement must be realized as a long-distance way of questioning on theessence of the world and humans. The twists in the arguments on free relationship withtechnology are key devices of Heidegger’s theory. They lead the readers to the way of
thinking wherein the free relationship with technology is able to maintain its selfcontradiction in “yes and no at the same time” without being admired as a convenient
ideal or represented as a naïve objective of human life and education.
The way of thinking does not lead from somewhere to somewhere else likea roadway hardened by cars nor does it exist somewhere in itself at all. First andonly the walking, here the thinking questioning, is the opening of the way (Bewegung: movement).31(2) Need for Questioning and the Spiral of Questioning
The 3.11 catastrophe compelled us to reconsider the relationship among the threat ofnatural disaster such as earthquakes and tsunamis, development of modern technology
symbolized by nuclear power plants, and human life. It seems, however, that even thoughmany problems caused by the catastrophe are still unresolved, we are becoming even lessaware of the present critical situation and losing the motivation to deliberate therelationship described above. When we are confronted with serious problems that castcritical suspicions on our conceptions of the world and humans, we often resign ourselves
to easy solutions and persist in them to escape the critical question of the essence of theworld and humans raised through the problems. Because of this attempt at escape fromthe essential question, the problem of the relationship among nature, technology, andhumans can be easily treated as a matter of cost performance and risk management in thelight of rationalism and functionalism. Indeed, some thoughtless propositions that only
search for easy solutions without confronting urgent problems may provide temporary
respite as they never deal with the essential contradictions in the world and human life.
However, these solutions must be consumed merely for transient tranquility or
enthusiasm as they are fated to stay in the previous rationalist and functionalist conceptionof the world and humans since they can never reach the essential questions at the core of
31

Heidegger 2002: 174.

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serious problems.
Heidegger explained that thinkers are driven to questioning not out of ethical andmoral value but out of a kind of need (Not: necessity and difficulty) to face the criticalquestion about the essence of the world and humans32. The need for questioning canoriginate from different situations such as natural and man-made disasters, likeearthquakes and wars; encounters with great works of art; and individual experiences ofadversity, like diseases, injuries, setbacks, and separations. However, Heidegger declaredthat these are not the origins of the most urgent need for questioning in modern society.
He suggested that the primal need for questioning today comes from a more serious
situation. People in modern society are leading peaceful lives and turning away from theneed for questioning, although it is now a substantial task to reconsider the essence of theworld and humans because the possibility for beings to emerge as something beyond
rationalist and functionalist conceptions has been veiled by the essential tendency ofmodern technology. He identified the oblivion of the essential question as the lack ofneed 33 . When Heidegger cited, “A savior also grows where danger is,” a line from
Hölderlin, during his lecture on modern technology and releasement34, he implied thatthe question about the essence of the world and humans today originates from the lack ofneed as the most critical need in modern society.
It is to be revealed on the way of questioning that the self-contradiction of releasement
reflects the ambiguity of the essence of the world and humans: the world and humans are
simultaneously of and beyond rationality and functionality. We cannot represent the
ambiguity as a material object because it is a manifestation of the unfathomable depth ofthe essence of the world and humans that invites us beyond the objects in front of us.
Heidegger’s philosophy demands the readers to sense the depth of the essence of theworld and humans on the way of thinking without capturing it as a simple object. All
beings can be easily evaluated with the criterion of “What is it useful for?” once they are
reduced to simple material objects in a modern society dominated by the essential
tendency of modern technology. This is why the ambiguity of the essence of the worldand humans should neither be seen as a simple object that we can capture as theconclusive answer to essential questions nor praised as a naïve objective of human lifeand education. Instead, it must be sensed as the depth of the essence of the world andhumans on the way of questioning.
Heidegger sometimes compared the way of thinking to a circulation or a spiral.
32

cf. Heidegger 1989: 45.
Heidegger 1989: 10f.
34
Heidegger 2000: 29.
33

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So we must perform the circulation. This is not any makeshift or deficiency.
To step into the [circulative] way is the strength of thinking and to stay in the[circulative] way is the feast of thinking […]35
It seems that thinking is continuously taken around the same or just trifled withlike in a magical circle and it cannot come closer to the same. The circle is,however, perhaps a hidden spiral.36
The depth of the essence of the world and humans manifests itself as the center of the
spiral just as long as the spiral of questioning continues to rotate. It is impossible forthinkers to capture this depth as a fixed object like a certain answer because the center ofthe spiral gradually disappears once they stop walking along the spiral way of questioning.
They can indistinctly sense the depth of the essence of the world and humans only in the
spiral of questioning as long as the question is being asked continuously. The spiralbecomes larger and deeper and develops greater centripetal force to involve people asthinkers continue to walk along the spiral way of thinking. Now, it is revealed that thestrange twists in the arguments on the free relationship with technology are derived fromthe spiral of questioning on the essence of the world and humans that manifests andmaintains the depth of the essence and tends to involve the readers into the way of
thinking.
(3) Philosophy of Hope and the Spiral of Questioning
We have now acquired the point of view that makes it possible to restore significanceto the illogical twists in the arguments on the moods of security and hope propounded by
Bollnow. The twists are derived from the spiral of questioning that involves the readers
into the way of thinking and creates an opportunity for the depth of the essence of theworld and humans to manifest itself.
The concept of releasement introduced by Heidegger was adopted by Bollnow
through the intermediation of Theodor Ballauff. We can find contradictions and conflicts
in the concept of releasement in Bollnow’s philosophy of time and space as well as in
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology as mentioned above. Releasement in Bollnow’s
35
36

Heidegger 1977: 3.
Heidegger 1976: 410.

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theory as the hopeful attitude toward the future means to believe that a way out ofdifficulties will be somehow provided while simultaneously knowing that the future is
full of uncertainty and unpredictability. The mood of security as the trust in the world
means, likewise, to believe that the whole space protects us safely while seeing clearly
that the world is full of threats and danger. Reflecting the contradiction and conflict in the
moods of security and hope, Bollnow’s theory on trust in the world and the future itself
contains impossible-to-ignore contradictions or twists in the arguments, as shown in theprevious section.
Bollnow recognized that it is not an easy task to chase the moods of security and hopeas fixed goals because they contain essential self-contradiction and conflict. His theory
demands the readers to abandon not only the natural tendency to imagine a beautiful
future naïvely but also the will to leave themselves to trust in the unpredictable gifts ofthe future37. Here, it is suggested that we must give up the will to learn to hope in orderto learn to hope in actuality. In addition, concerning the mood of security, Bollnow
declared that we are able to dwell in the world comfortably only when we are dwellingin our houses as essential foundations. He insisted, at the same time, that we can dwell in
our houses comfortably as long as we are dwelling in the whole space. Moreover, he
added that we must overcome the “deceptive” security provided by our houses in orderto acquire the mood of security in the whole space38. Thus, it is implied that the way
toward acquiring trust in the whole world is not a simple one-way street. Bollnow evensuggested that whether we can acquire the moods of security and hope as the trust in theworld and the future, sometimes referred to as the trust in the being itself, depends oncontingent grace39.
The moods of hope and security contain unsublatable self-contradictions andconflicts that make it impossible to admire the moods as certain ideals of human life andeducation. Bollnow’s theory on trust in the world and the future ventures to accept thefact that each phenomenon refuses to be completely captured in solid logic and a fixedsystem. The price for this venture is that the theory contains impossible-to-ignore
contradictions or twists in the arguments that prohibit its readers from representing theworld and the future as mere objects. Is the world full of threats against us or is it apeaceful and safe place for human life? Is the future filled with the danger of ruin or thepromise of relief for human beings? Are crises the chance for new beginnings or theopportunities of predicted maturity? The readers of Bollnow’s theory are required to keep
37

Bollnow 1955: 124.
Bollnow 1963: 148, 304, 307.
39
Bollnow 1955: 126f. & 168.
38

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asking these questions. The ambiguity between security and insecurity in the world, hopeand despair toward the future, and rebirth and maturity through crises manifests itself as
the depth of the essence of the world and humans as long as the readers are walking alongand deepening the spiral way of questioning in a thoughtful and continuous manner. The
central characteristic of the new security and true hope in Bollnow’s theory is nothingother than the ambiguity that is to be kept open through thinking that never advertises
itself as facile optimism or easy pessimism.
Here, the style of “sitting between the two chairs” in Bollnow’s theory regains its
original dynamism as the illogical twists in the arguments on the moods of security andhope are identified as the key devices in the theory.
4. Conclusion toward the Inconclusive Future
In what manner is it possible for philosophers of education today to think and write
toward the future? This paper concludes that it is in the manner of thinking and writingin which contradictions or twists in the arguments involve the readers in the spiral ofquestioning on the essence of the world and humans that is driven by the need originatingin critical situations such as that after the catastrophe of 3.11. Each philosopher must, ofcourse, avoid arbitrarily twisting arguments. Twists in the arguments inevitably arise on
the way of sincere questioning on the essence of the world and humans that is driven by
the need for questioning originating in critical situations, especially by the lack of needas the most crucial need today40. Twists in the arguments by each thinker who is driven
by this need invite the readers to the way of thinking about the essence of the world andhumans and give them the opportunity to maintain the depth of the essence without
capturing it in the light of rationalism and functionalism. What is important is not theanswer that is usually obtained through and so distinguished from questioning but thequestioning itself. Questioning the essence of the world and humans is itself the humanactivity that maintains the depth of the essence of the world and humans beyond naïve
objectivity and logicality. To undertake the question is exactly to respond to the call fromthe depth of the essence of the world and humans and this is what we call responsibility.
Continuing to question the essence of the world and humans includes continuing to
40

Heidegger admonished people’s problematic tendency to reduce questioning easily to a tool for a goal and spread
it as a useful model solution for present problems.
Let’s pay attention to another thing, however, concerning the overhasty masses. It happens easily
that people spread the catchphrase as soon as just tomorrow: everything depends on the questionability.
People with this slogan appear to belong under those who question. (Heidegger 2002: 189)
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reconsider the problems described at the beginning of this paper: the definition of what
we define as a “stricken area” and whom we are referring to as “we.” What philosophersof education today can and should do for future generations is not simply produce
convenient ideas and concepts but fully maintain the depth of the essence of the worldand humans as the depth that definitely refuses to be captured with easy ideas andconcepts. The way of sincere questioning about human life and education that enables us
to survive an age of homelessness and human alienation after major catastrophes without
absolute reliable grounds and boundaries is opened up as long as the depth of the essenceof the world and humans is retained.

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