October 28th, 2011(Fri)Ohmae Kenichi (BBT University President)
Press Release

What should we learn from the severe accident
at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant?
Regarding the Project● Background： Upon uploading the “Business Breakthrough (BBT)” TV program broadcasts for
BBT members regarding the severe accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Power Plant throughYouTube on March 12th and 19th, we have received over 2.5 million views. I continued to broadcast
information through my publications such as, “Japan: The Road To Recovery” published by Bungei
Shunju Co. I was concerned that the government had been conveying the facts regarding the accident.
So I made the following proposal to Accident Prevention Oversight Minister Goshi Hosono, who
was an aide to the Prime Minister at the time;
１． As a ‘second opinion from a neutral position’ on the stress tests and the NISA’s operations, I
would like to start a project and summarize the proposals on the accident analysis andrecurrence prevention within three months.
２． This project would be implemented from a taxpayer/citizen’s standpoint on a volunteer basis,and the only request is for access to the information necessary for the investigation.
３． Since the data will be analyzed from an objective viewpoint, the research result may not bealways what the government or electric power providers expect.
４． The project’s existence should be handled in a confidential manner until the report is finalized.
● Project team： Dr. Kenichi Ohmae, held PhD in Nuclear Engineering at MIT and has anexperience on design of high-breeder nuclear reactors at Hitachi Co. Ltd., is the Deputy Executive of
this project. Mr. Iwao Shibata, who has an experience on project management, and another person
served as secretariat.

Two members from Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc. as experts in nuclear reactor operations, two fromHitachi GE Nuclear Energy Co Ltd and four from Toshiba Corporation as experts in nuclear reactor
design, cooperated for the interviews, hearings, and information gathering.
● Research Method： The Fukushima Dai-ichi, Fukushima Dai-ni, Onagawa, and Tokai Dai-ni
Nuclear Power Plants were investigated with a focus on BWR-type.
１． What happened?:

Regarding all plants, the details concerning what happened and how it

happened since the earthquake were pursued to develop a timeline (chronology).
２． What were the causes and inducements?:- 1/4 -Comparisons and variation analyses wereconducted between the four reactors that suffered severe accidents: Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1,2, 3 and 4, and those which could reach cold shutdown: Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 5 and 6,
Fukushima Dai-ni, Onagawa, and Tokai Dai-ni.
３． What are the lessons learned?: Analysis of the cause and effect relationship was conducted
between the design philosophy, design guideline, and development of the accident (chronology).
４． Organization/Risk management:

Problems in the organizational management for severe

accidents were examined (accident, radiation, evacuation instructions, relations with local
municipalities, etc).
５． Information disclosure: Information disclosure to public, and its issue are examined.
Conclusion●Lesson： The biggest lesson is not that the “predictions on tsunami were too low”,
but that there was no “design philosophy and guideline” that indicates “no matter
what happens, a severe accident will not be allowed to occur from the reactor” In that sense, the severe accidents at the four reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi were not naturaldisasters, but man-made disasters.

１． There was an error in the design philosophy: The containment vessel myth, probability theory.
２． Design guideline was wrong: No consideration of long-term loss of all AC power, and no
distinction between normal and emergency use equipments.
３． The generation and scattering of large quantities of hydrogen and fission products caused bycore meltdown were beyond the scope of the design assumptions: No devices for hydrogendetection or safety measures to prevent hydrogen explosions.
４． There are multiple cases of ‘coincidences’ that prevented major accidents that were not in theoriginal designs: Unit 6’s air cooling generator, etc.
●Proposal： For recurrence prevention, and for logical discussions on pros/cons of
re-operations of the power plant.

１． Clarification of the responsibility of regulatory authorities: Regardless of this man-madedisaster, no one has taken their responsibility for the accident.
２． No matter how high the prediction is set, there is always a possibility of an event that exceeds it.
The design concept should be revised to secure power and coolant (the ultimate heat sink) under
any circumstances. Those nuclear reactors that can not fulfill these conditions should not be
brought back into operation.
３． ‘Multiplexing with differing principles’ instead of ‘multiplexing with the same mechanism’ isneeded.
４． Three independent systems of “normal, emergency, and extreme emergency use” must be
established in the system design and operation.
５． A structure must be constructed to share information in real time with local officials, and- 2/4 -perform mutual decision making when accident mode (Accident Management) occurs.
６． Upon the management of extreme accidents, not only those on-site and power companies, butalso central/local governments must take part in such as utilizing shared off-site devices andfacilities, or the support from self-defense force.
７． Share this report with the world, as most nuclear reactors have the same design philosophy.
Important Findings●Power loss： External AC power sources were greatly damaged by the earthquake (securing
on-site power is a key) and was followed by long-term loss of all power sources (both DC andAC) which proved fatal.

・

Emergency diesel generators were submerged.

・Emergency cooling pumps and motors placed on the sea side were damaged.

・

Direct current power sources (batteries) were submerged.

・Electrical boards for external power intake were submerged.

・These damages were all caused by a huge tsunami that exceeded all predictions. However, thereason of such a major accident was not because the predictions on tsunami were too low.
－Even with a smaller tsunami, the emergency cooling water intake on the coast
would have been destroyed.

－The air-cooling emergency generator that was not submerged spelled
the difference between the life and death of the reactors.

●Design philosophy： As long as the design philosophy is to secure power and cooling sources(and methods) in any event, ‘cooling down’ of a shutdown reactor could be operated, and severe
accidents would be prevented.

・It must be said that the design philosophy represented by the Nuclear Safety Commission’sguideline, ‘long-term loss of all AC power sources needs not to be considered’, disregarded thisextremely important point. This is the direct cause of the major accident in Fukushima Dai-ichi.

●Was the message given to the public at the time of the accident appropriate?

・The government must have known that at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 meltdown had occurredon March 11th. But even after over a month had passed, their announcement was still ‘ameltdown has not occurred’. The divergence between the facts and the contents of theirannouncement is large.

・The question still remains whether the information disclosure to the public and internationalsociety at-large was appropriate or not.

●Regarding the speculation and rumors at the time： As far as our project investigated,- 3/4 -there was no evidence that confirms the followings;
１． Event progression at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 was significantly accelerated because sea water
injection and ventilation was delayed.
２． The event progression of Unit 1 was significantly accelerated because a large-scale pipe rupture
occurred due to the earthquake.
３． The event progression of Unit 1 was significantly accelerated because the type of primarycontainment vessel was Mark I.
４． Event progression was accelerated because extreme operational mistakes occurred at theFukushima Dai-ichi Plant.
５． The hydrogen explosion at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 4 occurred mainly because of spent fuelmeltdown within the plant.
The main cause lies with the fact that the safety concept and design philosophy, “under any
circumstances, power and cooling sources must be provided to the plant” were not sufficientlyimplemented. We should focus on this point for future prevention.
●Facts that should be recognized justly and fairly：

・Even in the major earthquake, all nuclear reactors successfully performed emergency shutdown(scram), and no large scale pipeline rupture had occurred.

・The on-site operation team at Fukushima Dai-ichi performed above and beyond just following
the manual on and after March 11th, under the worst conditions and in an extremely dangerous
environment.

Release of reports and contents
１． This report (full document) is viewable on the website at: http://pr.bbt757.com/2011/1028.html
２． This press conference and the detailed explanation (120 minutes) are available at the website
below:● http://pr.bbt757.com/2011/1028.html● UStream live broadcast (from 18:00 today) Business Breakthrough 757ch Annex
http://www.ustream.tv/channel/business-breakthrough-757-annex
３． Ongoing research results such as for the PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) etc will be released.
４． Individual media interviews are not available.
５． For any questions regarding the facts, please contact: secretary@work.ohmae.co.jp
End of the release.

- 4/4 -