Digging in the Dirt:
Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s
Diamond Industry

The International Human Rights Clinic @ Harvard Law School© 2009 International Human Rights Clinic
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 1-56432-469-9
Cover design by Michael Jones
1563 Massachusetts Avenue, Pound Hall 401
Cambridge, MA 02130 • United States of America+1-617-495-9362 • hrp@law.harvard.edu
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp

“Digging in the Dirt”
Child Miners in
Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

A Report By

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY		IV

RECOMMENDATIONS		

IX

I.

1

INTRODUCTION: MINING FOR SURVIVAL			II.

The Protection of Children Under Domestic andInternational Law					
3A.
Minimum Age Requirements for Hazardous WorkB.
The Relationship Between the Rights to Health and
Education and the Practice of Child Mining
C.
Protecting Children’s Rights in Post-Conflict		
Sierra LeoneIII.

An Overview of Artisanal Diamond MiningA.
The Artisanal Diamond Mining Hierarchy: Mining for
the Benefit of Few
B.
Regulatory Agencies: Failed Oversight, Accountability,		and Enforcement
C.
Failures to Adequately Capture Diamond Revenues

11

IV.

19

The Practice of Child MiningA.
The Prevalence of Child MiningB.
Age of Child MinersC.
The Length of Time Children Spend as Miners
D.
Working Conditions for Child Miners
E.
Poor Compensation for Child Labourers
F.
The Impact of Mining on Children’s HealthG.
How Elder Sibling Responsibilities Drive Children
into Mining
H.
The Exploitation of Girls in Mining AreasI.
The Emotional Consequences of Mining onChildrenV.

THE IMPACTS OF THE WAR ON Child MiningA.
The Loss of an EducationB.
The Forced Labour and Recruitment of Children
by the Fighting Forces
C.
Loss of Family Members and the Corresponding
Economic Burdens for Children
D.
Associating DDR’s Shortcomings with Mining

VI.
CHILD MINING AND GAPS IN THE PROVISION OF 			EDUCATION		A.
Missing School to Mine
B.
Ensuring Affordable Education
C.
Ensuring That Education is Accessible and Adequately 		
DeliveredVII.

addressing Regulatory Shortcomings
A.
Removing Barriers to Legitimate Local Ownership
B.
Injecting Information and Agency into the“Supporter Structure”
C.
Designing and Implementing Development Initiatives:
Two Case Studies
D.
Considering a Child-Labour-Free Certification Scheme
Akin to the Kimberley Process

33

41

51

CONCLUSIONS					

61ANNEXURES								ANNEX A
Community Voices – Expressing Local
			
Development Needs
ANNEX BAn Overview of the Kimberley Process

62

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS						

76IV 		

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Seven years after the end of a civil war that targeted children foratrocities, hundreds of children and youth are exploited daily as they labourin open-pit diamond mines. This report describes how the Government of
Sierra Leone’s failure to address the widespread use of child miners violates
its obligations under domestic and international law to protect and promote
the rights of children, in particular the rights to health, education and welfare.
Specifically, these legal frameworks prohibit children under 18 years of age
from performing hazardous mining work that interferes with their educationor that is harmful to their health. By failing to redress the ongoing use of childlabour in mining activities, the Government of Sierra Leone is permitting
violations to continue and allowing the development of deep socio-economic
grievances that threaten future social stability. The Government of Sierra Leone
must undertake immediate measures to address the widespread use of children
for mining-related activities in the country’s diamond mines.
The implications of the Government of Sierra Leone’s failure to ensure
the rights of the country’s children are two-fold: First, the practice of childmining is driven by the Government’s failure to enforce laws prohibiting
child labour and to provide truly affordable and accessible primary education.
Second, once working in the mines, children are deprived of an education andcompromised in terms of their overall health and welfare. Sierra Leone has
approved both domestic legislation and ratified treaties to guarantee children
accessible primary and junior secondary education as well as the provision ofadequate health care services. These legal protections oblige the Government of
Sierra Leone to implement measures necessary to end the systemic exploitationof children by the country’s diamond industry.
Based on the experiences of child miners interviewed in over twodozen artisanal diamond mining sites, the International Human Rights Clinic(IHRC) at Harvard Law School has prepared this report, which describes how
the rights of child labourers are grossly violated while working in such mines.
Drawing from over 200 interviews with diamond diggers, mining actors,
local chiefs, mine union representatives, community leaders and members ofmining communities, this report seeks to inform immediate responses thatare necessary to help eliminate this deeply exploitative practice and the rights
concerns surrounding the health, education and welfare of children.
Labouring Under Hazardous and Unhealthy Conditions
Beginning as early as ten years of age, child miners perform backbreaking labour under poor conditions where they receive little compensation

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		V

for their efforts. The mean time spent mining by the children interviewed forthis report was approximately two years, which confirms findings from earlier
studies chronicling the practice. Child miners interviewed for this report
appeared overwhelmed by the work they undertook from morning to evening– shovelling and washing gravel for six days of the week. They complainedof body and headaches, worms, malaria and other disease; adult diggers
described the dangers posed to child miners from collapsing mining pits. These
conditions constitute hazardous work and violate prohibitions on child labour.
The dire health impacts that child miners uniformly complained of violate theirright to health as protected under domestic and international law.
Performing Hard Labour for Little Pay Fosters a Low Sense of Self-Worth
Daily wages for child miners range from Le 500 to Le 2,000(approximately US$0.15-US$0.60); while those digging on contract (i.e. who do
not receive any percentage of their diamond finds) reported being paid Le 7,000(approximately US$2.10) per day. In an industry marked by exploitation, childminers reported being denied their share of diamond proceeds as comparedto those given to adults. Performing physically exhausting labour for virtuallyno pay, IHRC interviewers observed that child miners displayed a low sense of
self-worth and little hope for the future. The situation facing child miners puts
the Government of Sierra Leone in direct violation of its obligations under theConvention on the Rights of the Child to ensure an environment that fosters
self-respect and dignity of the child.
Depriving Child Miners of the Right to an Education
Affordable and accessible education is an important factor in alleviating
the financial pressures placed on Sierra Leonean families in caring for theirchildren. Many children interviewed for this report explained how as elder
siblings, they found themselves mining, in part, to cover the education costs
for younger siblings. Although government-run primary schooling is legally
mandated as “free,” parents explained that costs associated with school
attendance, such as payments for books, uniforms and report cards, preclude
their children from completing their primary and junior secondary education.
The failure of the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure the universal provisionof education violates children’s right to education as guaranteed under domestic
and international law.
The lack of affordable and accessible basic education, coupled withthe abject poverty faced by families in mining communities, leads parents to
put children to work to supplement low household incomes. Once mining,

VI 		

Executive Summary

child miners run the risk of being permanently deprived of their rights to an
adequate education and to earn a reasonable livelihood. Though most childminers cannot afford to go to school, the children interviewed for this report
overwhelmingly expressed a strong desire to learn. Likewise, parents of childminers interviewed for this report uniformly expressed the desire to return
their children to school. Ensuring that schooling is affordable and accessible
can help enable families to prioritize education for their children over working
in the diamond mines.
Ensuring a Reasonable Livelihood and Standard of Living for Mining
Families
Resulting from weak regulatory oversight of artisanal diamond mining,the meagre distribution of benefits to families and communities in diamondmining areas exacerbates the practice of child mining. Thus, eradicating thepractice of child mining also requires broad regulatory changes to ameliorate
structural and systemic problems associated with the exploitative practices
that characterize artisanal mining. The informal nature of alluvial diamondmining presents particular regulatory challenges, however; artisanal diggers
are usually unregistered, have no formal employment contracts, and often
work on an itinerant or seasonal basis. Asymmetrical bargaining power andweak regulatory oversight also enable a small number of dealers and exporters
to ultimately profit from mining revenues, little of which is enjoyed byartisanal diggers or mining communities. Along the chain of diamond actors,
supporters – who serve as financial backers of mining sites – exert considerable
control over mining licence holders, which lowers earnings for licence holders
and subsequently squeezes the earning potential for diamond diggers. To
overcome these power imbalances, the regulatory regime must be reworked
so that the large base of actors at the bottom of the mining pyramid are betterdrawn into the formal diamond economy and protected from exploitation. The
Government of Sierra Leone’s failure to develop appropriate policy frameworks
and laws that ensure just and favourable conditions of work, including adecent standard of living for artisanal diamond diggers and their families,
stand in violation of rights guaranteed under international law, including theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Ensuring that mining communities better benefit from artisanal
diamond mining is essential to improving the quality of life of families whocurrently do not see alternatives to putting their children to work in diamondmining. Encouraging legitimate local ownership of artisanal mines can provide
the impetus to reinvest diamond profits in mining communities. Reform of
Sierra Leone’s regulatory agencies at both the national and local levels is thus

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		VIIneeded to ensure that those with access to and control over diamond wealth areappropriately reinvesting that wealth in their communities.
Ensuring a Role for Industry in the Fight Against Child Labour
Industry actors must also support efforts to eliminate child mining. A
key component to the role of industry is ensuring the equitable redistributionof diamond proceeds to diggers, their families and mining communities. Someadvocates have highlighted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which
regulates “conflict” diamonds, as a potential model through which to compel
state and industry actors to directly participate in addressing human rights
violations in relation to the diamond industry. The feasibility of whether acertification scheme for child-labour-free diamonds can help to achieve rights
protections must be deeply considered. In particular, implementation at the
local level and the effective development of external evaluative methods are
crucial components to a successful certification initiative.
Failing to Address the Needs of War-Affected Children
The best interests of the child must be a primary consideration while
undertaking post-war reconstruction efforts. IHRC researchers discovered how
certain factors attributable to the war – such as disruption to schooling, lossof parents and exposure to mining as a result of abduction by armed factions– help drive children to work in diamond mining. In addition to children, thediamond mines employ many war-affected youth between the ages of 18 – 25
years, whose childhood development was similarly disrupted. International
instruments oblige states to provide for physical and psychological recovery, as
well as the rehabilitation and social reintegration of children affected by armed
conflict. The ongoing exploitative situation facing child and youth miners
demonstrates how the Government of Sierra Leone must do more to fulfil thesocio-economic rights of children and youth whose childhood development
was disrupted by the country’s civil war.
Undertaking a Two-Pronged Approach to Eliminating Child Mining
The impoverishment of adult miners, war-related factors and thefailure of the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure universal access to abasic education together drive the practice of child mining in the country’s
artisanal diamond mining industry. The elimination of the practice of childmining therefore requires a two-pronged approach. First, development
programming that directly protects and realizes child rights – including andVIII 		Executive Summary

especially ensuring affordable and accessible primary education – is urgently
needed. Second, regulatory reforms must be implemented to ensure improved
distribution of diamond proceeds to diggers, their families and mining
communities, as well as better working conditions. The Government of Sierra
Leone must respond to the situation or risk marginalizing a large segmentof the country’s post-war generation due to systemic failures to protect andpromote their rights to education, health and welfare.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

IX

RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Sierra Leone
ILO Convention 182• Immediately ratify ILO Convention 182, joining the commitment of
169 States to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.
Delivery of Education• Undertake measures to ensure the provision of free education fromprimary to secondary school. Obligate the Government, throughstatutory instrument, to ensure that primary and junior secondary
education must be made available free of any direct and ancillarycost, in accordance with § 3(3) of the Education Act. Eliminate exam
fees, uniform fees, and report card fees, and ensure that basic schoolsupplies are directly provided to children.
• Commit to ensuring access to primary and secondary education tochildren living in rural communities, including the rehabilitation and/or construction of schools outside of district capitals, with a particularfocus on mining communities.
• Implement measures to ensure the delivery of quality schooling,including achieving reduced class sizes and improving teacher training.
Ensure the placement of properly trained and qualified teachers inprimary and secondary schools in rural areas, especially in diamondmining communities.
• Provide accelerated learning programs for child and youth diamond
diggers who do not possess a primary education. Ensure that
accelerated learning programs are made accessible during off-workhours.
Health & Safety in Mining Communities• Develop and implement targeted health interventions in mining
communities, including the provision of medical treatment for children
engaged in mining-related activities.
• Consider and implement measures to protect the occupational
health and safety of diamond diggers, including strengthening legal
obligations on industry actors to provide medical care for diggers when
they become injured or sick as a result of their work.

X 		

Recommendations

Mining Regulation• To address the practice of child mining:o Implement programs targeting the rehabilitation of childminers, focusing on the delivery of a basic education andlivelihoods support for mining families.
o Ensure that programs targeting child miners are situatedwithin broader community development programs, which
address the underlying causes of child mining.
o Strengthen mines monitoring to ensure oversight ofcompliance with diamond mining regulations, including
reporting on the use of children for mining-related activities.
Improve the training, logistical support and salaries of mines
monitors.
o Consider extending education and livelihoods programming toyouths between 18 and 25 years of age who turned to diamondmining after the civil war devastated their childhood educationand development.
• To improve the overall welfare of diamond diggers and their families:o Ensure transparency and access to information concerning
diamond valuation, which can improve bargaining power
among diggers, miners/supporters and exporters. Consider
implementing a system of independent valuators to oversee
sales between mining actors to ensure that sales reflect actual
market value.
o Adopt and enforce occupational health and safety standards
that address exploitative working conditions for diamond
diggers.
• To improve the overall welfare of mining communities:
o Consider and implement measures to ensure the transparent
distribution and use of monies in mining communities fromthe Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF),
including: Publish the amount of monies released to chiefdoms
and districts in mediums accessed by ruralcommunities, including radio and local newspapers.
 Establish reporting mechanisms to enablelocal communities and civil society to demandaccountability for how DACDF monies are allocatedand spent.
 Implement spending guidelines that direct DACDF
monies to education programming, including theDigging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		

o

o

XI

rehabilitation of schools, supporting school feeding
programs, etc.
 Mandate participation by local civil society and local
community members on committees that oversee
disbursement of DACDF funds, which will be used in
specific areas.
Facilitate legitimate local ownership of artisanal mining
licences to ensure that mining communities better benefit
from diamond proceeds. Specifically, clarify property andinheritance laws; streamline the currently complex licencing
scheme; and transparently oversee the exercise of power by
Paramount Chiefs over surface rights.
Consider and develop land reclamation projects in mining
areas that are no longer producing significant diamond yields;
and support agricultural projects.

To The Anti-Corruption Commission• Investigate any allegations that government officials, individuallyor through relatives, hold interests in diamond mining ventures, incontravention of domestic law.
• Work with mining regulators to ensure transparency in mining
dealings at the central and community government levels, including
eliminating corrupt practices by mining and other government officers,
community leaders and industry actors.
To Paramount and Local Chiefs, as well as District Councils• Lead community monitoring efforts of the use of children in mining
areas, working with stakeholders to eliminate the practice of childmining.
• Ensure a transparent and participatory process concerning the
disbursement of DACDF monies that includes civil society andcommunity representatives.
• Support land reclamation processes and work towards ensuring
sustainable agriculture initiatives at the community level.
To the Diamond Industry• Commit to measures to eliminate the practice of child mining,
including the development and implementation of educationand livelihoods programs to rehabilitate child miners in mining
communities based on donations from diamond revenues.
• Provide technical support and resources to regulators and mining

XII 		

Recommendations

communities to implement measures to ensure fair transactions of
diamond sales among all actors in the diamond mining industry.
To the Kimberley Process• Formulate, through the recently established Working Group on
Artisanal Alluvial Producers, standards for working conditions inartisanal mining countries like Sierra Leone.
• Through consultations with government, industry and civil society
stakeholders, consider the feasibility of designing and implementing
a certification scheme that would guarantee that diamonds were notproduced through child labour.
To International Organizations and International Donors• To eliminate the practice of child mining, develop and fund programs
targeting the rehabilitation of child labourers in mining communities,
which address education and livelihoods issues:o Partner with local organizations working on child protection
issues, with a focus on supporting community-basedorganizations operating outside of the capital of Freetown, toaddress the socio-economic needs of children living in mining
communities.
o Continue to incorporate the participation of children, parents,
school teachers and other local stakeholders in the design andthe implementation of programming.
• To improve the welfare of families living in mining communities,
undertake feasibility studies to improve the capture of mining revenues
for local mining communities, including further investigations into thefeasibility of mining cooperatives such as those supported by USAID.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		

1

I.
INTRODUCTION: Mining for Survival
Under the glare of the West African sun, 15-year-old Ibrahim stands
and stretches. Ibrahim and his younger brother Joseph, a 13-year-old, do not
enjoy working in diamond mining. “We suffer,” says Ibrahim, as he describes
painful headaches that result from carrying heavy buckets of gravel on his
head. The two brothers came to the artisanal diamond mines in Kono District
after their parents died during the country’s eleven-year civil war. Living withan uncle who struggles to feed his own four children, Joseph explains, “[It]here is not enough for all of us. I’m just his nephew.” Child labour in artisanal
diamond mining is common. The exploitative working conditions thatcharacterize artisanal diamond digging adversely affect the physical health ofchild miners and deprive many of a sense of self-worth.
Initiated by the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard
Law School, this report presents findings based on over 200 informant
interviews with adult and child miners as well as consultations with communityand civil society actors living and working in diamond mining communities.
Over the course of two weeks in January 2008, IHRC researchers conducted
120 interviews with adult and child miners in mining communities throughout
Kenema and Kono Districts of Sierra Leone. Interviewees were selected
through a non-random targeted sampling; access to mining sites was gained
through local community contacts, including community-based organizations
and representatives of the United Mineworkers Union. Each qualitativeinterview was conducted through the same set of open-ended questions. Of the
120 interviews with individuals working in artisanal diamond mining, 30 werechildren (from 8 – 17 years), 45 were youths (from 18 – 25 years), and 40 were
adults (26 years and older) – five interviewees were of an ‘unknown age.’ Focus
groups were also conducted with chiefs, community leaders and membersof diamond mining communities, in addition to individual interviews withmembers of civil society, teachers and other community actors living and/or
working on issues related to mining communities.
This report explains how the prevailing impoverishment of adultdiggers, war-related factors and the failure of the Government of Sierra
Leone to ensure universal access to a basic education drive the practice ofchild labour in artisanal diamond mining. Chapter II of this report explains
how the prevalence of child mining violates Sierra Leone’s obligations underdomestic and international law, which are necessary to ensure the survival
and development of children through the prohibition of their involvement in

2 		

Introduction: Mining for Survival

hazardous labour as well as the protection of their rights to health, education
and welfare. Chapter III describes the artisanal diamond mining industry,including the exploitative conditions under which adult diggers work, andwhich drive the practice of child mining by impoverishing families in mining
communities. This report describes in detail the experience of children who
work in artisanal diamond mining in Chapter IV; specifically, it examines
how prevailing exploitative conditions detrimentally affect their physical andemotional well-being and therefore violate their fundamental rights. Chapter
V identifies specific factors that drive children into mining that have directly
resulted from the country’s eleven-year civil war. Chapter VI highlights how
shortcomings in the delivery of basic education by the Government of Sierra
Leone also drive the practice of child mining, while Chapter VII highlights how
weaknesses in the regulation of Sierra Leone’s artisanal mining industry keep
communities from profiting from the industry.
Development and regulatory shortcomings ensure that families
in mining communities remain impoverished and unable to educate theirchildren, leaving few options but to work in diamond mining. Based on the
documentation of the causes and nature of the problems addressed, this report
recommends an integrated two-prong approach that undertakes development
programming to address the educational and economic needs of children
and their families, in parallel with improving mining regulations and otherinitiatives to increase local ownership over mining activities that would better
direct benefits to mining communities.
The exploitation of child labourers in artisanal mining stands togenerate grievances amongst a large segment of the country’s post-war
generation. This situation must be considered against existing concerns withwidespread youth unemployment and the potential impact on social stability.
To avoid extinguishing the hopes and dreams of Joseph and Ibrahim, and manyother boys and girls, Sierra Leone must comply with its obligations underdomestic and international law and put an end to the practice of child labourin the country’s artisanal diamond mines through measures that address theunderlying societal inequities that force children to seek work in the mines.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

3

II.
The Protection of Children Under
Domestic and International Law
Children working in the diamond mines of Sierra Leone represent a
cross-section of society’s most vulnerable groups such as former child soldiers,
street children, unaccompanied children and children from households inextreme poverty. The children endure physically punishing work and risk of
injury or death from serious accidents and disease. Moreover, the work keeps
them from attending school and receiving a basic education.
This chapter outlines the legal protections afforded children underinternational as well as domestic law that oblige the government of Sierra Leone
to end the systemic exploitation of children by the country’s diamond industry.
Animated by the “best interests of the child” standard, international law andSierra Leonean law aim to eliminate child labour, recognizing the potential
harm it poses to the full development and well-being of children. Both legal
frameworks share one overarching objective: to respect, protect, and fulfil thelife, health and dignity of children. The practice of child mining grossly violates
these standards.
With the Child Rights Act of 2007, Sierra Leone sought to bringits domestic law into compliance with the leading international instrument
on child rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).1 The
three overarching CRC principles that direct the form and orientation of all
measures affecting children are the best interests of the child (Article 3), nondiscrimination (Article 2) and participation (Article 12). Of particular importto the CRC and the Child Rights Act is the “best interests of the child,” whichshould be a primary consideration “in all actions concerning children” engaged
in by a government.2 The Child Rights Act and the CRC underscore children’s
right to life, survival and development as well as the state’s responsibility tofulfil this right.3 To achieve the survival and development of children, the CRC
principles ought to be considered in every aspect of state action.
Beyond the primary CRC principles, three important dimensions ofchild rights are applicable to the context of child mining:
1
The Child Right Act, 2007, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary Vol. CXXXVIII, No. 43, pmbl (2007) (Sierra Leone) [hereinafter Child Rights Act].
2
See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3[hereinafter CRC].
3Child Rights Act, supra note 1, §§ 3, 23-26. See CRC, supra note 2, art. 6.

4 		

The Protection of Children Under Domestic and International Law

 Minimum age requirements that protect children from the harms ofphysical labour; Rights to health and education, which are critical to the survival anddevelopment of children; and The prevailing need to connect and contextualize the protection ofchildren’s rights to their post-conflict environment.
A. Minimum Age Requirements for Hazardous Work
Sierra Leonean law prohibits employing children under the age ofeighteen in diamond mining. The Child Rights Act of 2007 establishes theminimum age for employment at fifteen for full-time employment; however,
the minimum age is set at eighteen for hazardous work.4 In recognitionof the dangers inherent to mining labour, the Child Rights Act explicitlyclassifies mining as “hazardous work.”5 To ensure compliance, the Act requires
mining employers to maintain a register of the birth dates, or apparent ages
(if the birth date is unknown) of all children and young people employed.6
The Government of Sierra Leone is under an ongoing duty to enforce theseprovisions; district labour officers and district councils are charged withensuring that mining operations are not employing children under the age ofeighteen, and that mine operators maintain the required birth register.7
Sierra Leone is a State Party to the CRC as well as the African Charteron Human and Peoples’ Rights. Both instruments prohibit the employmentof children under eighteen in work that is likely to be hazardous or interferewith their development, and recognize mining work as such.8 The CRC further
prohibits children from performing work that interferes with their education
4

Child Rights Act, supra note 1, §§ 125, 128.

Id. § 128.
Id. § 130.
7
Id. §§ 132-133.
8
See CRC, supra note 2, art.32.1; African Union, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, art. 15.1, July 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 [hereinafter African Charter].
The International Labour Organisation also prohibits the employment of children under the ageof eighteen from working in conditions that are “likely to harm their health, safety, or morals.”
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour (ILO No. 182), art. 3(d), June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S.161 [hereinafter
ILO Convention 182]. The ILO defines hazardous work to include “work . . . which involves the
manual handling or transport of heavy loads; work in an unhealthy environment . . . work underparticularly difficult conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work where
the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the employer.” International Labour Organization, Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Eliminationof the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO R190), ¶ 3, ILO Gen. Cont., 87th sess. (June 17, 1999).
Sierra Leone has not signed or ratified ILO Convention 182.
5
6

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

5or that is harmful to their health.9 As a State Party to these treaties, theGovernment of Sierra Leone is obligated to enforce minimum age requirements
in practice.10 Reviewing Sierra Leone’s compliance with the CRC, the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2008 specifically noted its concern
with “the continuing existence of child labour [in Sierra Leone], including… the widespread use of children for purposes of manual labour in mining
areas.”11 The findings of IHRC researchers as presented in this report confirm
this conclusion and detail the serious consequences of child mining for thewell-being of many Sierra Leonean children.
B. The Relationship Between the Rights to Health and Educationand the Practice of Child Mining
The implications of the Government of Sierra Leone’s failure to
realize the survival and development of children are two-fold. First, thefailure to provide accessible and affordable primary education, as well as
the failure to enforce laws prohibiting child labour, together lead families to
put their children to work rather than send them to school. Second, childlabour deprives children of their education while compromising their health.
Recognizing this critical relationship between education and child labour,
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recently recommended that
Sierra Leone combat child labour by “ensur[ing] that primary education isfree of charge, and also of other (additional) costs, in order to facilitate theparticipation of all children in primary education.”12
1. The Right to Basic Education for Sierra Leonean Children
Sierra Leone’s Education Act of 2004 stipulates that every citizen has
the right to a basic education, defined as six years of primary school and three
years of junior secondary school. The Act requires the government to provide
basic education free of charge in government-assisted schools.13 Furthermore,
9
CRC, supra note 2, art. 32.1. See also U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rightsof the Child, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2003/4 (July 1, 2003) [hereinafter CRC General Comment
No. 4].
10
See CRC, supra note 2, art 32.2; African Charter, supra note 8, art. 15.2.
11
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, Sierra Leone, ¶ 68, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/SLE/CO/2 (June 20, 2008) [hereinafter CRC Concluding Observations].
12
Id, ¶¶ 65, 68.
13
The Education Act, 2004, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXXV, No. 19 (2004)(Sierra Leone), § 3. The Government of Sierra Leone unfortunately qualified this provision
by saying that education would be free in government-assisted primary and junior secondary

6 		

The Protection of Children Under Domestic and International Law

the Child Rights Act prohibits the involvement of children in any form of
exploitative labour, defined as labour that “deprives the child of its health,education or development.”14
Under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the CRC, the Government of Sierra Leone is obligatedto realize the right to education, in particular, the provision of primaryeducation.15 The ICESCR and the CRC require States Parties to realize the rightto education progressively16 by making primary education compulsory andavailable at no cost to all17 and by making secondary education – both generaland vocational education – available and accessible to all, including throughfinancial assistance when necessary.18 In addition, ILO Convention 182
recognizes “the importance of education in eliminating child labour” and calls
upon states to ensure access to free basic education and vocational training.19
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted the special importance of
free primary education and accessible secondary education for adolescents.20
The Committee on the Rights of the Child applauded the Governmentof Sierra Leone’s enactment of the Education Act and the Child Rights Act,as well as the draft National Policy on Child Well-being.21 However, in 2008
the Committee noted that the Government of Sierra Leone had not yet fully
implemented much of this legislation and, furthermore, that basic healthschools “to the extent specified by the Minister by statutory instrument.” Id. § 3(3).
14Child Rights Act, supra note 1, § 32.
15
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], art. 13; CRC, supra note 2, art. 28.
16
The concept of “progressive realization” reflects a recognition that resource limitations constrain state action. However, progressive realization of a particular right imposes upon states an“obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any
deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration
and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in theCovenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.” Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’
Obligations, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec 14, 1990).
17
See ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 13(2)(a) (“Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all.”); CRC, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(a) (“Make primary education compulsory andavailable free to all.”).
18
See ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 13(2)(b) (“Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of freeeducation.”); CRC, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(b) (“Encourage the development of different forms of
secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free educationand offering financial assistance in case of need.”).
19
ILO Convention 182, supra note 8, art. 7(2).
20CRC General Comment No. 4, supra note 9, ¶ 17.
21
CRC Concluding Observations, supra note 11, ¶¶ 3, 12.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

7

services and educational opportunities remained out of reach for many ofSierra Leone’s children.22 The Committee also noted that the Ministry ofSocial Welfare, which oversees the Government’s children’s rights portfolio,
lacks the necessary resources to carry out its tasks and recommended that theGovernment of Sierra Leone increase the Ministry’s budget.23
2. The Right to Health for Sierra Leonean Children
The Child Rights Act recognizes children’s “right to life and maximum
survival and development,” of which health is an integral component.24
Children’s right to health is explicitly protected under international law. The
ICESCR’s recognition of the right to the highest attainable standard of healthhas been interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights to include specific guarantees for children’s health.25 The Committee
identifies the provision of health care for children as a core priority for States
Parties, and directs them to “ensure access to essential health services forthe child and his or her family.”26 Such services include, according to theCommittee, “adequate nutrition, safe environments, and physical as well as
mental health services.”27
Affirming these principles, the CRC also recognizes “the right of thechild to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health….”28 States
must take measures under the CRC “[t]o ensure the provision of necessary
medical assistance and health care to all children”29 and “[t]o combat disease
and malnutrition.”30 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified
adolescent health as an area deserving of special attention, calling on States
Parties to provide “material assistance and support with regard to nutrition,
clothing and housing” as needed to the families of adolescents.31 While theId. ¶¶ 51-52, 64.
Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.
24
Child Rights Act, supra note 1, § 2.
25
ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 12(1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize theright of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.”). See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14:
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 44(a), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11,
2000) [hereinafter ESCR General Comment No. 14]. The Child Rights Act includes numerous
duties to parents, the community and the government (including through the provision of basicsocial services) to ensure the health of the child.
26
ESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 25, ¶ 22.
27
Id.
28
CRC, supra note 2, art. 24(1).
29
Id. art. 24(2)(b).
30
Id. art. 24(2)(c).
31
CRC General Comment No. 4, supra note 9, ¶ 16.
22
23

8 		

The Protection of Children Under Domestic and International Law

Committee on the Rights of the Child’s 2008 review of Sierra Leone took noteof the improvements made in the provision of basic health services, it remained
concerned by the continuing lack of access to health care in some areas of
the country, and by the absence of adolescent-specific health policies.32 The
African Charter also provides for children’s right to health33 and obligates States
Parties to take a range of actions to support realization of this right, including
maintaining a focus on developing primary healthcare and integrating basic
health services into national development plans.34
C. Protecting Children’s Rights in Post-conflict Sierra Leone
Engaging in responsible post-conflict rebuilding requires
foregrounding the needs and vulnerabilities of children. As highlighted in the
groundbreaking Machel Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children:
Apart from direct violence, children are also deeply affected byother distressing experiences. Armed conflict destroys homes,
splinters communities and breaks down trust among people,
undermining the very foundations of children’s lives. The
impact of being let down and betrayed by adults is measurelessin that it shatters the child’s world view.35
The CRC calls on States Parties to consider the needs of children andundertake measures to promote the “physical and psychological recovery andsocial reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation,or abuse… or armed conflicts” through measures that “take place in anenvironment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.”36
The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, to which Sierra Leone is a State Party, identifies further obligationsof states vis-à-vis children who have been involved in hostilities, includingchild soldiers and also those recruited to serve in other roles of support to anarmed force.37 Specifically, States Parties must provide appropriate assistance
CRC Concluding Observations, supra note 11, ¶¶ 51-56.
African Charter, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
34
Id. art. 14(2)(b),(g).
35Graça Machel, Expert of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Impact of Armed Conflicton Children, ¶ 167, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/157, UN Doc. A/51/306(Aug. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Machel Report 1996].
36
CRC, supra note 2, art. 39. In addition, ILO Convention 182 calls on states to take measures to“reintegrate and rehabilitate” former child labourers, reach out to “children at risk” and “take into
account the special situation of girls.” ILO Convention 182, supra note 8, art. 7(2)(b),(d),(e).
37United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve32
33

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

9

for the “physical and psychological recovery” and the “rehabilitation and social
reintegration” of children involved in armed conflict.38
These provisions reflect the centrality of understanding the context
within which children are situated in order to protect their rights andincorporating these circumstances into post-conflict rebuilding efforts.
According to findings of IHRC researchers, the children working in the minesof Sierra Leone find themselves in difficult socio-economic circumstances thatare a legacy of the country’s ten-year civil war. Their families and communities
continue to struggle to recover from the destruction of infrastructure,
dissolution of familial and social networks, disruption of education and the lossof livelihoods that have resulted from the country’s civil war.
Despite the many development and governance challenges that exist
in Sierra Leone, international and domestic law reguires the pursuit of areconstruction and development strategy that does not neglect the rights ofchildren. As provided in the Machel Report, “The task of rebuilding war-tornsocieties is a huge one that must take place not only at the physical, economic,
cultural and political, but also at the psychosocial level. Reconstruction must
relate to the child, the family, the community and the country.”39
Programs implemented during reconstruction can lay the foundation
for the survival and development of children, particularly in relation totheir rights to health and education. The realization of children’s rights
does not appear to have been given adequate consideration in post-conflictreconstruction plans or peace agreements, yet their generation will inherit the
post-reconstruction nation, including its successes and failures. A child rights
perspective should ensure social stability following post-conflict reconstruction;
meeting international and domestic obligations to protect and promote therights of children is a key component to these efforts.

ment of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 [hereinafter CRC
Optional Protocol].
38
Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
39
Machel Report 1996, supra note 35, ¶ 241.

10		

The Protection of Children Under Domestic and International Law

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

11

III.
An Overview of Artisanal Diamond Mining“People make nothing, though they dig forever.”40– Adult digger, Kenema District
In Sierra Leone’s “‘one-crop’ economy, [where] the ‘crop’ is diamonds,”41
the diamond sector is the largest contributor to the Gross Domestic Product(GDP) and export earnings.42 In 2007, Sierra Leone exported US$141 millionof diamonds, of which US$100 million came from artisanal mining. In a
country with a population of 6.3 million,43 around 120,000 people are directly
involved in artisanal mining.44 Artisanal diamond mining is a major sourceof employment for many Sierra Leoneans, many of whom survive on roughly
one dollar a day.45 Studies on child mining estimate up to 10,000 children
working at diamond mining sites;46 up to 80 percent of these children have beenreported to work for their parents or relatives.47
Most artisanal diamond mining is alluvial,48 meaning that the
diamonds are located on the surface of thousands of small mining sites
scattered across 20,000 square kilometres – approximately a quarter of the
IHRC Interview #22, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, Rich Man, Poor Man, Development
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond Fields of Africa 8 (2004).
42
See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Republic of Sierra Leone (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (“Sierra
Leone has relied on the mining sector in general, and diamonds in particular, for its economic
base.”).
43
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book’s July 2008 estimate is 6,294,774.
United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sierra Leone (2008),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html#People.
44
Diamond Development Initiative International, Standards & Guidelines for Sierra
Leone’s Artisanal Diamond Mining Sector 7 (2008) [hereinafter DDI International]45
See id. at 2; Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 9.
46
See Network Movement for Justice and Development Sierra Leone, Report on
the Situation of Child Miners in Sierra Leone: Case Study of Four Districts (2006)(interviewing over 200 child miners); World Vision Sierra Leone, Report on Children in
Mining Activities (CIMA), Assessment Survey, Kono District (2002) (interviewing 497
child miners).
47
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 13. See also DDI International, supra note
44, at 5.
48
Over 90 percent of Sierra Leone’s official diamond exports come from alluvial mining. DDIInternational, supra note 44, at 14.
40
41

12 		An Overview of Artisanal Diamond Mining

country’s total area.49 Artisanal sites are worked by diggers who use simple
tools and labour-intensive techniques. The informal nature of alluvial mining
work presents regulatory challenges;50 “outside much of the legal and regulatory
framework,”51 artisanal diggers are usually unregistered, have no formal
employment contracts, and often work on an itinerant or seasonal basis.
A. The Artisanal Diamond Mining Hierarchy: Mining for the 		
Benefit of Few
Although the mining industry produces considerable export revenue,
artisanal diggers receive little compensation for their labour. The diamondsupply chain resembles a pyramid, with a large number of diggers at thebottom. Asymmetrical bargaining power allows a “concentration of profits” to
go to a small number of dealers and exporters at the top of the mining pyramid,
most of whom reportedly reinvest very little in the industry or the country.52
Indeed, in 2005, seven major diamond exporters each reaped a gross profit
of US$1.5 million from their Sierra Leone operations, while the estimated120,000 diggers earned on average US$195 each.53 Serving pre-war patronage
systems, the system of supply funnels diamond profits to a powerful group ofelites. The sequence of exchange up the pyramid, from digger to licence holder
to diamond dealer to exporter, involves frequent transactions between various
agents who possess greater bargaining power than those below them.
1. Diggers“Diggers” perform arduous tasks including digging and washing gravelwith simple tools. There are two types of compensation arrangements that they
may enter into in exchange for their labour. Under a tributor system, where
diggers receive a bargained percentage of earnings from diamonds found, theyearn approximately Le 500-1,500 (US$0.15-$0.45) per day, in addition to one
49
Victor A. B. Davies, Diamonds, Poverty and War in Sierra Leone, in Small-Scale Mining,
Rural Subsistence and Poverty in West Africa 168 (Gavin M. Hilson ed., 2006).
50
For a comparison of regulatory difficulties in Sierra Leone to what are considered to stronger
regulatory frameworks in Botswana and Canada, see Partnership Africa Canada & Global
Witness, supra note 41, at 3 (“The geological nature of diamonds creates special situations.
The Kimberlite mines of Botswana, Canada and Russia can be fenced and protected. Alluvial
diamonds, however, scattered over hundreds of square miles, present a very difficult regulatory
problem.”).
51
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 8.
52
Id. at 6.
53
Estelle A. Levin & Lansana Gberie, DDI International, Dealing for Development?
The Dynamics of Diamond Marketing and Pricing in Sierra Leone 13 (2006).

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

13

or two cups of rice.54 This lottery system appears increasingly exploitative ofdiggers since IHRC researchers found that major diamond discoveries thatwould bring a sizable profit to diggers are becoming less frequent in certain
over-mined areas such as Tongo.55 Second, under a contract labour system,some diggers receive no percentage from their diamond finds but are paid ahigher daily wage of approximately Le 7,000 (US$2.10).56
2. Licence Holders
The actors that follow the diggers in the mining hierarchy are “miners”
or “licence holders.” These actors “organize and manage the mining of
diamonds,” including applying for the mining licence from the government
through “traditional authorities” (the chiefdom system).57 Officially, only
indigenous Sierra Leoneans can hold artisanal diamond mining licences;58
however many foreigners appear able to obtain control over such licences
through Sierra Leonean nationals.59 In practice, domestic licence holders
often lack the funds needed to independently purchase mining licences andundertake operations. Instead, licence holders enter into agreements with“supporters,” who provide the necessary capital in exchange for terms thatenable them to profit maximally from related diamond finds. As a principal
54
Id. at 2. See also IHRC Interview #105, 21-year-old digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21Jan. 2008) (given Le 1,500 (US$0.45) and two cups of rice a day); IHRC Interview #102, 19-yearold digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (generally given Le 500 (US$0.15) in themorning, Le 1,000 in the evening); IHRC Interview #113, 19-year-old digger, Yoradu Village,
Kono District (22 Jan. 2008) (receives Le 2,000 (US$0.60) per day and no cups of rice); IHRC Interview #114, 24-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008) (receives Le 2,000(US$0.60) a day); IHRC Interview #90, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan.
2008) (given Le 1,500 (US$0.45) a day with no additional food); IHRC Interview #44, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (given one cup of rice and Le 250 (US$0.08)
in the morning; two cups of rice and Le 500 in the evening).
55
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #105, 21-year-old digger, Small Sefadu (21 Jan. 2008) (since thebeginning of the last dry season, he has only found a few small diamonds that sold for less than
Le 100,000 (US$30.00)); IHRC Interview #96, 23-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village (21 Jan. 2008)(been three months without any diamond finds, and “even if we do find a diamond, the supporterbuys it at his own price.”)56
E.g., IHRC Interview #78, 16-year-old child miner, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan.
2008) (paid Le 7,000 (US$2.10) a day for eight hours of work and receives nothing if he finds a
diamond; strictly contract work); IHRC Interview #81, 15-year-old child miner, Peyima Village,
Kono District (19 Jan. 2008) (receives Le 7,000 ($2.10) for eight hours of work); IHRC Interview#46, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (given Le 7,000 ($2.10) a day,no additional rice and it is his own responsibility if he gets sick). For a full discussion of typicaldiggers’ wages, see infra Ch. IV(E) (“Poor Compensation for Child Labourers”).
57
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 15.
58
DDI International, supra note 44, at 4.
59
Id. at 14.

14 		An Overview of Artisanal Diamond Mining

source of capital, supporters enjoy considerable bargaining power over licenceholders, who find themselves obligated to sell their finds to their supporter
without room to negotiate fair rates. Thus compromised, licence holders
become relegated to the role of mine supervisors and have little means available
to provide properly for diggers working on the site.
3. Diamond Dealers“Diamond dealers,” largely consisting of foreign nationals, follow.
Although not perfectly coterminous with supporters, they often appear to hold
both roles in practice,60 purchasing diamonds from the licence holder andselling them to exporters.61 Dealers have “real expertise in valuation in the
diamond chain, allowing them to pay undervalued prices for gems.”62 Since
they are usually also supporters, they possess additional leverage over the
licencee and can negotiate lower percentages of proceeds. As explained by one
digger, “The miners only get a small percentage from the diamonds because
they work for supporters.... Whenever we do tripping [digging], the landownercomes to the area and spies on us…. If he sees something he likes, he will buy itfrom you there and take his percentage and give you less than your percentage.
Miners need help working against the dealers. The dealers never buy with goodprices.”63
4. Exporters“Exporters” sit at the top level of the diamond-mining pyramid.
Exporters purchase diamonds from diamond dealers for export to the foreign
market and are comprised of a small cadre of mostly foreign actors who
control industry profits. In 2003, for example, five foreign individuals and/or
companies accounted for 74 percent of diamond exports; the following year,
four entities handled 91 percent of exports.64

60
See Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 15 (“‘Supporters’ arethe financial backers for most artisanal diamond mining. They are generally businessmen livingin the diamond areas, and by far the majority are also dealers, or diamond buyers and sellers.”).
61
Id. at 16.
62
Id. This conclusion was confirmed in IHRC interviews. E.g., IHRC Interview #126, licenceholder/supporter, Tongo, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town
Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
63
IHRC Interview #94, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
64
DDI International, supra note 44, at 26.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

15

5. Diamond Industry
In order to eliminate the practice of child digging, broad regulatorychanges are needed to draw the large base of actors at the bottom of the mining
pyramid into the formal economy and enforce more equitable wages andimproved labour conditions.
B. Regulatory Agencies: Failed Oversight, Accountability, and 			Enforcement
Multiple stakeholders and industry commentators have observedthat artisanal diamond mining lacks robust regulatory implementation andoversight at the national and local level.
Principal Policies and Laws Governing the Diamond-Mining Sector• The Mines and Mineral Act of 1994 (and subsequent amendments) isthe primary legislative instrument governing the mining sector.
• The national Core Mineral Policy, enacted in 2003, aims to create an
investor-friendly mining environment with preferential treatment for
Sierra Leoneans, as well ensuring that mining is conducted in a"transparent, open, and accountable manner."• The Kimberley Process administers a certificate system for all diamond
exports, aiming at guaranteeing that no diamonds are used to fund conflict.
Sierra Leone administers this system through The Diamond Cutting andPolishing Act (2007).
• The Local Government Act of 2004 seeks to loosen the Freetowncentered control over diamond concessions that led to corruption in the
pre-war era.65 Local councils and chiefs share power, as councils disburse
funds for development and set tax rates while chiefdoms control access toland and mineral revenue and are responsible for collecting taxes.66
1. National Agencies
The Ministry of Mineral Resources administers regulations for themining sector through two agencies: the Mines Department and the GeologicalPaul Jackson, Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in
Sierra Leone, 106/422 Afr. Aff. 95, 102 (2006).
66
Id. at 104-5.
65

16 		An Overview of Artisanal Diamond Mining

Surveys Division.67 Diamond dealers and exporters report their monthly
purchases and sales to the Ministry through Mines Monitoring Officers, whooversee all of the major mining and trading centres.68 The mines monitoring
program is intended to ensure the fair sale of diamond proceeds, monitor thepractice of child labour and oversee the reporting of sales by diamond dealersand exporters. However, mines monitoring officers reportedly lack adequate
compensation, training and equipment required to be effective regulators.69
The Anti-Corruption Commission – a national-level partner inregulatory enforcement – seeks to prevent and enforce sanctions for thecommission of corrupt acts at all levels of government in Sierra Leone. The
Commission ought to be more active in this important sector of the Sierra
Leonean economy, but it possesses limited institutional capacity.70 Its work
to date has reportedly failed to keep government officials from illegally
maintaining a stake in mining activity.71 However, there have been a few
successful prosecutions of public officials for diamond smuggling and illegal
possession.72
2. Local Agencies
Local Paramount Chiefs administer Chiefdom Mining Allocation
Committees (CMACs). The committees conduct dispute settlement andconflict prevention whilst adjudicating over landholding claims.73
The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development
also administers land tenure and arbitrates property rights disputes at the local
level.74
The Local Government Act’s mandate to grant greater local control
DDI International, supra note 44, at 4.
Id. at 15.
69
Brian Thomson, Chatham House Report, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflictand Governance Reform 14-17 (2007). See also Partnership Africa Canada & Network
Movement for Justice and Development, Diamond Industry Annual Review: Sierra
Leone 2006 6 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Diamond Industry Review]. While problems markmuch of the oversight of the diamond industry, one assessment found that the Gold and Diamond Department, which administers the Kimberley Process, operates “with a level of transparency and professionalism unmatched by other institutions in Sierra Leone.” Partnership
Africa Canada, Diamond Industry Annual Review: Sierra Leone 2005 1 (2005).
70
Sierra Leone ranked 150th out of 179 countries on Transparency International’s Perception of
Corruption Table, 2007. Transparency International, 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
71
DDI International, supra note 44, at 11.
72 Id.
73
Id. at 6-7.
74
Id. at 4.
67
68

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

17over diamond revenues is reportedly ineffective for the diamond sector. Underfunded local councils lack the means to enforce necessary accountability
mechanisms such as effective auditing.
C. Failures to Adequately Capture Diamond Revenues
The Government of Sierra Leone has failed to implement measures
to control its diamond revenue stream effectively at the local, national andexport levels. Diamond revenues are collected through licencing, explorationand prospecting fees; a 3 percent tax on all diamond exports;75 and a corporate
income tax of 30 percent.76 These monies represent a significant amount of
Sierra Leone’s annual budget revenues.77 However, the Government of Sierra
Leone has been spending a significant portion of the diamond-mining revenue
on independent valuators, management and monitoring of the licencing
system, and regulatory mechanisms necessary for compliance with theKimberley Process, a voluntary international diamond certification scheme
crucial to Sierra Leone’s ability to trade in the international diamond market.78
The involvement of political elites in private diamond dealings can pose
problems for maintaining transparent regulatory oversight and control of theflow of diamond revenues. For example, while it is forbidden for government
officials to hold licences, sources suggest that “some have covertly invested
in the diamond sector, compromising the implementation of official policy”
and creating a conflict of interest.79 These practices preclude opportunities for
DDI International, supra note 44, at 6.
Id. at 16. In addition, some towns also apply an additional council tax. Id.
77
In 2007 the export total was about US$142 million, resulting in an export fee alone to thegovernment of about $5 million. While it is true that “artisanal alluvial diamond mining will
never generate large amounts of revenue for the governments in question,” Partnership Africa
Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 6, diamond revenues are still relatively importantto Sierra Leone. As one expert on the Sierra Leone diamond industry stated: “If you look at those
figures alone, they do not look extremely significant, but when you combine them they are very
important to Sierra Leone … [Last year’s revenue] may seem small, but it’s not.” IHRC Interview#146, Lansana Gberie, Monrovia, Liberia (15 July 2008).
78
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 10.
79
DDI International, supra note 44, at 11. See also Diamond Intelligence, “Sierra Leone
Diamond Exports Down 31%” (Jan. 18, 2009), https://www.diamondintelligence.com/magazine/
magazine.aspx?id=7516 (noting that despite a 2008 review of all mining agreements and othermineral rights in the country that covered technical, legal, financial and social issues, “no final
recommendations or decisions have been made on any specific mining lease or agreement” following the delivery of a progress report to the President). See also “Sierra Leone: Government is
not the Solution to the Country’s Problems; Government is the Problem,” Concord Times (Jan.
27, 2009) (reporting that Vice President Sam Sumana “has been associated with the Mexivada
Diamond Mining Company (SL) Limited (“MGD”), [in an] alluvial diamond mining deal in theGbense Chiefdom where Mexivada is pursuing small scale rapid gold and diamond mining op75
76

18 		An Overview of Artisanal Diamond Mining

greater local ownership of diamond mines.
In addition, the failure to stem diamond smuggling and to curb
corrupt practices has reportedly enabled potential revenue to flow out of thecountry entirely.80 Failure to control smuggling leads to the loss of diamondrevenue each year, although smuggling has decreased in recent years. In 2005,
smuggling was estimated to account for 50 percent or more of diamonds sold.81
More recent estimates approximate smuggling to account for only 10 percent
of diamond exports.82 Continued vigilance is necessary to combat the work ofsmuggling networks; efforts to redress the endemic poverty in the mines can domuch to reduce smuggling practices.

CONCLUSIONAt the base of the diamond mining pyramid sits a large number ofartisanal diamond diggers who work outside the formal economy under
exploitative conditions. Profits from diamond finds are enjoyed mostly by
the exporters, who sit at the top the pyramid; percentages received fromfinds decrease as they move down the pyramid from diamond dealers tolicence holders and finally, diggers – who receive the lowest share despite
having laboured for the finds. In addition to failing to address poor working
conditions and unfair sharing of diamond proceeds, weaknesses in regulatory
oversight preclude adequate sharing of diamond revenues to mining
communities and have not been maximally capturing national diamondrevenues. Proposals for reform of the artisanal mining industry, which seeks to
improve profit-sharing amongst diggers and their communities, are presented
in Chapter VII (“Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings”).

portunities.”).
80
Levin & Gberie, supra note 53, at 15.
81
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 10 (“Unofficial government estimates place the level of smuggling at 50 per cent and one recent study suggests that it ismuch higher.”). See also U.S. Department of State, supra note 42 (stating that annual estimatesfor diamond mining production range between $250-300 million, but official exports in 2005
totalled only about US$142 million).
82
DDI International, supra note 44, at 24.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		

19

IV.
The Practice of Child Mining“I mine diamonds to survive.” – 15-year-old digger83
This chapter outlines the prevalence and average age of childminers, the nature of mining activities undertaken by children, their meagre
compensation and poor treatment, and finally, the impact of mining onchildren’s health and schooling. Taken together, the impacts of mining on
the lives of children combined with state complicity place the Government of
Sierra Leone in violation of its obligations under domestic and internationallaw. While a return to full-scale conflict on the level of the recent civil war isunlikely, “[t]he poverty, the hundreds of thousands of … exploited adults andchildren, and the volatility of the diamond fields make for a highly flammablesocial cocktail, one that has ignited several times in recent years, with tragic
results.”84
A. The Prevalence of Child Mining“Child mining is rampant. It is a common, well-known business.”85- Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun
IHRC researchers visited over a dozen artisanal diamond mining sites
in the two principal diamond-producing regions of Sierra Leone, Kenema
and Kono Districts, where they observed the widespread prevalence ofchild miners. Diggers in every mining village and town confirmed IHRC’s
observations that many children work in the artisanal diamond mines. One
child digger explained: “boku (many) people my size come to work at themine.”86 Youth and adult diggers in mining areas throughout Kenema andKono Districts described the prevalence of child miners in their respective

IHRC Interview #54, 15-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 6. See also IHRC Interview #146, Lansana Gberie, expert on Sierra Leone’s diamond industry, Monrovia, Liberia (22July 2008) (“Violence as a result of diamond mining issues is not only possible but happening andwill continue to happen. There are clashes and people get killed, and that is bound to continue
happening.”).
85
IHRC Interview #33, Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun, Hangha Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008).
86
IHRC Interview #81, 15-year-old child miner, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
83
84

20 		The Practice of Child Mining

mining communities.87 In Paiama Village, located in Kenema District, a digger
explained that “there are up to 100 child miners here on most days;”88 while in
Ngaiya Junction, in Kono District, a local digger told IHRC researchers that“there are boku children in the mines.”89
These observations are consistent with recent studies documenting theprevalence of child mining in Sierra Leone:•

In August 2002, World Vision Sierra Leone examined the practiceof child mining in Kono District and found that “there is a sizeable
proportion of children between the ages of 6 – 18 years in Kono thatare involved in mining activities.”90 World Vision interviewed 497 childminers, crew bosses, parents and guardians, in the six major diamondproducing chiefdoms of Kono District.91•

In April 2005, Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy of Fafo (a Norwegian
research foundation) interviewed 616 children in four diamond mining
sites in Kono District who were working directly and indirectly indiamond mining.92•

In February 2006, the Network Movement for Justice and Development(NMJD) found that “poverty and a continued lack or nonimplementation of proper policies” had pushed many children intomining.93 NMJD interviewed 267 children “directly and indirectly

See, e.g., IHRC Interview #102, 19-year-old digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008)(“There are a lot of children who work here.”); IHRC Interview #7, adult digger, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“Yes, there are lots of children working in this mine; they comefor the same reason we all come, because they do not have any other opportunities.”); IHRC Interview #119, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“Any day we see plentyof [child miners].”); IHRC Interview #133, Augustine Bangalay, teacher, Hangha Village, Kenema
District (15 Jan. 2008) (“Child mining is common.”); IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief Sahr
Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (16 Jan. 2008) (“The current population [of diggers] is 50
percent school drop-outs; many are 15, 17 18 [years old].”).
88
IHRC Interview #51 youth digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008). On the dayof the IHRC visit to the diamond mining pits near Paiama, there were several hundred diggers
working in total.
89
IHRC Interview #101, adult digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21Jan. 2008).
90
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 36. The report noted that although child mining dates back at least to the 1960s and 1970s in Sierra Leone, the practice has grown considerably as the country’s economy deteriorated and, more importantly, as a consequence of the war.
Id. at 6.
91
Id. at 9. The six chiefdoms studied were Tankoro, Nimiyama, Kamara, Nimikoro, Gbense andSandor.
92
Morten Bøås & Anne Hatløy, Living in a Material World: Children and Youth inAlluvial Diamond Mining in Kono District, Sierra Leone 32 (2006), available at http://
www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/515/515.pdf.
93
Network Movement for Justice and Development, supra note 46, at 5.
87Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		

21

facilitating various mining activities” in four diamond mining districtsof Sierra Leone.94
B. Age of Child Miners
The child miners interviewed for this report ranged primarily from10 to 17 years of age; there were few child miners observed to be under theage of 10. A majority of the 40 adult diggers interviewed by IHRC researchers
confirmed that child miners fall within this age range. In Yormandu Village, forexample, one adult digger reported, “I have seen children as young as 8 in themines here. There are lots of small boys who engage in mining.”95 In Ngaiya
Junction, an adult digger explained how he worked with children as young as
11 years old, although a majority of the child miners were school drop-outs
aged 14 years or older.96
Prior studies on child labour in the diamond mines have foundcomparable age distributions97 among child miners:•

In a 2002 study performed in Kono District: 36.9 percent of children
involved in mining-related activities were between 16 and 17 years old,
56.9 percent were between 10 and 15 years old, and 6.2 percent were
between 7 and 9 years old.98•

In research performed in 2005 in Kono District: 41 percent of children
involved in mining-related activities were between 14 and 17 years ofage, 44 percent were between 10 and 13 years of age, and 15 percent
were under 10 years of age.99

Id. at 7. The four districts studied were Kono, Kenema, Bo and Bombali.
IHRC Interview #91, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
96
IHRC Interview #101, adult digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008). See also
IHRC Interview #102, 19-year-old digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (relatingthat he saw children as young as 12 or 13 in the mines).
97
The differences between these prior studies and the research undertaken by IHRC include:
First, recent studies have generally documented the presence of all children working in themining areas, which includes children below the age of 10 years who undertake related activities; IHRC researchers focused specifically on child diggers and amongst those interviewed forthis report, none fell below 10 years of age. Second, prior studies surveyed a large sample size ofchildren, while IHRC research focussed on deeper qualitative field interviews. Also, over time,
the understanding that child labour is not an acceptable practice appears to have reached certain
mining areas; IHRC researchers observed child miners being driven away in some mining areasthat were visited.
98
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 12. The study also included 18-year-olds (whoare not considered children under international or domestic law), who comprised 18.3 percentof the 497 miners interviewed. These figures representing individuals of 18 years of age were notincluded in the figures presented above.
99Bøås & Hatløy, supra note 92, at 50 (Table 5.1). The higher percentage of extremely young
94
95

22 		•The Practice of Child Mining

In a 2006 study performed in four major diamond mining districtsof Sierra Leone: 36 percent of children involved in mining-related
activities were between 16 and 17 years old, 60 percent were between
10 and 15 years old, and four percent were under 10 years old.100
C. The Length of Time Children Spend as Miners

For many child miners, labouring in the diamond mining pits isneither a new nor a temporary activity. Many adult diggers reported to IHRC
researchers that they had begun working in the mines as children; child miners
also reported having mined for extended periods of time.101
According to IHRC research, the average time spent by individuals
working in mining, or in the case of children, mining-related activities, grows
with the respective age of the digger:•

According to 20 of the 30 children interviewed by IHRC researchers,
the mean time they spent working on mining-related activities was
1.95 years while the median reported was 1.5 years. An earlier study
similarly reported child miners having been involved in mining
activities for approximately two years.102•

According to 34 of the 45 youth (aged 18 – 25 years) interviewed
by IHRC researchers who reported the time they spent working indiamond-mining, the mean time was 4.07 years; the median timereported was three years.103

children reported in comparison to the other studies is likely attributed to the large number ofchildren interviewed by researchers who were performing support activities. Only 31 percent ofrespondents were involved in digging, or what the researchers termed “direct work.” Moreover,
38 percent of respondents were involved in “support functions,” while 31 percent were involved in“petty trading” around the mines. Of those respondents who reported being involved in “direct
work,” 84 percent were between 14 and 17 years old, 14 percent were between 10 and 13 years old,and 2 percent were between 5 and 9 years old. Id.
100
Network Movement for Justice and Development, supra note 46, at 11.
101
See, e.g. IHRC Interview #36, 14-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15Jan. 2008) (mining for three years); IHRC Interview #42, 13-year-old child miner, Paiama Village,
Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (mining for two years).
102
Network Movement for Justice and Development’s 2006 study, which covered four diamondmining districts, reported that 68 percent of child miners interviewed had been involved in mining for two or more years (i.e., 32 percent of child miners had worked in the mines for a year; 29
percent for two years; 15 percent for three years; 10 percent for four years; 3 percent for five years;
and 11 percent for six or more years). Network Movement for Justice and Development,
supra note 46, at 15.
103
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #28, 25-year-old digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008) (mining for nine years); IHRC Interview #30, 25-year-old digger, Hangha Village, Ken-

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry•

23

Finally, of the remaining 40 adult diggers who reported their time spentworking in the mines, the mean time involved in diamond mining was
9.15 years and the median time reported was nine years.
D. Working Conditions for Child Miners“If there’s a way for me to get out of the mines, I’ll be very happy, because this is aman’s job.” – Child miner104
IHCR researchers observed mining work to be overwhelming for amajority of the children they interviewed. Aiah, a child miner, explained,“When you are shovelling, your body will just feel like fire.”105 The work
performed by child miners varies according to their age. The youngest
children, those below 13 years of age, carry loads and bring food or water todiggers.106 In Tongo Fields, for example, two young boys aged 11107 and 12
years108 described to IHRC researchers how they fetched and carried water forthe diggers; both children were under the care of an adult digger at the mine
who could not afford their school fees. Our researchers also observed three
girls, who appeared to be between 7 and 10 years of age, selling fruit in andaround the pits of Tongo Fields.109 The crew boss or supporter determines
when a child labourer is strong enough to dig.110
ema District (15 Jan. 2008) (mining for eleven years); IHRC Interview #38, 21-year-old digger,
Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008) (mining for seven years); IHRC Interview #47,
25-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (mining for twelve-thirteen
years); IHRC Interview #79, 23-year-old digger, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008)(mining for eight years).
104
IHRC Interview #54, 17-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
105
IHRC Interview #139, 15-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
106
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #120, Shoa Sheriff, diamond mining supporter, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (“The small boys come with chop [food] and water. We use them torun errands. I do not pay them; I take care of their responsibilities such as feeding.”).
107
IHRC Interview #15, 11-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
108
IHRC Interview #15, 12-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
109
IHRC Researcher Observation, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
110
Earlier studies have confirmed the widespread use of young children for menial tasks andolder children for adult-like digging tasks. For example, 83 percent of the children interviewed in
the World Vision study “were actually involved in the mining activities, 8.6% went to the mining
sites to prepare food for the miners … [and] [a]bout 8% were there to run errands for the miners.” World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 16. Of the children that Bøås and Hatløy
interviewed, fewer were directly involved in mining; the principal reason for the difference,
however, is that 59 percent of their respondents were below the age of 14. The age breakdown
according to the type of work was similar to findings of IHRC researchers: 84 percent of those
involved in “direct work” were between 14 and 17 years old, whereas 78 percent of those in “support functions” and 80 percent of those in “petty trading” were younger than 14. Bøås & Hatløy,24 		The Practice of Child Mining

The average day of a child digger looks more or less identical to that ofan adult. Each morning between 7 and 8 a.m. and each evening between 5 and6 p.m., child and adult diggers can be seen walking to and from the mines, their
shovels and “shakers” in hand. In the mining pits, child and adult diggers work
side-by-side: shovelling sand in the mining pits, transporting bags of gravel thatweigh up to 50 to 60 kilograms (110 to 130 lbs.) to the washing site, and leaningover in shallow waters to wash the gravel. A 14-year-old who had been digging
for three years described his tasks: “I transport the gravel for washing. I put thebucket over my head and take it to the washing area. The work is so hard; I do
not have the chance to go to school.”111
E. Poor Compensation for Child Labourers“The problem is that I am a small boy and can not get more food or more payment
when I find diamonds.”112 – Child Miner“After working in the mines, I go to a cookery shop and get a plate of rice. It is the
only thing I eat all day.”113 – Youth digger“Sometimes I cannot study because I am so hungry.”114 – Youth digger
Child miners receive low daily wages and are routinely cheated of theirshare of diamond finds when compared to their adult counterparts. Childminers reported to IHRC researchers that their daily wages ranged from Le 500
to Le 2,000 (approximately US$0.15-US$0.60). Child miners who were digging
on contract (i.e. who do not receive any percentage of their diamond finds)
reported being paid Le 7,000 (approximately US$2.10) per day.
Some child diggers are brought by a parent or guardian to assist in
digging; these children do not appear to be paid at all. A 13-year-old childminer explained that he works in the mines with his father “to help increase theodds of finding a diamond,” though the supporter only pays the father.115 Thisfinding by IHRC researchers supports earlier conclusions that children brought
to the mines by a parent or guardian to assist with mining efforts follows out of
supra note 92, at 50 (Table 5.1).
111
IHRC Interview #36, 14-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008).
112
IHRC Interview #136, 16-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008).
113
IHRC Interview #110, 20-year-old digger, Tombodu Village, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
114
IHRC Interview #63, 16-year-old digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
115
IHRC Interview #42, 13-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

25“a sense that the boys are ‘miners in the making.”116
IHRC researchers interviewed children who live with their supporter
who receive little more than one or two meals a day. For example, Sheiku, a
15-year-old miner, is given Le 500 (US$0.15) in the morning, from which hemust obtain food to eat before dinner, while his pit boss’s wife later prepares
dinner for the young diggers living in their house.117
Beyond daily wages, many child diggers reported being denied thesame share of diamond proceeds accorded to adults. An 18-year-old digger
explained, even if he were to “get good proceeds [i.e. diamond finds], the older
and bigger ones take the finds and get higher rates – they are bigger and we aresmaller than them.”118
Under these circumstances, the child miners interviewed for thisreport regularly complained of being unable to afford a proper diet and ofconsequently suffering from hunger. For example, one 14-year-old digger
showed IHRC researchers a piece of raw cassava that was to be the only thingthat he and his father would eat until dinner, which usually constitutes a single
plate of rice.119
F. The Impact of Mining on Children’s Health“Right now I would rather do anything else. It hurts now, it hurts. The work isvery tedious at times. If you are unfortunate, you experience a lot of pain.”120 –Youth digger
Artisanal diamond mining constitutes hazardous work that seriously
jeopardizes the health and safety of child miners. First, repeated shovelling,transporting and washing of large amounts of gravel produces severe physicalpain for child miners. Second, routine accidents cause major injuries and116
Morten Bøås & Anne Hatløy, Child Labor in West Africa – Different Vulnerabilities, 46 Int’l
Migration 13 (2008). See also Bøås & Hatløy, supra note 92, at 50 (finding that 84 percent of
those in “support functions” and 77 percent of those in “petty trading” were supervised in theirwork by parents or relatives).
117
IHRC Interview #65, 15-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
118
IHRC Interview #124, 18-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008). See
also IHRC Interview #131, 16-year-old child miner, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008) (“Elders take away the big diamond finds and I do not get my share.”); IHRC Interview#137, Samuel Gbundor, Head Teacher of a primary school, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16Jan. 2008) (“The sale of the diamond will not reach the child, just a pittance is given. The childdoes not stand to gain [even when a diamond is found] because of the supporter relationship.”);IHRC Interview #142, 20-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (“Thesmaller diggers do not get as much as adults [when a diamond is found].”).
119
IHRC Interview #95, 14-year-old child miner, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
120
IHRC Interview #70, 18-year-old digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).

26 		The Practice of Child Mining

occasionally death in the pits. Children, given their smaller size and weakerstrength, are at an even greater risk than adults. Third, the pit areas – shallow,
still waters – are breeding grounds for diseases. An already-high risk of
illness is intensified by children’s physical weakness, leaving them particularly
vulnerable to contracting disease. Compounding the severe impact on health,supporters offer woefully inadequate care when their diggers fall ill.
While the work is difficult for all diggers,121 it takes an especially heavy
toll on child miners. Forced to wield a shovel or hunch over to wash graveleight to ten hours a day, six days a week, children told our researchers thatthey routinely experience physical pain – especially back pain. As one childminer who “feels real pain,” especially in his sides, explained, “If I can get[other] work, then my body – my life – will no longer suffer.”122 Child miners
commonly complained of headaches to IHRC researchers; indeed, almost all
child miners interviewed for this report attributed medical problems to theirarduous digging activities.123“The work it is strong and I am still a boy.”124 – Youth digger“The labour, like ‘tripping’ and carrying bags of gravel (50-60 kg) is very
dangerous and risky; it affects their health - their general well-being and feeling of
dignity.”125 – Head teacher in Tongo Fields“When I am sick the supporter only buys tablets; it is not sufficient and sometimes
I stay sick for a long time.”126 – Youth digger
An overwhelming majority of adult and youth diggers interviewed reported physical and psychological harm from digging. See, e.g., IHRC Interview #102, 19-year-old digger, Small Sefadu,
Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (“The work is so hard, it gives me serious pain in my sides.”); IHRC
Interview #89, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008) (“I have had swellingof my feet for three years, but the boss has not done anything for me.”); IHRC Interview #7, adultdigger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“The suffering is overwhelming; I do not
enjoy anything about this work. I live in total deprivation; I have been deprived of all – all social
activities, money. All I am doing is struggling for my survival.”); IHRC Interview #37, 18-year-old
digger, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008) (“I have a lot of pain from shovelling.”);IHRC Interview #142, 20-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) ( “I donot feel well. Since I’ve started this work, my body has not felt well.”).
122
IHRC Interview #139, 15- to 16-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan.
2008). See also IHRC Interview #136, 16-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008) (describing weekly headaches and constant pain in his sides).
123
See also Bøås & Hatløy, supra note 92, at 51 (“[M]any of the [child] miners complained ofmuscle cramps and constant pain in their back and chest.”).
124
IHRC Interview #124, 18-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
125
IHRC Interview #137, Samuel Gbundor, Head teacher of a primary school, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
126
IHRC Interview #110, 20-year-old digger, Tombodu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
121

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

27

As diamonds become harder to find near the surface, supporters arepushing their diggers to dig deeper and deeper. IHRC researchers were toldthat pits are becoming increasingly unstable and more prone to collapsing. In
Ngaiya Junction, one youth digger explained that “The sand covers people up;
most deaths are caused by the sand covering people,” and that two people had
recently died from a pit collapsing at his worksite.127 As emphasized by the
Town Chief of Peyima Village, “This mining area is dangerous – children may
fall and die, dirt may fall on them…. Precautions are not taken for them.”128“Alluvial mining areas are more vulnerable than others to infectious
diseases. They are over-crowded and lack basic housing, sanitation, water andhealth facilities.”129 The shallow waters of the pits are breeding grounds formosquitoes and result in widespread incidence of malaria.130 Moreover, many
child miners complained to IHRC researchers of significant stomach pain,
which appeared to be attributable to gastrointestinal parasites.131 A youth
digger explained, “Till now, I feel like an old person when I sit down; my toilet
has blood.”132
Despite the considerable health problems reported by the child andadult diggers, IHRC researchers learned that overseers routinely fail to provide
diggers with proper medical care. Mohamed Kamara, a representative fromthe United Mineworkers Union office in Tongo Fields, explained how his officereceives complaints from diggers of supporters simply providing painkillers,such as paracetamol tablets, when the diggers fell sick; in some cases, these werereportedly “expired” tablets.133 Child and adult diggers were frustrated with
IHRC Interview #148, 23-year-old digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #144, Sahr S.M. Burah, Town Chief, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan.
2008).
129
Diamond Development Initiative, supra note 44, at 8.
130
Id. at 8. Prior research found that over 40 percent of children involved in digging were prevented from performing their normal duties at some point during the previous month as a resultof fever. Bøås & Hatløy, supra note 92, at 61.
131
Prior research has found that over 40 percent of children involved in digging were prevented
from performing their normal duties at some point as a result of abdominal pain. Bøås &Hatløy, supra note 92, at 61 (Figure 5.4).
132
IHRC Interview #140, youth digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008). See also
IHRC Interview #142, 20-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“I have
had diarrhea, blood is in my toilet because I am not used to the work.”); IHRC Interview #116,
25-year-old digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (“I have worms in my system which are really affecting me.”); IHRC Interview #93, Aiah Janga, human rights promoter,
Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008) (“The licence holders are not told to have good
drinking water and toilet facilities at the mines, so there is lots of disease. The workers have lots ofheath problems, like worms.”).
133
IHRC Interview #149, Mohamed Kamara, United Mineworkers Union representative, Tongo
Fields, Kenema District (14 July 2008).
127
128

28 		The Practice of Child Mining

the lack of medical care provided by their supporters.134 In some cases, diggers
reported having been given a small sum of money by their supporter (usually,
Le 500-1,000, or less than US$0.50), which was insufficient to cover basic
medical expenses such as a visit to a doctor and/or medication. Of concern,
one youth digger reported that should an illness become severe enough toaffect a digger’s work, his supporter simply “abandons” the digger.135 Working
through pain and sickness, however extreme, thus appears to be standardpractice.
According to these findings, the negative impact of digging on thehealth of child miners clearly constitutes work that is both “hazardous,”136 and“likely to jeopardize their health [and] safety,”137 as defined under domestic
law138 and prohibited under international human rights law.
G. How Elder Sibling Responsibilities Drive Children into 		
Mining“I’m trying to pay for my younger siblings’ school fees by working in the mines.”139– Youth digger.
IHRC researchers observed many child miners who were the oldest
male sibling in their family, sent to the diamond mines to contribute to theirhousehold earnings. As explained by Abdulai, a youth digger, “I came to themines because this year I did not have the money to pay my school fees. There
are six children in total in my family, and my mother and I are trying to pay
for the younger siblings.”140 For some families, IHRC researchers learned thatpoverty may force them to bring additional children into mining. The father of
a 14-year-old digger for whom he could not afford schooling explained, “If we
continue to lack success in the mines, the younger son’s schooling will stop as
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #95, 14-year-old child miner, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008) (“The supporter gives me tablets [painkillers] for minor illnesses, but for severe sickness
the supporter does not take charge of that.”); IHRC Interview #47, 25-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (“The medicine supplied is not always right. The supporter
gives us tablets that are not meant for what is bothering us.”).
135
IHRC Interview #89, 27-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
136
CRC, supra note 2, art. 32.1.
137
ILO Convention 182, supra note 8, art. 3(d).
138Child Rights Act, supra note 1, § 128.
139
IHRC Interview #60, 19-year-old digger, Koidu Town, Kono District, (18 Jan. 2008).
140
IHRC Interview #114, 23-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008). See
also IHRC Interview #42, 13-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan.
2008) (He joined his father in the mines after his mother died because his father could not afford
the school fees for him and his four siblings.).
134

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

29

well, because we are barely managing right now.”141
H. The Exploitation of Girls Involved in Mining Areas“The ‘girl child’ is not exempted from the mining industry.”142 Tom Sandy, Member of Civil Society and Human Rights Advocate
The impact of mining on children is not limited to boys; girls areboth directly and indirectly affected by diamond mining activities. Many girls
work in and around the mines, though they appear to be involved in support
activities, such as carrying water or tools and selling food. IHRC researchers
also received reports of girls engaging in commercial sex work.
Throughout the mining areas, IHRC researchers observed small groupsof young girls carrying food and water and selling items.143 A prior study byWorld Vision found 9.9 percent of 497 children involved in mining activities
to be female.144 These female respondents “spent all day at the mining sites,”145
preparing food or performing other tasks. In another study, 168 of the 618
interviewees (27.2 percent) were girls;146 a majority of whom were under 14
years of age147 and involved in petty trading around the mines.148 Finally, thelocal non-governmental organization Network Movement for Justice andDevelopment interviewed 267 children engaging in activities in and aroundthe diamond mines, 13.9 percent were female;149 most girls were reported toperform “less strenuous jobs like fetching water, cooking and carrying tools.”150
Though not directly involved in mining, engaging in these activities appears to
IHRC Interview #95, adult digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #117, Tom Sandy, Head of Campaign for Just Mining, Bo Town, Bo District(12 Jan. 2008).
143
See, e.g., IHRC Researcher Notes, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (“Girls were on
the far side of a mining pit from where we entered and began interviews. They were very small,but because of the distance I could not determine an approximate age. By the time we moved tothat side of the pit, they had left.”); IHRC Researcher Notes, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14Jan. 2008) (“Three girls seen, they look around 7 – 10 years old. They sell fruit while their parents
work in the mines. Their mother digs gold in Tongo, but she was not around so we could not
obtain permission to speak with them.”)
144
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 12.
145
Id at 16.
146Bøås & Hatløy, supra note 92, at 35 (Table. 4.1)
147
Id. (finding that 18 percent of females involved in and around the diamond mines were
between 5 and 9 years old, 55 percent were between 10 and 13 years old, and 26 percent were
between 14 and 17 years old; in comparison, 46 percent of the boys interviewed were 14 or older).
148
Id. at 50 (finding that 1 percent of “direct workers” were female, 21 percent of those in “support functions” were female, and 62 percent of those in “petty trading” were female).
149
Network Movement for Justice and Development, supra note 46, at 9.
150
Id. at 16.
141
142

30 		The Practice of Child Mining

affect negatively school enrolment for girls.151
IHRC researchers also confirmed the practice of commercial sex
work in major mining areas. As reported by Mohamed Kamara of the United
Mineworkers Union, “Girls who do selling at the mines are often encouraged
to enter prostitution.”152 Two commercial sex workers in Tongo also confirmedthat the majority of their customers are diggers and miners.153 According
to the head teacher of a school associated through the International Rescue
Committee’s CYCLE program (described below), which rehabilitates childlabourers and reintegrates them into schooling, most sex workers are between
15 and 17 years old and many of them are child mothers who do not have themeans to care for their own children.154 Commercial sex workers in Tongo
reported being poorly paid – if at all – and regularly suffering physical abuseby their clients.155 While the commercial sex workers IHRC researchersinterviewed in Tongo reported being from the area, IHRC also received reportsof women and girls being trafficked from other parts of the country to mining
areas.156 Sex workers in Tongo told us that they “want to come off the streets,”
but lack alternative employment opportunities to do so.157
Finally, IHRC researchers also received anecdotal information fromcivil society and humanitarian aid workers concerning the prevalence ofgender-based violence (GBV) in mining communities. The U.N. Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has called upon the
Government of Sierra Leone to respond with immediate interventions tocombat the widespread commission of gender-based violence.158 In response,151
In the Bøås and Hatløy study, for example, only 46 percent of females interviewed were currently enroled in school; 47 percent had never attended and 7 percent formerly attended. Bøås &Hatløy, supra note 92, at 45 (Table 4.7).
152
IHRC Interview #149, Mohammed Kamara, United Mineworkers Union representative,
Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
153
IHRC Interview #138, youth sex workers, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
154
IHRC Interview #137, Samuel Gbundor, Head Teacher of a primary school, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (reporting that 20 percent of the children in the IRC CYCLE
program at his school were removed from sexually exploitative situations).
155
IHRC Interview #138, youth sex workers, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008). See
also IHRC Interview #137, Samuel Gbundor, Head Teacher of a primary school, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (relating that sex workers receive between Le 2,500 and 5,000 – or
between $0.75 and $1.50).
156
IHRC Interview #137, Samuel Gbundor, Head Teacher of a primary school, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
157
IHRC Interview #138, youth sex workers, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
158
For discussion of gender-based violence problems in Sierra Leone, see, e.g., U.N. Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination, against Women: Combined Initial, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Reports of States Parties, Sierra Leone, ¶ 12.13.4-5, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SLE/5 (14 Dec. 2006)(noting that gender-based violence rose sharply during and after the war and that there is an op-

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

31

the Government of Sierra Leone ought to consider addressing GBV issues inmining communities in partnership with existing initiatives such as the sexualassault services provided by the International Rescue Committee through its“Rainbow Centres.”
I. The Emotional Consequences of Mining on Children“I really have a lot of potential. When you meet me in the mining pit, you
cannot know my value.”159 – Adult digger
Many child miners interviewed for this report described a life ofdeprivation and physical hardship. These children correspondingly displayed
an overwhelming sense of fatalism and/or despair with this prevailing lack ofopportunity. Echoing the sentiments of many children, one 15-year-old digger
explained: “I mine diamonds to survive.”160 According to another youth digger,“I am just doing this because there are no other alternatives. I do not haveanything at the end of the day, but it is my only way to survive.”161
IHRC researchers observed that child and youth miners struggle
with the belief that their dire economic circumstances will never improve anddisplay a loss of self-esteem and self-identity. Aiah, a child digger, lamented, “I
have had no achievement, nothing really good has come in my life – I make justenough for survival, for some food.”162 Likewise, a 25-year-old who had beenmining since he was approximately 16 years of age, explained:
I am the first son in my family, and I am totally confused
because I have not been engaged in gainful employment toassist my family. My father did not achieve any status – did notprovide good housing or have a good job – so as the eldest it is
my responsibility to improve the economic status of the family.
My father has gotten old, so the burden is on my head. I am
hurting because I have not been able to do so.163

pressive “culture of silence”).
159
IHRC Interview #86, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
160
IHRC Interview #54, 15-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
161
IHRC Interview #109, 25-year-old digger, Foudu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
162
IHRC Interview #139, 15-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
163
IHRC Interview #116, 25-year-old digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).

32		

The Practice of Child Mining

CONCLUSION
A considerable number of children work in the artisanal diamond mines in
Sierra Leone, performing strenuous tasks that detrimentally affect their physicalhealth and overall development. Rather than obtaining an education, children
are driven into the highly exploitative situation in the diamond mines. The
result is that many child miners become frustrated and despondent. Without
immediate action from the Government of Sierra Leone, the deplorable
conditions under which children and youth work in the diamond mines arelikely to create a generation of marginalized post-war children and youth.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

33

V.
THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON Child Mining“While children were used as labour in the diamond-mining industry even before
the war, there has been a noticeable growth in the use of children in the mines
both during and after the conflict.” - 2004 Report of the Sierra Leone Truth andReconciliation Commission164
The present hardships borne by children and youth in the diamondsector reflect patterns of exploitation that reach back to Sierra Leone’s tenyear civil war.165 Children and youth diggers interviewed for this report
overwhelmingly identified war-related factors as among the reasons why they
now work in mining. Facing economic destitution, many children and youth
have turned to diamond mining to survive.
In many ways, child miners remain almost as vulnerable as they wereduring the war, finding themselves in a harmful and exploitative situation
where their rights are not protected. IHRC research identifies the following
factors related to the war that drive children and youth to mining: Loss or disruption of schooling: Deprived of an education during thewar, children and youth who have since passed the age of attending
primary school have limited access to educational opportunities. Manyturn to diamond mining because they lack a basic education;
 Loss of family members, especially parents and siblings: Orphaned
children and youth have been driven to support themselves and theirfamilies during and after the war; and Abductions and forced recruitment/labour: Children associated withthe fighting forces were forced to mine or were exposed to diamondmining. With limited livelihood options after the war, many of these164
Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission vol. 3b, ch. 4, ¶ 335 (2004) [hereinafter TRC Report]. In its fieldwork conducted soonafter the conflict, World Vision also found that the “war aggravated the involvement of children
in mining activities.” World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 6.
165
For a detailed history of Sierra Leone’s civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002, see Lansana
Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone(2006); Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s
Most Precious Stones (2004); Ibrahim Abdullah, Between Democracy and Terror: The
Sierra Leone Civil War (2000); Human Rights Watch, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The
Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors (2005) [hereinafter HRW, Youth,
Poverty and Blood].

34		

The Impact of War on Child Mining

children have returned to the mines seeking a livelihood.
A. The Loss of an Education“I stopped school at class 2 because of poverty and because the war came;the war destroyed everything and I could not go to school anymore.”166– Youth digger
A primary experience of children during Sierra Leone’s civil warthat has driven children and youth into mining was the disruption of theirschooling. The loss of education resulting from war has dire consequences forchildren and youth:[t]he destruction of educational infrastructures represents oneof the greatest developmental setbacks for countries affected byconflict. Years of lost schooling and vocational skills will takeequivalent years to replace and their absence imposes a greater
vulnerability on the ability of societies to recover after war.167
In Sierra Leone, the conflict seriously disrupted child and youth
development. Displacement of children and their families was widespreadfollowing the systemic destruction of their communities. Many child and youth
diggers interviewed for this report described being forced to abandon theirschooling; for example, a 19-year-old digger was in Class 4 when the war “found
him and his family” in Kono. He told IHRC researchers, “My father died andthere was no one to pay my school fees.”168 For Jibri, a 27-year-old digger, anarmed group forcibly recruited him when he was in his third year of Arabic
studies; he eventually fled to Liberia and lacked the means to continue his
studies once the war ended.169
Many of the younger children interviewed explained that the war
prevented them from commencing their formal education. Unable to read or
write, a 14-year-old child digger explained, “the war cut me off from starting
schooling when I was supposed to.”170 Another child digger was about to startschool when his father was killed by the rebels; since his mother could notafford to pay his school fees, he never attended school.171“[Education] gives shape and structure to children’s lives and can
IHRC Interview #113, 19-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
Machel Report 1996, supra note 35, ¶ 186.
168
IHRC Interview #43, 19-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
169
IHRC Interview #46, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
170
IHRC Interview #61, 14-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
171
IHRC Interview #65, 15-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
166
167

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

35

instil community values, promote justice and respect for human rights andenhance peace, stability and interdependence.”172 The full extent to which thedeprivation of a basic education during Sierra Leone’s civil war has affected thelives of children and youth is unclear. However, the child and youth minersinterviewed for this report commonly attributed their mining work to thedisruption of their schooling during the war, and their subsequent inability
to pursue an education after the war ended due to their advanced age orinsufficient means.
B. The Forced Labour and Recruitment of Children by the Fighting
Forces
The conflict in Sierra Leone included the widespread abduction ofchildren by the fighting factions that resulted in their forced recruitment and/or forced labour. Children associated with the fighting forces were frequently
exposed to mining operations. Many children and youth diggers reported
having worked in the mines during the civil war.173 Since armed factions
controlled virtually all of the major diamond mines in the final years of theconflict,174 these children would have been mining under the command ofarmed groups. As explained by a youth digger, “I was just a slave to the rebels.
I was their manpower.”175 The Sierra Leone TRC found:[M]any children were captured and conscripted into the RUF[Revolutionary United Front] and AFRC [Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council] fighting forces. Those children
captured … were forced to engage in mining activities, where
they were used to provide slave labour. These child combatants
and other abducted children were ultimately seeking fortunes
for their commandos. Many of the children and youth whoescaped capture by the RUF were later recruited by the CDF …

Machel Report 1996, supra note 35, ¶ 184.
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #29, adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008)(27-year-old who had worked in the mines for ten years); IHRC Interview #98, 23-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (explained that the war forced him to leaveschool and enter mining in 1999); IHRC Interview #30, 25-year-old digger, Hangha Village,
Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008) (worked in the diamond mines for eleven years); IHRC Interview#109, 25-year-old digger, Foudu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008) (worked in the mines since
he was so small that all he could do was fetch water, including working around Koidu Town during the war).
174
TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 1, ¶¶ 86-147.
175
IHRC Interview #75, adult digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
172
173

36		

The Impact of War on Child Mining[and] were later to become miners too.176
The mining experiences of children during the war appear to havecontributed to their post-war participation in diamond mining in two principal
ways. First, children witnessed the windfalls associated with diamond mining:
Finds were accumulated by the top command to gain weapons and otherbenefits for their respective fighting forces; children and youth were thus
exposed to the potential wealth that the mines could generate. Years later theyremain in the industry, having never been able to generate enough income fromdiamond proceeds to leave mining.177
The second factor concerns former lower-ranking commanders who,with few viable employment options available after the end of the conflict,returned to diamond mining.178 IHRC researchers were unable to determine
conclusively the extent to which lower-ranking commanders influenced theparticipation of their colleagues, including children and youth, who wereformerly associated with the fighting forces.179 However, anecdotal evidence
from industry actors, including diggers, confirmed a general understandingthat lower-ranking commanders may have recruited their fellow former
combatants, including children and youth, to work with them in the mines.
Preliminary evidence from a 2002 World Vision study more convincingly
found that of the 454 crew bosses interviewed, 80 (17.6 percent) said that theyacquired children to mine for them through their combatant networks.180
Deeper research is required to determine the extent to which networks offormer fighters were absorbed by the diamond mining industry.

TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 4, ¶ 335.
Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of
Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, June –August 2003, Interim Report 27-28 (2004), available at http://www.columbia.edu/ ~mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf. See also TRC Report, supra note
164, vol. 3b, ch. 1, ¶¶ 86-147. For a further discussion of the expectation of money in the mines,
see infra Chapter VI.A and B.
178
See TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 1, ¶¶ 86-147.
179
Considerable confidence-building and deep referral networks are required to enable this kindof research with children formerly associated with the fighting forces. The passage of time since
the end of the war and the precarious situation within which these children now find themselvescompound the difficulties in determining the extent to which they were influenced by combatant
networks into working in the diamond mines.
180
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 27. Interestingly, child miners overwhelmingly characterized their crew bosses as “friends” as opposed to a “former commander.” Id. at 13.
176
177

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

37

C. Loss of Family Members and the Corresponding Economic
Burdens for Children“I went to Form 1 in school, but then my father was killed by the rebels
during the war so I had to stop school.”181 – Youth digger“I was in class four when the war came to Kono. My pa died by the rebels
and there was no one to pay my school fees.”182 – Youth digger
An overwhelming majority of child miners interviewed for thisreport described having suffered economic deprivation in part because they
had lost their parents during the war.183 The report of Sierra Leone’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission found that “[t]he conflict has led to the lossof breadwinners through death, disability or sickness, so children have been
forced to become economic contributors and in some cases providers for theirfamilies.”184 Without direct familial support, it appears that many children andyouth have turned to diamond mining and thus, abandoned their education.
A 15-year-old digger, who had lost his father during the war and had to stopschool because his mother could not afford the fees, explained: “[I came to thediamond mines] because it was the only way to get my daily bread.”185 Indeed,
the deaths of family members during the war appear to have brought about theend of childhood for many of the child and youth miners that IHRC researchersinterviewed. A 17-year-old digger explained: “I lost my pa and ma in the war,[and] my uncle is not too caring, so I decided to fend for myself.”186
D. Associating DDR’s Shortcomings with Mining
In considering the legacies of Sierra Leone’s armed conflict, IHRC
IHRC Interview #79, 23-year-old digger, Peyima Village, Kono District, (19 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #43, 18-year-old digger, Paiama Villeage, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
183
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #124, 18-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan.
2008) (father “died in the war when they met the rebels.”); IHRC Interview #96, 23-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (was in Form 2 when the war found his family
and his father was killed; he has been working in the mines for six years); IHRC Interview #101,
adult digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (father was killed when the war found
his family in Makeni).
184
TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 4, ¶ 329. Human Rights Watch similarly found thatthe killing, raping and maiming of thousands of civilians “shattered the bonds of family and community needed to shield such fighters from their already precarious economic situation and at thesame time made them more vulnerable to exploitation….” HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood,supra note 165, at 33-34.
185
IHRC Interview #65, 15-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
186
IHRC Interview #55, 17-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
181
182

38		

The Impact of War on Child Mining

researchers found that some youth and adult miners who were associatedwith the fighting forces during the war attributed their poor socio-economic
situation as diamond diggers to the shortcomings of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programs (DDR):“DDR failed [me] because they asked what I wanted tolearn – which was to be a mechanic – but I was never given achance to do so. I don’t know why I was never called for skills
training.”187 – A 21-year-old digger who received a lump-sum
payment (Le 40,000, or US$12) through the DDR process andultimately became a diamond digger“I soon discovered that tailoring would not provide for me
and my brothers and sister, so I went to the diamond mines.
DDR failed because they promised to get us workshops andshelter facilities, but they failed to do so. The work was not
sufficient to sustain my family.”188 – Adult digger who wastrained in tailoring and given a sewing machine as a result ofparticipating in the DDR process“I was taught carpentering, but the tools were not enough toactually start a business. The training was also inadequate. I
need to learn more in order to engage in carpentering as a job.
I did not get the full skill training, so I am back here in themines.”189 – Adult digger“They just gave us a little money, and that was it. I had
nothing, and since there was no other thing for me to doafter DDR, I had to engage in mining.”190 – Adult digger who
received a payment of Le 150,000 (US$45) during the DDR
process“I did not go through DDR because you can only be disarmed
if you have access to a gun, and I never had a gun. So I could
not do much else. That is why I jumped into mining. It’s the
only work that I feel I have a chance to make enough money to
IHRC Interview #48, 20-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #50, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
189
IHRC Interview #29, adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
190
IHRC Interview #44, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
187
188

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

39

return home.”191 – Adult digger
Considering DDR’s Skills-Building Programs – Lessons Learned
An overwhelming majority of the child miners interviewed for thisreport requested educational opportunities while older child and youth
miners requested education and/or vocational training. A major componentof the DDR process undertaken in Sierra Leone consisted of skills-training
programs; lessons learned from these programs ought to be considered when
designing potential interventions for child miners. A major criticism of
DDR’s skills-training programs, for example, was how former fighters foundit difficult to transfer their skills-training into viable employment; specifically,
there was an increase in the supply of labour in the training areas without acorresponding increase in demand for such services.192 Sierra Leone’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission noted, “the sustainability of [skills training]
initiatives must be given greater consideration. There is a need to locate skills
training in the wider context of improving the economy. Skills training shouldbe accompanied by carefully planned follow-up mechanisms, which would
allow [those] successfully trained to utilise their skills to their own economic
advancement and the collective benefit of the nation.”193 Moreover, maintaining
realistic expectations for stakeholders is important in such interventions. In its
evaluation of DDR experiences in West Africa, Human Rights Watch noted thatsuch programs “should not be expected to bear the entire burden of creatingsocial stability following an armed conflict. Far reaching efforts must also bemade to provide for parallel community development programs assisting thegeneral population whose lives, communities, and villages were destroyed
during armed conflict.”194

191
IHRC Interview #75, adult digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008). Consider thefindings of Humphreys & Weinstein, supra note 177, at 9 (DDR programs “discriminatedagainst women, children, and others who participated in the conflict primarily as forced labouror sex slaves, and who may have participated in active conflict when defending their bases orvillages from attack.”); HRW, Youth, Poverty, and Blood, supra note 165, at 3-4 (finding that amajority of DDR participants “were kept out of skills training aspects of the program, or did notreceive any benefits at all.”).
192
See e.g., TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 4, ¶ 469.
193
Id. ¶ 471.
194
HRW, Youth, Poverty, and Blood, supra note 165, at 48. See also Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/62/228, partII, ¶ 99 (Aug. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Special Representative Report] (“Increased support for childand youth livelihoods is essential; however, broader economic recovery and investment allowing
small businesses to survive is equally vital. The education and livelihood aspects of reintegration
programming require greater investment and identification of effective models.”).

40		

The Impact of War on Child Mining

Conclusion
The experience of Sierra Leone’s civil war on today’s children andyouth – the loss of their caregivers, the deprivation of an education as well as
the experience of forced recruitment and/or labour – not only violated theirbasic rights but drove them into circumstances that continue to violate theirsocial and economic rights.195 The Government, with assistance from theinternational community, has an ongoing obligation to address the needs ofchildren and youth effectively and in a manner that realizes their social andeconomic rights and enables them to become a productive and self-fulfilled
post-war generation.196

195
196

See supra Ch. II.
TRC Report, supra note 164, vol. 3b, ch. 4, ¶ 363 (emphasis added).

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

41

VI.
CHILD MINING AND GAPS IN THE PROVISIONOF EDUCATION“My biggest problem is that I am unable to go to school.” – Child miner197
In addition to the legacies of the war described in Chapter V, theprevalence of child mining in Sierra Leone is related to widespread poverty
and gaps in basic living standards experienced by most Sierra Leoneans.198 The
primary development gap in this regard is the widespread failure to universallyprovide a basic education to the children of Sierra Leone. Affordable andaccessible education is an important factor in alleviating the financial pressuresplaced on Sierra Leonean families in caring for their children.199 According
to the findings of this chapter, it appears that parents of children in mining
communities are currently unable to meet the costs associated with schoolingand instead put their children to work.200
In responding to the prevailing gaps in the provision of education, theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has called for educational
funding programs as a potential mechanism through which to make education
an economically viable choice for families.201 Children and parents in mining
IHRC Interview #42, 13-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
According to the United Nations 2008 Human Development Index, Sierra Leone is the least
developed country in the world. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: Sierra Leone (2008), available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/
country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SLE.html [hereinafter UNDP].
199
The International Labour Office (ILO) has proposed a two-pronged approach to ending childlabour, which includes the enforcement of anti-child labour legislation and compulsory education up through secondary school age. The ILO strongly recommends free education as a tool for
combating child labour because evidence suggests that moving away from free education impacts
marginalized groups and the poor, primary suppliers of child labour. Further, a lack of free education may help perpetuate the cycle of poverty that is the primary motivation for child labour.
As children are forced to work to pay school fees or begin to work after dropping out of schoolsthat they cannot afford, their future employment opportunities are impeded since they are notcurrently receiving the education that they will need to compete in labour markets as young
adults. International Labour Office, The End of Child Labour: Within Reach xi, 21-22,
59 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf[hereinafter The End of Child Labour].
200
See id. at 21-22, 59, 62. See also IHRC Interview #95, 14-year-old child miner, Bumpeh Village,
Kono District (21 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema
District (14 Jan. 2008).
201
See, e.g., International Poverty Centre, Conditional Cash Transfers in African Countries (UNDP
Working Paper No. 9, 2005), available at http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorking197
198

42		

Child Mining and Gaps in the Provision of Education

communities told IHRC that they would prioritize education over child mining
if schooling was more financially accessible. Eliminating child mining requires
ensuring the delivery of universal education in conjunction with high-impact
measures that address the exploitative underpinnings of artisanal mining, as
described in Chapters III and VII of this report.
A. Missing School to Mine
The practice of child mining puts child miners at risk of losing anadequate education and the opportunity to earn a reasonable livelihood.
While most child miners cannot afford to go to school, many possess anoverwhelming desire to learn: “I like school more than anything else in mylife,” Usman, a 14-year-old digger, told IHRC researchers. “I want to go back toschool, but I do not have the chance.”202
Parents of child miners expressed the desire to return their children
to school. As a parent in Hangha explained, “On behalf of my child, I want
free education.”203 Earlier research has established through surveys of children
and parents that the practice of child mining has arisen out of the need ofmany families for supplemental income.204 Of these surveys, an overwhelming
majority of children preferred to attend school or be given skills training overmining;205 moreover, many parents want their children to return to school, but
Paper9.pdf.
202
IHRC Interview #36, 14-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008). See also IHRC Interview #60, 18-year-old digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan.
2008) (“I would really prefer to go to school; I would like to get educated, but because of a lackof money I could not continue school and came here [to the mines] in search of money.”); IHRC
Interview #2, 15-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“I want to
be in school but my family is too poor and could not pay my school fees. My father said that hehad seven children and cannot pay for the school fees for all of us.”); IHRC Interview #128, childminer, Hangha Village, Kenema District, (15 Jan. 2008) (“I am not glad to have been pulled awayfrom school.”).
203
IHRC Interview #25, adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
204
See World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 33. Of child miners interviewed, 75 percent stated that they were involved in mining in order to make money; another 15.2 percent said
that they did not have any alternative. Only 4 percent of child miners said that they were sent to
the mines by their parents. Of parents interviewed, 58.2 percent said that their children mined
to bring in money; another 30.5 percent said it was to help towards the schooling of siblings. Id.
See also Network Movement for Justice and Development, supra note 46, at 17 (“All of thechildren who were interviewed said that they were at the mines to raise money to feed themselves; over three-fourth [sic] of them said they were using the proceeds from the mines to help
take care of their homes.”).
205
Of the 497 children interviewed by World Vision, only 14 – or 2.8 percent – expressed a desire
to continue mining. In comparison, 44.1 percent indicated a preference to go to school, 39.6
percent wanted skills training, 7.8 percent wanted to farm, and 5.6 percent preferred petty trad-

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

43

are unable to manage without their assistance as child labourers.206
IHRC researchers found that many adolescents between 14 and 17
years of age were mining to earn money to cover their secondary school fees, oras described earlier, to earn money for their siblings’ school fees. Mohammed,
a 16-year-old digger, passed Form 1 but could not collect his report card (which
will force him to repeat his grade) because he was unable to complete thepayment of his school fees; he explained to IHRC researchers how he went towork in the diamond mines in hopes of obtaining “quick money” that would
allow him to pay his school fees.207
B. Ensuring Affordable Education“I want an education instead of mining.”208 – Youth digger“If education is free, I am ready to go back.”209 – Youth digger“I left [school] only because of financial constraints.”210 – Youth digger“Yes, there are some children younger than me that work in the mine here. They
are here for the same reason that I am - they cannot pay school fees and there isno other gainful employment.”211 – Youth digger
ing. World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 19. Only 3 percent of the children directly
involved in mining in the Bøås and Hatløy study wanted to continue their work. Instead, thechildren expressed a desire to “go to school” (31 percent), “get a better job” (27 percent) and “goabroad” (20 percent). For those involved in “support functions” and “petty trading,” 3 percent
and 0 percent of respondents, respectively, wanted to continue their current work. Bøås &Hatløy, supra note 92, at 74 (Table 7.2).
206
World Vision Sierra Leone, supra note 46, at 34. 42.8 percent of parents wanted their children to return to school, 41.4 percent wanted their children to learn vocational skills, and 12.7
percent said that they had no plans for their children. For a qualitative discussion of the economics of child labour more generally, see The End of Child Labour, supra note 199, at 60 (“Parents will send their children to school if it is acceptable quality, free, accessible and particularly ifthere are incentives such as a midday meal.”); Kaushik Basu & Van Hoang Pham, The Economicsof Child Labor, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 412, 413, 415 (1998) (stating that child labour “reflects stark
poverty and not necessarily the failure of will of parents…. This is supported by evidence thatparents withdraw children from the work force as soon as they are able to do so, so that nonworkof children is a luxury good that poor households simply cannot afford.”).
207
IHRC Interview #63, 16-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
208
IHRC Interview #147, 18-year-old digger, Farandu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008). See
also IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #87, 19-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
209
IHRC Interview #97, 22-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
210
IHRC Interview #28, 25-year-old digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
211
IHRC Interview #150, 19-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).

44		

Child Mining and Gaps in the Provision of Education

Sierra Leone’s Education Act of 2004 provides that every child has
the right to a basic education, which is defined as six years of primary school
and three years of junior secondary school.212 Despite being stipulated ascompulsory and free, the meaning of “free” under the Education Act213 remains
subject to interpretation and application by the Minister of Education, anddirect and ancillary costs remain. Prevailing costs associated with school
attendance include payments for books, uniforms and report cards.214
Meanwhile, for older children, secondary school fees in Sierra Leone amount toroughly US$66 while the average annual income is only US$240.215
Thus, although government-run primary schooling has beencharacterized as “free” in Sierra Leone since 2001,216 these remaining costs forbasic primary education, as well as school fees associated with secondary school
education,217 prevent many children from completing their schooling. A rangeof educational initiatives have been instituted, including the Community School
Initiative, which seeks to provide primary education to children in poor andremote areas, and the Caritas Project for Girls, which targets ex-combatant girls
left out of DDR skills training programs.218
In mining communities, as the Town Chief in one village told us,“[t]he main reason children go to mines is poverty. School charges [are high];
The Education Act, 2004, supra note 13, § 3.
Id. at § 3(3) (“Basic education shall be, to the extent specified by the Minister by statutory instrument, free in government assisted primary and junior secondary schools.”) (emphasis added).
214
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #80, adult digger, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #33, Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15Jan. 2008).
215
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women & Children, Country at a Crossroads:
Challenges Facing Young People in Sierra Leone Six Years After the War 2 (2008),
available at http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/sl_youth.pdf [hereinafter Country at a
Crossroads].
216
DDI International, supra note 44, at 8; Women’s Commission for Refugee Women andChildren, Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone
16-17 (2002) [hereinafter Precious Resources], available at http://www.womenscommission.
org/pdf/sl_adol.pdf.
217
Statistics show that Sierra Leonean students are not likely to continue their education beyond
primary school. UNICEF reports that 69 percent of males and 69 percent of females attend
primary school while only 22 percent of males and 17 percent of females attend secondary
school. UNICEF, At a Glance: Sierra Leone, Statistics, at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
sierraleone_statistics.html. UNESCO reports that 73 percent of males and 67 percent of females
are enroled in primary school, while 27 percent of males and 23 percent of females are enroledin secondary school. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS Statistics in Brief: Education in Sierra
Leone, at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_
Language=eng&BR_Country=6940&BR_Region=40540.
218
Alison Parker & Alusine Savage, UNICEF, Executive Director Says Stability is Bringing Progress
for Children in Sierra Leone, Feb. 29, 2008, at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_43047.html.
212
213

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

45

then there are extra charges like admissions fees, school uniforms.… If theseareas were addressed, it would discourage children from mining.”219 A fatherof thirteen children from Peyima reported that he found it difficult to pay
for the education of each child since basic school fees alone were expensive,
independent of supplemental expenses.220
Community members in diamond mining areas, including childreninterviewed for this report, voiced their desire for government-sponsoredinitiatives that focus on education.221 Patrick, a child digger, voiced a deep
desire for an education and echoed the voices of most of children interviewed:“I want the government to provide free education and to open more schools.
I would prefer to go to school . . . but because of a lack of money I could notcontinue school and came here [to the mines] in search of money.”222
The removal of primary school tuition may have already enabled anincrease in primary school attendance in Sierra Leone, where school enrolment
is twice as high as it was before the war.223 Because children tend to leaveschooling after primary school, often because they cannot pay secondary
school costs, a reduction of fees associated with secondary school would
assist considerably in precluding children from entering the mines once theyreach the pivotal age of fifteen.224 The elimination of school fees has facilitatedenrolment increases in several countries that are similarly undergoingpost-conflict reconstruction.225 Deeper research is needed on how mining
communities in Sierra Leone could benefit from widespread implementation ofschool funding programs. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs), for example, give
cash to families and are contingent on compliance with certain behaviour, such
IHRC Interview #33, Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun, Hangha Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008).
220
IHRC Interview #80, adult digger, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
221
Consider the sentiments of an adult digger that characterized the desire of many parents interviewed: “I want the government to provide free education so that my children can learn; that is
the main thing that I need.” IHRC Interview #32, adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008). A child digger similarly stated, “If there was free education, I would go right away.”
IHRC Interview #95, 14-year-old child miner, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008). See
also IHRC Interview #14, 20-year-old digger, Tongo Fields, Kono District (14 Jan. 2008) (“I want
the government to provide free education; that is the number one thing that I want the government to do.”).
222
IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
223
DDI International, supra note 44, at 8. UNDP also reports increases in primary school enrolment following passage of the Education Act of 2004, which requires all children to complete
primary school. United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone: MDG Goal 2 – Achieve
Universal Primary Education, at http://www.sl.undp.org/Goal2.htm [hereinafter MDG Goal 2].
224
See UNICEF, At a Glance, supra note 217. Because of statistics like these, the Women’s Commission has declared that fifteen is the “pivotal” dropout age in Sierra Leone. Precious Resources, supra note 216, at 15-17.
225
Special Representative Report, supra note 194, ¶ 84.
219

46		

Child Mining and Gaps in the Provision of Educationas school enrolment or attendance. These initiatives have proven successful
in middle-income countries in Latin America.226 The International Rescue
Committee’s CYCLE program, described below, similarly provides educational
support for school fees, uniforms, stationery and textbooks to encourage
student retention.227 It should be noted, however, that the CYCLE project will
be phased out in September 2009. Finally, many community members voiced
their interest in complementing programs to strengthen primary and secondary
schooling with alternate programs, such as accelerated learning programs andskills building.228
THE CYCLE PROGRAM: KEEPING CHILDRENOUT OF THE MINES AND IN SCHOOLThe International Rescue Committee’s Countering Youth and Child Labor
through Education (CYCLE) Program has met with success in helping
children obtain access to education and avoiding mining work. The objectof the program is to reduce the prevalence of child labour in Sierra Leone
and Liberia by offering educational and vocational training programs tochildren.
CYCLE works with communities to identify children and youth who areeither at risk of leaving school to enter exploitative labour, or who are
already engaged in such labour. If a determination is made that no othermeans of support is available to the child, community partners and the
IRC undertake to provide whatever school fees are necessary, in addition
to uniforms, stationery and textbooks, so that the child can enrol(or remain) in school. Older children and youth are offered subsidies
for vocational training programs, which include instruction in a trade,See generally International Poverty Centre, supra note 201.
IHRC Interview #151, Annalisa Brusati, Child and Youth Protection Development Coordinator, International Rescue Committee, Freetown (18 Nov. 2008).
228
IHRC Interview #33, Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun, Hangha Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict confirms this, stating that alternative forms of education and livelihood support systems
are desirable in post-conflict countries like Sierra Leone, especially if these programs are tailoredto the age of individual students. Special Representative Report, supra note 194, ¶ 98. Skillstraining programs, however, require careful consideration and do not necessarily always deliverin terms of ensuring viable livelihoods. One town chief, for example, expressed his concern that
if there are no markets to sell goods produced by newly skilled labourers, then workers will bedrawn back to the mines. IHRC Interview #33, Town Chief Amara Sonjo Vangahun, Hangha
Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
226
227

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

47

business skills training and a starter kit designed to assist with setting up
a business.229 Teachers receive training in order to provide needed
educational and psychosocial support to children enroled in school
through CYCLE, and the program also trains community representatives to
conduct child labour monitoring.230 As of March 2007, CYCLE had trained
243 representatives in Sierra Leone.231
Since its inception in October 2005, CYCLE had reached 14,600 children
and youth across Sierra Leone. By the end of 2007, CYCLE had enroled
285 children from Tongo Fields and 180 children from Kono District.
However, CYCLE was intended only to be a four-year program, plannedto phase out in September 2009. When families are faced with having to
pay the costs of education by themselves, it will be very difficult for someto avoid sending at least some of their children back into exploitative
labour. With this in mind, the IRC is working on several initiatives aimed
at helping CYCLE beneficiaries stay in school. Children formed clubs to
support each other, and the IRC is working with several government
ministries to explore the possibility of scholarship programs or fee
subsidies for children previously assisted by CYCLE. The IRC also works
with local child welfare committees and mining committees in Tongo
Fields on potential strategies to keep children out of the mines and inschools, and talks to families of CYCLE beneficiaries about budgetinghousehold income in a way that would allow children to stay in school.232
While a good short-term solution should involve continued donor support
for programs such as these, which can continue to pay school fees andprovide school supplies to children, donor funding is not a sustainable,
long-term solution to the problem of access to education. Poverty
reduction and a strong system of compulsory, free education are key
components to any long-term strategy aimed at keeping children andyouth out of Sierra Leone’s mines. The Ministries of Education, Labour
IHRC Interview #151, Annalisa Brusati, Child and Youth Protection Development Coordinator, International Rescue Committee, Freetown (18 Nov. 2008).
230
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, SIERRA LEONE PROGRAM BRIEFINGSHEET 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_part/5_5/irc_program.
pdf.
231
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Child Labor Education Initiative Technical Assistance Program, at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/armedliberia.htm.
232
IHRC Interview #151, Annalisa Brusati, Child and Youth Protection Development Coordinator, International Rescue Committee, Freetown (18 Nov. 2008).
229

48		

Child Mining and Gaps in the Provision of Educationand Social Welfare should together develop a strategy to reduce barriers toaccessing education, with a focus on making education as low-cost as
possible, and developing new income-generation programs for families.

C. Ensuring That Education is Accessible and Adequately Delivered
Poor access to education and its inadequacy compound the challenges
facing families in mining communities in ensuring the proper developmentof their children. Adolescents in some mining communities must travel toneighbouring areas to attend secondary school, such as in Peyima233 andLowoma234 for example. Usman, a student from Pandieu, expressed a desire fora nearby secondary school to stay close to his family: “I want to continue myeducation in this town. My parents are old and I do not want to go far fromhere.”235 Attending school in another community invariably adds to existing
obstacles for mining families to send their children to school.
Members of mining communities in Sierra Leone also complained ofovercrowding in schools that resulted from school shortages. A section chief
underscored the problem: “The population is too much for the schools wehave – we have reported this to the district council, asking them to build morestructures, but nothing has happened…”236
The problem of school shortages is compounded by the overall weakcapacity of the educational system, including the infrastructure and teachingpool. Several communities have schools with inadequate structures or no
structures at all, as many were destroyed during the war.237 In Lowoma forexample, the Town Chief indicated that students attending primary school
sat outside in the open air.238 A chief ’s wife in Yengema explained how thestructure for the community’s primary school was destroyed during the war
IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
235
IHRC Interview #36, 14-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008).
236
IHRC Interview #39, Section Chief, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
237
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #36, 14-year-old child miner, Pandieu Village, Kenema District(15 Jan. 2008). In fact, the destruction of educational facilities is a phenomenon that has beenhighlighted as one of the greatest developmental setbacks for conflict-affected nations. Years oflost schooling and vocational skills may take the same amount of time to replace. Further, theirabsence imposes a greater vulnerability on the ability of societies to recover after war. See Machel
Report 1996, supra note 35, ¶ 186.
238
IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
233
234

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

49

and remains to be rebuilt.239 In another area, a chief stated that although his
town had five primary schools and one secondary school, there was nothingleft because of destruction and vandalism during the conflict.240 Children wereleft to learn in old buildings formerly used by mining companies – buildingsthat were lacking windows and occasionally roofs, leading to difficulties during
the May - September rainy season.241 In addition to infrastructure, community
members reported a shortage of qualified teachers. One deputy town chiefemphasized that his community needed more qualified teachers, especiallythose who taught preschool and secondary school.242 If educational quality isimproved, families are more likely to sacrifice the short-term gains of sending
children to work in the mines for the long-term gains that come with a quality
education.243
The Sierra Leonean government has been building and rehabilitating
primary and secondary schools since 2003;244 however, as confirmed bythose interviewed for this report, diamond mining communities remain
underserved.245 Efforts to rehabilitate educational facilities should becoordinated with educational programs to reduce the cost of schooling. Sucha strategy has proven effective in Latin America, where various countries havecoupled demand-side educational funding programs with increasing the supplyof quality schools.246

IHRC Interview #108, wife of Yengema Town Chief, Yengema Village, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008).
240
IHRC Interview #99, Town Chief, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
241
IHRC Interview #99, Town Chief, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
242
IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono
District (19 Jan. 2008).
243
For example, UNICEF has reported that increased school quality has resulted in higher school
enrolment for girls. See Richard Lee, UNICEF, Improved Child-Friendly Schools Offer Girls a
Better Future in Sierra Leone, June 11, 2007, at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_39962.html.
244
DDI International, supra note 44, at 8.
245
Id.
246
The End of Child Labour, supra note 199, at 60.
239

50		

Child Mining and Gaps in the Provision of Education

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

51

VII.
ADDRESSING Regulatory Shortcomings“It is very difficult to find diamonds now except with great capital. As a result,
we have to cater to the investor; we are dependent on the investor.”247 – Town
Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District
Regulatory failures play a direct role in the inability of the diamondindustry to bring many Sierra Leoneans, including and especially children andyouth, out of poverty. Post-war reforms have succeeded in creating a viable
investment environment in the sector and promoted the expansion of the legal
diamond trade. Specifically, regulatory reforms such as the implementationof the Kimberley Process certification scheme and overall improvements insecurity have resulted in the increase of official diamond exports.248 However,as of 2005, an estimated 15249 to 50250 percent of diamond mining in the
country remained unlicenced. While recent increases in industry revenue havebenefited investors, many people interviewed for this report – from community
members who have yet to see diamond-funded development projects cometo fruition to diggers who struggle to support their families – reported having
failed to benefit from post-war regulatory developments.251
The laws, licencing schemes, regulatory bodies and modes of revenue
collection that govern diamond mining are presented in Chapter III. This
chapter discusses more deeply the shortcomings in Sierra Leone’s post-war
regulatory reforms in the diamond sector, which can be divided into threeareas:
 Failure to restructure the sector to promote the redistribution ofmining concessions and mining profits; Failure to design, administer and fund accountability mechanisms

properly to prevent graft, corruption, smuggling and embezzlement;

IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
U.S. Department of State, supra note 42 (noting that “formal exports have dramatically
improved since the days of civil war.”). See also Thomson, supra note 69, at 14-17.
249
Thomson, supra note 69, at 15 (citing a submission by the Government of Sierra Leone to theKimberley Process).
250
Twenty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,¶ 38, U.N. Doc. S/2005/777 (Dec. 12, 2005).
251
One digger reported: “As a married man with children, I cannot make it on two cups of riceand Le 500 a day…. From the small amount of money from this mining I have to feed my family,
pay school fees, for uniforms, for medicine; the money is not sufficient.” IHRC Interview #32,
adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
247
248

52		

Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings

 Failure to redress the deep bargaining inequities among industry actors

or to remedy deplorable working conditions in the mines.

As discussed in Chapter III, diamond revenues continue to fund prewar patronage systems that funnel diamond profits to a group of elites, which
precludes the implementation of serious reforms that can improve working
conditions for diggers.252 Unfortunately, prior initiatives aimed at improving
the distribution of diamond profits have been characterized by inadequate
oversight and accountability. At the same time, failure to stem remaining
diamond smuggling and to curb corrupt practices has enabled potential
revenue to flow out of the country entirely.253 Comprehensive approaches andsupport are needed to ensure that necessary regulatory reforms are considered
and implemented in the three areas identified above.
A. Removing Barriers to Legitimate Local Ownership
Encouraging legitimate local ownership of artisanal mines can enable
investment of diamond profits back into mining communities, potentiallyresulting in better working conditions for adult diggers, and ultimately reducing
familial dependence on child labour.254 Enabling legitimate local ownershipof mining licences requires reforming the currently complex licencing scheme
and clarifying property and inheritance laws. Immediate action is needed,
for example, towards enacting draft legislation prepared by the country’s Law
Reform Commission to rationalize property laws,255 as well as a proposed land
survey (“cadastre”) system that would accurately map property boundaries.256
At present, the mining licencing scheme can involve up to fifteen
separate administrative steps, which include formal and hidden costs that
effectively put mining licences out of reach for most Sierra Leoneans.257 Indeed,
licencees applying to the local Chiefdom Mining Allocation Committee
for a licence must negotiate separately with the local presiding Paramount
Chief for surface rights,258 who reportedly expect an additional “handshake”
Thomson, supra note 69, at 14-17.
Levin & Gberie, supra note 53, at 15.
254
DDI International, supra note 44, at 17-18.
255
See id. at 17.
256
As of 2006, a pilot “cadastre” system – a comprehensive register of the metes and bounds ofreal property including details of ownership, tenure, location, dimensions, cultivations and valueof individual parcels of land – was being implemented in Kono District. Government of Sierra Leone, Annual Progress Report – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 44, 47 (2006).
257
Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness, supra note 41, at 14.
258
DDI International, supra note 44, at 17.
252
253

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 		

53

of approximately Le 100,000 (US$30).259 The cost of this step in the processalone is prohibitive in Sierra Leone, where the income per capita is US$260
per year.260 To lower these barriers to licencing, there is a current call to adjust
licencing fees to more favourable rates for average Sierra Leoneans.261 Without
such initiatives, the present licencing scheme restricts licences and theircorresponding profits to a few investors with the resources to negotiate (orguide proxy licencees) through this process.
These barriers to legitimate local ownership and control over artisanalmining areas are compounded by gaps in the Mines and Mineral Act and theCore Mineral Policy, which concern specific property rights issues in relation to
the allotment of mining licences. For example, conflicts between commercial
interests and communities holding traditional land rights arise where theMines Department issues artisanal licences for the same locations where leases
have been issued for prospecting and exploration.262 Moreover, the Minesand Mineral Act’s failure to distinguish fully the requirements for granting
industrial as opposed to artisanal mining licences has resulted in overcharging
of licencees, who can pay up to “four times more in licence fees than industrialscale miners for the same plot-size of mining land.”263
B. Injecting Information and Agency into the “Supporter 		
Structure”
The inequitable distribution of diamond proceeds can be correctedby improving access to information about diamond valuation and giving
lower-level actors direct access to valuators. Diggers interviewed for thisreport overwhelmingly cited unfair pricing as a core injustice that required a
remedy.264 One digger reported, “We get diamonds but we don’t know the priceId. at 20.
The World Bank Group, Sierra Leone at a Glance (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://devdata.
worldbank.org/AAG/sle_aag.pdf.
261
For a chart of licencing fees under the Mines and Minerals Act, see DDI International
supra note 44, at 36.
262
Id. at 17.
263
Id. at 6.
264
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #106, adult digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008) (“Ifa person buying the diamond refuses to pay more, you just have to accept their price…”); IHRC
Interview #109, 25-year-old digger, Foudu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008) (“When I get a diamond, they do not buy it at a fair price…”); IHRC Interview #115, Brima Levi, Pit Boss, Yoradu
Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008) (“We need training in the pricing of diamonds. The government should provide or train objective valuing experts. Right now diamonds are not bought at
the proper price.”); IHRC Interview #113, 19-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22Jan. 2008) (“When we get a diamond, we do not receive a fair price…”); IHRC Interview #37,
18-year-old digger, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008) (“Whatever diamond comes
259
260

54		

Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings

so the supporter pays us what he wants.... Even if we get a big stone it is sold forfar less than it is worth. We need someone to help.”265 A system of independentvaluators ensuring that diamond prices are set closer to actual market value,
for example, which includes direct valuation support to diggers and licencees,
could shift control over prices away from supporters and dealers. Fostering
increased local ownership of mines could shorten the transactional chain andincrease the profit available at each exchange from mine to market. As one
digger emphasized, “We want a [community association] to empower thecommunity, so that we can dig on our own land.”266
C. Designing and Implementing Development Initiatives: Two
Case Studies
In recent years, both Sierra Leone and foreign donor agencies havedeveloped initiatives to combat persistent accountability and corruption
problems in the diamond sector. Unfortunately, these initiatives have beencharacterized by flawed design and weak implementation that has hampered
their ability to redress these problems. The two case studies below exemplify
the types of problems that have beset efforts to redirect benefits from diamondmining to local communities.
.
1. The Story of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund
A key component – and corresponding failure – of the Government’s
post-war reform program was the Diamond Area Community Development
Fund (DACDF), established in 2001 to facilitate reinvestment of diamondprofits into local communities.
The DACDF was charged with collecting and disbursing one-quarter of
the three percent export tax to local Chiefs for use in community improvement
projects.267 Chiefdom Development Committees, whose members wereselected by the local Chief, allocated DACDF funds to projects. Although
the program initially appeared to be an effective means of returning proceeds
to diamond communities – for example, the DACDF returned US$850,000
to diamond mining communities in 2004 – charges of corruption andmismanagement later arose. Disbursement of funds has now been suspended

up, the supporter prices it himself whether we like the price or not…”).
265
IHRC Interview #111, adult digger, Tombodu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
266
IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
267
Jackson, supra note 65, at 100. See also Partnership Africa Canada & Global Witness,supra note 41, at 10.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

55

indefinitely.268
The failings of the DACDF exemplify the lack of sufficient oversightand accountability mechanisms within the regulatory framework, especially inlight of the prevailing reports of corruption in its operation.269 For example,
one town chief reported to our research team that, despite being a hub ofmining activity for many years, his town had received relatively small sums ofmoney through the Fund and had not received anything at all since the Fund
had begun to distribute the money to local councils instead of to the paramountchief.270
Another problem inherent in the Fund’s procedures was that membersof the Chiefdom Development Committee were handpicked by Paramountchiefs with very little oversight despite the considerable disbursement powers
they enjoyed. It was reported that some Chiefdom Development Committees
were unable to account for Fund money.271 Over the course of IHRC research,
one community member reported that the local chief and community
authorities had used development funds from diamond revenues for their selfenrichment: a market structure that the Chief claimed to have been built by
these funds was reported by community members actually to have been built
by an international aid agency.272 As explained by an individual in anothercommunity, “proceeds [from diamonds] are put into a fund, but we never see
anything. We have been discussing this with the paramount chief; we brought
him gifts, but all went in vain.”273 Compounding the accountability issues at the
local level, mistrust of government bureaucracy in Freetown pushed donors andNGOs to reject a plan for a central oversight body that would have monitored
the disbursement of funds to chiefs.274
2. USAID’s Diamond Mining Cooperatives: Good Idea, Poor
Execution
In 2005, the United States Agency for International Development(USAID) launched a program to organize diamond mining cooperatives in
DDI International, supra note 44, at 29. See also 2006 Diamond Industry Review, supranote 69, at 11-12.
269
Roy Maconachie, Diamond Mining, Governance Initiatives and Post-Conflict Development in
Sierra Leone 12-13 (The University of Manchester Brooks World Poverty Institute, Working Paper
No. 50, 2008), available at http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/50_machonachie_sierraleone.pdf.
270
IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
271
Maconachie, supra note 269, at 12-13.
272
IHRC Interview #145, community member, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
273
IHRC Interview #39, Section Chief, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
274
2006 Diamond Industry Review, supra note 69, at 12.
268

56		

Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings

Kono District.275 T﻿he goal of the program was to enable diggers and theircommunities to receive a greater percentage of diamond proceeds by bypassing
the supporter system and selling directly to reputable international buyers.276
T﻿he cooperatives were organized in groups of 50-70 members who mined
as a team, carefully cataloguing any diamonds found and storing them in a
local bank for safekeeping until they were sold.277 Members of a cooperative
expected daily wages of approximately US$1-2, as well as food and basic healthcare.278
The program was short-lived due to problems securing the seed money
for the cooperative, misallocation of funds, a below-expected profit yieldin the first year and a poorly-designed scheme for financing and managing
the cooperative.279 However, even within a short timeframe, the program
generated: new employment for members and women providing support
services; access to basic medical care; and additional household income,some of which was used to pay for children’s education.280 Some cooperatives
even managed to become self-sustaining by supplementing the cooperative’s
funds with farming activities. As of late 2007, a few cooperatives were still in
operation and were engaging in community projects such as building a school,
implementing a new revolving loan program, and providing skills training for
women.281
While the USAID-funded cooperative program failed, its failure
should be taken as the result of poor planning and implementation, rather
than as a signal that cooperative schemes cannot work in Sierra Leone. A 2008
evaluation of the USAID cooperatives scheme made several recommendations
that will be useful to future projects of this type: Adopting a longer timeframe
for financial self-sustainability, providing better training for cooperative
members and leaders in the skills needed to operate this type of scheme,
taking more care in selecting mining sites, and ensuring better monitoring of
the program would likely lead to a more successful diamond cooperative than275
Estelle A. Levin & Ansumana B. Turay, Artisanal Diamond Mining Cooperatives in
Sierra Leone: Success or Failure? 1 (2008), available at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/
stories/documents/sierra_leone_cooperatives_study_2008.pdf.
276
Jean P. Tutusaus et al., Amex International, USAID/Sierra Leone Diamond Sector
Program Evaluation Report 20 (2007), available at http://www.usaid.gov/sl/contracting/mission/refmaterials/USAID SierraLeoneDiamondProgramEvaluationreport_final.pdf; Levin andTuray, supra note 275, at 3.
277
Levin and Turay, supra note 275, at 3.
278
Id. at 4.
279
Id. at 1-8; Tutusaus et al., supra note 276, at vii-viii.
280
Levin and Turay, supra note 275, at 4.
281
Id. at 5.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

57

USAID’s pilot.282
Finally, as noted by USAID and Global Witness, government
monitoring of mining operations is generally poor. Regardless of whether a
new cooperative scheme is attempted, effective monitoring is equally applicable
to reducing child labour in diamond mines. Frequent, regular monitoring ofmining sites could serve as a deterrent to using children for mining operations.
Both the DACDF and USAID programs show how developmental
initiatives aimed at redirecting revenue from diamonds to local communities
cannot be effective without adequate planning as well as comprehensive
oversight and accountability mechanisms. Subsequent initiatives must
carefully examine the shortcomings of these programs to ensure that they do
not succumb to the same difficulties. Ultimately, however, well-designed andimplemented programs can and should take centre stage in the effort to redress
endemic poverty among mining communities and stop the practice of childmining.
D. Considering a Child-Labour-Free Certification Scheme Akinto the Kimberley Process
A central component of recent industry reform is Sierra Leone’s
participation in, and compliance with, the Kimberley Process Certification
System. (For a full exposition of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
see Annex B.) Launched in 2003 in response to diamond-fuelled civil conflicts,
the Kimberley Process is a voluntary international regulatory scheme that seeks
to maintain the legitimate circulation of diamonds through the issuance of“conflict-free” certificates for diamond exports.
The internal control system required by the Kimberley certification
process remains hampered by the same sets of challenges that limit nationaloversight of the industry, such as: lack of capacity to monitor the industry andcollect accurate data; inadequate government oversight of mining transactions;and under-resourced domestic and cross-border law enforcement coordination
to prevent illicit and unlicenced mining.283 Nonetheless, the Kimberley Processrepresents an important international initiative that brings together actors
282
Tutusaus et al., supra note 276, at 22. See generally Global Witness, Monitoring Artisanal Diamond Mines: A Workshop Report (2006).
283
See Global Witness & Partnership Africa Canada, The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls – Seven Case Studies 2 (2004) [hereinafter GW & PAC]. See also
Pamela Wexler, An Independent Commissioned Review Evaluating the Effectivenessof the Kimberley Process 9 (2006) (“It comes as no surprise that the most problematic areafor internal controls is in countries where alluvial diamonds are produced by artisanal miners,
outside the formal sector. Countries vulnerable to conflict diamonds … are the least able to adopt
or enforce strong control measures.”).

58		

Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings

from government, the diamond industry and non-governmental organizations
to develop and implement a standards system to mitigate the trade of illicit
diamonds.
For the child and adult diggers in Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamondmines, however, the Kimberley Process does little to improve working
conditions in the mines directly.284 Building on the momentum generated
through its widespread participation among diamond-exporting statesand industry actors, Amnesty International has encouraged the Kimberley
Process “to start considering moving beyond conflict diamonds and includingin the certification system other human rights implications of the trade indiamonds.”285 Addressing human rights violations in relation to the diamondindustry – such as eliminating the practice of child mining – in states withartisanal diamond mining merits consideration. Specifically, conflict-freediamonds could be evaluated for certification as “child-labour-free.”
The successful implementation of a “child-labour-free” diamondlabel requires a deeper feasibility study that is beyond the scope of this report.
However, flaws in the Kimberley Process’ conflict-free certification scheme
ought to be considered to ensure more effective design of any parallel childlabour-free certification. For example, the Kimberley Process presently
depends on the capacity of participating states to comply with the requisite
standards;286 external technical support and monitoring are thus necessary
to ensure adequate implementation. Though the artisanal diamond mining
industry poses particular regulatory difficulties because it is conducted largely
outside the formal sector, child-labour-free schemes already exist in varying

Global Witness, The Truth About Diamonds 3 (2006) (“Little benefit goes to those thatneed it most, including the million or more artisanal diamond miners and their communities[who] often live in conditions of dire poverty.”).
285
Amnesty International, Recommendations to the Kimberley Process (KP) participants in order to effectively strengthen the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme (KPCS) (2006).
286
Of note, during a Moscow plenary meeting in November 2005, a declaration was adopted by
Kimberley Process participants regarding the improvement of internal controls in alluvial mining
countries; though helpful, these recommendations were not binding and were generally quitevague, leaving broad implementation authority to national governments. Kimberley Process,Improving Internal Controls Over Alluvial Diamond Production: Declaration
Adopted by the Moscow Plenary Meeting of the Kimberley Process (2005), available
at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/structure/working_group_en.html. Later, in November
2007, Kimberley Process participants created the Working Group on Artisanal Alluvial Producers (WGAAP). Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Working Group on Artisanal
Alluvial Producers, Terms of Reference (2007), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.
com/structure/working_group_en.html.
284

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

59

degrees287 for other industries including chocolate,288 rug-making289 and sports
equipment.290 Finally, any oversight body established to monitor a “childlabour-free” scheme would require technical and funding support, as well as anindependent and professional staff including child protection specialists.

For a discussion of these types of measures, see generally UNICEF, Child Labour Resource
Guide, Appendix 3 – Trade Associations: Responding to Child Labour, available at http://
www.unicef.org.uk/campaigns/publications/clrg/pdf/appendix3_C.pdf.
288
See e.g., Equal Exchange, Child Labor in the Cocoa Industry, at http://www.equalexchange.
coop/child-labor-in-the-cocoa-industry.
289
See e.g., RugMark Foundation, Campaign to End Child Labour, at http://www.rugmark.org/
campaign.php?cid=2.
290
See e.g., Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Sports Balls, at http://www.fairtrade.
net/sports_balls.html.
287

60		

Addressing Regulatory Shortcomings

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

61

ConclusionS
The survival and development of children living in Sierra Leone’s
mining communities – a large segment of the country’s post-war generation– is seriously threatened by the widespread practice of child mining. The
situation stands in gross violation of Sierra Leone’s obligations under domestic
and international law. To eliminate the practice of child mining, this reportadvocates a two-pronged approach – one that undertakes regulatory reforms intandem with development programming, including and especially in the area of
education.
As outlined in Chapters VI and VII, child mining cannot be eliminatedwithout addressing its primary causes: poverty among diggers and theircommunities and the failure to ensure basic education for all children living in
mining communities. Effective diamond sector regulatory reform must aim to
improve the lives of adult diggers – and their families – in relation to working
conditions, the supporter structure, diamond valuation and the distributionof proceeds. The creation of meaningful accountability mechanisms to curb
corrupt practices is also required. Improved avenues to ensure local mineownership with strong ties to mining communities and the transparent
implementation of programs designed to redistribute diamond wealth todiamond-mining communities are critical. The provision of accessible,
affordable and adequate primary and secondary education is also crucial to
keeping children out of diamond mining and must be undertaken in parallelwith industry reforms.
Ultimately, reforms must redress the basic inequities that impoverish
diggers and their families. By closing the gap in bargaining power between
actors in the transactional chain and strengthening the provision of education
to children in mining communities, Sierra Leone can avoid the marginalizationof a large segment of its post-war generation.

62		

Annex AANNEX A
Community Voices –Expressing Local Development Needs
Eliminating the practice of child mining requires responses that
correspond with development initiatives that are undertaken by national andinternational actors. This annex describes local development needs as voiced
by community leaders and members such as chiefs, parents, children, diggers
and educators living in mining communities. IHRC researchers received
information concerning i) livelihoods, ii) infrastructure development andiii) the broader provision of basic services such as housing, food, and water.
These needs represent a long and broad list of development needs whose
detailed consideration falls outside the scope of this report. This annex
aims at providing a space for the development concerns of local leaders andstakeholders in light of the strong sense of urgency with which they wereexpressed and serves as a locally-expressed call to action to the Government of
Sierra Leone, as well as to the international community and local community
members.
A. A Call for Improved Wages and/or Decent Livelihoods
Many of the young diggers and families in mining communities
interviewed for this report lamented their present working conditions andwages; they expressed a preference for job opportunities outside of the mining
industry, including the development of alternative employment and skills
training programs.291 As one digger explained:
I do not want to do mining, but I have no other option.…
There is no other work. I have to be patient and workin the mines and accept what I get in the mines. God
willing, I will find a big diamond and get skills training

291
An overwhelming number of interviewees expressed their desire for skills training or employment assistance. See, e.g., IHRC Interview #106, adult digger, Small Sedafu, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #98, 25-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #101, adult digger, Ngaiya Junction, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #73, adult digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008) (all stating that they believed
other employers or skills programs should be brought in to their communities). The Women’s
Commission also recommends skills training as an alternative to traditional education. See generally Country at a Crossroads, supra note 215.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

63

so that I can leave the mines.292
The diggers interviewed for this report universally desired a decent
living wage from their mining activities. One adult miner explained, “I ammining and seeing diamonds, but I am not profiting.”293 Adult diggers also
complained of limited employment options that render it difficult to leavemining work. For example, a father of three who occasionally received
contracts to do brick moulding indicated that he returned to the mines in hopesof securing a better income to support his family. Although he preferred towork in brick moulding, he could not sustain his family because there was alack of available employment in that field.294“The number one thing I want the government to do is create jobs.”295 – Adult
digger
“I was expecting more from mining, but I have not got any benefit from it; I wantskill training.”296 – Youth digger“I want the government to bring jobs other than mining; if they did I would leave
the mines immediately.”297 – Adult digger
Facing poor wages in mining and a dearth of employment options,many diggers – adults and children – expressed a desire for alternative
employment training; “I want to learn skills to do skilled work,” emphasized
Mustafa. “I want to be an electrician.”298 Other livelihoods that were mentioned
by diggers included carpentry, tailoring,299 driving,300 mechanized agriculture,301
masonry,302 teaching,303 and mechanics.304 Community members reported
that they were unable to afford the tools, facilities, and professional training.305
IHRC Interview #106, adult digger, Small Sedafu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #11, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
294
IHRC Interview #7, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kono District (14 Jan. 2008).
295
IHRC Interview #4, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kono District (14 Jan. 2008).
296
IHRC Interview #60, 18-year-old digger, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008).
297
IHRC Interview #31, adult digger, Hangha Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
298
IHRC Interview #52, 20-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
299
IHRC Interview #87, 19-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
300
IHRC Interview #98, 25-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
301
IHRC Interview #100, 15-year-old child miner, Koila Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
302
IHRC Interview #113, 19-year-old digger, Yoradu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
303
IHRC Interview #147, 18-year-old digger, Farandu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
304
IHRC Interview #44, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
305
See IHRC Interview #11, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008) (“I wantmechanic learning, but because I do not have any money, I came here to the mines.”). See also
292
293

64		

Annex A

While it is beyond the scope of this report to assess the feasibility of providing
such programs – especially considering the mixed success of previous skillsbuilding initiatives in Sierra Leone306 – it is important to note the broad interestin skills development programs expressed by the diggers.
Many community leaders emphasized that their communities should
focus on agriculture as an alternate source of livelihood to mining.307 For
example, one chief stated that agriculture, if properly utilized, could provide thevillage with money to build schools and water pumps.308 However, town chiefs
explained that they did not have the machinery, seeds and financial support
to encourage agriculture as an alternative to mining.309 One particularly
important undertaking for mining communities in Sierra Leone is land
reclamation, which restores mined-out pits to suitable farming land. The
Lowoma Town Chief explained:
We need machines in order to make the land suitablefor farming again. We are hopeful that land reclamation
will spread – it would also be a way to employ youths
and get them engaged in their communities. We would
prefer to be involved in agriculture, but people comefrom outside and [tear up the land through engaging in

IHRC Interview #56, 17-year-old child miner, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #50, adult digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008) (“I want the
government to support employment facilities for the [tailoring] skills that I have learned. I also
want it to supply building supplies or to at least lower the cost of the supplies.”).
306
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict hasreported that alternative forms of education and livelihood support systems are desirable inpost-conflict countries like Sierra Leone, especially if these programs are tailored to the age ofindividual students. Special Representative Report, supra note 194, ¶ 98. However, the skillstraining programs initiated in Sierra Leone after the civil war have enjoyed mixed success. See
HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, supra note 165, at 67. Indeed, as one digger from Tongo
Fields who had gone through such training explained: “I want the government to bring in more
work; I have learned a trade but there is nothing for me to do. I still have the masonry tools, andam still ready to work, but there are no jobs.” IHRC Interview #5, adult digger, Tongo Fields,
Kenema District (Jan. 14, 2008).
307
IHRC Interview #152, Suleman Turi, diamond mining supporter, Bumpeh Village, Kono
District (21 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #99, Town Chief, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono
District (19 Jan. 2008).
308
IHRC Interview #112, Paramount Chief of Kamara Chiefdom, Tombodu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
309
IHRC Interview #99, Town Chief, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

65

diamond mining].310
The Chief referred to a land reclamation program that was initiated byan international group in a nearby area that has since been discontinued. He
urged the government to sponsor similar initiatives across the diamond mining
regions of the country.311“I want the government to improve the medical facilities in this village. My niece
fell sick and we had to rush her to the hospital all the way in Kenema. She died.
We need an improved hospital here.”312 – Youth digger“There are inadequate accommodations. I have to use my shirt as my bedsheet.”313– Child Miner“I also have no place to sleep. I frequently sleep in marketplaces.”314 – Adult digger
B. Overall Community Needs
Community members interviewed for this report expressed awidespread desire for improved living standards and community infrastructure.
Chiefs and diggers alike reported that their communities suffered fromshortages of medical care, food and adequate housing. Improvements inthe delivery of basic services should be considered as a means of supporting
families in mining communities that can prevent the practice of child mining.
1. Rehabilitating Basic Infrastructure
Despite the passage of years since the end of the country’s civil war,
community leaders uniformly urged rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in
their villages. Community members and town chiefs interviewed expressed theneed for improved roads in mining communities,315 especially during the rainy
IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
312
IHRC Interview #37, 18-year-old digger, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
313
IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
314
IHRC Interview #12, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008).
315
IHRC Interview #65, 15-year-old child miner, Koidu Town, Kono District (18 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #112, Paramount Chief of Kamara Chiefdom, Tombodu Village, Kono District(22 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan.
2008).
310
311

66		

Annex Aseason.316 One youth digger suggested that revenues from diamond mining
ought to be directed to road improvements in mining communities.317 In
addition to road improvements, community members also expressed the needfor improved markets, town centres and the delivery of electricity in mining
areas.318
2. Improving Access to Water and Sanitation Facilities
Many community members expressed the need for better water andsanitation facilities in mining areas.319 One youth digger from the village of
Bumpeh lamented how his town lacks clean drinking water; he explained thateven when the rainy season (from approximately May – September) provided
a fresh supply of water, by March the wells reportedly dry up.320 Mining areas
also lack proper toilets.321
3. Improving Access to and Delivery of Primary Health Care
Members of diamond mining communities also complained of poor
access to and adequacy of health care.322 Specific access problems included an
insufficient supply of pharmaceutical drugs,323 as well as the overall absenceof available health clinics.324 While the Government of Sierra Leone hasreportedly taken preliminary steps to improve the country’s weak system of
IHRC Interview #87, 19-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
IHRC Interview #79, 23-year-old digger, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
318
IHRC Interview #98, 25-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008); IHRC
Interview #144, Sahr S.M. Burah, Chief, Peyima, Kono, Sierra Leone (19 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
319
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #97, 22-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #41, Town Chief, Lowoma Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008); IHRC
Interview #87, 19-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview#87, 19-year-old digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
320
IHRC Interview #98, 25-year-old digger, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
321
IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
322
IHRC Interview #144, Town Chief S.M. Burah, Peyima Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008).
A Deputy Town Chief explained how social services are lacking for those disabled and widowedby the war. IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village,
Kono District (19 Jan. 2008). According to the Women’s Commission, disabled youth – many ofwhom were forcefully amputated during the war – have reported being treated like they are subhuman or have been left without opportunities because of their disabilities. Precious Resources, supra note 216, at 30.
323
IHRC Interview #99, Town Chief, Bumpeh Village, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
324
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #37, 18-year-old digger, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan.
2008) (explaining how his niece died while being rushed to a health facility in another town).
316
317

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

67

health care delivery,325 mining areas remain underserved.326
4. Alleviating Chronic Food Shortages
Food security remains a critical issue cited by many members of
diamond mining communities. One Town Chief reported that many mining
communities in Kono District did not have enough food to sustain workers;327
indeed, in his opinion, negative community attitudes towards farming push
many to concentrate on mining as a livelihood.328 It should be noted that some
diggers interviewed for this report expressed a desire to farm but explained thatthey lacked the means.329
5. Insufficient Affordable and Adequate Housing
Finally, members of mining communities lamented the inadequacy of
their current forms of shelter.330 A youth digger explained: “Where I live, there
is only a plastic roof, so when it rains it falls on us. I have no bed. I sleep on the
ground.”331 The Section Chief for Pandieu, Kenema District reported: “Houses
are overcrowded – many were burned down [during the civil war], but we have
had no assistance in rebuilding them.”332 The widespread nature of the situation
was confirmed by a Deputy Town Chief in Kono District: “Most houses weredestroyed by the war, and people do not have the means to rebuild them.”333
Like the lack of health care and food, lack of shelter is both a reflection of
the severe poverty of many Sierra Leonean communities and a contribution
DDI International, supra note 44, at 8.
Id.
327
IHRC Interview #107, Paramount Chief, Small Sedafu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008). See also,
IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono District(19 Jan. 2008) (“We need food for working because an empty belly cannot work.”).
328
IHRC Interview #107, Paramount Chief, Small Sedafu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
329
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #94, adult digger, Yormandu Village, Kono District (19 Jan. 2008);
IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008); IHRC
Interview #48, 20-year-old digger, Paiama Village, Kenema District (16 Jan. 2008).
330
See, e.g., IHRC Interview #102, 19-year-old digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono
District (19 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #39, Section Chief, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #3, 14-year-old child miner, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan.
2008); IHRC Interview #12, adult digger, Tongo Fields, Kenema District (14 Jan. 2008); IHRC Interview #93, Aiah Janga, human rights promoter, Tombodu Village, Kono District (22 Jan. 2008).
331
IHRC Interview #102, 19-year-old digger, Small Sefadu, Kono District (21 Jan. 2008).
332
IHRC Interview #39, Section Chief, Pandieu Village, Kenema District (15 Jan. 2008).
333
IHRC Interview #92, Deputy Town Chief Mohammed Matthias, Yormandu Village, Kono
District (19 Jan. 2008).
325
326

68		

Annex Ato the financial pressures that currently overwhelm families living in mining
communities.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

69

ANNEX BAn Overview of the Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process represents a voluntary initiative to combat thesmuggling of conflict diamonds. This Annex explains the operation of theKimberley Process, outlines its achievements and identifies its weaknesses.
A. A History and Overview of the Kimberley Process
At the height of the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia in the 1990s,“blood diamonds” – diamonds mined by fighting forces to fuel conflict –comprised as much as 15 percent of the world’s total diamond circulation.334 In
December 2000, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution
in support of an international certification scheme for the trade of diamonds.335
After continued “pressure on governments and the diamond industry from
NGOs,”336 as well as the threat of a consumer boycott, the Kimberley Process
was launched at a meeting of southern African diamond producing states
held in Kimberley, South Africa, in December 2000. Subsequent international
negotiations on ways to stem the illegal trade in diamonds from conflict zones
led to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which took effect in2003 as a voluntary agreement among the diamond industry, governments andcivil society organizations.
The central premise of KPCS is that “any shipment of rough diamonds
to or from a participating state [must be] accompanied by a Kimberley Processcertificate guaranteeing that the rough diamonds are ‘conflict-free.’”337 The
certification scheme tracks traded diamonds from their origin to their finaldestination in retail jewellery stores or industrial production. Participatingstates are “only allowed to trade rough diamonds with other participants,”338
keeping conflict diamonds entirely outside of legitimate circulation. There are
334
Global Witness, The Truth, supra note 284, at 2. For a history of conflict diamonds,
specifically in Sierra Leone, see generally Ian Smillie et al., Partnership Africa Canada,
The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (2000); Greg
Campbell, supra note 165.
335
G.A. Res. 55/56, ¶ 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Dec. 1, 2000). See also G.A. Res. 56/263, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/263 (Apr. 9, 2002).
336
Amnesty International, Update on the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting ofNovember 2006 and Recommendations to Kimberley Process Participants 1 (2006)(“Background”), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL30/057/2006.
337
Id.
338
Global Witness, The Kimberley Process at Risk 1 (2006) [hereinafter KP at Risk].

70		

Annex Bcurrently 49 participants, representing 75 countries,339 which, according to theKimberley Process’s website, “account for approximately 99.8% of the global
production of rough diamonds.”340
The responsibilities of the three principal actors in the Kimberley
Process – governments, industry actors and civil society – are summarized
below:
1. Governments
To become a KPCS participant, governments must:• Enact legislation that implements and enforces the scheme;• Guarantee the security of containers used for the import andexport of rough diamonds;• Compile and exchange accurate records on their production andtrade; and• Create and use a certificate that meets the scheme’s requirements.341
2. Diamond Industry
The diamond industry is “committed to a system of selfregulation” which includes requirements to:• Create a code of conduct related to conflict diamonds;• Implement a system of warranties guaranteeing that diamonds sold
are conflict-free;• Keep records of warranty invoices for auditing; and• Inform employees of domestic regulations and industry policies.342
3. Civil Society
Led by Global Witness, Amnesty International and Partnership Africa
Canada, civil society organizations were central to the establishment of the339
For the most updated information on participating nations, see Kimberley Process, Whatis the Kimberley Process?, at www.kimberleyprocess.com. The European Union counts as one
participant.
340
Kimberley Process, Background, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_
en.html.
341
Global Witness, Making it Work: Why the Kimberley Process Must Do More to
Stop Conflict Diamonds 4-5 (2005). See also Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/basic_core_ documents_en.html.
342
Amnesty International, Update, supra note 336, at 1 (“Background”). See also Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme, supra note 341, at § IV (“Principles of Industry Self-Regulation”);
Global Witness, Making it Work, supra note 341, at 5.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

71

KPCS and continue to play an important role in monitoring compliance. Alongwith participating governments, industry and civil society representatives arepresent at the yearly plenary meetings.
B. Achievements of the Kimberley Process
The most practical achievement of Kimberley has been a reductionin the circulation of conflict diamonds. Compared to the mid-1990s, whenconflict diamonds were estimated to have comprised up to 15 percent of theworldwide circulation, estimates now place conflict diamonds at less than one
percent of total market volume.343 These estimates are somewhat unreliable,
however, as a diamond is presumed to be automatically conflict-free if it
is Kimberley certified344 – a presumption that does not always stand up to
scrutiny, as explained below. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the exact
contribution of KPCS as opposed to other factors that might account for
fewer conflict diamonds. For example, there may simply be greater stability indiamond-producing countries, since the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola andLiberia have come to an end. While one cannot determine the precise impactof Kimberley on reducing conflict diamonds, there is widespread consensus
that the Kimberley Process has had positive effects. As stated by Global
Witness, the “scheme makes it more difficult for diamonds from rebel-heldareas to reach international markets.”345
The Kimberley Process has also helped to establish an international
norm against the trade of conflict diamonds. Regardless of the effectivenessof governments’ internal controls or self-regulation by the diamond industry,
the mere existence of the norm provides a powerful incentive to reduce thepractice,346 which corresponds to consumer demand for higher accountability
from the diamond industry.
Finally, the Kimberley Process reflects a “high degree of collaboration
among nations, industry, and NGOs.”347 Given the different interests of these
actors and the fact that “the scheme was not mandated by an international

EC Chairmanship of the Kimberley Process, From Conflict Diamonds to Prosperity Diamonds (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/kimb/docs/handout07_
en.pdf (“Overall, it is estimated that over 99% of today’s diamonds are conflict-free.”).
344
See, e.g., World Diamond Council, Eliminating Conflict Diamonds, at http://diamondfacts.
org/conflict/eliminating_conflict_diamonds.html (maintaining that “over 99% of all diamonds
are certified through the Kimberley Process to be from conflict free sources.”).
345
Global Witness, The Truth, supra note 284, at 2.
346
For a discussion on norm diffusion, see generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 Int’l Org. 887 (1998).
347
Wexler, supra note 283, at 5.
343

72		

Annex Bbody,”348 this collaboration is noteworthy. It demonstrates that it is possible
to bring actors with divergent agendas together for a common, humanitarian
purpose. If the failings of the Kimberley Process described below can beproperly addressed, the process could serve as a model to improve practices inother extractive industries, many of which have likewise fuelled conflict andgross human rights abuses.349
C. Key Shortcomings of the Kimberley Process
Despite the successes of the Kimberley Process, “blood diamonds still
exist and are entering the legitimate trade” because of “significant weaknesses
in the scheme that undermine its effectiveness…”350 Five major shortcomings
identified with the Kimberley Process include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Weak internal control systems in participant States;
Ineffective statistical reporting;
Lack of funding;Self-regulation by the diamond industry; andThe limited mandate of the Kimberley Process.

1. Weak Internal Control Systems
At the core of the Kimberley Process is the requirement thatgovernments must “develop and implement [a system of internal controls] totrack the origin of diamonds and ensure that no conflict diamonds are being
exported or entering the formal trade.”351 Rather than outlining mandatory
policies – or even baselines of necessary internal controls – the Kimberley
Process leaves the design and implementation at the discretion of participating
governments. Although in theory this allows governments to devise standards
related to the specific circumstances and problems of the country, the reality
is that “[t]his discretion results in uneven standards of control between
participating states and opens the way for conflict diamonds to infiltrate thelegitimate diamond trade via the states which have the weakest internal control

Id.
See, e.g., Global Witness, Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fuelled the Conflict inCôte d’Ivoire (2007); Global Witness, Under-Mining Peace – Tin: The Explosive Tradein Cassiterite in Eastern DRC (2005); Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human
Rights (2003); Global Witness, Logging Off: How the Liberian Timber Industry Fuels
Liberia’s Humanitarian Disaster and Threatens Sierra Leone (2002).
350
KP at Risk, supra note 338, at 2.
351
Wexler, supra note 283, at 8.
348
349

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry		

73

measures.”352 Moreover, “[e]ven where controls appear adequate on paper, there
are substantial deficiencies with implementation and enforcement” in many
countries.353
Weak or non-existent controls as well as uneven enforcement can be
attributed to an over-arching lack of capacity, technological shortcomings andcorrupt practices by state actors. Moreover, borders are porous and there exists
little regional cooperation to stop illicit trading. Global Witness maintains that“[t]he (Kimberley) process will be neither credible nor effective and diamonds
will continue to be exploited and used to fund conflict” so long as there exist
participant States without reliable control systems.354
A Case Study of Kimberley: Côte d’Ivoire*
Diamonds mined in northern Côte d’Ivoire reportedly funded theoperations of the Forces Nouvelles, a rebel army that once controlled thenorthern part of the country. As a result, the U.N. implemented anembargo on diamonds from Cote d’Ivoire in December 2005; nonetheless,an estimated US$23 million worth of diamonds managed to reach theinternational diamond market the following year. Diamond traderssmuggled diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire into four neighbouring countries:
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and, once sanctions were lifted, Liberia. Becauseof weak internal controls in Ghana and Guinea, both Kimberley Process
participants, the conflict diamonds from Cote d’Ivoire entered thecirculation of legitimate rough stones and thus were certified as “conflictfree.” At the same time, rough diamonds from Cote d’ivoire were smuggled
into Mali, which is not a Kimberley Process participant, from which theyreached the international market through illegal deals. Conflict diamonds
from Côte d’Ivoire reached the international market due to the prevailinglack of transparency in the diamond industry, which enabled their purchase(and sale) without consequence. The case of Cote d’Ivoire demonstrates theneed to address weak internal controls in the diamond industry.
*Global Witness, Loopholes in the Kimberley Process: Summary of Results of Diamond Trade Statistics
Review (2007); Amnesty International, Update on the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting of November
2006 and Recommendations to Kimberley Process Participants 1 (2006) (“Background”), available
at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL30/057/2006. Global Witness, Making it Work: Why the
Kimberley Process Must Do More to Stop Conflict Diamonds 4-5 (2005).
352
Amnesty International, Update, supra note 336, at § 2 (“Minimum Internal Controls”).
See also Wexler, supra note 283, at 8.
353
Wexler, supra note 283, at 8. See also KP at Risk, supra note 338, at 3.
354
Global Witness, Implementing the Kimberley Process: 5 Years On – How Effectiveis the Kimberley Process and What More Needs to be Done 2 (2005). See also Global
Witness, Monitoring Artisanal Diamond Mines, supra note 282, at 7 (“… [w]eak, ineffective
or non-existent internal controls are the Achilles heel of the Kimberley Process.”)

74		

Annex B

2. Substandard Statistical Reporting and Analysis of the RoughDiamond Trade
Difficulties remain for participating states to accurately report on
the import and export of rough diamonds. Poor reporting is a major cause
for concern since “reliable and comparable data on the production and theinternational trade in rough diamonds are an essential tool … for identifying
any irregularities or anomalies which could indicate that conflict diamonds areentering the legitimate trade.”355
According to Global Witness, these problems include the failure to
submit statistics in a timely manner, poor quality or comparability of data,
and the “lack of regular analysis of statistics that is needed in order to identify
illicit trade.”356 The first two issues appear to relate to the will and/or capacityof governments, while the latter concern the structure of the Kimberley Process
as a whole.357 Strong statistical analysis is a critical tool to detecting conflictdiamonds; problems with statistical reporting “threaten[] to undermine theeffectiveness of the entire Scheme.”358
3. Funding the Implementation of the Kimberley Process
An overall lack of available funding for the implementation of the
Scheme in participating states threatens to undermine the Kimberley Process
in two ways. First, participating states may lack the capacity to implement theprocedures necessary to ensure compliance. Second, the Kimberley Process
is not formally funded per se and instead is “run by those that volunteer timeand resources.”359 Although volunteers have provided the foundation for a
successful scheme, the system as presently constituted “is not sustainable andplaces an undue burden on those who volunteer.”360

355
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 341, at Annex III (“Statistics”). See also
Wexler, supra note 283, at 8.
356
Global Witness, Implementing the Kimberley Process, supra note 354, at 4.
357
Wexler, supra note 283, at 16 (noting that the Working Group on Statistics, like other bodiesof the Kimberley Process, is an all-volunteer unit that simply does not have the time or expertiseto adequately review all of the incoming statistics).
358
Global Witness, Implementing the Kimberley Process, supra note 354, at 3.
359
360

KP at Risk, supra note 338, at 4.
Id.

Digging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

75

4. Self-Regulation Resulting in Weak Compliance by Industry Actors
As with participating states, the diamond industry is almost entirely
self-regulated under the KPCS. Industry actors are expected to articulate
applicable rules and enforce their compliance. However, this structure has beenreported to result in weak regulations and widespread non-compliance amongst
industry actors.
Global Witness has reported that “[o]nly a minority of diamondjewellery retailers … have effective measures in place” to implement therequisite regulations to combat conflict diamonds.361 U.S. and U.K. jewellery
companies have been found to frequently fail to respond to inquiries about
their policies on conflict diamonds; of those that do, only a few are able toprovide information on their system of warranties.362 A 2004 retail surveyof jewellery stores demonstrated a lack of knowledge and assurances about
whether diamonds were in fact conflict-free.363 Ultimately, these investigations
have demonstrated “the flaws in the self-regulation and its implementation,” aconsiderable problem for the KPCS’s effectiveness and legitimacy.364
Global Witness suggests that participating states should take a more
active role in ensuring industry compliance, “requir[ing] that the diamondindustry put meaningful systems in place” that provide for a “comprehensive,auditable system to track diamonds from mine to point of sale…”365 It further
advocates annual, independent audits of each diamond company’s system of
warranties and greater cooperation with law enforcement.366
5. A Mandate Limited to Conflict Diamonds
Finally, in addition to the problems outlined above, as currently
constituted, the mandate of the Kimberley Process is narrowly confined toconflict diamonds and does not address other human rights violations that areassociated with diamond mining.

361
Global Witness, Déjà Vu: Diamond Industry Still Failing to Deliver on Promises –Summary of UK and US Results of Global Witness and Amnesty International Survey
3 (2004). See generally Global Witness, Broken Vows: The Diamond Industry’s Failure to
Deliver on Combating Blood Diamonds (2006).
362
Global Witness, Déjà Vu, supra note 361, at 3.
363
Id.
364
Global Witness, Making it Work, supra note 341, at 7.
365
Global Witness, Broken Vows, supra note 361, at 3.
366
Id.

76		

Acknowledgments

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Kimberly Sullivan and Matthew Wells, students in the International
Human Rights Clinic of Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program (IHRC),
performed the field research for this report with Sharanjeet Parmar, a Clinical
Instructor. Antonia Carew-Watts, Padraic Glaspy, Katy Glenn, Aminta Ossom,
Chris Rogers, and Matthew Wells, all students in the IHRC, with Sharanjeet
Parmar, co-authored the report. Sharanjeet Parmar edited the report andcoordinated the project. Bradford Adams, Ashleigh Ferris, Tyler Giannini,
Sarah Min, Maggie Morgan, Anita Parmar, Surita Parmar and Sandy Wongcontributed in the final stages of editing. Christof Kurz, Ph.D. Candidate at
Tufts University, and Professor James Cavallaro, Executive Director of the
Human Rights Program, provided editing assistance and feedback. Michael
Jones, the Communications Director of the Human Rights Program, prepared
the report for publication.
IHRC would like to thank the many people and organizations who
gave considerable time and effort to make this report possible. We are gratefulto Partnership Africa Canada for inviting us to the Diamond Development
Initiative workshop on artisanal diamond mining in Freetown in January 2008.
We also appreciate the field assistance that we received from the International
Rescue Committee, in particular from Annalisa Brusati. We also extend our
gratitude to Ann Jones, who generously agreed to share her photographs from
Tongo Fields, Sierra Leone.
The contributions and assistance from the people of Sierra Leone are
too numerous to list. The Network Movement for Justice and Development(NMJD), a Sierra Leonean NGO, was invaluable in introducing us to diamondmining stakeholders throughout the country. We would like to specificallythank Abu Brima, the Director of NMJD; Patrick Tongu, the Head of NMJD’s
Kono Office; and Beny Sam, the Head of NMJD’s Kenema Office. We are also
grateful to the Freetown-based NGO, Promoters of Peace and Justice (PPJ). In
particular, we would like to express our utmost gratitude to Alex B. Kamara
and Augustin S. Bonga, who served as supporting field researchers. We would
also like to thank the United Mineworkers Union, in particular Ezekiel Dyke
in Freetown and Mohammed Swarey in Tongo Fields, for their assistance andenthusiasm for our work. Campaign for Just Mining, and in particular Tom
Sandi, provided important support in the field. We would also like to thank
Mohammed Jallow, our driver in Sierra Leone who kept us entertained overlong, bumpy roads across the country’s mining areas, at considerable cost to his
vehicle.
Most importantly, we would like to thank the individuals who gave
their time to be interviewed for this report. We are thankful to the local leadersDigging in the Dirt: Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry

77– in particular to Town, Section, and Paramount Chiefs – who spoke with us
at length and provided us with access to the diamond mines in their area. We
are likewise grateful to the supporters, licence holders and “boss men” whooffered invaluable insight and, with only a few exceptions, graciously allowed
us to disrupt the day’s work and interview the diggers. We appreciate all of the
youth and adult diggers who offered their difficult personal stories and theirinsight into diamond mining in Sierra Leone. Finally, we extend our utmost
gratitude to the child miners who related their experiences, and to their parents
for consenting to our interviews. It is our hope that this report offers a platform
for their voices and an impetus to put them, the future of Sierra Leone, at theforefront of the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Digging in the Dirt:
Child Miners in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry:
Seven years after the end of a civil war that targeted children for atrocities, hundreds of children and youth are exploited daily as they labourin open-pit diamond mines. This report describes how the Governmentof Sierra Leone’s failure to address the widespread use of child miners
violates its obligations under domestic and international law to protect
and promote the rights of children. By failing to redress the situation,
the Government of Sierra Leone is allowing the development of deepsocio-economic grievances, which could threaten future social stability
amongst a large segment of the country’s post-war generation.
Based on the experiences of child miners interviewed in over two dozen
artisanal diamond mining sites, the International Human Rights Clinic(IHRC) at Harvard Law School has prepared this report, which describes
how the rights of child labourers are grossly violated while working in artisanal diamond mines. Drawing from over 200 interviews with diamond
diggers, mining actors, local chiefs, mine union representatives, community leaders and members of mining communities, this report seeks
to deepen understandings of the practice of child mining and inform immediate responses that are necessary to eliminate this deeply exploitative
practice.

The International Human Rights Clinic@ Harvard Law School
The International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School is a centerfor critical thought and active engagement in human rights. Each year,
the Clinic undertakes several dozen projects focusing on fact-finding, litigation, legal and policy analysis, report drafting for international oversight bodies, and the development of advocacy strategies in partnershipwith organizations around the world.
The International Human Rights Clinic @ Harvard Law School
1563 Massachusetts Avenue, Pound Hall 401
Cambridge, MA 02130 • United States of America+1-617-495-9362 • hrp@law.harvard.edu
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp