E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of
EmotionReiko MUROI
Iwate University
Abstract
How do we constitute our “society”? Is it by a “contract”? Does our society need a “social contract”
as its basis? Some arguments on “civil society” in 18th Century Europe responded negatively to thesequestions and instead tried to construct a social theory based on an assumption that human social
bonds are formed within spontaneous (natural) occurrences, in which the principle or ties to connect
individuals are found in “emotion/sentiment.”
However, Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) critically confronted such arguments in those days
and their concept of “civil society as it exists” as a community of emotion. For Rousseau, humanemotions are brought about by society, therefore “natural emotions” as natural (spontaneous) social
bonds never exist. Rather, emotions caused by societies have led humankind to corruption; the peakof human historical corruption has been reached with civil society as an emotional community.
Rousseau also worked on how a human being can exist as a “natural person,” without degradation
in a corrupted “civil society as it is,” in his book on education Emile, or On Education (1762).
Rousseau attempts there to describe how Emile is taught the art to survive in a civil society as acorrupted community. This art consists of controlling emotions by other emotions, as though fighting
evil with evil. This art of survival is discussed in section 3. Section 1 reviews the transformation ofcivil society in the 18th century. Section 2 examines Adam Ferguson’s argument on civil society as acommunity of emotion/sentiment. Michel Foucault’s works are utilized throughout this article.
Key words: J.-J. Rousseau, M. Foucault, A. Ferguson, civil society, emotion, sentiment

Correspondence:
Reiko MUROI, Iwate University. Email: muroi@iwate-u.ac.jp

26

R. MUROI

Introduction
How do we constitute our “society”? Is it by a “contract”? Does our society need a “social
contract” as its basis? Some arguments on “civil society” in 18th Century Europe
responded negatively to these questions and instead tried to construct a social theory
based on an assumption that human social bonds are formed within spontaneous (natural)
occurrences, in which the principle or ties to connect individuals are found in“emotion/sentiment.”
However, Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) critically confronted such argumentsin those days and their concept of “civil society as it exists” as a community of emotion.
For Rousseau, human emotions are brought about by society, therefore “natural emotions”
as natural (spontaneous) social bonds never exist. Rather, emotions caused by societies
have led humankind to corruption; the peak of human historical corruption has beenreached with the civil society as an emotional community. In one of his main books On
Social Contract (1762), Rousseau searched for and planned a civil society as a legitimate
political community which is governed under people’s sovereignty grounded by a social
contract. At the same time, he also worked on how a human being can exist as “natural
person,” without degradation in a corrupted “civil society as it is,” in his book on
education Emile, or On Education (1762: hereinafter Emile). Rousseau attempts there todescribe how Emile is taught the art to survive in a civil society as a corrupted community.
This art consists in controlling emotions by other emotions, as though fighting evil withevil.
I will treat this art of survival in Section 3 of this article. Section 1 will review thetransformation of civil society in the latter half of the 18th Century. Section 2 will examine
the argument of Adam Ferguson on civil society as a community of emotion/sentiment.
Throughout this article, I will make use of Michel Foucault’s works as references.

1. Transformation of Civil Society in the Latter Half of the 18th Century
In the latter half of the 1970’s, Foucault shifted the priority of his argument on “rulingpower” from “disciplinary power” to “bio-power” and began to study the nature of social
ruling (governmentality). He describes then the development of bio-power and biopolitics in the 17th and 18th Centuries as transformation from “rasion d’État (statereason)/government of police” to “liberalism/government of political economy.” Afterthe Treaty of Westphalia (1648), a competitive space of states opened up in Europe. There
Symposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

27

emerged the theory of “rasion d’État” (state reason), which, according to Foucault (cf.
Foucault, 2004a: 293-318=2007: 285-310),1 was intended to respond to problems suchas enhancement of national strength, maintenance of a state and order among states. The
governance by state reason aimed to “regulate its subjects unlimitedly” within thegovernment of police. Against this tendency, the principle of “droit” (laws and/or rights)
was asserted in order to restrict the regulations of the state. This latter argument developed
into theories of natural law and social contract in the 17th Century (Foucault, 2004b: 711=2008: 6-10).
In the mid-18th Century, “coordination” of governance began to be sought, not byan “external principle” of droit, but by an “internal principle” of political economics. As
far as political economics aimed to enrich the state through coordination of population
and resources, we can say it was within the framework of state reason. But thecharacteristic of political economics was in that it attempted to judge the success or failureof governance under the criteria of whether or not it is in accordance with “nature” and“effectiveness”. This made it possible for government to self-restrict according to thenature of objects (subjects) of governance (Foucault, 2004b: 15-19=2008: 13-17).
Furthermore, this self-restriction led the government to “govern as least as it can” or “least
government” according to the nature of things, instead of maximum government as in
the 17th Century (Foucault, 2004b: 29-31=2008: 27-29).
However, this internal self-restriction of the governance system, even if it isachieved by minimum governmental reason, must be formulated in terms of droit.
Because of this necessity, the problem of limitation on exercise of public power against
the sphere free of governmental intervention has arisen after the advent of political
economics, until today, in place of the arguments on legitimate justification of sovereignty
before and in the 18th Century. Two paths have been proposed. One intends to define
natural or fundamental rights of individuals first, and then determine the limits ofgovernmental intervention against them. This approach would be named “Rousseau’s
approach” or “the path taken by the French Revolution.” The other starts fromgovernmental practice itself and tries to crystallize de facto limitations of governmentality
either from history and/or tradition, or in relation with the purpose of growth of national
wealth, and then formulate those limitations in legal terms (Foucault, 2004b: 3842=2008: 37-41). These two approaches may lead to different ideas of freedom. The
former asserts that individuals have certain fundamental freedoms by nature; a subject of
1

In this article, references to M. Foucault are indicated with the page(s) of the original texts and then with that of
the English translation edition. As a general rule, citations are from English translations, except for some revisions I
made for this article to fit its context.
E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

28

R. MUROI

such freedoms is called “homo juridicus”. The latter grasps the sphere to which a ruler
should not intervene (the independent sphere of the ruled people) as the freedom; asubject of non-interference (laissez-faire) is called “home œconomicus” (Foucault,
2004b: 43-44, 286=2008: 41-42, 282-283). The homo juridicus accepts a dogma of“restraint by social contract” (cf. Supiot, 2005). The homo œconomicus determines
whether or not to keep a promise according to one’s own interest, or to the standard ofusefulness (Foucault, 2004b: 276-280=2008: 273-276).
Political economics admitted the fact that the economic space was complicated likea labyrinth, that homo œconomicus was embedded in contingencies, and that one’s act
could serve others in unintended ways. These facts were utilized to assert that an intentionof totalitarian governance would not work and that it would be better as a whole to let
individuals pursue the maximization of their interests. The economy/market was
regarded as an uncontrollable sphere in this sense. Such a logic of economics led to adenial of logic of droit and politics, as well as to an idealization of homo œconomicus
who would follow the logic of economics. There still existed attempts to confine thesphere of uncontrollable economics/market, in order to maintain the form ofgovernmental reason itself. But they did not succeed, as Foucault says. Then appeared a
new attempt to reconstruct the concept of “civil society,” totally different from theconcept in the former half of the 18th Century. The new concept consisted of a sphere ofgovernance which practiced self-restriction without violating laws of economics nor lawsof droit, and, or rather, in a way different from these laws. Such a civil society appeared
as a sphere of “governance of liberalism/political economics” (Foucault, 2004b: 280-285,
296-301=2008: 276-281, 292-298).
This is how the “civil society” or the concept thereof changed in the mid-18th
Century. I would like to review the details of this concept in the next section, focusing on
an essay by Adam Ferguson, which is, according to Foucault, the most basic text of thetime on this topic.

2. Civil Society as “Community of Emotions”: the Case of Adam
Ferguson
Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) is a figure in Scottish Enlightenment, who had an
acquaintance with David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790). His book
An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) was read widely in Europe at that time,
including German and French translated editions (Ferguson, 1995: xvi-xvii). Foucault
Symposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

29

pointed out four characteristics of his argument on civil society.
First, Ferguson asserts that a civil society is a given, beyond which lies nothing toresearch. (Foucault, 2004b: 302=2008: 298). He rejects any attempt to assume a state ofnature or to trace its transition to a social state, calling such attempts “wild suppositions”
that ignore the records of history (Ferguson, 1995: 7-8). For human beings, society is as
old as individuals; “Mankind are to be taken in groupes, as they have always subsisted.
The history of the individual is but a detail of the sentiments and thoughts he hasentertained in the view of his species: and every experiment relative to this subject should
be made with entire societies, not with single men” (Ferguson, 1995: 10). In short,
Ferguson approves no special theoretical operation to found a society, nor prehistories tosocial bonds.
Second, he grasps civil society as a natural, spontaneous principle which guarantees
the integration among individuals, who are social beings from the beginning. Civil
society is not constituted under a pact of subjection to establish sovereignty. The
integration of civil society is brought about by individual satisfactions in the social bonditself (Foucault, 2004b: 304=2008: 300-301). And the principle of integration lies in“emotions,” as he says:[…] neither a propensity to mix with the herd, nor the sense of advantages enjoyedin that condition, comprehend all the principles by which men are united together.
Those bands are even of a feeble texture, when compared to the resolute ardour withwhich a man adheres to his friend, or to his tribe, after they have for some time run
the career of fortune together. Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of
fortitude, redouble the ardours of friendship, and kindle a flame in the human breast,
which the considerations of personal interest of safety cannot suppress. The most
lively transports of joy are seen, and the loudest shrieks of despair are heard, when
the objects of a tender affection are beheld in a state of triumph or of suffering.
(Ferguson, 1995: 22)
Mere acquaintance and habitude nourish affection, and the experience of society
brings every passion of the human mind upon its side. Its triumphs and prosperities,
its calamities and distresses, bring a variety and a force of emotion, which can only
have place in the company of our fellow-creatures. It is here that a man is made toforget his weakness, his cares of safety, and his subsistence; and to act from thosepassions which make him discover his force. (Ferguson, 1995: 23)

E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

30

R. MUROI

Even emotions such as malice, hatred, anger and so on, which bring about hostility, arenecessary to the formation of civil society. Without them “[…] civil society itself could
scarcely have found an object, or a form” (Ferguson, 1995: 28).
Third, in a civil society which is brought about through spontaneous bonds ofemotion, political power also comes about spontaneously. The division of labor emerges
spontaneously according to functions and missions among individuals in the society;
Some become persons to order, the others to obey, thus emerges a political power(Ferguson, 1995: 63-64). Political power exists in civil society in advance of its legitimate
creation, authorization and regulation. The legal structure thereof comes ex post facto(Foucault, 2004b: 307-308=2008: 303-304).
Incidentally, Ferguson examines “democracy” “aristocracy” “monarchy” and“tyranny,” in accordance with Montesquieu, who considered forms of government fromthe viewpoints of “sentiments” and “maxims of action” (Ferguson, 1995: 67). But
Ferguson emphasizes that he examines forms of government according only to “ideal
limits” and that in “reality” human characteristics, external circumstances, moral
sentiments as people may say, and so on are mixed up in different ways so that forms ofgovernment are infinitely diverse (Ferguson, 1995: 71-72). “Democracy, by admitting
certain inequalities of rank, approaches to aristocracy. In popular, as well as aristocratic
governments, particular men, by their personal authority, and sometimes by the credit of
their family, have maintained a species of monarchical power. […] All these varieties are
but steps in the history of mankind, and mark the fleeting and transient situation throughwhich they have passed, while supported by virtue, or depressed by vice” (Ferguson,
1995: 72).
Civil societies vary infinitely and change constantly. This characteristic links to thefourth feature of civil society that it is the driving force of human history. This is so
because civil societies are communities consisting of spontaneous subordination in which
individuals connect to each other by natural bonds of favorable emotions such as loveand friendship. There also exist “by nature” interests of homo œconomicus and egoism(selfishness), as the principle of such connections and separations (Foucault, 2004b: 308311 =2008: 305-307). Thus, according to Ferguson, emotions drive the history of civilsocieties as communities of emotions.

Symposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

31

3. “Natural Person” in a Civil Society: Rousseau’s Works on
Emotional Education
It would be safely presumed that Ferguson counted Rousseau as one of those who wereon “wild suppositions,” since An Essay on the History of Civil Society referred criticallyto Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1755: hereinafter
Discourse on the Origin) (Ferguson, 1995: 10-11). But for Rousseau, the theme ofDiscourse on the Origin was to “explain” “what chain of wonders” caused moral andpolitical inequality in human beings. In order to achieve this, it was necessary for him to
reject all the “facts” and suppose a “state of nature” which excludes thoroughly the ideas
we acquired in society and deduce conditionally and hypothetically (Rousseau, 1964:
131-13=1997: 131-132).2 In such hypothetical reasoning Rousseau described humanhistory up to the formation of civil society as a history of corruption and degradation.
Then, in On Social Contract, Rousseau searched for and planned a new politicalcommunity governed under the sovereignty of people by a social contract (cf. Omoda,2013).
In contrast to this, Emile explores how a human being can live in a corrupted anddegraded “civil society as it is.” At the final stage of educating Emile, his teacher took
Emile out to a two-year journey around Europe, in order to have him consider “where tolive” as if he is a “natural man” (Rousseau, 1969a: 831=2010a: 644-645).
Emile’s assignment was to observe countries and societies all around Europe, toobtain extensive knowledge of various governments, political customs and axioms ofstate, and to find the finest government (Rousseau, 1969a: 836-837=2010a: 649-650).
The “measurement” (échelle) for the judgment was “our principles on state law” (nosprincipes de droit politique), that is, the theories developed in On Social Contract(Rousseau, 1969a: 837=2010a: 650). A summary of On Social Contract is inserted in thebook V of Emile as the “measurements” to observe and evaluate various countries andsocieties, and not to have Emile construct an ideal political community after his comingof age.
Emile could not find an ideal country on this journey, but rather realized that there
was no such country, and finally settled down in the country he was born (Rousseau,
1969a: 857-859=2010a: 666-668) and chose not “big cities,” but a “country,” where his
future spouse Sophie and her parents live. Then he aimed, together with Sophie and her
2

In this article, references to J.-J. Rousseau are indicated with the page(s) of the original texts and then with that of
the English translation edition. As a general rule, citations are from English translations, except for some revisions I
made for this article to fit its context.
E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

32

R. MUROI

parents, to revive and restore the “golden age” of the region they lived, which had been
devastated at the cost of urban areas (Rousseau, 1969a: 859-860=2010a: 668).
This “golden age” to be restored resembles the beginning society formed by people
in the primitive state (“the genuine youth of the world”), which was depicted at the
beginning of part II of Discourse on the Origin (Rousseau, 1964: 171=1997: 167). These
communities do not overlap perfectly, since agriculture is a main industry in the place
Emile and his companions settled, whereas the original state in Discourse on the Origin
is supposed to exist before metallurgy and agriculture. But they may overlap, when
considered under the viewpoint of “sentiment.”
In the part I of Discourse on the Origin, almost the only emotion human beings(natural persons) possess is “pity” (pitié). This is an emotion which Nature endowed tohuman beings, a sentiment suited to human nature (Rousseau, 1964: 156=1997: 154).
“There is, besides, another Principle which Hobbes did not notice and which, having been
given to man in order under certain circumstances to soften the ferociousness of hisamour propre or of the desire for self-preservation prior to the birth of amour propre,
tempers his ardor for well-being with an innate repugnance to see his kind suffer”(Rousseau, 1964: 154=1997: 152). Natural persons did not possess any other passions
nor sentiments (Rousseau, 1964: 157-158=1997: 154-155). These other emotions arebrought about artificially to society by customs. In part II of Discourse on the Origin, it
is supposed that human beings began to band together by various coincidences, began toform families, and began to obtain abstract ideas, among which are the first sentiment of
one’s own existence, then secondly diversification into affection, jealousy, admiration,and so on. These sentiments have made human beings’ ties closer and closer, making
their bond tighter and tighter (Rousseau, 1964: 164-170=1997: 161-166). But the growthof these emotions and the strengthening of ties are to be understood, at the same time, as
the first step to inequality and vice, that is, to corruption (Rousseau, 1964: 169-170=1997:
166).
Nonetheless, Rousseau viewed human beings who were on the first step to vices
and corruption in the beginning society to be, in fact, in the finest condition.
[…] whereas nothing is as gentle as he in his primitive state when, placed by Nature
at equal distance from the stupidity of the brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civilman, and restricted by instinct and by reason alike to protecting himself against theharm that threatens him, he is restrained by Natural pity from doing anyone harm,without being moved to it by anything, even after it has been done to him. For,according to the axiom of the wise Locke, “Where there is no property, there can be
Symposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

33

no injury.” (Rousseau, 1964: 170=1997: 166)[…] although men now had less endurance, and natural pity had already undergone
some attenuation, this period in the development of human faculties, occupying ajust mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of
our amour propre, must have been the happiest and the most lasting epoch. The
more one reflects on it, the more one finds that this state was the least subject torevolutions, the best for man, and that he must have left it only by some fatal
accident which, for the sake of the common utility, should never have occurred.
(Rousseau, 1964: 171=1997: 167)
Human beings were restrained from harming each other, not only because full-scale
property was not realized there, but also because the harsh activities of “amour propre”(self-love) were controlled by the emotion of pity.
In the case of Emile, he could not find an ideal political community illustrated in On
Social Contract. Nevertheless, he was educated to live as if he was a man in the primitive
state, who would try with Sophie to restore the golden age in the land he was born, which
was not his “homeland”, but a “civil society as it exists.” With regard to this, Rousseau
gives caution about passions in Emile as follows:
It is an error to distinguish permitted passions from forbidden ones in order to yield
to the former and deny oneself the latter. All passions are good when one remains
their master; all are bad when one lets oneself be subjected to them. What isforbidden to us by nature is to extend our attachments further than our strength;
what is forbidden to us by reason is to want what we cannot obtain; what isforbidden to us by conscience is not temptations but rather letting ourselves beconquered by temptations. It is not within our control to have or not to have passions.
But it is within our control to reign over them. All the sentiments we dominate arelegitimate; all those which dominate us are criminal. (Rousseau, 1969a: 819=2010a:
634)
What is important is not emotions themselves, but whether we have control over them.
If human beings fail to control emotions in a civil society as it exists, they immediately
fall into dependence on others, no longer can retain their free existence, and thus become
corrupt.
For Emile, “pity” was the controller of evil emotions and sentiments. His teacher
E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

34

R. MUROI

was very careful to help Emile control by pity his “amour-propre” (self-love), which wasperverted from “amour de soi-même” (love to oneself), especially after his adolescence.
By the way, Emile did not succeed to restore the golden age and live in happinesswith Sophie. In Emile and Sophie, or the Solitaries (a sequel of Emile), Emile and Sophie
suffered the deaths of their child and her parents, and then moved to Paris, the city
regarded as the least suitable place to live after the two-year journey around Europe
described in Emile. Unfortunately, Sophie became pregnant after being deceived byanother man in Paris. Emile decided to leave Sophie and throw himself into lonesome
wonderings. Emile was educated to live in a corrupted society as a natural person or ahuman being in the original condition. It was his fate to become miserable, being rejectedby a corrupted society.
Rousseau aims to have readers realize how our society is absurd and evil byintentionally breaking down his search on education (cf. Sakakura, 2018). It should beemphasized, however, that Emile’s education half-succeeded, since he recognized thevalue of the education he received, even in the midst of misfortune, as follows:[…] you, my dear master, […] Never have I known the value of your efforts better
than after harsh necessity made me feel its blows so cruelly and deprived me ofeverything except myself. I am alone, I have lost everything, but I have myself left,and despair has not annihilated me. (Rousseau, 1969b: 882=2010b: 685)

Conclusion
I reviewed in this article why and how civil society transformed into the emotional
community, according to Foucault’s works. I also examined how this transformation was
evaluated and confronted, as well as what problems the civil society rose and what
responses were made, along with two figures in contrasting positions, Ferguson andRousseau.
According to Rousseau, we are unable to constitute an authentic society or
legitimate political community without a social contract for it. Therefore, a civil society
as an emotional community without social contract is found at the peak of humancorruption history as depicted in Discourse on the Origin. Such is the civil society
described in Emile which the protagonist must live with. His teacher attempted to help
Emile survive in the society, by teaching him to control emotions with other emotions.
Though Rousseau internationally halfway breaks down this search in a sequel work, theSymposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

35

attempt in Emile seems to reveal one phase of modern education in regard with civilsociety.
According to Ferguson, to the contrary, we need no contract at all to let a society
emerge; where there are human beings or individuals, there is a society. It is spontaneousemotions that connect individuals naturally, and that brings about a government or
governance naturally. The modern liberalism government required civil society to exist
as such. This sort of idea became radicalized into the Neo-liberalism government
afterwards.
It should be noted, however, that Ferguson himself also describes such a civilsociety critically. As Sonoe Omoda points out, “on the other hand, he [Ferguson]
recognizes shadows of civilization such as full (rotten) maturity of commercial society,loss of bravery virtue, laxity of national moral, decadence related to the pursuit of wealthand extravagance, and so on. […] Ferguson thus overpaints gloomy corruption anddownfall above the glorious history of refinement from the primitive state to thecivilization and its delicacy” (Omoda, 2018: 471-472).
Discussions on politics and emotions tend to develop as criticism of modern politics(and its theories). Against the background of the transformation of civil society in the 18th
Century, though, it is revealed that it is in the Modern Era when sentiments came to thecenter of the political sphere and that emotions and politics became inseparable thereafter.
Foucault says that politics is a function of various governing arts and that arguments
triggered by governing arts bring about politics (Foucault, 2004b: 317=2008: 313). The
modern government and its governing arts are correlative of civil society as an emotional
community. Therefore, as far as the former is possible within the latter, modern politics
is indivisible with emotions.
Furthermore, discussions on politics and emotions often criticize the support for“reasonableness/rationality” of modern politics (and its theories) and often tend to rethinkpolitics (and its theories) from the viewpoint of “unreasonableness/irrationality” (cf.
Yoshida, 2014; Yoshida, 2020). Perhaps we need to note Foucault’s remark on this point:
Undertaking the history of regimes of veridiction […] obviously means abandoning
once again that well-known critique of European rationality and its excesses, which
has been constantly taken up in various forms since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. From romanticism to the Frankfurt School, what has always been called
into question and challenged has been rationality with the weight of power
supposedly peculiar to it. Now the critique of knowledge I would propose dose notin fact consist in denouncing what is continually […] oppressive under reason, for
E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022

36

R. MUROI

after all, believe me, insanity (déraison) is just as oppressive. (Foucault, 2004b:
37=2008: 35-36)
Probably we need to abandon criticisms based on binary schema of “rational/irrational,”“reason/emotion,” and so on. This may be necessary work to be done in education study,
too.

References
Ferguson, A. (1995) An Essay on the History of Civil Society, edited by Oz-Salzberger,
F., Cambridge University Press.
Foucault, M. (2004a) Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France. 19771978, Gallimard/Seuil. [Foucault, M. (2007) Security, Territory, Population:
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, translated by Burchell, G., Palgrave
Macmillan.]――――(2004b) Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France. 1978-1979,
Gallimard/Seuil. [Foucault, M. (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1978-79, translated by Burchell, G., Palgrave Macmillan.]
Nagami, F. (2021) “Dai 1 shou: Émile wa doko ni sumunoka? (Chapter I: Where does
Emile live?)” in Nagami, F. (ed.) Rousseau Ronshû: Rousseau wo shiru, Rousseau
kara shiru (Collected Works on Rousseau: Learning Rousseau, learning fromRousseau), Chûô-daigaku shuppanbu. [in Japanese]
Omoda, S. (2013) Shakai-keiyaku-ron: Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau and Rawls (Social
Contract: Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau and Rawls), Chikuma-shobô. [in Japanese]――――(2018) Tôchi no Kôsô shi: Foucault Kôgi 1978-79 (The History of Governance
Strives: Lectures by Foucault 1978-79), Keisô-shobô. [in Japanese]
Rousseau, J.-J. (1964) Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité, Œuvres
completès, t. III, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. [Rousseau, J.-J. (1997)
Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in The
Discourses and other early political writings, edited and translated by Gourevitch,
V., Cambridge University Press.]――――(1969a) Émile, ou de l’éducation, Œuvres completès, t. IV, Gallimard,
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. [Rousseau, J.-J. (2010a) Emile, or On Education,translated by Bloom, A., in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, Vol.13, DartmouthCollege Press.]――――(1969b) Émile et Sophie ou les solitaires, Œuvres completès, t. IV, Gallimard,
Symposium: Emotion, Democracy and the Philosophy of Education

Rousseau’s Dissent from “Civil Society” as Community of Emotion

37

Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. [Rousseau, J.-J. (2010b) Emile and Sophie, or theSolitaries, translated by Kelly, C., in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, Vol.13,
Dartmouth College Press.]
Sakakura, Y. (2018) “Kitai toiu yamai” wa ikanishite fukou wo manekunoka: Rousseau
no Émile wo yominaosu (How “Illness of Hope” Leads to Misery: Rereading
Rousseau’s Émile), Gendai-shokan. [in Japnese]
Supiot, A. (2005) Homo juridicus: Essai sur la fonction anthropologique du Droit, Seuil.
Yoshida, T. (2014) Kanjyô no Seiji-gaku (Politics of Emotion), Kôdan-sha. [in Japanese]――――(2020) After Liberal: Ikari to Zôo no Seiji (After Liberal: Politics of Rage andHate), Kôdan-sha. [in Japanese]

E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 7, 2022