JSAC
JSAC
JSAC
JAPAN AND THE
ENVIRONMENT:LESSONS FOR
THE WORLD
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual
Conference of the Japan Studies
Association of Canada
October 3 - 6, 2019
Mount Allison University

WWW.JSAC.CA/JSAC_PAST.HTMLProceedings of the 2019 Annual Conference of the Japan Studies Association of Canada
Japan and the Environment: Lessons for the World

October 3 – 6, 2019
Mount Allison University© 2019 Japan Studies Association of Canada(Individual essays © the authors)

Editor: Owen Griffiths
Formatting and cover design: Brittany JonesTable of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………1
Owen Griffiths
Dōgen’s Jinzū 神通……………………………………………………….3
Jay Goulding, Dept. of Social Science, York University, Toronto’I'mPOSSIBLE’: Accessibility and Inclusion for the Tokyo 2020
Games……………………………………………………………………23
Susan S. Lee, University of Toronto
Osaka’s Troubled Metropolitan Plan: A Local Tragedy or Japan’s
Triump?.....................................................................................................39
David W. Edgington, Department of Geography, University of British
Columbia
The Pros and Cons of the Recent Diffusion of Solar Panels on
Farmland in Japan……………………………………………………...73
Tom Waldichuk, Department of Geography & Environmental Studies,
Thompson Rivers University

Introduction
The 32nd annual conference of the Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC) was heldat Mount Allison University in Sackville, NB from October 3-6, 2019. The theme of theconference was “Japan and the Environment: Lessons for the World.” With the ominous
warnings coming from the IPCC, Northern Canada’s accelerated warming, and ongoingdebates over the new carbon tax, an environmental theme for the conference seemed mostfitting.
Japan is no stranger to cataclysmic environmental disasters, both natural and humanmade. Its experience with the externalities of rapid industrial development at two points in its
modern history, for example, offers valuable insights into understanding how we have arrived
at this point in world history and may also offer suggestions as to how we can address thechallenges that lie before us. Japan also has deep aesthetic and spiritual connections to thenatural world that are reflected in its literary, philosophical, and artistic traditions. Japan’s
diverse engagements with the natural world may provide thoughtful reminders of ourinterconnectedness with the environment as we move further into the 21st century.
The issues surrounding global warming and climate change manifest themselves at alllevels of the world’s societies, from cultural and social practices to economic activity andgovernment policy. We were fortunate to have a robust and diverse collection of papers
addressing many of these issues as they related to Japan and its relationship with other peoplesof the world. Topics ranged from tourism and the Olympic Games to contemporary issues insustainable living, pollution control, and energy conservation. Rounding out the presentations,were papers on contemporary politics, language and popular culture, and philosophical andaesthetic explorations of Japan’s past and present.
Complementing the high quality of presentations was an exceptional slate of keynote
speakers. Beginning close to home, the conference opened with an informative discussion of the
Gulf of St Lawrence crab fishery and its relationship to Japan by former Fisheries and Oceansscientist Moriyasu Mikio. This was followed by a stimulating presentation on the relationshipbetween the state and nuclear power in Japan by noted historian Jeff Kingston. Conference
attendees were also treated to an excellent talk on the Greenhouse Effect by physicist JeanFrancois Bisson, followed by a powerful account detailing new research on the Minamata
poisoning case dating back to the 1950s by Ingrid J. Pickering and Graham George. Shifting
gears slightly, attention then turned to economist Osawa Machio’s fascinating presentation on
the Japanese government’s failures to more fully integrate women’s participation in Japan’s
economic recovery plans. Rounding out the keynote presentations was an exceptional
discussion on the state of Japan studies by the eminent historian Laura Hein, who is currently
General Editor of the new Cambridge History of Japan due to be released in 2023.
These proceedings contain a small sampling of the many fine papers given at theconference. Jay Goulding kicks things off with a lively discussion of Buddhist monk and Sōtō
School Founder, Dōgen (1200-1253). Goulding highlights the impact of Daoism on Dōgen’s
thinking and also offers some interesting parallels with the much later work of German
philosopher Martin Heidegger. Next up, Susan Lee brings us into the contemporary world witha thoughtful assessment of the Japanese government’s Universal Design 2020 Action Plan created
for the 2020 Olympics. Among other things, Lee addresses the possible consequences of such aplan for Tokyo and Japan more broadly after the Olympics are over. From there, we move toDavid Edgington’s evaluation of the proposal to merge Osaka City and the Osaka government
into a single metropolitan unit. Edgington traces the decade-long evolution of the proposal,

paying particular attention to the interplay of local and national politics. Finally, Tom
Waldichuk offers a fascinating examination of the tension between the use of solar panels on
unused farmland and the sustainability of farming itself. Waldichuk explores the pros and consof solar panel use on farmland, their ability to generate significant revenue, and the degree towhich the two can coexist.
Aided by exceptional fall weather in southern New Brunswick, the 32nd JSAC
Conference was a resounding success with the range of topics and papers complementing thediversity of its members and their various areas of research and teaching. As always, JSAC is
profoundly indebted to the ongoing support of the Japan Foundation and its Toronto
representative Shimizu Yuko. We also want to acknowledge the Canadian Studies Program andthe Departments of History and Geography and Environmental Studies at Mount Allison for
their financial contributions. Thanks also to my colleagues Oe Miyako and Tim Reiffenstein,
and Brittany Jones, Admin Assistant for History, Canadian Studies, and Women’s and GenderStudies. I also want to acknowledge the great work done by our student assistants Ae Minaho,
Arima Eri, Hori Suzuka, Katayama Seema, Ohashi Eri, and Gorkem Malkoclu. Last but notleast, thank you to all those who travelled long distances to attend this year’s conference in the
Canadian far east as well as to my JSAC colleagues who helped bring this all together.
Owen Griffiths
Department of History
Mount Allison University

2

“Dōgen’s Jinzū 神通,” Jay Goulding, Dept. of Social Science, York University, Toronto
Abstract: In 1223, Dōgen Zenji (1200–1253) lives for four years in China at several Buddhist
monasteries. His return to Japan marks the creation of Sōtō style seated meditation as
exemplified in the rarely read Fukanzazengi. Dōgen is influenced by Daoist inspired texts such as
the Chan monk Yongming Yanshou’s (904-975) zongjinglu (Record of the Source Mirror), a manualon the supernatural that emphasizes miracles. Remarkably, the phenomenologist Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976) creates a parallel world to Dōgen with his idea of Schritt zurück (the stepback) which shadows the Zen master’s taiho (step back). Dōgen calls the supernatural jinzū (thepassage of the gods) but ironically dismisses its small miracles in favour of the big miracles ofeveryday life—breathing, sitting and gazing at the moon.
Introduction 1
In 1223, Dōgen Zenji (1200–1253) travels to China on a four-year sojourn to live atvarious Buddhist monasteries. When he returns to Japan, he revolutionizes Zen with thecreation of Sōtō style seated meditation as exemplified in the rarely read Fukanzazengi 普勧坐禪儀, Universally Recommended Instructions for Zazen of 1233. 2 He subtly alters the perception ofnature and environment coming from Daoism with the hint of esoteric texts such as the Chanmonk Yongming Yanshou’s 永明延壽 (904-975) Zōng jìng lù 宗鏡錄 (Record of the Source Mirror)
written in 960, a manual on the supernatural. Yanshou engages five vital forms of supernatural
power that Dōgen eventually turns back inside everyday experience on his way to creating a
new Zen philosophy.
Although Dōgen does not directly mention this text, he explores a summary of its
ramifications in “Miracles,” and also recalls a story regarding Yanshou, both appearing in the
Shobogenzo Zuimonki (The Treasury of the True Dharma Eye: Record of Things Heard) of 1241.
Collectively, Dōgen calls the supernatural phenomena jinzū 神通 (the passage through orpermeation of the gods or kami); he then ironically dismisses it in all its forms as “small
miracles” in favour of the “big miracles” of everyday life (such as breathing, sitting and looking
at the moon). In doing so, he seems to shed some grandiose Indian Buddhist apertures in favourof humble Daoist essences of the everyday. Hence, he dismisses Zen wizardry in favour of a
return to a natural environment.
The hermeneutic phenomenologist Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) creates a parallel
universe to Dōgen with his idea of Schritt zurück (the step back) which shadows the Zenmaster’s taiho 退歩 (the step back). Heidegger too explains the doubling of the extra-ordinary
back into the ordinary as the heart of everyday phenomenon—itself a manoeuvre resembling
Dōgen’s existentialist twist. The contemporary monk and eminent Kyoto philosopher Tsujimura
Kōichi (1922-2010) gives us this tidbit at Heidegger’s birthday party in 1969. 3

1 All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

2 Jay Goulding, “Japan-West Interculture: Time’s Step Back—Dōgen, Watsuji, Kuki and Heidegger,” inProceedings of the 31st Japanese Studies Association of Canada Annual Conference, Japan’s World and the World’s
Japan: Images, Perceptions and Reactions, eds. Aya Fujiwara and James White (Edmonton: University ofAlberta, 2019), 1-26.
3 Tsujimura Kōichi, “Martin Heidegger’s Thinking and Japanese Philosophy,” Epoché 5, no. 2 (Spring 2008):
352.

3

Comparison versus Mutual Interpenetration of the Uncanny
If we wish to talk about inter-cultural texts, a crucial question arises: how is comparison
possible? It would seem that many of the disciplines in professional academics that I haveengaged in throughout the last forty years wish to raise to a near apotheotic level, the idea ofcomparison: comparative philosophy, comparative religion, comparative sociology,
comparative social science, comparative ideas, comparative cultures, comparative linguistics,
comparative governments, comparative political theory and recently global comparative
thought—a sub-discipline of social and political thought that I helped create with the renowned
political theorist and historian Cary J. Nederman of Texas A and M. 4 Yet few of these areas haveaddressed the idea of comparison itself. The Latin word verb comparāre means “to liken, tocompare,” from com “with, together” + par “equal.” Of course, nothing compares with the
Roman Empire—what is above it is superstitio as supernatural (standing aloof and thus not
relevant), and what is below it is falsum (false and fallen); what is true to it is certum (certitude)
or veritas (rectitude)—complete reconfigurations and often misconstructions of early Greek preSocratic terms. 5 As part of the canon in contemporary Japanese philosophy in the last 100 years,
Heidegger is one of the few scholars in the Western world to unpack these meanings and attend
to their philosophical shifts. In fact, comparison is a relatively recent development. Ironically,
the phrase “without compare” (from the 1530s) revised by folk etymology from compeer as“competitor” meaning “rival” or “adversary” (with-outen compere from 1400) is more aptly
stated as “without rival.” “Without compare” carries the sense of “without rival.” For centuries,
it was the default for a person to be “without compare” as that which stands alone and above allothers. Only in the contemporary world do we seem to value “compare” in a new sense as thegoal of various intellectual fields that might inevitably reduce to the same under the spell of
equality. The Chinese expression duìzhào對照means both compare/contrast as a noun (attributing
to its ambiguity) and juxtapose/contradistinguish as a verb.
Likewise, the Japanese expression taisho 対照 as contrast, antithesis and comparison,stands in for the Western binary of “compare and contrast.” The Japanese etymology yields tai
対 (“place in opposition and compare”) + shō 照 (“check one thing against another”). This being
said, there is no direct comparison possible between Dōgen and Western thinkers or probably
between yesteryear and today.
In this case, both Dōgen and Heidegger respectively are incomparable in their own right.
Hence, they can be understood only on their own accounts or in terms of their own nature andtheir own environments, such as it is. I understand such as it is as the Daoist zìrán自然 or later theJapanese shizen 自然 as popularized in Meiji Japan from Daoist roots 6: “self so; so of its own; soof itself” and “naturally; spontaneously; freely; in the course of events.”
4 Jay Goulding, “Barbarism and Civilization,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 1, ed. Maryanne

Horowitz (New York: Charles’ Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 195-197; “Globalization: Asia,” New Dictionary of
the History of Ideas, vol. 3, ed. Maryanne Horowitz (New York: Charles’ Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 941-947;“Religion: East and Southeast Asia,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol.
5, ed. Maryanne
Horowitz (New York: Charles’ Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 2060-2064; “Society,” New Dictionary of the Historyof Ideas, vol. 5, ed. Maryanne Horowitz (New York: Charles’ Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 2238-2241; “Zen,” New
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 6, ed. Mary Anne Horowitz (New York: Charles’ Scribner’s Sons,
2005), 2513-2514.
5 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 35-48.
6 Aldo Tollini, “Japanese Buddhism and Nature: Man and Natural Phenomena in the Quest for
Enlightenment,” in Rethinking Nature in Contemporary Japan, eds. Bonaventura Ruperti, Sivlia Vesco andCarolina Negri (Venezia: Edizioni Ca’ Foscari, 2017), 82-83.

4

In Poem 25 of Daodejing, Lăozĭ utters:
人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然
Rén fǎ di, dì fǎ tiān, tiān fǎ dào, dào fǎ zìrán
Humanity’s law is the earth, the earth’s law is heaven, heaven’s law is the Way andthe Way’s law is such as it is. 7
On advice from William Richardson (1920-2016), Heidegger’s first English-speaking
student of prominence in the 1950s, I draw attention to a later version of the famous fourfold—sky-earth and mortals-gods. In a 2004 personal conversation with Richardson in Boston, and in his
writing, he professes that Heidegger told him that the idea of the fourfold came from Lǎozǐ. 8
Heidegger’s metaphor of the fourfold might owe something to pre-Socratic cosmology or to
Aristotle but also to Daoism. Heidegger’s ‘fourfold oneness’ might reflect the ‘four greatnesses’(Sì dà 四大) also coming from Daodejing’s Poem 25: “the Way is great, Heaven is great, Earth isgreat, the King too is great” (Dào dà tiān dà dì dà wáng yì dà 道大天大地大王亦大). 9 Both
Heidegger’s fourfold and the four greatnesses encompass a multiplicity of world shapings
regarding nature and environment. Appropriately, Heidegger writes in 1927:
No matter how easy it may be to show how ontological problematics differ formallyfrom ontical research there are still difficulties in carrying out an existential analytic,
especially in making a start. This task includes a desideratum which philosophy has
long found disturbing but has continually refused to achieve: to work out the ideaof a ‘natural conception of the world.’ The rich store of information now available as
to the most exotic and manifold cultures and forms of Dasein [ex-istence] seems
favourable to our setting about this task in a fruitful way. But this is merely asemblance. At bottom this plethora of information can seduce us into failing torecognize the real problem. We shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences
simply by the syncretistic activity of universal comparison [my emphasis] andclassification. Subjecting the manifold to tabulation does not ensure any actual
understanding of what lies there before us as thus set in order. If an ordering
principle is genuine, it has its own content as a thing (Sachgehalt), which is never tobe found by means of such ordering but is already presupposed in it. So, if one is toput various pictures of the world in order, one must have an explicit idea of theworld as such. And if the ‘world’ itself is something constitutive for Dasein, onemust have an insight into Dasein’s basic structures in order to treat the worldphenomenon conceptually. 10
So how can we proceed? In the last several decades, I have endeavoured to create a field
in Chinese philosophy called “Daoist Phenomenology” which is the culmination of my research
on classical Daoism melded with close textual readings of Heidegger’s seminal interconnection
7 See https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing.

8 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. 3rd edition. The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1974, 571.

9 See https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing.

10 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper andRow, 1962), 76-77.

5

of hermeneutics and existential phenomenology. 11 Phenomenology consists of a constellation of
co-constitutive, co-resonating and equiprimordial events that generate mutually conditioned
linked opposites that are necessary for each other that I dub—dipolarity—such as the dynamic ofDaoist yin and yang. 12 Phenomenology is a life-world platform that supports hermeneutics as aninterpretive strategy of everyday existence, hence existential. One level is ‘horizontal’
phenomenology, the explication of everyday life in the lebenswelt. The world is our horizon of
being and time. Heidegger’s emphasis on the idealist Friedrich Schelling’s (1775–1854) “ecstatictime” which stands outside of itself, seeks for a unity of present, past and future time. 13
What celebrated Heidegger associate Baron Kuki Shūzō (1889-1941) adds is a second
level, the notion of a “vertical” phenomenology which is no longer simply an existential reality
but a “mystical ecstasis”: “each instant, each present, is an identical moment of different times.
Each present has identical moments, in the future as well as in the past [Each is an instantwhose thickness is of infinite depth]; time is in this sense reversible.” 14 It flows back upon itself
as a retrograde temporality or as a reversibility of time. Word (kotoba 言), event (koto 事) andmeaning (kokoro 意) are synchronous; the ancient past folds into the now. 15
And further to this, Heidegger’s early horizontal phenomenology of everyday life lays out
and gathers up, while Kuki Shūzō’s vertical phenomenology of mystical ecstasis emerges from whatlays hidden since each moment is an identical instance of different times—a reversibility.
Together, horizontal phenomenology as corporeal and vertical phenomenology as spiritual
reveal as they conceal. In 1944, Heidegger anchors both in a common primordial ground as
what he calls “horizonal.” He theorizes:

11 Jay Goulding, “‘Visceral Manifestation’ 藏象: Chinese Philosophy and Western Phenomenology 現象,”

in Chinese Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization vol. 4, ed. Fang Keli (Beijing: Commercial
Press Inc., 2003), 360-417; Jay Goulding ed., China-West Interculture, Toward the Philosophy of World
Integration: Essays on Wu Kuang-ming’s Thinking. The Association of Chinese Philosophers in America(ACPA) Series on Chinese and Comparative Philosophy (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008). A
festschrift honorary volume celebrating a leading scholar in Chinese Daoist philosophy; Goulding,“Daoist Phenomenology: Heidegger’s Chinese Students,” Interdisciplinary Social Science Speakers Series:
Winter, Department of Social Science, York University televised by Fairchild TV, Steven So producer,
March 2, 2016; Goulding, “Cheng and Gadamer: Daoist Phenomenology,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy,
eds. Cheng Chung-ying, Linyu Gu, and Andrew Fuyarchuk, Special Issue “Gadamer and Chung-ying
Cheng,” forthcoming; Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” in Heidegger and Daoism, ed.
David Chai (London: Bloomsbury Academic, forthcoming); Jay Goulding, “Phenomenology: East andWest,” in Paul Brienza, Jay Goulding and Livy Visano, Vico, Daoist Phenomenology and Anarchism (Toronto:
Athenian Policy Forum, forthcoming).
12 Jay Goulding, “New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy
34, no. 1 (February 2007): 100.
13 Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology.”
14 Kuki Shūzō, “The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time,” in Stephen Light, Shuzo Kuki andJean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 45-46.
15 Jay Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin Heidegger: Iki いき and Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” in Why
Japan Matters!, vol. 2, ed. Joseph F. Kess and Helen Lansdowne (Victoria: Centre for Asia-PacificInitiatives, University of Victoria, 2005), 682.

6

Ich verstehe »horizontal« nicht im Gegensatz zu »vertikal«, sondern in dem Sinne,
daß das Horizontale dasjenige ist, zu dessen Wesen ein offener Gesichtskreis odereine Gesichtsflucht (fuga) gehören, die es nach allen Richtungen umgeben. Nur
innerhalb des so verstandenen Horizontalen ist das von Ihnen gemeinte Vertikale
möglich.
[I understand “horizontal” not in contrast to “vertical” but rather in the sense of“horizonal,” harkening to this essence of an open circle-of-vision or a fleeing line ofsight (fuga) that envelops it in all directions. What you mean by the vertical ispossible only within the horizonal so understood]. 16
Both Dōgen and Heidegger embrace dipolarity in terms of the totality of their respective
projects: the visible and the invisible, the present and the absent, the real and the unreal, thespeakable and the silent, the material and the spiritual to name a few. Unlike eras long past, thecontemporary global world usually privileges one side over the other of these pairings.
It is within this grid of Daoist phenomenology that I understand a rather crucial but
neglected element of Dōgen’s Zen—that of jinzū—ostensibly called “the supernatural” or the“supernormal” or “miracles”—what I call the “extra-ordinary”—which bears much on the topic
of nature and the environment. The Chinese shén tōng 神通 literally means what passes throughby way of the gods, hence superhuman ability or magical power.
In this paper, I attempt to understand jinzū not through comparison but through a mutualinterpenetration of the uncanny. This hermeneutic task is in and of itself uncanny. Heidegger
explains the task as “translating the untranslatable” by shifting übersetzen (translation) intoübersetzen (transportation); translation is a transportation within and between languages as is
Dōgen’s task within Japanese and between Chinese and Japanese texts.
Heidegger relates:
This is certainly true for every translation, because every translation mustnecessarily accomplish the transition from the spirit of one language into that ofanother. There is no such thing as translation if we mean that a word from one
language could, or even should, be made to substitute as the equivalent of a wordfrom another language. This impossibility should not, however, mislead one into
devaluing translation as though it were a mere failure. On the contrary: translation
can even bring to light connections that indeed lie in the translated language but are
not explicitly set forth in it. From this we can recognize that all translating must be
an interpreting. Yet at the same time, the reverse is also true: every interpretation,and everything that stands in its service, is a translating. In that case, translating
does not only move between two different languages, but there is a translating
within one and the same language. 17

Martin Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche (1944-45), Gesamtausgabe Band 77, Herausgegeben von Ingrid
Schüßler (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 83.
17 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 62.
167

And as Heidegger continues, quoting Sophocles’ Antigone:πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει.
Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts dochüber den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt.
Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing
more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being. 18
Further to the primordial human as uncanny, Heidegger outlines in Introduction to Metaphysics:
We are taking the strange, the uncanny (das Unheimliche), as that which casts us
out of the ‘homely,’ i.e., the customary, familiar, secure. The unhomely(Unheimische) prevents us from making ourselves at home and therein it isoverpowering. But man is the strangest of all, not only because he passes his life
amid the strange understood in this sense, but because he departs from his
customary, familiar limits, because he is the violent one, who, tending toward thestrange in the sense of the overpowering, surpasses the limit of the familiar (dasHeimische). 19
JinzūRemarkably, Dōgen’s courageous wanderings from Japan to China and his return withsacred texts interpolate and resonate with Heidegger’s idea of the uncanny. In 1241, Dōgenretells the story of Chinese Chan monk Yongming Yanshou who influences him one way or theother. Chikaku Zenji, honorific title of Yomyo Enju (Yongming Yanshou) serves as agovernment officer and becomes a monk at age twenty-eight. He is disciple of Tendai Tokusho(Tiencai Deshao), the second patriarch of the Hogen (Fayan) School of Chinese Zen. As aprovincial governor, he procures official money unlawfully and distributes it to poor folk. Upon
learning of this, the Emperor reluctantly orders him to be executed: “This officer is a man oftalent and a wise man. He dared to commit this crime. He might have had some profoundmotivation. When his head is about to be cut off, if he looks regretful and full of grief, cut it off
quickly. If not, undoubtedly he had a deeper motivation so do not kill him.” 20 But instead,
Yongming appears happy and says: “I give this life to all living beings.” The Emperor
proclaims: “It’s exactly as I thought! He must have had some deeper reason.” When theEmperor questions Yongming’s motivation, he responds: “I wanted to retire from government
office, throw my life away by giving it to all living beings to form an association with them, beborn into the family of Buddha (become a monk), and practice the Buddha-Way wholeheartedly.” 21 Impressed by his reply, the Emperor gives him the name Enju 延壽 (Yánshòu,“prolonged life”) and frees him from a death sentence. Dōgen tells this story to inspire monks to
18 Martin Heidegger, Hӧlderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister,’ Gesamtausgabe Band 53, Herausgegeben von Walter

Biemel (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), 74.

19 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1959), 127.

20 Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō-zuimonki, trans. Shohaku Okumura and Tom Wright (Tokyo: Sotoshu Shumucho,1988), 43.

21 ibid., 43.

8think little of their own well-being, hold compassion for all living things, and devote bodily life
to Buddha. If you have already aroused such aspiration, protect it. 22
The original texts of Yongming Yanshou zongjinglu (Record of the Source Mirror) areexceedingly esoteric and not fully translated anywhere in Western languages as far as I know.
In itself, the text would be the very definition of the uncanny.
The impossible cypher-level encryption probably motivates even Dōgen himself toembrace an existential reversal of its deep concealment. An encrypted Buddhist and Daoist
vocabulary lurks beneath. It reads (my emphasis):智中有通。
Zhì zhōng yǒu tōngWisdom of the middle states of the passages of death.
[中有 or 中陰 as antarābhava or intermediate states between death and reincarnation;at the end of forty-nine days, judgment having been made, a person enters upon thenext state] 23
通有五種。
Tōng yǒu wǔ zhǒng
This way of death has five forms.
智有三種。
Zhì yǒu sānzhǒng
There are three kinds of wisdom associated with human existence.
[“三種有 Three kinds of existence: (a) 相待有 that of qualities, as of opposites, e.g.
length and shortness; (b) 假名有 that of phenomenal things so-called, e.g. a jar, aman; (c) 法有 that of the noumenal, or imaginary, understood as facts and not as
illusions, such as a ‘hare’s horns’ or a ‘turtle’s fur’”] 24
何為五種通。
Hé wèi wǔ zhǒngtōng
What constitutes the five kinds of passages of death?
一曰道通。
Yī yuē dàotōng
One is called the way passage [bodhisattvas through their insight into truth; “theway through”]
二曰神通。
Èr yuē Shéntōng
Two is called gods passage [arhats through mental concentration and mind reading;remarkable ability; “gods passage”]

22 ibid., 44.

23 See William Edward Soothill, and Lewis Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms with Sanskrit andEnglish Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1937), 110.

24 ibid., 73.

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三曰依通。
Sān yuē yītōng
Three is called obeying passage [“supernatural” or magical powers dependent on
spells, drugs, charms, incantations; “through obeying a wish passage”]
四曰報通。
Sì yuē bàotōng
Four is called report passage [reward or karma powers of transformation or
shapeshifting by possessed demons, spirits, devas, nāgas; “report passage”]
五曰妖通。
Wǔ yuē yāotōng
Five is called the monster passage [magical powers of goblins; satrys; demons; evil
spirit; bewitching; “monster passage”] 25
As described above, Yanshou engages five vital forms of miracles or “supernatural
powers” that Dōgen eventually turns back inside everyday experience as the step back. William
Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous in A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms deciphers these
five forms as follows. Known in classical Chinese as Wǔ zhǒng tōng 五種通, the five types ofsupernatural powers include: “(1) Dàotōng 道通 of bodhisattvas through their piercing insight
into truth; (2) Shéntōng 神通 of arhats through their mental abilities; (3) Yītōng 依通 magicalpowers of drugs, charms, incantations; (4) Bàotōng 報通 or Yètōng 業通 reward or karma powersof transformation by devas and nāgas; (5) yāotōng 妖通 magical power of goblins and satyrs.” 26
Carl Bielefeldt further explains that the higher knowledge of Shéntōng (Japanese jinzū orSanskrit abhijna अ�भ�) as culminating in Dàotōng is “an enlightened state in which one with ‘nomind’ (Wúxīn [無心]) accords with all things, existing without subject (Wúzhǔ [無主]) like themoon in the water or flowers in the sky”; It is gathered from “transformations of animals andspirits” (Yāotōng), “the preternatural acts of god, demons and dragons” (Bàotōng) and “theworkings of talismans and magic potions (Yītōng).” 27Contemplating Yanshou’s passages, Dōgen (like Heidegger) turns to the everyday. Like
the samurai culture of his era, Dōgen’s Chinese inspired and revamped Zen pays attention tolittle things and relies on everyday “miracles” such as bringing a robe, facing a wall, lying
down, washing your face, sitting up, making a bowl of tea—all gathered together under thepractice of seated meditation. In Shobogenzo Zuimonki, Dōgen presents a speech on the sixteenthday, the eleventh month, the second year of the Ninji Era (1241) at Kannondōri Kōshō Hōrinji.
This seminal speech is entitled jinzū (“miracles”) and most likely transmitted from Yongming
Yanshou of a much earlier era as mentioned above. As Dōgen relates in detail: “The miracles[jinzū] I am speaking of are the daily activities of buddhas, which they do not neglect topractice. There are six miracles [freedom from the six sense desires], one miracle, going beyond
miracles, and unsurpassable miracles. Miracles are practiced three thousand times in themorning and eight hundred times in the evening. Miracles arise simultaneously with buddhas
25 See http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/BDLM/sutra/chi_pdf/sutra19/T48n2016.pdf.
26 ibid., 125.

27 Carl Bielefeldt, “Disarming the Superpowers: The Abhijna in Eisai and Dōgen,” in Dōgen: Textual andHistorical Studies, ed. Steven Heine (New York: Oxford, 2012), 196.

10

but are not known by buddhas…” 28 Bringing a robe and a stūpa to Shākyamuni Buddha is amiracle of inconceivable power that can happen to buddhas now and to buddhas in the future.
Guishan turns around to face the wall and asks Yangshan to interpret his dream. Yangshan
fetches a basin of water and a towel. Guishan washes his face and sits up. These are great
miracles of everyday. Dōgen relates:
People of limited views study small miracles and attain limited understanding.
They do not experience the great miracles of buddha ancestors…Encompassed by
the power of great miracles, lesser miracles occur. Great miracles include lesser
miracles but lesser miracles do not know great miracles. Lesser miracles are a tuft ofhair breathing in the vast ocean, a mustard seed storing Mt. Sumeru, the top of thehead spouting water, or feet spreading fire. Miracles like these are lesser
miracles…In the inexhaustible ocean of the phenomenal world the power of great
miracles is unchanging. A tuft of hair not only breathes in the great ocean [as inlesser miracles] but it maintains, realizes, breathes out, and utilizes the great ocean.
When this activity arises, it encompasses the entire phenomenal world. However,
do not assume that other activities do not also encompass the entire phenomenal
world. A mustard seed containing Mt. Sumeru is also like this. A mustard seedbreathes out Mt. Sumeru and actualizes the inexhaustible phenomenal world…This
bringing forth is a great miracle… 29
Dōgen continues with a few seminal examples. The four, five, or six great elements, aregreat miracles that appear and disappear and are spit out and swallowed. The great earth andempty space are miracles that are swallowed and spit out:
The miracles I have described of these devas, sorcerers, fighting spirits, and demons
are the result of past actions or present skills. But the six types of miracles of abuddha are different. A buddha enters forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touchables, andobjects of mind and is not confused by them. Thus a buddha masters the six sense
objects, which are all marked with emptiness. A buddha is free of conditions. Even
having a body of five skandhas accompanied by desires, a buddha does not dependon anything. A buddha practices miracles that are grounded on the earth. “Fellowsof the way, a true buddha has no form, and the true dharma has no marks. From
your mind’s illusions, marks and appearances are created. What you get is a wild
fox’s spirit, which is the view of those outside of the way, and not of a true
buddha.” Thus, the six types of miracles of the buddhas cannot be reached by thoseof the Two Lesser Vehicles, or of devas or demons. The six types of miracles of thebuddha way cannot be measured. They are only transmitted to disciples of thebuddha way, person to person, but not to others. Those who have not inherited such
miracles do not know them. Those who have not inherited such miracles are notpersons of the buddha way…“The six types of miracles are neither empty nor not
empty. A circle of light is neither inside nor outside.” “Neither inside nor outside”
means leaving no trace. When you practice, study, and realize no-trace, you are not
28 Tanahashi Kazuaki ed., Enlightenment Unfolds: The Essential Teachings of Zen Master Dōgen(Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 104.

29 ibid., 106-107.

11

disturbed by the six sense organs. Those who are disturbed should receive thirty
blows. The six types of miracles should be studied like this…Thus, the buddhadharma is invariably actualized through miracles. 30
Do Nothing and All is Done
Dōgen completes his story with a pronouncement: “a drop of water swallows the great
ocean, and a speck of dust hurls out a high mountain. Who can doubt that these are miracles?” 31
When speaking of no-trace, Dōgen might be referring to the Daoist classics which he studies in
China. Both Daoist scholars Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang mention the trace (jī 跡), an idea thatechoes throughout Heidegger’s writings. 32 According to Guo, the Daoist sage has “no deliberatemind or purpose of his own.” 33 Instead, he acts spontaneously. People who imitate the actions
or words of the sages are on the wrong path. What matters is the whimsical abandonment of thesage or zìrán as that which deposits the traces. Traces are places where the sage disappears. For
Heidegger, you find your own place to leave the world. Heidegger’s turn back or bend back
(Kehre) by way of the trace (Spur) in wending one’s way uncanningly resembles Dōgen’s
bending back the light of taiho. Both Heidegger and Dōgen step back through parallel universes
from our everyday known reality. 34 As I previously argue, Dōgen and Heidegger are “walkersof the boundary of the boundless” (Grenzgänger des Grenzenlosen) as Zhuangzi explains in
Chapter 22: “bù jì zhī jì jì zhī bù jì zhě yě 不際之際，際之不際者也 [The Border (Boundary, Limit)of the borderless (Boundless, Limitless) is (yě 也) the Borderless (Boundless, Limitless) of the
Border (Boundary, Limit)].” 35 It is worth stating again that Laozi’s walker of Daodejing’s Poem
27 leaves no trace (tracks, wagon tracks, footprints)—shàn xíng wú zhé jì 善行無轍跡. 36 A trace
does not leave itself. The thingness of the thing is not itself a thing. Inspired by Guo Xiang andDōgen, Heidegger explains: “Das Da. Eine Spur davon in der ἀλήθεια [un-concealment] derφύσις [emergent nature]. Aber längst ausgelöscht ist die Spur—nie einfach wieder zu be-treten,
sondern aus eigenem Gang zu finden.’ [The There (Da). A trace of the There in the ἀλήθεια ofφύσις. But the trace has long since been extinguished—it can never simply be followed again
but must be found from one’s own trail].” 37 Heidegger’s poetic pondering reflects Dōgen’s
multivalent idea of “ranging” or “flowing” or “passing through in all directions” (kyōryaku 經歷) of future to past and past to future by way of the step back. 38
The 2009 Japanese film Zen directed by Takahashi Banmei starring Nakamura Kantarō IIas Dōgen is an excellent illustration of the existential view of miracles as described above.
30 ibid., 111-112.
31 ibid., 112-113.

32 Jay Goulding, “Barry Allen’s Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition,” Journal of Chinese

Philosophy 44, no. 1-2 (March–June 2017): 113-116.

33 Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (New York: SUNY, 2003),

18, 66.

34 Goulding, “Japan-West Interculture,” 23.
35 See https://ctext.org/zhuangzi.

36 Goulding, “Japan-West Interculture,” 23.

37Martin Heidegger, Die Geschichte des Seyns (1938-1940), Gesamtausgabe Band 69, Herausgegeben von Peter

Trawny (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998), 9; Heidegger, The History of Beyng, trans. William
McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 9. See Goulding, “Japan-WestInterculture,” 22-23.
38 ibid., 19-22.

12

Historically, Hōjō Tokiyori (1227-1263) is the fifth shikken (regent) of the Kamakura shogunate(1185-1333)—portrayed as the Shogun himself in the film version—who is perpetually
tormented by demons. This episode is quite reminiscent of Minamoto Yorimitsu (948–1021),
loyal retainer of the Fujiwara clan, tormented by the legendary Yōkai 妖怪 (ghost, strange
apparition) named Tsuchigumo 土蜘蛛 (dirt and earth spider). In the film, Tokiyori summons
Dōgen to exorcise his relentless demons:
Tokiyori: What do you do in your sect?
Dōgen: Just sitting in meditation. We sit and we sit.
Tokiyori: How can true Buddhism be found, sitting around doing nothing?
Dōgen: Lord Tokiyori, that is akin to being in the ocean and claiming to have nowater.
Tokiyori: What!
Dōgen: Flowers in spring cuckoos in summer the moon in autumn and chilly snowsin winter.
Tokiyori: Flowers in spring cuckoos in summer Dōgen, these are most obvious.
Dōgen: They are indeed obvious. Things as they are [my emphasis]. Seeing things
as they truly are. That is enlightenment. Zazen is to see the water in the vast ocean.
And yet, until we find the innate Buddha, we cannot understand there is water inthe vast ocean…
Tokiyori: There is only one moon in the heavens. I cannot see a moon in my heart.
Furthermore that full moon is soon fated to fade and whither.
Dōgen: Lord Tokiyori. Please look…Can you cut down this moon?
Tokiyori: Easily [swinging his sword into the water]. I have cut it down.
Dōgen: Is that so? Have another look. Though clouds should obscure the moon or
the moon disappear from the heavens we cannot say there is no moon. The mooncannot be wet and water cannot be torn. The moon is innate Buddha, and water isthe self.
Tokiyori: This incomprehensible dialogue does not quell my anguish. Damn you.
You’re back again [as the moon appears again in reflected water]. Get away! Dōgen,how can I exterminate these vengeful ghosts which taunt me nightly?... 39
Dōgen advises Tokiyori that the pain and sorrow of those spirits is his own. Until you abandon
your entire self you cannot accept that anguish nor will the anguish fade away. The moment hegrasped power in his right hand, his left hand grasped suffering. The very definition of a regent
is to hold power in place of a monarch. It is grasping power that has caused anguish. Dōgenadmonishes Lord Tokiyori: “now is the time to release your grasp.” 40 The engagement peaks:
Tokiyori: Dōgen! Are you prepared to die!
Dōgen: I always have been. When I came here, I had already abandoned my bodyand my soul. As you wish. If you do evil you will harvest evil. If you do good you
39 Takahashi Banmei, dir., Zen (Tokyo: Kadokawa Pictures, 2009), DVD.

40 Cf. Heidegger’s “releasement toward things and the openness to the mystery” (Die Gelassenheit zu den

Dingen und die Offenheit für das Geheimnis). See Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M.
Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) 54-55. See Goulding, “Visceral
Manifestation,” 370-391.

13

will harvest good. When death approaches neither political power nor those youlove nor vast fortunes will be able to save you. To death, you must go alone. All thatwill accompany you is everything you did in life. That and nothing else.
Tokiyori: [While raising his sword above the kneeling Dōgen, the moon appearing
from behind the clouds and shines upon Dōgen’s shaven head; Seeing the moon’s
reflection upon Dōgen’s head, Tokiyori drops his sword as he experiences a total
awakening]….
Dōgen: Now I must take my leave. “Flowers in spring…cuckoos in summer…themoon in autumn…and chilly snows in winter.” 41With a simple but essential Daoist strategy—do nothing and all is done (Wéi wúwéi爲無爲), Dōgeninitiates a new no-self for Tokiyori.
With a mere poem, a genre quite popular at the time—31 syllables in a 5-7-5-7-7
pattern—Dōgen offers Tokiyori a remedy for his conflict. The full splendor the poem displays“Original Face” (Honrai no menmoku wo yomu 詠本来面目):
春は花
夏ほととぎす秋は月
冬雪きえですずしかりけり

Haru wa hananatsu hototogisu
aki wa tsuki
fuyu yuki kiede
Suzushi kari keri

Spring, flowers
summer, cuckoos
autumn, the moon
winter, snow does not melt
All seasons pure and upright. 42

Dōgen’s Taiho and Heidegger’s Schritt zurück
In September 1969 at Meßkirch, Tsujimura Koichi (1922-2010), a Zen monk and close
Heidegger student gives generations of readers an invaluable hint to the connection between
Heidegger and Dōgen in “Martin Heideggers Denken und die Japanische Philosophie” on theoccasion of the German philosopher’s 80th birthday. Very perceptively, Tsujimura recognizes
that: “…[Heidegger’s] thinking withdraws itself in its truth as soon as we simply want torepresent, grasp, and know it…his thinking remains in principle inimitable…his thinking
indicated by the ancient Greek word Aletheia (un-concealedness), could be understood in viewof Western philosophy, and that means here metaphysics, as a ground that is concealed tometaphysics itself.” 43 Tsujimura eloquently explains:
Thus, the matter itself would have demanded from the thinker a transformation of
thinking—namely, the transformation of philosophical thinking into “anotherthinking.” Only by this other thinking—and that means by “the step back fromphilosophy”—has what is “proper” to philosophical thinking…been “properly”
glimpsed. That is an extraordinary appropriating event [Ereignis]…we Japanese see
in Heidegger’s thinking a glimpsing-of-itself of what is “proper” to Westernhumanity and its world…we Japanese, too, necessarily had to be thrown back onto
the forgotten ground of our own spiritual tradition…Right after my first encounter
with Being and Time when I was still in secondary school, I sensed that at least for us
41 Takahashi Banmei, Zen.

42 See https://dogeninstitute.wordpress.com/tag/seasons/.

43 Tsujimura Kōichi, “Martin Heidegger’s Thinking and Japanese Philosophy,” 351.

14

Japanese the only possible access to a genuine understanding of this work of
thinking is concealed in our tradition of Zen Buddhism…Zen Buddhism is nothingother than a seeing-through (Durchblicken) to what we ourselves are. For this seeing
through, we first have to let go of all representing, producing, adjusting, altering,acting, making, and willing, in short, all consciousness and its activity, and then,following along such a way, to return to its ground source. As one of the greatest
Japanese Zen masters, Dōgen, says as well: “You shall first learn the step back[taiho]…(Dōgen, Fukanzazengi).” 44
In the Fukanzazengi (Universal Recommendation for Zazen), Dōgen writes: “o mochi-iyo ēko-henshōno taiho 須迴光返照之退歩 (Take the step back of turning light around and illuminate
inward).” 45 I believe this to be the most lucid expression of all his writings. Heidegger’s hermeneutics
lays it out, and his phenomenology gathers it up. 46 As much as Dōgen requires Heidegger,
Heidegger requires Dōgen. What is salvaged from medieval Japan is Dōgen’s Chinese image of
huí guāng fǎn zhào 迴光返照: the medical image of a “terminal lucidity”—seeing the light oftruth at the moment of death or “last radiance of the setting sun” or most recently “a death
resurrection card” from contemporary role-playing animated games. 47 As I explain:Alas, Dōgen intends a much deeper meaning than this—one that is quite
apocalyptic and revelatory of his unique version of Zen. The sage fades in the midstof time’s passing as the world vanishing into nothing—certainly reminiscent of wabi
sabi 侘寂 of samurai culture, both of life’s impermanence and unfilled goals (sabi 錆as rust on a sword). Dōgen’s originary taiho 退歩 as a “step back” is a dimensional
shift—the cultivation of energy gathered within oneself not only at the last breath ofone’s own life but perhaps at the last sunset ever of humankind. As a corollary, in
respect to his time in China, especially at Shaolin, Dōgen is assuredly influenced by
the Daoist imagery of the first sunrise ever such as in the variegated clouds soaking
up the emerging fireball at dawn at Huang Shan (Yellow Mountain), captured in theclassical Chinese graph wén 雯 described in dictionaries as “variegated clouds” oforange and red blending, technically named by the colour “Claudia,” and only seenat 5:30-6:01 in the morning in the mountains of Anhui Province. Dao 道is the firstsunrise coming into being; Dōgen’s Zen is the last sunset receding into nothing. The
Chinese Chan monk Jianzhi Sengcan (529-613) is the first to record the imagery ofhenshō 返照 (Chinese fǎn zhào) in Song of the Trusting Mind (xinxinming 信心銘)… 48
Dōgen’s step back (taiho) is a bending back of light of the extraordinary into the ordinary.
Heidegger’s step back (Schritt zurück) is a retrograde movement of the extraordinary ontologicalgrounds of Being back inside the ordinary of the everyday.
Heidegger writes:
Dies besagt: Wir wagen einen Versuch mit dem Schritt zurück. Der Titel »Schritt
zurück« legt mehrfache Mißdeutungen nahe. »Schritt zurück« meint nicht einen
44 ibid., 352.

45 Dōgen, “Fukanzazengi,” https://terebess.hu/zen/dogen/Fukanzazengi.html#1.
46 For elaboration, see Goulding, “Japan-West Interculture” throughout.
47 ibid., 14.
48 ibid., 15.

15vereinzelten Denkschritt, sondern die Art der Bewegung des Denkens undeinenlangen Weg. Insofern der Schritt zurück den Charakter unseres Gespräches
mit der Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens bestimmt, führt er das Denken
aus dem in der Philosophie bisher Gedachten in gewisser Weise heraus. Das
Denken tritt vor seiner Sache, dem Sein, zurück und bringt so das Gedachte in ein
Gegenüber, darin wir das Ganze dieser Geschichte erblicken und zwar hinsichtlich
dessen, was die Quelle dieses ganzen Denkens ausmacht, indem sie ihm überhaupt
den Bezirk seines Aufenthaltes bereitstellt. Dies ist im Unterschied zu Hegel nichtein überkommenes, schon gestelltes Problem, sondern das durch diese Geschichte
des Denkens hindurch überall Ungefragte. Wir benennen es vorläufig und
unvermeidlich in der Sprache der Überlieferung. Wir sprechen von der Differenz
zwischen dem Sein und dem Seienden. Der Schritt zurück geht vom Ungedachten,
von der Differenz als solcher, in das zu-Denkende. Das ist die Vergessenheit derDifferenz. Die hier zu denkende Vergessenheit ist die von der Λήθη (Verbergung)her gedachte Verhüllung der Differenz als solcher, welche Verhüllung ihrerseits sichanfänglich entzogen hat. Die Vergessenheit gehört zur Differenz, weil diese jener
zugehört.
This means: we venture an attempt with the step back. The term “step back” suggests
various misinterpretations. “Step back” does not mean an isolated step of thought, but rather
means the manner in which thinking moves, and a long path. Since the step back determines
the character of our conversation with the history of Western thinking, our thinking in a way
leads us away from what has been thought so far in philosophy. Thinking recedes before its
matter, Being, and thus brings what is thought into a confrontation in which we behold thewhole of this history—behold it with respect to what constitutes the source of this entire
thinking, because it alone establishes and prepares for this thinking the area of its abode. In
contrast to Hegel, this is not a traditional problem, already posed, but what has always
remained unasked throughout this history of thinking. We speak of it, tentatively andunavoidably, in the language of tradition. We speak of the difference between Being and beings.
The step back goes from what is unthought, from the difference as such, into what gives us
thought. That is the oblivion of the difference. The oblivion here to be thought is the veiling of
the difference as such, thought in terms of Λήθη (concealment); this veiling has in turnwithdrawn itself from the beginning. The oblivion belongs to the difference because thedifference belongs to the oblivion. 49
Dōgen’s step back into the void as the last sunset of humankind is an apocalypticalversion of Heidegger’s sinking into the ever of the everyday. Both Dōgen’s Zen and Heidegger’s
hermeneutic phenomenology fall through the rabbit hole.
Dōgen’s understanding of jinzū seems to be parallel to Heidegger’s Unheimliche. Both arenecessary traces of disappearance from one reality into another. Rather than laud the“supernatural” as what goes above life as in Indian philosophies, Dōgen praises its retraction
into the everyday as illustrated above in the Yanshou stories. This itself is a Daoist inspired
bending back into life that does not yearn for shores beyond the existential world. Rather than
49 Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, Gasamtausgabe Band 11, Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelmvon Herrmann (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), 58-60; Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference,trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), 49-50.

16place Being above life as a metaphysical entity, Heidegger too sinks Being down into the midstof the existential everyday (alltäglichkeit). 50 The ancient Greek δεινόν is similar to the English
word awe as in awesome meaning both reverent and fearful as in: terrible, horrible, astounding,marvelous, mighty, powerful, wondrous, strange, able, skillful, clever, shamefully timid, andcowardly. Returning to the first chorus of Sophocles’ Antigone, Heidegger renders the Greekδεινόν by the German word das Unheimliche (the uncanny). 51 With perceptive analysis byphilosopher Véronique M. Fóti, Heidegger’s commentary displays the following oscillating
meanings: Δεινόν as “the fearsome (das Furchtbare)” understood as both “the terrifying (dasFürchterliche)” and “the venerable (das Ehrwürdige)” yielding “the powerful (das Gewaltige)”
understood as both “the violent (das Gewaltätige)” and “the sovereign (das Überragende)”yielding “the extraordinary (das Ungewöhnliche)” understood as both “monstrous (dasUngeheure)” and “the universally skilled (das in allem Geschickte).” 52
Conclusion
Heidegger revises the poet Friedrich Hölderlin’s (1770-43) Ungeheure as “monstrous”
and “eerie” in favour of Unheimliche as “extra-ordinary” or “uncanny”; He doubles it backwithin the everyday in order to hold sway between primordial and existential positions. Dōgen
understands jinzū as not beyond human volition but turned within it at the moment of its pureeverydayness which is his unique contribution to Zen. The extra-ordinary steps back within theordinary; the uncanny steps back within the everyday; jinzū steps back within the existential. In
their unique and respective ways from their unique and respective worlds, Dōgen and
Heidegger strip away any metaphysical baggage from the extra-ordinary or uncanny. For both,the purity of the everyday as the thing-in-itself is always already the miracle of the extraordinary or uncanny—of Dōgen’s jinzū and Heidegger’s Unheimliche. Heidegger writes of thesupernatural in his work on Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900): “…the cause of nihilism ismorality, in the sense of the positing of supernatural [übersinnlich] ideals of truth, goodness,and beauty that are valid ‘in themselves.’ The positing of the highest values simultaneously
posits the possibility of their devaluation, which already begins when these values show
themselves to be unattainable.” 53
In 1227 at Kyoto, in the Fukanzazengi, the clearest manual every created for Zen practice(and written in classical Chinese), Dōgen speaks of the jinzū-shusho神通修證:When you arise from sitting, move slowly and quietly, calmly and deliberately. Do
not rise suddenly or abruptly. In surveying the past, we find that transcendence ofboth unenlightenment and enlightenment, and dying while either sitting or
standing, have all depended entirely on the strength (of zazen). In addition, thebringing about of enlightenment by the opportunity provided by a finger, a banner,a needle, or a mallet, and the effecting of realization with the aid of a hossu [hokken
拂拳; ceremonial fly whisk], a fist, a staff, or a shout, cannot be fully understood bydiscriminative thinking. Indeed, it cannot be fully known by the practicing or
50 Heidegger, Being and Time, 69-76.

51 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in Die Metaphysik Band 40. Herausgegeben von Peter Jaegar (Frankfurt:

Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 158; Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim(New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 127.
52 Véronique M. Fóti, “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy,” in Heidegger Toward the Turn, ed.
James Risser (Albany: SUNY, 1999), 172; Heidegger, Holderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister,’ 77.
53 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, ed. David
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 206.

17

realizing of supernatural powers [jinzū-shusho], either. It must be deportment
beyond hearing and seeing—is it not a principle that is prior to knowledge andperceptions. This being the case, intelligence or lack of it does not matter: between
the dull and the sharp-witted there is no distinction. If you concentrate your effort
single-mindedly, that in itself is negotiating the Way. Practice-realization isnaturally undefiled. Going forward (in practice) is a matter of everydayness. 54
From the quote above, a key line reads 55:
豈
qǐ

爲
wèi

神通修證
之所 能
知 也。
shéntōngxiūzhèng zhī suǒ néng zhī yěani to[suru] jinzū-shusho no tokoro yoku shiru to sen ya
How become supernatural practice by object be able know
Reconfigured by Dōgen into more meaningful Japanese word order, the line reads: ani to[suru]
jinzū-shusho no yoku shiru tokoro to sen ya. Norman Waddell and Masao Abe (another renowned
Heidegger student) translate: “Indeed, it cannot be fully known by the practicing or realizing ofsupernatural powers, either.” 56 Parallel to Heidegger’s everydayness, Waddell and Abe say itbest in characterizing and summarizing Dōgen’s jinzū:
The supernatural powers (jinzū 神通) are possessed by beings of exceptional
spiritual attainment, enabling them unrestricted freedom of activity, eyes capable ofseeing everywhere, ears of hearing all sounds, and so on. Dōgen says that the means
used by a master in bringing students to enlightenment are not only beyond humanthought, they are also beyond such super-normal powers. Moreover, there isnothing mysterious or supernatural about it; it is normal, every-day activity. 57
Bibliography
Bielefeldt, Carl. “Disarming the Superpowers: The Abhijna in Eisai and Dōgen.” In Dōgen:Textual and Historical Studies, edited by Steven Heine, 193-206. New York: Oxford, 2012.
Dōgen. Shōbōgenzō-zuimonki. Translated by Shohaku Okumura and Tom Wright. Tokyo:
Sotoshu Shumucho, 1988.
Dōgen. The Heart of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō. Translated and annotated by Norman Waddell andMasao Abe. New York: SUNY, 2002.

54 Norman Waddell and Masao Abe trans. https://terebess.hu/zen/dogen/Fukanzazengi.html.
55 Dōgen, “Fukanzazengi,” https://terebess.hu/zen/dogen/Fukanzazengi.html#1.

56 Dōgen, The Heart of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, Trans. and annotated Norman Waddell and Masao Abe (NewYork: SUNY, 2002), 4.

57 ibid., 4.

18

Fóti, Véronique M. “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy” 163-187 in James Risser ed.
Heidegger Toward the Turn. Albany: SUNY, 1999.
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"’I'mPOSSIBLE’: Accessibility and Inclusion for the Tokyo 2020 Games,” Susan S. Lee,
University of Toronto, ss.lee@utoronto.ca.
Abstract: Japan’s Universal Design 2020 Action Plan, which was released in 2017 by the Office of
the Prime Minister, is a call to action to increase accessibility throughout the country, and acts
as a catalyst for change in preparation for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Thisaction plan, along with the standards and recommendations of the Tokyo 2020 Accessibility
Guidelines, aims to remove barriers for all. A textual analysis will be applied to these documents
to determine how these plans have been created to address the structural, environmental andattitudinal barriers faced by individuals with impairments. With the countdown to the Tokyo
2020 Games underway, how close are the organizers in reaching their accessibility goals? What
will the impact be for citizens and visitors during the Tokyo 2020 Games? In looking ahead,beyond the Tokyo 2020 Games, this paper will also identify the planned legacies foraccessibility and inclusion for Japan.
Keywords: Tokyo2020 Olympics, Tokyo 2020 Paralympics, disability, accessibility, barrier-free,
universal design
Introduction
The bid for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games focused on an integrated
approach, with sport as the unifying force for change. The vision of the Tokyo 2020 Games ishighlighted on their website (Tokyo2020.org) to read, “Sport has the power to change the world
and our future.” 1 The three key concepts of 1) achieving your personal best, 2) unity indiversity, and 3) connecting to tomorrow arose from plans based on universal design,accessibility and barrier-free, which aim to shift the Japanese culture to a more inclusive one.
Japan will be holding the Olympic and Paralympic Games for the second time in 2021, after it
was postponed due to the global pandemic. This will be a different set of games compared to
the Tokyo 1964 Games.
Building on the technological advances of the Tokyo 1964 Games which prompted thedevelopment of transportation systems, including the Shinkansen and local transits, the Tokyo
2020 Games have set new targets for technology and diversity. The diversity lens, which
includes an abilities/disabilities perspective, will be a departure from the Tokyo 1964 Games,
which often found athletes relegated to hospitals or remained in their homes. 2 Sport, back then,was utilized for rehabilitation rather than performance. In reflecting on two films about theTokyo 1964 Games which are translated as “Tokyo Paralympics, Festival of Love and Glory”
and “Record of the 1964 Tokyo Paralympic Games,” archer Tomohiro Ueyama said “I’ve
noticed the word rehabilitation was mentioned many times, but it’s different now, and I am
hoping people will enjoy the Paralympic Games as a sports event rather than rehabilitation” 3

1 Tokyo2020. (2016). Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy Plan (2016),

https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/legacy/items/legacy-summary_EN.pdf.

2 Ryusei, T. (2019). Pioneering Japanese Interpreting Team Opened Nation’s Eyes to Disabled Athletes at ’64

Olympics, The Japan Times, August 22, 2019.

3 Tominaga, T. (2019). Forgotten films from ’64 shed light on Paralympic evolution in Japan, Japan Times,

Sept 5th, 2019.

22

Photo 1. Matt Stutzman

Reprinted with permission from Tokyo 2020.

The plans for the Tokyo 2020 Games are developing for a shift towards a barrier-free
Japan for the athletes, spectators, staff, volunteers, and citizens. Japan’s Universal Design 2020
Action Plan, 4 which was released in 2017 by the Office of the Prime Minister, is a call to action toincrease accessibility throughout the country, and acts as a catalyst for change in preparation for
the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. This action plan, along with the standards andrecommendations of the Tokyo 2020 Accessibility Guidelines, aims to remove barriers for all.
Another pivotal document includes the Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy Plan. 5 A textual analysis
will be applied to these documents to determine how these plans have been created to address
the structural, environmental and attitudinal barriers faced by individuals with impairments.
This critical analysis through text “can bring to attention how disability appears, the grounds ofthat appearance, as well as the various interpretive slants, such as acceptance or critique, of thecurrent appearance of disability in our lives. 6 With the countdown to the Tokyo 2020 Games
underway, how close are the organizers in reaching their accessibility goals? What will theimpact be for citizens and visitors during the Tokyo 2020 Games? In looking ahead, beyond the
4 Government of Japan. (2017). Japan’s Universal Design 2020 Action Plan from the Office of the Prime

Minister Abe
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tokyo2020_suishin_honbu/ud2020kkkaigi/pdf/2020_keikaku.pdf,
Feb. 2017.
5 Tokyo2020. (2016). Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy Plan (2016),
https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/legacy/items/legacy-summary_EN.pdf.
6 Titchkosky, T. (2007). Reading & Writing Disability Differently: The Textured Life of Embodiment, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, p. 25.

23

Tokyo 2020 Games, this presentation will also identify the planned legacies for accessibility andinclusion for Japan. To answer these questions, the analyses are organized into sections on
promises, possibilities, shortfalls, and legacies.
Promises
The national document on accessibility is a 35-page document from the Office of thePrime Minister entitled Universal Design 2020 Action Plan, which was released in 2017. 7 The
document is informed by five considerations. First, the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic
Games are intended to proceed with an integrated approach for the planning andimplementation of the events. Second, the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities states that there will not be any discrimination and that all persons should
receive fair treatment. Third, the document cites the Social Model of Disability 8 which identifies
that “disability” is an interaction between the impairment of the individual and the social
barriers. Fourth, the action plan aims at building awareness and knowledge by everyone.
Finally, the document outlines that the goal is to ensure that everyone can move safely andcomfortably.
The opening paragraph of the action plan is critical in setting the stage for an integrated
and inclusive environment. Specifically, “we are developing the 2020 Paralympic Games inorder to realize this symbiotic society.” The paragraph continues “we are all men and women,elderly people and young people, with or without disability. People value and support eachother’s human rights and dignity and everyone enjoys a lively life. We aim to realize asymbiotic society that can be received.” 9 The statement emphasizes the need to take all humanbeings into consideration and they are to be treated with dignity and respect. To realize asymbiotic society, action needs to be taken to remove all barriers and to ensure thatenvironments are “barrier-free.”
To become barrier-free, there needs to be changes in a number of areas. Changes need tohappen at the personal level. Individuals need to learn to communicate with different people,
with diverse social identities, including a range of abilities and disabilities. Cultivating abilities
to empathize would strengthen the communication skills. Learning that there are different
modes of communication can enhance understanding amongst individuals. Changes canhappen through education by teaching children about the meaning of “barrier-free.”Curriculum revisions can improve the knowledge of barrier-free, along with adding teachertraining courses. Partnerships with different stakeholders in business, government and tourism
7 Government of Japan. (2017). Japan’s Universal Design 2020 Action Plan from the Office of the Prime

Minister Abe,https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tokyo2020_suishin_honbu/ud2020kkkaigi/pdf/2020_keikaku.pdf,
Feb. 2017.
8 Oliver, M. (1990). The Politics of Disablement, London, England: Macmillan Education Ltd.; UPIAS. (1976).
Fundamental Principles of Disability (London, Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation)
Available on the Disability Archive: www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/index.
9 Government of Japan. (2017). Japan’s Universal Design 2020 Action Plan from the Office of the Prime
Minister Abe,https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tokyo2020_suishin_honbu/ud2020kkkaigi/pdf/2020_keikaku.pdf,
Feb. 2017.

24

can also contribute to a greater understanding of what a barrier-free environment could bewithin the different contexts. While the Universal Design 2020 Action Plan offers the context andthe guiding considerations for accessibility and barrier-free, the TOKYO 2020 Accessibility
Guidelines provides specific steps on how to achieve these goals.
The TOKYO 2020 Accessibility Guidelines 10 is a 153-page document that outlines thefundamentals of equity, dignity and functionality, and focuses on a range of individuals who
can benefit from a more accessible environment. The list includes individuals with physicalimpairments (i.e. mobility, visible, hearing), intellectual challenges, and mental illness. Others
who can benefit from changes include people with injuries, older adults and seniors, pregnant
women, people with infant children, people who speak languages other than Japanese, andpeople travelling with a service dog. For individuals who will be connected to games, which
include athletes, spectators, volunteers, staff, tourists, and citizens, they will all be able tobenefit from the technical requirements specified in the guidelines. Technical specifications arefor doorways, ramps, venues, washrooms, hotels, publications, and communications,transportation and training.
The document provides specifics on infrastructure, communications and training.
The specifications for infrastructure detail the measurements in numbers, words and diagrams
required for barrier-free access, such as ramps leading into venues, doorway widths formotorized wheelchairs, accessible washrooms, and counter heights for reception andinformation booths. Communications needs to be offered in different formats.
With print material, large font sizes and sans-serif font types would enhance reading.
Signage for way finding should be high contrast such as black and white to increase readability.
For disability awareness training, there needs to be focus on the individual rather than the
impairment. The guidelines provide specific directions to speak directly to the person, and nottheir personal support worker, to speak clearly in a normal tone and speed, to avoid touching
service dogs and mobility aids, and to never touch a person with a disability unless you havereceived expressed permission.
These guidelines are detailed to ensure that these standards can be implemented for thegames, and are to be expected by persons with and without disabilities who are participating in
the games, organizing the games, or attending the games as mega-sport fans. The guidelines
take a comprehensive approach by addressing social attitudes and the built environment.
Progress
To highlight the progress made, the social model of disability 11 offers an approach toorganizing the information from a disability lens perspective. A disability lens approach
identifies disability or disabilities as barriers in the social environment, not the individual.

10 Tokyo2020. (2019). Accessibility Guidelines,
https://tokyo2020.org/en/organising-committee/accessibility/data/accessibility-guidelines_EN.pdf.
11 Oliver, M. (1990). The Politics of Disablement, London, England: Macmillan Education Ltd.; UPIAS.
(1976). Fundamental Principles of Disability (London, Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation)
Available on the Disability Archive: www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/index.

25

Specifically, one can identify these barriers within structures, environments and attitudes (i.e.
who are the targeted audiences, what are the plans, what will the impact be), or the
SEAwall. 12 The structural level was depicted by French as the macro-system or the foundational
level which included the hierarchical power relations and structures which disempowered
disabled persons, the denial of human rights and opportunities such as education and work in
relation to disabled persons, and the welfare policies which could have a negative impact onsocio-economic class.
In the middle of the SEAwall, there were the environmental factors which included fourkinds of barriers: ableist language, institutional policies and regulations, professional practices,
and inaccessible physical environments. The top level of the SEAwall depicted attitudes or
prejudices that had three components: cognitive, emotional and behavioural. The cognitive
component reflects the lack of understanding of disability in general, and the skills andknowledge of disabled persons in particular. The emotional component revealed the feelings of
non-disabled persons when they interacted with disabled persons, and feelings ranged fromfear to respect in any of these encounters. The behavioural component reflected the actions of
non-disabled persons towards disabled persons. This SEAwall of barriers was influenced by or“cemented by ideologies of ‘normality’ and ‘independence’.13 This metaphor and acronym of
the SEAwall, while initially addressed possible barriers in the workplace, can be applied to theanalysis and shortfalls of the Tokyo 2020 Games.
The Sustainability Progress Report 14 focuses on five areas that include: climate change,
resource management, natural environment and biodiversity, consideration of human rights
and fair business practices, and cooperation and communications. For the purpose of this paper,
the results from the latter two areas will highlight how diversity practices are being
implemented, and how partnerships are being formed to enhance equity and inclusion.
Structural
The organizing stakeholders include governments, businesses, and sport governing
bodies. To ensure that there are different perspectives included in the development of policies
and programs which will organize the development of the games, there needs to be a hiring of adiverse group of staff and volunteers. The Tokyo 2020 games recruited many staff throughsecondments from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the government of Japan. Games
volunteers have been recruited for the 80,000 positions out of the 200,000 applications. The
80,000 volunteers consist of 36% male, 64% female, 64% Japanese, 36% non-Japanese. 15 The goal
for the recruitment of the torch relay volunteers is to also provide a broad representation,
including disability, age, gender, and nationality.

12 French, S. (2001). Disabled People and Employment A Study of Working Lives of Visually Impaired

Physiotherapists, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Company.

13 Ibid, p.14.
14 Tokyo2020. (2019). Overview of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games Sustainability Progress

Report, https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/sustainability/report/data/overview-tokyo2020-games-susreport_EN.pdf
15 Ibid.

26

Environmental
While there are 25 sports centres which are accessible for persons with disabilities inJapan, guaranteed training times are not available for para-athletes. The sports centres are often
used for rehabilitation and recreation purposes. The new Para Arena, located next to themuseum of Maritime Science in Tokyo’s Shinagawa Ward – a 3,187 square metre facility – isnow available as a training space for para-athletes. 16 Built by the Nippon Foundation
Paralympic Support, the new Para Arena includes three courts for wheelchair basketball or
rugby, eight for boccia, two for sitting volleyball, and one for blind soccer or goal ball.
Additionally, there are barrier-free entrances, multiple areas featuring universal design
elements such as high contrast wall and floor colours to support individuals with visual
impairments. Air conditioning is important since athletes with spinal cord injuries may havedifficulty cooling the body, plus a “huge parking space” for accessible parking. Despite thestate-of-the-art facilities that are now available for para-athletes through the Para Arena, there is
uncertainty as to the existence of the facility after the games
Attitudinal
Attitudinal changes may be the greatest catalyst for a cultural shift towards accessibility.
As highlights in the Sustainability Progress Report, training for staff, volunteers and contractors
has been provided since 2017. A handbook with basic knowledge of diversity and inclusion was
prepared. Educational sessions have been designed to address the reception and support forindividuals with visual impairments, hearing impairments and who use wheelchairs. To learn
more about diverse communities, a LGBTQ Café and Human Library was also coordinated forstaff training. To ensure that human rights procedures are adhered to, a Grievance Mechanism
has been installed in place for daily operations, during the games, and throughout the supply
chain.
To ensure that more of the general population is aware and engaged, there is a need for
education starting with the very young. The International Paralympic Committee (IPC)
developed I’m Possible in 2017, as their official education program. The IPC partners withnational paralympic committees and ministries of education, with Japan being the first country
to launch the program. With an initial target of 20,000 teacher toolkits to be distributed, theactual distribution was of 36,000 packs by Feb 2019. 17 The packs were initially launched for 6 –12 year olds, but with an intention to provide “reverse education” these tool kits set the stage
for discussion with family and across generations. Family talks can help promote theParalympic values of courage, determination, inspiration and quality. The teacher toolkits
provided 15 lesson plans, which included learning activities, power points, questions andquizzes for 45-minute sessions. The I’m Possible toolkits also offered 6 inspirational films. In
addition to the toolkits, schools have hosted Parasport exchange conferences to show casespecific disability sports such as boccia and floor volleyball.

16 Ikezawa, H. (2018). Para Arena a barrier-free home base for athletes, The Japan Times, Aug. 24th, 2018.
17 Tokyo2020. (2019). Overview of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games Sustainability Progress

Report, https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/sustainability/report/data/overview-tokyo2020-games-susreport_EN.pdf

27

Picture 2. Mami Tani

Reprinted with permission from Tokyo 2020

Shortfalls
Structural
Stakeholders are coming together for the games, from the national and local
governments, to the disability sport organizations. The Paralympic Support Centre whichhouses 23 disability sports organizations has an uncertain future. Without funding the centre
may be dissolved following the implementation of the Tokyo 2020 Games. 18 With the different
organizations involved in the planning of the games, are there sufficient representation frompersons with disabilities? Representation of individuals with impairments at the staffing levels
can still be improved. Nearly 40% (17 out of 44) of government entities missed the hiring targets
for persons with impairments as of June 2019 even though 3,623 were hired since October
2018. 19 The proportion of persons with disabilities across the 44 government entities stood at
2.31%, which is still below the legally required level of 2.5%. 20

18 Ogura, K. (2018). Visions of the legacy of the Tokyo 2020 Paralympic Games, In I.

Brittain & A. Beacom (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Paralympic Studies, Switzerland:
Springer Nature, p. 579-602.
19 Jiji Press. (2019). Nearly 40% of Japan Government institutions miss hiring targets for people withdisabilities, The Japan Times, August 29, 2019.
20 Ibid.

28

Environmental
To ensure there are sufficient accommodations for the tourists for the games, hotels needto provide more accessible rooms per night. Specifically, there is a projected 300 rooms short of
the 850 needed; 35% accessible rooms are missing. 21 However, Bookman 22 notes that hotels
missed the mark on accessibility. Although 900 out of the 240,000 are listed as barrier-free,certain features such as a raised entryway, a narrow bathroom door, and a long commute
render the accommodations inaccessible for individuals with disabilities. Currently, 0.4% ofJapan’s hotel rooms are accessible. 23
In a recent situation, conflict arose with the British paralympic teams which were
initially asked to pay for construction before the games to make the rooms accessible, and thenadditional costs to return to current state; Yokohama City agreed to pay for the costs, with afund now available for subsidization (20 million yen fund) for construction of at least 1000
square metres of floor space. 24 New standards will be implemented to address the concerns oflimited accessible hotel rooms. Under the new standards, hotels with 50 or more rooms willneed to design 1% of their hotel rooms to be accessible. For example, 300 room hotels need tobuild and allocate three rooms as accessible. A barrier-free room must have an entrance wider
than 80 centimetres (30 inches), a bathroom with handrails and no steps dividing rooms. Still,even with this new law, this percentage is far below the number of persons with impairments in
the general population, which is 15% according to the World Health Organization. 25
While accessibility standards are detailed for the training and competition venues, this is
not the case for restaurants and tourist sites. Tourists will also be eating out at restaurants andvisiting tourist sites. For example, steps at entrances can limit the eating options. In a videointerview between BBC disability news correspondent Nikki Fox and Josh Grisdale, founder ofAccessible Japan, who both use electric wheelchairs, could not enter a restaurant in Tokyo. 26
Their alternative option was to eat in the local food court in the nearest department store that
had elevator access.

21 Kyodo Press. (2019). Wheelchair-accessible hotel rooms still an issue ahead of theTokyo 2020 Paralympic and Olympic Games, The Japan Times, June 10, 2019.

22 Bookman, M. (2019). An Olympics crowdsourcing project may be the answer to making Japan a moreaccessible country, The Japan Times, May 26, 2019.

23 Bookman, M. (2019). An Olympics crowdsourcing project may be the answer to making Japan a moreaccessible country, The Japan Times, May 26, 2019.

24 Jiji Press. (2019). Nearly 40% of Japan Government institutions miss hiring targets for people withdisabilities, The Japan Times, August 29, 2019.

25 World Health Organization. (2011). World Report on Disability.

https://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/report/en/.
26 BBC. (2019). Tokyo Paralympics 2020: Will Tokyo Be Accessible Enough?

https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-49434807/tokyo-paralympics-2020-will-tokyo-beaccessible-enough.

29

Attitudinal
While employment of persons with impairments is a goal, the actual rates are below thestandards within the government institutions. Decreasing the unemployment rates among
persons with disabilities can make a difference in meeting their basic needs such as food, shelterand clothing, and enhancing independence. By decreasing underemployment or fully utilizing
the skills of the individuals with disabilities will provide for retention and satisfaction in theircurrent jobs. Greater recruitment needs to take place from a larger pool of candidates. Once
hired, employers need to have discussions with their new employees on what can be achieved
with a professional development plan to ensure that all skills are being optimized.
In preparation for the Tokyo 2020 Games, the staff requires disability awareness training
in preparation for their roles and responsibilities. For example, the staff who created theticketing systems have fallen short of making this process barrier-free. Tickets were notprepared in Braille or on a CD, but only in an audio format and a hotline. The Japan Federation
for the Blind has criticized the process, with “It’s strange that Tokyo 2020 isn’t sharing
information according to its own guidelines”. 27 While there are more accessible taxis being
made for the games, the taxi drivers need technical and empathy training. To transition thetaxis into barrier-free vehicles, the taxi drivers need to take time to fold the seats, install slope
plates and secure the wheelchair, with the process taking upwards to an hour to complete. 28
Unfortunately, some taxi drivers have admitted to not stopping for individuals who use
wheelchairs, especially if it was a short distance ride. These structural, environmental andattitudinal shortfalls can potentially still be remedied, with the time available, before the start of
the games. As with the promises, the long-term impact of the accessible features will form thelegacies of the Tokyo 2020 games.
Legacies & Leverages
The Tokyo 2020 Games have prepared and outlined the Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy
Plan (2016) with their intentions: “The overriding objective of our Action & Legacy Plan is toengage as many people as possible with the Games (Action), and pass on the positive benefits ofhosting the Tokyo 2020 Games to future generations (Legacy).” 29 The games are significant withthe goals of improved accessibility, improved communications, change in the psycho-social
environments and reconstruction following the Great East earthquake of 2011. Ogura’s 30
analysis of the upcoming games indicate that there will be impact on disability sport, social
participation of persons with disabilities, and social participation in general. Impact on
disability sport will include the availability, access and quality of training centres. The impact
on social participation of persons with disabilities will include in sports, work, and everyday
27 Kyodo Press. (2019). 2020 Games Criticized by Tokyo Association for the blind for lack of ticket info in

Braille or on CDs, The Japan Times, Sept. 5th, 2019.

28 The Japan Times. (2019). Take 5 from the Japan Times: Accessible taxis – if you can wait an hour. (Oct.

25th, 2019).

29 Tokyo2020. (2016). Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy Plan (2016),

https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/legacy/items/legacy-summary_EN.pdf , p1.

30 Ogura, K. (2018). Visions of the legacy of the Tokyo 2020 Paralympic Games, In I.

Brittain & A. Beacom (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Paralympic Studies, Switzerland:
Springer Nature, p. 579-602.

30

living. The impact on social participation in general will include attending the games, barrierfree education in the public schools, greater accessibility in the transportation systems, and anincrease in the number of disability sport instructors in each of the 59 districts in Tokyo. The
social participation goals of the Tokyo 2020 Games include 53+ goal medals, the selling of 2.3
million tickets to fill all venues, and a more inclusive society. A spokesperson for the Tokyo
2020 games said that the Paralympics can help grow “the promotion of universal design insports facilities and living spaces, and encouraging people’s minds to become barrier-freethrough Paralympic Education.” 31
Legacies often focus on the event and are reported after the games, with limited
opportunities to engage the local community. In contrast, leveraging emphasizes the strategic
goals of the opportunity and the evaluation centres on how effective these activities have been
to create the outcomes regardless of the timeframe. To ensure that legacies last and aresustainable, leveraging needs to be planned and cultivatedthrough “social leverage” or “synergistic relationships.” 32 In a comparative analysis of theattitudes of individuals towards persons with disabilities in two mega-sports events – theGlasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games and the Toronto 2015 Pan Am and ParaPan Am Games,
there was no significant change in attitudes in volunteers (n=1500). With the Toronto 2015
Games, 55% of spectators (n = 1062 total survey) responded that the event changed theirattitude towards disability. 33 The lack of change in attitudes amongst volunteers could be basedon their demographics. The researchers explained that the volunteers are well-educated, havemoderate to high income living, and have a high interest in social values. While there waschange in the spectators’ attitudes towards persons with disabilities, the researchers did
conclude that, “We suggest that it is problematic to continue to expect the event in and of itself(i.e. merely seeing athletes with impairments) to be the social change desired. There needs to beclear strategies that focus on the targeting of cognitive and behavioural dimensions ofchange.” 34
Within the Tokyo 2020 Action and Legacy Plan (2016) some of the key social levers include
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the Government of Japan, Economic organizations, andthe Japan Olympic Committee and Japan Paralympic Committee.

31 Bauer, A. (2019). Athletes and organizers hope to use Paralympics as catalyst for future, The Japan

Times, July 31, 2019.

32 Misener, L., McPherson, G., McGillivray, D. & Legg, D. (2019). Leveraging Disability

Sport Events: Impacts, Promises & Possibilities, New York: Routledge.

33 Ibid, p.14.

34 Ibid, p.120.

31

Photo 3. Shingo Kunieda

Reprinted with permission from Tokyo 2020.

Working together to put plans into actions, Tokyo2020 Nationwide Participation
Program was developed and implemented. As of January 2019, the Sustainability Reporthighlighted the numbers for the Nationwide Participation Program: 1,845 parties ororganizations registered, 93,000 actions or events occurred and 60 million people participated. 35
Based on Japan’s population of over 126 million people, nearly half of the population has
participated in these nationwide programs, including the Tokyo 2020 Medal Project and the“Yoi Don!” Program. The Tokyo 2020 Medal Project engaged the general Japanese population tocollect enough metal for the Olympic and Paralympic medals, while the “Yoi Don!” (Get Set!)
Education Program promoted knowledge about the Olympic and Paralympic Games andengaged students in the creation and selection of the Tokyo 2020 Games mascots.
In identifying the impact of disability sport, different sporting events around Japan canalso influence the perceptions on accessibility and inclusion. One case study is the OITAInternational Wheelchair Marathon which has been in place since 1981. The historical context
began in 1960, when Dr. Yutaka Nakamura first brought the concept of sports competition after
learning from the father of Paralympic Games, Sir Ludwig Guttman. At the time, persons withdisabilities were immobilized and provided with bed rest. In 1962 he sent two para-athletes tothe international wheelchair athletics called the Stoke Mandeville Games. With the Japanese
35 Tokyo2020. Overview of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games Sustainability Progress Report,

https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/sustainability/report/data/overview-tokyo2020-games-susreport_EN.pdf.

32

media picking up the news, Dr Nakamura’s efforts led to the Paralympic Games being held inTokyo in 1964. Over 200 athletes from 16 countries compete in men’s and women’s events in
October and has been hosted 38 times. 36 Both the full marathon of 42.195 km and half marathon
are available. The best time was with Swiss athlete Marcel Hug in the T34/53/54 category in
1:23:59; some go from 30-70 km/hr; runners go 20km/hr. 37
Pieter du Preez, South African wheelchair athlete and 4th in the world, wanted to try theonsen and found the area very accessible. Additionally, he adds
I’ve been to all sorts of countries, but I can say that Oita is the mostinclusive space I’ve ever been to. There are flat spaces everywhere
you go to accommodate wheelchairs and considerations for othertypes of impairments too, like textured paving blocks all around thecity for people with visual impairments. As someone who uses awheelchair, I was quite impressed with this city. 38
The Japan National Tourist Association (JNTO) is promoting safe tourism in Oita byshowcasing a city which is accessible for people who are older or have impairments. Tatsuo
Yamashita, 5th and current director of Japan Sun industries which founded by Yutaka
Nakamura hires individuals with impairments. Sun industries highlights that 1100 out of the1800 employees (61%) have impairments and are employed in the five offices inside and outside
Oita Prefecture. Beginning back in the 1960s, Yutaka Nakamura wanted to create a community
where people with and without impairments could live and work together in symbiosis. Yutaka
Nakamura’s son, Dr. Tao Nakamura, reflects on is father’s legacy of symbiosis
Oita is associated with tourism and hot springs, but Beppu is
promoting itself to the rest of Japan and the world as a placeof symbiosis. Beppu has a population of about 120,000, but around
8,800 of its residents have impairments and about 4,300 are fromother countries. I doubt there are many places in Japan withso much diversity. I want to spread the word to inspire more places
around Japan to become places of symbiosis like Beppu. 39

36 Tokyo2020. (2019) Oita International Wheelchair Marathon, an event held in southeastern Japan,

attracts top athletes across the world and many local spectators: The Paralympic Games transform theregion (Vol.1) 24 April 2019, https://tokyo2020.org/en/news/notice/20190410-02.html.
37 Ibid.
38 Tokyo2020. (2019) Oita International Wheelchair Marathon, an event held in southeastern Japan,

attracts top athletes across the world and many local spectators: The Paralympic Games transform theregion (Vol.1) 24 April 2019, https://tokyo2020.org/en/news/notice/20190410-02.html.

39 Tokyo2020. (2019) Oita International Wheelchair Marathon, an event held in southeastern Japan,

attracts top athletes across the world and many local spectators: The Paralympic Games transform theregion (Vol. 1) 24 April 2019, https://tokyo2020.org/en/news/notice/20190410-02.html.

33

Oita was transformed by sport, through the international wheelchair marathon, andprovides a model of how “unity in diversity” and symbiosis can be realized. Symbiosis becomesa reality when these employees with impairments participate in everyday living with theirfamilies. “Over the years, with impairments being very common, it becomes natural to havefriends with impairments as well” says Tao Nakamura. 40 Impairment becomes normalized,
rather than being the exception. With this majority in the population, there is evidence of asocial cultural shift in the attitudes towards persons with disabilities. This is an increasing
concern as Japan’s aging population is 65 and older and totals 35.88 million or 28.4% of total
population. 41 Oita has been transformed by sport, workplaces and attitudes over the past 50
years, and this could be possible with the Tokyo 2020 Games as a catalyst for change. With theconcerted efforts of many stakeholders, this can be possible.

Photo 4. Siamand Rahman

Reprinted with permission from Tokyo 2020.

To better understand the social leveraging and synergistic relationships, Misener et al.
offers a social change analysis from a disability studies lens (see Table 1). 42
From a social change perspective, there are different levels of impact and influence: individual,
behavioural and group/organization/society. For the purpose of this paper, key players have
40 Ibid.
41 Nippon.com. (2019). Japan’s Elderly Population Totals Record 35.88 M, Sept 15th, 2019https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2019091500338/japan's-elderly-population-totals-record-35-88m.html?cx_recs_click=true
42 Misener, L., McPherson, G., McGillivray, D. & Legg, D. (2019). Leveraging Disability
Sport Events: Impacts, Promises & Possibilities, New York: Routledge.

34been identified based on the progress made in advance of the Tokyo 2020 Games. All thesestakeholders can play a role in disability sport, the social participation of persons withdisabilities, and raising the social consciousness of disability in our everyday lives.
Table 1. Social Change Analysis
Individual
BehaviouralGroup/
Organization/
SocietySport &
Individual
Audience
Disability sports
Disability Studies
participation &participation &groups working
support for
attitudes towards
togetherdisability sports
disability sport post
event
Tokyo 2020
AthletesMedia
Disability sports
Progress
Staff
representationsgroupsVolunteers
Social media
Tokyo2020
Torchbearers
Fan engagement
organizers
Citizens
Education
All governments
Disability Activists
Professional
Employers
Journalists
development
Multi-level
Photographers
Casual dialogue
stakeholders
Bloggers

Hopeful Outcomes
Promises for the Tokyo 2020 Games were outlined from the official government ofJapan’s Universal Design Action Plan and carefully planned in the Tokyo 2020 Accessibility
Guidelines. With stakeholders working from governments and sports organizations, there ismuch progress made for disability awareness through education and sports participation for all
abilities. Legacies and leveraging ensures that the Tokyo 2020 Games will be sustainable for
sports athletes and the general population. The changes for accessibility and disability
awareness are timely, as the Japan population ages. With the aging of Japan’s population, there
will be higher incidences of impairments.
At the nexus of disability rights, human rights and sports events, social justice ispossible, with a transformational shift that reduces and eliminates structural, environmental
and attitudinal barriers. From the vision of the Tokyo2020 Games that “Sport has the power tochange the world and our future” to Japan’s Universal Design Action Plan that states “we aredeveloping the 2020 Paralympic Games in order to realize this symbiotic society,” there is muchto celebrate on the progress made since Tokyo was awarded the host city for the Tokyo 2020
Olympic and Paralympic games. While there remains criticisms for more changes to be
implemented to meet the Tokyo 2020 Accessibility Guidelines, Tokyo has offered an all-Japan
approach along with accountability commissions to host the Olympic and Paralympic games,
and more importantly, to sustain a continuous improvement on accessibility and inclusion
beyond 2020.

35

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37

“Osaka’s Troubled Metropolitan Plan: A Local Tragedy or Japan’s Triump?,” David W.
Edgington, Professor Emeritus, Department of Geography, University of British
Columbia (David.Edgington@ubc.ca)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the proposal by Tōru Hashimoto and his `One Osaka’ politicalparty followers to merge Osaka City and Osaka Government into a Metropolitan government.
Conceptually, this case study is set within a literature that appraises arguments both for andagainst metropolitan-level governance, and the tensions between Osaka and Tokyo.
Empirically, I chronicle the evolution of the Osaka Metropolitan Plan over the 2010 to 2020
period. The analysis draws attention to the challenges of implementing the Plan together withlocal and national political frictions and coalitions at play.
Key words: urban governance, Osaka Metropolitan Plan; Japan’s regions; One Osaka Party;
Tōru Hashimoto.
Introduction
Japan is one of the world’s most heavily urbanized nations, which makes the questionof how its cities are governed an important political and policy question. In April 2019 thequestion of urban governance dominated the last local elections of the Heisei Era (1989-2019). In
what was termed a `cross-election’, the mayor of Osaka City, Hirofumi Yoshimura, resigned to
run for governor of Osaka Prefecture, while the then governor, Ichirō Matsui, stood down tocampaign for the city mayor’s office. At stake was an unusual strategy known as the Osaka
Metropolitan Plan, the crown jewel in the policy plans of “One Osaka” (also known as the
Osaka Restoration Association, Ōsaka Ishin no Kai), the political party to which both men
belonged to. The Osaka Metropolitan Plan, which aims to unify Osaka Prefecture as a
metropolis divided up into special wards similar to the current administration of Tokyo, wasproposed originally by One Osaka founder Tōru Hashimoto in 2010 and has been a central anddivisive part of the region’s politics ever since.
In the event, both candidates won their respective seats contested in the 2019 election
and a second referendum on the Osaka Metropolitan Plan will likely take place in late-2020 (thefirst was in 2015). This paper reviews the rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo, arguments
surrounding the relative merits and debates over a metropolitan government (is it a local
tragedy for Osaka if implemented, or does its agenda form part of a larger struggle to revitalize
Japan’s regions?), the rise of Hashimoto’s regional populist movement in Japan, shenanigans inboth local and national politics, and along the way I discuss Prime Minister Abe’s backing for
the World Expo in Osaka and an analysis of the 2015 Osaka City referendum. A key researchquestion is to what degree does the Osaka Metropolitan Plan reflect wider issues surrounding
the search for better urban governance. Results indicate that arguments for the plan were
couched largely in efficiency terms, while its many opponents raised issues relating togeographical equity and accountability over likely future resources and services provided by
the proposed special wards. In addition, there is scant evidence as to whether a merger of
Osaka city and the prefecture would assist the local economy, or whether there is support for asimilar metropolitan governance in other jurisdictions across Japan.

38

Some General Principles of Metropolitan Governance
Efficiency, Equity and Accountability Arguments
While the question of how to govern and manage large metropolitan regions is notnew, Bourne argues that these debates have taken on renewed vigor and urgency in recent
years. 1 Among the triggers include the increasing scale and complexity of metropolitan regions,the rapidity of social and economic change, the perceived threats of increased globalization,
severe constraints facing financing of the public sector, and a greater perception ofenvironmental degradation in large cities and their surrounding areas together with adeterioration in the quality of life. Indeed, scholarship that focuses on rethinking governance ofthe contemporary metropolis has yielded examples of challenges and change from North
America, Europe and Asia. 2 The key questions asked are: what kinds of organizations,institutions, strategies and policy instruments are most appropriate to address these problems;
and what geographical delimitation of a metropolitan region is most suitable for management
and planning? In this regard, Bourne maintains that there has been little agreement on what theissues really are, either in theory or in practice. 3
Historically, a fundamental concern has been the existence of widespread
metropolitan fragmentation. It is often claimed that larger metropolitan areas are divided into
numerous municipal units (or government service districts) with relatively weak authorities
covering the entire region. At the same time, entire metropolitan areas are often undergoing
rapid physical expansion together with a decentralization of population and economic activity.
A common assumption is that such fragmentation contributes to economic inefficiencies andsocial polarization and that some form of metropolitan consolidation or regional government isessential. In practice, however, fragmentation persists, often because of the inability or
1 Bourne, Larry S. Alternative Models for Managing Metropolitan Regions: The Challenge for North American

Cities. Paper prepared for the International Forum on Metropolization, 22 February, 1999, Santa Cruz,
Bolivia. Accessed June 2020.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=128639331A37B34F6370364B5C108D9C?doi=10.1.1.195.8335&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Bourne, Larry S. “Designing a Metropolitan Region: The Lessons
and Lost Opportunities of the Toronto Experience”. In The Challenge of Urban Government: Policies andPractices, edited by Mila Frier and Richard E. Stren 27-46. Washington D.C. : World Bank Institute, 2001.

2 Edgington, David W. Antonio Fernandez and Claudia Hoshino. New Regional Development Paradigms

Volume 2. New Regions – Concepts, Issues and Practices. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001;
Miller, David. The Regional Governing Of Metropolitan America. New York: Routledge, 2002; AsianDevelopment Bank. Managing Asian Cities: Sustainable and Inclusive Urban Solutions. Mandaluyong City,
Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2008; Laquian, Aprodicio A. Beyond Metropolis: The Planning andGovernance of Asia's Mega-Urban Regions. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005;
Phares, Donald. Governing Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century. New York: Routledge, 2009; Xu, Jiang
and Yeh, Anthony G.O. Governance and Planning of Mega-City Regions: An International Comparative
Perspective. London, Routledge, 2011; Nelles, Jen. Comparative Metropolitan Policy: Governing Beyond Local
Boundaries in the Imagined Metropolis, London: Routledge, 2012; Thibert, Joel Governing Urban Regions
Through Collaboration: A View from North America. London: Routledge, 2015; Chatry, Isabelle andHulbert, Claudia, eds. Multi-Level Governance Reforms: Overview of OECD Country Experiences. Paris:
OECD, 2017.

3 Bourne, Alternative Models for Managing Metropolitan Regions.

39

unwillingness of growing suburban municipalities to agree to annexation or amalgamation, oreven cooperation, on grounds of local autonomy. 4
A major theoretical criteria used to design governance structures is the `subsidiaryprinciple’, which underscores that the efficient provision of public services (police, health,education and welfare services, and so on) require decision-making to be carried out by thelevel of government that is closest to the individual citizens. 5 Thus, as long as there are local
differences in tastes and costs, there are clear efficiency gains from delivering many public
services at the local level, together the advantages of greater accountability and responsiveness.
Higher ranking government agencies, say at the regional or national level, should only take on
public services where there are clear efficiencies or redistributive advantages to be
demonstrated (e.g. national defence). By this criterion almost all public services should be
provided at the local (or sub-national regional) level with local policy-makers making decisions
about what services to provide, how much to provide and who should pay for them. Of course,
no scholar defines adequately what is meant by `local’ (or `regional’) in terms of municipal
population size; neither is there any consistent evidence that there is a single `optimal size’ forany urban municipality or for any particular service (for instance the provision of water andsewerage, police, health, education or welfare services may each have a different optimal size ofgovernment). Still, it is argued that having many truly local municipal governments – rather
than a consolidated `metropolitan’ (or Metro-wide) government – is more democratic becausesuch governments are `closer to the people’. This standpoint is supported by classicaleconomics and the `public choice’ paradigm of Tiebout, in which people can `vote with theirfeet’ by moving to jurisdictions that offer a basket of public goods and services they prefer, andare willing to pay for. 6
By contrast, the proponents of consolidation, and of metropolitan governance anduniform service provision, reverse these arguments. They suggest that fragmented government
structures in large metropolitan areas lead to inefficiencies if local governments are too small toachieve scale and scope economies in service provision. Moreover, metropolitan governments
may be able to bring greater efficiencies through budget and cost improvements. In addition,
fragmented government urban settings are likely to head to significant spill-over effects (ornegative externalities) resulting from uncoordinated development trends – for instance, in
housing, factories, commerce or large infrastructure projects - leading to some form ofenvironmental degradation (e.g. congestion, pollution and other spill-over costs) from one small
municipality to another that cannot be effectively compensated for. Conversely, with smallscale local municipalities there are also inefficiencies related to the provision of services by one
jurisdiction that are often consumed by citizens in another jurisdiction (e.g. water and4 Slack, Edith, Bourne, Larry S. and Meric Gertler. Vibrant Cities and City-Regions: Responding to Emerging

Challenges, The Panel on the Role of Government, 2003. Accessed June 2020.

https:// ospace.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/3486/1/244174. Pdf.
5 Spiller, Marcus and Murrian, Rhys. “Subsidiarity and Metropolitan Innovation in the USA.” In

Australia’s Metropolitan Imperative: An Agenda for Governance Reform edited by Rhys Tomlinson andMarcus Spilller. 77-92. Melbourne: CSIRO Publishing, 2018.

6 Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. Journal of Political Economy, 64 (1956): 416-

424.

40

transportation). 7 Political fragmentation could also result in different standards of building andland use codes and might allow property development industries or factories to play one
municipality off against another. Perhaps more important, it is also argued that a fragmented
metropolis would lead to unequal provision of services as wealthy municipalities typically havehigh levels of services and low taxes, while municipalities with low-income households and few
resources often have relatively low levels of services, and that these differences would increaseover time. A consolidated or `Metro’ model, would allow – but does not guarantee – the intermunicipal redistribution of resources and revenues, and in theory would be more efficient inensuring more uniform regulations and standards of services and infrastructure. 8
In response, advocates of a more fragmented approach regularly argue that
metropolitan-wide administrative structures tend to become overly bureaucratic, rigid andinflexible. They are also assumed to be more expensive to operate and allow servicing standards
to be set too high. The potential benefits of competition between municipalities are also lost. It issometimes claimed that the benefits of region-wide coordination could be achieved throughvoluntary agreements between municipalities or by the use of special purpose service andregional taxing authorities (for instance, by using metropolitan public housing agencies). As
stated above, a more decentralized arrangement is reasoned to provide better accessibility tourban services as well as greater accountability by citizens. Slack provides an outline of some of
the criteria, which at least in theory, may be used to evaluated alternate designs for the
structure of (and functions) performed by different levels of urban government (see Table 1). 9
Metropolitan Governance Models
Slack et al. noted that a number of governance models have been used by large urban
areas and city-regions. 10 Two-tier models consist of an upper-tier governing body (e.g. a
metropolitan-wide government that encompasses a large geographic area, together with lowertier municipalities that could include individual cities, towns and villages. The upper-tierprovides region-wide services that are typically characterized by allowing economies of scale(e.g. metropolitan transport and water systems, metropolitan-wide planning and development)
and controlling externalities (e.g. regulatory control over large-scale factory and commercial
development), whereas the lower tiers are responsible for services of a local nature and takeadvantage of local accountability (e.g. elementary schools, waste collection, and local parks).
Proponents also note that two-tier governance models lend themselves to collection of taxes atthe lower-tier municipalities (e.g. property tax) who then contribute to the upper-tier
metropolitan level depending upon the size of its tax base. Critics of the two-tier model argue
that costs may be higher because of inevitable waste and overlap in the provision of services by
the two levels of government, effective metropolitan-wide decision-making is often stalled or

7 Slack et al., Vibrant Cities and City-Regions.
8 Slack et al., Vibrant Cities.
9 Slack, Edith. “Finance and Governance: The Case of the Greater Toronto Area.” In Urban Governance andFinance: A Question of Who Does What, edited by Paul A.R. Hobson and France. St.-Hilaire. 81-112.
Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

10 Slack et al., Vibrant Cities.

41

postponed because of inefficiencies and negotiation costs incurred with the lower-leveljurisdictions, and this arrangement may be less transparent and more confusing to taxpayers.
In comparison, under a one-tier model of urban governance, a single local governmentis responsible for providing the full range of local services and has a geographic boundary thatcovers the entire urban area or metropolitan region. In theory, the boundaries of a one-tier (orunitary) local government should move outward as the urbanized area expands. The main
advantages cited for one-tier governments are better service coordination, clearer
accountability, more streamlined decision-making, and greater efficiency. They also have thepotential to internalize externalities, for instance through suburban or surrounding rural
residents having to pay for the urban services (some of which could be subsidized) that theyuse. Arguments against one-tier government structures included accountability due to the
problems of access and being overly-bureaucratic. In some cases, local satellite offices are
distributed across the municipality for people to pay tax bills, apply for building permits andinquire about household services. 11
Other models also exist, including informal, voluntary or formally mandated (usuallyby national or larger regional governments) cooperation among municipal authorities, often
leading to special boards of member local governments. This provides an alternative (secondbest) way of providing services across a region without resorting to amalgamation. 12
How the criteria in Table 1 are rank-ordered in the eyes of the public will obviously
influence any assessment of the performance of different governance models. Bourne notes thaturban governance reorganization, such as city and suburban municipality consolidation – is oneof the most radical reforms that local governments can undertake. 13 This is because it abolishes
small jurisdictions and relocates power in more central decision-making units and it is rarely
reversed. Bourne (ibid.) also points out that neither specific urban governance arrangements or
shifts from one type of mode to another emerge in a vacuum. They are, in large part, placespecific and historically contingent. With this discernment the paper now moves to examine
urban governance systems in Japan, especially for Tokyo and Osaka.
Japanese Urban Governance and the Competition Between Osaka and Tokyo
Urban Governance in JapanThe Local Autonomy Act, 1947, stipulates the legal framework of Japan’s local
governance system. Outside of the capital, Tokyo, local government in Japan is administered at
two levels: 46 upper-level of prefecture-wide governments (including Osaka prefecture) together with one metropolis (the Tokyo Metropolitan Government [TMG]) - and around 1,700
lower-level municipal governments (cities, towns and villages). 14 Prefecture governments
support municipal government units within their jurisdictions by providing public services
requiring additional resources and which cover a broader scope than just one municipality. For
11 Slack et al., Vibrant Cities.
12 Chatry and Hulbert, eds. Multi-Level Governance Reforms.
13 Bourne, Alternative Models for Managing Metropolitan Regions.
14 CLAIR. Local Government in Japan 2016 (2019 Revised Edition). Tokyo: Council of Local Authorities forInternational Relations.

42

instance, a prefectural government in Japan is responsible for constructing major inter-cityroads and operating wide-area sewerage facilities, together with high-school education. Local
municipalities operate local services, such as parks and elementary schools, maintain local
roads, and are subject to prefectural approval for regulations, such as land use plans. A
municipality can be classified into one of three categories (cities, towns and villages) according
to its population size. If the population is less than around 8,000 people the prefecture will term
the municipality a `village’. In excess of this figure the municipality qualifies as a `town’. Whenit exceeds 50,000 people the municipality is considered a `city’. 15 In times past, an
overwhelming majority of municipalities were villages. For example, when the Local
Autonomy Act was first established over 70 years ago more than 80 per cent of Japan’smunicipalities were villages. However, many villages became towns and cities since then due topopulation growth and the merging of municipalities leading to a sharp decline in the numberof villages. 16
If the population of a city exceeds 500,000, and if the Prime Minister’s office recognizes
the city office as having a high level of administrative ability, the city qualifies to become an`ordinance-designated city’ (seirei shi). This system of ordinance-designated cities commenced in1956 when five major cities (Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe) were thus named.
Currently, there are 20 cities designated by government ordinance. An ordinance-designatedcity has far greater autonomy than an ordinary city government and has equivalent powers andresponsibilities as a prefecture. 17
In the case of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) area (population 13.7
million in 2017) there is also a third level of governance: this comprises the 23 special wards (forinstance, Shinjuku ward, Shibuya ward) into which Tokyo was originally divided when it was
still categorized as a `city’ before World War II, rather than the official `metropolis’ it became
later. Tokyo’s special wards are similar to municipalities, but under the Local Autonomy Act
they cannot independently operate certain services, such as city sewerage, bus and subway
services, crematories, pubic hospitals or universities. 18 Tokyo’s western extension, known as the(somewhat less urban) Tama area, comprises separate 26 cities, 3 towns and one village. This
area was governed by a Tokyo prefecture government (as was the more urbanized Tokyo
city/special ward areas) up until 1943 when the dual administrative system of Tokyo-fu (theprefecture) and Tokyo-shi (the city) was abolished for war-time efficiency, and the prefecture
and city were merged to form the Metropolis of Tokyo (Tokyo-to) in 1943. 19 In essence, the TMG
15 For further details see CLAIR, Local Government in Japan.
16 For details see Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. Changes in the Number ofMunicipalities and Characteristics of the Great Meiji and Showa Mergers (in Japanese), 2014. Accessed June
2020. http:www.soumu.go.jp/gapei/gapei2.html.

17 Edgington, David. W. “Comprehensive Planning in Japanese Large Cities.” Planning Perspectives, 34,(2019): 115-132.

18 Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Structure of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). 2020.

Accessed June 2020. https://www.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/STRUCTURE/index.htm.

19 Seidensticker, Edward G. Tokyo Rising: The City Since the Great Earthquake. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1990; Cybriwsky, Roman. Tokyo: The Shogun's City at the Twenty-First Century. Chichester, John Wiley,
1998.

43

area today operates as a unique two-tier model of metropolitan governance (unique that is forJapan – at least to date) both with respect to the special wards as well as the more rural Tamamunicipalities (see Figure 1).
The upper-level Tokyo Metropolitan Government has its own legislative assembly,
and its chief executive is denoted by the term `governor’. It operates broader planning andadministrative activities, while the special wards and municipalities deliver services that closely
affect the everyday lives of the local residents. The TMG oversees the provision of firefighting
and water supply (except in certain municipalities), collection of metropolitan taxes, urban
development and regulation, environmental programs, social welfare and public health,industrial and labor affairs, transportation systems (bus and rail) as well as ports, harbors andsewerage systems. The special wards (and municipalities in the Tama area) have their own
democratic elections and are responsible for welfare, education and housing for residents. Thereis a special Metropolitan-Ward Council, established to coordinate relations between themetropolitan government and the special wards, as well as a financial adjustment system toarrange the allocation of metropolitan tax revenues among the special wards based on their
population and fiscal requirements. 20 Surrounding the TMG area are the prefectures of Saitama,
Chiba and Kanagawa – which also have cities, towns and villages – and together this vast urban
commuting area is often referred to as the `capital region’, although thus far there are no formal
regional government arrangements. 21
As a whole, the Japanese urban governance system has a number of distinctive
features, one of which is the limited fiscal autonomy of its prefectures, cities, towns and villages(apart from prosperous Tokyo) despite being formally known as `autonomous bodies’ (jichitai).
For instance local governments have only limited rights to raise taxes or issue debt and depend
heavily on the national government for budgetary support. In lieu of their limited local taxation
power Japan has established a money transfer system between the national government and its
local governments (both prefectural and municipal governments) based on the Tax Allocation
to Local Governments system, often called the Local Government Block Grant. 22
Another characteristic of Japanese local governance concerns the role of city mayors
and prefectural governors. Local governments in Japan comprise a legislative assembly led by apresident elected from among its members, together with a chief executive system involving thegovernors of prefectures and mayors of municipalities. Both members of legislative assemblies
and the chief executives of local governments are elected separately by the popular vote ofresidents, and perform their duties while maintaining both an independent yet equal stance,

20 For further detail see Tokyo Metropolitan Government, The Structure of the Tokyo Metropolitan

Government.

21 Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Tokyo’s History, Geography, and Population. Accessed June 2020.

https://www.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/HISTORY/index.htm.

22 Edgington, David W. “Local Government Fiscal Relationships and Regional Equalization.” In

Understanding Japan: Essays Inspired by Frank Langdon, edited by Larry T. Woods. 59-86.

Vancouver: Centre for International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2004.

44

acting as checks on each other to achieve democratic local public administration. 23 Thus local
assemblies are elected in each municipality to keep the mayor in check, and to pass local
ordinances, as well as to provide members that serve on committees in charge of education,
policing and elections. However, the powers vested in mayors as political and organizational
head of the municipalities affords them considerable control over their local authorities. Under
the 1947 Local Autonomy Act eligible voters elect mayors and governors, as well as local
assembly members, for four-year terms. Mayors and governors are not allowed to serve
concurrently as elected members either on other local governments, or for the national
government Diet (parliament). While mayors and governors have the right to enact regulations,draft budgets and to introduce bills to the prefectural legislature, they typically work together
in tandem with the elected assembly - the mayors and governors taking the lead in long-term
policy making in conjunction with the municipal and prefectural chief bureaucrats,
respectively. 24
Up until the late 1990s most mayors and governors had local political experience orwere former government bureaucrats. However, in 1995 former actor and Upper House (Diet)
member Yukio Aoshima was elected governor of Tokyo, without major official political party
support but largely on a promise to cancel a costly urban waterfront project that the previous
governor had approved. 25 In the same year, Osaka prefecture elected popular comedian `Knock’
Yokoyama. In the 1999 Tokyo gubernatorial election former Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) Dietlawmaker and author Shintaro Ishihara, a noted outspoken nationalist, successfully ran as anindependent with a populist appeal. As governor he cut municipal projects that he deemed to
be a waste of money and imposed new taxes on local hotels and banks. 26 Despite thesesingularly high profile individuals, City Mayors Research reports that the current profile ofJapan’s designated cities and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government include only a handful ofmayors that came from careers lying outside of traditional political or bureaucratic
backgrounds (for instance, as former business executives or media personalities). 27
Tokyo and the Osaka Problem
Economically, Tokyo and Osaka are the two largest cities in Japan, with central
government offices, leading research institutes, headquarters of famous companies and major
cultural and entertainment facilities clustering predominantly in Tokyo. Still, before the Meiji

23 CLAIR, Local Government in Japan.
24 CLAIR, Local Government in Japan.
25 Seguchi Tetsuo and Malone, Patrick. “Tokyo: Waterfront Development and Social Needs.” In City,

Capital and Water, edited by Patrick Malone. 164-194. London: Routledge, 1996.

26 Johnston, Eric. “Japan's Governors Under the Spotlight as Coronavirus Pandemic Rages.” The Japan

Times, 16 April. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/16/reference/japans-governors-coronaviruspandemic/.

27 City Mayors Research. “Japanese Local Government and Mayors of Largest Cities.” July 2020. Accessed

July 2020. http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/japanese-mayors.html.

45

Restoration (1868) Osaka was far more developed than Tokyo. 28 Indeed, for centuries, Osaka
was Japan’s dominant commercial centre with its own earthy culture and comedy. As far backas the feudal Edo period (1603-1868) a climate conducive to modern capitalism flourished in
Osaka. 29 Although Osaka was under the direct control of the shogun government in Edo, there
was basic freedom of movement for people, goods and money. At that time, Osaka functioned
as the gateway to the former capital Kyoto, connected by the Yodo River, one of the largest
rivers in Japan. In Osaka, business ranked higher than feudal bureaucracy and the local
mercantile culture respected innovation above everything else. For instance, in 1730 the world’s
first futures market opened at the city’s Dōjima Rice Exchange. 30 Indeed, people flocked to
Osaka with dreams of success. “Here it was possible to start a business from scratch and, withapplication and talent, make a fortune in a single generation. This was the `Osaka Dream’,familiar to everyone in Japan”. 31 The spirit of the city was characterized by staunch self-reliance,
independence and a tendency to defy authority. “Osaka people are impatient and love todisobey rules”. 32
Even after the Japanese capital was moved from Kyoto to Tokyo following the Meiji
Restoration in 1868, Osaka maintained its position as an economic powerhouse and it was thebirthplace of many companies that defined Japan’s leap to modernization. When Japan started
its heavy industrialization after the First World War, new businesses, such as steel, developed
faster in Osaka than in any other region in Japan. In this regard, Osaka had various advantages- for example, factory sites for heavy industries, large-scale water resources and adequate watertransportation. Osaka also had easy access to low-wage manual workers because of its long
history of fostering communities of migrant workers from less developed rural areas in Japan.
In the 20th century Osaka spawned famous manufacturing companies (for example, thePanasonic Corporation, Sharp Corporation, and Sanyo Corporation) together with financial
firms (including the Sumitomo Bank, Nomura Securities and Nippon Life Insurance) along withmajor media companies (such as the Mainichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun newspapers). 33
In the 1920s, Osaka surpassed Tokyo in population and flourished as the sixth largest
city in the world at a time when Tokyo suffered tremendous damage due to the 1923 Great
Kanto Earthquake. In the immediate post-World War II period Osaka’s economy grew faster

28 Ruble, Blair A. Second Metropolis: Pragmatic Pluralism in Gilded Age Chicago, Silver Age Moscow, and Meiji

Osaka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

29 McClain, James L. and Wakita, Osama (eds.) Osaka, the Merchant's Capital of Early Modern Japan, Ithaca,

Cornell University Press, 1999.

30 Takatsuki, Yasuo and Kamigahashi, Takashi. Microstructure of the First Organized Futures Market: The

Dojima Security Exchange from 1730 to 1869. Volume 3 of Advances in Japanese Business and Economics.
Singapore: Springer, 2020.

31 Mamiya, Jun. “A Metropolitan Government for Osaka?” nippon.com, 30 November, 2011. Accessed June

2020. https://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00006/.

32 Kerr, Alex. Lost Japan: Last Glimpse of Beautiful Japan. London, Penguin, 1993, 190.
33 Mosk, Cark. Japanese Industrial History: Technology, Urbanization, and Economic Growth. New York: M.E.

Sharpe, 2000.

46

than Tokyo’s and Osaka’s per capita income was highest among all prefectures. 34 However, theoil crisis in the 1970s marked a turning point as Japan’s leading sector shifted frommanufacturing to services, signaling the arrival of a post-industrial stage of development. In
recent years Osaka’s biggest post-1945 corporations, the likes of Panasonic and other consumer
electronics firms, ceased growing locally and moved factory production overseas. 35 Osaka also
lost its mercantile base, with major lenders, such as the Sumitomo Bank, merged into Tokyobased institutions during the banking crisis of the 1990s. Historic trading houses, for instancethe Sumitomo Corporation, migrated to the capital and the neither the city nor the prefecture
produced any significant new entrepreneurs. 36 By comparison, Tokyo continued to grow awide-range of service sector jobs, such as finance, tourism, education and commerce. 37
In the 1980s Osaka attempted to revive its local economy with public sector`technopolis’ projects, together with large-scale commercial office and hotel towers, but sincethen it has endured a painful decline compared to Tokyo. 38 The galling defeat of its bid for the2008 Summer Olympic Games was made worse by Tokyo’s successful effort to host the
Olympics in 2020. More importantly, Osaka’s per capita income fell below the national averagein 2002, and among Japan’s major cities it saw the highest unemployment rate, together withthe highest welfare recipients per capita, crimes per capita, child abuse per capita, homelesspeople per capita, and the lowest scholastic ability of middle school students. Godo terms thesepoor performance indicators as the `Osaka Problem’. 39 While tourism, pharmaceuticals andmachinery industries have boomed in Osaka there also remain pockets of deep poverty in thecity. Nishinari ward in the south of Osaka is the closest district Japan has to an slum. 40 Even
with the national economy doing relatively well in recent years (particularly after the `Lehman
Shock’ of 2008-9), Osaka’s post-industrial problems of dislocation and homelessness have beendifficult to solve, and people who had many years of unemployment are now reaching old age.
All told, the Osaka prefecture continues to have a gross domestic product (GDP) that outstrips
entire nations, such as Switzerland or Sweden. Still, for some commentators it is tempting to see

34 Godo, Yoshihisa. “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka: The Role of the Local Governance System.” In

Metropolitan Circles Development and the Future of Urbanization, edited by Wei Shan and Lijung Yang. 2540. Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2020.

35 Hayter, R. and Edgington, David W. Panasonic in China: A Search to Overcome the Liability of Foreignness.

Unpublished manuscript.

36 Hill, Richard Child and Fujita, Kuniko. “Osaka's Tokyo Problem.” International Journal of Urban andRegional Research, 19, (1995): 175-331.

37 Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Tokyo is the Hub of Japan’s Economic Activity, 2017. Accessed June 2020.

https://www.sangyo-rodo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/toukei/2-overview-2017en.pdf.

38 Edgington, David W. “City Profile: Osaka.” Cities, 17, (2000): 305–318; Anttiroiko, Arvi-Veikko.

“Making of an Asia-Pacific High-Technology Hub: Reflections on the Large-Scale Business Site
Development Projects of the Osaka City and the Osaka Prefecture.” Regional Studies, 43, (2000): 759-769.

39 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”
40 Yang, Manuel, Haraguchi, Takeshi and Kazuya Sakurada. “The Urban Working-Class Culture of Riot

in Osaka and Los Angeles: Towards Comparative History.” In Marxism and Urban Culture, edited by
Benjamin Fraser. 230-231. New York: Lexington Books, 2014.

47

Osaka’s straitened circumstances as a reflection of the loss of drive and vitality of Japan as awhole. 41
Osaka’s Urban Governance
When comparing the urban governance systems of the TMG with those of Osaka
prefecture and Osaka city, the special metropolitan arrangements of Tokyo are often viewed
more favorably. For instance, Godo maintains that Tokyo’s increasing prosperity is due in partto its ability to conduct comprehensive planning and development projects across the broad
metropolitan area, and so it is more efficient in stimulating economic activities. 42 Indeed,
compared to most other prefectures and cities, which can often only generate around 30 per
cent of their required fiscal revenue from local taxes, the figure for the TMG is around 80 per
cent. While this may give the impression of Tokyo’s advantageous financial independence fromthe national government compared to other cities, it belies the tensions between the TMG’sdevelopment plans and the national government’s aspirations for Japan’s capital to become a`global city’, one able to compete with London and New York as a high-level international
financial centre, as well as with other Asia-Pacific commercial hubs such as Shanghai, Seoul andSingapore. 43 Tokyo’s governance system also has the familiar problems of being too centralized
in terms of local democracy. Moreover, the TMG and its 23 special wards often cannot agree on
the allocation of budgets, administrative powers and tasks, and special ward governments inTokyo occasionally advance the idea of their conversion to independent cities. 44 An additional
challenge, as already pointed out, is that the TMG itself is surrounded by urban-based
prefectures – Saitama, Chiba and Kanagawa – which in part act as the residential andcommercial suburbs of central Tokyo and, together with other prefectures, form a much larger
capital region that to-date has no effective regional governance (Tokyo Metropolitan
Government, 2020b).
By comparison to the TMG two-tier system, the Osaka urban area operates as a multimunicipal, one-tier system. Specifically, Osaka Prefecture (population 8.8 million and Japan’s
second most populous urban region) contains 33 cities, 9 towns and one village (see Figure 2).
Osaka City (population 2.7 million) and adjoining Sakai City (population 840,000) are bothordinance-designated cities and have 24 wards and seven wards respectively. At present these
operate only as administrative wards when compared to Tokyo’s special wards, and as suchthey are merely the contact point for their respective cities’ administration; the so-called ward
`mayors’ in Osaka and Sakai are not elected officials but rather are public servants appointed bytheir cities’ mayor.

41 Mamiya, “A Metropolitan Government for Osaka?”
42 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”
43 Kantor, Paul, Lefèvre, Christian, Saito, Asato, Savitch, H.V. and Andy Thornley. Struggling Giants: City-

region Governance in London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2012; Clark, G. and Moonen, Tim. World Cities and Nation States, Oxford, John Wiley, 2017.

44 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”48

In the period before World War II, Osaka City constituted around 70 per cent of the
Osaka Prefecture population and beyond the City limits the character of the Prefecture was thenoverwhelming rural. At that time Osaka City was capable of operating various urban functions
for the urban area on its own, including a municipal subway and public transport, as well aswater and sewage systems. But following Japan’s rapid economic growth that began in the
1950s the situation changed dramatically. While Osaka City now represents fully half of thetotal GDP of Osaka Prefecture, by 2010, the total population of the Osaka Prefecture area rose to
8.8 million, of whom only 2.7 million lived in Osaka City (about 30 per cent). (Sakai City’s
history as a port and industrial town predates its own recent population growth; today,
however, it operates principally as a major suburb adjacent to Osaka City). Although theprefectural government is nominally in charge of wide-scale regional policy, in reality it has
been unable to interfere with matters within Osaka City. Geographically, Osaka Prefecture is
the narrowest prefecture (after Kagawa on Shikoku island) stretching out in a long thin urban
belt from north to south (Figure 2). The designated City of Osaka lies in the centre of this area.
Thus, Osaka prefectural government has constructed facilities inside Osaka city, such as publicart galleries, while the Osaka City government has also built similar facilities close by. In sum,
Osaka Prefecture has been required to operate urban-style pubic facilities for the extensive area
outside Osaka City, both to the north and south, leading the two governments to habitually
carry out similar functions resulting in (at least perceived) inefficiency and waste. 45
Two specific examples of the troublesome and ambiguous role division between the
Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City can be given. The first concerns the public transportation
system, and illustrates the negative externality impact of urban governance between
municipalities as outlined earlier. In this case, the Osaka Municipal Subway (OMS) has been
operated by the Osaka City government, and accordingly it only operates within thejurisdiction of Osaka City. Yet around 60 per cent of its passengers live outside, mainly
commuters who come in from various towns and cities in the Osaka Prefecture area for jobs,
shopping and schools located within Osaka City. As the subway system was subsidized by theCity in the past (the OMS was privatized in 2018) this had negative effects on the fiscal
condition of Osaka City. Moreover, new subway lines within Osaka City may not have been
suitable for neighbouring municipalities whose residents comprised the majority of the subway
riders. A second example is that the two governments operate their own water supply services.
Godo argues that a lack of coordination between them has led to complicated and inefficientpipeline layouts, and that some areas within Osaka City have been better served by the Osaka
Prefecture Water Supply Authority rather than by the Osaka City Water Works Bureau. 46
Despite these inefficiencies, both the merger of the two water utility services and theprivatization of the city subway system have been continuously opposed by the powerful labor
union of public servants of the Osaka City government.
Further duplication by the Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture governments may be
noted. Each invests in its own libraries, universities, sports facilities and schools without formal
coordination mechanisms, and each has overlapping services, such as subsidies and benefits forsmaller companies and city residents. Sasaki claims that overall authority over wide-area andlong-term development policy has been hampered by conflicting ideas about Osaka’s future
45 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”
46 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”

49

role by both the Prefecture and City, and harmonization between the two has been plagued by acontinuous struggle stemming from the poor `alignment of the City and Prefecture’ (fu-shi awase
in Japanese, which is also a homophone of the word `unhappiness’, fushiawase). 47 All told, there
appear to be strong prima face arguments that a chronic overlapping of functions between theprefecture and its ordinance-designated cities (Osaka and Sakai) has taken place, leading to
redundant administration. An allied problem is that while Osaka City has the vast majority ofjobs and commerce within Osaka Prefecture, its relative small size of population relative to its
suburban municipalities has hindered systematic and effective long-term planning for the entire
area and, according to scholars such as Godo, this has been unfavorable for effective overallpromotion of economic and public activities, especially when compared to the morecomprehensive two-tier urban governance system of the TMG. 48 With this context, the paper
now turns to the rise of Tōru Hashimoto and his vision of merging Osaka City with thePrefecture – often called the Osaka Metropolitan Plan. Table 2 provides a broad scalechronology of the more significant events in this saga over the past 15 years or so.
The Hashimoto Phenomenon and the Osaka Metropolitan Plan
Hashimoto and One Osaka’s Rise to Power
Although Shintaro Ishihara, former governor of the TMG (1999-2012), may have been
Japan’s first post-war `populist’ politician, the charismatic leader Tōru Hashimoto became theyoungest of Japan’s 47 governors when he won the Osaka gubernatorial elections in 2008 at theage of 38, espousing populist rhetoric, market fundamentalism and severe cost cutting
programs in order to reduce the Prefecture government’s substantial debt burden. Not
surprisingly, his liberal economic political stance immediately earned him the enmity of many
local government officials alongside widespread support from numerous voters discontented
with more conventional politicians who appeared to have few new ideas on how to address
Osaka’s reduced economic and social circumstances. 49 Prior to this, Hashimoto had noexperience in the political world and a complete lack of any strong political base among any ofthe established Japanese parties. Yet, at the age of 33 he became a household name in Osaka
after appearing regularly on a local TV programme in 2003. By presenting sharp comments
about current political events, as well as posing local and national policy reform proposals
contrary to status quo thinking, he became a charismatic opinion leader and expectations began
to increase about his entrance into politics. Such strong local support motivated Hashimoto to
run for the gubernatorial election which he won with a landslide victory. His electoral rivals
were candidates who were backed by two Japan’s major national parties, the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Hashimoto’s campaign was also
supported by the local Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito party chapters, as well as
by major corporate lobbies in the wider Kansai (Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto) region. 50
47 Sasaki, Nobuo. “Osaka Metropolis Plan Dissolved.” Global Chuo, 1 June, 2015. Accessed June 2020.

http://global.chuo-u.ac.jp/english/features/2015/06/7105/.

48 Godo, “Thriving Tokyo and Declining Osaka.”
49 Weathers, Charles. “Reformer or Destroyer? Hashimoto Tōru and Populist Neoliberal Politics inJapan.” Social Science Japan Journal, 17, (2014): 77-96.

50 Godo, Yoshihia. “Toru Hashimoto’s Unfinished Local Governance Reform: A Micro Case Study of

Political Leadership at Local-level Politics in Japan.” In Leadership: Political-economic, Regional Business50

As governor, Hashimoto immediately set out to reconstruct Osaka Prefecture’s
finances by revising the system of public-sector accounting, cutting wages for public servants
such as high-school teachers, reducing the Prefecture’s share of public construction projects
while urging the national government to increase their share, and letting-go business venturesthat were financed jointly by the Prefectural government and the private sector. He also paid
attention to various urban development projects aimed at improving Osaka’s international
competitiveness. These included unifying and privatizing the two international airports in
Osaka Prefecture (Osaka International Airport at Itami, and the Kansai International Airport),
relocating the Osaka prefectural government building from its current location adjoining Osaka
Castle to the World Trade Center building operated by the Prefecture in the Nankō Harbor
district (this plan was opposed by the Osaka Prefecture Assembly in 2009 and to date has notbeen realized), and pursuing a casino for Osaka similar to that in Singapore. 51
His signature policy, however, was the Osaka Metropolitan Plan (Osaka-to koso), a
proposal to merge Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture (including the designated city of Sakai),believing that it would cut back on overlapping functions and inefficiencies, and raise Osaka’s
administrative status to the equivalent of Tokyo. Specifically, the plan envisaged reorganizing
the administrative wards that currently form part of Osaka and Sakai, together withsurrounding municipalities of the prefecture (cities, towns and villages) and making them into
special wards, similar to those in the TMG area. Figure 3 illustrates a scheme for reorganizing
the central part of Osaka Prefecture (Osaka City and its adjoining nine cities, including Sakai
City) into 20 special wards, as proposed by the Osaka Restoration Association in 2010. These
proposed special wards would each have a population of around 100,000 or more. The
surrounding (smaller) cities, towns and village would be also part of the metropolitan area andtreated essentially in the same manner as municipalities in the (more rural) Tama area of Tokyo.
In effect, Hashimoto believed that concentrating the decision-making procedures of the entire
area in the hands of a wished-for Osaka Metropolitan Government would make forward
planning and development more consistent and innovative. He also considered that
introducing elections for the heads of the proposed special wards within Osaka and Sakai city
would improve the relationship between citizens and local governments in these areas andmake them more accountable. As is the case in Tokyo, this governance reform would see the
Osaka prefectural government responsible for collecting fixed asset taxes and regional
corporate taxes within this area, and it would provide water, fire protection, public transit andother services through a unified administration for all 20 special wards, while resident services
and other administrative tasks would be handled by the wards themselves. In addition, an
important component of the proposed restructuring involved renegotiating relative functions
with the national government to increase the `Osaka metropolitan government’s’ power overboth tax collection as well as the provision of public services. 52

and Socio-community Contexts, edited by Tai Wei Lim and Carol Hok Ka Ma. 91-110. Singapore, World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2020.
51 Matthews, Joel. “Osaka In and Out of the Nation: Neoliberal Spatial Gestures for the Globally

Competitive City-Region.” in City Imaging: Regeneration, Renewal and Decay, edited by Tara Brabazon.
211-217. Dordrecht: Springer Science, 2014; Weathers, “Reformer or Destroyer?”

52 Godo, “Toru Hashimoto’s Unfinished Local Governance Reform.”51

To further all these ends, Hashimoto launched the `One Osaka’ political party (theofficial name is the Osaka Restoration Association, Ōsaka Ishin no Kai), which was triggered by
the 2009 defeat in the Osaka Prefecture assembly of his plans to relocate the Prefectural officebuilding to the World Trade Centre. In 2010 he persuaded similarly minded (former LDP)
assembly members of the Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Sakai City to join with him in thisnew political bloc. At first a faction of six assembly members, led by Ichirō Matsui, who was
supported by Hashimoto, formed the Liberal Democratic Party Restoration Association. By
April 2010 this group had broken away from the Liberal Democratic Party and expanded to 22
members, and it was then officially registered as the Osaka Restoration Association with 30
members and Hashimoto as its leader (the name alludes openly to the 19th century Meiji
Restoration). Although the new party began as a regional pressure group, over time it put
forward radical ideas that had far wider regional and national government implications, such as
merging existing prefectures (both in Kansai and throughout Japan) into a series of federated
regions, abolishing the national upper house (the House of Councillors), halving the size of thelower house (the House of Representatives), joining the Trans-Pacific free trade bloc, andrelaxing requirements for constitutional revision. This broader reform `manifesto’ had the effectof launching both Hashimoto and Ōsaka Ishin no Kai into national politics. 53
Despite the popularity of Hashimoto as prefectural governor, his plans for an largescale Osaka Metropolis and the abolition of the existing city were strongly opposed (perhaps
not surprisingly) by the incumbent centre-left Mayor of Osaka City, Kunio Hiramatsu (20072011), who warned that Hashimoto’s market efficiency approach would result in large revenue
differentials among the proposed special wards and tend to disadvantage the city’s poorer
districts without improving overall administrative effectiveness. As a result, Hiramatsu
presented his own policy to assist Osaka, the Declaration of Regional Sovereignty, a proposalthat advocated the transfer or more power from the national government to designated city
governments. The confrontation between Hashimoto and Hiramatsu became more heated withthe presentation of these two competing political manifestos, especially so when Hiramatsu
decided to run for re-election when his term of office was about to expire (a mayoral election
was scheduled for November 2011). This instigated Hashimoto’s resignation as the governor of
Osaka Prefecture, and his run for the Osaka mayor’s position to advance his plans to merge thetwo entities. Subsequently, Hashimoto supported the gubantorial candidacy of Ichirō Matsui,
who (as intimated earlier) was his friend and fellow One Osaka member, and before then amember of the Osaka Prefectural assembly. In the event, Hashimoto and Matsui won both themayoral and gubernatorial `cross-elections’, respectively, with their victories signaling strong
support for the One Osaka party and the Osaka Metropolitan Plan among voters in both local
governments. At the same time, One Osaka ran many candidates in other local elections held in
the Osaka region, and gained a majority in the prefectural assembly as well as more than onethird of seats in the Osaka city assembly. 54
53 Jain, Purnendra. “What the Osaka Elections Mean for National Politics in Japan.” East Asia Forum

Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, 2 December, 2015. Accessed June 2020.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/02/what-the-osaka-elections-mean-for-national-politics-injapan/; Jou, Willy. “A Regional Party in a Centralized Country: The Case of One Osaka in Japan.”
Regional & Federal Studies, 25, (2015): 145-163.
54 Godo, “Toru Hashimoto’s Unfinished Local Governance Reform.”52

After taking office a mayor, Hashimoto soon proclaimed he would launch a `great
reset’ (his catchphrase) and `change Japan, starting from Osaka’, hinting at national ambitions. 55
A Prefecture and City Unification Headquarters was established immediately to oversee joint
policymaking, and it begin conducting a unified long-term strategy and economic policy. 56
Nonetheless, a major impediment for Hashimoto achieve the Osaka Metropolitan Plan was thelack of a legal framework to carry out the proposed changes. In point of fact, various
modifications to Japan’s urban and regional governance systems had already been widely
discussed in political and scholarly circles since around the 1990s. These debates were triggeredby a variety of themes including the need to revitalize Japan’s economy, society and polity, theoverwhelming danger posed to the nation’s capital by a catastrophic earthquake, chronic
population decline in most rural areas, and an increasing disposition to decentralize certain
functions to local governments that were previously conducted or supervised closely by central
Ministries based in Tokyo. 57 By way of illustration, after the new national government headedby the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control in 2009 the government’s Cabinet officeissued a strategy for local sovereignty (chiiki-shuken), which endorsed the view that nationallocal government relations should change from a strictly hierarchical relationship (whereby thenational government took decisions unilaterally and imposed them on local communities) tothat of horizontal partnerships in which local communities would take more initiatives over theways they were governed and assume more responsibility for local policy choices. 58 While theseaspirations from the DPJ government (2009-2012) were never fully implemented it can be seenthat Hashimoto’s designs for metropolitan governance were part of an ongoing debate over

55 Weathers, “Reformer or Destroyer?”
56 Interview with Mr. Hirofumi Ichisaka, Manager, International Relations, General Affairs Division,

Economic Strategy Bureau, Osaka City Government, May, 2013.

57 see Ozawa, Ichiro. Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Tokyo: Kodansha International,

1994; Barrett, Brendan D.F. “Decentralization in Japan: Negotiating the Transfer of Authority.” JapaneseStudies, 20, (2000): 33-48; Kitazume, Takashi. “Revitalizing Japan through 'Doshu-sei': Ultimate
Structural Reform will Cede More Powers to Local Authorities.” The Japan Times, 3 October, 2007.
Accessed June 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/10/03/business/revitalizing-japanthrough-doshu-sei/; Ikawa, Hiroshi. 15 Years of Decentralization Reform in Japan. Up-to-date Documents
on Local Autonomy in Japan No.4. Tokyo: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations(CLAIR), 2008; Ikuta, Masato. “Restructuring in Regional Economies and Introducing a Province System
in Japan: With Special Reference to the Kansai Region,”, in Spaces of International Economy andManagement edited by Rolf D. Schlunze, Michael Plattner, William W. Baber and Nathaniel O. Agola.
113-133. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Tsukamoto, Takashi. “Devolution, New Regionalism andEconomic Revitalization in Japan: Emerging Urban Political Economy and Politics of Scale in Osaka–
Kansai.” Cities, 28, (2011) 281-289; Maruyama, Sawaki, “Regional Coordination and its Background:
Should Kansai Be Heading For Regional Coordination Like Västra Götaland?” Kobe University Economic
Review, 59, (2013): 37-57; Sasaki, Nobuo. “What Type of Decentralization Best Suits Japan? The
Challenges Ahead for Decentralization Reform.” nippon.com, 22 April 2013. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a01801/; Samuels, Richard J. 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.

58 Tsukamoto, Takashi. “Why Is Japan Neoliberalizing? Rescaling of the Japanese Developmental Stateand Ideology of State–Capital Fixing.” Journal of Urban Affairs, 34, (2016): 395-418.

53

local governance in Japan, rather than a completely unexpected initiative without any warningor precedent.
In actual fact, the meteoric political ascension of Hashimoto and the One Osaka party,
together with his ambition to enter national politics by fielding a large number of candidates in
the forthcoming 2012 general election, led to both the ruling DPJ and opposition parties (theLDP and Komeito) to fear any outright confrontation with these political newcomers.
Hashimoto himself demanded that the Diet quickly pass legislation to allow the unification of
Osaka. Alarmed at One Osaka’s political popularity (and anxious about their ability to dislodge
the most vulnerable DPJ, LDP and Komeito legislators in the 2012 election), the establishedparties prepared new legislation, even as gridlock persisted on (arguably) weightier issues, suchas disaster recovery assistance after the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power
plant accident in northeast Japan. As a result, in order to address the Osaka mayor’s request toamend the Local Autonomy Law no fewer than three bills were submitted to the Japanese Dietin mid-2012. Under the DPJ’s proposal any local government of at least 2 million could set up
special wards, while this population requirement was lowered to one million under the LDPKomeito bill, and just 700,000 under bill submitted by the smaller opposition Your Party group.
The final legislation passed by the Diet with the cooperation of all parties - the Act Allowing
Establishing Special Wards in Areas Outside of Metropolitan Tokyo (hereafter the Special
Wards Act) - enabled Osaka and nine other Japanese major cities with populations over 2
million (Sapporo, Saitama, Chiba, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Kyoto, Sakai, and Kobe) tointroduce new metropolitan structures based on special wards (similar to the TMG) following
approval not only by the local and prefectural assemblies, but also by a city-wide referendum.
Specifically, three cities (Yokohama, Nagoya and Osaka) met the two million population
requirement on their own, while other major designated cities areas could set up special wards
if joined by neighboring municipalities. 59
Unusual (for Japan) procedures for implementing these urban governance changes
were spelled out in the Special Wards Act, reflecting the DPJ’s expectation that local
governments should take more responsibility for important policy and governance changes.
Thus, an initial step was that the city government introducing the special wards, together withthe associated prefectural government, should prepare jointly a plan to dissolve the city into
special wards. An important second-stage was that the plan outlining the changes would haveto be approved by a city-wide referendum. This route was rather exceptional in that while local
referenda are certainly allowed under Article 95 of Japan’s Constitution, they have rarely beenused and previously had no binding legal effect other than in the recall of a local assembly or
the head of a local government. Local assemblies are particularly antagonistic towardreferendums, and even for a merger of multiple municipalities (as occurred in the 2000s, the socalled Heisei mergers) a local public referendum was not a required procedure. In effect, thenational Diet opted to address Hashimoto’s goal of achieving an Osaka Metropolitan Plan bylegislation that left the hard work of changing the status quo to local governments, in particular

59 The Japan Times. “Editorial: Scrutinize 'Special Ward' Plans.” 19 June, 2012, Accessed June 2020.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/06/19/editorials/scrutinize-special-wardplans/#.Xy2DYC0ZNHQ.

54

through the mechanism of a local public referendum. 60 For the Osaka Metropolitan Plan to berealized, Osaka residents would ultimately have to give their consent in a citywide vote. In
addition, the Special Wards Act did not allow any prefecture to rename itself as a `metropolis’(or `to’ in Japanese), reserving this status just for Tokyo. Still, other than that stipulation, thecontents of the new Act largely satisfied Hashimoto’s political ambitions, giving him and the
One Osaka Party a `green light’ to experiment with special ward introduction. As a start heappointed local `mayors’ from among his own supporters to preside over the 24 existing
administrative wards of Osaka City. 61
Based on his noticeably bold entrance into national politics (by demanding that theDiet pass legislation to allow the unification of Osaka) Hashimoto also formed an official
national party, The Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai). This endeavor was launched a
few months prior to the national election of December 2012 and it soon merged with the Sunrise
Party led by former TMG governor, Shintaro Ishihara, who himself had resigned from local
government in order to enter national politics. Following the 2012 election the Japan Restoration
Party gained sufficient Diet seats to become the third largest national party and a significant
voice of opposition. As suggested earlier, Hashimoto's new national party went far beyond theaims of the One Osaka group, and sought sweeping constitutional and national governancereforms, such as a directly elected prime minister and a radical regional decentralization of
power. Negotiations between Hashimoto and Ishihara following Japan’s 2011 earthquake andtsunami also saw a joint plan for Osaka to become a `back-up’ capital for Japan amid any future
emergency. 62
The 2015 Osaka Referendum
In the ensuing two years Hashimoto’s political fortunes both in Osaka and on thenational arena appeared to falter. First, faced with opposition to the Metropolitan Plan by Sakai(expressed in that city’s 2013 mayoral election won by Osami Takeyama, a consistent antagonist
to the idea of any merger) Hashimoto decided to reduce his metropolitan government aims to amore limited yet concrete plan to abolish Osaka city, at least as a first step. Then, in accordancewith the Special Wards Act he set up a formal Council for Converting Osaka City into Special
Wards (hereafter the Osaka Council). This Council consisted of the governor of Osaka
Prefecture (Matsui), the mayor of Osaka City (Hashimoto), nine members of the assembly of
Osaka City (three from the One Osaka Party, and six from other parties), as well as nine
members of the Osaka Prefecture assembly (five One Osaka members and four from otherparties). However, Hashimoto and the Council could not obtain broad consensus over thenumber, boundaries and extent of the special wards proposed for Osaka, or the detailed budget
allocation between the Osaka Prefectural Government and the proposed special wards.
Specifically, he faced strong opposition from the local branches of the Liberal Democratic Party,
60 Hitora, Tadashi. “`Osaka Metropolis’ Plan Faces Many Hurdles.” nippon.com, 16 October, 2012.

Accessed June 2020. https://www.nippon.com/en/column/l00035/.

61 The Japan Times. “Editorial: Scrutinize 'Special Ward' Plans.” 19 June, 2012. Accessed June 2020.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/06/19/editorials/scrutinize-special-wardplans/#.Xy2DYC0ZNHQ.

62 A. Stevens, Andrew. (2014) “Mayor of the Month: Toru Hashimoto, Mayor of Osaka.” City Mayors, 7t

June, 2014. Accessed June 2020. http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/osaka-mayor-hashimoto.html.

55

the Japan Communist Party, and the Democratic Party of Japan, which - together with New
Komeito (which previously had cooperated with Osaka Ishin in the city assembly) - all opposed
the either the very idea of abolishing Osaka city and introducing special wards, or the detailed
implementation plans, together with the perceived hasty introduction of a public referendum toapprove it. Consequently, Hashimoto stood down as mayor in early 2014 and called a snap
election – winning - but without any official opposition candidates standing against him fromthe other major parties, and with a very low electoral turn-out that both supporters and critics
criticized as a waste of time and taxpayer money. 63
Second, Hashimoto and Matsui parted ways with Tokyo’s Ishihara over a number ofpolicy issues, (such as national constitutional reform) and the Japan Restoration Party was split
with the Hashimoto/Matsui group forming the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin no Tō) in 2014, still
comprising the second largest opposition party at the national level after the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ). However, the two Osaka politicians themselves decided not to run for thenational Lower House election arranged for the end of 2014, preferring to focus on the local
Osaka election and to make a concerted attempt to introduce the merger plan. 64
The most crippling blow, however, came in the spring 2015. Following his re-election
as mayor, Hashimoto and One Osaka members took the assertive action of pushing out nonOne Osaka members from the Osaka Council in order to solve any further impasse. Together
with the cooperation of the local Komeito party in the Osaka assembly, a referendum finally
took place that year to abolish the city of Osaka, return all wide-area functions to the prefecture,and to set up elected mayors and assemblies of special wards for Osaka to support the citizens’
daily lives. Figure 4 indicates the final boundaries of the five special wards proposed to replace
Osaka City in the referendum, each with enlarged ward boundaries and competencies in thenorthern, coastal, eastern, southern, and central districts, and each with a population between
340,000 and 700,000. In the event, the number of votes in favor of the 2015 referendum was
694,844 (49.6 per cent of total votes), marginally lower than the number against, 705,585 or 50.4
per cent of the total votes. In effect, the referendum was defeated by less than 11,000 votes outof 1.4 million cast. Although this rejection margin was narrow, the proposal was turned down.
Accepting defeat of the plan he had championed for the previous five years or so, Hashimoto
decided to retire from the political world. When his term as mayor of Osaka City ended in
November 2015 he did not run for re-election, and he resigned his position as President of the
One Osaka Party in favor of Ichirō Matsui. 65
During the weeks before the referendum, One Osaka proponents of the merger argued
that over a 10-year period the new arrangements would lead to an extra ¥1.1 trillion of public
63 Johnston, Eric. “Hashimoto Wins Snap Mayoral Election Amid Record Low 23.6% Turnout.” The Japan

Times, 23 March, 2014. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/23/national/politics-diplomacy/hashimoto-wins-snapmayoral-election-amid-record-low-23-6-turnout/#.Xyx0vi0ZNHQ.

64 Jou, “A Regional Party in a Centralized Country.”
65 Johnston, Eric. “Hashimoto Announces Exit From Politics After Osaka Rejects Merger Plan inReferendum.” The Japan Times, 17 May, 2015. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/17/national/politics-diplomacy/osaka-referendumrejects-merger-plan-possibly-ending-hashimotos-political-career

56

expenditure savings that would not have been available otherwise. However, this figure was
hotly disputed by opponents, including the local chapters of the Liberal Democratic Party andKomeito. Merger plan opponents in all parties argued that the assumptions on which the ¥1.1
trillion figure was based were far too optimistic and that rather than saving money, a merger
could actually end up raising taxes to meet the increased welfare needs of Osaka’s aging
population and stagnant economy, especially if the plan failed to attract many new residents
and businesses. 66
Figure 5 indicates the results of the referendum (yes/no) broken down by existing city
wards. It shows that the strongest support came from citizens in the generally more prosperous
northern part of the city, where many major corporations and financial institutions have been
based and which also host extensive transport connections to other Kansai regional cities
together with the economies of Kyoto and Kobe. As a whole, citizens in this area supported themerger as a way to reduce bureaucratic costs, which they hoped would lead to lower corporate
and property taxes. The greatest opposition came from the city’s less prosperous southern
regions, where there were many older people and small businesses together with less moderntransportation links. It was reported that many who relied on the city’s social welfare services
and other forms of financial assistance feared a merger would lead to a cut in those services
because they would find themselves living in a special ward with a smaller tax base ascompared with the more prosperous northern special wards. 67 Moreover, in term of Osaka’s
demography, a large portion of residents consistently reported in opinion polls that they did
not understand why the abolition of Osaka City and why the merger with Osaka Prefecture wasnecessary. Specifically, young people tended to vote in favor of the change, but the large elderly
demographic leaned towards keeping the Osaka they had known all their lives. Others,
especially younger and older women, feared a decline in child care, education and social
welfare services for the elderly if the merger went through. 68
The Road to a 2020 Referendum
Initiatives from Osaka (Ōsaka Ishin no Kai)
The failed referendum had a number of consequences beyond the vote itself. For
instance, at the national level the result created immediate political discord between the Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, whose government indicated support for the merger, and members of his
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), especially in the Osaka LDP chapter who opposed it. On top of
66 The Japan Times. “Osaka Referendum: Merger Gets Second Chance, But are Voters on Board?”. 17

February, 2020. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/02/17/reference/osaka-merger-plan-second-chanceqa/#.X0GSHS0ZOGQ

67 Cornell Law School. “The `Osaka Metropolis Plan’ Referendum and the Future of Japan's Democracy:

Interview with Hiroyuki Mori.” Meridian 180, 2015. Accessed June 2020.
https://web.archive.org/web/20160812124415/http://meridian-180.org/en/osaka-metropolis-planreferendum-and-future-japans-democracy-interview-hiroyuki-mori-0.

68 Johnston, Eric. “Hashimoto Announces Exit From Politics After Osaka Rejects Merger Plan inReferendum.” The Japan Times, 17 May, 2015. Accessed June 2020.
.https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/17/national/politics-diplomacy/osaka-referendumrejects-merger-plan-possibly-ending-hashimotos-political-career/.

57

this, Abe counted on the cooperation of Hashimoto’s national Japan Innovation Party (Ishin noTō) to back his proposal for a national referendum to revise Japan’s postwar Constitution.
Hashimoto and his followers were willing to cooperate in constitutional reform, as among its
many radical proposals this measure also advocated consolidating prefectural governments togive them more autonomy from the national government, which boosted One Osaka’s
aspirations. 69
At the local level, Hashimoto tried to find common ground with his opposition(especially the local branches of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito Party) and agreed toform a new special Council and continue exploring ways to reduce bureaucratic redundancy
between Osaka Prefecture and the city of Osaka. There was broad support among the various
parties for a future vison of Osaka as Japan’s sub-capital and a bustling international city, withcentral government ministries and agencies redistributed from Tokyo to Osaka. But when
Hashimoto said they should officially state that a formal goal was to come up with analternative to the plan rejected in the May 2015 referendum, he ran into opposition. For
instance, the LDP’s Osaka chapter proposed to upgrade administrative cooperation between thecity’s existing wards into 11 administrative areas without actually merging them (or eliminating
the mayoral and city assembly positions), and ward heads would obtain more authority fromthe city assembly. But unlike the Osaka Ishin plan, they would not have full budget autonomy. 70
With no chance to come to a compromise among the various parties, Hashimoto dismissed thespecial Council prior to his final standing down at the end of the same year, and invited
Hirofumi Yoshimura (formerly a One Osaka member of the city assembly and a Osaka-based
Ishin no Tō [Japan Innovation Party] Diet member) to run for mayor in the November 2015
election as his designated successor. Yoshimura won easily, defeating a candidate backed by the
local chapter of the Liberal Democratic Party. Ichiro Matsui also won his re-election as Osakagovernor. 71
Matsui (together with Hashimoto up to the end of 2015) then focused his attention on
national issues and established yet another national party, Initiatives from Osaka (Ōsaka Ishin noKai), after he and his supporters left the Japan Innovation Party. Osaka Ishin no Kai lacked an
official English name, but had Osaka written in hiragana, and was often called `Initiatives from
Osaka’. This was an attempt to convince voters around Japan that, while the party was centeredin Osaka, the idea of “Osaka” symbolized a political philosophy of decentralized, smaller
government rather than a physical location. Hashimoto and Matsui also stated the new politicalgroup would aim to revitalize Japan’s regional economies by promoting decentralization andintegrating the nation’s 47 prefectures into between seven and 11 states (shu or do in Japanese). 72

69 Johnston, Eric. “Election wins energize Osaka Ishin.” The Japan Times, 23 November, 2015. Accessed

June 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/23/national/politics-diplomacy/electionwins-energize-osaka-ishin/.
70 Sasaki, Nobuo. “Osaka Metropolis Plan Reemerged.” Global Chuo, 10 October, 2015. Accessed June 2020.
http://global.chuo-u.ac.jp/english/features/2015/12/7964/.
71 Jain, “What the Osaka Elections Mean.”
72 Johnston, Eric. “Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto's New Party Debuts.” The Japan Times, 31 October, 2015.

Accessed June 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/31/national/politicsdiplomacy/osaka-mayor-toru-hashimotos-new-party-debuts/.

58

The first major national election contested by the party (now led solely by Matsui) was
the July 2016 House of Councillors election, after which the party became the third-biggest
opposition party in the National Diet. However, following the election Matsui indicated that its
poor showing in the polls outside of Kansai was unacceptable for a national party, and that the
Osaka Ishin no Kai would adopt a new name that did not include the word `Osaka’ in an attempt
to broaden its nationwide appeal. Accordingly, the party voted to change its name to the Japan
Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai). The strong performance of this erstwhile regional group
was keenly observed by Prime Minister Abe, who renewed his expectation for Matsui’s Party tocooperate in support of amending the national Constitution, especially as any amendment
would require a two-thirds majority of members in both chambers of the Diet, seen widely as anearly impossible realization for the ruling parties by themselves. 73
The Bid for the 2025 World Expo
In return for his support, Osaka Governor Matsui sought cooperation from the LDP
national government to host the 2025 World Expo, a project that had been considered by Osaka
Prefecture for some years, subsequent to Tokyo’s winning bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics.
However, in contrast to the Olympic Games the national government plays (arguably) a more
central role in bidding for the World Expo. Fortunately for Osaka, the proposal was favored by
the national LDP on the grounds that it would provide an economic stimulus for the country as
a whole by helping to maintain a high number of international tourists visiting Japan following
the end of the Tokyo Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games. 74 Tied to the Osaka Expo bid by
the prefecture was Osaka City’s submission for a license to operate a casino and resort under
the provisions of the 2017 Integrated Resort Act. Both the Expo and casino/resort were slated to
be located on a large artificial island in Osaka Bay called Yumeshima. 75 Under the banner of`Designing Future Society for Our Lives’, Osaka was eventually awarded the right to hostWorld Expo 2025, the results being announced at the end of 2018. 76
Bolstered by this success, Osaka Governor Matsui and Osaka Mayor Yoshimura
announced at the end of 2018 that they would step down to call an early election in an attempt
to resurrect the public referendum and break the continuing deadlock with both the city andprefecture assemblies over their plans to introduce special wards (and a perceived betrayalfrom their political allies in the local branch of the Komeito party who were presumed initiallyto support a new referendum), and to keep alive the idea of establishing an Osaka Metropolitan
73 The Mainichi. “Osaka Ishin No Kai Struggles to Expand Strength, Could Affect Abe’s Constitutional

Agenda.” 30 April 2016. Accessed June 2020.
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160430/p2a/00m/0na/006000c.

74 The Mainichi. “Abe Gov’t Backing Osaka Expo Plan in Exchange for Constitutional Revision Support.”

29 October, 2016. Accessed June 2020.
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20161029/p2a/00m/0na/016000c.

75 Johnston, Eric. “Osaka Pushes Yumeshima for Casino and Resort, 2025 World Expo.” The Japan Times, 8February. 2017. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/08/national/osaka-pushes-yumeshima-casino-resort2025-world-expo/.

76 The Mainichi. “Local, National Officials Rejoice as Osaka Wins World Expo 2025.”, 24 November, 2018.

Accessed June 2020. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181124/p2a/00m/0na/007000c.

59Plan. Nonetheless, faced with the practical consideration of fielding their best-known
candidates, the One Osaka party decided that resigning mayor Yoshimura should run forgovernor, while the current governor Matsui should run for the mayor’s office. Essentially, sucha forceful manoeuvre to gain full four-year terms for both candidates was an provocative repeatof the Hashimoto-Matsui `cross-election’ that occurred in 2011. In the event, this politicalgamble was surprisingly successful and led to a fortuitous series of events for One Osaka. 77
The 2019 Cross-election and a New Referendum
First, both Yoshimura and Matsui efficaciously swapped seats in the 2019 local
government elections, defeating LDP and Komeito-backed candidates. One Osaka also captured
the majority of seats in the prefectural assembly and won more seats in the city assembly, justtwo short of forming a majority. Second, following these larger than expected setbacks the local
chapters of both the LDP and Komeito parties reversed their positions and agreed to areferendum to merge the city’s wards, in part due to pressure applied by senior officials inTokyo who feared further squabbling with One Osaka over this issue would upset relations
with The Japan Restoration Party in the Diet and spoil the chance to hold a national referendum
on constitutional revision. 78 Third, the long-standing anti-merger mayor of Sakai city, Osami
Takeyama, was forced to resign due to a political funds scandal, and a One Osaka candidate
won the June 2019 election for a new Sakai mayor. 79
Faced with this novel political alignment, Osaka City mayor Matsui announced his
intention to hold a new referendum. A new statutory Council (set up in 2017 and which drew
together both the new mayor and governor, as well as members from the city and prefecturalassemblies) had already resumed talks, but as before subsequently reached a stalemate due to adisagreement between the Komeito party and Matsui. Still, it drew up a revised merger plan,
which was finally approved by both municipal and prefectural council members in June 2020.
This plan divided Osaka into four special wards – Yodogawa, Kita, Chuo and Tennoji - basedon fiscal circumstances and future population estimates for each area (Figure 6). At present,
Kita Ward in the northern part of the city contains major train stations linked to other parts ofKansai together with the existing Osaka City Hall. Yodogawa Ward to the north and west islargely an industrial area along the Yodogawa river. However, this proposed special ward is thelocation of Shin-Osaka Station, where rapid inter-city Shinkansen trains stop, and it also includes
Yumeshima Island in Osaka Bay, where the 2025 Expo will be held. The other two wards cover
the central and southern areas of the city. In the revised special ward draft, the populations of
the new Shinyodogawa, Kita, Chuo and Tennoji Wards were set to be 600,000, 750,0000, 710,000
and 640,000 people, respectively. At the time of writing (summer 2020) the referendum toapprove or reject this new plan is likely to take place in November 2020. Opinion polls suggest
the public would vote 60:40 in favor. If successful, it is envisaged that the proposed changes
77 Fahey, Rob. “Crossing Over: Osaka’s Troubled Metropolitan Plan.” Tokyo Review, 26 March, 2019.

Accessed June 2020. https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/03/crossing-over-osaka-metropolitan-plan/.

78 Johnston, Eric. “Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito Flip-flop on Osaka Merger.” The Japan Times, 18

May 2019. Accessed June 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/18/national/ldpkomeitos-face-osaka-merger/.

79 The Mainichi. “Pro-metro Osaka Plan Candidate Narrowly Wins Sakai Mayoral Race.” 10 June, 2019.

Accessed June 2020. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190610/p2a/00m/0na/006000c.

60

would come into effect in 2025. Both Osaka mayor Matsui and Osaka governor Yoshimura haveaffirmed that this would be One Osaka’s final attempt to hold a referendum, merge the city’s
wards, and carry out its goal of introducing an Osaka Metropolitan Plan 80
The essay concludes by examining this 15 year chronicle in light of the moreconceptual literature and issues surrounding urban governance introduced earlier, as wellreflecting on whether or not a metropolitan government would likely succeed either inaddressing `the Osaka problem’ or provoke new thinking about broader national issues related
to local government reform and decentralization.
Conclusion
The preceding narrative on the introduction of the Osaka Metropolitan Plan - also thedebates at the time of the 2015 public referendum - has many links to the theoretical arguments
for and against metropolitan reform as well as the key issues summarised in Table 1. For
example, Hashimoto raised the spectre of increasing Asian `inter-city competition’ as part of his
claims that Osaka city required an enlarged geographic space similar to Tokyo-to, and he easily
connected the concept of an Osaka Metropolitan Government to his market determinism
agenda by emphasizing that the scheme would raise efficiency, save money (notably throughthe reduction of personnel), and advance customer (taxpayer) satisfaction by improving
services. Indeed, One Osaka’s mandate emphasized competition and private business practices
in its aspirations to overhaul a wide range of municipal services, including delivery of welfare,transportation, and cultural programs. As could be expected, opponents mustered theirarguments along contrary lines, specifically that any merger of the prefecture and cities would
create additional costs and lower the quality of local services. They also pointed out the likely
reduction in accessibility to services and local accountability that would occur throughabolishing Osaka City. While the two-tier system inherent in the Special Wards legislation
might address these issues, One Osaka’s adversities raised concerns over equity issues,
especially the distribution of funds and services among the new special wards in Osaka city,and the likelihood that outer suburban municipalities would be neglected by the upper-level
Osaka prefectural government. By comparison, environmental issues and spatial externalities
that were raised in the theoretical literature did not appear to be among the key concerns in
Osaka.
Beyond these standard theoretical arguments, the Osaka case study also underscores
Bourne’s insight about the importance of local circumstances and path dependency inexplaining a rationale for metropolitan governance and changes to the status quo. 81 Distinctive
factors working at the local level in Osaka included the emotional symbolism of the region’s
80 Johnston, Eric. (2020b) “Osaka’s Second Merger Push Faces Pitfalls From Pandemic.” The Japan Times,

20 June. Accessed June 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/20/national/politicsdiplomacy/osakas-second-merger-push-faces-pitfalls-pandemic-abes-poll-woes/.

.

81 Bourne, Alternative Models.

61

wounded pride together with citizens’ frustration over traditional political parties. Osaka’s poor
economic performance over many decades was a fertile ground for the emergence of reformist
politicians, such as Hashimoto and his followers. Also important was the role taken by thenational government, especially its willingness allow special wards for Osaka, similar to thosein Tokyo (together with the 2025 Expo), in exchange for One Osaka’s (in its many nationalguises) support for constitutional reforms.
Two critical questions can only be answered by further research. One concerns
whether the proposed metropolitan government would really address Osaka’s problems orwhether it would become a `local tragedy’ potentially involving even more costlier
administration and widening revenue inequalities among the five special wards. Of course,
opinions on this have varied, as noted earlier. For some, the Osaka Metropolitan Plan would
provide substantial administrative cost savings that could be invested in productive
infrastructure projects. For others, it was merely a good example of a policy presented as asimple solution (administrative restructuring) to the complex problem of Osaka’s weakeconomic growth in an era of globalization and the increasing concentration of Japan’s financial
and commercial economy in Tokyo. 82
A second issue that should be studied is whether One Osaka’s reform-minded
manifesto might have any impact on political culture and policy making in any of Japan’s otherlarge cities also suffering from long-term decline in relation to Tokyo. To date, no other city has
attempted to use the Special Ward Act to restructure its administration. Shen noted that Nagoya
mayor Takashi Kawamura (2009 to present) was also interested in promoting greater local
autonomy and envisioned a Chukyo Metropolitan Plan that would require Nagoya city to bedissolved and reorganized into special wards under the authority of Aichi prefecture. 83 While
this arrangement received the backing of Aichi governor Hideaki Omura (2011 to present) no
concrete steps have been taken due to lack of wide-spread political support for the plan. In sum,
although approved in principle by the 2012 Special Ward Act, greater autonomy for major cities
in Japan is contingent on the agreement of many layers of urban government, public
referendums and the vagaries of domestic politics. The wider application of Osaka’s experimentin metropolitan governance is not guaranteed and serious challenges to its realization remain.
Acknowledgements
I would to thank the assistance of Professor Kekichi Nagao in the preparation of thisresearch. The article was prepared with funds from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC; Grant 410-2005-0050).

82 The Japan Times. “Osaka Referendum.”
83 Shen, Simon Xu Hui. “Local Governments in Japan and Roles Played in Sino-Japanese Relations.” East

Asia, 31, (2016): 49–65.

62

Table 1. Possible Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Forms of Urban Governance andService Delivery.

Criteria

Description

Objective

1. Economies of scale

Service provision, range andscope, quality levels, better
costing and budgets

Macro-efficiency

Containment of local spill2. Spatial externalities overs (including spill-overs of Spatial efficiency/equity
public goods)

3. Redistribution

4. Accessibility

Reallocation of the social
benefits and costs ofdevelopment, revenuesharing

Level of access to serviceproviders and decisionmakers

EquityVertical equity

Degree of political/social
accountability
5. Accountability

Democratic efficiency

Based on material in Slack, Edith. “Finance and Governance: The Case of the Greater Toronto
Area.” In Urban Governance and Finance: A Question of Who Does What, edited by Paul A.R. Hobson
and France. St.-Hilaire. 81-112. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Slack (1997).

63

Table 2. The Hashimoto Phenomenon and the Osaka Metropolitan Plan: Chronology ofMajor Events, 2003-2020

Year

Event

2003-2007-Toru Hashimoto’s emergence as a TV celebrity in Osaka

2008-Hashimoto elected to Osaka Prefectural Governor

2010-Osaka Metropolitan Plan first announced- `One Osaka’ political party established after LDP assembly members
defect to Hashimoto’s new group

2011-The first `cross-election’: Hashimoto elected as Osaka City Mayor andIchiro Matsui elected as Prefectural Governor

2012-Special Ward Act passed by Diet
-Japan Restoration Party established by Hashimoto and Shintaro Ishihara
wins many Diet seats in the 2012 election

2013-Sakai City mayoral election won by One Osaka opponent Osami
Takeyama

2014-Hashimoto re-elected as City Osaka Mayor-Hashimoto’s split with Ishihara and the dissolution of the Japan
Restoration Party-Japan Innovation Party established by Hashimoto/Matsui

2015-Osaka City referendum-Hashimoto stands down as mayor and Hirofumi Yoshimura electedmayor of Osaka City
-Matsui re-elected as Osaka Prefecture governor and the Initiatives From
Osaka party established as a national party

2016-Japan Innovation Party picks up seats in the House of Councillors
election

64

2018

-Osaka prefecture awarded the right to host World Expo 2025

2019

-The second `cross-election: Matsui elected Osaka city mayor,
Yoshimura elected Osaka governor-Sakai city mayor Takeyama loses election to a One Osaka candidate-LDP and Komeito assembly members support a new Osaka
Metropolitan Plan referendum to create special wards for Osaka

2020-new proposal for four special wards in Osaka city and for a second
referendum to be held in November

65Figure 1. Tokyo-to: Indicating the 23 Special Wards and the Tama Area

66

Figure 2. Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and other Municipalities

67

Figure 3: 2010 Osaka Metropolitan Plan Proposal Indicating 20 Special Wards

Note: The proposed Special Wards are shown in color.
This reorganization comprises the existing wards of both Osaka City and Saka City (named inthis figure), together with surrounding municipalities.

Based on a map provided by the Osaka Restoration Association.

68

Figure 4. Proposal for Five Special Wards in the City of Osaka 2015 Referendum Plan

Note: The proposed Special Wards are shown in color. Osaka’s existing 24 wards are named inthis figure.
Based on a map provided by the Osaka Restoration Association.

69

Figure 5. Results of the City of Osaka 2015 Referendum (Yes/No) Broken Down by Existing
Wards

Based on a map provided by the Osaka Restoration Association.

70

Figure 6. Proposal for Four City of Osaka Special Wards, 2020 Referendum

Note: The proposed Special Wards are shown in color. Osaka’s existing 24 wards are named inthis figure.
Based on a map contained in The Japan Times. “Osaka Referendum: Merger Gets Second Chance,
But are Voters on Board?”. 17 February, 2020. Accessed June 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/02/17/reference/osaka-merger-plan-second-chanceqa/#.X0GSHS0ZOGQ
71

“The Pros and Cons of the Recent Diffusion of Solar Panels on Farmland in Japan,” Tom
Waldichuk, Department of Geography & Environmental Studies, Thompson Rivers
University, Kamloops, BC, twaldichuk@tru.ca.
Abstract: In recent years, abandoned farmland has increased rapidly in Japan while food selfsufficiency has decreased. Photovoltaic solar panels continue to be assembled on this land, thepower generated from which provides a stable source of income for farmland owners. The
agriculture ministry argues that this revenue can be reinvested into agriculture. The purpose ofthis paper is to examine the recent history and pros and cons of solar panel diffusion on
farmland in Japan. Do solar panels help to sustain agriculture? The research is based primarily
on a literature review and landscape observations. The spread of solar panels has increased
since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster when a new feed in tariff program was introduced toincrease the monetary rate of return for generating electricity using solar panels, and since 2013
when the Japanese government gave permission to temporarily build solar panels on farmland.
The newest type of panels are spaced out to allow farmland under the panels to be cultivated.
However, some solar panels on abandoned farmland are not spaced out, which prevents theland from ever being cultivated again. The principal conclusion is that managing solar panels
on farmland can be combined with agriculture to provide an extra source of income forfarmland owners, who otherwise would not be cultivating that land. However, the reduced
productivity of higher quality farmland under the panels can be a threat to farm sustainability.
Introduction
Most people are familiar with roof-top solar heating where water flows through tubes
while heating (Figure. 1). These solar devices, known as solar thermal, 1 are used for hot waterneeds and can commonly be seen on homes in rural areas of Japan. Solar thermal devices
became common in the 1980s after the second oil crisis. 2 This paper concerns photo voltaic (PV)solar systems (Figure 2),which were introduced to Japan in 1958, 3 do not involve hot watertubes, and are inexpensive to install 4 unlike solar thermal. 5 From 1992 to 2001 PV production
1 GENI (Global Energy Network Institute). “Solar Energy in Japan – Summary,” Accessed July 6, 2020.

http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energytrends/currentusage/renewable/solar/japan/sum
mary.shtml

2 GENI (Global Energy Network Institute). “Solar Thermal,” Accessed July 27, 2020.

http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energytrends/currentusage/renewable/solar/japan/solart
hermal/solar-thermal.shtml

3Yuriko Yoneda, “The Spread of Solar Power Generation in Japan,” Japan For Sustainability Newsletter

No.70 (June 30, 2008). Accessed July 3, 2020.
https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id027851.html
According to Yoneda, PV was introduced at a radio relay station in Fukushima Prefecture in the Tohoku
region over the years this PV technology was refined, and in 1976 the electronics company Sharp
developed a solar calculator. A number of years later, in 1992, Sanyo Electric was installing PV solar
panels on houses.
4 GENI (Global Energy Network Institute). “Photovoltaics,” June 30, 2016. Accessed July 6, 2020.
http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energytrends/currentusage/renewable/solar/japan/solarenergy/Photovoltaics.shtml
5 GENI, “Solar Thermal.”73

increased steadily in the world and Japan. 6 By 2004, the total amount of PV solar generation in
Japan was 1.13 million Kilowatts (KW), which was the largest in the world at that time. 7 Still, in2002 the proportion of PV power generation compared to all electricity generated was less than
0.1% in Japan. 8 Around 2004, PV panels started to appear among farm fields in Japan.

Figure 1. “Taiyounetsu Onsui Ki – Taiyounetsu de Mizu wo
Atatamete Kyuutou nado ni Riyou Suru Tame no Souchi (Solar
Water Heater -- A Device to use for Hot Water Supply, etc. -Heating Water Using Solar Heat).” Solar Thermal Heating System.
Solar Thermal Heating System. Source: Toto-tarou - Own work,
Wikimedia commons. CC BY-SA 3.0, August 1, 2006. Accessed
August 10, 2020.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TaiyonetuOnsuiki.jp
g#/media/File:TaiyonetuOnsuiki.jpg

6 GENI, “Photovoltaics.”
7 Yoneda, “The Spread of Solar.”
8 Yoneda, “The Spread of Solar.”74

Figure 2. Solar Panels on Abandoned Farmland, Ushiku City,
Ibaraki Prefecture (T. Waldichuk photo)
In March 2011 there was a tsunami and subsequent nuclear accident at the Fukushima
Dai Ichi nuclear power plant, which resulted in farmland being contaminated by radiation. 9
Since then it has not been safe to grow crops because of the nuclear radiation in the soil, andconsumers have been fearful of purchasing produce grown near the nuclear power plant. 10
Therefore, some of the contaminated farmland has been covered in solar panels 11 to provide
farmers with some revenue from electrical energy generation to provide some income to offset
the losses from the declining sales, and to improve their farmland. 12 An example of this is Iitate
village in the northeast part of Fukushima Prefecture, which was evacuated after the nuclear
accident. 13 Two people from the local area started a community-based solar power company in

9 Timothy Fraser, "How Governance and Disasters Shape Renewable Energy Transitions: The Case ofJapanese Megasolar." Social Sciences Quarterly 100, no.3 (2019): 975990.https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12603; Mae-wan Ho, “Japanese Farmers Producing Crops and Solar
Energy Simultaneously,” Science in Society Archive, October 16, 2013. Accessed August 5, 2020. www.isis.org.uk/Japanese_Farmers_Producing_Crops_and_Solar_Energy.php
10 Ho, “Japanese Farmers.”
11 Junko Mochizuki and Stephanie E. Chang, "Disasters as Opportunity for Change: Tsunami Recovery

and Energy Transition in Japan." International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 21 (2017): 331-339.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.01.009
12 Ho, “Japanese Farmers.”
13 Shoto Furuya, “Solar Sharing for the Future Generation – the Story of Iitate Electric Power inFukushima,” The Beam, No.5, May 9, 2018).

75

2014, which involved placing solar panels over top of farm fields – a technique known as solar
sharing (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Solar sharing panels facing upwards. Aomori Prefecture (T. Waldichuk photo)76

After the 2011 Fukushima accident there were large public demonstrations against
nuclear power. 14 But Japan was promoting renewable energy even before the accident, 15 and it
has been promoting it ever since. 16 After the nuclear accident, the central government started
subsidizing the production of renewable energy. 17 Soon there was an expansion of solar power
to generate electricity, and one could see a proliferation of solar panels, including on farmland.
For example, solar arrays were installed in a “renewable energy village” in the city of
Minamisoma, Fukushima Prefecture, on farmland contaminated by the nuclear accident. 18 The
government subsidized the production of electricity from solar panels by raising the yenamount per watt that solar power producers would receive when selling their power to thehttps://medium.com/thebeammagazine/solar-sharing-for-the-future-generation-the-story-of-iitateelectric-power-in-fukushima-c28efd5d7e41
14 For example:

Jeff Kingston, "Nuclear Power Politics in Japan, 2011-2013." Asian Perspective 37, no. 4 (2013): 501-521.
doi:10.1353/apr.2013.0021.; Yvonne Chang, “Nuclear Restart Generates Power, Protest in Japan.”National Geographic. July 17, 2012. Accessed July 27, 2020.
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/07/120716-japan-nuclear-restart-protests/

15 John Duffield, “Japanese Energy Policy After Fukushima Daiichi: Nuclear Ambivalence.” Political

Science Quarterly, 13, no.1(2016): 133-162. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/polq.12431

16 Aya Takada, and Chisaki Watanabe, “Business:

Solar Farmers in Japan to Harvest Electricity with
Crops,” Bloomberg News. May 27, 2014. Accessed June 30, 2020.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-26/solar-farmers-in-japan-to-harvest-electricitywith-crops; Mochizuki and Chang, "Disasters as Opportunity.”
17 Kingston, “Nuclear Power, ” 501-521; Shu Deng Fam, Jieru Xiong, Gordon Xiong, Ding Li Yong, andDaniel Ng, “Post-Fukushima Japan: The Continuing Nuclear Controversy,” Energy Policy, 68 (2014): 199205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.01.014; Chisaki Watanabe, “Japan Spurs Solar, Wind Energy
with Subsidies for Renewables,” Bloomberg News. August 26, 2011. Accessed July 6, 2020.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-26/japan-passes-renewable-energy-bill-oneprecondition-of-kan-s-resignation
18 Rob Gilhooly, “Japan Could Become Second Biggest Solar Power Nation,” New Scientist. August 1,

2012. Accessed July 28, 2020. https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528764-800-japan-couldbecome-second-biggest-solar-powernation/#:~:text=Some%20estimates%20suggest%20the%20move%20could%20help%20Japan,nuclear%20power%20industry%20will%20continue%20to%20provide%20competition; Rob Gilhooly, “Renewable
Village Offers Lifeline to Fukushima Farmers,” New Scientist. January 6, 2014. Accessed August 7, 2020.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24816-renewable-village-offers-lifeline-to-fukushimafarmers/#:~:text=Renewable%20village%20offers%20lifeline%20to%20Fukushima%20farmers%20%7C,
panels%20on%20land%20contaminated%20by%20fallout%20in%202011; Jeremy Hsu, “Japan Plants
Renewable Energy Village in Fukushima’s Contaminated Farmland,” IEEE Spectrum. January 6, 2014.
Accessed August 1, 2020.

https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/green-tech/solar/japan-plants-renewable-energy-village-infukushimas-contaminated-farmland;77large electrical utilities. 19 These subsidies started in 2012, 20 and the panels could be located on or
off farmland. Historically, the Japanese government has also provided subsidies for the
installation costs of PV panels. 21 The agricultural ministry describes farm examples ofsubsidized solar arrays in a recent renewable energy document. 22 But how the facilities are
subsidized and to what degree are not given.
Special legislation was responsible for subsidizing and promoting the production ofrenewable energy, including that produced by the farm community. 23 In August 2011, the “Acton Special Measures Concerning Procurement of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources byElectricity Utilities,” also known as the “Renewable Energy Special Measures Act” wascreated. 24 This act 25 refers to the damage caused by the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and nuclear
power plant accidents. The new renewable energy law also led to the Feed in Tariff Act of2012, 26 which was responsible for subsidizing the production of renewable electricity. Also, a
new renewable energy law was passed in November 2013 entitled “Act on Promotion of
19 Gilhooly, “Japan Could Become Second Biggest Solar Power Nation;” Gilhooly, “Renewable Village;”Kingston, “Nuclear Power,”501-521; “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels on Farmland
Launched,” Japan for Sustainability. August 16, 2013. Accessed July 28, 2020.
https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id034166.html

20 Gilhooly, “Renewable Village;” Kingston, “Nuclear Power,”501-521.
21 GENI (Global Energy Network Institute), “Solar Energy in Japan – Summary,” Accessed July 6, 2020.

http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energytrends/currentusage/renewable/solar/japan/sum
mary.shtml
22 For example: MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Nourinsuisansho)), “Nourin
Gyogyou no Kenzenna Hatten to Chouwa no Toreta Saisei Kanou Enerugi- Hatsuden wo Okonau Jirei(Examples of Renewable Energy Power Production in Harmony with the Heathy Development ofAgriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries),” Food Industry Affairs Bureau (Shokuryou Sangyou Kyoku),
Baiomasu Junkan Shigenka Saisei Kanou Enerugi- Shitsu, (2019), Accessed July 6, 2020.
https://www.maff.go.jp/j/shokusan/renewable/energy/attach/pdf/zirei-195.pdf
23 MAFF(Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Nourinsuisansho)), “Nousangyouson ni Okeru
Saisei Kanou Enerugi- Hatsuden wo Meguru Josei” (The Situation Regarding Possible Reusable Energy
on Agricultural and Fishing Villages),” Shokuryou Sangyou Kyoku (Food Production Division), Saisei
Kanou Enerugi-Guru-pu (Renewable Energy Group), June 2016, Accessed June 13, 2020.
www.maff.go.jp/j/shokusan/renewable/energy/pdf/meguzi.pdf; “New Renewable Energy Law to
Allow Conversion of Farmland in Japan to Wind Farms,” Japan for Sustainability. April 21, 2014.
Accessed July 28, 2020.
https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id034849.html

24 Sayuri Umeda, “Japan: Renewable Energy Special Measures Act Amended,” Library of Congress, Law

Library, News and Events, Global Legal Monitor. August 16, 2016. Accessed July 28, 2020.
https://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-renewable-energy-special-measures-act-amended/;
Chisaki Watanabe, “Japan Spurs Solar.”

25 Accessed from the Japanese Law Translation Database System of the Ministry of Justice, Japan (2020)(www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp)

26 Chico Harlan, “After Fukushima, Japan Beginning to see the Light in Solar Energy,” The Guardian. June 18,

2013. Accessed June 30, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/japan-solar-energyfukushima-nuclear-renewable-abe; “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels.” 201378

Generating Renewable Energy Harmonized with Healthy Development of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishery,” 27 which combined with the FIT and other policies led to the spread of solar
projects. 28 In 2016, the Renewable Energy Special Measures Act was changed to allow thecentral government to increase the proportion of future renewable energy from 22 to 24 percent
of all electrical production. 29 What have been the effects of these new renewable energy laws on
farmland in terms of solar energy production?
Solar farms, as mentioned above, started to increase in number after the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear accident. Some argue that Japan has enough farmland to support enough solar panels
to generate enough electricity to support Japan’s needs. 30 Japan requires about 1.0 million ha ofland to supply Japan’s total electricity with PV, 31 and as of about 2013 it had about 4.6 million
ha of total farmland.
Megasolar plants, or what Gilhooly 32 calls large-scale solar parks, have a capacity of atleast 1000 KiloWatts (1 MW) 33 and account for about 32% of “installed capacity.” 34 Residential
solar power consists of less than 10 KiloWatts and account for about 23% of “installedcapacity.” 35 Non-residential solar facilities that generate between 10 and 1,000 KiloWatts, make27 “New Renewable Energy Law.” 201428 Kei Sakamura, Takatoshi Kaneko, Mamiko Numata, Norohiro Nakai, “Study on the Site Character of

the Ground Standing Photovoltaic Power Generating System,” Journal of the City Planning Institute ofJapan, 49 no.3 (October 2014): 633-634. Accessed August 6, 2020.

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/journalcpij/49/3/49_633/_pdf/-char/en
See also Hori and Shibata, who mention the new renewable energy law of November 2013:
Ayumi Hori, and Yuki Shibata, “Geographical and Social Characteristics of Landscape Conflicts on PV
Projects in Japan – Case Study of 12 Small-Large Scale PV Projects,” IAIA17 Impact Assessment’s
Contribution to the Global Efforts in Addressing Climate Change, 2017. Accessed July 30, 2020. 5 pages.
https://conferences.iaia.org/2017/final-papers/Hori,%20Ayumi%20%20Landscape%20conflicts%20on%20PV%20projects%20in%20Japan.pdf
29 Umeda, “Japan: Renewable Energy Special Measures Act Amended.”
30 For example, Junko Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers Cultivate Crops and Solar Energy,”

Renewable Energy World. October 10, 2013. Accessed July 25, 2020.
https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2013/10/japan-next-generation-farmers-cultivateagriculture-and-solar-energy.html

31 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”

32 Gilhooly, “Japan Could Become Second Biggest Solar Power Nation;” Gilhooly, “Renewable Village.”
33 Edgar Hahn, “Japanese Solar PV Market and Industry -- Business Opportunities for European

Companies” -- EU-Japan Centre for industrial Cooperation, November 2014, 1-40. https://www.eujapan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/pvinjapan.pdf
34 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendation for Expansion of Sustainable Solar Power,” 1-7. January
7, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020.
https://www.renewable-ei.org/en/activities/reports/20190130.php/REI_Recommendation_SustainableSolarDevelopment_EN.pdf
35 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,” 1-7.

79

up the remaining “installed capacity” – less than 50%. 36 In about 2013-2014 the focus switchedfrom building large megasolar plants to more mid-size plant due to the lack of large tracts ofsuitable land close to grid connection points. 37 More floating solar farms have been planned. 38
One solar farm, formerly the largest in Japan, is built on reclaimed land near Kagoshima in
Kyushu. 39 There are also plans for solar farms in space, which would likely involve othercountries too, because of the cost. 40 Japan has already developed high tech innovative solar
facilities, such as the Solar Ark, which is the size of a broad-based 37m high office building,designed by Sanyo and taken over by Panasonic Corporation. 41 By 2013 Japan was the second
fastest growing PV market behind China. 42 In 2019 the total installed cumulative capacity of PV
in Japan was 63 GW 43 (up from 7 GW in 2012 for both Japan and China), 44 whereas it was
higher in the US and China, 75.9 GW and 204.7 GW respectively. 45 PV solar made up about

36 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
37 Hahn, “The Japanese Solar PV Market and Industry,”1-40.
38 Jason Deign, “Floating Solar Gets Ready for the High Seas. ” August 15, 2019.

https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/floating-solar-gears-up-for-the-high-seas

39 Kyocera, “News Release: Kyocera Starts Operation of 70MW Solar Power Plant, the Largest in Japan.”November 5, 2013. Accessed July 11, 2020. https://global.kyocera.com/newsarchive/2013/1101_nnms.html

40 “Japan Wants to put a Giant Solar Farm in Space,” IFL Science. Accessed July 11, 2020.

https://www.iflscience.com/technology/japan-wants-put-giant-solar-farm-space/; Shimizu
Corporation, “Shimizu Dream: Luna Ring, Solar Power Generation on the Moon,” (1996-2020). Accessed
July 11, 2020. https://www.shimz.co.jp/en/topics/dream/content02/
41 Panasonic Corporation, “Panasonic Newsroom Press Ririsu “So-ra-a-ku” no Burando Hyouki no
Henkou ni Tsuite.” June 24, 2011. Accessed July 11, 2020.
https://news.panasonic.com/jp/press/data/jn110624-1/jn110624-1.html
Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd., “Solar Ark,” 2009. Accessed July 11, 2020.
https://web.archive.org/web/20100102012206/http://sanyo.com/solarark/en/
42 Hahn, “The Japanese Solar PV Market and Industry,”1-40.
43 (1 Gigawatt (GW)=1,000 Megawatts (MW)44 IEA PVPS (International Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme), “PVS Report: A

Snapshot of Global PV 1992-2012, Preliminary Information From the IEA PVPS Programme,” Report
IEA-PVPS T1-22: 2013, Table 1 – Top 10 Countries for Installations and Total Installed Capacity in 2012 –in MW, p.7. Table 2 – Synthesis Table for PV Installations and Installed Capacity in 2012, p.11. Accessed
July 12, 2020. https://iea-pvps.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/PVPS_report__A_Snapshot_of_Global_PV_-_1992-2012_-_FINAL_4.pdf

45 IEA PVPS (International Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme), “Task 1 Strategic

PV Analysis and Outreach -- Snapshot of Global PV Markets 2020,” Report IEA-PVPS T1-37: 2020.
Technology Collaboration Programme by IAE (April 2020), Countries with Highest PV Penetration(2019), p.7. Table 1. Top 10 Countries for Installation and Total Installed Capacity in 2019, p.10,
Accessed July 12, 2020. https://iea-pvps.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/IEA_PVPS_Snapshot_2020.pdf

800.77% of total electricity used in Japan in 2012 46 while in 2019, PV’s share increased to 7.6%47 -still a small share compared to other energy sources.
The focus of this paper is the recent history of the spread of solar panels on farmland inJapan. What are the pros and cons of allowing this? For example, does it impact farm
productivity? Does generating electricity provide enough extra revenue to help keep farmhouseholds economically viable? Do farmers re-invest their profits from generating solar
power into farming? In other words, does solar power keep agriculture sustainable? I will firsttalk about the trends in farming, particularly the increase of abandoned farmland. Second, I
will describe solar panels on farmland, including the effect of the feed in tariff rate. Third, I willtalk about solar sharing and the temporary designation of farmland to allow for it. Fourth, I
will discuss the pros and cons of erecting solar panels on farmland in order to generate
electricity. I argue that generating solar power on farmland – particularly in the form of solar
sharing – will in the short run help to sustain Japanese agriculture by providing an extra sourceof income for farmers. However, without continuing to subsize the amount earned fromgenerating solar power, farmers will be less keen to go through the procedure to put a solar
sharing array of panels on their fields, thus, minimizing the positive effects on sustaining
farming.
The Implications of Increasing Abandoned Farmland for Solar Panels
In general, all over Japan farms have been decreasing in number, 48 although many of theremaining farms are larger, cultivating more land. The reasons for the decrease in farm
numbers is an aging farm population, 49 and a decline in the number of young people willing to

46 IEA PVPS, “Report IEA-PVPS T1-22: 2013,” p.11
47 IEA PVPS, “Report IEA-PVPS T1-37: 2020,” p.7
48 The total number of farm households (“farm households” is generally the category used to count the

number of farms) with cultivated land under management decreased from 4,953,00 in 1975 to 2,848,000
in 2005. Source: II Overview of the Results for the Census of Agriculture and Forestry 2005, Figure 1.
Transition in the Total Number of Farm Households (Nationwide), p.31,

https://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/census/afc/2005/pdf/eng_results.pdf
There was a further decrease in farm household numbers from 2,520,027 in 2010 to 2,143, 878 in 2015.
Source: Excel page N198, III Nouka no Bu, 1 Nouka Settai in nado (Tsuzuki), 2. Number of FarmHouseholds with Cultivated Land Under Management, and Area
https://www.maff.go.jp/e/data/stat/91th/attach/xls/index-30.xls
49 The average age of persons involved in farming (nougyou shuugyou jinkou) increased from 61.1 years

in 2000 to 66.4 years in 2015.
Source for 2000 population data:
Hyou (Table) 3-16 Nougyou Shuugyou Jinkou Kikanteki Nougyou Juujishasuu no Idou (Movement in
the number of core farmers)
https://www.maff.go.jp/j/wpaper/w_maff/h23_h/trend/part1/chap3/c3_3_02.html
Source for 2015 population data: Excel page N202_203, 202 III Nouka bu, I Farm Households, Household
members, etc. (b) Average age of Persons Engaged In Farming, etc. (source: Census of Agriculture &Forestry” by the Statistics Department of MAFF)

81

take over farm operations. 50 As well, farming has become less profitable, 51 forcing farmers totake side jobs. 52 These trends have led to an increase in abandoned farmland.
Abandoned farmland (kousakuhoukichi, 耕作放棄地) is defined as land not cultivated forat least a year and not expected to be cultivated again for a number of years. 53 As of about 2018
there was approximately 420,000 ha of abandoned farmland, making up about 10% of Japan’s
farmland area 54 – this is the approximate size of Saitama Prefecture. 55 About 180,000 ha, ornearly half of all abandoned farmland, is not thought to be restorable for future cultivation. 56
Therefore, this land could be used for solar panels.
There are fewer farms now, many of them larger, but as mentioned above, the amount ofcultivatable farmland is decreasing. 57 This had led to a decrease in national food production
https://www.maff.go.jp/e/data/stat/91th/attach/xls/index-30.xls
Regarding the aging farm population, see also:
Junichi Ito, Mari Nishikori, Mami Toyoshi, and Hart Nadav Feuer, “The Contribution of Land Exchange
Institutions and Markets in Countering Farmland Abandonment in Japan,” Land Use Policy 57 (2016):
582–593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.06.020; Kenji Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned
Farm Land Increasing in Japan.” Nikkei Business Publications, Nikkei BP CleanTech Institute, January 13,
2016, Accessed 2019. https://tech.nikkeibp.co.jp/dm/atclen/news_en/15mk/011300302/?ST=msbe
Alana Semuels, “Can Anything Stop Rural Decline?” The Atlantic. August 23, 2017, Accessed July 13,
2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/japan-rural-decline/537375/
50 Related to the farm succession problem see: Ito et al., “The Contribution of Land Exchange,”582-593;.
Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned Farm Land;” Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers;”
Semuels, “Can Anything Stop Rural Decline?”
51 Noriko Irie, Naoko Kawahara, and Ana Maria Esteves, “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of

Agrivoltaic Systems: A Case Study in Japan,” Renewable Energy, 13 (2019): 1463-1476.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2019.02.048; Ito et al., “The Contribution of Land Exchange,”582-593.

Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
52 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
53 See the definition of abandoned farmland on p.19 of : I. Overview of the Census of Agriculture andForestry 2005. https://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/census/afc/2005/pdf/eng_overview.pdf

See also: Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
54 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7;” Hanno Jentzsch, “Abandoned

Land, Corporate Farming, and Farmland Banks: A Local Perspective on the Process of Deregulating andRedistributing Farmland in Japan,” Contemporary Japan, 29 no.1 (2017): 31-46.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18692729.2017.1256977

55 Nishi, “Multi-Level Governance.”
56 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
57 For example, the area of abandoned cultivated land in Japan increased from 217,000 ha in 1990 to

386,000 ha in 2005. Source: II Overview of the Results of the Census of Agriculture and Forestry 2005,
Figure 12, Transitions in the Area of Abandoned Cultivated Land Area (Nationwide) (1,000 ha), p.43.
https://www.maff.go.jp/j/tokei/census/afc/2005/pdf/eng_results.pdf

82and a decrease in national food self-sufficiency. 58 Farmland abandonment has also led tonegative effects on food security. 59 Abandoned farmland may be taxed at a higher rate thancultivated farmland. 60 Thus, some farmers put their unused farmland in a farmland bankwhere it can be used by others, so it will not be taxed at a higher rate. 61 Thus, one could argue
that using this abandoned land for solar panels is a positive action.
Will solar panels help sustain farming?
The larger question is will putting solar panels on farmland -- including abandoned
farmland -- make farming more sustainable? What is the best use of abandoned farmland to
make farming more economically and environmentally sustainable? In addition to solar panels,
what are the other options? Estoque et al. 62 state that abandoned farmland may have positiveenvironmental impacts, such as restoring ecosystems. Osawa et al. in 2013 63 mention that
The area of abandoned cultivated land also increased from 395,981 ha in 2010 to 423,065 ha in 2015. Data
source: Excel page III Farm households N201 I Farm Households, Household members, etc. (5) “No. of
Farm Households (Households) with Abandoned Cultivated Land and Area” Added abandoned
cultivated land areas for commercial, non-commercial, and non-farm households with agricultural land.
(source: Census of Agriculture & Forestry” by the Statistics Department of MAFF)
https://www.maff.go.jp/e/data/stat/91th/attach/xls/index-30.xls
Su et al. focus on farmland abandonment in Japan:
Guandong Su, Hidenori Okashi and Lin Chen, “Spatial Pattern of Farmland Abandonment in Japan:
Identification and Determinants,” Sustainability, 10 no.10, (2018): 3676 - (22 pages)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/10/3676
58 “Japan’s Falling Food Self-Sufficiency (editorial),” Japan Times. August 20, 2019. Accessed June 19, 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/08/20/editorials/japans-falling-food-selfsufficiency/#.XuKPA0VKg2w
59 Even companies selling solar panels to farmers on their internet homepages talk about decreasing

farmland and fewer successors taking over their farms, and the importance of farmland and national
food production, e.g., Einougata Taiyoukou Jouhou Teikyou Shisutemu Dotto Komu (営農型太陽光情報
提供システムドットコム). No date. Accessed August 9, 2020. http://www.nouchitaiyoukou.jp/farmland/difference.html. Regarding farmland abandonment, see also Su et al., “Spatial
Pattern of Farmland Abandonment,” 3676 - (22 pages)
60 “Japan to Use Tax Carrots, Sticks to Move Ilde Farmland,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 10, 2014,
Accessed July 13, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-to-use-tax-carrots-sticks-to-move-idlefarmland; Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned Farm Land.”61 “Japan to Use Tax Carrots.”

A. Otsuka, “Farming Increasingly Dependent on Non-Japanese.” The Asahi Shimbun. June 26, 2018.
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201806260001.html
62 Ronlad Estoque, Kei Gomi, Takuya Togawa, Makoto Ooba, Yasuaki Hijioka, Chiaki Akiyama, Shogo
Nakamura, Akira Yoshioka, and Keisuke Kuroda, “Scenario-Based Land Abandonment Projections:
Methods, Application, and Implications,” Science of the Total Environment, 692 (2019): 903-916.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.07.204
63 Takeshi Osawa, Kazunori Kohyama, and Hiromune Mitsuhashi, “Areas of Increasing Agricultural
Abandonment Overlap the Distribution of Previously Common, Currently Threatened Plant Species,”
PLoS ONE, 8 no.11, e79978 (2013): 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0079978

83abandoned farmland can provide habitat for threatened plants (but not always) -- they also
state that farmland abandonment can threaten plant species. On the other hand, Osawa et al. in2016 64 review some of the negative effects of abandonment on the services that ecosystems
provide (i.e., ecosystem services), such as producing food. 65 They also point to the effects ofabandonment on the reduction in biodiversity, which can affect, e.g., pollination, anotherecosystem service. 66
Although one may think that abandoned farmland should be put back into production(to increase food self-sufficiency, etc.), some farmers may not want to buy or rent abandoned
farmland 67 due to the increased costs to farm it. Ito et al. 68 calls these land transactions “risky”.
Jentzsch 69 also mentions that active farmers are not interested in acquiring poorly locatedfarmland, e.g., in remote hilly areas or among residential developments. So perhaps solar
panels are the best land use for much abandoned land.
The Spread of Solar Panels on Abandoned and Other Farmland
As mentioned in the introduction, large-scale solar facilities are commonly called solar
farms, solar parks, or megasolar parks. Some of these facilities are on abandoned farmland, butthey can be placed on sites of other land use. 70 These types of megasolar projects have been
64 Takeshi Osawa, Kazunori Kohyama, and Hiromune Mitsuhashi, “Multiple Factors Drive Regional

Agricultural Abandonment,” Sci. Total Environ., 542 (2016): 478–483.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.10.067

65 Carlos Corvalan, Simon Hales, and Anthony J. McMichael. Ecosystem and Human Well-Being – Health

Synthesis: A Report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005.
Accessed August 8, 2020.
https://ohcea.org/OhceaModules/Ecosystem%20Health/Ecosystem%20Health%20Resources/Corrval
an_Ecosystem%20Health.pdf

When mentioning biodiversity and ecosystem services, Osawa et al. in 2016 refer to Osawa et al. from2013; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being, Island Press, Washington,
D.C. , 2005; and Teja Tscharntke et al. (see below).
66 Teja Tscharntke, Alexandra M. Klein, Andreas Kruess, Ingolf Steffan-Dewenter and Carsten Thies,“Landscape Perspectives on Agricultural Intensification and Biodiversity-Ecosystem Service
Management,” Ecological Letters 8 (2005): 857-874.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00782.x
67 Ito et al., “The Contribution of Land Exchange,”582-593.
68 Ito et al., “The Contribution of Land Exchange,” 582-593.
69 Jentzsch, “Abandoned Land, Corporate Farming, and Farmland Banks,” 31-46.
70 e.g., see:

Andrew Chapman and Timothy Fraser, “Japan’s Megasolar Boom: Quantifying Social Equity
Expectations and Realities at the Local Scale,” Sustainability Science, 14 (2019): 355-374.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-018-0613-y; Timothy Fraser, “How Governance and Disasters Shape
Renewable Energy Transitions: The Case of Japanese Megasolar,”. Social Sciences Quarterly 100 no. 3(2019): 975-990. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12603; Timothy Fraser and Andrew Chapman, “Social
Equity Impacts in Japan’s Mega-Solar Siting Process,” Energy for Sustainable Development, 42 (2018): 136-

84

common in Japan since about 2012 when the new feed in tariff (discussed below) was
implemented. Forested areas still have the potential to receive large-scale solar facilities,
although a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper.
The idea of combining farming and solar panels for electricity production, known asagrivoltaics -- or solar sharing in Japan -- started with the publication of a paper by Adolf
Goetzberger and Armin Zastrow in 1982. 71 Agrivoltaics allows crops to be grown under solar
panels. The panels are positioned above the crops and are spaced out to allow sunlight to reachplants below. 72 Only a small percentage of sunlight is needed for plants to grow. 73 Weselek et
al. 74 review the recent world development of photovoltaics. Valle et al. 75 cite Dupraz et al., 76
who mention that the initial prototype for agrivoltaics was located in an open field in France in151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2017.11.002; Varvara Akimova, and Irina Tikhotskaya, “A way to a
Sustainable Future: The Solar Industry in Japan,” Geography, Environment, Sustainability, 8 no.3 (2015): 92100. https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2015-8-3-92-100
71 A. Goetzberger, and A. Zastrow, “On the Co-existence of Solar-Energy Conversion and Plant

Cultivation,” International Journal of Solar Energy, 1 no.1 (1982): 55-69.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01425918208909875

Ketzer et al., 2020, Valle et al., 2017, and Weselek et al., 2019, refer to or imply Goetzberger and Zastrow,
1982, as the developers of agrivoltaics.
Daniel Ketzer, Peter Schlyter, Nora Weinberger, Christine Rosch. “Driving and Restraining Forces for
the Implementation of the Agrophotovoltaics System Technology – A System Dynamics Analysis,” J. ofEnvironmental Management, 270 (2020): 1-11.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110864
B. Valle, T. Simonneau, F. Sourd, P. Pechier, P. Hamard, T. Frisson, M. Ryckewaert, and A. Christophe,“Increasing the Total Productivity of a Land by Combining Mobile Photovoltaic Panels and Food
Crops,” Applied Energy 206 (November 15, 2017):1495-1507.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.09.113
A. Weselek, A. Ehmann, S. Zikeli, I. Lewandowski, S. Schindele, and P. Hogy, “Agrophotovoltaic
Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities. A Review.” Agronomy for Sustainable Development
39 no.35 (2019), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-019-0581-3
72 MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Nourinsuisansho)), “Einougata Hatsuden

Setsubi no Setchi ni Kakaru Nouchi Ten'you-Nado no Toriatsukai ni Tsuite (Handling Farmland
Conversion to Install Farm-Type Power Generating Devices),” May 15, 2018a, Accessed July 14, 2020.
http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press/shokusan/r_energy/180515.html

73 Ho, “Japanese Farmers.”
74 Weselek et al., “Agrophotovoltaic Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities,” 1-20.
75 Valle et al., “Increasing the Total Productivity of a Land,” 1495-1507.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.09.113
76 C. Dupraz, H. Marrou, G. Talbot, L. Dufour, A. Nogier, and Y. Ferard, “Combining solar photovoltaic

panels and food crops for optimising land use: Towards new agrivoltaic schemes,” Renewable Energy 36
no.10 (2011): 2725-2732. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2011.03.005

85

2010. Weselek et al. also cite Movellan 77 who states that agrivoltaics were started in Japan in
2004 78 by a man named Akira Nagashima. 79 Irie et al., 80 who focus on the social impacts of solar
panels on farmland in Japan, also review the literature on agrivoltaics -- mostly from Europe -and mentions that the two types of solar sharing panels are those put on single posts above
fields and the more common roof-type panels placed over fields (see Figure 3, p.4). Somepanels on single posts are part of the soraku system, which has a hand winch that allows theoperator to move the panels around to account for seasonal changes. 81 This solar sharing has
become more common in the US and France too as the cost of PV panels has decreased. 82
Feed in Tariff System (FIT), 2012
As mentioned in the introduction, after the 2011 nuclear power plant accident, thecentral government came up with a new Feed in Tariff law in 2012, which ensured thatproperty owners with solar panels on their land would be paid a fixed amount per kilowatt
hour. 83 This arrangement applied to all solar panels, not just those on farmland. 84 The
electricity was and is sold to the power authorities, e.g., Tokyo Electric Power Company. 85 The
FIT program has financially assisted farmers whose land was contaminated by nuclear fallout
77 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
78 An agriculture ministry document states that Nagashima started his work on solar sharing in 2003.

Source:“We’re in Business to Save our Home Planet,” Patagonia, December 6, 2019.
https://www.maff.go.jp/e/policies/env/attach/pdf/climate_smart_ws_2019-19.pdf
79 Movellan mentions that Nagashima was a retired agricultural machinery engineer with no experiencedeveloping solar panels, although he was interested in solar energy generation.

80 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems.”1463-1476.
81 “Solar Sharing in Japan: Efforts and Hurdles,” Japan for Sustainability. August 15, 2014, Accessed July 30,

2020. https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id035010.html

82 “Solar Panels on Farmland Have Huge Electricity-Generating Potential,” Yale Environment 360. August

15, 2019. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://e360.yale.edu/digest/solar-panels-on-farmland-have-hugeelectricity-generating-potential

83 “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels.” 2013

Before the FIT system, there was a program started in 2009 that involved buying surplus electricity withmany ten year residential contracts expiring in 2019 (Martin, 2020).
A. Martin, “The Climate Crisis. Balance of Power: Redefining Japan’s Energy Needs,” Japan Times online,
Jan. 19, 2020. https://features.japantimes.co.jp/climate-crisis-renewables/
There was also an older FIT known as Solar Fit from 2009 to 2011 (Hahn, 2014, “The Japanese Solar PV
Market and Industry,”1-40).
84 Hori and Shibata, “Geographical and Social Characteristics of Landscape Conflicts.”
85 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 201486

and now have solar panels on their land. 86 Also, the income from the power generation is astable source of income for aging farmers. 87 In fact, some vegetable farmers earn more moneyfrom solar panels than from growing vegetables. 88 The FIT has led to the massive spread ofsolar power across Japan, 89 including megasolar arrangements. 90
Permission to Temporarily put Solar Panels on Farmland, 2013 regulation change
The FIT was established in 2012, and in April 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries (MAFF) allowed the temporary use of farmland for the use of solar panels as longas crops could still be grown. 91 As of 2013, using solar sharing, about 2.8 million ha, or over halfof Japan’s 4.6 million ha of farmland, were needed to meet Japan’s electrical needs. 92 The May
2014 “Act on Promoting the Generation of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources
Harmonized with Sound Development of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 93” made it
possible in some cases to erect solar panels on class 1 farmland. 94 As long as 80% of crops can begrown beneath the panels, permission is granted. 95 If less than 80 percent of their farmland iscultivated, farmers have to dismantle their solar systems. 96 Shade tolerant crops are best grownunder the panels, e.g., mushrooms. Permission was initially granted for three years, before one
could apply for a renewal; however, this permission has been extended to 10 years, 97 as long as
agricultural production continues beneath the panels.

86 “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels.” 201387 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
88 Takada and Watanabe, “Business:

Solar Farmers in Japan to Harvest Electricity With Crops.”

89 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 2014; Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
90 Fraser, “How Governance and Disasters Shape Renewable Energy Transitions;” Chapman, and . Fraser.

“Japan’s Megasolar Boom,”355-374.

91 “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels.” 2013
92 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”

93 Also known as: “Act on Promotion of Generating Renewable Energy Harmonized with Healthy

Development of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery” (see “New Renewable Energy Law…,” 2014)

94 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
95 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 2014
96 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
97 MAFF, “Einougata Hatsuden Setsubi no Setchi.” 2018a87

Examples of Solar Sharing
The first solar sharing project to be subsidized by FIT was a project in Chiba Prefecture -the 34.4 KW Kazusatsurumai Solar Sharing Project. 98 Initially, the farmer earned 16 million yen
per year from his solar sharing panel. His father grew vegetables and peanuts under the panels,
which were sold at a local market. Another example project is in Minami-Soma, Fukushima
Prefecture, where 500 panels were installed on individual poles, awaiting the return of
residents, who were evacuated due to the nuclear accident. 99 In Aichi Prefecture a 50 kw system
was built over about 3.1 ha of citrus trees using 5.5 m high steel pipes. 100
With a FIT rate that allows owners and managers of solar projects to receive relatively
high income from solar power generation, several companies have become involved inmanaging solar projects. For example, Mitsubishi Electric sells small panels. 101 In Tsukuba City
near Tokyo there is a large scale 54 ha solar farm called the SJ Solar Tsukuba Power Plant, run
by Shanghai Electric Power Co., which is the largest solar sharing project in Japan. 102 Korean
ginseng, the herb ashitaba, and coriander are grown under the panels. The power company
rents its land from the local area farm corporation called “Mimori no Sato.” A partnershipdeveloped among Hitachi Capital, house manufacturer Daiwa House, and a Tokyo-based
company Sustainenergy to create a new solar sharing business model. 103 At least two of theseprojects are in Miyagi Prefecture in Tohoku, 104 and the electricity is sold to Tohoku ElectricPower. 105

98 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
99 “‘Solar sharing’ Spreading Among Fukushima Farmers,” Power Inside Publishing. June 28, 2013.

Accessed July 25, 2020.

https://www.pimagazine-asia.com/solar-sharing-spreading-among-fukushimafarmers/#:~:text=Farmers%20in%20Fukushima%20Prefecture%20are%20turning%20to%20%E2%80%9
Csolar,Power%20Co.%E2%80%99s%20Fukushima%20No.%201%20nuclear%20power%20plant.
100 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
101 “Can Mushrooms and Solar Power fill Japan's Vacant Farmland?” Nikkei Asian Review. September 5,

2017. Accessed June 15, 2020.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Can-mushrooms-and-solar-power-fill-Japan-s-vacantfarmland
102 Kenji Kaneko, “Chinese Power Company Runs Solar Plant in Harmony With Local Community” –“Japan's Largest Solar Sharing Operation in Tsukuba City.” Nikkei Business Publication. March 6, 2018.
https://tech.nikkeibp.co.jp/dm/atclen/news_en/15mk/030601952/?ST=msbe?ST=msbe&P=4
103 “Japan Combines Agriculture With Solar Power Generation to Revive Unexploited Farmland,” Climate

Action. September 7, 2017. Accessed June 15, 2020, http://www.climateaction.org/news/japancombines-agriculture-with-solar-power-generation-to-revive-unexploite; “Can Mushrooms and Solar
Power,” 2017

104 “Japan Combines Agriculture With Solar Power,” 2017
105 “Can Mushrooms and Solar Power,” 2017

88

The Process of Setting Up Solar Sharing Solar Panels on Farmland
Businesses help farmers set up their solar sharing systems. One company -- Einougata
Taiyoukou Joho Teikyo Shisutemu, for example -- advertises with a website, and explains the solar
sharing and non-solar sharing solar systems and the regulations involved. It has a free dial
number that customers can call for more general information and for free quotes on a solar
panel system. 106 Another company -- Liberal Solution 107 of Tokyo was selling panels forabandoned farmland since about 2014, with good sales in the Sendai area of Tohoku. 108 Morerecently, in 2015 the company offered weeding and cleaning services for solar power facilities,
focusing on elderly farmers.
A small megasolar solar system that produces about 35 KW of electricity annually costs(in 2013) about 12.6 million yen (~$168,000 Canadian). 109 However, instead of buying the solar
panels, many farmers contract solar panel companies to set up solar panels on their farmland. 110
Still, some farmers do sell their farmland to solar energy companies, as has been the case in
Ushiku City, Ibaraki Prefecture. 111
Rules Regarding the Placement of Panels on Farmland
One cannot normally place solar panels for solar sharing on the best (classes A or 1)
farmland. The Agricultural Law (Nouchihou) prohibits the use of farmland for anything otherthan agriculture. 112 It is also difficult to erect solar panels on land designated under the
Agricultural Promotion Act. 113 In some cases, one needs to convert the land-use category of the
farmland to allow for solar panels to be erected. 114 According to Movellan. 115 the following
conditions are necessary for installing panels. The actual solar panels on the farmland must be
easily dismantled and have enough space underneath them to allow for machinery to movearound. MAFF does not want the pillars holding up the solar panels to be cemented into theground. The panels must be spaced out, so enough sunlight reaches the plants below. The
solar panels need to be light weight as they are installed high above the ground, and they
106 Einougata Taiyoukou Jouhou Teikyou Shisutemu Dotto Komu.
107 Liberal Solution Co. Ltd. website: https://www.liberal-solution.co.jp/
108 Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned Farm Land.”109 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
110 MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Nourinsuisansho)), “Nougyousha no Tame no

Einogata Taiyoko Hatsuden Donyuu Chekkurisuto” (Checklist for Farmers for Introducing Farm-Type
Solar Power). 2018b, Accessed July 2, 2020.
http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press/shokusan/r_energy/attach/pdf/180515-3.pdf

111 Agricultural Section, Ushiku City Hall, personal communication, May 18, 2018
112 “Solar Sharing Program Through Solar Panels.” 2013
113 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
114 Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned Farm Land.”115 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”

89

should not block wind flow. 116 Movellan 117 states that these requirements (above) are in place
to prevent farmers from abandoning farming and converting all their land to solar panels. One
must also make sure that when one erects solar panels, that there is no possibility of affecting
agricultural conditions or facilities in the surrounding area. 118 Once panels are erected on
farmland for solar sharing, the farmland’s productivity must not drop below 80 percent of
normal (without solar panels) 119 – and farmland yields must be reported annually. If at least 80
percent of the land is not being farmed, the farmer may be asked to remove the panels andrestore the land to its previous farmland conditions.
The Role of Local Agricultural Committees in Permitting Solar Panels to be Erected on
Farmland
Local agricultural committees decide whether solar panels can be erected on
farmland. 120 These committees are responsible to authorize the change of farmland to otheruses. 121 One must fill out an application form when wanting to put solar panels on one’s
farmland. 122 In Ushiku City, Ibaraki Prefecture, for example, one must fill out an applicationand supporting documents when applying to use part of one’s farmland for solar panels. 123
When Ushiku city hall examines the application for non-solar sharing type panels, someone will
actually visit the farmland to see which part of it will be used for solar panels. But some pastcommittees have not been familiar with the process of converting farmland for solar panels
when the law changed. 124

116 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 2014
117 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
118 MAFF, “Nougyousha no Tame no Einogata Taiyoko.” 2018b
119 Movellan, “Japan Next-Generation Farmers.”
120 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 2014
121 Jentzsch, “Abandoned Land, Corporate Farming, and Farmland Banks,”31-46.
122 Einougata Taiyoukou Jouhou Teikyou Shisutemu Dotto Komu.
123 The Ushiku City application to change part of one’s farmland, so that non-solar sharing solar panels

can be erected includes attaching information according to the following document:
http://www.city.ushiku.lg.jp/data/doc/1493347100_doc_80_4.pdf.

The Ushiku City application for placing solar sharing type solar panels on one’s farmland includes
attaching information according to the following document:
http://www.city.ushiku.lg.jp/data/doc/1494206161_doc_80_0.pdf
124 “Solar Sharing in Japan.” 201490

Discussion: Pros & Cons of Solar Panels on Farmland
Pros:
The pros of locating solar panels on farmland are as follows. First, they provide an extra
source of income for farmers, 125 especially aging farmers, and in particular, farmers inFukushima whose land was contaminated by nuclear fallout in 2011; these Fukushima farmers
will likely be unable to cultivate their land for years to come. Second, the revenue from solar
power provides money for farmers to maintain farmland or farm infrastructure. 126 Third,
according to the Renewable Energy Institute, 127 the spread of solar power has also led to more
employment and has revitalized regional economies. The agriculture ministry also supports
renewable energy, which improves rural areas. 128 Fourth, Adeh et al. 129 argue that solar power
has its greatest potential to generate electricity over farmland, and its presence does not meanthat crop productivity is sacrificed. Based on an experiment on farm plots in Oregon, they statethat solar sharing type panels can improve moisture conditions – where moisture is a problem –and can help to improve crop productivity. Weselek et al. 130 also mention that solar sharing can
aid agriculture in arid environments, thus reducing the negative effects of climate change. Fifth,in terms of land-use problems, only 4% of problem cases of solar panels were on farmland, andonly 3% were on uncultivated fields (most were in forested areas). 131 Sixth, once installed, solar
panels do not make noise. Seventh, the panels can be installed and managed by a contractor, so
the farmer does not have to be directly involved other than leasing the land to the contractor.
Eighth, solar panels, if built on abandoned farmland, help to offset the higher taxes that may becharged on abandoned farmland. 132 Ninth, and finally, solar sharing allows farmers to continue
cultivating their land.
Cons:
The cons of setting up solar panels on farmland are as follows. First, some solar sharing
operations may not be agriculturally productive. One solar sharing array that I observed had
nothing cultivated under the panels, even though it was late spring when crops should beplanted. Second, the FIT amount will decrease in 2020, 133 so farmers will earn less from125 Irie et al. mention that solar sharing is one way to sustain farmers’ incomes.
126 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476; MAFF,“Nousangyouson ni Okeru Saisei Kanou Enerugi-,” 2016.

127 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
128 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
129 Elnaz Adeh, Stephen Good, M. Calaf, and Chad Higgins. “Solar PV Power Potential is Greatest over Cropland,”

Scientific Reports, Nature Research, (2019): 1-6. Accessed August 9, 2020.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-47803-3.pdf
130 Weselek et al., “Agrophotovoltaic Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities,”1-20.
131 Ministry of Environment study, cited in Renewable Energy Institute, 2019, 1-7.
132 “Japan to Use Tax Carrots;” Kaneko, “PV Systems for Abandoned Farm Land.”133 Jiji Press. “Japan to Partially end Feed-in Tariff System for Electricity from Renewable Sources,” Japan

Times. June 13, 2019. Accessed October 28, 2019.

91

generating solar power. 134 Third, some abandoned farmland can be used more effectively or
productively. Jentzsch 135 calls the placement of solar panels on abandoned farmland “abuse”,
i.e., when outside corporations are involved in the setup or management of solar panels. He
mentions that in Gumma Prefecture a solar sharing project was approved by the local
agricultural committee because beets could be grown beneath the solar panels, implying thatthe farmland could have been used more productively. 136 Fourth, related to this, there are thosecritics who point out Japan’s low food self-sufficiency and food security. 137 A decline in farm
production cannot help either one. Fifth, solar panels can negatively impact adjoining
farmland. 138 According to MAFF, 139 the panels can alter how water hits the ground below thepanels, affecting drainage, which could have an impact on adjacent farmland drainage too. Irieet al. 140 list similar possible negative effects on the environment, neighbourhoods, andagriculture. There is a risk of landslides by putting solar farms on steep slopes. 141 Sixth, solar
farms negatively impact landscape aesthetics. 142 This has been a concern in Otama town,
Fukushima Prefecture, where the town is a member of “The Most Beautiful Villages of Japan,”an organization created in 2005, in which member villages and towns have to be vetted formembership. Seventh, the location of solar projects does not always fit with regional planningpolicy, which can lead to opposition and conflict. 143 Eighth and finally, the process of setting up
solar panels on one’s farmland involves an understanding of farmland regulation, solar panel
technology, contracts with solar power companies, business plans, the costs of panels (if one
chooses to purchase them), and municipal approval processes.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/13/business/japan-partially-end-feed-tariff-systemelectricity-renewable-sources/#.XROfQqIs-fA
134 So there is less financial burden on the average household and companies(Jiji Press, 2019), whichindirectly pay for the subsidy through high electricity rates – the FIT amount will decrease. The rate will
decrease to European levels (Jiji Press, 2018).

Jiji Press. “Japan to More than Halve its Solar Power Feed-in Tariffs,” Japan Times. September 15, 2018.
Accessed August 2, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/15/business/japan-halvesolar-power-feedtariffs/#.XROalKIs-fA
135 Jentzsch, “Abandoned Land, Corporate Farming, and Farmland Banks,”31-46.
136 One’s personal attitudes and values toward farmland can likely make the issue of placing solar panels

on farmland controversial.

137 For example, Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
138 Hori and Shibata, “Geographical and Social Characteristics of Landscape Conflicts;” MAFF,“Nougyousha no Tame no Einogata Taiyoko,” 2018b

139 MAFF, “Nougyousha no Tame no Einogata Taiyoko,” 2018b
140 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
141 Martin, “The Climate Crisis. Balance of Power.”
142 Martin, “The Climate Crisis. Balance of Power.”
143 Hori and Shibata, “Geographical and Social Characteristics of Landscape Conflicts.”

92DOES SOLAR SHARING MAKE AGRICULTURE MORE ENVIRONMENTALLY AND
ECONOMICALLY SUSTAINABLE?
Do non-solar-sharing type panels on farmland, e.g., megasolar parks, prevent
abandoned farmland from being used for other purposes, e.g., wildlife habitat, water storage,
carbon sinks, or pasture? Abandoned farmland can provide such ecosystem services, but notwhen it is covered up by panels. On the other hand, there can be negative impacts on farmsustainability by letting abandoned land revert back to nature through successional processes.
For example, it could lead to an increase in more unwanted wildlife, e.g, wild boars, 144 whichhave trampled good farmland. But if solar panels are put on this abandoned farmland, they canalso affect how precipitation hits the ground and runs off, which can lead to soil erosion. 145 As
well, would an increase in the area of solar panels on farmland near cities and towns contributeto an urban heat island effect due to the cumulative built-up urban land? Moreover, what about
the disposal cost of panels that no longer work? What is the environmental damage from theirimproper disposal?
The agriculture ministry promotes the use of non-solar sharing-type solar panels if theremaining farmland is being used effectively for agriculture. 146 The ministry also promotes
using the revenue from solar energy produced on abandoned land or land not used for farming
to improve the productivity of this remaining farmland. 147 The agriculture ministry gives
several examples of these types of farm operations – with panels usually on forest land or othernon-farm land – used to support agricultural production. 148 The agriculture ministry provides
farmers with much information about solar panels and solar sharing, e.g., a checklist forfarmers. 149 However, based on personally assessing some of these documents I would argue
that setting up a solar system involves a steep learning curve for the farmer because it is notdirectly related to farming, and there is financial risk because of the changing FIT rate andhaving to negotiate a contract with contractors who usually manage the panels. The process to
set up panels on one’s farmland can be arduous. As mentioned above, in some cases, farmers
have to change the designated class of their farmland to allow for panels to be erected.
Commercial information on the internet, and even government literature seems to focus onchanging the class of one’s farmland, so panels can be erected for solar sharing. However,
perhaps this is not necessary because in Ushiku City, for example, solar sharing can take placeon even the best quality farmland (based on reading the application form). Also, one needs to
144 A. Taylor, “The wild boars of Fukushima,” The Atlantic. March 9, 2017. Accessed July14, 2020.

https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/03/the-wild-boars-of-fukushima/519066/;“Kousaku Houkichi wo Kariharatte Nouchi kara Inoshishi wo Oiharaou!” (Clear Abandoned Farmland
and Get Rid of Boars!). MAFF (Nourinsuisansho)). no date. Accessed August 5, 2020.
https://www.maff.go.jp/j/seisan/tyozyu/higai/hyousyou_zirei/yuuryou_jirei/47kamisibai/attach/pd
f/47zirei-39.pdf
145 MAFF, “Nougyousha no Tame no Einogata Taiyoko,” 2018b
146 For example, MAFF, “Nousangyouson ni Okeru Saisei Kanou Enerugi-,” 2016
147 MAFF, “Nousangyouson ni Okeru Saisei Kanou Enerugi-,” 2016
148 MAFF, “Nousangyouson ni Okeru Saisei Kanou Enerugi-,” 2016
149 MAFF, “Nougyousha no Tame no Einogata Taiyoko.” 2018b93

receive local agricultural committee approval for placing panels on one’s farmland. Thus, theprocess of receiving approval to set up panels is complicated, and permission is only granted
temporarily, although, as mentioned, it has recently been extended from 3 to 10 years.
DOES THE PROLIFERATION OF SOLAR PANELS ON FARMLAND MAKE FARMING
MORE OR LESS SUSTAINABLE?
Weselek et al. would answer “more sustainable.” 150 Solar panels do provide an
additional source of income for farmers, so they can continue farming their remaining farmland
for a longer period of time. 151 However, it is difficult to know how much of this extra revenue isbeing invested in farming as highlighted in the farm examples provided by the agriculture
ministry in their publications – I suspect if the farmers are nearing retirement age, very little.
Meanwhile, the number of people involved in agriculture continues to decline. Moreover,farmland that is in a solar-sharing arrangement is probably less productive than if it werefarmed without solar panels above it, except perhaps in arid environments, 152 which do notexist in Japan. This difference in productivity needs further research. What are the effects ofpotentially lower food production on national food self-sufficiency and food security? Irie etal. 153 ponder this question. Moreover, some abandoned farmland that is used temporarily forsolar panels may be able to be used again for farming. There is also a cost to monitoring how
farmland in solar sharing situations is being used. Perhaps this is one reason why the farmers
are now allowed to temporarily put panels on their land for ten years rather than three. Or is
the Japanese government less interested in national food self-sufficiency and food security? Irieet al. 154 mention the continued weakening of the agricultural economy in Japan.
What is the future of solar panels, regardless of whether they are on farmland or not?
According to the Renewable Energy Institute, 155 in the future solar panel diffusion will happen
most easily on roof tops and unused land. Perhaps one can also place megasolar and smaller
arrays on brownfield sites and low value urban land as it becomes available. The Renewable
Energy Institute 156 continues that it is likely that there will be more solar panels in forested areas
as that land is less regulated than farmland; however, this may lead to more environmental
impacts, especially due to solar panels being located on steep forested slopes. Still, there are
advocates of solar sharing who argue that Japan’s electrical needs can be met by solar sharing

150 Weselek et al., “Agrophotovoltaic Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities,”1-20.
151 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”p.1466.
152 Weselek et al., “Agrophotovoltaic Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities,”1-20.
153 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
154 Irie et al. “Sector-Wide Social Impact Scoping of Agrivoltaic Systems,”1463-1476.
155 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.
156 Renewable Energy Institute, “Recommendations for Expansion,”1-7.

94

on existing farmland. Some believe that solar sharing maximizes the use of farmland from thepoint of view of both energy and agricultural production. 157
Summary, Future Prospects, & Conclusion
Solar power is a clean energy source, and generating it provides an extra source ofincome for farm owners, which can encourage farmers to continue farming and invest more in
their agricultural operations. As mentioned above, approximately, 180,000 ha of abandoned
farmland in Japan is no longer thought to be restorable in the future. 158 Therefore, it is possible
to create large-scale solar power facilities without making new impacts on the naturalenvironment, 159 or on good farmland. In addition, solar sharing can provide clean renewableelectricity while allowing agriculture to sustain itself, 160 and solar sharing provides farmers andfarmland owners with an extra source of income. 161 But one can still argue that even building
solar sharing arrays does decrease crop productivity on normally productive land, as crops
cannot be grown as intensively. As well, some abandoned farmland may be better used forother uses, such as bird habitat or as a carbon sink, rather than a site for solar panels. Finally,
not maintaining the FIT to supplement payments for solar energy generation could persuade
farmers to not put solar panels on their farmland, which would limit the further diffusion ofsolar sharing and its positive effects on farm sustainability by increasing farm income.

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