Philosophy of Education Society of Japan
President
Yasuo IMAI (Japan Women’s University)

E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan
Editorial Board
Chief Editor
Morimichi KATO (Sophia University)
Board Members
Mika OKABE (Osaka University)
Fumio ONO (Doshisha University)
Satoshi TANAKA (The University of Tokyo)

Title: E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education
Society of Japan, Vol. 2
Published: October 2017
Republished in New Edition: October 2020
© 2017 Philosophy of Education Society of Japan
ISSN 2435-5364
E-Journal of Philosophy of Education: International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japanis published annually by the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan. The Office Address: Division of Basic
Theories of Education, Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. Email: phil.ed.soc.jp＠gmail.com

Contents
The 2nd Research Promotion Award Article (2016)

The Early Educational Thinking of Meikichi Chiba: Focusing on
the Influence of the Philosophy of Life
Shin KINOSHITA

1

Symposium
Civil Society and Education: The Public, Self-Interest and Democracy

Education and Politics in the Individualized Society:
Connecting by the Cultivation of Citizenship
Kayo FUJII

19

Thematic Research
Educational Practices, from Which Philosophy Emerges:
Frontiers of Philosophy of Education

What does it mean to be “doing phenomenology”?
Reasons for reflecting on personal experiences used as case studies
Rui OTSUKA

26

Reflection on Gaining Trust of Students with Careers:
Between Academic Expertise and Intellectual Pursuit
Shinichi TAKEUCHI

33

Structure of Mutual Learning Between a Teacher and a Student
in a Nursing Practicum
Yukiko MAEKAWA

40

E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 2, 2017

The Early Educational Thinking of Meikichi Chiba:
Focusing on the Influence of the Philosophy of Life
Shin KINOSHITAThe University of Tokyo
Abstract
This paper examines the educational thinking of Meikichi Chiba, a thinker and practitioner deeply
influenced by the philosophy of life. He is known for advocating an educational theory at a series ofmonumental lectures, entitled The Eight Greatest Pedagogical Opinions, presented in 1921. This
thinker, who was inspired by Western philosophers such as Bergson and Nietzsche, attempts topromote vital activities of children, who find and solve problems to satisfy their own needs. His
educational thinking is unique; yet, few studies have been conducted to examine his views. We
therefore focus on how the philosophies of life impacted his life-centered theories. In the 1910s, Chiba
established his pedagogy based on the problem-solving learning model proposed by progressive
American educators. He believes in learning as a problem-solving process based on the needs of anorganism. He then proposed a unique theory named the all-impulses-fully-satisfied theory (issai syōdō
mina manzoku ron) in the early 1920s, with reference to the key concepts of the philosophy of life
such as élan vital and creative evolution. Supported by these ideas, he claims that all the impulses ofchildren should be entirely satisfied, because every impulse is an adequate manifestation of vital life.
Chiba devoted all his energy to promoting the realization of children’s potentiality. Ironically, however,
his approach sometimes results in the depth of life being ignored, despite his intentions. He sometimes
reduces vital potentiality to superficial aspects. To analyze the roots of this problem, this paper reviews
the structure of Chiba’s life-centered thoughts, by comparing them to Deleuze’s ideas; thiscontemporary philosopher of life proposes the distinction between virtuality and actuality, which hints
at reconsidering the concept of the potentiality of life.
Keywords
problem solving, all-impulses-fully-satisfied, solidarity, association, virtuality, actuality, potentiality

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Introduction
This paper investigates the educational thinking of Meikichi Chiba (1887-1959), a
thinker and practitioner of New Education in Taisho Era, focusing on his early work fromthe late 1910s to the early 1920s. He is known for advocating his unique theory, allimpulses-fully-satisfied theory at a series of monumental lectures, entitled The EightGreatest Pedagogical Opinions, presented in 1921. His early thinking is deeply
influenced by life-centered philosophies, especially those of Emerson, Dewey, Bergson,and Nietzsche. These impacts also left traces their mark on his educational thinking after
1922, when he went abroad to study Spranger’s cultural pedagogy and Husserl’s
phenomenology in Germany, and even later when he began to support a Manchu
occupation policy in the Showa era. In this paper, therefore, we examine the influence ofthe philosophy of life on his early thinking in order to elucidate the fundamental
characteristics of Chiba’s educational thinking.
Regarding previous studies on Chiba, Horimatsu (2003) is the most allencompassing study. He points out the crucial influence of Bergson and Atsutane Hirata,
a noted Shinto thinker from the Edo era (Horimatsu 2003: 131-3). According to
Horimatsu, Chiba was profoundly impressed by Bergson’s works, Matiére et Mémoireand L’évolution Créatrice, both of which he read in the English versions (Horimatsu
2003: 131). Although Horimatsu provides a detailed biography of Chiba from theperspective of prosopography, he does not adequately account for the construction of
Chiba’s thinking. Kikuchi (1994), on the other hand, analyzes how Shinto and Bergson
influenced Chiba. According to the research, Chiba believes in the commonalities
between the Shinto perspective of continuous life and Bergsonian notion of duration(Kikuchi 1994: 149-51). Kikuchi explains Chiba’s thinking from the perspective ofHirata’s Shinto and Bergsonian influences; however, his analysis regarding thephilosophy of life is, in our view, insufficient.
Although we do not deny the importance of Shinto for Chiba’s thinking, we focus
instead on the Western philosophy of life in order to more precisely examine thefoundations of his life-centered thoughts. In the following chapters, we will consider
several Western thinkers, such as Emerson, Dewey, Bergson, and Nietzsche. In addition
to these scholars, we will touch on Deleuze, a contemporary philosopher who inherited
the Bergsonian and Nietzschean philosophies of life. For Chiba’s thinking can be
explained more clearly, including all its complexities, by being compared to the
Deleuzian concepts of virtuality and actuality. As discussed below, the predicament of
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Chiba’s thinking can be attributed to the fact that he prioritizes functional ability over vital
potentiality: that is to say, functionalism over vitalism1.
1. Life and Problem Solving
In this chapter, we describe the basic features of creative education, which is
proposed in Chiba’s early works, Theory and Practice of Creative Education (1919) and
Creative Education (1921). Its core concepts are “creation” (sōzō) and “origination”(dokusō). According to Chiba, these are vital activities: an organism feels frustrated with
its environment, so strives to produce new circumstances, and finally achieves
satisfaction (Chiba 1919: 3-8). In other words, creation and origination are problemsolving activities inherent to life itself. The starting point of the process is the organism’s
dissatisfaction; the end point is its satisfaction; the drive is the impulse to fulfill its needs.
Chiba considers learning to be principally concerned with problem solving and tried
to construct teaching plans based on this leaning model, referring to progressive
educationists such as Dewey 2 . He illustrates the learning procedure as follows: (1)receiving materials, (2) finding problems, (3) formulating problems, (4) solving problems,and (5) expressing solutions (Chiba 1921a: 433-8). As intelligent organisms, humanbeings follow these steps: first, they receive materials with their sense organs; they thenfind, formulate, and solve problems intelligently by themselves; and finally, they express
their solutions with motor organs. Of all these stages, Chiba emphasizes the significanceof “finding problems” and “formulating problems,” particularly for creative education3.
Chiba regards problem solving as an inherent activity of life. The act of living
involves striving to improve one’s situation and seeking satisfaction in order to growcontinually. The demand to “create new circumstances for self-development” causes
children to find and solve problems by themselves (Chiba 1919: 177). In this sense,“problems” are sort of “means” for making the present situation better for life (Chiba
1919: 46). The problem-solving process based on intrinsic demands is not controlled bya purposeful rationality imposed from the outside. It has, on the contrary, an innate
1Hara (1992) discusses the “functionalism” observed in the New Education thoughts. We believe that suchfunctionalism is comparable to “pragmatism’ in Chiba’s vocabulary. cf. Hara (1992: 8).
2
Chiba was so familiar with Dewey’s thinking that he translated his Reconstruction in philosophy (1921) into
Japanese. Hayakawa (2010) conducted a detailed comparison of Dewey’s problem-solving learning theory andChiba’s.
3“What is lacking in the three sects [Herbart’s, Lay’s, and McMarry’s educational theories]? That is the following
two stages: finding problems and formulating problems. These are the cardinal points of creative education. The
essence of learning also consists in these phases. Study-based education should center on these steps. This claim is
my original thought exactly” (Chiba 1921a: 120, text in square brackets is mine).
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purposeful rationality that aims at self-development.
These schemas of learning are associated with three basic characteristics of Chiba’s
educational thinking. First, he insists on the unity of knowing and doing (chikō gōitsu) in
Yangmingism, which he identifies with “pragmatism” in that both theories encouraged“thinking well and acting well” (Chiba 1919: 25-6). He consistently emphasized theinseparability of knowledge and practice since his first publication, A Study of Test
Reform Based on the Unity of Knowing and Doing (1918). According to this perspective,
thinking and acting are the essential components of problem solving. He claims that bothelements should contribute to achieving goals in a complementary way, and criticizes
thought without action or action without thought. Second, Chiba demands the efficiencyof knowing and doing from children. For problem-solving intervention in surroundings
requires subtle skills to handle the factors of complex circumstances. Therefore, learning
as problem solving should be assessed in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness ofchildren’s activities (Chiba 1919: 312). Third, Chiba underlines the utility of problem
solving, because it is done for life itself (Chiba 1919: 312-45, 557-61, 572-5). Problem
solving accompanied by satisfaction results in further self-development of life, so there
is intrinsic utility for life in the process.
Arguing for the unity of knowing and doing, efficiency, and utility, Chiba opposes
the idea that teachers should impose problems on students from outside. Chiba believes
that the cornerstone of creative education is the spontaneity of life, which thinks and acts
to develop itself. The three characteristics are distinguished from the general unity,
efficiency, and utility demanded from society. In this respect, however, Chiba’s thinking
is ambiguous. He regards individual lives as modes of national life; the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic viewpoints mentioned above thus becomes blurred.
Individual lives are the differentiated complex forms of national life. Therefore,
it means that, in the development of life itself, each life ultimately serves thenational life. What is effective, efficient, and useful for life is good for life; it isnational utility. It is good to bring what is of utility for the Emperor as the greatlife of the nation in an immanent and ordered manner. (Chiba 1919: 558)
Chiba asserts that the individual life is inseparable from the national life and that what isgood for life is not only good for the individual, but also for the whole nation.
In summary, Chiba’s creative education is grounded in his life-centered theory,
which enables him to describe learning activities as dynamic processes. On the one hand,
he finds purposeful rationality in the process aiming at development and derives several
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viewpoints for assessment from intrinsic rationality: unity of knowing and doing,
efficiency, and utility. On the other hand, he blurs the boundary between intrinsic
rationality and extrinsic rationality, which he tries to distinguish by identifying personal
lives within the larger flow of national life.
2. Impulse of Life
2.1. Self-affirmation and Solidarity
Building on the schema of problem-solving learning theory mentioned above, Chiba
began to assert his all-impulses-fully-satisfied theory (issai syōdō mina manzoku ron) in
the early 1920s. The theory was presented at a series of monumental lectures, entitled The
Eight Greatest Pedagogical Opinions, presented in 1921, but it appeared so sensationalthat its substance has not yet been analyzed in detail. In this chapter, we investigate his
insistence on encouraging all impulses in every life.
In the previous chapter, we saw that the motivation to solve problems wasconsidered to originate from the needs of life. Based on this idea, Chiba starts to regard
impulse as a fundamental need of life and then claims that all impulses should be fully
satisfied. He believes that each impulse, a spontaneous force issuing from life, is good forlife (Chiba 1921a: 1). An impulse does not seek to maintain the present form of life as itis, but to sustain life through “eternal change” (Chiba 1921a: 14). According to Chiba,
instinct is a congenital mold and desire is an acquired one, while impulse is “a power
penetrating through forms.” Impulse breaks through the fixed modes of life, whilst also
shaping individual modes4. It is a fluid force, never confined to certain forms; it is life
itself, which is always in a state of becoming. Individuals feel the flux of life immanently,
and they have to act in order to satisfy their impulses. Chiba claims that students should
be engaged in “taking care” of their own impulses and in “thorough pursuit” of theirsatisfaction (Chiba 1921a: 8) 5 . That is not to say students should blindly aim at
satisfaction, but rather think deliberately and act carefully toward one’s goal (Chiba
1921a: 71). In other words, this refers to the act of sticking to one’s own problems andstriving to solve them committedly.
4

The impulse-satisfaction theory is inspired by the instinct-satisfaction theory (honnō manzoku ron) of Chogyu
Takayama, a famous Nietzschean of the time, accused by Chiba of not discriminating impulse from instinct (Chiba
1976: 180). Chiba also distinguishes impulse from desire (Chiba 1976:181-2).
5
At this point, Chiba refers to Emerson’s work, Self Reliance, in which he says, “Trust thyself” (Chiba 1919: 310;
Chiba 1921a: 68).
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If impulse can be regarded as an affirmation of life that promotes its duration(conatus), then respecting impulse is to reflexively re-affirm the innate affirmation. We
can think of this self-affirmative attitude as “creativism” (Chiba 1919: 9). In the field ofcreative education, Chiba emphasizes the self-affirmative attitude of individuals facing
up to any obstacles and conflicts. They take care of innate impulses and expect opposing
impulses to unite, believing that every impulse is originally intended to affirm life. The
concept of “origination” (dokusō) implicates an attitude that refers to the fundamental
tendency of life. The originality stems from the original impulses of life (Chiba 1976:
179).
Chiba insists that all impulses should be fully satisfied. Although Chiba believes thatevery impulse is somewhat valuable to life, he does not claim that individual impulses
should be satisfied momentarily and independently. For the satisfaction of a single
impulse without resistance is merely an animal life, such as swilling water because one
feels thirsty (Chiba 1921b: 111-2). On the contrary, satisfaction acquires values beyond
nature when all conflicting impulses are satisfied without sacrificing any individual
impulse (Chiba 1921b: 111-5). According to Chiba, “all impulses fully satisfied” does not
only mean that each impulse should be satisfied, but also that all impulses should becompletely satisfied in “solidarity” with each other6.
Chiba maintains that ordinary views of education and morals are biased in favor ofcertain impulses and tend to suppress the rest. For instance, educational directions filter
children’s impulses, promoting some and stifling others (Chiba 1921b: 122). Nonetheless,the ideals of teachers in fact derive from their impulses, and so there is no reason to givepriority unilaterally to their impulses over those of children in the name of an “ideal”(Chiba 1976: 192-3). In existing moral codes, there is also supposed to be a self-evident
priority of reason over emotion, or “a sense of duty” (giri) over “human empathy” (ninjō);
however, Chiba considers both to be manifestations of impulses to be satisfied, criticizing
conventional morals as fixing unjust dualism (Chiba 1921b: 154; Chiba 1976: 200-3). As
it were, he attempts to dismantle commonly accepted hierarchical moral instances bybreaking them down into the original impulses from which they derived. The allimpulses-fully-satisfied theory assumes that everything is impulse, but it does not followthat only disorder remains. He describes a plural world where all impulses exist as equals,
engaging in mutual agony and solidarity.

6

Chiba points out two meanings of the word “all” (issai) as follows: “(1) All means every single impulse” (Chiba
1921b: 137); and “(2) All means the wholeness of things in mutual solidarity” (Chiba 1921b: 142).
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Although there seems to be a dualism opposing good against evil, impulses areplural. They should be regarded as plural conflicts. Conflict does notnecessarily mean that one beats another. It consists in fighting each other. If one
is beaten immediately, no conflict exists. The genuine conflict occurs whenimpulses aggressively compete against one another. If impulses compete, it isbecause each one desires to grow. If impulse were not worth claiming, there
would be no battle from the outset. Battle does not automatically mean selecting
one and discarding the others. Plural conflicts lead to plural satisfactions. (Chiba
1921b: 158, italics in original)
From this perspective, a teacher’s impulse does not command a child’s impulse fromoutside, and the impulses of reason do not suppress those of emotion from inside. All ofthem are resolved into impulses in agony and solidarity. The self-denial of impulse by
impulse is not any more hidden under the guise of dualism. Impulse simply affirms itself
and fights to assert itself. Chiba believes that while competing against one another,
impulses seek ways of satisfying each other together. If one impulse represses another, it
has a feeling of “guilt,” with its satisfaction remaining insufficient7. Chiba seems to insist
on the transformation from the ethics of self-denial (asceticism) to the ethics of selfaffirmation (creativism), following the Nietzschean idea of the “guilty conscience”8.
As an educational form of solidarity, to replace command and direction, Chibasuggests “consultation” (sōdan). Consultation is not so much an act of persuasion as oneof “opening up to one another” and “embracing the other’s life in our own life” (Chiba
1921a: 142-3). He states that the fundamental mode of consultation is an internal dialogue,
in which present impulses interact with the whole past ones. Citing the Bergson’s
discussion in Matière et Mémoire, he claims that the association between present
impulses and past ones (memories) is necessary for the wholeness of self (Chiba 1921a:
142-7). Chiba’s concept of association not only refers to the mental mechanism, the socalled “association of ideas” in the sense of associationism, but also implicates thesolidarity of different impulses. He regards past memory, which is a latent impulse, as apartner of inner consultation, anthropomorphizing it as “an associate filled with love and7“If a great self subdues a small self, it will necessarily feel guilty. If the latter conquers the former, the small self
will also inevitably have a guilty conscience. When both of them grow together, there would be a sense of solidarity
and authentic morals” (Chiba 1921b: 158-9).
8Chiba was familiar with Nietzsche’s thoughts through Chogyu Takayama. Chiba referred to Nietzsche in his
discussion (Chiba 1921a: 68). Probably inspired by Nietzsche, who confronted Greek thinking with Christian
asceticism, he attributed the impulse-centered theory to Shinto, not to Buddhism or Confucianism, and he pointed
out that the affirmation of impulse is a common feature of both Japanese and ancient Greek (Chiba 1976: 175-6).
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wisdom” (Chiba 1921a: 146). From his perspective, the familiar association between
present consciousness and past memory is an ideal form of solidarity.
The solidarity of impulses is sought among people as well as in an individual mind.
Chiba states, “[s]ocial solidarity is nothing less than impulse solidarity” (Chiba 1921b:
152). In this case, “consultation” is interpreted as being with another person in a literal
sense. He asserts that when children consult with a teacher, the latter also must be “anassociate filled with love and wisdom” (Chiba 1921a: 147). A teacher, however, only
gives advice to the children so that they can consult themselves in order to find a solution
by themselves. The consultation in this sense is the basic relationship in creativeeducation, rather than directions given to subordinate students (Chiba 1921a: 8). In short,based on the all-impulses-fully-satisfied theory, which insists on plural solidarity among
self-affirmative impulses, he proposes internal and external dialogues called“consultations” as the ideal form of educational relationship.
2.2. Difficulties with the All-impulses-fully-satisfied Theory
In this chapter, we examine the difficulties with the all-impulses-fully-satisfied
theory. Chiba claims that we should return to the origin of impulses and restart from theirfoundation: self-affirmative life. He trusts in the tendency of life. He is, so to speak,
optimistic about the possibility for satisfaction. Is it unreasonable, however, to hope that
all needs can be fully met?
As a workable framework to guarantee the reconciliation of conflicting impulses,
Chiba maintained the problem-solving learning model after having developed the allimpulses-fully-satisfied theory in the 1920s. In addition to the problem-solving process
mentioned above, he adds the five stages of emotional process: (1) frustration, (2) effort,(3) care for oneself, (4) thorough pursuit, and (5) gratification (Chiba 1921a: 67-70).
Actual satisfaction is eventually dependent on the creative solution. In other sections, henotes that creative activity shows “contingency” (Chiba 1921a: 48-9). Considering thesepoints together, we can suppose that impulse satisfaction is caused by a creative solution
which occurs contingently, so that the successful satisfaction also remains contingent.
Nevertheless, Chiba often suggests that all impulses can be necessarily satisfied. We
explain what theoretical schemas enabled him to think of uncertainty as necessity9.
There are three controversial points in Chiba’s impulse theory. First, self-trust based
9“It is not easy to satisfy all that are associated with each other, but it is not impossible. Its difficulty is the same asthat of doing good deeds or that of exhibiting originality. However difficult it is, we can certainly do that, as long as
we hope. That is because life does not hope for impossible things” (Chiba 1921b: 143).
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on spontaneity of impulse is at risk of transforming into blind self-conceit. Chiba
encourages individuals to thoroughly pursue the satisfaction of their impulses. He claims
that they should follow the problem-solving process as “an associate filled with love andwisdom,” even though they do not know exactly what consequences will result from thisprocess. If we trusted in the course without analysis of its conditions and results, wewould lapse into a blind belief or self-conceit. In this sense, I would merely beunquestionably affirming all my choices, rather than a sensible companion for
consultation. When the circle of self-reference as self-affirmation is closed, self-relianceis liable to convert into self-conceit10.
Second, Chiba tends to assume the pre-established harmony among impulses. His
premise is that life maintains its integrity through differentiation (Chiba 1919: 556).
According to this standpoint, life is a comprehensive process that unifies different
components, so that, in principle, no irreconcilable contradiction can exist within it. On
the one hand, there is no contradiction in social life, which he classified into six fields(health, economy, politics, leisure, academics, and religion), because all the spheres work
as “functions” to sustain the whole social life11. On the other hand, he also postulated the
intrinsic integrity of an individual life, interpreting “individuality” as “indivisibility” ofthe whole ego (Chiba 1921b: 26; Chiba 1976: 194). He often ensures the success ofachieving satisfaction in advance: any possible contradiction is considered reconcilable
because of the integrity in social life as well as in personal life.
Third, the arbitrary demarcation of life’s totality can be observed in Chiba’s theory.
He claims that all impulses should be fully satisfied; however, what does he mean by “all”
with regard to life, which is always changing? If life is enduring changes, as he said,
determining life’s totality must be impossible at any given moment. Chiba strives toaffirm the whole life, but such an attempt may erase what is left of the alleged “all.” Whenevery impulse is allegedly recognized, in principle, no impulse can be left behind; when
everyone is considered to be content, in theory, no one else can be discontent. When
students are filled with delight at the moment of resolution in the climax of the dramatizedprocess, which is supposed to proceed from “frustration” to “gratification,” discontent
voices should be drowned out by the enthusiastic applause of the class. Impulses left
behind, which are supposed to be resolved, are consigned to being lost in oblivion.
Given the essence of the all-impulses-fully-satisfied theory, which is firmly against
10This risk is illustrated by Chiba’s argument itself; he was proud of his thoughts as unique to Japan, which heconsidered to be lacking in Western thoughts (Chiba 1919: 571).
11“These fields originally derive from functions for the perpetual motion of nation state. Because all the functions
exist for the perpetual motion, they cannot be contradictory to each other” (Chiba 1919: 334).
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the oppression of impulses, such unexpected outcomes must be contrary to Chiba’s
original intentions. In fact, the concept of plural solidarity across conflicting impulses ismeant to revitalize the excluded impulses. Nevertheless, we have to admit that Chiba’s
life-centered thought is at risk of contravening its spirit. The key concepts of his
philosophy of life need to be reviewed in order to achieve his original objectives.
2.3. Contemporary Philosophy of LifeIn this chapter, we limit ourselves to offering some suggestions for such a task. We
make a comparison with Deleuze, who has developed a unique philosophy of life,
inheriting Nietzsche and Bergson’s legacy in a different way from that of Chiba. Indeed,
it may be a little simplistic to interpret Deleuze, who used the concepts of “body without
organs” and “death drive,” as a philosopher of life, but the category is helpful toemphasize the genealogical link between Nietzsche/Bergson and Deleuze.
Deleuze (1983) focuses on the value transformation from negative to affirmativewith reference to the Nietzschean concept will of power (volonté de puissance / Wille zur
Machat). It is the transformation from a human, who is full of ressentiment and guilty
conscience, to an overman; the former is transcendentally conditioned by negative willof power, and the latter by the affirmative. Deleuze cites several phrases from Thus Spoke
Zarathustra as follows.
Play: “A throw you made had failed. But what of that, you dice throwers! You
have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock.” Dance:“Even the worst thing has good dancing legs: so learn you higher men, how tostand on your own proper legs.” Laughter: “I have canonised laughter; you
Higher Men, learn to laugh!” (Deleuze 1983=1986: 196=218, emphasis
original, passages quoted by Deleuze are from Thus Spoke Zarathustra IV “Of
the Higher Man”)
Learning to affirm is the essence of Zarathustra’s teaching. Learning to play, dance, andlaugh is necessary in order to metamorphose from a (higher) man into an overman.
According to Deleuze’s interpretation, it is to affirm not just contingency but also its
necessity (play), becoming and its being (dance), and life and its suffering (laugher)(Deleuze 1983: 196).
For Deleuze, the Nietzschean theory of eternal recurrence is critical for valuetransformation. He interprets eternal recurrence as the affirmation of affirmation, theThe 2nd Research Promotion Award Article (2016)

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essence of which is the enjoyment of difference itself. Yet, he criticizes dialectic logic as
the negation of negation, which misinterprets difference as opposition to be overcome.
Deleuze insists that the negative logic of dialectic is insufficient for transformation as longas negative will rules human histories, and that the affirmative logic of eternal recurrence
is indispensable for transformation. In addition, he suggests that the conversion also needs
the genealogy of morals to analyze the human condition. It follows that we needdynamics to analyze where life came, where it will go, and how its forces have beenorganized, instead of a naive trust in life’s potentiality.
Furthermore, Deleuze (1966) discusses Bergson’s thoughts, focusing on the
distinction between virtual and actual. By distinguishing two dimensions, Deleuze
explains the principle of creative evolution. He says, “[e]volution takes place from thevirtual to actuals. Evolution is actualization, actualization is creation” (Deleuze
1966=1988: 101=98). According to his interpretation, creative evolution is anactualization from virtuality to actuality. The former dimension cannot be reduced to thelatter level. The visible differences of organisms at the present time are not the whole;rather, they are the differentiated forms of life.
According to Bergson, the word “Whole” has a sense, but only on the condition
that it does not designate anything actual. He constantly recalls that: Whole is
not given. This means, not that the ideal of the whole is devoid of sense, but thatit designates a virtuality, actual parts do not allow themselves to be totalized.
(Deleuze 1966=1988: 95=131-2, emphasis original)
Deleuze insists that the whole is not given in actuality. The actual spheres are not the
totality of being; life is also open to the virtual dimension.
In addition to this distinction, there is another difference between possible and real.
According to Deleuze, the transition from the possible to the real, which is called
realization, is based on “resemblance” and “limitation.” Reality resembles the possibility
and realization is performed by limiting various possibilities to certain possibilities. The
transition from possibility to reality, however, cannot explain the emergence ofdifferences nor their creativity. The actualization, on the other hand, is based on“difference” and “divergence.” There is a “difference” between virtual and actual, and“divergence” among the pathways from virtuality to actuality (Deleuze 1966: 99-101)12.
Deleuze claims that the creative evolution of life is only understood in terms of
12

Bergson criticized the concepts of possible and real in “Le possible et le réel” (in La Pensée et le Mouvant).

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actualization, not realization.
Virtuality is considered to be the transcendental condition (élément généalogique)from which actual differences emerge. Deleuze derives the theory of virtuality andactuality from the whole philosophy of Bergson, referring to not only L’évolution
Créatrice but also Matière et Mémoire and so on. In a word, he opens up a new horizon
for describing life’s creativity, using Bergsonian concepts in a different way from that of
Chiba.
3. Potentiality of LifeIn this chapter, we return to Chiba’s argument and review his ideas regarding life’s
potentiality with reference to the concepts of Bergson and Deleuze13. Chiba prizes the
dynamic expression of potentiality. Needless to say, no one would disrespect the lively
activities of children, but positive evaluations are often too superficial. What is important
to note here is the depth of the vitality, as detailed below.
Chiba insists on “the unity of knowing and doing.” This implies that thinking andacting should work together to achieve an objective. According to his explanation, whenan action is interrupted by an obstacle, thoughts and memories are activated to overcome
the problematic situation, as if to bypass the dead end (Chiba 1919: 32) We live under thedivergence of thought and action. As a result, two unbalanced attitudes arise from thisseparation: some people think so hard they cannot make a decision; others are so
impetuous they do not deliberate (Chiba 1921b: 286). Opposed to such a dichotomy,
Chiba calls for the seamless integration of thinking and doing. He suggests that “thinking
well and acting well” enables us to live an active life in the truest sense (Chiba 1919: 256).
This viewpoint allows us to take into account both the mind and body of students,
so that teachers can understand the dynamism of the learning process and adjust theirteaching plans accordingly. Nonetheless, this perspective requires utility and efficiency
in thoughts and actions. As long as knowledge and memory are evoked for practicalsolutions, they are destined for efficient actions. Chiba condemns the inefficiency andstagnation of activity: “[i]n a word, the evil is waste or paralysis of ego, not anything else.
Because ‘ego’ is the same as ‘national ego,’ the waste or paralysis of ego inflicts a large
loss for national development” (Chiba 1921b: 274). He deplores the waste or paralysis of13

As regards the concept of potentiality, see Agamben (1999). He discusses Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis andenergeia and Deleuze’s ideas noted above.
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life, which are caused by either hesitant or hasty actions. Comparing life to the flow ofwater, he laments its course being deflected from the mainstream and blocked by
obstacles. He believes that the current should be quickly redirected, so to speak, into theoriginal stream through a bypass of thinking, in order to maintain its momentum.
Based on this perspective, the teaching plan is prone to a straight-line pathway, even
if it allows for some meandering. The teaching schema illustrated by Chiba provides anexample of this. The learning process was represented by a single line: from “receiving
materials” to “finding problems” to “formulating problems” to “solving problems” andfinally to “expressing solutions” (Chiba 1921b: 433-8). It thus appears to be a steady flow.
Furthermore, his vision of school facilities corresponds to the schema. He classifies
classrooms according to their uses and arranges them concentrically on the model of ahuman body (Chiba 1921b: 471). The arrangement of the school represents the neuralcircuit from the sense organs via the central nervous system to the motor organs;classrooms designed for receiving materials and expressing solutions correspond tosensory and locomotor apparatus respectively.
These ideas are related to the concept of potentiality. Chiba refers to Dewey’s
passage on potentiality of children14. Influenced by Dewey, Chiba finds potentiality in theimmaturity of children. In his opinion, “the mission of education is to add progressive
potentiality to conservative potentiality, and to actualize it. That is why education is called
the arts to promote growth and to encourage development” (Chiba 1921b: 343). He
distinguishes the potential level from the actual level, and considers the actualization frompotentiality to actuality to be the mission of education. He makes the distinction, but hetends to reduce potentiality to actuality: “[i]f adults are the kinetic energy of a nation, thenchildren must be its potential energy. Education in its essence is to produce the potential
energy of the nation” (Chiba 1921b: 574-5). He regards the potentiality of children,
expected to work as members of the nation, to be “potential energy” that can be converted
into “kinetic energy.” He also stated the following:
The essence of education for perpetual motion is to increase potential energy. It
is to provide enormous coal fuel for perpetual motion. Coals that burn well andfresh represent children growing and developing well who find, formulate, andsolve problems in themselves in a miniature perpetual motion. Each item of
14“The prefix ‘im’ of the word immaturity does not mean a mere void or lack, but something positive, capacity andpotentiality. Potentiality is potency. In fact, immaturity is not an absence of power, but the possibility of growth, theforce positively present and the ability to develop” (Chiba 1919: 343). Chiba’s translation is not word-for-word. See
Dewey (1997: 41-2).
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S. KINOSHITA

knowledge needs sufficient efficiency to convert into every action. The
knowledge merely stored in memories is as inefficient as incomplete
combustion. For this reason, we need creative education to encourage selfsustaining development with the unity of knowing and doing. (Chiba 1921b:
576-7)The potentiality of life is interpreted as potential energy for a machine in perpetual motion,
narrowly represented by coal fuel and heat engine, which are the symbols of modern
industrialization. Potential knowledge and memories are mobilized and forced to convert
into actual motions as efficiently as possible.
By contrast, Bergson claims that the potentiality of memory cannot be reduced tothe actuality of present actions. According to his explanations in Matière et Mémoire,memory is not physically stored in the brain; it simply exists. Memory is evoked as far as
it is “useful” for the present needs of agent, while there subsists “inutile” memory freefrom the current necessity (Bergson 1959: 282-3)15. According to his memory model, inthe shape of inverted cone, the whole memory exists with virtual multiplicity to varying
degrees of its contraction: on one plane, individual memories are scattered while keeping
their particularities; on the other plane, similar memories are contracted to the extent ofhigh generality (Bergson 1959: 302). It is here that Bergson finds the vertical depth of
spirit, which cannot be reduced to the horizontal extension of body.
Chiba was evidently aware of this argument. With clear reference to Bergson’s
theory, he mentions the latent existence of memory (Chiba 1976: 190-1). Besides,
Bergson does not ignore the necessity of useful actions. He instead supposes that the
inextricable linkage of memory and action is the essence of “good sense” and “practicalsense” of practitioner (Bergson 1959: 293-4). In this sense, Chiba’s theory, with emphasison the unity of knowing and doing, corresponds to Bergson’s theory; however, they
proceeded in different directions. Chiba progresses to actuality to seek practical actions,while Bergson moves on to virtuality to explore pure duration and pure memory.
According to the latter, the mission of philosophy is the pursuit of “depth”; it brings us“joy” different from “pleasure” of science16. Chiba does not simply neglect the profound
15

Deleuze explains Bergson’s idea as follows: “[i]t [the present] is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being
but the active or the useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be.
Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word” (Deleuze 1966=1988: 49-50=55, emphasis
original, text in square brackets is mine).
16“With its applications which aim only at the convenience of existence, science gives us the promise of well-being,
or at most, of pleasure. But philosophy could already give us joy” (Bergson 1959=2007: 1365=106, italics added).
“It [art] enriches our present, but it scarcely enables us to go beyond it. Through philosophy we can accustom
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potentiality of life, but rather he returns too quickly from the depth to the surface.
We should re-examine the relation between the virtuality and actuality in order toexplore the profoundness and dynamics of life. Life is not confined to the short-circuit
linkage between an organism and its environment. Creative actualization occurs from thevirtual sphere of potentiality. If we neglected them, the lively activities of children would
be narrowly interpreted: on the one hand, child-centered discourses would focus onsuperficial aspects such as their shining smiles or cheerful voices; on the other hand,
meritocratic discourses would emphasize practical aspects such as their creativecompetencies contributing to national and global economy. These risks are implicitly
included in Chiba’s arguments. Although he respects the potentiality of life more thananyone, he sometimes tends to promote the effective exploitation of life, rather than the
dynamic duration of life itself.
Conclusion
The early educational thoughts of Chiba are based on a unique philosophy of life.
Perceiving impulse as the driving force, he claims that life is a process of problem solving
to reach satisfaction. He describes the dynamism of problem-solving learning withemphasis on the unity between knowing and doing. This functionalistic theory, however,allows him to reduce potentiality to superficial efficiency by ignoring the virtuality of life.
Chiba employs the problem-solving learning model, which had been developed in
American progressive education in particular, as the framework of his educational
thinking, through the lens of Yangmingism’s concept of the unity between knowing anddoing. In addition, he establishes his life-centered thoughts on the basis of the Bergsonian
and Nietzschean philosophy of life, through the Shinto notion of life. The former
functionalistic perspective tends to focus on the horizontal interaction between organisms
and circumstances, while the latter perception of the philosophy of life is inclined toemphasize the vertical dimension, such as pure memory and eternal recurrence. In the
middle of this historical carrefour, Chiba is destined to integrate these heterogeneous
dimensions: horizontal–vertical, functionalism–vitalism, and West–East.
This paper proposes potentiality as a key concept for reviewing life-oriented
educational theories, including Chiba’s thinking. We discuss Deleuze’s concept ofvirtuality and actuality, but our attempt remains insufficient. Further study of these
ourselves never to isolate the present from the past which it pulls along with it. Thanks to philosophy, all things
acquire depth” (Bergson 1959=2007: 1391=131, italics added, text in square brackets is mine).
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S. KINOSHITA

concepts should be conducted to include the primary concepts affecting modern
education, namely perfectability and educability.

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References
Agamben, G. (1999) Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, edited and translated
by Heller-Roazen, D., Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bergson, H. (1959) Œuvres, Paris: PUF.
――Matière et Mémoire――L’évolution Créatrice――La Pensée et le Mouvant (= 2007 The Creative Mind: An Introduction to
Metaphysics, translated by Andison, M.L., New York: Dover
Publications).
Chiba, M. (1918) Chikō Gōitsu Kōsa Kakushin ni kansuru Kenkyu (A Study of Test
Reform Based on the Unity of Knowing and Doing), Tokyo: Megroshoten.
Chiba, M. (1919) Sōzō Kyōiku no Riron oyobi Jissai (Theory and Practice of Creative
Education), Tokyo: Dōbunkan.
Chiba, M. (1921a) Sōzō Kyōiku: Jiga Hyōgen no Gakushu (Creative Education:
Learning of Self-expression), Tokyo: Dōbunkan.
Chiba, M. (1921b) Issai Syōdō Mina Manzoku (All Impulses Fully Satisfied), Tokyo:
Dōbunkan.
Chiba, M. (1926) Mondai no Kyōiku Shinrigaku teki Kōsatsu (A Study on Problem in
Terms of Educational Psychology), Tokyo: Tōyōtosho.
Chiba, M. (1976) “Issai Syōdō Mina Manzoku Ron” (All Impulses Fully Satisfied
Theory), in Hachidai Kyōiku Shuchō (The Eight Greatest Pedagogical
Opinions), edited by Obara, K. et al., Tokyo: Tamagawadaigakushuppanbu, pp.
167–216.
Deleuze, G. (1966) Le Bergsonisme, Paris: PUF (= 1988 Bergsonism, translated by
Tomlinson, H. and Habberiam, B., New York: Zone Books).
Deleuze, G. (1983) [1962] Nietzsche et la Philosophie, 6th ed., Paris: PUF (= 1986
Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Tomlinson, H., London and New York:
Continuum).
Dewey, J. (1997) Democracy and Education, New York: The Free Press.
Hara, S. (1992) “Kindai ni okeru Kyōiku Kanōsei Gainen no Tenkai o Tou: Rokku,
Kondiyakku kara Herubaruto e no Keifu o Tadori nagara” (On the Conceptionof Educability in the Modern Era: A Genealogy from Locke and Condillac to
Herbart), Kindaikyōikufōramu, vol. 1, pp. 1–16.
Hayakawa, M. (2010) “Chiba Meikichi ni yoru Deyūi Shisō no Juyō to Henyō: Deyūi
Kyōiku Riron no Juyō kara Mita Taishō Jiyū Kyōiku Shisō no Ichi Sokumen”(Acceptance and Transformation of John Dewey's Philosophy by Meikichi
Chiba: A Study of Dewey's Philosophical Influence on Chiba's Theory ofCreative Education during the Era of Taisho Democracy),
Nihondeyūigakkaikiyō, vol. 51, pp. 23–33.

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Horimatsu, B. (2003) Nihon Kyōikushi Kenkyū (A Study on Japanese Educational
History), Tokyo: Iwasakigakujyutsushuppansha.
Kikuchi, K. (1994) “Chiba Meikichi no Issai Syōdō Mina Manzoku Ron o meguru
Kōsatsu: Shintō to Berukuson no Eikyō o Chūshin ni” (A Study of Meikichi
Chiba’s All-Impulses-Fully-Satisfied Theory: Focusing on the Influences of
Shinto and Bergson), Ningenkagakuronkyū, vol. 2, pp. 147–63.

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E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 2, 2017

Education and Politics in the Individualized Society:
Connecting by the Cultivation of Citizenship
Kayo FUJII
Yokohama National University
Abstract
In this paper, I will consider the citizenship education of the future in the Individualized Society, whilebearing in mind how politics has directed education. According to a proposal by the Science Councilof Japan, the new subject, “Publics,” is “citizenship education that fosters political literacy,” citizenshipeducation has taken its first steps in Japan. But, citizenship education sometimes promotes social
inclusion. Social inclusion tends to expand and strengthen homogeneity and commonality, thus
moving is different from the formation of a political community based on multiplicity and difference.
For that reason, I will talk about citizenship education as subjectification. According to Gert Biesta,
subjectification is not about maintaining the existing order, but about independence from the existingorder. Subjectification has a unique relationship to politics in citizenship education. In this sense,children are already political entities, faced with the numerous worries and struggles that stem fromexisting with numerous layers of citizenships, and there is no one way by which problems relating tocitizenship arise nor is there one way to solve them. This paper concludes that citizenship education isless of an education that seeks to form predetermined good citizens and more of an education that isheaded toward a democratic experience.
Keywords
citizenship education, democratic experience, subjectification, politics, public places

Introduction
Looking back at the history of Bildung (education, cultivation, refinement, andcharacter building), it can be said that it has had an educational and a political aspect(Biesta 2003). The educational aspect is the history of devising educational contents
needed for fostering good character and a good internal spirit. What emerged as a part of20

K. FUJII

that process were Kant’s ideas. Kant suggested a philosophy of Enlightenment fromimmaturity to maturity, a state where one can perceive one’s own will and make decisions
without being swayed by external factors. At the same time, he saw that education wasneeded to become such a person. The image of the mature person was “an answer to thequestion about the role of the subject in the emerging civil society” as well as an aspectof “political history” (Biesta 2003:62).
Kant was not the only one to envision a connection between education and politics.
For example, critical pedagogy is a field of study. Having incorporated the theories ofHabermas, critical pedagogy (that is, Kritische Erziehungswissenschaft) was conceivedof and practiced in the 1960s and 1970s in Germany, critically framing the social situationof that time. In the United States as well, critical pedagogues such as Apple and Giroux
inquired about social and educational issues from a political perspective, pointing out thatthat no knowledge is neutral. What this suggests is that the concept of education has
always already contained politics.
In this paper, I will consider the citizenship education of the future, while bearing in
mind how politics has directed education thus far.
1. The New Subject, “Publics”
According to a proposal by the Science Council of Japan, the new subject, “Publics,”
is “citizenship education that fosters political literacy” that encourages “thinking deeply
about controversial issues” and “understanding what the points at issue are,” centering on
political literacy.1 Active proposals have been made about what to learn and how—for
example, a shift from knowledge acquisition to active learning, learning about therelationship between citizens and the state (“how citizens support the state and control
the state’s authority”)—so it can be said that citizenship education, which teaches students
how to live as citizens, has taken its first steps in Japan.
An especially interesting part of the proposal is the “quality of publicness” thatcitizenship education pursues. Simply put, the “quality of publicness,” which consists ofthe five areas of multicultural coexistence, sexual diversity and gender equality, Japan in
East Asia, constitutionalism and democratic government, and elementary philosophy andethics, can be explained as follows. Among other things, publicness is a state thatembraces the diversity of people and religions; it is thinking from “a broad perspective of1

Science Council of Japan (Psychology and Pedagogy Committees, Subcommittee for Thinking about HighSchool Civics Education from the Standpoint of Citizenship Education), Proposal: Citizen at Age 18: High-School
Civics Reform for Citizenship Cultivation, May 2016.

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cultivating ‘global citizens’” and not just “cultivating the nation”; it is “further opening
up our national consciousness (understanding of domestic multiculturalism and diversity)”by framing Japan as part of the “East Asia region” and “relativizing the self with theperspective of the other”; it is the availability of diverse pathways of political participationon the foundation of constitutionalism and the existence of a multilayered “public” spaceconsisting of “municipalities, prefectures, and nation”; it is “‘public’ space whose
structure is neither singular nor simple” because “one man or woman simultaneously
belongs to multiple spaces”; and it is citizen cultivation in the form of ethical subject
formation.
In other words, publicness in citizenship education is highlighted from theperspectives of geography, equality, ethics, and politics, thus being framed as a complex
quality woven from multiple perspectives that embrace spatial multilayeredness and thediversity of human relations, political participation, and lifestyles. Hence, publicness
cannot be understood with close-mindedness or individual thinking.
2. Social Inclusion and Citizenship Education
As a matter of fact, citizenship education sometimes promotes social inclusion.
According to Biesta, because European active citizenship promotes active participationin the community and is an activity for practicing “good citizenship,” the image conjured
up is one of citizens who do what are considered “good” deeds without reflecting on whatis “good” and from what perspective (Biesta 2011).
If it is decided from the outset what is “good,” then the result will be the formationof a largely steady and stable community premised on existing values. According to
Lingis, such a community is a place where conversations are maintained as part of a given
context and a rational community, in which individual voices are exchanged as
representative of roles within that community. For example, a school becomes a place
where teachers and students speak “as a representative of the common rational discourse”(Lingis 1994:112). A different kind of community is one where nothing is shared. Such a
community does not emerge from the importance of conversational contents, but from asituation in which one must say something.2
2

Lingis’s theory on community categorizes based on differences in communication quality. “There are then two
entries into communication—the one by which one depersonalizes one’s visions and insights, formulates them inthe terms of the common rational discourse, and speaks as a representative, a spokesperson, equivalent andinterchangeable with others, of what has to be said. The other entry into communication is that in which you find
it is you, you saying something, that is essential” (Lingis 1994:116).

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As a matter of course, a community of active citizenship is not one where nothingis shared. Active participation in a community based on specific values is premised not
only on simply being citizens, but on the common goal of being “good citizens.”
Participation in such a community gives rise to an inside and an outside of the community
and tends to expand and strengthen homogeneity and commonality, thus moving in a
direction different from the formation of a political community based on multiplicity anddifference.
Moreover, how we understand political literacy becomes important when we talkabout citizenship education. If we were to understand political literacy as something
individual, that is, specific knowledge or skills to be acquired by individuals, then thiswould mean that democracy is sustained and created by the skills of individuals.
Citizenship education teaches students how to live with others, so is individual skill
acquisition enough?
3. Citizenship Education as Subjectification
The aforementioned Biesta observed that education, while partially overlapping,fulfills the three different functions of qualification, socialization, and subjectification,
arguing that education is not simply the acquisition of skills by individuals.3 In the caseof citizenship education, qualification is about providing citizens with important
knowledge and skills. Socialization is about fitting individuals in “existing ways of doing
and being” (Biesta 2010:20) and is deeply connected with maintaining existing order. For
example, schools have pulled newcomers into the community through specific forms ofcultural transmission. Subjectification is not about maintaining the existing order, but
about “independence from such orders” (Biesta 2010:21). In this sense, subjectification
has a unique relationship to politics in citizenship education.
The concept of subjectification is a notion conceived of from the fact that students
can learn things that are unknown to the teacher. According to Rancière, the educational
relationship of the student learning what the teacher explains is one intelligence
subjecting another intelligence, and it is a relationship that advances “stultification”(Rancière 1991:13). This educational relationship is dependent on the division between
the teacher and the learner, so that “those excluded from the world of intelligencethemselves subscribe to the verdict of their exclusion” (Rancière 1991:16). As such, any
3This division is a theoretical division to clarify “the different functions of education and the different potential
purposes of education” (Biesta 2010:21). As such, the three educational functions are not independent, but exist ina multilayered relationship.

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education premised on a separation of learners and teachers by there being “an inferior
intelligence and a superior one” (Rancière 1991:7) must be criticized, allowing us toconceive of an education based on intelligence equality in which the manifestation of
intelligence is unequal, “but there is no hierarchy of intellectual capacity” (Rancière
1991:27). In other words, subjectification signifies liberation from hierarchical educationthat subjects the student’s intelligence to that of the teacher. Subjectifying education
reframes the student from being a “good citizen” to an “ignorant citizen” (Biesta 2011:97)
released from the intellectual hierarchy, thus building up a politics of intelligenceequality.4
Citizenship education as intelligence equality is not a process of continuously
acquiring the knowledge of the teacher. If socialization is future-oriented learning(preparation for entering society)—learning to become a citizen—then subjectification islearning that stems from the irregularity of experiences in the present—learning to be a
citizen.
Adults and children alike are born into diverse citizenships, being citizens of Earth,
East Asia, a prefecture, a city, a town, etc., and live life with multiple citizenships at thesame time. As such, children are already political entities, faced with the numerous
worries and struggles that stem from existing with numerous layers of citizenships, andthere is no one way by which problems relating to citizenship arise nor is there one way
to solve them. Citizenship education, which throws this diversity of life into relief, acts
as a bridge between being a citizen and becoming a citizen, repeatedly revealing life as a
citizen as the base of human life.
Furthermore, subjectification does not refer to Kant’s autonomous subject, which
has been central to conventional pedagogy. The reason for this is that, although the
Kantian subject very much is character-building oriented toward freedom, it “seems to
be unable to be open to the possibility that newcomers might radically alter our
understandings of what it means to be human ” (Biesta 2010:79-80), owing to how it
limits the meaning of being human. In other words, citizenship education as
subjectification is ever expanding educational horizons driven by an “interest in human
freedom” (Biesta 2010:75), even when education is carried out with a focus on
qualification and socialization.

4

In an interview, Rancière was asked whether democracy is neither a form of government nor a form of society,but something like an ideal beyond reach or a critical tool, something akin to a drop hammer for debates, to which
he replied that, “No, it’s not an ideal, because I always follow the principle of Jacotot that equality is apresupposition, not a goal to be attained” (Rancière 2011:78).

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4. An Education Theory without Teaching
Subjectification is the appearance of individuality that cannot be contained in theexisting order or, put differently, the appearance of unique individuals within a world of
multiplicity. This uniqueness stems from “interruptions” to regular continuous education
caused by human action, meaning that it cannot be defined as a result of education. In
this sense, the notion of subjectification is something that cannot be taught, an educational
notion that originates from process.
We already saw how the creation of a community is the same as the appearance of
uniqueness. A community with nothing shared is not formed as a result of education, but
comes into being when a rational community is interrupted (Biesta 2010:90). It appears
when continuous educational actions are interrupted, such as when those educational
actions are obstructed by noise or when one is not deprived of the chance to encounter
one’s own voice within those educational actions. Similarly, the appearance of acommunity with nothing shared is also something that cannot be planned in education.
In other words, the coupling of freedom and citizenship education suggests a notion of
sporadic education. It is education that is incidental to regular educational actions andsomething that might happen anywhere. If so, is the citizenship education of the futuresomething that forges ahead with socializing and qualifying education while always
latently containing subjectification, only to have it appear unexpectedly and sporadically?
5. Education and Politics in the Age of Individualization
Now, I would like to consider the place where subjectifying learning takes place.
Biesta says that subjectifying learning happens in “public places.” Public places refer toplaces where private voices shift to concerns greater than individual summation. They
are places where democracy is practiced.
According to Bauman, public places are nothing more than “a giant screen on which
private worries are projected” (Bauman 2000:39) that are beginning to disappear in our
modern age of individualization as the public spaces have become incapable offunctioning as places where private worries and public problems meet and enter dialogue.
In order to energize the hollowed-out public places, we need to stimulate citizenshipeducation in the form of citizenship cultivation, and in order to stimulate citizenshipeducation, we need to revive the public places. To achieve this, we must practice learning
based on intelligence equality as well as engage in debate in a broad sense, conversing,
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Education and Politics in the Individualized Society

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debating, and negotiating with children as ignorant citizens. The reason for this is that
democracy always contains the potential for innovation by heterogeneous voices and ismaintained by constantly devising pathways that connect the public with the problems
that arise from the lives of fluid individuals that can be framed as neither minorities nor
the majority, without doing away with them as individual issues.
Conclusion
Citizenship education is less of an education that seeks to form predetermined good
citizens and more of an education that is headed toward a better democratic experience.
Better democracy does not emerge from practice converging on a single order, but frompractice that redraws the borders of a new order directed toward freedom and equality.
Discourses at school always contain the potential for drawing new borders. At thesame time, they also have the potential to operate to qualify students through theacquisition of debating skills and to socialize them to enter debating groups. Citizenshipeducation that is directed toward freedom and equality will have to explore how tocontinue the discourse when no mediation is possible.

References
Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity. Polity.
Biesta, G.J.J. (2003) How General Can Bildung Be? Reflections on the Future of aModern Educational Ideal, in: Educating Humanity: Bildung in Postmodernity.
Blackwell.
Biesta, G.J.J. (2010) Good Education in an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics,
Democracy. Paradigm Publishers.
Biesta, G.J.J. (2011) Learning Democracy in School and Society: Education, Lifelong
Learning, and the Politics of Citizenship. Sense Publishers.
Lingis, A. (1994) The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. Indiana
University Press.
Rancière, J. (1991) The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual
Emancipation. Stanford University Press.
Rancière, J. (2011) Democracies against Democracy: An Interview with Erich Hazan,
in : Democracy in What State?. Columbia University Press.

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E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 2, 2017

What does it mean to be “doing phenomenology”?
Reasons for reflecting on personal experiences used as case studies
Rui OTSUKA
Aoyama Gakuin University
Abstract
From her time as a student to the present day, the author has had dealings with children through having
been a volunteer at children’s homes and elementary schools, and has researched case studies fromthe theoretical background of phenomenology. In addition to presenting a case study from a children’shome, this paper discusses two issues. The first issue is that, within the process of conducting researchusing case studies taken from personal experience, there are encounters with three kinds of ‘Others’;
the children from whom the line of enquiry starts, the improvised actions of the ‘Self’, and theaudience for the research. The second is the consideration that the activities involved in “doing
phenomenology” are case study research, with its opportunities for encountering the three kinds of‘Others’, and a series of cyclical changes in the ‘Self’.
Keywords
doing phenomenology, case study on children, reflection on personal experience, the three kinds ofothersIntroduction: Composition of this paper
From her time as a student to the present day, the author has had dealings withchildren through having been a volunteer at children’s homes1 and elementary schools,
and has researched case studies from the theoretical background of phenomenology. In
addition to presenting a case study from a children’s home, this paper discusses two issues.
The first issue is that, within the process of conducting research using case studies taken
1

A children’s home is a type of children’s welfare institution established by the Child Welfare Act which provides
a home for children between the ages of 1 and 20 who cannot live with their own families due to abuse. The
author has been conducting research at a certain children’s home for a dozen years and has been involved with thechildren there once or twice a week.

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27

from personal experience, there are encounters with three kinds of ‘Others’; the children
from whom the line of enquiry starts, the improvised actions of the ‘Self’, and theaudience for the research. The second is the consideration that the activities involved in“doing phenomenology” are case study research, with its opportunities for encountering
the three kinds of ‘Others’, and a series of cyclical changes in the ‘Self’.

1. Case Study
The event described in this case study relates to an occasion when two boys who
had been living in a children’s home for approximately one year were faced withseparation from the other children, because the other children were being taken to new
homes by their mothers2. The narrator of the events is the author herself, but the namesof the two boys have been changed.
As soon as the other children who had come to say good-bye were out of sight,
Kohta (8) came back to where I was standing. He grinned, and then suddenly started
slapping Yuuto on the face and head while saying, “Yuuto’s an idiot! Yuuto’s stupid!”
As he was saying this, Kohta continued to hit Yuuto relentlessly. “Doesn’t hurt! You
idiot!” said Yuuto provocatively. “Kohta, stop it. Yuuto, don’t provoke him,” I
screamed while trying to protect Yuuto with my arms. However, Kohta laughed tohimself as he reached in through the gaps between my arms to thump Yuuto’s head andface several more times with his fists. “You can’t hurt me, you idiot! I hate you!
Kohta, I hate you!” All the while Yuuto was being attacked, he continued to provoke
Kohta. “Kohta, Yuuto, what’s got into you? Both of you, stop it please!” I shouted.
I could feel that, by avoiding my arms, Kohta was still using his fists to hit Yuuto, but all
I could do was to scream at him to stop. At that moment, one of the staff of thechildren’s home was passing and held Kohta firmly before leading him away.

2. The meaning of a marginal existence: Confronting two types of the ‘Other’
The author feels that she has a “marginal existence” when dealing with children
because her identity is neither that of a child nor of an adult, neither that of a childcare2

For the purposes of writing this paper, minor additions and revisions have been made which do not affect thecontent.

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worker nor that of someone being cared for, neither that of an educator nor that ofsomeone being educated. A marginal existence is different to being a childcare worker
or a teacher because there is no clear educational intent in spending time with the children
and does not fit into the ‘mold’ of being either a childcare worker or an educator.
Because the author met the children without typical educational objectives and did not fit
into a typical ‘mold’, the children behaved outside the framework of being cared for or
educated. For this reason, the improvisation and uniqueness, which are built-in featuresof dealings with the ‘Other’, stand out in the practical experiences of the author. For
example, in the case study mentioned, the author reacted instantly (reflection in action)3
when Kohta suddenly started to hit Yuuto. In that situation, the two boys wereencountering the author as an overwhelming ‘Other’ who was beyond their expectations.
For this reason, after the author’s dealings with the two boys had come to an end, theauthor asked herself the simple question; “Why did Kohta suddenly attack Yuuto, andwhy did Yuuto provoke him further?”Another simple question arose concerning the author’s ‘Self’ at the time of theevents in the case study. This was because the author’s ‘Self’ in the past, which had
acted impulsively on a sudden decision, was an unknown ‘Other’ to her present ‘Self’ as
it reflected on the events in the case study. From the very fact that her involvement withchildren was always a one-off matter, with no opportunity for making amends later, theauthor felt regret that she could not answer the question of, “Should I have tried to restrain
Kohta more forcibly when he started to hit Yuuto?” It was because the author was amarginal existence and did not have a typical educational intent or fit into a typical ‘mold’that she always faced children as a unique individual with the way of thinking, way of
behaving, and way of living of her own ‘Self’.
The process of putting an experience into words and doing a mental reconstructionof the experience which provided the opportunity for the author to consider the questionof the two kinds of ‘Other’, namely the children and her ‘Self’ in the past, gave arise to a
fresh realization and another question (reflection after action) 4 . In the case study
described, “I had not been aware of it at the time, but while I was trying to protect Yuuto
with my arms, Kohta was trying to hit only Yuuto in the spaces which remained between
my arms. This goes to show that Kohta was completely composed at that time. Thatbeing the case, there must have been some meaning behind the attack.” This reflection
prompted the author to realize something new and to ask yet another question of herself.
3

Shön, D. 2001. Senmonka no chie [The Reflective Practitioner]. Translated by Manabu Sato and Kiyomi Akita.
Yumiru Publishing.
4Shön, D. Previously cited.
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The author thinks that this realization and self-examination was prompted by writing her
experience down in order to record it and becoming aware that her ‘Self’ in the past had
become objectified as the ‘Other’5.
Through the medium of case study research, as the author confronted the two kindsof ‘Other’ which were the two boys and her ‘Self’ in the past, she took a step towards
understanding the subject of the research (the ‘Other’ and the circumstances surrounding
her practical experience). The author also took a step towards understanding her ‘Self’
when dealing with the ‘Other’ in that situation, and to changing her perceptions and herrecognition of things. Through that moment of realization and understanding, bychanging her perceptions and her recognition of things, the behavior of the author alsochanged when she was dealing with children. As shown in the case study, by observing
the event with a knowledge of phenomenology6 the author came to understand that, “forsome types of children violence is a means of communication”. The author’s automatic
perception of children’s violence as negative disappeared, and she became able to deal
with it as violent behavior directed towards the ‘Self’7. When this happened a new
relationship developed between the boys and the existence of the author.
In other words, the “reflection on action” involved in researching a single case study,changed the author’s ‘Self’. As a result, further “reflection in action” made the author
ask another question. That question produced, in turn, further “reflection on action” andreflections on that produced further changes in the author…, and so a cycle of behavior
was started. Within this cycle of conducting case study research and having practicalexperiences, if there is also reinforcement or conclusive evidence which leads to tentative
answers regarding understanding the ‘Other’, in cases where the relationship between the
researcher and the children was successful, then it produces a recollection of further
incidents which exceed assumptions of having been successful, and changes become
necessary. The author considers that this cyclical series of self-changes is the essenceof conducting research (phenomenology).
5

Phenomenologist, Yasuhiko Murakami said, “When Husserl recorded the stream of his own consciousness, thephenomenon took on a kind of ‘Otherness’. (Abbreviated) In other words, even when you are analyzing your own
experiences, you are analyzing them as the experiences of the ‘Other’ (Murakami, Y. 2016. Sennin to mousou deto
suru [A Delusional Date with a Mountain Hermit]. Jimbun Shoin. p.230). In this way, for “qualitative research inphenomenology” it can be said that the ‘Self’ which experienced the event appears as the ‘Other’ in relation to the‘Self’ which analyzes the event as a case study.
6
For further reading about observing case studies, refer to chapter 3, section 4, of Otsuka, R. 2009. Shisetsu dekurasu kodomotachi no seicho [The Development of Children Living in Institutions]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo
Press.
7
The author, who does not fit a typical pattern and therefore has a marginal existence considers that behavior which
is produced through the understanding of the ‘Other’ gained through case study research could be said to be theauthor’s individual pattern.
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R. OTSUKA

3. Encounters with third-party ‘Others’ in the course of presenting research
The previous section of this paper outlined; (1) that the author herself was a marginalexistence without fitting into a typical ‘mold’, (2) that for that very reason, within
relationships in which improvisation and uniqueness stand out, encounters with the twokinds of ‘Others’ as represented by the boys and her ‘Self’, became the opportunity forcase study research, and (3) that one case study research is not a complete ending, but
produces further case study research and a series of cycles in understanding of the ‘Other’.
This section focuses on how the verbalization of experiences as case study research canlead to a dialogue with third-party ‘Others’.
The case study which the author has presented was a unique incident between theauthor and the two boys which cannot be replicated. In spite of this, when the author
describes this case study in presentations, she often receives feedback such as, “I canempathize, because I’ve had similar experiences”. People who offer this kind of
feedback are not limited to those connected with child welfare; some have connections
to formal school education, some are medical personnel, some are parents, and some are
students. Despite the fact that the circumstances in which an incident occurs, and therelationship between the people involved and the ‘Other’ will be completely different ineach case, the people who give feedback to the author have experienced “similar”, that is
to say analogous, experiences, and the author’s words have “reactivated” those people’s
experiences8. The author considers that whether or not the experiences of her audiencecan be “reactivated” is a measure of the validity of her reflections on case study research9.
In the previous section, within the series of cycles of case study research and practical8

Husserl, E. (1974). Yōroppa shogaku no kiki to chōetsuronteki genshōgaku [The crisis of European sciences andtranscendental phenomenology]. Japanese trans. Tsuneo Hosoya and others. Tokyo: Chuokoronsha.
9
The author considers that her marginal existence is a consequence of her not fitting into a typical ‘mold’, and forthe author, an understanding of the ‘Other’ based on case study research, and the existence of behavior createdthrough that understanding of the ‘Other’, could, perhaps, be said to be the author’s own type of ‘mold’. The
reasons for this are as follows. In phenomenology based on a theoretical background, as exemplified in theexpression “individuality is expressed through universality”, there are indications towards a fundamental
understanding of the essence of ordinary human experiences which are gained from personal experiences (“zu den
Sachen selbst her = from the things themselves”). Accordingly, the author thinks that discussion about case study
research is close to the essence of ordinary human experiences when case study research produces empathy withinpeople who come from a variety of practical backgrounds. Certainly, within qualitative research incorporating casestudy research, there is little objectivity in terms of potential for replication. Instead, case study research produces
reactivation of similar experiences in many readers or listeners and allows for vicarious experience of the case study.
In other words, the validity and universality of qualitative research is secured because it includes this kind of potential
for replication.
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experience, it was mentioned that, by making successful relationships with children, atentative answer leading towards an understanding of the ‘Other’ can be reinforced orconclusively proved. However, the same kind of reinforcement or conclusive proof canalso be produced by empathy from readers and listeners.
Conversely, there are also times when suggestions or criticism from her audience inregard to the author’s practical experiences, writing style, or considerations regarding acase study, can elucidate fresh viewpoints and realizations. For example, in connection
with the case study described, although the author came to realize that “for some types ofchildren, violence is a form of communication”, people often opine that, “violence mustnot be tolerated in any situation”. When people make suggestions like this, the author
searches for an expression which shows that she is not condoning violence, and shequestions anew whether her understanding is appropriate. The very fact of doing
research into case studies which are personal experiences means that suggestions andcriticism from other people have a direct influence on the author herself. Sometimes
people express empathy and sometimes people offer suggestions or criticism.
Encounters with the third-party ‘Others’ who are the people who attend a researchpresentation are outside the series of personal case study and practical experience casestudies outlined above, and this produces a series of cycles based on third-party ‘Others’
who have listened to the research. This duality in the cycle of research results in thecontinued changing of the ‘Self’ and this is probably what is meant by phenomenology.

Conclusion
Within improvised relationships consisting of chance meetings, a confrontation withchildren in the role of being the ‘Other’ was an opportunity for questions to be raised.
In order to answer those questions, the author described the situation as a case study andher ‘Self’ in the past which appeared as an ‘Other’. A single example of case study
research can be brought to completion by writing a paper or giving a presentation, but thefact that it has been made into a formal style allows for encounters and dialogue with new‘Others’ who are the audience for the research. This kind of dialogue with third-party‘Others’ leads to a reinforcement of the validity of the author’s interpretation andproduces a fresh set of questions.
This process can be described as a double cycle. The first cycle is the cycle of casestudy research and practical experiences, and the second is the cycle arising from
dialogue with third-party ‘Others’ who have observed the presentation of research results.
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It is because the author has been researching case studies based on personal experiencethat this series of double cycles inevitably becomes harmonized with normal changes in
the author. Each individual case study can be brought to a conclusion, but the very actof researching personal experiences results in changes in the author’s ‘Self’, which
continue to develop based on satisfaction, indecision, and trial and error, without reachinga conclusion.

Thematic Research: Educational Practices, from Which Philosophy Emerges: Frontiers of Philosophy of Education

E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 2, 2017

Reflection on Gaining Trust of Students with Careers:
Between Academic Expertise and Intellectual Pursuit
Shinichi TAKEUCHI
Tokushima Bunri University
Abstract
This paper discusses the author’s thoughts on gaining trust as an instructor from business school
students with careers. Unlike would-be researcher graduate students taking an academic path, themajority of students with careers do not consider researcher instructors to be career models, which
limits the authority of business schools and their faculty members. However, even when difficult for
researcher instructors at business schools—including the author—to gain the trust of students withcareers, for these students to learn effectively it is crucial to be worthy of respect as a person in theireyes. A question then emerged: How to become a respected instructor for students with careers. In theprocess of seeking an answer to this question, the author came to understand that he must contributeto business management practice as a researcher by walking side-by-side with business practitioners
from the researcher’s viewpoint. Moreover, a researcher must challenge students with careers in termsof attitude toward intellectual inquiry and always win them over. While business education conductedat business schools is clearly professional education, it is healthier to guide education practice toward
intellectual pursuit by seeking more universal values instead of directing it toward academic expertiseby seeking individual values of business education. Attainment of the above understanding was
facilitated by the fact that the author is a practitioner and researcher of education that uses case methodof instruction. This unique teaching approach was inextricably linked to reflection about teaching at
business schools and planted the seeds of a philosophy.
Keywords
Business schools, students with careers, trust, respect, authority, case method

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S. TAKEUCHI

Introduction“Several premises are required for education to work,” or so goes the hypothesis;
yet when the premises are questioned and uncertainty arises, educators must reconsider
criteria for establishment of education and rebuild the logic necessary for solid education.
If educators encounter situations that require reflection during the process, there may also
be an opportunity to generate a philosophy.
This paper has as its discussion stage the education of students with careers at abusiness school where the author taught for 10 years, and discusses the author’s thoughts
on gaining their trust. Setting aside the question of whether the author’s continuing
contemplation can be counted as a philosophy, the thoughts gained through instruction
experience at a business school are summarized here.
For this purpose, characteristics of business education and how it is pursued atbusiness schools as well as the author’s confusions, reflections, clues and discoveries are
discussed, in this order.
This paper does not employ research paper style discussion where knowledge isoverlaid based on the literature. While several references were cited and reviewed as partof an abstract draft for an academic conference where this proposition was published andfor slides used in its presentation, here the paper is structured with a focus on the author’sinternal reflection.
1. Business Education Market and Business Schools
Business education is characterized by its diverse providers. Companies or businessconductors usually have an internal education and training department. Employees
assigned to the department become trainers and provide internal education and training.
There are a number of business education and training companies of different sizes thatsell education to companies, as well as a great number of individual vendors1. Amidst theplethora of business education providers, universities maintain a certain presence, yet
traditional research universities’ presence is vague.
Countless corporations provide business education and severely compete in termsof education quality and price. Business education is a huge, big-money market of diverse
providers. There is market segmentation as well as competition strategies according to
1

Freelance seminar trainers, etc.

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market position, and almost all education providers are evaluated, distinguished andweeded out by market mechanism.
Let’s now focus on business schools. Universities are the only institutions that
conduct business education based on academics, yet at business schools this does notnecessarily apply to all their education programs. Many business schools employ a
mixture of researchers and practitioners as faculty members, and which type takes thelead cannot be generalized. Among researcher instructors, some well-known professors
are in the forefront of business education, which bestows authority. Yet a number ofstudents with careers express a desire to learn from practitioner instructors rather thanresearcher instructors, because of the peace of mind inherent with the practical experienceof instructors.
If the author were to direct these arguments at researchers in the philosophy ofeducation, the main readers of this paper, he would first emphasize that the majority ofstudents taking business education do not consider researcher instructors to be careermodels. The number of students who anticipate a long-term relationship with a researcher
based on pursuit of academic research is also assumed to be relatively limited. It can also
be said that students with careers do not necessarily trust their school and instructors,
especially researcher instructors. This is because of difficulty believing that researchersof business administration can actually manage a business. Therefore, the authority ofbusiness schools and their instructors is limited for students with careers. This is the majordifference on the business education side when comparing education in philosophy ofeducation and business education. The difference, however, is also largely attributable tothe fact that the former is education to train researchers and the latter is education to train
practitioners.
2. Author’s confusions
One discovery after having started teaching is that business schools are an educationsite where instructors do not easily gain respect or trust. Despite a number of twists andturns in the author’s path to becoming a university instructor, his career has always beenspent in the position of educator, including time employed at a private company, and there
was a strong subconscious need to continue performing as an educator while satisfying
personal standards at university. While confident in his sophistication in fundamental
qualifications as a coursework educator—including basic teaching actions, giving clear

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S. TAKEUCHI

classroom direction2, and communication with students in and out of the classroom—
trial and error continued in the contemplation of fundamental values of education
activities and how to improve feasibility. Students in front of him included those alreadyassuming important roles at industry leader companies as well as promising“thoroughbreds” with a bright future, or people earning much more than university
faculty. The author was then unreservedly evaluated by these students based on theirindividually established evaluation scales. In circumstances where a great deal of courage
was required to teach every class, “establishing himself as an instructor throughquestioning his qualifications and repeated review” was an urgent matter.
In the author’s case, uncertainty over a career as a business school instructor madethe process of reflecting on what works and what doesn’t even more complex. Despiteteaching at a business school, business administration was not the author’s discipline, andhe could not take the standard path of a business school instructor career. Yet his school
traditionally used the approach of case method of instruction, and this provided an
opportunity for the author to build his own career—luckily, as a result of capitalizing on
the opportunity, the author finds himself in a position to write this paper. Nevertheless,not being able to take the standard path of a business school instructor was indeed a major
concern. Therefore, a breakthrough unique to the author—contributing to a businessschool through pedagogy—was needed, knowing it was probably unprecedented forbusiness school instructors. As such, the author, who had confidently referred to himself
as an “educator” for many years, experienced deep distress, until starting to see, albeitvaguely, the prospects for a breakthrough.
3. Contemplation to leave confusion behind
Despite having concerns, the author, originally a business management practitioner,
had a realistic understanding of the general mindset of students with careers. This
understanding provided clues to moving his thinking forward, and the author soon
grasped that it was no use to compete based on research achievements against students
who are confident about practical business performance achievements. Talking highly of
researchers based on different criteria from the evaluation scale used for confident
students would not lead to understanding nor would it motivate them to actively try tounderstand.
2

Expressed as “conveying directions” by primary and middle school teachers and “effectively establishing
control” by representatives of training companies.

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Yet for students to effectively learn from the author, it was crucial to be worthy ofrespect as a person in their eyes. How to be a respected instructor for students withcareers—a clear, new question was revealed. While the process of solving this question
continues, a few answers have emerged.
First, the author pledged to contribute to business management practice as a
researcher by walking side-by-side with practical business practitioners from theviewpoint of a researcher. Here, it is important to accompany or support practitioners
without competing. Students with careers are not people researchers should compete with.
Researchers should only compete with other researchers. Instead of competing, theauthor often tried to send a message that “we are both working hard” to students withcareers. Instructors should challenge these business school students in terms of attitudes
toward intellectual inquiry. In this particular challenge, the author decided not to come insecond against students with careers. After gaining this understanding, the author seldom
accommodated students and was not greatly bothered by superficial student satisfaction
evaluation.
The next revelation was that while business education at business schools is clearly
professional education, it is healthier to guide education practice toward intellectual
pursuit by seeking more universal values instead of directing it toward academic expertiseby seeking individual values of business education. This understanding originates inlearning gained in an interview with Professor Emeritus Thomas R. Piper of Harvard
Business School3. According to Professor Emeritus Piper, “business education is training
in values, attitudes and skills, and it is essentially different from traditional graduate
school education that pursues science.” The author received this advice later in his
business school career, and it provided a valuable clue that enabled moving forward withhis thinking. While identifying with a shift in the axis of education values from expertise
to attitudes, the author had a glimpse of the mechanics of the shifting focus in education
at graduate schools for people with careers in the US, moving away from expertise
toward attitudes.
4. Case method of instruction, a teaching approach that triggers and supports
reflection
Case method of instruction is a teaching approach where students learn through3

Interview with Professor Emeritus Piper, Thomas R., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 2013/2/21 9:00-10:30, @Cumnock, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.
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S. TAKEUCHI

spontaneous discussion with each other based on case materials. In this teaching approach,
instructors do not give lectures but instead let students discuss. It is the core teachingapproach at Harvard Business School in the US and Keio Business School in Japan.
Moreover, it is representative of traditional teaching approaches at business schools. The
school where the author previously taught (Keio Business School) is a traditional school
where case method of instruction is utilized, and as the author himself mainly studied thisteaching approach for his research, case method of instruction has always been at the coreof his education practice.
While instructors have limited authority and building trust of students with careers
does not necessarily occur naturally at business schools as discussed previously, casemethod of instruction was another major factor that made it difficult to establish a “reason
for instructors to be instructors.” This is because teaching what should be taught whileletting students freely discuss is a very difficult task for instructors. If an instructor tries
to forcefully move in a desired direction while calling for free discussion, it would
immediately be perceived as “no freedom in reality.” If an instructor winces after
continuing to suffer inconvenient comments, the atmosphere would instantly beperceived as “not all comments are welcome here.” An instructor who cannot smoothly
achieve both free discussion and education objectives is in a critical situation, and his or
her lack of confidence is revealed, or loss of composure could result in insufficientattention to students as well as create distance from the image of a respected instructor
for students. Using this teaching approach reveals the capabilities of instructors.
Therefore, it is not too much to say that instructors face risks as an instructor and as anintellectual.
With case method of instruction, there are few class scenes where instructors’comments take the spotlight on the basis of authority and information asymmetry. It is
education practice similar to composite art, and uses educational resources—theexperience and awareness of issues of students with careers—as a driver, guiding
students to a place only they can go. At this point, a significant level of insight into people,
capability in terms of education technique and deep affection for students are essential
for instructors.
Advocating classes where instructors would realize their own inadequacies by
having students think requires substantial preparation on the part of instructors. Being
thoroughly prepared when appearing in the classroom would change students’
perceptions of university faculty who, at first glance, seem to have established careers.
Finally, respect and trust increase as “the teacher thinks that far ahead” and “is so well
prepared to teach our class.” When thinking this way, ultimately it is the instructor’s
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Reflection on Gaining Trust of Students with Careers39

attitude toward intellectual inquiry that affects students’ mindset and motivates them toengage in true learning. Professional education for students with careers seems to be filledwith scenes where we realize such truths, because it is staged where a relationship of trust
between students and instructors does not smoothly function.
The circumstance of the author only being able to take the path of intellectual pursuit
due to difficulty pursuing academic inquiry of business administration may have been a
blessing in disguise. In addition, the author was grateful for the existence of case methodof instruction as a teaching approach and for personally being able to work on researchof education based on the method. It cannot be denied that case method of instruction
was an aporia for the author, but one that helped him move forward with reflection insome areas. This unique teaching approach was inextricably linked to reflection aboutteaching at business schools and planted the seeds of a philosophy.
Conclusion
The mechanism at issue in this paper seems to directly apply to professional degree
programs at graduate schools of education. Naturally, an aporia of gaining trust fromstudents with careers is not resolved for graduate-level professional education, advanced
business schools, or the business administration instructors who teach there. However, inthe process of professional degree programs at graduate schools of education gaining
greater presence as graduate schools for people with careers in the school administration
field, it is likely inevitable to face situations of overcoming authority and trust issues in
education. When this occurs, some assistance may be afforded by senior scholars like
Professor Emeritus Piper who have sincerely and persistently contemplated such issues,or educators such as the author who have been bound by restraining factors or haverepeatedly held internal arguments based on educational thinking found within theteaching approach.
The author has noticed subconscious glimmers of a new ego emerging in recent
years as he examines the core attitude of intellectual pursuit against the possibility ofarrogance with increasing academic expertise. This will become an important asset inwinning future trust as a scholar.

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E-Journal of Philosophy of Education:
International Yearbook of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, Vol. 2, 2017

Structure of Mutual Learning Between a Teacher and aStudent in a Nursing Practicum

Yukiko MAEKAWA
Konan Women’s University
Abstract
This paper aims to identify how mutual learning is structured by approaching the realities of theexperiences of students and teachers in a nursing practicum. This was done by requiring students andteachers to rethink how they experience the world being humans. Nursing depends on the relationshipbetween the patient and the nurse; various views and perceptions stemming from that relationship are
not caused by only one of them, but manifest themselves in both nurses as well as patients. Similarly,
education is created not in the dualism of teacher and student, but somewhere in between. Accordingly,
an attempt was made to rethink the mutual relationship between the student and the teacher without
separating the two, as a means of examining the state of learning for students and teachers in a nursing
practicum. In doing so, the following points were clarified. 1) Although students meeting patients
understood the necessity of interacting with the patients in the “here and now,” they were aware that
this does not lead to tangible nursing. 2) When teachers understood that students cannot practicenursing in response to patients, the teachers themselves practiced nursing on patients using thepractical sense and nursing skillsets they had developed. 3) Even as they are engaged in nursing,teachers urge students toward the world of nursing by demonstrating what nursing is and guiding
students with verbal instructions. 4) Students are attracted to nursing by the presence of their teachers.
Nursing tailored to patients and education tailored to students are created as teachers open up to others(patients and students) and guide them. Based on the above, it was shown that a passivity wherein an
acceptance of circumstances that did not lead to the tangible nursing of students is necessary to develop
an educational approach by teachers in a nursing practicum. In addition, patients themselves, as
recipients of nursing, strongly attracted students and teachers—the providers of nursing—to nursing
and enticed them to the practice of nursing. Education that appears to be an active act becomes an act
whereby teachers teach through the passive activity of sensing students. Accordingly, it was shownthat having students and teachers learn in a nursing practicum presupposes a mutual relationshipStructure of Mutual Learning Between a Teacher and a Student in a Nursing Practicum

41

without a clear separation between the two sides; the relationship is rather renewed when both work
together as a single system.
Keywords
mutual learning, experience, nursing practicum, learning structure

1. A Display of Practical Learning
A nursing practicum is an endeavor comprising an assumed relationship between apatient and a nurse in which the nurse physically feels the pain and suffering of the patientand adapts accordingly. The way in which this occurs is defined by the circumstances ofthe patient. Thus, nurses cannot work with patients in a unidirectional or manipulative
fashion because the relationship between the two is entwined within nursing practiceeven as it occurs. Students learn about this type of practice through training. Nursing
training in which nursing students learn through practice is often referred to as the coreof nursing education owing to its role and the number of practicum credits in a nursing
curriculum. A review of related prior research reveals topics such as aspects that are
taught to students, aspects related to the patient, student relationships, teaching activities
for teachers training nurses, and capabilities required in teachers. The characteristics oflearning and education in a nursing practicum are identified by means of an analyticalview of students and teachers. However, learning and education are not treated as
different aspects, but rather as efforts that are simultaneously created on the spot.
Students begin to explore the meaning of living, falling sick, and growing old as
they are placed in actual nursing scenarios and encounter patients; in other words, they
explore about sick patients and their lives. In addition, by involving with these people,
they can feel the joys and difficulties of nursing, become aware of their own
preconceptions by understanding others, and discover opportunities for introspection. In
such times, how do we as teachers view these students?
Nursing occurs between a patient and a nurse. Approaching the facts of nursing
requires a new awareness regarding a living world that is experienced by nurses as
individuals or, put differently, in interactions directly in front of us and hidden to science.
When closely examining this phenomenon, we cannot separate actions and responses ofnurses and patients; nursing practice relies on the patient–nurse relationship, and theawareness and views created in that relationship are not caused by one of them but by

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both of them 1 . Similarly, educational practicum does not exist within a dualism ofteachers and students, but rather arises somewhere between the two. Based on this, one
way of approaching a nursing practicum is to attempt to rethink mutual relationships
without separating teachers and students.
2. Encounters with Sick PatientsJun (names have been changed) is a second-year nursing student who has accepted
responsibility for S, a 70-year-old male patient who is forced to rest in bed due to an
illness. On the second day of training, Jun, who was assisted by Professor Minami,
decided to give S a sponge bath while he was in bed. When Jun unbuttoned the patient’s
pajamas, she was paralyzed by the sight of his body, which had several tubes inserted
because of his ongoing medical treatment. Noticing this, Professor Minami quickly
responded to S by talking to him as Jun wiped his chest with a warm towel. Professor
Minami lightly held his rib cage down with an open fist so the towel could make contact
with his chest; then, S breathed deeply.
After wiping S a couple of times, Professor Minami asked Jun if she would wring
out the towel. Jun then came to her senses, looked at Professor Minami, and then faced
S. Jun said to Professor Minami, “I will clean the arms next,” and appeared to follow
nursing explanations as her cue. As the assistance with washing the patient’s bodyprogressed, he gradually began to relax his body and the soft sound of him sleeping could
be heard through the oxygen mask, despite his complaints that he was unable to sleep atnight.
Reflecting on the event, Jun said that she knew that S “had tubes inserted into his
body for treatment.” However, she could not hide her shock of seeing the raw scars fromsurgery and the “unexpected wasting away of S.” Jun felt the reality of S’s body but could
not simply provide the hygienic assistance of cleaning his body the way it had beenplanned. At that moment, she did not know what to do, and could not move. For Jun, thiswas the beginning of her search for a nursing practicum; it was in response to helping an
individual that was new and different from S.
In this setting, Professor Minami used discretion to determine the direction of future
1“Descriptions, patient stories, and outward-facing expressions are all distorted in phenomenological posturing,upon which a phenomenological view, observations, and awareness are created. This awareness does not comefrom patients, nor does it come from us. Rather, it is positioned somewhere in between.” Bin Kimura (1985).
“Seishin Igaku ni okeru Genshougaku no Imi” [The Meaning of Phenomenology in Psychiatric Medicine]. ed.
Nihon Genshougakkai, Genshougaku Nenpou 2.

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nursing by understanding Jun’s situation as she interacted with S; this was based on Jun’s“tendency to diligently interact with patients” and how she had handled herself in school
up to that point. For Jun, who was unable to predict nursing methods, a setting for anursing practicum where teachers themselves explain and demonstrate nursing by
explaining future nursing steps was developed.
3. Engendering Interest in Nursing
When one gets an illness, one experiences various symptoms including pain. This
experience is inseparably linked to various characteristics that make up our lives2. Thus,
while nursing, a nurse cannot forget about his/her values or emotions at a moment. The
actions of a person in everyday life, which in our example is about good hygiene, arehindered by illness and therefore, one may not be able to perform his or her duties. Nurses,
therefore, must engage with patients using greater cleanliness compared with thecleanliness already present around the patient in a way that allows the patient toexperience comfort and relief. This “process of interaction” leads to easing and calminga person in their pain and suffering and, further, to a heightened ability for natural healing.
As it is specific and individual patients and nurses mutually interact with each other, thiscannot be explained by the causality theory of natural sciences. Therefore, nursing
requires natural actions reasonable to the patient. Along with resulting actions andprocedures, a nursing practicum has a flow and rhythm that matches the individual.
Students who are beginners in nursing may remember what must be done next, but may
not have the means of creating a flow and rhythm in their nursing practicum that meetsthe circumstances of their patients is an unknown world. Jun was bewildered during thefirst step.
Professor Minami continued with the nursing workflow for S, which appeared tocome to a halt. Moreover, as per the practical nursing sense developed as a nurse and an
extensive educational skillset, Professor Minami was able to bring Jun into the real worldof nursing by demonstrating her own nursing skills and providing direction verbally.
Moreover, Professor Minami engendered an interest in nursing within the student by
noting the difference in the patient’s condition compared with his condition on theprevious day and asking if that bothered Jun instead of asking a more relevant question.

2

Kleinman, Arthur (1988). The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition，Basic Books.
Translated into Japanese by S. Eguchi, S. Gokita, G. Ueno (1996) Yamai no Katari: Mansei no Yamai o Meguru
Rinshō Shinrigaku. Seishin Shobo.

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At that time, Professor Minami did not require adherence to matters within her
framework; rather, the student and the patient attempted to understand their current
experiences. The feelings that informed Professor Minami’s foundation were personal,
even though those feelings were open to patients (and students), and guided them.
Regardless of one’s role as a nurse, those feelings did not allow one to overlook
circumstances and be disinterested, but rather brought about a desire to take action whenconfronting someone in pain. One actively engages in the practice of nursing by offering
one’s will to others and passively accepting their existence.
How are nurses from the perspective of patients? Arthur W. Frank3, in a writing of
his experience with illness, stated that due to a desire to share their new phase of life (ofillness) with nurses, patients manifest their illness and entrust it to them. Thus, this mutualstate does not become polarized with the sick and their pain at one end and healing nurses
at the other. The experience pain and suffering does not arise only within the patient;nurses, through their nursing, can also share that experience. The experience of accepting
suffering is brought about by encounters with patients, and is both spontaneous andunpredictable. Accordingly, the answer to the question of whether one’s nursing wasappropriate can only be given after introspection.
A nursing practicum cannot be performed entirely according to a plan and problems
cannot be solved beside a patient through the strict application of scientific theory andtechnology. Nursing is not dominated by a pre-existing awareness, but is an ethicalpractice created out of an orientation toward what the individual perceives as good at agiven time, and insight into the methods used in practice. This is the same for students
who learn nursing at their workplace. As teachers sometimes make students anxious andshed tears in their encounters with patients, they support their students in pondering what
nursing means to them personally, which makes the ethical practice a work of education.
Ethical practice in this type of education then comes back to nursing as practical work by
students for the benefit of thoughtful patients.
4. Uniqueness of Experiences
Experiencing others’ illnesses is something that goes beyond one’s own experiences,and can be difficult to comprehend. Approaching the incomprehensible state of sufferingwith those that suffer and attempting to heal them can only be done if one puts one’s
3Frank, Arthur W. (1995). The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics, The University of Chicago Press.
Translated into Japanese by T. Suzuki (2002) Kizutsuita Monogatari no Katarite: Shintai Yamai Rinri. Yumiru
Shuppan.

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nursing skills to work in response. The means of doing this is a process that creates thenext action4, by reflecting on how we are viewed by others. In other words, quickly
responding to the circumstances of patients is thought to be nursing practice that puts
one’s skills to work, but when that inclines to the mere application of techniques within
one’s skill-set, a nurse focuses on the patient by his or her side to maintain a practicum
that does not become stagnant.
Practical knowledge employing various nursing methods appropriate to the patientis needed. Thus, nursing practice is not the routine mastery or application of technicalprinciples according to any theory in a book, but rather the ability to perform thoseprinciples with an orientation toward mutual understanding in the present.
This can be seen in educational practice as well. Students and teachers are unique.
An educational practicum that is brought about through interactions with others that are
involved with the students and teachers can be made up of various patterns. The matterof whether my educational practicum is good should not be determined by my standards,
but by those of the student. I believe that the meaning of my interactions in the context ofa student’s life can only be reflected upon through dialog.
Nursing practice and educational practice by nature have an element of uniquenessacross the ebb and flow of experiences. However, these experiences permeate our mutual
feelings. While I know that my feelings cannot be transferred to a student (or others) asis, we have retrospectives based on reflective dialogs. By enriching our practice skillset,
we can begin to interact with others (students) in a way that is best for them.
5. Education Premised on Co-Existence
It can be seen through the nursing practicum of Jun and Professor Minami on S thatan educational practicum is created by mutually and simultaneously sharing the same
event. When Jun cleaned the patient’s body with Professor Minami, her mind went blankand she was unable to move because of her confusion over the treatment S was receiving
and the tubes in his body. Realizing this, Professor Minami continued with her nursing
work by explaining to Jun how to nurse and encouraging her to practice. At a first glance,
this scene may appear to be unidirectional: a teacher giving instruction and a student
following. However, is that really the case?
Certainly, teachers teach students; however, that interaction alone is a one4

Ikegawa, K. (1991). Kango: Ikirareru Sekai no Jissenchi [Nursing: Practical Knowledge of a Living World].
Yumiru Shuppan, p.103.

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dimensional view because the actions of students that bring about an educational
approach used by teachers cannot be seen, and a passivity that received such action is thepremise of the approach. Moreover, further thought shows that patients, who receive
nursing, are themselves strongly attracted to students and teachers or to those that provide
nursing, and entice them toward nursing practice. Learning through practice cannot beviewed only as the category of science known as reductionism, upon which modern
science is built. It means living, acting, and discovering knowledge, at times throughchance and circumstance.
Education that appears to be active becomes the act of teaching by teachers, whether
or not the education is intentional, because the teachers feel what their students arethinking. Accordingly, learning by both students and teachers in a nursing setting requires
a mutual relationship; it does not occur individually and cannot be made individualspecific. While dualistic, it is continually renewed, with “me” and “you” working
together as a single system5.

5Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1961). L’Œil et l’esprit. Translated into Japanese by S. Takiura and G. Kida (1966) Me
to Seishin. Misuzu Shobo. pp. 135-136

Thematic Research: Educational Practices, from Which Philosophy Emerges: Frontiers of Philosophy of Education