From Public Lecture*The Psychology of Democracy*Based on the book, ‘The Psychology of Democracy’(published by the American Psychological Association Press, 2016)

Fathali M. Moghaddam

J

OHN Adams (1735–1826), second president of the United States, isquoted as saying, “There never was a democracy yet that did notcommit suicide” (Ketchum, n.d.). I believe this is an apt starting point
for our discussion of the psychology of democracy, because the 21st
century is going to be a highly challenging time for democracy. The
threat to democracy arises in many ways. First, there is the direct threat
posed by dictatorships large (e.g., China, Russia) and small (Iran, North
Korea). Second, there is indirect threat to democracies from radicalization movements of different kinds, including religious extremists who
engage in violent terrorist acts. In reaction to radicalization and terrorism, even more democratic governments are limiting freedoms
and weakening democracy. Third, democracy is being threatened by
globalization forces, which weaken local and national governments, andaccelerate the concentration of global wealth in fewer and fewer
hands. According to Oxfam (2016), 62 people now own as much wealthas the poorest half of the world’s population, 3.5 billion people.
My concern for the future of democracy will be rejected by optimists
who see an endless supremacy of democracies, led by the United States.
The American empire is suffering from what the historian Toynbee(1965) described as the ‘mirage of immortality’, when global powers
come to see their own way of life as the final form of human civilization. Some American politicians tout the United States as ‘the greatest
nation in history’, and some American academics seriously argue that
we have reached the ‘end of history’. Obviously we should not allow
these short-sighted pronouncements to distract us from the long-termgoal of progressing beyond the profound limitations of nations today—
including the severe limitations of the United States, countries of theEuropean Union, and the other semi-developed democracies in the 21st
century.
My goal is to discuss how psychological changes are needed to move
our societies forward to achieve what I call actualized democracy,
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where there is full, informed, equal participation in wide aspects of political, economic, and cultural decision-making independent of financial
investment and resources. These psychological changes can be seen as
part of a growth toward a ‘greater self’, as proposed by Daisaku Ikeda(2010), for example. Such a growth is essential for the fulfillment of actualized democracy. From Athens 2,500 years ago, to the Roman Republic half a millennium later, to modern democracies, there has been a
tradition of democracies “committing suicide”, and of not achieving
their full potential. There are no actualized democracies in our 21st century world. India, the ‘largest democracy’, and the United States, the‘superpower democracy’, are far from actualized democracies. India
is rife with corruption and enormous injustices; the United States has acitizenry that is largely disillusioned and distrusting of government.
Even in the most important national elections, barely 50% of eligible
citizens actually vote in the U.S.A., and participation in local elections
is routinely below 20% (Sharp, 2012).
The weakness of American democracy is in part by design: for example, some elite groups in America invest heavily in preventing mass
participation in American elections, and ensuring that only those withenormous private funding can compete as candidates in elections. Consequently, many U.S. citizens do not see their interests represented
among the well-resourced candidates for political office. The Supreme
Court decision equating spending in political elections with free speech(Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 2010)means that there is no limit to what the most affluent individuals andfamilies spend attempting to shape election results. It is hardly surprising that trust in politicians and political institutions has declined among
Americans. But the idea of the United States being an open society
where ‘anyone can make it’ continues to influence the non-elite masses,
and they continue to vote for political leaders who do not represent theirtrue interests.
My goal is to explore the psychological reasons for the allusive natureof actualized democracy, even after major revolutions have createddramatic macro level political and economic changes. This discussion isintended to pave the way for psychological science to play a more central role in achieving movement toward actualized democracy. I begin
by distinguishing between three different types of change, at micro,
meso, and macro levels. I argue that revolutions typically achieve macrochange in a relatively short amount of time, but they fail to achieve themeso and micro level changes necessary for movement toward actualized democracy. This is despite sometimes using extreme violence andthe psychology of democracy

127high levels of control, as in the so-called ‘cultural revolutions’ of the
1960s in China and the early 1980s in Iran. Consequently, even major
revolutions only change political and economic systems, often only at
the surface level, without transforming styles of social relations and cognition. Second, I map out the social and psychological changes that needto take place in order to develop psychological citizens capable ofachieving and sustaining actualized democracy. Third, I discuss the psychological foundations of the macro system that can sustain actualized
democracy, with a focus on meritocracy.

Three Different Types of Change
It is useful to distinguish between three different types of change.
This distinction will help us better understand movement toward andaway from actualized democracy. We must keep in mind that movement
can be both toward and away from actualized democracy.
First-Order, Second-Order, and Third-Order Change

All major societies began as dictatorships, and some societies havemade some progress toward actualized democracy (Moghaddam, 2013).
If we imagine a continuum with ‘pure dictatorship’ at one extreme and‘pure democracy’ at the opposite extreme (Figure 1), all major societies
are located somewhere between these two ends, with some being closer
to ‘pure democracy’ than ‘pure dictatorship’. However, no major society
is a ‘pure dictatorship’ or a ‘pure democracy’.
Pure Dictatorship______________________________Pure Democracy
Figure 1. The dictatorship-democracy continuum

Movement on the ‘dictatorship-democracy’ continuum is usefully
conceptualized as involving three different types of change(Moghaddam, 2002). First-order change takes place without altering either the formal law or the informal normative system that justifies unequal treatment on the basis of group membership. For example, during
the era of slavery in the United States, various changes took place insociety (such as in fashion) without changing either formal law or the
informal normative system as it pertained to slavery. Second-orderchange involves change in formal law to make illegal unequal treatment
on the basis of group membership, but the informal normative system
continues to allow unequal treatment on the basis of group membership.
For example, race based discrimination continued in various ways in the128the psychology of democracy

United States after slavery formally ended. A second example concerns
social class: despite formal laws supporting ‘fair competition’ in accessto higher education, children born in poor families are far less likely togain access to competitive universities than equally talented children
born in affluent families. Thus, first-order and second-order change constitute ‘within system’ change, because they do not necessarily bringabout a change from one system to another. Third-order change involves
a transformation of both the formal and informal systems: it is a changeof systems, from one system to another, rather than a change only within
one system.
Most revolutions throughout history have brought about first-orderchange, a few have resulted in second-order change, but so far thirdorder change has remained elusive through revolution. That is, most
revolutions have, at most, changed the formal economic, political, legal
macro-structure. In most instances this represents only cosmetic, surfacechange. On paper, the constitutions put in place by some revolutions
seem progressive. But actual behavior, regulated as it is by powerful
informal normative systems, has not been changed toward actualized
democracy. This pattern is clear when we examine change over historical time, which fits Pareto’s (1935) model of perpetual ‘elite rule’ andinter-group inequalities, rather than idealist visions of Thomas More
(1965/1516), Karl Marx (Marx & Engels, 1967/1848), and others,
depicting egalitarian societies sometime in the future.
There was some movement earlier in the 20th century toward smaller
resource inequalities between high and low status groups (such as different social classes, ethnicities, and the like), but since the 1970s groupbased inequalities have accelerated. This trend is well documented(Atkinson, 2015; Dorling, 2014; Piketty, 2014), as are the detrimental
physical and mental health consequences of greater resource inequalities
particularly for the groups with least access to resources (Marmot,
2004). Pareto’s (1935) elite theory provides a critical lens through whichto evaluate these trends: we should not be distracted by the labels political systems give themselves, because elites use ideologies to mask thetrue nature of continued inequalities and elite rule. For example, Pareto
could argue that the United States and China, the nations with the twolargest economies in the world, are ostensibly very different from one
another: the most powerful capitalist democracy and the most powerfulcommunist nation. But the United States and China are similar in that inboth nations, a tiny elite monopolizes wealth and power.

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The Macro-Micro Rule of Change

Macro level change can be brought about quickly by political revolution. After they have come to power, revolutionaries can with the strokeof a pen change constitutions, the rules of ownership, and even entire
economic systems. For example, private ownership can be abolished by
the new government. Monarchs, Shahs, and Tsars can be executed and‘representatives of the people’ or ‘the representative of God on earth’can gain absolute power ‘on behalf of the people’, taking on titles like‘supreme leader’ and ‘chairman’ or ‘president’. These macro level political, economic, and institutional changes can take place very quickly.
However, micro-level changes involving the values, attitudes, motivations, needs, and relationship patterns between people, how they solve
problems and interact at the everyday level, how they think and act
in relation to authority figures as well as those with lower status thanthemselves—these all change at a relatively slow pace.
The Fleeting Post-Revolution ‘Opportunity Bubble’

This relatively slower pace of change at the micro social and psychological level is particularly important in the highly sensitive period immediately after a revolution, when a dictatorship has just collapsed.
There is usually a brief period of jubilation and opportunity; the chainsof dictatorial control have been broken and it is possible to move toward
a more open society. The door seems to be open for a change of systems. All major revolutions have a brief window, an ‘opportunity bubble’, during which this change from one system to another is feasible.
I experienced such a momentous ‘opportunity bubble’ when I was in
Iran immediately after the 1979 revolution. The Shah had fled Iran andhis regime had collapsed. We had a brief opportunity to move from dictatorship to democracy. The excitement was palpable in the cities andvillages in Iran. People talked enthusiastically about the opportunities
ahead: the dictator Shah had fled and there seemed to be a real chance toachieve a more open society, with free speech and political and social
freedoms for all, including women and minorities. However, we learned
the hard way that such third-order change, a change from one system toanother, can only come about when certain pre-requisites are met.
First, there must be leadership in support of movement toward actualized democracy. This is a tall order; George Washington and Nelson
Mandela stand out as exceptions among the leaders at times of major
revolutions. These two leaders voluntarily stepped aside from power,
rather than monopolizing power all of their lives, as did Stalin, Mao,130

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Khomeini, and other dictators. In terms of personality characteristics,
the kind of leader who is able to win power and control through andafter a major revolution is typically not likely to reach out to oppositiongroups and attempt to develop dialogue and compromise.
Most leaders who come to power through revolutions are motivated toachieve power monopoly: the behavior patterns of Stalin, Mao,
Khomeini, Castro, and Putin represent the norm. Washington and
Mandela are the anomalies. Unfortunately, in terms of personality characteristics, the kinds of leaders who are ruthless enough to come to
power through revolution, and who often have the charisma and ability
to rabble-rouse and mobilize the masses, are less inclined to share powerand democratize decision-making after they have come to leadership
positions. In the terminology of traditional personality research, leaders
who come to power through revolutions tend to be high on Machiavellianism, authoritarianism, and need for power, but low on tolerance for
ambiguity, openness, and conscientiousness. From Napoleon to Stalin to
Khomeini, the behavior pattern of these leaders is characterized bydogmatic, ruthless, relentless pursuit of power, not compromise andreaching out to opposition groups in order to achieve consensus. As I
witnessed in Iran in the case of Khomeini, these leaders are inclined tosmash the opposition with iron fists, rather than engage the opposition in
dialogue with open arms.
Second, there must be political opportunity to create institutional support for movement toward democracy. Such political opportunity isoften thwarted by elites within society, such as military, religious, andbusiness elites determined to protect their resources, high status positions, and domains of influence. Another important source of opposition
to democracy can be foreign powers, including world powers, who
might see continued dictatorship as the best means of protecting theirown interests. Unfortunately the post- World-War two era is littered with
examples of American, European, Russian and (most recently) Chineseinterventions in nations around the world is support of dictatorshiprather than democracy. Thus, it is seldom the case that elites, foreign
powers, and other forces are in support of building institutions to movetoward openness and democracy.
But there is a third, far less researched and discussed, pre-requisite forthird-order change: the general population has to acquire in a timely
manner the social and psychological skills needed to become democratic citizens. This change has to take place at two levels: first at the collective level and second at the individual level; it is collective level changes
that make widespread individual level changes possible (Moghaddam,

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1312006). Some exceptional individuals are able to achieve the characteristics of democratic citizenship without support from the collective, but aslone individuals their influence always remains very limited.
Unfortunately this third condition is very difficult to achieve, becauseof the slow pace of change in styles of cognition and action. One canchange governments overnight, but changing the way people think andact takes far longer. This proves to be a huge stumbling block confronting pro-democracy movements immediately after they have toppled
a dictatorship. There is very little time, sometimes not more than a few
months, in order to socialize the population to think and act in ways thatwill nurture and support democracy, rather than return the country backto dictatorship. But what are the characteristics of the psychologicalcitizen we need to achieve, in order to support movement toward
democracy? This is the question I turn to next.

Characteristics of the Democratic Psychological Citizen
I have identified ten key psychological characteristics that the citizen
needs to have in order to be capable of fully supporting, and participating in, a democracy (see Figure 2). These characteristics should be
the focus of socialization in families and schools. In particular, civic
education should focus on these characteristics.

Not all experiences
are of equal
value
There areprinciples ofright and wrong

I should be open to creating
new experiences for others

I should be
actively open
to new
experiences
I must seek
informationand opinionsfrom as manysources as possible

I could be wrong

I mustcriticallyquestioneverything,including thesacred beliefsof my society

I must revise my opinion
as the evidence requires

I must seek tobetter understandthose whoare different
from meI can learn
from those whoare different
from meFigure 2. The psychological characteristics of the democratic citizen

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the psychology of democracy

Have Self Doubt: The first step is the experience of self-doubt andleaving open the possibility that “I could be wrong”. This does not meanthat the person is crippled with doubt and unable to take positive action.
Rather, it means that the person moves forward always ready to incorporate and adopt better information, ideas, and directions.
Be Ready to Question Sacred Beliefs: The individual must not only
question their own assumptions, but also be willing to seriously question
the sacred beliefs of their own societies. This can be extremely difficult
to do, because often it involves going against the norms and beliefs seen
as ‘natural’ and even ‘sacred’ by one’s family, community, and nation.
However, such questioning is necessary because it opens the path for theconstructive growth of both individuals and societies.
Have Flexibility of Opinions in Light of Evidence: As opposed to categorical ‘we are correct, they are wrong’ thinking, democratic citizens
develop high tolerance for ambiguity and openness to change. They seek
and are guided by new information and are capable of changing theiropinions. Their opinions are less likely to be guided by dogma andirrational factors, and more in line with the latest evidence gatheredfrom different sources.
Understand Those Who Are Different from Us: Most human groups
tend to be insular and to see their way of life as ‘natural’ and ‘better’.
This trend is in line with the requirements of closed rather than open
societies, dictatorships rather than democracies. Democracy requires us
to seek out and be inclusive toward those who are different from us.
Learn From Those Who Are Different: We must not only be open
toward others who are different from us, but be motivated to learn what
we can from them. This is a very difficult characteristic to acquire,
because the ‘natural’ tendency for humans is to be attracted towardsimilar rather than dissimilar others.
Seek Information and Opinions from Different Sources: A central feature of education for democratic citizenship is that it teaches people
from a young age to seek information from different sources. This is notdifficult to achieve when it is carried out systematically, and becomes
central to the educational mission from the start of schooling. In manycases teaching the young to seek information from different and sometimes contradictory sources goes against the traditions in their families,
where political and religious biases strictly narrow down the sources of
information. However, when carried out correctly, teaching the young toseek diverse sources of information will also feed back into the family,
helping the parents to also become more open-minded.
Be Open to New Experiences: Democratic citizens actively seek out

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new experiences through engagement with those outside their ingroups.
This encompasses all kinds of learning, and includes behavioral engagement and interactions with outgroups on the basis of openness.
Openness is motivated by the ever-present question: what can I learn
from these other people?
Create New Experiences for Others: In addition to gaining from the
new experiences that others open up for the self, the democratic citizen
actively opens up new experiences for others to benefit from. This is adifficult skill to learn, because sharing ingroup experiences with outsiders can feel threatening. This ‘opening up to others’ is often very
challenging, because it means allowing outgroup members to enter astrusted partners into the life of the ingroup. However, such ‘opening up’
is made possible through trust and priority being given to basic humancommonalities, in line with omniculturalism (Moghaddam, 2012), rather
than giving priority to intergroup differences. Omniculturalism leads us
to give priority to our similarities and what we share with other humans,
rather than first attending to how we are different.
Adopt Principles of Right and Wrong: The characteristics needed for
democratic citizenship, such as openness to others, should not lead tothe acceptance of relativism and a rejection of all universal principles.
Growth toward democratic citizenship is based on principles of rightand wrong, as reflected in the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) and other such foundational documents. Similarly, democratic governance is based on universal principles that guarantee basic
freedoms and just treatment. It is strong adherence to basic democratic
principles that enable the democratic citizen to gain the confidence
needed to acquire all the characteristics outlined above.
Seek Experiences of Higher Value: Guided by basic principles of rightand wrong, the democratic citizen seeks out experiences of higher value
and rejects less valuable experiences.

Psychology and Third-Order Change
I have argued that psychological obstacles make it very difficult toachieve a change from one system to another, third-order change. This isparticularly when the change involves moving society from dictatorshipto democracy. Because of the influence of psychological obstacles, history often seems to follow a cyclical path, with each revolution resulting
in a change of who is ‘on top’ and who is ‘at the bottom’, but no change
in the deeper nature of relationships. The poet Yeats (1865–1939)
captured this cycle in his poem ‘The great day’, with the image of two
beggars changing places to whip one another, so one beggar now rides

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on horseback and the other beggar is on foot receiving the lash. The
fixed feature of their relationship is the lash, which goes on irrespectiveof who is riding the horse.
“The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.”William Butler Yeats (1962, p. 190)

This is in line with Pareto’s (1935) vision of elites always ruling in all
major societies, but using different ideologies to manage their rule overthe non-elite. This pattern is clearly visible when one considers themove from the Tsar to Stalin and his successors, the Shah to the mullahs
in Iran, the Arab Spring and what followed in Egypt and most other
Arab societies, to consider just a few examples.
While I have identified the very difficult psychological changes thatthe masses need to achieve in order to evolve into democratic citizens
and move society toward actualized democracy, the elite theory tradition
highlights the perhaps equally difficult transformations the elites need toachieve for democratic change. According to elite theorists, when a society becomes too closed and social mobility diminishes, so that talented
individuals are unable to climb up the status hierarchy, a counter-elite
forms to lead the masses against the current rulers. However, after arevolution has succeeded, the elite who led the masses to overthrow theold regime, gradually change their own behavior until they become
corrupt and resemble the former elite they replaced.
But we should not assume that ‘power corrupts’ only in relatively
closed societies such as Russia and Iran. The connection between political power, corruption, and hypocrisy is evident in Western societies(Runciman, 2008). Empirical research in Western societies suggests thatpower can lead people not only to cheat more, but also to overlook theirown moral transgressions (Lammers, Stapel & Galinsky, 2010). Evidence also shows that power can lead people to act and perceive theworld in self-serving ways (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003;
Whitson, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld & Cadena, 2013;
Overbeck & Droutman, 2013; Overbeck, Neale & Govan, 2010) and to
become blind to the perceptions and interests of others (Galinsky,
Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006; Lammers, Gordijn & Otten, 2008). Influencing those in power to sense the illegitimacy of their own position
can result in some constraints (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn & Otten,2008), but this is difficult for the powerless to do.
Thus, one of the psychological obstacles to democratization is thetendency for leaders to become corrupted by power. In order to limit the

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135

possibility of this happening and society more broadly being protectedagainst corruption, a number of contextual conditions have to be met.
These conditions include measures to ensure leaders are responsive
to the wishes of citizens and are removable through popular will;other conditions are rule of law, freedom of speech, minority rights,
independent judiciary, universal suffrage, some measure of proceduraland equitable justice, and meritocracy. The legal and ‘formal law’conditions in areas such as rule of law can only be adequately met
when the population collectively acquires certain psychologicalcharacteristics (as discussed in Moghaddam, 2016).

Concluding Comment
About 2,500 years ago, Plato (trans. 1987, Book III 415b, c. d) argued
that social mobility is essential for the survival of societies. If talented
children born to ‘copper’ parents are not allowed to rise up, and untalented children born to ‘gold’ parents are not allowed to fall to lower
levels, society will collapse. Extreme capitalism relies on talented
individuals being motivated by personal greed to excel, whereas
communism attempts to develop citizens who would be motivated to
excel solely by collective interests. Actualized democracy requires abalanced approach between these two extremes.
The challenge in social organization is to achieve a balance between
individual and collective incentives. Too much emphasis on ‘greed isgood’ leads to financial crashes, as occurred in 2008-2009; too muchemphasis on collective ownership and group incentives results in thekind of lackluster economic performance as witnessed in many communist states. A balanced approach requires sufficient social mobility: as
Plato argued, individual talent must be allowed to circulate on the basisof personal motivation to a minimum degree, otherwise society will
collapse. From this perspective, the growing concentration of wealth infewer hands (Atkinson, 2015; Dorling, 2014; Piketty, 2014), andthe stagnation of social mobility are warning signs for capitalist
democracies (Moghaddam, 2016).
The 21st century is characterized by competition and conflict between
forces attempting to move human societies toward less and more openness. China and Russia, supported by lesser dictatorships such as Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and North Korea, are leading the efforts to move us awayfrom openness. Capitalist democracies, including those of North America and the European Union, continue to be relatively open. However, it
is not clear what the situation will be by the end of the 21st century.
Globalization is associated with radicalization of different types and the136the psychology of democracy

strengthening of anti-democratic forces (Moghaddam, 2008), and it may
be that by the end of the present century the world has moved further
toward dictatorship rather than democracy. Psychological science has avitally important role to play in helping human societies move toward
greater openness.
The achievement of actualized democracy requires psychologicalchanges in cognitive and behavioral styles. The psychological citizen
can become capable of constructively participating in, and supporting, ademocracy through acquiring a variety of cognitive and behavioral skills
and practices. I discussed a number of such psychological characteristics needed at the individual level. A challenge is that such psychological characteristics cannot be acquired quickly; they are acquired far
more slowly than the time it takes to topple a government or write a new
constitution. In practice, this means that even major revolutions only
manage to achieve first- and second-order change; they fail to achieve
third-order change, a change of systems. The struggle for open societiesthat began about 2,500 years ago in Athens continues today, but now
psychological science can put into effect more powerful tools in favorof the pro-democracy forces. This requires that psychology itself first
becomes more open and pro-democracy.
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Author Biography
Fathali M. Moghaddam is a professor, Department of Psychology, and Director, Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, Georgetown University. Prof. Moghaddam
was born in Iran, educated from an early age in England, and worked for the United
Nations and for McGill University before joining Georgetown in 1990. He has
researched a broad range of topics, toward developing psychology for and of humankind. His publications include, Understanding the Self and Others: Explorationsin Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity (2013), The New Global Insecurity (2010),
and Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Implications for Democracy in Global
Context (2008). He has also authored the companion volumes The Psychology ofDictatorship (2013) and The Psychology of Democracy (2016).