A PRESENTATION ON THE HISTORY
OF THE COQUITLAM WATERSHED AND RIVER
FROM 1898 - 1914,
FOR THE PORT MOODY ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY,
ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 6, 1994
RESEARCHED, WRITTEN, AND PRESENTEDBY WILL KOOP.

Coquitlam Lake in the late 1910s. B.C. Hydro Archives photo.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction

3

2. The B.C. Electric Railway Company

4

3. The First Coquitlam Dam and Tunnel(A) The Tunnel(B) Protection of the Coquitlam Forest(C) The Coquitlam Dam and the Fisheries

5
6
8
10

4. The Proposal and the Responses

12

5. The BCERC takes on Governmental Bodies(A) Water Diversion Legislation(B) Fisheries(C) Water Rights

13
15
16
18

6. Clearing Coquitlam Lake

19

7. The New Forest Reserve21

8. Conclusion

24

9. Epilogue

26[Note: most references in this report are from internal Vancouver Power Company correspondence
files, being a part of The B.C. Electric Railway Co. collection, donated to the U.B.C. Special
Collections Library. Footnotes #23 and #24 were mistakenly not included.]

Newly constructed Coquitlam Reservoir water supply intake, around 1912. B.C. Hydro Archives photo.

2

1. INTRODUCTION
Tonight is really the first occasion that I am addressing the public about some of my continuingresearch on the history of the Greater Vancouver watersheds. And it is also the first time that I am
presenting recent research from the turn of the Century on the history of the Coquitlam watershed
and the British Columbia Electric Railway Co. (BCERC), the period that I’ve been asked to speak
about.
There are literally thousands of pages of information from their old files on the Coquitlam
watershed and river, and the forgotten stories involve many details, characters, complexities, andeven a few controversial episodes. So, tonight I am going to try and boil it all down by telling you
about what happened to the Coquitlam Lake and River from about the year 1900 to 1914; what
happened to New Westminster City’s and their municipal partners’ water supply; what happened tothe salmon, steelhead, and fresh water fish of the Coquitlam; and what happened to the Coquitlam
watershed forests.
I’d like to begin by reading a quotation from a BCERC ad in the Financial Times, dated
September 25th, 1909:“Under rows of industrial stars, and before the passing and repassing city, suburban andinterurban trams of the B.C. Electric Railway Co., stood an Indian and an electrical engineer.
That scion of a passing race, yet one of Vancouver’s 100,000, there alone in Carrall Square
before the home of this first and greatest electric railway and power development company inwestern Canada, was obviously in dumb amazement at the electrical energy thus displayed in
but two of its countless forms, and perhaps reflecting, in his own way, upon the changed
industrial and social conditions compared with his papoose days.
The engineer was with a friend. They were also reflecting in their way.
“I’ll venture that he knows as much about it, this mighty power of electricity, as we do,”observed the friend.
“Hardly,” smiled the engineer. “While we have not yet solved the mystery of electrical power,
we at least know how to produce it. Our Siwash friend may know, in his native way, that the
sun’s rays, the primary source of energy, lift the water from the sea level to the clouds and this,falling in rain, gives us our plant and forest growth, and eventually our coal. But there his
simple knowledge and imagination ends. He does not realize that there are two forms of coal,
black and white.”“White coal! What is that?”“White coal is the greatest of all British Columbia’s great assets, the most plentiful of all its
resources, and I will venture the chief element of its vast potential wealth.”“But what is it?”3

“It is hydro-electricity or, plainly, snow - the installations where water power, the cheapest andmost satisfactory power of to-day, is obtained from accumulated snow on the mountains, andby the sun’s rays converted into streams.”“The eternal snow on the mountains up the North Arm of Burrard Inlet is the white coal which
is your Coquitlam and your Bunzten Lakes, connected by the longest water power tunnel in theworld and, thus harnessed by the B.C. Electric Railway Co., brought down here in light, heatand power.”
After the discovery of electricity in the 19th century, it was quickly learned that the movementof water could be ‘harnessed’ to produce this new and mysterious form of energy. Stock markets
began sky rocketing as corporations poured investor-financed capital for ambitious hydro-electricalprojects in North America. Competition was fierce, rivalries ensued, and partnerships weredeveloped. But the main problem for these companies was to acquire guaranteed and approved
water flows from governments for their projects. Controversies naturally arose throughout thecontinent because people were learning that building dams, flooding lands, and tampering withrivers had certain consequences. In order to control public opinion the new ‘electric’ companies
devised slick advertisements and campaigns by rationalizing the economic ‘benefits’ as compared tothe ‘cost’ of the natural consequences.

2. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ELECTRIC RAILWAY CO.
The BCERC, being the predecessor of B.C. Hydro, established itself in B.C. in 1897 and“acquired the electric street railways and electric power facilities which local entrepreneurs had
initiated in Vancouver, New Westminster, and Victoria.” 1 And unlike previous entrepreneurs thisnew company, through the influence of its director Horne-Payne, had financial backing from British
capitalists in London, which, at the turn of the century, was “the centre of the most extensive
financial empire in the world”. 2 At the close of the 19th century Greater Vancouver’s meagre
electrical demands were furnished by the operation of a steam power plant. Prior to the Company’s
arrival, other local companies had been unsuccessful in attempting to establish hydro-electric power
projects, specifically on the local Capilano and Seymour Creeks, because the rights of the Water
Works Companies were either too protective of the local population’s water supplies or too
expensive to purchase.
In 1898 the BCERC hired the local engineering firm of Hermon & Burwell, and also a
consultant from a San Francisco engineering firm, to search for a hydro-electric facility and a water
source close to Vancouver in order to provide a cheaper and more powerful alternative forgenerating electricity than steam power. Hermon & Burwell devised an ingenious scheme to divert
water from Coquitlam Lake via a very long tunnel into Trout Lake, alternatively called Lake
Beautiful, and later re-named Buntzen Lake. From there the water would then drop verticallyalmost 400 feet through a number of large diameter pipes to a generating plant on the south-eastern
shore of Indian Arm. The Coquitlam/ Trout Lake proposal was quickly understood to be a great
financial prospect for the London-based investors, so they launched an immediate hydrological and
1

The British Electric Railway Company, 1897-1928; A British Company in British Columbia, by Patricia
Roy. PhD. Thesis, Department of History, University of B.C., March 1970, p.ii.

2

Ibid., p.ii.

4engineering investigation to determine the future potential of this proposal. And under an Act of the
B.C. legislature, the BCERC then formed a subsidiary to take charge of this project and christened it
the Vancouver Power Co. (VPC).
An observation station was constructed in the year 1900 at the mouth of Coquitlam Lake todetermine hydrological and meteorological information: maximum and minimum flows from thelake in cubic feet per second; maximum and minimum temperatures each day. Snow levels werealso recorded in different portions of the watershed. It was determined that the maximum available
run-off was about 36,000 miner’s inches, and the minimum about one quarter of that. The
conversion to cubic feet per second (cfs) used at that time was a Californian measurement, and
5,000 miner’s inches equalled roughly 125 cfs. So, in essence, the maximum volume in cfs is 900.
Coquitlam Lake was about 7 miles in length and had a surface area of about 2190 acres. They
estimated that 90% of the Coquitlam watershed run-off came into the upper two thirds of the Lake.
The difference in altitude between Coquitlam and Trout Lake was estimated to be 32 feet, with
Coquitlam Lake at 432 feet above sea level - just enough to divert its waters. And the capacity forthe first tunnel was made to transport almost 15,000 miner’s inches, or about 375 cfs.

BCERC’s clay model of the Coquitlam Lake Diversion to Lake Beautiful, and power house on Indian Arm.

3. THE FIRST COQUITLAM DAM AND TUNNEL.
The VPC’s only obstacle, in its initial attempts to access water rights from the government,
was that Coquitlam Lake was the source of New Westminster City’s water supply. The Coquitlam
Water Works Company (CWWC), owned by local businessmen, was first established through alegislative Act on April 1st, 1886, along with a long and detailed list of requirements, and had been
given certain rights and the responsibility to construct and maintain water works to provide New
Westminster City its water from the mouth of Coquitlam Lake. This, however, did not deter the
VPC as they tried to buy out the CWWC’s Charter in 1898, but were advised not to purchase it,
because, it was argued, even if they did acquire the Charter, it would not allow them to use water forwater power. But later, in November 1902, the VPC did purchase the Charter for $6,000, about525% of the original investment. This gave the VPC not
only the responsibility of the water works for New
Westminster City, is also provided bargaining power for
their special interests.
The VPC took a cautious look at the local politicalsituation and enticed New Westminster City Council topermit them to construct a very small dam that would
raise the lake merely five feet, as, they argued, thiswould give the City a little more water pressure and asteadier supply of water. And besides, they were only
going to syphon off a small proportion of the available
water flow. The VPC also promised that they would
provide cheaper electricity for the City and that its
parent, the BCERC, would upgrade their electric railway
system in the New Westminster area. This sort ofbargaining removed the political opposition for the
VPC’s application to the provincial government for theirpower project. So, by an Order-in-Council in February,
1902, the VPC was granted a water licence for 5000
miner’s inches, about one half of the minimum flow
during the dry season run-off, or about one seventh theflow during high water.
(A). THE TUNNEL.
By the summer of 1902, after the Coquitlam/Buntzen project received the go ahead, the VPC
started a three year project of building a tunnel 12,776 feet, or some 2.4 miles in length, from thesouthwest shore of Coquitlam Lake to the northeast shore of Trout Lake. I’m not exactly certain, as
I’m still trying to find out, but I believe this was the first tunnel of its kind and length constructed in
North America. It was anengineering marvel, anamazing feat.
In those days jackhammers, operated by steam
power, were already in use,
and were used by crews of men
in three eight-hour shifts, todrive a tunnel in two
directions: one from the eastand the other from the west.
The broken rock wastransported by a narrow
railway system out of either
end as the tunnels were only 9
by 9 feet square. It was very hard work, especially when they hit intermittent sections of blue
granite, a denser form of granite. The men were paid an average of 25 cents per hour. Working
conditions were cold, wet, and cramped. There were a number of related accidents and fatalities,
6and even though the men wanted to take time off to mourn the dead and attend funerals, thecompany foremen frequently insisted they keep right on working.
On April 27th, 1905,
the tunnels met and it wascalculated that they “metfair and square, the error in
the line being 7/8 of an inch
and the levels 3 inches.” 3
Two months later the VPC
dedicated the tunnel andtheir generating plant with
an official ceremony.
There were 200 guests
invited to the opening
ceremony:“The premier, chief justice,several cabinet ministers,
mayors of three cities withmost of the Aldermen, several
leading lawyers, the mostprominent business men, bankmanagers, merchants, city
officials, engineers. Some of
our largest customers and one
or two local shareholders were
specially invited.”“After an inspection of theworks (at the Power Housestation on Indian Arm) thewater was turned on throughTunnel construction residential and maintenance buildings.
the tunnel by the Lieutenant
Governor by means of a golden
key bearing a suitable inscription, and the appearance of the water at “Lake Buntzen” portal
was greeted by most enthusiastic cheering.” 4This was also the occasion when the VPC christened Trout Lake Buntzen Lake, after Johannes
Buntzen, the Director of the VPC.

3

May 6, 1905. Sperling to Hugh Cooper.

4

June 14, 1905. Hope to Binder.

7

(B). PROTECTION OF THE COQUITLAM FOREST.
A number of months before the completion of the tunnel, a logging company, Ironside, Rennie& Campbell, had proposed a scheme to the Mayor of New Westminster to shoot four foot sectionsof cedar shingle bolts through the tunnel, and then float the wood to their existing mill beside
Buntzen Lake. This very same company had been contracted by tender to build the tunnel, and after
living and working for two and a half years on Coquitlam Lake, the logging bosses speculated on
the potential of the rich and untouched Coquitlam forest for their mill. Though New Westminster
Council were somewhat startled by the proposition, Director Buntzen was passionately opposed tologging in the Coquitlam watershed. F.R. Glover, the VPC’s local manager, wrote to the Mayorthat:“I agree with you that it would be a very risky thing to run timber through the tunnel, for therisk of blocking it would be considerable. I understood, however, from Mr. Buntzen that hewould object in the strongest possible manner to the timber around Coquitlam being removed,
and I feel satisfied that even if the City of New Westminster were agreeable to its removal, it
would be a great mistake for our Company to consent, without a hard fight, to the deforestationof that region.” 5

R.H. Sperling, the VPC’s General Superintendent, wrote James Leamy, the Crown’s Timber
Agent, in early May 1905, regarding the concerns of the VPC’s responsibility and investment:“As you are aware, our Company has already spent a million and a half dollars developing thiswater power, and will continue to expend money from time to time on this enterprise as thetowns of Westminster and Vancouver increase in population. It is, therefore, a matter of the5

February 25, 1905. Glover to Sperling.

8

greatest importance to us that nothing should be done to diminish the water supply. The City of
New Westminster is also interested in seeing that their water supply is not interfered with.” 6“I consider that the removal of timber would seriously
affect the present annual rainfall in the vicinity ofCoquitlam Lake. I consider that if logging or shingle
bolt cutting were carried on, that the danger from fire
sweeping that part of the country, would be very great
indeed, owing to the amount of debris left on the
ground, as a result of such work and that if a fire wereto spread over the area immediately surrounding
Coquitlam Lake, destroying the timber thereon, it
would undoubtedly affect the storage of the water there,
by reason of lessening the precipitation and causing theearly melting of the snow which falls in considerable
quantities on the hills in that vicinity during the wintermonths. The snow, if protected by the shade of timber,would run off slowly but if the timber were removed,
the snow would go off with a rush, carrying with it allkinds of debris, depositing same in the Lake, thereby
defiling the water supply of the Cities which consume
it. The removal of the timber would, I consider, lessen
the storage of water, by at least 25 per cent.” 7First water intake just north of the dam.

Sperling also wrote to Hugh Cooper in New York, one of their consulting engineers, about thevery subject:“The City of New Westminster have certain riparian rights on Coquitlam Lake, as they derive
their water supply from it, and it is possible that concerted action on the part of the City of
New Westminster and our Company might induce the Government to place a reserve on thetimber in this valley.” 8The logging company continued to lobby and pressure New Westminster City Council, and by
December 1905 came to some arrangement so that they could apply to the government to log theupper Coquitlam Lake forest. When the government posted notice of this 12,200-acre area fortender in January 1906, the Vancouver Power Company strongly opposed the notice and thegovernment withdrew its consent.

6

May 10, 1905. Buntzen to Leamy.

7

May 13, 1905. James Leamy to Sperling.

8

May 6, 1905. Sperling to Hugh Cooper.

9

(C). THE COQUITLAM DAM AND THE FISHERIES.
Work on the first Coquitlam dam began in April 1904 and was completed by September 1905.
The comparatively small dam was built in two stages, western and eastern halves, so that theCoquitlam River could continue to flow during construction without building a diversion channel.
The Federal Department of Fisheries was quite concerned about the dam and the local
Fisheries officer, C.B. Sword, had been closely monitoring the effects it would have on the salmon
migration route. Thousands of salmon ran the Coquitlam in spawning season. During a public
discussion in February 1909 Stott, the Superintendent of the Waterworks, commented that:“anyone who made the trip around Coquitlam Lake in those days could not see hundreds, but
thousands upon thousands, of dead salmon scattered along the beach and floating in the water”,... (and stated that) “it was sometimes necessary in the Fall of the year to send men with pitchforks to clear away the dead and rotting salmon which had accumulated at the intake.” 9

Photo of Coquitlam
dam, taken sometime
between 1905 and
1911. Fish Ladder onright of dam. B.C.
Hydro archives.

Because the dam was to raise the Coquitlam Lake by 5 feet there was little concern for thedestruction of spawning channels in the tributaries to the Lake. A fishway was installed on theeasterly part of the dam in the summer of 1905 which was “well drift bolted to the dam and made towithstand the rough treatment which it (would) be subjected to at freshets.” 10 About a half a year
after the completion of the dam, Sword had carefully investigated the movement of water throughthe fish ladder and asked the VPC to modify the fish ladder to improve it by adding two “extra
pockets or steps”. 11 Sword had noted that:
9

February 8, 1909. 10 page VPC report.

10

Coquitlam dam status report - week ending Sept.3, 1905.

11

May 8, 1906. H.M. Burwell to Sperling.

10

“the foot coming out of the second apron instead of as anticipated ... into a pool three or four
feet deep, [created] quite a different condition of affairs from what was counted on when the
Department accepted the plan adopted.” 12
For a short period of time the VPC’s dam was accommodating Greater Vancouver’s electrical
power, New Westminster City’s water supply, and the Federal Fisheries Department. But all that
was about to change.

Photo of ten salmon caught
below fish ladder.

View of the first small
dam above the eastern
stream channel.

12April 25, 1906. C.B. Sword to Sperling.

11

4. THE PROPOSAL AND THE RESPONSES.
In September of 1906 the Coquitlam dam was discovered to be leaking. A few months
previous, managing director Sperling had written that he thought the dam to be “the best constructed
Dam in the Province, if not in Canada.” 13 Word soon got out and the Coquitlam Council threatened
legal action should the dam break and jeopardize the lives and property of its District. The leak was
fixed but began leaking again in early 1908, and leaking badly. One of the VPC’s staff had
estimated that the amount of water leaking was equal to that being transported through their tunnel
to Buntzen Lake. This time the London office was faced with the expenditure of refitting the entire
dam so they decided to implement their internal plans to further raise Coquitlam Lake.
Years back the VPC envisioned raising the Lake in their original plans to about the 30-footlevel. But when they hired J.D. Schuyler in the summer of 1908, a renowned engineer with aresume bursting with experience on hydraulic and concrete dams in the United States, he suggested
they raise the dam another 70 feet. Schuyler had quickly calculated the potential for more andreliable hydropower from a larger reservoir, a proposal that of course delighted the head office inLondon. This would almost triple the amount of water flowing into Buntzen Lake. It was this
proposal that started a ruckus over the next three years with the Coquitlam and New Westminster
municipalities, the provincial, and federal governments.
Coquitlam Council and certain municipal ratepayers had their lawyers advise the VPC that they
better not raise the height of the dam. Some logging firms were also opposed to any reduction or
danger to their operations that depended on floating wood down the Coquitlam River. A petition
was sent to Victoria that stated:“Two years ago the Municipal Council called the attention of your Department to this dam, but
nothing has been done by the Government, and should a disaster happen, who would be toblame?” 14
The VPC had Schuyler present his authoritative comments to Coquitlam and New Westminster City
Council about the safety of the dam, the benefits of more water pressure for the water supply, andproposals to upgrade the water intake. He was quite effective, and the VPC quickly learned to have
him present during many future meetings in Victoria and Ottawa.
When the VPC applied to Victoria for a Certificate of Approval, another petition was sent to
the Lieutenant Governor from Coquitlam Council. Seven concerns were raised in the petition, threeof which I will recite:“1. The waters of Coquitlam Lake are not within the jurisdiction of the Province, nor are theywaters to which the Water Clauses Consolidation Act, 1897 is applicable.”“2. That a grant under the said Act cannot be made so as to effect the vested rights of riparianowners or so as to interfere with navigation and fisheries, and the building of such dam and thediversion of such water would interfere with all such rights.”

13
14

May 10, 1906. Sperling to Hermon & Burwell.
November 19, 1908. F.J. Fulton to Glover.

12“5. That the construction of the proposed dam would practically dry up the River as the only
reservation for the use of the public is 50 miners inches of water.” 15

Housing complex during construction of second dam.

5. THE BCERC TAKES ON GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
Pressure was mounting on the VPC. New Westminster City Council obtained an engineering
consultant to investigate the feasibility of the new dam proposal regarding its safety and sanitary
standpoint. The Federal Justice Department interceded in January 1909, and objected to the
proposal as it would interfere with both navigation and the fisheries. And in what was to become
one of the more fascinating and documented accounts of political wrangling, the VPC’s London
secretary wrote:“It seems that this question of heightening the dam is one of the most important we have before
us, and that to achieve this end we should spare neither energy nor money.” 16
The BCERC did have a lot of money and they also had some of the best legal council. It had
important and influential friends in high places, both in Victoria and Ottawa, and secretly donatedfinancial contributions to political parties.
The VPC had organized itself to regain support and footing within the Coquitlam and New
Westminster Districts. It was largely successful in these matters and got prominent businessmen to
back their proposal.
15
16

December 9, 1908. Petition to the Lieutenant Governor.
January 14, 1909. Kidd to Sperling.

13

“As we have been unable to make any amicable arrangement with Mayor Lee of New
Westminster, we have endeavoured to bring pressure to bear on him through influential
citizens, and through the medium of the Press, to force him to make a reasonable stand.” 17
The VPC even negotiated with the timber bosses to promise flows for their river runs at two
times in the year, during spring and fall run-off (a deal which they later withdrew). The VPC werealso able to obtain leaked copies or inside information on draft agreements and draft legislation from
Victoria and Ottawa. They kept close watch on key players from local municipalities, from
Victoria, and from Ottawa. The BCERC also arranged to silence the newspapers during critical
periods. Confidential cabled correspondence was sent in secret code, what was known as Bentley’s
Code. And when it came to dealing with Ottawa they had the cunning influence of their lawyer
Andrew Thompson, a former M.P., who played the key role in the VPC’s pursuits to succeed inraising the dam. Managing Director Sperling wrote Thompson in February of 1909:“... the fact remains that the Dominion Government has taken a hand in the game now andmust be gotten rid of if at all possible, and the Company invokes your assistances for thispurpose, and expects you to leave no stone unturned to accomplish this.” 18

Beginning of construction period of second dam.

Thompson’s big task was to work on the Federal minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver. He got
Oliver to re-interpret the original Orders-in-Council for water flow rights to mean that the VPC wasentitled to use “ALL the water from Coquitlam Lake, and that there would be none to “spill” down(their) spillway.” 19 He also got Oliver to cancel the 1901 Order-in-Council land grant which
17

August 31, 1910. Sperling to Kidd.

18

February 24, 1909. Sperling to Andrew Thompson.

19

March 9, 1909. Thompson to Sperling.

14

protected the immediate forest around Coquitlam Lake for New Westminster City’s water supply, sothat the VPC could apply for certain lands on the Lake. This move later launched a supreme court
action by New Westminster City in April 1910, an action which remained unsettled until 1913. And
during these court proceedings the minister of the Interior actually provided confidential
government documents to the VPC:
“Mr. Oliver tells me that these constitute the whole of the material upon which Council acted
in reaching its decision. Permit me to call your attention to the fact that these documents are
extremely confidential, and have been so marked by Mr. Oliver himself. Make all the use you
like of the material therein contained, but do not let them out of your possession, and above all
do not quote from them or refer to them in framing your defence. I a quite sure you would notthink of doing either, but the Minister was so very particular in handing them over to me that I
think it best to be very definite.” 20

Diverson tunnel outlet at Buntzen Reservoir.

(A). WATER DIVERSION LEGISLATION.
Now that all kinds of matters were being investigated by the federal Justice Department it was
discovered that when the VPC built its first tunnel and diverted some of the Coquitlam flow, they
were in contravention of federal legislation. The London secretary wrote in a letter marked“Private”:“Mr. Oliver stated that there is a Dominion Act providing that any water taken from a river
must return to the river. This, of course, would be impossible in our case as the water will flow
through Lake Buntzen into Burrard Inlet. If this is so it has presumably been illegal for us in
the past to take water from the Coquitlam River.” 21
20

April 30, 1910. Thompson to Sperling.

21

July 29, 1909. Kidd to Sperling.

15

“In view of the fact that your present diversion
is illegal, as stated in your cable, and thepresent diversion is only “condoned”, I
certainly think that Oliver should be pressed topass amending legislation at the next session of
Parliament of such a nature as will make yourproperty rights secure in the future, when a new
Minister or a new government will arise.” 22
So, in order to protect their interests, the
BCERC got the legislation altered. It is
important to note that had this legislation stood
the test of time it would also have prevented the
BCERC’s Bridge River power project in the
1920s, which diverts water to Seton Lake and,and the controversial Alcan project on the
Nechako, from ever occurring.

Photo. Intake wall construction on west side of
Coquitlam Lake. Intake at bottom middle ofstructure.

(B). FISHERIES.
The federal government had tough laws within its mandate to protect rivers regarding navigationand fisheries. On navigation concerns the VPC had already negotiated with the logging companies
to float their timber in spring and fall, but they were weren’t as easily fortunate facing the Fisheries
department.
Because the VPC had secretly planned to shut off the entire flow at the Coquitlam dam, it
realized that should a long fish ladder be installed it would lose out on the extra supply of water for
its dam. It then began to reason to the three levels of government that fish were detrimental to New
Westminster’s water purity and that its hydro project was of more economic benefit to the Lower
Mainland than the fish could ever hope to be. Oliver, the federal minister of the Interior, sent thefollowing memo to the B.C. Governor General:

22

August 3, 1909. Thompson to London.

16

“The undersigned is advised that salmon have in the past ascended this river in large numbers
to spawn in the Lake but that they afterwards die and consequently prove detrimental to thewaters as a source of domestic supply. The undersigned is of the opinion that no provision forthe passage of fish is necessary in the new works, and that such provision may be dispensed
with, subject to the approval of the proper officers of the Marine & Fisheries Department.” 23
Despite the fact that federal government bureaucrats were bowing to the VPC’s persistentarguments, the Fisheries Department had come up with a report criticizing the hydro project that thebureaucrats had to initially recognize. Thompson wrote after a meeting:“The Dep. Min. intimated that his official would report solely with respect to the effect on the
Fisheries, and personally he thought there could be no doubt that the building of so high a dam
would practically destroy the run of fish up to the Lake. He said further that you might be able
to make it appear that the fulfilment of the Company’s project would be much more beneficial
than would the loss to the Fisheries be detrimental, in which case consent would probably begiven.” 24The problem the Fisheries Officer faced, and still faces today, was that despite his critique andconcerns someone back in Ottawa had the power to re-interpret his recommendations. Thompson
had been ordered by the BCERC to watch for the Fisheries Department report:“The attitude of the Fishery Board is now the only thing that is causing us any anxiety, and I
shall be obliged if you will wire me at once the substance of the inspector’s report when it isreceived in Ottawa.” 25
On October 28, 1909, Thompson, after failing to meet with the Minister of Fisheries, met with
the Deputy Minister and wrote the following to the Vancouver office:“He told me that it was against the Custom of the Department to show the reports received
from its officers, but he was good enough to say that this particular report was somewhat
noncommittal in character, and that while their officer did not specifically recommend the
granting of our application, still he did not take very strenuous ground against it.”“He certainly gave me the impression that we need expect no serious opposition from him, but
he advised me to see the Minister, which I will certainly do.” 26
Three days later local manager Glover wrote back to Thompson directing him to take sternmeasures:“I have reason to believe that this report will not be favourable to our proposition ... For thisreason it will be necessary for you to use your very best influence with the Minister, pointing
out to him that it cannot be shown that the Coquitlam River is now, or ever was, of any special
value to the fisheries in British Columbia, and as a matter of fact, such salmon as did enter theLake at one time, have since been excluded by the erection of the Dam which was placed there
23
24
25
26

October 6, 1909. Glover to Thompson.
October 28, 1909. Thompson to Glover.

17

in 1904. Further, to permit the salmon (which are largely of an inferior species) to enter theLake, would mean serious injury to the New Westminster water supply.” 27
Thompson returned a letter that same day after meeting with Marine and Fisheries Minister
Brodeur and happily concluded, “we would be experiencing no further interference from his
Department”. 28(C). WATER RIGHTS.
After the VPC got its first water licence for 5,000 miner’s inches in early 1902 it was privately
eager to get approval for more. Director Buntzen wrote in March 1902:“... any such move would be sure to meet with much determined resistance on the part of
New Westminster and the other Municipalities interested as it would mean that if ever they
wished to take more water from the lake we could prevent them from doing so or claim
compensation.” 29
After receiving advice “with someone in close touch with the Government”, 30 Buntzen
requested an Interim water record for 10,000 miner’s inches in March 1903, and obtained Victoria’s
approval on April 30, 1903. An interim licence could bypass the provincial government’s water
reserve in the Coquitlam watershed, which was passed to protect New Westminster’s water supply,“thereby allowing the Vancouver Power Co. to use the water so long as the City of New
Westminster does not need it.” 31
In 1909 a federal court case regarding jurisdiction over Lilloet Lake (later renamed AlloetteLake) concluded that the federal government retained jurisdiction as it fell within the 20-mile limitof the federal Railway Belt lands. The reason I mention this case is that it meant that the federal
government now had rights over the Coquitlam Lake area. In March of 1909 Andrew Thompson
wrote the following:“The Minister of Justice is down with erysipelas, has been confined to his house all week, andis likely to remain there an indefinite time. His Deputy is, however, an old and trusted official,
and I have got him to withdraw the very unfounded plea that our case has anything to do withthe conflict of jurisdiction re certain B.C. waters now being tried in the Courts. This is a big
step in advance.” 32

27

November 1, 1909. Glover to Thompson.

28

Ibid.

29

March 22, 1902. Buntzen to McPhillips & Co.

30

March 10, 1903. Sperling to McPhillips.

31

Ibid.
March 13, 1909. Thompson to Sperling.

32

18

And during the skirmish between Coquitlam, New Westminster City and the VPC, the federal
government cancelled the provincial government’s water licences and then granted almost the entire
water supply to the VPC. Local Manager Glover reported in August 1909, that:“With reference to the water rights the Minister stated that in the erection of the dam bebelieved that we would be rightfully entitled to all the water stored, and he would be inclined
to give us a grant of the whole, reserving only the water which would be withdrawn throughthe pipe of the Westminster water system. The grant, he said, would be made under theprovisions of the Dominion Water Power Act and would continue in force for some84 years.” 33
In essence the federal government, being constantly lobbied by the VPC, usurped New
Westminster City’s future rights granted by the B.C. government and re-drafted legislation giving
the VPC rights to the water within the new reservoir and almost the entire Coquitlam run-off.

Sluicing platform and delivery of sluicing material for new dam. This period created many long
periods of extreme turbidity in Coquitlam River, which residents often complained about.

6. CLEARING COQUITLAM LAKE
There was also great concern for the area which was to be flooded and the effects it would
have on causing floating debris and the quality of the water. The Lakeshore was surveyed and theyfound that about 900 acres were to be flooded, including the land originally flooded by the first dam.
It was later ordered by the federal government that the VPC had to cut all stumps down to one footabove the ground to address water quality and sanitation concerns. This was an enormous cost to
the VPC both monetarily and in terms of time. The VPC protested to the federal engineer after the
first year and managed to persuade him to alter the guidelines regarding stump height on the upper
33

August 25, 1909. Glover to Sperling.

19

areas of the new reservoir. And this is why, if you ever get the opportunity to visit the reservoir at
low water, as I have, there are so many trees and high stumps sticking out of the water.

Photo of men
cutting stumps
down to one footabove ground level.

Clearing of forest for new Reservoir level.

20Burning piles of wood debris just north of dam. Steamboat to right of center.

7. THE NEW FOREST RESERVE
As was mentioned earlier, the VPC was ardently opposed to logging in the Coquitlam. In
September 1909, three years after they had requested Victoria withdraw the area from cutting, thefederal government was about to cancel the reserve. The VPC’s local manager Glover wrote toFrank Oliver:“In the event of the Government ever deciding to sell the timber in question we desire the firstright to purchase it in order to preserve the watershed in its natural condition and also enable us
to maintain the purity of the City of New Westminster water supply. This application is madeat the present time in order to anticipate any other application which might be made by loggers
or others when the cancellation of the reserve becomes public.” 34
On March 3rd, 1910, the federal government passed an Order-in-Council creating a 56,000
acre forest reserve in the Coquitlam.
In March 1913, Challies, the superintendent of the Water Power Branch, confidentially suggested toConway, the VPC’s chief engineer, that the government consider making a new National Park:“If the Coquitlam Reserve were made a Dominion Park, under the Dominion Forest Reserves
and Parks Act, and placed under the control of the Commissioner of Dominion Parks, that the34

September 8, 1909. Glover to Frank Oliver.

21

desire of the City of New Westminster for a permanent reservation under proper sanitarycontrol would be consummated. I have discussed the matter informally with Mr. Maber,Superintendent of the British Columbia Lands Branch, and with Mr. Harkin, Commissioner ofDominion Parks, of this Department. Mr. Haber had no objection to the suggestion, and I thinkstated he would discuss the matter with Mr. Taylor, the local member, and with Mr. Lee,
Mayor of N. West.... which would include at least the land now known as the Coquitlam
Reserve and probably most of the land between the North Arm and the northern limit of theRailway Belt and Pitt Lake. Such a park would not only be an attraction to the people at thecoast, but could be used to great advantage in propagating bird life and wild animals that
inhabit that district.” “It would appear to me that the final visit of Mr. Freeman to the dam
would be would be an opportune time for all those interested in the Coquitlam Dam andCoquitlam Lake waters to get together and suggest to the Government that the whole Reserve
be included in a new Dominion Park, to be known as Coquitlam Park, all of which isrespectfully submitted.” 35

In a report to superintendent Challies dated
November 4, 1913, federal engineering consultant
Freeman described a recent government decree:“The Government, by recent action, has set aside
as a National Forest Reserve, a tract of land
embracing substantially the entire watershedtributary to Coquitlam Lake, and by this means
has safeguarded it against pollution that mightcome from future human habitation or frompromiscuous lumbering operations. The area now
within the reservation is thus more than threetimes the area contained in the originalreservation, which was confined to the immediatesurroundings of the Lake. The extent of theoriginal reservation as compared to the present
reservoir is shown upon the accompanying
photograph from a Government map.” 36
Bulletin to right. Official 1910 No Trespassing
Declaration Notice by Frank Oliver, Minister of theInterior, regarding the Coquitlam Watershed Reserve:“Any unauthorized person in any manner occupying or
taking possession of any portion of these lands, or cutting
down or injuring any trees, saplings, shrubs or any
underwood, or otherwise trespassing thereon, will be
prosecuted with the utmost vigour of the law.”

35

March 27, 1913. J.B. Challies to Conway.

36

November 4, 1913. Freeman to Challies.

22

Wood-stave water pipe under construction from Coquitlam Lake.

Hydroelectric transmission line construction from Buntzen power plant at Indian Arm to Greater Vancouver.

23

8. CONCLUSION
So, in conclusion, I have told you how almost all the water rights from the Coquitlam
watershed had been questionably transferred by a vested interest out of the public’s use for hydropower. B.C. Hydro has inherited rights to 94% of the Coquitlam Reservoir water flow and the rest
to us. The GVRD has an agreement in place to rent up to 12% more of Hydro’s rights. Recently theGreater Vancouver Regional District has proposed to purchase all the water rights from B.C. Hydro
to supply needed water to Greater Vancouver’s growing population. It is a very good proposal, inthat there is a lot of water available, so much so that the proposal to raise the Seymour dam may be
put aside for quite a long time. The question must be asked though, historically, who really has thelegal water rights to the Coquitlam watershed and, consequently, does the Greater Vancouver
Regional District have to pay B.C. Hydro at all?
Secondly, we have seen how the salmon run into the Coquitlam Lake was knowingly
devastated. Over the past 20 years the Department of Fisheries and Oceans have been trying torestore and protect a portion of the historic Coquitlam salmon run. The federal fisheries staff
encountered problems regarding inadequate flows from the Coquitlam reservoir and serious
sedimentation loading from the gravel pit operations just south of the Coquitlam watershed gate. At
the end of last November B.C. Hydro had an important ceremony at the Coquitlam dam whereby
they announced the release of some additional water run-off to provide for the salmon in what used
to be the Coquitlam River, and which should really be renamed the Or Creek River. I think that wasan important ceremony, not only for B.C. Hydro, but also for some of the fish.
Thirdly, and most importantly, we owe an immense debt of gratitude to B.C. Hydro’s
predecessor, the BCERC, for having the courage and wisdom to set aside and protect the Coquitlam
watershed forests. In my earlier research it had always troubled me why, out of the threewatersheds, the Coquitlam was undeveloped. Not only did the BCERC ensure us a fully functioning
and pristine watershed for the public’s water supply, but they also left us a sanctuary for our
heritage, one of the only remaining portions of Lower Mainland’s magnificent old growth forests.
Unfortunately, much of the BCERC’s foresight came to ruin when the Greater Vancouver Water
Board and local politicians consented to commercially log the Coquitlam watershed, which began in
1973, just 21 years ago. It has been an enormous tragedy for Greater Vancouver, as I have tried to
explain some of this in my April manuscript, Wake Up Vancouver. Because of the Greater
Vancouver Water District’s tight and almost secretive control over public access, concerned
members of the public have not been allowed access to scrutinize and comprehend what has been
going on in the Coquitlam and the other two watersheds, the Capilano and Seymour. Because of myresearch and lobbying the Water District, they were kind enough to provide a tour for me into the
Coquitlam last October. It was a good and an important visit for me and I hope that I can continue
to return to learn more about the area and its forests and to also learn more about the Seymour andCapilano watersheds.

24

Final phase of Coquitlam dam construction. Photo taken May 20, 1913.

Power House station at Indian Arm. Intake pipes from Buntzen Reservoir provide water pressure forturbines.

25

9. EPILOGUE
I’d like to end by getting back to the “Siwash” Indian referred to in the quote at the beginning.
What he was no doubt contemplating was “what is really going on here, and how can I get my landback which was stolen from me and my people?”At the end of the 1970s, when B.C. Hydro was doing repairs on the Coquitlam dam, they had
to draw down the Reservoir to a very low level, and two student archeologists conducted a brief
study on old Salish Nation occupation sites during this time. They discovered that the sites were
between 5,000 and 7,000 years old. In a chapter devoted to this topic, now in press, it states:“The primary significance of the Coquitlam Lake sites remain their location, and the fact thatthey represent the first substantive prehistoric site discoveries from the coastal mountain lakes
north of the Lower Mainland.” 37
These 6 sites are all on the Cedar Creek mouth area, a sub-drainage system in the southeast
portion of the watershed, photos of which I have on my display marked in yellow. This was once anextensive flat area, and one of the only ones alongside the original Lake. It was an area that could
be described as an idyllic village site, right next to Cedar Creek.

37

Early Human Occupation in British Columbia, ed. by Roy L. Carlson, in press. Chapter 16, Coquitlam
Lake: An Early Lithic Component in the Lower Mainland, by Milt Wright.

26