Modality and the Infinitive:
Towards the Semantics of the Infinitive Marker To and the Complementizer
For as a Modalizer

byRyoto Morita

Submitted to Foreign Studies Division in Partial Fulfillment of theRequirements for the Degree of Doctor of English Linguistics
at
Kansai Gaidai University

2019Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Harumi Sawada, mydissertation adviser, for his expertise and constant support, for his energy and curiosity towards
language, and for a number of valuable comments and suggestions that have motivated me tocomplete this study. I feel very privileged to have been able to study under him for over six years.
I would also like to extend my great gratitude to Professor Yukio Oba, my co-adviser, for histhoughtful advice, for his expertise and professionalism, and for his insightful comments thathave contributed to improving this study.
Besides that, I would like to thank Professor Tetsuji Machida, the president of Kwansai English
and American Literary Society of Japan, for having provided me with a chance to present mystudy and given me a lot of helpful comments.
I am also very thankful to my graduate school colleagues for the stimulating discussions andall the fun we have had for the last five years.
Last but not least, my special thanks go to my friends and the members of my family. I thankthem for their moral support and warm encouragements.

iTable of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Preliminary Illustrations .................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1. Complementizer ........................................................................................................ 2
1.1.2. Interrelationship between Complementizers and Matrix Elements ............................. 4
1.1.3. For Virsus To ............................................................................................................ 5
1.2. Aim ................................................................................................................................... 9
1.3. Organization ................................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 2 Selected Previous Studies on Modality and the Infinitive

2.0. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 16
2.1. Selected Previous Studies on Modality ............................................................................ 16
2.1.1. Definition of Modality............................................................................................. 16
2.1.1.1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 16
2.1.1.2. Palmer’s Approach .......................................................................................... 16
2.1.1.3. Declerck’s Approach ....................................................................................... 17
2.1.1.4. Langacker’s Approach..................................................................................... 18
2.1.2. Classification of Modality ....................................................................................... 19
2.1.2.1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 19
2.1.2.2. Palmer’s Approach .......................................................................................... 20
2.1.2.3. Sawada’s Approach ......................................................................................... 21
2.2. The Semantic Relationship between Modality and the To complement ............................ 22
2.2.1. Declerck (2011)....................................................................................................... 222.3. Selected Traditional-Grammatical Appoaches to the Meaning and Use of the Infinitive ... 23
2.3.1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 23
2.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V) ................................................................................................. 23
2.3.3. Bolinger (1968) ....................................................................................................... 23
2.4. Recent Semantic Approaches to the To complement and the For Complement................. 24
2.4.1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 24
2.4.2. Quirk et al. (1985) ................................................................................................... 24ii

2.4.3. Wierzbicka (1988) ................................................................................................... 25
2.4.4. Dixon (1991)........................................................................................................... 26
2.4.5. Huddleston and Pullum (2002) ................................................................................ 27
2.4.6. Hamawand (2003) ................................................................................................... 29
Chapter 3 Wierzbicka’s (1988) Analysis and Its Problems

3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 30
3.2. To and “Wanting” ............................................................................................................ 30
3.2.1. Verbs of Volition...................................................................................................... 32
3.2.2. Verbs of Attempting ................................................................................................ 33
3.2.3. Verbs of Speech Act ................................................................................................ 34
3.3. To and “Opinion” ............................................................................................................ 36
3.4. To and “Emotion”............................................................................................................ 37
3.4.1. The For Complement and Intention......................................................................... 38
3.4.2. The For Complement and Emotional Evaluation ..................................................... 39
3.4.3. The For Complement and Intellectual Judgment ..................................................... 41
3.4.3.1. Expectability ................................................................................................... 41
3.4.3.2. The Parallelism between the For Complement and Evaluative Should ............. 42
3.5. The Semantic Difference between For and To ................................................................. 43
3.6. Problems ......................................................................................................................... 45
Chapter 4 The Infinitive Marker To as a Modalizer

4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 47
4.1.1. Aim ......................................................................................................................... 47
4.1.2. Organization............................................................................................................ 49
4.2. Modality and Non-factuality............................................................................................ 49
4.2.1. Declerck’s (2011) Definition of Modaliy ................................................................. 50
4.2.2. Some Problems on Decleck’s (2011) Definition of Modality ................................... 52
4.3. Suggestion ...................................................................................................................... 55
4.3.1. Introducation ........................................................................................................... 55
4.3.2. Counterfactual Modality.......................................................................................... 55
iii

4.3.3. The Relationship between Futurity and Modality..................................................... 57
4.3.3.1. Verbs of Volition.............................................................................................. 57
4.3.3.2. Verbs of Attempting......................................................................................... 58
4.3.3.3. Verbs of Speech Act ........................................................................................ 58
4.3.3.4. The Purpose Infinitive ..................................................................................... 59
4.3.4. Deontic Modality and Dynamic Modality ................................................................ 59
4.3.4.1. Deontic Modality ............................................................................................ 61
4.3.4.2. Dynamic Modality .......................................................................................... 62
4.3.5. Emotive Modality ................................................................................................... 63
4.3.6. Epistemic Modality ................................................................................................. 64
4.3.7. Possible Counterevidence for the Infinitive Marker To as a Modalizer ..................... 66
4.3.7.1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 66
4.3.7.2. The Resultative Infinitive ................................................................................ 66
4.3.7.3. Implicative Predicates ..................................................................................... 68
4.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 69
Chapter 5 The Resultative Infinitive and Transparentizing Phenomena

5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 70
5.1.1. Organization............................................................................................................ 71
5.2. The Semantic and Syntactic Constraint on the Resultative Infinitive ................................ 71
5.2.1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 71
5.2.2. Actualization ........................................................................................................... 72
5.2.2.1. Previous Studies and Problems ........................................................................ 72
5.2.2.2. Syntactic and Semantic Differences between the Resultative Infinitive and the
Purpose Infinitive ........................................................................................................ 74
5.2.2.2.1. Preposing of the Infinitive ....................................................................... 74
5.2.2.2.2. In Order Insertion.................................................................................... 75
5.2.2.2.3. The Scope of Sentence Negation ............................................................. 76
5.2.2.2.4. Cleft Sentence ......................................................................................... 77
5.2.2.2.5. Paraphrasing with “So That…Can/May” Construction ............................. 77iv

5.2.2.2.6. The Presence/Absence of the Complementizer For .................................. 78
5.2.2.2.7. The Possibility of “Only” Insertion .......................................................... 79
5.2.2.3. Ambiguity ....................................................................................................... 80
5.2.3. Intension ................................................................................................................. 82
5.2.3.1. The Constraint on Matrix Predicates ................................................................ 82
5.2.3.2. …, and S Do Too Construction......................................................................... 84
5.2.3.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 86
5.2.4. Expectability ........................................................................................................... 87
5.2.5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 88
5.3. Transparentizing Phenomena........................................................................................... 89
5.3.1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 89
5.3.2. Past Tense ............................................................................................................... 90
5.3.3. Present Tense .......................................................................................................... 93
5.3.4. Progressive.............................................................................................................. 94
5.3.5. Subjunctive Past Perfect .......................................................................................... 95
5.3.6. Modality ................................................................................................................. 96
5.3.7. Negation ................................................................................................................. 97
5.3.8. Others ..................................................................................................................... 98
5.3.8.1. Participial Construction ................................................................................... 98
5.3.8.2. Gerund ............................................................................................................ 99
5.3.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 100
5.4. Generalization of Transparency Phenomena .................................................................. 102
5.4.1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 102
5.4.2. Implicative Predicate Constructions....................................................................... 102
5.4.2.1. Implicative Predicates and Their Implicature ................................................. 102
5.4.2.2. Past Tense ..................................................................................................... 103
5.4.2.3. Present Tense ................................................................................................ 104
5.4.2.4. Progressive.................................................................................................... 105
5.4.2.5. Modality ....................................................................................................... 105
5.4.2.6. Negation ....................................................................................................... 106v

5.4.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 107
5.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 107
5.6. Residual Problems......................................................................................................... 108
Chapter 6 The Complementizer For as a Modalizer

6.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 110
6.1.1. Aim ....................................................................................................................... 110
6.1.2. Complementizers .................................................................................................. 114
6.1.2.1. The Definition of Complementizers ............................................................... 114
6.1.2.2. The Individual Meanings of Complementizers............................................... 115
6.1.3. Organization.......................................................................................................... 116
6.2. The Complementizer For as a Modalizer ....................................................................... 116
6.2.1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 116
6.2.2. The Definition and the Classification of Modality.................................................. 117
6.2.2.1. The Definition of Modality ............................................................................ 117
6.2.2.2. The Classification of Modality....................................................................... 118
6.2.3. The Complementizer For and Nonfactuality .......................................................... 119
6.3. Some Previous Studies .................................................................................................. 122
6.3.1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 122
6.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V) ............................................................................................... 122
6.3.2.1. The Environment of the For Complement ..................................................... 122
6.3.2.2. Counterfactuality........................................................................................... 125
6.3.3. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) ............................................................................... 125
6.3.4. Bresnan (1972) ...................................................................................................... 130
6.3.4.1. Two Types of the For Complement................................................................ 130
6.3.4.2. Counterfactuality........................................................................................... 132
6.3.5. Aijmer (1972)........................................................................................................ 133
6.3.6. Spears (1973) ........................................................................................................ 136
6.3.7. Quirk et al. (1985) ................................................................................................. 138
6.3.8. Wierzbicka (1988) ................................................................................................. 139vi

6.3.8.1. The Environment of the For Complement ..................................................... 139
6.3.8.2. The Differences between the For Complement and the To Complement ........ 139
6.3.8.3. The For Complement and Emotivity ............................................................. 140
6.3.8.3.1. The For Complement and Intention ....................................................... 140
6.3.8.3.2. The For Complement and Emotional Evaluation ................................... 142
6.3.8.3.3. The For Complement and Intellectual Judgment.................................... 144
6.3.8.3.3.1. Expectability ................................................................................. 144
6.3.8.3.3.2. The Parallelism between the For Complement and Evaluative Should........................................................................................................................ 145
6.3.9. Dixon (1991)......................................................................................................... 146
6.3.9.1. Modal (FOR) TO and Judgment TO .............................................................. 146
6.3.9.2. Syntactic Features of Modal (FOR) TO ......................................................... 147
6.3.10. Hamawand (2003) ............................................................................................... 149
6.3.10.1. The Difference between the For Complement and the To Complement ........ 149
6.3.10.2. Semantic Compatibility Analysis ................................................................. 150
6.3.11. Swan (20174) ....................................................................................................... 154
6.3.12. Problems ............................................................................................................. 155
6.4. Some Suggestions ......................................................................................................... 158
6.4.1. Reconsideration of Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s (1971) Analysis ................................ 158
6.4.1.1. Factive Emotive Predicates............................................................................ 159
6.4.1.2. Factive Non-emotive Predicates .................................................................... 161
6.4.1.3. Non-factive Emotive Predicates..................................................................... 162
6.4.1.4. Non-factive Non-emotive Predicates ............................................................. 163
6.4.2. From “The Emotivity Constraint” to “Non-epistemicity Constraint” ...................... 164
6.4.3. Emotive Modality ................................................................................................. 169
6.4.3.1. Surprise/Disdain ............................................................................................ 170
6.4.3.1.1. Surprise ................................................................................................. 171
6.4.3.1.2. Disdain.................................................................................................. 172
6.4.3.1.3. Case Studies of Likely ........................................................................... 173
6.4.3.1.3.1. Likely with Negative Modifiers...................................................... 173vii

6.4.3.1.3.2. Likely with Positive Modifiers ....................................................... 176
6.4.3.1.3.3. Likely with Equality Modifiers....................................................... 179
6.4.3.1.4. Parallelism between the Complementizer For and Emotive Should........ 180
6.4.4. Deontic and Dynamic Modalities .......................................................................... 182
6.4.4.1. Deontic Modality .......................................................................................... 182
6.4.4.2. Dynamic Modality ........................................................................................ 184
6.4.4.3. Parallelism between the Complementizer For and the Modal Should as a
Subjunctive Substitute.................................................................................. 186
6.4.5. Counterfactual Modality........................................................................................ 189
6.5. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 192
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Research

7.1. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 198
7.2. Future Research ............................................................................................................ 200

References ........................................................................................................................... 202

viii

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. Preliminary Illustrations
We can find many mysterious phenomena in infinitival constructions. Observe thefollowing examples:(1) a. It is true of America that many different ethnic groups are living side by side.
b. It is wrong that anyone should have to live on the street.
(Youth Progressive English-Japanese Dictionary)First, why is it that it is impossible for (1a), but not (1b), to be paraphrased by using a forcomplement, as in?
(2) a. *It is true of America for many different ethnic groups to be living side by side.
b. It is wrong for anyone to have to live on the street.
Second, why is it that emotive modal should can occur in the that complement in (1b), but not in(1a)?
The following sentence is ill-formed when should is emotive:(3) *It is true of America that many different ethnic groups should be living side by side.
(should is emotive)
Furthermore, observe the following sentences:(4) a. I was delighted to win.
b. I was ashamed to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))(5) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.
b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))
According to Wierzbicka (1988: 111), native speakers of English don't hesitate to accept 'factive'1

TO sentences in (4), but they often do hesitate to accept the corresponding FOR TO sentences in(5). On the other hand, she states that, if the FOR TO sentences are generic, or refer to the future,or are openly hypothetical, they are usually accepted much more readily. For example, she
adduces the following sentence, which is usually accepted as felicitous:(6) I am ashamed for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 304))
She concludes from this that the basic semantic function of FOR TO emotion sentences consists
in expressing attitudes as such rather than actual emotions.
In order to explain these linguistic facts, we have to take into consideration crucial elements,
including complementizers, the properties of for complement and to complement, the speaker’s
construal of the situation, modality, mental attitudes, emotion and the emotivity of predicates.

1.1.1. Complementizer
Since Rosenbaum (1967: 24) introduced the term “complementizer” into modern linguistics
for the first time, complementizers have generally been regarded as markers which introduce
complement clauses. However, little attention has been paid to their inherent meanings.
“Complementizers” in Rosenbaum (1967: 24), are composed of that, for, to, Poss (the possessivecase), -ing, and interrogative adverbs such as when, why, where, how, what, if, and whether. To
and -ing can be combined with for and POSS, while POSS cannot be used alone and is always
combined with -ing:(7) One of the properties of predicate complements that distinguishes them from other typesof complements is a unique set of markers taking the form of single and paired
morphemes. Such markers, including the morphemes that, for, to, Poss, ing, and others
will be referred to as complementing morphemes or simply complementizers.
(Rosenbaum (1967: 24)) (Underline is original)“Complementizers” in Rosenbaum (1967) are shown by the underlined morphemes below:2(8) a. I think that Fords are too expensive.
b. I dislike arguing about silly matters.
c. I’m concerned about John’s being so lazy.
d. The king ordered the proclamation to be read.
e. I should like very much for you to reconsider your refusal.
f. I doubt if he is going.
g. I dislike it when you do that.
h. I often wonder (about) why he does these things.
i. I know where he went.
j. Everyone understands how he does it.
k. What he is doing is useless.
l. I wonder whether he is going.
(Rosenbaum (1967: 24, 32)) (Underline is original)
It was Bresnan (1972) who refined the concept of complementizers by classifying them into
four types: that, for, WH, and if. Based on this classification, POSS and -ing are excluded fromthe class of complementizers and the examples in (8g)-(8l) are all regarded as including WH. We
assume in this dissertation that the category of “complementizer” needs to be divided into two
subcategories: the one which introduces a sentence and the other which introduces a verb phrase.
This is because to differs from the other complementizers in that it introduces a VP, a part of acomplement sentence, rather than a complement sentence itself. If we take into consideration thisfact, to can be regarded as a “VP complementizer”. This claim essentially accords withHuddleston and Pullum’s (2002) analysis which regard it as a “marker of subordination” andSawada’s (2016) analysis which regards it as a “VP complementizer” (see Bresnan (1972)).
In addition, the to complement and the for complement are independent constructions in thesense of Goldberg (1995: 4). The concept of construction is defined as follows from theviewpoint of Construction Grammar:(9) C is a construction iffdef, C is a form-meaning pair <Fi, Si> such that some aspect of Fi
or some aspect of Si is not strictly predictable from C’s component parts or from otherpreviously established constructions.
31.1.2. Interrelationship between Complementizers and Matrix Elements
We assume that all complementizers have their inherent meanings. This assumption is
supported by the fact that the kind of complementizers is chosen depending on the presence orabsence of their interrelationship with a matrix element. I will adduce three arguments in supportof this analysis:
First, in principle, the choice between whether (= WH) or that as a complementizer isdetermined depending on the presence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element(e.g. predicates such as undetermined and (not) determined):(10) a. It is still undetermined [whether she has escaped].
b. #It is still undetermined [that she has escaped].
(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 70))(11) a. It has not yet been determined [whether she has escaped].
b. It has not yet been determined [that she has escaped].
(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 70-71))
The difference of the acceptability in (10) indicates that the complementizer whether has aninterrelationship with the matrix predicate undetermined, and that that does not. Furthermore,
the difference of the acceptability in (11) indicates that both whether and that have aninterrelationship with the matrix element (not) determined. In other words, the predicate
undetermined selects a whether complement in (10), while the predicate determined selects awhether complement or a that complement in (11).
Second, the choice between that or for as a complementizer is determined depending on thepresence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element (e.g. the indicative mood):(12) a. It's rather odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting].

4b. *It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 71))
The difference of the acceptability in (12) indicates that the complementizer that has aninterrelationship with the indicative mood, shown by is in the matrix clause, and that thecomplementizer for does not.
Third, the choice between -ing or to as a complementizer is determined depending on thepresence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element (e.g. the verbs enjoy andwant):(13) a. I enjoyed swimming.
b. *I enjoyed to swim.
(14) a. *She wanted talking to him.
b. She wanted to talk to him.
(Cf. Wierzbicka (1988: 162))
The difference of the acceptability in (13) indicates that the gerundive marker -ing has aninterrelationship with the matrix verb enjoy, and that the infinitive marker to does not. The
difference of the acceptability in (14), on the other hand, shows that to has an interrelationshipwith the matrix verb want and that -ing does not.
We can conclude based on the above three facts that it is adequate to assume thatcomplementizers have their own inherent meaning because it would be difficult to give natural
explanations to these three facts without postulating their inherent meanings.

1.1.3. For Virsus To
The complementizer for has often been regarded as a marker with no inherent meaning whichis introduced to explicitly express the semantic subject of the following to complement. This
claim indicates that the underlined parts in (15) are regarded as the semantic subjects of the tocomplement and thus can be mechanically omitted when the semantic subjects do not need to be5

explicitly expressed:(15) a. It's important for you to read the first one immediately.
b. For you to give up now would be tragic.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1182)) (Underline is mine)(16) a. It's important (for us) to read the first one immediately.
b. (For us) To give up now would be tragic.
If we follow this claim, the main role will be attributed to to when the complementizer for andto co-occur. For example, in (15a), just as in (16a), it is to, but not the complementizer for, thathas an interrelationship with the matrix predicate important. Furthermore, in (15b), just as (16b),
it is to, but not the complementizer for, that interrelates with the counterfactual modal auxiliary
would.
This claim, however, is not general enough to be applied to another similar cases: in (17),where a complementizer (i.e. WH) appears before the to complement, just like in (15). In thiscase, it is clear that matrix predicate such as wonder, ask, tell, decide, and uncertain interrelateswith the complementizer WH, but not with to:(17) a. They are wondering what to do.
b. Ask him when to stop.
c. She wouldn't tell me how to finish it.
d. He's trying to decide whether to disqualify himself.
e. I am uncertain who to speak to about this.
(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 68))(17a) indicates that the matrix verb wonder interrelates with what, rather than with to. Similarly,in (17b)-(17e), the matrix elements interrelate with the complementizers (i.e. when, how, whether,who). These facts enable us to postulate the following principle on the interrelationship between
6the matrix elements and complementizers:(18) When a complementizer for and to co-occur, the former interrelates with the matrix
element.
According to this principle, when the complementizer for and to co-occur, for, but not to,interrelates with the matrix element. In other words, for, but not to, has the priority of theinterrelationship. Therefore, to regard the complementizer for as an arbitrary subject marker withno inherent meaning would violate this principle.
It should be noted that the present claim that the complementizer for has its inherent meaning
has often been made in the literature of modern linguistics: Bresnan (1972: 79-81), for example,
argues that the key to the meaning of the for complementizer lies in the meaning of the
preposition for, which is schematized as follows (see Chapter 6 for more detail):(19) for (X) → Y

X is the reason or subjective cause for Y(20) for (X) ← Y

X is the purpose or goal of Y

Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988) argues that an analysis which regards to as equivalent to the
combination of for-to is singularly unilluminating. According to her analysis, not only does it failto explain facts which at first sight seem mysterious, but it also obscures those which areotherwise relatively clear. As for the differences between the two patterns, she adduces thefollowing two differences (see Chapter 3 and 6 for more detail):First, the for complement, but not the to complement, is often unacceptable in factual contexts:(21) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.
b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))(22) a. I was delighted to win.
b. I was ashamed to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))
Second, in the to complement, but not in the for complement, the subject of the complement
7

clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause:(23) a. *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.
b. I want very much for him (*for me, *for myself) to be present.
c. It is desirable for him (for me) to be present.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 120, 125))
Third, the version with for sounds more helpless and less confident than the version withoutfor:(24) a. He wanted her to kiss him.
b. He wished for her to kiss him.
c. ?He wished her to kiss him
d. I want very much for him to come.
e. ?I want for him to come.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 109, 166))
Furthermore, notice that there are constructions in which the to complement, but not the forcomplement, occurs:(25) a. To be frank with you, I don’t think you’re competent for the job.
b. To tell the truth, I don’t agree with you.
c. Strange to say, the cat was able to speak with the owner.
d. He is, so to say, an all-round player.
(A New Comprehensive Guide to English Grammar)
The above examples imply that the for complement and the to complement are distinct
constructions.
By taking these arguments into consideration, the present dissertation assumes that the tocomplement and the for complement are distinct complements and adopts the position that thecomplementizer for, but not the infinitive marker to, plays a crucial role in the interrelationshipwith the governing elements when for and to co-occur.
8

1.2. Aim
The primary aim of the present dissertation is to examine the meanings and functions of theinfinitive marker to and the complementizer for and to demonstrate the following two points
from semantic points of view (“modalizer” refers to a grammatical category which expresses
modality):(26) The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.
(27) The complementizer for belongs to the category of “non-epistemic modalizer”.
On the basis of (26) and (27), the present dissertation takes a semantic and cognitive approach
towards the infinitive marker to and the complementizer for by adopting the viewpoint of CG(Cognitive Grammar) (Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008); Yamanashi (1995, 2000, 2009)).
Langacker (2008) states on the fundamental claim of CG as follows:(28) CG’s most fundamental claim is that grammar is symbolic in nature. What does thismean, exactly? Let us first define a symbol as the pairing between a semantic structure
and a phonological structure, such that one is able to evoke the other. A simple lexical
item, such as skunk, is thus symbolic because it resides in the pairing between ameaning and a phonological shape. Grammar, of course, is concerned with how suchelements combine to form complex expressions. The basic tenet of CG is that nothing
beyond symbolic structures need be invoked for the proper characterization of complex
expressions and the patterns they instantiate. More specifically: lexicon and grammar
form a gradation consisting solely in assemblies of symbolic structures. An immediate
consequence of this position is that all constructs validly posited for grammaticaldescription (e.g. notions like “noun”, “subject”, or “past participle”) must in some way
be meaningful.

(Langacker (2008: 5)) (Underline is mine)

Furthermore, as is stated by Yamanashi (2009: 7), the form of everyday language as symbolreflects the conceptualizer’s cognitive process whether it is a morpheme, a word, a phrase, or asentence.
9

Therefore, on the basis of CG, all constructions including the for complement and the tocomplement contain some inherent meanings.
Aijmer (1972: 86) analyzes the for complement (“for infinitive” in her term) bases on its
meaning. Observe the following examples:(29) a. I like Mary to sing.
b. I don’t like Henry to be here.1(30) It is annoying for Mary to buy so many new dresses.
According to Aijmer (1972: 86), (29a), (29b), and (30) show that the emotive predicates canoccur with infinitival complements.
(31) a. For John to eat ice-cream shows that he must be hungry.
b. *That John eats ice-cream shows for him to be hungry.
(31a) and (31b) show that the verb show requires two sentential complements the subject
complement can be a for complement, but not object.
Therefore, it is difficult to explain the above examples without taking into consideration thesemantics of the for complement.
This section make concrete the content of the present dissertation. First, in the present
dissertation, “modality” is regarded as a semantic category which expresses or construes how thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) is, and it is defined asfollows (Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6)):(32) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or its part comes
from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards thesituation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.
Second, generally speaking, the infinitive marker to has been regarded as having the function

1

We regard Mary to sing and Henry to be here as for complements, because the object of like is not
10

to introduce “future” situations through the original meaning of the preposition to, which
expresses a “direction” (Cf. Curme (1931), Jespersen (1933), Visser (1984)). There are, however,a number of cases which cannot be explained only in terms of “futurity”: cases in which theinfinitive marker to introduces situations which have already occurred (i.e. nonfuture situations),
cases in which it introduces someone’s “thoughts” or “judgments,” and cases in which the resultof an action or event is described (i.e. “the infinitive of result”). Therefore, it is impossible toexplain these nonfuture cases in a unified way only by having recourse to the notion of “futurity”.
Third, the complementizer for, on the other hand, has been regarded as a meaninglessgrammatical marker which is introduced to explicitly express the semantic subject of theinfinitive complement. However, if we pay close attention to specific linguistic facts, we willencounter a lot of cases which we cannot explain in terms of a traditional approach that analyzes
the complementizer for as having no inherent meaning: in some cases, the complementizer for
refers to different times, and, in other cases, it has a cooccurrence restriction on the matrix
predicate. Therefore, it is impossible to explain these cases naturally by adopting the traditional
analysis which regards the complementizer for as a grammatical marker with no inherent
meaning.
Fourth, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that thecomplementizer for differs semantically from the infinitive marker to in that only the former hasa feature called “other-orientedness” and that it shows the conceptualizer’s less confidence thanthe latter. This claim makes it clear that they belong to different semantic categories from eachother.
The above points enable us to conclude that it will be theoretically possible to give an adequate
semantic and cognitive explanation to grammatical behaviors of the infinitive marker to and thecomplementizer for by regarding them as modalizers.

1.3. Organization
The organization of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the essence of some selected previous studies which are significant forthe present dissertation and discusses the relationship between the infinitive and modality. The
11

first half of this chapter discusses the relationship between modality and the notion of“nonfactuality” (i.e. “irreality”) on the basis of Declerck (2011) and Langacker (1991). Then,after taking a brief look at how modality has been classified on the basis of Palmer (20012) and
Sawada (2016), we analyze the relationship of the infinitive with the notion of “nonfactuality”
and other modalizers.
The latter half of this chapter introduces Jespersen’s (MEG V) and Bolinger’s (1968)
traditional analyses by which the infinitive is regarded as being likely to be used in imaginative
contexts. Then, after adducing Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Huddleston and Pullum(2002), Dixon (1991) as suggestive previous studies, we discuss their claims that the meaning
expressed by the infinitive can be classified into “counterfactuality”, “possibility”, “futureorientedness”, “wanting”, “opinion”, and “judgement”.
Chapter 3 introduces Wierzbicka’s (1988) analysis, which we regard one of the mostsuggestive researches for this dissertation, and clarifies some problems which cannot be solved
by her analysis. Wierzbicka (1988) classifies meanings expressed by the to complement into“wanting”, “opinion”, “emotion”, and “aspect”, and discusses in detail the semantic formula
implied by the infinitive marker to (the following examples are quoted from Wierzbicka (1988:
31, 48, 77)):(33) Wanting: He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go.
(34) Opinion：I believe/judge Mary to be dishonest.
(35) Emotion: I blush to think of it.
(36) Aspect: John began to peel the potato.
Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the infinitive marker to and the complementizer fordiffers from each other in that the latter shows the conceptualizer’s less confidence than theformer. This claim supports our approach proposed in the present dissertation.
Chapter 4 reconsiders Declerck’s (2011: 27) definition of modality as shown in (37):(37) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.
His definition is noteworthy in that the notion of modality is expanded and many expressions
12

other than modals or modal adverbs are regarded as belonging to modalizers. By reconsidering
his definition of modality, we claim that the infinitive marker to is a modalizer and that themodality expressed by to can be classified into the following modality types: evidential modality,
epistemic modality, counterfactual modality, deontic modality, and dynamic modality.
Chapter 5 puts its focus on the infinitive of result, which is shown in the underlined parts inthe following examples:(38) a. Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, to find that her husband had not yet
returned.

(A. C. Doyle, The Naval Treaty) (Underline is mine)b. In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew to be a woman.
(Sherwood Anderson, Winesburg, Ohio) (Underline is mine)
The infinitive of result (i.e. “the resultative infinitive”) is different from the other infinitive inthat can refer to the situation which has already occurred.
In this chapter, based on the traditional analysis in terms of “realization”, “intentionality”, and“predictability”, we propose Transparentizing Phenomena of the matrix verb followed by theinfinitive marker to in order to explain why the resultative infinitive is interpreted as nonfuture:(39) Transparentizing Phenomena:
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to is relatively weakened,
and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality,
negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.
Thus, the following example is interpreted through the following two processes:(40) On August 27 they awoke (to) find that food had gone on ration, …
(awake) –ed(Cf. BNC)First, the finite verb awoke in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form awake and thepast tense morpheme -ed, and awake and the infinitive marker to becomes transparent. Second,-ed transfers, over the transparent awake and to, to the complement verb find. Since the meaningof the transparent awake is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like a kind of an “adverb.” The13

complement verb find, on the other hand, is interpreted like a “main verb” with a past tense,
because the past tense has transferred to it. Chapter 4 concludes that the fact that the infinitivemarker to does not function as a modailzer is attributed to the fact that the infinitive marker tobecomes transparent and loses its original function to introduce the complement.
Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship of the complementizer for and its complement sentence(i.e. the for-complement) and demonstrates the following two hypotheses:(41) A. The complementizer for belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.
B . The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into thefollowing types: emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, andcounterfactual modality.
The first half of this chapter demonstrates the following points: the complementizer for has
long been regarded as a grammatical marker which is mechanically introduced to explicitly
express the subject of the following infinitive and which has no inherent meaning. However,based on the fact that (i) the complementizer for can refer to both “future” and “nonfuture”
situations, that (ii) the acceptability of the for-complement varies depending on what kind of
matrix predicates are chosen, (iii) the for complement and the to complement are independent
construction, and that (iv) the acceptability of the for-complement also varies depending onwhether the matrix clause is in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically
expressed by the counterfactual modal auxiliary would, it is clear that there are a number of cases
which cannot be explained by the analysis that regards complementizer for as lacking any
inherent meaning. In order to give a unified explanation to these cases, it is necessary to reanalyze
the complementizer for from a semantic and cognitive viewpoint.
The main aim to the latter half of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between themodality expressed by the complementizer for and the one expressed by the matrix elements,
and to argue for the following hypothesis:(42) There must be a “modal harmony” between the complementizer for and the matrix
elements.
Chapter 7, the final chapter, summarizes main arguments and conclusions in the whole14dissertation, and mentions some residual problems for a future research.
Most of the supporting data used in the present dissertation are adduced from corpora such as
British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), andfrom novels by Agatha Christie (some parts in the data which we put emphasis on are indicatedby a single underline, and, when necessary, the for complements are indicated by square brackets
in order to distinguish the complementizer for from the preposition).

15

Chapter 2 Selected Previous Studies on Modality and theInfinitive
2.0. Introduction
The present chapter takes a brief look at some essentials of the selected previous studies which
are important and influential to the present dissertation. The organization of this chapter is asfollows: Section 2.1. divides major previous studies on modality into two categories: studies on
the definition of modality such as Palmer (20012, 2003), Portner (2009), Declerck (2011),
Sawada (2006, 2016, 2018a) and Langacker (1991) and those on the classification of modality
such as Palmer (20012, 2003) and Sawada (2014). Then, Section 2.2. discusses Declerck (2011)
in support of the claim upon the semantic relationship between modality and the to complement.
Section 2.3. adduces two important previous studies concerning the meaning and use of theinfinitive on the basis of the traditional-grammatical approaches: Jespersen (MEG V) and
Bolinger (1968). Section 2.4. provides some major recent semantic studies on the meaning andthe classification of the to complement and the for complement: Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka(1988), Dixon (1991), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Hamawand (2003).

2.1. Selected Previous Studies on Modality
2.1.1. Definition of Modality
2.1.1.1. Introduction
This section takes a brief look at four important previous studies on the definition of modality:
Palmer (20012) as the most standard theory on modality, Portner (2009) from a logicalperspective, Declerck (2011) from a semantic perspective, and Langacker (1991) from a
cognitive perspective.

2.1.1.2. Palmer’s Approach
Palmer (20012: 1, 2003: 5) describes modality as a category closely related to tense and aspect.
According to Palmer (20012: 1), the three categories can be defined as follows:16

(1 ) Tense, rather obviously, is concerned with the time of the event, while aspect isconcerned with the nature of the event, particularly in terms of its ‘internal temporalconstituency’ (Comrie 1976: 3). Modality is concerned with the status of the proposition
that describes the event.

2.1.1.3. Declerck’s Approach
Declerck (2011: 27) characterizes modality as follows:(2) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.
Here, “nonfactual world” must not be confused with ‘counterfactual world’ which is realized bycounterfactual modalizers such as modal auxiliary would. With regard to the relationshipbetween nonfactual and factual worlds, Declerck (2011: 27) states as follows:(3) It should be stressed that by ‘nonfactual world’ we do not mean a world that is necessarily
different from the factual world but rather a possible world that is not represented and/orinterpreted as being the factual world. This is clear from John may be here, which refers
to a nonfactual world in which the state of John being here actualizes and which may or
may not coincide with the factual world. A nonfactual world could not be represented as
possibly coinciding with the factual world if ‘nonfactual world’ were defined as ‘worldthat is necessarily different from the factual world’.

(Declerck (2011: 27))

Furthermore, he expands the classification of modalizers, linguistic devices which express
modality, in the following way:
(4) A. A Modal Auxiliary (can, must, may…)
B. A Modal Adverb (perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily…)
C. An Intentional Verb (believe, suppose, imagine…)
D. An Attitudinal Verb (like, intend, want, hope, wish…）
E. The Subjunctive Mood
17

F. The Imperative Mood
G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)
H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (will, be going to, be about to…)
I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority
J. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（I think…）
K. “Modal Backshifting”
L. “Modal Conditionalization”
M. A Combination of K and L(Declerck (2011: 28))
Among all the nonfactual worlds expressed by these modalizers, tense auxiliaries creating afuture world or expressing posteriority, namely H and I, are regarded as a world which isincompatible with the factual world at a certain time and will be compatible at a future time.

2.1.1.4. Langacker’s Approach
Langacker (1991) defines modality as the conceptualizer’s attitude towards a proposition andproposes the following configuration as showing the grammaticalization of modal auxiliaries
such as will, can, and may from original content verbs:(5)(Langacker (1991: 270))
According to Langacker, modals, which are “grounding predicates” in his term, represents thedesignated situation as irreal. This is shown as in (c).
Furthermore, he advocates two distinct notion, “reality” and “irreality” in defining modality:18

Fig. 1: Dynamic Evolutionary Model (Langacker (1991: 242))
According to his analysis, “reality” refers to the history of what has happened in the world. For
example, the domain of “reality” in Figure 1 contains “(known) reality”, the cylinder which
glowing to the present time along the temporal axis, and “present reality”, the section of thecylinder. Here, “(known) reality” corresponds to the situations which the speaker knows to betrue, while “present reality” corresponds to the situations which is actualizes in front of the
speaker.
On the other hand, “irreality” refers to all the situations which is not included in the domainof “reality”. For example, the domain of “irreality” in Figure 1 contains “non-reality”, the partoutside of the cylinder, and “projected reality (or “potential reality”)”, the part cylinder envisaged
with the dotted line. Here, “non-reality” refers to the situations which is not factual or which the
speaker does not recognize to be factual (i.e. Unknown reality). “Projected reality” refers to thesituations which is certain to happen in the future, while “potential reality” to the situations whichis possible to happen. It is important to note that the future situations which is usually expressedby will (i.e. projected reality) are included in the domain of “irreality”.
According to Langacker (1991), modality indicates that the situation is located in the domainof “irreality”.

2.1.2. Classification of Modality
2.1.2.1. Introduction
This section adduces some essence from several studies on the classification of modality:
19

Palmer (19902, 20011, 2003) and Sawada (2014).

2.1.2.2. Palmer’s Approach
Palmer (20012: 7, 2003: 8) classifies modality into two significant categories: “Propositional
modality” and “Event modality”. These two categories can also be divided into four different
subcategories: evidential, epistemic, dynamic, and deontic. This classification can be
schematized as follows:
Reported
Evidential
Propositional

Sensory
Speculative
Epistemic(6) Modality

Deductive
Assumptive
Abilitive

Dynamic
Volitive
Event

Permissive
Deontic

Obligative
Commissive

Palmer (20012: 7-8) argues that the following sentences:(7) a. Kate may be at home now.
b. Kate must be at home now.
(8) a. Kate may come in now.
b. Kate must come in now.
can be paraphrased, in terms of “possibility” and “necessity”, with the following sentences:(9) a. It is possible (possibly the case) that Kate is at home nowb. It is necessarily the case that Kate is at home now20(10) a. It is possible for Kate to come in now.
b. It is necessary for Kate to come in now.
In addition, according to his analysis, the important distinction between may and must is indicatedby the complementizers that and for. This clearly suggests that the first pair are concerned withthe speaker's judgment of the proposition that Kate is at home, whereas the second are concernedwith the speaker's attitude towards a potential future event, that of Kate coming in. For that reason,a basic distinction may be made between “prepositional modality” and “event modality”.
Furthermore, “propositional modality” can be classified into “epistemic modality” and“evidential modality”. The two subcategories have distinct meanings, as in:(11) The essential difference between these two types is (as is implicit in the discussion) thatwith epistemic modality speakers express their judgments about the factual status of the
proposition, whereas with evidential modality they indicate the evidence they have for(Palmer (20012: 8))

its factual status.

The difference of the subcategories of “event modality”, namely, “deontic modality” and“dynamic modality” can be explained in the following way:(12) The basic difference between deontic and dynamic modality is that with dynamic
modality the conditioning factors are external to the person indicated as the subject(that he is permitted, ordered, etc., to act), whereas with deontic modality they areinternal (that he is able, willing, etc., to act).

Palmer (20012: 70))

2.1.2.3. Sawada’s Approach
Sawada (2014: 328) expands Palmer’s classification by claiming that it lacks “existential
modality” realized by can, “speech act modality” realized by should and may, and“counterfactual modality” realized by would, and reclassifies modality as follows:21

Evidential
Knowledge
Epistemic
AttitudinalCounterfactual
Emotive

Propositional

Sensory
Spontaneous(13) Modality

Speech Act
Existential
Event
Dynamic
Actional
Deontic

2.2. The Semantic Relationship between Modality and the To complement
2.2.1. Declerck (2011)
In the field of modality, it has been often discussed whether futurity should be categorized asmodality. Declerck (2011) puts its focus on “posterity” and states as follows:(14) Some nonfactual t-worlds can be characterized in terms of a modal concept that has
been neglected in the literature on modality, viz. the idea that the t-world in question isenvisaged by the speaker but not yet factual at the time t to which the world in questionis anchored.

(Declerck (2011: 32))

The t-world in question, by his definition, is the world realized by tense auxiliaries such as will,
be going to, and be about to and coordinating conjunctions such as before. He regards theseauxiliaries as modalizers expressing “not-yet factual world”.
The present dissertation claims that the infinitive marker to can be regarded as a kind ofmodalizer in that it can realize the world which is seen to be not-yet-factual. A more detailed
claim will be made in chapter 4 and 6.
22

2.3. Selected Traditional-Grammatical Appoaches to the Meaning and Use of theInfinitive
2.3.1. Introduction
The aim of this section is to adduce some essentials of two important previous studies:
Jespersen (MEG V) and Bolinger (1968), concerning the meaning and use of the infinitive on
the basis of the traditional-grammatical approaches.

2.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V)
Jespersen (MEG V: 166) compares the use of the infinitive with the gerund and claims that theinfinitive seems more appropriate than the gerund to denote the imaginative (unreal). Thus, itfollows from the following sentence,(15) To arrest her on insufficient evidence would be dangerous. (Jespersen (MEG V: 166))
that the event denoted by the to complement has not yet actualized in the factual world, but rather,it only actualizes in the speaker’s imagination.

2.3.3. Bolinger (1968)
Bolinger (1968: 124), along the similar lines, states that the infinitive represents “reification”,
while the gerund represents “hypothesis or potentiality”. For example, in the following pair,(16) a. He started to get mean (but thought better of it).
b. He started getting mean (so I got out of there).
(Bolinger (1968: 125))
the context shown in the parentheses in (16a) is not compatible with that in (16b), because, while
the infinitive in (16a) denotes that he has not yet got mean, the gerund in (16b) shows that he has
already been mean. The context shown in (16b) is compatible with that in both sentences since23the possibility for him to get mean could be the reason for my getting out of there.

2.4. Recent Semantic Approaches to the To complement and the For Complement
2.4.1. Introduction
This section adduces some important points from five recent semantic approaches to themeaning and classification of the to complement: Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Dixon(1991), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Hamawand (2003).

2.4.2. Quirk et al. (1985)
Quirk et al. (1985: 1191) compares to and -ing and defines the meaning of the to complement
as “mere ‘potentiality’ for action” and the -ing as “the actual ‘performance’ of the action itself”.
In order to establish the definitions, it assumes three groups of verbs taking both complements:
emotive verbs, aspectual verbs, and retrospective verbs.
First, emotive verbs include dread, hate, like, loathe, and prefer. According to their analysis,verbs in this group can basically take both complements, but, in “hypothetical and nonfactual
contexts”, the to complement tends to be chosen:(17) a. Would you like {to see / ?*seeing} my stamp collection?
b. I hate {to seem / ?seeming} rude, but you’re blocking the view.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))
Second, in the case of aspectual verbs such as start, continue, and cease, there is no significant
difference in meaning between to and -ing:(18) Lucy started/continued/ceases {to write / writing) while in hospital.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))
In the following sentence, however, there is an observable difference between them:(19) a. He started to speak, but stopped because she objected.
24

b. He started speaking, and kept on for more than an hour.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))
According to their analysis, the action referred to by the to complement in (19a) has not yet been
carried out, whereas -ing complement in (19b) refers to an actual “performance”.
Last, verbs such as forget, remember, and regret imply the event denoted by the to complement
has been actually performed. Nevertheless, the complement expresses “potentiality” since theaction or event takes place after (and as a result of) the mental process denoted by the verb has
begun, as in:(20) I remembered to fill out the form. [‘I remembered that I was to fill out the form andthen did so’]

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1193))

In the case of -ing complements, on the other hand, it is implied that the action denoted by thecomplements has actually been performed, which is shown by the following sentence:(21) I remembered filling out the form. [‘I remembered that I had filled out the form’](Quirk et al. (1985: 1193))

2.4.3. Wierzbicka (1988)
Wierzbicka (1988: 26) divides the to complement, as well as the for complement, into threesemantic categories: “wanting,” “opinion,” “emotion.” This is shown by the following sentences:(22) “Wanting” (Wierzbicka (1988: 27-44))
a. To be or not to be – that is a question.
b. Did you think to ask Brown?
c. I intended to go.
d. He failed to hit the target.
e. He refused to go.
f. I order you to do it.
g. The rain forced me to go inside.
25

(23) “Opinion” (Wierzbicka (1988: 46-56))
a. Mary is known to be dishonest.
b. John is likely to win.
c. John seems to be a Mormon.
(24) “Emotion” (Wierzbicka (1988: 98-99))
a. I was delighted to win.
b. I would be delighted to see Peter here.
c. It is desirable for him to be present.
This classification will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

2.4.4. Dixon (1991)
Dixon (1991: 220) also classifies the use of the to complement. The categories he proposes
are “Modal” and “Judgement,” both of which are represented in (25). (25a) is an example of“Modal,” while (25b) “Judgement”:(25) a. I want Mary to be a doctor.
b. I discovered him to be quite stupid.
(Dixon (1991: 220))
According to his analysis, “Modal (FOR) TO” complements relate to the subject of thecomplement clause becoming involved in the activity or state referred to by that clause, or to thepotentiality of such involvement. On the other hand, “Judgement TO” complements relate to thesubject of the main clause verb ventures a judgement or opinion about the subject of thecomplement clause predicate.
Furthermore, he also argues that a judgment and an opinion expressed by the “Judgement TO”
complement must be subjective, which is shown by the fact that it is anomalous to use it withverbs expressing a conclusion, while it is natural with verbs of thinking.

26

2.4.5. Huddleston and Pullum (2002)
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241) point out that the infinitive marker to derives from the
proposition to, which expresses a goal, and that the meaning of the former reflects that of thelatter.
Furthermore, they divide verbs which take both the to complement and -ing complement into
six groups in order to demonstrate the difference in meaning between to and -ing.
The first group includes bother, intend, plan, and propose. In this case, there is no difference
between the to complement and the gerund:(26) a. He didn’t bother to tell us.
b. He didn’t bother telling us.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))(27) a. He intended to leave tomorrow.
b. He intended leaving tomorrow.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))
In case of (27b), the gerund form is used together with an adverb tomorrow. They point out
concerning this point that futurity is not incompatible with a gerund-participle.
The second group consists of aspectual verbs such as continue, begin, and start. In this case,there is no significant difference between the to complement and the gerund, but in case of begin,and start, the difference will appear:(28) a. ?Don’t start to tell me how to run my life.
b. Don’t start telling me how to run my life.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))
According to their analysis, the gerund-participial tends to suggest ongoing activity. Thus, in(28b), the addressee has already said something which the speaker interpret as telling him or her
how to his or her my life.
The third group consists of verbs of liking:(29) a. I like to stay home at weekends.
27

b. I like staying home at weekends.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1242))
They claim that (29a) is more appropriate than (29b) when the speaker is asked to go
bushwalking next weekend but he or she wishes to decline. In contrast, (29b) will be more
appropriate when the speaker currently enjoys a week-end at home.
The fourth group consists of memory verbs, such as remember, forget, and recollect:(30) a. I remembered to lock up.
b. I remembered locking up.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1242))
According to their analysis, in case of (30a), the action of locking up and remembering issimultaneous, but the speaker remembered some kind of prior obligation to lock up and hence
there is projection into the future with respect to that implicit earlier time, while in (30b), theaction of locking up has been carried out at the time prior to the time referred to by the main verb
remember.
In the fifth group, the gerund-participle expresses progressive meaning:(31) a. I’ve finally got the program to work.
b. I’ve finally got the program working.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1243))
There is an aspectual difference between (31a) and (31b): in (31a), the program now works, while,in (31b), it is working now.
Finally, verbs categorized in the sixth group are shown in the following sentences:(32) a. She tried to open the window.
b. She tried opening the window.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1243))(33) a. They fear to go out at night.
b. They fear going out at night.
28

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1243))
They state about the above sentences that, in (32a), to open the window refers to a potential action,
whereas (32b) implies that the action of opening the window has been actually done. In (33a),fear to go expresses an element of volition/intentionality. Thus, (33a) as a whole means that they
intentionally won’t go out at night. (33b), on the other hand, does not have this kind of elements.

2.4.6. Hamawand (2003)
Hamawand (2003: 171) claims from the viewpoint of Cognitive Grammar that all linguistic
elements posited in grammar are ascribed some kind of conceptual import. On the basis of thisclaim, for-to complement clauses have not only a syntactic function but also meaning of theirown which conditions its behavior. He also claims that the syntax of an expression is a reflectionof its conceptual organization, which represents the specific construal imposed on their content.
In this sense, the for-to complement can be regarded as a “construction” in Cognitive Grammar.
According to him, to complement clauses represent a “self-related” construal in the sense ofreflecting the main clause subject’s involvement in the complement event, and so implying his
or her high degree of interest in its realization. By contrast, for-to complement clauses represent
an “other-related” construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject’s distance from thecomplement event:(34) I like [to win the race].

(Hamawand (2003: 172))(35) I like [for Jane to win the race].

(Hamawand (2003: 172))

According to his analysis, in (34), for example, the main clause subject relates the content of thecomplement clause to himself and so opts for the to complement. In (35), on the other hand, themain clause subject relates the same content to Jane and so chooses the for-to complement.

29

Chapter 3 Wierzbicka’s (1988) Analysis and Its Problems
3.1. Introduction
This chapter introduces Wierzbicka’s (1988) analysis, which we regard as one of the mostsuggestive researches in this dissertation, and clarifies some problems which cannot be solved
by her analysis. Wierzbicka (1988) classifies meanings expressed by the to complement into“wanting”, “opinion”, “emotion”, and “aspect”, and discusses in detail the semantic formula
implied by the infinitive marker to. The present chapter adduces some essentials of Wierzbicka’s(1988) analysis of the relationship the infinitive and the notions of “wanting”, “opinion”, and“emotion”, and semantic differences between the complementizer for and the infinitive marker
to.

3.2. To and “Wanting”
Wierzbicka (1988) puts its focus on the meaning of following sentence:(1) To go or not to go? – that is the question.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

The meaning of (1) can be shown as follows:(2) Should I decide: ‘I want this: I will do it’ or should I decide: ‘I want this: I will not doit’? Should I decide: ‘I want this: I will be’ or should I decide: ‘I want this: I will notbe’?

(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

According to her analysis, this meaning must be due largely to the construction used, because if-ing is used instead of to, it is no longer there, and in fact the whole utterance loses its original
sense:(3) ?Being or not being — that is the question.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

However, the meaning in question does not apply to the verb know regardless of the use of to:(4) ?To know or not to know — that is the question.
30(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

This is because “knowing” is not something one can control at will. For example, one cannot say
the following:(5) a. *I decided to know it.
b. *I decided not to know it.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))
She also argues that the element “should”, which she has detected in Hamlet's question may or
may not be implied by volitional to complements, but the elements of 'thinking', 'wanting' and'future time' are always there. For example, consider the following sentence with the infinitive of
purpose (i.e. the purpose infinitive in our term):(6) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of Language.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 28)) (Italics is original)
That the above sentence can be roughly paraphrased as follows also supports her analysis of themeaning of volitional TO complement:(7) Mary went to the Librarybecause she thought this:I want this: I will read the latest issue of Language(Wierzbicka (1988: 28))
To summarize, she proposes that the following semantic formula applies to all sentences where
the to complement is compatible with the idea of volition:(8) X Vvol to be Z ⇒X thought this: I want this: I will be Z.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 28))
The following sections adduces three cases (verbs of volition, verbs of attempting, and verbs ofspeech act) in support of her claim that the infinitive marker to implies the notions of “thinking”,“wanting”, and “future time” when it is compatible with the idea of volition.
31

3.2.1. Verbs of Volition
Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the infinitive marker to implies the notions of “thinking”,“wanting”, and “future time” when it is used with verbs of volition:(9) He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go. ⇒he thought this: I want this: I will go(Wierzbicka (1988: 31))
In order to demonstrate this claim, she gives her attention to the different phrases such as
decide on and decide to, which have been thought to have no difference in meaning, and argues
that the three notions in question are only implied by decide to, but not by decide on: according
to her analysis, decide on implies that a number of possibilities have been considered ('gone
through' in a person's mind) and that the subject decided to “stop” on one of those possibilities,
whereas decide to does not imply any such series of possibilities.
She also gives her attention to the semantic relationship between afraid of -ing and afraid to:(10) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up.
b. She was afraid of waking her mistress up.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))
According to her analysis, In (10a), the maid thinks that she should wake her mistress up, and atentative intention to do so is formed in her head; and this tentative intention is accompanied byfear. In (10b), on the other hand, the idea of deliberately waking her mistress up never enters the
maid's head. She concludes based on this analysis that only (10a) has the notions in question inits semantic formula:(11) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up. ⇒when she thought this: I want this: I will do it
she felt afraidb. She was afraid of waking her mistress up. ⇒32

when she thought this:
this might happen because of what I am doing
she felt afraid(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))

3.2.2. Verbs of Attempting
Wierzbicka (1988) argues that t the semantic formula of the infinitive marker to can also apply
to sentences with verbs of attempting:(12) He tried/attempted/strove/managed/failed/endeavored to go. (Wierzbicka (1988: 35))
According to her analysis, the claim that to has the semantic formula in question when it is usedwith verbs of attempting becomes evident by comparing the meaning difference between succeed
in and manage to. The verbs succeed and manage are similar in meaning, but only the latter cantake to. She compares the following:(13) a. Most people failed to hit the target, but Mary, who was hardly looking, accidentally
succeeded in hitting it.
b. *Most people failed to hit the target, but Mary, who was hardly looking, accidentally
managed to hit it.
c. She applied for the job, and she managed to get it (isn’t she crafty).
d. She applied for the job, and she succeeded in getting it (isn’t she lucky).
(Wierzbicka (1988: 35))
She explains the difference of acceptability of the above sentences as follows: manage refers to
the interested person's action, and it implies a causal relation between the action and the desired
outcome; this is why, if this outcome is achieved, it can be attributed to the agent's craftiness or
skill. Succeed refers to an event and it does not imply a causal relation between the desired
outcome and the interested person's action (this outcome may be due to luck). Furthermore,manage implies an effort and an intention aimed at the desired outcome (one cannot manage to
do something by accident, without really trying); and this effort creates a natural expectation that33

the desired outcome might indeed eventuate. In the case of succeed the desired outcome can be
due to accident and luck; and there is no reason to expect that it will eventuate.
Based on the above analysis, she postulates the following semantic formulae of manage withto and succeed with -ing (notice that the configuration “X thought this: I want this: I will do Z”
is included in the explication of manage but not in the explication of succeed.):(14) X managed to do Z. ⇒one could think this: X cannot do Z
X thought this: I want this: I will do Z
X did some things because of thatOne could think at that time: Z will happen because of that
Z happened because of that
(Wierzbicka (1988: 36))(15) X succeeded in doing Z. ⇒X wanted this: Z will happen
X did something because of thatOne couldn’t know this: Z will happen because of that
Z happened(Wierzbicka (1988: 36))

3.2.3. Verbs of Speech Act
Wiezbicka (1988) argues that the same semantic formula also applies to sentences with verbsof speech act. According to her analysis, these verbs can take the to complement not only in casesof positive volition (= (16a)) but also in cases of negative volition (= (16b)):(16) a. He vowed/agreed/consented to go.
b. He refused/declined to go.
(Wiezbicka (1988: 37))
The semantic formula of the sentence with the intransitive verb refuse in (16b) can be shown as34

follows:(17) I refuse to do Z (go) ⇒I know this: someone wants this:I will think this: ‘I want this: I will do Z (go)’And I will do it because of that
I know this: one could think this of me:
I will do it because of that
I say: I don’t want it
I will not do it(Wierzbicka (1988: 37))
According to her analysis, “negative” acts such as refusing or declining can be actually
performed with utterances containing a to complement: I am not going to do it, just as acts ofpositive intention can: I intend to do it, I promise to do it. This to indicates that, at the end of therelevant “script”, there is a future oriented thought in the speaker's mind: “I will (not) do it”.
Furthermore, she argues that the same semantic formula can also apply to the transitive verbsof speech act, such as order and beg and that the speaker is not considering his own future action,
but he is considering a future action of the addressee:(18) I order/beg you to do it. ⇒I think this: I want this: you will do it
I say: I want this: you will do it(Wierzbicka (1988: 38))
She also argues, however, that the above semantic formula does not apply to all transitive speech
act verbs which take the to complement. The following sentences do not imply that I want you
to do these things:(19) a. I remind you to take your medicines.
b. I advise you to appeal against this decision.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 38))
35

She concluded based on the above analysis that the combination of a transitive verbs of speechact does not always imply that X said to Y “I want this: you will do Z”.

3.3. To and “Opinion”
Wierzbicka (1988) puts its focus on the function of the infinitive marker to in sentences
expressing “opinion”:(20) She is thought/believed/said/alleged/reported/rumoured to be dishonest.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 46))
She argues, based on the fact that the to of opinion occurs most commonly (and for some verbs,
exclusively) in the passive form, that in sentences of this kind the speaker is clearly distancing
himself from other people's opinion. Thus, the meaning of these sentences can be represented asfollows:(21) Mary is said (thought, believed etc.) to be dishonest. ⇒people say (think, believe etc.) this of Mary:she is dishonest
I don't (want to) say: I say this
I say: people say this(Wierzbicka (1988: 46))
She also suggests that it is this distancing function inherent in the English 'passive of opinion'
which explains the lesser acceptability, or the nonacceptability, of the corresponding active
constructions:(22) a. Mary is rumored/said to be a Mormon.
b. *They rumor/say Mary to be a Mormon.
c. Mary is alleged to be a Mormon.
d. ?They/I allege Mary to be a Mormon.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 47))36

According to her analysis, (22b) is unacceptable because it is the only one which would not allow
the speaker to diminish his responsibility for what is being said and thus contradicts the following
formula:(23) “I say this; I don't (want to) say: I think this”(Wierzbicka (1988: 48))

Believe, on the other hand, allows the speaker to do even when it is used in the active form. In
that case, it refers to the speaker's private thoughts. She distinguishes the function of the passive
constructions from that of the active constructions by pustulating the following semantic
formulae:(24) a. Mary is believed to be dishonest. ⇒people believe this of Mary: she is dishonest
I don’t want to say: I say this
I say: people say thisb. I believe Mary to be dishonest. ⇒I believe this of Mary; she is dishonest
I don’t want to say: people say thisI don’t want to say: I know this
I say: I believe this

3.4. To and “Emotion”
After pointing out that the for complement appears in the sentences expressing emotions along
the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Wierzbicka (1988) classifies these sentences into (i)sentences expressing intention, (ii) sentences expressing emotional evaluations, and (iii)
sentences expressing intellectual judgment and discusses the semantic formulae implied by eachof the sentences.

37

3.4.1. The For Complement and Intention
Wierzbicka (1988) discusses the relationship between the for complement and personal
intention in sentences with the verbs, such as long and ask, which require personal subjects andpredicates such as desirable and necessary, which do not. Verbs such as long and ask express
weak confidence of the possibility for the situation to occur. Taking this fact into consideration,
Wierzbicka (1988) states that these verbs imply the following semantic formula:(25) “I don't want to say: one could think this: it will happen (because of that)”(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))(25) expresses weak confidence that the situation denoted by the for complement will occur, but,at the same time, these verbs also imply a strong desire for the possibility. According to
Wierzbicka, generally speaking, we do not tend to have a strong desire for the realization of thesituation which is quite possible to occur: the lower the possibility becomes, the stronger thedesire will be. This general claim enables us to give a semantic explanation to the difference of
the acceptability of the following pair:(26) a. I want very much for you to come.
b. ?I want for you to come.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))
According to Wierzbicka (1988), the insertion of very much in (26a) expresses the speaker’s
strong desire for the realization of the situation referred to by the complement and, at the sametime, his weak confidence in it. In (26b), on the other hand, the absence of very much expresses
the speaker’s weak desire and, at the same time, his or her strong confidence. Therefore, theunacceptability of (26b) comes from the incompatibility between strong desire (i.e. weak
confidence) implied by the for complement and strong confidence (i.e. weak desire) implied by
the whole sentence. Wierzbicka’s (1988) hypothesis that the for complement expresses “strong
desire” (i.e. “weak confidence”) can be supported by the fact that it is used in the sentence whose
subject is impersonal, which is shown in the following sentences:(27) a. It is desirable for him to be present.
38

b. It is necessary for him to be present.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))
According to Wierzbicka (1988: 121), in (27), the speaker conceals his or her desire andexpresses it as a public necessity by using an expletive it. Thus, “there is perhaps more urgency
and more authority” to (27) than to sentences with personal subjects. Therefore, the following,in addition to (25) can be postulated as one of the semantic formulae of sentences with impersonal
subjects:(28) “I don’t want to say: I want it”(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

To summarize the above discussions, the semantic formulae implied by impersonal sentences
and the personal sentences with the for complements can be shown by (29) and (30), respectively:(29) I want (very much) for him to be present. ⇒I think this: I want this: he will be present
I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))(30) It is desirable for him to be present. ⇒if one knew this: he will be present
one would think this:
this will be goodhe should do it
I don't want to say: I want it
I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

3.4.2. The For Complement and Emotional Evaluation
Predicates which express “emotional evaluation” include right, wrong, not fair, appropriate,
inappropriate. According to Wierzbicka (1988), if we consider the fact that these predicates are39

used in the sentences with impersonal subjects, the semantic formula shown in (28) (i.e. “I don’t
want to say: I want it”) will apply to them. Furthermore, they express an evaluation such as “good”
or “bad” towards the situation referred to by the for complement, which is shown by theunderlined part below:(31) It is {right / wrong etc.} for X to do Z. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this: it will be good/bad(Wierzbicka (1988: 128) (Underline is mine)Thus, clear and true, which do not express such evaluation, cannot occur with the forcomplement:(32) a. It is {illegal / *clear} for these houses to be occupied.
b. It is {right / *true} for God to punish sinners.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 127))
Notions such as “good” or “bad” implied by these sentences do not express their literary
meanings, but rather they express “obligation”, which is usually expressed by should. Therefore,(31) can be changed into the following:(33) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. (It is right/wrong for X to cause Z.) ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this: X should/shouldn't do it
I don't want to say: I don't want this(Wiezbicka (1988: 128))
Wierzbicka (1988) also points out that the for complement used in the sentences of this kindrefers exclusively to human actions:(34) a. It is illegal for these houses to be occupied.
b. ?It is bad for this soil to be so poor.
c. It was crazy for her to leave that job.
40

d. ?It was a tragedy for the babies to die.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))
Wierzbicka (1988) claims, based on this fact, that the matrix predicates of emotive judgment
express an evaluation of the action itself rather than of the agent of the action. Thus, the semantic
formula implied by the sentences of this kind includes (35) below (in (35), X refers to the agentof the action):(35) “I don't want to say something good/bad about X”(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the semantic formula implied by emotive
evaluation sentences expressing is the following:(36) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this:it will be good/bad
X should/shouldn't do it
I don't want to say: I don't want it
I don't want to say something good/bad about X(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

3.4.3. The For Complement and Intellectual Judgment
3.4.3.1. Expectability
Wierzbicka (1988: 130) discusses the relationship between the situation denoted by the forcomplement and an expectation of the realization of it. Predicates which express an intellectual
judgment includes unexpected, odd, strange, surprising, normal, natural, and usual. According
to her analysis, intellectual judgment sentences imply that the realization of the situation is
expectable or unexpectable:(37) “one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will happen” (Wierzbicka (1988: 130))41

In (37), the counterfactual modal auxiliary would is used because the exprectation of therealization of the situation referred to by the for complement is a “hypothetical expectation”(Wierzbicka (1988: 130)). Therefore, sentences of this type imply the following semantic
formula:(38) It is unusual for the train not to leave late. ⇒if someone said: the train will not leave late
one would have thought: one should not think that
if I knew: it happened
I would have thought: it is unusual(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))(38) shows that the for complement in intellectual judgment sentence refers to a factual situationand that the speaker made a prediction that the situation would occur.
She argues that, in intellectual judgment sentences, but not emotive evaluation sentences, theemphasis is on the intellectual judgment rather than the speaker’s personal emotion:(39) a. I was delighted / sorry for Mary to win.
b. ?I was surprised for Mary to win.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))
In (39), delighted and sorry express emotional evaluations, while surprised expresses anintellectual judgment. (39b) is unacceptable because the emphasis is on the speaker’s personalemotion though the whole sentence is an intellectual judgment sentence. Wierzbicka (1988: 130)
postulates the following semantic formula for intellectual judgment sentences:(40) “I don't want to say: I felt …”(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))3.4.3.2. The Parallelism between the For Complement and Evaluative Should
According to Wierzbicka’s analysis, “expectability” expressed by the for complement used inintellectual judgment sentences is parallel to that by evaluative should. Evaluative should implies
42

that there is or was no expectation that the situation would occur:(41) It was interesting/amusing/funny that X should have done Z.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 131))
In (41), interesting, amusing, and funny co-occur with evaluative should. This shows that thesepredicates have “unexpectability” in their semantic formulae. Thus, (41) can be changed into
(42):(42) It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))3.5. The Semantic Difference between For and To
Wierzbicka (1988) criticizes the traditional analysis that there is no semantic difference
between the for complement and the to complement and claims that they are quite different fromeach other. This claim is supported by the following evidence:First, the for complement, but not the to complement, is often unacceptable in factual contexts:(43) a. I was delighted for Mary to win.
b. I was ashamed for Mary to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))(44) a. I was delighted to win.
b. I was ashamed to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))
In (44), the to complements, to win and to see that, express factual situations. In (43), however,the for complements do not express them.
Second, in the to complement, but not in the for complement, the subject of the complement
clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause.
(45) *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 113))(45) is unacceptable because the agent of the emotion expressed by the emotive predicate
43

delighted is coreferential with that of the verb win. Wierzbicka (1988: 113) refers to this featureof the for complement as “other-orientedness”.
The “self-orientedness” of to and the “other-orientedness” of for can be shown as in thefollowing semantic formulae:(46) I shall be only too pleased to take over the pew. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: this will happen to me
I think this: this will be good, I will feel pleased(Wierzbicka (1988: 115))(47) I shall be only too pleased for Albert to take over the pew. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this:
this will happen to someone
I think this: this will be good, I will feel pleased(Wierzbicka (1988: 116))
The “other-orientedness” of for allows the for complement to occur in the context of impersonal
predicates as in the following sentences:(48) a. It was unexpected for him to do that.
b. ?It was unexpected for me to do that.
c. It was odd for him to fail.
d. ?It was odd for me to fail.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 116))
According to her analysis, the oddness of (48b) and (48d) can be explained in terms of the otherorientedness of the complementizer for: sentences of this kind imply that one is looking at oneself
from outside, as if one were looking at someone else.
She also argues that impersonal to implies self-orientedness, even though, formally speaking,its subject is no more coreferential than that of the corresponding sentences with thecomplementizer for:(49) a. It was good to see them.
44

b. It was nice to talk to them.
According to her analysis, the above sentences imply that the experiencer of the “good feeling”
is identical with the subject of the complement clause.
Based on the above discussion, she concludes that the real difference between FOR TO andTO, then, is one of perspective: the infinitive marker to implies an experiential, internal, first
person perspective, whereas the complementizer for implies an external, third person perspective.

3.6. Problems
It is true that Wierzbicka (1988) is very suggestive for the approach adopted in the present
dissertation in that it focusses on the meanings and functions of the infinitive marker to as wellas the complementizer for based on various linguistic facts and that it demonstrates the semantic
difference between these two categories. There are however some problems left to be solved.
First, Wierzbicka (1988) does not clarify the temporal reference of the infinitive marker to.
Although she clarifies that manage implies the subject “will” in its semantic formula, it should
be noted that the verb manage functions as an implicative verb and thus necessarily implies thetruth of the complement (Cf. Karttunen (1971)). For example, in the following sentence, the verb
manage implies that the action referred to by the complement verb go was performed.
(50) He managed to go.
In this respect, manage is different from the other verbs of attempting (see Chapter 5 for a further
discussion).
Second, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the for complement expresses a “strong desire” bycomparing the combination of want + the for complement with that of want very much + the forcomplement. Generally speaking, however, it is not only because very much is inserted but
because they are separated by some grammatical operation that want can be used with the forcomplement. Very much insertion only constitutes one of those operations:(51) a. What I want is [for you to feel great].
b. She wants very much [for her friends to be truthful].
45(COCA)

(Bresnan (1972: 154)) (Underline is mine)
Therefore, her claim is not convincing enough.
Third, if we take into consideration the fact that the for complement favors unreal contexts,
we should postulate a certain semantic formula for the complementizer for:(52) a. I'd be delighted for you to stay with me.
b. ?I was delighted for you to stay with me.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 111))
The difference of acceptability of the above sentences indicates that there is an interrelationshipbetween the complementizer for and the counterfactual modal auxiliary would in the matrix
clause (see Chapter 4 and 6 for more detail).

46

Chapter 4 The Infinitive Marker To as a Modalizer
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Aim
This chapter puts its focus on the relationship between the infinitive marker to as well as thecontent of the to complement and modality and demonstrates the following three points (wewill discuss the definition of “modalizer” in Section 2.1.):(1) A. The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.
B . The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into thefollowing types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic
modality, and counterfactual modality.
C. There must be a “modal harmony” between the infinitive marker to and the matrix
elements.
The classification of modality expressed by the infinitive marker to can be schematized asfollows:
Epistemic
Propositional

Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)(2) Modality
Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose,
Possibility)
Event
Deontic (Obligation)
Generally speaking, the infinitive marker to has been regarded as having the function to
introduce “future” situations through the original meaning of the proposition to, which expresses
a “direction”. As for this point, Curme (1931: 456), Jespersen (1933: 330), and Visser (1984:947) states as follows:(3) This to, as can still be seen in many sentences, originally meant toward and pointed to47

that toward which the activity of the principal verb was directed.
(Curme (1931: 456)) (Italics is original)(4) This [to] was at first the ordinary preposition indicating direction or purpose...
(Jespersen (1933: 330))(5) The particle to preceding the infinitive was originally a preposition with the sense of‘direction towards’…

(Visser (1984: 947)) (Italics is original)

The typical use of the infinitive marker to which introduces a future situation is shown by (6):(6) To see her is to love her.

(Jespersen (MEG III: 11))

In (6), the two situations referred to by the infinitive are interpreted as not yet factual. This isevident from the fact that they can be paraphrased with a conditional with if and auxiliary will
which introduces a future situation:(7) If you see her, you will (definitely) love her.
The actual linguistic data concerning the infinitive marker to, on the other hand, exhibit the facts(i) that the infinitive marker to, when used after implicative predicates or aspectual verbs, orwhen used as the resultative infinitive, can introduce a situation which has already occurred, (ii)that it can introduce the subject’s “thought” or “opinion”, and (iii) that it can introduce anevidence of some emotion:
First, in (8), the infinitive marker to follows the implicative predicates manage and happen torefer to the situation which has already occurred:(8) a. He managed to speak then. 'Thank you ... I've washed in cold ... '(Agatha Christie, The ABC Murders) (Italics is mine)b. The first time I played this competition my team happened to come first.
(BNC) (Italics is mine)
Second, in (9), to follows the aspectual verb continue to refer to the situation which has
already occurred:48

(9) He continued to read.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 24))
Third, in (10), the to complement is used as the resultative infinitive to refer to the situation
which has already occurred:(10) I awoke to find a burglar in my room.
(Shogakkan Progressive-Japanese Dictionary, Forth Edition)
Fourth, in (11), the to complement expresses the speaker’s “thought” or “opinion”:(11) She is {thought / believed / said / reported} to be dishonest. (Wierzbicka (1988: 46))
Fifth, in (12), the to complement constitutes the evidence of the emotion expressed in thematrix clause:(12) I’m pleased to meet you.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 98))

The aim of this chapter is to give sufficient explanations to the above linguistic facts in a
unified way.

4.1.2. Organization
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 puts its focus on Declerck’s (2011)
definition of modality and the notion “nonfactuality” and redefines modality essentially basedon Sawasda (2016, 2012 2018a). Section 3 proposes that the modality expressed by it can beclassified into “epistemic modality”, “emotive modality”, “deontic modality”, “dynamic
modality”, and “counterfactual modality”. Section 5 summarizes main arguments andconclusions in this whole chapter.

4.2. Modality and Non-factuality
This section puts its focus on Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality and the notion of49

“nonfactuality” and redefines modality essentially based on Sawasda (2006, 2012, 2018a).

4.2.1. Declerck’s (2011) Definition of Modaliy
Declerck (2011: 27) defines the notion of modality as follows:(13) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.
“Nonfactual world” here refers not only so called a counterfactual world, which is made by thecounterfactual modal auxiliary would, but also any kinds of world which cannot be asserted tobe equivalent to the factual world.
(14) If I were you, I wouldn’t do such a thing.
“Nonfactual world” contains a world which is imagined (and, thus, not asserted). Thus, in thefollowing example, the nonfactual world expressed by the epistemic modal auxiliary may is not
the counterfactual world but the world which cannot necessarily be asserted to be equivalent to
the factual world:(15) John may be here.1(Declerck (2011: 27))

In (15), the situation corresponds to the infinitive clause, namely John be here, and themodalizer to to the epistemic modal may.2 Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is
not asserted to be true and thus consists of an uncertain situation. In other words, it cannot be
asserted to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in “a possible world that is not

1

The modal may, in the combination with but, can express “admission”, as the meaning ofspeech act:(i) He may be a university professor, but he sure is dumb.

(Sweetser (1990: 70))

In (i), the modal may is used to indicate that the speaker admits the truth of the residue proposition(he be a university professor). See Section 2.2. for a further discussion on whether may of thiskind can be regarded as a modalizer.
2

Declerck (2011: 26) refers to “subject + bare infinitive”, which remains after removing themodalizer from the whole sentence, as “residue situation” or “residue proposition”.
50represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world” (Declerck (2011: 27))) and therefore
it is regarded as nonfactual.
On the other hand, a nonfactual world expressed by the root modal must is obligatorily
compatible with the factual world. This world is equivalent to the world expressed by the
epistemic modal may in that the residue proposition does not realize in the factual world:(16) The fugitives must leave the country.

(Declerck (2011: 39))

In (16), “the situation” corresponds to the infinitive clause, the fugitives leave the country, andthe modalizer to to the root modal must. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is notasserted to be true and thus constitutes an uncertain situation. In other words, the situation inquestion cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in “a possible worldthat is not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world” (Declerck (2011: 27))), andtherefore it is regarded as nonfactual.
Furthermore, he argues that a “nonfactual world” also contains the world which is not yet
compatible with the factual world at the speech time. The world of this kind is usually expressedby the modal will (= simple future) and called “not-yet factual world”: 33

Declerck’s (2011) definition of “factual world” and “nonfactual world” is compatible with
Langacker’s (1991) definition of “reality” and “irreality” respectively. Langacker (1991: 242)
advocates two distinct notion, “reality” and “irreality”.

Fig. 1: Dynamic Evolutionary Model
According to Langacker (1991: 276), “reality” refers to “the history of what has happened in theworld”. For example, the domain of “reality” in Figure 1 contains “(known) reality”, the cylinder
which glowing to the present time along the temporal axis, and “present reality”, the section of
the cylinder. Here, “(known) reality” corresponds to the situations which the speaker knows to
be true, while “present reality” corresponds to the situations which is actualizes in front of the
speaker.
On the other hand, “irreality” refers to all the situations which is not included in the domain
51

(17) John will trim the hedge.

(Declerck (2011: 32))

In (17), the world in which the residue situation, John trim the hedge, actualizes is expressed as
the one which is not yet compatible with the factual world at the time of speaking. Declerck(2011: 33) refers to the world in question as “not-yet-factual world” and states that this worldconsists of a kind of nonfactual world.4

4.2.2. Some Problems on Decleck’s (2011) Definition of Modality
Declerck (2011) is epoch-making from the viewpoint of the present dissertation in that heexpands the classification of modality which has traditionally been regarded as only containing
modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs.5 There are, however, the following two problems:of “reality”. For example, the domain of “irreality” in Figure 1 contains “non-reality”, the partoutside of the cylinder, and “projected reality (or “potential reality”)”, the part cylinder envisaged
with the dotted line. Here, “non-reality” refers to the situations which is not factual or which the
speaker does not recognize to be factual (i.e. Unknown reality). “Projected reality” refers to thesituations which is certain to happen in the future, while “potential reality” to the situations whichis possible to happen. It is important to note that the future situations which is usually expressedby will (i.e. projected reality) are included in the domain of “irreality”.
Considering these definitions, “reality” and “irreality” can be diagrammed in the following
way:(Known) Reality(ii) Reality
Present Reality
Non-reality (Unknown Reality)(iii) Irreality Potential Reality
Projected Reality
According to Langacker (1991), modality indicates that the situation is located in the domain of“irreality”. His definition is parallel to that of Declerck (2011).
4

The notion of “not-yet factual world” is an important theme which must be further explored.

5

Declerck’s (2011) classification of modalizers is as follows:(iv) A. A Modal Auxiliary (can, must, may…)
B. A Modal Adverb (perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily…)
C. An Intentional Verb (believe, suppose, imagine…)
D. An Attitudinal Verb (like, intend, want, hope, wish…）
E. The Subjunctive Mood
F. The Imperative Mood
G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)
H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (will, be going to, be about to…)
I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority
52

First, there are a number of cases which cannot be explained in Declerck’s(2011) definition ofmodality. Here, we adduces two of them as follows:
The first case is related to the emotive should. The situation referred to by the emotive should
is a factual situation:(18) It’s odd [that the letter should mention the 21st of the month].
(A. Christie, The ABC Murders) (Underline is mine)
In (18), the situation referred to by the emotive should (the letter mentions the 21st of the month)is a factual situation. It is difficult to explain this sentence in terms of “nonfactuality”.
The second case is related to closed conditionals. As shown in the following sentence, whena conditional clause is interpreted as closed, the situation referred to by the conditional clause isa situation which the speaker admits to be true:(19) [“The picture you are now looking at is a Van Gogh.”] – “Well, if this is a Van Gogh,
I’m rather disappointed by it.”In (19), it is presupposed that the situation referred to by the closed conditional clause is a fact.
According to Declerck (2011: 31), the world expressed by the clause is assumed (or ostensibly
assumed) to coincide with the factual world:This explanation contradicts his definition of modality: the emotive should and a closed
conditional clause do not evoke any “nonfactual world”, but rather, they express the speakers’
construal of a fact.
Second, Declerck’s classification of modality is not elaborate enough. As was mentioned in
Section 4.2.1., he expands the classification of modality to the modal will expressing simple
future. According to his classification, the infinitive marker to must be included in the categoryof modalizer. This is because the infinitive marker to, as well as the modal will, can express theJ. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（I think…）
K. “Modal Backshifting”
L. “Modal Conditionalization”
M. A Combination of K and L(Declerck (2011: 28))
See Chapter 6 for a further discussion on the above classification.
53

“not-yet factual world”.6 In order to regard the infinitive marker to as a modalizer, we must firstregard the definition of modality as expressing a construal of a part of the situation as well as thewhole situation.
We adduce Sawada’s (2006, 2012, 2018a) definition of modality as a significant suggestion
to solve the first problem. Sawada regards the emotive should as a kind of modalizer and defines
modality as follows:(20) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) comes from,
how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards the situation,rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.
(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))
According to his definition, modality expresses a construal of a situation rather than locating asituation in the “nonfactual world”. The situation in question includes not only an uncertain
situation introduced by the modal may or a “not-yet factual” situation introduced by the modal
will, but also a factual situation introduced by the emotive should. Based on the above claim,
we can conclude that Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality is not elaborate enough to be
applied to any kind of modality.
If we take into consideration the above discussion, it is now clear that Declerck’s (2011) and
Sawada’s (2006, 2012, 2018a) definitions of modality can be revised as follows:(21) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or a part of itcomes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards
the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.
(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))
If we follow this definition, we can postulate the following hypothesis:

6

The reason why Declerck does not regard the infinitive marker to as a modalizer ispresumably because it introduces a verb phrase (i.e. a part of a situation) rather than a wholesituation.
54

(22) The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.
“Not-yet factuality” expressed by the infinitive marker to is paralleled to that of the modal will
expressing simple future. The only difference between the two is that, while the modal will
expresses a construal of the whole situation (i.e. X do Y), the infinitive marker to expresses its
part (i.e. do Y).
Furthermore, the emotive should, as well as the infinitive marker to, can also be regarded as
expressing a construal of a factual situation.

4.3. Suggestion
4.3.1. Introducation
This section classifies the modality expressed by the infinitive marker to and adduces someevidence for the present claim that the infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.

4.3.2. Counterfactual Modality
First, the infinitive marker to can function as a counterfactual modality when it is used in acounterfactual situation and compatible with the counterfactual modal auxiliary would in thematrix clause. Bolinger (1968) compares the infinitive marker to with the gerundive marker ing
and argues that only the latter can refer to the factual situation:(23) a. To wait would have been a mistake.
b. *To wait has been a mistake.
c. Waiting has been a mistake.
d. Waiting would have been a mistake.
(Bolinger (1968: 124))
The difference of the acceptability of the above sentences can be explained as follows: In (23a),the infinitive marker to introduces a counterfactual situation and modally harmonizes with thecounterfactual modal would in the matrix clause. By contrast, (23b) is unacceptable because the55indicative mood in the matrix clause does not modally harmonize with the infinitive marker to.
(23c) is acceptable because the -ing complement refers to a factual situation and thus iscompatible with the indicative mood in the matrix clause. These explanations can be schematized
as follows (MH is the abbreviation of “Modal Harmony”):(24) a. To wait would have been a mistake.
(MH)b. *To wait has been a mistake.
c. Waiting has been a mistake.
(MH)
The reason why (23d) is acceptable is not because the gerund marker -ing modally harmonizes
with the modal would in the matrix clause but because there is a modal harmony between would
and a certain counterfactual element implied in the sentence:(25) Waiting would have been a mistake (if …).
(MH)
These explanations can be applied to the following similar example.
(26) a. It would be perverse to reject his offer.
b. Oh, to be in England now that April’s there.
(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fourth Edition)
The situation referred to by the to complement in (26a) is counterfactual. In this case, theinfinitive marker to modally harmonizes with the counterfactual modal auxiliary would in thematrix clause. On the other hand, the modal harmony cannot be found in (26b). However, if we
postulate that a certain phrase expressing a counterfactual desire (i.e. I wish) is implied in thesentence, we can conclude that there is a modal harmony in (26b). The claim that the tocomplements in (26) refer to counterfactual situations is supported by the fact that they can beparaphrased with the subjunctive mood:(27) a. It would be perverse if you rejected his offer.
56

b. Oh, I wish I were in England now that April’s there.
(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fourth Edition)
Furthermore, observe the following sentence:(28) To have seen him again would have pained me.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 166))(28) is acceptable because the to complement clause functions as a conditional clause with asubjunctive past perfect and modally harmonizes with the counterfactual modal auxiliary wouldin the matrix clause.
We can conclude based on the above discussion that the infinitive marker to functions as acounterfactual modalizer in the combination with the counterfactual elements in the matrix
clause.
The above discussion enables us to postulate the following principle as for the interrelationshipbetween the infinitive marker to and the matrix elements:(29) There must be a “modal harmony” between the infinitive marker to and the matrix
elements.

4.3.3. The Relationship between Futurity and Modality
The infinitive marker to functions to introduce a future situation. The following sections,
essentially along the lines of Wierzbicka (1988), argues for the following two points: first, theinfinitive marker to can introduce a future situation (i) when it co-occurs with verbs of volition,verbs of attempting, and verbs of speech act, and (ii) when it is used alone to express “purpose”,“plans”, or “necessary conditions”; second, the infinitive marker to can function as a modalizer
expressing “deontic modality” and “dynamic modality”.

4.3.3.1. Verbs of Volition
Observe the following sentence:57(30) He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 30))
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the infinitive marker to , in the
combination with verbs of volition, implies the following three notions: “thinking”, “wanting”,
and “future time”, which are shown by the following semantic formula (X refers to the matrix
clause subject):(31) “X thought this: I want this: I will go”(Wierzbicka (1988: 30))

The above semantic formula is suggestive in that it explicitly shows that the infinitive marker toexpresses the subject’s “desire” and “future time”. In the following sentence, for example, afuture situation is referred to by the infinitive marker to:(32) Science can be embedded in many other activities. For example, children planning totell a story might decide to use shadow puppets.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the partial situation (tell a story) is regarded as not-yet factual. This is evident fromthe matrix volitional verb planning.

4.3.3.2. Verbs of Attempting
Observe the following sentence:(33) He tried/attempted/strove/endeavored to go.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 35))

According to Wierzbicka (1988), the infinitive marker to in the above sentence also implies thethree notions of “thinking”, “wanting”, and “future time” in its semantic formula.

4.3.3.3. Verbs of Speech Act
Observe the following examples.

58(34) a. I promise to do it. ⇒I think this: I want this: I will do it
I say: I will do it
b. I order/beg you to do it. ⇒I think this: I want this: you will do it
I say: I want this: you will do it(Wierzbicka (1988: 37))(34a) and (34b) are paralleled with each other in that the infinitive marker to in both examples
expresses the three notions of “thinking”, “wanting”, and “future time”.

4.3.3.4. The Purpose Infinitive
The infinitive marker to also introduces a future situation when its complement constitutes the
purpose infinitive. Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the purpose infinitive implies its subject’s“thinking”, “wanting”, and “future time”:(35) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of Language. ⇒Mary went to the Librarybecause she thought this:I want this: I will read the latest issue of Language(Wierzbicka (1988: 24)) (Italics is original)
Based on (35), the situation referred to by the purpose infinitive is expected to occur in the
future.

4.3.4. Deontic Modality and Dynamic Modality
If we take into consideration the above discussion, we can conclude that the infinitive tobelongs to the category of modalizer expressing “futurity”. However, the notion of “futurity”
expressed by to needs to be subclassified.
59

For example, Wierzbicka (1988) compares the following sentences:(36) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up..
b. She was afraid of waking her mistress up.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))
According to her analysis, (36a) and (36b) is paralleled with each other in that the situations
following the matrix predicate afraid are both not-yet factual. However, they differ from eachother in that only (36a) contains the subject’s “intention” to wake up her mistress up. The
implication of the subject’s “intention” can only be attributed to the presence of the infinitivemarker to. The present claim that to expresses “intention” is supported by the fact that to of thiskind cannot be followed by any unintended verbs such as fall down. According to Goldberg(1995), (37a) is infelicitous unless the falling is interpreted as somehow volitionally intended:(37) a. *I am afraid to fall down.
b. I am afraid of falling down.
(Goldberg (1995: 4))
The above discussion enables us to conclude that the infinitive marker to can express an“intention” to do something as well as “futurity”.
Furthermore, in some cases, the infinitive marker to can also be regarded as expressing an“obligation”. Observe the following sentence:(38) a. You came out of the gate with a big list of things [to do].
b. It's imperative [to think things through clearly and completely].
(COCA)In (38), the to complements express an “obligation” as well as “futurity”.
If we take into consideration these linguistic facts, we can subclassify the “not-yet factuality”
expressed by the infinitive marker to into at least two subcategories: “deontic” and “dynamic”.

60

4.3.4.1. Deontic Modality
The infinitive marker to can function as a deontic modality when it occurs after adjectives suchas such as urgent, vital, important, essential, and imperative, and nouns such as order,
importance, and request:(39) Adjectives
a. … it's urgent [to develop a conservation strategy for the African wolf].
b. … it is absolutely vital [to keep Trump's base angry and riled up and active].
c. But as we build and deploy intelligent systems, it is vital [to understand them so we
can design with awareness and hopefully avoid potential problems].
d. It is essential [to teach letters as well as phonemic awareness to beginners].
e. It's imperative [to think things through clearly and completely]. (= (38b))(COCA) (Underline is mine)(40) Nouns
a. He also issued an order [to freeze all new regulations from agencies across the board]…
b. It's a request [to hurry up and have a life again].
(COCA)(39) and (40) express “importance” or “obligation” for the partial situations denoted by the tocomplements. For example, in (39), by using urgent, vital, essential, and imperative, the speakers
indicate that the “importance” or the “obligation” for the situations in question should be realized.
In these cases, the infinitive marker to also expresses the “obligation” of the realization of thesesituations and thus interrelates with the “importance” or “obligation” expressed by the matrix
predicates. In other words, there is a “modal harmony” between the two.
Furthermore, the infinitive marker to can express deontic modality when it is used with somenouns implying “obligation”, such as thing and work, and WH phrases:(41) a. And don't worry because I have so many things [to do] every day.
b. I don't know where [to go].

(COCA)(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1264))61

(41) expresses “obligation” for the partial situations denoted by the to complement. In (41a), by
using a noun thing, the speakers indicate the “obligation” for the situation in question to occur.
In these cases, the infinitive marker to also expresses the “obligation” of the realization of thesituation and thus interrelates with the “obligation” expressed by its antecedent. The claim thatthe to complement in (41b) expresses “obligation” is supported by the fact that it can beparaphrased with a free relative clause containing the deontic modal should:(42) I don't know where I should go.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1264)) (Underline is mine)

4.3.4.2. Dynamic Modality
The complementizer to can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs after predicates
which express “desire”, “acceptance”, or “intention”, such as anxious and willing:(43) a. You must be anxious [to return home].
b. I am willing [to give up my life for this position].

(COCA)

Both sentences in (43) indicate that the future situations referred to by the to complement
constitute the object of desire, acceptance, or intention denoted by the matrix predicates anxious
and willing. In the above sentences, we can see that the to complement modally harmonizes withthe matrix predicates.
Furthermore, the complementizer to can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs aftersome nouns and express “possibility”:(44) Give me something [to eat].
(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fourth Edition) (Underline is mine)
In (44), the to complement modifies a noun something. In this case, the infinitive marker to refers
to “possibility”, which is evident from the fact that the to complement in (44) can be paraphrasedwith a relative clause with the dynamic modal auxiliary can:(45) Give me something (which) I can eat.
62

(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fourth Edition)
If we take into consideration the above facts, we can conclude that the infinitive marker to canfunction as a dynamic modalizer and express “desire”, “acceptance”, “intention”, and“possibility”.

4.3.5. Emotive Modality
The infinitive marker to can function as an emotive modalizer and express a feeling of“surprise” when it occurs after emotive predicates such as fool, crazy and delighted (theunderlines in the following sentences are mine):(46) a. Boehner must have been crazy [to invite him].
b. I am delighted [to see Peter here].

(COCA)(Wierzbicka (1988: 98))

In (46a), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a factual situation referred to by the to complement
is expressed by the matrix predicate crazy. In (46b), in the same way, a subjunctive, emotive
evaluation of a future situation referred to by the to complement is expressed by the matrix
predicate delighted. It should be noted here that the emotional judgment is expressed not only by
the matrix predicates but also the infinitive marker to itself. By using the infinitive marker to, thespeakers express the situations in question as surprising situations which are divorced from hisor her assumptions.
Furthermore, the infinitive marker to can also function as an emotive modalizer and express afeeling of “disdain” when it occurs after emotive predicates expressing a calm judgment, such as
usual:(47) … it is usual [to give some small amount to the poor and destitute].
(COCA) (Underline is mine)
In (47), a subjunctive, emotive judgment of a situation referred to by the to complement isexpressed by the matrix predicate usual. In the present case, the infinitive marker to functions as
an emotive modalizer, and a feeling of “disdain” is expressed concerning the situation it63introduces.
The above facts enable us to conclude that the infinitive marker to can function as an emotive
modalizer and that the emotion expressed by to can be classified into “surprise” and “disdain”(see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

4.3.6. Epistemic Modality
The infinitive marker to can function as an epistemic modalizer when it occurs after verbs
such as discover, find, etc. (the underlines in the following sentences are mine):(48) a. I discovered [him to be quite stupid].
b. I find [sewing to be refreshing to Jane].

(Dixon (1991: 220))(Borkin (1984: 79))

In (48), the situations referred to by the infinitive marker to constitute the speaker’s judgment
based on his or her experience. The interpretation of (48) is paralleled to that of the sentenceswith the epistemic verb seem:(49) Sewing seems to be refreshing to Jane.
(49) expresses the speaker’s subjective thought based on his or her experience. Borkin (1984:79) puts its focus on to be deletion in the constructions of this kind and states that to be is deleted
when the speaker represents the report of his or her experience:(50) a. I found that this chair is comfortable.
b. I found this chair to be comfortable.
c. I found this chair comfortable.
(Borkin (1984: 79))
According to her analysis, the complement in (50a) represents a proposition viewed as based onevidence, while the complement in (50c) represents the report of an experience.7 (50a), but not7

According to Borkin’s analysis, to be in (49) cannot be deleted because it is impossible todirectly report a sensory experience of someone else's:(v) *I find sewing refreshing to Jane.

64(Borkin (1971: 79))

(50c), might be used as a statement about consumer reaction tests, but (50c), but not (50a), would
be used as a statement about how the chair feels to the speaker. (50b), on the other hand, might
be used in either circumstance. This is presumably because the to complement in (50b) merely
expresses the speaker’s “thought” or “judgment” rather than his or her own “experience”.
The present claim that the infinitive marker to can express epistemic modality is supported by
the fact that it can co-occur with epistemic verbs such as think, mean, imply, believe, or seem.8(51) a. I believe [John to be beaten].
b. I reported [John to be absent today].
c. I suspect [him to be hiding in the shrubbery].
d. I consider [myself to be cleverer than Fred].
e. I know [Mary to have raced giraffes in Kenya].
(Dixon (1991: 223)) (Underline is mine)f. They thought [him to be a spy].

(Swan (2017: 664)) (Underline is mine)

In the cases in which to co-occurs with these epistemic verbs, to modally harmonizes withthese verbs.
It should be noted that verbs such as conclude, infer, or argue do not take the to complement.
(52) ?I {concluded / inferred / argued} John to be stupid.

(Dixon (1991: 255))

This shows that these verbs do not take “thought” or “judgment” as their complement. According
to Dixon (1991: 255), the epistemic to complement can only be related to some “straightforward
impression” or “opinion”, not to “the result of a process of reasoning”. “The result of a processof reasoning” has stronger factivity than “thought” or “judgment” has.

8

Notice that the for complement cannot co-occur with epistemic verbs.
(vi) a. *What I believe is [for Mary to be shy].
b. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
c. *I know (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].
d. *It is true [for God to exist]
e. *It is false [for there to be only finitely many primes](Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)

This linguistic fact suggests that the complementizer for cannot function as an epistemic
modalizer (see Chapter 6 for a further discussion).
65

The above discussions enable us to conclude that the infinitive marker to can function as an
epistemic modalizer when it co-occurs with epistemic verbs and modally harmonizes with them.

4.3.7. Possible Counterevidence for the Infinitive Marker To as a Modalizer
4.3.7.1. Introduction
This section adduces two cases as possible counterevidence for the present claim that theinfinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer: (i) the cases in which the tocomplement is used as the resultative infinitive, and (ii) the cases in which infinitive marker tofollows an implicative predicate.

4.3.7.2. The Resultative Infinitive
First, the infinitive marker to cannot be regarded as a modalizer when the to complement isused as the resultative infinitive because the resultative infinitive merely refers to a fact and do
not express any construal of the fact:(53) a. I woke up to find myself lying on the grass.
(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fifth Edition)b. "Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, to find that her husband had not yet
returned. She dressed herself hastily, called the maid, and set off for the stables. The
door was open; inside, huddled together upon a chair, Hunter was sunk in a state ofabsolute stupor, the favorite's stall was empty, and there were no signs of his trainer.
(A. C. Doyle, The Naval Treaty) (Italics is mine)
The situations referred to by the resultative infinitive in (53a) and (53b) are interpreted as factual
situations which occurred in the past. The infinitive of this kind differs in meaning from the
purpose infinitive in that only the former does not allow preposing of the infinitive or in order
insertion:(54) a. ?To find myself lying on the grass, I woke up.
66

b. ?To find that her husband had not yet returned, Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in themorning…
(55) a. ?I woke up in order to find myself lying on the grass.
b. ?Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, in order to find that her husband had
not yet returned.
The present chapter regards the resultative infinitive as exceptional to the claim that theinfinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer and attributes the reason to“Transparentizing Phenomena” proposed by Sawada (2016, 2018a).
Sawada (2016, 2018a) puts its focus on pseudo modal have to and proposes the following
effect:(56) The Transfer Effect of Tense, Aspect, and Modality:
Tense, aspect, and modality in the matrix verb transfers to the complement verb.
(Sawada (2018a: 156))
Based on (56), we can analyze the construction as in (57) by postulating the interpretation process
shown in (58) below:(57) Although I've trained and worked in this area since 1982 I am having to learn a whole
new dimension that is multi-cultural.

(BNC)(58) …I am having (to) learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural.
(have) -ing
(Cf. Sawada (2016: 399))
According to his analysis, (57) is interpreted through the following two processes: First, thepresent participle having in the present progressive form am having to divided into the verb haveand progressive morpheme -ing. Second, the progressive morpheme -ing transfers to thecomplement verb learn after the verb have as well as the infinitive marker to are transparentized.
The deontic modality expressed by have to is transparentized (= backgrounded) and, thus,interpreted “adverbially”. The complement verb, by contrast, is foregrounded and thusinterpreted as the matrix verb. The infinitive marker to, in this case, cannot be regarded as a
67

modalizer because it loses its function as the VP complementizer. See Chapter 5 for further
discussion.

4.3.7.3. Implicative Predicates
Second, the infinitive marker to cannot be regarded as a modalizer when it is used after
implicative predicates because it merely introduces a fact and do not express any construal of thefact:(59) a. He managed to solve the problem.

(Karttunen (1971: 341))

b. I just happened to be looking out of the window - the blind was flapping.
(A. Christie, The Murder of Roger Ackroyd) (Italics is mine)
According to Karttunen (1971), implicative verbs theoretically imply the truth of thecomplements. Thus, the situations referred to by the infinitive in (59) are regarded as factual.
The present chapter also regards these cases as exceptional to the claim that the infinitivemarker to belongs to the category of modalizer and attributes the reason to “Transparentizing
Phenomena”. Observe the following example:(60) He remembered to solve the problem.

(Karttunen (1971: 341))(60) shows the following two processes: First, the finite verb remembered in the matrix clauseis divided into the nonfinite form remember and the past tense morpheme -ed, and remember
and the infinitive marker to becomes transparent. Second, -ed transfers, over the transparent
remember and to, to the complement verb solve. Since the meaning of the transparent remember
is relatively weakened (= backgrounded), it is interpreted like an “adverb.” The complement verb
solve, on the other hand, is interpreted as a “main verb” with the past tense because the past tense
has transferred to it.
The infinitive marker to, in this case, cannot also be regarded as a modalizer because it loses
its function as the VP complementizer. See Chapter 5 for further discussion.

684.4. Conclusion
The present chapter put its focus on the relationship between the infinitive marker to as wellas the content of the to complement and modality and demonstrated the following three points:(61) A. The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.
B . The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into thefollowing types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic
modality, and counterfactual modality.
C. There must be a “modal harmony” between the infinitive marker to and the matrix
elements.
The classification of modality expressed by the infinitive marker to can be schematized asfollows:
Epistemic
Propositional

Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)(62) Modality
Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose,
Possibility)
Event
Deontic (Obligation)
We hope that the present chapter will make a substantial contribution to the area of studies on
the infinitive as well as on modality in that (i) it expands the definition of modality by clarifyingthat modality expresses not only a “nonfactual situation” but also the speaker’s construal of thefactual situation and his or her mental attitude towards it, and that (ii) it emphasizes the necessity
to reanalyze the infinitive marker to as a modalizer.

69

Chapter 5 The Resultative Infinitive and Transparentizing
Phenomena5.1. Introduction
As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the infinitive marker to has generally been regarded as having
the function to introduce “future” situations through the original meaning of the proposition to,which expresses a “direction” (Curme (1931), Jespersen (1933), and Visser (1984)).
The resultative infinitive, which is focused on in the present chapter, differs from the otherinfinitive in that only the former expresses an event which occurred after an event referred to by
the matrix verb (the underlines in the following sentences are mine):(1) a. Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, to find that her husband had not yet
returned.

(A. C. Doyle, The Naval Treaty)b. In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew to be a woman.
(Sherwood Anderson, Winesburg, Ohio)c. I ran all the way to the station only to find the train had just left.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1224))
The situations referred to by the resultative infinitive in (1a)-(1c) are interpreted as factual
situations which occurred in the past.
Visser (1984: 1009-1011) divided the resultative infinitive into result type and action type. The
former expresses a result which follows the event referred to by the matrix verb, while the latter
expresses an action which immediately follows the action referred to in the matrix clause.:(2) Result typea. Many of the familiar landmarks had vanished, to leave new squares and avenues.
b. None of them lived to grow up.
c. …I could never talk to poor people to do them any good.
(Visser (1984: 1010))(3) Action Typea. He awoke suddenly to find the car had stopped outside the hotel.
b. He went away, never to return.
70

c. …he opened surprised eyes to find himself flying on the beach.
(Visser (1984: 1011))
The present chapter, however, will not make a classification between the two types and regard
them as one single type. Furthermore, this chapter will propose the notion of “Transparentizing
Phenomena” as a decisive factor conditioning the interpretation of the resultative infinitive as
nonfuture (see Chapter 3 for more detail).

5.1.1. Organization
The Organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 will introduce the essence from someprevious studies on the resultative infinitive and clarify the syntactic and semantic constraints on
it. Section 3 will propose the notion of “Transparentizing Phenomena” on the matrix verbs andthe infinitive marker to. Section 4 will summarize the whole chapter and discuss some residual
problems.

5.2. The Semantic and Syntactic Constraint on the Resultative Infinitive
5.2.1. Introduction
To the best of my knowledge, the number of semantic studies discussing the resultative
infinitive in detail is rather limited, and almost all the studies merely provide a list of the examples.
The majority of previous studies conducted in Japan put their focus on the comparison between
the resultative infinitive and the other infinitive, while most of the previous studies in foreigncountries focus on whether the actions referred to by the resultative infinitive is taken
intentionally.
The present section will classify the previous studies on the resultative infinitive into three interms as “realization”, “intentionality”, and “predictability” and clarify the syntactic andsemantic constraints on it by pointing out their problems.

715.2.2. Actualization
5.2.2.1. Previous Studies and Problems
This section will adduce two previous studies in support of the claim that the resultative
infinitive expresses “realization”: namely Yasui (1996) and Yamaoka (2014). Yasui (1996: 217)
points out that, when the matrix verb is in the past tense, the situation referred to by the following
resultative infinitive implies that it was realized. According to his analysis, (4a) implies (4b):(4) a. He grew up to be a fine gentleman.
b. He became a fine gentleman.
(Yasui (1996: 217))
Yamaoka, on the other hand, compares the resultative infinitive (= (5a)) and the purpose
infinitive (= (5b)) and argues as follows:(5) a. Alan lived to be ninety-nine. [Result]b. Derek worked energetically to support his family. [Purpose](6) The infinitive will be interpreted to be “resultative” when the truth of it is presupposed,
while the infinitive will be interpreted to be “purpose” when the truth of it is uncertain.
(Yamaoka (2014: 350))
According to Yamaoka’s (2014) analysis, the resultative infinitive in (5a) presupposes that Alanactually became 99, while the purpose infinitive in (5b) does not presuppose that Derek actually
worked energetically to support his family.
Yasui (1996) and Yamaoka (1996) have the following two problems:First, the truth of the situation referred to by the resultative infinitive is not “implied” but“asserted”. This is because the focus of the whole sentence is on the infinitive rather than thematrix clause. For example, asserting (7a) is equivalent to asserting (7b) (for the sake of
convenience I will requote (4) as (7) below):(7) a. He grew up to be a fine gentleman.
b. He became a fine gentleman.
72

Second, the resultative infinitive is a kind of “assertion” rather than “presupposition”.
Generally speaking, “assertion”, but not “presupposition”, can be operated by sentence-negation.
For example, since the truth of the that complement in (8a) is presupposed to be true, thecomplement will not be operated by the sentence-negation even if the whole sentence is negatedas in (8b). Thus, in (8b), the matrix clause constitutes the “assertion”, while the that complement“presupposition”.
(8) a. It is odd that the door is closed.
b. It is not odd that the door is closed.

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 351))

However, the resultative infinitive will never be presupposed to be true, because the scope ofthe sentence negation in the matrix clause contains the resultative infinitive. Thus, (9a) istheoretically equal to (9b):(9) a. Yehiel Erlich did not live to see the marriage of his only son.

(COCA)

b. Yehiel Erlich did not see the marriage of his only son.
If we take this fact into consideration, the resultative infinitive is not “presupposition” but“assertion” (Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Leech (1981), Levinson (1983)). See Section 3
for further discussion on the scope of negation.
Third, it is not necessarily true that he situation referred to by the resultative infinitive occurredin the past:(10) a. The day after tomorrow they'll wake up to find themselves in Madeira.
b. He'll probably live to be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his
old college, and I shan't mind at all.
(BNC)
The situations referred to by the matrix clauses in (10a) and (10b) are not yet factual. In the sameway, the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive are also something which will occur inthe future. Thus, (10a) asserts that they will find themselves in Madeira, and (10b) asserts that hewill probably be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his old college.
Therefore, the resultative infinitive does not always refer to the situation which occurred in the73past, but rather, its time is simultaneous with that of the matrix clause. By contrast, the purpose
infinitive always refers to the situation which follows the situation referred to by the matrix verb,
because it expresses the “purpose”, “aim”, or “intention” (Jespersen (MEG V: 247)). Thus, (11a)and (11c) below does not always assert (11b) and (11d), respectively:(11) a. I went to see my aunt on Saturday.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 247))

b. I saw my aunt on Saturday.
c. I will leave for Tokyo tonight (in order) to participate in the meeting tomorrow.
d. I will participate in the meeting tomorrow.
Based on the above discussion, we can postulate the following temporal constraint on the
resultative infinitive and the purpose infinitive:(12) Temporal Constraint on the Purpose Infinitive and the Resultative Infinitive:
The purpose infinitive refers to the situation which follows the situation referred to by
the matrix clause, while the resultative infinitive refers to the situation which issimultaneous with the situation referred to by the matrix clause.

5.2.2.2. Syntactic and Semantic Differences between the Resultative Infinitive and the
Purpose Infinitive
This section adduces 6 syntactic/semantic differences between the resultative infinitive andthe purpose infinitive: (i) the possibility for preposing, (ii) the possibility for in order insertion,(iii) the scope of the sentence negation, (iv) the paraphrasability into the cleft sentence, (v) the
paraphrasability with so that … can/may construction, and (vi) the presence or absence of thecomplementizer for.

5.2.2.2.1. Preposing of the Infinitive
First, the purpose infinitive allows preposing when it is focused, while the resultative infinitivealways does not:74

(13) a. To open the carton, pull this tab. [Purpose](Quirk et al. (1985: 1107))b. To get out of the country it is necessary to have a passport. [Purpose](Jespersen (MEG V: 254))
c. To switch on, press red button. [Purpose](Swan (20174:143))(14) a. *To be ninety-nine, Alan lived. [Result]b. *To find myself lying on the grass, I woke up. [Result]c. *To find that her husband had not yet returned, Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in themorning… [Result]
Quirk et al. (1985: 1079) supports this claim and states on the preposing of the resultative
infinitive as follows:(15) These clauses [infinitive clauses expressing the outcome of the situation] are restricted
to final position …

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))

The reasons for the resultative infinitive’s nonacceptability of the preposing are as follows: First,
since the situation referred to by the resultative infinitive constitutes the result of the situationreferred to by the matrix clause, to prepose the infinitive would lead to a contradiction of the timeorder between the matrix clause and the infinitive. Second, the infinitive could not share the tensewith the matrix verb after the preposing.

5.2.2.2.2. In Order Insertion
Second, the purpose infinitive allows the in order insertion, while the resultatie infinitive doesnot:(16) a. In order to open the carton, pull this tab. [Purpose]b. In order to get out of the country it is necessary to have a passport. [Purpose](Jespersen (MEG V: 254))
c. In order to standardize children's learning, teachers tend to standardize theirapproach to teaching. [Purpose]

(BNC)
75

(17) a. *Alan lived in order to be ninety-nine. [Result]b. *I woke up in order to find myself lying on the grass. [Result]c. *Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, in order to find that her husband had
not yet returned. [Result]5.2.2.2.3. The Scope of Sentence Negation
Third, the purpose infinitive is ambiguous when the matrix clause contains a sentence negation,
while the resultative infinitive is not:(18) a. He didn’t go to the library to study. [Purpose]b. He didn’t live to be 90. [Result]
In (18a), where the purpose infinitive is used, the scope of the sentence negation can or can notcontain the infinitive. In other words, it can mean either that he studied or that he did not. (18b),on the other hand, can only mean that he did not reach 90 although he lived long. In this case,the scope of the negation does not contain the matrix verb live. The above facts enable us toconclude that the following principle is applied to resultative infinitive construction:(19) The Affirmation Principle for the Resultative Infinitive:
The matrix predicate of the resultative infinitive is always affirmative and not negated.1
According to the above principle, even if the matrix clause contains negation, its scope can only
contain the resultative infinitive. Thus, in (20) below, the scope of negation only contains theresultative infinitive:(20) I didn’t wake up to find myself lying on the grass.
Therefore, (20) receives the same interpreted as (21):(21) Although I woke up, I didn’t find myself lying on the grass.

1

We can assume that, in the resultative infinitive construction, not in the matrix clause transfers
to the complement verb. See Section 5.3.7. for a further discussion on the transfer of not.
76

In the resultative infinitive construction, the situation referred to by the infinitive is expressedas the result of the realization of the situation referred to by the matrix clause. If the matrix clauseis negated, any results could not be realized. Thus, if (20) received the interpretation that I did
not wake up, then it would be impossible for me to find myself lying on the grass. In the present
case, the resultative infinitive loses the meaning of its existence.

5.2.2.2.4. Cleft Sentence
Forth, the purpose infinitive can be the focus of a cleft sentence, while the resultative infinitive
cannot. For example, in (22a), the purpose infinitive can be the focus of its corresponding cleft
sentence (= (22b)):(22) a. Mary drove all the way to Maine to visit some friends. [Purpose]b. It was to visit some friends that Mary drove all the way to Maine.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 629))
By contrast, in (23a), the resultative infinitive cannot be the focus of its corresponding cleft
sentence (=(23b)):(23) a. Mary drove all the way to Maine, to find that her friends had moved to Florida.
[Result](Quirk et al. (1985: 629))

b. *It was to find that her friends had moved to Florida that Mary drove all the way
to Maine.

5.2.2.2.5. Paraphrasing with “So That…Can/May” Construction
Fifth, the purpose infinitive can be paraphrased with so that … can/may construction, while
the resultative infinitive cannot. For example, (24a), where the purpose infinitive is used, can beparaphrased with (24b):(24) a. Endill went to the library to find pictures of a catapult to help them on their way.
(BNC)
77

b. He went to the library so that he can find pictures of a catapult to help them on theirway.
By contrast, (25a), where the resultative infinitive is used, cannot paraphrased with (25b):(25) a. He awoke to find himself lying on the grass.
b. *He awoke so that he can find himself lying on the grass.

5.2.2.2.6. The Presence/Absence of the Complementizer For
Sixth, in a sentence with the purpose infinitive, the subject of the infinitive is explicitly
expressed by the complementizer for:2(26) a. The hunters encircled the deer in order for the animal not to escape.
(Declerck (1991: 478)) (Underline is mine)b. In order for you to be eligible for a student grant, your parents must receive less thana stipulated annual income.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1004)) (Underline is mine)

By contrast, in the resultative infinitive construction, the complementizer for is not used. Thus,
the following sentences are not accepted by any native English speaker:3(27) a. *I woke up for Mary to find herself lying on the grass.
b. *I lived for Tom to be 90.
Furthermore, (28a) cannot contain the complementizer for even if the verb is passivized.
(28) a. But they lived to see the light of day.

(COCA)

2

According to Quirk et al. (1985: 696), the preposition for can be used to express a purpose.
For example, in the following sentences, the prepositional phrase for money and for sheltermean in order to gain money and in order to reach shelter, respectively:(i) a. He'll do anything for money.
b. Everyone ran for shelter.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 696))
3

The fact that there is no similar examples in British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus ofContemporary American English (COCA) also support the present clam.
78

b. *But they lived for the light of day to be seen (by them).
The presence/absence of the complementizer for plays a vital role in explaining the“Transparentizing Phenomena” which is discussed in detail in Section 3. When thecomplementizer for is used, it prevents any matrix elements from transferring to the complement.
See Section 3 for further detail.

5.2.2.2.7. The Possibility of “Only” Insertion
The possible difference between the two types of infinitive is that the resultative infinitive, but
not the purpose infinitive, allows only insertion before it. Palmer (1965) and Inoue (1971) support
this claim: Palmer (1965: 176) adduces (29) in support of this claim and states as follow:(29) He arrived at last, only to see that the others had all left.
(Palmer (1965: 176)) (Underline is mine)(30) Here, of course, there is no possibility of ambiguity. The occurrence of only and neverillustrates quite clearly that this is an infinitive of result.

(Palmer (1965: 176))

Furthermore, Inoue argues that, when the resultative infinitive follows verbs of intention, theadverb only is used before the infinitive to avoid its confusion with the purpose infinitive:(31) a. He went abroad only to die.4
b. They went out, only to get wet.
(Inoue (1971: 1192))
If we take into consideration the fact that the situations referred to by the infinitive in (31a) and(31b) is something which occurred in the past, the infinitive should be regarded as the resultative
infinitive. Inoue (1971) regards these sentences as examples of the resultative infinitive. It
follows that only occurs only in the resultative infinitive construction. However, Quirk et al.

4

The verb die is usually regarded as an unaccusative verb without the subject’s intention, but,in some cases, it can be regarded as an unergative verb with the subject’s intention (see Section
5.2.3.3. for more detail).
79

(1985: 629) argues that the adverb only can occur with the purpose infinitive:(32) Mary drove all the way to Maine (only) to visit some friends.
If the infinitive in (32) is interpreted as the resultative infinitive, the whole sentence means that
Mary drove all the way to Maine, but she only visited some friend. Therefore, in that case, (32)asserts (33) below:(33) Mary visited some friends.
However, based on the fact that only can occur in the purpose infinitive construction,

thesituation referred to by the infinitive in (32) can be expressed even when it is not yet factual:(34) Mary drove all the way to Maine (only) to visit some friends, but in fact she couldn’t
visit any of them.
This fact enables us to conclude that only insertion cannot be a crucial factor which helps us todistinguish the resultative infinitive from the purpose infinitive.

5.2.2.3. Ambiguity
Section 5.2.2.2. argued that the resultative infinitive differs from the purpose infinitive in thefollowing 6 points:(35) 1. The possibility for preposing of the infinitive
2. The possibility of order insertion
3. The scope of sentence negation
4. The paraphrasability with a cleft sentence
5. The paraphrasability with so that … can/may construction
6. The presence/absence of the complementizer for
These differences can be a crucial factor in analyzing the sentences which has ambiguousinterpretation.
80

(36) He came into the room to shut the windows while we were still in bed and I saw helooked ill.

(Hemingway, “A Day’s Wait”)

The infinitive in (36) means that he actually shut the windows, but, if the whole sentence isuttered when it is uncertain whether he shut them or not, the infinitive will be ambiguous inmeaning: it can mean either that he actually shut the windows and that he did not. If we take thedifferent syntactic/semantic features of the two types of the infinitive in order to interpret thisexample correctly, we can argue as follows:First, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be preposed:(37) *To shut the windows, he came into the room…
Second, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it does not allow in order
insertion:(38) *He came into the room in order to shut the windows...
Third, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if the negation in the matrix clausedoes not contain the matrix verb. As was mentioned earlier, the matrix predicate of the resultative
infinitive is always affirmative and not negated. Although the matrix verb appears to be negatedin the following sentence, the actual scope of the negation contains only the complement verb.
Therefore, (39) below means that he did not shut the windows although he came into the room:(39) He didn’t come into the room to shut the windows…
Fourth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be the focus of its
corresponding cleft sentence:(40) *It was to shut the windows that he came into the room…
Fifth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be paraphrased with sothat … can/may construction:(41) *He came into the room so that he {could / might} shut the windows…
81Sixth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if we cannot use the complementizer
for to express the semantic subject of the infinitive:(42) *He came into the room for her to shut the windows…

5.2.3. Intension
5.2.3.1. The Constraint on Matrix Predicates
This section adduces Jespersen (MEG V) and Ando (2010) as previous studies which analyzes
the resultative infinitive in terms of “intention”. Ando (2010: 212) argues that the resultative
infinitive can only co-occur with verbs with no intention:(43) a. He will live to be ninety.
b. In 1980 he left Japan never to return.
c. I woke that night to find my house in flames.
d. She opened her eyes to see a tall, dark-haired man standing beside her.
(Ando (2010: 212))
In (43a)-(43d), where predicates such as be, return, find, and see, the situations referred to bythese verbs dos not express the subject’s intention.
Jespersen (MEG V: 256), by contrast, divides the result expressed by the resultative infinitive
into two types: Live Type and Find Type. The former type can express either intended orunintended result, while the latter type expresses an unintended result:

Live Type(44) Result
Find TypeAccording to Jespersen (MEG V), the infinitive classified in Live type is used after the verb
live which means “live long enough to experience”. In the present type, the infinitive can express
either an intended result or an unintended result:82

(45) a. My papa lived to bail Mr. Micawber several times.
b. … we shall not live to make other friends.
c. …the son, who grew up to be killed in the Great War.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))
In (45a), the situation referred to by the infinitive expresses the subject’s intention, while, in(45b), the situation referred to by the infinitive constitutes the subject’s oath and expresses theirintention. By contrast, in (45c), where the resultative infinitive is used in a relative clause, thesituation referred to by the infinitive does not involve the subject’s intention. This is because no
one is killed by intention.
The infinitive in classified in find type always does not involve the subject’s intention:(46) a. I opened my eyes to find that we were standing still before a large building.
b. She woke suddenly to find some one standing in her open doorway and holding acandle.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))
In both (46a) and (46b), the infinitive refers to situations which unintentionally happened to thesubjects, and thus does not involve any intentions. Furthermore, according to Jespersen’sobservation, the adverb only can co-occur with the infinitive of find type:(47) a. I am sorry to have raised your expectations only to disappoint them.
b. You have only ended courting to begin marriage.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 256-7))
The situations referred to by the infinitive in (47a) and (47b) are not those which usually do not
involve any intentions.
The above discussion enables us to summarize Jespersen’s (MEG V) subclassification of theresultative infinitive with the following schema.

83Intentinal
live type(48) The Resultative Infinitive

Unintentionalfind type

Unintentional

5.2.3.2. …, and S Do Too Construction
This section adduces …, and S do too insertion as one of the factors to clarify whether thesituation involves some intention. Generally speaking, the present construction can only be used
to refer to a situation which involves some intention:(49) a. Tom went to the library, and Mary did too.
b. *It rained heavily yesterday, and it did the day before yesterday too.
Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 85) adduces some examples with the purpose infinitive andargues that the purpose infinitive allows …, and S do too insertion:(50) a. The plumber came into the room to fix the sink.
b. John went off to the store to buy a chocolate bar.
(51) a. John came into the room to fix the sink, and Mary did too.
b. John went off to the store to buy a chocolate bar, and Mary did too.
(Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 85)) (Underline is mine)
In (51), the verb did in the clause after and is the substitution of the whole verb phrase including
the purpose infinitive in the former clause. Thus, did in (51a) and (51b) refers to actions of“coming into the room to fix the sink” and “going off to the store to buy a chocolate bar”,
respectively. The both sentence in (51) are acceptable because the actions referred to by the
purpose infinitive involve the subject’s intention just as the actions referred to by did involves
the subject’s intention. By contrast, based on the fact that the resultative infinitive refers to an
unintended action, we can predict that the resultative infinitive does not allow …, and S do too
insertion. The nonacceptability of the following example proves this prediction to be correct.
84

(52) ??He woke up to find himself in jail, and she did too.
Furthermore, based on Jespersen’s (MEG V) claim that the infinitive in live type can refer toeither an intended or unintended action, we can predict that the infinitive in this type can be
subclassified into the following two subtypes: the one which does not allow …, and S do too
insertion, and the other which does allow it. The nonacceptability of the following sentences
proves this prediction to be current:(53) a. ??He lived to be 90, and she did too.
b. ?My papa lived to bail Mr. Micawber several times, and Mary did too.
According to a native speaker of English, (53a), where the verb be is used in the infinitive sounds
infelicitous, while (53b), where the verb bail is used, sounds better than (53a). We can conclude
based on these data that live type is divided into intentional subtype and unintentional subtype,
depending on the presence or absence of the verb used in the infinitive. 5

5

Oe (1983: 181), in terms of the coreferentiality of the subjects, adduces the following sentencein support of the claim that the resultative infinitive does not involve the subject’s intention:(ii) Hei rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill, to give himi a sense of reality
again.
(Oe (1983: 181))
According to his analysis, in (ii), the subject of the matrix clause and that of the infinitive are notcoreferential. If the both subjects are coreferential, the object of the verb give will be himself
instead of him. Based on this explanation, he concludes that the semantic subject of the infinitive
is not a person (he) but rather the whole matrix clause which, of course, cannot have intention.
Therefore, the infinitive used in (ii) can only be the resultative infinitive, and thus it cannot be
preposed and does not allow in order insertion. This is shown in the following examples:(iii) a. ??To give him a sense of reality again, he rose and stood a moment clutching thewindow-sill.
b. ??He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill in order to give him a senseof reality again.
Furthermore, the subject of the purpose infinitive is coreferential with that of the matrix clause
unless it is explicitly expressed by the complementizer for. Thus, if the infinitive in (iii) is the
purpose infinitive, himself, but not him, will be chosen as the object of the verb give. It can bepredicted that, if the object of give in (iii) is substituted with himself, the whole sentence will be
acceptable under the coreferentiality of subject. The acceptance of the following sentences
proves this prediction to be correct:(iv) He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill, to give {himself / ?him} a senseof reality again.
(v) a. He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill in order to give {himself /*him} a sense of reality again.
b. To give {himself / *him} a sense of reality again, he rose and stood a moment85

5.2.3.3. Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, the differences between the resultative infinitive and the
purpose infinitive can be summarized as follows:(54) In the case of the purpose infinitive, the action referred to by the infinitive involves the
subject’s intention. In the case of resultative infinitive, the action referred to by theinfinitive in live type involves the subject’s intention, while the action referred to by
the infinitive in find type either can or cannot involve the subject’s intention.
If we follow this principle, we can postulate that the infinitive will be ambiguous if none of thegrammatical operations, such as preposing or in order insertion, is applied or if it is uncertain
whether the infinitive involves the subject’s intention. In order to make sure the validity of thishypothesis, (31) will be requoted as (55) below. Notice that Inoue (1971) regards both of thefollowing sentences as examples of the resultative infinitive:(55) a. He went abroad only to die.
b. They went out, only to get wet.
In (55a) and (55b), the expressions die and get wet are used, respectively. While the verb die canclutching the window-sill.
The following sentence is similar to the above examples in this respect:(vi) Nothing happened the next day to weaken her terror.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))(vi) will be unacceptable if we regard the semantic subject as coreferential to that of the matrix
clause. Thus, the subject of the infinitive is interpreted to be the matrix clause as a whole. The
fact that the infinitive in question can be paraphrased with (viia) below or that the semantic
subject of the infinitive can be expressed with it which refers to the matrix clause supports thisclaim:(vii) a. Nothing happened the next day, which weakened her terror.
b. Nothing happened the next day, and it weakened her terror.
Here, the situation referred to by the matrix clause, the subject of the infinitive, cannot be
regarded as involving its intention.
The infinitive discussed here differ from the resultative infinitive discussed in the present
chapter in that the subject of the former is not coreferential with that of the matrix clause.
Therefore the present chapter excludes these example from the objects of its analysis.
86express a change of a state which cannot be controlled by the subject’s intention, it also can mean
to commit a suicide, which expresses an intended action. The verb phrase get wet can express
either a change of a state or an intended action. Thus, the above sentences are both ambiguous.
In the first interpretation, the infinitive is regarded as the purpose infinitive which involves the
subject’s intention. In this case, the situations in question are expressed as not yet factual. In thesecond interpretation, on the other hand, the infinitive is regarded as the resultative infinitive
without the subject’s intention. In this case, the situations in question are expressed as actuallyoccurring after the situations referred to by the matrix clauses actualize. The infinitive allows its
preposing or in order insertion when it is interpreted as the purpose infinitive.

5.2.4. Expectability
Declerck (1991: 479) argues that the result or outcome referred to by the resultative infinitive
is not predictable:(56) a. He rushed to her bed, only to find that it was empty.
b. The next thing I knew. I woke to find myself in jail.
c. He rose to be Chief Superintendent.
d. You will live to regret this foolish decision.
(Declerck (1991: 479))
According to his analysis, in (56), all the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive aresomething which was unexpected to occur.
Here, it is questionable why the result or outcome referred to by the resultative infinitive isregarded as unpredictable. The present dissertation takes the position that the unexpectability of
the resultative infinitive is related to its nonintentionality: that the situation does not involve any
intention means that the situation is not expected to occur. By contrast, the situation referred toby the purpose infinitive cannot be unexpected because the situation involves the subject’s
intention. Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the purpose infinitive implies its subject’s “thinking”,“wanting”, and “future time”:
87(57) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of Language. ⇒Mary went to the Librarybecause she thought this:I want this: I will read the latest issue of Language(Wierzbicka (1988: 24)) (Italics is original)
Based on (35), the situation referred to by the purpose infinitive is expected to occur in the
future because it is the object of the subject’s desire. On the other hand, the situation referred toby the resultative infinitive cannot be the object of the subject’s desire, and thus it must be theone which happens (or happened) to occur.

5.2.5. Conclusion
The present section classifies the previous studies on the resultative infinitive into three interms as “realization”, “intentionality”, and “predictability” and clarified the syntactic andsemantic constraints on it by pointing out their problems. The features of the resultative infinitive
and the purpose infinitive can be summarized as follows:

The Resultative Infinitive

The Purpose Infinitive

Simultaneous with the

Posterior to the matrix

matrix verb

verb

Intention〇/×〇

Expectability

×〇Preposition

×〇/×

In Order Insertion×〇

The Scope of Negation

the infinitive

the matrix clause /

Time

88

the infinitive×〇

The complementizer for×〇…, and S Do Too Construction〇/×〇The Coreferentiality of Subject〇/×〇/×（introduced by for）

So That … Can/May
Construction /Cleft Sentence

Fig. 1: The Features of the Resultative Infinitive and the Purpose Infinitive

5.3. Transparentizing Phenomena
5.3.1. Introduction
This section puts its focus on the temporal relationship between the resultative infinitive andthe matrix clause and adduces “Transparentizing Phenomena” proposed by Sawada (2016,2018a) in support of the temporal constraint on the resultative infinitive (as was mentioned in(12) in Section 5.2.2.1.).
Sawada (2016, 2018a) puts its focus on pseudo modal have to and proposes the following
effect:(58) The Transfer Effect of Tense, Aspect, and Modality:
Tense, aspect, and modality in the matrix verb transfers to the complement verb.
(Sawada (2018a: 156))
Based on(58), we can analyze the construction as in (59) below by postulating the interpretation
process shown in (60):(59) Although I've trained and worked in this area since 1982 I am having to learn a whole
new dimension that is multi-cultural.

(BNC)

89

(60) … I am having (to) learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural.
(have) -ing
(Cf. Sawada (2016: 399))
According to his analysis, (59) is interpreted through the following two processes: First, thepresent participle having in the present progressive form am having to divided into the verb haveand progressive morpheme -ing. Second, the progressive morpheme -ing transfers to thecomplement verb learn after the verb have as well as the infinitive marker to are transparentized.
The deontic modality expressed by have to is backgrounded (= transparentized) and thusinterpreted adverbially. The complement verb, by contrast, is foregrounded and, thus interpreted
as the matrix verb.
The present section further generalizes this effect and expands its application range to theresultative infinitive construction. First, the notion of “transparentizing” which Sawada (2016,2018a) proposes is redefined as follows:(61) Transparentizing Phenomena：
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to is relatively weakened,
and the matrix elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect,modality, and negation transfer to the complement verb.
These general phenomena on the resultative infinitive construction enable us to explain the facts
that the time of the matrix is simultaneous with that of the resultative infinitive and that the scopeof the sentence negation in the matrix clause contains the resultative infinitive. The next sections
argue that the tense, aspect, modality, and negation in the matrix clause transfer to thecomplement verb after the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to are transparentized.

5.3.2. Past Tense
Observe the following sentence:(62) On August 27 they awoke to find that food had gone on ration, as had petrol and manyother necessities.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)90

In (62), the matrix verb awake and the infinitive marker to are transparentized, and the past tense
morpheme -ed contained by the verb awoke transfers to the complement verb find. This
interpretation process can be shown schematically as follows:(63) On August 27 they awoke (to) find that food had gone on ration, …
(awake) –ed(63) shows the following two process: First, the finite verb awoke in the matrix clause is divided
into the nonfinite form awake and the past tense morpheme -ed, and awake and the infinitivemarker to becomes transparent. Second, -ed transfers, over the transparent awake and to, to thecomplement verb find. Since the meaning of the transparent awake is relatively weakened, it isinterpreted like an “adverb.” The complement verb find, on the other hand, is interpreted as a“main verb” with the past tense because the past tense has transferred to it. The claim that thepast tense morpheme transfers to the complement verb is supported by the fact that in (62) the
tense in the that clause is backshifted depending on the tense which transfers to thecomplement
verb find. Therefore, (62) receives the same interpretation as (64) below:(64) On August 27 they found that food had gone on ration, as had petrol and many othernecessities.
The same explanation can apply to (65) below:(65) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew to be a woman.
In (65), grew is divided into the verb grow and the past tense morpheme -ed, and the past tense
morpheme transfers to the complement verb be after grow and the infinitive marker to aretransparentized:(66) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew (to) be a woman.
(grow) -ed
As a result, the meaning of the matrix verb grow is relatively weakened, and the verb isinterpreted adverbially. Therefore, (65) receives the same interpretation as (67) below:
91(67) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved was a woman.
It is clear from the above analysis that, in the resultative infinitive construction, the relationshipof subordination between the matrix verb and the complement verb is reversed. That is to say,the matrix verb is interpreted adverbially by being transparentizing (or backgrounding), while
the complement verb is interpreted as the matrix verb after the infinitive marker to aretransparentized. Quirk et al. (1985) agrees with this claim and states as follows:(68) The sentences can usually be paraphrased by reversing the relationship of subordination…

(Quirck et al. (1985: 1079))

For example, (69a) and (70a) can be paraphrased with (69b) and (70b), respectively:(69) a. I awoke one morning to find the house in an uproar.
b. When l awoke one morning, I found the house in an uproar.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))(70) a. He survived the disgrace, to become a respected citizen.
b. After he survived the disgrace, he became a respected citizen.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))
Furthermore, the fact that (71a) and (72a) can be paraphrased with (71b) and (72b), respectively,
shows that the complement verb semantically functions as the matrix verb. In the following
resultative infinitive, which is classified in live type, the matrix verbs live and went on aretransparentized and regarded as the adverb eventually:(71) a. You'll live to regret it.
b. You'll eventually regret it.
(72) a. The show went on to become a great success.
b. The show eventually became a great success.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079)) (Underline is mine)(71b) and (72b) show that the matrix verbs function as adverbs and that the complement verbs
92

function as the matrix verbs.6
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that the interpretation of the resultative
infinitive depends on the phenomena in which the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to aretransparentized.

5.3.3. Present Tense
The number of examples in which the matrix verbs have the present tense is rather limited,
because the result expressed by the infinitive tends to be something which occurred in the past.
Observe the following sentence:(73) According to the U.N. secretary-general's report, despite progress in narrowing the gap
between rich and poor countries, “significant health inequities remain across countries
and regions.” For example, on average, people in high-income countries live to be 80
years old, compared with those in low-income countries who live to be 61.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)(73) describes the difference among the people’s health condition depending on where they live.
Here, the resultative infinitive is used twice, and, in both examples, the matrix verb live and theinfinitive marker to are transparentized. This process can be schematized as follows:(74) …people in high-income countries live (to) be 80 years old, …
(live) -es(74) shows the following two processes: First, the finite verb live in the matrix clause is divided
into the nonfinite form live and the present tense morpheme -es, and live and the infinitivemarker to becomes transparent. Second, -es transfers, over the transparent live and to, to thecomplement verb be. Since the meaning of the transparent live is relatively weakened (orbackgrounded), it is interpreted like an “adverb.” The complement verb be, on the other hand, is

6(71a) and (71b) indicates that will transfers to the complement verb. See Section 5.3.6. forfurther detail.
93

interpreted as a “main verb” with the present tense because the past tense has transferred to it.
Therefore (73) receives the same interpretation as (75) below:(75) … on average people in high-income countries are 80 years old, compared with thosein low-income countries who are 61.

5.3.4. Progressive
Observe the following sentences:(76 ) a . But Israelis have been waking up to find that many of their goals have goneunrealized.
b. If you're a space dreamer like me, then believe it when I say that you're waking up
to find that it's really happening.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)
In these examples, the progressive morpheme -ing in the present perfect progressive have been
waking up and the present progressive are waking up transfers, over the transparent wake and theinfinitive marker to, to the complement verb find. This process can be schematized as follows:(77) a. … Israelis have been waking (up) (to) find that …
(wake) -ing
b. … you're waking (up) (to) find that ...
(wake) -ing
After these processes, the meaning the verb wake is relatively weakened, and the verb isinterpreted adverbially. Thus, (76a) and (76b) receives the same interpretations as (78a) and (78b),
respectively:(78) a. But Israelis have been finding that many of their goals have gone unrealized.
b. If you're a space dreamer like me, then believe it when I say that you're finding thatit's really happening.
94Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the matrix verb in the resultative infinitive
construction does not contain the progressive aspect. Since the resultative infinitive refers to asituation which actually occurs after the realization of the situation referred to by the matrix
clause, the situation referred to by the matrix clause is obligatorily expressed to have realized. If
the matrix verb contains the progressive aspect, it indicates that the situation does not completely
realize. In that case, the resultative infinitive loses the meaning of its existence.

5.3.5. Subjunctive Past Perfect
Observe the following examples:(79) a. He knew so little of women that he felt as though he had woken up to find himself
halfway across a vast mountain in a blizzard without map or rope or compass.
b. It was as if she had been having a nightmare -- terrible, perhaps, but still only a
dream in which the money could vanish like fairy gold -- and woken up to find it
was true.
(BNC) (Underline is mine)
In (79a) and (79b), the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive are interpreted ascounterfactual. As is interesting, in (79b), the tense of the verb in the that clause is backshifted.
This linguistic fact cannot be explained unless we postulate the following process:(80) … had woken (up) (to) find …
(wake) -en(80) indicates the following two processes: First, the finite verb woken in the matrix clause isdivided into the nonfinite form wake and the present tense morpheme -en, and wake and theinfinitive marker to becomes transparent. Second, -en transfers, over the transparent wake and to,to the complement verb find. Since the meaning of the transparent wake is relatively weakened,
it is interpreted like an “adverb”. The complement verb find, on the other hand, is interpreted asa “main verb” with the present tense because the past tense has transferred to it. Therefore, (79a)and (79b) receive the same interpretation as (81a) and (81b), respectively:95

(81) a. … as though he had found himself halfway across a vast mountain in a blizzard
without map or rope or compass.
b. It was as if she had been having a nightmare -- terrible, perhaps, but still only a
dream in which the money could vanish like fairy gold -- and found it was true.

5.3.6. Modality
Observe the following example.
(82) I used to be frightened to fall asleep at night sometimes, afraid I'd stick my head out
from under the clothes while I was asleep and wake up to find my head in a dragon's
mouth, before I died.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (82), since the matrix verbs stick and wake are in the coordinate relationship, the modal would,
which expresses the past habit, apparently expresses the subject’s construal of the both of them:(83) I'd stick my head out from under the clothes while I was asleep and would wake up tofind my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died.
However, the modal would is interpreted to transfer to the matrix verb find after the matrix verb
wake and the infinitive marker to are transparentized. Eventually, the meaning of the matrix verb
wake is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like an “adverb”. Thus, would expresses the
subject’s construal of the complement verb find. This process can be schematized as follows:(84) I'd stick … and (wake up) (to) find my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died.

Therefore, (82) receives the same interpretation as (85):(85) I'd stick my head out from under the clothes while I was asleep and find my head in a
dragon's mouth, before I died.
In addition, in (86) below, the modal would (= simple future), whose tense is backshifted as96the result of the sequence of tense, expresses the subject’s construal of the complement verb see,because the matrix verb live and the infinitive marker to are transparentized:(86) It was doubtful that he would live to see either of his daughters marry.
(COCA)
Therefore (86) receives the same interpretation as (87) below:(87) It was doubtful that he would see either of his daughters marry.
In (87), what was doubtful is not that he will live but that he will see his daughter’s marriage.
Furthermore, in (88), two matrix verbs are in the coordinate relationship:(88) He'll probably live to be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his
old college, and I shan't mind at all.

(BNC)

In the present case, the modal will (= simple future) and the modal adverb probably in the matrix
clause appear to modify the matrix verbs live and make at the same time. However, what they
actually modify is the complement verb be and the matrix verb make. This is evident from thefact that the matrix verb live and the infinitive marker to are transparentized. Thus, (88) receives
the same interpretation as (89)below:(89) He'll probably be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his old college,
and I shan't mind at all.

5.3.7. Negation
In Section 5.2.2.2.3., we argued that “The Affirmation Principle for the Resultative Infinitive”
is applied to resultative infinitive construction. According to the principle, the matrix verb of theresultative infinitive is always affirmative and not negated. This section attributes the evidence
for the principle on the resultative infinitive construction to “Transparentizing Phenomena”. First,
observe the following sentence:97(90) Unfortunately, Elizabeth did not live to be Queen.

(BNC)

In (90), the matrix verb live and the infinitive marker to are transparentized, and the scope of thesentence negation in the matrix clause contains the complement verb be. Interestingly, the pasttense morpheme -ed also transfers, over the transparent live and to, to the complement verb. In
this case, the meaning of the matrix verb live is not negated, and the whole sentence receives thesame interpretation as (91) below:(91) Unfortunately, Elizabeth wasn’t Queen.
Furthermore, in (45b) in Section 5.2.3.1., the negation not co-occurs with the modal shall (forthe sake of convenience, (45b) will be requoted as (92) below):(92) …we shall not live to make other friends.
The same analysis can be applied here: the modal shall and the negative not transfer to thecomplement verb make:(93) … we shall not (live) (to) make other friends.

5.3.8. Others
This section generalizes “Transparentizing Phenomena” and puts its focus on (i) the participial
construction and (ii) the gerundive construction.

5.3.8.1. Participial Construction
Observe the following sentence:(94) Mia, waking up to find her companion still sleeping, hardly gives the impression that
she has spent a passionate night.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (94), the whole resultative infinitive construction constitutes a participial construction. In this98

case, the participial clause functions as a subordinate clause and, thus, can be preposed:(95) Waking up to find her companion still sleeping, Mia hardly gives the impression that
she has spent a passionate night.
(95) indicates the following two processes: First, the verb waking in the governing clause isdivided into the nonfinite form wake and the present participle morpheme -ing, and wake andthe infinitive marker to becomes transparent. Second, -ing transfers, over the transparent wakeand to, to the complement verb find. These processes can be schematized as follows (thefollowing analysis is paralleled to that of the progressive morpheme which was shown in Section
5.3.4.):(96) … waking (up) (to) find her companion still sleeping …
(wake) -ing

5.3.8.2. Gerund
Observe the following sentences:(97) a. “I've never even thought about living to be over a hundred,” he said.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)b. Branson's role in the Atra deal had been negligible, and his first reaction on waking
up to find three men standing at the bottom of his bed demanding 5,000 was oneof confusion and outright terror.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (97a) and (97b), the governing verbs living and waking are expressed as the objects of the
prepositions about and on. In (97a), the verb live and the infinitive marker to are transparentized.
The gerundive marker -ing transfers, over the transparent live to, to the complement verb find. In(97b), in similar way, the gerundive marker -ing transfers, over the transparent wake up to, to thecomplement verb find. These processes can be schematized as follows:(98) a. … never even thought about living (to) be over a hundred …
(live) -ing99

b. … his reaction on waking (up) (to) find three men …
(wake) -ing
The followings are similar examples:(99) a. I went to sleep that night not afraid of waking up to find him dead.
b. Martin et al. give an example of one boy feeling a bit sick at waking up to see all
the pins in his leg.
c. “It is a sight worth living to see,” I avowed.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)d. The conclusion is that we need enthusiasm for living to be healthy and energetic.
e. Mrs Gorman even made a little joke about living to be ninety.
(BNC) (Underline is mine)

5.3.9. Conclusion
This whole section put its focus on the temporal relationship between the resultative infinitive
and the matrix clause and argued that various elements in the governing clause transfer to thecomplement verb. The transferring elements proposed in this whole section can be summarized
as follows:(100) Tense morphemes (the past tense and the present tense), progressive morphemes,
modality (including will of simple future), negation, participle morphemes (thepresent participle and the past participle), and gerund morpheme.
Sawada (2016, 2018a) adduces three elements (tense, aspect, and modality) as the transferring
elements in the sentences with pseudo modal have to, but this whole section expanded the rangeof these elements to “negation”, “participle”, and “gerund”. Based on these additional elements,“Transparentizing Phenomena” can be redefined as follows:(101) Transparentizing Phenomena:
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to are relatively weakened
100(or backgrounded), and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense,
aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.
These elements transfer to the complement verb because the governing verb and the infinitivemarker to are transparentized. Therefore, it can be predicted that the transfer does not occur when
there is a certain element blocking the transfer. The following examples prove this prediction to
be correct:(102) a. John went to the library (for him) to study.
b. John opened the door for Mary to come into the room.
In (102), where the purpose infinitive is used, no transfer can be seen. As was mentioned in
Section 5.2.2.2.6., the purpose infinitive contain the complentizer for (either explicitly or
implicitly), and, when the subject of the infinitive and that of the matrix clause are coreferential,
for does not appear (= (102a)). In the case in which the complementizer for exists in the position
between the matrix verb and the infinitive, the transfer is prevented by its existence:(103) John opened the door for Mary to come into the room.
open –ed

Since the complementizer for is derived from the preposition for expressing “purpose” or “goal”(Bresnan (1971: 81)), it still has “futurity” in its meaning even after the grammaticalization fromthe preposition to the complementizer. Therefore, Transparentizing Phenomena cannot be seen
in sentences containing the complementizer for. Verbs taking the for complement contain hope,want, need, require, or expect, for example (Cf. Dixon (1991)).
(104) a. I'm hoping for John to beat up the bully.
b. I want very much for Mary to win.
(Dixon (1991: 244, 246))
The transfer cannot occur in (104) because the for complement refers to the future situation.

101

5.4. Generalization of Transparency Phenomena
5.4.1. Introduction
The present section argues that Transparentizing Phenomena are more general phenomena by
expanding its application range to implicative predicates constructions.

5.4.2. Implicative Predicate Constructions
5.4.2.1. Implicative Predicates and Their Implicature“Implicative predicates” (proposed by Karttunen (1971)) are predicates which theoretically
imply the truth of the complement. Karttunen (1971) divides English predicates into two major
categories: “implicative predicates” and “non-implicative predicates”:(105) Implicative Predicates：manage, remember, bother, get, dare, care, venture, consider,happen, see fit, be careful, have the misfortune/sense, take thetime/opportunity/trouble, take it upon oneself
Non-implicative Predicates：agree, decide, want, hope, promise, plan, intend, try, belikely, be eager/ready, have in mind
(Karttunen (1971: 341))
According to his analysis, (106a)-(106c), where non-implicative predicates are used, do nottheoretically imply the truth of the complements (= (107a)-(107c)). Thus, all the infinitive usedin (106) refers to future situations:(106) a. John hoped to solve the problem.
b. John had in mind to lock his door.
c. John decided to remain silent.
(Karttunen (1971: 341))(107) a. *John solved the problem.
b. *John locked his door.
c. *John remained silent.
(Karttunen (1971: 341))
102

By contrast, (108a)-(108c), where implicative predicates are used, theoretically imply the truthof the complements (= (109a)-(109c)):(108) a. John managed to solve the problem.
b. John remembered to lock his door.
c. John saw fit to remain silent.
(109) a. John solved the problem.
b. John locked his door.
c. John remained silent.
（Karttunen (1971: 341)）
The above claims are supported by the fact that, while (110a) is acceptable, (110b) is
unacceptable:(110) a. John hoped to solve the problem, but he didn't solve it.
b. *John managed to solve the problem, but he didn't solve it.
(Karttunen (1971: 342))
Furthermore, since the complement verb is regarded as simultaneous with the matrix verb, thetemporal adverb modifies not only the matrix verb but also the complement verb. For example,(111a) implies (111b) below:(111) a. Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem.
b. John solved the problem yesterday.
(Karttunen (1971: 346))
The next sections argue that Transparentizing Phenomena can be applied to the implicative
predicates construction.

5.4.2.2. Past Tense
Observe the following sentence:103(112) … she also remembered to ask for another ten-shilling note a week later.
(BNC) (Underline is mine)
If we take the fact that (112) implies that she asked for another ten-shilling note a week later, we
can assume that the past tense morpheme -ed transfers to the complement verb:(113) … she also remembered (to) ask for another ten-shilling note…
(remember) -ed
As a result, the meaning of the matrix verb remember is relatively weakened, and the verb isinterpreted adverbially. In the same way, since the complement verb ask received the past tense
morpheme, it is interpreted like a matrix verb. Therefore, (113) receives the same interpretationas (114) below:(114) … she also asked for another ten-shilling note a week later.

5.4.2.3. Present Tense
Observe the following sentence:(115) My wife works hard all day, but she manages to find the energy to cook us somethingoriginal every night.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

Based on the fact that a temporal adverb modifies both the matrix verb and the complement verb
in the implicative predicates construction, we can assume that the habitual adverb every night in(115) modifies both manage and find at the same time. Thus, both verbs express a habitual action.
Therefore, it is possible to analyze that the present tense morpheme -es transfers to thecomplement verb:(116) … but she manages (to) find the energy to cook …
(manage) -es
It follows from the analysis that (115) receives the same interpretation as (117) below.
104

(117) … but she finds the energy to cook …

5.4.2.4. Progressive
Observe the following sentence:(118) I thought I was managing to hide it.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the matrix verb managing is divided into the nonfinite verb manage and theprogressive morpheme -ing. Then, the progressive morpheme transfers to the complement verbhide:(119) I thought I was managing (to) hide it.
(manage) -ing
Therefore, (118) receives the same interpretation as (120) below:(120) I thought I was hiding it.

5.4.2.5. Modality
Observe the following sentence:(121) a. I will remember to treat each student as an individual first …
b. … these plants may manage to produce a good crop.
c. I found it strange that she should see fit to tell me this.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)
In (121), the modal will, may, should do not express the speakers’ construal of implicative
predicates remember, manage, and see fit, but rather, they express the speakers’ construal of thesituations referred to by the complements. Thus, (121) implies (122) below:(122) a. I will treat each student as an individual first …
105

b. … these plants may produce a good crop.
c. I found it strange that she should tell me this.
(Karttunen (1971: 345)) (Underline is mine)
Based on the present analysis, we can conclude that the implicative predicates and the infinitivemarker to are transparentized in sentences with modals:(123) I will (remember) (to) treat each student as an individual first …

5.4.2.6. Negation
Observe the following sentence:(124) a. John didn't manage to solve the problem.
b. John didn't see fit to remain silent.
(Karttunen (1971: 343)) (Underline is mine)
According to Karttunen (1971), (124) implies (125) below:(125) a. John didn’t solve the problem.
b. John didn’t remain silent.
(Karttunen (1971: 343))
Since the implicative predicates manage means to do something to accomlish some actionreferred to by the complement verb, it does not contradict even if the action is not completely
accomplished. Therefore, S didn’t manage to V means that the subject did not accomplish theaction referred to by the complement verb although he or she did something. In this case, thescope of negation does not contain the matrix verb mamage. In other words, the implicative
predicates manage and theinfinitive marker to are transparentized. This can be schematized asfollows:(126) John didn't (manage) (to) solve the problem.
did not
106

The same explanation can be applied to (124b): since the implicative predicate see fit and theinfinitive marker to are transparentized, the meaning of see fit is not negated:(127) John didn’t (see fit) (to) remain silent.
did not

5.4.3. Conclusion
The transferring elements in the matrix clause in the implicative predicates construction are as
follows:(128) Tense morphemes (the past tense and the present tense), progressive morphemes,
modality (including will of simple future), negation
If we take into consideration the above discussion, we can conclude that “Transparentizing
Phenomena” are general phenomena which can be seen in the in the implicative predicatesconstruction.7

5.5. Conclusion
The present chapter argued the resultative infinitive construction syntactic/semantic features

7“Transparentizing Phenomena” can be applied to the aspectual verb construction with
continue:(viii) Mary continued to paint her car.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 82))

In (viii), first the main verb continued is divided into the nonfinite verb continue and the pasttense morpheme -ed, and the nonfinite verb and the following infinitive marker to becomestransparent. Second, the past tense morpheme -ed transfers, over the transparent continue and to,to the complement verb paint. Since the meaning of the transparent continue is relatively
weakened, it is interpreted like an “adverb”. The complement verb paint, on the other hand, isinterpreted as a “main verb” with the past tense because the past tense has transferred to it. These
processes can be schematized as follows:(ix) Mary continued (to) paint her car.
(continue)

-ed
107

by analyzing it in terms of “realization”, “intentionality”, and “expectability” and attributed theevidence for the principle on the resultative infinitive construction to “Transparentizing
Phenomena” which is proposed by Sawada (2016, 2018a). “Transparentizing Phenomena” isredefined as follows (for the sake of convenience, (101) will be requoted as (129) below):(129) Transparentizing Phenomena:
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to are relatively weakened(or backgrounded), and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense,
aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.
In the sentences where Transparentizing Phenomena occurs, the matrix verb is interpreted
adverbially because its meaning is backgrounded, while the complement verb is interpreted as
the matrix verb because its meaning is foregrounded.

5.6. Residual Problems
This section adduces a few residual problems. Transparentizing Phenomena cannot explain
the following example:(130) John didn’t remember to lock his door.

(Karttunen (1971: 343))

According to Karttunen (1971), (130), where the implicative predicate remember is used, implies
that John did not lock his door. In this case, the scope of the sentence negation in the matrix
clause seems to contain the complement verb lock. However, the scope also contains the matrix
verb remember. Thus, (130) can be paraphrases with both (131) and (132):(131) John didn’t remember his obligation and didn’t fulfill it.
(132) John forgot to lock his door.
According to this paraphrase, we can assume that Transparentizing Phenomena can be applied
to sentences with remember.
On the other hand, Dixon (1991) states that the infinitival complement of remember contains
108the complementizer for and that for is omitted when the subject of the complement iscoreferential with that of the matrix clause. For example, in (133b), for me is omitted under the
coreferentiality of the subjects:(133) a. I remembered for Mary to sign the visitors' book.
b. I remembered to sign the visitors' book(Dixon (1991: 224)) (Underline is mine)
As was mentioned in Section 5.3.9., the presence of the complementizer for prevents any
elements from transferring from the matrix clause to the complement verb, and thus thecomplement refers to a future situation. Therefore, the whole sentence is acceptable even if it
implies the assertion referred to by the infinitive:(134) I remembered to lock the door (but then Mary took the key and pushed it down agrating, so I couldn't).

(Dixon (1991: 221))

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that remember does not function as animplicative predicate. However, if we take into consideration the fact that the infinitive following
remember can refer to the situation which occurred in the past, we can analyze remember as
ambiguous between an implicative meaning and a non-implicative meaning, which is similar tothe one of have in mind, as in (106b). Transparentizing can be applied to the former use, but not
to the latter use. However, we would like to leave this interesting problem as a topic of a future
research.

109

Chapter 6 The Complementizer For as a Modalizer
6.1. Introduction
6.1.1. Aim
This chapter puts its focus on the relationship among the complementizer for, the complement
clause introduced by for, the for complement in our term, and modality, and clarifies thefollowing two points:(1) A. The complementizer for belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.
B. The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into emotive
modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.
The classification of modality expressed by the complementizer for can be schematized in thefollowing way:
Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
Propositional
Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)(2) Modality
Dynamic (Desire, Accetance, Intention, Purpose, possibility)
Event
Deontic (Obligation)
As will be shown in the following, traditional grammar has regarded the complementizer for
as a marker which introduces tenseless clauses, and it can occur in various position in a sentence(the following examples are based on Jespersen (MEG V: 314)).
(3) A. in the beginning of a sentence: [For a man to tell …] is hard.
B. in a position separated from the governing verb: What I like best is [for a nobleman
to marry …]
C. after than and as: Nothing can be more absurd than [for a prince to employ …]
D. after a noun: It is my wish [for you to be happy].
E. after an adjective: I was so impatient [for you to come].
110Generally speaking, the complementizer for has been regarded as a meaningless marker whichis mechanically introduced to explicitly express the subject of the to complement. However, if
we pay attention to the situation expressed by the for complement and its environment, it will beclear that there are a number of cases which cannot be explained by the analysis that thecomplementizer for has no inherent meaning.
First, the for complement can refer to the situation which has not yet occurred and the one
which has already occurred. For example, the following sentences show that the situation referred
to by the for complement is the one which has not yet happened at the time expressed in thematrix clause:(4) a. We got to the church ﬁrst, and when the four-wheeler drove up we waited [for him tostep out], but he never did, and when the cabman got down from the box and looked
there was no one there!

(A. C. Doyle, “A Case of Identity”)

b. They planned [for the mayor to arrive on the following day].
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1194))c. It’s important [for the meeting to start at eight].

(Swan (20053: 266))

d. The hunters encircled the deer in order [for the animal not to escape].
(Declerck (1991: 478))
e. The book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I’m away]. (Bresnan (1972: 79))
In (4), the for complement refers to a situation which the subject of the main clause wants it tooccur (= (4a)), a situation which the subject of the main clause plan to actualize (= (4b)), a
situation which the subject of the main clause thinks should occur (= (4c)), and the purpose of
the action referred to by the verb or the event referred to by the subject of the main clause (= (4d,e)). In each case, the situation referred to by the for complement is what has not yet occurred (i.e.
a future situation) rather than what has already occurred (i.e. a nonfuture situation).
(5), on the other hand, suggests that the situations denoted by the for complements are
nonfuture ones:(5) a. Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)]? (Bresnan (1972: 82))b. It’s natural [for them to be together].
111(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

In (5), all the complement sentences consist of the reason of the subjects’ feelings denoted by thematrix predicates. Thus, in (5a), the for complement refers to a situation which has actuallyoccurred, and the for complement in (5b) refers to a present situation in a similar way. In bothcases, the for complements refer to nonfuture situations.
Taking these differences among the for complements into consideration, we can assume thatthe complementizer for can be classified into the following two types: one which introduces afuture situation, and the other one which introduces a nonfuture situation:
Future type(6) forNonfuture type
If it is presumed that the complementizer for has no inherent meaning, it will be difficult tonaturally explain where the temporal difference shown in (6) comes from.
Second, the acceptance of the for complement varies depending on what kind of matrix
predicates are chosen:(7) a. It is right [for God to punish sinners].
b. It is wrong [for there to be such inequalities].
c. It's a sin [for you to do that].
d. It is illegal [for these houses to be occupied].
e. I consider it unfair [for them to win all the time].
(Bresnan (1972: 79, 83)) (Underline is mine)(8) a. *It is true [for God to exist].
b. *It is false [for there to be only finitely many primes].
c. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
d. *I {believe (with good reason) / know (for a fact) / assume (on these grounds) /infer (from the above)} [for them to win unfairly].
(Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)
The examples in (7) and (8) clearly show that the for complement can co-occur with adjectives
112such as right, wrong, illegal, and unfair and a noun sin, while it cannot co-occur with adjectives
such as true, false, and clear and verbs such as believe, know, assume, infer. If we take thesefacts into consideration, it is evident that there is a co-occurrence restriction or a compatibility
relationship between the for complement and its matrix predicates. Therefore, it would be quitedifficult to theoretically explain the cause of the restriction under the presumption that thecomplementizer for has no inherent meaning, for the restriction could only be attributed to the
distinct features of the matrix predicates.
Third, the acceptability of the for complement varies depending on whether the matrix clauseis in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically expressed by thecounterfactual modal auxiliary would:(9) a. ?It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
b. It would be odd [for a man to be chairing a women’s meeting].
(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)(9a) sounds unnatural since the matrix clause is in the indicative mood, while (9b) does not, since
the matrix clause includes the counterfactual modal auxiliary would. It would be difficult to
explain the difference of acceptability unless it is presumed that the complementizer for itself has
its inherent meaning. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a certain interrelationship ofcompatibility between the counterfactual modal auxiliary would and the complementizer for.
The above three points clearly show that it is theoretically insufficient to analyze thecomplementizer for as merely consisting of a grammatical marker which shows the semantic
subject of the following infinitive and thus as having no its inherent meaning. Therefore, we
conclude that the complementizer for has its inherent meaning. This claim will play a significant
role in explaining the temporal distinction as mentioned in (6), the compatibility between thecomplementizer for and the matrix predicates, and the interrelationship between thecomplementizer for and the counterfactual modal auxiliary would in a unified way.

113

6.1.2. Complementizers
6.1.2.1. The Definition of Complementizers
Since Rosenbaum (1967: 24) first introduced the term “complementizer”, complementizers
have generally been regarded as markers which introduce complement clauses and their inherent
meanings have almost never discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 1, “Complementizers”, in
Rosenbaum’s (1967: 24) term, are composed of that, for, to, Poss (the possessive case), -ing, andinterrogative adverbs such as when, why, where, how, what, if, and whether. To and -ing can be
combined with for and POSS, while POSS cannot be used alone and is always combined with ing:
(10) One of the properties of predicate complements that distinguishes them from othertypes of complements is a unique set of markers taking the form of single and paired
morphemes. Such markers, including the morphemes that, for, to, Poss, ing, and others
will be referred to as complementing morphemes or simply complementizers.
(Rosenbaum (1967: 24)) (Underline is original)
The examples of the “complementizer” introduced in Rosenbaum (1967) are shown in theunderlined parts below:(11) a. I think that Fords are too expensive.
b. I dislike arguing about silly matters.
c. I’m concerned about John’s being so lazy.
d. The king ordered the proclamation to be read.
e. I should like very much for you to reconsider your refusal.
f. I dislike it when you do that.
g. I often wonder (about) why he does these things.
h. I know where he went.
i. Everyone understands how he does it.
j. What he is doing is useless.
k. I doubt if he is going.
l. I wonder whether he is going.
114

(Rosenbaum (1967: 24, 32)) (Underline is original)

6.1.2.2. The Individual Meanings of Complementizers
In Rosenbaum (1967), the semantic differences in question are not discussed and explained
under the transformational rule. Therefore, he analyzes that all the complementizers have thesame deep structure. Bresnan (1971, 1972) states that every sentence in (12) is derived from thesingle deep structure shown in (13):(12) a. It may distress John for Mary to see his relatives.
b. It may distress John that Mary sees his relatives.
c. Mary’s seeing his relatives may distress John.
(Bresnan (1971: 297, 1972: 9))
(13)

S
N

MV

N

S

It

Mary sees his relatives

may

P
V

NP

distress

John(Bresnan (1972: 9))

However, it is essential to consider the difference of the kind of the complementizers ininterpreting the individual sentences, because all the sentences in(12), which seem to have thesame structure, are interpreted differently. For example, (12a) means that Mary has not yet seen
John’s relatives, while (12b) means that Mary has a plan to see John’s relatives. Furthermore,(12c) means that it is a fact that Mary actually saw John’s relatives. It is clear from these examples
that the difference of the kind of the complementizers is influenced by the semantic differenceof the sentences. Sawada (2016: 131) states as follows:(11) Complementizers are quite an abstract notion and do not seem to have its inherent
meanings in themselves. However, a close look at them will make it clear that they115

express what kind of information the complement sentences show. If we compare thecomplement sentences to a drawer, the content of a complement sentence could becompared to a container of a drawer, while the complementizer to a handle of a drawer.
(Sawada (2016: 131))

6.1.3. Organization
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 puts its focus on Declerck’s (2011)
definition of modality and “nonfactuality”, which are quoted in Chapter 2. Section 3 introduces
Jespersen (MEG V), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972), Aijmer (1972), Spears(1973), Quirk et al. (1985), Wierbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), and Swan (20174) as suggestive
previous studies on the complementizer for and clarifies some problems which cannot be solvedby their analyses. Section 4 proposes that the complementizer for functions as a non-epistemic
modalizer and the modality expressed by it can be classified into “emotive modality”, “deontic
modality”, “dynamic modality”, and “counterfactual modality”. Section 5 summarizes mainarguments and conclusions in this whole chapter.

6.2. The Complementizer For as a Modalizer
6.2.1. Introduction
As mentioned earlier, the complementizer for has been regarded as a marker with no inherent
meaning, and, to the best of my knowledge, any studies have been conducted that analyze it as amodalizer. This section will reconsider the definition of modality and will clarify what
“nonfactual world” expressed by modalizers is by taking a view of Declerck’s (2011) definitionof modality. The latter half of this section will adduce several evidences in support of the claimthat the complementize for can be regarded as a modalizer.

1166.2.2. The Definition and the Classification of Modality
6.2.2.1. The Definition of Modality
This section takes a view of Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality and discuss therelationship between modality and “nonfactuality”. Declerck (2011) defines modality as follows:(14) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.

(Declerck (2011: 21))

“Nonfactual world” here refers not only so called a counterfactual world, which is made by thecounterfactual modal auxiliary would, but also any kinds of world which cannot be asserted tobe equivalent to the factual world.
(15) possible worlds that are not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world(Declerck (2011: 5))
Thus, in the following example, the nonfactual world expressed by the epistemic modal
auxiliary may is not the counterfactual world but the world which cannot necessarily be asserted
to be equivalent to the factual world.
(16) John may be here.

(Declerck (2011: 27))

In (16), the situation corresponds to the infinitive clause, namely John be here, and themodalizer to the epistemic modal may. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is notasserted to be true and thus consists of an uncertain situation. In other words, it cannot be asserted
to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in “a possible world that is not represented
and/or interpreted as being the factual world” (Declerck (2011: 27))) and therefore it is regarded
as nonfactual.
The same explanation can be applied to the case of the root modal must:(17) The fugitives must leave the country.

(Declerck (2011: 39))

In (17), “the situation” corresponds to the infinitive clause, the fugitives leave the country, andthe modalizer to the root modal must. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is not117asserted to be true and thus constitutes an uncertain situation. In other words, the situation inquestion cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world, and therefore it is regarded as
nonfactual.
According to Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality, a situation which actualizes in thefactual world is equivalent to an “asserted” situation, while a situation which actualizes in thenonfactual world is equivalent to an “unasserted” situation. That is to say, modality is a semantic
category which expresses the spear’s construal of the situation, rather than asserting its truth
value. Regarding this point, Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality is parallel to that of
Sawada’s (2018a). Sawada (2018a) claims that the essence of modality is to express how thesituation is and how the situation is construed and defines modality in the following way (Cf.
Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6)):(18) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) comes from,
how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing of the situation, rather
than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.

(Sawada (2018a: 6))

6.2.2.2. The Classification of Modality
Traditionally speaking, modalizers have been composed mainly of modal auxiliaries andmodal adverbs. Declerck (2011: 28) expands the classification of modalizers in the followingway:(19) A. A Modal Auxiliary (can, must, may…)
B. A Modal Adverb (perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily…)
C. An Intentional Verb (believe, suppose, imagine…)
D. An Attitudinal Verb (like, intend, want, hope, wish…）
E. The Subjunctive Mood
F. The Imperative Mood
G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)
H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (will, be going to, be about to…)
118

I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority
J. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（I think…）
K. “Modal Backshifting”
L. “Modal Conditionalization”
M. A Combination of K and L(Declerck (2011: 28))
Among all the nonfactual worlds expressed by these modalizers, tense auxiliaries creating afuture world or expressing posteriority, namely H and I, are regarded as a world which isincompatible with the factual world at a certain time and will be compatible at a future time. (20)refers to a situation which is not yet factual:(20) John will trim the hedge.

(Declerck (2011: 32))

In (20), the world in which the residue situation, John trim the hedge, actualizes is expressed as
the one which is not yet compatible with the factual world at the time of speaking. Declerck(2011: 33) refers to the world in question as “not-yet-factual world” and states that this worldconsists of a kind of nonfactual world.1 It is now clear that the situation which actualizes in thefactual world is something which can be asserted to have actually occurred at some time in thepast or to be occurring at the time of speaking. Even if the situation is actually true, it cannot be
regarded as actualizing in the factual world if the speaker does not recognize or deliberately assert
the situation to be true. The situation which is not yet factual cannot be regarded as factual, either.
It is important to note that all the situations located in the nonfactual world refer to “unasserted
situations”. Modalizers enable the speaker to avoid asserting that the situation is true and instead
express their construal towards the situation.

6.2.3. The Complementizer For and Nonfactuality
This section argues for the claim of the complementizer for as a modalizer. First, let us

1

Declerck’s (2011) definition of “factual world” and “nonfactual world” is compatible with
Langacker’s (1991) definition of “reality” and “irreality” respectively. See Chapter 4 for detail.
119

reconsider Declerck’s (2011) definition of modality:(21) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.
According to his definition, the complementizer for can be regarded as a modalizer because it is,just as will and the infinitive marker to, a form which introduces future situations. For example,
the for complement in the following sentence expresses a future situation:(22) a. … it became essential [for there to be clear guidelines to distinguish county issues
from district issues].

(BNC)

b. As you can imagine, we are eager [for our niece to come to us].

(COCA)In (22a, b), the situations referred to by the for complements, namely there to be clear guidelines
to distinguish county issues from district issues, and our niece to come to us, are construed as“not-yet factual”. In these cases, the modalizer corresponds to the complementizer for, and thesituations to the following infinitive clauses are modalized.
Sawada (2018a) agrees for this claim and mentions the possibility for the complementizer for
to be regarded as a modalizer.
(23) a. I’m anxious [for there to be plenty of time].

(Swan (20053: 268))

b. What I would like is [for there to be put in place a welcome center that could orient
people who have questions] …

(COCA)

According to Sawada (2018a: 6), in (23), the situation, there to be plenty of time, is regarded as“not- yet factual”.
Furthermore, the for complement in (24) refers to a counterfactual situation:(24) It would be odd [for a man to be chairing a women’s meeting].

(Bresnan (1972: 71))

In (24), the for complement is harmonious with the counterfactual modal auxiliary would. The
for complement is parallel to the counterfactual conditional clauses in this respect. In the present
case, the situation referred to by the for complement is construed as a counterfactual situation.
120

“Futurity” and “counterfactuality” expressed by the situations referred to by the forcomplement constitute “nonfactuality” in Declerck’s (2011) terms, as shown by (21). This isbecause these situations are not asserted to be true.
There are, however, a number of cases which cannot be explained only in terms of“nonfactuality”. For example, modalizers can be used to refer to a fact:(25) It’s odd [that the letter should mention the 21st of the month].
(A. Christie, The ABC Murders) (Underline is mine)
In (18), the situation expressed by emotive should, the letter mentions the 21st of the month, isfactual. It is impossible to give a sufficient explanation to the case of this kind in terms of“nonfactuality”. Furthermore, when the conditional is regarded as closed, as in the following
example, the situation is something which the speaker admits to be factual:(26) [“The picture you are now looking at is a Van Gogh.”] – “Well, if this is a Van Gogh,
I’m rather disappointed by it.”(Declerck (2011: 31))

In (19), the truth of the situation referred to by the closed conditional clause is presupposed in
the context, which is shown in the square brackets. Declerck (2011: 31) states about this point asfollows:(27) … it [the world in which the situation in question is located] is assumed (or ostensibly
assumed) to coincide with the factual world.

(Declerck (2011: 31))This explanation obviously contradicts his definition of modality that modality is “thephenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.”
Emotive should and the closed conditional do not create a nonfactual world but express the
speaker’s construal of a fact. If we take the fact into consideration, Declerck’s (2011) definitionof modality should be revised into the following:(28) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on thesituation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or a part of itcomes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards
121the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.
(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))(28) enables us to regard the complementizer for as a modalizer, because it expresses the
speaker’s construal towards the situations.

6.3. Some Previous Studies
6.3.1. Introduction
The present section adduce five significant previous studies on the complementizer for, such
as Jespersen (MEG V), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972), Aijmer (1972), Spears(1973), Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), and Swan (20174), and clarifies
some problems of their analyses.

6.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V)
6.3.2.1. The Environment of the For Complement
Jespersen (MEG V) mentions the following five environments of the for complement:
First, the for complement is used after particular verbs such as long, wish, pray, care, andprepare, which takes the preposition for in their complement position:(29) a. Pen longed [for the three years to be over].
b. He wished [for her to have con1e to him].
c. I wished and prayed [for you to come].
d. Unless you care [for me to do it], I don't care to do it.

e. I don’t think I should care [for it to be known that I was selling pictures].
f. I wanted [for yü to know, zurr, that …]
g. You must be prepared [for your children to bring you unhappiness].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 300-301)) (Underline is mine)
Second, the for complement is also used after particular verbs such as fix, choose, like, hate,122

and bear, which do not take the preposition for in their complement position:(30) a. He had fixed [for the marriage to take place at eleven].
b. I hardly know in what language you would choose [for me to reply].
c. You'd like better [for us both to stay home together].
d. She wouldn't like [for him to know anything].
e. I hate [for you to be giving lessons].
f. I couldn't bear [for us not to be friends].
g. I mean afore all else [for that woman to be happy].
h. I'd sooner [for her to die than have her go to you].
i. I suppose I don't much deserve [for you to write to me].
j. I could arrange [for you to be in the background].
k. she planned [for you not to know about it until after tomorrow].
l. She said [for you all to go in].2(Jespersen (MEG V: 301)) (Underline is mine)
Third, the for complement is used after the combination of too + an adjective and an adjective+ enough, which expresses degrees:(31) a. The tempest was too high [for her to be heard].
b . One word is too often profaned [for me to profane it], One feeling too falsely
disdained [For thee to disdain it]. One hope is too like despair [for prudence tosmother].
c. Mr. Tulliver's own hand shook too much under his excitement [for him to write
himself].
d. Am I too wicked [for you and me to live together]?
e. It often happens that the truth lies too far back [for us to discover].
f . Mr. Darcy had been standing near enough [for her to overhear a conversation

2

According to Jespersen (MEG V: 302), (30l) constitutes an interesting correspondence to “She
told you all to go in”. In (30l), [for you all to go in] constitutes a complement clause, and thus
the object of her instruction is not explicitly expressed, while, in the latter sentence, [you all to
go in] does not constitute a complement clause, and thus the object of the verb tell is you all.
123

between him and Mr. Bingley].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 303)) (Underline is mine)
Fourth, the for complement is used after particular adjectives such as keen, afraid, ashamed:(32) a. Nor am I afraid [for them to see it].
b. Shouldn’t you be glad [for me to have the same sort of happiness]?
c. His mother was frightfully keen [for Michael to stay with them].
d. Nora's husband is content [for her to be a doll].
e. I'm ashamed [for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married].
f. I was so impatient [for you to come to God].
g. He was quite willing [for everyone else to do the same].
h. We shall be only too pleased [for Albert to take over the pew].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 303-304)) (Underline is mine)
Fifth, the for complement is used solely to express future situations such as “purpose”,“design”, and “necessary condition”:(33) a. I thought you had kindly left it [the book] here, on purpose [for me to read].
b. In the pauses when she stopped [for the Judge to write it down] ...
c. She held out her hand [for him to shake].
d. He placed himself at a corner of the doorway [for her to pass him into the house].
e. He unwrinkled the letter carefully [for it to be legible].
f. Vernon stood aside [for her to enter].
g. My parents had but to give me an order [for me to conceive at once some plan ofdisobeying it].
h. We'll have to go round by Lippinghall, [for me to get some clothes].
i. The tin mug with the hot water [for Alexis to drink from].
j. She is now coming to town, in order [for me to make my addresses to her].
k. In order [for a poet to be taken seriously by the public], it must first be abundantly
clear that he takes himself seriously.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 304-305)124

6.3.2.2. Counterfactuality
Jespersen (MEG V) makes the following claim in terms of “counterfactuality” on thesentences with the for complement:(34) It should he noted that in nearly all sentences the combination of for and an infinitive
denotes some vague possibility or something imagined.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

This claim shows that, in almost all cases, the situations referred to by the for complement are
not expressed as factual. For example, the for complement in the following sentence refers to thepossibility that the Japanese will see it:(35) He was ashamed [for the Japanese to see it].

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

Therefore, the for complement in (35) can be paraphrased with the that complement with theauxiliary might which expresses a possibility:(36) He was ashamed [that the Japanese might possibly see it].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Underline is mine)
The claim that the for complement in (35) does not refer to a fact is supported by the fact that it
cannot be paraphrased with -ing complement, which is shown in the following sentence:(37) *He was ashamed of the Japanese seeing it.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

6.3.3. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971)
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345, 347) claims that English predicates can be semanticallyclassified depending on whether they are factive or not:Subject Clause【Factive】【Non-factive】

significant

likely

125

odd

sure

tragicpossible

exciting

true

relevant

false

matters

seems

countsappears

makes sense

happens

sufficeschancesamusesturns outbothers
Object Clause

regretsupposebe aware (of)assertgrasp

allegecomprehend

assumetake into

claim

consideration
take into accountmaintainbear in mind

believe

ignoreconclude

make clear

conjecturemind

intimateforget (about)deem

deplorefancy

resentfigurecare
Fig. 1: The Classification of Predicates Based on Factivity/Non-factivity
This classification is based on whether predicates presuppose a certain fact. For example, in thesentence with a factive predicate, the truth of the complement used as the subject or the object of
the whole sentence is presupposed. This is justified by the fact that the proposition of the126complement is not included in the scope of negation in the matrix clause:(38) It is not significant that he has been found guilty.
(Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345))
Even if the factive predicate significant in (38) is negated, the proposition of the that complement
is not negated. It follows from this fact that the proposition of the complement which follows
factive predicates is presupposed to be true.
(39) It is not likely that he has been found guilty. (Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345))
In (39), on the other hand, the non-factive predicate likely is used. Therefore, if the matrix clausecontains negation, the proposition of the following that complement is also negated. It follows
from this fact that the proposition of the complement which follows non-factive predicates is notpresupposed to be true.
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) expanded the classification in terms of emotional/nonemotional distinction, and mentions that the predicates which take the for complement isrestricted to emotive predicates, which are shown in the underlined parts in the following
sentences:(40) a. It bothers me for John to have hallucinations.
b. I regret for you to be in this fix.
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 363))
The situations referred to by the for complements in (40a, b) are those which are already inthepresent, rather than those which will occur in the future. The speakers express their subjective
emotion towards such situations.
According to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), emotive predicates express someone’s subjective
feelings towards a certain proposition, rather than showing their knowledge about it or its truth
value. Thus, they do not follow the verbs such as believe and force, which have nothing to dowith the truth value of the complement:(41) a. *I believe for John to have liked Anselm.
b. *I forced Johni for Johni to say cheese.
127

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))
Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s (1971: 363-364) cross-classification of factivity and emotivity is asfollows:【Factive】

Emotive

Non-emotive

Subject Clause

importantwell-known

crazy

clear

odd

(self-evident)

relevant

goes without saying

instructivesad
sufficebotheralarm
fascinate
exhilarate
defy comment
surpass belief
a tragedy
no laughing matter
Object Clause

regretbe aware (of)resentbear in mind

deploremake clear
forgettake into account【Non-factive】

Emotive

Non-emotive

Subject Clauseimprobableprobableunlikely

likely128

Object Clausea pipedreamturn out

nonsense

seem

urgentimminent

vital

in the works

intendpredict

preferanticipate

reluctantforeseeanxioussaywilling

supposeeager

concludeFig. 2： The Cross-classification of Factivity and Emotivity
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) points out the following three feathers of emotive predicates:
First, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, allow emotive should in theircomplement3:(42) a. It’s interesting that you should have said so. [Emotive]
b. *It’s well-known that you should have said so. [Non-emotive](Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 364))
Second, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, allow the degree adverb at all in
their complement:(43) a. It’s interesting that he came at all.
b. *It’s well-known that he came at all.
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))

3

It should be noted that among all emotive predicates, urgent and vital, which introduce future
situations as their complements, take should as a subjunctive substitute. Should as a subjunctive
substitute is different from emotive should in that only the former can be substituted with a bareinfinitive (should as a subjunctive substitute is used only in British English).
(i) a. It is most urgent that they {should be / be / *is} treated properly.
(Cf. Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fifth Edition)b. It is vital that he {should understand / understand /*understands} how to operate acomputer.
129

Third, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, cannot be used in the relative
clauses introduced by as.
(44) a. *As is interesting, John is in India.
b. As is well-known, John is in India.
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))
If the complement sentences of emotive predicates are called “emotive complements”, the forcomplements, which can be taken only by emotive predicates, can be referred to as “the emotive
complements”.

6.3.4. Bresnan (1972)
6.3.4.1. Two Types of the For Complement
Bresnan (1972: 81) claims that the complementizer for has its inherent meanings and that it isderived from that of the proposition for. The meanings in question is the following:(45) “Reason/Evidence”
a. He considers her a fool for her generosity.
b. He considers it foolish for her to help him.
(Bresnan (1972: 79)) (Underline is mine)(46) “Purpose/Use/Intention”
a. This book is for your amusement.
b. This book is for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away.
c. I'm aiming for victory.
d. I'm aiming for my team to win.
(Bresnan (1972: 79-80)) (Underline is mine)
In (45a), where the proposition for is used, the propositional phrase introduced by for expresses
the reason why he considers her foolish. In (45b), in the same way, the for complement
constitutes the reason why he does so. Furthermore, in (46a, c), the propositional phrases express130the use of the book and the speaker’s aim respectively, while the corresponding (46b, d) showthat the for complements express the same things. These meanings, i.e. “reason/evidence” and“purpose/use/intention”, are incorporated into the complementizer for, which is derived from the
proposition for, and they are not expressed by the complementizer that:(47) a. *You’re bastard that you do/did that.
b. *I’m aiming that my team will win.
(Bresnan (1972: 80))
Bresnan (1972:81) classifies the complementizer for into the “reason type” and the “purpose type”
by considering these facts. In the following formulas, the theoretical relationship between thesituation of the for complement (= X) and that of the matrix clause (= Y) can be expressed byusing arrows expressing the directions of meaning:(48) for (X) → Y(49) for (X) ← Y
These formulas show the following theoretical relationship between X and Y: in the type of (48),
X constitutes the reason or subjective cause for Y, while, in the type of (49), X constitutes the
purpose or goal of Y. From the viewpoint of the temporal relationship, the situation referred toby the for complement (= X) in (48) is anterior to Y, while, in (49), X is posterior to Y, which isshown in the following time axes:(50) Reason TypeX

Y

Y( = X)(51) Purpose Type
Y

X
131

Bresnan (1972) explains the use of the for complement in these types in the following way: In
the type of (48), Y is expressed by emotive predicates such as surprise, astound, and crazy, andthe for complement corresponds to X, which constitutes the reason or cause:(52) Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)]?

(Bresnan (1972: 82))

Therefore, the sentences without emotive predicates do not allow the for complements. In (53),the verbs such as believe, consider, and doubt, which express “thoughts” or “judgment”, are used,
and thus the for complements are unacceptable:(53) a. *He believes somehow for Frank to be here.
b. *What I believe is for Mary to be shy.
c. *They doubted very much for me to be capable.
(Bresnan (1972: 79))
In the type of (49), on the other hand, Y is expressed by the predicates showing a requirement
or a desire, while the for complement corresponds to X, which constitutes the object of therequirement or desire:(54) It's absolutely imperative for Nell to feign stupidity.
Since, as mentioned earlier, X must be posterior to Y in this type it cannot express any situationsin the past:(55) *It's absolutely imperative [for her to have acted stupid yesterday].

6.3.4.2. Counterfactuality
Bresnan (1972) compares the complementizer for and that to explain the differences between
them in terms of the presence or absence of “definiteness” and “counterfactuality”. According to
Bresnan (1972), the for complement is “counterfactual”, while the that complement is not, andit introduces a factual, or “definite” situation:132

(56) a. It's rather odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting].
b. ?It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
(Bresnan (1972: 71))(56a), where the that complement is used, sounds natural, while the acceptability of (56b), where
the for complement is used, varies among the native speakers of English. Bresnan claims that theinsertion of the adverb always, as in (57), changes the acceptability of both sentences:(57) a. *It's always rather odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting].
b. It's always rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)
This difference in acceptability is parallel to that of the following pair, which includes thecounterfactual modal auxiliary would:(58) a. It would be odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting (but for the fact that…)].
b. It would be odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
(Bresnan (1972: 72)) (Underline is mine)
Although both sentences are acceptable, the that complement in (58a), but not the forcomplement in (58b), presupposes that the situation is factual. That is to say, the that complementin (58a), unlike the for complement in (58b), cannot be counterfactual in any way. Thus, in orderfor the that complement to be combined with the counterfactual modal auxiliary would, a certain“counterfactual” phrases must be implied in the sentence. Bresnan (1972) uses a counterfactual
conditional clause “but for the fact that…” as a suitable example for it. On the other hand, in (57),
always functions as a counterfactual controller, and thus it is compatible with the for complement.

6.3.5. Aijmer (1972)
Aijmer (1972) puts her focus on the differences of the following two constructions with likeand believe and demonstrates that the former has the complementizer for in the complement
position in its deep structure and that the latter does not.
133

(59) a. I like (for) Mary to sing.4
b. I believe Henry to be successful.
(Aijmer (1972: 86))
In (59a), the complement of like is not only Mary but also the whole complement sentence,
namely [(for) Mary to sing], which is clear from the fact that the for complement, but not Mary,is chosen as the subject of the corresponding passive sentences:(60) a. *Mary is liked to sing.
b. For Mary to sing is liked by everyone.
(Aijmer (1972: 86-87))
In (59b), on the other hand, believe does not take a complement sentence, but rather it only takes
Henry. Therefore, it is impossible to choose the combination of the accusative + the infinitive as
the subject of the corresponding passive sentence:(61) a. Henry is believed to be successful.
b. *For Henry to be successful is believed by everyone.
(Aijmer (1972: 86-87))
Aijmer (1972), along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) and Bresnan (1972), claims
that the for complement occurs in the complement position of the predicates which express“emotional reaction”, and that it constitutes the “cause” of the reaction. Thus, obvious, which isa non-emotional predicate, does not take the for complement since it does not need a cause as its
complement:(62) *It is obvious for John to come.

(Aijmer (1971: 90))

Aijmer (1971) also compares the for complement with the -ing and that complement and explains
the difference among them in terms of “presupposition” and “general validity”:
First, the -ing and that complement can refer to a situation which has already occurred in the4

According to Aijmer, (59a) is acceptable in American English, but many of British English
speakers do not think it acceptable.
134past, while the for complement can refer to a situation which will occur in the future or has
already occurred in the past.
(63) a. John hates Peter’s singing.
b. John hates Peter to sing.5(Aijmer (1972: 88))
In (63a), it is presupposed that peter actually sang, while, in (63b), there is not such a
presupposition.
Second, the situation referred to by the for complement is general rather than specific, whilethe -ing and that complement refers to an actual event. This claim is supported by the fact that(64a) implies the truth of (64b), but not vice versa:(64) a. I like John to smoke a cigar.
b. I like John’s smoking a cigar right now.
(Aijmer (1972: 89))(64a) is interpreted to mean that the speaker likes it whenever John smokes a cigar, while (64b)that the speaker likes the present situation where John is smoking a cigar (, but I do not likeyesterday’s situation where John was smoking a cigar).
Third, the for complement, unlike the that complement, harmonizes with the counterfactual
modal auxiliary would in the matrix clause:(65) a. *I would like it that John is at home.
b. I would like John to be at home.
(Aijmer (1971: 89))(65a) is unacceptable because there is a logical crash between the counterfactuality of would in
the matrix clause and factuality of the complementizer that. On the other hand, (65b) is

5

The verb hate can take the for complement.
(ii) John hates [for Peter to sing].
(iii) I hate [for rice to be cooked this way].
135(Cf. Aijmer (1972: 88)) (Underline is mine)(COCA) (Underline is mine)acceptable because the for complement is counterfactual. Here, the for complement presupposesthat it is uncertain whether the situation will occur or not.

6.3.6. Spears (1973)
Spears (1973) discusses “habituality” as a feature of the significant-class predicates (i.e. “SC
predicates”). The features of SC predicates are as follows (Spears (1973: 627)):First, they take the combination of POSS + -ing or that clauses as their complement:(66) a. His doing that is significant.
b. It is significant that he did that.
Second, they take the for complements:(67) It is significant for him to do that.
Third, they do not take subjunctive complements:(68) *It is significant that he do that.
Fourth, they take factive would complement:6(69) It is significant that she would even think such a thing.
According to Spears (1973), SC predicates can be subclassified in the following way:
Judgmental Type: significant(70) SC Predicates
Experiential Type: strange, odd, tragic, interesting, amazing,disheartening, awful, wonderful, fascinating

6

According to Spears (1973), factive would complements are complements which presuppose
its truth. In some dialect, should instead of would is used. This should is not what is called a
subjunctive substitute but emotive should which express a mental distance between a fact andthe speaker’s assumption.
136

Spears (1973: 633) describes the features of the two types of SC predicates in the following way:(71) To resume the discussion of judgmentality and experientiality, all of the experiential
predicate-plus-complement constructions make reference to states of mind or feelingson the part of an experiencer or experiencers. Significant, the judgmental predicate, on
the other hand, makes no reference to emotional states or feelings of experiencers; it
simply characterizes the process itself referred to by the complement.
(Spears (1973: 633))
Following this explanation, (72), where an SC predicate of judgmental type is used, for example,
is interpreted as meaning (73):(72) It is significant for a bat not to be able to fly.

(Spears (1973: 628))(73) Any instance of a bat not being able to fly is significant.

(Spears (1973: 633))

On the other hand, (74), where an SC predicates of experiential type is used, is interpreted asmeaning (75):(74) It’s surprising for a Frenchman to speak flawless English.

(Spears (1973: 633))(75) a. Whenever a Frenchman speaks flawless English, it’s surprising.
b. A Frenchman’s speaking flawless English causes a feeling of surprise on the part ofany experiencer(s) that perceive(s) or learn(s) of it.
(Spears (1973: 633))
Observe the following on these facts:(76) It’s surprising that Joe beat Hilda last night.
(77) It’s surprising that Joe beats his wife.
(78) It’s surprising for Joe to beat his wife.
(Spears (1973: 634))
In (76) and (77), the that complements refer to two different processes, one of which refers to asingle past process that Joe beat his wife, and the other of which to Joe’s present habit that he137

beats his wife. On the other hand, (78), where the for complement is used, several processes areinferred. To put it another way, each (76) and (77), by using a that complement, shows that the
speaker gets surprised at the single process at the time of t1, the time shown in the matrix clause.
The for complement in (78), on the other hand, refers to several processes, and the wholesentence indicates that the speaker will get surprised every time any one of the processes occurs.
Spears (1973) names this feature of the for complement “habituality”.

6.3.7. Quirk et al. (1985)
Quirk et al. (1985) claims that the situations referred to by the for complement can be divided
into future situations which express “possibilities” and “suggestions” and nonfuture situations.
(79) It’s natural for them to be together.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

According to Quirk et al. (1985: 1063), if the situation denoted by the for complement isinterpreted to be “not-yet factual”, the complement can be paraphrased with the that complementwith “putative should” (in this case, the for complement has a conditional meaning):(80) It’s natural that they should be together.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)
If the for complement in (79) is interpreted to refer to a nonfuture situation, then thecomplement can be paraphrased with the that complement without modals:(81) It’s natural that they are together.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the complement verb be is interpreted to be a state verb, and the whole complement
is assumed to be factual.
The for complement can often be paraphrased with a conditional clause because its putative
feature is equivalent to that of the conditionals with if. For example, (82a) has the sameinterpretation as (82b) has:
(82) a. It would be unwise [for you to marry him].
138

b. It would be unwise [if you were to marry him].
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))(82a) is paralleled with (9(9b), as was mentioned in Section 6.1.1.

6.3.8. Wierzbicka (1988)
6.3.8.1. The Environment of the For Complement
Wierzbicka (1988) puts her focus on the fact that the for complement prefers a nonfactual
context and discusses the meanings and functions of the for complement:(83) a. ?I'd be delighted for you to stay with me.
b. ?I was delighted for you to stay with me.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 111))
According to Wierzbicka (1988: 112), the for complement prefers the following cases:(84) A. When referring to a generic situation
B. When referring a future situation
C. When referring a counterfactual situation(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))
This claim accords well with Jespersen’s (MEG V) claim in terms of “possibility” and“counterfactuality”, Bresnan’s (1972) claim in terms of “counterfactuality”, and Spear’s (1973)
claim in terms of “habituality”.

6.3.8.2. The Differences between the For Complement and the To Complement
Wierzbicka (1988) criticizes the traditional analysis that there is no semantic difference
between the for complement and the to complement and claims that they are quite different fromeach other. This claim is supported by the following evidence:First, the for complement, but not the to complement, is unacceptable in factual contexts:
139(85) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.
b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))(86) a. I was delighted to win.
b. I was ashamed to see that.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))
In (22), the to complements, to win and to see that, express factual situations. In (21), however,the for complements do not express them.
Second, in the to complement, but not in the for complement, the subject of the complement
clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause.
(87) *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 113))(45) is unacceptable because the agent of the emotion expressed by the emotive predicate
delighted is coreferential with that of the verb win. Wierzbicka (1988) refers to this feature of thefor complement as “other-orientedness”.

6.3.8.3. The For Complement and Emotivity
After pointing out that the for complement appears in the sentences expressing emotions along
the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Wierzbicka (1988) classifies these sentences into (i)sentences expressing intention, (ii) sentences expressing emotional evaluations, and (iii)
sentences expressing intellectual judgment and discusses the semantic formulae implied by eachof the sentences.

6.3.8.3.1. The For Complement and Intention
Wierzbicka (1988) discusses the relationship between the for complement and personal
intention in sentences with the verbs, such as long and ask, which require personal subjects andthe predicates, such as desirable and necessary, which do not. Verbs such as long and ask express
140

weak confidence of the possibility for the situation to occur. Taking this fact into consideration,
Wierzbicka (1988) insists that these verbs imply the following semantic formula:(88) “I don't want to say: one could think this: it will happen (because of that)”(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))(25) expresses weak confidence that the situation denoted by the for complement will occur, but,at the same time, these verbs also imply a strong desire for the possibility. Generally speaking,we do not tend to have a strong desire for the realization of the situation which is quite possible
to occur: the lower the possibility becomes, the stronger the desire will be. This general claim
enables us to give a semantic explanation to the difference of the acceptability of the followingpair:(89) a. I want very much for you to come.
b. ?I want for you to come(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))
According to Wierzbicka (1988), the insertion of very much in (26(26a) expresses the speaker’s
strong desire for the realization of the situation referred to by the complement and, at the sametime, his weak confidence in it. In (26(26b), on the other hand, the absence of very much
expresses the speaker’s weak desire and, at the same time, his strong confidence. Therefore, theunacceptability of (26(26b) comes from the incompatibility between strong desire (i.e. weak
confidence) implied by the for complement and strong confidence (i.e. weak desire) implied by
the whole sentence. Wierzbicka’s (1988) hypothesis that the for complement expresses “strong
desire” (i.e. “weak confidence”) is supported by the fact that it is used in the sentence whose
subject is impersonal, which is shown in the following sentences:(90) a. It is desirable for him to be present.
b. It is necessary for him to be present.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))
According to Wierzbicka (1988: 121), in (27), the speaker conceals their desire and expresses it
as a public necessity by using an expletive it. Thus, “there is perhaps more urgency and more141

authority” to (27) than to sentences with personal subjects. Therefore, the following, in addition
to (25) can be postulated as one of the semantic formulae of sentences with impersonal subjects.
(91) “I don’t want to say: I want it”(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

To summarize the above discussions, the semantic formulae implied by the impersonalsentences and the personal sentences with the for complements can be shown in (29) and (30),respectively.
(92) I want (very much) for him to be present. ⇒I think this: I want this: he will be present
I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))(93) It is desirable for him to be present. ⇒if one knew this: he will be present
one would think this:
this will be goodhe should do it
I don't want to say: I want it
I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

6.3.8.3.2. The For Complement and Emotional Evaluation
Predicates which express “emotional evaluation” include right, wrong, not fair, appropriate,
inappropriate. According to Wierzbicka (1988), if we consider the fact that these predicates areused in the sentences with impersonal subjects, the semantic formula shown in (28) (i.e. “I don’t
want to say: I want it”) will be applied to them. Furthermore, they express an evaluation such as“good” or “bad” towards the situation referred to by the for complement, which is shown in theunderlined part below:
142

(94) It is {right / wrong etc.} for X to do Z. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this: it will be good/bad(Wierzbicka (1988:128) (Underline is mine)Thus, clear and true, which do not express such evaluation, cannot occur with the forcomplement:(95) a. It is {illegal / *clear} for these houses to be occupied.
b. It is {right / *true} for God to punish sinners.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 127))
The notions such as “good” or “bad” implied by these sentences do not express their literary
meanings, but rather they express “obligation”, which is usually expressed by should. Therefore,(31) can be changed into the following:(96) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. (It is right/wrong for X to cause Z.) ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this: X should/shouldn't do it
I don't want to say: I don't want this(Wiezbicka (1988: 128))
Wierzbicka (1988) also points out that the for complement used in the sentences of this kindrefers exclusively to human action:(97) a. It is illegal for these houses to be occupied.
b. ?It is bad for this soil to be so poor.
c. It was crazy for her to leave that job.
d. ?It was a tragedy for the babies to die.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))
Wierzbicka (1988) claims, based on this fact, that the matrix predicates of emotive judgment
express an evaluation of the action itself rather than of the agent of the action. Thus, the semantic
143

formula implied by the sentences of this kind includes (35) below (in (35), X refers to the agentof the action):(98) “I don't want to say something good/bad about X”(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the semantic formula implied by emotive
evaluation sentences expressing is the following.
(99) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z
I think this:it will be good/bad
X should/shouldn't do it
I don't want to say: I don't want it
I don't want to say something good/bad about X(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

6.3.8.3.3. The For Complement and Intellectual Judgment
6.3.8.3.3.1. Expectability
Wierzbicka (1988: 130) discusses the relationship between the situation denoted by the forcomplement and an expectation of the realization of it. The predicates which express anintellectual judgment includes unexpected, odd, strange, surprising, normal, natural, and usual.
According to her analysis, intellectual judgment sentences imply that the realization of thesituation is expectable or unexpectable:(100) “one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will happen”(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))
In (37), the counterfactual modal auxiliary would is used because the exprectation of therealization of the situation referred to by the for complement is a “hypothetical expectation”(Wierzbicka (1988: 130)). Therefore, the sentences is this type imply the following semantic
144

formula:(101) It is unusual for the train not to leave late. ⇒if someone said: the train will not leave late
one would have thought: one should not think that
if I knew: it happened
I would have thought: it is unusual(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))(38) shows that the for complement in intellectual judgment sentence refers to a factual situationand that the speaker made a prediction that the situation would occur.
She argues that, in intellectual judgment sentences, but not emotive evaluation sentences, theemphasis is on the intellectual judgment rather than the speaker’s personal emotion:(102) a. I was delighted/sorry for Mary to win.7
b. ?I was surprised for Mary to win.
(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))
In (39), delighted and sorry express emotional evaluations, while surprised expresses anintellectual judgment. (39(39b) is unacceptable because the emphasis is on the speaker’s personalemotion though the whole sentence is an intellectual judgment sentence. Wierzbicka (1988: 130)
postulates the following semantic formula for intellectual judgment sentences:(103) “I don't want to say: I felt …”(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

6.3.8.3.3.2. The Parallelism between the For Complement and Evaluative Should
According to her analysis, “expectability” expressed by the for complement used inintellectual judgment sentences is parallel to that by evaluative should. Evauative should implies

7

According to Wierzbicka (1988), native speakers of English often hesitate to accept (102a)(see (85) in Section 6.3.8.2.).
145

that there was no expectation that the situation would occur:(104) It was interesting/amusing/funny that X should have done Z.
(Wierzbicka (1988:131))
In (41), interesting, amusing, and funny co-occur with evaluative should. This shows that thesepredicates have “unexpectability” in their semantic formulae. Thus, (41) can be changed into
(42):(105) It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.

(Wierzbicka (1988:130))

6.3.9. Dixon (1991)
6.3.9.1. Modal (FOR) TO and Judgment TO
Dixon (1991) divides the infinitive into “Modal (FOR)TO” and “Judgement TO”:
(106) Modal (FOR)TOa. I want Mary to be a doctor.
b. She forced him to recite a poem.8(Dixon (1991: 220)) (Underline is mine)(107) Judgement TO
a. I discovered him to be quite stupid.
b. We had assumed Mary to be a doctor.
(Dixon (1991: 220)) (Underline is mine)
He argues that one of the differences between “Modal (FOR)TO” and “Judgment TO” is thefollowing: in the former, the complementizer for is explicitly expressed, while, in the latter, it is8

Him to recite a poem in (106b) is probably not categorized in Modal (FOR)TO because him is
not the subject of the infinitive clause but the object of the verb force. This is evident from thefact that him can be raised to the subject of the corresponding passive sentence:(iv) He was forced to recite a poem by her.
It is clear from this fact that “him to recite a poem” does not constitute a for complement, but aquite difference construction of “accusative + infinitive”.
146not expressed either explicitly or implicitly. In the present section, only “Modal (FOR) TO” will
be discussed since “Judgment TO” is not included in the subjects of the present chapter.

6.3.9.2. Syntactic Features of Modal (FOR) TO
According to Dixon’s analysis, Modal (FOR) TO complements is related to the subject of thecomplement clause becoming involved in the activity or state referred to by that clause, or to thepotentiality of such involvement. The other syntactic features of the complements are as follows9:
First, in Modal (FOR) TO complements, the complementizer for exists in the underlying level,but its existence on the surface will be effected by the kind of the matrix verb: for example, it isobligatory after hope, while it is not after wish. After the verb force, unlike these two, for must
obligatorily deleted:(108) a. I hope *(for) Mary to accompany me.
b. I wish (for) Mary to accompany me.
c. I forced (*for) Mary to accompany me.10(Dixon (1991: 220))
Second, the for phrase will be deleted if a Modal (FOR) TO complement functions as the
subject of the sentence and the subject of the complement clause and the object of the matrix
clause are coreferential:(109) (*For Mary) to have to travel so much annoys Mary.11(Dixon (1991: 220))

9

Dixon (1991) discusses another feature of Modal (FOR) TO in the following way: “If thecomplement clause is in object function then its subject may be omitted under the coreferentiality
with main clause subject”. The present section, however, omits this feature because no suitable
example for it is found in Dixon (1991).

10(108c) is not a suitable example of Modal (FOR) TO complements since, as mentioned above,force does not take the for complement. Therefore, it can be said that Modal (FOR) TO
complements only have two cases: where for can be omitted, and where it cannot.
11

Dixon (1991) takes the following sentence as an example of the second feature:(v) (For Mary) to have to travel so much annoys John.

The present dissertation, however, does not regard (v) as a suitable example and changes it into(109) because, in (v), the subject of the complement clause and that of the matrix clause are not147Third, if a Modal (FOR) TO is changed into a that complement, a modal auxiliary must be
used in the complement (The underlines are drawn by the author):(110) a. I wish (for) John to go.
b. I wish that John would go.
(Dixon (1991: 221))(111) a. I decided for Mary to give the vote of thanks.
b. I decided that Mary should give the vote of thanks.12(Dixon (1991: 221))(112) a. I decided to give the vote of thanks.
b. I decided that I would give the vote of thanks.
(Dixon (1991: 221))(113) a. I expect Mary to be appointed.
b. I expect that Mary will be appointed.
(Dixon (1991: 221))(114) a. I ordered the flag to be raised.
b. I ordered that the flag should be raised.13(Dixon (1991: 221))(115a) does not have its corresponding Modal (FOR) TO complement since it cannot have any
modality in the that complement:

coreferential.
12

Should in (111b) is thought to be a subjunctive substitute rather than the epistemic or root
modal auxiliary. This is clear from the fact that it is paraphrased with verbs in the subjunctive
present form, as is shown in the following:(vi) I decided that Mary give the vote of thanks.
Considering the above discussion, Dixon’s (1991) insistence on the relationship between the forcomplement and the modal auxiliaries seems unconvincing.
13

The same analysis of should in (111b) can be applied to that in (114b(114a).
148

(115) a. ?I decided that I was sick.

(Dixon (1991: 221))b. ?I decided to be sick.
In the present analysis of this dissertation, the reason why the for complement is unacceptable isbecause the verb decide expresses “thoughts” (for further discussion, see (53) in Section 6.3.4.1.).

6.3.10. Hamawand (2003)
6.3.10.1. The Difference between the For Complement and the To Complement
Hamawand (2003: 171), essentially along the lines of Wierzbicka (1988), claims that all
linguistic elements posited in grammar are ascribed some kind of conceptual import. On the basisof this claim, he argues that for-to complement clauses have not only a syntactic function but
also meaning of their own which conditions its behavior. He also claims that the syntax of an
expression is a reflection of its conceptual organization, which represents the specific construal
imposed on their content. In this sense, the for-to complement can be regarded as a “construction”
in Cognitive Grammar.
According to him, to complement clauses represent a “self-related” construal in the sense ofreflecting the main clause subject’s involvement in the complement event, and so implying his
or her high degree of interest in its realization. By contrast, for-to complement clauses represent
an “other-related” construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject’s distance from thecomplement event:(116) I like [to win the race].

(Hamawand (2003: 172))(117) I like [for Jane to win the race].

(Hamawand (2003: 172))

According to his analysis, in (116), for example, the main clause subject relates the content of
the complement clause to himself and so opts for the to complement. In (117), on the other hand,
the main clause subject relates the same content to Jane and so chooses the for-to complement.

149

6.3.10.2. Semantic Compatibility Analysis
Hamawand (2003: 180-183) argues that adjectival predicates evoke a number of domains suchas evaluation, emotion, deontics, and epistemics. He explains these domains as follows (Theexamples are Hamawand’s (2003: 180-183):
First, “evaluation” refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker makes an assessment ofa situation based on personal beliefs. It evokes the following five subdomains:
A. Difficulty: arduous, burdensome, difficult, hard, laborious, onerous, strenuous, toilsome,etc.
(118) a. For him to climb the mountain is difficult.
b. It is difficult for him to climb the mountain.
B. Ease: cushy, easy, effortless, elementary, light, painless, plain, simple, etc.
(119) a. For her to do the exercise is easy.
b. It is easy for her to do the exercise.
C . Morality: (in)appropriate, (in)correct, (in)decent, (un)ethical, (im)moral, (im)polite,(im)proper, (im)prudent, etc.
(120) a. For him to answer back is impolite.
b. It is impolite for him to answer back.
D . Intellectuality: (un)fair, (un)just, (un)lawful, (il)legal, (il)legitimate, (il)logical,(in)credible, (ir)rational, (ir)relevant, etc.
(121) a. For the employee to demand more money for less work is unfair.
b. It is unfair for the employee to demand more money for less work.
E. Recurrence: common, customary, habitual, natural, recurrent, regular, usual, etc.
(122) a. For guests to see tears at a wedding is usual.
b. It is usual for guests to see tears at the wedding.
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He argues that the co-occurrence of a complement clause with any predicate is possible under
the condition of semantic compatibility between the two. According to the subdomains ofevaluation, the predicates refer to the possibility that the event might happen in the future when
the necessary conditions exist. This is so because the evaluation is based on personal beliefs
rather than on known facts. He also argues that for-to complement clauses refer to an event thatis essentially potential. In other words, the event is based on suggestion about what might happen
or an idea which has not yet shown to be true. The event which for-to expresses is made only at
the general level (Cf. Spears (1973)). It refers to a general situation applicable to many of its
types. According to him, the for-to complement clauses in all the examples seem to be compatible
with the governing predicates.
Second, “emotion” refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker tends to have strong
feelings as a response to a certain action. It evokes the following two subdomains:
A. Positive emotion: admirable, adorable, delightful, enjoyable, nice, pleasurable, lovely,
amazing, amusing, astonishing, fascinating, interesting, intriguing,pleasing, surprising, etc.
(123) a. For them to remember old acquaintances is nice.
b. It is nice for them to remember old acquaintances.
c. For her to give a speech in public is interesting.
d. It is interesting for her to give a speech in public.
B. Negative emotion: (disapproval) awful, disagreeable, disdainful, scornful, contemptuous,
horrible, ridiculous, terrible, (sadness) deplorable, lamentable,
mournful,

rueful,regrettable,

woeful,alarming,annoying,

disappointing, disgusting, distressing, disturbing, irritating, shocking,etc.
(124) a. For her to discuss sexual matters openly is horrible.
b. It is horrible for her to discuss sexual matters openly.
c. For them to lose the match is regrettable.
d. It is regrettable for them to lose the match.
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e. For anyone to see the increase in violent crime is alarming.
f. It is alarming for anyone to see the increase in violent crime.
He argues that the choice of a complement clause is the result of its semantic compatibility withthe aspect of meaning the main predicate evokes. In both subdomains of emotion, the predicates
express an attitude towards an event, which is triggered by merely a thought. He also argues that
for-to complement clauses refer to an event that is prototypically potential. The speaker imagines
the event before it actually happens, or rather predicts his emotional response. The for-tocomplement clauses express a type of event which is indistinguishable from events of similartypes. They refer to a general situation which is applicable to every person in a similar position
to perform the event. According to him, that is the reason why the for-to complement clauses andthe governing predicates are compatible with each other in the above examples.
Third, “deontics” refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker tries to influence thecourse of reality and bring about a new facet of the world. It evokes the following threesubdomains:
A . Obligation: obligatory, compulsory, imperative, imperious, mandatory, necessary,urgent, prescriptive, etc.
(125) a. For children to go to school is compulsory.
b. It is compulsory for children to go to school.
B . Permission: acceptable, acknowledgeable, admissible, allowable, authorisable,
constitutional, permissible, warrantable, etc.
(126) a. For the visitors to take photographs is admissible.
b. It is admissible for the visitors to take photographs.
C. Prohibition: constrictive, forbidden, inadmissible, interdictive, preventable, prohibitive,
proscriptive, restrictive, etc.
(127) a. For them to smoke in school is forbidden.
b. It is forbidden for them to smoke in school.
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He argues that the co-existence of for-to complement clauses and predicates expressing deontics
is underpinned by the semantic compatibility between the two. In all subdomains of deontics, thepredicates refer to a force that allows or forbids the happening of an event in the future. He also
argues that the for-to complement clauses refer to a move forward, in a series of events, that is tohappen. When the situation has a tinge of importance, the speaker has high expectation for theoccurrence of the event. The for-to complement clauses express a type of event which cannot be
distinguished from events of similar types. This is so because the event is a general situation.
According to him, it is this semantic compatibility that permits the co-occurrence of for-tocomplement clauses and the governing predicates in a construction.
Fourth, “epistemics” refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker passes a judgement ona situation based on practical or known facts. It evokes the following three subdomains:
A. Possibility: supposable, thinkable, etc.14(128) a. For her to win the game is possible.
b. It is possible for her to win the game.
B . Probability: feasible, foreseeable, inevitable, likely, plausible, presumable, probable,
tenable, etc.
(129) a. *For the mechanic to repair the machine is likely.
b. *It is likely for the mechanic to repair the machine.
C. Certainty: clear, certain, factual, obvious, self-evident, true, well-founded, well-known,
etc.
(130) a. *For her to lose weight after a severe diet is obvious.
b. *It is obvious for her to lose weight after a severe diet.
He argues that the occurrence of a for-to complement clause in a construction containing a
predicate expressing epistemics is also conditioned by semantic compatibility. In this respect, not

14

Leech (20043: 82) states that possible in (128) is not “factual” but “theoretical”.
153every predicate allows a for-to complement clause as its subject. According to his analysis,
predicates which denote possibility are felicitous with a for-to complement clause because they
imply that the complement event is forward-looking. By contrast, predicates which denoteprobability are infelicitous with a for-to complement clause because they imply that thecomplement event is almost sure to happen. Likewise, predicates which denote certainty are
infelicitous with a for-to complement clause because they imply that the complement event has
already taken place.

6.3.11. Swan (20174)
Swan (20174:145) classifies the situations referred to by the for complement in the followingway:(131) A. Possibility
B. Necessity
C. Frequency
D. Wishes
E. Suggestions
F. Plans
G. Personal reaction to situations(132) a. She's anxious for us to see her work.
b. I'm eager for the party to be a success.
c. Robert says he’d be delighted for Emily to come and stay.
d. It's impossible for the job to be finished in time.
e. It’s important for the meeting to start at eight.
f. It seems unnecessary for him to start work this week.
g. I consider it essential for the school to be well heated.
h. Is it usual for foxes to come so close to the town?
i. I thought it strange for her to be out so late.
j. It’s not good for the oil tank to be so close to the house.
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(Swan (20174: 144-145)) (Underline is mine)
According to him, the for complement which refers to “wishes”, “recommendations”, or “plans”
can be paraphrased with the that complement with evaluative should or verbs in the subjunctive
present form:(133) a. It is important that there should be a fire escape.
b. I'm anxious that the party should be a success.
(Swan (20174: 146))(134) a. His idea is that we should travel in separate cars.
b. It is essential that the meeting start at eight.
(Swan (20174: 146))
He also argues that likely and probable are not used with the for complement:(135) a. *It’s likely for her to arrive this evening.
b. *It’s probable for her to be …
(Swan (20174: 177)) (Underline is mine)

6.3.12. Problems
It is now clear from the above previous studies that the for complement can follow thepredicates which express emotion. These studies essentially accord with the present dissertationin that they discuss the correlationship between the for complement and the governing predicates.
However, all the studies, except Bresnan (1972), which divided the function of thecomplementizer for into (i) Reason / Evidence and (ii) Purpose / Use / Intention, only remain at
the level of observation of its usage. Thus, the inherent meaning of the for complement has not
fully clarified yet. It is still questionable whether it is mechanically chosen depending on whether
the governing predicates are emotive or not.
As pointed out in various previous studies, in addition to the fact that the complementizer for
is often used after the emotive predicates such as imperative or foolish, it is also clear that these155

predicates can take the that complement as well:(136) a. It was imperative [that the state should intervene to preserve the higher life of thenation].
b. We've been talking so much, it's foolish [that we don't even know each other' s
names].
(BNC) (Underline is mine)
The non-emotive predicates such as well-known and conclude, by contrast, can only take the thatcomplement:(137) a. It's well-known [that vitamin D is important for bone health].
b. From these results, we conclude [that the genomic distribution of GR bindingsites does not explain the gene-specific regulatory activity of GR in macrophages].
(COCA)
It follows from this fact that the that complement is used regardless of whether the governing
predicates are emotive or not. As pointed out in Bresnan (1972), the that complement can follow
either emotive or non-emotive predicates because it only has a function to show that its
propositional content is “definite”. In other words, the speaker can either express or not express
his or her emotional attitude towards the situation denoted by the that complement.
The for complement, by contrast, can only follow the emotive predicates. Therefore, it must
be presupposed that some semantic feature compatible to the emotivity expressed by the matrix
predicates is attributed to the complementizer for itself.
Furthermore, there are a number of counterexamples to the claim that likely cannot take thefor complement, which is pointed out by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Swan (20174), andHamawand (2003):(138) a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making
it less likely [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].
b. She believes that's also made it more likely [for minorities to be racially
profiled and stopped].
156

c. In his view, it was just as likely [for News Feed to highlight fake news about
Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters
ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)
In (138), likely takes the for complement. These linguistic facts cannot be explained by the
analysis which regards likely as non-emotive.
In addition, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the for complement expresses a “strong desire” bycomparing the combination of want + the for complement with that of want very much + the forcomplement. Generally speaking, however, it is not only because very much is inserted but
because they are separated by some grammatical operation that want can be used with the forcomplement. Very much insertion only constitutes one of those operations:(139) a. What I want is [for you to feel great].

(COCA)

b. She wants very much [for her friends to be truthful].
(Bresnan (1972: 154)) (Underline is mine)
Therefore, her claim is not convincing enough.
Finally, Hamawand’s (2003) analysis is partly parallel to the analysis in the present dissertationin that he analyses the for complements in terms of their semantic compatibility with the main
predicates. His analysis, however, has the following two problems:First, his classification of the predicates is rough and inconsistent. For example, possible canbe interpreted not only epistemically but also dynamically (= ability): It is possible for her to win
the game can be paraphrased with She can (or is able to) win the game (see Leech (20043: 82)).
Furthermore, it is questionable whether imaginary and thinkable belong to the category of
epistemicity. The fact that It was hardly thinkable means I would never have believed it suggeststhat at least thinkable belongs to the category of counterfactuality.
Second, it is questionable whether predicates which denote certainty necessarily imply that thecomplement event has already taken place. For example, certain can take the to complement or
the that complement which refer to a future situation.
(140) a. He is certain to come.
157

b. It is certain that he will come.
Hamawand’s (2003) semantic compatibility analysis may be interesting, but it is not convincing
enough.
Based on these problems, the following sections will discuss the semantic features of the forcomplements and explain them in terms of the concept of “Modal Harmony”.

6.4. Some Suggestions
6.4.1. Reconsideration of Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s (1971) Analysis
As mentioned earlier, the complementizer for, in almost all cases, occurs in the sentences withemotive expressions (For the sake of convenience, Fig. 2 will be requoted as Fig. 3 below).
【Factive】

Emotive

Non-emotive

Subject Clause

importantwell-known

crazy

clear

odd

(self-evident)

relevant

goes without saying

instructivesad
sufficebotheralarm
fascinate
exhilarate
defy comment
surpass belief
a tragedy
no laughing matter
Object Clause

regretbe aware (of)158

resent

bear in mind

deploremake clear
forgettake into account【Non-factive】

Emotive

Non-emotive

Subject Clauseimprobableprobableunlikely

likelya pipedreamturn out

nonsense

seem

urgentimminent

vital

in the works

intendpredict

preferanticipate

reluctantforeseeanxioussaywilling

supposeeager

conclude

Object ClauseFig. 3： The Cross-classification of Factivity and Emotivity
The following sections will divide these predicates into (i) Factive Emotive Predicates, (ii)Factive Non-emotive Predicates, (iii) Non-factive Emotive Predicates, and (iv) Non-factive Nonemotive Predicates and discuss each of these cases.

6.4.1.1. Factive Emotive Predicates
Factive emotive class consist of predicates such as significant, important, regret, odd, andfoolish. These predicates express an emotive evaluation of the situation referred to by thecomplement. Furthermore, they are equivalent to significant-class predicates proposed by Spears(1973) and can take the Poss + -ing complement as well as the that complement with emotive
159

would (or should in some dialects). It should be noted that the complement following thepredicates in this class must be non-future and factual:(141) a. But bitterly I regret [that I needed another man's hands to help me] ...
(COCA) (Underline is mine)b. [His doing that] is significant.
c. It is significant [that she would(/should) even think such a thing].
(Spears (1973: 627)) (Underline is mine)
In (141), emotive evaluations are made of factual situations located in the present or past.
Predicates in this class only express non-future, factual situations because the complements
constitute the cause of the emotion expressed by the predicates. Generally speaking, it is notpossible to make an emotional evaluation of future, nonfactual situations. The predicates in thisclass can also take the for complement, as is stated by Bresnan (1972) (For the sake of
convenience, (45b) will be requoted as (142) below):(142) He considers it foolish [for her to help him].
(Bresnan (1972: 79)) (Underline is mine)
The for complement in (142) refers to a factual situation which has already occurred. Here, themain clause subject, the agent of the judgment, makes a subjective and emotive judgment of thesituation. The following are the examples from Corpus of Contemporary American English(COCA) and British National Corpus (BNC), where factive emotive predicates take the forcomplement (All the underlines were drawn by the author):(143) a. It is sad [for me to see the medical practice close], but …
b. … it was very sad [for a girl to lose her father in her teens].
c. It's kinda crazy [for an almost 33-year-old big man to adapt to a new point guard].
d. Darlington MP Michael Fallon said it was crazy [for the brochure to encourage
people to stay so far from the town].
e. The formal incantation of such words would suffice [for the tribunal to remain
within the scope of its authority].
160

f. No longer does it suffice [for a teacher to retype overheads into PowerPoint andhave students take notes].
g. … it is relevant [for this court to have regard to the fact that …]
h. What a tragedy [for the king to lose his only son and heir].

6.4.1.2. Factive Non-emotive Predicates
Factive non-emotive class consist of predicates such as clear and forget. These predicates
express an non-emotional evaluation of a fact (= (144a)) or the presence/absence of the memoryof it (= (144b)):(144) a. It is clear [that their damage control effort saved their ship and saved lives].
(COCA) (Underline is mine)b. I forgot [meeting her in 1980].
(Quirk et al. (1985: 553)) (Underline is mine)
It should be noted here that these predicates express a non-emotive mental process such as“thought” or “recognition”, but not an emotive judgment. Thus, it can be predicted that thesentence with these predicates will be unacceptable if they take the for complement which only
follows the emotive predicates. The following examples supports this prediction:(145) a. *What I believe is [for Mary to be shy].
b. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
c. *I know (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].
d. *It is true [for God to exist]
e. *It is false [for there to be only finitely many primes](Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)
f. *They decided very much [for them to be sick].

161

6.4.1.3. Non-factive Emotive PredicatesNon-factive emotive class consist of predicates such as improbable, unlikely, urgent, vital,
anxious, and intend. These predicates can be classified into those which take nonfuturecomplements and those which can take either nonfuture or future complements. Thus, urgent andanxious express “desire” or “requirement” for future situations, while improbable and unlikely
can express “possibility” for either past or future situations. The former type can be referred toas “Desire Type”, while the latter as “Possibility Type”.

Desire Type: urgent, vital, intend, prefer, reluctant,anxious, willing, eager）(146) Non-factive
Emotive Predicates
Possibility Type: improbable, unlikely,a pipedream, nonsense）
When the predicates classified in both types refer to a future situation, they are basicallycompatible with the for complement which expresses “purpose”, “use”, and “intention” (Bresnan(1972: 79-80)):(147) The students started to put away their books, anxious [for him to finish].
(COCA) (Underline is mine)(148) And as she and Steve are together it's not unlikely [for him to pick up the phone if itrang].

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

The for complement in (147) refers to a future situation, and the main predicate anxious expresses
the students’ desire. Likewise, in (148), the for complement also refers to a future situation, andthe matrix predicate unlikely expresses a negative emotion by referring to the low possibility forthe situation to occur.
By contrast, when predicates classified in “Possibility Type” refer to nonfuture situation, they
are compatible with the for complement which constitutes the object of an emotional evaluation
162

rather than “purpose”, “use”, or “intention”:(149) Although possible, we think it unlikely [for this to have occurred for risk factors suchas smoking and parity].

(BNC)

In (149), the matrix predicate unlikely expresses an emotive evaluation of a past situation denotedby the for complement.

6.4.1.4. Non-factive Non-emotive PredicatesNon-factive non-emotive class consist of predicates such as probable, likely, predict, andanticipate. These predicates can either refer to “possibility” for future situations or express“prediction” of them. Thus, they take a that complement which refers to a future situation ((150)is quoted from Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fifth Edition):(150) a. It is likely [that he will live to ninety].
b. The radio report predicts [that snow is coming].
Generally speaking, these predicates do not take a for complement:(151) a. *It is likely [for him to live to ninety].
b. *The radio report predicts [for snow to be coming].
However, as mentioned earlier, there are a number of examples where likely takes a forcomplement (For the sake of convenience, (138) is requoted here as (152)):(152) a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making
it less likely [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].
b. She believes that's also made it more likely [for minorities to be racially profiled
and stopped].
c. In his view, it was just as likely [for News Feed to highlight fake news about
Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters
ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.
163

(COCA) (Underline is mine)
It should be noted that, in (152), likely, which is classified in the category of Non-factive Nonemotive predicates, is modified by comparative expressions such as less, more, or just as. It
follows from this fact that the present dissertation regards these cases as different from the cases
where only likely is used in the main clause and reanalyze them in terms of the presence/absenceof emotivity, which will be discussed in detail in Section 6.4.3.1.3.

6.4.2. From “The Emotivity Constraint” to “Non-epistemicity Constraint”
The above sections, essentially along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), divided
English predicates into four distinct types in terms of “factivity” and “emotivity”. As a result, it
was clarified that there are some differences of the acceptability of that and for among these fourtypes. In Table 4, the acceptance and non-acceptance are shown as ✓ and *, respectively:

that

for

Factive Emotive✓✓

Factive Non-emotive✓*

Non-factive Emotive✓✓

Non-factive Non-emotive✓*/✓

Table 4：The Difference in Acceptability in Terms of “Factivity” and “Emotivity”
Table 4 indicates the following: the acceptance of that is not influenced by either “factivity” or“emotivity”, while that of for depends on the presence/absence of “emotivity”. This result
essentially supports the claim postulated by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972),
Aijmer (1972), Hamawand (2003), and Swan (20174).
However, as seen in Section 6.3.11. and 6.4.1.4., the fact that the for complement can follow

164likely might contradict the claim that it can only co-occur with the emotive predicates.15 If not,the reason why the complementizer for can co-occur with these predicates will remain unclear.
In Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s (1988) position, the following hypothesis could be postulated:(153) “The Emotivity Constraint”
The complementizer for expresses an emotional attitude towards the situationreferred to by its complement.
If (153) was correct, it would be quite natural that the matrix predicates followed by the forcomplement obligatorily have emotivity. This is because it is logically impossible to express nonemotive mental process towards the situation construed emotionally. Thus, the following
examples are unacceptable because there is a logical crash between “emotivity” expressed by thefor complement and “non-emotivity” by the matrix predicates clear, know, and predict (For thesake of convenience, (145a), (145c), and (151b) is requoted as (154)):(154) a. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
b. *I know (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].
(Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)c. *The radio report predicts [for snow to be coming].
The following example, on the other hand, shows that there is no such logical crash between“non-emotivity” expressed by the that complement and “emotivity” by the matrix predicate. In
the following example, the that complement, which introduces a “definite” situation, follows anemotive predicate surprising:(155) It is surprising [that none of the mothers said that listening to music was her child's
favorite music activity], although the majority of participants cited listening to musicas a common daily activity the mother and child did together.
(COCA) (Underline is mine)

15

The emotivity expressed by likely will be discussed in detail as a case study in Section
6.4.3.1.3.
165

In (155), the that complement expresses a fact with no emotion. The speaker makes an emotional
evaluation of the non-emotional situation. The claim that the complementizer that expresses
emotivity could not explain the following cases where it co-occurs with non-emotive predicates:(156) a. It is clear [that people are still eager to send their children to school].
b. He knows [that he's looking for a one-way result].
(BNC)
c. The radio report predicts [that snow is coming]
The sentences in (156) are all acceptable because there is no logical crash between “nonemotivity” expressed by the that complements and “non-emotivity” by the matrix predicates.
However, although it has been verified that emotive predicates can take the for complement,
it is still not questionable whether the complementizer for always expresses “emotivity”. The
following are the cases where the complementizer for cannot be analyzed only in terms of“emotivity”:
First, the complementizer for does not express “emotivity” after fix, choose, like, hate, andbear (For the sake of convenience, (30) is requoted as(157) below):(157) a. He had fixed [for the marriage to take place at eleven].
b. I hardly know in what language you would choose [for me to reply].
c. You'd like better [for us both to stay home together].
d. She wouldn't like [for him to know anything].
e. I hate [for you to be giving lessons].
f. I couldn't bear [for us not to be friends].
g. I mean afore all else [for that woman to be happy].
h. I'd sooner [for her to die than have her go to you].
i. I suppose I don't much deserve [for you to write to me].
j. I could arrange [for you to be in the background].
k. she planned [for you not to know about it until after tomorrow].
l. She said [for you all to go in].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 302)) (Underline is mine)
166

The for complements in (157) express “desire” or “obligation” rather than “emotion”.
Second, the complementizer for does not express “emotivity” after the combination of “too +an adjective” or “an adjective + enough” (For the sake of convenience, (31) is requoted as (158)
below):(158) a. The tempest was too high [for her to be heard].
b. One word is too often profaned [for me to profane it], One feeling too falsely
disdained [For thee to disdain it]. One hope is too like despair [for prudence tosmother].
c. Mr. Tulliver's own hand shook too much under his excitement [for him to write
himself].
d. Am I too wicked [for you and me to live together]?
e. It often happens that the truth lies too far back [for us to discover].
f . Mr. Darcy had been standing near enough [for her to overhear a conversation
between him and Mr. Bingley].
(Jespersen (MEG V: 303)) (Underline is mine)g. The weather was too fine [for us to keep the children inside].
h. The wall is too thick [for the drill to pierce through].
i. The bridge was not strong enough [for the tank to cross].
j. That boulder is too heavy [for you to lift].
(Declerck (1991: 484)) (Underline is mine)
The for complements in (158) express “possibility”.
Third, the complementizer for does not express “emotivity” when it is used alone andexpresses “purpose”, “plans”, or “necessary conditions” (For the sake of convenience, (33) isrequoted as (159) below):(159) a. I thought you had kindly left it [the book] here, on purpose [for me to read].
b. In the pauses when she stopped [for the Judge to write it down] ...
c. She held out her hand [for him to shake].
d. He placed himself at a corner of the doorway [for her to pass him into the house].
167

e. He unwrinkled the letter carefully [for it to be legible].
f. Vernon stood aside [for her to enter].
g. My parents had but to give me an order [for me to conceive at once some plan ofdisobeying it].
h. We'll have to go round by Lippinghall, [for me to get some clothes].
i. The tin mug with the hot water [for Alexis to drink from].
j. She is now coming to town, in order [for me to make my addresses to her].
k. In order [for a poet to be taken seriously by the public], it must first be abundantly
clear that he takes himself seriously.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 304-305)
Fourth, the complementizer for does not express “emotivity” after possible (the following
are quoted from Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fifth Edition):(160) a. It is not possible [for humans to breath under water].
b. It is possible [for me to read the book in a day].
The combination of possible + for in (160) expresses “external situation” or “internal ability”.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 6.3.9.2., the combination of possible + for in (161)expresses “theoretical possibility” rather than “emotion”.
(161) It is theoretically possible [for aerosols to explode].

(Declerck (1991: 397))

Thus, (161) can be paraphrased with the that complement including existential can:(162) Aerosols can explode if you do not treat them properly.
(Declerck (1991: 397)) (Underline is mine)
If we take these cases into consideration, “the Emotivity Constraint” shown in (153) should
be regarded to be theoretically too weak to explain the behavior of the complementizer for in a
unified way. Therefore, the present chapter proposes the following new condition for thecomplementizer for:168

(163) “Non-epistemicity Condition on the Complementizer for”：
The complementizer for cannot express epistemic modality
This condition shows that the complementizer for belongs to the category of modalizer which
expresses any kinds of modality except epistemic modality.16 This condition enable us to give asemantic explanation to the fact that the complementizer for can occur not only after emotive
predicates but also non-emotive predicates based on the above four conditions. The fact that thecomplementizer for cannot occur after verbs such as believe, know, assume, and infer (asmentioned in Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971)) or after some predicates such as true, false, andclear (as mentioned in Bresnan (1972)) can be explained by analyzing all these predicates as
expressing “epistemicity” (For the sake of convenience, (8) and (41a) is requoted as (164)
below):(164) a. *It is true [for God to exist].
b. *It is false [for there to be only finitely many primes].
c. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
d. *I {believe (with good reason) / know (for a fact) / assume (on these grounds) /infer (from the above)} [for them to win unfairly].
(Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)e. *I believe [for John to have liked Anselm].
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))
The following sections will classify the modality expressed by the complementizer for into“emotive”, “dynamic”, and “counterfactual” and discuss each of them based on concrete
examples.

6.4.3. Emotive Modality
The present section will argue that the modality expressed by the complementizer for can beclassified into a feeling of “surprise” and “disdain” and that the complementizer for is
16

Consider the fact that epistemic may cannot be paraphrased with possible for.
169

semantically parallel to emotive modalizer should.

6.4.3.1. Surprise/Disdain
The complementizer for expresses a feeling of “surprise” or “disdain” when it occurs after
intellectual judgment predicates. As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.1., Wierzbicka (1988)
adduces some examples of the predicates in question as follows:(165) unexpected、odd、strange、surprising、normal、natural、usual, …
These predicates belong to the category of emotive predicates since the following thatcomplement contains emotive should (the underlines in the following examples are drawn by theauthor):(166) a. He did not find it unexpected [that a man who was not generous with words shouldlose his capacity to say them as well as to hear them].

(COCA)

b. It is extremely odd [that the Labour party should propose that women should bebarred from jobs because of their husband's position in public life].
c. How strange [that critics should not have remarked the possibility]!
d. It was hardly surprising [that this should result in the coup of January 1971 in which
Amin overthrew Obote while he was absent abroad].
e. But while it seems at first quite normal [that this should happen at an inquest
involving the opera's central character one soon notices that the process is in fact
highly artificial, like the narrations which open several of Britten's later operas,
designed in this instance to have the dramatis personae stand up and be recognised
but in a context which fits the story].
f. It was natural [that their products should be in great demand].
g. It has become usual [that there should be a generally drafted indemnity against all
taxation liabilities arising from trading transactions prior to the last balance sheet
date and which were not provided for in such accounts, or which arose fromtransactions outside the ordinary course of business since that date].
170

(BNC)
According to her analysis, when the predicates take the for complement, they imply that thesituation denoted by the complement is expected or is not expected to occur. Concretely speaking,predicates which express a negative emotion, such as unexpected, odd, strange, and surprising,
imply that the situation in question is not expected to occur, while predicates which express acalm judgment, such as normal, natural, and usual, imply that the complement in question is
expected to occur. The former type can be referred to as “Predictable Type”, and the latter as“Unpredictable Type”:
Predictable Type (unexpected, odd, strange, surprising)(167) Emotive Predicates
Unpredictable type (normal, natural, use)
The following sections will regard the emotion expressed by the predicates classified in“Predictable Type” as “surprise” and the emotion expressed by the predicates classified in“Unpredictable Type” as “disdain” and discuss each case in detail.

6.4.3.1.1. Surprise
Consider the following examples:(168) a. And yet it was just as improbable [for a white child to be colored].
b. … it is very unlikely [for two very different methods to have same bias].
(COCA) (Underline is original)
In (168a), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a future situation referred to by the forcomplement is expressed by the governing predicate improbable. In (168b), in the same way, asubjunctive, emotive evaluation of a future situation referred to by the for complement isexpressed by the governing predicate unlikely. It should be noted here that the emotional
judgment is expressed not only by the matrix predicates but also the complementizer for itself.
For example, the situations denoted by the complements in (168a, b) are generally thought to behardly possible. By using the complementizer for, the speaker expresses them as surprising171

situations which are divorced from his or her assumptions. Both improbable and unlikely can beclassified into “Unpredictable Type”.
The claim that a for complement which occurs after improbable, unlikely, unexpected, odd,
strange, or surprising express a feeling of “surprise” is parallel to Wierzbicka’s (1988) claim thatit expresses “unexpectability”. As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.1., she claims that a forcomplement which follows intellectual judgment predicates indicates that the situation inquestion was generally not expected to occur and postulates the following semantic formula:(169) “one wouldn’t have thought this: this will happen”17(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

Since the situation referred to by the for complement is generally not expected, thecomplement expresses a feeling of “surprise”.

6.4.3.1.2. Disdain
Consider the following example: In this scene, Mr. Lestrade of Scotland Yard comes to visit
Holmes in order to ask him for help with the incident:(170) It was no very unusual thing [for Mr. Lestrade, of Scotland Yard, to look in upon usof an evening], and has visits were welcome to Sherlock Holmes, for they enabled
him to keep in touch with all that was going on at the police head-quarters.
(A. C. Doyle, “The Adventure of the Six Napoleons”) (Underline is mine)
In (170), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a factual situation referred to by the forcomplement is expressed by the governing predicate not very unusual. In the present case, thecomplementizer for functions as a modalizer, and a feeling of “disdain” is expressed concerning
the situation it introduces. In other words, the situation referred to by the for complement may
be based on a fact, but it is not asserted merely as a fact itself. What is expressed here is the17(169) is essentially a re-quotation of (37) (“one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will
happen”), but would is deliberately deleted in (169) because it is implied that the situation
denoted by the complement was not expected to occur when the for complement express a feelingof “surprise”.
172speaker’s subjective construal of the fact. Therefore, it can be concluded that the emotion
expressed by the complementizer for is “disdain”.

6.4.3.1.3. Case Studies of Likely
In Section 6.4.1.4. and 6.4.2., it was suggested that the fact that likely, which is classified into
the category of non-emotional predicates, can take the for complement might be acounterexample for the claim that the for complement can express “emotivity”. However, if wetake into consideration the present analysis that the complementizer for functions as an emotive
modalizer, likely could be regarded as an emotive predicate in the combination with the forcomplement. The following sections will discuss individual examples after dividing theexamples which contain likely + the for complement into the following cases: (i) where likely is
modified by negative adjuncts, (ii) where it is modified by positive adjuncts, and (iii) where it ismodified by Equality Adjuncts.

6.4.3.1.3.1. Likely with Negative ModifiersConsider the following sentences:(171) a. And in the process, he is undermining the Democratic process in America and heis making it less likely [for people to vote in the future].
b. Oh, it's going to take a long, long time to determine whether having gay marriage
will make it less likely [for kids to be raised in settings where there's a mom anda dad].
(COCA) (Underline is mine)
In (171a, b), likely with a negative modifier less co-occurs with the for complement. Here, thecomplementizer for expresses a feeling of “disdain” towards the future situations. Furthermore,a negative expression less likely expresses a negative feeling towards the situation where theusual situation is becoming uncommon.
Likely can sometimes be used in a metaphorical construction with no more … than, as shown173

by the following:(172) A general who seized power during the last military coup announced, at the time, that
it was no more likely [for Aristide to return] than [for an egg to be put back in achicken].

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

Generally speaking, the expression, A is no more B than C (is B), is used to claim that the former
proposition (= “A is B”) is false by regarding it as possible to be true as the latter (= “C is B”)
under the presupposition that the latter is false (see O. Sawada (2004) and Sawada (2014) for
detail). (172) indicates a proposition (= it is likely for Aristide to return) is false by regarding it
as possible to be true as the latter (= it is likely for an egg to be put back in a chicken) under thepresupposition that the latter proposition is false. In the present case, the complementizer for
expresses a feeling of “surprise” towards the former proposition (= Aristide to return) as well as
the latter (= an egg to be put back in a chicken).
Furthermore, consider the following:(173 ) There are some fundamental differences between fantasy sports and gambling
websites that offer online poker or roulette that make it less likely [for the former tolead to problems], according to Peter Schoenke, chairman of the Fantasy Sports
Trade Assn.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

In (173), fantasy sports18 and gambling websites are compared with each other. I this case, thespeaker regarded the situation referred to by the for complement as unfavorable for society, andthe complementizer for expresses a feeling of “surprise” towards the situation.
It should be noted here that likely, which is classified into the category of non-emotive predates,
functions as a emotive predicate in the combination of a negative modifier less and the forcomplement. Therefore, it can be included that there is an interrelationship between thecomplementizer for as an emotive modalizer and “emotivity” expressed by the matrix predicate
less likely.

18

Fantasy sports are a kind of gambling. The participants choose some players on the active
list and gain some points depending on how the player actually made a spectacular showing.
The participants can also gain some prize money depending on their points.
174

The followings are similar examples (underline is mine):(174) COCA
a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making
it less likely [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].
b. When biased legislators make it harder [for certain communities to vote], they arealso less likely to serve alongside lawmakers from those communities - thus
making it less likely [for a coalitional experience to change their biases]
c . This has caused tension and in some cases violence which increases distrust
between the two groups and makes it less likely [for an infected migrant worker
to seek out medical care from, or to cooperate with, Saudi officials]
d. Whether it was Dodd-Frank or pushing card check or cap and trade or higher
taxes, higher marginal tax rates, all these things, Obamacare, all of them make itless likely [for a business to grow].
e. Romney said Obama's policies have “made it harder for entrepreneurs to start abusiness” and have " made it less likely [for businesses like this to hire more
people]f. Just as the openness of American society has made it less likely [for Jews to marryother Jews], so, too, it is less likely that Jews will give primarily to Jewish causes.
g. One of the sources I talked to said as soon as this becomes public, it is probably
less likely [for it to happen].
h. She knew it wasn't likely [for a married man to leave his wife for another woman].
i. It can be, but the effort, of course, is to create a climate that makes it less likely[for people to convert powder to crack]j. I think that Alan Greenspan made a terrible mistake when he raised interest rates
over and over again, increasing the cost of homes, of automobiles, making it lesslikely [for new businesses to start]k. For one thing, we have lots of horizontal stabilization that will -- that makes theaircraft more stable, less likely [for the pilot to get into pilot-induced
oscillations]; and secondly because we can reduce collective pitch in flight.
175

l. “But that,” said Glen kindly, “would make it even less likely [for someone to breakin], wouldn't it? If they could tell somebody's home?”m. In the end, each investment decision, each positive news story, each company
statement gave Bre-X a tougher veneer of legitimacy and made it less likely [forthe next person in line to question the underlying facts], said Toronto Stock
Exchange President Fleming and others who followed the company.
n . That's what the research is showing because what happens is it diffuses the
responsibility amongst a number of people, making it less likely [for one
individual to act].
o. The EPA and the Justice Department believe that this threat will make it less likely[for a member of the regulated community to consider willful or calculated
evasion of the environmental laws]
p. Early signs of weakness would make it less likely [for Dirksen to join as an ally
down the road].
(175) BNC
Identification of polymer samples can be made by making use of the 'finger-print'
region, where it is least likely [for one polymer to exhibit exactly the same spectrum
as another]

6.4.3.1.3.2. Likely with Positive Modifiers
In the following sentences, likely with the for complement is modified by a positive modifier
more:(176) a. One issue debated was whether playing professional football made it more likely[for men to abuse their families]b. Sternheimer says birthday parties in America didn't become popular until the early
20th century, when medical advances made it more likely [for children to survive
illnesses in infancy and childhood].
(COCA)
176

In (176a), the complementizer for expresses a feeling of “surprise” towards the situation referred
to by its complement. In the same way, the governing predicate more likely expresses a subjective
emotion as well as the meaning that the unfavorable situation denoted by the for complement ismore realistic. The complementizer for in (176b), on the other hand, expresses a feeling of“surprise” or “praise” of the situation. A feeling of “surprise” is also expressed by the governing
predicate more likely.
The following are similar examples (underline is mine):(177) COCA
a. It's more likely [for you to see a male who says “Hey!”] and females are like "Don't do that, Billy " said in a weak, whiney voice.
b. This space is removed from the landscape, which makes it more likely [for people
to feel safe here].
c. And because many proposed state voucher programs are aimed at " at-risk " ortroubled youth, presumably this would make it more likely [for Christian reform
schools to be involved].
d. The structure makes it more likely [for them to stick with their workout routines],
experts say.
e. Sternheimer says birthday parties in America didn't become popular until the early
20th century, when medical advances made it more likely [for children to survive
illnesses in infancy and childhood].
f. It is this twin dynamic that makes it more likely [for many to tilt away from modern,pluralistic secularism toward a religious political system].
g. Because learning tasks are less complicated in the primary grades, implementing
the use of technology at this stage could help teachers of students with visual
impairments to become more knowledgeable about technology and make it more
likely [for the teachers to use more technology at earlier ages with students whoread braille].
h. In the Calender, it would be much more likely [for the object to be dropped], and[for the grammatical subject of the new stanza to appear forthwith].
177

i . Because such evaluation involves effort, it is easier and often more likely [forpeople to ignore, reinterpret, or reject competing beliefs rather than to reorganize
their belief systems].
j . Despite this overall level of change, however, it does appear that learnercharacteristics make it more likely [for certain students to change their beliefs].
k . Participants were instructed to indicate, by checking the appropriate box, if aparticular item made it more likely [for an individual to develop osteoporosis], lesslikely [for an individual to develop osteoporosis], had nothing to do with
developing osteoporosis, or that the participant was not sure of the correct response.
l. In Arnheim's view, it is more likely [for a painter to create visual tensions], but forphotographers, the reality of a physical subject comprises the total course of its
existence in time.
m. One of the things that you found is that it's a lot more likely [for a mother to either
stop working altogether or to reduce her workload having a second child thanhaving a first].
n . The format of the UCT, not directly asking participants to endorse sensitive
behaviors, makes it more likely [for persons to admit to not using a condom andnot using a condom when drinking].
o. There have also been changes in social and economic conditions that may havemade it more likely [for women to consider other women as sex partners].
p. In fact, because online usage has jumped dramatically in the past few years, it's now
estimated to be about 20 times more likely [for the average user's computer tocontract a virus].
q. When you compare the races of the victims of homicides, white, Latino, and black,you find that it is more likely [for the crime to go unpunished if the victim was aminority victim]?
r. By contrast, it is very likely [for brothers to live in the same neighborhood], and,
therefore, [for patrilateral parallel cousin marriages to be between neighbors].
s. The countries of the Ngbandi and Ngombe lie in about the same latitude as the
Gabon estuary; but since the rivers run in a southwestward direction, it would have178

been more likely [for spears from that region to be acquired by a European on thelower Zaire].
t. It's more likely [for swimsuit weather to grace Chicago in January] than it is [forbaseball's most color player to be left alone].
u. Consequently, as shown in Table 3, it was approximately 27 times more likely [forrespondents not to identify repeating the lesson] (i.e., " no current no ideal "), as
compared to " yes current, no ideal, " " no current, yes ideal, " and " yes current,
yes ideal.
v. So, as shown in Table 3, although it was always somewhat more likely [for teachers
not to identify increasing practice] (i.e., " no current, no ideal "), that likelihood
was disproportionately high in the assisted idea generation format.
w. Since Reagan and Bush appointees began to dominate his court, Reinhardt says, it
has become more and more likely [for civil cases to be thrown out because of
missed filing deadlines].
(178) BNC
a. Had a more diverse stock existed it would have been more likely [for a less familiar
tale to have been selected].
b. The performance of modern gliders makes it much easier and more likely [for apilot to fly himself into a potential death trap unless he uses his imagination or has
already learned to have a healthy respect for the elements].

6.4.3.1.3.3. Likely with Equality ModifiersConsider the following sentences. In the following sentences, the matrix predicate likely withequality expression just as co-occurs with the for complement:(179) a. In his view, it was just as likely [for News Feed to highlight fake news about
Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters
ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.
b. We have to get to the point where it's just as likely [for a woman or a person of179

color to be the president], and we just get used to that, get past it.
(COCA)
In (179a), the complementizer for expresses a feeling of “surprise” towards the situation referred
to by its complement. Furthermore, the matrix predicate just as likely also expresses an emotional
attitude towards the situation by regarding it as a dangerous inclination. In (179b), thecomplementizer for is used to refer to the situation that a woman or a person of color to be thepresident. At the time of speaking, the situation in question had generally been regarded as
unrealistic since a woman was not at the time nor ever had been president of the U.S. In this case,however, the speaker does not regard the situation as something surprising or rare, but rather, sheregards it as highly realistic, and so expressing a feeling of “disdain” towards it by using thecomplementizer for. At the same time, he expresses his subjective, emotive opinion about therealistic situation by using just as likely in the matrix clause.
The followings are similar examples (underline is mine):(180) COCA
a. But it is just as likely [for the sounds of children's musical play to remain outside
the realm of lessons organized by teachers], even when music making is both anatural and necessary part of childhood.
b. In terms of character performance, which is what I'm always interested in, I think
it is just as likely [for it to be good on television].
(181) BNC
However, it is equally likely [for Dwarf troops to wear clothes or uniforms they
have devised themselves].

6.4.3.1.4. Parallelism between the Complementizer For and Emotive Should
The above sections revised Wierzbicka’s (1988) claim that the for complement can beanalyzed in terms of “expectability” and states “surprise” and “disdain” as a emotion expressedby the complementizer for. The present section will compare the complementizer for with180

emotive should and discuss the parallelism between the two.
As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.2., Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the for complement andemotive should are parallel to each other in that they both express “unexpectability”. According
to her analysis, (182a) and (182b) are semantically parallel and imply (183):(182) a. It was interesting/amusing/funny that X should have done Z.
b. It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.
(Wierzbicka (1988:130-131))(183) one wouldn't have thought this: this will happen
Emotive should usually occurs in a that complement after certain emotive predicates such as
odd, glad, a pity, incredible, and impossible. It is regarded as a marker which shows that thewhole complement is construed emotionally. Sawada (2016) proposes the following principle onemotional should:(184) “Principle of Psychological Conflict” :English emotive should … indicates that the proposition p (i.e. situation or world)
deviates from the evaluation subject’s assumption about p.
(Sawada (2016: 291))
He argues that emotive should indicates that the situation referred to is construed as “hard toaccept”, “hard to expect”, or “hard to bring about”.
(185) It’s odd [that the letter should mention the 21st of the month].
(A. Christie, The ABC Murders) (Underline is mine)
In (185), emotive should is used in the that complement after a emotive expression odd.
According to his analysis, in this case, emotive should expresses that it was unexpected for theconceptualizer to assume that the situation in question would occur. The notion of “unexpectation”
here is parallel to “surprise” as mentioned in detail in Section 6.4.3.1.1. This is because these two
notions indicate that a situation deviates from the conceptualizer’s assumption about it. Therefore,a that complement with emotive should is parallel to a for complement expressing a feeling of181

“surprise”:(186) It’s odd [for the letter to mention the 21st of the month].
Emotive should as well as the complementizer for is also used to express a feeling of “disdain”.
In the following sentence, an emotive predicate surprising is negated:(187) It is not surprising, therefore, [that we should find a sharp contrast in style and outlook
between Maugham’s early and late work].

(Behre (1955: 71)

According to Sawada (2016), (187) expresses a calm judgment of the situation referred to by thethat complement, but not surprising is used to express a feeling of “disdain” towards the situation.
Thus, the use of emotive should is not unnatural here. Emotive should in this sentence is parallelto the complementizer for in that it expresses a feeling of “disdain”.
The following are similar examples (underline is mine):(188) a. It is wrong [for you to blame him].
b. It is wrong [that you should blame him].
(Shogakkan Progressive-Japanese Dictionary, Forth Edition)
It follows from the above discussion that the validity of the complementizer for as an emotive
modalizer is guaranteed by the present claim that it is semantically parallel to another emotive
modalizer should.

6.4.4. Deontic and Dynamic Modalities
This section will introduce a number of examples where the complementizer for functions asa deontic or dynamic modalizer and argue that it is semantically parallel to should as a
subjunctive substitute.

6.4.4.1. Deontic Modality
The complementizer for can function as a dynamic modality when it occurs after some182

expressions categorized in the subtype of “Desire Type” as shown in Section 6.4.1.3., including
adjectives such as such as urgent, vital, important, essential, and imperative, verbs such as say
and ask, and nouns such as order, importance, and request:(189) Adjectives
a. … it is urgent [for school personnel to uncover the factors related to suicide].
b. Also, it is vital [for pupils to use modern technology in information gathering].
(COCA) (Underline is mine)c. It's important [for him to be more careful].
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1173)) (Underline is mine)d. It is essential [for the teen to continue to question who is telling the truth andwhom to trust].

(COCA) (Underline is mine)e. Tell your mother it's imperative for me to reach the other side of the river.
(BNC) (Underline is mine)(190) Verbs
a. She said [for you all to go in]. (Jespersen (MEG V: 301)) (Underline is mine)b. He asked [for Pat to be interviewed].19(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230)) (Underline is mine)(191) Nouns
a. My parents had but to give me an order [for me to conceive at once some planof disobeying it].

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Underline is mine)b. It is of importance [for him to know, as soon as possible, if what is said should
be taken as a simple positive statement, as a negative statement, as a question,or as a wish].

(Jespersen (MEG VII: 58-59)) (Underline is mine)c. The court denied the defense's request [for a special master to investigate].
(COCA)

19

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230), (190b) is interestingly parallel to He asked
Pat to be interviewed. In the latter, Pat is the object of ask and serves as both the object of therequest and the object of the interview. By contrast, in the former, pat can serve as the object of
the interview but not the object of the request because it does not constitute the object of ask.
183

(189)-(191) express “importance” or “obligation” for the situations denoted by the forcomplements. For example, in (189), by using urgent, vital, important, essential, and imperative,
the speakers indicate that the “importance” or the “obligation” for the situations in question to
occur. In these cases, the complementizer for also expresses the “obligation” of the realization ofthese situations and thus interrelates with the “importance” or “obligation” expressed by thematrix predicates. In other words, there is “a modal harmony” (i.e. “modal concord”) between
the two (see Lars (2019) for detail20).

6.4.4.2. Dynamic Modality
The complementizer for can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs after predicates
which express “desire”, “acceptance”, or “intention”, such as anxious, willing, intend, aim:
(192) a. The Queen is anxious [for the negotiations between our two parties to be concluded
satisfactorily].
b. I'm willing [for people to be critical of us].
(BNC)
c. Yes, our conclusion is that he didn't intend [for there to be any back-channel
communications].21(COCA)

20

Lars (2019: 403) argues that “modal concord” occurs when a single modality is realized as
two modal expressions.
(vii) Possibly this gazebo may have been built by Sir Christopher Wren.
(Lars (2019: 403), Halliday (1970: 328)) (Underline is mine)
In (vii) epistemic modality (i.e. “epistemic possibility” in his term) is realized as two modal
expressions, namely possibly and may. In other words, there is a modal concord between the two.
He insists that a modal concord can be seen in the following five modalities: “epistemic
modality”, “dynamic modality”, “deontic modality” and “emotivity”.
21

The verb intend can very rarely take the combination of “an accusative + the to complement”,
but American English prefers using the for complement. According an native American English
speaker, for example, prefer (ix) to (viii):(viii) I intend [him to help me with drafting the proposal].
(ix) I intend [for him to help me with drafting the proposal].
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230) argues that there is no semantic difference between the
two.
184

d. I'm aiming [for my team to win].

(Bresnan (1972: 80)

All the sentences in (192) indicate that the future situations referred to by the for complement
constitute the object of desire, acceptance, or intention denoted by the matrix predicates anxious,
willing, intend, and aim. In the above sentences, the situations referred to by the for complement
are “not-yet factual”, and the complementizer for functions to express “desire”, “acceptance”, or“intention”.
Furthermore, the complementizer for can also be regarded as a dynamic modalizer when it isused alone to express “purpose” (= (193a)) or when it is used in the complement position toexpress “use” or “intention” (= (193b) and (193c)):(193) a. In order [for him to maintain interest] he needed to work in short spurts.

(BNC)

b. This book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away].
(Bresnan (1972: 80))c. The intention is [for all 16 teams to come back for the 2010 season].

(COCA)The situation referred to by the coplementizer for in (193a) constitutes the purpose of the action
denoted in the main clause, while, in (193b), the situation constitutes the utility of the main clausesubject this book. Besides, in (193c), the situation is expressed as the object of the “intention”,
which is evident from the fact that the for complement is in apposition to the subject the intention.
Consider the following sentence:(194) It is possible [for me to read the book in a day].
(194) indicates “I am able to read the book in a day”. Here, the complementizer for itself
functions as a dynamic modalizer which express “possibility” (or “ability”), and shows its
interrelationship with the matrix predicate possible which expresses “possibility”. In this case,the modality, referred to as “possibility”, is expressed not only by the complementizer for but
also the matrix predicate possible. Considering these discussion, it should be concluded that, in(194), the modality in question is expressed by both possible and for and that there is a modal
concord between the two (see the discussion in Section 6.3.10.2.).
Also, consider the following sentences. In the sentences, the modality “possibility” is185

expressed when some expression of degree, such as too or enough, are used:(195) a. The case was too heavy [for a child to carry].
b. He spoke too quickly [for me to understand].
c. The case is light enough [for me to carry].
d. He spoke slowly enough [for everyone to understand].
(Thompson and Martinet (19864: 223-224))
In (195), the complementizer for functions as a dynamic modalizer after too and enough. This isdemonstrated by the fact that these complements can be paraphrased with the that complementwith the dynamic modalizer can (or could) expressing “possibility”:(196) a. The case was too heavy [that a child couldn’t carry it].
b. He spoke too quickly [that I couldn’t understand].
c. The case is so light [that I can carry].
d. He spoke so slowly [that everyone could understand].
(Cf. Thompson and Martinet (19864: 223-224))
Finally, observe the following sentence. It seems that the modality “possibility” can be
expressed even when the for complement lacks the governing predicate:(197) Well, it is not [for me to judge you], ...
(A. C. Doyle, “The Boscombe Valley Mystery”)(197) indicates “I’m not able to judge you” (i.e. “I’m not in a position to judge you”). Here thecomplementizer for functions as a dynamic modalizer to express “possibility”, while the mainclause it is not constitutes an idiomatic construction to express “disability”. It should beconcluded from the above discussion that there is a modal harmony between the main clause andthe complementizer for.

6.4.4.3. Parallelism between the Complementizer For and the Modal Should as a
186

Subjunctive Substitute
The above sections divided the functions of the complementizer for into the following: (i) toexpress “obligation” and (ii) to express “desire” or “possibility”. The present section comparesfor with should as a subjunctive substitute and argues for the parallelism between the two.
As mentioned in Swan (2017) and Leech (20043), should as a subjunctive substitute is used in
the that complement after the expressions which express “desire”, “suggestions”, or “plans”,
such as suggest, propose, and insist, as an expression of asking for the realization of the situationreferred to by the complement:(198) a. It is important [that there should be a fire escape].
b. I'm anxious [that the party should be a success].
c. His idea is [that we should travel in separate cars].
(Swan (2017: 146)) (Underline is mine)d. The judges have decided / decreed / insisted / voted [that the existing law should(Leech (20043: 78)) (Underline is mine)

be maintained].

Furthermore, as pointed out in Leech (20043) and Ando (2005), should as a subjunctive substitutediffers from emotive should in that, in only the former case, bare infinitive can be used insteadof should + verb. The difference in acceptability of the following sentences supports this claim((199) corresponds to (198), and (200) to the sentences with emotive should):(199) a. It is important [that there {be / *is} a fire escape].
b. I'm anxious [that the party {be / *is} a success].
c. His idea is [that he {travel / *travels} in separate cars].
d. The judges have decided / decreed / insisted / voted [that the existing law {be / *is}maintained].
(200) a. It’s surprising [that she {*say / says / said} that sort of thing to you].
(Swan (20174: 359))
b. It is interesting [that the play {*be / should be} a huge success].
(Leech (20043: 118))
187

The complementizer for as a deontic or dynamic modalizer is parallel to should as a subjunctive
substitute in that they both refer to “obligation”, “desire”, or “intention” for the realization of thesituation denoted by the complement. According to Swan (20174), the only difference between
the that complement with should as a subjunctive substitute and the for complement is that theformer is more formal than the latter. It follows from this explanation that it can be predicted that,
despite the slight difference in style, (198) can be changed into (201). This prediction iscorroborated by the fact that the following sentences are acceptable as correct paraphrases of(198):(201) a. It is important [for there to be a fire escape].
b. I'm anxious [for the party to be a success].
c. His idea is [for us to travel in separate cars].
d. The judges have decided / decreed / insisted / voted [for the existing law to be
maintained].
All the above sentences, as well as those in (198), indicate that the future situations referred toby the complement are the object of desire.
The same paraphrase can apply to all the for complements in (193) except for (193b)22:(202) a. In order [that he should maintain interest] he needed to work in short spurts.
b. The intention is [that all 16 teams should come back for the 2010 season].
Furthermore, the following sentences support the parallelism between the two. The following
example can be paraphrased with the for complement:(203) a. We invited her husband too, in order [that he should not feel left out].
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187))
b. They met on a Saturday in order [that everybody should be free to attend].
(Swan (20174: 652))

22

The reason why the paraphrase does not apply to (193b) (= This book is [for you to amuse
yourself with while I'm away].) is because the that complement cannot function as “purpose” or“use”.
188

It can be concluded from the above discussions that the complementizer for is parallel toshould as a subjunctive substitute when it functions as either a deontic or dynamic modalizer.

6.4.5. Counterfactual Modality
As mentioned in various previous studies, the for complement is often used in imaginative
contexts. The following are the quotations from the previous studies introduced in Section 6.3:
For example, Jespersen (MEG V) states as follows:(204) It should be noted that in nearly all sentences the combination of for and an infinitive
denotes some vague possibility or something imagined.
(Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Italics is original)
Wierzbicka (1988) supports this claim to postulate the following semantic formula as for the forcomplement. The following underlined part indicates that the situation referred to by the forcomplement is a generic situation:(205) I am ashamed for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married. ⇒when I imagine this: I know this:
this will happen to someone [X will see Y]
I think this: this will be bad, I will feel ashamed(Wierzbicka (1988: 112)) (Underline is mine)
In addition, Bresnan (1972) argues for the following (here, a “modal” situation refers to a“generic” situation rather than a factual situation):(206) …which [the for complement] is open to, and may even require, a “modal” context.
(Bresnan (1972: 72))
Furthermore, Spears (1973) refers to the feature of the for complement as “habituality”. Hereagain, it seems possible to regard the term “habituality” as equivalent to “generic”:(207) … all the FOR complements of significant-class predicates make reference not to one
189process, but a class of processes, and the embedding predicate assigns a property to
any process that qualifies for membership in that class. This property of these FOR
complements will be termed habitual aspect.

(Spears (1973: 634))

These claims are common in that the situation introduced by the complementizer for refers to a
generic situation rather than a single fact. This clearly explains the reason why the forcomplement, but not the that complement, can co-occur with always (For the sake of
convenience, (57b) is requoted as (208) below):(208) It's always rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].
(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)
The reason why (208) is acceptable is because there is a modal harmony between “habituality”
expressed by the complementizer for and the adverb always.
As mentioned in Section 6.3.7., according to Quirck et al. (1985:1063), the for complement isparallel to a conditional clause introduced by if:(209) This putative feature of the infinitive clause may often be paraphrased by a conditionalclause.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

It can be concluded from the above claims that the complementizer for functions as acounterfactual modalizer. For example, the for complement in the following sentences refers tocounterfactual situations and the complementizer for modally harmonizes with counterfactual
would in the matrix clause:(210) a. It would be catastrophic for the economy [for there to be a sudden massive influxof women into the job market].

(Bresnan (1972: 77))b. It would be unwise [for you to marry him].

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

c. [For you to hear him talk], you would take him for a genius.
d. [For you to have seen him again] would have pained me.
(Cf. Jespersen (MEG V: 166))
The claim that the situations referred to by the for complement in (210) are all counterfactual is
190

supported by the fact that they can be paraphrased with counterfactual conditional clauses. In thefollowing sentences, the conditional clauses as counterfactual modalizers modally harmonize
with would in the matrix clause:(211) a. It would be catastrophic for the economy [if there were a sudden massive influx of
women into the job market].

(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 77)) (Underline is mine)b. It would be unwise [if you were to marry him].
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)c. [If you heard him talk], you would take him for a genius.
d. [If you had seen him again], it would have pained me.
(Cf. Jespersen (MEG V: 166))
Observe the following sentence:(212) { *[For John to eat cabbage] / [That John eats cabbage] } means that he is of low birth.
(Bresnan (1972: 85))
Bresnan (1972: 85) claims that the for complement is unacceptable here because the verbs suchas mean, prove, imply, and entail all require a factual situation as their complement. Thus, it will
be acceptable if the complementizer that is chosen.
Bresnan’s (1972) claim, however, should be revised in terms of the present analysis: the forcomplement in (212) is unacceptable because it does not modally harmonize with epistemic
verbs mean, prove, imply, and entail. However, it may still be impossible to explain why (213)is acceptable:(213) [For John to eat cabbage] would mean that he is of low birth.
(Bresnan (1972: 85)) (Underline is mine)
In the present case, the complementizer for does not modally harmonize with mean, but rather,it harmonizes with the counterfactual modal would. The following is a similar example:(214) [For Mary to giggle a lot] would indicate that she is silly.

191

In (214), the complementizer for co-occurs with an epistemic verb indicate, but the wholesentence is regarded as acceptable because there is a modal harmony between the
counterfactuality expressed by the complementizer for and by counterfactual.

6.5. Conclusions
This chapter put its focus on the complementizer for and the for complement and demonstrated
the following three claims:(215) The complementizer for belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.
(216) The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into emotive
modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.
(217) “Non-epistemicity Condition for the Complementizer for”：
The complementizer for cannot express epistemic modality
According to the present study, the classification of modality expressed by the complementizer
for can be schematized in the following way:。
*Epistemic
Propositional

Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)(218) Modality
Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose,
Possibility)
Event
Deontic (Obligation)
The classification shown in (2) differs from that of the to complement shown in (219) in that theformer lacks epistemic modality (For the sake of convenience, the classification proposed in
Chapter 4 is quoted here as (219)):
192

Epistemic (Thought, Judgment)
Propositional

Counterfactual (Hypothetical)
Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)(219) Modality
Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose,
Possibility)
Event
Deontic (Obligation)
As mentioned in Chapter 4, notice that the infinitive marker to can function as an epistemic
modalizer when it co-occurs with epistemic verbs such as believe, report, suspect, consider, know,
think, and conclude. The following sentences clearly show the difference between thecomplementizer for and the infinitive marker to (the underlines are all mine):(220) a. I believe {John to be beaten / *for John to be beaten}.
b. I reported {John to be absent today / *for John to be absent today}.
c . I suspect {him to be hiding in the shrubbery / *for him to be hiding in the
shrubbery}.
d. I consider {myself to be cleverer than Fred / *for myself to be clever than Fred}.
e. I know {Mary to have raced giraffes in Kenya / *for Mary to have raced giraffes
in Kenya}.
(Cf. Dixon (1991: 223))
f. They thought {him to be a spy / *for him to be a spy}.

(Cf. Swan (20174: 664))

g. From his explanation, I conclude {him to be right / *for him to be right}.
(Cf. Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fifth Edition)
If we take the above distinction into consideration, it is clear that the traditional analysis that,
where the infinitive marker to exist, the complementizer for also exists either implicitly or
explicitly and that the complementizer for is mechanically introduced to explicitly express the
subject of the infinitive. The presence/absence of the complementizer for depends on whether
there is a modal harmony with each other: It can be concluded that the reason why the193complementizer for does not occur when the infinitive marker to functions as an epistemic
modalizer is because there cannot be a modal harmony between the two.
The present claim that the complementizer for belongs to the category of non-epistemic
modalizer and that a for complement is a “construction” can be the sufficient semantic
explanation to a number of linguistic facts which otherwise cannot be explained under the
traditional hypothesis that the complementizer for is a meaningless marker which is introduced
to explicitly express the subject of the infinitive.
First, as shown in the following sentences, the for complement can refer to future situations
because the complementizer for functions as either a deontic or dynamic modalizer to refer tothe situation as the object of “obligation”, “desire”, “acceptance”, or “intention”. These notions
can only apply to future situations (For the sake of convenience, (4) is requoted as (221) below)(221) a. We got to the church ﬁrst, and when the four-wheeler drove up we waited [for him
to step out], but he never did, and when the cabman got down from the box andlooked there was no one there!

(A. C. Doyle, “A Case of Identity”)

b. They planned [for the mayor to arrive on the following day].
(Quirk et al. (1985: 1194))c. It’s important [for the meeting to start on time].

(Swan (20053: 266))

d. The hunters encircled the deer in order [for the animal not to escape].
(Declerck (1991: 478))
e. The book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I’m away].
(Bresnan (1972: 79))
The for complement in the following sentences refers to future situations because it functions
here as an emotive modalizer to express a certain emotion towards a future situation (For thesake of convenience, (168a) and (171a) are requoted as (222a) and (222b) respectively):(222) a. … it is very unlikely [for two very different methods to have same bias].
b. And in the process, he is undermining the Democratic process in America and heis making it less likely [for people to vote in the future].
(COCA)194

By contrast, the for complement can refer to non-future situations because it can also function
as an emotive modalizer to express a subjective emotion towards a certain situation in the past
(For the sake of convenience, (5) and (170) are requoted as (223a) and (223b) respectively):(223) a. Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)] ?
(Bresnan (1972: 82))b. It was no very unusual thing [for Mr. Lestrade, of Scotland Yard, to look in upon
us of an evening], and has visits were welcome to Sherlock Holmes, for they
enabled him to keep in touch with all that was going on at the police head-quarters.
(A. C. Doyle, “The Adventure of the Six Napoleons”)
The above facts cannot be explained at all under the analysis that complementizer for has noinherent meaning.
Second, the acceptance of the for complement varies depending on what kind of matrix
predicates are chosen. This fact can be explained by the presence/absence of a modal harmony
between the two. Thus, predicates such as right, wrong, a sin, illegal, and unfair are compatible
with the for complement because there is a modal harmony between these predicates and for (Forthe sake of convenience, (7) is requoted as (224) below):(224) a. It is right [for God to punish sinners].
b. It is wrong [for there to be such inequalities].
c. It's a sin [for you to do that].
d. It is illegal [for these houses to be occupied].
e. I consider it unfair [for them to win all the time].
(Bresnan (1972: 79, 83)) (Underline is mine)
On the other hand, predicates such as true, false, clear, believe, know, and infer are
incompatible with the for complement because these predicates does not express any emotion
and thus does not harmonize with the complementizer for (For the sake of convenience, (8) is
requoted as (225) below):(225) a. *It is true [for God to exist].
195b. *It is false [for there to be only finitely many primes].
c. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].
d. *I { believe (with good reason) / know (for a fact) / assume (on these grounds) /infer (from the above) } [for them to win unfairly].
(Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)
Furthermore, another explanation could be that there is a semantic crash between these predicates
and the complementizer for as a non-epistemic modalizer because they do not refer to thesubject’s cognition.
Third, the acceptability of the for complement also varies depending on whether the matrix
clause is in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically expressed by thecounterfactual modal auxiliary would. This is because for as a counterfactual modalizer modally
harmonizes with the hypothetical modal would. Following this claim, it can be predicted that thefor as a counterfactual modalizer will be compatible with another counterfactual marker. Thisprediction is corroborated by the following sentence:(226) It might be odd [for a man to be chairing a women’s meeting].
(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)
If it is postulated that might in (226) can be paraphrased with perhaps + would, then it is possible
to think that might, as well we would, expresses counterfactuality. Therefore, the reason why(226) is acceptable is because for as a counterfactual modalizer modally harmonizes with thecounterfactuality expressed by might. The interrelationship between the two can be schematizedin the following way (MH is the abbreviation of “Modal Harmony”):(227) It might be odd [for a man to be chairing a women’s meeting].
perhaps would(MH)
Consider, furthermore, the following. The following schema below shows that for modally
harmonizes with counterfactual could in the main clause:196

(228) [For John to be operated by the excellent doctor] could save him.
would

can

(MH)
Finally, observe the following sentences:(229) a. [For her to have known chemistry] would have indicated that she was a witch.
b. [That she knew chemistry] would have indicated that she was a witch (if she hadn’t
died during the poison test)(Bresnan (1972: 19))
In (229a), there is a modal harmony between the complementizer for and the counterfactual
modal would, while, in (229b), the that complement refers to a fact, and thus there is no modal
harmony. In the present case, would modally harmonizes with if clause in the bracket (=subjunctive past perfect) rather than the that clause. These facts could not be explained at all if itwould be postulated that the complementizers have no inherent meanings.
The above discussions lead to the conclusion as follows:(230) There must be a “modal harmony” between the complementizer for and the matrix
elements.
This chapter argued against the traditional claim that the complementizer for is a grammaticalcategory with no inherent meaning and demonstrated that (i) the complementizer for belongs to
the category of modalizer, (ii) the for complement is an independent “construction”, (iii) themodality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into emotive modality, deontic
modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality, and that (iv) the complementizer forcannot express epistemic modality.
We hope that the conclusions of this chapter will make a substantial contribution to the areaof studies on the infinitive as well as on modality in that they emphasize the necessity to reanalyze
the complementizer for as a modalizer.

197

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Research
7.1. Conclusion
This dissertation discussed meanings and functions of the infinitive marker to and thecomplementizer for to argue for the following two points from the viewpoint of semantics andCognitive Grammar:(1) The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.
(2) The complementizer for belongs to the category of “non-epistemic modalizer”.
Chapter 1, after adducing some mysterious phenomena in infinitival constructions, presented
the aim of this dissertation: to argue that the infinitive marker to and the complementizer for canbe regarded as different types of modalizer. Furthermore, we stated that the present approach
adopts the “semantic approach” in Wierzbicka’s (1988) terms and that most of the supporting
data are adduced from corpora such as British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus ofContemporary American English (COCA), and from novels by Agatha Christie.
Chapter 2 introduced essentials of some selected previous studies which are significant to thepresent dissertation and discussed the relationship between the infinitive and modality.
Chapter 3 discussed Wierzbicka’s (1988) analysis, which we regard as one of the mostsuggestive researches in this dissertation, and clarified some problems which cannot be solved
by her analysis.
Chapter 4 reconsidered Declerck’s (2011: 27) definition of modality as shown in (8):(3) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual
world.
His definition is noteworthy in that the notion of modality is expanded and many expressions
other than modals or modal adverbs are regarded as belonging to modalizers. By reconsidering
his definition of modality, we demonstrated the following two points:(4) The infinitive marker to belongs to the category of modalizer.

198

(5) The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into the following
types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, andcounterfactual modality.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 also put its focus on the interrelationship between the infinitive marker
to and the matrix elements and demonstrated the following principle:(6) There must be a “modal harmony” between the infinitive marker to and the matrix
elements.
Chapter 5 put its focus on the infinitive of result, in which, based on the traditional analysis interms of “realization”, “intentionality”, and “predictability”, we proposed Transparentizing
Phenomena of the matrix verb followed by the infinitive marker to in order to explain why the
resultative infinitive is interpreted as nonfuture:(7) Transparentizing Phenomena:
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker to is relatively weakened, andthe elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, negation,
participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.
Chapter 5 concluded that the fact that the infinitive marker to does not function as a modalizer is
attributed to the fact that the infinitive marker to becomes transparent and loses its originalfunction to introduce the complement.
Chapter 6 focused on the relationship of the complementizer for and its complement sentence(i.e. the for complement) with modality and demonstrated the following two hypotheses:(8) A. The complementizer for belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.
B. The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into thefollowing types: emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, andcounterfactual modality.
Finally, we demonstrated the following principle:

199

(9) There must be a “modal harmony” between the complementizer for and the matrix
elements.
Where are original points of this dissertation? We can point out the following four points:
First, this dissertation put its focus on the meanings of the infinitive marker to and thecomplementizer for as well as their interrelationship with modality and demonstrated with thatthe infinitive marker to and the complementizer for functions as modalizers and that an epistemic
modality is not included in the modality expressed by the complementizer for.
Second, this dissertation clarified that the traditional, grammar-oriented analysis that theinfinitive is composed of the complementizer for and the infinitive marker to and that for is
optionally added (or omitted) cannot give a sufficient explanation to all linguistic facts.
Third, the present dissertation focused on the resultative infinitive, which has not been fully
discussed so far, and gave a semantic and cognitive explanation to the grammatical phenomena
and its interpretation process by explicitly schematizing the process under the notion of“transparentizing of the infinitive marker to”.
Fourth, the present dissertation is expected to make a substantial contribution to the area ofstudies on modality in that it clarified that the essential of modality is to express a construal or amental attitude towards a situation (i.e. proposition or event) or its part rather than merelyreferring to a nonfactual situation.

7.2. Future Research
There still remain issues that deserve due consideration in the future:
The first issue is related to the gerundive marker -ing. The function of the gerund marker -ing
has long been analyzed by comparing it with the infinitive marker to. For example, Bolinger(1968) states that the following sentence are all infelicitous because there is no temporal or
locational reference:(10) a. ?It's nice resting.
b. ?lt' s easy working.
c. ?lt is fun playing.
200

d. ?It 's hard guessing.
e. ?It was a mistake waiting.
(Bolinger (1968: 125))If we take into consideration his analysis, we may be able to state that the gerundive marker -ing
can function to express a construal of a concrete situation rather than of a generic one.
Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988: 24) states as follows:
In my view, all this is insightful, and true, but it is not sufficient to explain why, for example,
one cannot say:
*He imagined to be blind.
or why one can say:He imagined being blind.
Surely, Jespersen's description "imaginative, unreal" does apply here, and yet TO cannot be
used, whereas ING can. Does Bolinger's description "projected" apply here? Of this, one
cannot be sure, since one doesn't really know what exactly Bolinger meant by this term. In
any case, the distinction between "something projected versus something actually done" isnot sufficient to explain why one CAN say:
He managed to do it.
Nor is it sufficient to explain the contrast between manage and succeed:*He succeeded to do it.
He succeeded (*managed) in doing it.
We would like to leave the interesting problem such as in what cases -ing is used or in whatcases to complement is used, how general Transparentizing Phenomena are, and whether -ing
can be regarded as a kind of modalizer for a future research.

201

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