Project COVID-19: Cremation or Burial

Between Piety and Safety:
The Question of Muslim Compliance with State and Religious Authority
During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Hisae Nakanishi
Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University

1. Introduction
The outbreak and spread of COVID-19 had dramatically impacted the globe. The
pandemic is still developing at the time of this writing (February 7, 2021). Except forgigantic American companies, GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon), most of
the world's firms soured in their business. Economic conditions are worsening. One of themost direct reasons for economic recession is that social distancing has become a universal
principle for avoiding public health risks.1 In other words, the pandemic situation is a socalled global humanitarian crisis.2
Like other religious communities, Muslim communities have faced many
challenges after the outbreak of the pandemic. As social distancing is imposed, orencouraged as a preventive measure to the spread of the pandemic, how to perform
religious rituals and practices became a challenge. This problem is particularly the casewith Muslims.
Muslims share a sense of community and bondage through religious rituals,ceremonies, charity activities, and so forth. Religious and cultural identity is manifested
among Muslims through their collective and religious practices. They pray in the mosque,often in the plurality. They celebrate the break of fasting by enjoying Iftar (evening mealin the month of Ramadan) with family or community members. They make a pilgrimage
to Mecca, where Muslims worldwide get together, performing various rituals collectively.
Every state should ensure "the right of all persons to worship or assemble inconnection with a religious or belief." Many human rights protocols and international
conventions recognize it. The Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/40(paragraph 4 (d)), Human Rights Council resolution 6/37 (paragraph 9(g)), and General
Assembly resolution 65/211 (paragraph 12 (g)) all stipulate such a right. 3 Here, the20

Hisae Nakanishi: Between Piety and Safety

question is how religious rights (or the right to worship) and the right to life, mainly life
safety, can be compatible in the real world.
Amid the pandemic, governments have taken different policies and measures.
Some measures are legal, and others are in the realm of recommendations.4 The Muslim
communities in the world reacted to such government measures.5 Some of them compliedwith the regulations, and other Muslims ignored restrictions on how they practice Islam.
In the process of their compliance and defiance, Muslims debated much about how
they could perform Islamic prayers and funerals.6 Should daily group prayer and Friday
mass prayer, in particular, be restricted or suspended under the pandemic situation? DoMuslims need to change their way of conducting funerary rites to avoid contagion? Whohas the authority to make these decisions?
Among these issues, this paper will draw attention to the Friday congregational
player's question, as this is one of the most significant deeds for Muslims. This paper
illustrates how state and religious authorities responded to the challenge of the COVID19 pandemic in the first two months after the first infection was found in Iran andIndonesia. How did each authority restrict congregational prayers? Who has the power toissue preventive policies and measures that are convincing to the Muslims? Thesequestions are addressed in this study.

2. The Question of Authority
Why does this study address the question of authority in Muslim majoritarian states? Thisis because one of the representative authorities is the ulama (religious leaders) thatgenerally plays a significant role in Muslims' social life. The position of the ulama varies
depending on the state's relationship to the religion of Islam. In most countries whereMuslims live, whether they are majoritarian or minority, the ulama is often a community
leader and does not have much political power. However, when it comes to interpreting
the Quran and/or the Islamic law that Muslims refer to for their practice of Islam, Muslims
often seek advice from the ulama and listen to them. In this sense, what the ulama says orif they issue a religious decree (fatwa) may matter more to the Muslims than what thegovernment orders to its citizen as long as it is Islam's question.
Muslims today are ubiquitous. They live mainly in Asia, the Middle East, Central
Asia, and Russia. Nevertheless, they also live in the United States and Europe. For
example, more than 16 million Muslims live in Europe. The study takes up two cases,

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Project COVID-19: Cremation or Burial

Indonesia and Iran.
There are two similarities between Iran and Indonesia. One is the fact that thenumber of infections in both countries still has not decreased. The other is that bothcountries are the Muslim majority states. However, the significant difference is that Iran'sregime is mainly a theocracy with some elective government elements, while Indonesia isa secular state. Moreover, Indonesia's Muslims are mainly Sunni, while Iran's Islam isShi’i and is the state religion. Despite these differences, taking up these two countries canhighlight the roles of religious leaders in convincing Muslims in their communities, andtherefore contributing or not to the suppression of the pandemic.
As stated above, Iran's system is a theocracy, and thus, the ulama is in theestablishment and wields significant decision-making power. In other words, the ulama
holds much of the state authority, as the Supreme Leader Khamenei holds ultimate state
power. On the other hand, Indonesia is a secular state in which the ulema does not directlyintervene in politics. The comparison between these states will address the impacts ofreligious authorities on their followers' compliance with their religious orders and decrees,
and whether the ulama being within the government like Iran or outside the government
authority like Indonesia matters much to the countries' Muslims.

3. Case Studies: Iran and Indonesia
Iran
After the government’s initial denial of the presence of the coronavirus in Iran in late
January to the middle of February 2020, the first infections came to surface in the holycity of Qom on February 19, 2020. 7 It took a week until the government issued onFebruary 27 the cancelation of Friday prayers in Tehran and other major cities.8 Shortly
after this measure, on March 2, representing Iran's electoral part of the government,
President Rouhani admitted that the coronavirus had spread through almost all provinces
and blamed the U.S. for not lifting sanctions, particularly for medicine. Under thesecircumstances, Iranian people expressed their complaints on social media: they critiqued
the government's delay in canceling the congregational prayers. The fact that the outbreakof COVID-19 started at the regime’s power center, Qom, also provoked people’s anger
against the clerical regime.9Moreover, according to a Reuters report, “some religious hardliners, including

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Hisae Nakanishi: Between Piety and Safety

clerics, have dismissed the idea of closing the holy site to prevent the spread of the virus,
arguing that the shrine in Qom is ‘a place for healing’.”10 On the other hand, anothersignificant shrine at Mashad, the Imam Reza Shrine, closed from March 14 until May 25,
2020. 11 Thus, it is interesting to note that the religious leaders' reactions toward thegovernment order were different between Qom and Mashad. Some ulema complied eveninside Qom, and other ulema did not comply with the government’s measures. Thus, theinternal division was manifested.
What about the later development of the government's policy and measures tocombat the pandemic? Headed by President Rohani, the National Headquarters ofAdministrating COVID-19 was established in the middle of March and hosted the Tehran
Meeting on March 16, 2020. The Headquarters consists of the Ministry of Health, Health
Education, the Foreign Ministry, representatives from other health and security-related
government agencies, and the military to develop specific policies and measures to tackle
the COVID-19 situation.
As is pointed out by the media, the Supreme Leader ordered the IRGC to play asignificant role in containing COVID-19 in all provinces. The IRGC is reported to havemobilized 300,000 troops, including from Basij, an auxiliary paramilitary force,nationwide, "to help sanitize public places, direct traffic, and test and treat citizens.”12Thus, the overview of how the Islamic Republic coped with COVID-19, as
analyzed above, indicates that the Supreme Leader's role was decisive. Moreover, the headof the elected government, President Rohani, exercised leadership in executing theurgently established National Headquarters, which took a whole-government approach tocoordinate the different branches of government agencies in restricting the people'sactivities, including the congregational prayers less than a month from the COVID-19
outbreak. According to the Brookings' report, by mid-March, "the restrictions weretightened, including the cancellation of public Nowruz (New Year) celebrations and thefirst-ever cancellation of Friday prayers since the 1979 revolution.”13Indonesia
Indonesia's first case of COVID-19 was found on March 2, 2020. As was pointed out bydifferent sources, the government's response was not so fast. President Joko Widodo firstissued "Presidential Decree No. 11 of 2020” on March 31 as "Determination of COVID19
Public Health Emergency under Law No. 6 of 2018 on Health Quarantine."14 On March5, Health Ministry Spokesman Kianush Jahanpur tweeted a map that showed the23Project COVID-19: Cremation or Burial

coronavirus's spread.
In response to the President’s appeal to the people, the Council of Indonesian
Ulama (MUI), on the next day, March 17, issued a religious decree, “No. 14 (fatwa) on
Organizing Worship under the Conditions of the covid-19 Outbreak.” 15 The fatwa
categorized the regions into two groups and encouraged the areas with a high risk ofcontagion to replace Friday prayers with the Zuhr prayers. For the areas with lowtransmission potential, the decree stated that people are “required to perform the religious
prayer and complying with the provisions of the health protocols.”16
Jakarta's capital city had a higher number of infections than other cities in Marchand April 2020.17 Consequently, Jakarta Governor Aries Baswedan requested its residents
on March 19 to abolish the Friday prayer following the MUI's fatwa. However, the Istiqal
Mosque administrators in Jakarta did not listen to the Governor's request and ordered theMosque's imam to hold the Friday prayer of March 20. On the other hand, there was noserious opposition to the MUI fatwa in general other than a mosque in Bandung. Moreover,by March 27 (Friday), "many mosques no longer held public Friday prayers" (ibid).
However, the story did not end then. As the number of the infections continued toincrease from the middle to the end of March, the MUI attempted to persuade people notto perform Friday prayers by referring to a hadith and interpreting the ongoing COVID19 situation.
Regarding theeffectivenessoftheseriesofencouraging statements,recommendations, and requests made by the President, the Governor of Jakarta, and theMUI, the evaluation seems to be divided. On the one hand, some scholars insist that ulama
can play a vital role in creating a norm in new normalcy. The article written by Permata,Nanda, and Dermawan suggested that local people in West Sumatra followed what theulama preached about the significance of complying with the government’s policy when
they emphasized the need of practicing social distancing in the mass prayers.18
On the other hand, some scholars argued that Indonesia's case under the pandemic
showed the general failure of Muslims' compliance with the government. As Yusuf Hanafi,Ahmad Taufiq et al. argued, Muslims, in general, did not change their attitude or behaviors
in performing the congregational prayer, whether religiously affiliated or secularauthorities issued public health messages.19 Other authors such as Kuipers, Mujani, andPepinsky also demonstrated in their quantitative analysis that any personal or institutional
encouragement had much effect on Indonesian Muslims. Thus, the "Pray From Home"
campaign of the government and the MUI was not successful.

24Hisae Nakanishi: Between Piety and Safety

4. Conclusion
The two case studies analyzed above give us an interesting comparison. In Iran's case, theulama holds the decisive powers in many aspects of governance and is in the establishedgovernment. Nevertheless, the government has faced defiance to their restrictive measuresboth from the ulama's conservative faction and those indifferent to the government'spolitical power. On the other hand, the regime seems to have shown its governancecapability to mobilize different government agencies' segments in creating the national
headquarters to cope with the pandemic situation under the religious leaders' leadership.
The case of Indonesia was different from Iran. Despite the common argument that theulama plays a religious and communal role in Indonesia's civil society, Muslims did notnecessarily listen to the ulama in the local communities and the MUI. The number ofMuslims that continued to attend the Friday prayers did not decline amid the pandemic.
Thus, who issues the restrictive measures toward the religious practices did not matter inIndonesia.
The World Health Organization published an interim guideline entitled “Practicalconsiderations and recommendations for religious leaders and faith-based communities in
the context of COVID-19.” The guideline suggested social distancing during gatheringsand “conducting faith activities remotely and virtually.”20 However, as this study showed,
Muslim majoritarian states in Iran and Indonesia have faced a challenge of how to combat
the spread of COVID-19, which meant the need of discouraging congregational prayers.
In both countries, the pandemic situation at the time of this writing has notimproved. As for Muslim majoritarian states, the question of how to restrict religious
rights and prevent the expansion of the pandemic will continue for some time. Thoughmuch study has emerged within the last year about this subject, many other aspects remain
to explore. Other factors that influence people's behavior in the new normalcy, such as
gender, education level, age, and socioeconomic attributes, should be further examined.
For example, mourning the loss of beloved persons is one of the most fundamental
aspects of humanity. Though the right to mourn involves culturally determined practicesof rituals and ceremonies, public health concerns in the age of COVID-19 dominates tothe extent that the families of deceased victims suffer from deprivation of not conducting
religious and cultural rituals and ceremonies that they ordinarily perform. Due to thispaper's limited space, this study did not deal with this subject. It is certain that more
substantial studies should be conducted on how to strike a balance between religious andcultural rights and the right to life.

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Project COVID-19: Cremation or BurialNotes
1
Solomon Hsiang, Daniel Allen1, Sébastien Annan-Phan1,et al, “The effect of large-scale anticontagion policies on the COVID-19 pandemic,” Nature Vol 584 (13 August 2020), p.262.
2Rebecca M., Jenna Tyler, Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, “Managing Mass Fatalities during COVID-19:
Lesson for Promoting Community Resilience during Global Pandemic,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 5, pp. 856–861, 2020. DOI: 10.1111/puar.13232.
3
International standards on freedom of religion or belief, United Nations Human rights Office ofHigh Commissioner. [https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomreligion/pages/standards.aspx#5] (accessed February 14, 2021)
4Amin, Al-Astewani, “To Open or Close? COVID-19, Mosques and the Role of Religious
authority within the British Muslim Community: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Religions 12: 11,2021. [https://dx.doi.org/ 10.3390/rel12010011] (accessed January 5, 2021)
5
Jardine, R., Wright, J., Samad, Z., Bhutta, Z. A. (2020). Analysis of COVID-19 burden,
epidemiology, and mitigation strategies in Muslim majority countries. Eastern Mediterranean
Health Journal, 26 (10), 1173-1183. [https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_med_car
diol/142] (accessed January 30, 2021)
6
Imran Ahmed, "The Politics of Congregational Prayer: Trust, Public Health, and Religious
Authority in Pakistan," Journal of Law, Religion and State 8 (2020) 251-271.
Doi:10.1163/22124810-2020015.
7
Parisa Badrkhani, “Pros and cons of Covid-19 in Iran: how Coronavirus outbreak has affected culture and living style of people of this ancient land,” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment (January 4, 2021) DOI: 10.1080/10911359.2020.1825261[https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2020.1825261] (accessed January 14, 2021)
8Ghadyani, Maryam; Hussain, Hinna; Odeh, Wael; and Wood, Philip, "Responses to the COVID19 Pandemic in Syria, Iran and Pakistan" (2020). Abdou Filali-Ansary Occasional Paper Series.
Book 2. https://ecommons.aku.edu/uk_ismc_series_ops/2
9
Sally Sharif “How Robust is the Authoritarian Social Contract?: Social Dissent during Iran’s
COVID-19 Outbreak,” The Project on the Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)[https://pomeps.org/how-robust-is-the-authoritarian-social-contract-social-dissent-duringirans-covid-19-outbreak] (accessed January 25, 2021)
10
Reuter, March 2, 2020, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-iran-mood-idUSK
BN20O1X1]
11
IRNA English, May 25, 2020. [https://en.irna.ir/photo/84200955/Holy-shrine-of-Imam-RezaAS-in-the-time-of-Coronavirus]
12“Iran Mobilizes Military to Fight Coronavirus,” The Iran Primer, updated April 27, 2020
(original March 4, 2020).
[https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/mar/04/iran-mobilizes-military-fight-coronavirus] (2021
年 4 月 30 日アクセス)
13[https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/16/reopening-the-world-reopeningiran/]
14
Kelly Buchanan “Indonesia: Spread of Covid19 Declared a National Disaster,” Global LegalMonitor, April 17, 2020. [https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/indonesia-spread-of-covid-19-declared-a-national-disaster/] (2021 年 2 月 8 日アクセス)
15
Amos Sulkamto & S. Panca Parudian, "Religious Community Responses to the Public Policy ofthe Indonesian Government Related to the covid-19 Pandemic,” Journal of Law, Religion and26

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161718

1920

State 8 (2020) 273-283.
Ibid.
Garudaworld, May 20, 2020. [https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/325061/indonesiagovernor-declares-state-of-emergency-in-jakarta-due-to-covid-19-march-20-update-6] (accessedon February 12, 2021)
Inda Mustika Permada, Bima Jon Nanda, & Rifki Dermawan, “New Normal: What Ualma Can
Do as a Norm Entrepreneur,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Science,
Political Science, and Humanities 2020, p. 82.
Yusuf Hanafi, Ahmad Taufiq, et al., "Indonesian Ulema council Fatwa on religious Practices
During Covid-19 Pandemic: An Investigation of Muslim compliance," Research Square.
[https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9118-9248] (accessed February 10, 2021)“Practical considerations and recommendations for religious leaders and faith-based
communities in the context of COVID-19,” World Health Organization April 7, 2020.
[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331707/WHO-2019-nCoV-Religious_Leaders-2020.1-eng.pdf] (accessed January 28, 2021)

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