ASEAN AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY
Rizal SUKMACSIS, Jakarta
Tokyo, 3 December 2010_________________________________________________
Introduction
The growing salience of non-traditional security (NTS) problems in Southeast
Asia has made it increasingly difficult for regional states to insist on strict separation
between domestic affairs and regional problems. No regional state can continue toinsist that various non-traditional problems within their respective domestic
boundaries can be addressed unilaterally through national response by the stateconcerned. The magnitude of the problems, and their impacts beyond nationalboundaries, render any national response inadequate. In other words, the nature of
non-traditional security problems requires not only national response but also close
regional cooperation to address them.
Indeed, what are now regarded as non-traditional security issues have always
been on the agenda of cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). Since its inception in August 1967, ASEAN has always approachedsecurity matters in a comprehensive manner. For Southeast Asian countries, security
has always encompassed wide arrays of issues in social, cultural, economic, political,and military fronts. Problems in those areas –especially within the domestic context-are seen to have the potential to destabilise nation-states and regional peace andsecurity. Based on such conception of security, ASEAN has always distinguishedsecurity in terms of what traditional and non-traditional threats. However, until very
recently, ASEAN countries tended to see non-traditional security issues primarily as
domestic problems of member state which required national solution. It was only
after the end of the Cold War, and more so after the 1997 economic crisis, whichbrought about the growing threats posed by non-traditional security problems, thatASEAN began to intensify inter-state cooperation in dealing with the problems.
1The Merits and Limits of ASEAN’s Cooperation on NTS
Initially, in resolving regional security issues, both at national and regional
levels, ASEAN from the outset undertook two interrelated approaches. First, threats
from non-traditional security problems were left to individual member state toresolve, especially through nation-building measures. Second, to enable individualstates resolving those problems, regional cooperation is necessary to create apeaceful external environment so that states would not be distracted from domestic
priorities. These approaches later evolved into a strategy of building regional
resilience, a conception influenced by Indonesia’s thinking of ketahanan nasional(national resilience). Such thinking postulates that “if each member nation canaccomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional
resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its
overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts”.1 In other words, ASEAN
believed that the management of inter-state relations in the region should befounded on the sanctity of national sovereignty of its member states. Regional
cooperation was sought in order to reinforce, not erode, that sovereignty.
With the end of the Cold War, however, ASEAN’s approach to regional
security began to change. ASEAN countries continue to face security challenges in
multiple forms, especially in non-traditional forms. For most Southeast Asian
countries, the threat of terrorism is but one problem alongside other security
problems such as extreme poverty, trans-national crimes, natural disaster, maritime
pollution, environmental problems, piracy, human trafficking, and communal
violence. ASEAN began to recognise the imperative for cooperation among member
states to resolve domestic problems with cross-border effects.
It was the implication of economic crisis of 1997 on human suffering that
demonstrated further the significance of non-traditional security problems in the1 Jusuf Wanandi, “Security Issues in the ASEAN Region,” in Karl D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro,eds., ASEAN Security and Economic Development, Research Papers and Policy Studies no. 11 (Berkeley,
CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 305.

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region. In 2003, the health crisis triggered by the problem of Severe AcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS), and then the Avian flu, clearly showed how security
threats in Southeast Asia has increasingly become trans-national, and therefore
blurred the distinction between internal and external security. The SARS epidemic
clearly reinforced the permeability of state boundaries and highlighted the growing
imperative for transnational cooperation. The fact that the spread of SARS could bechecked by close regional and international cooperation sent a strong lesson that thecontainment and resolution to such problems would require close inter-state
cooperation. Without a coordinated cooperation, which will be much more effective
if it is done within a multilateral institution, this kind of threat could lead to a global
catastrophe. Indeed, these problems serve as the latest reminder to all regional statesthat security interdependence has become an undeniable reality in Southeast Asia.
While the depth and scope of NTS cooperation in ASEAN remain subject tocriticism, it does have its merits. For one, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional
security issues does provide an additional platform for developing the habit ofcooperation among ASEAN states within a formal multilateral setting. Within thissetting, states could institutionalise the notion of “security with” rather than“security against” as the dominant paradigm for inter-state relations. As ASEAN’s
experience has shown, the process is also important, especially for the institution tomature and induce a level of comfort among the participating states.
Addressing NTS problems, however, still constitutes a formidable challenge
for ASEAN for a number of reasons. First, NTS issues do not necessarily mean “nonsensitive” problems. For example, the problem in Burma --which led to thedisplacement of people and refugees-- has also reinforced the point that humanrights is a security issue for the region. The same can also be said regarding theproblem of trans-boundary pollution. In other words, NTS problems do relate
closely to the issue of national sensitivity. In this regards, the cliché problem of noninterference should not be overlooked.

3The second constraint is the continuing problem of limited state capacity toaddress the NTS challenges. The financial crisis of 1997, for example, clearly reduced
the capacity of some states –such as Indonesia-- to push through some policy
measures and allocate the needed fund for addressing the problem. As most ASEAN
countries are facing multiple NTS problems at the same time, there is a competition
for limited state resources, thus making it difficult to prioritise.
The third constraint comes from ASEAN’s internal working mechanism.
Despite recent institutional adjustments after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in
2007, ASEAN still lacks a mechanism to enforce compliance. The trans-national
nature of the problem clearly requires a collective effort among affected states toaddress and resolve the problems. It is precisely on this imperative that ASEAN has
been weak.
The fourth constraint comes from the fact that ASEAN remains an intergovernmental form of regional cooperation. Despite its declaration to become apeople-oriented or people-centred, some governments in the region remain
suspicion of the civil society organisations (CSOs) and reluctant to work them.
Meanwhile, most NTS problems need a strong state-CSOs partnership in addressingthem.
Concluding Notes
ASEAN, however, has begun to consolidate its efforts in addressing the NTS
problems through a number of initiative. Two most important steps towards thisdirection have been the adoption of the ASEAN Political and Security Community(APSC) in October 2003 and the APSC Blueprint in 2004. Indeed, greater cooperation
has been evident with regards to the management of the problem of terrorism,natural disasters, and maritime safety. While the extent of the implementation ofthese measures remain unclear, ASEAN does have a platform through which NTS
cooperation could be intensified.

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Regarding the principle of non-interfence, ASEAN should continue to adhere
to this principle. However, this principle should not become an obstacle to greater
cooperation in addressing NTS. The principle of non-interference needs to beemployed in a flexible way so that it would allow ASEAN to cooperate on transboundaries issues, internal problems with clear regional implications, and issues
with identifiable humanitarian dimension such as gross violation of human rights,
natural disasters, humanitarian crisis, internally displaced persons (IDP) and otherhuman security problems. In other words, ASEAN needs to employ the principle ofnon-interference within the context of interdependence among states.
Despite the growing recognition on the importance of NTS, however, theplace of NTS in security discourse and policy in the region should not be taken forgranted. East Asia is at the most important juncture of great strategic transformation.
While the existing regional security architecture is better equipped to tackle NTS
challenges, it is not so in managing “traditional” or “hard” security problems.
Questions are being asked regarding the viability of the current regional architecture
in coping with strategic challenges resulting from the changing dynamics and power
relations among major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Changes and strategic realignments in the relationship among the major powers, as a result of global
transformation and regional power shift, have begun to galvanise the discourse andstudies on the adequacy of the existing architecture. By nature, this debate bringsback the attention to the “traditional” or “hard” security issues.
Indeed, as the discourse on the need for a new regional security architecture
intensifies, traditional security concerns may once again overshadow the attention
and preoccupation with NTS issues. Governments could be easily distracted by theimperative of addressing traditional security problems. In East Asia, there is no
shortage of such problems. In addition to the problem of major power relations andregional security architecture, there are also unresolved territorial disputes, bilateraltensions, the implications of military build-up, and nuclear issue in the Korean
Peninsula. Government officials and traditional security analysts might find these5issues more “sexy”. The concerns for protecting human beings from sources ofthreats no less deadly than wars could be easily lost within the overriding concerns
over traditional security concerns. These traditional security concerns are important,
but they should not be allowed to dominate security discourse and practices in Asia.

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