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Vehicular Terrorism
The Threat Behind the Wheel
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
Recent vehicular attacks in France andGermany clearly highlighted the viability ofvehicle ramming as a legitimate terrorist
tactic and one that should be a focus for law
enforcement, especially during special event
planning. These attacks vividly demonstrate
how challenging it can be to stop a vehicular
attack once it has been launched. The
attacks also signal a new strategy in Islamic
terrorism that uses small cyber-connected
cells of radicalized Muslim militants.
The sudden increase of this activity
leading up the 2016 Christmas holidays
resulted in significant countermeasures by
law enforcement and security personnel
throughout the United States. In New
York City, police dispatched heavily armed
counterterrorism officers to stand guard
at crowded pop-up Christmas markets inUnion Square, Bryant Park and Columbus
Circle only an hour after news of theattack in Berlin. Other cities followed withsimilar tactics.
In Chicago, police parked their vehicles
diagonally at the corners of Daley Plaza toblock any vehicular access to a Christmas
market being held there. In San Francisco,
motorcycle and mounted horse units
patrolled high-traffic shopping areas. In Los
Angeles, law enforcement placed rows of
two to three cars or other large equipmentin front of large event entrances, which
included two massive parades in West
Hollywood this year. In Boston, at the sceneof the marathon bombing and throughout

other cities in Massachusetts, authorities
went on a heightened state of vigilance.

trucks to stop truck-driving attackers likethose in Germany and France.

The alert remains high and countermeasuresare extended into the 2017 New Year. On
Dec. 28, 2016, the Nashir Media Foundation,a pro-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL) group, urged ISIL supporters “to carryout attacks on targets such as markets andhospitals in Europe over the Christmas
holiday period and urged Muslims to stayaway from Christian celebrations.”

Over 100 patrol cars were also used as
blocking vehicles. To limit vehicular traffic,
extra public transit service was provided
to and from the city until 2 a.m. New Year’sDay. NJ Transit provided extra service toand from New York City from New Year’s
Eve until 6 a.m. New Year’s Day, along withextra evening and late night bus routes inand out of Port Authority Bus Terminal.

In a message posted online to “Islamist‘lone wolves’ in Europe,” the Foundation
said, “Their celebrations, gatherings, clubs,
markets, theaters, cinemas, malls andeven their hospitals are all perfect targets
for you.” Although not specifically citing
vehicular attacks, the message was clear…
Attack by all means possible.

Similar countermeasures for the New Year’s
Day Rose Parade in Pasadena, California
followed the increased alert.These included
barricades, water-filled barriers at somestreets, security checkpoints and clandestine
measures designed to stop terrorists fromcrashing cars into crowded areas.

However, New Year terror threats cameshortly after ISIL promised to bomb
Christians and their churches in the
United States, Canada, France and theNetherlands, stating, “We will make your
New Year mayhem with bombings andtrampling attacks.”

Continuing and increasing countermeasures
are planned between Friday, Jan. 20, andMonday, Jan. 23 to and from Washington,
DC, for the Presidential Inauguration. These
preparations cover not only the ceremony
at the National Capitol, but also the many
Inaugural Events within the District ofColumbia during the celebration.

Countermeasures by law enforcement for
New Year’s Eve in New York City included
extra security being added not just in New
York City, but New Jersey as well.There wereextra security checkpoints across the Times
Square area. Over 7,000 police officers
patrolled the area, and the NYC sanitation
department blocked strategic intersections
with 65 large garbage collection and sandA vehicular attack is easy for anyone tolaunch with little or no planning. Active
shooter tactics target crowds who arecontained, vehicle ramming tactics are nothampered by this requirement. Crowdsof people are ubiquitous in every city in
America, regardless of holidays, special
events or general workdays, and security
personnel and law enforcement must be

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Vehicular Terrorism: The Threat Behind the Wheel

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prepared for evolving terrorist tactics thatremain unconventional but are simple andeasily supported logistically.

the timeline of recent incidents indicates a
growing understanding of the viability andease of a vehicular attack:

BACKGROUND• Dec. 19, 2016, Berlin, Germany. 12 people
dead and 56 others injured. The truck’s
original driver, Lukasz Urban, was foundshot dead in the passenger seat. The
actual perpetrator was killed on Dec. 23,
during a shootout with police near Milanin Italy. ISIL claimed responsibility for theattack, saying that the attacker answered
its calls to target the citizens of statesthat are fighting against it. On Dec.23,
2016, ISIL released a video of the suspectpledging allegiance to the terror group’s
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The internet and social media provide
unlimited access to motivation, tactics,
techniques and procedures for planningseveral types of terrorist attacks, including
vehicular attacks. Inspire Magazine, theEnglish language publication of Al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is a major
media venue for several recent terrorist
attacks in Europe and the United States.
The magazine, which published its firstedition in July of 2010, is believed tohave been started by Anwar al-Awiaki, an
American citizen based in Yemen, but bornin the United States.
The second edition of Inspire, in October
2010, included an article titled The Ultimate
Mowing Machine about using a vehicle asa weapon to “… mow down the enemiesof Allah.” It also states, “If you have accessto firearms, carry them with you so thatyou may use them to finish off your work
if your vehicle gets grounded during theattack.” The article itself may have been
based on Anwar al-Awiaki’s knowledge ofseveral previous incidents by individuals
who did not have ready access to firearms
or explosives.
Following in the footsteps of its parent
Al-Qaida, ISIL has also proven effective intheir use of the internet and social media.
ISIL main messages have been to join thebattle in Iraq and Syria, or kill westerners
in the home country and encouraged “lonewolf” operations.
In September 2016, ISIL began internet
publishing of Rumiyah Magazine, the online
version of ISIL’s glossy magazine Dabiq anda mirror of Al-Qaida’s Inspire. However,where Inspire provided guidance andmotivation, Rumiyah Issue No. 3 builds
upon lessons learned from recent attacks
and provides more specific tactical details
for vehicular attack planning and execution.
Although not always related to terrorism,• Nov. 28, 2016, Columbus, Ohio. A Somali
refugee named Abdul Razak Ali Artan,
driving a car, conducted a vehicular
attack and mass stabbing at Ohio State
University Watts Hall courtyard, injuring
13 people. He was shot and killed by afirst responding OSU police officer. Artan
was inspired by terrorist propaganda from
ISIL and radical Muslim Cleric, Anwar alAwlaki. ISIL released a statement claiming
responsibility for the attack, though there
is no evidence of direct contact between
the group and Artan.
• July 14, 2016, Nice, France. 31-year-old
Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel was inspired
to utilize a large rented truck to conduct
one of the most severe active killing
attacks in history. Bouhlel drove thetruck into crowds of people who werecelebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France,
killing at least 84 adults and children on
the Nice seafront.
• Dec. 22, 2015, Lakeisha Holloway
intentionally drove her car repeatedly
onto the sidewalk on the Las Vegas strip,
killing one person and injuring 37 others.
• Oct. 24, 2015, Stillwater, Oklahoma.
Adacia Chambers intentionally crashedher car into a crowd at Oklahoma State’s
Homecoming parade, killing four andinjuring dozens more. Chambers has ahistory of mental illness.
• Dec. 22, 2014, Nantes, France. Sébastien
Sarron ran over ten pedestrians in awhite van at the Christmas market, thenattempted suicide by stabbing himself.Tenpeople, including the suspect, suffered
non-fatal injuries, and one person was
pronounced clinically dead the following
day. The attack was apparently inspiredby a video circulated by ISIL calling on
French Muslims to attack non-Muslims
using vehicles.
• Dec. 21, 2014, Dijon, France. A driver
shouted ’Allahu Akbar’ before ramming
his van into pedestrians, injuring 11
people.
• Oct. 20, 2014, Quebec, Canada. An ISIL
radicalized man in a car, hit two Canadiansoldiers, killing one of them before he
was shot dead by police at St-Jean-surRichelieu in Quebec.
• May 23, 2014, Isla Vista, California. Elliot
Rogers stabbed, shot, and ultimately ran
down people with his vehicle in an attack
combining firearms, edged weapons anda motor vehicle. Rogers first stabbed
three people, then shot four others, andcontinued his attack by both shooting
people while driving and running them
down. He killed six and injured manyothers.
• Sept.22, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel. Qassem
Mughrabi, a Palestinian member of Hamas,
drove a BMW saloon car into a group ofcivilians and off-duty soldiers in a terrorist
ramming attack, injuring 19.
• July 2, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel. Hussam
Taysir Duwait (aka Hussam Duwiyat andHossam Dawyyat) attacked several cars
in a terrorist vehicle ramming using afront-end loader, killing three people andwounding at least thirty before being shot
to death.
• Aug. 30, 2006, San Francisco, California.
An individual from Afghanistan, named
Omeed Aziz Popal, killed one person andinjured 18 in a vehicle attack, saying topolice that “everyone needs to be killed.”• March 3, 2006, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina. A radicalized Iranian-American
named Reza Taheri-azar drove a rented
silver 2006 Jeep Grand Cherokee
through a common courtyard area, to

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Vehicular Terrorism: The Threat Behind the Wheel

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intentionally hit people on the campusof the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. Taheri-azar claimed that
he was avenging the death of Muslims
worldwide while attempting to punish theUnited States government. Nine people
were injured during Taheri-azar’s attack.
• June 4, 2004, Granby, Colorado. Marvin
Heemeyer conducted a “kill-dozer” attackin Colorado, with a bulldozer hardenedwith steel plates to protect Heemeyer
while he destroyed everything in his path.
• March 30, 2002, Lyon, France. A group ofmasked men rammed two cars throughthe courtyard gates, then rammed one of
the cars into the prayer hall of a synagogue
in the neighborhood of Duchere, before
setting the vehicles afire, causing severe
damage to the synagogue.

• Cause civil or economic disturbance• Take hostages or kill people
On Dec. 28, 2016, following the Berlin
attack, the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) reported a significant
shift in terrorist tactics that requires theFBI, DHS and other agencies to locate themobile and cyber/internet smart “lonewolf” individual attacker, and not necessarily
detect a complex plot.
The steady rise in the number of lone actor
operations is a trend which coincides withthe deepening and broadening of the digital
revolution as well as the encouragement ofsuch operations by terrorist groups because
intensified [counterterrorism] operations havedisrupted their ability to launch larger plots... Lone actors now have greater capability tocreate and broadcast material than a decadeago, while violent extremists can contact andinteract with potential recruits with greater ease.

ATTACK SCENARIOS
Complicated attacks can be planned withincreased time and assets.However,the more
complicated the planning is, then the greater
the chance of discovery and interdiction.
Large vehicles and trucks have always beena concern especially from the standpointof vehicle bombs. A decade ago, the police
departments discussed a terrorism scenario
in which a fuel truck would be used in an
attack. A typical fuel tanker carries at least
9,000 gallons of gasoline, and they make up
90% of hazardous materials on roads. During
a study for Manetta Transportation Institute,these were found to be the deadliest
threat among dangerous cargoes. Modern
vehicular attacks are more asymmetric andscalable to the individual “lone wolf.”

As with traditional violent crime, vehicular
attacks can be classified by major profiles of“organized” and “disorganized” that provide
indicators of the nature of the individual(s)involved and extent of the support
In 2010, following the Inspire article,
Use of a vehicle to run down people is not dissimilar structure.
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
VEHICLE ATTACK PLANNING,TACTICS, TECHNIQUESAND PLANNINGfrom an active shooter attack in intent and could
Organized
easily kill or injure as many people as possible until
stopped.Therefore, using a motor vehicle would • Organized attacks are typically
Terrorists overseas have suggested
well-planned events
conducting vehicle ramming attacks make planning an attack much easier and it would— using modified or unmodified offer a wide variety of target-rich environments. The • Conducted by an Operational Cellor Individual more sophisticated in
vehicles — against crowds, buildings,
and other vehicles. Such attacks could selection of the weapon is varied, scalable and easily their approach. Members are normallybe used to target locations where large mastered. It is only left to the terrorist’s imagination well trained.
numbers of people congregate, including
and dedication to accomplish.
• Motivation/radicalization is well(FBI) and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) advised that:sporting events, entertainment venues,
or shopping centers. Vehicle ramming offers
terrorists with limited access to explosives
or weapons an opportunity to conduct a
Homeland attack with minimal prior training orexperience.

ISO 28001:2007, Security Management
Systems for the Supply Chain alludes to thisin a supply chain threat scenario. The threat
will intrude and/or take control of an asset(including conveyances) within the supply
chain. Application examples include:• Damage or destroy the supply chain asset• Damage or destroy an outside target
using the supply chain asset or goods

The analysis identifies a shift in extremist
violence to “small autonomous cells” and“individual terrorism. Increasingly, thanks inpart to the digital revolution, they can rely
on what Syrian terrorist Abu Musab al-Suricalled “individual terrorism” and publishedin a training guide titled A Call to Global
Islamic Resistance.
Indicators show that with ISIL losing territory
and al-Qaida increasingly decentralized,
individuals and small autonomous cells may
increasingly take the initiative in both themurderous and messaging dimensions ofviolent extremism.

developed over time within a mutual
support group/ mechanism• Security is paramount, due to the scopeof planning and coordination involved• Requires communications, logistics anddetail coordination• Study target area, route reconnaissance,
timing, possible rehearsal• Selection of vehicle(s) must be madefor reasons that are feasible to avoid
suspicion• Acquisition of vehicle(s) requires proper
timing to avoid early discovery and may
be stolen or carjacked immediately prior

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to an attack• Modification of vehicle(s) may be required,depending on the target area and route,and should be accomplished in a manner
to avoid early discovery. This may require
additional logistical planning for a garage
or maintenance facility with equipment• Additional equipment/weapons, such as
body armor and firearms are desired andmay be available, but must be acquired ina manner to avoid suspicion• Legacy material (written or recorded)announcing one’s allegiance is produced
at a time just prior to attack to avoid
early discovery• Early discovery is possible and will resultin sufficient warning and interdiction, evenwith individual “lone wolf” attacks
Disorganized or Impulse• Disorganized attacks are typicallyunplanned events and impulsive in nature• Conducted by an Individual “lone wolf”
who may not have a previous record ofarrest or trouble making• Psychologically or event triggered by
impulse driven core beliefs of motivation/
radicalization• Little or no planning; related to being
psychologically or event triggered by
impulsetheir individual jihad.” Based on attacks
conducted since the 2010 Inspire article,
ISIL’s Rumiyah Magazine Issue No.3 provides
more specific tactical guidance for vehicular
attacks in a section titled Just Terror Tactics.
The article provides details for suggested
tactics by Jihadist in the United States, who
are referred to as “stationed behind enemy
lines.” Taken together, Inspire and Rumiyahprovide an effective and feasible operational
concept for vehicular terrorism.
OBJECTIVE AND
TARGET SELECTION
The guidance emphasizes the importanceof defining the objective. An attack may
be to achieve a large kill count; disrupting
the financial stability of a specific nation; or
simply be aimed at “terrorizing the enemiesof Allah and depriving them of a peacefulsleep.”
When deciding on the target, attention will
be given to the target’s accessibility by thevehicle where the target would be on a roadthat offers the ability to accelerate to a highspeed and allows for inflicting maximum
damage on those in the vehicle’s path. It is
not important to target gatherings restricted
to government or military personnel only.
Civilian (and low-security) parades andgatherings are considered more devastating
to the West, especially the United States.

• Hasty acquisition of vehicle (stolen or
carjacked), impulse driven

In general, applicable targets are any outdoor
attraction that draws large crowds:• Known target area, route, timing• Largeoutdoorcelebrations• Possible additional equipment/weapons,
based on known availability• Possible legacy material (written orrecorded)conventionsand• Pedestrian-congested streets (High/Mainstreets)• Outdoor markets• No warning• Festivals• Hard to stop, ultimately relies on first
responder direct action• Parades

AQAP’s Inspire Magazine enabled by themass distribution of the internet, andremains an effective groundwork for Islamic
propaganda, terrorist planning, recruitment
and motivation with a new focus on
the “lone wolf” as an asset “to wage

As indicated by the Inspire article
encourages use of heavy-duty fourwheel-drive pickup trucks, modified withsteel blades welded on front, designed tosever body parts. A photo of a heavy-duty• Political rallies

Ford pickup was included. Larger heavy
vehicles or vehicles that have undergone
modifications would increase casualties andmake it more difficult for law enforcement
to stop an attack. Inspire advises:• Raise the level of the blades as high as theheadlights to make the blades strike yourtargets at the torso level or higher• Pick your location and timing carefully. Go forthe most crowed locations. Narrower spots
are better because it gives less chance forthe people to run away. Avoid locations whereother vehicles may intercept you• To achieve maximum carnage, you need topick up as much speed as you can whilestill retaining good control of your vehicle
to maximize your inertia and can strike as
many people as possible in your first run• Keep in mind that as soon as people realize
what you are up to, they would scatter andrun in every direction looking for cover. They
would look for areas where the vehicle cannot
reach them.Therefore, it is important to study
your path of operation beforehand• The ideal location is a place where there area maximum number of pedestrians and theleast number of vehicles. In fact, if you can get
through to “pedestrian only” locations thatexist in some downtown (city center) areas,that would be fabulous. There are someplaces that are closed for vehicles at certain
times due to the swarms of people• If you have access to arms, carry them withyou so that you may use them to finish yourwork if your vehicle gets grounded during theattack• After such an attack, we believe it would
be very difficult to get away safely andwithout being recognized. Hence, it should beconsidered a martyrdom operation.
• If Allah guides your heart to such a great
operation, please leave behind a note.Tell theworld why you did it
Vehicle Selection
Acquiring a vehicle is a simple task regardlessof one’s location. One may be purchased,
rented, stolen or carjacked en-route to thetarget area. Depending on the region in

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Vehicular Terrorism: The Threat Behind the Wheel

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the United States, the FBI estimates that avehicle is stolen every 43.7 to 46 seconds
with 25 percent of the vehicles being trucks.
However, the type of vehicle and its
structural and technical specifications are
extremely important factors for ensuring
the success of the attack. Observing previous
vehicle attacks, smaller vehicles (even light
pickup trucks) are considered incapable ofa high number of casualties. Similarly, offroad vehicles (SUVs and small four-wheel
drive vehicles) lack the necessary attributes
required for causing maximum casualties
because smaller vehicles lack the weight
and wheel span required for crushing many
victims. Rather, the type of vehicle mostappropriate for such an operation is a large
load-bearing truck.
Terrorists view the ideal vehicle
to generally be:• Load-bearing truck• Large-in-size, keeping
controllability

in

mind

its

• Reasonably fast in speed or rate ofacceleration (Note: Many European
countries pre-restrict larger vehicles tospecified speeds)• Heavy-in-weight, assuring the destructionof whatever it hits
• Double-wheeled, giving victims less of achance to escape being crushed by thevehicle’s tires• Possessing a slightly raised chassis (theunder frame of the vehicle) and bumper,
which allow for the mounting of sidewalks
and breeching of barriers if needed• If accessible, with a metal outer frame
which are usually found in older cars, as
the stronger outer frame allows for moredamage to be caused when the vehicle isslammed into crowds, contrary to newer
cars that are usually made of plastics andother weaker materials• In the United States, the largest truck aperson without a commercial driver’s
license can rent is a Class 6 vehicle, which
can weigh up to 11,800 kilograms (26,000

pounds). Larger vehicles require greater
vetting of the driver and a commercial
license. If renting, individuals following
Rumiyah’s guidelines would likely use aClass 6 vehicle or smaller. However, an
attacker could simply commandeer avehicle, as done in Berlin
Some vehicles that ideally satisfy theserequirements, however may require
moderate operating experience, include:• Heavy duty pickups, such as a Ford F-350
or Dodge Ram• Single Unit Trucks, such as U-Haul or
Ryder rental trucks• Certain commonly found special purpose
trucks (Tow Trucks, Tractor Rigs, Light
Tankers)• Buses (public, commercial, school) oflength like Single Unit Trucks
Vehicles that terrorists
generally avoid include:• Small cars, including larger SUVs
• Slower vehicles that cannot exceed 60
mph (90 kph)
• Load-bearing
truckswithload
compartments that are not fixed to thecabin, which may cause loss of control
and subsequent jack-knifing, especially if
driven erratically• Load-bearing trucks with excessively
elongated trailer compartments, which
can cause the driver trouble as he seeks
to maneuver
PLANNING AND PREPARATIONAs possible and based on individual
experience, planning will be with a military
mindset, possibly based on previous militarytraining. Selection of driver(s) may be basedon technical ability, however the determining
factor is assessed individual motivation(radicalization.) Preparations will include:• Assessing the vehicle for roadworthiness• Filling the vehicle with enough fuel• Mapping out the route of the attack• Surveying the route for obstacles, suchas posts, signs, barriers, humps, bus stops,
dumpsters, etc. which is important for
sidewalk-mounted attacks, keeping in
mind that more obstacles might be set
up on the day of a targeted event, anddoing the surveillance in an inconspicuous
manner, especially if one suspects being
monitored by an intelligence apparatus• If accessible, a secondary weapon will beattained
To further casualties, it is imperative thatthe driver does not exit his vehicle during
the attack. Rather, he should continue
crushing people until the vehicle cannot
proceed further. At this stage, the driver
may exit the vehicle and finish his operation
using a secondary weapon, such as a gun ora knife. Depending on what is obtained, thekill count can be maximized and the levelof terror resulting from the attack can beraised. The driver can also remain in thevehicle targeting pedestrians, the emergency
first responders or security forces whoarrive until he is martyred.
Rumiyah advises that an appropriate way
should be determined for announcing
one’s allegiance to the “Khalifah of the
Muslims and the goal of making Allah’s word
supreme,” so that the motive of the attackis acknowledged. An example of such would
be simply writing on dozens of sheets ofpaper “The Islamic State will remain!” or “I
am a soldier of the Islamic State!” prior, andlaunching them from the vehicle’s window
during the execution of the attack.
VEHICLE DYNAMICS
The driving characteristics and dynamics
of appropriate vehicles will vary with
type and weight. The center of gravity will
be related to the load capacity for eachvehicle and will determine the speed andmaneuverability. These are vulnerabilities
that may be exploited in countering anactive vehicular attack.
Generally, trucks and other linear vehicles(buses) have an increased turning radiusbeyond that of cars and SUVs.The increased
radius requires the vehicle to swing widearound corners and obstacles. To do so,

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Vehicular Terrorism: The Threat Behind the Wheel

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they must reduce speed to avoid exceeding
the center of gravity and overturningor lose driving control. It is at this pointthat pedestrians may escape the path;interdiction vehicles may move into thepath and assault personnel may engage thedriver with gunfire.
Heavy Duty Pickup• Turbodiesel V8 generates immense power
and torqueoperation and maneuverability• 28-40 ft. long, 7.8-8.5 ft. wide
• Top Speed approx. 97 mph (156 kph)
• Wheelbase: Up to 255-300 inches• Turning Radius: 36-42 feet
• Although overall bus dimensions may belike a Single Unit Truck, the engineering
is significantly different in the vehicle
dynamics• Stronger frame and suspension
enable increased payload andtow ratings• Aluminum body reduces
overall weight and improves
efficiency• Substantially larger frame rails
and cross members made of
95% high-strength steel• 19.3-22.25 ft. long, 6.6-.0 ft.
wide• Top Speed approx. 97 mph(156 kph)

even a typical larger school bus outer front
wheel, outer front body, and inner rear
wheel radii are smaller than the Single Unit
Truck radii. Test templates show that theschool bus can make a much smaller turnthan the Single Unit Truck, even though theschool bus may be larger than the Single
Unit Truck.
Additionally, the larger school bus outerfront wheel and outer front body radii aresmaller than the typical public
bus radii. The inner rear wheel
radius of the school bus islarger than that of the publicbus. During the transition
portions of the turn, the public
bus and larger school bus havevery different paths. The public
bus spirals slowly into the turn,whereas the larger school bus
more quickly attains a circularpath. The school bus has ashorter overall length than the
public bus and the overall turnis much smaller.

• Wheelbase: 155-166 inches

Tractor Truck Rig• Turning Radius: 23.8-29.8 feet•
Diesel V8 generates
immense power and torqueSingle Unit Truck•
Strongframe
andsuspension with a 6x2 axle
configurationforeasieroperation and maneuverability• Gas or Diesel V8 generates
immense power and torque• Strong frame and suspension
with 4x2 or 6x2 axle
configurationforeasieroperation and maneuvering•
Top Speed approx. 95
mph (152 kph)

• 22-36 ft. long, 7.8 ft. wide•
Wheelbase: Approx. 150258 inches• Top Speed approx. 97 mph(156 kph)•
Turningfeet• Wheelbase: 240-250 inches

Radius: 29-35

Tow Truck• Turning Radius: 36-42 feet•
Light to medium towing
vehicleBuses (small public/commercial or school)• Gas or Diesel V8 generates immense
power and torque• Strong frame and suspension with a
4x2 or 6x2 axel configuration for easier• Curb clearance will vary between public
and school buses which will affect vehicle
dynamics and may impact route selection
It is understandable that a small school bus
will have a lesser turning radius. However,• Diesel V8 generates immense power andtorque• Strong frame and suspension with a 4x2
or 6x2 axle configuration• Top Speed approx. 97 mph (156 kph)

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Vehicular Terrorism: The Threat Behind the Wheel

Corporate Risk Services• Wheelbase: Approx. 165-200 inches• Turning Radius: 28.3-43.5 feet
Light Tanker (<3500 US gal)
• Diesel V8 generates immense power andtorque• Strong frame and suspension with a 4x2
or 6x2 axle configuration• Top Speed approx. 95 mph (152 kph)
• Wheelbase: Approx. 280-350 inches• Turning Radius: 28.3-43.5 feet
COMMON SECURITY MEASURES
Stopping vehicular attacks, especially bya truck or bus, is not easy. In the wake of
the December 2016 attack in Germany,
the director of the Institute for Crisis
Prevention (IFUS) in Essen, Germany, stated:“If a radicalized fanatic decides to use atruck as a weapon, you don’t stand a chance,
unless you know about him and his plansin advance and arrest him before he canact. It’s impossible to check all vehicles inthe EU [European Union] or to seal off all
Christmas markets to protect them fromany danger.You’d have to close them for that.
An attack like this one cannot be prevented
with 100 percent certainty.”
Indicators
Although a single indicator may not be
suspicious, one or more may indicate avehicular attack is being planned. A vehicle
ramming attack can be conducted withlittle to no warning. Examples of potential
indicators are:• Unusual modifications to commercial
motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
passenger cars, and sports utility vehicles(SUVs), such as homemade attempts toreinforce the front of the vehicle withmetal plates.
• The purchase, rental, or theft of largeor heavy-duty vehicles or equipment,such as SUVs, trucks, or commercial
motor vehicles, if accompanied by typicalindicators such as nervousness during

the purchase, paying in cash, or lack offamiliarity with the vehicle’s operations.
• Commercial motor vehicles or heavyequipment being operated erratically, atunusual times, or in unusual locations,particularly in heavy pedestrian areas.
• Attempts to infiltrate closed areas wheretraffic usually moves, but where crowds
are gathered, such as for street festivals
or farmers’ markets.
• A
vehicleoperator’s
apparent
unfamiliarity with commercial motor
vehicle or heavy equipment operation(unable to back up; trouble with shifting;poor lane tracking; unfamiliarity withbasic vehicle mechanics such as air brake
operations, slack adjusters, fifth wheel
operations, Jake brakes, engine type, or
location of fire extinguishers and otheremergency equipment).
Passive Measures
VehiclesLarge vehicles can be used in ways tocreate road closures into the parade route/
event area. This is a very flexible solution,very fast to deploy, and can be redeployed/
moved at very short notice. They canbe easily moved to permit authorized
vehicular and/or emergency access. Largevehicles such as garbage trucks, sand, andconstruction vehicles may be used forthis purpose. Lawful positioning of heavyequipment, such as large generators, skips,
cherry pickers and forklifts at temporary
events will offer protection and slow downa momentum vehicle.
Barriers
The crash performance of barriers depends
on the type of vehicle, speed, and othervariables. Understanding these variables
enables agencies to select the mostappropriate type of barrier to address
specific concerns. There may be several
privately held anti-vehicle barrier (AVB)
systems available at a cost or possibly
donated for short term public service.
Use of pedestrian barriers or construction

fencing may act as a slowing mechanism,
but cannot be expected to stop a vehicular
attack. If this is all that is available, then it
should be used.
There are two essential categories of AVB
systems: stationary and operable.
• Stationary barriers are equivalent but
not identical to “fixed barriers” asdefined in FEMA 430 and are attached to
the ground or base diaphragms to blockvehicle entry. These barriers shall not
move or deform unless within allowablemagnitude under attack.
• Operable barriers are not anchoredand can be moved as necessary for
authorized vehicle access. Operable
barriers are beam barricades orwedge barriers. Typically, hydraulic orelectrical power equipment is needed toreposition an operable barrier, making
its entire design and construction (liftpoints) more complicated than that ofstationary barriers.
Operable barriers require considerable
time for construction, are expensive
and require special maintenance. These
characteristics make operable barriers
unfeasible for many activities, periodic
events and along parade routes; however,they may be used when integrated withmovable and stationary barriers andblocking vehicles for those events.
The two most effective operable barriers
against vehicular ramming attacks arewedges and bollards.
They may be configured in various heights,
lengths and combined in patterns for
optimum protection within a specific area.
They are most appropriate for traffic
control, defense of facilities and protectionof fixed areas of constant pedestrian trafficand congregation, such as stadiums, parks
and town squares which may be routinely
used for large public events.
Jersey barriers
Jersey barriers (K-Rails) are the most

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common AVB for rapid or temporary
security and general vehicular traffic
control. They were originally developed by
the New Jersey State Highway Department
to divide highway lanes. A concrete Jersey
barrier stands 2.6 to 3.5 feet tall with theoriginal design intent of minimizing damage
and reducing the likelihood of vehicles
crossing into oncoming lanes in the event ofa collision. There have been variations fromthe original shape including the constantslope barrier, the F-shape barrier, and theCalifornia K-rail.
The easy construction,mobility,and efficiencyof the Jersey barrier make it applicable foranti-terrorism security. U.S. military forces
use them extensively in Iraq to fortify
roadblocks and public infrastructure withtaller variants. In addition, Jersey barriers
are used domestically as perimeter security
barriers since the Oklahoma City bombing
and the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to
enforce standoff distances from federalbuildings and monuments such as the
Washington Monument in Washington, DC,
the Willis Tower in Chicago and the Library
Tower in downtown Los Angeles.

42 inches. The U.S. military nicknamed thedevices “Qaddafi Blocks” after truck bomb
attacks in Beirut in 1983 resulted in morewidespread use in military installations.

• Integrate easily into continuous walls or
combine with other types of barriers likesteel fencing• Install in various flexible patterns for
temporary or permanent protection
purposes
Disadvantages of the Jersey barriers aremainly related to the original design purpose:
to deflect the crashing vehicle rather
than completely damage or totally stop a
vehicle’s forward movement. In defense
against terrorist attacks, Jersey barriers
normally cannot qualify for high ratings (asthe DoS K12) if directly impacted by heavy
trucks due to:Advantages of the Jersey barriers are theirability to:• Insufficient barrier height• Stop the impacting vehicle quickly with alarge mass of concrete• Sloped front lower portion causes liftingof the truck bed• Deflect vehicle collisions at angularimpact• Dissipate kinetic energy by thelifting vehicle’s front and engaging its
undercarriage• Relatively weak anchorage to ground

Shape barriers, such as Jersey barriers(K-Rails) and F-shape barriers are designed
to mitigate the energy of crash impacts tothe driver, and will not necessarily stop a
speeding vehicle. They minimize vehicle
damage in cases of incidental contact
while still preventing the crossover caseof a head-on collision and are designed
to redirect, slow, or stop a vehicle from
causing a more severe crash. F-shapebarriers get their name from the researchstudy that analyzed the performance ofbarrier design parameters, where barrierconfigurations were labeled A through F,
and F was the best-performing design.

These standard barriers begin with a3-inch vertical face at the pavement level,
then break to a sloped face, changing to anearly vertical face at the top of the barrier.
The overall height is at least 32 inches
above the pavement. Jersey barriers are theoriginal and most widely used safety shapeconcrete barriers.
The only difference between Jersey barriersand F-shape barriers is that the distancefrom the ground to the slope breakpoint is
13 inches in Jersey barriers, versus 10 inches
for F-shape barriers. In high-speed impacts,
there is a greater likelihood that a small car
will be rolled by a Jersey barrier than by an
F-shape barrier. The F-shape barrier was
specifically engineered to limit the potential
for small cars to rollover upon impact. The
F-shape barrier begins with a 3-inch verticalface at the pavement level, then breaks toa sloped face that rises to a height of 10
inches, before changing to a nearly verticalface at the top of the barrier.
Because the Jersey-shape design requiresvery little modification to become an
F-shape design, asphalt resurfacing canconvert the Jersey-shape barrier into a
more F-shape-like barrier that is safer for
lighter cars. However, these increased layersof asphalt also reduce the working height ofthe barrier which reduces its effectiveness

Crashworthy concrete barriers come in avariety of shapes and heights that affect crashperformance. The most common are 32-

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for heavier vehicles.
Newer versions are impact resistanthollow polyethylene barriers developed forshort-term applications where portability
is important. These plastic barriers arenormally filled with water after placement toprovide a moderate level of crash protection.
They are not designed to deflect vehicles, sovehicles may penetrate the barriers. Thesebarriers can also be filled with soil, spill, or
concrete to produce a heavier barrier withgreater crash protection, at the cost of
reduced portability.
Staggered placement of multiple Jersey

barriers at close distances in an obstacle
wall will force reduced speed and increase
non-penetration, however will require agreater footprint than what may be available.
When deployed staggered at wide distances
or in “zig-zag” they force vehicles into a“serpentine” pattern that force vehicles into
45-90 degree turns and will slow vehiculartraffic.A “chicane” of 90-180-degree S-turns
will further slow vehicles.
Active Measures
Technical SurveillanceIntegrated with any AVB plan should besurveillance of the event area by CCTV andsecurity video from commercial, public andlaw enforcement sources. Gaps in coverage
should be identified well in advance toacquire additional technical assets and planother mitigating actions. Coordination

between law enforcement, businesses, andprivate security should be conducted forthe monitoring and handling of imagery
prior to and during the actual event. Prior
event surveillance is important to identify
and assess indicators of surveillance, routereconnaissance, and rehearsal by threats.
Following a security incident, rapid andproper review and handling of all imagery
will be critical to suspect identification andcase management.

general area coverage by law enforcementwith trained snipers. Large caliber weapons,such as .50 BMG rifles, should be used
for attack vehicle engagement. After anattack vehicle is stopped, security forces
should plan for a secondary attack by thedriver if he is not dead using firearms,
edged weapon or explosives to maximize
casualties. Further, a secondary attack could
be planned especially if committed by anoperational cell.

Direct Action

SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

Vehicular attacks are almost impossible
to stop once they are initiated. Security
personnel
shouldplan for stopping theattacker.
Security
forcesandlaw
enforcement should
review their existing
training,
tactics,
andprocedures
for a direct-action
responsetoanongoing attack ofthis nature. Planningscenarios
shouldincludeexplosive
ordinance disposal,
vehicle mounting from the side and above,
breaching and assault of a linear target,
support fire, and dynamic command andcontrol. The driver must be considered
mission-focusedandpsychologically
prepared to die. Facing such an attacker,
security forces must be psychologically
prepared to immediately engage withdeadly force. Additionally, the vehicle may
continue to travel into pedestrians after
the driver is killed or incapacitated.

The shape of terrorism has changed since
Sept. 11, 2001. Al-Qaida and ISIL haveadapted tactics from necessity and havetapped into a virtual unlimited talentpool for recruiting jihadists. Not only canthey recruit fighters for the conflict areasof the Middle East and North Africa, butalso expand globally to bring the war toformerly denied regions and conductpropaganda operations for psychological
warfare. Within the context of global
Islamic radicalism, terrorism is now
becoming more individual in nature.

Planning should integrate AVB obstacles
along vehicle approach routes with
sufficient numbers of reinforced barriers
and large vehicles.Additional vehicles can be
strategically prepositioned to further blockroutes that will channel an attacking vehicle
away from the crowd and into a kill zone
where the vehicle and driver can be engaged
by law enforcement. Positions should be
identified for over-watch of key routes and

The new paradigm is one with few
boundaries, where small cells canform wherever resources permit andcircumstances allow. Technology permits
active militants to become individual terror
promoters who provide a motivational
path to terror and instructions to othersin tradecraft and tactics. Additionally, somemilitants have been allowed migration into
Western societies for politically naïve andhumanitarian reasons without means toinvestigate and assess their backgrounds.
The modern terrorist is, therefore, hardto detect, much like the truck terrorists in
Nice and Berlin in July and December 2016.
He will hide in a closed community, use
personal resources, strike in an unexpected
way and then may try to disappear into
society, but will be radicalized and motivatedto the extent that he will be willing, if notdesire, to die in martyrdom. This potentiallyputs every citizen on the frontlines of a war
that has come to them.
To protect against this new paradigm the

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following basic security measures arerecommended for consideration:• Conduct risk assessments and select predetermined lowest threat routes• Conduct background checks and social
media checks of all drivers and employees
who have access to heavy vehicles• Geo-fence all pre-planned routes toprovide alerts at the monitoring center
whenever a vehicle varies from its
designated route• The public must have a basic understandingof the psychological mindset of a dedicatedattacker. Especially with radical Islam, theattacker is prepared for or looks forward
to dying• Vehicles should be equipped withconcealed GPS tracking equipment.
• Vehicles should be equipped with a duress
signaling device• Reassess the daily work environment
based on the geographic location anddeveloping events. See something, saysomething/report it• There should be a redundant policy andplan such as GPS, communications, andcapability for the monitoring center tocommunicate with a driver• Because a vehicle attack can be conducted
at any time, with almost any readily
available and public accessible vehicle,
businesses and the public at large should
maintain situational awareness, especiallyobserving the movement of trucks andbusses. Any sudden deviation of scheduleor route should be considered suspicious• The GPS/Security monitoring center
should have the capability to remotely
activate disabling equipment• Businesses should review emergency andsecurity plans. Many businesses operatevehicle fleets as part of their core businessto supply and deliver goods. Given theterrorist attacks in Nice and Berlin, thesecurity of vehicles of all sizes and thesafety of the vehicle operators must be
considered• Businesses should coordinate information
sharing and local safety/security measureswith Public Safety agencies to prepare
for events and guard against criminal andsuspicious activity• Businesses should verify the identity of
persons driving company vehicles andtheir documents and use E-verify whereappropriate. Additionally, businesses
should include situational awareness as acomponent of company safety orientation
with periodic updates to all drivers• Drivers should park vehicles in securewell-lighted areas; off the street where
possible, in an authorized truck park.
Vehicles and their loads should besecured when left unattended. The cabshould be secured always with valuables
and documents out of sight• Provide emergency medical care, if
possible• Monitor truck parking areas, empty
trucks/trailers to ensure that the vehicles
cannot be misappropriated• Companies using heavy-duty vehicles
and/or trucks, including rental companies,
should consider applying the following
security
standards,
Transported
Asset Protection Association (TAPA)
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO)
Customers Trade-Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-PAT) and ISO 28000 —standards for transportation conveyances
to their fleet with this threat in mind
If present during
a vehicular attack• Give immediate warning to surrounding
pedestrians and notify law enforcement at
first opportunity• Immediately move out of the line of
movement. Run at a right angle away fromthe vehicle and try to put objects suchas buildings, trees, lampposts, fire hydrants
and garbage bins between yourself andthe attacker• Do not run with the crowd. Attacking
vehicles intend to target large groups• Seek hardened shelter until “all clear” isannounced. Remember that the attacking
driver may exit a disabled vehicle andattack on foot with a weapon

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Copyright 2017 G4S North America. All rights reserved.