The Future of US Presence in Asia
Paper for4 International Symposium
Security Cooperation and Regional Integration in Asia
Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)
Tokyo, Japanth

3 December 2010
Dr Benjamin Schreer
Senior Lecturer
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University(benjamin.schreer@anu.edu.au)
For over half a century, US military presence in the Asia-Pacific has been a key
determinant of the regional security order. Forward deployed land, air and maritime
forces underwrote US hegemonic leadership in the Asia-Pacific by reassuring allies
and security partners in the framework of the ‘San Francisco’ system, and bydeterring potential adversaries. Importantly, China since the 1970s also by and large
accepted US presence in the region. This has led to a distinct pattern of Asian regional
security integration: multilateral security integration among Asia-Pacific nations
today is predominantly focussed on non-traditional security challenges, whereas
traditional security, i.e. the prevention of major power war, is still largely left to thesecurity umbrella provided by the United States and manifested in a bilateral systemof alliances, security partnerships as well as US military presence.
Yet, doubts have grown over the future of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific.
Three interrelated factors contribute to the discussion of whether US presence cancontinue to play a key role in maintaining regional stability:••

Firstly, the rise of China is seen by many as inevitably eroding the foundationsof US hegemonic leadership. Already, some Chinese leaders have questioned
the legitimacy of US regional force posture. Moreover, the continued build-upof the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with its focus on maritime power
projection and anti-access/ access denial capabilities might deny the US theability to control the sea and undermine its maritime power projection
capabilities. In the future, the PLA Navy might be able to hold US carriergroups at significant risk given its investment in submarines and other antiaccess military capabilities. For example, the future costs for the US in
standing up to China in another crisis over Taiwan might be perceived to be
too high by Washington.
Secondly, US ability to maintain its leadership role and to ‘command thecommons’ in the Asia-Pacific to many appears to be diminishing. In this view,not only long-term Chinese growth but also the dismal state of the US
economy and Washington’s skyrocketing debt will impede on America’s
ability to muster enough resources to support its leadership position. From theview of allies such as Japan this raises the question over the future credibilityof US extended deterrence guarantees which is intimately related to theStrategic and Defence Studies Centre
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•military presence, and which has both a conventional and nuclear dimension.
There was also a widespread perception that US attention had diverted fromthe Asia-Pacific region, reflected in the costly military engagements in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Many US observers have thus called for a period of ‘military
restraint’ and for a focus on rebuilding America at home.
Finally, there is the assumption among some experts that US military presencein the region might be detrimental to efforts to accommodate China’s peacefulrise as a major Asia-Pacific power. US presence as part of a potential
containment strategy against China is seen as destabilising and confrontational.
In this logic, US military presence is regarded as an impediment for regional
security cooperation.

This paper will challenge these three propositions. It will argue that America’s
retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific is unlikely for the foreseeable future and that its
forward presence will continue to provide the military foundations of its leadership
position. It will also claim that US military presence will not obstruct China’s
peaceful accommodation in a new regional security order but will rather be aprecondition for this development. Finally, the point will be made that Asian regional
security integration will continue to be characterised by bilateral and multilateralmodes of security cooperation that interact and compete with each other depending on
the security issue at stake.
US leadership renewed
Contrary to current debate on American ‘imperial overstretch’, the US will be bothwilling and able to maintain a strong military presence as part of its continued
leadership role in the Asia-Pacific. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent
speech in Hawaii underlined Washington’s continued commitment to a strategy ofsustaining and strengthening leadership in the region, of increasing regional security,and of heightening prosperity and promoting US values. Clinton also stressed that
securing US strategic interests as a ‘Pacific Power’ ultimately depended on a strong
military presence, not least to reassure allies and security partners in the region. 1
While ‘places not bases’ in the Asia-Pacific will certainly increase in importance for
the US to project power into the region, the US will continue to see its forward
deployed presence in Japan, South Korea and Guam as a key to reassure allies.
Rhetoric about renewed US commitment will also be matched by resources.
Predictions about major US defence cuts disregard that what is causing problems for
the Pentagon at the moment are the huge operational costs stemming from
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, these will end rather sooner than later,
taking off the pressure from cuts which would go to US military substance. And there
is much to the argument that US foreign and security policy will continue to be driven
by the objective to maintain its global military presence, in particular in the AsiaPacific given its strategic eminence in US grand strategic thinking. The next US
Global Posture Review will very likely confirm Washington’s commitment to astrong military presence in the region.

1

U.S. Department of State, Clinton’s Speech on U.S. Agenda in Asia-Pacific Region, 28 October 2010,
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/October/20101028191722su0.9814875.html&distid=ucs, accessed 30 October 2010.

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Clinton’s remarks captured the mood among US allies and partners that given China’s
rise and the apparent demise of Beijing’s former policy of ‘reassurance’ in recent
months a strong linkage between US leadership and its forward deployed militarypresence was vital to secure America’s national security interests and to maintainregional stability. Despite its impressive economic growth, China is far from offering
an attractive alternative leadership model for most Asia-Pacific countries. In thiscontext, a narrow focus on growing Chinese economic and military capabilities
underestimates the difficulty for Beijing of translating these assets into actual politicalinfluence and leadership capacity. In other words, a possible Chinese intention to
replace US leadership and its related military presence depends on Beijing’s ability toprovide for an alternative regional security model. If China fails to provide an
acceptable alternative leadership model and uses its growing leverage to bully its
Asia-Pacific neighbours, these countries will only move closer to the US.
Recent events are very instructive in this regard. China’s reactions to the sinking of
the Cheonan and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea have done much toreinvigorate US traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea, and tostrengthening security partnerships with Southeast Asian countries like Singapore andVietnam. US leadership and military presence as a building block in a ‘hedging’strategy against uncertain Chinese behaviour seems to become more attractive formany countries in the region. Thus, contrary to widespread assumptions about adecline in US leadership the opposite might actually be the case. Growing Chinese
assertiveness will work detrimental to any plans Beijing might have to undermine thelegitimacy of US leadership and military presence in the region.
In sum, the likelihood of an American retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific region
seems rather low for the foreseeable future. 2 For this to happen, a combination of
events will need to occur. These factors include a dramatic shift in US foreign policy
thinking coupled with a continued, massive downturn of the US economy; theevolution of an attractive Chinese leadership model; the conclusion of US allies(foremost Japan) and partners that they are better off without American militarypresence; and the development of new bilateral or multilateral defence structures. In
this light, the assumption that the US will no longer be able and willing to sustain its
military presence in the Asia-Pacific is premature. Likewise, the possibility that AsiaPacific allies will ask America to pull its troops out and to put their faith in the US asan ‘offshore balancer’ seems unlikely for the time being. The issue is therefore not if
the US will reduce its military presence but rather what functions it will perform in a
future Asia-Pacific security order. The key issue here is if US presence will be
detrimental to accommodating China’s rise.
Precondition for China’s peaceful accommodation
Rather than being a destabilising factor, US military presence will be a necessary
precondition for China’s peaceful accommodation in an evolving Asia-Pacificsecurity order. This argument is based on the proposition that absent effective
alternative bilateral or multilateral structures to deal with traditional security
dilemmas and enduring questions of deterring major power wars, US militarypresence will be critical in reassuring allies and partners, and in encouraging
responsible Chinese strategic behaviour.

2

See also Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Future of American Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 6 (November/
December 2010).

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A number of different order-building concepts in the future Asia-Pacific beyond
uncontested US primacy can be envisaged, including a new balance of power with ahigh potential for US-Chinese strategic competition, US-Chinese condominium, and a‘concert of powers’ (including Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia and potentially
Russia). In all of these scenarios, however, US military presence will be critical tomaintaining stability:•••

In a potential ‘Asian Cold War’, US presence will be instrumental to guarantee
stable conventional and nuclear extended deterrence, similar to America’s rolein Europe during the Cold War. In a new framework of strategic stability US
presence will allow to develop mutual ‘red lines’ between the antagonistic
parties, thereby contributing to crisis stability. In this scenario, the ‘places’ inSoutheast Asia and Australia could be turned into bases to project power in acontainment strategy.
In the case of a US-Chinese condominium, where both China and the US reacha stable and mutually acceptable power sharing arrangement (a scenario which
will take significant time to develop and which will suffer from setbacks), US
military presence will provide two central functions. US bases in Japan, South
Korea and Guam will still be kept – even if in reduced numbers – to reassure
allies such as Japan in the case of a resurgent China. Beyond this, US maritime
forces will provide vital military capabilities in a new division of labour
between China and the US to, for example, jointly secure the SLOCs.
Finally, in a hierarchical ‘concert of powers’ scenario in which powers like the
US, China, Japan, India, South Korea and potentially Russia will aim atsecuring influence in a maritime environment of ‘multiple sea-denial’, the US
as the still biggest maritime power again will prove crucial in reassuring bothallies and China about their respective ‘spheres of influence’.

Very likely, the future security order in the Asia-Pacific will be characterised by nosingle country being able to dominate the maritime domain. While China’s growing
maritime and air anti-access capabilities over time will deny the US unrestricted ‘sea
control’, the PLAN will likewise not be able to exert ‘sea control’ itself – also partly
because of Japan’s significant ‘sea denial’ capabilities. Also, Chinese military ability
to holding US Navy carrier strike groups at risk does not necessarily translate into
political influence, nor is it sufficient to prevent the US from continuing to project
power to protect its strategic interests. As a consequence, China in the end will benefit
from US military presence in that the US will be more ‘relaxed’ than other regional
powers to accommodate an increased Chinese strategic reach as long as Beijing is notoverstepping well-defined boundaries. In the end, managing the new maritime
security order in the Asia-Pacific will depend on the powers’ ability to agree on
mutual maritime ‘spheres of influence’.
Conclusion
An end of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific is neither desirable for the mutual
goal to maintaining a stable security order, nor is it likely to happen any time soon.
US presence, primarily build around a set of bilateral alliances and new security
partnerships, should be regarded as a stimulus rather than an impediment to future
strategic stability, also in regards to approaches to accommodate the rise of China.
Since security cooperation and integration are not ends in themself, but means tosecure countries’ strategic objectives and to maintain regional peace and stability, theStrategic and Defence Studies Centre
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Asia-Pacific region will benefit much from keeping the existing system of bilateraland multilateral structures of security cooperation. It is hard to imagine current
multilateral settings providing any credible alternative to the US-based system when it
comes to addressing the manifold security dilemmas and the core questions of war
and peace related to the future Asia-Pacific security order.
US-based bilateralism will continue to effectively contribute to regional security.
Allies, partners and even potential adversaries will think twice before asking the US
to leave as absent effective alternative mechanisms of collective defence thewithdrawal of US military forces would open ‘Pandora’s Box’ of all sorts of security
dilemmas in the Asia-Pacific. A look at the European theatre might be instructive here.
Over 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, European NATO allies stillshiver at the prospect that the US might withdraw its forces from the region altogether.
And, unlike the Asia-Pacific, this is a region commonly perceived to having overcome
traditional security problems.
Those who ponder about Asia-Pacific countries in the future being able to maintaining
regional stability ‘on their own’ will not only have to resolve the long-standing
controversy over ‘who belongs to the region and who does not’. Even more critically,
they will have to demonstrate how the remaining and (potentially) new security
structures can effectively substitute for US military presence. Otherwise, this‘experiment’ can result in disastrous consequences. Anyone in for an Asian NATO?

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