Feature 2: Creation of a Global Civilization—
Transcending Multiculturalism
From the Symposium in conjunction with the 31st Annual
Conference of the IOP
On March 19 and 20, 2016, the Institute of Oriental Philosophy (IOP) held its
31st annual conference at Soka University and the IOP respectively.
The IOP invited Professor Fathali M. Moghaddam from the U.S. as a
distinguished guest to the symposium, “Creation of a Global Civilization—
Transcending Multiculturalism” held on March 19. Prof. Moghaddam is a
professor of psychology and director of the Interdisciplinary Program in
Cognitive Science at Georgetown University.
In his speech entitled, “Omniculturalism and Our Human Path,” he introduced the idea of omniculturalism as a constructive and practical policy for
managing diversity. He pointed out that the globalization is having spread “alife-and-death struggle between forces for and against the open society.”
Furthermore, it increased contact between different groups that can lead toenormous psychological threats. He emphasized that traditional policies
based on assimilation and multiculturalism have led many groups to feelthreatened and are creating problems. As an alternative policy, he proposed
omniculturalism, and stressed that it gives priority to human commonality, andis only concerned with inter-group differences as a secondary matter.
At the symposium, Professor Yutaka Ishigami, Senior Research Fellow, and
Ms. Fumiko Tsutaki, Commissioned Research Fellow of the IOP, delivered theirspeeches. This issue includes three papers presented at the symposium.

Prof. Moghaddam giving a speech. From right, Ms. Tsutaki,
Prof. Ishigami, and IOP Director, Dr. Kawada

76

Omniculturalism and Our Human Path

Fathali M. Moghaddam

I

N what is arguably Shakespeare’s greatest play, Hamlet describes
humans in the same speech as “the beauty of the world”, but also as“quintessence of dust” (Shakespeare, Hamlet, II. ii. 293–310). This contradiction jumps to life when we critically review the human conditionin the 21st century. On the one hand, we have established and propagated universal standards for human rights (Finkel & Moghaddam, 2005),
brought fatalities from direct violence more under control (Pinker,
2011), and taken some steps to make universal health care a reality, totake advantage of impressive advances in medical science (Rodin & deFerranti, 2012). Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased
more than three-fold since 1950. These improvements reflect an imageof humans as “the beauty of the world”.
On the other hand, human rights violations continue in many parts of
the world, sometimes perpetrated by the United States and other Western powers (Zimbardo, 2008), but the International Criminal Court has
only targeted African leaders for rights violations (Villa-Vicencio,2009). Second, the real level of physical violence is camouflaged by improved medical care, which often helps to keep even the seriously
wounded alive, while structural and cultural violence have in many ways
increased in recent decades. Third, broader measures of economic welfare, such as Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) have shown a decline
since the late 1970s (Kubiszewski, Costanza, Franco, Lawn, Talberth,Jackson, & Aylmer, 2013). In addition, environmental degradation
continues at an alarming rate (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2008), as does theconcentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands (Atkinson, 2015;
Dorling, 2014; Picketty, 2014) with dire health consequences for thepoor (Marmot, 2004). These trends are more in line with the view ofhumans as “quintessence of dust”.

The ‘Global’ Turning Point
My point of departure in this discussion is the assertion by scientists(Corlett, 2015) that we have reached a ‘global’ turning point in the77

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omniculturalism and our human pathevolution of human societies, the start of what has been termed the
Anthropocene (‘new human’) time period. This new time period emphasizes the central role of humankind in shaping geology and ecology.
The build up to the start of this new period arguably began about
12,000 years ago, when we established human settlements, and used
domesticated animals and better farming techniques, as well as more effective social organizations, to produce a substantial and dependable
surplus. On the basis of this surplus, we developed stratified and well organized societies, with specialized branches of governance. The industrial revolution significantly increased our productivity from the 18 th
century, and the computer revolution of recent decades has once again
enabled significant rises in productivity and resulted in larger surpluses.
But this rise in human material productivity has not been accompaniedby comparable growth in the quality of social relationships and morality.
Various forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence, together withmassive environmental degradation, raise serious challenges for ourcontinued survival; the Anthropocene period is a ‘global’ turning point,
because we must all succeed or fail together.
In order to increase the probability that we will move toward becoming “the beauty of the world”, we need to make foundational changes in
how we organize relationships between human groups. We have beenbrought to this potentially destructive turning point by accelerating globalization, which is resulting in an unprecedented level of contact between human groups with little prior history of large-scale intergroupcontact (Moghaddam, 2008b; 2010). In this emerging new world, where
we are forced to interact directly and indirectly with massive numbers ofoutgroup members, without adequate time for adaptation, we must
develop and adopt new ways of managing diversity. The traditional policies for managing diversity are proving to be inadequate to meet thedemands of the 21st century. The traditional paths will end with humans
being much closer to “quintessence of dust” than “the beauty of theworld”.
As a way to stimulate more critical re-thinking of our current
direction, my modest proposal is that we consider the alternative path ofomniculturalism as our future policy for managing diversity: this newpolicy involves first teaching people to give priority to human commonalities, and only secondly giving attention to group-based differences.
This is in contrast to the currently popular path of multiculturalism,
which gives priority to and celebrates group-based differences, and thehistorically important path of assimilation, which typically involves
giving priority to majority group characteristics. My use of the termomniculturalism and our human path79

omniculturalism is new (Moghaddam, 2012), but the main idea it
reflects is ancient and shared in many different cultural traditions. For
example, the unity of, and commonalities in, humankind is a major
theme in Buddhist tradition (Ikeda, 2010), as well as some other major
human traditions (Moghaddam, 2016).
This discussion is organized in four main parts. In part one, I establish
the context of our discussion by explaining the nature of 21st century
globalization, what I term ‘the new globalization’ and the ways in which
it is unique. Second, I highlight two of the most important consequencesof the ‘new globalization’: wide-scale and rapidly increasing intergroupcontact and, second, the inevitable clash between forces for and against
open societies and open minds. In part three, I critically examine themajor policies for managing diversity, with particular focus on multiculturalism. I argue that multiculturalism policy has both resulted inminority groups underperforming in the education system of Western
societies, and in the exaggeration of inter-group differences andconflicts, creating room for radicalization movements to grow. Fourth,I discuss omniculturalism as a constructive and practical alternative
policy, one we should embrace globally for the 21st century.

1. The ‘New Globalization’
It could be argued that globalization has existed in different forms forthousands of years. For example, two thousand years ago the Roman
Empire spanned from North Africa to England, and in the nineteenth
century the ‘the sun never set’ on the British Empire, because it was so
expansive. However, what I call the ‘new globalization’ is in key ways
different and new.
First, globalization is now ‘fractured’ because it involves two diametrically opposed forces, captured by the phrase ‘global economy, local
identity’ (Moghaddam, 2008a). Economic and technological forces are
moving the world toward greater integration, involving larger and larger
units, such as the European Union, NAFTA, and the like. These forces
are encouraging people to act economically as part of ‘one world’. On
the other hand, local identities continue to have a powerful pull, motivated by basic psychological identity needs (Moghaddam, 2008a). People
continue to feel strong links to local identities, particularly based on ethnicity and the idea of homeland. Just as Europe expands and becomes
more integrated, Scottish and Basque and other ‘separatist’ movements
continue to be strong, and at times grow even stronger. ‘Brexit’ reflects
this same trend. Just as NAFTA strengthens economic integration,

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Quebec separatism remains an active movement threatening Canadianunity. Numerous separatist movements thrive in different parts of theworld (for example, Kurdish, Bosnian, Croatian, Kosova-Albanian,Basque, as well as dozens of separatist movements in Latin Americanand African countries). Thus, the new globalization is fractured, witheconomic and technological forces moving people to become part oflarger units, but ethnic, religious, language, and other group identity
bases pulling people to the local.
Second, globalization today is different and new because it is driven
by technological and economic factors that are unpredictable, influencedby small non-state actors, outside the control of even the most powerful
governments. At this moment, there are small groups of young innovators working in basements and garages, with very little capital andresources, who are creating the next Google, Facebook, or Twitter, oreven creating an alternative to the World Wide Web. We are unable topredict exactly how these innovations will change us over the next three
decades, just as it was impossible to predict three decades ago how
the internet, Google, Facebook and Twitter would evolve and change us
and create what we have become today.
Electronic integration of the world has facilitated and speeded up economic integration. Despite the continuation of various barriers to tradeacross nations and regions, the world is now integrated economically toan unprecedented extent, as reflected in the global 2008–2009 financial
crisis. The economic plight of Greece and other small economies has to
be of concern to economic giants such as the United States, China, andGermany; to echo John Dunne (1572–1631), everyone is now economically and technologically part of the whole.
Similarly, security has now become global, with even remote parts of
the world being part of the interdependent whole. In the 19 th century,
the political leaders of the British Empire did concern themselves with
distant places such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, but
nobody sitting in Westminster felt threatened because of the possibility
that London would be attacked by people from Afghanistan, Sudan,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other such ‘remote’ places. But in the 21st
century, the leaders of the most powerful nation are forced to treat seriously threats from even the most distant places; the perpetrators of the
9/11 terrorist attacks mostly originated from Saudi Arabia, and terrorist
attacks against Western targets in general continue to be perpetrated bypeople with strong links to the Near and Middle East.

omniculturalism and our human path81

2. Consequences of Fractured Globalization
Fractured globalization is having widespread consequences for all of
humanity. In this discussion, I only focus on two consequences that haveparticularly important implications for peace and democracy. The first
consequence concerns intergroup contact that is unprecedented in scopeand speed, resulting in intergroup tensions and violence, sometimes
direct. The second consequence involves rising threats to democracies
around the world.
Increased Intergroup Contact and Catastrophic Evolution

It is useful to think of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors responsible for thedramatic increase in the movement of vast numbers of people around theworld. ‘Push’ factors are events that cause people to want to escape their
homeland. These include violent revolutions, wars, invasions, lack ofrule of law, and repression of human rights, as has taken place, for example, in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, andvarious other countries of the Near and Middle East since the 1970s.
‘Pull’ factors include all those features of a society that make it attractive to outsiders. These include rule of law, employment and educational
opportunities, higher standards of safety and health, and particularly
opportunities for the young to live in peace and enjoy basic freedoms.
Push and Pull factors include the impact of widely differing birthrates of countries and regions around the world. In some parts of theworld, including the European Union, the birth rate among the indigenous population is well below the 2.1% needed to maintain a stable population. Japan and Russia are also in this category. These countries areexperiencing a decline in their populations, and a lack of young workers. There are many different ways of trying to deal with this challenge,
including using robots to do more of the basic work, raising worker productivity, increasing the retirement age, and so on. But one of the main
solutions is to import labor, as has been done throughout the history of
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. More recently,
the European Union has been importing labor on a large scale.
Where would labor be imported from? The answer is, from countries
that are experiencing population increases and have excess labor. Most
African, Latin American, and Asian societies fall into this category(excluding China, where until recently the ‘one child’ policy was inplace). Improvements in health care have resulted in many African,
Latin American, and Asian countries having population growth rates
above 2.1%, in some cases substantially so.

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omniculturalism and our human path

Globalization has facilitated the movement of tens of millions of people from African, Latin American, and Asian countries to North America, Western Europe, and some other parts of the world where labor is inhigh demand (such as the Arab Gulf States). This movement has resulted in dramatically increased contact between human groups with little
prior history of intergroup contact. Some such movements have been
rapid and unplanned. For example, in the summer of 2015, the pace ofrefugee exodus from Syria, Iraq, and some other countries of the Nearand Middle East increased. Millions of refugees poured westward, making their way into the European Union through Greece and various Eastern European countries. The intended destination of these refugees has
been Western European countries, particularly Germany, which has thelargest and strongest economy in Europe. Most of these refugees are
Muslim, and many of them are traditional in their dress, attitudes, andcognitive style in general. The close proximity of European Union borders to the Near and Middle East means that, according to the distancetraveled hypothesis (Moghaddam, 2008b), they need less resources toreach the European Union relative to North America, which is muchfurther away and needs greater resources to reach. As a consequence,
refugees reaching North America from the Near and Middle East tend tohave greater resources. In contrast, illegal immigrants from Mexico,
who only need to cross a border, need a lower level of resources to enterthe United States.
The ‘Life and Death’ Struggle to Save and Expand the Open Society

A second consequence of fractured globalization is that in the 21st
century we are experiencing a life-and-death struggle between forces forand against the open society. Of course there was already competition
between these forces in the 20 th century, particularly during the Second
World War and the Cold War era. What is new in the 21st century is that
globalization will not allow pro- and anti-open society forces to live inisolation and ‘peaceful coexistence’, they are forced into contact andinto battle against one other.
Globalization in the 21st century has put a great deal of pressure on
the more closed societies, from the giants, China and Russia, to thesmaller countries, such as North Korea and Iran. Despite keeping up
strong barriers against the outside world, a great deal of Western (andparticularly American) cultural phenomena penetrates the barriers andreaches the populations of these dictatorships. The young are widely
influenced by American popular culture, including music, films, andclothing fashion. Most importantly, the young around the world areomniculturalism and our human path83

influenced by ideas of freedom and individuality expressed in popular
culture produced by more democratic societies. These ideas seepthrough national borders, using electronic highways when otherhighways are blocked. In this way, dictatorships feel threatened by
globalization and the expansion of pro-democracy values.
The reaction of dictatorships to these ‘threats’ has been retrenchment,using nationalistic and various traditional ideologies. The Chinese rulers
have fallen back to Confucius and other traditional thinkers, while Putin
has relied heavily on traditional Russian mythologies and institutions,such as the Russian Orthodox Church. In some other dictatorships, suchas Iran and Saudi Arabia, regimes have relied on religious traditions as adefense against ‘imported’ ideas of freedom and democracy. Common
to all these ‘defenses’ is the idea that ‘we have to keep to our own authentic traditions, which are superior to imported ideas of democracy’.
As an added layer of defense, Russia and Iran hold regular elections, sothey make a show of including the people in decision making. Of
course, the vetting of candidates and other measures ensures that theregime controls the outcome (Moghaddam, 2013).
Dictatorial regimes have routinely defended their actions to keep theirsocieties closed through reference to their right to govern according tolocal traditions and customs, as opposed to ‘international’ criteria. The
basic argument they make is that ‘Western democracy’ and so-called‘universal human rights’ are not applicable everywhere; moreover, ‘democracy’ and ‘rights’ are excuses used by Western powers, particularly
the United States, to interfere in the affairs of other nations—often withnegative consequences for those other nations. In this regard, the catastrophic invasion of Iraq in 2003 by American-led forces provides readyammunition for dictatorial governments. This is very unfortunate,because it distracts from the basic point that all human beings havecommon needs in terms of freedom and personal development. Local
customs and traditions must not be used as an excuse to prevent
improvements in the individual and collective lives of humans.
Clearly, we do not as yet have any actualized democracies, societiesin which all citizens enjoy “full, informed, equal participation in wide
aspects of political, economic, and cultural decision making independent of financial investment and resources” (Moghaddam, 2016, p. 4).
But it is also clear that some societies have made greater progress toward becoming an actualized democracy, whereas some other societies
are far closer to absolute dictatorship.
The support of dictatorships for ‘doing things our way’ and each nation maintaining its different way of governing, has corresponded with a84

omniculturalism and our human pathtrend in Western societies to ‘celebrate and maintain inter-group differences’ as a policy for managing diversity. This is a striking coincidence:at the same time that dictatorships such as Iran are justifying their mistreatment of minorities through reference to local ‘culture’ and theirright to ‘govern their way’ on the basis of their particular interpretationsof Islam, in Western societies since the 1960s there has been an emphasis on ‘celebrating diversity’ and each group having the right to maintaintheir own distinct culture. In both of these trends, there is a rejection ofuniversal human needs, values, and rights.

3. Policies for Managing Diversity
Given the context created for us by fractured globalization, what is thebest policy for managing diversity in our 21st century world? In thiscontext, there is rapid and vast movement of people and information andresources around the world. Contact between groups is at an unprecedented level, and increasing. Should we follow the path of assimilation,
and assume that all cultures will melt into the dominant culture or into
one another? Or, should we give priority to group differences throughmulticulturalism policy? I argue that both of these traditional paths arein major ways flawed; we must explore alternative policies for managing
diversity. My proposal is that we give serious consideration to a newpolicy, omniculturalism, which gives priority to human commonalities,
and only secondarily attends to inter-group differences.

Assimilation and Globalization
On the surface, assimilation and globalization seem to go hand in
hand. As globalization proceeds, there is increased contact between
groups from different parts of the world, as well as greater cultural,technological, and economic integration. This would seem to be in linewith greater and greater assimilation. However, as we discussed under
the topic of ‘fractured globalization’, the movement toward global integration is countered by a movement in the opposite direction, driven bya need for local identities. Thus, at a deeper level assimilation andglobalization are only in some respects moving in the same direction.
It is also useful to distinguish between two types of assimilation(Moghaddam, 2008a). Minority assimilation involves minority groups
assimilating into the culture of the majority group. This is exactly thekind of assimilation being forced on the world by Western powers, according to fundamentalists and traditionalists of various kinds, including
nationalists and religious groups. These critics argue that globalization

omniculturalism and our human path85

is really Americanization and the spread of Western secular values; allother groups are being pressured to assimilate into this dominant way oflife through the powerful and pervasive influence of ‘Hollywood culture’ and ‘Mcdonaldization’ (Ritzer, 2014). In reaction, fundamentalists
and traditionalists are retrenching and defending what they see to be
their embattled ways of life.
But there is a second kind of assimilation that we must also consider,melting-pot assimilation, involving the melting of all groups into one
another to create a new global culture. One could argue that in areas
such as popular music, entertainment, as well as food, different types offusions are underway, with contributions from many different cultures,
leading to outcomes that are novel for everyone. But this seemingly
egalitarian process, with all cultures contributing to a new global culture, is dismissed by those critics who see the global dominance ofWestern and particularly American culture as both overwhelming andreinforced by military power. These critics see it necessary to put up defensive walls against the influx of Western and particularly American
culture—the kinds of electronic and other walls set up by the governments of Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, China, to name just a
few countries.
Ultimately, the most important reaction against assimilation has been
based on identity needs. Groups of all kinds, particularly religious andnationalist, have insisted that they need to retain their own distinct identities and ways of life. They do not want to assimilate into a global
culture—particularly not one dominated by the United States. This identity-based reaction has coincided with the rise of a new and apparently
more democratic policy for managing diversity, which I turn to next.

Multiculturalism“National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense,
must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of
this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas,
attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will
help create this initial confidence. It can form the basis of a society
which is based on fair play for all”.
This is part of a statement made by the Canadian Prime Minister
Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1919–2000) in the Canadian House of Commonson October 8, 1971 (Trudeau 1971, 1992). In the same statement,
Trudeau asserted that there is no official culture in Canada, and individuals should not be locked into a culture by their birth. Trudeau’s statement was part of a multiculturalism movement that swept across much

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omniculturalism and our human pathof the world from the 1960s, as the concern with ‘identity’ took center
stage in the lives of individuals and groups. Associated with this movement was greater concern with indigenous identities; minority groupmembers in particular returning to their roots, re-constructing theiridentities, and celebrating their ‘differentness’. Canada became thefirst country to adopt multiculturalism as official national policy, andin many other countries multiculturalism became de facto national
policy (Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014).
The multiculturalism movement has been associated with minority
rights, what is seen to be owed to minorities. In his 1971 House of Commons statement on multiculturalism, Prime Minister Trudeau (quoted
above) asserted that multiculturalism can form “...the basis of a society
which is based on fair play for all”. Minority groups would be given therights they were owed, and treated fairly. In line with this, from the
1960s various movements emerged concerned with minority rights—
marching under the banner of ‘Women’s rights’, ‘Black rights’, ‘Hispanic rights’, ‘Aboriginal rights’, ‘Gay rights’, and so on. The assertion
has been that ethnic minorities in particular would be helped by multiculturalism policy. However, as I argue below, with respect to ethnic
minorities there is a fatal flaw in this argument; multiculturalism has not
resulted in fair play for all.
Multiculturalism and Minority Performance:The Case of Education

From its beginning, the impact of multiculturalism on ethnic minorities was problematic, and sometimes even detrimental. Unlike women,
who in the 20 th century entered the education system determined tocompete with men on the assumption that women and men should betreated the same, multiculturalism resulted in the highlighting of how‘ethnic minorities are different’ and should be treated differently. The
priority given to group-based differences has had unintended consequences. Schools and universities now celebrate and exaggerate how
ethnic minorities are different, formalizing ‘African-American month’,‘Hispanic month’, and programs on ‘African-American culture’, and thelike. Ethnic minority students are now encouraged to see themselves as
different, and to celebrate and act on ‘their differentness’. The notsurprising result has been that many ethnic minority students haveperceived a different set of paths for their own educational development,
paths away from traditional ‘white’ middle-class professions.
In contrast, in the education sector women have emphasized how they
are not different from men and can compete successfully with men.
The outcome of the different paths taken by women and ethnic mi-omniculturalism and our human path87

norities has been markedly different in education. Women are now successfully competing with men, and in many domains outperforming
men, in higher education. The question in education has changed from‘How can women catch up?’ to, ‘Why are men falling behind?’ (Conger& Long, 2010) and ‘What does the rise of women mean for education?’(DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013). About 60% of undergraduates in higher
education are female. Universities in the United States have been investing in larger American football programs as a way to attract more males.
In medicine, law, and science graduate programs, women are now atleast level with men. Women have also made up a lot of ground in business and government related graduate programs. The contrast is
dramatic in comparison with the relatively poor performance of ethnic
minorities in American education (Dixson & Rousseau, 2006; Kena,Musu-Gillette, Robinson, Wang, Rathbun, et al., 2015). In his excellent
book Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis, Robert Putnam (2015)
clarifies the situation in this way, “Inequality in the United States
increasingly operates through education...women are now more likely tograduate from college than men...Progress on racial difference has beenless encouraging...racial gaps in schooling and involvement with thecriminal justice system remain immense...black children experience
less upward mobility and more downward mobility than their whitecounterparts who started at the same income level” (pp. 18–19).
My contention is that one of the factors leading to enormous successfor women in American education, and relatively poor performance byAfrican-Americans and Hispanics, is that women have competed headon with white men, whereas many African-Americans and Hispanics
have been influenced by the rhetoric of multiculturalism to see themselves as ‘different’ and as needing to go down non-mainstream paths.
These are the two largest ethnic minority groups and now make up
about 110 million (one-third of the total United States population). Their
poor educational performance is problematic, because the 21st century
economy needs a far more skilled and better educated workforce.
Multiculturalism, Radicalization, and Fractured Globalization

On the world stage, the multiculturalism movement is in line with that
aspect of fractured globalization that celebrates and even manufacturesdifferences across different groups, including nations, ethnicities, andreligions. In particular, the relativism underlying multiculturalism
encourages the rejection of universal principles of rights and duties,
common human values, and shared human characteristics. The result isa world in which humans with manufactured identities perceive a right88

omniculturalism and our human path

to pursue their ‘different cultural paths’, with every path being as
valuable as any other. There is a hint of this in Pierre Trudeau’s 1971
Canadian House of Commons statement, when he claims there is no
official culture in Canada. By implication, no culture should be given
priority over any other culture.
Ironically, the relativism underlying multiculturalism has opened thedoor to extremist religious groups that reject the very openness that is
supposed to be at the heart of multicultural societies (Moghaddam,
2006, 2008a, 2010); they take advantage of the freedoms and humanrights available in democracies to fight against these same freedoms andhuman rights. These groups include violent Islamic Jihadi movements ofvarious kinds, responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in major Western cities, including New York, London, Madrid, Paris, as well as more
remote places, such as St. Bernardino, California. Of course, these terrorists are not relativists, but relativism and the focus on group-based
differences has given them room to grow. They reject our common
humanity and the fact that human beings are in so many important
respects very similar.
In conclusion, the priority given to group-based differences and theunderlying relativism of multiculturalism has not helped, and probably
has hindered, the performance of African-Americans and Hispanics inthe U.S. education system. Multiculturalism ideology has probably had
a similar role in shaping the poor educational performance of ethnic
minorities in the European Union. Of course, this is not to diminish therole of socioeconomic status (SES), which has a powerful and independent role in educational performance (Agirdag, Van Houtte & Van
Avermaet, 2012).

4. Omniculturalism“The omnicultural imperative: During interactions with others, under
all conditions, first give priority to the characteristics you share withother people as members of the human group”(Moghaddam, 2012, p. 318)
I propose that children should be socialized in families and taught inschools to act according to the ‘omnicultural imperative’. The objective
should be to give highest priority to what all human beings have in common, and of thinking of oneself first and foremost as a member of humanity. This is opposite to the current multiculturalism ethos of teaching
children to give priority to group-based differences, and of thinking of

omniculturalism and our human path89

oneself first and foremost as a member of ethnic group X, religion Y,
and so on.
Omniculturalism involves both rights, what are owed to us, and duties, what we owe others (Moghaddam, 2000; Moghaddam, Slocum,
Finkel, & Harré, 2000). On the one hand, every one of us is owed theright to be included in the human category and treated as a person who
has all of the many important common characteristics of humans. On theother hand, we all share the duty to treat others in this same ‘inclusive’
way, giving priority to our common humanity and our important sharedcharacteristics. These rights and duties are inter-dependent andinter-locking.
The fairness of omniculturalism as a policy becomes clearer when we
consider John Rawls’s (1971) famous thought experiment: imagine aworld in which all roles are re-assigned, but none of us are certain what
our future roles will be. Because of this ‘veil of ignorance’, we cannot
be sure of our group memberships; for example, we are uncertain as towhether we will be male or female, Black or White, or rich or poor.
Rawls’s thought experiment forces us to construct a world in which all
humans are treated fairly because of their common humanity, disregarding their particular roles and group memberships. The question changes
from, ‘How should a poor Black person be treated?’ or ‘How shoulda rich White woman be treated?’ to, ‘How should a human being betreated?’
The inclusive nature of omniculturalism makes it more compatible
with democracy, in contrast with the detrimental impact of multiculturalism on democracy. Multiculturalism ideology has resulted in the balkanization of politics in North America and the European Union. Voting
blocs emerge in elections, so that who one votes for is related to one’s
religious, ethnic, and other group affiliations. The particular group memberships that influence voting vary to some degree across nations, butbalkanization tends to be present in most North American and EU societies. For example, studies show that religion plays a particularly important role in the United States (see Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2014)
and ethnicity tends to be more important than religion in the EU context(e.g., Hajnal & Trounstine, 2014). But the net result of this trend isclear: voting in such multicultural blocs diminishes the quality of
democracy. In contrast, omniculturalism rejects voting on the basis ofreligion, ethnicity, and the like, and gives priority to voting forcandidates on the basis of their qualifications, irrespective of their groupmemberships.
A second step in omniculturalism policy is to acknowledge and pay

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omniculturalism and our human pathattention to group differences. However, this must be done appropriately, so that the priority always remains on human commonalities. Children must be socialized to understand that relative to what human beings
share and the similarities they have, differences across ethnic, religious,
national, and other groups are small and should not be highlighted andexaggerated. Such socialization is against the traditional trends foundin most cultures, where ethnocentrism results in groups giving priority
to group-based differences, and in general seeing themselves as both
distinct and superior (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Moghaddam,
2008a).This suggests that the implementation of omniculturalism (likeRawls’s thought experiment) requires citizens with certain special stylesof cognition and action that need to be nurtured—a topic I turn to next.

The Democratic Citizen and Omniculturalism
The development and implementation of omniculturalism policy requires changes in how people think and act, particularly towards giving
priority to human commonalities and the unity of humanity. But how
feasible is it to bring about such changes, and how much time will beneeded to achieve enough change? To examine these questions,researchers must explore the psychology of change, a path that hasreceived very little attention so far (de la Sabblonnière, Taylor, Perozzo& Sadykova, 2009; Moghaddam, 2002). However, ‘malleability’ and‘plasticity’ have been studied extensively by one group of researchers,
neuroscientists, and we can borrow some ideas from them.
Political Plasticity: How Much and How Fast Can People Change Styles
of Political Thinking and Action?

The term ‘plasticity’ is commonly used in neuroscience research torefer to change in the human brain (Huttenlocher, 2002). Research has
shown that brain plasticity is higher in the early stages of life, relative toadulthood after the age of about 25. Research also suggests there arecertain ‘critical’ (sometimes referred to as ‘sensitive’) periods in development. For example, language learning probably has to take place byaround 8-10 years of age—after that a child who has not learned any
language will find it extremely difficult to do so, and will probably growinto adulthood mentally impaired. The research on neuroplasticity andcritical periods raises fascinating questions about plasticity in the political domain, but available research on related topics such as ‘social
plasticity’ (Collin, 2016; Rodriguez, Rebar & Fowler-Fin, 2013) and‘cultural plasticity’ (Takagi, Silverstein & Crimmins, 2007) provide
little guidance for us, in part because they have been applied mostly toomniculturalism and our human path91

animals. Based on my personal experiences of life in a society following
a revolution, as well my studies of experimental evidence and historicalcase studies, I offer some observations regarding political plasticity, theextent to which change is feasible in political behavior in a given time
period.
Experimental evidence on conformity and obedience (see Moghaddam,
2005, chapters 15 & 16) suggests that extreme conditions can leadordinary people to change behavior in specific areas and even carry out
extreme acts that were not predicted. For example, in Milgram’s (1974)
famous series of studies, which are still valid today (Burger, 2009), individuals with normal personality profiles obeyed an authority figure to do(what they thought to be) serious and even fatal harm to a stranger. Historical case studies of extreme conditions, such as those created by Nazi
Germany and other dictatorships, demonstrate that ordinary people canbe changed to become highly destructive against fellow humans—otherswith whom they were previously living peacefully. Anthropological casestudies demonstrate the same possibilities, an example being Turnbull’s(1972) study of the Ik, a traditionally nomadic tribe who were forcibly
settled in unsuitable territory and within three generations degenerated
into a self-destructive collection of individuals intent on personal survival, even at the expense of their own children and parents.
Although these examples demonstrate how humans can change to
become destructive and to take on the worst aspects of dictatorial
life, there are fewer examples available of people changing rapidly fromdestructive, dictatorial conditions to constructive, democratic forms oflife. This may be because we developed our psychological characteristics and social skills in the context of dictatorships over thousands ofyears, and even in the 21st century it is still far easier to establish dictatorships than democracies (Moghaddam, 2013, 2016). One after another,revolutions against dictatorships have resulted in the ousting of one
dictator, to be replaced by other dictators, such as in Iran, Russia, andEgypt. Post World War II Japan represents the one successful example
of fairly rapid change from dictatorship to democracy in a major society,but this was a ‘top down’ change imposed through foreign occupation,
involving a highly literate, industrialized local population.
Rapid change was the dominant feature of Japan following World War
II (Haddad, 2012; Tsurumi, 1970). Japan is probably the most dramaticdemonstration of how movement toward more open, democratic
governance can be achieved in a relatively short time. However, the conditions in which this change took place were extreme. In his highly
insightful book about post-war Japan, John Dower (1999) argues that

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omniculturalism and our human path

“Because the defeat was so shattering, the surrender so unconditional,
the disgrace of the militarists so complete, the misery the “holy war”
had brought so personal, starting over involved not merely reconstructing buildings, but also rethinking what it meant to speak of a good lifeand good society...” (p. 25). General MacArthur and his command had avery high level of control over just about every aspect of post-war Japanand could introduce democratization changes at a rapid speed that in theAmerican context at that time would have been considered extremist(Dower, 1999). The fact that change did take place so rapidly gives hopefor the future, “The ease with which the great majority of Japanese wereable to throw off...intense militaristic indoctrination...offers lessons on
the limits of socialization and the fragility of ideology, that we have seenelsewhere...in the collapse of totalitarian regimes” (Dower, 1999, p. 29).
As I have argued elsewhere (Moghaddam, 2013), it is brute force rather
than ideology that keeps the masses obedient in totalitarian regimes.
Once the regime loses the ability to use extreme violence to keep control, the masses enjoy a brief period of opportunity to learn new ways ofthinking and acting in order to move in democratic directions. But they
can only take advantage of this ‘opportunity bubble’ if the leadershipand powerful institutions dominating society support such a move.
Japan after World War II experienced a rare moment in history, whenthe most powerful leaders and institutions worked to move the country
toward greater openness and democracy. Of course, this move was facilitated by the high level of education among the Japanese population, as
well as the advanced level of science, efficiency in management and organizations in Japanese society generally. The transformation of Japanas an advanced democratic society was so rapid that in just over three
decades after experiencing utter defeat, Japan had become the envy ofindustrial and organizational managers in the West. Vogel (1979) wrote
a well-received book entitled Japan As Number One: Lessons for America. By the 1980s, American and European management teams werevisiting Japan to learn lessons from the ‘Japanese miracle’.
The post-war experience of Japan suggests that under certain conditions societal and individual change can take place rapidly; people canlearn to think and act to support a more open, inclusive society. By
implication, change toward omniculturalism is also possible, and may
even be achieved rapidly (in a matter of decades, rather than centuries ormillennia) under certain conditions. One such condition is the development among the general population of democratic citizens: individuals
capable of participating in and supporting an actualized democracy(Moghaddam, 2016). In discussing the characteristics of the democratic

omniculturalism and our human path93

citizen, I further clarify the harmony between omniculturalism anddemocracy.
The Democratic Citizen

The development of actualized democracy requires citizens who havedeveloped certain styles of thinking and acting. Just as we do not yet
have a developed actualized society in the world, there are no societiesin which the majority of citizens are capable of fully participating in andsustaining an actualized democracy. We still need to work toward thefull development of such citizenry. For example, citizens should vote forthe best candidates for political office, irrespective of their group memberships. More broadly, citizens must have certain key foundational
characteristics in order support and participating in an actualized democracy; in this section I examine the 10 most important characteristics(see Figure 1). These ten characteristics are psychological, in the sensethat they involve how citizens think and act.
The characteristics and their relationships are represented in a circle,
starting with ‘I could be wrong’ and coming full circle to ‘Not all experiences are of equal value’. The starting point of ‘I could be wrong’requires critical self-reflection; this is not a step that can be taken by

Not all experiences
are of equal
value
There areprinciples ofright and wrong

I should be open to creating
new experiences for others

I should be
actively open
to new
experiences
I must seek
informationand opinionsfrom as manysources as possible

I could be wrong

I mustcriticallyquestioneverything,including thesacred beliefsof my society

I must revise my opinion
as the evidence requires

I must seek tobetter understandthose whoare different
from meI can learn
from those whoare different
from meFigure 1. The psychological characteristics of the democratic citizen

94

omniculturalism and our human pathindividuals who think categorically and lack tolerance for ambiguity. In
short, fundamentalists of various kinds, including religious fundamentalists, could not even get past the first step of critically considering, ‘I
could be wrong’. Next, the individual must go beyond personal doubt,
by questioning even the sacred beliefs of their own society. Of course,
this is difficult to do, because it means withstanding social pressure toconform with the norms and rules of one’s own society. Following thisquestioning at both personal and societal levels, individuals must be
ready to revise their opinions based on new evidence.
The next three steps involve the belief that one must seek to better understand others who are different from oneself, one can learn from thesedifferent others, and one must seek information and opinions from as
many sources as possible. Coupled with this are two steps concerning
new experiences: being open to new experiences, and creating new experiences for others. However, this ‘openness’ should not be interpreted
as an endorsement of relativism; the final two steps are based on theidea that there are principles of right and wrong, and some experiences
are of greater value than others. This anti-relativist position brings usback to universals, shared values, and our common humanity.

Concluding Statement
Accelerating globalization and the start of the Anthropocene time period (Corlett, 2015) confronts us with enormous new challenges. We areforced to interact with out-group members who are often very different
from us, with little time for adaptation. The result can be disastrous, forexample as reflected by radicalization and terrorism. We need better policies to manage diversity on the global stage; policies that will enhance
democracy. The traditional policy of assimilation and the new policy ofmulticulturalism have failed. In particular, multiculturalism policy has
exaggerated group-based differences and has had detrimental consequences for minorities. We must give priority to human commonalities
and adopt a shared vision of our future together (Ikeda, 2010). Omniculturalism is put forward as one part of a solution, toward achieving
actualized democracy.

omniculturalism and our human path95

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Author Biography
Fathali M. Moghaddam is a professor, Department of Psychology, and Director, Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, Georgetown University. Prof. Moghaddam
was born in Iran, educated from an early age in England, and worked for the United
Nations and for McGill University before joining Georgetown in 1990. He has
researched a broad range of topics, toward developing psychology for and of humankind. His publications include, Understanding the Self and Others: Explorationsin Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity (2013), The New Global Insecurity (2010),
and Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Implications for Democracy in Global
Context (2008). He has also authored the companion volumes The Psychology ofDictatorship (2013) and The Psychology of Democracy (2016).