2011-E-3
Popular Culture and Regional Identity in East Asia:
Evidence from the Asia Student Survey 2008
Hiro Katsumata* and Takeshi Iida**
May 2011* Assistant Professor, the Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies** Assistant Professor, the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of cultural exchanges on theformation of an East Asian regional identity. Has the spread of popular culture led to
the formation of a collective identity in East Asia? A statistical analysis of the datafrom the Asia Student Survey 2008 demonstrates that cultural exchanges have apositive impact on the formation of an East Asian regional identity.

In East Asia, thespread of popular culture has led to the formation of a collective identity or thecultivation of a sense of “we-ness” or “we-feeling.”

In concrete terms, students who are

more frequently exposed to cultural products originating in East Asia – specifically, TV
programs, movies and animations produced in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and China – tend to identify themselves more strongly as “Asians,” and be more
sympathetic to the concept of “Asian citizenship.”1

Introduction

In East Asia today, the spread of popular culture has been remarkable.

The people inthis region favor popular cultural products, such as pop-music, TV dramas, movies,

manga (comic books) and anime (animations), originating in the region, including
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China.

Their consumption has

increased regional exchanges at the societal level, which are distinct frominter-governmental activities. In other words, by consuming foreign cultural products,
they have facilitated the bottom-up process of “regionalization,” as opposed to the
top-down process of “regionalism,” centered on inter-governmental institutionalframeworks for political and economic cooperation, such as the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia
Summit (EAS) (Pempel 2005, 19-24; Hurrell 1995, 39-40).
This being so, the purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of cultural
exchanges on the formation of an East Asian regional identity.

Has the spread of

popular culture led to the formation of a collective identity in East Asia?

Given thatthe people in East Asia are engaging in cultural exchanges on a regional scale, havethey developed a sense of “we-ness” or “we-feeling” – described by Karl Deutsche (1957,36) as an integral component of regional community?

This paper examine thesequestions by statistically analyzing the data from the Asia Student Survey 2008,
conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) – a five year
research project of the Tokyo-based Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,from 2007 to 2012.
The present paper represents a new direction for research on community
building and collective identity formation in the East Asian region – which, in thispaper, simply refers to an area encompassing Northeast and Southeast Asia.
existing research has paid insufficient attention to cultural exchanges.
2

The

Its mainconcern has been developments in the security sphere; namely, the spread ofcooperative security ideas through diplomatic exchanges, which facilitate the formationof a community of friendly nations, or the cultivation of a sense of “we-ness” or“we-feeling” (see Snitwongse 1995; Dösch and Mols 1998, 170-171; Acharya 1998, 2001).
Yet, to enhance our understanding of an East Asian community, it is essential
to focus on cultural exchanges, the core component of which is the consumption offoreign cultural products.

This is because the consumption of cultural products

should facilitate community building and collective identity formation, or thecultivation of a sense of “we-ness” or “we-feeling.”

The consumption of these products

is all about the sharing of common images and feelings through the exchange of theseideational elements across national boundaries.

The International Relations

literature maintains that the sharing of common ideational elements through various
forms of communication and exchange across borders facilitates community building
and the formation of collective identities (Deutsch et al. 1957, esp. 145; Adler and Barnett 1998,
esp. 41; Barnett and Adler 1998, 416-418; also see Wendt 1994, 388-391; Wendt 1999, 343-363).
In what follows, this paper first sheds light on the spread of popular culture ona regional scale.

It then conduct a statistical analysis of the data from the Asia

Student Survey 2008, a survey of students in six East Asian countries – China, South
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

To put it briefly, the study

demonstrates that cultural exchanges have a positive impact on the formation of an
East Asian regional identity.

In East Asia, the spread of popular culture has led to theformation of a collective identity or the cultivation of a sense of “we-ness” or“we-feeling.”

In concrete terms, students who are more frequently exposed to cultural

products originating in East Asia – specifically, TV programs, movies and animations
produced in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China – tend to identify
themselves more strongly as “Asians,” and be more sympathetic to the concept of“Asian citizenship.”3

Regional Cultural Exchanges

Before examining the impact of cultural exchanges on the formation of an East Asian
regional identity, it is important to explore whether there are “regional” aspects tothese exchanges – or whether some elements of cultural exchanges can be considered“East Asian” phenomena, taking place within a particular geographical area.

This isso because cultural exchanges in East Asia seem to have a global aspect, in two senses.
First, the spread of certain popular cultural products seems to be a global phenomenon.
For example, Japanese manga and anime are popular all over the world.

Second, theEast Asians are by no means culturally insulated from the global society, as they watch
Hollywood movies and listen to Western pop music.

Given these two points, if noaspect of cultural exchanges is regional, the focus of analysis should be shifted to global
cultural exchanges and the formation of a global identity.
Yet, remarkably, some elements of cultural exchanges can be considered “EastAsian” phenomena.

This is because the popularity of certain kinds of popular cultural

products is concentrated in East Asia, namely, TV dramas and pop music.

To

illustrate this point, it is worth focusing on the spread of Japanese TV dramas andJ-pop music.

Japanese products seem less likely to spread than those originating inSouth Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, for historical reasons. The historicalmemories shaped in the first half of the twentieth century must have made the people
in the East Asian region reluctant to accept anything originating in Japan.
Nevertheless, Japanese TV dramas and J-pop music are favored by youngsters in many
Asian countries, and influencing their fashion and lifestyle.

Understandably, theexports of Japanese TV programs have largely been concentrated in East Asia. The
Tokyo-based Institute for Information and Communication Policy (2007) found in 2005
that approximately 60% of Japan’s total exports of TV programs went to the Asian
region. A special project team of the Broadcasting Culture Research Institute of the4

Japan Broadcasting Corporation found in 2001-02 that nearly a half of Japan’s totalexports of TV programs went to the Asian region: 46.1 % to Asia, 27.9 % to Europe,
7.6 % to North America, 7.1 % to Latin America, and the rest to other areas (Hara,
Kawatake, and Sugiyama 2004, 217).1
The next task is to examine whether regional cultural exchanges have led to
the formation of an East Asian regional identity.

One thing is notable in this respect:on the basis of survey data and experts’ analyses, it seems fair to say that popular
culture enables people to develop a positive view of the country of origin and a sense ofaffinity with the people in that country. According to a survey conducted in Japan, in
the first half of the 2000s, 38 % of the population watched at least one episode of the
Korean TV drama, Winter Sonata, and many of them either held a favorable view ofSouth Korea or developed a new interest in this country (Mitsuya 2004).

With regard

to Japanese popular culture, a number of experts have argued that the spread of thecountry’s cultural products has improved Japan’s image and boosted the people’s senseof affinity with the Japanese, in such places as Taiwan, South Korea, China, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Thailand.2
1

In terms of the number of programs, the top five export destinations were, in descending order, Taiwan,

the US, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. In terms of the number of hours, the top five export
destinations were, in descending order, Taiwan, the US, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong (Hara,
Kawatake, and Sugiyama 2004, 217-218). The US, which is the only non-Asian country in these lists,should be considered a special case. This is because a few cable TV channels are available for theJapanese who live there, in addition to NHK World, the international broadcasting channel of the Japan
Broadcasting Corporation, which is available in all countries. The present authors thank Yumiko Haraof the Broadcasting Culture Research Institute of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation for clarifying thispoint (also see Hara, Kawatake, and Sugiyama 2004, 222, 230).
2

Ishii Kenichi, Satoshi Watanabe and Susumu Kohari have conducted surveys in Taipei, Seoul andShanghai, and found that, in each of these cities, people who watch Japanese TV programs tend todevelop a favorable view of Japan (Ishii and Watanabe 2001, 62-64; Kohari 2005, 68-70). Wai-ming Ng
notes that, in Hong Kong and Singapore, Japanese popular culture is improving the country’s image andenhancing the people’s sense of affinity with the Japanese (2006a, 198, 2006b, 203). Worawut
Worawittayanon (2003) maintains that Japanese manga and anime are enhancing the Thai people’sinterest in Japan. Homare Endo (2008, 61) observes that Chinese youngsters are developing a sense of5

Research Design

To examine the effect of regional cultural exchanges on the formation of an Asian
identity, we analyze the data gathered from a survey conducted in six countries (China,
South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) in 2008 by GIARI at
Waseda University.

The sample consists of 2,463 college students from two

universities in each of the six countries (approximately 200 students were recruitedfrom each university).

Using questions in this data set, we operationally define theimportant variables discussed in the sections above.
For the dependent variable, the formation of an Asian identity is measured byresponses to two questions in the survey.

The first question is whether or not

respondents agree with the statement, “I see myself as part of Asia.”

The second iswhether respondents agree with the statement, “We should foster the concept of Asian
citizenship.”These variables are coded 1 if respondents answered “strongly disagree,”2 if “disagree,” 3 if “agree” and 4 if “strongly agree.” We regress each of them separately
on independent variables.
For the key independent variable, regional cultural exchanges are measured byresponses to questions about the frequencies of exposure to foreign popular culture inAsia.

In the survey, respondents were asked how often they were exposed to TV

programs, movies and/or animations, produced in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hongaffinity with the Japanese, although they remain critical of Tokyo’s attitude toward the issue of history.
Yoshiko Nakano (2008) has drawn a similar conclusion, by conducting rounds of interviews with a large
sample of Chinese university students: Japanese popular culture has not washed away the negative
memories of the past, but it has created a positive image of contemporary Japan. By surveying
undergraduate students in Hong Kong, Bangkok and Seoul, Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin (2008, 93-95) has
found that the appreciation of Japanese popular culture tends to foster a positive image of Japan, andincites additional interest in other aspects of Japan, such as customs, sports and fashion. On the basisof his interview data, Ming-tsung Lee (2004) argues that many Taiwanese who had watched Japanese
TV dramas traveled to Japan by joining the so-called “Japanese TV drama tour,” and then enhanced
their interest in the country.

6

Kong and/or China. Two dummy variables are created, by using answers to thesequestions.

One variable is coded 1 if respondents reported that they were exposed to

one foreign popular culture almost every day, and 0 if otherwise. The other dummy
variable is coded 1 if respondents reported that they were exposed to at least two
foreign Asian popular cultures almost every day, and 0 if otherwise.

This means thatthe base category is “no everyday exposure to foreign Asian popular culture.” For
Chinese and South Korean respondents, the popular culture of their own country is notcounted as foreign popular culture.

Therefore, theoretically, Chinese and South

Korean respondents can be exposed to two foreign popular cultures at most while othernationals can be exposed to three at most.
Other independent variables are included in the models as controls.

Gender (1if “male,” 0 if “female”), academic year (1-4), age, and major (1 if “science major,” 0 if
otherwise) are included to control for the effects of respondents’ demographic
characteristics on the formation of an Asian identity.

Proficiencies in English andJapanese (1-4, with higher values associated with higher proficiencies) may have apositive impact on the formation of an Asian identity by allowing the students to gain
knowledge of foreign countries or to communicate with people from foreign countries.
Frequencies of Internet use, email use, and cell phone message use (1-5, with higher
values associated with higher usage) may also have a positive impact for similarreasons. Premised on the view that positive images of Asia may enhance a sense of
belonging to the region, the notion that “Asia is developing” (1-7, higher values
associated with stronger agreement with the statement) is considered an independent
variable. In addition, the effect of non-Asian popular culture or soft power should also
be considered. The notion that “US soft power is too strong” may entail reactions
against American soft power, and therefore enhance an Asian identity (1-4, higher
values associated with stronger agreement with the statement), while exposure to US
and European popular culture may water down such an identity (1 if respondents are7

exposed to US and European popular culture almost every day, 0 if otherwise).

Thenumber of countries which, respondents think, are included in Asia may affect theirsense of belonging to the region.

Finally, the number of regional organizations in Asia

recognized by respondents is included in the model to capture the impact of theknowledge of the region on the formation of an Asian identity.
Ordered logit is used to estimate the models because the dependent variables
are ordered categorical variables.

Standard errors are clustered by countries, andcountry fixed effects are included in the models. We do recognize that there may besimultaneity between our independent and dependent variables.

That is, students

who have a stronger Asian identity are more likely to be exposed to Asian popular
culture. The most common way to deal with simultaneity bias is to run 2SLS with an
instrument variable for the independent variable.

In our case, however, this method

is not feasible because our key independent variables are three dummies. Therefore,
we simply regress Asian identity on the raw independent variables.

All Vietnamese

respondents are dropped from the analysis due to missing values on some independent
variables.

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis.

8Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variables
I see myself as part of Asia

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

2031

3.234

0.597

1

4

We should foster the conceptof Asian citizenship

2010

2.968

0.681

1

4

Male

2063

0.502

0.500

0

1

Academic year

2063

2.419

1.092

1

4

Age

2063

20.505

2.017

16

32

Science major

2063

0.509

0.500

0

1

Proficiency in English

2058

3.129

0.677

1

4

Proficiency in Japanese

2044

1.323

0.558

1

4

Frequency of the Internet
Use

2062

4.781

0.518

1

5

Frequency of email use

2062

4.299

0.879

1

5

Frequency of cell phonemessage use

2062

4.697

0.770

1

5

Image of Asia as developing

2058

5.123

1.254

1

7

US soft power too strong

2007

2.601

0.769

1

4

The number of countries in
Asia

2063

16.358

8.457

1

32

The number of regionalorganizations recognized

2063

3.005

1.244

1

6

Exposed to 1 Asian pop
culture almost every day

2063

0.163

0.370

0

1

Exposed to at least 2 Asianpop cultures almost every day

2063

0.061

0.239

0

1

Exposed to US and European
pop culture almost every day

2059

0.271

0.445

0

1

9

Findings

The results are shown in Table 2.

In the first model, male dummy, age, proficiency inJapanese, the image of Asia as developing, and exposure to at least two Asian popular
cultures almost every day are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level.
College students who are female, older, more proficient in Japanese, and exposed to atleast two foreign Asian popular cultures almost every day are more likely to seethemselves as part of Asia.
In the second model, academic year, the notion that the US soft power is toostrong, and exposure to one and at least two foreign Asian popular cultures almost
every day are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level.

College students

who are more senior in their academic years, more cautious of American soft power,
and more exposed to foreign Asian popular culture are more likely to think that theyshould foster the concept of Asian citizenship.

It should be noted that, in both models,

exposure to foreign Asian popular culture contributes to the formation of an Asian
identity while exposure to US and European popular culture does not.
To interpret the effect of exposure to foreign Asian popular culture on theformation of an Asian identity more substantively, the post-estimation interpretation of
the ordered logit model is shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 depicts the predictedprobabilities of strongly agreeing with the statement, “I see myself as part of Asia,” as afunction of exposure to foreign Asian popular culture, for Chinese, South Korean,
Philippine, Singaporean and Thai college students.

The exposure to foreign Asian

popular culture varies within three categories: “no every day exposure,” “exposure to
one almost every day,” and “exposure to at least two almost every day.” All othervariables are fixed at their mean values.

10These lines clearly indicate that more exposure to Asian popular culture leads
to a stronger Asian identity, although the strength varies across countries.

For

example, the predicted probability of strongly agreeing with the statement, “I see
myself as part of Asia,” is .43 for a Chinese college student who is not exposed to Asian
popular culture almost every day, while it is .53 for one who is exposed to at least two
Asian popular cultures almost every day.
Likewise, Figure 2 shows that more exposure to Asian popular culture leads tostronger support for the concept of Asian citizenship, although the strength varies
across countries.

For example, the predicted probability of strongly agreeing with thestatement, “We should foster the concept of Asian citizenship,” is .13 for a Chinesecollege student who is not exposed to Asian popular culture almost every day, while itis .19 for one who is exposed to at least two Asian popular cultures almost every day.

11

Table 2 Factors Affecting the Formation of Asian Identity and the Motivation to Foster Asian
Citizenship: Ordered Logit Analysis
Dependent variable

I see my self as part of
Asia
Coefficient-0.334**SE
0.085

We should foster the conceptof Asian citizenshipCoefficient-0.032SE
0.138

Academic year

-0.084†0.047-0.059*

0.027

Age

0.069*

0.030

0.033

0.032

Science major-0.012

0.140

0.025

0.066

Proficiency in English

0.094

0.172

0.085

0.165

Proficiency in Japanese

0.187**

0.068

0.125

0.080

Frequency of theInternet use
Frequency of email use

0.088

0.087

-0.0690.052-0.0240.048-0.0150.041-0.023

0.092

0.046

0.050

0.123**

0.029

0.017

0.068

-0.0260.048

0.187**

0.021

0.013

0.013

0.004

0.009

0.074

0.050

0.045

0.052

0.212

0.187

0.265**

0.090

0.399**

0.082

0.412**

0.150-0.0400.104-0.0010.182-1.7051.328-2.153*

0.982

0.952

1.052

0.454

0.961

4.405**

1.036

3.324**

1.036

Independent variable
Male

Frequency of cell phonemessage use
Image of Asia as
developing
US soft power too
strong
The number ofcountries in Asia
The number of regionalorganizations
recognized
Exposed to 1 Asian pop
culture almost everyday
Exposed to at least 2
Asian pop cultures
almost every day
Exposed to US andEuropean pop culture
almost every day
Constants

Model statistics
N
1951
1937
Log-likelihood-1653.982-1926.007
χ2
74.49181.463Significance levels : †: 10% * : 5% **: 1%.
Notes: Standard errors (SE) are clustered by countries. Country fixed effects are included in themodels.

12

Figure 1 Predicted probability of strongly agreeing with the statement, “I see myself as part of Asia”(All other variables are fixed at their mean values).

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

China
Korea
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Never/ Seldom/
Exposure to 1 Asian pop Exposure to at least 2
Several times a week, a culture almost every
Asian pop culturesmonth, or a yearday
almost every day

Figure 2 Predicted probability of strongly agreeing with the statement, “We should foster theconcept of Asian citizenship” (All other variables are fixed at their mean values).

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

China
Korea
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Never/ Seldom/
Exposure to 1 Asian pop Exposure to at least 2
Several times a week, a culture almost every
Asian pop culturesmonth, or a yearday
almost every day

13

Conclusions

It can be concluded that cultural exchanges have a positive impact on the formation ofan East Asian regional identity.

In East Asia, the spread of popular culture has led to

the formation of a collective identity or the cultivation of a sense of “we-ness” or“we-feeling.”

The significance of the conclusion here should not be underestimated.

This is because the consumers of popular cultural products include students andyoungsters, or the next generation who will in the future lead the creation of a regional
community in various fields, including security, the economy, the environment,
education and culture.

The images and feelings which this generation share today

must have a strong bearing on the future of an East Asian community.
Policy recommendations are in order: the governments of the East Asian
countries should promote cultural exchanges at the regional level.

Such exchanges

facilitate community building, which in turn contributes to the maintenance of apeaceful regional environment.

To promote cultural exchanges, they should

coordinate their policies within frameworks, such as the APT and the EAS.

Withinthese frameworks, they have expressed their commitment to building an East Asian
community which would “contribute to the maintenance of … peace and security,prosperity and progress” (APT 2005; also see EAS 2005). What they should do now is
to put cultural cooperation at the forefront of their community building effort.

That isto say, they should collaborate on the formation of what can be regarded as an “EastAsian cultural community.”14

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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2011-E-3,
May 2011
Published by Waseda University Global COE Program
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