G-SEC WORKING PAPER No.11
Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy
in the Philippines in the Last Fifty Years:
An Assessment
Lydia N. Yu Jose *December 2006

Abstract
The cultural diplomacy that Japan used in the 1950s through the 70s did
not significantly change the unsympathetic Philippine public opinion about Japan.
On the other hand, such cultural diplomacy was not wasted, for it created a cultural
capital that contributed to the Filipino elite’s understanding of Japan.
The Japanese experience of modernizing without losing the traditional
culture in the last half of the nineteenth century and the Japanese economic miracleof the 1960s are part of the Japanese culture admired by the Filipino intellectuals.
The social base of Filipinos who admire Japanese culture became wide in
the late 1980s, where came about a public demand for teachers of Japanese
language and information about Japan.
The case of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in the Philippines in the last fifty years
shows that cultural diplomacy does not always produce the desired results; neither
does it have results immediately. It is nevertheless a valuable capital that is usefulfor its own sake and that may become useful for other purposes in due time.

*

Professor, Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila,
The Philippines

Introduction

Almost all scholarly works on Japan’s foreign relations with Southeast Asia
say that Japan has prioritized economic relations, especially in the first decades afterWorld War II. Almost all are in agreement that economic diplomacy is one reason forJapan’s postwar economic success, but at the same time, it caused tension between
Japan and Southeast Asia in the 1970s.
This paper nuances this observation by arguing that while economic
diplomacy in the first three decades after World War II (1950s to 70s) failed to win
the hearts of Filipinos, Japan’s economic development attracted them. Economic
development became a source of soft power that made Filipino observers look at
Japan with admiration. “Economically developed” became the most frequently
mentioned characteristic of Japan, and many were inspired to scrutinize the factorsthat made it possible. Moreover, many casual observers—and they were more in
number than the frequent and close observers, equated the manifestations of economic
development, such as the bullet train, elevated highways, cars, and electronic gadgets,with Japanese culture.
Economic development is different from economic diplomacy which for Japanin the 1960s through the 1970s meant aggressive trade with and investment in Asia.
Economic development embodies and is embodied in Japanese culture. Economic
diplomacy, on the other hand, is one of the strategies employed by states to achieve
foreign policy goals. Trade, investment, grants and loans are the usual components ofeconomic diplomacy.
Cultural diplomacy is also a strategy. Its usual components are movies,
paintings, literary forms, sculpture, architecture, the state’s history, economy, politics,1

ideology, foods, costumes, science and technology, values, and many more. Cultural
diplomacy is the selective dissemination abroad of such components either for theachievement of certain policy goals such as economic development, mutual
understanding, or purely for the sake of cultural dissemination.
The second argument of the paper is that, while Japan focused on economic
diplomacy towards the Philippines in the 1950s and 60s, it used several componentsof culture, such as sports, arts, education, language, and even the members of theimperial family, to win the hearts of Filipinos, and achieve its economic objectives.
The third point that this paper stresses is that since the 1980s to the present, atleast so far as Philippines-Japan relations are concerned, Japanese culture reaches thePhilippines through unorganized agents such as the Filipino migrants in Japan, morethan it reaches the Philippines through the Japanese government’s cultural diplomacy.
A deeper inter-twining of economics and culture has developed, in that the Filipino
migrant workers get attracted to Japan for economic reasons, but in the process, they
become unwitting agents of the promotion of Japanese culture.
The paper covers fifty years because this year (2006) marks the fiftiethanniversary of the resumption of Philippines-Japan relations. Within these years, thePhilippines and Japan concluded three major treaties, namely, the San Francisco
Peace Treaty which restored the relationship between the two countries after WorldWar II, the War Reparations Treaty, and the Treaty of Amity, Commerce andNavigation. It is not certain yet if the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA), which Philippine President Gloria Arroyo and Prime Minister
Koizumi Jun’ichiro signed in September of this year at Helsinki is a treaty or an
executive agreement. The Philippine Senate tends to look at it as a treaty and istherefore waiting for the Executive to submit it to the Senate for ratification, but the2

Executive tends to look at it as an executive agreement which does not require
ratification.
The paper will use these treaties, as well as the JPEPA as points of reference
around which cultural diplomacy will be discussed. This approach ensues from thesecond argument stated above; that is, Japan used cultural diplomacy to achieve
economic goals. And since cultural diplomacy as a component of soft power is about
attracting followers and supporters, the paper will identify who in the Philippines got
attracted to what.

1. Japanese Soft Power vis-à-vis the Philippines: Soft Economic Power andCultureJoseph Nye developed the concept of “soft power” in the late 1980s at the time
when the United States was perceived to be declining in power. He argued that theUnited States was far from declining, for it was not only the strongest power in theworld in terms of military and economic power, but also in soft power (Nye 2004: xi).
Soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather
than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004: x). Nye believes that American culture, fromthe noble values of democracy and human rights to the more mundane consumerism,sex and violence portrayed in Hollywood movies make the United States seductive to
many people (Nye 2004: 12).
Nye does not condemn hard power. He is in favor of using it, when necessary,
but in combination with soft power. What Nye condemns is the use of hard poweralone, like President George Bush’s unilateral attack on Iraq in the wake of theterrorists’ attack on the United States on 11 September 2000.

3

Policy, aside from culture, is also a source of soft power. Policy includes
economic assistance, scholarships, educational and cultural exchanges, sports, andother diplomatic strategies (Nye 2004: 25-30).
Soft power, Nye says, is available to all states. Even Bin Laden “has soft
power for those who believe in the legitimacy of his objectives” (Nye 2004: 2). In
other words, as a cliché goes, beauty is in the eye of the beholder.
Nye initially used the concept of soft power in the context of the United Statesthat traditionally has employed all the three powers: military, economic, and soft, invarious ways of combination. The most basic formula was to use military might andeconomic power for the cause of democracy (democracy being an element of
attraction). Initially, Nye wanted to argue that in the late 1980s, even though theUnited States seemed to be weakening in military and economic influence, it still had
soft power to get what it wanted. After President Bush’s decision to attack Iraq in theaftermath of terrorists’ attacks on the United States in September 2000, however, Nyecriticized Bush for depending too much on hard power, and thus losing its soft power.
The concept of soft power in the context of Philippine-Japanese relations
operates differently, because in the initial interaction between the Philippines andJapan at the turn of the twentieth century, Japan did not use military power, and had
only economic power as element of hard power. Unlike the United States, it had very
little soft power to lose towards the Philippines. Gradually, in the 1930s, it had tobuild soft power in order to maintain its economic power in the Philippines, and tojustify the use of military power in China. Japan used military power towards thePhilippines only during World War II and its occupation of the Philippines (1942-45).
After World War II, through Article Nine of its postwar Constitution, Japan adopted
the policy of refraining from the use of force to advance its national interests.

4

In the context of Philippine-Japanese relations therefore, and indeed, in thehistory of Japan’s postwar foreign policy in general, hard power for Japan was only
economic power (for the United States, it was military and economic). It must be
remembered, however, that Nye identifies economic policy as a source of soft power.
There is, therefore, a need to stress the difference between economic power as hard
power and economic power as soft power. Economic power manifested in the strengthof exports, sheer amount of foreign direct investments, size of gross domestic productand gross net profit is hard power. For example, Japanese economic expansion to thePhilippines in the 1920s and 30s became a source of tension between the two.
Likewise, in the 1960s, Japanese economic penetration of Southeast Asia earned
Japan the ire of many Southeast Asians, and the sobriquet “economic animal” (Sudo
1992:60). Economic power manifested in the fair amount and beneficial quality offoreign aid for the recipient, fair amount and beneficial quality of foreign direct
investment in the host country, and fairness of trade practices is soft power. The
Fukuda Doctrine of the late 1970s promised to do these. Simply put, therefore is adifference between just being rich and how wealth is obtained and used.
Additionally for Japan, its ability to modernize and industrialize during thesecond half of the nineteenth century without losing much of its traditional culture
made it attractive to the world. After World War II, the economic miracle it achieved
became a source of soft power that attracted many developing countries to study
Japan. As will be seen below, Japan possesses various potentials for soft power,
namely, soft economic power, traditional arts and culture, popular culture, values, its
own history of modernizing without entirely Westernizing, and its proverbial ability
to quickly rise from the ashes of defeat in World War II. In the context of its bilateral5relations with the Philippines, the question is whether Japan was able to effectively
utilize these potentials.

2. Japanese Cultural Assets and Liabilities in the Philippines

In spite of centuries of contact with the Philippines, Japan did not have acultural policy towards the Philippines. It was only interested in trade, investment, andpromotion of Japanese immigration to the Philippines, especially in the 1920s and1930s (Jose 1998).
A semblance of Japanese cultural diplomacy towards the Philippines began
only in the 1930s, and gradually became more active and overt towards the 1940s. It
was triggered by a desire to counteract anti-Japanese public opinion about theJapanese invasion of China and public suspicion about Japan’s aggressive intentions
towards the Philippines, and to protect Japanese trade and Japanese immigration to thePhilippines from adverse effects of anti-Japanese public opinion (Jose 1999: 141-144).
The inchoate Japanese cultural diplomacy targeted the Filipino elite, students,
and young professionals. Semi-governmental organizations, newspaper companies,
and business enterprises invited them for a minimal fee to visit Japan. Tour
participants were guided to regular tourist spots, invited to ikebana exhibitions and tea
ceremony, and given lectures on Japanese history, arts, and culture.
Japanese lecturers were sent to major Philippine universities to lecture on
Japanese economy, history, arts, and culture. Filipino students were invited to Japan
to attend student conferences and Japanese students were sent to the Philippines forthe same purpose. The student conferences aimed at mutual cultural understanding.

6

Japan, however, could only offer what it had. In the 1930s, it had a militaristic,
non-democratic government. Japanese were, under the constitution, subjects of theemperor. Male-female relationship was hierarchical, with the woman expected to besubmissive to the man. Majority of the Japanese were not Christians. Many Japanese
were poor, and just like Filipinos, quite a number dreamt of, and did migrate to theUnited States and even to the Philippines.
Tours of Japan did expose a few Filipinos to architecturally beautiful Buddhist
temples and Shinto shrines, but at the same time, it stressed upon the Filipinos thatJapanese were not Christians, and therefore were different from them. Very few
Filipinos at that time appreciated religious plurality. With the presence of an
influential Catholic hierarchy, beliefs and practices that went against Christian beliefs
were strongly criticized. Thus, while Japanese intellectuals were proud of the samurai
ethics or bushido, and a few Filipino intellectuals had gained a deeper understandingof it, to the Catholic Church in the Philippines, seppuku (more commonly known as
hara-kiri) was absolutely unacceptable.
Lectures on the emperor system and the relationship between the emperor andhis Japanese subjects could have extolled loyalty, but at the same time, it brought tosurface the undemocratic and illiberal political system of Japan. By the 1930s,
Filipinos had been taught by their American colonizers the values of democracy andpolitical rights.
Still along the concept of democracy and equality, a male chauvinist Filipino
could have been attracted to the idea of having a submissive Japanese wife, but such
culture nevertheless clashed with the Filipino accepted norm of respect for
womanhood and equality of man and woman before the law, no matter how limited its
enforcement was during that time. Madame Butterfly, an opera by Italian composer

7

Puccini was translated into Tagalog and serialized in a magazine. This indicates the
popularity of the image of a loyal Japanese wife and of committing seppuku as proofof loyalty and endless love. Indeed, it was popular among young women of the 1920s
and 1930s to don a kimono and have their photo taken in a studio. But Madame
Butterfly was just a romantic tragedy meant for entertainment and, posing for a
photograph garbed in a kimono was just a fashion. Kimono or even the more
comfortable yukata was not worn by Filipino women everyday.
Moreover, Japanese cultural diplomacy reached only a handful of Filipinos.
Whatever beauty and attractiveness that this handful of Filipinos admired in bushido,
ikebana, Noh, tea ceremony, and other fine Japanese ways of doing things, were
simply irrelevant to majority of Filipinos. To most Filipinos, the cheap and easy to
break made-in-Japan toys, bicycles, fountain pens, and low quality facial make-up andhair dyes embodied Japanese culture.
Towards the 1940s, the Japanese government doubled its efforts at defending
the invasion of China and explaining its concept of equal sharing of the resources of
the world. But in doing so, Japanese speakers unwittingly revealed their values whichwere not at all attractive to Filipinos. The more Japan’s relationship with the Westworsened because of the China question, the more the Japanese criticized the UnitedStates and American culture and the more they did so, the wider they made the gap
between their and the Filipinos’ values. The more they contrasted Japanese industry
and the Yamato damashii (Japanese spirit) with the individualistic and materialistic
culture of American democracy, the more the militaristic and totalitarian nature of
their culture surfaced. Moreover, Japan’s explanations about why it had to invade
China struck the Philippine mass media as propaganda because of the gap between
Japanese actions and Japanese claims.

8

Consequently, Japan’s attempts at introducing Japanese culture had an
ambiguous impact. Ikebana was appreciated, but it did not become the Filipino way ofarranging flowers. Japanese disgust for individualism and materialism was anindication of undemocratic culture to some but to others, it meant nationalism andefficiency. A member of the first educational tour in 1935 said, “To me one of themost striking social phenomena in the life of the Japanese people is their willingness
to sacrifice individual liberty of action and freedom of thought for the sake of national
discipline and collective efficiency …. Perhaps a combination of both …would serve
the interests and well being of our commonwealth” (Calica 1935: 106). If others
criticized Japanese social values for being different from the Hispanized andAmericanized social values of Filipinos, others saw in Japanese values an admirable
blend of the modern and the traditional. A journalist wrote: “There seems to be noquestion that there is today a silent struggle between the ancient and the modern,between the native and the foreign, between tradition and the increasing demand for
new things. The ability of Japanese so far to maintain their own culture in the face ofadvancing modernity reveals the native strength and characteristic individuality of therace” (Farolan 1934: 35). The journalist who wrote this was commissioned by theJapanese Consulate in the Philippines to go to Japan and write about his observations.
The same strategy will be employed by the Japanese government in the immediate
post World War II period.
The Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942-45) was the first time theFilipino nation had a first-hand encounter with Japanese culture. Before the war, as
mentioned above, Filipinos who had some knowledge of Japan were largely from theelite and those who followed current events in the mass media. But during theJapanese occupation, experience of a culture of discipline, unforgiving punishment

9even for minor offenses, brutality, ruling through threats, and cowing the people bysowing fear in their hearts, is a national Filipino experience with only a few
exceptions.
Filipinos who still remember the war mostly recall Japanese discipline andnationalism. To them, discipline was manifested in lining up for rides, movie andration tickets. They saw in the Kamikaze pilots ultimate nationalism. There were
those who admired these characteristics and wished Filipinos were as disciplined andnationalistic as Japanese. But there were also those who equated discipline withharshness and cruelty, and nationalism with the major cause of Japanese aggression in
World War II. Filipino reaction to Japanese culture during the war was ambivalent
and ambiguous as before World War II, but the negative impact during and after the
war was more predominant. This will be evident in the difficulties the Philippines andJapan encountered in normalizing their relations after the war.

3. Ratification of the Peace and the Reparations Treaties

The first postwar major negotiations between the Philippines and Japan wereover the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the War Reparations Agreement. The
Philippine Senate initially did not want to ratify the peace treaty without any
agreement on war reparations. Basically, the negotiations revolved around Japan’s
insistence to pay reparations only according to its ability to pay, and the Philippine
demand to be paid for all the measurable damages and losses that it suffered during
the war (Yoshikawa 2003).

The Japanese and Philippine governments correctly

assessed the stumbling block to the ratification of the two treaties as not only mere
politicking of the Japanese and Filipino politicians, but the real anti-Japanese mood of10

public opinion in the Philippines, and the real desire on the part of Filipinos to avenge
their wartime losses and sufferings (Meyer. 1965: 63). The task for Japan, therefore,
was to appease the Filipinos.
In the first half of the 1950s Japan could not use its cultural assets as sourcesof soft power. Anti-Japanese feeling was too strong to be conquered with displays of
ikebana, performance of Noh, origami demonstration, and the likes. The Japanese
government knew very well they would only be rebuffed. Besides, doing cultural
diplomacy was not affordable to Japan that was still re-building from the damages ofwar.
Japan was further hampered by fears among its Asian neighbors that it mightrearm and become militaristic again. These fears were brought about by the UnitedStates’ request to Japan to build its army in the wake of the Communist invasion of
Korea in 1950.
Japanese cultural diplomacy towards the Philippines in the 1950s had few
resources to draw from. It was hampered by proximity to World War II. Moreover,using potential resources presented various dilemmas. If it used the attractive fact that
it was fast recovering from the destruction of World War II, it would face moredemands for bigger reparations. If it used an anti-communist policy, which would be
attractive to the Philippines (then fighting its local communist adherents and also
being threatened by the international domino effect of communist expansion), it mightantagonize China and the Soviet Union and jeopardize future relations with them.
Japan used whatever limited resources for cultural diplomacy were available.
Sports was one of them. The First Asian Games in New Delhi, India in March 1951
offered an opportunity for the Philippines and Japan to explore sports as a means ofpatching up the wounds of war (Bitong 1957: 27). Japan garnered the most number of11gold, silver, and bronze medals. This was followed by Japanese and Filipino sports
matches in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, the very first of which was in February 1952
in Tokyo (Takamatsu 1952). Organized by the Japan Basketball Association andsponsored by the Yomiuri Shimbun-sha (Yomiuri Newspaper) with the cooperation of
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Ministry of Education, and an
association of Japanese businessmen, the Firipin Tomo no Kai, the Philippine Air
Lines Basketball Team played with several Japanese company and university
basketball teams (Japanese-Philippine Basketball Friendship Matches 1952). The aimof the matches was to promote friendship and mutual understanding between thePhilippines and Japan (Vargas 1952; Takamatsu 1952). The Second Asian Games
were held in Manila in 1953, and the largest group of Japanese was seen in Manila for
the first time since the end of World War II (Bitong 1957: 27). Again, Japan garnered
the most number of gold, silver and bronze medals.
On the part of the civil society, there were pen pal clubs ostensibly started by
Japanese and Filipino students between 1952 and 1953 (Serrano 1952: 48;
Serrano1953: 48). In January 1953 four Japanese students came to Manila to attend
the first postwar Philippine-Japanese student conference (Bitong 1957: 27). Japanese
boy scouts participated in the first Philippine National Boy Scouts Jamboree, held in
Balara, Quezon City in 1954 (Jap Boy Scouts 1954: 48).
The Philippine Senate finally ratified the peace treaty and the reparations
agreement on 23 July 1956, five years after the Japanese and Philippine governments
officially signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Sports diplomacy, pen pal clubs, boy
scouts jamboree, and student conference did not influence the Senate to ratify thetreaties, but they were proofs that Japan did not simply rely on pragmatic economic
arguments about why the Philippines should ratify the two treaties. Japan tried12

cultural strategies in order to resume friendship with the Philippines. On the other
hand, the cooperation given by the Philippine presidents and their advisers towards
the ratification of the treaties indicates that they were motivated by pragmaticconsiderations, but hampered by the anti-Japanese public opinion and considerations
about the future of their political career. The realities of the Cold War and thepromises of trade, aid, grants, loans, and investments in the Reparations Treaty were
the ones that made the Senate ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty and theReparations Treaty.

4. Negotiating a Commercial Treaty

The limited results of Japanese cultural diplomacy in the 1950s were evident
in the difficulty experienced by Japan in getting the Philippines to conclude with it acommercial treaty.
In the initial years of the implementation of the Reparations Treaty, theJapanese government exerted its utmost efforts to have a commercial treaty with thePhilippines signed and ratified. The Japanese government was eager to conclude acommercial treaty with the Philippines because the latter had a stable economy,
second only to Japan. On the other hand, Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia wanted
the Japanese government to agree to certain adjustments in the implementation of thereparations agreement to enable him to carry out development projects. The Japanese
government used this political need of Garcia as a bargaining tool to persuade Garcia
to start negotiations for a commercial treaty (Yoshikawa 2003). Garcia gave the signal
to begin the negotiations, and shortly after, the two governments signed the Treaty ofAmity, Commerce and Navigation on 9 December 1960. The Japanese Diet ratified it

13

in October 1961. From this point, however, political exchange of favors did not work
anymore. The Philippine Senate steadfastly refused ratification of the treaty.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, pending the ratification of the commercial treaty,
the Philippine mass media expressed skepticism about the beneficial effects of thetreaty to the Philippines. Many commentators revived memories of Japanese
expansionism before World War II and the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
during the war, as a way of warning readers as to what would happen if the treaty
would be ratified.1 It was evident that twenty years or so after the war, negative
memories could still be used to arouse suspicion and skepticism about Japaneseintentions.
The task for the Japanese government was to present an image of a Japan thatwas peaceful, modern, friendly, generous, and trustworthy. And, by the 1960s, such
was not an empty image. It was real, and possessed a tremendous potential to win theFilipinos’ admiration.
The 1960s Japan was already confident that it could display its economic
achievements without fear of being asked to pay huge war reparations. It wasdetermined more than ever to expand markets for its exports and to buy raw materials
from its Asian neighbors to feed its manufacturing industry. Hence, if in the 1950s, it
was the Philippine economic missions that were going to Japan, uninvited, to observe
Japan, in the 1960s, it was already Japan that was inviting journalists, educators, andartists to see the new Japan, and write about it back home.
In January 1966 Chronicle Magazine, a weekly, came out with a special on“The New Japan.” The cover featured the famous Toshogu Shrine of Nikko. Inside,1

The critical tone of the commentaries was obvious in their titles: “Must We Have Roads andPeace at the Price of our Self-Respect?” (Weekly Graphic 1967: 1-2); “Japanese Economic
Penetration” (Alegre 1967:17; 22); “A Second Japanese Invasion” (Almario 1968: 10-12; 72);
“The New Imperialism: Japan’s Renewed Thrust” (Guerrero 1970: 16-18); “Remember the‘Hayun Maru’” (Barranco 1970: 3; 22).

14

was an article by Ileana Maramag, associate editor of the magazine, who had been
invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to visit Japan. Escorted by a lady officer ofthe ministry, she toured Tokyo, Kyoto, and Nara (Maramag 1966: 9). Maramag’s
article, which begins with “Today Japan Views War with Instinctive Dread andPursues a Policy of Progress through Peace” (Maramag 1966: 6), presented a very
positive picture of modern Japan. Another article, “Progress through Education,” waswritten by a professor of commercial law in the University of Santo Tomas, who had
also been invited by the Japanese government to visit Japan. The article praises
Japan’s move to review its educational system and see how it could further contributeto economic development, and urges Filipino educators to do the same. The otherarticles introduce tea ceremony, Japanese music, Noh, a woman novelist, tinytransistors and satellite transmitters, Toyota car, Hotel Okura, and the Japanese
shipping industry with quite detailed information and a fair amount of admiration.
One symbol of social change and modernization of Japan which captured theimagination of the world in 1959 was the marriage of the Crown Prince Akihito to acommoner, Princess Michiko (former Michiko Shoda), breaking an old tradition
which decreed that the crown prince could marry only a person of royal blood. The
crown prince broke tradition again when he and Princess Michiko decided against
having their son to be separated from them and be reared by nurses and tutors.
In November 1962 the Crown Prince and Princess Michiko visited thePhilippines. The announced purpose of the visit was to promote friendship andgoodwill. The mass media, however, reported that there were speculations that themore important purpose was to charm public opinion into favoring the ratification of
the commercial treaty.

15

In December 1966 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs donated to the
Ateneo de Manila University the first Japanese Studies Program in the country(Report 1969; Memorandum 1966). The donation included the salaries of the visiting
Japanese professors and free tuition fee for students in the courses offered by the
program. In 1967 the Japan Information and Cultural Center in Manila wasestablished, and became the main source of information about Japan. The center was
also given responsibility to screen applicants to the Japanese Government Scholarship,then popularly known as the Mombusho scholarship, and one of the major
components of Japan’s cultural diplomacy. Shortly after its opening, the Centerstarted offering Japanese language lessons. The Ship for Southeast Asian Youtharrived for the first time in Manila in 1968. It was also in 1968 that the Japanese
Garden in Luneta Park was completed.
On the local level, sister-cities between the Philippines and Japan were forged.
It is interesting to note that six out of the twenty sister-cities identified by Sato (1994:
199-201) were created in the 1960s and 1970s.The purpose of the Japanese local
governments (LGU), consistent with Japan’s national policy, was to win the goodwillof the Filipinos. For the Philippine LGUs, they would not lose anything by positively
and cordially responding to the offer of friendship and cultural exchanges. These
sister cities were the Caba-Oizumi (1964), Manila-Yokohama (1965), Hanyu-Baguio(1969), Pasig-Marugame (1972), Quezon City-Chiba (1972), and Baguio-Wakkanai(1973).
Except for the fact that all these cultural initiatives happened during the periodof waiting for the ratification of the commercial treaty, there is no watertight proof
that they were launched with the single purpose of enticing the Philippine government
to ratify the commercial treaty. Whether there was a direct connection or not, it was16

clear that these cultural initiatives did not change the mind of the Philippine Senate.
On 2 March 1972, the Senate rejected the resolution for the ratification of the Treatyof Amity, Commerce and Navigation. On 21 September, Marcos declared Martial law
on grounds of communist threat to the Philippines. He abolished the Senate and theHouse of Representatives and ruled like a dictator. On 27 December 1973 heunilaterally declared the commercial treaty as ratified.
Before Martial Law, when freedom of speech and of the press was exercisedunder a democratic government, public opinion was relevant to foreign policy. Therewas strong evidence that the public was against the ratification of the commercial
treaty and the Senate listened to it. The arguments put forward against the treaty wererebutted by equally plausible arguments. If there was goodwill towards Japan, there
would not have been a great difficulty to ratify the treaty. That the treaty had to be
declared as ratified by a dictator showed that Japan was not attractive to the Filipino
public, but was attractive to Marcos.

5. Martial Law and the Fukuda Doctrine

Nine years of Martial Law (1972-1981) and six more years of dictatorial rulesince the lifting of Martial law (1981-1986) in the Philippines coincided with thelaunching of the Fukuda Doctrine in August 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine was meant todramatically change Japan’s economic diplomacy with ASEAN from one ofaggressive trade and profit making to doubling of economic aid to ASEAN countries,
promoting friendship with ASEAN, and cultivating cultural relations (Sudo 1992).
The doctrine was Japan’s response to anti-Japanese demonstrations in many ASEAN
countries, particularly in Thailand and Indonesia in 1974, as expressions of protest

17

against Japan’s unfair trade practices (Sudo 1992: 71-72). The impact of the doctrine
was less dramatic than its announcement (Sudo 1992: 233-234). Economic aid
increased, but Japanese trade surplus vis-à-vis all the ASEAN countries generally
remained, and the cultural policy was halfheartedly implemented.
The doubling of economic aid benefited Marcos, who carried a program ofextensive infrastructure construction, using foreign loans. In terms of amount, thecontribution of Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to Marcos’ program
which in effect helped to legitimize martial rule averaged only 6 percent of the total
external debt of the Philippines between 1973 and 1983. The amount was small,compared to the contributions of the United States (8 percent), the International
Monetary Fund (19 percent), and the World Bank (11 percent). On the other hand, it
was much easier for Marcos to obtain Japanese ODA and to control its use, because of
the hesitation of Japan to put conditionalities on its lending. U.S ODA to thePhilippines declined in the 1980s, but Japanese ODA increased and replaced the U.S.
as the largest aid-giver to the country (Rivera 2003: 525-526).
With the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship, followed by the assumption to
the presidency of Corazon Aquino in 1986, there was a great deal of optimism about
the future course of Philippine democracy and development. Bilateral trade withJapan increased in volume, but the balance of trade continued to be in favor of Japan.
Expansion of Japanese ODA to the Philippines was a welcome development for the
new administration that had to face the responsibility of carrying out economic andadministrative reforms, including payment of huge foreign debts incurred by Marcos.
In July 1989 Japan joined nineteen countries, the Asian Development Bank, and theInternational Monetary Fund in forging an agreement that came to be known as theMultilateral Aid Initiative (MAI), locally known in the Philippines as the Philippine

18

Assistance Program (PAP). In the case of Japan, MAI was significant because it
agreed to let the World Bank monitor the Philippines’ compliance to the conditions ofJapanese aid, except for regular Japanese ODA that continued to be managed
bilaterally (Rivera 2003: 529).
For ASEAN as an organization, the Fukuda Doctrine, despite its limited
impact, was a turning point in its relations with Japan because of the Japanese official
commitment to give importance to ASEAN and to be more proactive in supporting
ASEAN’s economic development, political stability vis-à-vis the Indochina problem,and forging closer cultural relations. However, for a particular country like thePhilippines, it was unfortunate that this important change in Japan’s foreign policy
happened at the time that the Philippines was not under a democratic government. It
was also unfortunate that Japan, under the principle of separating economics frompolitics, did not discriminate against a dictatorial and corrupt rule. Japanese aid, loans,and investments entered the Philippines, but Marcos had the sole power to decide
where to use the loans and the aid, and to which crony to grant the contracts. As aresult, Japanese ODA and investments got tainted with corruption. To date, anobjective accounting of Japanese economic relations with the Philippines underMartial Law has yet to be made. Through the MAI, however, the Japanese
government was, to a certain extent, able to correct its ODA policy, by agreeing to let
the World Bank monitor the Philippines’ management of ODA.

6. Elite and Popular Attraction to Japan

In the 1960s and 1970s Japan accumulated huge capital through its labor
intensive industrialization. Japan had achieved an economic miracle. In 1968 Japan19

commemorated the centennial of the Meiji Restoration, inspiring the holding ofvarious conferences on Japanese modernization and publication of books on the topic
by American scholars. Intellectual leaders and students looked up to Japan as a modelof non-socialist, non-violent modernization. In Asia, the impact on the Philippines
must have been most tremendous, because of the easy access by Filipino students andprofessors to American publications.
Japanese modernization was soft power to Philippine government officials andintellectual elites. So were Japanese arts like ikebana, the performing arts, literature,origami, and films. Wives of department secretaries usually graced Ikebana
demonstrations and exhibits (Japan Bulletin 1977 February: 25-26; 1982 February: 4;
1982 July: 4). Cultural performances and films were held at the Cultural Center of thePhilippines and the Film Center, to which members of the high society, the diplomatic
corps, professionals, businessmen, and students were invited. Literature and origami
were taught to high school teachers (Japan Bulletin 1982 May: 9-10; 1983 May: 20).
But the majority of Filipinos had remained oblivious of developments in Japanand the world. Even university students did not display great enthusiasm for Japan.
The Japanese Studies Program in Ateneo attracted only a handful of students. So bad
was the student turn-out that classes about Japan were not economically viable. As aresult, the university, despite the general recognition that Japan was an importantmodel of modernization for the Philippines, hesitated to invest on faculty
development and on an undergraduate degree on Japanese Studies. In 1979, theuniversity president wrote: “The basic goals of a strict Japanese Studies Program for
majors is out of the question for the Ateneo de Manila. It is not possible to get thestudents for this, nor are we willing to make the investment of time and money thatsuch a specialized program would require” (Memo 1979). No undergraduate degree20on Japanese Studies was established, but the university continued offering Japanese
language along with other foreign languages such as Spanish and French. Elective
courses on Japanese history, politics, economics, and foreign relations were also
retained. They were usually small classes of a dozen students at the most.
Filipino popular attraction to the rich, industrialized, and modern Japan began
only in the 1980s. The factor that propelled it was the high value of the Yen. Many
Filipinos, attracted by the good exchange rate of the Yen vis-à-vis the Philippine peso,
went to work in Japan. Migration of Filipino workers to Japan began in the 1970s, but
it was in the 1980s that the number of registered Filipinos dramatically increased fromover 6,000 in 1981 to close to 50,000 in 1991 (Ministry of Justice Homepage).
Moreover, by mid-1980s, because of the high cost of domestic labor brought about bytremendous economic growth, many Japanese companies relocated to Southeast Asia,
in search of cheap labor. Japanese direct investments abroad surged and began to besignificant in the Philippines in the late 1980s (Tecson 2003: 464 – 475). Possibilityof employment in Japanese companies after graduating from college became a strong
motivation to take up Japanese language and Japanese culture as elective subjects.
A number of schools offering Japanese language outside of the university
opened around the same time, catering to all sorts of people, male and female: those
who wanted to work in Japan, those who had business with Japanese, those who
worked or wished to work in Japanese companies, those who were married toJapanese, those who wanted to study in Japan. The economic gap between thePhilippines and Japan helped in bringing about the Japayuki-phenomenon, increase in
the number of students who wanted to study in Japan, and increase in the number ofFilipina-Japanese marriages.

21One undesirable result of the attraction of Filipino workers to Japan is thepractice of some workers to continue staying in Japan despite the expiration of theirvisas. Other undesirable results are cases of maltreatment of the workers by theemployers and recruitment agencies. They have caused frictions between the twocountries, but there is no evidence that these problems have diminished the attractionof Filipino job seekers to Japan.
Thus, while the late 1970s is the turning point of Japan’s policy towards
ASEAN, as envisioned by the Fukuda Doctrine, for the Philippines and Japan, theturning point was the late 1980s. This means, the vision of the Fukuda Doctrine began
to show obvious results in the late 1980s. The Filipino middle and upper class who
had some admiration for Japanese culture, particularly its history of modernizationand economic success were joined by the lower class who were attracted to economic
opportunities in Japan. It was in the 1980s that Japanese popular culture, such as food,karaoke, manga and anime, began to be appreciated by the lower working class. It
may be argued that these aspects of Japanese culture still have not reached the poorestof the poor Filipinos, but compared to the 1950s through the 1970s, Filipinos
knowledgeable about Japan and appreciative of things Japanese were less elitist.
The late 1980s was a turning point in Philippines-Japan relations in still
another sense. Dissemination of Japanese popular culture by the returned Filipino
migrant workers in Japan parallels the cultural diplomacy conducted by the JapanFoundation, whose projects and activities mainly attract Filipino students,
professionals, established intellectuals, and mass media. What college students learn
about Japan in the classroom and activities sponsored by the Japan Foundation
perhaps differs from what a neighbor of a Filipina entertainer in Japan learns from thestories of the entertainer when she comes back to the Philippines.

22How the gap between elite and popular attraction to Japan impacts on theattractiveness of Japan to the Philippines, has not been tested yet. It is clear, however,that the Philippine government appreciates Japan not only as the second biggest
source of ODA, investments, and trade, but also as a destination of thousands ofFilipino workers every year, who regularly send much needed remittances to theirfamilies back home.
As a result, the Philippine government has become an important supporter ofJapan in international affairs. The impact of Japan’s soft economic power on thePhilippine government was seen in the support given by the Philippines to many of
the Japanese goals in the United Nations and regional organizations. In 1995 thePhilippines withdrew its bid for a nonpermanent seat in the Security Council in favorof Japan (Villacorta 2003: 587) The Philippines supports Japan’s current bid for apermanent seat in the Security Council (Villacorta 2003: 588). In the ASEAN, thePhilippines supports Japan’s participation as a dialogue partner.

7. The Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement

Since the ratification of the commercial treaty, the Philippines and Japan havenot signed any treaty of significance until the signing of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) on 9 September 2006 in Helsinki. Unlike
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Reparations Treaty, and the Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, which were rigorously debated and opposed by public
opinion, the JPEPA did not see much public discussion. In rare mention of it innewspapers, objections focused on unequal benefits that the Philippines and Japan
would get from the agreement.

But the criticisms were expressed without any

23reference to World War II or a hint of anti-Japanese sentiment. On the contrary, thecritical remarks seemed to target the Philippine government more than they targeted
the Japanese government. The political opposition and the Fair Trade Alliance, amulti-sectoral NGO, criticized and still criticize the Philippine government for lack oftransparency on the details of the agreement (PDI 16 June 2005:B-6; 17 June 2005: B1). Several weeks after the news of its signing in Helsinki, several dailies carried news
that through the agreement, the Japanese government will export without tariff
hazardous materials to the Philippines (PDI 26 October 2006: A-1, A-13; Philippine
Star 26 October 2006: 1; 11). The Philippine Senate, in response, urged the Philippine
president to submit to the Senate the agreement for scrutiny.
While bilateral free trade is provided for in the agreement, it takes secondary
importance, at least from the point of view of the Philippine government, to anunderstanding that enabling laws of the agreement would allow the entry of Filipino
information technology (IT) workers, nurses, and caregivers to Japan. Before these
new type of workers can enter Japan, they will have to learn the Japanese language,
and show proof of proficiency by passing the Japanese government’s Japanese
language proficiency test. Such a requirement certainly is necessary to assure efficientperformance, but there is more to it. The requirement would open an opportunity for
the Japanese government to push the learning of Japanese, and thus, further promote
its wider use in Asia, if not the whole world.
The signing of the JPEPA signifies the deepening of the inter-twining
relationship between economics and culture, which began in the late 1980s. JPEPA
embodies the close relationship between economics and culture more than the earlier
treaties between the Philippines and Japan. Fifty years after the resumption ofPhilippines-Japan relations, the two states signed a treaty that attests to the fact that24

economic needs of Filipinos create opportunities for Japan to promote Japaneseculture, especially Japanese language. In the 1950s through the 1970s Japan tried touse cultural diplomacy to achieve economic goals; in the 1980s through the present
Japan’s economic stature and capability are the ones reinforcing the spread ofJapanese culture. The agents are not just Japanese, but Filipinos as well.

Conclusion

The cultural diplomacy that Japan used in the 1950s through the 70s did not
significantly change the unsympathetic Philippine public opinion about Japan.
Negative memories of World War II lingered and the mass media often referred tothem as a way of illustrating their objections to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, theWar Reparations Treaty, and the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. The
treaties were finally ratified not as a result of Japanese cultural diplomacy, but
because of pragmatic considerations, such as the prospects for grants, loans, trade, andinvestment.
This shows that soft power in the form of cultural diplomacy is not as potent
as soft economic power as far as Japan’s ability to make the Philippines do what it
wishes it to do is concerned.
On the other hand, the cultural diplomacy that Japan launched in the 1950s
through the 1970s is not wasted. It exposed the Filipino upper and middle class to thehigh brow Japanese culture. Such exposure was not the factor that made thePhilippine Senate ratify the treaties, but it was nonetheless a cultural capital that
contributes to the Filipino elite’s understanding of Japan.

25

The Japanese experience of modernizing without losing the traditional culturein the last half of the nineteenth century and the Japanese economic miracle of the
1960s are part of the Japanese culture admired by the Filipino intellectuals. Thisshould be distinguished from the aggressive economic diplomacy Japan embarked onin the 1950s through the 1970s, which earned the ire of Southeast Asians, including
the Filipinos. There were no violent protests in Manila, as there were in Bangkok andJakarta, but this was mainly because the Philippines was under Martial Law.
Filipino appreciation of Japan assumed a wider social base only in the 1980s,
when thousands of Filipinos sought employment in Japan. To them, the attraction ofJapan was basically economic opportunity. These Filipino workers go back to thePhilippines and unwittingly become agents of the spread of Japanese culture in thePhilippines. The popular culture that they appreciate and bring to the Philippines isdifferent from the high culture that the Japan Foundation promotes. Such difference
has not overtly figured yet in the Philippine’s foreign policy towards Japan, but thePhilippine government recognizes that Japan is an importation destination of Filipino
migrant workers, and source of much needed remittances. This, again, is soft
economic power.
The turning point of Philippines-Japan relations was the late1980s in terms of
the widening of the social base of Filipinos who had some knowledge of Japan, and interms of the tighter inter-twining of economics and culture. In the late 1980s there wasgreat demand for teachers of Japanese language, and information about Japan. The
cultural diplomacy that Japan launched in the decades before the 1980s, and theinstitutions created, enabled both Japan and the Philippines to meet these demands.
In September 2006 the Philippines and Japan signed the JPEPA, an agreementthat is significant for embodying the inter-twining of economics and culture. Filipino26

IT workers and caregivers will be allowed to enter Japan, but one of the conditions isa high level of Japanese language proficiency. The Philippines’ need for job
opportunities is now officially an opportunity for the Japanese government to promote
the Japanese language abroad.
The case of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in the Philippines in the last fifty years
shows that cultural diplomacy does not always produce the desired results; neither
does it have results immediately. It is nevertheless a valuable capital that is useful for
its own sake and that may become useful for other purposes in due time.

27

Bibliography

Alegre, Aurelio D. 1967. “Japanese Economic Penetration.” Examiner. 26 November:
Almario, Manuel F. 1968. “A Second Japanese Invasion.” Graphic. 22 May.
Barranco, Vic. 1970. “ Remember the ‘Hayun Maru’.” Examiner. 25 April.
Bitong, Ernesto T. 1957. “The Japanese are Back!” Philippines Free Press. 18 May.
Calica, Pio. 1935. Japan Footnotes. [Manila]: publisher not known
Farolan, Modesto. 1934. Japan at a Glance: Travel Impressions, a Study in JapanPhilippine Relations. Manila: publisher not known.
“Jap Boy Scouts in National Jamboree.” 1954. Philippines Free Press. April.
Japan Bulletin. Various dates
Japanese-Philippine Basketball Friendship Matches brochure. 1952. 2-12 February.
(personal copy of the author).
Jose, Lydia N. Yu. 1998. “Philippines-Japan Relations: The Revolutionary Years anda Century Hence,” in Baviera, Aileen and Jose, Lydia N. Yu, eds. Philippine
External Relations: A Centennial Vista. Manila: Foreign Service Institute,
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jose, Lydia N. Yu. 1999. Japan Views the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo deManila University Press.
Maramag, Ileana. 1966. “Progress through Peace.” Chronicle Magazine. 29 January:
6-11
Memo. 1979. Bienvenido F. Nebres, Dean, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo deManila University, to Joseph Pittau and Michael Yanase, 28 August.
Memorandum. [1966]. The Japanese Studies Program, Ateneo de Manila University.

28

Meyer, Milton Walter. 1965. A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Ministry of Justice Homepage (Japan). http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/0106131/010613-1-3.html. Viewed on 1 October 2001.
“Must We Have Roads and Peace at the Price of Our Self-Respect?” 1967. Weekly
Graphic, 1 November.
Nakagawa, Toru. 1953. “Japan-Philippine Relations.” Fookien Times Yearbook.
PDI (Philippine Daily Inquirer). 2005 June; 2006 October.
Philippine Star. 2006 October
Report..1969. The Director [Haruo Tsuru] of the Japanese Studies Program of the
Ateneo de Manila University. February.
Rivera, Temario C. 2003. “The Politics of Japanese ODA in the Philippines, 19711999,” in Ikehata, Setsuho and Jose, Lydia N. Yu, eds. Philippines-Japan
Relations. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University.
Sanvictores, Philip. 1993. “A School is Born.” The Philippines-Japan Digest. Vol.
XVIII, No. 1 (February)
Sato, Torao. 1994. Firipin to Nihon: Koryu 500 nen [Five Centuries of FilipinoJapanese Relations]. Tokyo: The Simul Press
Serrano, Paquito. 1952. “Japan Uses Her Youth.” Philippines Free Press. August.
Serrano, Paquito. 1953. “Japan and Her Pen Pal Clubs.” Philippines Free Press.
January.
Sudo, Sueo. 1992. The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN. Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies.
Takamatsu (Prince). 1952. Message in Japanese-Philippine Basketball Friendship
Matches brochure, 2-12 February. (personal copy of the author)

29

Tecson, Gwendolyn R. 2003. “Postwar Japanese Direct Investments,” in Ikehata,
Setsuho and Jose, Lydia N. Yu, eds. Philippines-Japan Relations. Quezon
City: Ateneo de Manila University.
Vargas, [Jorge]. 1952. Mmessage in Japanese-Philippine Basketball Friendship
Matches brochure, 2-12 February. (personal copy of the author)
Villacorta, Wilfrido V. 2003. “Political Relations between Japan and the Philippines
during the Aquino and Ramos Administrations,” in Ikehata, Setsuho and Jose,
Lydia N. Yu, eds. Philippines-Japan Relations. Quezon City: Ateneo deManila University.
Weekly Graphic. 1967
Yoshikawa, Yoko. 2003. “War Reparations Implementation, Reparations-Secured
Loans and a Treaty of Commerce,” in Ikehata, Setsuho and Jose, Lydia N. Yu,
eds. Philippines-Japan Relations. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University.

30