A Mirror of Flesh: An Exploration of Materiality in Living Bioengineered Art

Lucy Winnington

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy in Art History, the University of Auckland
2021

Abstract
Living works of bioart force an encounter with the visceral, ethical and embodied actualitiesof bioengineering, through the liminal form of the non-human art subject. Intertwining andintentionally confounding traditional dualisms of self/other, living/non-living andsubject/object, bioart challenges perceptions of living matter and human relationships withother forms of life. Using a pluralistic approach, this thesis comprises of a descriptive,
theoretical and aesthetic exploration of bioart, which includes consideration of facture, uses
and application of biotechnological tools and processes in art construction, and the visual formsof living bioart works, in addition to theoretical engagements with posthumanism, ethics andnew materialism. Furthermore, aesthetic notions of the abject and the uncanny, together with
understandings of the phenomenological art encounter are explored alongside these theoreticalconsiderations.
This research suggests that the use of living materials and tools of biotechnology byartists is a purposeful act which intentionally challenges and critiques contemporary genetic
manipulation and uses of living materials. This critique is enabled through the visual, material
form of bioart, which appears to inhabit a new uncanny valley; producing a sense of eerinessand a conflation of familiarity and unfamiliarity enabled through living materiality, bioart
places the viewer in a unique position of perceiving the artworks simultaneously as of the self
and other, thus enabling both critical and emotive perspectives. It would appear that this act oftransposing living matter into the role of art media can be perceived as being a transgressive
act, thus exposing a cultural double-standard whereby the artist is publicly scrutinised in waysthat bioscientists are not, despite using the same materials and processes. This, in turn, appears
to be an important aspect of bioart practices as it offers new perspectives for critique of extant
practices by disrupting the expectations of both scientific materials and what art should or canbe. Bioart offers a platform for discussing these questions and for facilitating an encounter withii

ideas and technologies that are often hidden or packaged palatably. Bioart is, therefore, aconfrontation with the values and processes of the Anthropocene, bringing the viewer face-toface with the impressive yet accelerating power of current technological capabilities.

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For my grandparents, David. J and Karen S. R. Johnstone,
and for Pollyiv

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I must thank my supervisor Dr Gregory Minissale for his unwavering
support, his constant belief in my abilities and his trust in my work. I have learned so many
valuable lessons from him and am so thankful for his guidance over the years I have known
him. Thank you also to my second supervisor, Dr Robin Woodward.
Thank you to the University of Auckland Art History department, the academic staff,
the administrative staff and students past and present who have provided so much knowledge,
growth and friendships over the years I have been a student here. A further thank you is
extended to the University of Auckland library staff for their assistance and support, withparticular thanks to the Interloan staff for always finding what I needed, no matter how difficult
the request.
The road here has not been easy, especially over the last year. Although mygrandparents did not get to see the completion of this thesis, it would not have been possible
without their love and support. One impact of the global pandemic has meant that I have spent
a lot of time at home during the writing of this thesis, and so I am grateful for the company of
my furry office companions, Hettie and Matilda who were good distractions whenprocrastinating. And, of course, an enormous thank you to my friends and my family, myparents and my sister for their unwavering support over these years.
Finally, a special thank you to my mother, without whom I would not have ventured
onto this path. Thank you for inspiring me, for believing in me and for always showing me thatanything is possible.

vTable of Contents

Abstracti

Dedicationiii

Acknowledgements

iv

Table of Contentsv

List of Figuresviii

Introduction

1

Chapter One Bioart: A Contextual Background10

1.1 Contemporary Art and Biotechnology

11

1.1.1 Precursors to Bioart

11

1.1.2 Early Bioart

20

1.1.3 Defining Bioart

22

1.1.4 Bioart as New Media Art

26

1.2. The Biotechnology Revolution

28

1.2.1 The Politics of Biotechnologies

31

1.2.2 Bioart and Bioterrorism

33

1.2.3 Bioengineering Anxieties36

1.3. Ethics and Art

39

1.3.1 Bioethics

40

1.3.2 Life as Material for Art

42

1.3.3 Duty of Care and Disposal of the Art Object/Subject

45

Chapter Two: Theorising Bioart

52

2.1 Matter and Materiality52

2.1.1Vitalism

56

2.1.2 Materialism

58

2.1.3 New Materialism

59

2.2 Posthumanism

63

2.2.1 Transhumanism

69

2.2.2 Posthuman Art

73

2.3 Otherness
2.3.1 The Uncanny

79
81

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2.3.2 The Uncanny Valley83

2.3.3 The Abject

86

2.3.4 Disgust and Art

90

Chapter Three: Living Bioengineered Art

93

Part One93

3.1 Eduardo Kac

94

3.1.1 Genesis

94

3.1.2 GFP Bunny99

3.2 The Tissue Culture & Art Project101

3.2.1 The Semi-Living Worry Dolls

106

3.2.2 Victimless Leather

111

3.2.3 Disembodied Cuisine

113

3.3 Guy Ben-Ary

116

3.3.1 cellF

117

3.4 Diemut Strebe

119

3.4.1 Sugababe

119

3.5 Gina Czarnecki

122

3.5.1 Heirloom

122

3.6 Amy Karle
3.6.1 Regenerative ReliquaryPart Two

125
125
129

3.7 Characteristics of Bioart

129

3.7.1 Human-like Forms of Bioart

130

3.7.2 Living Cells and Growth Serums

134

3.7.3 Exposing, Exploring and Critiquing Bioscience138

3.8 Responses to Bioart

141

3.8.1 Expectations of Art

142

3.8.2 Ethical and Practical Concerns

146

Chapter Four: Encountering Living Bioart
4.1 The Display of Bioart

150
150

4.1.1 Locations of Bioart Display

157

4.1.2 Art/Science Venues

160
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4.1.3 Audience and Viewership

163

4.1.4 How Bioart is Displayed

165

4.1.5 Encountering Living Artworks

169

4.2 The Effects of Materiality

171

4.2.1 The Separation of Art and Science

177

4.2.2 The Objectification of the Art Other

180

4.2.3 Ethical Responsibilities: Creation, Display and Viewership

182

4.3 Materiality and the Uncanny Valley186

4.3.1 The Uncanny Valley of Bioart

197

Chapter Five: Bioart as a Product and Reflection of the Anthropocene
5.1 The Function of Abjection

203
205

5.1.1 The Yuck Factor

207

5.1.2 The Power of Abjection

212

5.2. Bioart, Biotechnologies and Bioethics

214

5.2.1 Ethical Concerns in Contemporary Biotechnological Practices

216

5.2.2 Synthetic Tissue219

5.2.3 Bioprinting

222

5.3. A Bioethics for Bioart?

226

5.3.1 New Ethical Considerations

230

5.3.2 Is Bioart an Ethical Practice?

232

5.3.3 Bioart and Being Beyond Human

235

5.3.4 Bioart and the Future

236

Conclusion

239

Figures

250

Bibliography

290

viii

List of Figures

Note: These figures are included for examination purposes only and no copyright is held for theseimages.

Chapter One
Figure 1.1: Edward Steichen, Delphiniums, 1936
Figure 1.2: Alexander Fleming, Germ Paintings, 1933
Figure 1.3: Man Ray, Le Violon d'Ingres, 1924
Figure 1.4: Lee Miller, Untitled [Severed breast from radical surgery], 1930
Figure 1.5: Damien Hirst, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone
Living, 1991
Figure 1.6: Joe Davis, Microvenus, 1986
Figure 1.7: Joe Davis, Microvenus Rune, 1986
Figure 1.8: Alexis Rockman, The Farm, 2000
Figure 1.9: Mat Collishaw, All Things Fall, 2014
Figure 1.10: Diemut Strebe, Sugababe, 2014

250
251
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253
254
255
255
256
256
257

Chapter Two
Figure 2.1: Didacus Valades, The Great Chain of Being, 1579
Figure 2.2: Stelarc, Ear on Arm, 2007
Figure 2.3: Orlan, The Reincarnation of Saint-Orlan, 1990-1992
Figure 2.4: Jacob Epstein, The Rock Drill, 1913
Figure 2.5: Patricia Piccinini, The Young Family, 2002
Figure 2.6: Patricia Piccinini, Still Life with Stem Cells, 2002
Figure 2.7: Vincent Fournier, Asimo #2, 2009
Figure 2.8: Vincent Fournier, Reem B #6, 2010
Figure 2.9: Vincent Fournier, Murata Boy #1, 2010
Figure 2.10: Patrick Tresset, Human Study #1, 5RNP, 2012-18
Figure 2.11: Masahiro Mori, The Uncanny Valley, 1970
Figure 2.12: Honda, ASIMO, 2000
Figure 2.13: Kokoro, Repliee Q2, 2003
Figure 2.14: Tom Hooper, Cats, 2019
Figure 2.15: Jeff Fowler, Sonic the Hedgehog, 2020
Figure 2.16: Marc Quinn, Self, 1991-2011
Figure 2.17: Judy Chicago, Menstruation Bathroom, 1971
Figure 2.18: Andres Serrano, Bull Shit, 2007

258
259
260
261
262
262
263
263
264
264
265
266
267
268
268
269
270
271

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Chapter Three
Figure 3.1: Eduardo Kac, Genesis, 1998-99
Figure 3.2: Eduardo Kac, Encryption Stones, 2001
Figure 3.3: Eduardo Kac, GFP Bunny, 2000
Figure 3.4: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Semi-Living Worry Dolls, 2000
Figure 3.5: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Semi-Living Worry Dolls [detail], 2000
Figure 3.6: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Victimless Leather, 2004
Figure 3.7: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Disembodied Cuisine, 2003
Figure 3.8: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Semi-Living Steak, 2000
Figure 3.9: Guy Ben-Ary, cellF, 2015
Figure 3.10: Guy Ben-Ary cellF [detail], 2015
Figure 3.11: Diemut Strebe, Sugababe, 2014
Figure 3.12 Gina Czarnecki, Heirloom, 2014
Figure 3.13: Gina Czarnecki, Heirloom [detail], 2014
Figure 3.14: Amy Karle, Regenerative Reliquary, 2016
Figure 3.15: Jun Takita, Light, Only Light, 2003
Figure 3.16: Andrew Krasnow, Palette, 1992-1999
Figure 3.17: Ezzam Rahman, Here’s What I Am, I Am What You See, 2015

272
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273
274
275
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277
278
279
279
280
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282

Chapter Four
Figure 4.1: Gunther von Hagens, Body Worlds Exhibit, 2018
Figure 4.2: Marta de Menezes, Nature?, 2000
Figure 4.3: Damien Hirst, In and Out of Love, 1991
Figure 4.4: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Semi-Living Worry Dolls (59 Decaying and
Preserved Dolls), 2019
Figure 4.5: Méret Oppenheim, Object (Le Déjeuner en fourrure), 1936
Figure 4.6: Tissue Culture & Art Project, Semi Living Worry Dolls Exhibition
Label, 2019
Figure 4.7: Andres Serrano, Piss Christ, 1987

283
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Introduction

This thesis explores the materials of living bioengineered art. These materials are at once bothfamiliar and foreign. Made from animals, tissues or cells, these works can also be made fromhuman flesh, but having been removed from the body these biological components havebecome malleable materials for art practices. Bioart is an emerging practice that has seen artists
appropriate the materials and processes of biotechnologies, repurposing them as art media.
These technologies are concerned with improving biological structures, adding to them,removing from them, and reimagining their natural form. Used by artists, biotechnologies havebecome the material and conceptual basis for a new form of cultural exploration and critique.
Bioart is not only a sign but a reflection of a cultural shift where knowledge has enabled thehuman to move beyond the limitations of nature, consequently forcing a reassessment ofcontemporary ideas of natural and artificial and living and non-living.
Contributing to current critical discussions of bioart through detailed exploration andanalysis of the materials, processes and understanding of the practice, this research contributes
to the current gap in the literature by both addressing the issues of definition and offering aconcise study on a specific type of material-based bioart. In paying attention to this, thisresearch aims to understand how and why artists are using these materials as art media and theconsequences and effects of doing so.

The Anthropocene
The twenty-first century is a time of profound technological change. These changes are
occurring at a rate that continues to accelerate exponentially, evident in the continual releaseof new consumerist technologies. More recently, this acceleration of technologicaldevelopments is apparent in the production of multiple potential vaccines after the outbreak of1

the Covid-19 pandemic. The first outbreak of the bubonic plague in the fourteenth century,
before the development of modern science, lasted around four years, killing a quarter of the
population of Europe, and approximately 25 million people across Asia and Africa (Frith,2012). Today, modern science has offered several vaccines for SARS-Cov-2 in less than a year,
whereas previously, a vaccine has not been produced in under five years (Davis, 2020). These
technologies are beneficial to public health, populations and agricultural production, however,they also raise questions about human relationships with nature, the environment, and our own
bodies.
Historically, human populations have produced technologies ever since we have beenable to access materials and craft tools to alter and improve the suitability of the environment
for agriculture and for human health. Periods of human history are now often referred to using
these materials: the stone age, the bronze age, the iron age. The current epoch of time we areliving in is often referred to as the Anthropocene, so named as it reflects the human-centric
nature of many human/environment interactions and relationships towards the environment
and its lifeforms. The notion of the Anthropocene is, however, not uncontested with somesuggesting that the term is unofficial, ambiguous and that the timeframe of human impact is
not significant enough at this point to signal a newly defined epoch (Demos, 2017). Despite
this lack of consensus, the term is often used to describe the current “multi-layered posthuman
predicament that includes the environmental, socio-economic, and affective and psychic
dimensions of our ecologies of belonging” (Braidotti, 2018, p.32). While the Anthropocene
reflects the impact of human behaviours on the Earth, this does not necessarily refer to it as
being a positive impact, but one which has led to the development of a posthuman rhetoric; amovement intended to shift the focus away from a narrow field of human-centric values, to abroader acceptance, care towards and respect of life beyond the limited traditional
configuration of the human.

2The technologies of the Anthropocene are vast, ranging from the built environment andtransport, industry to information and communication, and biotechnologies. These
technologies have provided us with global connectivity, the Internet, intensive food andcommodities production and medicine. Biotechnologies are the tools of the Anthropocene andare routinely produced and used daily, infiltrating human life in many different ways; the drugs
and pharmaceuticals we consume, medical processes and treatments, and the crops and animals
produced for consumption are all products of bioengineering. It is this subliminal omnipresenceof biotechnologies which have altered fundamental human relationships with nature that,
therefore, challenges what we understand as being natural in the twenty-first century. Nature,
as a term, is itself a complex and problematic concept that has been created by and for humans
that serves to separate humans from the rest of the ecological system we exist within (Jiménezde Cisneros, 2016). Therefore, when understanding ideas of the natural aspect of bioart andbioengineering, the natural and artificial are not clearly defined concepts, but categories
attributed to different aspects of the interconnected ecological network of the planet.
Consequently, bioengineering can be understood as the application of modification
technologies to living materials; there are many different methods of modifying biologicalmatter as will become apparent in this thesis, however, as new technologies develop, thelimitations of possibilities are further eliminated. This increasing plasticity of living matter has
seen it become art material for exploration, construction, and critique.

Living Matter to Living Materiality
Living materials and living organisms as materials, whether for scientific research or art
production, pose significant ethical, moral, logistical, practical and legislative issues.
Contemporary bioengineering practices see living materials grown from cells, genetic
modification of living plants and animals, the merging of genetic materials of more than one

3

species, and bodily modifications of the human. Many questions emerge regarding the different
types of living materials used for bioengineering practices, in addition to how these materials
are acquired or grown. Furthermore, issues such as whether there is a perceived difference
between human material, as opposed to the manipulation and growth of animal materials,
bacteria and other microscopic materials and plant materials, is an essential consideration forsuch practices. The explicit manipulation of living materials using biotechnologies requires asociety that is complicit or ignorant of it to allow life to be altered, used, and commodified.
The use of living materials as art mirrors or parodies uses of living materials as scientificmaterials. In many ways, bioart increases the visibility of using living materials and asks how
far this should go.
Bioengineering, therefore, reveals many questions that extend beyond the scientificprocess and into the values and standards of the cultures that practice, allow and accept it. The
dilemmas that biotechnologies can evoke have, however, already been addressed directly andindirectly in fiction. Ursula K. Le Guin’s, 1973 short story, The Ones Who Walk Away From
Omelas, tells of a utopia in which there is perfect happiness, however, this happiness isdependent on the suffering of a single child. Residents of the town are told about the sufferingof the child when they are old enough to understand, and the majority of the residents choose
to accept the suffering in order for them to continue to live in their utopia. In this way, theacceptance of biotechnologies that cause harm or suffering to animals in our current societies,
while controversial, is ultimately accepted and legislated in many countries for human benefit.
Similarly, Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel, Never Let Me Go tells of a dystopian reality
where human clones are grown and raised for their organs to be harvested and transplanted into
others, resulting in a short life for the clones. In the novel, the use of clones for transplants isgenerally accepted by both the wider population and the clones themselves. Most famously
perhaps amongst literature which is closely associated with the biotechnologies is Mary4

Shelley’s, Frankenstein, 1919; the story of a young scientist with ambitions to discover the
spark of life, creating his own living ‘creature’ from an assemblage of dead materials, only tolater reject his creation as a ‘monster’. As such, these fictional scenarios reflect the existential
anxieties that emerge alongside the production and implementation of new technologies, whichchallenge existing structures of the human and how it can change when the substances of ourown bodies become materiality.
It is this juxtaposition of anxiety amidst ‘progress’ that has manifested in the emergenceof bioart, a practice that appears to play on these coexisting tensions within the uncertainty ofthe effects of current scientific endeavours. By using and recontextualising these living
materials and bioengineering processes, bioart appears to provoke, question, and expose thetechnologies currently being developed and interrogates how these technologies affect us bothcognitively and emotionally. In bioart, traditional dualisms of art/science, living/non-living,natural/artificial and subject/object are blurred, suggesting that these works offer multiple
levels of ambiguity. In order to understand, contextualise and theorise the ways in which
encountering living biotechnologies make us feel, and to what ends, the exploration of living
materials in this thesis takes a pluralistic approach which considers multiple aspects of bioart
thus providing a thorough and complex picture and engagement with bioart. This approach
includes the descriptive, theoretical and aesthetic considerations of bioart together with theuses of living bioengineered materials as an artistic medium. The initial component of thisapproach focuses on the descriptive elements of bioart, which includes the facture of bioart
works and the materials they are constructed from, in addition to the biotechnological tools thatare used in the construction processes. This attention to describing the artworks is essential forlater theoretical explorations in understanding the purposes, aims and wider socio-cultural
engagements of bioart works and bioartists. Furthermore, by detailing how works areconstructed, what they are constructed from and how artists are engaging with specific tools of5biotechnology, this provides a detailed orientation for the later discussions of the theoreticaland aesthetic properties of bioart.
The second component of this methodological approach is, therefore, theoretical innature and, as such, considers the theoretical engagements of bioart, how these perspectives
can assist in understanding the effects of bioart, together with its ambiguous moral, ethical andcategorical status. This theoretical exploration of bioart includes discussions on posthumanism,
ethics, considerations of materiality including new materialism, approaching materiality andthe ways in which bioart challenges and highlights material and ethical understandings ofbiotechnological practices; together with art practices situating bioart in a broader context andthe connection of this practice to wider contemporary perspectives.
The final component of this approach focuses on aesthetic considerations of bioart
works, including theoretical frameworks prominent within visual culture, consisting of theabject, the uncanny and monstrosity, together with an exploration and analysis of how works
appear and how they are presented to audiences, thus offering insight into how these visual
aspects of bioart can effect interpretation and subjective phenomenological understandings
through the art encounter. As such, this pluralistic methodology provides a multifaceted andbroad-ranging platform for the exploration of bioart and the role, effectivity and understandingof materiality in living works of bioengineered art.
An essential aim of this research is to understand what is meant by the use of the term
bioart. Many of the works that this thesis will explore have been described using the term,
however, what will become apparent is the broad range of different materials, processes, forms,
implications and conceptual ideas in these works. Therefore, exploration of the term, its origin
and what is intended to be included and what it refers to is ambiguous and the use of it unclear;consequently, a clearer understanding of what is meant by the term may reveal news ways in6which these works can be connected and what they might collaboratively contribute to newunderstandings of materiality.
The works of art selected as the focus for this research share material and criticalsimilarities and include some of the most well-known and well-documented instances of bioart
produced by the founding artists of the contemporary practice. The primary material of focus
in this thesis is tissue culture; living material grown from the cells and genetic materials ofhumans and animals. There is, however, some variation in materials used for the works
examined in order to reflect and include the founding works of the genre, including living
animals and bacteria. Selected works also include some of the most recent examples of bioart
to be exhibited, which I was able to view as a means of considering both the encounter withmateriality personally and observe the ways in which bioart works are displayed. This,
therefore, presents a broad scope of works spanning the recent history of the genre and provides
a comprehensive indication of the bioart works that have been created and for analysis of theuse of living materials in art practices.
In following this methodology, the primary objective of this research is to understandthe complexities of living materiality in bioengineered art and how these materials can beunderstood through the art encounter; this includes considerations of how understandings ofthese living materials might change through the unexpected transposition from scientificpractices into an art context. Furthermore, this research aims to understand how and why artists
might choose to use these materials, the processes of construction, and what effects these may
produce. This includes understanding accessibility to the materials and processes ofbioengineering for artists and their motivations in doing so, as well as understanding how living
materials may impact how and where such artworks are displayed.

7

Thesis Structure
The first chapter of this thesis considers bioart as a practice and how it has been treated in theexisting literature. This includes exploring different definitions of bioart that have beenpresented to date, with perspectives from scholarly sources as well as from artists involved in
the practice. The chapter also examines how living materials have been used inbiotechnologies, both historically and in current practices. Ethical and political implications ofthese practices, and the use of living materials as new media art, are also addressed here.
The second chapter reflects on the theoretical considerations of matter and materiality;
this includes a detailed examination of life as a material and concepts that concern theinterrelationships of materials. An account of posthumanist philosophy and its connections toboth the Anthropocene and to bioart practices is provided with particular reference to the worksof Rosi Braidotti as a key theorist of posthumanism. This also includes subsidiary concepts thatfall under the umbrella of posthumanism, including critical posthumanism and transhumanismand how these theoretical considerations can contextualise bioart works within the changing
ideas of what the human is and is in the process of becoming. These could be characterised as
the humanities’ critical responses to scientific positivism. This chapter engages with theconcept of the abject in relation to materiality and explores how Julia Kristeva’s theory of theabject can explain negative reactions to the visceral materials of bioart works. Furthermore,this chapter explores Masahiro Mori’s phenomenon of the uncanny valley in response tostimuli that are situated in liminal spaces between the familiar and the unfamiliar or the self
and the other and how this can assist with understanding the categorical conflations present inbioart works.
The third chapter examines specific works of bioart and is divided into two parts. Part
One comprises of in-depth descriptions of bioart works, including their visual appearance, theirmaterials, how they have been made and any motivations that informed their construction. This8

part will also provide contextual information about the oeuvre of each of the artists, as manyof them are responsible for more than one work. The works have been selected according totheir materiality in order to provide a cohesive and nuanced discussion of the range of living
tissue bioart works produced to date. The second part of Chapter Three then focuses on various
responses to these works of art. This includes the responses by viewers, critics, and scholars,
as well as the artists themselves. The responses are discussed according to two central yet
connected themes; the expectations of art and of science as separate cultural categories and theethical problems of manipulating living matter for art purposes.
The fourth chapter is the first of two discussion chapters. This chapter analyses bioart
as a window to bioengineering practices and what this can reveal about ourselves and thesocieties we live in. This is achieved through the exploration of how bioart can affect the viewer
as a result of its materiality. This chapter addresses the effects of the viewer’s encounter withliving bioart as mediated by the materiality, in addition to an examination of bioart responses
based on materiality, including abjection of materiality and living bioart as a continuum of theuncanny valley phenomena to stimuli. This chapter considers how responses to bioart, both byvisitors and criticism, can be understood through psychological processes that are enabledthrough the subjective phenomenology of encountering the living works.
Chapter Five draws upon the findings of the previous chapter to explore the criticismsof bioart in a broader socio-cultural context. This includes connecting the visitor experienceand responses to living bioart to the phenomenon of the ‘yuck’ factor in biotechnologicalpractices; an effect similar to abjection, which is used to describe public aversions to certain
new technologies that are associated with threats of contamination or evoke disgust. The roleof institutional bioethics is also considered in relation to accessibility and control overbioengineering practices, including how a prospective bioethics for art practices might emerge.
The relationship between subjective, embodied experience to ethical conduct is considered, as

9well as the ways in which posthumanist perspectives contest the positivism of institutional
bioethics.
Together, this thesis uncovers the ways in which bioart offers a critical reflection of ourcurrent technological practices and their impacts within the Anthropocene. Using andtransforming living matter into art materials, bioartists appear to draw attention to our values
and our ethical standpoints regarding bioengineering practices that we are becoming
increasingly dependent upon. Through the exploration of bioart, its materials and processes,
this thesis, therefore, reveals how this new, unexpected art encounter can both complicate ourperceptions of life and simultaneously suggests new considerations for how we live, what wevalue, and our relationships with other forms of life.

10Chapter One
Bioart: A Contextual Background

Bioart is a relatively recent emergence in contemporary art with a short yet diverse history ofutilising life and living structures as artistic material. Predominantly located in the twenty-first
century, the biological arts have few precursors before this time and instead have developed
alongside the production of contemporary biotechnologies. Despite the recent expansion of the
field, with complex artistic and biological engagements emerging across the world, bioart
remains a relatively obscure genre; this is in part due to a plethora of legislative and ethicalissues that manifest from it, and as a result of its very existence transgressing the norms andexpectations of both art and science. Bioart is, therefore, a liminal art form, created through apurposeful transgression of traditional boundaries, problematising binaries of art/science,natural/manufactured, living/non-living and object/subject. At the threshold of theseboundaries, biological artworks force an encounter with contemporary biotechnology throughthe use of these technologies as their materiality and processes.
Consequently, these works provoke contemplation on our perceptions and values oflife, both human and non-human, as well as our relationship to these other forms of life in anage of pervasive biotechnologies. This chapter aims to understand what bioart is through theassessment of existing literature and consideration of current debates regarding definitions ofbioart. Furthermore, consideration will be given to how the term bioart is used and by whom,
together with a background to the origin of this term and historical examples of similar works.
As bioart is a practice based on biotechnologies, this chapter will also explore exactly whatbiotechnologies are, how they are used, and the ethical and legal implications of their usage.

1.1 Contemporary Art and Biotechnology

111.1.1 Precursors to Bioart
There are a multitude of reference points to understanding the emergence and history of bioart
and are found in the artistic uses of biotechnologies and biological materials, in the history ofmonsters and monstrosity, as well as in the twenty-first century through surrealism. While there
are limited examples of material-based bioart before the 1990s, the interconnectivity of art andthe natural sciences do have a small number of precursors, particularly during the Renaissancein the works of Leonardo.1 During the nineteenth century, however, the arts and sciences
suffered from a cultural divide, primarily stemming from the development of separated
institutions such as science museums and art museums, as the result of an attempt to define
each separately (Else, 2010). This division is famously noted by C. P. Snow in The Rede
Lecture of 1959 in which he states that cultural forces had created “two groups – comparable
in intelligence, identical in race, not grossly different in social origin, earning about the same
incomes, who had almost ceased to communicate at all” (2008, p.1). It is from this analysis
that Snow coined the phrase ‘the two cultures’ in describing an apparent cultural division
between artists and scientists.
Following Snow’s lecture, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed increasing
attempts to reunite the two cultures, most notably through incorporating scientific technologies
and ideas into art practices. This has been apparent across the scientific disciplines, fromastronomy and mathematics to ecology and engineering being incorporated into contemporary
art practices, with both artists and scientists instigating processes of collaboration andinterchange. Some of these collaborations appear simplistic, only transferring subject matterfrom one field to the other, however, others have demonstrated processes of complex

1

Historically art and science have not been as clearly divided as they have been since the nineteenth century (Whelan,2009), with artists such as Leonardo contributing important innovations to both subjects equally, demonstrated by a dispute
between the National Gallery and the Royal Collection, regarding whether a selection of Leonardo’s anatomical drawings
should be displayed in the science collection or the art collection (Jones, 2012).

12

fundamental interchange in which outcomes appear both works of art and scientificexperimentation simultaneously.2 Complex collaborations between the visual arts andbioengineering are, however, a significantly more recent and obscure phenomenon than otherfields of science and have primarily emerged from the 1990s onwards due to the rapid
expansion of biotechnological capabilities during this time.
The origins of bioart are situated in the expansion of biotechnologies and thesubsequent ability to control and manipulate life at the turn of the twentieth century, with the“emergence of biotechnologically oriented industrial methods of plant and animal farming andproduction” (Mitchell, 2010, p.35). Such new technologies have allowed for greater control
over the genetic properties and behaviours of living material, “radically reconstructing relations
between politics and nature, and allowing for a reassessment of how we look at life today”(Pandilovski, 2017, p.141). These technologies were appropriated in the 1930s by Edward
Steichen, whose works are considered to be among the first examples of an artist using
biotechnologies in their practice (Stracey, 2009). Steichen was a plant breeder in addition to
being a photographer and utilised plant hybridisation techniques to grow mutated delphiniums.
These flowers were artificially coloured blue by Steichen through bathing the seeds incolchicine. In 1936 the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York held its only ever flower
exhibition specifically for Steichen to display his delphiniums [Figure 1.1] (Hartmann, 2011).
This work was considered successful not only in its art context but also for the developments
Steichen contributed to agriculture through his production of new hybrid plants.
A second notable figure in the history of biological materials used for art purposes is
Alexander Fleming, the Scottish physician known for his discovery of Penicillin. Aside fromhis scientific investigations, Fleming was a keen painter and a member of the Chelsea Arts

2

This level of interchange between art and science can be found exploring a wide number of scientific fields, including
chemistry, biology, ecology, physics and computer sciences, and can also be found in the cosmographical works of Katie
Paterson’s All the Dead Stars (2009), Ruth Watson’s Between Light and Dark Matters (2005), and Karel Nel’s The Collapseof Time (2008).

13

Club before he combined his two interests in the laboratory. In 1933, Fleming created a seriesof ‘germ paintings’ using bacteria incubated on culture-soaked paper (Stracey, 2009). Using
bacteria pigmented with colour, Fleming painted a range of scenes, including ballerinas,
soldiers, and stick figures [Figure 1.2], by inoculating areas of an agar filled petri dish using awire tool (Dunn, 2010). The germ paintings were only temporary as the bacteria eventually
grew obscuring the initial design, therefore “the lines between, say, a hat and a face were
blurred; so too were the lines between art and science” (Dunn, 2010, para.4). It remains largely
unknown why Fleming decided to produce these paintings with bacteria, however, these works
are some of the first known living works of art and among the first predecessors tocontemporary bioart.3
A further reference point for bioart is found in the long-held interest in monstrosity, often
located in the context of change, transformation or category conflations. Monster “is a flexible,
multiuse concept” which “has evolved to become a moral term in addition to a biological andtheological term” (Asma, 2009, p.7). Furthermore, monsters are beings that “resist a fixed stateor assimilation within existing systems of knowledge; they are interstitial, things of in-between
identity” (Alder, 2017, p.1085). The idea of the monster is, however, a creation and often amarginalisation that is culturally created, and frequently carries negative connotations and ismost often used to describe transgressions of biology, anatomy, or social behaviours, this isbecause “monsters terrify us, in part, because they are ontologically confusing – because they
seem to exist in a non-relation to other living beings” (Danta, 2012, p.698). Monsters haveexisted throughout human history, some real and others imagined, yet have existed across all
cultures and include “demons, dragons, ghosts, wrathful Buddhas, and supernatural animals[who] occupy the theology, folklore, and daily rituals of religious cultures around the globe”

3

Bacterial paintings have continued to be produced, particularly by scientists, with the American Society for
Microbiology hosting an annual Agar Art competition since 2015 (Bowerman, 2015). Works have included
reproductions of paintings such as Vincent van Gogh’s, The Starry Night (1889) and Edvard Munch’s, The
Scream (1893), in addition to scenes of landscapes, animals and portraits.

14

(Asma, 2009, p.14). While there are multiple uses and associations with the use of ‘monster’,the term itself
derives from the Latin word monstrum, which in turn derives from the root monere (towarn). To be a monster is to be an omen. Sometimes the monster is a display of God’s
wrath, a portent of the future, a symbol of moral virtue or vice, or an accident of nature.
The monster is more than an odious creature of the imagination; it is a kind of cultural
category, employed in domains as diverse as religion, biology, literature, and politics(Asma, 2009, p.13).
As a warning, the figure of the monster exists in opposition to normative, expected and moral
standards of a culture. For this reason, monsters are often transgressive and constructed fromthe fears and anxieties of the cultures they exist in. However, not all monsters exist exclusively
within these boundaries of negative connotations, omens or transgression, and can be
exemplified by dragons, which, in Chinese culture, are revered and celebrated as figures ofnational identity (Asma, 2009). This variation suggests that monstrosity is not a static concept,
but it is one that is diverse and exposes many different forms of monstrosity; these include
culturally dependent monsters and pancultural monsters, behavioural monstrosity andmonstrous acts, monsters of variable moral alignments and the space for new ideas of themonstrous to develop. It is this understanding of monstrosity that is apparent in practices ofbioart, that is a perceived monstrosity of the new and the othered living art subject and theconsequential act of objectifying life; an othering that emerges through the technologicalmanipulation of living matter for art construction, thus altering both the biological structuresof matter and the subjectivity of the material as it becomes an art object.
Interest in the changeability and transformation of biological structures can be foundthroughout the history of art and literature, with Ovid’s Metamorphoses being a prime exampleof this. The Metamorphoses detail more than 250 myths that engage in themes oftransformation and change. These include changes from human to animal and plants, animals
to human, and inanimate matter to human. The changing compositions of living and non-living
matter suggest both the malleability of life and the transgressive act of moving from one type15

of living matter to another. Book ten of Ovid’s poem tells the story of Pygmalion who fell inlove with the ivory statue he had sculpted, and upon prayer to Aphrodite that he might marry awoman who looked like the sculpture, the goddess brought the ivory woman to life. However,also in book ten, Ovid describes a transformation that, instead of giving life, reduces it.
Following an incestuous relationship with her father, Myrrah, the mother of Adonis, wastransformed from a woman into a myrrh tree, where her tears became the fragrant sap of thetree. These transformations demonstrate morphological changes between different bodies,
species and forms of life and matter. Mirroring this transition between different types of life
and the transformation of different forms of living matter, the materiality of bioart works areoften situated between the living and non-living and between different species. The uncertainand fluctuating categorisation of the materials of bioart can, therefore, be historically connectedto the changing biological compositions and life status of figures in the Metamorphoses.
While Ovid’s writings are based on mythology rather than real physiologicaltransformations of living subjects, interest in atypical, abnormal, or anomalous bodies astransformed or different examples of the normative expectations of the human body endured
throughout history. During the medieval period, individuals born with physical abnormalities
were regarded as divine warnings and omens (Durbach, 2010, p.2), which follows the meaningof the term monstrous to signify a warning. Ideas of the monstrous during this period continued
to be associated with these sentiments until they became a subject of fascination and intrigue
later in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, during this early period,“representations of monstrous bodies, rather than the physical bodies themselves, circulated
freely within and beyond Europe in the print culture that witnessed an explosion in the earlymodern period” (Durbach, 2010, p.2). Monsters and beasts were consequently catalogued inmanuscripts known as bestiaries. While bestiaries began in antiquity, it was between the twelfth
and fourteenth centuries that they rose to prominence (Morrison & Grollemond, 2019).

16

Bestiaries documented and illustrated both real and imaginary creatures “showcasing natural
history and a succession of animals that appeared real but unreal, preposterous yet frightening,or sometimes even whimsical. Their origins were steeped in the literature and mythology ofmany countries and cultures” (Candy, 2020, p.236). Including animals such as unicorns andgryphons, imaginary beasts often took the form of assemblages; several different animals
combined to create new, unnatural and imagined creatures. As will become apparent inpractices of bioart, assemblages comprising of living materials from different species is acentral feature of many bioart works. In this way, many living works of bioart resemble themonstrous and imaginary assemblages found in historic bestiaries.
Following colonial expansion between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, ideas
of monsters and monstrosity moved from the literary and imaginary to the real through theadvent of freak shows (Krishnan, 2014). Human bodies are not uniform, and “extraordinary
bodies have been cause for both anxiety and worship” (Fordham, 2007, p.210). Living
individuals with rare, unusual, or atypical biological or physiological features or disabilities
have historically been transformed from subjects to objects of curiosity, amusement andrejection through the frame of freak shows. Freak shows featured
three kinds of ‘freaks’. ‘Born freaks’ were those who had been born with a particularphysical anomaly, like Siamese twins or armless people. ‘Made freaks’ were those who
had done something to their body to make it unusual, such as covering it with tattoos.
‘Novelty acts’ were performers who did something unusual for the show, such as
pounding nails into their heads or swallowing swords (Fordham, 2007, p.2011).
One of the most notable figures from the freak shows of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
was the Khoikhoi woman, Sarah Baartman, born in 1775 in South Africa. Also known as the
Hottentot Venus, Baartman was initially sold into slavery aged 20, and in 1810 travelled toEurope where she was subsequently exhibited in numerous freak shows in London and Paris.
The primary reason for Baartman’s inclusion in these shows was that she “had what appeared
to European audiences to be unusually large buttocks, which were read by some as a freakish

17mutation and by others as merely typical of Khoikhoi women. To accentuate her buttocks, she
appeared in a tight-fitting costume that closely matched her skin color, thus creating the illusionof nakedness” (Durbach, 2010, p.32). Consequently, Baartman was objectified through thecolonial gaze, which saw her body transformed into a spectacle of eroticism and fascination.
Even after her death, Baartman’s body continued to be treated as an object and was displayedin the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle in Paris. However, by the early twentieth century,“fascination with the unusual body became more tainted with pity and disgust, causing the
freak show to lose social status and popularity” (Fordham, 2007, p.2012), and after decades ofrequests by the South African government to return Baartman’s remains to her homeland,
French officials repatriated her body where it was finally buried in 2002. This reduction of theliving human from subject to object parallels the concerns and processes of bioart; a practicethat sees life become material to be transformed, viewed and objectified. Like freakshows, thedisplay of bioart is alluring through the simultaneous discomfort and curiosity of the strange.
However, in contrast to the natural anomalies most often found in the exhibits of freak shows,bioart works are intentionally and artificially engineered to exist as new and unique forms oflife.4A further referential precursor to bioart can be found in surrealism, which attacked therational, the expected and the ordinary intentionally, and deliberately made the expectedstrange. In understanding this disruption to the expected, Hal Foster has suggested that
if there is a concept that comprehends surrealism, it must be contemporary with it,
immanent to its field; and it is partly the historicity of this concept that concerns me here.
I believe this concept to be the uncanny, that is to say, a concern with events in which
repressed material returns in ways that disrupt unitary identity, aesthetic norms, andsocial order (1993, p.xvii).

4

While many individuals who were exhibited in freak shows did so as a result of natural physiological abnormalities, some,known as phonies, attempted to mimic these abnormalities such as the “’Armless Wonder’ whose arms were hidden under atight-fitting shirt” (Fordham, 2007, p.2012).

18

The uncanniness of surrealism that is situated in the disruption of expectations is apparent incontemporary works of bioart, which similarly subvert expected uses of living materials,
biotechnologies and the art object being replaced with the art subject. Visually, many bioart
works might also appear surreal through the recontextualisation of their materials, together
with the aspect of living body parts existing separately to a body.
Surrealism’s attack on the normal and the expected has often taken place through thebody, with the female body frequently being a specific focus. In transforming the body, deassembling or reassembling the body, and objectifying the body, surrealism has been criticisedfor its “violent objectification of the female” (Malt, 2004, p.3). However, as a reference point
for bioart, it appears that the objectification and reimagination of othered and marginalised
subjects has a clear trajectory in art history. Man Ray’s Le Violon d'Ingres (1924) [Figure 1.3]
is a notable example of how the surrealists simultaneously reimagined and objectified the body.
The photograph features the figure of a seated nude woman, her robe fallen, with her backexposed to the viewer. The artist transforms the woman’s body through the shape of f-holes
placed onto her back, turning her body into a violin. While the female figure is objectified in
the sense that she is the subject of the male erotic gaze, her body is also reimagined as an actual
object in the form of a musical instrument. The criticism of this prevalent male gaze, and its
objectification of the female body, has also been critiqued through surrealism, such as in Lee
Miller’s 1930, Untitled (Severed Breast from Radical Mastectomy) [Figure 1.4], whichsuggests a reinterpretation of this form of bodily transformation. Served on a plate, Miller
presents the dissected breast with a knife and fork on a dining table. Offering the dismembered
female body for consumption, Miller disrupts the sexualised consumption of the male gazewith trauma and violence, yet simultaneously reflects and subverts the traditional role of thehousewife preparing and serving meals.

19

The displacement and disruption of expected categories and the surrealist merging of
the expected and unexpected can be seen more recently in Damian Hirst’s works which havepreserved dead animals in formaldehyde. The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of
Someone Living (1991) [Figure 1.5] featured a four-metre tiger shark preserved in a tank offormaldehyde. The shark’s open mouth and eyes, together with the blue-toned colour of theformaldehyde, make it appear as though the animal was alive and swimming towards theviewer. The disjuncture between the animal being dead and it appearing alive, although out ofplace through its display, follows the surrealist conflation of the expected and unexpected inboth material and contextual ways. This material and contextual conflation is a significant
aspect of bioart works as they utilise the materials of biotechnology, presenting them in art
contexts. Furthermore, as a biological specimen that was caught and killed for the purpose ofart display, Hirst’s work serves as a historical precursor to bioart both materially as well as
ethically.
These shared aspects of historical ideas of monstrosity and the subversions of
expectations of surrealism assist in identifying and locating the practice of bioart within art
history. This reveals a trajectory in which the simultaneous fascination and fear of monstrosity
can be understood as a response to otherness and the encounter with the unexpected; thisencounter with the unexpected is, furthermore, the intended motivation of surrealism’s
purposeful disruption of the normal, the expected and of rational categorisation. In bioart,
therefore, the monstrous appears both in the form of the works created, as well as through thetransgressive act of transforming the living subject into the art object through the manipulationof life. Similarly, through the unexpected use of living, biological materials for art purposes,
transferring the contents of the bioengineering laboratory into the art exhibition space, theinfluences of surrealism are evident.

20

1.1.2 Early Bioart
Where these examples can be seen to inform bioart and provide a contextual trajectory for thedevelopment of practice, the microscopic level of intentional genetic alteration for artistic
purposes is found later in the twenty-first century. While biotechnologies continued to develop
throughout the twentieth century, it was the fundamental discovery of DNA (Deoxyribonucleicacid) by James Watson and Frances Crick in 1953 that changed the landscape of biotechnology
and subsequently abilities to alter and manipulate life. Although hypothesised long before its
discovery and first identified by Friedrich Miescher in the 1860s, the discovery of DNA
provided a foundational structure for understanding the construct of all living material (Dahm,
2008). This intricate understanding of the structures of living material subsequently gave way
to technologies being able to directly and purposefully manipulate life at a genetic level; forexample, the ability to grow fresh produce with a longer shelf life or contain higher nutritional
contents, without the need for generations of selective hybridised breeding. This understandingof DNA led to the development of molecular biology, where the inner structures of a single
cell can be studied and consequently manipulated. The ability to manipulate life at a genetic
level is the basis for many contemporary biotechnologies and has consequently been adapted
into bioart practices.
One of the first known artworks to use this type of bioengineering is Joe Davis’ 1986
work, Microvenus [Figure 1.6]. Formed from Bacillus subtilis bacteria, cells were geneticallymodified to create the outline of the Germanic rune of “female earth” [Figure 1.7] (Loder,2017, para.2). This work was a response to the Pioneer plaques designed by Frank Drake andCarl Sagan, which were attached to the Pioneer 10 and Pioneer 11 spacecrafts, with theintention that it could, for the first time, pictorially introduce our planet to any extraterrestrial
life that may encounter it (Davis, 2007). The images on Drake and Sagan’s plaque include anude male and female, the solar system and Earth’s location within it. Davis’ work is critical21

of the censorship of the female figure’s genitalia, which lacks detail in comparison to the malefigure; consequently, Davis refers to the image as the “‘man and Barbie’ version of humanity”(Hussain, 2000, para.17). In creating his work, Davis encoded the structure of Microvenus into
bacteria by coding the graphic rune symbols into a nucleotide sequence (Reder, 2016),
therefore reproducing the shape of the rune in the fundamental structure of the bacteria. Since
Davis first made the work in 1986, the Microvenus bacteria has reproduced itself into morethan a billion copies. Furthermore, millions of these copies have been released into outer space
as a rebuttal against Drake and Sagan’s representation of the female anatomy (Reder, 2016).
The final decades of the twentieth century, together with the biotechnologies developed
during that time, appear to have been a catalyst for many of the first artists to intentionally andcritically engage with biotechnologies as part of their practice. By the late 1990s, genetic
engineering had developed to the extent that the first mammal, a female sheep named Dolly,
was successfully cloned in 1996 and announced to the public in 1997 (Best, 2009). Following
this, the Human Genome Project, which mapped the entire set of genes present in human DNA,
was completed in 2003 (Guihan, 2009), simultaneously piquing cultural interest in, andconcern with, biotechnologies. The scope of this cultural anxiety extended beyond
biotechnology to technology in general and is evident in the fear of the ‘millennium bug’ or‘Y2K bug’ forecast to disrupt computer systems globally on New Year’s Day in 2000 (Gere,2008). It is during this time that many contemporary bioart pioneers began to include
biotechnologies in their practice, with Eduardo Kac coining the term ‘bio-art’ in 1997 in respectof his work Time Capsule, which saw him implant a microchip into his own skin. Kac explainsthat the idea of bioart is connected to his earlier work, which he refers to as telepresence artthat “is a new art form predicated on the creation by the artist of new telerobotic bodies that aremote participant inhabits in order to experience new, invented forms of presence” (Osthoff,
2007, para.11). This evolution from the robotic to the living is symptomatic of the22contemporary condition of human/non-human and living/machine binaries that are being
eroded through technology (Kac, 2004). This culturally informed process of incorporating
contemporary biotechnologies into art appears to have been a global phenomenon as in 2000,
artists Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr established SymbioticA, along with biologist Miranda
Grounds and neuroscientist Stuart Bunt. Located within the School of Anatomy and Human
Biology at the University of Western Australia, SymbioticA is the first artistic researchlaboratory and offers interdisciplinary residencies, academic programmes and workshops,
facilitating practical engagement with biotechnologies.
Collaborative processes between artists and biotechnologies have continued to emerge,developing an expansive and diverse field of complex creative works by a global communityof artists. This engagement is the foundation for the practice that is known as bioart, which has
emerged as a distinctive genre demonstrating intricate uses of biotechnologies to manipulate,change and grow living structures as the basis of artworks. However, bioart itself is a complex
term and attempting to define it is problematic as a result of the intrinsic diversity of artworks
labelled as such, in addition to the relative infancy of the term and its associated works.

1.1.3 Defining Bioart
Bioart is a collective name often used to describe artworks that engage with biological sciences
and technologies (Mitchell, 2010). These projects are diverse in form, subject and materiality,
however, the name ‘bioart’ is derived from the use of life and the artificial manipulation of life
using the tools and processes of biotechnology. As the name bioart is coined from Eduardo
Kac’s work but is now used by artists, critics and theorists to describe a wide range of works,
the term is itself ambiguous. The name ‘bioart’ suggests a focus on life and biological matter,
however, what kinds of life and how this life should be used, presented or even whether it stillmust be alive remains uncertain. Robert Mitchell supports this complexity and ambiguity,23

stating that “bioart is in many ways a confusing term with uncertain reference” (2010, p.16).
Melentie Pandilovski concurs with this perspective, suggesting that “as bioartists expand theirpractice, it becomes very difficult for art critics and cultural theorists to fully understand the
new sorts of artworks they produce, let alone find consensus or common ground” (2017, p.1423). This current ambiguity in defining bioart is the result of it still being a relatively recent
phenomenon and one that is constantly evolving alongside the technologies it utilises, and forthis reason, Frances Stracey suggests that bioart is “still at the threshold of definition” (2009,
p.496).
This lack of clarity has, however, not stopped the term from being used by artists orcritics and has produced a wealth of interpretations as to what bioart is or could be. Marietta
Radomska suggests that bioart “may be briefly defined as a current of contemporary art thatinvolves the use of biological materials (cells, tissues, organisms) and scientific methods, tools
and procedures” (2017, p.377). Similarly, bioartist, Suzanne Anker suggests that “Bio Art isan umbrella term for a host of practices that draw from fields such as synthetic biology, ecology
and reproductive medicine, often combining art’s pictorial processes and nature’s living
library. Simply put, Bio Art employs the tools and techniques of science to make artworks”(2015, p.6). This definition acknowledges the comprehensive sources of scientific influence
found in bioart and the scope in outcomes and, as such, suggests that the processes involved increating such works are implicitly tied to biotechnological processes. However, in the same
book as Anker, Bio Art: Altered Realties, curator William Myers suggests, “Bio Art is apractice that utilises living biology as an artist’s medium, or addresses the changing nature of
biology’s meaning through its output” (2015, p.7). In this case, Myers appears to offer two
definitions; bioart being a media-based field reliant upon biotechnology as its very fabric, andbioart as a more general field of enquiry into biology through varied means.

24

The dichotomy of whether bioart is a media-based or thematic engagement withbiotechnology is one that has been highly debated as it has the potential to threaten or
undermine the use of the term. Here, Stracey favours defining bioart by its specific use of living
biological matter “such as genes, cells or animals, as its new media” (2009 p.496), andRamdoska suggests that “projects [that] often involve procedures conducted at a microscopic
level (of cells and tissues), the ‘beyond-the-skin’ level of various embodiments” (2016, p.43).
Alexis Rockman’s 2000 oil painting, The Farm [Figure 1.8], has also been described as bioart.
Rockman’s painting was exhibited in New York, United States (US) in 2000 at the Paradise
Now: Picturing the Genetic Revolution exhibition, and depicts a farm scene with animals andcrops, however “as one moves to the right, the plants and animals seem to have been geneticallymodified to increase their exchange value” (Mitchell, 2010, p.16). While it is demonstrated
through painting rather than living material, Rockman’s work presents a future of the natural
turned unnatural through biotechnology, explicitly for the financial benefit of humans withlittle regard for the animals involved. Consequently, through details such as a chicken withfour extra wings, the work offers a vision of the dystopian future that is, in some ways, alreadyoccurring through the use of hormone implants to increase muscle in livestock for maximum
capital gain. In this way, bioart can offer a critique of practices that see animals and other life
forms become victims of human greed without engaging in the practices themselves, causing
further harm while still being critical of them.
While it is possible for bioart to be an encompassing term, including both material andconceptual critical engagement of biotechnologies, some critics, including Eduardo Kac, reject
this notion, emphasising that “one must distinguish between artists who simply engage
biotechnology as a topic and those who engage with biotechnology on a material level by
employing biotechnology as their very medium” (Mitchell, 2010, p.24). Biotechnologies as a
medium are therefore distinct from conceptual engagement and from using life as a medium as25

it suggests not only the use of living material but an intentional artificial manipulation of thismaterial using these processes critically. This differentiation between engaging withbiotechnologies on a material and a conceptual level is, therefore, a difference between
presentation and representation. While many works such as The Farm do engage in criticaldebates that concern the impacts and outcomes of bioengineering, it does so through a
representation of these issues. In contrast, artists who use living matter as their media andbiotechnologies as their tools offer a direct presentation of these technologies and, therefore, asubjective, material encounter with the source of such debates and critical discourses.
A further aspect that complicates the ability to define the boundaries of what works canbe conceived as being bioart is the number of different terms such works are presented under.
Along with the various spellings of bioart, works have also been described using the associatedterms of “‘biotech art,’ ‘life art,’ ‘genetic art,’ and ‘transgenic art” (Mitchell, 2010, p.3). The
use of so many different terms highlights the variation in the form of many works and the lackof unifying features with the exception of using biotechnologies. Furthermore, many of theseterms have been used synonymously, and while they are all related, they do not refer to thesame technologies. Despite this, many of these terms have been used interchangeably, thus
highlighting the need for specificity in order to accurately define and understand such works.
As a name, biotech art is an unambiguous term and is perhaps even more precise thanbioart as it suggests explicitly the involvement of biotechnology. Yet, as there is still
controversy over whether bioart must utilise biotechnology as a process and a medium, biotech
art could instead be deemed as a subset of bioart at present. However, in contrast, life art
suggests a much broader and ambiguous reference to these artworks, with little to indicate a
differentiation between life and the intentional critical engagement with living materials as
subject matter. Genetic art and transgenic art are related terms, where genetic art could beapplicable to any use or reference to genes, transgenic specifically refers to the implantation of26

genetic material from one organism to another separate organism of a differing species. While
all of these terms relate to aspects of bioart, they are not all synonymous and demonstrate thecomplexities of attempting to understand expanding bioart practices. Furthermore, the use ofso many separate terms has highlighted issues with incorrect terminology being used todescribe artworks accurately. Catts and Zurr suggest that critiques of bioart have been “marredby the misunderstanding of the different levels of engagement with life, overwhelmed by thecomplexities of life processes and outcomes” (2010, p.125). Consequently, the use of correct
and accurate terminology can assist in understanding works of bioart and the ways in which
they engage in biotechnologies and living material.
While it is evident that currently there is no precise definition of bioart or a rigid
categorisation of which artworks should be considered as bioart, it appears that there are
specific key characteristics that unify works involved. The first of these is that works of bioart
collectively engage in discussions regarding biotechnology and provoke questions around ourabilities to shape nature, the environment and ourselves. Secondly, this is achieved through theactualised usage of biotechnologies as tools in the creation process and through the use of living
biological material as the basis for bioart works. While traditional media works have also been
described as bioart, it is evident that the fundamental approach to engagement withbioengineering is through its actualised usage.

1.1.4 Bioart as New Media Art
While it is apparent that bioart is a diverse and complex field, materiality is a common theme
that is present across current bioart research and art practices. Although there is currently nofirm consensus on whether bioart should be considered as a media-based field, specificallyincorporating the use of biotechnology as a medium, the issue of materiality has seen bioart
linked to wider contemporary art practices. In particular, bioart has frequently been associated27with new media and interpreted as a new form of new media art. New media art refers to theuse of new media communications, including computers and the Internet, which began toemerge and infiltrate everyday life in the 1980s and 1990s (Lievrouw, 2011). New media “hasgained currency as a term because of its useful inclusiveness” (Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant,& Kelly, 2009, p.11). This inclusivity is significant as these new digital media are produced,
created and utilised globally in many different ways. Therefore, new media “is a term withbroad cultural resonance rather than a narrow technicist or specialist application” (Lister et al.,2009, p.12). This cultural resonance is evident in new media art which has seen artists borrowfrom this expansion of communicative technology and incorporate it into art practices, giving
rise to many new fields of art, including digital art, computer art and video installations(Partridge, 2015). Given the varied nature of these distinct technologies and the numerous ways
in which they can be used, new media art is again an expansive term with a wide field ofreference, linked by the usage of technologies found in a specific techno-cultural epoch rather
than formal similarities. In this way, Stracey’s comment that bioart is “a crossover of art andthe biological sciences, with living matter, such as genes, cells or animals, as its new media”(2009, p.496) suggests that living matter is the materiality of new technologies of contemporary
cultures.
Examining bioart as a new form of new media art is, therefore, valuable in one respect
as it invites a wider cultural perspective in which the art is intrinsically tied to the socio-culturalcontext it is produced in through the use of current technologies. In this way, bioart is a productof the contemporary fascination with and fear of biotechnologies that are fundamentallyentangled in every aspect of daily living. Through consideration of bioart alongside art
practices that draw from other types of contemporary technology, it is evident the ways inwhich technology infiltrates cultures and becomes both a medium and a source of exploration.
Like other forms of new media art, this suggests that artists using biotechnologies are not bound28

to using them only to engage in biotechnology debates, but because they are important andpervasive contemporary materials, like computers and the Internet.
It is, however, simultaneously problematic to define bioart as new media as a result ofsuch a wide cultural resonance beyond biotechnology, as this overlooks the many complexitiesof bioart which serves to separate it from other forms of new media art despite using similar
technologies. This differentiation is evident in the contrast between two recent artworks, bothmade using 3D printing technologies. Mat Collishaw’s 2014 work, All Things Fall [Figure 1.9],
is a zoetrope based on the biblical narrative The Massacre of the Innocents and 3D printed in
epoxy resin. Dietmut Strebe’s 2014, Sugababe [Figure: 1.10] was also constructed using 3D
printing technology, however, printed using living chondrocyte cells, thus producing a living
artwork. Although both works employ the same new technology, there is a marked differencein materiality and therefore where Collishaw’s work is a static object, Strebe’s is a living,growing subject. Consequently, bioart is simultaneously both new media art and somethingelse entirely distinct and idiosyncratic.
A further problem with exclusively positioning bioart under the umbrella of new media
is the dependence of this term on defining bioart by its specific use of biotechnology as its
media, a definition which, as previously discussed, is not a universally accepted generalisation.
Therefore, this association is contingent on a media-based definition of bioart, or at least a
subset of bioart that is defined by its use of biotechnology as a medium. Despite these issues,
however, exploring bioart in the frame of new media offers a broader perspective of thesimilarities and differences defining bioart in a wider art context.

1.2 The Biotechnology Revolution
Biotechnologies have existed in varying, albeit more simplistic forms since early humancivilisation. From grain fertilisation for the production of beer in Egypt between 5500-3100

29

BCE to controlled crop fertilisation in Babylon around 2000 BCE, and calculated crop rotationin Greece around 250 BCE (Newell-McGloughlin & Re, 2006), it is clear that humans haveconsistently attempted to control and alter nature to suit our own needs and desires.
Furthermore, such historical examples of biotechnology “shows not only that humans havebeen trying to put nature to use for a long time, but also this control has very often been
deployed to serve commercial and political ends” (Stevens, 2016, p.21). Since this early time,
it is evident that developing biotechnologies have altered our environment, our societies andourselves, from the way that we control and manipulate agriculture for maximum capital gain
to the ways that we fix and improve the human body using biomedical developments. However,
the rate of these changes and the extent to which they have altered ourselves and ourenvironment has led to the 1970s onwards being known as the biotechnology revolution(Pandilovski, 2017).
The catalyst for the development of modern biotechnology was the discovery of DNA
in 1953, as previously mentioned, which provided the basis for subsequent generations todevelop powerful tools in genomics, biochemistry and biomedicine, including immunologythat “have further unfixed the definition of life” (Terranova, 2016a, p.409). Whilebiotechnologies before the discovery of DNA had significant social or economic effects, it is
the rate at which biotechnology progressed from the 1970s as a result of the DNA discovery
that has led to the biotechnology revolution. Mark Herring (2006) suggests that in encountering
tangible outcomes of biotechnology, such as improved food crops or more effective medical
treatments, individuals are more likely to accept the technology, however, when processing
such technologies in an abstract or removed sense, such as theoretically or in artworks, theyexpress concerns that they “may have deleterious consequences and so it must be regulated”(p.10). Regulation of biotechnologies is, however, a contentious and ongoing issue, both in30

terms of what research is appropriate to undertake together with the commercial uses of certain
biotechnologies.
As a result of this rapid change in the pervasive omnipresence of biotechnologies, there
has been widespread resistance to certain technologies, particularly on the part of the consumer
over the potential damages these technologies could cause (Hallman, 2000). Of thesecontroversial biotechnologies, the use of genetically modified (GM) foods has been one of themost persistently debated in the twenty-first century (Splitter, 2019). Commercially introducedin the 1990s, most GM foods are crop-based products, however, the technology is also used inlivestock and medications and refers to produce that has had its DNA altered using genetic
engineering (Murphy, 2011). Advantages of genetically engineered crops include the ability tocontrol traits that inform the development of produce, such as their resistance to pests, theiradaptability to environmental conditions, and that they can be grown more intensively than
through traditional methods, increasing the potential yield (Thomson, 2006). Similarly,
supporters of GM crops have argued that they can offer an improvement in global health,particularly in countries where famine and malnutrition exist, through increasing the vitamincontent of grains such as maize (Thomson, 2006). Despite the assurances from official
government organisations and biotechnology firms asserting the potential benefits of GM
foods, there has been substantial consumer resistance. Public concerns include the safety ofGM foods, their impact on the environment and a lack of agency or control in the decision toallow GM produce to be sold without being labelled as such, unless there is a substantial
difference in the product (Jones, 2009).
The mistrust and suspicion over the pervasive mass use of biotechnologies in everyday
life appears to sit behind the critical intentions of many bioart practitioners. In appropriating
and utilising the same technologies that they are critical of and reinterpreting them in analternative context, one in which the immediate capital values are less apparent, allows for31these technologies to be seen in new ways. While many bioart works often explicitly engage
in such criticisms, in doing so, they have simultaneously received criticism of their own forappearing hypocritical in using the very technologies they are critiquing. Stracey acknowledges
this perspective, stating that for many bioart practitioners, “their rationales and justifications
for turning life into art often remain hidden behind aestheticism or scientism, or rather glib
‘because I can’ attitudes” and that “there is a sense of a lack of accountability on their part in
the making of bio-artworks” (2009, p.496). However, this sense of accountability on the partof artists reveals a double standard in itself as it suggests that artists should be publicly
accountable for their works in ways that scientists involved in developing such biotechnologies
are not; this will be a key issue explored in later chapters.

1.2.1 The Politics of Biotechnologies
Contemporary biotechnologies and their uses are highly politicised issues, with politicians
often including their viewpoints on many biotechnologies as part of their electoral campaigns(Moreno, 2012); examples include the legality of abortion and the fluoridation of drinking
water (Manch, 2020). However, the lack of consensus and repeated political debates about
these issues demonstrates that ability and policy are not always universally compatible withindividual moral thought. As biotechnologies have evolved and more complex procedures havebeen developed, these political debates have become less clear cut and subsequently moredivisive; this is particularly evident in biotechnologies that have become everyday parts of life,
such as the genetic modification of crops and the new selectivities available in the now
commonplace In vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatments.5 However, one of the most significant
political issues associated with the development of contemporary biotechnologies, evident in

5

While IVF is a widely accepted process, the abilities to selectively choose specific characteristics such as sex or eye colour
has led to concerns over ‘designer babies’, however these selectivities have been found to be more accepted if they relate todiseases such as cystic fibrosis (Cell Press, 2019).

32

both biomedicine and agriculture, is its commercialisation, prompting concerns over privatecompanies controlling biotechnologies for capital gain. One such example is the patenting ofGM crops by biotechnology firms, meaning that even when bought and planted by farmers, thecrops are technically owned by the corporations, thus limiting the exertion of control of the
farmers (Pollan, 1998). On this topic, Eduardo Kac comments that “it is not clear what are thebenefits, if any, to the consumer” (2006, p.14), further suggesting that the GM food industry isbuilt upon corporate profit rather than global social welfare. While in medicine, it is clear tosee the benefits of certain medicines and procedures, there are similar issues relating toownership of patents and patient accessibility to drugs due to high cost as a result of large profit
margins of pharmaceutical companies (Deangelis, 2016).
The development, production and dissemination of pharmaceuticals are often owned
and controlled by large private companies and it is then the “pharmaceutical executives [that]
determined the costs of those drugs, which must be paid by the public” (Deangelis, 2016, p.30).
Consequently, there have been numerous controversies and ethical debates surrounding thecost and availability of drugs, recently evidenced in the US, where several pharmaceuticalcompanies were found to be “financially incentivising doctors and health care providers topromote their drugs, and compensating pharmaceutical sales reps [sic] based on the number ofprescriptions written by the doctors they call on” (Archer, 2013, para. 1). Similarly, there havebeen concerns that drug manufacturers are implicit in the US opioid epidemic by downplaying
the addictive nature of their products in their marketing (Semuels, 2017).6 These examples
demonstrate the interconnectivity between biotechnology and capitalism and highlight that
beneficial biotechnology is not necessarily used for utopian benefit, and consequently

6

The US opioid epidemic refers to the current increase in uses of prescribed synthetic opioids, such as Fentanyl, and thesubsequent increase in deaths due to overdoses of these drugs; the crisis has been referred to as one of the largest publichealth issues in US history (Volkow & Blanco, 2020).

33

demonstrates the public mistrust of many technologies and those who own and manufacturethem.
As part of an attempt to democratise biotechnology and its commercial by-products,
there has been an emergence of a practice known as biohacking. Biohacking is a twenty-first
century social movement, sometimes referred to as do-it-yourself (DIY) biotechnology, which
involves individuals and small groups undertaking biotechnological experimentation andresearch outside of traditional research institutions (Ikemoto, 2017). One of the most notableaspects of biohacking laboratories and research centres is the involvement of non-specialists.
While there are often mentors who have been traditionally trained, the underlying manifesto of
biohacking aims to make biotechnology practices and products accessible and affordable,encouraging involvement and inclusivity (Guizzetti, 2017). Biohackers have gained
controversial attention in the media for testing unlicensed procedures on themselves,
exemplified by Aaron Treywick and Tristan Roberts, who injected themselves with an untested
gene therapy that they anticipated would cure herpes (Cuthburtson, 2018). However, theiractions are primarily deemed illegal by authorities, and some individuals within the biohacking
community have voiced concerns that either government or pharmaceutical agents may havebeen involved in Treywick’s sudden death in 2018 after considering him a threat (Cuthburtson,2018). While this is only speculation, the concerns here demonstrate the inherent power
structures present within bioengineering and, therefore, the underlying critiques present in the
biological arts.

1.2.2 Bioart and Bioterrorism
The suspicions around both bioartists and biohackers engaging in biotechnologies can be foundin the fears of bioterrorism, which is one of the biggest threats posed by biotechnology,
particularly synthetic biology, in the twenty-first century (DiEuliis, Ellington, Kwik Gronvall

34

& Imperiale, 2019). Bioterrorism refers to the deliberate use of biological agents to cause harmand death and has
a lot in common with naturally occurring public health emergencies resulting from
infectious diseases. However, there are some important differences. Since it is adeliberate act to cause harm, there are the obvious security considerations. The resulting
outbreak differs in some important ways from naturally occurring epidemics—for
instance, it is more likely to be a point source outbreak initiated by simultaneous exposure
to many people. The infectious agent used is likely to be uncommon and possibly notendemic to the region, might have been modified genetically to make it resistant tocurrent medications and vaccines, and produced in a way that enhances its transmission
or virulence (Green, LeDuc, Cohen & Franz, 2019, p.e3).
Bioterrorism is, therefore, a deliberate use of naturally occurring or biologically altered viruses,
toxins or bacteria to harm or kill individuals or large populations. Those that pose the greatest
threat include anthrax, smallpox, botulism, plague and Ebola (Niiler, 2002). The improved
abilities of genetic engineering could lead to these harmful agents being altered in order tomake them resistant to any known vaccines or can increase their predisposition for contagion.
Simplistic forms of bioterrorism and biological warfare have been used for centuries,
demonstrated by some indigenous cultures of South American countries, for example, who
frequently laced the tips of arrowheads with poisons secreted from frogs (Mayor, 2008).
However, contemporary biotechnological developments have allowed for more sophisticated,
directed threats. One of the first documented instances of bioterrorism in the twenty-first
century, known as Amerithrax, involved the anonymous mailing of envelopes laced withanthrax in the US in 2001; five people died as a result of the poisoning (Niiler, 2002). Occurring
the week following the US terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the US government
consequently increased expenditure for research into biological warfare and into preparedness
for other such instances of bioterrorist incidents (Niiler, 2002).
Bioterrorism is feared, therefore, as a result of the development of increasingly
powerful biological materials that can be harnessed and used in unprecedented ways, whether
by intent or error, and can cause widespread harm from the actions of a single individual. The

35

potential damage resulting from bioterrorism ranges from widespread human death to the lossof livestock and crops, suggesting both public health and economic concerns. Therefore, thepotentially significant global impact of a single act of bioterrorism has resulted in social
tensions and high suspicion over possible attacks.
Bioartists have not been immune to the suspicion and tension caused by the global
tensions surrounding bioterrorism and is notable in the US government’s legal case against
Steve Kurtz of the Critical Art Ensemble (CAE). In 2004, Kurtz’s wife and fellow CAE artist,
Hope Kurtz, died suddenly, however during the routine police visit that followed, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were alerted to investigate the presence of scientific equipment,
including bacteria, in Kurtz’s home. Initially, Kurtz was suspected of involvement in HopeKurtz death, however after the post-mortem confirmed that she had died of natural causes, theinvestigation turned into one of bioterrorism. Kurtz was detained for five days and his“scientific equipment, his computers; his notes, a shelf of books on science, epidemiology andthe history of biowarfare; his passport; other personal documents and Hope’s body” wereconfiscated (Hirsch, 2005, p.22). Shortly after, members of the CAE were called before a jury
investigation seeking to charge Kurtz with offences relating to the Biological Weapons Statuteas it is prohibited to possess any “biological agent for any purposes except ‘prophylactic,
protective bona fide research towards educational or other peaceful purposes” and they
believed that Kurtz’s work was “being used for something other than ‘research or educational
purposes, something terroristic’” (Hirsch, 2005, p.22). Charges against Kurtz were finallydropped in 2008 due to a lack of convincing evidence against him.
This intense suspicion and subsequent extensive investigation demonstrates worst-casescenario thinking that is now commonplace as a result of social anxieties over terrorism

36

(Annas, 2006). In particular, these tensions are symptomatic of the post-9/11 culture.7 Despite
the threats of terrorism and bioterrorism being a legitimate concern and present acrosscontemporary cultures, this isolated incident of artists being potential suspects of planning tocause harm reveals the inherent anxieties surrounding possession, use and abilities ofbiotechnologies and those who control them, in addition to the mistrust of the artist stepping
over the traditionally expected boundaries of art. This case demonstrates the marginalised
position of bioart, and the prevailing unease and suspicion of an art form that is still undergoing
the process of definition, highlighting that “probably never in recent art history have wewitnessed a case in which questions of content, public utility or epistemological andeducational value are asked so directly and in real time to an emergent, marginal art form”(Hauser, 2008, p.94).

1.2.3 Bioengineering Anxieties
The pervasive presence of biotechnologies within contemporary culture has produced both
dependence and subsequent positivism with respect to potential capabilities. Simultaneously,
however, resistance and suspicion exist over the blind acceptance of all biotechnologies, as
discussed previously in this chapter, thus challenging the motivations that sit behind thedevelopment of these technologies. Both the hypothesised threats of bioterrorism and theongoing debates over safety concerns of some technologies demonstrate the intrinsic culturalanxieties produced by fears of potential new and uncontrolled technologies that threaten thecurrent social order. Cultural tensions and anxieties often sit below the surface, only revealing
themselves when confronted with a possible deviation from cultural, political or moral order

7

Post-9/11 culture refers to the ongoing cultural impacts of the domestic terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New
York City on 11th September 2001 in which 2,977 people were killed and more than 6000 were injured; the impact of thisevent has been experienced globally as well as domestically with a “significant and abrupt change in both the U.S. culture
and the global relations, shifting the nature of civil liberties, causing divisive political climates, and birthing the War on
Terror” (Light, 2016, p.536).

37

and therefore are concerned with a transgression of boundaries (van Amelsvoort, 2018).
Tensions are present across cultures, with anxieties over terrorism, racial difference andbiotechnologies evident amongst global news headlines, government policies and protests. The
common thread found through social anxieties is a fear of a threat of otherness, however, theseare often imagined rather than actualised threats. Consequently, anxieties surrounding
biotechnologies are not limited to concerns about what scientists have produced but what they
could potentially produce and the subsequent actions they could take.
The historic anxieties over the limitations and potential capacities of science are evident
in Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel, Frankenstein. In writing Frankenstein, Shelley stated that she
wanted to write a story “which would speak to the mysterious fears of our nature and awaken
thrilling horror” (2013, p.4); this she achieved through the juxtaposition of an overly confident
young scientist and the monstrous creature he brings to life. While Frankenstein is fictitious,
Shelley’s writings reflect the advances in science during her own lifetime with experiments
such as Giovanni Aldini’s electro-stimulation of the limbs of executed criminal George Forster
in 1803 (Taylor, 2019). Scientific investigations at this time into the ‘spark of life’ are mirroredin Shelley’s work, as is the moral dilemma of overreaching social and moral boundaries. As ametaphor, “the monster was a visible, material manifestation of the troubled time and place
wherein it made its appearance” (Dixon, 2008, p.680). The centuries following Aldini’s
experiments and Shelley’s writing, have witnessed the continued stretching and redefinition of
moral and social boundaries through scientific inquiries into the nature of life.
Similarly to Shelley’s reflection of contemporary thought and scientific practices, by theend of the nineteenth century, H. G. Well’s The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), evokes thecomplex moral and ethical concerns of emerging biotechnologies, while also anticipates thedevelopments of scientific abilities. The monstrous figures of Well’s novel, known as the Beast
Folk, are created by Doctor Moreau by vivisection on his secluded island home in the Pacific38Ocean. These creatures were created from animals to be transformed into humanlike figures,
yet appear to be hybrids of both, visually and behaviourally. However, Well’s writes that“strange as it may seem to the unscientific reader, there can be no denying that, whateveramount of credibility attaches to the detail of this story, the manufacture of monsters – andperhaps even quasi-human monsters – is within the possibilities of vivisection” (Wells, 2009,p.174). In this, Well’s directly addresses his audience, telling them that despite the accounts of
the novel being imaginary, these imaginary practices are in the processes of being possibilities.
While the ability to create new, unnatural or hybrid lifeforms was not fully viable during thisperiod, the novel “anticipates certain key developments in late-twentieth century molecularbiology” (Danta, 2012, p.687). These developments are evident in the biotechnologies thathave been appropriated by artists in the twenty-first century through bioart. However, thepractices in Well’s novel have also anticipated the associated ethical dilemmas that emerge
from the biological alteration of the human, the non-human and the creation of new hybrid
forms of life. A century following Well’s novel, the technologies of the biotechnology
revolution have allowed for new life to be grown in the laboratory. Dixon comments that,a progressive history of science would have it that these monsters have disappeared under
the light of empirical inquiry, as once wondrous anomalies and aberrations are to be
explained as excessive deviations from biological norms, while other fantastical forms
are relegated to the realm of myth. And yet, biotechnology and bioart have brought us
new wonders that deliberately exceed such norms (2008, p.680).
Bioart, therefore, reflects the changing political, cultural and social contexts of our relationshipto biotechnologies by deliberately exacerbating these anxieties of potential misuse or crossingof boundaries through the actualised presentation and visualisation of these fears. Bioartists
have created bioluminescent animals, responsive musical instruments and living dolls and, assuch, these works present and realise the anxieties of potential unchecked positivism, partiallythrough the technologies used, but also as a result of their complex dichotomy as living art
object and living material subject. These anxieties manifest as a result of the fundamental

39

construction of bioart, “within liminal spaces that combine elements of the womb and themachine, the studio and the laboratory, the garden and the factory, the gallery and the morgue”(Dixon, 2009, p.412). These dichotomies further complicate our relationship to living works
of art and, therefore, force an encounter with the complexities of how we perceive andunderstand life and our relationship to other forms of life, whether they occur organically or in
the laboratory.
The anxieties invoked by biotechnologies refer, therefore, both to fears of the past
repeating itself in the form of previous unethical behaviours exhibited, and to the future andthe potential ways in which these technologies could be used that may fundamentally affectour species and our environment. These unethical behaviours can be found throughout humanhistory, but within recent Western history it is the Holocaust that hasleft a scar on the human psyche. Determined not to let history repeat itself, most people
developed an instinctive revulsion to all ideas appearing to have any kind of association
with Nazi ideology. (And yet, it must be remembered, history did repeat itself, e.g. in the
Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which the world did nothing but wring its hands as
800,000 Africans were slaughtered.) In particular, the eugenics movement as a whole, in
all its forms, became discredited because of the terrible crimes that had been committed
in its name, although some of the milder eugenics programs continued for many years
before they were finally scrapped. These programs are all now almost universallycondemned (Bostrom, 2005, p.6-7).
Through the actualised usage of these biotechnologies, however, bioartists allow these cultural
tensions and fears to manifest, highlighting the anxieties that progress and new knowledge havebrought with them in the past and the present.

1.3 Ethics and Art
A prominent issue in bioart discourse is the ethical implications of the practice. Ethics is aprevalent topic in the use of living materials in art practices and is one that many bioartists are
fully aware of and appear to purposefully engage in. These ethical debates have centred on the
ethical suitability of using living material for artistic purposes, how these works mediate or40

force a confrontation with the ways we use biotechnologies and our relationship to other life
forms, in addition to the problems of responsibility of care for living works and subsequently
the disposal of them (Solon, 2011). Furthermore, ethical guidelines for the use of living
material in applied scientific research have developed alongside the biotechnologies they were
designed to regulate, however, due to the complexities of the collaborative processes of thebiological arts, there appear to be potential problems in attempting to apply existing bioethicallegislation to art. These issues are explicitly pertinent as they are largely unprecedented due tothe recent emergence of such collaborations and, therefore, prompt unique ethical concerns(Vaage, 2016).

1.3.1 Bioethics
Bioethics is fundamentally regarded as the moral investigation of issues emerging from
biological and medical sciences (Zylinska, 2009). As a specific institutional term, bioethics
was coined in 1970 by American scientist Van Rensselaer Potter (Whitehouse, 2003) andinitially was brought about in direct response to deal with the increasing capabilities ofdeveloping biotechnologies and the subsequent desire to implement a set of principles tosafeguard human participants in medical and psychological experiments that may follow.
Within medical history, bioethics is regarded to have roots in the aftermath of the Second
World War (Lopez-Munoz, 2016). Following the end of the war, the Nuremberg Tribunal, held
between 1945 and 1946, tried many officials associated with the Germain regime and included
23 doctors who were tried for committing experiments on captive individuals, along withmurder; these trials consequently revealed explicit, inhumane and harmful acts of humanexperimentation and saw seven of the convicted doctors executed and another nine imprisoned(Craig & Desai, 2015). This exposition of medical professionals being responsible for cruelexperimentation first prompted the need for ethical considerations to be made with regards to41

experiments that involve human participation, which manifested in the presentation of the
Nuremberg Code in 1947 (Craig & Desai, 2015). This code sets out many guidelines that are
still evident in contemporary bioethical codes, and amongst them is the principle thatparticipants in human experimentation must participate voluntarily.
Currently, applied bioethics functions as a legislative and regulatory framework, which
can be used to resolve whether a particular action, experiment or behaviour should or should
not take place. This process is often administered on an institutional basis, however, certain
fundamental features of bioethics are contained within international legislation such as the
Nuremberg Code and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and include theimportance of free will in participating in scientific experiments. However, due to theinstitutional basis of many bioethical codes and the individualistic perception of suchguidelines by ethics committees, there are levels of subjectivity in the application of bioethics.
Bioethics is a complex, inter-disciplinary framework of moral philosophy
encompassing medicine, law and philosophy, in addition to art, business and politics. However,these areas often interconnect due to the complexities of contemporary biotechnologies and theissues they evoke. The scope of bioethics is, therefore, wide-ranging due to the ever-evolving
nature of biotechnology; however, some key issues covered include the use of human tissue,
genetic testing, the use of stem cells, cloning, abortion, the use of living animals in research,genetically modified crops and euthanasia. Bioethicists seek to decipher ethical codes ofconduct, which dictate how these technologies should be applied, to reduce potential harm, toensure beneficence, and in some cases limit accessibility to such technologies to avoid misuse;
however, as discussed, misuse is not a clear cut idea with biohacking and bioart both being
subject to ethical scrutiny.

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1.3.2 Life as Material for Art
The use of living biological material as the basis for artwork has proven to be controversial andprovocative, this is because “for many advocates and critics of bioart, the use of bioengineered
living beings as an artistic medium seems to cross a technical or moral threshold (or both)”(Mitchell, 2010, p.6). Living materials used in works of bioart include bacteria, animal cells,
human cells, living animals and often the materials and bodies of the artists themselves. The
moral threshold of concern is two-fold; in one sense, a threshold is crossed by blending
scientific practices with art, and in another, a threshold is more specifically crossed by using
living material as art media, thus turning the subject into an object.
In one respect, bioart is inherently controversial because of the ethical and moral
problems that are already present in contemporary biotechnology as a result of anxieties overthe potential misuse of materials and the crossing of moral boundaries. This sense of uneaseand contention that results in controversial perspectives is fluid and changes over time as new,often more provocative technologies develop; for example, IVF treatments are now
commonplace and widely accepted. However, in 2018 Chinese scientist, He Jiankui caused
global controversy for gene-editing two embryos using the CRISPR gene-editing tool which
eventually resulted in the birth of twin girls (Marx, 2019).8 While He contends that theprocedure was designed to generate a specific gene mutation that could produce immunity to
HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) (Raposo, 2019), he was heavily condemned for his
actions, which were deemed irresponsible, unethical and monstrous by global media, with
Julian Savalescu, Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics stating that “these
healthy babies are being used as genetic guinea pigs. This is genetic Russian Roulette” (2018,
para.7). He, has also been described as “‘rogue,’ ‘China’s Frankenstein,’ and ‘stupendously

8

CRISPR is a gene-editing tool that is an anacronym for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, and isoften compared to genetic scissors, or a word processing copy and paste function for genetic information (Greely, 2019).

43

immoral’" (Cohen, 2019, para.2). Furthermore, He’s experiment was illegal and a violation of
the bioethical codes of the institution he was affiliated with, and he was subsequently
investigated by Chinese authorities (Cyranoski, 2019).
Importantly, however, He’s experiment was not only condemned for overstepping
ethical thresholds but as being premature, as the later health effects and the long term impactof gene editing on the children are unknown (Cyranoski, 2019; Raposo, 2019). This, therefore,suggests that such editing processes of humans may not always cause this level of concern.
Furthermore, in response to this, some researchers have suggested that gene editing in humans
is likely to be inevitable (Rosenbaum, 2019) and would follow He’s motivations of attempting
to eradicate certain diseases and medical conditions. What this incident demonstrates, however,is that notions of acceptance and controversy in biotechnologies are fluid and change alongside
their development, and in time many technologies that were once controversial subsequently
become normalised.
There is, therefore, a threat present in biotechnologies, particularly those that appear tothreaten human life, however, bioart is also controversial as such manipulations of living
material are specifically for the purpose of art. However, Zurr and Catts suggest that bioart
demonstrates a transgression for both art and science, as “scientific techniques, tools andmethodologies are being used, subverted and elaborated on for the production of artisticknowledge, discourse and objects (which can be seen as contestable tangible items for cultural
discussion)” (2004, p.1). This use of living materials suggests that bioart potentially threatens
traditional art expectations and methods by “intentionally transgressing procedures ofrepresentation and metaphor, going beyond them to manipulate life itself” (Zurr & Catts, 2004,
p.1). Consequently, bioart produces an actualised engagement through the realised presence ofbiotechnologies rather than through representation. In using and manipulating living material,
it is apparent that some practitioners specifically engage in bioart as a direct engagement with44

the ethical problems it provokes, and for this reason, use such works to create a critique anddiscussion with regard to the viewer’s ethical positioning in respect to other forms of life andthe concept of life itself. In doing this, artists “are forcing the audience to engage with the living
artwork and to share the consequences/responsibilities involved with the manipulation/creationof life for artistic ends” (Zurr & Catts, 2004, p.2).
As wide-ranging as the implications and scope of bioethics are, there is still contention
as to the suitability such frameworks offer to bioart, in part due to the unprecedented ethicalcontroversies these works induce. Nora Vaage suggests that “bioethics is poorly suited for artspecific questions, which are also often posed in discussions of bioart” (2016, p.3). The primaryreason for this unsuitability is due to the inherent subjectivity implicit in both the art object andin the viewer’s relationship to it. Furthermore, bioethical frameworks are not necessarily rigid
and work on the basis of attempting to achieve a result using the best option in order to cause
the least harm and, therefore, are treated as a case by case scenario rather than one pathway fits
all problems (Vaage, 2016). Consequently, subjectivity plays a significant role in theinterpretation of bioart as the moral and ethical implications of such artworks is dependent
upon the viewer's ethical standpoint and their subjective understanding and expectation of what
art should do (Vaage, 2016).
Stracey (2009) comments that criticism of bioart has ranged from “accusations ofpromoting a new ‘artful’ eugenic movement, to cries of aesthetic indulgence in ‘carnivalesquesadism,’ to condemnation of the artists as naïve or unwitting pawns in a market-driven public
relations game on behalf of bio-tech industries, using the allure of culture to sell controversial
science to a wider audience” (p.497). These critiques suggest that it is not the science itself thatis drawn into question, but the use of it by artists, “calling into account what exactly ought tocount as ‘art’” (Mitchell, 2010, p.8). Bioart, therefore, can be transgressive, not necessarily forthe technologies used themselves but for being used in the construction of art.

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1.3.3 Duty of Care and Disposal of the Art Object/Subject
The ethical concerns prompted by bioart are not only limited to the process of construction andmateriality but also new uncharted concerns involving the care of and responsibility towards
living artworks. Stracey suggests that it is a fundamental concern as to “who is responsible forthe creation, care and disposal of a bio-engineered life form, regardless of whether it goes under
the name art, science or both” (2009, p.496). These responsibilities are as varied and distinctive
as each work created, as each will have different requirements for care dependent upon thematerials used. However, living artworks generally require basic care, including specificenvironmental conditions such as controlled temperature and sterility, in addition to nutritional
support if required.
As Stracey points out, these duties of care are necessary for all living structuresirrespective of whether they are classified as scientific experiments or as living works of art.
As is the case with bioethics dictating codes of conduct for experimentation within appliedbiotechnology research, there are similar governmental and institutional codes for theappropriate care of living animals for laboratory research; for example, the Guide for the Careand Use of Laboratory Animals (National Research Council, 2011) disseminated by the
National Research Council in the US. These guidelines are apparent globally, and while theydiffer in terms of wording, all are built upon the extensive history of bioethics and aim to “assist
institutions in caring for and using animals in ways judged to be scientifically, technically, andhumanely appropriate” (National Research Council, 2011, p. xiii). Although these codes dictate
specifically only the care of animals, not of living laboratory-grown tissue matter, they
demonstrate the extent to which proper care is considered and delivered to living subjects,
including the provision of specialist care staff and specific habitats. While tissue structures do
not require the same extensive care as living animals, these codes suggest that within applied46

biomedical research, the issue of responsibilities towards living matter is dealt with throughextensive and specific guidelines.
Increased politicisation and consequential legal parameters surrounding the use of
biotechnologies and control over possession and use of associated materials have proved
problematic for artists involved in the biological sciences, as evident in the treatment of Steve
Kurtz. However, before issues of suspicion of use of biotechnologies becomes an issue, there
are many restrictions that artists face in accessing these materials in the first instance, alongwith subsequent issues in exhibiting works made from these materials. In a practical sense, thelegislative difficulties in exhibiting bioart works that contain living media are a consequenceof the strict regulations surrounding the possession of live biological materials. In the United
Kingdom (UK), for example, institutions must hold a Human Tissue License from the Human
Tissue Authority to display works containing living tissue (Solon, 2011). This complex formof licensing and control over the possession of human tissue follows the organ scandal at Alder
Hey Children’s Hospital, where organs were removed from a number of deceased children andstored without parental consent between 1988 and 1995 (De Cruz, 2001). In the US, similar
legislation has had a direct impact on the ability of bioartists being able to exhibit their work,
as demonstrated when in 2003 the curator of the Gene(sis): Contemporary Art Explores Human
Genomics exhibition was prohibited from using live E. coli in Eduardo Kac’s Genesis(Mitchell, 2010). This was due to the gallery’s affiliation with the University of Washington,
meaning that the university’s biosafety regulations were applicable to the gallery.
Consequently, the live bacteria was replaced with a projected video of live E. coli, satisfying
the legal and safety restrictions but removing the element of the live encounter from theexhibition.
There are few examples of living animals as the primary subject of bioart, however, theissue of responsibility remains explicitly problematic in respect of bioart as created works are47

removed from the laboratory and placed into a display context. The new and expanding natureof the bioart field means that these issues of care are generally unprecedented within museum
exhibitions. Although all artworks and artefacts require the care of specific environmental
conditions and conservation maintenance, living works of bioart possess needs that extend
beyond these conventions in order to survive. This creates a level of unprecedented
dependency, as while a painting may require a climate with a specific temperature, it will not
immediately suffer if these needs are not met within a short timeframe; however, if a living
artwork requires a climate of a specific temperature, this need not being met immediately may
damage or even kill the work. Consequently, the stakes in the care of living artwork are more
immediate than works made from traditional media.
Like scientific institutions, museums fall under the jurisdiction of governmental,
organisational or institutional codes of ethics, such as the American Alliance of Museums(AAM) Code of Ethics for Museums Operating in the US, and the Museums Aotearoa Te TariO Ngā Whare Taonga o te Motu’s, Code of Ethical and Professional Practice in New Zealand.
These codes set out best practice for a range of ethical obstacles encountered in museum
settings, including issues of ownership, copyright, care for human remains, care for indigenous
objects and the repatriation of artefacts. There is, however, little consideration given withinthese issues for the care of living artworks, predominantly as a result of bioart’s relative
obscurity and the limited number of bioart works and exhibitions. Furthermore, the AAM statesthat while they assume that the code of ethics will be followed by all museums, there is little
legislation to legally enforce this, meaning that even if the care of bioart works were accounted
for within such guidelines, these would be idealist rather than legislative (American Allianceof Museums, 2019). One of the only legally enforceable laws applicable to the display of bioart
is the provision that in the UK, a licence from the Human Tissue Authority is required for the
storage and possession of any human tissue. The GV Gallery in London was the first privately

48

owned gallery to acquire this licence alongside the larger museum intuitions of the Wellcome
Trust, the Hunterian Museum, the Science Museum and the Natural History Museum (Solon,2011).
Beyond this one specific piece of legislation that only regulates possession rather thancare of human tissue in one particular region of the world, it appears that the maintenance of
bioart works falls ambiguously between artists, curators and other museum personnel involvedin such exhibitions. This creates a unique dynamic between the artist and artwork as the artist’srole extends beyond that of the creator to also being a carer, expanding the relationship beyond
the studio for the entirety of a work’s lifespan. Furthermore, when a living work of art is placed
into the care of a museum, a complex relationship of responsibility forms where it is ambiguous
as to who is responsible for ensuring its care.
The Tissue Culture and Art Project (TC&A) were confronted with the issue of
responsibility of care towards their work, Victimless Leather, when it was displayed at New
York’s MoMA in 2008. Consisting of a living tissue jacket shaped sculpture, growing andsurviving inside of a glass bioreactor, the museum found that the sculpture was growing too
quickly and that it started to block the wires inside the reactor used for its care halfway throughthe exhibition. Consequently, the wires were removed, effectively killing the sculpture. Whilethe curator of the exhibition stated that she felt uncomfortable turning off the work’s life
support system, Oron Catts supported the decision, saying that it was necessary “to present theend of our projects in ways that remind people that these works are/were alive and that we havea responsibility towards the living systems that we engage in manipulating” (Schwartz, 2008,
para.5).
While in this case, MoMA, rather than the artist, made the decision to kill the work,
this demonstrates the absence of ethical guidelines in the display of living artworks, particularlyon the part of the museum. However, it also provokes questions surrounding what would be in49

a code of ethics for the care of living artworks were one to exist. The decision to kill the work
is one that appears to not fit easily into a rigid set of guidelines, as it was an atypical andidiosyncratic situation for an artwork, which was dependent on the specific circumstances.
Furthermore, the act of killing is in itself a complex issue and one that from many moral
perspectives carries different emotive connotations dependent upon the classification of such
life; for example, the difference in classification between microbes, insects and mammals.
Therefore, given the diverse range of types of living artworks, implementation of a single setof guidelines would appear to be insufficient to be able to dictate appropriate care and disposalof such a wide range of artworks. Consequently, these issues are ones that are being
encountered when they arise and in ways acted upon by subjective moral perspectives rather
than guided by overriding principles. It is unlikely that ethical guidelines for the care of living
artworks will emerge in the near future, instead, it is clear that as the field continues to expand,new unexpected ethical problems will emerge from bioart, forcing us to question our own
ethical standpoints, which is perhaps one of the innate purposes for such artworks existing in
the first place.
Bioart works are temporal and ephemeral because as a condition of being alive, they
have a finite lifespan and as a consequence, will die. However, given the time constraints ofexhibitions, it is often the case that works outlive the span of the exhibition. Ionat Zurr of the
TC&A reveals that once works leave the laboratory for display, they cannot return due to therisk of contamination, consequently, the living artworks must be destroyed and disposed of(Solon, 2011). To highlight this responsibility towards bioengineered life, Zurr describes how
the TC&A “have a symbolic device to raise discussion – the killing ritual – where we invite
audiences and curators to expose the tissue to the external environment and touch it andcontaminate it" (Solon, 2011, para.26). Through the involvement of the audience in the50

destruction of the living artwork, they force an encounter with the entire life processes oflaboratory-grown life.
The complexities of the transdisciplinary foundations that inform the construction ofliving biological artworks are mirrored in the difficulty of attempting to define such works.
Drawing from developments in contemporary bioengineering and transposing them into an
artistic context through the actualised usage of these technologies in the material constructionof artworks has provoked a reassessment of the nature of life and our ethical obligations
towards other life forms, particularly new life forms that are a direct result of biotechnologies.
Furthermore, given the controversial nature of many of these new life-altering biotechnologies,
the artists who incorporate them into their practice appear to create inherently controversial
and provocative artworks. However, this appears to be an intentional aspect of bioart practices
and consequently creates a platform for discussion and debate around our relationship withnew technologies and the inherent fears and anxieties they produce.
Through the production of living works of art, new ethical considerations regarding thecare and disposal of living biotechnological products are brought to the forefront of ethicaldebates. Despite the application of pre-existing ethical legislation to bioart works in terms of
production in addition to artists and exhibitions, extant ethical codes were not designed tocontrol or regulate art; therefore, consideration must be given to new ways of thinking aboutliving artworks and how best to ensure technologies are not misused, but also allows forcreativity and fair, democratised use of biotechnology.
Living biological artworks force an encounter with the ‘other’ by presenting
actualisations of new technologies that are consequently liminal forms of life as they aresituated between subject/object and organic/manufactured binaries. This marginalised life is a
product of our current knowledge and abilities; however, transferred from the laboratory to theart museum, these technologies are stripped of their immediate capital benefit, revealing the51

raw materials of life and thus forces a reassessment of our uses of biotechnology and ourdeveloping future with them. Bioart works vary vastly in subject and materiality, therefore, thenext chapter will explore visual, theoretical and contextual frameworks in order to provide abackground for understanding the implications of encountering living artworks.

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Chapter Two: Theorising Bioart

The use of living materials as art media and the subsequent manipulation of them using thetools of biotechnology presents new perspectives and understandings of life, matter and ourrelationship to new life forms. This chapter aims to address the theoretical implications thatbioart presents by outlining them and offering a background for the subsequent examination of
specific works and their materials in the third chapter. These theoretical considerations include
the concept of materiality and how new considerations of matter expand understandings of theabilities and capacities of matter to produce effects. Additionally, posthumanism and its
associated concept of transhumanism will be discussed in relation to how they assist inunderstanding the ambiguous life status and ethical position of the works created by bioartists.
Finally, this chapter will examine ideas of otherness, including the abject and the uncanny
valley as a basis for understanding encounters with living bioart as an uncanny life form thatis situated between the familiar/unfamiliar, subject/object, living/non-living.

2.1 Matter and Materiality
Following the emergence of conceptualism in art in the mid-twentieth century, and later thematerial turn which infiltrated through all of the humanities and social sciences, the importanceof materiality has become a primary issue in art theory (Berger, 2019). The material turnconsiders the roles, functions and capacities of objects and matter and “has been motivated by
the perceived inadequacies of the linguistic turn and by new scientific definitions of matter,
including living matter” (Mondloch, 2018, p.10). Drawing attention to the matter, the physicalsubstances and materials that are used in the production of art to become the very basis of thework, in addition to how these materials play a role in the interpretation, understanding andembodied phenomenological experiences of art, the importance of materiality is equally53

significant in our understandings of art. This recent focus on materiality has found prominencein critical discourses surrounding new, unusual, and non-traditional art media (Berger, 2019),
which is significant in the emergence of bioart, in which biotechnology replaces traditional art
media in the production and physical materiality of the art produced.
Matter, from a scientific perspective, refers to a physical mass that exists in physicalspace and can be thought of as principally being biotic, that is, living matter including humans,
animals, plants, bacteria and cells, or abiotic non-living matter such as minerals, metals, waterand light (Sharma, 2008). However, it is important to understand that biotic and abiotic matterco-exist in the same ecosystems and frequently, either directly or indirectly, interact with eachother; these are often necessary interactions, such as the photosynthesis of biotic plant matterenabled through the abiotic light from the sun. The co-dependencies of biotic and abiotic matterdemonstrate the complexities of separating one from the other conceptually, as together, theycreate interdependent networks.
Issues of attempting to define what it means to be living and fully understand the origins
of our consciousness as living beings are contentious and have been researched and debatedfor centuries (De Sousa, 2013). While it is not currently possible to define life in an absolutesense, or precisely how the fundamental physical components of life come to emit
consciousness distinct from non-living material entities, there are several characteristics ofwhat life does that have allowed us to reach some degree of consensus from a biologicalperspective. As with most aspects of biological understandings, however, there are many
exceptions to each rule, thus increasing the difficulties in attempting to categorise and define
life, as discussed in Chapter Two. Human attitudes towards different types of matter and theuses of such materials are, therefore, complex and multifaceted and are often culturally
informed. In this way, matter can be understood in more ways than its physical properties.
Despite the importance of these fundamental properties, matter can be understood in more54

dynamic, emotive or phenomenological terms than simply whether it is living or non-living,natural or artificial. This idea of the natural and the artificial being different forms of being hasorigins in Ancient Greece with the use of the terms physis and techne. Where physis, equivalent
to the Latin, natura, refers to life and objects that come into being independently, its antithesis,
techne, refers to objects that are produced and, therefore, “do not have their origin inthemselves” (Dunshirn, 2019, p.1).
These divergent attitudes towards different types of matter are evident in treatment andattitudes towards different kinds of animals, plants or bacteria; these attitudes are often
dependent on whether living matter is perceived at a molecular or organism level (Woese,
2004) and in terms of the genetic and relational proximity of the life form to humans, such ascompanion animals and primates (Carvalho, Gaspar, Knight & Vicente, 2019). This notion of
a closer affinity or proximity to other animals, however, is a result of “the systemic and quite
gymnastic categorisations we humans invent impotently [to] order the diversity of biota only
to obscure our relations with the rest of the living world” (Zaretsky, 2007, p.267).
Consequently, attributions of difference in attitudes towards different animals or living beings
is a human construct that has occurred through the humanist categorisation of life, causing arift in different human/non-human relations.
This is notable in regard to which animals are deemed ‘acceptable’ for slaughter andconsumption. In certain countries or within specific religious beliefs, there are variabilities as
to which animals are considered acceptable to kill and eat. Across some European and Asian
cultures, horse meat is frequently eaten, whereas, in the US, the idea is more commonly
regarded as being objectionable as horses have a close relationship with humans, both ascompanion and working animals (Enders, 2015). Similarly, in Hinduism, respect for animals
and minimising their harm through food consumption is important and, therefore, many follow
a vegetarian diet, however, among those who do consume meat, they do not consume beef due

55

to the cow being a sacred animal to the point that most states in India have a ban forbidding
cow slaughter (Biswas, 2015). Both horses and cows are living mammalian animals withsimilar biological structures, and yet their materials are considered in different ways bydifferent populations. Furthermore, studies have shown that people are more likely to be
uncomfortable with large animals such as chimpanzees, monkeys, dogs and dolphins being
used for testing purposes but express more neutral reactions to smaller animals being used,
including rats, pigeons and carp (Bradley, Mennie, Bibby & Cassaday, 2020). Consequently,“categories of disgust elicitors are fairly uniform across cultures, although the particular items
assigned to those categories manifest variation, such as the foods that are considered noxious;
thus disgust is both pancultural and culturally variant” (Korsmeyer, 2012, p.754). This
demonstrates the complexities of understanding material affectivity and the range of possible
responses elicited based on specific materialities.
In the twenty-first century, however, distinctions between types of matter have become
more complicated and interconnected, thus calling for new understandings of matter. These
new understandings of matter have, therefore, emerged alongside the changes in scientificabilities in creating and altering matter, as the traditional scientific notions of living/non-living
and natural/artificial no longer suffice in understanding and describing matter in the twentyfirst century as “in the short space of these three decades, human beings have learned how toanimate heretofore inanimate materials. It is by no means an oversimpliﬁcation to say that wehave, in at least in a few ﬁrst, cautious steps, learned how to bring ideas to life” (Davis, 2007,
p.249).
Living substances, including biological components, therefore, are no longer restricted
to occurring naturally with the advent of synthetic biology. Still emerging as a researchdiscipline, synthetic biology seeks to create and alter biological components and systems in thelaboratory. These technologies are not just theoretical but are manifesting, with the ﬁrst

56

completely functional synthetic genome, a synthetic poliovirus, being created in 2002
(Whitehouse, 2002), and the first bacterial genome, Caulobacter Ethensis-2.0, made by acomputer in 2019 (Puiu, 2019). Being both biological organic matter but structures not
emerging directly from or found within the naturally occurring world, contemporary science
renders the categorisation of matter more complex and ambiguous than ever before.
Consequently, these developments have, and will continue to have, significant impacts on theways we think about, categorise, and ultimately utilise living matter. These new developments
blur the boundaries between what we think of as being natural or unnatural, born or
manufactured. In exploring the uses of biological materials and bioengineering technologies in
the production of art, an understanding of the properties and capabilities of materiality isimportant. However, as with scientific definitions of matter, understandings of matter
philosophically have changed and developed through history and continue to do so as ourabilities to manipulate and create materials change alongside them.

2.1.1 Vitalism
An early philosophy of matter that concerns the relationship between life and matter is that ofvitalism. Aspects of vitalism can be seen in the religions and beliefs of many cultures
throughout history (Coulter, Snider & Neil, 2019). However, as a specific philosophy, thetheory rose to prominence among biologists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Greco,2005). Vitalism posits that living entities are intrinsically different from non-living matter,
despite being made from the same physical elements, and that the origin and nature of life
cannot be explained by physics, chemistry or biology; instead, vitalism deems life as anindependent phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a scientific theory (Coulter, Snider & Neil,2019). This independence or separation of life as a characteristic from the physical materiality

57

that it inhabits innately places the living hierarchically above the non-living, deeming it special
and not able to be replicated by humanity, but only as decreed by some higher force.
This perspective is found in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), where the assemblageof body parts stitched together to create the creature requires a ‘spark of life’ from outside of
the physical body in order to animate it. However, rather than by divine force, electricity isused, with Shelley’s work is situated firmly in contemporary scientific beliefs, with her statingthat “perhaps a corpse would be reanimated; galvanism had given token of such things, perhaps
the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued withvital warmth” (2013, p.x). Shelley’s words reflect the influence of the scientist Luigi Galvani
whose work with electricity during the late eighteenth century aimed to uncover the cause oflife or what was required to animate the inanimate. Using electrical currents, Galvani was
successful in making the legs of a dissected frog twitch and move (Pera, 1992). While now thisis understand to be nerve reflexes activated by electricity, at the time this was thought to be apotential answer to understanding life and is why Victor Frankenstein uses electricity to bringhis creature to life in Shelley’s novel. However, vitalism during this period often takes aspiritual perspective with an emphasis on an approach that embraces the unknown and theunknowable, and that in opposition to materialism, not everything can be reduced to the same
singular essence or force (Normandin & Wolfe, 2013). In the twentieth century, however, thisform of vitalism was largely marginalised and replaced by new theories that valued theempirical evidence of the combined research of biologists, chemists and physicists, that theorigin of life is endemically positioned within the chemical reactions of a being’s physicalconstitution (Ramberg, 2000). This perspective is known as materialism as it suggests that all
matter, including living beings and their conscious psychological processes stem from afundamental material basis.

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2.1.2 Materialism
In opposition to vitalism, materialism proposes that matter is the foundation for everything thatexists, “rejecting a distinction between the physical world and the social constructs of humanthoughts, meanings and desires” (Fox & Alldred, 2019, p.3). In this way, materialism posits
that everything is a result of, or a by-product of, material interactions at a fundamental level.
Like vitalism, the core concepts of materialism can be found in antiquity, with some of thepreliminary examples of materialism found in the works of Epicurus, among other classicalphilosophers (Wolfe, 2016). However, the meanings, associations and usages of the termmaterialism have changed and evolved over time, and as a distinct philosophy, materialism
began to emerge from the Enlightenment, with philosophers offering a contrasting view toRené Descartes’s dualism of the body being separate from the mind. Instead, materialists
proposed that all of reality can be understood in empirical measures and that the spirit or themind is included in this so that all properties that can be experienced have a material-based
foundation.
As a philosophy that has grown and changed alongside the evolving scientific theories
of matter, there have been many interpretations of matter and the behaviours and characteristics
it can possess. These include Aristotle’s understanding that matter is an empty, waiting vessel
for containing forms and Isaac Newton’s perspective that matter is fundamentally the subjectof the laws of physics (DeLanda, 2015). Despite these differences, all of these changing
conceptions of matter stress that all physical and non-physical properties of the universe are
the product of material-based presence and the interactions that they produce. However,materialism has attracted criticism that its principles essentially “reduces everything to ‘dead’matter, and that it eliminates the ‘higher’ intellectual or spiritual parts of life, and thereby
cannot but be immoral” (Wolfe, 2016, p.6). This argument is particularly held by many
religious perspectives which hold that life is something divinely appointed and fundamentally59

separate from the physical world. Furthermore, criticism has also been directed towards thephilosophy’s dependence on scientific theory, which is subject to constant amendments asknowledge changes and, therefore, is an unstable philosophy.
Contemporary notions of materialism have, however, expanded and evolved into
further branches as a means to understand the properties and behaviours of matter as being
more than passive building blocks for forms. Of these branches, new materialism has come tothe forefront of contemporary thought, offering a reinterpretation of the fundamental conceptof matter and our relationship to it. New materialism reconfigures an understanding of matteras being active material, with its own unique capacities and behaviours. In this way, matter is
not a static or passive substance but is “engaged in its own divergent, open-ended evolution,
animated from within by immanent patterns of being and becoming” (DeLanda, 2015, p.16).
This idea of matter being innately imbued with the capacity for action and effect is explored
more in-depth by Jane Bennett in her approach known as vital materialism, however, the sharedprinciples of both vital materialism and new materialism stress the unique capabilities of all
matter.

2.1.3 New Materialism
New materialism marks a “theoretical and practical ‘turn to matter’” (Fox & Alldred, 2019,p.1) in the humanities and social sciences that emphasises the importance and effectivity of thematerials of the world. This includes both the natural, the artificial, the living, the non-living,
spatial qualities, natural forces and human concepts and processes such as thought and feelings;
while the inclusion of all of this matter as being of the same kind does not fit with traditional
scientific concepts of matter, new materialism posits that all of these things have the equal
ability to produce material effects and are contingent on each other (Fox & Alldred, 2019). The
turn towards matter as being of importance follows “a perceived neglect or diminishment of60

matter in the dominant Euro-Western tradition as a passive substance intrinsically devoid of
meaning” (Gamble, Hanan & Nail, 2019, p.111). In a practical sense, this change of perspective
has implications for traditional divisions of the natural and unnatural, the human and the nonhuman which has a consequential impact on our perspective of these relationships andenvironmental or ecological methodologies.
These new perspectives of materialism “signals a growing cross-disciplinary effort tochallenge longstanding assumptions about humans and the non- or other-than-human material
world” (Gamble, Hanan & Nail, 2019, p.111). As such, this renders new materialism as aprominent perspective arising out of a critical lens of anthropocentric attitudes that divide thenatural world into dualisms, in which the human stands in opposition to nature rather than apart of it. Through the understanding of materiality to possess its own form of vitality and that
this not only has the ability to cause effects, but that it does so because all matter is intrinsicallyinterconnected, suggests a new understanding of the physical world and its relationship to theconceptual world. With this new attention towards matter, “new materialists consider that theworld and history are produced by a range of material forces that extend from the physical andthe biological to the psychological, social and cultural” (Fox & Alldred, 2019, p.2). In this way,
matter is not a static, isolated physicality that is detached from the world and other forms, but
is interconnected and produces both affects and effects. Rather than dividing types of matter,
new materialism posits that all matter is “invested with a vitality or liveliness, as opposed tobeing inert and passive matter” (Fox & Alldred, 2019, p.2).
The notion of vital materialism as a specific approach to new materialism is put forward
by Jane Bennett in, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010). Replacing traditional
notions of non-living, or even non-human life as being passive objects, Bennett emphasises
this ability all matter has to cause effects and “to give voice to a vitality intrinsic to materiality,[and] in the process absolving matter from its long history of attachment to automatism or61

mechanism” (Bennett, 2010, p.3). The focus on the vitality of matter, irrespective of its life
status or capacity to physically move, suggests a re-formation of ideas of life or what it means
to be living. Even inert matter can have some kind of life force despite it not being intrinsicallybiologically living, as it has the ability to produce effects on the environment it is part of andthe other materialities that it is inextricably interconnected with as part of the environment.
This is because “new materialism opens up the possibility to explore how each affects the other,and how things other than humans (for instance, a tool, a technology or a building) can besocial ‘agents’, making things happen” (Fox & Alldred, 2019, p.3). Furthermore, byconceiving matter as possessing its own modes of self-transformation, self-organisation,and directedness, and thus no-longer as simply passive or inert, disturbs the conventional
sense that agents are exclusively humans who possess the cognitive abilities,
intentionality, and freedom to make autonomous decisions and the corollary presumptionthat humans have the right or ability to master nature (Coole & Frost, 2010, p.10).
Tied into theories of posthumanism, new materialism decentres the human as the centre ofissues of matter and instead considers all matter as being imbued with a sense of agency andforce. As a standpoint that seeks to move beyond the anthropocentrism that currently operates
in human/environment relationships,
new materialism’s post-anthropocentrism shifts humans from the central focus ofattention, not only emancipating the affective capacities of the non-human but alsoestablishing an ethics that can engage productively with human culture, with other living
things, and with the wider environment of inanimate (Braidotti, 2013, p.60).
This understanding of matter as being active is also to understand that matter is not isolated but
forms dynamic interconnections that work together. As Bennett explains,a landscape possesses an efficacy of its own, a liveliness intermeshed with humanagency. Clearly, the scape of the land is more than a geo-physical surface upon which
events play out. Clearly, a particular configuration of plants, buildings, mounds, winds,
rocks, moods does not operate simply as a tableau for actions whose impetus comes from
elsewhere (Bennett & Loenhart, 2011, para.3).
Furthermore, by understanding the forces of matter, and their capacities to interact and cause
affect, there comes forth a worldview that rejects fundamental “differences between ‘natural’and‘cultural’

realms,

human

and

non-human,

structure/agency,

reason/emotion,

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animate/inanimate and – perhaps most significantly – between mind and matter” (Fox &Alldred, 2019, p.3). Instead, agency or force is not the sole possession of the living or thehuman but can be found in new and different ways amongst all materials.
For bioart, this way of thinking can open up new insights into the use of biologicalmaterials that are both alive yet not classified as independent living beings. As an art practicethat is based on the use, reuse and repositioning of specific materials, a deeper understandingof materiality is required. This is required both for understanding the practice and forunderstanding its position and place as a new cultural form of life. The concepts found in newmaterialism help to understand and contextualise the materials of bioart. Marietta Radomska
uses the term ‘uncontainable life’ in respect to the material understandings of bioart, suggestingthat,
this concept is intended to refer to an understanding of life as a material, dynamic, andexcessive force of transformation that traverses the divide between the living and nonliving, organic and inorganic, human and non-human, growth and decay, and, ultimately,
life and death, as they are currently conceived (2016, p.32).
This uncontainability of life, or the ways in which understandings of matter as an expansive
and affective force that cannot be reduced to a simplistic definition or idea, manifests throughthe marginal position of bioart as it resists categorisation. Radomska confirms that“uncontainable life dwells in the sphere of the in-between: it is processual, dynamic, andmultiplicitous” (2016, p.32). In considering matter as complex active agents that are vast andinterconnected and produce effects that are contingent on their environment and the people
who interact with them in these environments, living biological artworks consequently suggest
a reconfiguration of how we think about the affectivity and immersive embodiment of theseworks. The composition of bioart works, blending the natural and the manufactured, the living
and the non-living, art and science, reveals new challenges and complexities in understanding
and experiencing our relationships with other forms of life and different forms of matter.

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2.2 Posthumanism
Posthumanism is a branch of philosophy that has emerged since the late twentieth century,
which seeks to reconsider ideas of humanism through a displacement of the human-centric
world view that humanism holds (Ferrando, 2013; Roden, 2015). By critically questioning “thevery structures of our shared identity – as humans – amidst the complexity of contemporary
science, politics and international relations” (Braidotti, 2013, p.1), posthumanism repositions
the human in favour of a state of being ‘beyond human’; that is, a reconceptualisation of what
humans are as a species, what we are in the process of becoming, and our relationship with therest of the planet as a consequence of contemporary scientific and technological advances.
Posthumanism does not seek to replace or dismiss humanity but instead to reconsider theomissions that a Eurocentric, anthropocentric perspective neglects to consider (Miah, 2007).
Inextricably linked to advancements in medicine and technology, although with adistinct and separate foundation from each, posthumanism is often used as a framework fordiscussions of the ethical concerns that arise from both of these industries (Miah, 2007). These
ethical concerns can be largely divided into two fields; the first being how medicine andtechnology will be able to permanently change or enhance human biology, and the second
being the new forms of life created by these technologies. Concerns regarding the inevitabilityof medical augmentation of humanity, and the future capacities and rights of artificial life
including Artificial Intelligence (AI), androids and cyborgs, posthumanist debates “provoke
elation but also anxiety about the possibility of a serious decentring of ‘Man’, the former
measure of all things” (Braidotti, 2013, p.2).9 This displacement of the human, the definitionof which is also brought into question, creates a new world view that challenges the dualistic
boundaries between the natural/unnatural, nature/culture, and human/non-human.

9

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the development and implementation of computer programs which are able toperform tasks otherwise only able to be performed by humans; this includes problem solving and decision
making. An android is a robot which appears human in physical form. A cyborg, or cybernetic organism is abeing which has both organic and mechanically enhanced body parts.

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As a critical theory, posthumanism is fundamentally a rejection and critical questioningof the established doctrines of longstanding Western humanist philosophies (Sterling, 2020).
Founded during the Renaissance as a revival of the secular civilisations of antiquity, humanism
displaced the idea of God being the centre of the universe in favour of man (Bolter, 2016).
With the human being of greater importance than the rest of the natural world, humanism
advocated for critical thinking and autonomy in navigating life, however, it simultaneously
retained the humancentric hierarchical structures of many Western religions. This hierarchicalconfiguration of the natural world can be seen in the Great Chain of Being [Figure 2.1], aMedieval Christian structure demonstrating the order of importance from God at the top, down
to humans, animals, plants and minerals (Nee, 2005). A hierarchical system placing humanity
above and separate from the rest of the natural world endured despite contemporary notions ofhumanism often rejecting religious viewpoints.
Contemporary humanism is most often associated with a secular perspective, withreligion almost entirely removed from its philosophy and is built upon the premise that humans
are fundamentally rational beings that are distinct from other animals, possess free will and areautonomous (Roden, 2015). In this anthropocentric view that places humans at the centre of
the world, it is important to note in doing this, humanism emphasises the fundamental
differences and privileges of humans over non-humans (Roden, 2015). Humanism advocatesfor secularist science and human agency over superstition, religion and ideas of preordained
fate, however through these beliefs, humanism inherently privileges and favours the human,
and therefore relationships with everything non-human, that is, animals, the environment, theartificial and the technological, are mediated through human interest, agency and opportunity.
Humanism and the anthropocentric values it advocates have faced challenges in the
recent criticism of ecological change and environmental damage caused by human actions. The
issue of climate change and environmental damage sits at the forefront of contemporary65

political and social issues, with constant calls for global governments to take action and prevent
any further destruction from occurring as most damage derives from preventable and avoidable
human behaviours.10 These behaviours include plastic pollution, greenhouse gas emissions
caused by intensive farming, reliance on fossil fuels, deforestation and destruction of habitats,and the spread of urban development as a result of overpopulation. The cause of much of thisdamage is attributed not only to human behaviour but the lack of responsibility exercised
towards the preservation of ecological health through the anthropocentrism of human activities.
With this, there has been a movement towards posthumanist approaches with respect toecological management and towards reducing and potentially reversing climate change that iscaused by human activities. However, despite these problems being human-induced,
posthumanism has highlighted the lack of equality present in humanity as
not all humans are equal and the human is not at all a neutral category. It is rather anormative category that indexes access to privileges and entitlements. Appeals to the‘human’ are always discriminatory: they create structural distinctions and inequalities
among different categories of humans (Braidotti, 2020, p.466).
In addressing a potential move to beyond humanistic, anthropocentric attitudes towards theenvironment and other life forms, posthumanism advocates that to do this there must also be amove to inclusivity in recognising that humancentricism does not include all humans, but isoften “based on a simple assumption of superiority by a subject that is: masculine, white,
Eurocentric, practicing compulsory heterosexuality and reproduction, able-bodied, urbanised,speaking a standard language” (Braidotti, 2020, p.466). In this way “not all humans have been
considered ‘human enough’ and not all living beings have been ascribed the status of ‘life’.
Being expelled from the ontological status of the human or of the living entails consequencesat the level of ethics (respective ways of treatment, e.g. exclusion, discrimination,
exploitation)” (Radomska, 2017, p.378). Therefore, to move beyond a human perspective

10 In September 2019, more than 6 million people joined strikes and protests in more than 100 countries across the world todemand governmental action to address climate change (Taylor, Watts & Barlett, 2019).

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means to move towards inclusivity of marginalised perspectives, which includes all humans aswell as the environment and its other life forms.
The development of posthuman discourse deviates against the anthropocentrism of
humanism and instead advocates for a theoretical approach that looks beyond the human andhuman hierarchical dominance. Critical posthumanism is “an interdisciplinary perspective
informed by academic poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminist and postcolonial studies,and science and technology studies” (Simon, 2003, pp.2-3). In rethinking the divisive humanist
structures placing the human in opposition to the concept of nature, critical posthumanism
suggests that “a new, subtler, and more complex relationship to our planetary dimension is now
needed and that a more egalitarian relationship to non-human others is called for” (Braidotti,
2017, p.10). Critical posthumanism, as a theoretical discourse, therefore, seeks to not only
deviate from humanism but to deconstruct it entirely in the ongoing renegotiation and reevaluation of what it means to be human in the twenty-first century; that is, “what it means to
be human under the conditions of globalisation, technoscience, late capitalism and climatechange” (Herbrechter, 2017, para.1). Consequently, critical posthumanism presents a
reinterpretation and redefinition of humanism, in a way that takes into account contemporarysocio-cultural, economic and ecological environments, and a “shift that also brings to an end
the categorical distinction between life as Bios, the prerogative of Anthropos, and the life ofanimals and non-humans, or Zoe” (Braidotti, 2017, p.12).11
This breakdown of the distinction between types of living organisms parallels theefforts of new materialism in attempting to contest the separation and categorisation of typesof matter and its qualities. The two approaches share a similar rejection of hierarchically based

11

Bios and zoe are two concepts of life deriving from Greek; Braidotti describes the terms as “life is half
animal: zoe (zoology, zoophilic, zoo), and half discursive: bios (bio-logy). Zoe, of course, is the poor half of acouple that foregrounds bios defined as intelligent life (2002, p.13).However, following the posthuman turn “thedecentring of Anthropos challenges therefore the separation of bios, life, as the prerogative of humans, from zoe,
the life of animals and non human entities” (Braidotti, 2016b, p.381).

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attributions of power, impact or abilities, and instead suggest that more nuanced
demonstrations of these qualities can be found across all materials and life forms. In this wayof rejecting hierarchies, posthumanism anticipates and seeks a concept of the human that is
postanthropocentric,
decentring the human altogether, post-anthropocentricism emphasises the technological,
ecological and biological entanglement of humans and non-humans in every dimensionof earthly affairs. This ontological shift focuses attention on things and processes that
may transcend or subvert human intervention, whether as individual objects or as
variegated assemblages (Sterling, 2020, p.1030).
Therefore, the distinction between the Anthropocene and the post-Anthropocene would be a
restructuring of the concept of human agency, and our relationship to technologies and theapplications of technology, in addition to the rest of the planet and its other life forms; throughthis approach “what comes to the fore instead are new human-nonhuman linkages” (Braidotti,
2017, p.12).
Posthumanism has, however, not been universally accepted as a necessary or evenlegitimate approach to renegotiating human/non-human relationships and the de-stabilisationof human-centred approaches to ethics and morality. Kate Soper (2012) suggests that
posthumanism is flawed in its reasoning of attempting to rid humanism of human
exceptionality as the discourse is only able to exist through human abilities of moral reasoningthat define humans as a different form to other forms of life. Soper states that “posthumanist
representations and ontological claims, to put it crudely, are produced exclusively by and forhuman beings, and no other animal, a fortiori, no tree or stone, will ever question its own status
as a being” (2012, p.376). However, Soper does concede that posthumanism can be successful
in focusing on attempting to redefine what it means to be human, especially in relation to newtechnologies, but remains firm that human exceptionalism continues to exist, even if not in theway humanism originally defined it.

68In addition to criticisms of the suggested irony of posthumanism only being relevant tohumans, a further potential flaw with posthumanism is situated in the very notion of what itmeans to be human. By this, posthumanism and its many branches attempts to simplify thehuman, reducing it to a number of generalised behaviours, traits and statistics (Lang, 2018),
therefore leaving it unclear as to what it refers to and fundamentally omits the inherent
individuality of individuals, cultures and populations. Further to this, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson
states that in ideas of posthumanism it is imperative to understand “what and crucially whose
conception of humanity are we moving beyond?” (2015, p.216). A wider concept of the figureof the human in posthuman discourse is fundamental to account for the diversity of the humanas a species, as Jackson (2015) suggests that without this acknowledgement the theory risks
overlooking issues such as race, instead presenting a Eurocentric perspective of humanity. As
an emerging discourse that focuses on a deconstruction of limited notions of the human,
posthumanism continues to expand its remit to accommodate the diversities of race, gender,
sexuality and disabilities in order to better understand the potential that the theory can offer interms of understanding relationships between species and environments.
It is important, therefore, to define the theoretical difference between posthumanism
and the figure of the posthuman, as while both terms are part of the same discourse, they haveseparate associations and the presence of one term does not inherently imply the presence ofthe other. As discussed, posthumanism, particularly critical posthumanism, is concerned withthe theoretical reconsideration of humanism and of what it means to be human. However, theposthuman figure is distinct from this discourse in referring specifically to the individual that
is, as the name suggests, in a state of being beyond human. The figure of the posthuman can
include, therefore, the actualised and imagined technologically enhanced human, the robot,
cyborg or android, or the form that is in other ways beyond human (Herbrechter, 2017).
Through the use of technology, the figure of the posthuman is a transformed or enhanced

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human which is most associated with a particular branch of posthumanism known astranshumanism.

2.2.1 Transhumanism
In many ways, posthumanism is an umbrella term for many associated concepts, most notably,
critical, cultural and philosophical posthumanism, transhumanism, new materialism,
antihumanism, posthumanities and metahumanities (Ferrando, 2013). While all of theseconcepts share a similar perspective in identifying the flaws and gaps in traditional humanism,
they differ considerably in terms of their own philosophies and approaches to a state of being‘post human’. Of these different subcategories, transhumanism is one of the dominant and mostcommonly discussed discourses and is markedly distinct from the others. Transhumanism
refers to the potential advancement of human beings, with the aim of perfection and betterment,in order to enhance the human body and mind. Also referred to as H+, transhumanism is distinct
from posthumanism in that rather than seeking to disestablish the humancentric perspectivesof humanism, transhumanists envisage a world of transformed humans, with an emphasis on
humanity’s uniqueness amongst the universe and how this could be enhanced and preserved
beyond the natural body (Vigo, 2018). While critical posthumanism addresses the ways inwhich we approach human-centric notions and seeks balance rather than a hierarchicalworldview, transhumanism champions the beneficial applications of human enhancement
through new technologies and medicine. These enhancements are physical, intellectual andbiological in nature and are found in the developing technologies of biomedicine, prosthetics,
cybernetics and robotics.
The foundations of transhumanism as a technology-focused aim of improving thehuman can be found in technology research of the 1960s, with futurology research led by FM2030 at the New School in Los Angeles, being one of the earliest advocates for human70technological advancement.12 However, the first use of the term ‘transhuman’ predates
futurology and is suggested to have been coined by Julian Huxley in 1951, in an eponymous
paper concerned with overcoming the biological limitations of humanity, however, it has also
been suggested that the phrase was used prior to this by Canadian philosopher W. D. Lighthallin 1940 (Harrison & Wolyniak, 2015). Despite the ambiguous origin of the term,transhumanism is now defined by the aspiration to fundamentally alter the human body at abiological level to improve human lifespans and abilities (Mirkes, 2019). As a branch of
posthumanism, the philosophies of transhumanism are therefore concerned with thetransformation of the human through taking control from nature, to be able to manipulate,change and evolve the human through the application of biotechnology, nanotechnology andinformation technologies (Roden, 2015). Furthermore, it is not only this possible manipulationthat underscores the fundamental ideas of transhumanism, but that this transformation andenhancement is an ideal and desired outcome. The importance of this idea to the philosophy oftranshumanism is clearly stated in Article One of the World Transhumanist Association
manifesto, published in 1998, in that “(1) Humanity will be radically changed by technology
in the future. We foresee the feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including suchparameters as the inevitability of ageing, limitations on human and artificial intellects,
unchosen psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth” (Allenby & Sarewitz,
2011, para.4).
The foundations of many of the technologies envisaged by transhumanists are alreadybeing created in laboratories and commercially sold globally, thus the perfection of the humanbody is becoming an ever-increasing reality due to the advancements of biotechnology andbiomedicine (Mirkes, 2019). Through this conflation of humanist ideals and biotechnology,

12

FM-2030 was one of the first transhumanists and legally changed his name from Fereidoun M. Esfandiary to FM-2030
inspired by his belief that technology would allow him to live for more than 100 years; born in 1930, his 100th birthday would
fall in 2030, thus the inclusion of this date in his name. The FM derives from his previous initials. FM-2030 died in 2000 aged
69 and therefore did not achieve his goal, however, his body is currently preserved through cryonics.

71transhumanists “believe that the traditional methods that humanists have used to foster them
have been limited until recently by the material constraints of human biology and of nature
more generally” (Roden, 2015, p.13). Procedures and technologies for enhancing the humanbody are already widely available commercially. Some enhancements are primarily aesthetic
such as cosmetic surgery and anti-ageing treatments, however, others have been designed toenhance the abilities of disabled individuals and, as such, seem to function better and more
efficiently than the human alternative, for example, running blade prosthetics (Greenemeier,2016). Prosthetics, especially those designed for competitive sport, have the advantage ofremoving any flaws inherent in human body design, for example, running blades weigh lessthan feet, are more aerodynamic and are more energy-efficient (Greenemeier, 2016).
Furthermore, there are also body modifications that are designed to make the human morecompatible with the technological world, including microchip implants under the skin designed
to be used in place of contactless travel passes or credit cards.
These modification technologies allow humans to change the way they look, the ways
in which they move and the fundamental abilities of the body beyond its innate biology andphysiology and will continue to do so into the future as technologies continue to evolve.
However, it is important to note that these enhancements are not universally accepted, and insome instances, procedures such as microchip implantation have proved to be highly
controversial with fears that given the ever-present threats of cybersecurity and government
surveillance, it could become a compulsory procedure (Schwartz, 2019). Furthermore, intechnologies becoming part of the body, the body becomes technologically connected toexternal corporate agencies who can then access information contained within the body and,
therefore, in some way could claim ownership over part of the body. Despite the potential
concerns these procedures posit, many individuals are choosing to adopt such technologies,72with Sweden having one of the highest uptakes, with over 4,000 individuals having undergone
the procedure as of 2018 (Savage, 2018).
Commentary and criticism of these issues can be found in performance art and bodyart, with body modification and augmentation having been actualised, as evidenced in theworks of Orlan and Stelarc. Such works demonstrate the potential for individuals to movebeyond the confinements of the traditional concept of the natural body by using
biotechnologies to enhance and modify their own bodies. Stelarc’s Ear on Arm (2007) [Figure2.2] saw the artist grow and implant an ear onto his left forearm. The ear was constructed using
an ear-shaped Medpor scaffold implanted inside of his arm, then the skin over the top was
suctioned to allow it to fit inside of the scaffold, revealing the shape. However, the ear is not
only designed as a visual replica of the artist’s own ear but was also fitted with a wirelessmicrophone that was connected to the Internet, allowing others to listen to what the ear ishearing. Stelarc suggests “this additional and enabled Ear on Arm effectively becomes anInternet organ for the body” (Stelarc, 2021, para.2). The ideology behind the construction of
the third transposed ear closely ties into posthuman and transhumanist ideas, with Stelarc
stating that “a facial feature has been replicated, relocated and will now be rewired for alternate
capabilities” (Stelarc, 2021, para.2). These alternate and new capabilities for the body,achieved through the use and application of technology fused with the natural, organic being
suggests an actualisation of transhumanist thought materialised through performance art.
Performance artist, Orlan’s work, The Reincarnation of Saint-Orlan (1990-1992)[Figure 2.3], also used biomedical procedures to artificially enhance and modify the artist’s
own body. Over a period of two years, Orlan underwent several cosmetic surgeries in order to
re-present her face as famous faces of ideal beauty from art history, including Venus, Diana,
Europa, Psyche and the Mona Lisa (Vaage, 2016). Using these figures as models, Orlan used
her body as a tool and a medium for exploring the changing ideas of beauty throughout human73history, demonstrating the pervasive availability and use of cosmetic surgery in contemporarysociety as individuals seek to change their appearance alongside these changing aesthetic
preferences. As an advocate of cosmetic surgery, Orlan embraces the aesthetic modification of
the body, which coincides with the transhumanist aims of being free from the constraints of
the natural body. Cosmetic surgery employs new technologies such as lasers and implants
which allow the body to be reimagined, redesigned and recreated, ultimately producing a new
and improved body. While these improvements are only aesthetic and sometimes procedures
such as Botox are only temporary, they highlight the potential malleability of the body.13
The works of Sterlac and Orlan are both positive and supportive of new technologies
and what they can do using the human body as a canvas. These works are more closely alignedwith the aims and values of transhumanism, with both being extreme examples of selfexperimentation and artistic bodily enhancement through technology, rather than criticalposthumanist theory, however, there is a strong presence of posthumanism withincontemporary art, distinct from bioart practices, as well as bioart-based posthumanist
engagements. As a theory focused on dissolving the hierarchies of humanism, expanding
definitions and understandings of what the human is or can be, in addition to drawing attention
to and elevating other forms of life, contemporary posthuman art takes many forms, from
sculpture to robotics and offers new immersive interactions with posthuman life, cultures andenvironments.

2.2.2 Posthuman Art
Posthumanism, as a critical theory, seeks the reinterpretation of the human, in part through theembrace of technology and utilising technology to advance humanity. Throughout history, the13

Botox is the commercial name for the cosmetic use of the commonly used toxin, OnaboulinumtoxinA, whichis injected into the skin and reduces visibility of wrinkles by paralysing muscles that cause facial movements(Berkowitz, 2017).

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visual arts have frequently played a vital role in carrying and amplifying the messages of newsocio-cultural movements, and the posthuman movement has been no different (Kordic,
Godward, & Martinique, 2016). Given the inclination for artists to demonstrate new anddifferent perspectives through their work, it is clear that the contemporary visual arts are aspace to imagine, create and envision the posthuman, and a perspective that is not necessarily
favourable and hierarchical for humanity, instead utilising other perspectives and identities.
The origins of posthumanism within art can be traced to the Futurist movement of theearly twentieth century (Kordic, Godward, & Martinique, 2016). Born out of the rapid
development of industry, the Futurists placed a heavy emphasis on embracing the new, the fast,
the mechanical and the modern while firmly rejecting notions of the past. Initially founded bypoet Filippo Tommaso Marinetti in 1901, Marinetti envisaged a reinvention of Italy which, to
his mind, was remained conservative in embracing the potential benefits that new technologies
could bring. Solidifying his ideas, Marinetti published the Manifesto of Futurism in 1901,
which set out principles of embracing a technologically informed future. In this manifesto,
Marinetti stresses the importance of embracing technology with passion and vitality, statingthat
4. We declare that the splendour of the world has been enriched by a new beauty: thebeauty of speed. A racing automobile with its bonnet adorned with great tubes like
serpents with explosive breath ... a roaring motor car which seems to run on machinegun fire, is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace.
5. We want to sing the man at the wheel, the ideal axis of which crosses the earth, itself
hurled along its orbit (Marinetti, 2020, p.3).
While in form most Futurist art bears little resemblance to posthuman art, in part due to thefluid diversity that comes with posthumanism, the critical philosophical ideals demonstrate agrounding for posthumanism. However, one key difference in the values of the two ideologies
lies in the attitudes towards technology. While posthumanism embraces technology on a wide
scope, the Futurists firmly celebrated technology as a conquest of the human over nature75

(Berghaus, 2009). This acceptance and promotion of technology is found in parts of posthumanthought, particularly in branches such as transhumanism, however, it is not necessarilyubiquitous of the entire field. In many respects, many posthuman discourses critique andcomment on the destructive capacities of technology, particularly when used by humans tocontrol and profit from the environment, consequently causing damage.
Nevertheless, the art of Futurism has evident similarities with posthuman ideologies.
Uberto Boccioni was one of the first artists to join Marinetti, and his works, such as UniqueForms of Continuity in Space (1913), clearly set out the legacy of connectivity between
Futurism and posthumanism. However, it is Jacob Epstein’s The Rock Drill (1913) [Figure 2.4]
that displays a compelling and significant foundation for this relationship. Epstein presents ahumanoid form, but angular and distorted in its hard metal frame. Like a futuristic vision of acold, metal human, it appears hostile and unemotional in its gaze, raising the question of how
much humanity is left in this new metallic form of humanoid. Symbolising a new era thatwitnessed the First World War, and with it, a growth in the forces of human and machinebrought together for the first time in an unprecedented way, The Rock Drill is symbolic of thisnew age. After the news of the deaths of British soldiers during the war, Epstein removed thedrill from the figure in respect of the dead. In doing this, the work not only shows a figure of
the posthuman but in this act, the work, like posthuman discourse, becomes a critique of ourrelationship to technologies and the potential for the negative impacts they can propagate underhuman use. This sensibility can also be found in contemporary practices, where artists havechosen to understand, critique, question or engage with new technologies, new lifeforms andnew humanity in order for the audience to reconsider their position in relation to them.
In contemporary art, the impact of posthuman thought is present across a wide range ofpractices which include the assimilation of non-human life into the everyday, transhumanist
body augmentation and imagined new forms of life. As previously discussed, Sterlac and76Orlan’s physical bodily modifications have a close connection to transhumanism and actively
engage in improving and changing the human, and appear to present an optimistic view of theuse of these technologies. However, there are many more artists who demonstrate complex anddiverse engagements with posthuman ideas, this is evident in the practice of Australian artist,
Patricia Piccinini. Many of Piccinini’s works, such as The Young Family (2002) [Figure 2.5]
and Still Life with Stem Cells (2002) [Figure 2.6], have been included in discussions aroundbioart as they focus on hybrid-like creatures. However, Piccinini’s works are large-scaleinstallations made from silicone and polyurethane and, therefore, would not necessarilyubiquitously fall under the category of bioart unless the artist specifically stated they were
engaging in bioart using a theoretical or critical approach to bioengineering and concepts oflife. Piccinini’s works nonetheless present an engagement with posthuman life forms, often
depicting hybrid creatures, slightly humanoid in some features, yet uncanny and grotesque inthe animal-like forms they take (Mondloch, 2018). These works highlight a blurring ofboundaries between the natural and the technological, and the self and the other (Toffoletti,2007). These hybrid biological specimens are often engaged in exchanges with humans or infamily groups with other similar forms and suggest strong emotional responses of both affinity
and aversion. While the figures often appear monstrous in form, they call for responses of
empathy from the viewer by their tangible humanity despite appearing fundamentally unhuman(Mondloch, 2018). Speaking about these fusions of binary dualisms presented by contemporary
biosciences and technology in relation to her 1997 video series, Protein Lattice, Piccinini
explains
it is no longer relevant to oppose the artificial to the natural. This dualism, which wasrendered self-evident by the juxtaposition of the ‘mechanical’ against the ‘organic’, canno longer be sustained. It is not even a question of championing the artificial against thenatural, as Huysmans did. The organic is now the stratum through which the cutting edgeof technology most regularly passes. It is commonplace for human children to beconceived and born via artificial means. To call the progeny of an IVF conception an‘artificial’ or ‘unnatural’ person is as ludicrous as to deny the fundamental involvement77

of technology in its birth. It’s not so much a question of claiming, as Donna Haraway
does, that we are all cyborgs. It is more to the point to acknowledge that technology isgetting increasingly natural (Piccinini, 1997, para.1).
The visual presence of a life-form that is not quite human but too human-like to be non-humanpresents an uncomfortable confrontation that is on the cusp of reality given the omnipresenceof bioengineering practices. Provoking questions of what is human and non-human, what isnatural or artificial is poignant to contemporary technologies and to posthuman discourse, as
the artist places the viewer in a position of a voyeur, observing the vulnerable life-form whichappears almost human-like in its facial expressions, yet it is an art object. As imagined hybrid
creatures, Piccinini’s sculptures visualise transgenic practices on a large scale, however, theartists’ position on whether this is a positive or problematic future remains unclear, reflecting
the ambiguities of bioengineering practices in general. Fundamentally, Piccinini’s works are
inanimate, abiotic sculptures and are stationary objects that are only imagined futures. There
are, however, other forms of life explored within posthuman art which conflate the dualismsof object/subject, natural/artificial further without being actualised bioengineered life forms;
this includes robotic life, artificial intelligence, and life which fuses both the natural and theartificial in the form of the cyborg.
Robotic life has become a central focus in posthuman art, both as subject matter and as
the material basis for works. Vincent Fournier’s photographic series The Man Machine (200910) features a number of images in which different androids participate in scenes of everyday
life alongside humans who appear to not notice their difference. The series proposes the ideaof a future in which robotic life forms have assimilated into everyday life, however, this futureis also the present as the android’s featured in the work are all pre-existing machines. In one
photograph, an android known as ASIMO, made by Honda in 2000, is seen walking throughthe corridor of a museum, looking around the space at the classical sculptures within it [Figure2.7]. In another photograph, REEM-B, an orange and grey cubist-looking humanoid robot,

78

made by PAL Robotics in 2008, is pictured standing on an outdoor basketball court, holding
the ball ready to shoot, with two small children standing nearby seemingly playing with therobot [Figure 2.8]; and in a third image a small self-balancing, bicycle-riding robot named
Murata Boy, developed by Murata Manufacturing in 2005, is seen being assisted by a woman
kneeling by its side [Figure 2.9]. Fournier describes the work as “a balance between the
spectator and the robot, between a process of identification and distance” (Yellowtrace, 2019,para.2), as the photographs show an assimilated society that is possible of the future, yetsuggest an inherent apprehension in these changes through the development of a new societythat is not fully human. Despite robots and androids being created by humans using humanknowledge, there are deep-seated fears of robots and artificial intelligence threatening to usurp
humanity. In 2017, The Guardian reported that more than 70% of US citizens were concernedby a future where robots and artificial intelligence would take on human roles and jobs (Solon,2017).
The conflation or assimilation of human and robotic life is present in Patrick Tresset’s
Human Study #1, 5RNP (2012-2018) [Figure 2.10], a robot installation that utilises five robotic‘arms’ to complete pen portraits of the viewer seated opposite. Named Paul, the robot uses
cameras to ‘see’ the sitter and then copies their likeness onto paper by drawing using its arms.
Like Fournier’s work, Tresset destabilises the idea of the human by showing the ability of arobot to draw, presenting a future in which behaviours thought only to be human, such as
creating art, become democratised among all life forms, thus confronting the viewer’s
preconceptions of human superiority and what defines us as being different from other life
forms, or indeed if we are not. These posthuman perspectives challenge and destabilise thehuman, our place, behaviours and social order through the insertion of the artificial life which
can assist us but is inherently an unhuman ‘other’.

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2.3 Otherness
In order for there to be a concept of the ‘self’ as an individual subjective identity, it precludes
that there must be, by default, an ‘other’. The other is the opposite of the self, is marked bydifference and is key to ideas of identity and identity construction (Kastoryano, 2010). The
other is located outside of the self and is an external presence that is often considered a threat
to the self. Otherness is often found in political discourse to describe the condition of sociopolitical exclusion and alienation of difference and those who are marginalised by the state, itsinstitutions, and its holders of power as “definitions of others in a negative way, especially by
the more powerful groups, often lead to the other being denied access to vital societal resources,
accessible to the more powerful group (Okolie, 2003, p.2). The idea of the other is, therefore,a key and fundamental role in the creation and maintenance of social relationships, hierarchies
and power, in addition to interpersonal relationships and ideas of self-identification anddefinition (Kastoryano, 2010).
The figure of the other is central to Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of ethicalrelationships within human societies. According to Levinas, the fundamental part of thephenomenological encounter with the other is the face, which both differentiates the self fromthe other, but also is the key element in creating a relationship to the other. This is particularly
true of an ethical responsibility and relationship with the other, as Levinas’ states that it is theface which “orders and ordains us” (Levinas, 1985, p.95). By this, Levinas is fundamentallyreferring to the face-to-face encounter, rather than through images or other non-direct
encounters, and in this way, it is the face that is the embodiment of the other, which hassimilarities to the self but is an external other. The face, therefore, gives the other humanity
and in the face-to-face encounter it demonstrates a defenselessness. Furthermore, it is throughthis encounter with the face that reflexively reveals that the other is not reducible to the face
but that the other is more than only a face. Recognising the humanity of the other through80

seeing the face, the face of the other is a symbolic plea for ethical and responsible behaviour
and consequently requires the self to act in this way.
The ethical responsibilities to the other that are employed by the face are significant
and complex issues in contemporary culture due to the ubiquitous presence of the Internet. The
twenty-first century has witnessed a drastic shift in how we encounter the world and mediate
relationships with other people. With the interconnectivity afforded by the Internet, individuals
are able to communicate globally en masse with strangers through social media platforms, forexample, thus interacting without the face. This has resulted in a culture which can operate inreverse to Levinas’ philosophy, in that encounters which occur without the human face nolonger have obligations of no harm and may, therefore, result in a culture of different ethicalstandards where the other can be attacked without being morally aligned by the sight ofpotential human pain. As a consequence, the lack of accountability to the face as a reminder of
ethical responsibilities, online abuse and cyberbullying have become significant social issues
causing real-world harm to individuals, manifesting in psychological and emotional harm,
particularly among young and vulnerable individuals (Peled, 2019). These online behaviours
and interactions have been found to be significantly different from offline encounters due tothe absence of the face, which is the reminder of the real, vulnerable human presence. The
Internet, therefore, has the ability to alter human behaviours and despite these behaviours
taking place on digital platforms, they have real-life impacts and consequences and highlightthe inherent nature of relationships between the self and the other. This emphasises theimportance of the presence-based encounter in terms of ethics, responsibility and a decider of
an individual’s moral stance, all of which is relevant to encountering works of living
bioengineered art.
The notion of the other inherently divides and separates individuals and groups into
opposing dualisms of the self/other and us/them. These dualisms exist within societies

81constantly, as Zygmunt Bauman states that, “woman is the other of man, animal is the other ofhuman, stranger is the other of native, abnormality the other of norm, deviation the other of
law-abiding, illness the other of health, insanity the other of reason, lay public the other of theexpert, foreigner the other of state subject, enemy the other of friend” (Bauman, 1991, p.8).
With these opposing others, societies are divided with seemingly nothing in-between thesedivergent categories, rendering every individual into one of two states, the self or the other, thesame or the different. Furthermore, existing outside of these dualisms automatically renders
the individual as other by failing to fall neatly into the expected this or that, self or other formof categorisation. These divisions are innate among many species, not only human cultures,and demonstrate instinctive defensive and self/species preservation behaviours, such as
aggression between adult female chimpanzees of one population when confronted with afemale from another group, which often leads to the killing of any infants belonging to thenewcomer (Pusey & Schroepfer-Walker, 2013). By othering potential threats such as an animalof one species moving into the territory of another population of the same species, this prevents
danger to the self as the other can be harmed and killed as it is not the same. However, thesebehaviours are damaging in their divisions, alienating and marginalising the other for being
different, placing them outside of the norms and accepted values of a society.

2.3.1 The Uncanny
The uncanny is a broad-ranging yet ambiguous psychological phenomenon. In many ways, it
is unspecific, provoked by experiences that are in some way a confrontation of the expectedwith the unexpected. It is a sensation of unfamiliarity but tinged with a feeling of the familiar,
as it is “not simply an experience of alienation but a commingling of the familiar andunfamiliar” (Royle, 2003, p.1). The uncanny is most often associated with the feeling of
strangeness and “involves feelings of uncertainty in particular regarding the reality of who one82

is and what is being experienced” (Royle, 2003, p.1). It is this conflation of reality and theimagination, the known and the unknown or even unknowable, the familiar and the alien thatis at the heart of uncanniness.
In contemporary usage, uncanny is often used to describe an unsettling feeling caused
by a close resemblance of two things or something familiar which is out of place, such as two
strangers who in appearance look as though they could be twins but are not related. While theresemblance itself is not uncanny, it is the realisation that they are not the same person or sharethe same DNA that is unsettling. However, identical twins are also uncanny in that they visuallyappear as doubles and a repetition which is innately uncanny as it is not typical for individuals
to appear as such. The twin is, therefore, a natural form of the double. The double or thedoppelganger has a long history associated with feelings of unease and is often found inEuropean folklore, for example, an old premonition stating that meeting your doppelganger isa premonition that you are about to die (Royle, 2003). The idea of the double is found in
Sigmund Freud’s interpretation of the uncanny, where he suggests that the double represents a
resistance against the threat of the extinction of the self. By this, he suggests that the double
increases the chances of survival.
The first in-depth exploration of the concept of the uncanny as a psychologicalphenomenon was undertaken by Freud in his 1919 essay, The Unheimlich; however, prior tothis, the idea was explored by Ernst Jentsch in his 1906 work, On the Psychology of the
Uncanny. Freud used the German term unheimlich, meaning strange, weird or unhomelike, andcontrasted it against the heimlich, meaning homelike, but also with a double meaning of hidden
or concealed. In his work, Freud suggests that the strangeness of the ordinary is present andgives a sense of being out-of-place and that the unheimlich is a sense of the re-emergence orrevealing of what has been hidden or repressed. For Freud, the uncanny “belongs to all that is
terrible—to all that arouses dread and creeping horror; it is equally certain, too, that the word83

is not always used in a clearly definable sense, so that it tends to coincide with whatever excites
dread” (1919, p.1). This unveiling of the hidden or the unknown produces feelings of anxiety,dread and unease as the unknown becomes the known, yet it is ‘other’ and not able to be
assimilated into the self.
Feelings of uncanniness are brought about often suddenly in response to the unexpected
and is most likely to arise when the boundaries between the imagined and the real are blurred(Royle, 2003). In this way, the uncanny is a response of uncertainty and a signal that what is
experienced is not what it seems at first glance. There are many things that evoke the uncanny,including “fear of losing one’s eyes or genitals, realising someone has a missing or prosthetic
body-part, in the strange actuality of dismembered, supplementary or phantom limbs” (Royle,
2003, p.1), in addition to dolls, human-like robots (androids) and cyborgs, and twins anddoppelgangers, among other things (Rahimi, 2013). For Freud, “dismembered limbs, a severed
head, a hand cut off at the wrist, feet which dance by themselves —all these have something
peculiarly uncanny about them” (1919, p.14). These provocateurs of the uncanny blur elementsof the unexpected and the expected, causing discomfort; dolls, robots, mannequins and otherhuman-like forms are not living, and yet they possess an agency and a presence which
continually makes us question whether they might be alive. Similarly, dismembered body parts
become uncanny when they are separated from the body, evoking a visual threat to the senseof self through the conflation of the expected and unexpected. The uncanny response fromobjects that are human-like in appearance, yet not actually human, or are human but not
attached to a body, elicit a response of intense rejection, theorised as the uncanny valley.

2.3.2 The Uncanny Valley
A newer insight into the understandings of the uncanny is the theory of the Uncanny Valley,as described by robotics researcher, Masahiro Mori in 1970. Despite being published half a84

century ago, Mori’s essay titled, Bukimi no Tani Genshō (不気味の谷現象) describes a future
filled with robots who would look and act almost identically to humans (Katayama, 2011).
While these robots would be able to perform useful tasks, such as production line assistance ina factory, Mori points out that with a human appearance, these robots would be seen as
monstrous in their apparent humanness. Mori’s essay was first translated into English in 1978
by Jasia Reichardt in her work, Robots: Fact, Fiction, and Prediction. It is from this work thatthe phrase ‘The Uncanny Valley’ derives, however, there has been some dispute regarding theaccuracy of this translation of Bukimi no Tani Genshō, with some suggesting that Valley ofEeriness is a more accurate translation (Hsu, 2012). Despite this difficulty of translation, thefundamental concept behind the theory is expressed by both interpretations as it is concernedwith intangible feelings of discomfort and creepiness.
The idea of the uncanny valley is based on the relationship between how much an object
resembles a human and how people emotionally respond to the object. Mori suggests that when
objects such as robots, prostheses or computer-generated images closely resemble humans but
are not humans, nor look exactly human, the observer experiences a feeling of eeriness andcreepiness. Specifically, the uncanny valley describes the positive correlation of the affinity
between people and objects that look and act like humans, up until a point where the likenessbecomes uncanny and the correlation sees a large dip, or ‘valley’, where affinity turns torejection and aversion [Figure 2.11]. This sense of unease or uncanniness derives from a sensethat something is not quite right and not quite human. However, the eeriness comes from aconflation of appearing too human to be non-human, but not exactly humanlike; it is a jarring
experience of the non-human appearing to be human which is then perceived as a threat to theself. When developing the idea through his robotics work, Mori explains that “you know those
wax dolls at exhibition halls? Like Columbus discovering America? I never really liked those.
When I started working with robots, I remembered those dolls, and I thought, wouldn’t it be85creepy if there was a human who didn’t blink? If their eyes just stared and stared at you …”(Katayama, 2011, para.3). Similarly, the phenomenon of the uncanny valley can be found in
expressionless faces of the deceased, even though they are human, however, by lacking thedistinctive behaviours of being alive such as breathing and blinking, the dead appear eerie andtherefore the level of affinity drops.
In identifying the point where the humanlike similarity descends into the uncanny
valley, Mori suggests that ASIMO, the humanoid robot made by Honda in 2000, sits just before
the drop of the uncanny valley (Katayama, 2011). ASIMO is a 130cm tall, bipedal android witha white, rounded plastic body that has been described as looking like a spacesuit and has a large
black screen in place of a face [Figure 2.12]. ASIMO is able to walk, recognise human gesturesand interact with its environment. In contrast, the Actroid line of humanoid robots, producedby the Kokoro company since 2003, are highly representative of the uncanny valley. In
particular, the Repliee androids resemble women and wear human clothing, making themappear almost identical to the human models they are based on [Figure 2.13]. Furthermore,they are designed to simulate breathing, blinking and are able to learn new behaviours byobserving humans. These two examples demonstrate the boundaries of the acceptable and theuncanny and exemplify the uncanny valley’s suggestion that humans generally feel moreaffinity towards non-humanoid robots and usually prefer them over humanoid robots.
There have been several recent occurrences of the uncanny valley within popular
culture, most notably the 2019 film adaptation Cats [Figure. 2.14]. Using computer-generated
imagery (CGI), actors were animated with feline features in post-production with the end resultof human-cat hybrids which prompted strong criticism from both critics and audiences(Malvern, 2019). The film was critically denounced, with some suggesting that “many of its
uncanny images are sure to haunt viewers for generations” (Hans, 2019, para.5). Furthermore,in early 2019 Paramount Pictures released a trailer for its film adaptation of the video game86character Sonic the Hedgehog [Figure. 2.15], however, akin to the response to Cats, audiences
strongly criticised the eeriness of the humanised characters (Lodge, 2019). However, as thefilm had not been completed at the point of the trailer being released, Paramount Pictures
redesigned the character before the release to greater public approval.
The uncanny valley is predominantly considered to be a theory of aesthetics,
particularly associated with how humans perceive and judge robots and other humanoidobjects, however, it is possible to draw parallels between the discomfort in appearance withuncanny uneasiness arising from materiality and, as such, this is where the uncanny valley
meets media-based bioengineered bioart. This connection between bioart and the uncanny has
been suggest by Marcus Wohlsen, who suggests “the irony of much bioart lies in the creepinessor queasiness it induces: The more the ‘materials’ used in the work resemble ‘us,’ the lesscomfortable we feel around it” (2011, p.201). Bioart then has the potential to invoke feelingsof uncanniness, causing revulsion and a separation of it as other from us as the ‘self’.

2.3.3 The Abject
Abjection is another concept that is intricately related to the uncanny and to ideas of otherness
in general. Literally meaning ‘to be cast off’, the abject is concerned with the breakdown of
the boundary between the self and the other (Felluga, 2011). However, rather than the self andthe other being assimilated, abjection marks a repulsion and rejection of the other as the self
no longer recognises the other. Like the uncanny, the abject is concerned with dualities ofrecognition and a failure of recognition, the known/the unknown, and the self and the other.
The abject is often associated with the visceral qualities of horror in both film and literature;for example, excessive blood is a common feature used for inciting horror, as seen in Peter
Jackson’s Braindead (1987), as is the use of excessive excrement and waste, seen in Bong
Joon-Ho’s Parasite (2019). Used in excess, these bodily fluids and waste products force the87viewer to experience discomfort and disgust as they are presented with the return of hidden or
discarded matter. Furthermore, the abject is also used in discourses of otherness, and in
discriminatory behaviours, wherein it has been used to describe the stigmatisation ofindividuals and bodies which do not fit societal norms.
These discourses on the abject generally stem from two prominent theorists;
psychologist, Jacques Lacan and then later, Julia Kristeva. Lacan’s work on the idea of theabject is based on theories of psychoanalysis and makes links between the symbolic order andthe abject. Kristeva’s work is heavily influenced by Lacan’s initial connection between theabject and the symbolic. The symbolic order, according to Lacan, refers to the collective
structure of language and the cultures which produce language, including the interconnectivity
between language and culture, and the intersubjectivities within them (Sheikh, 2017); and,
therefore, experiences of the subject are mediated and understood through language. However,
the abject, as the instinctive disgust of the repressed, exists outside of the symbolic order(Hook, 2003). Lacan’s abject can be understood as a psychological process of separating anddetaching that which is not the individual nor can be assimilated from the individual’senvironment. That is to say that abjection is the response process to an external other rather
than the other being inherently abject. Consequently, existing outside of the symbolic order,
the way things are understood and processed, encountering the abject causes a disturbance andsignifies something which cannot be assimilated by the individual.
Kristeva’s theorisation of the abject posits that the abject is the disintegration of theboundary between the self and the other that causes a lack of recognition of the other and,
therefore, elicits a response of disgust and repression. In opposition to Lacan’s concept of theobjet petit a, wherein an unattainable object of desire is seen in the other, Kristeva’s abject isless concerned by the symbolic order, instead focusing on the instinctual and primal fears thatare pre-linguistic (Felluga, 2011). In this way, the abject represents the most universal fears

88and threats to the self, which appear to be instinctive responses to encountering otherness.
Kristeva explores the notion of abjection in her 1982 work, The Powers of Horror: An Essay
on Abjection. In describing the abject, Kristeva suggests,
there looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark re-volts of being, directed against
a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond thescope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot
be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not
let itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects (Kristeva, p.1).
The body is, therefore, regarded as the main site of the abject, as it is the physical space of theself. However, it is specifically waste matter that is expelled from the body that Kristeva
considers as being abject, “such as feces, urine, vomit, tears, and saliva are repulsive because
they test the notion of the self/other split upon which subjectivity depends” (Covino, 2014,p.17). Inside the body, these substances are part of the self, however, once they have been
excreted they are no longer the self. The abject is the disgust and repulsion of the visceral otherthat was once the self but can no longer be recognised as such. Bodily fluids, hair, teeth andeven limbs and internal organs can also be considered abject once they have been separated
from the body. The skin is, therefore, the boundary of the self and beyond this boundary all
else is other. It borders the self from that which is abject. Once the abject material is separated
from the body, it is unclean, visceral and repulsive. Kristeva describes this as “loathing an itemof food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung. The spasms and vomiting that protect me. The
repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement,
sewage, and muck. The shame of compromise, of being in the middle of treachery. The
fascinated start that leads me toward and separates me from them” (1982, p.2). According toKristeva, the ultimate manifestation of this bodily conception of the abject is found in thephysical body of the corpse. The corpse is the fundamental meeting point of the self and other,and the real and imaginary, as it forces a confrontation with the inevitable future of our own
death and decay; in Kristeva’s words, the corpse “is death infecting life” (1982, p.4).

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The abject is not only confined to the biological material of the body, but also humanbehaviours. Many of these behaviours and acts do, however, still centre around the body andother bodies, as even in behaviour, the abject is the severance of the self and other to a pointof alienation, and “religious abhorrence, incest, women’s bodies, human sacrifice, bodily
waste, death, cannibalism, murder, decay, and perversion are aspects of humanity that society
considers abject” (Pentony, 1996, para.2). These acts are abject in both a practical sense thatthey cause repulsion or acts of violation against order and are simultaneously abject as they are
manifestations of otherness, immorality and illegality. Violations of the social, biological andcultural orders can be seen as abject as they threaten the accepted order of meaning and the
known and the understood.
Despite the abject being heavily associated with visceral, biological material, Kristeva
highlights that the threat and repulsion are not due to a fear of contamination, and that “it isthus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system,
order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, thecomposite” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4). Therefore, the abject other represents a threat to the self as it
is a confrontation with alienation and threatens to absolve the self through this ambiguity andlack of order. The threat of the abject is not a threat caused by harm elicited by the other, but
in the realisation of the self at risk of disappearance through the breakdown of the barrier
between the self and the other. However, despite this threat, Kristeva suggests that while weare repulsed and reject the abject other in disgust, it simultaneously draws us in, thus, theconfrontation is both captivating and alienating. In this way, the other is in many ways
unavoidable, and sits as a reminder of what is not the self, therefore continuously troubling,
disturbing and provoking a reassessment of the self.

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2.3.4

Disgust and Art

The abject as an embodied response that rejects what is not the self, or a threat to the self is,therefore, evoked by disgust and repulsion of the visceral. Disgust “is an emotion that isvisceral, reactive, and uncomfortable” (Korsmeyer, 2012, p.753). In this way the object of
disgust affects the self physically as well as emotionally and prompts a response that causes us“to gag or recoil in the presence of its objects” (Carroll & Contesi, 2019, p.23). Objects of
disgust are, consequently, similar to the stimuli of the abject which also elicits physical andemotional rejection of otherness, however, not all objects of disgust are abject. Where the abject
threatens the boundaries of the self, such as bodily fluids or disembodied body parts, objectsof disgust have a wider remit and in addition to bodily waste, infections and mutilations can
include “the vermin that congregate to take care of these unseemly objects are also on the listof disgusting objects: swarms of insects, maggots, avidly chewing rats” (Korsmeyer, 2012,
p.754). Furthermore, disgust can be evoked by moral and behavioural violations, including“filth, contamination, mutilation, and decay” (Korsmeyer, 2012, p.754). These objects of
disgust are “often impure, or incomplete or unclean, excessive, categorically contradictory
relative to a dominant cultural scheme, forbidden, freakish, particularly biologically. They arethings to be hidden, shunned or avoided” (Carroll & Contesi, 2019, p.23). Yet, these objects,
both materially and representationally, have found their way into the subject matter ofcontemporary art.
The power and affectivity of disgust as an emotional response has been “purposively
aroused by art in ways that contribute substantially to the meaning of a work” (Korsmeyer,
2012, p.753). Disgust, therefore, can be a purposeful emotional provocation intended to not
only repulse the viewer, but to offer new understandings or perspectives through this repulsion.
Carolyn Korsmeyer explains that,
artworks have always deployed disgust with images and descriptions of mutilations, rot,bodily wastes, and gore in the course of propelling plots or enhancing depictions, often91

to convey a sense of mortality, human frailty, or sin. Moreover, much art of the last
decades includes many works that appear to be aimed at the arousal of disgust as theprimary purpose or end of a creative work (2013, p.187).
The intentional evocation of disgust, therefore, serves a purpose to heighten the emotive
affectivity of the work, which consequently provides a deeper understanding and engagementwith the work. In art, the intentional provocation of disgust has manifested through “manyvarieties, including the humorous, the horrid and the tragic. The responses it elicits can bestrong or subtle, but few are actually pleasant” (Korsmeyer, 2012, p.753). Disgust can,therefore, manifest in art through the inclusion of such visceral objects which have the capacity
to affect the viewer. This disgust can emerge from the use of certain materials being used as
art media; these include the visceral, abject objects of disgust which include bodily excretions,bodily materials such as skin, nails and sometimes hair, and discarded refuse. There are
numerous examples of these materials and subjects being used in art, including Marc Quinn’s
portrait series, Self (1991-2011) [Figure 2.16], for which the artist cast a 3D portrait of his headmade from his own frozen blood, Judy Chicago’s Menstruation Bathroom (1971) [Figure 2.17]
which featured a rubbish bin filled with used tampons and Andres Serrano’s photographic
series, Shit (2007) [Figure 2.18], which evokes disgust through numerous images of faecal
matter of varied biological origins. These materials were once part of the body, and upon
removal become objects of disgust. Their use as art materials, therefore, both repels the viewer
as a result of their associations with contamination and uncleanliness, and simultaneously is anobject of disgust through the realisation that these materials are detached parts of the self.
For bioart, disgust can be evoked by the viscerally confronting living material with its
bare flesh and the exposed inner workings and substances of living tissues. These materials canbe interpreted in the same trajectory of disgusting bodily materials as they are comprised ofliving flesh that is external to the body and exposes its visceral inner workings. Following
Korsmeyer’s suggestion that disgust is “purposively aroused by art in ways that contribute92substantially to the meaning of a work” (2012, p.753), the visceral, living materiality of bioart
can, therefore, be understood as an intentional attempt to evoke emotive responses in the viewerthat consequently assist in delivering the aims and critical understandings that bioartists
intended. Furthermore, while bioart’s materiality can be the subject of disgust, bioart can alsothen be understood as a site of abjection through the recontextualisation and objectification of
the visceral living matter. This combination of disgust and abjection, enabled throughmateriality, demonstrates a practice that is concerned with affecting the viewer emotionally inan embodied and subjective way in order to explore our relationships with these materials.

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Chapter Three: Living Bioengineered Art
Part OneThe extent of bioart practices that use biological materials is dependent on how bioart isdefined. Following on from the discussions in the first two chapters regarding the culturalcontext of bioart, the problems with defining the practice, this chapter will examine a numberof artworks that use living materials as their media, biotechnologies as their tools. The rangeof works is vast, with many types of materials being used, including plants, bacteria, cells,
tissues, animals and humans, using different biotechnologies for different purposes.
Consequently, as set out in the beginning of this thesis, this research is predominantly
concerned with the use and growth of human and animal cells and tissues and, therefore, thischapter will comprise of an examination of such artworks by several artists who are prominent
practitioners in the field. These artists include Eduardo Kac, The Tissue Culture and Art
Project, Guy Ben-Ary, Diemut Strebe, Gina Czarnecki and Amy Karle. These artists
demonstrate a range of engagements with bioart, with some producing many works using living
materials and others either singular or few works.
This first part of this chapter will describe a range of works from these artists in theirconstruction and display, their processes and the artists’ motivations in using these materials.
The second part of the chapter will then analyse these works. While most of these artists’practices involve tissue culture and cells, Eduardo Kac’s works do not engage in tissue
culturing practices in the same way that most works in this chapter do, however, this chapter
does begin with a brief insight into his work. This is due to the importance of Kac not only as
the artist who coined the phrase bioart but for being one of the first artists to intentionallyincorporate biotechnologies and living materials into his practice. Therefore, including a
discussion of his practice assists in providing a contextual background for newer practices, for94

both living biological materials and the genetic-level manipulation of them. Furthermore, itcannot be overlooked that Kac’s practice is amongst the most well-known within bioart, andthe consequential significant cultural discussions and ethical debates that arose from his works
are important in understanding the wider context of bioart.

3.1 Eduardo Kac
Eduardo Kac began his career as a performance artist in the 1980s in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil.
Kac’s works have incorporated technologies, particularly communications technologies, robots
and biological technologies. Thematically, Kac’s practice explores notions “that range fromthe mythopoetics of online experience (Uirapuru) to the cultural impact of biotechnology(Genesis); from the changing condition of memory in the digital age (Time Capsule) to
distributed collective agency (Teleporting an Unknown State)” (Kac, 2020a, para.1). In termsof Kac’s involvement in bioart, he is responsible for coining the term ‘bioart’ in response tohis 1997 work Time Capsule. Furthermore, Kac is also considered an originator of transgenic
art with his 1998-99 installation, Genesis. Despite Kac’s work differing from most of the otherworks discussed in this chapter from a material perspective, two of his most notable works,
Genesis and GFP Bunny, will be discussed due to their importance in relation to the origins ofbioart. These two works are fundamentally significant to both the initial development of bioart
as being defined by its media and in terms of the critical responses to the use of these media
for art purposes.

3.1.1 Genesis
Eduardo Kac’s Genesis (1998-99) is one of the earliest examples of contemporary bioart. First
exhibited in 1999 at the O.K. Center for Contemporary Art, Linz, Austria, and simultaneously
online, the work was a transgenic interactive installation, comprising of a computer system, E.

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coli bacteria, ultraviolet (UV) light and the Internet [Figure 3.1]. Through online audience
participation, Kac drew on biblical scripture referring to the domination of humanity overnature and translated the DNA of E.coli into the biblical passage, and when prompted, asked
the audience to either agree with the sentiment or destroy it by activating a remote UV lightwhich would generate a mutation within the bacteria. The work demonstrates an engagementwith early internet technologies, with genetic modification, and with the history of translation.
Drawing on the theme of humanistic control over nature, often found in contemporary
bioengineering practices, Kac began the work using a passage from the book of Genesis (1:26)
in the Old Testament of the Bible, which reads, “let man have dominion over the fish of thesea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth” (Elwell,2011, p.27). This passage selected by Kac was chosen for its overt implication of divinely
appointed human supremacy over and above the rest of life that exists on the planet. Althoughtaken from the Bible, this sentiment is not necessarily restricted to only a particular religion
but demonstrates the debatable divinely sanctioned superiority of the human above other life
forms that is present in many belief systems and not restricted to Christianity. Taken from thebook of Genesis, this is in itself symbolically significant as it details the creation of the world
and of people. Therefore, this can also be regarded as one of the foundation texts fordemonstrating and asserting this hierarchical relationship of humanity over and separate fromnature. In using this text, and this specific extract, Kac highlights the discord in morality
suggesting that this statement is, or should be untrue, and sits juxtaposed to the contemporary
reality of human superiority evidenced in practices such as deforestation and destruction of
habitats for human benefit, animal testing and intensive farming.

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The process of translating the passage from written language into the DNA base pairsof E. Coli involved the intermediary process of first translating it into Morse code.14
Consequently, Morse code represents the beginning of long-distance and eventually global
human communication technology, or the genesis of such communications, a trajectory thathas culminated, for now, with the Internet. Morse code is a convenient tool for the process ofrecoding language into DNA, as it first converts the possible twenty-six letters of the English
alphabet into more simplistic sequences of individual codes, which Kac did using “thefollowing conversion principle: the dot in Morse code becomes a C; the line, a T; the word
space, an A; the letter space, a G” (Andrews, 2007, p.132). Therefore, the initial sentence took
three forms in three separate types of language: English, Morse code and genetic code.
After being translated into Morse code and then recoded into DNA base pairs, Kac
subsequently integrated this coded DNA into the DNA of E. coli, which was then grown in a
Petri dish. In doing this, the artist created a new gene which he named the ‘artist’s gene’. While
the sentence underwent visible reinterpretations through multiple translations, when grown as
genetic material the sentence was no longer visible or readable, instead, the sentiment resided
as a living, growing lifeform. This meant that the biblical statement had been physicallyactualised as Kac had altered a living lifeform, and created a new genetic structure, therefore,
the sentence existed as multiple living subjects rather than a static, lifeless sentence, offering a
new perspective on how we think about and use language as communication.
Genesis was a performance work that relied on the participation of the audience andwas both an online and a physical spatial installation at the O.K. Centre for Contemporary Art.
During the performance, the Petri dish containing the E. coli biblical passage was placed under
the UV light after which Kac shared the statement and asked participants to consider whether

14

Established in the nineteenth century, Morse code developed as a method of encoded communication acrosslong distances by translating letters into a coded series of individual combinations of dots and dashes. It was
initially designed for transmitting messages using telegraph systems and later for early endeavours into radio
communication.

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they agreed that humans should have authority over other living forms or whether they thought
we should not. If they disagreed, Kac asked them to destroy the sentence by activating the UV
light above the petri dish, which accelerated the mutation rate of the DNA, thus altering anddestroying the original sentence. The participants who disagreed complied with Kac’s request
and remotely activated the light in the gallery to destroy the bacteria. In this process, however,the participant’s actions and beliefs become hypocritical as by disagreeing with the statement,
they then take control over the growth process of the bacteria. Kac suggests that changing thebacteria and therefore the meaning of the sentence indicates that “it means that we do not accept
its meaning in the form we inherited it, and that new meanings emerge as we seek to changeit” (Kac, 2000a, para.5). Furthermore, it highlights the innate complicity present in thepervasive biotechnologies of the twenty-first century; whether we agree with harnessing andutilising power and control over other living lifeforms or not, it is almost impossible to avoid
involvement.
After the work was performed, Kac translated the DNA of the mutated bacteria backinto Morse code and then back into English as follows:
Mutated Genesis gene:
CTCCGCGTACTGCTGTCACCCCGCTGCCCTGCATCC
GTTTGTTGCCGTCGCCGTTTGTCATTTGCCCTGCGCTCATGCCCCGCACCTCGCCGCCCGCCCCATTTCCTCATGCCCCGCACCCGCGCTACTGTCGTCCATTTGCCCTGCGCTCATGCCCCGC
ACCTCGTTTGCTTGCTCCATTTGCCTCATGCCCCGCACTGCCGCTCACTGTCGTCCATTTGCCCTGCGCTCACGCCCTGCGCTCGTCTTACTCCGCCGCCCTGCCGTCGTTCATGCCCCGCCGTCGTTCATGCCCCGCTGTACC
GTTTGCCCTGCGCCCACCTG
CTACGTTTGTCATGCCCCGCACGCTGCTCGTGCCCC
Translated to Morse code:.-.. . -/.- .- -./.... .- ...- ./-.. --- -- .. -. .. --- -./--- ...-. .-./- .... ./..-. .. ... ..../---..-./- .... ./... . .-/.-. -../---...- . .-./- .... ./..-. --- .-- .-../--- ..-./- .... ./.- .. .-./.- -.-../--- ...- . .-./. ...- . .-. -.--/.-.. ..
...- .. -. --./- .... .. -.--./- .... .- -/.. --- ...- . .../..- .-/. --- -./- .... ./. .- .-. - ....
Translated back to English:“LET AAN HAVE DOMINION OVER THE FISH OF THE SEA AND OVER THE
FOWLOF THE AIR AND OVER EVERY LIVING THING THAT IOVES UA EON
THE EARTH” (Kac, 2000a, para.1-3).

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Consequently, the bacteria mutated as a result of the triggered UV light, thus transforming thesentence and therefore the meaning of the sentence. The participants’ act of rejection of thesentiment and the subsequent recreation of the sentence suggests a metaphorical perspectiveon the processes of art in general, as well as human capacity for reinventing the ways in which
we behave; evident in the three types of language used and how each demonstrates areinvention of the same process and endeavour. However, the process of the work highlights
the unavoidable duplicity present in bioengineering and complex moral ambiguities andhierarchies present in these practices.
Genesis emerged out of intentions to explore the intricacy of contemporary relationships
between bioengineering, biological matter, religion, ethics, technology, global communicationand the Internet, in addition to the ideas and values that inform our use of and relationships
towards these technologies in current society. The layers of translation involved in the work
mirror the relationship between the separate languages found on the Rosetta Stone (Kac,
2000a); where the Rosetta Stone allowed one language to be uncovered and translated into theother two, Genesis demonstrates a shared commonality between types of communication andcommunication technologies.15 The original quote, Morse code and genetic sequence, alongwith the mutated versions, were later displayed on tablets in triadic configurations resembling
the Rosetta Stone; named the Encryption Stones (2001) [Figure 3.2], the information was
etched into two granite tablets using a laser, referencing both the beginnings of communication
technologies and the multiple translations and adaptations these technologies have undergone
since. Through the invention of the ‘artist’s gene’, Kac suggests that it is the artist’s innate
propensity to connect, reconnect and reinterpret information, and through the actualised
production of the living gene, Genesis demonstrates this through Kac’s production of the15

The Rosetta Stone is an Egyptian stele with a decree inscribed in three languages, Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics,
Ancient Egyptian demotics and Ancient Greek; these multiple inscriptions of the same text is regarded as the key indeciphering and translating hieroglyphics.

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artist’s gene; that is an actualised living gene created through the transformation of living
information, representing the ongoing sociocultural role of the artist in transforming knowledge
and communicating new ideas.

3.1.2 GFP Bunny
GFP Bunny (2000) is an art project comprising of three components; a transgenic rabbit, thepublic response to the rabbit, and the rabbit’s social integration. The albino rabbit named Alba
was bred for the artist in collaboration with the National Institute of Agronomic Research inFrance in early 2000. With the assistance of scientists Louis Bec, Louis-Marie Houdebine andPatrick Prunet, Alba’s DNA was altered using the green fluorescent protein (GFP) gene foundin bioluminescent jellyfish, which causes them to express green fluorescence under specificlight conditions. Consequently, when exposed to blue light, Alba’s skin would glow green(Kac, 2000b). Alba’s modification was publicly announced for the first time at the Planet Work
conference in San Francisco, US, in May 2000; however, the rabbit was not present at theconference and instead was represented by a photograph showing her body glowing green[Figure 3.3], which resulted in international criticism. This critique was the second stage of the
project. Kac claimed that the artwork would be complete when Alba would leave the laboratory
to live with him and his family, however, the laboratory refused to release Alba and announced
she had died in 2002.
The first stage of Kac’s project centred around the genetic manipulation of a rabbit. The
process of integrating genetic material of one species into the DNA of another produces a
hybrid known as a transgenic organism; these organisms contain the genetic structures of morethan one species. Alba was an albino rabbit and therefore had no pigmentation in her skin or
fur, and under normal light conditions, she appeared to have white fur and red eyes. Following
the mutation process, however, Alba’s skin glowed green under blue light. Her fur did not glow100

as only living tissue expresses characteristics of the GFP gene, and fur is comprised of nonliving cells. Consequently, only Alba’s inner ears and eyes would have glowed bright green,with her body perhaps emitting some light visible underneath her fur. Furthermore, Kac notesthat the visual characteristics of the GFP gene increase in magnitude when implanted into
mammals, therefore the rabbit would express the gene with greater intensity than the jellyfish
in which it originated, thus creating an animal with a luminescent vibrancy that does not exist
in nature. This concept of an unnatural or impossibly natural creation is at the heart of Kac’s
involvement in transgenic art. Transgenic refers to genetic material that has been combinedwith genetic material from one or more different species; in Alba’s case, her DNA wascomposed of both rabbit and jellyfish genetic material. Kac suggests that while transgenic
technology can be used to make “unique living beings”, the crux of the artwork is that “thismust be done with great care, with acknowledgement of the complex issues thus raised and,above all, with a commitment to respect, nurture, and love the life thus created” (Kac, 2011,p.61).
The final phase of the artwork, according to Kac, was to retrieve Alba from thelaboratory and take her home to live with him, however, he encountered difficulties in realising
this goal soon after launching the project as the photograph he released resulted in adisagreement with the laboratory. Houdebine claimed that Alba had never been specificallydesigned for Kac and that she was one of several rabbits genetically engineered at the sametime, a claim that Kac has refuted (Philipkoski, 2002). Furthermore, the director of thelaboratory where Houdebine worked refused to allow the animal to leave the lab. In response,
Kac flew a flag featuring a green rabbit outside of his home in the US as a protest against
Alba’s forced captivity. In 2002, Houdebine announced that Alba had died aged four years old,
the average lifespan for a laboratory rabbit and that her death was not caused by the genetic
alteration she endured (Philipkoski, 2002). Kac contested this stating that at the time of the101announcement Alba was only two years old, having been born in 2000, not four as Houdebine
had announced and that he did not believe she was dead. Instead, Kac suspected theannouncement was intended to end the criticism Houdebine and the laboratory had continued
to receive following Kac’s public announcement of Alba’s existence. Consequently, the final
stage of Kac’s project was never actualised and the transgenic animal remained confined to thelaboratory until death.

3.2 The Tissue Culture & Art Project
Along with Eduardo Kac, The Tissue Culture and Art Project (TC&A) are among the firstartists to intentionally and directly engage in living biological materials and biotechnologies asa focus of their practice. The TC&A is an ongoing artistic research project which aims toinvestigate the development and usage of tissue culture as an artistic medium. Established in
1996, the project was co-founded by Oron Catts, a tissue engineering artist, and Ionat Zurr, a
wet biology art practitioner, and is primarily based out of SymbioticA, the artistic laboratory
the project helped to establish at the University of Western Australia in Perth. The TC&A,
however, does not function in isolation and since its establishment has collaborated with artists
globally to develop and produce artworks made from living tissue culture. In summarising theaims and workings of the group, the following manifesto is posted on the research group’s
website, detailing their intentions as,
The Tissue Culture & Art Project (TC&A) was set [up] to explore the use of tissue
technologies as a medium for artistic expression. We are investigating our relationships
with the different gradients of life through the construction/growth of a new class ofobject/being – that of the Semi-Living. These are parts of complex organisms which aresustained alive outside of the body and coerced to grow in predetermined shapes. These
evocative objects are a tangible example that brings into question deep rooted perceptionsof life and identity, concept of self, and the position of the human in regard to other living
beings and the environment. We are interested in the new discourses and new
ethics/epistemologies that surround issues of partial life and the contestable futurescenarios they are offering us (The Tissue Culture & Art Project, 2021a, para.1).

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As the world’s first artistic laboratory, SymbioticA was established by Oron Catts, Miranda
Grounds and Stuart Bunt in 2000. Following a four-year residency of the TC&A at the Schoolof Anatomy and Human Biology at the University of Western Australia, Catts and Zurr set out
on a funding quest to establish a base for artists to engage with biological sciences (Quaranta,2014). Initially, SymbioticA performed at a small scale, and in the first year of its founding it
acted as a studio hosting two residencies for local artists. However, Catts and Zurr were
ambitious to develop the capabilities of SymbioticA and established a research programme,
postgraduate courses, undergraduate papers and with more funding were able to increase thenumber of residencies, including an annual six-month residency for Australian artists fundedby the Australia Council for Arts (Quaranta, 2014).
The development of SymbioticA emerged out of the lack of opportunities for artists towork with biotechnologies “because the resources needed are almost exclusively in academia
and industry” (Zurr & Catts, 2014, p.201). Consequently, SymbioticA provides institutional
access for artists through a workspace that is shared with bioscientists, ensuring that bothmaterials and expertise are accessible to artists. Working alongside biotechnologists andtechnicians, artists are able to physically share space with scientists, increasing the flow ofcommunication, ideas and collaborative opportunities between two spheres that are often
separated both physically and intellectually. However, as the laboratory is located within theuniversity, one of “the requirements of the University is that all projects, including those ofSymbioticA, must receive ethical as well as health and safety clearances from appropriate
committees” (Zurr & Catts, 2014, p.202). This is evidenced by Adam Zaretsky, an artist whocompleted a residency at SymbioticA, who states that “before using these tissues as a mediumof art and science expression, I had cleared the artistic use of semi-living kitchen foodpreparation ‘waste’ with Sue Lewis, Manager, Research Ethics and Animal Care, The
University of Western Australia” (2007, p.274).

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The ethical assessment of art projects that use bioengineering processes has, however,been challenging, with Zurr and Catts stating that “on a few occasions the first response fromthe Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), to a proposal from SymbioticA, was to statethat the Committee did not consider the proposed work to be research, or (similarly) to request
a statement explaining why the proposed project should be considered research” (2014, p.203).
This difficulty in ensuring that bioart works are considered to be legitimate research projects
is also reflected in the difficulties in assembling a committee to ethically assess these works inthe first place, as “in the first major project conducted by the artists and their collaborators at
the UWA [University of Western Australia] in the early 2000s, the ethical committee members
were at a loss as to how to relate to a project with ends they were not set up to deal with, anddeemed themselves unqualified to assess it” (Vaage, 2016, p.94).
Since its foundation, SymbioticA has hosted more than 90 residents from around theworld including, Steve Kurtz of the Critical Art Ensemble, Orlan, Art Orienté Objet and Martade Menezes (University of Western Australia, 2020). Furthermore, these residents all comefrom many different disciplines, thus producing widely different outcomes. Of these outcomes,
one of the most specialised and unique features of SymbioticA, and of the TC&A in particular,
is the growth of living tissue as material for art; these works are known as ‘semi-living’ art.
The biological artworks made by the TC&A are unique not only in their intricate engagement
in altering biological matter as material but in the way that they classify these works as being
semi-living. Semi-living suggests partial life, an in-between state of living and non-living, or
living and death. These works are made from living tissue, grown from immortalised cell lines
or donated cells from living specimens, and are kept alive by means of nutritional andenvironmental support. Furthermore, despite the material used, these living organisms are
unique and not able to independently exist in nature; they are distinctly artificial yet biologicallife forms engineered by artists. The artists describe the semi-livings as104

a new class of object/being in the continuum of life: the Semi-Living are sculpted fromliving and non-living materials, and are new entities located at the fuzzy border between
the living/non-living, grown/constructed, born/manufactured, and object/subject. The
Semi-Living relies on the vet/mechanic, the farmer/artist or the nurturer/constructor tocare for them. They are a new class of object/being that is both similar and different fromother human artefacts (human’s extended phenotype) such as selectively bred domestic
plants and animals. These entities consist of living biological systems that are artificiallydesigned and need human and/or technological intervention for their survival andmaintenance (Catts & Zurr, 2002, p.5).
The unique and ambiguous position of the semi-livings, challenging and disrupting theconventional binaries of the subject/object and living/non-living dualisms, has presented many
practical, ethical and epistemological issues in the creation and display of such artworks, inaddition to how we interact with them, care for them and dispose of them (Zurr & Catts, 2003).
In this way, “bioartworks challenge Western cultural and bioscientific imaginaries of sealed,self-contained bodies and the accompanying firm distinction between life and non-life, naturaland artificial, and human and non-human” (Radomska, 2017, p.378). Consequently, semiliving art sculptures are compelling and uncomfortable simultaneously, by bringing a new formof life into existence, the very existence of these works challenge our fundamental conceptionsof life, sentience, and empathetic responsibilities to other life forms.
In creating the semi-livings, Catts and Zurr describe themselves as “scavengers” (2002,
p.366), as they source their living materials from the waste or surplus products from scientificlaboratories and the meat industry. Therefore, they do not directly contribute to harvesting
living matter but work with material that has already been produced, extracted or removed fromorganisms, consequently creating life from discarded biological materials. These materials
have so far been wide-ranging with grown materials including “epithelial (skin) tissue fromrabbits, rats and mice, connective tissue from mice, rats and pigs, muscle tissue from rats, sheep
and goldfish, bone and cartilage tissues from pigs, rats and sheep, mesenchymal cells (bonemarrow stem cells) from pigs, and neurons from goldfish” (Catts & Zurr, 2002, p.367). The
processes behind the actual construction of these works are complex and similar in method to105

in-vitro organ growing, however as they are grown for artistic purposes and do not need to take
into account issues such as body compatibility, tissues can be merged between species and new
and unnatural forms and substances can be made. Practically, semi-living works have extensive
environmental and nutritional requirements in order for them to grow and survive, including
temperature-controlled sterile conditions and routine feeding, which consequently requires
these conditions to also be met in the gallery space if they are exhibited, thus forcing a recreation of the traditional art space.
The creation and classification of the semi-livings as a new form of life, hierarchically
positioned below humans and animals and produced to be living works of art has raised many
ethical debates. These have included the issue of reducing life to the status of art (Stracey,2009), the potential censorship of artistic experimentation by science committees, and thedisplay challenges faced by art museums (Dumitriu, 2016). One of the most prevalent
discussions beyond the ethics of their very existence is around the terminology of ‘semi-living’and how the artists have defined this being due to the sculptures complete dependence on themfor survival. This perspective that the works are only semi-living because they cannot survive
without artificial assistance is problematic given the increasing capacities and humandependency on supportive and enhancement biotechnologies, such as incubators, pacemakers,
prosthetic limbs and dialysis machines. However, this uncomfortable reality of there being
little difference between the dependency of the artworks and the dependency of humans sits atthe crux of semi-living sculptures as the artists present this unique dichotomy between living
subject and art object to highlight cultural concerns stemming from contemporary
bioengineering. Furthermore, this destabilises pre-held notions of human life, as if dependent
sculptures are semi-living, this problematises how we perceive humans who require artificial
support. These provocative issues are key to the works of the TC&A. Despite the number of
opinions and positions surrounding these ethical debates, for now, they are mostly rhetorical106

due to how new the semi-livings are and the ambiguity of where they fit into the establishedhumanist hierarchy of living things.

3.2.1 The Semi-Living Worry Dolls
The Tissue Culture & Art Project’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls were first exhibited in 2000 andare defined as being the first living tissue-engineered sculptures to have been exhibited in agallery (Catts & Zurr, 2002). The work is comprised of seven doll-like sculptures, grown from
PGA and P4HB degradable polymers, surgical sutures, and seeded with skin, bone and muscle
cells, with each grown inside an individual custom-made bioreactor conditioned to act as asurrogate womb to support the growth of the sculptures [Figure 3.4]. The dolls are inspired by
Guatemalan worry dolls; small wooden dolls wrapped in coloured wool akin to traditional
Mayan clothing. Tradition states that the dolls are often given to children in the belief that insharing their worries, the dolls will take their concerns away. The Semi-Living Worry Dolls
skew this tradition, instead of being confidantes of childhood fears, they are designed toembody and listen to the fears and concerns people may have about bioengineering.
The dolls were grown using tissue culture, which refers to the growth of tissue from
cells in vitro, therefore artificially cultivated outside of the organism the cells originally derived
from. Plant and animal cells can both be grown using this method which sees isolated cells
saturated in a growth medium inside a test tube or similar vessel, with this medium supporting
the nutritional requirements of the cells and under the correct conditions allows them tomultiply. Cells can either be primary cells purposefully extracted from a donor or immortalised
cells which are mutated cells designed to reproduce indefinitely. The cells used to create thesemi-living worry dolls were immortalised cells known as McCoy line cells, which are cells
originally thought to be human in origin but were subsequently confirmed to have been
extracted from a mouse (Fong, Yang-Feng & Lerner-Tung, 1994). These cells were cultured

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in fetal bovine serum (FBS) and were incubated in sterile conditions at 37c for between 14 and21 days (Catts & Zurr, 2002).16
Tissue culture can be grown two-dimensionally or grown using a scaffold to achieve athree-dimensional sculpture, it can also be 3D printed and these techniques have been used to
grow organs in vitro. The dolls in this work were grown using scaffolds where the cultured
cells were seeded onto degradable polymers in the shape of dolls; this meant that as the forms
grew the scaffolds supporting them gradually decayed, leaving the structures self-supported indoll-like shapes. After the initial growth period, the sculptures were transferred from their
incubator into individual glass bioreactors, designed to rotate to produce microgravitational
conditions which assisted with growth stimulation of the three-dimensions of the structures.
The artists have noted that the growth of the tissue is not a precise process that they were able
to control entirely (Catts & Zurr, 2002), giving the dolls unique forms, each with a recognised
similarity, but with individual localised tissue clumps in different shapes and sizes. Catts andZurr recognised this differentiation stating that their “practice is in the realm of a dialogue withnature rather than control over it” (Catts & Zurr, 2002, p.368). Therefore, regardless of theextent to which these biotechnologies are used and able to control the growth of artificialorganisms, the artists here do not claim to be able to control or to want to control nature, but toalter it, how it functions and our perceptions of nature in response to biotechnologies. In order
to complete the visual appearance of the traditional Guatemalan worry dolls, surgical sutures
were used to create face-like details on the structures, in addition to replicating the woven
clothing wrapped around the torso area of the figures [Figure 3.5].
After the initial growth stage, the dolls measured 10mm by 7mm by 5mm and were
exhibited in their individual bioreactors. Submerged in a transparent liquid medium, each of

16

Fetal bovine serum (FBS) is produced from blood taken from unborn calves during the slaughter of pregnant
cows and is the most widely used medium in growing tissue culture (Reynolds, 2018).

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the dolls appears visually unique, reflecting the idiosyncratic individual growth of each cellseeded structure. The material appears flesh-like and uneven in colour with a deep yellow tone
towards the thicker parts of the tissue and more translucent towards the edges. Texturally thematerial is also uneven with irregular density and thicker clusters apparent across the figures.
With their arms raised out to the side, the dolls mimic the traditional worry doll form of a
crucifix, with no legs or other distinct anatomy, leading some to draw a comparison with
Christian iconography (Senior, 2014).
In the Guatemalan tradition, small worry dolls made of wood are given to children sothat they can pass on their concerns and the dolls will listen and take their worries away. In
replacing the innocent childhood dolls with living tissue replicas, the TC&A recreate worry
dolls for the age of experience where concerns are more complex and with less clear-cut
solutions, resolutions or answers than in the past. In creating living dolls reflecting thistradition, the artists explain that
if we are able to grow something as complex as a fully functioning organ, why not change
this design to suit other tasks? And if we can keep a complex organ in vitro, why notdesign semi-living objects that can be sustained alive outside of the body for the durationof their use? The TC&A Project also asks: If this is possible, should we go down thispath? (Catts & Zurr, 2002, p.365-366).
In this sense, the Semi-Living Worry Dolls demonstrate a self-reflexivity as they are derived
from these concerns but in their creation they are actualisations of this posthuman attitude ofutilising tissue culture and bioengineering for other uses and tasks. Therefore, the work
presents the reflexive dichotomy of asking how we should use biotechnologies and whether weshould use them for more purposes than biomedicine and then actually do so in creating thedolls.
Concerns regarding the appropriate applications and use of bioengineering and thepossibilities that could potentially arise from misuse or as a result of unrestricted positivist
attitudes are a growing issue as the increased proliferation of biotechnologies continue to be109

developed. Reflecting these concerns, the artists attributed a worry to each of the seven dolls
based on these contemporary issues. The dolls are named alphabetically from A to F, with each
attributed an individual worry in response to contemporary bioengineering practices, with theartists suggesting that they could “find a worry for each letter of the language that made us
what we are now” (Catts & Zurr, 2017, para.3). The dolls were named as follows:
Doll A = stands for the worry from Absolute truths, and of the people who think theyhold them.
Doll B = represents the worry of Biotechnology, and the forces that drive it. (see doll
C)
Doll C = stands for Capitalism, Corporations
Doll D = stands for Demagogy, and possible Destruction.
Doll E = stands for Eugenics and the people who think that they are superior enough topractice it.
Doll F = is the fear of Fear itself.
G = is not a doll as the Genes are present in all semi-living dolls.
Doll H = symbolises our fear of Hope… (Catts & Zurr, 2017, para.4).
These concerns highlight the other factors which have played a role in controlling thedevelopment and usage of biotechnologies, namely for-profit corporations and potential
prejudices. Furthermore, in being aware of these external motivations present inbiotechnologies, the artists suggest that it is not the technology itself that is a cause for concern
but the human interests that inform its usage. In addition to these worries, the artists’ addedthat the audience was welcome to rename the dolls, adding their own concerns and fears of
bioengineering to the project. This invitation to the audience to participate acknowledges thewide-ranging views that are present across perspectives towards biotechnologies and thefluidity of these concerns to change and develop alongside the evolving landscape of
bioengineering. In encountering the living embodiment of these fears, the dolls allow for an
actualised context for these concerns to exist and to be validated or annulled.
As the dolls are made from living materials, they require ongoing care to ensure theirsurvival. In highlighting that the art objects are also living subjects, the artists incorporated thiscare into a performance ritual during exhibitions. Technicians would dress in typical white110

laboratory coats and feed the dolls with the fetal bovine serum required to sustain them(Johung, 2014). Not only does this ritual transform the art space into a laboratory, bringing thenormally hidden implications of laboratory-grown life into the open, but it also makes it starkly
apparent that these artworks are alive and dependent. In addition to the feeding ritual, in 2002
the artists added a killing ritual to mark the end of the exhibition at the Perth Institute ofContemporary Arts, Australia. This ritual involved removing the dolls from their sterilebioreactors and allowing the audience to touch them. The bacteria of the non-sterile
environment quickly contaminated the dolls, eventually killing the tissue.
The killing ritual was repeated at a later exhibition, however, with the added
performance aspect of a funeral and a condolence book for the audience to sign at the 2011display at the Science Gallery in Dublin, Ireland, again stressing the living dynamics of theinstallation. In response to these performances, Catts “noted that [although] he had alreadykilled far more living matter when he brushed his teeth that morning, there was still uneasesurrounding the killing of these dolls, which required the event to be marked, framed, andperformed, and which called those who had previously grown, fed, or even just viewed thesefigures-in-growth to be present” (Johung, 2014, para.7). This discomfort is significant as it
demonstrates the awareness of the audience that they are encountering life in an imbalanced
exchange of an uncomfortable collapse of the self/other subject/object paradigms through theact of killing the dependent installation, the life of which was only brought into existence byhuman creation for this very purpose. Consequently, the act of killing draws attention to thenecessity of this action as there are few alternatives to this due to the limitations in transporting
living artworks that are unable to survive outside of specific sterile environments. Therefore,
the inherent duplicity that inextricably links the act of creation to the responsibility of care anddestruction of the living art subject is apparent and highlights the wider ethical responsibilities
we have towards the things that we create.

1113.2.2 Victimless Leather
Victimless Leather (2004) is a living prototype of a leather jacket grown inside of a custombuilt perfusion chamber [Figure 3.6]. Like the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, the sculpture wasgrown around a supportive biodegradable polymer scaffold and was first exhibited in 2004 as
part of The Space Between exhibition at the John Curtin Gallery in Perth, Australia (Bell, 2010).
The sculpture has been recreated several times globally between 2004 and 2013, with all having
been created in the same way, using the same materials and techniques. As with other biologicalartworks created by the TC&A, Victimless Leather is described as being semi-living in that itis grown from living cells yet is fully dependent on the artists for survival.
The jacket was grown using 3T3 mouse cells, an immortalised cell line of mouseembryonic fibroblast cells, established from a single mouse in the 1960s (Stracey, 2009). Thesecells were seeded onto a biodegradable polymer scaffold shaped in the form of a small jacket,
as the cells grew across the surface a seamless, stitch-less jacket shape was achieved. In orderto strengthen the material and to keep the shape supported after the scaffold would disintegrate,
the mouse cells were combined with human bone cells (Jeffries, 2019), the source of which is
unclear. This transgenic material required nutrition supplementation in order to survive, andtherefore was grown inside of a sterile, custom-made perfusion chamber. The perfusion
chamber, shaped like a bioreactor, was designed based on an organ perfusion pump which isdesigned to artificially maintain blood supplies during surgery by pumping blood through theheart. In this fashion, the chamber is designed to automatically drop necessary nutrients onto
the jacket as it is required.
Measuring two inches in height and one and a half inches wide, the miniature jacket
hangs suspended inside of the rounded glass bioreactor by a length of surgical sutures. The
thread hangs from a ‘U’ shaped glass pipe which delivers the required FBS to the living tissue.
A shallow pool of the pink-toned serum sits in the bottom of the glass, with a tube connected112

to it in order to help drain excess liquid. The sculpture itself appears quite flat and angular inshape yet still takes the distinctive form of a jacket. As the work is made from bone and tissue
cells, there is a visible density to the material which is an off-white colour tinged with pinkdemonstrating the fusion of the bone and tissue cells. Consequently, the living material of thiswork is visually different from the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, demonstrating the variation invisual effects depending on the materials used.
As with the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, the issue of responsibility for the life and deathof the artwork is prevalent in the creation and destruction of Victimless Leather. During thework’s display at New York’s MoMA in 2008, an unexpected confrontation with this sense of
responsibility occurred after it was found that the sculpture was growing too quickly and thatit started to block the wires inside the bioreactor which supplies the required nutritional
supplements. After discussions regarding how to overcome this issue, it was decided to let thework die as it could no longer be sustained in the chamber. Consequently, the wires were
removed, killing the jacket. While the curator of the exhibition stated that she felt
uncomfortable turning off the jacket’s life support system, Oron Catts supported the decision,
saying that it was important “to present the end of our projects in ways that remind people thatthese works are/were alive and that we have a responsibility towards the living systems that weengage in manipulating” (Schwartz, 2008, para.4).
The title of the work, Victimless Leather, engages in discourses of the moral and ethicalresponsibility and attitudes embedded within consumerism and consumption. The use ofimmortal 3T3 mouse cells is significant in this trajectory as they “are very common in scientificresearch centres around the globe [and] can be weighed in tons or even tens of tons and they
all came from one mouse in the 1970s” (Wired, 2004, para.7). Therefore, the project proposesa sustainable method of leather production without the need for killing animals for thecommercial value of their skins. However, there is a hidden duplicity present in the artwork,113

as in contrast to the sustainability of the 3T3 mouse cells, the culture used to grow them
contains FBS which requires the death of unborn calves in its acquisition. Consequently, theduplicity of the work is not victimless, however, this is not lost on the artists who reinforce that
there is no real sense of being victimless irrespective of materiality used, especially from a
posthumanist perspective.

3.2.3 Disembodied Cuisine
Among the many biological artworks created by the TC&A over the two decades of their work
to date, Disembodied Cuisine stands uniquely aside from all other works by the fact that it was
created to not only be killed but to be consumed. Disembodied Cuisine was an installation aspart of the 2003 L’Art Biotech exhibition in Nantes, France, and was designed to criticallychallenge how we perceive what is edible and our feelings towards utilising animals for food(Catts & Zurr, 2013). The installation involved the in vitro growth of steaks using cells
extracted from living frogs which were presented alongside the growing tissue [Figure 3.7].
The work culminated in the artists hosting a dinner party where the steaks were cooked andconsumed.
Disembodied Cuisine is the companion piece of an earlier work by the TC&A named
Semi-Living Steak, 2000 [Figure 3.8], which saw the artists grow steak from embryonic sheep
cells, thus harvesting meat grown from the cells of an unborn lamb (Catts & Zurr, 2013). Of
this earlier work, the artists state that “as there was a risk that the laboratory we worked withat the time might lose its license if we attempted to eat the results of our experiment, we realisedthat we could only taste our ‘meat’ in an alternative venue” (Catts & Zurr, 2004, para.5).
Consequently, it was an important part in the creation of Disembodied Cuisine to be able toactually consume the grown products. Like the earlier work, Disembodied Cuisine engages
with the inherent relationship present between humans, death and food, however, in this work,

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frogs were used to source the cells needed in place of sheep cells. The specific use of frog cells
over the previous choice of lamb tissue is a reflection of the French classification of frogs being
considered a delicacy (Henley, 2009).
The installation comprised of a long dining table, covered in a white tablecloth and withthree chairs lined up on each side. The table was set with plates, cutlery, glasses and wine, as
the artists stated that it was their intention to present the food as nouvelle-cuisine in style (Catts& Zurr, 2013). This dining area was set up inside of a transparent plastic tent-like structure,
which had a large yellow biohazard warning sign attached to the front. Simultaneously
appearing like a scientific biohazard experiment and a crime scene, the space was divided as
the enclosure was sealed and the dining space was only viewable from the outside. However,mediating the two spaces, on one side of the structure, splicing the transparent material being
both inside and outside of it simultaneously, a glass tank half-filled with water contained theliving frogs which had donated the tissue to grow the in vitro meat; in addition to containing
water, the tank also replicated the frogs’ natural environment with plants, flowers and rocks.
Transparent on all sides, the frogs are able to view inside the dining area and outside into theexhibition space. Several glass jars sitting on top of the tank contained the growing frog steaks.
The frog tissue was situated outside of the biohazard barrier, suggesting that it is not yet
problematic as it is not yet food.
The frog steaks were grown from frog skeletal muscle which was extracted via a biopsy
from four frogs rescued by the artists. Using tissue from a biopsy is presented as a viable
alternative to produce ‘victimless meat’ as the animals are not killed, and the site of the biopsy
is able to fully heal afterwards. The project arose from the idea of producing victimless meat
wherein humans could still consume animal products without the need for slaughtering theanimal. The artists comment that
this piece deals with one of the most common zones of interaction between humans andother living systems and will probe the apparent uneasiness people feel when someone

115‘messes’ with their food. Here the relationships with the semi-living are that ofconsumption and exploitation however, it is important to note that it is about “victimless”
meat consumption (Tissue Culture & Art Project, 2008., para.4).
In harvesting meat from semi-living organisms, the artists explain that Disembodied Cuisinepresents a new form of living creature, intentionally designed and created to be exploited for
consumption, but that this can also be seen in the same vein as growing crops for harvest.
However, the artists comment further that this presentation of a victimless source of meat
consumption is only illusionary as the nutritional requirements for growing in vitro meat stillrequires animals to be killed, as discussed in the use of FBS. While this irony is present andnoted in the work, it does speak to the growing research into establishing a victimless,laboratory-grown meat industry and the hidden costs still embedded in this quest. Beyond theneed for killing animals for the blood plasma needed to support in vitro growth, Catts and Zurr
add that these potential industries also have hidden costs in the carbon emissions released in
the process of running such a laboratory, in addition to the semi-living still being a victim,
albeit one that is removed from nature where “the animal is abstracted into fragments andmediated through technological apparatuses” (Catts & Zurr, 2013, p.107). On an ethical level,
the project addressed the most common zone of interaction between humans and the living
world and also probed the apparent uneasiness people feel when someone contaminates orchanges their food. The project offered the illusion of ‘victimless’ meat consumption.
At the end of the installation, the artists held a dinner party, attended by themselves,
the two curators of the exhibition, a chef designated to cook the steaks and six volunteers. The
steaks were marinated in Calvados and cooked in garlic and honey, these ingredients werechosen for their inherent antibacterial properties, then covered in laboratory-grown herbs andserved to each of the participants. Although the grown frog tissue resembled meat, the verdict
after the tasting was that it lacked the expected texture associated with meat, instead having
the texture of “jellied fabric” (Catts & Zurr, 2004, para. 6). While in part this is due to the lack116

of being able to exercise the tissue which is naturally achieved when meat is taken from ananimal that could exercise, Catts stated that this effect could be achieved in vitro through theuse of culture, however, concluded that the three-month period of growth was not sufficiently
long enough to achieve this. In terms of the responses of the participants, Catts commented that“four people spat it out. I was very pleased” (Catts & Zurr, 2013, p. 109). This suggests that infact, the ‘victimless’ meat industry is not currently palatable, both in consumption but also in
manufacture and in the ways in which we mediate relationships with new, non-human
lifeforms. After the performance and the frog steaks had been consumed, the living frogs werereleased into the Nantes Botanical Gardens to be allowed to continue living even though theirflesh had been extended outside of their bodies and eaten. The impact of this unique methodof growing and harvesting meat has been significant as the corporate race to produce
laboratory-grown meat for commercial availability has increased vastly since the work was
first performed.

3.3 Guy Ben-Ary
Guy Ben-Ary is an artist closely associated with the TC&A, of which he was a member from1999-2003, and SymbioticA, where he currently works (Kelley, 2016). Ben-Ary’s works often“utilise motion, growth and big data to investigate technological aspects of today’s culture andthe re-use of biological materials and technologies” (Ben-Ary, 2014a, para.3). Like theprevious two artists, many of Ben-Ary’s works engage in biological and scientific practices.
Ben-Ary’s works explore the use of robotics, biotechnologies and biological materials using a
range of different media; specifically, his works have engaged with the science of cryonics in
Snowflake (2006-2015), robotics and sound in Silent Barrage (2008-2009) and induced
pluripotent stem cell (iPS) technology in In Potentia (2012) and cellF (2015). Consequently,
Ben-Ary’s works demonstrate a vast number of interdisciplinary collaborations, which include

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works that fall under the umbrella of bioart and others which explore more branches of scienceand technology.

3.3.1 cellF
cellF is a synthesiser operated by a neural network grown from the artist’s own skin cells[Figure 3.9]. Over a four-year period, Guy Ben-Ary collaborated with scientists and engineers
to realise the completion of the instrument, which was produced at SymbioticA in Western
Australia. The work creates music alongside a human participant playing a drum kit; thevibrations of the drums stimulate the neural network, which then controls the synthesiser in
response, creating an improvised arrangement. This neural network effectively functions as asecond, external brain of the artist, which operates independently, despite sharing the same
genetic material.
The neural ‘brain’ of cellF was constructed from skin cells retrieved by a biopsy fromthe artist’s forearm. In conjunction with several artists, musicians and scientists, Nathan
Thompson, Andrew Fitch, Darren Moore, Stuart Hodgetts, Michael Edel and Douglas Bakkum,
the cells were converted into stem cells using iPS technology (Ben-Ary, 2014a). This process
allows for the stem cells then to be converted to any other type of cell found in the body. Once
converted, the cells were then fully differentiated into neural stem cells, which were then fitted
over a multi-electrode array dish. These electrodes record the signals produced when music is
played to the structure. When music is played, it is experienced by the work as stimulation
through these electrodes (Ben-Ary, 2014a).
As a fusion of biology and technology, the immediate visual presence of cellF is anencounter with many interconnecting wires and electronic devices. The actual biological‘brain’ of the work is positioned in the middle of these wires, and the neurons are contained
within a Petri dish with wires running through it and is enclosed inside of an incubator [Figure118

3.10]. While the biological component of cellF is small, the entire structure it sits within islarge in scale, resembling a rectangular trumpet horn. The sound is transmitted through a set of
16 speakers, with cellF’s spontaneous responses being generally low in tone and limited to asingle note at a time. While the project is hosted by SymbioticA in Australia, the scale andcomplexity of the work has prevented it from being exhibited easily in other locations. For thisreason, in overseas locations, the work has been presented in video format, accompanied bylarge scale microscopic prints of the neurons, coloured red against a black background.
Ben-Ary’s practice frequently employs biological material as he states that it is his“interest in problematising new bio-technologies and contextualising them within an artistic
framework” (Ben-Ary, 2014b, para.13). The artist explains that cellF “started with a newmaterialist question underpinned by the belief that artistic practice can act as a vector forthought: What is the potential for artworks using biological and robotic technologies to evoke
responses in regards to shifting perceptions surrounding understandings of ‘life’ and themateriality of the human body” (Ben-Ary, 2014b, para.13). cellF challenges such perceptionsof life by presenting a functioning second ‘brain’ outside of the artist’s body and beyond his
control. In this way, the work can also be seen as a self-portrait of the artist as it replicates theartist’s physical self, which he confirms, stating that he was “inspired by an ultimately
narcissistic desire to re-embody myself” (Ben-Ary, 2014b, para.4). However, in the creation ofa living, visceral neural network, Ben-Ary has stated that through the work, he seeks “to open
up the possibility to question how modern Western culture’s institutionalisation andfetishisation of consciousness has significantly contributed to historically distinctive forms of
being human” (Hudson, 2014, p.40).
cellF was not designed to be an isolated musical instrument, but to be an interactive
participant to create and play music alongside human players. Participants are invited to play
any kind of musical instrument alongside cellF, and the musical stimuli are then detected by119the synthesiser’s neurons which in turn control the output and respond to the music with notesof its own. In this reflexive performance, the music created is both human and non-human,dependent upon conceptions of humanity and whether cellF is considered to be human or
machine. In reality, cellF sits somewhere between the two, being both biological materials
acquired from the artist and being a separate functioning machine, thus contributing toposthuman ideologies.

3.4 Diemut Strebe
Multimedia artist Diemut Strebe has engaged with many types of science in her practice,including biotechnologies, physics and artificial intelligence. Strebe’s works intentionallyengage in new technologies to explore the new questions and problems their existence creates,socially, ethically and philosophically. Strebe has completed the Ida Ely Rubin Artist in
Residence at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for Art, Science &Technology, US, where she produced The Redemption of Vanity (2016); a 16-carat diamondthat was covered in carbon nanotubes to create “the blackest black material on earth” (Arts at
MIT, 2020, para.2). The work simultaneously explores applications of new technologies whilechallenging issues of materiality and its associated financial value. Strebe has worked withMIT scientists on a number of projects, including Litmus (2014), The Origin of the Works of
Art (2017) and most notably on the 2014 living replica of Vincent van Gogh’s missing left ear,Sugababe.

3.4.1 Sugababe
Sugababe is a living replica of Vincent van Gogh’s infamously missing left ear, grown frombioprinted familial DNA [Figure 3.11]. Taking over three years to grow, Diemut Strebe worked
with several faculty members at MIT, including Robert Langer and Noam Chomsky, to120

produce the ear, which is presented inside of a transparent acrylic chamber and is fitted with amicrophone and speaker system (Arts at MIT, 2020). The sculpted ear is made from cartilage
grown using the DNA of one of van Gogh’s decedents and engages in discourses ofauthenticity, originality and the nature of replicas, specifically in the context of a society thatis now able to insert grown life and living objects into the pre-existing social order, and theimplications and consequences of these new abilities. The life-sized ear is presented inside ofa square tank which is filled with plasma, an off-white slightly golden-coloured liquid filledwith small bubbles, designed to support the nutritional requirements of the work. The ear ismostly opaque and white in colour but appears more translucent in the parts where the cartilage
is thinner. However, while it is living, it does not resemble a living ear entirely due to theabsence of blood supply and skin which would provide a more life-like colouration. This lackof colour gives the structure an otherworldly, uncanny appearance of being living but notnecessarily life-like.
The ear sculpture was grown using chondrocytes, cells that form cartilage, which wereextracted from one of van Gogh’s living decedents (Strebe, 2019). These living chondrocytes
were then bioprinted into the shape of van Gogh’s left ear. Bioprinting is a type of 3D printing,which combines biological materials such as cells, and then prints them layer by layer into thedesired form. In order to grow the replica, Strebe required DNA from van Gogh and attempted
to obtain a sample from a letter the artist had sent to Joseph Roulin, however, this was
unsuccessful as she was not able to collect a large enough sample. Instead, Strebe contacted
one of van Gogh’s living relatives, Lieuwe van Gogh, the great-grandson of his brother Theovan Gogh, who consented to donate his DNA for the artwork and, consequently, two samples
of cartilage from his own left ear were donated (Mafi, 2015). To add more authenticity to thework, Strebe also incorporated further DNA from a female living relative, Rosine Weenick, in
addition to original DNA extracted from van Gogh’s letter. Therefore, as most of the DNA

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used was not directly obtained from van Gogh himself, the ear is not an entirely authentic
replica, yet, both Vincent and Liuwe share one-sixteenth of the same DNA, including the same
Y chromosome (The Guardian, 2014), clarifying the approximate level of similarity between
the two individual’s genetic matter.
As with other tissue sculptures, the ear is supported by a scaffold which was integrated
into the chondrocytes during the bioprinting process. To achieve an authentic shape, the ear
was digitally mapped out, reconstructed and then printed using a polymer culture substrate.
The scaffold inside the printed sculpture allowed the ear to retain its shape and provide atemplate for the chondrocytes to grow around. After this process, the sculpture was placed ina bioreactor, where it continued to grow for a year until fully formed. Sugababe was firstrevealed at the ZKM Centre for Art and Media in Karlsruhe, Germany, following a lecture by
Noam Chomsky; Chomsky was the first person to speak into the microphone in an attempt totry and communicate with the deceased artist (Blakemore, 2015).
The artist’s concern with authenticity and the nature of the replica is evident in both the
ambiguity raised by the distance in the DNA used and also in the title of the work. Sugababe,refers to the eponymous British pop group whose original members were all replaced (Guth,2015); thus, the group was known by the same name, yet all of the original components hadchanged. Strebe compares the work to the paradox, The Ship of Theseus, which questions
whether the ship of the Greek hero, Theseus, is the same ship if, after replacing all wooden
planks and sails as they decay, is still the same vessel despite each original material aspect
having been replaced. Sugababe parallels this paradox as the ear contains the original genetic
material of van Gogh yet translated through generations, it has fundamentally beenreconstructed; therefore, the work provokes a reassessment of what it means to be original or
to be a replica in the age of pervasive biotechnologies.

1223.5 Gina Czarnecki
Gina Czarnecki’s practice has incorporated many different types of media since the beginningof her career in the 1980s, including video, drawing and sculpture. According to the artist, herwork is “about human form and function, developments in biotechnology, the intertwining
histories of medicine, myth, history and ethics” (Czarnecki, 2018, para.1). Czarnecki’s interestin the use of science and technology in art has seen her act as an advisory source to a numberof programmes and institutions, including the Science Gallery, London and the Casebooks
Project at Cambridge University, UK. Czarnecki’s best-known biological work is Heirloom(2014), her series of living portraits that uses both 3D printing and cultured cells.

3.5.1 Heirloom
Heirloom (2014) is a set of living portraits of the artist, Gina Czarnecki’s two daughters, Lola
and Saskia, grown from their own donated cells [Figure 3.12]. The portraits are threedimensional masks grown from cells and remain living through their containment in sterile
conditions and fed nutritional supplements. The masks are colourless and appear transparent
as the layer of cells is as thin as tissue paper. Furthermore, the masks depict the girls with theireyes closed and a neutral facial expression, leading Jens Hauser to describe the portraits as“living mortuary masks” (Bureaud, 2016, para.16). When exhibited at the Medical Museion in
Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2016, the portraits were displayed alongside the moulds used to cast
the faces of the children, including those that were damaged or broken, and a video detailingthe construction processes (Bureaud, 2016).
In order to grow the portraits, the DNA of the two girls was first needed. As Czarnecki’s
daughters were only 11 and 13 years old at the time the work was created, they were not able
to consent to donate their own DNA. Instead, Czarnecki, as their parent, signed the consent
forms required for the girls to donate cells which were taken from the inside of their mouths

123using buccal swabs. In order to grow the portrait masks accurately, molds were taken of thegirls’ faces, which were then turned into glass masks. The cells were 3D printed into the shapeof the faces and were incubated in culture serum. After growing the tissue, the thin cellular
portraits were placed over the glass masks and then sealed in bioreactor cases [Figure 3.13].
The portraits live in a bath of nutritional liquid and are fed through a hose which is attached tothe mouth of each portrait, an equally necessary and aesthetic decision which suggests “as if itwere vital for breath” (Bureaud, 2016, para.16). The blurred boundaries between the masks
being living and displayed as such through the hose being attached to the mouth area, yet
simultaneously appearing as a contemporary form of death mask that will continue to live.
However, that they will not portray the changing appearances of the girls as they age presents
a dichotomy reflective of the living materials used in bioart; simultaneously, they are living
but not fully alive. Similarly, they are living depictions of living individuals, however, in thisprocess, the portraits become separate living objects.
The scientific production of the project was supported by John Hunt, a scientist at theInstitute of Ageing and Chronic Disease at the University of Liverpool, UK; however,Czarnecki has stated that she faced many difficulties and obstacles in trying to find willingindividuals and ethics committees that would assist and allow the work. Czarnecki commentsthat “it took years for me, bouncing around through various institutions and individuals, toreceive ethical guidance in the use of tissue from living, consenting humans in artworks”(Czarnecki & Hunt, 2016, p.84). This issue of ethics appears to stem from Czarnecki’s lack ofaffiliation with a licensed institution rather than the project or technologies used, however, this
openness about the difficulties she faced in practicing bioart is a notable event of transparency
in a genre which is often criticised for the opposite. In terms of specific materials used,however, there are many ambiguities in the descriptions of the construction process, with
Czarnecki describing the growth solutions that were used as “cell nurturing cocktails”

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(Czarnecki, 2018, para.2). This lack of specificity is problematic in trivialising the scientificaspect of the work while also potentially hiding the use of certain solutions that require thekilling of animals, such as FBS.
In terms of the artist’s motivation behind the project, the direct aim was to “investigate
the idea of preserving her daughter’s youthful appearances and offering them back to herdaughters in the future as a kind of inheritance: an artist’s heirloom” (Whiteley, Tybjerg &Pedersen, 2016, p.86). In a wider sense, Czarnecki explains that the work was inspired by her“interest in the complex philosophical and ethical questions that developmental
biotechnologies raises, using the lens of art” (Czarnecki & Hunt, 2016, p.84). However, thisinterest also ties into the theme of ‘heirloom’ as Czarnecki comments that due to her “father
surviving the Nazi camps and what I learned from visiting the Medjaneck concentration campwith him when I was seven years old has resounded through my life works” (Czarnecki &Hunt, 2016, p.84). In this way, the artist is not only demonstrating a passing on of genes throughthe portraits but a family history that has directly encountered the ethical and practical problemsof biotechnologies, their uses and potential misuses.
In naming the work Heirloom, Czarnecki comments that “heirloom is something ofvalue passed down through generations that parents might decide to leave for – and from –their children” (Czarnecki, 2018, para.3). The work reflects the meaning of the term heirloom
in multiple ways, alluding to both the portrait tradition and genetic inheritance, rendering thetitle “both direct and poetic, with many layers” (Bureaud, 2016, para.4). According to the artist,
the portraits “sit between representation and actuality, between the ontological and theevidential, weaving together principles between ideas, forms and understanding that ask us toconsider our own materiality and values: where, between us and our cells, identity lies
(Czarnecki & Hunt, 2016, p.84). Therefore, as a living heirloom, the artist has both preserved
her children’s youthful images, as well as creating new lifeforms in doing so; furthermore, by125

looking to the future by anticipating the works as being heirlooms, Czarnecki has also formed
living connections to her family’s past.

3.6 Amy Karle
Amy Karle is a self-described bioartist who has undertaken several international residencies
that encourage and facilitate art and science interaction, including at the Copernicus ScienceCentre, Warsaw, Poland, and Ars Electronica’s AIxMUSIC, Linz, Austria (Karle, 2021a).
Karle describes herself as a “provocateur and a futurist, opening future visions of how art,science, and technology could be utilised to support and enhance humanity while making
advancements in the technology towards those goals in the process of making her artworks”(Karle, 2021a, para.1). Karle’s work has engaged in both conceptual and material bioart,
including drawings, performance, sound and 3D bioprinting in her practice.

3.6.1 Regenerative Reliquary
Amy Karle’s 2016 3D bioprinted sculpture, Regenerative Reliquary, is unique amongst theworks discussed in this thesis as it is not a living sculpture as of yet, but the artist intends it to
be in the near future. However, it is included in this thesis due to the artist listing the work
under the category of bioart on her website and the speculative addition of living cells being
added to the work in the future; that is, the work is currently incomplete and is intended to bea living work of bioart when it is completed. At present, the work consists of a hand-shaped
sculpture bioprinted using a biodegradable pegda hydrogel [Figure 3.14]. The work is not acompleted biological hand but a scaffold that is designed to, in the future, support seeded stem
cells from an adult human donor (Karle, 2021b). It is the artist’s intention that the seeded stem
cells will grow into tissue, which will subsequently be mineralised into bone. As the scaffold

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is made from biodegradable material, it will gradually disintegrate, leaving behind a skeleton
of a hand that is grown rather than being the remains of a corpse.
Regenerative Reliquary was produced in collaboration with the Computer-aided design(CAD) software company Autodesk, at the Pier 9 Residency programme in San Francisco, US(Capossela, 2016). The structure of the hand was first designed digitally using Autodesk, where
the intricate scaffold structure was informed from scans of human bones the artist made(Capossela, 2016). These digital designs were then 3D printed using hydrogel. Visually, thework does resemble a human hand in shape and size, with four fingers, a thumb and joints all
distinct through variations in the thickness of the gel. The hand appears yellow in colour but
translucent, with geometrically shaped holes evident in the scaffold, allowing the viewer to seeright through parts of the work. The sculpture is housed inside of a glass bioreactor andsubmerged in a protective preservation solution, however, the details of what the solution
comprises of has not been noted. The work is pioneering from both an artistic perspective as
well as within biotechnological practices as “this piece required new materials to be developed
and made” (Karle, 2016, para.7), demonstrating an exploratory element of bioart practices in
the new uses of existing technologies, as well as innovative ideas requiring new or alternativetechniques or materials to be produced. Furthermore, at the time that the work was produced,
it was the largest freestanding printed sculpture (Karle, 2016).
The use of bone resembles the many extant religious relics that claim to preserve bone
fragments of dead saints (Ephanov, 2020). Furthermore, the work references the relic tradition
through its presentation in a glass case, however, the glass case used in the work is a bioreactor,
yet for the work and for religious relics, glass cases are necessary for the preservation of theobjects, only they function in different ways and for different reasons. The contradicting ideaof an artificially grown biological relic rather than an organic, historic relic is central to thework, with the artist suggesting that “instead of enshrining the inanimate remains left after127death as a memorial to the life that was once there, ‘Regenerative Reliquary’ presents the
opposite, depicting the possibility of life from an inanimate object” (Karle, 2016, para.4).
Replacing the historic with the new, and the natural with the manufactured, the work
deconstructs the ideas of preservation and the mythologies or beliefs attached to materiality,with preservation in this work revolving around a new, artificially grown limb which, like thestories attached to histories of relics, raises new speculations of what this technology could
offer in the future.
Despite the conceptual relationship to relics, one of the motivations behind the work isalso informed by the speculative practice of these technologies integrated into healthcare
approaches, both for internal organ implantation and for prostheses. Karle explains that she“began envisioning a future factory where the same materials – just a few cells, could be used
to grow organs, marrow, limbs and also create art and design objects, even technology for both
inside and outside of our bodies” (Karle, 2021b, para.12). This vision of the future is growing
closer to reality, with bioprinting suggesting possibilities of custom-designed organs thatwould not require transplantation from a deceased donor while also reducing the risks of organ
rejection.
This work, in particular, demonstrates how artists using technologies can offer unseen
advantages and new developments for science and technology as it is not until artists seek newmaterials and ways of using them that new challenges are unfolded, and in surmounting them,
they reveal new knowledge under the realm of science. However, the incomplete nature ofKarle’s work is also an example of the barriers and difficulties of artists accessing the materials
and expertise in order to create bioart works as she “is seeking scientific and biomedical
partners to collaborate on cell culture and establish repeatable successful results for stem cellgrown into bone in this or a similar method” (Material District, 2016, para.4). The creation

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process of the work is therefore separated into stages, with Karle forming the first stage of thework separately from the ultimate biological components that will complete the work.

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Chapter Three: Living Bioengineered Art
Part Two

The first part of this chapter described a number of bioart works that engage in living matterand biotechnologies. These works represent some of the most well-known, as well as some of
the less-discussed examples of media-based bioart. While this included two of Eduardo Kac’s
works which used bacteria and living animals, most of these examples were tissue-based works
grown from cells. Therefore, there are a number of shared qualities and characteristics present
in these works, both in their materials and construction processes, as well as in a broader sense
through the motivations of the artists, the aesthetic and the conceptual aspects of the works.
The second part of this chapter examines these works together through visual analysis andreflects on the critical responses that these works have attracted. Together, this will assist inbuilding a clearer picture of what bioart practices look like and what they have in common.
Not only will these commonalities help to understand a more generalised grouping of bioart asa contemporary movement, but it will also help to position bioart in a sociocultural context
through a deeper understanding of shared materials, characteristics and objectives.

3.7 Characteristics of Bioart
One of the most prominent issues raised around discussions of bioart is in relation to what theterm actually encompasses and what the use of it is referring to. While this thesis has been clear
about focusing on the materiality of works discussed, the lack of clarity around the use of theterm bioart points to a lack of clarity around what unites such works and what features can besaid to be specific or typical of bioart. By examining the key features, materials, processes,
theoretical engagements and artist motivations that inform the works discussed, it is possible
to begin to understand what is meant by bioart and what are the most significant unifying

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features of these works. From this, it is then possible to understand critical responses and thecultural role of bioart, in addition to better understanding its context and importance in thehistory of art.
The characteristics that appear prevalent operate on both a visual and material level.
Visually, many of the bioart works discussed appear to be based on or related to the humanbody. Materially, the majority of works use human or animal-derived cells aided by the use of
growth serums. In terms of the motivation behind the artists’ engagement with biotechnologies,
there are varied aims detailed, yet all works appear to be purposeful and intentional
explorations of human relationships with biotechnologies in the twenty-first century. Exposing
the shared characteristics and distinct differences in works that have all been associated withthe term bioart will allow for a more specific understanding of what is meant by the use of theterm bioart.

3.7.1 Human-like Forms of bioart
There are many similarities and differences present in the bioart works discussed, however, anobvious and prominent similarity present in these works is that artists demonstrate an interestin mimicking or replicating the human body, its features and abilities. In this way, the many
works appear to demonstrate either the isolated growth of a human body part; found in
Sugababe, Regenerative Reliquary, Heirloom and functionally in cellF, which operates like abrain despite it not visually resembling one. The body parts created, grown and reimagined bybioartists include ears and limbs. In addition to Diemut Strebe’s Sugababe, ears have been a
popular choice for artists, with Sterlac’s Ear on Arm being another notable example of an ear
grown for art purposes, along with the Vacanti Mouse, grown by scientist Charles Vacanti inthe mid-1990s (Catts & Zurr, 2016).17 While the choice to grow an ear may stem from a

17

The Vacanti Mouse was a mouse which had the shape of a human ear grown on its back using cartilage.

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conceptual idea, such as the ear being symbolic of Vincent van Gogh and suggesting aninteresting and novel method of exploring the artist the ear appears, however, to be one of themost accessible and researched biological forms that have been grown in bioengineering
practices.
The doll-like forms of the TC&A’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls is an interesting deviationfrom the authentic bodily representations of the aforementioned artworks. The choice of dolllike forms appears to be based on the concept of worry dolls embodying subjective fears
attributed towards them, however, it is significant to note that a doll is also a non-living
representation or stand-in for a human. As an inanimate representation of a body, historically,dolls have been used as children’s toys and as part of religious or magical rituals (Bado-Fralick& Norris, 2010). However, in this artwork, the dolls are not toys or ritualistic but are
constructions made of flesh as a product of contemporary abilities of bioscience. These dolls
are a new type of doll and highlight “that new forms of visual culture change not only the way
we approach images, but our understandings of bodily modalities and experiences” (Toffoletti,
2007, p.59). In this way, the Semi-Living Worry Dolls demonstrate the need for a newunderstanding of the changing human body in the age of biotechnologies.
In many contemporary cultures, dolls have taken on a new role, not only as toys but asobjects that are deeply tied to capitalism; this is particularly true of dolls such as Barbie who
is “indicative of endless transformations and eternal youth, manifested by the consumption of
mechanisms of control such as plastic surgery” (Toffoletti, 2007, p. 61). However, the TC&A’s
dolls are not plastic, but flesh that is equally malleable, transformative and exists beyond
symbolic representation. While manifesting the conceptual form of a vessel designed to carrychildhood fears, as dolls, the Semi-Living Worry Dolls also stand in for our own bodies which
are becoming more malleable and borderless due to biotechnologies. Furthermore, as
highlighted by the concerns of Doll B and Doll C, which “worry about biotechnology, and the132forces that drive it [and] worry about capitalism and corporations” (Tissue Culture & Art
Project, 2021b, para.3), there are a great number of potential problems that could arise out of
the capitalisation of biotechnologies through the control of them by pharmaceutical companies.
The connection between the dolls and the message that the TC&A are trying to convey,
therefore, has many deeper levels than the dolls only being living replicas of objects designed
to hold concerns.
Ben-Ary’s construction of a functional ‘brain’ neural network, however, appears tofocus more on function than form. The living neurons that were grown from stem cells do notresemble a human brain, and instead, the material appears to have no actual structure. Sitting
in a Petri dish, the biological material appears to be a flesh-coloured jelly-like substance thatis connected by wires to the electrical interface and only performs as a brain rather thanphysically resembling one. However, technology and machinery take a central role in theconstruction of cellF, thus demonstrating a fluidity of boundaries between the biological andthe technological, with wires and other equipment connecting cellF to the musical machinerywith which it interacts. This speaks to the transhumanist visions of a future in which the humanbody is enhanced and becomes one with technologies, therefore, redefining the human and theself.
The human form, therefore, appears to be an appealing reference point for bioartists.
This could be linked to motivations that are driven by the influence of bioengineering
technologies on the body through medicine and aesthetic augmentation. However, not all
bioartists have followed this decision to directly engage in the human body, but instead many
have appeared to resemble the body as a more conceptual reference. In this way, a number ofbioart sculptures visually resemble objects that are intended to aid the body, protect the bodyand fulfil bodily needs. Victimless Leather imitates an item of clothing designed to cover andprotect the body; Disembodied Cuisine presents the flesh of a dissected dead animal that133

provides the human body with nourishment. This reference to bodily needs and the ways inwhich animals are used to meet these needs suggests connections between existing practices
and new biotechnologies that propose new methods of growing living materials to offer
solutions to the harm caused to living animals through consumerism; this includes clothing,cosmetic products, medicine and food. However, they both reveal the fallacies of claims of‘victimless’ technologies, as even grown life requires ethical considerations. Therefore, byreferencing such objects or needs, these forms draw attention to the wider scope of humanimpacts on living subjects and the costs of biotechnologies.
In a wider sense of works that are not discussed in this thesis but have been discussed
under the umbrella of bioart, there appears to be a range of reference points, but many continue
to engage with the body. This is apparent even when the biological material used is not tissue,
such as Jun Takita’s, Light, Only Light (2003) [Figure 3.15]; a brain-shaped sculpture covered
with bioengineered bioluminescent moss. This suggests that due to a majority of bioartists
seemingly engaging in bioengineering in order to explore, understand and critique its presence
in contemporary society, the outcomes of such projects appear to reference the body and theeffects of biotechnology on the body; a body that is being redefined and altered in the twentyfirst century. However, it is significant to highlight that bioartists’ engagement with the body
is not necessarily a requirement of the materiality used or of bioart, as demonstrated by Andrew
Krasnow’s Palette (1992-99) [Figure 3.16] and Ezzam Rahman’s Here’s What I Am, I Am
What You See (2015) [Figure 3.17] which both use human skin but take the form of a map anda flower respectively, yet these works do not appear to engage in the genre of bioart. Whatthese works demonstrate, therefore, is that through materiality, bioartists are engaging in amore complex practice that concerns the social and cultural impacts of biotechnologies, andthis is enabled through the effectivity of material engagement which sets bioart apart from othergenres of art that use similar materials.

1343.7.2 Living Cells and Growth Serums
Most of the works discussed in this thesis are constructed from living cells that are either
donated or extracted from living organisms. The process of growing three-dimensional
sculptures from cells requires a form for the cells to grow around. For this reason, most of theworks created use either 3D bioprinting technologies or seed cells onto a constructedbiodegradable scaffold. While the outcomes of these works are all vastly different, there aremany shared aspects in the materials used and how they are processed into the final sculptures.
However, with these materials, there are many ethical and practical considerations andpotential problems with the use and acquisition of them.
Three of the works include human cells; Ben-Ary’s work uses the artist’s own cells,
Czarnecki’s work uses cells donated from her children, and Strebe’s work uses both donatedcells and historical DNA extracted from a letter. These three different methods of acquiring thegenetic materials present three different challenges and associated ethical problems. The useof the artists’ own cells is ethically ambiguous but consideration of the biopsy needed to extract
materials from the artist is important as it could cause damage or harm; furthermore, the work
cellF was designed to function as a second, separate brain. Therefore, questions of ownership,subjectivity and agency are raised by the work being both human and part of the artist, as well
as being a mechanical artwork and separated from the artist. However, for Czarnecki’s work,
the most problematic issue with her use of living cells is that they were donated by her children,
who, as minors, could not legally consent to the donation. Instead, as both the legal guardianand the artist, it was Czarnecki’s consent that was given, which holds a bias as it was in her
interest to consent for her work. Consequently, the use of human cells in this particular artworksuggests a difficulty between artistic access to biological materials and the rights of a parent toconsent for DNA donation.

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Strebe’s work also uses donated cells, however, in this instance, Lewie van Gogh wasa consenting adult and therefore the use of his cells is not as ethically problematic. What issomewhat problematic, however, is that his cells, combined with others, were intended toreproduce a replica of a deceased third party; Vincent van Gogh. Not only could van Gogh notconsent to this act, nor the extraction of his cells from the letter, Strebe notes that not all of thevan Gogh family did approve of her project, saying that
the Van Gogh family now takes on two very different roles. On one end, you have theartists who are very creative and were eager to help with my project [Lieuwe van Goghis an artist]. On the other side, there are those who handle the administrative duties of
Van Gogh’s brand. This part of the family wasn’t nearly as receptive to the idea ofcreating a replica of Vincent’s missing ear. It was very interesting to witness this division.
I suppose ears don’t continue to haunt without reason (Mafi, 2015, para. 5).
This elicits new concerns around the acquisition of DNA and the retrospective use of it for
growing or cloning new life. While the ethical considerations of growing or cloning life areimportant, so too are considerations of ownership. If Sugababe is Strebe’s work, but materiallyand genetically belongs to multiple individual members of the van Gogh family and is an object
that is technically alive but dependent for care and survival, who can claim to be the owner ofthe work? Furthermore, how would these issues of ownership and consent translate into a
medical context involving bespoke organs or limbs grown by corporations using an
individual’s own genetic materials? The lack of clear answers in light of these problems
highlight the emergence of bioart as a platform to intentionally problematise and ask thesequestions.
In contrast to the concerns of consent in the use of living human materials, the use ofanimal-derived cells and matter elicits concerns associated with ethics and animal rights,
together with the new concerns over life status and the agency of new life grown from animal
products. The works of the TC&A all use animal-derived cells, however, the methods ofacquisition of these materials vary. In the construction of Victimless Leather, the artists used
McCoy cells which, while originating from a mouse, the cells come from an immortalised cell

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line. This means that cells originally extracted from a single mouse in the 1970s have been
manipulated so that they continue to multiply. Consequently, the cells can be acquired in bulk
and do not require an animal to undergo a donor procedure. The cells used in Disembodied
Cuisine, however, are frog cells extracted from a frog which was also displayed in the exhibit.
Therefore, the frog was not killed for the work, but its materials were used to create a new massof living matter which simultaneously existed externally from the animal. As such, thisproblematises notions of authenticity as well as the self and the other, but opens opportunities
for minimising animal harm in acquiring and using biological materials.
In addition to the different types of living cells acquired by artists for their works, thegrowth of living cells requires nutrition which is provided through submersion in growthserums. Of all the artists’ works discussed in this thesis, the TC&A are the most transparent
about their use of growth serums, specifically the use of FBS, a growth serum that is collectedfrom unborn calves in slaughterhouses (Reynolds, 2018). Part of the transparency from the
TC&A about the use of FBS is a critical response to the claims of ‘clean meat’ companies thatsuggest a cruelty-free alternative to slaughtered meat, as the reality is that for meat to be grownoutside of a body, FBS must be used, rendering such meat still problematic (Reynolds, 2018).
Therefore “growing animal tissue in a laboratory is not a cruelty-free procedure” and while
there are “hopes to develop a synthetic or plant based alternative for the calf serum in the future,but it is worth remembering that currently, laboratory-grown meat is not an ‘innocent’ product”(Radomska, 2017, p. 382). However, by offering more transparency around the construction
details of their works than other artists, the TC&A also have the potential to attract morecriticism than those who choose to omit the use of FBS from the details of their practice.
However, this is an important aspect to address as not only does the production of FBS require
the slaughter of cattle, the omission of its usage “keeps the victims (i.e. slaughtered cows andunborn calves) undisclosed” (Radomska, 2017, p.384).

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Of the other artists’ works discussed, Czarnecki mentions that the growth of her cell
portraits involved “combining innovative new methods and cell nurturing cocktails”(Czarnekci, 2018, para.2), however, she omits the exacting solutions used; whether this is tosimplify details, the process or to hide the use of specific materials is unknown. However, if
the former option is the reason, the simplification of such biological processes is problematic
as it fails to accurately discuss the processes and costs of bioengineering. Details of the growing
process of Strebe’s Sugababe are limited, with no direct reference being made to growth
medium, and for Amy Karle, her work does not yet include biological material. Ben-Ary
provides in-depth details regarding the process of extracting his own cells and reprogrammingthem to create functioning neural stem cells, including that the cells were grown in a tissue
culture lab; while there is no exact reference to the use of FBS, the clarity of processes provided
suggests an implied use of FBS that was not noted due to it being an expected part of theprocess. In comparison to many other accounts of artist’s processes, Ben-Ary’s account is themost specialised and detailed in terms of vernacular and scientific processes, further suggestingthat the use of FBS is implied and not worthy of noting for the intended audience.
The materials used by the artists currently engaging in living bioart, therefore, share anumber of similarities, as many are human or animal-derived cells which have been cultured
into tissues. However, the acquisition of these materials appears to vary, with some posing
greater ethical concerns than others, leading to further problems of consent and ownership,demonstrating the complexities present in bioart and in defining it as one shared genre of art.
Furthermore, the processes of constructing living tissue sculptures from cells appear to be
similar, with most artists culturing tissue with the assistance of scientists using either scaffolds
or 3D bioprinting. By looking at the forms these sculptures take, it appears that bioart can be
united by more than just materiality, but by the deeper engagements with the culture of
biotechnology that these artworks suggest that is enabled through materiality. This becomes138

even more apparent when examining the motivations that informed the construction of theseworks, of which many artists appear to be concerned with exploring and critiquing
biotechnologies.

3.7.3 Exposing, Exploring and Critiquing Biotechnologies
The choice of using living matter as art materials by bioartists appears to have been informedby some shared sentiments, in addition to unique ambitions and concerns. A majority ofbioartists have suggested that their engagement with biotechnologies stems from a desire to
explore the presence and the role of bioengineering technologies in contemporary society.
However, it is important to note that not all artists involved in bioart practices have explicitly
referenced their rationale for using living materials which in itself poses a problem in assessing
the claims that bioartists engagement in living materials is for shock value or superficial
purposes (Stracey, 2009).
As with the transparency regarding materials used and processes involved inconstruction, the TC&A are the most transparent in detailing their motivations, together withhaving the largest collection of literature written by themselves about their practice. The groupplace their motivation fundamentally in exploring the “impact of tissue engineering on society”(Tissue Culture & Project, 2021, para.1), which focuses on life grown in a laboratory setting;the same life that they refer to as being semi-living. While individual works appear to focus onparticular problems or aspects of bioengineering, such as food consumption or clothing
consumerism, the “primary aim of the TC&A Project is to explore the philosophical, culturaland ethical implications of the semi-living and the contestable future scenarios they offer us”(Tissue Culture & Project, 2021, para.5). This suggests that the use of living matter isimperative to their practice as their purpose is to explore the implications of these materials,
including how they are interpreted and perceived by critics. Furthermore, they are not unaware139

of their engagement with biotechnology being perceived as hypocritical, as Oron Catts
describes his practice in his Twitter biography as “culturally scrutinising Neolifism by actually
doing it” (2021). This self-awareness is important for bioartists in order to dismiss the criticalassertions of hypocrisy and self-indulgence of artists which have been used in criticism directed
towards bioartists.
Similarly, the problem of critically exploring new biotechnology by applying them inart practices is apparent in the work and motivations of Gina Czarnecki in Heirloom.
Czarnecki’s work explores the ethical problems regarding the ownership of biologicalmaterials when they are donated for various medical or research practices, such as the donationof blood, organs or DNA. This issue is explored by the donation of DNA from the artist’s two
daughters to be able to create the works and their lack of ownership over the produced works.
However, her work is equally concerned with the nature of heirlooms and the processes
associated with them. By using living materials and biotechnologies, Czarnecki’s practice
combines the new and the old and anticipates the future in both the use of materials and thepreservation of her daughters’ youthfulness for them to reflect upon when they are older.
Like Czarnecki, Guy Ben-Ary’s use of biotechnologies and the exploration of themthrough his art practice is also through a critical lens, with cellF “forcing viewers to lookforward at possible future implications of technologies, as well as to look backwards in termsof how technologies have informed our belief in the givenness of categories, I create artworks
that (I hope) critically question the practices through which distinctions and categories arematerially and discursively produced” (Hudson, 2014, p.40). This interest in intentionally
provoking critical reflection appears to be a central theme across bioartists, with such works
physically embodying bioengineering technologies that question previous assumptions aboutideas of life, materiality and how we mediate and understand them. However, for some artists,
the draw of using living materials sits in line with the new possibilities it offers to art and design140practices for aesthetic and practical uses. For Amy Karle, her interest in biological materials is
motivated by a wider interest in the future of technologies and their potential impacts, statingthat she is “a provocateur and a futurist, opening future visions of how art, science, andtechnology could be utilized to support and enhance humanity while making advancements inthe technology towards those goals in the process of making her artworks” (Karle, 2021,
para.1). Regenerative Reliquary appears to support this aim as it is not a completed work but
one which looks to the future and anticipates new ways for technologies to enhance humanity
through applications in art.
Similarly, Diemut Strebe “has said she is interested in bringing cutting-edge
technologies like these to the art world ‘because science has so much creativity and inspiring
processes, which I love to involve in my work’” (Osberg, 2015, para.3). While the work,
Sugababe appears to have been specifically influenced by exploring the paradox, The Ship ofTheseus, this can also be linked to the concerns of biotechnologies in society, as the work
explores concepts of originality and authenticity through genetics. Furthermore, Strebe hascommented that her work is asking questions about these new technologies and that they areimportant questions to ask in contemporary society, saying, “we don’t live in Disneyland. We
live in a time when these questions are important to ask” (Guth, 2015, para.9). In this way,
Strebe’s work appears to be provocative in her use of living technologies, using them to open
dialogue rather than assert knowledge or answers.
The uses of living materials as art media appear to be, therefore, for reasonspredominantly concerned with the problems that new technologies pose for concepts and usesof living matter. The consideration of these issues by artists demonstrates an intentionality andsincerity of bioart works, moving beyond accusations of an insincere disregard for living
materials or producing such works simply because it is possible to do so. By actualising theirconcerns materially, bioartists seem to invite curiosity and discussions around these materials

141and our relationship with them. However, in doing this, it appears that many opponents tobioart require artists to provide justifications for their use of living matter. This requirement
for justification of artists’ use of living materials once again demonstrates a cultural set of
expectations that appear to divide art from science and creates boundaries that are subjective
and appear to align with moral expectations rather than ethical guidelines. However, in using
these materials and processes, it appears that bioart is helping to produce discourse aroundthese expectations, allowing audiences to reflect on and address them.

3.8 Responses to Bioart
The responses to works of living bioart, by both audiences and critics, has varied widely. While
there is a growing field of literature on critical and scholarly responses to bioart, there is limited
documentation or research on the individual responses of exhibition visitors. The responses tobioart can be found in a number of sources, with most appearing in academic journals, books
and mainstream media, with notable authors including Eduardo Kac, Anna Dumitriu, Oron
Catts and Ionat Zurr, Lindsay Kelley, Robert Mitchell, William Myers, Nora Vaage, Charissa
Terranova and Frances Stracey. Furthermore, there are a number of theses and dissertations
that have explored different aspects of bioart, including Marietta Radomska’s Uncontainable
Life: A Biophilosophy of Bioart (2016), Marianne Cloutier’s Bioart as a Space for Identity
Conceptualisation: Figuring the Human Body under the Scope of Biotechnologies [French](2017), Svenja Kratz’s Artscience in Practice (2013), and Howard Boland’s Art from Synthetic
Biology (2013). Of these numerous sources, a majority of works tend to deal with theconstruction of artworks, artist’s perspectives and the ethical implications of bioart, withlimited insight on bioart from the viewers perspective. However, it is possible that thislimitation is a reflection of the limited opportunities for bioart to be exhibited and viewed andthe restrictions on artists accessing the materials to create these works. Consequently, there is142limited literature which provides insight into understanding how bioart is experienced and thereasons for these embodied experiences. However, despite these limitations, the controversial
nature of bioart means that the literature that does exist is often transparent in expressing where
it is situated in either the praise or criticisms of bioart.
The criticisms of bioart can primarily be categorised into two related themes; that bioart
appears to present a transgression of the expectations of art and artists, and the ethicalimplications that these transgressions present. Given the range of living materials used in the
different works that have been included in discussions of bioart, it is possible that the materials
used and explicit knowledge of these materials is contingent on the response as some artworks
appear to have attracted stronger responses than others. Therefore, many of the responses, both
positive and negative, appear to be based on perceptions and understandings of materiality andtheir suitability for art media and as something that can be manipulated and used by humanity
for our own purposes. This importance of materiality appears to be a deciding and divisive
aspect of bioart and consequently is at the forefront of responses to these artworks, not only as
a confronting new media for art, but as a source of deeper sociocultural concerns aroundbioengineering.

3.8.1 Expectations of Art
The expectations of art, that is, perceptions of what art should be and do, have influenced thereception of bioart works. Firstly, it is clear from the nature of bioart being included under this
name, and most often discussed in an art context, that these works are intended to be considered
artworks; however, it is also apparent that they intersect the traditional categories of both art
and science, consequently embodying both simultaneously. This affect of bioart being both art
and something that exceeds the traditional notions of art is a possible cause of discomfort and
one which evokes responses of bioart being an act of transgression that disrupts the cultural143

expectations of art and artists. These expectations are not necessarily clear cut but become
apparent in the provocative acts that bioartists partake in by using life as art materials. As oneof the originators of the bioart genre, Eduardo Kac comments that,while specialized publications showed greater appreciation for “GFP K-9”, the responsein the general media covered the whole gamut, from forthright rejection to considerationof multiple implications to unmistakable support. The shock generated by the proposal
curiously caused one critic to declare “the end of art”. As I see it, there’s no reason to see
the beginning of a new art as the end of anything (Kac, 2011, p.3).
This reveals that responses to Kac’s proposed work differed depending upon the knowledge
base and interest of the audience. While there is no clarification of the nature of the specialised
publications that offered a more optimistic response, this claim suggests that a greater
understanding of the context and processes of the proposal allows for a more positive
experience with it. The varied response of more generalised media indicates, however, that
responses are subjective and dependent on a wide range of factors. The suggestion of bioart
representing an end to art, however, is an interesting and important comment, especially in thecontext of the history of art. Bioart appears to be based around the introduction of new materials
into art practices, a process which has happened many times in art history, for example, theintroduction of new media in contemporary art since the 1980s, as discussed in Chapter One.
The rejection of bioart, even as a proposed work here in Kac’s case, as being art reveals thechallenging nature of the media of bioart, and what a change in the use of this media reveals
about our own prejudice and expectations about life outside of ourselves as being the cause of
these rejections, yet is simultaneously one of the most compelling and important features ofthe practice. Art, therefore, enables an encounter with both the fears and the possibilities of thevery same biotechnologies that are being developed and used at present. However, somediscomfort may stem from a lack of familiarity with these technologies as they are often not
publicised until end products are announced. Therefore the first encounter with some of these144

technologies may be through bioart, and consequently, this contextual shift along with newtechnologies can provoke a negative response.
The simultaneous criticism and curiosity towards actualised works of bioart havecontinued to emerge, with the critical lens being the more dominant response. The reasons forcriticism appear to be linked to the ethical problem of living materiality becoming art media.
Frances Stracey summarises the range of responses to bioart as follows:
responses to more recent and controversial forms of bio-art, such as the creation oftransgenic mammals, have gone beyond judgements of beauty in favour of more sublime
and apocalyptic assessments. These range from accusations of promoting a new ‘artful’eugenic movement, to cries of aesthetic indulgence in “carnivalesque sadism”, tocondemnation of the artists as naive or unwitting pawns in a market-driven public
relations game on behalf of bio-tech industries, using the allure of culture to sellcontroversial science to a wider audience (Stracey, 2009, p,497).
Stracey’s remarks touch on two key issues regarding the reception of artists using living media
and biotechnologies in their practice; the first is the problem of the works being interpreted ashollow or exploitative uses of living materials just because artists can, and the second being
the perception of the relationship between the artist and the scientist or the art and thetechnology (Stracey, 2009). For the first issue, this is perhaps one of the biggest obstacles forartists to overcome. Despite transparency around critical engagement with bioengineering ona theoretical as well as a practical level, there appears to be a prevalent perception that an
artist’s use of scientific materials is frivolous and has an inherently lower value or importancethan the very same processes and materials have when they are a product of science. Thisconsequently prompts a reconsideration of how materials and processes are divided by culturalforces into one of two categories wherein it seems that one group of individuals are given
privilege to overcome ethical concerns and negate the same criticisms as the other group. Theseroles attributed to the scientist and the artist are conflated through the production of bioart
works, through the development of the artistic laboratory, and through the direct engagementwith living art objects. Furthermore, the accusation “of the artists as naive or unwitting pawns
145

in a market-driven public relations game on behalf of bio-tech industries, using the allure ofculture to sell controversial science to a wider audience” (Stracey, 2009, p.497) suggests not
only are artists and scientists perceived differently but that artists are naïve participants inbioengineering practices, rejecting their agency and intentionality in their involvement.
Although there is little documented about the response of bioart exhibition audiences,with the notable exception of Wolfgang Kerbe and Markus Schmidt’s 2015 paper, Splicing
Boundaries: The Experiences of Bioart Exhibition Visitors, which will be discussed in the next
chapter as it considers the bioart encounter, the TC&A have made responses to their works partof the exhibition experience. On the display of the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, Deborah Dixon
states that “audience members were invited to tell their worries to these dolls and reflect upon
the worries expressed by others. They are, therefore, very much evocative objects. But, these
are also prompts towards critical thinking; that is, they are intended to change an audience’s
perception of what art itself is” (2009, p.417). This suggests that not only did this work facilitate
an encounter with living products of bioengineering but also actively encouraged the audience
to express their subjective feelings of the encounter. In the 2019 display of the Semi-Living
Worry Dolls at the Future and the Arts exhibition at the Mori Museum in Tokyo, the artists
similarly provided a notebook and pens for visitors to write down their feelings towards the
sculptures. In this way, whether the responses are critically engaged with and considered ornot, it allows for a process of active engagement with the living works and prompts theaudience to think about how the objects make them feel.
As Dixon suggests, however, the presence of these works prompts a realisation that theart the audience is engaging with is alive and perhaps not art as they have encountered it
previously. A change in the perception of art mediated through bioart, therefore, prompts asimilar challenge in perceptions of science and biotechnology. This is further evidenced by
Ionat Zurr’s statement that “one of the most common and somewhat surprising comments we146heard was that people were disturbed by our ethics of using living cells to grow living fabric,
while the use of leather obtained from animals seems to be accepted without any concern for
the well-being of the animals from which the skin has been removed” (Wired, 2004, para.9).
This attitude demonstrates the precarious ambiguity of the semi-living as a life form, as inencountering it, the audience feel compelled to acknowledge its agency, even over the lives
and agencies of consumer livestock, as those practices are often hidden from view.
Furthermore, Ben-Ary suggests that the viewer is not alone in their discomfort when
encountering bioart, but that it is present for the artist too, saying that “philosophically, I feela sense of discomfort in working with dissociated neurons, or bits of brains as I am constantly
confronted by ethical questions regarding past, present and future understandings ofconsciousness, intelligence and sentience” (Hudson, 2014, p.40). Therefore, the ways in whichbioart provokes critical responses through the disruption of expectations of both the artist andthe art appears to be situated in the materials used and the discomfort these materials provoke.
Works of bioart are not static, but they are living objects made from living materials which aremalleable and mouldable like traditional art materials. Through this reconfiguration andrecontextualisation of visceral, living matter, emotional and embodied discomforts appear to
emerge, along with the ethical concerns that this presents, therefore, exposing new,unprecedented concerns for artists and art practices.

3.8.2 Ethical and Practical Concerns
The ethical concerns of bioart are a prevalent issue that has emerged as a focus of the practicein the literature surrounding it. Through these discussions, it is apparent that it is difficult toseparate the practices of tissue manipulation in art from tissue manipulation in bioengineeringas they are fundamentally the same processes, with the outcome or conceptual processes being
different. Therefore, to critique bioart is to critique bioengineering which is a reflexive process147

that appears to be a central role of bioart. However, this has not prevented bioart from creatinga platform to generate uncomfortable discussions around ethics.
Furthermore, there are a number of practical issues that have emerged from using living
materials as art media, which have also been discussed in the literature. One such example is
the TC&A’s 2008 iteration of Victimless Leather which, as previously discussed, was killedduring its display at MoMA, which provides an example of the unexpected concerns that arise
from using and displaying living materials as art. Gillian Terzis comments that “the artwork
was designed as a critique of the type of research that goes on behind closed laboratory doors,
but its ‘death’ triggered unease. What are the ethics of manipulating biology? And does itmatter if it’s for the sake of art, rather than the sake of medicine?” (Terzis, 2015, para.1). This
comment highlights that the realities of bioengineering are often off-limits to the public andthat the ethical considerations required for practicing tissue engineering appear to be
insufficiently well-defined to encompass a range of uses and applications. Victimless Leather’s
uncontrollable growth and subsequent public demise exposes a practice that exists but is notcommonly seen. It demonstrates a lack of control over nature in a practice where control isoften exercised and is necessary for growing specific, functional products that may one day be
implanted into human bodies. However, here, Victimless Leather grew independently,
demonstrating that it existed beyond being an art object, but a living subject, and that despite
attempts to control nature, we still cannot exercise complete control over a subjective, living
entity. This unexpected growth highlights the work as being a living being and, therefore, its
death is more pronounced than if its growth had not been visible or if it was killed out of sight.
The spectacle made of its death is a significant reminder of the limitations of bioengineeringand the unpredictability of using new materials as art media, especially living ones.
For some critics, however, the TC&A are not sufficiently political in their provocationsof drawing attention to the practices and ethical considerations of tissue engineering. Deborah148

Dixon states that “they [TC&A] argued, an ‘aesthetics of care’ demands that the status affordedlab-born, Semi-Living Objects be placed under critical scrutiny, such that the commercial, legal
and regulatory frameworks that shape form and feature, but also their diffusion TC&A isinsufficiently political in their endeavours” (Dixon, 2009, p.420). The lack of substantial
political engagement appears to be in relation to the perceived hypocritical nature of critiquing
a practice while partaking in it, evident in “for example, while TC&A may express compassion
for the other, their position is necessarily and ‘absurdly’ compromised by the fact that they
manipulate tissues as if they were mere objects” (Dixon, 2009, p.420). This implies that despite
attempting to highlight concerns evident in the use and manipulation of living subjects throughbioengineering, their participation in the same practice can be perceived to undermine
expressions of concern or care that may have been the initial motivation in engaging with thesubject matter.
This accusation of bioart practices being hypocritical and lacking in accountability is
not an isolated concern, with further critiques stemming from how this hypocrisy does not sit
well with bioartists who use posthumanist and anti-anthropocentric rhetoric in justifying theirpractice. Steve Baker and Carol Gigliotti refute the critical works of bioart, stating that they do“not see these works as ‘opening up new perspectives’, but immersed in existing perspectives,
which I, among others, have already found to be not only troublesome, but also disastrous, notjust for animals, but for the planet at large” (2006, p.38). This suggests that bioart practices areextensions of extant anthropocentric bioengineering practices and rather than existing as a
critical opposition to them, bioart is complicit in the damaging behaviours and rhetorics they
produce. In this way, no matter how critical bioartists are of these technologies, by using them,
they implicitly are part of the problem. This is emphasised by Dixon, who says that for “suchcritics, there is no apprehension of irony in the documentation of TC&A, but rather confusion
and hypocrisy, while their parody merely serves to replicate regressive practices” (Dixon,

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2009, p.420). Consequently, the actions of bioartists can be seen as not only transgressive but
problematic, creating new problems through being a new practice entrenched in the problems
that already exist.
However, Catts and Zurr of the TC&A have rejected these claims that their work lacks
political validity, stating thatfor the non-scientist, the ‘wet’ experience in the laboratory involving some degree of life
manipulation can be seen not only as an ethical conduct but also as a political act. A
political act that goes beyond the democratization of the technology, to the act ofbreaking down dominant discourses, dogmas and metaphors to reveal newunderstandings of life and the power structure it operates within (Catts and Zurr 2008,
p.140)For Catts and Zurr, then, the act of using and manipulating living matter is an intrinsicallypolitical act. By engaging in bioengineering and using life as art media, from their perspective,
this practice is an important contribution to enabling conversations to move on from theanthropocentrism of current bioengineering practices. Furthermore, not only does their work
reveal new discourses, but highlights and exposes the practices that are problematic, along with
their political, economic and philosophical implications. Radomska suggests that “TC&A uses
irony as their artistic strategy in order to problematise and ridicule transhumanist dreams” anddoes this “not with the aim of finding new technological solutions but, instead, to disclose thelogic of the ‘governing of life’ prevalent in the field of biodesign” (2017, p.385). Therefore,
the disputes and lack of consensus around where bioart sits on this political and philosophicalspectrum between critical or implicit engagement with bioengineering is a prominent issue thatis yet to be determined as there is no clear answer. Instead, bioart intentionally problematises
bioengineering and our perspectives of these practices, purposefully provoking questions rather
than answering them.

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Chapter Four: Encountering Living Bioart

The use of biological materials and bioengineering technologies for art has presented a numberof new and unprecedented situations, problems and phenomenological experiences. As
demonstrated by a majority of the artworks discussed in Chapter Three, bioart, as art, isintended to be displayed and has been so across a number of institutions globally. The viewing
experience of living materials is, therefore, an important aspect of bioart, as is understanding
its importance and impact. However, there are a number of unanswered questions regarding
the viewership of bioart; if artists have gone to the difficulties of accessing and using thesematerials and processes, what is the resulting experience for the viewer, and is this experiencesomething that is intended or an unexpected result of the materiality? This chapter will,
therefore, consider the ways in which bioart is displayed and how the viewing experience of
bioart is mediated through the encounter. This will include examination of how the physicalspatial experience is constructed both to care for these works and to guide the viewer’s
encounter, as well as considering the locations chosen for bioart display. Furthermore, thischapter will explore the viewer’s relationship with bioart, the phenomenological andpsychological implications of encountering these living artworks, and the consequential
outcomes of these experiences and perceptions of the works in a wider socio-cultural context.

4.1 The Display of Bioart
Given that the emergence of bioart is primarily situated in the twenty-first century, there islittle precedent for negotiating the issues that arise from the display of living materials. The
field of living media-based bioart is vast and diverse in respect of the materials used and,
therefore, the idiosyncratic nature of each individual work of bioart as living art objects is best
understood through the subjective experience of encountering individual works in person.

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While there is little precedent for engaging with bioart, there are other cultural experiences thatcan offer some insight into the ethical considerations of encountering life. These include zoos,
circuses and ‘freak shows’, which are experiences that provide different forms of encounterswith living subjects, and consequently present different ethical concerns and considerations forviewing.18 However, a critical difference between these examples and bioart exhibitions is thatmost often, bioart works are laboratory-grown living materials rather than pre-existing
subjects, such as animals or people.
Through sensory and environmental observations and feelings, the ways in which bioart
works are displayed dictates how they are encountered and consequently how they areperceived. This, therefore, highlights the importance of where bioart works are displayed, thecuratorial decisions in their display, and the additional practical requirements in the exhibition
space. Furthermore, given the range of living substances being used as art materials, it is clearthat there are new and unprecedented obstacles in the display as well as the production of living
bioart works (Kallergi, 2008). These complications include strict licensing over the possessionof human-derived materials such as tissue and organs and potential breaches of bioethicalregulations for the display and possession of biohazardous materials. These issues, first andforemost, however, dictate the spaces in which living bioart works can be presented andviewed, which subsequently affects who the audience is and the environment in which theycan experience bioart.
Legal requirements for the display of biological materials, such as licensing, is notuniversal, as discussed in Chapter One, and where it does exist, it is usually for specificmaterials. For tissue-based works, some jurisdictions have laws regarding the possession ofhuman tissues, such as the UK’s Human Tissue License and, therefore, “galleries looking to

18 These types of exhibits express a varied range of ethical problems as they can include both animals and humans. As

discussed in Chapter One, the exhibition of living humans has been witnessed throughout history, whereby indiviudals oftenwith anatomical abnormalities have either been trafficked or coerced into appearing in ‘freak shows’, providing
entertainment in the form of novel value, such as the case of Sarah Bartmann in the nineteenth century (Buikema, 2009).

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display bioart also need to take into consideration the fact that they may need a Human Tissue
License, should they be using any pieces made using human cells” (Solon, 2011, para.17). As
of 2009, Frances Stracey commented that only one independent UK gallery held such a license,
then in 2011, Olivia Solon clarified that GV Gallery in London “is the only private gallery in
the United Kingdom that has one of these licenses – sharing the certificate with the likes of the
Wellcome Trust, Hunterian, Science Museum and the Natural History Museum” (2011,
para.19). With regard to obtaining the license, and the purposes for holding it, the gallery’s
director, Robert Devcic states that “it regulates and maintains confidence and makes people
work ethically. It took me nine months to get a license. They don't regulate tissue that's fromoutside the EU, but nevertheless I'm keen to keep those standards” (Solon, 2011, para.19).
Following approval for the Human Tissue License, GV Gallery hosted an exhibition of Andrew
Krasnow’s works made from human skin in 2009, noting that prior to this the artist’s works
had only been accessible in the UK by private appointment (Johnson, 2011).
Licensing for possession of biological materials, as well as care of them, is anestablished practice within museums, particularly regarding the possession and display ofhuman remains (Clegg, 2020). These regulations dictate the care of biological materials thatare of a significant age and exist within museum collections, such as preserved human bodies
and body parts. As these objects are not living, this care refers to preservation and treating theremains with respect and dignity. These policies and regulations have, however, changed overtime as understandings of holding certain objects has changed (Clegg, 2020). The changing
and precarious dynamics of holding and displaying biological materials, specifically humanremains, is demonstrated in the collection and policies of the Wellcome Collection. Based in
London, the Wellcome Collection is a medical and scientific collection established by Henry
Wellcome in the late nineteenth century, displaying some artefacts in their own museum, withothers loaned to the Science Museum, London, UK. The Wellcome collection holds more than153

500 human remains ranging from prehistoric humans to the last century, including bodies, bodyparts, bone fragments, organs and teeth (Biers, 2020).
Providing transparency around the possession and display of these items, the Wellcome
Collection has published its Care of Human Remains policy (2018), which acknowledges thatthese artefacts are of a sensitive nature, however, they have a great and necessary educational
value which is why they continue to be kept and displayed. Furthermore, in this policy, thecollection clarifies that it holds a Human Tissue License and will honour ongoing requests forrepatriation of remains to communities and cultures who make such requests. This commitment
was demonstrated in 2013 when three items identified as being Māori in origin, two toi moko
and a skull fragment were repatriated to New Zealand at the request of Te Papa Tongarewa(Wellcome Collection, 2020). Furthermore, as well as committing to ongoing repatriation
requests, the museum states that its policy is subject to review and able to change toaccommodate new or additional needs or requirements. However, the possession of these
artefacts and the ongoing changes of attitudes in collecting and displaying human remains
demonstrates both the ongoing fascination with, and simultaneous repulsion of, ancestors beingtransformed from subjects to objects; a phenomenon that appears to occupy a middle groundbetween education and the sanctity of the body. Nonetheless, it is evident that there is a purposeto these displays, one which has a different function and response to models or artificial humanreplicas as it provides a direct, material-based connection to our past and ourselves.
It is, however, important to note that the Human Tissue License is not a retrospective
legislative order and does not apply to ancient or historical artefacts that are more than 100
years old (Biers, 2020). Instead, “the license is mostly required by academic institutions (suchas medical schools), research departments, mortuaries and museums. It requires organisations
to ensure that the human donors of tissue collected after 2006 have consented for use in public
display (as opposed to just medical research)” (Solon, 2011, para.18). The implications of this154

suggest that bioart made using human tissue must always follow these new regulations,however, institutions which hold and display older artefacts do not necessarily have the samelegislative restrictions, therefore making bioart more difficult to display than scientificexhibitions and collections.
While most scientific collections, including the Wellcome Collection, comprise ofhistoric artefacts, not all exhibitions of human remains have been historic. In contrast, thepreservation techniques of Gunther von Hagens have been subject to global interest andcriticism (Singh, 2003), in addition to raising many unprecedented concerns around the display
and importation of his works. Von Hagens, a German anatomist, developed his own uniquemethod of bodily preservation in the 1970s which is known as plastination. The techniqueinvolves replacing the fluids and fat from a dead body with plastics such as silicone and epoxy,which preserve the internal organs and cause the soft tissues to harden. Many of the bodies
used have been donated to be plastinated on request of the individuals, however, there has beensome controversy around von Hagens obtaining bodies of individuals who did not consent tobeing plastinated before death (Harding, 2004).
One of the primary criticisms of von Hagen’s work is that the acquired bodies havesince been modelled in various poses, most with their plastinated organs exposed and displayed
globally in various exhibitions (Singh, 2003). Each body is modelled in a different way, withmany styled in the historic écorché anatomical style, semi-dissected showing both theindividual’s skin, muscle, bone and organs [Figure 4.1]. Many of von Hagens’s exhibitions
also include a large number of plastinated, dissected organs, removed from the body, often to
demonstrate the visual effects of different diseases or health conditions. Due to this anatomical
style, von Hagens’ plastinates are often considered to have an educational or didactic functionin their display (Burns, 2007). This educational aspect of von Hagens work is emphasised by
the sponsorship of the New Zealand display of von Hagens’ exhibition, Body Worlds in 2018155

in Auckland, by a health insurance company. Not only was the exhibition advertised as being
educational for promoting healthy lifestyles, but at the end of the exhibition, viewers wereasked as to whether witnessing the bodies and organs of both healthy and unhealthy plastinates
would change their lifestyle or dietary habits, such as stopping smoking, exercising more
frequently or losing weight. This suggests a focus on a didactic experience rather thanprovoking criticism through controversial means for the sake of spectacle.
While some bodies were donated to von Hagens with consent, in 2004, it was reported
that he had acquired the bodies of several executed prisoners from China (Harding, 2004); thisis one of many accusations of obtaining and trafficking bodies and human remains without
consent of the deceased that von Hagens has faced. However, issues of consent are variable bycountry and therefore have proved difficult to prove or dispute. Von Hagens’ work has received
further criticism from religious groups believing his work is offensive to the sanctity of life,
criticism for his techniques lessening the supply of organs for donation as all organs or bodies
donated are completely plasticised rather than being able to be transplanted into another person
in need, and criticism for his commercial practices of selling the plasticised corpses (James,
2010). One of the most significant elements of von Hagen’s work is the discussions it hasbrought to legislative issues, in particular the ambiguities regarding biological materials,
especially of human origin, being used as objects of display. As discussed, licensing forpossession or display of bodies or human remains in the UK is clear and derives from medical
malpractice, however, in the US, many states have proposed laws based on von Hagen’s
exhibitions, including Florida and Hawaii, in order to prevent trafficking of dead bodies andensuring consent was given for bodies to be plastinated and displayed (Gonser, 2009; Crist,2007).
While the critical debates of von Hagen’s works are a useful background for bioart inunderstanding and negotiating legal issues and consent, living tissue artworks are not donated156corpses, nor are they considered to be independent living subjects. Therefore, issues of consent
do not apply, with the exception of human materials in jurisdictions that require a license.
Furthermore, while not fully living, they are not dead either, nor are they historical remains
and, therefore, traditional museum policies do not necessarily include the protection, care andregulation of bioart works. Instead, living tissue bioart works present new challenges innegotiating laws of display in order to both exhibit such works, but also to ensure that theprotection and care for these living subjects is fulfilled and regulated to avoid unethicalpractices. However, such legislative issues are largely unclear and not widely discussed,
particularly with respect to tissue being used for artistic purposes. Furthermore, “these artworks
are provocative and raise a wide range of technological, logistical and, crucially, ethical issues.
So knotty is the area that very few galleries even show these works, and those that do tend to
be large scientific institutions” (Solon, 2011, para.12). This is significant as it suggests that itis the scientific community that possess the legislative powers, the means to obtain appropriate
legislative documents and support to hold and display these biological materials, which hasconsequential impacts on viewership and democratisation of these technologies and materials.
These issues demonstrate, however, the emergent nature of the genre and the normalisation oftissue culture being isolated to scientific uses, therefore demonstrating the lack of familiarity
the general public has with visceral encounters with actual tissue culture, especially throughart.
The issues around licensing, therefore, prove problematic and limiting for the displayof biological materials, and consequently limit the capabilities for certain institutions or venues
to hold or display such works as “one can easily acknowledge that, practically and spatially,the (art) museum is not the optimal space for accommodating living organisms” (Kallergi,
2008, p.3). These obstacles are multifaceted, however, and extend beyond ethical issues as
after obtaining legal permission there are a number of logistical measures which may be limited157

by space, equipment and policies. Furthermore, the financial impacts of meeting the spatial andenvironmental conditions for artworks are also important to consider as this further impacts
whether institutions are able to display living works. However, due to the unprecedented natureof many of the works, their individual needs and requirements cannot always be predicted or
anticipated until the processes of display are underway.
Collaboratively, these issues demonstrate that living artworks prove inherently
problematic for art museums, not only in terms of practicality but also philosophically andculturally, as “according to Gessert, the problem with exhibiting artworks that employ some
sort of life form is not only practical but also philosophical. He argues that the museum
architecture embodies the deeply rooted throughout art history and art theory idea of separation
between art and nature” (Kallergi, 2008, p.3). This suggests that by displaying living objects,
bioart ruptures traditional viewership not only by reconfiguring what can be used as media forart but by challenging expectations of the traditional art space by exhibiting these works.
Furthermore, by the nature of bioart disrupting categorisation of art and science, this isconsequently translated into problems of display, with it being unclear whether bioart should
be displayed in science museums where facilities and legal requirements may be moreaccessible, or art institutions as they are primarily works of art. This liminal cultural positioningof bioart is an important element in the wider attitudes and perspectives towards bioengineeringand consequently has a wider impact than just the responses to bioart, but also how and where
people can engage with these works.

4.1.1 Locations of Bioart Display
Given the limitations of legal and bioethical legislation, the practical requirements of space,facilities and equipment, and the financial cost of these requirements are also obstacles
institutions face when displaying bioart. It is, therefore, for these reasons that many bioart

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exhibitions appear to be held in scientific institutions, suggesting that they have greater accessto these facilities. However, the location of display for these artworks has a consequential effecton viewership and the audience of the works; while the location may alter the demographics ofthe audience, the location can also carry coded connotations and impact how works are viewed.
The effect of location on viewership and audience is therefore significant when considering thephenomenological experiences of encountering artworks which are living objects. While there
has been a steady trajectory of bioart exhibitions throughout the twenty-first century, they are
not always mainstream exhibitions and do not occur with routine frequency. Therefore, tounderstand the physical presence of bioart within contemporary culture, it is important toconsider the locations that have been used to display living bioart in the past. Furthermore, in
addition to the physical location of display, how works are displayed within these institutions
is a further consideration that is significant in understanding how we encounter living
bioengineered materials and consequently provides an insight into the critical responses
towards bioart. These considerations are also important in understanding the aims of inciting
critical awareness and debate of bioengineering in contemporary culture, as the processes ofviewing can impact how works are perceived.
There have been several recent major exhibitions globally that have either centredaround or included bioart, including Spare Parts: Rethinking Human Repair (2019) at the
Science Museum in London, UK, Art’s Work in the Age of Biotechnology: Shaping our Genetic
Futures (2019) at the Gregg Museum of Art and Design in Raleigh, US, and Future and theArts (2019) at the Mori Museum in Tokyo, Japan. Each of these exhibitions focused on
different aspects of bioart, but all showcased the biological works of international artists.
However, each of these major demonstrations of the genre was held in a different type of
institution, demonstrating the diversity and simultaneous ambiguity of bioart; one being ascience museum in the UK where a license is required for human materials, one being a159

university-based gallery in the US, and one an art museum in Japan. However, in addition to
current bioart exhibitions, it is important to consider the exhibition venues for the tissue works
discussed in-depth in Chapter Three that are central to this thesis. These works differ vastly inmateriality, with most having been displayed at least once, with several having been displayed
many times in different locations. Looking at the locations of where these works have been
displayed offers an insight into the types of institutions that have successfully held tissue
culture exhibitions, while highlighting the range in institutions that both demonstrate an interestin showcasing bioart and the consequential audiences of each of the works.
The works of the TC&A have been exhibited in a range of institutions, including art
museums, science museums and other alternative venues. Of the works discussed, Victimless
Leather appears to have been exhibited more times than any of the other works, having been
displayed in more than ten locations, including the Ontario Science Centre in 2006, New
York’s MOMA in 2008, the Science Gallery in Dublin in 2008, the Casino Luxembourg in
2009, and the Mori Museum in Tokyo in 2010. In addition to the art galleries and science
museums the work has been displayed in, it has also been exhibited in more obscure venues,
including The National Glass Museum in The Netherlands in 2008.
The many iterations of the TC&A’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls have also been displayed
a number of times, including at Austria’s Ars Electronica in 2000, then at the Natural History
Museum of Vienna in 2011, Dublin’s Science Gallery also in 2011, the Laznia Centre ofContemporary Art in Gdansk in 2012, the Copernicus Science Centre in Warsaw in 2012, andthe Mori Museum in Tokyo in 2019. In the latest exhibition in Tokyo, however, the dolls were
not presented living, but instead a showcase of 59 preserved dolls that had previously been
living but no longer were. Despite this, the exhibition did display other tissue works that were
living, in addition to multiple works made of living bacteria; therefore, even though thisspecific iteration of the work was not living, the museum still hosted living works. The range

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of institutions which have displayed the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, therefore, include bothscience venues and art institutions, in addition to the Science Gallery, Dublin, which is a
purpose-built institution designed to promote the merging of art and science.
As for the other works discussed in Chapter Three, the TC&A’s Disembodied cuisine
was only performed once at the Lieu Unique in Nantes, France, a Centre for contemporary
culture, which hosts exhibitions, performances, symposiums and more. The venue was used
for both the exhibition which featured the growth of the in vitro meat and the performance
aspect, which involved the cooking of the meat and a dinner party in which participants
consumed the grown food. Dietmut Strebe’s Sugababe has been displayed multiple times indifferent iterations of the same work. These iterations have been exhibited at the ZKM Centre
for Art and Media in Germany in 2014, the Ronald Feldman Gallery in New York in 2015 andthe Mori Museum in Tokyo in 2019. Regenerative Reliquary by Amy Karle has been exhibitedat Ars Electronica in Linz, Austria, in 2016 and again in 2017. As a centre for media art, Ars
Electronica has played an important role in displaying works of bioart, having also displayed
Eduardo Kac’s Genesis (1999).

4.1.2 Art/Science Venues
Following the rise of connectivity between art and science in the twenty-first century, there has
been a similar development of institutions, both for research and display, specifically aimed atpromoting and supporting this connectivity, often enabling an interdisciplinary exploration ofart, technology and science. While some of these institutions have a specific focus on bioart,
others include a wider science focus, with some institutions having a foundation in practices
such as biohacking but also include the capacity for artistic exploration of biological materials.
These collaborative institutions have emerged globally and include Science Gallery (Republicof Ireland), ArtScience Museum (Singapore), Bioart Laboratories (Netherlands), BioClub

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(Japan), Bio Art Lab (US), WAAG (Netherlands), Arts Catalyst (UK), (Art)Science BLR(India), Incubator Art Lab (Canada) and Coalesce Centre for Biological Art (US). Many ofthese places include both the laboratory setting and facilities for producing works but also
spaces for display and engagement.
The Science Gallery, Dublin, has hosted a number of the works discussed in this thesis,
and was established by Trinity College Dublin in 2008 and is part of the Global Science Gallery
Network, which has further presences in the USA, UK, Australia, India, the Netherlands and
Italy. With the aim of highlighting the importance of STEAM education and direct engagementwith contemporary art and science as united experiences, the Science Gallery focuses on theimportance of new ideas, new knowledge and the importance of these in society and for the
future, stating that,19
bringing science, art, technology and design together, Science Gallery ignites a passion
in young people for new ideas and areas of study that can help to guide their career andeducational choice, equipping them with resilience, empathy and ethical understanding
to thrive in the knowledge economy (Science Gallery, 2020, para.1).
While not solely designed for display, SymbioticA, founded by members of the TC&A, as
discussed in Chapter Three, is the first intentionally designed and constructed artistic
laboratory. Designed to enable collaborative work between artists and scientists in a sharedlaboratory setting, SymbioticA has been key in enabling many bioartists to actualise theirworks, with more than 100 artists having taken up a residency at SymbioticA and who havecollaborated with the TC&A in their practice to date (SymbioticA, 2020).
The cultural importance of institutions that support bioart and wider collaborative
practices is apparent in their global presence and concurrent emergence, with most having been
established following the turn of the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the number of
institutions and the growing rate of new venues demonstrates a cultural need and desire for

19

STEAM refers to science, technology, engineering, art and mathematics; it is an educational approach aimed at increasing
creativity and innovation through transdisciplinary engagement (Liao, 2016).

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greater connectivity beyond the restrictive categorisation of art or science. These institutions
are, therefore, as equally important for artists, scientists, creators and curators in being able todisplay and share challenging and unconventional works, as they are for audiences toexperience an unmuted, unlimited view of a subject or theme without being limited to a specifickind of art or a specific kind of science.
In addition to collaborative institutions which assist in the creation and display of bioart,
there are a number of bioart groups that have been established to connect artists and scientists
in order to build a network of individuals who seek to collaborate. Similarly, the number ofgroups continues to grow and currently include Bioart.tw (Taiwan), BioArt Society (Finland)and Hackteria (online). Again, these networking groups provide support for bioart and acontext and community for expansion and growth amongst the genre. This is particularly
important for facilitating connections between scientists and artists that enable bioart practices
to occur, as many artists have stated that this process has often been long and complicated, as
bioartist Gina Czarnecki has stated that “it took years for me, bouncing around through various
institutions and individuals, to receive ethical guidance in the use of tissue from living,consenting humans in artworks” (Czarnecki & Hunt, 2017, p.84). Therefore, providing acommunity for bio-artists and bioart, critical networks can enable future projects to occur.
The dynamic interactions between the art and science communities, supported andenabled by these networks and institutions are, therefore, imperative to both the construction
and consumption of bioart. The development and growth of institutions as well as local andglobalised communities demonstrates the relevancy of bioart to contemporary cultures, as thisnew media is now embedded in the structures of contemporary life. The globalised emergenceof these communities suggests that a connection between contemporary arts and sciences isboth a natural occurrence but also pertinent to contemporary global issues. In enabling,
connecting and displaying works of bioart, as well as other forms of art and science163

collaborations, these communities can then disseminate bioart works to a global audience,
prompting a wider network for critical engagement in current science and technologies.

4.1.3 Audience and Viewership
A further consideration in understanding the bioart encounter is the audience. As the genre
merges together contemporary art and contemporary biotechnology, it is likely that individuals
with an interest in science would be interested in these exhibitions, as well as those who havean interest in art. However, it is not only the breakdown of categorisation that is a key issue butthat, as discussed, the location of these displays has the capacity to influence who might view
such works. As such, these locations have the potential to expose bioart to new audiences thatmight not otherwise engage with this genre were an exhibition to be held in a traditional art
setting. The nature of bioart in resisting categorisation, therefore, appears to simultaneously
invite a wider audience of those interested in both arts and science, while also potentiallyalienating them through its ambiguities. Furthermore, when works are displayed in nontraditional art settings, the audience may not be limited to a traditional art audience, therefore,
expanding the potential interpretation and responses to bioart and its associatedbiotechnologies through new audiences. This is an element demonstrated at the 2019-2020
Future and the Arts exhibition at the Mori Museum in Tokyo, where automatic admission wasprovided to the art museum with the purchase of a ticket to the Tokyo City View, anobservation deck 250 metres above sea level providing panoramic views of the city. Therefore,
the exhibition was accessible to viewers who may not have necessarily chosen to visit, thus
creating opportunities for new and unexpected encounters.
While there is limited literature examining the exhibiting process and audience
responses to bioart exhibitions, Wolfgang Kerbe and Markus Schmidt (2015) produced a studyof the “experiences of bioart exhibition visitors” (p.129). The study used semi-structured

164interviews to understand how visitors experienced the Synth-ethic exhibition at the Museum of
Natural History in Vienna in 2011. In total, 119 visitors were interviewed over the two-month
period the exhibition was in situ; these visitors were selected to be interviewed as they had
been observed viewing the exhibits for more than five minutes. Synth-ethic featured both living
and non-living works by 11 artists, including Joe Davis, Paul Vanouse, Art Orienté Objet, andthe Tissue Culture & Art Project. The data collected revealed that more than half of theattendees were male (54.6%), and the average age of all participants was 36.1 years, with arange of 13-67 years (Kerbe & Schmidt, 2015). Kerbe and Schmidt (2015) state that“participants were also asked to rate their interest in art and science on a scale from 0 to 7” andfound that “interviewed visitors were slightly more interested in science than in art” (p.131).
Furthermore, the study revealed that “the interviewees had on average a high formal educationand included many students and academics” (Kerbe & Schmidt, 2015, p.131). These basic
statistics recorded offer an insight into the demographics of bioart visitors; however, it is alsosignificant to highlight that this exhibition was held at a science museum and, therefore, thedata tentatively supports that the audience is likely to be slightly more science-focused.
Although only one such study appears to have been published at this time, this data
provides an insight into the audience demographics and consequently their experiences andexpectations when encountering bioart. While it cannot be assumed that all bioart exhibitions
would have a similar audience, this data reveals that visitors had a higher interest in science
than art when this exhibit was held in a science museum. This is significant when thinking
about where bioart is displayed, who the intended audience is, and the expectations of theviewer. The fundamental concern with the audience of bioart, therefore, reflects back to theaims of bio-artists who suggest they seek to raise discussion, critique and reassessment ofbiotechnologies in contemporary culture through their works.

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The effect of location of display of bioart on the viewer, therefore, has the ability to
influence the response towards the art through the potential demographic of the audience whichis influenced by the venue. However, the ways in which works are displayed and exhibitions
are organised and designed within these settings can also affect how audiences engage withliving bioart, including the use of coded cultural symbols and objects, specific environmental
conditions and sensory, participatory or immersive experiences. While some of these features
are practical elements required for the works, others are aesthetic decisions, creating anexperience for the viewer. These design features can dictate how works are engaged with andthe consequent phenomenological experiences and critical responses of the viewer.

4.1.4 How Bioart is Displayed
The multifaceted considerations required for displaying bioart reflects the unique nature ofeach individual living work. Each work, the location it is created in, the materials it is made of,any specific environmental specifications it requires, and the exhibition itself all pose
individual considerations and unprecedented challenges. For this reason, it appears that while
there are legal and financial limitations to display, there are few guidelines specificallydesigned to guide the display of bioart in part due to its recent emergence, but also its complex
ambiguities and the diverse range of living works created. However, it is evident that inaddition to the legislative requirements for displaying living bioart, there are further
supplemental considerations surrounding the care and maintenance of living materials. These
special considerations are not ones routinely required in the display of art, but vary dependingon the materials used. The extent of these requirements is dependent upon the living structures,
as some materials require more invasive, ongoing care, whereas others need less maintenanceand only require certain atmospheric conditions such as light or temperature considerations, toensure the survival of the materials as,

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works that employ some sort of life form require particular conditions or arrangements
during an exhibition. Kathy High's transgenic rats need to be fed (the artist will report ahigh level of attachment between her rats and the museum guards feeding them) and
Gessert's hybrid irises need access to direct sunlight. Less complex life forms may stillrequire a repetitive feeding procedure and/or particular light or temperature conditions.
As for organisms whose natural residence seems to be the laboratory space, they may
require specialized lab equipment and/or sterile conditions in order to survive (as e.g.
Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr's 'Semi-living worry dolls') (Kallergi, 2008, p.3).
Therefore, for works which involve the use of living animals, such as Marta de Menezes
Nature? (2000) [Figure 4.2], the requirements and responsibilities of care are more obvious, as
the butterflies require space to fly, plants to eat and water to drink; these being some of thefundamental needs for living things.20 21 Microorganisms also require specific conditions thatare well understood, with individual types of microbes having specific sets of requirements
such as being temperature or light sensitive. However, with living tissue sculptures, therequirements of care are more complex and may be different and unique for each individual
work dependent upon the exact materials used. While some artists might fail to make theserequirements clear, the TC&A have been transparent in detailing the needs of their living
works, such as requiring ongoing feeding with FBS and sterile growing conditions (Catts &Zurr, 2008). Therefore, “to facilitate a living exhibit, the hosting institute often needs toundergo spatial modifications and incorporate new routines and procedures in its normal
practices. A dedicated environment may be necessary to host, facilitate and possibly restrict
the life form in presence” (Kallergi, 2008, p.3). This, therefore, suggests a substantial spatial
and organisational impact on host institutions and a disruption and reconstruction of theexhibition space.

20

These needs have also been noted outside of bioart, such as during Damien Hirst’s In and Out of Love (1991) [Figure 4.3]
which saw a room filled with butterfly pupae, and included sugar water, fruit and flowers for the hatched butterflies to eat
and drink. However, the care of the butterflies was a concern for some viewers despite their fundamental needs being met,with one viewer saying that “I'm totally concerned. I'm wondering if this one is suffering” (Barkham, 2012, para.8).
21
In Nature?, de Menezes altered the wing patterns of living butterflies using cauterising tools on butterfly chrysalises.
These patterns existed only temporarily in the living butterflies and were not passed onto their offspring as no genetic
mutation was made.

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Aside from the logistical requirements for scientific apparatus for providing care ofliving artworks, some artists and curators have incorporated laboratory apparatus into theexhibition design for visual effect. This is evident in multiple works by the TC&A, mostnotably in the display of Disembodied Cuisine and Victimless Leather. Both artworks
demonstrate the incorporation of scientific equipment and its associated coded meanings into
the art space, therefore affecting how the viewer interacts with and interprets the works. In thedisplay of Disembodied Cuisine, the installation was stylised as a biohazard containment area,
complete with plastic sheeting enclosing the artwork, with biohazard warning tape sectioning
the work off from the rest of the gallery space. Furthermore, the work included a domestic
dining table scene within the biohazard warning apparatus, further conflating the ideas ofscience and danger alongside scenes from everyday lives. This display, therefore, highlights
what the technology entails; technology which is currently being developed for mainstream
consumption and marketed as a potential beneficial asset as a means of environmental
protection. The inclusion of these features emphasises the potentially hazardous aspect of thetechnologies used and bioengineering practices in general which are infiltrating everyday
mainstream culture. Visually, the transposition of scientific equipment, especially that which
alludes to a potential danger, into the art display is an important dynamic as it has potential toaffect how the viewer interprets the artwork and, consequently, biotechnologies.
For the display of Victimless Leather, the TC&A built scientific procedures andinstruments into a performance known as the ‘feeding ritual’ which simultaneously fulfilled
the nutritional supplementation of the sculpture (Kelley, 2016). This saw gallery staff dress inwhite laboratory coats, protective gloves and glasses, and feed the sculpture with growth
medium through a tube that dripped the solution onto the tissue. The ‘feeding ritual’ wasconducted routinely in front of the gallery audience, therefore directly demonstrating that thework was alive and, as such, immersing the audience in a process that reveals the living works’168vulnerability and dependence, but simultaneously its distinctive lack of humanity andconscious otherness. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the iteration of the work presented
at MoMA in 2008 included a killing ritual due to the uncontrollable growth of the sculpture,
which invited the audience to participate. Unlike the observational aspect of the feeding ritual,
the audience were directly invited to be involved in actually killing the work by touching it,
infecting it with bacteria. In addition to using the affectivity of the visual presence of scientificinstruments and apparatus, this performance highlights that the work is, in fact, a living subject
which requires care, feeding and the emotional empathy of both creators and the viewer inorder to survive. Simultaneously, it demonstrates the precarious nature of these living objects
and their vulnerability to human care as to whether they live or die.
Despite advances in biotechnological capabilities, the limited control that humans haveover natural procedures is evident in the TC&A’s display of the Semi-Living Worry Dolls at
the Future and the Arts exhibition at the Mori Museum in 2019. Instead of a new iteration ofliving dolls, this version of the work showcased a collection of 59 dolls from previous
iterations, each in different stages of preservation and decay. While some still retained a dolllike shape, the shapes of others appeared ambiguous, either having grown in different forms or
had collapsed [Figure 4.4]. This demonstrates that despite using the same technologies, thedolls did not always grow uniformly according to the wills and desires of the artists, therefore,highlighting the inconsistencies of human control over growing life. While it is possible togrow living materials, it is not an exacting practice that has yet been perfected. Instead, thisshows that life and growth are unpredictable and this exhibition publicly displays the processesof trial and error, failing and the dead matter that are usually confined to laboratories andsubsequently disposed of there.
The use and incorporation of laboratory equipment into the display of bioart works
appears both to serve a practical purpose in the care of the works but also to highlight and169

showcase the technical, visceral, living part of the works. It draws attention to processes anddevelopment of tissue-growing technologies which are still mostly confined to biomedicallaboratories where their potential uses continue to be uncovered. Such inclusions, throughbringing coded equipment from the laboratory to the exhibition gallery is an importantconsideration in communicating the core aspects of these works as a means to explore
biotechnologies through art. Fundamentally, the display of these works and the complex
decisions made, incorporating both practical and philosophical components, dictate how the
works are encountered and is fundamental to the phenomenology of experiencing them asliving objects. However, as living tissue, cells or semi-living lifeforms, these objects are notalways visibly alive; therefore, the ways in which we perceive them as being alive falls to themethod, acts and contexts of display in which the artists and curators show them to us. As such,
this allows us to perceptibly understand the intrinsic vitality of the living materiality on display.
In this way, Jane Bennett’s ideas of vital materialism can be understood through the
ambiguities of bioart being both living and non-living, yet their affectivity is highlighted andenhanced through the ways in which they are displayed.

4.1.5 Encountering Living Artworks
In creating living artworks, especially semi-living tissue sculptures, the very point that
underscores the reason for the work existing is that it is alive, and the living material becomes
media for art. However, therein lies a fundamental problem with tissue and bacterial artworks
in that although they are alive, and the audience is informed that they are alive, the works often
appear static and inanimate, thus making it difficult to actually experience and understand theworks as living beings. It, therefore, seems problematic for artists to go through the difficulties
and complexities in time, ethics and legislation to present living works for them to not to beinterpreted as such. Consequently, it appears that the quality of being alive must be

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communicated in other ways through bioart exhibitions. Through subjective phenomenologies
and specific exhibiting styles selected by the artists, unique encounters with new lifeforms are
created, thus enhancing the critical capacity of the audience to engage with new
biotechnologies.
The state of being alive is a complex set of characteristics and a state that is still
undergoing definition, as what we define as expressing the qualities of life itself is still evolving(Oliver & Perry, 2006), as demonstrated by laboratory-grown tissue cultures. Despite thisongoing issue of definition, “most biologists agree that life forms should fulfil the following
criteria: (1) the entity has a body; (2) it metabolises; (3) it reproduces; (4) it is capable ofmovement. Yet what counts as life and how we account for life forms that do not fulfil theabove-mentioned criteria are two questions that are still being discussed” Radomska, 2017,p.388). This is particularly important when considering living bioart, as artworks made from
artificially grown tissue may or may not express all characteristics or may express them only
on a cellular level rather than as an entire organism. Therefore, when expressing fundamental
characteristics of life, they may not be visible to the viewer or difficult to detect and thisconsequently increases the difficulty in separating living bioart from traditional media or
inanimate new media such as plastic; the latter of which is further problematised by theprevalence of imitation life in contemporary cultures such as AI and robots. Simplistically, thecharacteristics of tissue and semi-living materials render them alive, but when works do notnecessarily move, verbally communicate, visibly eat or show apparent signs of living, it isimportant to understand how the audience experiences them as living and how this affects theirsubjective phenomenologies of the encounter. Instead, it appears that the understanding ofthese bioart works as living derives from instinctual, psychological processes as a result ofvisual clues from both the materiality and the methods of display used.

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4.2 The Effects of Materiality
The effects of materiality of new media art are wide-ranging given the diversity of materials
used which, therefore, evoke unique responses. Within examples of bioart, as we have seen,materials also vary widely dependent on where the biological matter is sourced from, therefore,
the effect of individual works is dependent on the unique materials used. The effects of bioart
are, however, evident in the critical responses bioart has attracted which, as previously
discussed, tends to focus on the materiality. To fully understand the effects of bioart in a
cultural context as well as a posthuman context, it is imperative to understand the ways inwhich different materials act on the subjective phenomenologies of the viewers and the intent
of the artists. Fundamentally, it is the purpose of material based bioart to utilise and emphasise
new biological materials and processes, however, these can only be fully understood andexperienced through the physical encounter. The physical, face-to-face encounter deconstructs
the boundaries between the self and other through the sharing of physical space and throughsocial, communal, reciprocal relationships that form social contracts of morality and ethicalbehaviour. This social contract enabled through the face-to-face encounter, is described by
Edward S. Casey, who recounts,
I encounter a woman on a plane that is flying between Chengdu, China, and Lhasa, Tibet.
She is in an advanced state of a crippling disease, perhaps multiple sclerosis. Her twisted
body moves only with great difficulty, but she insists on moving herself. She walks down
the aisle, resting heavily on a cane at each step. Her glance engages mine, and in thatbrief moment (which I have never forgotten) I perceive her distress: her need for support
from others, yet her proud defiance of this same support as long as she can walk on her
own. In this case, there is nothing I can do except look back sympathetically and realizethat I have been put on ethical notice: I have grasped human frailty and mortality, mine
as well as my fellow passenger's, and I have been reminded of the fact that, at some point
in life, each of us will require the concrete assistance of others (Casey, 2006, p.77).
This sense of ethical responsibility for the other is enacted through the physical space that isshared and is, therefore, the basis for social engagements between individuals. For bioart, andliving art in general, there appears to be a similar social contract despite these works not having

172a human face or gaze. Therefore, in place of the glance between two subjects, we can recognise
the human glance through the materiality of these objects being living tissues or cells like partsof our own bodies. Through this physical encounter the materiality of bioart can be fully
understood and experienced, “since a majority of bioart works (and artists) strongly value andutilise the notion of material presence as embodied in (tangible) displays” (Kallergi, 2008, p.5).
The responses, both the subjective experiences of the viewer and critical responses oftheorists, towards living works of bioart are simultaneously dependent upon the materiality as
well as how the materiality is experienced. As living bioart is defined by its medium, the media
is central to the concept of the work as it is to the subjective experience of encountering it.
Tissue, as a medium, is both complex and ambiguous due to the liminal nature of its life status
and categorisation. Therefore, in addressing how audiences respond to these living works andhow they feel towards them in terms of affinity is difficult to measure because they are newlife forms, only experienced during specialised bioart exhibitions, which are infrequently held
niche events. These works are a new form of life, an ‘other’ form of life and, therefore,
understanding encounters with this new type of life is important for posthuman understanding
and critical engagement with new biotechnologies from which they are created.
As previously discussed, there are limited investigations into the experiences of viewers
in encountering bioart and how individuals perceive and feel about living artworks; while there
is a growing amount of criticism and cultural commentary around the greater practice of bioart
and the ethical and philosophical issues the practice can provoke, this does not necessarily
mirror the experiences of viewership. However, Kerbe and Schmidt’s 2015 study, as discussed,
reveals the differing levels of affinity and moral concern between the participants and theartworks based on materiality. The exhibition, Synth-ethic, featured 11 artworks exploring thetheme of synthetic biology. Of these 11 works, seven involved the use of organisms as
materials; these works were: Art Orienté Objet’s Que le Cheval Vive en Moi! (2011), a173

performance including human and horse materials and a living horse, Revital Choen and Tuurvan Balen’s, Pigeon d’Or (2010), which used pigeons and bacteria, Tissue Culture & Art
Project’s, Semi-Living Worry Dolls (2011), made of McCoy cells of mouse origin, Andy
Gracie’s, Autoinducer_Ph-1 (2006), made of rice plant, azolla plant and cyanobacteria, Paul
Vanouse’s, Latent Figure Protocol (2007-2009), made using a DNA sample from the artist’s
own cells, Joe Davis’, Bacterial Radio (2011), made from transgenic bacteria, and Sonja
Bäumel’s, Cartography of the Human Body (2010), made using bacteria (Kerbe & Schmidt,2015).
In the study, participants who had viewed the exhibition were asked about the potential
ethical problems posed with the use of living organisms in the artworks viewed, and “for amajority of the visitors, the use of bacteria and simple organisms does not pose an ethicalproblem, whereas the integration of higher animals (e.g. pigeons/horses), let alone humans,
into the artwork is much less well accepted” (Kerbe & Schmidt, 2015, p. 132). Furthermore,
the responses documents are clear in demonstrating the difference in the number of ethicalconcerns raised; Art Orienté Objet’s Que le cheval vive en moi!, which contained both humanand horse materials received ten comments relating to ethics or morals. Cohen & Van Balen’s
Pigeon d’Or, made from both pigeon and bacteria, followed with eight comments pertaining
to ethical concerns; with the TC&A’s Semi-living Worry Dolls, made from mouse cells, thenreceiving two comments about the work concerning ethics. It is, therefore, apparent that theworks containing human and animal materials are perceived as being the most problematic interms of ethics, while the works containing bacteria did not appear to evoke ethical concerns
in the same way. Yet, the tissue-based work by the TC&A evoked more responses of ethicalconcern than the bacterial works, but less than the works containing human and animal
materials. Furthermore, the work also received the second highest number of comments in174

general, following Art Orienté Objet’s work; this suggests that the work was memorable andpiqued the interest of the viewers, yet its ethical positioning is ambiguous.
The data from Kerbe & Schmidt’s study suggests, therefore, that the level of ethicalconcern increases as the size and perceived sentience of the organism used increases; thus, aneed to exercise ethical responsibility is contingent on perceived importance, size and ourrelationship to other animals, with humans sitting at the top of this hierarchy. However, where
tissue-based sculptures are concerned, they are not animals or bacteria, they are unnaturalforms that are artificially made, yet made from organic, biotic matter, usually retrieved fromhumans and animals. Therefore, their place within this hierarchy is ambiguous, andconsequently, so is their ethical and moral status. This suggests that while tissue culture canprovoke discussions around ethical issues relating to bioengineering, it is more subtle andnuanced than the overt discomfort that arises from the explicit use of animals or humans. Given
the ambiguous and equivocal nature of the relationship between us and grown tissue culture,irrespective of its origin, there appears to be a lapse in recognition of tissue as being equivalentof a ‘natural’ animal. The study suggests that where there is tension in using products or partsof an animal, there is less, but not an absence of, tension in the use of animal cells to grow newlife forms.
One of the fundamental differences between explicit animal material and grown tissue
is that the tissue objects have been grown, sculpted and manipulated into different forms. While
the material is alive, the objects are not natural forms, nor have they been born or are theyrecognised as living subjects. The dichotomy between them being alive but not possessing anyof these characteristics creates a conflict. One of the potential causes of this conflict that makes
it difficult to define its ethical status is the simultaneous ambiguity in recognising the tissue
culture as being a living substance. Although appearing like flesh, cartilage or skin, most
sculptures do not move, or breathe or show signs of being alive. Instead, they are alive on a175

cellular level where the characteristics of life take place, but we do not see a moving,
responsive, sentient being. This renders it more difficult to experience and understand theworks as being alive as we cannot see the signs of life, yet they are living and able to evoke
unique affects through their living materiality.
A further element that dictates responses towards living works of bioart are the forms
chosen by the artists. Given the dynamic and flexible capacities of tissue culture to be growninto a multitude of shapes, achieved through seeding the material over sculpted scaffolds andthen fed nutrients in order to stimulate growth, the range of forms able to be achieved is vast.
However, as discussed in Chapter Three, many of the sculptures that have been grown appear
to reference the human body, and in the case of the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, mimic the humanbody. Dolls, as discussed in Chapter Two, are innately uncanny by their appearance in imitating
humans, but are not alive. Yet, here the doll-like sculptures are alive and made from living
mammalian flesh. However, sculptures which take the form of body parts such as an ear or ahand are not inherently uncanny, as they are expected parts of the human body with which weare familiar and are viewed as being necessary for everyday activities. However, thesesculptures become unnatural in their apparent detachment from a body; and moreover, they
were never attached in the first place but grown outside of a body.
The issues, therefore, of affinity, empathy and concerns of ethical treatment towards
the other is dependent on appearance and familiarity as much as embedded cultural attitudes
towards them; for example, it is commonplace that rats are used for testing in laboratories,
however, there is a greater level of unease over larger domestic animals such as dogs or large
primates that are biologically close to humans being similarly used for testing (Ormandy &Schuppli, 2014). Therefore, in terms of the living works of bioart, they are simultaneously notnecessarily recognisable as being living entities, however, in realising that they are living tissue
derived from living creatures, this is when concerns about the usage of such materials for art

176becomes ambiguous and problematic. Detached from normative contexts of encountering thesebodily forms, they become strange, and the use of living tissue renders them uncomfortable.22
In seeing these human-like forms grown from living materials, there is a conflation of the self
and the other, the human and the nonhuman, however, as Radomska states, “human bodies arealways already nonhuman” (2016, p.44). Referring to the microcosm of bacteria, viruses andother microorganisms that not only live in our bodies but “without which our organisms would
not be able to perform their basic functions or even to survive” (Radomska, 2016, p.37), thisnonhuman or not-fully-human aspect of the human is juxtaposed alongside the self/otherconflation of bioart’s materiality; consequently, the position of ourselves in our relationship tothese artworks is both ambiguous and unsettling.
The ambiguity in affinity between the viewer and tissue bioart is contrasted by the more
explicit and definite relationships exhibited between the viewer and other living media used inbioart, as outlined by Kerbe & Schmidt (2015). It is clear that microbial media is lessproblematic from an ethical standpoint, however, in terms of affinity, materials could beuncomfortable for the viewer if they were potential biohazards, such as contagious pathogens.
Similarly, the use of animal materials prompted a strong critical response in the study,
suggesting a high level of affinity between the participants and the materials used. For tissuebased media, there are a number of contributing factors present leading to the liminal mix ofapathy and ethical concern, which then results in ambiguity. Along with form and movement,
awareness of where the materials have derived from is a contributing factor in ascertaining
feelings towards living media this, therefore, depends on the information being displayed on
exhibition labels. During display, the TC&A’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls list the materials of

22

As discussed in Chapter One, this contextual shift that causes discomfort or uncanniness can be found in art history
predating bioart, most notably in surrealism, exemplified by Méret Oppenheim’s Object (Le Déjeuner en Fourrure) (1936)[Figure 4.5]; the work comprises of a teacup and saucer covered in fur, which is a familiar object made strange by themateriality. While fur is a natural material and one that is considered to be a luxury consumer material, the inclusion of it on
an object that is concerned with drinking evokes a sense of discomfort.

177the work as ‘McCoy cell line, biodegradable/bioabsorbable polymer, surgical suture’ [Figure4.6], however, this does not specify the origin of the McCoy cells, therefore the viewer might
not be aware that these cells originated in mice.
The relationship between the viewer and the living artwork is, therefore, mediated byand contingent on the media used and knowing where this material is from. In encounteringliving tissue, removed from medical contexts and artificially grown and housed insidebioreactors, the works are confronting in their materiality, yet are not known previously
encountered living creatures that the viewer has a pre-established moral and ethical standpoint
towards. This ambiguity transmitted through the media of these works, therefore, allows forcriticism of the technologies. By not having a high level of affinity with the material combinedwith the uncanny forms often used by the artists, the effect of this is that it allows the viewer
to be critical of the technologies through the forms. It is not as highly emotionally charged as
Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny, where the welfare of the rabbit is central to the critical responses,
yet they demand a higher level of engagement and moral responsibility than microbial works.
This ambiguous middle ground, between overt ethical boundaries being crossed andimpartialism allows, therefore, a medium which invites critique by highlighting the plethora ofambiguities present in contemporary biotechnologies.

4.2.1 The Separation of Art and Science
In encountering living bioart, audiences become directly and implicitly engaged in the ongoingdebates of the uses and ethical implications of bioengineering technologies that pervade
contemporary life. This process of coming face-to-face with living art raises many potential
issues in both challenging the audience’s perspective on ethical debates, but also with the
ethical implications placed upon the viewer through the very act of viewing. The most frequent
debates instigated by living bioart works involve the ethical problems of the use of178

bioengineering technologies in art and by artists. Most significantly, living bioart often “raises
awkward (and unaddressed) ethical questions: what are the rights of a living creature that has
been reduced to art?” (Stracey, 2009, p.498). Therefore, it is not only the ethical implicationsof growing living materials using biotechnologies that is central to bioart criticism, but it is theuse of them for artistic means. These concerns call into question how we categorise, divide andvalue art and science, in addition to our expectations of which fields should create, use andengage in certain materials and processes. Fundamentally, these concerns contribute to thecultural separation of art and science and apply constraints to both fields, limiting creative
freedom and new possibilities. However, it is art that sees the constraints applied mostrestrictively as the concept of bioart explicitly critiques the usage of scientific tools throughart. In this ethical problem of justifying the use of biotechnologies in contemporary art, Annick
Bureaud (2018) states,
ethical rules in research and medicine are a delicate balance between risk (for humans)
and the abuse of, pain inflicted on, or fatal damage to the creatures used (non-human andhuman) in regard to the potential benefits (usually the health and well-being of humans).
Could ‘aesthetic interest’ be considered a criterion for ‘reasonable risk- or damagenecessity’? Experts judge art projects daily for grants and programs of all sorts, and it
seems to me no less or no more (ir)rational or subjective than the criteria used in scienceand medicine (p.85).
This demonstrates the different cultural expectations for science and art, not by each fieldindependently, but by subjective feelings and opinions which arise from culture itself, and thecultural norms and expectations of art and science. It suggests that it is a transgression of
accepted ethical norms for artists to utilise biological materials for purposes that sit outside ofbiomedicine and thatby exhibiting our very contradictions—that under certain circumstances you are allowed
to do what is otherwise considered immoral—art is not only questioning the ethics of(bio)science but is contributing to the larger debate: redefining where we put the limitsof what is acceptable—or not—and setting new, crossed hybrid hierarchies among theliving on which we are collectively elaborating (Bureaud, 2018, p.85-86).

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This exploration into our ethical positioning is enabled through the art encounter, as Bureaudsuggests, “by exhibiting our very contradictions” (2018, p.85) and creating a new and uniqueforum for a direct engagement with these technologies; however, this encounter re-presents
and re-purposes the technologies in new ways, challenging our expectations. Through thephysical encounter with living bioart, a direct confrontation is actualised by witnessing andliving with living biotechnologies where it becomes apparent that they are visceral, living
works of art and new lives that we do not know how to categorise or understand yet. Being on
display, existing as art objects for voyeurism and aesthetic spectacle, these lifeforms do notoffer cures for ailments, nor are they participants of clinical trials for new drugs to benefit
humanity; instead, they exist to provoke our emotions and our conscience in regards to ourhierarchical treatment and classification of other lifeforms, particularly the marginalised
lifeforms that have been artificially manufactured. This uncomfortable juxtaposition ofequating lower levels of life with commodities used for our own gain and benefit is revealed
through this method of explicitly exhibiting our double standards and the implicit reaction of
discomfort and ethical and moral unease of such exhibitions.
Alongside the discomfort suggested by the merging or blurring of boundaries separating
and controlling the use of biotechnologies, further criticism and unease is prompted in theconcern that bioart demonstrates uncontrolled usage of technologies. The fears of uncontrolled
use are not specifically confined to art but are more generalised fears over the potential
detrimental impacts of technologies, such as threats of bioterrorism. This discomfort is notwithout justification, however, given the misuse of experimentation in the past which led tothe establishment of bioethical regulations, particularly within Europe as,practical ethics in biotech and biomedical research laboratories, as well as legislation,
form a blurry landscape with varied rules and regulations that seem to be in constant flux,
without a shared homogeneity among the EU countries. Here and there the weight oflocal history, sometimes tied to medical scandals, can be witnessed—not to mention the
moral and mental scars left by World War II (Bureaud, 2018, p.85)

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The issue with bioart lies in the ambiguities that inform its ethical position; when it is on
display, despite most works being created in authorised laboratories alongside bio-scientists
following strict codes of conduct, this is not reiterated in the exhibition space. Instead, bioart
sculptures exist often without context, suggesting fears of the uncontrolled artist overtaking thecultural image of the uncontrolled scientist. The transition of biotechnologies into theexhibition space, therefore, appears as a transgressive act through the reconstruction of the
purpose and the consequent meaning of these materials. By publicly displaying actualisationsof contemporary bioscience, bioart prompts us to question our ethical standards and whether
these lifeforms should be protected or even created in the first instance, whether in the nameof art or science. It is, however, important to highlight that while bioart has gained significant
criticism, bioartists have only used the tools and techniques created by scientists that alreadyexist and are also being used behind closed laboratory doors. Therefore, the ethical dilemmaof bioart is not only concerned with living media so much as it is an issue of what we perceive
to be legitimate and justifiable uses of these technologies. Through the visceral, physicalpresence of these technologies, bioart draws upon our fears of unchecked usage, and represents
a reflection on our ethical limits, however, the monstrosity of bioart is not located in the
artworks, but within cultural hypocrisy over what we accept as reasonable or appropriate useof living biotechnologies.

4.2.2 The Objectification of the Art Other
In addition to prompting reflection on issues of ethical guidelines and appropriate usage of
biotechnologies, living bioart has also provoked contemplation on how we treat other forms oflife. Specifically, in encountering living bioart, not only are our subjective embodied feelings
affected, but through the encounter with the living other, our responses to a dependent,
purposefully created other that does not and could not exist outside of its display are brought

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into question. It is this posthuman perspective that many artists seek to intentionally reflect andexplore, particularly in regard to issues of responsibility towards new types of life asbiotechnologies force a reconfiguration of how we think about and classify what is living andwhat is natural. Stracey (2009) highlights this perspective, stating that “it has been argued that
this work emphasises our ethical responsibility towards ‘other humans, part-humans,
posthumans and non-humans with whom we cohabit and ... seek to perfect and control’”(p.499).
This responsibility to other life forms outside of traditional anthropocentric humanist
perspectives is one of the primary elements of posthuman thought, as discussed in Chapter
Two, and in displaying and encountering living bioart, the audience is affronted by new life
inhabiting the same spatial environment, therefore forcing the viewer to consider the new lifeand how to respond to it. By being vulnerable, dependent and reduced to performing as a workof art rather than afforded its own agency and freedom to exist as the lifeform that it is, living
bioart, especially manufactured tissue bioart, causes unease by forcing this objectification
through the act of viewing. Through exhibiting these works, audiences have no choice but tobe the spectator. There is no option for equality, as the very act of viewing is voyeuristic andin turn, objectifies the art subject further. It is this dichotomy, the unclear distinction as towhether the living work is, in fact, an object or subject, that intensifies the discomfort of living
artworks and forces the reconsideration of how we define life and our relationship with otherliving things. Instead of the bioart itself being uncomfortable, it is what it reveals, which “moreimportantly, it is our conceptions and beliefs about life and the living that are currently shaken
and have become unstable. That is the very issue of the redefinition of ethics and the basis of
our attitudes toward and relations to our fellow humans and other living creatures with whom
we are sharing the planet” (Bureaud, 2018, p.85). Consequently, the need for reassessment of182

ethical practices and processes is important in respect of new understandings of life and life’smaterials enabled through biotechnologies.

4.2.3 Ethical Responsibilities: Creation, Display and Viewership
There are many aspects of living bioart that incite criticism of ethical care and considerations
towards living matter, however, this is dependent on the audience being acutely aware of thematerials works are made from. Knowledge of the types of living matter used and the original
source of the materials have the potential to impact ethical or moral opinions on the art created
and biotechnologies in general. However, knowing how the works are cared for is a further
concern that presents a new challenge for artists, curators and the audience. The Tissue Culture& Art Project are transparent regarding both aspects of care for their works and the implications
and problems caused by creating them, such as the responsibility towards their death as wellas life (Vaage, 2016). This is evident in the feeding ritual being included as a performance inthe display of the Semi-Living Worry Dolls, and the killing ritual publicly enacted in the displayof Victimless Leather. However, this emphasis on responsibility and transparency is not evident
across all bioart practices. In particular, Stracey references Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny andstates that “what Kac and his supporters fail to discuss, however, is that GFP and otherfluorescent molecules used in imaging can cause cell damage. The fluorescent proteins in Alba
(and in Kac’s other organisms) might be toxic, if not fatal” (2009, p.499). Although theparticular gene that was implanted into the rabbit was named, Kac failed to highlight thepossible side effects of the process which could have potentially harmed the animal. This lackof transparency in bioart, particularly in respect to the possible harm processes could cause theliving materials, is problematic and simultaneously prevents a balanced ethical perspective byconcealing information, but also potentially increases ethical concerns by the lack of
information available.

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In addition to ethical anxieties, concerns regarding responsibility are also central tobioart debates (Vaage, 2016); this includes who is responsible for the living works created andhow this responsibility can be applied ethically and appropriately. Part of the complexities
around the ethics of responsibility lies in the collaborative foundation of bioart practices, withartists, scientists, laboratory technicians, ethics committees and more involved in the practice.
There is no one specific individual responsible for the creation of bioart works, but instead they
are the result of many individuals suggesting, therefore, that the role of responsibility is shared.
While the fundamental burden of responsibility is often placed on the artist, “what happens
when, or if, it is released into the wild? And who benefits from this life-sculpting process?”(Stracey, 2009, p.498). These are issues that again change the dimensions of responsibility andquestion the very act of bringing new life into existence, particularly when its’ position in theworld is unclear.
Furthermore, in the process of exhibiting and subsequently viewing bioart, the issue of
responsibility becomes even more complex as it is “less discussed when dealing with ethics,
the artist and the audience are the other recipients on whom responsibility is placed” (Bureaud,
2018, p.86). This issue of the implied or projected responsibility of living works onto theviewer is a complex and ambiguous one, which places the viewer in an uncomfortable positionof both needing to consent to viewing these works, but simultaneously has no real opportunity
to disagree. Bureaud compares this problematic encounter with performance art, asking, “canthe audience have a say during a performance? But who would dare to interrupt a performancethat is explicitly ‘at the edge’? Isn’t the artist responsible for him or herself? Where is the line
drawn? As long as it is ‘made public’, isn’t an artwork considered ‘safe’ for both the performer
and his or her audience?” (2018, p.86). This provides an important perspective on works ofliving bioart as by displaying them, artists and curators are implicitly implying that the works
are ‘safe’, however, the very point of bioart is often to disrupt expectations and challenge the184accepted norms, uses and ethics of bioengineering. This is exemplified in the experience of the
TC&A in 2003 when attempting to display a collaborative project with Stelarc, theyreceived correspondence from the exhibiting venue stating that there was no policy onpresenting living tissues in their gallery and requesting a statement from us that the work
did not raise ethical issues in general and in particular in the bio-medical community. We
could not give this assurance to the gallery as we see the primary aim of our work as
providing tangible examples of issues that need further ethical scrutiny (Zurr & Catts,
2014, p.208) .
Consequently, along with issues such as lack of transparency around the impact bioengineering
can have on such lives, these works are not necessarily ‘safe’.23 Furthermore, the ethicalimplications of bioart works are not only fundamental to bioart practices in critiquing
contemporary bioengineering, but are inherently engrained in these scientific practices andtherefore cannot be avoided.
While bioart is often created to invite discussion and criticism of bioengineering fromaudiences, there are few ways for audiences to actively voice their critique. The audiencecannot stop the display, free the living work or intervene in the processes. While this mirrors
the pervasive nature of biotechnologies, such as the prevalence of genetically modified food,it places responsibility on the audience, without consent, to act responsibly towards the workand to consider other life forms. However, importantly, for galleries and institutions in the UK
which hold a Human Tissue License, “the license has to be on display at all times during
exhibitions including human tissue, and visitors need to consent to viewing and not damaging
the works” (Solon, 2011, para.19). This, therefore, requires the viewer to consent to viewing,
but also to act responsibly towards the living works. Fundamentally, ethical issues found in thecreation of bioart are reflected in the experiences of viewing and participating in the

23This is also present in performance works, particularly where there is involvement of danger, injury or harm as theaudience is implicitly bound into a social contract with the artist through the process of viewing as they “not only watch but
also share the experience. They are communicated to and communed with, they ‘bea[r] witness’ to the ordeal” (Bennett,
2017, p.26).

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objectification of living works of art. For living bioart, “ethics is a dual issue of power andresponsibility” (Bureaud, 2018, p.86). The power in creating life produces a contract of
responsibility, however behind these actions sits the problematic issue of ethics and the
difficulty in establishing an appropriate ethical guideline for bioengineering technologies andanswering the ethical concerns that these works produce.
It is clear that in encountering living bioart, the viewer is encountering a new form oflife as well as a new form of art. This art object is simultaneously a living subject whichcollapses the traditional subject/object-based encounter, therefore, forcing a new type of
encounter. While ethical concerns have been raised towards the living materials used, there
must also be considerations for the psychological, physical and phenomenological effects thisengagement has upon the viewer. Through immersive, face-to-face encounters with living
tissue sculptures, criticism and new perspectives can emerge through the subjective, emotive
and psychological responses of the individual. This is enabled through the visual and physicalpresence of these works and the embodied experience which is not replicable throughrepresentation.
From an immediate, visual perspective, many works of bioart are visceral and raw
confrontations with living tissue that have not been previously encountered. While we are also
made from cells and tissues present in the works, the sculptures often lack skin, fur or hair that
normally act as boundaries separating the inner parts of the body and the outside world. The
exposure of vulnerable materials, removed from the body and reproduced in a context where
they are voyeuristic objects and reliant on their creators and viewers for ethical care, exposes
the uncomfortable reality of biotechnologies and the exploitation of other forms of life forhuman gain. Consequently, the living matter provokes an abject response, distancing theviewer emotionally and physically from it. This abjection is located in the living matter, as wellas in the conflations between the works as occupying both object and subject categories and186living and non-living categories. There is an immediate confusion regarding the life status ofthese works as the knowledge that they are living and are made from tissue and cells,
juxtaposed with encountering a static sculpture in a gallery setting creates a new andunprecedented encounter. Not fitting into any pre-existing category of life known, living bioart
is abject through its otherness and its liminal positioning between prior learned categories ofliving entities and the unknown, experienced through the visceral, face-to-face encounter withthe media.
As the forms of many tissue-based works imitate the human body, often in the shape oflimbs or organs, they conflate the self and other through sharing the same materiality, breaking
down this self/other distinction and therefore become abject. However, despite this abjection,
there appears to be enough vulnerability and intrigue present in the living bioart sculptures thatis sufficiently compelling to incite care for it, but also to be critical of the technologies, asevidenced in the responses given in Kerbe and Schmidt’s (2015) study. The materiality,
therefore, both ethically compels us to care for the works and orders us to do so by virtue ofsharing the same physical space as it. However, the materials become other by occupying aliminal space between categories leaving a feeling of uncertainty and renders the living
sculptures as other.

4.3 Materiality and the Uncanny Valley
Masahiro Mori’s uncanny valley is an idea that is fundamentally based on the aesthetic
properties of objects which appear human-like and the consequential psychological responses
they elicit. Mori’s initial paper, published in 1970, focused specifically on the appearance ofrobots that performed assistance functions such as working in factories, therefore, robots
designed to automate human processes. This aspect of performing human tasks appears
important to the theory as it focuses on the relationship between the human and the non-human,187

yet these non-humans take human-like appearances while fulfilling human tasks. Mori’s work
highlights the ongoing human fascination with creating life as “one of the long-term dreams
and fears of humans has been the ability to construct life from scratch” (Beloff, 2017, p.1), andthe ambiguity of different types of ‘life’, such as machines, that exist outside of natural
biological reproduction. Gray and Wegner (2012) state that “people have long been fascinatedwith the idea of creating humans” (p.125), from folklore to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein(1818), to “more recently, books and movies have imagined a time when computers and robots
will be fully human— our friends and enemies, our lovers and therapists” (p.125). It is thisongoing diversity of new life infiltrating and pervading many social and emotional aspects ofhuman lives, which we increasingly are becoming dependent on as they can enrich our lives,
however, “there is a commonality underlying many of them, an undercurrent of apprehension
or unease—the uncanniness of the inanimate made living” (Gray & Wegner, 2012, p.125).
Furthermore, the idea of artificially creating life in Shelley’s Frankenstein “produces anuncanny effect in us as it blurs the boundaries between fantasy and reality and the figure ofFrankenstein brings forth a range of feelings in us – from amazement to revulsion” (Beloff,
2017, p.1). However, as these ideas have spread beyond the realm of literature and fantasy into
actualised practices, so too have the uncanny feelings they evoke.
Mori’s theory speculates that the more human-like new life forms become, the morepositively people will respond to them and the more liked and accepted they will be. However,this affinity will only occur until a speculated, undefined point in which perceptions of objects
appearing or becoming too humanlike causes a sudden dislike, inciting feelings of creepinessor unease. Mori demonstrates this using a linear graph, and the sudden dislike is shown in a
deep curve in a loss of affinity, which is the uncanny valley. For Mori, this decline in likability
is problematic if robots and androids need to assimilate into society to assist with tasks andtherefore warned roboticists to take this into account when producing their designs.

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The effect of the uncanny valley has, however, had a wider spread than just robotics,
despite Mori’s theory only focusing on robot design. One of the major sources for stimuli being
cited as uncanny is digital animation, found in both film and video game production, as
discussed in Chapter Two. With the advancement of animation technologies, including theability to digitise people using motion capture technologies and CGI, higher levels of realism
have been realised in these media, therefore, increasing the human-likeness of animatedcharacters (Wolchover, 2011). This subsequently increases the likelihood of the uncanny valley
effect, as it becomes more difficult to distinguish between reality and animation. This effecthas been witnessed in cultural responses to certain films or games, which demonstrate this highlevel of realism, with criticism of characters for being creepy or strange. It is this cultural effectthat has seen the uncanny valley to have “already attained a dogmatic status” (Burleigh,Schoenherr & Lacroix, 2013, p.2), despite the relatively recent uptake in research into theeffect.
The uncanny valley has pervaded many forms of media, and despite its negative effects,
examples of it continue to emerge in popular culture; as previously discussed, animated films
including Sonic the Hedgehog (2020) and Cats (2019), in addition to The Polar Express (2004)
have all been cited as examples of the uncanny valley and prompted negative critical responses,
despite predominantly being aimed at children, as “no one would expect a holiday children’s
movie to generate such reactions. It is particularly interesting then when such a movie, The
Polar Express, can be cited as an example of incidental horror” (Burleigh, Schoenherr &Lacroix, 2013, p.1). Through the use of animated characters, it has been “suggested that thenear-perfect human likeness of the animation was responsible for people’s negative reaction toit” (Burleigh, Schoenherr & Lacroix, 2013, p.1). The pervasiveness of the uncanny valley effectin both human and non-human characters has led to the development of suggested guidelines
for animators and designers to assist with preventing characters from falling into the uncanny189valley; with suggestions to prevent this, including avoiding strong deviations from normal or
expected features when rendering realistic figures, incorporating childlike and appealing
features such as large eyes and healthy skin tones, and conversely, amplifying uncanny valley
characteristics for villainous characters to draw contrast and promote a negative relationship(Schwind, Wolf & Henze, 2018).
It is this presence of the uncanny valley in mainstream cinema, as well as video games,that has led to an acceptance of Mori’s theory, however, only recently has there been muchresearch and experimentation into the validity of the theory and what specifically is behind thecause of these responses. This research is necessary as despite the prevalence of uncannycharacters, and guidelines for animators in trying to avoid the effect, Mori’s initial paper “doesnot, however, offer a causal explanation of eeriness; it does not explain why stimuli that arenearly perfectly human are perceived as eerie” (Burleigh, Schoenherr & Lacroix, 2013, p.2).
This, therefore, suggests that phenomena such as animation guidelines are directly informedby experience and cultural response rather than any known underlying psychologicalmechanisms that might specifically cause the effect.
Although Mori does not offer a causal explanation for the uncanny effect, he does
highlight a key indication into what could affect the response by plotting two separate curves
on the linear graph which demonstrates the uncanny valley. Mori’s initial work plotted thesuggested correlative affinity between people and objects that resemble humans using two
separate curves on a linear graph; one curve representing static objects and the otherrepresenting moving objects. Along both curves, Mori gives examples of objects and theirapparent likeability based on their appearance. The static curve begins with a stuffed animal,
which is also the peak of affinity along this curve, which then descends into the uncanny valley
with a corpse, and then regains some affinity, but still in the valley with a prosthetic hand. The
prosthetic hand is plotted on both curves and appears at the same point in the uncanny valley190

on both curves, suggesting that whether static or moving, prosthetic limbs are always uncanny.
Along the curve of moving objects, Mori begins with industrial robots, which are plottedclosest to the baseline than any other object on either curve. Humanoid robots appear justbefore the highest peak of the curve, before the curve descends into the uncanny valley, where
zombies sit at the very bottom of the dip. As the curve begins to recover, prosthetic hands sit
near the top of the valley, and as the curve rapidly ascends back into positive affinity, bunraku
puppets sit just before a healthy, living person.24
Moving objects that resemble humans demonstrate both a greater increase in positiveaffinity at a certain level of aesthetic resemblance, around the point of a humanoid robot, butsimilarly demonstrates a greater dip into the uncanny valley, around the point of zombies. In apractical sense, this demonstrates the threat that arises from movement as a static agent is lesslikely to present a threat to the self than a moving one. This strengthening of the response withthe element of movement potentially ties into the suggested evolutionary reasoning for theuncanny valley, which is linked to theories of danger avoidance, mortality salience andpathogen avoidance (Moosa & Ud-Dean, 2010). Danger avoidance theory locates the responseof eeriness to humanlike forms as an instinctive response to otherness and outsiders and thethreat they could present to the self. In this way, a corpse may be uncanny and evoke fear as
an evolutionary response to avoid potential pathogens or disease. Death is often cited as beinga source for the uncanny, with Moosa and Ud-Dean (2010) ordering the responses to deathaccording to how the strength of the uncanny feeling increases as follows:
1. Dead insect – as a matter of fact, many of us kill insects (mosquitoes, cockroaches,etc.) without even having the feeling of regret
2. Decomposing insect body
3. Dead small animal
4. Decomposing small animal
5. Dead large animal
6. Decomposing large animal
7. Human corpse
24

Bunraku puppets are traditional Japanese puppets, almost life-sized and carved from wood, they have been used in puppet
theatres since the seventeenth century.

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8. Decomposing/freshly dead mutilated corpse
9. Freshly dead mutilated corpse with sudden movements (p.13).
Therefore, not only is it the most humanlike that is the most uncanny, but it is the mosthumanlike that is not presented as it should be. Where a dead body is uncanny, a mutilated
corpse is more uncanny as the body is violated and the rotting state of the body demonstrates
the change from life to death, self to other, existing to not existing; thus, it is a visual threat tothe self, as it demonstrates the body decomposing and becoming other. However, in respect of
movement and how movement increases the effect, a moving ‘other’ poses more threat than
one that cannot move. In this scale of negative affinity, a moving corpse presents the strongest
feelings as it is unnatural for the dead to move, thus sudden movements by the dead poses athreat to the natural order. From an evolutionary perspective, movement is strongly linked tomoving threats or even predators and, therefore, moving humanlike figures that are not the self
are likely to pose a threat.
In exploring the concept of danger avoidance to explain the uncanny valley
phenomenon, it has been suggested that categorisation based danger avoidance is a moreaccurate or defined method of understanding the danger posed; that is, an avoidance of stimuli
which is difficult or impossible to file into known categories, such as human or not human.
This approach was first researched using “morphed images of real, stuffed, and cartoon humanfaces as stimuli and measured both a likability score and categorisation latency to classify each
image into a given categorization class. They found that the likability score was lowest when
the categorization latency was highest” (Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya & Yamada, 2017, p.129).
Therefore, a delay in recognising and subsequently categorising different types of human faces,
directly correlated with low levels of likeability, thus rendering the resulting stimulus to be
more likely within the uncanny valley. What this categorisation latency means is that “an object
with such an improbable appearance is not categorized into already acquired classes of objects,

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is probably judged as a stranger to be avoided, and, consequently, has a low likability score”(Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya & Yamada, 2017, p.129). Therefore, categorisation based stranger
avoidance explains the phenomenon of the uncanny valley as a psychological barrier in being
able to quickly and accurately identify an object into a set of objects that has already beenlearned, such as a human face or the face of a known animal; instead of identifying the object,
the individual cannot categorise it due to ambiguities in its appearance and therefore arouses
feelings of uncertainty or eeriness which results in the uncanny valley.
In identifying what specifically causes the uncanny valley and which objects may
prompt the response, it appears that “the uncanny valley likely depends on extensions of prepotent responses to stimuli via general learning mechanisms” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015,p.1) which includes abilities to recognise faces and, therefore, “negative responses are the resultof a lack of familiarity” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.1). Mori’s initial paper and most of
the current literature tends to focus on the effects of human likeness in causing the uncanny
valley “when human likeness is operationalized as a merger of human and non-humancategories, or when a human likeness continuum is paired with one or more atypical features”(Burleigh, Schoenherr & Lacroix, 2013, p.2). However, the element of familiarity being
important suggests that there is no universal uncanny valley, but rather that it is culturally
dependent based on norms and exposures within these cultures. Therefore, where one object
may have high affinity within one cultural context, it could potentially be perceived as uncannyin a different one. The uncanny valley, therefore,emphasizes the deviation of an object’s appearance from a human one as the decisive
factor causing eeriness in the uncanny valley phenomenon. It thus focuses on human
likeness in the stimulus continuum from non-human to human. On the other hand, thecategorization-based explanation does not always focus on human likeness. It thus
assumes a more general cognitive function to emotionally evaluate an object on the basisof categorization (Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya & Yamada, 2017, p.131).

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In terms of understanding the mechanisms of danger avoidance stemming from conflict in
categorisation, Schoenherr and Burleigh (2015) suggest that “a particularly compelling sourceof evidence for the uncanny valley comes from research into folktaxonomies” (p.1). As
opposed to the technical categorisation of scientific taxonomy, folk taxonomy refers to lessprecise, vernacular categorisation of organisms, such as ‘insect’, as opposed to specific species
of insects. Schoenherr and Burleigh (2015) explain that “when we encounter an organism, ourknowledge of folkbiological categories can cause us to classify stimuli in terms of a species(e.g., “fish”) or an ecological niche (e.g., “aquatic habitat”) that is available within afolktaxonomic structure” and that “while the preferred level of categorization within thesetaxonomies differs between cultures and expertise such taxonomies form the basis for all
judgements of category membership” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.1). However, in respectof how categorising objects can affect the uncanny response, they “suggest that cognitive
anthropological research on folktaxonomies has revealed uncanny valley-like phenomena in
the form of ‘covert categories’– categories that cannot be readily placed into a taxonomical
structure” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.1). This suggests that visual ambiguities which
disrupt recognition and subsequent categorisation could cause an uncomfortable response, suchas a robot with a human face. This lack of ability to categorise, therefore, suggests an innate
predisposition to avoid that which cannot be recognised or assimilated.
This recognition and categorisation using folk taxonomies is not only limited to objects
with a human-likeness, but also when two distinct objects are merged, distorting the ability tocategorise them such as “hybrids and monsters, [as] such entities tend to combine features fromdisparate categories; ranging from the addition of a single feature, such as unicorns which are
horses with a horn” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.2). This strengthens the idea behindcategorisation based stranger avoidance, which places emphasis on the known, whereas
hybrids are often visually and categorically ambiguous. This effect was demonstrated by194

Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya & Yamada (2017), who ran a study “using morphed images of a tomato
and a strawberry as stimuli” (p.130). Using the two fruits as an example, this study found thatwith low categorisation ability of the image, participants reacted with a low desire to consume
the morphed fruit, however, when the fruits were distinguishable and categorised easily, there
was an increased desire to eat the known fruits. This is significant as it demonstrates the safety
and likeability of the known and the unease that comes with the collapse of the known, evenwhen the hybrid is a result of two known objects.
In addition to the visual hybridisation of food, such as the aforementioned hybrid
representation of a tomato and a strawberry, Schoenherr and Burleigh (2015) suggest that “theuncanny valley could also have implications for recall that facilitates the cultural transmissionof knowledge. As in the case of food taboos, such a negative valence might reduce ourwillingness to interact with features of our environment, thereby further reducing our exposure
to a range of stimuli” (p.2). This suggests that cultural knowledge and values and the ways they
are communicated has the potential to impact future relationships with stimuli. Furthermore,in the age of pervasive biotechnologies, sources of the uncanny continue to become lessvisually distinct, with the uncanny valley “also evidenced in genetically modified organismsthat antagonist interest groups have labelled ‘Frankenfoods,’ such as the transgenic tomato”(Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.2). As a consequence of these new biotechnologies, ideas ofwhat is natural and what is artificial collide and create new problems for categorisation which
are beyond the visual confusion of likeness, but instead are more theoretical and abstract,
questioning our own methods of categorisation.
Given the range of stimuli cited as being uncanny, it is suggested that “the uncanny
valley might reflect a primary response to unfamiliar or covert categories” (Schoenherr &Burleigh, 2015, p.3). This suggests a strange feeling of eeriness or unease can emerge when
encountering something unexpected such as a robot with a human appearance, or an animated195

character that appears to look real. However, the uncanny valley emerges as a response whenrealising that while resembling a living human, there is something detectably ‘off’ about thesefigures, which is due to a delay in being able to identify the figure being human or not. It is this
delay in recognition or categorisation that prompts an inherent feeling of discomfort or unease.
Therefore, “in the absence of having prior knowledge of an individual or group, the relative
distinctiveness of a category, due to a lower frequency of exposure, will produce negative
affect” (Schoenherr & Burleigh, 2015, p.3). This means that using Mori’s example of robots,
it is the sudden, jarring realisation that robots with human-like appearances are robots, nothumans, the recognisable category for human-looking stimuli that causes the uncanny valley
effect. Robots are still emerging technologies and, therefore, it is the double-take that thehuman-like objects produce that triggers a misrecognition and difficulty in categorisation thatcauses the uncanny valley. Therefore, not only can the uncanny valley be culturally or
historically dependent, but is suggestive of a future ability to change, for example, if humanlike robots become more commonplace, would the effect still occur, or would something new
begin to inhabit the uncanny valley?
The categorisation issue is a direct result of our experience of objects rather than theinherent aesthetic qualities of them. It is the process of experiencing them which causes thelapse in categorisation abilities. For Mori’s theorisation, machinery with a high level of human
likeness are not practically different from ones which do not look human-like, furthermore,they are both fundamentally robots, instead, it is the human perception of the robots when we
see them functioning and performing human tasks. In this way, the human-looking robot ismore difficult to categorise than the machine looking robot as “humanlike robots are not only
unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, wesuggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience (the capacity196

to feel and sense), rather than agency (the capacity to act and do)” (Gray & Wegner, 2012,p.125).
In understanding the critical responses towards bioart, the same categorisation based
danger-avoidance that is used to explain the uncanny valley can offer an explanation for the
discomfort that bioart works appear to elicit. The uncanny valley occurs when non-humanobjects appear to become too humanlike and therefore become difficult to categorise,consequently producing a negative response. However, when looking at bioart made fromliving tissue, the atypical features that problematise categorisation are not only aesthetic but
contingent on materiality and life status that are simultaneously human-like, but not human;
this is because “an uncanny sense of nature is currently emerging around us, which is causedby the fact that today, increasing amounts of biological organisms are based on man-madedesign” (Beloff, 2017, p.2). While the flesh-like materials visually appear similar to thematerials of our bodies, the similarity extends beyond a visual similarity; instead, it is theknowledge that these artworks are alive and produced from cells taken from living animals or
people that provokes a difficulty in categorising them into known fields. Furthermore, living
bioart presents not only the conflation of two categories, but multiple categorical conflicts
simultaneously, occupying the categories of human and non-human, living and non-living, artand science, subject and object, and yet not precisely fitting into any of these categories.
Therefore, the complexity of their creation and socio-cultural-philosophical positionality
makes categorising these works difficult, if not impossible.
Moving beyond only aesthetic stimuli as a source of the uncanny valley, there appears
to be many contributing factors to evoking sensations of the uncanny, including movement, as
initially demonstrated by Mori, that are important in affecting the strength of the uncanny
effect. The increased intensity of response appears to be linked to the more humanlike a being
is, the more this has a negative impact. For bioart, the materiality, being both living and197

humanlike, therefore, poses a similar threat and consequently a similar effect. Being
constructed from living matter but being a recognisable animal, or even fully living, it is clearthat bioart suggests a strong uncanny effect through its materiality. Hence, it is not only theaesthetic profile of an object that might cause the uncanny valley, but a collaborative effect ofhuman-like features that prompts a greater response of unease and a greater dip into theuncanny valley.

4.3.1 The Uncanny Valley of Bioart
The notion of the uncanny valley, where affinity with an object is contingent on specificaesthetic features, where the strength of the effect can increase based on additional
characteristics such as movement, offers a compelling and dynamic insight into both the criticalintentions and critical responses towards living material-based bioart. According to Laura
Beloff, “where Mori was investigating robots and their human-likeness in relation to humansensations, the author points towards comparable sensations and experience when concerning
biological organisms that are either manipulated or designed by humans” (2017, p.2).
Therefore, following Mori’s analysis of the relationships between humans and human-likerobots and objects with human-like appearances, it is possible to see parallels between thepsychological processes which produce the uncanny response in the materiality of bioart. The
process of categorisation based danger avoidance functions through psychological processesof categorising learned stimuli into known categories, for example, a person or a cat. However,
one of the key features with robots or objects with a high level of realism in their human-likeappearance is that viewers struggle to immediately categorise them as either human or robot as
they appear to occupy both categories and neither simultaneously; they seem to be somethingelse, something which has not yet been encountered and therefore does not have a learned
category for it to fit into.

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In the context of bioart, the number of conflictive categories is high and subject tochange based on both aesthetic appearance and dependent on knowing the materials that areused; for example, an artwork which includes human material may evoke a categorisation issue
where the viewer is aware of this material inclusion compared to if it is used and the viewer isunaware. This is apparent in the exhibition label for the TC&A’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls,
which, as previously discussed, lists the materials as being McCoy line cells without explicit
reference to what these cells are or where they came from. Therefore, the work may evoke adifferent response if the materials were more explicitly detailed. Furthermore, works which
visibly resemble hybrids by highlighting the humanity and the lack of being fully human may
also evoke categorisation difficulties. This is evident in Czarnecki’s Heirloom, where thesculptures are portraits intended to represent the appearances of the artist’s daughters.
However, with this work, the most immediate categorisation difficulty is not only themateriality but also the conflict between the portraits as appearing as a hybrid between bothliving and dead. This is because although the portraits are made from living genetic materialsof the individuals they portray, they appear like “living mortuary masks” (Bureaud, 2016,
para.16). The juxtaposition of living materials resembling death masks, therefore, evokes aconflict and produces a jarring momentary inability to recognise the works as being living or
not; that is, depicting the living or the dead. The work, in fact, however, is simultaneously bothliving and non-living, therefore this inability to correctly categorise the work is because there
is no single category for it to belong to, as with all living bioart works discussed in this thesis.
The materiality evoking a sense of uncanniness is because these “artistic works no longer
simulate nor create representations of the world. They deal with the actual real” (Beloff, 2017,p.4). Therefore, moving beyond representation of biotechnologies to using and presenting
actualised real materials suggests an effect evoked by the vitality of the media used.

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A dominant feature present among a majority of these works, in addition to theirmateriality, is the ways in which they resemble parts of the human form. Unlike the purposefulhuman-like resemblance of Heirloom, the Semi-Living Worry Dolls are suggestive of theuncanny valley through their close proximity to known forms of imitating human appearance,that is, the figure of the doll. Where the uncanny valley arises from a conflation of the toohuman-like with the non-human, it appears on the surface that the lack of sophistication in therendering of worry dolls would not cause a strong reaction. However, the living materiality ofthe dolls adds a dimension of unfamiliarity and discomfort as it produces a living, almosthuman but distinctly not-human figure. Similarly, the living reproduction of an ear using
human genetic materials, as in Strebe’s Sugababe, elicits a duality of the human, but not fully
human. Severed limbs and prosthetics have previously been cited as being uncanny as perMori’s initial graph, however, here the artwork invites further layers of familiarity andunfamiliarity as the ear is an independent living object, not an artificial ear or a severed deadear. Strebe’s ear is, therefore, not a known or previously encountered form of limb but one thatis new and occupies a liminal space between natural and manufactured.
This categorisation conflict is also present in Karle’s Regenerative Reliquary, which
although does not yet contain living materials, resembles a human body part but exists
separately to a body. In addition to this, there are the conflicting categories present in many ofthese bioart works, of art/science, art object/living subject, living/non-living, human/nonhuman and self/other which are inherently present in the fundamental process of bioart
creation. These categories are learned, pre-established categories that bioart, by its nature ofbeing a hybridised transdisciplinary practice, does not fit neatly into. Therefore, when bioart isencountered, it is a new form of imaginative, critical exploration that is difficult to comprehend
as an art practice that has been encountered before, or as a form of biotechnology that is often
encountered indirectly or subconsciously.

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As an emergent form of creativity and cultural criticism, bioart has demonstrated new
relationships between the viewer and the art. This has occurred through merging two previously
culturally separate fields of art and science, bringing the hidden processes of biotechnology
into visible public realms, and displacing the traditional viewing arrangement of viewer/object
with a subject/subject encounter. Furthermore, this subject/subject encounter is not as clear cut
as perhaps viewing an animal in a zoo whereby both parties are active individual agents, albeit
the animals are not consenting to captivity, yet here instead the viewer has agency andautonomy, and the living artwork is vulnerable and dependent on the viewer as well as its
creator for care and ethical treatment. Together with criticism and concern regarding bioart
posing as a potential misuse of scientific materials and processes, which appears to be
somewhat ironic and part of the point of bioart to highlight our ethical boundaries in general,bioart has and continues to provoke strong emotive reactions from audiences and critics alike.
Criticisms of bioart, together with the general reception towards living bioart works,
suggests a relationship with the viewer is contingent on multiple related facets of materiality.
The effects of materiality appear to parallel Mori’s configuration of the uncanny valley inrobotics, humanoid machines and objects, however with human-like materiality replacing
human-like appearance. This consequently suggests an impact on levels of positive affinity ora negative response are subject to the materials used, which is supported by Kerbe andSchmidt’s (2015) study, which found that bioart works which used human matter generated
the highest levels of ethical concern while microorganisms garnered very little concern bycontrast. However, artificially grown tissue culture, being a new form of life, appears
ambiguous in eliciting some level of ethical concern, but less than living animals.
Mirroring Mori’s graph of the uncanny valley, there is a steady level of increasing
discomfort that rises from bioart that changes through materiality. The uncanny valley of bioart
plunges into a similar irrecoverable dip when the materiality becomes too human-like until it

201becomes fully, unaltered human. However, works that use human materials, that are either nonliving or bodily fluids, such as Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ (1987) [Figure 4.7], which uses a
photograph of the artist’s own urine, and Andrew Krasnow’s Palette (1992-1999), which uses
donated human skin, that do not necessarily fit the definition of bioart that this thesis focuseson, still do not have high levels of affinity despite using human materials.25 These works
demonstrate an effect that is abject as the materials used have been directly removed from thebody, whereas tissue bioart has an additional effect of uncanniness by being a living subject
created through artificial methods.
Therefore, using Mori’s proposed relationship between a human-like appearance andaffinity, it would appear that the more human-like a work is through its materiality, the greater
the level of concern and consequential criticism it incites. However, with tissue art, these works
are living, but not living subjects that have been encountered before that occur naturally outsideof human intervention. They simultaneously appear human-like and non-human, which
manifests through new uses of living materiality and the objectification of the living matter
through the use of it as art media. These works consequently “tamper with expectations of how
things used to be. These kind of experimental artworks present us moments when the boundary
between fantasy and reality is broken and we are faced with the reality of something that wehave until now considered imaginary” (Beloff, 2017, p.4). If, therefore, it is the aim of bioartists
in using living media to explore and critique contemporary biotechnologies by partaking in thesame processes, it appears that innate human psychological functions assist in this endeavour
through evolutionary responses to the unknown, the uncategorisable and the other. This isbecause, “to put the point perhaps over-simply: we are more shocked by bio-art than by abstract
debate, because bio-art utilizes, in culturally compelling ways, the technologies we may want

25

Although not human material, Wim Delvoye’s Art Farm, established in China in 2004 would also be applicable here,
where the artist tattooed living pigs with a range of designs. Although pigs are not human, tattooing is recognised as ahuman behaviour and practice.

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to interrogate” (Simoniti, 2017, p.125). Bioart, therefore, “both observes and explores thepossibilities of the uncanny nature – a nature or reality that used to be familiar but which has
been modified in a laboratory, extended with various agencies and components, which all
together form a hybrid ecology” (Beloff, 2017, p.4).
By using, exposing and forcing an encounter with biotechnologies, bioart is a
confrontation with the other which cannot be categorised into known categories due to its new
and unknown nature. This, therefore, evokes responses of alienation which consequently
allows for a more objective scrutinisation of both the technologies and materials used, as wellas bioethics in general. Therefore, it appears that the aims of artists are assisted by our
evolutionary responses to otherness, which is achieved by removing bioengineering from its
original context, breaking down boundaries and categorisation of what is art or what is science,and reimagining these technologies to explore our hopes, fears and questions over our future.
Through innate responses to unknown or new stimuli, that is, bioart, our subjective experiences
through the encounter allows for a greater level of understanding and critical judgement ofbiotechnologies, together with our ethical and moral obligations towards other forms of life,
and our complex relationships towards them as the creator of them, the users of them for new
products, and critics of them.

203Chapter Five: Bioart as a Product and Reflection of the Anthropocene

The materiality of bioart is a central feature of the genre that affects, problematises and alters
traditional expectations of art and science, in addition to traditional viewership and embodied
art encounters. Bioart has attracted both criticism and intrigue for its ethically ambiguous
positioning between contemporary art and living bioengineered materials, which has resulted
in complex debates as to whether it is an acceptable use of living materials, that is to reducethem to the status of an art object. However, when considering these ethical issues in a wider
context, they reveal deeper socio-cultural concerns that infiltrate contemporary science. The
use of living animals in scientific experiments and research is a well-documented practice, andone which is culturally sensitive and has prompted many well-publicised critiques andarguments (Ormandy & Schuppli, 2014); it is a known practice, and despite moral discomfort,
it continues to be a common practice that is often mandated by law in that many drugs, medical
procedures and cosmetics must be tested on animals before they can be used by humans(Archibald, Coleman & Drake, 2019). A key difference between the established practice ofanimal testing and grown tissue culture is largely concerned with the ambiguity of the ethicalstatus of the tissue, which is a reflection of its uncertain life status. Bioengineering is rapidly
infiltrating many aspects of society, such as food production and medicine, and, therefore, these
uncertainties must be discussed in order to be better understood. Through bioart practices wider
debates about the uses and processes of these new technologies can be explored as a cultural
turn and not only as a response to art.
The introduction of new biotechnologies has often resulted in fear and anxieties
regarding the impact of such technologies, including our relationship with the natural world,
as well as concerns over potential misuse, for example, fears of bioterrorism or compulsory
microchipping as previously discussed. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the204expansion of biotechnological capabilities has accelerated, altering life through the increased
abilities of manipulating and editing living structures at a microscopic level, as discussed in
Chapter One. However, synthetic lifeforms, grown from cells into larger tissue forms, are still
an emerging technology and, therefore, their position within contemporary culture remains
unclear. The emergence of bioart as an artform that explores biotechnologies by using them as
its media suggests a pervasive interest in these technologies as they have become the media ofcontemporary life. Both the use of living materials and the use of life editing and altering
technologies have become important tools trialed in attempts to alter and design humangenomics; through this, biotechnologies have demonstrated the potential to improve humanhealth from gene editing to eliminate diseases, to artificially growing organs fortransplantation. As such, this in turn suggests a future where humans can live longer, healthierlives, however, the ethical implications of changing the fundamental structures of the humanbody are complex and remain unanswered. The responses to bioart artworks has, however,been to challenge the ethical considerations of the use of living materials as suitable and ethicalmedia for art. Conversely, as a deliberate attempt to reflect on the ethics and morality ofbiotechnological capabilities, bioartists have exposed the hypocritical double standards
attached to ethical conduct towards other forms of life. The criticisms aimed at bioart works
are not the same criticisms directed towards the same biotechnologies used in medicine,
agriculture and biosciences. They are aimed at the appropriation of scientific media by artists
which suggests that artists do not share the same benefits that allows for ethical problems to be
accepted or suppressed for human gain.
In considering the confrontational otherness of bioart, it is easy to overlook the fact thatthese ‘other’ lifeforms are, in fact, the product of human enquiry and construction.
Furthermore, the liminality and abjection of these same life forms are the product of ethicalapproval by institutional ethics committees, moral views and subjective value systems. This is205

evident in the marginalisation and criticisms of bioart, which is not replicated by the productsof the same technologies through medicine, with artist Adam Zaretsky stating that “because I
am an artist, I am not shielded by the rhetoric of moral sanctity implicit in the public face of
scientific rationalisation” (2007, p.275). In many ways, bioart is a reflection of contemporary
humanity, current scientific and artistic interests and concerns, and of the current socio-cultural
positioning at the very beginnings of manipulating life to suit subjective, humancentric needs
and desires. As a mirror, encountering bioart allows us to encounter and be confronted by theseself-reflexive concerns. Exploring the role of bioart as a reflection of contemporary concernsand practices that enables a critique of technologies with greater objectivity ties into theobjectives of many bioartists in inviting discussion and debate around the use of
biotechnologies. However, in doing this, artists must acknowledge the hypocritical nature of
their usage of biotechnologies in order to incite these debates. Consequently, separating thisconscious and deliberate act of hypocrisy from artists who do not acknowledge the hypocrisy
is problematic, yet, this reflects the true complexities present in our relationship withbiotechnologies and other life forms in the twenty-first century.

5.1 The Function of Abjection
Abjection, as an embodied reactionary response to otherness in relation to aspects of the body,
is a warning of the transgression of boundaries as the abject sits in opposition to object andconsequently is a place “where meaning collapses” (Kristeva, 1982, p.2), as previously
discussed in Chapter Two. As evident in the perceptions of living bioart, the abject arises fromthe lack of distinction between the self and the other, which manifests through the living
materiality. The living or semi-living bioart sculpture appears to occupy a space that is
equidistant between the living body and the corpse, which is a source of abjection as it
represents “cesspool and death. Without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me what206

I permanently thrust aside in order to live. Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, fromloss to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit-cadaver”(Kristeva, 1982, p.4). This liminal space of bioart, between life and death, presents a crisis of
the self and its borders as the “abject never ceases to haunt the borders of identity; it constantly
threatens to dissolve the unity of the subject” (Ross, 1997, p.149), which manifests in bioart asits materiality simultaneously occupies the position of the self and the other, sometimes throughthe vitality of the materiality, and sometimes even genetically. The mechanism of abjection istriggered by materiality in the visceral, physical sense of encounter, but also through theadditional knowledge of exactly what the material is made of and the fact that it is alive.
Abjection is a warning from the body of an outside threat from the self when part of the self iscast off and becomes other. It is a crisis of identity in response to the body and bodily functions
that become othered or discarded. By inhabiting human forms and being made from living
materiality, occupying the roles of both subject and object, self and other, bioart threatens theidentity of the human body. By inciting an innate response of rejection, bioart presents a threat
to current boundaries of the body and to the understanding of what it is to be human and to bea living subject.
In understanding whether the effect of abjection is an intended aspect of bioart or an
unexpected but instinctual reaction to bodily otherness, it is useful to look at the role ofabjection in a wider context where it is often addressed in response to the female body or bodies
that are in some way ‘other’. Addressing this use of abjection, Caroline Ross asks, “is the useof revulsion and disgust a shock strategy elaborated in response to a cybernetic age where thebody is threatened with disappearance into virtual reality?” (Ross, 1997, p.149). Bioart, as abody of otherness, presents an encounter with the future of the human body as biotechnology
continues to inform medical practices. This, therefore, represents both a promise and a threat
to the body but is manifested in feelings of shock and repulsion through the living materiality.

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However, Ross (1997) suggests that “the contemporary use of the abject is indeed a ‘return tothe body,’ but one that produces an excessivity that problematises the absence/presence duality
and opens up new cybernetic definitions of subjectivity” (Ross, 1997, p.149). Looking at theabjection of bioart as a return to the body suggests that the confronting otherness that itpresents, offers a reimagining of the body as a new conception of humanity. In embracing thefusion of the body and technology, the abject can reveal a new framework for the body and ourrelationship to it. The instinctual nature of recognising otherness in living materiality, and theways in which it threatens the identity boundaries of the self and the other, is not limited tobioart but can also be found in the public responses to new processes and products ofbioengineering. This is because bioart is only a repurposing of the materials and tools of
bioengineering, suggesting that it is the fundamental act of artificially altering life which
provokes abjection. However, instead of responses to bioengineering products being
specifically abject, these responses are referred to as producing the ‘yuck factor’.

5.1.1 The Yuck Factor
The abject response provoked by the visceral materiality of bioart sculptures is mirrored insimilar public responses to products and outcomes of biotechnology, in particular those withmedical and environmental functions. Known as the ‘wisdom of repugnance’ or the ‘yuck
factor’, the effect has been used to describe the responses of visceral or graphic processes oruses of biotechnologies and refers to the effect in the self rather than the stimuli that prompts
the response. The yuck factor describes “the influence of instinctive responses against newtechnology” and is a “catchall phrase to describe techphobic sentiments that vary by what
triggers them” (Schmidt, 2008, p.525). In terms of what produces the effect, the yuck factor
has been observed in response to a wider range of technologies, including cloning of animals,
genetically modified crops, and the consumption of recycled wastewater. As a response to208technologies, the yuck factor reveals “that violating moral codes relating to divinity andsanctity can provoke reactions of disgust. Studies that involve creating and destroying humanembryos have elicited such reactions” (Schmidt, 2008, p.526). Morality as a signifier of theyuck factor is a marked difference from ethical practices. Practices such as destroying humanembryos are legal practices that have therefore been permitted by ethics committees, so longas they are given permission to destroy them by the parents (Douglas & Savulescu, 2009).
However, morality does not equate to ethics, as morality refers to personal, or culturally
specific perspectives, whereas ethics aim for objective, logical perspectives that consequently
contribute to legislation and decision making; this difference is described by Deleuze as,
the difference is that morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort,ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent
values (this is good, that’s bad…); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do,what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved (Deleuze, 1997, p.100).
The difference here is that where ethics is a deliberate set of rules that are designed to judge
actions and behaviours that we are not ordained to follow, morality is both more constraining
and more ambiguous as it is based on values that are more difficult to determine. When dealing
with biotechnologies, therefore, there is a greater span of moral concerns due to the number ofsubjectivities present within society and the ways different people perceive good or bad.
Morality is dependent on many subjective factors and not necessarily based on fact or evidence,but on feelings of how one should behave in relation to others, such as whether behaviours areor should be altruistic or just (Joyce, 2006). Feelings of morality may vary within cultures and,
therefore, are difficult for scientists to navigate in communicating new technologies. This is acomplex issue that is imperative for the success of new technologies that offer beneficial use
to humans, but simultaneously keeps the positivism of science in check and held to account.
In relation to the technologies used by artworks in this thesis, the prospective benefitsof bioprinting as a technology to increase the supply of human organs for donation could be“an attractive alternative as it avoids the ‘yuck’ factor” which is present in the209contemporaneous technology of “chimaera pigs, used to incubate human organs createdthrough the implantation of iPSCs, can be an ethical source of immunocompatible organs”(Vermeulen, Haddow, Seymour, Faulkner-Jones & Shu, 2017, p.620). While it is ethically
viable to practice both processes of growing transplantable human organs outside of the body,the morality of the practices differs. The yuck factor emerges through the discomfort ofcombining human and pig genetic material and the consequential harvesting of organs fortransplantation between species. It is a gut response to a change in order that elicits atransgression of morality. Similarly, the yuck factor has been found in public responses totechnologies which filter and recycle wastewater into drinking water (Leong & Lebel, 2020).
These examples of the consumption of reused wastewater and organs harvested fromchimeric pigs being sources of the yuck factor, demonstrate that the response stems from aperception of contamination and redefinition of what is clean, natural and the boundaries ofthese concepts. The yuck factor is, therefore, “linked to ideas about ‘Pollution behaviour’ thereaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherishedclassifications’ as out-of-place” (Vermeulen et al., 2017, p.620). This suggests that stimuli
classified as being ‘yuck’ challenges our ideas of the natural and the boundaries of theself/other. While the consumption of cleaned wastewater poses no detrimental impact on
health, nor is it distinguishable from other clean sources of water, it is the knowledge that it
was once waste that is problematic.
The yuck factor poses an interesting insight into responses towards living tissue bioart
as it has a similar effect to that of the abject which, in bioart, can be linked to the uncanny
valley. Reflecting on ‘yuck’ as being a psychological safety response, it is clear to see how
bioart could also fall into being perceived as eliciting feelings of ‘yuck’. As such, this ispotentially a consequence of the concept of ‘yuck’ originating in scientific literature, which
has not engaged in bioart debates on a large scale, and it not being a frequently used term within

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art discourse. This, however, does not suggest that it is not ‘yuck’, but instead that there is ashared response to certain stimuli across disciplines; that is, materiality and categorisation. Oneof the explanations for the yuck factor is a lapse in effective communication between scientists
and the public, suggesting that a lack of education regarding new technologies renders them asthings to be feared or repulsed by. Through educating members of the public and providingthem with more information of the processes and benefits of such technologies, formallyproblematic technologies such as recycled water subsequently improves levels of acceptance(Leong & Lebel, 2020, p.2). This suggests once again that it is not the technologies that are
inherently problematic, but how they are perceived which depends on knowledge throughinformation being openly accessible and understandable.
Active engagement with science, however, relies on the scientific community anddisseminating corporations to provide direct, honest engagement with the public, and notnecessarily expect the public to actively seek more information or a greater understanding
themselves. This, therefore, renders the methods of communication and dissemination to beimportant. However, scientific literature has stated that information “can be enhanced orframed to improve public response” (Leong & Lebel, 2020, p.2). Framing is often used inscience communication and can be understood asa set of simple elements that organise the perception of a given situation. Framing is how
those elements tune the interpretation of a phenomenon. In other words, framing
constantly answers the question “what is going on here?” in any activity. From thescience communication literature we know that frames embedded in texts affects theinterpretation of scientific research (Davis & Russ, 2015, p.223).
Therefore, through the framing of technologies in literature and communication, public
perceptions of specific products or processes can be affected or changed; for example, researchhas demonstrated that “there is increased acceptance, positive emotions and reduced risk
perceptions of recycled drinking water when information is framed as coming from scientists
who share regional identity” (Leong & Lebel, 2020, p.2). While the technologies involved may
211have positive environmental impacts in the long term, the knowledge that this information canbe disseminated in persuasive ways creates a distrust. Furthermore, “choices in language andterminology are pivotal in determining how new technologies are received” (Schmidt, 2008,
p.526). This suggests that in some instances, the yuck factor could be prompted by how
technologies are named and described, and reflexively, could be avoided by alternative
wording and “to overcome that [yuck factor], you have to become sophisticated about how
experts manipulate emotion” (Schmidt, 2008, p.526). However, as both a psychological andphysical behaviour, the disgust that is a response to the yuck factor has been a usefulmechanism for humans as “it evolved to protect us from illness and death. Before we had
developed any theory of disease, disgust prevented us from contagion” (George, 2012, para.4).
Therefore, the response of disgust and revulsion to stimuli including corpses or rotten foods
may have an evolutionary function which is to protect the self from harm. The stimuli thatevoke disgust, however, are not only limited to sources of abjection such as death,contaminated foods or bodily fluids, but are commonly associated with biotechnologies, as“the ‘yuck factor’, often automatically associated with genetic issues such as cloning andhybridisation, is a sign of a deep, intuitive wisdom” (Niemela, 2011, p.267).
In regard to biotechnologies, “genetic technologies have the capacity to fundamentally
alter life as we know it, in some cases with uncertain benefits. By giving pause to technologicalprogress, the yuck factor opens new opportunities for dialogue between scientists and the
public” (Schmidt, 2008, p.525). Therefore, through the provoked responses of disgust andrejection, scientists can capture and harness this effect to produce new and meaningfulconversations with the public. This is what bioart offers that other art media cannot, it provokes
abjection and the yuck factor through its materiality, which consequently prompts new
discussions around both art and science. A potential problem is that these debates aboutbioengineering between the public and scientists could end up being one-sided, with scientists

212simply finding the most acceptable use of wording rather than changing or adapting thetechnologies. It is, however, significant to recognise that “the disgust attributed to certain
violations of societal behaviour derives from an intuitive account of the motivations and desiresof the violator” (Niemela, 2011, p.270). Consequently, disgust or repulsion towards
biotechnologies is not only a response to the technologies but towards those who created themand their underlying motives.
One of the key questions regarding biotechnologies is whether the ability to perform
certain actions equates to whether they should be performed; if pigs can be bred using humanstem cells and farmed for organs, does that equate to an ethical practice that should be
employed on a mass scale? Is it comparable to meat farming, which although attracts criticism
from a growing number of activists, still exists as a somewhat accepted and legalised methodof food production? These questions do not have answers, yet the reaction to these technologies
suggests that they are new phenomena that have not been encountered before and potentiallypose a threat, whether real or perceived, to the established hierarchical ordering of life withincontemporary societies. What is clear, however, is that there appears to be an instinctual
embodied warning against these practices when they are encountered, therefore enabling thesequestions to be asked.

5.1.2 The Power of Abjection
The presence of the yuck factor in response to many different types of biotechnologies suggeststhat it is not only linked to a specific type of technology or materiality, but to a deviation in
expected norms, particularly in relation to habitual tasks, objects or beings. Described as a “gutresponse” (Schmidt, 2008, p.525), the yuck factor sits in opposition to the values and methodsof science, and yet it plays an important role in disseminating and commercialising the productsof science. Scientific research and experimentation rely on rigor, repeatability and evidenced-

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based practice, where decisions can be made by logic and fact in an attempt to achieve
objectivity and accuracy. The yuck factor, however, stands in opposition to these as it is basedon instinctual, intangible emotions and feelings. Yet, the fact that scientists factor this response
into the communication and dissemination of new technologies suggests that it is an importantand powerful consideration in the processes of these technologies.
Comparing the effects and causes of the yuck factor with theories of abjection, it
appears that the two phenomena share similarities; however, where the yuck factor is used to
explain aversions to science and technology, the abject is an established theory often used in
the arts such as film and literary criticism, as well as art. Both feelings stem from a repulsion
towards phenomena that is ‘other’ that arises from a perceived transgression of boundaries
which can emerge from new biotechnologies. The boundaries of self and other become
obscured through the use of materials that at once are both of the self and of the other; forexample, wastewater, that is water that becomes unclean through contamination with thehuman, or where an animal, well-defined and separate from the human, becomes genetically
part-human through transgenic implantation of human genes. The fact that both of these effects
describe subconscious, embodied reactions is important in recognising that the cause of
abjection is through the perceived notions of existing boundaries which, therefore, locates thesense of abjection within the self. In this way, the abject arises not in the ‘other’ but in the self
through a crisis of identity that occurs in the presence of the other. Consequently, the abject is
a product of self-reflection and identification.
As abjection is, therefore, situated within the individual and not in the technologies ormaterials used, it is a reflection of our own moral codes being brought into question in the faceof contemporary cultural endeavours. It is a product of confronting the cultural materiality ofthe twenty-first century. The affectivity of the yuck factor on the marketing and consequential
acceptance of new technologies, along with the abjection of visceral bioart prompting214important critical debates around materiality, demonstrates the power of these responses toliving materiality. Furthermore, Mary Douglas suggests that out of place matter is like dirt, it
is uncomfortable and evokes fears of disorder and this disorder being contagious,
as we know it, dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists
in the eye of the beholder. If we shun dirt, it is not because of craven fear, still less dreadof holy terror. Nor do our ideas about disease account for the range of our behaviour incleaning or avoiding dirt. Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative
movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment (2003, p.2).
In this sense, dirt is not only the materiality of bioart, but it is the transgressive practice ofmanipulating these living materials and then using it for art practices, thus disrupting the
expectations of art and of science. The fear of this disorder is due to the way that bioart
reorganises these expectations and the new ways for these materials to be used suggests a threat
to the self and the materials of the self. Instinctive reactions to transgressive uses of thesematerials prompts subjective, critical engagement with biotechnologies. It is the power ofabjection that prompts discussions around norms, expectations and acceptance of art
materiality, democratisation of these materials, and our uses of life in technologies to aid andimprove our lives at the cost of that of the other.

5.2 Bioart, Biotechnologies and Bioethics
Biotechnologies are a central component of bioart, both in the construction of the works andthe thematic engagement with contemporary cultural debates. Biotechnologies have an interestin manipulating, altering and improving living matter at a fundamental level; therefore, inbiotechnological research, bioethics is an important process in enabling practicalexperimentation to occur and consequently commercialised usage of these technologies.26 The
regulation of science practices through bioethics sees proposals being passed through ethics

26 Bioethics here refers to the institutional structures that permit or prevent practices based on assessment by committees
rather than the bioethics that are discussed by theorists which contest, critique and contemplate the ethics of medical, animaland environmental issues.

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committees in order to deem whether any risk or ‘cost’ of using and experimenting on living
matter, organisms, animals and humans are worthwhile, and whether any harm or death can beoffset by potential benefits. While most experimentation initially takes place on small rodents
such as mice, rats and rabbits, testing on larger animals including cats, dogs, horses andprimates also occurs; however, research facilities such as Cancer Research UK state that they
only use these animals “in the limited circumstances of veterinary oncology studies or for
toxicology and safety pharmacology studies where required for safety or regulatory purposes”(CRUK, 2020, para.6). Although on the surface, this caveat appears to suggest the use of suchanimals is limited, the range of possible experiments required to test toxicology andpharmacology appears extensive and demonstrates that through attempts to mitigate the risk tohumans, this is at the cost of causing harm to animals.
Institutional bioethics emerged following the Second World War (Lopes, 2014) in orderto protect individuals and their rights from issues such as involuntary human experimentation,
as previously discussed. In the twenty-first century, biotechnological research is most often
restricted to institutional laboratories, where scientific professionals and academics are given
access to the uncensored reality of how many living beings are used in experimentation to test
new technologies. These could be cockroaches with computer chips implanted into their
nervous systems so that they can be controlled remotely like a toy (Sample, 2015), or the
deliberate bioengineering of animals to carry diseases in order to test the efficacy of new
medications or vaccines (CRUK, 2020). While some institutions such as Cancer Research UK
are somewhat transparent in their animal testing policies (CRUK, 2020), the general publicoften only see selective scientific data being published (Schooler, 2011), with little insight into
the processes and costs that enabled such results.
Bioengineering practices are therefore not without ethical concerns, even after passing
applications to ethics committees and existing inside of bioethical codes of conduct, many new216technologies prompt new concerns as they change the ways processes occur and ultimately
alter our world, world view and position within it. Due to the lack of visibility and transparency
around practices, however, these concerns may not take into account all of the issues present,with many focusing solely on visible or known problems such as the morality of animal testing.
However, through the visibility of bioart, artists are able to incite a reassessment of how we
use biotechnologies and the expectations we have of them. The ethical concerns over new
biotechnologies are therefore important in understanding the greater context of bioart and how
these materials and processes are controversial even in their original context.

5.2.1 Ethical Concerns in Contemporary Biotechnological Practices
The ethical problems new biotechnologies create have been present in each new developmentin human history, from the very foundations of agriculture, such as the domestication ofanimals to the intensive farming of sheep, cattle and pigs for human consumption, there arechallenges to ethical frameworks which have consequential impacts on our relationships withnature and other forms of life. These ethical challenges have steadily become more complex
through the development of new technological capabilities, which not only affects ourconnection with nature, but with the very concept of what it is to be human. The ability togenetically alter life at a fundamental level, along with the developing abilities to artificially
produce life, presents the greatest challenge to bioethics to date, as they possess the mostsignificant opportunities for changing and enhancing the human, therefore posing the largest
threat to the idea of the human.
Bioethics, as a method of controlling and restricting usages of biotechnologies tominimise ethical harm, is a process as well as a set of guidelines which takes place during
research practices, experimentation and wider production of biotechnologies. While codes ofbioethical conduct exist to guide best practice, the innovative nature of these experiments

217means that ethical perspectives have the ability to change and, therefore, bioethics is a constantreassessment through time of what is deemed to be acceptable or not. The processes ofcomplying with bioethics is often hidden from public view. The committees and decisionmaking processes are not public and, therefore, there is little consideration or consultation
regarding what practices are considered to be ethical or not. This has produced a number ofnotable examples in recent history of new technologies and processes receiving high levels of
public concern when reaching the consumer despite often having been regulated by andcomplying with bioethical guidelines, for example, the introduction of technologies such as
GM foods have been met with controversy. The controversies around GM foods stem fromseveral issues, including a lack of public consultation in produce being genetically modified.
This has caused further issues in that the legislation for food being labelled as geneticallymodified varies highly between countries (Carter & Gruere, 2006). This lack of public
consultation and communication, together with discrepancies in the labelling of geneticallymodified foods, has resulted in a divisive technology that has led to a global market of organic,
non-genetically modified produce. This is a prominent example of bioethics not always being
equitable with public opinion and morality.
Bioethics, although a relatively new occurrence in the history of humanbiotechnologies, must also take into account practices that are not necessarily new that may
have once been deemed as acceptable, but now pose a threat to human health and climatechange (Cox MacPherson, 2013). This is evident in the reliance on fossil fuels as an energy
source. While once a small-scale industry, the exponential growth of the global population
along with the same growth in mining and use of natural resources has taken a toll on the planet.
The pollution damage to the environment, in addition to climate change caused by combustingthese materials, is a significant ethical problem given the accelerating damage that this causes
to the planet and its inhabitants (Greene & Kammen, 2014). Furthermore, in finding new218sources of these materials, natural habitats are destroyed, consequently harming wildlife,
leading to a decline in animal populations, therefore, as time has passed, what once may havebeen deemed ethical no longer is, leading to global demonstrations and protests in order toincite change, exemplified by the global climate protests in 2019 (Taylor, Watts, & Bartlett,2019). The dependence on these technologies, along with the commercial interest in thematerials, however, does not always align with morality. Such technologies are ethicallyproblematic and yet they continue to exist and to cause harm.
These considerations demonstrate the complexities of bioethics in terms of approved
practices and the changing perspective of ethics and morality. However, these examples
highlight how there is a fundamental difference between bioethics in practice and to the public.
The general, day-to-day concerns of bioethics are kept within the laboratory and are not publicconcerns until, on most occasions, they are approved and are communicated to the public as
new technologies. However, when they do become public knowledge, bioethics becomes morethan processes of approval, but human judgements of right and wrong and issues of harm anddamage are viewed from a broader perspective and in relation to the rest of the planet, not as
an isolated technology. This is because biotechnologies are designed to interact with life andliving materials and, therefore, must be considered in the context of culture, not only thecontext in which they are designed to alter; for example, the ability to grow organs in vitro
must account for the wider socio-cultural contexts of organ donation as they exist in different
countries, cultures and religions, in addition to the environmental impact of growing tissue invitro and the potential impacts large scale industry of this nature could impose on the planet.
In terms of the technologies featured most frequently in living bioart sculptures, theethical concerns are more nuanced and more focused on applications of the technologies rather
than the living materials used; living materiality, whether donated cells, extracted cells or living
animals, appears to be an accepted and unquestioned part of contemporary science. Used in a219

range of practices, it appears to only be when these materials are transposed into a context
outside of scientific research that issues around living materiality are truly addressed. Within
the context of contemporary art, issues of materiality are heightened and allow for criticalengagement with fundamental questions of what the materials are, and how or even if theyshould be used, and whether such usage should have limits. Thus, it is the importance of bioart,and the emotive, immersive and subjectivities of art practices, that draw attention to theseissues. The most prominent biotechnologies used in bioart, as discussed in Chapter Three,concern the cultivation of synthetic living tissue culture. This is most often achieved throughseeding shaped scaffolds with cells, which are then submerged in a growth medium andincubated, allowing and encouraging the cells to reproduce, forming the desired shape.
However, this technology has developed even further through the ability to 3D print theseobjects, allowing for a higher degree of accuracy and repeatability of specific forms.

5.2.2 Synthetic Tissue
Synthetic biology spans a range of practices that concern experimenting with changing, alteringand creating biological life through scientific methodologies (Roosth, 2017). This includes thepractice of growing living materials, such as cells and tissues, inside of a laboratory using
bioengineering tools and techniques. Tissue engineering shares a history with modern organtransplantation, as “perhaps the most obvious precursors to TE [tissue engineering] lie in theclinical domain. These are best understood as specific examples of general problem-solving
strategies employed by physicians” (Lal, Viola, Hicks & Grad, 2003, p.11). In the process ofattempting successful transplantation of organs, the move into attempting to grow and altertissues to suit the needs of patients has become a logical progression. Therefore, tissue
engineering has a direct link to the body and its needs, which has given way to the explorationand criticism of it through bioart.

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In terms of ethical considerations apparent in the process of growing synthetic tissue
culture, one of the most pressing issues is that of what kinds of cells are used and how thesecells are accessed. The growth of plant tissue culture is a continually expanding practice within
agricultural biotechnological research, exemplified by the aim and ability to improve crops towithstand certain environmental conditions or to create biofortified crops, heightening thenutritional value of foods to combat malnutrition (Hefferon, 2015). Following on from thestudy of the ethical implications of living materiality in Chapter Four, plant tissues do not posta great moral concern when it is used as a living material. However, there is a simultaneous
growth in the use of human cells in tissue culture research, aimed at enhancing medical
procedures, such as artificially growing skin for grafting, vascular grafts, and islet cells fordiabetic patients (Lal et al, 2003). The ethical concerns of these practices are twofold; where
did the cells derive from and whether they have been consensually taken? And, is it ethicallysound to grow living human material in a context where it is designed to function as a consumer
object rather than a subject, and a piece of medical equipment rather than human remains?
These are important questions to ask as the complacency of treating living matter as
any other abiotic material poses the risk of failing to act ethically and responsibly towards these
new types of life; this becomes particularly difficult when drawing a line between synthetic
tissue and the human if these products are implanted into the body. Therefore, ethicalconsiderations are vital to regulate practices and to protect the rights of the life involved.
However, as with the difficulty of bioethics, these concerns do not exist in isolation but must
be weighed against the potential beneficial outcomes of these new technologies. Growing
synthetic tissue culture could create a dependency on living materials and a lapse in recognising
the humanity or vitality of them, and consequently, “tissue culturing and the production ofsemi-living entities on a massive scale could lead to the emergence of a ‘new class for
exploitation’, where the exploited are not necessarily fully developed complex organisms but,221

instead, their fragments: cells and tissues” (Radomska, 2017, p.382). However, at the sametime, the benefits of such technologies to human health and benefit is a strong driving force
behind the production and implementation of these biotechnologies.
In bioart, the sculptures grown by the TC&A use the technique of seeding cells over ascaffold in order to grow the artworks into the desired form. The cells used in these works stemfrom various sources, however, one of the most frequently used materials is the McCoy cellline, as discussed, as an immortalised cell line, there is a continuous supply of living matterthat does not hurt or affect the animal but provides material suitable for growing tissue culture.
However, while the cells that form the basic structure do not cause any direct harm, the FBS
required for nourishing the growing cells requires the death of unborn calves. This is ethicallyproblematic, especially when these technologies are being used in the new industries aimed at
growing cruelty-free meat.
Laboratory grown meat, or ‘clean meat’, is a new technology that is attempting toanswer the ethical and environmental issues caused by farming animals for meat (Penn, 2018).
Using stem cells from animals to engineer meat in vitro not only eliminates the need to killnumerous animals each year but would also significantly reduce the environmental damage
caused by farming animals (Penn, 2018). However, immortalised cell lines are not used in thispractice, but stem cells are directly harvested from animals and, therefore, “fresh samples ofstem cells would be periodically removed from live cows and proliferated, since stem cells canbecome genetically unstable after many divisions” (Cassiday, 2018, para.18). While this does
reduce harm, many of these companies growing and marketing such meats fail to acknowledge
the need for FBS, for which there is currently no alternative (Reynolds, 2018). The need forthis solution or another growth solution that is sourced from animals not only eliminates thebenefits of clean meat, but the larger the scale of in vitro meat that is produced, the more FBS
is required, rendering it more ethically problematic than the traditional slaughter method of222

meat, as to grow one piece of clean meat numerous calves would be killed; Catts and Zurr,
suggest that “growing around 10 grams of tissue will require serum from a whole calf (500ml.), which is killed solely for the purpose of producing the serum” (2008, p.133).
This hypocrisy, or lack of transparency, is one of the key issues raised in the TC&A’s
Victimless Leather. While, on the surface, the name of the work suggests that by attempting togrow animal products, in this case a leather jacket in vitro, we can avoid harm to animals whilestill enjoying the byproducts of animal farming. However, in reality, there is always a cost anda victim in the production and consumption of animal products, as the artists reveal that to
grow the artificial leather jacket, FBS is used and currently cannot be avoided in tissue
engineering practices. While the TC&A do reveal the use of FBS and include this duplicity as
part of the work, not all artists are transparent about the uses of such animal-sourced materials,
as discussed in Chapter Three. However,bioartists often create absurd art pieces: the supposedly cruelty-free manipulations of theliving bits (since these are in commonly understood as mere fragments or
microorganisms) may in fact conceal and push away the ‘animal-big-like-us’ victims;
and this is indeed the case in any project that involves tissues engineering. Violence ismerely being transposed onto less visible, or less relatable levels (Radomska, 2016, p.45).
This, again, highlights the power of bioart as both an exposé of current practices and as areflexive insight into contemporary practices through the displacement of traditional
expectations of science and art. The ethical concerns directed towards the artwork reflect thecurrent practices that occur in bioengineering and are in the process of being developed for
public consumption. This, therefore, suggests that ethics is not only problematic for bioart, but
for technologies in general.

5.2.3 Bioprinting
Bioprinting is a new form of growing tissue culture that is a variant of 3D printing; a technology
which has become a mass solution to many issues in the twenty-first century, such as the ability223to locally mass-produce personal protective equipment and medical devices during the
COVID-19 pandemic (Choong, Tan, Patel, Choong, Chen, Low, Tan, Patel & Chua, 2020). In
place of plastic inks used in 3D printing, however, bioprinting uses biological inks, known asbioinks. Bioinks use living cells “such as differentiated, human embryonic or induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) to print 3D constructs composed of living organic materials”(Vermeulen et al, 2017, p. 618). Furthermore, printing “usually also includes biomaterial‘scaffolds’ for growing these cells into tissues” (Gilbert, O’Connell, Mladenovska & Dodds,
2018, p.74). The processes of printing living matter are complex and time-consuming, as after
the printing process is complete, the cells then require time to grow and reproduce, before
finally fulfilling the shape required.
The rapid growth in the applications of bioprinting follows a number of potential
medical uses that could solve many contemporary dilemmas, particularly around organtransplantation. Organ transplantation developed during the twentieth century, transplanting
healthy organs from deceased donors into the bodies of individuals who required new organs
for a number of reasons. As the reliability of transplantation has increased in time, the greater
the reliance on the process has become to resolve the medical needs of an expanding global
population; however, organ transplantation has become “a victim of its own technologicalsuccess; as a greater range of organs can be transplanted, more organs will be needed. And fororgans that are not paired and cannot come from living donors, organs rest on an ethicallydouble-edged sword; in order to save life another person has died” (Vermeulen et al., 2017,
p.620-621). Therefore, the ability to bio-print organs, ones which can be tailor-made to fit theneeds of individuals, made from their own cells to avoid rejection or the need to wait upon thedeath of another individual, shows promise for fulfilling more needs without relying on thedeath of others.

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While bioart has attracted criticism for the potentially ambiguous ethical stance of using
living materials for art media, the technologies themselves have also created dialogue regarding
the new ethical dilemmas that they too can produce. Bioprinting both resolves a number ofexisting ethical problems while simultaneously creating new ones, as whilebioprinting can avoid ethical dilemmas associated with xenotransplantation and clinicalorgan transplantation, it is not without its own challenges, practical, ethical and regulatory,
which we will need to address. These relate to managing public expectations, and the ethicsof biomedicine’s continuing reliance on costly technoscientific solutions (Vermeulen etal., 2017, p.619).
The central ethical concerns raised in response to bioprinting, however, appear to refer tohuman-centric needs, demands and accessibility rather than the implicit ethical problem ofcreating and cultivating living materials as a commodity. Some of the ethical concerns cited
include the cost of bioprinting only benefitting wealthy occupants of wealthy countries, thehealth risks associated with transplanting grown parts into bodies and the issue of legal
ownership of transplanted parts, whether ownership sits with the producer or the recipient, as
well as patenting issues as bioprinting could be “categorised as machines used for a medical
purpose, and thus a patentable entity, or non-patentable medical techniques involving direct
printing onto or into the body, and thus not possible to be patented through the legal ‘medical
treatment exemption’” (Vermeulen et al., 2017, p.621-622). These issues are problematic in
the lack of clarity over who would be able to supply these organs and to whom and at what
cost. This highlights one of the most problematic ethical issues in contemporary biomedicine,that is the accessibility to treatments and medicines as a result of the commercialisation andprofitisation of these technologies; pharmaceutical companies in particular are criticised for
putting profit before health (Deangelis, 2016), which is likely to infiltrate new biotechnologies
in a similar fashion.
These ethical considerations only focus on bioprinting as a medical solution to healthissues and the ethical concerns raised in the current literature often focuses on ethics as risk to225humans. These ethical concerns do not take into consideration the life used in thesetechnologies, the issues of consent around donating cells for bioprinting, or the nature of the
new products being human ‘subjects’ in their own right akin to the way in which bioart
sculptures are both subjects and objects. The critiques of bioart using the same techniques,
however, focuses on materiality and the tools and materials artists use for art. Therefore, thenarrow ethical scope of biomedicine’s gaze is highlighted by bioart practices and thus
challenges the medical practice in a wider scheme of materials and processes rather thancapitalistic economics, human expectations and potential effects on the human body.
A further ethical issue cited as being problematic for bioprinting is that “there is aconcern that bioprinting could lead to unregulated DIY home use or bioterrorism. Almost
anyone could bioprint tissue in their garage with just a proper bioprinter, biogell, cells, acomputer, the internet, and freely available data” (Gilbert et al., 2018, p.75). This suggests aninherent distrust in the use of scientific apparatus outside of conventional laboratory settings,
and a belief that any outside use would have a detrimental effect. While bioterrorism is an everpresent threat in the volatile political climate of contemporary society, the assumption that
unregulated usage of bioprinting could result in bioterrorism is problematic for artists who seek
to engage in these new technologies in their practice. Firstly, this concern could lead tolegislation preventing individualised practices of bioprinting which could limit access forartists to these technologies; while most artists actively collaborate with scientists in theseendeavours, requiring their skills and knowledge to grow such sculptures, this could still prove
limiting for artists and non-scientific professionals. Furthermore, limiting access to thesetechnologies has a wider cultural impact in that it normalises and perpetuates an authoritarian
approach to knowledge and technologies. This subsequently limits access through legislatedmeans such as artists collaborating with scientists within these settings and assists inconstructing boundaries between fields of creativity.

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The wider ethical implications noted around the practice of bioprinting, therefore,
focuses heavily on the social impact of the technology and the ways in which implementationof the technology on a wide scale will impact current practices in terms of accessibility to its
products and dependency on them or the expectation that it would be more effective than it
might actually be. These ethical concerns have little direct comparison for works of bioart asthey are not consumer products, nor are they intended to be. Therefore, it is clear that throughbioart being an exploration and critique of these technologies, new ethical concerns are
revealed that are directly applicable to the commercial medical applications of bioprinting
within scientific settings. With issues of using living materials, sourcing living materials, andtreating them as living beings, bioart can assist in wider, new discussions around appropriate
ethical considerations of bioprinting and other biotechnologies.

5.3 A Bioethics for Bioart?
Bioethics, as applied ethical frameworks for research and experimentation, exist within formal
institutions and based on committee agreement, decide whether or not practices should takeplace. Bioartists who undertake their practice within scientific institutions, therefore, must
follow the same procedures as scientists (Vaage, 2016). However, due to the marginalised andpioneering nature of bioart, it is unlikely that these ethical committees have extensive
experience on deciding the ethical status of art projects. As discussed in Chapter Threeregarding SymbioticA, “in the first major project conducted by the artists and theircollaborators at the UWA [University of Western Australia] in the early 2000s, the ethicalcommittee members were at a loss as to how to relate to a project with ends they were not set
up to deal with, and deemed themselves unqualified to assess it” (Vaage, 2016, p.94). While
the UWA did consequently create a new committee which included art experts, thefundamental process of applying existing bioethics to the production of art is problematic as it

227does not fit into the existing literature or values. Furthermore, outside of research institutions,artists engaging with life as media are not necessarily bound by any ethical guidelines. Zurr
and Catts have stated thatrecently the need to develop an ethical framework for artists, who work with biologicalresearch methods and materials, has been suggested. Nicola Triscott, Director of ‘Arts
Catalyst,’ proposed: “a possible structure for an independent arts ethics advisory panel,since a number of artists have said that they would benefit from expert ethics advice on
their proposed projects, both to reassure funders, venues, collaborators and media, andto advise the project itself”. We would support this development (2014, p.209).
In this way, a framework specifically created for artists could expand opportunities forengagement in accessing and using living materials, but also assist in bioart being recognised
as a legitimate and intentional practice. The support of bioartists in seeking such a frameworkfurther demonstrates their considered motivations in seeking to manipulate life and not as anact of frivolity or without care.
The ethical concerns raised over bioart frequently pertain to the uses of biotechnologies
and living materials for artistic purposes, with additional issues raised around responsibility ofcare. However, there are further pressing issues which present different challenges from theapplication of bioethics to science, which includes consent for responsible viewership andconsiderations for disposal of living artworks. In understanding the ethical positioning of
bioart, the criticisms are often directed towards the use of biotechnologies for artistic purposes
rather than the use of biotechnologies in general. This provokes the question,
should life science artists be held to higher, the same, lesser, or different standards
entirely than scientists? Artists who undertake body art are generally held to higher
standards than scientists. Artistic exploitation of the body is frowned upon, while
commercial and experimental exploitation by scientists—even without the person’s
consent— is allowed (Andrews, 2007 p.139).
From the concerns raised over bioart practices, it not only appears that bioart is inherently
subject to greater criticism than the equitable processes that occur within scientific research,
but to different criticisms. The overriding problem with bioart is that it is art, and consequently,
is expected to fulfil a different role to that of science. By using the materials and processes of228

scientists, bioart reveals the cultural privileging of science, where “the fact that medical
institutions are allowed to do things with body parts that other individuals and institutions arenot. This unquestioned privileging of the medical sector may be as outrageous to many people”(Andrews, 2007, p.141). It is this disparity between accepted uses of living materials that calls
into question how ethics should be applied and whether they should be equitable or not. Whilethe ethical status of bioart is not the central concern of this thesis, the effect of ethicalperception and value on the practice as a public engagement with science reveals further
cultural anxieties that contribute to the impact of perceiving and encountering living bioart;
this particularly concerns the expectations of art and artists.
Beyond the unbalanced ethical considerations of categorisation, bioart also reveals thedifferent cultural expectations of art and science, which consequently highlights the culturalvalues placed on both fields. The difference in values is demonstrated in the criticisms ofutilising life as media for art, but not directed at the technologies themselves. Furthermore, theimplication that usage of bioengineering technologies outside of the biomedical sphere islinked to subversive activities such as bioterrorism is problematic, as evident in the arrest of
Steve Kurtz of the Critical Art Ensemble in 2004 for possessing biological materials. This
attitude of suspicion presents limitations and restrictions for artists to be able to accessmaterials and technologies, thus gate-keeping technologies and the subsequent cultural critiquethat art can offer.
While uncovering the hierarchies present in culture, bioart highlights the importance of
the artists in contributing important opportunities for social engagement with new ideas andtechnologies. In existing as a controversial manifestation of embedded biotechnologies, bioart
invites criticism and engagement with processes that are conventionally secluded to thelaboratory. The consequential impact of this engagement has the potential to influence theoverall considerations around the ethical position of these technologies as “if people are229

confronted in an embodied way with something they would not have thought of themselves, it
may spur them on in developing their personal ethical framework” (Vaage, 2016, p.102). Yet,despite these advantages and potential benefits of bioart, the issue of “whether the use of
biotechnological animal products in art is morally defensible” (Vaage, 2016, p.99) continues
to haunt bioart, again highlighting the continuing cultural and material separation of art andscience. While, Radomska suggests that “the death of an animal killed in corrida (i.e. forreasons deemed ‘aesthetic’) and of the one butchered for meat – regardless of the symbolic
value ascribed in each case – boils down to the same thing: in both cases, the fate of the animal
is determined beforehand” (2017, p.387); it appears, therefore, that the symbolic or cultural
expectations of artists as separate from scientists compels greater justifications despite the same
fate of the living material used.
Fundamentally, the double standard that appears in ethical debates of bioart forces theartist to justify their engagement with living materials in ways that individual scientists are
rarely asked to. The problem with this is not the accountability of the artists, but the lack of
accountability in the position of the scientist. This manifests in the privileges that exist in boththe practices of science but also in “the approach of treating artists more harshly than scientists
or doctors [which] is suspect. For many people, art contributes more to their daily life thandoes science” (Andrews, 2007, p.141). The idea of art contributing a greater impact to theindividual’s daily life than science reveals the disparity in public perceptions and expectationsof art and science, as art often inhabits physical space within societies, whereas science often
infiltrates culture more subliminally. It is because of this that the explicit engagement withbiotechnologies in art practices appears transgressive and prompts reflections on the
expectations and allowances of artists and scientists.
While ensuring that practices are ethical and regulated, the application of existingbioethical rhetoric to bioart is in some ways problematic as the practices of scientific research

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and bioart have fundamentally different purposes and motivations. Where biotechnologies seek
to change the ways in which medical and environmental processes can be improved, bioartists
engage in a more fundamental exploration of ideas of life and living matter. Therefore, “inremoulding life, bioartists cannot, therefore, be judged by the established normative criteria
which correspond to entities and the world presumed to be a certain way if they themselves are
involved—at the core level, we might say—in transforming the very fundamentals of thatworld” (Zylinksa, 2014, p.195). However, by pointing out the stark differences in practice andthe more concrete aspirations of scientists, this argument could give preference to theprivileging of science over art.

5.3.1 New Ethical Considerations
Beyond the ethical decisions underlying the construction of bioart and the collaborative
practices of artists and scientists within research institutions, bioart presents unprecedented
problems that are not encountered through the traditional methods of applied bioethics inscience. This is through the process of the art display. Display, allowing for engagement andencounter with the art object, elicits new ethical issues that are not only unprecedented but also
more difficult to regulate given that display often occurs in separate settings from researchlaboratories where applied ethics usually operate. While applied institutional bioethics
regulates the practices of producing bioart within research institutions, the ethical regulationsof display and viewership remain ambiguous and variable dependent on country and institution.
The key ethical considerations regarding the display of living materials includes
consent for viewership, safety to the public in the presence of materials that could present a
threat, and issues around responsibility for the death and disposal of bioart. For the living
artworks, the ethical considerations concern the care of the artwork while it is alive and theethical care of its death and disposal. These highlight the most central ethical concerns of231bioart; that living matter is most often created to be displayed and to ultimately be killed at theend of display. The care of bioart works during the process of display is similar to therequirements within a laboratory setting, which has been highlighted by the TC&A in thedevelopment of their ‘feeding ritual’ performance in the display of The Semi-Living Worry
Dolls. While the artists also featured a killing ritual, the death of bioart works is a key issue
that is not often addressed. How the tissue works are killed and whether this death should be apublic event is one of many concerns that require ethical consideration.
As bioethics exist to minimise harm and risk, the ethical considerations in viewershipand display are twofold, needing to consider both the living artworks and the viewer as they
simultaneously exist as subjects. For the viewer, the ethical considerations include consent toviewing living works, assurance of respectful and responsible viewing whereby there are
guarantees that the viewer will not damage, hurt or destroy the vulnerable living artwork, andfinally, the safety of the viewer is important in ensuring they are not harmed by living materials
used. Consequently, new bioethical considerations for bioart might include what materials are
permissible for display and those which are not. Furthermore, it might consider viewing
conditions, contemplating the ways in which these hazardous materials may be viewed safely
and if consent is given by the viewer to view such materials in a safe environment.
A final consideration addresses one of the most fundamental problems in bioart; adefinition of bioart. While the genre of bioart is still undergoing the process of definition as anart practice, in understanding the difference between empirical scientific research and bioart isan important consideration for ethics. Many bioart practices use processes that have originatedwithin science, such as the growth of a living artificially grown ear, found in the Vacanti Mousegrown in the name of tissue engineering research, and Sugababe grown by artist Diemut Strebe.
In understanding the ethical positions of art and science and whether they should be held to thesame account, it is first important to consider whether and how these practices are different.

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The point where a work becomes bioart rather than a biotechnological experiment is, therefore,a significant issue, and one which has the potential to impact the approval of ethicalcommittees, and of the public through perceptions of art and science.

5.3.2 Is Bioart an Ethical Practice?
As evident, the ethical position of bioart remains ambiguous and contentious. While works
continue to emerge, be passed and approved by research institutions in most cases, the cultural
reception of these works remains unclear. Bioart works continue to incite debate around ethics
and continue to attract both interest and revulsion through their living, physical, visceralotherness; but not only do they incite debates, but they also continue to begin debates such as
the Bioart Society’s 2021 project ART4MED, which aims to addressquestions such as: What kind of artistic approaches can deal with such complex issues as
health and biomedicine, and what are successful strategies for production andpresentation? How can we share good practices and methodologies for cross-disciplinary
collaboration? How can we consolidate and broaden the networks of contemporary
cultural operators dealing with health and biomedical research? How can we disseminate
this content beyond our immediate peer networks? How can art improve awareness of
the wider public on issues of health and care? (Salmela, 2021, para.2).
The continuous drive by bioartists and bioart networks to open and address the problems thatbioengineering poses to our behaviours and concepts and values of life is clear, and yet, thepractice often remains contentious and marginalised. Despite some changes having been madetowards a more inclusive response to bioart practices, such as the development of a bioart
approval committee at UWA, the fundamental problem of whether bioart is an ethical practiceor not remains unanswered and potentially even unanswerable at this point in time.
Instead of the ethical position of bioart, we can look to the potential value and purposeof using living materials in art practices to understand their role as material products of thetwenty-first century. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of bioart is not only that artists
have demonstrated a reimagining of what it means to be living materiality, but that these new233

forms of life are brought into the public realm enabling direct, embodied, subjective
encounters. The ability to personally encounter bioart suggests that “if people are confronted
in an embodied way with something they would not have thought of themselves, it may spurthem on in developing their personal ethical framework” (Vaage, 2016, p.102). Through thesubjective and tangible experience of encountering and sharing a physical space and conscious
relationship with bioart, the viewer is confronted by something that they cannot avoid. This,
therefore, positions bioart as an important method of social engagement with scientific ideas
and the ethical problems they evoke. While scientific communication is also a significant
method in achieving this, “bioart is uniquely placed to undertake this kind of questioning
knowingly and purposefully, since it lacks the pragmatic imperative of many science andtechnology projects, whereby innovation and economic growth frequently overshadow any
non-goal oriented agendas” (Zylinska, 2014, p.194). The power of art to reveal and examine
the self and contemporary culture is at the heart of the significance of bioart, as “beyond its
aesthetic value, the work can help society to: confront the social implications of its biologicalchoices; understand the limitations of the much hyped biotechnologies; develop policies for
dealing with biotechnologies; and confront larger issues of the role of science and the role ofart in our society” (Andrews, 2007 p.126). Furthermore,
the works created by life-science artists can emphasise the limits of these technologies
and the likely social impacts. But they can also serve as a guide to public policy. By
pointing out the gaps in regulation, the risks of these technologies, the inequities inaccess, and the way in which application of certain technologies may harm importantsocial and cultural values, artists can encourage the social discussion that is necessary toadopt social public policies for biotechnologies (Andrews, 2007, p.142).
These issues reveal an imbalance present in contemporary culture where value systems areaffected by specific expectations which has led to a segregation of materials and processes
expected of art and science, despite recent efforts to bridge and connect between the two fields.
However, it is also apparent that bioart can offer a social commentary through public234

engagement with actualised products of bioengineering through the construction of living
tissue sculptures, thus providing a tangible link to ongoing debates and reassessment of our
ethical standpoint. Consequently, bioart can, therefore, be perceived as both a window and amirror of contemporary culture. Through instinctive psychological responses evoked bymateriality, bioart provokes new ethical considerations of living materials and consequently
reveals the status quo in current societies regarding the value of the ‘other’. As a window,
bioart offers a critical inquiry into the kinds of biotechnologies that are emerging and are on
the cusp of radically changing biomedicine and the resulting ways in which our bodies willchange. This, in turn, reveals the costs of these new technologies in terms of life and ethicalconsideration for use. Furthermore, as a mirror, bioart functions self-reflexively while also
reflecting that the fundamental issues that are being debated around bioart are not situated in
the art or the technologies, but in current human culture and how these new technologies arevalued, used and negotiated by the cultures who have constructed them. Bioart is a complex
reconfiguration of the contemporary technologies, tools, ideologies and bioethics that humanculture has produced. Bioart is a product of human production. The critical concerns over bioart
are not of the art but are a reflection of the society in which it proliferates. Therefore, as thetools of bioart, biotechnologies are also a reflection of current social positioning, along withthe ethical concerns they produce, or fail to produce.
The increasing presence and reliance on biotechnologies which utilise, manipulate,alter and produce life in the twenty-first century creates new challenges in incorporating theminto society. The ethical problems apparent in biotechnologies and the living products that are
created through these processes demonstrate a need to fairly and ethically negotiate these newlife forms as they become more embedded within everyday life. It is clear that some of theseissues have been considered, but equally apparent that there are many more that need to beaddressed. However, through the use of these technologies in new, visible, public and creative235

contexts, we can begin to uncover what these further issues are and, in turn, create wider
networks of dialogue and exchange which can assist with understanding the future as theconcept and the physical body of the human, animals and the planet change under the tools of
biotechnologies; this includes the ethical implications and restrictions of these practices andhow they affect our relationships to the rest of the planet.

3.3 Bioart and Being Beyond Human
The prospect of bioart highlighting prominent issues of ethics, morality and the divisions
between art and science, intellectually if not practically, highlights the key concerns that inform
posthumanist thought. The posthumanist perspective is prevalent in both the discourses aroundcreating bioart and also the commentary about its existence and display. As a broad categoryof philosophy that has many branches, it is clear to see that bioart engages with more than one
perspective of posthumanist thought as discussed in Chapter Two; specifically transhumanist
posthumanism, which envisages the human body moving beyond its current form and abilities,
as well as critical posthumanism which seeks to decentralise the humanist world view whichplaces humanity at the centre of the universe.
Bioart and the associated biotechnologies that artists use in the processes of creatingthese works demonstrate the impending changes to the composition and concept of the natural
human body. As the development of synthetic tissues become more plausible incommercialised medical practices, the possibilities for the body, from medical needs to bodily
enhancement, also change. In this way, our bodies are increasingly becoming posthuman. The
reconfiguration of the human, where the body is no longer natural and relies on technologies
and the materials of other species, therefore, implores that we become posthuman in ourperspective as our bodies become posthuman physically. This suggests that as our bodies

236

change, our values and relationships with living matter must also change as the human can nolonger be situated at the top of traditional humanist hierarchies if it is no longer fully human.
This posthuman perspective, however, does not remove the human from the framework,
but instead seeks for a balance in recognising the needs, value and agency of the other. The
other, until recently, has been the rest of the life on the planet as it exists naturally, as well as
marginalised humans. However, now in the twenty-first century, the other has been born insideof a laboratory, often from our own genetic materials, and simultaneously inhabits the positionof the self and the other. The spectre of the other haunts the self through this duality, together
with the dualities inherent in the transdisciplinary practice of bioart. Bioart demonstrates that
innate reactions to otherness, especially otherness which has not yet been encountered, is thatof rejection and abjection. Although grounded in instinctual behaviours, the rejection of living
bioart and living bioengineering, evidenced through the uncanny valley, the abject and the yuckfactor, demonstrates the newness of these technologies and the inevitable conflicts that willarise as they become more embedded in contemporary life. It suggests that we must embracelife as an expansive concept, not limited to the traditional narrow concepts of the human, while
simultaneously continuing to exercise caution over the uses and processes of biotechnologies.

5.3.4 Bioart and the Future
Bioart is a product of the twenty-first century’s rapid development of biotechnologies. Like theemergence of new media art, in which bioart can be situated, these works not only critique anddraw attention to the materials of contemporary science and technology, but use them as their
media because they are the materials that create our everyday lives. New media refocuses ourattention on the media that constructs our contemporary lives, such as the internet, computersand virtual reality, from being passive, subconscious experiences into a direct engagement withthem. Biotechnologies are a key component of contemporary life and are challenging and237

changing the ways in which we live. The new biotechnologies emerging from contemporary
research suggests further, more invasive changes which are simultaneously more impactful yet
often more discrete. The borders between the artificial and the natural are changing and,
therefore, the definition between the self and the other is changing as a consequence. The useof these technologies as new media in contemporary art present a visceral, physical presenceof these changing frameworks and consequently challenge perceptions and expectations of art
as well as perceptions of life.
The criticism and concerns raised by the use of living materials as art media areimportant in examining the cultural expectations of art, the ethical practices of bioengineeringand in understanding contemporary cultures that they have developed within. The immediate
controversy provoked by using living media has suggested that bioart is a transgressive
practice, disrupting the norms of art production and consumption through the disruption of
expectations of science. The resulting field of bioart reveals, therefore, a plethora of questions
demanding further investigation within contemporary practices. Furthermore, prompted byevolutionary psychological processes related to new and unencountered stimuli, the uneasearound using living tissue as art is a useful and important mechanism for wider reflection on
greater biotechnological practices. This is possible through the visible and public facets of art,
rather than being concealed inside laboratories only those with certain privilege can access,such as the National Institute of Agronomic Research in France, where Eduardo Kac’s
bioluminescent rabbit was born, genetically altered and died (Philipkoski, 2002). Bioart brings
the processes and materials of bioengineering into the public realm.
Our responses to bioart reveal an overall moral compass for our usage of
biotechnologies and of our treatment towards life, especially when used for human gain. By
exposing and highlighting this abjection through the uncanny valley, bioartists ask us toconsider these predicaments and consider the values we place on life, and for awareness of238

processes. These processes which use life as a base material have a ‘cost’ beyond a financial
sense and in this way must be acknowledged. This is further accentuated when the materials
used are, in some cases, human genetic material. The uncanniness of bioart can therefore be
said to be intentional in evoking the instinctual reaction to the exposed otherness of living
materiality detached from the body. Through this forced encounter with an uncomfortable
truth, bioart reveals the ambiguities and complexities of the changing concepts of life in thetwenty-first century. Through examining ethical concerns of bioengineering, it exposes thenarrow frameworks of bioethics where bioart does not fit neatly. Furthermore, the ethicalproblems suggested demonstrates a clear mistrust of technologies and their associated materials
outside of the hands of professional scientists. This mistrust demonstrates a hierarchical value
system of creative and exploratory practices whereby scientific practices are permitted broader
ethical scope than artists, which then becomes evident in the access to materials.
The concerns highlighted by bioart suggests a move towards a posthumanist
perspective when using life as material. Whether being used for art or science, life should bevalued as such without the hierarchical needs and desires of human supremacy negotiating
which uses are ethical or not. In the context of the Anthropocene, bioart also provokes anassessment of the position of the human in the context of bioengineering and human-induced
climate change. This is because bioart is not a monstrous form of contemporary art, but an
artform that is contentious because it reflects certain values, ethics and socio-cultural
expectations that emerge alongside the development of bioengineering and its potential
applications. Fear, disgust, repulsion and ambiguous ethical positioning are a reflection of thecontexts in which bioart is positioned and reveals not only concerns around bioart, but ofbioengineering and the place of the human in a context where living matter becomesmateriality.

239

Conclusion
How we understand, interpret and experience living materials in an art context has been acentral theme of this research. Bioart, as a transdisciplinary genre, in many ways has resisted
definition and categorisation, although it might appear to occupy a specialist and ambiguouspresence in contemporary art. This research has framed bioart in a context of aesthetics, ethics
and materiality and has focused on how these aspects can affect viewership and the art
encounter. Furthermore, this research has explored why artists would choose to use suchmaterials and processes, and considers how such artworks as objects are intended to beexperienced

phenomenologicallythroughsubjective,

embodied

experiences.

By

contextualising bioart in the trajectory of new media art, this thesis has considered both thesocio-cultural and political contexts of living tissue being appropriated by artists as materials
and how they can be understood from the perspective of the viewer.
This research has used a novel mixed methodology that has included descriptive,
theoretical and aesthetic elements of bioart. This pluralistic approach has explored a range ofbioart work, including their facture, the motivations of artists and the ways in which different
forms of biotechnological tools and processes have been transposed into art practices.
Incorporating theoretical perspectives from posthumanism, new materialism and ethics, thisresearch has also examined the complex interconnected framework of bioart and the ways inwhich the practice appears to explore, critique and question contemporary uses and processesof biotechnologies. Furthermore, combining these descriptive and theoretical perspectives withconsiderations of aesthetic implications including the abject and the uncanny valley, haveallowed for new understandings of the relationships between art, biotechnologies andcontemporary socio-cultural, ethical and environmental issues. This approach has allowed forthese complex and innovative artworks to be viewed from multiple perspectives, in turn,240

offering a comprehensive and detailed analysis of contemporary bioengineered artworks andthe potential impact of such works during subjective processes of viewing.
The aims of this research included understanding uses of the term bioart, understanding
the effects of living materiality in the art encounter, and how understandings of these living
materials are challenged through the contextual shift from scientific to artistic practices.
Together with understanding why bioartists have chosen to engage in living materials, and how
artists might access and display them, the aims of this thesis have attempted to contextualise
and understand the complexities of what remains a new and marginalised art form. Throughthis research, therefore, there have been four key findings deriving from these aims: that bioart
is an ambiguous term, but the use of living materials is an intentional act by bioartists, that
there are a number of inequalities present in the usage of living materials and biotechnologies
between artists and scientists, that responses to bioart might be understood as a new, materialbased extension of the uncanny valley, and that bioart practices are both a product and areflection of the Anthropocene.

Key Findings‘Bioart’ is ambiguous, but the use of living materials is intentional
A key issue encountered throughout this research concerned the definition of bioart;
specifically, whether works described as bioart should include only material engagement withbiotechnologies or if thematic critiques can also be considered bioart. The ambiguity of thename bioart is significant and is evident in its use throughout current literature, by scholars,critics, and artists, as well as in the labelling of exhibitions, events and collections by museums,
institutions, and curators. The use of the term bioart does not always, therefore, reflect or referto the practice of using and manipulating living biological materials as art media, and instead
appears to refer to a number of different reference points, including materials, processes,

241critical enquiry and new media for art. This ambiguity and the wide-ranging works that appear
to be labelled as bioart, therefore, reflects a genre that is still in the process of emerging andforms increasingly complex relations with other disciplines and domains.
While the lack of a static definition allows for a greater wealth of practices to emerge
without limitation, pursuing a greater degree of specificity when describing or labelling works
considered as being bioart can lead to more individualised and in-depth discussions around thepractice. This is important in avoiding an assumption that all works described as bioart use thesame materials and processes or seek to engage in the same critical issues and concerns.
Furthermore, this has an impact on viewers, including the differences in interpretation andunderstandings of different materials. This thesis suggests that while bioart does not require an
exacting definition, more precision in discussions of the materials and processes of individual
bioart works will offer more nuanced understandings for future research. This could have asignificant impact on how institutional ethics committees might more effectively take into
account material and situated specificities presented by individual works.
This research has also established that artists are choosing to engage with living
biological materials intentionally and purposefully. In contrast to suggestions of artists using
biotechnologies as a result of being naively manipulated into doing so by bioengineering
companies, as noted by Frances Stracey (2009), it appears that artists are fully aware of what
they aim to produce and for what purposes. This, therefore, consolidates the agency ofbioartists in their intentionality towards producing works which are designed to evokereflection, contemplation and critical discussions relating to bioengineering practices.
Furthermore, this agency is apparent in the number of artists who have explicitly stated that
their motivation behind engaging in biotechnologies is to assist with understanding, exploring
and critiquing them and their associated materials. It appears that bioart is not a product ofartists using certain materials just because they can, but as a result of a more complex

242

engagement with how technologies can affect our relationships with concepts of materiality
and life.

Inequalities between practices
A significant outcome of this research is the deeper understanding of how expectations of art
and artists are distinct and separate from those of scientists and technologies. While theseparation of art and science has been previously described in a cultural context, the criticisms
directed towards bioart reveal a material separation, in which expectations of what is
considered as art materials have been challenged. Through practices of bioart, the boundaries
between the arts and sciences have become complexly blurred as a result of the use of materials
that are more commonly associated with scientific practices, technologies developed fromscience, and the thematic exploration of science for artistic purposes. This new practice of
bioart, bringing the tools and materials of bioengineering out of their original context and into
the art space, however, reveals that the historical separation of art and science is material aswell as cultural and spatial. This material separation is evident in the responses towards bioart
appearing to be a transgressive act, with questions arising as to whether the materials should
be explicitly used for the purposes of art. The lack, however, of the same literature asking
whether it is somehow more acceptable for scientists to use, manipulate, grow, and kill thesame materials reveals inconsistencies in treatment and expectations.
The different standards, expectations and allowances for artists, when compared with
scientists, is also evident in the legislative and institutionalised bioethical considerations; asseen in Chapter Three in the difficult process of establishing SymbioticA and recognition of
the artists as conducting legitimate research. As such, this demonstrates a privileging of
scientific research over that of art research, yet simultaneously highlights an absence of an
open-minded perspective from scientific bodies. This is also evident in the limitations placed243on artists attempting to access biological materials and expertise in order to practice bioart, as
demonstrated in Gina Czarnecki’s difficulties in Chapter Three. Furthermore, when looking at
licensing and the practical requirements for the display of bioart, as seen in Chapter Four, it
would appear that science museums and institutions are more suited to hosting living materials
and yet it is more difficult for art museums to fulfil such requirements.
A further significant finding is the acknowledgement that scientific information is
purposefully presented in ways that make it the most acceptable for audiences. As discussed in
Chapter Five, some technologies can evoke feelings of disgust, known as the yuck factor,
however, when this feeling arises, literature tells us that the technologies have not changed, butthat the language used to describe them, and how they are framed to make them more palatable,
has. In contrast, however, it appears that artists intend to prompt this discomfort deliberately
in order to provoke critical reflection and discussion. Yet, this is one of the criticisms aimed atbioart, that it causes controversy because the artists do not attempt to frame or justify thesetechnologies, but to address them in an art context. These inconsistencies across the domainsof art and science centre on a positivist framing for science and bioart being understood astransgressive, even though the same materials and technologies are used in each domain. These
inconsistencies reflect profoundly different cultural expectations of art and artists to that ofscientists.
Bioart proves to be a powerful platform for contributing to cultural dialogues regarding
the uses of biotechnologies and how the ethical and moral accountabilities for using living
matter are evaluated. Through the posthumanist motivation to move beyond the limited
definition of human and its hierarchical separation from other forms of life and theenvironment, bioart works suggest that to condemn the products of bioart is misplaced. Bioart
practices expose the subjectivity and contextual basis and bias of our ethical judgments and theextent to which we are able or willing to overlook ethical dilemmas if they appear to offer244

tangible benefit or gain. Yet, the benefit and gain of having art act as critic and conscience ofsociety is often not acknowledged.

Materiality as a new uncanny valley
The criticisms and responses evident towards bioart practices, as discussed in this thesis, appear
to centre around the use of materials that are more frequently found in scientific research for
artistic purposes. The transposition of materials from one context to another unexpected
context appears to have produced a discomfort which is noted in the ethical criticisms andresponses to bioart. This is seen in Ionat Zurr’s assessment of the response to Victimless
Leather, “one of the most common and somewhat surprising comments we heard was thatpeople were disturbed by our ethics of using living cells to grow living fabric, while the use ofleather obtained from animals seems to be accepted without any concern for the well-being of
the animals from which the skin has been removed” (Wired, 2004, para.9). It is, therefore, thevisceral and vital materiality of bioart which elicits these concerns, which bioartists appear tofocus on to highlight and prompt a reassessment of our relationship with life and life’smaterials.
These responses are, therefore, the result of using the living materials of science for a
new purpose in a different context. These known living materials consequently appear to causesome discomfort resulting from the context of their use. This thesis has found that thisunexpected contextual encounter with living materials may be indicative of a new uncanny
valley. Where Masahiro Mori’s initial detailing of the uncanny valley describes a decline inaffinity through the aesthetic proximity of robots to humans, bioart demonstrates a material
proximity to humans, which appears to evoke a similar phenomenon. This is supported by
Kerbe and Schmidt’s 2015 study, which reveals responses are contingent on the type ofmaterials used in bioart, where human materials and hybrid materials cause the most concern

245through to microorganisms causing less concern. This is also reflected in the responses toanimal testing, as discussed in Chapter Four, which demonstrates a similar correlation ofconcern that is based on the proximity of the animal to the human.
In the uncanny valley phenomenon, the closer an object appears to being human, yet is
not actually human, causes a negative response. Through the replacement of aesthetic likenesswith material likeness, it appears that negative responses to bioart could also be explained inthis way. Where human-like robots cause discomfort by visually appearing human but are nothuman, bioart sculptures are human-like in their living materiality. In these materials of bioart,
the viewer is, therefore, confronted with the malleability of life in the twenty-first century,
where life and living materials are also objects, commodities, and disposable materials forexperimentation. These current biotechnologies have transformed ideas of life where “cells andtissues are no longer exclusively bound to bodies but have become plastic materials to be
manipulated, shaped and sustained through technological means” (Radomska, 2017, p. 383).
However, the underlying processes that appear to produce feelings of the uncanny valley are
currently thought to be situated in categorisation difficulties, wherein the uncanny stimuli
appears to occupy two known categories but neither distinctively, therefore being unable to fit
into either. In this way, the stimuli become othered through being unknown. In bioart,
traditional categories of art/science, natural/artificial, living/non-living and subject/object areblurred, suggesting that these works offer multiple levels of combining familiarity andunfamiliarity.
The effect of this uncanny valley response is a rejection of otherness that may present
a threat to the self. As with concerns regarding robots as noted by Mori, bioart and living
engineered tissues may present a threat to the self in that it threatens the natural order ofhumans. Human life is no longer dependent on nature as it can be altered and changed throughpurposeful modification. It is through the living tissue materials, that in some works are human,

246

and in others often of mammalian origin, that we at once recognise the self, yet through therendering of it in the context of an art object, it is othered. This research suggests that it is thisdifficulty in categorising bioart as something known and experienced that contributes to thecriticism the practice receives, and that reflexively this lack of recognition is what allows forcritical examination of biotechnologies.

Bioart is a material product and reflection of the debates about the Anthropocene
In the critical discussions surrounding the ethical, moral, and material problems that bioart
presents, it appears that these issues are not situated within bioart works, but in the wider sociocultural context in which they are produced. Bioart is, therefore, not inherently uncanny, abject
or unethical, but becomes so through the transgressive act of displacing living materials froman expected context to the unexpected. This thesis suggests that bioart is an intentional material
manifestation of the many problems suggested by the Anthropocene, such as committing to therights of, and ethical conduct towards, other life forms and moving beyond limited concepts of
the human, and re-evaluating the current hierarchies present in humanist worldviews. In thisway, bioart appears to follow the perspectives offered by posthumanist theorists and forces theviewer to engage with alternative compositions of life and of the human. Furthermore, throughthe use of living materials bioart works, therefore, actualise configurations of life, and thehuman, beyond limited definitions and understandings of what the human is or can be.
Bioart is a product and a reflection of current knowledge and contemporary socioethical values through the use of new technologies that are currently being researched,produced and implemented in other aspects of contemporary life, such as medicine, and in thisway bioart offers a window into contemporary practices. However, this research has also foundthat bioart is a mirror, offering critical reflection away from the work itself and onto the cultures247

in which these technologies are being produced, allowing for contemplation on what is being
produced, how it is being produced and for what or whose ends.
This research has explored bioart and bioartists’ intentions, as well as critical responses,
from an art history perspective; a perspective which is somewhat limited amongst the current
literature. While the broad span of transdisciplinary engagement with bioart reflects its wideranging reach and impact, it is significant to understand that such works are intended to beviewed and encountered as art and, therefore, are part of a historical trajectory of art which
utilises new media as its materiality and art which deals with ideas of transformation,categorical confusion and monstrosity, in addition to art with concerns of disgust, the abject
and posthumanism. Through consideration of form, construction, display, the embodied
phenomenologies of the encounter and the responses to bioart, this research offers a newperspective into understanding the impact of bioart as a socially engaged art form.
Finally, this thesis contributes to understanding why bioart might elicit criticism,
unease, and ethical concerns. There are a number of discussions present in the current literature
which address the ethical issues that arise from using living materials in art practices, however,they do not provide in-depth understandings of why this practice produces these concerns
beyond the fact that it is art. This thesis offers an understanding of the separate cultural
expectations of artists and scientists, and how this is often an ingrained expectation.
Furthermore, this research suggests that it is then through subversion of these expectations that
discomfort arises, and through a conflation of expectations and the subsequent difficulties in
categorising practices and objects that these concerns may come to the fore. Consequently,
bioart presents a subversion of expectations which, in turn, renders categorising bioart as either
art/science, an object/subject, natural/artificial and living/non-living difficult. It is thisdifficulty that, therefore, appears to elicit discomfort and ethical concerns.

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Final Remarks
The Anthropocene, a period of time that many have suggested is a new epoch defined by humanpresence and actions, is a time of exponential and fundamental change. We are witnessing theeffects of our own actions, both positive and negative, on our environment, other life forms
and ourselves, physically and culturally, and in real-time. It is also a time where existential
anxieties seem to have multiplied, evident in global movements demanding social equality
steps to avoid the current climate emergency and the spread of pandemics. Bioart is a part ofthis picture, offering a reflective and critical lens on our own practices. Under the microscopeand removed from the context of medical, financial, or personal benefit, artists have drawn
attention to the accepted and routine practices of this time.
Bioart has attracted criticism for transgressing the expected norms of art and art
materials, yet still remains an ambiguous artform that is marginalised and has little presenceoutside of specialised institutions and research outlets; this, in part, is as a result of thelimitations and difficulty in accessing the materials for artists. However, the presence of thisgenre, with artists in different countries, cultures and contexts beginning to utilise the same
technologies for similar critical purposes in the same time period, suggests that bioart is bothpart of, and speaking to, a wider scepticism of so-called human progress.
This research documents and examines the contemporary practice of using living
materials and bioengineering processes in art practices. It is apparent that although thesepractices are a relatively recent occurrence, there are a growing number of works, each utilising
diverse and nuanced materials and tools in order to convey, provoke and ask compellingquestions that are important in the twenty-first century. The nature of our relationships withbiotechnologies, with living materials, and what basis our bioethical decisions are made on,
are just some of these questions. There will, however, continue to be new questions arising as
newer technologies are developed, implemented, and understood. Bioart offers a platform for249

discussing these questions, and for forcing and facilitating an encounter with ideas andtechnologies that are often hidden, packaged palatably or that drift without notice into a newnormal. Bioart is, therefore, a confrontation with the values and processes of the Anthropocene,
bringing the viewer face-to-face with the impressive yet seemingly limitless power of ourcurrent technological capabilities.

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List of Figures
Figures have been removed from this copy of the thesis to prevent copyright infringement.

251

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