第 2 セッション 発展格差問題
Widening Development Gap in Asia

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第 2 セッション
発展格差問題Widening Development Gap in Asia
セッションチェア
深川 由起子(早稲田大学大学院経済学研究科教授)

第 2 セッションは GIARI のメンバーでもあります、私、深川が浦田先生に続きましてチェアを務めさせていただきます。
第 2 セッションのテーマは「発展の格差」という問題です。第 1 セッションでは主として経済統合全体に関する話が様々な角度からなされていたわけですけれども、このセッション
では内部の問題について考えていきます。東アジアの中にも後発国の問題がありますし、中国のように巨大な国の場合には、国の中にも経済統合をしていくのは結構だけれども、勝ち組と負け組が出るようなことは困るということがあるように思います。そこで、そうした問題に焦点を当てまして討論を進めていきたいと思います。
最初のご報告者は「発展格差の縮小へ向けた人材育成における地域協力の役割」をテーマに、インドネシア国際戦略研究所でシニアエコノミストを務められていますシマンジュンタ
ク（Simandjuntak）先生にお願いいたします。今聞いていらっしゃる方、通訳機日本語はチャネル 1、英語チャネル 2 となっておりますのでよろしくお願いします。それからプレゼン
ターの方、セッション 1 と同じに 20 分間でプレゼンテーションをお願いします。討論者は
10 分以内で終えていただきたいと思います。それではよろしくお願いいたします。

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【報告】

Development Gaps in ASEAN and East Asia:
A Human Capital Perspective 1)「発展格差の縮小へ向けた人材育成における地域協力の役割」

Djisman Simandjuntak(Senior Economist at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia)

Statistically, development gap is a perpetual feature of economies or parts thereof thatco-evolve together like the East Asian economies. It has been investigated very
intensively using different perspectives. It may just be an unavoidable phenomenon in
the transition to the steady state income as countries at different demographic stages
seek to grow while saving differently. Certain elements of culture such as a more secular
view of the world, thrift as a life’s call, and receptiveness to ideas of foreign origin may
explain part, but not the entirety of gap between economies. The “Bell-Curvists” like
Richard Lynn who tend to squeeze life’s phenomena into the “Bell Curve” of
distribution even attribute economic gap to genetically inherited general intelligencequotient. Even luck may have played a role in economic development. Adam Smith
considered colonization a misfortune for the colonies.
This paper is an attempt to look at development gap in East Asia from human capital
perspective. It, too, can never be an exhaustive explanation. Knowledge is nevercomplete as Kurt Goedel once said. Nevertheless, the human capital perspective seems
to have gained a large followership in politics, academia and business. There is in fact adanger that people look at human capital as development mantra, overlooking the factthat producing something, tangible or intangible, requires a set of inputs and processesof which human capital and its deployment are only part. The concept of human capital
as it is used in this paper is broadened to include health and entrepreneurship in addition
to educational attainment, which in the economic literature is placed as core.
Sequentially the extent of the gap in general, the health gap, the education gap, theentrepreneurship gap and implications for co-operation in East Asia will be discussed.
This purely qualitative paper is expected to amplify interests among scholars and policy
makers in human capital formation not only as a highly rewarding use of limited
1)

The original version of this paper was prepared for the Expert Study Group on Comprehensive
Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA).

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resources as demonstrated by developed economies of East Asia, but also as a realistic
option in the attempt of lagging economies to catch up with the leading ones.
The Human Resource Divides in East Asia
East Asia Summit (EAS) Countries of the early 2000s are faced with stark contrasts
despite some signs of convergence and multiple initiatives on an accelerating catching
up. The sticky gap is well known to politicians and scholars. National, regional andglobal rounds of poverty eradication program have been launched in over 60 years afterWorld War II. Narrowing the gap between developed countries and developing ones has
indeed been made an element in almost all agendas of international relations, including
global and regional trade agreements. The paradigm evolves continuously. There weretimes when priority was attached to meeting basic needs. A different approach waslaunched in the late 1960s under the heading of “development through trade” where
manufactures originating in developing countries are granted easier access in developed
countries’ markets. The story of the East Asian success is to a large extent one ofpreferential trade opening which in due course of time triggers a large-scale
manufacturing relocation to the developing East Asia.
Old paradigms of cooperation may be reinvented or new ones my even emerge.
However, development catching up will remain probabilistic. It takes huge efforts undera favorable external environment for a catching up strategy to work sustainably.
Whatever the approach is called its success depends crucially on the human capital edgethat the catching up countries is capable to harness. Whether one talks about
cooperation, facilitation or liberalization the centrality of human capital accumulation as
prerequisite of success is well acknowledged. In all walks of life champions are
successful accumulators of human capital. What is more human capital is apparently themost durable form of capital. Its cross-border flows leave a lasting footprint ofpeople-to-people connection. Unlike gold human capital is more difficult tomisappropriate. Benefits of a rising stock of human capital is spread very widely unlike
those of a physical building that owner can internalize completely. Human resources
development or human capital accumulation is, therefore, a very promising field forinter-governmental co-operation and has, in fact, occupied a very high rank in thepriorities of development co-operation.
The development gap that separates the 16 countries in the East Asia Summit from one
another is well known. In terms of per capita GDP in 2007 international PPP dollar
Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Republic of Korea
form a small club of countries with per capita GDP ranging from $ 24801 in the163Republic of Korea to $ 50199 in Brunei Darussalam. These high-income countries
account for only 6.4 percent of the total population of the EAS area. Malaysia can begrouped as a middle-income economy, but add only another 1 percent in terms of
population. The rest of EAS economies have to struggle with a per capita income, which
is lower than world average. Furthermore, the gap that separate Japan as the richest
populous economy within EAS area with a per capita GDP of $ 33632 from China,
India and Indonesia with a per capita GDP below world average but together accountfor 83 percent of EAS population is truly enormous. Issues of development gap are
aggravated by an even lower output in Lao, PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar and apparent
entrapment of Myanmar in stagnant development, however difficult it is to judge on
Myanmar’s development given the lack of recent indicators. Under such a deep gap one
has to stretch every imagination to arrive at agreements that are perceived to be ofmutual benefits for both ends of the spectrum.
The proposed tripod of Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA)
looks to fit well with the prevailing circumstances in EAS countries in that cooperation
is attached at least the same importance as integration. Unfortunately, proposing abinding commitment in co-operation is far less straightforward than it is for integration.
First of all, the enormity of development issues makes any co-operation initiative look
like a drop in vast ocean. It is perhaps the perceived limited benefits that discourage
governments from pursuing speedy implementation of the numerous cooperationagreements between ASEAN and the rest of the world, particularly its external dialogue
partners. Secondly, co-operation requires in most cases funding commitment whichgovernments prefer to make on a bilateral basis rather than regionally. Thirdly, EAS
countries are faced with a huge imbalance in terms of potential to contribute to thefinancing of cooperation in spite of the rapid speed at which China, India, ASEAN-4
and Vietnam are catching up. Designing co-operation under such circumstances is aherculean job. Yet, experiences with regional and sector cooperation under the umbrellaof the European Communities, later European Union, indicate that acceleration ofcatching is probable under a proper mix of co-operation, integration and facilitation.
Enhancing productive capacity rather than artificially raising consumption has been
accepted as the core principles of good co-operation. The core element of productive
capacity is, in turn, human capital understood as the net present value of income thatpeople, individually and as collective, can generate throughout their productive life, netof natural resources depletion and consumption of produced physical capital. In a study
on the wealth of nations the World Bank arrives at some interesting figures. The gap that164

one sees in income is generally found in wealth. Within EAS countries per capita wealthis highest in Japan at PPP $ 493241 in 2000 before Australia at $ 371071, and Singapore$ 252607. In the middle we have Malaysia and Thailand with per capita wealth of$ 46687 and $ 35854 respectively and at the lower end Indonesia at $ 13869, China$ 9387 and India $ 6820. Figures are not available for CLMV. The composition of percapita wealth shifts in favor of intangible capital, the residue after natural capital andproduced capital, as income rises. Intangible capital comprises 77.8 percent ofAustralia’s per capita wealth, 69.2 percent of Japan’s wealth, but only 57.8 percent ofIndonesia’s wealth, 54.8 percent of India’s wealth and 44.8 percent of China’s wealth.
Intangible capital can take different forms such as patents, trade mark, and copy rights.
Its main ingredient is human creativity and innovativeness. Co-operation under EAS
initiatives should, therefore,
be centered on human capital formation andaccumulation. Yet, human resources development is an immense field, spread all overwalks of life, all spatial units and all stages of the human life cycle.
Human capital of a country can be gauged with the help of three groups of indicators:
health, educational attainment, and entrepreneurship, the last group being a proxy forthe use of knowledge and skills. If the relation between population and human resources
is linear EAS countries would by far be the richest in the world. Apparently, the relation
is anything but linear. Which element should be discussed first is also akin to chicken or
egg. Health is an input to education in as far as it affects human accomplishments in
education. On the other hand, the health of an unborn baby is partly dependent on the
education of the mother. In the section that follows health is discussed first before
education and entrepreneurship.
The Health Capital
One of the most comprehensive yardsticks of health is life expectancy at birth. Longer
life can be understood to mean longer working life. On this score EAS countries are led
by Japan with 83 years, followed by Australia with 82, New Zealand and Singapore
with 80 each and South Korea with 79. In the middle there live Chinese, Malaysians,
Thais, Vietnamese, the Filipinos and Indonesians with life expectancy ranging from 68
in Indonesia to 73 in China. Indians, Cambodians, Laotians and Burmese live
significantly shorter, namely closer to 60 years. Life expectancy is usually positively
related with health. Longer life expectancy is a logical consequence of improving health.
However, life expectancy can be adjusted with health to arrive at Health Adjusted Life
Expectancy (HALE). It roughly tells how long people live a healthy life. On this score165

the top 5 within EAS area is occupied by Japan at 75, Australia 73, New Zealand 71,
Singapore 70 and South Korea at 68. The middle group consists of Chinese at 64,
Malaysians at 63, Vietnamese at 61, Thais at 60, Philippines at 59 and Indonesians at 58.
Health-adjusted life expectancy is only 53 years for Indians, 52 years for Burmese, 48
years for Cambodians and 47 years for Laotians. Years of life can be lost because ofpremature death and burden of diseases. Put together they are converted into DALYs(Disability Adjusted Life Years). DALYs are as long as 0.4 per population of Lao, PDR
in 2002, 0.38 for Cambodia, 0.3 for Myanmar, and 0.29 for India. Indonesia and China
suffer from DALYs of 0.21 and 0.15 per population respectively, but the healthiest
countries of Japan and Australia lost only 0.1 and 0.11 per population. Both numbers of
HALE and DALYs tell about losses of life expectancy. Compiled mainly from WHO,
UNESCO, ILO and to a lesser extent national statistical offices selected indicators ofhealth, education and entrepreneurship are reproduced in Appendix Table.
Interpreting differences in life expectancy, HALE and DALYs is difficult. What is it that
one can say in economic terms about the longer HALE of the Japanese than that of therest of East Asians? Given Indian population of 1124787 thousands, the Japanese’s
HALE of 75 and Indian’s HALE of 53 and an implicit foregone HALE of 24.7 billion,
can something meaningful be squeezed out these numbers? The optimal length of life islargely unknown. Relatives of an aged human being are usually willing to pay a large
sum money for the latest medical technology. There must have been strong evolutionary
reasons for such behavior. If what counts in life is the share in the gene pool as argued
by some geneticists, and if that share depends on fitness or probability of reproducing
successfully, living longer beyond reproduction age may not be the best strategy tomaximize share in the gene pool. Be it as it may, the rise in life expectancy from aroundthirty at the start of Current Era to over eighty in the case of the Japanese in early 21st
century is widely considered one of the greatest human accomplishments. It is possible
to statistically attach a pecuniary value to human life. One can multiply length of life
with the Statistical Value of Life (SVL) which can be gauged on the basis of the amountof money that a person is willing to pay for an extension of life by one unit of time as it
is implicitly done in insurance, to obtain an estimate on the total value of a population.
Longer HALE does indicate the competitiveness of a country to provide for its people
the tangible and intangible ingredients of a healthy life. The ingredients are extremely
manifold and relate to one another in intricate ways. The tangible ingredients start withthe living environment, housing, access to treated water, excretion facility, genetic
distance between husband and wife, maternal nutrition during pregnancy, child nutrition,

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access to vaccines and vitamins, access to social amenities, including sport facilities,
access to health facilities in times of sickness and a lot of other ingredients that get morediversified as one climbs up the life cycle. On the other hand the intake of certain
ingredients beyond a certain quantity affects health in a harmful way. Tobacco isconnected with diverse diseases and is even called a time bomb in a 2008 study by theWorld Bank. Its incidence tends to decline with per capita income. EAS countries arehome to most active consumers of tobacco. Other health-phobic substances include
alcohol, excessive fat, and abused narcotics. Physiological capital of a person such as
body-mass index, height and physical dexterity depends to an important degree on theintake of tangible ingredients. Educational attainment has been found, for instance, to bepositively related with body weight at the time of birth. Under weight is statisticallycorrelated with lower attainment.
A myriad of intangible ingredients go to HALE. Life style is one of the most genericamong them. The intake of health-phobic substances is part of life style, which in turn is
at least partially affected by government policies. Dependence on tobacco excise
revenue is often time quoted to defend a very puzzling policy of compulsory statementon the harmful effects of tobacco and alcohol on the one hand and toleration ofextensive emotional advertisement on public properties such as busy intersections andgovernment-sanctioned sport events. Education is undoubtedly a very important
ingredient to health. The educational attainment of a mother is bound to affect the healthof her descendents for a very long time. Health literacy is a very important element of
inputs to health and should be sought at the earliest stages of the life cycle.
The health gap as reflected in HALE or DALYs of East Asians can further be broken
down to more varied indicators such as access to piped water, education of mothers in
the fertile cohorts, early births, underweight at birth, births attended by medical
professionals, infant mortality, incidence of malnutrition, health facilities per population
and areas, medical doctors and nurses per population and many other indicators. The
wide gap that one finds in HALE and DALYs is also reflected in health ingredients. The
pattern is more or less straight forward. Poor countries fare poorly in terms of HALE,
DALYs and other health indicators.
The following is just an illustration of the gap in health inputs in the period of
2004-2006. Access to improved water sources is universal in Australia, Japan,
Singapore and over 90% in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam but is only
65% in Cambodia and even 60% in Lao, PDR. Likewise, access to improved sanitation167

is universal in Australia, Japan and Singapore, but only 48% in Lao, PDR, and 28% in
Cambodia and India respectively. Life expectancy at birth ranges from 60 in Lao, PDR
to 83 in Japan, a difference of 23 years. Only 3 out of 1000 births in Singapore, 4 inJapan, 5 in Australia, Republic of Korea and New Zealand die in infancy, but 79 in Lao,
PDR, 74 in Myanmar, 65 in Cambodia and 57 in India. Children failing to survive 5thlife’s year are as many as 121 out of every thousand in Lao, PDR, 103 in Myanmar, 89
in India and 82 in Cambodia, but only 3 in Singapore, 4 in Japan, 5 in Republic ofKorea, and 6 in Australia and New Zealand. In the age of 5 or less over 40% of children
are stunted in Lao, PDR, India, Myanmar and Cambodia.
Given the severe gap health improvement should have been given a strong and durable
push in severely lagging countries. There are signs that health is being elevated tohigher rank in household and government expenditures. Lao, PDR and Cambodia spenton health in 2005 no less than 3.6% and 6.4% of GDP. However, health is relatively
sticky as an issue of development. Catching up at a rapid rate is improbable in health.
For obscured reasons people spend more on health as they get richer. New Zealandspends 8.9%, Australia 8.8% and Japan 8.2% on health in 2005. Resource availability
cannot be the entire explanation for such a positive relation between income and health.
Equally puzzling is government inclination to spend on health in that their commitment
to health is positively related to per capita income and health status. Government sharesin total health expenditures are as high as 82.2% in Japan, 77% in New Zealand, 64% in
Thailand and 53% in Republic of Korea, but only 24% in Cambodia, 21% in Lao, PDR,
and 10.6% in Myanmar. Health accounts for 18% of total government expenditures in
New Zealand, 17.8% in Japan and 17% in Australia, but only 4.1% in Lao, PDR, and1.1% in Myanmar.
Health can perhaps be called the prime element of human capital. Before the arrival ofculture health as reflected in physiological capital is the currency of survival. Morehealthy members of a group secure a better access to mating and reproduction than lesshealthy ones. While culture such as philanthropy, altruism, co-operation and medical
technologies has immensely reduced the limiting impacts of physical disabilities someelements of intangible capital, such as schooling-based knowledge and skills, haveremained more accessible with better health. Access to employment is usually madeconditional on health such as height, body-mass index, color blindness, and freedom
from certain diseases. On the other hand, nurtured competencies have greatly gained inimportance as the knowledge intensity of life in general and its science intensity inparticular are rising. Proper education and training can compensate for a lot of168

shortcomings that stem from physical conditions.
Ideally speaking educational attainment should be measured in terms of literacy ormastery of general and scientific knowledge, hard skills and soft skills. However,statistics on the mastery of knowledge and skills are available only very partially and in
scattered forms. For practical purposes other indicators are more accessible.
The East Asian stories about human resources development are mixed. Long ago, East
Asia was said to suffer from over population that hinders the progression to higher per
capita income. While perception about East Asian population has changed somedifficult issues persist. The share of EAS countries in world population will remainvery high in 2020 at 47%. Of the latter 87% agglomerate in China and India and another
14% in the next three most populous countries of Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines.
The other 11 countries share only 9% of the region’s population. The picture of world
labor force looks similar. The share of EAS countries in world population in the cohortsof 15 years and over will remain high at 49.7% in 2020 down only slightly from 50.3%
in 2010. Of the nearly 405 million addition to world population in the group of 15 years
and older between 2010 and 2020, 40 percent will come from EAS countries. Of theincrease in EAS countries almost 73 percent will be Chinese, Indians and Indonesians.
Large population number does signal survival advantage of a group such as ability tofeed members. On the other hand large population poses some difficult problems in an
increasingly science-driven world. Enormous resources will have to be invested in
education, health and entrepreneurship to enable large population to compete
successfully.
Literacy and Educational Attainment
Information on education is available from myriad of sources. UNESCO maintains alarge-scale online database. Education is also reported by the International Labor Office
for labor force and by World Health Organization in relation to the impacts of parent
education on child health. World Bank’s Development Indicators also include someseries on educational attainment and educational resources. Needless to say, National
Bureaus of Statistics compile extensive data on education. However, not all series areavailable for the sixteen EAS countries. Statistics are also hard to compare. One year of
schooling may mean different length in terms of hours of teaching or amount of
resources spent. Some figures look suspiciously small or big. Caution is therefore
needed in interpreting educational statistics.

169Imbalance is unmistakable in the human capital of EAS countries. Some countries are
known for their very strong propensity to invest in education. They include Japan,
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Others are yet toearn such reputation. East Asian good record in education is well known. However,enormous challenges still lie ahead. School life expectancy from primary to tertiary
education is highest in Australia at 20.5 followed by New Zealand at 19.5, Republic ofKorea 16.6, Japan 15 and Brunei Darussalam at 14. In the middle one finds Indonesia at
11.6, the Philippines at 11.8 and China 11.2. Despite a strong reputation as investor in
education school life expectancy from primary to tertiary is lower in India at 10. Lao,PDR ranks lowest within EAS countries at 9.2. The gap is also reflected in enrollment
in secondary and tertiary education. Republic of Korea and New Zealand rank highest interms of tertiary enrollment at 93% and 80% respectively ahead of Australia at 73%,
Japan 57%, Thailand 50%, the Philippines 28% and China 22%. India and Indonesia lag
at a distance with a ratio of 17% and 12% respectively. Cambodia with 5 percent andLao, PDR at 9% lag farthest behind.
The countries of EAS differ starkly in terms of inputs dedicated to education.
Expenditures on educational institutions as fraction of GDP ranges from as low as 1.5%
for Indonesia (this number looks suspiciously low) to 7.2% for the Republic of Korea,
the highest among EAS countries. Apparently East Asians value education differently.
Involvement in financing educational expenditures also differs starkly among
governments in the regions. Governments of OECD members in the region shoulder
over 70 percent of total expenditures on educational institutions. In the case of New
Zealand the share of government in educational expenditure is even higher at almost 81
percent. On the other hand government shares in educational expenditures is moderately
lower in Indonesia at 64.3 percent or even lower in the Republic of Korea at 60.5
percent, revealing that the reputation of South Korea as champion of education is
attributable to households endeavors to a greater extent than it is in the rest of EAS
countries. Expressed as the ratio of expenditure on educational institutions from primary
to tertiary institutions to per capita GDP, both in US PPP dollars, average propensity toinvest in education is highest in the Republic of Korea at 0.29, followed by Japan at
0.28, Australia at 0.26, Malaysia and New Zealand at 0.25 and India at 0.22. Among thecountries of EAS Indonesia shows the weakest average propensity at 0.06, putting aside
countries for which data is not available. How should one comment on the statisticalfact that expenditure per student in Indonesia in 2003 of PPP US $220 is only 2.7
percent of Japan? Under such circumstances catching up is only an illusion.

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The same dollar is deployed differently in in education in EAS countries. In Australia,
India and the Philippines expenditure per student is mostly routine in nature. Capital
expenditure accounts for only 0.8 percent of total per student expenditure in India, 2.3
percent in the Philippines and 9.1 percent in Australia. On the other hand Indonesia
spends 10 percent, Japan 15 percent and South Korea 19% on capital expenditure.
Under routine expenditure compensation of teachers and other staffs constitute the lion
share in most countries. However, the structure of routine expenditures is by no means
uniform across borders. In the case Australia, Japan, South Korea and Malaysia asizable proportion is left to cover other routine expenditures other than compensation ofteachers and other staffs. The proportion ranges from 39 percent in Japan to 53 percent
in Malaysia. It is puzzlingly low at 1 percent in the case of Indonesia. What teachers andother staffs can accomplish with trivial routine expenditure is one question that needs
further exploration.
Ability of educational institutions to attract talents, develop and maintain them
determines to an important degree the quality of education. Admittedly, every student
brings to the learning process certain traits that are given to educational institutions suchas intelligence, health and family background as discussed for instance in Charles
Murray’s controversial The Bell Curves. What teachers can do is to add to thepre-school capital the magnitude of which remains a matter of heated disputes. However,arguing that the addition is related positively with qualification and motivation ofteachers does sound plausible. Some teachers may choose teaching profession as a call.
However, a minimum level of compensation is required to make educational institutions
competitive vis-à-vis other employers while competing for superior talents. On thisscore EAS countries generally offers attractive compensation. Entry salary in primaryeducational institutions as percentages of per capita GDP is almost 400 in India, 184 in
the Philippines, 146 in South Korea and 100 in Australia. Such progressive level musthave allowed institutions to set demanding standards for teaching profession. The
percentages are lower at 88 in Japan, 82 in Malaysia, 77 in New Zealand and lowest at
72 in Indonesia. The picture looks similar for top salary. India ranks highest with a
top-salary to per capita GDP ratio of 615 percent, followed by South Korea at 400
percent, the Philippines at 219%, Japan 211 percent, and Malaysia at 183%. Again
Indonesia occupies a low rank at 104 percent.
Educational attainments are more directly linked than educational inputs to economic
development and other processes that one wishes to accelerate with the help of
education. Unfortunately measuring attainments is formidably difficult. How does one

171compare 25 years of experience without schooling with 19 years of experience with 6
years of schooling? How does one compare as element of human capital three years ofschooling in mechanical engineering with the same length of schooling in fishery oreven political science? Assigning different weights to different levels of education or
using earning differential between different levels of schooling does help as attemptedin many studies. However, the problem of measurement remains very complex.
Educational institutions do have the tradition to require students to go through exams
and to cumulative record grade point average, but testing the latter’s correlation withcreative, productive and entrepreneurial accomplishments is rarely performed. Thoughadvances in ICT may one day allow a real-time accounting of the stock and changes inhuman capital due to schooling such approach is a remote possibility for the time being
and may not be the best way to proceed.
UNESCO does report on educational attainment. Within EAS countries children
reaching Grade 5 have reached 100 percent in Japan, almost 100% in Australia,
Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Brunei Darussalam, 92% in Vietnam, 86 percent in
China and almost 80 percent in Indonesia and 73 percent in India. Cambodia and Lao,PDR lag far behind with a ratio of 62 percent respectively. Upper secondary graduates
as percentage of their cohort have approached 70 in Australia and Japan, exceeding
OECD average of 59. Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand are not far
behind Australia and Japan, but China, India and Indonesia, the three most populous
countries of EAS, do lag far behind with ratios of between 21 and 28. Attainment in
tertiary education is highest in New Zealand where tertiary graduates make up 72
percent of relevant cohort compared to 61% in Japan, 59% in Australia, 42% in
Malaysia, 40 percent in Thailand, 26% in China and 16% in Indonesia. A morecomprehensive picture can be gained from ILO’s labor statistics. For every 1000
population in the cohorts of 25-64 years 400 have completed tertiary education in
Japan, 317 in Australia, 273 in the Philippines, 135 in Korea and a small 49 inIndonesia. Unfortunately, numbers are not available for the two most populous countriesof China and India as well as for CLMV.
The Use of Health and Educational Attainment: Entrepreneurship
The last element of human capital on which the economic status of a person andcommunity of persons greatly depends is entrepreneurship. Health, knowledge andskills get productive only when exercised or used as underlined more than half a century
ago by Friedrich von Hayek in his now classic piece titled “The Use of Knowledge in

172Society”. Entrepreneurship is needed to reproduce a useful product using existingknowledge like making cars out of the same technologies or millions of tons of soap
using a single formula. This type of entrepreneurship is called “economizing spirit” byIsrael Kirzner. A different kind of entrepreneurship is indispensable to harness newscientific discoveries such as the science of stem cell for productive purposes. Indeed, it
is probably also entrepreneurship of non-commercial kinds that allow scientists toventure into new paradigms, sometimes at the cost of being condemned as heretics, or
politicians to migrate from monarchy to democracy and from totalitarianism topluralism.
Much has been written on entrepreneurship, mostly in association with capitalist
systems. Some trace it back to cultural background or particular changes in it.
Unfortunately, something similar to a black box is found in the properties that areunderstood as ingredients of entrepreneurship. The view that entrepreneurship is largely
born rather than acquired and nurtured has largely discouraged empirical studies onentrepreneurship. The fact that entrepreneurs make up only a very small fraction ofworking population is widely swallowed as fact. The imbalance of wealth that in thelong progression of time turns in favor of entrepreneurs has been exploited often time
for political purposes, particularly in countries where the small class of entrepreneurs
happens to consist almost entirely of immigrant citizens like the ethnic Chinese inIndonesia and seemingly also in the rest of Southeast Asia. Policy on entrepreneurshipdevelopment is largely reduced to affirmative action in favor of groups that areperceived to have been disadvantaged like the “Bumiputra” in Malaysia and poorly
defined “indigenous population” in Indonesia. Such pragmatism may have helped
enlarge the population of entrepreneurs in some places, but as far as Indonesia isconcerned the result has been too meager to justify the distortions that come along withsporadic affirmative action.
The fact that entrepreneur population differs across nations indicate that entrepreneurs
can perform differently under different policy settings. Market is a more promising
hatchery for entrepreneurs than government intervention, though reality is a mixture of
the two. A certain level of regulatory certainty is conducive to entrepreneurship, though
not a complete certainty. Policy transparency is good for entrepreneurship, but there is
no money to be made under perfect information. Intellectual properties serve as a strong
incentive for innovative and creative works, but progress would have been unlikely or atleast turned much slower if everything is protected under intellectual property rights.
Positive inclination toward wealth accumulation is likely to encourage people to173accumulate wealth, but culture that is unrestrictedly permissive to greedy undertaking islikely to turn counterproductive. Fair access to finance is stimulating to enterpriseestablishment, but financial egalitarianism of the extreme sort would prevent the flow offinancial resources to most businesses that serve as backbone of contemporary
civilization. To ascertain the degrees of mixtures in the entrepreneurship environmentthat tends to work best empirical extensive testing is needed. Good entrepreneurshippolicy is only possible, if it is based on such findings. The alternative is the current
practice in most countries where people of talents are expected to respond to stimuli thatare implied in open market-friendly policies that governments across the five continents
seek to establish in the last quarter of a century or so.
Realizing the importance of entrepreneurship to sustainable development the OECDlaunched in late 2006 its Entrepreneurship Indicators Program following a feasibility
study in 2005, the latter under the sponsorship of the Kauffman Foundation. The
program seeks to develop indicators for entrepreneurship determinants, entrepreneurial
performance and entrepreneurial impacts. The countries covered are limited to OECDmembers. Entrepreneurship performance is measured in terms of firm-based indicators:
employer firm birth rate, employer firm death rate, business churn, net businesspopulation growth, survival rate at 3 and 5 years and proportion of 3 and 5 years
survival; employment-based indicators: high-growth firm rate by employment, gazellerate by employment, ownership rate start-ups, ownership rate business population,
employment in 3 and 5 years old firms, average firm size after 3 and 5 years; and otherthat includes high-growth firm by turnover and gazelle rate by turnover. The findings
show that entrepreneurship activities have been most active in the transition economies
of East Europe where birth rates and one year survival rates are highest in contrast to
Italy and the Netherlands where they tend to be low.
National bureau of statistics of EAS countries do extensively collect statistics that one
can use as indicators of entrepreneurship. The last column of the Appendix Table showsthat the number of employers as percentage of working population differs across theeleven countries for which data is available. The most entrepreneurial in EAS are
obviously the Koreans. Seventy three out of every thousand working Koreans are
employer against 26 Japanese, 31 Australians, 33 Indonesians, 34 Malaysians and 65
New Zealanders. Digging deeper into enterprise statistics and labor statistics would
undoubtedly allow the measurement of entrepreneurship in EAS countries, but requires
formidable statistical works. The variation between countries suggests that EAS
countries, too, are open to entrepreneurship promotion under a well-designed policy.

174

Countries may not be as helpless as they are generally believed to be while confronted
with the realities of scare entrepreneur. Needless to say, in a region where commercial
life is getting linked more and more closely across borders cross-border initiatives onentrepreneurship appear to make sense.
Room for East Asian Co-Operation
Each of the three elements of human capital has been discussed. Putting them together
is even more daunting. A very well educated worker will produce little, if afflicted withsevere illness that translates into large DALYs. A healthy worker with low educational
attainment is also bound to produce less than a similarly healthy worker with a better
education, considering that educational attainment extends productive capacity throughthe use of tools. A worker with excellent health, excellent education and strong
entrepreneurship is likely to produce the most, but the differential productivity is hard togauge. Writing concisely Kh = A Hh Ee Uu where Kh means human capital, H healthcapital and U entrepreneurship leaves some very important questions unanswered,notably the exponents that one should assigned to each of the three elements. Supposingthat human capital is a product of the three elements rather than their simple addition
one can easily see how differential in just one of them would separate countries far andwide within a relatively short period in terms of human capital stock. We see suchseparation happening in East Asia when Japan pulled ahead before World War Two,
Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei in the last 40 years, and a similar process iscurrently in the making in China and hopefully also in other EAS countries.
Catching up of the narrowing of inter-country development gap is primarily a national
affair. The successive rise of Japan, Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei, Singapore,
Hong Kong China SAR earlier years and the rise of China in recent past clearly indicatethat a successful catching up is primarily the outcome of a national endeavor. Before thefinancial crisis of 1997-1998 it was in fact a habit among East Asians to encourage
developing economies of the region to learn from the experiences of the moredeveloped economies. Formal regional integration and co-operation have not been an
important ingredient of the success attained by these economies, however helpful
regional stability may have been to such progression to higher stages of development.
Notwithstanding the proliferation of regional and sub-regional integration andco-operation in East Asia, positive catching up will continue to rely much more on
national initiatives than regional initiatives. However, regional co-operation should not
be narrowly seen as a strategy of benefaction to lure the participation of poorer

175economies. It can accelerate regional integration wherein division of labor as the mostimportant source of growth can thrive quicker than otherwise would be the case.
Regional co-operation in human resources is as old as the co-operation itself. In fact
under the UN institutions regional co-operation was maintained even during the periodof cold-war hostilities. Since the inception of the ASEAN external dialogues East Asian
co-operation has branched into a very complex web. Targeted predominantly at official
institutions with a view to improving their capacity the cooperation is spread across avery wide range of sectors and issues. In the vastness of ASEAN-centered cooperationsome weak points are apparent. While comprehensive review is missing co-operationagreements are generally perceived to have progressed at slow speed as far as
implementation is concerned while new agreements keep piling up. Most of theinitiatives are bilateral and sub-regional at best, involving one or more countries of
ASEAN on the one hand and a particular dialogue partner on the other. This preference
for bilateral co-operation is by no means anomalously East Asian. It is among the corefeatures of cross-border development co-operation across continents. Assuming a good
coordination such bilateral cooperation can serve as regional binding ties, but needs
undoubtedly complementary regional initiatives to be able to serve as durable bindingtie. Greater impacts can be produced, if governments can pool their co-operation
resources, which individually may look like a drop in the vast ocean.
It has been a cliché to say that co-operation should primarily aim at creating capacity
rather than accessing consumables – fishing net or better capacity to make net rather
than fish – or that it should be future oriented rather than shortsighted. Yet, parties toregional co-operation are well advised to reflect on their records on cooperation, asking
among others the question on the extent to which completed projects and programs
improve the ability of beneficiaries to face up future development challenges.
Closing the human resources gap between members of EAS as discussed in respect of
the three basic elements is a herculean challenge. Yet, changing global and regional
environments are sure to make it even more formidable. Elsewhere in countless ofreports and analyses it has been said that the world and its inhabitants are entering a newchapter of evolution. Natural forests, mangrove forests, coral reefs disappear at a
dangerous rate of depletion. Desertification exacerbates ceaselessly. The seas are
overfished and fishermen are getting less choosy in respects of their catches. To move a
motorized civilization centered round internal combustion in mining sites, factories,
farms, leisure centers, on the roads, in the air, at homes and in offices billions of tons of176

fossil fuels are burned every year. The ease at which people around the globe can now
communicate with another at an instant and at asymptotically declining cost may haveburdened the life of some species such as the bees which may have found it more andmore difficult to get home from their work places
under the confusing
telecommunication signals. Many islands in the world’s largest archipelago, thehatchery of many marine species, are projected to disappear in the wake of rising sea
surface as global warming deteriorates. Soil is getting thinner and as are water tables.
Some gases are said to escape the atmosphere at an accelerated rate because of thewarming. Fresh water, energy, food crises have become a recurring feature of the world
economy. Humans are likely to survive in the “Red-Queen games” or doing the runningand staying at the same level of fitness by stretching their creative and innovative
capacities, at least for a little more while. Indeed, the geologically little time still looks
very long in Gregorian calendar, obscuring the detrimental impacts to non-scientists thatmake up the bulk of the human race. Considering the positive feedback entailed in theongoing environmental changes the time seems to have really come for them to think
anew, to switch to a new path of development. Admittedly, such warnings are often time
ridiculed as just another apocalyptic prophecy, which by default unleashes a new waveof human ingenious responses. However, there is no harm in shifting to a lifestyle that isless resource-intensive than the current dominant style, yet promises better quality oflife at the same time. A case in point is electricity which may be cut tremendously withthe help of better technologies without sacrificing comfort.
Preceding discussions are basically verbal in nature. Extensive works on health andeducation statistics cannot obscure the problems that arise from incompleteness,
discontinuity of series and limited comparability across borders, however helpful
existing statistics may have been for the purpose of rough estimates. These statisticalproblems point out to one area of co-operation that looks trivial at first glance but
indispensable for human resources co-operation. It borders at frustration to keep missing
parts of statistical series or cross section. Yet, statistics are compiled for a certain
purpose. In an integrated world comparability of statistics is crucial to the merits ofgathering them. More importantly, statistics are compiled to allow model testing which
in turn can greatly aid policy making and implementation. Policy study and related
activities should therefore be attached a high priority in EAS co-operation. Suchco-operation promises high benefits at relatively low costs, accessible to all members,
and non-controversial politically. In the absence of reliable and current statistics andwell-tested models policy makers would have to be groping in the dark, leaving successlargely to chances. The call for an OECD-type of institution in EAS context is, therefore,177a valid one. Improving an information base is a condition sine qua non of an informed
decision on co-operation involving countries that house almost half of the world’s
population. Areas where it is badly needed extend far beyond human resources. Whether
the institution is a new establishment or an existing institution converted as necessary isa question of secondary importance.
OECD-type of co-operation is complex and highly attractive to scholars but notnecessarily to politicians who are fond of to show tangible results to their constituents.
The ongoing projects and programs in East Asian co-operation, particularly the ones
involving ASEAN as a group should be managed better to produce such results,
however unspectacular each of them may be. EAS may consider stepping forward bypooling resources to acquire and update capacity in new technologies that are of crucial
importance to the daily life of East Asians. Promising areas abound. They include crop
diversification, seed improvement and soil conservation in agriculture, transformationof marine fishery from hunting to aquaculture of a large scale, reforestation based on
fast-growing species, alternative energies, to vaccine search in health. This co-operationin science and technology can be shaped in such a way as to allow interested members
to proceed under the formula of EAS-X.
Considering the human resources gap in EAS countries one is tempted to suggest somemodes of cooperation where real transfer is involved from richer members to poorer
ones. Bilaterally such transfer is a generic element of development co-operation ofwhich in turn human resources co-operation is a significant part as reflected inscholarship and assistance in times of natural disaster. Expecting a regionalization ofdevelopment assistance may not be realistic for EAS for the time being. Yet, EAS
regional co-operation requires visible projects and or programs to be perceptible to thebillions of East Asians. One major program in health, one in education and one inentrepreneurship promotion would help raise awareness about CEPEA in general and
EAS human resources co-operation in particular. Whatever happens in the politics of
EAS human resources co-operation should precisely be conceived as a tie that helps
bind people of East Asia in good or bad times.
A government-centered co-operation strategy is not without fundamental weakness inthe 21st century economy. One of the distinctive features of this century is its much
deeper science intensity, which is expected to deepen further. In the course of the last 30
years
or
so
liberalization,marketization,
privatization,
deregulation,
de-bureaucratization, have made economies more dependent on one another, less178

state-centered, and more private-driven at the same time. Today’s employment andsourcing of goods and services, including telecommunication and transportation
services, are much more dependent on private businesses than they were 30 or so years
ago. A similar shift is taking place in science, the last frontier in the quest for economic
growth, with the rise of corporate science. The share of private sector in the total
expenditures on research and development (R&D) has risen to exceed by a large margin
the shares of both government and university research centers in all developed
economies, including EAS economies. Responding to the fundamental shift,
governments and civil societies prescribe corporate governance reforms, corporatesocial responsibility (CSR) and other initiatives, however meager the success may havebeen measured in terms of reduced frequency of deadly governance scandal. Given thevery prominent role played by private business in contemporary economic system theeffectiveness of co-operation that is exclusively government to government must havebeen reduced. EAS co-operation is also challenged to secure the involvement of theprivate sector. Relying on the deepening of regulation as governments was doing in theaftermath of the Asian financial crisis and is likely to be doing following the current
crises is insufficient. The current mode of engagement in that representatives of theprivate sector are invited to present views in front of political leaders have proven to beineffective. The perennial complaint about the lack of enthusiasm among businesspeople about ASEAN integration and East Asian integration may have something to dowith faulty design in that it fails to address issues that are really urgent in the eyes of theprivate sector. How exactly governments can better engage private sector in regional
co-operation is a very difficult question. However, private sector involvement is perhaps
one of the promising innovative elements of regional co-operation in the 21st century. It
is even more pressing in human resources co-operation.
Effective co-operation requires funding. On this score EAS is faced with a dilemma.
The gap that needs to be narrowed is immense in magnitude and complexity. Even aslight catching up seems to require a large financial commitment. The largest part of thefinancial resources will have to originate in national budgets. It can never beoveremphasized that the East Asian human resources gap is to an important extent theresult of misallocation of public resources. Correcting such misallocation would allow
accelerated investment in human capital. Yet, even the most trivial form of co-operationsuch as information gathering and processing in comparable format can only advancewith adequate financial support. It should not be conceived as a one-way flow fromricher to poorer members. EAS should consider establishing a Co-operation Fund towhich all members contribute in accordance with ability.

179

180

24
0,5
18
1431
1362
268
122
49
9
31
52
4,6
119
5
69
96
3360
7780

12.2
0.2
10
834.3
589
137.4
60.1
25.5
4
15.2
33
2.5
49.3
2.8
38.7
56
1870.23681.3

34923
50199
1802
5383
2753
3712
33632
24801
2165
13518
‐
27336
3406
49704
8135
2600
‐
9980

73
65
48
64
53
58
75
68
47
63
52
71
59
70
60
61
‐
67

110
130
380
150
290
210
100
‐
400
150
300
120
190
110
210
170
‐
‐

8,8
2,0
6,4
4,7
5,0
2,1
8,2
5,9
3,6
4,2
2,2
8,9
3,2
3,5
3,5
6,0
‐
8,6

67,0
79,6
24,2
38,8
19,0
46,6
82,2
53,0
20,6
44,8
10,6
77,4
36,6
31,9
63,9
25,7
‐
44,0

* Together with New Zealand
1) Health Adjusted Life Expectancy in Years
2) Disability‐Adjusted Life Years or Loss of Life Years Due to Premature Death and Burden of Disease

Australia
Brunei D.
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Lao, PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
New ZealandPhilippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
EAS
World

20,5
14,0
9,8
11,2
10,0
11,6
15,0
16,6
9,2
12,7
12,7
19,5
11,8
‐
13,5
‐
‐
10,8

4,8
‐
1,6
‐
3,2
3,6
3,5
4,4
3,0
5,9
‐
6,5
2,5
‐
4,2
‐
‐
‐

5
4
2
2 (?)
3
1 (?)
3
4
1
6
1
7
2
‐
5
3
‐
4

31,7
‐
‐
‐
4,9
‐
40,0
13,5
‐
12,8
‐
27,1
27,3
‐
13,6
‐
‐
‐

26
‐
‐
‐
22
6
28
29
‐
25
‐
25
11
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

9833
2468
2480
417351
‐
33904
60225
101913
2206
45195
2911
7355
‐
20322
24082
23160
‐
‐

144
‐
‐
‐
615
104
211
400
‐
183
‐
149
219
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

888
‐
‐
‐
1013
1260
578
810
‐
792
‐
985
1182
‐
1000
‐
‐
‐

3,1
‐
0,2
‐
‐
3,3
2,6
7,3
‐
3,4
‐
6,5
4,5
4,9
3,1
0,5
‐
‐

1)
2)
Health Governme School Life Total Public Education Adult Population
Populatio Labor ForceGDP
AnnualStudents Teacher's Top Teaching Employer
HALE at DALY
Expenditur nt Shares Expectancy Expenditure Expenditurwith Tertiaryn 20202020
Per Capita
Expenditure on
Studying Salary as % of Hours per s as % of
per
Birth
on
e as % of Education as % of
(Mio)
(Mio)
PPP $2007
Education
Abroad GDP per Capita, Year at
Working
thousand e as % of in Health Primary to
Total Adult
Institutions per
LatestPrimary School Primary Populatio
population GDP 2005 Expenditu Tertiary Education as GNI 2006
Total
re %
% of GDP
Population (25‐64 Student as % of Per
Around 2004
Schooln
2005
Years)
Capita PPP GDP

Selected Basic Indicators on Human Resources for EAS Countries

【Power Point】

Development Gaps in ASEAN and East Asia:
A Human Capital Perspective 1)
Djisman Simandjuntak(Senior Economist at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia)

181

182

183

184

185

【討論】
Development Gaps in ASEAN and East Asia: A Human Capital Perspective
討論者:トラン・ヴァン・トゥ
(早稲田大学大学院社会科学研究科教授)
こんにちは。私は英語も日本語も下手ですけれども、こういうような日本での国際会議でどういう言葉を使えばいいかいつも迷います。今日は Dr. Djisman のペーパー、英語で書かれたので読んだときに簡単なコメントを英語で書きました。しかし、今朝インタープレターとの打ち合わせでは日本語のほうがいいと言われましたので日本語で話させていただきます。
Dr. Djisman のペーパーは非常に興味深いもので、特に経済発展のギャップ、所得のギャ
ップ、それから人的資源のギャップが強調された。中でも人的な資源のギャップから見たほうが重要ではないかというような問題提起ですね。これは非常に面白かったです。そしてペーパーの中に人的資源は 3 つの要素で構成されていて、1 つは健康そして 2 つ目は教育で、
これらはサプライサイドの 2 つの要因です。そして 3 つ目は起業家精神でこれはデマンドサ
イドの要因です。そして筆者によれば東アジアでは所得のギャップよりも、３つの要素から構成される人的資源のギャップのほうが深刻である。この分析の結果、各国のドメスティッ
ク・ポリシー、つまりそれぞれの国内の政策と、地域全体の協力で、ギャップを縮めるべきということが結論づけられています。
以上は、私がこの論文を読んで、感じ取ったポイントです。
やはりヒューマンキャピタルの側面から見たギャップを分析することは非常に重要であると思っています。現在のヒューマンキャピタルでのギャップは将来の所得のギャップをもたらすので、
こういうヒューマンキャピタルでのギャップは問題の深刻さを表すことができます。
そういう理由で、私は Djisman 博士のアプローチに賛成です。ただ、所得でのギャップと人的資源のギャップはだいたい相関関係があるので、所得のギャップからだいたい人的資源のギャップも予想できることであります。もちろん Djisman 博士が出された具体的なデータは非常に興味深いものでした。けれども政策提言になりますと、もう少し問題を掘り下げて明らかにする必要があるのではないかと思います。
私はいくつかの問題についてもう少し詳細にコメントしたいと思いますが、時間の関係で教育問題と起業家精神の問題だけに絞って、私の見解を述べたいと思います。まず、エンタープレナーシップがなければ養成された人材が雇用されないので、ここで教育と雇用との関係を議論できます。教育と雇用との関係をみますと少なくとも東アジアにおいて 3 つのことを指摘しておく必要があります。1 つ目は若者、つまり 15 歳から 24 歳までの人口、その人たちはこの 10 年間か 20 年間、かなりの高学歴化で、割合として学歴が非常に高くなりまし186

た。しかし同時に 2 番目の問題として若者層の失業率も深刻で高い。特にいわゆる educatedunemployment です。教育された失業者が非常に多い。それが 2 番目です。そして 3 番目のポイントは、アジアで展開している企業、日本企業とか外国企業が直面している問題として
スキルレーバー（skilled labor）の不足です。つまり、熟練労働、エンジニアとか中間管理層などは足りない。そういう問題を指摘できると思います。
例えば、こういうデータを見ていただくと、1994 年から 2004 年の間、インド、インドネ
シア、フィリピン、タイの高等教育の状況ですね。このデータから大学を卒業した人たちの割合を見ますと、例えば、タイの場合は 4％から 11％に上昇したとか、あるいは高等学校の卒業者の割合もかなり高くなった。また、若い人たちの unemployment も示されています。
さらに、jobless のデータも印象的です。Jobless は失業者だけでなく、今仕事を持っていな
いが、就職活動をしていない人たちも失業者に加わっています。つまり、今仕事を持っていないし、学校にも行っていないが、仕事を探していない人たちです。そういうような人たちを含めた場合は jobless と言います。これを見ますとインド、インドネシア、フィリピンとも非常に高く、この jobless の割合が 24％以上ですね。タイの場合は低く 10 数％で。こういうような問題を指摘しておきたいです。
今アジアで展開している日系企業が直面している問題は何か。第 1 番目の問題は賃金が急速に上がったということですけれども、2 番、3 番はだいたいエンジニアだとか中間管理層のリクルートが非常に難しいということです。
言い換えれば人的資源が足りないということです。
そこで、こういうふうにまとめられます。つまり、現在の労働市場においてミスマッチがあります。熟練労働の場合は需要が多くて供給不足です。けれども、そうでない若い人たち
は、供給が多くて需要不足という問題があります。そうしますと、やはり各国の教育政策は
やはりそういうような問題を解決しなければなりません。
企業が必要な人材を供給できるよ
うな教育というようなことをやらなければなりません。だから単純にギャップ、例えばヒューマンキャピタルギャップを縮めるというマクロ的、全体的ではなくて、こういうような詳
細ないろいろな問題の検討も必要ではないかと思います。
そこで東アジアでの協力関係を考えますと、二国間の協力ではトレーニングプログラムは
いろいろありますけれども、労働者の移動が必要です。労働移動がかなり盛んにはなりまし
たけれどもいろいろ摩擦も起こっています。このため、秩序のある労働移動、効果的移動の促進を各国が検討して協力していくことが必要です。FTA とか EPA については、例えば看護師とか介護福祉士などの人材をアジア諸国から日本への移動ということを織り込んでいますけれども、やはりそういう秩序のある移動がまだ少ないですね。例えば、日本とインド
ネシアの EPA 締結に伴ってインドネシアから日本への看護師などの移動は、年間 300 人くらいというように非常に少ない。今後はこういうようなことを拡大していくことが重要です。
最後にエンタープレナーシップについて非常に興味深いご見解を聞かせていただきました。これは例えばエンタープレナーシップをどういうふうに測るか、Dr. Djisman のペーパ

187

ーには、労働人口の中の employers、つまり雇用主の割合は 1 つのインディケーターとして指摘されましたけれども、このインディケーターはちょっと適切ではないんじゃないかなと思います。中小企業が多い国はどうしてもこのような指標が高いわけです。あるいは、農業
国から工業国へ入りつつある国はどうしても低いわけです。だからこの指標はちょっと問題があるのではないかなと思っています。
もしエンタープレナーシップは、例えばシュンペーターが言ったように、新しいマーケッ
ト、新しい技術、新しいプロダクトについての探求精神、そして risk taking、そしてなんといっても rent seeking ではなくて profit seeking を追求するというような人たちは起業家精神のある人と定義すれば、私はどんな国でもだいたい潜在的にはエンタープレナーシップがあるんじゃないかなと思っています。
問題はそのエンタープレナーシップが顕在化するかどうかです。顕在化するためには政策が必要です。例えば中国では 1984 年まで郷鎮企業はあまりなかった。けれども政策の転換で 84 年以降は非常に多くなった。あるいはベトナムでも同じように 2000 年ごろから新しい民間企業が次から次へと生まれていって、これも政策の結果ですね。
後もう 1 つは各国のエンタープレナーシップを考えるとき、直接投資も一緒に考えなければならない。直接投資は foreign entrepreneurship と言えば、domestic entrepreneurship と foreign
entrepreneurship はリンクしていて、外国からの投資が多くなると、国内の起業家精神も出てくるんじゃないのかなと思います。そこでまた直接投資に関する政策も 1 つの問題になる。
こういうことを考えますと、エンタープレナーシップという要素をヒューマンキャピタルに入れて考えますと面白いけれども、やはりもう 1 つの要素はポリシーフォーメーションキャパシティですね。つまりエンタープレナーシップを顕在化したり、人材の養成や需給ミスマッチの解消を促進したりする政策形成の能力も重要でないかと思います。これら全ての要素を合わせて考えますと、クズネッツとかアブラモヴィッツとかが描いたような social
capability ではないかと思います。そこでその中で、エンタープレナーシップの場合は、多分地域協力には限界がありますけれども、政策形成能力とかキャパシティビルディングとか、そういうような方面でのアジアの協力の余地があるのではないかと思っています。
時間が来ましたので終わりにしたいと思います。どうもありがとうございました。

188

【Powerpoint】
Development Gaps in ASEAN and East Asia:
A Human Capital Perspective
討論者:トラン・ヴァン・トゥ
(早稲田大学大学院社会科学研究科教授)

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194

【質疑応答】
深川：

社会科学研究科のトラン・ヴァン・トゥ先生でした。コメントありがとうございました。それでは第 1 セッションと同じようにもしご質問、あるいはコメントがあればフロアから多分 1 つくらいですかね、受けたいと思う
んですけどいかがでございましょうか。
ちょっとみなさんお昼を食べすぎてしまったのかもしれません。それでは私から 1 つ質問させていただきたいと思います。ヒューマンキャピタルの中で、健康、教育、起業家精神という観点から今日はお話をいただいたと思うんですけど、教育にしても、健康にしても確かに自国の政府とかが頑張らなくてはだめで、地域協力でやれるところは限界があるっていうのもそうかなというふうに思ったんですけれども。でも自国とか、あるいは二カ国間の協力とかで協力してあげようと思っても、トラン先生のコメン
トの中にもあったんですけど、起業家精神というのは、政府とか、外国人が助けてあげられるものではないんじゃないかという気もするんです。起業家精神についていうとどういう協力がありうるのか教えていただけれ
ばというふうに思います。あとトラン先生のコメントも含めて、もう 1 回
レスポンスをお願いしたいと思います。

Simandjuntak: Thank you, Madam Chair. What I am going to say may sound like awild idea. I try to go deeper beyond the popular explanations for the
obvious gap between economies that we keep seeing whenever we
confront income statistics. I appreciate the comments by my friend
Tran. All the points are well taken and are clearly enrichment to theviews that I expressed.
Entrepreneurship, as I said, is a very new theme in empiricalstudies. OECD launched such study a few years back. I find theframework of that study very useful, but cannot discuss it in details on
this occasion.
I agree that there is not much that we can expect from regional
cooperation in pushing forward cooperation to strengthen
entrepreneurship.
But the main message that I would like to get across is firstthat nationally, I think, there is a strong reason to argue thatgovernments should pay more attention to human capital formation
rather than physical infrastructure formation, spending more on health,195

Simandjuntak: education, and perhaps also entrepreneurship, rather than on physical(cont'd)infrastructure.
We see, for example, that Korea and other more developed
economies in East Asia for that matter, are more aggressive to invest in
education and health compared to many other economies. The
investment is not confined to government investment. The people, too,spend a great deal on education. Governments follow rather than lead.
So it is not government budget that serves as primary source of financefor human capital formation. But to be able to inspire people,
governments of less developed economies in East Asia on their sideshould invest more in human capital formation than they are doing
currently. Enabling them to learn such lessons and to internalize themin development policies is one possible item of regional co-operation.
The second message that I would like to underline is related to
the room that is open to East Asia to deploy regional cooperation forthe purpose of human capital formation in general and entrepreneurshipin particular. We are familiar with the regional production system,
which is also called regional production fragmentation in East Asia.
Employees of companies that are involved in such production systemhave a good chance to become entrepreneurs, serving for instance asvendors of auxiliary inputs. Regional cooperation can encourage firms
to mobilize their respective regional networks for the purpose of
spreading entrepreneurship, opening thereby the room for deeper
division of labor for mutual benefit.
The third message relates to priorities of regional cooperation.
Resources are typically very limited for regional cooperation.
Governments still prefer to pursue national development assistancepolicies. Considering the resource constraints regional cooperation
should concentrate on human capital formation rather than physicalinfrastructure, which usually profits from bilateral cooperation.
The positive externalities of investment in human capital may
be much greater than those of physical investments.
Those are the three main messages that I would like to share.
Underlying reasons are discussed in greater details in the paper.

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【報告】

Industrial Cluster Policy in CLMV to Narrow the Gaps in East
Asia
「東アジアの地域統合と CLMV 諸国における産業クラスター政策」

Akifumi Kuchiki(Professor at College of Bioresource Sciences, Nihon University)

1. Introduction

Three key issues for regional integration of East Asia are topics on deepening
integration, narrowing gaps, and sustaining growth. The topic on narrowing gaps
focuses on the development of Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Vietnam. While there
are many large industrial agglomerations or clusters in East Asia, there are none in
Cambodia, Lao, and Myanmar. It may be difficult to narrow the gaps in East Asia
without any industrial clusters in Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
In his development theory, Nurkse (1953) explained that there exist vicious
cycles of poverty in developing countries. Nelson (1956) also proved that there exists a
low-level equilibrium trap. Yokoyama (1997) derived the policy implications asfollows: To get out of the trap and take off, developing countries must attain criticalminimum effort via the big push concept. Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961),
Jorgenson (1967), and others discussed a dual economy that consists of traditionalcustomary economy and modern market economy. A modern economy is needed togive employment opportunities to redundant labor in the traditional economy.
Hirschman (1958) recommended fostering industries with high values of backward
linkage effects at growing points or poles.
A closed economy, protectionism and centralization dominated the economies
before the 1980s. However, the economic conditions saw a marked change after the
1980s. The principles of the open economy, free market, and decentralization started
to dominate. Global trade and investment were liberalized. Economies moved awayfrom the import substitution policy, which dominated the era before the 1980s, andtoward the export-led policy. The most important change in the development strategy
was that Asian economies introduced the foreign direct investment (FDI) by liberalizing
the inflow of foreign investment.

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In summary, the introduction of foreign investors to export processing zones
has been instrumental to the big push that paved the way for Asian countries to freethemselves from their low-level equilibrium trap since the 1980s. That is, the idea ofindustrial clusters was tapped to make foreign investors agglomerate in industrial zones
in the Asian economies.
This paper proposes an industrial cluster policy of establishing an export
processing zone to form industrial clusters at the cities in CLMV. The strategy of our
flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an unbalanced growth under theconditions of the open economy and decentralization. The flowchart approach toindustrial cluster policy suggests us to find actors to implement policy measures at
Hanoi and Danang in Vietnam, Yangon in Myanmar, Savannakhet and Vientiane in
Lao, Sihanouk Ville and Phnom Penn in Cambodia, Guangzhou in China, and Eastern
Seaboard in Thailand.
The policies recommended by the flowchart approach are as follows: First,
export processing zones are needed to invite anchor firms since domestic markets ofcountries in CLMV are small; Second, on capacity building, physical infrastructure forforeign direct investment in the labor intensive manufacturing industry should be
strengthened; Third, incentives for anchor firms, such as cheap land prices, theconstruction of roads and railways for the firm, and the establishment of international
hospitals and schools, are effective in inviting them to export processing zones; Fourth,the flowchart approach makes clear who are actors or players at each step of theflowchart in forming an industrial cluster.
We find the following facts by our interview method on the investment
environment of the cities above: First, in inviting foreign direct investment in the labor
intensive manufacturing industry with the high value of backward linkage to export
processing zones, the score of Eastern Seaboard area in Thailand is more than that ofGuangzhou and the highest among the cities: Second, the scores of the other cities are
not so much different: Third, the score of Vientiane can become higher than the scoresof the other cities by establishing physical infrastructure such as a port and watersupply.
Section 2 reexamines development theories in the past including Hirschman(1958). Section 3 reclassifies industrial clusters by using Markusen (1996) and
Iammarino and McCann (2006). Section 4 defines our flowchart approach toindustrial cluster policy. Section 5 explains the development of the electronics
industry cluster policy in northern Vietnam using the flowchart approach andintroducing an interview method to find the bottlenecks of its industrial cluster policy.

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Section 6 applies the flowchart approach to cities in CLMV.
paper.

Section 7 concludes the

2. Reexamination of development strategy

There is a critical minimum level of per capita income which must be reachedin order for sustained growth to take place. To escape the low-level equilibrium trap,
per capita income must rise to the critical minimum level. Leibenstein (1957)
explained that, on the big push, the depressing forces operating below the criticalminimum rate of growth include (a) population growth and the reduction in available
capital per worker, (b) a rise in the incremental capital-output ratio, (c) insufficient
stimulus to entrepreneurial activity, and (d) resistance to new ideas, technical progress,
and non-productive conspicuous consumption (pp. 189-90).
Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), Jorgenson (1967), and others discussed adual economy. The Lewis model consists of the traditional agricultural sector with low
or zero marginal products and the modern industrial sector with high rising marginal
products. The Lewis model argues economic growth requires structural change in theeconomy whereby surplus labor in traditional agricultural sector migrates to the modern
industrial sector.
A modern economy is needed to give employment opportunities toredundant labor in the traditional economy. Hirschman (1958) proposed fostering
industries with high values of backward linkage effects at growing points or poles. In
Hirschman’s concept of unbalanced growth leading sectors induce growth in othersectors. Individual firms create backward linkages through the purchase of inputs inthe local market or they create forward linkages through selling output as intermediate
input to other local firms. A theory of protecting infant industries supported the importsubstitution policy of fostering domestic industries that Hirschman recommended by theprotection policy. That is, the government should foster domestic industries byintervening in the dynamic market failure and protecting the industries of importsubstitution.
Though a closed economy, protectionism and centralization dominated theeconomies before the 1980s, the economic conditions saw a marked change after the
1980s. Reaganomics, Open-Door Policy, and the Structural Adjustment Policy by theWorld Bank promoted the shift from the planned economy to the market economy andinternational trade and investment have been liberalized.
Economies moved away from the import substitution policy, which dominatedthe era before the 1980s, and toward the export-led policy that the World Bank called
the “export push strategy adopted in Asia” in a book titled ‘East Asian Miracle’199

published in 1993. The most important change in the development strategy, however,
was that Asian economies introduced foreign direct investment (FDI) to export
processing zones, special economic zones or free trade zones by liberalizing the inflow
of foreign investment. Development strategy changed from import substitution policy
to export-oriented policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of Asian economies positively
introduced foreign direct investment one by one and their development pattern was
called patterns of flying geese.
In summary, unbalanced growth is needed to get away from the vicious cycle ofpoverty. The growing industry may belong to an industry with high backward linkages.
International trade and investment has been liberalized since the 1980s. While
Hirschman (1958) recommended us to foster the domestic industry by protecting
domestic firms before the 1980s, we should introduce his unbalanced growth strategy
under the liberalization of international trade and investment after the 1980s. One of
the strategies is industrial cluster policy.
3. New classification of industrial clusters

This section tries to reclassify the classifications of Markusen (1996) and
Iammarino and McCann(2006) and position University-Industry Linkages (UILs) andNational Innovation Systems (NISs) overviewed by Hershberg, Nabeshima and Yusuf(2007) at the third step of our flowchart approach by Kuchiki and Tsuji (2008) that iscomposed of two steps of agglomeration and innovation. Kuchiki and Tsuji (2008)
needs to take into account the third step of activating innovation in order to understandthe dynamics of industrial clusters by Iammarino and McCann (2006).
Figure 1 shows our new classification consisting of the following four
dimensions: the first dimension is whether there are industrial zones or industrial parks;
the second dimension is which type of ownership of anchor firms is, public, private orsemi-public; the third dimension is which linkage is, backward linkage, forward linkage
or little linkage; the fourth dimension is which step an agglomeration locates, the firststep of agglomeration, the second step of innovation, or the third step of innovation with
University-Industry Linkages (UILs) and National Innovation Systems (NISs).
Our aim is to propose sufficient conditions for the success of an industrial cluster
policy. That is, we hope to provide a flowchart that can lead to the successful formationof an industrial cluster if the sufficient conditions listed in the flowchart are satisfied.
(1) Step I. Agglomeration:
Our flowchart approach is illustrated in Figure 2. First, we ask whether industrial
zones have been established (see the detail in Kuchiki and Tsukada (2008)). If they have200

not, we must decide which actors should establish such zones. Once these actors are
identified, we return to the main stream of the flowchart.
Next we apply the flowchart’s second step, capacity building, which takes
place after the establishment of industrial zones. We examine whether there is anadequate water supply for the industrial zones. We then proceed along the flowchart toexamine power supply, communication, and transportation.
Figure 2. Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy
S tep I:
Agglomeration(a)Industrial zone(b)

Capacity building (I)
1. Infrastructure
2. Institutions
3. Human Resources
4. Living conditions

S tep II:
Innovation(c)Anchor firm(d)Related firms(a)Universities / Research Institutes(b)Capacity building (II)
1. Infrastructure
2. Institutions
3. Human Resources
4. Living conditions(c)Anchor persons(d)Cluster

Source: A.Kuchiki and K.Yoshida

After looking at the physical infrastructure, we examine whether institutions
are in place. The central government must institutionalize national tax systems and the
local government must institutionalize local tax systems. It is well known that one-stop
investment procedures are crucial for success in attracting foreign investors.
In the area of human resource development, an abundance of unskilled laborwith a high literacy rate is a necessary condition for luring foreign investors whose
purpose is to employ cheap labor. On the other hand, an industrial cluster sometimes

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faces a shortage of skilled labor after industrialization has progressed; universities andon-the-job training centers for innovation are then needed for further development.
Living conditions are crucial for attracting foreign investors. Researchers
from investor companies have incentives to work hard if they can enjoy their lives, so it
is important to create satisfactory conditions in areas such as housing, schools, hospitals,
and so on. These are the final conditions that must be satisfied to bring in anchor firms.
Here the anchor firm is defined as follows: it belongs to the manufacturingindustry and has a high value of backward linkage in its input output relationship.
3. The electronics industry cluster policy in northern Vietnam(1) Thang Long Industrial Park (TLIP)
As is shown in Figure 3, we explain a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy byshowing industrial clusters in Hanoi and Haiphong that are located west and east ofnational highway Route 5 (see the detail in Kuchiki (2007)).
Highway Route 5 is 100 km long and links Hanoi in the west and Haiphong in
the east. Hanoi is the capital of Vietnam and Haiphong is a port city. Thang Long
Industrial Park (TLIP) located in Hanoi was established by Sumitomo Corporation. Its
total area is 220 hectare. Nomura Haiphong Industrial Zone (NHIZ) located in
Haiphong was established by Nomura Security Company.
(2) Canon’s effect
Sumitomo Corporation began selling TLIP land lots in 1997. Canon that wasestablished in April 2001 started operation in May 2002. Companies that provided
parts to Canon decided to move into TLIP particularly in 2002. Canon and its related
firms established factories in TLIP after national highway Route 5 was constructed andHaiphong port rehabilitated in period 2 starting from 2002. Canon is an anchor
company to lead other companies to provide parts and components.
(3) Its outcomes
The number of the suppliers to Canon is around 100 including about 20 local companies
in 2007. Eighty two foreign firms have invested from 1997 to 2007 and about 37
thousand of people are employed in TLIP. The share of the export by the firms in
TLIP as the total amount of Vietnam’s export is 3.3 %.
4.

Prescriptions for the industrial cluster policy of Hanoi

We propose that, considering the facts of northern Vietnam, its industrial
policy can take the following three ways. First, the flowchart goes to Step II ofinnovation. Second, the flowchart feeds back to the capacity building of the flowchart.

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Third, the local related firms are suggested to take partnerships with foreign firms.
Here we examine the second way of the feedback and raise the following
twelve questions as is shown in Table 1.
We carried out a survey of the industrial cluster policy of northern Vietnam todetermine whether we can solve its problems using our flowchart approach. We
interviewed ten professionals on the questionnaire, and found the following six results,
as summarized in Table 1. (The ten respondents included six staff at companies in
Hanoi, three staff of Japanese semi-government organizations in Hanoi, and one
Japanese professor studying the Vietnamese economy).
Regarding industrial zones, no respondent answered “Yes.” Our survey madeclear that the roads, electricity and ports of infrastructure are insufficient in industrial
clustering. Regarding highway roads specific for automobiles, all of the ten
respondents answered “No.” In particular, the following roads are listed: (1) Hanoi –Haiphong, (2) Hanoi – southern China and (3) Hanoi – Noibai Airport. Regarding
electricity supply, seven of the ten answered “No.” Three of the ten, who belong tofirms located in Thanglong Industrial Park answered “No.” They have no problem ofelectricity supply since they are given priority for the electricity to be supplied.
But electricity supply in Hanoi is usually planned to stop (August 2008).
Regarding communication, two of the ten respondents answered ‘No’. Email system
of Vietnam is not sometimes connected smoothly. Regarding ports, eight of the ten
respondents answered ‘No’. The other two who answered ‘No’ cannot know the
problems of the port since they ask logistics companies to carry their materials andproducts, and do not directly use ports. This means that all of the respondents pointed
out the problem of ports. Haiphong Port, which is a main port in northern Vietnam, isa river port and shallow in depth from five meters to seven meters. Cailan Port islocated in Halong Bay and substitutes the role of Haiphong Port. It is worried aboutthat the development of Cailan Port will harm Halong Bay that is a world heritage. So
it is necessary to expand the facility of Haiphong Port. Cargos are loaded on a small
ship at the port, sent to Hong Kong Port, and loaded on a large ship again.
Regarding institutions, all of the respondents answered ‘No’. The problem of
institutions is the most serious of the twelve questions. In particular, the four problem
of customs clearance are serious as follow. First, every document on customs
clearance should be translated into Vietnamese language. Second, every paper of the
documents should be original. Third, companies should put their stamps on their
documents. Fourth, every document needs the signatures of companies. In short, it
costs much that original documents move from one place to another in northern203Vietnam to put stamps and signatures on the documents.
The three problems of transporting cargos from Hanoi to the border of southern
China are as follows. First, working hours at customs clearance of the border is shortin operation. Suppose that their working hours at Vietnam and China at the border are
from 8 A. M. to 5 P.M. Their operating hours are different from the working hours and9 A. M. to 4 P. M. The time difference between Vietnam and China is one hour.
Then their operation hours are for six hours. Trucks must spend one night at theborder when they miss to arrive at the border during the real operating hours. The timeof one night is the cost.
Second, it cost much for container cargos to be transshipped, that is, unloaded
from one truck in Hanoi and loaded to another truck in China at the border. The
second problems of the transshipment of container cargos are as follows: stealing,damaging, getting wet, and delaying. A truck consists of its driving part and container
part. We can reduce transportation costs when we can use the container partcontinuously beyond the border between Vietnam and China.
Third, the road condition is very bad as follows. First, there is a lot of death
traffic accidents on the highways in Vietnam since the highways are not in particular use
for automobiles. Bicycles and motorcycles can use the highways at the same time.
Second, the speed of trucks on the highways is slow compared with that in Thailand and
Lao due to the road condition of Vietnam. Suppose that the speed in Vietnam is 30
kilometer per hour while that in Thailand is 50 kilometer per hour (We interviewed afirm at Thanglong Industrial Park on August 30, 2008).
Regarding customs clearance in Vietnam, its implementation of rules is nottransparent. It was pointed out that the rules change so often and are sometimes
implemented.
Regarding unskilled labor, all of the ten respondents answered ‘No’ partly
because illegal strikes happened at many firms in 2008. Firms are forced to be obliged
to establish their labor unions starting from 2008. The boards of firms can designate
the presidents of their labor unions in 2008. But the labor unions can decide theirpresidents by themselves in 2009. So the boards feel uneasy at the future of the labor
unions.
The labor market of unskilled labor has become tight in Hanoi’s areas. For
example, when firm A employed 50 workers in both 2007 and 2008, the number of theapplicants of firm A in Thanglong Industrial Park reduced to 170 in 2008 from 700 in
2007. The firm employed its workers around the Hanoi area in the past but was forced
to employ them from mountain areas far from Hanoi. The firm needs to construct an204apartment for the workers to live. The share of its workers from the Hanoi is 70 % in
the past but reduced to 30 %. The share of the workers from the mountain areas
became 10 % in 2008.
Regarding skilled labor, two of the ten respondents answered ‘No’. It is acommon phenomenon in most of Asian countries that workers change their jobs so often.
The phenomenon is called job hopping. One respondent pointed out that it is difficult
to find many Vietnamese people who can speak Japanese and that Japanese firms should
employ the Vietnamese who can speak English. More the Vietnamese people will
study Chinese and Korean languages due to the shortage of the Vietnamese who canspeak Chinese and Korean languages.
Regarding living conditions, most of the respondents answered ‘Yes’. But
four of the respondents answered ‘No’ regarding hospitals. They usually use hospitals
not in Hanoi but in Bangkok or Singapore in the cases of serious illness. In addition,
few firms periodically send food from Japan due to the seriousness of bird influenza.
Regarding entertainment, some respondents answered ‘No’. They cannot
enjoy on Saturdays and Sundays due to the shortage of entertainment facilities such as
shopping centers and movies. It is difficult to satisfy these conditions since people
cannot fully saturate at any conditions.
Five of the ten respondents pointed out that the thefts of raw materials such as copper
coils happen since some of their workers are lack in moral. It takes time for them tochange their moral.
In summary, the issues of the investment environment of Vietnam are highways,
electricity, ports, customs clearance, and unskilled labor in 2008.
(3) Prescriptions based on the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy of northern
Vietnam
We write out prescriptions for industrial cluster policy in northern Vietnam according to
Figure 6. Northern Vietnam is needed to facilitate infrastructure for the next stage of
growth since it has reached one thousand dollar of per capita of around 900$ in 2008.
Capacity should be built for the stage.
First, new highway route 5 specific for automobiles between Hanoi and
Haiphong is needed regarding roads. Second, it is desirable to construct a highway
between Hanoi and southern China. The highway should be the same level as China’s
highway of three lanes of one way. It may be very sure that northern Vietnam will go
to next stage if the procedures of customs clearance are simplified together with theconstruction of the highway. Third, a highway between Noibai Airport and the centerof Hanoi is needed. Vietnam needs a highway to link Noibai Airport and Hoalac

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Hitech Park the government shifts its capital from Hanoi to Hoalac Hitech Park. A
highway between Hoalac Hitech Park and the center of Hanoi under construction is
expected to be surely effective in promoting the growth of Vietnam since it has threelanes of one way specific for automobiles and is different from its highways that havealready existed. The highways of three lanes of one way will contribute to economic
growth and reduction in the number of traffic death accidents.
Electricity supply is usually planed to stop in Hanoi even though northern
Vietnam is importing electricity from China. Increase in electricity is needed to be
developed by private sector development of build-operate-transfer or official
development assistance.
Regarding ports, Cairan Port should be expanded and Haiphong Port should befurther facilitated. The procedures of customs clearance should be more transparent bysimplifying them. For example, the format of customs clearance should be simplified
by omitting signatures and stamps. Regarding transshipment, its rule should bechanged into the rule of changes in driving parts of trucks by leaving the other parts andnot transshipping the contents in trucks.
Regarding unskilled labor, it is desirable to employ it all over the country
including local villages. Apartments for the unskilled labor are needed to beconstructed. Their employment will contribute to reducing the income gap of people
between Hanoi and mountain areas. Regarding thefts, it takes time to change people’s
moral by educating ethics.
5.

An application of the flowchart approach to CLMV

A condition to be satisfied for regional integration of Asia is to narrow its regional gaps.
The incomes of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam are not as high as other
ASEAN countries. It is desirable that at least one industrial cluster is formed in eachcity of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The desirable situation for ASEAN
to be integrated by reducing its income gaps is that the six cities are to be competitiveby satisfying the conditions of investment environment for industrial cluster policy.
Our flowchart approach is useful to propose industrial cluster policy.
Industrial agglomeration has been progressed in Hanoi and Guangzhou.
Guangzhou has become to be difficult to further introduce the labor intensive industry
due to rise in the wages of unskilled labor. Guangzhou is needed to upgrade the levelof industrialization and make the labor intensive industry shift to other cities at thelower level of wages.
Canon is located in the center of industrial agglomeration in Hanoi.

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Panasonic and Brothers of Japanese companies in the electronics industry are
agglomerated in northern Vietnam. The demand for and supply of unskilled labor in
the suburb of Hanoi was tight in the former half of 2008. Consequently, the wages of
unskilled labor rose and companies in northern Vietnam tried to employ workers fromin the mountain areas.
Generally speaking, the condition of physical infrastructure is relatively easy to
be satisfied while the condition of institutions is relatively difficult to be satisfied. In
particular, the implementation of institutions is difficult to be enforced. It is usual thatthe simplification of customs clearance is not enforced in most of the countries. It isnecessary that neighboring countries should supply unskilled labor by lowering national
borders, i.e., reducing tariffs and abolishing non-tariff barriers. It is effective to build
the institutions to accept foreign workers.
As is shown in Table 2, this section compares the scores of the cities on theirinvestment environment to form industrial clusters by using “our interview method” and“the investment environment survey method”. The cities are Hanoi and Danang in
Vietnam, Phnom Penn and Sihanouk Ville in Cambodia, Yangon in Myanmar, Vientianeand Savannakhet in Lao, Eastern Seaboard Region in Thailand, and Guangzhou in
China. The results of the comparison of scores are that Danang is the highest and that
Vientiane is the lowest. However, the score of Vientiane is better than that of Danang
only if Vientiane facilitates its industrial zone and physical infrastructure. The factorsof its comparison consist of the following nine factors: industrial zones, transportation,
electricity, telecommunication, ports, institutions, human resources related to unskilledlabor and skilled labor, and living conditions. The investment environment is anenvironment to invite the labor intensive industries to export processing zones of thecities.
When there are little differences in the scores of the cities, their differences
crucially depends on the weight of each factor. The factors of industrial zones,
unskilled labor, and ports are indispensable to invite the labor intensive industry toexport processing zones. A highway to link an industrial zone and a port is needed toexport products from the industrial zone. Customs clearance procedures should be
simplified for a city to be competitive with other cities.
First, we apply “the interview method” to the cities of CLMV in the case of theweight of each factor of the nine given by a simplified AHP (analytic hierarchy Process)method. Suppose that the weight of the first group is one. We divide them into
three groups as follows: the first group represents infrastructure for the labor intensive
manufacturing industry at an export processing zone: the second group represents

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infrastructure indispensable to the manufacturing industry: the third group is the factorof human resources. Then the weights of the second group and the third group are
two and 0.5, respectively. This means that export processing zones do not function
without industrial zones, ports and institutions. The weight of the second group is not
the same as that of the first group.
Table 2 illustrates the case of Vientiane to obtain its score. The weight ofindustrial zones is 0.125 and the number of persons who answered ‘Yes’ is three.
Multiplying 0.125 and 3 obtains 0.375. Similarly, the weight of roads is 0.125, thenumber of persons who answered ‘Yes’ is three, and multiplying them obtains 0.375.
Continuing the process from the first factor of industrial zones to the ninth factor of
hospitals and schools and adding the each point obtains 2.95 in total.
Regarding the final scores of the cities, that of Guangzhou, China is the second
highest at the score of 5.75 and that of Phnom Penn, Cambodia, is the third highest at
the score of 4.8. The fourth and fifth are Danang in Vietnam and Sihanouk Ville in
Cambodia at the score of 4.3 and 3.81, respectively. It is reasonable that theinvestment environment of Danang to invite multinational firms in the labor intensive
manufacturing industry to invest in export processing zones is good among all of thecities in August 2008 since Vietnam started to facilitate the investment environment
earlier than other CLM, i.e. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In general, Cambodia isbetter in the investment environment than Laos and Myanmar. The final scores of
Savannakhet and Vientiane are low at 2.44 and 2.19, respectively. The score of
Yangon is not so low at 3.75.
Second, we consider the case of the same weight to all of the nine factors at thepercents of 11.1 as is shown in Table 3. We intend to reflect that this is not a casewhen the industry in export processing zones is not labor intensive. The final scores of
Guangzhou and Yangon are the highest at 2.76 and the lowest at 2.76, respectively.
Third, we find the case when Vientiane’s final score becomes high among eightcities in the case of the labor intensive industry at export processing zones. We
suppose that Vientiane’s numbers of persons, who answered ‘Yes’ on physicalinfrastructure of roads, electricity and communication, get 100 percent out of 10. Thenits score at 4.5 is higher than that of Danang. In short, Vientiane is competitive withthe other cities enough to invite foreign investors if it establishes industrial zones andfacilitates physical infrastructure. The results show that all of the cities arecompetitive to invite the labor intensive industry into export processing zones when thecities satisfy the conditions of the establishment of industrial zones and the facilitationof infrastructure.

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Next we apply “the investment environment survey method” to the cities of
CLMV surveyed by ERIA (2008). Table 4 shows that the total scores of the cities arealmost the same except Yangon in the case of the same weights of the ten questions of aquestionnaire.
We obtained the following two conclusions. First, the scores of Phnom Penn
and Vientiane in 2008 are the best and the worst, respectively. Second, however, eachcity has at present its possibility of forming industrial clusters if the city satisfies theconditions of industrial zones.
6. Conclusions

This paper proposed an industrial cluster policy of establishing an export
processing zone to become an industrial cluster. The strategy is an unbalanced
growth under the conditions of the open economy and decentralization. Our
flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy was applied to Hanoi and Danang in
Vietnam, Yangon in Myanmar, Savannakhet and Vientiane in Lao, Guangzhou in
China, and Eastern Seaboard in Thailand.
The paper established a questionnaire survey method of prioritizing policy
measures and giving the scores on the investment environment to the cities above. The
questionnaire survey method was applied to CLMV, Thailand, and Guangzhou in China.
The policy recommendations tried to find players, or actors, to implement the policy
measures in the cases of ‘No’ of the questionnaire survey. The players are expected tobe central governments, local governments, and players in the semi-government and theprivate sector.
We found the following facts to narrow the gaps in East Asia: First, in inviting
foreign direct investment in the labor intensive manufacturing industry with the highvalue of backward linkage to invite to export processing zones, the score of Eastern
Seaboard area in Thailand is more than that of Guangzhou and the highest among thecities analyzed in this paper: Second, the scores of other cities are not so much different:
Third, the score of Vientiane can become higher than the scores of the other cities in
CLMV by establishing physical infrastructure.

209

REFERENCES

Hershberg, E., K. Nabeshima, and S. Yusuf (2007), “Opening the Ivory Tower toBusiness: University-Industry Linkages and the Development of Knowledge-Intensive
Clusters in Asian Cities, World Development, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 931-940.
Hirschman, A. O. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Iammarino, S. and P. McCann (2006), “The Structure and Evolution of Industrial
Clusters: Transactions, Technology and Knowledge Spillovers,” Research Policy, Vol. 35,
pp. 1018‐1036.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1961), “The Development of a Dual Economy,” The Economic
Journal, 71, June, 309-34.
Kuchiki, A. (2007), “Agglomeration of Exporting Firms in Industrial Zones in Northern
Vietnam: Players and Institutions,” Chapter 5, Industrial Agglomeration and New
Technologies: a Global Perspective, M. Tsuji, E. Giovannetti, and M. Kagami eds.,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.97-138.
Kuchiki, A. and M. Tsuji eds. (2008), The Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster
Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kuchiki, A. and H. Tsukada (2008), “Guangzhou’s Automobile Industry Cluster,” in The
Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy, A. Kuchiki and M. Tsuji eds., New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 41-70.
Leibenstein, H. (1957), Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, New York:John Wiley & Sons.
Lewis, W. A. (1954), “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The
Manchester School of Economics and Social Sciences, 22, May, 139-91.
Markusen, A. (1996), “Sticky Places in Slippery Space: A Typology of Industrial Districts,“ Economic Geography,” Vol. 72, pp. 293‐313.
Nelson, R. R. (1956), “A Theory of the Low-level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped
Economies,” The American Economic Review, 46(5), 894-908.
Nurkse, R. (1953), Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ranis, G. and J. C. H. Fei (1961), “A Theory of Economic Development,” The
American Economic Review, 51(4), 533-65.
Yokoyama, H. (1997), “Development Strategy,” in Chapter 10, eds. A. Kuchiki, H.
Nogami, and T. Yamagata, Development Economics, Tokyo:Yuhikaku.

210

Figure 1. An Asian growth model:
Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy
Classification
1. Satellite platforms

1. Industrial

park

Industrial park

2. Non-park

2. Hub = anchor

1. Public = state-anchor
2. Private = Multinational

Multinational+

3. Hub-spokes

1. Backward linkage

Backward linkage

2. Forward linkage
3. No linkage

4. Dynamics

1. Step 1. agglomeration

Agglomeration

2. Step 2. innovation
3. Step 3. innovation(i) UILs(ii) NISs
Source: Author.
UIL: university-industry linkage
NIS: national innovation system

211

Figure 3. The electronics industry cluster in northern Vietnam(Unit:million $: 1$=100¥)
Year

ODA

Highway Route 5

1993,

1995

210

Haiphong Port

1995,

1999

173

Thanglong Industrial Park

1997

Nomura Haiphong Industrial Zone

1997

Institutional Reform

1999

Canon

2001 Total

200

amount583
100 suppliers

2008

30 thousand employees
Source: A. Kuchiki.

212

Table 1. Questionnaires on industrial cluster policy: Hanoi
1
1. Do industrial zones exist sufficiently?
Capacity building: Physical infrastructure
2. Does transport infrastructure exist sufficiently?
3. Does electricity infrastructure exist sufficiently?
4. Does communication infrastructure exist sufficiently?
5. Does port infrastructure exist sufficiently?
6. Do institutions exist sufficiently?
Human resources
7. Does unskilled labor exist sufficiently?
8. Does skilled labor exist sufficiently?
Living conditions
9. Do hospitals exist sufficiently?
10. Do schools exist sufficiently?
11. Do entertainments exist sufficiently?
12. Do thefts happen?

O

O

2
O

3
O

4

5
6
7
8 9 10 Results
Problems
O O O O O O
10

X
X
O
X
X

X
X
O
X
X

X
X
O
O
X

X
X
O
O
X

X
X
O
X
X

X
X
O
X
X

X
X
O
X
X

X
O
X
X
X

X
O
O
X
X

X
O
X
X
X

0X
3X
8
2X
0X

X
X

X
X

X
O

X
O

X X
O O

X
O

X
O

X
O

X
O

0X
8

O
O
O
X

O
O
O
X

X
O
X
X

X
O
X
X

O
O
X
X

X
O
X
O

O
O
O
O

O
O
O
O

X
O
O
O

6
10
5X
5X

O
O
X
O

Source: A. Kuchiki and T. Gokan (interviews in Hanoi on Aug. 28-30, 2008)

Table 2. Comparison of Cities in Investment Environment by Interview for Industrial Clustering (different weights)
CitiesDanang Phnom PSihanouk V Savannakhet Yangon Vientiane Guangzhou Hanoi Bangkok Weight
Full scores = 10.
4.38 4.75
3.81
2.44
3.75
2.19
5.75 4.06
9.13 AHP
1. Do industrial zones exist sufficiently?
10
5
8
3
3
3
3
10
10 0.125
2. Does transport infrastructure exist sufficiently?
4.2
2
3
3
2
3
10
0
10 0.0625
3. Does electricity infrastructure exist sufficiently?
5.8
1
3
7
0
5
2
3
10 0.0625
4. Does communication infrastructure exist sufficiently?
10
5
7
9
2
6
10
8
9 0.0625
5. Does port infrastructure exist sufficiently?
7.5
4
2
2
1
2
10
2
10 0.125
6. Do institutions exist sufficiently?
5.8
4
5
4
1
4
0
0
9 0.0625
7. Does unskilled labor exist sufficiently?
0.8
10
4
0
7
0
4
0
8
0.25
8. Does skilled labor exist sufficiently?
0
2
2
1
2
1
8
8
8 0.125
9. Do hospitals exist sufficiently?
4.6
2
1
1.5
7
2
6
8
10 0.125
Source: A. Kuchiki.
Table 3. Comparison of Cities in Investment Environment Survey by Interview for Industrial Clustering (the same w eight)
CitiesPhnom PenSihanouk VilleSavannakhet

DanangYangonVientiane

Guangzhou

Hanoi

Bangkok

Full scores = 10.

5.41

3.88

3.88

3.39

2.76

2.89

5.88

4.33

1. Do industrial zones exist sufficiently?

10

5

8

3

3

3

3

10

9.324 Weight
10

11.1

2. Does transport infrastructure exist sufficiently?

4.2

2

3

3

2

3

10

0

10

11.1

3. Does electricity infrastructure exist sufficiently?

5.8

1

3

7

0

5

2

3

10

11.1

4. Does communication infrastructure exist sufficiently?

10

5

7

9

2

6

10

8

9

11.1

5. Does port infrastructure exist sufficiently?

7.5

4

2

2

1

2

10

2

10

11.1

6. Do institutions exist sufficiently?

5.8

4

5

4

1

4

0

0

9

11.1

7. Does unskilled labor exist sufficiently?

0.8

10

4

0

7

0

4

0

8

11.1

8. Does skilled labor exist sufficiently?

0

2

2

1

2

1

8

8

8

11.1

9. Do hospitals exist sufficiently?

4.6

2

1

1.5

7

2

6

8

10

11.1

Source: A. Kuchiki.

213

Table 4. Comparison of the Cities from the Point of Investment Environment Survey (1)PhnomSihanouk

Penn

Ville

(4) ERIA IES2009

Danang

HCMC

YangonVientiane

Industrial estates

3.35

3.06

3.5

Transportation

3.13

3.49

Electricity

3.1

Telecommunication

3.7

2.9

3.2

n.a.

10

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.2

n.a.

10

3.91

3

3

2.2

3.4

n.a.

10

3.57

3.37

3.5

2.8

3.1

3.6

n.a.

10

Water

3.64

3.03

3.4

3.5

3.5

3.4

n.a.

10

One-stop service

3.46

3.75

3.3

3

2.5

3.1

3.5

10

Governance

3.25

3.18

3.1

3.2

3.09

3.3

3.3

10

Regulatory framework

3.3

3.19

3.3

3.4

3.28

3.4

3.3

10

Labor

3.2

3.15

3.2

3.3

3.4

Accomodation

3.05

3.08

3.7

4

3.3

Average

3.31

3.32

3.33

3.32

3.06

n.a.

Savannakhet

Weight

n.a.

10

3.3

n.a.

10

3.32

n.a.

Case 1

Source: ERIA's Investment Environment Survey 2009
(Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia in Jakarta).
Table 4. Comparison of the Cities from the Point of Investment
Environment Survey (2)PhnomSihanouk

Penn

Ville

Danang

HCMC

Industrial estates

3.35

3.06

3.5

3.7

2.9

3.2 n.a.

20

Transportation

3.13

3.49

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.2 n.a.

10

Electricity

3.1

3.91

3

3

2.2

3.4 n.a.

10

Telecommunication

3.57

3.37

3.5

2.8

3.1

3.6 n.a.

10

Water

3.64

3.03

3.4

3.5

3.5

3.4 n.a.

10

One-stop service

3.46

3.75

3.3

3

2.5

3.1

3.5

10

Governance

3.25

3.18

3.1

3.2

3.09

3.3

3.3

10

Regulatory framework

3.3

3.19

3.3

3.4

3.28

3.4

3.3

20

Labor

3.2

3.15

3.2

3.3

3.4 n.a.

Accomodation

3.05

3.08

3.7

4

Average

3.30

3.28

3.33

3.35

214

YangonVientiane

Savannakhet

Weight

n.a.

20

3.3

3.3 n.a.

10

3.09

3.32 n.a.

case2

【Power Point】
Industrial Cluster Policy in CLMV for Narrowing the Gaps in East Asia
Akifumi Kuchiki,(Professor at College of Bioresource Sciences, Nihon University)

215

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【討論】
Development Gaps in ASEAN and East Asia: A Human Capital Perspective
討論者：栗田匡相(早稲田大学大学院アジア太平洋研究科助教)
栗田と申します。よろしくお願いいたします。朽木先生、大変ウィットに富んだ、そして刺激的なご報告をありがとうございました。日本への警鐘のようなものをふまえて、非常に示唆に富んだ報告だったと思います。お偉い先生方の中に私のような若造がおりますので、今日は教えを受ける学生の立場でいくつかコメントないしは質問をさせていただければと考えております。
まず、お手元にあるペーパーの内容についてざっと概観をさらってみたいと思います。ペーパーの書かれた背景と言いますか、モチベーションみたいなものですけれど、日本、韓国、台湾が経験してきたような工業化政策、産業政策、つまり国民国家というものを基盤とした
幼稚産業保護であるとか、国民経済をどうにか強くしていこうというようなスタンスの成長戦略が最近ではなかなかうまく機能してこなくなっている。代って多国籍企業や物流のネットワークを活かした、まさにこのシンポジウムのタイトルにもなっている「地域協力」というもののメリットを活かした成長戦略というものが最近非常に叫ばれているわけです。
これを見ていただくと、最初のジェネレーションとして、この工業化の世代別ということで並べてみたんですけど、これは我々がこのシンポジウムの前に内々の研究会をした際に、今日の座長の深川先生がお示しになったレジュメから少しひっぱってきたものなんですが、
日本、韓国、台湾といったファーストジェネレーションは今申し上げた通りの幼稚産業保護であるとか、中央集権化であるとか、そういった国のパワーで産業を引っ張っていこう、成長を引っ張っていこうという形で国を開発していこうということだった。
しかし、その後の ASEAN、タイ、マレーシア、先行している ASEAN という意味でしょうけれども、そういうところは少し状況が変わってくる。そこには外資を入れて発展していこうという政策が出てくるわけですが。この段階では外資と内資の区別というのはちゃんと置いておきましょうということであったり、自然資源の活用をどうにか考えてみたいとか、あるいは華人の資本、そのネットワークを活かして成長していこうというのが、インターナ
ショナリゼーションと書いてあるセカンドジェネレーションです。
その次に中国とかインドという国が来る。ここにベトナムも含めてもいいのかもしれませんけれども、ここはグローバリゼーションというものの恩恵をフルに活かして、FDI なども
もっとより強く活用していく。または先ほど言ったような物流のネットワークとか、ですね。
そして、この段階になってくると非常に国によるイニシアチブのようなものがかなり薄れてきます。そして、今日のご報告にあった CLMV の 4 番目のジェネレーションがここに続く

231

ということになってくるわけです。ここで朽木先生は、クラスターポリシーというものが非
常に功を奏していくのではないかと、とお話になったわけです。
ですので、国民国家からネットワークとか集積を活かした、地域協力を活かした形に成長戦略が変わってきているということと、工業化というものの意味がグローバルの成長戦略へと変わってきているということです。その成長基盤となるようなプラットフォームというのは、当該諸国である CLMV という国にあるというわけではなく、例えば日本のような先進諸国にあるということであったり、外資と内資の区別はもうほとんど関係なくなってきてい
るとか、あるいは今日のご報告の中にもありましたけれども、個人の能力であるとか、1 つの企業の存在というものが非常に大きくなるような成長戦略というものが考えられるわけです。
今申し上げたことが背景になりますけれども、次にこういった地域協力のメリットを活かすような戦略というものを考えた時に、実際にこういった変化により適合できるような具体的な成長戦略というものはないのか、ということで、今日お示しになられたフローチャート
アプローチというものがでてくるわけです。
フローチャートモデルというものは、実はその前にクラスターというものの概念を提起した、マイケル・ポーターさんという方のモデルがあって、これが朽木先生も触れられていましたけど、ポーターのダイヤモンドモデルと呼ばれるものです。これはどんなものかと言いますと、ポーターというのは特定産業において企業が競争に成功する際、国の経済環境、制度、政策などが果す役割を説明しようとしたんですね。国際競争を実行するのは国ではない
んですけれども、企業または産業であるのにも関わらず、ある国に本拠地を置くような企業だけが成功しているのはなぜかというような問いかけからこのモデルを開発しました。
4 つの決定要因というのが要素条件、ファクターコンディションと呼ばれているものです。
ある任意の産業で競争をするのに必要な熟練労働、またはインフラといった生産要素における地位であるとか、需要条件、どれだけ需要があるかとか、関連支援産業、サポーティング
インダストリーというものがどれだけ育っているかとか、
そういった 4 つの要因が必要だということになるわけです。これは日本の、今日は海外からの方も見えていますので、例えば秋葉原というような地域で考えてみると、秋葉原も歴史があってですね、非常に有名ないろんな家電製品を売っているお店がたくさん並んでいるところです。ああいうものも最初は少数の家電製品のメーカーが進出して来て、小規模な価格競争などが起きることによって、お客さんが集まってくるわけです。低価格が実現できれば、お客さんも更に集まる。それに伴っていろんな部品メーカーなどが集まってきて、いろんなネットワークができてくる。それを聞きつけていろんな他の家電のメーカーなども進出して来る。そこにさらなる競争が生まれて、さらなる低価格化が起きるとか、あるいは高品質化が起きるとか。そしてそういう高品質化からイノベーションのようなものが生まれてくるとか、というような形でその産業のクラスターの形成過程を説明することができるモデルになっているわけです。
ところが先ほど朽木先生、トートロジーと呼ばれましたけれども、実はこれは事後的なモ232

デルです。つまり、先進諸国の成長戦略を後付け的に説明したものですから、どうやってイ
ノベーションを生み出せばいいのかということに関しては、なかなかこれだけでは答えが出ない。そして今日のご報告の内容は CLMV という途上国の話ですから、先進諸国のモデルをベースにしているポーターさんのモデルではなかなか成長戦略として考えることが難しいわけです。なので、先ほどのフローチャートアプローチを改良して出そう。つまりはどう
やってイノベーションを起こすか、どうやって集積を起こすかという意味での、プライオリ
ティ、優先順位を重要視する。こういうふうにやれば少なくともアグロメレーションが起きますよ、イノベーションが起きますよ、というようなステップを提示するということです。
CLMV ないしは途上国はインフラであるとか、いろんなものはもちろん不足していますから、そういうものとして優先順位をつけてどこからやっていくのかということを示したモデルとして、非常に実践的で有用性の高いモデルになっているかと思います。
ここからが質問になるわけですけれども、まず、『Foreign Affairs』の今年の 8 月号くらいに「輸出主導型経済モデルの終わり？―アジア経済が苦境に陥っている本当の理由」というブライアン・クラインさんとケネス・ニール・クキエルという方が書いたものがあったんですけれども、皆さん御承知の通りの金融危機では、第 1 セッションでも議論されたと思いま
すけれども、アジアの国は非常に打撃を受けた。それは中間財が 60％くらい域内貿易の割合を占めていて、最終財は基本的にアメリカとかに行っている。だから先進諸国が打撃を受ければアジアも打撃を受けてしまう。例えばカンボジアでは 5 万人の人たちが雇用を失う。
これはびっくりすることにカンボジアの全雇用の 17％ぐらいの人たちの数字である、と彼らは論じています。なので、実はこのフローチャートモデルというのは、作れば売れるというような意味の状況を多分設定されているかと思うんですけれども、これからの社会、こういったグローバリゼーションの中で、危機とかいろいろな問題があるわけですから、デマン
ドサイドの分析というものの必要性があるのではないか。
もう 1 つの質問は格差に関する質問です。このセッションのタイトルに「格差」の言葉がついていますけれども、まずクラスターを作る、クラスターを作るとそこの地域は潤うかもしれないけれども、じゃあ国内の他の地域との格差はどうなるのか。あるいは、タイのケースが非常に重要だとおっしゃられましたけれどもタイは実はバンコクとか 1 極集中型の工業化を遂げることによって、東北部とかの地域とかの所得格差ですとか経済格差みたいなものが非常に担保されて、今でも残っていて、それが問題になっているんですね。そういうことが起こる。つまりは、国内の格差を助長したり、あるいは固定化したりしてしまう恐れがあるんじゃないか。
もう 1 つは国家間の格差です。実は先ほどのファーストジェネレーション、セカンドジェ
ネレーションという図式をもう 1 度見てもらえれば分かるんですが、
実はサードジェネレー
ションがセカンドに追いつくとか、中国はあるかもしれないけど、セカンドがファーストに追いつくとか、こういった相対的な順位づけそのものはこの 2、30 年間ほとんど変わっていないわけです。ですので、本来であれば成長戦略というものは、例えば上の諸国にくっつい

233

ていけるような、追いついていけるようなものであっていいはずなのに、そういうようなことに実は高度経済成長が言われていたアジアもなっていなかったんじゃないか。
こうしたア
ジア域内で相対的な順位はほとんど変わっていないという事実をどう捉えるべきなのか。それを捉えた上でクラスターポリシーは中・長期的な CLMV 諸国の発展戦略として適当なのかどうか、という点ですね。かつ、格差の問題で考えるのであれば、CLMV というのは、右の図にもあるように貧困に苦しんでいる人がたくさんいる。そういった人たちにとって優しい戦略になっているのかどうかということをちょっと考えていただきたい。
最後ですけれども、実はこれは WWF が今年出したレポートで、実はこの 10 年間くらいで、いわゆる CLMV 地域、メコン河流域地域で 1000 種ほどの動植物の新種が見つかったということが挙げられています。そして、APEC とかで鳩山さんが大変巨額なお金を開発に投じる、GMS（大メコン圏）地域に投じるということをお話されたわけで、アジア会議とかもありますけれども、そういう中でこういった野生動物の保護、もっと言ってしまえば生物多様性条約との関連をどう考えて行くのか、といったこともおそらく今後 CLMV が成長を遂げていく中でどうしても考えなければいけない話ではないかと思っております。以上です。

234

【Powepoint】
Industrial Cluster Policy in CLMV for Narrowing the Gaps in East Asia
討論者：栗田匡相(早稲田大学大学院アジア太平洋研究科・助教)

235

236

237

【質疑応答】
深川：

ありがとうございました。北京ダックの発表に最後は何か、爬虫類系のお話でした。今のことに関してそれではフロアからご質問を受けたいと思うんですけれどもいかがでしょうか。
それでは私からまた 1 つ質問させていただきたいと思います。産業クラスターの話の中で、多分クラスターができるところはいいんだけれども、できないとこ
ろはどうしちゃうんでしょうね、というお話はやっぱりいつもあるんだと思うんですね。そうすると、国の単位で考えているときは国の中でまあ何とかしよう、
いくらなんでも政府がする。普通はすると思うんですけど、クラスターごとにば
らばらに地方分権みたいになった場合、一体誰がそうじゃなくなっちゃった人た
ちを引っ張っていくのかという話はあるように思うんです。先ほどのコメントと一緒にちょっとお答えいただけたらなというふうに思います。

朽木：栗田先生と今のご質問に合わせてお答えします。まず、私のモデルで話す時に一番問題になるのは、需要ですね。どこに売るのか。これはアジアの場合は、かつては、例えばキャノンがアユタヤにあった工場をハノイに移した。そこは輸出加工だったので作ったものはどこかに輸出するということを前提にしていますから、デマンドは最初から持っていっているわけです。だから、全く、輸出加工区の場合はデマンドというのは問題にならない。ところが、中国の国内向けとか、インドの国内向けといったところで進出した場合には、国内が飽和したときどうするかという問題はある。
とりあえず、アジアで起こったものは EPZ（Export Processing Zone）、輸出加工
区を前提としていますから、そこはできるだけ問題にならないようなシフトをする。ですから、今タイで生産している部品をラオスのビエンチャンに新しい工業団地ができるから、ビエンチャンに移す。そこで地域統合というのが重要になってくるわけです。つまり、今国境があるのでここの通関手続きが 1 日かかったり、
2 日かかったりする。これがコストになる。それから道路が東西回廊とか南北回廊とかいうのができているのですが、要するに先ほど言いました空間経済学の理論で言うと、2 地点間の輸送費がゼロになれば、A 地点と B 地点は同じ地点として考えてよくなるわけです。つまり、ラオスもタイも差がなくなるわけです。現
実に今、タイの東部臨海に行きますと、ラオスの人が働いている。要するに、人の移動はそういうところで起きているわけです。ですから、いかに地域統合を早く進めて、午前中にありました FTA、EPA というのを進めて、国境の壁をなくしていく。これが午前中に出られた方の重要な役割になるわけですね。ですから、先ほどの問題で言うと、輸送費にかかるインフラ・コスト制度をどう低くするか

238

朽木：
(Cont’d)というのが需要に大きく関わってくる。
それから格差の問題ですが、産業クラスターを作るということは、そこができたところとできなかったところの差を広くするわけですから、これは格差の拡大
政策なわけです。ですから私がこういう話をすると、場所によっては犯人みたいに、お前何言っているのだという批判をよく受けるのです。が、ところが中国で起こった 1992 年鄧小平の南巡講話というのは、黒い猫でも白い猫でも、ネズミを取る猫はいい猫だ、つまり成長するところから成長しろというのが中国の発展につながった。これをやらなかったのがインドだったわけですね。それが、インドがここ数年はそういうことも認めるようになった。今日は説明しなかったので
すが、デリー・ムンバイ産業大動脈という午前中見えた経産省も大変力を入れて、日本企業がホンダの自動車基地となろうとしている。そういうのが 20 社以上行って、ここ 1、2 年くらいでできると思うんですが、そういう新しい動きができてきている。だからとにかく平等にやったら、平等にそのまま沈んだままであるから、どうやって核を作って引っ張るか、ということが重要であるということですね。
それと、もう 1 つ私の大きな問題は、環境問題。これは産業が集積したらコン
ジェスチョン、混雑が起こるわけですから必ずポリューションが起きてくる。ですから、ここのポリューションを解決するのをどうするかというのを、これは松岡先生に次のセッションで頑張っていただきたいと思います。産業クラスターができるときにどうやって解決していったらいいかというのを次のセッションで解いていただければと思います。ちょうど時間もいいのではないでしょうか。

239

【報告】

Evolution of Regional HDI in China (1982-2006)「人間開発指数(HDI)から見た中国の地域発展格差（1982-2006）」

Angang Hu(Director of the Center for China Study at Tsinghua-CAS;
Professor at School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University)

I.

Introduction:

Historical progress of China’s human development

How to measure the development level of a country or region? People used to use percapita income or per capita GDP to do it. The most typical is the World Bank’s “World
Development Report 2005”. It divides the 206 countries and regions into four groups:
high-income group (per capita GNI was over US$9,386 in 2003), the upper
middle-income group (per capita GNI was US$3,035~US$9,386), the lower
middle-income group (per capita GNI was US$765~US$3,035) and the low income
group (per capita GNI was below US$765).29 Following this method, this author has
found that China falls into the lower middle income group, presenting a typical patternof “One China, Four Worlds”, with the 31 provinces, autonomous regions andmunicipalities fitting in the four different income groups.30
The second method is that advanced by UNDP, known as human development index(HDI). It has been extensively used to measure and compare the relative humandevelopment levels of various countries. As a composite index, HDI is used to measure
the economic, health and education achievements. The HDI attempts to rank all
countries on a scale of 0 (lowest human development) to 1 (highest humandevelopment) based on three goals or end products of development: Health andlongevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a weighted
average of adult literacy and the gross enrolment rate of primary, secondary and tertiary
schools; and decent living is measured by per capita GDP (PPP dollar) (UNDP, 2004).
29

World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate For Everyone.
Chinese edition, P. 254. Beijing, Tsinghua University Press, 2005.
30
Angang Hu, Eds. “Regions and Their Development: the new Western region development
strategy”, Beijing, China Planning Publishing House, 2001.

240

As HDI includes per capita GDP, it is superior to the simple per capita GDP. The
index has been widely acknowledged and accepted for its rich content and definite
meaning.31 In line with HDI, UNDP divides all countries into three groups: Low
human development (0.0~0.50), middle human development (0.51~0.79) and highhuman development (0.80~1).
As the most populous country in the world, China used to be one of the poorest
countries. Over the past more than 60 years, especially over the 30 years sincereform and opening up, it has created the biggest miracle in the history of humandevelopment, which is reflected not only in the alarming development speed but
also in the major progress in human development. China’s HDI was 0.225 in 1950,
an extremely low level, even lower than that of India. But it rose to 0.525 in 1975 torank among the countries with the middle human development. It rose further to 0.722
by 2007 to rank the 92nd among the 182 countries. Such indicators as the life expectancy
at birth, adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment were
72.9 years, 93.3% and 68.7%, above the world average. In just 25 years (1950~1975),
China advanced into the lower middle level from the extremely low level and in just 20
years (1975~1995) it went on to edge into the ranks of the upper middle level from thelower middle level. It has continued to maintain the momentum of leveling up to thesame level as high HDI countries.
Table 1 Changes in China’s HDI Ranking in the World（1950—2007）
1950

1975

1980

1990

2000

2007

China

0.225

0.523

0.533

0.608

0.719

0.772

Ranking

-

62

74

88

96

100

Total countries
102
113
136
173
182
Sources ： Figures for 1950 come from Crafts, N. 2002, The Human Development Index,
1870-1999; some Revised Estimates, European Review, Economic History, 6, 495-505；figures for1975 come from UNDP, Human Development Report 2002. Oxford University Press. p.246, 2002；
figures for 1980-2007 come from UNDP, HDI_trends_components_2009.

In health, China has already brought infectious diseases under effective control and realized themodern demographical transition featuring low birthrate and low infant mortality rate. The life
expectancy at birth rose from about 35 years before the founding of New China to 68 years by
31

Todaro (1999) holds that The HDI has made a major contribution to improving our understandingof what is the composition of the development process in the countries (all are reflected in the HDI
growth at all timnes) and what are the group and regional disparities inside a country. As an
integrated social-economic index, HDI provides broad indictors both relative and absolute in thedevelopment of a country so as to make these countries to focus their economic and political policies
directly on areas that need improvements.

241

1978 and further up to 73 by 2005. The maternal death rate dropped from 1,500/100,000 at the
beginning of the 1950s to 34.2/100,000 by 2008. Infant mortality rate dropped from 200‰ to
14.9‰ in 2008. All these indicators are in the front ranks of developing countries.32

In education, China has completed the transition from a big population power to a big
human resources power. It has realized the nine-year compulsory education, with the net
primary school enrolment rate reaching 99.5% in 2008. The gross enrolment of juniorsecondary schools reached 98.5%. The senior secondary education (high school) is in
for a period of rapid development, too, with the 2008 gross enrolment rate reaching
74.0%. The tertiary education has realized the transition from elite education to popular
education, with the gross enrolment rate in 2008 reaching 23.3%.

In international comparison, the most successful of the 28 transitional states since the1990s are only China and Viet Nam, which have maintained a rapid growth in social
wealth while pushing rapid social reforms. In contrast, the human development growthis much slower in Poland and other Eastern European countries. Russia and othermembers of the Common Wealth of States experienced a big drop in humandevelopment and did not recover until the inset of the new century. (See Figure 1). The
rapid convergence with high HD countries has also created the conditions for theconvergence of different regions in China in terms of human development level.

0.900
0.850
0.800
First group

0.750

Second group

0.700

China

0.650

Viet Nam

0.600
0.550
1990

1995

2000

2007

Figure 1 Changes in HDI of transitional states in 1990~2007
Note: Sorted out by the author according to UNDP: HDI Tends (1980~2007). Data are available from 20
transitional states. Those in the first group are of the stagnant type. They included Poland, Czek
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia. Those in the second group are of the downward
restoration type. They include 12 countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan,32

Public Health Minister Chen Zhu, September 8, 2009.

242

Slovenia, Estonia, Romania, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Moldova. The thirdgroup is of the rising type, including China and Viet Nam.

However, China has attracted world-wide attention not only for its tremendous
progress in human development but also for its regional disparities in humandevelopment. If the various regions of China are put in the world context, Guizhou islike Namibia in ranking while Shanghai is like Portugal (UNDP2005). Chinese
provinces with high human development, apart from Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, aremainly concentrated in the eastern coastal areas and those with relatively low humandevelopment are mostly in the western part of the country (UNDP China Office, 2005).

This shows that reform and opening up have brought about huge achievements inhuman development but also regional disparities. How about the human developmentlevels of various regions in China when put in the world context? What progress havevarious regions of China made over the past more than three decades? How has theregional HDI pattern come about? What new progress is expected in humandevelopment in various regions of China in the next 20 years? This paper tries to probe
into these and other problems. The second part of the paper divides the regions into fourgroups or “four worlds” according to HDI level by the international standards. The thirdpart is devoted to the evolution of the regional pattern of human development in China,
which has experienced a fundamental change. Part Four presents a summary andconclusions.

II.

Standards for dividing the regional HDI pattern

UNDP has released a world development report every year since 1990. The report
divides countries and regions into three groups according to human development level.
They are high human development (HDI≧0.80), middle human development (0.80≦
HDI ≧ 0.50) and low human development (HDI ﹤ 0.50). The middle humandevelopment group claims to have the largest population in the world, accounting forover 2/3. Obviously, this group should be subdivided.

Putting China’s various regions in the world context, we have found that most provinces
are in the middle human development group and the three-group division cannot reflect
the regional disparities. For instance, in 1990, the population of the middle groupaccounted for 99.89%. So, I have further divided this group into two sub-groups: upper
middle (0.80≦HDI≧0.65) and lower middle ((0.65≦HDI≧0.50). So it has becomefour levels or “four worlds”. From this we have obtained the standards for dividing the“four worlds” (See Table 2). This method of division facilitates the understanding of the
distribution and evolution of China’s human development level.

243

Table 2Classification
1st Worldnd

2 World

Divisional standards for the “four worlds” in human development
MeaningStandards

High Human Development
Upper middle Human
Development

3rd World

Lower middle Human
Development

4th World

Low Human Development

HDI≥0.80
0.80>HDI≥0.65
0.65>HDI≥0.50
0.50>HDI

Note : The values for the second and third worlds are fixed by the author. The rest is determined by
UNDP.
Source：UNDP. 2005. Human Development Report 2005, New York.

UNDP study of China reveals the regional disparities and changes in China’s humandevelopment. We have added the data for 198233 to the “China’s Human Development
Report” for 1990 and 2006 published by UNDP and, in line with the “four worlds”
division, analyzed the regional HDI pattern in 1982~2006.

What needs special mention is that UNDP did not use the logarithm method to regulate
the per capita GDP (PPP dollar) at first. Instead, it used Atkinson's formula for theutility of incomes to convert the per capita GDP higher than the limit of the standards(i.e. average income level in the world).34 In order to maintain the uniformity ofstandards, we use the logarithm method for the current incomes to recalculate 1990
GDP indicators and HDI. For that of 2006, we still use the HDI data published by
UNDP.

III.

Evolution of China’s regional HDI pattern

China has made tremendous progress in human development following its reform andopening up program. Such achievements are easy to see and have been recognized andextolled by the international community. In poverty reduction, for instance, if China’s
progress is not counted, the world retrogressed in general (UNDP 2005). But how
should we assess the human development progress from the perspective of regions? Wehave divided the regional HDI pattern (See Table 3) for 1982, 1990 and 2006 according
33

Estimated according to the current method of calculation and by using the data available in thestatistical yearbook.
34
For details about the method of calculation, see UNDP, 1997, Human Development report 1997,
New York, UNDP.

244

to the classification standards mentioned above. We have discovered that China’s
regions have assumed a “One China, Four Worlds” pattern in human development.
But it is different from the same pattern as described according to the per capita
GDP35. This shows that HDI is more accurately in describing the development stages
and features of different regions than per capita GDP. This study is an auto breakthroughon the original studies, which has enabled us to have a more comprehensive and moreaccurate understanding of the national conditions, regional disparities and unevennessof development in China.
Table 3 China’s regional HDI（1982－2006）
HDI group

1982

1990

2003

Shanghai, Beijing,High

Tianjin, Zhejiang,（HDI>0.80）

Liaoning, Guangdong
and Jiangsu

2006

Shanghai, Beijing,
Tianjin, Zhejiang,
Jiangsu, Guangdong,
Liaoning andShandong

Heilongjiang, Fujian, Hebei, Heilongjiang,
Jilin, Shandong, Hebei, Jilin, Fujian, Shanxi,
Shanghai, Beijing,
Tianjin, Liaoning,
Upper middle

Shanghai andGuangdong, Zhejiang,（0.65<HDI<0.80）

Beijing

Jiangsu, Heilongjiang,
Jilin, Shanxi, Hainan
and shandong

35

Hainan, Xinjiang,

Inner Mongolia,

Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan,

Henan, Hubei,

Chongqing, Henan,

Hainan, Chongqing,

Inner Mongolia,

Hunan, Shaanxi,

Jiangxi, Guangxi,

Guangxi, Xinjiang, ,Shaanxi, Sichuan,

Jiangxi, Sichuan,

Anhui, Ningxia,

Anhui, Ningxia,

Qinghai, Gansu andGansu, Qinghai,

YunnanYunnan and Guizhou

According to the method of the World Bank, this author has divided the HDI into four different
income groups. By the per capital GDP (real PPP), the first world has already entered the highincome group. They include Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, with their combined populationaccounting for 2.2% of the national total in 1999. The second world refers to the upper middle
income group in the world. They include Tianjin, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, with their
combined population reaching 22% of the national total. The first world refers to the low middle
income level in the world, with their combined population accounting for 26% of the national total.
The fourth world refers to a level like the lower middle income areas in the world. They are mainly
distributed in the middle and western parts of the country, with their combined populationaccounting for half of the national total. Angang Hu, Eds. “Region and Devleopment: New Western
Development Drive Strategy. Beijing, China Planning Publishing House, 2001.

245

Tianjin, Liaoning,
Heilongjiang,
Guangdong, Jilin,
Lower middle

Shanxi, Hebei,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang,（0.50<HDI<0.65）

Guangxi,
Shandong, Hunan,
Hubei and Inner
Mongolia

Hebei, Fujian, Xinjiang,
Guangxi, Hubei, Inner
Mongolia, Hunan,
Henan, Shaanxi,
Sichuan, Ningxia,

Guizhou, Tibet

Tibet

Jiangxi, Anhui, Gansu,
Yunnan, Qinghai andGuizhou

Henan, Jiangxi,
Fujian, Shaanxi,
Low

Xinjiang, Ningxia,
Sichuan, Anhui,（HDI<0.50）

Tibet

Gansu, Qinghai,
Yunnan, Guizhou
and Tibet

Note: Regions are arranged according to the sequential order from big to small.
Sources: State Council Population Census Office, State Statistical Bureau, Population Statistics
Department, “China 1982 Population Census Materials (Computerized), Beijing, China Statistical
Press, 1985; State Council Population Census Office, eds. “China 4th Population Census Data”(manually collected”. State Statistical Bureau, “China Population Statistical Yearbook 2004”,
Beijing, China Statistical Press, 2004; UNDP and China Institute (Hainan) for Reform andDevelopment, “China Human Development Report (2007/08), UNDP, 2008.

At the beginning of reform (1982), HDI was very low in various regions. About 56.54%of the population were in the lower middle human development group and 41.36% of
the population were in the low bracket. Only Shanghai and Beijing were at the upper
middle level, with their combined population accounting for only 2.10%.

Over the past more than 20 years, fundamental changes have taken place in theregional HDI pattern, with the “third world” and “fourth world” moving into the“second and first world”. In 2006, eight areas were in the first world. They included
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, mainly municipalities under the direct administration of
the central government and coastal provinces, with their combined populationaccounting for 30.34% of the national total. Most others were in the “second world” orin the upper middle human development group. There were 22 provinces, including
Heilongjiang and Fujian, with a combined population reaching 69.44% of the national

246

total. Provinces listed toward the end of the “second world” were mostly the middle andwestern regions. Only Tibet was in the “third world”. The population of the twocategories made up 3.22% of the national total (Table 4). Such regional and population
distribution has stimulated China’s general human development level to move by leaps
and bounds, ascending a new step for every few years.

a. 1982
Figure 2

b. 2006

Historical changes in the “One China, Four Worlds” regional
Human development pattern

Note: Drawn based on the data in Table 3. In 1982, Chongqing and Sichuan were in the same province andHainai and Guangdong were in the same province.

Table 4

Combined population of different HDI groups in national total（1982－2006）
Unit：%
Changes

HDI group

1982

1990

2003

2006

1st World

0.00

0.00

22.15

30.34

30.34

2nd World

2.10

37.45

74.63

69.44

67.34

3rd World

56.54

62.36

3.22

0.21

-56.334th World

41.36

0.19

0.00

0.00

-41.36

National total

100

100

100

100

in

1982-2006

Note：Population ratio is the ratio of combined population in the same world in the national total.
Source: Calculated according to the data in the table above and all years of China Statistical
Yearbook.

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The three sub-indicators have all played their part in the rise of regional HDI and humandevelopment. But the main contributing factor is per capita GDP while the healthindicator has risen not so much. We have also discovered that relative disparity
co-efficient in per capita GDP in various regions has been expanded while thedisparities in health and education indicators have been narrowing (Table 5). This showsthat the disparities of various regions are likely to be further enlarged due to the varying
speed of rise when the per capita income of the regions rises in general. If we continue
to increase investment in health and education, the disparities are likely to be narrowed,
thus realizing the narrowing of the disparities in human development.
Table 5

Regional Human Development Disparities（1982-2006）

HDI
Health
Education

Life expectancy at birth
Adult literacy rate
Gross enrolment rate
Education as a whole

EconomyPer capita GDP

Overall

HDI

Trend of regional
disparities
Narrowing
Narrowing
Narrowing
Narrowing
Narrowing-expanding-narrowing
Narrowing

Main disparities
Inter-regional
Inside regions
Inter-regional
Inside regions
Inter-regional
Inter-regional

Source：Estimated by the author.

Taken as a whole, China has attained the lower-middle level in income and upper
middle level in human development. Major changes have taken place in the
consumption structure (wealthy type in cities and well-off type in the rural areas). The
size of poor population has been reduced sharply (lower than the average of developing
countries). But China is not homogenous and unitary, without disparities. Rather it isheterogeneous and diversified with big disparities. I have categorized it as “One China,
Four Worlds” or “One China, Four Societies”. It is far more complicated than what wehave imagined. This basic national condition merits full attention and priority solution
in discussing how to build a well-off society in every aspect of the word.
IV.

Brief conclusions

The use of HDI to measure the development level of a country is more accurate than theuse of per capita GDP in reflecting the dynamic changes in the development level. Thisauthor has divided HDI into four groups or “four worlds” to show the changes ofdevelopment level of various regions in China over the past 20 years.

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The three sub-indicators have all played their part in the rise of regional HDI and humandevelopment. But the main contributing factor is per capita GDP while the healthindicator has risen not so much. The relative disparities in per capita GDP in various
regions have been expanding while the disparities in health and education indicators
have been narrowing.
China owes the significant rise in human development over the past 20 years to thesteady rise in the average human development level in various regions. Almost every
region has undergone changes in HDI and ascended a new level to varying degrees, thus
leading to the fundamental change in the regional human development pattern, withthose in the “third world” and the “fourth world” moving rapidly into the “second world”
and the “first world”. It is alarming to discover that about 1.2 billion people in the world
are in the “first world”, including 390 million people in China. With the development in
the future, there would be more and more people getting into the “first world”.
China’s HDI in different regions will rise by varying degrees by 2020. The changes inregional human development may lead to a deeper understanding of what a well-off
society really means, that is, it requires that the HDI must reach 0.86~0.87, the highhuman development in the world when the per capita GDP is slightly higher than
the world’s average. About 80% will be in the “first world” and the remaining 20%
will be in the “second world”. The “third world” would be eliminated. Even Tibet
will also be in the “second world”. This is the most important feature of the China
development model: the per capita income is relatively lower than that ofdeveloped countries but the human development has attained a fairly high level inthe world. In this sense, it is more important to seek growth in human development
than in seeking the growth of per capita GDP. The “people first” scientific development
approach advanced by the central authorities conforms not only to the national
conditions of China but also to the historical trend of China’s development. As seenfrom the international perspective, it is entirely possible for China to realize its
grand goal of completing the building of a well-off society.

249

Reference
Crafts, N. (2002). "The Human Development Index, 1870-1999: Some revised estimates." European
Review of Economic History 6(3): 395-405.
1.

Schady, Norbert (2005), “Change in the Global Distribution of life Expectancy and Education”,
World Bank, Washington DC. Processed.

2.

UNDP (2005). Human Development Report 2005--International Cooperation at A Crossroads:
Aid, Trade and Security in An Unequal World. New York, United Nations Development
Program.

3.

Angang Hu, eds. “Regions and Development：New Western Development Drive Strategy”,
Beijing, China Planning Publishing House, 2001.

4.

UNDP：”Human Development report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse Worl”, Beijing,
China Financial and Economic Publishing House, 2004.

5.

UNDP, China Office, “China Human Development Report 2005: Towards Human Developmentwith Equity” , Beijing, China Foreign Translation Company, 2005.

6.

World Bank, “World Development Report 2005：A Better Investment Climate for Everyone”,(Chinese edition），Beijing, Tsinghua University Press，2005.

7.

World Bank, “World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development”, （Chinese edition），
Beijing, Tsinghua University Press，2005.

8.

Todaro, Michael, “Economic Development”, sixth edition，Beijing, China Economics Press，
1999.

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Appendix Table 1
RegionBeijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
FujianJiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
HainanChongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
YunnanTibet
Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang

HDI of Various Regions of China（1982－2006）
1982
0.660
0.637
0.538
0.545
0.501
0.606
0.554
0.571
0.693
0.534
0.527
0.466
0.492
0.493
0.514
0.498
0.508
0.511
0.559
0.514

1990
0.741
0.735
0.644
0.654
0.620
0.701
0.657
0.662
0.777
0.668
0.669
0.591
0.642
0.593
0.650
0.613
0.621
0.619
0.696
0.621
0.653

0.474
0.397
0.400
0.382
0.486
0.456
0.441
0.475
0.475

0.598
0.538
0.553
0.446
0.610
0.564
0.548
0.598
0.626

2006
0.897
0.877
0.768
0.775
0.765
0.814
0.778
0.786
0.911
0.821
0.831
0.723
0.786
0.735
0.797
0.758
0.755
0.753
0.820
0.741
0.762
0.756
0.728
0.647
0.672
0.616
0.742
0.681
0.685
0.724
0.744

Source：Figures for 1982 are the authors estimates；Figures for 1990come from “China Human
Development Report 1997”，with the per capita GDP recalculated according to the current methodand HDI changes accordingly；Figures for 2006 come from UNDP, China Institute (Hainan) for
Reform and Development, “China Human Development Report 2007/08”，UNDP，2008。

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【Power Point】
Evolution of Regional HDI in China (1982-2006)
Angang Hu(Director of the Center for China Study at Tsinghua-CAS;
Professor at School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University)

252

253

254

255

256

257

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【討論】
Evolution of Regional HDI in China (1982-2006)
討論者：Tomoo Marukawa(Professor at Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo)

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I noticed that I’m the only one who hasn’t preparedPowerPoint slides here. Sorry for that. That is because I just received Professor Hu’s
paper two hours ago.
I will only give three brief comments or questions.
First, Professor Hu has referred to China as “One country, four worlds.” But
when we look at Table 3 of this paper, on page 174, I think this table shows that there
have always been three worlds instead of four in China. In fact, in 2006 all provinces in
China except for Tibet belonged to the first and second words. So why not call it “Onecountry, two worlds plus Tibet”? That’s my first comment.
The second is that I think it’s a good proposal to adopt HDI instead per capita
GDP, because the Chinese local officials were so obsessed with industrial growth rather
than human development. However, at the same time I found that the investments,
especially in education, are very impressive after 2001. For example, the number ofuniversity enrollments has doubled during the period from 2001 and 2006. That means
in a span of five years the whole capacity of the university system has doubled, which isvery impressive.
But in recent years I have started to read in Chinese newspapers that many
university graduates are facing trouble finding jobs. Only Tsinghua University, where
Professor Hu works, and Peking University graduates can easily find jobs. But there arenow, if I remember correctly, 1,700 universities in China. So many new university
graduates face trouble finding jobs.
So does that mean that instead of a disparity between those not enrolled inuniversities and those enrolled in universities, a new type of disparity has appeared,
which is the disparity between those from good universities and less good universities,
so a disparity related to quality of university education?
And I think the same thing can be applied to health care. I read in Chinese
newspapers that there are many complaints about the high prices of medicine and healthcare. That means that only the rich people can afford to have good health care, while thepoorer people cannot have good health care or cannot afford to buy medicine. So doesthat mean that a new type of disparity is emerging in China, which is a disparity in thequality of health care?
That’s all for my comments. Thank you259

【質疑応答】
深川：

ありがとうございました。では、フロアのほうからもできたらご質問をいただ
ければというふうに思うんですけれどもいかがでしょう。じゃあどうぞ。

フロア：

Thank you very much, Professor Hu. It was a very interesting presentation.
And it is a pioneering job, using the HDI index in an analysis on regional
China.
I have one question. First, Tibet is classified as the lowest.
My name is Young Nuk Chung, from Seoul National University.
I’m an exchange researcher at Waseda.
Tibet is very low, and as far as I know, the Chinese central
government has put a lot of money into increasing the development levelof Tibet for many reasons. Why it is still even in 2007 or 2006 very low?
Second, in your one historical graph, Fujian is classified in thesecond group. As we know, Fujian was the first tier of open areas when
China started economic reform and open-door policy in 1978. But why is
Fujian still in the second group rather than the first group? That’s
myquestion. Thank you.

深川：

他にご質問いかがでしょうか？どうぞ。

フロア：

My name is Diaz. I’m from Hasanuddin University in Indonesia. Thankyou for your presentation, Professor Hu.
I would like to connect your presentation with the theme fortoday, which is regional integration. My question relates to the questionthat was raised by the first presenter. To what extent is improvement in
HDI a result of integration of the Chinese economy into the regional or
global economy? Or to put it another way, the improvement is a way toeven increase the integration. So which is first, the improvement or the
integration?
Thank you.

深川：

他にございませんか。それでは胡先生お答えいただければと思います。

Hu：

For a real understanding of China, to grasp the real situation, we need todevelop some approach to consider China’s regional disparity. I think it’s avery complex, even contradictory story.

260

In 1998, the data only showed per capita GDP or per capita
income. So my conclusions, like “One China, Four worlds,” is based on
per capita GDP, defined in old terms. Even in 2002 my research followed
this approach.
And today there are more choices, based on HDI. So we foundeven China as “One China, Three worlds” in 1982 until 2006. This is stepby step, with three worlds, four worlds, even back to three worlds now. In
the future it will be two worlds. These are steps--pictures, a dynamicchange pattern of regional HDI for China.
On the other hand, we find the patterns of China very much likethe world patterns. If you use per capita GDP or per capita income,according to the World Bank “World Development report” of 2006 or
2005, it’s similar. Income in a region or country diverges. But theeducation and the health for different countries converge.
So today I showed this map, and this pattern has changed. It’svery complex. But we want to find some policy implications.
We have regional disparity in terms of per capita GDP divergence,
mostly driven by the market mechanisms. But like education, convergenceis driven by the government. Even the public investment and government
services are basically creating equalization basic public service fordifferent regions.
Another question was about Tibet. Tibet is a special case in China.
Why? In 1959 in Tibet life expectancy at birth was only 32-35 years, much
lower than the national average and even lower than that in India.
Even now the per capita GDP in Tibet is higher than that of
Guizhou, but life expectancy is lower. So the Chinese government is now
making more and more investment, especially in human capital, now only
for health but also for education. I think it’s a good policy.
I believe in it. Even now Tibet is lowest. By 2020 Tibet will be in
the Second World if compared with other countries with same level ofincome. Thank you.
深川：

特にフロアからご質問がないようでしたら、非常に奇跡的なことにぴったりと終わることができました。素晴らしいプレゼンテーションをしていただいた発表者ならびにコメンテータの方々に今 1 度拍手をお願いいたします。
どうもありがとうございました。

261