Suggested Papers (Signaling, Reputation andCareer Concern)
Katsuya Takii
Abstract
This is a list of suggested papers that students can choose for their presentation.

1Theory
1. Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) “Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments,”Journal of Law and Economics, 273-306.
2. Anderson, Alex and Lones Smith (2010), “A Dynamic Matching and Evolving
Reputations,”Review of Economic Studies, Vol.77, 3-29.
3. Auriol, Emmanuelle, Guido Friebel, Lambros Pechlivanos (2002), “Career Concerns in Teams”Journal of Labor Economics, 289-307.
4. Camargo, Braz and Elena Pastorino (2011), “Human Capital and Career Concerns,”Mimeo.
5. Cisternas, Gonzalo (2011), “A Continuous-Time Model of Career Concerns andHuman Capital Accumulation”Princeton Working Paper. .
6. Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999), “The Economics ofCareer Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures,”The Review ofEconomic Studies,Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: pp. 183-198.
7. Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999), “The Economicsof Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability ofGovernment Agencies”The Review of Economic Studies,Vol. 66, No. 1, Special
Issue: pp. 199-217
8. Ely, Je¤rey C., and Juuso Välimäki (2003), “Bad Reputation,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118, 785–814.

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9. Garicano, Luis, Ignacio Palacios, and Canice Prendergast. (2001) “Favoritism
under Social Pressure”. NBER Working Paper 8376.
10. Holmstrom, Bengt. (1999) “Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective”. Review of Economic Studies 66(1).
11. Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information,”Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253–279.
12. Mailath, George. “Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types.”Econometrica 55, No. 6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 1349-1365
13. Mailath, George J, and Larry Samuelson (2001), “Who Wants a Good Reputation?,”Review of Economic Studies 68, 415–441.
14. Martinez, Leonardo (2009) “Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 15.
15. Ottaviani, Marco and Peter Sorensen. Professional advice: the theory of reputational cheap talk. 2001.
16. Prat, Andrea (2005), “The Wrong Kind of Transparency”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-877Published
17. Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole. Impetuous youngsters and jaded oldtimers. Journal of Political Economy 104(6), 1999.
18. Yeon-Koo Che, Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik. Pandering to Persuade.
American Economic Review, forthcoming

2Labor
1. Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo (2010), “Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability,” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (October 2010): 76–104.
2. Arrow, Kenneth J., “Higher Education as a Filter,” Journal of Public Economics, II (1973), 193–216.
3. Bordón, Paola nd Breno Braga (2014), “Employer Learning, Statistical Discrimination and University Prestige,”Mimeo.
4. Clark, Damon and Paco Martorell (2014) “The Signaling Value of a High School
Diploma,”Journal of Political Economy, 282-318.
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5. Landers, Renée M, James B. Rebitzer, and Lowell J. Taylor. (1996.), “Raterace redux: adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law …rms.”
American Economic Review 86(3),6. Lofstrum, M., and J. Tyler. (2007). “Modeling the Signaling Value of the GED
with an Application to an Exogenous Passing Standard Increase in Texas.”IZADiscussion Paper no. 2953, Inst. Study Labor, Bonn.
7. Spence, Michael, “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
LXXXVII (1973), 355–374.
8. TYLER, JOHN H., RICHARD J. MURNANE, JOHN B. WILLETT (2000)“ESTIMATING THE LABOR MARKET SIGNALING VALUE OF THE GED”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 431-468.

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Political Economics
1. Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2007), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part
I: A Single Policy Task”American Economic Review, 169-179.
2. Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2008), “Bureaucrats or politicians? PartII: Multiple policy tasks”Journal of Public Economics, 426-447.
3. Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. (2003), “Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence.”Working pahper, LSE. .
4. Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole (2004), “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,”American Economic Review, 1034-1-54.
5. Morris, Stephen. (2001), Political Correctness. Journal of Political Economy,
Volume 109, Number 2.
6. Phelan, Christopher (2001), “Public Trust and Government Betrayal,”in Journal of Economic Theory.

4Corporate Governance
1. Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. Do CEOs set their own pay?
The ones without principals do. NBER Discussion Paper 7604, 2000.
2. Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison. Risk taking by mutual funds as a responseto incentives. Journal of Political Economy 105(6), 1997.

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3. Gibbons, Robert and Kevin J. Murphy. Optimal incentive contracts in thepresence of career concerns: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy
100(3), 1992.
4. HERTZBERG, ANDREW, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, and DANIEL PARAVISINI(2010), “Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Of…cer Rotation,”THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE VOL. LXV, NO. 3.
5. Jiang, Wei and Hualin Wan, “Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors:Evidence from Individual Director Voting,”Mimeo.
6. Levit, Doron (2012), “Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards”
Mimeo.
7. Levit, Doron and Nadya Malenko (2013), “The Labor Market for Directors andExternalities in Corporate Governance,”Mimeo.
8. Milbourn, Todd T. (2003), “CEO reputation and stock-based compensation,”
Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2003) 233–262
9. Milbourn, Todd T., Richard L. Shockley and Anjan V. Thakor (2001), “Managerial career concerns and investments in information,”RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 334–351.
10. Ruiz-Verd, Pablo and Ravi Singh (2011), “Board Reputation, CEO Pay, andCamouaged Compensation,”unpublished.
11. Roberts, Peter W. and Grahame R. Dowling (2002), “Corporate Reputation andSustained Superior Financial Performance,”Strategic Management Journal, 23,1077-1093.
12. SONG, FENGHUA and ANJAN V. THAKOR (2006), Information Control,Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance,”THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE
VOL. LXI, NO. 4., 1845-1896.

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Corporate Finance
1. Atkeson, Andrew, Christian Hellwig, and Guillermo Ordonez. Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns. QJE forthcoming
2. Chari, V. V., Ali Shourideh, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones. "Reputation and persistence of adverse selection in secondary loan markets." American Economic
Review 104.12 (2014): 4027-70.
3. Dasgupta, Amil and Andrea Prat. (2006), “Financial Equilibrium with Career
Concerns”. Theoretical Economics, Volume 1, Issue 1, March4

4. Diamond, Douglas W (1989), “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,”Journal of Political Economy 97, 828–862.
5. Guerrieri, Veronica and Péter Kondor (2012), “Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility,”American Economic Review, 1986-2017.
6. MYERS, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. MAJLUF (1984), “CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN FIRMS HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE” Journal of Financial Economics, 187-221.
7. Ordonez, Guillermo L. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking."
Theoretical Economics 8.3 (2013): 653-700.
8. Ordonez, Guillermo. Sustainable shadow banking. No. w19022. National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
9. Zitzewitz, Eric. Measuring Herding and Exaggeration by Equity Analysts andOther Opinion Sellers. Working paper, Stanford University, 2001.

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Corporate Reputation
1. Andersson, Fredrik (2002), “Pooling reputations,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 715–730.
2. Cabral, Luís M B (2000), “Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation,”Rand Journal of Economics 31, 658-673.
3. Choi, J.P. (1998), “Brand Extension and Informational Leverage,” Review ofEconomic Studies 65, 655–69.
4. Fishman, A., and R. Rob (2005), “Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion
through Word of Mouth Reputation,”Journal of Political Economy.
5. Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1982) “Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis.” Econometrica 50, no. 2 (March1982): 443-59.
6. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts (1982), “Predation, Reputation, and Entry
Deterrence,”Journal of Economic Theory 27, 280–312.
7. Tadelis, S. (1999), “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset,”
American Economic Review 89, 548–563.
8. Tirole, Jean (1996), “A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications tothe persistence of corruption and to …rm quality),”Review of Economic Studies
63, 1–22.
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Accounting Theory
1. Bertomeu, Jeremy, Lecture Note of Voluntary Disclosure, Earning Management,and Markets and Information.
https://sites.google.com/site/jeremybertomeu/ph-d-course
2. Demers, Elizabeth and Chong Wang (2010), “The Impact of CEO Career Concerns on Accruals Based and Real Earnings Management” INSEAD working
paper.
3. Demers, Elizabeth and Chong Wang (2014), “Career Concerns and EarningsManagement”unpublished.

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