CPB

Transport System
Resilience
Summary and Conclusions

194

Roundtable

Corporate Partnership
Board

194

Roundtable

Transport System
Resilience
Summary and Conclusions

The International Transport ForumThe International Transport Forum is an intergovernmental organisation with 66 member countries. It acts
as a think tank for transport policy and organises the Annual Summit of transport ministers. ITF is the only
global body that covers all transport modes. The ITF is politically autonomous and administratively
integrated with the OECD.
The ITF works for transport policies that improve peoples’ lives. Our mission is to foster a deeper
understanding of the role of transport in economic growth, environmental sustainability and social
inclusion and to raise the public profile of transport policy.
The ITF organises global dialogue for better transport. We act as a platform for discussion and prenegotiation of policy issues across all transport modes. We analyse trends, share knowledge and promoteexchange among transport decision makers and civil society. The ITF’s Annual Summit is the world’s largest
gathering of transport ministers and the leading global platform for dialogue on transport policy.
The Members of the Forum are: Albania, Armenia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China (People’s Republic of),
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Türkiye,
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uzbekistan.
International Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16
contact@itf-oecd.org
www.itf-oecd.org

ITF Roundtables
ITF Roundtables bring together international experts to discuss specific topics on economic and regulatory
aspects of transport policies in ITF member countries. Findings of ITF Roundtables are published in a
Summary and Conclusions paper. Any findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are thoseof the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Transport Forum or the OECD.
Neither the OECD, the ITF nor the authors guarantee the accuracy of any data or other information
contained in this publication and accept no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use.
This document and any maps included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty overany territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries or to the name of any territory,
city or area.
Cite this work as: ITF (2024), Transport System Resilience: Summary and Conclusions, ITF Roundtable
Reports, No. 194, OECD Publishing, Paris.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements
This report builds on expert discussions during an ITF Roundtable, “Transport System Resilience
Transport”, held in Paris and virtually on 14-15 September 2023. Professor Elise Miller-Hooks (George
Mason University) chaired the Roundtable.
At the ITF, Olaf Merk wrote the report and co-ordinated the overall project, while David Prater managed
the editorial process. Orla McCarthy and Michael Kloth provided feedback on the draft report. Mila Iglesias
and Charlotte Bracke helped organise the Roundtable event.
Antonella Teodoro (MDS Transmodal) co-authored the sections on the Maritime Trade Connectivity
Indicator.
The author would like to thank Elise Miller-Hooks (George Mason University), Johan Visser (KIM) and David
Caubel (Université Gustave Eiffel) for their feedback on the report.
The ITF would like to thank Elise Miller-Hooks for chairing the Roundtable. Thanks also to William Hynes(OECD), Dirk Helbing (ETH Zurich), Aimée Aguilar Jaber (OECD), Kelsey Stoddard (US Corps of Engineers),
Martin Marshall-Clarke (UK Department for Transport), Jillian Anable (University of Leeds), Erik Jenelius(KTH Royal Institute for Technology, Sweden) and Elise Miller-Hooks (George Mason University) for theirpresentations during the Roundtable.
Annex B lists the names and affiliations of the Roundtable participants.
This Roundtable Report is part of the ITF’s core Programme of Work for 2022-23, co-ordinated by Jagoda
Egeland and Orla McCarthy, and has been approved by the ITF’s Transport Research Committee.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents
Executive summary ........................................................................................................................ 6
The resilience of transport systems ................................................................................................ 8
Disruptions to transport systems .................................................................................................. 11
Climate change .............................................................................................................................. 11
Pandemics ..................................................................................................................................... 12
Geopolitical conflicts ..................................................................................................................... 13
Cyber-attacks ................................................................................................................................ 17
Interconnections and cascading effects ........................................................................................ 18
Predicting vulnerabilities .............................................................................................................. 20
Measuring transport system performance.................................................................................... 20
Measuring recovery time .............................................................................................................. 24
Mapping network characteristics .................................................................................................. 25
Modelling transport systems ......................................................................................................... 27
Policy measures for resilient transport systems ............................................................................ 29
Mitigation measures ..................................................................................................................... 29
Adaptation measures .................................................................................................................... 32
Policy trade-offs ............................................................................................................................ 34
Strategic planning.......................................................................................................................... 34
Transport appraisal processes ....................................................................................................... 35
References ................................................................................................................................... 36
Annex A. Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicator methodology and dataset ................................... 42
Annex B. List of Roundtable participants ....................................................................................... 44

4

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FiguresFigure 1. Transport systems’ preparedness for disruption ............................................................... 9
Figure 2. Number of ships transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, week 45 2023 to week 4 2024 ..... 15
Figure 3. Container freight rates on selected trade routes ............................................................ 16
Figure 4. The interconnectedness of systems................................................................................ 18
Figure 5. Maritime Trade Connectivity of countries in 2022 (Q4)................................................... 23
Figure 6. Maritime Trade Connectivity scores by world region, 2006-2022, per quarter ................ 24
Figure 7. Vessel traffic disruptions in ports affected by hurricanes and cyclones ........................... 25
Figure 8. Schematic representation of a shock on a network with a lot of redundancy .................. 26
Figure 9. Schematic representation of impacts of a shock on a modular network .......................... 27

TablesTable 1. A typology of main disruptions according to their causes. ................................................ 10
Table 2. Main climate impacts for different transport modes ........................................................ 12
Table 3. Shipping cost increases due to Red Sea situation for median size container ship .............. 17
Table 4. Top 10 countries with the highest maritime trade connectivity scores in 2022 ................. 22
Table 5. transport networks and their preparedness for disruptions ............................................. 26
Table 6. A classification of main mitigation measures.................................................................... 29
Table 7. A classification of main adaptation measures................................................................... 32

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary
Key messages
Transport networks are vulnerable
Transport systems face multiple disruptions, from geopolitical tensions and climate change impacts topandemics. Understanding these disruptions is crucial for strengthening their resilience.
Disruptions have spillover effects
Transport networks are interconnected, and transport disruptions in one part of the world can easily
spread to other regions. Managing such spillover effects requires inter-regional co-operation.
Be systematic about resilience
The concept of transport resilience must be built into national-level policies, long-term plans, appraisal
procedures, competition policies and transport indicators.

Main findings
The transport sector currently faces simultaneous disruptions related to geopolitics, climate change andenergy security. This growing exposure to “poly-crises” is exacerbated by increased interconnections
within transport systems. This is also the case for the linkages between the transport sector and othersystems: disruptions related to energy, pandemics, cyber-attacks or supply chains can easily cascade totransport systems and across regions.
The severity of disruptions depends on the characteristics of the affected networks. Hub-and-spoke
networks are more vulnerable to cascading disruptions than less centralised systems, for instance. In thecase of container shipping, regional crises can quickly spill over to other regions: the Red Sea navigation
crisis of 2023-24 disrupted shipping not only between Asia and Europe but also between Asia and North
America, even though ships on this route do not transit the Red Sea.
Huge uncertainty exists where disruptions might occur in future. Despite progress in risks assessment, few
governments currently use existing tools to identify potential risks. These tools include horizon scanning,vulnerability analysis of network characteristics, digital twins, and transport modelling.
Transport system resilience is the sector’s capacity to deal with, adapt to and recover from severe andsudden shocks. An important distinction is between a system’s robustness and its capacity to recover.
Robustness determines the extent to which disruption reduces the functioning of the system. Recovery
capacity determines the time needed to return to business as usual. Improving robustness can beconsidered a form of mitigation, whereas recovery capacity can be obtained through adaptation measures.

6

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Policies to make transport systems more resilient need to define the balance between mitigation andadaptation measures. Which measures make most sense differs per transport system and thecharacteristics of the different transport networks.

Top recommendations
Incorporate resilience into transport policy and planning systematically
Resilience should be a core objective of transport policy. Resilient transport systems continue to function
or recover quickly in case of disruptions, minimising the cost to society and the economy. Inoculatingtransport systems against breakdowns requires making the notion of resilience an integral part oftransport policies, strategic planning, infrastructure appraisal, competition policies, and transport-related
indicators.
Develop tools that help reduce uncertainty about future disruptions of transport systems
Analytical tools and indicators can help reduce uncertainty by detecting vulnerabilities in transportsystems. Such tools should be employed by policies that aim to increase transport's resilience. The
effectiveness of such tools, and the policies they inform, in turn, depends on the coherence andconsistency of the information gathered on transport system performance. Policy makers should stimulate
the development and deployment of methods such as horizon scanning, risk assessment and prediction ofvulnerabilities via analysis of network characteristics, digital twins or transport modelling.
Develop guidance on which resilience measures for transport systems should be applied when and how
Guidance for policy makers on how to prepare for transport system disruptions should focus on bestpractices on robustness and recovery. One important aspect is the policy trade-off between proactive(mitigation) and reactive (adaptation) policies. Another is estimating costs of disruption, mitigation andadaptation in different circumstances. A third is how to embed concepts such as redundancy andadaptability in transport decision making. All of these help to determine when specific policy measuresmake most sense.
Improve global co-ordination mechanisms to deal with the impacts of transport system disruptions
Multilateral co-ordination makes national transport policies more effective. Many crises can cascade andhave global impacts. Likewise, global transport companies can shift resources and capacities to other world
regions. In both cases, national governments are limited in their ability to act alone effectively. Multilateralco-ordination also offers huge opportunities for governments to learn from each other how to deal with
disruptions.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 20247

THE RESILIENCE OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

The resilience of transport systems
The transport sector currently faces simultaneous disruptions related to geopolitics, climate change andenergy security. This report sets out the main disruptions to transport systems worldwide. It explores ways
to reduce uncertainty resulting from these disruptions by assessing vulnerabilities, and the main mitigation
and adaptation measures required to ensure transport systems function in times of crisis.
Transport systems consist of infrastructure, management, transport users, and the interaction between
these three (Jenelius and Mattson, 2021). Technical and physical infrastructure include rails, roads,
terminals, airports, ports, vehicles, signals and signs. Transport users can be travellers, companies whowant goods to be moved and society in general. Transport managers are the actors responsible forplanning, operating and maintaining the infrastructure and services under given regulations and budgets(Jenelius and Mattson, 2021). Policy makers in public administrations do not have full leverage over thetransport system, as a considerable part of the transport operations is subject to market forces.
Transport systems exist on different spatial scales, from the local to the global; bring together different
transport modes; and serve different functions (e.g. passengers or freight; business travel, commuting,other daily traffic, or tourism) that are often interconnected. Despite these interconnections, it makes
sense to distinguish between separate transport systems, including urban transport systems and global
freight transport systems.
Transport systems form part of a wider set of systems, for example supply chains and production systems.
It is difficult to consider resilience of transport systems without taking account of the resilience of supply
chains and production systems that transport is supposed to facilitate. Movements towards more
resilience in critical supply chains, including more strategic autonomy of certain regions, will have an
impact on transport systems.

Defining resilience
Transport system resilience refers to the system’s capacity to deal with, adapt to and recover from
disruptions. In the engineering literature there is a tendency to focus on a system’s capacity to return toequilibrium, whereas the ecological literature has stressed the possibility of moving towards new equilibria(Holling, 1973; McDaniels et al., 2008; Matsson and Jenelius, 2015).
This report takes both approaches into account in discussing policy measures. Whereas the return to theprevious equilibrium is possible in the short run, it is less easy to conceive in the medium and long run
when disruptions like climate change will have fundamentally changed the conception of functions thatcan still be provided.
There are two important aspects to the resilience of transport systems:
1. Robustness. The robustness of a system determines the extent to which a deterioration of asystem’s functions is due to the disruption. The more robust a system, the less the system
functions are affected. Another term to describe this aspect is absorptive capacity. Transportsystems are more robust or absorptive if they provide additional and alternative capacity(redundancy).
8

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

THE RESILIENCE OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

2. Rapidity of recovery. This is the time needed for a transport system to get back to the service level
or level of operations before the disruption took place (time of recovery). A related concept is theadaptability of the transport system (Rehak et al., 2019).
These two aspects can be graphically expressed (see Figure 1) and are logically connected to two different
types of policy tools:
1. Mitigation measures increase the robustness of the system. Mitigation is a pro-active tool,
meaning measures are taken before the disruption takes place (ex ante).
2. Adaptation measures increase the rapidity of recovery. Adaptation is a reactive tool, meaningmeasures are taken after the disruption has taken place (ex post). The concepts generally
associated with adaptive capacity are flexibility, agility, collaboration and communication.
While these two tools can be clearly distinguished conceptually, in practice they can partly overlap. For
example, adaptation measures can be prepared for in advance, and therefore also require a certain proactivity to be effective.
Our description here evidently represents a simplification of reality. In practice, there are complex
interactions between measures and their effects in the short-run and long-term. For example, it is possiblethat adaptation measures can be effective in the immediate aftermath of a disruption but can lead to new
disruptions in the long run.
A related concept frequently used in discussions on resilience of transport systems is vulnerability. The
vulnerability of a system can be considered the likeliness to suffer aggregate system impacts in case of
disruption. The extent of system vulnerability depends on risk (the probability that a disruption will hit thetransport system) and exposure (the service function impacts in case of disruption).
This report sets out the main disruptions to transport systems, ways to reduce uncertainty by assessing
vulnerabilities, and main mitigation and adaptation measures to ensure transport system functions in caseof disruptions.

Figure 1. Transport systems’ preparedness for disruption

Source: McDaniels et al. (2008).

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 20249THE RESILIENCE OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMSClassifying transport system disruptions
This report classifies transport system disruptions according to two types of causes. The first distinction is
between internal or external causes:
1. Internal disruptions may originate from mistakes and accidents caused by staff or users, technicalfailures, components that break down, faulty constructions, overload and so on. They could also
be intentional, such as labour market conflicts.
2. External disruptions may be related to natural phenomena including various degrees of adverse
weather and natural disasters.
One specific long-term threat that lies between internal and external causes is climate change, which ispartially a consequence of human activities in the transport sector.
The second distinction is between accidental or intentional causes:
1. Accidental disruptions strike the system mostly at random.
2. Intentional disruptions take place because one or more actors decide to cause the disruption.
Based on these two distinctions, it is possible to distinguish between four different kinds of disruption:internal accidental disruptions, internal intentional disruptions, external accidental disruptions, andexternal intentional disruptions (see Table 1).
While transport policy makers have considerable leverage over internal causes, this is much less the casefor external causes. Intentional disruptions to systems will generally be concentrated where the transportsystem is most vulnerable, as this will increase the potential impact of the intended disruption. Intentional
external disruptions are more difficult to predict with respect to frequency and location, compared tonatural disruptions and internal technical and human failures, for which it may be possible to collectstatistics.
Table 1. A typology of main disruptions according to their causes
CausesAccidental

Intentional

Internal

Technical, operational, human failure

Strikes

External

Climate events, pandemics

Geopolitical tensions, terrorism, cyber-attacks

Source: Matsson and Jenelius (2015).

10

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

External disruptions to transport systems
This report focuses on external disruptions and describes four specific types of external disruption: climate
events, pandemics, war and terrorism, and cyber-attacks. Many of these disruptions are interrelated,which means that disruptions in one system or domain can spill over to another system or domain,increasing the potential impacts of disruptions to interconnected systems.

Climate change
The transport sector already faces a large variety of extreme weather events, and these events will become
more frequent and serious if climate change continue. Most of these extreme weather events have been
well documented in reports of institutions such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The IPCC also provides regular updates on the likely effects of climate change. Table 2 gives an overview
of the four types of climate event that will likely be the most relevant for the transport sector: extreme
heat, sea level rise, soil humidity and extreme storms.
Despite extensive data and knowledge, a large range of uncertainty persists about the likelihood of certain
effects, due to the existence of tipping points beyond which certain ecosystems might collapse and whichmight have non-linear and unpredictable outcomes. Much will also depend on the extent to whichgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions decrease in the coming years. There will also be large differences
between world regions. For example, temperature rises in the Mediterranean region are predicted to beconsiderably higher than global average temperature rises due to climate change. As some regions will
likely be more affected than others, adaptation policies will also differ (IPCC, 2023).
Land transport will face many different climate-change impacts. Extreme heat will deteriorate
infrastructure such as roads, railways and bridges, but also machinery and equipment. Extreme heat will
result in more wildfires that will disable transport access to affected areas. Sea-level rise and the increased
risk of inundations will affect roads, rail lines and underground tunnels. In addition, rising sea levels could
lead to the erosion of road and bridge supports. Changes in soil humidity due to extreme weather events
including droughts or extreme precipitation could lead to landslides and increase the instability of bridges.
Extreme storms could also damage roads and railways as well as lighting, power and communications
infrastructure that could complicate transportation.
Other transport sectors, such as aviation and maritime transport, suffer from similar challenges, even if
some weather events are more challenging than others. For example, seaports are particularly vulnerable
to sea-level rise, resulting in higher tide and storm surges that could damage port infrastructure and leadto temporary closures (see Table 2). The thawing of the Arctic waters could offer alternative global
maritime trade routes. While potentially economically beneficial, increased traffic through these pristinewaters will likely have negative environmental impacts.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

11

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Table 2. Main climate impacts according to transport mode
Extreme heatLand transport

Aviation

Maritime transport

Deterioration of materials, asphalt
rutting, rail buckling, intelligent
transport systems (ITS)Longer airport runway
requirements

Less inland navigation at low
water levels

Thermal expansion of bridges andjointsObstacles to inter-oceanic
passages (e.g. drought in the
Panama Canal)

Damage to machinery and engines

Thawing of Arctic waters

Wildfire and smoke risk
Reduced construction work hours
Sea-level rise

Inundation of roads and rail lines

Inundation of runways

Flooding of underground tunnels

Reduced clearance underbridges

Erosion of road and bridge
supports
Soil humidity

Higher tide and storm surges

Subsidence of substrata

Subsidence of substrata

Subsidence of substrata

Damage to roads, railway
superstructure, lighting, power,
communications

Damage to airport
superstructure, lighting, power,
communications

Damage to port superstructure,lighting, power communications

Traffic disruption from felled trees

Temporary closure of airports

Structural instability for bridges
Increased landslide risk
Extremestorms

Storm debris

Temporary closures of ports
Storm debris
Loss of cargo, damages to ships,
loss of life at sea, pollution,
dangerous goods

Source: ITF (2016).

While the transport sector suffers from climate impacts, it is also a driver of climate change, as a large
emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other GHGs. It is estimated that the transport sector is responsible foraround one-quarter of total global GHG emissions, mainly because most of the sector’s energy still comesfrom fossil fuels. In almost half of the world’s countries, the transport sector constitutes the largest sourceof energy-related emissions. Moreover, transport emissions continue to rise in most countries (ITF,
2023b).

Pandemics
A pandemic is a widespread occurrence of an infectious disease over a wide range of countries at the sametime. Around 60% of existing human infectious diseases, including Covid-19, are zoonotic – that is,transmitted from animals to humans. Zoonotic viruses cause no symptoms in the host animal, but forhumans they can be deadly.
The main factor behind zoonotic diseases is humanity’s relationship and interaction with nature. Viruses
spill over to people because of the exploitation of the world’s fauna, including via hunting and the global
trade in wildlife. Human encroachment into other species’ natural habitats, for instance through logging,

12

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

mining cultivation or urban development, has increased contact with wild animals and heightened virus
spill-over (Johnson et al., 2020).
As humans continue to invade unexplored wildlife areas, more zoonotic diseases are likely to jump theboundary between species and afflict human populations. At least 75% of the emerging infectious diseases
are zoonotic. Of these, almost half are linked to changes in land use, principally for the production of meat,soy and palm oil (Keesing et al., 2010). Unless these practices change, there is a large likelihood that more
pandemics will take place in the future.
Transport has often played a central role in the transmission of pandemics. The 1991 cholera epidemic in
Peru is believed to have been introduced into three ports through ballast water from Bangladesh. The
disease subsequently spread throughout Latin America, killing more than 10 000 people by 1994 (OECD,2014). The increase in transport speeds and connectivity has spectacularly multiplied the diffusion ofpandemics (Merk, 2020).
Another direct impact of pandemics is their impact on transport workers. Many of the people working in
the transport sector, such as bus drivers, seafarers and port workers, were directly exposed to Covid-19
and suffered from high infection rates and related health effects. Due to the infectious nature of the virus,
many transport users shifted from transport modes with high perceived risk of infection (e.g. public
transport) to modes with lower perceived risk (e.g. such as individual cars) (ITF, 2023a).
Policies that reduce, control and regulate transport movements constitute an important way of containing
pandemics’ potentially huge lethal impacts. This was obvious from government responses during theCovid-19 pandemic. In this context, so-called Covid-19 impacts on transport are in fact the impacts ofgovernment responses, such as the closure of borders, lockdowns and quarantines. These responses
resulted, in the short term, in very large decreases in transport movements, and related reductions intraffic congestion and transport-related emissions (ITF, 2021).
At the same time, lower passenger volumes made travelling off-peak feel less safe, which had significant
impacts on women who continued to work during the pandemic (UN Women, 2020). Many cities
addressed the connectivity challenge during the pandemic by promoting active transport modes andmicromobility. They invested in pop-up infrastructure, widened footpaths, and partially closed streets toencourage walking and cycling. The local authorities that already had comprehensive active mobility plansin place were able to quickly roll out infrastructure during the pandemic (ITF, 2023).
While the levels of teleworking applied during the Covid-19 pandemic have not continued to the same
extent in the post-pandemic world, hybrid working arrangements for office workers have become common
in regions with industries and working cultures that could adapt. Fewer trips to the office can reduce
environmental pollution and strains on the transport network. However, less commuting can also haveinverse effects and lead to more non-work-related travel when more possibilities of teleworking meansthat more city-dwellers relocate to suburbs, prolonging occasional commutes and potentially increasing
car dependence. In many cities, car traffic has returned to pre-pandemic levels and is rising further. The
teleworking patterns emerging in the future could be a deciding factor in whether people adopt more carcentric lifestyles (ITF, 2023a).

Geopolitical conflict
Geopolitical tensions have important impacts on transport systems, depending on the intensity of thetension. Highly conflictual situations, such as interstate conflict and asynchronous warfare (e.g. terroristacts), can lead to destruction of infrastructure and significantly impact mobility and connectivity. Such
TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

13

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

impacts are most severe in areas that are targeted, but often spill over to other regions and other domains,
especially if transport systems are part of global supply chains. This can be illustrated by two recent
geopolitical events: the war in Ukraine since 2022 and the crisis surrounding Red Sea navigation thatstarted in November 2023.
The war in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine, which commenced in February 2022, has had huge impacts on the country’s transport
infrastructure, accessibility and connectivity. It also has wider repercussions for global transport networks,
particularly rail transport, aviation and maritime transport.
Prior to February 2022, the main rail freight route between Asia and Europe was the Northern Corridor,
or New Eurasia Land Bridge. Its rail link connects China and Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. The
dominance of the Northern Corridor reflects the uniform track gauge and harmonised legal regime of theOrganization for Co-operation of Railways (OSJD). When the war in Ukraine brought sanctions anduncertainty, transit on the corridor plummeted.
These disruptions persist and further intensify the problems created by fuel price increases, land-transportcapacity constraints and port congestion, such as higher transport costs and delays. Moreover, insurancecompanies have begun to refuse coverage for shipments via the Northern Corridor (ITF, 2022d). As a result,transport via this corridor has come to a halt. Meanwhile, alternative rail corridors have not been able toabsorb these freight flows.
Civil aviation activity in Ukraine ceased as soon as the country closed its airspace on 24 February 2022. As
most Ukrainian airports have suffered damage, Ukrainian carriers have adapted to the closure of theirhome market by evacuating aircraft to airports outside Ukraine for lease to other airlines. Russia’s airspace
is now inaccessible for carriers from 36 countries, necessitating detours for planes that previously passed
over its territory. This has led to significant increases in travel times for passengers on approximately 80%of the air routes connecting Asia and Europe. Longer flight times lead to increases in fuel consumption andassociated CO2 emissions.
Even if the war-related airspace closures prove temporary, they could spark long-lasting changes to theindustry. Carriers quickly reconfigured their routes and networks in response to the hostilities; government
sanctions may well outlast them. For example, Finnair, a hub airline based in Finland’s capital thatspecialised in Europe-Asia flights before the war, shifted its offer towards Western destinations. Similarly,
the increase in freight flights between Europe and hubs in the Middle East, at the expense of flights
between Europe and Asia, could herald a permanent shift (ITF, 2022b).
The war has also resulted in the partial destruction of Ukraine’s seaports, which export massive quantities
of grain around the world. It also made navigation in the Black Sea a very risky undertaking. With many
African and Asian countries dependent on grain from Ukraine, and limited transport options to get it there,
food prices rose.
Although grain from Ukraine could potentially be exported via rail to other European ports and then by
ship, there are various practical obstacles, including differences in rail gauges between countries.
According to some calculations, exporting Ukrainian grain via foreign ports could add transport costs of
USD 150 or more per tonne. This is triple the average intercontinental shipping cost. (ITF 2022a).

14

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMSNavigation in the Red Sea area

Attacks by Houthi militia on ships in the Red Sea area since November 2023 have impacted maritime
transport between Asia and Europe (ITF, 2024). In response to the Houthi attacks some shipping
companies have instructed vessels to travel to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope route and avoid the Red
Sea route.
Between 1 November 2023 and 28 February 2024, the number of transits via the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
dropped by around 55%. For containerships, one of the ship type most affected by the crisis in the Red
Sea, there was a 75% decrease in transits over the same period (see Figure 2). The diversion via the Capeof Good Hope adds 8 500 nautical miles to a roundtrip between Asia and Europe; for a typicalcontainership, this means an addition of approximately 10 days to the voyage. This increase in travel timetranslates into shipping delays, lower ship schedule reliability, more fuel consumption and additional
shipping costs.
Figure 2. Number of ships transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, week 45 2023 to week 9 2024

Source: Lloyd’s List.

Container shipping companies offer weekly services to their customers. With the shipping distanceincreased because of re-routing via southern Africa, individual companies require more ship capacity to beable to offer the same level of service (assuming they do not change the speed at which their ships travel).
In this situation, shipping companies would need to deploy 15 instead of 12 ships to be able to offer aweekly Far East–Europe service (considering the time it takes for a ship to get back to the point of
departure).
The extra capacity needed for the Far East-Europe services appears to be coming from Pacific services (i.e.
from Asia to the US west coast). The scheduled capacity for the first quarter of 2024 on Far East-Europe
routes was 5% higher than for the first quarter of 2023, while on routes between the Far East and theUnited States, capacity was 16% lower. This data shows that regional disturbances on one shipping route(Far East-Europe) quickly cascade to other shipping routes, since the main container shipping companies
are global operators that can shift their ship capacity from one to another shipping route, depending on
the circumstances.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

15

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

These disruptions are also reflected in developments in shipping rates. The container freight rate for the
Far-East Europe route increased by USD 1 872 (representing an increase of 220%) between 1 December
2023 and 2 February 2024, while the rate for the Far East-Mediterranean route increased by USD 2 493(or 198%) during the same period. As a result, rates for transporting a 20-foot container rose to USD 2 723
for a voyage between the Far East and Europe, and to USD 3 753 for a voyage between the Far East andthe Mediterranean, according to the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index.
Rates have also risen substantially on other routes. For example, container transport rates between the
Far East and the US West Coast stood at USD 5 005 on 2 February 2024, an increase of USD 3 359 (or204%) from 1 December 2023. Rates for container transport between the Far East and the US East Coast
stood at USD 6 652, an increase of USD 4 206 (or 172%). As Figure 3 shows, the rate increases on theseroutes have accelerated since mid-January, in comparison with rates for Far East-Europe and Far EastMediterranean routes, which have slightly declined. This difference could be related to the shift in ship
capacity from Far East-US routes to Far East-Europe routes, which created more scarcity on the former
and less on the latter.
Figure 3. Container freight rates on selected trade routes

Source: Shanghai Containerised Freight Index.

The situation in the Red Sea has increased costs for shipping companies for both those with ships that
continue to use the Red Sea and Suez Canal, and those that sail around the Cape of Good Hope instead.
When comparing costs in the current situation with those prior to the disruption in the Red Sea, bothscenarios (using the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope route) need to be assessed (ITF, 2024).
This assessment considers various cost components: fuel costs, crew costs, canal fees, insurance costs,
maritime security costs and other operating costs. Re-routing ships results in higher fuel costs, crew costs
and other operational costs, but saves on Suez Canal tolls. Ships that continue to transit the Red Sea might
have higher insurance and maritime security costs. The order of cost increases is set out in Table 3.

16

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Table 3. Shipping cost increases due to Red Sea situation for median size container ship
Cost item

Via Suez Canal (USD)

Via Cape of Good Hope (USD)

Fuel costs

1 million

Charter costs

1 million

Container hire

0.3 million

Canal fees

–0.6 million

Insurance costs

Up to 1 million

Maritime security

0.03 million

Total additional costs per ship

Up to 1 million

1.7 million

Additional costs per 40-foot container

Up to 160

272

Notes: The data in this table assume a load factor of 80%; therefore, a 12 500 TEU ship would carry 5 000 40-footequivalent units (FEUs). A total of 80% of the costs of the round trip are assigned to the westbound trip.
Sources: Personal communication with MDS Transmodal for calculation of Cape Good Hope scenario; ITF (2024)
for data on Suez Canal scenario.

From these calculations it appears that there is a significant divergence between the costs for shipping
companies and freight rates. The cost increases involved in rerouting a median-size container ship aroundthe Cape of Good Hope represent an increase of around USD 300 per 40-ft import container, whereas thecontainer freight rates on the Asia-Europe and Asia-North America routes have increased by around USD
1 800-4 200 per container.
Carriers have also applied a variety of surcharges, such as transit disruption surcharges, peak season
surcharges and emergency contingency surcharges, ranging from hundreds to several thousands of dollars
per transported container (ITF, 2024).
Crises such as the disruptions to Red Sea navigation or the Covid-19 pandemic frequently result in rateincreases for transport services that are unaligned to the actual cost increases, risking escalation of
disruption and inflation. This could be problematic. As the Group of Seven (G7) Transport Ministers havedeclared, it is important to increase transparency for transport users and to understand the drivers ofincreases in rates and surcharges related to disruptions (G7, 2024).

Cyber-attacks
The increased digitalisation of transport systems has increased the risk that cyber-attacks will create
catastrophic disruptions. Digitalisation contributes to the efficiency of transport systems because it canfacilitate smooth interfaces and procedures between different stakeholders. It can take the form of dataexchange and processes in which information systems are linked. However, digital systems can be hacked
by private individuals and organisations as a means of extortion, or by states as part of their efforts todestabilise their enemies. Considering their strategic importance, transport infrastructure or systems areevident targets for cyber-attacks (ITF, 2018).
The impacts of cyber-attacks can be particularly significant when transport systems are highly integrated
on a global scale, because it means that hacking a local information and communications technology (ICT)system can have enormous cascading effects. To take one example, the NotPetya cyber-attack was aimed
at various Ukrainian targets, including a Ukrainian port terminal that was part of the global network ofMaersk, one of the world’s largest shipping companies. The attack crippled the ICT network of the
TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

17

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Ukrainian terminal as well as the entire Maersk network consisting of more than 50 port terminals aroundthe world and all ICT systems at Maersk headquarters. This failure of the whole computer network lasted
for ten days, paralysed Maersk’s shipping business and resulted in economic damage in the order of several
billion dollars (Greenberg, 2019).

Interconnections and cascading effects
Transport systems contain many different parts and stakeholders that are interconnected. Transportsystems themselves form part of a larger whole of interconnected systems related to food, energy, waterand other commodities as well as industrial, financial and information systems (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. The interconnectedness of systems

Source: WEF (2023).

The increased interconnectedness between non-transport and transport systems means that shocks in theformer can easily cascade to the latter. Furthermore, many of these systems are global, and while
increased interconnectedness at a global scale has increased efficiency, it has also hugely increased therisks of disruptions, especially due to cascading effects.
Cascading effects are local disruptions spilling over to other places with the potential to generate global
crises. Cascading is determined by the level of interconnectedness. Research on cascading effects between
interconnected networks shows that, beyond a certain point, interconnections could lead to catastrophic
cascading effects. Interconnections between networks can divert loads, with diverted load absorbed by
the neighbouring network rather than amplified and returned, but only up to a critical point. Introducing
too many interconnections after the critical point is detrimental, as this will let diverted load more easily
return and with catastrophic effect (Brummitt et al., 2012).

18

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

EXTERNAL DISRUPTIONS TO TRANSPORT SYSTEMSThe crucial question for different transport systems is whether it is possible to determine this criticaltipping point beyond which more connectedness results in catastrophic cascading prevalence. There arevarious transport systems in which the level of interconnections seems to have set in motion cascading
effects that have transformed local crises into global crises, as was the case in the containerised transport
chain in 2020-21 (ITF, 2022).

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

19

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESPredicting transport system vulnerabilities
Policy makers seeking to increase the resilience of transport systems need to be able to assess current andfuture vulnerabilities. Such an assessment could be considered a “stress-test” of transport systems andcould also help make policy actions more focused. Assessments of vulnerabilities can consist of different
indicators: for example, on the performance of existing transport systems, recovery times in cases of
disruption, and on the exposure of transport systems to disruptions. Exposure to disruptions can, in turn,
be expressed by mapping network characteristics and modelling transport systems.

Measuring transport system performance
The resilience of a transport system cannot be discussed without establishing the baseline performanceof the system in question. Baseline performance here refers to the performance of the system that would
need to be maintained (via robustness of systems) or to be recovered in case of disruptions. So, improving
the resilience of transport systems pre-supposes a sound set of transport system performance indicators(see e.g. ITF 2023c). However, in practice this is not the case, for a variety of reasons. These include a lackof available and transparent data, data bias in favour of certain stakeholders and a lack of policy relevance.
Transport system performance indicators are not neutral, as every stakeholder in the transport system has
a set of indicators that he will find most important. For example, transport users will generally want thehighest service quality for the lowest price, whereas transport managers care more about the return on
their investments, so would prefer high asset utilisation and high tariffs and prices to recover their costs.
Selecting transport system indicators also raises the fundamental question what kind of performance thesystem tries to achieve, so it is linked to a wider discussion on which societal objectives governments wantto promote. A transport system could be assessed by its function to support economic development andgrowth objectives, or essential needs of its population, or other objectives. As such, the choice ofperformance indicators might reflect choices on societal objectives, e.g. with respect to planetary
boundaries. The use of performance indicators is based on assumptions that often remain implicit.
There is also a difference between infrastructure managers who want to make transport companies pay
for the use of their infrastructure, and transport companies who will generally try to offload this to thetaxpayer. Much also depends on the specific transport system. Delays or schedule reliability records, which
are common in cargo transport, would be completely unacceptable in passenger transport. Some cargo(e.g. food that has an expiry date) is highly time sensitive. Time-related indicators are therefore consideredmore important in this context than for less time-sensitive cargo.
This means that governments need to have an adequate and balanced set of indicators on theperformance of transport systems. These indicators should also be collected regularly, publicly available
and be policy-relevant: in other words, designed in such a way that that it could be considered abenchmark for policy makers. An indicator’s positive development over time would then express
something meaningful for the transport system, which is not always the case, as the example of maritime
connectivity indicators shows.
20

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESThe case of maritime connectivity indicators

Connectivity is widely considered one of the main strategic objectives of transport policy. The possibility
to be connected rapidly and smoothly to as many places as possible has emerged as a priority for policy
makers and has translated into strong interest in what connectivity means, how it could be increased, andhow it could be measured.
Various studies have sought to capture the most important requirements for shippers when it comes tomaritime transport services. Although much depends on the type of goods that are shipped, as well as
distances and shipment size, there is some consensus on the priorities of shippers: low prices, reliable
service and direct connectivity (ITF, 2022a).
If prices remain the same, shippers will always prefer a direct connection over cargo transport that includes
one or more transshipments. The reason is that this reduces the risk that cargo gets delayed because ofcongestion or interconnection problems at the transshipment port, where cargo is transferred from one
ship to another ship. Direct calls in many cases also lead to shorter transport times.
Despite the relevance of direct liner connectivity to shippers, no existing maritime indicator measures thisconnectivity. At best, direct connectivity forms part of a composite indicator that does not show directconnectivity scores. For example, the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) developed and disseminatedby the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development amalgamates six different components(UNCTAD, n.d.):1. the number of scheduled ship calls per week in the country
2. deployed annual capacity offered at the country in twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEU)
3. the number of regular liner shipping services from and to the country
4. the number of liner shipping companies that provide services from and to the country
5. the size of the largest ship (TEU capacity) deployed on services from and to the country
6. the number of countries connected to the country via direct liner shipping services.
Only one of these components – namely, the number of countries connected to the country via direct liner
shipping services – refers to what could be considered a measure of direct liner connectivity. As the LSCI
provides equal weight to each indicator, it only covers direct connectivity to a very limited extent. The ITF(2019) previously found that LSCI increases over time were mainly driven by one component: thespectacular increase in container ship size. Hoffmann and Hoffmann (2021) confirmed this finding.
To resolve these drawbacks – and those described in a more extensive critique of existing maritime
connectivity indexes (Merk and Teodoro, forthcoming) – this report proposes an alternative indicator: theMaritime Trade Connectivity Indicator (MTCI). In essence, this indicator measures the maritime
connectivity of a country as the share of its international trade volume (transported by ship) carried on
direct liner connections with its trade partners. This generates a single value per country with a scale from0 to 1 (0% to 100%), that is easy to compare over time and between countries. 1
The MTCI covers international containerised trade and therefore excludes intra-regional trade by sea. This
specific coverage enables a focus on trade volumes that are most likely to be moved exclusively or
predominantly via sea. For example, if intra-regional trade was included, the connectivity indicator would
be subject to value changes related to modal shifts rather than changes in connectivity. Annex A outlines
the methodology and data sources for the indicator.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

21

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES

According to the MTCI, in 2023 the Bahamas was the country with the highest maritime trade connectivity(see Table 4). In that year, it realised a score of 0.96, which means that 96% of the international tradevolumes (transported by ship) from the Bahamas arrived at their destination via a direct liner connection(i.e. without transshipment). Other countries with very high MTCI scores in 2023 were the United States,
Singapore, China, Germany, South Korea, Solomon Islands, the United Kingdom, Panama and theDominican Republic.
The countries with the worst maritime trade connectivity – as defined by the MTCI – are those countries
for which none (0%) of their international trade volumes (transported by ship) arrived at their destination
via a direct liner connection. In 2023, this was the case for 29 countries, some of which are small islandstates with very small trade volumes. But the group also includes larger countries, such as Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Finland, Georgia, Norway, Tunisia and Ukraine.
Note that the maritime trade connectivity indicator covers international trade: that is, trade between
different world regions. Most of the countries with a zero-score on the MTCI have direct connections withmain trade partners, but these are intra-regional and are therefore not considered in the MTCI. Figure 5
provides a graphic overview of the maritime trade connectivity scores of all countries.

Table 4. Countries with the highest maritime trade connectivity scores, 2023
Country

Maritime trade connectivity score

Bahamas0.96

United States

0.94

Singapore

0.94

China

0.93

Germany

0.93South Korea

0.93

Solomon Islands

0.91

United Kingdom

0.90

Panama0.90

Dominican Republic

0.90

Note: For Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicator methodology and data sources see Annex A.

22

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESFigure 5. Maritime trade connectivity by country, Quarter 4 2023

Note: For the Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicator methodology and data sources see Annex A.

The database used to calculate the MTCI contains data from 2006 onwards, making it possible to compare
how country scores have developed over time. Whereas in 2006 a total of 25 countries had a MTCI scoreof 0.90 or higher, this was the case for 17 countries in 2023, so the number of countries with very highmaritime trade connectivity has declined since 2006, which suggests that the exporters in most countries
have less access to direct maritime connections.
The country with the highest maritime trade connectivity indicator in 2006 was Belgium with a score of
0.98, followed by Italy (0.97), the United Kingdom (0.97), Spain (0.97), Germany (0.97), Costa Rica (0.96)
and Jamaica (0.95). It is interesting to note how the top-ranked countries in 2006 were all European, which
was much less the case in 2022. Not only did European countries show a relative decline (in terms ofranking) but they also witnessed an absolute decline (in terms of indicator values).
North America is the world region consisting of the countries with the highest MTCI score in 2023. It
realised a score of 0.92, which means that 92% of the international trade volumes (transported by ship) of
North American countries arrived at their destination via a direct liner connection (i.e. withouttransshipment). Other world regions with relatively high maritime trade connectivity scores in 2022 wereAsia and Australasia.
The world region with the lowest maritime trade connectivity scores in 2022 was Sub-Saharan Africa (seeFigure 6). The connectivity scores of North America and Asia were generally stable with only very minorchanges from quarter to quarter. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the world region whose countries display thelargest swings in maritime connectivity. Several world regions have witnessed a decline in maritime tradeconnectivity over the last decades. This is particularly the case for Latin America (-6 percentage points) and
Sub-Saharan Africa (-4), and to a lesser extent for Europe and Mediterranean (-2). This matters, consideringthat connectivity is widely considered one of the main strategic objectives of transport policy.
TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

23

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESFigure 6. Maritime Trade Connectivity scores by world region, 2006-2022, per quarter

Note: For the Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicator methodology and data sources see Annex A.

Measuring recovery time
The resilience of transport systems has been defined as the capacity to recover from disruptions.
Therefore, an assessment of the resilience of transport systems could focus on this capacity. One way tomeasure this aspect of resilience could be to calculate the time it takes for an individual system to recover
to its original level of transport services or operations. For example, an assessment of the vessel count inports affected by hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones shows that recovery time in case of these disruptions
is between one and three weeks (see Figure 7), depending on specific circumstances.
A related approach could be to calculate the costs required to achieve this recovery in services oroperations. However, it should be noted that quite often full recovery is not actually realised. This seems
to have been the case for US ports affected by supply chain disruptions during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Average ship waiting times for ships waiting to enter these ports have not yet returned to pre-Covid levels
but instead seem to have stabilised on a structurally higher level (so higher average waiting times for ships
than before Covid-19).
Calculations of recovery times can also be carried out for disruptions that have already taken place. Suchcalculations can provide evidence of the extent to which specific transport systems have shown resilience,and therefore provide policy makers with an indication of which interventions helped and under which
circumstances. However, these measurements are also limited, as they can only take place after
disruptions have occurred. The following sections highlight approaches that could help to assessvulnerabilities before such disruptions take place.

24

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESFigure 7. Vessel traffic disruptions in ports affected by hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones

Note: Overview of port disruptions for four ports and events: (a) Port of Houston/Freeport/Galveston (United States)
during Hurricane Harvey; (b) Port Dampier (Australia) during Tropical Cyclone Veronica; (c) Port New York/New
Jersey (United States) during Hurricane Sandy; and (d) Port Shanghai (China) during Typhoon Lekima. The grey
shading represents the formation and dissipation of the event, while the grey vertical line indicates the date on which
the weather event made landfall.
Source: Verschuur, Koks and Hall (2020).

Mapping network characteristics
The process of mapping transport network characteristics is based on network theory. This academic
discipline has classified networks and investigated how different types of networks react to disruptions.
Network theory can help transport policy makers assess the extent to which actual transport systems
resemble such schematised network types, and the implications for the vulnerability of these networks to
disruptions.
Four main network types appear to be relevant for transport: 1) highly connected networks, 2) centrally
connected networks, 3) circuit-like networks and 4) randomly connected networks. These four main
network types are based on a classification of 17 network types that Zhang et al. (2015) identified as
relevant to transport systems (see Table 5).
Various studies have shown that many existing transport systems resemble one or more of these network
types. For example, in a general sense, many arterial roadway networks have a grid or ring shape; networks
of towns often resemble small-world networks; and air systems and container shipping networks arecommonly shaped as hub-and-spoke networks. In a specific sense, scale-free type characteristics exist in
urban transit networks in Beijing (Wu et al. 2004) and the Boston subway system has a small-world network
structure (Latora and Marchiori, 2002).
Research shows that highly connected networks, often found in urban street systems of larger cities, scorehighest on resilience. In contrast, centrally connected networks, such as aviation and container shipping
TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

25

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES

networks, are the least resilient, but relatively most responsive to adaptation. Randomly connected
networks, such as those found in urban transit networks and intercity roadways, are also not very resilient,but their structure provides some redundancy that compensates for this. Circuit-like connections are not
the most resilient types of networks, but still relatively resilient (Zhang et al. 2015).
Such findings should not be used as evidence that certain transport systems (e.g. aviation networks) aredestined to be less resilient, but rather to ensure that policy makers take these considerations into accountwhen developing transport policies. For example, policy makers could, when designing and expandingtransit systems, add new services to create loops. By doing so, they would convert a crossing path network
to a central ring network, thereby creating a more resilient overall structure and providing riders with moretransfer opportunities (Zhang et al. 2015).
Table 5. Transport networks and their preparedness for disruption
Type of network

ExamplesTransport system

Extent of preparedness

Highly connected

Grid, matching pairs, complete
grid, diamond

Urban street systems oflarger cities

Highest preparedness

Centrally connected

Hub and spoke, double tree,
diverging tails, crossing paths

Aviation networks

Least prepared, but most
responsive to adaptation

Central ring, double U,converging tails

Underground transit

Random, scale-free, small world

Urban transit networks

Circuit-like connections

Randomly connected

Container shipping

Relatively prepared

Urban roadway system

Intercity roadways

Less prepared, but provides someredundancy

Source: Zhang et al. (2015).

In line with the network-mapping approach, one could assess the characteristics of transport networks
that could help to accelerate recovery in case of disruptions. For example, networks have higher reboundpotential if they have in-built redundancy and modularity. These properties shield networks from huge
impacts when transport links are broken (Kharazzi et al. 2020).
Redundancy refers to the replication of pathways, functions or components that provide transport systems
with more alternatives to adapt to shocks. In case of disruptions, redundancy makes it possible for atransport system to continue its functions without failure (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Schematic representation of a shock on a network with a lot of redundancy

Source: Kharrazi et al. (2020).

26

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESFigure 9. Schematic representation of impacts of a shock on a modular network

Source: Kharrazi et al. (2020).

Modularity is the property of a system whose components can be separated or integrated without any
change within their properties or within those of the rest of the system. It is designed to measure thestrength of the division of a network into modules. Systems with high modularity are better able to containstress within a module without damaging other components (see Figure 9). For example, firebreaks inforest land management may break the spread of fire (Kharazzi et al., 2020).
Statistical indicators have been developed to operationalise these concepts and calculate values that could
be compared over time and across sectors. In this way, policy makers could better understand the extent
to which transport network preparedness develops over time.

Modelling transport systems
The second approach to assessing the vulnerabilities of transport systems is to model the potential impacts
of disruptions on these systems. Such models could, for example, estimate the recovery time of any
potential disruption that would incapacitate any combination of links and nodes, considering possible
adaptations (e.g. route diversions, mode shifts or fluctuations in transport prices).
Certain models, such as general equilibrium models, could also model dynamic economic effects thatwould impact transport systems, such as firm location decisions in response to disruptions in transportsystems. The crucial assumption here is that models react in a way that corresponds to reality.
Modelling of transport systems can be done on the micro level – for example at the level of infrastructure
assets, such as bridges, terminals and ports (Neugebauer et al., 2024). Creating a digital model (digitaltwin) of the asset that is fed with information from sensors and other information could help to assessvulnerabilities in a timely way and report them to infrastructure managers for action. This type of process
is already applied on bridges in Italy (ITF, 2021).
A digital twin has also been generated for container port terminals in Singapore that can be helpful insuggesting alternative combinations of quay and terminal equipment in case of disruptions such as a partial
shutdown due to power loss (Zhou et al., 2021). Similar methods have been used to simulate the impactsof earthquakes, floodings and terrorist attacks. For example, researchers have simulated the effects of abomb in the port, on hinterland access points or chemical storage areas in the port of Świnoujście, Poland(Nair et al., 2010).

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

27

PREDICTING TRANSPORT SYSTEM VULNERABILITIESModelling of transport systems can also be carried out on the macro level. The ITF non-urban freighttransport model assesses and provides scenario projections for freight flows around the globe. It is a
network model that assigns freight flows of all major transport modes to specific routes, modes, andnetwork links. Centroids, connected by network links, represent zones (countries or their administrative
units) where goods are consumed or produced.
The most recent version of the ITF freight transport model integrates the (previously distinct) surface andinternational freight models. International and domestic freight flows are calibrated on data on national
freight transport activity (in tonne-kilometres) as reported by ITF member countries. Reported data is also
used to validate the route assignment of freight flows.
Trade projections in value terms stem from the OECD trade model and are converted into cargo weight(tonnes). These weight movements are then assigned to an intermodal freight network that develops overtime in line with scenario settings. These define infrastructure availability, available services and related
costs.
The current version of the model estimates freight transport activity for 19 commodities based on trade
projections from the ENV-Linkages trade model produced by the OECD for all major transport modes,
including sea, road, rail, air and inland waterways. The underlying network contains more than 8 000
centroids, where goods are consumed and produced. Several attributes describe each of the network’s
more than 150 000 links. These include length, capacity, travel time (including border crossing times), andtravel costs per tonne-kilometre (ITF, 2023b).
Another approach to assessing the resilience of transport systems involves determining the factors
relevant to system resilience in the different phases (including preparedness, adaptation during thedisruption and recovery) and assessing – based on expert judgement – the extent to which an existing
system scores well on these factors (Rehak et al., 2019).

28

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Policy measures for resilient transport systems
Policy makers have a range of options available to them which can help increase transport system
resilience. There are two main categories of policy measures to increase the resilience of transport systems
to disruptions: mitigation and adaptation measures. This section describes the main goals and means of
implementing these measures and concludes with a discussion of the relationship and possible trade-offs
between mitigation and adaptation.

Mitigation measures
Mitigation measures focus on increasing the robustness of transport systems, so that disruptions are lesslikely and have less significant impacts. Mitigation measures are pro-active: they are conducted before
disruptions take place. This report distinguishes between three types of measures (see Table 2):
1. Avoid. Measures to avoid disruptions reduce the probability that the disruption takes place.
2. Coping capacity. Measures to increase the capacity of the system to disruptions when they takeplace so that the system functions are minimally impacted.
3. Redundancy. Alternative capacity in case disruptions take place.

Table 6. A classification of main mitigation measures
Type of measure

What does it aim to do?

Examples of measures

Avoid

Mitigate disruptions (e.g. climate change)

Climate-change mitigation policies

Avoid settlement in high-risk areas

Land-use planning, relocation policies

Produce networks that reduce the risk ofcascading

Strategic planning (hubs and minor hubs)

Increase resistance of infrastructure to
disruptions

Infrastructure investment (e.g. in drainage,
permeable road surfaces, earthquakeproof construction, and increased
pumping capacity in tunnels)

Coping capacity

Protect critical infrastructure

Investment in elevated roads, runways,
dikes, seawalls and bridges
Prioritising maintenance of “critical
networks”
Redundancy29

Add links to create more alternative routes

Infrastructure investment planning

Provide buffers for crucial inputs (including
electricity, workers and equipment)

Prioritising redundancy budgets forinfrastructure managers

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Measures to avoid disruptions

A key element in policies to avoid disruptions is to assess vulnerabilities of transport systems, along thelines that were indicated in the previous chapter. Several countries have invested in capacity to assess risks
and vulnerabilities. For example, France has started a project to map vulnerabilities in its transport system,
consisting of case studies of vulnerabilities in supply chains in cereals and chemicals, and on thevulnerability of the multi-modal transport systems in two selected areas in France.
Certain disruptions could be mitigated, particularly those caused by human behaviour. The prime example
is climate change, which is primarily caused by human activity and could be mitigated by changing
behaviour, and by phasing out activities or technologies that generate GHG emissions.
Transport policy makers have greater leverage over GHG emissions produced by the transport sector itself,
and many countries are engaged in creating and implementing policies to decarbonise their transport
sectors. This can take the form of strategies to avoid unnecessary transport, shift to cleaner transportmodes, and improve the energy efficiency while reducing the carbon intensity of transport vehicles. The
main mechanisms used to achieve these policies are standards, regulations and incentives, such as carbon
pricing and subsidies for the development and roll-out of clean technologies.
However, the effectiveness of transport decarbonisation policies is dependent on policies in otherdomains. For example, energy policies determine the availability of renewable and clean energy sources.
Transport decarbonisation is also embedded in broader climate policies that can vary in ambition andeffectiveness.
Regardless of the policies governments put in place to avoid disruptions, such disruptions will always occur.
Therefore, policy makers could ensure that these policies minimise the exposure risks of people andtransport infrastructure assets. Similarly, even if governments implement ambitious climate change
policies, emission trajectories are already locked in. This means that many catastrophic climate events willtake place in the coming years.
In this context, policy makers could increase the disruption-preparedness of transport systems by avoiding
human settlement – and the transport infrastructure that comes with it – in high-risk areas. Most coastal
areas, river deltas and low-lying areas are likely to be flooded. Therefore, spatial planning of settlements
will need to account for this disruption to reduce the risk that transport systems are exposed tocatastrophic failure. Mechanisms that could help here include changes in land-use planning, and relocation
policies, to make sure that no new settlements will be constructed in flood-prone areas. For example,
county governments in the US state of Virginia buy houses and land when it comes for sale in areas where
they do not want continued development (e.g. on flood plains).
To limit the possibilities of cascading effects that can turn small and local disruptions into large andcatastrophic disruptions, policy makers could also reconsider the design of transport networks. A drive forever greater efficiency has resulted in centralised network structures (e.g. hub-and-spoke networks) thatare less prepared for disruptions because of the risk of cascading effects.
Policy makers could introduce more redundancy in transport networks, for example by introducing
secondary or tertiary hubs that could take over functions in the case of the failure of main hubs. The
disruption-preparedness of the design of transport networks could be integrated into infrastructure
investment appraisal processes.

30

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Measures to increase coping capacity

Transport systems can better cope with disruptions by improving the resistance of transport network
infrastructure. Improvements can take various forms, depending on the specific challenges. For example,
to better cope with the risks of flooding, transport infrastructures could be provided with better drainage
facilities and permeable road surfaces. Tunnels could be made more resistant by improving their pumping
capacity.
Governments could also prioritise investments in ecological urbanism and adaptive “soft” infrastructure
measures. Examples of soft infrastructure measures include permeable surfaces and bioswales;preservation of natural water bodies, wetlands, natural reefs and mangroves in coastal areas (which act asbarriers against storm surge), afforestation, and more ground drainage through wetlands and greenspace
to ameliorate flash flooding. Various countries, such as South Korea, have removed elevated highways topreserve neglected waterways, or restored canals that were previously converted to motorways.
Another type of coping-capacity measure aims to better protect critical infrastructure. To limit the possible
impacts of rising sea levels and extreme flooding, several countries have elevated roads, runways, dikes,
seawalls and bridges. Many countries have also defined what they consider their critical infrastructure thatneeds to be protected and prioritised. Infrastructure maintenance policies are updated to reflect thesepriorities, with more frequent maintenance and repairs for critical infrastructure, to avoid system failure
when disruptions occur (OECD, 2021).
Measures to create redundancy

Increasing redundancy in transport systems will generally increase their preparedness for disruptions. This
could be done by adding links and nodes to create more alternative transport options that could be ofgreat use in case of disruptions. This would require that infrastructure investment planning takes accountof specific network vulnerabilities and guides investment decisions with the aim of increasing networks’
preparedness for disruptions.
Transport systems deliver their outcomes by a combination of “inputs”, such as workers, equipment,
energy and often electricity. Disruptions can often have catastrophic effects when there is a lasting
shortage of any of these production factors. Transport systems are better prepared for disruptions if
strategic buffers are created (e.g. electricity storage) that could be used in case of disruptions.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

31

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Adaptation measures
Adaptation measures focus on the rapidity of the recovery when a disruption takes place. These arereactive measures. This report distinguishes between two types of adaptation measures (see Table 7):
1. Response measures. These are measures to deal with the immediate impacts of the disruption.
This is a necessary step before recovery can take place.
2. Recovery measures. These are measures put in place to restore system functions.
Table 7. A classification of main adaptation measures
Type of measure

What does it focus on?

Examples of measures

Response

Planning, institutional and legal
frameworks

Contingency plans and timetables

Training

User communication plans
Information systems for rescue workers

Optimising existing infrastructure

Legal and contractual frameworks
Support tools on which responses to prioritise
Lane reversal and shoulder use (on roads)

Recovery

Clearing obstacles
New transport equilibria
New societal equilibria (e.g.
teleworking, inventories, sourcing)

Plans and resources for clearing debris andconducting urgent repairs
Relocation of roads, railways, runways and ports
Policies on framework conditions (e.g. labour,
trade facilitation, foreign direct investment)

Measures to improve response capacity

Plans and frameworks can increase the capacity to respond adequately in the case of disruptions. Withbetter preparation, responsible actors will be more likely to be able to respond effectively. Policy makers
could ensure that transport managers and operators have developed contingency plans and timetables,
user communication plans and information systems for rescue services. This, in turn, will help ensure thatprocedures exist which can be followed to facilitate an adequate response.
Such contingency plans need to be specific for as many different situations as possible, as required
measures might need to vary by scenario. For example, cities that introduced mandatory masking, physicaldistancing and frequent disinfection (among other measures) during the early phase of the Covid-19
pandemic helped manage the fear of infection among public transit passengers and performed best interms of continuity of ridership (McKinsey and Company, 2021). Nevertheless, it will be impossible toforesee every disruption in advance, so organisations will always to a certain extent need to improvise andadapt to the situation at hand. In order for this to work, it needs to be clear which organisations have
which roles and responsibilities in case of disruptions (PIARC, 2019). In other words, increased resilienceof transport systems also requires adaptations in governance.
Legal and contractual frameworks could be designed that make disaster responses as smooth as possible.
It is essential that transport staff receive relevant training to be able to respond to disruptions. Part of thattraining should involve developing decision support tools for transport staff that can help them to prioritise
the appropriate actions to take in case of disruptions. In Japan, an important element in the policy
approach is to enhance disaster awareness and skills, at the one hand by stimulating transport disaster
32

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

management evaluation among board members of enterprises, on the other hand by training local
authorities so that they can cope with disasters.
Governments have also deployed tools to make sure that workers at critical facilities or services willcontinue to perform their tasks. One specific strategy used by governments is to designate specific groups
of workers as “essential” to improve the capabilities of transport nodes (including ports and airports) to
respond to disruptions or abrupt changes in demand.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, many transport workers were required to continue working
despite the health dangers. Improving the safety of riders and essential transport workers was crucial forthe survival of cities during the pandemic. Specific initiatives included off-board fare collection and backdoor boarding, barriers, spacing, enhanced cleaning, personal protective equipment for staff, and mask
mandates (UITP, 2020; 2021).
To help essential workers get to their workplaces, some transport authorities and operators also
redeployed radial services and other lesser-used routes to suburb-based services (ITF, 2023a). In themaritime sector, crises such as pandemics could require facilitation of transport of seafarers to, andrepatriation from, their vessels and appropriate access to shore leave, urgent medical care and welfare
facilities.
Response capacity could be improved by optimising the infrastructure that continues to exist after a major
disruption. For example, mechanisms such as lane reversal or shoulder use could help to maximise the useof roads, even in cases of disruption. Such emergency measures can be quickly implemented if procedures
have been prepared and drilled in advance.
Measures to speed up recovery

The clearing of obstacles is one of the key measures for restoring transport system functions. This can takethe form of clearing debris and urgent repairs of failing parts of infrastructure. This clearance of obstacles
can be accelerated by preparation in advance via planning mechanisms and reservation and repositioningof resources for emergencies.
Recovery can also take the form of the emergence of new transport equilibria. This means that disruptions
could lead to situations where decision makers decide against restoring a transport system to the state it
was in before the disruption, choosing instead to “build back better” – that is, to recover along a pathwaythat makes more sense considering changed circumstances.
For example, when extreme weather events destroy infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways, bridges, ports andairports) that are highly exposed to these risks, governments could decide to recover transport system
functions by locating such infrastructure assets in areas that are less exposed to climate risks. Such a policy
response would reduce the likelihood of future disruptions and make the transport system better preparedfor disruptions. It may be necessary to align regulations to support such policies.
Recovery measures could also take account of new societal equilibria. The increased acceptance of
teleworking following Covid-19 has decreased the number of commuting trips but also increased
commuting distances. The changed sourcing decisions of businesses following geopolitical tensions, suchas the war in Ukraine and the related economic sanctions imposed on Russia, have changed internationaltransport flows.
The vulnerability of supply chains to disruptions such as Covid-19 and related phenomena, such as port
closures, fluctuations in shipping capacity and freight rates, have cast doubt on the sustainability of justin-time business models and increased interest in inventory buffers. All of these tendencies might lead to

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

33

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

new societal and economic equilibria that require different transport system characteristics. Any future
policy package to recover from disruptions would need to take these new equilibria into account.
Whereas recovery measures provide the opportunity to “build back better” and use the adaptation to thedisruption as an opportunity to be better prepared for future shocks, there is also the risk ofmaladaptation. As adaptation policies are based on imperfect information and designed under great
uncertainty, they frequently fail and can actually worsen the situation; this is called maladaptation. In thecase of maladaptation to climate change, this results in increasing rather than limiting the vulnerability to
climate change. Poor planning is often the primary cause of maladaptation, but identifying maladaptationin advance is difficult (Schipper, 2020).

Policy trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation
There is a strong inter-relationship between mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation reduces theneed for adaptation, as it decreases the likelihood of and exposure to disruptions. However, mitigation
could also be more expensive than adaptation in certain circumstances. Transport policy makers face two
important questions in this context: in which circumstances is mitigation more expensive? And when does
mitigation or adaptation make most sense?
The exact form of the trade-off between mitigation and adaptation differs per transport sector and thedesign of the networks in those different sectors. For example, centrally connected (i.e. hub-and-spoke)
networks are less robust, but most reactive to response actions. Therefore, in sectors where such network
structures are common (including aviation and container shipping), disaster preparedness is most critical– unless policies can be implemented to better prepare such networks for disruption, for example bystimulating smaller ports and airports. To take a different example, certain mitigation measures (e.g.
infrastructure relocation) could be too expensive until the disruption has already occurred, as in cases
when infrastructure in a coastal area is flooded.
If transport policy makers are to make efficient decisions about the right mix of mitigation and adaptation
measures, they need more insights into the costs of disruption and the costs of mitigation and adaptation
options in case of a disruption. Such insights might differ according to local circumstances and the type of
disruption. A tool to guide decision making in a variety of situations could help policy makers in finding theright balance between mitigation and adaptation measures.
International co-operation could focus on defining good policy practices for robustness and recovery andclarifying which measures have worked under which conditions. As part of this co-operation, policy makers
could define a tool for incorporating disruption-related costs (i.e. the costs of disruption, mitigation andadaptation) into transport investment decision-making processes. An example of a tool that quantifies thecosts of sudden shocks is the cost of disruption framework developed by the UK Department of Transport
to quantify impacts of a disruption (Marshall-Clarke and Stewart, 2023).

Strategic planning
Resilient transport systems can only be realised if they become a priority in long-term strategic planning.
This requires a clear articulation of strategic choices, for example with respect to the trade-offs between
resilience and efficiency, and between mitigation and adaptation, and in relation to equity issues. Such a
strategic vision should translate into identification of transport projects that contribute to increasing theresilience of transport systems.
34

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

POLICY MEASURES FOR RESILIENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Critical steps in this respect could include better framing of project proposals in light of broader policy
objectives, identification of alternatives consistent with these broader framings, and improvements in theway projects are reviewed against broader policy objectives in the initial needs-case assessment. Adopting
a strategic planning framework can improve outcomes by offering a co-ordinated and consistent approach
to infrastructure investment (ITF, 2022c).

Transport appraisal processes
The need for infrastructure investment is assessed in appraisal processes, using techniques such as cost–benefit analysis (CBA). These traditional appraisal processes and techniques have changed significantly inrecent decades, by incorporating analysis of wider economic benefits. For example, some investments inimproved transport infrastructure can enable external benefits which improve the productivity ofincreased urban agglomeration. Indirect valuation techniques have also progressively broadened thescope of CBA to capture more impacts that are harder to express in monetary values.
Despite these changes, significant modification of appraisal practice might be required to ensure that
resilience considerations are appropriately addressed. Although CBA can be well-equipped to address nontraditional goals, such as resilience, in practice resilience is either not included in CBA or resilience is undervalued because resilience aspects are not fully quantified or monetised.
The need for resilient transport policies has increased calls for changes to the way transport investments
are reviewed and selected. Achieving this change requires enhancements to CBA and the use ofcomplementary appraisal methods. Supplementary analyses, alongside CBA results, can greatly enhance
the information available to decision makers, even where state-of-the-art CBA practice is applied. These
could include risk assessments, vulnerability analysis and transport modelling to provide information on
the resilience impacts of transport infrastructure projects (ITF, 2022c).

Institutional arrangements
Several countries have established specific bodies to co-ordinate efforts on the resilience of transportsystems or supply chain resilience. For example, Transport Canada established a National Supply Chain
Office in December 2023, to increase efficiency and resiliency across supply chains, including mitigating
impacts from disruptions, by developing a National Supply Chain Strategy, supporting data sharing andfostering collaboration (Government of Canada, 2023).
In the United States, a Council on Supply Chain Resilience was inaugurated in November 2023 that will
advance the long-term, government-wide strategy to build enduring supply chain resilience (The WhiteHouse, 2023). The US Department of Transportation (DoT) has launched its Office of Multimodal Freight
Infrastructure and Policy, responsible for maintaining and improving the condition and performance of thenation’s multimodal freight network via the development of the National Multimodal Freight Network andreview of State Freight Plans (US DoT, n.d.).

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

35

REFERENCES

References
G7 (2024), “Declaration issued by the G7 Transport Ministers on the Red Sea escalating crisis”, Rome,
20 February 2024, www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/DECLARATION-G7-RED-SEA-TMM-DEF.pdf(accessed 11 March 2024).
Government of Canada (1 December 2023), “Minister of Transport announces launch of the National
Supply Chain Office to strengthen Canada’s supply chains and increase the economy’s competitiveness”,
Press release, Transport Canada, www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/12/minister-oftransport-announces-launch-of-the-national-supply-chain-office-to-strengthen-canadas-supply-chainsand-increase-the-economys-competitiv.html.
Greenberg, A. (2019), Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous
Hackers, Anchor Books, New York.
Groves, D. et al. (2008), “Preparing for an Uncertain Future Climate in the Inland Empire: Identifying
Robust Water Management Strategies”, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2008/RAND_DB550.pdf.
Holling, C. (1973), “Resilience and stability of ecological systems”, Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution
and Systematics, Vol. 4, pp. 1-23, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096802.
IPCC (2023), “Climate Change 2023; Synthesis Report”, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Geneva, www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr.
ITF (2024), “The Red Sea Crisis: Impacts on global shipping and the case for international co-operation”,
Background Paper, International Transport Forum, Paris, www.itfoecd.org/sites/default/files/repositories/red-sea-crisis-impacts-global-shipping.pdf.
ITF (2023a), Shaping Post-Covid Mobility in Cities: Summary and Conclusions, ITF Roundtable Reports,
No. 190, OECD Publishing Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a8bf0bdb-en.
ITF (2023b), ITF Transport Outlook 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6cc9ad5-en.
ITF (2023c), "Using safety performance indicators to improve road safety: The case of Korea",International Transport Forum Policy Papers, No. 126, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/d35f8e67-en.
ITF (2022a), “Dealing with the War’s Impacts on Ukraine’s Ports: How to Get More Grain to the World”,
Transport Policy Responses to the War in Ukraine, No. 1, 11 July 2022, www.itf-oecd.org/war-impactsukraine-ports-grain.
ITF (2022b), “How the war in Ukraine impacts aviation – and what to do about it”, Transport Policy
Responses to the War in Ukraine, No. 3, 22 December 2022, www.itfoecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/ukraine-impacts-aviation.pdf.
ITF (2022c), Broadening Transport Appraisal: Summary and Conclusions, ITF Roundtable Reports,
No. 188, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/25198785.
36

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

REFERENCES

ITF (2022d), “Transport Connectivity in Central Asia: Strengthening Alternative Trade Corridors between
Europe and Asia”, Transport Policy Responses to the War in Ukraine, No. 2, 24 October 2022, www.itfoecd.org/sites/default/files/kraine-trade-corridors.pdf.
ITF (2021), Covid-19 and Transport: A Compendium, OECD Publishing, Paris, www.itf-oecd.org/covid-19.
ITF (2018), "Information Sharing for Efficient Maritime Logistics", International Transport Forum Policy
Papers, No. 57, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/def963a5-en.
ITF (2016), Adapting Transport to Climate Change and Extreme Weather: Implications for Infrastructure
Owners and Network Managers, ITF Research Report, OECD Publishing, Paris,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789282108079-en.
Jenelius, E. et al. (2006), “Importance and exposure in road network vulnerability analysis”,
Transportation Research Part A, Vol. 40/7, pp. 537-60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2005.11.003.
Jenelius, E. and L.-G Mattsson (2021), “Resilience of transport systems” in: R. Vickerman (ed.),International Encyclopedia of Transportation, Vol. 1, pp. 258-67, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08102671-7.10719-5.
McDaniels et al. (2008), “Fostering resilience to extreme events within infrastructure systems:
Characterizing decision contexts for mitigation and adaptation”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 18,
pp. 310-18, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.03.001.
McKinsey and Company (2021), “Urban Transportation Systems of 25 Global Cities”,
www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/building-a-transport-system-that-works-fiveinsights-from-our-25-city-report.
Marshall-Clarke, M. and L. Stewart (2023), “Quantifying the impacts of disruption”, Presentation at the
ITF Roundtable, “Transport System Resilience”, 14 September 2023, www.itfoecd.org/repository/roundtable-transport-system-resilience.
Nair, R., H. Avetisyan and E. Miller-Hooks (2010), “Resilience framework for ports and other intermodal
components”, Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, Vol. 2166,
pp. 54-65, https://doi.org/10.3141/2166-07.
Neugebauer, J., L. Heilig and S. Voß (2014), “Digital twins in the context of seaports and terminal
facilities”, Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10696-023-09515-9.
OECD (2021), “Building resilience: New strategies for strengthening infrastructure resilience andmaintenance”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 05, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/354aa2aa-en.
PIARC (2019), “Adaptation Methodologies and Strategies to Increase the Resilience of Roads to Climate
Change: Case study approach”, PIARC, Paris, www.piarc.org/en/order-library/31335-enAdaptation%20Methodologies%20and%20Strategies%20to%20Increase%20the%20Resilience%20of%20
Roads%20to%20Climate%20Change%20-%20Technical%20Report.
Rehak, D. et al. (2019), “Complex approach to assessing resilience of critical infrastructure elements”,
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vol. 25, pp. 125-38,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2019.03.003.
Schipper, L. (2020), “Maladaptation: When adaptation to climate change goes very wrong”, One Earth,Vol. 3/4, pp. 409-14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.09.014.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

37

REFERENCESUITP (2021), “Preparing for a better future: How transport authorities have managed the crisis”, Union
Internationale des Transports Publics Knowledge Brief, www.uitp.org/publications/preparing-for-abetterfuture-how-transport-authorities-have-managed-the-crisis/.
UITP (2020), “Covid-19 pandemic: Resuming public transport services post-lockdown”, Union
Internationale des Transports Publics Knowledge Brief, www.uitp.org/publications/covid-19- pandemicresuming-public-transport-services-post-lockdown/.
UN Women (2020), “COVID-19 and Ensuring Safe Transport with and for Women and Girls”,
www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/12/brief-covid-19-and-ensuring-safetransportwith-and-for-women-and-girls.
UNCTAD (n.d.), Statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva,
https://unctad.org/statistics
US DoT (n.d.), Office of Multimodal Freight Infrastructure and Policy, US Department of Transportation,
www.transportation.gov/freight.
Verschuur, J., E. E. Koks and J. W. Hall (2020), “Port disruptions due to natural disasters: Insights into port
and logistics resilience”, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, Vol. 85, 102393,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2020.102393.
WEF (2023), Global Risks Report 2023, World Economic Forum, Geneva,
https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2023.
The White House (27 November 2023), “President Biden Announces New Actions to Strengthen
America’s Supply Chains, Lower Costs for Families, and Secure Key Sectors”, Fact Sheet,www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/27/fact-sheet-president-bidenannounces-new-actions-to-strengthen-americas-supply-chains-lower-costs-for-families-and-secure-keysectors.
Zhang, X., E. Miller-Hooks and K. Denny (2015), “Assessing the role of network topology in resilience oftransportation systems”, Journal of Transport Geography, Vol. 46, pp. 35-45,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.05.006.
Zhou, C. et al. (2021), “A decision support digital-twinning framework for maintaining a resilient port”,
Decision Support Systems, Vol. 143, 113496, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2021.113496.

38

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

REFERENCES

Further reading
Asadabadi, A. and E. Miller-Hooks (2017), “Optimal transportation and shoreline infrastructure
investment planning under a stochastic climate future”, Transportation Research Part B, Vol. 100,
pp. 156-74, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2016.12.023.
Asadabadi, A. and E. Miller-Hooks (2018), “Co-opetition in enhancing global port network resiliency:
A multi-leader, common-follower game theoretic approach”, Transportation Research Part B, Vol. 108,
pp. 281-98, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2018.01.004.
Asadabadi, A. and E. Miller-Hooks (2020), “Maritime port network resiliency and reliability throughco-opetition”, Transport Research Part E, Vol. 137, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.101916.
Banarjee, I. et al. (2021), “Introducing participatory fairness in emergency communication can support
self‑organization for survival”, Nature Scientific Reports, Vol. 11: 7209, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598021-86635-y.
Börjeson, L. et al. (2006), “Scenario types and techniques: towards a user’s guide”, Futures, Vol. 38/7,
pp. 723-39, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2005.12.002.
Carlsson Kanyama, A. et al. (2019), “‘We want to know where the line is’: comparing current planning for
future sea-level rise with three core principles of robust decision support approaches”, Journal ofEnvironmental Planning and Management, Vol. 62/8, pp. 1339-358,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2018.1496070.
Chen, L. and E. Miller-Hooks (2012), “Resilience: An indicator of recovery capability in intermodal freighttransport”, Transportation Science, Vol. 46, pp. 109-23, https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1110.0376.
Faturechi, R., E. Levenberg and E. Miller-Hooks (2014), “Evaluating and optimizing resilience of airport
pavement networks”, Computers and Operations Research, Vol. 43, pp. 335-48,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2013.10.009.
Faturechi, R. and E. Miller-Hooks (2014a), “Travel time resilience of roadway networks under disaster”,
Transportation Research Part B, Vol. 70, pp. 47-64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2014.08.007.
Faturechi, R. and E. Miller-Hooks (2014b), “Mathematical framework for quantifying and optimizing
protective actions for civil infrastructure systems,” Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering
Systems, Vol. 29, pp. 572-89, https://doi.org/10.1111/mice.12027.
Fotouhi, H., S. Moryadee and E. Miller-Hooks (2017), “Quantifying the resilience of an urban traffic
signal-power coupled system”, Reliability Engineering & Systems Safety, Vol. 163, pp. 79-94,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2017.01.026.
G7 (2023), “G7 Transport Ministerial Declaration”, Ise-Shima, Japan, 19 June 2023,
https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/g7-transport-ministerial-declaration-2023-06-19_en(accessed 3 April 2024).
Ganin, A. et al. (2017), “Resilience and efficiency in transportation networks”, Science Advances, Vol.
3/12, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1701079.
Ghayoomi, H. et al. (2021), “Assessing resilience of hospitals to cyberattack”, Digital Health, Vol. 7,
pp. 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1177/20552076211059366.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

39

REFERENCES

Haldane, A. (2009), “Rethinking the financial network”, Speech delivered at the Financial Student
Association, Amsterdam, 28 April 2009, https://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf.
Helbing, D. (2013), “Globally networked risks and how to respond”, Nature, Vol. 497, pp. 51-59,
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature12047.
Hynes, W. et al. (2020), “Bouncing forward: A resilience approach to dealing with COVID-19 and futuresystemic shocks”, Environment Systems and Decisions, Vol. 40, pp. 174-84,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-020-09776-x.
ITF (2024), “Transport Network Resilience to Critical Events Working Group”, www.itfoecd.org/transport-network-resilience-critical-events-working-group.
Korecki, M., D. Dailisan and D. Helbing (2023), “How well do reinforcement learning approaches copewith disruptions? The case of traffic signal control”, IEEE Access, Vol. 11, pp. 36504-515,
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3266644.
Kurth, M. (2020), “Lack of resilience in transportation networks: Economic implications”, Transportation
Research Part D: Transport and Environment, Vol. 86, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2020.102419.
Lämmer, S. and D. Helbing (2008), “Self-control of traffic lights and vehicle flows in urban road
networks”, Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiments, P04019,
https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/2008/04/P04019.
Lämmer, S. and D. Helbing (2009), “Self-Stabilizing Decentralized Signal Control of Realistic, Saturated
Network Traffic”, SFI Working Paper 2010-09-019, Santa Fe Institute,www.santafe.edu/research/results/working-papers/self-stabilizing-decentralized-signal-control-of-r.
Levenberg, E. et al. (2016), “Resilience of networked infrastructure with evolving component conditions”,
ASCE Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering, 04016060, pp. 1-9,
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CP.1943-5487.0000629.
Li, W., A. Asadabadi and E. Miller-Hooks (2022), “Enhancing resilience through port collaboration in
maritime freight networks”, Transport Research Part A, Vol. 157, pp. 1-23,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2022.01.015.
Linkov, I. et al. (2020), “The case for value chain resilience”, Management Research Review, Vol. 43/12,
https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-08-2019-0353.
Linkov, I., et al. (2018), “Resilience at OECD: Current state and future directions”, IEEE Engineering
Management Review, Vol. 46/4, pp. 128-35, https://doi.org/10.1109/EMR.2018.2878006.
Maier, H. R. et al. (2016), “An uncertain future, deep uncertainty, scenarios, robustness and adaptation:
How do they fit together?”, Environmental Modelling & Software, Vol. 81, pp. 154-64,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2016.03.014.
Miller-Hooks, E., “Constructs in infrastructure resilience framing: From components to community
services and the built and human infrastructures on which they rely”, IISE Transactions, Vol. 55/1, pp. 4356, https://doi.org/10.1080/24725854.2022.2070801.
Miller-Hooks, E., X. Zhang and R. Faturechi (2012), “Measuring and maximizing resilience of freighttransportation networks”, Computers and Operations Research, Vol. 39/7, pp. 1633–43,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2011.09.017.
Money, C. et al. (2017), “Establishing the value of resilience”, New Zealand Transport Agency Research
Reports, No. 614, https://www.nzta.govt.nz/resources/research/reports/614.
40

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

REFERENCES

Pant, R. et al. (2020), “Resilience study research for NIC: Systems analysis of interdependent network
vulnerabilities”, Environmental Change Institute, Oxford, https://nic.org.uk/app/uploads/Infrastructurenetwork-analysis.pdf.
Ramirez-Mendiola, J.L. et al. (2022), “I’m coming home (to charge): The relation between commuting
practices and peak energy demand in the United Kingdom”, Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 88,
102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102502.
Rohr, J. et al (2019), “Emerging human infectious diseases and the links to global food production”,
Nature Sustainability, Vol. 2, pp. 445-56, https://doi.org/10.1038/s4189 3-019-0293-3.
Schiffmann, O. et al. (2023), “A cost–benefit analysis simulation for the digitalization of cold supply
chains”, Sensors, Vol. 23, 4147, https://doi.org/10.3390/s23084147.
Shahverdi, B., M. Tariverdi and E. Miller-Hooks (2020), “Assessing hospital system resilience to disasterevents involving physical damage and demand surge”, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Vol. 70,
100729, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2019.07.005.
Tariverdi, M., E. Miller-Hooks and T. Kirsch (2018), “Strategies for Improved Hospital Response to Mass
Casualty Incidents”, Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Vol. 12/6, pp. 778-90,
https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2018.4.
Vodopivec, N. and E. Miller-Hooks (2019), “Transit system resilience: Quantifying the impacts of
disruptions on diverse populations”, Reliability Engineering & Systems Safety, Vol. 191, 106561,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2019.106561.
Walker, W. et al. (2003), “Defining uncertainty: A conceptual basis for uncertainty management inmodel-based decision support”, Integrated Assessment, Vol. 4/1, pp. 5-17,
https://doi.org/10.1076/iaij.4.1.5.16466.
Watkiss, P., F. Cimato and A. Hunt (2021), “Monetary Valuation of Risks and Opportunities in CCRA3:
Supplementary Report for UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 3”, Paul Watkiss Associates, London,
https://www.ukclimaterisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Monetary-Valuation-of-Risks-andOpportunities-in-CCRA3.pdf.
Wikman-Svahn, P. (2016), “Principer för robusta beslut inför osäkra klimatförändringar” [Principles forrobust decisions in the face of uncertain climate change], KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm,www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.676458.1555404452!/Principer%20fo%CC%88r%20robusta%20beslut%20WE
BB2.pdf.
Wilby, R. L. and Dessai, S. (2010), “Robust adaptation to climate change”, Weather, Vol. 65/7, pp. 176-80,
https://core.ac.uk/reader/288355770.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

41

ANNEX A

Annex A. Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicatormethodology and dataset
The Maritime Trade Connectivity Indicator (MTCI) measures maritime connectivity of a country as the shareof its international trade volume (transported by ship) carried on direct liner connections with its trade
partners. This generates a single value per country that is easy to understand, with a scale from 0 to 1 (0%to 100%), and straightforward to compare over time and with other countries.
The MTCI covers international containerised trade and therefore excludes intra-regional trade by sea. This
specific coverage enables a focus on trade volumes that are most likely to be moved exclusively or
predominantly via sea. For example, if intra-regional trade was included, the connectivity indicator would
be subject to value changes related to modal shifts rather than changes in connectivity.
The indicator is applied to seven world regions: Australasia and Oceania; Europe and the Mediterranean;
the Far East; the Gulf and Indian Subcontinent; Latin America; North America; and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Indicators are calculated quarterly, to allow for precise monitoring of developments over time.
Calculating the MTCI involves the following five steps:
1. Establishing if a direct container shipping connection has been offered in the relevant quarter foreach possible country pair. If this is not the case for a specific country pair, it receives a score ofzero. If direct connections have been offered for a country pair, the following information is
identified: the name of the service, its TEU capacity and its frequency. This makes it possible tocalculate the total TEU capacity offered per quarter for that country pair.
2. For the same country pair, the number of TEUs that are exported from country A to B are identified,along with the number of TEUs imported from country B to country A in that quarter. These two
numbers are added to calculate the bilateral container trade volume.
3. The ratio of the TEU capacity offered for that country pair (see Step 1) is calculated, along with thebilateral container trade volume (see Step 2). This ratio represents the share of country A’s
international trade volume with country B (transported by ship) carried on direct liner connections.
In the case that these ratios exceed 1.00 (i.e. when more direct ship capacity is available than there
is demand for that capacity) a value of 1.00 will be assigned, to indicate that 100% of the bilateral
trade volume was carried on direct liner connections. This can be considered the bilateral maritime
trade connectivity score between country A and country B.
4. The country score is calculated by aggregating all the bilateral maritime trade connectivity scoresfor that country. When the ratios from the country-to-country level to the country level areaggregated, the country-to-country ratios are multiplied by the share of the international
container trade volumes that each country pair represents. In other words, the MTCI for a country
represents the aggregation of the weighted bilateral MTCIs relevant to that country.

42

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

ANNEX A

5. A similar process of aggregation is applied to arrive at MTCIs at the regional and global level.
Country scores are weighted according to their shares of total international container tradevolumes.
The MTCI is calculated using two different data sources: the MDS Transmodal World Cargo Database (WCD)
and the MDS Transmodal Containership Databank.
The WCD is used to calculate bilateral containerised trade volume (see Step 2 in the five-step approachdescribed above). It contains containerised cargo volumes from 1996 to the present for around250 countries and territories.
The WCD is generated by gathering quarterly trade data (in tonnes) from the major economies of the world,covering 95% of unitised world trade. These include the 28 individual European Union member countries,
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, Thailand and theUnited States,
For trade between other countries, trade data from the United Nations is used, which boosts the global
coverage of unitised world trade to 99.9%. Using various lookup tables based on commodity, volume andthe origin and destination countries, the WCD tonnage data is translated into unitised tonnes and then into
loaded TEU, carried by container ships.
The MDS Transmodal Containership Databank is used to assess the capacity scheduled to be offered forany given country (see Step 1 in the five-step approach described above). It contains operational details of
the world container carrying fleet and 30 fields of information for every vessel, including operator, service,route, TEU, service frequency, port rotation and much more.
The MDS Transmodal Containership Databank, which in its current format has been produced since 2006,
is mainly used by MDS Transmodal for its consultancy services and by UNCTAD to produce (in collaboration
with MDS Transmodal) the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) and by the World Bank to produce the
Logistics Performance Index (LPI).

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

43

ANNEX B

Annex B. List of Roundtable participants
Elise MILLER-HOOKS (Chair), George Mason University, United States
Aimee AGUILAR JABER, OECD
Jillian ANABLE, University of Leeds, United Kingdom
Raffaella CAMPANATI, Permanent Delegation of Italy to the OECD
Agustina CALATAYUD, Inter-American Development Bank
Marco CONFORTI, PSA Italy
Luciano CUERVO, Permanent Delegation of Chile to the OECD
Silvia DE MARUCCI, PROPANAMA, Panama
Luca DEMICHELI, Permanent Delegation of Italy to the OECD
Giovanni DONATO, Ministry of Infrastructures and Transportation (MIT), Italy
Jagoda EGELAND, ITF
Riccardo GENTILUCCI, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Italy
Lucy GILLIAM, Seas at Risk
James HOOKHAM, Global Shippers' Forum (GSF)
William HYNES, OECD
Erik JENELIUS, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
Francesco LUCIANO, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Italy
Martin MARSHALL-CLARKE, Department for Transport (DfT), United Kingdom
Olaf MERK, ITF
Silvia MORETTO, DB Group Italy
Livia SPERA, European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF)
Laura STEWART, Department for Transport (DfT), United Kingdom
Kelsey STODDARD, US Army Corps of Engineers, United States
Yoshito SUGA, OECD
Pyers TUCKER, Hapag-Lloyd AG

44

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

ANNEX B

Online participation:
Mohamed ABDEL AZIZ, Suez Canal Zone, Egypt
Mohamed Wasel AL-Hourani, United Arab Emirates
Hassiba BENAMARA, UNCTAD
Antal BÓDI, KTI, Hungary
Jose Miguel DE LA VEGA, Ministry of Telecommunications and Transport, Chile
Abdul-Fahd FOFANA, OECD
Sophie HAYES, Department of Transport, Ireland
Dirk HELBING, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Carolina HERRERA FONSECA, Andi, Colombia
Rose JONES, Department of Transport, Ireland
Benoit LEBOT, Ministry for Sustainable Development, FranceDavid LIBATIQUE, Port of Los Angeles, United States
Igor LINKOV, US Army Corps of Engineers, United States
Shadab MAHMOOD KHAN, India
Rajali MAJARHAN, Ernst Young, Japan
Sochiro MINAMI, Japan
Walid MORSI, Suez Canal Zone, Egypt
Wei-Shiuen NG, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Luisa PUCCIO, European Community Shipowners Association
Andaleeb QAYYUM, Transport Canada
Gustavo RINALDI, Ministry of Transport, Argentina
Zabdiel RUIZ-ORTIZ, Mexico
Haruki SAWAMURA, Ministry for Land Infrastructure and Transport, Japan
Hinko VAN GEELEN, BRRC, Belgium
Xianguang WANG, China
Stefano ZAMPINO, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Italy

Participants provided their affiliations at the time of their attendance at the Roundtable meeting.

TRANSPORT SYSTEM RESILIENCE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © OECD/ITF 2024

45

CPB

Corporate Partnership
Board

Transport System Resilience

International Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16+33 (0)1 73 31 25 00
contact@itf-oecd.org
www.itf-oecd.org

Published: 04/2024 | Photo credit: Bilanol/Shutterstock/Shutterstock

The transport sector currently faces a number of disruptions related
to geopolitics, climate change and energy security. Transportsystem resilience refers to the sector’s capacity to deal with, adapt
to and recover from such disruptions. This report sets out the main
disruptions to transport systems worldwide. It explores ways toreduce uncertainty by assessing vulnerabilities, and the main
mitigation and adaptation measures required to ensure transportsystems function in times of crisis.