Renegotiating Indonesian Secularity: Socio-legal study of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law
By Muktiono
If ‘secularism’ is merely the decline of the role of religion in public spheres or making religion a privatematter, it would be difficult to apply the term ‘secular’ to Indonesian history. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa,
the principle of the ‘divine’ in the Indonesian state ideology Pancasila, has been the basis for religionizationand the rejection of references to secularism in Indonesian law, state institutions and other public spheres.
At the same time, Indonesia has never aspired to become an Islamic state or adopt a theocratic state model.
It adopted the Western notion of the rule of law and a democratic political system. Indonesia thus appears
to present a paradoxical situation that conflicts with both the strict concept of an Islamic state and that ofsecularism. One might also suggest that Indonesia constitutes a unique combination of religion andmodernity, reflecting the country’s history.
The role of the Muslim majority in Indonesia is key to understanding Indonesian secularity in terms of both
political and cultural power in the course of the development of a national ideology and constitution as thebasis for liberating the Indonesian archipelago (Nusantara) after three centuries of Dutch colonialism.
Although Islam is the dominant religion, there is considerable internal plurality along social, cultural andideological lines. To some extent, this plurality has resulted in discord over religious and political issues.
This discord can be seen in the division of the Masyumi Party in 1950s.
The Masyumi Party combined four prominent Islamic organizations (Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah,PUI, PUUI). It was established in 1945 in response to the minority position of the Muslim nationalists(20%) compared to the (secular) nationalists (80%) within the ‘Investigating Body for the Preparation ofIndonesian Independence’. The Masyumi Party was unsuccessful in establishing Islam as a state ideology
over Sukarno’s concept of Pancasila (a Buddhist term). In the general election of 1955, the Islamic parties
gained about 39% of votes while the secular nationalists (PNI (Indonesian National Party) and PKI(Indonesian Communist Party)) gained 38% of votes. The political significance of Islam reached a low pointduring the Soeharto administration (1968-1998) despite Islamic groups supporting Soeharto’s presidency
and helping to subdue Communism in 1965. In the transition period after 1998, Islamic parties continued
to be subordinate to the nationalist (secular) party. All this raises a number of questions: Was the fact thatthe majority of the Indonesian population was Muslim of any significance given that Islamic groups lacked
political superiority? Did this weak position influence how Muslim groups approached religious minorities
and blasphemy cases? What are the guiding ideas behind how Muslims in Indonesia view secularity?
The blasphemy law, established through Presidential Decree No.1/PNPS/1965, is the application of article 29 ofthe 1945 Constitution. Echoing the state ideology Pancasila, article 29 states that “the state shall be based on thedivine” (“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”) and “the state shall guarantee the freedom of its people to embrace theirrespective religions and to worship according to their respective religions and beliefs”. In practice, the blasphemy

Research Proposal :Renegotiating Indonesian Secularity: Socio-legal study of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law
By Muktiono

law has been used to prevent behavior that misuses and insults recognized religions in Indonesia. The stateprosecutor, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs serve a supervisory function withthe power to dissolve religious groups that persist in not complying with the law.
While article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code also serves a preventive function, this article of criminal
law can be applied separately to the supervisory mechanism outlined in Blasphemy Law No.1/PNPS/1965. A
key problem with article 156a is the lack of clear criteria to define words or behaviors that count as ‘hostility’,‘misuse’, or ‘insult’. This allows recognized religions in Indonesia to determine the boundaries of what should
be considered deviant and what should be considered a valid interpretation of religion. When it comes todeciding blasphemy cases, there is a kind of formal and informal power-sharing between the state andrecognized religions under the administrative and criminal justice systems. According to the Elucidation1 tothe Blasphemy Law, the intention of the law is to protect recognized religions in Indonesia from any hatred,misuse, or insult from members of mystical belief organizations (Aliran Kepercayaan). The precedent for
applying article 156a independently of the blasphemy law has resulted in a shift in how religious groups apply
the law. The blasphemy law’s initial purpose was to protect the authenticity of recognized religions and shield
members of recognized religions from proselytization by members of mystical groups and communists.
Religious groups have exploited article 156a to their own political ends. There have been numerous caseswhere the article has been applied independently of the supervisory mechanism mentioned above. One suchcase is that of Ahok, the Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta. Another is the case of Tajul Mulik (Shi’aminority) on Madura Island. This case underlines how cultural and economic sentiment, as well as local
political rivalry, can be exploited when applying the blasphemy law. The more progressive interpretation ofthe blasphemy law, provided by Indonesia’s Constitutional Court following its judicial review in 2009, has not
resulted in significant change in the application of the law.
The liberal rights movement has also shaped public debate on the blasphemy law with legal and politicaldemands from the international community and Indonesian activists in light of Indonesia’s involvement in
the United Nations human rights system, which calls for state neutrality and more space for the right tofreedom of religion or belief. There have been diverse public debates on the blasphemy law with manydifferent interest groups involved. This has resulted in some agreement on how religion should beconsidered in social, political, economic and cultural contexts.
In my research, I intend to explore the diverse perspectives on Indonesian secularity by looking at how theblasphemy law developed and was interpreted over the course of modern Indonesian history. Indonesiansecularity was first negotiated as the country moved towards independence in 1945. It has subsequently
been renegotiated multiply in light of developments in politics, business, law and culture. The blasphemy
law will be used to interpret how various actors in Indonesian history have constructed their concept ofstate and religion and how these two notions overlap. On the basis of extensive reading and analysis, I will
outline any evidence of a unique Indonesian secularization, which may support the notion of multiplesecularities.

1

An ‘Elucidation’ is a guide to the interpretation of a law that may be issued by the legislature at the time the law ispassed.
2