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CLIMATE JUSTICE AND
POLICY COHERENCE FORSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Lessons from theAsia-Pacific Region

PRINCIPAL
AUTHORS
Deirdre De Burca, Forus, Dr. Jyotsna
Mohan, Asia Development Alliance. Ajay
Jha, CECODECON/Pairvi.

The drafting of the “ Climate Justice andPolicy Coherence for Sustainable
Development - Lessons from the Asia
Pacific region” report has been
supported by the contributions of avariety of experts from civil society – allof whom have worked extensively on
SDG16 and the 2030 Agenda. ADA, Forus,
and the JANIC are grateful for thecontributions from these experts.

Contributors
Ali Jillani, Karachi Research Chair (KRC),
Pakistan
Anh Vu, Research Director, NatCen
International, National Centre for Social
Research, UK.
Chao,Kung-Yueh, International Climate
Development Institute, (ICDI, Member of
Taiwan AID), Taiwan
Conie Pamposa, The Philippines
Graham Long, Living Deltas Hub, UK
Hemantha Withanage, Centre forEnvironmental Justice, Sri Lanka
Junghee MIN, KCOC, Republic of Korea© Sanjog Manandhar
Md. Mujibul Haque Munir, Coast
Foundation, Pakistan
Nodira Akbarova, Yuksalish, Uzbekistan
PIANGO, Pacific Islands Association of NonGovernment Organisation
Qurratul Ayen, ADA, Asia Development
Alliance
Urantsooj Gombosuren, CHRD, Mongolia
Wanun Permpibul, Climate Watch,
ThailandZia Ur Rahman, Pakistan Development
Alliance, Pakistan© Sanjog Manandhar

FOREWORDAs we move towards the latter half of the timeframe within which theAgenda 2030 and its SDGs must be achieved, Policy Coherence for
Sustainable Development (PCSD) seems to be a forward looking tool for
ensuring real and meaningful interconnections between the economic,
social and environmental dimensions of development.
The conceptual frame it provides yields a good analyses of positive feedback and adverse
trade-offs among different SDGs as well as between the SDGs and other development
objectives including climate action. It can also contribute to addressing the immense andimmeasurable loss and damage that humanity is witnessing around the world, andparticularly in the global south. We are confident that lower and middle income countries will
expedite their efforts towards the achievement of the SDGs if they pursue both the spirit andpractice of policy coherence and sustainable development. However, no one country or one
region can be truly sustainable or reverse the climate crisis unless all the countries areworking towards achieving these outcomes. Considerations of justice, equity, historical roleand the need to create development space for less developed countries requires stronger
integration of these values within the policy coherence for sustainable development frame ofreference, and making therefore a truly transformational tool.
The present study is mainly based on the reflections of a variety of actors from Asia and thePacific and gives us good insights into their perspectives, their roles and contributions, andthe challenges and responses of governments in the region in ensuring policy coherence forsustainable development better in both the global north and the global south. The study
underlines the need for more evidence- based research to facilitate the work, analysis andadvocacy of civil society, particularly in Asia and the Pacific. It unambiguously calls for astronger partnership between organized civil society across the world to create a morenuanced, shared, and critical understanding of policy coherence for sustainable development.

Prof. Saleemul Huq
International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) - Bangladesh.

© Sanjog Manandhar

ANNOTATION
The “Climate Justice & Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD
Report - Lessons from the Asia Pacific region” represents an initial study on
this important topic. It contains case studies from 17 countries from 4
different sub-regions in Asia, and includes the Pacific region as well. This is adocument aimed at all development actors; and they are invited tocomment on, and to enhance it.
The study defines the need for greater policy coherence between climate actions and thesustainable development goals at all levels, and across all areas of work. But the study is also
honest enough to accept the difficulty and challenges of achieving policy coherence forsustainable development. While advocating for greater coherence, it is conscious of the
obstacles to its achievement. It proposes that clear advocacy on PCSD should lead to muchgreater coherence. PCSD, as a principle, is conceptually very strong. But there is a risk that itexists purely at a theoretical level under the present circumstances where the neoliberalparadigm dominates the global political economy. Most stakeholders can commit to PCSD.
But the people and planet need more than a commitment; achieving PCSD requires action.
I agree with the general findings of the study that policy coherence for sustainable
development can only be discerned in a rudimentary form across the Asia Pacific region, as
evidenced by the country studies. But it can be properly achieved under the common or
overarching principle of partnership, cooperation, and solidarity for people's rights anddevelopment.

Beverly L. Longid
National Convener, Katribu the National Alliance of IP organizations in the Philippines.

LESSONS FROM FINLAND
Finland is one of the most successful countries in the world when it comes tocitizens’ wellbeing. This development has been the result of conscious
decisions seeking to foster gender equality, education, equity and equal
opportunities for participation and to ensure good operating conditions forbusinesses. Finland’s success is built on competence and innovation. it´snatural resources have also played an integral role in increasing economic
wellbeing.
In 2021, the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development drew up a national
2030 Agenda roadmap, which is a medium-term plan detailing the actions Finland needs totake to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the
UN in 2015. The roadmap is guided by the six areas of change defined in the work to draw up
the 2030 Agenda roadmap. For each area of change, the roadmap includes a vision extending
to 2030, a set of objectives that translate the visions into concrete terms, and a description of
the key measures that will affect different sectors of society and play a key role in bringing
about change. In addition to the six areas of change, the strategy discusses how Finland is
supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda globally. These six areas are: 1. Economy
and work promoting wellbeing and sustainable consumption, 2. Education, competence andsustainable lifestyles, 3. Wellbeing, health and social inclusion, 4. Food system promoting
wellbeing, 5. Forest, water and land use promoting biodiversity and carbon neutrality and6. Sustainable energy system.
The roadmap also includes five cross-cutting principles comply with in its implementation.
The principles are the following: ensuring fairness, equity and gender equality; facilitating theinclusion and participation of society at large; paying special attention to the most vulnerable(leaving no one behind); ensuring long-term commitment and policy coherence; and taking
global responsibility.
The goal of Finnish development policy and development cooperation is to strengthen
developing countries’ own capacity and resilience. The countries’ ownership, needs andnational plans play a key role in this. Finland allocates resources to achieving systemicchanges that strengthen the partner countries, as well as their societies and communities’
opportunities and abilities to secure the wellbeing and income of people in a better and moresustainable way. Finland’s Taxation for Development Action Programme (2020–2023) supports
developing countries’ efforts to strengthen their tax systems and have a say in global tax
policy negotiations Another goal is to ensure that companies supported with development
cooperation funding comply with the criteria for tax responsibility and transparency. For more
info: https://kestavakehitys.fi/en/frontpage

Rilli Lappalainen
CONCORD President , Director of Sustainable development at Fingo, Finland

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report analyses the extent to which
PolicyCoherenceforSustainable
Development(PCSD)
informsthedevelopment that is taking place in AsiaPacific, with a particular focus on climate
action & climate justice.
The report finds that, overall, development
in many Asian-Pacific countries isinformed by a very basic level of policy
coherence where climate action and SDGs
are concerned. It offers recommendations
on how this situation across the region
could be improved.
The study is based on the premise that acredible approach to PCSD includes bothvertical coherence (i.e. between local,
national, regional and international levels)and horizontal coherence (i.e. between
environmental, economic, and social
policy areas and sectors as well as
governance mechanisms).
The study notes that SDG target 17.14, andthe newly developed SDG global indicator
17.14.1, on Policy Coherence for Sustainable
Development provide a useful monitoring
tool for measuring PCSD.

The study also notes that the multi-part
indicator for 17.14.1 makes it clear that theimplementation of a PCSD approachrequires the emergence of truly democratic
participatory processes and “whole-ofsociety” approaches with a vibrant civic
infrastructure
acrossalllevelsofgovernance. Examples of participatory
governance mechanisms relevant to a
PCSD approach include citizens’ assemblies
andmulti-stakeholder
sustainable
development councils.
This initial study undertook a rapid
assessment of climate action, mainly
through commitments in the Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDC) in specificcountries across the Asia-Pacific region, andpolicycoherenceforsustainable
development in the context of SDG
implementation.
Primary data was collected through casestudies and secondary data through a desk
review. The contributors provided data
through a mix of tools including policy
papers (e.g. India, RoK and Sri Lanka),
opinion pieces (Nepal, Mongolia & Taiwan,
Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam) andcase studies of issues, social groups(Bangladesh,Pakistan,Uzbekistan&
Thailand) as well as through PRA (Kiribati).
The study does not claim to be exhaustive:the data, comprised of diverse and inclusive
peoples’ perspectives, is not uniform in its
approach. Though the report cannot
unpack in an in-depth way NDC-SDG
interlinkages, it is still a good starting point
for future insights into barriers to policy
coherence for sustainable development
and viable modalities for reforms in the
climate and SDG governance architecture.

© Sanjog Manandhar

KEY FINDINGSThis report analyzed climate action and progress on PCSD in specific countries in the region
from the perspective of four key dimensions of the SDG indicator 17.14.1. (i) politicalcommitment and leadership, (ii) institutional structure, (iii) policy integration and conflict, and(iv) people’s participation. Overall, some policy coherence can be detected at theoretical levelin the NDCs. However, this has yet to percolate into policies, programmes or institutions.

Political Commitment and Leadership
While an increasing number of countries are theoretically in agreement on policy coherence
for sustainable development, political commitment and leadership are yet to emerge at apractical level. Political instability can also adversely affect political commitment (e.g. in
Nepal). Only a few countries have passed legislation on climate action or sustainable
development enhancing the long-term level of accountability of the government around theParis Agreement, Agenda 2030 and SDGs. There are examples of positive practice, such as The
Republic of Korea’s Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth which brings
both climate action and sustainable development together, and Sri Lanka’s Sustainable
Development Act, 2017. Sri Lanka’s revised NDC, adopted in 2021, also shows deeper analysis
and interlinkages with many SDGs including SDG5.
Institutional structures
PCSD relies on the creation of appropriate institutional structures that coordinate actors,
promote coherence and evaluate trade-offs and synergies. However, the creation of
institutional structures for planning and implementation remains uneven and sporadic acrossAsia-Pacific. For example, Bangladesh’s NDC does not even mention the SDGs. India has set up
a Prime Minister’s Council on climate change under the leadership of the Prime Minister thatlacks focus on sustainable development. However, National and State Action Plans which
cover various sectors (and the SDGs) can compensate for this, as they prescribe actions acrossthe SDGs and climate action. As indicator 17.14.1 makes clear, budgeting is vital to support
action on PCSD. Where budgets attached to SDG actions cannot be tracked, or inadequate
budget allocations are made, this shows a lack of seriousness in enacting commitments toaddress PCSD.

Policy integration and conflicts
Asia-Pacific countries are still struggling to remove barriers in planning, governance andimplementation of climate goals that lead to conflict with sectoral policies. This study
identifies five key areas of policy incoherence:
Mitigation and adaptation: the NDCs in the region are mitigation- focused and fail tocapitalize on the opportunity of availing of the co-benefits of adaptation policies.
Renewables and fossil fuels: While many countries have put forward ambitious renewableenergy plans, they are still quite tentative about reducing their fossil fuel dependence
evident of the massive subsidies compared to peanuts in reneawable sources. Energy
transitions are taking place within fossil fuels as most attempt a fuel switch from coal togas, rather than to renewable energy.
Commitments and actions on forestry: where forests are concerned, policy conflicts arecommonplace. While countries talk about increasing forest cover, halting and reversing
deforestation, in practice, many countries are taking actions to the contrary. For example,
India and Sri Lanka have revised the definition of forests to include plantations, giving anappearance that forest cover is increasing while in fact natural forests – the rarest and mostimportant ecological systems - are being lost, mainly due to increasing demand ofanimal/livestock agriculture and industrial farming.
Economic growth and sustainable development: Many countries are in the process ofaligning their NDC commitments (more ambitious) with their national and sectoral
policies which are more traditional and focus largely on “economic growth dominantdevelopment”. Sustainable development cannot be sacrificed in this conflict.
Integrating “leave no one behind” in PCSD: The SDGs commit countries to prioritizing
marginalized, vulnerable and disadvantaged populations, but this can be forgotten inpolicies on climate action. For example, in Bangladesh, 8,000 farmers and fisher families
are threatened with dislocation due to Rampal Thermal Power Project closing the biggest
wetland and Ramsar protected site of Sundarbans. In Indonesia too, despite the promise
to return ancestral land to indigenous population, more small farmers and plantation
workers are facing dispossession. In Thailand, a large number of women (farmers) arebeing left behind in social protection benefits including universal health coverage,
contesting government claims that all Thais are covered.

© Sanjog Manandhar© Sanjog Manandhar

People’s participation
The Asia Pacific region has a poor record historically of people’s participation in policy making
and participation is worsening in the context of climate action and the SDGs. PCSD requires aconcerted effort to involve all key stakeholders, ensuring equal participation in the process.
But while many countries mention the participation of stakeholders in their NDCs, they fail toprovide more explicit information on how their inputs were incorporated into NDC
development. Case studies in this report affirm that in a large number of countries there has
been no public consultation in the NDC development or climate action and responses (e.g.
Kiribati, Mongolia). Similarly, the general public is also unaware of public consultations being
held while planning or implementing the SDGs or while preparing the VNRs.
In addition to the many examples of failures to consult with stakeholders across the region,
there are other instances of governments actively closing down civic space. India and thePhilippines have seen a large number of activists, forest and environmental defenders being
terrorized and facing charges of being perceived as” anti-national.” In the Philippines,
environmental or forest defenders are hounded by the anti-Terrorism Act while the ancestral
land of the indigenous populations is being parcelled away at a concerning rate.

© Sanjog Manandhar

RECOMMENDATIONSFOR ACTION
NATIONAL LEVEL
Develop a clear PCSD roadmap: Governments should develop a PCSD roadmap with
time-bound targets. Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit toachieving policy coherence for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD
governance mechanisms.
Create Awareness: A positive narrative should be created by governments and other key
stakeholders around PCSD by emphasising the great leverage PCSD can have forsustainable development and NDCs by showcasing transferable, up-scalable andpromising practices.
Create avenues for CSO and people’s participation: Reflecting a “whole of society”
approach to sustainable development and climate justice, effective spaces andmechanisms should be created for civil society organisations and other stakeholders toparticipate in PCSD discussions, in particular ensuring relevant connections with local
communities (and developed countries need to ensure dialogue with local communities
in the Global South where their policymaking has clear policy impacts on thesecommunities).

© Sanjog Manandhar

REGIONAL LEVEL
Create spaces for learning and discussion: PCSD is not discussed enough, and notunderstood well enough. Discussion and peer learning around PCSD between national
contexts is vital. Sub-regions and regions provide the best space for peer learning anddeep exchange of knowledge, experience, insights, challenges and cutting-edge successfactors.
Assign a lead role for APFSD: APFSD can take a lead in initiating such discussions at subregional and regional forums, incentivizing smaller countries with capacity building
support and developing tools to support progress towards PCSD.
Build national capacity: Identify and respond to the capacity building needs ofdeveloping countries. Capacity building is most often cited critical need in the NDCs of thedeveloping countries.

GLOBAL LEVEL
Ensure more discussion of governance for PCSD at the HLPF: At the HLPF a thematic
session could be devoted to discussing and highlighting best practices in overcoming
barriers and challenges in policy coherence. SDG 16, parallel with SDG 17, should beannually reviewed due to its cross-cutting implications with a decisive bearing on theagenda 2030’s success.
Ensure more recognition for regional perspectives: The outcomes from regional
mechanisms that reflect local aspirations (such as the APFSD) need adequate formal
recognition across global deliberative processes to ensure policy coherence.

Use other UN Forums as springboards: As the SDGs and the Agenda 2030 form the core of
discussion in addition to climate crisis and its manifestations and management at all UN
fora, (viz. UNFCCC, UNCBD, UNCCD, UNEA) a PCSD-centered discussion can be aspringboard to elevate discussions, understanding and insights on the policy coherence.
Take PCSD seriously across the globe: Policy coherence does not just require horizontal
coherence within countries, but between them. Developed countries need to monitor andevaluate the probable impacts of their policies beyond their borders, substantively reducesuch impacts, and address the sustainable development deficits that these policies might
create. They also need to acknowledge the loss & damage already created as aconsequence of their policies, and support climate action (mitigation, adaptation, as well
as loss and damages) and growth towards a sustainable and just future.
Establish a global PCSD institution: A global steering body/committee should develop astandard and recommended process/structures for PCSD, which should be flexible andadaptable to different government models of the countries, and monitor progress overtime towards that standard.

© Sanjog Manandhar

TABLE OF CONTENTS
01

CLIMATE JUSTICE & POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: AGENDA 2030 & PCSD.

07

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY COHERENCE FORSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

14

ASSESSING PROGRESS ON CLIMATE JUSTICE. REFLECTING ON THE
OUTCOMES OF THE COP 27 IN EGYPT, NOVEMBER 2022.

23

POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC REGION: AN OVERIVEW.

30

POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE ACTION IN the ASIA-PACIFIC. THE POTENTIAL FOR
SUBSTANTIAL NDC SDG SYNERGY.

37

NDC SDG COHERENCE IN SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES.
BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, PAKISTAN AND SRI LANKA.

44

NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES.
VIETNAM, THAILAND, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES.

52

NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN NORTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES.
TAIWAN, MONGOLIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

6065

NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES.
KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

01

CLIMATE JUSTICE &POLICY COHERENCEFOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:AGENDA 2030 & PCSD.

01

02

CLIMATE JUSTICE
The Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda represent two complimentary global frameworks
for eradicating poverty and hunger and achieving environmental sustainability. For the firsttime, these frameworks reflect a bottom- up approach in international policymaking. Whilecountries have laid down “nationally determined commitments” (NDCs) under the Paris
Agreement; 2030 Agenda gives flexibility to the countries to chart their own sustainable
development pathways and programmes within the rubric of sustainable development goals.
One cannot be achieved if the other derails. Climate policies or NDCs go much beyond climate
action and intersect with several SDG goals. NDCs also have strong connections with some of
the SDGs (which they support and reinforce); while also very weak connection andinterlinkages with many SDGs.
An SEI study1 which examined connections between the Paris Agreement and the 2030
Agenda (Sept, 2019) reviewed 164 NDCs found that the strongest connections existed between
the NDCs and Affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), Life on land (SDG15), No Hunger (SDG2) andSustainable cities and communities (SDG 11). It is interesting to note that climate action (SDG13)
itself did not have very strong linkage with the NDC possibly due to the limited nature of the
SDG13. There were weak connections between NDCs and No Poverty (SDG1), Gender Equality(SDG5), reducing inequality (SDG10). NDCs showed the weakest connection with peace, justiceand transparent institutions (SDG16).
Therefore, a policy coherence for sustainable development approach provides a helpful tool for
better understanding how climate policies and SDG policies support each other, and to
identify and plug gaps. In a national policy framework, the policy coherence analysis becomes
critical both on the horizontal level (sectoral policies vis-à-vis sustainability policies, generally
looked at add ons) and at vertical level (on short term and long term as well as between
national and sub national policies). It is essential that countries establish coherence between
the policies on climate change (and NDCs) and sustainable development programmes.
However, due to the weak relationship between the climate and the sustainable development
agendas at the global and national levels. the prospects of achieving either of them isthreatened.
This study aims to examine the extent to which policy coherence exists in countries across the
Asia Pacific region between national policies linked to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda
on sustainable development and climate policies which are linked to the implementation of
the Paris Climate Agreement.

03© Sanjog Manandhar

THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Since its adoption in 2015, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has become a key
framework for international cooperation, a global social contract between governments andpeople of the world, influencing how UN member states collectively and individually approachsustainable development. Thanks to the 2030 Agenda, the world now has this global
framework as a roadmap for achieving sustainable development and equality for all. The
principles enshrined in the overall 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) themselves are universal, meaning that all 193 countries who t signed the UN Agenda
2030, are expected to achieve them, but not at the expense of other countries or future
generations’ ability to do so.
On the basis of current progress with the implementation of the Agenda 2030 however, nocountry is in a position to achieve all SDGs by 2030. Even before the Covid 19 pandemic, nocountry was in a position to achieve all the SDGs, including the climate related goals (SDG12,
SDG 13, SDG 14 & SDG15). Behind the rhetoric of making development sustainable and inclusive
for all and leaving no one behind, very few countries have assumed a meaningful emissions
reduction burden, according to their fair share. Other challenges such as the highunsustainable debt burdens of many developing countries, illicit financial flows, reduction in
ODA and the shrinking of fiscal and policy space for other critical priorities all impacted
negatively on the ability of countries, and particularly developing countries, to achieve thegoals and targets of the SDGs.
The pandemic also dealt a severe blow to progress with implementing the 2030 Agenda. The
most important learning from the pandemic should have been the need to restrain humans
from altering nature and protecting planetary boundaries and natural habitats. Yet globally the
majority of the responses from different governments neglected this in the race to regain
economic strength. Environmental standards were relaxed, monitoring reduced, and penalties
for environmental violations waive. Fossil fuel and other companies which are responsible for
profoundly adverse impacts on the environment and the climate were rescued with hugeamounts of bailouts. Reuters News Agency reported2 in November 2020 that G20 countries
which together account for more than 80% of global emissions had committed more than $230 billion in dirty energy in their Covid-19 recovery funds.

04

In contrast, the support for clean energy amounted to only $ 150 billion. Between 2017 to 2019,
G20 countries provided a subsidy of close to $ 584 billion per year to dirty energy, only 9% lessthan the subsidies they provided in 2014-2016. Seven countries including Australia, Canada,
China, France, India, Russia and South Africa increased their support to fossil fuel companies
during these years. (Reuters, 2020).
Business as usual continued, with International Financing Institutions, especially theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), pushing for further belt- tightening measures across 76 ofits 90 negotiated loans in 2020/21 despite the global need for strengthening healthcare andsocial protection sectors, posing a serious question about the leadership provided bymultilateral organisations. The inability of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Ministerial
Conference to waive the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS)
stipulations, severely affected the ability of developing countries to recover from Covid-19
recovery in the absence of technology transfer for vaccines and other medical technologies.

THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENTClimate change is a global challenge which, according to the widely ratified Paris Climate
Agreement, 3requires all countries to tackle it both domestically and internationally. Under thisagreement, all countries have committed to prevent the rise in global temperatures to well
below 2C and to make further efforts to keep it below 1.5C by the end of the century. In
Glasgow, the COP26 reaffirmed the overarching aim of achieving the 1.5C goal. The big flaw in
the Paris Agreement, which also represents a policy coherence conflict from a justiceperspective, is that all countries are required to make efforts irrespective of their historical role –in other words regardless of how much carbon they have issued into the atmosphere from thestart of the industrial revolution and of how much of the mitigation burden they should
assume in accordance with their historical emissions. The seven historical polluters- the UK,
USA, Australia, Canada, Russia, Japan and the EU - will still occupy 26% of total carbon space in
2030. The poorer and developing countries are denied legitimate development space in returnfor a low ambition among the developed and industrialized countries in significantly reduce
their own emissions, and to share finance, technology and capacity.

05

Another policy conflict related to this is that while it is essential that countries engage in steep
short-term emission reductions to the tune of 7-8% every year until 2030 to remain within thepossibility of preventing the rise in temperature below 1.5C, they continue to target theextremely ambitious target of net zero in 2050. As a result, global emissions have been rising
and will have increased by 13.7% in 2030, as compared to in 2010. Investment in energy
returned to be leveraged for fossil fuel in the wake of the pandemic. Several studies show that
only a small fraction of the financial stimulus (USD 18 billion approx.) can be called green
investment. In addition, industrialized countries have continued with their generous support tothe fossil fuel industries in the form of subsidies and bail outs. It is clear therefore that a policy
coherence for development approach where climate policy is concerned will be criticallyimportant if the ambitious aims and objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement are to beachieved.
The majority of developing countries which are most impacted by the climate crisis, havealready a huge adaptation burdens are also compelled to further reduce their emissions
denying them the essential carbon space to meet their developmental challenges. They arelikely to falter in achieving their NDC and also the SDGs without genuine efforts to ensure
policy coherence at a global level.

POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (PCSD)
The 2030 Agenda specifies a highly integrated policy approach to achieving sustainable
development, involving coherence between policies at different levels and across different
policy areas and sectors. Such policy coherence for sustainable development includes bothvertical coherence (i.e. between local, national, regional and international and local levels) andhorizontal coherence (i.e. between environmental, economic, and social policy areas andsectors as well as governance mechanisms). SDG17 of the 2030 Agenda includes a target on
promoting policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) ((Target 17.14: “Enhance policy
coherence for sustainable development”) and this target is accompanied by Indicator 17.14.1:(“mechanisms in place to enhance policy coherence for sustainable development”.).
PCSD is thus a very wide ranging and multi-directional principle. The entire conceptual frameof the 2030 Agenda is thus to achieve well integrated and coherent policymaking which
recognizes the wider impact of all policies beyond the immediate effect that they are
individually intended to achieve. The adoption of a PCSD approach helps to reduce incoherences across policies in different sectors, improve policy synergies, configure
complementarity effects and resolve trade-offs between different interests. According to theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), PCSD is “an approach andpolicy tool to integrate the economic, social, environmental, and governance dimensions ofsustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making4.” Therelevance of a PCSD approach to ensuring the effective implementation of the Paris Climate
Agreement is also very difficult to deny.

06© Sanjog Manandhar

THE ROLE THAT PCSD CAN PLAY IN AVOIDING A
FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO THE PURSUIT OF
DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIESThe ambition of achieving contemporary development priorities while ensuring theconservation of the natural resource base for the future requires holistic programming
involving multifaceted actors and expertise. This study sets out to demonstrate that it is hightime for the international community to attempt to consolidate hard-fought gains linked to theimplementation of key normative frameworks such as the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Climate
Agreement, and to better align their future implementation through the pursuit of wellplanned, policy coherence for sustainable development strategies. Such an approach would
support a more holistic conceptualization of development centering on the primacy of humanrights as well as on the integrity of the natural environment and its ecosystems. A majoradvantage of promoting a PCSD approach in how these two major international policy
frameworks are implemented is that, along with an important emphasis on cross-cutting,multisectoral, holistic tracking and reporting, PCSD requires avoiding the duplication of effort
resulting in a fragmented analysis of development priorities.
Finally, achieving a sufficient level of political will to mobilize international cooperation on
policy coherence for sustainable development will depend on the continued existence of thewell-functioning multilateral system that has already produced the 2030 Agenda and otherimportant international policy frameworks.

07

A GLOBALPERSPECTIVE ON
POLICY COHERENCEFOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT.

02

08

MEASURING INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS ON POLICYCOHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The difficulties involved in identifying indicators for measuring progress on policy coherence forsustainable development have attracted considerable academic attention. The United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) was given the responsibility within the UN system to propose
a way forward for measuring progress on Target 14 (PCSD) of SDG17 (partnerships and means of
implementation) in the context of monitoring the 2030 Agenda. The indicator proposed by
UNEP is extremely comprehensive and is part of the official set of indicators for the 2030
Agenda. This indicator focuses on eight mechanisms that are key to ensuring policy coherence
and which provide long-term leverage for PCSD. A government would be expected to put inplace the following mechanisms if it intended to achieve policy coherence for sustainable
development: (1.) Institutionalised political commitment1 (2) . Long-term considerations indecision-making (3). Inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral coordination (4). Participatory
processes (5). Policy linkages (6). Alignment across government levels (7). Monitoring andreporting for policy coherence 8. Financing for policy coherence.

THE OECD RECOMMENDATION ON PCSDThe OECD has been an important platform for promoting PCSD and developing conceptual
thinking on policy coherence and its implementation. This is reflected in its recently revised
Council Recommendation on PCSD (OECD 2019) which concisely summarises the main
measures that governments can take to promote PCSD. PCSD is defined by the OECD as “anapproach and policy tool to integrate the economic, social, environmental, and governancedimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy
making”5 while “its objectives are to advance the integrated implementation of the 2030
Agenda.”6 It is a framework for analysing the synergies and trade-offs between and acrosssustainable development policy throughout all stages of the policy making process andensuring inclusive, participatory and transparent decision-making.

09© FORUSThe OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD),
provides a comprehensive standard to help countries equip policy-makers and key
stakeholders with the necessary institutional mechanisms and policy tools to enhance PCSD
and accelerate progress on SDGs. To translate policy coherence principles into concrete action
at different levels, the OECD-UNDP Global Hub on the Governance for the SDGs aims to help
countries build governance capabilities and leadership in support of SDGs. PCSD is now
recognised in global governance as a key ‘Means of Implementation’ of the 2030 Agenda and a
key element for delivering the SDGs at the global level and to be pursued by all governments.

CORE ELEMENTS FOR TRACKING PCSD
Tracking progress on PCSD, both at national and other levels is an important step toward
ensuring implementation and monitoring effectiveness. PCSD indicators are crucial forunderstanding the relationship between the various actors, processes and drivers of a system.
Different sets of indicators can be used to track progress on PCSD, depending on the elementsof policy coherence to be monitored. However, the OECD has outlined what it sees as the coreelements for tracking PCSD at the national level.
These include the assumption of high-level responsibility and central leadership for PCSD, theappointment of dedicated coordinators and points of contact, vertical coordination and thecoordination of the PCSD response with sub-national governments, adapting existing financeand governance structures to tackle challenges, ensuring trust through evidence-based
decision-making and heightened reliance on science and technical expertise, effective andcoherent public communication and finally ‘scenario-based’ planning and the integration ofstrategic foresight to inform debate and decision-making about PCSD in the longer term. Thisrequires a strong emphasis on enhancing the strategic capacity of national statisticalcommissions to track transformation by complementing it through indicative data producedby academia, citizen-led initiatives and civil society organizations. It also requires acomprehensive alignment of several reporting processes at the national and global level tosynthesize the analysis vis a vis use to better conceptualize PCSD mechanisms.

10

GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF PCSD
As PCSD covers all government portfolios, overall responsibility should lie with the head of thegovernment and his/her cabinet. This will ensure that PCSD will be promoted and emerging
inevitable trade-offs will be resolved. Various countries have recognised this necessity and haveshifted responsibility for policy coherence for sustainable development out of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs where it was, to the Office of the Head of State. The OECD itself has also
recognised that in practical terms the final responsibility for PCSD should move to a centre-ofgovernment level (OECD 2019) and cannot just be kept in a single line ministry. For example,
the government of Finland moved responsibility for PCSD to the Prime Minister’s office where it
is managed by the National Commission on Sustainable Development (van Seters et al 2020).
Similarly, France has a General Commissariat for Sustainable Development under the Prime
Minister’s office (van Seters et al 2020).
Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit to achieving policy coherence
for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD governance mechanisms. This will
require maintaining PCSD and the SDGs among the top government priorities, beyond partisan
mandates or electoral cycles as state level priorities. This should strengthen the mobilization ofa collective political will fostering competitive yet complementary party manifestos as well as
restricting regressive trends. It will call for robust data as well as strong institutions,coordination mechanisms and tools, such as impact assessments, budget systems, andreporting systems to parliaments enabling efficient policy oversight for comprehensiveplanning, implementation and review mechanisms. A dedicated PCSD rapporteur should be
appointed to promote PCSD between government departments, across the entire government
and internationally. Also, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and a dedicated unit
within the Prime Minister’s office to promote PCSD will foster horizontal and verticalcoordination.
Finally, according to the most recent CONCORD PCSD report 20227 PCSD is an underestimated,even ignored, but very crucial element in achieving the 2030 Agenda worldwide. The
CONCORD report argues that when implementing the 2030 Agenda it is vital to respect theinterlinkages between different sectors, and between the domestic and external dimensions ofpolicymaking. The report also mentions that to look at policymaking through the lens ofsustainable development requires a new form of governance: one that addresses the root
causes of today’s challenges and that focuses on a long-term vision and overall system change.
It proposes that the aims of a PCSD approach should be to” foster synergies across policy areas
and between sectors, ensure that today’s policies do not undermine the well-being or
sustainable development of future generations, identify and address trade-offs, or negative spillovers, both between different domestic policies, and where domestic policies affect othercountries. It points out that policy coherence for sustainable development can support
countries to achieve sustainable development, whereas policy incoherence can seriously
undermine it. For example, European Union (EU) trade policy might create economic gains for
the EU but might have devastating impacts on partner countries’ economy, their environment
and their poorest communities.

11

PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS & PCSD
Many PCSD studies point to the importance of including a sound political economy analysis
when implementing policy coherence for sustainable development, understanding thestakeholders’ interests in the decisions being made. Promoting PCSD is inevitably political, so it
is important to have a good grasp of the different stakeholder interests before policy decisions
are made. To date, the experience of many countries that have implemented a genuine PCSD
approach to policymaking is that the introduction of multi-stakeholder and participatory
governance mechanisms is important to address current complex issues and challenges(reference CONCORD report8). The implementation of a PCSD approach therefore, requires the
emergence of truly democratic participatory processes and “whole-of-society” approaches
constituting a vibrant civic infrastructure across all levels of governance. Examples ofparticipatory governance mechanisms relevant to a PCSD approach include citizen assemblies
and multi-stakeholder sustainable development councils.

EXAMPLES OF POLICY INCOHERENCE
One prominent example of policy incoherence was in the area of Food Security where the EU
reformed its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2013 because its agricultural policies were
not consistent with its policies on international development. The reform of the EU’s CAP
resulted in a significant reduction in EU export subsidies which had historically resulted inprice-distorting effects on the markets of developing countries, negatively impacting
agricultural producers and communities in the global south.
Another example is that of developed countries which in an effort to “go green” and become
more sustainable, opt for sources of energy that make them dependent on minerals fromunsustainable mining sites in developing countries (e.g. lithium to make batteries for electriccars). This causes the ecological or material “footprint” of developed countries to be far higher
than their global “fair share” and would indicate that they were taking too many natural
resources from elsewhere while posing serious environmental and social costs to thedeveloping countries.

12

Developed countries also often pay too low a price for commodities produced in thedeveloping world or for the labour involved in producing these commodities. This can affectexporting countries in their efforts to implement their SDG agenda, because it results in the
exploitation of cheap labour, inadequate working conditions, inequality, increased foodinsecurity, degradation of soils and groundwater, deforestation and biodiversity loss etc.,
among others.
This requires a conscious reconfiguration of global economic governance in particularparalleled by equitable redistribution of wealth, power and resources through a political willthat prioritizes people and the planet over profits. PCSD could serve as a roadmap towards thatambition provided it is prioritized as a critical consideration ahead of consensus at the very
heart of our multilateralism.

A PROMISING PCSD-RELATED PRACTICE
Eurostat, the European level statistical office, has developed an indicator for spill over effects on
consumption patterns in the EU, which it presented in its 2021 Report. This is very promising.
For several years now, Eurostat has invested heavily in tracking transboundary environmental
impacts by modelling footprint indicators based on official statistics. It now calculates three
types of environmental spill overs: the material footprint, the carbon and CO2 emissions
footprint and the air pollution footprint. It also measures a social spill over (employment) andan economic spill over (income). It has become clear that the EU’s material footprint is far too
high in relation to its ‘fair share’. This could serve as a model for configuring similar analyticalmechanisms at global, regional, national as well as the local level to better understandintersectional ties as well as negotiate trade-offs across policy pursuits. In parallel, it isimperative to utilize the evidence base to inform the policy processes for holistic countermeasures. Such an evidence base could also unlock several policy advocacy instruments andavenues for robust follow up and accountability mechanisms for sustainable development.

13

PCSD & POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACED
Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda countries have started to integrate the SDGs into
national plans and strategies, and many have set up dedicated institutional structures andgovernance mechanisms for coordinating implementation. However, addressing synergies andtrade-offs between economic, social and environmental policy objectives, while avoiding thenegative effects of policies still is a major challenge for most countries worldwide. Eight years
now and, the aftermath of COVID-19 has pushed back several gains on sustainable
development urges the need for expeditious, elaborate and efficient policy action.
Policymakers are struggling to manage and leverage linkages among goals and tooperationalize an integrated and coherent implementation of the SDGs with the involvementof all key stakeholders. Governments and policymakers need to consider several key issues
where PCSD is concerned - what governance mechanisms can be used to balance competing
sectoral priorities, minimize trade-offs and facilitate synergies? How to ensure that the needs offuture generations are considered systematically in policymaking? How to maintain politicalcommitment beyond electoral cycles? How can countries in the pursuit of the well-being of
their citizens avoid negative effects on other countries and future generations? These are someof the difficult questions that policymakers are facing.
The promotion of PCSD is highly political in nature. Each policy in each sector has its backers
and interest groups pushing for a particular course of action and arguing that their view should
be dominant. A commitment to policy coherence for sustainable development with otherpolicies in other sectors puts limits on how far each policy can go and each interest can besatisfied. Finding win-win solutions that will please all stakeholders in each policy sector isfrequently difficult and it is often the case that there will be losers as well as winners. Technicaltools and administrative mechanisms to find coherent policy solutions can go so far as to build
a consensus, but in the end some level of arbitration is likely to be needed. This is compoundedby the absence of data on almost half the indicators on SDGs with a variance of degree acrosscountries and regions. UNESCAP’s 2022 report indicated that the current rate of progress
would mean that the Asian Pacific region could only achieve the SDGs by 2065. The situation
across other regions may not be different with variant sets of issues and bottlenecks across tiersof governance. Policy coherence for sustainable development mechanisms can help make theprocess to reach the decision point more transparent and democratic, but ultimately
established political decision-making institutions will need to take over for the final step.

14

ASSESSING PROGRESSON CLIMATE JUSTICE.
REFLECTING ON THE
OUTCOMES OF THE
COP 27 IN EGYPT,NOVEMBER 2022.

03

15

© Midia Ninja

INTRODUCTION
In the final days of COP 27, the collective power of vulnerable and marginalized communities,
social movements, and civil society breathed into life a historic agreement among
governments present to set up a Loss and Damage Fund. This is a positive step in inching
towards justice for those most affected by the climate crisis, and in holding to accounthistorically polluting nations.
But such gains on the loss and damage conversation is undermined by a COP that ultimately
fails to signal the phaseout of all fossil fuels. It will be no different to prescribing medicine torelieve pain for a sick person without addressing the root cause of his sickness9.
The cover decision of this year’s COP barely builds on the outcomes of the Glasgow pact, whichcalls for only the phase down of unabated coal and restricts subsidies for fossil fuels. The
presidency and global leaders touted COP 27 as the ‘implementation COP’ – in the end it seems
that what it sought to implement is the abandonment of the 1.5C ambition due to more coal,gas, and oil. It need not be said that going beyond 1.5C means even more unspeakable loss anddamage for vulnerable people.
But the final text does not speak for the multitudes of voices calling for a phaseout of fossil
fuels. Civic movements and climate science have long called out coal, gas, and oil as the culprit
to the catastrophic changes in our global climate. At COP 27, dozens of governments joined in
to say that fossil fuels must be phased out – yet a handful of nations including China,
Philippines and Saudi Arabia, blocked a key proposal to phase out all fossil fuels, not just coal. It
is more than frustrating to see overdue steps on mitigation and the phase-out of fossil energies
being stonewalled by a number of large emitters and oil producers
It cannot be denied that the urgent need for an equitable phaseout of all fossil fuels has madeits mark in today’s global consciousness. This is a reality that we would be bringing back to thefight for a just energy transition in our own home countries, a much more spirited fight that thefossil fuel industry and its backers would find themselves confronting and losing even beyond
COP.

16

© Midia Ninja

LOSS AND DAMAGE FUNDS
Some of the countries that had pushed hardest for the new fund for loss anddamage simultaneously tried to weaken language around phasing down fossil fuels.
The COP27 agreements are in line with what came out of the Glasgow meeting last year, toaccelerate "efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficientfossil fuel subsidies", rather than being strengthened to phasing down fossil fuels as somecountries had pushed for. In a historic decision, after 30 years of delay and inaction, Parties at
COP 27 established a Loss and Damage fund, a first step towards redress and accountability forthe human rights harm caused to millions confronting climate impacts on the frontlines.
It also included a new reference to "low emission and renewable energy". The Egyptianpresidency said the language reflected part of the "just transition" adopted by all parties, which
includes the use of hydrogen and nuclear energy to reduce emissions10.
For some, the Egyptian presidency had delivered a satisfactory deal by forging the agreement
to set up a loss and damage fund. The idea had been resisted for years by some of the largest
emitters, such as the United States and Europe, who were worried about the extent ofliabilities.
Loss and damage was "the one thing the climate activists wanted for ages, which was finallymade at a COP being hosted by a developing country, that in itself is a great win because itshows their diplomatic strength,"
However, many climate activists and some delegates believe little progress had been made on
most other issues, contending that the tone had been set by fossil fuel producers who played amore public and prominent role in Sharm el-Sheikh than at previous summits.

17“As per the relevant decision text:
The Conference of the Parties …
Acknowledge the urgent and immediate need for new, additional, predictable and adequate
financial resources to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change in responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events andslow onset events, especially in the context of ongoing and ex post (including rehabilitation,
recovery and reconstruction) action;
Decide to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to loss anddamage, including with a focus on addressing loss and damage by providing and assisting in
mobilizing new and additional resources, and these new arrangements complement andinclude sources, funds, processes and initiatives under and outside the Convention and theParis Agreement;
Also decide, in the context of establishing the new funding arrangements referred to…above,to establish a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus onaddressing loss and damage.”
The fact that we have a fund at all is a testament to the immense collective power of the unityof social movement and Indigenous leaders, civil society campaigners, and the G77 plus China,building on tireless efforts over decades, staring down relentless initiatives to block the fundfrom the outset from countries like the USA and some EU nations.
Much work remains to be done in terms of operationalizing the loss and damage fund andimplementation thereof to ensure that the fund is not just an empty shell but fit-for-purpose,
sufficiently resourced, and in line with human rights, climate justice, and the needs ofcommunities and Indigenous Peoples. Moreover, while we welcome the much needed
establishment of a finance facility, we recognize that no amount of money can recompensecommunities who have suffered the irreparable losses of their territories, cultures andtraditions.
At COP 27, also witnessed the operationalization of the implementation arm of the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), namely the Santiago Network, an
important element to ensure the WIM delivers on its third function: enhancing action andsupport through catalyzing technical assistance.
A text was adopted affirming that technical assistance provided by the Santiago Network for
Loss should be in line with the Paris Agreement's preambular text on human rights, including
also other human rights-aligned language and considerations, such as ensuring representationfrom the women and gender constituency, indigenous peoples organizations, and children andyouth non-governmental organizations on the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network, andgender reporting including through the use of gender-disaggregated data. The text is far fromperfect but creates a foundation for human rights-based approaches. We know human rightsbased climate action leads to more effective outcomes – what will be important now is tomonitor how this all plays out in practice, reinforcing the existing human rights obligations ofStates11.

18© Midia Ninja

FINAL NEGOTIATIONSIn the final 24 hours, the COP presidency held a meeting where calls from negotiators fromcountries and groups including Switzerland, the United States, Latin America and small islandstates, for Egypt to include language initially proposed by India to phase down all fossil fuels
were unheeded, where at least 80 countries supported such language. Egypt will hold the COP
presidency until it hands over to the United Arab Emirates, an ally and a major hydrocarbons
producer, in just under a year.
“Holding COPs in petro-states may seem counterproductive but actually we can’t ignore thesecountries. They need to be engaged in the process and putting pressure on them as a COP host
may provide bigger gains.

KEY OUTCOMES
In terms of key outcomes, COP 27 was the first environmental negotiation process to include
an explicit reference to the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Thiswas made possible due to sustained civil society advocacy and their continued efforts tostrengthen environmental governance across the board recognizing that the real fight lies
ahead in translating initial steps into strong outcomes meaningful for those most affected byclimate impacts. The civil society called out the abysmal failure of Parties to make any
significant collective progress on the phase out of all fossil fuels. Loss and damage cannot beadequately addressed without tackling the root causes of the climate crisis. Continued
addiction to fossil fuels will only see impacts worsening, leading to continued and devastating
human rights harm.

19© Midia Ninja

COP 27; THE LONG STORY TOLD SHORT; A SEA OFEXPECTATIONS AND AN EMPTY BUCKET
Cop 27 ended on early 20th November in the tourist town of Sharm El Sheikh. The city amply
reflected the COP process. Glitzy and sprawling but lifeless town, the silence punctuated by thehumming of big cars and common people, workers, women hard to find by as if they were
tucked away somewhere out of sight!
The second most attended COP and probably the longest one, the “green wash festival of theNorth” ended refusing to move even an inch beyond Glasgow outcomes. Many were ready toretreat, but pulled along to wait for a more opportune moment. The 27th series of COP wasorganized in the backdrop of huge climate disasters all over the world, especially in Africa andAsia. While in Africa, 8 million were affected and displaced in Ethiopia due to drought andfamine and 2500 perishing due to the same in Uganda and Nigeria and South Africa witnessing
worst floods of the century. Pakistan became of poster boy of disaster and destruction in Asiawith around 2000 dead, tens of millions affected, one third of the country inundated and with$40 million estimates of losses. People had hoped that COP will come with determined efforts
to further reduce the emissions fast, scale up climate finance and adaptation finance and therich countries will acknowledge their historical responsibility and put up a fund for loss anddamage for the worst affected and the most vulnerable. However, against this huge surge ofsea of expectations; the outcomes clearly manifested the mentality that the poor of the worldmust fend for themselves. Notwithstanding the fact that they have no contribution in the crisis,
notwithstanding the fact they are the ones on the frontlines of the everyday battle against thenature’s wrath, even notwithstanding the fact that their own governments have very little tosupport and protect them as most of them remain saddled with debts paid many times over!
The most celebrated outcome and historic outcome of the COP 27 was setting up of a fund for
addressing loss and damage. Developed countries only agreed to it as determination of the G77
and other similar countries made it impossible to go negotiations further without settling Lossand damage finance facility issue. The history of this demand is as old as the UNFCCC itself andtherefore, it is historic. Now Loss and damage has at least a home within labyrinths of the COP
negotiations. However, except for crumbs from few rich countries, the money looks hard tocome by.

20© Midia Ninja

Though it might still take several years for this fund to be put up, operationalized and money
actually flowing from this fund. On the margins of it, most vulnerable countries might getcapacity in developing early warning systems, and some insurance schemes might also headtowards them. However, it leaves us to wonder, which kind of insurance will find it lucrative towork in countries where disasters and destruction are bigger realities than life? But as the realoutcomes from the climate negotiations have been so modest that even this “nondescript”
fund became joy d vivre for many who thronged the COP to bring accountability on the big
polluters past as well as current, public as well as private, hidden as well as ones with thenames and addresses!
All other elements of the discussion viz. mitigation, climate finance and adaptation finance aswell as global stock take faced usual north south divides. The hosts avoided major
confrontations by pushing it for years ahead. Mitigation and finance related issues witnessedalmost no progress, so that many commentators (including me attending all COPs after
Copenhagen) missed their deadlines on first week outcomes as they did not have anything toreport except for bickerings. UNEP’s Emission Gap Report showed that we are still at thedanger of 2.4 degree rise even if all promises are kept, far from the Paris Agreement targets.
Finance Gap reports showed almost unbridgeable gaps. Ones who have to provide finances,
showed incapacity, repeated old promises (and old lies) and wanted to draw in countries who
have a per capita GDP of less than their tenth and far more smaller emissions. Land GAP report
told us that countries are putting huge faith in magic bullet of the nature Based Solutions(NbS) which will require 1.2 billion hectares of land, which is equal to all crop lands of the world
and the area of the United States of America. This can be possible only when we probably
remove all human beings from that area!
The long and the short of it that 1.5 degrees target and expectations of poor people in the world
still remain on the life support. And everyone knows longer the life support smaller the chancesof survival!

21© Midia Ninja

LOSS AND DAMAGE (L&D)
Decision to establish a fund to respond to loss and damage, among other funding
arrangements; a transitional committee (with a majority of developing country
representatives) to be nominated by Dec. 15th will make recommendations for its
operationalisation by COP28.
United Nations agencies, bilateral, multilateral and international financial institutions called
on to submit views on how they might enhance finance for loss and damage [para 7d], and
UN Secretary General to convene a summit with international financial institutions’principals [para 11]
Operationalisation of the Santiago network aimed at catalysing technical assistance on L&D
Launch of the Global Shield against climate risks by German-led G7 and V20 helping tosecure pre-arranged finance to vulnerable countries, including through insurance.

FINANCE
Canada-Germany Climate Finance Delivery Plan reviewed progress towards the $100bn andthe doubling of adaptation finance on the eve of COP27.
Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) of $20bn (including $10bn from private sources)
between Indonesia and the United States, Japan, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
and Norway.
South Africa launched its five-year Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP) for the$8.5bn JET-P announced at COP26.
Cover decision calls on the shareholders of multilateral development banks andinternational financial institutions to reform multilateral development bank practices andpriorities [para 61].
France, in partnership with Barbados, looking to establish a high-level panel of experts tosuggest innovative ways to unlock climate finance by next IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings(April 2023).

22

MITIGATION
Similar language on 1.5C and phasing down coal from last year’s Glasgow Climate Pact; text
on fossil-fuel phase-down/out supported by over 80 countries but not included in the final
text.
Adoption of a mitigation work programme convening two dialogues per year until at least
2026, which “will not impose new targets or goals”.
A few countries updated or fleshed out their commitments: e.g. India submitted its longterm low-carbon development strategy, EU to update its NDC to 57% reduction by 2030 on
1990 levels due to the adoption of a regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry.

ADAPTATION
Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme initiated the development of a thematic andpolicy-related framework for the global goal on adaptation.

ACCOUNTABILITY
The report of the High-Level Panel on net-zero commitments by businesses, financial
institutions, cities and regions convened by the UN Secretary General makes 10
recommendations to draw a red line on greenwashing, including that carbon credits involuntary markets should be used for beyond value chain mitigation only.
The Carbon Neutrality Coalition released a voluntary framework for net-zero climate action
in countries.
Africa Carbon Markets Initiative led by the UN Champions, and the Energy Transition
Accelerator led by the US were launched to develop voluntary carbon markets.

23

POLICY COHERENCEFOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC REGION:AN OVERIVEW.

04

24

© PIANGO

INTRODUCTION
The current initial study looks at a rapid assessment of climate action (mainly throughcommitments in the NDC), and policy coherence with the SDGs. The primary objective is tolook at Institutional, policy and procedural challenges and conflicts in order to suggest how
they can be ironed out.
Primary data was collected through case studies and secondary data through a desk review.
Countries that were part of this study included India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Thailand, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Kiribati. The contributors
provided data through a mix of tools including policy papers (India, RoK and Sri Lanka),
opinion pieces (Nepal, Mongolia & Taiwan) and case studies of issues, social groups(Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uzbekistan & Thailand) as well as through PRA (Kiribati). Due to data
received through variety of methods, mainly to include peoples’ perspectives, the study does
not claim to be an exhaustive one, and lacks uniformity and universality in data and NDCSDG interlinkages.
Our analysis shows that Asian countries are at a rudimentary level of policy coherence as far as
climate action and SDGs are concerned. Some coherence can be seen at the theoretical level in
the NDC, however, it is yet to largely percolate in policies, programmes or institutions. However,based on the data received we tried to analyze it on 4 parameters of (i) political commitment
and leadership, (ii) institutional structure, (iii) policy integration and conflict, and (iv) people
participation.

25© Sanjog Manandhar

POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP
Political commitment and leadership provide a strong foundation and vision by translating
ambition into legislations or clear policies and action plans. Our analysis shows that while anincreasing number of countries theoretically are in agreement on policy coherence forsustainable development, political commitment and leadership is yet to emerge at a realistic
level. At best, it remains uneven and sporadic.
Only a few countries have passed legislations on climate action or sustainable development
enhancing the status and level of accountability of the government to the Paris Agreement,
Agenda 2030 and SDGs. The Republic of Korea has legislated Framework Act on Carbon
Neutrality and Green Growth bringing both climate action and sustainable development
together. Sri Lanka legislated Sustainable Development Act, 2017 and set up the Ministry of
Sustainable development to coordinate the work on the SDGs. Sustainable Development
Council has been tasked with the planning and implementation of the SDGs. The revised NDC
adopted in 2021 also shows deeper analysis and interlinkages with many SDGs including SDG5.
Political instability in Nepal adversely affects political commitment. Bangladesh NDC has noteven mentioned SDGs even once. India has set up a Prime Minister’s Council on climate change
under the leadership of the Prime Minister. However, the lack of focus on sustainable
development is compensated by linking the National and State Action Plan which covers
various sectors (and the SDGs) as they prescribe actions on energy, renewable energy, water,
health, food and agriculture, industry, infrastructure, disaster management, etc.

26

© Sanjog Manandhar

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND STRUCTURES
Institutional structures provide a vehicle for the efficient implementation for policy coherence.
They manifest whether the impact of the commitment is going deep (down to sub national
and local levels) and wide (across sectors and time horizons). They also set up appropriatemonitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and mechanisms for feedback and reporting. At thesame time, they also indicate whether these mechanisms are dynamic and have the capacity
to improve over time incorporating the feedback loops.
The institutional mechanisms and arrangements seem to be wilting in Asia and the Pacificwhere climate action and SDGs are still captive in separate siloes. While the ministry ofenvironment is mainly responsible for climate action, SDGs are taken care of by host ofagencies including the ministry of development, planning, or national development council.
These “agencies” have wider membership. However, the whole of the government approach isstill lacking. Especially lacking is horizontal coherence, as there might be institutions at thecapital, however, they don’t generally run down to subnational or seldom to local levels.
Similarly, in the vertical coherence also, many sectors are still at crossroads (conflict) withclimate action or SDGs action plan in general. Even the countries which show high politicalcommitment and deeper interlinkages between climate justice and the SDGs get weak on theinstitutional arrangement. They often lack details on how coherence will be achieved.

REPUBLIC OF KOREAThe Republic of Korea provides a good case study in the context. In Korea, every municipal andlocal area government is obliged to follow the National Adaptation Plan (2021-25). The Plan has
a linkage with many SDGs and proper implementation will have co-benefits for expediting
achievement of many SDGs, but lacks detailed roadmap for implementation. This is also true
for the Carbon neutrality and Green Growth Act, which also suffers from poor implementationand monitoring mechanisms.

27

SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka, where Climate Change Secretariat looks into the implementation of the NDC and thesustainable development council is charged with the administration of the SDGs have both
failed to provide much momentum either on the SDGs or policy coherence. The climatechange secretariat fails to provide updated information on climate finance.

MONGOLIA
In Mongolia, the SDGs is administered by the National Committee on Sustainable Development
under the Prime Minister and are composed of a wide variety of stakeholders including theCSOs, trade unions, consumers and academia. The Committee meets irregularly. Mongolia has
failed to adopt national targets and indicators till now. No meeting of the Committee has been
held since Mongolia presented its Voluntary National Review (VNR) in 2019. The revised NDC(2021) does not refer to the governance or institutional structure; neither has it laid down any
mechanism for the disclosure of information and reporting.

INDIA
In India, no review of the National Action Plan on Climate Change has been conducted in thelast 15 years. The States largely lack the capacity, institutional structure, and finance forplanning and implementation and are still revising their Action Plan on climate change to alignit with the SDGs. The Niti Aayog, which is the nodal agency for the SDGs implementation is only
concerned with developing annual SDGs report and Index and the state do not have any
guidance on how to better align SDGs with their development programmes.

KIRIBATIIn Kiribati, people on the frontlines of climate change hardly know about governments’ planand policies with regard to climate change and have differential threat perceptions of impacts
due to a lack of appropriate information and communication.

28

POLICY INTEGRATION, COHERENCE AND CONFLICT
Poor political commitment and gaps in institutional structure are bound to lead toinappropriate policy integration, lack of coherence and lots of policy conflict, which is clearlyreflected in the countries reviewed. From the data available, there are two very clear trends.
One, the NDCs in the region are mitigation focused and fail to capitalize on the opportunity ofavailing co-benefits that policy coherence provides, second energy transition is taking place
within fossil fuel as most of them attempt a fuel switch (from coal to gas) rather than go forenergy transition. While many countries have put forward ambitious renewable energy plans,
they are still quite tentative about reducing their fossil fuel dependence. These trends areindicative of continued and or (even increased) policy conflicts than policy coherence forsustainable development.
India has made impressive gains in renewable energy, yet it has allocated new coal blocks formining, intends to increase its coal production and is increasing its pipeline projects. This is
despite the advice of many reputed agencies including IEA and its own Central Electricity
Authority to the contrary. Sri Lanka is increasing its dependence on non-sovereign gas and oil.
Small countries like Bangladesh and Nepal are also going ahead with Thermal Power Plants
against their own environmental policies and Environmental Impact Analysis requirements.
The 9th Basic Electricity Plan in RoK still prioritises LNG to compensate for the loss of coalbased power. Private companies like POSCO and Samsung are going ahead with thermal
power plants emboldened by GCCS & KEPCO assurance of safeguarding private companies
from incurring losses should they incur additional expenses in constructing or operating
thermal power plants. Increased power privatization also leads to increased costs for people
and conflicts directly with SDG7. People and herder families continue to be adversely affected
due to unabated mining in Mongolia. Mining provides approximately one-third of revenues to
the government in Mongolia with 80-90% of revenue from mining coming from the same top
10 companies every year.
As far as another critical area in mitigation forests is concerned, the policies in Asia and Pacificcountries lead to similar results and policy conflicts. While all the countries talk about
increasing forest cover, halting and reversing deforestation; in practice, many countries aretaking actions to the contrary. India and Sri Lanka have conveniently revised the definition offorests to include plantations. This has the effect of giving an appearance that forest cover isincreasing while in fact natural forests are being lost. India has been engaged in the last coupleof years to increase government control over the forests and dilute conservation standards sothat it has almost zero rejection rate for forest clearance for any proposal for industry,
infrastructure or any other economic activity. Similarly, Sri Lanka is also seeking to divert forest
for non-forest purposes. In Sri Lanka pandemic also facilitated land grabbing due to reduced
monitoring and policies to stop the import of cattle feed. Deforestation has not declined
significantly in Indonesia despite having a moratorium on deforestation and signing a pledge in
COP 26 to protect forests and halt and reverse deforestation by 2030.

29© Both Nomads

PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATIONThe region has a poor record on the people’s participation in policy making. With climate
action and SDGs it is getting worse. While many countries mention the participation of the
stakeholders in their NDCs, they fail to provide more explicit information on how their inputs
were incorporated in the NDC development. However, case studies affirm that in a large
number of countries there was no public consultation in the NDC development or climate
action and responses. Similarly, stakeholders are also unaware of public consultations being
held while planning or implementing the SDGs or while preparing the VNRs.
In Kiribati, people have very little on the climate change policy manifesting that they might nothave been involved in any communication/consultation etc. In Sri Lanka, a large number ofenvironmental defenders protested against a government notification intending to free forest
for non forest use by withdrawing protection by labelling them “other forest.” India andPhilippines have seen large number of activists, forest and environmental defenders being
terrorized and slapped with charges of being anti national. In the Philippines, environmental orforest defenders are hounded by the anti Terrorism Act while ancestral land of the indigenous
populations are being parceled away en masse. In Bangladesh, 8,000 farmers and fisherfamilies are threatened with dislocation due to Rampal Thermal Power Project close biggest
wetland and Ramsar protected site of Sunderbans. Mongolia does not have any mechanism forpeople’s participation in the NDCs. In Indonesia too, despite the promise to return ancestral
land to the indigenous population, more of small farmers and plantation workers are facing
dispossession. In Thailand, a large number of women (farmers) are being left behind in social
protection benefits including universal health coverage and contesting government claims that
all Thais are covered.

30

POLICY COHERENCEFOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE ACTION IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC.

05

THE POTENTIAL FOR
SUBSTANTIAL NDC
SDG SYNERGY.

31© Sanjog Manandhar

INTRODUCTION
With less than eight years remaining to achieve the objectives of Agenda 2030, no country is on
track to meet all 17 SDGs. Countries are also far behind in achieving the low-carbon andclimate-resilient society envisioned in the Paris Agreement, their climate pledges, or NDCs, are
far less ambitious than required to keep global warming to the Paris target of “well below” 2C
above pre-industrial levels (UNEP 2019).
The goals of the NDCs intersect both positively and negatively with the SDGs, progress on
climate goals can therefore either help or hinder progress on the SDGs (Brandi et al. 2017;
Dzebo et al. 2019). The success of both can be helped by policy coherence, wherein countries
promote synergies and address conflicts in the implementation of both their NDC and SDG
agendas.

GENERAL MITIGATION AND ADAPTATIONCONTRIBUTION IN ASIA
All 25 countries in Asia communicated a mitigation contribution in their NDC, 19 of which (76%)
set a greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) target and six12 (24%) qualify their contribution in termsof “Action-only.” At the sub-regional level, countries communicated a mix of GHG targets and“Action-only” as their respective mitigation contribution, with the exception of Eastern Asiawith all countries setting a GHG target. Figure 1 illustrates the shares of countries with amitigation contribution, at the regional and sub-regional level, by type of contribution.

32

FIGURE 1
The majority of countries in the region (79%) express their GHG target as an absolute reductionof net emissions, while four countries13 express the reduction in terms of emission intensity perunit of GDP. Around three-fourths (74%) set their target in comparison to the level of emissions
under a business as usual (BAU) scenario, and the remaining countries (26%) set their GHG
target against emissions from a specific base year14.
The timeline of the contributions vary between 2016 and 2035, with the majority of countries
specifying an implementation period between 2020/21 and 2030. One country15 sets an end
date of 2035. Around 85 percent of countries in the region include the agriculture sector andalmost 90% include the LULUCF sector in their general mitigation contributions. Figure 2
illustrates the share of countries, at the regional and sub-regional level, with IPCC sectors
included in their general mitigation contributions, by sector.

FIGURE 2

33

FIGURE 3
Adaptation to climate change refers to changes in processes, practices and structures tomoderate potential damages from climate change, or to benefit from opportunities associatedwith such changes.
Amongst cross-sectoral priorities for adaptation, water is promoted most frequently (83% ofcountries with an adaptation component), followed by oceans and coastal zones (54% ofcountries), biodiversity (33%), ecosystems and natural resources (29%) land and soil (13%).
Figure 3 illustrates the share of countries with an adaptation component, at the regional andsub-regional level, with cross-sectoral priorities in ecosystems, by type.

Countries often identify a number of cross-cutting priorities in social systems as part of theiradaptation strategy. Health represents the most frequently promoted cross-cutting adaptation
measure in social systems amongst countries in the region (79% of countries with anadaptation component), followed by Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (54%), food security andnutrition and resilient infrastructure (42%, respectively). Gender equality and poverty andinequality reduction are included to a comparable degree (17% each). The distribution ofpriorities at the sub-regional level reflects regional trends, with indigenous peoples and humanrights specific to adaptation in South-eastern Asia. Figure 4 illustrates the share of countries
with an adaptation component, at the regional and sub-regional level, with cross-cutting
priorities in social systems by type.

34

FIGURE 4
All countries in Asia, with the exception of one, 56 communicated an adaptation component,
all of which include the agriculture and land use sectors. The level of detail included in eachcountry’s adaptation component varies, as some countries detailed their adaptation visions,
goals and measures, while other countries made reference to national adaptation and climate
justice plans. The majority of countries include a set of priority sector(s) and measures in the
agriculture and land use sectors (96% of countries with adaptation) and two countries only
include measures. Figure 6 illustrates the share of countries with an adaptation component
and adaptation in the agriculture and land use sectors, by type.

INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE
Ninety-two percent of countries with an adaptation component include measures related to
institutions and governance. The majority of those countries promote DRR/M (67% of countries
with adaptation in social systems), followed by policy mainstreaming and coherence (42%),
institutional capacity building for climate action (33%) and water governance, law andregulation reform and participatory governance and inclusion to a comparable extent(13 to 17 %), amongst others. Figure 5 illustrates the share of countries, at the regional and subregional level, with one or more (to avoid bias of representation) institutions and governancerelated adaptation measure out of countries with adaptation measures in social systems, byintervention option.

35

FIGURE 5

FINANCIAL CONDITIONALITIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE
CLIMATE GOALSCountries highlight that access to additional financial resources is a prerequisite for achieving
the climate goals and targets in country NDCs. All developing countries, with the exception of
one16, indicate whether they require full, partial or no financial support for NDC
implementation, but not all quantify the respective conditional and unconditional share. Eighty
percent of countries in Asia communicate that NDC implementation is partly conditional tointernational financial support, two countries17 make their NDCs totally conditional and two
country18 make their NDC unconditional to the provision of external finance. Not all requiring
financial support however, quantify financial needs disaggregated by conditional andunconditional shares. Only 16% of countries specify the conditional and unconditional share.
Overall, NDC implementation in Asia is associated with a reported 1.6 billion USD. This however
represents the financial needs expressed by only one-third of the countries in the region.

36

FIGURE 6

SHARE OF COUNTRIES WITH NDCS THAT ARE FULLY,PARTIALLY OR NOT CONDITIONAL TO THE PROVISION OF
EXTERNAL FINANCE
The Paris Agreement’s success depends on parties’ implementation of their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) towards the Paris Agreement’s goals. In these climate actionplans, most developing countries make their mitigation and adaptation contributions
conditional upon receiving international support (finance, technology transfer and/or capacity
building).
While provision of support for NDC implementation could enhance equity among countries,
the feasibility of NDC implementation might be challenged by the large number of conditional
NDCs.
We find that feasibility is challenged because conditions applied to NDCs are often not welldefined. Moreover, the costs of implementing all conditional contributions are too high to becovered by existing promises of support from developed countries, even if the entire annual$100 billion of climate finance were earmarked for NDC implementation. Consistent withprinciples of equity and the prioritization in the Paris Agreement, a higher proportion of Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have conditional NDCs
than do other countries.

37

NDC SDG COHERENCE
IN SOUTH ASIANCOUNTRIES.
BANGLADESH, INDIA,NEPAL, PAKISTAN AND
SRI LANKA.

06

38

© Both Nomads

INTRODUCTION
The study is based on the review of revised NDCs of the five countries in south Asia. It does
not explore linkages in other policy documents. South Asia is one of the most vulnerable
regions in the world with as many countries in the region figure in the top 10 in the Climate
Change Risk Index. With high poverty and high population density many countries havesubstantial populations dependent on climate change sensitive sectors (agriculture, fisheries,
livestock, forests and tourism etc.). A World Bank study20 noted that 50% population of South
Asia has suffered from at least one natural disaster in the last two decades. India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka has suffered from severe floods in very recent past as well as severe heatwaves in India and Pakistan. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are affected by rising sea levels. For
Nepal and India glacier melting has intensified in recent years. Besides rapid and extensive
climate change impacts, Covid-19 pandemic has also challenged countries’ capacity to reach
the SDGs.
South Asia countries display a variety in policy coherence for the SDGs, some vouching fordeeper policy coherence while some show coherence at a very rudimentary level. NDC
themselves show differences in approach, structure, balance between mitigation andadaptation and commitment to move towards low carbon production pathways. However, theoverall analysis shows that while some countries are at an advanced level of planning andimplementing policy coherence at least between the nationally determined contributions andsustainable development goals, some are yet to take off. However, to expect smaller countries
to take rapid and swift steps towards coherence would be unrealistic due to their constrained
capacity to plan, finance, implement and deliver coherence due to poverty and low resilience,high vulnerability and exposure to disaster and extreme weather events, lack of appropriatetechnology, finance and technical capacity. These needs can be met with domestic resources
and capacity only to a very small extent, in the absence policy coherence at the global levelwith predatory trade practices and hegemonic neoliberal instruments like Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) robbing developing countries off vital resources that could havebeen used for effective Covid-19 recovery, efficient climate change response, or holistic
sustainable development priorities. Therefore, this snap study aims to look only at theirreadiness for creating policy coherence for sustainable development. It does not explore thequestions of appropriateness and ambition of the NDCs and their gaps either.

39© Sanjog Manandhar

BANGLADESH
Revised NDC of Bangladesh commits (i) reduce 6.37% emissions unconditionally and 21.85%
conditionally in three sectors of power, industry and transport. The revised NDC also extends
the coverage of the NDC to the sectors of energy, industrial processes and products use (IPPU),(ii) agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), (iii) waste. Bangladesh spends around USD 1
billion (6-7%) of its annual budget on adaptation. However, WB estimates adaptation
investment requirements is five times more.
Bangladesh is still preparing its national Adaptation Plan. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy
and Action Plan (BCCSAP, 2009) includes 44 programmes under six areas, including foodsecurity, social protection and health, disaster management, Infrastructure development,
research and knowledge management, mitigation and low carbon development, capacity
building and institutional development and Major adaptation actions. In addition, adaptation
plan is also taking considerations of sustainable ecosystem and livelihood (mainly sustainable
forest management and livelihoods), disaster management (tidal areas management byimproving embankments, engaging communities to cope up with cc, EWS), Ag & Food (ag techprogramme, community based fisheries, LS development, agro-industrial value chain), water
resources management (drainage management, CSA water management, reviving small riversetc.) and surface water and rain water harvesting. It remains to be seen how these importantconsiderations are factored in the Adaptation Plan and up to what measure.
However, CSOs lament that NDC development process did not undertake consultations withthem and only Ministries, agencies, academia and media was allowed in the consultations andprovided inputs. Also, a quick look at the NDC reveals that there is no information on
institutional structure, or on information disclosure mechanism.

40

INDIA
India’s NDC commits to (i) reducing its emission intensity by 33%-35% by 2030 over the 2005
baseline, (ii) to achieve 40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non fossil basedenergy, and (iii) to create an additional sink of 2.5 -3 billion tons of co2 equivalent by 2030. It
also lays down a requirement of USD 2.5 billion for achieving its NDC. The mitigation will cost
USD 834 billion, while adaptation measures will require USD 206 billion.
The priority sectors listed in the NDC comprise of (i) clean tech in thermal, (ii) renewable energy,(iii) emissions from Transportation, (iv) energy efficiency (including in Industries, transport,
building and appliances), (v) waste, (vi) infrastructure, (vii) afforestation and (viii) enhancing
climate resilience, (ix), and (x. Additional sectors for adaptation are listed as, (i) health, (ii) waste
to energy, (iii) coastal areas, (iv) water, and (v) agriculture, (vi) disaster management, (vii) ) rural
livelihoods, (viii) biodiversity and the Himalayan Ecosystem.
The NDC mentions that India wants to achieve SDGs, but does not talk about coherence ofclimate action under NDCs with the SDGs. However, the adaptation sectors actions touch
several SDGs including SDG1, SDG 2, SDG3, SDG6, SDG8, SDG 9, SDG 11, SDG14 and SDG 15
besides SDG 7 and SDG 13.
The NDC does not give any information on how the NDC was developed and whether
stakeholders were consulted. No information on institutional structure or whether there areany efforts for policy coherence. The NDC also lacks information on monitoring mechanisms;
however, it may be presumed that NDCs will be updated every five years as required by the PA.
The NDC does not give any details on how the NDC will be implemented.

41© Both Nomads

NEPAL
Nepal is a least developed country (LDC) with per capita GDP of USD 1,085. Agriculture andremittance are major contributors to the economy besides tourism. Their latest
multidimensional poverty index (MPI) report shows that 28% of Nepal’s population is below
MPI. Nepal’s NDC commits to (i) increase energy generation from 1400 MW to 15000 MW(5000MW being unconditional) by 2030 (ii) by 2030 ensure that 15% of the total energy
demand is met by renewable energy, and (iii) 25 EV in the new sales by 2025. Revised NDC ismore ambitious both in terms of sectoral coverage and net emission reduction. Nepal also put
a financial requirement for USD 25 B for mitigation.
Key mitigation areas (i) energy and transport, (ii) IPPU, (iii) agriculture, forestry and other landuse (AFOLU) and (iv) waste.
Nepal claims to have decreased deforestation rate by 0.05% from about 0.44% and 0.18% in
the terai and chure respectively with a target of -0.5% by 2030 apart from equipping every
household in rural areas with smokeless (improved) 450,000 cooking stoves by 203021.
Mitigation areas also touch a lot of SDGs especially under forestry, agriculture, waste, tourism
and urban settlements, and also promote action on GESI. The National Adaptation Plan of
Nepal is still being finalized but priority areas include Agriculture and food security, forests, BD
and watershed conservation, water resources and energy, rural and urban settlements,
industry, transport and physical infrastructure, tourism, natural and cultural heritage, healthdrinking water and sanitation, and disaster risk reduction and management.
Nepal’s is the only South Asian country which in its NDC, talks about 50% women’s in forest
management committees, proportional representation for IPs and Dalits in key positions in theSFM, budget provision to ensure social and environmental safeguards, FPIC, forest tenure,access to finance and technology for local communities, women and IP, fair and equitablebenefit sharing (carbon and non-carbon) among LCs, women and IPs. The CSOs also agree tothe fact that the NDC development process has also been democratic involving both national
and provincial level involving LCs, women, IPs and the youth.

42© Midia Ninja

PAKISTAN
Pakistan has been the 8th most disaster affected country during 2000-2019. It is among the top
10 countries in risk index. More than 30 million have been affected by extreme weather events
since 2010. The economic costs of floods is approximately USD 3.32 billion per year. Pakistan
spends 11% of its budget on adaptation and mitigation. Agriculture is the main economic
sector contributing 19% to the GDP, 68% people rely on agriculture for livelihood in rural areasand provides employment to 45% of the national labour force.
Pakistan’s NDC commits to (i) 50% reduction in projected emissions (15% unconditional, 35%
conditional), (ii) 60 RE by 2030, and 30% EVs, and (iii) completely ban imported coal,moratorium on new thermal power plants. Pakistan also puts a price tag of USD 101 billion only
for energy transition.
Main programmes cited are Ten Billion Tree Tsunami Programme (TBTTP) and Billion Trees
Afforestation Programme (will reduce 500 Mt of carbon by 2040), Recharge Pakistan andProtected Areas Initiative. Current emission of Pakistan is measured at 489.84 Mt co2e. it claims
to have reduced its emission by 8.7% between 2016-2018. Key mitigation areas include, (i) RE,(ii) transportation, and (iii) coal. Adaptation areas include (recharge Pakistan, Protected Areas
Initiative (increase total protected areas from 12% to 15%). The adaptation areas focus
specifically on (i) agriculture, (ii) water, (iii) health, and (iv) disaster preparedness. The NDC also
puts emphasis on gender equality and youth participation. Its NDC also puts a lot of emphasis
on NBS and Financial instruments.
SDGs have been specifically mentioned in the NDCs. NDC says that the SDG support units havebeen established for integration of climate change measures into national and provincial
policies, strategies and planning. However, no more details are available. One specific challengein policy coherence is cited with regard to the SDG 13, where it says “SDG 13 reinforces theimplementation of all but also challenge targets of several SDGs.”

43

SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka, despite its low emissions has achieved high human development. The country has
low poverty rate 4.1% (down from 28% in 2000) and its unemployment rate is also low but
recently unemployment has been rising among educated youth. Women have higher
educational attainment. Per capita emission is low at 1.02 tons and its contribution in global
emissions is only 0.03%
Sri Lanka’s NDC commits to (i) reducing GHG emission by 14.5% from BAU by 2030 (4.5%
unconditional and 10% conditional), (ii) achieve 70% RE in electricity generation. (iii) increase
forest cover from 29.5% to 32%, (iv) carbon neutrality in electricity generation by 2050 andcarbon neutrality by 2060. Key sectors in mitigation are (i) electricity/power, (ii) transport, (iii)
industry, (iv) waste management, (v) forestry, and (vi) agriculture and livestock. It’s surprisingthat there is no financial estimate in the NDCs. It simply reveals that there is not yet a deep
systematic analysis inputting costs to each action.
Key adaptation sectors include (i) Agriculture, (ii) fisheries, (iii) Livestock, (iv) water, (v)biodiversity, (vi) coastal and marine, (Vii) health, (viii) Urban planning and human settlement,and (iIx) tourism and recreation.
As far as NDC SDG synergy is concerned, there is a chapter on integrating SDGs and Gender to
the NDCs. Sri Lanka has used SCAN Tool for policy coherence analysis. Analysis found over 270
linkages, majority being positive interactions. NDC also lays down strong positive interlinkages
with SDG7, SDG 8, SDG9, SDG 11, and trade off or mixed interaction with SDG1 and SDG15. Power
sector NDCs are shown to have trade offs with SDG 1,2,3,6 and 14. The NDC presents a goodanalysis of the NDC SDG synergy. However, it fails to detail how this positive interaction will be
reinforced and how conflicts will be removed.

44

NDC AND SDG
COHERENCE IN SOUTH
EAST ASIANCOUNTRIES.
VIETNAM, THAILAND,INDONESIA AND THE
PHILIPPINES.

07

45

INTRODUCTION
Within the Southeast Asian region, the threat of climate change is increasing rapidly. Droughts
and floods affected 13.1 million hectares of croplands in the region and about 20.6 million tonsof crop production was lost between 2015 and 2019. Numerous studies in the region havesuggested that both inland and marine fishery production have started declining because ofclimate variation and climate-induced disasters. Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, andThailand have been identified as among the most affected by impacts of weather-related loss
events from 1999 to 2018, according to the Global Climate Risk Index 2020. IPCC AR6 warns
that Southeast Asia will be hit by rising sea levels, heat waves, drought, and more intense andfrequent bouts of rain. Heavy rain events will intensify by 7% for each degree of global warming.
The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather disasters as a result of climatechange is having a devastating effect on food security and livelihoods. This warning was issued
by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which played a galvanizing role in the
inclusion of agriculture in global climate change negotiations and in linking agriculture to
National Adaptation Plans and NDCs, in a report. Dominant systems of agriculture and foodproduction including associated land use is a big contributor to climate change along with
deforestation, altogether comprising almost a third of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Decarbonizing food production and promoting sustainable agriculture and agroecology should
be at the core of addressing interlinked challenges between food security/food sovereignty andclimate change.
It has been found that sea levels are rising faster in Southeast Asia than elsewhere. Hugeswathes of land are closer to sea level across the region than previously realized. Indonesia,
Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines, which are highly vulnerable to sea level rise and withland prone to sinking due to subsidence, will face annual extreme sea level events that areprogressively getting worse due to climate change. An estimated 15 million people in Asia’s
seven biggest cities will live in areas at risk from rising sea levels by 2030.
Bangkok will be the hardest hit, with 10 million people and 96% of the city’s GDP at risk fromflooding. Parts of Jakarta, coastal home to 10 million people, could be submerged completely.
Parts of Manila in the Philippines could be immersed in floodwater. New elevation measures
also show that climate change could quickly swamp the Mekong Delta. This will affect 12
million Vietnamese in the next 50 years.
Researchers have predicted a decrease in rice production throughout Southeast Asia as
massive floods and droughts become recurring events and saltwater intrusion intensifies.
Vietnam’s rice production could be reduced by 3 million tons in the coming decades as a resultof flooding. Large parts of the Mekong River Delta, where rice is grown by farmers in Thailand,Laos, and Vietnam, may be inundated by sea level rise as a result of warming seas.
The IPCC and another study predict that a one-meter rise in sea level could result in Vietnam
losing 7% of its agricultural land, Myanmar seeing a decline in rice yield, and Malaysia sufferingdamage to 180,000 hectares of agricultural land.

46

VIETNAM
Vietnam is one of the world’s top five most vulnerable countries to climate change22, ranking
13th highest among 180 countries by the Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index for 2000-19.
The national preparation capacity in coping with extreme events, hotter temperatures, andrising sea levels is also poor, ranking 91 of 192 by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative(ND-GAIN) Readiness Index23. The country’s rapid economic growth over the past three
decades has been fuelled by a coal-dependent energy supply that creates significant GHG
emissions.24 The country is one of the first countries to ratify the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol . Vietnam announced at the 2021 United Nations COP26 a target of net zero carbon
emissions (GHG) by 2050. To deliver this target, Vietnam is reviewing and updating its
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).
The Government of Vietnam released Decree 06 on January 7, 2022, providing regulations on
the reduction of GHG emissions and protecting the ozone layer, and has issued the country’s
National Climate Change Strategy to 2050 in July 2022. Vietnam’s NDC has been developedwith the participation and contributions from different line ministries, non-governmentalorganisations, research institutions, business sector representatives as well as international
development partners. Apparently there is a strong supporting legal framework for
implementing NDC actions in Vietnam. However, several gaps and challenges remain,
including technical capacity, coordination and resource allocation, downscaling to theprovinces, genuine engagement of private sector and NGOs and community-based groups, andregulatory framework, all of which is critical to NDC implementation25.
Vietnam’s NDC includes a mitigation and an adaptation component. The mitigation
component includes both unconditional and conditional contributions. The unconditional
contributions are measures that will be implemented using domestic resources, while theconditional contributions are measures that could be implemented if new and additional
international financial support, technology transfer and capacity building are received. Thisconditionality reflects the dependency of the government plan on international financial
support. Viet Nam has actively been researching and implementing GHG mitigation measures
Under mitigation component, renewable energy, agriculture projects account for highest sharefollowed by waste treatment and reforestation and afforestation among the total operational
projects in the country.

47

Vietnam’s NDC identifies the GHG reduction pathway in the 2021-2030 period. With domestic
resources GHG emissions will be reduced by 8% by 2030 compared to the Business as Usual
scenario (BAU). The above-mentioned contribution could be increased up to 25% withinternational support. Under adaptation component, “Pro-actively responding to climatechange, enhancing natural resource management and environmental protection” have beenstressed. Vietnam believes that climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable
development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic,
joint, interdisciplinary, inter- regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger
eradication and poverty reduction.
The adaptation component identifies adaptation gaps in terms of institutional and policy
arrangements (lack of integrating legal framework for climate change issues into national
Socio-Economic Development Plans is still limited; apart from ineffective coordination
between line ministries, sectors and localities to address multi-sectoral and inter- regional
issues; a lack of incentives to attract domestic and foreign investment and to mobilise theprivate sector to participate in climate change adaptation.), financing, human resource
capacity and technology and prioritized adaptation measures for the 2021-2030 period. It isestimated that the national budget will be able to meet approximately one third of thefinancial needs to implement adaptation measures in this period, and will seek international
support and private sector investment for the remainder. The cost of adaptation is estimated to
exceed 3- 5% of GDP by 2030. The Vietnam Country Climate and Development Report 2022
highlights the need of creating synergies between development and environmental objectives
and navigating the (un)intended negative consequences of climate actions from falling onto
the poor and most vulnerable groups.
Vietnam has determined that the climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable
development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic,
joint, interdisciplinary, inter- regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger
eradication and poverty reduction. Climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable
development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic,
joint, interdisciplinary, inter- regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger
eradication and poverty reduction26.

48

THAILAND
Thailand is one of the most vulnerable countries in SEA due to its long coastal area and its
highly dependence on climate patterns for its agricultural activities. Women and communities
are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts, especially those in the Lower Northern Region ofThailand (LNRT) where the region is suitable for growing rice and other agricultural crops.
Communities earn their living and maintain their livelihoods from agricultural and farming
practices and agricultural and farming activities are the main source of their income.
Considering the issue of climate justice, these women and communities are having long andextensive experiences in extreme and climate-induced events like heat and droughts andchanging climate patterns as these changes are affecting their crops in the farms.
Thailand NDC and the National 25-Year Master Plan on Climate JusticeThe discussion around NDC in Thailand has been around mitigation --energy and forest issues,
while adaptation is not equally addressed. Adaptation is site specific and needs to engage thelocal communities to avoid mal-adaptation and false solutions --where there seems to be
climate solutions, they might create another problem or violate human/community rights ordestroy ecological services communities are depending upon.
The current NDC does not address human rights, women and gender and the different needs
and socio-economic and livelihoods of those who are vulnerable to impacts of climate change.
Take for example, droughts are addressed but the adaptation to droughts can be varied andthere has always been a tradition of solving droughts by constructing a large dam that is notcontributing to communities’ resilience building and enhanced adaptive capacity. As far as
climate justice and historical responsibility is concerned, the NDC does not address climate
justice issues from developed countries --how adaptation and loss and damage due to climatechange will be financed. It is very likely that adaptation and mitigation will be financed by thegovernment’s budget which also raises a question if it will be competing with or compromisingother community development needs e.g. education, social welfare, health services, etc.

49

The NDC was revised and submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2020, without consultation
with CSOs and women, taking the opportunity of the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown. The
substance in the NDC very much remains the same. Similarly, the National 25-Year Master Planon Climate Change, at the draft final stage, is gender blind (Climate Watch Thailand, 2019) --nota single word on women or gender in this 105-page draft document. CSOs have madecomments on this and at the current stage it has included women as one of the vulnerable
groups, despite the fact that women are an agent of change and have implemented different
initiatives to cope with climate impacts. The same as in NDC, the Master Plan does not address
climate justice issues and means to monitor and hold developed countries accountable to their
historical responsibilities.

INDONESIA
Indonesia’s NDC outlines the country’s transition to a low carbon and climate resilience future.
The NDC describes the enhanced actions and the necessary enabling environment during the2015-2019 period that will lay the foundation for more ambitious goals beyond 2020,
contributing to the concerted effort to prevent 20 celsius increase in global averagetemperature and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5o celsius above preindustrial levels. For 2020 and beyond, Indonesia envisions achieving archipelagic climate
resilience as a result of comprehensive adaptation and mitigation programmes and disasterrisk reduction strategies. Indonesia has set ambitious goals for sustainability related to
production and consumption of food, water, and energy. These goals will be achieved by
supporting empowerment and capacity building, improved provision of basic services in healthand education, technological innovation, and sustainable natural resource management, incompliance with principles of good governance.
Post 2020, Indonesia envisions a progression beyond its existing commitment to emission
reductions. Based on the country’s most recent emissions level assessment, Indonesia has set
unconditional reduction target of 29% and conditional reduction target up to 41 % of thebusiness as usual scenario by 203027.

50
Indonesia has set a goal in updated NDC and formulates a long-term strategy on low carbon andclimate resilience, committing to reducing GHG emissions by 29% unconditionally and up to 41%
conditionally from the business as usual (BAU) emission by 2030. For the adaptation action plans,
the government of Indonesia has developed the National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate
Change (RAN-API) to build economic, livelihood, and environmental service resilience. According
to official documents, although Indonesia has gradually strengthened its climate commitments
and established emission reduction pathways and targets for each sector, its ambitions are stillinsufficient to reach the Paris Agreement. Indonesia even directly states that they required
financial, technology and capacity building needs support to meet the targets. For the mitigation
part, we can see that the deforestation in Indonesia has not significantly declined since themoratorium on deforestation is without strict enforcement mechanisms. For the adaptation part,the progress level seems to be not enough, especially in ecosystem-based adaptation (IPCC AR6
WGII). There is still a lack of specific implementation strategies and plans for the goals ofadaptation and resilience building.
Indonesia is also prepared to carry out the mitigation efforts especially in the land use sector that
includes social forestry through active participation of the private sector, small and medium
enterprises, civil society organizations, local communities and the most vulnerable groups,
especially adat communities (Indonesia: Masyarakat Hukum Adat, internationally known as
Indigenous People), and women –the planning and implementation stages, apart from its focus onclean and renewable energy, waste management for GHG reduction.
The adaptation policy is yet to be finalised but the medium-term goal of Indonesia’s climatechange adaptation strategy is to reduce risks on all development sectors (agriculture, water, energy
security, forestry, maritime and fisheries, health, public service, infrastructure, and urban system) by
2030 through local capacity strengthening, improved knowledge management, convergent policy
on climate change adaptation and disaster risks reduction, and application of adaptive technology
The preparation of the NDC has taken into account the Post-2015 SDGs particularly on taking
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, promoting food security and sustainableagriculture, achieving gender equality, ensuring the availability and sustainable management ofwater, access to affordable, reliable, and renewable energy for all, sustained, inclusive andsustainable economic growth, resilient infrastructure, sustainable consumption and production
patterns, conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources, andprotecting, restoring and promoting sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably
managing forests, combating desertification, and halting and reversing land degradation andbiodiversity loss. The preparation and development of NDC also included multi-stakeholder
consultations including civil society, academia, private sector through workshops andconsultations at province and national level28.
Following article 3.4 UNFCCC Handbook, Indonesia has integrated its policies related to mitigation
and adaptation into the national development planning, including National Medium-Term
Development Planning (RPJMN 2020-2024) and Indonesia Vision 2045 (Visi Indonesia 2045)
In order to strengthen climate financing, Indonesia has established a national agency forenvironmental fund management (Id. Badan Pengelola Dana Lingkungan Hidup/BPDLH). BPDLH is
mandated to manage and mobilize finance for environment and allowed to mobilize climate
finance from various sources both national and international sources, private and public sources,
bilateral and multilateral channels. Since its establishment in October 2019, BPDLH has managed
reforestation fund from domestic sources (forest levy paid by private sectors) and initiated REDD+
result- based payment from international sources apart from ‘Carbon pricing’ under preparation29.

51

THE PHILIPPINES
In the Philippines, agriculture, forestry and fishing account for a large proportion of thecountry’s GDP and contribute to job creation and reduced inequality, but these sectors are alsosignificant contributors to overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, and carbon emissions30
Goals related to economic growth and sustainable consumption and production also comewith conflicts. Our analysis found that a switch to sustainable energy sources could conflictwith economic growth and raises concerns of increased poverty and inequality. The country
plans to construct more than 10 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired power plants by 2025 under its
Coal Roadmap 2017-2040. This unsustainable production is incoherent with the emissions
reductions planned in the country’s NDC. Again, poverty, equity and inequality shape synergies
and conflicts for example, in the Philippines, climate goals interact with employment needs,
particularly those of more marginalized populations. Green job creation for marginalized
populations could help minimize equity conflict and facilitate a just transition away from fossil
fuels.
Mitigation
The country’s climate change mitigation actions shall strengthen the resilience and adaptive
capacity of the country, including through enhanced access to climate finance from the official
budget, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, especially on theimplementation of the policies and measures on and the uptake of circular economy andsustainable consumption and production practices.
Adaptation
The National Climate Change Action Plan 2011 - 2028 established the seven thematic areas ofgovernment action to address climate justice, namely food security, water sufficiency,
ecological and environmental stability, human security, climate-smart industries and services,sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development, which are pursued coherently
with the SDGs and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction31.

52

NDC AND SDG
COHERENCE IN NORTH
EAST ASIANCOUNTRIES.
TAIWAN, MONGOLIAAND THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA.

08

53

INTRODUCTION
Climate justice has been a salient issue for the countries of Northeast Asia in terms of impacts,
adaptation, and mitigation. Preliminary analyses suggest that the costs of coastal protection
are likely to be the largest adaptation costs across sectors in the region. In infrastructure,
Mongolia will probably have the largest adaptation costs in percentage terms. In the PRC, there
is a large 'adaptation deficit' to extreme events (e.g., flooding and cyclones) in the infrastructure
sector that should be addressed now. There is a large mitigation potential in Northeast Asia - atleast 7 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2030. Furthermore, much of the potential is at
negative cost. That is, they are economically justified regardless of their emission benefits.
Regional cooperation is important as it can help reduce the total costs of implementing
mitigation in Northeast Asia32 If PRC fails to realise its mitigation goals , global mean annual
temperature will almost certainly exceed 20C.
The formation of a common development idea and vision for this sub-region is particularly
challenging. Compared with Europe and some other sub-regions in Asia and the Pacific, thissub-region is characterized by complicated political and security situations, prominent
historical issues, major differences in social systems and ideology, and multilevel economic
development, among other such issues33. In addition, these countries have taken different
development paths, and are characterized by very diverse levels of economic development. In
general, a sense of sub-regional identity is absent in the ENEA sub-region. All these elements
thus make it difficult to establish a cohesive regional approach to solving shared regional
problems. In addition, localization of Sustainable Development Goals at the national and subregional levels poses another challenge for the ENEA sub-region. Achievement of the Goals at
the national level − tailored to suit respective national circumstances − is key to achieving those
Goals globally. In view of the uneven economic development and different economic systems
in the sub-region, these countries have different levels of understanding and interpretation ofsustainable development priorities and approaches
Countries in this sub-region have differing priorities in their national plans and strategies, withvarying degrees of association and alignment with the SDGs. Some countries have aligned theirnational plans with those Goals. Others, even without explicit reference to the Goals, have many
elements in their plans and strategies which are consistent with the achievement of theSDGs34.

54

TAIWAN
In 2010, Taiwan set up a task force to" plan and promote climate change adaptation policy
guidelines and action programs," jointly develop the National Communication Adaptation
Strategy to Climate Change in Taiwan and construct a framework for promoting adaptation in
Taiwan. Referring to the future situation and research results of climate change in Taiwan
discussed in the 2011 Taiwan Climate Change Science Report, as well as to the adaptation
actions taken by various countries and the particularity and historical experience of Taiwan's
environment, the Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change in Taiwan which was approved by
the Executive Yuan in 2012 divided national adaptation into eight areas that are most seriously
affected: disasters, infrastructure, water resources, land use, coastal zones, energy supply andindustry, agricultural production and biodiversity, and health. To put the adaptation strategy
into action, eight working groups are set up under the Organization of the National Adaptation
Policy Framework to assist in planning and promoting adaptation-related work, which havebeen compiled with the National Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan (2013-2017) by the
National Development Council (NDC).

MONGOLIA
Mongolia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change impacts. Mongolia
Voluntary National Review Report 2019 describes long-term impacts of climate change.35
Mongolia’s annual average temperature has increased by 2.24 C over the last 70 years. The
number of cold days has fallen by 15 days and hot days have increased by 24 days for the last 45
years.
Number of policies has been adopted to address the impacts of climate change such as
National Action Programme on Climate Change to be implemented from 2011 to 2021; Greendevelopment policy of Mongolia, 2014; State policy on food and agricultural sector, 2010; State
policy on forest, 2015; Law on renewable energy, 2015; Law on energy, 2015; State policy on theenergy sector of Mongolia, 2015 etc.

55

These and other relevant national level policy documents served as a basis for the developmentof Mongolia’s INDC submitted in 201636. In its INDC, Mongolia has outlined a series of policies
and measures that the country commits to implement up to 2030, in the energy, industry,
agriculture and waste sectors. The expected mitigation impact of these policies and measures
was a 14% reduction in total national GHG emissions excluding Land use, land use change andforestry (LULUCF) by 2030, compared to the projected emissions under a business as usual
scenario. However, according to the Environmental Performance Reviews conducted in 2017
implementation of the measures foreseen is not yet started. Furthermore, although adaptation
components have been included in the main strategic documents on climate change, nostrategy or national adaptation plan has been approved to date of the review.37 Unfortunately,
no data is available on the progress so far on the relevant SDG 13.2 target.
In 2020 Mongolia submitted an updated NDC to the UNFCCC. Mongolia sets a new target of
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 22,7% by 2030, compared to the BAU scenario.38 Thisnew mitigation target is an improvement on a 14% goal from its earlier intended NDC. It isbased on new baseline emissions that Mongolia re-calculated, which are estimated to reach
74.3 MtСО2eq, compared to its 2015 intended NDC baseline of 51.3 MtСО2eq.
The updated NDC includes additional sectors. In the energy sector, Mongolia intends toincrease the use of renewable energy sources and improve efficiency of energy production andplans to switch from truck to rail transport of its coal export. Adaptation targets include:
implementing sustainable forest management (SFM) and sustainable use of water and pastureland; enhancing the disaster prevention system against drought; enabling adaptation
opportunities for vulnerable biodiversity; and building resilience to natural disasters by
reducing the risks and adapting to impacts of climate and weather-related hazards anddisasters. The NDC builds on existing national development policies as well as newly adopted
long-term policy: Vision-2050.39

56

However, according to the WWF assessment of Mongolia’s 2020 NDC40, Mongolia’s rating
grade was not satisfactory. This assessment was made in comparison to 2016 NDC of Mongolia
and shown in the table below. From this table it is clear that only two components ofMongolia’s 2020 NDC: Adaptation and Fostering systemic change are on right track or marked
as “NDC We want”.
The alarming status is with the component: Inclusiveness and Participation. In this regard,
WWF assessment states the fact that although the 2016 NDC mentions an inclusive process toinvite inputs for the NDC design, the updated 2020 NDC does not make any reference to such a
process. Both NDCs do not provide details about disclosure of information and do not provide
information related to reporting back on processes. The 2016 NDC briefly mentions Ministries
that should be engaged as part of the climate governance, the updated 2020 NDC makes noreference to governance structures. Overall rating grade is that Mongolia is: SOME WAY TO GO!
Based on this assessment it can be concluded that Mongolia fails completely in relation to
Inclusiveness and Participation in terms of: a) inclusive process in design; b) disclosure of
information; c) reporting back on process; d) participatory climate governance structure on2020 NDC. As for participation in actions against climate change the NDC document does notprovide with necessary information on how to track on the progress, where to find progress
report and what a structure or focal point to approach with questions and demands to.

CONSULT THE WWF CHECKLIST FOR MONGOLIA

Cases of policy incoherence and conflicts
Mongolian people have been observing policy incoherencies causing conflicts at national andsub-national levels and between sectors because of lack of established mechanisms to preventfrom policy incoherence causing conflicts. Policy incoherence or policy conflicts in sector
policies, such as minerals policies, policies on environment protection and herders livelihood
have been very clear for the last two decades of mining developments in the country as thepolicies and regulations have been approved without proper consultations with local
governments, local communities, environmental specialists and others.
As of January 31, 2022 there are 2,641 licenses held by 1,719 companies operating country wide.
Out of 2,641 licenses 1,751 licenses are for exploitation and 890 are for exploration according to
the statistics of the Minerals Authority of Mongolia. Main minerals for extraction are coked coal,gold and copper. The mining sector accounted for 26.13% of Mongolia’s national budget
revenue during 2019.41 According to the EITI Mongolia data for the last 10 years annually showsthat 80-90% of mining revenue have been collected from same 10 top companies.42

57

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Korea’s rate of increase in GHG per capita has been the highest among the OECD member
countries. Korea’s per capita emissions are 1.85 times the G20 average. The total per capita
emissions increased by 3% between 2013 and 2018.43 Korea is identified as one of the worst
climate action performers along with Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan according to the
Climate Change Performance Index 2021.44 In June 2015, the Korean government submitted its
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which stated to reduce the emissions by 37% fromthe BAU-based emission (851 million tons) by 2030. However, the government changed thetarget four years later based on the absolute emissions methodology. Accordingly, thegovernment updated the 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Then in 2021, it
declared carbon neutrality by 2050 and legislated carbon neutrality. While these are asignificant progress, these measures came largely in response to the strong advocacy by civilsociety groups like the Korea Climate Crisis Emergency Network — a host organization to morethan 300 grassroots organizations — which played a central role in pressurizing the government
to assess and improve its climate policy. After the Korean National Assembly ratified the Paris
Agreement in 2016, the government integrated K-SDGs, which reflects the economic, socialand environmental context of Korea, into the National Strategy for Sustainable Development.
The Climate Action, no.13 of the K-SDGs, aims to reduce 24.4% of the emissions from 2017 levels.
In contrast to the declared promises written into legislation and strategy for the GHG emissions
reductions, the Korean government permitted the construction of new coal-fired power plants
and even promoted construction of new airports in controversial sites, exacerbating theongoing climate and ecological breakdown.
The Carbon Neutrality Commission submitted to the UN at the end of 2021 the 2030 NDC
target of reducing 40% of the emissions by 2030 below from 2018 levels. However, 40%
reduction of emissions in 2030 is the same as 34% reduction from 2010 levels. Given that the
IPCC recommended that global emissions need to be cut by more than 45% by 2030 from 2010
levels to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 C, Korea’s 2030 NDC target is not aligned withthe 1.5 C goal.

58© Sanjog Manandhar

CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIOS (*SOURCE: CARBON NEUTRALITY COMMISSION)

Climate Adaptation
The Korean government released last year its third and quinquennial 2021-2025 National
Climate Change Adaptation Plan. The Adaptation Plan targets eight fields including responses
to flood, drought, wildfires, food sovereignty, and protecting people from infectious disease.45
The Korean government, by implementing the Adaptation Plan as a mandatory and legal
obligation for every municipal and local government to follow, received a score of its
adaptation measures well above the G20 average.46 However, the government’s commitment
to adaptation becomes questionable when the Plan is looked at closely. In the food andagriculture sector, the adaptation measures cover only limited aspects like the provision ofservices for alarming extreme weather events, improvement of the existing insurance system,and development of climate-resilient crops. It also leaves out the biggest issue of the low selfsufficiency rate of grain and food, which are 21% and 47%, respectively.

59

Climate Finance
Korea has tripled its funds for climate action over the past five years. In 2019, Korea committed
USD 1 billion of its bilateral allocable ODA to the projects that counter climate change. The
funds that the government made a pledge to contribute was above the OECD countries
average.47 Climate change is included in The Framework Act on International Development
Cooperation. The government committed to contribute USD 5 million to the Global Green
Growth Institute (GGGI) in support of developing climate projects in low and middle-income
countries. It has also made a voluntary contribution of USD 11.3 million in total to the GGGI and
Global Environment Facility Since 1995.48 However, not unlike other developed countries,
Korea’s funds tend to focus on climate mitigation projects. Mitigation takes up 73.9%, leaving
little room for the adaptation funds.

SOUTH KOREA’S BILATERAL ODA FOR CLIMATE BY TYPE OF INTERVENTION(USD 1,027 MILLION IN TOTAL, WWW.DONORTRACKER.ORG)

60

NDC AND SDG
COHERENCE IN
CENTRAL ASIANCOUNTRIES .
KAZAKHSTAN ANDUZBEKISTAN.

09

61

INTRODUCTION
Central Asia provides examples of turning climate change challenges into concrete
opportunities for climate action and sustainable development, and this was communicatedduring the COP 26 where these five countries spoke about their approach to decarbonizationand create new opportunities for sustainable growth and the wellbeing of future generations.
The region is collectively yet to develop a roadmap on adaptation with a particular focus onwater resources looking at the scarcity of water resource apart from a concrete action andapproach on climate action transparency. Some common approaches to maximize climate
action in the region and beyond are following:long term low-carbon strategies,
the development of renewable energies,
phasing out coal and gas,sustainable and low-carbon agriculture,
reducing water consumption, andusing waste as a source of energy and bio-waste as a fertilizer.
Central Asia’s green climate fund (GCF) projects between 2015 and 2020 account for only 4% of
the overall GCF approved portfolio. There’s room for improving those figures and attracting
more funds in a strategic region like Central Asia. Concrete regional support would allow
National Designated Authorities (NDA) of Central Asia to deliver successful project proposals
under the GCF umbrella on both national and regional levels. The momentum is favorable for
attracting international partners and donors to work together on sustainable ideas to promotea green recovery post-pandemic on the one hand, and on the other, increase the region’s
climate resilience and stability49.

62

KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan’s NDC enhancement is supported through collaborative efforts with thePartnership for Market Readiness under the World Bank, Deutsche Gesellschaft fürInternationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)50. The World Bank in Kazakhstan is supporting a Mitigation Roadmap until 2025,
which includes the required activities to reduce GHG emissions, while GIZ is supporting thedevelopment of a low-emission development strategy. IRENA to conduct an assessment of thesocio-economic impacts of achieving an energy transition in Kazakhstan, including impacts on
GDP and jobs; develop policy measures needed to maximize the benefits of such a transition;and support a just transition, including policies on labour, education, industry and training andreskilling.
Recognizing the importance of preserving the future climate, Kazakhstan has proposed as its
unconditional NDC an overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 15% by 2030
compared to 1990 level and the conditional NDC of 25% by 2030. Kazakhstan ratified the Paris
Agreement in November 2016 and committed itself to meeting the proposed target as the first
NDC. The goal will be to contribute to sustainable economic development, as well as to thelong-term global goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2C
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5C51. Kazakhstan has
also launched an online platform for monitoring, reporting and verification of emission sourcesand greenhouse gases. This inventory is an essential part of Kazakhstan's national emissions
trading system.
The objective of Kazakhstan’s NDC is to support sustainable economic development, achieve
the OECD’s countries level of life quality, and enter the path of low-carbon green development,
as well as to contribute to the achievement of the long-term global climate goal.

63

Mitigation Sectors
Energy, agriculture, waste, land use, LULUCF
Monitoring and Transparency
Develop GHG emission inventory methodologies for the sectors covered in the GHG
emission control system;
Create a legal framework for the national GHG inventory system;
Provide trainings on the GHG emission inventory for experts, including experts frombusiness enterprises;
Improve inter-agency coordination of GHG emissions inventory; andBuild capacity of participants of the national GHG inventory system for data collection andprocessing.
Adaptation Component for NDC
Create adaptation-related measures and policies for the updated NDC based on
vulnerability assessment;
Develop a roadmap for the implementation of adaptation-related NDC components; andRaise public awareness on climate change adaptation.
Awareness Raising for Climate JusticeOffer expert assistance for preparing Kazakhstan delegation for international meetings on
climate justice; andFacilitate dissemination of key takeaways of national and international events.
Kazakhstan has been listed among the ten countries with insufficient NDC. Furthermore, thecountry has highly carbon intensive energy systems that steadily increase GHG emissions,which are the reasons for the low progress in reaching the NDC targets. Recent forecasts
demonstrate that at the current rate of GHG emissions growth and with the adopted andplanned measures and policies Kazakhstan’s NDC target till 2030 will not be achieved with 45
million tons of СO2 equivalent over52
The Green Economy Concept
The political will of Kazakhstan to transition towards Green Economy is best of all reflected by
the Green Economy Concept which is monitored and coordinated by the Special Council on
Green Economy under the President (the Green Council) and is chaired by the Prime Minister
The main priorities for the transition to Green Economy are:
Effective water management;
Modernization of agriculture;
Energy saving and energy efficiency improvement;
Energy Development;
Waste management;
Air pollution reduction

64

UZBEKISTANThe Republic of Uzbekistan submitted its revised NDC in October 2021. The Republic of
Uzbekistan set a target of reducing specific greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP by 35%
below 2010 levels by 2030. This is an increase compared to the first NDC which included atarget of 10%. The revised NDC also strengthens adaptation measures, particularly inagriculture. The country is also working to align its NDC with its Strategy for Transition to Green
Economy by 2030.
Adaptation and Resilience areas in the NDC, until 2030
Adaptation in water management
Adaptation in agriculture
Climate adaptation of social sphere
Mitigating the Aral Sea disaster
Ecosystem adaptation
Adaptation of strategic infrastructure and production facilities
Under climate action, Uzbekistan prioritizes mitigation and adaptation to climate change(including under the Paris Agreement) with a special focus on the Aral Sea region, conservationand the efficient use of water, land and energy resources, as well as biodiversity conservation(SDG 13, 14 and 15)53.
In its NDCs to the Paris Agreement, Uzbekistan identified key climate change adaptation
measures in agriculture, natural resources, and infrastructure. They include (i) introducing andscaling up modernized agricultural methods and technologies that are more productive andresilient to the impacts of climate change and variability; (ii) restoring degraded land andimproving the management of water resources to ensure sustainable and efficient use ofresources with better drought resilience; 26 (iii) modernizing, constructing, and maintaining
climate-resilient irrigation, water supply, and other infrastructure that is more resilient to
extreme weather events; and (iv) conserving and restoring livelihoods and ecosystems the Aral
Sea Basin54.
Government measures to increase the share of renewable energy sources for stable energy
supply of the population
According to the Ministry of Energy of Uzbekistan, over the past 5 years, daily electricity
consumption in the country has increased by 44.3%. With a fast-rising population of 34 million
and a growing economy, the government expects demand for power to rise by over 100 TWh by
2030, a significant increase from 61 TWh in 2018. At the same time, energy resources produce asignificant part of greenhouse emissions in the country.
In this regard, Uzbekistan takes concrete measures for the transition to a green economy in thenear future, including the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to expert
estimates, the gross potential of RES in the country is at approximately 51 billion toe, technicalat 179 million toe. More than 99% of the gross RES potential relates to solar energy. In recent
years, Uzbekistan has accelerated relevant policy reforms and approved key acts for thetransition to a green economy.

65

CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS.

10

66

OVERVIEW
Policy coherence has received due importance in the Agenda 2030, and has been enshrined
as an important indicator (SDG 17.4). The indicator suggests that implementation of the SDGs
should have synergy (among the SDGs) and other development and sectoral policies of thecountries. However, policy coherence for sustainable development goals is conspicuous by its
absence in Asia and the Pacific region as far as synergy between climate action and SDGs areconcerned. NDCs though refer to co benefits of climate action in achieving the SDGs,
however, political commitment and leadership is low. As regard to the SDGs countries are on
still lower level of accountability as they continue to guide action on the SDGs by policies,
which are less likely have as much of clarity as legislated instruments or by their own
development programmes. The Asian countries are still struggling with removing barriers in
ideas, governance and implementation of climate goals with contrasting sectoral policies.
Many countries are in the process of aligning their NDC commitments (more ambitious) with
their national and sectoral policies which are more traditional and focus largely on “economic
growth dominant development,” confusing between growth and development. There is lackof clear action plans, timelines, communication strategies, and robust framework formonitoring and evaluation. Lack of synergistic ideas, plan to manage trade-offs and conflicts,
institutional fragmentation, and lack of CSOs participation remain major challenges toaddress. However, for this to happen, it is critical that the developed countries should map
the probable impacts of their policies in the global south, substantively reduce such impacts,
and address development deficits that these policies might create. They also need toacknowledge the loss & damages already created as a consequence of their policies, andsupport climate action (mitigation, adaptation, as well as loss and damages) and growth
towards a low carbon resilient economy for sustainable development through financial,technical, technological, and capacity building related support.

67© Sanjog Manandhar

RECOMMENDATIONFOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS
Increase Ambition in the NDCs; The countries need to show more ambition in their NDCs
both in terms of climate action as well as synergy with the SDGs. This can happen only inreciprocity of quick decarbonization of developed/industrialized economies. It is
impossible to find increasing synergy between Climate action and SDGs in the absence
just and quick climate action in the industrialized economies. However, beyond thissynergy will not happen automatically and deep efforts are required to bring policy
coherence for sustainable development.
Incorporate Adaptation Elements into the NDCs to increase Policy Coherence. Currently
the NDCs are dominated more by mitigation actions. The PCSD approach demands that
adaptation components too are given equal emphasis. Especially, SDG1 (poverty), SDG 3(health), SDG 4 (education), SDG 5 (gender), SDG 8 (decent work), SDG 10 (inequality) SDG
16 (human rights, peace and justice and inclusive institutions) and SDG 17 (development
assistance, trade negotiations, and technical & technological support) have very poor
reflections in the NDCs. Increased focus on adaptation will bring NDCs closer andsynergistic of the Agenda 2030.
Ensure Parliamentary Oversight; The implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs
needs Parliamentary oversight, which currently happens in a very few countries; while
NDCs, being legally mandated, get more Parliamentary attention. Therefore, it is critical toengage the Parliaments for a synergized pursuit of the Agenda 2030 too. This would alsoenhance examination of and action on the policy coherence for sustainable development.

68

Increase the Role of NSOs; Governments should commission National Statistical
Organizations (NSOs) in consultation with broader stakeholder communities to develop
PCSD indicators (based on the UNEP indicators) for monitoring the policy coherence
between the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement and of the SDGs in nationaland subnational policy & decision-making. The national complementary indicators could
also align normative frameworks reporting for holistic tracking of transformation as well
as a clear view of regressive trends.
Ensuring Whole of Society Approach; Governments should ensure that all levels of society
share the responsibility of implementing the National Sustainable Development
Strategies, the 2030 Agenda and the NDCs. This would overcome accountability concerns
by ensuring that relevant government departments are responsible for implementing
highly cross-cutting goals. It should also enable fusion of critical reflection andcollaborative action combining multi-actoral and sectoral expertise driving the political
will towards synergized collective outcomes of individual countries.
Clear PCSD Plan and Roadmap; Governments should develop a PCSD roadmap with timebound targets. Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit to achieving
policy coherence for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD governancemechanisms. This will require maintaining PCSD and the SDGs among the top
government priorities beyond the electoral cycles. It will call for robust data as well as
strong institutions, coordination mechanisms and tools, such as impact assessments,budget systems, and reporting systems to Parliaments. A dedicated PCSD rapporteurshould be appointed to promote PCSD between government departments, across theentire government and internationally. Inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and a
dedicated unit within the Prime Minister’s office could promote PCSD and foster
horizontal and vertical coordination. Complementary quantitative and qualitative
indicators should be developed for PCSD reporting as a collective roadmap responsive todevelopment priorities within and beyond borders.
Mechanism for Assessments and Improvements; Appropriate mechanisms should beestablished to allow continuous ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments for sustainability
to be carried out on all government policy-making, legislation, decision-making,budgetary choices etc.

69

Create Mechanisms for Managing Conflicts; Robust regulatory/arbitration mechanisms
should be established that can adjudicate on trade-offs between different policy interests
whenever it has not been possible to identify win-win solutions and synergies. The
mechanisms should also be empowered to evaluate and inform multi and bi lateralnegotiations as well as national policy pursuits. In many policy making contexts this is best
done at the level of ‘centre-of-government’ – that is by the prime minister and cabinet or
equivalent.
Create Awareness; A positive narrative should be created by governments and other key
stakeholders around PCSD by emphasising the great leverage PCSD can have forsustainable development and NDCs by showcasing transferable, up-scalable andpromising practices.
Avenues for CSO Participation in the Agenda and PCSD; Effective spaces andmechanisms should be created for civil society organisations and other stakeholders toparticipate in PCSD discussions, in particular ensuring relevant connections with local
communities (and developed countries need to ensure dialogue with local communities
in the Global South where their policymaking has clear policy impacts on thesecommunities).
Align Domestic and Foreign Policies; Governments everywhere should adopt a balanced,
comprehensive, and integrated approach to sustainable development in both theirdomestic and foreign policymaking by taking all key dimensions into account andensuring that social and environmental dimensions are not undermined by economic
priorities or by vested interests.

Create Knowledge and Insights with Research; Further research is needed on the kinds ofstrategies and interventions that could address not only institutional barriers, but also
target ideas and interests in order to either enhance policy coherence or ensure goal
achievement despite incoherence.

70

Create Mechanisms for Managing Conflicts; Robust regulatory/arbitration mechanisms
should be established that can adjudicate on trade-offs between different policy interests
whenever it has not been possible to identify win-win solutions and synergies. The
mechanisms should also be empowered to evaluate and inform multi and bi lateralnegotiations as well as national policy pursuits. In many policy making contexts this is best
done at the level of ‘centre-of-government’ – that is by the prime minister and cabinet or
equivalent.
Create Awareness; A positive narrative should be created by governments and other key
stakeholders around PCSD by emphasising the great leverage PCSD can have forsustainable development and NDCs by showcasing transferable, up-scalable andpromising practices.
Avenues for CSO Participation in the Agenda and PCSD; Effective spaces andmechanisms should be created for civil society organisations and other stakeholders toparticipate in PCSD discussions, in particular ensuring relevant connections with local
communities (and developed countries need to ensure dialogue with local communities
in the Global South where their policymaking has clear policy impacts on thesecommunities).
Align Domestic and Foreign Policies; Governments everywhere should adopt a balanced,
comprehensive, and integrated approach to sustainable development in both theirdomestic and foreign policymaking by taking all key dimensions into account andensuring that social and environmental dimensions are not undermined by economic
priorities or by vested interests.

Create Knowledge and Insights with Research; Further research is needed on the kinds ofstrategies and interventions that could address not only institutional barriers, but also
target ideas and interests in order to either enhance policy coherence or ensure goal
achievement despite incoherence.

71

RECOMMENDATIONSFOR REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL LEVELSThe countries in the Asia Pacific and especially smaller countries with limited financial andintellectual resources and organizing capacity need strong support in understanding,planning, implementing and analyzing policy coherence. It can be done best at sub-regionaland regional levels. However, many needs (and policy incoherence or conflicts) as mentioned
before emerge at global level and need to be addressed at appropriate global platforms. In
particular, following recommendations can enhance understanding and action at policy
coherence at regional and global levels
Create space and avenues for PCSD discussion; Policy coherence is a less discussed andless understood concept. There is an urgent need to position discussions and peer
learning on the PCSD and sub-regional and regional spaces. APFSD can take a lead ininitiating such discussions and sub-regional and regional forums, which can be followed
by incentivizing smaller countries with capacity building support. At global level too viz.
the HLPF, a thematic session can be devoted to discussing and highlighting best practices
in overcoming barriers and challenges in policy coherence. SDG 16, parallel with SDG 17,
should be annually reviewed due to its cross-cutting implications with a decisive bearing
on the agenda 2030’s success. Also, regional mechanisms like APFSD outcomes
containing local aspirations need adequate formal recognition across global deliberative
processes to ensure policy coherence.
Other UN Forums as springboards: As the SDGs and the Agenda 2030 form the core of
discussion in addition to climate crisis and its manifestations and management at all UN
fora, (viz. UNFCCC, UNCBD, UNCCD, UNEA) a PCSD centered discussion can be aspringboard to elevate discussions, understanding and insights on the policy coherence.

72

Create space for discussion at sub regional forums; Besides sub regional and regional
forum on the SDGs, there are a number of sub regional forums like ASEAN, Pacific Island
Forum, SAARC to list a few. Development of understanding and approaches and practices
can take leaps If these spaces can also open up avenues for similar discussions.
Utilize capacity building needs of developing countries; Capacity building is most often
cited critical need in the NDCs of the developing countries. Agencies like UNDP, UN
Country offices, UNEP and others can take note of these capacity building avenues andutilize them in developing countries understanding, structures and institutions forcreating synergy between climate action and SDGs.
Map progress on PCSD; sub-regions and regions provide best space for peer learning anddeep exchange of knowledge, experience, insights, challenges and cutting-edge successfactors. It would be extremely helpful if regional commissions of the UN can develop tools
for mapping progress towards the PCSD and accompany it with a compendium of bestpractices on creating the policy coherence on sustainable development.

SOURCES
1 Connections between the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda ,https://www.sei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/connections-between-the-paris-agreement-and-the-2030-agenda.pdf , November, 20192
G20
countries
stillbackingfossilfuels
through
COVID-19
response,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-climatechange-energy-trfn-idUSKBN27Q00Q

November,

2020,

3 Paris Agreement – International treaty on climate change. Adopted in 2015
4 ttps://community.oecd.org/community/pcsdpartnership
5 https://community.oecd.org/community/pcsdpartnership
6 https://www.oecd.org/gov/pcsd/recommendation-policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-2019.pdf
7 https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Advocacy-Plan-PCSD.pdf
8https://concord.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/spotlight-policy-coherence-on-development-eu-memberstates-concord-europe-2015.pdf
9 http://ceedphilippines.com/on-the-outcomes-of-cop-27/
10 https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/cop27-climate-summit-missed-chance-ambition-fossil-fuels-critics-say2022-11-28/
11 https://www.escr-net.org/news/2022/cop-27-delivers-progress-loss-and-damage-fails-fossil-fuels
12 Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, Bhutan and Nepal
13 China, India, Singapore and Malaysia
14 https://www.fao.org/3/ca7264en/ca7264en.pdf
15 Brunei Darussalam
16 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not indicate any conditionality of financial support in its NDC.
17 Philippines and Afghanistan
18 Brunei-Darussalam and Singapore.
19 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2019.1635874
20 https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration/climate-change
21 https://www.fao.org/3/ca7264en/ca7264en.pdf
22 https://www.climatelinks.org/resources/vietnam-climate-change-fact-sheet
23 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/brief/key-highlights-country-climate-and-developmentreport-for-vietnam
24
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/brief/key-highlights-country-climate-and-developmentreport-for-vietnam

SOURCES
25 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311843.2020.1792670
26 https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndcs/country/VNM/full?document=first_ndc-EN&query=6&searchBy=goal
27 NDC, Indonesia, http://ditjenppi.menlhk.go.id/reddplus/images/resources/ndc/First_NDC.pdf
28 https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndcs/country/IDN/full?document=revised_first_ndc
29 Ibid30
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340248644_Increasing_policy_coherence_between_NDCs_and_SDGs_a_national_perspective
31 https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndcs/country/PHL/full?document=first_ndc-EN&query=4&searchBy=goal
32 https://www.adb.org/publications/economics-climate-change-northeast-asia
33 Li Wen and Wang Yuyi, “Impact of political factors on regional cooperation in Northeast Asia”, Northeast Asia
Forum, vol. 24, No. 1 (December 2014), pp. 53-60
34
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/publications/Achieving%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%2
0in%20East%20and%20North-East%20Asia.pdf
35
Mongolia
Voluntary
National
Review
Report2019p.
phttps://www.mn.undp.org/content/mongolia/en/home/library/mongolia-voluntary-national-review-report2019.html

32

36 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) Submission by Mongolia to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on
the
DurbanPlatformforEnhanced
Action(ADP)
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Mongolia%20First/150924_INDCs%20of%20Mong
olia.pdf
37
Environmental
Performance
Reviews
2018
https://unece.org/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/Synopsis/ECE.CEP.182_EPR_Mongolia_Synopsis.pdf

P.11

38 MONGOLIA’S NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTIONON
CLIMATECHANGEhttps://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Mongolia%20First/First%20Submission%20of%20
Mongolia%27s%20NDC.pdf
39
https://sdg.iisd.org/news/mongolia-and-thailand-update-ndcs-pledge-to-up-targets-with-technological-andfinancial-support/
40
NDC
Checklist:
Mongolia
https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/ndcs_we_want_checklist___mongolia.pdf
41 https://eiti.org/mongolia
42 https://www.eitimongolia.mn/a/176

Analysis

SOURCES
43 Climate Transparency, Climate Transparency 2021 South Korea, 2021, 1
44 Climate Change Performance Index, https://ccpi.org/ranking/45 Republic of Korea, The 3rd National Climate Change Adaptation Plan, 2021
46 Climate Transparency Report 2021
47 Donor Tracker, https://donortracker.org/south-korea/climate
48 Donor Tracker
49 https://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/central-asia-at-cop-26-5-countries-1-region-1-voice/50
https://www.ndcs.undp.org/content/ndc-support-programme/en/home/our-work/geographic/europe-andcis/kazakhstan
51 https://www.un-page.org/files/public/ge_stocktaking_report_eng_final.pdf
52 E-magazine Climate Action tracker - 2020
53 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/uzbekistan
54 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/04_UZB%20CPS_LD_ISGA.pdf

ABBREVIATIONSACRF: The ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework
AF: Adaptation Fund
AFOLU: Agriculture, forestry and other land use
ASCCR: ASEAN State of Climate Change Report
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWGCC: ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change
BAU: Business as Usual scenario
BCCSAP: Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BIMP-EAGA: Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
BPDLH: Badan Pengelola Dana Lingkungan Hidup (Translation: The Environmental Fund Management
Agency )CAP: Common Agricultural Policy
CBDR-RC: common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
C: Celsius
CO2: Carbon dioxide
COP: Conference of the Parties
CSA: Climate Smart Agriculture
CSO: Civil society organizations
DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction
ENEA: East and North East Asia
EU: European Union
EWS: Economically Backward Class
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
F: Fahrenheit
FPIC: Free, Prior and Informed Consent
G20: Group of 20
GCCI: Global Green Growth Institute
GCCS: Global Capability Centres
GCF: Global climate fund
GCF: Green Climate Fund
GDP: Gross domestic product
GEF: Global Environment Facility
GESI: Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GGA: Global Goal on Adaptation
GHG: Greenhouse Gas
GIZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GMS: Greater Mekong Sub-region
GW: GigaWatts
IEA: International Energy Agency
INDC: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPPU: Industrial Processes and Product Use
IRENA: International Renewable Energy Agency
ISA: International Solar Alliance
ISDS: Investor-State Dispute Settlement

KEPCO: Korea Electric Power Corporation
LDC: Least developed countries
LNG: Liquefied natural gas
LNRT: Lower Northern Region of Thailand
LPG: Liquified Petroleum Gas
LULUCF: Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
Masyarakat Hukum Adat: internationally known as Indigenous People (Indonesia)
MPI: Multidimensional Poverty Index
MtСО2eq: Million Tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
NAP: National Adaptation Plan
NbS: Nature based Solutions
NDA: National Designated Authorities
NDC: Nationally Determined Contributions
Niti Aayog: NITI Aayog serves as the apex public policy think tank of the Governmentof India
NSOs: National Statistical Organizations
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCSD: Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
POSCO: POSCO (formerly Pohang Iron and Steel Company) is a South Korean steelmaking
PRA: Participatory Research Approach
RAN-API: National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (Indonesia)
REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, plus thesustainable
management of forests, and the conservation and enhancement offorest carbon stocks
RE: Reduced Emission
RES: renewable energy sources
RoK: Republic of Korea
SDG: Sustainable Development Goals also knowns as Agenda 2030
SEI s: Stockholm Environment Institute
SFM: sustainable forest management
TBTTP: Ten Billion Tree Tsunami Programme
UK: United Kingdom
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
USA: United States of America
USD: United States Dollar
VNR: Voluntary National Reviews
WTO: World Trade Organization
WWF: World Wide Fund for Nature

Contact
Asia Development
Alliance (ADA)

https://ada2030.org/+91-965-4440441
info@ada2030.org