Contemporary

India Forum
Quarterly Review

No.41

現代インド・フォーラム

2019 年 春季号

https://www. japan-india. com/

日印文化交流小史 ～知られざる特性と絆
History of Cultural Interactions: Lesser Known Features and Links
Dr. Ashok Jain (President of Mombusho Scholars Association of India (MOSAI),
President of Society for Promotion of Science and Society Studies)
アショック・ジェイン(日本文部省元留学生インド同窓会会長)

２０１９年下院総選挙を控えた印内政状況
Indian Domestic Political Situation towards the General Elections 2019
杉本 昭男 (在インド日本大使館二等書記官)
Akio Sugimoto (Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi)

韓国から見た日印関係
Japan-India Relations from the Perspective from South Korea

Dr. Rajiv Kumar (HK Research Professor, Institute of Indian Studies,

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
ラジーヴ・クマール（韓国外国語大学校インド研究所 研究教授）

公益財団法人 日印協会

The Japan-India Association

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件名｢現代インド･フォーラムについて｣と、明記願います。
現代インド･フォーラム

第 41 号

2019 年 春季号

発行人 兼 編集人

2019 年 4 月 1 日発行

平林 博

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現代インド研究センター

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History of Cultural Interactions: Lesser Known Features and Links
日印文化交流小史 ～知られざる特性と絆
President of Mombusho Scholars Association of India (MOSAI),
President of Society for Promotion of Science and Society Studies
日本文部省元留学生インド同窓会会長
Ashok Jain
アショック・ジェイン

Abstract: The paper is an analysis of cultural interactions between India and Japan
during the period from eighth century AD to nineteenth century AD. These interactions havebeen succinctly summarised in the opening paragraph of History of Japanese-Indian
Relations on Ministry of External Affairs (MOFA) web site as ‘Indian culture, filtered throughBuddhism, has had a great impact on Japanese culture and thought, and this is the source of
the Japanese people's sense of closeness with India’. The objective of the paper is to seek someunderstanding of processes and agencies that enabled Indian culture to filter throughBuddhism, and make the stated ‘great impact’ on Japanese culture and become a source of‘sense of closeness’.

The aim of analysis is to decipher distinctive features of processes andagencies that made their functioning effective. It is noted that the aim of the programme‘enhancing people-to-people contacts (an important component of India-Japan bilateralprogramme)’ is also to create a ‘sense of closeness’ and, therefore, the findings of analysis may
inform that programme too.

【要旨】本稿は、8世紀から19世紀までの期間を通じての日印文化交流について分析するものである。こうした交流については、外務省ウェブサイトに掲載されている日印関係史の最初のパラグ
ラフにおいて、「インドの文化は仏教の浸透を通じて日本の文化・思想に対して多大な影響をもたらしており、このことが日本人のインドへの親近感の源泉になっている」と簡明に要約されている。本稿の目的は、仏教を通じてインドの文化を浸透させ、それによって日本の文化にまさに「多大な影響」をもたらし、さらには「親近感」の源泉をなしたプロセスと担い手についての理解を深めることにある。ここでの分析の主眼は、そうしたプロセスと担い手を有効に作用させた特徴を抽出することにある。留意されるべきは、「人的交流の促進」プログラム（日印二国間プ
ログラムの重要な構成要素）もまた、「親近感」をもたらすことを意図したものであり、それ故、ここでの分析結果はそうしたプログラムに息を吹き込むことにもなるかもしれないということである。

I .Introduction

Dialogues between India and Japan usually begin by referring to historical connect
between the two countries going back to initial contacts through Buddhism in 8th century AD.
The preamble to Japan-India relations on the web site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF) of
Japan formulates the historical connect as: -‘Indian culture, filtered through Buddhism, has had a great impact on Japanese culture
and thought and this is the source of Japanese people’s sense of closeness to India’.
The above formulation evokes an enquiry into the following questions:
How did Indian Culture starting with initial contacts of Japan with India throughBuddhism create an impact on Japanese Culture? What were the channels that facilitatedpermeation of impact in Japanese culture?
This article attempts to provide some insights into the above questions by analysing
information on history of cultural interactions between India and Japan contained in i) Seriesof lectures on India -Japan Relations delivered in New Delhi and Chennai (hereafter referred
to as Lecture Series)i and ii) papers presented by international scholars on Lesser Known
India-Japan linkages at a recently organised conference in New Delhi. ii Both events wereorganised on special occasions, the former during the Japan-India Friendship Year and thelatter to mark the 50 years of Mombu-kagakusho (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology) Scholarship in India.
The relevance of the article based on historical information to contemporary programmes
through which India-Japan relations are rapidly expanding may be mentioned. Several
bilateral programmes are being carried out. Enhancing ‘people-to-people contacts’ is one of theimportant programmes. Strengthening of closeness amongst people is often articulated as theaim of this programme. Insights from analysis of past cultural interactions that are statedto act as ‘source of closeness’ may thus provide useful inputs to the current programme of‘people-to-people contacts’ aimed

at strengthening closeness.

II. Sense of Closeness: the Buddism Connect: Japan’s Protohistory Period

Though initial contacts of Japan with India through Buddhism are well-known andresearched, a somewhat detailed description of this period is given in Sections 1 and 2 to bringout special features in the history of that period.

1. The Connect and Its Spread effectWide spread adoption of Buddhism in Japan and the emergence of an image of India
amongst Japanese people can be traced to policies adopted by Emperor Shomu (enthroned in724) of Nara Period. The Emperor, to rescue his people from miseries and to take the nation
forward towards prosperity, adopted the Buddhist ideology and code of conduct based on asynthesis of two main Buddhist Sutras, the golden light sutra meant for the ruling class andthe decorated flower sutra meant for prosperity of all life forms, people, animals and flora andfauna. The synthesised form of Sutra (the Lotus Sutra)iii and its commandments were to
guide the behaviour of common man, the ruling class and the Emperor himself. Under the
court-sponsored Buddhism, temples were built across the country, including one at Todaiji
Temple in Nara, for monks and nuns to study Sutras and spread its message. To impart deepand correct knowledge of Sutras to them, the Emperor assigned Japan’s emissaries andpriests sent to China to seek a high-ranking priest with deep knowledge of Sutras. (Buddhism
had by then spread in China).

They located Bodhisena, a 33-year-old priest from southernparts of India who had acquired
requesteddeep knowledge of Sutra in India. Bodhisena wasto visit Japan and he sailed from China in 736. On reaching Japan, he was madehead of the working team to construct Todaiji with complete command on the priests. In 743,
by an imperial proclamation, a giant statue of Lord Buddha was constructed in Todaiji. The
construction started in 745 and was completed in 752.
Bodhisena was accorded the privilege of performing the eye-opening ceremony of thestatue of Lord Buddha on September 752.
Bodhisena remained in Japan until his death in 760 and taught philosophical thoughts of
Sutras and Prakrit to the Temple disciples.
Japanese people during that period did not know India as a geographical country (thatunderstanding came much later)iv. They associated Bodhisena and Buddhism to a land where
Buddha was born. As Bodhisena came from that holy ‘land’ and was accorded the honour of
performing the eye-opening ceremony, the land of Buddha caught the popular imagination ofmasses; attraction to the land of Buddha had generated seeds of emotional admiration to
Tenjiku (ancientname of India, in Japan) .

2. Rooting of Sense of Closeness: Image of Land of Buddha (India) amongst Japanese.
During the long years of construction of Todaiji Temple and the Great Buddha, over 2.6
million Japanese were involved (50% of Japan’s population). Over ten thousand Priests
attended the eye-opening ceremony. Traditional Japanese musical and dance performances aswell as performances from other regions of Buddha followers such as China, Central Asia,
Korea were held.
Building on the large-scale spread of emotional affinity to Buddhism, a structured
approach was adopted for unraveling all aspects of Buddhist knowledge and philosophy.
Gradually, Todaiji Temple with around 1000 disciples from all over Japan emerged as a mostvibrant centre of learning for various aspects of Buddhism and also logics, Japanese Language,
and knowledge systems that, in modern terms, relate to science, engineering, architecture,
medicine etc. In a sense, Todaiji Temple became what we now call a University. Other
temples created across Japan also became teaching and education centres. Thus educatedpeople spread in Japanese society and engaged themselves in all types of occupations.
As their teaching and learning derived from ethos of Buddhism-oriented thought andphilosophy (often called spiritualist), Buddhism and the land of Buddha (Tenjiku) got
embedded in them. Almost every one carried a feeling of closeness and affinity to Tenjiku andits people.

3. Summary
In summary during this period, an image of the land where Buddha was born and where
people had adopted knowledge of Sutras for happiness and prosperity spread amongst thepeople of Japan. In a subtle way, an emotional link and a sense of closeness of Japanesepeople to Buddha’s land and its people took roots in Japan.

Importantly, the sense of closeness to Tenjiku was nurtured and spread by temples andpriest-scholars , which encouraged a large scale involvement of people in an emotional activityof construction of Great Buddha and the eye opening ceremony.

III. Intellectual Nourishing of the Roots (Closeness): Ancient Period
To further strengthen political authority of the emperors, Confucianism was harnessedalong with Buddhism. A new capital was set-up in Nara. More cultural and technicalinfluences came from outside, mainly from China. As time passed, the stability of social andpolitical structure came under strain, and as an attempt to restore order, a new capital wasestablished under the name Heiankyo (Capital of Peace and Tranquillity) at a place that
subsequently became known as Kyoto. A period of tranquillity followed.
This ‘tranquil’ period (Heian period 794-1185) was ripe for the flourishing of an elegant
culture along with intellectual pursuits.
It is under this environment, one can conjuncture, that the philosophical aspects ofspiritual thoughts prevalent in society received attention of Japanese priest-scholars andthinkers.
Following references in literature may be mentioned as manifestations of these
intellectual pursuits: 

Visits of

Recognition in Japan of a strong Vedic tradition and philosophy in India (often called

Japanese monk-scholars to places of learning like Nalanda in India

Hinduism) along with sects of Buddhism.
Reflections of legends of Indian gods and goddesses in images of idols worshiped in
Japan



Influences on Indian religious rituals and practices in Shinto shrines and Buddhist
temples

Influence of Sanskrit on Japanese syllabary and vocabulary

The intellectual pursuits at temples facilitated creative and selective amalgamation ofIndianreligious and philosophical thoughts with related practices in Japan’s own Buddhist

and Shinto thinking and practices. And teaching centres spread the amalgamatedunderstanding amongst people.

The intellectual nourishment strengthened and deepened

the already existing spiritual and emotional bonding and sense of closeness of Japanesepeople with the ‘land of Buddha’.

IV. Closeness through Culture: Textiles, Arts and Crafts:
Period

1. Facilitating Conditions in Japan

Early Modern

During this period, opening up of sea routes and other changes in Japan diversified thescope of interactions between Indian and Japanese cultures. Conditions in Japan that wereconducive for diversification and cultural interactions may be briefly noted:

Expansion of Indian Ocean routes linked India to Southeast and East Asia and Europe
and through these to Japan

A desire amongst Japan’s powerful nobility and the rich emerged for grandeur, novelty,
and variety in attire material and for openness to products from outside.

Consequent emergence of a merchant class engaged in expansion of commerce andtrade in cities around Edo, Osaka, Kyoto (in addition to those in Ruykyu group ofislands).

2. Textile:(1) Sarasav
Presentation made in New Delhi Conference relating to Indian hand-painted cotton fabriccalled Sarasa in Japan is

an example of cultural interactions through textile.

The Dutch merchants who had established trade connections with India and Japanbrought Indian hand-painted cotton cloth painted in various designs from markets inIndonesia to Japan. Fascinated by exotic colours of the fabric, masters of tea ceremony used
these as wrappers (furoshiki) in tea ceremony utensils in pouches for tea containers. Due tocottons’ comfort in summer, tailors used the fabric for making short-sleeved coats. Market
for Sarasa expanded in Japan and in response, the Dutch trained artists /artisans in Petapoeli(India) in painting Japanese style designs on Indian cotton. Taking note of the popularity ofSarasa, Japanese designers

tried imitating Sarasa but in the absence of knowledge,

without success. However, using Japanese dyeing techniques, they innovated a way of making
Sarasa-like fabric ‘Wasarasa’ or Japanese Sarasa. In due course, Kyoto and Osaka emerged as
centres of commercial production of fabric.
It may be noted that Sarasa was also used extensively in several East and South-East
Asian countries.
(2) Indigovi
India was known for cultivation of Indigo and its use for dyeing cotton. Indigo as dyeing
material was used in several East and South East Asian countries. Development of making
indigo-dyed cloths, glossy and waterproof, had led farmers in Japan to use it for making
umbrellas and because of its flame-resistant quality, the cloth was also used by fire fighters inJapan. Indigo was also used for dyeing paper and the covers of the religious books as aprotection from moth.
Indigo had also entered into life styles of people in East and South East Asia andcontinues to be so.

(3) Craftvii
With reference to cultural interactions through ‘craft techniques’, a lesser known example
of reverse cultural flow from Japan to India was mentioned in the New Delhi Conference. It
was reported that expensive lacquered-decorated items such as shields used in battle fields
and palanquin were brought from Japan to India during the 17th century by Dutch traders.
They were made by artisans in Japan exclusively for Indian elites and aristocrats.

In summary, as hand printed or handmade products (crafted products) and techniques ofnatural dyes necessarily were embedded, internalised or personalised form of cultural
specificities of societies where items are made and used (unlike industrial products), they
indirectly create a sense of closeness between peoples of producing and using societies.

V. Contacts through Travellers:
By the 17th century, Japanese had started venturing to foreign shores including India.
Just two examples out of many available in literature are included to highlight a few featuresof cultural interactions.
Tokubei Tenjiku’s visit to India is one of the most well-known and extensively referred.
In New Delhi Conference, the following aspect of his visit was raised. viii
It was pointed out that up until the medieval and early modern periods, Japanese viewed
the whole world as consisting of three parts (a world view

called ‘Sangoku- Sekaikan’ orthree ‘country’ view), Honcho (their own country Japan), Shintan (China), and Tenjiku (India).
Japanese had by then recognised Shintan as a country outside Honcho, but the rest of theworld was associated with the land of Buddha and Buddhism called Tenjiku. When in 16 th
century Jesuit missionaries such as Francis Xavier arrived, he was initially called Tenjikujin(people of Tenjiku) and Christianity was considered as a sect of Buddhism.

As new

geographical information arrived with the Portuguese, the world view got modified asconsisting of five continents (not countries) which were Asia , Europe, Livia (Africa), America
and Magallanica.

This division of the world into continents was perhaps based on sea traderoutes.

The land until then imaged by people in Japan as of Tenjiku acquired identity of aseparate country ‘Indo’ in the Asian continent. The New Delhi Conference thus raises thefollowing important issue that may be worth researching further:

With what do people of Japan have a sense of closeness created through impact of Indianculture filtered through Buddhism on Japanese culture, with a land imaged as ‘Tenjiku or the
Nation state Indo/ India?

VI. Modernisation & Impact: Late 19th to Early 20th Century
1. Interactions in Technology
Two not so well-known cases presented in New Delhi Conference under the sub-theme ofSeismology and Architecture (in the session on Technology) are mentioned below as they bringout special features relating to creating closeness amongst people by appreciating andunderstanding mutual cultures.
(1)ix In 1897 Shillong, a city in North-Eastern part India was completely devasted byearthquakes (referred to in records as the 1897 Great Earthquake). The British Governmentof India invited experts like Dr Fusakichi Omori, Professor T. Nakamura and Dr T. Koyama
from Tokyo Imperial University (present University of Tokyo) to advise on post-earthquake
reconstruction of Shillong and again in 1905 for after-earthquakes in Kangra . Reports ofthese experts provided inputs to Japan’s Earthquake Prevention Committee (Shinsai Yobo

Chosakwai). This led to the introduction of a distinct type construction system called ‘AssamType’ in seismology-related literature and in practices of architects and builders. The term
‘Assam Type’ succinctly captures a deep sympathetic involvement of University scientists
with people of the region to understand theirliving culture under hard conditions; anunderstanding without which the construction system could not have been developed.
(2)x A Mission for Indian History and Archaeology at University of Tokyo required fieldstudies by Scholars for documenting in detail Dargahs (Islamic Structures) in Delhi City.
Surveys were conducted in 1959-60, 1961-62 and again in 2015 and 2018. This involved
understanding of changes over time in the living cultures of people coexisting with historicmonuments under compulsions of Government regulations on preservation of the latter.
Intensive interaction of experts with large number of people living in stressful conditions
generated a sympathetic and emotional closeness with that strata of society and its people.

The above examples are mentioned not as an example that usually would fall under‘technological’ cooperation but as an example of science and technology cooperation withspecial feature of cultural and emotional understanding between experts and common people.

2. Education during the Meiji Period
Japan envisaged India as an important partner in the resurgence of New Asia. After all,despite the political upheavals and changes, India was known for, in addition to possessing
unparalleled reservoir of spiritual wealth, its enormous economic wealth.

(for example in the

18th century India contributed about 24% to world economy xi ). As at that time, base ofprevailing understanding of India in Japan was mainly traditional temple-institutions, theMeiji government deemed it essential to re-study India using modern approaches in a modern
university.

As authentic sources on Indian philosophy and Buddhism on which India’s image

was built were mainly in Pali and Sanskrit, a chair in Sanskrit and Pail was established in1899 in Tokyo Imperial University. Subsequently as studies on multilingual andmulti-religious contemporary India were necessary, a chair of comparative religion in Tokyo
University was established in 1903 and Urdu was introduced in University of Foreign
Languages of Tokyo in 1911 and of Osaka in 1921.

Gradually interest of scholars instudying contemporary India expanded in more universities.

The importance of continued study and research on all aspects of India by scholars inJapanese Educational Institutions is recognised by Japanese government as a necessity.

VII. Reverse flow: from Japan to India
By late 19th century and up to mid 20th century (the period covered in this paper),impressed by Japan’s modernisation and military might demonstrated by its military
victories over China and then Russia, travels from India to Japan increased by Indianpolitical leaders, nationalists,business men and others. Important visits from India toJapan are mostly well known and considerable literature is available on them. Here It isconsidered sufficient to only point out that literature can be read and referred to in thefollowing contexts: 

India’s nationalistic effort for independenceIndustry and trade (economic context)Thoughts on development and modernisation (simply put: dominantly materialistic
and industrialised

or dominantly for ethical and universal harmony and peace)

Alignments for New Asia



Learning from Japan’s academic and education system

As role of scholars and educational institutions have emerged in the above sections asimportant in seeding a sense of closeness, a lesser known example of interactions in thecontext of learning from Japan’s education system was presented in New Delhi Conference
and summarised below: In 1922xii the State of Hyderabad, enthused by developments in Japan and attributing it
to a large extent to Japan’s education system, sent a mission to study Japanese education
system under Syed Ross Massod leadership. The purpose was to derive lessons for imparting
higher education in Osmania University (in the State) in vernacular language, like in Japan.
However, due to political compulsions and constrains of British rule, lessons learned fromJapan were not implemented. Understanding and learning of private university system inwhich Japan has good experience may be useful.

VIII. Conclusions from the Past
Sense of closeness of Japanese people to India took roots and flourished for centuries (from8th century to about early 19th century) without direct people-to-people contacts between
Indians and Japanese. Therefore, relationship of people-to-people contacts with sense of
closeness is not clear. Contacts through tourism do not involve personalised interaction in an
open and free environment and hence do not generate ‘closeness’ nor is tourism meant topromote closeness’. The motivation of tourists is mainly enjoyment and to see another country.
And for receiving people, it creates county’s awareness amongst people

and economic

returns.

Trade in hand-crafted products (as opposed to industrially-manufactured products)
indirectly generates a subtle sense of closeness of the user towards the craftsmen or maker ofthe product. Several Japanese scholars through their almost life-long studies on India haveplayed a critical role in creating sustainable sense of closeness to India amongst Japanese.
Such scholars are little known to Indians. They need high recognition. Science and technology

programmes that involve interaction with common people to acquire understanding of culture
promotes emotional bonding.

(1st April, 2019)

Path from India – Path from Japan: Lecture Series on Japan -India Relations. Lecturesdelivered by scholars from Japan and India in New Delhi and Chennai during the India Japan
Friendship Year 2007, Complied by Sengaku Maeda. English translation of book by
Shuppan Sinsha 2008 published by Northern Book Centre, New Delhi
ii New Delhi Conference. India-Japan: Unearthing Lesser Known Linkages, New Delhi
November 15-17, 2018
iii Lotus Sutra is specifically mentioned here as it has an estimated 150,000 followers in India
and the number is growing. This is an indication that the one sees a reverse flow of a version
of Buddhism from Japan to India. This may indicate that Japan has over the years Japan
internalised Buddhism so deeply that it now ready to announce ownership of its version
Nichiren.
iv Historically, new Geographical Information of the world as we know it today reached Japan
in parts starting with through the Portuguese in the 16th century
v Yasuruha Oyama: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 2
vi Padmani Tolat Balaram: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 7
vii Timon Screech: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 3viii Takahiko Ishizaki: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page16
ix Anuradha Chaturvedi: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 19
x Naoko Fukami: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 18
xi Angus Maddison: Historical Statistics of World Economy: 1-2003 ADi

xii

Sushila Narsimhan: New Delhi Conference, Abstracts: page 13

Bio-brief

Dr. Ashok Jain

Dr. Ashok Jain obtained a PhD degree in Physics
from University of Delhi and been a researcher atUniversity of Kyoto as Mombusho Scholar, Universityof Bristol, U.K. as Commonwealth Scholar andInternational Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste,
Italy, as a visitor.
He was Science Attaché, Indian Embassy, Tokyo,
Director in the Ministry of Science & Technology,
Government of India and retired as Director of National Institute of Science
Technology and Development Studies (NISTADS), a multidisciplinary think tank on
interaction of science technology and society.
He has published over 150 research papers and edited several books. He is anelected Fellow of National Academy of Sciences, India and recipient of Emperor ofJapan’s medal. He is President of Mombusho Scholars Association of India (MOSAI)and of Society for Promotion of Science and Society Studies.

13

２０１９年下院総選挙を控えた印内政状況
Indian Domestic Political Situation
Towards the General Elections 2019
在インド日本大使館二等書記官
Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi
杉本 昭男
Akio Sugimoto

Abstracts: Narendra Modi-led BJP with its strong agenda for development
and reform swept the last general elections in 2014. Since then, Modi
government enjoyed wide and strong support of the electorate, and held 19
state governments in the country at one time. However, BJP lost 3 major stateelections held in December 2018. It is generally considered that BJP would
have quite tough fights in the coming general elections due to be held from
April to May this year.
And then,” Pulwama terror attack” took place by cross-border terrorists
from Pakistan-occupied Kashimir. This attack and following military
encounters between India and Pakistan have turned the relations between
India and Pakistan into heavy strains, which may gravely affect the coming
general elections in India.

はじめに
本年 4 月から 5 月にかけて連邦下院総選挙が実施される。前回 2014 年では、モディ首相率いるインド人民党（BJP）が、ガバナンスの強化等を掲げ、汚職問
題等で国民の支持を失っていた国民会議派（コングレス党、以下国民会議派と表記）を破り、単独過半数を獲得する歴史的大勝を飾った。その後も BJP は高い支持を受け、主な州議会選挙で勝利を続け、2018 年 3 月には、北東部の 3 州で勝利し、29 州と 7 連邦直轄地のうち地域政党との連立政権含め、19 州で州政権を握るに至った。
しかしながら、昨年 12 月に実施された 5 州議会選挙において、主要 3 州で政権を失うという結果に終わり、モディ首相のカリスマ性の陰りも指摘さ れ、次期下院総選挙は、BJP にとって決して楽観視できるものではなくなっていると見ら14れていた。
このような状況の中、2 月にインド北西部のジャンム・カシミール州プルワマ
において、パキスタンに拠点を置くイスラーム武装勢力ジャイシェ・ムハンマド（JeM、「ムハンマドの軍隊」の意）により 40 人以上のインド治安部隊が死亡する
爆弾テロが発生した。これに対し、インド軍がパキスタン領内のテロ組織施設を
空爆、さらに報復としてパキスタン戦闘機がインド戦闘機を撃墜したことで、イ
ンドとパキスタンの関係は十数年来経験しなかったような緊張状態となった。これにより、総選挙情勢はまた大きく変化の様相を見せている。

I．ラジャスタン州等 3 州議会選挙
1．選挙結果概要
はじめに、昨年末にラジャスタン州、マディヤ・プラデシュ州、チャッティー
スガル州、テランガナ州、ミゾラム州、5 州で実施された州議会選挙を振り返ってみたい。各州における獲得議席数は表のとおりである。
表: 2018 年 12 月州議会選挙結果※選挙管理委員会発表のデータをもとに執筆者作成。括弧内の数値は前回選挙からの増減数。

（注）括弧内の数値は前回選挙からの増減数。
（出所）選挙管理委員会発表のデータをもとに執筆者作成。

15

2．BJP の敗因
5 州議会選挙結果の特徴として、5 州の内 4 州で政権が交代したことが挙げられる。ラジャスタン州及びミゾラム州における定期的に政権交代が起こる伝統的な傾向、マディヤ・プラデシュ州及びチャッティースガル州における 15 年という長期政権に対し変化を求める感情が強く作用したことが今回の選挙結果の大きな要因と考えられる。ヒンディー・ハートランドとも呼ばれ、BJP の支持基盤の強いラジャスタン州、マディヤ・プラデシュ州、チャッティースガル州、3 州全てにおいて BJP が州政権を失う結果となったのも、各州それぞれにおいて変化を求めた民意が示された結果と考えられる。
一方において、これらの州に共通する要因も挙げられる。モディ政権による道路、電力網等のインフラ政策、住宅整備、トイレの普及、調理用ガス設備の支給等の農村部における堅実な発展政策は評価を得ているものの、農作物の価格低迷
や中間業者による搾取構造の改革の遅れにより収入が増加していない農民は 不満を抱えている。事実、この不満を解消できていないとされる BJP は農村部で広く票を失った。なお、農民の不満の燻りは、2017 年 12 月にモディ首相の牙城であるグジャラート州議会選挙で、BJP が過半数を維持するも議席を減らして以来指摘されてきていた。
BJP は、大勝した前回州議会選挙と比較し、ラジャスタン州農村部では 6．8％
減の 36.9％、マディヤ・プラデシュ州農村部では 3.6％減の 39.6％と、両州全域で軒並み得票率を落とした。加えて、BJP は、都市部における得票率も落とした。
前回に比較し、ラジャスタン州で 14.9％減の 39.8％（前回は 54.7％）、マディヤ・
プラデシュ州で 6．7％減の 47.2％（前回は 53.9％）（数値はヒンドゥー紙によるもの）となっており、両州の農村部における得票率下落の 2 倍の下落率が記録された。BJP の伝統的な支持層である中小企業者は、旧高額紙幣廃止や物品サービ
ス税（GST）導入によりダメージを受けたとされ、雇用機会不足に苦しむ若者の不満もあり、BJP が都市部において大方の予想よりも大きく票を失うことにつながったと見られる。

3．国民会議派の取り込み戦略
国民会議派は、農業債務の即時免除、電気料金の 50％値下げ、雇用創出等の公約を掲げ、不満を持つ州民の票の取り込みを図った。ラジャスタン州及びマディ
ヤ・プラデシュ州においては、選挙を決定付ける程の効果があったとまでは言い難いまでも公約の効果が一定程度認められ、また、チャッティースガル州においては投票直前に農民債務免除の公約を掲げたことが、国民会議派の勝利に大きく16寄与したと見られる。国民会議派のポピュリスト的な公約は、全般的に功を奏したと言えよう。

4．得票率は僅差
以上のような要因により BJP はこれら州議会選挙で議席を減らすこととなったが、ラジャスタン州及びマディヤ・プラデシュ州においては、過半数には僅かに至らなかったものの第一党となった国民会議派と BJP の得票率の差は、ラジャ
スタン州で 0．4％、マディヤ・プラデシュ州で 0.1％という非常に僅差であった。
僅差で勝敗の分かれた選挙区が多い中、主に BJP 政権への不満を示すと見られる「支持候補なし」（NOTA＝none of the above）票がラジャスタン州で 2.0％、マディヤ・プラデシュ州で 1.4％を占め、接戦の勝敗に小さからぬ影響を及ぼした。

II．3 州議会選挙以降の動向
1．国民会議派及び地域政党の動き
上記州議会選挙の結果は、それまで強者 BJP の一方的な勝負であるとの見方が多かった下院総選挙が、BJP にとって決して楽観視して良いものではないことを示した。一方、3 つの大規模州の政権を獲得し、存在感を大幅に増強したばかりでなく豊かな資金源を得て党勢の回復に大きな弾みをつけた国民会議派は、待望論の強かったカリスマ性の高いプリヤンカ・ガンジー（ラーフル総裁の妹）の国
民会議派幹事長、ウッタル・プラデシュ州選挙責任者就任、貧困層対象のベーシ
ック・インカム導入の約束等を矢継ぎ早に発表した。
また、各地域政党の動きも更に活発化しつつある。インドの各州の中で下院での最大議席定員数（80 議席）を有するウッタル・プラデシュ州では、長年の宿敵同士であった大衆社会党（BSP）及び社会主義党（SP）が国民会議派を排した連合を発表した。西ベンガル州の全印草の根会議派（AITC）主催の大規模野党集会には 20 以上の主だった野党が参加した。テランガナ州のテランガナ民族会議（TRS）とアンドラ・プラデシュ州の YSR 国民会議派（YSRCP）は、BJP も国民会議派も排した第三勢力による連合組織のための協力をして行くことで一致した。
国民会議派は、アンドラ・プラデシュ州におけるテルグ・デサム党（ TDP）との連合、デリー準州における庶民党（AAP）との連合の否定、ラーフル総裁の上
記 AITC 主催の大規模集会欠席等、各地域政党と一定の距離を置き、独自に選挙を戦う姿勢を強めた。国民会議派の 3 州議会選挙勝利は、国民会議派の野党諸派への妥協姿勢を弱めたところがあり、国民会議派と野党諸派が足並みを揃えた強17

力な反 BJP 連合の成立を却って困難にしたとの見方もある。

2．BJP の選挙戦略
BJP は、州政権を失った 3 州に加え、ウッタル・プラデシュ州、グジャラート
州等、前回 2014 年に大勝し飽和状態とも言える議席数を保有する州で不可避とされる議席減の抑制を図り、さらには、伸びしろのある北東部、西ベンガル州、
オディシャ州等での議席増に注力している。BJP は、3 州議会選挙で示された有権者の反発を解消するため、様々な方策を打ち出した。農民及び小規模事業主の不満の解消を迫られているモディ政権は、農民対策、中低所得者層の支持拡大を目指し、下院総選挙前の暫定予算案は新規政策を含まないという慣例を破り、 2
月 1 日、低所得農民への年 6,000 ルピーの直接支給、非組織部門労働者への年金制度の創設、所得減税や控除拡大等、選挙を意識した広範な経済政策を含む暫定予算案を発表した。また、BJP の伝統的な支持基盤である上位カースト内に燻る、下位カースト優遇の留保制度に対する反発を解消するため、上位カースト内の経済的弱者に対する留保枠を新設する憲法改正を行った。さらには、 アヨーディヤ
問題の審理を先送りにする最高裁の姿勢を受け、治安維持のために収用されていた係争地周辺の土地をヒンドゥー教団体含む所有者に返還する請願を最高裁に 提出した。ラーマ寺院建設を後押しする姿勢を明確にすることで、ヒンドゥー至上主義団体であり BJP の支持母体である民族義勇団（RSS）の支援を固めることにも成功した。
それでも、なお、国民会議派の復調や各地域政党等による野党連合の形成の活発な動きに加え、モディ首相の求心力の低下が指摘され、BJP が総選挙において相当苦戦すると見られていた。この時点では、BJP の予想獲得議席数は全 545 議席中 200 議席程度との見方が多く、200 議席を割り込むようであれば、モディ首相の退陣或いは野党連合による政権樹立もあり得ると見る向きもあった。

Ⅲ．選挙情勢を一変させたプルワマにおけるテロ事件
上記のような状況の中、2 月 14 日にジャンム・カシミール州プルワマにおいて、ジャンムからスリナガルに移動中だった治安部隊の車列に爆発物を搭載した車両が突撃するテロ事件が発生、犠牲者は 16 州の出身者 40 名以上にのぼった。犯行声明を出した JeM 及び JeM の拠点となっているパキスタンに対する激しい反発
が北インドを中心に起こり、政府による強硬な対応を求める声が高まる中、26 日にモディ政権がパキスタン国内のテロリスト拠点への空爆を実施した。強い指導者、モディ首相への強い支持を表す国内世論が巻き起こった。
総選挙を約 2 ヶ月後に控えたタイミング発生したプルワマにおけるテロ、及び18

モディ政権による対応は、BJP の苦戦が予想された選挙情勢を一変させるものとなった。BJP は、それまで攻防ラインと見られていた 200 議席よりも相当数多くの議席を獲得することになると現時点で見られている。空爆後に India TV-CNX
がウッタル・プラデシュ州において実施した世論調査では、プルワマ以前の調査結果と比較して BJP の大幅な議席拡大の可能性が示されている。

Ⅳ．今後の注目点
1．BJP
BJP は、プルワマにおけるテロによって沸き起こった強いナショナリズムの大波に乗って、モディ首相の強いリーダーシップのイメージを最大限活用しヒンドゥー教徒票を固め、支持の維持強化を進めて行くことが想定される。同時に、モディ政権は、パキスタンに対する強硬姿勢を貫きつつも、印パ対立が拡大し過ぎて各国からの批判を浴びたり、国内における宗教間対立が深まり大きな混乱を招いたりする事態にならぬように慎重な舵取りも求められる。インド軍による空爆
以降もパキスタン軍による空爆や両国戦闘機の撃墜、地上部隊の小規模な衝突等のニュースが継続しており、引き続き注視が必要である。

2．野党と大連合
プルワマにおけるテロによって一変した選挙情勢は、国民会議派を含めた野党
各党の選挙戦略、動向にも影響を与えるものと見られる。
国民会議派は、再び窮地に立たされることとなったとも言え、3 州議会選挙での勝利後に強めていた自党主導の方針を転換し、各地域政党と足並みを揃えた野党大連合の形成を目指す可能性もある。
他方、各地域政党が、国民会議派との大連合を目指し BJP と徹底抗戦するのか、
再度一方的な強者となったと目される BJP への迎合姿勢に傾いて行くのかも注目される。モディ政権は、かねてから問題とされてきたプリヤンカ・国民会議派
幹事長の夫であるヴァドラ氏の海外不動産に係る資金洗浄疑惑、西ベンガル州のAITC による汚職疑惑に加え、ウッタル・プラデシュ州の BSP 及び SP の汚職疑
惑、ハリヤナ州における国民会議派の汚職疑惑捜査等もそれぞれ強化してきている。モディ政権による強い追求から逃れるためにも選挙前あるいは選挙後に BJPに近寄る地域政党が出てくる可能性も排除されない。

おわりに
19

上記のとおり昨年末の州議会選挙の結果を踏まえ、現時点での下院総選挙情勢を述べたが、実のところインドでの選挙予測は非常に困難であり、特に投票直前の数日間で選挙動向が大きく変化する傾向が強いとされる。当地各機関が実施する世論調査や出口調査も大きく外れることが多い。プルワマにおけるテロのように、一つの事件、一つのイシューが選挙情勢を劇的に変化させる可能性も常に存在し選挙の行方を予断することはできない。投票完了までの今後約 2 ヶ月間で、周辺国との関係等対外イシュー、ヒンドゥー・ムスリム等宗教イシュー、各地域
やカースト等民族イシュー、原油価格等経済イシュー等、選挙に影響を与えうる
様々な動きに引き続き注視していく必要がある。
総選挙終了後の 5 年間は、日本にとっても世界にとっても益々重要性を増すイ
ンドの行方を決定する非常に重要な 5 年間である。インドの人々が国の舵取りをどのような政権に委ね、その政権が何を目指すのか。総選挙とインドの行方は、引き続き注目すべきところである。

(2019 年 4 月 1 日)

執筆者紹介

杉本 昭男（すぎもと・あきお）

在インド日本大使館二等書記官。
早稲田大学第一文学部哲学科東洋哲学専修卒。
1999 年より約 20 年間にわたり、インド在住。インド
国立バナラスヒンドゥー大学（BHU）文学部ヒンディー語学科アドバンスディプロマ修了。BHU にて外国
語 学 科 非 常 勤 講 師 を 務 め つ つ 、 2001 年 J A I
COLLABORATIONS Pvt. Ltd.（ヴァラナシ）を設立。
2016 年より任期付き職員として現職を務め、インド国
内政治分析や国会議員交流等を担当している。
＜著書＞『インドで「暮らす、働く、結婚する」』2010 年

20

ダイヤモンド社

Japan-India Relations from the Perspective from South Korea
韓国から見た日印関係
HK Research Professor, Institute of Indian Studies, Hankuk Unive rsityof Foreign Studies
韓国外国語大学校インド研究所研究教授
Dr. Rajiv Kumar
ラジーヴ・クマール

Abstract: South Korea is closely observing the upward trajectory ofJapan-India relations as many regional issues which are driving them are also
affecting South Korea’s strategic thinking. One of the major factors that has
influenced South Korea’s shifting attitude toward regional issues is China’s
rising power and its growing assertiveness. Indeed, China’s aggressive
posture toward the region, including the Korean issue, has compelle d Seoul to
re-calculate its strategy. This development has brought South Korea closer toJapan and India. It is evident as South Korea, like Japan and India, has
adopted a strategy to reject China’s assertiveness by promoting a rhetoric ofmaintaining of the existing rule-based order. Seoul is also shifting its stancetoward the Quad, an arrangement for cooperation among Japan, India, US
and Australia, by demonstrating a clear inclination toward this regionalgrouping. Equally significant, South Korea’s recent maritime strategy alsosuggests that Seoul is preparing itself to deals with its mighty neighbor,
China, by providing naval support to its allies in case of contingency. All thesedevelopments underlines that South Korea is moving closer to the democratic
alliance system in Asia, which includes Japan and India.

【要旨】韓国は、自国の戦略思考にも影響することから、地域的な諸問題がもた
らした日印関係の緊密化を注視している。韓国がこれら諸問題への対応を変化させている主因には、中国の勢力と自己主張の増大がある。実際のところ、中国が朝鮮半島などの地域に対して攻勢的なスタンスをとっているため、韓国はその対外戦略を再検討せざるを得ない。こうした状況が韓国の対日・対印接近の誘因で21

ある。韓国は、日印と同様、現行ルールに基づく秩序維持というレトリックを主張することで、中国の独断的な主張を拒否する戦略を明らかにとってきた。韓国
は、日印米豪の協力措置である4カ国枠組み(Quad）に明白に前向き姿勢を示すな
ど、Quadへのスタンスを変えつつある。加えて、最近の韓国海洋戦略、すなわち、韓国が有事に際しては同盟国に海洋支援を提供することによって、強大な隣国・中国への対処を始めつつあることは重要である。こうした新事態は、韓国が日印を含むアジアの民主主義同盟システムにより接近しつつあることを浮き彫りにしている。

I. Introduction
The upward trajectory in Japan-India relations in the recent decade isbeing closely observed by other powers in the region, including South Korea.
One of the major reasons behind this development is that many issues which
are driving Tokyo-New Delhi relations are also affecting Seoul’s foreign
relations with major powers. These issues include dealing with China’s
growing power and its assertiveness, maintaining the rule-based order (RBO)
in the region, securing the freedom of navigation (FON) and so on.
South Korea, which has been a strong pillar of the US-led security system
in Asia, is particularly paying keen attention toward the development ofbilateral and multilateral alignments in the region. This is because the policy
communities in Seoul believe that these emerging security dynamics will
directly influence the future direction of the Korean Peninsula security
dynamics and South Korea’s relations with the major powers. Accordingly,
South Korean government is closely examining regional security environmentand designing a new type of strategy to meet the new challenges, which inturn seems to be closer to Japan-India-led liberal alliance network.
Indeed, a new type of challenges are emerging in Asia as China’s power
and assertiveness are rising and directly affecting foreign policy strategies ofmany Asian powers, including South Korea. As this article will show, South
Korea which remarkably improved its relations with China in the post-cold
war era and saw the rise of China as an economic opportunity until recently isshifting its stance: that is, Seoul now views the rising China as a threat for its
economic and national security. Accordingly, South Korean government is22

designing a new type of foreign policy which is closer to Japan-India-led
liberal democratic alliance in Asia.

II. Factors which Bring South Korea Closer to Japan-India-led
Liberal Order
One of the major factors that is bringing South Korea closer toJapan-India-led liberal order is South Korea’s shifting relations with China.
It is significant to note that after China’s economic retaliation policy over the
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) controversy between Beijing
and Seoul, South Korean policymakers now come to believe that their futurelies in strong relations with liberal countries in Asia, such as India. It isevident in the words of Trade Minister Kim hyun-chong, who openly said that
South Korea will seek to deepen its relations with India at the expense of its
relations with China, because Beijing has created serious problems for South
Korea over the THAAD issue. 1 Similarly, the government run-trade body,
KOTRA, has also announced that it will facilitate India-South Korea relations
to reduce its economic dependence on China as Beijing’s THAAD reta liation isa serious concern for South Korean economy. 2 Above all, South Korea’s top
business establishments are now in opinion that as Beijing’s assertiveness is
growing, their businesses are not safe in China and hence they should develop
relations with another regional power, India. 3
Equally significant, South Koreans are now more favorable toward Japan
than China, as China has begun to create problems for South Korea with its
economic power. It is important to mention that until recently, Japan has
consistently been South Koreans’ least favored country, with the exception of
North Korea.

However,suchsituationisnowchangingasChina’sassertiveness towards South Korea grows. It is evident in an opinion survey
published by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, whose major conclusion
underscores that “the favorability of China among South Koreans dropped
precipitously to a level even below to that of Japan’s.” 4 This deteriorating
perception was a result of Chinese retaliation against the deployment o f
THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, this report suggested. A group of scholars
and policymakers in Seoul are also of the opinion that South Korea should
enhance its relations with Tokyo, as China’s economic and military rise is23

steadily becoming a threat for South Korea. 5
The THAAD controversy is not the only issue which has influenced South
Korea’s changing relations with China vis-à-vis other major powers. Other
geopolitical issues have also provided an opportunity for South Korea to
re-calculate its relationship with China. For example, China’s open
demonstration of imperialist mindset, which China demonstrates by the claim
to the ancient North Korean Kingdom’s territory-Koguryo- as ancient Chinese
dynasty’s

territory, the declaration of a new Air Identification Zone (ADIZ)

which partially overlaps the zones of South Korea and Japan, and its
geo-political motivation to bring South Korea into China-led economicarchitecture including the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), hasdrastically changed South Korea’s positive view on China. According to asurvey conducted in 2006, only 41 percent of South Koreans considered China
as a threat. However, as China’s assertiveness grows, this situation hadchanged drastically in 2014’s survey, with 72 percent of South Koreansviewing China as a threat 6. What is more, most South Korean are also of theopinion that their future lies in strengthening its relations with the US -ledliberal order vis-à-vis China-led tributary system, as one survey suggests that
South Koreans’ consideration of the United States as future economic andsecurity partner has enhanced whereas China’s rate has significantly dropped(See figure 1).

24

Figure 1: South Korea’s Views on Most Important Country for its economy/security

ECONOMY
55.1

56.1

SECURITY
52.6

47.7

34.2

56.6
34.3

31.9

2015
US

2016

63.1

65

33.9

15.5

2014

60.6

2014

2018

10

11.6

2015

2016

US

China

6.9
2018

China

Source: Prepared by Author based on data from ASAN Institute for Policy Studies . 7

What is more, for the first time China has emerged as the top security
threat to South Korea. It is significant to note that North Korea for the longtime has been the top security threat for South Korea. However, as China’s istaking aggressive posture, it has now replaced North Korea as the biggest
security threat for South Korea. According to a survey by the Institute for
Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University, South
Koreans for the first time cited ‘China – not North Korea –as the biggest
threat to the Korean peace’. 8 Another crucial survey also found that China
has replaced North Korea as the most threatening country for South Korea 9.
In addition, some scholarly studies also suggest that the South Korea-China
relations have got into an unprecedented level of “new normal”, as Beijing has
adopted a hostile stance toward Seoul. 10
Against that background, there is an emerging debate in the country that
Seoul should develop its relations with the liberal countries in the region sothat South Korean security can be enhanced. This situation has led South
Korea to design a new type of strategy, which in turn seems to be closer toJapan-India-led liberal alliance network.

25III. South Korea’s New Regional Strategy: Moving Closer to Japanand India?
In the previous section, we have seen that how China factor is influencing
South Korea’s strategic thinking. Such development, in turn, is pushing South
Korea closer to Japan-India-led liberal order.

1. Rejection of Great Power Assertiveness and Emphasis on ASEAN
Centrality
South Korea has now adopted a strategy to reject rising great power
assertiveness of China and emphasizes on the existing rule-based order. It issignificant that both Japan and India, along with other like-minded partners,
are opposing China’s growing aggressiveness by promoting a rhetoric that
ASEAN should play a central role in the changing security environment in theregion. Hence, by stressing on ‘ASEAN centrality’ they are sending a clear
message to a revisionist China that no dispute or issue should be resolved
through unilateralism and that ASEAN’s role should not be marginalized. It
was evident when the 2018 meeting of Quadrilateral grouping comprising
India, Japan, Australia and the US stressed ASEAN’s centrality in theirIndo-Pacific visions. 11
South Korea has also designed a similar type of strategy to promote
ASEAN centrality in its foreign policy rhetoric. And, not surprisingly,
China-related fear is a major factor behind this move. For example, according
to one report by a government-run influential think-tank, Korea National
Defense Academy (KNDA), “due to China’s aggressive posture in its One Belt
One Road (OBOR) initiative and its offensive strategy in dealing with South
China Sea disputes, the ASEAN centrality has been drastically weakened inrecently years. 12 ” Accordingly, South Korean government should actively
promote the ASEAN centrality through its New Southern Policy, the reportsuggests. Other policy reports also raised concerns over the ASEAN centrality
in their policy recommendations for the Moon Administration. 13‘ASEAN centrality’ rhetoric also appears in South Korea’s bilateral andmultilateral diplomacy. For example, when President Moon embarked on an
official visit to Indonesia, which is also concerned about China’s rising26

assertiveness in the region, the South Korea-Indonesia Joint Declaration
underlined the ASEAN centrality issue. 14 This issue was also highlighted in a
recent summit meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi andSouth Korean President Moon Jae-in. What is more, South Korean
government extended its strong support for the ASEAN centrality at themultilateral forum such as the 20th Korea-ASEAN summit in Singapore lastyear. 15 All these developments show that South Korea is moving closer toJapan-India-led liberal order

2. Inclination toward the Quad
A close examination of South Korea’s emerging strategy in the region also
reveals that Seoul is now inclining towards the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (hereafter the Quad). One of the most significant developments
between Tokyo and New Delhi in recent times is that both countries areactively engaged in cooperation for the promotion of the Quad, a formation of
democratic countries in the region such as US, Japan, India and Australia.
South Korea, a democratic country and US’s ally in Asia, remains sidelined on
this issue.
However, as the China’s aggressiveness grows and the United States
becomes more supportive to the Quad, strategic discourses are emerging inSouth Korea whether Seoul should develop close relations with the Quadmembers. As one policy report suggests that President Trump’s Asia policy
will emphasize more on developing the Quad groping in future as China’s
aggressive maritime policy is become more apparent. In such a scenario,“South Korean government may participate in the Quad” provided that thissecurity body should be a multilateral security cooperation architecture,
rather than a military alliance containing China. 16
Besides, one recent report of a government-run think-tank, the Korea
Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) also argues that the emergence of the
Quad is a result of the United States’ diversifying bilateral security relationsin Asia beyond the traditional Hub-and-Spoke alliance system. Against thisbackground, South Korean government may strengthen its alliance with the
new security system to maintain the rule-based global order. 17 Even somegovernment officials also share the opinion that South Korea may align with27

the Quad. According to a release by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), South
Korean ambassador to India Shin Bongkil recently said in New Delhi that
“South Korea likes to join the India-US-Japan-Australia Quadrilateral in the
future 18.” His remarks came ahead of President Moon’s crucial visit to India.
South Korea’s recent new approach to India to deepen Seoul-New Delhi
strategic partnership can be seen in this regards. It is significant that theMoon Administration has announced that strengthening of South Korea-India
relationships is the top priority of its New Southern Policy (NSP). And, forthis reason, South Korean government has taken a number of steps toupgrade its relations with India. More importantly, as one study argues,‘China-related risks’ has played a key role in this new approach. 19 Taken all
together, it can be said that ‘China factor’ has pushed South Korea closer to
India and Japan.

3. Maintaining a Rule Based Maritime Order
There is no doubt that like in Japan and India, China's rise and its
growing maritime assertiveness are now viewed in Seoul with uncertainty andanxiety. As a result, South Korea takes a position that a rule based maritime
order (RBMO) is critical for its economic survival. Accordingly, South Korea is
expanding its maritime strategy and enhancing its footprint beyond
Northeast Asia. According to one MOFA release, Korean Government is of theview that it is critical to establish a rules-based order in the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean Region is an indispensable conduit for South Korea’s major
exports and energy imports. It is therefore clearly in the interests of South
Korea to join other countries to safeguard the peace and stability of theregion’. 20
Equally significant, amid the China’s growing maritime assertiveness,
South Korean government is now actively promoting principles such as
freedom of navigation and rule-based maritime order. In this regards, South
Korean government has decided to join emerging regional fora such as the
Indian Ocean Conference (IOC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOR A).
South Korea’s deepening interest in the Indian Ocean and its active
participation in the regional fora with democratic countries, including Japanand India, underline South Korean inclination towards the rule-based28

maritime order.
South Korea’s recent maritime strategy also suggests that Seoul ispreparing itself to the protection of the freedom of navigation in the region.
For example, a South Korean warship sailed closer to disputed islands in theSouth China Sea lastSeptember when there was escalation of operations by

US allies to challenge China’s aggression in Asian water. 21 What is more,amid the China’s growing assertiveness in South Korean water recent years,
South Korean government last year announced that the country for the firsttime is ready to build a blue-water naval fleet, capable of conducting global
operations. South Korea’s both actions underscore that Seoul is preparing
itself to deal with its powerful neighbor, China, and in doing so it may provide
support to its allies in case of contingency.

Ⅳ. Looking Ahead
So far we have seen that the China factor is pushing South Korea closer toJapan and India. It is evident in South Korea’s new approach toward theregion, which includes rejection of China’s assertiveness, inclination t oward
the Quad, and emphasis on the preservation of a rule-based order. Yet, it isimportant to mention that South Korea’s such approach is part of its‘soft-containment’ strategy amid the changing balance of power in the region.
And, for now, South Korea is unlikely to have a hard alignment with liberalalliance system in Asia, at least for two reasons.
First is economic concern. South Korea’s economic overdependence on
China will prevent Seoul from joining Japan-India-led grouping, calculatingthat China will adopt an economic retaliation policy to harm South Korean
economy, if Seoul joins the liberal democratic alliance in Asia. It is significant
that South Korea, as a trading nation, is heavily dependent on export
activities for its economic growth. And its total exports to China is higher
than its total exports to the democratic countries, including Japan, India andthe US combined (See Table 1). South Korea’s such economic dependency on
China compared to other liberal economy will hamper South Korea’s active
participation in liberal democratic alliance in Asia.

29

Table 1: South Korea’s Export to Major Powers in 2018 (in US$ Billion)
Country

Value

Proportion

Total

605

100

China (Including Hong Kong)

207

34.2

US

73

12

Japan

30

4.9

India

16

2.6

Source: Prepared by Author based on data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy(MOTIE).

The second reason is security. South Korea understands that China hasmore leverage with North Korea than any other nation. Hence, Beijing’s
cooperation is required for any meaningful solution for the Korean Peninsula,
including the North Korean nuclear issue. This situation will prevent Seoulfrom joining any liberal groping in the region as it may provide a pretext for
China to take a strong anti-South Korea stance on the Korean Peninsula issue.
Instead, Seoul will seek omni-directional diplomatic relations with all major
powers in the region to resolve its own issue. South Korea’s strategy toward
Japan and India is likely to evolve around this background.

(1st April, 2019)

1“Moon's trip seeks to turn India into 'next China' for S. Korea: official,”

Yonhap News Agency , 9 July 2 0 1 8.
July 9.
2“사드 보복' 중국 대신 13 억 인도시장 노린다… 코트 라 무역관 증설,” [THAAD

Retaliation causes South Korea to see India as alternative to China,
KOTRA will expend regional trade centers in India], Yonhap News Agency ,22 September 2017.
3

Rajiv Kumar, “South Korea’s New Approach to India,” ORF Issue Brief No.

263, October 2018.

30

Kim Jiyoon, John Lee and Kang Chunggku, “Changing Tides: THAAD and
Shifting Korean Publich Opinion toward the United States and China,” Issue
Brief, (Asan Institute of Policy Studies), March 3, 2017.
5 On this issue, Author has conducted a number of interviews in Seoul, South
Korea.
4

6

ASAN Institute for Policy Studies “동 북 아 질서 와 한중 관 계의 미 래 : 경 쟁 과협력 사 이”, [The Northeast Asian Order and the Future of Korea-China
Relations: Between competition and cooperation], July 3, 2014.
ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, “South Koreans and Their Neighbors
2018”, ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, March 2018.
7

8

Lee Jeong-ho, “China – not North Korea – is our biggest threat to peace,

South

Koreans

say”,

South

China

Morning

Post ,

October4,2018https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2166792/china -not-north-korea-our-biggest-threat-peace-south-koreans9“한국인 49.7% “최대 위협국 북한 아닌 중국,” [49.7% of South Koreans said: The

biggest threat is China- not North Korea] Hankook Ilbo , July 5, 2018
http://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201807031894787102
10

Sukhee Han, “사드갈등과 한·중관계의 신창타이( 新 常 态 ) - 외교·안보를중심으로 –“ [THAAD Controversies and Post-THAAD New Normal in
Korea-China Relations], Journal of East and West Studies, 30-1 (2018), pp.
63-81.
Bhagyashree Garekar, “Quad leaders stress Asean's centrality in theirIndo-Pacific visions,” November 17, 2018https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/quad-leaders-stress-aseans-centrality-in-their-indo-pacific-visions
11

12

Choe Wongi, “신남방정책의 전략적 환경과 추진 방향,” [Strategic Environment andFuture Direction of New Southern Policy] IFANS Focus, (Institute of Foreign
Affairs and National Security), June 29, 2018.
13

Lee Jaehyon “문재인 정부의 미래지향적 아세안 외교 정책 제안,”[Future-oriented

ASEAN Foreign Policy Proposal for the Moon Administration], Issue Brief(Asan Institute for Policy Studies), June 12, 2017.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, “한 - 인 도네 시 아 공 동 비전 성 명 ,”[Korea-Indonesia Joint Vision Statement], November 14, 2017,1431

http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_20053/view.do?seq=367354&srchFr=&srch
To=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&co
mpany_cd=&company_nm=&page=4
15 Association of Southeast Asian Nations “Chairman's Statement of the 20th
ASEAN-Republic of Korea Summit,” November 14, 2018 athttps://asean.org/storage/2018/11/ASEANROKSummitChairmanStatementFi
nal.pdf
16 Lee Daewoo, “미국 의 인 도 -태 평 양 전 락” [U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy],
Sejong Policy Brief (Sejong Institute), July 26, 2018.
17

Seol Inho, “트럼프 행정부 인도-태평양 전략의 전개방향과 시사점”, [Development

Direction

of

Trump

Administration’s

India-PacificStrategy

andits

Implications] KIDA Defense Issues & Analyses no 1740 (Korea Institute ofDefense Analysis), January 7, 2019.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, “신 봉 길 대 사 Indian Express인터 뷰 전면 기사 ,” [Ambassador Shin Bongkil’s Interview in Indian Express]
June 27, 2018
http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/in-ko/brd/m_2808/view.do?seq=1336958
19 Rajiv Kumar, “South Korea’s New Approach to India,” ORF Issue Brief No.
263, October 2018.
18

20

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, “Remarks by KNDA Chancellor

at Session on Peace of Second Indian Ocean Conference”, September 8, 2017.
“South Korean warship sails by disputed South China Sea islands”, Nikkei
Asian Review, September 28, 2018.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-Korean-warshi
p-sails-by-disputed-South-China-Sea-islands
2132

Bio-brief Dr. Rajiv Kumar
Dr.

Rajiv

Kumar

is

a

Research

Professor at Institute of Indian Studies,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies inSouth Korea. He has been an affiliate
scholar at the East-West Center in UnitedStates. Rajiv Kumar has a Ph.D. in
Political

Science

Sungkyunkwan

andDiplomacy

University.

He

from
has

conducted research on India’s Foreign policy, India-Korea relations, andKorean and East Asian Affairs and has widely published in various reputed
academic journals.

33